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Wisdom or Foolishness? A critical examination of Eberhard Jüngel’s theology of the cross

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Abstract

The theology of Eberhard Jüngel endeavours to rethink the being of God and how humanity comes by knowledge of God from the crucifixion of Christ. By focusing on the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, Jüngel proposes that a theology of the cross should be the basis of human knowledge of God as all can be said about the Trinity and christology must be said from the cross. As Jüngel holds that the humanity of Christ is the example and basis for humanity, the cross is also the source of information for Jüngel's theological anthropology. This thesis seeks to determine whether Jüngel's focus on the cross as the source of all theological knowledge results in a limited view of God, of Christ, and of humanity.

In order to do this, the thesis looks at the history and context of Jüngel himself and why he is interested in basing a theology on the cross. The thesis also looks at the history of critical engagement with Jüngel, and the conclusions that those works have come to. The history of the theology of the cross is explored, from its provenance in Luther through to its rise during and after the Second World War. After detailing the history of the cross Jüngel’s own particular formulation is explicated, alongside Moltmann and Sölle who were the main exponents of a theology of the cross in Germany. Having done so, the effects of Jüngel’s theology of the cross on christology, the doctrine of God, and on anthropology are detailed, and it is argued that Jüngel’s theology of the cross restricts the activity of the person of Christ and that this restriction contradicts his emphasis on the perichoretic union of the Trinity, as well as restricting human action to a creative passivity.

However, the thesis also explores the positive sides of Jüngel’s theology of the cross. Jüngel’s theology of the cross is the most theologically and philosophically rigorous of his time, and a theology of the cross is still needed as a normative control in theological thought. Furthermore, the thesis examines how Jüngel’s account of love can be used to advance his theology and repair some of the damage that the limits of his theology of the cross cause.
Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not been submitted for another degree or professional qualification. This thesis is approximately 97,000 words long.

Deborah L. Casewell

27th March 2015
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Reference Notes: Abbreviations and Translation


Becoming: Jüngel, Eberhard, God’s Being is in Becoming, trans J. Webster, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2001).


Mystery: Jüngel, Eberhard, God as the Mystery of the World (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988).


If a quotation is followed by a German title, then the translation is always mine. If the title is in English, then the quotation is from that edition.
For the message about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written,

“I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the discerning I will thwart.”

Where is the one who is wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, God decided, through the foolishness of our proclamation, to save those who believe. For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For God's foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength.

1 Corinthians 1:18-25 (NRSV)
Eberhard Jüngel’s theology is often characterised as complex and hard to access, especially in how the aim of his theology is to rethink the being of God in detailing how one comes to knowledge of God. Jüngel’s theology endeavours to detach God from metaphysics in line with the anti-metaphysical turn in German theology in the sixties, but to do so it must first come to terms with how the greatest metaphysical thinkers have shaped Christian thought. Jüngel wishes to achieve this through use of the death of God and a theology of the cross, through identifying a theology of glory and rethinking the being of God from the cross. The aim of this dissertation is first to investigate Jüngel’s wisdom in using the cross as the Grundprinzip of an entire theological system: to see whether an understanding of revelation based solely in the cross can support an entire theology; whether one can learn from the cross enough about the Trinity; about christology; and about anthropology; without sacrificing and inhibiting other parts of one’s theology. In short, whether a balanced theology can be achieved.¹ I regard Eberhard Jüngel as one of the greatest proponents of a theology of the cross in the twentieth century, and thus the task of this dissertation is to examine whether Jüngel’s theology of the cross can support his theological endeavours, or whether there is a need for a more expansionist theology of creation, love, the life of Jesus, and the indwelling of the Spirit.

I shall argue that what Jüngel endeavours to do theologically is undermined by the narrow nature of his doctrine of revelation. Jüngel sees that God is only revealed and fully known in the event of the cross. However, what is revealed on the cross often undermines or stands in conflict with what he wants to say about God as Trinity, about Christ’s role and nature, and about how humanity can act; especially considering Jüngel’s original dynamic writing about love. Moreover, Jüngel’s understanding of the cross and the death of God was formulated in a specific theological environment in

¹ To contextualise the need for balance, I shall note for example that in David Kelsey’s Eccentric Existence he sees that a systematic theology is formed of a triple helix, and must give equal stress to each strand: to create, to draw to eschatological consummation, and to reconcile. Kelsey sees that these are ‘the three inseparable but irreducibly distinct ways in which God relates to all else, which come together in the narrative logic of canonical stories that describe the content’. (David Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 914). Whilst Jüngel’s theology does give an account of each of these three strands, it shall become clear throughout this thesis that due to how Jüngel places the full revelation of God in the event of the cross that there is undue stress on one strand of this helix, which to the detriment of the others.
Germany created by the legacy of the Second World War and the situation of the Cold War, where there was a strong focus on reconciling God, death, and suffering, and where there was a stronger stress on atheism as a protest against the presence of evil. Having noted this critique, this study will evaluate the usefulness of Jüngel’s critique of metaphysics through the cross for a world that has shifted both in its understanding of the place and nature of atheism and of metaphysics and will also signal a ways forward within Jüngel’s own thought.

Biographical Note

Eberhard Jüngel was born on the 5th of December 1934 in Magdeburg, which was to become part of the German Democratic Republic. He was not raised in an especially religious household yet as he grew up he found that in that particular society the church was the one place where he felt truth could be spoken. This has deeply influenced his understanding of how the church engages with politics and its relation to the state, as this initial association of atheism with politics and finding the truth in church rather

2 Jüngel notes that ‘in my parental home religion was not discussed, and my desire to study theology met with the concerned astonishment of my mother and the resolute refusal of my father. To be sure, my mother had taught her children to pray, but she feared that the choice of the pastoral vocation would not exactly open up bright prospects for the future in the socialist society of the German Democratic Republic. We lived in Magdeburg on the Elbe, which even though it was conquered by the American troops in 1945 was handed over to the Red Army camped on the other side of the river. And my father had nothing but ridicule for the Christian faith. That I nevertheless held fast to my intention and finally even realized it certainly cannot be explained merely as the adolescent rebellion of a son against his father’s authority’. “Towards the Heart of the Matter” in Christian Century, http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=441, (accessed 26th November 2014). This is reiterated in an interview with SWR, where he says that ‘chez Jüngel religion was not discussed’. “Die hohe Kunst des Unterscheidens: Ein Porträt des Theologen Eberhard Jüngel”, Südwestrundfunk SWR2 Glaubensfragen, wr. and ed. Johannes Weiß, Sonntag, 22.08.2004, 12.05 Uhr, SWR2, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/koreabank/EberhardJuenel.rtf (accessed 25th November 2014).

3 “There was, however, one experience that affected me even more deeply than had my experiences at home, and which was decisive for my choice. It continues to shape me even now. That was the discovery of the church as the one place within a Stalinist society where one could speak the truth without being penalized. What a liberating experience in the face of the ideological-political pressure that dominated in school! Friends were arrested, I myself was interrogated more than once - only because we dared to say what we thought. Immediately before the Workers’ Revolt in 1953 I was denounced, together with other young Christians, as an “enemy of the republic” and expelled from school before a full assembly of teachers and students expressly convened on the day before the university entrance exams. Our fellow students were ordered to break off all contact with us. As I left the hall named after the Humboldt brothers - but dominated by a completely different spirit! - the upright among my teachers turned away in helpless silence. It was a scene pregnant with symbolism, in which the truth of the Ciceronian maxim (a maxim that had been pounded into us by the very same teachers) suddenly dawned on me: cum tacent, clamant (“when they are silent they cry loudest”). In the Christian church, however, one was free to break through the silence and the pressure to lie that was growing stronger all the time. Here one dared to bear witness to the truth of the gospel in such a way that its liberating power could also be experienced in very worldly, very political terms.” Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

4 “When my dear colleagues Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann later initiated the project of a “political theology” and developed it with great impact, I insisted on the basis of those experiences that the political relevance of Christian faith consists, from beginning to end, in its ability and obligation to speak the truth. The political activity required of the church aims, above all else, to assist the cause of truth”. Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.
than in school and public life led to Jüngel's objection to Christian socialism. However, it is due to being raised in an atheistic Marxist society that Jüngel is interested in engaging with atheism theologically: as a reality that Christian thought must pass through.

He found studying theology to be an intellectual oasis within the ideological restrictions of the GDR. As a result of this he started his career as a theologian, undertaking studies at Naumberg, Berlin, Zürich, and Basel. In the latter two places he was introduced to Bultmann through Ebeling, and to Barth. Jüngel’s theological career was then kickstarted by the rise of the Berlin Wall, which abruptly cut off the East German students from their professors on the other side. Thus overnight Jüngel became a lecturer in Berlin, eventually moving to Zürich, and then settling at Tübingen where he remains to this day, although he insists that the decision to move from East to West was not taken lightly.

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5 Jüngel relates another dispute, this time with Gollwitzer and Sölle, where Jüngel replies to the comment that a Christian should be a socialist that ‘my fatherly friend Helmut Gollwitzer and adversial friend, or frenemy Dorothee Sölle were of the decided opinion that that Christians must be socialists. I myself have fought against this, and have said: that contradicts the freedom of a Christian. However, Christians “may” be socialists, yet that is something entirely different to “must”. And if today anybody wanted to rule out that a Christian “can” also be a socialist, then he has become just as much an enemy to me as those who claimed at the time that Christians must be socialists.’ “Die hohe Kunst”.

6 ‘It should give one pause to consider that people in the GDR apparently allowed themselves to be more impressed with the atheistic option of Marxism than with its political and economic form. At any rate, the great number of Germans living on the other side of the Elbe who don’t belong to any religious community speaks for itself. The encounter with atheism, quite apart from all statistics, has consistently stimulated my thought since the beginning of my teaching career.’ Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

7 ‘On the contrary, I have been and continue to be concerned with discovering a moment of truth in atheism, a moment which is at least as important as that to be found in a theistic metaphysics. Is it merely an accident that the young Christian movement was charged with atheism in its religious environment? Did not the radical negation of the ancient world of gods by the Old Testament prophets and by the Word of the crucified Son of God prepare the ground upon which modern atheism could thrive? Did not Nietzsche recognize, more clearly than many theologians that the proclamation of the crucified God threatened to become a negation of Deity? The answer to this question is certainly not to be found in the “death-of-God theology” that aroused some interest in the U.S. a quarter of a century ago. But the fact that the expression “death of God” has a Christian origin should give us something to think about. I have thought about it, and I can conceive of the God who overcomes death only in such a way that God himself is nothing other than the unity of life and death on behalf of life. As such he bears the marks of our godlessness within himself; a godlessness the overcoming of which was and is his concern, not ours’. Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

8 ‘The theological colleges were intellectual oases in an ideological wasteland. And that was decidedly soothing.’ “Die hohe Kunst”.

9 ‘I vacillated for a long time over whether to accept the invitation of a Swiss university and to leave “realized socialism” for the ostensibly capitalist world of the West... as I sought to orient myself in the colorful, sometimes too colorful, Western world, I noticed how in every respect life behind the iron curtain was in danger of becoming one-dimensional. In body and soul and with every fiber of my being I felt the dreary grayness of that walled-in world beginning to fall away from me. The intense love of truth that had hitherto determined my theological existence was now matched by a passionate love of life’. Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

11
Jüngel’s relationship and personal knowledge of figures from separate theological schools in German thought influenced his own theological development and caused him to reject such divides in theology,\textsuperscript{10} as he learnt of and came to know Bultmann through Fuchs,\textsuperscript{11} learning of Luther, Heidegger, and Bultmann from Ebeling, and of learning of Barth from Barth himself during Jüngel’s (illegal\textsuperscript{12}) time at Basel. Philosophically, Jüngel learnt of Kant and Hegel through Gerhard Stammler. It is due to these varied experiences and influences that Jüngel sees that ‘the truth of theology is richer than that of its schools of thought’\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Previous Jüngel Scholarship}

English scholarship on Jüngel began with John Webster’s \textit{Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to his Thought}, which to this day is a comprehensive survey of Jüngel’s thought. Webster notes the main influences on Jüngel and details the main themes in his work, and thus it is essential reading. However, on the topic of influences, it tends towards situating Jüngel’s thought rather close to Barth, a problem that has continued to plague scholarship of Jüngel. Webster has also written a number of articles and chapters on the theology of Jüngel, focusing on Jüngel’s account of language; understanding of christology and proclamation; and on Jüngel’s account of anthropology in the light of Jüngel’s reception of Luther’s doctrine of justification.

\textsuperscript{10}At first Barth looked upon me as a sort of spy from the Bultmann school and greeted me with unconcealed skepticism. But when I dared, in an unforgettable meeting of his group, not only to contradict the Basel criticism of Bultmann with a vehemence born of youthful audacity but also proceeded to interpret one section from Barth’s anthropology to his satisfaction, I was invited for a late-night dispute over a bottle of wine. And a few days later the entire Church Dogmatics stood in front of my door with the dedication: “To Eberhard Jungel, on the way into God’s beloved eastern zone.” Jüngel, ‘Towards the Heart of the Matter’.

\textsuperscript{11}Jüngel initially studied theology with the goal of becoming a pastor. His true theological teacher was Ernst Fuchs. Through him Jüngel met the great theologian Rudolf Bultmann and learnt also of the famous philosopher Martin Heidegger. “Die hohe Kunst”.

\textsuperscript{12}Yes, I had gone – although I had given myself some difficulty in meticulously following the laws of the German Democratic Republic – for an illegal semester in Switzerland. I had let the rumour spread that I had suffered a nervous breakdown, and to my horror – after I had returned from the semester abroad – people said, “yes, we had seen that coming”. In reality, I was fine. I flew to Zürich – The Berlin Wall was still standing, so one had to travel solely by the S-Bahn to Tempelhof to board the plane. In Zürich I studied theology mostly with Gerhard Ebeling, but I went to Basel weekly in order to see Karl Barth, and there I came to know a teacher who has impressed me in a very special way.” “Die hohe Kunst”.

\textsuperscript{13}It is no wonder, then, that it never occurred to me to settle down in the so-called Barth school. Nor in the Bultmann school either, for that matter. It didn’t even occur to me to suppose that the Reformers always had the deeper insight and the most adequate solution to all theological problems. I say this with all due respect for the unusually incisive theology of the Reformers, which has not even yet come to the end of its historical influence. That is why to this very day I have steadfastly refused to succumb to the temptation to make disciples of my own. To be sure, students are undoubtedly eager for that sort of thing; and not a few of my listeners have pressured me to orchestrate something like a theological school’. Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

12
Other scholarship on Jüngel has been more specialised, and focused on Jüngel’s doctrine of God, such as Paul DeHart’s *Beyond the Necessary*, which focuses on Jüngel’s engagement with the theological tradition, especially regarding how atheism emerged out of the collapse of metaphysical theism. However, this study again is limited in how it assumes Jüngel’s trinitarian theology is a reiteration of Barth’s trinitarian thought. In contrast to this, German scholarship on Jüngel’s doctrine of God largely explores Jüngel’s reception of Hegel for his trinitarian thought.\(^{14}\)

Jüngel’s understanding of language, and especially his account of analogy,\(^{15}\) has also been the focus of more specialised studies, most notably Roland Zimany’s exploration of the importance of Heidegger for Jüngel in *Vehicle for God: The Metaphysical Theology of Eberhard Jüngel*,\(^{16}\) which followed on from and expands on his doctoral thesis on the subject.\(^{17}\) This use of Heidegger has also been noted by Mark Mattes\(^{18}\) and Arnold Neufeldt-Fast,\(^{19}\) although they see the importance of Heidegger for Jüngel in Jüngel’s rejection of the traditional, metaphysical view of the being of God. Moreover, Mattes also looks at Jüngel’s trinitarian theology, although it ultimately finds it in lacking in how Jüngel understands subject and community in the being of God.

Christologically, Neufeldt-Fast assesses the relation of Jüngel’s understanding of anthropology in the light of his doctrine of Christ, along with how Barth and Luther influence Jüngel’s christology. In a study on justification, Mattes evaluates Jüngel’s understanding of Luther,\(^{20}\) and along with other commentators notes the deliberate dereliction of human agency. However, none of those have looked at this in relation to Jüngel’s understanding of love as revealed on the cross, which this study intends to do.


Whilst Ivor Davidson has on two occasions looked at Jüngel’s theology of the cross and found it too narrow to support the structure of Jüngel’s thought, any reparative steps have either not been attempted or have not been conducted alongside Jüngel’s understanding of love as understood anthropologically. Piotr Małysz in *Trinity, Freedom and Love* aims to critique and repair Jüngel’s understanding of the doctrine of God from the anthropological effects it has. Małysz’s main focus in his study is on Jüngel’s understanding of freedom and love; both human and divine. Małysz’s study, however, does not give the space that Jüngel gives to freedom as freedom to limit oneself, or certainly finds Jüngel’s account of such a freedom inadequate. What this study intends to do is to critique Jüngel using the means that Jüngel himself has provided, rather than critique it from a position in theology that Jüngel himself has left behind.

**Chapter Outline**

The argument that this thesis wishes to make will be explored in the five chapters that follow. Chapter One undertakes an exploration of the origin and development of a theology of the cross, looking at its provenance in Luther, and its development through Hegel and Bonhoeffer, and how Jüngel develops themes found in both thinkers. I shall argue that a theology of the cross is not understood solely as a means of the revelation of God, but largely as experiential and in the context of a theology of glory, although that context changes in each iteration. These thinkers are each acknowledged by Jüngel as influential on his thought. Looking at these sources, as well as Jüngel’s reliance on Heidegger for his understanding of existence, it shall become clear that whilst Jüngel draws on the cross for knowledge of God, he can only do so with the methods from the thinkers listed to come to such a conclusion.

Having seen the origination and development of the theology of the cross, in Chapter Two I shall detail how Jüngel himself understands a theology of the cross, and shall explore it in contrast to the work of his contemporaries Jürgen Moltmann and Dorothee Sölle. This shall help contextualise the theological concerns of the time and show the theology that Jüngel formulates his theology of the death of God and of the

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cross in contrast to. I shall also look in more depth at Jüngel’s use of Hegel and Bonhoeffer in determining the use and the implications of a theology of the cross.

In Chapter Three I shall look at Jüngel’s account of christology: as Christ on the cross is the centre of Jüngel’s understanding of revelation, therefore the role of Christ is key for Jüngel. I shall look at the person and work of Christ; Christ’s relation to history in how Jüngel understands proclamation; and at Jüngel’s continued emphasis on the uniqueness of Christ through Jüngel’s understanding of sacramentology. I shall also look at common critiques of Jüngel’s doctrine of Christ, all the while focusing on how Jüngel’s account of the passivity of Christ impacts on his theological vision.

Following on from a discussion of christology, I shall look at Jüngel’s account of the doctrine of God and how the relationships of the Trinity are revealed in the relations on the cross. I shall explore Jüngel’s account of love as the basis and expression of the relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Chapter Four will argue that whilst Jüngel’s account of love in the trinitarian relations as cruciform is in many ways nuanced, it is the case that Jüngel’s christology, as explored in the previous chapter, inhibits this dynamic account of the Trinity that is posited in Jüngel’s doctrine of God. Jüngel’s account of the passivity of Christ on the cross does not allow for the Son to fully reciprocate the love of the Father in the event of the cross, given the emphasis in Jüngel’s christology on the passivity and obedience of the Son to the Father. I shall also survey the responses that Jüngel’s doctrine of God has elicited.

Following on from that, Chapter Five will explore Jüngel’s account of humanity and shall focus on how humanity is to act in relation to God. I shall look at Jüngel’s accounts of language, faith, justification, and I shall look at what Jüngel writes about human love, which Jüngel initially sees as a model for how God loves, and yet does not follow through with in his account of the being of God as love. I shall also look at how Jüngel’s understanding of aspects of humanity such as worship and suffering clarify the fullness and complexity of Jüngel’s understanding of human activity and passivity. It shall be seen, that following on from how Jüngel understands Christ as example, Jüngel’s account of human action reinforces a passivity that is not present in his account of love as mutual action and surrender both for humanity and for God. Instead, as with
the person and action of Christ, Jüngel instead promotes a passivity that relies on submission and dependence from one side rather than from both.

Thus I shall conclude that Jüngel’s theology can be critiqued and found lacking on its own grounds. However, despite the failings of Jüngel’s thought his account of a theology of the cross is still pertinent today, and I shall explore how Jüngel’s thought should still be considered good and relevant despite its internal flaws and the change of context. Finally, I will outline how it may be possible to repair Jüngel’s account for those who have the time, space, and inclination to do so.
Chapter One: Origins and Influences for Jüngel’s Theology of the Cross

A theology of the cross is characterised by two things. First, it focuses on the cross as the source of revelation of the being of God; second, that revelation is always a challenge to preconceived ideas of the being of God. I shall argue that due to these criteria Jüngel’s theology must be understood as opposed to a theology of glory as well as a theology that has its focal point in the cross. The theology of glory that Jüngel writes against is the metaphysical conception of God where knowledge of God is gleaned from human reason and philosophy. In contrast to that, Jüngel locates knowledge of God in the cross, which is where God subverts our understanding of what is good, rational, and beautiful and so enables us to speak of God outside of the strictures of philosophy.

However, to understand a theology of the cross as Jüngel articulates it, it must be expounded both in its original intentions and in how it has been taken throughout Christian thought. Jüngel himself traces the history of the theology of the cross from its origin in Luther and its continuation in Hegel and Bonhoeffer. Yet Jüngel’s thought is also deeply influenced by Heidegger, and I shall thus look at the influence that he has both on theology and more specifically on Jüngel; and how Heidegger can also be seen as working in contrast to what can be termed a theology of glory although this is articulated differently to the other thinkers. Through exploring the sources for Jüngel’s theology of the cross, I shall set the scene for exploring for what Jungel retains of its development, and how it is developed in Jüngel’s own thought. Moreover, I shall explore to what extent these thinkers who use a theology of the cross base their entire thought on it. In exploring the influence and position of a theology of the cross in its previous instantiations, I shall see whether it has ever been seen as suitable for supporting an entire theological or philosophical system.

I shall start with Luther’s understanding of a theology of the cross, and look at whether it remains a central part of his thought. From there, I shall explore how it is used in Hegel, and touch briefly on the issues involved in using Hegel as a source for theology. Following on from Hegel, I shall look at Bonhoeffer’s formulation of a theology of the
cross. I shall finally look at Heidegger’s thought and note what is pertinent to Jüngel, who first knew of Heidegger through his teachers Bultmann, Fuchs, and Ebeling and who later knew Heidegger himself. After this survey of influences on Jüngel, I shall locate the place of a theology of the cross in these thinkers and see whether there is a consensus on how it has and should be used.

**Luther’s Theology of the Cross**

Luther’s theology of the cross is introduced and discussed in the Heidelberg Disputation. Whilst it is a key part of Luther’s theological break from Catholicism, in the works that precede and succeed it is ambiguous whether a theology of the cross is maintained. Thus I shall explore a selection of Luther’s works in order to determine whether this foundational role of the cross is brought in again. It must be noted that many commentators point to the lack of a system in Luther’s works or writings, and speak also of a lack of sustained interest and writing on the topic of the cross. It is seen as a reaction to a particular event and consistent with Luther’s methodology as much of Luther’s theology comes about as reactions to particular events. This is evinced in how the revelation of Christ is written about against the backdrop of the break with Rome; the Eucharistic presence of Christ in conflict with Zwingli; and the disputation on the humanity and divinity of Christ is a polemic against Schwenkfeld.

In the Heidelberg Disputation, Luther met with representatives of his Augustinian order to debate and defend his theological position. At the heart of the disputation is the question of where knowledge of God is located. Luther leads into this question by noting how that which is attractive to humanity; good works, profitable endeavours, power and glory, are considered evil by God. Instead, what appears to be good to humanity is evil to God, and what is good for humanity, that which is decreed by God appears evil. Luther sees that ‘although the works of God always seem unattractive and appear evil, they are nevertheless really eternal merits’. Thus, in seeing the revelation of

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23 Whilst Jüngel acknowledges and is seen as mediating the thought of Bultmann this dissertation will not look in depth at Jüngel’s relationship with Bultmann and his works, as Jüngel does not rely on Bultmann for his understanding of a theology of the cross, and the influence that Bultmann has on Jüngel is similar to the influence that Heidegger has on Jüngel, and thus I focus more on Heidegger as Jüngel gives greater weight to Heidegger in his interviews.

God solely in the terrible event of the suffering and death of Christ Luther challenges both the human desire for comfort and the cold logic of Aristotelian philosophy with its concept of *facere quod in se est*. In Luther’s theses the theology of the cross reveals the futility of human works in attaining salvation, and sees that human glory, which is the goal of human works, stands in opposition to the weakness and suffering of God on the cross.

The Heidelberg Disputation is also an attack on free will as Luther sees that humanity’s ability to discern good or evil is an illusion, instead ‘free will, after the fall, has power to do good only in a passive capacity, but it can always do evil in an active capacity’. The state of humanity, according to Luther here, is that we are only able to actively do evil, and are unable to see the truth of God. Luther notes that despite our incapacity, we have attempted to see and behold the truth. However, as in the case of Scholastic theology, what is noted is not what is revealed, for

> The person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened [Rom.1:20].

Instead, Thesis 20 posits that

> He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things to God seen through suffering and the cross.

And therefore

> A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian of the cross calls the thing what it actually is.

We know what “the thing” actually is through the revelation of God in the death and suffering of Christ. We cannot come to know of it of our own ability and thus the theology of the cross is deeply linked to an understanding of the privations of human will and human intellect. Luther sees that the only will that has power to differentiate between good and evil and to create is God’s, and this will of God is shown in the love of God. The love of God stands in contrast to human love in that it ‘does not find, but creates, that which is pleasing to it. The love of man comes into being through that which is pleasing to it’.

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26 “Heidelberg Disputation”, LW 31:40.
Luther sees good in how this revelation is *sub contrario*, as the works of God appearing evil ‘is understood to mean that the Lord humbles and frightens us by means of the law and the sight of our sins so that we seem in the eyes of men, as in our own, as nothing, foolish, and wicked, for we are in truth that’.\(^\text{28}\) This fear is what first enables us to relate to God, for fear produces humility and ‘the unattractive works which God does in us, that is, those which are humble and devout, are really eternal, for humility and fear of God are our entire merit’.\(^\text{29}\) In order to approach God we need these two checks, as otherwise we fall prey to our more common, deleterious human desires for ‘where there is no fear there is no humility. Where there is no humility there is pride, and where there is pride there are the wrath and judgment of God, for God opposes the haughty. Indeed, if pride would cease there would be no sin anywhere’.\(^\text{30}\)

Luther does allow that there was a way in which humanity could know God other than the cross, but this is now a thing of the past.\(^\text{31}\) Now one can only know God through Christ, and Christ through the cross, and ‘he who does not know Christ does not know God hidden in suffering. Therefore he prefers works to suffering, glory to the cross, strength to weakness, wisdom to folly, and in general, good to evil’.\(^\text{32}\) The cross both stands in contrast to our knowledge, and also destroys our previous sense of self.\(^\text{33}\)

According to Luther, the cross also speaks of God’s action in salvation, as on the cross everything that could have been asked of the law has been accomplished by the work of Christ on the cross, and now whilst ‘the law says, “do this,” and it is never done. Grace says, “believe in this,” and everything is already done’.\(^\text{34}\) Now that Christ has accomplished that, Luther writes that Christ lives in us through faith (a concept which

\(^{28}\) “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:44.

\(^{29}\) “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:44.

\(^{30}\) “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:47.

\(^{31}\) ‘Because men misused the knowledge of God through works, God wished again to be recognised in suffering, and to condemn wisdom concerning invisible things [virtue, godliness, wisdom, justice, goodness and so forth] by means of wisdom concerning visible things, so that those who did not honor God as manifested in his works should honor him as he is hidden in his suffering,’ “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:52. ‘Now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does him no good to recognise God in his glory and majesty, unless he recognises him in the humility and shame of the cross. Thus God destroys the wisdom of the wise.’ “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:52-3.

\(^{32}\) “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:53.

\(^{33}\) ‘Through the cross works are destroyed and the old Adam, who is especially edified by works, is crucified. It is impossible for a person not to be puffed up by his good works unless he has first been deflated and destroyed by suffering and evil until he knows that he is worthless and that his works are not his but God’s.’ “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:53.

\(^{34}\) “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:56.
will become important later) and in doing so ‘he arouses us to do good works through that living faith in his work, for the works which he does are the fulfilment of the commands of God given us through faith’. This is the work of Christ within us, where again, ‘rather than seeking its own good, the love of God flows forth and bestows good. Therefore sinners are attractive because they are loved; they are not loved because they are attractive. For this reason the love of man avoids sinners and evil persons’. Luther then writes that ‘this is the love of the cross, born of the cross, which turns in the direction where it does not find good which it may enjoy, but where it may confer good upon the bad and needy person’. However, for Luther, is this just a moment in his theology or, in fact, the grounding principle of all his thought? Does Luther himself narrow revelation to this one event? There is debate as to whether a theology of the cross is a moment in Luther’s thought or the guiding principle of it. To explore this, I shall look at other works of Luther that mention a theology of the cross, and then at various commentators on Luther and examine whether that is the case.

**Luther’s earlier and later works**

In Luther’s early works, such as his “Lectures on Romans” (1515-6), Luther relates aspects of a theology of the cross, such as the hiddenness of God’s good attributes. The idea of the hiddenness of God becomes crucial to Luther’s theology of the cross, and reappears throughout his work, especially in relation to human life and suffering. However, further on in the Lectures Luther shows signs of and focuses on his doctrine of justification by faith alone, as he writes that the ‘righteous works of people who are not yet righteous are like the works of a person who performs the functions of a priest and bishop without being a priest; in other words, such works are foolish and tricky and are to be compared with the antics of hucksters in the marketplace’. Luther understands that we are made righteous only through the substitutionary action of Christ, and our righteousness is the righteousness of Christ. Importantly, here we see

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36 “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:57.
37 “Heidelberg Disputation”, *LW* 31:57.
38 “Thus all power and wisdom and righteousness must be hidden and buried and not apparent, altogether according to the image and likeness of Christ, who emptied Himself so that He might completely hide His power, wisdom, and goodness and instead put on weakness, foolishness, and hardship”. “Lectures on Romans, 1516”, *LW* 25:151.
39 “Lectures on Romans”, *LW* 25:152.
40 “If He has made my sin to be His sin, then I do not have it, and I am free. If He has made His righteousness my righteousness, then I am righteous now with the same righteousness as He”. “Lectures on Romans”, *LW* 25:188.
the beginnings of Luther’s understanding of God’s action and human passivity, where God acts in all things and the human receives in faith.⁴¹

With this totality of the work of Christ, any work done through the law is invalid as we act from the wrong motives. The law asks us to do good works through fear or obedience instead of freedom and love.⁴² Furthermore just as the person and work of Christ are one, ‘faith in Christ is similarly indivisible, just as Christ and the things which pertain to Him are one and the same thing’.⁴³ However, despite this spiritual change we are still in the same world and the same body. Thus Luther mentions the distinction between the inner and outer, or the old and new human, where the inner man is how we truly are and thus the part that God truly sees, whereas the outer shows how we see ourselves and present ourselves to the world.

In the “Disputations Against Scholastic Theology” (1517), the passivity of humanity leads into a statement about the captivity of the will,⁴⁴ and that in setting up humanity as being able to choose they always choose incorrectly.⁴⁵ This theme hearkens to the Heidelberg Disputations. Despite this, it is not followed through in the succeeding work on “Two Kinds of Righteousness” (1518). Here Luther returns to the theme of justification, where the two kinds of righteousness are alien and proper, and alien is ‘the righteousness of another, instilled from without. This is the righteousness of Christ’,⁴⁶ and proper righteousness that of Christ working within us, where ‘this righteousness is the product of the righteousness of the first type, actually its fruit and consequence’.⁴⁷

⁴¹ The passive and active justification of God and the faith or belief in Him are the same thing. For the fact that we declare His words righteous is His gift, and because of the same gift He Himself regards us as righteous, that is, He justifies us’. “Lectures on Romans”, LW 25:212.
⁴² The works of the Law are those, he [Paul] says, which take place outside of faith and grace and are done at the urging of the Law, which either forces obedience through fear or allures us through the promise of temporal blessings. But the works of faith, he says, are those which are done out of the spirit of liberty and solely for the love of God. And the latter cannot be accomplished except by those who have been justified by faith, to which justification the works of the Law add nothing, indeed, they strongly hinder it, since they do not permit a man to see himself as unrighteous and in need of justification’. “Lectures on Romans”, LW 25:234.
⁴³ "Lectures on Romans", LW 25:238.
⁴⁴ "It is false to state that man’s inclination is free to choose between the either of two opposites. Indeed, the inclination is not free, but captive’. “Disputations Against Scholastic Theology”, LW 31:5.
⁴⁵ "Man is by nature unable to want God to be God. Indeed, he himself wants to be God, and does not want God to be God’. “Disputations Against Scholastic Theology”, LW 31:10.
⁴⁶ "Two Kinds of Righteousness”, LW 31:297.
⁴⁷ "Two Kinds of Righteousness”, LW 31:300.
This theme of justification continues in Luther’s “The Freedom of a Christian” (1520), where the relationship between law and grace is elucidated, and where justification is affirmed as freedom from the law. However, this freedom from the law is instead to be understood as freedom to be subject to God and neighbour, and thus serve them in light of the gift of justification through Christ. From this we can glean some understanding of what human action and will is good for in Luther, especially considering the more negative statements about it above. Luther begins with the famous paradox that ‘a Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all’,\(^{48}\) referring back to Luther’s understanding of humanity as twofold, inner and outer, old and new, spiritual and bodily. Spiritually, we are now new, whilst ‘according to the bodily nature, which men refer to as flesh, he is called a carnal, outward or old man’.\(^{49}\) Here Luther notes that the Word of God is the only necessary thing for Christian life, righteousness, and freedom.\(^{50}\) However, Luther notes that ‘faith can rule only in the inner man’,\(^{51}\) and thus it is only through this faith that change is effected in us, ‘just as the heated iron glows like fire because of the union of fire with it, so the Word imparts its qualities to the soul’.\(^{52}\)

Luther sees that ‘works, being inanimate things, cannot glorify God, although they can, if faith is present, be done to the glory of God’,\(^{53}\) although even though the inner man is free and needs no works, ‘insofar as he is a servant he does all kinds of works’.\(^{54}\) For despite the freedom that humanity now has, we still live in our carnal body, with its needs and its restrictions, and Luther writes that ‘in this life he must control his own body and have dealings with men. Here the works begin’.\(^{55}\) However, justification must always occur before this.\(^{56}\) Conversely, if one is not justified through faith in Christ, then one’s good works do nothing, but one’s evil works condemn them. It is possible to link statements on works in Luther to a theology of the cross with the stress on the

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50 “The Word is the gospel of God concerning his Son, who was made flesh, suffered, rose from the dead, and was glorified through the Spirit who sanctifies. To preach Christ means to feed the soul, make it righteous, set it free, and save it, provided it believes the preaching. Faith alone is the saving and efficacious use of the Word of God”. “The Freedom of a Christian”. LW 31:346.  
56 “It is always necessary that the substance or person himself can be good before there can be any good works, and that good works follow and proceed from the good person”. “The Freedom of a Christian” LW 31:361.
impotence of the will and the human view of works, although, as noted above, the futility of works comes earlier and is a recurring theme in Luther’s works.

However Luther does insist that good works are to be done after justification regardless of their efficacy, because humans are relational beings, who exist for and with each other: ‘a man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body to work for it alone, but he lives also for all men on earth; rather, he lives only for others and not for himself’. In doing so, we are following the example of Christ, who emptied himself to the form of servant, and offered himself to us. Thus, there seems here to be some positive spin to human action, but only in how the ‘believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever Christ has as though it were its own, and whatever the soul has Christ claims as his own’. This happens not only in the sense that Christ’s righteousness is imputed to the believer, but also that Christ’s function as priest and intercessor continues. Therefore ‘the inner man, who by faith is created in the image of God, is both joyful and happy because of Christ in whom so many benefits are conferred upon him; and therefore it is his one occupation to serve God joyfully and without thought of gain, in love that is not constrained’.

Luther’s thoughts on human action are crystallised in the “The Bondage of the Will” (1525), where Luther again writes that the will of the human has no freedom, cannot choose good over evil, and always turns to evil. However, in this text Luther speaks again of the hiddenness of God, in that it is not hidden to the godly, who can now conceive of God in suffering and death, for ‘God hidden in his majesty neither deplores nor takes away death, but works life, death, and all in all. For there he has not bound himself by his word, but has kept himself free over all things’. Thus we can see that the theme of the hiddenness of God that is key in a theology of the cross is continued here.

60 ‘A godly mind is not shocked to hear that God is present in death or hell, both of which are more horrible and foul than either a hole or a sewer’. “The Bondage of the Will”, LW 33:47.
61 “The Bondage of the Will”, LW 33:139.
Yet Luther writes more on justification here, seeing that it is in the power of Christ and the impotence of humanity that our justification hinges. Our humanity is constituted by this act of justification in the person of Christ, for we are always coram deo. It is shown here that God is the only one with true free will, and God’s power overcomes our will after the event of justification through faith. For as Luther writes in “Theses Concerning Faith and Law” (1535), ‘if we ourselves could be obedient to God or fulfill the law, it would not have been necessary for the Son of God to become obedient in place of all of us or for the sake of all of us’. Yet as “The Disputation Concerning Justification” (1536) says, ‘human nature, corrupt and blinded by the blemish of original sin, is not able to imagine or conceive of any justification above and beyond works’. We still cannot comprehend this ourselves, but instead ‘faith itself, which is poured into us from hearing about Christ by the Holy Spirit, comprehends Christ’.

These themes, rather than themes of hiddenness and the cross, are furthered in Luther’s “Lectures on the Galatians” (1535), where Luther again speaks of the futility of human action, as in justification. The distinction between the old and new man is brought up as well as Luther uses it to distinguish between law and gospel in that ‘Christian righteousness applies to the new man, and the righteousness of the Law applies to the old man, who is born of flesh and blood’. However, the role of the cross is mentioned here as the cross is applied to humanity in that ‘our cross or suffering is the suffering of Christ’. Moreover, the cross of Christ is also understood as the ‘afflictions of all the faithful, whose sufferings are the sufferings of Christ’.

From this survey of Luther’s thought, it is clear that a theology of the cross is explicitly mentioned only in the Heidelberg Disputation itself. Otherwise, Luther focuses more on justification and the person of Christ apart from the cross and when the cross is

62 ‘If we believe that Christ redeemed men by His blood, we are compelled to confess, that the whole man was lost: otherwise, we shall make Christ superfluous, or a Redeemer of the grossest part of man only, — which is blasphemy and sacrilege!’ “The Bondage of the Will”, LW 33:286.
64 “The Disputation Concerning Justification”, LW 34:151.
66 ‘Here we work nothing, render nothing to God; we only receive and permit someone else to work in us, namely, God. Therefore it is appropriate to call the righteousness of faith or Christian righteousness “passive”. This is a righteousness hidden in a mystery, which the world does not understand’. “Lectures on the Galatians ch.1-4”, LW 26:5.
68 “Lectures on Galatians, 5-6”, LW 27:133.
69 “Lectures on Galatians, 5-6”, LW 27:134.
mentioned it is mentioned more for its experiential qualities than for its epistemological ones. However, it could be said that those doctrines are indebted to a theology of the cross. The critical consensus on this is varied, as I shall now explore.

**Interpreters of Luther**

It has been shown from Luther’s own writings that what occupies Luther more than a theology of the cross is the development of justification. However, turning to commentators on Luther there is a sense that a theology of the cross is instrumental not only in the development of Luther’s thought, but also as being a natural progression from, as MacKinnon notes, the training that Luther received in the new way (Ockhamist), which stood in contrast to the Scholastic school (the old way) which relied more on Aristotle. According to MacKinnon, the diatribe against Aristotle contained within a theology of the cross has its roots in this divide in theology at the time. Luther saw the unhelpful concept of *facere quod in se est* as the result of this Scholastic reliance on Aristotelian thought, and reacted against that.  

Watson also sees that Luther challenges the Scholastic reliance on humanity’s natural capacity to know God from reason and the world, as ‘God is more deeply hidden in Christ crucified than He is in His creation; for the natural man, at any rate, more easily connects divinity with power and justice than with the humiliation and suffering of the Cross’. While this grounding of the revelation of God in the crucified Christ rather than the created world does not necessitate a rejection of natural theology, it rejects the notion that humanity can reach God through their intellect and actions. As Oberman states, for Luther ‘only through the cross of Christ is God’s Word revealed; the cross constitutes the only genuine theology’.

However Althaus sees that the theology of the cross in Luther is more than a point in the development of Luther’s doctrine of justification. Instead it is the standard by which

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70 MacKinnon writes that Luther believed that this led to a situation where ‘the scholastic theologians have distorted this knowledge by their exaltation of works and human wisdom above the suffering and foolishness of the Cross’ James MacKinnon, *Luther and the Reformation* (London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1925–30), 46. Therefore ‘the philosophy and ethics of Aristotle are altogether at variance, and in the last dozen theses he adds some arguments in proof of his contention that it is dangerous for anyone to make use of his philosophy unless he has first become a fool in Christ’. MacKinnon, *Luther*, 47.


72 Heiko Oberman, *Luther, Man between God and the Devil* (London: YUP, 1970), 248. This view is also held by Bainton, who writes that that Luther’s later doctrines were ‘but commenting and sharpening to obviate misconstruction. The centre about which all the petals clustered was the affirmation of forgiveness of sins through the utterly unmerited grace of God made possible by the cross of Christ…beyond these cardinal tenets Luther was never to go’ Roland Bainton, *Here I Stand* (New York: New America Library, 1978), 51.
all theological knowledge is to be measured.\(^73\) Althaus also emphasises instead the practical, experiential nature of Luther’s theology,\(^74\) as well as the Christocentrism of Luther’s thought, where Christ is the subject matter of theology, because theology is about the encounter between God and humanity that only happens in Christ. Philosophy thus has little or no use, as Luther comments that ‘Plato can assert neither that God cares about us nor that he hears and helps the needy. He stays within the limits of metaphysical thought like a cow staring at a new gate’.\(^75\) This use of reason which appeals to and uses human pride,\(^76\) is a theology of glory which Althaus notes ‘leads man to stand before God and strike a bargain on the basis of his ethical achievement in fulfilling the law, whereas the theology of the cross views man as one who has been called to suffer’.\(^77\) Due to this emphasis on suffering, on \textit{Anfechtung},\(^78\) ‘knowledge of God is not theoretical but rather a matter of man’s entire existence’.\(^79\)

Walther von Loewenich also upholds the centrality of Luther’s theology of the cross. He sees it as a true theology of revelation, albeit one in which revelation is indirect and concealed, not found in works but in suffering, as for Luther knowledge of God is a matter of faith and reflected in the practical nature of suffering and hence \textit{sub contrario}.\(^80\) This hiddenness is manifested in the cross\(^81\) as it is there that ‘we are directed to God’s revelation in the word. God himself could not be grasped by us but would crush and

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\(^73\) Paul Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther} (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1996), 30. Althaus sees that this determines Luther’s view of the church in how the church is also \textit{sub contrario}, ‘the true church of Christ cannot be identified with the historical institution which calls itself the church and with its errors, sins, divisions, and heresies. Rather the true church is hidden under this empirical reality’. Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther}, 32. All is \textit{sub contrario}, and therefore Luther’s theology of the cross means that the cross conceals God and thus marks the end of all speculation about God on the part of self-confident reason’. Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther}, 28. This means that for Luther ‘only theology of the cross now leads to a true knowledge of God’. Althaus, \textit{Theology of Martin Luther}, 34.

\(^74\) ‘Theological knowledge is won by experiencing it’. Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther}, 8.

\(^75\) \textit{LW} 44:591.

\(^76\) ‘Natural theology and speculative metaphysics which seek to learn to know God from the works of creation are in the same category as the work righteousness of the moralist. Both are ways in which man exalts himself to the level of God. Thus both either lead men to pride or are already expressions of such pride’. (Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther}, 27).

\(^77\) Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther}, 27.

\(^78\) \textit{Anfechtung} is a word that is hard to translate, and I shall thus not render it, as many other writers do the same in order to avoid confusion from the manifold ways in which it can be translated. These translations can refer to \textit{Anfechtung} as suffering as a particular challenge, as agony, temptation, struggle. It is probably best described circumspectly as a dark night of the soul, or the experiential nature of the cross. It is an important concept in Luther, Jüngel, Bonhoeffer, and Kierkegaard as Althaus especially sees that ‘Luther’s understanding of \textit{Anfechtung} as an essential characteristic of Christian existence is part of his theology of the cross’. (Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther}, 33). See Simon Podmore, \textit{Struggling with God: Kierkegaard & the Theology of Spiritual Trial} (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2013) for a fuller account of the doctrine in itself.

\(^79\) Althaus, \textit{The Theology of Martin Luther}, 28.

\(^80\) ‘The cross of Christ makes plain that there is no direct knowledge of God for man. Christian thinking must come to a halt before the fact of the cross.’ Walther von Loewenich, \textit{Luther’s Theology of the Cross} (Belfast: CJ Ltd, 1976) 27.

\(^81\) As ‘the hidden God is the crucified God. There on the cross, at this one place and cloaked in deepest weakness, God becomes visible’. Loewenich, \textit{Luther’s Theology of the Cross}, 30.
annihilate us in his majesty, for he is a consuming fire. For that reason God wraps himself in his word. This stands in contrast to the theology of glory, where instead of suffering and humility ‘reason and law are the two foundation pillars which support the theology of glory’.  

Loewenich’s remarks stand in contrast to other scholars, of whom Williams notes that ‘some Lutheran scholars of an earlier generation, conscious of the links between the Luther of these years and certain aspects of the mystical tradition, tended to regard the theologia crucis as no more than a stage in Luther’s progressive emancipation from “Catholicism”’. Williams sees the theology of the cross as an invaluable summary of Luther’s views, a theological underpinning of Luther’s call to let God be God, for ‘theology deludes itself if it finds the invisibilia Dei, the hidden things of God, clearly manifest in the world or in experience’. Thus the only way in which God can be truly known, and accurately known is through the cross where ‘the theologia crucis is accurate vision, which is prepared to confront without flinching the terror of God’s judgement, to look at the “evil” of doubt, dereliction and fear and call it good’. Therefore, Williams also upholds an understanding of the theology of the cross in Luther as a key aspect of his theology.

Lienhard also sees the cross as key to revelation in Luther, and Lohse notes regarding Luther’s theology that as a whole ‘it holds solely to the cross, where God both hides and reveals himself’. Lohse notes that here ‘Luther’s radical teaching on sin and grace reached its sharpest point’, yet perhaps not its furthest point. The cross breaks down

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82 Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 33.
83 Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 76. Loewenich sees that ‘for Luther the cross is not only the subject of theology, it is the distinctive mark of all theology’. Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 18-19. Loewenich draws out its influence on the doctrine of sola fide, for as ‘revelation is possible only in concealment, we are now confronted by the other side of the matter, namely faith can be directed only to what is concealed, hidden and invisible’. Therefore ‘faith needs the idea of a hidden God for its own sake. This thought is a constant reminder that it is risky to believe in the revealed God.’ Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 38.
85 Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 146.
86 Williams, The Wound of Knowledge 145.
87 ‘In the weakness of the human Jesus triumphs God’s redemptive love. One can tell, all in all, what a dynamic concept of God’s essence Luther has. The divine nature is not a thing in itself or a multiplicity of attributes that must be defined in contrast to humanity, such as omnipotence, omniscience and other divine attributes. The divine nature is first the mysterious, life-giving love, which frames the story of works in which the human is involved.’ Marc Lienhard, Martin Luthers christologisches Zeugnis: Entwicklung und Grundzüge seiner Christologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980), 111.
88 Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 38.
89 Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology, 106.
human self-sufficiency and undermines our ability to take pride in it, which counters sin, which Lohse identifies in Luther primarily as pride and self-will, and thus self-righteousness. Sin can also be described as self-love, and as setting oneself in the place of God, who is the one we should truly love.

However Alister McGrath argues for a more limited role of the cross as revelatory in Luther’s thought, noting that Luther’s understanding of the righteousness of God and the cross of Christ are linked. The cross enables Luther’s use of the opus proprium and opus alienum, where again, good can be hidden under an apparent evil. However, it is not the revelation of Christ that McGrath sees as the role of the cross, but it is instead key to Luther as a revelation of Anfechtung, as we only know from the cross that this humiliation occurs. Whilst we first experience God’s wrath, it is the penultimate word, as God is the source of our Anfechtung. Kolb also takes the view that the cross does not show the complete revelation of God. Instead what the cross really does illustrate is the pro me of Luther’s thought, and Kolb sees that a major stress in Luther’s theology is instead the nature of human will, where Luther sees that ‘the human will on its own cannot contribute to obtaining grace; it actively does evil but can only passively, that is, with God’s assistance, do good’.

For Ebeling, Luther’s theology of the cross emphasises the importance of faith as the only way in which God can be known, as ‘the concealment of God on the cross is paralleled by the structure of faith, which consists of concealment beneath a contrary’. Ebeling sees this as the central tenet of Luther’s understanding of the relation between

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90 ‘Luther’s discovery of the righteousness of God is but one step in the process leading to the theology of the cross – but it is nevertheless the decisive catalytic step, which forced Luther to reconsider the theological matrix within which this concept was set’. Alister McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther’s Theological Breakthrough (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 99.
91 ‘The basic paradox involved is illustrated with reference to the justification of an individual. In order that a man may be justified, he must first recognise that he is sinner, and humble himself before God. Before man can be justified, he must be utterly humiliated – and it is God who both humiliates and justifies’. McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 151.
92 ‘Luther did not believe that God’s mercy and goodness reveal themselves only in the cross, but the cross illuminates the more ambiguous encounters with the Creator’s providential goodness in the course of his supplying the needs of daily life’. Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 56.
93 ‘God’s power, godliness, wisdom, justice, and other such attributes are invisible, but knowledge of them does not as such make one wise regarding the personal relationship God has established with his people. That comes through looking to the weakness and foolishness of the cross. Suffering marks the Christian life, and the fact that it often seems to be undeserved and contrary to God’s promise raises doubts in Christian minds’. Kolb, Martin Luther, 57.
94 Kolb, Martin Luther, 56.
humanity and God. Whilst the terms used at Heidelberg, and especially the terms “theology of the cross” and “theology of glory” are not used throughout his writings and life, Ebeling thinks that ‘they are a very accurate expression of his understanding of theology’. This is because Ebeling sees that ‘the aim of the theology of the cross is in a pre-eminent sense “practical”, for its aim is a right use of reality. It leads into experience, and is existential theology. Thus true theology is “practical”, while speculative theology belongs in hell with the Devil.’

Although if Ebeling is saying that the theology of the cross is practical, as other commentators have noted, due to the example of the suffering of Christ on the cross it would be more beneficial to focus on the experiential character realised in *Anfechtung* rather than how it points to it as a paradox, or how it bestows faith. However, Ebeling can look to the paradox in that, as he sees that in Luther’s thought there is an emphasis on proclaiming the word, where God hides under a contrary until faith is stirred by an encounter through proclamation.

Bayer notes how Luther’s theology centres on how one is called to freedom, and in his discussion on the theology of the cross, Bayer also notes the character of *Anfechtung* in contextualising the hiddenness of God. However, Bayer emphasises the difficulty of extricating and talking on particular topics in Luther, and focuses more on the

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96 ‘Luther referred to the theology which discusses God in theological terms and therefore also discusses man in theological terms, as the theology of the cross, by contrast to the theology of glory, in which God and man are discussed in a pseudo-theological way’. Ebeling, *Luther*, 226.
97 Ebeling, *Luther*, 226.
98 Ebeling, *Luther*, 228.
99 ‘The understanding of revelation as revelation under a contrary was a determining factor in Luther’s theological thought as early as the first lectures on the Psalms, and was maintained right up to the end’. Ebeling, *Luther*, 236.
100 ‘Because the revelation of God takes place on the cross, everything depends upon the world and upon faith. The word and faith are the marks of the revelation which is concealed under its contrary’. Ebeling, *Luther*, 236. However, this concealment must not led to blind faith, as ‘one must be on one’s guard not to succumb to the emotional force of such utterances, or to resist it, without understanding the true reason for such a way of speaking, a reason which leads to much more than such paradoxical language, and which is not satisfied by the ecstasy of paradox’. Ebeling, *Luther*, 238.
101 ‘That freedom through which the conscience is free of works – not in the sense that none take place but in the sense that one does not rely on any of them’ Oswald Bayer, *Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation* (Grand Rapids MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2008), 289.
102 The translator of Bayer’s text renders *Anfechtung* as agonising struggle: ‘discussion about the “hidden” God has much more to do with a very specific “setting in life”: it is extracted from within the agonising struggle in the form of a lament’. Bayer, *Martin Luther’s Theology*, 81.
103 Since the sinning human being and the justifying God coexist in the Word and in faith, theology cannot be treated in alternate ways, so that some teaching is about the Word and other teaching is about faith – even though, to accentuate the greater import of the Word over that of the faith, it is more appropriate to speak of teaching the Word than of teaching the faith. Correspondingly, it cannot be ignored that the subject matter is constituted specifically with respect to the text’. Bayer, *Martin Luther’s Theology*, 41.
multivalent meanings of faith, noting that faith includes both the justified human being and the justifying God. The righteousness that faith imputes is a passive one, but faith is also understood as a divine work within us, therefore faith always speaks of God. Like Althaus, Bayer also draws out how creation and justification are linked, in that justification creates a new being for us, individually and beyond that as ‘creation takes on the character of a communication: Creation is the establishment and preservation of community’. This is also done through love and thus Bayer sees that there are other themes in Luther’s thought, namely justification and faith, which hold to the key to his theology more than a theology of the cross does.

In support of views that see Luther as focusing more on other doctrines, Siggins sees that any suggestion that a theology of the cross is emblematic of the whole of Luther’s theology is due to a lack in Luther scholarship, where many do not distinguish clearly between the early and late theology of Luther. This leads to interpretations where ‘an experiential theologia crucis…becomes the characteristic spirituality of all Luther’s doctrine’.

To move to a new direction in Lutheran thought I shall note briefly that within the Finnish school of Lutheran studies the cross also plays a pivotal role, but this has more to do with its experiential quality rather than as the sole source of revelation of God. Tuomo Mannermaa first wrote in English about this new interpretation, where having Christ be present in faith makes, through the joyous exchange, justification to be

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104 Bayer, *Martin Luther’s Theology*, 101.
105 ‘Based on God’s love, which as such forms community, the possibility of a private happiness and of an egotistical form of salvation is excluded from the outset’. Bayer, *Martin Luther’s Theology*, 328.
107 The Finnish school is distinguished from other understandings of Luther in how it uses Luther’s understanding of Christ as present in faith to support an understanding of theosis in Luther. Mannermaa sees that as Luther does not separate the person and work in Christ, it means that ‘instead, Christ himself, both his person and his work, is the Christian righteousness, that is, the “righteousness of faith.” Christ – and therefore also his entire person and work – is really and truly present in the faith itself’. Tuomo Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith: Luther’s View of Justification*, (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 5. With this unity of person and work in Christ, it means that both the forgiveness of sins and the gift of God to the believer unite in Christ, and thus being justified means receiving the Godhead. Just as Christ took on all humanity, and in doing so all sin and overcame it, Mannermaa says that now it is a central idea of Luther’s theology that in faith human beings really participate in the person of Christ, and in the divine life and victory that come with him. Or to say it the other way round: Christ gives his person to us through faith. ‘Faith’ means participation in Christ, in whom there is no sin, death, or curse’. (Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 16.) The victory of Christ achieved by us in faith is Christ’s victory, because faith ‘unites the believer with the person of Christ, who, in himself, is the victory.’ Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 16.
a kind of theosis. This understanding of theosis, whilst beneficial for ecumenical relationships with the east, is analogous, not identical, with the Orthodox understanding of theosis, as deification occurs not as change in our human nature but in a takeover of our humanity by the deified humanity of Christ as done through the *communicatio idiomatum*. We do not participate in God but the humanity of Christ participates in God on our behalf. However this affects a change in our being. Mannermaa links his understanding of Luther’s account of theosis with a theology of the cross, in that the experience of theosis is initially one of *Anfechtung* which one must experience in order to receive the gift of Christ. Thus ‘the theology of the cross is the necessary context of the idea of participation in God’ for God nihilises the person before God gives Godself to a person, and thus the cross and *Anfechtung* ‘refers only to the destruction of the person’s constant effort to make himself god and to justify himself’. The cross then becomes participative and the goal of a theology of the cross is preparation for theosis.

Peura also emphasises the necessity of *Anfechtung*, as our self-serving love becomes idolatry. Any gifts we receive from God we must be willing to receive not because of our own merit, but for the opposite reason – for our unlovableness. Due to this self-aggrandisation we must experience *Anfechtung*, for ‘His purpose in making us almost nothing is not to destroy us, but to destro...’ Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 46.

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109 The “happy exchange” that occurs between Christ and the believer in the eyes of God in the event of justification is used as the basis for his understanding of Lutheran theosis, as ‘what takes place here between Christ and the believer is a kind of communication of attributes: Christ, the divine righteousness, truth, peace, joy, love, power, and life, gives himself to the Christian. At the same time, Christ “absorbs” the believer’s sin, death and curse into himself. As Christians thus really participate in Christ, they have no sin or death anymore’. Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 17. The crux of Mannermaa’s argument rests on his understanding that faith denotes a real union with the person of Christ, and thus of the christological underpinning of the union of person and work in Christ, ‘because to Luther faith denotes a real union with the person of Christ, his understanding of faith is directly anchored in Christology’. Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 18. Luther’s understanding of the ubiquity of Christ also helps with understanding Christ as present in faith to every believer. Mannermaa also sees a *unio personalis* of Christ and the believer, wherein God lives in the believer. Through this indwelling of Christ ‘when the reality of faith becomes incarnate in works they become works made into faith’ (opera fideificata) – or, as Luther says explicitly, “divinised works” (opera deificata).


111 Mannermaa, “Justification and Theosis” in *Union with Christ*, 39.

112 Mannermaa, “Justification and Theosis”, 39.

113 ‘The participation that is a real part of his theology is hidden under its opposite, the *passio* through which a human is emptied. It is not grasped in rational knowledge but only in faith, and the grasp faith has of it in this life is still only the beginning of a much greater participation that awaits in the eschatological fulfilment. But – and this is often forgotten – the goal of the *theologia crucis* is precisely *theosis*. Mannermaa, “Justification and Theosis”, 39.

114 Whatever form of idolatry we might consider here, the common characteristic of all of them is that God is not allowed to be God, the giver of all goodness. The goodness one should seek from God has instead been wrenched or stolen from him, preventing him from realising nature as the Giver’.

pure love, thus effecting in us a capacity for similar love'.

Thus whilst the interpretation of Luther contained here is certainly controversial, what I shall focus on here is how the theology of the cross is understood as the basis for the human experience of *Anfechtung*. In this case, this is what these interpreters see as the key emphasis of the doctrine of the theology of the cross.

From this survey of Luther and his commentators, it can be determined that even if a theology of the cross can be claimed as the underpinning of his theology, it is not explicitly stated as such throughout his career, and when it is, the emphases of the cross shift from revelation to sympathy. As it is, we can say that it is mentioned once fully, a few other times in passing, and thus its grounding influence must be drawn out, rather than taken for granted. Indeed, whilst a case can be built for it being the ground of Luther’s theology, that case can be easily contradicted and is not backed up by a close reading of Luther’s texts after the Heidelberg Disputation. What this study has shown is that if there is a consensus on the role of the theology of the cross in Luther, then it focuses on how the significance of a theology of the cross in Luther is not that of revelation, but of the importance of *Anfechtung* in the Christian life as directing us towards God. What is drawn from a theology of the cross is the necessity of *Anfechtung* in coming into a proper relationship to God in the justifying grace of God, where the human must be challenged, and emptied in order to receive the gift of God *sub contrario*. It seems that within Luther, the true significance of a theology of the cross is finding God in suffering, in *Anfechtung*.

Therefore, instead of a theology of the cross being the lens through which Luther’s theology is seen and developed, a theology of the cross is seen as being a practical aid to the Christian life. This is in how a theology of the cross corresponds to moments in the Christian life where we discover God, and discover the presence of God in and through our own experience of suffering. It is in suffering that there is an analogy to God, for all else that God is, is so unlike us and unworthy of us, according to Luther. Thus whilst there was an initial understanding that the only true revelation of God was from the cross and so was *sub contrario*, this shifted in Luther’s later works to a focus on knowing God in our own experience of suffering rather than the cross itself being the sole event

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of revelation. A theology of the cross should be seen here as an aid for theology rather than the sole source of theology.

**Hegel’s Theology of the Cross**

Jüngel writes in *God as the Mystery of the World* that after Luther, the theology of the cross fell out of use due to G.W.F. Hegel, although Jüngel sees that Hegel’s use of the death of God concept was misunderstood and neglected. Interpretation of Hegel’s oeuvre is contested philosophically, politically, socially, and theologically. However, in this section I shall be focusing on how Hegel can be seen to have influenced theology and whether it is helpful for Hegel to influence theology. I shall also mention how Hegel can be taken atheistically in order to provide a fuller account of the ambiguity of Hegel. Hegel, in a series of works from the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, through the *Encyclopaedia of Logic* and the *Science of Logic*, alongside lectures on art, history, and religion, expounded a comprehensive and systematic ontology that aimed to have a logical starting point; and which worked according to the movement and process of logic and reason mirrored on how he saw the process of human thought. There are two main views of how Hegel engages with reality and God – the right wing and the left wing or more simplistically the theistic and the atheistic view of Spirit. Whether that is an accurate representation of Hegel or a false dichotomy is incidental to our enquiry, instead what must be understood is that these two interpretations exist and have shaped scholarship on Hegel and theology. According to “right wing” interpreters, the Absolute Spirit in Hegel’s thought is synonymous with a Christian God, who is the ultimate reality that humanity comes to know both through experience and thought, but in such a way that it is gained through philosophy in contrast to theology; as philosophy informs our eventual understanding through concept, rather than through representation, which Hegel sees as the role of theology. It certainly can be said of Hegel that the end of knowledge is God, as Hegel writes that philosophy ‘has no other object but God and so is essentially rational theology and, as the servant of the truth, a continual divine service’. However, the latter, “left-wing” view sees Hegel as extending Kant’s critique of metaphysics and

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116 The history of the alienation between theology and talk about the death of God began primarily with the intellectual accomplishments of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This happened paradoxically in his attempt to reconcile philosophy with the theological meaning of the philosophically intolerable thought of the death of God, which was the negation of the absolute. Eberhard Jüngel, *God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism*, trans. Darrell Guder, (Grand Rapids MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1983), 55.

moving all knowledge to embodied human existence within the world, looking at nothing outwith it, making there no Absolute outside or beyond ourselves. Thus the Spirit that Hegel refers to is not a transcendent God as understood by theology but instead an ideal of human knowing.

In order to see how Jüngel sees Hegel as influential I shall look at where Hegel engages specifically with the cross, which occurs in Faith and Knowledge. Following that I shall look briefly at the Hegelian system as it is presented in the Phenomenology of Spirit and in so doing look at the reasons put forward by the more “left-wing” interpreters of Hegel as to why the system is profoundly anti-metaphysical, with no need of reality outside or beyond ourselves. Finally, I shall look at Hegel’s Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion to find out how Hegel in his later years understood Christianity in particular. Moreover, it can be argued that all of these works draw on a theology of the cross, here understood initially in Hegel as a speculative Good Friday, which transmutes in the Phenomenology to the engagement of Spirit with negativity, and culminates in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion as the actual death of Christ on the cross.

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118 Hegel’s writings about religion prior to Faith and Knowledge are seen as a phase through which he passed as Hegel’s work from the Stift was unpublished during his lifetime, which some have argued means that he did not mean it to be seen. These works certainly have a different character to his more mature work. Within it there is an understanding of a folk religion that influences the heart, and this understanding of religion is one where the highest form of religiosity is one that is informed by reason and the command to love, as opposed to defined by doctrinal debates. Moreover, there is a rather Kantian insistence on the importance of duty and virtue, in that ‘the difference between a pure religion of reason, which worships God in spirit and in truth, affirming that he is served through virtue alone, and an idolatrous faith, which imagines it can curry God’s favour by some means other than a will that is in itself good, is so great that in comparison the latter is utterly worthless’. (G.W.F. Hegel, The Tübingen Essay, in Three Essays 1793-1795 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 45). This is carried through in the “Berne Fragments”, where Hegel writes that ‘religion’s proper task is to strengthen, by means of the idea of God as moral lawgiver, what impels us to act ethically and to enhance the satisfaction we derive from performing what our practical reason demands, specifically with regard to the ultimate end that reason postis: the highest good’. (Hegel, “Berne Fragments”, 93.), and reaches its apex in Hegel’s retelling of the “Life of Jesus”, which depicts Jesus as composed and dignified, giving paraphrased speeches about the importance of virtuous acts and the fulfillment of duty, all in line with pure reason, which ‘transcending all limits, is divinity itself – whereby and in accordance with which the very plan of the world is ordered’. (Hegel, “The Life of Jesus”, 104.) This understanding of Jesus is then carried through into Hegel’s Early Theological Writings, where Hegel sees that ‘Jesus had the pain of seeing the complete failure of his zealous attempt to introduce freedom and morality into the religious life of his people, and the very ambiguous and incomplete effect even of his efforts to kindle higher hopes and a better faith at least in those few men with whom he was more intimately associated and whom he sought to shape for their own good and the support of his enterprise. Jesus himself was sacrificed to the rising hatred of the priesthood and the mortified national vanity of the Jews.’ (Hegel, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion”, in Early Theological Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 180-1.) There is hostility on Hegel’s part towards Judaism and Jews in this text. This failure and the tragedy is compounded as later ‘we do see his successors renouncing Jewish trivialities, but they are not altogether purified of the spirit of dependence on such things. Out of what Jesus said, out of what he suffered in his person, they soon fashioned rules and moral commands, and free emulation of their teacher soon passed over into slavish service of their Lord’. (Hegel, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion”, 181.) We can see that Hegel’s engagement with theology was always rather unconventional.
Considering the range of views that can be formed of Hegel, it is an interesting question to ask whether Hegel is to be judged more appropriately by philosophical thinkers or theological thinkers. As I shall explore in Chapter Two, commentators looking at Hegel and Jüngel tend to look at whether Jüngel interprets Hegel correctly on the terms of Hegel’s own (disputed) philosophical endeavour. In considering both a philosophical and a theological critique of Hegel, this will aid discussion later on about Jüngel’s use of Hegel, especially of whether one can use Hegel even partially, or whether any use brings with it the entire system and all that it entails.

**Faith and Knowledge**

Talk of the death of God appears first in Hegel’s work *Faith and Knowledge* (1802), which explores the presentation of God in the thought of Kant, Jacobi and Fichte and the alienation of humanity from God that results. Hegel sees that in their thought, ‘God is represented as somehow “beyond” human capacities of knowing and therefore not a proper object of reason. This means that these philosophies can only ever deliver knowledge of humanity; not of God’.119 This is Hegel’s reaction to the success of the Enlightenment in how it changed the boundaries of human thinking yet he sees that it failed in setting these boundaries too low.120 Due to this Hegel sees that reason and religion are now seen as mutually exclusive, as in Kant where faith begins where reason stops (‘I must deny reason to make room for faith’).121

Moreover Hegel notes in *Faith and Reason* that the thought of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte set up a bad understanding of the relationship between the finite and infinite where ‘the absoluteness of the finite and of empirical reality is still maintained in these

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120 ‘Enlightened Reason won a glorious victory over what it believed, in its limited conception of religion, to be faith as opposed to Reason. Yet seen in a clear light the victory comes to no more than this: the positive element with which Reason busied itself to do battle, is no longer religion, and victorious Reason is no longer Reason. The new born peace that hovers triumphantly over the corpse of Reason and faith, uniting them as the child both, has as little of Reason in it as it has of authentic faith.’ G.W.F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, ed. Cerf and Harris, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), 55.
122 ‘According to Kant, the supersensuous is incapable of being known by Reason; the highest Idea does not at the same time have reality. According to Jacobi, “Reason is ashamed to beg and has no hands and feet for digging.” Only the feeling and consciousness of his ignorance of the True is given to man, only an inkling a divination of the True in Reason, Reason being something subjective, though universal – an instinct. According to Fichte, God is something incomprehensible and unthinkable. Knowledge knows nothing save that it knows thing; it must take refuge in faith. All of them agree that, as the old distinction put it, the Absolute is no more against Reason than it is for it; it is beyond Reason’. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, p.56.
Philosophies. The infinite and the finite remain absolutely opposed. Ideality is conceived
only as the concept.\textsuperscript{123} Hegel sees that this has left humanity in a situation where the
human is conceived as ‘not a glowing spark of eternal beauty, or a spiritual focus of the
universe, but an absolute sensibility. He does, however, have the faculty of faith so that
he can touch himself up here and there with a spot of alien supersensuousness’.\textsuperscript{124}

This philosophical landscape is unsatisfactory for Hegel, and the entire enterprise seems
doomed to failure or worse for Hegel, one-sidedness. Hegel here shows glimpses of the
system of reconciliation, where here the incarnation of God is noted as the original
possibility of reconciliation: ‘the identity of the possibility with the actuality through the
spirit is the union of the subjective side with God made man. Thus the world itself is in
itself reconstructed and redeemed and hallowed in quite another way than the volcanoes,
etc.’\textsuperscript{125}

For Hegel, previous thought has moved the question of God from that of objective
knowledge to that of subjective knowledge, and in doing so has also ‘recast the
dogmatism of being into the dogmatism of thinking, the metaphysic of objectivity into
the metaphysic of subjectivity’.\textsuperscript{126} Moreover, the philosophers mentioned separate out
infinity and finitude in such a way that never shall the twain meet.\textsuperscript{127} Hegel finds that

\begin{quote}
The pure concept or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all being
is engulfed, must signify the infinite grief [of the finite] purely as a moment
of the supreme Idea, and no more than a moment. Formerly, the infinite
grief only existed historically in the formative process of culture. It existed
as the feeling that “God Himself is dead,” upon which the religion of more
recent times rests.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

The only way in which this can be overcome is through a Speculative Good Friday,
where, as on the historical or Christian understanding of Good Friday, this idea that is
prevalent in the philosophy of the time must die. The Speculative Good Friday ‘must re-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[123] Hegel, \textit{Faith and Knowledge}, 61.
\item[125] Hegel, \textit{Faith and Knowledge}, 181.
\item[126] Hegel, \textit{Faith and Knowledge}, 189.
\item[127] ‘They make infinity into an absolute principle, so that it becomes infected by its opposition to finitude. For they
recognise that thinking is infinity, the negative side of the Absolute. Infinity is the pure nullification of the antithesis
or of finitude; but it is at the same time also the spring of eternal movement, the spring of that finitude which is
infinite, because it eternally nullifies itself. Out of this nothing and pure night of infinity, as out of the secret abyss
that is its birthplace, the truth lifts itself upward’. Hegel, \textit{Faith and Knowledge}, 190.
\item[128] Hegel, \textit{Faith and Knowledge}, 190.
\end{footnotes}
establish for philosophy the Idea of absolute freedom and along with it the absolute Passion, the speculative Good Friday in place of the historic Good Friday. Good Friday must be speculatively re-established in the whole truth and harshness of its Godforsakenness.¹²⁹

This move of Hegel’s must be examined. For what understanding of God can be born from those ashes? Whether Hegel’s later work answers that question is subject to much contention. Furthermore, is the actual, historic death of God replaced with a movement of thought? Whilst Hegel does not separate thought and being, is God dying speculatively an echo of the actual crucifixion? In other words, is there still a religious significance to Good Friday, or has it been subsumed into speculative thought, where Hegel sees what Good Friday historically meant for reconciliation in religious terms and then applies that same movement to philosophy? However, despite these questions what is more pertinent here is that within this work there is an echoing of one of Luther’s intentions in a theology of the cross, where a false understanding of something is killed off through the event of the cross. Although here this seems to happen only speculatively and there appears to be no identification of another, proper way of thinking of God.

Thus I now turn to the Phenomenology where there appear hints of what could be seen as a trinitarian movement of Spirit, as a dynamic Absolute that follows the pattern of revelation. In order to see this, a brief explanation of the Hegelian system in its entirety must be undertaken. The system is laid out, as Cyril O’Regan sees it,¹³⁰ as a Bildungsroman which details the long, torturous personal journey that must be made by the consciousness in thought through stages of life in order to reach the Absolute, truth, which will turn out to be consciousness grasping its own essence. However, this is not easily said or done, or even easily depicted.

¹²⁹ Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, 191.
The Phenomenology of the Spirit

In the Preface of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel likens the process that humanity undergoes, which involves movement, and engagement with failure and negation to the development of fruit, in that

The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.¹³¹

In other words, the movement of spirit is that of a slow ripening which overrides the previous structures but does not obviate them. Instead, they are an essential part of the process. This whole understanding of Spirit ‘hangs on apprehending the truth not merely as *substance* but also equally as *subject*.¹³² For whilst it is important that there is a solid certainty to truth, or Spirit, or the Absolute, for Hegel ‘it is to be noted that substantiality comprises within itself the universal that is, it comprises not only the *immediacy of knowledge* but also the immediacy of *being*, that is, *immediacy for knowledge*.¹³³

Spirit, truth, and the Absolute ‘is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end’.¹³⁴ It cannot be isolated, static and out of reach of humanity, but instead ‘the life of God and divine cognition might thus be expressed as a game love plays with itself’.¹³⁵ However, this life needs the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative; otherwise it lowers itself into edification, and by being mere edification becomes trite. The whole cannot be seen as any less than ‘the essence completing itself through its own development’.¹³⁶

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¹³² Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §17, 10.
¹³³ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §17, 10.
¹³⁴ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §18, 10.
¹³⁵ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §18, 10.
¹³⁶ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §20, 11.
This triteness is avoided by having everything mediated through this prism of process; for Hegel mediation is necessary, nothing is to be unmediated and therefore Spirit ‘is nothing but self-moving self-sameness, or it is a reflective turn into itself, the moment of the I existing-for-itself, pure negativity, that is, *simple coming-to-be*.\(^\text{137}\) This follows on from Aristotle’s understanding of nature as purposive; for Hegel, this process is captured by reason, which is itself purposive activity. Whether this Spirit is God or not is ambiguous, as the mention of God appears to be minor, and when it appears it is as a designation of something ‘that it is neither a being nor an essence not a universal per se which is posited; what is posited is what is reflected into itself, a subject’.\(^\text{138}\) This is elaborated on further as ‘that the true is only actual as a system, or that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the representation that expresses that absolute as *spirit* – the most sublime concept and the one which belongs to modernity and its religion. The spiritual alone is the *actual*; it is the essence, that is, what *exists-in-itself*.\(^\text{139}\) The way in which this Spirit moves ‘is *science*. Science is its proper actuality, and science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element’.\(^\text{140}\) The movement of truth is one to be emulated, as ‘science requires that self-consciousness shall have elevated itself into this ether in order to be able to live with science and to live in science, and, for that matter, to be able to live at all. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint’.\(^\text{141}\)

Knowledge, however, is not merely a positive progression, it involves a separation and an engagement with negativity, which is the power of progression. For ‘the activity of separating is the force and labour of the *understanding*, the most astonishing and the greatest of powers, or, rather, which is the absolute power’.\(^\text{142}\) There has to be an engagement with what should nullify the consciousness, where

> The accidental, separated from its surroundings, attains an isolated freedom and its own proper existence only in its being bound to other actualities, and only existing in their context; as such, it is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure I. Death, if that is what we wish to call that non-actuality, is the most fearful thing of all, and to keep and hold fast to what is dead requires only the greatest force.\(^\text{143}\)

\(^{137}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §21, 11.


\(^{139}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §25, 14.

\(^{140}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §25, 14.

\(^{141}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §26, 14.

\(^{142}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §32, 18.

\(^{143}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §32, 19.
Spirit does not shrink from this task, as ‘the life of spirit is not a life that is fearing death and austerely saving itself from ruin; rather, it bears death calmly, and in death, it sustains itself’\(^{144}\), for ‘spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and lingering with it. The lingering is the magical power that converts it into being’\(^{145}\).

It is important to note here that the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* can be interpreted atheistically, where Spirit is purely the movement of human thought, which is the totality of all things. Richard Schacht, in his commentary on the Preface, notes that in combating both the excesses of empiricism and romanticism, Hegel focuses on reason and thus the Absolute rests on an understanding of philosophical enquiry that has the characteristics of a reasonable system. Philosophy is genuine self-knowledge,\(^{146}\) and negation drives this process by finding the inadequacies in each stage and overcoming them. The process is a long way of knowing oneself.\(^{147}\) This means that there needs to be no Absolute that is truly outside ourselves, therefore designating Spirit as God is a move that is not sanctioned and thus relation of “God” to the concept of Spirit or the Absolute is not correct,\(^{148}\) for ‘God’s life is nothing other than existing consciousness, which develops from the simplest forms of consciousness to its highest form, Absolute Knowledge’.\(^{149}\)

\(^{144}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §32, 19.

\(^{145}\) Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §32, 19.

\(^{146}\) Consciousness does not realize that what it has before it (for-itself) is what it *itself essentially is* (in-itself). Only when consciousness recognizes this - only when it sees that ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are but two sides or aspects of the same fundamental reality (viz., spirit, which is both substance and subject) - is the appearance of a subject object split overcome. Then genuine self-knowledge - which is also genuine knowledge of the nature of reality generally - is at last achieved. Only then is it appropriate to speak of the existence, not merely of ‘spirit in itself’ and ‘spirit for-itself’, but of ‘spirit in-and-for-itself’. And with this, the end of the process of spirit’s self-realization is reached. Richard Schacht, “A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the Spirit*”, *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, 23:1/2, 1972, 1-31, 9.

\(^{147}\) (Although it does not recognize this to be the case until it reaches the end of its development) its object is never anything other than the ‘substance’ or structural content of spirit - which is nothing other than its own substantial content. Thus its object, in other words, is always only its *self*; but in its naive and simpler forms, it fails to see this, and regards its objects as something *other* than itself. Its objects are something other than *itself qua-subject* or thinking activity; for they are *itself-qua-substance*. And until it achieves an adequate knowledge of its own nature, as “spirit.” Schacht, “A Commentary”, 28.

\(^{148}\) Insofar as it is legitimate philosophically to speak of ‘God’ at all - *is* nothing other than “spirit knowing itself as spirit”, as this notion has been developed in the preceding discussion. God’s *nature* is nothing other than the Begriff, as this is set forth in philosophical Logic’. Schacht, “A Commentary”, 29.

Terry Pinkard also holds this view in “What is a Shape of Spirit?” as the process in Hegel involves the individual rather than something outside the individual. However, Pinkard acknowledges here that Hegel is using religious terms such as self-emptying and reconciliation although he sees that Hegel is secularising them, in that this emptying of the self and reconciling with the other is a unity of thought and being that is reflected in personal interactions. It cannot be denied, even amongst the more vocal religious supporters of Hegel, that his system can be interpreted as meaning that Spirit is just the human realising themselves as spirit, where Spirit is not something separate from humanity and the world at all. However, it shall be explored whether this view can be upheld when Hegel talks explicitly about God and religion.

**Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion**

I shall now turn to Hegel’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, and how that frames the Christian religion as the consummate and fully revealed vehicle of Spirit. Hegel’s trinitarian thought is explicated most thoroughly in the 1827 lectures, which all lead on from themes brought forward in the manuscript and discussed in the 1824 lectures. I shall be focusing on the 1827 lectures as it in them that Hegel becomes more theological than ever before, and focuses most explicitly on the Trinity. Hegel starts off these lectures by defining what the consummate religion is, looking at previous iterations of it throughout history and sees that through the First Element, which is the Idea of God In and For Itself, what could perilously be termed the immanent Trinity, and then the Second Element, that of Representation and Appearance, which again could be perilously termed the economic Trinity. With this triadic idea and movement the consummate religion is revealed. Thus the history of the Trinity on earth is the history of reconciliation, and the Trinity as revealed on earth is an externalisation of the inner life of God, for as discussed above, the movement towards reconciliation is not

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150 It ‘involves the way in which an individual is conscious of the natural world around him, how he represents that world to himself, how he represents himself to himself and to others and how he represents others to himself’. Terry Pinkard, “What is a Shape of Spirit?” Hegel’s *Phenomenology at 200*, ed. Dean Moyar and Michael Quante, (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/21288399/Articles%20for%20Webpage/What%20is%20a%20Shape%20of %20Spirit.pdf, (accessed 25th January 2013), 1.

151 ‘The two beautiful souls “intuit” themselves in each other, see that they are different versions of the same attitude, and thus prepare themselves for the more explicit acts of forgiveness and reconciliation, for a reaffirmation of the sociality that binds them together rather than clinging to the fantasy of self-sufficiency and the mental fanaticism attendant on it’. Pinkard, “What is a Shape of Spirit?” 12. Pinkard notes also in the same passage that ‘that capacity of reconciliation and forgiveness, which cannot be understood except as the secularisation of a religious practice that itself has its own developmental and dialectical history’. Pinkard, “What is a Shape of Spirit?” 12.
something foreign for Hegel’s thought. Instead due to Hegel’s understanding of Spirit reconciliation is not effected for Hegel because of a broken relationship that needs repairing, it is the innate structure of life and thought. Thus in these lectures Hegel retells the Christian narrative of creation, fall, redemption, and establishment of community within the narrative of his understanding of Spirit, and sees the Christian faith as the consummating religion due to its closeness to his understanding of the movement of Spirit.

Religion is seen as human consciousness of God, and Christianity the consummate religion as it affirms a God who is Spirit and absolute essence whose nature is both to self-differentiate and to reveal itself. Hegel states that ‘it is the essence of God as spirit to be for another, i.e., to reveal himself’.\(^ {152}\) This is not static, but a dynamic act, as ‘God is this process of positing the other and then sublating it in his eternal movement. Thus the essence of Spirit is to appear to itself, to manifest itself’.\(^ {153}\) Hegel uses triadic themes frequently, and both in the 1824 and the 1827 lectures, Hegel sees Spirit as having a threefold form into which it posits itself. These are (1) eternal being within and present to itself: universality (2) the form of appearance, that of particularization, of being-for-others and (3) the form of return from appearance into self, absolute singularity, absolute presence-to-self.\(^ {154}\) As it happens in the world, so it happens also outwith the world, as ‘Spirit is the divine history, the process of self-differentiation, of diremption and return to self; it is the divine history and therefore is to be viewed in each of the three forms’.\(^ {155}\)

Thus true religion will recognize and emphasis this above all else; ‘consciousness relating itself to its essence, knowing itself as its essence and knowing its essence as its own, and that is spiritual religion. This means that spirit is the object of religion, and the object of the latter essence knowing itself – is spirit’.\(^ {156}\) True religion is reconciliation; it is a return, a relation of spirit to spirit, its ‘fulfillment is itself’.\(^ {157}\) In order for God to reconcile the world ‘finitude must be posited in God himself, not as something


\(^{153}\) Hegel, *LPR III*, 170.

\(^{154}\) Hegel, *LPR III*, 186.


\(^{156}\) Hegel, *LPR III*, 251.

\(^{157}\) Hegel, *LPR III*, 251.
insurmountable, absolute, independent, but above all as this process of distinguishing that we have seen in spirit and in consciousness – a distinguishing that, because it is a transitory moment and because finitude is no truth, is eternally self-sublating'.  
However, in positing finitude as a necessary moment in God, is Hegel necessitating the world, and not only the world, but also the incarnation? Hegel also talks about positing an other in God, in the first movement of spirit; yet it is hard to know what that other in God that God has to reconcile Godself with could be.

Whilst Hegel sees that God can and does exist only for Godself, to exist for Godself means to be this process of engagement and negation, as God’s act is God’s being. It would be interesting to know what God has to reconcile in Godself, for the otherness cannot be such that there is a difference in essence. Hegel writes that the Son is distinct and different from the Father, but unlike in traditional theology there is no mention of differentiation through relations or source. Hegel merely states that ‘the Son is other than the Father, and this otherness is difference – otherwise it would not be spirit’ for ‘spirit is the process of self-differentiating, positing of distinctions’. This mirrors our own thought processes, as Hegel states that God/Spirit needs to be understood and known in three ways, (1) as for thinking or in itself (2) God for finite, external and empirical spirit, for sensible intuition, for finite spirit as finite spirit, and (3) for sensibility, for subjectivity, as present in the community.

I turn now to Hegel’s understanding of the cross. Hegel's understanding of humanity and human action is essentially positive in that humanity can realise and achieve salvation of sorts by its own efforts, and the whole knowledge of God is not contained and only known in the event of the cross. Instead, knowledge of God is contained within knowing the process of thought. What Hegel does in his understanding of the death of Jesus is to think God and death together, and not think them as contradictory or opposite. For death is part of the process of Spirit having come into the world,

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159 'The vitality of God or of spirit is nothing other than a self-determining (which can also appear as a predicate), a self-possing in finitude, [which involves] distinction and contradiction, but is at the same time an eternal sublating of this contradiction. This is the life, the deed, the activity of God; he is absolute activity, creative energy and his activity is to posit himself in contradiction, but eternally to resolve and reconcile this contradiction: God himself is the resolving of these contradictions'. Hegel, *LPR III*, 271.
161 Hegel, *LPR III*, 311.
posing finitude within itself, and leading us away from the evil that is one-sidedness. It is a drive towards knowledge as ‘Spirit presses towards its truth because it has an infinite cleavage and anguish within itself’.\textsuperscript{163} The death of Christ is important to Hegel for what it shows about Spirit, which is that death becomes mediated, and thus can be reconciled with God.\textsuperscript{164} This shows both the truth of Spirit and the way that humanity can follow,\textsuperscript{165} and shows further that there is no otherness in Hegel’s thought between God and humanity. Due to this act of reconciliation, ‘even the human is not something alien to him [God], but rather that this otherness, this self-distinguishing, finitude as it is expressed, is a moment in God himself, although, to be sure, it is a disappearing moment’.\textsuperscript{166}

This lack of otherness and the importance of reconciliation is a feature of love for Hegel, as ‘the Holy Spirit itself, or, so expressed, in the mode of sensibility, it is eternal love: the Holy Spirit is eternal love’.\textsuperscript{167} God is love, and ‘love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each other. The consciousness or feeling of the identity of the two – to be outside of myself and in the other – this is love’.\textsuperscript{168} Love unites and yet preserves, for ‘without knowing love is both a distinguishing and the sublating of the distinction, one speaks emptily of it. This is the simple, eternal idea’.\textsuperscript{169} Hegel uses this to describe what he sees as the life of God in Godself, of Spirit, where ‘its proper content, its determination, is to posit this distinction and then absolutely to sublate it, this is the vitality of the idea itself’.\textsuperscript{170} Hegel sees the role of the Spirit both in the Trinity and within the community as facilitating friendship and love, as ‘in friendship and love I give up my abstract personality and

\textsuperscript{163} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 316.
\textsuperscript{164} ‘This humanity in God – and indeed the most abstract form of humanity, the greatest dependence, the ultimate weakness, the utmost fragility – is natural death. “God himself is dead,” it says in a Lutheran hymn, expressing an awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself; that finitude, negativity, otherness are not outside God and do not, as otherness hinder unity with God. Otherness, the negative, is known to be a moment of the divine nature itself. This involves the highest idea of spirit.’ Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 326.
\textsuperscript{165} ‘The truth to which human beings have attained by means of this history, what they have become conscious of in this entire history, is the following: that the idea of God has certainty for them, that humanity has attained the certainty of unity with God, that the human is the immediately present God. Indeed, within this history as spirit comprehends it, there is the very presentation of the process of what humanity, what spirit is – implicitly both God and dead.’ Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 326.
\textsuperscript{166} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 327.
\textsuperscript{167} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 276.
\textsuperscript{168} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 276.
\textsuperscript{169} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 276.
\textsuperscript{170} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 278.
thereby win it back as concrete’.\textsuperscript{171} The community that the Spirit establishes is called to live out this life, where ‘God is the one who as living spirit distinguishes himself from himself, posits an other and in this other remains identical with himself, has in this other his identity with himself. This is the truth’,\textsuperscript{172} and this is done in love, for ‘this otherness is what eternally posits and eternally sublates itself; the self-positing and sublatting of otherness is love or spirit’.\textsuperscript{173}

Yet Hegel does not see his engagement with Christianity as theology (which he sees as representational), instead he sees it as philosophy (which is conceptual). Whilst Hegel does now explicitly incorporate theology into his understanding of his philosophical system, theology does not remain in its original state and there is in Hegel’s account of God and the life of God a determinateness that is hard to combine with an understanding of God as free, although Hegel’s account of God is certainly triadic in a way that more traditional theologians are criticised for neglecting. Moreover, as noted above, Hegel retains an ambiguity about whether God is or was ever truly other to humanity. Whilst in Hegel’s \textit{Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion} there is more scope for favourable Christian interpretation it seems as if that comes as an afterthought to the entire system, and concepts such as community, love, the fall, and redemption are restructured to fit a movement of Spirit that Spirit has little choice in following through with.

\textbf{Reflection}

Thus, the importance of Hegel for a theology of the cross is in how he thinks God and negativity, and negativity as death, as not being separate from or incompatible with each other. Within Hegel there is a unity of life and death in his understanding of Spirit, opening the way to seeing death and God as not opposed to each other, but as involved in the other. Moreover, it enables God and death to be thought in such a way that death does not destroy, but instead becomes a necessary part of understanding, who God is. Theologians who interpret Hegel favourably frequently note this aspect of Hegel’s thought. Aside from this understanding of the relationship of God to death, Hegel’s account of the triadic logic of Spirit and the closeness of God with the world are seen as

\textsuperscript{171} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 286.
\textsuperscript{172} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 293.
\textsuperscript{173} Hegel, \textit{LPR III}, 312.
positive influences on theology. This is because it shows how Hegel’s God is not a God that is distant, nor one that affirms distance between God and humanity. However, this is only achieved in Hegel’s thought by having God be synonymous with human thought. For God is seen as knowable, discoverable, logical and rational, and whilst there is an attraction in that, in being able to know, grasp, understand God, and not to have God so beyond ourselves, it does mean there is no desire in God for humanity, and moreover, it can be argued that we strictly do not need any revelation in Hegel in spite of what he writes in the Lectures. Instead, we could come to know God from just thinking a bit more, and a bit better. In knowing our mind, in knowing how we think, we have seen and know the mind of God.

174 Laurence Dickey sees that Hegel grounded his anthropology in Christianity, and gave humanity a religious nature and a dignity (Laurence Dickey, “Hegel on religion and philosophy”, Cambridge Companion to Hegel (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 301-347, 307-8). However Dickey does note that Hegel was ‘constantly criticized for having cut the core – literally, the heart - out of Christianity’. Dickey, “Hegel on religion and philosophy”. 315. Williams notes that Hegel binds God up with the notion of making sense, (Rowan Williams, “Hegel and the gods of post-modernity”, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology ed. Mike Higton (London: SCM Press, 2007), 25-34, 30) but appreciates Hegel’s stress on reconciliation in how everything is mediated, and the structuring narrative of the incarnation in Hegel’s thought so that ‘no otherwise is unthinkable’. Williams, “Logic and Spirit”, Wrestling with Angels, 35-52, 36-37. Williams also praises Hegel’s reconception of divine simplicity and focus on the self-relatedness of God, and the interconnectedness of all aspects of Christian revelation, the Trinity, Christ, the incarnation, life, and death of Christ, the resurrection, Pentecost and eventually the parousia. (Williams, “Logic and Spirit”). Kung is also positive about Hegel’s relationship to theology, where for him Hegel’s work is prolegomena to any future christology, as Hegel emphasises the nearness of God in Hegel’s thought. (Hans Küng, The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel’s Thought as Prolegomena to any future Christology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987), 132). However, Küng does not appreciate the primacy of reason in Hegel’s thought that exists at the expense of love, or the elevation of religion to philosophy. (Küng, The Incarnation of God, 159-160). Lauer also appreciates the melding of God and intelligibility, (Quentin Lauer, Hegel’s Concept of God (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), 1) which entails a rejection of unhelpful ideas of God’s mystery, where ‘they are downgrading man by wrapping him in a cloud of mystification’. (Lauer, Hegel’s Concept of God, 265). Martin de Nys notes incarnational and trinitarian affirmations are in Hegel (Martin de Nys, Hegel and Theology, (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 49), whilst Ward finds Hegel’s heterodoxy a natural part of the development of Christian doctrine: ‘Orthodoxy is not a closed system or some repository of abstract truth claims. There may be a theological grammar, but if our God-talk is not simply to lapse into inauthentic formulations – then theology has to be rethought, authentically, in every generation as the operations of God unfold in new understandings of the world and what it is to be human. Orthodoxy is an unfinished project and an ongoing praxis of faith seeking understanding that has to take materiality and history seriously. Hegel understood that’. (Graham Ward, “How Hegel Became a Philosopher: Logos and the Economy of Logic”, Critical Research on Religion, December 2013, 1,3, 270-292), 283. Hodgson sees that Hegel’s ‘accomplishment as a philosopher of religion was to create a philosophical theology that transformed the metaphorical language of religion into a conceptuality that spoke to the modern world, while at the same time it provided that world with spiritual depth and meaning’. (Peter C. Hodgson, G.W.F. Hegel: Theologian of the Spirit (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 1) Hodgson also appreciates how Hegel sees God as essentially dynamic and self-revealing (Hodgson, G.W.F. Hegel, 7). Fackenheim emphasises love in Hegel, as ‘Hegel’s Christian, then, affirms the Trinities: the pre-worldly Trinitarian play eternally complete apart from the world, and the real Trinitarian incarnation into the world, which can forever conquer death only by forever suffering it. But the bond between the two Trinities is Love’. Emil L. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought (Bloomington: IUP, 1967), 153. Yet Fackenheim affirms the priority of philosophy over theology. James Yerkes sees that the reconciling work of love is higher than that of reason in Hegel, where love ‘unites man with man, and man with God at the level of Gefühl and Herc… “Love proper” or “true union” consists in the actual reconciliation of living beings in community beyond the abstractly theological deliverances of Verstand and Vernunft – or practical reason per se. (James Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel (Albany: SUNY, 1983), 15). Furthermore, the engagement with negativity affirms for Yerkes the centrality of the crucified Christ. Andrew Shanks finds that Hegel is ‘the prime Christian advocate, and refiner, of second modernity, he sets out, once and for all, to rescue the Christian gospel from church ideology, the limitations of first modernity; and to rethink it systematically as inspiration for the politics of a secular state, ideally dedicated to freedom’. (Andrew Shanks, Hegel and Religious Faiths: Divided Brain, Atoning Spirit (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 162).
Therefore it must be said overall that Hegel should be used with caution; his theological faults are legion, although the way in which his theology avoids any sense of God being static aids a perichoretic understanding of God. However, this should be tempered with an understanding of God as still beyond us and still other to us even in God’s likeness to us in the incarnation. Strictly taken, Hegel’s thought cannot provide this God. Moreover, even the engagement with negativity is not a decision God makes to be with humanity, but just an expression of what Spirit is. The system can be shifted to be more friendly to Christian doctrine, yet it seems that in shifting the understanding of knowing and experiencing God this is getting away from what I see as the true sense of Hegel’s system, which is that there is no otherness, no beyondness, but all is revealed and more importantly, all is known and understood in such a sense that the revelation is no longer needed.176

175 Lakeland notes that religion is, for Hegel, merely a step along the way of the journey of spirit, (Paul Lakeland, “A New Pietism: Hegel and Recent Christology”, The Journal of Religion, 68:1, 57-71, 58), but appreciates the vestigium trinitatis that Hegel establishes in the human mind (Lakeland, “A New Pietism”, 60). However, Lakeland does note that ‘to argue for a close relationship between Hegel’s Spirit and the Christian God involves a view of the Christian God that not all Christians would recognize, just as it requires an interpretation of the Hegelian Spirit that not all Hegelian scholars can stomach’. Lakeland, “A New Pietism”. 61. Nicholas Adams appreciates the reconciling logic in Hegel’s thought, and the way in which it enables one to think, which he labels as Chalcedonian in how it resolves false oppositions, and how it reconciles and is participative. However, whilst he laments the hostile and often ill-informed treatment that Hegel has received from theologians, Adams also notes that there is not much safeguarding of the infinite qualitative difference between humanity and God, (Nicholas Adams, The Eclipse of Grace (Oxford/Sussex/MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 96-7), and that certainly regarding the Trinity Hegel writes more on the logic of thought, rather than the actual Trinity. (Adams, The Eclipse of Grace, 245). Schlitt acknowledges the trinitarian logic in Hegel, but notes that ‘Hegel cannot establish his trinitarian claim as he intended to, namely, on the basis of an argumentation in the public realm from infinite to finite. Hegel’s argument presupposes a prior movement from finite to infinite’. (Dale M. Schlitt, Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim: A Critical Reflection (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1984), p.7) Schlitt also sees that ‘Hegel has taken up and transposed “God” in logic to self-positioning resultant Subject and in the final systematic moment, philosophy, to absolute Spirit with the identification of Concept and Self’. (Schlitt, Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim”, 33.). Beiser remarks favourably on Hegel’s emphasis on love as self-surrender, where ‘love is the paradoxical process whereby the self both loses itself (as an individual) and finds or gains itself (as part of a wider whole). Love contains therefore the moments of self-surrender and also of self-discovery. There is a moment of self-surrender in love because the self loses itself by renouncing self-interest as its ultimate value, and by ceasing to define itself in opposition to others. There is also a moment of self-discovery because in love the self also finds itself in and through the other; it sees that it is no longer something opposed to the other but the unity of itself with the other. Hegel has in mind the common experience of love where one makes oneself richer by giving to the other’. (Frederick Beiser, Hegel (NY: Routledge, New York, 2005), 114). However, in later iterations of the Hegelian system, this is lost in favour of rationality (Beiser, Hegel, 120). Beiser describes Hegel’s system as a rational Christianity in contrast to Luther, where ‘Hegel’s God is rational and acts from the necessity of its own nature alone; Luther’s God is mysterious and acts according to free decrees. Hegel’s absolute idealism opposes all forms of dualism; Luther’s theology is based upon his dualism between the heavenly and earthly. While Luther’s faith is based on the Bible, the record of supernatural revelation, Hegel does not believe in miracles and thinks that the Bible is an insufficient foundation for the faith’. Beiser, Hegel, p.145-6. Paul Fiddes is generally positive about Hegel, appreciating the sense in Hegel of God coming to humanity and being grasped by humanity, as well as the engagement with negativity that brings oppositions into the life of God (Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: OUP, 1992), 232). However, Fiddes notes that ‘overall, Hegel’s scheme is a magisterial working out of the pattern of the positive generating the negative as the dynamism of divine life, but it must be questioned whether we can accept his claim that the negativity of non-being which God encounters is an alien one’. (Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, 236). Furthermore, the stress on logic and rationality exists for Fiddes at the expense of love, joy and spontaneity, there is no desire in God, just system.

176 Cyril O’Regan, whilst noting Hegel’s claims to Lutheranism says that ‘Hegel is almost certainly moving beyond Luther and Lutheran orthodoxy when he suggests that the theologoumen of the Trinity is the Christian principle, the central symbol of the living God’. (O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel, 66.). William Desmond is particularly hostile to Hegel’s account of God, noting that ‘an idol is not less an idol for being wrought from thought and concept as from
Aside from Hegel’s theological pitfalls, the role of the cross in Hegel’s thought can be seen to be both a challenge to the previous understanding of God and as a moment in the system that Hegel proposes. Whilst Hegel uses a theology of the cross, and introduces again the dark idea of the death of God into theological discourse, it appears only as part of a wider system that may not even be particularly healthy theologically. Yet it is not just due to the reintroduction of the death of God that Jüngel finds Hegel’s contributions helpful, but also Hegel’s linking of the act and being of God and his understanding of love.

**Bonhoeffer’s Theology of the Cross**

I turn now to Bonhoeffer. Jüngel references Bonhoeffer’s work in *Letters and Papers from Prison*, but Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the role and the importance of the cross goes back further, in *Discipleship* and in *Ethics*. Thus, I shall explore how Bonhoeffer presents the cross in these works, and then see whether Bonhoeffer’s view of the cross changes in *Letters and Papers*. Moreover, I shall show the person of Christ is key to Bonhoeffer’s theology, and that centrality of Christ means that the cross is central in Bonhoeffer’s thought.
In *Discipleship* Bonhoeffer writes that, for Christ, ‘death on the cross means to suffer and die as one rejected and cast out’. Discipleship emphasises an imitation of Christ and thus this example of Christ becomes the pattern of our lives, which are under the cross. Just as the suffering of Christ was no accident but ordained for Christ, Bonhoeffer sees that suffering is not a misfortunate or harsh fate but the often harsh reality of the Christian life. Yet, as with Christ, this suffering is a means to an end, not an end itself: ‘the cross is not the terrible end of a pious, happy life. Instead, it stands at the beginning of community with Jesus Christ. Whenever Christ calls us, his call leads us to death’.

Whilst Bonhoeffer’s Christ may choose to undergo this suffering, Bonhoeffer does not ignore the issue of Gethsemane. Bonhoeffer understands the will of Christ in wanting the cup to pass from him in Gethsemane in that Christ knows ‘the cup of suffering will pass from Jesus, but only by his drinking it. When Jesus kneels in Gethsemane the second time, he knows that the cup will pass by his accepting the suffering. Only by bearing the suffering will he overcome and conquer it. His cross the triumph over suffering’. Therefore, the attitude towards the cross, and towards suffering, is to submit to it, to be passive in regards to it, for ‘suffering passes when it is borne. The evil comes to an end when we permit it to pass over us, without defence’. We can now follow in obedience through the example of the passion of Jesus and through the cross. This suffering is an essential part of our lives as Bonhoeffer understands suffering as ‘distance from God’, and that we are called to suffering in discipleship.

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178 ‘Just as Christ is only Christ as one who suffers and is rejected, so a disciple is a disciple only in suffering and being rejected, thereby participating in crucifixion. Discipleship as allegiance to the person of Jesus Christ places the follower under the law of Christ, that is, under the cross’. Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 85.
179 ‘The cross is not random suffering, but necessary suffering. The cross is not suffering that stems from natural existence; it is suffering that comes from being Christian. The essence of the cross is not suffering alone; it is suffering and being rejected’. Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 86.
180 Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 87.
181 Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 90.
182 Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 132.
183 ‘The passion of Jesus as the overcoming of evil by divine love is the only solid foundation for the disciple’s obedience. With his command Jesus calls disciples again into communion with his passion.’ Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 136.
184 ‘In the cross alone is it true and real that suffering love is given to the disciples by the call into discipleship. They are blessed in this visible communion’. Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 137.
185 ‘God is a God who bears. The Son of God bore our flesh. He therefore bore it on the cross. He bore all our sins and attained reconciliation by his bearing. That is why disciples are called to bear what is put on them’. Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 90.
This submission and passivity is understood by Bonhoeffer to be emblematic of love, which also requires obedience. Yet even with this call to love as God loves, Bonhoeffer upholds a difference between God’s love and human love in how it is manifested for ‘God’s love for the people brings the cross and discipleship, but these, in turn, mean life and resurrection’. However, with this call to love there is therefore a strong emphasis on relationality and this is expanded upon in *Ethics*.

Bonhoeffer sees that the example of Jesus Christ shows that ‘God loves human beings. God loves the world. Not an ideal human being, but human beings as they are; not an ideal world, but the real world. What we find repulsive in their opposition to God, what we shrink back from with pain and hostility, namely, real human beings, the real world, this is for God the ground of unfathomable love’. This reality of love in Christ is openness to the world, and now Bonhoeffer sees that ‘the world has no reality of its own independent of God’s revelation in Christ’. Now ‘there are not two realms, but only the one realm of the Christ-reality [Christuswirklichkeit], in which the reality of God and the reality of the world are united’.

This union is fixed in Christ, as Christ is the only place where the reality of God and the reality of the world coexist. The person of Christ means that ‘this place does not lie somewhere beyond reality in the realm of ideas. It lies in the midst of history as a divine miracle. It lies in Jesus Christ the reconciler of the world’. Due to this action Christianity is not an other-worldliness, instead, only Christianity can overcome the world for ‘the world exhausts its rage on the body of Jesus Christ. But the martyred one forgives the world its sins. Thus reconciliation takes place. Ecce homo’.

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187 *The only required reflection for disciples is to be completely oblivious, completely unreflective in obedience, in discipleship, in love*. Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 150.
188 ‘As love as the deed of simple obedience is death to the old self and the self’s discovery to exist now in the righteousness of Christ and in one’s brothers and sisters. Then the old self is no longer alive, but Christ is alive in the person. The love of Christ the Crucified, who leads the old self in us to death, is what lives in Christ’s follower: Disciples find themselves only in Christ and in their brothers and sisters’. Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 152.
189 Bonhoeffer, *Discipleship*, 197.
191 Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 82.
sees the cross of Christ as the centre of theology due to its christological nature. Whilst this reconciliation occurs due to the suffering on the cross and God's love is shown in that, Bonhoeffer calls for balance in his theology as the cross must always be seen alongside the expression of God's love as creation and as the resurrection. This is because they must be understood as part of the same event, with this understanding that 'no one of these is without the others.'

Therefore it can be seen that before the *Letters and Papers from Prison*, there is a centrality of the cross in Bonhoeffer's thought linked with his focus on Christ as the source of all theology. Within the *Letters*, a shift in Bonhoeffer's understanding of the cross is a part of other shifts in his thought. There is also a shift from the previous passivity of the human subject to an emphasis on action even though we cannot act as effectively as Christ. The emphasis on responsible action comes as Bonhoeffer sees that in human nature 'it is infinitely easier to suffer in obedience to a human command than in the freedom of one’s very own responsible action'.

The need for action may come from the current age, where Bonhoeffer sees that

> We are approaching a completely religionless age; people, as they are now simply cannot be religious anymore. Even those who honestly describe themselves as “religious” aren’t really practicing that at all; they presumably mean something quite different by “religious”. But our entire nineteen hundred years of Christian preaching and theology are built on the “religious a priori” in human beings.

Bonhoeffer does not necessarily see this as an evil, but more as a chance to discover Christianity anew, to find out whether there can be a religionlessness Christianity.

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195 ‘It is the case that 'the figure of the reconciler, of the God-man Jesus Christ, steps into the middle between God and the world, into the centre of all that happens. In this figure is disclosed the mystery of the world, just as the mystery of God is revealed in it’. Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 83.

196 ‘In Jesus Christ we believe in the God who became human, was crucified, and is risen. In the becoming human we recognize God's love toward God's creation, in the crucifixion God’s judgement on all flesh, and in the resurrection God's purpose for a new world. Nothing could be more perverse than to tear these three apart, because the whole is contained in each of them. Just as it is improper to pit against one another a theology of the incarnation, a theology of the cross, or a theology of the resurrection, by falsely absolutising one of them.’ Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, 157.


198 ‘We are not Christ, but if we want to be Christians it means that we are to take part in Christ’s greatness of heart, in responsible action’. Bonhoeffer, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Works: Letters and Papers From Prison, Volume 8* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998/2010), 49.


201 How can Christ be Lord of the religionless as well? Is there such a thing as religionless Christian? If religion is only the garb in which Christianity is closed – and this garb has looked very different in different ages – what then is religionless Christianity? Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 363, 3/137.
Religionless Christianity would free the meaning of who Christ is for us today, for ‘Christ would then no longer be the object of religion, but something else entirely, truly lord of the world’.  

Bonhoeffer sees this as beneficial, as he sees that in the current age God has become a crutch. This religionlessness means that Christianity can rid itself of unhelpful ideas of God, to find God instead in the midst of our lives,

In life and not only in dying, in health and strength and not only in suffering, in action and not only in sin. The ground for this lies in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. God is the centre of life and doesn’t just “turn up” when we have unsolved problems to be solved. Seen from the centre of life, certain questions fall away completely and likewise the answers to such questions.

Bonhoeffer notes that philosophically, and in the mind of the world that, God had been seen as less necessary even though there was a sense in which religion was still an *a priori* position, and to deal with this Bonhoeffer sees that ‘God should not be smuggled in somewhere, in the very last, secret place that is left. Instead, one must simply recognise that the world and humankind have come of age. One must not find fault with people in their worldliness but rather confront them with God where they are strongest’.

However in the later pages Bonhoeffer focuses again on finding and knowing God in suffering and powerlessness, that ‘before God, and with God, we live without God. God consents to be pushed out of the world and onto the cross; God is weak and powerless in the world and in precisely this way, and only so, is at our side and helps us. Thus ‘Christ helps us not by virtue of his omnipotence but rather by virtue of his weakness and suffering’.

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203 ‘It always seems to me that we leave room for God only out of anxiety. I’d like to speak of God not at the boundaries but in the centre, not in weakness but in strength, thus not in death and guilt but in human life and human goodness. When I reach my limits, it seems to me better not to say anything and to leave what can’t be solved unsolved’. Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 366, 3/137.
205 ‘My starting point was that God is being increasingly pushed out of a world come of age, from the realm of our knowledge and life and, since Kant, has only occupied the ground beyond the world of experience. On the one hand, theology has resisted this development with apologetics and taken up arms – in vain – against Darwinism and so on; on the other, it has resigned itself to the way things have gone and allowed God to function only as deus ex machine in the so-called ultimate questions, that is, God becomes the answer to life’s questions, a solution to life’s needs and conflicts’. Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers*, 450, 3/170.
The power of God in the world has gone, and whereas ‘human religiosity directs people in need to the power of God in the world, God as deus ex machina. The Bible directs people toward the powerlessness and suffering of God: only the suffering God can help’.\(^{209}\) Thus there is a renewed emphasis on sharing in the suffering, where ‘the human being is called upon to share in God’s suffering at the hands of a godless world’.\(^{210}\) This leads to us being more human, to become ‘the human being Christ creates in us. It is not a religious act that makes someone a Christian, but rather sharing in God’s suffering in the worldly life’.\(^{211}\) It can be seen that in *Letters and Papers* the suffering and death of Christ is seen not as an example or a precedent for our lives, but instead the source of knowledge about God.

However, this can only happen from a blank slate, as

> If one wants to speak of God “nonreligiously,” then one must speak in such a way that the godlessness of the world is not covered up in any way, but rather precisely to uncover it and surprise the world by letting light shine on it.\(^{212}\)

The merits of taking this as a starting point for one’s theology can be debated, as Bonhoeffer himself writes ‘forgive me, this is all still put terribly clumsily and badly; I’m very aware of this’.\(^{213}\) Yet the kernel remains, that Bonhoeffer does not want people to encounter the religious explanation of Christ, he instead wants the discrediting of religion\(^{214}\) where now ‘Christianity arises out of the encounter with a concrete human being: Jesus’.\(^{215}\)

Whilst Bonhoeffer’s previous use of the cross was in the sense of *Anfechtung* that has been previously demonstrated to be key for Luther,\(^{216}\) it can be seen that in *Letters and Papers* that Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the cross expands. It is now a tool for

\(^{216}\) Aubert emphasises the Christocentrism of Bonhoeffer’s thought, where Christ is the Mitte, and she looks at his understanding of the theology of the cross as a theodicy. Therefore, whilst she sees that the source of revelation of God is in Christ on the cross, from this she understands a way of dealing with the problem of evil by reemphasising the nature of suffering as an *Anfechtung* that God undergoes and leads us to God, even though there is no mention of this in the *Letters and Papers*. (Annette Aubert, “Theodicy and the Cross in the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer”, *Trinity Journal*, 32, 47-63, 2011).
combating the world’s perception of God because it is both where God is now to be found, and the way in which God is removed from the world. Bonhoeffer’s take on a theology of the cross is that there is, as in Luther and Hegel, a false idea of God, but the death of Christ is not just the revelation of the true nature of God. The death of Christ is also the means by which God changes God’s position and relation to the world. Therefore in Bonhoeffer the theology of the cross also expands beyond its prior remit; where in Hegel it became a way to think of God and death together as noncontradictory, in Bonhoeffer it also becomes a way to think of and encounter God outside of the previous strictures of religious thought.

However, within Bonhoeffer it is only in his work in *Letters and Papers* that this understanding of God and of the cross is espoused, and it stands in contradiction to his previous outworkings in those letters. Thus it can be said that a more accurate understanding of Bonhoeffer’s theology of the cross is that the cross exists for us to be able to know and sympathise with God in suffering. It is not the sole source of our knowledge of God; neither does it do anything to the being of God or the relation of God to the world. It is also the case that that the relationship of *Letters and Papers* to the thought of Bonhoeffer is debated. However, despite the debate over the effect of the cross in Bonhoeffer it is clear from *Ethics* and *Discipleship* that the cross has a centrality in Bonhoeffer’s work, albeit more experientially than conceptually.

As I move on to a more detailed exposition of Jüngel’s theology of the cross, it will be seen that Jüngel takes up the task of all of these thinkers, finding a theology of glory understood as the untouchable, unchanging, and unassailable metaphysical conception of God, and in destroying it, take up the task that Bonhoeffer was unable to complete; to find how to talk about God and the world when God and the world do not relate in

217 Krieg discusses how Bonhoeffer in *Letters and Papers* understands transcendence as an unhelpful concept, and links it with inauthentic religion. Although Krieg notes that ‘it is unfortunate that Bonhoeffer was unable to relate more completely religious and non-religious Christianity. Even in a non-religious interpretation concerned with the Kingdom of God, account must be taken of sin - personal and communal - and the redemption required for the Kingdom’. Carl Krieg, “Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers”, *Religious Studies*, 9:1, 1973, 81-92, 89.

218 Gruchy argues that although ‘Bonhoeffer’s reflections in prison indicated that he was in the process of breaking new ground in his theology, there is a remarkable continuity in his thought which can be discerned from its early expression in *Sanctorum Communio* through to the *Ethics* and prison letters’. John W. de Gruchy “Dietrich Bonhoeffer [1906-1945]”, *The Dictionary of Historical Theology* ed. Trevor A Hart, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000, 80-81, 81. However, John Godsey argues that what is espoused in *Letters and Papers* is entirely new in “Theology from a Prison Cell,” *DrewG* 27/3, 1957.
the way that was previously thought, and from that, to have an encounter with the historical Christ revealed in the suffering and death on the cross.

Heidegger’s methods, and understanding of Existence

Having discussed the theologians that Jüngel uses in developing his understanding of a theology of the cross I shall now take a detour into the thought of Heidegger. Whilst the relationship that Heidegger has to Christianity is fraught, it cannot be denied that his influence on Jüngel is impressive, as Jüngel acknowledges in his article “Towards the Heart of the Matter”. From Heidegger, Jüngel draws his understanding of language, of human being as a kind of ecology, and the definition of the human as living being with the potentiality for discourse. Heidegger’s use for a theology of the cross consists more in his account of Destruktion rather than in Heidegger’s ontology, although knowledge of Heidegger’s ontology is essential for an understanding of Jüngel’s anthropology in relation to God and the cross.

Jüngel draws on Destruktion in his relation with the philosophical, metaphysical tradition, and where Heidegger wishes to rid philosophy of its previous misconceptions of being, Jüngel wishes to use method this regarding God. Moreover Heidegger also specifically works to overcome ontotheology and to overcome metaphysics, which Jüngel himself does in God as the Mystery of the World. Furthermore, Jüngel takes up Heidegger’s account of death especially in how it relates to the death of God, and the death of God

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219 Toward the end of his life I had a conversation with Heidegger about the relation between thought and language, and I asked whether it wasn't the destiny of thought to be on the way to God (unterwegs zu Gott). He answered: “God - that is the most worthy object of thought. But that’s where language breaks down.” Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

220 ‘My encounter with this thinker, [Heidegger] however, has proven to be of enduring significance in many respects, not least of which is that it prevented me from an anthropomonism in the doctrine of creation. I made a mental note of his statement: “Philosophy perishes when it has become anthropology.” Mutatis mutandis, the same holds true for theology. We human beings must learn to understand ourselves as relational beings instead of as subjects in the centre of things. We must learn to conceive of being as a being-together instead of as substance. Then and only then will the usurped Imperium become once again the Dominium terrae that the Creator entrusted to his creation’. Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

221 This can be found in “Humanity in Correspondence to God,” in Eberhard Jüngel, Theological Essays I, trans. J. Webster & A. Neufaldt-Fast, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989) 146 and “Value-Free Truth” in Theological Essays II, trans. J. Webster & A. Neufaldt-Fast, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 207.

222 Kevin Hector notes and draws out Heidegger’s engagement with Descartes and Nietzsche in Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), which shows another link with Jüngel’s engagement with the metaphysical tradition.

223 Regarding Heidegger’s work on ontotheology and metaphysics, Jüngel underscores that theology is not ontology. However, he sees that theological statements have ontological implications, ‘theology does not ask about being as such, but instead about the being of God, human being and the being of the world. It further asks, because it has heard, not because it seeks after that which remains to be interrogated’ (Eberhard Jüngel, “Gott entsprechendes Schweigen? Theologie in der Nachbarschaft des Denkens von Martin Heidegger” Martin Heidegger: Fragen an sein Werk (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1977).
is an essential part of Jüngel’s theology of the cross. In order to explore this I shall embark on an overview of Heidegger’s works, from the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, where the understanding of a disruption and an interruption to human being is first broached, then through *Being and Time*.

In the *Phenomenology of Religious Life* Heidegger looks at early Christian writers to find out the kind of existence that Christian life calls one to. There are strands here that reappear in his later work, such as the limit of temporality as the horizon of human life, and Heidegger’s understanding of the power of proclamation in how ‘through the completion of the explication, that which is explicated becomes apparently independent, released from its enactment’.²²⁴ However, there is a sense of distance that Heidegger upholds, as he notes that ‘one could say it is impossible – or possible only in a limited way – to transport oneself into Paul’s exact situation’.²²⁵ Heidegger also notes the shift in the object of proclamation from Jesus to Paul in that ‘on the object of proclamation: we must differentiate between the proclamation of the synoptics and that of Paul. In the synoptic gospels, Jesus announces the *kingdom of God*… in Pauline gospel, the proper *object of the proclamation is already Jesus himself as Messiah*’.²²⁶ However, as Inwood sees, what is important in the *Phenomenology of Religious Life* is that through this work

Heidegger’s account of resoluteness is coloured by his study of the conversions of St Paul, St Augustine, and Martin Luther. Paul is in the same world after seeing the light on the road to Damascus as he was before, but everything looks different. Resoluteness confers on Dasein’s decision a fateful necessity despite the nullity of its projection: Luther says not “perhaps this is what I should do”, but “here I stand; I cannot do otherwise.” In resoluteness Dasein pulls itself together as well as opens itself up.²²⁷

From this, it can be seen that Heidegger’s thought has its basis in a Christian understanding of being, where Heidegger himself is influenced by and admits influence from Augustine and Luther,²²⁸ and thus basing an ontology on Heidegger is not the same as rejecting Christian thought.

²²⁸ As we have explored, Jüngel is influenced by Luther’s rejection of Aristotelian ontology, and Crowe argues the same for Heidegger. (Benjamin Crowe, *Heidegger’s Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006)).
These themes are more fully explicated in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger seeks to find out what it means to exist rather than to ascertain what exists: to determine Being from beings. There are things we can know about being without examining the nature of being but Being is always grounded in an entity, and is not something beyond humanity or entities that is constant and waiting to be discovered. To describe this kind of existence Heidegger introduces the concept of Dasein as a word for the mode of existence of humans. Dasein is translated as being-there, and this is because ‘Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it’. Dasein is itself occupied with the question of being, and ‘understanding of Being itself is a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontologically distinct in that it is ontological’. For ‘Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got into them, or grown up in them already’. Heidegger proposes to bring out the meaning of Being in how ‘by having regard for the basic state of Dasein’s everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion’. Heidegger also notes that temporality helps constitute the meaning of Being of that entity which is termed “Dasein”, for ‘whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint’. In this work, time is the horizon for the understanding of being.

However, in order to posit this new understanding of being, Heidegger must first destroy the history of ontology. He notes that ‘with the “cogito sum” Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began in this “radical” way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the res cogitans, or – more precisely – the meaning of the Being of the “sum”’. For Heidegger finds that ‘Descartes not only evades the ontological question of

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229 ‘One can determine the nature of entities in their Being without necessarily having the explicit concept of the meaning of Being at one’s disposal’. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (London: SCM Press, 1962), 27, Int.1¶2.
230 ‘Being is always the Being of an entity’ *B&t*, Int.1¶3, 29.
231 *B&t*, 32, Int.1¶4.
232 *B&t*, 22, Int.1¶4.
233 *B&t*, 38, Int.2¶5.
234 *B&t*, 39, Int.2¶5.
235 *B&t*, 46, Int.2¶6.
substantiality altogether; he also emphasises explicitly that substance as such – that is to say, its substantiality – is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset. Heidegger thus goes back to Greek philosophy in defining as living Being that has the capacity for discourse, and for Heidegger discourse lets something be seen ‘when fully concrete, discourse (letting something be seen) has character of speaking [Sprechens] – vocal proclamation in words.’ As the expression of the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world, language has an enlightening function, where it articulates via discourse what has been disclosed. Talking is Dasein expressing itself. As language involves listening it is thus relational.

Heidegger sees that ‘the essence of Dasein lies in its existence.’ However, the existence of Dasein is that of being faced with myriad possibilities and choosing them, and ‘because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, “choose” itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only “seem” to do so.’ Dasein is ‘primarily Being-possible.’ Due to myriad possibilities, an aspect of being in the world is Sorge, care or concern about its Being-in-the-world. Dasein cannot escape the world, ‘because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern’, and ‘taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is’.

As being-in-the-world, Dasein involves relations, ‘so far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being.’ However, this can go too far as ‘when Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern – that is, at the same time, in its Being-with towards Others – it is not itself.’ This involves Dasein being taken in by the “they”, who seek to prevent Dasein from realising its true self by distracting Dasein by calling it

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towards averageness. Dasein, being thrown into the world and having to find its own way in the world, tends towards surrendering to the world, ‘and lets the “world” “matter” to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self’. Talk can also be subverted by the “they”, and turned into idle talk (Gerede), where ‘idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own’. This closes up Dasein’s being-in-the-world, which is already ‘proximally absorbed in the world of concern. This concern is guided by circumspection, which discovers the ready-to-hand and preserves it as thus discovered’.

What occurs is falling: Being is consumed by care and distracted by the “they” and thus Dasein is carried along by the world and makes no choices for itself. It is characterised by ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit), idle talk, and curiosity. However, this falling, which is inauthentic being, does not mean that the being of Dasein is lessened, but more that being inauthentic is a particular kind of not-Being. Moreover, despite the term, fallenness also does not mean having fallen from a purer or higher primal status, but more that it has fallen away from itself.

Dasein does not see itself as falling or inauthentic because the “they” provide a false tranquillity which leads into hustle, which is both tempting and tranquillising, and alienating. This alienation closes off Dasein from its authenticity and those possibilities, forcing it into inauthenticity. The Self then often becomes the They-self. Therefore, with all that in mind, Dasein’s everydayness ‘can be defined as “Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the “world” and in its Being-with Others”.

248 “That tendency of Being-with which we have called “distantiality” is grounded in the fact that Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with averageness, which is an existential characteristic of the “they”’. Be&T, 164, 1.4\#27.
249 Be&T, 178, 1.5\#29.
250 Be&T, 213 1.5\#35.
251 Be&T, 216, 1.5\#36.
252 ‘Dasein lets itself be carried along [mitnehmen] solely by the looks of the world; in this kind of Being, it concerns itself with becoming rid of itself as Being-in-the-world and rid of its Being alongside that which, in the closest everyday manner, is ready-to-hand’. Be&T, 216, 1.5\#36.
253 ‘In falling, Dasein itself as factual Being-in-the-world, is something from which it has already fallen away. And it has not fallen into some entity which it comes upon for the first time in the course of its Being, or even one which it has not come upon at all; it has fallen into the world, which itself belongs to its Being’. Be&T, 220, 1.5\#38.
254 Be&T, 225, 1.5\#39.
for-Being, that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for (propensio in…) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is’. Yet this entails feeling not at home (unheimlich), which we flee in the face of, even though the experience helps us on the way to authenticity.

Dasein is characterised more by how it relates to its possibilities than its actualities in that it is ahead of itself. The one possibility that cannot be evaded or not chosen, however, is death and for Heidegger authenticity has to do with our attitude towards death. We can only know our own death, for ‘the dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just “there alongside”’. There are other ways in which Dasein can be represented or experienced by another, but death is the only possibility that truly belongs to any particular Dasein.

Death is inevitable as the possibility of it cannot be outstripped. It is one’s ownmost possibility, and the uttermost one. Yet often it is glossed over, the true possibility of death is concealed, and the “they” does not allow us to have courage in the face of death. Moreover, whilst the rest of our life is relational, our ownmost possibility is non-relational. Fallenness and inauthenticity are highlighted in relation to death, where ‘our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is an inauthentic Being-towards-death. But inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity’.

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255 Bc²T, 232, I.5¶40.
256 In Being-ahead-of-onself as Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, lies the existential-ontological condition for the possibility of Being-free for authentic existentiell possibilities. For the sake of its potentiality-for-Being, any Dasein is as it factically is. But to the extent that this Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is itself characterised by freedom, Dasein can comport itself towards its possibilities, even unwillingly; it can be inauthentically; and factically it is inauthentically, proximally and for the most part’. Bc²T, 237, I.6¶41.
257 Bc²T, 282, II.1¶47.
258 Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there’. Bc²T, 294, II.1¶50.
259 ‘The They show that “Dying” is levelled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular. If idle talk is always ambiguous, so is this manner of talking about death. Dying, which is essentially mine in such a way that no one can be my representative, is perverted into an event of public occurrence which the “they” encounters.’ Bc²T, 297, II.1¶51.
260 ‘Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility – non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity towards its end’. Bc²T, 303, II.1¶52.
261 Bc²T, 303, II.1¶52.
However Dasein can achieve authenticity because it is always called to authenticity by itself, and the process of being authentic is through individuation. The knowledge that death is one’s ownmost possibility and thus non-relational, death, and the anticipation, which is manifest in us by facing our death properly, individualises Dasein and ‘allows it, in this individualisation of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being.’ This anticipation is a clearing (Aufklärung) and ‘anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather in an impassioned freedom towards death — a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the “they”, ad which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.’ It individualises, it reveals the self, and in doing so frees it, and now the authentic self is now resolute is the face of death.

Heidegger sees that resoluteness is authentic Being-one’s-Self, which ‘brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others’. We must become individuals before we can be true in our Being-with-Others, because we are aware of the scope of our possibilities: ‘the resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time’. Thus ‘when, in anticipation, resoluteness has caught up [eingeholt] the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein’s authentic existence can no longer be outstripped [überholt] by anything, and therefore ‘Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial individualisation of the reticent resoluteness which exacts anxiety of itself.’

With this overview of Heidegger’s account of existence, albeit before the turn, I turn now to look at the interpreters of Heidegger from a religious standpoint, who note his

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262 ‘Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. The entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost Being, and doing so of its own accord.’ B&T, 308, II.1¶53.
263 B&T, 310, II.1¶53.
264 B&T, 311, II.1¶53.
265 B&T, II.2¶60.
266 ‘In saying ‘I’, Dasein expresses itself as Being-in-the-world’. B&T, 369, II.3¶64.
267 B&T, 345, II.2¶60.
268 B&T, 355, II.3¶62.
269 B&T, 369, II.3¶64.
270 Whilst Jüngel does use the work of the later Heidegger, especially regarding language and nothingness, those influences can be mediated through Bultmann and Fuchs and understood in the section on proclamation. However, to fully understand Jüngel’s account of anthropology it is essential to look at Being and Time to note how Jüngel both relies on and moves away from Heidegger.
religious influences. However they also note his deliberate lack of engagement and at times hostility towards theology. Heidegger rejects the link between ontology and theology as part of his programme of Destruktion because he sees that Descartes has left philosophy with an impoverished sense of the diversity of what-being, reducing ‘it to oversimple categories such as the Cartesian dichotomy between nature (res extensa) and mind (res cogitans) - a set of categories which, on Heidegger’s view, obliterates both the specific nature of human beings and that of the objects they encounter’. Heidegger rejects metaphysics as it contains a natural theology, where ‘used as a synonym for metaphysics, onto-theology conceals the question of the meaning of being by constructing a narrative that traces all beings back to a highest being, the good, the first mover, the Creator, the first cause or the causa sui. Therefore ‘metaphysics, Heidegger says, is essentially onto-theological: it allows us to elide the question of the meaning of being by presenting the origin of beings as a foregone conclusion’. Thus, McGrath sees that ‘Heidegger redesigns philosophy in Luther’s perspective’. However this means that ‘in a reversal of the medieval understanding of the relationship of theology to philosophy, theology works within the boundaries established for it by philosophy’. Hector also notes how Heidegger sees that metaphysics is

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271 I refer to Inwood’s earlier comment. Moreover Mulhall notes the subversion of Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity where instead of relying on God for knowledge of one’s true self and identity, it becomes about human action, and thus ‘by accepting the Kierkegaardian conjunction between authenticity and wholeness, but arguing that this conjunction can be properly forged by relating to one’s mortality, Heidegger in effect argues that the theological terminus of Climacus’s argument is avoidable’. Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996), 124. McGrath notes that ‘we know from the few references that survive from his early study of Luther that Heidegger was particularly attracted to the Lutheran doctrine of corruptio, the deformation of human nature resulting from original sin’. (S.J. McGrath, Introducing Heidegger: A (very) critical introduction (Grand Rapids, MI/Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2008), 17.) Although for Luther, at least ‘the crucified God forces us either to reject God or to reject reason: faith alone can see God in the crucified’. McGrath, Introducing Heidegger, 17. McGrath also notes that ‘it is not theologically insignificant that God appears nowhere in Being and Time – not even as a desire or cultural artifact. That Dasein has no natural religious life is an implicitly theological position, a rejection of the doctrine of natural theology’. McGrath, Introducing Heidegger, 19. Instead, McGrath notes that ‘for Heidegger, theology is truly itself only when it stands in open conflict with philosophy’. S.J. McGrath, Introducing Heidegger, 22. 272 Inwood notes that Aristotle ‘held that the study of being must begin with an exemplary type of being, namely substance, and with the exemplary instance of that type, namely God’. Inwood, Heidegger, 17. However, Inwood also notes that with Heidegger’s account of Destruktion that ‘spurred to authenticity by our encounter with Heidegger, we should treat Heidegger as he treated Aristotle, Descartes, or Kant, interpreting and disentangling his work, using it as a basis for new thoughts of our own’. Inwood, Heidegger, 51. Caputo sees that ‘the goal of Being and Time was to keep the existential analytic free of any “existentiell ideal,” any concrete, factual way to be – like Christian or Greek life’. John D. Caputo, “Heidegger and theology”, The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 270-288, 274. 273 Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, 7. 274 McGrath, Introducing Heidegger, 73. 275 McGrath, Introducing Heidegger 73. 276 McGrath, Introducing Heidegger 106. 277 McGrath, Introducing Heidegger 114.
anthropomorphism, and ‘does violence to objects by forcing them into predetermined categories’.

Despite this, Heidegger’s influence on theology through Bultmann, Fuchs, and Ebeling comes partly from this anti-metaphysical strain in Heidegger. Furthermore, this rejection of ontotheology enables Heidegger to claim the primacy of possibility, for Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein ‘violates Aristotle’s ontology in two respects. First, it is not a substance with an essential nature and with properties or “accidents”. Second, Dasein’s potentiality or possibility is prior to its actuality: Dasein is not a definite actual thing, but the possibility of various ways of being’. Instead, Dasein is its possibility, ‘Dasein is an entity that can decide whether to be or not’. This was transmuted through Bultmann, who, as Caputo notes, took that

The task of theology, armed now with the Heideggerian analytic of existence, is to deconstruct and demythologise the canonical Gospels in order to retrieve their kerygma, the living-existential Christian message, one of existential conversion (metanoia), of becoming authentic in the face of our finitude and guilt, a task that faces every human being.

The influence of Heidegger was also more in the sphere of language, for Robinson sees that Heidegger, in his later works sees that ‘language needs man as its loudspeaker and hence uses man’, and this plays into hermeneutic theology in that ‘the new correlation of hermeneutic to the later Heidegger’s understanding of language provides the potentiality for a new correlation between God’s word and man’s understanding’.

Certainly these are interesting followers for a thinker, who, as Caputo relates, believed in the 1940s that ‘the believer does not have the passion – or the honesty – to enter the abyss of the questionability of being’. Regarding the emphasis on Dasein saving itself in Heidegger in contrast to Kierkegaard, Pattison notes that there is, he sees, a central passivity in Heidegger despite the emphasis on action and individualisation as ‘here too, by a mysterious philosophical alchemy, the ultimate passivity of having to die has been

278 Hector, Theology Without Metaphysics, 10.
279 Inwood, Heidegger, 19.
280 Inwood, Heidegger, 19.
283 Robinson, “The German Discussion”, 53.
transformed into the ultimate activity of a supremely heroic but also perhaps self-deceiving gesture’. Pattison sees that authenticity will always elude us, as the whole ‘of our existence is destabilised at its deepest roots by the possibility of a death that could come at any moment or that might not arrive at the moment when we feel ourselves ready for it, leaving us suspended in meaningless existence’.  

Thus, I would argue part of the use Heidegger has for Jüngel is in bringing awareness to the dangers of metaphysics and providing a method for its destruction before it is rebuilt in, for Jüngel, a more Christian manner. There are other influences that Heidegger has on Jüngel. Whilst Zimany notes Jüngel’s appropriation of Hegel, he also sees that Jüngel’s theology ‘unites Barth’s insistence that people can know God only through God’s self-revelation with the later Heidegger’s claim that Being reveals itself through language’. Furthermore, he notes that Jüngel takes on Heidegger’s understanding of human existence in how a person is a process of being related to others and that which is outside itself, as Dasein derives from contextualised relationships. Moreover Jüngel’s understanding of the reality of nothingness is also informed by the work of Heidegger, and Zimany sees Jüngel as drawing from both

286 Pattison, Heidegger on Death, 59.  
287 Zimany, Eberhard Jüngel’s Synthesis of Heidegger and Barth, 3.  
288 From Heidegger, Jüngel gets his appreciation of phenomenology. He also takes seriously Heidegger’s insistence on the reality of Nothingness. He accepts, in addition, the ‘Being-with’ nature of human being, along with the changing and developing character of existence’. Zimany, Eberhard Jüngel’s Synthesis of Heidegger and Barth, 28. Heidegger’s lecture ‘What is Metaphysics’, deals with the concept of Nothingness, which he links with his earlier thought in that ‘in anxiety occurs a shrinking back before . . . which is surely not any sort of flight but rather a kind of bewildered calm. This “back before” takes its departure from the nothing. The nothing itself does not attract; it is essentially repelling. But this repulsion is itself as such a parting gesture toward beings that are submerging as a whole. This wholly repelling gesture toward beings that are in retreat as a whole, which is the action of the nothing that oppresses Dasein in anxiety, is the essence of the nothing nihilation. It is neither an annihilation of beings nor does it spring from a negation. Nihilation will not submit to calculation in terms of annihilation and negation. The nothing itself nihilates’. ‘What is Metaphysics?’ 31, http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Heidegger,Martin/Heidegger,Martin..What%20Is%20Metaphysics.htm, (accessed 30th August 2015). However, this performs a useful function in that ‘it makes possible in advance the revelation of beings in general. The essence of the originally nihilating nothing lies in this, that it brings Dasein for the first time before beings as such.’ ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Nothingness becomes key for understanding humanity for ‘if in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to itself. Without the original revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom. With that the answer to the question of the nothing is gained. The nothing is neither an object nor any being at all. The nothing comes forward neither for itself nor next to beings, to which it would, as it were, adhere. For human existence the nothing makes possible the openedness of beings as such. The nothing does not merely serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such. In the Being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs. Only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing can human existence approach and penetrate beings. But since existence in its essence relates itself to beings — those which it is not and that which it is — it emerges as such existence in each case from the nothing already revealed. Dasein means: being held out into the nothing.’ ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Nothingness is what makes things possible, for that ‘the nothing is the negation of the totality of beings; it precedes every negation; it is even more original than the “not.” It is not only that the nothing makes possible the negating of everything; it makes possible the thinking of everything — it is the transcendental condition’. S.J. McGrath, Introducing Heidegger, 69.
the early and the late Heidegger, for the later Heidegger is characterised as being more poetic, focusing on mystical language rather than phenomenology, and from this Jüngel has derived his understanding of truth as the revelation and “letting-be” of what is. More importantly, from him he also gets his understanding of the value of language for revealing the ultimate. When Jüngel claims that the parables reflect Jesus’ own (God-determined) Being, he is applying Heidegger’s explanation of how Being expresses itself in language.289

This, Zimany notes, is mediated through Fuchs and Ebeling, who with the concept of Sprachgewinn used later Heidegger to temper Bultmann, and Jüngel followed in these steps.290 However Jüngel differs from Heidegger substantially, as in Heidegger it is through individuating that one achieves authenticity, through taking control of one’s own being and choosing for oneself whilst in Jüngel, as I shall explore more fully, authenticity is realised through relinquishing any claims of individuality and freedom to choose one’s own destiny. Instead what creates true human existence is surrender to God and God’s action in us. Jüngel, whilst holding to many tenets of Heidegger’s understanding of human being and accepting that there is a drive for self-actualisation in humanity, turns what is natural and needed in Heidegger into sin.

However, to return to the purpose of this chapter, it is Gregor who explicitly links Heidegger’s thought to a theology of the cross, albeit a diminished one, in how Heidegger’s ontology has the form of the cross, but denies its true power. The problem with Heidegger’s project is the way he conceives the relation between the cross and ontology. Heidegger’s analysis must treat the historical cross of Christ in the same way it treats sin and faith – namely, as a particular ontic phenomenon rather than a fundamental ontological concern.291

Despite this caveat, Gregor argues that the cross is linked inextricably to Heidegger’s concept of Destruktion, and Heidegger’s diminution of the role of religion means that Heidegger’s account of Destruktion does not have the power it needs, for The cross is ontologically significant because it indicates concreteness, historicity, and facticity; it teaches us to stop thinking about Being as substance, to think in terms of absence and hiddenness as opposed to pure presence, temporality as opposed to static eternity. The cross is therefore an ontic model of this ontological insight. The historical cross of Christ and its

289 Zimany, Eberhard Jüngel’s Synthesis of Heidegger and Barth, 53.
290 Mattes sees Jüngel’s use of Heidegger as “unthematised” (Mattes, Toward Divine Relationality, 310). However, Neufeldt-Fast finds Jüngel’s understanding of Heidegger considered and thorough (Neufeldt-Fast, Eberhard Jüngel’s Theological Anthropology, 72).
291 Brian Gregor, A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self (Indiana: IUP, 2013), 84.
work of destruction point toward the more fundamental ontological structure of Destruktion. With this formulation, Heidegger loses the real scandal of the cross.292

Therefore, one could take this interpretation of Heidegger and claim that his thought is really a theology of the cross at its heart. That is certainly one that I would argue for, as the purpose of Heidegger’s account of Destruktion is to create a clean slate in which to restart the task of thinking being. However, there are clearer influences from Heidegger for Jüngel, especially as linked to Destruktion is a rejection of natural theology, a destruction of metaphysics in favour of a clearer idea of being, the importance of an interruption in human life, death as the ending of possibilities and one’s ownmost end, the role of language in human being and an understanding of nothingness as somehow active in its malevolence.

**Summation**

From this discussion of varied systems, I would like to reiterate the point made at the start, that a theology of the cross is not one that is simply focused on the cross. A theology of the cross has always come about in contrast to a theology of glory, in whatever form that may take. In Luther, this was a scholastic theology that thought it was possible to know God through reason; in Hegel, an understanding of transcendence that put God beyond human reach; in Heidegger, a linking of God and being together and an understanding of being as static; and for Bonhoeffer, a theology which saw God as a stopgap. The way in which to combat these issues was through the cross, where God is seen to engage with situations and issues that appear at first glance to be against the nature of God as it was conceived of in their times. Certainly for Luther, Hegel and Bonhoeffer, it became necessary to conceive of God on the cross. However, for none of these thinkers is the cross the source of all revelation about God. The only thinker that could be said of is Bonhoeffer, and that is in a contested work rather than in the more widely accepted instances of his thought. Whilst it can be argued that the cross is the centre of Luther’s thought, that interpretation is easily contested. However, as I shall explore in the next chapter, an understanding of these thinkers is essential for an understanding of a theology of the cross as it was developed in 20th century Lutheran theology. By returning to the sources, it is now clear what the intent of a theology of the

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cross was in each of these thinkers, and therefore I can examine whether it has been taken correctly in the context of post-war German Lutheranism.

From this investigation it can be said regarding a theology of the cross historically that it is a normative focus of Christian theology but it can never be an exclusive one. A theology of the cross serves a role in Christian theology: it exists to challenge our preconceptions of God, to kill them off in the moment of the death of Christ and from there rebuild our view of God informed by what was revealed or undergone on the cross. When it is understood thus, it can be seen in the discussion of the above three theologians that a theology of the cross exists as a moment in their thought, not as the sole basis of their thought. Therefore, when I shall explore later accounts of a theology from the cross, they are distinguished from these previous iterations by their exclusive focus on revelation from the cross.

However, from these thinkers it can be seen how a theology of the cross can be best approached. It can be seen that a theology of the cross works best as part of a whole theology, and rarely exists alone. When a theology of the cross is seen as a moment in the thinker’s thought, or as a part of a wider focus on revelation, then this approach means that revelation is not focused solely on the suffering and death of God. There is a focus on the humanity of Christ in Bonhoeffer, on the history of God with humanity in Hegel, and on justification in Luther. Moreover, the use of an experiential theology of the cross means that this linking of the suffering of God with the suffering of humanity becomes both a comfort and a signpost back to the God who became human and shared in human life.

Yet within these systems a theology of the cross plays a revelatory part. It can emphasise the humanity of God and illustrates in a deep and profound fashion the being of God for humanity. Therefore, to conclude this survey of theologies of the cross and Jüngel’s influences, what must be emphasised is that the humanity of God is not only characterised by suffering, pain, and death. The cross is a very particular form of revelation, as it communicates the being of God in its opposite form: in powerlessness, death, and helplessness. As Jüngel explicitly bases his theology on this event I shall now explore through Jüngel what system that results in, and the benefits and deficiencies that
this system creates. I shall undertake a close exegesis of Jüngel’s theology of the cross in comparison with other forms of theopaschite theology at the time and explore the impact of the cross on Jüngel’s understanding of Christ, God, and the world.
Chapter Two: Jüngel's Theology of the Cross

Introduction

Having considered the historical precedents for Jüngel's theology of the cross, I turn now to how Jüngel develops and states his own understanding of it. Jüngel was not writing in a vacuum when it came to expounding his understanding of the cross and the death of God. Although as I noted in the introduction, Jüngel wrote more specifically about working through the Marxist death of God that he had experienced in the German Democratic Republic. *God as the Mystery of the World* appeared in 1977 after a number of works had been published in Germany on the death of God, exemplified here by Moltmann and Sölle. This instantiation of a theology of the death of God and of the cross was characterised by a focus on the importance of the death of God for theology; and relied on Luther’s original exposition of a theology of the cross, combined with Hegel’s understanding of Spirit as event and engagement with the opposite and Bonhoeffer’s call for a new understanding of God’s relation to the world. Moreover, by locating the knowledge of God in the death of Christ it challenged previous philosophical concepts of God as impassible and simple.

Jüngel conforms to these criteria in his understanding of a theology of the cross and of the death of God. However Jüngel’s understanding of the union of God with death on the cross does not go so far as Sölle’s and Moltmann’s theologies although he follows similar steps, in how Jüngel leads up to his understanding of the revelation of God by detailing the mistakes of theological metaphysics and shows a reliance on the thought of Hegel and Bonhoeffer. Jüngel also seeks in *God as the Mystery of the World* to reconstruct

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1 The death of God movement was wider than Germany, although Jüngel restricts his analysis of it to Germany. At the time there were many attempts to reconcile the being of God with suffering. In the Anglophone world it took very different forms. There was a death of God movement in America, led by Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton. In the UK the focus was on process theology rather than the death of God, as developed by A.N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne and John Cobb. Jüngel focuses on the German discussion, as seen by his of Bonhoeffer and Hegel for an understanding of God’s relation to suffering and the world.

2 Moltmann sees that Hegel enables a view of justification of the other through the cross (28) and of the cross of Jesus as a divine event (246). (Jürgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology* (London: SCM, 1974)). Sölle looks at Hegel’s development of reconciliation in *Christ the Representative* (78-83), as well as noting that ‘from Hegel’s anthropological approach, we learned that identity can only appear (and be conceived) in the difference which explains both our dependence upon representation and our responsibility for representation’. Dorothee Sölle, *Christ the Representative: An Essay in Theology after the “Death of God”* (London: SCM Press, 1967), 102. Regarding their use of Hegel, Jüngel writes ‘that Hegel’s massive accomplishment was almost immediately misunderstood is no excuse for the scandalous fact that there are contemporary thinkers who would have us believe that they could appeal to Hegel for their theologically senseless use of the idea of the death of God’. (*Mystery*, 56). Their use of Bonhoeffer will be discussed below.
the concept of God from the cross as he sees that as a result of a reliance on metaphysics and the history of metaphysics the modern concept of God is problematic.

**Destruktion**

In order to be able to think and speak of God anew Jüngel finds it necessary to understand previous philosophical and theological thought on God and see how it went wrong. More specifically, what Jüngel wishes to assert regarding metaphysics is that the being of God neither necessary nor unnecessary; the two categories that can be used philosophically, but instead *more than necessary* in that the being of God is first groundless; then has the character of accidence which surpasses necessity; and finally as the freedom of existence defined as breaking out of oneself. In accordance with other proponents of the death of God theology and in order to correct them, Jüngel uses the starting points that Hegel’s work gives him about the being of God as dynamic movement to build an understanding of the being of God as more than necessary. For Jüngel, God cannot be seen as dependent on some other being; God must be completely grounded in Godself. God is not necessary but more than necessary. Whilst using Hegel, Jüngel is keen on avoiding the pitfalls of Hegelian thought in how Jüngel’s approach sets up a way of thinking about God so that God is conceived of as both coming to Godself and coming to humanity in such a way that it does not, like Hegel has been said to do, make God dependent on the existence of humanity, and also does not go the opposite way and devalue the importance of God coming to humanity by eradicating mention of creation entirely.

It is also important to note that Jüngel does not reject wholesale all the findings of the metaphysical tradition as he is clear that God is unconditioned, as the concept that ‘God comes from God means, negatively formulated, that God stands under no conditions of any kind’. However, Jüngel understands that the way in which God is seen as necessary

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3 ‘When God reveals himself, then man experiences his existence and the being of his world as a being which has been plucked from nothingness. To that extent, man has already experienced God himself as a being which is not necessary but more than necessary. For, in the experience of being preserved from nothingness in such a way that gratitude results, God is experienced as the Being who disposes over being and nonbeing’. Jüngel, *Mystery*, 33.

4 ‘If one still wanted to postulate for God the highest and absolute necessity, then it could not be distinguished from absolute accidence, and then one would have to do as Hegel did, and postulate that the essence of “absolute necessity” is pure accidence. The expression chosen instead, “more than necessary” to the extent that it rejects necessity and yet not its opposite, which is the affirmation of the arbitrariness of a “this way or possibly that way,” is an expression which only implies what is at stake, but implies the issue in a better way than a concept of absolute necessity which conceals the nonnecessity of God.’ Jüngel, *Mystery*, 33.

in metaphysical thought conditions God. When God is seen as necessary God becomes a guarantor for the world and thinking and being. Yet Jüngel sees that this understanding of God led to a conceptual separation of essence and existence in God in order to guarantee human thought and existence. Thus, God is necessary because knowing and thought is grounded upon something outside of humanity. Whilst this in itself is negative Jüngel sees that a greater ill was achieved through Descartes and his shift to grounding human thought on itself.

Jüngel sees that ‘Descartes secured the existence of God in such a way that it necessarily had to lead to the destruction of the concept of God and of the metaphysically grounded certainty of God’. Jüngel argues that whilst Descartes was trying to make belief in God reasonable, in doing so ‘Descartes made God into the comrade in arms of doubt’, as he writes that ‘Descartes’ proofs of God all are connected to an idea of God which I discover in my consciousness as a form of it’. In order to secure certainty against doubting our existence, God becomes a guarantor, for ‘doubt of the human ego as such is not strong enough to produce the securing of the continuity of human existence which he wants. He needs God as a comrade in arms’. Due to the efforts of Descartes ‘the mere “rational distinction” between the essence and existence of God was already caught up in the dependence of human thought, which makes that distinction, on the divine thought which from its very origin is in agreement with itself’.

This undermines Descartes’ attempts to see God as the most perfect, as for Jüngel Descartes’ workings mean that ‘God ends up in the position of a predicate of perfection, which is conceived in terms of the defectiveness of a not quite perfect human essence. Thus, by identifying God with that which is highest, God is totally relativised by man’. The thinking self then becomes the subject of all existence, and

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6 ‘In God, thought had a guarantor not only for the context of all things but also for the coherent context of thinking and being’, Jüngel, Mystery, 105.
7 ‘In order to think God really, the simultaneous originality and unity of his essence and his existence had to be conceived of. But, in order to think God really, one had to make a mental distinction between his essence and his existence. Thought, then had to make a rational differentiation between something which was in reality in identity, because of the real identity of the “essence” and “existence” of God’. Jüngel, Mystery, 107.
8 Jüngel, Mystery, 111.
9 Jüngel, Mystery, 113.
10 Jüngel, Mystery, 120.
11 Jüngel, Mystery, 122.
12 Jüngel, Mystery, 108.
13 Jüngel, Mystery, 122.
when God is conceived of, God is conceived of as above humanity, only with Godself and yet is only known through one’s own thought. This position creates problems that are evinced in later thought as Jüngel sees this contradiction played out in Fichte, where he states that God should not be thought of as it is impossible,\textsuperscript{14} where Feuerbach asserts that only when your thought is God is your thought truly thought\textsuperscript{15} and in how Nietzsche exclaims whether you could conceive of a God.\textsuperscript{16}

As a result of this aporia concerning the nature of God and in order to be able to speak and think of God correctly again, Jüngel wishes to destroy what they insist on, which is the metaphysical concept of God as a presupposition for the possibility of thinking God.\textsuperscript{17} Jüngel sees that it is impossible to think God anew without creating a blank slate as all our terms have a loaded history behind them and that history, when taken as Nietzsche does, to its logical conclusion entails and necessitates atheism as such a God cannot be conceived of.\textsuperscript{18} Jüngel thus wishes to think both God and thought anew from a present situation of inevitable atheism, where belief in God is either nonexistent or there is a false belief in the wrong sort of God. In order to do this Jüngel focuses on the

\textsuperscript{14}Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Der Herausgeber des philosophischen Journals gerichtliche Verantwortungslösungen gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, in Sammlliche Werke, ed. I.H. Fichte, (Berlin: Veit & Company, 1845/1971). ‘Fichte contests the thinkability of God, for the sake of the glory of God. But it is the glory of a highest being metaphysically understood. Feuerbach asserts the conceptual necessity of God for the sake of the dignity of human thought. But it is the dignity of man identifying himself with the highest being, metaphysically understood. Nietzsche questions the thinkability of God, for the sake of the praise and justification of all mortality. But it is the praise and justification of a mortality from which God, metaphysically conceived as the highest being, must be and remained removed, because all mortality is by definition excluded from the metaphysically conceived highest being’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 128.

\textsuperscript{15}Ludwig Feuerbach, \textit{The Essence of Christianity}, trans. G. Eliot, (NY: Harper & Brothers, 1957). ‘The mystery contained in the word “God” should profit man in such a way that everything implied by the word “God” should be asserted of man…with constant reference to the essence of the Christian faith, this exposition is to be completed with the rigorous intention to demonstrate that what theology asserts to be the contrasting relationship between God and man is really the mere division of man within himself. The result is to be that man, now coming to himself out of that dichotomization, can be asserted to be that being which rightfully and solely merits being called \textit{divine}'. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 142.

\textsuperscript{16}Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None} in \textit{The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche}, ed. O. Levy, tr. T. Common (NY/London: Macmillan/George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1930). From Nietzsche's understanding of metaphysics, Jüngel sees that ’Nietzsche’s consequence was the most consequent because it began to take leave of the results. In this leave-taking it becomes completely certain that the last certainty of modern metaphysics is that of the factual inconceivability of God. Atheism could now become a foregone conclusion’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 152.

\textsuperscript{17}All three thinkers are presupposing, in one way or another, the metaphysical concept of God'. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 128.

\textsuperscript{18}Whilst Jüngel wishes to follow Augustine’s use of words as signs here, and thus 'what the word “God” provides for our thinking is then basically impossible to think through, cannot be grasped by thinking, and thus can only be grasped as something incomprehensible'. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 8. He further follows Augustine's statement in Sermon 117 that if you can comprehend it, it is not God. Therefore, there is a problem of how we are both able to think God and to think of God, which results in a problem in how we can speak of God. Despite these dangers and limitations, Jüngel does not want to go down the route of apophatic theology, for 'if God is thinkable only as the Unthinkable, must not then our thinking ultimately resign when it turns to God?' Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 8. Jüngel thinks that ‘such resignation would affect not only thought. It has practical consequences. How should the Christian faith act if it is no longer able to think God and thus no longer understand itself as faith?’ Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 9. Therefore, whilst Jüngel is not open to an apophatic theology, he is still insistent on the mystery of God, as 'the thinkability of something is not necessarily identical with its knowability’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 103.
revelation of Christ, as he sees that the origin of Christian theology is in the unity of God and humanity in the incarnation of the person of Christ. Jüngel sees that this is most clearly revealed and known in the event of the cross, for ‘faith in the crucified God forces us to contest the view that God is absolutely invulnerable essence’ as it is an inversion of the Cartesian confidence. What happens is that ‘God is transformed into the humanly conceivable only when he ceases to be that infinity which as superego is opposed to finite man. According to the logic of the presupposed concept of God, he then ceases to be God in any sense at all’. It is due to this that Jüngel sees that ‘as far as the concept of God is concerned, the history of European Christianity until now has fallen prey to this in one regard. It has considered itself capable of thinking of God in his being as God without thinking of him simultaneously as the Crucified’. Too often the suffering and death of God is seen as antithetical to the being of God, as God is not allowed to change or suffer, but for Jüngel God’s being does not contradict itself in the crucified man Jesus, but harmonises with itself. However, this is not to say that the death of God is easy or trivial; ‘the proposition that God is dead is a dark statement. And it will remain dark as long as it is not understood in terms of its origin’. The way in which Jüngel is to lighten this statement is by considering its ‘metaphysical and genuinely Christian origin’. Therefore, despite the initial inconceivability of this God, Jüngel insists that there should be only one thing we are bound by in terms of talk about God, and that has been revealed to us as the Crucified One. The death of Christ is possible due to Christ’s

19 Jüngel, Mystery, 155.
20 Jüngel, Mystery, 123.
21 It was the defeat of the ability to doubt which made Cartesian man powerful. Would one not suspect that, conversely, the God understood as the highest power would be the one who was totally defective? The highest power could ultimately be found in actual weakness’ Jüngel, Mystery, 123. Whilst this reaches its apex in Descartes Jüngel puts this theological and philosophical train of thought further back than Descartes to Anselm’s ontological argument, where ‘the thought of God, always presupposed in a metaphysic which understands God as “that which nothing greater can be conceived”, causes giddiness because it forces thought to compare itself to a height to which it is forbidden to climb’. Jüngel, Mystery, 149.
22 Jüngel, Mystery, 149.
23 Jüngel, Mystery, 39.
24 Jüngel, Mystery, 45.
25 Jüngel, Mystery, 47.
26 When we attempt to think of God as the one who communicates and expresses himself in the person Jesus, then we must always remember that this man was crucified, that he was killed in the name of God’s law. For responsible
humanity and therefore ‘talk about God which is oriented to the crucified man Jesus must understand God’s deity on the basis of his humanity revealed in Jesus’. Jüngel is adamant that we only know God in the incarnation, for God determines Godself towards the incarnation. However it is important to note than in Jüngel this does not mean that God is lacking without humanity, for ‘God perfects or consummates himself. But it may and must be said that God does not want to perfect himself without man’.

For Jüngel, the statement of the death of God must be taken and understood within the Christian faith, for throughout its development ‘to think seriously of the death of God without the Christian faith was totally impossible’. The death of God has a profoundly anti-metaphysical significance for Jüngel. However, does the death of God free Christianity from metaphysics or bring both to an end? It is clear, nevertheless, that Jüngel intends to destroy a good portion of the metaphysical tradition and thought about of God, and replace it with evangelical theology, by which Jüngel means talk about God which expresses the identity of God with the crucified Jesus in the gospel, which ‘attempts to think God from the encounter with God, and thus to think thought anew’, and to recalibrate the question of where to find God by also obviating the false dichotomy between presence and absence. Jüngel wishes to achieve this through his use of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Christ being pushed out of the world, which Jüngel understands happens in the death of God.

The Death of God

More than that, Jüngel wishes to rehabilitate the death of God from both its neglect and its misuse in theology. He writes that previously

A theology which participates in criticism of theism has much reason to counter the absurd and irresponsible use of the statement through a discussion of the meaning of talk about the death of God. The best

Christian usage of the word “God”, the Crucified One is virtually the real definition of what is mean with the word “God”. Christian theology is therefore fundamentally theology of the Crucified One. Jüngel, Mystery, 13.
27 Jüngel, Mystery, 14.
28 Jüngel, Mystery, 38.
29 Jüngel, Mystery, 47-8.
30 Jüngel, Mystery, 154.
31 ‘As long as the question about the Where of God can be answered with the alternative reference either to his presence or his absence, then God’s being has not been put into question radically’. Jüngel, Mystery, 54.
32 ‘Whether in one in stance or the other, the statement about the “death of God” was a substantive partner in dialogue for theology. Then it became a fad. Not a few theologians who began to be somewhat embarrassed about their actual task now used the statement as a kind of fig leaf in order to conceal the nudity of their theology behind it. The motto “God is dead” can be used to make theological thinking unbelievably simple. The serious involvement with the problems raised by the idea of the death of God is then seriously jeopardised.’ Jüngel, Mystery, 44.
possibility for countering the irresponsible and absurd use of this phrase is still that of working through its actual meaning.\textsuperscript{33}

Jüngel is writing against the use of the death of God in writers such as Moltmann and Sölle, which I shall now explore in order to gain a fuller understanding of what Jüngel is trying to accomplish and combat with his theology of the cross.

Moltmann and Sölle see a theology of the cross as a way of responding to the horrors of the twentieth century, where in the context of the Second World War and its legacy ‘a theology which did not speak of God in the sight of the one who was abandoned and crucified would have had nothing to say to us then’.\textsuperscript{34} Moltmann legitimises his theological movement by tracing a theology of the cross from Paul, to Luther, and then to the Luther renaissance of the 1920s. Moltmann wishes to emphasise the abandonment of Christ and to open a conversation against what he sees as the contemporary society’s blindness;\textsuperscript{35} and he seeks to link the Cross and Trinity more fully as he sees them as the two unique and central aspects of Christian thought.

Moltmann starts from Bonhoeffer’s experimental idea of religionless Christianity and God being pushed out of the world in \textit{Letters and Papers} as well as following on from Käsemann in stressing the event of the cross.\textsuperscript{36} Moltmann wants to emphasise the practical nature of a theology of the cross.\textsuperscript{37} What Moltmann sees the cross as achieving is a differentiation and a rupture in the being of God, where ‘the cross of the Son divides God from God to the utmost degree of enmity and distinction. The resurrection of the Son abandoned by God unites God with God in the most intimate fellowship’.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{33} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 44.
\textsuperscript{34} Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 1.
\textsuperscript{35} ‘What does it mean to recall the God who was crucified in a society whose official creed is optimism, and which is knee-deep in blood?’ Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 4.
\textsuperscript{36} ‘The church lives under the sign of the cross, that is to say, given over to death inwardly and outwardly, waiting longingly with the whole of creation for the liberty of the children of God and manifesting the imitation of Jesus through the bearing of the cross...The person who does not share in the carrying of the cross, leaving the things that lie behind, has no part in the church; nor has the man who does not stand in the no-man’s land before the gates of this world’s permanent camp, repeating Israel’s Exodus. He is in truth not a Christian at all, but a member of the old world, whose characteristic is enmity to the cross. No one can take on the likeness of Christ in the birth-pangs of the Messiah without having become a disciple of the one who was crucified’. Ernst Käsemann, \textit{Perspectives on Paul} (London: SCM, 1971), 67-8.
\textsuperscript{37} ‘A thoroughgoing theology of the cross must apprehend the crucified God in all the three areas in which the ancient world used the term theology, and in which even today men are inescapably religious: in mythical theology, in the form of demythologisation; in political theology, in the form of liberation; and in philosophical theology, in the form of understanding the universe as creation’. Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 73.
\textsuperscript{38} Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 152.
The incarnation is seen as teleologically realised in the event of the cross,\(^{39}\) the revelatory function of which is to show that love and suffering are not mutually exclusive.\(^{40}\) It also shows that the death of God must be understood as ‘death in God’.\(^{41}\) This understanding of God’s relation to death for Moltmann rids theology of the idea of the simplicity of God and of metaphysics, for he sees that

Christian theology is not the “end of metaphysics”. Precisely because metaphysical theism is not applicable to it, it is for its part free to take up metaphysics as a task of theology and to think through the consequences of faith in the sphere of experiences and hopes of the world.\(^{42}\)

The simplicity of God, for Moltmann, precludes a God who can be affected by suffering, and he sees that ‘a God who is incapable of suffering is a being who cannot be involved…so he is also a loveless being’.\(^{43}\) Moltmann links this inability to see God as involved in suffering as a cause of protest atheism, exemplified by Ivan in *The Brothers Karamazov* wishing to return the ticket, and thus Moltmann sees that

The only way past protest atheism is through a theology of the cross which understands God as the suffering God in the suffering of Christ and which cries out with the godforsaken God, “My God, why have you forsaken me?” For this theology, God and suffering are no longer contradictions, as in theism and atheism, but God’s being is suffering and the suffering is in God’s being itself, because God is love…God himself loves and suffers the death of Christ in his love…is known as the human God in the crucified Son of Man.\(^{44}\)

Moltmann sees that this is theologically possible through the communication of attributes in the Lutheran understanding of the person of Christ.\(^{45}\) With Christ and the Trinity thus able to affect each other more fully, Moltmann can thus say that the whole Trinity suffers in the event of the cross: the Father suffers in his love the grief of the death of the Son, and the Son is forsaken and the Father forsakes, and there is a Spirit of surrender. This event overcomes the division between the immanent and economic Trinity for

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\(^{39}\) ‘There can be no theology of the incarnation which does not become a theology of the cross’. Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, 205.

\(^{40}\) ‘Here God has not just acted externally, in his unattainable glory and eternity. Here he has acted in himself and has gone on to suffer in himself. Here he himself is love with all his being’. Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, 205

\(^{41}\) Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, 207.


\(^{45}\) ‘With the help of the notion of the *communicatio idiomatum* one can attribute the human characteristics of suffering and death to the whole person of Christ’. Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, 232.
What happened on the cross was an event between God and God. It was a deep division in God himself, in so far as God abandoned God and contradicted himself, and at the same time a unity in God, in so far as God was at one with God and corresponded to himself. In that case one would have to put the formula in a paradoxical way: God died the death of the godless on the cross and yet did not die. God is dead and yet is not dead.\(^{46}\)

It is only this understanding of the cross of Christ as a divine event that leads to proper trinitarian theology, where it is no longer “impractical speculation” but the narrative of salvation,\(^{47}\) where the concept of God is broken in how ‘the cross stands between the Father and the Son in all the harshness of its forsakenness’.\(^{48}\) Moltmann here shows a theology of the cross that emphasises the solidarity of the suffering and community of God with human experiences, where ‘there is no suffering which in this history of God which is not God’s suffering; no death which has not been God’s death in the history on Golgotha. Therefore there is no life, no fortune and no joy which have not been integrated by his history into eternal life, the eternal joy of God’\(^{49}\). As this event of God is now an event that incorporates human existence, there is a theopoeisis from it,\(^{50}\) in how ‘one does not pray to an event but \textit{in} this event’.\(^{51}\) Moltmann sees that a theology of the cross that emphasises the suffering of God and death in God explodes the dichotomy between atheism and theism, and means that

God is not only other-worldly but also this-worldly; he is not only God but also man; he is not only rule, authority and law but the event of suffering, liberating love. Conversely, the death of the Son is not the “death of God”, but the beginning of that God event in which the life-giving spirit of love emerges from the death of the Son and the grief of the Father.\(^{52}\)

\(^{46}\) Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 244.

\(^{47}\) If the cross of Jesus is understood as a divine event, las a event between Jesus and his God and Father, it is necessary to speak in trinitarian terms of the Son and Father and the Spirit. In that case the doctrine of the Trinity is no longer an exorbitant and impractical speculation about God, but is nothing other than a shorter version of the passion narrative of Christ in its significance for the eschatological freedom of faith and the life of oppressed nature. It protects faith from both monotheism and atheism because it keeps believers at the cross. The content of the doctrine of the Trinity is the real cross of Christ himself. The form of the crucified Christ is the ‘Trinity’. Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 246.

\(^{48}\) Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 246.

\(^{49}\) Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 246.

\(^{50}\) ‘To think of “history in God” leads beyond that, into new creation and \textit{theopoiesis}.’ Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 247. ‘If one conceives of the Trinity as an event of love in the suffering and death of Jesus – and that is something which faith must do - then the Trinity is no self-contained group in heaven, but an eschatological process open for men on earth, which stems from the cross of Christ. By this secular cross on Golgotha, understood as open vulnerability and as the love of God for loveless and unloved, dehumanised men, God’s being and God’s life is open to true man. There is no ‘outside the gate’ with God (W. Borchers), if God himself is the one who died outside the gate on Golgotha for those who are outside’, Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 249.

\(^{51}\) Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 247.

\(^{52}\) Moltmann, \textit{The Crucified God}, 252.
Moltmann sees that this approach emphasises the acceptance by God of humanity in all its varied states, and sees this as a template for Christian action in the world marked by empathy and the solidarity of God with human suffering.

Sölle also wishes to use the suffering of God on the cross in Suffering, and she also uses the death and suffering of God to struggle conceptually though the legacy of Nazism and the Vietnam War. She sees however that as a result of these events ‘there is…no way to combine omnipotence with love’. Whilst she notes that her approach is similar to Moltmann’s, she sees that in Moltmann there is too much of a focus on the Trinity on the cross whereas Sölle wishes to focus on Christ in the world. Like Moltmann, Sölle sees a problem with the apathetic God of metaphysics: she sees that God as “mute”, especially when compared with the ‘speaking God of a reality experienced with feeling in pain and happiness. It was this God with whom Christ spoke in Gethsemane’. However, Sölle’s understanding of God’s experience of suffering on the cross is unique in how Sölle sees that ‘God is not in heaven; he is hanging on the cross. Love is not an otherworldly, intruding, self-asserting power – and to meditate on the cross can mean to take leave of that dream’. In how human suffering will not end until the eschaton, neither does the suffering of God; ‘we don’t have the choice of avoiding suffering and going around all these deaths. The only choice we have is between the absurd cross of meaninglessness and the cross of Christ, the death we accept apathetically as the natural end and the death we suffer as a passion’.

Sölle notes that contemporary discourse and society is marked by the death of God. The nature of death, she notes, is that it has an effect on others, and what this death of

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53 The godforsaken and rejected man can accept himself where he comes to know the crucified God who is with him and has already accepted him…man is taken up, without limitations and conditions, into the life and suffering, the death and resurrection of God, and in faith participates corporeally in the fullness of God. There is nothing that can exclude him from the situation of God between the grief of the Father, the love of the Son and the drive of the Spirit…a trinitarian theology of the cross perceives God in the negative element and therefore the negative element in God, and in this dialectical way is pantheistic’. Moltmann, The Crucified God, 277.


55 ‘God is not understood as only or even primarily as the loving and suffering Christ. He is simultaneously supposed to occupy the position of the ruling, omnipotent Father’. Sölle, Suffering, 27.

56 Sölle, Suffering, 78.

57 Sölle, Suffering, 148.

58 Sölle, Suffering, 157.

59 ‘The historical condition under which the absolute appears today is described…as the “death of God”, and event which has taken place within the last two centuries of European history and which conditions every aspect of life’. Sölle, Christ the Representative, 10. The phrase “the death of God” is meant to give theological expression to these changed psychosocial conditions. It points to the experience of the end of all immediate certainty, whether objective
God has done means that ‘any direct religious certainty has become impossible’.60 What Sölle wishes to do from this situation is to recast the question of the death of God as the absence of God, and work from there,61 and use the view of Christ as Representative to facilitate an understanding of how Christ is the living God due to Christ’s continued suffering on the cross.62 Only at the eschaton will suffering and thus the office of representation pass away. Sölle, in emphasising that God is helpless in the world uses Bonhoeffer’s understanding of how God lets himself be pushed out of the world. However, whilst the statement that God continues suffering is on the cross in the world is unconventional, Sölle also differs from Jüngel due to her understanding that in the incarnation and the cross there is not a complete kenosis, that God holds back some of Godself.

Jüngel, as noted earlier, finds that these expressions of the death of God obscure the true meaning of the phrase. Jüngel sees that unless the statement that “God is dead” is properly illuminated, all that can be said of it is that it is a dark, somewhat depressing and mysterious statement. Jüngel wishes to use the statement as a negation of a certain understanding of God, as ‘the origin of the concept of the death of God must be sought in the thought of God which was pursued through to its conclusion in the thought of the death of God’.63 It is this understanding of the death of God – as the death of a false concept of God, rather than an actual death, that causes Jüngel to turn to Hegel, who makes use of the concept of the death of God. However, Jüngel also sees that Hegel’s philosophy contributed to the situation of improper views of God.64

and universal or subjective and private. Those who remain within the scope of this new experience of the death of God cannot escape the “infinite pain,” as Hegel called it. Sölle, Christ the Representative, 12.

60 Sölle, Christ the Representative, 131.

61 ‘Either we can assume that God’s absence means he is dead, and so seek or create a substitute for him. Or we can regard his absence as a possible mode of his being-for-us’. Sölle, Christ the Representative, 131.

62 Christ is not a replacement for the dead God, instead Christ is the living God as ‘Christ represents the absent God by allowing him time to appear’. Sölle, Christ the Representative, 137. Moreover, ‘by continuing to suffer, he maintains his kingdom which has not yet appeared, he remains a powerless advocate in man’s behalf, the actor who plays the role of God’. Sölle, Christ the Representative, 148.

63 Jüngel: Mystery, 47.

64 The theological difficulties Jüngel has with Hegel are that he sees Hegel’s system as resulting in a concept of deification where God became human so that humanity may be deified. For Jüngel sees the point of the incarnation as not melding God and humanity, but to distinguish definitively between God and humanity, and Hegel does not deal with, for Jüngel, this fundamental soteriological aspect but instead does the opposite: ‘Hegel’s God needs man, who thereby becomes divine himself. It may be that the God who is in the process of coming to himself uses man and in that act of “development” elevates him to himself. It may be that man uses God while en route to the depths of spirit, so that instead of crying out to God “from the deeps” (de profundis), he elevates himself to his true height “out of the deeps” (de profundis). Whichever option is chosen, the end result is that one has used, has exploited and destroyed the other. It is irrelevant whether man is the being who uses God or God is the being who uses man – the latter is the more like one – the concrete distinction between God and man is jeopardised in either case. By contrast, it would be important here to recognise the human God in the Crucified One, who is both divine and human in that
Jüngel sees that this death on the cross changes the being of God, and sees that this conceptual step can only be made due to Hegel’s depiction of Spirit as event and as Spirit necessarily engaging with negativity, as forming and being historicised in the world, of God as movement: a sentiment echoed in the title of Jüngel’s previous book *God’s Being is in Becoming*. In order to do this, Jüngel sees Hegel reformulating and re-interpreting absolute necessity as pure being but with an emphasis on the relational structure of existence. Jüngel saw that in earlier theology ‘the death of Jesus, generally speaking, has had little significance for the concept of God’. Jüngel wants to make clear that correctly understanding ‘the dark statement that God is dead does not so much mean that the existence of God has been made a problem but rather that the essence of God has become a problem. Of course that must necessarily mean that the divine existence is questioned’. Therefore, it is ‘unthinkability of the essence of God [that] leads to the proclamation of the death of God as the greatest event of modern history’. Jüngel identifies Barth as being influential as here ‘Barth concludes that lowliness and innerworldliness cannot be excluded from the concept of the essence of God’.

he prevents man from becoming God and liberates him to be man and nothing other than man.’ Jüngel, *Mystery*, 95. Jüngel also sees that Hegel’s thought gets rid of the distinction that Lutheran thought preserves of the uniqueness of Christ compared to other humans due to the *communication idiomatum*, as ‘if God has become man, then the divine and human nature in the person of Jesus Christ must be thought of as in communication with each other so that their personal unity (*unio personalis*) is to be understood as the differentiated unity of one event. According to the Lutheran view, this unity must be conceived of strictly as limited to the person of Jesus Christ. Hegel’s view that through the incarnation and death of God there comes the resurrection of an absolute spirit which transforms the unity of divine and human nature into a universal must be disputed by theology as a threat to the concrete being of Jesus Christ and to the proper distinction between God and man’. Jüngel, *Mystery*, 97.

Jüngel sees the trinitarian formula as starting a linguistic shift that led to Hegel trying to reconcile substance and subject into one dynamic thing, Spirit. Jüngel sees Hegel as saying that spirit is substance that has gained self-certainty as subject, which it does through mediation and negation, and ‘if the subject is distinguished from substance in that the subject is not itself without some other, then the self-certainty in which consciousness is only totally certain of itself is not yet the complete definition of the subject’. Jüngel, *Mystery*, 84. The effect this has on the concept of God implied in Spirit is conveyed in how ‘revealed religion distinguishes itself as absolute religion from the preceding forms of religion in that it perceives the necessity of becoming in which the substance becomes self-consciousness’. Jüngel, *Mystery*, 85. This is manifested as creation and reconciliation in religious thought, where the seemingly opposite movements are the same.

‘Hegel’s concept of “absolute necessity” shows clearly the kind of difficulties one encounters when one tries to deal adequately with the relational structure of necessary existence and still wants to assert the existence of an “absolute necessity” which is not dependent on something else. On the other hand, Hegel’s interpretation of “absolute necessity” points out clearly the elements which characterise an existence which surpasses the concept of necessity.’ Jüngel, *Mystery*, 28.


Jüngel, *Mystery*, 101. Barth sees in *Church Dogmatics IV/1* that the power of God is precisely this – to appear to be other than Godself, to have ‘freedom for this condensation, for this concealment of His Godhead. He had it and He made use of it in the power and not with any loss, nor with any diminution or alteration of His Godhead. That is His self-emptying. It does not consist in ceasing to be Himself as man, but in taking it upon Himself to be Himself in a way quite other than that which corresponds and belongs to His form as God’. (Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* [hereafter: *CD*], 4 volumes in 13 parts, edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956-1975], CD IV/1, 180).
Therefore Jüngel takes these precedents set by Hegel and Barth, and follows on from Bonhoeffer,\textsuperscript{71} when he sees that ‘atheism can be rejected only if one overcomes theism, which is the presupposition of modern metaphysics and its disputation’.\textsuperscript{72} As noted earlier Jüngel needs to overcome metaphysics, which follows an impulse that traces the thought of God to its end in order to rehabilitate the death of God within theology.\textsuperscript{73} Accordingly, Jüngel now strives to give Hegel’s discussion of the death of God substantive theological attention, and he sees this explicit focus on the death of God as starting in \textit{Faith and Knowledge},\textsuperscript{74} where it begins to make the transition from theological to philosophical significance.\textsuperscript{75} As death entails the full understanding and experience of humanity, it is proof of the full humanity of Christ and the religious significance is, according to Hegel, more than that God died, but that in the death of God death itself was negated.\textsuperscript{76}

Jüngel further notes that theology is indebted to Hegel’s particular form of the theology of the cross in how it destroys the axioms of absoluteness, apathy, and immutability, which for Jüngel are all unsuitable axioms for the Christian concept of God. It is due to Jüngel’s use of Hegel that he finds these concepts so unsuitable. Thus God is not static, for Jüngel, but is a being in becoming. However, it is clear that Jüngel finds Hegel’s

\textsuperscript{71} Hegel wanted to understand the death of Jesus Christ expressly as the death of the divine. And it was on the basis of this event that he then interpreted the dogma of the incarnation...[that] Hegel provided an interpretation of the dogma of the incarnation which is astonishingly in line with the New Testament’s history of traditions when he sought to understand the incarnation on the basis of the death of Christ, deserves the highest regard. It cannot be theologically devalued when the christological truth is immediately diverted into the philosophical, in that the incarnation of God is discussed as the “divesting...of the abstract being” as “the sacrifice of divinity, i.e. of the abstract beyond essence.” Understanding the divine essence as an “abstract essence from beyond” is certainly not biblical.’ Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 77.

\textsuperscript{72} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 43.

\textsuperscript{73} ‘Acting in terms of its inner necessity when it traced the thought of God to its end’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 47-8.

\textsuperscript{74} ‘By designating the feeling that “God himself is dead” as a moment of the supreme Idea, talk about the death of God gains a twofold meaning. First of all, in talk about the death of God, the situation of absolutised finitude expresses itself, which corresponds to abstract infinitude as empty negativity. Once that feeling is grasped as a moment of the supreme Idea, then the death of God is understood as an event of the self-negation of God, who does not desire to be “in and for himself” and does not desire to forsake the world in its finitude. Or must one perhaps say: who cannot be in and for himself and cannot leave the world to its finitude?’ Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 74.

\textsuperscript{75} Jüngel notes that ‘it is fascinating to see in Hegel’s exposition how Luther’s dogmatic insights are made hermeneutically fruitful. The “theology of the cross” (\textit{theologia crucis}) asserts its material insights hermeneutically at this point. The crucifixion of Jesus Christ is regarded not only as the decisive event of his life but also as the criterion for the proper understanding of his being’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 92.

\textsuperscript{76} ‘Hegel understood the trinitarian dogma as an explication of the meaning of the death of Jesus Christ as a demonstration of an admirable awareness of the problem, both from its historical and its dogmatic aspects. Hegel’s \textit{philosophy of religion} represents here in any event a high-water mark of the first order in the history of theology, in that here the “theology of the cross” and the doctrine of the Trinity mutually encourage and establish each other...regardless of any theological criticism which must be rendered, we are dealing here with a grand theological accomplishment, namely, a philosophically conceived theology of the Crucified One as the doctrine of the Triune God.’ Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 94.

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conclusions lacking, especially as regards the lack of distinction between God and humanity. From this analysis of Jüngel’s writings on Hegel in God as the Mystery of the World, we can see that there is simultaneously an acceptance and a distancing. There is gratitude expressed for the conceptual framework that makes Jüngel’s understanding of God as “more than necessary” possible, and for a reintroduction of a central Lutheran theme of the death of God into an atmosphere where a certain understanding of God needed to be eradicated. However, Jüngel does not engage with Hegel’s system otherwise, and thus what we must note is that Hegel’s understanding of the act of God as God’s being, and of the death of God as an integral part of our knowledge of God means that Jüngel’s engagement with Hegel must be understood as part of Jüngel’s understanding of a theology of the cross.

What a theology of the cross shows us about Jüngel’s thought is that with this identification of the being of God with death, and with the understanding of revelation as solely on the cross, Jüngel is intent on preserving the freedom of God to determine God’s self. Jüngel understands that ‘freedom is always self-determination’.  

This is because ‘the will to determination is what makes self-determination, makes freedom something concrete’. Again, this is only possible due to the nature of God as happily revealing, for ‘God is experienced only on the basis of self-revelation. God comes from God. If God reveals himself as the one who distinguishes being and not being and decides in favour of being, then he cannot be placed within the category of the necessary…God is more than necessary’. This understanding of freedom and necessity has nuances for Jüngel’s doctrine of trinity, where God determines Godself in that ‘God comes to himself when he comes from himself. Obviously the proposition threatens to become nothing else than a cheap tautology. Christian tradition has excluded this appearance of cheap tautology with the trinitarian dogma.’

To do this, Jüngel wishes to conceive, in the revelation from the cross, of how God and death relate to each other and what this tells us about the essence of God. For Jüngel, the death of God is a statement about the humanity of God: ‘not the identification of

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77 Jüngel, Mystery, 36.
78 Jüngel, Mystery, 36.
79 Jüngel, Mystery, 34.
80 Jüngel, Mystery, 36.
man with God, which necessarily must lead to the replacement of God with man (understood generically), but the identification of God with the one man Jesus for the sake of all men.81 The humanity of God, for Jüngel, enables us to think of God ‘as the subject of himself who is free in the very event of love, and that led to the formal insight that God can be known and thought only on the basis of his own being. God is thinkable as God solely on the basis of his self-sharing of his being, which has taken place’.82 This self-sharing of the being of God must also take account of the whole life of Christ, for Jüngel sees that ‘no theology of the Crucified One can or may do without the narration of the life and suffering of Jesus, as a life in the act of the word which tells of God’s humanity’.83

Despite this call to think of the whole narrative of Christ’s life, the life of Christ does not reveal all about Christ and God. It is only the death of Christ that counts as full revelation in that ‘the death of Jesus opens a new relationship to God because it discloses the being of God in its divine vitality, on the basis of the death of Jesus’.84 This is disclosed in how Christ bears suffering, as ‘in that the living God in his deity bears the death of Jesus, in that he burdens the eternity of his being with the crucifixion of Jesus, he demonstrates his divine being as a living unity of life and death’.85

The death of God enables Jüngel to develop Bonhoeffer’s thoughts of God being pushed out of the world as a way to engage with the atheism that Jüngel grew up with. Jüngel sees that

Bonhoeffer did not take modern atheism to be a reason to remove God from contemporary thought, but rather conversely took modern atheism as an opportunity to investigate anew a Christian concept of God in critical interaction with the theological tradition. Bonhoeffer, writing in prison, was thus sharing in the problems as seen by the young Hegel.86

Jüngel sees Bonhoeffer as detailing the problem that ‘God cannot be thought of as God without simultaneously considering the world and its historical situation’.87 However, there was a concurrent development in which human reason made understanding the

81 Jüngel, Mystery, 299.
82 Jüngel, Mystery, 299.
83 Jüngel Mystery, 302.
84 Jüngel Mystery, 343.
85 Jüngel Mystery, 344.
86 Jüngel, Mystery, 57.
87 Jüngel, Mystery, 57.
universe possible without the idea of God, and he regards this development as impossible to reverse. Thus what happens is that ‘the world lives without God. And as world it is understood through the fact that one lets it live as world without God’.\textsuperscript{88}

As noted earlier, Jüngel wants to set aside these false presuppositions of worldly necessity of God. This is because

The death of Christ on the cross is the event in which God allows himself to be pushed out of the world. This event forces us to live “even if there were not God” and forces us theologically to recognise that we must live this way if we want to be honest not only in regard to the world but also before God.\textsuperscript{89}

Jüngel sees that Bonhoeffer creates a situation where ‘in that “not thinking without the world” means to think God as the one who lets himself be pushed out of the world and thus the one who relates himself to the world’.\textsuperscript{90} The statement that God ‘lets “himself be pushed out of the world” is oriented to the cross and thus is to be understood soteriologically’\textsuperscript{91} and therefore ‘if God lets “himself be pushed out of the world” and bears the world on the cross as the world on the cross as the world which will not bear him, then the being of God is in fact to be thought of as a being which explodes the alternative of presence and absence’.\textsuperscript{92}

This means for Jüngel that ‘if God is present as the one who is absent in the world, if absence is not simply the alternative opposite to the presence of God, then what Bonhoeffer presented as the interpretation of the cross event actually expresses in focused soteriological fashion the ontological characteristics of the divine being’.\textsuperscript{93} The death of God must change all our previous understandings of God, as ‘the concept of the omnipresence of God must pass through the eye of the needle of the properly understood concept of the death of God’.\textsuperscript{94} "Thinking of God as both present and absent changes the nature of the existence of God for Jüngel. This entails that revelation is both a opening and a withdrawing, where the

\textsuperscript{88} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 59.
\textsuperscript{89} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 60.
\textsuperscript{90} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 61.
\textsuperscript{91} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 62.
\textsuperscript{92} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 62.
\textsuperscript{93} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 62.
\textsuperscript{94} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 63.
Essence of God must therefore be thought of, on the basis of revelation, in such a way that revelation is thought of together with the concept of the divine essence, without revelation degenerating into coercion. To think of the divine essence means to think of it as an essence which has revealed itself and for which therefore a certain inner connection of presence and absence is essential.  

Jüngel also sees that the statement about the death of God has christological and soteriological implications, in how it affirms the *communicatio idiomatum* and also the reality of the humanity of Christ, as

Talk of the death of God is for Luther however not only possible in the sense of it being a logical consequence of the communicatio idiomatum. Instead, talk of the death of God is necessary, because Jesus Christ comes in reality as truth. One cannot only say that God has been killed, but one must rather say that God has suffered and has died. It is in this necessity that the soteriological implications of Christology hang, for Luther.

Due to these Christological and soteriological implications, Jüngel sees that our understanding of God must come from the death of Jesus.

Moreover, the engagement with the “feeling of the world” is part of Jüngel’s engagement with the metaphysical tradition, which Jüngel sees as the theology of glory, and perhaps as a continuation of the same theology of glory that Luther railed against, which calls good evil and evil good. However, Jüngel continues his attack on the metaphysical tradition and its idea of a simple, impassible God, as he sees that the cross unites the being of God with perishing, potentiality, possibility, and death. Therefore Jüngel holds that

If God himself has defined himself as God in the death of Jesus, then death has ontological relevance for the being of God and thus for the life of Jesus Christ. God defines himself not with propositions namely, but with his own being. And he does it, in that he defines the dead Jesus as the living Son of God.

The dead Jesus can be seen as the living Son of God because Jüngel is adamant that the death of Christ is only to be seen in the light of the resurrection. The suffering of God has fulfilled a purpose, and in doing so

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95 Jüngel, *Mystery*, 104.
97 Jüngel, “Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes” 119.
Divinity dies and returns again. He who returns again from divinity lets divinity leave death behind him, and turns back to life. But he who leaves death behind, and returns to life, still has death before them. Death remains the old…Because death is still not left to itself, but instead it is undergone and suffered by God, in the life that God himself is, and is entered into, because its negation is certain only as a concession in the being of God in order to give us a place there (John 14:3), therefore death becomes a good deed, it is changed in that the ability to die is possible again.98

Death now is not seen as it was previously in the Heideggerian sense as the final ending of all human possibilities. Instead death is now the beginning of a new possibility, it ‘belongs to the beginning of Christian existence’.99 This is because God, who is infinite, and therefore contains infinite possibilities, brings those possibilities into the centre of the end of possibilities and is not overcome.

Although the death of God is seen only in light of the resurrection, the two balance each other, as

The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead can only be understood, believed and become known as the event of the identification of God with Jesus, if in this event of identification the unsurpassable opposite of the living God and the dead human corresponds with the absolute identity of God with the killed Jesus, so that God first and foremost in this as the Holy Spirit truly with the eschatological correspondence between the life-giving Father and the crucified Son as divine being is determined.100

However, does this redefine the being of God, or is the being of God always this way? Jüngel, as I will explore more fully in Chapter Four, sees the being of God as an event, as a being in becoming. Is the full being of God only revealed in its changed state, rather than the state it was in all eternity? This is pertinent as Jüngel states that ‘in the homoousia of God the Son with the human Jesus, the whole divinity is revealed: God is completely defined in the crucified Jesus of Nazareth’,101 that ‘faith in the crucified Jesus Christ leads in the centre of Christian faith. Christian theology is therefore essentially theologica crucifi’.102

98 Jüngel, “Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes”, 123.
102 Jüngel, “Das Sein Jesu Christi”. 278.
Jüngel's understanding of a Theology of the cross

Jüngel's intention in his theology of the cross is, as explored above, to ‘restore to the dark statement of the death of God its good Christological meaning’. Moreover, what Jüngel wishes to do is show how the cross reveals the essence of God as love. However, this revelation of God on the cross in the death of Jesus must always be seen in the light of the resurrection and triumph of God over death, as ‘the simplest view of God is this: God lives. If we must speak of the death of God, then we can absolutely not abstract from this, that God lives’. In Jüngel’s thought the death of God is always informed by the reality of the living God.

Being able to think God and death together has another aspect in God as the Mystery of the World, as Jüngel brings a theology of the cross to theological thinking as a way of creating an encounter between Christian theology and what he sees as the feeling of the world regarding religion. When the death of God is brought to speech ‘the feeling of Godlessness and a specific Christian tone meet one another. The dead Christ himself proclaimed on the worldstage that there is no God’. As noted earlier this engages with the atheistic trend in philosophy that Jüngel has traced from Feuerbach to Nietzsche, culminating in the godlessness in which Jüngel was raised. Thus, Jüngel wants to use this statement about the possibility and thinkability of the death of God to rediscover the living God.

Jüngel understands that the revelation on the cross is sub contrario, revealed under the opposite. This itself is necessary as Jüngel thinks that humanity is predisposed towards things that are aesthetically pleasing, and thus whilst ‘revelation is by definition an aesthetic event’, the revelation of the Christ sub contrario means that ‘the event of revelation cannot therefore be subordinated to the category of the beautiful. Sin – that which God made him, who knew no sin, for the sake of sinners, and for their benefit –

103 Jüngel, Mystery, x.
104 “Christian theology can refer wholly and solely to the suffering God on the cross, which reveals that when God undergoes death, God overcomes death. Here, on the cross of Jesus Christ, where God is seen as impotent, with this impotence as love, love itself is not destroyed, but the omnipotence of love is first and foremost constituted here’. Eberhard Jüngel, “Gottes ursprüngliches Anfänge als schöpferische Selbstbegrenzung. Ein Beitrag zum Gespräch mit Hans Jonas über den “Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz””, Wertlose Wahrheit: Zur Identität und Relevanz des christlichen Glaubens, Theologische Erörterungen III (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1990), 160.
107 Eberhard Jüngel, “‘Even the beautiful must die’ – Beauty in the Light of Truth: Theological Observations on the Aesthetic Relation”, Theological Essays II, 76.
was too ugly for that’.\textsuperscript{108} This is because the revelation of God in Jesus Christ ‘shatters all beautiful appearance. It must shatter the beautiful appearance, because it is not a pre-appearance of the truth, but is the truth itself’.\textsuperscript{109}

It is a quality of the cross that it subverts our language and our expectations, especially regarding our understanding of beauty and worth, as ‘beauty and art are both welcome and dangerous competitors with the Christian kerygma, for in the beautiful appearance they anticipate that which faith has to declare; without any beautiful appearance and indeed in contrast to it: namely the hour of truth’.\textsuperscript{110} As discussed previously, it is central to the understanding of the theology of the cross that there is a contrast between what the world sees as worthy, glorious, and meritorious, and what God reveals on the cross. Therefore, from the cross the starting point for talk about God is not on the world’s terms, but on God’s. Jüngel sees that humanity wishes to have the positive predicates of God, such as power, majesty and glory, yet Jüngel sees that searching for God through this is misguided, as ‘human reason can no more maintain the Godhead of God than can the human will’.\textsuperscript{111} A theology of the cross instead reveals that no-one loves like God, ‘who turns without any reason not to man in his desirability and attractiveness but to the dead and repulsive man on the cross, whose death shows us who we are’.\textsuperscript{112} This is not only a statement about how God chooses to reveal Godself to the world, but an indication of the essence of God as love, for ‘only God can begin to love where there is nothing worth loving, where he himself is not being loved first’.\textsuperscript{113}

In Jüngel’s thought there is a sense that there is something deeper than the dissonance of the power and majesty of God revealed solely in a weak, suffering human. As Jüngel identifies God and death together in the person of Christ, then ‘only if the death of Jesus and God belong together would it make sense not only to ask who Jesus was but to move on to the question of who Jesus Christ is’.\textsuperscript{114} The death of Jesus is not only the

\textsuperscript{108} Jüngel, “Even the beautiful must die”, 79.

\textsuperscript{109} Jüngel, “Even the beautiful must die”, 80.

\textsuperscript{110} Jüngel, “Even the beautiful must die”, 81.


\textsuperscript{113} Jüngel, “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love?’” 310.

\textsuperscript{114} Eberhard Jüngel, “The Effectiveness of Christ Withdrawn, On the process of historical understanding as an introduction to Christology”, \textit{Theological Essays}, 231.
identification of God with death, but of life and death united in favour of life, which is love. This means that the event of the cross is an event of love: yet on the cross ‘the event of the love of God, the death of Jesus Christ is the opposite of what it appears to be, the cross of Jesus Christ does not disclose that in this death there occurs the unity of life and death in favour of life, which deserves to be called love.’ Yet the death of God is also linked to the judgement of God because

God’s glory, revealed under its opposite in the shame of the cross of Jesus, is a judgement on humanity and their world. The addressee of the revelation is so against God that with his whole being he is opposed to the glory of God. When God reveals himself in the misery and death on the cross of Jesus, the actual misery of humanity and their world is the divine judgement of God.

In this event, Jüngel’s theology of the cross is not only a statement about the being of God, but it is also a statement about human life for ‘in suffering death, in bearing the negation of death, God has deprived this act of its essence. In this sense it is valid that he has taken the power from death. Death is made powerlessness in the powerlessness of the Son of God.’

Although in Jüngel the revelation of God on the cross is a full revelation, there is still a hiddenness of God in revelation. The issue of the hiddenness of God also references the theology of the cross, in how God is hidden under the opposite: the glory of God is concealed by the death and suffering of Christ. Whilst Jüngel also holds to the understanding that there is a limit to the human capacity to receive God in God’s fullness, this hiddenness does not mean deliberate inaccessibility, for

The starting point of any talk about God’s hiddenness can under no circumstances mean that God is locked up within himself. Certainly language about the hiddenness of God can mean that some, much, or even

115 Jüngel’s thoughts on death are scattered throughout his thought, but mostly reiterate what he writes in Death: The Riddle and the Mystery, trans Iain und Ute Nicol, (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1975). The text explores different conceptions of death and dying, and sees that death must be turned into a positive from negative through the work of Christ, ‘put to death on a cross, Jesus lives. This explosion of language brings to expression a new being. It can find expression in no other way than by letting the linguistic tradition so to say, burst its banks’, 85 and it establishes that our life is not our own, ’man’s life is gift. It is not his own possession…. even though he has dominion over the earth (Gen. 1:28), he is not his own lord.’ 63. This means that now ‘death must be and must become what Jesus Christ has made it: the limit to man which is set by God alone, who, in our total powerlessness, never abuses his power. For when there is nothing we can do, he is there on our behalf. His purposes are wonderful and his power great’, 136. How humanity relates to death both positively and negatively after the death of Christ is explored in Chapter Five.

116 Jüngel, “Even the beautiful must die”, 80.

117 Jüngel, “Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos: Eine Kurzformel der Lehre vom verborgenen Gott – im Anschluss an Luther interpretiert”, Entprechung, 249.

118 Jüngel, “Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes”, 120.
everything about God is dark to us. But it cannot imply that God himself is dark. That possibility is absolutely excluded if we know God himself in his revelation, and if in his revelation we actually know God himself.\(^{119}\)

On the contrary, ‘it is the glory of God that conceals him’.\(^{120}\) It is beyond our comprehension or perception, and although it is a full revelation it is too much for us to take on.\(^{121}\) We must understand the hiddenness of God not as darkness that obfuscates, but rather as brilliant light that overwhelms our senses and perception. The hiddenness in plain light shows instead that ‘the God hidden in the light of his being is the actively creative God, God the Creator. As such he is most intensively related to us’.\(^{122}\) It is due to this incomprehensibility of God in the world that we cannot come to God on our own terms and of our own reason and abilities. Instead we can only know God in this hiddenness of the light of God’s being on the basis of revelation,\(^{123}\) which happens only in the person of Christ, and only fully on the cross.\(^{124}\) However there is still the darkness of the crucifixion.\(^{125}\) Whilst Jüngel would ideally like to avoid a sense in which God works through evil,\(^{126}\) Jüngel shifts the conversation from Luther’s understanding of it,\(^{127}\) where ‘the hidden and the revealed God seem to stand in contradiction to each


\(^{120}\) Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 123.

\(^{121}\) For ‘in this light, in the light of his own being, God is not visible, he is hidden. If there is in him an inaccessible depth, it is in no way a dark depth or a murky abyss, but rather the depth of his glory, the unfathomableness of primal light. It is the majesty of God that lets him be hidden for us’. Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 124.


\(^{124}\) ‘The incarnation is the revelation of God which allows his glory, that is, the hiddenness of God in the light of his being, to be present in a part of this world, present in the flesh of a human being. The primary hiddenness of God is now identifiable. But it is identifiable only in the secondary, worldly hiddenness of a quite particular human life. And so it is pertinent to say that this secondary hiddenness of God, which is identical with his revelation, is the concealing of the hiddenness of God. By concealing God’s primary majestic hiddenness, concealing it indeed in the flesh and blood of Jesus, it reveals God himself.’ Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 129.

\(^{125}\) The hiddenness of God under its opposite, as Luther called it, cannot however mean that in this particular hiddenness God corresponds to himself, but rather must mean that God corresponds to himself in this hiddenness. Even in the greatest of all imaginable contradictions, even in the contradiction of eternal life and earthly death, God corresponds to himself. The being of God is capable of this contradiction. Indeed, God’s being is realised in this contradiction without being destroyed by it. God endures it. And this endurance of the contradiction of life and death is God himself; it is the depth of God’s glory.’ Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 130.

\(^{126}\) ‘What is questionable about this doctrine of the hiddenness of God is that a hidden, indeed terrifying, divine subject is inferred from the hidden activity of God in his opus alienum, which Luther can even identify with the divine majesty and the divine nature’. Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 135.

\(^{127}\) Luther talks in On the Bondage of the Will of how ‘that which is above us does not concern us’, and sees that the *deus absconditus* explains how God works in evil to our good, and also how God is hidden in the supposed evil and suffering of the Christ, as shown in the Heidelberg Disputations. In Luther there is a sense of the hiddenness of God as darkness and in evil and suffering, whereas Jüngel follows the Barthian view that the hiddenness is due to human incapacity to fully comprehend God, but that the revelation of God is always a full revelation, there is no God behind God or God working in evil.
other, so that in the end it is not evil against God but rather God against God’. This is as Jüngel sees that

It is theologically illegitimate to infer from an opus alienum of God which works everything in everyone without difference, that there is a deus absconditus [hidden God] whose majesty incites terror. Rather there is one activity of God which specifically forbids one from drawing inferences about God himself. That is the insight to be gleaned here.

Jüngel wishes to make it clear that whilst we may be ambivalent or uncertain about God, we can never think of God as evil. Despite this discomfort Jüngel sees the hidden work of God as necessary to an understanding of revelation sub contrario, although Jüngel works to talk about the hidden work of God rather than the hiddenness of God.

To do so Jüngel works from the contrast between the world and how God is seen as loving, towards the world on the cross. Against this symbol Jüngel can see the essence and full revelation of God is love standing out starkly against that background as ‘in the face of the dark fact that God works everything in everyone, that God is at work even in evil, the statement “God is love” becomes a point of decision’. Therefore, with this understanding that God is love, it becomes clear that there is no hidden God behind God, and contrary to Moltmann, no God opposed to God, for

God’s action is not opaque to God himself, his work is not dark. His right hand knows what his left hand does. Love cannot be hidden to itself. One who through God’s revelation has become certain that God is love, will thus endure the hidden work of God as something hidden, without God himself being hidden from him or her and thereby becoming a deus absconditus.

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130 We only know his action on the basis of the revelation of his glory under the antithesis of the cross, thus on the basis of that action which as such is our salvation. But then the shadow of ambiguity may not also be cast over God himself. And for just this reason we speak of the dark hiddenness of God only in view of his work, more specifically, in view of his opus alienum which includes everything that seems to contradict his revelation. Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 137.
131 Luther’s thesis, that God who works everything in everyone also works in evil and through evil without himself being evil, cannot be abandoned. We take it up by speaking of the hidden work of God rather than the hidden God, on the basis of which no one can believe God or even love God. On the basis of this work one can only fear God and even that would not yet be proper fear of God, directed by the love of God. The light which is shed on this distressing fact by the cross of Jesus Christ and from the gospel of Easter however does not yet explain the fact. The fact itself, the raw facticity of evil in the world, remains dark. The light which falls on it does not illuminate this dark fact, but rather enlightens us, illuminating the fact that the God who suffers and in this way conquers death – which as the wages of sin is the epitome of nothingness! – is nothing other than love.’ Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 142.
Jüngel also takes cues from Barth here, as in Barth ‘the opus alienum of God consists in the active negation of nothingness, and not in the employment of nothingness as an instrument with which God wants to work and through which he wants to implement his omnipotent will’.\(^{134}\) Jüngel also takes from Barth the idea that God always corresponds to Godself,\(^ {135}\) and does not and cannot contradict Godself as a way of combating the idea that God works through evil.\(^ {136}\)

**Critique**

Jüngel’s theology of the cross cannot be fully understood without an understanding of the philosophical and theological world of Germany at the time as it is developed in reaction to that. Furthermore this is as Jüngel is keen to deal with a particular problem in theology signified by the use of the death of God, and intends to rehabilitate it using itself. However, does this contextual nature of Jüngel’s theology hinder its effect, as Davidson suggests?\(^ {137}\) I would like to argue no, and this is on the basis that Jüngel’s approach avoids the pitfalls of other theologies of the death of God and of the cross that have both been more popular and quicker to fail.\(^ {138}\) Jüngel is less outlandish and more cautious when it comes to the death of God, holding that God does not die but instead transforms death by entering into it and not being overcome by death. On the subject of the suffering of God, Jüngel advocates a more dynamic understanding of God but maintains an understanding of God being true to Godself and not changing during suffering, thereby avoiding an approach that ties God to transience and

\(^{134}\) Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 139. We shall discuss later whether Jüngel follows through with this understanding of nothingness and evil, for Jüngel also understands nothingness as a tool of God, but only in the light of the cross.

\(^{135}\) The great merit of Barth’s dogmatics for the question at hand is that in looking at the distressing facticity of evil in the world it does not assume a double will of God and thus does not seduce us into positing a contradiction in the being of God. God does not contradict himself. We have already recognised that even where God takes the contradiction of the world upon himself and suffers it in the form of the crucifixion of Jesus, even in contradiction God corresponds to himself. Indeed, the very essence of God is that he endures even the contradiction of eternal life and worldly death without contradiction himself. Theology does well not to turn from this insight of Barth.’ Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 141.

\(^{136}\) It is on the cross of Christ that evil and God encounter one another, and ‘where God definitively wins, as one cannot balance God and evil with each other. Theologically – and, once again, in this respect Barth is to be endorsed without qualification – one can only speak of God as the uncompromising enemy of evil. There is only one, but one decisive, connection of God and evil. And that is the cross of Jesus Christ, the fundamental fact of Christian faith: that God conquers evil in that he suffers it himself. The power of the passion of God is stronger than the power of evil and all its actions.’ Jüngel, “The Revelation of the Hiddenness of God”, 142.

\(^{137}\) A nuanced approach may well suggest that Jüngel’s work as a whole is not explicable save in the light of a certain kind of debate within German Lutheranism from the late 1970s onwards over the nature of divine presence and the nature of the church and churchly agency in human society’. Ivor Davidson, “The Crucified One”, 30.

Furthermore, whilst Jüngel uses sources that are debated, such as Hegel's theology and Bonhoeffer's *Letters*, the use of these sources is necessary as they have been used to support a theology that he sees as dangerous. However, Jüngel's use of Hegel is especially contested, in how Jüngel is seen as misrepresenting Hegel's thought, alongside Küng and Moltmann, and seeing it too theistically. Whilst this interpretation of Hegel is another debate in itself as noted in the first chapter, the greater issue that has been noted with Jüngel's use of Hegel is whether this use of Hegel has negatively impacted on Jüngel's thought. There are, however, those who see that Jüngel's use of

139 Jüngel's lack of engagement with the question of suffering is even cause for complaint. Davidson writes that 'it is notable, indeed, how little Jüngel has to say about the potential intellectual, moral and spiritual implications of divine suffering, and limited also are his attempts to engage with the arguments for impassibility'. Davidson, "The Crucified One", 42.

140 For example, Ford wonders whether Jüngel has questioned Hegel critically enough as regards this understanding of self and love, Jüngel's fundamental thrust in *God as the Mystery of the World* is that of following through Luther's Christology with a critical appropriation of Hegel's philosophy in the death of God. The main criticism he makes of Hegel is in line with Lévinas: Hegel fails to differentiate God and humanity sufficiently. So Jüngel constantly insists that the event of the death of Jesus Christ involves the differentiation of humanity from God. (David Ford, "Hosting a Dialogue: Jüngel and Lévinas on God, Self and Language", *The Possibilities of Theology: Studies in the Theology of E. Jüngel in his Sixtieth Year*, ed. J. Webster, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 46.

141 Deland Anderson complains that Jüngel makes Hegel's thought essentially atheistic (Deland S. Anderson, *Hegel's Speculative Good Friday: The Death of God in Philosophical Perspective* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), xi), and whilst that is a valid, yet fraught interpretation of Hegel, he agrees that 'the death of God in Hegel represents a watershed between a previous age dominated by theology and our present'. (Anderson, xl.) Anderson sees more that Hegel has a lack of transcendence when speaking of God and does not emphasise the differences between God and the world enough, and that Jüngel's account is certainly more Christian than Hegel's. Martin Wendte sees that Jüngel takes mere moments from Hegel that he finds beneficial, then criticises the whole. However, Wendte does not think that one can just take moments from the Hegelian system and thereby preserve their original intent – the whole system needs to journey with them to work, and thus Jüngel's theological enterprise is undermined (Wendte, *Gottmenschliche Einheit bei Hegel: Eine logische und theologische Untersuchung von Martin Wendte*, 558).

142 Cyril O'Regan in *The Heterodox Hegel* sees Jüngel as interpreting Hegel in the same light as Küng and Moltmann, but that Jüngel best captures the dramatic modulation of absence and atheism, (Miroslav Volf also holds this view) in that 'Hegel, as Jüngel and others have argued, suggests as absolutely crucial the subversion of traditional atheism's view of the uninvolved and invulnerable deity, and insinuates in contradistinction a version of atheism. The context, however, determines that the attack against traditional theism does not represent an attack against Christian substance'. (O'Regan, 199), (O'Regan writes that Küng captures the dynamic character of Hegel better). O'Regan also notes that whilst Jüngel points out that 'the theocentric aspect of Hegel's agonic Christology is to the fore even in such a text as *Ps*, where its presence provides some evidence that by no means has Luther been thoroughly dispatched. But, of course, the affirmation of seriousness of recall does not amount to the affirmation that Luther's *theocentric* core is faithfully recalled. Since kenosis is at the core of Luther's theocentric Christology, as it is at the core of the Lutheran avowal of the death of God, investigation into the measure and limit of correspondence will be pursued under the auspices of this theological presentation'. (O'Regan, 216), and that Jüngel is reading too much theology into Hegel.

143 Milbank is more critical of Hegel, writing that 'Jüngel's trinitarian model is still Hegelian and modalist, though with voluntarist tinges. For Jüngel, the transcendent paternal subject freely identifies himself with the man Jesus Christ in his death on the cross. The ‘polar tension’ of identity-in-difference within the relationship of the man Jesus Christ to the Father replaces the union of two natures under one divine hypostasis as the locus of Jesus's divinity. But this again, is to promote 'mythic' themes - a direct personal relation to God in dialectical tension with a hint of Sabellian patrpassism-onto the level of ontological discourse'. (John Milbank, "The Second Difference: For a Trinitarianism without Reserve", *Modern Theology*, 2:3, 1986, 213-234, 223). In Jüngel's account of theology, Milbank sees that Jüngel is reiterating Hegelian theodicy, where there is a necessary estrangement of God and God, which is justified by the final outcome, which in Jüngel's theology makes creation into a struggle with the nihil, and where the cross 'is the deepest reach of the divine “identification with perishing”, through which alone God finally “occurs”. But this “justification of God through the cross” simply re-writes traditional theology. Jüngel's governing premise is that of Leibniz - namely that death belongs to the condition of created finitude, rather than being the contingent outcome of
Jüngel breaks off too early when it comes to the death of God. This is as much a cross. Moltmann sees that a comment could not have been written before Hegel’s death. Economic is the immanent Trinity and vice versa. And thus the crucified one belongs to the concept of God. For that reason, the economic is the immanent Trinity and vice versa. And thus the crucified one belongs to the concept of God. Such a comment could not have been written before Hegel. (Lakeland, “A New Pietism”, 68.)

Jüngel’s emphasis on love rather than on suffering in the event of the cross further differentiates his account of a theology of the cross and of the death of God, as it shows that even with this focus on the cross, it reveals not only God sub contrario but also the being of God as love for God and for humanity. For Jüngel, the revelation of the cross is not God against God, not the inaccessibility of God, and not the continued, almost helpless suffering of God, but God as love.  

Hegel is beneficial theologically, and what must be held to is that for Jüngel, the theological and philosophical climate in which he worked necessitated his use of Hegel. Yet I have noted above that Jüngel does not take on the conclusions and the worldview of Hegel, especially as Jüngel sees that Hegel does not distinguish sufficiently between God and humanity, and Jüngel does not support Hegel’s intimation that we can achieve knowledge of God through knowledge about the world. Instead, I shall discuss in the succeeding chapters that Jüngel is intent on keeping God and humanity distinct even in the incarnation of Christ. Yet I must also note that it can be argued that other aspects of Hegelian thought, such as his understanding of love and God as an event, are absorbed by Jüngel and reworked in his theology. However, I would argue that that is different from an acceptance of the Hegelian system and all that it entails.

Paul Fiddes also draws out Jüngel’s synthesis of Luther, Hegel and Barth for his Kreuzestheologie (owing much to Luther’s “theology of the cross” and building upon Barth’s theology of the humility of God, this modern version of Kreuzestheologie has also been constantly in dialogue with Hegel, blending criticism with a new admiration of his attempt to speak of God’s encounter with nothingness and death in the midst of the worldly sphere’, Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, 13.) Locating death in the being of God means that there is another way forward when discussing the non-necessity of God and ‘we can affirm that God’s suffering of death is in fact at the heart of his vitality, that he is not irrelevant to our world of both science and suffering because he himself suffers death. His death is at the same time his living presence’. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, 189. Lakeland sees that Jüngel is indebted to Hegel christologically, and more than using the death of God in his own thought, Jüngel also absorbs Hegel’s writings on the Trinity where the Hegelian legacy is evident for Hegel in how Jüngel links the immanent and economic Trinity, in saying they are the same, and in how “The self-relatedness of the deity of God takes place in an unsurpassable way in the very selflessness of the incarnation of God. That is the meaning of talk about the humanity of God. It is not a second thing next to the eternal God, but rather the event of the deity of God. For that reason, the economic is the immanent Trinity and vice versa. And thus the crucified one belongs to the concept of God.” Such a comment could not have been written before Hegel. (Lakeland, “A New Pietism”, 68.)

Moltmann finds that Jüngel, before God at the Mystery of the World, did not go far enough in his theology of the cross. Moltmann sees that as a result of following Barth in developing his notion of the death of the living God, Jüngel breaks off to early when it comes to the death of God. This is as Moltmann sees that Barth is not sufficiently
Yet in doing this, and despite what he emphasises as the positivity of the cross, Jüngel still locates the full and entire revelation of God in the event of the cross, in death and suffering. Whilst Jüngel does insist that the cross is only to be viewed in the light of the resurrection, the focus is not on the resurrection, but instead on the cross. This approach is criticised as restrictive, especially by Holmes who criticises Jüngel's 'dogged insistence that all that can and indeed must be said about God's identity and attributes is determined by the ignominy and lowliness that the Son of God takes upon himself in the cross of Jesus'. Therefore, when exploring the themes of Jüngel's theology this must be kept in mind: is what Jüngel wants to say theologically hindered or helped by

trinitarian, but focuses on the action of God rather than the persons of the Trinity ('I see the critical limitation of Barth in the fact that he still thinks too theologically, and that his approach is not sufficiently trinitarian. In stressing constantly and rightly that "God was in Christ", God humbled himself, God himself was on the cross, he uses a simple concept of God which is not sufficiently developed in a trinitarian direction'. Moltmann, The Crucified God, 203). This means that Barth has to make a distinction between 'the God who proceeds from himself in his primal decision and the God who is previously in himself, beyond contact with evil. For all his polemic against Luther's distinction between the deus revelatus and the deus absconditus, Barth himself comes very close to the same sort of thing. It can, however, be avoided at this point of one makes a trinitarian differentiation over the event of the cross. The Son suffers and dies on the cross. The Father suffers with him, but not in the same way. There is a trinitarian solution to the paradox that God is "dead" on the cross and yet not dead, once one abandons the simple concept of God. Theopaschite talk of the "death of God" can be a general metaphor, but on closer inspection it will not hold'. Moltmann, The Crucified God, 203. Regarding Jüngel and Geyer Moltmann writes that 'further trinitarian criticism of Barth's way of talking about God in connection with the cross of Jesus would also affect them. When one considers the significance of the death of Jesus for God himself, one must enter into the inner-trinitarian tensions and relationships of God and speak of the Father, the Son and the Spirit. But if that is the case, it is inappropriate to talk simply of "God" in connection with the Christ event. When one uses the phrase "God in Christ", does it refer only to the Father, who abandons him and gives him up, or does it also refer to the Son who is abandoned and forsaken? The more one understands the whole event of the cross as an event of God, the more any simple concept of God falls apart. In epistemological terms it takes so to speak trinitarian form. One moves from the exterior of the mystery which is called "God" to the interior, which is trinitarian. This is the "revolution in the concept of God" which is manifested by the crucified Christ'. J. Moltmann, The Crucified God, 204.

Christopher Holmes, "The glory of God in the Theology of E Jüngel", JBT 8, 342-355, 344. He traces this to Jüngel's adoption of the communication of attributes, which means that an 'inadequately differentiated identification of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ on the cross'. Holmes, "The glory of God", 352). Instead, he asks 'the glorious God is light and life, light and life which includes humanity. Might it not be better, then, to simply stress the perspicuity of God in his humanity, forsaking dialectical descriptions such as presence and absence, in order to better describe the arresting clarity of God's encounter with humanity in the man Jesus of Nazareth?' (Christopher Holmes, "Disclosure without Reservation: Re-evaluating Divine Hiddenness", NZSTR, 483, 367-380, 376). Davidson also writes that 'we may legitimately ask about the strength of his achievement in seeking to trace all things from the history of Jesus Christ'. Davidson, "The Crucified One", 42. Whilst Ellis disagrees Holmes, this is done by situating Jüngel's thought too closely to that of Barth, ignoring Jüngel's acceptance yet reworking of Luther's opus alienum: Jüngel's reliance on Barth in describing the indirect and mediated nature of our knowledge of God as it is connected to God's primary hiddenness in the glory of his being simply cannot be emphasized enough'. (Daryl Ellis, "God's Hiddenness as Trinitarian Grace and Miracle: A Response to Christopher R. J. Holmes's Critique of E Jüngel's Concepcion of Divine Hiddenness", NZSTR, 52:1, 82-101, 90) However, Fiddes emphasises the importance of seeing this all within the scope of divine self-determination, where 'we must not neglect the indispensable notion of the desire of God. If God aims at the goal of himself in so far as he aims at man, this can only be through his own desire to be this kind of God.' (Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, 82). Dalferth also writes regarding this that in way we must accept what we can get, as 'Jesus is not simply God, but the place where God reveals Godself, namely where God lets Godself be known for what we must know for our salvation by him. In this sense Jesus is, respectively, the revelation of truthful witness to God. And this faith in Jesus Christ corresponds with the faith in God, as he has already appeared and made himself available in Jesus Christ', (Ingolf Dalferth, "Gott für uns: Die Bedeutung des christologischen Dogmas für die christliche Theologie", Denkwürdiges Geheimnis: Beitrag zur Gotteslehre, Festschrift für E Jüngel zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Ingolf U. Dalferth, Johannes Fisher, Hans-Peter Großhans, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 51-76, 60).
his focus and his insistence that theology can only be true or valid when it is a theology of the crucified one? How does Jüngel's emphasis and insistence on the cross fit with how he understands God and the world, in relation to themselves and to the other?

**Summation**

This chapter has outlined Jüngel’s understanding and sources of his theology of the cross. It can be concluded that the important aspects of Jüngel’s theology of the cross are that it is both a *Destruktion* of previous philosophy and theology, and theologies of the death of God in how it attempts to think God anew from the event of the cross, where God’s being is exposed as love, for love is the unity of life and death in favour of life. Furthermore, it is clear that whilst Jüngel takes his cues from Hegel and Bonhoeffer Jüngel moves beyond them in locating the full revelation of God in the event of the cross, due to what it discloses about the Trinity, which I shall explore in Chapter Four. Therefore, whilst proceeding with the thesis, it is important to keep in mind that all that Jüngel has to say about christology, God, and humanity is only known through the cross and revealed at that point in time.

It must be considered whether that is too narrow a basis on which to build an entire theology. Both the narrowness of revelation and the hiddenness of God in Jüngel are criticised: it is seen that Jüngel hides too much, and what can be said of God is narrowed unavoidably by Jüngel’s insistence on locating the revelation and knowledge of God solely in the death of Christ on the cross even though the crucifixion is always informed by the resurrection. Thus I shall now explore Jüngel’s understanding of Christ, of God as Trinity, and of humanity, and see how Jüngel’s revelation from the cross informs those doctrines.
Chapter Three: Jüngel's Christology

Introduction
As a theology of the cross centres on the revelation of God in the midst of the death of Christ, it is clear that Jüngel’s christology is crucial to his understanding of revelation. As noted in the previous chapter, all that must be said about christology must be said from the cross. As the cross is also the means by which humanity is saved, then the way in which humanity is saved speaks of the nature of both God and of humanity. Therefore, I shall look at Jüngel’s account of the person of Christ, and then look at what he considers the work of Christ. However it is to be understood that looking at these separately is not meant to condone a division between the two, but to enable a clearer exposition of Jüngel’s thought. In order to understand the transmission of the knowledge of the cross, I shall look at Jüngel’s understanding of proclamation as a christological event. Finally, I shall look at the sacraments in Jüngel as further evidence of the centrality of Christ in Jüngel’s thought, and thereby gain a fuller understanding of what Jüngel's christology is saying. However, all of this is a weighty structure not only for christology, but also for Jüngel’s understanding of revelation to support, and therefore it shall be seen whether basing the full revelation of Christ on the cross leads Jüngel to make moves christologically that narrow what can be said about Christ’s agency. As I shall explore, Jüngel sees that Christ is revealed as passive and obedient to the will of God, especially to death on the cross as that is the event where the full revelation of God is known.

The Person of Christ
It must be noted that Jüngel has a traditional Lutheran understanding of the person and work of Christ, where the main work of Christ is that of the justification of sinners, achieved through the substitutionary sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Both the humanity and divinity of Christ are affirmed, although Jüngel focuses more on the divinity of Christ than on the Christ’s humanity. This may be due to Jüngel’s acceptance of the communicatio idiomatum in the person of Christ, which means that the humanity of Christ is distinct from the humanity of other humans. It is through this doctrine that Jüngel is able to affirm the uniqueness of Christ by preserving a distinction between the humanity
of Christ and that of humanity in general and thus of God from the world; and also because the divinity of Christ is responsible for the efficacy of Christ.

For Jüngel, Jesus’s humanity is the medium for the presence of God in the world. God can only be found in Christ, and this is known from the existence of the historical Jesus, who with ‘the unity of his proclamation and his behaviour, has rewritten the sacramentality of his being’. Whilst there is this unity in Christ between humanity and God, the person of Christ still preserves the distinction between God and humanity in order to prevent the divinisation of humanity. The incarnation necessitates this, because ‘God became human, in order to distinguish so strictly between God and humanity that they might be able to be together without restriction’. This again ensures that it is only through the action of Christ, not that of humanity, that we are united with God.

The Communication of Attributes

As the being of Jesus Christ is the meeting point of the two different poles of humanity and divinity, Jüngel clarifies his christological position pertaining to the human and divine natures that

The Christological dogma asserts the unity of the human and divine natures in the person of Jesus Christ. The divine nature was incorporated into the unity of the Person and distinguished from the human nature, and thereby the relation between the divine nature of the Person of Christ and the human nature of the person of Christ is differentiated. The divine nature was originally identified with the Person of Jesus Christ, insofar as the person of Jesus Christ is identical with the second trinitarian person, the eternal Son of God.

Jüngel takes this Christological starting point from Luther, where with ‘the unity of both natures in the person of Jesus Christ, the human nature can correspond to the

2 ‘The humanity of God corresponds not to the divinity of humanity, but only to the humanity of humanity, who, as it is and from him, cannot correspond in themselves to the possibility of the mediation of God’ Jüngel, *Was ist ein Sakrament*, 58. This is emphasised by McCormack: see Bruce L. McCormack, “Participation in God, Yes, Deification, No: Two Modern Protestant Responses to an Ancient Question”, *Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008).
3 Jüngel, “The Dogmatic Significance of the Historical Jesus” in *Theological Essays II*, 118.
4 ‘The being of Jesus Christ is, on one hand, God’s own self-relation as a relation to the being of humanity of Jesus, and on the other hand the human Jesus’ self-relation as a relation to God’; Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, *Unterwegs zur Sache*, 277.
6 In “The Disputation On the Divinity and Humanity of Christ” (1540), Luther clarifies his position on Christology. He states that he confesses the catholic faith of one Lord Jesus Christ, true God and human, and that ‘from this truth
predicate of suffering, of being crucified and of dying as well as the accords of the divine nature, because the person fulfills in himself these events and endures anything which happens through the two natures.\(^7\)

Jüngel thus upholds the \textit{communicatio idiomatum} as understood by Luther, in as he states that ‘God’s humanity belongs to his divinity. This is what theology must finally begin to learn’.\(^8\) This prevents any understanding of works as divinisation, for ‘God is a God who is human in his deity, and man, instead of penetrating God and thus deifying himself, is a human person, who is always becoming more human’.\(^9\) Moreover, the Crucified Christ is seen as the true imago Dei, as evinced in Christ’s unique relationship to God the Father, where

What characterised Jesus’ self-relationship was this unique openness for this divine activity, which corresponds to the God who is more intimate to me than I am to myself, in the performance of his own human existence. He relied so totally on God that he could not really be a person without God’s existence turned toward him. And because of his total dependence of God he was able, as one who was without pretension in regard to himself, to be completely there for others.\(^10\)

of the double substance and the unity of the person follows the communication of attributes [\textit{communicatio idiomatum}], as it is called. 3. So that those things which pertain to man are rightly said of God, and, on the other hand, those things which pertain to God are said of man’. Luther, “Disputation On the Divinity and Humanity of Christ”, \textit{D. Martin Luther Werke}, 69 Vols, (Weimar: Böhlau, 1883-1993), 39/2:92-121, trans. Christopher B. Brown, http://folk.uio.no/lukeb/docs/Luther\%20Disputation\%20On\%20the\%20Divinity\%20and\%20Humanity\%20of\%20Christ.pdf, (accessed 10th November 2013). However, this communication is from one side, in how the human attributes are concrete, but the divine attributes are both concrete and abstract (from the divine side the attributes can be said to apply to the human nature, attributes of humanity such as thirst do not apply to the divine nature. Only the attributes of the divine nature define Christ, as such). Thus Christ is a human like no other, and Luther writes that creature is used in a new way with Christ, ‘in the new use of language it signifies a thing inseparably joined with divinity in the same person in an ineffable way [ineffabilis modis].’ “Disputation On the Divinity and Humanity of Christ”. Despite this disparity there is no sense of the two natures acting separately or contrary to each, for ‘Christ is God and man in one person, and there are not two persons, but two natures are united in one person, so that what is done by the human nature is said also to be done by the divine nature, and vice versa’. (“Disputation On the Divinity and Humanity of Christ”) It is essential for the communication of attributes that whilst the natures are distinct and different, there is still one person; they are still united in that one person. This is what holds everything together. This is accomplished by the union [unitas], which is a greater and stronger union [coniunctio] than that of soul and body, because soul and body are separated, but never the immortal and divine nature and the mortal human nature [in Christ], but they are united in one person. That is to say, Christ, the impassible Son of God, God and man, was crucified under Pontius Pilate.” “Disputation On the Divinity and Humanity of Christ”. The union is so close that, as noted above, whilst it is technically impossible to kill God, it is still possible to kill a human, and thus the crucifixion and suffering happen to the divine nature as well as the human nature, although unlike in humanity, the death does not triumph.

\(^7\) Jüngel, “Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes” 113.
\(^8\) Jüngel, Mystery, 37.
\(^9\) Jüngel, Mystery, 190.
\(^10\) Jüngel, \textit{Mysterien}, 358. Torrance sees that this hypostatic union enables an understanding of the death of God in Jüngel, thus enabling his theology of the cross as ‘it is no longer to rest satisfied with a traditional \textit{theologia gloriae}, without avoiding the scandal of the fact that in becoming flesh for us the Son of God became cursed under the law and that in his death the love of God identified itself with the crucified. Can one both deny the fact that Jesus died “as God” and affirm that God gives himself in self-communication to man? The doctrine of the hypostatic union holds those inseparably together’, T.F. Torrance, \textit{Tritubational Perspectives: Towards Doctrinal Agreement} (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1994), 83.
Obedience and Passivity

This emphasis on passivity and obedience may initially seem to stand in contrast to the understanding of Jesus acting in justification through Christ alone. However, this harks back to a Lutheran understanding of passivity in the person of Christ. Moreover, this can also be read as Jüngel’s Lutheran reworking of Barth’s understanding of the obedience of the second person of the Trinity as espoused in the fourth volume of *Church Dogmatics* which I shall explore in the succeeding chapter.

This obedience, dependence, and passivity emphasises a humanity that in its selflessness ‘was not concerned with its own preservation, but rather a humanity which placed its own life on the line in every act of life. As such, it was the being of a man who corresponded to God, and it was the human parable of the God who is love’. This understanding of selflessness as love carries through into Jesus’ death on the cross, where ‘by depending totally on God, his life ended in the event of God-forsakenness. The special severity of Jesus’ God-forsakenness of the cross is the experience of that God-forsakenness by an existence which derived solely from God’.

Therefore, with this passivity, and dependence understood as the supreme act of selflessness, and this supreme act of selflessness as the death on the cross, Jüngel sees

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11 This is seen most clearly in Bonhoeffer on Gethsemane, as noted in Chapter One.
12 This is first mentioned in II/2, where Barth sees that ‘the obedience which he renders as the Son of God is, as genuine obedience, His own decision and electing, a decision and electing no less divinely free than the electing and decision of the Father and the Holy Spirit’. (*CD* II/2, 105.) and continued in IV/1, where he writes that ‘the New Testament does not speak of the One whom it calls “Lord” in the way we might expect, as a human lord furnished with sovereignty and authority and the plenitude of power, maintaining and executing his own will. According to this presentation what distinguished the man Jesus as the Son of God is that which apparently stands in the greatest possible contradiction to the being of God: the fact that in relation to God – and therefore to the world as well – this man wills only to be obedient – obedient to the will of the Father, which is to be done on earth for the redemption of man as it is done in heaven’. (*CD* IV/1, 164.), and also that ‘He was and is and will be very God in the fact that as the Son He willed to be obedient to the Father, and to become the servant of all and therefore man and therefore the One who fulfilled in His death the reconciling will of God’. (*CD* IV/1, 159.). Barth, however, sees the obedience of the Son as essential to the inner-trinitarian relations, (‘the obedience of Jesus Christ as such, fulfilled in that astonishing form, it is a matter of the inner being of God as the being of the Son in relation to the Father. From the point of view of that form, of the character of that obedience as obedience of suffering, of the self-humiliation of Jesus Christ, of the way of the Son into the far country, it is a matter of the mystery of His deity in His work *ad extra*, in His presence in the world’). (*CD* IV/1, 177.) and thus makes it a part of God’s being in Godself, whereas Jüngel focuses more on the obedience as a self-surrender, and as complete dependence on God as an example for humanity, rather than emphasising the need for obedience. Obedience becomes part of Christ’s dependence of God, rather than the main message of the cross.
that ‘God defines himself when he identifies himself with the dead Jesus’. This identification is also how Jüngel sees that the trinitarian relations are revealed as ‘the Jesus who exists totally from the Father made it possible to believe in God as the Father, the God who identifies with Jesus in his death makes it possible to believe in God the Son’, and again I shall explore this more fully in the succeeding chapter.

The question of the historical Jesus

Considering Jüngel holds to a theology of the cross, within Jüngel’s theology the death of Jesus and what is revealed there is of the most importance, not the life of Jesus. In order to explore why there is this lack of focus it is important to ask of Jüngel why and whether he neglects the historical Jesus. There is a background to Jüngel’s lack of focus on the life Christ, as Jüngel was well aware of the debates concerning the historical Jesus and was originally a New Testament scholar. Therefore, it can be seen that although Jüngel writes on how to understand and see the historical Jesus, what we should remember is that it is the death of Christ, not the life of Christ that is effective for us. Jüngel sees that we must understand Jesus Christ as both past and present in order to understand him fully; ‘we have to consider whether it would be possible to ask who Jesus Christ is without exposing ourselves to the question of who Jesus was’. This is only possible and applicable as Jüngel sees that ‘our existence within time connects us fundamentally with all historical existence’.

Yet Jüngel understands that when we ask after the historical Jesus we are dealing more with absence than a particular presence for ‘Jesus’ effectiveness consists in his death, in his withdrawal, which faith in his resurrection does not reverse but rather confirms’. Jüngel sees that this withdrawal prompted the writing of the New Testament; it created new ways of communicating the effectiveness of Christ whilst not binding Christ to the world. However, Jüngel sees that the figure of the historical Jesus is useful in how it illustrates the humanity of Jesus, and that encourages us to strive towards our full

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15 Jüngel, *Mystery*, 364. ‘God has then identified himself with the Jesus who made himself sin for us as our substitute. We have recognised this identification of divine life with the dead Jesus as the event of divine love. As such, it is the turning point of the world, because God has interposed himself in the midst of fatal God-forsakenness in order to create a new relationship with God.’ Jüngel, *Mystery*, 367.


18 Jüngel, “The Effectiveness of Christ Withdrawn” 218.

19 Jüngel, “The Effectiveness of Christ Withdrawn” 231.
humanity, as ‘the dogmatic significance of the historical Jesus consists in the fact that he is the human person in correspondence to God and as such is the Son of God who also wishes to make us into human persons in correspondence to God, which then means: into human persons who, instead of being unhappy gods, are content to be truly human persons’. As well as illustrating what true humanity is the historical Jesus is important as it means that ‘the Christian faith relates to its core in that it relates to the death of Jesus as a historical event’. This enables faith, and this faith ensures the contemporary power of Christ, as ‘faith in Jesus Christ is responsible for the currently effective being of Jesus Christ in the eschatological identity of Jesus’ past and God’s eternity, in that this identity of the resurrection and death of Jesus is understandable from the incarnation of God’.

Thus when considering the historical Jesus Jüngel sees that it is key that we must not become trapped by the idea of the historical Jesus as an example, or fixate on Christ’s life as ‘a Christology that only sets forth the exemplary nature of Jesus reduces the significance of Jesus Christ to the role of a saint who is certainly able also to sacrifice his life, but with the sacrifice of his own life he is only able to appeal to, but not to effectively change, the life of humanity’. Instead, what we need to see from the life of Jesus is that ‘the life of Jesus Christ is fundamentally distinguished from the lives of all others, including the life of a saint, in that his life does not remain with him…but rather, shows itself in a singularly unique way with the rest of humanity’: this is the real mystery of the Christian faith.

Again, it is the death of Christ that is key in Jüngel’s thought. The death of Christ also creates the absence of God in the world which necessitates the faith that is caused by Jesus. It is the absence of God that enables Christ to return to the world. For with this absence through the death of Christ there is an opening up of hope, of the future, which enables us to associate the glory of God with the powerlessness of Christ on the

24 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Sacrament and Example”, 171.
25 ‘The moment of the absence of the effective being of Jesus Christ is the Christological truth of the historical phenomenon of the postponement of the parousia’. Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, 277.
Jüngel understands that this pre and post Easter distinction is explained through the an- and enhypostasis, and the death of Christ is essential to this, as ‘we understand the cross in view of the Anhypostasis, where the being of the existing Jesus is integral to the earthly existence of Jesus’. As a result, the person of Christ must never be considered apart from his work, as ‘the task of thinking of Jesus Christ as currently effective implies that his being and his work can be thought of as an original unity’.

This focus on the death of Christ also illustrates Jüngel’s use of revelation as sub contrario, as for Jüngel, this is the key to seeing God as God truly is, for

His cross says who Jesus is (not only who he was). Thus, as Jesus can only speak of this cross in the strength of the resurrection; Paul concludes that the cross is not able to be spoken of in strength, and through this alone one is able to speak of who is resurrected.

A theology of the cross must always inform our christology, for

Whoever thinks he can speak of Jesus Christ without having to speak of God, ignores the fact that the Jesus who affects us is a dead person. Whoever thinks he can speak about how we are related to Jesus without thereby having to talk about God, ignores the fact that the life of Jesus seeks to be revealed in our sufferings.

Moreover, the death of Christ is founded on and confirms his exclusivity, ‘and this exclusiveness consists precisely in a universal inclusivity, in that in his death the sin of all sinners is condemned to pass away and brought to nothing. Thus those who believe in this effect of the death of Jesus Christ are justified’.

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26 ‘In death, Jesus breaks down the barrier between the eschatological future and the historical present, because in the death of Jesus (where our time is consummated, and the new time brought about) the power of the Lordship of God is identified with the powerlessness of this person.’ Jüngel, “Jesu Wort und Jesus als Wort Gottes: Ein hermeneutischer Beitrag zum christologischen Problem”, Unterwegs zur Sache, 133.
27 We have the en- and an-hypostasis to be differentiated and consecutively to be correlated as two different relations. These are still ontically separated in their ontological identity, insofar as the pre-Easter Jesus’ being as anhypostasis existed historically and was revealed (that which he is, ontologically, by virtue of his Enhypostasis; his being in the mode of being of the Logos), whilst his entire being enables the distinguishing of the Enhypostasis in the mode of being of the Risen Christ: revealed as the existence of Jesus Christ. Thus, we have to think of En- and Anhypostasis not only as relations, but we have to think these relations historically. I therefore take an approach from Karl Barth, although I differentiate myself from Karl Barth in the implementation of this approach’. Jüngel, “Jesu Wort und Jesus als Wort Gottes”, 137.
28 Jüngel, “Jesu Wort und Jesus als Wort Gottes”, 143.
30 ‘Previously the powerlessness of the crucified one had claimed my thought and challenged me to conceive of the doctrine of God, as much as possible, apart from metaphysics. Now, however, my concern was learning to think about the creative omnipotence in such a way that it proves itself to be divine power precisely in its capacity for powerlessness (even to the point of death on the cross)’. Jüngel, “Toward the Heart of the Matter”.
absence of God in the world, necessitating and causing faith in Christ, which brings God back into the world. This is a unique occurrence and a narrative that does not come naturally to humanity. Hence why Jüngel is insistent that ‘Christianity must narrate or proclaim the death of its Lord, his passion story, not its own passion story. A soteriologically freighted ethicæ crucis [ethics of the cross] would be the worst form of a theologia gloriae!’

As one must think of the death of Christ in light of the resurrection of Christ the divine nature of Christ remains and must never be neglected or forgotten, for ‘Jesus is not himself apart from God. That is how he understood himself. That is how one must understand him if one is to do justice to what can be known historically about Jesus’ self-understanding’, we must always, when thinking of the historical Jesus, think of him as the unity of God and humanity, for

The historical Jesus is of dogmatic significance precisely to the degree that the mystery of his personal identity points beyond his earthly story of life and suffering, and thus beyond his death. This has occurred in the most compressed form in the way in which the title Christ has become part of the name of the person: Jesus Christ.

Despite the historical link, we cannot come to know God through history, because we cannot access the past. It is only the present and the future that are available to us. The historical Jesus is relevant only as it points to the current and future situation – to focus on the historical Jesus would otherwise result in binding the being and effective nature of Christ to that time, and Jüngel is reluctant to compromise God in that way.

**Proclamation**

Following on from this question of the historical Jesus, Jüngel sees that the relation of the past Christ to the present is that his life has residual influence, and does not remain with him, which for Jüngel ‘is the simple expression of the fact that the death of Jesus

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34 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Sacrament and Example”, *Theological Essays II*, 188.
35 Jüngel, “The Dogmatic Significance of the Historical Jesus” 102.
36 Jüngel, “The Dogmatic Significance of the Historical Jesus” 112.
37 Whilst the incarnation ‘is prevailingly regarded as divine truth, a so-called eternal truth was conceived as a historical event and thus could be understood entirely within the horizon of the temporality of history’ Eberhard Jüngel, “Wirkung durch Entzug: Eine theologische Anmerkung zum Begriff der Wirkungsgeschichte”, *Außer sich: Theologische Texte*, (Stuttgart: Radius, 2011), 101. Moreover, there is a difference between historical claim and a theological claim. This is because Jüngel sees that due to the power of Christ in proclamation ‘more belongs to the event of truth than to be seen as just another brute fact in the long chain of facts that history tends to be perceived as. To the event of truth belongs the opening up of possibilities, which do not necessarily vanish as we become aware of the process’. Jüngel, “Wirkung durch Entzug”, 114.
has the status of a sacrifice that interrupts the unholy person’s sickness unto death, and thus also of a sacrifice that atones for the unholiness of the sinner’. Jüngel sees that Christ redefines history and thus interrupts human life;

In the person of Jesus Christ something new has come on the scene who can never again be surpassed, which can never be obsolete, but rather will remain new for all time, there are important consequences for the Christian understanding of time, for the Christian understanding of God, and for the Christian understanding of human persons and their world.

Therefore our apostolic proclamation causes God to be brought into the world, and in doing so God is brought closer to ourselves and interrupts our being. Therefore Jüngel sees that it is the task of dogmatics and systematic theology ‘to bring out the fact that not only the death of Jesus, but also the life of Jesus continues to benefit people today. Dogmatics has to recognise that it has more simply historical responsibility. It is responsible to the possibility of contemporary faith in Jesus Christ’.

This shows that Jüngel retains from his teacher Bultmann a strong stress on the proclamation of the Word of God as the interruptive event that brings Christ into the present day. Jüngel thus sees that ‘proclamation is language, which corresponds to and is analogous to God’s coming’. Jüngel sees that language is the medium of human existence, a place of encounter. This means that the relation of the past of Jesus to the present is one that is realised in being brought to speech, and that the being of God can be brought into the world through language.

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38 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Sacrament and Example”, 172.
40 Apostolic existence causes, as it were, the word “God” to burst out, but the necessity to speak of God is not at all limited to the apostle. Just as it is God who made Jesus who he is, so it is God again who makes us what we will be and now already are, namely, those who live in the face of death with Jesus Christ. In view of the passing of his life’s time the believer experiences an eternal time gain. This news must be spread among the people, so that more and more might come to faith’. Jüngel, “God - As a Word of our Language”, Theology of the Liberating Word, 45.
41 “Certainly the event of justification which takes place in the history of Jesus Christ needs to be brought close to the sinner – we may say, in hushed tones, needs to be internalised by the sinner”. Jüngel, “On the Doctrine of Justification”, 42.
43 The essence of language as language is that God brings himself to speech by capturing language. Thus language becomes the free place of encounter’. Eberhard Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming, trans J. Webster, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 26n42.
This is how God communicates the incarnation and Godself to humanity, but in such a way that preserves God’s aseity, for ‘God is, if he himself makes speech necessary, never a speech premise but, rather, always a concrete speech event. God introduces himself by speaking. Every *verbum dei sit dei loquentis persona*’.45 As Jüngel wrote at the beginning of his career in *Paulus und Jesus*, this occurs as the event of God being brought to speech. Language, in the service of proclaiming the Christ event makes Christ the ground of belief and this is the origin of christology.46

What the event of proclamation does is that it ‘reveals to us the being of God as the event of his humanity, in which itself his divinity is proved’.47 Due to this revelation ‘this event, in which the God who, as God, has become speakable comes to speech in human words, is faith’.48 The faith that is received as a result changes the person who receives it as ‘the being-as-subject of the person who knows God is therefore faith’.49 For in that faith comes from God it is not a matter of the general human capacity for knowledge. Instead, what faith does has the character of an event, where it justifies and illuminates human existence and casts it in a new light.50 This truth that we now know is Christological, and it is only able to have an effect due to the power of Christ.51 We are only able to have faith because ‘Jesus has made faith in God possible’.52

The centre of proclamation for Jüngel is that the history of God with humanity is not private but can be communicated and known by all,53 because this speaking is a new

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45 Jüngel, “God – As a Word of our Language”, 29.
46 ‘The origin of Christology – naturally, this always refers to the objective origin of Christology, as this is not about the provenance of christological titles – does not find itself in the relation of a (confessing) community to Jesus, and not in the relation of Jesus to humanity, but rather in those relations that determine the relation of God to Jesus. This origin of Christology itself is indicated in that eschatological speech event which is spoken out, where the proclamation of Jesus refers implicitly to christology that comes straight from Jesus, straight out of his proclamation and his behaviour, which authorises the power of the lordship of God, which the Pauline understanding of justification explicitly rejects christology as the event of the identity of the eschaton and history in the event of the death and resurrection of God.’ Eberhard Jüngel, *Paulus und Jesus: Eine Untersuchung zur Prüfung der Frage nach dem Urprung der Christologie* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1979), 283.
50 ‘In faith in the justification of the ungodly, the confession of Jesus Christ comes to be a truth that illuminates human existence. That truth is eminently critical, leading the human self-understanding, and therefore the whole of human existence, into an elemental crisis, a crisis which decides between life and death’. Jüngel, “On the Doctrine of Justification”, 25.
52 Jüngel, “Das Wunder des Glaubens”, 144.
53 ‘The centre of the Christian proclamation is that the history of Jesus Christ is not a private history, but that, in that history, God’s history with the whole of humanity takes place, and that in this one, unique history there occurs a
revelation in contrast to the previous giving of the law where ‘God speaks of himself in such a way that he communicates himself, opens himself, gives himself. As such, however, the gospel is sharply to be distinguished from God’s law, which makes demands of humanity and makes exorbitant demands of the sinner.’

Proclamation is not just that of the possibility of faith but also of the Lordship of God. As the lordship of God is the weakness of God revealed in the event of the cross, this means that proclamation also furthers an understanding of God as event, as ‘the event of the proclamation constitutes the existence of the person of Jesus. In this sense the being of the human Jesus is essentially a being in the act of the Word’. Therefore, what we draw from Christ as the event of proclamation is an enabling of faith and a revelation of the lordship of God. Moreover, proclamation affirms that the being of God is the act of God, and that act is affirmed as love. This is as the lordship of God is understood as love and an event as Jüngel sees that ‘godly power and godly love are related to one another neither through subordination nor dialectically. Rather, God’s mightiness is understood as the power of his love. Only love is almighty. Then God’s lordship is to be understood as the rule of his mercy and God’s law is accordingly the law of his grace’.

As noted earlier, Christ is both saviour and exemplar, although the latter is secondary to the former. It is thus not only the being of Christ that affects humanity, it is also important in Jüngel’s christology that Christ himself lived the perfect human existence which is characterised by Christ’s obedience to the Father. The death of Christ is part of this perfect living out of Godly life in that God is only revealed as love in the person


55 ‘Jesus proclaims the lordship of God. Jesus’ behaviour corresponds to his proclamation. Jesus’ earthly existence was thus as such and on the whole certain of the connection to the lordship of God.’ Jüngel, “Jesu Wort und Jesus als Wort Gottes”, Unterwegs zur Sache, 127.
56 Jüngel, “Jesu Wort und Jesus als Wort Gottes”, 129.
57 As Jesus exists out of and in the act of the Word of the Lordship of God, and thus exists from the fatherly act of the majesty of God, his human being comes from the act of the Word, which is: to be in the act of the Word of God. The Being of Jesus comes here, and is first revealed here, where Jesus, in unchristian Kerygma, is proclaimed as the Word of God.” Jüngel, “Jesu Wort und Jesus als Wort Gottes”, 136.
58 Jüngel, Mystery, 22.
59 ‘The formal significance of the death of Jesus, when it is seen as integral to his earthly existence, reveals the whole life of Jesus as a life which takes upon itself the sinner’s approaching destruction and overcomes it. For Jesus is not for himself, and is nothing for himself: Jesus’ life and death was a living out of the coming kingdom of God and an insistence on God’s fatherly will’. Jüngel, “Das Sein Jesu Christi als Ereignis der Versöhnung Gottes mit einer gottlosen Welt: Die Hingabe des Gekreuzigten”, Entsprechung, 283.
of Jesus Christ, who existed in ‘the greatest of all conceivable opposites: this antithesis of divine life with the self-inflicted death of the sinners’. Therefore, what we are saved from is our own inclination towards a certain kind of death.

**Salvation**

Jüngel understands death as complete relationlessness, and in contrast to this relationlessness the relationships of the divine trinitarian love are the template for our salvation. This conjunction of selflessness and sacrifice nuances Jüngel’s account of soteriology as Jesus Christ’s being exists in the act of the Word of God, in that he is (for us) actualised: so that with him we “die and are spiritually resurrected, to inherit eternal life, as has happened in him” and that ‘in Christ, God has reconciled the world to himself, in whom God, who has no acquaintance with sinners, was made sin for us, so that we become God’s righteousness’ (2 Cor, 5:19-21). This is what God has done. God’s act is thus our being. For the atoning death of Christ on the cross is not a cruel act, but an act that fully reveals God’s being as event, and that event as an act of love. As love is the unity of life and death in favour of life, and the life of God, it contains infinite possibilities and therefore conquers the closing of possibilities that is death.

As noted above the death of Christ shows that the being of God undergoes, develops, and suffers; this shows not the impotence of God but the love and empathy of God with the world. For the identification of God with Jesus can only be comprehended in the tension of the ‘death and resurrection of Jesus Christ’s earthly lowliness’. Again the death of Christ is key to Jüngel’s thought as Jüngel holds to a traditional view of the work of Christ as substitutionary atonement where Christ reconciles us with God in our

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64 ‘In the death of Jesus Christ God’s act is proved as an event of love, his suffering is proved as an act of love. God’s love is that of a superiorly consummated act of divine being, through which God overcomes, in his power; and says both No and Yes to humanity, indeed to sinners, that is, to obsolete, dead humanity.’ Jüngel, “Erwägungen zur Grundlegung Evangelischer Ethik”, 238.

65 ‘Thus it is done: the act of divine suffering. It has happened: the action of the passion of God in Jesus Christ, the obedience unto death on the cross. And that is done for us. In that this has happened, mercy and comfort have happened, so that God can be lauded as the Father of mercy and God of all comfort’. Jüngel, “Erwägungen zur Grundlegung Evangelischer Ethik”, 238.

place, as our actions could never do so. Furthermore, this substitutionary sacrifice of Christ underlines the uniqueness of who Christ is in that he could do what no one else could, and therefore Jüngel sees that ‘reflection on this mystery of substitution is imperative if the gospel is not to be falsified into a new law, if the church of Jesus Christ is not to degenerate into a moralistic institution’.68

The substitution happens when God united with death and overcame it, for God is the only one who could overcome death:

When God became human, he came in the place of humanity in contradiction. And so God’s substitutionary work leads to the depths of this contradiction (again, this self-incurred contradiction), the contradiction of our guilt. There is the existential place of his being. There – under the wrath of the holy God. And so there is the holy One himself.69

The miracle of the incarnation is that God assumes humanity so inclusively that he can come to the world exclusively in our place, so that humanity does not suffer the true effects of the curse of sin and death. Therefore there is a totality of substitution, and a complete sacrifice of Christ.

However, Jüngel clarifies regarding sacrifice that Christ’s death should be understood as sacrifice in the context of the whole of divine action.70 Sacrifice must involve an understanding of love, and not be seen as prompted only by judgement and divine anger. Atonement is therefore more than making good.71 As this debt that humanity owed God was so great and so irreparable, it required an act of love to repair this. It is also not obviated by the death of Christ as ‘one must recall that death, understood as an

67 ‘One person has done or suffered something on behalf of, that is, in place of, other persons. And whereas what was done or suffered in place of others is a negative event from which the other is spared, the expression on behalf of or in place of carries at the same time the positive meaning of for or to the benefit of. In so far as the one person has become a curse and has died the curse of death on behalf of all other persons, he has become a curse and died for them and to their benefit.’ Jüngel, “The Mystery of Substitution – A Dogmatic Conversation with Heinrich Vogel”, Theological Essays II, 152.
68 Jüngel, “The Mystery of Substitution”, 149. The German term used here is Stellvertretung, which also has meanings of being a proxy, and also of representation, which gives it maybe a more active nuance, in that there is a representation, an advocacy to the role.
69 Jüngel, “The Mystery of Substitution”, 158
70 ‘Only when the history of Jesus Christ has been grasped as a history in which divine anger has come to its goal in such a way that it stands in the service of divine love, will it become comprehensible why this history is told as gospel, and why the gospel story of Jesus Christ must be interpreted primarily as sacramentum, and only secondarily as exemplum’. Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ”, 172.
71 ‘Atonement is something other than making good. Rather, atonement is made for that which reparation cannot be made. Faith in atonement presupposes that there is such a thing as irredeemable transgression, that there is a kind of debt that is unlike other debts which can be calculated and paid. Such transgression or debt can in no way be repaid from the side of the debtor’. Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ”, 176.
atonning surrender of life, does not have the mere function of annihilation. If this were so, then the sinner could atone for him- or herself. Instead, it needed God to die, as what is required is the presence of that lost wholeness of existence; for that to come about, what is needed is a presence in which the whole creation is present. And that can only mean what is needed is the presence of the divine Creator in the form of the creature. Humanity is redeemed as all humanity is integrated in Christ’s human existence. The unity in and universality of Christ enables Jüngel’s account of substitutionary sacrifice.

The salvific action of Christ is not only that of substitutionary sacrifice, however. In how the death of Christ affects death, it also affects sin itself. Jüngel understands humans as fundamentally relational creatures. We do not exist independently of our own relations, yet we strive to actualise ourselves and live apart from others as individuals. However, when relations end, life ends. The atonement repairs our relationships to God and to others in how ‘the person of Jesus Christ creates peace in the midst of strife of a damaged relation to God, of a damaged relation to one’s contemporaries and to oneself’. As Christ himself consists of unbroken and unbreakable relations between humanity and God and between God and God, God entering into death means that power of death in ending relationships is itself ended, and thus we need not fear death.

This reparation sets the tone for future human life, as ‘peace is, indeed, the category which appropriately comprehends the good fruit of the atoning sacrificial death of Jesus Christ’. As peace is a category in which we are to live, Christ is not only a sacrifice and substitution for us, but Christ is also an example. It is important, however, to reiterate

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72 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ”, 177.
73 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ”, 178.
74 ‘Because the eternal God has identified himself with the human person, because the man Jesus is the Son of God, therefore all of humanity is integrated into his human existence. Therefore we are all present in the one’. Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ”, 179.
75 ‘That God had expiated the world was not just symbolically represented in him; this expiation was rather realised in him: not through substitutionary achievements, but rather through the ontologically adequate substitution’. Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ”, 179.
76 Jüngel, “The Dogmatic Significance of the Historical Jesus”, 112.
77 ‘We must think God in his relation to this human person, and think this relation itself as the inseparable unity of the humanity of Jesus Christ with the Son of God. The person of the Son of God is the person of this human being, in so far as this relation occurs in this person in the form of a history beginning from God and going to God’. Jüngel, “The Dogmatic Significance of the Historical Jesus”, 115.
78 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Sacrament and Example”, 180.
that this is not how we should first understand Christ. Instead, Jüngel sees that we can know Christ as an example for us when we acknowledge Christ as our saviour in order to avoid the misapprehension that by following Christ’s example we can obtain salvation for ourselves.\(^79\)

Therefore, when we understand Christ as sacrifice and example, we must understand that due to the completeness of Christ’s sacrifice the term has now become a metaphor, and it must characterise the Christian life. This sacrifice was also an example of turning towards others, towards relationships that create new possibilities and new life and love.\(^80\) For the event of salvation is characterised by love, and

Love resolves the total relationlessness of death in that it creates new relations and therefore new life where all connections break down and all relations end in relationlessness. Only the one who is God’s love in person can make the old pass away and generate new being. Only he can die for our sins and be raised for our justification.\(^81\)

**Justification**

I turn now to a brief discussion on justification, which is where Jüngel sees that God’s righteousness ‘became an event in our midst precisely in that God became human and as a human suffered for us and died for us’.\(^82\) Justification is also a trinitarian event, as God is justified in Godself hence the event of justification is a revelation of how God is in God’s triunity.\(^83\) This outworking of God’s inmost relations, where the members of a community of mutual otherness uphold and ground each other, is the ground for the universality of justification for ‘the righteousness of God always reaches beyond the community of rights, drawing the foreigner into itself’.\(^84\) This is also present in Christ’s death, as ‘it is the event of Jesus Christ’s death on the cross which calls the being of

\(^79\) Only when Jesus Christ is affirmed and believed to be our saviour, the effective sacrament of our salvation, is it then also really permissible, indeed, really required, to emphasise that Jesus Christ is the example, the one who offers a model of our own action’. Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Sacrament and Example”, 181.

\(^80\) As the incarnation of God is also ‘the counter-movement to this urge towards relationlessness. The incarnation of God means the entry of God into the world, creating new possibilities and ending relationlessness in death – this should not be understood as a tragedy for God, but as a benefit to humanity due to the coming event of divine love’. Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Christentums”, 22.


\(^83\) ‘The trinitarian God who exists in the trinitarian community of mutual difference in such a way that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit give each other their due. The criterion of divine justice is that it guarantees, gives and establishes that which is due’. Jüngel, “Living Out of Righteousness”, 260.

\(^84\) Jüngel, “Living Out of Righteousness”, 260.
God into question and presses for a trinitarian statement’.\(^{85}\) This shall be explored further in the succeeding chapter.

This act of justification also underlines the difference between God and humanity, as justification is accomplished emphatically through Christ alone: ‘since God himself has acted once and for all in this man alone, the particular exclusive of solus Christus is both possible and essential’.\(^{86}\) Yet despite this difference, there is still inclusiveness,\(^{87}\) as within Christ all humanity is justified.\(^{88}\) Furthermore, the sacrifice of Christ emphasises the passivity of the human in relation to God, for ‘sacrificing means acknowledging that one is forced to rely on an intermediary’.\(^{89}\) This restates the power of God in contrast to the impotence of humanity as it is the case that ‘it is not God who is conciliated, but God who reconciles the world. Sinful human beings do not atone for themselves; the Holy God removes sin from sinful human beings’.\(^{90}\) This is done only because Christ ‘is the epitome of the perfect sacrifice, sacrificed once and for all. There is no meaningful sacrifice that can follow’.\(^{91}\) ‘This is how they are justified through grace alone, as it comes through Christ alone.’\(^{92}\) I shall explore the doctrine of justification more fully in the final chapter, as much of it relates to the proper human response to this event.

**Sacramentology**

This uniqueness of Christ also informs Jüngel's understanding of sacraments. As Christ is the full and sole revelation of God, the only way in which God is mediated in the world, Jüngel sees Christ as the ‘one sacrament of the church’.\(^{93}\) Again, Jüngel is keen on rejecting any way in which natural theology can make a claim to know or access God: just as we cannot reach God by human reason and efforts, neither can human action bring Christ or God, into the world. Instead, the being of Jesus Christ is the one

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\(^{85}\) Jüngel, *Becoming*, 4.


\(^{87}\) Jüngel sees that ‘we must emphasise forcefully that Jesus Christ is the one who, not because of his particular humanity, but only because of the love of God which identified itself with his humanity, was and is able to stand as a representative for all the rest of humanity’: Jüngel, *Justification*, 151.

\(^{88}\) ‘Only he and he alone! But this one alone takes the place of all others and so represents all others. That is the inclusiveness, which is the goal of Jesus’ exclusiveness. Both are fundamentally linked to each other in the concept of substitution. This concept links the element of Jesus’ exclusiveness to that of inclusiveness’: Jüngel, *Justification*, 151.

\(^{89}\) Jüngel, *Justification*, 155.

\(^{90}\) Jüngel, *Justification*, 159.

\(^{91}\) Jüngel, *Justification*, 162.

\(^{92}\) ‘When the righteousness of human beings is decided in the person of Jesus Christ alone and when God’s grace has obtained its rightness in that person and only in him, then sinners are justified by grace alone’: Jüngel, *Justification*, 171.

\(^{93}\) Jüngel, *Was ist ein Sakrament*, 36.
proclaimed word, which becomes an effective sacrament in faith: ‘alone, the being of Jesus Christ is the sacrament of the world, that itself is mediated to faith alone through the proclaimed word of God alone.’

Jüngel sees that as a result of the doctrine of justification the only mediation of God in the world is the person and work of Christ, and therefore any mediation through the sacraments must follow that pattern. Thus for Jüngel ‘the sacraments are not activities which are concurrent with the divine word-act, but they are sacraments only because the divine word-act joins itself to a worldly action…in order to make itself visible in this worldly action’. Jüngel sees sacraments as interruptions in our lives much as proclamation is as they are also an event of Christ, and the only event that can interrupt our existence is the profoundly unusual and challenging event of Christ. This event has the power to change our existence in how it interrupts it, and makes us view life again anew. Therefore, Jüngel’s understanding of the uniqueness of Christ and the interruptive nature of Christ in our everyday life as something which calls us out of ourselves is replicated here, reinforcing his understanding of the centrality of Christ in his thought.

**Critique**

To sum up what Jüngel understands of the person and work of Christ as revealed on the cross, it can be seen that according to Jüngel’s understanding of the being of God as an event of love, that ‘an encounter between God and humanity’ can come about. It is from this event we come to know God as triune because ‘in revelation, therefore, we have to do with one internally-distinguished being of God’. Christology is therefore never abstracted from soteriology as ‘the being of Jesus Christ, the identity of God with

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95 ‘Sacrament is the theological concept of mediation, which mediates not only something, but also ourselves’. Jüngel, *Was ist ein Sakrament*, 41.
97 Jüngel corroborates this understanding of sacrament by drawing on Schleiermacher, in that ‘I refer myself to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s definition of the Christian worship as interruptive event. What deserves to be called sacramental is always an elementary interruption of worldly life’. Eberhard Jüngel, “Sakrament und Repräsentation: Wissen und Funktion der sakramentalen Handlung”, *Ganz Werden: Theologische Erörterungen V* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 277.
98 ‘It is decisive for the self-understanding of Christian theology, whether the story of Jesus is conceived only ethically, as an example of right human behaviour, or beyond and behind that, as a history which effectively changes the being of humanity, as a sacrament’. Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ”, 169.
Jesus, is based on the crucifixion of Jesus which is the event in which God reconciles Godself with a godless world.\textsuperscript{101} Yet the death of Christ must always be seen in the light of the resurrection, where ‘the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead is the ground and the strength of homological speech about Jesus Christ’.\textsuperscript{102} For it is ‘in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead alone that God grounds faith solely in God, in that he reveals himself as the God who wants only to be united with the human Jesus, and therefore with all humanity’.\textsuperscript{103} The communicatio idiomatum is key here in how it preserves the uniqueness of Christ and in how it enables Jüngel’s understanding of soteriology.\textsuperscript{104} This also prohibits the divinisation of human nature, as whilst ‘God in his divinity is human, this does not mean, but rather excludes, that the human in their humanity is divine’.\textsuperscript{105}

However, despite seeing the crucifixion in the light of the resurrection, the Lordship of God is still the Lordship of the crucified Christ, not of the resurrected Christ. Lordship is understood in terms of a theologia crucis, as the world is still Godless and ‘the lordship of the crucified accomplishes itself in the authority of the plea of a godless world’.\textsuperscript{106} It is this lordship of God that is called into the world. It is in this sense that we understand that ‘the lordship of the crucified is the lordship of the pleading Christ’.\textsuperscript{107}

However is the cross too narrow to bear the weight of what Jüngel wants it to bear? A constant charge that commentators level at Jüngel is that there is inordinate stress placed on the death of Christ at the expense of other aspects of Christ’s life. This criticism of the narrowness of Jüngel’s means of revelation also ties into how Jüngel presents the figure of Christ, where Christ does not have enough agency due to Jüngel’s focus on Christ’s passivity; and that the divinity of Christ is emphasised at a loss to an adequate account of the humanity of Christ. Whilst the charge of narrowness is one that

\textsuperscript{101} Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, 279.
\textsuperscript{102} Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie” 282.
\textsuperscript{103} Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, 290. ‘The Christian faith believes in a human God. This world and the next, immanence and transcendence, being and eternity, are not alternatives for God. Having faith in God’s identity with the crucified Jesus means that God, in his divinity, is human, that he is close in his distance and that in his eternal loyalty he has connected to us, in our humanity’. Jüngel, “Was ist „das unterscheidend christliche“?”, Unterwegs zur Sache, 298.
\textsuperscript{104} In that God has identified himself with the dead Jesus, this leads to the communication of divine life in the death of Jesus and the appropriation of human death through God’. Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, 290.
\textsuperscript{105} Jüngel, “Was ist „das unterscheidend christliche“?”, 298.
\textsuperscript{106} Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, 294.
\textsuperscript{107} Jüngel, “Thesen zur Grundlegung der Christologie”, 294.
I would like to uphold, the lack of emphasis on the humanity of Christ and on the passivity of Christ are internally consistent within Jüngel’s own christology, and thus it can be seen that that criticism is part and parcel of Jüngel’s narrow understanding of revelation.

Davidson sees that ‘the overall logic of Jüngel’s position is to depreciate the relevance of the human Jesus by exaggerating the resurrection’s retroactive ontic force which constituted his life and death as God’s actions’.108 Webster articulates this position as well, noting the ‘restricted presentation of the figure of Jesus’109 where the humanity is sidelined in favour of the power of God at work in Christ; which means that the humanity of Christ is seen as almost incidental to the actual work of Christ. This view extends to the lack of importance placed on the life of Christ known in the historical Jesus by Jüngel, and also in how other doctrines are inferred from christology rather than spoken of in their own right.110 As Jüngel is criticised for focusing overly much on the divinity of Christ, the question then is: why is there so little on the humanity of Christ, and does that need to be corrected in Jüngel? Contrary to Webster and Davidson I see that this is entirely consistent with the stress that Jüngel places on the communicatio idiomatum, which means that the humanity of Christ is different from that of all other humans. It is also of interest to note that contrary to this criticism Thompson finds that Jüngel ‘begins with a Christology from below which requires the retroactive power of the resurrection to confirm Jesus’ unity with God as the Son. This is not a very convincing way to seek to affirm the deity of Christ’.111 However, as I have explored Jüngel does focus on the divinity of Christ more than the humanity of Christ especially considering his use of the communicatio idiomatum to separate the humanity of Christ from that of all other humans, yet the issue that Thompson raises of how the life of Christ does not illustrate the divinity of Christ ties into the discussion of how Jüngel focuses on the divinity of Christ at the expense of the humanity of Christ in that there is little

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108 Davidson, “Crux probat Omnia”, 175
110 ‘Because of the place afforded to Christology in the total theological context, the structure of theological argument on which Jüngel places considerable emphasis is, in a loose sense, that of inference, in that the direction of theological procedure is from Christology towards other theological loci’. John Webster, Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to his Theology (Cambridge: CUP, 1986), 132.
information about the life of Christ and how that manifests his nature. Instead, the focus is on Christ after the resurrection for us today.

This criticism that Jüngel focuses too much on the divinity of Christ ties into the critique of the lack of agency given to Christ. Whilst this is consistent with the obedience and passivity of Christ, which is key to Jüngel's thought and the natural outworking of a theology that focuses on the bearing of suffering at the cross, Webster notes that even within how God is brought into our lives and interrupts our being in proclamation that the figure of Christ ends up 'curiously on the sidelines, a past and passive figure mediated through word and faith, one who no longer proclaims but is proclaimed'.

Nelson also holds this view, noting that 'Jüngel exhibits a troubling tendency to reduce the being of Jesus Christ, both his historical existence as Jesus of Nazareth and his post-resurrection existence as the Christ of faith, to the event of the word'. These commentators see that Jüngel's account of proclamation does not excuse this lack as the account itself seems to reduce the being of Christ for humanity today to a speech-act. Davidson notes this when he asks 'how can the entire gospel genre be compressed into this category of parable, into primary “speech-events”, since this is only a small part of the gospel story?'

However, saying that Christ is reduced to just a word does not do justice to Jüngel's understanding of the vitality of language or of its necessity of human life. Words are not just words, language is more than speech; it is an interruptive, essential quality of human life, and the means in which being is expressed. Moreover with Jüngel's understanding of parable as an event that draws people together the role of proclamation contains within itself a more active sense than being preached at, it has the character of an event that includes the listeners in itself. Furthermore, as Jüngel also understands that the person and work of Christ is focused more on the cross than on the life of Christ, the focus of Jüngel's christology does not need the life of Christ to explain the work of Christ, as the work of Christ is explained only through the death and resurrection of Christ.

112 John Webster, “Jesus in the Theology of E Jüngel”, C TJ 32:1, 1997, 43-71, 54. Pannenberg also notes this, where due to his focusing on the identification of God with the crucified Jesus (363ff.), there is a drift toward the idea of a one-sided movement from the Father, a self-distinction which derives from the Father (363). Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol.1, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 308.
114 Davidson, “Crux probat Omnia”, 173.
Thus, the emphasis on proclamation entails that human language is universal and an integral aspect of humanity and is thus not a reduction of reality to a word but instead the essence of reality. This focus on proclamation and language can be explained by Jüngel’s reluctance to focus on the Sitz in Leben of Christ as that ties Christ to history and to a specific time, where it can be dismissed as far away and of no real relevance to our everyday lives. Yet Ford seeks to repair Jüngel by suggesting that a widening of focus to Christ’s life might take some of the strain that the death of Christ has to bear as the source of all revelation of God, as ‘relations of origin are so intrinsic to the trinity that some explicit thought about birth might be in place’.

However it can be argued that what is mentioned is sufficient for Jüngel’s purposes. Regarding the passivity of Christ, Fiddes notes that the heightening of obedience into passivity is not purely a christological statement as ‘Jüngel further makes the point that “passivity” and suffering are also the highest activity in so far as they are “affirmed” by God, and so are proper to the being of God as act’. An important point to note here is that passivity and obedience are understood by Jüngel to be key to the relationship between the Son and the Father. As I shall explore when I turn to Jüngel’s understanding of love in the next chapter, there is a focus on both partners equally self-surrendering to the other. Yet with Christ alone displaying passivity and obedience, is there an imbalance in the account of love that is evidenced by the Trinity in Jüngel? At this point what is to be noted is that the activity of Christ on the cross is one of suffering, of being affected, and of undergoing. The activity of Christ is passivity, in other words, is of allowing something to happen to him. With this focus on the death of Christ, then the example we have of Christ is of passivity, not of combating evil or promoting good, but of letting what needs to happen, happen. This is due to the revelation we have of Christ, which is solely in the event of the cross. We cannot look

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115 Jüngel mentions an aphorism that Hegel references: ‘In Hegel’s Jena diary one finds this memorable note: “In Swabia people say of something that it happened so long ago that it can hardly be true any more. So Christ died for our sins so long ago that it can hardly be true any more”. It is the task of dogmatics or systematic theology – despite this note form Hegel – to bring out the fact that only the death of Jesus, but also the life of Jesus continues to benefit people today’, “The Dogmatic Significance of the Question of the Historical Jesus”, 82. By the life of Jesus here, Jüngel refers more to Christ’s post-resurrection life than the historical accounts given. However, as we know Jüngel is deeply aware of the problems of using Hegel, and notes the sublation of God in how ‘it is clear Hegel’s understanding of reconciliation has excited theological opposition. Whilst he admittedly knows that the Christian Kerygma of reconciliation with God is that it has already happened, namely in the consummating event of the death of Jesus Christ on the cross…whereas in Hegel reconciliation is principally reconciliation with the negative.’ Jüngel, “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht” aus theologischer Perspektive”, Ganz Werden, 338.

116 David Ford, “Hosting a Dialogue”, Possibilities in Theology, 44.

117 Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God, 118.
elsewhere to find examples of Christ’s activity for that one event contains all we need to know.

This leads into the criticism I would like to make about Jüngel’s christology; that focusing on the cross for the entire revelation of God and God’s relationship with humanity places an undue burden on Jüngel’s account of christology, where due to the stress on revelation from the cross it is in the person and work of Christ in that particular event that God is revealed. There is a lot that Jüngel says about Christ and christology: who Christ is, how Christ is different, what Christ means for us today, how Christ meets us today; and in order to avoid being tied to history and the fallenness of human reason and control it is revealed in the cross, where it goes against all that humanity finds good and powerful and forces us to find God under the pain, suffering, and unreasonableness of the death of God on the cross.

Therefore this focus on the death of Christ and on the divinity of Christ can be clarified in that Jüngel sees that there is a danger in tying God to the world. As he notes in his understanding of the cross, when God is tied to the world whether conceptually or historically then it means that the world can contain God, and control God; and by limiting God, overcome God. This is one reason why Jüngel sees the humanity of Christ in abstraction from the divinity of Christ as unhelpful. The other is that because the humanity of Christ is always considered with the divinity of Christ then the communicatio idiomatum means that the humanity of Christ is unique in how it is affected by the union with God, and thus the humanity of Christ can only be a vessel for salvation rather than something to be held up and mimicked.

Furthermore, if this understanding of the being of Christ is taken with Jüngel’s understanding that Christ is more than necessary and has a different relation to the world than that which is previously understood, then the role of language is that of bringing Christ in from outside the world into our own being; to use Heidegger, language is the house of being. This means that to see proclamation as bringing Christ into the world coheres with Jüngel’s understanding of God’s relationship to the world. If it were not for these caveats then I would understand that Jüngel’s account falls prey to the criticisms of a lack of focus on Christ’s humanity and the will of Christ. However,
taken within his christology as a whole it is consistent and can be understood in the light of his theological endeavour of thinking God anew.

Yet there is still the question of whether this aids, as Webster says, the ‘weighty superstructure that christology has to support’. The reason I think that Jüngel’s understanding of revelation cannot support what he wants it to is based in but not found fully in Jüngel’s account of christology. Whilst the passivity and obedience of Christ is consistent with what Jüngel wants to accomplish christologically and soteriologically, it is not consistent with what he says in his doctrine of God and his understanding of human action. Yet it is impossible to articulate this problem without first having explored Jüngel’s christology, to find what Jüngel has to say about the activity of Christ. Webster notes that in Jüngel ‘everything is compressed into the Passionsgeschichte Jesu’, and what this reveals is fundamentally the passivity of Christ in his relation to the Father both on his human nature and as the second person of the Trinity. Whilst this may be consistent with Jüngel’s account of christology, it shall become clear that this is not the case when it comes to Jüngel’s understanding of the Trinity. However, from this it is clear that what the theology of the cross does in Jüngel’s christology is narrow it down so that the complete revelation of the person and work of Christ is dependent on this one moment in the history and life of Christ. Moreover, Jüngel’s christocentrism as shown in his understanding of sacramentology means that Jüngel’s theology as a whole stands or falls on his understanding of Christ, and I shall show in the following chapter that focus proves damaging to his theology as a whole.

118 Webster, “Jesus in the Theology of E. Jüngel”, 66.
119 Webster, “Jesus in the Theology of E. Jüngel”, 69.
Chapter Four: Jüngel’s Doctrine of God

Introduction

Jüngel’s account of the Trinity is commonly seen as essentially Barthian due to his paraphrase of Barth in *God’s Being is in Becoming*. However, whilst Jüngel takes themes that Barth uses in *Church Dogmatics*,¹ Jüngel moves radically beyond Barth in *God as the Mystery of the World* in acknowledging influences from Hegel. Jüngel also gives the doctrine a deeper Lutheran treatment in his book on *Justification*. In looking at these works, and other essays that open up Jüngel’s understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is important to reiterate that the starting point for the doctrine of the Trinity is christology, as it is the revelation of God in the death of Christ that opens up the full revelation of the Trinity. This enables Jüngel to be able to say that a theology of the cross is not abstract revelation, but the concrete revelation of the being of God both as Christ and Trinity: ‘to be able to comprehend the history of God with humanity and at the same time the history of God with Godself, it is necessary to testify the consubstantiality of the Jesus Christ, the Son of God with the Holy Spirit’.² Jüngel has an understanding of God’s being as an event found both in Hegel and in Barth, where God’s being is God’s act: ‘what God does, must be understood as an expression of God’s being’.³ Therefore, as God’s being is God’s act, the act of God must be a trinitarian act which is understood by Jüngel to be the dynamic community of mutual otherness, the continued act of self-relating and self-loving, where ‘the three persons in real self-relation is the divine essence’.⁴

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¹ The idea of God as self-determined towards revelation in God’s very nature can be seen to have a Barthian provenance, where Jüngel claims that for Barth the lordship of God is ‘the expression of the capability of revelation and thus the possibility of revelation, which is grounded in the being of God’. (Jüngel, *Becoming*, 21.) as well as how the Lordship of God is revealed and God’s revelation is always consistent with how God is in Godself, as Barth claims that the freedom of God is in God’s ability to differentiate ‘Himself from Himself to become unlike Himself and yet to remain the same’. *(CD I/1, 320).* The fact that there is no hidden other in the revelation of God, and that God self-determines Godself towards revelation as an expression of freedom is key to Jüngel’s understanding and appropriation of Barth, for ‘the revelation of God and therefore His being as Father, Son and Spirit is not an economy which is foreign to His essence and which is bounded as it were above and within, so that we have to ask about the hidden Fourth if we are really to ask about God. On the contrary, when we ask about God, we can only ask about the One who reveals Himself’. *(CD I/1, 382).*


Despite this affirmation of perichoresis Jüngel is criticised for leaving little room for the work of the Holy Spirit in his thought. However what Jüngel has to say about love adds depth to his understanding of the Spirit. As I have noted in Chapter Two Jüngel is also criticised for following a Hegelian metaphysic, yet Jüngel does not retain the philosophical conclusions of the Hegelian system; thus whilst he uses part of the methodology of Hegel, he does not remain bound to the system. Beyond that, there is the criticism that Jüngel fails to define freedom and love in a satisfactory manner. Whilst these, and other critiques of Jüngel’s trinitarian thought will be discussed as to their merit, I will argue that Jüngel’s insistence on the sole revelation of God being through the event of the cross, which reveals God as event, God as Love, and God as Trinity, results in a concept of the Trinity that fails to live up to what Jüngel promises it does. On the basis of this, I would like to further the critique of Jüngel’s narrowness and say that the failings in his doctrine of the Trinity are a result of this very narrow focus on Jüngel’s doctrine of revelation, which is extremely concentrated through Jüngel’s insistence on the theology of the cross; where the centre of the event is always the person of Jesus Christ, only on the cross.

Revelation

I shall look again at how Jüngel understands revelation. Jüngel is adamant that the revelation of God as we receive is a full revelation of God in God’s entirety. Despite the completeness of this revelation of God in the incarnation and in Christ’s death on the cross the mystery of God’s existence as Trinity is preserved rather than fully explained. This unveiling increases the mystery of God as it reveals God to be beyond our understanding and comprehension: it shows the ‘eternally rich being of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, who discloses himself out of himself alone as the fullness of light. The doors of mystery only open from the inside’.

Revelation is the act of God, and in Jüngel’s understanding of God’s being as God’s act, revelation is always revelation of the triunity of God. Revelation is also trinitarian in how God’s existence is a trinitarian event which foreshadows and is a model for God’s action.

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5 ‘In faith in the triune God, the depths of the Word of the cross are opened up. I believe, therefore I am astonished at the trinitarian mystery as the sum of the gospel: God from eternity and thus in and of himself is God for us’. Jüngel, ‘“My Theology” – A Short Summary’, Theological Essays II, 8.
6 Jüngel, ‘“My Theology”’, 8.
in creating, sustaining, and saving the world; it speaks of the nature of God.  

This understanding of the being of God as a triune event means that revelation shows that God is by nature for humanity as God is by nature always for the other within God.  

This trinitarian action of existence and creation also forms a template for justification, for Jüngel sees that the Trinity itself is an event of justification. This is because justification is seen as an affirmation of something before something else: justification is a relational event. Therefore, as Jüngel sees the Trinity as infinitely relational, and in being relational the nature of God is to embrace and justify the other for ‘in God himself, otherness has been and is being affirmed: not the otherness of three different beings, but the otherness of distinct ways of being or persons of one and the same being’.  

Justification is the affirmation of being, in that ‘the Father, the Son and the Spirit affirm each other in their mutual personal otherness and so form the most intimate fellowship; the trinitarian fellowship of mutual otherness’.  

**God's Being is in Becoming**  
The reason that Jüngel’s trinitarian thought is frequently seen as essentially a rephrasing of Barth’s is due largely to Jüngel’s book on the Trinity: *God's Being is in Becoming*. Becoming is a paraphrase of Barth’s trinitarian theology from its exposition in I/1 through to the changes to it in IV/1 in order to assert against Gollwitzer that Barth’s doctrine of God does not support an understanding of God solely for Godself. To do this Jüngel

7. ‘As Spirit God comes to himself in such a way that he remains the one who is primordial beginning, and is thus able to start something with himself, and therefore with others also, even with us. And this is the *Sitz im Leben* of that which remains new within the inner life of God: that God does not cease to be the one who begins. He remains the one who begins in freedom’. Jüngel, “The Emergence of the New”, Theological Essays II, 57.  

8. God is to be thought out of the event of his advent: as a being who is in coming, and who in himself is the eternal story of God’s richness of relation, God’s coming-to-himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit’. Jüngel, “‘My Theology’”, 11.  

9. ‘The trinitarian differentiation of God’s Godness is in a manner of speaking the theological (one could also say: the ontological) backbone of the justification event’. Jüngel, *Justification*, 82.  

10. ‘God exists in relation to himself in such a way that he exists as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. He so relates to himself in this threefold personal existence that Father, Son and Holy Spirit mutually affirm each other in their respective otherness’. Jüngel, *Justification*, 82.  


13. Jüngel is wishing to mediate the debate between Herbert Braun and Helmut Gollwitzer about safeguarding God’s aseity. Braun wished to introduce a “non-objectifying” account of God as he saw that talk about God as an independent being was impossible and thus talk of God must be as a subjective anthropological reality, to relate and speak to and of God as one would to another person. (See Herbert Braun, “The Problem of New Testament Theology”, JTCh, 1, 1965, 169-83, “The Meaning of a New Testament Christology”, JTCh, 1968, 89-127, and “Gottes Existenz und meine Geschichtlichkeit”, Zeit und Geschichte: Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann Zum 80. Geburtstag. Im Auftrage Der Alten Marburger Und in Zusammenarbeit Mit Hartwig Thyen. Herausgegeben Von Erich Dinkler, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1964, and Jesus, (Philadelphia: ET, 1979)). Gollwitzer, however, sees that Bultmannian existentialism, with its emphasis on the Christian experience reduces talk about God solely to accounts of God-for-us, where Jesus becomes no more than a mediator of this experience. Gollwitzer thus wishes to counter Braun’s moves by emphasising the divine independence in contrast to subjectivism. (Helmut Gollwitzer, *The Existence of God as*
emphasises how the will of God to be a certain way is the essence of God. This way of being is not to exist apart from and outside humanity, but to be determined towards creation and towards humanity from the outset. Whilst Jüngel deals mainly with elucidating Barth in this book, tendrils of Barth’s thought remain with Jüngel, as I shall explore in the exposition of God as the Mystery of the World.

Jüngel notes that in Barth we are first and foremost looking at a God who fully reveals Godself. However, Jüngel still finds in Barth a sense in which God is not fully understandable and explainable in worldly terms. Jüngel sees this as bringing the concept of the deus absconditus back into theology. However, in doing so he understands that the deus absconditus is not

Hostile to revelation. Rather, precisely as the deus absconditus, that is, in his hidden mode of being, God is the subject of revelation. The fact that this subject of revelation is the God who cannot be unveiled to man, sharpens and safeguards the concept of revelation as God’s self-unveiling. In his self-unveiling God unveils himself as he who cannot be unveiled.

For Jüngel, due to this we can only grasp God as being-as-object sub contrario, under the opposite, and grounded outside us. We only are able to grasp God in this limited way as ‘God loans the human capacity for knowledge and gives knowledge of God to this loaned capacity,’ for human reason can never reach God of its own accord. This is because God is beyond humanity and the world, and if an object can be mediated as God’s being-as-object its reality is grounded outwith, not in and of itself. This way of

Confessed by Faith, (London: SCM, 1965), 90). Whilst Jüngel also wishes to maintain the objective reality of God from the revelatory experience of God-for-us, he sees that Gollwitzer, in maintaining Barth’s position over Bultmann’s ‘considering this question “God himself”. The vast, and as yet barely recognised, significance of K. Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation is, that is recognises this task and strives never to lapse into a description of Jesus Christ as a means for some interest that lies beyond his own person’, Gollwitzer, The Existence of God, 238), argues too strongly for God’s being-in-and-for-Godself, which threatens the position of revelation and thus Jüngel wishes to show that Barth has a greater focus on God’s being-for-us in his doctrine of election.

14 ‘Is not God’s essence determined precisely in his will? Is not precisely God’s eternal will the will of his free love, directed towards his revelation by virtue of his free decision as Lord which in such love determines his being and essence? Does not the being of God which becomes manifest in and as history compel us to think historically of God’s being in its potency which makes possible historical revelation in any other way than as trinitarian being?’ Jüngel, Becoming, 6.

15 Jüngel, Becoming, 31. As we noted earlier distinction between a hidden and revealed God is very important for Jüngel’s understanding of a theology of the cross, in how he draws it from both Barth and Luther. Jüngel notes, and preserves in his own work the sense that ‘Barth is concerned to prevent the opposition between a deus nudus [naked God] and a deus incarnates [incarnate God]’. Jüngel, Becoming, 53. However, Jüngel also notes that this opposition does not mean that God, in the incarnation, is therefore bridging God and humanity as such, for whilst ‘God manifests himself in his Word, there is, nevertheless, a permanent distinction between God and humanity. God as God differentiates himself from humanity precisely at the point at which he reveals himself to humanity. As knowledge of God, faith is the acknowledgement of this distinction between God and humanity which takes place when God comes to be expressed in human speech’. Jüngel, Becoming, 60.

16 Jüngel, Becoming, 61n24.
revelation safeguards God’s objectivity. Therefore, we must make a clear distinction between God’s being-as-object and creaturely witness to God’s being-as-object.

Jüngel also notes that Barth’s trinitarian theology enables an understanding of God that is independent from metaphysics, for Jüngel notes that when we see God as Lord in revelation, and when the revelation of God is of God’s complete being

Then the being of God which becomes thematic in the as-relations of revelation must correspond to his function manifest in self-interpretation as revealer, revelation and revealedness. Therefore the dogma of the Trinity is the appropriate expression for the being of God. It protects the Christian doctrine of God from becoming mythological or slipping into metaphysics.17

Jüngel sees that the substance of Church Dogmatics is that God corresponds to Godself, and sees that ‘as the mutual self-giving of the three modes of God’s being, God’s being is event. Because God’s being as threefold is self-giving (love), this being may not be conceived as something abstract’.18 Due to this continuous correspondence, the doctrine of the Trinity is what ‘teaches us to think of God’s being as event, and so enables us to think of God as the one who reveals himself’.19

In Barth’s definition of God as revealing it means that it is inevitable that God is going to reveal Godself to the world, because God has chosen to do so. Jüngel links this to the Lordship of God, which itself contains the capacity for revelation. This capacity is not something incidental to God, but is ‘an actuality proper to God’s being. God’s ability is thus not something future to him, in Aristotle’s sense of potentiality in tension with actuality. Rather, God’s ability is really present in him as his power’.20 This is because revelation is a matter of the love of God, for in revelation we see that ‘God acts as the loving one in that he wills to be ours’.21 Due to this revelation of the love of God, and as it would not be true revelation if it were not consistent, ‘it must also follow from the relation of God’s three modes of being to one another that God acts as the loving one’.22

17 Jüngel, Becoming, 33.
18 Jüngel, Becoming, 41.
19 Jüngel, Becoming, 63.
20 Jüngel, Becoming, 82.
21 Jüngel, Becoming, 82.
Jüngel notes in *God’s Being is in Becoming* that in Barth, this inevitability of revelation shows that there is a primal decision by God to elect, which may necessitate the incarnation. This ambiguity that launched a thousand debates is noted by Jüngel, who concludes about any possible aporia between I/1 and IV/1 that within Barth this ‘was at most stated but certainly not thought through’. Within Jüngel, I would like to note that there is less of a stress on election in his work and more on God known in the proclamation rather than only in the incarnation. The incarnation is essential to the proclamation, but the event is always brought to us, and in bringing that event to us in proclamation brings Christ to the world again in the analogy of advent.

Jüngel also notes Barth’s theology of the cross, where God and the trinitarian relations of love and the community of mutual otherness are only known and only shown in the event of the cross, which shows the abandonment of the Son by the Father, and the suffering and death of God. This is not just the appearance of the suffering of God, but the actual subjection of the divine essence to change and perishing. Jüngel insists however, that this is not a contradiction of God’s being in act, for he sees Barth as saying that ‘God’s suffering corresponds to his being-in-act’²⁴, for from the very first God’s passion is to be understood as God’s action.

For Barth this is achieved in that the trinitarian relationships are shaped by the eternal obedience of the Son to the Father. This, in Barth, leads to Christ going into the far country via the death on the cross. Jüngel takes this revelation of the inner trinitarian relation of obedience, and sharpens it into a passive acceptance of the Son to the will of the Father. Christ on the cross is where this is revealed, as

> On the basis of Barth’s inference from God’s being revealed to his ‘inner’ being, we shall have to understand, in God himself, too, God’s ‘being-in-act’, which corresponds to the passion of the Son of God, as in a certain sense a passive being – passive in the sense of obedience. This passivity of obedience in God is also the highest form of activity in so far as it is affirmed passivity.²⁵

This passivity makes the death of Christ possible, but is not the sole factor in it.²⁶

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²⁴ Jüngel, *Becoming*, 100.
²⁵ Jüngel, *Becoming*, 100.
²⁶ ‘Precisely because obedience from eternity is not strange to the life of God, and precisely because this being is utterly other than, a ‘divine death’, God can suffer and die as man. This inner-trinitarian ability of God must not,
Thus, as the whole of *God’s Being is in Becoming* is a paraphrase of Barth on his debate with Gollwitzer on the impassibility of God, it must be noted that by the end of the book Jüngel is less keen on supporting Barth than on challenging Gollwitzer. Jüngel sees Gollwitzer as wishing to conceive of God independently from God’s action with humanity, for ‘if, like Gollwitzer, we wish to maintain and think of God’s independence, we cannot avoid the task of conceiving God’s independence out of God’s own subsistence and thus also of thinking of this subsistence’. Jüngel sees that this heightening of God’s independence done by Gollwitzer draws too much from an unhealthy metaphysics, a topic he deals with extensively in *God as the Mystery of the World*. However, for now Jüngel restricts himself to writing that ‘this kind of being as subsistence excludes event from itself; such an independent being cannot reveal itself. The subsistence of being as idea excludes the event of revelation because it excludes the event of being as subsistence’.

However, Jüngel does take a number of cues from Barth regarding the trinitarian relations, aside from the obedience and passivity of the Son and Barth’s understanding of hiddenness in the full revelation of God. What Jüngel also wants to proceed with is the idea that if we understand the being of God as event, then there can be no standstill however, be thought of as a transcendental condition of possibility for the passion of God in Jesus Christ. Rather, God’s ability means that God is Lord’. Jüngel, *Becoming*, 101.

27 Eberhard Busch notes that Barth’s reaction to Jüngel’s appraisal of this debate was that ‘Barth expressed the highest satisfaction with the book. Fundamentally, he had no objections to the book, apart from that the fact that Jüngel’s linguistic style was not always accessible to him’, and that Jüngel’s objection to the understanding Gollwitzer had that God’s essence was realised in the event of a determined relation. However, he notes the criticism that Jüngel teaches an essence of God that Barth did not teach (But, said Fangmeier: Jüngel still brings Barth into a connection with Ebeling’s statement: God is not an extramundane essence. Barth replied: “Yes, that is factually correct. God is in fact not such an essence. I have not taught such an essence.”). However Barth objects to the sense of novelty that Jüngel gives his doctrine of the Trinity, as ‘in the form in which Jüngel currently explains it, it seems almost as though the doctrine of the Trinity is “a special invention of Karl Barth.”’ His “modest contribution” to the churchly doctrine of the Trinity has only been the one that he saw, understood, and developed in close, indissoluble connection with the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.’ Eberhard Busch. *Meine Zeit mit Karl Barth: Tagebuch 1965-1968*. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 13-15. Translated by Matthew J. Aragon Bruce, 3 September 2011, http://derevth.blogspot.fr/2011/09/karl-barth-on-ephrard-jungels-gods.html, accessed 1st December 2014.

28 Jüngel’s own relationship with Karl Barth can best be summarised by his first encounter with Barth, where he recalls that ‘I dared, in an unforgettable meeting of his group, not only to contradict the Basel criticism of Bultmann with a vehemence born of youthful audacity but also proceeded to interpret one section from Barth’s anthropology to his satisfaction, I was invited for a late-night dispute over a bottle of wine. And a few days later the entire Church Dogmatics stood in front of my door with the dedication: “To Eberhard Jungel, on the way into God’s beloved eastern zone.”’ Jüngel, *Toward the Heart of the Matter*. 108.


30 This may be seen as a Hegelian move rather than a Barthian move, and Jüngel himself notes criticism that he may be drawing too much on Hegel’s philosophy of history in his account of *Becoming*, and does not see how this is necessarily something reprehensible, responding that ‘I cannot see that proving that I have learnt from Hegel ought to be a matter for censure. As long as theology lets itself be ashamed of the decisiveness with which Hegel dared to think
in God as ‘God’s being as subsistence is self-movement. As self-movement, God’s independent being makes revelation possible’.\(^{31}\) Having now seen the necessity of understanding God as event, it can be seen that the being of God can be known through the history of God with humanity, which Barth sees as where ‘God’s grace is rather the reiteration in relation to something other of the Yes to himself which constitutes God’s being’.\(^{32}\) For the trinitarian relations of God are God’s self-relatedness, and this self-relatedness forms the template for God’s engagement with humanity.\(^{33}\)

Jüngel also looks at the role of election in the Trinity, for ‘the revealed God is also understood here as the triune God. In him our election is, so far as it is tangible (predestined) as the identity of the Word of God, whom God himself made possible, the salvific will of the triune God is to surrender, so that only faith can influence our election’.\(^{34}\) This election is through the Son, where ‘the central event of the selflessness of God is the cross and death of Jesus Christ, who is the Father’s only son, and in obeying the Father, gives himself’.\(^{35}\) Again this means that God is love for ‘the unity of life and death in favour of life is the material expression for the essence of love, the formal structure of a greater selflessness in the middle of a great self-referentiality’.\(^{36}\) This definition of God as love, and as movement means that ‘the doctrine of perichoresis and of appropriation, thinks the being of the triune God concretely as the vivacity of life and death in favour of life, and unites history so that God’s being is in coming’.\(^{37}\)

Whilst I have noted how Jüngel takes various cues and stresses from Barth, I would also like to note that Jüngel himself differentiates between his approach and that of Barth.

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\(^{31}\) Jüngel, Becoming, 109.
\(^{32}\) Jüngel, Becoming, 122.
\(^{33}\) ‘God’s self-relatedness thus springs from the becoming in which God’s being is. The becoming in which God’s being is is a becoming out of the word in which God says Yes to himself. But to God’s affirmation of himself there corresponds the affirmation of the creature through God. In the affirmation of his creature, as it becomes event in the incarnation of God, God reiterates his self-relatedness in the relation to the creature, as revealer, revelation and as revealedness. This christological relation to the creature is also a becoming in which God’s being is’. Jüngel, Becoming, 122.
\(^{34}\) Jüngel, “Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos: Eine Kurzformel der Lehre vom verborgenen Gott – im Anschluss an Luther interpretiert” in Entsprechung, 238.
\(^{35}\) Jüngel, “Gott selbst im Ereignis seiner Offenbarung”, 27.
\(^{36}\) Jüngel, “Gott selbst im Ereignis seiner Offenbarung”, 27.
Jüngel notes that whilst he has found great treasures in Barth, he never felt inclined to settle in that school, finding that whilst it had applications to his thinking, he found the scholasticism of Barth restrictive in its own way.

This is also shown in how Jüngel also notes his debts to Hegel and Heidegger at the end of God’s Being is in Becoming, and Jüngel links what he has taken from Hegel and Heidegger together by stating that

God is at one and the same time the interruption of the coherence of being and its intensification; and therefore, the correspondence between person (mind) and reality, which occurs in all true knowledge, means, in the case of knowledge of God, a gain to being which at the level of practice makes more possible in the actuality of the world than that actuality is capable of granting to itself. If God’s being is in becoming, then for us, too, more is possible.

God as the Mystery of the World

From examining Jüngel’s first full exploration of the Trinity, I shall see how Jüngel articulates his own understanding of the Trinity and of God in God as the Mystery of the World. In God as the Mystery of World Jüngel sets out his own understanding of a theology of the crucified, wherein ‘the Christian faith lives out of that particular proclamation which identifies God with the crucified man Jesus and thus differentiates between God and God’. We can only understand God when we realise that ‘God has defined himself through identification with the crucified Jesus’.

38 ‘Barth’s theology was autochthonous. From it one could learn that substantive concentration upon the truth to which the Bible bears witness is the best prerequisite for keeping faith in the present world. I gained a new acquaintance with the tradition, in relation to which there was neither a disrespectful criticism nor an uncritical respect. Thereby an ecumenical horizon opened up for me, without which I simply cannot conceive any future theology. Above all, I was challenged to think about God from the event of his revelation, and that means from the event of his coming into the world: hence, as a God to whom nothing human is foreign and who, in the person of Jesus Christ, has come nearer to humanity than humanity is able to come near to itself. The Augustinian interior intimo meo (“nearer than I am to myself”) became something of a hermeneutical key, not only for the correct understanding of God but also for the correct understanding of the human being, whose subjective godlessness is mercifully anticipated by God’s objective humanity’, Jüngel, Towards the Heart of the Matter. Jüngel’s approach to Barth can be further inspected in Barth-Studien, (Zürich/Gütersloh: Benziger/Mohn, 1982) where Jüngel takes both complimentary and critical positions on aspects of Barth’s theology.

39 ‘In short, in contrast to the sterile Barth-scholasticism that dominated Germany at the time and that had built around the master’s dogmatics a Chinese “Great Wall” not to be penetrated, in my case something like a “new frontiers” mentality grew out of my encounter with the person and work of Karl Barth’. Jüngel, “Towards the Heart of the Matter”.

40 Jüngel, Becoming, 139.

41 Jüngel, Mystery, ix.

42 Jüngel, Mystery, x.
Here, Jüngel focuses on what the trinitarian relations, and the death of Christ, say about God and love, and how this is revealed. Jüngel here is insistent that the understanding of God as love ‘should be the explication of the doctrine of the Trinity, which is based on the self-identification of God with the crucified man Jesus’. However, Jüngel understands that talk about God is hard to do, and is made harder by the history of talk about God, which he sees historically as being clouded by metaphysical speculation on the essence of God. As a result of this aporia we exist in an age of ‘the verbal placelessness of God…which finds its counterpart in the increasing inability to think God and the speechlessness of theology, which is only poorly concealed in its opposite. Theology is thus in a bad state’. As noted in Chapter Two, Jüngel’s solution to this state is to find Christ on the cross, where Christ shatters and does not conform to our worldly and philosophical expectations.

Jüngel’s other main philosophical interest in *God as the Mystery of the World* is in conceiving of the essence and existence of God together, not as separate, for ‘the identity of the essence and existence of God was destroyed by the intervention of something else. That something else, our thought, threatened not only the essence and existence of God, but logically, the very idea of God itself’. Jüngel, in his effort to rehabilitate theology, sees that there are two tasks, one that ‘God must be thought as the one who he is. And this must be done in such a way that no distinction emerges between the essence and existence of God, the distinction which made it possible for the “I think” to intervene between God and God’; and secondly that ‘thought itself must be so conceived of that it can no longer even intend to intervene between the essence and existence of God’, and it has to reject any interloping between essence and existence and thus ‘one must learn to think thought in a new way’.

Jüngel finds that this is possible through his understanding of proclamation. Jüngel states that the ‘place of the conceivability of God is a Word which precedes thought’. The fact that God is one who speaks is confirmed through the Bible and therefore we

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43 Jüngel, *Mystery*, x.
encounter God where God speaks, which is in the revelation of God.\textsuperscript{50} Jüngel believes that ‘without revelation, thinking will at best construct a thought of God which it can then disintegrate and at some point must disintegrate’.\textsuperscript{51} Revelation, Jüngel sees, using concepts from \textit{God’s Being is in Becoming}, is characterised in that ‘the fact that God makes himself accessible to man presupposes that God has something to do with man. This, in turn, implies that God himself proceeds along a pathway’.\textsuperscript{52} Not only does God proceed along a pathway, we are taken up along this path alongside God, as ‘to think God means to be taken along by God’.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore we understand God’s being as an event.

This thinking of God is only possible from the incarnation, as that is how, when, and where God gave Godself to be thought.\textsuperscript{54} As noted in Chapter Two Jüngel wants to avoid conforming God completely to human reason, and thus on not tying God to the world as he writes that ‘the way that God is to be thought can be more precisely defined on the basis of the insight that God is present in the word as the one who is absent’.\textsuperscript{55} Jüngel uses this to link together and deepen his earlier argument that God is more than necessary.\textsuperscript{56} The more than necessary being of God is linked to the crucifixion of Christ and the existence of perishing in the being of God. Jüngel wants to destroy any notion of God as impassible or imperishable. He sees that God as a God who is terrible and in being terrible is boring.\textsuperscript{57} However, as noted before this means jettisoning the metaphysical concept of God, as ‘one cannot think God and perishability together without setting aside the metaphysically conceived thought of God. Perishability disintegrates him’.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{50} ‘God, even in these texts, does not disclose himself directly…they reveal God as the one who speaks. In doing that they prohibit the misunderstanding that the Bible itself is a talking God’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 157.
\textsuperscript{51} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 158.
\textsuperscript{52} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 159.
\textsuperscript{53} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 159.
\textsuperscript{54} ‘Theological thinking must proceed from the fact that God gives himself to be thought. In theology, then, thinking means to attempt to conform to God with the capacity of human reason’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 160.
\textsuperscript{55} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 169.
\textsuperscript{56} ‘If one thinks God’s being on the basis of this “more than necessary,” that is, his relationship to the world out of the superabundance of his being, his deity out of his self-determination to become human, and his eternity out of his identity with the crucified Jesus of Nazareth, then one has begun to think God and perishability together and thus to think God for his own sake’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 193.
\textsuperscript{57} ‘The abstract imperishability of God above us is the expression of a God who in his abstractness (or, as Luther could say, in his nudity) is a terrible and in his terribleness ultimately a boring God. Terror without end ultimately kills all attentiveness. Even fascination at the abstract majesty of God over us results in a thoroughly terrifying boredom. And for that reason, the wordless, dumb and perfectly abstract divine majesty does not concern us.’ Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 198.
\textsuperscript{58} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 203.
Moreover Jüngel sees that the death of Christ on the cross enables a new way of conceiving of God and of death because of God’s engagement with the opposite – death and perishing. Jüngel writes that ‘because death and perishing are ontological similes for nothingness and the tendency toward nothingness, it is very easy for perishability to be judged exclusively as a negative phenomenon’. However, we cannot just see perishability as the power of nothingness and decay and evil, for Jüngel seeks to work with a new understanding of perishability, as ‘that which is ontologically positive about perishability is the possibility’. Jüngel sees that ‘there remains within the context of the perishable the capability of becoming’. Therefore perishability should not be understood as annihilation, but rather ‘perishability is the struggle between possibility and nothingness’.

A true understanding of God’s being in becoming is that God’s being exists as infinite possibilities from perishing. Once it is understood that perishing opens up possibilities and death ends possibilities, then we can unpack the statement that ‘talk about the death of God implies then, in its true theological meaning, that God is the one who involves himself in nothingness’. The death of Christ ‘located nothingness within the divine life’ and in doing so overcomes nothingness by opening up possibilities through the eternal, immortal life of the Trinity as infinite possibilities. Jüngel understands that love, as revealed on the cross, shows that ‘there a dialectic of being and nonbeing takes place which belongs to the essence of love’, and that, more importantly, love ‘unites life and death in favour of life’. For ‘love is the living unity of life and death and as such the victory of life over death’.

This overcoming of death with infinite possibilities reveals more than just the death of death; it is an event of love. This is because God is love in Godself as Trinity, and
therefore when love is shown in the crucifixion, it is shown as the differentiation of the trinitarian relations. In the event of the cross Christ is revealed as ‘the beloved Son, who, in the midst of his separation from the Father, relates to him. In that way God is Spirit, establishing the link between Father and Son in such a way that man is drawn into this love relationship’. The fact that Christ, the Son was crucified means that ‘the identification of God with the crucified Jesus requires the differentiation of God the father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit! Only in this threefold differentiation of the being of God does the statement that God is love become understandable. The love that God is; is revealed in how it is in giving up the Son that the Father shows his true love for the Son.

Jüngel thus understands that

The theology of the Crucified One is speaking, then, of a heightening, an expansion, even an overflowing of the divine being, when it considers God as the total surrender of himself for all men in the death of Jesus. In that God is that total self-surrender, that is, not only the one who surrenders or what is surrendered, but the event of self-surrender itself, the New Testament statement is true: God is love.

Love is understood as selflessness and in the death of Christ on the cross Jüngel sees that ‘self-relatedness and selflessness correspond to each other in such a way that here, as we have already shown, the basic structure of evangelical talk about God is to be applied mutatis mutandis; we must speak of a still greater selflessness in a very great, a properly great self-relatedness’. This selflessness enables Jüngel to connect God’s essence and existence as one thing, for

The God who is love is totally identical with his essence in his existence. His existence is his essence. That is precisely what the doctrine of the Trinity formulates. It does this by thinking of the essence of God, which is love, as an essence constituted by relations and by thinking of the relations which constitute God’s essence as the divine existence.

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70 ‘In that God comes from God, he has always been the one who loves. God is the one who loves out of himself, who does not have to be loved by man in order to love’. Jüngel, Mystery, 327.
71 ‘God differentiates himself in that he loves himself. In an irremovable differentiation within himself, he is lover and beloved…God is rather the radiant event of love itself’. Jüngel, Mystery, 327.
72 Jüngel, Mystery, 328.
73 Jüngel, Mystery, 329.
74 Jüngel, Mystery, 369.
75 Jüngel, Mystery, 369.
76 Jüngel, Mystery, 371.
Thus, because God is love, then God is trinitarian, and thus God saves.\textsuperscript{77}

The cross is the source of our revelation of God because of how it reveals this event of love. Our understanding of God as love intersects with this revelation of God, although the suffering and death of a person seem to be an unusual place to locate love. Jüngel sees love as an event,\textsuperscript{78} and ‘to think God’s being as love means then to think God’s thinkability as the basis of his speakability, and his speakability on the basis of the correspondence he has established between God and man’.\textsuperscript{79} This rids theology of the idea that God cannot be spoken of,\textsuperscript{80} because God has given us the capacity to speak of God through the cross.\textsuperscript{81}

This love that God is also relates to Jüngel’s understanding of freedom as self-determination rather than unlimited potency. Jüngel sees that God exists in the ‘freedom to self-determination which for its part is as such defined, concrete freedom: the freedom of love’.\textsuperscript{82} This freedom understood as determined by love means that when we understand God as love, it is with all these meanings that we can say that ‘through this mystery of love [that God is], man moves from the fixation of wanting to have into the freedom of being able to be. In the love which God merits being called, we are made those who are out of those who have’.\textsuperscript{83}

A way in which we express this love is in giving thanks.\textsuperscript{84} This giving thanks enables us to be able to speak of God. Whilst receiving our knowledge of love and freedom from the event of the cross appears counterintuitive, Jüngel writes that this understanding of

\textsuperscript{77} ‘The one who loves out of himself must always be related to a beloved one, since it is not possible to love without reference to that beloved one who always receives this love: God the Son’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 371.

\textsuperscript{78} ‘Essentially existing lovingly. As love, God is thinkable in the concept of an overflowing being which subjects itself to nothingness, a concept which understands God’s essence and existence which cannot be differentiated’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 300.

\textsuperscript{79} ‘To grasp God as love, that certainty means to grasp God as self-communication. That, however, explodes the thesis of the unspeakability of God’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 260.

\textsuperscript{80} ‘God is not only one who loves, but is love itself, one must not speak only about him, but one can speak about him. Love possesses the power of speech: \textit{caritas capax verbi} (‘love is capable of the word’). Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 298.

\textsuperscript{81} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 221.

\textsuperscript{82} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, x.

\textsuperscript{83} ‘Who is God that we must speak about him? God is he whom man must gives thanks. More exactly, God is he whom we cannot thank enough. The fact that we cannot thank him enough defines him as the one whom we may fear above all else. The fact that we cannot thank him enough defines him as the one whom we may love above all things. Thus we are told how we stand with God when we experience how we stand with Jesus Christ. At the same time we are told how we stand with ourselves. If God is the one whom we cannot thank enough, everything is also said about us that needs to be said. Once again: Is the word “God” still a word of our language? Answer: “God” can always only become a word that speaks of God’. Jüngel, “God - As a Word of our Language”, 45.
the doctrine of the Trinity ‘is the indispensable, and indispensably difficult, expression of the truth that God lives’. Jüngel sees that ‘the death of Jesus opens a new relationship to God because it discloses the being of God in its divine vitality, on the basis of the death of Jesus. The deity of the living God – the divinity of his life and thus the vitality of God – is compatible in a very precise sense with the death of this human life’. However, the death of Christ is not the last word but ‘as victor over death, God discloses himself as God’, for Jüngel sees that we can only understand the cross in light of the resurrection.

Therefore, in Jüngel the Trinity is not an abstract doctrine that bears little relevance to human existence, but it is the explication of salvation. Jüngel also takes his cue from Luther again here and applies Luther’s concept of the deus revelatus and deus absconditus as being the distinction between law and gospel applied to the concept of God. For both are necessary in God, for ‘God does not contradict himself. God corresponds to himself. For that reason we need the doctrine of the Trinity, through the whole sweep of theology’. This is as it is ‘only the God who is identical with the Crucified One makes us certain of his love and thus of himself.’

I have thus far focused on the relationship between the Father and the Son on the cross. Although there has been mention of the Spirit, Jüngel writes further of the Spirit that the Spirit is found

Only in the unity of the giving Father and the given Son is God the event of giving up which is love itself in the relation of lover and beloved. The Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son constitutes the unity of the divine being as that event which is love itself by preserving the differentiation.

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88 This revelation is also effective revelation as ‘the man Jesus and his death on the cross would basically not affect faith in God if God himself had not come to the world in this human life and death.’ Jüngel, *Mystery*, 349.
89 Since the issue here is God in special concentration and ultimate concreteness, the doctrine of the Trinity is the dogma of soteriology in an absolute sense – and it certainly is anything other than a speculation which has little to do with the question of man’s salvation’. Jüngel, *Mystery*, 344.
90 Jüngel, *Mystery*, 346. Jüngel’s concern for consistency means that Jüngel understands that the distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity is not that of a God behind God, but is ‘legitimate only when the economic doctrine of the Trinity is its summarising concept. Here careful corrections of the traditional form of trinitarian doctrine are absolutely called for. These corrections must do justice to the dialectic of law and gospel with regard to “God himself”’. Jüngel, *Mystery*, 346.
The importance of love in Jüngel’s understanding of God and theology, and his identification of the Spirit as the bond of love between the Father and Son, should show a heightened understanding of the role of the Spirit in the Trinity itself, even if the Holy Spirit does not do so much in human life. However, what the Spirit does in human life is that the Holy Spirit enables us to meet God and draw us into God’s relationship of love, and work to renew us. However, these are the few mentions of the work of the Spirit in a hugely christological tome, and Jüngel states a few pages later that it is through ‘his identity with Jesus Christ, [that] God is the actual mystery of the world’.

Thus God as the Mystery of the World, the grounds of Jüngel’s theology can be summed as how

The identification of God with the Crucified One implied the trinitarian self-differentiation of God, so that the doctrine of the unity of God with the crucified man Jesus revealed itself to be the grounding of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Trinity of God implies, within the horizons of the world, the self-differentiation of the invisible Father in heaven from the Son on earth, visible as man, and from the Spirit who reigns as the bond of unity and love between the invisible Father in heaven and the visible Son on earth and who produces in an invisible way visible results in us. This underlines that the only revelation of God is what happened on the cross, which was ‘an event which in its uniqueness discloses the depth of the deity’, which are the relations of overflowing love. Talk about God must always correspond to how God revealed Godself, as ‘talk about God is responsible when it is its intention to correspond to God’.

Jüngel’s other writings on the Trinity outside of God’s Being is in Becoming and God as the Mystery of the World continue along the same lines. Jüngel links christology and theological

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93 ‘In the Holy Spirit, the selfless God and totally self-centered man meet each other in such a way that the eternally new relationship of love between God and God effectively draws man into itself’. Jüngel, Mystery, 375.
94 ‘The creative power of renewal which reverses the movement from life to death by which earthly existence is defined and leads from death into life, from nonbeing into being. Understood in this way as a renewing power, the new which endures is a divine predicate’. Jüngel, “The Emergence of the New” 55.
95 Jüngel, Mystery, 379.
96 Jüngel, Mystery, 379.
97 ‘God comes to himself even in the death of Jesus Christ, the Father to the Son. And thus he comes to man as his eschatological goal. In the death of Jesus, God comes in one and the same event as God to God and as God (definitively) to man, as the Father to the Son, and as the Son to Jesus. This death is the seal of that event in which God comes both to God and to man, of that event then in which God as man is his own goal’. Jüngel, Mystery, 383.
98 Jüngel, Mystery, 220.
99 ‘God’s being, as overflowing and creative being, is, so to speak, the eternal reduction of nothingness which for its part only “is” in that God distinguishes himself from it and relates to it’. Jüngel, Mystery, 223.
100 Jüngel, Mystery, 227.
anthropology to the Trinity in that the Trinity exists as a blueprint for the two natures in Christ, and for human relationships.\textsuperscript{101} This enables us to see how we can understand Christ both as powerless on the cross and as God, for as ‘faith in the identity of God with this human necessitates the difference between God and God – such that the \textit{deus summus} is at the same time the \textit{infimus}.\textsuperscript{102} These two ways of seeing and knowing God are shown in how the crucified God exists under the anger of God, in how God is seen as asserted against Godself.\textsuperscript{103} This in turn destroys any understanding of an aloof and distant God, for

God is not only the eternal living creator, who calls non-being into being, but rather he is the one who also abandons himself to nothingness, who in the Person of his Son Jesus Christ is killed for the world. And he is simply so, that he is both, and can be, first and foremost, God. Life and death together first account for the being of God.\textsuperscript{104}

However, here Jüngel is keen on preserving the being of God as love, so whilst God is asserted against God there is no break in the divine life. Love as life and death together accounting for the being of God is not only possible in the incarnation, where God encounters nothingness and death, but also in how life can only be victorious in the face of death due to the richness of relationships. This the life that God is in Godself as Trinity, as ‘divine love is unending richness of relationships, which itself creates new relationships in the barren and total relationlessness of death’.\textsuperscript{105} Due to this balancing of death with the life of God, there can be a stress on how the cross reveals the nature of God as love.

Jüngel is, as discussed in Chapter Two, aware of how an improper understanding of a theology of the cross creates further aporia about God, and therefore about the Trinity. Jüngel thus emphasises that a theology of the cross cannot be abstract,\textsuperscript{106} but that it must

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} The Christological unity of God and humanity repeatedly applies in the relation of creator and creature, as it is already also the trinitarian self-relation of God. Furthermore, God exists himself, yes, not in eternal absence of communication, but rather in the differentiation of Father, Son and Spirit, and thus in the differentiation of the trinitarian persons, who affirm one another in their mutually personal otherness and therein the identity of the divine essence is thus preserved: not aliud, but alius, alius.’ Jüngel, ‘Zwei Schwerter – Zwei Reiche: Die Trennung der Mächte in der Reformation’, \textit{Ganz Werden}, 154.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Jüngel, ‘Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse: Zum Verhältnis von theologia crucis und Trinitätslehre’, \textit{Ganz Werden}, 247.
\item \textsuperscript{103} ‘Belief in the triune God has its concrete ground in faith in the sacrificial victim, wherein which God is exerted against God’. Jüngel, ‘Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse’, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Jüngel, ‘Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse’, 249.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Jüngel, ‘Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse’, 250.
\item \textsuperscript{106} ‘I can also say that, lurking errors exist here in an abstract theologia crucis. Its logical signet is the absolute legal paradox. One can only understand the centre of the Christian faith as a contradiction; where it is appropriate that the
have a concrete grounding and it must result in knowing God as love and knowing love as victorious. This is possible when we see that a theology of the cross must always be seen in the light of the Easter message.107

Jüngel also relates the Trinity to the idea of the communicatio idiomatum in that God is communicable to us through God’s existence in Christ.108 Through the communication of attributes discussed in Chapter Three, eternity is communicated as ‘God’s trinitarian existence is intensively self-referential, self-concentrated life and as such it is eternal’.109 It is this mixture of selflessness and self-containedness that causes God to want to and to be able to communicate eternity and immortality, for this is what love truly is.110 As eternity is the life of God, it is thus a life of love and peace, and these aspects of eternity are communicated to us.

Jüngel also wants to assert that this life of love is also that of peace, and uses Hegel’s assertion in the Phenomenology that ‘it is not life, that itself shies before death…, rather that it endures…, this is the life of the spirit’111 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s statement also applies rightly to that peaceful divine spiritual life understood as eternity.112 Love and peace are thus linked to true happiness, as ‘in the eternal realm, the divine life is infinitely evoking trinitarian life, in that God in Godself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit are constantly related to each other, each occur in God’s being as love. It is this divine love, that God is happy in Godself, where seekers find themselves, and stay’.113 The essence of the Trinity is therefore the ideal existence. Moreover, this impacts on the life of humanity for as God does not exist in isolation, but in loving relationships,
so the human should never be isolated, but exist in mutually giving relationships. In doing so, one exists with God as ‘wealth of relationships [Beziehungsreich]’ is faith. One knows the triune God, one knows the mutual trinitarian community of otherness as an event of love. And one knows oneself in God, who is love’.  

It is this trinitarian community of mutual otherness that is also the ground of freedom and of creation, for the freedom of the creator is that God wants to communicate with creation. This perichoretic union, which Jüngel again defines as ‘the trinitarian community of mutual otherness as love and the interpretation of love as a greater self-referentiality happening in the midst of a still greater selflessness’ is a blueprint for humanity, as Jüngel states that ‘the broader concept of God has its correspondence in the understanding of humans’.

Again, understanding God as love means that God’s definition of love has its correspondence in humanity which in turns incites faith, because God is hidden away in every event of true love, because he is therefore absolutely, reliably, present in every event of human love, there is a well-founded basic trust in this world, that would not be possible without this experience of love. In so far as the identity of God and love is the absolute ground of trust, during the revelation of the identity of God and love the basis of faith as true trust in God.

However, this does not mean that God is not God without humanity, instead the interaction of God with humanity should be understood as voluntary overflowing of the nature of divine life. This leads to a curious balancing act where Jüngel writes that ‘God does not want to be God without the world and without humanity, but he must not create the world and become human, in order to be God’.

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114 Jüngel, Beziehungsreich, 10.
116 ‘Correctly understood, the trinitarian self-differentiation of God brings to speech that which is not only the origin of created life (father) but also that which endures death (Son), and this contradiction of life and death is withstood and as such is turned to be (Spirit) in favour of life. God’s being is understood by the Christian Faith as the trinitarian community of mutual otherness: that is, as the exact opposite of a lonely, divine nature existing in splendid isolation.’ Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Christentums”, 21.
119 Jüngel, “Gele gentliche Thesen zum Problem der naturlichen Theologie”, Entsprechung, 201.
120 Jüngel, “Gott selbst im Ereignis seiner Offenbarung”, 35.
Critique

Jüngel aims to accomplish a lot with his doctrine of God: to set out an understanding of divine freedom, remark on how the persons in the Trinity relate to one another, define what love is in regards to God, and uphold the mystery of God whilst underlining the knowledge we can have of God. Jüngel attempts all this from the basis of the death of Christ on the cross, albeit viewed in the light of the resurrection. Thus, following on from the critique of narrowness in Jüngel’s christology, it is clear that commentators on Jüngel have found a lack within his thought on these points. Namely that Jüngel’s account of divine freedom is ill defined and unhelpful, that his identification of the immanent and economic Trinity is not worked out, that the doctrine of the trinity has too much to support, and that his doctrine of the Spirit is thin.

Jüngel’s account of the Spirit is criticised by Webster and Gunton,\(^\text{121}\) who sees that ‘the Achilles’ heel of Western theology, as if often-enough repeated, is the under-determination of the person of the Holy Spirit in almost all areas of dogmatics’.\(^\text{122}\) The effect Gunton sees this as having is a lack of focus on the humanity of Christ,\(^\text{123}\) in that it makes Christ the prime mediator between God and the world rather than the Spirit. Although as I have noted, Jüngel’s christology focuses less on the humanity of Christ more because of Jüngel’s upholding of the \textit{communicatio idiomatum} than because of reasons connected to the cross or the Spirit. As a result of this Gunton finds Jüngel guilty of inadequately explaining the presence of God in the world, despite approving of the attention he gives to immanent Trinity.\(^\text{124}\) Yet Jüngel’s account of the distinction of the immanent and economic Trinity is viewed with caution,\(^\text{125}\) as Thompson sees that there is a lack of talk about God in Godself which can tend to the view that incarnation and

\(^{121}\) ‘If there is a weakness to be detected in Jüngel’s account, it is in the area of the doctrine of the Spirit’. John Webster, \textit{Eberhard Jüngel}, 76.


\(^{123}\) Gunton asks of Jüngel ‘has the Lutheran Christological tradition on which he has drawn made so much of the cross as the act of the crucified God that attention is taken away from the human Jesus?’ Gunton “The Being and Attributes of God”, 21.

\(^{124}\) ‘Eberhard Jüngel’s attention to the part played by the immanent trinity in maintaining a non-necessary relation between God and the world has saved him from submission to the shibboleths of modern immanentism. But there must still be a question of the under-determination of the place of the Spirit, and therefore a weakness in conceiving the manner of the presence of God the world. It must be doubted whether Jüngel’s conception of the Spirit in the trinity is strong enough to prevent a possible ambivalence from creeping into his thought at this crucial juncture’. (Gunton “The Being and Attributes of God”, 22).

\(^{125}\) Jüngel acknowledges only a very minor rational distinution between economic and immanent Trinity. Their unity must not be thought of as tautological but as an expression of the free, undeserved grace of God present in the act of his self-communication. This \textit{distinctio rationis} points to the Trinity as mystery’, Thompson, \textit{Modern Trinitarian Perspectives}, 31.
the cross are a necessity for the being of God, as ‘there is a weakness here which fails to speak of the eternal Son and Spirit as from the Father before all ages or of God being truly God without the creation of the world’. Molnar also sees that Jüngel’s understanding of the immanent and economic Trinity must be taken with care, as ‘Jüngel sees the immanent Trinity as a summary concept for the dealings of the economic Trinity with us. But if this is the case then Barth’s insistence that human experience cannot set the paradigm for what can and cannot be said about God in se and ad extra is compromised’.

Although Jüngel does have an understanding of God’s presence in the world as the absence of God in the world, Watts finds that this understanding of God’s relationship to world contributes to Jüngel’s lack of focus on the Spirit. Dvorak also calls for a further developed pneumatology in Jüngel so that ‘the relation of the Son to the Father through the Holy Spirit can be mediated and in this manner the historical character of the christological identity as identification is allowed to be thinkable’. It can be seen that there is a worry in Jüngel is that the Spirit is simply reduced to the bond of love between the Father and the Son, who has little to do other than connect them. Moreover, this deficiency in the doctrine of the Spirit means that the way in which God works in the world is handicapped. Although with Jüngel’s understanding that God is outside the world, and needs to be brought in through the interruptive Word this means that there is little space for the Spirit in the world outside of the Word. That can be counted as a lack in Jüngel’s thought, but in Jüngel’s thought it does cohere with his understanding of God’s current relation to the world. However, Fiddes finds that the focus on the divine relationships within the Trinity deflects from this particular criticism as ‘God himself has eternally new relationships within his (Trinitarian) being, on the basis of self-giving love to another, that is to his creation. To speak adequately of a

126 Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 32.
127 Paul Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002), 260. In this work Molnar is keen on arguing for a clear and sharp distinction between the immanent and economic trinity ‘in order to stress that creation, reconciliation and redemption are not necessities grounded either in transcendental experience, suffering or love or some principle of relationality or of communion’ Divine Freedom, 235, therefore attempting what appears to be a similar task to Gollwitzer before him. Thus he disagrees with much of Jüngel’s theology, especially with the power of the Godhead in humanity due to the communicatio idiomatum and the closeness of the human experience love and how Jüngel defines divine love.
relatedness between Father and Son which is so intimately bound up with God's relation to humanity and our response to him, it becomes necessary to talk of the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of Love’. Congdon also objects to the criticism that the Spirit does not play a significant role in Jüngel’s theology and sees that in Jüngel ‘the Spirit sustains a space of freedom for new possibilities of appropriate God-talk. But not only God-talk, of course, since the freedom of faith is a truly practical freedom’.

Whilst the validity of his critique about the Spirit is more ambiguous, Gunton worries more about Jüngel’s rejection of divine immutability and thus of the philosophical tradition. DeHart phrases a similar concern in how he sees Jüngel’s relationship with philosophy; noting that Jüngel has two inherited postulates concerning the divine being that he wishes to preserve, that God is absolute perfection, and that there is no real distinction of essence and existence in God. However, the first is problematic for Jüngel as if God is absolute perfection God is free from becoming, as in Anselm where God’s perfection is that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. DeHart notes that ‘Jüngel’s rather laboured attempt to relate the two postulates in this way is, then, more an interpretive than a historical endeavour; one suggestion of this is the lack of any cited precedent in the tradition for just this kind of link’. Thus, there is a sense that Jüngel’s thought on God is in tension with itself with no resolution found in Jüngel’s thought. DeHart finds Jüngel’s destruction of metaphysics insufficient to prevent Jüngel from being critiqued and playing by the rules of metaphysics. However, as the idea that absolute perfection means that there is no need to become, Jüngel’s primacy of possibility could be a way around this particular dilemma, as what is the now the highest good is not actuality but possibility, for actuality is contained whereas possibilities are endless.

Whilst Jüngel wishes to link freedom and love in the Trinity and thus in the being of God, Malysz sees a dissonance existing between Jüngel’s account of freedom and determination. He finds that ‘not only is Jüngel’s doctrine of God dissonant, but as a

subject God seems to mirror the types of self-related subjectivity that Jüngel identifies anthropologically as unfree'. Therefore ‘Jüngel is unable to provide a coherent account of what he identifies as two moments of divine freedom: independence and determinateness. As a result, God emerges from Jüngel’s account, despite his intentions to the contrary, as a fundamentally self-related object’. Jüngel tries to see God both as self-related and related to others, but Jüngel’s attempt to preserve God’s aseity ends up too far on the side of self-relation. However, it must be asked here whether Małysz gives enough space for Jüngel’s understanding of freedom as self-limitation as well as determinateness? Jüngel sees God’s divine freedom as independence in how God is more than necessary, and God’s freedom as determinate, that despite being more than necessary God determines to be God only with humanity. Moreover, Jüngel’s understanding of freedom and determinateness requires a close consideration of Jüngel’s account of creation as limitation, where freedom is determined from the start in how God creates out of nothing, limiting both Godself and nothingness. Additionally, in order to draw out the full nuances of Jüngel’s account of freedom and creation, it is important to note as Fiddes does Jüngel’s form of tzimtzum theology, where ‘God endures negation within himself, which creates room in his Being for other beings’. I shall discuss Jüngel’s account of creation in the succeeding chapter.

This critique of Jüngel’s account of determination and freedom is relevant to Jüngel’s understanding of the Trinity; as whilst Małysz understands the death of Jesus as the free choice of God, Małysz also sees that

Though God’s identification with the dead Jesus was, it must be added, effected wholly by God, with the resulting differentiation being uncoerced – it must likewise be pointed out that, in Jüngel’s formulation, there no longer is any sense of God’s decision as a primal inter-trinitarian event aimed that which only is to be beyond God.

Instead the death of God seems more self-serving than in service of humanity. However, the way I see this is that this is the consequence of Jüngel walking the

135 Małysz, *Trinity, Freedom and Love*, 62. Ted Peters also critiques Jüngel for this mixing of the self-relation of God and the relation of God to the world (God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993)). Yet in contrast to this point both Peters and Małysz can be met by Molnar’s point that this is trading ‘upon an ambiguity in Jüngel’s thought that can avoided only by seeing God as the subject of both his external and internal relations’. Molnar, *Divine Freedom*, 140.
tightrope that any theological use of Hegel entails, and the sense of insularity is how Jüngel is explicitly avoiding Hegelian overtones of engagement with humanity as part of an impersonal process.

Jüngel’s designation of possibility over actuality is seen as irrelevant and misplaced by Welker who writes regarding Jüngel’s critique of Aristotle that ‘Aristotelian metaphysics conceives the intellectual self-actualisation that stands at its centre as a living power that can definitely claim to stand in union with perishability and with possibility’, \(^{138}\) and

The Aristotelian conception thus provides all the preconditions necessary to carry out Jüngel’s program by its own means and within its own boundaries. The “highest point” (Hegel) of Aristotle’s metaphysics is not at odds with defining the living, intellectually active divine spirit as holding the fullness of possibility present and as standing in differentiated unity with perishability. \(^{139}\)

Against Welker it can be said Jüngel is working more with Heidegger’s rejection of actuality than necessarily formulating his own. The place of possibility in Jüngel’s thought is linked to his understanding of love as that of consisting more of potentiality and actuality, and of potentiality being more powerful than actuality, because it can, in the case of God, be infinite and unrestrained. However, contrary to the lack that Malysz sees, Watts finds the priority of possibility problematic in how he sees that it ties God too much to creation. \(^{140}\)

Another recurring critique of Jüngel’s doctrine of God is in how sourcing revelation from the cross is seen as narrow and critiqued as inconsistent with the original intent of the doctrine. Korthaus sees that Jüngel’s theology focuses too much on the cross at the expense of other doctrines. \(^{141}\) Mattes is also critical of Jüngel’s use of a theology of the cross to determine the trinitarian relations, stating that Thesis 20 of Luther’s Heidelberg Disputations is meant to be a statement of faith, not a ‘clue by which to sleuth the

\(^{139}\) Welker, *God the Spirit*, 300.
\(^{140}\) Jüngel’s rather tortuous attempts to ascribe ontological priority to the possible over the actual on the basis of the doctrine of justification results in a securing of the freedom of God to become the God of another. It is in danger of becoming a complex expression of the ontological priority of God over his creation; he is the God of the possible’. Watts, *Revelation and the Spirit*, 69.
\(^{141}\) ‘The first, whole, foundational problem that we have designated is the way and manner in which Jüngel defines the concept of a theology of the cross, or “theologia crucifixae”. We have thus pointed out that his explicit definition is unfolded together with the condensed epitome of whole doctrine of the trinity. This particular staurolological specifism, that which defines this definition materially, is distinguished, for example from the doctrine of justification, which remains in darkness’. Michael Korthaus, *Kreuzethologie: Geschichte und Gehalt eines Programmbegriffs in der Evangelischen Theologie* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 318.
divine'. However, it can be argued that Jüngel is writing more to clarify the proper use of the cross in contemporary theology than provide an account of Luther. Instead Jüngel is intent on upholding the goodness of God and the consistent goodness of God. If God is already fully revealed sub contrario then there cannot be any more depths to God’s revelation or God’s work. Therefore, as the revelation on the cross is complete there cannot be anything hidden or evil in it; the hiddenness then becomes a result of our incapacity rather than of anything untoward by God, and thus Jüngel cannot uphold Luther’s opus alienum. Trojan sees that this is Jüngel’s greatest achievement and yet also his greatest vulnerability, for whilst ‘Jüngel presents God to us in terms of incarnational dynamics in which he falls into kenotic situations. This is a risking God who does not hesitate to sacrifice himself for the renewal of his creation. He is constantly in motion; he is active and invoking. However, the type of relationship that Jesus of Nazareth has to this active God remains vague’, reiterating the previous complaint that Jüngel focuses more on the divinity of Christ than on Christ’s humanity.

Jüngel is also critiqued by Watts in that Jüngel’s stress on finding God as defined by the cross does not offer a theodicy, and thereby is a theology that is unengaged with the world and its issues. This makes the assumption that talk of suffering must provide a theodicy and neglects the criticism that Jüngel has of other theologies of the cross in how they envision God when trying to make a theodicy of the cross. For Jüngel the cross is not a theodicy, it is a restructuring of the concept of God. Furthermore, that view makes the assumption that suffering and death are opposed to or incompatible with God, and Jüngel wishes to show that they are part of God. Moreover, considering the previous engagements of God with suffering and death noted in Chapter Two, there

142 Mark Mattes, *The Role of Justification in Contemporary Theology* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 35. The point is that faith discerns God’s sustenance and support of human life sub contrario even in the midst of trial and temptation. Luther certainly never intended that we might be able to think into God’s life. For Luther, the paradox of God deep within the flesh can never be scripted as an analogy. The shamed and scorned victim is not an analogy of the divine love, because it is itself the gift of divine love. However, this is exactly what Jüngel, as faithful to Barth, makes of this paradox’. (Mattes, *The Role of Justification in Contemporary Theology*, 35).


144 Trojan, *From Christ’s Death to Jesus’ Life*, 295.

145 ‘To see God’s being somehow defined in suffering and perishability still fails to offer any significant contribution to theodicy. It may be that we have to conceive of the true being of God as both engaged with and beyond the suffering of creation, and yet still admit that a proper theodicy is ultimately unattainable. It remains disappointing to find a theologian so deeply engaged philosophically in notions of death and pain while still failing to engage in any meaningful way with the issues of the world’. Watts, *Revelation and the Spirit*, 74.
can be read into Jüngel’s account of the cross an avoidance of theodicy as its previous usage had been seen by Jüngel as a misuse of the concept of the death of God.

Instead, what Jüngel wants to emphasise is how this revelation of Christ on the cross is not an analogy of God, or of God’s love, it is God’s love. The totality of revelation on the cross is key to Jüngel’s thought. Jüngel sees that love emerges out of change and suffering, even in the face of great evil. However, is Jüngel undermined by this insistence on love through his understanding of God as love? Pannenberg sees Jüngel as failing to counteract Feuerbach’s critique of theology in how Jüngel restates that God’s love must have God as its subject ‘he thus repeats the equation of God with the subject of love that Feuerbach criticises’. Although does making God both the subject and the object of love in Godself change things, as well as differentiating between how humans love and how God loves?

Pannenberg also sees that Jüngel’s account of revelation is not cohesive as

Jüngel rightly says that we cannot think of God as God unless we think of him as self-revealing God, for knowledge of God has to be knowledge that derives from God. This is reasonable, as Jüngel says. But to say this is not to show how this insight which underlies the modern thinking on revelation as the self-revelation of God relates to what the Bible has to say about revelation and the Word of God.

Pannenberg also notes that ‘there is something forced when theology must begin with the expectation that is implicit in the concept of the Word of God, i.e., in the demand that we take God seriously as a God who speaks.’ Pannenberg thus sees that Jüngel’s account of the being of God neglects the Bible in favour of the cross, whereas a balance and a relating of the two to each other would aid, rather than hinder Jüngel’s theological endeavour, and thus can be counted in the criticisms that Jüngel’s understanding of revelation comes from too narrow a source to be beneficial.

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146 “That which love is, is God (1 John 4:8,16: ὁ Θεός ἀγάπη ἐστίν.) is understood as the unity of life and death in favour of life. Out of this thought of God it is possible, even facing the potentised evil of Auschwitz and the oppressive fact, that in this world there is still potentialisation of evil, that humanity can and will wrought upon each other, one can all God a good God and as such praise God. Then what is earned in truth could be called good, if not love, which itself does not shy from death and is therefore stronger than death?’ Eberhard Jüngel, “Gottes ursprüngliches Anfangen als schöpferische Selbstbegrenzung. Ein Beitrag zum Gespräch mit Hans Jonas über den „Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz””, Wertlose Wahrheit, 160.

147 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol.1, 298.


However, it can be seen that there are other criticisms of Jüngel’s doctrine of God that take precedence over the question of the narrowness of Jüngel’s doctrine of revelation. Looking at Jüngel’s doctrine of God, what is debated is more the role of the Spirit than the doctrine of revelation. Yet it is impossible to separate questions of revelation from Jüngel’s doctrine of God because of how Jüngel sees that the trinitarian relations, and thus the essence of God, is revealed solely and fully in the event of the cross. Even though the narrowness of the doctrine is not discussed so much here, I would like to follow on what was said in the previous chapter of how the fullness of revelation of Christ on the cross emphasised one thing in particular about Christ, and that is the passivity and obedience shown both in the humanity of Christ and in the trinitarian relations. As I previously noted when taken solely as christology, Jüngel’s understanding of the necessity of the passivity and obedience of Christ is not contradictory to what he says about Christ elsewhere. However, what I would like to explore is whether the revelation of Christ on the cross as passive and obedience fits with what Jüngel has to say about the Trinity, especially if Jüngel wishes to make the point that the Trinity is revealed as the dynamic event of love itself.

As noted above, with his understanding the Trinity as an event of love, Jüngel holds to a perichoretic understanding of the trinitarian relations. A key part of perichoresis is a sense in which all three persons of the Trinity are equal in their love, agency and response, and if Jüngel sees love as selflessness, this selflessness should ideally be shown by all three persons of the Trinity in the event of the cross. However, what is revealed christologically on the cross is that Christ suffers and dies, Christ is abandoned by the Father and surrendered to death; Christ is selfless, and it is in Christ that the whole trinitarian plenitude of love enters death and defeats it through bringing the myriad possibilities they offer into the end of possibilities itself. Yet there is nothing in the death, obedience and passivity of Christ that speaks of a relationship of mutuality.

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150 As a result of this emphasis on perichoresis, Moltmann and his student Miroslav Volf have taken up a call to social trinitarianism, a view espoused in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (London: SCM, 1981) by Moltmann, and in After Our Likeness (Grands Rapids/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1998) by Volf. Jüngel does not go as far as they do, and social trinitarianism has been criticised, notably by Karen Kilby in “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with the Social Doctrines of the Trinity,” New Blackfriars, 81:957, 2000.

151 “His is a theology of the cross which shows us the selfless love of God and defines God as one who identifies himself in his Son with the death of the man Jesus. That love displays both a self-related aspect – one who is loved – and a self-giving aspect,” Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 30.
There is too much on the Father, and possibly the Spirit as the actors, whereas the Son suffers and dies in obedience.

This trinitarian self-differentiation in love is further criticised by Małysz who sees that despite the efforts undertaken in Jüngel’s thought on love to engage with the other of humanity, the way that it is phrased and shown on the cross shows instead that ‘God’s relation to the other borders on a modality of God’s self-relation. God’s intersubjective determinateness appears in the end as nothing but subjective determination, performed by a subject who makes a show of the risk he faces when, in fact, he does not seem to face any’. Therefore, aside from having an inadequate account of how the trinity reveals the selfless love that Jüngel champions, Jüngel is further charged as being unable to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of determinateness and independence, instead crashing against the rocks because he cannot deny the aseity and otherness of God as compared to humanity. In Jüngel’s attempt to make the death of God theologically respectable, he creates his own problems where the independence of God is preserved at the cost of a coherent account of human or divine love.

Furthermore there appears to be little on the cross the reveals the Spirit, which enables critiques of Jüngel’s incipient binitarianism. It is only through Jüngel’s explication of love that the Spirit can be seen as revealed as part of the event of the cross, and as I shall explore in the succeeding chapter, Jüngel’s development of pneumatology is dependent on his understanding of how God works in the human to enable participation in God.

This lack in Jüngel’s theology will become even clearer in the next chapter when he discusses the divine love as a template for human relations, where what Jüngel says about love is shown to be undercut by how Jüngel presents Christ on the cross, and because Jüngel can only have the trinitarian relations revealed on the cross. However, it is important to note here that Jüngel’s doctrine of God is largely positive. Jüngel’s understanding of perichoresis points the way to an understanding of the relationships

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153 ‘It is tempting to make independence a mere logical precondition of God’s determinateness, whereby God Himself surrenders Himself to his creature, comes to rely on His creature, and receives His being from the creature in all the vulnerability that such a relationship entails. But Jüngel cannot take this step because divine independence means precisely loving initiative and creative power’. Małysz, *Trinity, Freedom and Love*, 94.
within God and to the world as positive, mutual, equal, and dynamic; and he uses the cross to act as a constant control to our tendencies to make God a perfection of humanity.

**Summation**

Thus, from this survey it can be seen from Jüngel’s account of the Trinity is that in the light of the theology of cross we cannot come to know God through philosophy and human endeavours, but only through the subversive and shattering event of the cross. This event of the cross reveals the event of God as an event of love, prompted by the love of God for God and by the love of God for the other who is both within God and outwith God, which reveals that the being of God is that of love. As it happens on the cross love is understood as including death within it, yet only in that life triumphs, for love is known as the union in favour of life. This is because the cross is only understood retroactively in light of the resurrection, and it is in this triumph that the death of God is no longer seen as a dark word. God does not die, cannot die, but God brings greater possibilities into the absence of all possibilities and thereby defeats the power of death.

Moreover, what characterises the relationship between the Father and the Son as revealed on the cross is obedience, heightened here as the passive bearing of suffering and death. The Spirit is understood as the bond of love between the Father and the Son. Thus whilst there are criticisms of Jüngel’s use of the Spirit and the validity of his accounts of the attributes of God, the main criticism of Jüngel's trinitarian thought that I would like to lead with is that considering what the cross shows us of the relation between the Father and the Son, it is too specific a relation to encompass the mutuality that Jüngel wishes to imbue the event of love with. The cross does not provide enough information about the inner trinitarian relations. Whilst there can be an account of mutual surrender in how the Father gives up the Son and the Son gives up his life, that does not go as far as speaking of an equal surrender. However, Jüngel’s wish to show that the event of the cross reveals the being of God as love involves coming to realise that love is more than generosity, selflessness and obedience, which can be seen from the cross; but also that love itself is the union of life and death in favour of life, which can only be known from the resurrection and applied back to the event of the cross. As Jüngel does insist on seeing the cross always in light of the resurrection, in light of what
has been accomplished, this is valid, however, even accounting for the *sub contrario* nature of revelation, it is a reach. Furthermore, the activity of the Son as revealed in the event of the cross is not an active role; instead there is a heightening of obedience into passive acceptance, and a more developed pneumatology cannot help there.

Again, the criticisms of Jüngel’s doctrine of God focus on the narrowness of the point of revelation. Thus it can be seen that despite Jüngel’s insistence on what the cross does show the outworkings of that can appear different to other readers. Furthermore, the redefinition of God as a result of this event is not without its detractors. However, if one is criticising Jüngel’s account of God from the position that he himself sees as untenable is that criticism then valid? If the concept of God that is alternative to Jüngel’s is one that he has already rejected as invalid and leading towards atheism, then unless one can establish that the contrary view of God as immune from that criticism, then one falls into the same trap that Jüngel sees the history of metaphysics doing.

Having seen the obedience and passivity of Christ on the cross as part of the trinitarian relations, I turn now to Jüngel’s account of anthropology to see how Jüngel understands human action based on the example of Christ.
Chapter Five: Jüngel’s understanding of Anthropology

Introduction
Whilst the previous chapters have focused on the activity of God and how that plays out in history through the story of Christ, the majority of Jüngel’s theological essays deal with anthropological themes. This is partly because of how Jüngel links the being of God as love and love as humans experience it. I shall look at how this understanding of God and love is worked out more fully in Jüngel’s thought. First, I shall reiterate that Jüngel sees that theology can only be understood and only be done in the light of the revelation of God in the death of Christ on the cross,¹ and that this applies as much for anthropology as it does for christology and the Trinity. Here it also underlines the impotence of human action and intellect, as Jüngel reiterates his assault on any kind of natural theology or knowledge of God apart from Christ.

The possibilities that love opens up are at the heart of Jüngel’s understanding of humanity. Love demands expression; love opens itself up, and seeks other relations. Love, in demanding expression, brings itself to speech and Jüngel thus sees language as key to understanding the being of humanity; both within humanity, as it is part of human relationality, and as the basis of human being in relation to God, where we are constituted by God’s address to us, and faith is our response to that. Thus I shall examine Jüngel’s account of language and what it reveals about his understanding of human nature. I shall also look at how Jüngel understands the human experience of love, and how that reflects and leads into his understanding of God as love. Love is central to Jüngel’s theology, and is understood as freedom and relationality, as well as that which starts the desire to speak, to express. As love is understood as freedom, and the freedom of God is self-determination, then for humanity freedom becomes something that we choose against other ways of being. We are able to choose this as we have been justified, and the justification event affects our humanity, as I shall explore. The event of justification frees us to have proper relationships, which are realised in the church in the act of worship.

¹The death of Christ is not a dark statement about a Godless world, but instead a statement of love, and provides the perfect example of how inactivity saves us, as ‘God loves us and accepts us not for what we do but for who we are, in the light of Christ’s perfect sacrifice on the Cross for all humanity. In other words, our value derives solely from God’s regard for us as human beings. Hence, being is greater than having or doing’ Roland Zimany, Vehicle for God: The Metaphorical Theology of Eberhard Jüngel (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1994), 125.
However, despite Jüngel's talk of human action in worship and the church, at the heart of Jüngel's understanding of anthropology is a passivity that, as I noted in Chapter Three, is meant to mirror the example of Christ on the cross. This passivity is linked to Jüngel’s understanding of suffering, and his emphasis on enduring suffering rather than trying to minimise or combat it. As a result of these investigations I shall consider whether Jüngel’s understanding of human life focuses too much on the human as a passive receiver, and of how this fits with how he describes the event of love both in human experience and regarding God. In doing so, I shall again look at whether Jüngel’s stress on theology from the cross is too restrictive for Jüngel’s theological vision as understood through his account of love shown both in the Trinity and in human life.

**Language**

Jüngel, following on from Heidegger and his Christian interpreters, has a strong account of the importance of language; constituted by the acts of speaking and of listening. Jüngel understands God as a God who speaks, and of humanity as constituted by the act of God addressing us. This act of speaking and the linked act of listening are in Jüngel the pivots on which the relationship between God and humanity turns. The importance of the use of speech is linked with an account of human and divine determination, where speech is the way in which God communicates Godself and in doing so determines Godself as the one who speaks. This impacts humanity in how Jüngel writes that ‘Paul who otherwise gladly and pertinent referred to himself as a free man was apparently unfree in this regard. He did not have the freedom to be silent about God. He had to speak of him’.  

However, it is not just important that we do speak, but that we speak properly about God, for ‘we can only speak of God in a credible manner when we do not ignore anything which appears to (and actually does) speak against him’.  

Speech and language, especially when it concerns God in proclamation, means an interruption of our everyday lives. Jüngel notes that ‘when we call upon God, the most remarkable thing in the world occurs: in such an exclamation – ‘Oh God! My God!’ –

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2 Jüngel, “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love?’” 297.
3 Jüngel, “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love?’” 297.
we interrupt our everyday life, we even interrupt ourselves. And we do this in order to come forth from ourselves. This interruption of our normal human life is what makes us more human, as it calls us to a new kind of being. This is the important facet of speech about God as the use of the word God for this interruption makes us joyous and free. Moreover, the event of language ties into the event of love, in how love seeks out and requires expression. However, when it comes to our love story with God, ‘no human being can speak from him or herself. But God is the one who does speak from himself.’

Jüngel sees that love works with language in aspects of inclusion and exclusion, as the term “I love you” includes the person in its meaning and thus approaches him too closely. The act of speaking does not result in something different from itself; instead, its effect consists of the fact that the person addressed and the result of what is said are both drawn into the act of speaking. This is understood as address, which is crucial to the relationship of God and humanity. Address is how God speaks to us, and ‘the way God is to be thought is then dependent on the kind of speakability which is his.’

Thus Jüngel defines revelation as address. Address is fundamental to human nature, for Jüngel; that one is able to receive communication, that ‘in this freedom of addressability he is man. This also explains why the obedience with which man properly responds to the God who addresses him in that he allows himself to be addressed and defined by him, is a realisation of freedom’. It is not only this receptivity that defines humanity, but it is also the addressing and response thereof; it is being addressed and the response of obedience that defines true humanity and true freedom. Jüngel here understands that ‘address is participation’. A capacity for a relationship with God is

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4 Jüngel, “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love?’” 298.
5 ‘When a human being is being interrupted in such an elementary way so that he is outside of himself, he then can become a different, a new, a free person’. Jüngel, “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love?’” 299.
6 ‘An element of love is the language of love. Every great love urgently seeks verbal expression. Indeed the expression of love is no less essential to love than the act of love itself, And every love story which is at all exciting demands to be told’. Jüngel, “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love?’” 302.
8 Jüngel, Mystery, 11.
9 ‘It is the address character of language which first makes it humane’. Jüngel, Mystery, 11.
10 Jüngel, Mystery, 12.
11 ‘We refer to the basic character of the singular self-disclosure of God as address. The fact that man is addressed by God makes him a fundamentally addressable being’. Jüngel, Mystery, 155.
12 Jüngel, Mystery, 155-6.
13 Jüngel, “Die schöpferische Kraft des Wortes”, 78. Address is also a statement about humanity and how it is constituted, both as creation and in the light of salvation, for Jüngel sees that the address of God to humanity is never
thus part of our being as ‘if man is the being who is addressed by God and thus can be addressed about God and therefore ontologically constituted by language, then the presumption that one should become involved with the Word of God is a presumption which accords with the very nature of man’. Moreover, this understanding of address is not only how God relates to humanity, but also how humanity relates to itself and to the world as there is an analogy between God and humanity in that ‘God is thinkable as one who speaks because and to the extent that he is human in and of himself. God relates to his word not only in a way similar to that which man relates to his word, but God relates to his word in such a way that he thereby relates to man, and in a very particular way relates to man’s relationship to his own word.’

However, it is important to note that Jüngel wishes to preserve God’s aseity, and thus emphasises that God cannot be constrained by the world and therefore by language. Therefore speech about God is a result of the accommodation of God to humanity, where humanity is the subject of this self-accommodation. In order for us to understand God, God’s address as revelation is an accommodation to humanity (for in revelation, as discussed previously, God is fully revealed yet remains hidden in God’s full revelation in the incarnation due to the inability of humanity to grasp the entirety of God). Therefore, language, for Jüngel, helps preserve God as mystery in that ‘mystery does not balk at understanding, but it wants to be taken and understood, and the more intensely it is grasped and understood, the more mysterious it is.’

To illustrate this, Jüngel uses an analogy of advent, as it is what enables us to know both the closeness of God to us and the distance, as ‘what grips us is that

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a No, but always a Yes, ‘God says yes, when he calls that which is not, in that his creation is the confirmation of the other, as God through God. In that God creates his creatures, he does not establish an arbitrary piece of shoddy workmanship, but affirms the creature in its existence and essence. The creature is in every way constituted by the Yes of God. In this respect is yes the original word of speech’. Jüngel, "Die schöpferische Kraft des Wortes", 79.

14 Jüngel, Mystery, 162.
15 Jüngel, Mystery, 289.
17 "As it is brought to speech in the biblical texts that God comes to world, and as the history of the God-Who-Comes-To-The-World is understood through the New Testament Gospels; that the goal of Coming-to-the-World is achieved through the person of Jesus and in his history in this world, then the anthropomorphic nature of human speech about God objectively cannot be missed.’ Jüngel, “Anthropomorphismus als Grundproblem neuzeitlicher Hermeneutik”, 126.
18 Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Christentums”, 8. Jüngel differentiates mystery from riddles, as riddles can be solved.
19 ‘in the event of analogy x→a=b:c God then ceased to be x. He introduces himself in that he arrives. And this his arrival belongs to his very being which he reveals as arriving. But this is possible only when this arrival itself takes place as an arrival-in-language so that in such an analogy not only the relata but also their relations to each other and
correspondence which mediates between the unknown and the already known, the foreign and the customary, the far away and near, the new and the old. Analogy grips us. It causes the character of address found in metaphor and parable. Analogy is a socialising phenomenon, like a parable it binds together the hearers and the speaker, it brings them together and involves them in the process of knowledge. Jüngel understands analogy as a metaphor, and this illustrates God’s relation to us as unlike commands, the address of a parable has the character of not demanding fulfillment but requiring it, and thus analogy reinforces the idea that God is not necessary but that God is more than necessary. The coming of God is only in words after Christ, for it is in words and faith that absence can be construed as presence, and the social and kerygmatic function of address and parable means that Jüngel sees that what language about God does is that it comes closer to human hearts than humans themselves can come.

This is how Jüngel envisages himself as staying true to his Evangelical commitments, both historically and contemporaneously, as

Reformation theology responds, to the contrary that God is not brought to speech, but rather comes to speech. God is not simply added to man’s speech by man himself. But he is also not created by man out of human

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20 Jüngel, Mystery, 290.
21 Parable: (as a parable involves address and response) Jüngel brings back his understanding of Christ as a parable, in how the event of the incarnation brings humanity into it and involves it in the address, as ‘the man Jesus is the parable of God (Gleichnis), understanding the being of the man Jesus on the basis of the Easter kerygma’. Jüngel, Mystery, 288. Jüngel also understands a parable as analogy, and as an extended metaphor.
22 ‘The sociality of metaphors and parables distinguishes itself from other kinds of addressing speech, such as the command, in that the discovering language of metaphor and parable is, in a very special way, really not necessary, but forceful in its nonnecessity’. Jüngel, Mystery, 291.
23 For ‘the God who comes only in the word finds his only correspondence in faith, because only faith lets God’s being be a being that is coming, that is, lets God be present as the one who is absent’. Jüngel, Mystery, 300.
24 The gospel is such that ‘it has kerygmatic character, and thus does not simply address one privately but rather in such a way that it can be passed on as something addressing every one’. Jüngel, Mystery, 306.
25 ‘If it is true of the parables of Jesus that God comes closer to their human hearers in them then they are to themselves, then it is true of Jesus as the parable of God that God has come closer in him to humanity than humanity is able to come close to itself. Through that process he brings humanity into a new relationship to itself whose form is the ecumenical community of Jesus Christ’. Jüngel, Mystery, 298.
26 ‘In the Word of the Gospel God comes nearer and closer to us, than we are able to be to ourselves. In the Word of the Gospel God speaks with us, about that which he absolutely concerns us with’. Jüngel, “Gottesgewissheit”, Entsprechung, 264.
27 By Evangelical, I mean it as is understood in Germany as the cornerstone of Protestant theology, where the focus of the church service is the proclamation of the gospel; where there is a response to the word of God. Jüngel writes of Evangelical Theology that ‘Evangelical theological has to be understood emphatically as a theologia orientata praxis. But the concept of Praxis is orientated completely different. For the believer, as understood by Paul, is a non-active believer. Theology, as Luther sees, it practical not because it challenges humans to be actors, but because it brings to speech human existence through God’s action as decisive existence.’ Jüngel, “Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Herausforderung und Chance für die universitäre Theologie”, Indikative der Gnade – Imperative der Freiheit, 322.
language. God himself comes to speech. To talk about God in ignorance of
his coming to speech is to make an idol of God.\textsuperscript{28}

We can only talk about God as a result of God coming to humanity, and thus coming to
speech.\textsuperscript{29} Finally, another aspect of language for Jüngel is that it has the capacity to
distinguish, and to judge.\textsuperscript{30} As Christ is the Word of God, Christ also comes as a judge
for the Word of God is the only true truth, and thus decides between truth and
falsehood and between God and humans. This means that until that time

Every theological statement is not only falsifiable, but is continually
exposed to the struggle of being true or false. For the being true that these
statements represent always refers back to a becoming true that has its own
time. We call this time the time of faith. Its peculiarity consists in the fact
that it alone helps the Word of God establish its limits within the limits of
our speech and thus lets our use of the word “God” become authentic.\textsuperscript{31}

For Jüngel our speech about God becomes authentic in faith alone.

\textbf{Faith}

Thus, I turn to Jüngel’s understanding of faith. The relation that humanity has to faith
can be summed up in the question of whom faith belongs to, and thus whether faith is
an active response to God’s revelation or the acceptance of a gift.\textsuperscript{32} Jüngel sees that faith
is always of God but humanity has a unique capacity for faith, just as humanity has the
capacity to receive the word that God speaks. Jüngel uses the independence of faith to
emphasize again that God is interesting for God’s own sake, not for our sake.\textsuperscript{33}

Furthermore, if faith were to arise from humanity independent of God, then this would

\textsuperscript{28} Jüngel, “God - As a Word of our Language”, 34.
\textsuperscript{29} Only the Word of God functioning within the limits of our language gives answer to the question: Who is God
that we must speak of him? The use of the word “God” depends on a prior hearing in order to let God come to
speech as the one who speaks of his own accord’. Jüngel, “God - As a Word of our Language”, 38. Jüngel does not
go into how God could or was spoken of correctly before the incarnation, before the Word of God as Christ came
into human parlance. Presumably this means that all talk of God before Christ was lacking and incomplete, as the
revelation of God just did not exist in the world, as even creation does not speak of or point towards God.
\textsuperscript{30} As a report about Jesus Christ the Word of God does not lead us beyond the boundaries of our language and or
world; rather it directs us exclusively to the world by the limits of our language judging it at the same time. Whoever
judges, makes distinctions’. Jüngel, “God - As a Word of our Language”, 38.
\textsuperscript{31} Jüngel, “God - As a Word of our Language”, 42.
\textsuperscript{32} Especially as Christian faith comes from no worldly experience but is entirely opened up by God: ‘Christian faith is
not derivable from any worldly experience or knowledge. But it is an experience that is itself opened up by God: an
experience, in which all made experiences and the experience itself must be made again and experienced anew’,
\textsuperscript{33} ‘God is interesting for God’s own sake, indeed, generally and unconditionally interesting. The generality of
knowledge of God is not possible without God’s own self-conception that makes God generally and unconditionally
interesting. Rather, the generality and unconditionality of current interest is due to God for God’s own sake. What we
grant to humans should not be denied to God even in theory’. Jüngel, “Gott – um seiner selbst willen interessant”,
196.
be indicative of a kind of natural theology to which Jüngel is vehemently opposed. Faith is necessary for human salvation, and God affects them both in humanity.34

In identifying what it is in humanity that receives faith Jüngel sees that it is the capacity for thought, as ‘I believe, therefore I think. Faith gives itself to be thought. One cannot believe in God without thinking about him’.35 Jüngel sees that in having faith we are given what to think of God, which is rooted in the cross.36 Faith thus has a staurocentrism for ‘that is what the word proclaims and states, the word to which faith corresponds: the word of the cross. In it, that which the word addressing us says about the God who speaks out of himself (God on the cross as our neighbour) and the structure of the relationship between word and faith are congruent’.37

Despite the given, independent character that Jüngel holds faith to have it is not immutable; instead faith suffers, changes, and needs bolstering due to the absence of God in the world: ‘faith suffers in this discrepancy between the definiteness of the revelation of God in the gospel and the dreadful hiddenness of God’s rule over the world, between the being of God which has been revealed and his deeply concealed action, between the revealed God and his hidden work’.38 However this Anfechtung strengthens our faith for as in Luther our suffering points to God’s suffering on the cross, and ‘connects the tested faith back to its origin, back to the God who suffers for us, because through his suffering he helped the love that has overcome death to victory, the only comfort of suffering humanity’.39

Faith is seen by Jüngel as more than a possibility for thought,40 but a capacity given by God. As faith is a gift from God Jüngel sees that there is an intrinsic passivity in faith, as ‘in faith, the human person relies totally upon the act of God, or rather, upon God’s

34 ‘God affects no salvation, without having affected faith’. Jüngel, Was ist ein Sakrament, 37.
35 Jüngel, “‘My Theology’”, 9.
36 ‘Faith which gives itself to be thought attains its idea of God from the harshness of the death of Jesus’. Jüngel, “‘My Theology’”, 10.
37 Jüngel, Mystery, 182.
38 Jüngel, “‘My Theology’”, 18. Despite this, Jüngel writes that ‘he who has faith in the renewed man can be challenged, his belief may be frail. But the new Adam cannot be broken’. Jüngel, “Außer sich: zu 2. Korinther 5, 17-21”, Außer sich: Theologische Texte, 50.
39 Jüngel, “‘My Theology’”, 19.
40 ‘Intrinsic to the definition of theology is that it has as its object that possibility which comes to human existence from beyond itself alone, not only as a possibility for thought, but rather as a real capacity’. Jüngel, “‘You talk like a book…’ Towards an understanding of the Philosophical Fragments of J. Climacus, edited by Sören Kierkegaard (1813-1855)”, Theological Essays II, 32.
creative word-act'. Faith is the renouncing of possession and claims to anything, a surrender. Jüngel emphasises the sense of surrender rather than entitlement, in faith as the freedom to decide for oneself involves an understanding of freedom that Jüngel does not accept. Instead Jüngel sees that

Real freedom does not even consist in freedom from the determination of the will by the outward conditions of life to which decision and action are subject; rather is it in freedom from ourselves – from ourselves as we are in every now as people who come out of their past and are determined by it. Faith provides this freedom from ourselves in our reliance in God, and in discovering God we discover ourselves anew. Freedom is thus being freed to say Yes to God, freed to be passive and obedient to God as ‘it is the act of saying Yes to my own negation and affirmation by God’. Faith is freedom from ambivalence, which Jüngel sees as intrinsic to our natures. Due to this tyranny of choice ‘it is good for us not to

42 The human person should have or possess something, but nor possess him- or herself. In their own regard, human persons are, rather, without possession. Much more does one forsake oneself in faith, in so far as in faith one goes beyond oneself and grounds oneself in God. And in love one gives oneself to others, thus forsaking oneself once more in another way.’ Jüngel, “On Becoming Truly Human”, 234.
43 Faith is frequently understood as being a human decision for God, whereby the human Self makes its own fundamental decision about itself, Jüngel, Justification, 238.
44 Jüngel engages with Bultmann regarding faith and understanding, and ultimately disagrees with Bultmann’s characterisation of faith. Jüngel characterises Bultmann’s definition of what makes theology as “faith and understanding”. What Bultmann does, Jüngel says, is to interpret ‘faith itself as an act of understanding and of decision’, (Jüngel, “Glauben und Verstehen – Zum Theologiebegriff Rudolf Bultmanns”, Werte und Wahrheit, 47). Jüngel sees that the misapprehension of the Tat-Charakter of faith is, according to Bultmann, the other misunderstanding of the passivity of faith. The human is passive, therefore, only insofar as he is the “object of the divine action’. But the being of the human remains, according to Bultmann, even if he is passive as the object of divine action, a being in the act “since being (Dasein) is always action’. Also, for Bultmann faith is therefore essential act’. (Jüngel, “Glauben und Verstehen”, 59). However, for Jüngel this leads to an inappropriate understanding of humanity, for ‘so long as faith is seen in the difference of an act of knowledge and an act of will, the wholeness of all of humanity remains unthought of, or at least thought of inappropriately’. (Jüngel, “Glauben und Verstehen”, 65). Jüngel sees this as a mistake more of Bultmann’s understanding of the Dasein of humanity where ‘the new self-understanding constitutes knowledge of God’, (Jüngel, “Glauben und Verstehen”, 76). However, Jüngel is adamant that ‘in theology, God is never in the sense of objects of practical knowledge, an object of knowledge in faith. He always remains for this knowledge a given object, although never in the sense of an object of theoretical knowledge is the object of faith knowledge. And so theology must, if it wants to speak properly of God, never treat God as an object of practical knowledge. In theology, God is rather an object of knowledge sui generis, that one has to think of as originating equally in theoretical and practical knowledge’. (Jüngel, “Glauben und Verstehen”, 77).
45 Jüngel, Justification, 240. Jüngel attributes this idea to Bultmann.
46 Faith is a self-discovery that begins at the same time as we discover God. It is the discovery of a self-renewal that affects the whole person. Those who discover themselves as new persons cannot make themselves into new persons; nor can they decide to exist as such’ Jüngel, Justification, 241.
47 ‘That Yes which we are to see as being faith is the discovering understanding of the divine decision about human beings, which is now being made by human beings. By expressing our entire existence in this heartfelt Yes to God’s judgement, we are admitting that the first thing was for our hearts to be conquered, that we needed first of all to be set free to speak this affirmative Yes. Thus faith is the self-discovery and experience of the Self that has been set free unto freedom’ Jüngel, Justification, 241.
48 Jüngel, Justification, 242.
have control over our personhood. We have been removed from ourselves for our own good.\(^{49}\)

With this Yes, it appears that faith is more understanding and agreeing with what is going on,\(^{50}\) and moves us away from pride in our own abilities.\(^{51}\) However, faith is not unthinkingness; faith does not replace thought. Faith instead replaces our need to rely on ourselves, to be insular and look and think only for ourselves. It annihilates our previous insular way of existence and opens us out towards relationships with God and others,\(^{52}\) and ‘if God makes participation in himself possible through his word, then this gift of participation is an event of the divine being itself’.\(^{53}\) This participation\(^{54}\) in God is true humanity,\(^{55}\) characterised by openness and dependence\(^{56}\) and through this ‘faith allows God as the absent one to be present’.\(^{57}\)

**Love**

In the section on faith there was an emphasis on the importance of surrender for receiving faith. Jüngel links faith and love together in that ‘out of faith in the God who is love there results with necessity – and with desire, as Luther rightly used to say – human works of love. For faith on its part becomes active in love’,\(^{58}\) and mutual surrender is a key characteristic of Jüngel’s account of love. The echoing of this central motif shows a correspondence between the act of love and the act of faith. As discussed earlier, Jüngel’s understanding of love is revealed in the trinitarian relations of God in

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\(^{49}\) Jüngel, *Justification*, 249.

\(^{50}\) ‘In faith we agree that God’s justifying Word is calling, taking and placing us outside ourselves. In faith we go outside ourselves, that is, in conformity with the divine decision that affects us. In faith we comprehend the movement of our own justification which has already taken place in Jesus Christ, and it is in that comprehension – and not in some other way! – that we also complement that comprehension’. Jüngel, *Justification*, 242.

\(^{51}\) ‘Faith alone justifies and excludes all human works and deeds because it recognises and affirms that God has already acted, that God in Jesus Christ has already been at work in a definitive sense, that God has already accorded us effectually the privilege of existing in relationship to him and thus forevermore being persons who are recognised.’ Jüngel, *Justification*, 250-1.

\(^{52}\) ‘The word of God which addresses man about God has, then, an annihilating effect, for the sake of something new’. Jüngel, *Mystery*, 175.

\(^{53}\) Jüngel, *Mystery*, 177.

\(^{54}\) ‘In believing, the human person experiences the mystery of the triune God who takes the relationlessness of death upon himself, in order to be the being rich in relations, the being of love in the unity of life and death to the benefit of life. It is the mystery of even greater selflessness in the midst of such great trinitarian self-relatedness’. Jüngel “My Theology”, 7.

\(^{55}\) ‘In faith humanity acquires the wholeness of their being. Also if faith itself focuses on particular events of the history of God with humanity, he acquires in, with and under the particularities, the whole of the relationship of God with him, and also his own wholeness’. Jüngel, “Ganzheitsbegriffe”, 53.

\(^{56}\) ‘Man is truly human in that he is able to place himself in dependence on someone other than himself. That entails his ability to be dependent. To be human means to be able to depend, to trust’, Jüngel, *Mystery*, 179.

\(^{57}\) Jüngel, *Mystery*, 182.

\(^{58}\) Jüngel, “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love’?”, 310.
the event of the cross, and has an analogy, with all the limitations that entails, in the human experience of love.\textsuperscript{59} Yet as I shall explore, Jüngel upholds the distinction between human love and the love of God, and thus human love cannot be a pre-existing understanding of God because human love is based on worth.\textsuperscript{60}

Jüngel writes of love that it craves intimacy and self-giving and receiving; but it involves risks, pain, and change, and thus has an affinity with death.\textsuperscript{61} As both actors in a relationship want to ideally mutually give and receive, this reciprocal nature of love means that love is also understood as an event of mutual surrender, and ‘the exchange of mutual surrender means then, with regard to the element of hearing in love, that the loving I wants to have itself only in the form of being had by someone else. And it means at the same time that, it wants to have the beloved Thou only as an I which also wants to be had’.\textsuperscript{62} In surrender one wants to be had rather than to have, and ‘the I in love promises itself nothing, or at least not something. But love itself promises it everything; or more precisely, more than everything…the turning away from oneself and the turning to someone else are now radical. We are now speaking of surrender’.\textsuperscript{63}

Therefore ‘in the event of loving surrender, then, a radical self-distancing takes place in favour of a new nearness to oneself – a nearness, to be sure, in which the beloved Thou is closer to me than I am to myself’,\textsuperscript{64} yet

It is a prevenient consequence in which the self-loss in the event of love is already surpassed by the new being which the loving I receives from the beloved Thou in the act of surrender. In this anticipative exchange of being between the self-surrendering I and the Thou who gives me myself anew consists the true desire or lust of love, which cannot be made to happen.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{59} Schulz looks at Jüngel’s account of love and sees in it a version of natural theology. Schulz ask whether it creates a pre-conception of God that could be just as dangerous and superfluous as natural theology (Michael Schulz, \textit{Sein und Trinität}), although we shall see that this is not the case, and thus Jüngel does avoid a natural theology of love.

\textsuperscript{60} ‘To think God as love is the task of theology. And in doing so, it must accomplish two things. It must, on the one hand, do justice to the essence of love, which as a predicate of God may not contradict what people experience as love, and on the other, it must do justice to the being of God which remains, so distinctive from the event of human love that “God” does not become a superfluous word’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 315.

\textsuperscript{61} ‘Because the loving I receives itself totally from the loved thou without which it does not want to be, therefore, every genuine love in a specific way has death behind it. By making people new, love causes death in a hidden way’. Jüngel “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love?’” 308.

\textsuperscript{62} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 319.

\textsuperscript{63} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 321.

\textsuperscript{64} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 321.

\textsuperscript{65} Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 322.
Thus there is an equal, mutual surrender and in this surrender all that one gives is received by the other which turns this self-abandonment into fulfilment. As the lovers give all, it is

In receiving himself from another, the lover exists. Thus he exists only because of the existence which is given to him, and apart from that he is nothing. The loving and beloved I is then totally related to the beloved Thou, and thus to his own non-being: without Thee I am nothing.

This love is not static; once it has been enacted it is a continuing event as ‘there is no such thing as a standstill in love’. The two lovers now proceed with each other, for ‘being with the beloved Thou is always a process of being taken along. And since that happens from both sides (alternately), the event of love always implies a common path’. Jüngel here works with the implication that love equalises as true love is equal fervour from both sides. However, it is here that this understanding of love fails when it comes to accounting for how God and the human love each other. For how can there be equality between God and humanity in this account of love, where what the human can give is finite, unlike the endless capacity of God? At this point it appears that humanity cannot reciprocate the way God would, calling to mind Kierkegaard’s lament at the King and the serving girl.

Thus whilst Jüngel writes that ‘God does not want to love himself without loving the other, the man’ there are, despite how Jüngel sees that God is love, differences between how humanity loves and how God loves. Jüngel sees that humans love because they see one another as worthy of love. Human love needs a worthy reason to begin, but God loves humanity because humanity is not worthy of love. Human love sees the beloved as beautiful in their eyes, if not in reality, and there is a similar movement in how God’s love takes this to an extreme as ‘if human love already makes a person beautiful in a certain way, then it is certainly true that God’s love, in a qualitatively

superior sense, makes the ugly person beautiful and worthy of love'.

The love of God has a transformative quality in how love transforms those who have into those who are, who understand how to become, as though they did not have anything namely, in the relationally rich differentiation from the God who is that love which can neither be surreptitiously gained nor coerced, which is entirely unnecessary and thus is more than necessary, becoming peculiarly human and ever more human people.

Jüngel sees that the power of this love transforms humanity, unlike human love; even though Jüngel does see that in the mutual self-giving, human love is profoundly non hierarchal and equal and intensely focused on the other. The love of God opens up humanity to the kind of perichoretic, dynamic, constant love that Jüngel claims that the Godhead is, and thus for humans now ‘wealth of relations' constitutes love. There is no more intensive relationship between I and Thou other than that life in its highest form of enhancing, mutual love. The intensity of these double-relations, in that the one I loves and is loved from the beloved Thou, shines beyond itself: love is an open house. Jüngel sees that this is possible as God came into the world to become human, to restore humanity’s capacity for relationships, as Jüngel sees that “God is love” means: God does not want to be God without an other, without us. However, we cannot fathom love, for love is a mystery. Although we share this mystery with God, this sharing is not a divinisation; instead it makes us more human.

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73 Jüngel, Mystery, p.396.
74 To one who really loves another human being, the beloved is interesting for his or her own sake. To one who really believes in God, God is interesting for God’s own sake’. Jüngel, “Living Out of Righteousness: God’s Action – Human Agency”, Theological Essays II, 244.
75 ‘Eternal life as participation in the life of the triune God itself never behind, but always newly before. As such is it a life of God – in God – to God’. Jüngel, “Der Geist der Hoffnung und des Trostes: Thesen zur Begründung des eschatologischen Lehrstücks vom Reich der Freiheit”, Ganz Werden, 322.
76 Jüngel, Beziehungsreich, 9.
77 ‘According to the biblical judgement, humanity is obvious a being in relationships, which is always relative to another being, and only is so in such relations. Martin Luther has thus rightly claimed that it is appropriate that one could say of humanity, only in praedicamento relations (and not in praedicamento substantiae)’. Jüngel, “Hoffen, Handeln – und Leiden. Zum christlichen Verständnis des Menschen aus theologischer Sicht”, Beziehungsreich, 16.
78 Jüngel “What Does It Mean to say, ‘God is Love’?”, 312. As love involves the creation of new relationships, this means that love can understood as the opening up of possibilities, and thus the love of God, with its infinite possibilities, confers immortality as ‘this God is love. And love knows no last word. Rather, it is far more eminently creatively spoken in evermore new ways, that it needs to be said again and again, however new and different: Yes. And where Yes is said, it goes on, it goes on, even if ‘the step back” (M. Heidegger), it advances.’ Jüngel, “Letzte Wort?”, Außer sich, 204. For God is future as well as present, as ‘he has a goal. The patience of God does not end sometime and somewhere, and still let evil run its course; rather the patience of God aims so that the people do not end up in a self-induced hell, that death does not have the last word and that in the end the devil does not triumph over his victims. The patience of God aims for the triumph of love and only love’. Jüngel, “Gottes Geduld – Geduld der Liebe”, Werthen Wahrheit, 192.
Freedom, Creation, and Sin

In the discussion of faith I noted that Jüngel sees that faith, in that it is reliance on God, frees us from self-determination and thus from ourselves. I shall now discuss Jüngel’s understanding of freedom. Freedom is important for Jüngel’s understanding of existence and theology, as ‘theology has to do with freedom, because it has to do with God’. As noted above, Jüngel does not see freedom as an infinite amount of choices, but as determined existence apart from the world in the light of the gift of God that is faith. Jüngel writes that it is ‘God’s reign [that] liberates. For it is the reign of truth which liberates from the living lie in which one entangles oneself and others. It liberates from the sin with which one incapacitates and enchains oneself. It liberates for a life in correspondence to God in God’s coming kingdom’. The reason for an understanding of freedom as determined can only be explored by first looking at Jüngel’s account of God’s self-determination in creation, and the relationship of both God and humanity to nothingness.

The interruption of the world that is the incarnation provides us with the imperative of freedom. Freedom is an interruptive event, but it is one of peace, ‘made concrete in faith’. It is an “allocated freedom”, which comes from the cross of Jesus. This allocated freedom is freedom from striving and instead reliance on God. However,
what is God’s freedom as God? Freedom is also identified as part of love, which helps determine it as ‘without love, the use of the human right to freedom makes freedom abstract. But abstract freedom does not produce free people’. Again, there is this stress that appropriate freedom is determined freedom, especially freedom from oneself. Not only is one free from oneself, but one is taken out of oneself.

Theology itself has a freedom that cannot be postulated, but only practised as an event of freedom. To see how Jüngel’s comes to this understanding of freedom I turn to Jüngel’s understanding of creation as it sets the scene for understanding freedom as self-determination. Jüngel sees that for God creating the world is a free and creative act, but this creative act should be understood as ‘creative self-limitation. To be creatively active is always and again: to let Godself be limited through God’s own work and God’s own creature.’ This is what Jüngel understands creatio ex nihilo as meaning and as God’s act is God’s being, this creatio ex nihilo is itself an expression of the love of God as known in the trinitarian relations.

Thus it is important that the act of creation as determination is a statement that ‘God’s creative freedom is not the whim of an almighty maker, but the freedom of a passionate lover, which lies at the heart of what he creates’. Accepting God as creator and human as creatures means that ‘existence means to be completely dependent on the addressing God’. Creation itself sets the model for human passivity and dependence that is evidenced in Christ and that I shall further explore in this chapter.
Jüngel sees God creating over and against nothingness. Whilst there are similarities to Barth’s understanding of nothingness: where God that creates over against nothingness for God does not create nothingness, and nothingness takes on a malignant existence of all that is adverse to grace; there are significant differences to how Jüngel interprets nothingness in relation to God and the cross. Jüngel’s intent in his understanding of nothingness is to avoid any sense that perishing and death can be seen as evil, although Jüngel notes that perishability, at first glance, seems to be a tendency towards nothingness. Instead Jüngel sees that death and perishing have become similes for nothingness, but Jüngel wishes to see perishing as positive. This is because, unlike nothingness, perishing is not evil, it is instead a mark of our created being, which was created by God and affirmed by God. As an intrinsic part of our being, it cannot be thought of as evil.

However, it is still a source of fear, and this fear of perishing makes us react against, and defend ourselves against what is actually our nature. Sin is thus understood more as result of self-deception than deliberate rebellion. Jüngel writes that ‘in defending himself against the sinister character of an exclusively negatively defined perishability, man feels driven to say to the moment: do stay, thou art so beautiful’. With echoes of Jüngel’s criticism of the static idea of God, he sees that humanity has mistakenly labelled permanence and static existence, the eternal moment or the eternal now as the highest good; thus we denounce time, and perishing, and one ‘wants to elevate himself beyond time into imperishability, which is the way he imagines eternity: eternity appears accordingly as the Now which is timeless, imperishable, and thus permanent’. Yet as I have explored, in Jüngel’s understanding of eternity, static existence is not eternity. Eternity is a communicable attribute of God, and of the triune, dynamic and relational act of the being of God. Thus whilst we see perishing as negative, what it actually is, is an opening up of possibilities: the capability for things to become.

only the existence of things, but also the essences in their antithesis to nonbeing’. Jüngel, “Die schöpferische Kraft des Wortes”, 75. Creation sets up the authority of God and the linguistic structure and statement about God’s Word, as ‘the creative Word of God is not only an imperious and defining Word, it has not only the property of a divine command, which invokes Nonbeing to be. And it has not only constituted the essence of the creature which has a divine imprint’. Jüngel, “Die schöpferische Kraft des Wortes”, 77.

96 *CD* III/3 §50.4.


This stands in contrast to nothingness, which Jüngel describes as

Absolutely impossible, the incapacity to become. From nothingness, nothing is derived. But that is not all! Beyond that we must say that because nothing is derived from nothingness, nothingness is, in relation to being and its possibilities, a negatively virulent emptiness without a place in being, a destructive undertow, a negative ontological whirlpool, a “nihilating nothing” (*nihil nihilans*).\(^{99}\)

Perishing itself, as Jüngel understands it is not annihilation but nothingness usurps our understanding of perishing; and threatens us with the false understanding of perishing in order to gain power over us. Nothingness does not permit possibilities and has power in how ‘nothingness which cannot become something out of itself is then in its own incapacity something like the power which renders impossible, the despotism. This is the tyranny of a power which builds on nothing and only on nothing, and which empowers the negativeness of perishing until it becomes annihilation’.\(^{100}\)

Nothingness thus makes us afraid of perishing; it makes life into a struggle between ‘the capacity of the possible and the undertow toward nothingness’,\(^{101}\) which Jüngel sees as the nature of human life apart from God. Jüngel then writes that we see this struggle revealed on the cross where ‘the being of God is first revealed as creative being in the struggle with the annihilating nothingness of nothing’.\(^{102}\) This struggle between possibility and nothingness exists because God creates and because God created possibilities in the face of nothingness. It must be noted that this account of creation and life appears to have no concept of original sin, apart from that human nature is inclined towards falsehood rather than the true reality that is hidden and needs bringing out.

Therefore, despite God creating over and against nothingness, a tendency towards nothingness attracts humanity more than creating possibilities. In order to limit the growth of nothingness in the world, God involves Godself in nothingness in the death of the cross, as ‘talk about the death of God implies then, in its true theological

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\(^{99}\) Jüngel, *Mystery*, 216. This refers back to Heidegger’s understanding of nothingness in “What is Metaphysics”.

\(^{100}\) Jüngel, *Mystery*, 216.


meaning, that God is the one who involves himself in nothingness.\textsuperscript{103} The resurrection, in fact, reveals how much and in what way God has involved Godself in nothingness, by drawing nothingness into the being of God, and not leaving it to its own devices. Instead, by involving Godself in nothingness, God defines and determines it by contradicting it and resisting it so that the ‘phantom-like attraction’ and power of nothingness is controlled by giving a place to what was its ontological placelessness.\textsuperscript{104}

Therefore, God struggles with nothingness, gives it a place, and thereby sets limits and determines it within the being of God as God identifies Godself with the dead Jesus. In giving nothingness a place, the chaotic effect of its phantom-like attraction is taken away from it. This victory is only possible because God’s essence as love is becoming, it is the constant creation of new possibilities that cannot be shut down and annihilated. This event of overcoming nothingness further determines the being of God as love, in that God’s being submits itself to perishability because God involves Godself in nothingness and as God is love, love now by definition submits itself to nothingness. What has happened is that ‘the difference between God and nothingness is not the logically neutral difference between being and nothingness, but rather an event of differentiation in which God in and of himself relates himself to nothingness’.\textsuperscript{105} Salvation is what happens when ‘the being of love unites death and love in that in the event of love life goes beyond itself’.\textsuperscript{106} This means that after the cross and resurrection nothingness now has a new function.\textsuperscript{107} Nothingness now becomes \textit{concrete negation}, which is the ‘function of raising the possibilities of being to a new level of power. It becomes the differentiating power in the identity of being’.\textsuperscript{108} So there is now no real evil in nothingness, but now God works through it having divested it of its power.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 218.
\item \textsuperscript{104}‘Which, in its absolutely undefined and empty state as a negatively virulent vacuum without a nameable position, in this its ontological placelessness, creates for itself a phantom like attraction, an annihilating undertow into itself, into nothingness. Nothingness does not let itself be precisely located. It is undetermined. And for that very reason, that nothingness has no place and is undetermined, it leads to chaotic consequences. It absorbs being until it is full, so to speak, by annihilating what exists. But because it takes being into itself only in the attraction of annihilation, it never \textit{has} being. And because it never has being, it must constantly seize hold of being in the act of annihilation. Because it has nothing, its “egoism” is total, and it wants everything’. Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 219.
\item \textsuperscript{105}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 222.
\item \textsuperscript{106}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 222.
\item \textsuperscript{107}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 219.
\item \textsuperscript{108}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 219.
\end{itemize}
Yet despite this sense that nothingness needs to be triumphed over, and has been triumphed over, in Jüngel’s thought God appears in creation to have already determined nothingness, as creation itself was \textit{ex nihilo}, it was already a limiting of nothingness. However, Jüngel focuses more on how this means that it is only pre-creation that God can be seen as imperishable and uninvolved. The act of creation makes God a being in process, of becoming: ‘going into nothingness and yet always, at the same time, coming from himself. As certainly as God comes from God, he does not come to himself without subjecting himself to nothingness. His way out of it is nothing other than the innermost work of his being’,\textsuperscript{109} and thus God exists as the Trinity.

Anthropologically, it has great repercussions. Much like how faith and righteousness are not our own in Jüngel’s thought, sin then seems to not be necessarily our own, but is instead the intensified power of nothingness; albeit determined nothingness, into which God goes out and then comes back; calling us into being. However, it appears that despite this limitation what this intensified power of nothingness does is tend us towards it in that we see nothingness as what we have come from, not God. In doing so, we make nothingness a sort of anti-deity, an opposite to God. It is our way of dealing with the threat of nothingness, to claim it as our own victory and origin. Yet this is a deception of nothingness, and thus ‘sin, then, is nothing other than the presumptuousness of man to be able to deal with nothingness himself, to justify himself as coming from nothingness (instead of being created from it), and thus to understand his own being as a going ‘out of nothingness’ (\textit{ex nihilo})’.\textsuperscript{110} In doing this, we exclude God from this struggle with nothingness that characterises human existence, and assert our own dominance over our own lives, and in doing so self-actualise away from other relationships, and sin. However, what happens post-Christ is that nothingness then becomes a risk we have to take even though we still view it and are subject to it as it was before Christ. Yet we are called in Jüngel’s thought to exist in relationships and love, as God as Trinity does, and what is shown in the determination of nothingness is that ‘whoever really is for others and seeks to be himself in that, always subjects himself immediately to nothingness’;\textsuperscript{111} but only nothingness as it has been determined, and we submit to it again in order to actualise society and community as loving relations.

\textsuperscript{109}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 224.
\textsuperscript{110}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 255, n.73.
\textsuperscript{111}Jüngel, \textit{Mystery}, 219.
The question remains, then, what role do sin and evil play in Jüngel’s account? Jüngel sees sin as a desire to be in charge of our own destiny and of our own origin, to want to be the judging, determining, differentiating factor in the world. Jüngel sees this self-determination and self-actualisation as sin as it is only God who can determine us, only mutually dependent relations that actualise us. However, it seems odd that evil is able to get that far, considering how well Jüngel wants it to be dealt with in the cross. All the risk of living, the risk of engagement is taken up by God, not by humanity. We can see how evil enters our lives by taking our natural tendency to perish and distort it into a tendency towards nothingness that we then want to get away from, to assert our dominance over it by having originally beaten it by coming from it. Yet at no point is the human responsible for sin, humanity is merely deceived by it and follows its path. Jüngel again seems intent on emphasising human passivity in sin as he does in righteousness. Does this minimise or maximise the effect of evil? Is it worse to be responsible for sinning, or does it seem worse to have sin be so great there is nothing to do in the face of it but trust that someone else has dealt with it better than you ever could? Does this just make us spectators in our own lives, and is that a healthy approach to human existence?

However Jüngel does provide an interesting account of creation which elucidates his understanding of nothingness and of sin and evil. It is an intensified power of nothingness which incites us to improper ideas of ourselves: as dominant over others, ourselves, and the world; as inclining us towards the sense that we are alone and triumphant in that loneliness; and as managing to both make us feel both afraid of nothingness and victorious over it in our own right. Further to this, God’s role as creator underlines the distinction that Jüngel maintains between humanity and God, for when we understand God as humanity’s creator we see the futility of constituting oneself through one’s own acts. What is held up as ideal by Jüngel is that

Nature is understood as creation and thereby all activities of nature move under the auspices of a passivity, the passive is in the case of each and every

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112 “The difference between creator and creation is applicable, in that the human is not his own creator, that he cannot constitute himself through his own deed as a person and that in he is without possession in view of himself, thus his freedom is forfeited if he wants to constitutes himself as a person through his works’. Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Christentums”, 13.
worldly active correspondences a worldly passive – namely the passivity of being created from the nothing (\textit{ex nihilo negative}).\textsuperscript{113}

Whilst Jüngel notes that humanity is created in the likeness of God, he understands that being created in the likeness of God means being created for and only fulfilled in relationships, as God exists as the Trinity.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Justification}\textsuperscript{115}

I now turn to Jüngel’s doctrine of justification, where he details the process by which we are able to form new relationships. Justification is a twofold statement about humanity, that ‘human beings in need of justification are sinners. That is why they can contribute nothing to their justification except to be present in a purely passive sense’,\textsuperscript{116} and that in being justified, humans can no longer be thought of or defined in terms of their acts and deeds and works, but they must be identified on the basis of what God has done for them,\textsuperscript{117} which is that Christ died on the cross for them.\textsuperscript{118} This means that now they are accepted before and by God,\textsuperscript{119} and this can only be done through Christ, not human actions. Justification is recognition before God. I have explored how one tries to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[113] Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Christentums”, 16.
\item[114] ‘Thereby it is presumed, that the human – as God, in whose likeness he was created – is a relationally rich essence, whose life is itself fulfilled in fundamental relations’. Jüngel, “Meine Zeit steht in Deinen Händen (Psalm 31,16): Zur Würde des befristeten Menschenlebens”, \textit{Indikative der Gnade}, 67. ‘That the being of the human person is constituted by a relation to self, a relation to the world, and a relation to God; no single one of these relations can be realised on its own, but is always realised only in a kind of perichoresis with the other two relations’. Jüngel, “Even the beautiful must die”, 60.
\item[115] Jüngel’s term for justification is Rechtfertigung, a process of justification. It is an eschatological term, and for Jüngel that on which the church stands or falls. This stress on justification as the criterion of faith underpins Jüngel’s rather aggressive understanding of the importance of faith alone and rises from Jüngel’s dispute with the \textit{Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification} in 1999. Jüngel’s thoughts on the document are that \textit{‘The Joint Declaration reiterates basically the only part of the Catholic doctrine of justification that was condemned by the Lutheran Confessions, saying that it is still Catholic teaching. And then it goes on to assert that the condemnation in the Lutheran Confessions no longer applies to the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification as expounded in The Joint Declaration. This is one of the scandals in the history of theology of which that Declaration will go on to serve as an example. To accept this amounts to a sacrifice of the intellect on the part of any theologian’. (Justification, 207). Jüngel objected to how the term \textit{simul iustus et peccator} was still unthinkable in Catholic theology (Justification, 215), but more so how justification by faith alone was not only not mentioned in the \textit{Joint Declaration}, but was seen by the bishops to have never been part of the Augsburg Confession, (Justification, 236n215). It is due to this development in the intersection of Catholic and Lutheran theology that Jüngel sees the need to properly expound the doctrine of justification.}
\item[116] Jüngel, Justification, 250.
\item[117] ‘In Christ human disobedience is a regression into the status quo. For in Christ the new human person has become actuality; one is no longer defined by one’s being in Adam and one’s existence under the law but rather by faith which affirms one’s being in Jesus Christ who was crucified and raised from the dead, and by the freedom of faith’, Jüngel, “The Emergence of the New”, \textit{Theological Essays II}, 50.
\item[118] ‘The Christian faith has to speak of God, that his incarnation – even his death on the cross - is brought to bear as justification of human being [Menschsein] of failed humans’. Jüngel, “Der alte Mensch – als Kriterium der Lebensqualität”, \textit{Entsprechung}, 320.
\item[119] ‘In being accepted by God the human person becomes that which he or she is determined to be: a whole human person, one who is identical with him- or herself’. Jüngel, “The Mystery of Substitution”, 161.
\end{footnotes}
take control of one’s own life and justify oneself, and now we turn to how God accomplishes this.

God justifies because it is the nature of God as Triune: God is not arbitrary, God makes covenants, and therefore justification has a logic to it. Jüngel sees that God makes a covenant with humanity through justification; God determines Godself in this event; God justifies Godself in justifying others; and God exists and justifies Godself in the community of mutual otherness. Justification is understood as an imparting of the being of God to others, as righteousness is a relational concept. Jüngel sees that

Human beings can only live in the community which Yahweh provides: we can only live as people whom God acknowledges. However, it is a condition of such acknowledgement that we behave as a community and so fulfill the righteousness of God – a righteousness that always obligingly anticipates us. So righteousness in human beings is the fact of our being acknowledged by God.

Jüngel maintains God’s aseity and lack of risk undertaken in justification as ‘it is true to say that God is faithful to himself when he justifies the ungodly, the sinner, the unrighteous. God forfeits nothing by forgiving us’. This is a matter of consistency for Jüngel, in that God is a God who gives Godself and affirms ‘that other’s otherness’. It is not only through the Trinity that God is justified in Godself, but also in how ‘the subject of the doctrine of justification is the human God’. This sets the template for human justification where the Father is as Other to the Son who become human ‘in that he, the eternal Source and Creator of life, sends the Son into the world of sinners

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120 ‘The doctrine of justification is unthinkable without God as the God of the Covenant. It is precisely in his Covenant that this “God who makes covenants” reveals himself to be the complete opposite of an arbitrary God’. Jüngel, Justification, 39.
121 ‘The logic of the doctrine of justification demands rather that sin be recognised as already overcome. This is the only way it can be adequately recognised as sin’. Jüngel, Justification, 42.
122 ‘For when he justifies the godless by grace alone through faith alone, at the same time God justifies himself. In remaining faithful to himself as the God of the Covenant, he justifies his own being. And with the justification of his being, his existence is justified. In the doctrine of justification the determination is made that God’s existence cannot be recognised apart from God’s self-justification.’ Jüngel, Justification, 46.
123 Jüngel, Justification, 62.
124 Jüngel, Justification, 78.
125 Jüngel, Justification, 78.
126 ‘God is righteous in the lack of internal contradiction in this extreme tension between the almighty Father – the origin of all life and being – and the Son who suffered death. This is where the foundations lie for the fact that the ungodly are justified’. Jüngel, Justification, 79.
127 Jüngel, Justification, 79.
128 ‘The justifying God is the God who is equally God the Father in heaven and God the Son on earth. God’s righteousness brings him down from heaven to the side of ungodly people: the God from the hereafter appears in the midst of this world. But he appears here in such a way that the real life context of the world is redefined in the power of God the Holy Spirit.’ Jüngel, Justification, 80.
and there, in the depths marked by transitoriness and death, affirms him as his beloved Son'. Jüngel also sees justification as having an interruptive quality, the interruption being Jesus Christ, and thus ‘we have called God’s righteousness an event and given this event a name: Jesus Christ. This person joins heaven and earth, the Godhead and humanity’. This again points to the centrality of the cross in Jüngel’s thought, where Jüngel identifies the righteousness of God as ‘that God is the eternal and almighty Father and is at the same time the Son who came as a man in poverty into the world, perishing in and by the world, that is, Jesus Christ, crucified in weakness’. For it is

Only in his identification with the crucified Christ, made ungodly in his accursed death, is God’s righteousness so evident that human beings, though they make themselves ungodly, can become righteous (that is, people suitable for God). So these two things are true in Jesus Christ: in him God is righteous and in him we become righteous.

What happens is that ‘judgement is passed on the world at the cross. That is grace’. As God opens up God’s being ‘in the justification event, God alone enters into a new fellowship of being with us by his grace alone. It is a fellowship of love because it is one of compassion. But love can never be earned. This is because Jüngel understands that ‘the formula clearly excludes human beings from taking an active role in their justification’. This event is both familiar to us, as it involves love and yet is utterly different from anything before as ‘the difference between human fellowships of love and the loving fellowship of God and human beings which is founded on compassion. God has mercy on those who are totally unlovable’. For nothing good can be found in the sinner hence the necessity of being saved by grace alone. This leads Jüngel to reject any sense of Mary or the sacraments as mediators between humanity and

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129 Jüngel, *Justification*, 83.
130 ‘We have no understood our justification until we see it as a fundamental interruption of our own life context and see Jesus Christ as being this fundamental interruption’. Jüngel, *Justification*, 81.
131 Jüngel, *Justification*, 82.
133 Jüngel, *Justification*, 79.
134 Jüngel, *Justification*, 86.
135 Jüngel, *Justification*, 79.
137 Jüngel, *Justification*, 175.
138 ‘But there is no question of the believer, or of course of Mary, being a cause of salvation, a causa salutis’. Jüngel, *Justification*, 179. One of Jüngel’s main issues with the Roman Catholic position is the role of Mary as mediatrix. Another is that he sees the Roman Catholic position as trivialising grace, and promotes work as ‘the latter sees God’s
God. Jüngel sees it as essential that ‘grace is and remains a divine concept, one of divine behaviour, a relational concept’.\textsuperscript{140}

This righteousness in justification is opened up to others.\textsuperscript{141} This sharing and relational character of justification reveals God as the opposite of what sin is, as Jüngel sees sin as a tendency towards lack of relationships with others and focused on self-actualisation. However, we can only know that self-actualisation is sin in the light of the gospel which ‘contradicts the impression that sin and evil are both identifiable and recognisable through a law – a law which makes the claim of being itself independent of the gospel’.\textsuperscript{142} Jüngel sees that it is easier to identify what sin is aligned against, which is that which ‘condemns it effectively to destruction: the gospel and the gracious God who speaks and communicates himself through the gospel. It is the grace of God that enables us to identify and recognise sin as sin, and of course, evil as evil’.\textsuperscript{143} Jüngel sees the normal definition of sin as a violation of the law as inadequate, and instead the account from the gospels ‘leads us to recognise sin as enmity against a gracious God, enmity which can only be conquered by God himself’.\textsuperscript{144} The only way in which sin can be destroyed is if the sinful human is condemned and destroyed.\textsuperscript{145} The only way to conquer sin is to destroy it.

As noted above in the discussion on nothingness, this destruction of sin is in the willingness of Christ to enter the total relationlessness of death and thereby conquer it by bringing the infinite relationfulness of the Trinity into that event. It is the destruction of evil (relationlessness) by good,\textsuperscript{146,147} of creating new relationships in the event of total

\textsuperscript{139} ‘The sacraments are not acting in competition with the effectual divine Word’, Jüngel, Justification, 232.
\textsuperscript{140} Jüngel, Justification, 196.
\textsuperscript{141} ‘The righteousness of God is the epitome of a well-ordered system of relationships which God does not reserve for his own benefit in some fit of divine selfishness; no, he gives his people a part in it by making them partners in the covenant…God is righteous in that he makes others righteous’. Jüngel, Justification, 86.
\textsuperscript{142} Jüngel, Justification, 96.
\textsuperscript{143} Jüngel, Justification, 97.
\textsuperscript{144} Jüngel, Justification, 101.
\textsuperscript{145} ‘I must be condemned as a sinner and be destroyed if my sin is to cease to be my sin’ Justification, Jüngel, 101.
\textsuperscript{146} ‘Good means existence together’. Jüngel, Justification, 103.
\textsuperscript{147} ‘This divine act is the love of God that brings about reconciliation, that promises and delivers salvation. It is an act of grace which expresses the good that God wishes and does. It also expresses the opposite: all that deserves to be called evil. Evil in the theological sense is simply that which contradicts the good that God wishes and does. But this
relationlessness. However, as noted above, another aspect of sin is self-deception where ‘it must be noted that evil starts not with an abstract No to God, but with a false Yes to God’,148 where ‘the real trouble in our relationship with God starts when, instead of being glad that we are takers and receivers in regard to God, we claim to be givers in our own right’.149 Yet through justification we are pardoned150 through the love and compassion of God.151

Justification also shows for Jüngel the primacy of possibility, as we are now defined by our future, not our past, our being is now eschatological: ‘then I am precisely what God’s Word makes of me’.152 Thus what Jüngel’s doctrine of justification shows us is that humanity is excluded in any way from defining itself by its own works, and that the righteousness of God must be seen as given,153 not earned, and thus in regards to justification we are also passive receivers.154 Justification is the centre of the Christian faith, and as the centre of Jüngel’s understanding of faith it is where we find ‘the massive assertion that the one who is rightly accused, the one who is completely in the wrong before God, and who therefore deserves to be called a sinner or ungodly, is justified by God and so finds approval with God’.155

Church as Community: Worship

I turn now to Jüngel’s account of how we live out this justification, which enables us to participate in the infinite relationality of the Trinity and bring that into the world; for the faith that we are given is one that is open to others and relational. Jüngel finds this in

good is simply what God in his gracious act sets in place, highlights or creates anew’. Jüngel, Justification, 103. However, it must be noted that Jüngel does not consider death to be evil.
148 Jüngel, Justification, 106.
149 Jüngel, Justification, 106-7.
150 ‘Pardon in the theological sense of the word is not only a quality that completely defines the recipient, it is also a quality that has an unparalleled effect in the core of the being of the one who pardons. When we speak of the justification of sinners by grace alone, we are claiming for God that his heart is totally characterised by his grace. And for human beings we are making the claim that only this altogether compassionate heart of God and nothing else can make them righteous.’ Jüngel, Justification, 173.
151 ‘When we speak of grace or pardon in the emphatic theological sense, and emphasise the exclusive formula sola gratia in the framework of justification, we are also thinking of an act of compassion, of divine compassion, an act which involves the heart of the one who is pardoning’. Jüngel, Justification, 172-3.
152 Jüngel, Justification, 225.
153 Instead there is imputation, as because ‘the imputation of extraneous righteousness (imputatio alienae iustitiae) can only be rightly grasped when it is seen as God granting divine righteousness in such a way as to effectively change the being of humans’. Jüngel, Justification, 211. Yet there does seem to be some ontological change here.
154 ‘What is excluded is any view of the righteousness of God as being in any way earned and possessed. Similarly out of the question is any understanding of justification as a process by which we are involved other than by hearing and believing’. Jüngel, Justification, 206-7.
the church where he sees that ‘the trinitarian community of reciprocal otherness finds its most impressive earthly correspondence’. Moreover, as Christ is the image of God, and our new humanity is the humanity of Christ, it follows now that ‘human life is an image of divine life. It is as such grounded in the delight of God as community, and therefore with people as a community. Human life is communal life’. 

The church, as the place where one is addressed by God in the Word, is understood by Jüngel as having an eschatological nature. Faith is an ‘eschatological new situation’. This new situation is the union of God and humanity that has happened in the death of Christ, and realised through faith in Christ. As the church is the community of believers, then the church is also other than the world, and is a witness of God to the world. Due to this relationship of the old world and the newness of faith, ‘an identification of church and world is therefore impossible.

However, the church is not only defined and identified by having this eschatological faith through justification, but also by how it responds to that faith. The most important characteristic of the Christian community is worship [Gottesdienst], which can only be fulfilled communally, as ‘the joy of worship is not only the expression of the wholeness of individual life. The individual can only be whole if his or her relationship to the community is intact. The celebration of worship is essentially a social act’. This is because ‘worship already implies a service of one another. Its decisive criterion in this regard is first of all the limitation of one’s own activity and the admission of dependence on the activity of others’. Human wholeness is realised by participation in God, and

157 Jüngel has yet another statement about the image of God, that this time ‘the image of God is human dignity’. Jüngel, “Zur Verankerung der Menschrechte im christliche Glauben”, Außer sich, 133. This ties into Jüngel’s thoughts on ending life, where he states that ‘the categorical distinction between letting something die and killing everyone must always stand clear in our sight’, Jüngel, “Meine Zeit steht in Deinen Händen (Psalm 31,16)”, 82, and that whilst ‘the human life has a right to find his timely end’, Jüngel, “Meine Zeit steht in Deinen Händen (Psalm 31,16)”; 82, the life of the human, is, in the words of the Psalm and despite its note of complaint, always in God’s hands.
160 Because God has graciously joined us together with Jesus in the death of Jesus, when we who are with Jesus open our mouths, there the Word of Faith is found’, “Was hat die Predigten mit dem Text zu tun?” 134.
161 The world is not part of God’s newly-created situation. The world is rather more as a constant old situation to God’s newly-created situation. The existence of the new situation testifies to the world that it is decaying world’, “Was hat die Predigten mit dem Text zu tun?” 137.
162 “Was hat die Predigten mit dem Text zu tun?” 137.
163 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Sacrament and Example” 185.
164 Jüngel, “The Sacrifice of Jesus Christ as Sacrament and Example”, 185.
by participation in God we enter into new and better relationships with our fellow humans,\textsuperscript{165} as ‘the wholeness of the whole humanity is but in a case completely otherly constituted as in others. And for every other constitution of wholeness of the \textit{tutus homo} the relationship is decided, in which the humanity of humanity is realised’.\textsuperscript{166}

Worship is an expression of our love for God,\textsuperscript{167} and it draws together a community that exists in peace\textsuperscript{168} for ‘humanity lives ontologically on the indicative of peace, that God creates’.\textsuperscript{169} Christ is our peace, and thus ‘the indicative of peace is, according to the judgement of Christian faith, constituted and guaranteed in this particular person, in which God becomes human to people’.\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, with the greeting of the peace in the church service, this enables those who do this act to experience freedom, ‘so to speak, as a realm in which it is taken up in the greetings, as a place of creative safety where trust thrives and every creature is so essential, that they are able to develop their own essence and realise themselves as they are able. The greeting of peace lets us who can be nothing else in the world thrive in the otherness of the other’.\textsuperscript{171}

**Passivity and Suffering**

Thus, from Jüngel’s understanding of church and community, it can be seen that there is a strong emphasis on service to others and to action, and the creation of relationships and peace. However, what has been noted about Jüngel’s thought thus far is that there is a strong emphasis on human passivity and receptivity towards God. Does this positive account of human action affect his previous statements on passivity, or is passivity to be

\textsuperscript{165} ‘It is made possible through the successful being-together with God and with fellow humanity (Being-for-others), but also upon orientated personal identity (successful Being-for-one-self) that the human I, is conceived as the personal unity of the human soul with its body and human person with its history’. Jüngel, “Ganzheitsbegriffe”, 51.

\textsuperscript{166} Jüngel, “Ganzheitsbegriffe”, 46. In doing this, Jüngel is following Luther’s meaning ‘that the homo totus et perfectus will be defined through the strength of the new creatorly Word of God which itself is fulfilled through justificiari fide, and is understood as a cue/hint, that points us continuously to our own responsibility, to the question of how the human is made whole, towards an answer that one is able to become.’ Jüngel, “Ganzheitsbegriffe”, 48.

\textsuperscript{167} ‘In worship God becomes interesting to us for his own sake: as the eternally creative Father, as the Son who suffered and overcame death for us, as the Holy Spirit who relates Father and the Son to each other with the bond of love, and who draws us into the divine community of mutual difference’. Jüngel, “Living Out of Righteousness: God’s Action – Human Agency”, Theological Essays II, 255.

\textsuperscript{168} Peace seems to be of interest to Jüngel, who sees it as a result of our nature to trust, and realized in trust upon the creative security of God. This is augmented or defined in how Christ is defined as peace, and the peace of Christ constitutes our being because Christ’s humanity defines our humanity and ‘it is in this sense that the Letter of the Ephesians names Jesus Christ as our peace, because in him Jews and Gentiles come to an end, to become representatives of a shared humanity, and as the church, to become a new spiritual wholeness’. Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Friedens: Frieden als Kategorie theologischer Anthropologie”, \textit{Ganz Werden}, 38.

\textsuperscript{169} Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Friedens”, 30.

\textsuperscript{170} Jüngel, “Zum Wesen des Friedens”, 31.

understood only in relation to God and nothingness, and not in relation to other humans? For this we need to turn to the role of the Spirit in human life. Jüngel sees that when we worship we are partaking of the Trinity and their relations, and that occurs through the Spirit’s work in us. Therefore, it can be seen that worship further supports human action as dependence and passivity as it is not us acting deliberately but us participating in the Trinity and thereby having the spirit work through us. However, Jüngel tempers this for whilst humanity is passive in the face of God, Jüngel understands that this passivity is not inactive, it is creative. However this creativity is not on our part, as where the human is passive God is active. Therefore it can be seen that passivity is more dependency than it is complete inaction, and thus it is able to be this creative passivity, where God is creating new relationships and events in worship. This underlines freedom as an event and an interruptive phenomenon.

This passivity also forms our reaction and relation to suffering in the world. Jüngel sees suffering as a natural part of our nature and therefore not an evil. Yet this experience drives us to the ultimate, despair-filled existential question. However, for Jüngel suffering is part of the Anfechtung which characterises human life. The Christian faith should not shy away from talking about suffering, but it should note the incomprehensibility of it, and acknowledge that suffering is the provenance of faith, as ‘this faith itself lives from a story of suffering. It lives from the passion history of Jesus Christ. But the fact that this crucified man, this man of pain, stands in the centre of Christian faith does not by any means imply that we could understand suffering. At the most we can comprehend suffering’s incomprehensibility, but nothing more’.

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172 There belongs to daily human life first and foremost a creative passivity, in which I am within myself, in which I receive myself, in which I am gifted with myself. One is confirmed as one created in such creative passivity, indeed, that he is God’s beloved creation.’ Jüngel, “Hoffen, Handeln – und Leiden”, 26.
173 ‘This passivity is extremely vibrant and full of spontaneity’. Jüngel, “Mensch, wo bist du? Glauben und Freiheit als Ortsbestimmungen des Christenmenschen”, Außer sich, 32.
175 The language here is reminiscent of Schleiermacher here, and Jüngel mentions Schleiermacher in that, ‘in the highest form of unmediated self-awareness or of feeling that the world is no longer faded out, but rather combined with the Subject, who experiences itself as no longer dependent on the world (and that means partially)’. Jüngel, “Der Gottesdienst als Fest der Freiheit: Der Theologische Ort des Gottesdienst nach Friedrich Schleiermacher”, Indikative der Gnade, 336.
176 ‘Worship is thus an event of soteriological passivity, indeed an extremely creative passivity, but simply a human passivity’, Jüngel, “Der Gottesdienst als Fest der Freiheit”, 339.
177 ‘Freedom is an interrupting phenomenon’. Jüngel, “Der Gottesdienst als Fest der Freiheit”, 349.
178 ‘Why is there anything at all? Why isn’t there nothing?’ This question indicates the risk which we take, when we inquire into the Christian understanding of suffering.’ Jüngel, “The Christian Understanding Of Suffering”, Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 65, 1988, 3-13, 3.
Therefore Jüngel also affirms an experiential theology of the cross as well as a revelatory one, as it is the case that one believes, one has faith, and therefore one suffers. Suffering is an intrinsic part of belief, as it is part of life, yet it has an added poignancy for the faithful as it heightens the hiddenness of God.

However, suffering also shows happiness because the experience of God is beyond all our other experiences, as ‘it is part of the very core of all religious experience that the holy God does not appear in the context of human reality without fundamentally shaking this same context’. Jüngel sees that this shows hope for humanity, in how compassion and overcoming suffering as shown on the cross is what leads to happiness eventually. Jüngel wants to show in understanding the suffering that a theology of the cross tackles that God cannot be a *deus ex machina*, instead ‘the Bible directs man to God’s powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God can help’.

Therefore suffering is affirmed as a challenge (also translated as *Anfechtung*) to the ideal of peaceful, relationship-filled life that should be the Christian life. However Jüngel

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180 'The God who was denounced and crucified by his human creatures has said to us and so also to himself once and for all Yes. And “my theology” can be and seeks to be nothing other than the reflective attempt to spell out this divine Yes. Quo Deus bene vertat!' Jüngel, “My Theology”, 19.

181 ‘Believers suffer with the suffering, for they would like to rejoice with the suffering and yet in their suffering they continue to long for the joy withheld from them. The believer grieves over the lack of love and hope which proceeds from lack of freedom, justice and peace. But when believers look into a world painfully marked by death and the henchmen of death, as believers they also suffer deeply over the experience of the hiddenness of God’s activity’. Jüngel, “My Theology”, 18.


183 ‘God is to be thought as the one whose creative omnipotence and freedom are something other than what is prompted by the axiom of divine absoluteness, and as the one whose eternity and activity is something other than what is demanded by the axioms of the timeless and impassibility of the eternal. If God is love, then truly love is omnipotent, and love is the very core of all true power. And the truth-criterion of power is that it is able to have compassion, and in this way to overcome suffering.’ Jüngel, “My Theology”, 10.

184 ‘I have said these sentences with a proviso, in order to make it clear for Christian theology, that especially with a pointed doctrine of *theologia crucis* raises the question of happiness for people’. Jüngel, “Was hat des Menschen Glück mit seiner Seligkeit zu tun?” Außer sich, 169.

185 Jüngel, Mystery, 60. Jüngel also notes that ‘theology takes suffering man seriously, because it has experienced through the course of its own history that there are too many explanations which do not illuminate the darkness but rather make everything shadowy, and that is much worse than the darkest darkness. There are hidden works of God which would turn enlightenment into twilight and the light of reason into a light of irrationality, if one wanted to elucidate these works’. Jüngel, “The Christian Understanding Of Suffering”, 9.

186 ‘The more intensive the suffering and the deeper the pain, the more severely disturbed, shaken and threatened are those relationships in which our life takes place. In suffering there occurs an unparalleled deserialization. The suffering “I” is thrown back upon itself. It is occupied with itself and only with itself in a way which is hardly accessible. And that is exactly how it becomes relationless. In suffering the human “I” is also threatened by the destruction of its self-relationship, by the loss of its own identity.’ Jüngel, “The Christian Understanding Of Suffering”, 5.
notes that despite this there is perhaps a need to suffer. A reason for suffering is love as one cannot love without sympathy, without passion, and

Apathetic love is a contradiction in itself, just as it is a characteristic of love that there is nothing in the world which is more capable of suffering than love! The fact that love can suffer does not make it weak, but rather strong. Love’s capability to suffer is the core of its passion.

Jüngel sees that understanding God is more important than understanding why one suffers, and that changes our attitude towards suffering. Jüngel notes that ‘the New Testament strikingly enough doesn’t try to interpret suffering; it doesn’t give suffering a meaning. Neither does it offer a justification for suffering; rather, the human attitude toward human suffering is determined in the light of Christ’s suffering, in the light of his passion history’. Jüngel does not want to glorify suffering, either our own or that of Christ. Yet what suffering does is aid our relationships with others; suffering makes us empathetic and sensitive and thus better at relating to others.

So whilst Anfechtung may not be enjoyable or something that people prefer, it is something that comes from God and it thus not evil in itself as it leads back to God. For it is in Christ that the conflict of the world with God occurred, and through which Christ triumphed. Anfechtung, which Christ himself underwent determines the

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187 “Thus before we join in the lamentation over the fact that a human being isn’t a human being without having to suffer, and before we search for the guilty subject who allows man to suffer at all - especially when one considers that the suffering person himself would rather cease being human - the question ought to be discussed as to whether the incapability to suffer (note: not the state of nonsuffering) is truly a blessing which is worthy of man’s aspiration. What would we be, if the capability to suffer weren’t our thing?” Jüngel, “The Christian Understanding Of Suffering”, 6.


189 “The faith which groans and cries for this God and his future still hasn’t understood suffering, but it has understood God.” Jungel, “The Christian Understanding Of Suffering”, 11.

190 “Shared suffering is halved suffering” - says a German proverb. The passion history of Jesus Christ not only tells however that God shares our finite suffering and thus suffers with us; rather, it also tells that he suffered to the bitter end the ultimate depths of our relationlessness, our desocialization, our lack of solidarity, and that means that God has suffered the curse of death and the misery of infinite suffering. This is the fundamental truth of the Christian faith: that God conquers the power of evil which lives on the sin of man by suffering this power’. Jungel, “The Christian Understanding Of Suffering”, 10.


192 The readiness to live in the community of Christ's suffering as well as the relentless opposition against destructive powers presuppose a maximum of sensitivity for suffering people. Christian faith heightens the power of perception. It makes us sensitive - often to the very limit of endurance - to the stories about the suffering which people bear and which all too often has to be borne by people. Faith knows that it is part of man's dignity, part of his glory to be able to suffer; however, for this very reason faith reacts alertly and sensitively toward each misuse of the human capability to suffer’. Jungel, “The Christian Understanding Of Suffering”, 12.


194 The reality of Anfechtung exists thus in a peculiar circle. It comes out from God and leads further into him. And it can only lead to him, because it comes out from him alone’. Jungel, “Anfechtung und Gewißheit des Glaubens”, 91.

195 “The crucified Christ is that conflicted person, where for our good he staged the conflict of the world with God”. Jungel, “Anfechtung und Gewißheit des Glaubens”, 112.
human attitude anew to suffering and universalises our responses to it. Our true humanity is built on and understood on the basis of suffering. There is anxiety and struggle in human life, and the Word of God is addressed to the inescapable rupture between being and time that is human existence in the world. Yet Jüngel sees that if we rely on God and participate in the divine life through worship, then life, whilst not necessarily easier, is for the best. For all of humanity’s problems, what is key is that we realise that human action does not get us where we need to go, and only God can alleviate the anxiety in us awakened by the struggle between being and non being; and only through identifying and overcoming it. Sin is renouncing our true need for dependence on God and is an attempt to set ourselves up as God, to create, to be responsible, and to justify ourselves. Instead, we only rely on God, and not on our own efforts and actions.

**Critique**

I turn now to interact with the criticisms of Jüngel’s anthropology. Jüngel’s account of the passive nature of humanity is noted by most commentators, and is seen as the prime fault of his anthropology. This passivity is not restricted to action, but is also at work in Jüngel’s understanding of language. Davidson sees that Jüngel’s accounts of justification follow on from his other theological accounts in how they ‘characteristically emphasize human passivity’. Davidson goes further, and sees that ‘Jüngel pushes the Lutheran emphasis on human passivity in justification so hard that he finds it very difficult to describe the place of human agency’. This criticism is echoed by Webster who also notes the effect of the doctrine of justification on human agency, and Watts also sees in Jüngel’s theology that

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196 ‘It is fundamental misunderstanding of the Christian faith if Jesus is only exerted as a moral example for our behaviour and that in him the addressed person is required to act only as an obligated perpetrator. Who wants to serve God, must first be served, and especially so by God’, Jüngel, “Anfechtung und Gewißheit des Glaubens”, 113.
197 ‘However it is from the suffering of Christ, from his passion narrative, that the human attitude to suffering is determined anew. This happened in very different, indeed a seemingly contrasting manner’, Jüngel, “Hoffen, Handeln – und Leiden”, 34.
198 ‘Who, meanwhile recognises God in the Passion of Jesus Christ, recognises that he has suffered for humanity, who believes thereby, that God suffered for every human, is indeed a suffering human. If it is anthropologically true, then it is a categorical obligation, therefore, to care, that sufferers in your fellow humanity can live and die among us as a suffered, and indeed suffered person’. Jüngel, “Hoffen, Handeln – und Leiden”, 35.
199 ‘The Christian understand of humanity is oriented on the suffering and death of Jesus of Nazareth and also conceives, and directly in view and through the crucifixion horrifying deformed Christ, that he manifested in himself the dignity of humanity’. Jüngel, “Hoffen, Handeln – und Leiden”, 36.
200 Davidson, “Crux probat Omnia”, 158.
201 Davidson, “Crux probat Omnia” 187.
202 ‘Most obviously such a use of justification introduces an emphasis on man as the passive recipient of the work of God’. John Webster, “Jüngel on the Language of faith”, Modern Theology 1:4 July, 253-78, 268.
The heart of the problem here is the essential passivity of humankind. Jüngel's theology of death is strongly theocentric which means that it is hard to see how death can constitute a mutual relationship between God and man. In the event of justification we are defined but humanity seems unable to enter into a relationship with God with any degree of reciprocity.  

Zimany sees that Jüngel's lack of human action is further damned by how there is little sense in which God acts in humanity as well, noting that Sin will enter between impact and accomplishment, of course, but since Jüngel can provide for the Universal to take human form fully, he ought also to be able to provide for divine reality to become manifest in at least some other specific human action – and if he does provide, he should say more often.

Furthermore, focusing on revelation and the experiential nature of a theology of the cross has made Jüngel's account of humanity vulnerable to the accusation that it promotes an acceptance of suffering and evil in world, and does not focus on combating it. However, this is more to do with the impotence of human action rather than any support for corruption and evil, and the lack of human action does not mean that nothing happens but that God is allowed to work in the world instead. Yet this also means that Jüngel’s account of justification is seen as too narrow in how it limits the role of humanity in the world.

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203 Watts, Revelation and the Spirit, 72.
204 Zimany, Jüngel’s Synthesis of Heidegger and Barth, 386.
205 ‘For Jüngel, justification by faith is a hermeneutical category through which human experience is understood. I want to ask whether this is a way of speaking about God which is indeed meaningful for the majority of those encountering the Christian faith or whether it is one which describes a God who is experienced by many women as the self-righteous judge without compassion’, Natalie Watson, “Theologia Incurvato In Se Ipse?: One Feminist Theologian’s Reading of Jüngel’s Theology”, Reviews in Religion and Theology, 9:3, June 2002, 201-205, 202. There is a lot of good in feminist theology, and feminist critiques of theology. However, this particular focus on Jüngel’s thought completely overlooks his theology of love, wherein both partners are equal, equally self-giving, and there is no sense of force, or coercion in it, and a profound equality therein. Jüngel also does not write theologically on many social issues, and he can be criticised for that. But this castigation of themes such as justification and salvation theology for not speaking to a specific problem just reinforces an understanding of feminist theology as curved in on itself, as well as failing to differentiate the starting points of theology and theological ethics that could follow from it. It also strikes me as failing to find the good and criticising for the sake of it, especially when she writes about a theology that finds God in suffering, that I do not hear the voices of the suffering, the victims of human injustice in this celebration of divine righteousness, Jüngel speaks with the generic voice of the male academic theologian of the doctrine of justification by faith alone as being the most important message which the church has to proclaim’, Watson, “Theologia Incurvato In Se Ipse?” 203.
206 Spjuth notes how Jüngel uses love in God as the Mystery of the World to open up a new way of seeing our dependence on divine love, and its futurity, dependent on God making the first move as ‘we must first be loved in order to be able to love, first be addressed in order to able to speak, and so forth. Yet, when redemption is seen as a divine Word-event received in passivity, it becomes difficult for Jüngel to break free from the modern tendency to place God in a defined existential realm, and to make so worldly that it can be rather untroubled by the faith that God makes everything new’. (Roland Spjuth, “Redemption Without Actuality: A Critical Interrelation between Jüngel’s and John Milbank’s Ontological Endeavours” in Modern Theology 14:4, Oct. 1998, 505-22, 512). Spjuth notes that the way justification is used in Jüngel’s thought is in fact limiting as since justification is a divine constitution of being and not a human act, God’s coming to the world always concerns being as a distinct from acts or actuality. This creates a
Jüngel’s account of love is also criticised, as in the translation of Jüngel’s account of love from divine to human, Saarinen notes that

It is, however, difficult to apply such a strong concept of distance to agapistic neighbourly love. When I love my neighbour as God has loved me, does this mean that I should take a position of power, which sets me above the recipient of my agapistic love? Do I need to perform an act of condescension in my neighbourly love?\(^{207}\)

However, I see that this particular criticism is misplaced, as Jüngel’s stress on the kenosis and humbling does mean that there is no position of power in love either in his account of human love or divine love; and even if there were the act of love itself equalises through mutual self surrender. Yet Saarinen sees that Jüngel’s account of love is difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in reality, although it must also be said that Jüngel sees that God effects this love of and for others through the Spirit, so there is little question of how humanity should act in love towards others for it is God acting through us who creates these new relationships and these new loves. As noted previously, Małysz criticises Jüngel’s understanding both of love and of freedom as he sees that Jüngel’s development of these concepts ends up focusing too much on the crucifixion and not on more holistic accounts of either, making the point that Jüngel’s stress on revelation undermines what he says about love, although Małysz does not compare this to how Jüngel can speak of love.\(^ {208}\)

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\(^{207}\) The model of beneficial agency is clearly applicable to such acts of helping and aiding other people, which require that the beneficial lover have additional resources at his or her disposal. The ideas of neighbourly love as aid programme, charity and service to others can fairly well apply the model of God’s agape, if in such acts the beneficial lover has the power and resources to contribute to the needs and deficiencies of the neighbour. Risto Saarinen, “Love from Afar: Distance, Intimacy and the Theology of Love” IJST, 14:2, April 2012, 131-147, 132. Furthermore, Saarinen sees that the definition of love as the union of life and death in favour of life seems sprung in on us, and does not always speak to human experience. (Saarinen, “Love from Afar”, 144). To which Jüngel would affirm yes, you need to love self-sacrificially, and part of the self-sacrifice is giving up power, real or perceived in order to create an equality.

\(^{208}\) Małysz notes regarding Jüngel’s account of freedom that Jüngel’s account of God’s self-determination as an event of love does not seem to go much further than God’s self-differentiation which includes the crucified man, to whom God relates, as one crucified, in God’s definition of God’s own being. (Małysz, Trinity, Freedom and Love, 88-9). Bongmba sees also that Jüngel’s account of love in narrow in how he shortchanges the concept of eros in favour of agape, where he ‘does not reflect the complexity involved in the platonice understanding of eros...Jüngel fails in this work to focus on human love, he compartmentalises love, and he adopts a theological approach that lacks pluralism’. Elias Kifan Bongmba, African Witchcraft and Otherness: A Philosophical and Theological Critique of Intersubjective Relations, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), 110.
Therefore it can be reiterated that Jüngel’s reliance on passivity as the only proper response to God both in Christ and in humanity is a key flaw in Jüngel’s theology. Although it is consistent with what he wants to stress in God’s relation to the world, and humanity’s relation to God, the lack of human action must be seen as a problem for Jüngel. Following on from the critique of Jüngel’s trinitarian theology as not showing equal participation required for perichoresis this is compounded by Jüngel’s lack of mutuality and action when what he writes about human love includes within it an affirmation and requirement for mutual self-surrender and equal participation. Again, it is the case that considering how full and rich Jüngel’s account of love is, it is interesting that the remainder of his theology cannot live up to it due to Jüngel’s emphasis on passivity; which I argue is a result of his focus on the cross of Christ as the only true and full source of revelation.

When I look at Jüngel’s account of love where Jüngel shifts the expression of God’s love on the cross from the love of God for humanity instead to an expression of love between the Father, Son, and Spirit, this seems to show that despite Jüngel’s attention to human love in God as the Mystery of the World, it ultimately does not matter compared to centrality of the love of God for God. I have already noted that the expression of the love of God on the cross, in that passive event where there is a sense of one fully surrendering and suffering in full obedience to the other, speaks of a passivity within love and thus within the triune God.209

This ultimately stems from an understanding of love that is shown as sacrifice, as onesided submission. In the event of the cross what is revealed is the ultimate self-surrender of the Son, the ultimate passivity of the Son in undergoing an engagement with nothingness. This aspect of the Son is then the template for human life, this dependence and passivity in which we which participate but do not contribute to, the life of the Trinity. It is my argument that this passivity, disclosed in the fullness of the revelation on the cross in the suffering of Christ, appears to undermine Jüngel’s strong account of the mutual self-surrender in love. Whilst I understand how Jüngel argues that it is not onesided by having the Father surrender the Son, and as triune God that makes

209 Malysz remarks that ‘what strikes one in Jüngel’s account of love as such is the remarkable passivity of the beloved’. Malysz, Trinity, Freedom and Love, 87.
it not as one-sided as it seems, there is still in this supposed trinitarian relationship of mutual surrender too much surrender on the one side. Furthermore, this imbalance is inverted in God’s relationship with humanity, where humanity receives the gifts of God, the righteousness, the salvation, and does nothing but trust; but God does not surrender to humanity, instead God surrenders to nothingness and death. Whilst this may be in one sense a relief, it jars with an account that is, at first flush, remarkable in how it focuses on the activities of both partners in a relationship, and holds that it is not love unless both sides are matched in how they give, and in how they receive.

Whilst I have noted that Jüngel insists on the centrality of the cross as the cornerstone of theology, there is a lot of material on human experience. Jüngel looks at the human experience of love and the human experience of suffering and sees in them parallels with the experience of God although he always stops short of saying that one can know God from them. Instead Jüngel sees that these experiences aid our knowledge of God after the revelation on the cross. However Jüngel is still making a connection between human experience and the divine. Thus, it seems in Jüngel that revelation and knowledge of God is torn between two options; between being focused exclusively on the cross at the expense of humanity, or in humanity in the form of love and the work of the Spirit. Thus is Jüngel’s focus on the cross a way of lessening the anthropocentric trend that his theology has?

As Jüngel’s thought draws both from Barth and Bultmann it is perhaps in mediating this divide between a subjective account that relies on human experience and an account based on the objective reality and absolute aseity of God that there is this tension. This could cause this situation where Jüngel focuses on the cross in order to uphold the distinction of God from humanity; but also needs to affirm the similarities in order to enable him to also connect God to human life in the Spirit and in love. I have shown how in critiques of Jüngel that some of the criticisms contradict each other; especially in how Webster sees Jüngel as focusing too much on the divinity and Thompson sees Jüngel as drawing more on the humanity of Christ. I argue that it is due to Jüngel’s use of these two accounts of knowledge of God that it is possible to criticise Jüngel both for being too anthropocentric and for separating God too much from humanity. However, the stress on human experience in the event of proclamation in Jüngel’s thought would
help combat the criticism that Hoff lays at him and other theologians who see that revelation is always self-revelation and thus always complete revelation, that ‘the medium is the message.’ However Jüngel is still vulnerable to this criticism as he holds to the cross even whilst acknowledging the continuing experience of God in the word event. It is this clinging to the cross that, as I have explored in this thesis, restricts how he can speak about God as Trinity and of humanity in itself.

**Summation**

The aim of these past chapters has been to show that Jüngel’s focus on the cross as the source of revelation is too narrow to show what Jüngel wishes to say about the triune life of God and the love that constitutes it. It is also clear that his account of anthropology is susceptible to this same criticism. What this narrowness translates into here is that it can be concluded that Jüngel’s account of humanity, much like his christology, relies not on our active response to God, ethically or otherwise, but on a passivity in accepting the new determination of human being as justified through faith, both of which are imputed. The view of human action and response is too narrow. This lack of optimism about human action means that there is no sense in which the Kingdom of God is part of this world, or can be built by humanity through ethical action, instead it exists both in our present and future through faith. However, Jüngel may well counter this by saying that the humanity of Christ, infused with divinity, gives us this new being and thus there is no need for human action. Yet Jüngel still has an ideal, contained within the idea of worship, of a community working for one goal and one end. Jüngel also sees that that is achieved through the creative human passivity, a passivity that allows God to work within humanity but only through the new humanity of Christ as that is the only one that finds any acceptance before God. Moreover, even in the sense of sin there is a lack of human action and responsibility, as if humanity is being pulled downwards by nothingness then upwards by God, and there is little or no choice in which way you go.

However, in some ways that could be seen to be quite reassuring. Our salvation is not in our hands. All we are called to do is suffer the vicissitudes of life and remain faithful,

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knowing that we could never do what has been done. There is no point in complaining about our lack of ability to determine ourselves with our limited capabilities. Thus, the cry of humanity about what is seen to be exacted by God despite our limited capacity can be answered by Milton; who when faced with his own limitations found the reply that

God doth not need
Either man’s work or His own gifts. Who best
Bear His mild yoke, they serve Him best. His state
Is kingly: thousands at His bidding speed,
And post o’er land and ocean without rest;
They also serve who only stand and wait.\(^{211}\)

Conclusion

I am on the whole supportive and very fond of Jüngel’s theological endeavour, especially how it is centred on fixing the theological flaws of the death of God movement by focusing on the aseity and otherness of God in the face of theologies which fixate on the passability of God to the point of actual death and continued suffering. I appreciate the way Jüngel objects to the use of philosophy that focuses on the otherness and aseity of God to the extent that God’s suffering and presence on the cross looks like a formality, and the way in which Jüngel actively engages with the problems that atheism brought about at that time rather than ignoring it. Moreover, whilst I recognise the premises of many critiques of Jüngel, I note that they mostly work based on the system that Jüngel himself has rejected and thus are themselves guilty of Jüngel’s critiques of the same system.

Most of all, what I find the most powerful in Jüngel is his understanding of love, as mutual self-surrender and self-giving, and wanting to have and be had. It is an outworking that is profoundly egalitarian: where there is power and discrepancy it needs to be sacrificed and overcome because the goal of love is more powerful. However, through Jüngel’s exclusive focus on the cross, it is on that very point that Jüngel shortchanges his own theology, not only in that although Jüngel sees the ideal love between humans as analogous to the love of God what Jüngel does with how God loves appears less dynamic than his understanding of human love but also in how due to the dynamics on the cross, Jüngel emphasises passivity above all other responses to the love of God, shown both by Christ and what Jüngel expects of human action.

Who is Jüngel for us today?

However, before I ask the question of whether Jüngel’s thought can be repaired, I would like to ask what use is Jüngel’s thought for us today? Jüngel was writing at a particular time within a particular theological movement that this day is no longer considered valid or important, although his account of the death of God and a theology of the cross is a lot more palatable and theologically rigorous than the competition. Yet there are fewer cries now about how God can be understood in the world that is broken, and instead more of a call for how can God make sense in a world that no
longer has an implicit understanding of God. To challenge this contemporary context, a number of theologies have developed which focus more on logic, as analytic theology does; on returning to classical theology, with a focus on permanence and divine impassibility; and focusing on individual identities.

In terms of current theological trends, I would first like to look at how Jüngel can be used in relation to analytic theology. Analytic theology applies the reasoning and logic of analytic philosophy to theological truths, and strives to give theology a foothold in the current philosophical climate, especially as pertains to philosophy of religion, and counters the continental turn that theology has taken with its reliance on Hegel, Heidegger and their disciples. This is exemplified by the work of William Wood, Oliver Crisp, and Michael Rea, and is currently a growing area in theology. To this Jüngel may be brought in to check the tendencies of such theology to reduce God to a logical puzzle, and thereby, in Jüngel’s term, be in control of God through logic rather than let God be in control of us through love. Moreover, with the stress on the univocity of Being that analytic theology can hold the stress on the aseity of God in Jüngel provides a counterpoint to subsuming God both under our own being apart from the incarnation, and under our own human abilities, which Jüngel will always see as unable to reach God. Jüngel’s focus on the accommodation of God to humanity in the incarnation keeps an understanding of a God about whom language can discuss on those terms, rather than on the terms of human reason. Jüngel would insist on seeing God as unconditioned apart from on God’s own terms, which are shown in the event of the cross and not in human reason and argumentation.

Furthermore, with regards to the increased acceptance of divine impassibility after the work of Moltmann, Jüngel’s approach represents a middle ground between the radical work of the death of God theologians and the stricter aseity of God that proponents of divine impassibility hold. Even though much of what is written about divine impassibility explicitly contradicts the efforts of Moltmann and Jüngel in order to reconcile God with the presence of evil, even though the world is not reeling as it was

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after the Second World War, the issue remains of how a God who does not and cannot suffer or change can relate to or comfort humanity that does, and there is sense that it is hard to speak of a God who loves that cannot feel or suffer.³

Moreover, Jüngel's stress on God and God alone, rather than humanity and humanity’s efforts and differences, can be used as a way of grounding theologies that focus on the differences in humanity as a way of articulating God,⁴ instead to make love the grounding of human action towards one another, and focusing on the peace that Christian life promises and brings rather than on division and on self-actualisation and realisation.

Reparation of Jüngel
As noted, Jüngel's emphasis on passivity as the proper mode of conduct for humanity as revealed on the cross by the example of Christ undermines Jüngel's statements on the mutuality of love, and this is due to Jüngel's narrow scope for revelation, where the full revelation of the Trinity is only in the event of the cross, an event which shows the Son submitting to the will of the Father and undergoing suffering and death. This surrender on the part of the Son and lack of mutuality shown in the cross within the Trinity stands in contrast to Jüngel other explications of the Trinity as perichoresis. Constructively, I would like to suggest that the means to repair this lack exist within Jüngel's own theology. That to repair Jüngel’s own account, Jüngel's re-imagining of humanity as relationships of mutual love and surrender facilitated by the trinitarian relations can be taken back to its own source.⁵

If there were more of a focus on the activity of Christ on the cross and if there was talk about the love of God manifested in the life of Christ and not just in the death of Christ then this imbalance may be redressed. Furthermore, if there were more of a sense of vulnerability in the being of God, if it were to be shared out among the trinitarian

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³ The work Anastasia Scrutton touches on this topic too, and affirms the need for a certain understanding of emotions within God, A. Scrutton, Thinking through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility (New York: Continuum, 2011).
⁵ On the topic of the love of God, George Newlands sees that Jüngel's work provides a way forward in theology in how it focuses on God as love, although he sees that 'Jüngel’s profound emphasis on the freedom of the Christian, based on Luther’s understanding of justification by faith, needs to be widened and applied directly to the whole created order as a reminder of the unconditional love of God which undergirds and invites to fulfilment all that is'. George Newlands, “The Love of God and the Future of Theology”, The Possibilities of Theology, 190-205, 204.
persons, if the Father could be seen as risking, then there could be a sense of this mutuality that Jüngel speaks of so well, but does not follow through. For there is within Jüngel a clear description of love as mutual self surrender where both parties are equally active, and that is necessary for it to be considered love, it is still the case that this account breaks down and when it comes to God and the cross. There is the potential for this within Jüngel’s own account of love, but it is an account that cannot be drawn solely from the cross as the cross focuses so much on the passivity of Christ in undergoing death and suffering.

**Summation**

However it is still the case that in Jüngel’s theology as it stands that the focus that Jüngel has on the cross as the sole means of the revelation of God damages his theology for revelation is not revelation for Jüngel unless it is from the cross. Moreover, as I am drawing on an understanding of love that is found in human experience this makes love a *vestigium trinitatis*, which then that makes it a natural theology as for Jüngel the only *vestigium trinitatis* can be Christ. Therefore, whilst I would like to repair Jüngel with Jüngel it would result in a version of his theology that does not focus solely on the cross and which gives more status to human action and the world. It includes the cross, but understands that what can be drawn from the cross is not the healthiest theology. For from what Jüngel has written what is shown is a theology that promotes passivity and suffering, and calls that love. It is helplessness recalibrated as hopefulness, and as thus is truly *sub contrario*.

My goal in this study has been to think through Jüngel’s theology as an exemplar of a theology of the cross in order to determine if a theology of the cross can ever be the *Grundprinzip* of a theological system. This has involved detailing Jüngel’s sources for a theology of the cross, and examining how he understands a theology of the cross in contrast to how it has been used previously. I have shown how Jüngel sees this as an appropriate account of revelation through his reliance on Luther and Bonhoeffer’s understanding of human activity; as well as the strands that he has picked up from Hegel in thinking of God’s being as action; from Heidegger in his understanding of human existence; and from Barth for Jüngel’s understanding of freedom as self-determination. From this survey of Jüngel’s sources I have noted that none of them rely
completely on the cross for revelation and thus Jüngel’s attempt here is more vulnerable to criticisms of narrowness than the above thinkers.

In examining Jüngel’s theology of the cross, it has provided a lens through which to examine Jüngel’s understanding of christology; Jüngel’s doctrine of God; and Jüngel’s account of anthropology. Having looked at these doctrines it is clear that Jüngel’s focus is too narrow and creates restrictions on the understanding of both of God and of humanity. However, Jüngel’s writing on love looks initially as if it may ameliorate these restrictions. Thus through explicating his understanding of love I have endeavoured to resolve the issues that I have found in Jüngel’s theology; whilst also appreciating the nuances and fruits of Jüngel’s thought. A survey has been taken of commentators on Jüngel and this common core drawn from them: that the focus of Jüngel’s theology is narrow and has an unhealthy focus on passivity both in humanity and in Jüngel’s account of the person and work of Christ. Although Jüngel’s account is more nuanced, a close reading of Jüngel’s thought shows that passivity is central to Jüngel’s understanding of human action and of the second person of the Trinity.

In placing Jüngel’s thought in its time and context it may appear as if Jüngel’s thought can be seen only as relevant to those problems and to that time. However I have endeavoured to show how Jüngel’s acceptance both of the aseity of God and an embrace of God’s being as an event provides a meeting point for theologies which uphold the aseity of God as well as theologies which want to find middle ground between philosophical and practical theology. I have noted ways in which Jüngel’s thought can be repaired by those who have the time and space. I have endeavoured to show how this can be countered in Jüngel not by using an understanding of theology or metaphysics outside of his own; or by using definitions of freedom, love, or God that are other than his but with his own account of human love as mutual self-surrender. However, even this reparative method fails in the end by Jüngel’s strict standards as it resembles a natural theology, a way of knowing God apart from God’s revelation on the cross, which is both the ground for Jüngel’s new concept of God apart from metaphysics, and its downfall.
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