THE SETTLEMENT OF ROMANS AND ITALIANS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA TO AD 14

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The settlement of Romans and Italians in Hispania between the Second Punic War and the death of Augustus has attracted much interest and confusion over the last two centuries. Study in this field has been impeded by a shortage of evidence, combined with a tendency to approach the topic with preconceived ideas concerning its place in both Roman history and society. The present study seeks to understand the chronological evolution of the settlement process and the politico-juridical patterns of settlement status produced as a result. New light will be shed on this complex subject by exploring aspects of the settlement process which have previously been ignored or dismissed. The recognised, but rarely applied, division between 'formal' and 'informal' settlement types will be used to provide a framework for the study of the settlement process as a whole. Through this the wider effects of the circumstances in which individual acts of settlement took place can be better understood. This framework also allows the question of the motivational factors affecting settlers, as well as those influencing settlement founders, to be raised. These factors had a powerful ability to affect the way in which the settlement process evolved.

The study is structured as follows: chapter 2 explores the current state of the evidence available and depicts the geographical background against which settlement took place; chapters 3 and 4 respectively examine the formal settlement of the peninsula during the Republic and under Caesar and Augustus; chapter 5 investigates the factors which may have influenced veterans of the Roman army in their choice to settle in Hispania; chapter 6 covers similar ground with reference to the urban poor of Rome who settled in Hispania during the Caesarian period; chapter 7 assembles the available evidence for concrete instances of informal settlement; chapter 8 attempts to identify possible participants in informal settlement and examines the question of motivation among these independent migrants; finally, chapter 9 draws together the general conclusions arising from the study.
ABSTRACT

The settlement of Romans and Italians in Hispania between the Second Punic War and the death of Augustus has attracted much interest and confusion over the last two centuries. Study in this field has been impeded by a shortage of evidence, combined with a tendency to approach the topic with preconceived ideas concerning its place in both Roman history and society. The present study seeks to understand the chronological evolution of the settlement process and the politico-juridical patterns of settlement status produced as a result. New light will be shed on this complex subject by exploring aspects of the settlement process which have previously been ignored or dismissed. The recognised, but rarely applied, division between 'formal' and 'informal' settlement types will be used to provide a framework for the study of the settlement process as a whole. Through this the wider effects of the circumstances in which individual acts of settlement took place can be better understood. This framework also allows the question of the motivational factors affecting settlers, as well as those influencing settlement founders, to be raised. These factors had a powerful ability to affect the way in which the settlement process evolved.

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DECLARATION

As required by University of Edinburgh regulation 3.8.7, I hereby confirm that this doctoral thesis was composed by me, and is my own work.

Lisa Bligh
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And finally, many thanks to all those decent souls who did not allow their eyes to glaze over when I uttered the dreaded words ‘Roman Spain’!
Footnotes:

References to modern works provide the author’s surname, publication date and page number - full bibliographic details are supplied by the bibliography. A few abbreviations are in use, mainly for epigraphic collections and certain common reference works. A full list of abbreviations appears in the bibliography. The numbers which follow an abbreviation are catalogue numbers, rather than page numbers, unless otherwise stated. The titles of works by ancient authors are also abbreviated, following the example of the Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1968) for Latin authors and the revised edition of Liddell and Scott’s Greek - English Lexicon (Oxford, 1940) for Greek authors. The solitary exception concerns references to Appian’s Ἰβηρία, which Liddell and Scott abbreviate as ‘Hisp.’; I have preferred to use the more usual ‘Ib.’.

Terminology:

Writing about the Iberian peninsula during the Roman period presents several challenges to the English academic vocabulary. In the course of this work it has been necessary to make frequent references to the peninsula as a whole, rather than the individual Roman provinces. Writers in the English-speaking world usually use the term ‘Spain’ for this purpose - inaccurate, but simple. Spanish and Portuguese academics, forced to grapple with the political realities of the divided peninsula on a more regular basis, have appropriated the Latin word ‘Hispania’ instead. This neutral term is used to refer to the peninsula at any point from the prehistoric period to the end of the Visigothic kingdoms. Although this practice is every bit as artificial as the English use of ‘Spain’, in the final analysis I have found ‘Hispania’ the preferable term. It has been difficult, however, to avoid the use of the word ‘Spanish’, due to the absence of a suitable English substitute. ‘Iberian’ is already in service as the designation of a specific ethnic group, and ‘Hispanic’ carries strong overtones associated with Central and South America. Consequently, the term ‘Spanish’ is used, sparingly, throughout this work. In the course of argument at times it is also
necessary to differentiate between the indigenous inhabitants of Hispania and those born in Hispania of a native Italian ethnic background. Here I have followed the Roman practice of labelling the former ‘hispanus / hispana’ and the latter ‘hispaniensis’.

Chronology:
Throughout this work all dates given are BC, unless otherwise indicated.

\[\text{OLD p. 799. Velleius Paterculus 2.51.3. provides the clearest ancient explanation of the differences between these two categories.}\]
The settlement of native Italians in the Iberian peninsula between the Second Punic War and the death of Augustus is a thorny issue of long-standing. There are few certainties in this field of research and even fewer orthodoxies. Bringing together such varied issues as the spread of romanised cultural ideology, the juridical status of settlers and the social policies of various leaders of the Roman state, the subject has been a source of considerable interest and debate amongst modern scholars since last century. As the settlement issue can be connected with so many different aspects of social and political history, it has been examined from a variety of different viewpoints across the years.

In many cases the study of settlement has been a means to an end, rather than a subject of interest in itself. In particular, the strong link in ongoing academic discussion between the early stages of the infiltration of Roman and Italian culture into the peninsula and the settlement there of native Italians makes it necessary to establish the parameters of this present study clearly from the outset. Its primary purpose is to explore discernible patterns in the process of settling native Italians in Hispania during the republican and Augustan periods, and to seek out some of the possible causes of these patterns. It must be emphasised that the defining criterion of this study is ethnic origin, rather than political or juridical status. To that end, the terms ‘Roman’ and ‘Italian’ are generally used as political and juridical sub-categories of the broader ethnic classification ‘native Italian’, which will be applied to any group containing both sub-categories. The approach deliberately ignores the creation by the Roman state of communities intended for occupation by the indigenous population of Hispania and the effect of the settlement of native Italians on that population. In part this exclusive approach is due to the constraints of time imposed by the degree structure. It would be an immense task to attempt to examine all settlement in Hispania which possessed a Roman connection. However, the

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1 Thus the interest of scholars like Hoyos (1971); Keay (1990) & (1998a); and Fear (1996).
obvious benefits of a concentrated study of one self-contained element in a vast field of research have also encouraged this approach.

Amongst those scholars for whom the settlement of native Italians is the primary focus of interest, the dual aim of study so far has been to establish a place in a fixed chronology for individual settlements and to understand the niceties of their politico-juridical status. Finding acceptable answers has proved extremely difficult. Progress has been impeded by the recognised, and much lamented, deficiencies of the republican and Augustan evidence, combined with attempts by many scholars to fit settlement in Hispania into a broader view of Roman social, political and juridical ideologies drawn from elsewhere. The vast majority of published works concerning the republican and Augustan settlement of native Italians in Hispania consists of detailed studies of individual cases. These generally seek to assess all the factors involved in considerable detail and to produce a solution which is workable with reference to those particular factors alone. Attempts to study the subject as whole, establishing the evolutionary patterns of settlement generally, are comparatively rare. There have been four major overview studies in the past fifty years, those of Vittinghoff, García y Bellido, Galsterer and Marin Diaz.² These works bear little resemblance to each other, for all four authors approached the topic from their own individual perspectives. In one aspect, however, they are united. Each scholar observed the existence of a broad division between settlement taking place on an externally organised basis and that occurring on an individual level.³ At its starkest this is the difference between the foundation of a colony by the Roman state and the emigration of a single family on their own private initiative.

Despite the long-standing acknowledgement of this division, little emphasis has been placed upon it and almost no attempt has been made to explore the precise nature of the ground on either side of it. Vittinghoff, García y Bellido and Galsterer all chose to restrict their interest to one side, that involving organised settlement. Here they showed most interest in those settlements which they perceived to have a

² Vittinghoff (1952); García y Bellido (1959); Galsterer (1971); Marin Diaz (1988). It could be argued that García y Bellido's contribution is essentially a series of studies of individual settlements.
³ Vittinghoff (1952) 54-56; García y Bellido (1959) 447; Galsterer (1971) 1 & 3; Marin Diaz (1988) 47 & 113. Vittinghoff's acceptance of the existence of different varieties of settlement is more implicit than explicit.
connection with the Roman state. Those which were found to lack such a connection tended to be marked as curiosities without any real attempt to explain the reason for their existence. Marin Diaz has taken a broader view, exploring elements on both sides of the divide, but she too expressed most interest in organised settlement, here following a similar approach to her various predecessors.

In presenting my own study of the settlement of native Italians, I am, like others before me, ultimately interested in establishing the pattern of settlement in terms of chronological evolution and politico-juridical status. However, I believe that in order to achieve this it is necessary to pay far greater attention to this oft noted fact that republican and Augustan Hispania experienced more than one type of settlement across a broad spectrum of possibilities. If one is prepared to accept the existence of these variations, one must be prepared to take them into account. Dismissing or ignoring them achieves nothing and may only serve to further cloud, rather than illuminate, the issue. A universal view is only possible when all factors are appreciated. Therefore, I have chosen to take an alternative route through the subject material. In contrast to previous attempts, I wish to use the division between settlement types as a framework within which to examine the republican and Augustan settlement of native Italians. This approach will assist in understanding how the circumstances in which individual acts of settlement took place affected the pattern of settlement as a whole.

In order to make this proposition workable, however, it is first necessary to clarify the nature of the divide by establishing definitions for each of the two elements of settlement. To this end I have designated them 'formal' and 'informal', respectively, and have attempted to create a working definition of each. Formal settlements were deliberately initiated as a community by a single act of creation, whether on virgin territory or as an extension of an existing community. The definition thus covers all foundations officially instituted by the Roman state, as well as settlements created by more abbreviated, less official, means under the orders of Roman commanders in Hispania. In contrast to this ordered approach was the informal settlement of native Italians, which occurred haphazardly throughout the republican period when individuals, with or without their families, emigrated on an
independent basis. There is no single paradigm for either formal or informal settlement; they are broad categories, not closely defined types. The definitions provided are intended to establish boundaries, rather than describe precisely what lies within them.

The process of producing these definitions has raised a further point of interest. It has become increasingly apparent to me that the two settlement categories were, not unnaturally, each the result of an entirely different set of circumstances and involved different sectors of Roman and Italian society, who were motivated in their participation by divergent factors. Motivational factors affecting migrants are of especial interest in modern studies of emigration during the recent past, which tend to display a strongly sociological element. In this field, the ability to use contemporary personal accounts as primary source material has made the individual migrant’s experience a strong focus of attention. This, in turn, has encouraged attempts to use such material to isolate the motivational factors affecting both individual and community. Psychological studies of modern migrants have also tended to emphasise the importance of such factors.

My own experiences as a migrant lead me to endorse this approach. I am the child of emigrant parents; born and raised in a self-proclaimed ‘emigrant nation’, I have myself emigrated in recent years. As a result of these experiences I can testify to the personal nature of emigration. Each free decision to migrate is made as the result of a complex network of factors, some consciously appreciated, others unconsciously accepted. This view is confirmed by the seminal migration theory of Everett Lee, which plays an important role in modern micro-analytical population geography. The range of potential motivational factors is huge, but according to this theory most can be categorised in one of three ways: 1.) positive, negative or neutral influences associated with the point of origin; 2.) positive, negative or neutral influences associated with the destination; 3.) obstacles associated with movement between the two locations. Thus a migrant is not simply propelled from one

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4 A representative collection of recent studies can be found in Pooley and Whyte (1992). For systematic analysis of motivation as a factor in the process of migration see Taylor (1969) passim; Lewis (1982) chapter 7.
5 Grinberg and Grinberg (1989) is the primary study in this field.
6 Lee (1966) 49-52.
location to another by an ineluctable demographic force, but makes a conscious choice after weighing up a range of issues relating to their present life, their hopes, fears and ambitions for the future, their perception of what another location may have to offer them and the risks associated with change.

In contrast to the work of their modern-history colleagues, the issue of motivation in migration has not loomed large among those concerned with the history of the Graeco-Roman world. Where the subject has been raised in connection with the study of native Italian migration to Hispania, the tendency has been to focus on the motivation of the founders of formal settlements. This is certainly an important area, for the factors influencing a founder could have a profound and lasting effect on the community he created. Its location, size, demographic profile, socio-political structure and economic base would all be affected by the founder’s motives. Nonetheless it would be unwise to consider the motivating factors affecting the founder in isolation, for the potential inhabitants of that community were no less influential. In order to be successful any act of settlement requires the commitment of the potential participants. Settlers’ expectations, needs and wants could all affect the location and structure of a formal community in its initial configuration. It should go without saying that the motivations of informal settlers would have helped mould every aspect of this type of settlement, but the general neglect of informal settlement has often seen the question of motivation ignored in these circumstances too. In short, there is much that a study of the motivational factors affecting settlers, rather than community founders, can contribute to our understanding of the way in which the settlement of Hispania evolved.

Why so little interest has been shown in the elements which combined to encourage different groups of settlers to migrate to Hispania is not clear. It is not as though the Roman world showed no cognisance of the issue. The works of Juvenal and Virgil, among others, discuss the question of motivation from numerous angles, showing an appreciation of all three categories specified by Lee’s migration theory.8

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7 For example Vittinghoff (1952) 49-71; Galsterer (1971) chapters 2-3; Marin Diaz (1988) 113-118. Studies of the imperial period do show a greater propensity to consider the motives of the settlers themselves, see Haley (1991) 88-89.

8 Juvenal. 3: Most of the satire is concerned with Lee’s first category, but lines 4-5 and 25-28 deal with the second and third categories respectively. Virgil, Ecl. 1: This piece is less clearly concerned with
Even if these observations are of little practical use in the context of settlement in Hispania, they do demonstrate a grasp of the mechanics of motivation which most modern studies of Roman migration lack. A feeling that study would be hampered by the type of evidence available to students of the Graeco-Roman world may have occasioned the modern avoidance of the issue. Nonetheless, scholars have often been quick enough to seize on factors which might have prevented migration. In addition, broad assumptions have been made concerning the types of people involved in such settlement, but little effort has been made to follow up these suppositions with investigation into their rationality or otherwise. The imbalance of present approaches only impedes progress in the understanding of settlement. Ancient literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence is certainly less well suited to this kind of investigation than the contemporary accounts and the complex statistical data used by modern historians. Yet, within restricted parameters, such a study is perfectly feasible.

The key to the matter is to accept the limitations of the evidence. We have moved far beyond the point at which it might have been possible to examine the motivations of individual settlers. The participants have been dead some two thousand years and their personal feelings and opinions, if ever recorded, are now lost. However, the fact that it is no longer possible to reconstruct individual experiences should not be seen as a barrier to understanding motivation in the settlement process on a broader basis. Each individual settler was part of a wider demographic group, whose members shared a common range of general concerns. These common concerns usually arose from the socio-economic position held by that particular section of society and are thus far more easily visible in the historical record than the personal considerations of an individual. Therefore, once the participation of a particular demographic group in a given settlement has been established, it is possible to reconstruct some of the broader motivating factors which may have affected the establishment of that community. Equally, an understanding

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For example, Fear (1996) 31-36.

Thus Wilson (1966) on the possibility of mercantile settlement in the western Mediterranean. See chapter 8, pp. 196-197.
of the possible motives of independent settlers engaging in informal settlement may also offer helpful insights into migratory patterns.

The present study is moulded by these two issues: settlement type and the motivational factors involved. The main body of text is divided into two sections, the first concerned with formal settlement, the second with informal settlement. The first section begins with two chapters cataloguing known examples of formal settlement during the republican and Augustan periods respectively. This is followed by a further two chapters tracing the motivational factors affecting two demographic groups closely connected with settlement in these two periods: veteran settlers and the urban poor of Rome. The second section begins with an attempt to establish patterns of informal settlement. This is followed by a detailed examination of the role of merchants, a group which was one of the most important sources of informal settlers, in an attempt to better understand this particularly complex settlement type.

The many difficulties connected with the study of the settlement of native Italians in Hispania prior to the death of Augustus are not likely to be solved in one fell swoop. However, both the categorisation of settlement types and an appreciation of the role of the settler in the process, as well as that of the founder, can do much to illuminate the complex issues involved in this field of research. With these factors in mind, it is possible to construct a relatively coherent evolutionary plan of the patterns of settlement in these early and turbulent phases of the long relationship between Rome and Iberian peninsula.
CHAPTER TWO
FACTORS GOVERNING THE STUDY OF SETTLEMENT

The native Italian settlement of the Iberian peninsula is a complex field of study in which many strands are interwoven. Social, political and economic factors in Italy and Hispania combined with the geography and the elaborate ethnic composition of the Iberian peninsula to produce a distinctive settlement process. It is particularly important that these last two factors are not forgotten in any study of the subject, for they played a vital role in shaping all aspects of native Italian contact with the Iberian peninsula. Modern attempts to understand the settlement process are impeded not only by its inherent complexity, but also by a shortage of information and the difficulties of interpreting what is available. The purpose of this chapter is to address some of these issues, prior to examining the settlement process itself. The chapter has two subsections. The first deals with the state of the evidence concerning the settlement of native Italians in Hispania prior to the death of Augustus and its various difficulties. The second examines the condition of the Iberian peninsula at the end of the third century, immediately prior to the arrival of Rome, with particular reference to its geography and population.

I The evidence for settlement

Modern academic interest in native Italian settlement in Hispania has long been faced with difficulties concerning the sources of information available. Evidence of settlement of any kind is in short supply and much of what does exist is surrounded by a cloud of doubts concerning its acceptable interpretation. This is a serious problem, but not an insurmountable one. It is necessary to explore the limitations of the available material in order to understand what can, and cannot, be achieved.

Traditionally the works of ancient authors have been an important source of information. The sources' eternal preoccupation with matters military in Hispania does limit their usefulness, but this does not prevent them making a substantial contribution. In particular, they supply much of what is known about pre-Caesarian
formal settlement. Comments are often limited to an observation that at the close of a campaign a given commander settled an unspecified number of veterans at a particular place. The literary accounts may lack detail, but they have their uses, especially in providing chronological data which is otherwise hard to come by. While direct references to informal settlement may be rare, some sources, in particular Caesar and the Pseudo-Caesarian authors, do mention the existence of specific individual settlers in passing. These men all gained their place in the literary record by being something else besides an emigrant. It is always their exploits as soldiers, magistrates or even conspirators that have caused them to be recorded. Their status as an emigrant is entirely beside the point as far as the ancient texts are concerned.

The epigraphic material presents a more complex situation. Numerous collections of Spanish inscriptions have been made over the years and a vast number of texts from all parts of Spain and Portugal have been published in a variety of journals. Unfortunately there are only a very few which can be dated with any certainty to the Republic. This, the most basic and overriding problem concerning the epigraphic evidence, has a dual cause. Both the difficulty of obtaining a narrowly defined date for many potentially useful inscriptions and an apparent dearth of pre-Flavian inscriptions have contributed to produce this situation.

The majority of the securely dated inscriptions we have from Hispania are, not unnaturally, of an official nature, usually recording administrative or military contact of one sort or another between Roman governors and hispani. Only one public text, the lex Ursonensis, offers any real information concerning settlement, although several inscriptions have helped establish the correct titles of Caesarian and Augustan colonies. Private and commercial inscriptions are potentially more useful, especially in the context of informal settlement as they record the presence and activities of individuals. Unfortunately, these are much more difficult to date than those produced under official Roman auspices, as they rarely carry any recognisable

1 For example: Appian, Ib. 38 describes the foundation of Italica; Livy, Ep. 55 mentions the creation of Valentia.
2 See appendix entries A5, B1, C2, F4, I4, L1, M1, M4, M7, M8, P5, S5, T2, T3, V3 & V7 for specific examples.
3 The term 'commercial inscriptions' covers such items as ingot mould marks and tituli picti.
chronological information. Dating such inscriptions by their archaeological context is frequently nigh on impossible. Many were removed from that context well before the development of anything approaching modern archaeological technique, a problem which affects all areas of the former Roman empire. Inscriptions have been particularly prone to removal for a variety of reasons, ranging from their usefulness as building material to their popularity with antiquarians from the seventeenth century onwards. Since it is rare to find inscriptions that can safely be dated from their context, it therefore becomes necessary to date them on grounds of style alone, always a complex and uncertain process. The stylistic changes in Roman epigraphic technique which occurred between the early second century and the Augustan period were comparatively minor and are often subject to disputed interpretation. Moreover, allowance must also be made for the influence of existing provincial styles and the possible delayed receipt of stylistic innovation, both of which are highly uncertain variables in the equation.\(^4\) It is inevitable, therefore, that the vast majority of attempts to date by style alone must be heavily subjective. As a result most epigraphers choose to date any given inscription within a large margin of error, with no hope of making any further distinction. References to a particular text being from ‘the late Republic or early Empire’ abound.

Despite the frequent vagueness of the dating process, one thing is abundantly clear: the epigraphic corpus of Hispania contains very few inscriptions from the republican era. In all probability the main cause of this was the widespread destruction of settlements in Hispania during the course of the Sertorian War and the Caesarian Civil Wars.\(^5\) Devastation was extensive, and massive rebuilding programmes followed at many sites during the Julio-Claudian period, in particular under Augustus. Archaeological reports on sites across the south and east of Spain routinely bewail the lack of republican material due to extremely thorough contemporary destruction. Generally speaking, only the standard urban detritus remains to be found: the contents of rubbish heaps and so forth. Thus ceramic material and small domestic articles may survive in decent quantities, but little else is

\(^4\) For detailed comment on the various problems see Gordon and Gordon (1957) 208-217; Gordon (1983) 40-42.

\(^5\) Sallust, Hist. 2.98.9 (M); Florus, Epit. 2.10.22.8-9. See also Richardson (1996a) 116-117.
preserved. Epigraphic material that did survive the initial onslaught may well have been destroyed during the restoration process, broken up or reshaped to be used as building material for new structures.

The slight upswing in numbers of surviving inscriptions, which appears to have begun in the Augustan period, may be a reflection of the rebuilding process at the time. It is, of course, also necessary to take into account the possible impact of increased numbers of native Italian settlers coming to join the newly founded colonies of both Caesar and Augustus. Whether, in fact, great use was made of epigraphic media during the pre-Caesarian period is a difficult question, and probably one without an answer. The only point that can be made with any assurance is that, despite the Augustan increase in epigraphic material, native Italians in Hispania still do not seem to have acquired what has been dubbed the 'epigraphic habit' at this date. In comparison with Italy, the numbers of inscriptions in the Julio-Claudian era remain relatively low. A second and much more marked increase in numbers of inscriptions in the Flavian period seems to indicate that this is the point at which the Spanish provinces developed the habit. The use of epigraphy became commonplace in the east and south of the peninsula at this time, although the central Meseta, the extreme west and north-west were slower to embrace the medium. This change may be connected with Vespasian’s mysterious grant of Latin rights to all Spanish communities recorded by Pliny, although the ever-growing prosperity of the three provinces and the lengthy absence of serious disturbances there must also have helped.

The problems involved in the use of epigraphic evidence are not insurmountable. The shortage of republican material may be regretted but must also simply be accepted, since there is nothing to be done to compensate. The chronological uncertainties of the material that does exist need to be taken into account and a reasonably flexible attitude taken to inscriptions that may belong either

6 A general increase in epigraphic material across the empire in this period has been noted. See Woolf (1995) 9.
9 Notably there was no great increase in epigraphic material in these areas until the late second and early third century AD. See: Knapp (1992) 339-342.
10 Pliny, Nat. 3.30.
to the late Republic or the early Empire. In the course of this study the practice has been to accept and use inscriptions whose possible dates straddle the late Republic and early Empire.

A word of caution is needed here regarding information from both the literary sources and the epigraphic material about informal settlement. Much of this information concerns individual settlers and because of this both types of source suffer from a shared interpretative difficulty, which lies in the need to differentiate clearly between native Italians and romanised *hispani*. The process involved is not always straightforward, for frequently little more is known than the individual’s name and this is an uncertain guide. As the Asculum bronze has taught only too well, *hispani* who had a reasonable amount of contact with Romans were not above adopting Roman names to which they were not entitled. There is a tendency to think of the *tria nomina* as a jealously guarded institution, strictly laid aside for those of Roman citizenship. In practice this does not appear to have been the case, at least not uniformly. It seems likely that far away from Rome, in the wilds of Hispania, few would even think to castigate the *hispani* for such a practice. Indeed, in a land where acceptance of the Roman regime was bought at such a huge cost in men and arms, quite possibly any signs of acculturation at all on the part of the locals, particularly those high up in local social hierarchies, would have been welcomed.

Certainly Cn. Pompeius Strabo does not seem to have objected to the fact that several of the *hispani* in his auxiliary cavalry fighting in Italy bore Roman names to which they had no right, prior to his gift of citizenship. Indeed, during the Republic the *hispani* seem to be split into two distinct camps, those bearing traditional Iberian, or Celtiberian, single names and those who had taken up a fully Roman tripartite formula. The in-between stage, common in the Empire, of a *tria nomina* format

11 The Asculum bronze (*CIL I*2 709) records a grant of citizenship *virtutis causa* to a troop of Spanish cavalry, the *Turma Salluitana*, in 89 B.C. Three recipients from Ilerda bear Roman *tria nomina*, although their patronyms are distinctively Spanish. See Badian (1958) 256; see also comment about the status of the Ilerdenses in chapter 3, pp. 82-83.

12 A general overview of the situation is given by Brunt (1971) 207-209.

13 On the slow absorption of Roman culture in Hispania up until the first century and the dependence of the process on the acculturation of individuals, rather than communities, see Keay (1995) 298-300; Woolf (1995) 11-13. Woolf (1995) 9-10 has pointed out that the Iberian peninsula seems to follow an acculturation pattern which was common among republican acquisitions of Rome.

14 *CIL I*2 709. See note 11 above.
containing native elements does not appear to have been in use before the very late Republic.\textsuperscript{15}

In the case of epigraphic material, a person’s Roman tribe, if given, can often be helpful. Tribal affiliations were not uniformly employed in epigraphic texts recording native Italians, so the absence of such information on a inscription indicates nothing. However, it should be noted that most enfranchisement of hispani is thought to have taken place after 45.\textsuperscript{16} Caesarian and Augustan citizenship grants generally arose from the creation of formal settlements and in many cases they are marked by the use of particular tribes. It is known that Caesar allotted his new Spanish citizens to tribes in a careful and controlled manner. Inhabitants of colonies were allocated to the tribus Sergia and those of municipia to the tribus Galeria. Augustus, a more energetic founder of cities in Hispania, was not quite so restrictive. Inhabitants of colonies were enrolled in a variety of tribes, but, as Caesar had done, all those from municipia were allotted to the tribus Galeria.\textsuperscript{17} How many people were actually affected by these grants is unclear, the area is full of confusion.\textsuperscript{18} However, as a result of the enrolment restrictions, individuals who appear in the sources belonging to either the tribus Sergia or the tribus Galeria may be treated with suspicion, no matter how impeccable their credentials seem to be in other respects.

There is clearly a need for caution, nonetheless it should be remembered that, while both epigraphic and literary sources may omit vital information, neither type deliberately sets out to deceive modern scholars. Careful reading and consideration of all the data available can go a long way towards a solution. An attempt to cover the minutiae involved in such exercises here would be lengthy and inappropriate. Such matters are far better dealt with as, and when, they arise.

\textsuperscript{15} The hispani adapted the traditional tria nomina in a variety of ways. The most common was the use of a Spanish cognomen, thus we have P. Plotius, P.f. Gal. Reburrus from Arucci (Aroche, prov. Huelva), see CILA I 6. ‘Reburrus’ is a characteristically indigenous name, often in use by itself. In some cases the gentilician name is also native in origin, for example Q. Cosconius Cousanus recorded at Finca Santa Maria del Guadiana (prov. Ciudad Real), see Alföldy (1987a) 240-241. In almost all cases praenomina are Roman.

\textsuperscript{16} Brunt (1971) 204-205. See also Badian (1958) Appendix B (i).

\textsuperscript{17} Castillo (1988) 234-236.

\textsuperscript{18} Brunt (1971) 246-250 gives a basic outline on the question of who might actually receive citizenship in the process of colonial foundation.
Epigraphic and literary sources supply comparatively direct information, which may need verification but generally requires little interpretation. The limited nature of this corpus has resulted in considerable attention being paid to more indirect material, making a clear delineation of its appropriate use vital. This sort of information frequently arises from the interpretation of archaeological data indicating contact between *hispani* and native Italians. It is not especially plentiful, due to the destructive phase of the Caesarian Civil Wars already discussed, but where it exists it seems to offer a viable alternative. However, the two most abundant indicators of contact produced by the archaeological material, imported manufactured goods and the romanisation of Spanish material, political and religious culture, both present difficulties. Each clearly indicates contact with Roman and Italian culture, but the degree to which either testifies to the settlement of native Italians remains a highly debatable issue. The careless use of these types of material must be avoided.

The discovery of elements of Roman culture in a foreign province, particularly if they date to an early phase of that province’s existence, provide intriguing food for thought. There is an obvious temptation to use this kind of evidence to assert the presence of settlers, either as the agents of the romanisation of indigenous society, or, more rarely, as preservers of their home culture in a foreign land. The use of either approach in a particular case without supporting evidence from other sources is unwise; blanket use of such an approach is unthinkable. The romanisation phenomenon is a highly complex one affecting, to differing degrees, all elements of the indigenous culture in question. The mechanisms by which it occurred are thought to have varied between different areas and, despite much research, they remain poorly understood. In the specific case of Hispania, a wide range of opinions exist concerning the degree of romanisation achieved by the death of Augustus. Although the consensus opinion is now turning away from Blázquez’ view that Hispania, in particular the south, was influenced by Roman culture from an early stage and heavily romanised by the end of the Republic, few have yet openly joined Fear in his belief that Roman ideas had had little impact on even the Baetic valley by this time. Equally there is considerable dissent concerning the manner by which such

19 See above, pp. 3-4.
romanisation was (or was not) accomplished. The respective roles of the army, along with its veterans and indigenous auxiliaries, civilian settlement, trade, the machinations of the Roman state and the willing participation of *hispani* have yet to be fully uncovered.\(^{21}\)

Under such circumstances, all use of this kind of material is best restricted to a corroborative role. This is a necessary decision, but one that has important ramifications. Archaeological studies of areas where there is no corroborative epigraphic or literary evidence of settlement, formal or informal, are naturally of less value as a result. This applies equally to field surveys and to more detailed excavation work. The Iberian peninsula has seen many publications arising from both kinds of investigation and those concerned with the spread of Roman villa systems in Hispania have often been associated with the quest to distinguish between the presence of native Italians and romanised *hispani* in a given area.\(^{22}\) The work of Gorges, Ponsich, Prevosti and the *Ager Tarraconenensis* survey team have all brought interesting findings to light in this connection.\(^{23}\) However, to use their data to substantiate or deny the presence of native Italians, when the ethnic origin of those inhabiting a given site remains uncertain, is unwise, to say the least. As a result these investigations do not play a major role in the current study, except where outside information suggests a native Italian presence.

Use of goods imported from Italy, mainly ceramic fineware and wine amphorae, as evidence for informal settlement requires similarly careful treatment. Although in recent years such material has been discarded by many scholars as possible evidence of the romanisation of indigenous inhabitants, dense clusters of finds around a particular site might still be taken to indicate a Roman presence.\(^{24}\)

\(^{21}\) A notable development in the last few decades has been the appreciation of the point that the process was probably the result of a blend of all these elements in uneven measures, rather than just one or two. The change is exemplified in the difference between the work of Balil and Le Roux. Both are deeply interested in the role of the Roman army in Hispania in their research generally, but Le Roux (1995) marks the army as only one of several factors, refusing to label it the primary agent of romanisation, a position Balil (1955-1956) cheerfully embraced.


\(^{23}\) Gorges (1979); Ponsich (1974-1991); Carreté *et al.* (1995). Prevosti has yet to produce a single compendium publication of all her research; Prevosti (1991) gives a good outline of her general approach. For a fairly thorough bibliography of Prevosti’s more specific investigations see Olesti Vila (1997) 87-90.

\(^{24}\) For recent and emphatic dismissal of Italian ceramic goods as proof of romanisation, see Keay (1995) 295.
However, the presence of Italian pots should never be automatically equated with the presence of native Italian people. In order for such an equation to be viable, it would be necessary to understand all finds of Italian goods in Hispania to have been brought there either by native Italian emigrants for their own use, or by merchants for the use of native Italian settlers only. This is clearly not the case. Italian ceramic goods are known to have appeared in Hispania as early as the sixth century, albeit on a very small scale.\(^25\) By the mid third century Italian goods, particularly those from Etruria, were being imported into communities throughout southern and eastern regions of Hispania.\(^26\) There is no indication from any other type of source that native Italian settlement occurred during this period and certainly there is no academic school of thought which would support this suggestion. True, imports continued to flourish after the arrival of Roman troops in 218 and there is no obvious bar to some of that trade being aimed at settlers yearning for a piece of home.\(^27\) Nonetheless, the existence of Italian goods in Hispania long before there is any serious possibility of settlement does establish clearly that finds of such items must be seen primarily as evidence of trade, not settlement. That trade may reflect aspects of the settlement of Hispania, but the information it provides should be used only in conjunction with other, corroborative material.

The manifold difficulties presented by the possible sources of information concerning the native Italian settlement of Hispania have serious and far-reaching consequences. There are definite limits to investigation in this field and it seems unlikely that we will ever properly understand many finer details of the settlement process. Before gloom and despair descend, however, it must be noted that for all the aspects of settlement lost to history, many more are perfectly comprehensible in the light of the material available. The geographical and chronological spread of settlement, particularly the formal variety, can be established with little difficulty. Within certain limits it is also possible to gather information about the settlers themselves, their ethnic and social background and the status of the communities they joined. It may not be possible to conduct this study in as systematic a manner as

\(^{25}\) Maluquer de Motes (1985) 20; Sanmartí Grego et al. (1991) 84.


\(^{27}\) See chapter 8, section II.
might be desirable, but it is still possible to draw valid and worthwhile conclusions from the available data.

II Geographical and ethnographic background

It is fast becoming a matter of informal tradition that works concerned with Hispania begin with an exposition of the geography of the Iberian peninsula and the nature of its inhabitants prior to Roman arrival. This tradition may cause a slight air of repetition, but it is does have a sound methodological basis. Both factors influenced the manner in which Rome and her representatives behaved in the Spanish provinces and must be taken into consideration in any study of Hispania. They also formed the background to native Italian settlement and were contributing factors in its evolution. Naturally, these matters will be explored in greater detail at appropriate points, but it is important to establish the broad outlines first.

In geological terms, the Iberian peninsula is a core of hard crystalline rock, overlaid with extensive, repetitive sedimentation. A series of orogenetic phases have rent the basic fabric of the peninsula and thrust large sections upwards, thus forming both the characteristic sierras of the peninsula's central sector and the high mountains at its margins (map 2). A central tableland, the Meseta, is framed by a series of ranges of varying heights: to the west the Estrêla-Guadarrama group; to the north-west the Cantabrian range; to the north-east the Pyrenees; to the east the broken hill country of the Soria-Teruel group; and to the south the successive barriers of the Montes de Toledo, the Sierra Morena and the complex Betic Cordillera. This last range, the Betic Cordillera, drops below sea level at the Cabo de la Náo on the Mediterranean coast, but a series of peaks occur at its eastern tip forming the Balearic Islands. The eastern coast of the peninsula is characterised by the existence of alluvial plains, narrow in places and enlarged in others by fluvial deposits. Along the peninsula's south-eastern and extreme north-western coasts the hills run more or less to the sea itself, in some areas with little reduction in altitude. However, towards the western end of the southern coast the Guadalquivir river has created a sizeable fluvial plain near its mouth, and on the western coast, south of the mouth of the Duero at Oporto, the hills slope away gradually, reaching a relatively low level at the coastline.
These two features combine to make the coastal zone of the peninsula’s south-west corner fairly low-lying.

The peninsula has a number of important river systems, chiefly the Ebro (Latin: Hiberus), Guadalquivir (Baetis), Duero/Douro (Durius), Tajo/Tejo (Tagus) and Guadiana (Anas).28 The latter three drain directly from the central Meseta to the Atlantic, the Duero and Tajo flowing more or less due west, the Guadiana flowing west then sharply south. However it is the Guadalquivir and Ebro which figure most prominently in the history of republican settlement, because they pass through territory routinely under Roman control at that time. The Guadalquivir also drains into the Atlantic, but rises in the eastern Betic Cordillera and flows out of it in a sluggish meandering course along the southern flank of the Sierra Morena. In the Roman period it is thought to have flowed into the sea due north of Gades (Cádiz) not far south of Hispalis (Sevilla) where it met a broad sea inlet known as the Lacus Ligustinus; the area is now heavily silted marshland.29 The river was navigable by seagoing vessels as far as Hispalis and by substantial rivercraft as far as Corduba (Córdoba) at this time.30 The Ebro, which rises at the eastern edge of the Cantabrian range, was also navigable by commercial vessels at this period.31 It flows south-east along the southern edge of a broad sedimentary depression and empties into the Mediterranean, offering the only useful fluvial entrance to the Spanish hinterland from the eastern coast.

As might be expected of such a large land mass, there is considerable climatic variation across the peninsula. The regions of Galicia, Asturias, the País Vasco and western Portugal north of Lisbon possess a moderate climate without seasonal extremes in temperature. Annual rainfall in these areas is high, however, roughly twice what the rest of the peninsula experiences. A typically Mediterranean climate of hot, dry summers, and mild winters prevails in Cataluña, the Balearic Islands, the País Valenciano, Murcia, Andalucia and south-west Portugal. However it should be noted that there are several localised variations within this group. The broad

28 The modern names will be used in the course of this geographical discussion, but the Latin ones will be preferred in the examination of settlement.
29 Keay (1998b) 12.
30 Strabo 3.2.3.
31 Pliny, Nat. 3.21.
depression formed by the central Guadalquivir valley experiences exceptionally high summer temperatures, often in excess of 35°C, combined with high humidity. Murcia, on the other hand, receives an extremely low annual rainfall, leading parts of the region to be the only areas in Europe designated ‘sub-Saharan’. The final climatic unit, comprising the central Meseta and the northern Ebro basin, also receive a low level of annual rainfall, but experience a far greater seasonal swing in temperatures than elsewhere. Hot, dry summers are combined with average winter temperatures of 1-7°C.

These geological and climatic features have remained unchanged for many millennia, but the same cannot always be said for the peninsula’s natural resources and we now enter the difficult, and often speculative, realms of historical geography. According to a number of Roman writers, Hispania was famous across the Roman world for a range of agricultural products, and mineral deposits. It was not only the quality of such goods, but also their quantity that counted. The peninsula had a reputation for production and export on a grand scale. This was particularly true during the Empire when most extant commentators were writing; her reputation for natural bounty may have been more muted during the Republic, when wine and silver had to compete with revolts and massacres in the public imagination. By far the most attention-grabbing aspect of Hispania in the republican period was the mining industry based in the central sierras of the peninsula. The greatest resources lay in the north-west, outside the area Rome controlled during the Republic. Within Rome’s reach at this time lay the mines around Carthago Nova (Cartagena, prov. Murcia), which were chiefly producers of lead and silver. By the first century the manifold mines of the Sierra Morena also came under Roman authority, producing silver, lead, copper and cinnabar, along with small quantities of gold. The ores in both areas lived up to their reputations, containing a comparatively high proportion of metal by both modern and ancient standards.

32 Way (1962) 58; British Naval Intelligence Division (1941-1945) vol. 1, 121-122 & fig. 34.
33 Strabo 3.2.10-11; Polybius 3.57.3; Diodorus Siculus 3.36-37.
34 See chapter 6, pp. 151-156.
35 Davies (1935) 107-110. See also chapter 7, pp. 183-185.
36 Davies (1935) 111-139.
Spanish agriculture and fisheries during the Republic were less likely to fire ancient writers' imagination, but nonetheless these were potentially important elements in the peninsula's economic life. Coastal regions had rich resources in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, both were well stocked and easily exploited. Almost nothing is known of fishing practices during the republican period, but the frequency with which fish appear in coin types suggests they were an important food source. Fortunately there is more information concerning republican agriculture. The central Meseta, now either under the plough or covered in scrubby vegetation, was heavily wooded until the late medieval period. It could provide timber and game, and some parts may have been suitable for the keeping of foraging animals, such as pigs, but arable farming would have been difficult. The richest arable land in the modern Iberian peninsula is alluvial in nature and lies in the Mediterranean coastal plains, especially to the south of the Ebro Delta, and in the Guadalquivir valley. These areas also appear to have offered the best agricultural land in the Roman era. Murcia is particularly fertile, but currently large areas must be farmed with the aid of modern intensive irrigation techniques, which were unavailable to the Roman landowner. The Guadalquivir valley fares better, combining good soil with an average annual rainfall of around 60cm, and it was highly productive during the Roman period. South-west Portugal and inland Cataluña also provided land suitable for arable farming, albeit less productive. Rich pasturage suitable for cattle would have been rare outside the north-west, given the rest of the peninsula's comparatively low rainfall. However animals of a smaller, tougher nature, such as sheep and goats, would be easily kept at the margins of arable areas and in the central sierras, during the summer. Notably Varro recommends slaves from Hispania as stockmen, suggesting herding was an important feature of Iberian agriculture.

37 There are many references in the ancient sources to Hispania's plentiful fish stocks, for example Strabo 3.2.7; Pliny, Nat. 9.49.
38 Fish are found depicted on coins from most coastal areas. A representative selection includes Balsa (near Tavira, prov. Algarve), GF 1176; Gades (Cádiz), GF 1296-1308; Carteia (El Rocadillo, prov. Cádiz), GF 1215ff; and Saguntum (Sagunto, prov. Valencia), GF 340-355.
41 Varro, R 2.10.4.
Prior to the dispatch of the army to Hispania in 218 there had been some limited diplomatic contact between Rome and the Carthaginian forces there, and it is also likely that there were at least a few traveller's tales concerning the area circulating at Rome, but there is no reason to believe that the Romans were well informed about the land they were invading.\(^{42}\) The situation at the time of their arrival was certainly complex. The Iberian peninsula was a melting pot of cultures and ethnic groups; Celts, Phoenicians, Greeks and, of course, Carthaginians mingled with the autochthonous population. Fortunately a combination of archaeological and ancient literary evidence allows the creation of a 'snapshot view' of the situation at the end of the third century, at which time the majority of the peninsula's population belonged to one of three basic ethnic groups: the Iberians, occupying Cataluña, the eastern coast and Andalucia; the Celts and Celtiberians holding the central Meseta, along with Asturias, Galicia and much of Portugal; and the members of the Talayotic culture in the Balearic Islands.

The term 'Iberians' is largely one of convenience used to describe a general category of people, who appear to have been autochthonous inhabitants of the peninsula. The various groups under this label all spoke dialects of the same non-Indo-European language and are further linked together by religious beliefs and practices and by other broad cultural concerns, including a preference for nucleated settlement.\(^{43}\) However, there was no single cohesive Iberian society. Numerous highly independent sub-groups existed and these are poorly understood by both modern and ancient scholarship. One of the few points that can be made with some assurance is that something of a north-south split seems to have existed. In southern areas urban centres appear to have been an important building block in the social power structure. These may not have conformed to Roman expectations of urban life, as they lacked many of the requisite physical features, but they do seem to have been recognised as cities.\(^{44}\) In the north-eastern sector, by contrast, there seems to have been a greater inclination towards tribal organisation. Here too there were fortified settlements - *oppida* - usually sited on hilltops which acted as central foci

\(^{42}\) For the diplomatic contacts see Polybius 2.12.3-7; 3.15.1-5.
\(^{44}\) For an exploration of these Roman expectations see Fear (1996) 6-16. The importance of cities in the south was noted, if over-emphasised, by Strabo (3.2.1).
for smaller settlements in less well-defended positions. These are frequently classified as urban communities by modern scholars, but they do not remotely conform to Roman social ideology concerning urban life and there is no sign that they were viewed as cities by the Romans.\textsuperscript{45} Archaeological research has already shown that southern communities had a richer, better developed material culture than existed in many northern areas;\textsuperscript{46} further research may produce answers to many questions about the Iberians.

Knowledge of the peninsula's second ethnic grouping is equally insecure. Celtic peoples from the central Meseta known as 'Celtiberians' attracted the attention of authors in the ancient world by their staunch defiance of Roman rule. These people were speakers of a dialect from that branch of the Celtic language group known as Q-Celtic or Goidelic.\textsuperscript{47} Modern scholars have since labelled communities spread over a far wider geographic range 'Celtic' on the basis of toponyms and some personal names from areas west of the Meseta which reflect the same linguistic features.\textsuperscript{48} Archaeological investigations have also shown that while material culture may not be uniform across these areas, there are recurrent characteristics, in particular a tendency toward the use of small, heavily defended hillforts (castros). Similarities in religious beliefs are also apparent and Celtic deities known from elsewhere in Europe have a high profile in many of these areas.\textsuperscript{49} It has never been clear whether the Celts, who seem to have arrived in Hispania as invaders at the beginning of the first millennium, drove out the autochthonous population, or simply absorbed them.\textsuperscript{50} No answer is currently forthcoming, but, whichever was the case, it was the incoming Celtic culture which predominated in the central and western peninsula. Like the Iberians, the Celts did not form a coherent single unit. Once again ancient sources suggest they were divided into tribes. This sounds plausible

\textsuperscript{45} Ruiz Zapatero and Alvarez-Sanchis (1995) 209-210. See also note 44.
\textsuperscript{46} Arribas (1964) 116-119.
\textsuperscript{47} Renfrew (1987) 244.
\textsuperscript{48} Rankin (1987) 166-168.
\textsuperscript{50} Fernández Castro (1995) 353. There have been a wide range of suggestions regarding when the Celts arrived, and this date merely reflects the latest academic consensus, rather than any real certainty offered by the evidence.
given what is known of Celtic societies elsewhere, but study is still continuing in this area.\textsuperscript{51}

The inhabitants of the Balearic Islands present further difficulties. The islands lie 100-200 kilometres off the coast of the mainland, a distance sufficient to ensure their social and cultural independence. There is little evidence for the habitation of the southern islands, Ibiza and Formentera, prior to the establishment of a Phoenician colony on Ibiza in the seventh century, and nothing is known of their indigenous populations.\textsuperscript{52} However, the northern islands of Majorca and Minorca appear to have been inhabited from the Neolithic period onwards, probably colonised from the mainland. Here, the Talayotic culture came into existence during the Bronze Age and continued without interruption until the arrival of the Romans. In essence it was an agricultural and pastoral society, inclined to live in small, fortified, nucleated settlements, but it had sufficient resources to engage in building complex tomb structures and in the erection of numerous megalithic monuments, the `talayots' which supply its modern label.\textsuperscript{53} Unfortunately, the comparatively rich archaeological record gives few other clues to its socio-political structure. However, it is interesting to note that this society seems to have developed with little reference to the mainland and, in fact, shows greater similarities to the `Nuraghic' culture of Sardinia.\textsuperscript{54}

These three groups form what may loosely be termed the native population of the Iberian peninsula. Although the Celtiberians should strictly be deemed immigrants, they had been the established inhabitants of large areas of Hispania for hundreds of years by the late third century and were regarded part of the Spanish landscape by Graeco-Roman historians, geographers and poets alike.\textsuperscript{55} Their status stands in contrast to several sets of later arrivals, who came in smaller numbers and stayed very much on the fringes of the peninsula. These groups created less serious disturbances in existing social and cultural systems, but nonetheless they had an impact which must be taken into account.

\textsuperscript{51} The difficulties of linking the archaeological evidence to the information provided by the literary sources is explored by Savory (1968) 239-242.
\textsuperscript{52} Pericot García (1972) 114.
\textsuperscript{53} Pericot García (1972) chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{54} Pericot García (1972) 111-112.
\textsuperscript{55} Thus Appian, \textit{ib.} 44-55; Strabo 3.4.10-14; Martial 1.49, 4.55.
The first of these newcomers were the Phoenicians, who founded numerous settlements across the western Mediterranean from the eighth century onwards. They appear to have been drawn initially by the silver resources of the Sierra Morena, in pursuit of which the mercantile colony of Gadir (Cádiz, Latin: Gades) was founded at the sea mouth of the Lacus Ligustinus. Settlements were also established along the Mediterranean coast of Andalucia, concentrated between the modern cities of Málaga and Almeria in areas with little indigenous habitation, and in the Sierra Morena, close to the mining zone. These were more modest enterprises than Gadir, and various suggestions have been made concerning their purpose. Trade with the indigenous population seems an unlikely function, since native settlements in these areas were few and far between, but they may have been involved in the export of their own agricultural produce or metallic resources. A further settlement, Eivissa (Latin: Ebusus), on Ibiza may also have been intended to exploit agricultural resources, but in addition it was a strategically placed entrepôt, lying on a commonly used route to Sicily, Carthage and the eastern Mediterranean.

The impact of these communities on the southern Iberian peninsula is difficult to quantify. The majority were small and short-lived, comparatively speaking, for Phoenician interest in Hispania spanned only two centuries. Nonetheless, various claims have been made on their behalf. Most notably the Phoenicians have been credited with bringing southern Spain into the Iron Age, but this idea is now viewed with some scepticism, given that iron tools are rarely found during the period of Phoenician settlement, and that the Celts had already introduced northern Spain to iron-working some two centuries earlier. They certainly did influence native religious beliefs, however, introducing various eastern cults, in particular those of Astarte and Melqart, especially in the south. They also brought writing skills, probably laying the basis for the partially syllabic Iberian alphabet. For much of

this century it has also been assumed that the Phoenician influence was at least partially responsible for the orientalizing style which dominated the Iberian plastic arts from the later sixth century onwards. However this has recently been disputed and scholars are increasingly willing to accept that Greek influence may also have been involved.\(^{64}\) It is interesting to note that the most fundamental levels of material culture do not seem to have been affected. Urban life in areas adjacent to Phoenician settlements proceeded much as it had before; domestic and funerary architecture, town planning, and other mundane aspects of human existence continued unchanged.\(^{65}\) Most Phoenician settlements were situated in areas of low indigenous population density, consequently Gadir, the commercial metropolis, would have been the main source of Phoenician cultural influence. This situation may explain the peripheral nature of that influence.

The Phoenician settlements’ economic fortunes were closely linked with those of their parent cities, since these provided markets for the goods which the settlements produced. In the mid-sixth century a series of events, beginning with the fall of Tyre to the Assyrian empire and ending with the fall of that empire in turn to the Persians, brought serious economic change to the cities of Phoenicia.\(^{66}\) This seems to have resulted in the abandonment by Phoenician settlers of most communities along the Mediterranean coast and in the hinterland.\(^{67}\) In some cases the settlements were then re-occupied by Carthaginians.\(^{68}\) Eivissa and Gadir seem to have been less severely affected, in part because they were active trade centres in their own right, rather than small production units. They had a larger population base and were less commercially specialised; their diversity would have offered alternative options after the loss of Phoenician markets. However in their case too, a crucial factor seems to have been the interest taken in them by Carthage.\(^{69}\)

This city, itself a Phoenician colony, seems to have taken a proprietary interest in the commercial centres of the western Mediterranean following the decline in

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\(^{64}\) Arribas (1964) 154.


\(^{67}\) Aubet (1993) 273-274.

\(^{68}\) Harrison (1988) 80-81.

power of the Phoenician cities. The stories told by both archaeological material and literary sources are still in the process of being unravelled. However, there is no sign that Carthage made any sudden attempt to dominate former Phoenician outposts, but rather her power developed slowly and over a long period of time. In fact, her interest in the settlements of southern Hispania seems to have begun before the Phoenician cities lost their grip on the area; certain changes in burial practice from Phoenician to Carthaginian are discernible in some places as early as the end of the seventh century. By the fifth century Carthaginian culture had more or less replaced the Phoenician influence, and by the fourth the Spanish communities Carthage controlled were flourishing. She did find a few settlements of her own, mainly in the mining districts of the Sierra Morena and the Betic Cordillera, but Gades and Eivissa remained the chief cities of Carthaginian Hispania. Carthaginians did conduct trade with inland areas of the peninsula, but the finds of her goods have been few and far between, and it would seem the main allure of Hispania continued to be the metallic resources.

It should be noted, that in contrast to the Phoenician cities, Carthage did exercise some measure of control over Iberian communities in southern Hispania. The mechanics of this situation largely elude us, but the archaeological evidence seems to indicate that Carthaginian power there was based on the use of political and economic protection and patronage, rather than territorial domination, and was, at least initially, apparently peaceable in nature. There is no sign of a sudden upswing in military activity, or of the imposition of Punic will through the adoption of cultural practices. Of course, this does not mean that the Carthaginian regime, if it can be called that, was a beneficent or harmonious one and it is clear that as time passed Carthage became increasingly jealous in her guardianship of southern Hispania. By the third century the peaceful approach had been abandoned and the Carthaginian army had moved in. It is usually assumed that Carthage had been forced to increase

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73 Harrison (1988) 89.
76 Harden (1962) 67-70.
her hold over southern Hispania as a result of the economic and political pressures brought to bear on her after the First Punic War.\textsuperscript{77} The course of the Second Punic War in Hispania demonstrated clearly that Carthage had a powerful political presence and was a force to be reckoned with there.

The Iberians showed no greater inclination to adopt Carthaginian ways than they had those of the Phoenicians. The Punic influence was mainly noticeable in matters of religious belief and burial practice, although it may also have helped foster some aspects of the ‘orientalizing’ Iberian art in this period.\textsuperscript{78} As in the case of the Phoenicians, Punic influence tended to produce changes in social, rather than political, aspects of life, and at a comparatively elevated socio-economic level.\textsuperscript{79} The people who responded most readily to the new culture were those at the top of the social hierarchy, more frequently exposed to foreign ideas through their roles as community leaders, and better able to afford the expense of their adoption. At lower levels of society the points of contact would have been small in number and erratic in nature.

Not all foreign influence on the indigenous inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula was Semitic in origin, however. Greek commercial expansion in the western Mediterranean had begun at roughly the same time as Phoenician activities.\textsuperscript{80} Their initial interests had concentrated around Italy and Sicily, and Greek pottery has not been found in Hispania before the start of the seventh century.\textsuperscript{81} Once established, however, Greek commercial contacts flourished; fine painted ceramic ware was exported to Hispania in huge quantities and from all quarters of the Greek world, finding its way deep into the hinterland.\textsuperscript{82} Nonetheless, many aspects of the trade remain a mystery, it is not known if other Greek goods were also exported, nor is it clear what Greek traders received in return. Most of the merchants involved in the trade were probably from western Greek communities, rather than the eastern cities.

\textsuperscript{77} Scullard (1989) 21-23.
\textsuperscript{78} Arribas (1964) 154.
\textsuperscript{80} Woodhead (1962) 31.
\textsuperscript{81} Boardman (1980) 213; Culican 524.
\textsuperscript{82} They have been found across the peninsula in Celtiberian, as well as Iberian, areas. Andalucía has produced enormous numbers of finds, suggesting people in the wealthier south were better able to afford the wares. See Maluquer de Motes (1985) passim; Rouvillard (1985) passim. Imitations were also popular, see Pereira and Sánchez (1985) 87.
where the majority of the pots actually originated. There is some speculation as to whether, particularly in the earliest phase of the trade, Phoenician or Carthaginian merchants were involved - a likely possibility in the south.83

The commercial expansion of Greek cities into the western Mediterranean resulted in city foundations on the eastern coast of the peninsula; Strabo refers to five such cities: Rhode, Emporion, Akra Leukré, Hemeroscopeion and Alonis.84 All were supposedly Massaliote in origin. The latter three were apparently located between Carthago Nova and the Júcar river (Sucro), but no information, beyond the fact of their existence, is available from the literary sources and their sites have yet to be discovered. There has been a move to dismiss Strabo’s description as confusion on his part between temporary Greek trading posts located in this general area and genuine city foundations, which seems a likely possibility, although the suggestion has not yet received widespread acceptance.85

Rhode and Emporion are less controversial entities. Situated on the northern and southern shores of the Golfo de Rosas respectively, their sites have been the subject of extensive archaeological investigation. Emporion was founded at the start of the sixth century, initially on a small island near to the shore, later transferring to a site close by on the mainland.86 Despite the opinions of some ancient authors, Rhode seems to have been a slightly later foundation, dating perhaps from the start of the fifth century.87 Although their primary purpose seems to have been to operate as trading posts, in the longer term both became fully-rounded, self-sufficient communities. In marked contrast to the Phoenician settlements in the south, they were established in well populated areas, close to existing Iberian communities.88 Providing good relations could be maintained, this situation allowed easy trade with local peoples and, through them, access to trade routes into the hinterland. Despite comments by Strabo and Livy regarding the cautious approach the people of Emporion took to their neighbours and their obvious concern for the town’s security,

83 Boardman (1980) 211.
84 Strabo 3.4.6 & 3.4.8. Strabo suggests Rhode was founded by the Rhodians, but he seems to be arguing on the basis of the name, rather than any historical information.
86 Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 16.
88 Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 14.
good relations seem to have prevailed both here and at Rhode. It is hard to imagine how either town could have survived the determined hostility of their neighbours, let alone thrived commercially, as both did.

The Greek presence in the Iberian peninsula was largely commercial in nature and seems to have left traces mainly in areas connected with those commercial endeavours. The most prominent of their contributions was the introduction of coinage, the use of which spread to both Iberian and Celtiberian communities. In addition Greek artistic styles have been linked to the 'orientalizing' period in Iberian art. It is important to note, that while the artistic influence of the Greeks through their pottery was probably considerable, their physical presence in the peninsula was small and geographically limited.

As can be seen clearly, even from this brief review, the Iberians were the frontline recipients of foreign cultural influence from the eighth century onwards. They lived along the southern and eastern coasts colonised by the Phoenicians, Carthaginians and Greeks. These were the main areas in which trade and other forms of cultural interface will have occurred. Even if only a few communities actually had a foreign 'colony' as a near neighbour, many others in this general area would have been subject to cultural influences through less direct means. Nonetheless, this contact does not seem to have produced fundamental change in the Iberian communities. The most immediate, archaeologically visible, changes were religious and artistic. These were not unimportant issues, but at a fundamental level life continued more or less unchanged.

Undoubtedly contact with foreign peoples will have had effects which archaeology is quite unable to trace. One pre-existing characteristic of Iberian life in the south of the peninsula may have been encouraged into greater development by the presence of these foreign cultures. Along the southern coast and in the Guadalquivir valley the practice of living in nucleated urban communities had been well established prior to contact with either Greek and Semitic groups. That contact with these foreign cultures may have encouraged this practice seems a reasonable

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89 Strabo 3.4.8; Livy 34.8.4-9.
90 Gil Farrés (1959) chapter 2.
hypothesis, given that they too were accustomed to live in this kind of community.92
Another strong possibility is that groups in regular contact with one of the 'colonial' settlements would have had an increased ability to cope with foreign cultures. The Iberians would have been more open to new ideas, even if they were unwilling to make wholesale changes to their own lives as a result. This flexibility was something the Celtic peoples of the peninsula appear to have lacked, quite possibly because any foreign influences reaching them had already been filtered through more familiar neighbours. The previous experiences of all the native inhabitants of Hispania would have a profound impact on the way they reacted to the arrival of Rome.

PART I: FORMAL SETTLEMENT
CHAPTER THREE
PRE-CAESARIAN FORMAL SETTLEMENT

This is already well-worked ground. A form of 'union catalogue' of republican settlements has existed for some time, and there have been few suggested alterations in the last fifty years. Although not numerous, the known examples are certainly varied and it is this variety which has provided, and continues to provide, considerable scope for scholarly argument. Constrained by the paucity of both literary and archaeological evidence concerning republican settlements, discussion has, to a very great degree, revolved around the question of their status. The need to draw a distinction between settlements created under Roman auspices for the use of the indigenous inhabitants of Hispania and those intended to involve Romans and Italians has been keenly felt. Likewise, much time has been devoted to the attempt to separate settlements created officially by the Roman state from those created unofficially. This chapter will concern itself with both questions, in particular the latter. However, before the cases of individual settlements are examined a few words on various questions of status and definition are necessary.

I The structure of formal settlement

In the first place, it must be remembered that this section deals only with formal settlement, which is to say settlements deliberately established as a community by a single act of creation (although they may have actually come into physical being over a period of time), whether on virgin territory or as an extension of, or replacement for, an existing community.¹ This definition naturally excludes a number of towns which are prominent in the account of the Roman experience in Hispania - for example Emporiae (L'Escala, prov. Gerona) or Ilipa (Alcalá del Río, prov. Sevilla). Many communities did indeed harbour Romans and Italians amongst their inhabitants, in some cases in quite large numbers, but experienced no single creative act which established them as a home to such people. Some of these towns

¹ See chapter 1, pp. 11-12.
did eventually acquire official status. A few were established as colonies by later emperors and thus lie outside the present remit; many more became municipia. This latter status did not make them formal settlements, however, as the existing community was elevated in rank without any additional population influx, or other elements associated with the creation of a formal settlement; elements which would not normally be part of municipal status in any case.² The acquisition of municipal status cannot, and should not, be confused with an act of formal settlement.

The issue of indigenous settlements also arises. Almost all formal settlements in Hispania intended for native Italians were established adjoining existing indigenous towns. Some deliberately included such local inhabitants in the new community.³ Others probably allowed hispani to mingle slowly with the native Italian population through marriage or ‘drift’ settlement, although in such cases it is to be expected that the hispani would not have been admitted to the citizen body, but lived as incolae. In short, it would be a rare native Italian settlement that did not include hispani in some way. Therefore this study does not restrict itself to towns of pure native Italian residency.

However, not all communities developed by Rome were for native Italians and, generally speaking, those settlements created, or restructured, for hispani lie outside the remit of this study. The identification of communities created under Roman auspices for hispani prior to 49 is not an exact science and we do not know what proportion of the whole are represented by the few recorded instances. Nonetheless, with the single exception of Valentia, the divide between settlements created by Roman authorities for hispani and those meant for native Italians is delineated with reasonable clarity in the sources. Following the Caesarian Civil Wars, official Roman involvement in indigenous communities did increase markedly, with many being restructured politically and physically on the orders of both Caesar and Augustus. Some gained official recognition, becoming colonies, and saw their ranks swell with a deductio of native Italians. For the majority of communities, however, the upheaval was limited to an elevation in status to that of municipium and the

² For an exposition of the elements involved in the constitution of a municipium, see Crawford (1998) passim.
³ For example Corduba, see Strabo 3.2.1.
consequent changes in political and administrative practices. In either case the increased adherence to formal structure in this period means the changes are usually well sign-posted.

The definition of what constituted an official formal settlement, as opposed to an unofficial formal settlement, is a complex one, which revolves around the manner in which any given community was established. The process of creating an official formal settlement, be it a citizen or Latin colony, was a symbiotic mixture of extreme practicality and arcane religious ritual, which were essentially indivisible.\(^4\) The combination is neatly demonstrated by the office of *finitor*, or land surveyor, whose function was to divide the land equably between settlers, according to scientific principles which had apparently evolved from the magical art of augury.\(^5\) The main features of colony foundation, as it existed in the second and first centuries, were often said by Roman writers to have been in place from the earliest phase of the Republic.\(^6\) Whether or not this is true, at its most basic level the process seems to have remained the same throughout the period under discussion.\(^7\)

The lack of any detailed account of the foundation process in the ancient sources limits our knowledge of it to a few essential elements. It began, obviously, with an official decision at Rome to found a settlement. The ultimate responsibility for that decision was attributed by Mommsen to the Roman people, following the discussion of the idea in the senate.\(^8\) This view, widely accepted for many years, has since been challenged in varying degrees by a number of authors.\(^9\) In particular, Laffi has argued that the people only became an important part of the decision-making process from the Gracchan era onwards.\(^10\) The weight of evidence does appear to support his opinion; in most recorded cases prior to 133 the senate alone seems to

\(^4\) For a discussion of the ritualistic elements, see Gargola (1995) 72-98.
\(^5\) Dilke (1971) 31-33. The *finitores* of the Republic became the *agrimensores* of the Empire.
\(^6\) Some of the ritualistic elements do appear to have their origins in the early Iron Age. The most obvious example of such ritual is the use of a bronze plough to draw the outline of the proposed walls for a city founded *ex novo*, which is described by Cato (*Hist.* 1.18 (Peter)).
\(^7\) Whether the more archaic elements of ritual had been in constant use, or were piously ‘revived’ during the early or middle Republic is still a matter for debate. See Cornell (1995) 167-172 & 203.
\(^8\) Mommsen (1887) vol. 2.1, 625-626
\(^10\) Laffi (1988) 25-33. They do seem to have become involved in some foundations prior to this date, apparently when there were unusual circumstances.
have taken the decision to found a city.¹¹ There does not seem to have been any constitutional requirement for the people to be consulted. In those cases where the senate took the decision, they appear to have issued a senatusconsultum on the subject and then appointed a commission of three men, the Illviri coloniae deducendae, to take charge of the actual foundation. In cases where the people were consulted, this seems to have followed a discussion in the senate.¹² A lex coloniae would be promulgated and voted upon, thereafter the commission might be either elected by the people or appointed by the senate.¹³ By the Sullan period all these public functions were often taken under the personal control of the pre-eminent commander of the day, especially when the prospective settlers were veterans.

Regardless of the process which had appointed them, the job of the Illviri coloniae deducendae remained the same. They were invested with imperium, given support staff, funds and equipment and sent off to the proposed site to begin the long, and often difficult, process of planning the new community.¹⁴ Colonies varied in size and complexity, but over the course of the Republic a more or less standardised list of requirements evolved. By the Caesarian period the town itself had to be laid out, preferably at the centre of its territorium, as a careful replica of a Roman town. A forum, associated with a basilica, curia and temple, was essential for all colonies and, wherever possible, there was a preference for an orthogonal street grid.¹⁵ The town’s dependent territory was also centuriated, creating land blocks of even size for incoming settlers. The speed at which this pattern evolved and how long it took to become standard are uncertain, but need for a pre-divided territorium was probably appreciated from an early phase.¹⁶ The job of finitor was an exacting one, for the colony’s success depended, at least in part, on an equitable distribution of land that

¹¹ Livy is virtually the only source for the establishment of colonies prior to 133. Eleven out of fourteen passages concerning this subject mention the senate only: 8.16.13-14, 9.26.3-5, 9.28.7-8, 32.2.6-7, 37.46.9-11, 37.47.1-2, 37.57.7-8, 39.23.3-4, 39.55.4-6, 43.3.1-4, 43.17.1.
¹² Livy 8.16.12-14, 34.53.1-2.
¹³ As references to this situation are few and far between, the exact legal process remains obscure. For a variety of interpretations see Mommsen (1887) vol. 2.1, 625-626; Salmon (1969) 19; Laffi (1988) 27.
was of sufficient size and fertility to support its new owners.\textsuperscript{17} When the surveying work was finally completed, the settlers were led out to their colony in a formal \textit{deductio}, where auspices were taken, sacrifices made and lots drawn for land parcels. It was only then that any building work commenced.\textsuperscript{18}

Foundations created according to the above process, under the aegis of the Roman state, were recognised by the title \textit{‘colonia’}. There were two essential types of \textit{coloniae}: one whose inhabitants were Roman citizens, the other inhabited by people of Latin status.\textsuperscript{19} A formal settlement created by other means might be referred to as a \textit{vicus} or even an \textit{oppidum civium Romanorum}, but, by definition, could not be a \textit{colonia}.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, despite various fluctuations in the process over the centuries, a combination of three elements formed the irreducible minimum required for an official formal settlement: 1.) a decision to found taken by the senate, by the people of Rome, or by Rome’s highest recognised contemporary authority; 2.) a commission invested with \textit{imperium}, under whose auspices the site would be surveyed and assigned; 3.) a \textit{deductio} of settlers. Consequently, any formal settlement lacking these elements must be deemed unofficial.

However, it is not always possible to make a clear-cut decision about a town’s proper status on the basis of the evidence available. There are no thorough accounts of the actual foundation of any Roman settlement in Hispania, so for the most part we are dependent on the titles used to describe them in both literary and epigraphic sources, in order to determine their status.\textsuperscript{21} While it is usually safe to assume that any town which claims colonial status in inscriptions does so legitimately, ancient authors’ use of the term \textit{‘colonia’} is looser than modern scholars might like. This means not only that colonial status is occasionally attributed to communities which had not received it, but also that not all towns with colonial rank were duly credited with possession of it. This is a problem best dealt with on an individual level, and cases will be discussed as they arise.

\textsuperscript{17} Campbell (1996) 90-91.  
\textsuperscript{18} Salmon (1969) 24-25; Campbell (1996) 87-88.  
\textsuperscript{19} Asconius 3 (Clark). See also \textit{TLL} 3 col. 1698-1699.  
\textsuperscript{20} For the possible definitions of the title \textit{oppidum civium Romanorum} see p. 73, note 173 below.  
\textsuperscript{21} The descriptions that do exist are mostly of towns founded during the second century and state little more than the fact that a settlement was founded. Livy’s (\textit{Ep. 55}) description of the foundation of Valentia and Appian’s (\textit{Ib. 38}) of the foundation of Italica are excellent examples.
The few authors who have chosen to explore the question of formal Roman settlement in Hispania before Caesar have each responded in a different way to the complexities of the issue. The chronological and geographical diffusion of the pre-Caesarian settlements and the scarcity of the evidence available have generally encouraged study of the subject on a case by case basis, rather than as a whole. Only three authors - García y Bellido, Galsterer and Marin Diaz - have been willing to attempt a detailed overview of the issue as a whole. García y Bellido’s work is little more than a catalogue raisonné, which carefully gathers the few shreds of evidence concerning each pre-Caesarian community, without attempting to establish the existence of broad patterns in the settlement. His work stands in contrast to that of Galsterer and Marin Diaz who have both moved towards the definition of formal settlement in republican Hispania according to conventional Roman approaches to colonisation used in Italy. Both suggest, Marin Diaz explicitly, Galsterer implicitly, that these foundations, having been carried out by magistrates possessed of imperium, were subsequently confirmed by the senate and moulded to fit acceptable models. In the detail the two differ. Galsterer was inclined to favour the widespread use of the Latin colony during the republican period, labelling Corduba, Palma, Pollentia and Ilerda as such. Marin Diaz was prepared to countenance a wider array of officially recognised peregrine communities operating within a comparatively romanised socio-political structure, a situation in which many Italian communities found themselves before the Social War. It was only those apparently founded ex novo for native Italians, for example Palma and Pollentia, that became Latin colonies.

The opportunity to establish settlement practices in Hispania as a modified extension of those in peninsular Italy is tempting. Roman society placed a high value on formal, hierarchical structures and the uncertain, insubstantial position of most Spanish pre-Caesarian foundations painted by the scant epigraphic and literary evidence has always seemed unsatisfactory. However, attempts to link these foundations to such formal models are equally unsatisfactory and may, in fact, miss

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22 García y Bellido (1959); Galsterer (1971); Marin Diaz (1988).
24 Galsterer (1971) chapter 2, passim.
the point. The Iberian peninsula was the home of Rome’s first truly foreign and distant provinces. Their populations accepted Roman rule grudgingly and often behaved in unexpected ways under it. The Romans were still in the formative stages of learning to control people of a different cultural background; it is only natural that they would have to adjust and refine their traditional practices in order to do so successfully.

One of the first and most basic lessons learnt by the Romans was that the hispani had different attitudes to the concept of both submission and alliance. An excellent example of this is the unwillingness displayed by natives, particularly those of Celtiberian origin, when required to demonstrate loyalty to the Roman state. They were accustomed to give more personal undertakings, and wherever possible offered their fealty only to those representatives of Rome with whom they dealt personally. This devotio iberica was to become a leitmotif of Hispano-Roman relations across the centuries. Most of the more successful efforts of Roman diplomacy in Hispania, for example the treaties of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, were conducted on this personal level. In some senses these attitudes may not have been unwelcome. There was, after all, a fiercely competitive and individualistic streak running through Roman public life and, as Keay has noted, devotio iberica was not dissimilar to Rome’s own patronage systems. Nonetheless it helped exaggerate the independence of the commanders posted to Hispania.

Theoretically, the commander was an instrument of the senate and Roman people, but the practicalities of communication in the ancient world had always allowed commanders room to manoeuvre. Political and tactical decisions had to be taken daily without the possibility of due reference of the matter to Rome. However, in Hispania, the situation seems to have been complicated by the lack of any clear, long-term policy on the conquest. This resulted in vital strategic decisions being taken by field commanders. Many scholars have noted the

26 Rodríguez Adrados (1946) passim; Dyson (1985) 185; Keay (1995) 293. For examples recorded by ancient authors see Polybius 10.34.4-35.3, 10.38.1-5; Livy 27.19.2-6.
27 Appian, Ib. 43; Livy, Ep. 41.
30 Various view of the conquest are given by Knapp (1977) passim; Dyson (1985) chapters 5-6; Richardson (1986) passim.
deleterious effect this seems to have had on the conquest of the peninsula. Roman commanders often simply reacted to immediate pressures, without thought for the future. They were, after all, politicians as well as generals and one eye was always on their own career back in Rome. At times, immediate personal success in battle was obtained at the expense of long term security for Roman-controlled areas. Governors accustomed to a relatively free hand in military and political affairs might well understand the consenting settlement of his, or his predecessor’s, veterans to be a legitimate part of his remit. Under these circumstances it is unwise to assume that structures in use in Italy would automatically assert themselves in Hispania.

II Formal settlements

Communities established during the first century or so of the Roman occupation of Hispania were few and far between, therefore it perhaps a little ironic that there is some dispute over which was the first formal Roman settlement there. The argument arises because of uncertainty over the origins of Tarraco (map 4). That a native settlement existed prior to Roman arrival is obvious both from its name, which (strangely) appears to be Celtiberian, and from Livy’s description of the events of 218.31 However, several scholars have described Tarraco as being founded by Scipio Africanus, basing their assertion on a brief passage in Pliny’s Natural History: ‘colonia Tarracon, Scipionum opus, sicut Carthago Poenorum’.32 They seem to have in mind an unofficial formal settlement, akin to Italica, presumably intended for veterans. Such an interpretation places more weight on Pliny’s words than they can reasonably be expected to bear.

In the first place the assertion that Scipio Africanus is responsible for the foundation ignores the fact that ‘Scipionum’ is a genitive plural and is much more likely to refer to Africanus’ father and uncle who campaigned as a team for seven

31 Livy 21.61.1-4. For the Celtiberian origins of the name, see Alföldy (1991) 18. It would seem that Tarraco was identical with ‘Cese’ the capital of the Iberian Cessetani, but quite how these two entities interrelate is unclear. For further discussion see Aquilué et al. (1992) 16; Keay (1988) 27, n. 5.
32 Pliny, Nat. 3.21. See Vittinghoff (1952) 79-80; García y Bellido (1959) 459-460; Marin Diaz (1988) 210-211.
years using Tarraco as their base.\textsuperscript{33} Secondly, given the elevated status the city later obtained as a provincial capital and its high profile in historical accounts of the Second Punic War, it seems unlikely that Pliny the Elder alone would have commented upon such an early foundation.\textsuperscript{34} The key to Pliny’s ‘Scipionum opus’ may lie rather in the choice of Tarraco as a base, apparently by Cn. Cornelius Scipio, and its subsequent use by both elder Scipios and Africanus. The latter made less regular use of the town than his predecessors, but nonetheless retained it as a winter camp and supply dump.\textsuperscript{35} The ancient historians paint a picture of an existing town monopolised by the Roman army, rather than founded by its commanders.

The Roman army’s intensive relationship with Tarraco over the course of the twelve year campaign against the Carthaginians set the tone for the future. Thereafter Tarraco’s facilities were habitually utilised by the vast majority of republican commanders operating in Citerior.\textsuperscript{36} The army’s presence would have shaped the physical, social and political nature of the town, encouraging the romanisation of the indigenous populace and the informal immigration of native Italians. These factors in turn led to the formal designation of Tarraco as provincial capital. Just as the Barcids’ use of Carthago Nova for the storage of equipment, supplies and even hostages made that town the centrepiece of their Spanish possessions, so the Scipios’ use of Tarraco made it important.\textsuperscript{37} The Roman commanders were responsible for the construction of massive fortifications, within which grew a substantial praesidium.\textsuperscript{38} It would not be too extreme to interpret such developments, structural and political, as the ‘product of the Scipios’.\textsuperscript{39} Tarraco would gain officially recognised status later, in the Caesarian age.

\textsuperscript{33} The first mention of the establishment of a base at Tarraco comes in Livy 21.61.1-4. Thereafter their use of Tarraco is recorded on a number of occasions, for example: Livy 21.61.11, 22.19.5, 22.22.2-3.

\textsuperscript{34} Arguments e silentio are, of course, always dangerous. Italica, whose early foundation seems assured, receives attention only from Appian. However Italica was a backwater, brought into brief prominence as the home town of an emperor, and not in the same position as a provincial capital. See further p. 64 below.

\textsuperscript{35} For example Polybius 10.20.8; Livy 26.19.12-13, 27.17.8, 28.16.10-11, 28.19.4, 28.42.3-4.

\textsuperscript{36} Strabo 3.4.7 & 3.4.20; Livy 34.16.6-10, 40.39.3-4, 40.40.13-15.

\textsuperscript{37} Barcid involvement with Carthago Nova: Strabo 3.4.6; Livy 26.42.2-5.

\textsuperscript{38} Aquilué et al. (1992) 40-42.

\textsuperscript{39} Peña Gimeno (1984) 77.
Italica is consequently assured of its established title as the earliest formal Roman settlement in Hispania (map 3). The town was founded near the western bank of the southern reaches of the Baetis river on the modern site of Santiponce (prov. Sevilla) by Scipio Africanus late in 206, following the final expulsion of Carthage from the Iberian peninsula. It was named Italica in commemoration of Italy, we are told, and was settled with wounded veterans of his arduous Spanish campaigns.40 This much is known from Appian’s account of events, for he is the only ancient source to give an account of the foundation of Italica.41 That we are told so little is extremely frustrating, for, in the wider context of Roman colonisation generally, the foundation of Italica was an event of considerable significance. It is the first extra-Italian Roman foundation known and that fact raises some interesting questions about the motivation for, and the mechanics of, the town’s creation.

The first point to be made is that Italica was not an official foundation, sanctioned by Rome and created according to normal colonial procedures. Epigraphic evidence suggests that Italica was given no official status either at foundation or retrospectively, once the senate learned of its existence. An inscription, apparently recording the presentation to Italica of spoils from the sack of Corinth in 146, refers to the town as a vicus.42 There is widespread agreement that Italica continued to lack official status at least until the Augustan period.43 After this period the town seems to have become a municipium. Aulus Gellius makes reference to a speech of Hadrian, in which the emperor reproached Italica, along with several other towns, for wishing to exchange the relative legal and political freedom of municipal status for the rigours of colonial rank.44 The town’s request for colonial

40 Appian, Ib. 38. The term used τραυματίς does not suggest the soldiers were left behind to die because they were simply too weak to travel. Many would have been due for discharge on health grounds, but that would not necessarily mean grave illness.

41 The anonymous author of the Vita Hadriani does state that the Aelii had been at Italica since ‘Scipionum temporibus’ (Historia Augusta, Hadr. 1.1). Syme (1964, 144) thinks this may be a slight exaggeration, but the comment shows the author was well aware of the link between Scipio and Italica.

42 CIL 2 1119, after a generally accepted restoration of a badly damaged text, attributed to Mommsen by Hübner. Aspects of the restoration have been challenged, but the presence of the term vicus in the text is undisputed. See Galsterer (1997) 54, who quotes A.M. Canto (1986) ‘Un nuevo documento de Paulo Emilio en la Hispania Ulterior (CIL 2 1119)’, Epigrafía hispánica de época romana-republicana, Zaragoza, pp. 227ff.

43 When a coin legend suggests it became a municipium, see GF 1690. See also Thouvenot (1940) 184; Wilson (1966) 16; Galsterer (1971) 12; Galsterer (1997) 56; Knapp (1977) 112-113; Marin Diaz (1988) 83-84.

44 Gellius 16.13.4.
status at this point is the final proof that the town had not enjoyed such a position previously. Italica’s unofficial nature presents little surprise. In the late third century Rome had yet to countenance the foundation of citizen or Latin colonies outside peninsular Italy.\textsuperscript{45} A citizen community at a distance from Rome received little benefit from its status, being unable to participate in political life, and deprived Rome of the services of its citizens. Similar, if less acute, problems affected Latin colonies. From this rather inflexible point of view, a colony had to be within easy travelling distance of Rome to be worthwhile. This is thought to have restricted the creation of citizen colonies within Italy itself, and certainly would have prevented their creation outside the peninsula.\textsuperscript{46}

It seems most unlikely that Africanus could have succeeded in any attempt to persuade both the senate and the people to agree to the creation of an officially sanctioned settlement several hundred kilometres away across the Mediterranean. For the most part the concept of citizen colonies outside Italy seems untenable prior to the attempted foundation of Junonia at Carthage by C. Sempronius Gracchus in 123/122. This event created enormous fuss, albeit not entirely concerned with the actual foundation, and was labelled the first transmarine citizen colony by Velleius Paterculus, a judgement which is broadly accepted.\textsuperscript{47} By this time Rome appears to have begun to grasp the possible benefits of distant colonies, probably spurred on by the growing demands for land by veterans and peasants alike. Junonia, and the more successful Narbo Martius, which was founded in 118 in the south-eastern corner of Gallia Transalpina, paved the way for still more distant foundations.\textsuperscript{48} Yet there was hardly a rush to make use of this new institution. Few colonies are known to have been founded between 123 and 45, when Caesar finally exploited the possibilities to the full.\textsuperscript{49}

Nothing in the sources suggests that Africanus even tried to consult any competent body prior to the foundation. He did not request an official blessing for


\textsuperscript{46} Salmon (1936) 62-63; (1969) 16-17; Sherwin White (1973) 76-79.

\textsuperscript{47} Velleius Paterculus 1.15.4. See also Brunt (1971) 214-215.

\textsuperscript{48} Narbo: Velleius Paterculus 1.15.5.

\textsuperscript{49} Valentia, Caecilia Metellinum and Salaria were all Spanish colonies probably created during this period, see pp. 71 & 80-82 below. Outside Hispania most foundations were Marian in origin, see Brunt (1971) 214-218.
his foundation, quite possibly, because the factors behind it were more tactical than political. There are signs that the creation of Italica was due to a variety of practical considerations and immediate needs. From a military standpoint, perhaps the most obvious advantage in founding Italica was the reinforcement this could offer the Roman military presence in Hispania. It was located in a reasonably secure area behind a contemporary frontier zone, in a solid defensive position, able to keep a watch to both the north and the west. It is unclear whether it was expected that the veterans who lived there would render practical assistance to the Roman army, but, in an emergency, Italica certainly had the potential to offer some resistance to unwelcome visitors and intelligence concerning their movements. The indigenous community already in residence at the site would, presumably, have provided assistance to the newcomers in the early years. Africanus was on his way back to Rome and more glorious pursuits; leaving at least one potential bastion behind him made good military sense. By leaving men who were not currently capable of continuing in active service, he avoided depriving Rome of much needed human resources.

There may also have been another factor involved. Many of Africanus’ veterans had served under his father and uncle. They were ready for dismissal and longing to return to civilian life. The mutiny of an apparently large proportion of Africanus’ troops at Sucro, following the battle of Ilipa in 206, is mentioned by a number of authors. It clearly constituted a serious crisis, one which took considerable disciplinary and diplomatic skill to quell. There is a certain amount of variation amongst authors concerning the exact causes of the sedition, but the basic factors seem to have been concerns about pay arrears and general disillusionment at the unsatisfactory nature of military life, these injustices being further aggravated by having the leisure in which to brood. The prospect of a further campaign against

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50 Vittinghoff (1952) 72; Montenegro Duque et al (1986) 35-36.
52 It also indicates a confidence that Rome was not about to abandon its interest in Hispania. See Lazenby (1978) 156; Richardson (1986) 53.
53 Toynbee (1965) vol. 2, 75.
local insurgents was the last straw and they rebelled.\textsuperscript{55} While a desire to return home was certainly shown by the seditious troops, the need to profit from their overseas service also ranks high in the list of concerns.\textsuperscript{56} In fact, it was this latter aspect which helped Africanus bring his men back under control: he lured them into a vulnerable position, by offering to pay them what they were owed, and then captured their leaders. The proposition of land in Hispania, as an alternative to returning to an Italy devastated by Hannibal,\textsuperscript{57} may well have been attractive to the mutineers, especially those whose chance to profit in future campaigns had fallen victim to age or injury.

Italica was, consequently, probably founded as a result of a propitious mix of defensive tactics and social need; a ‘private arrangement’, neither requesting nor needing official approval. From both constitutional and legal standpoints the town was perfectly inoffensive. It could be dealt with on the same terms as any other vicus community. Native Italian members of the community would be treated by officialdom according to their personal status, whatever that of the town and its broader population, just as was normal in Italy. That such a broader population existed in this case seems highly likely, as Italica was established on the site of an existing indigenous community and probably included members of the original town among its citizenry. The veteran section of the community may have comprised mostly Italian allies, rather than Roman citizens, judging by the name ‘Italica’.\textsuperscript{58} Given such a mixed community and the social and cultural isolation of the native Italians at this date, it is unlikely that the town functioned as a model of Roman life. As Keay and Rodríguez Hidalgo have pointed out, in the absence of satisfactory archaeological evidence, it must be assumed that Italica remained as a mainly Turdetanian community, within which lay a steadily growing native Italian enclave.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{55} Owing to a gap in the text of Polybius, this aspect of the mutiny is known largely from Appian, \textit{Ib.} 34 and Livy 28.24.5-11.
\textsuperscript{56} Livy 28.24.7-8 & 28.28.7. Homesickness is not mentioned by Appian or Polybius. In the former case this is not particularly noteworthy, since Appian’s account is extremely brief. However it is interesting that Polybius does not mention it. His version of Africanus’ reply to his men (11.28-29) deals solely with the financial side of their complaints.
\textsuperscript{57} Cornell (1996) has recently argued that it was mainly southern Italy which was affected, but that the damage done there probably was serious. How accurate a picture of Italy’s sufferings the troops in Hispania received is difficult to tell; gossip might easily have given an exaggerated picture.
\textsuperscript{58} Saumagne (1965) 51-54; Fear (1996) 36.
We are largely ignorant of the evolution of Italica during the Republic, and indeed during the early Empire. Despite its illustrious founder, the town was not destined for a prominent role in political or military life. In political, military and economic affairs Italica was eclipsed by grander, more populous neighbours like Hispalis, Cordubá and even Gades. It did not even begin to issue coinage until the Augustan period.\textsuperscript{60} It is difficult to piece together any coherent picture of the town’s republican phase, owing to the lack of archaeological remains and the silence of the sources.\textsuperscript{61} At the point of foundation, and for several decades thereafter, it would have been one of the chief enclaves of Roman citizens and ethnic Italians in southern Hispania and this must have given it a certain importance.\textsuperscript{62} Although it remained comparatively small, Italica seems to have proved reasonably prosperous. The pseudo-Caesarian account of the Civil Wars mentions four Italicenses, all of whom appear to be equites.\textsuperscript{63} A further proof of Italica’s political and economic health comes in the Augustan period, when the town apparently received municipal status.\textsuperscript{64} From this time onwards the archaeological record of Italica becomes legible and the remains of several elaborate homes for the wealthy have been discovered in the urbs vetus.\textsuperscript{65} Despite her comfortable economic position and improved political status, Italica continued to be a backwater. The town only began to receive attention when Trajan and Hadrian, both sons of important local families, became emperor successively.\textsuperscript{66} Hadrian, in particular, ensured that his home town reflected his imperial status; he created the urbs nova, a grand, if ill-planned, new quarter for the

\textsuperscript{60} See Chaves Tristán (1978) 98; Burnett et al. (1992) 77.

\textsuperscript{61} Keay (1997a) summarises the archaeological exploration of the area to date.

\textsuperscript{62} García y Bellido (1979) 4, 18 & 73. García y Bellido places considerable emphasis on this point, rather overstating the case, but the basic premise seems reasonable.

\textsuperscript{63} B. Alex. 52; B. Hisp. 25. Three of the men, M. Mercello, Munatius Flaccus and T. Vasius, were involved in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus. The fourth, one Q. Pompeius Niger, is recorded as serving in Caesar’s army. See appendix entries M4, M8, P5, V3.

\textsuperscript{64} There is some uncertainty surrounding this point. As Fear (1996) 111 has pointed out, Italica was a municipium when Hadrian granted it colonial status (see Gellius 16.13.4). However no record of the transition from vicus to municipium has so far been discovered. The most obvious time for this change is the period comprising Caesar’s sole rule and Augustus’ reign, when dozens of indigenous communities underwent a change of status and this seems to be confirmed by the legends appearing on the town’s coins in this period (GF 1690). Vittinghoff (1952) 105 believes Caesar to have been responsible, but the grant of municipal, rather than colonial, status seems better in keeping with Augustan practice. It is true that the majority of Caesarian foundations occurred in Ulterior, while Augustus focused on Citerior, however neither favoured one province exclusively.

\textsuperscript{65} Fear (1996) 207.

town, and granted it colonial status. However, the renamed *colonia Aelia Augusta V(ictrix or -rbs) Italica* was never destined for great success and in the years following the redevelopment it sank back into obscurity.

Italica set a precedent in the foundation of formal settlements by unofficial means, but this did not result in a sudden deluge of foundations. It would be more than two decades before the process was repeated, and then in quite different circumstances. In 180 Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and L. Postumius Albinus arrived in Hispania to take up their posts as governors of Citerior and Ulterior respectively. Although little is known of their activities, they were later regarded as honourable exceptions to the usual standard of Roman governors, especially Gracchus. One of the few things known about Gracchus’ activities is that in 179 he founded the town of Gracchurris in the upper Hiberus valley, ‘as a monument to his labours’. Those labours were the reduction of Celtiberian tribes and the establishment of binding treaties between them and Rome, so it would appear that Gracchurris (Alfaro, prov. Logroño) was intended to act as a restraining influence in a restless area.70

The composition of the initial population has been the cause of considerable discussion, but there now seems little doubt that, despite being a Roman foundation, Gracchurris was inhabited solely by Celtiberians. Unfortunately, the mixture of indigenous and Roman material found on the site provides no definitive evidence about the ethnic background of the population, merely indicating that Gracchurris had access to imported goods. According to Pliny, the town was still an *oppidum* in his day and there is no indication in either the literary or epigraphic record that

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67 Gellius (16.13.4) records the request for the change in status. Confirmation that the grant was made comes from an epigraphic source, see *CIL* 12 1856. Hadrian did not actually visit Italica as Emperor (Dio 69.10.1), but he did accept an honorary magistracy (Historia Augusta, *Hadr.* 19.1.). For the massive physical changes brought to Italica, see García y Bellido (1979) 74-128. The city gained enormous, if temporary, prestige from its imperial connection, which may help explain why Appian alone records the foundation of Italica. Of our sources, he was the only one writing after Hadrian’s reign and he was thus aware of the imperial prestige the town eventually gained.

68 There is a lacuna at the beginning of Livy 41, so we are forced to rely on the epitome. For the later admiration of Gracchus for his establishment of peace treaties, see Appian, *Ib.*, 43; Plutarch, *TG.* 5.3-4.


70 The Celtiberian tribes of the upper Hiberus valley appear to have been a source of trouble to Roman governors since the early 190s. Numerous campaigns against them are recorded: Livy 34.11-21 (195); Livy 35.1-2 (194); Livy 39.21.6-10 (187); Livy 40.33 (181); Livy 40.47.1-50.5, *Ep.* 41, Appian, *Ib.* 43 (179-178).

71 A good summary of history of the question is provided by López Melero (1987) 171-177.
Gracchurris ever gained colonial status. However, there is some justification for the suggestion that the town acquired municipal status under Augustus. If this were the case, it would suggest that in this period at least the inhabitants were regarded as *hispani*, rather than as the descendants of native Italian soldiers, for municipal status was not often given to towns formally settled with native Italians. Roman involvement beyond the initial phase seems highly unlikely. The town was built far upstream, in an area dotted with the hill forts of various Celtiberian tribes which had only recently come to terms with the Romans. As a home for veteran soldiers, Gracchurris offered neither security nor the opportunity for expansion, and their presence would be likely to make the local inhabitants nervous.

Nonetheless it occupied a strategic position on a heavily used fluvial route. The town was positioned so as to facilitate rapid communication between the unsettled Meseta and the eastern coast, now under Roman control. Gracchurris appears to be the first of several Roman foundations for natives in Hispania. A number of these would be founded in a variety of guises over the course of the next hundred and fifty years. Initially the foundations seem to have been more concerned with the twin strategic requirements of holding key positions and pacifying the local population, than with any real social need, but the phenomenon would come to fulfil both requirements in time. Over the years, the idea expanded beyond Hispania into the western empire generally, culminating in the *civitates* of the empire.

The foundation of Gracchurris was followed within a few years by a further innovation in the Roman instigated settlement of Hispania. *Colonia Latina Libertinorum Carteia* was to be the only Latin colony in republican Hispania; indeed it may have been the only official formal settlement to be approved by the senate.

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73 The only two coin types known from the reign of Tiberius both bear the legend ‘MVNICIP GRACVRRIS’ (Vives 163:1-2); no Augustan types are known. Some link the change in status to Augustus because of his apparent enthusiasm for creating *municipia* in Hispania. See García y Bellido (1959) 448-449; Wilson (1966) 41; Galsterer (1971) 13. Peña Gimeno (1984, 54) suggests that the more obvious possibility - foundation by Tiberius - is correct and this is supported by Burnett *et al.* (1992) 134.
74 See chapter 4, p. 86.
75 Dupré (1985) 281-285. The area is thought to have been the most heavily populated part of Citerior.
76 Hernández Vera and Casado López (1976) 27.
prior to foundation (map 3). Livy, the only extant source for the event, records a group of *hybridae*, the offspring of Roman soldiers and native women, petitioning the senate in 171 for somewhere to live.\(^78\) They met with a particularly generous response, for the *patres* instructed L. Canuleius, the incoming governor of Ulterior, to create for them a freedmen’s colony with Latin status at Carteia (El Rocadillo, prov. Cádiz.).\(^79\) The reasons behind this generous response and the status of the colony created as a result has provided many scholars with food for thought. Both Marin Diaz and Galsterer draw their enthusiasm for the use of the Latin colonial structure in Hispania from the Carteian example. Their examination of the settlement of Hispania as a whole naturally encouraged them to look for settlement models and they found one in Carteia. In both works allusions are made to this or that settlement being ‘*the same as Carteia*’ or ‘*in a similar position to that of Carteia*’.\(^80\) To say Carteia has been posited as the complete blueprint for Latin colonies in Hispania would be an exaggeration, but its foundation is unquestionably seen as a precedent and a stimulant to further Latin colonisation. The validity of Carteia as a settlement model is therefore a matter of unquestionable importance. In order to know whether it may be used in this manner, we need to understand why Carteia was given that particular juridical status.

At the heart of this matter lies the status of its proposed inhabitants and the senate’s attitude towards them. It is clear that the senate wanted to help this group of *hybridae*, for they acted generously despite the absence of any obligation to do so. The cause of their humanitarian concern is probably beyond recovery, although we may guess that contemporary allegations of brutality and extortion may have influenced senators. The petition arrived hard on the heels of envoys from several tribes in Hispania complaining of the greed and arrogance of their Roman governors. It had been obvious to the senate that there was some truth in the claims and they set legal proceedings in motion to deal with the complaints.\(^81\) The *hybridae* may have caught the senate at a suitably awkward moment. The changing character of the

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\(^78\) Livy 43.3.1-3.

\(^79\) Livy 43.3.3-4.


\(^81\) Livy 43.2. M. Titinius, M. Matienus and P. Furius Philus were the men accused, they escaped punishment by going into voluntary exile. On this subject see also Feig Vishna (1996) 135-136.
Latin colony may also have assisted matters, making it simpler to provide a formal settlement in Hispania. By the early second century the Latin colony had already evolved considerably from its initial role as a settlement device for the shared benefit of Rome and the Latin League. Latin colonies were now established solely with Roman tactical and social needs in mind and had, by this date, been founded well beyond the traditional areas. In fact, Latin colonies had already been established outside peninsular Italy proper during the previous two decades, in Cisalpine Gaul.

When used in such a context the curtailment of the individual’s political rights was less severe, as Latin colonists did not possess Roman citizenship, although the potential loss to the state of the inhabitants’ services remained a possible problem. While hardly representing the same kind of challenge to the traditional mindset that Hispania would have done, Cisalpine Gaul certainly lay outside peninsular Italy and may have provided a precedent for a Latin colony at Carteia. There are signs too that the bonds which previously kept Latin colonies politically, and well as physically, close to Rome’s heart were loosening. Rome’s domination of Italy had reduced their tactical importance as guardians of strategic areas and providers of manpower.

It may not be possible to explain the creation of a Latin colony for the hybridae in entirely rational terms, but the choice is explicable within certain frames of reference. Once a decision was made to grant some kind of formal recognition to the this group, a Latin colony was a more appropriate vehicle for such recognition than a citizen one. What is more difficult to understand is the ‘freedman’ element of Carteia’s status. Given the senate’s apparently friendly attitude towards this group of hybridae it seems likely, as asserted by Hoyos, their classification as libertini was not intended as any kind of insult, but as an accurate assessment of their legal

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82 Cornell (1995) 301-302. Cornell points out that the benefits would not have been evenly distributed between Rome and the Latin League.
83 Chilver (1941) 6-7; Brunt (1971) 168.
84 By the second century the ‘ius Latii’ had taken the form of a ‘lesser’ citizenship. Political participation in Roman politics was possible, but only when the holder of Latin status was in Rome. Consequently, many Latini never exercised their political powers and valued their rank for its theoretical possibilities as much as what it offered on a routine basis. See Sherwin-White (1973) chapter 3, passim.
85 On the general precedent provided by the Cisalpine colonies see Salmon (1969) 108.
status. Nor do ethnic factors seem to have a natural place here. Rather, the senate seems to have been searching for a way to classify these individuals with due regard for the legal disparity of their parents. The juridical status of the mothers in this case is of especial interest. If freeborn, hispanae of whatever ethnic background would have been peregrinae. However, it may be safely assumed that many would have been prostitutes by profession, meaning they would have possessed the lower status of servae or dediticiae. In either case a recognised marriage to a Roman citizen would have been impossible. Where there was no recognised marriage, any children would take their mother’s status - either peregrine or servile - in accordance with ius gentium.

In legal terms the hybridae were a new breed. This was not because children had never previously been born of such unions, undoubtedly they had, but because those children had never before attempted to operate within the legal bounds of Roman society. The Roman legal system, public and civil, had no reason to recognise the existence of such individuals prior to its direct contact with them. In 171 this group of Spanish hybridae brought their case to the senate’s attention and as a direct consequence the senate sought to classify them correctly, finding that these men did not fit easily into any existing pigeonhole: Rome owed them nothing because of the status of their mothers, yet the hybridae felt entitled to ask for help due to the status of their fathers.

Various attempts have been made to elucidate the designation of Carteia as a freedman colony in the light of the putative status of the hybridae at the time of

86 Hoyos (1971) 67-75. For a more thorough analysis of the situation see Saumagne (1962) 135-152; Saumagne (1965) 62-69.
87 Attempts have been made to explain the phrase ‘novum gens hominum’ in this light. See Saumagne (1965) 62-63; Peña Gimeno (1988) 275.
88 The problem of how to deal with children whose parents were of different legal status seems to have been addressed systematically only during the Empire. Under the Republic presumably too few cases came to the attention of the courts to warrant the creation of a standard legal answer. See Weaver (1986) 145-169 passim.
89 See chapter 5, pp. 136-137 for further detail concerning this issue.
90 Gaius, Inst. 1.67 & 1.76-78. According to Gaius (Inst. 1.79) the lex Minicia ordered that in cases where a Roman or Latin woman married a peregrine without conubium then the child would still be peregrine, since no person of Roman or Latin status could be allowed to spring from a marriage without conubium. The date of the lex Minicia is unclear, a republican date is possible, but unproven. On the lex Minicia, see Corbett (1930) 26; Watson (1967) 27; Treggiari (1991) 45-46.
92 Any previous appeals had been made directly to provincial governors. See Richardson (1996a) 78.
petition. The Vindobonensis manuscript, the standard text of Livy for this passage, offers one obvious solution. In this text the third sentence of 43.3 reads

'Senatus decrevit, uti nomina sua apud L. Canuleium profiterentur eorumque, si quos manumisisset, eos Carteiam ad Oceanum deduci placere;\textsuperscript{93}'

This may be translated as ‘The senate decreed that they should declare before Lucius Canuleius their own names and the names of any slaves they might have set free and that it was the pleasure of the senate that these people should be settled at Carteia near the Ocean.’ On this basis, some have suggested that the hybridae themselves were largely freeborn peregrini, but that Carteia was to be referred to as a freedmen’s colony due to the inclusion of a, presumably small, proportion of newly freed slaves formerly owned by the hybridae.\textsuperscript{94}

However, this seems a rather narrow view of the situation. It would be more comprehensible if the town’s status was not based on a small portion of the population, but upon the status of the vast majority: the hybridae themselves. The work of Madvig, a nineteenth century textual critic offers some help in this respect. Madvig suggested that the sentence should be emended to read:

'Senatus decrevit, uti nomina sua apud L. Canuleium profiterentur; eorumque si quos manumisisset, eos Carteiam ad Oceanum deduci placere;\textsuperscript{93}'

This is to be translated as ‘The senate decreed that they should declare their names before Lucius Canuleius and that it was the pleasure of the senate that those whom he freed should be settled at Carteia near the Ocean;\textsuperscript{95}’ Although there are grammatical objections to aspects of this emendation,\textsuperscript{96} it has given rise to several suggestions over the years. Saumagne suggested that the hybridae would be public slaves - that status having been acquired through an act of deditio on the part of the mothers’ tribe or tribes.\textsuperscript{97} Humbert reinforced this idea by asserting that their servile status was in any case more nominal than actual. They conducted their lives much as before, so

\textsuperscript{93} Vindobonensis text drawn from Weissenborn and Mueller (1959).
\textsuperscript{94} Mommsen (1887) vol. 3.1, xiii, n.1 and Peña Gimeno (1984) 57 are among those who explicitly embrace this explanation.
\textsuperscript{95} Madvig (1860) 43.3.
\textsuperscript{96} Peña Gimeno (1988) 271.
\textsuperscript{97} Saumagne (1962) 138.
that, provided they could find a patron, petitioning the senate would present no great difficulty.\textsuperscript{98} Cels - Sainte-Hilaire has taken several steps further down the same road, proclaiming that the \textit{hybridae} were not slaves at all. Rather they were free men and the manumission to which the text alludes was nothing more than a convenient legal fiction, designed to allow the free peregrine \textit{hispani} to attain Latin status.\textsuperscript{99} She claims that the term \textit{`libertinus} referred legally to any person possessing a citizenship to which they had not been born, but is forced to admit there is no juridical evidence to support this opinion.\textsuperscript{100}

While there are aspects of her argument that seem tenuous, Cels - Sainte-Hilaire's work does seem to offer a realistic solution, especially as it need not depend on the acceptance of Madvig's emendation. If the traditional reading is correct, this argument is still acceptable - the fictional freedmen were simply joined by freedmen of a more usual variety. The theory harks back to the legal classification of the \textit{hybridae} as a new breed of men. The group may have been accorded this status as the best reflection of its members' legal position the senate could produce at the time. Under such unusual circumstances, it is reasonable to envisage that manumission was considered a necessary precondition to the acquisition of this status. A new legal entity requires new legal solutions and the classification of Carteia as a freedman's colony may represent just such a legal solution.

However care should be taken in establishing Carteia as a model for future settlement. As has been demonstrated, the prospective inhabitants were an atypical group and the senatorial solution to their plight was directly connected with their unusual status as \textit{hybridae}. Everything we know about Carteia suggests its possible applications as a model would be extremely limited, requiring a very specific set of preconditions. There is nothing in the corpus of evidence concerning Corduba, Ilerda, Palma or Pollentia which would justify the application of the 'Carteian' model to them. The circumstances surrounding the foundation of Carteia were not, to our knowledge, duplicated prior to the foundation of any other formal settlement in Hispania. In short, Carteia appears to have been an anomaly.

\textsuperscript{98} Humbert (1976) 231-232.
\textsuperscript{100} Cels - Sainte-Hilaire (1985) 354.
How this anomaly functioned as a community has gone largely unrecorded. According to Livy there were 4,000 individuals involved in the petition to Rome and it is normally assumed that this number represents the adult males of the hybridae population. The 4,000 would have been joined by an uncertain number of women and children, and, presumably, by a number of recently freed slaves. After forty-seven years of Roman military activity in Hispania, men of a wide range of ages would have been involved. Some might have had children, even grandchildren of their own, others would be little more than adolescents. Their respective places of origin also remain obscure. The group was too large to have come from a single town, but presumably they must have had some unifying connection, beyond their parenthood, in order to mount an organised petition for land - a tribal bond perhaps, or a more general geographical link. Since Carteia lies in Ulterior, it might be argued that these men came from southern Hispania, but this cannot be confirmed. What must be remembered about these men is that they were not likely to be upstanding models of Roman ways, having been raised by their Spanish mothers. It would seem unlikely that their fathers played any major role in their lives. However, it is certainly likely that they were exposed to a greater degree of Roman influence than many of their peers, since it might be expected that many had spent part of their lives, at least, in canabae, in daily contact with Romans.

In comparison with the scholarly attention paid to the legal basis of Carteia's foundation, the amount of information available about the town itself in the years following its creation is small. Carteia, like most Roman colonies of the middle and late Republic, was not an ex novo foundation, however almost nothing remains of the pre-Roman town. The original inhabitants were invited to join the colony by the senate; those who lacked land elsewhere are likely to have taken up this option.

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101 Livy 43.3.2-3.

102 Although their parenthood must have helped cement bonds between them. It has been suggested by del Castillo (1991) 607 that the offspring of Roman soldiers might have been subject to racial abuse and made unwelcome in their mothers' communities by their fathers' origins.

103 See chapter 5, p. 135.

104 The archaeological remains suggest that it was an indigenous town, rather than a Phoenician/Carthaginian foundation, but little more than this can be surmised. See Presedo Velo et al. (1982) 14. In addition, Strabo (3.1.7) describes Calpe, a town closely connected with, if not identical to, Carteia, as a naval station of the Iberians. See Jones (1923) 14, n.1; Lasserre (1966) 187.

105 Livy 43.3.4.
This will have emphasised the native aspect of the settlement. Little more is known about the republican phase, which was largely replaced by a building programme during the Augustan era. The building of a new forum, large temple and theatre/amphitheatre completely changed the town’s central district. The provision of these facilities does indicate that the town was a sizeable and fairly prosperous community by this point, but exactly how it had fared over the previous century and a half remains uncertain.

What is particularly interesting about Carteia is how little importance the town seems to have gained by its colonial status. In political and military terms the town was greatly overshadowed by grander neighbours in the south. The only other occasion on which it gains prominence occurred during the Caesarian Civil Wars, when Carteia sheltered Cn. Pompeius, thus leaping briefly into the limelight. In fact, little is made of the town’s colonial status either by the sources or by the town itself. Livy is the only author to pay any real attention to the issue, and even then only in the context of the actual foundation. This is perhaps not so surprising, given that all the extant sources were writing when colonial foundations in Hispania were not unusual and there were many more illustrious than Carteia. However it is intriguing that the town itself never emphasised its status. Unlike a number of its vicus neighbours, Carteia did not mint coins in the second century and when it began to do so in the mid-first century there was no sign of colonial status in the types produced. The obverses bear standard images reproduced on the coins of many other Baetic mints - bearded heads of Jupiter, Hercules and Mercury - which probably owe as much to Punic influences as they do to the Roman ones. The reverses are equally standardised with the terse legend ‘CARTEIA’ and, occasionally, the name of a magistrate. This is not to say that Carteia was an impoverished or obscure community, but merely that its status as a Latin colony had brought it neither fame nor fortune.

106 Fear (1996) 172, 193 & 198-199. There is some doubt over the original function of the seating structure discovered at Carteia; it may be the remains of either a theatre or amphitheatre.
107 B. Hisp. 37.
108 The dating remains a little doubtful and cannot be refined any further. See GF p. 330.
110 On the typology of Carteian coinage generally see Chaves Tristán (1979) 33.
Considerable confusion surrounds the foundation of Rome’s next formal settlement, Corduba (Córdoba), a situation largely due to Strabo’s treatment of the subject (map 3). Strabo states that it was the first Roman colony in the region, founded by Marcellus and inhabited by a select population of hispani and Romans.\textsuperscript{111} Although Strabo does not identify this ‘Marcellus’ further, it is generally assumed that the man involved is M. Claudius Marcellus, who served both Spanish provinces as praetorian governor in 169/8 and returned to Citerior as first consular, and then proconsular, commander in 152-150.\textsuperscript{112} This identification is not without its problems. No historical source mentions the foundation of a colony by Marcellus, or anyone else at this time, and the town’s full title, \textit{colonia Patricia Corduba}, sits awkwardly with the proudly plebeian Claudii Marcelli.\textsuperscript{113} A further complication is added by Caesar’s commentaries on the Civil Wars, in which he noted that Corduba had a \textit{conventus}, something no citizen colony could possibly need.\textsuperscript{114}

These difficulties have been variously dealt with over the years, with greater or lesser degrees of success. The most commonly endorsed suggestion is that Marcellus founded a \textit{vicus}, rather than a \textit{colonia}, when he wintered there in 152.\textsuperscript{115} However this proposal does not explain why Strabo refers to the town as a colony, and some have moved away from the common herd in order to do so. Knapp’s solution, enlarging on ideas of Galsterer, was to designate the town a Latin, rather than Roman, colony. It would have been founded by Marcellus as praetor in 169/8, using the recent example of Carteia as a blueprint.\textsuperscript{116} Knapp’s argument does not, however, acknowledge the absence, in this case, of the unusual conditions which precipitated the senate’s creation of Carteia. Canto also deals with the problem most ingeniously, if unconvincingly. She suggests that Corduba was originally founded as a small citizen colony c.200 and owed its connection with a ‘Marcellus’ to a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Strabo 3.2.1.
\item \textsuperscript{112} 169/8: Livy 43.14.2-5 & 43.15.4-5. 152-150: Polybius 35.2-4; Livy, Ep. 48; Appian, Ib. 48-49.
\item \textsuperscript{113} The title is recorded by Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 3.10 and by a number of inscriptions, for example \textit{CIL} 2 2245-2247, 5523; \textit{CIL} 2\textsuperscript{2,7} 228.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Caesar, \textit{Civ.} 2.19. This is further confirmed by comments in parts of the pseudo-Caesarian corpus: \textit{B. Alex.} 57, 59. For a discussion on \textit{conventus} see chapter 7, pp.170-172.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Thouvenot (1940) 184; Vittinghoff (1952) 72-72;García y Bellido (1959) 451-452; Knapp (1977) 121; Marin Díaz (1988) 205-207; Richardson (1996a) 78.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Knapp (1983) 10-12; Galsterer (1971) 9-10. More recently, Stylow (1990) 262-263 has also lent his support to this idea.
\end{itemize}
refurbishment of the town centre administered by another M. Claudius Marcellus, son-in-law of Augustus, in the mid 20s.\textsuperscript{117} It will be noted that neither of these arguments manages to explain the presence of a convenitus in the Civil Wars period.

As these and other eminent scholars have demonstrated, it is difficult to find a single solution that takes account of all elements of the puzzle and it is necessary to accept that it is simply not possible to accommodate them all. The weakest element is Strabo’s assertion that the town is the oldest colony in the region. Strabo probably places emphasis on Corduba because of its importance in his own day and that of his main source for Turdetaenia, Poseidonius.\textsuperscript{118} He links it with Gades, another flourishing centre, and talks of their commercial and agricultural success. He shows no cognisance of the antiquity of Italica, or of Carteia which was a genuine colony. As minor towns both are dismissed with a mere mention of their location.\textsuperscript{119} If Corduba is reduced from the status of ‘oldest colony’, to that of being one of the older towns with Roman connections in the region, then a viable solution can be reached. Accordingly, it seems likely that a formal Roman settlement at Corduba was indeed initiated in the second century by M. Claudius Marcellus, next to the existing indigenous town, which lay on the modern Colina de los Quemados. The earlier of the two possible foundation dates - 169/8 - seems the more likely. This would fit smoothly with Marcellus’ governorship of both provinces and Polybius’ comment that Marcellus wintered at Corduba in 152, when the town was apparently capable of housing his army.\textsuperscript{120}

The Roman element will almost certainly have been composed of veterans.\textsuperscript{121} It is difficult to imagine that, as governor of the Spanish provinces, Marcellus could have solicited for settlers in Italy. It is possible that there were numbers of native Italian civilians in Hispania willing to join a formal settlement, but this is a contrived

\textsuperscript{117} Canto (1991) 849-855.
\textsuperscript{118} Strabo is thought to have been heavily dependent on Poseidonius for much of his information about southern Hispania and to have been a broadly accurate transmitter of the earlier writer’s work. See Lasserre (1966) 13; Alonso-Núñez (1979) 641-643.
\textsuperscript{119} Strabo 3.2.2.
\textsuperscript{120} Polybius 35.2.2-3. Neither the fact that Marcellus was governor of Citerior alone in 152, nor the ability of the town to winter a large army in that year are an insuperable bar to this being the date of foundation. However since the only conceivable objection to 169 as a foundation date is Marcellus’ rank as praetor, that year must be given serious consideration. See also Ibañez Castro (1983) 61.
\textsuperscript{121} Knapp (1977) 123; Fear (1996) 37.
solution. Marcellus commanded a large army, in whose ranks prospective settlers could easily be found. They would certainly be the most useful type of settlers from a tactical point of view. Corduba was situated hard by the southern edge of the Sierra Morena, the great natural boundary between the relatively peaceful Baetic valley and the unconquered interior of the peninsula. It was also positioned roughly at the point where the Baetis became safely navigable for light cargo vessels. It seems likely that Marcellus was seeking to preserve Roman interests in an area of immense strategic value. Former soldiers who were experienced in Iberian warfare would make ideal settlers under such circumstances.

Whether the ethnically mixed population described by Strabo was achieved by inviting romanised *hispani* to immigrate to Corduba, or simply integrating the existing indigenous community on the Colina de los Quemados is unclear. It is possible that the mixed population resulted from Marcellus’ inability to persuade enough native Italians to participate, although a deliberately mixed group may have been intended from the outset in order to help reconcile natives in the wider region to a Roman presence. A dedicatory inscription to a prominent townsman, L. Axius Naso, found at Córdoba records the same information twice, once on behalf of the *vicani vici forensis* and once on behalf of the *vicani vici hispani*, which may suggest a preservation of ethnic distinctions within the town for some time after foundation. Equally this dedication may simply reflect the existence of definite topographical divisions at Corduba. This would seem a probable explanation if the inscription does indeed date from the first century AD, by which time the area enclosed within the extended city walls was nearly double that of the republican period.

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122 Strabo 3.2.3. The Guadalquivir is no longer navigable this far upstream, due to silting. There are indications that during the imperial period considerable efforts were required to keep the river open to vessels. See Ibañez Castro (1983) 281-282.  
123 Montenegro Duque et al., (1986) 64; Harris (1989) 139. In any case, by the first century the native site had been abandoned. At what point the population was first either enticed or compelled to move into the Roman town is not known. See Knapp (1983) 16; Marin Diaz (1988) 129-134.  
124 AE 1981, 495. The recipient of the dedication has proved hard to trace, but he may be identical with the L. Axius Naso who acted as a moneyer at Rome in the mid-first century, or with the proconsular governor of Cyprus in 29 AD. See Castillo (1974) 195-196; appendix entry A11.  
125 Ventura et al. (1998) 92-93 & fig. 2.
The exact status of this community still presents some confusion. However, there is no reason to disbelieve Caesar’s testimony of a *conventus* at Corduba in the mid first century and it may safely be assumed that the settlement had no official status at the outset. It seems likely that the town finally gained official status from Caesar himself. Corduba was the most successful of the pre-Caesarian formal settlements. Flourishing on a mixture of agriculture and commerce, it rapidly established itself as the normal headquarters of the governors of Ulterior and was the accepted regional capital by the Caesarian Civil Wars period. The legends on Corduban coins advertised this position, for they bore the names, not of local magistrates, but of Roman commanders and officials. By the late first century, Corduba had a basilica and forum in the city’s centre, while some of the inhabitants may have owned peristyle houses built within an orthogonal street grid. The notorious victory celebrations held in the town by Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius in 72/1 show that the city, or at least the *conventus*, had sufficient resources to spend lavishly. The same incident provides evidence for the presence of the literary side of Roman culture. Local poets, says Cicero, lauded Metellus’ achievements in thickly accented Latin verse. It has been suggested that Corduba may have functioned as a display of Roman culture. Although deliberate showcasing seems unlikely, Corduba may well have performed such a function in an unpremeditated fashion. Its mixed population may have made it all the more effective in the role.

The second half of the second century brought what is, for modern scholars, perhaps the most controversial of the Roman foundations: Valentia (*map 3*). The epitomist of the fifty-fifth book of Livy’s history is the only extant ancient writer to

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126 Caesar was well acquainted with Corduba, having held council there in 49. See Caesar, *Civ.* 2.19. Later he invested much time and effort in trying to recapture it from Sex. Pompeius. See *B. Hisp.* 2; 12; 33-34. In the Augustan period Corduban coin legends began to refer to the town as ‘*COLONIA PATRICIA*’ rather than ‘*CORDUBA*’, a suggestion that the city was flaunting a newly acquired status. See *GF* 1263-1265 & 1702-1708; Chaves Tristán (1977) 100.

127 See chapter 4, pp. 90-91.


129 Chaves Tristán (1977) 45.

130 Forum: Cicero, *Ver.* 4.25; the site has been located, see Stylow (1990) 272. Basilica: *B. Alex.* 52. Peristyle house: Martial 9.61; see also Fear’s comments (1996) 208. For deductions about an orthogonal street grid, see Fear (1996) 217; Ibáñez Castro (1983) 296 expresses serious reservations, based on the remaining trace of the city walls.

131 Valerius Maximus 9.1.5.


133 Harris (1989) 140.
report the foundation. He states D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus established a city with this name in 138, at the close of the Lusitanian Wars, for those ‘qui sub Viriatho militaverunt’.134 Both the site of this foundation and the nature of its initial inhabitants have been the source of controversy and discussion since the nineteenth century. The first of these problems has now been solved to general satisfaction.135 The work of both Torres and Fletcher Valls have now firmly established that, of the three possible candidates - Valencia del Cid, Valencia de Alcántara (prov. Cáceres) and Valença do Minho (prov. Minho) - the first is the only reasonable contender.136 It has now been shown that both the latter two candidates were dubbed ‘Valencia’ during a vogue for the title among the Castilian and Portuguese kings of the thirteenth century AD.137 The debate concerning the occupancy of Valentia, however, continues to rage. Inconsistencies in the evidence have resulted in a distinct split in the scholarship on the subject, with some asserting that Brutus’ settlers must have been Lusitanian and others that they were native Italian.138 At the present time numbers supporting both sides are comparatively balanced, a reflection of the subtleties of the issue.

Supporters of the former proposition look to the writings of Appian and Diodorus Siculus for support. These two authors state that the followers of Viriathus received an unnamed city and land at the end of the war, although they both agree that it was Q. Servilius Caepio who was responsible.139 In many senses the settlement of Lusitanian veterans in the heart of Roman-controlled territory is perfectly plausible. From a political point of view, the settlement of them in a fertile

134 Livy, Ep. 55.
135 An objection to the solution has been raised by Knapp (1977) 127-130, as archaeologists have found little at Valentia del Cid dating prior to the 120s. This should not be a matter of concern. Archaeological investigation has necessarily been limited by current occupation of the site and the data produced to date should not be regarded as definitive.
136 Torres (1951) 113-116; Fletcher Valls (1963) 198-199.
137 The connotations of health and strength made it a suitable title in a time of massive social and political upheaval. Valencia de Alcántara was one of many to receive a new population and a new name in the course of the Reconquista. See Jackson (1972) 82-88; de Moxó (1979) 201-205. Valença do Minho was renamed by Afonso III during his restructuring of the commercial patterns of urban life in Portugal. See Menéndez Pidal (1990) 545-548.
139 Diodorus Siculus 33.1.4; Appian, Ib. 75.
area with good prospects was logical. A desire for wealth to supplement the poor conditions of their homeland in the west had driven the tribesmen into conflict with the Romans in the first place and promises of land, subsequently reneged upon, had merely set the seal on the situation.\textsuperscript{140} The settlement brought the saga to a natural and fitting conclusion. In settling them on the Mediterranean coast Brutus risked very little and gained much. The common modern image of the Lusitani as a primitive society wedded to ancient nomadic ways is as much a product of scholarly imagination and romantic nationalism, as it is of any concrete evidence.\textsuperscript{141} As Torres has pointed out, in 138, after the treacherous death of Viriathus and the swift defeat of his successor, the Lusitani would be better disposed to accept what they were offered and make the best of it.\textsuperscript{142} Valentia's geographical position reduced the risks involved for both parties. The town's \textit{territorium} lay in some of the most fertile land available anywhere in the peninsula, which promised a stable farming future for the Lusitani and hope for the Romans that the new settlers would not feel the need to return to brigandage. Although it lay on the coast overlooking the Balearic route, the town was not provided with good harbour facilities, so there was also little danger that they might venture into piracy.\textsuperscript{143} Isolated from their native land and surrounded by romanised and hellenised neighbours, the chances for success in their integration were high.

Nonetheless, there has long existed a certain reluctance to take the Livian passage at face value, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, Valentia is known to have been a pre-Caesarian colony, something which sits awkwardly with a

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Appian, \textit{Iib.} 59-60.}
\footnote{Very little is known of the Lusitani, beyond what is said by the literary sources. Archaeological investigation of their heartland is still ongoing at present, but it is clear that they were not nomadic, even if they were prone to long-distance raids. The Lusitani appear to have built \textit{castros}, permanent defensive settlements, like other groups in northern and western Hispania. See Alarção (1988) vol. 1, 4-5; Edmondson (1990) 157-160. For criticism of modern treatment of hispani in general, see García Quintela (1990) passim, especially 188-190. For modern and ancient distortions of Viriathus' men in particular, see Rubinsohn (1981) passim.}
\footnote{Torres (1951) 118.}
\footnote{Although some sea traffic is likely to have passed through Valentia, the town was not a noted port in the ancient period. Strabo (3.4.8) reports that the stretch of coast between Carthago Nova and Tarraco was not well suited to the landing of vessels. This was probably due to the silting problem which continues to build up sand bars and create shallow saltwater lagoons in the region, and which gives modern Valencia's artificial harbour, El Grao, one of the shallowest draughts in Spain. See Way (1962) 42; British Naval Intelligence Division (1941-1945) vol.3, 391.}
\end{footnotesize}
foundation for reformed bandits.\textsuperscript{144} In addition, the town produced a series of coins, on the uncial standard and in Roman style, at some point during the period 120-90. These bear the names of magistrates who appear to be Italian.\textsuperscript{145} This latter point is not a particularly serious problem. Given the position of the town and the identity of its founder, it is not surprising to see Roman styles used in local coinage, especially when numerous other Spanish mints had also adopted the uncial standard.\textsuperscript{146} It may be suggested that the coins were produced towards the end of the established timeframe and that the men named on them were in fact \textit{hispani}, who had either received citizenship as individuals, or, more probably, appropriated Roman names to which they were not officially entitled. However none of the names involved are those of high profile Roman commanders, which might be expected in such a situation and this does give pause for thought.

With these obvious problems as a starting point, scholars supporting the idea of a foundation for native Italian soldiers have succeeded in finding further support for their theory. Both Fletcher Valls and Ventura Conejero have successfully demonstrated that the phrase `\textit{sub Viriatho}' may have temporal, rather than figurative, significance, meaning `during the time of Viriathus' and thus possibly referring to Roman troops.\textsuperscript{147} Blázquez has also made much of the semi-nomadic Lusitanian lifestyle, lack of evidence notwithstanding, suggesting they might have proved very difficult to settle in an urban environment, where they might be a risk to their neighbours.\textsuperscript{148} Moreover a foundation for Roman soldiers would certainly be no less in keeping with past gubernatorial practice than a foundation for Lusitani.

At the current time we still await an element in the evidence which will show that either solution is the definitive one. There is something to be said, therefore, in favour of a compromise solution which has received moderate support. This proposes that while Roman veterans were accommodated at Valentia, Brutus did

\textsuperscript{144} CIL 9 5275. See p. 71 below for further discussion.
\textsuperscript{145} GF 366-368.
\textsuperscript{146} Approximately fifteen other mints had adopted the uncial standard by the 90s: Saitabi, Saguntum-Arse, Emporiae, Obulco, Abra, Ulia, Arva, Barbula, Castulo, Bastulo and Ilderaca, along with four anonymous mints. At the time none were formal settlements, official or unofficial. Saguntum-Arse and Castulo both produced coins on the uncial standard which appear to show magistrates with Italian names. See GF chap. 5.
\textsuperscript{147} Fletcher Valls (1963) 197; Ventura Conejero (1981) 539-544.
\textsuperscript{148} Blázquez and del Castillo (1991) 275.
provide for Viriathus’ men by settling them at Brutobriga. However, this cannot be regarded as an entirely satisfactory, since little is known about this foundation beyond its existence. There is a single literary reference to it and a single coin type is known, neither of which provide any concrete information about the town’s foundation or subsequent development. Even the site has yet to be securely located, although it is thought to have been situated between Abrantes and Santarém in the modern Portuguese province of Ribatejo.

Whatever the correct solution, it is difficult to believe that a Roman commander would have made any move to found a colony at this date, nor is it likely that the senate would have allowed him to do so. Such a prospect would have been quite unthinkable in the case of the Viriathic soldiers, who were mere dediticii. The Roman troops’ prospects were better, but, sixteen years before the infamous attempt to found Junonia, a colonial foundation still seems unlikely. That Valentia was not a colony at the outset is suggested by the wording of Livy’s text, which states that the soldiers received ‘agros et oppidum’; the phrase is mirrored by Diodorus’ ‘χώραν και πόλιν’. It recalls Aemilius Paullus’ edict on the ‘Turris Lascutana’ inscription, which sought to achieve an unofficial solution to a local problem, albeit in differing circumstances. The term ‘colonia’, so prominent in Livy’s account of the foundation of Carteia, is absent. There is no obvious reason why either Livy, or his epitomist, should avoid the term ‘colonia’ if it were appropriate to the occasion, therefore it could be argued that it was not appropriate. It seems possible, therefore, that Brutus established nothing grander than a vicus, an unofficial formal settlement.

150 Le Roux (1982) 36 summarises the basic problems.
151 Stephanus Byzantius, Eth. in FHA 8 p. 427: ‘Βροτοβρία πόλις μετέχει Βατιος ποταμοῦ καὶ Τυπιτανίνυν δηλοί δε Βροτούπολιν’. For the coin type see GF 1181.
153 During the Republic, the fate of dediticii lay absolutely in the hands of the Roman people. The status of dediticiaus was a transitory one, representing neither slavery nor freedom, given to those who surrendered until their long term fate was decided. Those who were not sold into slavery were usually returned to their original peregrine status. See Jones (1936) 229-232; Sherwin-White (1973) 284-285.
154 Livy, Ep. 55; Diodorus Siculus 33.1.4.
155 CIL 2 5041. Aemilius Paullus gave the group involved ‘AGRVM • OPPIDVMQV(E)’.
156 Livy 43.3.4.
However, the town did acquire official status at a later date, as Pliny lists Valentia as a colony.\(^{157}\) The city does not seem to belong to the group of early \textit{vicus} foundations that finally received colonial status under Caesar or Augustus, for it lacks the elaborate titles normal for that period. An inscription from near Ascoli in Italy, which refers to \textit{`CONSC[\textsc{R}\textsc{P}\textsc{T}] C[OL(\textsc{O\textsc{N})I}) \textit{\textsc{C}OL(\textsc{O\textsc{N}}\textsc{IAE}) VALE\textsc{N}I\textsc{T}(\textsc{INORVM})'\textit{, is dated the consulship of L. Afranius, suggesting the town may have been a colony already in 60.}\(^{158}\) Afranius was one of Pompey's loyal supporters and, during the closing phase of the Sertorian War, he was one of Pompey's most senior officers.\(^{159}\) A \textit{deductio} of new settlers would have been a vital part of the establishment of a formal colony at Valentia and the most obvious opportunity for such an event would have been the aftermath of the Sertorian War. A number of scholars have backed the idea of a second settlement at this time, undertaken by Pompey just prior to his return to Rome in 71.\(^{160}\) Pompaelo, an indigenous settlement, was also created at this time. Pompey was acknowledged, even in ancient world, as being one of the most effective manipulators of the Roman patronage system.\(^{161}\) A colonial foundation would have represented an important achievement in this respect. That a second foundation took place at Valentia seems all the more likely in the light of a number of inscriptions from various points in the imperial period, which seem to refer to the existence of two linked, but separate, communities within the physical limits of the town.\(^{162}\)

The failure of Rome to implement the infamous \textit{lex Plotia agraria}, a bill apparently promulgated in 70 with the intent to provide land for Pompeian veterans, until 59 is no barrier to a Spanish colonial foundation.\(^{163}\) In the first place, the bill was most probably intended to provide \textit{viritane grants} in Italy, rather than colonies in

\(^{157}\) Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 3.20.

\(^{158}\) \textit{CIL} 9 5275. The inscription has been heavily restored by Mommsen. For Valentia's status as a \textit{vicus}, see Vittinghoff (1952) 73; Galsterer (1971) 12; Hoyos (1971) 97.

\(^{159}\) Plutarch, \textit{Sert.} 19.3.


\(^{161}\) Plutarch, \textit{Pomp.} 18; Strabo 3.4.10. See also Seager (1979) 21.

\(^{162}\) \textit{CIL} 2 3733-3737, 3739 & 3741. The majority of these inscriptions date to the third century AD, so caution must be exercised when using them to refer to the republican disposition of the town. See Peña Gimeno (1984) 65.

\(^{163}\) Dio 38.5.1-2; Cicero, \textit{Att.} 1.18.6. See Gabba (1950) 66-68 for the connection between these two passages.
Hispania.  

Secondly, if Marshall and Smith are correct in their respective arguments that Pompey did not press for the implementation of the bill for political reasons, then there is no reason why the settlement by him of a small number of veterans in a single colony cannot be countenanced.  

For the next formal foundation episode in Hispania we must return to the second century. Although the Balearic Islands form an integral part of modern Spain, their position 100-200 km from the shores of the mainland made them far less easily accessible by boat in the ancient period than they are today. They did possess a certain strategic value, offering a possible staging point for ships sailing from southern Hispania to Italy and southern France and providing a handy base for pirates preying on trade between these areas. Nonetheless, they lay outside Roman control, and apparently Roman interest, until the late second century. Their isolation from the Roman world was ended by Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus, who invaded in 123, apparently as part of an anti-piracy campaign. The establishment of two formal settlements followed swiftly: Palma (Palma de Majorca) and Pollentia (Alcudia de Pollensa) on the western and eastern coasts of Majorca respectively (map 3).  

The status of both towns is particularly problematic. The ancient sources are split on the subject, with Mela labelling them ‘coloniae’ and Pliny referring to them as ‘oppida civium Romanorum’. Epigraphic evidence attests that the dominant voting tribe among Roman citizens on the island was the tribus Velina, one rarely found elsewhere in Hispania, which was not generally used for new citizens from the Caesarian period onwards. This has led more than one scholar to conclude that the towns were colonies from the outset. However others prefer Pliny’s version, as the

164 This was the purpose of the bill promulgated by the tribune L. Flavius in 60, to which Cicero explicitly compares the lex Plotia. See Dio 37.50.1; Cicero, Att. 1.18.6.  
166 Morgan (1968) 224-228.  
167 Livy, Ep. 40; Florus, Epit. 1.43.1.  
168 Strabo 3.5.1.  
169 Mela 2.124; Pliny, Nat. 3.77.  
170 For example CIL 2 3696-3698.  
171 Vittinghoff (1952) 55; Hoyos (1971) 95; Galsterer (1971) 10; Marin Diaz (1988) 140-143. Marin Diaz and Galsterer both suggest the towns were created as Latin colonies. Marin Diaz also includes an excellent summary of past opinions on the subject.
more reliable source.\textsuperscript{172} There are difficulties with both alternatives. The latter solution does not explain the widespread membership of the \textit{tribus Velina}, or indeed how to define an \textit{oppidum civium Romanorum}\textsuperscript{173}, and proponents of the former make no attempt to explain why official settlements would be founded in such an isolated position in the same year that, in the face of intense opposition, C. Sempronius Gracchus succeeded in founding Junonia, the first transmarine Roman colony.\textsuperscript{174}

In short, no tidy solution is available. However, an examination of the pattern established by the pre-Caesarian formal settlements of Hispania up to this point is helpful in this regard. With a single exception, all of these were the unofficial foundations of Roman commanders. The motivation for their creation came from the commander himself, rather than from Rome. As has been shown, that single exception, Carteia, occurred as the result of highly irregular circumstances. The background to the foundation of Palma and Pollentia is, perhaps, not quite as clearly illuminated as that of Carteia, but we possess a reasonably coherent picture. There is no real sign of a desire on the part of either the Senate or the Roman people to colonise that part of the world at this time. Most scholars are agreed that the acquisition of the Balearics did not have a colonial motive and that, however dubious Balearicus' subsequent triumph was, he was fêted for his conquest of pirates, not land.\textsuperscript{175} Therefore it must be accepted that, whatever the remaining difficulties, it is more likely that Palma and Pollentia were unofficial settlements of the type already well established in Hispania, rather than official colonies created at the behest of Rome. In this context the term \textit{oppida civium Romanorum} should be taken as indicating a town without official status, but containing a sizeable proportion of Roman citizens.\textsuperscript{176}

It seems clear, from both Pliny and Strabo's accounts, that these towns were intended for native Italians, rather than the local islanders. Pliny's \textit{oppida civium}

\textsuperscript{172} Wilson (1966) 16; García y Bellido (1959) 457; Morgan (1968) 230.

\textsuperscript{173} There have been various interpretations, but the prevailing view is that such communities were not possessed of any particular official status. For a general discussion of the problem, see Sherwin-White (1973) 344-50.

\textsuperscript{174} Plutarch, \textit{CG.} 9.2, 10.2. See also above, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{175} Dyson (1985) 220; Morgan (1968) 224; 225-230 for Balearicus' questionable worthiness of a triumph.

'Romanorum' is matched by Strabo's report that Balearicus filled the settlements with 3,000 'Ῥωμαῖοι', all drawn from mainland Hispania. Strabo is thought to have applied the term in the same loose manner that most Greek authors of the Roman period did, using it to designate all native Italians, rather than just Roman citizens. By this time the Spanish provinces contained several different types of native Italians who might be candidates for immigration to the islands. Besides men at the end of their service in Balearicus' army, there were veterans from the mainland troops and people from both formal and informal settlements, who were interested in a larger holding or new opportunities. Any or all types might have been involved in Palma and Pollentia at the outset and many authors favour the idea that civilians dominated, but confirmation of this is not available.

Following the foundation of Palma and Pollentia the issue of native Italian settlement in Hispania becomes even more vexed, if that were possible. The root cause of the problem is the destruction of Numantia in 133, the final event in the long series of second century crises in Hispania. For nearly forty years an uneasy peace reigned in Roman controlled areas, broken only periodically by localised, small-scale eruptions of violence. Officially the wars in Hispania were at an end and Roman attention, political and literary, turned first to Africa, then Gaul and Italy. Even when large-scale strife returned to Hispania, in the form of the Sertorian War, we receive remarkably little information about its effect on the peninsula. As Appian observed, the sources focus on the Roman participants in the 80s and 70s, Hispania merely provides a backdrop.

It is probable that as military activity in the peninsula reduced, so did the impetus for the creation of formal settlements. The increasingly pacified state of the Spanish provinces limited the tactical value of such settlements. The armies posted in Hispania were proportionately smaller and the need for experienced soldiers had moved elsewhere, suggesting that those sent to Hispania in this period would be less likely to remain there for the whole of their service career. There would be less demand for Spanish land amongst the troops. Yet it is clear from the archaeological

177 Strabo 3.5.1.
179 Appian, Ib. 101.
evidence and from literary comment on later periods, that there were some settlements whose origins lie in the period between 120 and the start of the Caesarian Civil Wars. The vast majority of those settlements traditionally associated with this period are the castra and castella communities, which seem to have their origins in camps erected by the Roman army.

The Iberian peninsula was conquered at a painfully slow rate over the course of two centuries. It was a piecemeal affair conducted by a series of generals who each acted as they saw fit in the circumstances and retired to safe territory at the close of each campaigning season. By the early second century, the speed of the conquest had slowed enormously and permanent territorial gains were rare. Operations against particular tribes often took decades to reduce them to the point of surrender. The banditry and guerrilla warfare of tribes from central and western Hispania conditioned the Roman approach. Since the annihilation of the enemy was the only way to secure a lasting victory, generals were often fighting to destroy enemy tribes, rather than to capture their land. An important result of this type of warfare was the construction of siege camps and operational bases designed for occupation over the course of several successive campaigning seasons. Occasional garrisons may also have been required to secure main transit routes. The remains of a number of these camps have been found and investigated. The most famous are those surrounding Numantia, but others have been found in the central Meseta.\textsuperscript{180} By imperial standards none of those found so far were large, but they were frequently built in stone and show no sign of having been systematically demolished when they ceased to be of use to the army.\textsuperscript{181} Many also show signs of having canabae, shanty towns containing the army’s camp followers. The construction of such camps tailed off during the Augustan years. The final pacification of the peninsula in this period and Augustus’ establishment of permanent military bases in the north-west removed the need for them.

It is important to emphasise that, however sturdily built and whatever the civilian population attached to them, the republican camps were not settlements in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Johnson (1983) 223-227; Salvatore (1996) chapter 2.
\item Salvatore (1996) 1-2 suggests the unusual preference for stone exhibited in Hispania was due to fieldstone being in plentiful supply in the central Meseta and adjacent sierras.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
any real sense. They were temporary homes for an essentially nomadic army, which lightly discarded them when the time came to move on. Therefore, it is interesting that a variety of literary and epigraphic sources of the first and second centuries AD refer to what are clearly permanent communities in Hispania, bearing titles containing the terms ‘castra’ or ‘castellum’: castra Aelia (upper Hiberus valley);\textsuperscript{182} castra Atiliana (\textit{conventus Asturicensis});\textsuperscript{183} castellum Berense (near River Lima, prov. Minho);\textsuperscript{184} castra Caeciliana (near Lisbon. prov. Estremadura );\textsuperscript{185} castra Caepiana (prov. Baixo Alentejo);\textsuperscript{186} castra Calpurniana (upper Baetis valley?);\textsuperscript{187} castra Cilniana (possibly near Marbella, prov. Malaga);\textsuperscript{188} castellum Ciseli (near River Lima, prov. Minho);\textsuperscript{189} castellum Ebora (probably in prov. Cádiz);\textsuperscript{190} castra Gemina (\textit{conventus Astigitanus});\textsuperscript{191} castra Liciniana (between Mérida, prov. Badajoz, and Toledo);\textsuperscript{192} castra Manliana (possibly in upper Tagus valley);\textsuperscript{193} castra Mariana (in general vicinity of Mérida, prov. Badajoz);\textsuperscript{194} castellum Meidunum (possibly near Alcántara, prov. Badajoz);\textsuperscript{195} castra Postumiana (possibly near Teba, prov. Málaga);\textsuperscript{196} castra Servilia (probably near Cáceres el Viejo, prov. Cáceres);\textsuperscript{197} castra Vinaria (southern Andalucía).\textsuperscript{198} These are rarely discussed in any detail by modern

\textsuperscript{182} Livy, \textit{Frag.} 91.
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Itin. Ant.} 450.3.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{CIL} 2 5353.
\textsuperscript{186} Ptolemy, \textit{Geog.} 2.5.6. Usually linked to Q. Servilius Caepio, governor of Ulterior 139. See \textit{MRR} 1 p. 482.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Itin. Ant.} 402.7.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Itin. Ant.} 406.1.
\textsuperscript{189} \textit{CIL} 2 5320.
\textsuperscript{189} Mela 3.4. The southern half of the Iberian peninsula seems to have contained a plethora of towns called ‘Ebora’. Mela clearly differentiates between this particular example and the more important Lusitanian Ebora (Évora, prov. Alto Alentejo), which he refers to as ‘Magnus Ebora’ (3.7). It is also likely that castellum Ebora is unconnected with Pliny’s ‘Ebora quaer Cerialis’ (\textit{Nat.} 3.10), which he places in the vicinity of Corduba. See Silverman (1988) 249 & 252; Hübner, \textit{RE} 5, col. 1897.
\textsuperscript{190} Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 3.12.
\textsuperscript{191} Ptolemy, \textit{Geog.} 2.5.6. Usually linked to P. Licinius Crassus, governor of Ulterior 96-93. See \textit{MRR} 2 p. 10; Blázquez (1964) 170.
\textsuperscript{192} Ptolemy, \textit{Geog.} 2.5.7. Has been linked by Schulten to P. Manlius (Vulso?), commander in Ulterior 182-180. See \textit{MRR} 1 p. 382; Schulten \textit{RE} 14.1, col. 1149.
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Itin. Ant.} 445.2.
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{CIL} 2 2520.
\textsuperscript{196} Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 4.117.
\textsuperscript{197} Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 3.10. Tovar has suggested that Vinaria should be read ‘Binaria’, in which case it may be an alternative name for castra Gemina. See Tovar (1974-1989) vol.2, 130-131.
scholars, not least because very little is known about them. However, when they are brought to light, it is all too frequently in the same context as other towns with military connections, such as Tarraco and Corduba. This is a mistake, for the probable settlement background to these communities is neither formalised, nor Roman.

It should be noted here that two sources, the *Itinerarium Antonini*, and Ptolemy's *Geography* do not actually use the term 'castra' or 'castellum', but simply record an adjectival title which appears to be a feminine singular or neuter plural. Knapp, supported by Marin Diaz, has suggested that these are the latter, in agreement with 'castra' which is to be understood.199 References to three of the seven towns affected - Caeciliana, Caepiana and Lniciana - have long been interpreted in this manner because they can be linked to specific commanders known to have campaigned in the areas in which these communities were located.200 Knapp's argument simply takes this approach to its fullest logical extension, associating with the term 'castra' all such towns located in areas known to have formed the backdrop to the Roman conquest. The case of the remaining towns - Atiliana, Calpurniana, Cilniana, and Mariana - is perhaps more suspect. Tovar questions the posited military nature of Atiliana and Cilniana, suggesting they are better characterised as road stations or large villa complexes.201 There is less cause for concern in the cases of Mariana and Calpurniana, not least because, although they cannot be linked to any particular commander, both reflect the names of gentes active in Roman politics.202 Due caution must be exercised in this area, but, with few exceptions, Knapp's suggestions appear to be sound.

What the designation 'castra' or 'castellum' actually represents for these towns is more difficult to say. Generally, we know little more about these settlements than their names and the region in which they were founded. No site has been identified with absolute security, which rather limits our ability to speculate. What does appear certain is that these castra and castella, which may be jointly subsumed under the cognate umbrella term praesidia, were originally military foundations. These terms

200 See notes 185, 186, 192, 193, 196 above.
are intimately connected with the army and with the operations of active troops, their use in a veteran context would not be usual. That these were originally a part of the Roman army's operations in Hispania is confirmed by their positions. Veteran settlements, as has been shown, were usually located in comparatively peaceable areas, even if these were adjacent to trouble spots. By contrast, all those praesidia which can be linked to specific commanders were situated in contemporary areas of military concern.

As has been noted before, the republican army was far less static than its imperial counterpart and it is difficult to envisage a republican commander deliberately establishing a permanent operations base. This leaves two possibilities: the first that these praesidia were founded as garrisons manned for the long term by hispani in the role of auxiliaries, who continued to live there after their military role was completed; the second that the canabae around some camps occupied by the army for prolonged periods, say several campaigning seasons at a stretch, continued to exist after the departure of the army. The question of the existence of garrisons in Hispania is a contentious issue, but most current argument revolves around the placement of garrisons in existing communities. The guerrilla tactics of many indigenous tribes suggest that independent camp-style garrisons guarding main military transit routes might have been useful. If they were in use, their responsibilities and the duration of their existence would presumably be controlled by the needs of the army. Some might conceivably spend a decade or more in active service, utilised by a series of commanders all engaged in the same area; others might last for only two or three campaigning seasons, as a change in governor brought a change in targeted areas. It is highly unlikely such guard-post would be manned by Roman soldiers, who were extremely valuable commodities in Hispania, particularly during the second century. It is improbable that any commander would consign troops to a garrison unit when he had the option of using hispani. The degree to which Roman commanders used Spanish troops continues to be debated, but if there is a likely area for their use, it is this one. Garrison duties would require a

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204 See chapter 5, pp. 120-121.
205 See chapter 5, p. 114, note 21.
reasonable degree of military discipline, but little in the way of training and would offer a comparatively settled existence. Once the military function of the garrison had come to an end, there would be no great incentive to return home and soldiers might well stay on.

The *canabae* theory is more difficult. The Roman army appears to have been almost perpetually accompanied by camp followers in Hispania, as it was elsewhere. When a camp was set up, these people settled alongside it in *canabae*, which could be both large and highly organised.\(^{206}\) This much is unambiguously recorded by a variety of ancient sources. Whether they could survive without the army component is questionable. The problem is not that the site would be uninhabitable after the departure of the army. The camps were established with an eye to many of the same factors that concerned those founding a civilian settlement: water, food supply, defence and so forth.\(^ {207}\) Rather the issue at stake is the ability of such a group to adapt swiftly to a settled existence in which commercial means of support could no longer be relied upon. During the imperial period the settled nature of legions led to the entanglement of many towns' fortunes with those of neighbouring encampments. A subsequent withdrawal of the troops could have a serious economic and social impact on such towns, but would not necessarily result in their collapse. However, these were established communities, rather than *canabae*, and it is difficult to offer their example as an exact parallel. It seems likely that *canabae* would be far more vulnerable in such circumstances.

Clearly neither the continued occupation of a disbanded garrison nor the take-over of deserted camp by civilians would occur as a matter of routine. It should be remembered that the seventeen known *praesidia* communities span more than a century and a half. Currently, the earliest is thought to be castra Manliana, which is linked to P. Manlius, governor of Ulterior 182–180. The latest were probably castellum Berense and castellum Ciseli, which were founded in the extreme northwest, possibly as part of Augustus’ campaigns of 26/5.\(^ {208}\) Over such a lengthy period

\(^{206}\) The existence of *canabae* has been recorded across the empire, for example *CIL* 3 7474 (Silistra, Moesia Inferior); *CIL* 13 6797 (Moguntiacum, Germania Superior); Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.22 (Vetera, Germania Superior). The best known Spanish example is Numantia, see Appian, *ib.* 85; Valerius Maximus 2.7.1.

\(^{207}\) Vegetius (*Ep. rei milit.* 1.22) summarises the basic concerns.

\(^{208}\) See notes 184, 189 & 193 above.
and with so many different founders involved, it seems most unlikely that a single motive prevailed for either the original foundation or the continued occupation of these sites. Equally, it is clear that, despite their obvious connections to individual Roman commanders, these settlements were the product of informal settlement processes, involving indigenous settlers, not native Italians.

The *praesidia* communities are not the only reported settlements ascribed to this era, however. Three further towns may actually have been formally established. The first of these is Caecilia Metellinum (Medellín, prov. Badajoz) (*map 3*).209 The foundation of this town is usually ascribed to Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, who commanded the Roman forces in Hispania for much of the Sertorian War.210 If the attribution is correct, and there is no serious reason to doubt it, the foundation is a concrete demonstration of the expansion of Roman control. Metellinum lay on the Anas river (Guadiana), north of the Sierra Morena, an area which had been part of the frontier zone for much of the second century. It is reasonable to assume that the town was not founded until the end of the war, just prior to Metellus' return to Italy, but who the intended inhabitants were is not clear. García y Bellido's suggestion that at this date it was a *colonia civium Romanorum* is not at all implausible, particularly when Pompey's probable foundation of one at Valentia is taken into account.211 The suggestion has not been endorsed in all quarters, however, with some preferring to interpret Metellinum as a *vicus* upgraded to colonial status later, by either Caesar or Augustus.212 In either case, given the context of the initial foundation, the settlers established on the site by Metellus are likely to have been veterans. The war's end would have brought the discharge of some of his sizeable army, no longer needed to control the relatively peaceful province of Ulterior.213 The town's development

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210 He was sent to deal with Sertorius in 79 (Plutarch, *Sert.* 12.4) and finally returned to Italy in 71 to celebrate a triumph (Appian, *BC* 121; Velleius Paterculus 2.30.2). See also *MRR* 2 p. 83-123; Degrassi p. 565.
212 Vittinghoff (1952) 77; Marin Diaz (1988) 85.
213 Although he fought Sertorius across Hispania, Metellus' official province was Ulterior. See Plutarch, *Sert.* 12.4.
thereafter is largely unrecorded, although, as one of only five colonies in Lusitania, it must have enjoyed a certain regional prominence during the imperial period.\textsuperscript{214}

Still more problematic is colonia Salaria (Ubeda la Viega, prov. Jaén), situated at the northern end of the Baetic valley, in an area which, by the late second century, had long since been pacified (map 3). Despite enjoying a position of near total obscurity in the historical record, the town appears to have been a properly instituted colonial foundation. Both Ptolemy and Pliny refer to it, mentioning nothing more than its existence as a colony, and two inscriptions refer to its colonial status.\textsuperscript{215} The sources provide nothing further. The simplicity of the title may suggest a pre-Caesarian foundation, although it is not clear whether ‘colonia Salaria’ is in fact the town’s full name.\textsuperscript{216} Private inscriptions rarely carry a colony’s full title and, to date, no public inscriptions have been found. The foundation date and the founder’s identity consequently remain unknown.

Whatever its foundation date, Salaria is likely to have been a veteran settlement. As either a Caesarian or Augustan foundation, Salaria had a statistically high chance of receiving veterans. Moreover, given the high profile of late second and early first century attempts at civilian emigration beyond Italy, it is unlikely that a republican colonia Salaria could have gone unnoticed as a participant in such activities. The end of the Sertorian War would have provided an obvious occasion for the creation of a veteran settlement - this may in fact be another foundation of Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius.\textsuperscript{217} The town might equally have its origins in the little-known Celtiberian campaigns of T. Didius and C. Valerius Flaccus during the 90s, which must also have involved the discharge of a large number of veterans.\textsuperscript{218} The exact site of the town may have been conditioned by the opportunity to exploit local resources and thus the foundation may have involved the development of an existing

\textsuperscript{214} Pliny, Nat. 4.117. The others were Emerita, Pax Julia, Norba and Scallabis, for which see chapter 4, pp. 99-104.

\textsuperscript{215} Pliny, Nat. 3.25; Ptolemy, Geog. 2.6.58; CIL 2.3329, 5093. The latter inscription was found by the banks of the Guadalquivir, at some distance from Ubeda, and thus may not refer to colonia Salaria, despite the editor’s attribution.

\textsuperscript{216} Hoyos (1971) 98. Galsterer (1971, 27) argues that Salaria is a Caesarian colony, but on the grounds that it is clearly a citizen foundation and he believes all pre-Caesarian colonies to be Latin ones, rather than on the basis of any solid evidence.

\textsuperscript{217} See p. 80 above.

\textsuperscript{218} Didius: Appian, Ib. 99-100; Frontinus, Str. 2.10.1; Plutarch, Sert. 3.3. Flaccus: Appian, Ib. 100.
town rather than a foundation *ex novo*. The title ‘Salaria’ suggests a connection with salt mining, something quite possible under local geological conditions.219

The final foundation in question, Ilerda (Lleida), presents a different challenge. This native town, made a *municipium* by Augustus, was a moderately prosperous community in the imperial period, enjoying regional importance as a civic centre in the grain-growing district of Tarraconensis.220 Far less is known about its republican years when it was the central settlement of the Ilergetes, an Iberian tribe. Some scholars have claimed it was a Latin colony at this time. The claim is based on the Asculum bronze, dating to 89, on which Cn. Pompeius Strabo announced his grant of citizenship to a Spanish cavalry troop. Included among the men receiving citizenship were a trio of ‘Ilerdenses’: [Q] OTACILIUS SUISETARTEN F I CN CORNELIUS NESILLE F I P [F]ABIUS ENASAGIN F.221 On the strength of this inscription, Pais suggested that Ilerda may have been a Latin colony at the time, the foundation being relatively recent since the fathers of these men, who were obviously of the communities’ upper ranks, had not gained citizenship.222 Pais did not state clearly the form he envisaged the colony would take. Presumably he had in mind a situation similar to Carteia, in which locals were included alongside the native Italian colonists who participated in a *deductio*. The idea was roundly criticised at the time of publication, but that criticism has since been rejected by Galsterer, who has endorsed the theory.223 He remains a lone voice however, and with good reason, for the theory is difficult to defend securely.224

Ilerda was, quite undeniably, a indigenous community. It appears as such in all the literary sources and the archaeological evidence is in agreement.225 There is no sign amongst the, admittedly small, corpus of evidence to suggest a sudden change in status at the end of the second century or beginning of the first. Coin types are the

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220 For evidence of municipal status see GF 1109, 1111, 1113-1115.
221 CIL I2 709.
222 Pais (1918) 200-203. This view is followed by the notes on the inscription in CIL. The *Turma Salluitana* were a cavalry unit and thus the men in it would have been from the upper echelons of their respective communities, with sufficient funds to maintain horses and train for cavalry service.
223 Galsterer (1971) 11. For criticisms of this idea see Stevenson (1919) 100-101; Bosch-Gimpera (1966) 148.
224 More recently, the subject has been widely avoided, rather than argued against. Even Marin Diaz, who is usually supportive of Galsterer’s ideas, remains silent.
225 For a brief overview, see Bosch-Gimpera (1966) 147-148.
most eloquent of our sources. The town continued to use Iberian symbolism and the Iberian alphabet on its coins, along with the Iberian version of the town’s name, ‘Iltirta’, at least until the Sertorian War.\textsuperscript{226} This is particularly striking when compared with the situation later in the first century, the time during which Ilerda apparently became a \textit{municipium}. Here there is a noticeable break from tradition; bearded Hercules and the Iberian horseman are replaced by the head of Augustus and Iberian legends give way to Latin ones on romanised themes.\textsuperscript{227}

In the light of this, Galsterer’s attempt to defend Pais’ theory seems misplaced. The Ilerdenses’ possession of Roman names is certainly interesting, but there are other explanations and it is not necessary to assume the possession of Latin status. While Galsterer may be right to reject Stevenson’s explanation of the Roman names as having been assumed between the citizenship grant and the setting up of the inscription, he makes no allowance for the possibility that the names were simply assumed in defiance of statutes.\textsuperscript{228} Ilerda lay in an area which had come to terms with the Roman presence at a relatively early stage and which had an extensive road network encouraging easy movement of both merchants and soldiers through the region.\textsuperscript{229} Such factors would be likely to encourage the acquisition of Roman names for social and political purposes, even where there was no entitlement to do so. It may be safely assumed that Ilerda remained a native \textit{vicus} throughout the republican period.

The pre-Caesarian formal settlements of Hispania are a motley band, widely dispersed, chronologically and geographically. Usually created unofficially, on an \textit{ad hoc} basis, each individual settlement was the product of the immediate problems and requirements of its founding commander. Even when official foundations began to enter the frame in the first century, these same concerns prevailed. Despite this the

\textsuperscript{226} Vives 27:3-13 & 28:7-17; \textit{GF} 297-302 and 946-954. See also Villaronga (1978) 16-17 & 43-44.
\textsuperscript{227} Vives 134:1-6; \textit{GF} 1109-1115.
\textsuperscript{228} Galsterer (1971) 11. Provincials in both the eastern and western Mediterranean adopted Roman names, or elements of them, without being entitled to do so, throughout the Roman period. See Badian (1958) 256-257 on the question in general and Richardson (1996a) 94-95 on Ilerda in particular.
\textsuperscript{229} Several milestones dating from the late second century have been found in the area. See \textit{IRC} 1 175, 176, 181; \textit{IRC} 2 89. See also Richardson (1996a) 91-92.
settlements display a remarkable unity in the broad concerns which motivated their foundation: the need to establish a Roman presence in certain strategic areas and the desire to offer veterans of the Spanish campaigns some tangible reward for their service. Native Italian soldiers were offered land and a relatively secure living in Hispania in return for their reassuring presence in areas adjacent to trouble-spots. It is important to emphasise this last point. The veterans’ presence offered reinforcement in difficult situations, but that was all; these were settlements not garrison forces. In addressing these concerns the commanders were helping to safeguard the socio-political stability both of the Spanish provinces and, to a lesser degree, of Italy itself. The settlements added to the security of the provinces and provided a home for soldiers who might otherwise have returned to Italy landless and ready to form part of the urban mob. It is characteristic of Rome that such important issues were dealt with by individual commanders without official sanction. That they did so using forms that were strictly controlled within Italy is demonstrative of the freedom enjoyed by republican commanders in Hispania.
CHAPTER FOUR
FORMAL SETTLEMENT UNDER CAESAR AND AUGUSTUS

The swift inclusion of the Spanish provinces in the Caesarian Civil Wars would have come as little surprise to anyone at Rome. Pompey's role in the defeat of Sertorius had ensured him strong support, both military and political, across Hispania. While Caesar's praetorian governorship of Ulterio had allowed him to establish some ties, he did not enjoy the same degree of support. Faced with two heavily armed provinces, which might easily become Pompeian strongholds, Caesar's decision was inevitable. However the changes it would bring to Roman settlement there were probably unforeseen. The established model was abandoned on a variety of levels by both Caesar and Augustus. The colonisation of Hispania 49 BC - AD 14 saw changes to every aspect of the previous pattern. It was conducted on an unprecedented scale, involving new types of settlers, who had been offered lives in communities very different from those their predecessors had joined.

The most fundamental change to formal settlements after 49 was their position within the Roman state. In that year the era of official, formal settlements in Hispania began in earnest. The change was due to the fundamental differences in constitutional position between Caesar and Augustus and their republican predecessors. The men who founded the pre-Caesarian settlements were elected magistrates invested with imperium, operating within the, sometimes rather elastic, bounds of long-standing Roman constitutional law and custom. Caesar and Augustus successively became sole ruler of Rome and her empire, a position which had not previously existed and which was contrary to all prior legislation and tradition. Each assumed the role by dint of sheer military might and initially ruled on that basis. Not unnaturally both sought a legal accommodation of their de facto power and in the process many of the rules they had broken were rewritten or reinterpreted. In

1 Pompey was one of the most effective gatherers of provincial support in republican history and in Hispania was probably assisted in his efforts by his father's contacts there. During the Civil Wars this provincial influence proved to be Caesar's main obstacle, see Pliny, Nat. 3.18; 7.96; Plutarch, Pomp. 18. See also Stevenson (1919) 96 & 101; Badian (1958) 272-278; Seager (1979) 17-21.
2 Gelzer (1968) 61-63. Caesar's speech to the populace of Hispalis (B. Hisp. 42) suggests he felt he was owed greater support than the towns of Ulterio had been prepared to give.
Caesar’s case full accommodation was never reached, although progress was made towards an acceptable constitutional definition of his role. Augustus was more successful and by the end of his reign a form of legal equilibrium had been regained. The subject remains a fertile area for research and this is not the place to explore the finer complexities of the issue. However, with regard to the foundation of communities in Hispania and elsewhere, it may be said that both men had the power to act as they saw fit; de facto, if not necessarily de iure. In consequence these foundations must be regarded as official.

This official nature was emphasised by their adherence to the traditional practices and regulations in the actual installation. In Hispania they followed the rules of status and title normally applied to foundations in Italy. Indigenous, or predominantly indigenous, communities that they wished to reward were designated municipia, with all the normal rights and opportunities. The communities extended to accommodate new, native Italian settlers were established as coloniae civium Romanorum, founded according to the age old customs. The correct use of colonial and municipal forms may have been the extent of Caesar’s concern for traditional conduct. Augustus was also meticulous about the accompanying ritual. Those who put into practice his instructions concerning both his own and Caesar’s foundations, apparently carried out both the strictly practical and the purely ceremonial elements of the ancestral foundation rituals with the same attention to detail. It is true that in his triumviral years Augustus rode roughshod over public sensitivities when setting up his veteran colonies in Italy. However, once he became sole ruler he was at pains to follow established rules, perhaps because of his own potentially precarious

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3 The most recent edition of the Cambridge Ancient History supplies a summary of the current state of opinion with regard to the position of both men. See Rawson (1994) 438-467; Crook (1996) 113-123.

4 How detailed the instructions about settlement foundation were that he left behind is not known. It is true that Caesar had been concerned to tread carefully over the settlement of veterans in Italy, by refusing to establish his men in colonies and awarding them individual plots instead, see Suetonius, Jul. 38. He also appears to have promulgated a lex Italia concerning the foundation of those colonies he did create elsewhere, see Cicero, Phil. 5.53; Suetonius, Jul. 81; Appian, BC 3.2. Nonetheless, there was a limit to his tolerance for tradition where it might slow his ability to make arrangements in what he saw as the appropriate fashion, e.g. Suetonius, Jul. 20, 28-29, 59.

5 After Philippi, Octavian returned to Italy to take up his chosen duty of settling the discharged troops. At the same time he forcibly assumed Lepidus’ responsibilities for the Spanish provinces, the latter having had charge of them since shortly after Caesar’s death. Therefore, he is likely to have been, at least partially, involved in the creation of all Caesarian Spanish colonies, with the exception of Celsa and, possibly, Carthago Nova. See Jones (1970) 25.

position. After Actium he placed particular emphasis on his role as defender of mos maiorum, which made his power a little more palatable to conservative Roman society.  

This concern for tradition has two important results for modern scholarship. The first is that neither Caesar nor Augustus may be charged realistically with awarding honorific colonial titles. Although the Roman system of colonial appellations was now moving inexorably towards the honorific application of titles, and municipal status was certainly being granted in this manner already, the creation of titular colonies would have represented a distinct break with tradition. It was the later Julio-Claudians who would finally make this a reality. This is not to say that each time a colony was created by either Caesar or Augustus, all the inhabitants of the original town would be evicted and replaced by settlers. Colonial status could be granted as a reward, in theory at least. In such a case a portion of the current inhabitants would be enrolled as settlers, but new settlers would still be introduced. In either case it is probable that the colonial unit would be surrounded by vestiges of the old community, now living as incolae in their former home town.

The second, and concomitant, point is that the problem of determining whether any new formal settlement was intended for native Italians now alters considerably. As long as a community's title is known, a reasonable idea of the composition of its intended populace can be gained. Only citizen colonies will have been created for native Italians. Although some must have admitted a few hispani, native Italians will have predominated. Equally, municipia may have contained some informal native Italian settlers, but hispani will have predominated. In the context of trying to separate communities intended for native Italians from those intended for the

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8 The idea of titular colonies during this period seems to have arisen from a passage in Dio (43.39.5) in which Caesar is described as granting the status of colony to some communities following his victory at Munda. It would be dangerous to read much into these comments. Dio wrote his history at the beginning of the third century AD, when titular colonies were commonplace and had been for nearly two hundred years. It would have been an easy assumption on his part that Caesar's colonial foundations were of the same variety as those with which he was acquainted.


10 The passage in Dio (43.39.5) suggests that any such reward came with strings firmly attached.

11 Over time the two groups would probably start to coalesce through marriage. Chapter 133 of the lex coloniae Genetivae Iuliae apparently anticipates such a situation, since it seems to expect that not all wives of colonists would be themselves of Roman citizen origin. See Crawford (1996) vol. 1, 454.
indigenous inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula, it is as well to take into account the
Caesarian Latin colonies mooted by Henderson.12 The type of settler she anticipated being involved in these creations is not entirely clear from her argument as it stands, but it is unlikely that, at this point in Roman history, the proposed participants could have been anything other than peregrine *hispani*.13 As a consequence, the issue of the possible foundation by Caesar of Latin colonies in Hispania will not be entered into here.

To demonstrate the other aspects of change, individual colonies must be examined. Although the Caesarian and Augustan foundations represent a distinct change in the established pattern, the problems that accompany them are familiar ones. Determining when any given town was founded, and by whom, is often little easier than before. In many cases the only evidence for the town’s status is a vague literary reference. Distinguishing Augustan colonies from Caesarian ones presents a particular problem in these circumstances. Most towns containing some form of the name ‘Augustus’ in their title generally may be attributed to Caesar’s heir after 27 without a qualm, but those bearing some form of ‘Iulius’ are more difficult.14 The term may refer to Caesar, but may equally be the work of his heir, before or after 27 - ‘Iulius’ remained Augustus’ gens name. Further uncertainties are introduced by the fact that the actual foundations of all Caesar’s planned colonies are thought to have been made after his death, under the auspices of the triumvirs. There are definite limits to our ability to disentangle the chronology of Spanish colonies during this period. Therefore colonial foundations will be discussed according to who originally planned them, regardless of when those plans were actually put in action. All colonies belonging to the Caesarian or Augustan eras have been attributed to a specific founder, although it is recognised that a few of these attributions are extremely tentative.

12 Henderson (1942) *passim*.
13 That Henderson does envisage the participation of *hispani* seems implicit in her argument, but the point is never clarified, see Henderson (1942) *passim*, esp. 5-7. On Latin foundations at this period see Sherwin White (1973) 230-236.
14 Dio 53.16.6-7. For a concise summary of the constitutional events of 27 and the sources for this year, see Lacey (1974) *passim*.
I Caesarian foundations

Caesar defeated Pompey’s sons and their followers at Munda in March 45; twelve months later he was dead.\textsuperscript{15} It is to be expected that little of what had been planned for the Spanish provinces by him had been achieved in such a short space of time. It is generally accepted that only a small proportion of the colonial and municipal redevelopment that eventually took place across the empire in his name had actually been put in place by the Ides of March.\textsuperscript{16} Certainly there is no reason to believe that the new Spanish colonies were anything but posthumous, founded by the triumvirs or their legates according to his plans. Nonetheless, the colonies owe much to their originator. Caesar had chosen their location and prescribed their nature, consequently they would remain indisputably his. One particular innovation made by him in this respect was the inclusion of civilian settlers from Italy, something that does not appear to have happened previously in the formal settlement of Hispania.\textsuperscript{17} What proportion of the total population of new settlers they represented is unclear, but the veteran element remained prominent. Caesar was wary of establishing veteran formal colonies within Italy and his insistence on scattered land holdings would have limited the number of men he could have settled there.\textsuperscript{18} It seems likely he envisaged the creation of communities in Hispania for at least some of the veterans of his Spanish campaigns. Given that it may have taken some years to put his plans into action, not all the men that settled in his colonies would have been his veterans; some veterans of later triumviral campaigns will have joined them.\textsuperscript{19}

The creation of Caesar’s Spanish colonies appears to have been inextricably bound up with his campaigns in the peninsula over the course of the previous four years. The majority are documented as supporters of the Pompeian cause at some point during the Civil Wars, although some also aided Caesar on occasion. There were eleven colonies in total: \textit{colonia Claritas Iulia Ucubi} (Espejo, prov. Córdoba), \textit{colonia Genetiva Iulia Urbanorum Urso} (Osuna, prov. Sevilla), \textit{colonia Iulia Romula Hispalis} (Sevilla), \textit{colonia Hasta Regia} (Mesa de Asta, prov. Cádiz), colonia

\textsuperscript{15} B. Hisp. 29-32. Suetonius, Jul. 82.
\textsuperscript{16} See above, p. 86, note 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Suetonius, Jul. 41-42. See also chapter 0.
\textsuperscript{18} Suetonius, Jul. 38. See also Hinrichs (1989) 65-67.
\textsuperscript{19} Keppie (1983) 88-89.
Patricia Corduba (Córdoba), colonia Iulia Urbs Triumphalis Tarracronensis (Tarragona), colonia Victrix Iulia [Lepida] Celsa (Velilla de Ebro, prov. Zaragoza), colonia Iptucci Virtus Iulia (possibly Cabezo de Hortales, near Prado del Rey, prov. Cadiz), colonia Iulia Gemella Acci (Guadix, prov. Granada), colonia Urbs Iulia Nova Carthago (Cartagena, prov. Murcia) and colonia Iulia Ilici Augusta (La Alcudia de Elche, prov. Alicante) (map 4).

Urso, Ucubi, Hasta, Corduba and Hispalis are all securely documented supporters of Sex. Pompeius during Caesar’s 46/45 campaign. Ucubi was seized for use as a camp at an early stage by Sex. Pompeius and was later torched when he chose to abandon it.²⁰ Urso was an active supporter of Pompeius and it held out against Caesar’s men after the former’s defeat at Munda.²¹ Hispalis pursued what can only be described as a chequered career during the campaigns. Its population was divided into Caesarian and Pompeian supporters, with the latter initially gaining the upper hand. Caesar set up a garrison there with the assistance of his own faction, but had some difficulty defending it at first. Once the garrison was established, Caesar used the town as a major operations base.²² Corduba’s loyalties were similarly confused. It began the conflict supporting Caesar, but later changed allegiance and provided a stronghold for Sex. Pompeius’ forces.²³ Hasta appears to have taken the Pompeian side during the Civil Wars but it surrendered to Caesar after Munda.²⁴

Urso’s founding charter the lex coloniae Genetivae Iuliae, otherwise known as the lex Ursonensis, clearly states that the official founder was Caesar.²⁵ Although the reasons for the foundation are not given, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that a colony may have been imposed, and that the majority of existing residents were not included in the settler population, but were replaced by members of the Roman urban plebs.²⁶ This would have served both as a punishment and a method of ensuring the

²⁰ B. Hisp. 27.
²¹ B. Hisp. 41; Strabo 3.2.2.
²² B. Hisp. 35-36.
²³ Caesar, Civ. 2.21; B. Alex. 57; B. Hisp. 2.
²⁴ B. Hisp. 36.
²⁵ Lex coloniae Genetivae Iuliae, 66 & 106. See also Crawford’s analysis of the creation of this document, Crawford, (1996) vol. 1, 395-396.
town’s future loyalty by rewarding the inhabitants of the reconstituted town with colonial status. The similar background of Ucubi, Corduba and Hasta make them candidates for the same type of treatment, although not necessarily involving civilian settlers. Certainly it was vital to reassert control over Corduba, the most important town in the Baetic valley, commercially and strategically, which possessed a long-standing connection with the Roman governors of Ulterior.27 Ucubi would have been a prime subject for slightly different reasons. It was in need of extensive rebuilding; a colony might have been viewed as more of a boon than a punishment.28

Hasta, situated in the heart of the area that had shown strong support for Sex. Pompeius, was also a good choice. Neither the town’s name, nor the literary sources indicate when it was actually founded, but there are no signs that it bore official status prior to 45.29 However, both Pliny and Pomponius Mela name it as a colony.30 This strongly suggests that Hasta acquired its colonial title from Caesar or Augustus, with most scholars feeling Caesar is the more likely candidate, due to the town’s position in a region where he was active during the Civil Wars.31 How the town acquired its unusual title ‘Regia’ is equally unclear. Galsterer has tentatively suggested Caesar might have chosen it to honour his maternal grandmother, a member of the Marcii Reges.32 Yet it is hard to see Caesar, or Augustus for that matter, applying the title to any colony, given their sensitivity to accusations of ‘kingship’, and Roman attitudes generally to the term ‘rex’ and its derivatives. The possibility of a more general connection with the Marcii Reges has been taken up by Marin Diaz.33 Although no Marcius Rex is known to have governed either Ulterior or Citerior, there are sufficient gaps in the existing catalogue, particularly in the

27 See chapter 3, p. 66. Colonial status is attested by Pliny, Nat. 3.10 and, in abbreviated form, by inscriptions, e.g. CIL 2 2224 & 2225.
28 Hoyos (1971) 107. Colonial status is attested by Pliny, Nat. 3.12.
29 Three equites from Hasta - A. Baebius, C. Flavius and A. Trebellius - are recorded as defecting to Caesar during the course of the campaign in 45. See B. Hisp. 26; appendix entries B1, F4, T3. This should not be taken as an indication of the town’s possession of an officially recognised status, however, whatever it might say about its level of prosperity. Italica, which was certainly a vicus at this time, also had at least one eques. See B. Hisp. 25; appendix entry P5. Equestrian rank was a measure of personal status, which reflected an individual’s possession of both Roman citizenship and the required financial qualification; their place of residence was immaterial. See Nicolet (1966) vol. 1, 205 & 209-210.
30 Pliny, Nat. 3.11; Mela 3.4.
32 Galsterer (1971) 22, n.53.
33 Marin Diaz (1988) 207.
second century, to allow one to have gone unrecorded. There is also support for the idea that the title refers to a former native king. Turdetania seems to have abounded in petty kings or chieftains in the third century, but they slowly disappear from the historical record in the second. No solution has found universal support, although, given the current state of the evidence, the last mentioned is perhaps the most satisfactory. Regardless of which proves to be correct, it remains highly probable that the town was re-founded as a colony by Caesar in the aftermath of the Civil Wars.

Whether Hispalis was treated in a precisely similar manner to the others in this group is more difficult to tell. Here the townspeople were divided over which side to support and the town had, eventually, functioned as a Caesarian base. Moreover, it was an important commercial centre in the first century and does not seem to have suffered any kind of dip in fortunes. Business in the Roman world being a highly personal affair, it would be hard to imagine that the city could undergo a substantial change in population without any ill effects. It is possible, therefore, that initially colonial status was bestowed upon the loyal section of the town and intended as a reward.

Tarraco, widely believed to be a Caesarian foundation, may have been treated in a similar manner to Hispalis. By the Civil War period, although the long established military connection remained important to the town, the civilian section of the community was flourishing. Years of entertaining wintering governors had boosted its status, and its place on one of the main Roman roads had made it an important trading centre. Tarraco must have had connections with Pompey dating

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34 PB pp. 203-217 provides a thorough catalogue of Ulterior’s governors.
36 Polybius 10.40.1-9; Livy 27.19.7.
37 Colonial status is attested by Pliny, Nat. 3.11, Strabo 3.2.1 and by several inscriptions, e.g. CIL 2 1193.
38 B. Hisp. 35-36.
39 Himpalis was a ship building centre with a forum and other accoutrements of a Roman city by the first century. See Caesar, Civ. 2.20; B. Alex. 56.
40 See chapter 8, p. 200.
42 Vittinghoff (1952) 79-80; García y Bellido (1959) 460; Marin Diaz (1959) 210; Richardson (1996a) 121. Colonial status is attested by Pliny, Nat. 3.21 and several inscriptions, e.g. CIL 2 4071, 4267, 4276.
back to the period of the Sertorian War and initially seems to have honoured these. The inhabitants soon had second thoughts, however, and turned the town over to Caesar shortly after his arrival in the peninsula in 49, after which they appear to have remained steadfastly loyal to him. It seems likely therefore that, as an early turncoat, Tarraco received colonial status as a reward, rather than an imposition. The gift of colonial status bound them ever more closely to Caesar.

Carthago Nova also appears to belong to the group of known Pompeian supporters, but the case for its inclusion is dependent on a relatively late source. Dio Cassius records Caesar besieging the town in 46, because it refused to agree to support him. The Caesarian and Pseudo-Caesarian corpus does not mention the behaviour of Carthago Nova, but if Dio’s tale is accurate then the town would appear to have suffered much the same fate as other staunch Pompeian supporters. Some doubt remains, however. Carthago Nova was a prosperous urban centre during the first century, thriving on overseas trade and the burgeoning mining industry, yet, like Hispalis, it shows no sign of suffering commercially from the imposition of a colony. Perhaps the city had an unrecorded change of heart, which resulted in the majority of the original community forming the basis of the new colony. New blood would have been easily absorbed under such circumstances. Indeed Carthago Nova may already have experienced such an influx: there is an unconfirmed suggestion from Cicero that the town received a settlement of veterans in the 50s, which presumably would have been formal in nature, even if it must have been unofficial.

There are many uncertainties surrounding this town. Its inclusion in this list of Caesarian colonies is perhaps the most tentative of all, despite widespread acceptance that that this was the case. Despite its prominence many aspects of its colonial status, including its name, remain uncertain. Its status is attested by Pliny, who does not give the official titles. Inscriptions confirm his comments but are equally unhelpful concerning the name. However, coin legends from the post-Augustan era

44 Caesar, Civ. 1.60.
45 Dio 43.30.1-2.
46 Strabo 3.4.6; Polybius 10.10; Diodorus Siculus 5.36.
47 Cicero, Agr. 2.51.
48 Vittinghoff (1952) 79; García y Bellido (1959) 470-471; Brunt (1971) 592; Galsterer (1971) 29;
Marin Díaz (1988) 204-205; Richardson (1996a) 120.
49 Pliny, Nat. 3.19.
bear the initials ‘VR · I · N · K’ and these have been restored as *colonia Urbs Iulia Nova Karthago* by García y Bellido.\(^{50}\) This restoration is widely accepted, although Vittinghoff has suggested that ‘Urbs’ is in fact ‘Victrix’.\(^{51}\)

Eager to put an actual name to the person responsible for putting Caesar’s orders into practice, some have suggested, with perhaps more optimism than certainty, that a legate by the name of Cn. Statilius Libo founded the town in 42 on the orders of Lepidus.\(^{52}\) The hypothesis is based on two coin types, minted at Carthago Nova, bearing the words ‘CN · STATI · LIBO · PRAEF’.\(^{53}\) Although several members of the *gens* Statilii were prominent in public life during this period, this particular Statilius remains otherwise utterly obscure. Unfortunately both Gil Farrés and Vives are firmly agreed that the portrait head which appears alongside this legend is that of Agrippa and that, consequently, these types were probably produced to celebrate the general’s final pacification of the north-west in 19.\(^{54}\) The idea that some unknown legate of Lepidus did install the colony remains attractive, but it seems unlikely that the details of the foundation will ever be known.

There remain three communities with a less tangible Pompeian connection: Celsa, Acci and Iptucci. They have gained their membership by their geographical position, rather than any particular event in the historical record. Celsa’s position in the central Hiberus valley, for example, may have involved it in the struggles of 49, which came to an end at Ilerda. It is not known which, if either, side it took in the conflict, although some believe it was a Pompeian supporter.\(^{55}\) Certainly it was situated in a suitable area to have had contact with Pompey during the Sertorian War. Celsa is thought to have been founded by Lepidus, during his second stay in Hispania in 44/3.\(^{56}\) The town briefly bore his name, until his disgrace saw the ‘Lepida’

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\(^{50}\) García y Bellido (1959) 470.

\(^{51}\) Vittinghoff (1952) 79.

\(^{52}\) García y Bellido (1959) 470; Marín Diaz (1988) 204-205.

\(^{53}\) *GF* 1634-1635; Vives 131:8, 173:9

\(^{54}\) See previous note.

\(^{55}\) Beltrán Llorís (1985) 22 has claimed to have seen Pompeian imagery in the coin types issued by Celsa immediately prior to colonisation.

\(^{56}\) Colonial status is attested by Pliny, *Nat.* 3.24 and Strabo 3.4.10. Lepidus had been to Hispania before, as proconsul in 48, however it seems unlikely this town would have been founded then, as the Spanish provinces were still in a state of upheaval at this time, see Weigel (1992) 27-29 & 51.
replaced with the original native name for the town.57 The foundation date is so close to Caesar's death that it is generally assumed that Lepidus did so to fulfil Caesar's colonisation plans. The type of settlers involved is not recorded, although the 'Victrix' could suggest a veteran population.58

Acci and Iptucci are in a similar situation.59 Very little is known about the foundation of either beyond their titles, both of which include the term 'Iulia'. Whether they may reasonably be attributed to Caesar on the basis of the title alone is a moot point and one that continues to be hotly disputed. No definitive solution is possible at the current time, and valid arguments can be offered for both Caesar and Octavian in the role of founder.60 However, both towns were situated in the area which showed the firmest commitment to the Pompeian cause. The land between the southern bank of the Baetis and the Mediterranean coast was dotted with towns which resisted Caesar: Ucubi, Urso, Hispalis, Hasta, Munda, Carteia, Ategua, Ventipo and Carruca are all recorded as such in the Caesarian commentaries.61 It is true that only some of these subsequently became Caesarian colonies, but it is worth considering that Acci and Iptucci may have formed an unrecorded part of this resisting group, and that they subsequently became colonies as a result. What type of settlers they received is uncertain, but we may be fairly confident that Acci received at least some veterans. During the Augustan period the town’s coin types were almost exclusively military in style.62 The title 'Gemella' may indicate two legions were involved.

57 The name change may have occurred in 36/5, directly following the triumvir’s downfall. ‘Lepida’ is briefly attested on the town’s coinage, see GF 1054-1061; Vives 160:1-8. See also García y Bellido (1959) 472-473; Burnett et al. (1992) 110.

58 García y Bellido (1959) 472-473 has suggested that some of the thousands of Gallic settlers which Caesar (Civ. 1.51) records pouring into Hispania in 49 might have ended up in Celsa. However if they were destined for Spanish communities with formally recognised status, then municipia seem more likely.

59 In the case of Acci, colonial status is attested by Pliny, Nat. 3.25 and Ptolemy, Geog. 2.6, along with numerous inscriptions, eg. CIL 2 3391-3394. Pliny (Nat. 3.12) refers to Iptucci’s colonial status.


61 Ucubi: B. Hisp. 20; Urso: B. Hisp. 41; Hispalis: B. Hisp. 35; Asta: B. Hisp. 36; Munda: B. Hisp. 30-32; Carteia: B. Hisp. 36; Ategua: B. Hisp. 7; Ventipo: B. Hisp. 27; Carruca: B. Hisp. 27. See also Vittinghoff (1952) 73.

62 Burnett et al. (1992) 89; Vives 166:1-3 & 5; GF 1581.
The last Caesarian foundation presents considerable difficulties. Ilici is not mentioned in any context in Caesar’s commentaries, and has no known connection with the Caesarian campaigns in Hispania. It lay well outside the main areas of activity during the Civil Wars, some 80km north of Carthago Nova. Nonetheless Ilici was almost certainly a Caesarian foundation. A town of at least regional importance by the Augustan period, it bore the titles ‘Iulia’ and ‘Augusta’, which might initially suggest an Augustan foundation. However, the town possesses two distinct sets of centuriation and there is no obvious opportunity for it to have received a second deductio of colonists after the Augustan period. Thus an original Caesarian foundation, further augmented under Augustus has been posed as the most logical solution. The background of the settlers on each occasion is unclear, but the second wave may have been veterans, as Augustus is not well known for settling civilians. Certainly several military coin types were produced by Ilici during the Augustan period. García y Bellido has suggested Lepidus may have been responsible for the administration of the initial foundation, but this must remain speculation. Why Ilici was chosen as a site for a Caesarian colony remains unclear. It is possible that it played a role as a Caesarian, or Pompeian, supporter which simply went unmentioned in the sources. Equally its position in a highly fertile, if somewhat arid, region may have made it an appealing choice for more prosaic, agricultural reasons.

This completes the catalogue of Caesarian colonies. Some anxiety might be expressed that so large a proportion of the Spanish colonies bearing the title ‘Iulia’ make an appearance. This should not be a matter for concern, however. As has been clearly demonstrated in each case, there are other arguments for the attribution of these towns to Caesar, which reach beyond their titles. The majority of Caesarian foundations were formerly Pompeian strongholds. The imposition of a colony upon such communities represented an effective method both of punishing them for their past behaviour and of ensuring future loyalty. The reactionary element of the

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63 Pliny (Nat. 3.19) calls it a ‘colonia immunis’ and notes that ‘in eam contribuantur Icostani.’. For suggestions that it was an Augustan colony see Keppie (1983) 83; García y Bellido (1959) 492.
64 Gorges (1983) 201-203.
65 Three types were issued showing a vexillum and an aquila between signa. See Burnett et al. (1992) 98; Vives 133:1-3; GF 1924 & 1928-1930.
67 See chapter 2, pp. 27-28.
population could be removed and dispersed and the new settlers would fall under the patronage of the founder and, subsequently, that of his heir. The degree of loyalty would be all the greater if the soldiers were his veterans. However, it would seem that by the time many of Caesar’s colonies were finally established some of the soldiers were not his veterans, but those of his successor. As a consequence, for the first time in the history of the formal settlement of Hispania, we may question whether all the veteran participants in the Caesarian colonies had previous experience of Hispania.

The high proportion of former Pompeian supporters among the colonies shows that Caesar considered establishing his authority in the region very important. Inasmuch as these foundations are primarily strategic in purpose, they are similar to the defensive ones of the republican period. However, there is a distinct change discernible in the attitude behind them. Republican generals created formal settlements to ensure a pro-Roman presence in areas which were strategically important for the Roman army. They certainly gained prestige from the exercise, but their actions were intended to assist not just themselves, but also the commanders that followed them. Caesar’s foundations have a more personal flavour, for he alone was the intended beneficiary. He thus shows himself a natural heir to Sulla, the creator of colonies for personal political gain par excellence.68

However, expediency was not his only motive in creating colonies. He also used the opportunities opened up by the changing political landscape of Hispania to attempt to solve some of Rome’s most intractable social problems: the need to house thousands of veterans and to reduce the civilian overcrowding of Rome. The new colonies could assist in this task, whether or not a sizeable reduction in the existing population took place. Caesar’s motive in founding all his Spanish colonies must be seen as a mixture of these two aspects; the need to entrench political support in the Iberian peninsula combined with the desire to ease social problems, potential and actual, in Italy. In the long term, the former strategy was the more successful of the two. Hispania and the West were to become Octavian’s powerhouse during the

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68 On Sulla’s manipulations of the colonial system, see Keaveney (1982) 182-183.
difficult period of the 40s and 30s, whereas many of Caesar’s social solutions proved to be short-sighted and inadequate.

II Augustan foundations

Augustan colonies were to represent yet another step in the evolution of Roman colonial practice. Two points need to be made at the outset about Augustan colonies. The first is that Augustus is known to have settled the vast majority of the veterans of his Civil War campaigns in Italy. Unlike Caesar, he did not scruple to confiscate land for this purpose and thus was able to accommodate most of his troops in Italy.69 The second point is that there is no suggestion from either Augustus himself, or ancient sources more generally, that any civilian emigration to the provinces took place on his initiative.70 As a result, it is to be expected that the vast majority of those settling in Augustus’ Spanish foundations would be veterans from his north-western campaigns.

Augustus turned his attention fully upon Hispania for the first time in 26, when he arrived in Hispania Citerior to begin the assault against the tribes of the northwest. His own efforts do not appear to have been the most successful, but with the help of his legates the area was declared pacified by the close of the following year. Unfortunately, the native inhabitants were unconvinced by this declaration and fighting continued sporadically until 19, when Agrippa finally subdued them. Augustus visited Hispania as princeps for the second, and last, time in 15/14, as part of a general provincial tour.71 The supposed foundation dates of those colonies thought to be Augustan are generally vague, but most appear to belong to the period between the close of the 26-25 campaign and the time of Augustus’ final visit. The Augustan colonies do not form an entirely homogenous group, but they do display certain repetitive similarities. Those colonies which can be linked to Augustus are as follows: *colonia Augusta Emerita* (Mérida, prov. Badajoz), *colonia Salduba Caesarea Augusta* (Zaragoza), *colonia Augusta Firma Astigi* (Ecija, prov. Sevilla), *colonia Libisosa Forum Augustana* (Lezuza, prov. Albacete), *colonia Faventia Iulia*

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70 The title of one Cisalpine colony founded in 27, *colonia civica Augusta Brixia*, suggests a civilian population, but by this date this area cannot really be regarded as outside Italy. See CIL 5 4212.
71 Dio 53.25.5-8, 54.11.2-6, 54.23.7, 54.25.1.
Augusta Paterna Barcino (Barcelona), colonia Caesarina Augusta Asido (Medina Sidonia, prov. Cadiz), colonia Scallabis (possibly Santarém, prov. Ribatejo), colonia Pax Iulia (Beja, prov. Baixo Alentejo), colonia Augusta Gemella Tucci (Martos, prov. Jaén) and colonia Norba Caesarina (Cáceres) (map 5).

The earliest of these colonies appears to have been Emerita.72 It was created, under the supervision of Augustus’ legate P. Carisius, primarily to absorb the sizeable number of veterans discharged in 25, following Octavian’s (inaccurate) declaration of the pacification of the north-west.73 Carisius had been heavily involved in the successes of 25, after Augustus withdrew to Tarraco, operating at the southern edge of Asturian territory.74 The chosen site lay squarely on a major route between the mining centres of the north-west and the south of the peninsula.75 The foundation of the town, on the southern flanks of Lusitanian territory was packed with symbolism. The term ‘Emerita’ announced that the town was for veterans, not active soldiers.76 Its very presence declared that the area had been successfully brought to heel, after centuries of resistance to Roman rule. Augustus became the final, and successful, entry in a long list of commanders who had waged war against the Lusitani. In this achievement he surpassed even his adoptive father’s military efforts in the region.

The initial body of settlers came from legiones V Alaudae and X Gemina both of which had fought in the north-west, and had previously been in Antonius’ command.77 Although they may have later been joined by civilians, the veterans must have remained in the majority for Emerita retained a distinctly military air for some time.78 Veterans would certainly have been appropriate, given Emerita’s location. Situated at the confluence of the Anas and a tributary, the Albarregas,

72 Colonial status attested by Strabo 3.2.5; Pliny, Nat. 4.117. There is also some epigraphic testament, e.g. CIL 2 32.
73 The current orthodox view of the foundation is challenged by Canto (1989) 159-200; 1990, 289-295, who argues that Augustus refounded Emerita as a colony, the town having already been established as an unofficial formal settlement by Caesar. Although she does raise some valid points, Canto’s view has yet to receive any firm support from other quarters.
74 Dio 53.26.1. See also Syme (1970) 100-103.
75 Roldán Hervás (1971) passim.
76 Richardson (1996b) 55-56.
78 This is most evident in its coinage, which used many military types, e.g. Vives 141:7, 9 & 11-14, 142:4; GF 1652-1659. See García y Bellido (1959) 485-489; Burnett et al. (1992) 20-21.
Emerita lay at the nexus of a web of transit routes which led to the four corners of the peninsula. It was particularly well-placed for communication with the central Meseta and the north-west.79

The town was clearly intended to impress. Set on a gently rising slope, near an easily bridged part of the Anas, it seems to have been fortified in proper Roman style from the outset.80 The town’s civic centre was built rapidly and, apparently, to precise instructions.81 Mierse has pointed out a number of distinct similarities between public construction at Rome, from the late Republic and Augustan period, and the main public buildings in Emerita. These seem to suggest that some kind of pattern book, or official prescription, was involved.82 Emerita’s territorium was large and centuriation extended both north and south of the town.83 The extensive land available to Emerita certainly gave the town prestige, but may also have been meant as compensation to new settlers for the isolation of the district.84 A mint was swiftly established in this burgeoning settlement. The bronze types it issued advertised the town’s close connection with Augustus, even noting at one point that its mint operated ‘PERMISSV CAESARIS AVGSTI’.85

The creation of Emerita proved to be a decisive point in the Roman occupation of the area. It functioned, quite deliberately, as a centre for the dissemination of Roman culture and as a stabilising force in a previously volatile zone.86 However, it did not do so alone. Emerita, the eventual capital of Lusitania, was joined in the west by two new colonies, which would later function as conventual capitals for the new province.87 The colonies in question were Scallabis (also called Scalabitana) and Pax

80 Richardson (1996b) 58. The town’s main gate is depicted on some of its earlier coinage, e.g. Vives 141:3 & 5.
83 Gorges (1983) 203-204. The potentially unfeasible size of the territorium has attracted considerable discussion, see Canto (1989) 149-159; Richardson (1996b) 57.
84 Hoyos (1971) 125.
85 GF 1660; Vives 141:6. The legend was probably a status symbol in nature, intended to link the town more clearly with Augustus, rather than any concrete acknowledgement of Augustus’ control of the coinage. See Richardson (1996a) 145-146.
87 Dio (53.12.4-5) assigns the creation of the new province to 27, but there is an ongoing debate as to whether he is correct about the date. The most recent treatment, Richardson (1996a) 134-138, summarises the problems. In this connection see also Elton (1996) 17.
Iulia.\textsuperscript{88} The former lay in the lower reaches of the Tagus valley, the latter was situated on high, rolling plains roughly 20 kilometres from the southern Anas (R. Guadiana). Their geographical position is highly important, for it links them to both Augustus and his adoptive father.

The Tagus formed the southern boundary of the region dominated by the Lusitani during much of the republican period and, as such, provided an obvious route to the central Meseta.\textsuperscript{89} From there, passes in the Sierra Morena lead to the Baetis valley and, eventually, to the Mediterranean coast. The Tagus’ importance as both a transit route and a boundary is obvious from the accounts of ancient geographers and historians alike. The river is presented not only as a vital means of communication in the area, but also as the foremost edge of the frontier zone for much of the republican period, beyond which Roman armies moved at their peril.\textsuperscript{90} The Anas had a far less turbulent history, but offered a route into Lusitanian territory that avoided crossing the Sierra Morena, by skirting the Sierra’s southern flank and following the valley northwards. By the late first century there had been a long series of campaigns against the Lusitani, but if they were a little cowed by this point, they were certainly not yet fully pacified. Pax Iulia’s position well beyond the borders of Lusitanian territory might have been regarded as comparatively safe, but it was still far outside the usual area of Roman settlement. Scallabis, on the lower Tagus, was on the edge of the known world.

During his governorship of Ulterior in 61, Caesar conducted a campaign against the Lusitani. Although several authors refer to his tenure of the office, we have no comprehensive account of the campaign, merely brief allusions to its occurrence.\textsuperscript{91} In the past, thanks to the willingness of the Lusitani to travel long distances on raids, campaigns against them were not always conducted within the confines of their own territory and we cannot be certain where Caesar fought. However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary we may assume that he took his campaign to the Lusitanian heartland, an increasingly common practice following the

\textsuperscript{88} The colonial status of Pax Iulia is attested by Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 4.117 and Strabo 3.2.15, along with \textit{CIL} 2 47. Pliny (\textit{Nat.} 4.117) also refers to Scallabis as a colony.

\textsuperscript{89} Strabo 3.3.3.

\textsuperscript{90} Appian, \textit{Ib.} 57, 64; Livy 35.22.5-8, 39.30-31; Strabo 3.3.1, 3.3.3.

\textsuperscript{91} Appian, \textit{Ib.} 102; Livy, \textit{Ep.} 103; Plutarch, \textit{Caes.} 12.
success of D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus in the early 130s. Caesar, never a fainthearted commander, is likely to have followed this example. It is to be expected that, in the course of his campaign, Caesar established various camps and the position of these two colonies make it possible that they were among them. This seems to be confirmed in the case of Scallabis, by Pliny’s reference to it as ‘praesidium Iulium’.

There is no suggestion in the sources that Caesar founded any formal settlements during his Lusitanian campaign. Nor would this have been likely given the isolation native Italians would have experienced in the areas involved. As has already been noted, it was not unknown for Roman military sites to become permanent civilian communities, but the inhabitants of such towns were clearly hispani, not native Italians, and their status that of a vicus. The final pacification of the peninsula under Augustus changed the situation considerably. Although these areas were still remote, they were no longer to be regarded as frontier zones. Colonial foundations in them were now much more reasonable. Scallabis and Pax Iulia almost certainly gained their colonial status at this time. Pliny indicates that both towns were colonies in his day, making Augustus the most likely founder, since few were founded in Hispania under the Julio-Claudians. In the case of Pax Iulia, this is further reinforced by the fact that Strabo also knew the town to be colony, referring to it as ‘Pax Augusta’ and listing it alongside Augusta Emerita and Caesaraugusta. Both towns probably became home to veterans from the north-western campaigns. Augustus seems to have intended Scallabis and Pax Iulia to form a tangible part of his demonstration that wild Hispania was now tamed. Never as grand as Emerita, they nonetheless formed nuclei of Roman culture and administration in the west of Hispania.

Augustus’ apparent desire to reshape western Hispania may also have involved Norba. A prosperous town, if administratively unimportant, the date of its initial

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92 Brutus’ campaign: Strabo 3.3.1; Appian, Ib. 71-73. For the situation after the 130s, see Dyson (1985) 223-225.
93 Pliny, Nat. 4.117.
94 Pliny, Nat. 4.117.
95 Strabo 3.2.15. Richardson (1996b) 54 suggests that the name ‘Pax Augusta’ was an accidental slip on Strabo’s part, understandable given the number of times ‘Augusta’ occurs in the sentence. However the use of the title might easily have been applied with the colony’s founder in mind.
foundation is unknown. Due to its name and location in the central Tagus valley the town has often been connected with both Scallabis and Pax Iulia. In combination with its title ‘Caesarina’, this has given rise to the suggestion that Norba was in fact a third member of Caesar’s castra group. The name is not conclusive proof however and the town might equally have added an extra element to its name after Caesar had used it as a base, or at the time of its elevation to colonial rank. The town’s name has, in fact, suggested not one, but two possible founders. The second candidate is one C. Norbanus Flaccus, proconsular commander in Hispania 36-34. Although nothing is known of Norbanus’ campaigns beyond the fact that he triumphed ‘ex Hispania’ on October 12th, 34, the similarity between his name and that of the town has given rise to the hypothesis that he made some kind of foundation on Augustus’ orders. Little is known of this region during this period, but it would be another 8 years before Augustus’ major north-western invasion and it is to be expected that the area was still unsettled. Thus tactical considerations would have been broadly similar to those of Caesar and the foundation of a stronghold on such an important natural boundary would make sense.

It seems most unlikely, however, that if Norba was founded for reasons of military expediency, it would have been established as a colony. Whichever of the many eligible generals actually founded Norba, either as a garrison or a mere camp, we can be fairly certain that it did not assume colonial rank until after Augustus’ north-western campaigns of 26/5. This is due to the position of the town, which, like the other two castra foundations, lay in a highly disputed and unstable area. Until the region had been reduced to a state of relative stability, the installation of a colony would have been largely unthinkable. A precise solution is not yet possible, as we do not yet have sufficient pieces of the puzzle. However, it is perhaps more likely that the town was founded by Norbanus, than by Caesar, whose other castra foundations are much further to the west, suggesting a campaign concerned mainly with territory in the Algarve, Alentejo and Beira Baixa regions of modern Portugal. Norba lies considerably further east and out of the natural orbit of the other foundations.

97 Colonial status attested by Pliny, Nat. 4.117 and CIL 2 694.
98 See MRR 2 p. 402.
99 Marin Diaz (1988) 222; Richardson (1996b) 54. For the triumph, see Degrassi pp. 86-87.
Therefore, it may be proposed that the town was founded by Norbanus as an unofficial formal settlement of some kind, which was then honoured with colonial status at a later point in Augustus’ reign.

These three satellites of Emerita - Scallabis, Pax Iulia and Norba - were not built to the same grandiose standard, but they performed essentially the same function. They were concrete reminders of the peace brought to this formerly barbaric corner of the empire and a civilising influence upon it.¹⁰⁰ The fact that the three were all former military installations, organs of war transformed into articles of civilisation, can only have emphasised the point. This showcase use of colonial foundations by Augustus was not restricted to the Iberian peninsula. Past study of the foundation of several colonies in Pisidia has drawn similar conclusions.¹⁰¹ This rough, mountainous region stood in the same relation to southern and central Asia Minor as Lusitanian territory had to the rest of Hispania: a refuge of bandits and raiders. The creation of native Italian enclaves in these areas were clearly seen as an effective tool in such circumstances.¹⁰²

The foundation of *colonia Salduba Caesarea Augusta*, better known by the contraction ‘Caesaraugusta’, has been less well documented, but in many ways it appears to have followed a similar pattern to that of Emerita.¹⁰³ Situated in the northern Hiberus valley, originally it may have been a winter camp for the troops involved in the north-western campaigns. It is thought to have been created after Agrippa’s final victory in 19, using veteran troops from the *legiones IV Macedonica, VI Victrix* and *X Gemina*.¹⁰⁴ Caesaraugusta was also founded on the site of a native community, which may have occupied the modern Cabezo de Alcalá.¹⁰⁵ ‘Salduie’, as it was called, seems to have enjoyed some regional prominence during the first

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¹⁰¹ Levick (1967) 38 & 42-55. The Pisidian colonies seem to have played a far greater role in the pacification of the region than can be claimed for Augustus’ Spanish colonies.
¹⁰² Some citizen colonies in Mauretania may also have played this kind of role, see Mackie (1983) passim.
¹⁰⁴ The debate over the exact foundation date continues to rage. Arce (1976) 118-120 gives perhaps the most detailed summary of the various views on dates ranging between 25 and 19. He himself supports the idea that Caesaraugusta was founded in honour of, or during, Augustus visit in 15/14, see Arce (1976) 125. See also Beltrán Martínez (1976) 224-226.
¹⁰⁵ An indisputable identification has yet to be made, owing to difficulties in separating pre-Augustan and Augustan levels. See Beltrán Llorís (1983) 21.
century. During this period it gave its name to the ‘Turma Salluitana’, an auxiliary cavalry group which participated in the Social War, and is recorded as one of the participants in a water rights dispute of sufficient magnitude that the Roman governor became involved.\textsuperscript{106} This is perhaps unsurprising, as it occupied a commanding position over the land and fluvial routes into the north-west.

Although the Augustan remains are poorly preserved, like Emerita, the public centre of the town appears to have been built in proper Roman style. The city was correctly aligned on north-south and east-west axes, but few traces of the street plan remain. The probable site of the forum has been located and the remains of an adjoining basilica excavated.\textsuperscript{107} The town was properly fortified, with at least two monumental city gates on the eastern and western sides.\textsuperscript{108} Caesaraugusta also established a mint, which was even more assiduous than Emerita in advertising the town’s imperial connections. With a single exception, every coin it produced during Augustus’ lifetime carried the princeps’ portrait or a scene of him with the imperial family.\textsuperscript{109} It is true that Caesaraugusta did not reach quite the same heights as Emerita; unable to rise higher than conventual capital, it was destined to remain in the shadow of Tarraco. However, there can be no doubt that it was created in the same mould.

Colonial foundations were undoubtedly a privileged class and the Augustan approach to colony foundation seems to have ensured that they received a solid start in life. However, given the number of such foundations, it was not possible to guarantee that each one was an unqualified success; not all Augustan colonies were destined for great things. Some settled down to moderately prosperous obscurity, often apparently within a few years of creation. The most retiring of these ‘lesser’ foundations is Libisosa, about which, beyond the fact of its existence, almost nothing is known. Pliny, in fact, does not list it as a colony at all and its status is only preserved in a single epigraphic find.\textsuperscript{110} The town’s privileged rank does not seem to have done it a whit of good in economic or political terms. Nonetheless, since it

\textsuperscript{106} Turma Salluitana: CIL I\textsuperscript{2} 709. The water rights dispute is recorded on the tabula Contrebiensis, see Fatás (1980); Richardson (1983).
\textsuperscript{107} Beltrán Llorís (1983) 39-44.
\textsuperscript{108} Beltrán Martínez (1976) 230-245.
\textsuperscript{109} The single exception is GF 1615; Vives 149:1.
\textsuperscript{110} CIL 2 3234. See also Pliny, Nat. 3.25.
merited mention in Pliny’s work, it must have remained a town of reasonable size, even if one of no importance.\footnote{García y Bellido (1959) 494; Hoyos (1971) 128-129.}

Most managed a slightly higher profile. Barcino, Astigi, Asido and Tucci are all thought, with varying degrees of certainty, to have been founded for time-expired troops, like their more prominent fellows. It is thought that Tucci was inaugurated as a colony during Augustus’ second and final Spanish sojourn in 15/4.\footnote{Hoyos (1971) 134; Fear (1996) 64. Colonial status is attested by Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 3.12 and a few inscriptions, e.g. \textit{CIL} 2 1680 & 1686.} The term ‘Gemella’ in Tucci’s title is usually taken to indicate a military foundation in which two legions were involved, but it could equally indicate a colony in which the veterans lived side by side with the town’s original civilian inhabitants.\footnote{Two legions: García y Bellido (1959) 500-502; Hoyos (1971) 135. Dual settlement: Fear (1996) 214. A third option may be offered by Diodorus Siculus (33.7.5-7), who reports that Viriathus reproached Tucci for changing sides frequently during the Lusitanian Wars.} In either case the source of the veterans is uncertain. At the time of Augustus’ visit it is thought that \textit{legiones I Augusta, II Augusta, IV Macedonica, VI Victrix, and X Gemina} were all still present in various parts of Hispania.\footnote{Syme (1970) 104.} While it never attained political importance, Tucci seems to have succeeded in a modest fashion. Pliny lists the town, along with several others in the same general area, as an immune colony, indicating a certain social and political prestige.\footnote{Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 3.12.}

Astigi, a distant neighbour of Tucci, appears in the same passage, although it is not designated as ‘\textit{immunis}’.\footnote{Colonial status is also attested by \textit{CIL} 2 1475.} Situated on the shores of the northernmost navigable stretch of the Singilis (R. Genil), Astigi may well have operated as a commercial centre. Little remains of the ancient town, but it seems to have been moderately prosperous, possessing an amphitheatre at one point in its life.\footnote{Fear (1996) 198. The date of this structure is uncertain.} A military background is suspected here, but there is little evidence to go on.\footnote{García y Bellido (1959) 481; Hoyos (1971) 134.}

Barcino is also thought to have been a foundation for veterans.\footnote{Hoyos (1971) 126; Keay (1990) 138. Colonial status is attested by numerous inscriptions, e.g. \textit{CIL} 2 4536-4538, 4541-4542.} Very little is known about its creation and it has been suggested that it belongs to the period of
Augustus' final visit to Hispania.\textsuperscript{120} Despite the presence of an old Iberian hill-fort on nearby Montjuïc, the new town was founded on the plain, albeit with heavy fortification.\textsuperscript{121} Although knowledge of the Augustan town is limited, due to extensive rebuilding in later periods, the remains of the main temple are suggestive of an imperial approach to city planning. The temple's architectonic decoration is similar to several building erected at this time, both in Italy and in southern Gaul.\textsuperscript{122} The town prospered in the imperial period, establishing itself in the role of an active commercial port that would bring it fame in the medieval period. During the imperial period, however, it was much overshadowed by its near neighbour Tarraco.

Asido's creation and subsequent existence are more obscure and far more complex. It is not entirely clear whether the town had municipal or colonial status. According to both Pliny and Ptolemy it had acquired the latter by the first century AD.\textsuperscript{123} However, one inscription refers to the inhabitants as \textit{MUNICIPES}, suggesting municipal status.\textsuperscript{124} Opinion is somewhat divided over the issue, but more recent thought on the subject leans toward the view of Pliny and Ptolemy.\textsuperscript{125} Fear has pointed out that the term \textit{municipes} should not be regarded as a stumbling block to colonial status, since it was used for self-reference by the inhabitants of a variety of different types of community.\textsuperscript{126} In light of this it seems unreasonable to overturn the evidence of the literary sources on the basis of a single inscription. Presuming the town was a colony, its founder was almost certainly Augustus, given its title. The 'Caesarina' element may indicate the acknowledgement of an earlier connection with Caesar, but is probably simply a secondary reference to Augustus.

These ten communities are the only formal settlements known to have been created by Augustus. Nonetheless, a further three towns, Asturica Augusta (Astorga, prov. León), Bracara Augusta (Braga, prov. Minho) and Lucus Augusti (Lugo), are commonly discussed in connection with Augustus' activities in Hispania. By the Flavian era they were \textit{conventus} capitals and the north-west's main centres of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Keay (1990) 138.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Granados (1984) 290; Keay (1990) 138.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Gutiérrez Behemerid (1992) 100-102.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 3.11; Ptolemy, \textit{Geog.} 2.4.
\item \textsuperscript{124} \textit{CIL} 2 1313.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Fear (1996) 65. See Gellius 16.13.
\end{itemize}
administration and justice, but there is considerable uncertainty concerning them.\(^\text{127}\) All three were originally indigenous communities, but the precise route by which they became important romanised administrative centres during the early imperial period is not clear. Currently the favoured theory is that all three acted as military bases during, and for a time after, Augustus’ campaigns in the north-west, combining this function with that of urban administrative centre. Over time the emphasis slowly shifted from one side of this equation to the other, a process unlikely to have been completed by 14 AD.\(^\text{128}\) This is a reasonable scenario in the case of Asturica and Lucus, given the amount of epigraphic material referring to various legions involved in the campaigns found within their walls and their obvious civil importance in the later Empire.\(^\text{129}\) At Bracara, however, investigation has not yet been as extensive and there is little early epigraphic information available, although the later importance of the city is unquestionable.\(^\text{130}\)

It seems unlikely, however, that any one of the three could have qualified as a formal settlement for native Italians during the Augustan period. Augustus was rigorous in his obedience to traditional models when creating settlements for native Italians, yet not one of these towns received the official status of colonia during the Augustan period, or indeed at any later date. Despite their importance as conventual capitals not one of the three seems to have attained any officially recognised status higher than that of oppida. In the case of Bracara this seems fairly certain; Pliny referred to Bracara as an oppidum and later public inscriptions do not qualify the town’s name in any way.\(^\text{131}\) While there is no literary or epigraphic evidence concerning the status of Asturica and Lucus, it seems probable they shared the same fate. Although the failure of these towns to acquire official status under the later Empire is striking, its initial absence is unsurprising. If the theory of combined military and administrative centre is correct, then the influx of formal settlers would

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\(^{127}\) Pliny, *Nat.* 3.28.

\(^{128}\) Keay (1988) 61-62; Le Roux (1995) 62-64 & 84; Richardson (1996a) 145. These authors express the general sentiment, see next note for specific arguments in favour of this view.


\(^{131}\) Pliny, *Nat.* 4.112; *CIL 2* 2423, 4747, 4749.
have been inappropriate. The emphasis would have been on creating an urban environment for the indigenous population. This was not a new development, other native towns had similar experiences during the Republic, although the simultaneous creation of a military base was innovative. Consequently, the indigenous populations of all three towns would have been joined by Roman soldiers on active duty, imperial administrators and, perhaps, a few native Italian informal settlers.

The Augustan formal foundations in Hispania, like most of their predecessors, had a dual motivation. As before, the need to settle veterans was one of these. Augustus had saturated Italy with the veterans of the Civil Wars, thus in order to find land for the men who had fought in Hispania he had to look elsewhere and found plenty of opportunities close to hand. However, for Augustus, the strategic motives behind the creation of colonies were different again from those of both Caesar and the republican generals. Augustus was the beneficiary of Rome's dawning realisation that only a standing army could cope with such a huge empire and with it he was able to establish permanent army bases to secure the less stable areas of the north-west. He did not need to found colonies prepared to act as an emergency source of military assistance. Several of his colonies did occupy strategically important sites, but they functioned as little more than route guardians, dominating roads and rivers of both military and commercial importance. His Spanish campaigns occurred less than a decade after Actium, during the period when Augustus was attempting to reinforce his newly acquired position as princeps. He sought not just to remind the world of his own military achievements, but also to encourage the realisation of the benefits of his reign - the much vaunted pax augusta. Consequently, his colonies were showpieces, intended to achieve both these ends by an impressive display of Roman urban civilisation. Most occupied high profile sites, which would be visited as a matter of course by soldiers, merchants and travellers of all varieties. They proclaimed to the world both the power of Rome and the power of Augustus.

\[132\] See chapter 3, pp. 54-55 for the example of Gracchuris.
CHAPTER FIVE

VETERANS

The previous two chapters have demonstrated that the most prominent element of formal settlement in Hispania during the period 218 BC - AD 14 was the establishment of veteran communities, for native Italians who had fought there in the service of Rome. The circumstances under which these settlements were established by various Roman governors, Caesar and Augustus have already been explored. It is now time to cast an eye over the issue from the participants' point of view. In the case of Italica there are some indications of the particular motivating factors which influenced the soldiers who chose to become involved, but this is unusual. However, while we may lack specific evidence in most cases, a number of general factors, which would have affected every settlement, can be adduced.

I The republican army in Hispania

It is unsurprising that veteran settlers comprise the bulk of all participants in republican formal settlement, for almost any work concerning Hispania inevitably raises the issue of the Roman army. The two subjects are so inextricably linked that at least one author has suggested that the evolution of Hispania was that of the Roman army.1 It is now generally agreed that active Roman involvement in Hispania effectively began in the early 220s and remained at a fairly low level until the dispatch of troops for the first time in 218.2 However once Rome had become involved she did not easily extricate herself, nor did she show any real signs of wishing to do so. Thereafter there was a constant Roman military presence, which would last until the Visigothic invasions of the fifth century AD. The Roman army’s long, if turbulent, relationship with Hispania makes the nature of its presence there an

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2 Summer (1967) 205-206 & 245; Errington (1970) 25-26 & 32-41. Although these two scholars do not agree on all points, their arguments are essentially similar: there is no case for long-standing Roman concern about Barcid activity in Hispania and Rome’s relationship with Saguntum was, in all probability, foisted upon her by Massilia. That city’s role in events is suggested by its strong economic presence along the eastern Spanish seaboard, see Ripollès (1994) 120.
important issue in the question of veteran settlement. As a preliminary step, therefore, it is necessary to establish clearly the nature of the Roman military presence in Hispania, its length, extent and purpose.

The first Roman troops arrived on the shores of the Iberian Peninsula in a somewhat inauspicious fashion. A sizeable force consisting of two legions with standard cavalry complement, 14,000 allied infantry, 1,600 allied cavalry and 60 quinqueremes had been dispatched under the command of P. Cornelius Scipio, with the intention of catching Hannibal before he left Hispania. On arrival at the Rhône, Scipio discovered he had failed in this object and sent the majority of his troops on under the de facto command of his brother and legate, Cn. Cornelius Scipio. They arrived in the autumn of 218, thus initiating over six hundred years of Roman military presence in Hispania.

During the part of the republican period for which we have reasonably accurate figures, that is to say 218-167, there were never less than two legions shared in varying proportions between the two provinces and at various times that number may have risen as high as four. The main source for these figures is, of course, Livy and in the absence of his narrative after 167 it becomes much more difficult to trace the pattern of military strength in the Iberian peninsula. However, Appian records a long series of campaigns against a variety of different Spanish tribes after 167, although his account supplies little detail. In 155 a Lusitanian by the name of Punicus lead his troops on a rampage across central and southern Hispania, effectively beginning the Lusitanian Wars which would last until the death of his successor Viriathus in 136. Two years after Punicus’ initial foray, the Numantine War began in the north of the Peninsula, which was to run almost continuously for 20 years. The period between

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3 Hispania has been appositely described as the Roman Republic’s equivalent of the Russian Front by Keppie (1984) 44.

4 Brunt (1971) 645-657 & 661-665; Smith (1958) 21;

5 Smith (1958) 21;

6 Brunt (1971) 645-657 & 661-665; Smith (1958) 21; Keay (1988) 72; Knapp (1982) passim, who provides a table of troop movements to and from Hispania as recorded by Livy. Knapp does not accept that there were at times four legions in Hispania, arguing that although there were sometimes two legions in Citerior, there was never more than one in Ulterior. See also Harris (1989) 127 who suggests that 20% of eligible iuniores were serving in Hispania at any one time during this period.

7 Appian, Ib. 56-75. See also Simon (1962) passim for a commentary on both Lusitanian and Numantine Wars.

8 From 153-133. See Appian, Ib. 44-55 & 76-98.
the fall of Numantia in 133 and the outbreak of the Sertorian War in 82 is regarded as something of a lull in the military history of the Peninsula, but even at this time there were revolts in Citerior requiring serious military intervention. These events can hardly have required the participation of fewer than two legions.

With the first century and the advent of the Sertorian War and Caesarian Civil Wars successively, matters become a little clearer, as there are a wider range of sources on which to draw. According to Plutarch, Sertorius' army numbered close to 130,000 men, the vast majority of whom were native. His figures may well be exaggerated, but there can be no doubting that the army was a large one, in contemporary terms, and that the Romans employed a sizeable number of troops against him. The army Pompey lead against him appears to have consisted of at least two legions. The exact details of the various troop strengths on both sides of the Caesarian Civil Wars, as they were played out in Hispania, are too complex to warrant full treatment here, but a general view of the sort of numbers involved is easily obtained. At the outset of the struggle in 49 Pompey is recorded as having six legions in Hispania, with a sizeable backing force of auxiliaries. Three years later, in 46, his son commanded no fewer than thirteen legions, two of which may have been composed of hispani. Against the Pompeian forces in Hispania Caesar employed six legions, along with something over 10,000 auxiliaries, many of whom were from Gaul.

How many men these forces might actually have involved is, in many ways, a matter of speculation. Although there is a tendency to think of a legion in terms of a set size, this was not actually the case. Both the nominal and actual sizes of the

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9 Appian, Ib. 99-100.
10 Appian does occasionally supply army figures for the events he narrates. Although the accuracy of the precise figures he supplies is questionable, they do suggest that, particularly during the Lusitanian campaigns and the last days of Numantia, substantial armies were engaged in the Spanish wars. For example, during the Numantine campaign, according to Appian (Ib. 76), a demoralised Metellus had handed over an army of 30,000 foot and 2,000 horse to his successor Q. Pompeius, at which point there was still a large army in Ulterior fighting the Lusitani. Later, Appian states (Ib. 84) that in addition to the standing forces in Citerior (size unknown), Scipio Aemilianus had the use of an extra 4,000 men drawn from clients and friends.
11 Plutarch, Sert. 12.2.
12 Appian, B. C. 1.111.
13 Caesar, Civ. 1.38; Cicero, Fam. 16.12.4.
14 B. Hisp. 7.
15 Caesar, Civ. 1.39.
Roman legions fluctuated during the course of the Republic. Polybius, speaking of the mid-second century, seems to expect the average legion to be a little over 4,000 strong, plus cavalry contingent. The Roman cavalry units varied in size, but were never very large, 300 horse per legion being average. His observations have been confirmed by a variety of methods and the general agreement among modern scholars is that the nominal strength of the legion throughout the Republic, after the Second Punic War, varied from 4,000+ to 5,000+ infantrymen, the latter figure being more common during the first century. It is important to remember, however, that these figures represent nominal size, that is the size expected and aimed for when raising a legion. The actual strength of a legion would depend on the circumstances under which it was raised and its subsequent fortunes in war. In the few instances where we have reliable figures for legionary numbers, they vary dramatically. The legions that fought at Pydna under Aemilius Paullus were 6,000 strong, whereas the two legions Caesar took to Britain came to a total of just 7,000 men. Of course the allies added considerably to the forces, since it was expected they supply troops to fight alongside the Romans, the number of men required being proportionate to the number of citizen legions raised. Indeed the allies predominated numerically in the Roman army, as the ratio of allied men to Roman soldiers seems to have run at a level of roughly 2:1 for the infantry and 3:1 for the cavalry. Although there was considerable variation over the course of the Republic, the citizen troops never outnumbered their allies.

After 90 obviously this situation changed, but all that the Italian allies’ altered status will really have meant in military terms is the replacement of large allied contingents by greater numbers of legionaries. From this point onwards a large proportion of the troops labelled as ‘auxiliaries’ are not Italian in origin, since most Italians now qualified for inclusion in legions. This is a particularly important point when considering the question of the armies that fought the Caesarian Civil War in Hispania. Another important consideration in this period is the question of

16 Polybius 6.21.10.
17 Brunt (1971) 672 & 688.
18 Pydna: Livy 42.31.2, 43.12.4, 44.21.8. Britain: Caesar, Gal. 5.49.
19 Brunt (1971) 678.
‘native’ legions - units that were legionary in form, but composed of non-citizen troops.21 The first native legion appears to have been created by Caesar during his Gallic campaigns and there seems to have been a general acceptance of native legionaries in small numbers by the Civil Wars period.22 It is not proposed to enter into this question fully here, but it should be noted that, in all probability, not all of those fighting in the legions on either side were Roman citizens.23 In addition to the two native legions fighting for Sextus Pompeius, one of which later defected to Caesar, there may possibly have been a small quantity of hispani, or in any case non-Roman troops, in the standard Roman legions.24

The open acceptance of these highly irregular practices demonstrates the strain the Civil Wars were placing on the manpower of Italy. It is noticeable that, when giving the number of legions under the command of Pompey’s sons, the author of the de Bello Hispaniensi uses the phrase ‘aquilas et signa habuit XIII legionum’, suggesting that these were legions in name, rather than substance, and that the actual number of men involved fell well short of thirteen legions at full strength.25 Given the desperation of recruiting drives at this time, it seems most unlikely that there were any full-strength legions in operation in Hispania during the Caesarian Civil Wars.26

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21 Hispani did make an appearance among the auxiliary (i.e. non-legionary) forces as time went on, but these groups are usually mentioned separately from Italian troops. How large a component of the allied forces they represented is most unclear and there are several different views on the subject at present. See Balli (1956) passim (heavy use of native troops); García y Bellido (1963) passim (minimal use of native troops); Roldán Hervás (1974) 27-42 (sums up previous arguments, opts for middle path).

22 The first known example of a ‘native’ legion was the Legio V Alaudae, formed in Gaul by Caesar late in 52. See Keppie (1984) 98 & 132-133 for its history and evolution.

23 The vernacular legion of Hispania has been thoroughly investigated by a variety of authors, producing widely differing results. While I do not agree with Fear’s view that the vernacular legion was made up wholly of hispani, I have doubts as to whether the unit was composed wholly of citizen hispanienses as contended by Le Roux. Some of the men in the vernacular legion may well have been at a considerable remove from the citizenship, even though they were hispanienses. That is to say they had some Italian blood, but the marriage pattern of the family had prevented them from inheriting the citizenship. For various viewpoints on the vernacular legion, see Fear (1991a) 809-821; Gabba (1979) 134-142; Le Roux (1982) 42-47; Roldán Hervás (1974) 173. On the question of the loss of citizenship, see pp. 136-137 below.

24 This is a contentious area. The authors appearing in the preceding footnote express a representative range of views on the subject.

25 B. Hisp. 7.

26 For the vagaries of Civil War recruiting see Le Roux (1982) 42-43.
On the basis of the information above, therefore, the nominal strength of the Roman army in Hispania would be a constant minimum of 26,000 - 27,000 Roman and allied soldiers. In times of major campaigns, troop capacity might conceivably have risen as high as 64,000-65,000 men. Any attempt to establish a base minimum must be guesswork, pure and simple. However, it does seem unlikely, given the constant presence of two legions and appropriate allied compliment whatever their actual size, that numbers would have dropped below 20,000 at any point in time.

The length of time that a soldier might expect to serve in Hispania presents more of a problem than the issue of how many served. A citizen became eligible for military duty at the age of seventeen and would promptly enter whichever part of the military services was appropriate for his census qualification. If he went into the infantry or the navy, he would be required to provide up to sixteen years’ service between his first campaign and the age of forty-six; this could be increased to twenty years in cases of dire emergency. Cavalrymen were liable for only ten years’ service. How many years were actually served by any given individual depended heavily on the political situation of the day and the place to which he was first posted.

Keppie has estimated that, under normal conditions, the average soldier in the second century might expect to serve up to six years in continuous postings. However, it is generally agreed that, owing to the special circumstances of Hispania, those sent there were liable to serve longer than men in any other part of the republican empire. The near-continuous campaigning required in the Iberian peninsula meant that few campaigns came to a natural end, allowing an entire unit to return home at once. In addition, the increasing unpopularity of Hispania as a place to serve during the second century meant that recruiting by dilectus, as was

27 Based on two legions of 4,000 plus 600 Roman cavalry and allied units in appropriate proportions.
28 Based on four legions of 5,000 plus 1,200 Roman cavalry and allied units in appropriate proportions. Any attempt to estimate the Caesarian Civil War forces seems futile, given the extreme difficulty in determining what a ‘legion’ actually represented during that period.
29 Plutarch, CG. 5.1.
30 Polybius 6.19.2-4.
31 Polybius 6.19.2.
32 Keppie (1984) 34.
traditional at Rome, became a steadily more tortuous process.\textsuperscript{33} This encouraged officials to keep more soldiers in Hispania longer, rather than risk trouble trying to forcibly recruit new men in Italy. The soldiers already on duty there were less able to make their displeasure clear to the magistrates than those in Italy.\textsuperscript{34}

Exactly how much longer troops in Hispania might be expected to serve is a question that has no clear answer, because it is difficult to establish the service records of most republican legions. Toynbee has succeeded in tracing the histories of certain units in Hispania with reasonable accuracy. The results show that some of the men in the legions originally levied for Hispania in 216 and 214 had served continuously for nineteen years by the time they were allowed home in the early 190s. Other second century legions, in his estimation, seem to have served upwards of twenty years.\textsuperscript{35} It would seem unlikely that soldiers in Hispania routinely suffered such extremely long tours of duty and it should be remembered that not all the men in these hapless legions would have served the full term. Certainly at various times during the second century attempts were made to prevent even those in Hispania serving longer than six years continuously.\textsuperscript{36} However, the conclusion that a soldier sent to Hispania would serve longer, on average, than those sent to other areas seems inescapable. In addition, he might expect to spend his entire term of service there, in contrast to men posted to other areas.

The ethnic and social make up of the Roman army in Hispania is relatively simple to determine. With regard to the former of the two elements, as has already been noted, in any Roman army the allied soldiers usually predominated. It has been suggested that in Hispania this tendency towards an Italian-dominated army may have been further exaggerated by the senate placing a higher priority on the repatriation of citizen veterans. As the clamour over excessively long tours of duty in the Spanish provinces grew, it would have been tempting to deal with citizens first,
since they and their relatives had the ability to create far greater political problems than the lowly Italians, be they Latin or ally.37 There is also some evidence for the recruitment of *hispanienses*, but this occurred at a late stage, during the Caesarian Civil Wars, too late to have any serious influence on the republican situation as a whole.38 In any case it is important to remember that, whatever their place of birth, these men were not Spanish in any meaningful sense.

Most conscripts, whatever their ethnic origin, came from a similar social background. The Roman army was founded firmly upon the land-owning peasant class, as is reflected in the basic, and largest, level of census assessment.39 Allied and Latin troops were recruited on an essentially similar basis. For much of the republican period it was men from this kind of background who made up the bulk of the forces in Hispania.40 As the first century arrived, however, a perceptible shift occurred. Due to various agricultural and economic changes in the countryside, the peasantry was no longer the fertile recruitment pool it had been in the early and middle Republic.41 After successive attempts to address the problem by reducing the basic census qualification for inclusion, none of which had any lasting effect, the ‘Marian reforms’ produced a more radical solution.42 The reforms, amongst other things, made it possible to accept volunteers who lacked the necessary economic qualification, thus rather increasing the pool of potential soldiers.43 The men who were now eligible to serve in the army included a mixture of recently dispossessed

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37 There are no real signs of discontent with Spanish postings before 152, when Marcellus tried to enlist troops in the wake of Nobilior’s disastrous Celtiberian campaign. However the violence of reaction then suggests this particular occasion was merely the straw that broke the camel’s back. The violence was largely at Rome, the Italians’ stand on the issue at this time is less than clear. See Appian, *Ib.* 49; Toynbee (1965) vol. 2, 129-134. See also chapter 6, pp.152-154.

38 See the vernacular legion question, note 23 above.

39 See note 42 below.

40 What is considered to be the archetypal description of this kind of soldier - the willing, dutiful conscript and occasional volunteer - appears in Livy (42.34), in the form of an autobiographical speech given before the senate by one Spurius Ligustinus. The portrait is clearly an idealised one, but the passage is no less interesting because of that.

41 This subject will be dealt with in greater detail below. See pp. 124-127.

42 Livy reports (1.43.7-8) that Servius Tullius established the lowest census classification eligible for military service at 11,000 *asses*. Some are of the opinion that this was still in force at the beginning of the Second Punic War, see Keppie (1984) 61. The qualification is known to have been lowered to 4,000 *asses* by Polybius’ day (Polybius 6.19.2) and had been reduced again by Cicero’s time to 1,500 *asses* (Cicero, *Rep.* 2.40). See Gabba (1949) 173-209 *passim*; Zetzel (1995) 196, for the various different versions of the reduction of census qualifications presented by ancient authors.

43 Sallust, *Jug.* 86.2-4; Smith (1958) 9-10. Such men still could not be compelled to join the army through the *dilectus*. 
peasants, some of whom had remained on the land in the ignominious role of hired labourers, and the urban poor.\textsuperscript{44} Many among this latter group would have a peasant background as well, earlier members of the family having lost their land. These men were thus of the same cultural origin as the army of the second century, but of an entirely different economic status.\textsuperscript{45}

Both the urban poor and this latest type of peasant helped to bring a new face to the army.\textsuperscript{46} One of the primary motives for volunteering would have been a desire to better one’s lot in life, for which foreign service might be thought to provide many opportunities.\textsuperscript{47} As both the Sullan and Caesarian Civil Wars unfolded during the first century, the possibilities raised by the Marian reforms came into full fruition. The demand for troops was high, and the enfranchisement of the former allied communities after the Social War meant that there was huge pool of potential volunteers.\textsuperscript{48} By this stage a large proportion of troops were raised from volunteers, and the fortune-seekers would have been to the fore.

There can be no doubt that, taken on a cultural, rather than martial level, the republican army in Hispania was a strange and foreign entity. During the Republic there was no routine local recruitment to cushion the impact between native Italian and local cultures, as was the case during the Empire. It is true that from a fairly early stage Roman commanders were able to call on friendly tribes for service as auxiliaries, but, in comparison with the native Italian section of the army, their numbers will never have been large, nor their influence great.\textsuperscript{49} For many of the republican soldiers the journey to Hispania will have been the first time they had ever left the Italian peninsula. Both sides must have found each other rather strange, at

\textsuperscript{44} Sallust, \textit{Cat.} 37.7. Smith (1958) 44-47. On why hired labour was beneath a free man’s dignity, see Cicero, \textit{Off.} 1.42.150.

\textsuperscript{45} For a general discussion of the situation following the Marian reforms see Gabba (1951) \textit{passim}; Smith (1958) chapter 4; Brunt (1988) \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{46} Their impact before the Social War should not be over emphasised. They remained only a section of the army and the gap between the poorest \textit{assidui} and the most comfortably placed volunteers would not have been large. See Smith (1958) 10; Rich (1983) 323.

\textsuperscript{47} Sallust, \textit{Jug.} 86.3-4. See also Brunt (1988) 262-264.

\textsuperscript{48} Smith (1958) 27-28.

\textsuperscript{49} Roldán Hervás (1974) 27-42. He goes so far as to suggest that native troops may have had only minimal contact with native Italian troops, by virtue of their role in military operations. \textit{Hispani} of all ethnic backgrounds were predisposed to service in foreign armies after years of service as mercenaries, particularly in Carthaginian armies. Celtiberians may have served as far east as Corcyra, see García y Bellido (1974) \textit{passim}. 

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least to begin with, and the hostile atmosphere of much of the peninsula's hinterland will not have helped. In the south and along the eastern coast, where Rome made lasting allies the quickest and where elements of native Italian culture were absorbed more rapidly than the rest of the peninsula, the Roman army probably ceased to be perceived in this way quite rapidly. Equally, it is in these regions that the soldiers themselves would feel most comfortable. However, the same cannot be said for the rest of Hispania, where the indigenous population must have remained a source of curiosity and fear for much of the Republic.

The operational profile of the republican army in Hispania differed substantially from the one which was to develop during the imperial period. As has been forcefully argued by Roldán Hervás, the republican army in Hispania was, throughout its career, an army of conquest, whereas that of the imperial period was an army of occupation.50 The function, activity and social status of the two types are largely dissimilar. The imperial army was far more sedentary than its republican counterpart, being stationed in permanent encampments in the more unsettled areas of Citerior and Lusitania. Thus the whole of Baetica was without a substantial military presence during the Empire, except on rare occasions when a crisis arose.51 The army's settled nature made it part and parcel of the local community and meant it was easy for soldiers to build up relationships with people outside the camp. It had a clearly defined role in society, in which the protection of local communities loomed large. The imperial army's status as an accepted part of the community was assisted greatly by the fact that it was made up of a broad cross-section of contemporary Spanish society, achieved through routine provincial recruitment. Although not all of those recruited in Hispania remained there, many did, serving their entire sixteen years in the same legion based in the same locality.52 As elsewhere in the Roman world this resulted in soldiering families, where son followed father into the army, and added a further layer of social acceptability to the army's presence.

50 Roldán Hervás (1974) 163-165, (1976) 129-130. Roldán's point may seem to be obvious, but is all too often overlooked by those examining the role of the army in republican Hispania.
51 For example during the invasion of the Mauri in the early 170s A.D., see Historia Augusta, Marcus. 21.1.
The republican army presents a stark contrast. Thanks to the apparently unending series of campaigns fought against a variety of enemies, the republican army’s presence in the peninsula was just as constant, but it was far more mobile. The arrival of the army on a community’s doorstep was unlikely to be the cause of great celebration. Driven by a combination of difficult circumstances and precipitate leaders, the republican army campaigned almost incessantly and the most common reason for its presence in any area was warfare. Even loyal and friendly communities would have suffered by the army’s presence, since they would have had to provide food for the troops and perhaps also men to serve as auxiliaries - a considerable burden for any town. At least they would not be under obligation for long, the army rarely settled in one place for an extended period, unless to winter or engage in siege tactics. The former of the two activities may well have brought a soldier back to the same town several times in the course of his tour of duty, providing the only element of real stability in military life.

It has also been argued that the Romans made fairly widespread use of town garrisons in Hispania, but this seems unlikely. Although treaties made with tribes following deditio allow for the provision of garrisons, there is little evidence that the option was routinely taken up. Literary attestations are extremely rare and there is no reason to believe that the use of town garrisons was any more common than the sources suggest. There were other ways to keep an eye on suspect populations. Garrisons on main military transit routes seem a more likely proposition, and in this case there may be some limited evidence in the literary sources to support the idea.

53 Cato’s declaration (Livy 34.9.12-13) that his campaign would feed itself - off the local communities - is the most famous occasion of exploitation, but not the only one. The Scipios certainly got food and raised money for the troops’ pay from indigenous communities, see Appian, Ib. 38, Livy 21.61.6-11, 23.48.5. See also, Curchin (1991) 93; Richardson (1996a) 36-37 & 71-72.


55 Le Roux (1995) 29-30 supports the idea of garrisons of short duration. Knapp (1977) 16 does concede that these garrisons may have been fairly short lived, although he does not favour this idea.

56 Chief among the critics of the garrison theory are Harmand (1967) 36-38 (in the late Republic generally) and Curchin (1991) 92 (Hispania in particular). The main alternative to garrisons was the creation or organised, urban settlements for natives, of which Gracchuris may be a good example, see chapter 3, pp. 54-55. The settlement of veterans would also have helped.

57 Certain itineraries and geographical works of the imperial period seem to record the former existence of such route garrisons. See chapter 3, p. 75.
However, in either case such facilities would most probably be manned by *hispani* acting as auxiliary troops, rather than native Italian soldiers.\textsuperscript{58}

In summation, the republican forces in Hispania were never small, but their impact on the individual communities of the peninsula was somewhat diluted by their mobility. The perpetual conflicts of the republican era ensured that soldiers posted there would be likely to remain for the long term, although they could expect to travel widely within the peninsula. For many service in Hispania proved disappointing, as, increasingly, soldiers hoped to profit from their military duties. With these factors in mind we may move on to the next stage.

**II Motivational factors**

The emigrant’s motivation to settle is important in overseas settlement of any variety, but is an element that is often forgotten in the case of formal settlement in general, and veteran settlement in particular. Whether a formal settlement is created with all the official structure in place, or is the result of *ad hoc* arrangements made by an individual commander on the ground, if the troops involved are not willing to settle, then no lasting foundation can be made. Even the most charismatic or authoritarian of leaders cannot order his men to spend the rest of their non-military lives in an alien place. There would be two possible results of such an order: either the men would mutiny, there and then, or they would abandon the foundation the minute the attention of the powers-that-be was elsewhere. Enforced settlement can only be achieved under the type of conditions established by the British in the convict colonies of New South Wales, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries AD. As the British discovered then, such conditions are difficult to maintain.\textsuperscript{59} There is, in fact, no sign that any enterprise of this type was attempted by Rome. Salmon has suggested that, technically, the colonial commissions were able to conscript individuals for citizen colonies, should there be a shortfall in the required

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\textsuperscript{58} See chapter 3, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{59} Official documentation concerning the last years of ‘transportation’ to British penal colonies indicates that a high level of institutionalised brutality was necessary to keep the colonies in order, which required the presence of a sizeable number of penal staff. In addition, the relationship that existed between the convicts and free settlers was an uneasy one, always threatening to erupt into violence. It was these two aspects that eventually brought an end to transportation by the British government. See Bell and Morrell (1928) section 3.
numbers. However, there is no known example of these powers actually being exercised. In the case of less official settlements, the commander would have no such authority. There can be no question of enforced veteran settlement.

The absence of compulsion alone does not make a successful settlement, however. If official compulsion can be ruled out, motivation to settle becomes a particularly important issue. Lack of enthusiasm could be a very serious problem. The classic example of this is the case of the citizen colonies founded in response to the threat of an invasion of Italy by Philip V of Macedon in the early second century. Five colonies - Puteoli, Salernum, Voltumnum, Liternum and Buxentum - were originally planned in 197. A commission of three was appointed to oversee their creation and their size set at three hundred families per colony. After this first flurry of activity there is no further news of the new foundations until 194, at which point it becomes obvious that the settlers for the colonies were only now being dispatched. The delay seems to have been caused by difficulties in finding participants. This is a situation worthy of note, for these proposed colonies were not particularly large. Since the threat was now even greater, due to the involvement of Antiochus the Great in Rome's eastern affairs, a further three colonies were planned: Sipontum, Tempsa and Croton. However, the safe dispatch of colonists to all eight settlements did not end their problems. In 186 the consul Spurius Postumius reported that he had discovered Sipontum and Buxentum to have been completely abandoned and a new batch of colonists had to be enrolled for them. After this, these two are lost from sight in the sources, but neither seems to have enjoyed prominence in regional affairs. The future of a further four was also inauspicious. Liternum was later described by Valerius Maximus as a forgotten marsh. Croton, Voltumnum and Tempsa never rose above the status of hamlets, something the latter two have remained to this day. Only Puteoli and Salernum prospered.

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61 Livy 32.29.3.  
62 Livy 34.45.1-2  
63 Livy 34.45.3.  
64 Livy 39.23.3-4.  
65 Valerius Maximus 5.3.2b. His comments suggest the site was partially, if not wholly, abandoned.  
All the colonies were on the very edge of, or well beyond, the *ager Romanus*.\(^{67}\) The colonists would have looked for benefits that compensated for the distance from Rome and, in many cases, found them wanting. The benefit of retaining, or in some cases perhaps gaining, citizenship were cancelled by the difficulty of travelling to Rome in order to participate. In several cases the land was poor and in all cases allotments of it were fairly small.\(^{68}\) Nor were most of the colonies well-placed to reap the benefits of commercial endeavour.\(^{69}\) The absence of social and economic opportunities in these colonies ensured their failure in two different ways. Not only did they directly limit the growth of these communities, they also restricted the enthusiasm of the settlers. People were unwilling to become involved in the first place and, once involved, lacked the determination to overcome the colonies’ inherent difficulties. A lack of enthusiasm was not the only factor in the dismal history of these colonies, but it is safe to suggest that it was behind the slow recruitment for the original *deductio* of colonists and the later dereliction of Sipontum and Buxentum.

Although the specific factors that motivated veterans to settle in Hispania did differ, at times, from those relevant to Italy, the issue of motivation is no less important. In the case of Hispania there were two factors at the heart of the issue: the availability and the desirability of Spanish land for native Italian soldiers. In short, suitable land had to be available for the creation of a formal settlement and it had to be of a kind that the prospective settlers in question would happily accept. This is not to suggest that there would have been no other factors involved, but these two are the most visible in the sources and, for veteran settlers, perhaps the most relevant. With particular reference to veterans, many scholars also point to the formation of relationships which might encourage soldiers to remain in Hispania and this question will also be considered.

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\(^{67}\) Liternum and Volturnum were located at the mouths of the Liternus and Volturnus respectively; Puteoli and Salernum were in Campania; Croton and Tempsa lay in Bruttium; Buxentum was in Lucania and Sipontum in Apulia.

\(^{68}\) Liternum (Valerius Maximus 5.3.2b), and Sipontum (Cicero, *Agr.* 2.71) were both described as marshy in ancient sources. For the size of the plots involved, see Salmon (1969) 98.

\(^{69}\) Sipontum might have operated as a port, but proved too marshy (see previous note); Liternum and Volturnum were far outclassed by Puteoli; Tempsa and Croton were in quiet areas, outside main trade routes.
In all of this the nature of the Roman army’s presence in Hispania played a
decisive role. It is the sheer length and extent of Roman military involvement in
Hispania that is vital; large numbers of Roman soldiers had the chance to get to know
both the land and the people of the Iberian peninsula. They had a first hand
opportunity to weigh up the possibilities for permanent residence in Hispania and
were able to establish ties with local inhabitants of the areas in which they were
stationed. Also important was the timing of Roman involvement. Due to the
complex social and economic changes Italy underwent during the second and first
centuries, land for settlement became an especially precious commodity, just as the
wide open spaces of Hispania were being conquered.

The first of the factors in the motivational issue - availability of suitable land -
is easily accounted for in the Iberian peninsula. Whatever its military horrors,
Hispania had plenty of fertile land and this fact seems to have been widely
recognised. Most of it was located along the Mediterranean and Atlantic seaboards
and in the valleys of the Baetis, Hiberus, Tagus, Anas and Durius. The Baetic valley
and the Mediterranean coast were particularly rich, combining good soil with
effective natural irrigation. As has been shown, the vast majority of successful
republican formal settlements were founded in these areas. Due to the defeat or
surrender of numerous communities in Hispania, large tracts of land were classified
as ager publicus and so, at least potentially, were available for lease or distribution in
land grants. Finding land for formal foundations did not present a problem at any
point during the Republic.

The question of the desirability of Spanish land for the common soldiery needs
to be seen in the wider context of the state of the Italian countryside during the
second and first centuries. This is a huge topic and one on which a great deal of time
and energy has been expended over the years. To carry out a thorough survey of the
subject would cover several thousand words and this not appropriate in the current

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70 Strabo 3.1.6 (Turdetania), 3.4.9 (eastern coast). Strabo, who never visited Hispania himself, drew
largely on Greek writers of late second and early first centuries who had - Polybius, Poseidonius,
Artemidorus and Aesclepiades of Myrleia. His work is thought to reflect received opinion of that era,
71 Way (1962) 100-101. See chapter 2, p. 28
72 Ager publicus would not be automatically destined for use in settlement, but it was not uncommon.
context, but a brief overview can be made. The traditional view of the situation has been that peasants were slowly being squeezed off their ancestral plots, some becoming hired labour, others forming a new and denser layer of urban poor in the cities. They were, it has been thought, replaced by large estates controlled by the rich.\textsuperscript{73} Recent archaeological investigations now suggest that smallholdings were preserved in several regions of Italy throughout the Republic and that the case for the spread of \textit{latifundia} has been overstated.\textsuperscript{74}

This is not to deny that there were agrarian problems, clearly there were. The thick crop of agrarian legislation belonging to the late second and first centuries was obviously being driven by disturbances in traditional country life.\textsuperscript{75} Equally the apparent drop in \textit{assidui} which was noted by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus is a warning sign of a serious rent in the social and economic fabric of Italy.\textsuperscript{76} However, it is now accepted that a precise definition of these problems currently lies beyond our grasp and only a few cautious observations can safely be made. Firstly, the rich of the

\textsuperscript{73} The view originated in comments made by several ancient authors, including Plutarch, \textit{TG.} 8.2-4, Sallust, \textit{Cat.} 37.7 and Varro, \textit{R.} 2, \textit{praef.} 3. For a general appraisal of the evidence see White (1967) 62-79. For a representative range of the traditional viewpoint, see Toynbee (1965) vol. 2, 155-189 and White (1970) 38 & 345-346.

\textsuperscript{74} Particularly in central Italy. A careful account of the emerging archaeological picture is given by Dyson (1992) chapter 2. Dyson sides with the archaeological picture, but makes no real attempt to explain how the literary version of events could have become as exaggerated as he believes it did. While I am prepared to accept that the manner in which the literature portrays the situation may be exaggerated and that the ‘drift to Rome’ probably did become the easiest thing to blame for social and economic problems with more widespread roots, given the fragmentary state of the archaeological investigations it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility of large estates out of hand. In particular, archaeologists are handicapped by the inability to determine population density accurately, as opposed to the density of building remains, as Carcopino pointed out some years ago (1956, 20). On this topic see also Frayn (1979) 21-22; Evans (1991) 108-112; Bergqvist (1992) 111-115; Cornell (1996) 109-112.

\textsuperscript{75} Regardless of the constant land distributions to veterans, there were no less than seven different plans put forward to deal with the civilian side of the problem. In chronological order: 133 Ti. Sempronius Gracchus - land distribution; 122 C. Sempronius Gracchus - land distribution and corn dole; 118 Spurius Thorius - law to enforce Gracchan land settlements; 100 Apuleius Saturninus - land distribution in Gaul; 91 Livius Drusus - colonies in Italy and Sicily; 63 Servilius Rullus - land distribution; 59 Julius Caesar - land distribution. These were followed by the transmarine civilian colonisation efforts of Caesar, which to a degree are related, although they were probably intended to address far wider problems than upheaval in the countryside.

\textsuperscript{76} Appian, \textit{B.C.} 1.11. It should be noted that this is a disputed area. Some extreme views of it have been taken in the last thirty odd years. Earl has gone so far as to propose that the recruitment problem was the driving force behind Ti. Sempronius Gracchus’ programme. Shochat has argued strongly against this view, without proposing a satisfactory solution himself. Stockton has taken a moderate line, suggesting that army recruitment and agrarian reform were different sides of the same coin. In my opinion this is the most sensible of the available arguments. See Earl (1963) \textit{passim}; Shochat (1980) \textit{passim}; Stockton (1979) 33-36. See also Rich (1983) \textit{passim} who disputes the existence of a drop in \textit{assidui} levels.
second century were certainly wealthier than their predecessors in the third. In tune with established Roman attitudes to wealth, they could be expected to invest much of their increased capital in land. So it is true that the rich were in control of more land than ever before, but the normal practice seems to have been to purchase a multiplicity of medium-sized estates across Italy, taking advantages of differing local conditions for different crops. This may have produced a change in patterns of land ownership which would not show up clearly in the archaeological record. Land-owning peasants may have been bought out of their estates and become tenant farmers or share-croppers instead. Others may have continued to run smallholdings that were not large enough to support the dependent family, causing them to look to work as hired labour for supplemental income. If a family contained more children than its land could absorb, there were few alternative careers available. It is not possible to take this issue much further than this.

There were reasons why the peasantry might have been particularly vulnerable to such practices from the second century onwards. The demands made by the state on those eligible to serve in the army would have been an important factor. By the second century an infantryman could expect to be away from home for up to six years continuously and many served much longer. The vast armies of the second and first centuries would have absorbed an increasingly large proportion of adult males. In a world where farming was based on a system of one nuclear family per smallholding, the removal of such quantities of manpower for long periods certainly had the potential to create serious economic difficulties.

Stockton (1979) 14. For example the types of estates discussed by Cicero in his defence of both Sextus Roscius and Aulus Caeedia. They were both part of wealthy, established Italian families who owned numerous individual fundi. These were not spread over a wide area, but neither were they contiguous. See Cicero, Caec. passim, esp.10-11; S. Rosc. 15.43-44. For the possible size of such estates see Bergqvist (1992) passim. The motivation behind this approach to land-owning seems to have been risk management; a desire to avoid putting all one’s investments in a single basket, so to speak. A range of farms growing different types of crops in different areas would be unlikely to suffer disaster simultaneously, see Garnsey (1988) 48-49.

Lintott (1992) 42. The situation and status of tenants and share-croppers in the Republic, and the differences between them, is explored by de Neeve (1984) 8-23.


Keppie (1984) 34; see pp. 115-116 above for details.

White (1970) 346; Evans (1991) 113. Evans does urge caution in this assumption, since many would have been able to appeal to the wider family for some measure of help. There is some uncertainty among modern historians as to whether the average new conscript would already be
many households.\textsuperscript{83} When this situation was combined with a tendency toward slave-run or free-tenant estates, it is likely that once land was lost, the possibility of acquiring a replacement plot was extremely low.\textsuperscript{84} As the longest serving soldiers of the Roman army, the men in Hispania would have been particularly hard hit.

The first real sign of concern about Italy's agrarian problems in the sources comes with the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, who based his political activities around the issue, and the situation seemed to have improved little by the end of the Caesarian Civil Wars.\textsuperscript{85} In a world where farming was the only honourable way to earn one's living, for both peasant and aristocrat, where neither craft nor profession alone gained any real social respect, the shortage of decent farming land was a matter of vital importance that had a profound impact on the whole of society.\textsuperscript{86} The situation affected more than social structures, Rome's army and her political system needed the small farmers in order to function properly,\textsuperscript{87} they were also linked to the peasant-farmer system in a more emotional sense. Returning to farm in the Italian countryside once more, after fighting for Rome, seems to have been a Roman ambition long before the oft-repeated tale of Cincinnatus made it a cliche and it had lost none of its emotive, not to mention pragmatic, force by the late Republic.\textsuperscript{88}

The desire for land is a topic which dominates the demobilisation of armies throughout the late Republic and the early Principate, for the simple reason that, increasingly, soldiers were left without an occupation on discharge.\textsuperscript{89} The traditions

married and thus in danger of neglecting and losing any land that had been settled on him at marriage. Legal marriage was possible once both partners had reached puberty. For boys this was originally determined by physical examination, which later seems to have been abandoned by some, in favour of accepting the arbitrary age of fourteen years. See Gaius, \textit{Inst.} 1.196; Corbett (1930) 51-53. Spurius Ligustinus, Livy's archetypal infantryman appears to have married before taking up arms, since he says \textit{`cum primum in aetatem veni, pater mihi uxorem...dedit'}, although it is not clear whether the 'coming of age' he refers to is puberty or the assumption of the \textit{toga praetexta} at the age of approximately sixteen. Even if new conscripts were routinely unmarried and had no land, as Brunt thinks (1971) 138-139, the loss of manpower from the family plot would be no less of a problem.\textsuperscript{81} Frayn, (1979) 75-77.

\textsuperscript{81} The rich could afford to outbid the poor, see Plutarch, \textit{TG.} 8.2-4; White (1967) 62-79.
\textsuperscript{82} Plutarch, \textit{TC.} 8; Suetonius, \textit{Jul.}, 42.
\textsuperscript{83} Polybius 6.56; Cicero, \textit{Off.} 2.87. The low status of artisans and many of the professions was due to the fact that to be in another man's employ was considered degrading, see Cicero, \textit{Off.} 1.42.150.
\textsuperscript{84} See above p. 117.
\textsuperscript{85} Livy 3.26-29. For the practical side of the issue, see Brunt (1988) 267-273.
of Rome made farming the most obvious source of economic salvation. The Marian reforms heightened a tension that must have existed already, greatly increasing the number of men who had joined the army with the intent of making their fortune. If such a man served in the Greek East, then he did stand some chance of attaining this goal, but if he had been unlucky enough to end up in Hispania, there was little hope. Of course, for the most part the demands for land were demands for Italian land. However the Romans were a practical people and if Italian land was out of the question then alternatives could be considered. The soldiers in Hispania were in a position to consider the possibilities the peninsula offered at close range and over a period of time.

This is, of course, a double-edged sword. Soldiers may have been able to weigh up Hispania’s possibilities, but they did so as part of a hostile military force and their impressions of both the country and its people were, obviously, potentially unfavourable. Attempts have been made by scholars to get round this problem by the proposal that soldiers who had served in Hispania would have become inured to its dangers and hardships, so that the place to longer held any fear for them. However, this proposal seems to be seeking a solution by examining the issue from the wrong angle. In dealing with the problem, it is vital to consider not just the type of army operations in Hispania, but also their chronology and location. The Roman campaigns in Hispania were not geographically fixed and this fact had considerable potential to influence the soldiers’ view.

After the battle of Ilipa in 206 and over the course of the second century the campaigns moved further and further north and west into the peninsula’s interior, away from the Baetic valley and the eastern coast. The cities and towns of these
latter areas had been in active conflict with the Romans relatively briefly; the worst of the fighting was over by the end of Cato the Elder’s campaign in 195. Apart from occasional, isolated, disputes, they were no longer hostile. Military activities in these areas seem to have been confined to the establishment of winter quarters and training grounds. Although the actual wintering places of the army are rarely specified by any ancient author, the few occasions on which authors do name the sites of winter camps strongly suggest that the normal wintering grounds, especially in the second century were in the east and south, safely removed from trouble. Tarraco (Tarragona), Emporiae (L’Escala, prov. Girona), Corduba (Córdoba), Conistorgis (in the Algarve region), Urso (Osuna, prov. Sevilla) and Castulo (near Linares, prov. Jaén) are the only ones which have been securely identified.

The cessation of hostilities by the local peoples of these areas did not, of course, guarantee freedom from military incursions by tribes outside them. There was no ‘front line’ in republican Hispania, no clear linear boundary, marked by fortified defences, indicating and defending the edge of Roman control. Instead there existed a kind of frontier zone, an area defined as much by politics, as by physical geography. The zone consisted of land held by those who were friendly towards Rome, but not yet fully subservient to her. The independent agents could be cities, tribes or individual leaders and their lands provided a buffer zone between Roman-controlled and independent areas. There is no sign of any clear policy on the

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93 Livy 34.8.4ff. The effects of Cato’s campaigns, and those of the governors before him, should not be seen as resulting in an immediate and total cessation of violence. Rather they resolved the worst of the problems and moved the focus of continued fighting to the edges of what was considered Roman-held territory.
94 There is a tendency for authors to refer simply to ‘χειμωνικα’ or a withdrawal into ‘hiberna’, without further specifications. With regard to winter quarters being in safe areas, it is interesting to note that in 180 Sempronius Gracchus claimed that the only settled areas in his province (Citerior) were those immediately adjacent to his unidentified winter quarters (Livy 40.35.13-14).
95 Tarraco: Livy 21.61.11, 26.20.1-6, 28.4.4. Emporiae: Livy 34.13.2. Corduba: Appian, Ib. 66. Conistorgis: Appian, Ib. 58. Urso: Appian, Ib. 16, 65. Castulo: Appian, Ib. 16. Among the more vague references to winter quarters there is also the case of Lucullus, who is recorded wintering ‘in the territory of the Turdetans’ by Appian (Ib. 55). The long term camps at Numantia were, of course, a part of siege warfare and do not really form part of this discussion.
96 The expectation of a linear boundary arises largely from nineteenth century scholarship, influenced by frontier politics of their own day. In this century the two world wars have helped reinforce the concept to a degree. Most scholars in frontier studies now accept linear boundaries were not a part of the Roman imperial experience. See Whittaker (1994) chapter 1. For the malleability of the concept in the Roman mind, see Trouset (1993) 115-120.
part of Rome concerning the creation and maintenance of these buffer zones, or, indeed, concerning incursions against them. They seem to have evolved as a result of the cut and thrust of daily activity, rather than through conscious decisions made in advance. 98 The nature of the frontier meant that it could prove highly permeable, in both directions. Raids against Roman-controlled territory did occur. The fertile valleys and established townships of Ulterior seem to have suffered more than Citerior in this respect. Not only were these areas tempting targets, they had covetous neighbours in the Lusitani, who were responsible for most of the depredations.

Fear has made much of these incursions, suggesting that they would make settlement in Ulterior a highly unpopular option. 99 This seems too extreme an interpretation. Lusitanian invasions of the province of Ulterior certainly occurred; they are first recorded in the 190s and seem to have continued sporadically during the second century, eventually developing into the Lusitanian War. 100 However, it has been suggested that raids by the Lusitani in the early part of the second century would be better characterised as retribution against the Roman army, since the main military pressure in this period came from Rome. 101 This does tend to be borne out by Livy, who refers to the Lusitani specifically targeting the army on at least two occasions. 102 Moreover, insofar as we can tell from the sources, the Lusitani did not seem to have a taste for siege warfare, preferring the easier pickings of the countryside. This is not to deny that the raids would have had an impact, merely that they did not represent an insurmountable obstacle to veterans intending to settle in a formally constituted community, where defensive procedures could be set in operation.

During the course of an average soldier’s tour of duty, he could expect to see quite a large area of the province to which he had been assigned. Given the naturally harsh environment of the active military zones and the ferocious nature of their inhabitants, often the only insight this travel would be likely to provide would be the insanity of trying to lead a normal Roman life in the hinterland. A soldier’s

100 190s: Livy 35.1.5 & 37.46.7-9. 180s: Livy 39.7.6-7, 39.21.1-3; Appian Ib. 56-75.
101 Harris (1989) 126.
102 Livy 37.46.7-9, 39.21.1-3.
experiences on active duty would help to reinforce the difference between the warlike interior and the peaceful periphery, to which he returned in the winter. The contrast between the two areas would be both striking and wide-ranging. The physical environment was different; the thickly wooded, dry Meseta or the rough ravines of Lusitanian territory were exchanged for the well-watered coastal zones and the fertile Baetic valley. Both the people and the general cultural atmosphere of the wintering grounds were also less threatening.

From the second century onwards ‘the enemy’ was usually the Celtiberians or Lusitani, another Celtic group. In Roman eyes these were the most barbaric of the Iberian peninsula’s inhabitants, whose every aspect was foreign to the Roman way of thinking. The Celtiberians were particularly frightening, given the overt cultural bond they shared with Rome’s ancestral enemy, the Gauls. Although both the Lusitani and the Celtiberians had their own distinct material cultures and social organisation, certain common elements allowed Romans to view them as part of the same wider group: the ‘barbarous hispani’. They were tribal cultures; their food, dress and daily life were both eminently suited to their circumstances and far removed from the Roman equivalents. From a philosophical point of view, they could be admired as ‘noble savages’, living the simple life, largely unaffected by luxury and moral decline, and this is reflected in ethnographic writers of the time.

It would seem unlikely that the average soldier would have stopped to consider these finer points. Certainly reflections on the noble aspects of Celtiberians and Lusitani are rare in the works of contemporary historians writing about the campaigns in Hispania from a Roman viewpoint.

103 Way (1962) 100-101. The importance of the fertility of Spanish land as an attraction, in contrast to mountainous regions of Italy, has been noted by Syme (1958) 10.

104 Rankin (1987) 166-169. It is interesting to note the seriousness with which the Numantine War was taken by the Senate, in comparison with the Lusitanian conflict. Both lasted similar periods of time and involved similar amounts of doubtful political and military manoeuvring on the part of Roman commanders, yet it was only the Numantine War over which the Senate took decisive action.

105 Strabo 3.4.12-13 (Celtiberians), 3.3.6-8 (Lusitani). As has been noted above, Strabo’s material is largely drawn from writers of the late second and early first century, so he reflects a state of affairs that may well have been altered by romanisation in his own day. The concept of ‘barbarous versus civilised hispani’ is a strong element of Strabo’s work, although the idea may well have been drawn from his original sources.

106 Strabo (3.3.7) reflects on the simple life of the Lusitani, but is less enthusiastic about the Celtiberians, calling them ‘άγριοι’ (3.4.13).

107 When such reflections do occur, they arise from truly momentous events. For example, the death of Viriathus (Appian, Ib. 75), or the fall of Numantia (Appian, Ib. 97).
By comparison, the coastal and southern inhabitants were a fairly peaceable cosmopolitan group, composed of Iberians, Greeks and Carthaginians, with perhaps a few Phoenician elements in the south. All these cultures had an urban structure, and thus were more readily comprehensible to the Romans, even if other elements of their lifestyle meant that, by Roman standards, they were considered ‘soft’. These were the ‘civilised *hispani*’. Through the campaigns of the Second Punic War and then the establishment of supply bases and wintering grounds, they had also long been exposed to Roman culture and were absorbing elements of it. The rate of absorption may not have been very high in the second century and no doubt varied from community to community, but it would have been of considerable assistance in bridging cultural gaps.

For those towns which regularly received a governor’s army for the winter, such as Corduba or Tarraco, the arrival of the army was probably not an unwelcome event. Although the republican approach to wintering armies, in which the troops tended to be foisted on the town requiring food and sometimes lodgings, would have been something of a discouragement to good relations, there was at least the possibility of making some money out of the exercise. Organised townsmen could hope to turn a decent profit providing for the soldiers’ creature comforts. The potential of such a situation for creating moderate goodwill amongst the *hispani* should not be underestimated. That some native communities tolerated, or even welcomed, the army is particularly important: most formal settlements adjoined an existing native community or included *hispani* in their foundation population.

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108 For a basic discussion of the controversial issue of the absorption, or otherwise, of both Phoenician and Carthaginian culture and people into the existing Iberian culture of southern Hispania see chapter 2, pp. 32-33 & 35.

109 For various different appraisals of the urbanisation of the south and the Mediterranean coast see Blázquez and del Castillo (1991) 138-142; Harrison (1988) 95; Keay (1988) 50-54. It should be noted that recent results of archaeological investigation suggests that such urbanisation did not occur along what are now the southern and western coasts of Portugal, see de Alarçäo (1988) 4-5 & 109.

110 Ancient commentaries on these people are somewhat limited. We have most information about the Turdetani, whom Strabo regarded as both civilised and heavily romanised (3.2.15). The lack of direct comment may itself be a comment on the acceptability of these communities in Graeco-Roman eyes.

111 The opportunities would have varied according to the attitude of the commanding officer. The situation met by Scipio Aemilianus in 134 suggests that some commanders in Hispania were lenient on their troops over the winter, as a compensation for the extremely tough campaigning conditions. See Appian, *ib*. 85; Valerius Maximus 2.7.1.
The possibilities offered by the more peaceable environment of the south and the coastal zones might well have invited the more adventurous, or desperate, legionaries to start a new life. However, for many, the structured, and relatively familiar, environment of a formal settlement was the final element needed. Settling in Hispania as part of an organised settlement had certain obvious advantages. The act of settling became a community venture, instead of an individual project, and in consequence the risks involved were somewhat lessened. The community could band together in order to support any members in difficulty, defend itself against the outside world and keep order within its own ranks. The degree of protection provided by a formal settlement in its earliest years was heavily dependent on whether the foundation had been officially or unofficially instituted. In the former case a reasonable degree of assistance was probably available to support the fledgling community, until it could feed and protect itself.\(^{112}\) In the case of unofficial foundations, such as Italica, the situation is more uncertain. It is unclear whether an individual commander would have the resources to provide quite the same degree of assistance as the Roman state, but the possibility of providing grain and other types of supplies to keep the settlement in food until the first harvest seems realistic.

In addition to physical advantages, involvement in formal settlements had psychological benefits too. By bringing together a group of individuals of the same background, they created a native Italian enclave within which life could continue much as it had at home. Formal settlements could recreate the physical, political and social structure to which the settlers were accustomed, making their new home seem less foreign. Again the degree of success achieved in this endeavour would be dependent on official status of the settlement, or lack of it. Official settlements had the standard romanised governmental forms that were to be found in towns all over Italy, initiated for them by the founding commission.\(^{113}\) It is thought that unofficial settlements may have lacked such carefully made arrangements, but they too tended to follow these established forms, through the medium of the *conventus*.\(^{114}\)

\(^{112}\) Salmon (1969) 25.

\(^{113}\) Gellius 16.13.9. See also Salmon (1969) 18.

\(^{114}\) The *conventus civium Romanorum* structure seems to have been widely used in Hispania as a substitute for the formal colonial systems that, as unofficial settlements, many native Italian communities lacked. There was no standard format and the *conventus* might be adapted to the needs of each community, which varied from area to area. For further discussion see chapter 7, pp. 170-171.
There was one remaining benefit which belonged only to official formal settlement - recognised political and legal status for the town and its inhabitants. This was perhaps of less importance in Hispania, than it would have been in Italy. Under normal circumstances, permanent emigration from Rome or an Italian town would not impair one's legal and political status. Roman citizens remained Roman citizens and retained their traditional privileges, as did those of the Latin right. Naturally these rights only provided protection if those in authority recognised the power of Rome to enforce them. In this sense, living in an official citizen colony was an advantage. Protection of an individual's rights was ensured and the community would also receive recognition from Rome in times of need. Latin foundations also received this official recognition from Rome, although Roman citizens joining the colony would be 'demoted' to Latin status by their participation. Such comprehensive protection was not routinely afforded to those in unofficial settlements. However the tendency to create a traditional governing body, through the medium of the *conventus*, within unofficial communities would have resulted in the observance of the rights of individuals, at least.

The advantages of an official citizen colony as compared with an unofficial one should not be seen as too great. The real advantage would have lain in the choice of a formal settlement of any description over private emigration on an individual level. Their combination of psychological and physical advantages considerably reduced the normal risks of migration and added to the desirability of the land in question.

There remains the last and ancillary element of the motivational issue: the establishment of personal relationships. This has been regarded as an important factor in veteran settlement by many scholars, but I would like to suggest that its importance has been long over-rated. Generally speaking, the relationships envisaged by modern historians as resulting from contact with *hispani* are sexual ones. It is thought that many men would acquire girlfriends or what might be termed common-law wives during their period of service. The *hybridae* who petitioned

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115 The term 'common-law wife' here is the best modern legal approximation of a situation in which a soldier took a non-citizen wife without applying for, and receiving, *conubium*. The Romans recognised that people who were not legally entitled to marry did live together as if they were married, and that this had legal consequences, but they did not have an all-embracing term for this situation. See Corbett (1930) 96.
the senate in 171 for land of their own are often cited as a tangible sign of this process. A substantial sign too, for there were no less than 4,000 adult males involved and in all probability they would have accounted for only a proportion of the total number of such individuals.

While the example of Carteia would suggest that the historians’ proposition is substantially correct, the ensuing assumption that this would automatically result in huge swathes of soldiers remaining behind at the end of their tour of duty is somewhat flawed. Soldiers on foreign campaigns, across the globe and the centuries, have behaved in a remarkably similar manner to those of Rome and the subsequent behaviour of the vast majority has failed to show any real signs of either paternal concern or connubial affection. Throughout the history of the western world, the desertion of indigenous lovers by soldiers upon receiving their discharge has been a commonplace, whether or not there were children as a result of the union. The phenomenon is recorded in almost every foreign campaign fought by western nations from the medieval Crusades to twentieth century AD Vietnam. It is unlikely that the particular case of Roman soldiers was any different. The men of Carteia may be testimony to the union of Roman soldiers and hispanae, but not to their permanent union. It is clear from Livy’s account of events that the vast majority of the men’s fathers had returned to Italy, taking no further responsibility for their offspring. Certainly none appeared openly to support their sons in the issue, although the generosity of the senate might be explained by general sympathy for the group quietly expressed in the wider community.

The permanence of such relationships is a question of considerable importance. As has already been noted, the republican army in Hispania was very different from the imperial one. The greater degree of mobility and the fact that the legions often

116 Livy 43.3.1-4.
117 Saumagne (1962) 138. See also chapter 3, p. 61. Such a number of male offspring is certainly credible, given the large numbers of troops in Hispania during the Second Punic War and shortly thereafter. Presumably most of these men will have been conceived before 190 or thereabouts.
118 A view held by a wide variety of authors. For example: Galsterer (1971) 3; Mann (1983) 1; Marin Diaz, (1988) 54-55 & 57; Presedo Velo et al. (1982) 18; Thouvenot (1940) 183-184; Wilson (1966) 25.
119 Although they must have had someone to speak on their behalf in order to obtain an audience with the senate, there is no clue to his existence in Livy’s text (43.3.1-4). Once before the senate, it would appear one of their number spoke on the group’s behalf.
spent much of the year in, comparatively speaking, hostile territory would mean that to a large extent the women with whom they were brought into contact would be camp followers: prostitutes, dancers and so forth. Since the women were there as a service to the soldiers, it is likely that they would be treated as exactly that by a high proportion of the men. This is not to deny the possibility that lasting relationships could grow from this background, but to suggest that the numbers of such relationships would be lower than those for an army in permanent encampment near a normal civilian community.

Social and juridical status might also be important considerations in the initiation of a permanent relationship. In order to contract a *iustum matrimonium* in Roman law a couple had to have the right of *conubium* with one another. Roman citizens had the right of *conubium* with one another, as well as with those of Latin status and certain *peregrini* to whom the right had been granted.\(^{120}\) Needless to say, no Spanish tribe had *conubium* with Roman citizens. Where there was no *conubium*, through normal circumstances or special grant, any children would take their mother’s status - either *peregrine* or servile.\(^ {121}\) It was possible to apply for a special grant of *conubium*, but unlikely that it would be given in the case of a *hispana*.

The fact that republican troops would have had more contact with camp followers than any other group complicates the issue further. Neither prostitution nor pimping were illegal in the Republic and there do not seem to have been any legal sanctions against marriage with Roman or Latin prostitutes.\(^ {122}\) There was considerable social contempt for the profession, however, particularly for those in the lower ranks. A prostitute would not have been seen as a respectable wife for any man of free birth, particularly not a Roman citizen.\(^ {123}\)

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120. See Gaius, *Inst. 1.56-78*, for the main legal provisions concerning *conubium*.
121. Gaius, *Inst. 1.67 & 1.76-78*. According to Gaius (*Inst. 1.79*) the lex *Minicia* ordered that in cases where a Roman or Latin woman married a *peregrine* without *conubium* then the child would still be *peregrine*, since no person of Roman or Latin status could be allowed to spring from a marriage without *conubium*. The date of the *lex Minicia* is unclear, a republican date is possible, but unproven. With regard to veteran settlement in republican Hispania this point is more or less academic. On the *lex Minicia*, see Corbett (1930) 26; Watson (1967) 27; Treggiari (1991) 45-46.
123. For example it is interesting to note the delicacy with which the tale of Hispala Faecenia, denouncer of the Bacchantes, is handled by Livy, who feels impelled to assure his audience that the woman in question was above the profession she pursued (39.9.5-6), implying by this that she is a more reliable person than a run of the mill prostitute might be. Equally when rewarding her, the senate decrees that if a free man marries her he shall not suffer in reputation by this act (39.19.5-6). There is no indication
a relationship mainly arise from the fact that the majority of prostitutes, in Rome and the provinces, were slaves. In Hispania it may be safely assumed that most were either servae or dediticiae. In either case there could be no conubium and thus no iustum matrimonium. Being a peregrine liberta or even ingenua would be little help, for as noted above, a special grant of conubium would be highly unlikely. The situation eased under the Empire, when veterans were regarded as a special case and special grants of conubium for them became standard practice.

To Roman citizens such considerations mattered a great deal. The citizenship was proudly held and tightly controlled; denying this privilege to one's children, especially a son, through an unfortunate marriage was a serious matter and a step that cannot have been taken lightly. Those of Latin status would be similarly concerned to protect their descendants from any degradation in status. For those of peregrine status the legal implications of such a step were not as serious, but they were likely to be very concerned about the social consequences. There can be little doubt that there were soldiers who formed permanent relationships with local women, but any attempt to estimate the numbers involved would stretch well beyond the sources of information currently available.

The concomitant assumption that a large proportion of those who did form such relationships would remain in Hispania is less problematic. For those who did stay behind, rather than return to Italy with their foreign partner, the choice is likely to have been conditioned by a combination of factors. The first of these would have been the Spanish partner's perfectly reasonable desire to remain in her homeland. This would have been reinforced by the economic and social advantages of staying in Hispania over returning to Italy, especially when a place in a formal settlement was available. The prospects of a mixed marriage would have been considerably better in Hispania. The inhabitants of the Italian peninsula were notably intolerant of unfamiliar peoples at all stages of their history, particularly so where former enemies

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125 Corbott (1930) 30
126 Gaius, Inst. 1.57.
were concerned.\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Hispani} in Italy throughout the Republic might expect a frosty reception unless they had influential friends.\textsuperscript{128} The lot of a foreign woman brought back to rural Italy, from which the majority of soldiers in the Roman army originated, would have been a difficult one. The resultant offspring of any such marriage, even if raised in Italy, would also be regarded with misgivings. The term \textit{hybrida} could be not only a term of definition, but also a term of abuse.\textsuperscript{129}

III Conclusion

Over the course of the second and first centuries many thousands of republican veterans took up residence in formal settlements in Hispania; none of these are thought to have failed and the vast majority were actively successful. The superficial appearance of the environment in which these communities flourished was hostile, which makes the willingness of veterans to participate a point of particular interest. The motivation of the founder in creating a given settlement is certainly an important factor in the long term future of that community, but the motivation of the settlers themselves had an equally important role. Without their ready participation the community would cease to exist. When compulsion is ruled out as a viable mode of encouraging settlement, then attention must turn to the concerns and interests of the settlers themselves. It will never be possible to examine the multiple strands of thought which comprised each individual decision to settle, but the broad motivating factors which would have influenced every participant, to a greater or lesser degree, are well within our grasp.

Within certain geographical restrictions, the Iberian peninsula was an attractive proposition for formal settlement. The harsh nature of the interior served to reinforce the desirable or, at the very least, acceptable nature of the coastal zones and the

\textsuperscript{127} Vasaly (1993) 133-139 & 191.
\textsuperscript{128} For example, L. Cornelius Balbus rose to great heights through his friendship with Caesar, see Cicero, \textit{Fam.} 6.12.2; Strabo 3.5.3; Tacitus, \textit{Ann.} 12.60; Velleius Paterculus 2.51.3. However others did not fare so well. The background of Egnatius (appendix entry E1), who was in all probability a \textit{hispaniensis}, not a \textit{hispanus}, nonetheless gave Catullus a fertile source of ammunition. See Catullus 37 & 39.
\textsuperscript{129} The term \textit{hybrida} was initially used of animals who parents were not of the same species, although they might be of the same genus. The offspring of a domesticated sow and a wild boar was the archetypal \textit{hybrida} (Pliny, \textit{Nat.} 8.213). Over time the term transferred to human use; it could have a neutral, factual connotation (B. Afr. 19.3), but often carried overtones of stupidity or low social and moral status (Horace, \textit{S.} 1.7.2; Martial 8.22.2).
south. The wintering grounds were the only areas in which the soldiery would have spent any length of time during their period of service and were probably the only places in which they had ever felt, and indeed been, secure. Equally the towns in these areas were the only ones likely to accept native Italian settlers into their community with any degree of ease. In some cases a long-term relationship with a indigenous inhabitant will have further increased the attraction of settling in these areas. Personal experience would have informed the soldiery of the superior climate and the agricultural possibilities of the coastal and riparian areas of the east and south, adding economic incentives to security. It cannot be emphasised too heavily that land ownership was the ultimate goal of all native Italians and the most socially acceptable form of wealth. For those soldiers who had land of their own in Italy, allotments of Spanish land gained through a formal settlement would have held little attraction, but for the dispossessed or those who had never owned land it was a golden opportunity. The prospect of fertile land in a stable district, under conditions in which the normal risks of emigration were considerably reduced, must have been attractive, particularly if the soldier had not yet married and so did not have a dependent family in Italy to consider.
CHAPTER SIX
CAESARIAN CIVILIAN SETTLERS

In the last years of his life Julius Caesar is reported to have arranged for the emigration of some 80,000 civilian citizens of Rome to various colonies across the Roman world.\(^1\) Amongst the recipients were both Spanish provinces. Although the exercise was a departure from past activities in terms of scale, it was very much in line with a rising trend in Roman politics, which had been discernible since the Gracchi. However, from the point of view of formal settlement in Hispania specifically, the Caesarian settlement initiative was a unique event. Up until this point the formal settlement of Hispania had involved veterans of the various Iberian wars; men who had experience of the land and people, and who were able to make an informed decision to remain. These civilians undoubtedly had much in common with the veterans, in terms of the type of settlement in which they were involved, but they lacked the personal experience which was a major factor in the veterans' case. In addition, they were faced with differing circumstances from those of their fellow civilians who embarked on informal emigration ventures. This chapter will examine the 'betwixt and between' nature of the Caesarian civilian settlers and attempt to determine the motivating factors involved in their decision to participate in the mass emigration initiative. It will also take into account the small numbers of Caesarian veterans who may have been settled in Hispania, without having served there.

I The settlers

As seems inevitable in all matters concerning Caesar's later years, there is some uncertainty and considerable dispute concerning the details of the civilian settlement. The identity of the colonies, the dates of their individual foundations, the composition of their populations and the purpose behind their creation are all areas of contention, not to say controversy. Most discussion of civilian settlement in this period focuses firmly on these issues and rarely strays beyond them. In the current

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\(^1\) Suetonius, Jul. 41.3-42.1.
context such problems are of less immediate importance, but one point must be noted: with regard to the population composition of the Caesarian colonies as a whole, attempts to separate veteran settlements from civilian settlements should be avoided. I agree with Brunt in his assertion that such a division would be entirely artificial.\(^2\) There was no reason, either in practice or in precedent, to keep the two types of settler separate. Indeed they had much in common, socially and economically. There is a case for suggesting that some colonies may have had one or the other element in the majority, but no more than this.\(^3\) It is intended to examine civilian settlers separately from veteran settlers, but not to divide veteran settlements from civilian ones.

Despite the problems of evidence, there is general agreement that the plans for civilian settlement were not set forth until Caesar had disposed of the veteran question. There were literally thousands of soldiers who required or demanded assistance in re-settlement after the Caesarian Civil Wars and the newly emerged peace would remain precarious until a solution was found. Many were settled in the provinces (including Hispania), as Caesar seems to have been keen to avoid the type of troubles which followed in the wake of Sulla’s settlements in Italy.\(^4\) This process seems to have been well under way by 45/4 and it is this period to which the initiation of civilian settlement is generally ascribed.\(^5\) Given that the process was begun so late in Caesar’s life, it is assumed that very little could have been achieved before the Ides of March 44. As a result, much of the actual settlement would have to have been carried out by the triumvirs, and later by Augustus alone, probably following a colonial law enacted by Caesar himself.\(^6\) This ‘common sense’ view is supported by the fact that only four Caesarian colonies, civilian or otherwise, can be

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\(^2\) Brunt (1971) 256. Fear (1996) 84 agrees with Brunt on this point. This is in contrast to some approaches to this question, for example those of Sutherland (1939) 127 and Vittinghoff (1952) 53.

\(^3\) For example, Urso’s full title - *colonia Genetiva Iulia Urbanorum* - suggests that civilian, urban settlers were in the majority.


\(^5\) Brunt (1971) 257-258; Vittinghoff (1952) 56.

\(^6\) On the colonial law see Cicero, *Phil.* 5.53; Suetonius, *Jul.* 81; Appian, *BC* 3.2. See also Salmon (1969) 134; Gelzer (1968) 283.
have been established before his death, though many more had been decreed. The Spanish colonies all seem to have been posthumous creations.

Although various ancient authors and epigraphic sources supply information about the cities in which the civilian colonists made their homes, information about the people themselves is extremely limited. Much of what is known, and assumed, by modern scholarship is drawn from a short and rather unsatisfactory passage of Suetonius’ biographical account. Given its importance, it is worth quoting the passage in full:

41.3 ‘Recensum populi nec more nec loco solito, sed vicatim per dominos insularum egit, atque ex viginti trecentisque milibus accipientem frumentum e publico ad centum quinquaginta retractor; ac ne qui novi coetus recensionis causa moveri quandoque possent, instituit, quot annis in demortuorum locum ex iis, qui recensi non essent, subsortito a praetore fieret. 42.1 Octoginta autem civium milibus in transmarinas colonias distribuitis, ut exhaustae quoque urbis frequentia suppeteret, sanxit, ne quis civis maior annis viginti minore quadraginta, qui sacramentum non teneretur, plus triennio continuo Italia abesset (...).’

41.3 ‘He made the enumeration of the people neither in the usual manner nor place, but from street to street aided by the owners of blocks of houses, and reduced the number of those who received grain at public expense from three hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand. And to prevent the calling of additional meetings at any future time for the purposes of enrolment, he provided that the places of such as died should be filled each year by the praetors from those who were not on the list. 42.1 Moreover to keep up the population of the city, depleted as it was by the assignment of eighty thousand citizens to colonies across the sea, he made a law that no citizen older than twenty or younger than forty, who was not detained by service in the army, should be absent from Italy for more than three successive years (…)’

Suetonius is the only source to place a number on those involved: 80,000. Perhaps because of the existence of more attractive arguments about where, and in what circumstances, those 80,000 settled, the accuracy of the number itself has not

7 These were Narbo and Arelate in Gaul, Curuba in Africa and Sinope in Asia Minor. See Brunt (1971) 258 and appendix 15.
8 Suetonius, Jul. 41.3 - 42.1. The Latin text followed is that established by Roth (1891); the translation is by Rolfe (1913).
generally been discussed. Brunt has been one of the few to do so. He believes Suetonius over-estimated civilian emigration levels and argues that 70,000 would be a more accurate figure. The basis for his argument is an estimate of the population levels of the urban poor in the mid to late first century. This estimate contains many potential problems, thus making Brunt’s revision little more certain than Suetonius’ original figure. Similar difficulties extend to the question of whether the figure of 80,000 is that of the adult males involved, or whether it refers to the total settler population, about which Suetonius provides no clue. Brunt appears to prefer the first of the two options, which is understandable given his views on the low reproductive capacity of the urban plebs of Rome, suggesting that the total would be in the region of 160,000. However, if rates of birth and marriage proved to be higher than Brunt has suggested this might raise the total figure to unreasonably high levels. This cannot be regarded as the last word on the subject, but at the current time we simply lack a satisfactory mathematical model with which to resolve the issue.

It is also currently impossible to establish what proportion of the group settled in Hispania. There is no secure list either of Caesarian colonies in general, or of the Spanish ones in particular. Various scholars have produced their own lists, but, owing to several complicating factors, their opinions vary considerably. Tradition did not decree any standard size of population at foundation for official colonies, and in any case it is likely that the colonies would have varied in size according to local conditions. Until a definitive list of all Caesarian colonies can be established the possibility of fixing a figure of the number of settlers travelling to Hispania under the Caesarian initiative will remain remote.

Assessing the types of people involved in the exercise is a marginally easier task. The word Suetonius himself uses to describe the emigrants is the fairly open term ‘cives’, which gives no clue at all to the social or economic status of those involved. It might apply equally to the richest senator or the poorest of the capite censi. Nonetheless, as the passage about civilian emigration follows hard on the

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9 Brunt (1971) 256-257.
10 Brunt (1971) 256-257. For details of Brunt’s views on the urban population of Rome, see (1971) 376ff.
11 Yavetz (1983) 144-145 gives a good summary of the difficulties.
12 Vittinghoff (1952) passim and Brunt (1971) 589-601 have made the attempt, but both catalogues are far from definitive.
heels of that concerning the corn dole, there has been a logical tendency to link the two events, especially in those works concerned with Caesar's political programme, or lack of it. As well as removing from the lists those who could well support themselves, it is argued, Caesar sent some of those who needed help overseas, to further reduce the burden on Rome. This view is particularly favoured by those scholars who see Caesar as a social architect seeking to reconstruct Roman society, but even those who question Caesar's ability to make long term socio-economic policy generally support the idea. That the 'urban poor' were the participants seems logical enough and there is no intention to dispute that here, but what has not been clearly established is what we should understand by that term. It is used with abandon by many scholars and what most seem to mean by it is the 'very poor', 'the destitute'.

This interpretation of the term by modern scholars has obvious causes. In the post-Gracchan period Roman colonisation underwent significant changes at a conceptual level. The primary focus of political thought on colonisation began to shift from its strategic purpose in securing newly conquered territory to its potential as a device for social improvement, in particular for depopulating overcrowded Rome and repopulating Italy. The change in emphasis from one factor to the other, both of which had always been, and would remain, integral to the Roman pattern of colonisation, was almost certainly precipitated by the rising problems of the Italian countryside, coupled with a steady increase in the population of the capital. The latter was especially important. With the increase in population came an increase in poverty and a decrease in living standards in the city; hard on the heels of this came a rise in crime. By the middle of the first century the problem was becoming acute.

That colonisation might provide a solution, particularly with regard to the criminal element of the problem, was recognised by writers as well as politicians. There are at least two significant depictions of 'urban cleansing', both in the works of ancient authors known for their moral concerns: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, when

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14 Salmon (1969) 121.
15 For the Italian countryside, see chapter 5, pp. 124-127.
discussing the reign of Servius Tullius, and Plutarch, in a description of Pericles' policy in fifth century Athens. They each portray the dregs of society - the destitute, criminal, and morally weak - being purged by means of colonisation. These examples have further reinforced the idea of the 'urban poor' being equivalent to an extremely low level of socio-economic status. While there are logical reasons for this view, there is also evidence to suggest that it is too narrow and severe a definition.

It is Dionysius’ treatment of the subject which is of particular interest. His remarks come in the context of a rather censorious explanation of the Roman custom of manumission and were written during the middle years of Augustus’ reign, when the colonisation plans of Caesar had only recently been completed by his successor. Dionysius’ plea for an upstanding magistrate who would eject criminal and otherwise indecent members of the freedman body from the city and dispatch them to a colony is often felt to reflect that relatively recent activity. This seems a reasonable assumption, for it is difficult to see how Dionysius, who was at Rome at the time, could not have been influenced by these events. Therefore, it is interesting to note that the focus of his concern is liberti, for it has long been noted in epigraphic evidence that this group have a unique relationship with Caesarian colonies. The wording of Urso’s founding charter seems to suggest that freedmen might become magistrates there as a matter of course. At Clupea and Curubis, both in Africa,

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17 Plutarch, Per. 11.5; Dionysius Halicarnassensis 4.24.8.
18 Plutarch described Pericles’ encouragement of transmarine settlement among poorer Athenians in a manner that clearly suggested Pericles’ chief purpose was to rid the city of unwanted inhabitants. Although the archaic and classical Greek poleis certainly did use colonisation and cleruchies to reduce population pressure, Plutarch’s portrayal of events still reflect Roman attitudes in these matters. The passage from Dionysius is dealt with in more detail below.
19 Dionysius states in his preface (1.7.2.) that he spent twenty-two years in Rome between the end of the Civil War of Octavian and Antony and the publication of the preface itself. Dependent on whether he regarded the close of the war as occurring with the battle of Actium, the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra, or Octavian’s triumph, the preface may then be dated to either 8, 7 or 6. Most modern authors seem to incline towards 7 and suggest that the majority of the work was published at that time. See Rhys Roberts (1900) 439 & 442; Cary (1960) vii; Gabba (1991) 2-4.
20 Dionysius Halicarnassensis 4.24.8.
21 Carteia does not belong in the group of colonies which are discussed below, despite the fact that Livy reports ‘Latinarum eam coloniam esse libertinorumque appellari’. The participants were legally classified as libertini, but their circumstances, as the offspring of Roman soldiers and native women, were entirely different from the freedmen involved in Caesarian colonies. Carteia is an anomaly in a great many senses and should be seen as no less so in this context. See chapter 3, p. 60.
22 The town’s founding charter (the Lex coloniae Genetivae Iuliae) has been preserved, listing the regulations controlling the role and conduct of decurions, amongst other things. The provisions of
freedmen are attested as having become *duoviri*, the highest magisterial post a colony could usually offer. This is highly irregular. It is known that republican colonies before Caesar normally followed Rome's lead in refusing magisterial posts to those of servile background and the imposition of legal restrictions under Tiberius hindered further elections of freedmen to positions of authority. Thus it is only the colonial and municipal foundations of Caesar and Augustus that are associated with freedmen magistrates.

Socially, a republican *libertus* was automatically inferior to any *ingenuus*, even though their financial position was often superior to their social one. Although freedmen in possession of enormous personal wealth are more of an imperial phenomenon than a republican one, that does not mean that all republican freedmen lived in penury. Most had been trained in some manner during their years of service and set themselves up in business following their manumission. Many received assistance from their patrons in this matter. They worked at their craft or engaged in trade with varying success, but generally speaking they were capable of supporting themselves financially. Freedmen might be expected to be found distributed across a wide economic range of late republican society, working both

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chapter 105 suggest that freedmen may have been permitted to become decurions. As Crawford points out, the wording is ambiguous and may equally be interpreted as a blanket ban on their admission, but given the evidence of practice elsewhere this seems unlikely. See Crawford (1996) vol. 1, 446.

23 Clupea: M. Caelius M.I. Phileros served as *duovir* twice during the triumviral period, see *CIL* 10 6104. Curubis: L. Pomponius L.I. Malcio carried out extensive building work as *duovir quinquennalis*, in the same period as Phileros, see *CIL* 8 977.

24 The exclusion of *liberti* from office during the Republic was based on *mos*, rather than law, and did not extend to their sons. Positions were open to the sons of freedmen at various times in Rome's history, from the fourth century onwards. See Livy 9.29.7-9 & 9.46.10-11; Suetonius, *Cl.* 24. For a general view of the situation before Caesar, see Treggiari (1969) 52-64. The law that severely restricted the electoral opportunities of freedmen was the *lex Visellia*, enacted in 24 AD, see Ulpian, *Dig.* 3.5; Rotondi (1962) 464-465. It is thought to have been intended to apply to all parts of the empire and there are few, if any, freedmen magistrates to be found anywhere in the empire after the inception of the law.

25 These colonies almost certainly owe their ability to admit *liberti* to magistracies, in contravention of existing practices, to Caesar and his relatively liberal attitudes towards freedmen. Caesar's behaviour in this regard was distinctive and different from standard Roman attitudes of his own day. He was more inclined than his contemporaries to allow an able man to rise, regardless of his background (see Dio 42.51 & 43.51.2-7). Likewise, in the chaos of the years following his death many freedmen, and slaves on occasion, rose much higher than would ever have been possible previously. See Treggiari (1969) 61-62. The more organised times of Augustus' later reign and that of Tiberius saw far fewer stratospheric rises, as the attitudes of those in power returned to a more conservative level.

26 Treggiari (1969) 37 & 55. Social conditions for freedmen in the late Republic were probably better than they had ever been. See also Duff (1928) 36 & 50.

alongside or in competition with freeborn individuals.\textsuperscript{28} In this respect freedmen may be considered a constituent part of the lower economic classes generally.

That liberti were being elected to magisterial posts in some colonies suggests, given their fairly low social status, that freedmen formed a prominent subgroup in these communities. No freeborn population would be likely to elect a lone libertus, but if such a candidate had the support of fellow liberti, who formed a sizeable proportion of the community, living and working among ingenui, their chances of being accepted by the majority of the community would be far greater.\textsuperscript{29} If liberti were being admitted to the colonies in such numbers, then this may suggest that freeborn men from a relatively wide range of the lower economic classes were also being considered as candidates for emigration.

Despite the physical proximity of the corn dole issue to the passage on civilian emigration, the very fact that Suetonius does not use either `plebs' or `proletarii' to describe the emigrants suggests that he has a slightly wider catchment area in mind than either of these terms would indicate. The Caesarian colonies were, after all, created according to the same pattern that had been followed for several hundred years. Each adult male settler was given a plot of land on which to raise food for his family. These plots were the economic basis of the community, at least in its first years. Assistance was available to the new settlers in the first year or so of occupation, but in the long term it was up to the community to ensure its own survival.\textsuperscript{30} Some settlers might attempt farming and fail, others might sell or lease their plot to another, but if the majority did not farm theirs and make a success of it, then the colony was doomed to economic failure. Although guided by the written constitution given to them at their inception, Roman colonies were self-governing, their magistrates and politicians drawn from the settlers' ranks. If the new settlement could not provide leadership from within its own ranks, it would fail as a community.

Despite the looming pitfalls, the Caesarian colonies were not failures. Some, like Lugdunum and Narbo, blossomed into successful and important economic and

\textsuperscript{28} Duff (1928) 89-94; Treggiari (1969) 89-105.
\textsuperscript{29} Duff (1928) 69 has argued that the sheer numbers of freedmen at Rome in the early years of the Empire encouraged acceptance of such people among the lower classes of the freeborn community. Ingenui commonly mixed with freedmen, since there were no `liberti quarters', and so developed relationships with them. A similar process may well have been at work in the provinces.
\textsuperscript{30} Salmon (1969) 25.
political centres, others merely settled down as moderately prosperous provincial towns. The evidence, therefore, points to a wider range of individuals than might be furnished normally by the very poorest grades of the Roman plebs. Given the epigraphic evidence and Dionysius' comments, even a cautious approach suggests that there were appreciable numbers of *liberti* involved in civilian settlement of this period and these were probably matched by *ingenui* from a similar range of economic levels. Craftsmen, artisans and small traders of all varieties, free and freed, should be considered in this context.

II Motivational factors

The motivating factors behind the migration of these people are difficult to determine. The ancient sources do not trouble themselves with this issue and the situation is complicated further by a general tendency to ignore the question among modern scholars. Amongst the few comments on the question, only one requires attention here. This is Yavetz's suggestion that colonisation efforts involving the inhabitants of Rome would have been doomed to failure, due to a lack of enthusiasm amongst the potential settlers.31 In actual fact, hard evidence for an anti-settlement stance amongst the urban poor is difficult to find. Yavetz points out that the vast majority of settlement in the late Republic involves veterans, not civilians, and cites the failure of the tribune Rullus to pass his agrarian bill as a sign of civilian unwillingness, but his suggestion is frankly unconvincing.32

The main source of information about Rullus' bill consists of the three speeches made by Cicero in opposition to it - one before the Senate and the remaining two before the people. If Yavetz is right, then it would be expected that Cicero would play on the Romans' disinclination to settle outside Rome in both public speeches. In fact, barely three chapters of the lengthy *de Lege Agraria II* are devoted to this subject and the topic is not mentioned at all in *de Lege Agraria III*.33 Instead Cicero concentrates on what he clearly feels are the more persuasive arguments: the vagueness of the legal phraseology, the personal power Rullus will

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31 Yavetz (1983) 137.
32 Yavetz (1983) 137.
33 Cicero, *Agr.* 2.25.66-67, 2.27.71 & 2.28.76. The speech has 37 chapters in total.
acquire through the bill and the detrimental impact it will have on the power and influence of the people of Rome. In short, the de Lege Agraria speeches do not make a compelling case for an animus amongst the Roman poor towards colonisation.

The absence of a predisposition against migration is one thing, active willingness to emigrate is quite another. The people of Rome had acquired a fearsome reputation during the first century for violent demonstrations of their displeasure. It seems most unlikely that Caesar, or his successors, could have quietly dispatched thousands of citizens to overseas colonies if they had not been willing to co-operate in the exercise. There is no record anywhere in the sources of protests against the colonies and this suggests that, in the main, those destined to go regarded the move as a positive one.

Looking back to the previous chapter, it can be seen that, in terms of socio-economic background, these civilian settlers had much in common with the veterans. They were essentially drawn from much the same areas of society, although the army also encompassed large numbers of men from rural areas and various Italian cities. Indeed the civilian community would have contained a reasonable number of former soldiers who had served in Hispania. Therefore caution is necessary in differentiating between the two groups when looking for motivation in settlement.

Many interests and concerns will have been held in common. The factors that made departure from Rome a positive option were much the same as those which dissuaded veterans from returning to Italy: the respectability and prestige of land ownership combined with the nebulous difficulties dogging Italian smallholdings in the late Republic. The appalling living conditions in some parts of Rome may well have helped civilian settlers make up their minds too.

34 Although less compelling, because the judgement was made nearly a century after the event, Pliny the Elder’s encomium on Cicero (Nat. 7.30.117) is also noteworthy. He comments that the consul was able to persuade the Roman people to reject Rullus’ bill directly against their own interests: ‘te dicente legem agrariam, hoc est alimenta sua, abdicarunt tribus’. His remarks come in the context of high flown praise for Cicero’s oratorical eloquence, suggesting that the people may have been well aware of the advantages offered by such a project, yet were convinced by Cicero that they must vote against it.

35 See chapter 5, pp. 117-118 for details.

36 See chapter 5, pp. 124-127 for details. Rome at this period will have been home to a number of dispossessed peasants, but the proportion of the population they represented is indeterminable.

What persuaded the civilian settlers to regard emigration to Hispania in particular as a positive option is where the veteran and civilian paths begin to diverge. The intention is to focus on this main variance between the two groups: the difference in their perception of Hispania as a place to which to migrate. It should be understood at this point that the motivational criteria of the civilian settlers would also be applicable to a small quantity of veteran settlers in Caesarian colonies. The armies of this period roved widely and not all the soldiers demanding land will have been offered a plot in an area in which they had served. Consequently, while most military settlers would have had practical, recent experience of the country, some were in a position more akin to the civilian settlers.

The civilian community was likely to have been less well informed than the veterans of the Spanish wars. Although some of their number would have visited Hispania, the proportion would not have been overwhelming, and many would not have been there for a number of years. The perception of Hispania formed by civilian community at large would be based on what they had heard about it from a variety of sources, which would vary in accuracy and age. There are certain difficulties in trying to determine what images Hispania conjured up in the minds of the civilian emigrants, the majority of whom would have had no experience of the Iberian peninsula. We do have some ancient authors who give descriptions of the land and its people during, or shortly after, the period under discussion, but on the whole these are not very helpful. They are, essentially, literary accounts, meant to inform and entertain a cultured audience and often suffering from artificial structuring. They are not faithful recording instruments of popular opinion, but the result of research and inquiry. Public opinion needs to be sought out by less direct

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38 Geographical or ethnographical writers usually wrote with the specific intent to educate their readers in matters of which they expected them to be largely ignorant. A prime example is Strabo’s approach to the indigenous peoples of Hispania. His descriptions of the urbane and cultured people in the south, where Roman contact had been long established, are in marked contrast to the picture he paints of the rough savages of the north-west, which had only recently been conquered. Between these two extremes come the inhabitants of central and north-eastern Hispania whose position between savagery and civilisation seems to be determined by their geographical location. For a detailed discussion of his approach see Abascal and Espinosa (1989) 11-14. For Strabo’s educational concerns, see Gabba (1991) 49-50.
methods. It is often more fruitful to examine the factors which would have shaped popular views, than to look for a record of the final result.

The people of Rome formulated their ideas about Hispania from a multitude of different sources: public debate on military affairs, triumphal processions, senatorial recruitment drives, the gossip of returning soldiers and traders, and even the failure to return of friends and relatives; all had their part to play. By the very nature of such circumstances the picture they received was likely to be exaggerated in one way or another. No one would bring home tales of familiar situations or ordinary people, and indeed there were plenty of differences between Spanish and Roman lifestyles and surroundings. Public opinion changes, almost by the hour at times, but it is also cumulative. Ideas may be revised, but previous views are never forgotten completely. This is particularly true of ideas about countries and peoples, opinions about which tend to be passed from one generation to the next, altering relatively slowly in the process. Therefore it is necessary to give consideration to all prior phases of Roman contact with Hispania, from the jubilant and prosperous years of the Second Punic War through the disasters of the second century to the inclusion of the peninsula in the internecine squabbles of the first century.

The first Roman contacts with Hispania were perhaps the most encouraging. Hispania had a general reputation in the Graeco-Roman world as being the source of fantastic mineral wealth and the initial impact of the conquest would have brought this home to those in Rome. Although the Spanish theatre of the Second Punic War could hardly be described as an easy posting, the various Roman successes in Hispania were achieved during a period when Rome badly needed a distraction from the drawn-out occupation of Italy by Hannibal and brought material gains that were probably far in excess of initial expectation. Before the final defeat of the Carthaginians came the capture of Carthago Nova, a rich prize in terms of bullion, arms and equipment. Following the triumph at Ilipa, Scipio Africanus returned home and dazzled the people of Rome with the spoils of his campaigns. The end of

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39 Phylarchus ap. Athenaeum 44B; Polybius 3.57.3; Diodorus Siculus 5.36-37.
40 Livy 26.47; Appian, ib. 23.
41 He entered the city accompanied by 14,342 Roman pounds of silver bullion and a large quantity of silver coins, according to Livy (28.38.5-6). Scipio was particularly careful to publicise the glory of his victories and the immense wealth gained from them, because, as a private citizen, he was ineligible for a triumph (Livy 28.38.4-5). He feared relegation to private life by a suspicious senate and popularity...
the war in Hispania would also have brought the rich argentiferous lead mines of the surrounding area back into full production, with the resulting bullion now pouring into Roman coffers. The end of the Second Punic War did not put a stop to Roman campaigns in Hispania; these continued against the local inhabitants, initially with similar success. The majority of the thirty-six triumphs celebrated at Rome between 200 and 170 had been won in Hispania; an impressive feat given the high-profile campaigns being fought in the East during this period.

Change to this relatively positive picture of Hispania came in the mid-second century. Triumphs arising from Spanish campaigns began to decline in number. This was partly due to general reduction in triumphs, backed by the senate, but also to a change in the types of enemy the Romans faced. Spanish campaigns were becoming increasingly difficult. In the middle years of the century there were several confrontational incidents at Rome, the direct cause of which were senatorial attempts to recruit men to serve in the Spanish wars. The first came in 151, when the senate, eager to prosecute the Celtiberian War under the new commander L. Licinius Lucullus, started an enthusiastic and extensive recruitment drive. This move was taken against the explicit advice of the current commander M. Claudius Marcellus, who had made an unofficial truce with the tribes involved. Moreover, according to Polybius, the commander who had preceded Marcellus, Q. Fulvius Nobilior, had spread word of the Celtiberians’ valour and of the heavy Roman losses suffered during his tenure. The result was a virtual riot. The problem was eventually solved

with the people of Rome was an obvious defence against this. On this topic see Earl (1967) 28-29; Scullard (1970) 108. Livy also informs us (28.45.12) that the following year M. Pomponius Matho and Q. Catius were sent on a embassy to Delphi, taking a golden wreath weighing 200 Roman pounds and silver representations of the spoils (simulacra spoliorum) weighing 1000 Roman pounds. These were a gift from the treasure won from Hasdrubal.

Polybius 10.10; Strabo 3.2.9; Diodorus Siculus 5.36. It is possible that the other mining centre under Roman control during the Republic, which was located in the Sierra Morena, was not in use until the late second century, see Domerge (1990) 184-185.

Richardson (1975) 54-57. It should be noted, however, that even at this early stage, the profits of war were not what they had been. None of the early second century generals could match Africanus in their triumphal displays. A comparison of the respective triumphs of L. Cornelius Lentulus in 200 (Livy 31.20.6-7), M. Fulvius Nobilior in 191 (Livy 36.21.10-11) and Ap. Claudius Cento in 174 (Livy 41.28.6-7) show a distinct decline in booty displayed over the first thirty years of the century.

For the decrease in triumphs see Richardson (1975) 58-62.

Polybius 35.3.

Appian, Ib. 49; Polybius 35.2.1.

Polybius 35.4.1-2.
by Scipio Aemilianus, who announced his willingness to go to Hispania and thus seems to have shamed others into following his example.\textsuperscript{48}

In 138 Livy reports serious disciplinary incidents involving the army in Hispania. Several men were found guilty of desertion; they were flogged and sold into slavery as punishment.\textsuperscript{49} At least one of these trials was held at Rome, before the Tribunes of the Plebs.\textsuperscript{50} In the same year, the consuls D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus and P. Cornelius Nasica Serapio were briefly imprisoned by the tribunes over a dispute arising from a levy.\textsuperscript{51} The tribunes wanted the right to exempt ten men each from the levy, which was apparently being conducted prior to Brutus' departure for Ulterior, his designated province. The extraordinary conflict between consul and tribunes clearly shows the pitch popular feelings about the Spanish campaigns had reached. The tribunes risked a great deal, but must have felt that there was great political capital, if nothing else, to be made in taking such action.\textsuperscript{52}

In between these two events came a further two which, while not explicitly connected to the situation in Hispania by ancient authors, have been linked to it in a convincing manner by Shochat. In 145 Fabius Maximus Aemilianus led a tyro army against the troops of Viriathus, in order to spare veterans just released from the Third Macedonian War any further service.\textsuperscript{53} Shochat's argument that this is another example of troops being unwilling to serve in Hispania seems reasonable.\textsuperscript{54} Aemilianus was an experienced commander and the war against Viriathus had reached a particularly desperate phase; it seems unlikely that he would have accepted such an army if any other option had presented itself.\textsuperscript{55} As it was he was forced to spend his first year in Hispania training the army.\textsuperscript{56} Five years later, Appius Claudiu

\textsuperscript{48} Appian, \textit{Ib.} 49; Polybius 35.4.3-14; Livy, \textit{Ep.} 48.
\textsuperscript{49} Livy, \textit{Ep.} 55.
\textsuperscript{50} Livy, \textit{Ep.} 55, the soldier involved is the only one named by Livy: C. Matienus.
\textsuperscript{51} Livy, \textit{Ep.} 55; \textit{Oxy. Per.} 55; Cicero, \textit{Leg.} 3.20. Livy names the tribunes as C. Curarius and Sex. Licinius. Cicero mentions only Curarius. He is also known also to have agitated for relief for the people from high grain prices (Valerius Maximus, 3.7.3) and may have been the ring-leader in the affair.
\textsuperscript{52} The tone of Cicero's (\textit{Leg.} 3.20) comments suggest that Curarius was not thought to have acted out of moral conviction, but out of a desire for personal gain.
\textsuperscript{53} Appian, \textit{Ib.} 65.
\textsuperscript{54} Shochat (1980) 57-58.
\textsuperscript{55} Appian, \textit{Ib.} 61-64. Viriathus had badly beaten both previous commanders sent against him, C. Vetilius and C. Plautius. Neither had achieved a single victory over him and Vetilius had actually been killed in the attempt.
\textsuperscript{56} Velleius Paterculus 2.5.3.
Pulcher initiated a law which prevented more than one *dilectus* occurring in a single year.\textsuperscript{57} Again the sources provide little indication of why this law was felt to be needed, but it was enacted against a background of the worsening situation in Hispania.\textsuperscript{58} It was the first time the senate had ever made a long term policy decision on recruitment and the fact that they did so now, in the midst of a military crisis, suggests that popular feeling on the subject was running so high that even the normally aloof senate felt the need to acknowledge it.\textsuperscript{59}

It is not difficult to understand why attitudes toward Hispania were changing. The Second Punic War and the campaigns immediately following it were hard fought but profitable. However, as the second century progressed, the conditions grew appreciably worse while the spoils steadily declined.\textsuperscript{60} The Romans were now pitched against the Celtiberians and Lusitani, successful military cultures endowed with skill, determination, perseverance and few material possessions.\textsuperscript{61} For the Romans it proved a particularly nasty combination. The campaigns were costly in men and equipment and the returns were almost non-existent.

Fortunately, the difficulties of the second century did not last. After the fall of Numantia in 133 the worst crises were over and, a few disturbances notwithstanding, life in the Spanish provinces settled down to a considerable degree.\textsuperscript{62} The two provinces were both more stable than they had ever been before. Frontier incursions were now rare, as was internal dissidence, export trade was increasing and the extremely rich Sierra Morena mining district was firmly under Roman control.\textsuperscript{63} Unfortunately, the increasing numbers of native Italians living in Hispania and the peculiar nature of the civil conflicts, which drew on the provincial resources of commanders, seems to have led to the inclusion of the peninsula in Italy’s internal affairs during the first century.

\textsuperscript{57} Livy, Ep. 54.
\textsuperscript{58} Appian, *ib.* 70 & 78-79. The year 140 was not a particularly auspicious year for the Roman army in Hispania. Q. Servilius Caepio was given permission to break the treaty with Viriathus, but failed to attack him successfully. In Citerior, Q. Pompeius Aulus suffered a series of bloody defeats at the hands of the Numantines.
\textsuperscript{60} For a summary of the events of the second century, see Richardson (1986) 126-127.
\textsuperscript{61} For an ancient view of these two tribes see Strabo 3.4.13 (Celtiberians) & 3.3.6-8 (Lusitani).
\textsuperscript{62} Richardson (1996a) 93-95.
The process began with Sertorius’ rebellion and was continued by the Caesarian Civil Wars. In both cases the conflict was protracted and destructive, the normal pattern in Hispania, but this time the enemy was native Italian. Hispania was now effectively functioning as an extension of Italy.64 The conflicts ensured that a large number of men had the opportunity to serve in Hispania during these years, in particular during the Caesarian Civil Wars when troop numbers rose to previously unimagined heights.65 Some of these may have been settled in Hispania as veterans, but others would have returned home by 45/4 to broadcast stories of the country they had encountered. The campaigns aside, their view may well have been positive. By this stage there were several veteran communities flourishing in the coastal and southern regions along with indigenous urban communities, Latin as an everyday language appears to have been spreading and, most importantly, the hispani were no longer the enemy.66

What the changes of the first century meant in terms of public opinion is difficult to determine. It is ironic that in a period when so much is known of Hispania in military and political terms, so little can be determined of the Roman populace’s attitudes to it. The records of the mob’s opinions in this period that do exist focus mostly on political individuals. Taking the various layers of past and contemporary opinion together, however, it is possible to make some suggestions. The Caesarian campaigns and, to a lesser extent, the Sertorian rebellion were conflicts between native Italians over Roman issues, Hispania now merely provided the backdrop. This change would affect public perception at Rome and in the armies. It would have discouraged a view of Hispania as the grinding, desolate home of terrible military struggles, putting forward the idea that it was simply one of several places where Caesarian and Pompeian forces chose to confront one another. For the soldiers particularly, it would allow appreciation of the admirable, and even the satisfactory, qualities of Hispania, reducing the inclination to blanket condemnation. It might also bring back earlier memories of the late third and early second centuries,

64 Thus Appian’s comments: Ib. 101.
65 See chapter 5, p. 112
66 Strabo 3.2.15. Although Strabo may have exaggerated the level of everyday Latin use in southern Hispania, there is no reason to doubt the general trend. Cicero’s account of native poets flattering Q. Cæcilius Metellus Pius in thickly accented Latin at Corduba in the 70s (Arch. 26) lends further credence to Strabo’s comments. See also García y Bellido (1967) passim; Stylow (1998) 111.
when it had represented the land of plenty. It is unlikely that Romans forgot Hispania’s notoriety entirely, but the events of the first century will have done something to soften that reputation.

In particular, it will have caused a revision of one aspect of public opinion, that all Hispania’s inhabitants were warlike and savage. Perhaps because of the serious threat they had once posed, old memories of savage hispani seem to have crystallised in the form of the stereotypical Celtiberian, who was hairy, tough, uncouth and smelly. Even this stereotypical image does not seem to have been viewed as an active threat, alive and well in the Spanish hinterland, so much as type of individual now invading Rome: the Spanish provincial would-be politician or socialite. The very term Celtiberian had once caused terror at Rome, now it had become an insult to be slung gratuitously at anyone of Spanish background, whether they were an indigenous hispanus or a native Italian emigrant. The truly belligerent parties there now were native Italian. Hispania will have remained a distant and foreign place to most, but one that was no longer actively frightening and dangerous. Perhaps most importantly, its involvement in the internecine turmoil had placed it inside the borders of the civilised world.

It is reasonable to argue that this new first century view of Hispania was a necessary precursor to emigration on the vast scale of the Caesarian initiative. Although the exact number of settlers dispatched to the Iberian peninsula remains uncertain, the figure will have been in the thousands. Such a large number of the urban poor could only have been enticed into migration if public opinion of Hispania had improved since the second century. However, a more positive image of Hispania would only encourage prospective settlers to a certain degree, it certainly would not guarantee active participation in migration. The decision to travel hundreds of miles across the sea to a strange and foreign land, away from friends and one’s extended family, abandoning one’s established livelihood, to settle in a small town and start from scratch in all aspects of one’s life, in the knowledge that the passage home was

68 The main form in which this stereotypical Celtiberian is recorded is invective, poetical or oratorical. See Catullus on Egnatius (37 & 39) and Cicero on Decidius Saxa (Phil. 11.12); appendix entries E1 and D1 respectively.
69 Syme (1979) 37-38.
70 See pp. 142-143 above.
difficult, expensive and would be out of reach for some time, would not be lightly made. Prospective settlers needed more encouragement than Hispania's new, moderate reputation. It is here that the other determining factors discussed with reference to the veterans came into play. The combination of a wish to escape the harsh conditions of life in the less prosperous parts of Rome and the turmoil in the aftermath of the Civil Wars, the desire for land and the comparative security offered by a formal, official settlement would be the real impetus behind decisions to settle.

The Caesarian civilian settlers were in a unique position in the history of native Italian migration to the Iberian peninsula. The manner and sheer scale of the exercise was hitherto unparalleled in Roman history and was not destined to be repeated. Moreover the factors involved in their decision to emigrate were an unusual mixture in comparison with other examples of civilian settlement. The prospect of emigration was surely far less daunting for them. In common with civilian migrants settling by informal methods, many would have been dependent on general public opinion, hearsay and gossip for information about their destination; unlike such people they had the security of a formal official settlement awaiting them. In this sense their position had more in common with many veteran settlers. Changes in public opinion during the first century, which would have modified some of the more hostile attitudes towards Hispania, could only do so much to encourage migration. This situation merely prepared the ground for a decision, the decisive factors would prove to be the possibilities offered by formal settlement in Hispania. This particular variety of civilian emigrant is therefore best treated in a similar manner to veteran settlers involved in formal settlement, official or unofficial, with whom they simply have more in common. They are an active demonstration of the reasons why it is necessary to divide emigrants by the type of settlement in which they participated, rather than their status and role in Roman society before their emigration.

71 See chapter 5, section II.
PART II: INFORMAL SETTLEMENT
The term ‘informal settlement’ is defined as settlement which occurred without any organisation by, or input from, the Roman state or its representatives at any level. In essence, informal settlement was a process directed by individual emigrants, each determining the means and form of their translocation; there was no formal constitution of a new community or socio-political structure involved. The basic units of this type of emigration were individual independent settlers, with or without family, who travelled to Hispania and, once there, acquired a place to live, all on their own initiative. This stands in stark contrast to formal settlement, where the basic unit was an entire fledgling community. The sporadic nature of informal settlement, the inevitable result of the independent decisions of many different individuals, creates difficulties for anyone wishing to study it. A tried and tested formula exists for the examination of a formal settlement, the creation of which, by definition, is a single concrete event, likely to leave some traces of its occurrence behind in the literary, epigraphic or archaeological sources. The informal settlement of Hispania was an entirely different phenomenon. It occurred gradually over long periods of time; there are no ‘defining moments’ likely to attract the interest of an author or be referred to in public inscriptions. Evidence of informal settlement tends to be both less overt and more diffuse, presenting serious methodological problems in consequence.

A comprehensive survey of informal settlement prior to the death of Augustus has yet to be conducted. A quick glance at the evidence for it soon reveals the reason why. The closest the ancient sources ever come to directly recording the general phenomenon of informal settlement appears in a passage from the works of Diodorus Siculus. Referring to the mineral resources of Hispania, he observed that in past years many Italians travelled there full of goldrush fever, eager to make their fortune. The implication seems to be that these people were engaged in independent

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1 For a definition of formal settlement see chapter 3, p. 40.
2 Diodorus Siculus 5.36.3-4.
activity and that, for a while, they were resident in Hispania as a result. In short Diodorus' comments suggest much and prove very little. This highly unsatisfactory passage is typical of the evidence for informal settlement as a whole - deductions and assumptions far outweigh solid evidence. Not only has the manner in which it was conducted resulted in little record of the settlers' activities, but there is some uncertainty concerning what actually constitutes that record.

In the absence of an easily comprehensible body of evidence, interest in informal settlement has wavered. Studies of the settlement process in Hispania have sometimes ignored the informal element, but in the main the solution has been to comment briefly and pass on to greener pastures. This is an option with which I can sympathise, but it creates problems of its own. The wider concerns of each scholar often produce preconceptions which then mould the view of informal settlement presented by that author. To take a pair of examples: an author who believes that Hispania had been little affected by Roman culture before the Caesarian period will play down informal settlement;\(^3\) whereas an author who believes in the progressive romanisation of the south and east of Hispania in the same period will emphasise it.\(^4\) Neither solution is necessarily accurate, but both can appear plausible because of the absence of a sizeable and well-defined collection of material concerning the subject. Informal settlement presents the modern scholar with many difficulties, not the least of which is its elusive character. The methodological problems presented by this topic are real and unavoidable; they cannot be ignored, nor should they be. The purpose of this chapter is to explore these difficulties, rather than neglect them, and to attempt to present what evidence does exist.

### I Methodology

Since the basic unit of informal settlement is the individual settler, it is appropriate to begin with what little is known about specific individuals. Both literary and epigraphic sources do record the presence of various native Italians in Hispania during the republican period, in contexts which suggest they may have been at least long-term residents. Still more are known from the early Augustan era. The

\(^3\) Fear (1996) chapter 3.

\(^4\) Blázquez (1989) 20 & 47-54.
total number of such cases is small; so small, in fact, that it has proved a viable proposition to create a catalogue of such material and this appears as an appendix at the end of this work. Not all recorded individuals can be linked to a specific community, but most can be associated with a geographical ‘sphere of activity’. Nineteen locations are linked in this way to some forty-four native Italians. True, many of these individuals are connected with communities known to exist solely as the result of formal settlement - most commonly Tarraco (Tarragona), Barcino (Barcelona), Corduba (Córdoba) and Italica (Santiponce, prov. Sevilla) (map 12). Nonetheless, there are some individuals who are associated with towns or areas for which there is no record of contemporaneous externally organised settlement: Gades (Cádiz), Hasta (Mesa de Asta, prov. Cádiz), Ilipa (Alcalá del Río, prov. Sevilla), Berrocal (prov. Huelva), Almonaster la Real (prov. Huelva), Emporiae (L’Escala, prov. Gerona), Dianium (Denia, prov. Alicante), the Sucro river (Júcar river), Cerro de los Santos (prov. Albacete), Mértola (prov. Baixo Alentejo), and Caséval (prov. Baixo Alentejo) (map 7).

The people associated with these locations are all the more interesting because the places in question are not only unconnected with known formal settlement activity, but they are also generally credible choices for independent settlement. The first five - Gades, Hasta, Ilipa, Berrocal and Almonaster la Real - all lie in modern Andalucia between the southern edge of the Sierra Morena and the coast. A generally prosperous area boasting a reasonable concentration of urban settlement, this region was also heavily settled by formal means in the Caesarian period. The Sucro, Cerro de los Santos, Emporiae and Dianium all lie at various points in, or at the edge of, the fertile zone which skirts the eastern coast. Again this was a well-populated area, although it did not possess the same kind of urban culture known in the south. Cerro de los Santos was an isolated sanctuary site, and is not a plausible...
location for settlement, but the discovery there of an epigraphic text bearing a Roman name does demonstrate the settled presence of native Italians in the region generally. The two examples from the extreme south-west of the peninsula, Mértola and Caséval, represent a more unusual choice since both sites are located in areas which are thought to have remained turbulent until the very end of the Republic.\(^\text{10}\) It seems reasonable to regard the people connected with these various sites as informal settlers.

On the basis of research carried out by Conway and the various authors contributing to Pauly-Wissowa it is possible to trace the probable origins of most gens names which appear in the Spanish epigraphic and literary record.\(^\text{11}\) An onomastic study of the group of supposed informal settlers produces some interesting observations. There are double the number of individuals with names of Roman origin in this group in comparison with those bearing Italian names.\(^\text{12}\) This fact can only be put in context through an examination of the catalogue of individuals as a whole, not all of whom can be connected with informal settlement. Overall, the numbers of Romans and Italians are more or less balanced, but a brief examination shows that members of each of the two groups tend to cluster in the source material. Bearers of Italian gens names are recorded chiefly in epigraphic evidence, particularly in the mould markings of lead ingots.\(^\text{13}\) By contrast Roman gens names are more usually recorded on tombstones and in literary accounts. As the names of individuals who can be connected with specific towns are most usually drawn from these latter two sources, it is easy to see how the skewed picture has been produced. In all probability, were it possible to collect a statistically random sample of names connected with sites, it would be found that numbers of informal settlers would be more evenly distributed.

Not only does onomastic investigation produce disappointing results, but the material assembled concerning this group as individuals is hardly a prosopographical

\(^{10}\) See the discussion of these areas in chapter 4, pp. 101.

\(^{11}\) Conway (1897). See individual appendix entries for RE contributions.

\(^{12}\) Gens names of clear Roman origin: A3, A6, B1, D3, F4, I3, L2, T3, P1, V2. Gens names of clear Italian origin, or cognomina suggesting an Italian origin: A4, B3, C7, I1, S3.

\(^{13}\) Sixteen individuals are known from mould marks, all except four bear Italian names: A7, A8, A9, C3, G1, M5, N1, P2, P3, R1, S2, U1. L6 and S6 both belong to Roman gens and the origins of F3 and L1 are not clear.
treasure-trove either. In the majority of cases the source of information is a tombstone, which supplies nothing more than a name and the standard funerary formula. Fleshing out these bare bones has generally proved impossible; there simply are no alternative sources of information concerning these individuals. In addition, the epitaphs are only datable on stylistic grounds. The broad designation of ‘late Republic’ that results from this process makes it impossible to gain from them even vague ideas about the geographical diffusion of informal settlement over time. Other types of material are not necessarily any more helpful. The case of L. Licinius, whose name was found inscribed across the throat of a headless togate statue at Cerro de los Santos, may be more exotic than most, but is scarcely any more informative.14

The sole literary reference is less reticent. Although A. Baebius, C. Flavius and A. Trebellius, three native Italian inhabitants of pre-colonial Hasta, make only the briefest of appearances as defectors to Caesar’s army, they are helpfully labelled as *equites romani*.15 It is not clear whether these men were themselves emigrants, or the descendants of emigrants. It would be most interesting if they proved to be the former, since this would show that men of some wealth and standing were involved in emigration and that they did not necessarily feel themselves restricted to participation in formal settlement. The alternative possibility is equally intriguing. Were the men to be *hispanienses*, the public acknowledgement of their status as *equites* would suggest ongoing contact with Roman society. As a whole, however, the body of information concerning individuals is more tantalising than actually helpful. Although prosopographical research can supply the names of some independent settlers, there is insufficient data to create substantial profiles of these people either as individuals or as members of a wider community.

There are three brief but important points to be made as a result of this study. The first is that it is now possible to say that, while the records of individual native Italians are of limited practical use, as a group they do testify to the existence of settlement outside a formal context. Informal settlement is not the construct of a combined academic imagination. The second conclusion is more guarded, for the catalogue of individual settlers cannot be used as the basis for statistical analysis.

14 See appendix entry L2.

15 *B. Hisp.* 26; appendix entries B1, F4, T3.
The numbers involved are simply not large enough and there are far too many unavoidable irregularities in the process of the catalogue's compilation. This list of locations cannot be regarded as a statistically random sample, and the extrapolation of data to produce a general analysis of native Italian population distribution is not possible. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the list does appear to reflect a long-held view that independent native Italian settlement would have been concentrated along the eastern coast and in the south, especially in the general vicinity of the Baetic valley.

This examination of the role of individuals in independent settlement produces one further, and perhaps more positive, conclusion. Individuals are simply not sufficiently visible in the historical record to make a sound basis for study of the phenomenon as a whole. Clearly, despite the intrinsic importance of the individual in this type of settlement, the best route to understanding the process lies in the examination of informal settlement on a broader level. Determining the exact nature of an appropriate approach requires careful consideration. One of the more obvious options is a general survey examining the nature and distribution of all archaeological traces of native Italians at sites in the Iberian peninsula not otherwise connected with formal settlement.

Unfortunately, this polar opposite of the individual approach is no more helpful. In the first place there is, at present, no agreed methodological approach to migration amongst archaeologists.\textsuperscript{16} The question of how to go about identifying migration archaeologically is one that few scholars have been willing to tackle since the efforts of Kossinna and Childe in this area.\textsuperscript{17} These scholars, along with others in the first half of this century, examined prehistoric migration in the light of the equation ‘Kultur = Volk’, ‘presence of examples of a material culture = presence of its originators’. In more recent years the fallacy of this assumption has been accepted and various prehistoric trade and exchange mechanisms have been identified.\textsuperscript{18} The known existence of such mechanisms in the Graeco-Roman world had always limited the possibilities offered by the equation, but its disgrace seems to have resulted in a

\textsuperscript{16} See Anthony (1990) 895-897 for a summary of the present situation.
\textsuperscript{17} Kossinna (1902) and Childe (1950) provide classic examples of their approaches to migration.
\textsuperscript{18} See Renfrew (1979) chapter 1 for a discussion of this process of theory revision.
subsequent avoidance of the migration problem by archaeologists of all periods. The tide is now turning, slowly, but so far the main beneficiary of renewed interest is the early prehistoric period once again. Most recent attempts to provide methodological approaches to migration have been specifically designed to deal with short distance, high volume movement. In the Mediterranean world this type is encountered mainly in the Neolithic and Mesolithic periods. Migration encountered within the Roman world, prior to late antiquity, is generally of the long distance, low volume variety, which is not easily comparable. In the absence of agreed models of what does, and does not, constitute archaeological evidence of the migration of a specific ethnic group, it is necessary for each study to draw up its own guidelines for archaeological material.

Logically, an archaeological survey seeking evidence of the presence of native Italians in Hispania should involve two separate lines of inquiry: changes in land use which might indicate alterations in population patterns; and signs of the impact of native Italian material, and non-material, culture. The first of these is potentially useful because emigration can produce a range of effects at its destination, including new urban habitation patterns and a shift in the method and scale of agricultural exploitation. In the specific case of Hispania during the Republic, unfortunately, its uses are limited because of the lack of available information. Two important surveys have been conducted to date, one focusing on the lower Baetis valley, the other on the territorium of Tarraco, but both have proved somewhat disappointing in the current context. Ponsich’s survey of the lower Baetis valley was primarily interested in population density during the imperial period, especially the changes brought about by the vicissitudes of late antiquity. He seems unwilling to concern himself much with the republican period, which receives little attention. It is impossible to build up a coherent picture of visible changes in the region at this time from this work.

The ager Tarraconensis field survey is another matter entirely. Despite an admitted difficulty in differentiating between pre- and post-conquest occupation, the

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19 Anthony (1990) 901-902. The term ‘high volume’ refers to the proportion of the home population involved, rather than the actual numbers of settlers.

survey team came to the conclusion that there was no notable change in the dense settlement patterns of the area during the republican era. The vast majority of population centres experienced uninterrupted occupation at this time, the main change being the substantial increase in the importation of Italian ceramic ware. The survey team stated categorically that there was 'no evidence for a phase of colonization'.\textsuperscript{21} This assurance might have been more comforting if it had been accompanied by an explanation of what would have been considered evidence of 'colonization', since this is a word with many possible meanings in a Roman context. No such statement appears, but comments made by the report’s authors in the course of their discussion of the republican period suggest that centuriation was regarded by them as an important sign of colonisation.\textsuperscript{22} This would tend to suggest that they were interested solely in indications of formal settlement, which reduces the usefulness of this study in the search for informal settlement.

In the Spanish context, potentially useful information arises from signs of the adoption of native Italian ideas and practices by indigenous peoples. However, the essential problem with these sources of information has already been outlined in Chapter 2.\textsuperscript{23} The appropriate interpretation of this material in the context of an investigation of migration and settlement is a contentious area. There are perils at every turn. There is considerable debate concerning what might actually constitute ‘romanisation’ and the level of progress achieved by any such process prior to the Caesarian period.\textsuperscript{24} The process by which this occurred remains poorly understood. A huge variety of examples has been adduced by different scholars over the years as proof of the adoption or adaptation of native Italian ideas and practices, with reference to both material and non-material culture. Most of these have also been decried at one point or another. The degree of native Italian presence required to spark the adoption of native Italian ideas lies at the heart of this vigorous and ongoing debate,\textsuperscript{25} making pronouncements about possible settlement on the basis of this type of evidence unwise at the present time.

\textsuperscript{21} Carreté (1995) 276.
\textsuperscript{22} Carreté (1995) 276.
\textsuperscript{23} See chapter 2, pp. 22-24.
\textsuperscript{24} An overview of recent debate is provided by Curchin (1986).
\textsuperscript{25} For examples see Keay (1995) 300-301; Fear (1996) chapter 3.
One further note of caution must be sounded concerning cultural artefacts. It is necessary to bear in mind that, just as signs of native Italian culture in Hispania are not a guarantee of the presence of native Italian individuals, a dearth of such cultural indicators is not proof of their absence either. Cultural contact is rarely a one-way process and it should not be expected that native Italians permanently resident in Hispania preserved their own cultural heritage in pristine condition. Archaeological investigation of Corduba suggests that, within the polygonal *opus quadratum* walls, domestic architecture and ceramic ware in the earliest phase of the Roman town were Iberian, rather than Italic, in style.\(^{26}\) Similar suggestions have been made about Italica, although here the inaccessibility of the site has hampered efforts at confirmation.\(^{27}\) However the implication of such observations is clear: if formal settlement sites, where native Italians dominated the population, were not oases of native Italian culture, it is unreasonable to expect informal settlers to achieve such insularity.

There is one particular aspect of the archaeological evidence which manages to combine both possible lines of inquiry. This is the replacement of small farmsteads with villa estates in the Roman style in some parts of Hispania during the first century. Villas have proved a particularly compelling topic for those interested in both romanisation and land use patterns and they require brief consideration at this point. The development of villa estates is certainly interesting and they can be linked to both formal and informal settlement, in some limited contexts. However, it is necessary to avoid the assumption that the occupants of villa estates would normally have been native Italian. It is true that provincial villas built in a solid Italic style at an early stage of Roman involvement in a province are usually credited to the ownership of Romans or Italians; men who had acquired provincial estates and then developed them according to Italian practices.\(^{28}\) Most western provinces can produce a few examples of this type of site and the Spanish ones are no exception. The villas at Can Collet (Llinas del Vallés, prov. Barcelona), El Casillet (Cabo de Palos, prov. Murcia), Loma de la Herrarias (Puerto Mazarrón, prov. Murcia) and Loma de la Viña

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26 Ventura *et al.* (1998) 88-90
28 Percival (1976) 40.
(Lebrija, prov. Sevilla) all display signs of being created on previously unoccupied sites during the first century and may be examples of early native Italian ownership.\textsuperscript{29} However, it must be remembered that most villas in the western provinces are thought to be the work of indigenous landowners, who sought to model at least some aspects of their lifestyle on the Roman and Italian élite.\textsuperscript{30} As a consequence, each case must be examined on its individual merits, blanket assumptions merely complicate an already complex issue.

The final conclusion of the swift exploration of this type of evidence must be that it is dangerous to move beyond a face value interpretation of the archaeological material without supplementary information. It is all too easy for scholars to make archaeological evidence reflect what they wish to see. Like all evidence for life in the ancient world, archaeological material does not present a single, unambiguous, incontrovertible account of events. Rather, it supplies raw data which must be sifted, clarified and interpreted, in this case without agreed guidelines in place to assist the process.\textsuperscript{31} The discovery of goods imported from Italy in a Spanish town where indigenous practices dominate the archaeological evidence, along with locally produced items which mimic or reflect native Italian values and behaviour patterns, could result in any one of several interpretations, all equally plausible. Such material might point to the permanent presence of native Italians resident in the town, to the passing presence of native Italians in the role of soldier or merchant, to the residence of native Italians in a neighbouring town, or to the scattered residence of native Italians in the peninsula at large. Without further information, archaeological, epigraphic or literary, to give guidance, a firm argument for a single interpretation cannot be constructed.

Clearly a broad survey approach is not the answer. More promising is an examination of informal settlers at community level. Careful scrutiny of some well-known aspects of native Italian socio-political habits suggest that, despite their independence of movement, once in Hispania informal settlers would tend to band together. As a consequence, informal settlement could present a very similar

\textsuperscript{29} Gorges (1979) catalogue entries B 48, MU 05, MU 46 and SE 124.
\textsuperscript{30} Percival (1976) 38.
\textsuperscript{31} The inevitable dangers caused by the lack of guidelines in any archaeological context are emphasised by Hodder (1991) 126-127.
appearance to formal settlement, for it is probable that the majority of informal settlers attached themselves to existing communities. Life in urban communities was the long-established natural tendency of all native Italian cultures; a pattern they are known to have replicated actively wherever they went. The city was the basic unit of all socio-political life in Italy and membership of a particular community represented an important factor in an individual’s process of self-definition. Estates and villas were established in the countryside, but their owners also maintained city residences and urban connections. All free native Italians possessed the citizenship of a single town, which conditioned their legal, social and political relationships with the rest of humanity. However, many native Italians in Italy took up residence, temporarily or permanently, in a city other than their own without difficulty. The concept of residing in a town as an incola, or non-citizen resident, was hardly foreign to them.32

In Hispamia there was no shortage of communities for the incoming settlers to join. Patterns of habitation in southern Iberian areas were characterised by the proliferation of urban settlements, recognisable as such to native Italians, even if they did not possess all the expected attributes of a true city.33 In the eastern coastal zone the preference was also for nucleated settlement, but of a different, and probably less attractive, pattern. Oppida, fortified towns, acted as central axes for smaller unprotected settlements within their radius.34 In addition to the native communities, there were also a few Greek trading settlements and Phoenician/Carthaginian cities dotted along the eastern and southern coasts.35 New settlers would naturally move to attach themselves to an existing community at an early stage. The mechanisms by which they would achieve this are quite unknown, but would presumably vary according to the chosen location. In their choice independent settlers would probably be even more conservative than their counterparts involved in formal settlement. Lacking the protective framework of an organised settlement, migrants would presumably prefer areas which were both firmly within Roman control and acceptant of foreigners. It is reasonable to expect that native Italians would tend to settle in

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32 See TLL 7 col. 972-975 for the many and various references to incolae in literary and epigraphic sources.
33 See chapter 2, p. 29.
34 See chapter 2, pp. 29-30.
35 Main Phoenician/Carthaginian sites: Gades (Cádiz), Malaca (Málaga), Sexi (Almuñecar, prov. Granada). Main Greek sites: Emporlae (L’Escala, prov. Gerona) and Rhode (Rosas, prov. Gerona).
areas which showed signs of embracing Roman ways. Future access to cultivable land might also affect choices, but the ownership of country estates would come later, if it came at all. A farm would certainly not have constituted a starting point for settlement. The image of the rancher labouring on his lonely property, miles from anywhere, belongs to more recent colonial endeavour - there is no reason to believe that native Italians would behave substantially differently in Hispania than they would have done in Italy.

This idea is reinforced by the recorded activities of Romans and Italians in other parts of the empire where they had a tendency to band together into 'expatriate' communities. This pattern of behaviour is one repeated endlessly by emigrants across the centuries. It helps them to feel more at home in a foreign land, insulating them against unwanted contacts and influences and assisting in the preservation their cultural and political heritage, at least in the short term.36 In the specific case of native Italians, such groups could also provide real, physical protection through the organisation of a militia in times of crisis.37 The ultimate outcome of this general tendency to cluster together were organised associations for the purposes of protection and self-government, usually attached to a specific town. The term applied to a number of these support groups in the works of ancient authors was 'conventus' and this has now been extended by modern scholars to embrace all such bodies. However, a precise definition of the republican institution eludes modern scholarship and far more has been surmised about these communities and their organisation than is actually known for certain.

The term stems from the verb 'convenire', 'to come together or assemble' and seems to have begun life as an exact synonym for the cognate term 'contio', 'a meeting or public assembly'.38 This initial meaning was retained, even when usage had produced more specialised definitions.39 It is unclear how narrowly defined the

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36 Price (1969) highlights the importance of the 'migrant group' in its effect on the speed with which assimilation occurs.
37 Such military activity could take several forms. Some communities seem to have restricted themselves to the defence of their city in times of crisis, others seem to have been willing to form mobile military units, such as the so-called cohortes colonicae. See Caesar, Civ. 2.19.
38 TLL 4 col. 846-849. See also Kornemann's article in RE 4, col. 1173-1200.
39 Thus Cicero (Ver. 4.138) uses it with reference to a meeting of the Syracusan senate, a non-Roman body.
technical use of the term had become by the late Republic, whence most reports stem. Cicero, Caesar and the authors of the pseudo-Caesarian corpus all use ‘conventus’ to designate groups of native Italians operating as a unified community outside Italy. However, the nature of the communities involved varied considerably. The conventus at Utica and Syracuse were highly influential bodies, but they were merely one component of their city’s infrastructure. By contrast the conventus of Salonae in Illyria appears to have more or less run the community as the overall governing body. This suggests that use of the term did not necessarily imply adherence to a specific form. It was the function of the body - protection of the native Italian community against outside threats - which defined it as a conventus. Some might possess magisterial posts and formal organisational structures, others were more loosely constructed entities. The most vital aspect of the term is its unofficial nature; conventus, whatever their context, were never officially constituted by Rome. However, this does not mean that they are exclusively connected with informal settlement, for an unofficial formal settlement was equally likely to possess such a body.

Where and under what circumstances the first such body began is unknown. They are not recorded in the eastern Mediterranean before the Principate, but are known from several sources to have existed in the western sector by the late Republic. It has been suggested that conventus might well have been in existence from the second century when native Italian traders became a noticeable feature of commercial life in the Mediterranean. This seems a reasonable suggestion, for the

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40 Conventus were sometimes referred to by the longer title of ‘conventus civium Romanorum’, but this should not be taken to mean that prior to the lex Iulia of 90, when very few Italians possessed Roman citizenship, they could not have participated in conventus-type bodies.

41 Utica: After taking the city, Caesar imposed harsher penalties on the conventus than he did on the ‘Uticensis incolas’ (B. Afr. 90). Syracuse: Wilson (1966) 59-61 notes that despite the existence of the conventus, Roman traders in Sicily only complained about Verres’ behaviour as individuals, suggesting that the body had little real influence.

42 M. Octavius attacked Salonae in an attempt to wrest it from the pro-Caesarian conventus in charge there. See Caesar, Civ. 3.9.

43 For example, Corduba, an unofficial formal settlement, had the only recorded example of a conventus in Hispania. See Caesar, Civ. 2.19; B. Alex. 57, 59.

44 With the exception of a fleeting remark by Caesar (Civ. 3.32) concerning the taxation of Roman citizens in Asia in 48.

45 Syracuse (Cicero, Ver. 2.70), Utica (Caesar, Civ. 2.36), Lissus (Caesar, Civ. 3.29) and Salonae (Caesar, Civ. 3.9) are among some of the more notable, non-Spanish, examples.

cities containing the more prominent of the republican *conventus* are all linked to the activities of native Italian *negotiaores*. Utica and Syracuse are obvious examples; Utica's large commercial community was remarked upon by several sources and Cicero's prosecution speeches against C. Verres frequently refer to the number and importance of the native Italian merchants operating in Syracuse at that time.\(^{47}\)

Unfortunately the urban, and usually communal, nature of informal settlement does not make it easier to trace in the historical record. The same community-by-community approach used in the case of formal settlement may be conducted, but the rewards will inevitably be poorer. In the course of the formal settlement survey the 'new foundation' element often proved to be the most visible trace left in the available sources. A single comment by an ancient author concerning the foundation of a town is enough to secure an initial place in the catalogue of formal settlement, even if that author's understanding of the situation is later modified or rejected.\(^{48}\) However, in the case of informal settlement the search is restricted to seeking signs of the presence of native Italians in towns which are known not to be formal settlements. In these towns the native Italians were neither the dominant population element nor members of a ruling minority; inevitably they are more difficult trace.

In order avoid a fruitless search of the literary, epigraphic and archaeological records of the urban communities of the Iberian peninsula, there will be no attempt at a general survey. Rather a more selective approach will be taken. This chapter will restrict itself to the detailed examination of two specific examples: Carthago Nova and Emporiae. Both appear to offer a comprehensive body of evidence for the presence of informal native Italian settlers. This material will be thoroughly explored, in order both to assess the merits of these particular cases and to seek out any information which may lead to a understanding of the informal settlement process as a whole.

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48 Thus the case of Italica, whose foundation is referred to only once, by Appian, *Ib.* 38.
II Emporiae

Located on the north-east coast, not far from the eastern edge of the Pyrenées, Emporiae (L'Escala, prov. Gerona) was somewhat precocious in its relations with the Romans (*map 7*). It was among the earliest to deal with Italian imported goods and, as the landing place for Cn. Cornelius Scipio's army in 218, it was the first to come into contact with the Roman military. Consequently, it is unsurprising that it has been put up as one of the primary candidates for native Italian informal settlement. Emporiae began life as a trading post established by Massaliote settlers at the beginning of the sixth century, initially occupying a rocky islet just offshore. Later, in the fourth century, the community moved to a new, mainland site less than 1 km south of the original. Here an indigenous settlement seems to have developed in the shadow of the Greek town's walls, for both Livy and Strabo describe it as a 'double community' with Greeks and *hispani* living separately, yet side by side. To date no trace of the Iberian settlement has been found, despite the efforts of several different excavating teams. Nonetheless their presence is confirmed by the joint use of burial sites by Greeks and Iberians from an early date.

At the outset, most overseas commerce was conducted with Athens. When trade with Italy did begin in the late fourth or early third century, much of the imported material was 'Campanian A' fine ceramic ware. Etruscan amphorae, which may have contained wine, and ceramic ware in the *bucchero nero* style were also popular at this period. Presumably, Spanish goods were exported in return. Small quantities of grey ware from Catalan coastal regions have been found in Etruria dating from the mid-third century onwards. These probably represent one aspect of this return trade, however, nothing further is known of this side of the

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49 Livy 21.40.1-2; Polybius 3.76.1. See below p. 177 for details of commercial contacts.
51 Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 60-61. The Greek name for the settlement was 'Emporion', but, for the sake of clarity, the Roman version of the name will be used throughout.
52 Livy 34.9; Strabo 3.4.8.
53 Almagro (1953-1955) vol. 1 passim, esp. the Las Corts and Martí necropoleis sections.
Another sign of contact with native Italians, or at least with native Italian influences, appears in the town’s domestic architecture. From the early second century houses in an Italic style, constructed around atria, began appearing within the Greek town. Greek peristyle houses continued to be built, remaining the most usual type, but the existence of these Italic houses is interesting.

Despite having landed at Emporiae, Cn. Cornelius Scipio preferred to establish his main encampment further south at Tarraco. The narrative of the Second Punic War as it has been preserved is highly selective, concerned with major events rather than the daily grind, so it is difficult to trace activity at Emporiae with any exactitude. However, there are signs that, as a city allied to Rome, it had a continuing military role. For example, its harbour seems to have acted as a safe haven for the navy on occasion. Two further incidents suggest that the town continued to act as a conduit for troops and supplies for some time: Scipio Africanus landed his army there when he took over his father’s command in 211 and nearly two decades later M. Porcius Cato used the town as his headquarters during the campaigns against insurrection amongst local indigenous groups. Clearly Emporiae was a trusted ally, which could be relied upon in times of crisis. The friendly relationship seems to have lasted throughout the Republic, and the town’s official status remained that of a formally allied city. The end of the first century seems to have brought a change to this situation, with the institution of Emporiae as a municipium. The cause of the new status lies at the heart of the debate concerning the possible creation and development of a native Italian community there during the course of second and early first centuries.

59 Livy 21.41.4-11. His brother, the proconsul Publius, continued to prefer Tarraco to Emporiae. He chose to land his troops at Tarraco when he arrived in 217. See Livy 22.22.2-3.
60 Livy 28.42.3. The city appears to have been formally allied to Rome under a foedus aequo iure.
61 Balil (1955-1956) 45. The navy was not a small force; P. Cornelius Scipio had originally been dispatched to Hispania with 60 quinqueremes, the majority of which presumably reached Hispania with his brother Gnaeus. Publius himself brought out a further 30 warships when he arrived in 217. See Livy 21.17.8, 22.22.1; Polybius 3.97.1-4 (who says Publius brought 20 warships).
62 Scipio: Livy 26.19.11-20. Cato: Livy 34.11.1-2. The high level of Dressel 1 amphorae finds around Emporiae may also be connected with supplying the army. See chapter 8, pp. 212-213.
63 GF 1077; Vives 121:1. The attribution of municipal status rests on a single coin legend. See below p. 181 for further comment on this issue.
During the early second century, the Greek town acquired a new neighbour on its western doorstep. The ‘double community’ had become tripartite. Little now remains of the new foundation, but it seems to have been a compact, well-defended unit, with stone-built watch towers.\(^{64}\) No trace of any stone wall between the towers dating to this period has been discovered, which may indicate that they were linked by a wooden palisade, or similar construction. Over the course of the century underground cisterns and silos, for water and grain storage, were installed within the walls. These facilities were built using Roman masonry techniques and styles, just as the towers had been, but there is little archaeological information concerning the daily life of those using them.\(^{65}\) The site chosen, on slightly higher ground than the Greek town, and the presence of towers have suggested a Roman military origin to many. Support for this type of explanation is found in the literary sources. M. Porcius Cato is known to have established the headquarters for his provincial governorship of 195 in this general area, and it has been suggested that he established a *praesidium* on the site, probably intended to act as a garrison for the port.\(^{66}\) The troops manning it would probably not have been Roman, but trusted indigenous auxiliaries.\(^{67}\) Opinion varies on the plausibility of Cato as founder, but the interpretation of the site as a *praesidium*, is popular and widely accepted.\(^{68}\)

Whatever the role of the original inhabitants, at the end of that century the site underwent a marked change in direction. Between the last quarter of the second century and the first quarter of the first century, stone walls on a rectangular plan were erected, enclosing a much larger area than the original defences: some 21 hectares in all.\(^{69}\) They were executed in a stout construction technique involving a shell of *opus caementicium* on a polygonal block base, with a rubble core. The area within the walls has been inadequately surveyed, with little more than 4 of the 21 hectares explored properly. To date, interest has centred on the southern central

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\(^{64}\) Aquilé Abadías et al. (1984) 16; Mar and Ruiz de Arbulo (1993) 186-192.  
\(^{65}\) Aquilé Abadías et al. (1984) 17.  
\(^{66}\) Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 121. For a hostile account of this theory see Peña (1989) 225. For Cato’s encampment see Livy 34.11.1-2.  
\(^{67}\) See chapter 3, p. 78 and chapter 5, pp. 120-121.  
\(^{69}\) Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 125-127.
sector, identified as the site's public zone. A forum was constructed here at about the same time as the walls.\textsuperscript{70} Although not executed on a grand scale, it possessed the usual facilities of temple, portico and tabernae built and arranged in a style similar to contemporary fora in Italy.\textsuperscript{71} The domestic architecture of the Roman town has not received much attention to date and little is known about the housing situation at any point in its history. Several imposing domus of the imperial period lying close to the forum have been excavated. They have been found to have first century predecessors, but extensive new construction in the Augustan era has made it difficult to establish much more than that the original houses were built in an Italian style.\textsuperscript{72} Close to these have been found the remains of a transverse wall running east to west, which divides the city into two uneven sections.\textsuperscript{73} The function of the wall, which seems to have been removed in the Augustan period, is uncertain and this is a point which will be discussed further below.

The comparatively sudden transformation of the site has naturally aroused considerable interest and a range of views have emerged. There is widespread agreement that the site had lost its military function and was now a civilian settlement, but its status and the nature of its inhabitants remain points for debate. Emporiae does not figure in historical accounts of the late second century; nor do geographical writers show any interest in the Roman component of the community. Moreover, there is no contemporary epigraphic material to assist in the identification of the incoming population. Consequently we are dependent on archaeological data, and on more general theories of population movement in this period.

It is a long-standing assumption that the camp erected to serve Roman interests was followed by a Roman civilian community.\textsuperscript{74} The idea is based on three separate elements of the available evidence. In the first place there is the heavily Italian style of the archaeological remains. Not only was the town laid out according to contemporary Roman and Italian principles of urban planning, but the buildings were constructed using Roman techniques. This use of Italian ideas extended beyond

\textsuperscript{70} Mar and Ruiz de Arbulo (1986) 367; Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 130.
\textsuperscript{71} Mar and Ruiz de Arbulo (1986) 373.
\textsuperscript{72} Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 149-160.
\textsuperscript{73} Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 123.
\textsuperscript{74} Roldán Hervás (1980) 164; Mar and Ruiz de Arbulo (1986) 367; Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 28-29.
public areas and into the realm of domestic architecture. There even appears to have been a fairly swift transition in burial practices from inhumation, the traditional method for both Iberians and Greeks, to cremation as favoured by Romans.\textsuperscript{75} Secondly the high proportion of native Italian names appearing in the town’s Latin epigraphic record suggests the presence of a sizeable community. Although there is little republican material preserved at Emporiae, or indeed anywhere in Hispania, the Augustan inscriptions which have been discovered so far record mainly native Italian\textit{ gens} names.\textsuperscript{76}

The final point, the long-standing existence of commercial contacts between Italy and Emporiae, supplies the possible motive for the presence of this expatriate community. There are certainly indications that Emporiae had become a major port, which remained sufficiently busy to justify major improvements to its facilities, despite Tarraco’s rising importance.\textsuperscript{77} Certainly, it had outclassed its former rival and fellow Massaliote trading post, Rhode, which occupied a prime site on the northern coast of the Golfo de Rosas.\textsuperscript{78} Emporiae was well positioned for Hispano-Roman trade, and archaeological investigation suggests that large quantities of Italian goods were passing through the port on their way to ready markets further inland. Sherds of Dressel 1 amphorae have been documented in large quantities, suggesting that it formed an important link in the Italian wine trade.\textsuperscript{79} Equally prolific are fragments of late Campanian A and Campanian B tableware.\textsuperscript{80} By the mid-second century, the Roman army controlled the south and east of the peninsula which contained most major commercial centres; native Italian traders were now well placed to take an interest in trade with the peninsula. The disappearance of Greek goods from archaeological deposits around Emporiae suggests that native Italian traders were now in the ascendant.\textsuperscript{81} As a loyal ally with a long history as an


\textsuperscript{76} IRC 3 pp. 43-171.

\textsuperscript{77} The precise purpose - jetty or breakwater - of the limestone and concrete construction at the harbour remains disputed. See Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 116-119; Sanmartí Grego (1995) 169.

\textsuperscript{78} Sanmartí Grego (1978) vol. 2, 610.

\textsuperscript{79} Tchernia (1983) 91.

\textsuperscript{80} Sanmartí Grego (1978) vol. 2, 607-608.

international trading post, Emporienae would have made an ideal base for merchants operating between the two peninsulas.\(^8\)

However, there is more than one possible interpretation of this material. In recent years Peña Gimeno and Plana Mallart have suggested that the changes to Emporienae in the late second century can be accounted for by the creation of a urban settlement for the local indigenous population, designed to encourage them to leave the hilltop oppida that were characteristic of the region.\(^9\) Such a foundation would not have been unique. At the beginning of the first century several new urban centres built in an essentially Roman style and occupied by indigenous tribes appeared in the north-east. The most prominent of these was Gerunda (Gerona) which lay on a tributary to the river Ter and close to one of the main routes heading for Gaul. It was joined by coastal foundations: Baetulo (Badalona, prov. Barcelona), Iluro (Mataró, prov. Barcelona) and possibly Blandae (Blanes, prov. Gerona), all of which also appear to have provided a romanised urban base for indigenous tribes.\(^8\) These foundations had been preceded in the second century by the abandonment of a number of traditional hilltop oppida.\(^5\) The trend was particularly noticeable in areas now forming part of the modern Gerona and Barcelona provinces, territory under the control of the Indigetes and Ausetani.\(^6\) The precise circumstances of their abandonment remain a matter of speculation, but it is possible that the Romans encouraged, or forced, a change of location. Well-defended hilltop settlements represented potential sources of insurrection; urban centres away from the hills would have been preferred by Roman commanders, who had experienced considerable difficulties with the well-defended oppida.\(^7\)

The idea that Emporienae represented another in this chain of new indigenous settlements is not implausible. In this version of events the marked physical changes

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\(^8\) See chapter 8, pp. 201-202.


\(^4\) Keay (1990) 133-134, who is uncertain whether Blandae actually belongs with this group. For individual settlements see Claría i Roig (1984) 96-99 (Iluro); Del Vilà et al. (1977-1978) 250-251 (Blandae); Guitart Duran (1976) 239-242 (Baetulo).

\(^5\) Miret et al. (1991) 50.

\(^6\) Keay (1990) 133.

\(^7\) Cato himself was concerned to gain the upper hand over the oppida of the area. See Livy 34.17.5-12; Plutarch, Cat. Ma. 10.3. The men that followed him in the post of governor of Citerior continued to campaign against the same kind of elements. See Richardson (1986) 95-101 for a brief account.
occurring at the site in the late second and early first centuries may be seen as
testament to an increasing romanisation of the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{88} The number
of Roman names in the epigraphic material of the Augustan period can also be
explained in this way. As Peña Gimeno has noted, the catalogue of native Italian
names includes a high incidence rate of the \textit{gens} names ‘Porcius’ and ‘Cornelius’,
which may be an obvious sign of romanisation, rather than Romans.\textsuperscript{89} The municipal
status of the late first century need not be seen as problem. Several undeniably
indigenous communities were given municipal status by Augustus, possibly as an
attempt to reward loyal, and romanised, communities for their past services. The
archetypal example is Ilerda (Lleida), an apparently loyal ally of Rome from an early
stage, whose municipal grant seems to have been intended as some kind of
recompense for many years of service.\textsuperscript{90} The result of the grant in Ilerda’s case was
an increased degree of romanisation, at least where the town’s public face was
concerned.\textsuperscript{91}

This proposition has not yet achieved any notable degree of acceptance in the
wider academic community. In fact there has been little reaction at all, and certainly
no comprehensive rebuttal of the idea has appeared. It would be rather difficult to
achieve the latter, in fact, for many aspects of the proposition are simply new
interpretations of existing data, the orthodox interpretation of which is already quite
fragile. After all, as has already been observed, architecture of an Italic style by no
means guarantees native Italian inhabitants. Moreover, the observations made by
Peña Gimeno concerning the epigraphic material are acute. It is clear that the high
number of apparent members of the \textit{gentes} Porcia and Cornelia must be regarded
with some suspicion.\textsuperscript{92} However, these points do not detract from the fact that the
stable commercial environment offered by Emporiae, and the level of goods

\textsuperscript{88} Plana Mallart (1989) 257-258.
\textsuperscript{89} Peña (1989) 224.
\textsuperscript{90} For a brief overview of the evidence for Ilerda’s status prior to municipalization, see Bosch-
Gimpera (1966) 147-148. For evidence of the acquisition of municipal status see \textit{GF} 1109, 1111,
1113-1115.
\textsuperscript{91} See chapter 3, p. 83 for details of the changes to the town’s coin types.
\textsuperscript{92} The elder Scipios, Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus and M. Porcius Cato all had contact with
this area as Roman commanders, a position in which it would be easy to acquire both clients and
admirers who might take up a Roman name to which they were not entitled. See Dyson (1980-1981)
258-259 & 266-272. See also the case of Ilerda, chapter 3, pp. 82-83.
apparently passing through the town as a result, does make the settled presence of native Italian merchants likely. Equally, the comparison of Emporiae with the indigenous settlements has its own difficulties. As a well-established Greek trading post on good terms with Rome, Emporiae was by no means an obvious choice for the re-settlement of indigenous peoples. The town is not easily comparable to the other four except in geographical terms.

The need to account for both native Italian and Spanish components displayed by the evidence may be eased by the discovery of what appears to be a transverse wall, which cuts across the site a little over half way from the southern end. This area is unexcavated at the present time, so speculation on the wall’s purpose is rife. A favoured theory at the moment is that the area north of the wall forms the ‘native quarter’, in which the members of Emporiae’s existing indigenous community lived from the late second century onwards. If this were to be the case, then misgivings concerning the epigraphic record and the need to account for the native Italian community can both be accommodated. Epigraphic finds, many of which come from the forum area, would refer to inhabitants of the entire site, on both sides of the transverse wall. Naturally, until the area beyond the dividing wall is properly explored questions will remain, but, at the present time, this solution does seem to be the best on offer.

If it can be presumed that the new community at Emporiae did indeed contain a substantial native Italian element, this does raise the issue of its status. Until recently, the general air of unease that surrounds many scholars’ contemplation of republican communities which appear to lack an official status had failed to penetrate studies of Emporiae, despite the speed and organisation displayed in the creation of the second century addition. In many respects it has always been classed as a special case. Whatever developments took place in the late second century, in origin Emporiae was a Greek trading base with a long history as a formal Roman ally. Its position could not easily be compared with indigenous towns suddenly enlarged by Roman additions. However, the discovery in the early 1980s of a badly damaged inscription, reused as part of a staircase belonging to the forum temple, has brought

91 Marcet and Sanmartí (1990) 123.
the issue of the town's status to the fore. The inscription reads \textit{M IVN[...]} \textit{PRO[...]} \textit{CO[...]}\textsuperscript{94}. The staircase itself appears to have been constructed during the third quarter of the first century, roughly 45-25.\textsuperscript{95} Initially the recipient of the dedication was identified as M. Iunius Silanus, the praetor, and propraetor, of Citerior in the years 113-112, and the text was consequently restored as follows: \textit{M. Iun[io D.f. Silano] / Pro [Praetori Hisp. Cit. or PHC] / Co[ioni Coloniae or -ioni et Incolae]}\textsuperscript{96}. This, in combination with the fact that villas first begin to appear in Cataluña at about the same time as the foundation of the Roman town,\textsuperscript{97} has given rise to several suggestions that the late second century site was part of an exercise which gave Emporiae as a whole the official status of a Latin colony.\textsuperscript{98}

There are a number of unsatisfactory elements in this conclusion. The most obvious of these is the fact that Emporiae may have acquired municipal status by the triumviral period. Generally bestowed as an honour, it would have represented a downgrading of the town's standing, if Emporiae was already in possession of colonial status. However, the attestation of municipal status is limited to a single coin type, so this cannot be taken as an insuperable objection.\textsuperscript{99} Continuing in the numismatic vein, it is interesting that there is no sign of a change in status in the town's coin types. It is true that Emporiae is believed to have started the production of a new coin series at the end of the second century, but the types, which mix Greek and Spanish symbolic elements and bear the legend 'UNTICESCEN', hardly suggest the acquisition of an official status.\textsuperscript{100} This is not to suggest that a newly established Latin colony would be expected to produce new coin types to mark its foundation - Carteia, the only Spanish community whose Latin colonial status is undisputed, did

\textsuperscript{94} IRC 3 29.
\textsuperscript{95} Aquilué Abadías \textit{et al.} (1984) 55.
\textsuperscript{97} For general surveys of the evidence see Prevosti (1991); Olesti Vila (1997).
\textsuperscript{99} \textit{GF} 1077; Vives 121:1. The legend reads 'MVNICIPI' and so may refer to the town's inhabitants rather than the town's status. See Fear (1996) 65.
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{GF} 222-265. The observe type is a garlanded head of Athena Pallas; the reverse types vary, Pegasus, a running lion and a charging bull are all common. If Gil Farrès is correct is his belief that the 'Iberian Horseman' series is also being produced at Emporiae at this time, that would reinforce the emphasis on native elements. See \textit{GF} 266-317.
not coin at all for more than a century after its foundation—however it is interesting that Emporiae did produce coins and they did not follow Roman types.

The tendency to use the rise of the villa in Cataluña as a supporting argument is also unfortunate. The creation of an official formal settlement might well encourage the establishment of villa estates in the surrounding area, but there is no reason why the expansion of a commercially successful native Italian community might not also provoke a similar reaction. The villa sites have been interpreted as symptomatic of a well-organised native Italian presence, but this need not be synonymous with formal status, official or unofficial. A conventus could be as well organised as an official formal settlement; essentially the officers of each performed the same function. The villas cannot be seen as contributing to proof of the existence of a Latin colony. In this connection, it should also be remembered that many of the Catalan sites are only tentatively identified as newly established villas. Olesti Vila has recently argued that many should be reclassified as existing indigenous sites which had been newly romanised; many certainly have indigenous origins.

In addition to these basic objections, the initial interpretation of the inscription is by no means secure, resting as it does on a partial text. The editors of Inscriptions romaines de Catalogne have rejected it entirely. They identify the recipient with a later bearer of the same name, preferring to read: M. lun[io Silano] / Pro[co(n)s(uli) Achaiae] / Co(n)[s(uli) des(ignato) patrono]. They suggest that this Silanus may have been involved in some manner in the grant of municipal status, which they date to the Caesarian period. At the time of this grant, Emporiae seems to have collected a number of patrons, and developed an inclination to record the town’s gratitude on stone. This scenario would necessarily involve the swift reuse of the inscription in the staircase, presumably because a replacement had been created in a superior material, perhaps bronze.

There is simply no compelling argument for the possession of official formal status by Emporiae from the late second century onwards. The comparatively sudden

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101 See chapter 3, p. 62.
102 Keay (1990) 131-133.
103 Olesti Vila (1997).
104 IRC 3 29.
106 See the commentary accompanying IRC 3 29.
arrival of this new community on the Greek town's western doorstep, and the fact that the bulk of the work appears to have been completed within half a century certainly does indicate a substantial degree of organisation. The possibility of an unofficial formal settlement cannot be completely ruled out. However, the pre-existing presence of native Italians in Emporiae would suggest that an informal settlement arranged by a well-organised local group remains a reasonable possibility and, on balance, the most likely solution.

Emporiae acts as a showcase for the complexities of the study of informal settlement. The material involved is limited and uncertain, often open to a range of interpretations. The answers to questions concerning the possibility of informal settlement inevitably hinge on evidence of the status and ethnic background of the people involved. However, these two qualities are poorly recorded by the available material. It is perfectly possible to make a case for informal settlement, but it is not possible to make such a position unassailable.

III Carthago Nova

The difficulties affecting the case of Carthago Nova (Cartagena, prov. Murcia) are somewhat different (map 7). This town was the recipient of an official formal settlement, in the form of a Caesarian colony established during the triumviral period. There is also an unconfirmed suggestion from Cicero that the town received a settlement of veterans in the 50s, which presumably would have been formal in nature. The presence of these formal settlement elements on this site has tended to inhibit interest in any informal components which might have preceded them. Nonetheless, certain aspects of the evidence concerning the town in the republican period make it a likely candidate for settlement on an independent basis. Here the difficulty lies in determining the precise nature of that independent settlement.

Like Emporiae, Carthago Nova was an active port and commercial centre during the Roman period. It first became famous during the Second Punic War as

107 See chapter 4, p. 93
108 Cicero, Agr. 2.51.
109 Strabo 3.4.6.
a result of being a Barcid stronghold and the object of one of Scipio Africanus’ more daring raids. The wealth of arms and supplies, along with the technical expertise of many prisoners taken in the course of its subjugation, made the town an impressive prize of war.\textsuperscript{110} The productive silver mines found in the surrounding area were to prove the crowning glory. It is the existence of these mines which lays the basis for Carthago Nova’s candidature as a site of informal settlement. These were brought under Roman control following the capture of the town, as part of the conquered territory designated \textit{ager publicus}. Mineral rights in the Roman world are often described as ‘vertical’, since the owner of the surface had the right to exploit whatever was buried under it, thus the Carthago Nova mines were automatically property of the \textit{res publica}, and at the disposal of the state.\textsuperscript{111}

Three ancient authors - Strabo, Polybius and Diodorus - make specific mention of the mines around Carthago Nova.\textsuperscript{112} Although their accounts carry little detail, a reasonable picture of activities can be assembled. Comments in the work of Polybius and Diodorus indicate that the ore seam was extremely rich and that material was being extracted on a vast scale. Only Polybius attempted to quantify the production capacity of the mines. In a passage now preserved only in the text of Strabo, he reported that they were a vast 400 \textit{stadia} in circuit and employed 40,000 men; 25,000 drachmae poured into the state coffers as a result every day.\textsuperscript{113} Modern geological investigation has confirmed the general impression received from the ancient sources. Ancient mining sites, both open cast and deep shaft, have been identified close to the modern city of Cartagena and further south-west at Mazarron.\textsuperscript{114} They had been thoroughly exploited during the Roman period. The main commercially viable material found in this area was galena, an argentiferous lead ore from which both lead and silver could be extracted profitably.\textsuperscript{115} Lead will, consequently, have

\textsuperscript{110} Livy 26.47.
\textsuperscript{111} Crook (1967) 161. As their conquest of the Mediterranean world progressed the Romans made a very sensible practice of controlling mineral resources in most provinces, even when they had no immediate use for the products involved. Their closure of the Macedonian mines in 167, following the conquest, is an excellent example of this practice. See Livy 45.18.3-4.
\textsuperscript{112} Strabo 3.2.9-10; Polybius 10.10; Diodorus Siculus 5.36.
\textsuperscript{113} Strabo 3.2.10.
\textsuperscript{114} Davies (1935) 107-110.
\textsuperscript{115} Davies (1935) 109. Silver did not form part of the chemical composition of this material, rather molecules of pure silver (Ag) were carried in a matrix of galena (lead sulphide, PbS). The raw ore was smelted to remove the sulphur, producing a lead/silver mixture which was then subjected to a further
been the main product of the mines, but it is understandable that ancient authors should concentrate on the more glamorous and valuable aspects.\textsuperscript{116}

While many of the sites may have been too far removed for workers to be resident in the city, the town seems to have acted as a general administrative centre for the industry. It is reasonable to assume that arrangements for supplying workers with the basic requirements of life, and indeed for supplying the mines with workers, would have been made there.\textsuperscript{117} The town would also have provided a market place for the end products. There is plenty of evidence that ingots were routinely shipped from Carthago Nova’s port.\textsuperscript{118} As a consequence the manner in which these Roman-controlled mines operated is of considerable interest, for, at least potentially, they may have drawn native Italians into long term residence in the area.

Although a combination of archaeological and literary evidence has provided a comparatively clear picture of the way ore extraction and processing were carried out on a daily basis, little is known about the management side of the operations. It is generally agreed that ultimate ownership of the mines in the region of Carthago Nova was retained by the Roman state, from the time of the Second Punic War until the end of the second century at least. However, by the end of the Republic the control of most, if not all, sites seems to have been in private (native Italian) hands. Strabo states categorically that public ownership of Spanish mines had ceased by his own day, and other sources do provide us with the names of some private owners.\textsuperscript{119} Plutarch credits Crassus with the ownership of numerous mines, while one Sextus Marius appears to have controlled most of the Sierra Morena under the early part of Tiberius’ reign.\textsuperscript{120} These stories do not utterly preclude the public control of some mines, but certainly suggest that private ownership was now the norm. Both Crassus

\textsuperscript{116} A sample of galena from Mazarron contained 85.5\% lead, 0.199\% silver, 0.44\% iron, 13.8\% sulphur, with traces of gold, arsenic and antimony. See Davies (1935) 109. The lead yield from the ore is quite high by modern standards, the silver yield only average. I am indebted to Dr J. St George of the Department of Civil and Resource Engineering, University of Auckland and Ms S. Bligh, of the Stockton Mine, Buller, New Zealand for advice on mining matters throughout this chapter.

\textsuperscript{117} Richardson (1976b) 146.

\textsuperscript{118} Domergue (1966) 41-42.

\textsuperscript{119} Strabo 3.2.10.

\textsuperscript{120} Crassus: Plutarch, \textit{Crass}. 2.5. Sex. Marius: Tacitus, \textit{Ann.} 6.19; Dio 58.22.
and Sextus Marius appear to have owned large numbers of individual mines; it may have been possible to own mines on a less extravagant scale, but there is no trace of such owners in the sources.

From the point of view of daily mine management, the niceties of ownership are in some senses irrelevant. In fact, both private owners and the Roman state will have endorsed one of two basic exploitation systems and it is these systems which will have had the real impact. Firstly there is large scale exploitation, where a single employer - individual or company - controls and works a whole series of mines in a particular area. Secondly, there is small scale exploitation, where an individual or small company owns or rents a single mine, or exploits a section of a larger mine worked by several different groups. These two different approaches to mine management have quite distinct implications for the settlement question. In the Roman world the difficult and dangerous conditions involved in mining resulted in it being carried out mainly by slaves. In the context of large scale exploitation, where a large workforce was maintained by a single employer and overseen by a limited number of the employer's agents, this would mean that the vast majority of people connected with the mines would be slaves - many of them hispani. The agents might be either ingenui or freedmen, the latter being more probable. From the point of view of informal settlement, small scale exploitation is far more interesting. Under these conditions the workforce would be broken up into much smaller, independent components, each in the charge of lessee or owner who would be more likely to reside in Hispania. These smaller operations would involve more modest entrepreneurs, whose business interests would be rather more limited, reducing the need for agents. Most such entrepreneurs would be ingenui, since republican freedmen are rarely found involved in business ventures which required capital, such as the purchase or lease of a mine.

Attempts to determine which operational style was in use at Carthago Nova have centred around the arrangements in place during the second century, with

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121 Diodorus 5.36 & 38. The mines probably also employed freeborn miners during the republican period, such as are attested at Vipasca in the second century AD. See CIL 2 5181.
122 See chapter 8, p. 218 for comments on the internal slave market in Hispania.
123 See below, p. 189.
scholars divided over which of the two options was involved. Since the choices made by the Roman state are likely to have had a strong influence on the management practices later adopted by private owners, academic opinions about the second century should be borne in mind when considering the first, regarding which there is far less evidence. The vast scale on which the mines appear to have operated, in particular the huge number of people working there, has encouraged many modern scholars to the view that, during the second century, they were exploited by large societates publicanorum, under contract to the state. It is generally presumed that the huge size of operations at Carthago Nova precluded any other kind of exploitation, that the publicani would be the only group able to cope. There have also been suggestions that the Roman reaction to the acquisition of the Macedonian mines indicates a belief that societates publicanorum were an integral part of the exploitation of mines - that the Senate refused to allow the mines to operate, because of unhappy experiences with publicani elsewhere.

This latter view has been roundly criticised by Richardson who suggests that all the incident concerning the Macedonian mines indicates is that Rome was concerned about the Macedonians raising funds to use against her. From a review of the evidence he concluded that there was no reason to believe that the mines at Carthago Nova had to be exploited by publicani. Instead, he offered an alternative system in which the right to mine was leased out on a shaft by shaft basis to small-time contractors. These men were still publicani but were not a part of large scale societates. His argument for this particular system was based broadly on two points. In the first place, he suggested that the numbers of workers mentioned by Polybius as being employed by the mines should be taken to include the mining community’s support systems - those who supplied the mining and mineral processing workforce with food and offered other essential services. Such people were dependent on the existence of the mines for their living, but could not be regarded as part of the actual

126 Assumptions concerning what type of operation would and would not be commercially viable are always risky. Even in the modern world a huge range of approaches to mine management function successfully because of the endless possible permutations of operating conditions.
127 Livy 45.183-4. See Brunt (1969) 106; Badian (1972) 40-42 for the development of this idea.
128 Richardson (1976b) 143-144.
129 Richardson (1976b) 144-147.
workforce and would not have been directly employed or owned by whoever operated the mines.\textsuperscript{130} Secondly he noted that the manner in which Polybius presents the profits received by the Roman treasury would fit better with a situation in which the lessees of mine concessions paid rent or a proportion of their earnings direct to a Roman official on the spot, than it would with the payment of a one-off lump sum for each \textit{lustrum} period, as was normal when contracting \textit{societates publicanorum}. Such small scale ‘tithe-style’ levies are known from other contexts, in particular they are connected with corn levies.\textsuperscript{131} As a final auxiliary point Richardson commented that unlike the imperial period, there are no mould marks known from republican Carthago Nova bearing the name of a \textit{societas}.

Richardson’s theory is not without its own problems. Domergue has rejected Richardson’s review of the Macedonian mines situation, suggesting that whatever the actual political motivation behind the senate’s decision, the story still demonstrates the expectation that \textit{publicani} would usually be involved in the exploitation of any mine acquired by the Roman state.\textsuperscript{132} He also suggests that analogies drawn between different taxation spheres are unhelpful, adding that, at least by the time of Cicero, \textit{societates publicanorum} were paying money due on their contracts annually, rather than by \textit{lustrum} period.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, he observes that the names of individuals appearing in mould marks can be interpreted as the names of each \textit{societas’} leading partner. Rejecting Richardson’s theory as interesting, but not convincing, Domergue has vigorously defended the concept of large scale exploitation by \textit{publicani} as the method used to exploit the majority of Spanish mines during the second century, suggesting a fairly limited number of large \textit{societates} were involved.\textsuperscript{134}

At the present time Domergue’s interpretation seems to have the upper hand. He has answered many of Richardson’s objections, and the existence of two inscriptions showing freedmen actively participating in community affairs provides positive backing for his argument.\textsuperscript{135} In contrast, defence of Richardson’s argument must be based either on Diodorus Siculus (never a happy situation) or on negative

\textsuperscript{130} Richardson (1976b) 145-146 & 151-152.
\textsuperscript{131} Richardson (1976b) 142, 145 & 149-150.
\textsuperscript{132} Domergue (1990) 248.
\textsuperscript{133} Domergue (1990) 248, adducing Cicero, \textit{Att.} 4.11.1.
\textsuperscript{134} Domergue (1990) 250-252.
\textsuperscript{135} See below pp. 191-192.
points: Domergue’s explanation of the use of a large number of individual names in mould marks sits uncomfortably with his endorsement of the existence of a very small number of mining societates and his comments on the change from lustrum period payments do not actually answer Richardson’s charge. These do not constitute a major objection, but they are sufficient to suggest that Domergue’s proposal should not be seen as the final word on the matter, merely an interim solution.

According to Domergue’s model, it is likely that the publicani involved in the mining industry were extremely rich and influential men who had no need to supervise operations on a daily basis, though it might be presumed that they did visit on occasion. In their stead would be sent business agents, institores, who had the legal power to act in place of their principal. This function was normally entrusted to those who were not legally independent - sons still in their father’s power, slaves or freedmen. The majority of institores are thought to have been freedmen, who were particularly well suited to the role. A reasonable number of these men would be required, but not a vast number, and many would not be of native Italian background. Some, in fact, might be hispani, since the indigenous inhabitants of the region had been working the mines on a more modest scale for many years prior to the Roman arrival. On the basis of Domergue’s theory, therefore, it may be said that although informal settlement almost certainly took place due to the existence of the mining industry, such settlement is unlikely to have included many native Italians.

It is difficult to find support in the literary and archaeological evidence for the scenario created by Domergue’s theory. Ancient authors lost interest in Carthago Nova following the defeat of the Barcids and the continued occupation of the site has hampered archaeological investigation. There is, however, a certain amount of epigraphic material which can offer some information about the community of independent settlers which formed as a result. Carthago Nova possesses an unusually

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137 The Romans clearly learnt a great deal about mining in Hispania. An examination of the technical Latin mining vocabulary shows a large number of words with Iberian origins. These borrowings tend to have highly specialised meanings, for example: *seguitium* = soil type usually associated with auriferosus deposits (Pliny, *Nat.* 33.67; *OLD* p. 1728); *talutium* = native gold which has become separated from the main deposit (Pliny, *Nat.* 33.67; *OLD* p. 1902); *urium* = thick river sediment which plays havoc with gold washing operations (Pliny, *Nat.* 33.75; *OLD* p. 2107).
large collection of republican inscriptions, most of which date from the first century. Most are mould marks from ingots, but four record benefactions and these are more helpful. Since considerable reference will be made to various features, they are reproduced in full here.138

CIL 2 3408:
L • BAEBIVS • M • F • L CATI • M • F • L • TAVRIVS • L • F • SER • AEFOLAN[...]/I GENIO • OPIDI • COLUMNAM • POMPAM • LVDOSEQ • COIRAVERVNT

CIL 2 3433:
HEISC • M • AGISTRIS • COIRA< R VNT • C • POPLICI • C • F • L • CERVI • LF • M • CAEICI • N • C • L • L • TALEPL • A • L • CN • TONGILI PVL • L • PAQVI • LON< G> /1 • L • SIL • Q • VERAT • CIS • PIL • PONTILI • M • C • S • Q • CLAVDI • POS[... ] C • S

CIL 2 5927:139
M • PVVPVS • M • SEX • LVVCIVS • SEX • L • CAEP[... ] / M • PROISVS • ML • N • TITIVS • L • L • NV[... ] / C • VEREIVS • M • L • ANTIOC • BRVTI[... ] / EL TERENTI • C • S • PILEMO • ALEDI • L • S • ALEX • TITINI • L • S • ACERD • SAPO • M • S • MAG • PILAS • III • ET • FVNDAMENT • EX CAEMENT • FACI • COERAVERE

HE 3 251:
[CN ATEL]LIVS CN F MEN[...]/ P F POLLIO • PORTICVM[...]

Not one of the four inscriptions provides anything in the way of background information concerning the benefactions they record, but despite this they offer a certain insight into the type of informal settlement community established at Carthago Nova. The first and fourth documents, CIL 2 3408 and HE 3 251, both involve groups of men whose position is undefined in the texts as we have them.140 However, both documents are familiar types: wealthy local men spending money to

138 All three inscriptions from CIL were designated as republican in date by Hübner in his editorial notes, apparently largely on the basis of orthography. The latter factor is not an entirely reliable guide, as archaic forms were deliberately used on occasion during the late Republic and Early Empire, especially in epigraphic texts, on which see Buck (1933) 87. There is no direct supporting evidence, but Hübner's assessment is widely accepted and probably justified. The case of the final inscription is also a little uncertain. A republican date has been suggested, in part due to the established existence of the gens Atellius in Carthago Nova at this time. A lead ingot of republican type bearing the name is recorded (CIL 12 2396) and a further Atellius appears on a semis issued by Carthago Nova in the triumviral period, apparently in a magisterial role (GF 1042). However, a date in the early Principate is also possible. See also Barreda Pascual (1998) 145 on the dating issue.

139 See also CIL 2 3434, for an earlier, but essentially similar, reading of the text.

140 See also appendix entries A2, A10, B2, C4, P4, T1.
benefit the whole community. These particular benefactors are native Italian *ingenui*, which is interesting. This small amount of information does not weaken Domergue’s theory of mine management, but does seem to show that either not all *institores* were freedmen, or that not all settlers were *institores*. Such benefactions normally took place against a background of the cut and thrust of local politics, suggesting there was some kind of political life to be engaged in at Carthago Nova. A *conventus* of some description would be the most likely vehicle for such activity, and it is possible to take these inscriptions as evidence for the existence of such a body, although native Italian participation in existing political systems in the town cannot be completely ruled out. The numbers of people involved in each case - groups of two and four respectively - may be significant, since they mirror common magisterial groupings in Italian communities. However, it would be wise not to make too much of this issue, since one would not normally expect to encounter *duoviri* and *quattuorviri* in a single community.

The two remaining texts, *CIL* 2 3433 and 5927, fit better with Domergue’s interpretation of the mining industry management. Mine management conducted by large *societates* using *institores* could be expected to result in sizeable numbers of freedmen congregating in towns connecting with mining areas and this is exactly what these inscriptions appear to show. Each records benefactions by a group possessing an organisational infrastructure, headed by ‘*magistri*’ of some kind. The exact nature of either group involved is unclear, but it is unlikely that they are *conventus*-type organisations, since in each case there are a large number officials listed on an apparently even footing. *Conventus* are thought to have followed the norms of native Italian government. Also ruling out a *conventus* in these cases is the notable freedman, and even slave, presence in the lists of officials; there are no *ingenui* at all in the list of *CIL* 2 5927. It has been suggested that these represent the officials of *collegia* instead, which is plausible enough. The term could cover a multitude of associations, political, social and religious, which usually had a

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141 See above p. 190.
142 For the *ingenui* members of these magisterial groups see appendix entries C5 and P6.
professional basis. Men of the same occupation gathered together for a common purpose, usually one connected with their work, however indirectly. They were particularly popular with freedmen, providing a social and political platform for a group whose ability to participate in the mainstream elements of community life was otherwise rather limited. The basis and purpose of organisation involved in either case is unclear. Marin Diaz has suggested that they were religious in function, but this is speculation. The existence of such collegia suggests that Carthago Nova possessed a sizeable community of freedmen who were in a position to take an interest in political or religious matters, and who were able to contribute to collegiate benefactions.

Although the basis for claims of informal settlement at Carthago Nova is highly theoretical, it is possible to make a credible argument for the existence of this type of settlement. The problem lies in the nature of that settlement. If Domergue is correct in his theory of mine management, then the settlement which took place, though informal, is unlikely to have involved many native Italians. To a degree the epigraphic evidence does seem to support Domergue’s version of events, although it should be noted that the support of the inscriptions is not unequivocal and the theory in its current form does exhibit certain flaws. For all its difficulties and uncertainties, the case of Carthago Nova must remain one of considerable interest.

Study of the informal settlement of native Italians in Hispania is beset with difficulties, the most fundamental of which is the shortage of evidence. Only in two cases has it been possible to present a reasonably solid argument for the presence of independent settlers in a given town. Elsewhere, hampered by the limitations of both very broad and highly specific approaches to the subject, it is more difficult to establish the existence of informal settlement. The scarcity of evidence suggests that attempting to proceed purely on the basis of the available material is a wasted effort. In such circumstances the construction of a credible theoretical model of the way in which informal settlement occurred seems a necessary precursor to further study. By

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144 TLL 3 col. 1591-1592 gives the basic definition; TLL 3 col. 1592-1594 explores the various types recorded.
146 Marin Diaz (1988) 58. The two inscriptions might also represent the same body in different years.
determining the types of people who may have participated in this form of settlement and endeavouring to understand their motives in doing so, it may be possible to learn a great deal about the process as a whole. This, therefore, is the purpose of the following chapter.
If it is helpful to take the question of motivation into account when dealing with formal settlement, in the case of informal settlement it is vitally important to do so. The subject is far less amenable to tightly structured academic analysis and any study of it must rely on a small and ill-assorted collection of evidence. The previous chapter has clearly demonstrated the difficulties which plague attempts to make use of this material. In this situation an understanding of the circumstances surrounding the general occurrence of informal settlement, and the creation of a theoretical model of the phenomenon is extremely useful. It provides a context for the available evidence; gaps may be tentatively plugged and conflicts explained. The purpose of the present chapter is to create and apply such a model.

The best place to begin is with past thought on this issue. The existing body of scholarship concerning informal settlement in Hispania before the death of Augustus is diverse, but not large, and suffers from several limiting factors. While it has been generally recognised that people who emigrated on their own initiative in the Roman world would have been influenced and affected by factors different from those affecting the participants in organised formal settlement projects, there has been little attempt to analyse those differences or to treat the informal settlers in isolation. In addition, a careful distinction is drawn between pre-Caesarian settlement and that occurring under Caesar and the emperors; discussions of informal settlement are generally confined to the former period.\(^1\) The only author to present any detailed assessment of informal settlement in the specific context of Hispania, Marin Diaz, follows these well-established patterns closely. Her introductory remarks do recognise that there are two different strands of settlement, which she labels 'fundaciones urbanas' and 'un flujo migratorio' respectively, but it is the former to which she is interested in devoting close attention.\(^2\) She divides her discussion into

\(^1\) There have been a few attempts to examine informal settlement of native Italians during the imperial period: Haley (1991); Etienne and Fabre (1982). However in these cases the authors have been chiefly concerned with the post-Augustan period, which lies outside the present remit.

\(^2\) 'Urban foundations' and 'a migratory flow' respectively. See Marin Diaz (1988) 47 & 113.
pre-Caesarian and Caesarian settlement and presents two chapters for each period; one concerning all modes of emigration during the period, the other specifically focused upon ‘fundaciones urbanas’, or formal settlement. She concludes that the participants in informal settlement were a mixture of army veterans and civilian settlers, suggesting the latter were most probably people with commercial connections in Hispania.

All other assessments of the amount of republican settlement that occurred outside the context of formally instituted communities have been conducted by authors concerned either with the wider history of Hispania, or with native Italian emigration in the broader context of the Roman world as a whole. Such work is far less specialised and more inclined to comment on possibilities than to present in-depth analysis. At one end of the spectrum lie the ideas of authors like Knapp and Fear. Knapp argues that most so-called ‘Roman’ settlement in Hispania before the mid-first century was in fact the settlement of hybridae - the children of Roman soldiers and local women, and he is joined by Fear in the suggestion that the level of informal military settlement was very low and that the civilian presence was negligible in the extreme. Brunt agrees that informal settlement numbers were not particularly large, but suggests that veterans could, and did, settle in the more peaceful parts of the peninsula. Many others take a still more moderate line and are prepared to accept the possibility of a small amount of civilian participation in informal settlement, particularly as a result of the mining industry. The wide range of views available is almost certainly due to the absence of any comprehensive study

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3 Marin Diaz (1988). Pre-Caesarian settlement is covered by chapters 2 (all settlement) & 3 (specific foundations); Caesarian settlement is covered by chapters 4 (all settlement) & 5 (specific foundations).

4 Marin Diaz has no serious competition in the field. García y Bellido (1959) does not mention informal settlement at all, Galsterer (1971) 1 & 3 mentions the subject only in passing.


7 Van Nostrand (1937) 135-137; Sutherland (1939) 58; Thouvenot (1940) 183-184; Wilson (1966) 10 & 25; Galsterer (1971) 3; Broughton (1974) 11; Key (1988) 72, also (1995) 295; Harris (1989) 129 &139; Le Roux (1995) 53. Sutherland and Harris place particular emphasis on the importance of the mining connection. Despite beginning his treatment of this topic by suggesting, from Caesarean evidence, that negociatories might have been common in Hispania, Brunt (1971) moves on to argue that men in business during the Republic were too prominent to consider emigration to a place like Hispania.
of the subject, so that informal settlement is easily moulded to fit an author’s views on other related issues.

For those authors who emphasise the immigration of settlers on an individual basis as component part of the general pattern of settlement, civilians with commercial connections have an important role to play. The Hispano-Roman trading relationship is seen as the primary method of introducing native Italian civilians to the Iberian peninsula, although there is some variation in the interpretation of its importance. Most supporters state clearly their belief that mercantile immigration operated in tandem with informal veteran settlement. Only Gabba has chosen to assert that mercantile immigration completely dominated the informal settlement of the Iberian peninsula.

The search for the origins and form of the independent settlement of the Iberian peninsula is one which brings the question of motivation into the foreground. Past studies have highlighted army veterans and merchants as the primary participants in informal settlement for excellent reasons. The decision to emigrate across the Mediterranean, to an area which remained an active field of conflict, could not have been made lightly. The importance of familiarity with the area in question when a place in a formal settlement was being offered has already been demonstrated. Informal settlement was potentially more hazardous and required a greater degree of personal initiative, since there was no outside organisation involved. It is widely, if often implicitly, assumed that the people most likely to make a decision to emigrate in such circumstances would be those with a personal acquaintance with the area they chose, as well as a compelling reason to make such a change. There were simply a limited number of ways in which native Italians were likely to become familiar with any part of the Iberian peninsula. The army clearly played a vital role in exposing native Italians to the Spanish provinces. Even those authors concerned to emphasise the mercantile role accept the importance of the army. Engagement in trade with Hispania offers an obvious alternative route to a similar kind of familiarity with the

10 Gabba (1954) 299-301.
11 See discussion in earlier chapters 5 & 6.
region and commercial prospects would offer further incentive for settlement. It is highly unlikely that individuals from outside these two groups would have formed a routine element in informal settlement. The possibility that an occasional pioneering type departed Italy for Hispania in search of farming land during the Republic, without any previous experience of the provinces may be countenanced, but such individuals would be rarities indeed.

In the past the recognition of the importance of commercial factors has not been accompanied by any serious analysis of the state of trade between the Iberian and Italian peninsulas and the activities of native Italian businessmen in the Spanish provinces. The thesis has been asserted, rather than proven. This is unfortunate, not least because there is a catalogue of evidence to support the idea. The strength of the Hispano-Roman trading relationship, recent revisions of economic theory and parallels from the eastern Mediterranean all combine to make a strong case for merchants as informal settlers. As the motivational factors involved with the settlement of army veterans have already been examined in some detail, this chapter will concern itself entirely with those factors which influenced mercantile emigration. All aspects of the Roman commercial world, and the negotiatores who operated in it, must be considered.

I Negotiatores as informal settlers

The best place to begin an examination of the evidence is with the well-documented behaviour of native Italian businessmen in the eastern Mediterranean, for this establishes an instructive pattern of commercial behaviour. The idea that native Italian merchant migration in the eastern section of the empire could act as a model for the West, both in size and content, has long been mooted, but a serious attempt to test this theory has yet to be made.

Exactly when native Italian emigration to the eastern sector of the empire began is unrecorded, but it seems to have taken off in the years immediately following 166,
when Delos was made a free port.\textsuperscript{16} Delos itself was an early target of emigration but as time went on the focus became more diffuse, so that by the end of the second century there were noticeable numbers of native Italians in many cities in mainland Greece and in the western and north-western regions of Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{17} In these eastern areas many emigrants were not involved in trade as such, but were participants in the financial sector of the Roman commercial world. Across Asia Minor most of those not in the employ of publican \textit{societates} are thought to have been money-lenders or bankers. The professions of those in mainland Greece are less clear and there probably existed a greater mix of business types.

On Delos Latin migrants practised a range of professions, among which those of slave dealer, banker and oil merchant predominated.\textsuperscript{18} Here, due to the existence of a large corpus of epigraphic material, it is possible to analyse the nature of the native Italian community in some detail. The expatriate community consisted of a mixture of \textit{ingenui}, slaves and freedmen.\textsuperscript{19} The latter two groups appear to have been acting as agents, carrying out business on behalf of their master or patron. However, the agent’s presence did not necessarily mean their principal was elsewhere. There is a considerable body of epigraphic evidence which demonstrates that many businessmen who employed agents on Delos continued to live and work there themselves.\textsuperscript{20} This suggests that the use of agents provided businessmen with some flexibility in their working practices, but could not replace personal involvement entirely.

Residence on Delos often spanned several generations of a family, as sons took over their father’s work.\textsuperscript{21} The size of the mercantile population at any given time is impossible to calculate, but the native Italians have a high profile in the epigraphic

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Sherwin-White, (1984) 31-33; Hatzfeld (1919) 18-19 has suggested the emigration to the East was well underway by the mid third century. Strabo (10.5.4) refers to the large numbers of Romans who went to set up in business on Delos.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Brunt (1971) 210; Rostovtzeff (1941) vol. 2, 762.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{ID} 1715-1729; Strabo, 14.5.2. See also Hatzfeld (1912) 141-143.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Wilson (1966) 105-111. From 231 inscriptions where the subject’s status could be determined with reasonable accuracy, Hatzfeld (1919) 247 showed that 88 were \textit{ingenui}, 95 freedmen and 48 slaves. Brunt (1971) 213 has accepted these figures.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Hatzfeld (1912) has documented numerous cases of masters and freedmen appearing in the same, or contemporaneous, inscriptions.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Familial relationships are not always clearly defined in the Delian inscriptions, but Hatzfeld (1912) has succeeded in identifying several families in which two or more generations operated on Delos: the Aemilii (10); the Caecilii (22-23); the Granii (40-41); the Seii (75-6)
\end{itemize}
Certainly the group was of a sufficient size that signs of community organisation are evident. Numerous official decrees have survived referring to joint decisions or actions of 'the Athenians and Ρωμαῖοι.'22 The guise in which this organisation came is uncertain. The use of *conventus* are not actually recorded in the eastern Mediterranean prior to the imperial period. Nonetheless, a body created along those lines seems likely, even if it did not pass under the name of 'conventus'. This body would provide both protection against outside interference and regulation within the native Italian community.23

This did not mean, however, that the community lived an entirely separate life to that of the Athenian settlers on Delos. Although the two groups’ ability to mix at a political or legal level was limited, the native Italians do seem to have involved themselves in the island’s social and religious affairs. Many are recorded as participating in the various Delian cults, others joined Greek businessmen in dedications to both gods and mortal benefactors.24 This picture of a stable settled existence, at least partially integrated with the local community, is one repeated elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. Roman and Italian names have been discovered among the entries on ephebic lists at Athens as early as the 130s.25 By the mid-first century such entries were common on both sides of the Aegean, in cities as diverse as Argos and Pergamon.26

The information available is insufficient to determine whether the native Italian *ingenui* were permanent residents on Delos, in the strictest sense of the term. In all probability they are best regarded as long-term residents, who spent lengthy stretches of their working life away from Italy.27 Certainly the native Italian community was regarded as a permanent constituent of Delian society by the Athenian settlers who made up the main element of the population. The constant epigraphic references to joint action taken by the 'Athenians and Ρωμαῖοι' are testament to that.

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22 *ID* 1642-1674. For the evolution of the formulae, see Hatzfeld (1912) 105-107. Ρωμαῖοι was a term used loosely by Greek authors, and in Greek epigraphic texts, to refer to both Romans and Italians. For another example of this kind of use see chapter 3, p. 74.
23 See chapter 7, pp. 170-172.
24 *ID* chapter 3, sections 2-5 and chapter 4 provide various examples.
25 *IG* 2(1) 471.
The reason why these native Italian businessmen took up residence on Delos is important. The tax advantages of Delos and the business opportunities of Greece and Asia Minor generally were only of any use if one was personally present to enjoy them. Commercial relationships in the Roman world were, by modern standards, extremely fragile. The most fundamental elements of business life were subject to all kinds of potential pitfalls. The majority of contracts were purely verbal, companies were automatically dissolved by the death of a single partner and the legal framework upon which the business world rested contained gaping holes, particularly when Roman businessmen attempted to negotiate with non-Romans.\textsuperscript{28} The potential for commercial difficulties loomed behind even the simplest of transactions. In a world lacking many of the most basic aids to international commerce, the personal touch was essential. In order to trust and work with each other, businessmen in the Roman world depended on a network of friends and friends of friends.\textsuperscript{29}

Agents, usually known as \textit{institores}, did have a place in this system.\textsuperscript{30} The post was a legal title, rather than a career option, and was deemed most appropriate for freedmen, slaves and \textit{ingenui} remaining in their father's power. Freedmen, in particular, were ideally suited to this kind of work.\textsuperscript{31} The traditional relationship between patron and freedman made an excellent basis and the tendency to free slaves late in life meant that many would be well versed in their patron's line of business by the time they became freedmen. In any case, social attitudes about the correct employment for someone of servile background would tend to push them toward careers in trade or industry.\textsuperscript{32} The prominence of such men in the role of \textit{institor} means that caution must be exercised. By the second century many slaves and freedmen in Italy were not of native Italian origin, so these men do not fall within the group targeted by this study.

Given the importance of verbal contracts, agents were essential for any businessman wishing to branch out beyond his immediate environs. Licensed to act for him in a limited range of activities, they allowed a principal to engage in business

\begin{enumerate}
\item Crook (1967) 206-217.
\item TLL 7 col. 1985-1986. The use of the term \textit{institor} to mean ‘business agent’ is primarily legal and rarely found outside the corpus of Roman legal writing.
\item Aubert (1994) 9-10.
\item Treggiari (1969) 88-91.
\end{enumerate}
over a wide geographical area.\textsuperscript{33} They had their limitations, however. The fact that agents were restricted in the matters they could attend on their principal’s behalf meant that businessmen negotiating with them had to ensure that agreements made and activities engaged in did not fall outside the agent’s competence or the principal would be entitled to repudiate his responsibilities.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, by the late Republic at least, agents had acquired an unsavoury reputation, partially as a result of their involvement in the petty aspects of trade, but also because many were of servile background. They were seen as unscrupulous and untrustworthy.\textsuperscript{35} The combination of these factors would have encouraged any moderately cautious businessman to ensure that he dealt directly with the principal from time to time. The situation on Delos demonstrates that agents often worked alongside their masters or patrons, as well as in their absence.\textsuperscript{36} Agents had their uses but they could not replace their principal completely.

Far more is known about the commercial conditions on Delos than in any other area in the eastern Mediterranean during the Republic. This cannot but affect our view of the east, which is perhaps not ideal. The conditions there were undoubtedly affected by its declaration as a free port, which encouraged large numbers of native Italians to settle in a geographically confined area. However, there is sufficient complementary evidence from other areas to provide a reasonably balanced picture. The merchants on Delos probably formed a more coherent unit than their counterparts elsewhere, but the pattern of their behaviour was not unique by any means.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, these \textit{negotiatores} can be seen to demonstrate certain attitudes which would be unlikely to change no matter where they were. The need for personal contact with the areas in which they did business, and for familiarity with the conventions of business there would have been universal issues; they were not specific to the eastern Mediterranean.

Consequently, the application of the Delian example to the situation in the Iberian peninsula is not unreasonable. In the first place a thriving commercial

\textsuperscript{33} Aubert (1994) 9-10.
\textsuperscript{34} Aubert (1994) 14.
\textsuperscript{35} See Henderson (1979) 80 for a brief overview of their public image.
\textsuperscript{36} See above, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{37} For an analysis of native Italian settlement patterns elsewhere in the Greek East, see Wilson (1966) chapter 8-9.
relationship existed between the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, the nature of which will be examined in more detail below. Hispania may have appeared stranger, even more barbarous, to the native Italian eye than the Greek East, but by the early second century the coastal regions of the east and south presented no greater threat to the commercial traveller than Asia Minor. Inevitably, trade would have brought native Italian merchants to Spanish shores, where they might be expected to behave in much the same manner as they did elsewhere in the Mediterranean.

This is not to say that there were no special factors affecting Hispania. Here it was perhaps even more likely that merchants would tend toward periodic, rather than permanent, residence. Culturally, Hispania was far more isolated than the Greek East, although the few Greek cities on the eastern coast may have retained enough of their cultural heritage to be familiar. Nonetheless, the distance involved and the difficulties of travel would suggest that the period of a merchant’s residence would not be short. A pattern of long stretches spent in Hispania interspersed with equally long periods in Italy seems likely, as does a number of years spent making one’s fortune in Hispania, followed by retirement to Italy. Permanent settlement would probably have been the exception to the rule.

The family element, so evident in the eastern empire, is more difficult to account for in Hispania. Places like Delos and mainland Greece had much to offer the family man: stable communities, cultural interest and good educational opportunities for his sons. Obviously none of these things were true for a native Italian migrant to Hispania during the Republic. Unfortunately there is almost no evidence that provides an answer to this issue, one way or the other. The mould marks on republican lead ingots from Hispania do record the names of successive generations within a family. This may constitute a sign that businesses were being handed down from father to son, but this would not have necessitated a son’s residence in Hispania until he took over the business. This probable tendency toward periodic residence would strongly suggest that merchants were less likely to

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38 There are certainly signs that Emporiae had, and that it also absorbed Italian culture rapidly. Marcet & Sanmartí (1990) 23-28, 83 & 86-87.
39 Domergue (1990) 255.
participate in formal settlements, where a long-term fixed commitment was involved. Informal settlement, organised on a personal basis was far more appropriate.

The importance of the Delian example has been reinforced by recent developments in economic theory. Changes in modern opinions concerning the mechanics of commerce in the Roman world have also changed attitudes toward those who engaged in it, particularly traders. Current discussion in the field arises mainly in reaction to the work of Jones and Finley, whose primitivist opinions formed the orthodox line during the 1960s and 1970s. The primitivists asserted that the Graeco-Roman world possessed only the most basic economic elements and functions, in contrast to the modernising school which held that complex economic structures and concepts were accepted and used by both Greeks and Romans. Both Finley and Jones tended to group the Greek and Roman experiences together. Although a particular article might lay emphasis on either the Greek or Roman element, the overall result was a series of ‘macroeconomic model’ studies of the Graeco-Roman world as a whole. Several changes in economic thinking have occurred in reaction to their work. Firstly, while primitivism in its Finley/Jones form has been broadly rejected, there has been no rush to embrace modernising tendencies either. Most have chosen to steer a moderate course between the two extremes. The increasing amount of archaeological evidence pertaining to economic matters has also had an effect. Intensive archaeological investigations of certain areas, particularly in the Roman world, have encouraged a change in emphasis from macro- to microeconomic studies. Even when a macroeconomic approach is taken, the need to treat the Greek and Roman worlds in their own right has been recognised. The rising profile of economic anthropology has also had an effect, as attempts are made to take the social function of economic activity into account. Unsurprisingly in such circumstances, economic historians are increasingly turning inwards,

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40 The archetypal examples of their work are Finley (1973) and Jones (1974) respectively.
41 Rostovtzeff (1941) and (1957) are two of the more prominent modernizing studies of the Graeco-Roman economy. For a specifically Spanish example see Van Nostrand (1937).
42 For example, Hopkins (1980) & (1983a); Greene (1986); Duncan-Jones (1990); Whittaker (1990); Laurence (1994); Morley (1997); Davies (1998); Parkins (1998).
43 For example Parker (1984); Barker (1995); Fülle (1997).
analysing established theory with the same degree of care they would normally expend on newly received concrete evidence.\textsuperscript{45}

The result of this process is that it is no longer possible to point to a comprehensive prevailing orthodoxy in economic thought concerning the ancient world. Certain points have widespread acceptance, however. It is generally acknowledged that there were a myriad of component parts to the 'Roman economy' and that to treat it as a single, uniform entity is overly simplistic.\textsuperscript{46} Different regions and industries made individual contributions to the economic life of the empire and fared in various manners in it. Also widely accepted is the move away from the restricted view of trade produced by the primitivist model. The practitioners of primitivist school of thought have always been heavily influenced by the Weberian concept of the 'consumer city'.\textsuperscript{47} According to this model, the majority of trade is carried out in staples, usually food, on a grand scale and over comparatively short distances, since, for the most part, the supplier is the city's own hinterland. Potentially, the theory reduces the role of merchants to an extremely passive one, since it assumes that trade occurs in a near-automatic fashion, in order to feed the 'parasite' city's needs. Influential work by Finley emphasised this aspect of it.\textsuperscript{48} The importance of salesmanship in commercial exchange was minimised: the city must be supplied, therefore trade takes place. This view allows for little in the way of ingenuity and commercial drive amongst those involved in this trade.

A rather different, more flexible, view of the impetus for trade in the ancient world is now emerging. One idea central to many of the works produced by this process of change is that trade in the classical world was conducted chiefly in luxury goods.\textsuperscript{49} These luxuries were not necessarily spectacular items, for their status was more defined by their inaccessibility and perceived desirability, rather than any

\textsuperscript{45} Since 1990 a profusion of articles have been published questioning the theoretical basis of current economic studies: Whittaker (1990); Whittaker (1995); Mattingly (1997); Davies (1998); Parkins (1998).


\textsuperscript{47} Weber (1924) section 1.

\textsuperscript{48} Finley (1973).

\textsuperscript{49} Greene (1986) 14-15 gives a clear and concise explanation of the transition. Keith Hopkins, one of the leading figures in this move away from the Finley/Weber model, details his own views in (1983a) ix-xxv.
arbitrary monetary value or hedonistic associations. The majority of trade is thought to have been conducted in order to fulfil the modest demands of the rural peasantry, most of whom lived at near-subsistence levels. This has important implications for the working practices of merchants in the Roman period. It does not necessarily mean than trade was routinely operating over far wider distances than has previously been believed. Hopkins has a strong argument in saying that the needs of the fifty million or so rural peasants for goods they could not produce themselves were the main instigators of trade. This would mean that the majority of goods were still being traded over fairly short distances; the specialised products of one small region’s craftsmen being traded with those of a neighbour. However, a trade predominantly in luxuries does allow for more long distance, overseas trade than a trade in staples would.

It also suggests more ingenuity on the part of merchants. A dependent city on the Weberian ‘consumer’ model would always need corn, demand would remain steady year in, year out; demand for luxury supplies would be more erratic because the governing conditions would be radically different. Luxury goods, major or minor, by definition were things which improved quality of life, but which were not utterly essential to the continuance of that life. A buyer was in a position to make a decision about whether they really needed a given item - luxuries could be eschewed. Equally supply patterns would vary. Supply from some regions might be regular as clockwork the whole year round, in others it might vary enormously, being constantly interrupted by irregular access to the necessary primary resources or by demand for the goods within the local community and so forth. The merchant dealing in this type of trade had to be more ingenious in order to make a profit. He needed a clear idea of the state of supply at any given moment, a better method of gauging demand than the season of the year and in many cases a sales pitch, since, unlike food staples, his goods would not necessarily sell themselves.

50 Thus, for example, a granite millstone is a luxury item in an area where only limestone is available, see Peacock (1980-1981) passim. Wallace-Hadrill, (1990) 145-192, gives a clear account of the nature of luxury with reference to trade in the ancient world.
51 Hopkins (1978a) 18.
52 The question of irregular supply, and its implications for archaeological research, is explored by Millett (1991).
Laurence, whose work on Pompeii includes an examination of the city as an economic unit, raises several important points in this context. Two are of particular interest. Firstly, Laurence emphasised that negotiatores were an essential part of the trading process, acting as the link between producer and consumer. Pompeii, he suggested, did not produce goods specifically for export, but, nonetheless, Pompeian goods were traded and exchanged across the Mediterranean by merchants who had purchased them in Pompeii.\(^53\) This is an idea which might apply equally to many communities in the Roman empire. Moreover, it can be taken a step further. For, just as producers might not always set out to make goods for export, nor would buyers necessarily look for foreign goods, but rather they would buy those items which best fit their requirements of usefulness, price, style or quality, often regardless of the item's origin. Naturally, in certain circumstances, foreign goods would be bought purely for their exotic nature - the lure of the unusual should not be underestimated - but this should never be regarded as the only motivating factor in the purchase of exported goods.

The second issue raised by Laurence was the suggestion that the export of goods was frequently conducted without a specific market in mind at the outset. He put forward the idea that goods being exported from Pompeii might initially be carried by traders from there to Puteoli. Merchants in Puteoli would buy them up and sell them on to men in Rome, from which point, traded amongst the merchant community, they might end up anywhere.\(^54\) This is an extension of the idea that all impetus for long distance trade came from merchants, not producers. The idea that goods tended to move from place to place in the hands of a series of traders, being sold piecemeal, has its attractions. It dovetails neatly with the mixed cargoes so familiar from Roman wrecks. These have always pointed to a situation in which merchants set sail with a shipload of various goods, assembled from a range of sources, that they knew would sell in a particular district, along with the odd trial item.\(^55\) It might also explain how some types of goods, ceramics in particular, came to be so widely distributed throughout the empire. However, while it is a plausible

\(^{53}\) Laurence (1994) 54.
\(^{54}\) Laurence (1994) 69.
\(^{55}\) Parker (1984) 102-105 sets out the case for this scenario.
scenario for some goods, this is not a theory to be applied blanket-style across all types of trade. In particular, it would be an inappropriate method of distribution for foodstuffs. In any case, there are several examples in the wine trade of producers who seem to be very closely connected with those carrying their goods far afield.56

The picture of the Roman merchant that is emerging from recent work on the ancient economy, in particular from Laurence, is a much more active one than has previously been accepted. The merchants of this period were more than passive agents of exchange, but active men of business. In the rush to avoid modern stereotypes of capitalistic businessmen and aggressive salesmanship, it is rather easy to go too far in the other direction. A balance needs to be maintained. Exactly where the middle ground lies is still uncertain, but steps in the right direction are being taken. It is possible that the term ‘entrepreneur’ needs greater prominence. The term embraces the concepts of salesmanship, profiteering, speculation and general business acumen which would have been an integral part of a trade in luxuries, major or minor. The pattern also emphasises the need for merchants to remain in personal contact with all aspects of their business, as demonstrated by the behaviour of native Italian merchants in the eastern Mediterranean. This approach does not envisage that merchants engaged in trade, particularly overseas trade, saw that trade as their only line of business. The Roman business world was far less specialised than its modern counterpart. This has been demonstrated in many ways over the years, from the mixed cargoes of Roman ships to the multifarious business dealings of Cicero and his associates. Merchants would deal in what they could, when they could, and invest the profits to the best advantage available to them at the time. Like the farmers of the day, merchants seem to have seen their best protection from business failure in diversification.57 Some may have had the opportunity and courage to specialise, but many did not.

The changing view of the Roman economy has brought economic theory into alignment with the long-standing assumptions of historians concerning commercial

56 The link between the estate of the Sestii of Cosa, which included vineyards, and wine amphorae found across the north-western Mediterranean is discussed by Peacock & Williams (1986) 62-62 and Greene (1986) 89-92.
57 On risk-control through diversification, as it applies to farming in the ancient world, see Garnsey (1988) 48-49.
migration. The basis on which these assumptions have rested, that merchants would have become familiar with Hispania in the course of their business activities, has been shown to be a justifiable one. The existence of an important pre-condition to the active participation by merchants in informal settlement has been established. However, there is a further, obvious precondition - proof of native Italian engagement in commercial activities in Hispania.

II Commercial activity in republican Hispania

Unfortunately, there is a distinct lack of evidence for the presence of native Italian negotiatores in Hispania and what there is gives us only brief glimpses of these men in action. The major problem facing any scholar working in this field is the scarcity of economic references to be found in the ancient literature and the extreme reluctance of many native Italians to be publicly identified as a trader. The ambivalent Roman attitude toward trade, and the business world in general, and the resulting vagueness concerning such matters which clouds the written record, have affected modern interpretations of Roman economic activity profoundly. It was not that the Romans were embarrassed by wealth. Being rich was a Good Thing and a status to which most aspired, but in social terms the source of one’s money was an important factor in its respectability.

Land was the ultimate form of respectable wealth and, in theory, the only truly acceptable one for a man of senatorial rank. In an ideal world a senator strove to be as self-sufficient as possible, selling only surplus produce. Small-scale trade acting as an adjunct to a largely self-sufficient lifestyle was perfectly respectable, but trade as one’s primary source of income was regarded as beyond the pale. This is not to say that those in the upper echelons of public life never engaged in trade, simply that they were not in the habit of drawing attention to that aspect of their lives. There are definite signs that senators and other men of standing in the community did engage in trade at all levels, often using agents. Commerce as a primary means of support

58 Pliny, Nat. 7.140; Cato, Agr. proem. 3-4.
59 Polybius 6.56; Cicero, Off. 2.87.
60 Cato, Agr. 2.7; 9; 146-150; 154.
61 Cato (Agr. proem. 2-3) condemns it as overly risky.
became more acceptable, or at any rate less unacceptable, as one moved down the social ladder. At the same time, the precise type of trade in which one engaged remained important. Cicero took the view that those who relied on trade should avoid the petty aspects of it and engage in grand overseas ventures. His remarks are symptomatic of the rather nebulous unease concerning trade which seems to have permeated all levels of society.

The end result of this situation is a fatal mixture of disinterest in, and active concealment of, commercial matters. It is noticeable that men rarely identified themselves as mercator, mango, or even negotiator in epitaphs or public inscriptions. Literary sources are similarly problematic. History was written primarily for the purpose of educating future leaders by the political and military example of their predecessors; trade played no part in this didactic exercise. However, merchants in Hispania did not go entirely unnoticed by the historical record and there were a few aspects of this kind of work which occasionally merited a mention in ancient texts. All are connected, by one means or another, to the Roman army's activities, a subject which naturally attracted much literary interest. Further supplementary information is provided by geographical writers such as Strabo, who was mainly concerned with the objects of trade, and commentaries on contemporary events, such as the letters and speeches of Cicero.

The shortage of direct evidence concerning merchants means that the subject is best approached in tandem with the evidence for the goods traded by them, although here too there are difficulties. The evidence for goods imported into Hispania is entirely archaeological, whereas most information concerning exports comes from literary sources. This uneven distribution of source material limits possible interpretations. Ancient literary sources are not known for their precise attention to detail where commerce is concerned and archaeological material is also restricted in its usefulness. Only non-perishable items are preserved, a particular problem if trade in foodstuffs is suspected, and the useful interpretation of such material is heavily

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63 Cicero, Off. 1.151. D'Arms (1981) 23 supports this as a more generally held view.
64 Polybius 3.31; Quintillian 2.4.2.
dependent on the circumstances of its discovery. Consequently, the available evidence must be approached with caution.

Although the Iberian peninsula lies in the far western reaches of the Mediterranean, and remained a remote area until well after the Second Punic War, nonetheless it had developed a number of commercial connections with Italy, the Levant, Greece and North Africa over a period of several hundred years before Rome took a political interest in the area. However, in the years following 218 the Italian connection came to dominate the peninsula’s external economic relationships. Even then, in some senses, the contacts were actually rather limited. Imported goods rarely travelled far overland, generally being limited to the eastern and southern coastal strips and to those areas accessible by the Hiberus or Baetis, the latter including the Sierra Morena. The goods Hispania herself exported during the Republic seem to have come from much the same areas. However, what this commerce lacked in geographical spread, it more than made up for in energy. Hispano-Roman trade was vigorous from an early date and its volume appears to have increased steadily during the course of the Republic.

On the basis of archaeological evidence it would appear that most imports were either foodstuffs or ceramic goods. The bulk were brought in by ship to any one of the peninsula’s ports along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts, from Emporiae to Gades. Some goods were also carried up the Baetis and Hiberus rivers, both of which were navigable for considerable distances inland, in the case of the Baetis, by ocean-going vessels. The distribution network which dealt with the goods when they landed, tended to concentrate around the areas immediately adjacent to the landing points. This was understandable since land transport was slow and expensive at the best of times and, especially in the early years, the poor Iberian road

66 For pre-Roman trade, see Harrison (1988) 42-43, 52 & 106.
67 Strabo 3.4.9 (Emporiae); 3.4.6 (Carthago Nova); 3.4.2 (Malaca); 3.1.8 (Baelo); 3.2.1 (Gades).
68 The Hiberus was reportedly navigable for 260 Roman miles inland (Pliny, Nat. 3.21), while the Baetis could accommodate seagoing vessels as far as Hispalis and substantial rivercraft as far as Corduba (Strabo 3.2.3).
69 See below pp. 211 (Dressel 1) & 214 (Black Gloss ware).
network and potentially unfriendly backcountry would have been no encouragement.70

It is possible that the importation of Italian foodstuffs into Cataluña and the País Valenciano had actually begun well before the Second Punic War, although this has yet to be confirmed.71 If this is not the case, then the trade certainly began fairly rapidly thereafter and appears to have grown steadily. The edible imports were brought to Hispania in amphorae and finds of these containers allow us to build up a picture of the trade, although their contents have usually long disappeared. The two predominant types of amphora in use in Italy during the Republic, from the second century onwards, were Graeco-Italic (Wills Form D) and Dressel 1, the changeover point between the two occurring perhaps around 145-135.72 The Spanish land-based finds of either of these have not been extensive. While Dressel 1 sherds have been documented at a huge number of republican sites, in most cases only a few pieces have been found. It is only at Emporiae and some Sierra Morena sites that large quantities have surfaced.73 With the exception of the Sierra Morena, Dressel 1 fragments tend to be found along the eastern and southern coasts.74 Graeco-Italic finds have received less attention from archaeologists but it seems likely that figures for these would be even lower than those for Dressel 1; their geographical distribution is similar.75 Underwater exploration has proved rather more fruitful. Wrecks containing either type of amphora are relatively common in the Mediterranean. Naturally it is only possible to take into account those whose final

70 The efficient and extensive road network of Hispania under the Empire was created by the Roman army to assist in controlling newly conquered areas. It was built in a piecemeal fashion over several centuries and was not completed until the early Empire, see Keay (1988) 49. Laurence (1998) has recently challenged the view that land transport was prohibitively expensive, although he agrees it was more expensive than water-borne conveyance. Transportation difficulties may not have been the only reason for the circumscribed distribution zone. Tsirkin (1988) 479 has suggested that easily half the population of Hispania lived in Cataluña, Baetica or along the eastern coastal strip.

71 Nolla & Nielo (1989) 367-368. See also Sanmartí Grego et al (1991) 84 & 87. The finds discussed in these works are few and far between and may be the result of a social, rather than commercial, distribution network.

72 Tchernia (1986) 42.

73 Tchernia (1983) 91.

74 Tchernia (1986) map 4.

75 The form was first identified by Benoît (1961) passim, esp. 36-41, but a systematic classification of sub-types was not produced until 1982, for which see Wills (1982).
destination was obviously Hispania, a grand total of eleven.\textsuperscript{76} Even working from this reduced group, it is clear that Dressel 1 and Graeco-Italic amphorae were far more common items in Hispania than the land-based evidence might lead us to suspect.\textsuperscript{77} Roman cargoes were traditionally mixed and certainly no ship has been found with an amphorae-only load, but in nine out of eleven cases amphorae formed either the main or a substantial portion of the cargo.\textsuperscript{78} It is clear that the trade in foodstuffs was a large and important one.

For a variety of reasons, both Graeco-Italic (Wills Form D) and Dressel 1 are generally believed to have been used primarily for the transport of Italian wine.\textsuperscript{79} As an export to Hispania during the Republic, wine does indeed seem to be a logical choice. Although it is thought probable that Greek settlers had brought the vine with them many centuries earlier, there are no signs that wine production was a widespread activity during the period immediately after the Second Punic War. Even when the Catalan region began to export wine itself in the first century, it would seem that the majority was destined for Gaul, where consumption was prodigious rather than discerning.\textsuperscript{80}

The cluster of Dressel 1 sherd finds around Emporiae, suggesting that it was a major port for the trade, may go some way toward explaining the origins of the business.\textsuperscript{81} As has already been noted the Greek trading foundation seems to have had extensive contact with the army from the early years of Roman control.\textsuperscript{82} Given that there are no signs of large scale wine production in this early period, it would seem reasonable to suggest that the imports may have begun in order to supply Roman troops with wine, a dietary staple, during the Second Punic War.\textsuperscript{83} The

\textsuperscript{76} Parker (1992). Wrecks of the second or first centuries found off the Spanish coast carrying Dressel 1 or Graeco-Italic (Wills Form D) amphorae, and likely to have been traveling to Hispania from Italy: catalogue nos. 39, 147, 195, 326, 369, 388, 489, 652, 1020, 1155, 1160.
\textsuperscript{77} It may be argued that wreck evidence is more complete than land-based finds, because the chief danger to underwater sites - the aqualung - has existed for only fifty years.
\textsuperscript{78} Parker (1992) catalogue nos. 195, 326, 369, 388, 489, 652, 1020, 1155, 1160. In addition it should be noted that nearly three quarters of all Mediterranean wrecks discovered by 1984, whose cargo could be determined, were found to have contained amphorae. See Parker (1984) fig. 7.
\textsuperscript{79} Beltrán Lloris (1970) 317.
\textsuperscript{80} For the exporting of the wine to Gaul, see Parker, (1992) 19; Pascual Guasch (1984) passim. For the Gallic reputation, see Tchernia, (1986) 144.
\textsuperscript{81} See p. 211, note 73 above.
\textsuperscript{82} See chapter 7, pp. 174. It seems to have been first used as a base by Cn. Cornelius Scipio in 218 (Livy 21.60.1-4).
\textsuperscript{83} Davies (1971) 124-125.
contracted army supply agents, the *redemptores*, were not merchants in the strictest sense, but as profit-making agents they fall under the general definition of commercial activity. Information concerning them is vague and the only specific reference to their activities in Hispania is the less than encouraging episode when Cato the Elder dismissed their services in 195. This event does at least indicate that the *redemptores* were a normal part of Spanish campaigning, since the story is told because this dismissal was so unusual. It is likely that the *redemptores* continued to be used in Hispania after Cato's tour of duty was over. Moreover Livy's wording in this passage '...itaque redemptoribus velitis frumentum parare ac Romam dimissis' clearly suggests that either members or agents of the *societas* involved were already present in Hispania and actually had to be sent home, rather than just be told they were not to ship supplies there. Whether, in fact, the *redemptores* brought many native Italians to the peninsula as a result of their work is unclear. Bidders for public contracts of this type would be companies of rich men with diverse business interests. The use of agents and local merchants of reliable and loyal backgrounds seems likely. Although important to the army, the *redemptores* will not have loomed large in the foreign commercial community of Hispania.

Naturally not all foreign foodstuffs would have been destined for Roman troops. If it is correct to assume that the bulk of amphorae contained Italian wine, then the proposition that some of it was being sold to the native population seems perfectly reasonable. It is, however, impossible to even guess what proportion of the wine might be accounted for by civilian consumption. The amphorae finds from areas along the southern coast are best accounted for by the civilian population, for the Roman army had had little reason to be concerned with the region after the Second Punic War. The behaviour of vintners in Cataluña equally suggests local familiarity with Dressel 1 amphorae and their contents. When this region initiated the Spanish wine trade, they exported the liquid in accurate copies of Dressel 1 amphorae, known as Pascual 1. Imitation being the most sincere form of flattery, it

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84 The organisation of the *redemptores* has been an area of much inconclusive discussion in the past, see Badian (1972) 28-30; Rickman (1980) 33-34; Briscoe (1981) 70. The recent completion of a doctoral thesis by Erdkamp (1998), in which he seems reluctant to view *redemptores* as publican holders of large-scale contracts, is likely to re-ignite the debate.
85 Livy 34.9.12-13.
86 Peacock and Williams (1986) 94.
seems likely that the hispani were trying to claim the same quality and prestige for their product, as they knew the Italian original had. They were certainly exporting to an Italian dominated market: Gaul.\textsuperscript{87}

The other major Italian import was pottery, mostly of the tableware variety. The study of the distribution of imported domestic ware in the Iberian peninsula is a vexed issue, because of the haphazard publication of finds. To date, there is no exhaustive synthesis study, which combines the findings of individual site reports to create a peninsula-wide picture of the situation at any given period.\textsuperscript{88} This is perhaps unsurprising since the amount of work required to create such a useful item would be phenomenal and, at the present rate of excavation, it would soon be out of date. The most useful work available in this area at the present time is Gorges' survey of Hispano-Roman villas, which provides a basic summary of pottery types found at rural sites across the peninsula.\textsuperscript{89} In the absence of a specific study it is not possible to be precise about the degree of distribution achieved by domestic ware. The air of generality which surrounds all discussions of this particular aspect of the issue is, unfortunately, unavoidable.

As with the trade in edible goods, there are signs, rather less open to dispute in this case, that the trade in domestic pottery had existed prior to the Second Punic War. Black gloss ware from Italy was being exported to the southern Hiberus valley and the Castulo and Carthago Nova areas before the war.\textsuperscript{90} Compared to later trade, however, this was a small enterprise. After the war two different varieties of black gloss ware, initially Campanian A and later Campanian B, were imported into Hispania in large quantities. These apparently found a ready market and became a widespread domestic article. Finds of these types have been made all along the eastern coast and throughout the Baetic valley. It would seem that there are few republican sites at which examples of one or the other have not been found and at many sites both types have occurred. These wares are also well represented in wreck

\textsuperscript{87} Tchernia (1983) \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{88} In this matter domestic ware and amphorae should not be confused. A comprehensive distribution survey of amphorae does exist - Beltrán Lloris (1970) - although subsequent discoveries have somewhat curtailed its usefulness.

\textsuperscript{89} Gorges (1979).

\textsuperscript{90} Pérez Ballester (1987) 65 & 72.
cargoes of the second and first centuries. This Arretine ware had a shorter vogue than its predecessors, the last third of the first century and the first decades of the new era, and finds are not quite as prolific, probably for this very reason. Nonetheless it is clear that it too enjoyed widespread use in Hispania and was imported in fairly large quantities.

The ceramic imports were clearly destined for the local market in Hispania. An army connection seems far less likely in this case and native Italian immigrants would not have been able to account for the huge quantities of ceramic goods imported. A taste for foreign ceramic ware had existed well before the Second Punic War and it was much more easily indulged once the Roman army reached Hispania. The ceramic goods travelled with foodstuffs in cargo holds, perhaps at first as mere speculative space-fillers, and found a market with plenty of room for expansion. The Iberians did not import ceramic ware because they had none of their own - they were simultaneously exporting local pottery goods all over the Mediterranean - but because something about the Italian goods appealed to them. It may have been a case of novelty, a desire to emulate the conquerors’ taste or simply a question of aesthetic preference. Even in the absence of a comprehensive study of imported Italian pottery from the republican period it is obvious that these wares were received with considerable enthusiasm and were generally accessible. Examples have been found at sites all over Hispania and finds have been made in modest homes, not just the grand residences. Indeed, the goods were so popular that local copies of Campanian ware were made and distributed almost as widely as the originals. In short these ceramic wares, in particular Campanian A and B, fall neatly within the category of a minor luxury.

91 For example, Parker (1992) catalogue nos. 39, 77, 312, 389, 489, 520, 847, 910 & 1020.
92 Montesionos i Martínez (1991) 17.
93 Oswald and Pryce (1920) 4.
94 See chapter 2, pp. 23-24.
95 Bruni and Conde (1991) 548-549. The ware involved was Painted Iberian pottery, for further comments see below pp. 218-219.
96 See the catalogue in Gorges (1979) for the widespread nature of Italian ceramics, especially Campanian ware.
The Hispano-Roman trading relationship was not a one-way exercise, however, and the export of Spanish goods to Italy was similarly active. However, the export trade of Hispania is, in some ways, less easy to analyse than its counterpart. In a number of areas the only information is literary. This does not necessarily make it unreliable, but does make the estimation of the trade's volume, organisation and origins that much more difficult. Such matters were not of much interest to ancient authors, who generally regarded commerce as a subject unsuited to literary endeavour. As a result, their comments are usually made in passing and contain little detail. A certain amount of archaeological evidence helps fill some gaps, but on the whole the picture is less cohesive.

The Spanish export trade appears to have hinged on two industries for which the Iberian peninsula was famous in classical antiquity: mining and agriculture. Ancient authors tended to depict the whole Iberian peninsula as a farmer's land of plenty, but this was not strictly true. The fertile soil of Hispania was limited to parts of the valleys of the Tagus, Hiberus and, in particular, the Baetis and to an eastern and southern 'coastal strip' as far as Gades. This strip varied greatly in width, enclosing much of Cataluña, but narrowing to a bare few kilometres in parts of Valencia and Murcia. However, these fertile zones made up for their restricted geographical nature by being exceptionally productive. We are dependent, for the most part, on Strabo for an account of the goods involved. He lists a wide variety of primary and secondary agricultural products: grain, wine, olive oil, wool and more delicate fabrics, esparto grass rope, wax and honey. Strabo also mentions the importance of two products from Hispania's equally famous marine resources, garum, the fish sauce so beloved of the Romans, and saltfish.

Archaeological evidence suggests that, although the trade in garum and olive oil began at the end of the Republic, it only reached high levels under the Empire, but the other items may well have been exported during the republican period. The

98 See above p. 209.
99 Pliny, Nat. 3.7; Strabo 3.1.6.
100 See chapter 2, pp. 28.
101 Strabo 3.2.5-6; 3.4.9.
102 Strabo 3.2.6; Pliny, Nat. 31.94.
wool, fabric and rope were all Spanish specialities, valued for qualities that were considered unique, according to Strabo. Comments by Athenaeus make it clear that Spanish esparto was a product of international renown as early as the third century. Physically not dissimilar to the rush, esparto's fibres have great tensile strength and when woven together they made one of the ancient world's strongest and most hard-wearing ropes. Spanish wool and the sheep that produced it were also both famous, to the extent that Varro recommended *hispani* as excellent stock-farmers. The volume of trade in these items is nearly impossible to estimate and its origins are difficult to discern in many cases, since there is little in the way of supporting evidence for Strabo's comments. There is no reason to doubt that trade in these items did occur, but the exact timing and volume of this trade remains unclear.

Information concerning the mining industry is similarly vague, although here considerable supplementary evidence is supplied from archaeological sources. The areas of the Iberian peninsula which came under Roman control during the course of the Republic gave access to vast reserves of copper, tin, lead, silver and cinnabar. The main mining areas were the Sierra Morena, where copper, cinnabar and argentiferous lead ore was to be found, and the hinterland of Carthago Nova, mainly known for its silver production. The latter group of mines fell into Roman hands during the course of the Second Punic War, but it is not certain exactly when those of the Sierra Morena were acquired. It is possible they were not in Roman possession until the late second century. The ore bodies formed part of the Spanish booty won by the army and were thus worthy of the attention of ancient writers. In any case, the level of production was far greater than anything the Romans had previously encountered and a little plain curiosity, even awe, is noticeable in all accounts. Most ancient authors dwell mainly on the silver mines at Carthago Nova, where production levels were prodigious by ancient standards, but archaeological evidence suggests that the Sierra Morena mines were both more productive and held greater reserves.

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104 Athenaeus 5.206D.
106 Varro, *R.* 2.10.4.
107 Davies (1935) 110-112.
109 Polybius 10.10; Diodorus Siculus 5.36; Strabo 3.2.9-10. See also chapter 7, pp. 184-185.
110 Davies (1935) 110.
The fact that the primary product of the Carthago Nova mines was silver may well explain the writers’ bias in this matter.

The degree to which native Italians are considered to have been involved in mineral production in Hispania, is, of course, heavily dependent on the theory of mine management to which one subscribes. The current preference for Domergue’s large scale exploitation theory rather limits active native Italian participation, suggesting that most on-site activities were in the hands of freedmen institores and overseers.111

Whichever method was in operation, the existence of the mines ensured a home market for many of the slaves produced as a by-product of continuing warfare in the peninsula.112 The horrific conditions in the mines created a high turnover rate amongst the workers, ensuring a constant demand for new slaves. However, the wars in Hispania, especially the Lusitanian and Numantine Wars, produced a high volume of prisoners, and some may have been sold to masters in Italy.113 Although the internal market may well have been the more important of the two, the slave trade will still have brought a good number of native Italians to the Iberian peninsula. There will have been few locals among the slave dealers. It would be a very foolish commander who delivered recently defeated troops into the hands of someone whose loyalties were uncertain. It would be reasonable to expect that the majority of such men would be native Italian. Presumably such dealers, or their representatives, travelled in the army’s train with other types of camp follower.

A final export item which is not mentioned in the literature, but which is firmly attested by archaeological evidence, is Spanish ceramic ware. The ware involved is known as Painted Iberian Pottery and was produced all over the Catalan region between the second century and the Augustan period. Italy was not the only recipient, and Painted Iberian Pottery found its way to many parts of the Mediterranean, especially the western sector.114 The sheer spread of examples

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111 Domergue (1990) 247-252. See chapter 7, p. 188.
112 For examples, see Appian, Ib. 68 & 100; Livy 21.15.1-2, 34.16.10 & 39.42.1; Plutarch, Sert. 3 & 25.
113 Thus Varro, R. 2.10.4.
suggests that the volume of trade may have been large, although not of a level to rival that of incoming ceramic ware.

Despite the volume of trade in both directions, however, there is little trace of the men involved in it. Despite this it can be safely assumed that there was considerable native Italian participation. The nature of the situation suggests that the portion of the trade which was dealt with beyond the Iberian shores - the export to, and sale of goods in, Italy and the transportation of Italian items to Hispania - will have been carried out predominantly by native Italians. It was they who held the Italian contacts and who were protected in their overseas work by the might of the Roman army. It is true that certain communities in Hispania, frequently Greek or Carthaginian in origin, had long been involved in overseas trade, but prior to the Second Punic War trade with Italy had not been substantial or formed a coherent pattern. As the conquered, Spanish towns, whatever their background, had somewhat lost the initiative; the native Italians had every advantage. In the case of the trader operating within the Iberian peninsula, especially in the hinterland, matters may well have been a little different. A higher proportion of Spanish merchants - a term which, in the present context, also includes those from Greek or Carthaginian communities in Hispania - must be expected, since they would have known the local market and have had a well established set of business contacts. However, given that the bulk of trade appears to have been conducted in the populous and accessible regions of the east and south, it would be reasonable to expect that native Italians still had a fairly important role to play, especially if operating in alliance with Spanish traders.

Account also needs to be taken of the institor, who would not necessarily be native Italian. In the eastern sector of the empire the use of institores by merchants is a well documented phenomenon, but it should remembered that periodic, or even permanent, presence of the principal was also normal. Naturally they were in most common use amongst wealthy men either with diverse business interests or the desire to distance themselves from commercial endeavour, the better to pursue a public

116 See above pp. 210-211 & 214.
117 See above pp. 198 & 201.
career. However, less affluent businessmen also had a use for such agents, which allowed them to engage in a geographically wider range of activities. In the West the picture is less clear, but the same general principles applied, no doubt. In the case of Hispania a further reason for the use of an agent probably became an even more important factor: a desire to avoid hazardous foreign travel. The special circumstances of Hispania must have increased the proportion of agents involved, but to what degree is impossible to tell. The only certainty is that the names of freedmen are quite prominent in Spanish republican epigraphy.\textsuperscript{118}

Since the question of the use of \textit{institores} has raised the issue, it is worth briefly considering the precise origins of the native Italian \textit{ingenui} involved in trade. Onomastic studies of traders operating in the eastern Mediterranean have shown that most such men were ethnically Italian, rather than Roman, even though some were also \textit{cives Romani}.\textsuperscript{119} This point has been confirmed by research into the linguistic peculiarities of Latin inscriptions on Delos.\textsuperscript{120} It is generally believed that this pattern was mirrored in the western provinces. The epigraphic records of Carthago Nova, a noted port, and the mould marks found on many republican Spanish lead ingots do offer some confirmation of this theory: the names of southern and central Italian \textit{gentes} predominate among the individuals mentioned.\textsuperscript{121} The Italians, particularly those from Campania and southern Italy more generally, seem to have been quick to take up the opportunities created by their ally’s military expansion. It is unlikely that there is any particular significance in this fact. Italians vastly outnumbered Romans in the Italian peninsula and that in itself is quite sufficient to account for the imbalance. However, the Italian predominance in commercial affairs

\textsuperscript{118} The benefaction inscriptions from Carthago Nova are an excellent example. See CIL 2 3433 & 5927; chapter 7, p. 190.
\textsuperscript{119} Hatzfeld (1912) passim, esp. 142-154.
\textsuperscript{120} Pocetti (1984) passim.
\textsuperscript{121} Barreda Pascual (1998) 318-319. See also the catalogue of individual settlers in the appendix. All, bar four, of the sixteen individuals in the catalogue known from mould marks have clear Italian origins: A7, A8, A9, C3, G1, M5, N1, P2, P3, R1, S2, U1. L6 and S6 both belong to Roman \textit{gens}, while the origins of F3 and L1 are unclear. Of the fifteen individuals known from epigraphic material found at Carthago Nova ten are thought to be of Italian origin: A2, A10, C1, C5, H1, N1, R1, R2, R3, V5.
is worth noting in the context of mercantile settlement since it may have produced differences in ethnic balance between communities of informal and formal settlers.\textsuperscript{122}

Many aspects of the mechanics of commercial endeavour elude us. It must be assumed that most merchants were, to some degree, engaged in trade in both directions - import and export. Whether they owned or chartered ships, it is common sense to assume that after all the trouble of carting goods in one direction, most would take the opportunity to make a profit on the return journey too. However it is rather difficult to assess how far this assumption can, or should, be taken. Some specialisation probably did occur. It is possible to suggest that some merchants did operate at a sophisticated level, as is demonstrated by the case of the terracotta antefixes and plaques from the now ruined classical temple at the Santuario de la Encarnación at Caravaca de la Cruz in Murcia. These have been identified, through their design and fabric, as being made in, and imported from, Italy during the second century.\textsuperscript{123} This type of import must have been brought in by merchants with a substantial network of business contacts, both buyers and sellers. Such architectural fancies would hardly have been brought to Hispania without a definite buyer in mind. They would need to have been of a suitable scale and number for the building in question and, given its religious nature and public prominence, the community would probably have wanted some control over the design of the articles. A great deal of effort would have had to be made to supply the temple with its requirements. It is clear that the importation of these items must have been a commission of sorts, in all likelihood carried out by merchants with the right contacts on behalf of those involved in the temple’s construction. This is not to suggest that all trade was carried out on a similar basis. Trade in the ancient world was frequently speculative and there seems no reason to deny this in the case of Hispania.

For some merchants the arrival at a Spanish port may have represented the end of their task. Bulk lots could be sold to small scale merchants and pedlars at the quayside. In Italy, and indeed across the eastern Mediterranean, much commercial

\textsuperscript{122} For example Barreda Pascual (1998) 367 has used the ethnic differences noted in the names recorded in the inscriptions of Valentia and Carthago Nova to argue that the former received little or no commercial immigration because the gentes found on Delos are not recorded in its epigraphic record and because those Italian gentes which are found in republican Valentia come from central Italy - not the commercially active south.

\textsuperscript{123} Ramallo Asensio and Arana Castillo (1993) 90-93.
activity is believed to have been conducted through periodic markets. Specific towns
in a given region would hold market days on a rotational basis, allowing traders to
travel from town to town in search of buyers. Activity is believed to have been conducted through periodic markets. Specific towns in a given region would hold market days on a rotational basis, allowing traders to travel from town to town in search of buyers. A similar approach seems to have been taken in Hispania, at any rate in the Baetic valley, although the degree of organisation and co-ordination involved is not clear. Evidence from the mid-first century suggests that by this time small scale native Italian merchants were working these regional trade circuits. In a letter to Cicero, C. Asinius Pollio refers to the violent death of a Roman circulator, or itinerant trader, at the hands of his quaestor, L. Cornelius Balbus. The unnamed man was executed at Gades, but reportedly also operated in the area of Hispalis, where he was well-known. Pollio notes that the reason he was well-known was due to a noticeable, but unspecified, physical deformity, indicating that the role of itinerant trader was not in itself unusual for a Roman.

In fact the first appearance of native Italian merchants on regional trade routes may belong to an even earlier period. In a rather fleeting episode, Livy tells of a crackdown on the southern town of Astapa (Estepa, prov. Sevilla) in 206. These people were notorious brigands who preyed on Romans and their allies with considerable vigour. Among their victims were “vagos milites Romanos lixasque et mercatores”, suggesting that native Italian merchants did indeed wander the highways and byways in some areas. Astapa was well located to take advantage of such travellers, centrally placed in a heavily populated area where a number of different trade circuits probably existed. The context of the passage, which dwells on the high nuisance value of the Astapa brigandage, suggests that such victims were not rare.

The use of the term mercatores suggests that these men were operating at a somewhat grander level than the humble circulator. Moreover the presence of soldiers and sutlers, lixae, in the same breath may indicate that these traders were not entirely independent travellers, but attached to the Roman army as camp followers. These were a fact of life on all campaigns and their numbers could reach quite high

125 Cicero, Fam. 10.32.3.
126 Livy 28.22.3.
levels, especially under siege conditions, when the army remained in one place for a prolonged period. They appear to have been a motley mixture of hispani and native Italians. The most detailed Spanish example of these people comes in the various descriptions of the expulsion of a group from Numantia by Scipio Aemilianus. Both Appian and Valerius Maximus recorded the event and detailed the various professions of the people in question. Amongst the expected employments of prostitute (ἐταῖρα, scortum) and soothsayer (μάντις, θυτής), are those of trader (ἐμπόρος), pedlar (institor) and sutler (lixia). Camp followers would have been providers of goods and services which fell outside the brief of the redemptores, minor luxuries intended to make military life more palatable. They are unlikely to have dealt in ceramics, but they probably helped swell the volume of the wine trade.

The essential problem with the proposition that there was mercantile participation in the informal settlement of Hispania is the lack of information concerning the traders themselves and this does present serious difficulties. However, the main purpose of this chapter has been to establish the existence of the necessary pre-conditions for such participation and this much has been achieved. The evidence concerning commercial activity in Hispania during the Republic is scrappy at best, but it is possible to create a coherent picture. The impression received from the sources is one of diversity and vigour, established from an early stage. The archaeological evidence clearly indicates that goods were being traded in large quantities, while the literary sources point to a wide range of commodities being involved, at least in the case of Spanish exports. The presence of some native Italians is recorded and the presence of others may be inferred. As a new entry to the empire, the Iberian peninsula was not a place where any native Italian would have ready-made commercial contacts. The need to establish a network of business friends would have been stronger than ever; mercantile involvement in Hispania will not necessarily have stopped at the quayside.

127 Appian, Ib. 85; Valerius Maximus 2.7.1.
128 This use of institor to mean ‘pedlar’ or ‘small scale retailer’ is in fact the more common in Latin literature. See TLL 7 col. 1985-1986.
III Applying the mercantile model

The pre-conditions for mercantile settlement did exist in Hispania and a review of the evidence presented in the previous chapter confirms the viability of this approach. The cases of Emporiae and Carthago Nova fit smoothly into the mercantile model. In both instances the probable presence of native Italian traders or businessmen has been an important component in the construction of a case for informal settlement. As its name suggests, Emporiae was deeply enmeshed in the Mediterranean’s trading networks, and trade has always been the most logical explanation for the presence of native Italians there. Archaeological investigation has painted the town as a clearing house for a wide variety of ceramic wares and as a centre for the importation of wine. An examination of this case in the context of the mercantile model serves to emphasise the likely outcome of this activity: settlement by native Italians.

Equally, the main grounds for connecting Carthago Nova with informal settlement has always been the presence of the mining industry on the town’s doorstep. Here the model further boosts the likelihood of resident traders. Carthago Nova was also an active port, one of the best on the eastern coast. Plentiful finds of ceramic imports and amphorae suggest there is no reason to believe that the town’s involvement in trade was limited to the mining industry. Under the mercantile model this would strengthen the likelihood that some independent settlement by native Italians did take place, since this type of trade would involve more small businessmen. Large societates, dependent on institores, would not be the only participants in commercial activity locally.

One particular aspect of the Carthago Nova case may also serve, in turn, to emphasise the relevance of the Delian component of the mercantile model. A detailed onomastic study of the republican epigraphic texts from the town has shown that a number of gentes operating on Delos were also at work in Carthago Nova.

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129 For the wine trade, see above pp. 212-213. For Emporiae’s trade in ceramics, see chapter 7, pp. 177.
130 Strabo 3.4.6.
during the Republic.\textsuperscript{132} 

\textit{Liberti} of the \textit{gentes Aleidia, Lollia, Ofellia} and \textit{Plotia} are all recorded in the corpus of Carthago Nova republican inscriptions, although no \textit{ingenui} with these names make an appearance.\textsuperscript{133} Members of these Italian \textit{gentes} are also found on Delos during much the same period.\textsuperscript{134} How close the relationship was between these geographically divergent family branches cannot be ascertained, but the existence of a link, however tenuous, is interesting. If nothing else, the existence of members of the same \textit{gens} at work at different ends of the Mediterranean serves to confirm that the expectation of similar behaviour by native Italian \textit{negotiatores} no matter where they were in the Roman world is not an unreasonable one.

The mercantile model allows us to do more than simply re-read and confirm the sparse evidence for informal settlement. It encourages the examination of Spanish communities generally, seeking those which may show little sign of involvement in informal settlement in the historical or archaeological record, yet which fit the expectations of the mercantile model.

There are several communities suitable for this type of treatment, of which perhaps the most obvious is Gades (Cádiz) (map 7). A thriving, cosmopolitan commercial centre, it seems to have successfully adapted to Roman rule in the peninsula and to have gone from strength to strength under it. Strabo described it as second only to Rome in population, possessing some five hundred \textit{equites}, a larger number than any Italian city except Patavium.\textsuperscript{135} Strabo’s figure is suspect and these men will have been Gaditanians, rather than native Italians, but his comments indicate the city’s perceived prosperity.\textsuperscript{136} By the end of the Caesarian Civil Wars it seems to have been granted the status of a \textit{municipium}, probably by Caesar, who had close links both with the town and one of its leading citizens L. Cornelius Balbus.\textsuperscript{137} Archaeological exploration of the city has been hindered by the fact that the modern city of Cádiz sits squarely over the ancient site. Epigraphic finds have been few, with

\begin{itemize}
  \item Barreda Pascual (1998) 318-319.
  \item Aleidii: \textit{ID} 2612. Lollii: \textit{ID} 1731. Ofellii: \textit{ID} 1688; Hatzfeld (1912) 60. Plotii: \textit{ID} 1732.
  \item Strabo 3.5.3.
  \item Lasserre (1966) 200.
  \item Cicero, \textit{Fam.} 10.32.2; Balb. 43.
\end{itemize}
only one republican example which refers to a native Italian - the tombstone of one Sex. Annius Lucanus. As the major commercial centre on the southern coast of Hispania, the only one on the Atlantic coast during the Republic, we might reasonably expect to find a native Italian community in Gades, but traces are hard to find.

The case of Hispalis presents exactly the same problem (map 7). Like Gades it was a major commercial centre, but very little is known about it prior to the Caesarian Civil Wars, when it first appears in the sources as a prosperous and politically active town. Placed at the highest point on the Baeitis which could be reached by ocean-going vessels, the town was well-placed to participate in trade from all over the Mediterranean. It also appears to have been involved in the boat building industry. It can be postulated that the combination of commercial activity and the proximity of the established native Italian community at Italica only a few kilometres away would have encouraged informal settlement, but proving this thesis is impossible at present.

Tarraco may be another possible site, although for slightly different reasons (map 7). Although it does not seem to have possessed a particularly good port, the town had good road connections and a long standing link with the Roman army. As a wintering base and commander’s headquarters it was an obvious place for native Italian traders and travellers in Hispania to congregate. The protection of the army and the opportunities for trade should have been an enticing combination. However, once again there is very little material with which to work. In the literary sources the town is only mentioned in connection with the military. It is also the army which causes problems for the sparse archaeological and epigraphic evidence. Archaeological investigation does suggest that Tarraco acquired the physical semblance of a Roman town during the Republic, and two inscriptions concerned

138 CIL 2 1761. See the appendix, entry A4.
139 B. Hisp. 35-36.
140 Strabo 3.2.3.
141 B. Alex. 56.
143 Port: Strabo 2.4.8; Road network: Keay (1988) 49.
144 Livy 21.61.11, 26.20.1-6, 28.4.4.
with native Italians have been found dating to the republican period, but the presence of the army provides a straightforward explanation for both.\textsuperscript{145} There is no material which could be specifically related to the informal settlement of civilian native Italians in Tarraco.

It should also be noted that a number of the communities connected with independent settlement in the previous chapter through the presence of individual informal settlers also fit with the mercantile model.\textsuperscript{146} The cases of Gades and Emporiae have already been dealt with, but those of Hasta (Mesa de Asta, prov. Cádiz), Iliipa (Alcalá del Río, prov. Sevilla), Dianium (Denia, prov. Alicante), the Sucro river (Júcar river), Cerro de los Santos (prov. Albacete), Berrocal (prov. Huelva), Almonaster la Real (prov. Huelva), Mértola (prov. Baixo Alentejo) and Caséval (prov. Baixo Alentejo), should also be borne in mind (map 7). The individuals recorded at Mértola and Caséval are perhaps less than convincing in the role of mercantile settler. These sites lay in the south-west outside Roman control for much of the Republic, as a result of which their attraction for native Italian traders may well have been limited. By contrast, Dianium, on the coast, and the Sucro river were actually components of the physical trade network during the Republic. The others lay in accessible, prosperous regions of the south and east and it is not unreasonable to suggest that some of their inhabitants may have been participants in trade.

The archaeological and epigraphic records from the republican period concerning all these communities are erratic and unhelpful. Although it is not possible to be sure of the role played by any of them in the development of informal settlement, the fact that they can be labelled as possible candidates through the application of the mercantile model shows the usefulness of this tool in the struggle to understand this complex process. The mercantile model does not provide answers to all of the many questions which remain concerning informal settlement, but it does make some aspects of this erratic phenomenon more readily comprehensible and provides a sound basis for further research.

\textsuperscript{146} See chapter 7, pp. 161-162.
In the midst of this concentration on matters mercantile, it must be remembered that the participation of veteran settlers in informal settlement is also probable, given their familiarity with the region and the willingness of veterans to join formal settlements. Their involvement in informal settlement is much harder to trace than that of merchants, however, for a number reasons. Veteran settlers in formal contexts have shown themselves to be chiefly concerned with the acquisition of agricultural land and a stable environment in which to exploit it.\(^\text{147}\) In this they acted no differently from their fellows elsewhere in the empire and the trend is likely to have applied to potential informal veteran settlers also. Discussion in chapter 7 clearly demonstrated that both the deficiencies and inherent weaknesses of the available evidence make it impossible to locate agricultural settlers outside a formal context with any confidence.\(^\text{148}\) This severely restricts what can be said on this topic.

A theoretical knowledge of the mechanics of the informal settlement of veterans would assist enormously, as it has done in the case of mercantile settlement, but at present it lies beyond reach. How an independent settler might acquire land in Hispania without official assistance is unknown and largely beyond supposition, although there is one obvious option: the easiest route, presumably, would be offered by existing formal settlements, where an informal settler could live as an *incola*, his bid to become a landowner eased by the existence of a familiar legal system. It is, of course, always possible that some veterans chose quite a different course, becoming small traders themselves. It is easy to envisage a veteran in the role of *circulator*, or even that of camp follower. It is necessary to accept, for the present, that, while veterans participated in informal settlement, it is impossible to be sure of the level of that participation or the manner in which it occurred.

Nonetheless, the effect of this group on the overall process must be taken into account. By and large veterans approached the issue of settlement from a different point of view from that of the merchants and they will not have been bound by precisely the same considerations. Their attitudes undoubtedly affected the overall pattern of settlement, but this difference in priorities need not have had too radical an effect. In the first half of the second century the needs and wants of these two groups

\(^\text{147}\) See chapter 5, section II.
\(^\text{148}\) See chapter 7, pp. 164-167.
would have led them to settle in similar areas in any case, since at this time the zone firmly within Roman control did not extend far from the eastern and southern coasts and the banks of the Baetis. However, as the conquest of the peninsula progressed veterans may have been tempted to move further afield than mercantile settlers. They did not share the negotiatores' need for ready access to commercially active areas and, especially by the later first century, may have been more easily tempted to settle in the newly secured areas of the north and west.

Informal settlement is an elusive phenomenon. Evidence for it is hard to come by and what material does exist is complex and full of difficulties. This much is indisputable. However, informal settlement should not be dismissed as an unrewarding subject, unworthy of close attention. In the absence of concrete evidence, a working knowledge of the types of people who participated and the factors by which they were affected vastly improves our understanding of how the settlement process may have functioned in practice. It is true that it is impossible to state with any certainty that informal settlement took place in a particular locality without direct evidence for such activity. Nonetheless, the mercantile model can be used realistically to suggest that the possibility of independent settlement in a specific place is better viewed as a probability. The evolutionary pattern of the informal settlement of Hispania was guided by the independent actions of many individuals, which suggests that it will never lend itself to neat academic structuring, no matter how much we learn about it. Nonetheless, within certain well-defined limits it is perfectly possible to explore native Italian participation in informal settlement.
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION

The corpus of modern scholarship on the pattern of native Italian settlement in the Iberian peninsula between the Second Punic War and the death of Augustus is both complex and controversial. Given the evidence on which it rests, that is entirely comprehensible. Study in this field faces many obstacles, most of which are connected with the scarcity of information. There are no definitive solutions to the problems arising from this situation. Different authors have brought a range of methods to bear on the subject over the years, illuminating it from a multitude of angles. The approach taken in the present study, which concentrates on both the types of settlement which occurred and the motivations behind them, has now been tested and has proven itself an effective tool in this difficult area. It has not produced a radical reordering of the pace or pattern of settlement, but rather it has clarified many of the issues involved, resulting in a better understanding of the process as a whole.

The strongest argument for the wisdom of investigating both types of settlement at the same time is the stark differences between them. These differences are evident not only in their form and function, but also in the amount of information available concerning each one. An examination of the division of settlement types has shown that most of the evidence called upon in the past in order to discuss settlement as a whole actually arises from a formal context. In order to fully understand the native Italian settlement of the peninsula in its entirety, it is necessary to be able to appreciate the relative contributions of the two very different types. In some senses our ability to understand settlement as a whole will always be limited, because of the disparity in information available for each type. However, acknowledgement of that disparity allows scholars to compensate for it, producing a more balanced picture overall.

The second element of the present approach has also demonstrated its usefulness. The examination of motivational factors in settlement has successfully
shown that it is possible to attribute coherent motives to specific categories of settlers, as well as settlement founders. This has helped illuminate informal settlement more clearly than would otherwise have been possible. The creation of a model of informal mercantile settlement from an analysis of motivational factors is arguably the most useful aspect of this work. An appreciation of the basic structure and pattern of informal settlement allows it to be compared and contrasted with formal settlement on a more realistic basis. The study of the motivational issues affecting both veterans and the urban poor has also helped produce a clearer understanding of formal settlement. In particular, it has furnished a coherent, reasoned answer to the long-standing question of why Hispania’s abysmal reputation as the graveyard of Roman armies did not prevent veteran participation in formal settlement.

The ultimate aim of the approach taken by this study has been to clarify the pattern of settlement by native Italians in Hispania in its entirety. So far, however, the results produced by this approach have necessarily been presented in a compartmentalised fashion. It is now time to assess the process of settlement as whole. The first formal native Italian settlement in the Iberian peninsula, Italica, was created in 206, in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of the Barcids.\(^1\) Established in an *ad hoc* manner, following the basic outline of a colony, but without the permission or assistance of the proper authorities, Italica was a result of contemporary strategic and political requirements. The circumstances surrounding this unofficial foundation set the tone for formal settlement in the following century. As an organised body, the unofficial representatives of the conquerors, the community probably had political and cultural importance beyond what might have been expected of such a small and isolated group. Nonetheless, that isolation must be born in mind. Italica would wait some 35 years for the creation of another formal settlement in Hispania, and at best Carteia was merely a step-sibling.

It is likely that the beginnings of informal settlement were contemporaneous and similarly modest. It is not inconceivable that informal settlement had in fact preceded the Second Punic War, since trade between Italy and Hispania had its

\(^1\) Appian, *ib. 38.*
origins in the sixth century, albeit on a very small scale.\textsuperscript{2} However, settlement at such an early date does not seem particularly likely, as the factors which later made secure settlement possible - Roman control of Spanish ports and the presence of the Roman army - were not yet in place. Independent settlement by native Italians probably began at more or less the same time in a number of different locations. The arrival of pioneering traders would be followed by a slow accumulation of less daring individuals. The fact that settlers were gathering at several different sites would have retarded the growth of individual communities. Emporiae, Carthago Nova and Gades were all likely to attract early settlers (map 8). Each one was situated in an area which had come under Roman control by 206. All were flourishing commercial ports and part of the existing Mediterranean trade network.\textsuperscript{3}

Both types of settlement became a natural part of the Spanish landscape as the second century progressed. The growth of formal settlement in the Republic was neither steady nor smooth. Although individual approaches to the task varied, at base all Roman commanders created formal settlements as a response to an immediate need to settle veterans and secure strategic positions. This resulted in scattered settlement, which did not follow an easily predictable pattern. It is difficult to talk of the ‘evolution’ of formal settlement during the pre Caesarian period because the term suggests a sense of coherency and progress that is lacking here. In terms of location and status, there is a considerable gap between the first republican foundation, Italica, and the last, the Pompeian settlement at Valentia. The former was an unofficial foundation established just behind a frontier zone, while the latter was an official colony founded in a long pacified coastal area. However, the settlements which intervened did not follow a straight path between these two positions. Italica’s first companion was Carteia, the grand anomaly in Spanish settlement. Thereafter, in order, followed Corduba, the second century foundation of Valentia, Palma and Pollentia (maps 3 & 6).\textsuperscript{4} Valentia was an unofficial foundation constructed in a

\textsuperscript{2} See chapter 8, pp. 211 & 214. For the earliest known phase of trade see Maluquer de Motes (1985) 20; Sanmartí Grego et al. (1991) 84.

\textsuperscript{3} Emporiae: Livy 34.9; Strabo 3.4.8. New Carthage: Strabo 3.4.6. Gades: Strabo 3.5.3. Hispalis: B. Hisp. 35-36.

pacified zone. The other three were all unofficial settlements established in frontier areas. Corduba became a military headquarters; Palma and Pollentia protected ports from which pirates had recently been evicted. Finally, in the first century, came Salaria and Caecilia Metellinum (*maps 3 & 6*). The former was an official foundation probably located in a major mining district for strategic reasons, the latter was almost certainly an official foundation, lying on the edge of the contemporary frontier. There is no evolutionary pattern here, rather a higgledy-piggledy arrangement in which there is only one clear-cut moment of permanent change: the beginning of the first century, when a move is made from unofficial foundations to official colonies. During the republican period formal settlement did not evolve so much as lurch from one foundation to the next.

What prevented an evolutionary pattern developing was the circumstances of settlement creation. When Roman commanders established settlements during the pre-Caesarian period they reacted to contemporary requirements in Hispania: the current military situation, the needs of their veterans, the prestige of their political career. Every commander’s situation was different, and every response was individual. The formal settlements in Hispania bear similarities to one another, but each one is designed to solve a very specific set of problems and so, in the final analysis, each one is unique. The permanent change from unofficial to official foundations was brought about by circumstances in Rome, not in Hispania. In 118 Narbo Martius was founded in southern Gaul: the Roman political establishment had finally brought itself round to the idea of the creation of colonies outside Italy. This naturally affected the commanders in Hispania. Although we know very little of the events surrounding the creation of Salaria and Caecilia Metellinum, it is a safe assumption that they were established under much the same kind of circumstances as their predecessors. The only difference was that now the commanders responsible had an alternative option when trying to make appropriate arrangements.

How informal settlement progressed during the Republic is more difficult to determine. The steadily increasing trade between the two peninsulas suggests that independent settlement may have followed suit - to what degree is difficult to tell.

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6 Velleius Paterculus 2.7.8.
The most noticeable aspect of the development of both Carthago Nova and Emporiae as communities is that both seem to have reached some kind of turning point in the late second and early first century. At Emporiae this period brought the establishment of the new civilian community, while Carthago Nova appears to have developed the Latin ‘epigraphic habit’ at about this time. Both events suggest that the local population of informal settlers had reached a substantial size, which allowed the community to function at a more sophisticated level than before. Whether the population had increased slowly over the course of the preceding century, or a sudden influx had occurred is not clear. It is likely that the flow of independent settlers to Hispania during the Republic suffered troughs and peaks, just as modern migratory patterns do. The overall trend was almost certainly an increase in settlement over the course of the second and first centuries, but the precise manner in which it occurred is now obscure (map 9).

While it is necessary to see formal and informal settlement in this period as quite separate phenomena, there is no reason to doubt that there was plenty of communication and interaction between formal and informal settlers. Besides the general, and perfectly natural, tendency of migrants with a common ethnic origin to form a wide variety of loose alliances, pre-existing professional links would also have encouraged such association. Formal settlers at this time were veteran soldiers and many mercantile settlers would have had links to the army as an important consumer of their goods. Equally some informal settlers were themselves veterans. In the early years of formal settlement, when official foundations had yet to appear, there was probably little physical, and indeed practical, difference between the two types once they had become properly established. Their daily circumstances, surrounded by indigenous peoples, and internal social structures would have been essentially similar. The development of a loose support network - social, commercial and political - is highly likely. There is, of course, a limit to the amount of interaction that can be expected. Settlement centres were generally well dispersed, the only really close neighbours being Italica and Hispalis. Despite the existence of similarities at the level of individual communities, as a general phenomenon informal

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settlement is not easily compared with the formal variety. It will have had its own chronological rhythms, linked to the steady expansion of the Hispano-Roman trading relationship and its own geographical patterns. Informal settlement was less cohesive and more likely to be transitory.

The total number of native Italian settlers living in the Iberian peninsula by the start of the Caesarian Civil Wars is a matter of considerable academic speculation. Most evidence for settlement concerns its existence, not its magnitude and it is extremely difficult to estimate the level of native Italian settlement at any period. Nonetheless there are some sources of information. During the Sertorian war, Plutarch makes mention of 2,600 men fighting in Sertorius’ army ‘οὗς ὑνόμαξε Ῥωμοῖος’ - ‘whom he called Romans’.⁸ The phraseology indicates that these troops were not formed from the pro-Marian exiles who had fled Italy to join Sertorius in Hispania. The citizenship of such men was in no doubt and, in any case, most are believed to have been prominent, politically active, individuals who would have been more likely to serve as cavalrymen than foot soldiers. Later, in the course of the Caesarian civil wars several legions raised in Hispania make appearances in the literary sources. One in particular, consistently referred to as the *legio vernacula*, has received considerable attention from modern scholars. It is first encountered in the sources in 49 when it revolted against the Pompeian governor of Ulterior, Varro.⁹ It returned to the fold soon afterwards and remained one of the crack Pompeian units until the battle of Munda, at which point it drops from sight.¹⁰ Following this defeat of the Pompeian forces, Caesar disbanded the units which had fought against him. Some troops were absorbed into his own army, but he agreed to let all those ‘qui habeant domicilium aut possessionem in Hispania’ return to their homes unmolested.¹¹ These men accounted for approximately one third of the Pompeian forces in Hispania - perhaps as many as 8,000 men.¹²

There are two obvious difficulties with this material: the potential pitfalls of extrapolating general population statistics from this type of data and the uncertainty

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⁹ Caesar, * Civ.* 2.20. For Varro see *MRR* 2 p. 264.
¹⁰ B. Alex. 53-54, 57-59; B. Afr. 7, 12, 20.
¹¹ Caesar, * Civ.* 1.86-87.
surrounding the ethnicity of those involved. The former issue has long been
recognised. The uncertainties of the evidence have generally restricted the
enthusiasm of modern scholars for placing a figure on the possible native Italian
migrant population in Hispania. Most have confined themselves to contemplating
the question of settlement in fairly broad, and usually non numeric, terms.13 There
is one famous, and instructive, exception to this tendency toward generality. Brunt,
frustrated by the tendency of many scholars to shrink from statistics, has suggested
that in the year 49 the resident population of ‘Romans’ in Hispania might come to
some 30,000.14 Brunt based his calculation on the first century data mentioned
above, but he does not disclose its mathematical basis, nor does he indicate whether
the final figure refers to adult males or the total population. In any case, even if these
issues were to be clarified, in terms of population statistics, the figure would still be
meaningless, since it lacks a broader context. In order to establish the proper
significance of such a number, it is necessary to be able to place it within the context
of the Iberian peninsula’s population as a whole - something which, in the absence of
data, cannot be calculated at the present time.15 The importance of context is made
obvious by other scholars’ use of figures. Harris talked of ‘tens of thousands’ of
native Italian migrants in the context of his discussion of the ‘considerable’ level of
immigration taking place in the second century, whereas Keay states that Brunt’s
analysis shows that ‘as few as 30,000 Romans’ lived in Hispania in the mid-first
century.16 Brunt’s opinion on the significance of the figure ‘30,000’ is unknown.
This example only serves to reinforce the wisdom of avoiding statistical approaches
to the quantification of native Italian settlement in Hispania. There is simply
insufficient reliable data to create even the most basic of rational, unambiguous
estimates.

13 Sutherland (1939) 58; Thouvenot (1940) 183-184; Wilson (1966) 10; Galsterer (1971) 3; Knapp
Fear (1996) 31-32. It is interesting to note that Marin Diaz does not attempt quantification.
15 The lack of data has not prevented guesses being made. Blázquez (1978) 247 suggested that the
population of the Iberian peninsula at the end of the third century may have been 5-6 million. He does
not supply either the evidential or mathematical basis of his calculations.
The second barrier to the quantification of settlement is also serious. The everyday lives of migrants after their initial settlement is a complex area of research, which lies outside the remit of this study. For present purposes it is enough to recognise certain realities. When examining the general history of Hispania in the republican and Augustan periods, native Italians settlers must not be viewed as a clear-cut group, preserving their juridico-political status and ethnic heritage in pristine condition. Unfortunately, questions about the degree to which native Italians intermarried with hispani, and how the descendants of such unions subsequently aligned themselves, ethnically and politically, are very hard to answer. In theory, a carefully defined gap may have existed between the hispaniensis and the hispanus, but in practice one suspects there were gradations between the Spanish-born son of two native Italians possessed of the standard complement of juridico-political rights and the indigenous hispanus, governed by the local laws of his community. Presumably, one hundred and fifty years of formal and informal settlement would have produced a very complex mix of ethnic origin and juridico-political status among the inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula. The literary sources do not record this mix with any clarity.

This situation has a real impact on the usefulness of the information found in the sources. It is unclear whether Sertorius’ designation of his infantry troops as ‘Roman’ was accurate, or inspired by the needs of wartime. Equally, while the term ‘vernacula’ clearly suggests provincial recruitment, it has been variously interpreted as referring to hispani or hispanienses.\(^\text{17}\) Realistically it might have indicated either; both would have had Spanish ‘domicilia aut possessiones’ to which to return when the fighting was over. Although, strictly speaking, the title ‘legion’ could only be applied to citizen troops, the exigencies of war had already caused the creation of one ‘legion’ composed of non-citizens: the legio V Alaudae, recruited by Caesar in Gaul.\(^\text{18}\) It is impossible to be certain about the precise ethnic origins of any of the people mentioned in these various excerpts.


So what can be said about the level of pre-Caesarian settlement in Hispania? The overriding impression received is one of considerable expansion from modest beginnings. Given the large gaps between formal settlement foundations, it is likely that informal settlers were in the majority initially (map 8). However the honours may have been more or less even by the mid-first century; formal settlement probably caught up with informal settlement in a series of leaps, as each new foundation was established (maps 9 & 10). Settler numbers must have risen exponentially during the course of the second and early first centuries, as mercantile settlers rolled in and successive formal foundations were created. Nonetheless, size is relative, and in relative terms it is doubtful that the pre-Caesarian native Italian settlers, whatever their background, represented a major factor in the Iberian peninsula's overall population. This does not mean they were unimportant. In part, it was the presence of native Italians which made the Iberian peninsula a theatre of war during the 40s: clearly neither side felt they could ignore such a source of support. The events of this period make it clear that the migrant population was a force to be reckoned with. Besides serving in the armies of both factions, native Italians formed conventus which, on more than one occasion, made and enforced decisions concerning political allegiance which also affected the wider indigenous community. Native Italian settlers were clearly influential and confident of their position. The settler population in the pre-Caesarian era is, therefore, perhaps best characterised as small but obtrusive.

The battle of Munda was to prove a turning point for the Iberian peninsula. The period between the end of the Caesarian Civil Wars and Augustus' last visit to Hispania, some thirty years, brought radical alterations to the character of settlement. The position occupied by native Italians in the peninsula by the end of this period was the cumulative result of changes made by both Caesar and Augustus, but their work should not be regarded as a joint effort. Both used settlement as a political tool, but for differing ends. Their approaches to the subject bore similarities, but did not produce the same outcome. As a consequence it is necessary to see the settlement of this period as falling into two well-defined blocks.

19 The famous example is that of the Corduban conventus recorded by Caesar (B. Alex. 57), but the same situation seems to have prevailed at Carteia (B. Hisp. 36).
Caesar’s most obvious contribution to the overall pattern of settlement was the determined use of colonial settlement forms: all new communities were official foundations. These enjoyed a regularised relationship with the Roman state, which few of the pre-Caesarian foundations had ever known. Like their predecessors these new communities were situated in areas of strategic importance, but under Caesar’s direction the strategy involved was now more political than military. He needed to control the prosperous south, which had been the heartland of support for Pompey. The majority of his settlements were re-foundations of towns which had previously shown themselves to be Pompeian supporters in one way or another. Consequently by the early years of the first century Caesarian foundations dominated the length and breadth of the Baetic valley. More than half the eleven Caesarian foundations were located in this area: Ucubi, Urso, Hispalis, Corduba, Hasta, Iptucci and Acci.\(^{20}\) The remaining four -Tarraco, Celsa, Carthago Nova and Ilici - were positioned to the north and east (maps 4 & 6).\(^{21}\)

The Caesarian creations in the Baetic valley represented the heaviest geographical concentration of new foundations the Iberian peninsula would ever see. The density and scale of the Caesarian group as a whole must be emphasised. During the republican era various Roman commanders had created nine communities over the course of roughly a hundred and thirty years; Caesar made plans for eleven colonies in the space of twelve months. Of course, these did not come into being for several years thereafter, but even so they represented a massive change in settlement patterns, which must have had a noticeable effect. Even if it is assumed that most new foundations retained a core of existing inhabitants, the Caesarian colonies would still have produced a native Italian migration explosion. In the space of a few years the numbers of native Italians living in Hispania might have increased by as much as half again.

Whether informal settlement prospered to a similar degree is uncertain. Although Caesar’s plans concerned formal settlement, they must have had an impact on the informal settlement of the period. He created formal settlements on the sites


of some communities which appear to have long played host to independent settlers. Carthago Nova, Hispalis and Tarraco were all made colonies at this time and, for a short while at least, all new settlers arriving in these places must have been part of the colonial process. On the other hand, a number of prosperous communities, among them Gades, were made municipia by Caesar. The title was prestigious, securing an advantageous relationship with Rome, but an influx of new formal settlers was not an integral part of the process of acquiring the status. Municipia situated in fertile areas, or with good commercial connections might have actively attracted informal settlement. There is certainly no reason to believe that mercantile settlement would slacken much (map 10), since the late first century was the period in which the export of Spanish wine and oil began on a grand scale. Indeed, the comparatively sudden boom in this trade may, in part, have been stimulated by the rise in numbers of native Italian settlers - cultivators and merchants - under Caesar and Augustus. Even if the producers of these goods were formal settlers, or hispani, the involvement of merchants in the process seems highly likely.

The completion of the conquest of the Iberian peninsula by Augustus saw further changes in the pattern of settlement. There was a second burst of foundation activity; ten new communities were created in the decade following the supposed defeat of the Astures in 25. On this occasion the demographic impact may have been muffled somewhat by the wider geographical distribution of the new settlements. As before, the prize was political, rather than military, security. There, however, the similarity ends. This time the wave of formal settlement was intended to emphasise the expansion of territory and the end of conflict. Caesar’s political preoccupations had led him to concentrate colonies in the south. The Augustan foundations were more varied, reflecting a different set of priorities (maps 5 & 6). It is true that Tucci, Asido and Astigi were all founded in the Baetic valley, neighbours to Caesarian colonies. In this case, the choice of location was probably governed by the fertility of the area, which could easily absorb yet another wave of veterans eager for land.

22 Gades: Pliny 4.119; Cicero, Fam. 10.32.2. Regina: Pliny, Nat. 3.15. Emporiae and Olisipo are other possible candidates for this status, see GF 1077 and Pliny, Nat. 4.117 for the respective cases.
24 Pliny, Nat. 3.11-12.
Barcino and Libisosa also occupied fairly conventional locations in the east, although with greater strategic importance. Barcino was a fine port, Libisosa guarded a route out of the Baetic valley, along the northern edge of the Betic Cordillera. However, the remaining five foundations, Caesaraugusta, Emerita, Scallabis, Pax Iulia and Norba lay far further west and north than would ever previously have been considered possible. Augustus had secured a sizeable tract of land, the occupants of which had previously defeated many a Roman general. It was a victory worth publicising and the positioning of settlements in secure locations within this area was an excellent method of achieving this.

The fact that Augustus planted his new formal settlements round the edge of Asturian territory, rather than squarely in it, merely indicates that his political ambitions were tempered by pragmatism. The north-western corner of the Iberian peninsula would not have presented an immediately attractive prospect to any kind of native Italian settler. The land is very hilly, mountainous in places, and climatically unsuitable for Mediterranean crop types. In addition, the treacherous Atlantic coastline and the difficulties of overland transport placed severe limitations on the participation of these areas in trade. Later, in the course of the first century AD the rich gold mines of the north-west did become a draw card for settlement, but they were of limited importance under Augustus. At this stage in its development north-western Hispania was an unlikely destination for informal settlers. By contrast the east and south of the peninsula would have remained attractive (map 11). Trade between Italy and Hispania continued to increase and the cessation of civil conflict and increased stability brought by Augustus must have further encouraged engagement in commercial ventures. The maturing formal settlements of the Baetic valley might even have become alluring targets for independent settlers, who could have joined the colonies as incolae.

What comes through very clearly from this review is the marked differences of behaviour between formal and informal settlement. The stark contrast in their form and function meant that the history of Rome’s relationship with the Iberian peninsula

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26 Caesaraugusta: Strabo 3.2.15. Emerita: Strabo 3.2.5. Scallabis, Pax Iulia and Norba: Pliny, Nat. 4.117.
produced a separate set of pressures and opportunities for each. The resulting complex pattern of settlement is difficult to encapsulate in the single pithy sentence usually required of a thesis conclusion. The complexity of the settlement process has been a point emphasised throughout this work, attempts at simplification set a dangerous precedent. However, if a snapshot view is utterly necessary then one can be provided, in metaphorical form. The two forms of settlement may be compared to two separate, co-existing power sources. Informal settlement may be likened to background energy, a more or less constant diffuse output suffering nothing more than occasional fluctuations. Formal settlement emanates from a second source, which generates sudden violent discharges at irregular intervals. A single such discharge may be produced, or a series, but after each burst the energy level drops back to constant. This picture may be a little fanciful, but it makes a vital point: informal, rather than formal, settlement was the consistent factor in the development of the settlement process. Independent settlers were there at the outset of the Roman conquest of the Iberian peninsula and they continued to migrate to Hispania long after the conquest was completed. It is both ironic and inauspicious that modern scholarship knows so little about this phenomenon.

This study has clearly demonstrated that the settlement of native Italians in Hispania prior to the death of Augustus was not a single, monolithic phenomenon, but a complex process involving many different interactive and interrelated strands. Official and unofficial formal settlement mixed with the informal migration of veterans and merchants to produce a huge range of settlement experiences. The cause of this complexity lies in the considerable variety of factors which influenced settlement development. In the past scholars have looked to the example of Roman behaviour in Italy to explain the evolution of settlement in the Iberian peninsula. To a degree they were correct to do so. The political attitudes surrounding settlement policy at Rome, which was then put into action across the Italian countryside, played a vitally important role in determining what it was possible to do at any given moment under the official aegis of Rome. Far more important, however, was the interaction of native Italians with the peninsula and its indigenous population. The independence of Roman commanders in Hispania, the lengthy conquest, the complex
geography and ethnography of the peninsula, the development of natural resource industries and the importance of Hispano-Roman trade each had an impact.

If there is a single thread which links all settlement, formal and informal, it is the Roman army. Each and every formal foundation was the result of military activity in the Iberian peninsula, which simultaneously made such settlement possible and supplied the need for it. Even Caesar's civilian settlers came to Hispania as the result of the Civil Wars fought there. Informal settlement too owes an important debt to the Roman army. Veteran troops became independent, as well as formal, settlers. Equally, while the conquest of Hispania was not essential to the migration of mercantile settlers, it still helped to encourage the commercial activity which drew them in the first place. Without the prolonged presence of the army in Hispania during the republican period, it is doubtful that the settlement of native Italians would ever have reached a notable level. The settlement of Hispania, formal and informal, was the direct product of a peculiar mixture of Roman reactions to Spanish influences. In the final analysis, settlement did not occur despite the troubled relationship between the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, but rather because of it.
geography and ethnography of the peninsula, the development of natural resource industries and the importance of Hispano-Roman trade each had an impact.

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APPENDIX

CATALOGUE OF INDIVIDUAL SETTLERS

The catalogue of individual settlers is presented here as an addition to the main body of the thesis, rather than as an integral part of it. The original purpose in creating the catalogue was to establish whether it was possible to trace the presence of any individual native Italians living in Hispania as a result of either formal or informal settlement, and whether any conclusions about the general pattern of emigration and settlement could be drawn from the material assembled. This line of research has proved disappointing in certain respects, but the results of it remain worthy of some attention, as has already been demonstrated.\(^1\)

I Criteria

The first of the original aims proved comparatively easy to fulfil. Despite the shortage of available material, it has been possible to create a catalogue of some seventy-eight individuals. Due both to the restrictions of time and the obvious limitations of the source material, the criteria for inclusion in the catalogue were kept as basic, and as broad, as possible. A native Italian ethnic background and residence in Hispania during the republican era (as opposed to those possessing short term 'visitor' status) or involvement in the earliest phases of Caesarian and Augustan colonisation were the only requirements made of candidates. For several reasons a decision was made to avoid material, mainly epigraphic, relating to the later Augustan years. The upswing in recorded inscriptions in this period and the increased difficulties of distinguishing indigenous *hispani* from native Italians as the romanisation of the Iberian peninsula progressed would have made the task more complex and lengthy than could be justified given its relative importance to the thesis as a whole.

Having established a body of individuals who appear in the sources, they were sorted into 'eligible' and 'ineligible' groups, dividing the *hispani*, visitors and non

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\(^1\) See chapter 7, pp. 161-164.
native Italian emigrants from native Italian migrants and *hispanienses*.\(^2\) Determining the correct status of those individuals who appear in the sources presents many difficulties. Neither literary nor epigraphic material routinely supplies adequate information to assist this. However, they do tend to allude to the status of an individual in a variety of ways some intentional, some quite unintentional. An individual’s classification is rarely achieved with utter certainty, only within varying degrees of likelihood. The manifold problems associated with separating *hispani* from native Italians has already been discussed in some detail in chapter 2.\(^3\) The difficulties are particularly acute in the case of individuals recorded on coin legends. In many cases uncertain chronology combines with highly abbreviated onomastic references to produce considerable confusion. Distinguishing native Italians from romanised *hispani* in such circumstances is impossible. The case of Valenția’s republican coinage is a fine example, with much academic argument surrounding the possible ethnic origin of the men appearing in the legends.\(^4\) As a result a deliberate decision has been made to exclude names produced by numismatic sources from the catalogue. For those interested in the numismatic evidence, there are two prosopographical works available which focus on this type of evidence: Castillo García’s *Prosopographia Baetica* (PB) and Curchin’s *The Local Magistrates of Roman Spain* (LMRS).\(^5\) However, it should be noted that neither work concerns itself with the ethnic origins of those involved, only with their political roles.

Non native Italians in permanent residence and those merely visiting Hispania on a temporary basis are more easily detected than romanised *hispani*. Those who qualify for the first of these categories seem to have come mainly from the Greek East. They are clearly marked out in the sources by their names and, frequently, by their social status. Almost all such people so far discovered in the sources have been of servile origin, although many had been freed by the time their names came to be

\(^{2}\) It should be noted that no great effort has been made to securely and separately classify emigrants and *hispanienses* within the catalogue, although where the sources give clear information on the subject this has been duly noted.

\(^{3}\) See chapter 2, pp. 20-21.

\(^{4}\) See chapter 3, p. 69.

\(^{5}\) Full bibliographic references can be found in the abbreviations list.
recorded. In fact, the elimination of this particular category from the material has led, quite unintentionally, to the exclusion of all slaves and freedmen. This is due to the fact that all those so far encountered in the sources bear unmistakably Greek or eastern names, and is not the result of any deliberate policy to exclude them.

Establishing who belongs to the ‘visitor’ category has been a little more difficult. Unlike ethnic background, which is best tackled on a case-by-case basis, the question of defining long term residence is a problem which tends to affect each of the varieties of source material in a particular way. Temporary residents are easiest to identify in the literature. It is usually possible to distinguish those who are merely ‘passing through’ Hispania, because they are generally labelled as such by the author in question. Gubernatorial staff, Roman soldiers of all ranks and other temporary visitors are registered as such, because it is their occupation or role in current affairs that is of primary interest to the author. It is consequently reasonable to take those who are not clearly labelled as temporary visitors to be permanent, or at least long term, residents.

In the case of epigraphic material, matters are not quite so simple. Epigraphic information is always more limited and subject to considerable uncertainty. Defining what is acceptable as emigrant status under these circumstances is more difficult. There are some obvious signs, of course. The recipients or dedicators of public inscriptions - often concerning magistrates, public benefactors or other upstanding members of the community - are obvious candidates for inclusion, since they are shown by their actions to be at least long term residents with strong ties to a specific community. The businessmen whose names are recorded in the mould marks of metal ingots or scratched on the sides of amphorae are less certain candidates. However, on the basis of the mercantile model, discussed in chapter 8, the assumption that they had strong connections with Spanish communities and were, at least periodically, resident there is reasonable. Consequently, they have been

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6 The sole exception this rule so far discovered is the P. Miacus, known from a painted inscription on an urn fragment found on Mallorca. He is also the only person of Semitic origin, albeit apparently romanised, found in the course of compiling the catalogue. See HE 1 118.
7 With the single exception of M. Laetilius (L1), whose exact status in any case remains uncertain.
8 As will be seen, the Delian parallel is reinforced by the particular individuals who appear in the catalogue. Several stem from families with known Delian connections, others belong to Southern
An element of doubt also surrounds those individuals appearing on tombstones and on inscriptions the purpose of which is unclear. These provide little or no background on the individual in question. However, it can be argued that it is likely that anyone whose name appears in an inscription, and is not obviously labelled by their position as a temporary visitor, was likely to have had strong connections with Hispania. Moreover, their exclusion would seem a pity, given that these types of inscription provide much information about possible centres of informal settlement. In mitigation, this type of material forms the smallest element of the catalogue, with tombstones providing eighteen names and inscriptions whose purpose is unclear providing just six, out of a grand total of seventy-eight names.

The second of the original aims in pursuing this line of research has proved more difficult to achieve. The catalogue’s limited usefulness as a research tool for informal settlement has already been discussed in chapter 7. Much the same restrictions apply to its use in investigating formal settlement. The uncertainties of epigraphic chronology and the paucity of information available from all source types present serious problems. Likewise the haphazard collection of epigraphic material, the result both of poor preservation and irregularities in publication, prevent statistical analysis. The information collected here can throw some light on individual settlement centres, formal or informal, but the catalogue is generally unsuitable for use in the study of settlement patterns. The limitations of the catalogue became readily apparent in the process of its creation. As a result, no attempt was made to ensure that it was utterly comprehensive. Every effort has been made to cover literary sources as thoroughly as possible, but some individuals may have escaped attention. In the case of epigraphic material there have been difficulties in gaining access to some publications and in the need to use only those inscriptions whose dates can be established with tolerable certainty. The time limits imposed by the degree structure have also played their part. The catalogue is fit for present purposes, but cannot be said to be the last word on the subject.

Italian families who share the same kind of background as the Delian traders. See chapter 8, pp. 224-225.

9 Obviously, governors and other Roman officials would not be considered for inclusion, no matter how frequently their names appear in epigraphic sources.

10 See chapter 7, pp. 161-164.
II Format

Entries are listed alphabetically according to gens and names are presented in the fullest form available. An individual's tribe and filiation are given, in abbreviated form and in the appropriate place, where it is known. At the beginning of each entry information is given concerning the source of the name. In the case of literary material this consists of the work in which the individual appears and the date of that appearance, where it can be established. Where epigraphic material is concerned the published source of the inscription is given, along with the location in which it was found and its date. In some cases an inscription has appeared in more than one publication. Since my intention in compiling the catalogue was not to create an entity complete in itself, but rather to establish a database which might act as a springboard for further work, I have not had the time, or necessary resources, to track down and record all published instances of the same inscription. As a result, I record the work in which I first encountered each inscription. References to relevant modern works, where available, appear at the end of each entry. All dates are BC, unless otherwise specified and all place names refer to locations in modern Spain and Portugal, again unless otherwise indicated.
III The Catalogue

A1. M. Acilius Mn.f. Silo
CIL 2 1314. Medina Sidonia, prov. Cádiz; late Republic or early Empire.
Tombstone. The Acilii were a prominent and successful gens, but this particular member is not otherwise known. His memorial states that he served as a duovir, probably at Asido (Medina Sidonia) where the inscription was found. Whether this magisterial role was played within a republican conventus or the Augustan colony is not clear. See: RE 1, col. 251 (gens); PB 9; LMRS 16.

A2. Ser. Aefolanus
CIL 2 3408. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; late Republic or early Empire.
Public inscription. Aefolanus appears as the last of a group of four benefactors (B2, C4, T1), which may have been connected with an informal settlement conventus. Nothing more about this individual is known. See: Marin Diaz (1988) 60; chapter 7, p. 190.

A3. C. Aemilius C.f. Gal. Montanus
IRC 3 17. L’Escala, prov. Gerona; early Augustan period, perhaps 30s BC.
Public inscription. Obviously involved in local politics, Montanus lists himself as an aedile and duovir. Nothing further is known of him. The fact that he belongs both to the Galeria tribus and the gens Aemilia does give pause for thought, but this inscription does occur very early in the Augustan period and he may well be Roman. See: Dyson (1980-1981) 267-272 (gens); chapter 7, p. 161.

CIL 2 1761. Cádiz; late Republic or early Empire.
Tombstone. Various members of the Annii served as officers in Hispania and this man’s tribal affiliation does raise the possibility that he was a romanised hispanus. However, the cognomen indicates a connection with southern Italy, though whether this was personal or a family connection is impossible to tell. Nothing further is known of this individual, but a link of some kind with Annius Scapula (A5) seems possible. See: RE 1, col. 2261 (gens); PB p. 384 (gens); chapter 7, p. 161.

A5. Annius Scapula
B. Alex. 55; date of appearance: 48.
A co-conspirator in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus. Scapula is referred to as a provincialis homo, presumably indicating his long-standing residence in Ulterior. He may have been the scion of an Italian family which had settled permanently in Hispania. See: PB 44; Thouvenot (1940) 143.

A6. Antonius M.f.
CIL A 57. Berrocal, prov. Huelva; late Republic or early Empire.
Tombstone. The text is badly damaged and both praenomen and cognomen are illegible. Nothing further is known about this individual. See: Chapter 7, p. 161.
A7. C. Aquinius M.f.
Lead ingots of Republican Spanish type. Possibly the son of the M. Aquinius (A8) listed below, he is certainly likely to have been a relative of some description for the gens name is uncommon - it may be Etruscan in origin.
See: RE 2, col. 332 (gens).

Lead ingots of Republican Spanish type. Possibly the father of the man above (A7), nothing further is known about this individual.

A9. Cn. Atellius
CIL i² 2396. Wreck off the North African coast; Republican period.
Lead ingot of Republican Spanish type. 'Atellius' is thought to be a Campanian name, but nothing further is known about this individual.

HE 3 251. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; Republican period(?).
Public inscription. Atellius dedicated a public portico with a partially illegible colleague, Pollio (P4). He may be the same man as the Cn. Atellius whose name appears on a semis of Carthago Nova from the Augustan period (Vives 130.15; GF 1629). Whether this man is identical with the Atellius (A9) listed above is unclear. If he is not, then a close relationship of some variety seems likely, given the importance of Carthago Nova in the mining industry.
See: Chapter 7, p. 190.

AE 1981 495. Córdoba; late Republic or early Empire.
Dual public inscriptions. Naso appears to have been prominent in public life and widely respected in Corduba. Attempts to identify him more clearly have produced no definite results, but he may be identical with the L. Axios Naso who held the post of moneyer at Rome at some point in the mid first century. If so, it is uncertain whether he held that post before or after his more successful provincial political career, nor is it obvious whether he was born in Italy or Hispania.

B1. A. Baebius
B. Hisp. 26; date of appearance: 45.
A resident of Asta, during the second civil war, explicitly identified as an eques Romanus. Several of the Baebii were military officers who campaigned in Hispania during the Republic, but there is no clear sign that this Baebius was directly connected to any of them. He is otherwise unknown.
See: PB p. 386 (gens); RE 2, col. 2728-2734; chapter 4, p. 91; chapter 5, pp.161 & 163.

CIL 2 3408. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; late Republic or early Empire.
Public inscription. Baebius appears as a member of a group of four benefactors (A2, C4, T1), which may have been connected with an informal settlement conventus. He may be
related to the A. Baebius mentioned above, but there is no further trace of him in the historical record.
See: Chapter 7, p. 190.

B3. M. Brutius (M.f.?)
Inscription on stone; purpose unknown. Brutius' name would appear to reflect a southern Italian background. Nothing further of this individual is known.
See: RE 3, col. 911 (gens); chapter 7, p. 161.

C1. C. Caedius P.f. Scap(io or -tio tribu)
CIL 2 3455. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; late Republic or early Empire.
Tombstone. This man may be identical to the C. Caedius who appears as duovir on a coin type issued by Carthago Nova during the triumviral period (GF 1049). The gens name is unusual; Barreda Pascual has suggested that it is central Italian in origin.

C2. Calpurnius Salvianus
B. Alex. 53; date of appearance: 48.
A co-conspirator in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus, neither his origin nor background is attested. He is not known from any other source, although he may be a relative of the man recorded manumitting a slave in a Julio-Claudian inscription from near Córdoba (CIL 2 2265). This later inscription would certainly suggest that the family continued to live in the area.
See: RE 3, col. 1401, nos.113 & 114.

CIL 11 6193. Monte Alboddo, Italy; Republican period.
Lead ingot of Republican Spanish type. 'Hispalus' presumably refers to the town of Hispalis. Other Carulii have been recorded with relative frequency in Campanian inscriptions, although nothing further about this man is recorded. It is interesting to note that Carula was a station on the road between Hispalis (Sevilla) and Ilipa (Alcalá del Rio, prov. Sevilla) during the Empire (Itin. Ant. 411.1).
See: Conway (1897) vol. 1, 156 (gens); Domergue (1984) 204-205.

C4. L. Catius M.f.
CIL 2 3408. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; late Republic or early Empire.
Public inscription. Catius appears as the second of a group of four benefactors (A2, B2, T1), which may have been connected with an informal settlement conventus. The gens name is more common under the Empire, but little is known of the family and nothing further of this man.
See: RE 3, col. 1792-1794 (gens); chapter 7, p. 190.

C5. L. Cervius
Public inscription. Cervius is one of two ingenui appearing in a list of freedmen and slaves, the purpose of which is not entirely clear. It has been suggested that these are the names of magistrates of a collegia. Nothing further is known of this individual, or his colleague Poplicius (P6).
C6. Clodia Q.f. Paulla
CILA 2.1 108. Housed at Sevilla, origin unknown; late Republic or early Empire.
Tombstone. Clodia is not an uncommon name and the woman is otherwise unknown.

C7. L. Cornelius Mitulus
Inscription on stone; purpose uncertain. According to the commentary in HE, ‘Mitulus’ is a cognomen otherwise found only at Puteoli. Nothing further is known of him.
See: Chapter 7, p. 161.

D1. L. Decidius Saxa
Caesar, Civ. 1.66; date of appearance: 49.
Cicero, Phil. 11.12, 13.27; date of appearance: late 40s.
Saxa served under Caesar, probably as a centurion, and rose to senatorial rank under his auspices. Cicero labelled him Celtiberian, but Syme has made a strong case for Saxa being a Roman citizen of central Italian descent, who was born and raised in the Spanish provinces. He would therefore be an example of a settled native Italian emigrant family.
See: Syme (1979) passim, esp.36-38; chapter 6, p. 156.

D2. T. Didius (T. or P.)f. Cor.
Tombstone. Various members of this Roman gens are known to have served in Hispania during the Republic, but nothing is known of this particular individual. The relative prominence of the Didii make it possible that such a name could acquired by romanised hispani. In this case, however, the early date of the inscription and the record of tribal affiliation make it likely that this man is indeed a native Italian.

D3. L. Domitius
CIL 2 5964. Denia, prov. Alicante; late Republic or early Empire.
Tombstone. Domitius is commemorated, along with his wife Sempronia Campana (S3), with a simple formula. The term ‘eques’ follows his gentilician name This is probably a descriptive term, rather than a cognomen, because there is no intervening filiation, which his wife’s name carries in the correct place. Possibly Domitius was one of the many local equites called upon by both sides during the civil wars in Hispania. Nothing further is known of him.
See: Chapter 7, p. 161.

E1. Egnatius
Catullus 37 & 39; date of appearance: 50s
A victim of Catullus’ sharp wit. He was lampooned as a wild Celtiberian who washed his teeth with human urine, even though he now lived at Rome, but there seems little reason to doubt his Roman citizenship and Italian ethnic background. The Egnatii were probably of Samnite origin and had a moderate political profile. The lack of praenomen and cognomen has made further identification of this particular man difficult, but he seems to have returned to Rome to carve out a political career, having been brought up in Hispania in an emigrant branch of the family.
See: Fordyce (1961) 84; Gabba (1954) 305; chapter 5, p.138; chapter 6, p. 156.

F1. L. Fabius Hispaniensis
Sallust, Hist. 3.63M; date of appearance: Sertorian War.
Mentioned by Sallust as a participant in the Sertorian War, Fabius is known from other sources to have been a praetor in 81. His cognomen suggests that he was the son of a Roman emigrant to Hispania who returned to make his way in politics. Under normal circumstances the background of any Fabius from Hispania needs to be examined carefully, since during his anti-Sertorian campaign in 79 Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius granted citizenship to the Spanish Fabii of Saguntum as a reward for remaining loyal to Rome (Cicero, Pro Balb. 50 - note that they already possessed Roman names). However this particular Fabius' political success pre-dates Metellus' grant and his Roman background is assured.


F2. Q. Fabius Cn.f. Senica

CIL 2 1315. Medina Sidonia, prov. Cádiz; late Republic or early Empire.

Public inscription. This man appears to have been a quattuorvir at Asido (Medina Sidonia). Another Asido resident, Acilius Silo (A1), is recorded as duovir. Whether these two men were magistrates on either side of a transition between conventus and colony, or whether the titles merely served to distinguish between senior and junior magistrates, is not clear.

See: PB 161; LMRS 14.

F3. C. Fiducius C.f.


Lead ingot of Republican Spanish type. The business partner of S. Lucretius (L6), nothing further is known of this individual.

F4. C. Flavius

B. Hisp. 26; date of appearance: 45.

A resident of Asta, during the second civil war, explicitly identified as an eques Romanus. He is otherwise unknown.

See: Chapter 4, p. 91; chapter 7, pp. 161 & 163.


Parker (1992) n.16. Wreck off Marseillan-Plage, east of Agde, France; late second to early first century.

Lead ingots of Republican Spanish type. Other bearers of this gens name are known from the Imperial period and from inscriptions in Campania and central Italy, but nothing is known of this man. His name is coupled in the inscriptions with that of an M. Laetilius (L1).

See: RE 7.1, col. 760-765 (gens).

H1. Herius C.f. Hispa(nus or -niensis or -llus)


Public inscription. The inscription records Herius as a legatus pro praetore, so his presence in Carthago Nova (Cartagena) must be regarded as transitory. However, his cognomen, although it remains incomplete, would appear to suggest a Spanish origin. A C. Herius C.f. is also known from the Asculum bronze (CIL 1² 709) as a member of Pompeius Strabo's consilium. Koch has suggested that this earlier Herius may have been the father of Herius Hispa(...). Why the son should bear this notable cognomen is unclear. It is not improbable that Herius had connections in Hispania, possibly arising from his involvement in the enfranchisement of the Turma Salluitana. Whether these connections included residence in Hispania is not clear, but the possibility must be considered.
I1. L. Iulius L.f. Campanus Tarmestinus
CILA 1, 47. Almonaster La Real, prov. Huelva; late Republic or early Empire.

Tombstone. The man’s name appears to reflect a dual heritage. Commentary in CILA suggests ‘Tarmestinus’ indicates a native of Termes (near modern Ntra. Sra. de Tiermes de Arriba, prov. Soria), but ‘Campanus’ also suggests an Italian link. He was probably the descendant of an emigrant family.
See: Chapter 7, p. 161.

I2. Q. Iulius Q.f. Celsus

Dedicatory inscriptions. It is not entirely clear whether this man was actually native Italian, given his gens name. Nonetheless, the fact that both he and his father bore the praenomen ‘Quintus’, rather than ‘Gaius’ encourages the idea that he was indeed a native Italian participant in the foundation of the Augustan colony at Tucci (Martos).
See: PB 183.

I3. Iunia M.f. Anus
CILA 2, 309. Alcalá del Río, prov. Sevilla; probably first century.

Tombstone. The Iunii were a high profile family and several female members of the gens are known to us, but this Iunia does not number among them. There is a small possibility that she is a romanised hispana. D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus conducted a highly successful series of campaigns in Hispania and although he is not known to have dispensed grants of citizenship there, there are many examples of hispani adopting the names of such generals without permission.

I4. L. Iuventius Laterensis
B. Alex. 53-55; date of appearance: 48.

One of the main organisers of the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus. The Iuventii were originally from Tusculum and were politically active at Rome from the early second century. The cognomen ‘Laterensis’ seems to have been a family one, but this particular bearer of it is otherwise unknown.

L1. M. Laetilius
Parker (1992) n.16. Wreck off Marseillan-Plage, east of Agde, France; late second to early first century.

Lead ingots of Republican Spanish type. Apparently the business partner of Gargilius (G1), Laetilius may be a freedman, since the letters that follow his name appear to be an M and L linked by an overarching crescent.

L2. L. Licinius

Heavily worn, headless togate statue, with the name inscribed across the base of the throat. This Licinius may be connected with the L. Licinius Squillus (L4) involved in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus in 48, but is probably not identical with him. Cerro de los Santos lies well within the republican borders of Citerior and a considerable distance from
the heartland of Ulterior where the rebellion took place. It must be born in mind that 'Licinius' was a fairly common name in southern Hispania, where it seems to have been popular with romanised *hispani*.

See: *PB* p. 405-406 (gens); Dyson (1980-1981) 280-283 (gens); chapter 7, pp. 161 & 163.

### L3. L. Licinius

*IRC* 4, 62a; Barcelona; early Augustan period.

Public inscription. One of four men, probably magistrates, recorded on blocks belonging to an exhedra and dating to the earliest phase of the Augustan colony. Licinius is the only one among them who can be clearly labelled native Italian. He may be a relative of Licinius (L2) or Licinius Squillus (L4), but nothing further is known about him.

See: *PB* p. 405-406 (gens); Dyson (1980-1981) 280-283 (gens); chapter 7, pp. 161 & 163.

### L4. L. Licinius Squillus

B. Alex. 52; date of appearance: 48.

A co-conspirator in the attempted murder of Q. Cassius Longinus and one of the main assailants. Despite the striking cognomen, he is otherwise unknown.


### L5. Lucia Porci f.

*RIT* 11. Tarragona; late Republic.

Tombstone. The filiation using the father's *gens* name rather than *praenomen* is unusual, but of no assistance in further identification of the lady.

See: *PB* p. 408 (gens); Dyson (1980-1981) 258-259 (gens).

### L6. S. Lucretius S.f.


Lead ingot of Republican Spanish type. The business partner of C. Fiducius (F3), nothing further is known of this man. The family is well known, but the *praenomen* 'Spurius', and the fact that his father's *praenomen* was the same, suggests that this may be a minor offshoot of the main family.

See: *RE* 13.2, col. 1656 (gens); Sandys (1927) 209.

### M1. Manlius Tusculus

B. Alex. 53; date of appearance: 48.

Another co-conspirator in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus, his exact origin is uncertain. He is not known from any other source.


*CIL* 2 1477. Ecija, prov. Sevilla; early Augustan period.

Public inscription. The Manlii were well known and politically active at Rome. This man probably represents a minor branch of the family, since he was almost certainly among the first wave of migration to the Augustan colony of Astigi (Ecija).

See: *RE* 14.1, col. 1149 (gens); *PB* p. 407 (gens); Thouvenot (1940) 181.

### M3. G. Marcius

Appian. *Ib.* 66; date of appearance: 143.

A commander of Roman troops, during the Virithic War, who came from Italica. Marcius has usually been assumed to have been a *hispanus* bearing a Roman name, perhaps a member of the local aristocracy. However Gabba has suggested that he was actually a
'hispaniensis' - someone born in Hispania of native Italian ethnic background. Since neither argument can be proved at the expense of the other, Marcius is provisionally included here. See: RE 14.2, col. 1544, n.10; Gabba (1954) 299.

M4. M. Mercello
B. Alex. 52; date of appearance: 48.
A co-conspirator in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus, Mercello was one of several men involved in the plot described as 'italicensis' - from Italic. There is an imperial inscription at Corduba commemorating one T. Mercellonus (CIL 2 2226), who may be a relative, but nothing further is known about Mercello. The name is thought to be Etruscan.
See: RE, 15.1, col. 972 (gens); Gabba (1954) 304-305; chapter 3, p. 53.

M5. C. Messius L.f.
CIL 11, 6722. Wreck near Cabo de Palos, prov. Murcia; Republican date.
Lead ingots of Republican Spanish type. 'Messius' is a Campanian gens name. Members of the family were active during the first century, the most prominent being Pompey's supporter C. Messius (Cicero, Ad Att. 4.1.7; 8.11D.2). Whether this is the same man is impossible to tell. The name is also known from Delos.
See: RE 15.1, col. 1242 (gens); Domergue (1984) 204-205.

M6. L. Minucius Philargurus
CIL 2 4391. Tarragona; Republican period.
Inscription on stone; purpose uncertain. The family is an illustrious one of Roman origin, but given to cognomina drawn from the Greek language. This habit might conceivably suggest links with southern Italy, on the other hand it might simply mark them as keen philhellenes. Nothing further is known of this particular individual.

M7. Minucius Silo
B. Alex. 52; date of appearance: 48.
The failed assassin of Q. Cassius Longinus. He is referred to as a client of L. Racilius, who was also involved in the conspiracy. Racilius was actively involved in politics at Rome and was probably not a permanent resident in Hispania, but there is not obvious reason to doubt that that Minucius was.
See: RE 15.2, col. 1937-1939; PB 246.

M8. L. Munatius Flaccus
B. Alex. 52; date of appearance: 48.
B. Hisp. 19; date of appearance: 45.
Cassius Dio 43.33-34; date of appearance: 45.
An officer of unspecified rank in the army of Sextus Pompeius during the Civil War who crossed to Caesar's side during the siege of Ategua (probably Teba la Vieja, prov. Málaga), unwillingly according to Dio. It seems reasonable to connect this man with the Munatius Flaccus who had earlier been involved in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus. This Flaccus is identified as 'italicensis' in De Bello Alexandrinno.

N1. P. Nona P.f. Nuc(erus/erinus?)

256
Lead ingot. Nona is an Etruscan name, while Nuceria lies in Campania. The cognomen probably reflects strong connections with the town. Nothing further is known of this individual. See: Domergue (1984) 205.

P1. L. Papirius Carbo
IRC 3, 77. L’Escala, prov. Gerona; late Republic.
Thought to be a tombstone. It’s unclear whether Carbo was the dedicator or the recipient. The Papirii Carbones were a large and complex family and further identification of this individual is not possible, despite the uncommon praenomen (C. or Cn. were more usual in the family). However it is known that the family had been involved in earlier colonisation efforts: the name is known from the Latin colony at Brundisium in the second century. See: RE 18.3, col. 1014, n.32ff (gens); chapter 7, p. 161.

P2. L. Planius L.f. Russinus
CIL 1² 2395. Various locations in Italy and Tunisia; Republican period.
Parker (1992) n.16. Wreck off Marseillan-Plage, east of Agde, France; late second century to early first century.
Lead ingots. Russinus’ operations appear to have been extensive, since ingots marked with his name have been found in a wide variety of locations. He may have been in business with an M. Planius Russinus (P3), possibly a brother or other close relative. ‘Planius’ appears to be a Campanian name - the only other member of the family known is M. Planius Heres of Cales (Cicero, Ad Fam. 9.13.2-3.). See: RE 20.2, col. 2186 (gens); Domergue (1984) 205.

P3. M. Planius L.f. Russinus
CIL 1² 2394. Mahdia, Tunisia; Republican period.
Lead ingot of Republican Spanish type. Probably a brother of L. Planius Russinus, he is known from a single ingot find. This was found in conjunction with a second ingot bearing L. Planius’ name, which may suggest the two men were in business simultaneously, not successively.

P4. (...)P.f. Pollio
HE 3 251. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; Republican period (?).
Public inscription. The co-dedicator of a public portico with Cn. Atellius (A10). The middle section of the text has been damaged beyond legibility, removing this man’s praenomen and gens name. He is unidentifiable. See: Chapter 7, p. 190.

P5. Q. Pompeius Niger
B. Hisp. 25; date of appearance: 45.
An eques Romanus from Italica, fighting on Caesar’s side during the Civil War. Nothing further is known about him. See: RE 21.2, col. 2250; chapter 3, p. 53; chapter 4, p. 91.

P6. C. Poplicius
Public inscription. Poplicius is one of two ingenui appearing in a list of freedmen and slaves, the purpose of which is not entirely clear. It has been suggested that they are the
names of the magistrates of a collegia. Nothing further is known of this individual, or his colleague Cervius (C5).


R1. M. Rarius Rufus
Domergue (1966) no. 31. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; late republican or early Augustan period.
Lead ingot in transitional form. The gens name is known from Samnite and Campanian areas and is not uncommon. Nothing is known of this particular individual.

R2. Cn. Ratumedius C.f. Vat(i)ia
IRC 4 226. Barcelona; early Augustan.
Tombstone. The co-dedicator of a memorial for Vassia Sabina (V4). His relationship to the dead girl is unclear, but, like her, he bears an Etrusco-Umbrian name. This contrasts sharply with the girl's mother, Valeria (V1) and he may have been a relative from the father's side of the family. Ratumedius was probably among the earliest wave of colonial settlers to reach Barcino (Barcelona).

CIL 2 3439. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; Republican period.
Inscription on stone; purpose unknown. Roscius appears with his brother Publius, neither of whom are known from other sources. The family name is central Italian; other Roscii are commemorated at Lanuvium and Ameria.
See: RE 1A.1, col. 1116 (gens).

R4. P. Roscius M.f.
CIL 2 3439. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; Republican period.
See previous entry.

R5. Rubena
CIL 24402. Tarragona; late Republic.
Tombstone. The name is unusual, but appears to be central Italian. Nothing further is known of this individual.

S1. Q. Salvius L.f. Gal.
IRC 4, 72. Barcelona; late Republic or early Augustan period.
IRC 4, 209. Barcelona; early Augustan.
Tombstone and dedicatory inscription. It would seem likely that both texts refer to the same individual, who seems to have been one of Barcino's (Barcelona) earliest colonial magistrates. 'Salvius' is first found as a gens name for ingenui in the late Republic; previously it had been a name often associated with slaves.
RE 1A.2, col. 2022 (gens).

S2. Q. Seius P.f. Men. Postumius
Lead ingots. The gens name is a southern Italian one and the family is well known for its trading activities, particularly in connection with Delos, where their presence is recorded from the second century onwards.
See: RE 2A.1, col. 1120 & 1124 (gens).
S3. Sempronia L.f. Campana
CIL 2 5964. Denia, prov. Alicante; late Republic or early Empire. Tombstone. Sempronia appears along with her husband L. Domitius (D3). Her cognomen would suggest Campania as her point of origin, or that of her family. Nothing further is known of her. See: Chapter 7, p. 161.

S4. M. Sempronius M.f. Bibulus
PB 288. Córdoba; early Augustan.
PB does not indicate inscription type. As a family the Sempronii enjoyed enduring political connections with Hispania from the early second century onwards. Consequently all members of the gens appearing in the historical record without exhibiting other signs of native Italian background, like Sempronia (S3), must be regarded with some suspicion. This man may be a romanised hispanus.

S5. Q. Sestius
B. Alex. 55; date of appearance: 48.
An apparent collaborator in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus. His background is uncertain, although the name is Roman and not a particularly common one. It seems unlikely that a hispanus would have acquired such a name through a grant of citizenship or by simple imitation.
See: RE 2A.2, col.1884.

S6. M. Sextius M.f. Calvinus
Parker 81. Wreck near Cabo de Palos, prov. Murcia; first century.
Lead ingots of Republican Spanish type. Although there are several men by the name of Sextius Calvinus known from other sources, none appear to match this one with any certainty and no further information about him is available.
See: RE 9A.1, col. 2045-2046 (gens).

T1. L. Taurius L.f.
CIL 2 3408. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; late Republic or early Empire. Public inscription. Taurius appears as part of a group of four benefactors (A2, B2, C4), which may have been connected with an informal settlement conventus. The gens is rarely attested in epigraphic contexts, but comments by Varro (RR 2.1.10) suggest 'Taurius' was not an uncommon name in Italy.
See: RE 5A.1, col. 16; chapter 7, pp. 190.

T2. T. Thorius
B. Alex. 57; date of appearance: 48.
The leader of rebel troops against Q. Cassius Longinus. The name is known from inscriptions at Caere. A few other members of the family had political careers at Rome, however, this man is specifically identified as 'italicensis' and was presumably permanently settled at Italica.
See: RE 6A.1, col. 343.

T3. A. Trebellius
B. Hisp. 26; date of appearance: 45.
A resident of Asta, explicitly identified as an *eques Romanus*. Other members of the family were fairly active politically in the late Republic and early Empire, but nothing further is known of this man.

See: *RE* 6A.2, col. 2262; chapter 4, p. 91; chapter 7, pp. 161 & 163.

Lead ingots of Republican Spanish type. Inscription 81 supplies the full *gens* name and filiation while 258 severely abbreviates the gentilician name, but provides the tribe. Nothing further is known of this individual, but the *gens* name is known from inscriptions in Campania and central Italy.
Conway (1897) vol. 1, 167 & 204 (*gens*).

V1. Valeria M.f.
*IRC* 4 226. Barcelona; early Augustan period.
Tombstone. The mother of Vassia Sabina (V4), who was partially responsible for the erection of the girl’s memorial. The name ‘Valerius’ was widely used in Hispania and this woman could be a romanised *hispanus*.
See: *PB* p. 410 (*gens*).

V2. Q. Varius Severus Sucronensis
Appian, B.C. 1.37; date of appearance: 90.
Valerius Maximus, 8.6.4.
A Tribune of the Plebs in 90, his *agnomen* suggests he was born, or had lived, at Sucro, in Hispania. The site of this town is uncertain; it was already deserted in Pliny the Elder’s day (*Nat.* 3.20), but is known to have lain close to the Sucro river (*map* 12). He is referred to by Valerius Maximus as ‘hibrida’ which may be either an accurate reflection of mixed parentage or a deliberate slur, but his father must have been a Roman, for Severus enjoyed a moderately successful public career at Rome in the early first century. He has been put forward as an early example of a member of a successful emigrant family returning to make his name in Rome.

V3. T. Vaisius
B. Alex. 52; date of appearance: 48.
Another co-conspirator in the plot against Q. Cassius Longinus, from Italica. The *gens* name is thought to be Oscan in origin, but nothing further is known about this man.
See: *RE* 8A.1, col. 453; Gabba (1954) 304; chapter 3, p. 53.

V4. Vassia L.f. Sabina
*IRC* 4, 226. Barcelona; early Augustan period.
Tombstone. Vassia seems to have died young, since her mother (V1) is recorded taking partial responsibility for the erection of her memorial. Her family were probably among the first wave of settlers at colonia Barcino (Barcelona). Nothing further is known of this individual, moreover, according to the editors of *IRC*, the inscription provides the only recorded Spanish example of this Etrusco-Umbrian name.

V5. Vergilia Q.f. Anus
*CIL* 2 3511, 3513. Cartagena, prov. Murcia; late Republic or early Empire.
Dedicatory inscription and tombstone. It is probable that these two inscriptions record different aspects of the same woman’s life, about whom nothing further is known. Members of the gens Vergilia begin appearing in epigraphic records in Italy in the first century. A branch appears to have established itself in Carthago Nova; quite a number of Vergilii are known from inscriptions there during the early Empire, most of them female. Intriguingly, Pliny (Nat. 3.25) records the existence of a group called the ‘Virgilienses’ settled in the conventus Carthaginensis during the imperial period. See: CIL 2 3514, 5935; Barreda Pascual (1998) 286.

V6. Vibius Paciaecus
Plutarch, Crassus, 4.2; date of appearance: 87.
A rich and apparently well respected local magnate in Ulterior active in the first half of the first century, he earned fame outside the province as Crassus’ saviour and protector. ‘Vibius’ was a fairly common Roman gens name with Oscan connections and the -aecus ending of the cognomen also makes an Oscan origin likely, although the complete name may have been Ibero-Oscan. It has been suggested that Paciaecus may have been born in Campania and been the first of the family to emigrate to Hispania, but he may equally have been the descendant of an emigrant.

V7. L. Vibius Paciaecus
B. Hisp. 3; date of appearance: 46.
Cicero, Ad Fam. 6.18.2; date of appearance: January 45.
This man is thought to be the son of the Paciaecus above. Like his father, he was a local magnate and a political and military force to be reckoned with; he appears to have sided with Caesar during the Civil Wars.

V8. L. Volteilius
Parker 776. Wreck at Palamós; 80-30.
Pena and Barreda (1997) 66-68. Various locations in Cataluña; late first century.
Tarraconense 1 and Pascual 1 amphorae. Several bearers of the name ‘Volteilius’ (in various spellings) are known from epigraphic sources in Italy and Narbonensis. Nothing further is known of this individual, except that his main business appears to have been the export of wine. Given the number of examples found, it is possible that there was more than one L. Volteilius involved - a father and son partnership perhaps.
The bibliography is divided into two sections: abbreviations and the bibliography proper. The abbreviations list is fairly short, comprising only those epigraphic and numismatic collections to which frequent reference is made, and the standard abbreviations of certain common reference works.

Bibliographic entries are presented in a manner designed to make it as easy as possible to interpret the references appearing in the footnotes. The primary identifying features of footnote references are the author’s name and the date of publication. Accordingly, entries are presented alphabetically, by author; within a series of works by the same author, entries are arranged chronologically. Items published by an author in conjunction with others appear separately at the end of that author’s series of entries. Journal titles are routinely abbreviated, using the standardised forms established by *L’Année Philologique*.

The practice of using different versions of double surnames, common among Spanish academics, has presented some difficulties. I have not attempted to regularise the presentation of names, since this might create problems when tracing particular publications. Instead I have always given a person’s name as it appears in each published work, but where different versions of a name are known definitely to refer to the same individual these works have been grouped together.

### I Abbreviations

**CIL**  
(1863- ) *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin.

**CILA**  

**Degrassi**  

**FHA**  

**GF**  


IG (1873- ) Inscriptio Graecae, Berlin.


LMRS Curchin, L.A. (1991) The Local Magistrates of Roman Spain, Toronto. (Used for Curchin’s catalogue entries only, see also entry in bibliography proper)


TLL (1900- ) Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, Leipzig.


II Bibliography


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MAP 1: Key

Spain

1.) Alava
2.) Albacete
3.) Alicante
4.) Almería
5.) Ávila
6.) Badajoz
7.) Barcelona
8.) Burgos
9.) Cáceres
10.) Cádiz
11.) Castellón
12.) Ciudad Real
13.) Córdoba
14.) La Coruña
15.) Cuenca
16.) Gerona
17.) Granada
18.) Guadalajara
19.) Guipuzcoa
20.) Huelva
21.) Huesca
22.) Ibiza
23.) Jaén
24.) León
25.) Lérida
26.) Logroño
27.) Lugo
28.) Madrid
29.) Málaga
30.) Mallorca
31.) Minorca
32.) Murcia
33.) Navarra
34.) Orense
35.) Oviedo
36.) Palencia
37.) Pontevedra
38.) Salamanca
39.) Santander (Cantabria)
40.) Segovia
41.) Sevilla
42.) Soria
43.) Tarragona
44.) Teruel
45.) Toledo
46.) Valencia
47.) Valladolid
48.) Vizcaya
49.) Zamora
50.) Zaragoza

Portugal

A.) Algarve
B.) Baixo Alentejo
C.) Alto Alentejo
D.) Estremadura
E.) Ribatejo
F.) Beira Litoral
G.) Beira Baixa
H.) Beira Alta
I.) Douro Litoral
J.) Minho
K.) Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro.
MAP 1: Modern Administrative Divisions of the Iberian Peninsula

See separate sheet for key.
MAP 2: Ranges and Sierras in the Iberian Peninsula

After Martin Echeverria, L. (1940) España, Mexico, p. 7.
MAP 3: Pre-Caesarian Formal Settlement

Key:
1. Italice
2. Carteia
3. Corduba
4. Valentia
5. Pollentia
6. Palma
7. Metellinum
8. Salaria
MAP 4: Caesarian Formal Settlement
MAP 5: Augustan Formal Settlement

Key:
1. Emerita
2. Astigi
3. Librosa
4. Barcino
5. Asido
6. Scallabis
7. Pax Julia
8. Tucci
9. Norba
10. Caesaraugusta
MAP 7: Possible Sites of Informal Settlement

Key:
1. Emporiae
2. Carthago Nova
3. Gades
4. Hispalis
5. Tarraco
6. Berrocal
7. Caseval
8. Mértola
9. Dianium
10. Almonaster la Real
11. Hípan

Italics = ancient place names
MAP 8: Area of Roman Control in 197 BC
(Establishment of Citerior and Ulterior)

Key:
1. Italica
2. Carthago Nova
3. Gades
4. Emporiae

- Formal settlement
- Suggested possible site of informal settlement

Italics = ancient place names
MAP 9: Area of Roman Control in 122 BC
(End of sustained republican campaigning period)