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NGO Legitimation as Practice: Crafting Political Space in Tanzania

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I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Where work generated during doctoral study has been published elsewhere, appropriate reference has been made. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgement, the work presented is entirely my own.

Signed:

13 June 2018
Abstract

The traditional monopoly of politics and international relations on theorizing power, authority and legitimacy has eroded in the late modern era. The complexity of these domains has been compounded in a strongly interconnected, post-Westphalian world, where sovereignty and statehood are increasingly negotiated, where centres of power and authority have shifted and where new configurations of governance have come to the fore. The conventional conceptual toolbox of inter-national relations has been slow to adapt, and so the need to embrace insights from other disciplines never greater. The study of legitimacy in particular has been hamstrung by conventional drawings of both sovereignty and authority. Public authority, in the Weberian idealist sense, is the legitimated exercise of power. The study of power has broadened considerably in this timeframe; legitimacy, or rather the practice of legitimation, must mirror power’s analytical expansion. Even where the need to broaden our conceptualization of legitimation has been conceded, its empirical content has remained woefully thin. The question of how political actors legitimate their authority to act thus remains under-theorized and under-researched.

This thesis contributes to contemporary debates regarding power, legitimation and authority in two key respects. The first is in theorizing legitimation as practice: the everyday ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’ (Adler & Pouliot 2011, p3) that render power authoritative. This practice-based approach, benefitting in particular from the legacies of Foucault and Bourdieu, moves firmly away from accounts of legitimacy as ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ towards a more processual account. The second is in locating these everyday practices beyond formalized institutions, undertaken by a range of actors in a range of forums. The increasingly blurred ‘non-state’ operates in the margins between global and local; national/international; public/private and indeed state/non-state, whilst nonetheless sustaining a claim to publicness. These ‘twilight’ institutions (Lund 2006a) include the non-governmental organizations in Tanzania on which this thesis is focussed. It draws on extensive critical ethnography in locating everyday governmental and non-governmental legitimation practice, whilst linking the local to the global. This is not solely about facilitating the travel of international relations to its hitherto geographical and theoretical margins, but to return with rigour to the centrality of legitimation as
experienced in ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004). It asks, in short, how NGOs, as non-state actors, legitimate their authority to act in the everyday, within today’s interconnected world.
This PhD has been an arduous journey. It has been punctuated by periods of severe illness and trauma, in which the act of conducting research has both exacerbated and alleviated that illness. My relationship with it will thus always be a complicated one, but one I hope any residual antipathy in time will give way to solely positive sentiments. In addition, through numerous periods of health leave, it has meant this campaign has been an unusually long one, spanning some eight years. Given both these respects, it has meant that these acknowledgments are commensurately long and deeply personal. As the thesis itself unpacks, I do not believe these aspects of our personal lives can be held at a detached distance from our professional ones. Thus, these acknowledgements may seem unusually candid and unusually raw.

In the early years of this research, before my illness took firm root, my list of acknowledgements will make for familiar reading. In the first instance, the research would not have been possible without the acquiescence and support of the NGO, district, ward and village representatives in Bagamoyo. It was not an easy path to forge assent and negotiate access in this context, with very good reason. My deepest gratitude is therefore duly extended to the NGO, government and village representatives who eventually opened their doors, offering growing companionship, advice and support along the way. Whilst I feel I have not adequately reciprocated their assistance, I hope they know how important they were to shaping the trajectory of this research.

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With a view to my own personal academic journey, I know I would not be writing this if it were not for the superlative teaching of Professors John Peterson and William Bain, as well as the supervision of Professor Nick Higgins, at the University of Glasgow in 2003-04. These mentors are directly responsible for my transition from an undergraduate to a postgraduate student, and indeed from a postgraduate to a teacher myself, giving me the confidence to return to academic life in its entirety in 2010. I am also thankful to have been supported by various staff members in Edinburgh’s department of Politics and International Relations as well as a part of the growing, vibrant and inspiring community that is the Centre for African Studies. Thanks in particular to Drs Claire Duncanson, Andrew Neal, Barbara Bompani, Sarah-Jane Cooper-Knock, Emma Hunter and Tom Molony. Thank you to Dr Ellen Stewart for mentorship at the time of submission.

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take professional steps I would not have considered if flying solo. Her supervision has been flawless and, as such, she has a fan, colleague and, hopefully, a friend for life.

With regard to my peers at Edinburgh, there have been friendships and collaborations over my eight years too numerous to mention. Of those that stand out, I must thank Dr Pete Kingsley, whose friendship spans now some fifteen years, and whose intermittent nuggets of advice had a tangible impact in shaping the direction of my research. Dr Maggie Dwyer has patiently offered professional support and advice whenever sought and I am now lucky enough to call her a friend. Dr Mike Slaven has also readily provided detailed and helpful advice, particularly in the finalization stages (so that I now feel my non-acknowledgement debt null and void). I have also benefited from the fun, supportive and warming camaraderie of Office 4.14 since 2013.

In the latter stages of my research, I became severely ill. This culminated in a two-month hospital stay in early 2017 after the birth of my son, Torrin. This time was the most frightening, disorienting and traumatic of my life. My research, as I undertook various treatments, never felt further from completion. Whilst I have very mixed feelings in retrospect about my hospital admission and its various interventions, I must applaud the services of the National Health Service, which is one of the few British innovations that remain truly world class. We must fight to protect it and its founding principles. I also thank my family and friends at this time for providing unwavering support during these dark days, particularly Vicky Buchanan and Fiona Bailey. Thank you to the hospital, Lisa Johnston and my husband Alex’s family for giving Alex the support he also desperately needed at this time.

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Legitimacy, or rather legitimation, lies at the heart of this thesis and it is therefore fundamentally a work of politics. Legitimation is the practice of accumulative claim-making. It infuses the exercise of power with symbolic capital: norms, institutions and material resource that render it ephemerally authoritative and rightful. The ‘right’ to govern others is one of the most elemental debates within political theory and as such, this thesis remains inextricably bound to it. The limits of politics and International Relations (IR) theorizing, however, at least as conventionally drawn, on the breadth and depth of legitimation in the everyday, solicits substantive insights from elsewhere.

Nevertheless, this thesis departs from politics and IR only ultimately to return to it. It aspires, therefore, to come in from the perceived conceptual, and indeed geographical, margins of the IR discipline. Through this, it aspires to contribute something broader to the perennial political question regarding the conditions of public authority, as the recognized and sanctioned use of power.

It is therefore imperative to acknowledge from the outset how IR’s traditional framing of legitimacy has artificially restricted the realm of its enquiry. Legitimacy, or rather legitimation, does not just appertain to the exercise of power via political institutions in a formalized setting; it also relates to informal governing practices in everyday life. It pertains to any claim of authority over the conduct of others, as well as compliance with and contestation of such claims. Indeed, the term ‘legitimacy’ infuses everyday speech in interpreting and contesting the actions of others. The prevalence of the term is reflective of the relevance of legitimation and its conditions in all areas of social and political life. Questions of ‘legitimacy’ are not just levelled at the bodies of the UN or the national government of the day. We pose questions of the legitimacy of organizations that act in the name of the public, whether for profit, religion and/or civil society. This is not a simple misappropriation of the term legitimacy, but a reflection of the validity of such questions as we scrutinize the institutions, formal or otherwise, that intervene in our daily lives.
Conventional IR has proven exclusionary in a second, but related, sense. The over-centrality of the (legitimate) sovereign ‘state’ in the production of International Relations (IR) theory has been duly noted and rigorously appraised by critical scholarship. Indeed, as the movement of people, resource, ideas and information become ever more ‘globalized’, the dissonance of the sovereign state as the key repository of rights, protections and indeed of legitimacy has become increasingly conspicuous. Nevertheless, the state has endured as the default entity via which international politics is depicted, understood and explained. Furthermore, the sovereign state-as-actor, with assumed exclusive legitimacy to govern, was founded on a particular snapshot of European history; indeed, it is as much normative prescription as empirical reality. The reification of the state, itself a Westphalian ‘myth’ (Carvalho et al. 2011; also Walker 1993), served to exclude large swathes of the globe from the field of IR. Such areas, particularly in Africa, were deemed as without order, characterized by ‘absence’ or dysfunction. As such, the structural hierarchy of IR itself had long mirrored, and indeed reproduced, global hierarchies of colonial and post-colonial power.

In keeping with a growing body of literature that rejects that Africa as exceptional or a challenge to IR, therefore, I seek to explore evolving, complex forms of governance that have notable resonance throughout ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004). The nominally state and non-state increasingly overlap, at times co-producing public authority; this is borne out at scales in this thesis’ focus on Tanzania. The case, while uniquely Tanzanian, provides a microcosm of the reconstituting public, as experienced globally. I focus predominately on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as they skilfully straddle public/private, government/non-government and global/local divides. Tanzania has witnessed a marked proliferation in NGO registrations since its ‘liberalization’ in the 1990s. This has reinserted the global into the local and vice versa, in new and adaptive ways. Tanzania, in addition, hosts a rich supporting literature regarding the historical blurring of state and society, from which to springboard its empirical work. The thesis looks at both district and village levels, which provide both contrast and, unexpectedly, continuity in legitimation practice across three settings.

This thesis thus gives empirical content to lateral and vertical legitimation practice at scales in Bagamoyo district, coastal Tanzania. In doing so, I examine the everyday, mainly discursive, practices of NGOs but also that of local government through, or
against, which NGOs legitimate their presence under the rubric of ‘development’. These practices are curated into symbolic sets of practices, introduced below, which run through each empirical chapter. Through this, I challenge the default understanding of legitimacy as formalized, contractual exchange between citizen and state in favour of legitimation as ongoing practice, undertaken by an array of increasingly ambiguous institutions as they (re)produce and compete for public authority. It is an iterative process that demands the insertion of the ‘collective’ in the affirmation or rejection of such claim-making. It is spatialized, demanding symbolic proximity and distance, the entreaty and repudiation of Others, as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699), which resonate beyond the African continent. I ask, in short: how NGOs as non-state actors legitimate their authority to act within contemporary configurations of governance.

Outline of the thesis

This reconstitution of the public has rearticulated verticalized development hierarchies: the ‘brokerage’ chain (Bierschenk & Sardan 2003, p163; also Lewis & Mosse 2006) or ‘contracted cosmopolitanism’ (Mercer & Green 2013). It has also led, however, to pronounced lateral collaboration and competition between organizations, particularly at the district level, thus precipitating similar forms of legitimation. Legitimation, as will be expounded in detail, is not simply about upwards ‘incorporation’ (Li 2013) into a global govern mentality architecture; it holds substantive lateral as well as downward aspects. The empirical chapters place these lateral (Chapter Three) and downward dynamics (Chapters Four and Five) at their heart. These aspects of course interrelate; there are situated hierarchies at district level that admits of a verticalized dynamic. Similarly, village leaders and volunteers are not solely upward-inclined, but rather authority to intervene and its supporting legitimation negotiated and contested laterally by peers. Nonetheless, these distinct and, at times, defining logics are distilled into respective chapters.

In building up to this enterprise, the thesis goes through a number of steps. Chapter One lays the theoretical and conceptual groundwork to rework legitimation as practice. It
reviews recent developments in the debate on legitimacy/legitimation from a number of disciplines that have unsettled, but also enriched, IR theorizing. There have been common developments across social enquiry that, despite epistemological differences, have lent themselves to more fruitful avenues of study. The first is a movement from normative to empirical enquiry in the study of legitimation. The second is a movement away from the state as the primary locus regarding political legitimacy. The third is the burgeoning field of ‘practice-based’ enquiry, which spotlights the practices through which power and authority are exercised and their conditions (re)produced in the everyday. The chapter reviews the corpus of academic work in these areas, forging the methodological basis for the case studies. It ultimately rests on a practice-based approach, drawing in particular on the legacies of Bourdieu and Foucault, as the most fertile with which to explore legitimation as practice, albeit with substantial qualifications.

Chapter Two takes up this mantle of practice-based enquiry and its epistemologies, marrying it to the methodology of critical ethnography. It is motivated by the efficacy of such an approach in linking ‘the detailed analysis of ethnography to wider social structures and systems of power relationships’ (Harvey 1990, p6). The thesis, however, is also motivated by a moral concern in locating the research ‘subject’, often obscured in structuralist, or indeed post-structuralist, analyses. The actions of such subjects are far from determined or ‘produced’ by structures far removed from their lives. Individuals are of course authors of their own actions, even in the face of powerful, often profoundly oppressive, constraints. Agency has as much of a role in institutional reproduction and continuity as it does in moments of change, which is true of legitimation practice as a whole. The chapter makes a case for an inductive, fluid form of critical ethnography in this regard, before speaking to the methods of data collection and analysis that formed the basis of the next three empirical chapters.

Chapter Three is the first empirical case, taking as its lateral ‘field’ the district of Bagamoyo itself. Bagamoyo has a distinct social, cultural and political context, much maligned in modern(ist) history. Nevertheless, Bagamoyo district forms a microcosm of recent development politics in Tanzania. The political economy of aid to Tanzania precipitated an increase in development initiatives in Bagamoyo. Mushromming numbers of NGOs have moved into the district, forming a competitive environment in which
lateral legitimation becomes pronounced. The impetus to explore a district, local
government-oriented case study is thus two-fold. The first is political in the
conventional sense, in that Local Government Authorities, or ‘the district’, are
ascendant decision-making bodies and administrative hubs, around which elites are
increasingly centred. The second is epistemological, whereby lateral legitimation has
been rendered invisible to date. The chapter thus embraces the full ethnographic
impulse to look laterally at the complex, overlapping institutional field in which NGOs
negotiate and entrench their presence. This includes relations between local
government, the civil society umbrella organization and NGOs themselves. Whilst
relations are formally hierarchical, legitimation discloses shifting and situational
hierarchies as well as striking commonalities in development disposition. This chapter
also introduces in depth the legitimation practices that run through the thesis.

Chapters Four and Five form the second and third empirical case studies respectively. It
moves from the district level to focus on two, quite contrasting, village/ward
environments: Kerege and Kibindu. Bagamoyo is a large administrative area, spanning
almost 10,000 square kilometres, with these two villages located at opposite ‘corners’.
Kerege, in the southeast, borders the burgeoning Dar municipality and is well-
served according to many metrics. Kibindu in the northwest, by contrast, takes five to seven
hours to reach from Bagamoyo town, is sparsely populated, under-served and has a
dearth of development activity. Whilst there is some overlap in the legitimation practices
undertaken by NGOs and local government in these two contexts, there is a discernible
divergence in emphasis and degree, as actors legitimate themselves under very different
conditions. Similarly, the negotiation of such claims on the part of those with whom
they engage also diverges in these two contexts.

The final chapter draws together the legitimation practices as actualized in these
different contexts. It examines, specifically, the interrelationship between themes, with
pairs at times in opposition and at others in congruence. Legitimation practice is thus
situational, its framings historically contingent and its product ephemeral. It may
fluctuate and reconfigure over the course of a single encounter. The specificity,
however, of legitimation in Bagamoyo does not prohibit generalizability. The concluding
coda returns to Africa’s international relations and the centrality of legitimation as
experienced by the governed in ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004). Shifting
configurations of global governance, increasingly permeated by non-state actors, have attendant fluid, informal legitimation practices, both laterally and vertically, which have been often rendered invisible by analysis to date.

**Legitimation practices: an overview**

This thesis makes an original contribution to contemporary debates on power and authority in two key respects. The first is in *legitimation as practice*, giving it extensive and grounded empirical content in this regard. The second, related respect is in locating these *legitimation practices in the everyday*, beyond formalized institutions, undertaken and negotiated by a range of actors in a range of forums. To these two ends, the research identifies a number of key legitimation practices over the course of empirical research. Some will be familiar to those working within the anthropology of the state, but they are grounded and reworked in new ways. These practices were present throughout, although they varied in configuration and intensity. These practices, crucially, are not reducible to individual actions, as determined by material interest. Ideas matter; their power runs through each theme and, therefore, the thesis as a whole.

The first of these themes is *extensity*, expanding on Held *et al.*’s term (1999), to include the projection of ‘scale’,¹ whether in *space* or *time*. Temporal extensity, encompassing claims of institutional continuity and embeddedness over time, is something that Bourdieu himself references as part of legitimation (1984b, p104). Extensity also holds a strong spatial element, as NGOs project expansive coverage, or ‘encompassment’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002), across the district, echoing the architecture of the omnipresent Tanzanian state. This, in addition, conveys the NGO as part of the district institutional ‘furniture’. This bolsters authoritative claims with its capacity to operate at scale, but also conversely to differentiate such NGOs from smaller players who fail to extend to the outreaches of the district.

Extensity, however, is not universal in its application, with some NGOs also exercising forms of *territorality*. Territoriality, through its supporting claims, is the demarcation

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¹ Held *et al.* define extensity as the ‘reach of networks of social activity and power’ (1999, p15).
of social boundaries of inclusion and exclusion: a turf. It is invoked by NGOs in their efforts to construct groups or communities as having particular needs, thus conditioning intervention. Territoriality as legitimation practice is thus decoupled from the state’s traditional monopoly on its conceptualization. It thus resonates with Sack’s broader conception of drawing boundaries as a fundamental human strategy to affect, influence and control the behaviour of others (1986, p2). Territoriality admits of scales, either geographical in its direct cartography of coverage, often following in Tanzania the grain of administrative boundaries but also indirectly, through the delineation of groups of volunteers, constituents and/or beneficiaries within a particular domain. Territoriality in the cases provided sits in tension with extensity, but often in concordance with claims to represent key populations more effectively, although not uniformly so.

The counterpoint to non-state territoriality and its competing claims to representation is thus the extensive state and its enduring symbolism in the Tanzanian political imagination. Extensity echoes the ubiquitous state architecture in actors’ bids to institute themselves as resilient and reputable players. Tanzania, in its sixth decade of single-party rule, houses little daylight between ‘government’ and the organs of the ‘state’, with government (serikali) proving the default linguistic referent. Relations with the state, via serikali, are often invoked directly by NGOs, citing formal partnerships with the district or national government, or by the assumption by NGO staff of key advisory or governance roles within government bodies. This is part of what Green calls ‘legitimation as being part of government’ (2010, p19), in accentuating claims of vetting, partnership and/or endorsement of NGOs on the part of government staff. The state, as will be explored, continues to command considerable symbolic capital. Its post-independence founder Julius Nyerere, via his Ujamaa brand of African socialism, casts a long shadow in contemporary Tanzania. Strong notions of duty, citizenship and sacrifice still infuse political language, despite the rapidly transforming, and increasingly unequal, political economy. Positionality vis-à-vis the state, however, is fluid and situational. Other NGOs, particularly those drawing on capital from the international sphere and templates of good governance, use distance from government: legitimation as part of its negation.

State/government relations, therefore, have an ambivalent relationship with the fourth practice: representation. Nyerere’s post-independence project positioned the state as
the omnipotent, universal representative of the development and welfare of ‘the people’. Since his lost grip on power in the 1980s, however, inequality, corruption and disillusionment grew apace, contemporaneously with neoliberal reforms, thus leveraging space for NGOs to question the representative efficacy of the state. Some NGOs claim a unique position as proximate to the people, particularly those on the margins, in the face of a distant, self-interested and unresponsive state. Some NGOs, alternatively, highlight their ability to service more remote areas alongside ubiquitous government, to distance themselves from the run of urban-based development entrepreneurs. Such claims are often again a call back to the authenticity of Nyerere’s virtuous project in the face of elite opportunism, and to the expansive state machinery deemed necessary to achieve it. Development actors, however, as their colonial predecessors, are ultimately bound to the need to reconcile claims of proximity to stand for the people with those of distance in having to act for them on their behalf.

The next practice is that of voluntarism. Voluntarism, certainly with regards to Western political theory, strongly coincides with a liberal conception of civil society, as citizens associate freely to counterbalance the excesses of state and market. New NGOs, therefore, often aligned with the neoliberal good governance agenda, assertively promote their voluntary nature, either through its staff or its village recruits, as pushback against an over-zealous, at times corrupt, state machinery. The situation in Tanzania, however, is more complex, with voluntarism having played a key historical role in Nyerere’s state- and nation-building efforts. Invoking voluntarism, therefore, calls forth at once the symbolism of the state and that of (neo)liberal conceptions of civil society, which are not always concordant. Voluntarism, in addition, underwrites other forms of legitimation for NGOs, such as extensity in recruiting a village-level social infrastructure; territoriality, in demarcating exclusionary turfs via particular groups; and/or representation, in invoking subtle ideas of consent and reciprocity.

The final practice relates to material and informational resource: the ‘politics of distribution’ (Ferguson 2015). This practice interweaves the five that preceded it, and is most familiar to proponents of neopatrimonial, clientilist analyses of African politics. Indeed, extensity, territoriality, representation, voluntarism and, of course, the ostensible state, all have discernible material costs and are subject to such distributive politics. Nevertheless, a core purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that legitimation is not
reducible to material interest. The ‘public’, in the name of which authority is (re)constructed, layers the ideational on to the material. Material resource, with an affinity to Bourdieu’s ‘economic capital’, is not the sole building block of social, cultural and, ultimately, symbolic capital. Ideas matter. The symbolism of the state, and its noted overlap with voluntarism, representation and extensity, looms large in the Tanzanian political imagination and is an important factor in effecting the behaviour of others. At the same time, intervention in the name of development must afford mutual, if unequal material benefits and people have a keen sense of the limits of NGOs’ legitimation in the absence of this exchange. Furthermore, information and data gathered on particular groups are also fungible, convertible with competency into funding. NGOs, as well as those they work with, experience the everyday politics of information distribution as keenly as that of brute resource.

To summarize, if new understandings of the workings of power have been conceded in the study of politics in the late modern era, then the study of legitimation must broaden accordingly. This study is paramount as new, competing and complex ‘entanglements’ (Hönke & Müller 2012, p385) of state/non-state, private/public, local/global actors come to the fore, demanding attendant complexity of legitimation. This broadening can only enrich the study of politics and international relations. This is not solely about facilitating the ‘travel’ of IR to its hitherto geographical, and indeed theoretical, margins (Death 2013; also Cornelissen et al. 2012). It is rather to return with vigour to the centrality of legitimation as experienced by the governed: to Africa as ‘global condition’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012, p125). Questions of legitimacy, therefore, must move away from their hitherto confines of deficit and redress. Rather, legitimation as practice gives a fuller understanding of power and authority in the new political topography of our time.
Chapter One:

Legitimacy and legitimation: a broadening landscape

The traditional monopoly of politics and international relations (IR) on a number of theoretical domains, from the nature of power to state-building to legitimacy, has been eroded in the late modern era. The complexity of these domains has been compounded in an interconnected, post-Westphalian world, where sovereignty and statehood are increasingly ‘negotiated’ (Hagmann & Péclard 2010), where centres of power have shifted and where new configurations of (global) governance have come to the fore. The conventional conceptual toolbox of inter-national relations has been slow to adapt, and the need to embrace insights from other disciplines never greater. A fundamental case in point is the study of legitimacy, or rather the *practice of legitimation*, hamstrung to date by conventional drawings of both sovereignty and authority. Public authority, in the Weberian idealist sense, is the *legitimated exercise of power* (1968; also Bulkeley 2012, p2429; Lake 2010; Lund 2006a). Legitimation, therefore, must mirror power’s analytical expansion. Even where the need to broaden legitimation has been conceded, its empirical content has remained woefully thin. Thus, the study of how political actors legitimate their authority to act remains under-theorized and under-researched.

This chapter thus makes the case for understanding contemporary *legitimation as practice*, as the accumulative ‘making of claims’ (Barker 2001, p2), drawing on a range of disciplines to do so. This reworking of legitimacy has implications, therefore, not just for IR and political theory, but for multidisciplinary debates regarding the very nature of contemporary power and authority. Three developments in particular lay the intellectual groundwork for such an enterprise. The first of these, specifically on the topic of legitimacy, is a movement away from normative towards empirical enquiry. This is arguably the most challenging, particularly within political theory, whereby the conditions of legitimacy are simultaneously critiqued vis-à-vis intrinsically normative frameworks. Classical political philosophy from Aristotle to Rousseau, in synchronously
raising questions of state, legitimacy and justice, has persistently melded what a legitimate state is with what a legitimate state should be. The most recent ‘wave’ of legitimation scholarship (Barker 2001, p13) strives to entangle the two.

The second development is a movement away from the state as the primary locus regarding (political) legitimacy/legitimation. This has come more naturally to some disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, than to others, such as IR. Nevertheless, there has been an increased concordance in the late-modern era that public authority is not limited to, nor contained by, the purview of the state. Non-state actors, with their evolving, hybrid forms of governance and authority, should not be probed intermittently, but rather they embody changes in the construction of the public sphere. New hybrid forms of authority, straddling public and private, local and global, state and society, encapsulate what is a broader phenomenon. Legitimation, furthermore, is not an insulated practice of elites that exists in isolation. It is an iterative process that demands the insertion of the ‘collective’ in the affirmation or rejection of such claim-making. It is intrinsically spatialized, demanding symbolic proximity and distance, the entreaty and repudiation of Others, as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699).

The third, related development is the burgeoning field of ‘practice-focused’ enquiry. This is by no means a uniform trend, but rather that methodological space has opened up in all relevant disciplines to spotlight the practices through which political power is exercised and its conditions (re)produced. This kind of enquiry is often rooted in the ‘micro’, or everyday realm, in a broader understanding of political ‘governance’ and in a more relational conception of power, with the legacies of Foucault and Bourdieu particularly prominent. There has thus been a productive, if eclectic, concordance around practice-based enquiry, as a ‘fertile “focal point”’ for a wide range of disciplines (Adler & Pouillot 2011, p3). The conceptualization of practice as ‘competent performances’ which ‘simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (ibid, p4), pertains strongly to contemporary legitimation. The ideational mells with the material, engendering the multi-faceted and variegated matrices of action common to public life throughout the globe.
This chapter, therefore, uniquely integrates these three key developments into the theory and study of legitimation as practice. Practices, following Adler & Pouliot, are ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’ (ibid.). Legitimation practice is the everyday rendering of power authoritative, and of reproducing that authority once in place. This chapter advocates for an empirical, practice-focused enquiry, centred on the evolving legitimation of public authority, which increasingly includes non-state actors. This is not to disregard the role of the state in legitimating public authority: far from it. It is rather an acknowledgement that public authority is produced, shared and contested by an increasingly disparate range of actors, converging around ‘templates’ (Lund 2006a, p675) of action. As such, authority, via its supporting legitimation, has never been more ambiguous or fluctuating in form. The chapter concludes that whilst this phenomenon may be particularly pronounced in parts of Africa, it is not unique to that continent. It is part of a broader reconfiguration of how modes of governance are actualized in ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004).

The chapter addresses these three developments in turn. The first section sets out the case for locating the practice of legitimation in the everyday, escaping the age-old impasses of conventional legitimacy theory, prising its empirical study from its normative roots. I probe legitimation as Barker’s ‘making of claims’: a process both conditional to and constitutive of the exercise of public authority. It is not, however, a mere ‘self-referential’ practice of elites (ibid. p13); it is operationalized within everyday ‘fields’ and infused by a range of economic, social and, ultimately, ‘symbolic’ capital. The second section broadens these fields of legitimation beyond its hitherto state-centric confines. I argue that ‘territorialism’ in the study of legitimacy discloses an enduring ideology of the state, foreclosing fruitful avenues of study. The neglect of non-state actors, in this instance NGOs, as part of new configurations or ‘assemblages’ (Collier & Ong 2005) of power and authority, is a case in point. The third and final section spotlights insights from practice-focused enquiry, exploring its potentials and limits, paving the way for the subsequent methodological chapter. In summary, the chapter navigates what the thesis looks at, who inhabits its field and how to study such. It provides

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2 Post-colonial writers lead the most recent charge against African exceptionalism (e.g. Acharya 2011; Chowdry & Nair 2002; Hönke & Müller 2012; Paolini et al. 1999). This project distances itself from Africanists who claim a ‘bottom up’ approach towards understanding the African context, but ultimately compound exceptionalism (for example Clapham 1996; Dunn & Shaw [eds] 2001; Englebert 2000; Lemke 2003).
a unique confluence of theoretical threads, paving the way for an in-depth examination of contemporary legitimation.

**Legitimacy to legitimation: prising the empirical from the normative**

The topic of legitimacy, as the conditions of political authority within a given territory, is one of the founding debates of political philosophy. The earliest theorizing around legitimacy centred on the conditions of political stability and the (rightful) use of power within city territories (Zelditch 2001, p42).¹ In the post-Westphalian era, it was state territory, power and the stability of the inter-state system that became entrenched as primary concerns of nascent IR theory. As such, Weber’s renowned definition of the state as ‘*monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory*’ (1970 [1919], p78, emphasis in original) grafted neatly onto a presupposed inter-state system. States recognized in this system are assumed to hold exclusive domestic authority backed by physical force, however covertly. The study of the state’s endurance, therefore, in a field where it is both the ontological departure and endpoint, proved something of a self-affirming enterprise (Ashley 1988; Walker 1993). As such, the state persisted as the primary, at times solitary, legitimate political actor in the inter-national system.

In this way, from legitimacy’s earliest framings, its debate conflated the conditions of political power with state power. The state is legitimate force: ergo legitimacy *is* the state. To pose questions of legitimacy is thus to pose questions of a state and/or regime (e.g. Buchanan 1999; Copp 1999; Stillman 1974). The ‘state-as-given’, however, signifies as much an ideology as an empirical realm of enquiry. Scholte highlights the pervasive hold of ‘methodological territorialism’ on political enquiry as a whole (2000, p66; also Agnew 1994; 2005; Murphy 1996; 2010), in its conflation of state, society and territory. Non-state actors, like NGOs, represent a deviation from the established, indeed endorsed, division of political space. Their location at the confluence of the global/local, public/private, state/society, has spurred particular consternation as to

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¹ Thucydides gave particular attention to the issues of the (moral) external use of force on a free state (in reference to the revisionist Athenian empire)(432 BCE [transl. Bohn 1848]. Aristotle was concerned with the just state, as a unique form of political community and the nature of consent (350 BCE [transl. Jowett 1905])
their presence on the world stage. Conventional constructions of legitimacy, centred on Westernized democratic ideals of elections and open government, fall down when applied to the NGO. This is why much of the literature that addresses NGO legitimacy studies either seeks to redress the ‘democratic deficit’ through good governance and accountability (e.g. Edwards 2000; Gourevitch et al. 2012; Grzybowski 2000; Nelson 2002; Slim 2002), or theorize NGOs’ essentially supplementary role on the international stage (e.g. Atack 1999; Benner et al. 2004; Dubash 2009; Gordenker & Weiss 1995; Ossewaarde et al. 2008). This offers no challenge to the state-centred nomenclature: the ‘National Order’ of things (Malkki 1995; also Walker 1993).

Westernized democratic norms have thus been transposed onto the realm of NGO governance, buried under the rhetoric of good managerial practice. Legitimacy is reduced to a number of ‘objective’ criteria, to which NGOs subscribe and/or are held to account. This ‘tickbox’, attributive brand of legitimacy is attained through discrete, rule-based processes, or ‘throughputs’ (Schmidt 2012), such as audits, meetings and evaluations. As such, the NGO legitimacy debate has assumed the language of ‘new public managerialism’: a ‘technical’ (Lister 2003) tweak to the inter-state system. Yet, given the Westernized brand of democracy that underwrites such a project, this is an intrinsically normative enterprise of how NGOs should be constituted, particularly vis-à-vis the state. It is at the expense of our understanding as to how NGOs create the space in which to operate and in which to govern. It neglects the role that NGOs play in the production and reproduction of subtler forms of legitimacy in their everyday work. Legitimacy, or rather the practice of legitimation, demands substantial, albeit less visible, work and indeed creativity on the part of NGOs, As such, this is an exercise in ‘craft over compliance’ (Dodworth 2014, p22).

The pervasive conflation of the descriptive and normative, in this case in theorizing legitimacy, reflects a tension, as Flyvbjerg argues, in the modernist project itself (1998,

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4 Lister (2003) makes a similar point.
5 Collingwood argues such a comparison ‘fails to recognise the extent to which states themselves consistently fail to meet liberal democratic standards of representation, accountability and transparency’ (2006, p452). The point is that any such comparison is essentially a normative debate, portrayed as established practice.
6 Oxfam’s statement on legitimacy, for example, merges issues of accountability, process, organizational structure, expertise and their (assumed legitimate) goals of poverty reduction [http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/accounts/legitimacy.html](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/accounts/legitimacy.html). Grzybowski’s piece also merges NGO location within civil society with goals, structures and expertise (2000). Gourevitch et al. (2012) examine how managerial, technical processes compensate when ‘virtue is not enough’.

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It is encapsulated by the *partial adoption* of Weber’s claim by the state to the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force’ (1970 [1919], p78): the touchstone of modernist politics. His renowned three-part typology holds that there are charismatic/traditional/rational-legal sources of legitimacy, or more precisely legitimate domination (*ibid.*, p79). Ironically, whilst Weber claimed to challenge the Enlightenment’s positivist legacy, his ‘rational-legal’ formulation of legitimacy has become its *de facto* definition, but also its normative evaluative frame in political theory. On this conception, legitimacy resides in the rules and laws that underpin the formal institutions of a state and public participation thereof. These rules codify the rational, conscious exchange of power for protection (and other public goods) between self-interested actors. A legitimate state, therefore, is a good in itself, freely chosen, and participated in, by its citizens.7

This, what I term ‘transactional’, conception of (state) legitimacy as a rational exchange of compliance for liberties and protections, of ‘input’ and ‘output’ (Easton 1965), is a key part of the Enlightenment’s legacy. It owes much to the Lockean idea of consent as the basis of the citizen’s contract with the state. Society, as Locke outlined in his Second Treatise, comes together to form ‘one body politic’ (1948 [1689], p44), thus authorising society to decree laws to protect its citizens from over-zealous state incursion. Consent to abide by such laws is given either expressly or tacitly, through even the most passive participation in a particular society (*ibid.*, p60). This conception of consent/exchange has proven central to subsequent legitimacy theorists’ seminal works. For Lipset, legitimacy is the capacity of formal institutions to engender the belief (or rather the concession) that they are the most ‘appropriate’ to safeguard public interests (1963 p77). For Dahl, an initial reservoir of legitimacy, forged on the consent of the masses, can be continually replenished through discrete events such as elections (1971). Consent is inferred from a perceived lack of disorder but also retroactively applied, masking the violence of oppression, conquest and colonization.8 Questions of legitimacy are only valid, therefore, in times of visible crisis or unrest.9

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7 Taylor makes a similar point in that this conception of legitimacy is founded on a (Westernized) idea of bargaining and exchange (1971, p34).
8 Webber & Macleod’s collection (2010) provides thoroughly historicized accounts in this regard. See also Galtung’s seminal work on structural violence (1971).
9 Bourdieu makes a similar point, drawing on Hume, in his fullest exposition of (state) legitimation: *Rethinking the State* (1994).
Locke’s philosophy is, of course, explicitly normative in its prescription of natural law and in the rightful power of the civic body to institute such laws. As is common in subsequent libertarian, Enlightenment-inspired writings, however, the full extent of its normativity is somewhat obscured. The valorization of a rather restrictive, indeed materialist brand of ‘rationality’ is an affirmation, rather than mere identification, of this logic of human behaviour. This move is reductionist in its portrayal of social interaction, leading to the denigration of other conditions and motives of action. The extension of this has been to ascribe rationality, in its fictional, idealized form, to both state and non-state in the West. The civic body, its government and its laws have been properly formed and so, as long as it remains rule-compliant, the business of government may ensue. The modern, read Western, state has reached this point of equilibrium, forming the blueprint for others, including NGOs. Locke’s condescension towards societies in their ‘infancy’ (1948 [1689] p56), clinging blindly to autocratic leaders without the political sophistication to contest them, still inheres in regime typologies today.

The subsequent use of Weber to add weight to this political cartography is, to some extent, based on a selective reading of his works. Firstly, specifically on the topic of legitimacy, he expounded other forms, charismatic and traditional, which inhere in all contemporary modes of governance. Weber was himself apprehensive regarding the ‘iron cage’ of rationalization (1970 [1905]; 2001 [1930]) as a societal endpoint, whereby technology and routinization indeed promote efficiency but in the service of goals which are increasingly devoid of any real meaning. Whilst political writers, therefore, have been quick to embrace rational-legal conceptions of legitimacy in the name of Weber, it is not always clear whether his own intention was to rank forms of legitimacy or rather curate them. Indeed for some, Weber’s aim to structure empirical investigations into the subject was not evaluative enough (Grafstein 1981, p456; also Barker 1990; Blau 1963). In addition, as Bourdieu states in his reading of Weberian ‘types’, albeit in a different context, ‘one must accept the existence of all the empirically observable intermediate stages between these conceptual types, which are themselves mere summations of distinctive features’ (1987, p120). As Weber notes himself, ‘pure types are rarely found in reality’ (1970 [1919], p79).

Secondly, the reification of Weber’s rational-legalism is also selective in its focus on the formal institutions of the state, seen as politically and culturally neutral, thus replicable.
The greatest legacy of late modern writers, including Weber, Habermas and Foucault, has been to broaden our understanding of power relations and, in turn, the parameters of the political realm. For Weber, legitimation is a sociological exercise grounded in existing beliefs and social practices; ‘legitimations of domination’ are ultimately ‘inner justifications’ (1970, p78). Habermas, in Legitimation Crisis (1976 [1973]), highlights the diminished capacity of the state to overcome contradictions in the capitalist system. This can only be overcome through practical discourse within civil society (1990), of which NGOs form a part, against the backdrop of a particular ‘lifeworld’ (1987). It is therefore necessary to locate socialized understandings of legitimacy against a wider milieu of norms, beliefs and practices. Foucault critiques the ‘juridico-discursive’ (1979 [1976], p82) conception of power, whereby legal norms and the ‘procedure of law’ mask the autarchy of elites, legitimated through the language of regulation and arbitration (ibid., p86). Whilst there are epistemological divergences, each of these theorists highlights how boundaries between political and social; public and private; power and knowledge; are not neatly drawn.10

The prescriptivism of the transactional, rational-legal state has been most discernible where such mechanisms are deemed absent, notably in post-colonial Africa. Scholars drew directly from Weber’s patrimonialism (a sub-form of traditional authority) in spotlighting antithetical ‘neopatrimonial’ regimes (e.g. Eisenstadt 1973). These were defined by the exercise of authority through ‘personal patronage, rather than ideology or law’ (Bratton & Walle 1994, p458). Such work highlighted the absence of rational-legal governance, drawing instead from Weber’s traditional form of legitimacy in shoring regimes. Bratton & Walle echo Roth’s earlier assertion that neopatrimonial regimes are essentially ‘private governments of…[the] powerful’ (1968, p196). Neopatrimonialism, and its near relative ‘personal rule’ (Jackson & Rosberg 1982; 1984; also Roth 1968), are determined by informal, clientilist networks that facilitate material exchange between the few at the expense of the many. Forms of personal and patrimonial rule are argued to have taken pervasive hold in post-independence Africa in the absence of strong institutions, the rule of law and formalized civil society, including in Tanzania (Englebert 2000; Hyden 1999). Such regimes have failed to develop into fully fledged,

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10 Barker argues that political legitimacy is a distinct relationship ‘between government and governed’ (1990, p20), not to be confused with the broader usage of the term. It is not made clear, however, why all forms of non-state actor activity are excluded from his structures of government.
functioning states and are prone to less ‘rational’ behaviour (Jackson & Rosberg 1982, p9).

Pitcher et al. (2009) suggest the conflation of legitimacy type with regime is another misappropriation of Weber’s work. This element has indeed been strongly amplified by the teleological, or as Pitcher et al. put it, ‘evolutionist’, undercurrent to neopatrimonial analysis. Personal rule dominates these nascent states due to a lack of the strong institutions and civic life associated with the modern state. The democratization wave in Africa is ‘incomplete’ (Bratton & Walle 1994, p453), allowing despotic modes of governance to flourish. Patrimonialism is the survival and revival of the ‘pre-modern’ in the modern era (Theobald 1982, p549, drawing on Roth 1968), and this evolutionist thread has pathologized what are seen as specifically African modes of governance.11

Pitcher et al. try to distance Weber from this charge, arguing that he is not prima facie ranking these forms of legitimacy. They argue, drawing on Callaghy (1988), that Weber is antievolutionist and patently not deterministic about the trajectory of capitalism nor its relation to the state. It is difficult, at times, to maintain this line, given the sense of time and progression that clearly does permeate Weber’s articulation of traditional, patrimonial legitimacy. The ‘authority of the “eternal yesterday”’ and the ‘prince of yore’ contrasts markedly with the functional ‘competence’ and ‘rationality’ of rule-based systems (1970, p78). Weber goes so far as to pronounce the ‘technical superiority’ of the rational bureaucracy (1968, p973) embraced in the West. As such, Weber often struggled to disentangle his ideal types from prescriptivism. Campbell indeed declares that the ‘value-free’ study of legitimacy has been rendered impossible (1986, p207). He argues, convincingly at times, that Weber accepts the ‘truth’ of rational-legal legitimacy whilst distancing himself from more alien forms. This is at odds with Weber’s own claim to identify, rather than evaluate, the beliefs of others (ibid., pp218-220).

The fact that Weber at times failed to meet his own standards of enquiry is not, however, sufficient to discredit his contribution. It is possible to embrace certain ‘thinking tools’, whilst distancing oneself from the modernism Weber himself viewed with intermittent apprehension.12 Where Pitcher et al. offer particular insight is their

11 Englebert, for example, deems the illegitimacy of some African states ‘insurmountable’ in some contexts (2000, px), Kaplan famously decried Africa’s inherent lawlessness (1994) and Reno identifies an intrinsic between weak African states and warlordism (1998).
12 See Walker’s strong reclamation of Weber’s ethics as well as his empiricism (1993, Chapter 3).
return to Weber’s assertion that all forms of legitimation inhere in all regimes (2009, p137). On this point Weber was unequivocal; ‘the three basic types of domination cannot be placed into a simple evolutionary line: they in fact appear together in the most diverse combinations’ (1968, p1133). Furthermore, all three may be productive, contributing to diverse but viable forms of governance. Lastly, and where Pitcher et al.’s critique of the neopatrimonial school is most incisive, is that such formulations neglect the role of broader society in affording or contesting legitimacy in everyday life. All Weberian forms of legitimacy require iterative interaction with the intended subjects of rule. As Pitcher et al. put it, the ‘collective…is frequently missing from contemporary discussions of African patrimonialism’ (2006, p140, emphasis in original). They draw ‘states without people’ (Mustapha 2002, p2). As such, neopatrimonialism reduces political action to the material interests of elites, leaving this sphere inhabited solely by ‘criminals and cranks’ (Mustapha 2002, p4).

This, uniquely ‘African’ brand of patrimonial legitimacy is projected onto all political actors, including those that act in the name of civil society. Clearly, there are clientelist networks that interlink NGO, government and corporate elites at local, national and transnational levels; that is not in dispute and duly warrants examination.13 Bayart’s ‘Politics of the Belly’ (2009 [1993]) has enduring relevance, encapsulated by the perennial debate as to ‘who eats first’ in the development hierarchy. The point is rather that the matrices for action, in the NGO world or any other, are not reducible to material exchange.14 There are indeed elements of predation on the part of elites, but also resistance on the part of non-elites. There is a whole range of motivations for action on the part of NGOs and those who interact with them. There is indeed a discernible and deliberate blurring of the public and private spheres in Africa, in which NGOs are complicit. This is hardly, however, a phenomenon unique to the continent. Those discourses that pathologize modes of governance as specific to Africa, in summary, raise the question as to whether normative templates have truncated empirical

13 See Gray (2015) and Lofchie (2014) for accounts of intra-elite dynamics in Tanzania.
14 Bayart’s own attempts to circumvent this charge of ‘reducing African social actors to no more than glutinous enzymes’ (2009, p242) are undone by his exclusive empirical focus on rapacious elites. Bayart does not, furthermore, explicitly attend to ‘symbolic resources’ (p. 217) until late into his analysis.
enquiry. Neopatrimonial studies do not embrace the breadth and richness of, as well as contradictions in, motivations for action in public life.

It is at this juncture, therefore, that the empirical study of legitimation practice must dovetail with the normativism regarding what constitutes a legitimate regime. It is a difficult division to maintain, but I disagree that it is intrinsically impossible. My window into this phenomenon is the legitimation practices of primarily NGOs, as an *accumulative process of ‘claim-making’*, located and contested in the everyday. This process is curated into sets of symbolic practices throughout the empirical chapters. The efficacy of these claims is not, contrary to the neopatrimonial school, reducible to economic rents or material resource, although these are still present. These practices are rather informed by a more nuanced conception of accumulated ‘capital’ - economic, social, cultural and, ultimately, *symbolic* (Bourdieu 1983; 1984; 1986) - as resources on which actors draw. Bourdieu, as I return to, advanced these forms of capital as an antidote to the assumed asocial, rational, interest-maximizing individual that exists independent of history (1986, p241). As such, a broader conception of legitimation provides a lens into the complex matrices of action and governance beyond the monotonous narrative of predatory elites in Africa.

This conception of legitimation as everyday practice returns us full circle to Weber and his original writings. Whether Weber’s ideal types had a modernist *telos* is possible, but without doubt, they have been wielded as a discursive weapon in a manner removed from his declared philosophy of enquiry. Weber’s models were designed as tools to help us probe real life situations. His rational-legal bureaucracy is a type that does not exist, by definition, anywhere in the world. To normalize his ideal types ‘obscures as much as it illuminates’ (Migdal 2001, p15). Different forms of legitimation practice thus sit alongside each other; Weber was as concerned with messy sociological process as with definitive political outcomes. As Barker remarks, ‘Weber is not talking about some abstract quality, “legitimacy”, but about an observable activity in which governments characteristically engage, the making of claims’ (2001, p2). Legitimacy is the ephemeral

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16 Bourdieu, as I return to, defines economic capital as material wealth directly convertible into money or property (1986, p242); social as relationships of acquaintance and recognition linked to membership in a group (p248); cultural as the acquisition of knowledge, education and other hereditary advantages over time (pp243-8); and symbolic as prestige, or recognition ‘as legitimate’ (1990, p118).
product of legitimation, and hence proven elusive to quantify. Barker goes so far as to call it a ‘fiction’, ascribed to situations where people seemingly accept the claims of their rulers (ibid., p19).

Whilst embracing Weber’s empiricism, however, it is important to highlight as a final note that this thesis does not emulate his project of interpreting legitimacy as belief. Firstly, this is an acknowledgement that this endeavour has long precipitated a ‘methodological impasse’ (Beetham 1991, p9), whereby such beliefs are not accessible or directly related to action. More substantively, however, as O’Kane points out, a belief in legitimacy merely begs the question on which grounds such beliefs are legitimated (1993; also Grafstein 1981). Rather than seeking to ground legitimacy elsewhere, however, as these theorists, this thesis has moved firmly away from a foundational account. Each of the practices is thus firmly historicized, rearticulated and appropriated in new ways on a daily basis. When constructed as practice, in addition, legitimation may be conscious, and even strategic, but the belief systems and capital on which it draws may not. Indeed, if public authority is legitimation’s ephemeral product, there is not necessarily the time or space for legitimacy belief to crystallize.

To conclude this section, I situate myself in Barker’s most recent, fourth ‘wave’ of legitimation scholarship in examining the process of making claims to authority (2001, p13). This project owes a debt to Weber, but to his social science over his renowned attributive forms of legitimacy. Legitimation is rather a process that marks a ‘central feature of governing’ (ibid.). The necessary, and indeed extensive, addendum to Barker, however, is that legitimation is not an insulated, ‘self-referential’ practice of formal rulers that exists in isolation. It is undertaken by a range of political actors in a range of forums. It is, furthermore, an interactive process, which demands the insertion of the broader ‘collective’ in the affirmation or rejection of such claims. The move to embrace the full breadth of political legitimation has, to date, been confounded by conflation of ‘governing’ with ‘government’. However, as I next explore, governing is not restricted to the organs of the state. The shifting global order has accelerated the entry of new actors and indeed new configurations of governance.
Letting the ‘non-state’ in: the politics of legitimacy and the legitimacy of politics

Non-state actors have shaped global politics long before the modern state came into being. Few IR scholars dispute such, or that such actors have had a discernible and enduring influence on the international system. As noted, however, a certain ‘ideology’ of the state underpinned IR as a discipline, with the conventionally drawn sovereign state its departure and endpoint. It is this epistemic deadlock that caused the slow inclusion of non-state actors into the topography of international politics. This reluctance disclosed unease with the changing contours of the ‘international’, but also regarding certain disciplinary domains (e.g. Ashley 1988). The role of non-state actors, with their rival claims to ‘legitimacy’ to influence global politics, marks a challenge to the state’s traditional monopoly of authority. The affirmation of legitimacy in one sphere thus represents a challenge in another. The politics of distribution of the legitimacy debate itself, therefore, has proved something, to borrow the hallmark language of IR, of a zero-sum game.

Global social and economic transformation, however, has marked a profound change both in the ordering of political space and its modes of governance.17 Rosenau comprehensively defines governance as ‘spheres of activity at all levels…that amount to systems of rule in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control’ (1997, p145). These levels have undoubtedly compressed under globalization. Power has diffused across boundaries, be they geographical or conceptual, as global structures have become increasingly characterized by a ‘disaggregation of authority’ (Rosenau 2003, p228). This is not to argue that the state has lost its position of prominence; disaggregation is followed by reconstruction. It is rather that the traditional armoury of state-centric political science has been left wanting. ‘Naturalized’ dichotomies between the national and international, public and private, economic and political have been unsettled (see...

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17 The abundant globalization literature of the last two decades points towards a substantive ‘spatio-temporal’ shift in the contemporary era, precipitated by an increase in the ‘extensity’ and ‘intensity’ (Held et al. 1999) of global information and resource flows across borders. This has been described as a ‘stretching’ of modes of connection between social contexts (Giddens 1990, p63), a ‘thickening’ of interdependency networks (Keohane & Nye 2000, p108) or ‘deterritorialization’, where globality provides the fourth spatio-temporal dimension (Scholte 2000, p46). This in turn has precipitated commentary on new transnational forms of governance (e.g. Avant et al. 2010; Rosenau 2003; Sassen 2006; Slaughter 2000).
e.g. Hall & Biersteker [eds] 2002; Migdal & Schlichte 2005; Sassen 1996; 2006; Strange 1997). Allen, more recently, discusses the ‘distorted reach’ of agents of power, beyond conventional territorial boundaries (2016).

The question, therefore, is not whether non-state actors are new, but whether their recent propagation captures something new in contemporary governance. There has been a reluctance to concede that the rules of the game have changed; that public authority is intrinsically more ambiguous; that there are forms of legitimation that pertain to both ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ action. Such a concession would undermine the urge to redress challenges to, or anomalies within, the inter-state system. This urge to redress is typical of ‘legitimacy deficit’ argumentation, which, as noted, scrutinizes NGOs for gaps in procedural, or ‘throughput’ (Schmidt 2012), legitimacy and accountability (e.g. Edwards 2000; Grzybowski 2000; Scholte 2007; Slim 2002). It is couched in the language of liberal democratic norms and its transactional account of legitimacy, providing a tacit endorsement of the division of political space in the inter-state system. It has presented, therefore, no fundamental challenge to the conventional framing of IR legitimacy debates. At the same time, however, it fails to capture new dynamics of (global) governance and its changing patchwork of actors and action.

This is not, however, to claim that all IR has stood still. Some scholars have presented this transformative change not as a challenge to the status quo but as a springboard to explore new forms of mobilization and contestation. Such scholars thus seek to explore new forms of legitimacy that inhere in emergent systems of governance and authority in the new global ‘order’ (Clark 2003; 2005; also Barker 2001; Bulkeley 2012; Erman & Uhlin [eds] 2010; Held 1995). Clark argues not for what constitutes legitimacy of this order but within it (2003, p75), insofar as such an order exists. As such, non-state actors do not mark an anomaly in the system but an integral extension of it. This path has demanded a shift in the perspectives, and therefore the methodological conventions, that have traditionally defined IR scholarship. Best and Gheciu, for example, moved

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18 Brown (2006) makes the important point that much critique is primarily levelled at (neo)realist IR theory and that IR’s conceptual toolbox can expand to embrace the breadth of global institutional life.

19 Critical and poststructuralist theorists have espoused the need for a more ‘global’ standpoint, from which to critique the ‘natural’ or rather ‘National’ order of things (Malkii, 1995). Such critique may derive from critical IR theory (e.g. Ashley & Walker 1990; Cox 1981; Linklater 1992; Scholte 1990), the governmentality school more generally (Leftwich 1994; Rose & Miller 2010) or, most
recently to redefine the resurgent ‘public’ in global governance not as a bounded sphere but as ‘an evolving set of practices’ (2014, p15; also Abrahamsen & Williams 2014; Porter 2014). Collier and Ong (2005) and Sassen (2006) explore ‘global assemblages’, whereby abstract, mobile ideas and systems of governance become operationalized within specific fields. Such analyses foreground not just types of actors but particular clusters of activity around the template of public action at any one time.

The majority of scholarship on Tanzania, however, has been more affiliated with the multidisciplinary African area studies than IR. African studies in the 1970s and 1980s settled too on the state as the main repository of public authority. Its key concern in this period was the prospects for order following the wave of independence in the 1960s. As such, it placed considerable emphasis on state-building and how to formalize, as well as ‘indigenize’, state-associated institutions. Comparisons against Western blueprints disclosed an implicit teleology, whereby African institutions were portrayed as underdeveloped and deficient. Jackson and Rosberg infamously claimed African states to be empirically ‘empty’, propped up solely by external recognition (1982; also Clapham 1996; Englebert & Hummel 2005). The tendency towards reductionism and pathology, however, eventually gave way to more nuanced examinations of the diversity and complexity of institutional life in various African contexts (e.g. Kelsall 2008; Lund 2006a; Menkhaus 2007; Nkiwane 2001; Tripp 2000). Statehood is ‘negotiated’ by a multitude of actors (Hagmann & Péclard 2010; also Boone 2003; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006), as indeed is the legitimation of authority. The dichotomies of Western political philosophy, therefore, were abandoned earlier, and more emphatically, than within IR.

Studies on the workings of power and authority in Tanzania neatly illustrate this shift in African studies. There is now a rich body of literature on the complexity of relations between ‘state’ and ‘society’ in post-colonial Tanzania, in contrast to earlier fascination with the state’s machinations of control. Its authoritarian regime, and its relative stability post-independence, had hitherto served as the main focus of study. Its political landscape has indeed been dominated by the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM]): a ‘one-party hegemonic regime’ (Hoffman and Robinson 2009, powerfully, from critical ethnography (Appadurai 1988; 1991; 1996; Bhabha 1996; Gupta & Ferguson 1992; 2002; Malkki 1992; 1995).
p125; also Phillips 2010) formed from both the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party in 1977. Counting from TANU’s assumption of power in 1961, CCM is now the longest ruling party on the African continent (Paget 2017, p154). ‘Government’ is not readily discernible from party or state. The sustained scholarly emphasis on its authoritarianism, however, in a sense reaffirmed the detachment of state from society, urban from rural; centre/periphery; elite/peasantry; ruler/subject; modernity/ tradition; town/village. It restricted conceptual space to foreground the ‘negotiation’, at times co-production, of state authority. These spheres, most notably espoused by Mamdani (1996), echoing Ekeh (1975), became distinct, or ‘bifurcated’. Whilst the latter is dependent on the former, the two do not interact on a daily basis. Indeed, it was argued, this very separation allowed both colonial and post-colonial order to endure.

Mamdani’s macro-analysis of the continent, whilst it does not entirely neglect localized forms of resistance, slid towards a mechanistic portrayal of the state and its architecture. Pockets of anti-state resistance, of ‘indigenous civil society’ (1996, p21), collapsed under the weight of state subjugation, reaffirming the authoritarianism it sought to explain. This purported division between state and society has since been forcefully taken to task in the Tanzanian context. It precipitated interpretivist-oriented scholars to step in, drawing on ethnographic and/or historical fieldwork to highlight the fluidity of state–society relations, or their ‘reciprocities’ (Tripp 1997, p198; also Dill 2013). Such work has suggested looking elsewhere for ‘resistance’ (Becker 2013; Tripp 1997, 2000; Kelsall 2000b; Pels 2002). It spotlights localized forms of accountability and civil society over imported ones (Geiger 1997; Kelsall 2003; Tripp 1997; Mercer 2003). It emphasizes informal practices over formal institutions as critical to understanding Tanzanian politics (Becker 2008; Brennan 2006; 2012; Boone 1998; Dill 2013; Kamat 2008; Schneider 2006; Harrison 2008). Even the state monolith itself can be unpicked; Costello examines resistance to reforms by bureaucrats from ‘within’ (1996). Lastly, it embraces recent, ‘revisionist’ (Englund 2013, p672) efforts to rehabilitate the ‘public’ and its civic sensibilities in African studies: the often untold ‘concerns for the public good’ (Werbner 2004, p2; also Englund 2012; Gewald et al. 2011; Hunter 2015; Routley 2012).

This fluidity in content and form, however, allows in turn for fluid positionality. Legitimation (most clearly brought out in representational practice) melds distance and
proximity as well as state and society. Distance, prominent in both state and non-state claims, manifests itself in the need to act for a constituency due to barriers to self-development, long embedded in Tanganyika’s colonial and post-colonial discourse (Green 2014; Hunter 2015; Schneider 2006). Proximity, in contrast, conveys resemblance: shared norms, traits or interests, allowing governors to stand for those excluded by the chauvinist mainstream. Both distance and proximity, however, engender conditions for intervention. Agencies from the colonizing north, ‘state’ or otherwise, co-produced enduring divisions between civilization and barbarism, developed and undeveloped, presence versus absence, success versus failure. This ‘Othering’ of swathes of the globe, linking systems of education and cultural production to geo-political influence, has been, following Fanon (1967) and Said’s lead (1978), vigorously deconstructed by post-colonial thought (e.g. Bhabha 1994; Coronil 1996; Cohn 1996; Doty 1996; Mbembe 2001; Ngugi 1981; 1986; Paolini 1999; Thomas 1994). Crucially, however, the post-colonial condition is replicated at numerous scales by numerous actors (Dodworth 2016; also Powell 2003).

Whilst the state/society division does not, therefore, hold much analytical scrutiny, it nevertheless continues to serve as a ‘template’ (Lund 2006a, p675) for action in Tanzania’s contemporary development context. Legitimation and its spatialized practices work though, by and indeed against the state, in crafting the space to govern. Tanzania, as the ‘paradigmatic development state’ (Green 2014, p17; also Dill 2013, p30), has itself been made possible by ‘the transfer of resources, policy templates and expertise’ (ibid. p3; also Lofchie 2014, pp105-116) from external agencies, both state and non-state, since colonial times. The idea of the omnipotent, benevolent state was paramount during Tanzania’s socialist engineering of the village community. In development’s most recent iteration, manifest through neoliberal reforms, which precipitated the ballooning of registered NGO and community based organizations (Tripp 2000; Mercer 2003; Kelsall 2004), assistance has been increasingly administered in the name of societal scrutiny of the state. The ‘community’, as a separate, homogenous, idealized space, has thus been strongly and continuously operationalized in Tanzania (also Marsland 2006).

Green and Dill’s respective monographs mark important work in this vein regarding Tanzania’s contemporary development landscape (2014; 2013). Both explore, combining critical ethnography with historical perspectives, the state-sanctioned leveraging of
societal action via ‘community development’. For Green, the appropriation of community development by internationally funded NGOs maintains the ‘vertical topography’ of the state (2014, p32) and beyond. Similarly, Dill argues the state/society division, via community based development, serves to enhance rather than temper the idea of the state and its claims to the legitimate use of force (2013, pp4-5, echoing Mitchell 1991). Both explore developmentalism at scales, with the idealized community ‘interstitial’ between the state and its backward subjects (Green 2014, p28; Dill 2013, p12). Both deconstruct contemporary development as the Foucauldian ‘mastery of techniques’ (Green 2014, p180): a highly verticalized form of governmentality working against the emergence of a more genuine form of politics (ibid. p182). Where they differ is that, for Green, the appropriation of community labour by external agencies represents colonial-like continuity (also Green 2010; 2015; Mercer 2003), whereas for Dill the shift to community as ‘both object and agent of development’ (2013 p7) marks a departure from the state-led model. Nevertheless, for Dill, the use of community still bolsters, legitimates and/or ‘fixes’ the state (also Hunter 2008; Jennings 2007; Moore 1988).

This type of work typifies developments in African area studies more broadly, challenging boundaries between domains through the commonality of practices that constitute them. It is a direct response to the portrayal of African states as vacuous spaces, devoid of institutions or ‘empirical’ statehood (Jackson & Rosberg 1986). It aims, in contrast, to disclose the diversity and vibrancy of institutional life across the continent. It contributes to the continuing broadening of the conceptual toolbox from that which historically defined power, authority and civil society in the West (Chabal & Daloz 1998; Death 2013; 2015; Ferguson 2006; Kelsall 2000a; 2003; Lewis 2002; Mercer 2003; Tripp 1997; 2000; also Bayat 1997; Chatterjee 2004; Li 2007; Mosse 2005 for notable studies outside Africa). Whilst contemporary African studies has sustained a clear interest, however, in recognizing new forms of power and authority across increasingly blurred domains, it has housed a healthy scepticism of NGOs as yet another Westernized import. Where the analysis becomes more interesting, therefore, is where the NGO, as a hybridized template of political action, becomes localized, indigenized and melds with existing forms of power and authority (e.g. Bierschenk & Sardan 2003; Lewis 2002; Lund 2006a; Tripp 2013). NGOs are shaped by, and shape, the power context in which they operate.

Social and political enquiry, therefore, whether in political theory, IR or African studies,
has had to make room for new understandings of governance, authority and therefore legitimation. NGOs in particular, in virtue of their ‘Janus-face’ between imagined public and private spaces, are thriving in these ambiguous, competing and overlapping modes of governance. NGOs, with their publically-oriented face, borrow heavily from a conception of the public good, via outputs such as ‘development’, ‘empowerment’ or ‘poverty reduction’. It also invokes procedural ideas; inputs/throughputs such as ‘representation’, ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Crewe and Harrison 1998) invoke a state-like rationality. There is also, however, increasing symbolic capital afforded by NGOs’ private-oriented aspect, towards other non-state actors, industry and commerce. This borrows from neoliberal, market-like metaphors such as ‘innovation’, ‘demand-led’ and ‘efficiency’. These ‘mobile’ regimes of governance (Collier & Ong, p4) operate ‘in the twilight between state and society, between public and private’ (Lund 2006a p678).

In contrast to these more established disciplines, NGOs were rapidly incorporated within nascent development studies. Development studies is a rather unique enterprise, which places social, political and economic change, often melded with advocacy, at its heart. The default ‘legitimacy’ in development studies, therefore, lay less in procedural accounts than in claims to further the provision of perceived public goods. This output legitimacy was supplemented with claims of representation of and solidarity with the poor and marginalized, not adequately represented by the inter-state system. NGOs were thus at first lauded as a democratic developmental solution in contexts perceived to be institutionally weak (e.g. Chataway 2000; Clark et al. 1998; Devetak & Higgott 1999; Korten 1987; 1995). Optimism, however, gave way to scepticism by the millennium, embodied by Slim’s critique ‘By What Authority?’ (2002). Subsequent practitioner-facing scholars responded over time to Slim’s call for improved NGO legitimacy, addressing how ‘throughputs’ might be improved in this regard.20

Development studies, of course, is not monolithic. In opposition to the development industry (although in a sense dependent on it), there grew a significant corpus of radical critique, which views these intervention cycles as part of wider power/knowledge structures. The development industry is the extension of neo-colonial, Eurocentric power (e.g. Brohman 1995; Cardoso 1977; Escobar 1995; Manji & O’Coill 2002; Petras

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foreign policy instrument (Akram 2003; Tvedt 1998; Woods 2005) or of global neo-liberal techne through which to constitute, govern and control the populace (e.g. Crush 1995; Dillon 2004; Duffield 1999; 2010; Ferguson 1994; 2006; Goldman 2001; Gupta & Sharma 2006; Rojas 2004; Stern & Öjendal 2010; Williams 1993). The insights of Foucault, via the ‘global governmentality’ and postcolonial schools, mapped neatly onto geographical, class, race and gender divides. NGOs are thus an integral part of governmental techne through their co-production of ‘rational’ development subjects. Such work resonates strongly with that of Green (2014) and Dill (2013) in the Tanzanian context. It sheds considerable light on the power/knowledge nexus, and the role of discourse in enacting subtle but profound interventions into the very subjectivities that shape lives and livelihoods.

Whilst such insights are fruitful in their clear location of material interests behind discourse, the governmentality school, as explored in the final section, can at times mask, if not denude, individual agency of real people, particularly via its ‘productive’ conception of power. This power is diffuse and becomes physically enacted and embodied, serving to ‘constitute[s] agents rather than being deployed by them’ (Gaventa 2003, p1 – emphasis added). NGOs, as echoed in Green’s work, are construed as extensions of a broader neoliberal project, whose architect is unseen. Those NGOs work with are drawn as passive objects of such productive power, which brings their ideas of (self)development and change in line with the neo-liberal worldview. As such, Foucault’s key concepts have been applied to their limits within critical development studies (e.g. Duffield 2001; Ferguson 2006; Green 2012; 2014; Li 2007), where global hierarchies are indeed so visible. What this has inadvertently neglected, however, is where NGOs become appropriated, contested and reassembled within local contexts and new modes of authority crystalize. Furthermore, an unmoderated governmentality overstates the finite role neoliberal institutions have in people’s lives and livelihoods.

There is, however, a ‘middle way’ in applying insights from Foucauldian-inspired critical theorists, whilst affording methodological space to legitimation in the everyday, inhabited by real, multi-dimensional people. This way, as explored in the final section, is captured by the shared vocabulary of practice-based enquiry, uniting Foucault with Bourdieu (Reckwitz 2002; also Schatzki et al. 2001). To conclude the debate in hand, NGOs are part of the reordering and (re)production of public authority. The
mushrooming NGO sector in Tanzania is relatively new in its political landscape. These NGOs, however, are not a failed expression of civil society, or co-opted workings of post-colonial state power. They do not necessarily constitute an extension, or ‘surrogate’, (Jennings 2008; also Hoffman and Robinson 2009) of the state, nor a groundswell of popular, ‘democratizing’ opposition (Tripp 2000; Snyder 2008). There is considerable variation in how NGOs position themselves in these regards. What unites them, however, is their agency in constructing their own authority: a ‘contested process of assertion, legitimization and exercise’ (Lund 2006a, p678; also Hilhorst 2003) in a recalibrating global order. Such ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699) thus form the empirical mainstay of this project.

I have, in this section, traced the shifting conceptualization of public authority and legitimation across the key disciplines that pertain to its study, with particular reference to NGOs. There has been a movement towards the exploration of how public authority has become more diffuse across types of actors and indeed action, albeit at different rates. There has been a degree of ‘politics’ in relinquishing the realms of the legitimacy/legitimation debate to include non-state phenomena. At this juncture, non-state actors, in this case NGOs, are no longer construed as an anomaly of, threat to, or extension of, the conventional state-based division of space. Their proliferation is indicative of more transformative change in the global political topography, which affords new opportunities for entrepreneurs within new constellations of governance. In a sense, therefore, the expansion of NGOs in Tanzania is part of the reconstituting public. The survival of these organizations depends on the continual exertion of legitimation in the everyday: the making of claims to craft the space in which to govern.

**Legitimation as everyday practice: crafting the space to govern**

I have argued for a broader, multidisciplinary conception of legitimation as practice: that is, meaningful pattern of actions that are performed with competence, embodying existing knowledge and rooted in the everyday. Such a project lies at the margins, both geographical and thematic, of much of mainstream IR. This framing is not, however,

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21 Tripp traces the exponential growth in the 1990s from 224 NGOs in 1993 to over 8,000 by 1997 (2000, p199–200), which has levelled off at over 9,000 today
without earlier precedent in classical political theory. The idea of legitimation as ongoing practice, rather than legitimacy as attribute, resonates with a Machiavellian, conflictual understanding of power and governance (1940 [1517]). This continual technique is deployed to maintain a façade of voluntary submission by the ruled. This technique entails the deliberate merging, assimilating and ‘grafting’ of *prima facie* unacceptable uses of power onto pre-existing acceptable beliefs, practices and procedures (Zelditch 2001, p42). Legitimation is not, therefore, conformity with the legal pre-conditions of governance but rather, foreshadowing Foucault, the exercise of more tacit forms of ideational power. What we once assumed to be the rational, self-interested action of individuals, therefore, is unveiled to be something quite different.

Such Foucauldian-esque governmentality plays out globally, by way of example, via dominant development discourse and how its ideas are practiced, projected and communicated. The critical development school, as noted, takes rightful aim at the ahistorical assumptions of development practitioners, unveiling deficient suppositions regarding human agency. According to the practitioner, if the conditions of development are present, governments, individuals and/or communities will freely engage with these processes and the realization of public goods will ensue. Individual agency and rationally-informed interests are paramount and ontologically precede any knowledge thereof. For the (global) governmentality school, however, the production of knowledge is intricately bound to the interests of the most powerful, manifest through the construction of particular societal ‘problems’ and attendant prescriptivism. In this instance, development knowledge, via categories such as ‘poverty’, ‘risk, ‘governance’ 'rights', is the exercise of more subtle, subjugating forms of power at once to design and construct such populations. These *technê* thus produce the very subjectivities of those upon whom development agencies strive to intervene.

The governmentality conception of legitimation as practice offers a more accurate picture of the daily activity of governing. Its major pitfall, however, is in affording seemingly unqualified power to an implicit, unified elite over the subjugated masses. Insights into the hidden workings of power are well-taken, but the strong *verticality* and unilateralism

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22 The term practitioner is a shorthand and not an assumption of a monolithic school vis-à-vis its approach to development. There is a shared optimism, however, within the development ‘orthodoxy’ that a form of development is feasible and desirable, should the approach and conditions be correct.
of some presentations (e.g. Duffield 2001; Ferguson 2006; Green 2012; Li 2007) unexpectedly reminiscent of the elite-dominated forums they aim to critique. The actions that replicate this bifurcation of power are lost in the very structures it seeks to explain. And yet, for Foucault himself, power is often misunderstood to reside within 'a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state' (1979 [1976], p92). Clearly, Foucault's conception of power is not simplistic in its instantiation nor its explication. He was explicit, however, that it not *attributive* in form, to individuals or institutions, but is *relational* within each 'complex strategic situation' (*ibid.*, p93). As such, Foucault is speaking to Machiavelli's relational conception of power, but expounds the need to 'remove the persona of the Prince' (*ibid.*, p97) in that there is no single, stable source, or indeed object, of subjugation.

Nevertheless, at least under the purview of politics, the study of legitimation has remained almost entirely focused on elites, as conventionally drawn, and nowhere more so than on the African continent. There is a recurrent drive to subsume such legitimation politics under elite-driven logics, such as neo-patrimonialism, extraversion or incorporation, focusing primarily on material accumulation and the 'politics of distribution' (Ferguson 2015). This drive, as noted, reproduces an unhelpful conceptual gulf between state and society; the elites and the masses; the 'haves' and the 'have nots', crowding out politics in the everyday. Mamdani's focus, as previously noted, at times proved too narrow in its neglect of informal, politicized practices. Schneider helpfully points to other 'frames of legitimation' (2006, p106) beyond formal institutions in Tanzania. Placing such practices at the forefront of analysis, continually contested and negotiated, circumvents the curation of types of actors into those with the power to act and those without. It is thus more helpful to curate types of practice: how they reaffirm and contest each other.

Michael Schatzberg's seminal work, specifically on political legitimacy and governance in central Africa (2001), aims to speak to this gap. It is a detailed, nuanced study with clear empirical foundations. His in-depth examination of eight countries across central Africa seeks to illuminate the culturally rooted 'moral matrix(es) of legitimate governance’ (p1) through which people understand (and accept) the legitimacy of institutions, ideas, policies and procedures. One such matrix is the metaphor of family, at once drawn on by leaders at all levels through the discourse of father, carer and provider, whilst at the
same time resonating with existing norms regarding the extended family. For Schatzberg, the poverty of existing conceptual tools lies in their exclusion of culture, literature, linguistics and spirituality in understanding how legitimacy is communicated by the powerful (ibid., p4). As such, Schatzberg marks a clear improvement on Englebert’s quantitative-oriented analysis that deploys African states’ intrinsic ‘legitimacy deficit’ (2000, p11) to account for neopatrimonialism’s pork and interminable economic stagnation.

Whilst Schatzberg’s contribution is clear, despite his claims to enter the daily ‘lifeworld’ of society, his emphasis nonetheless on the actions of elites in imparting particular symbols to their various publics endures. He focuses on newspapers, manifestos and policy statements than on how such communications are interpreted and contested. This is symptomatic of a broader lack of methodological attention to the tensions within strong constructivism regarding the structure/agency divide. On the one hand, most of our thoughts are pre-theoretical and passively received; on the other he defines legitimacy as what is ‘politically thinkable’ (p32): a conscious deliberate act. Thus those deemed without power are at once passive consumers and active participants in the matrix of political legitimacy. His own brand of culturalism ultimately veers towards the structural, with the form and content of such deliberate action left unclear. It is not, therefore, only the ‘usual suspects’ of the (neo)patrimonial school who fail to provide a comprehensive, interactive account of legitimation, agency and action.

The study of legitimation, therefore, even when framed as a political process, has tended to exclude the ‘everyday’, and/or overstate the role of elites in its authorship. Even the late modern theorists whose work informs this thesis, when discussing legitimacy/legitimation, return to state power and its elites. Bourdieu, for example, cites the state as the dominant source of ‘doxic submission’ (1994, p15). It is the ‘site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power’ (ibid., p9; also 1984, p27), his formulation of legitimation. Foucault is more equivocal on legitimation, ‘disowning’ it (Doxiadis 1997, p531) in his avoidance and yet, like Bourdieu, legitimation arguably becomes his ultimate problematic. Governmentality is indeed conduct that solves the problem of legitimation (ibid. p514; also Dean 2010). This is codified for Foucault in juridico-legal discourse, which reifies the liberal democratic order and its keystone of sovereignty. What Foucault then lacks (ibid. p532), is an adequate ‘exposition’ of how sovereignty is
itself legitimated. This is despite the fact that ‘the legitimacy of this sovereignty…deeply permeates our images and theories of the state’ (Dean 2010 [1999], p35). When Foucault does take direct aim, it is at government elites and their representations of power, whether his contemporaneous French administration, post-war Germany or Iran’s pre-revolution Shah (see e.g. Dean 2010; Doxiadis 1997; Gordon 2014). Whilst such late modern writers have therefore, on the one hand, indelibly changed the course of how we study the political sphere, their recapitulation of the state as the main locus of productive power, rather counterintuitively, truncated avenues of study.  

This thesis, therefore, rather than being reliant on the analytically implicit, brings the core work of everyday legitimation to the fore. It is intrinsically multidisciplinary in its approach, drawing on the strengths that particularly sociology, anthropology and political geography bring to bear. Such a framing embraces the processual elements of legitimation, within which the realm of the everyday marks continuation rather than a perceived inversion of the field of study. It embraces the primary unit of legitimation analysis as, rather than the state, institutional fields more broadly, as well as the interactions of those who inhabit them. It thus allows for a fuller account of the interaction between individual actors and the environments, or fields, in which they operate. Thus, the social, cultural, economic and, ultimately, symbolic legitimation resources, or ‘capital’, on which actors draw, both give and are given meaning through iterative interaction with their intended audiences. As such, this approach is as pertinent to institutional reproduction as it is in moments of rupture.

Such an eclectic formulation draws therefore most prominently from the works of Foucault and Bourdieu. With regard to Foucault, there has been a fruitful broadening of his approach by his scholars into an ‘analytics of government’ (Dean 2010 [1999], p3, emphasis added; also Rose 1993; 1999), now expansively defined. This allows for ‘an assemblage of rationalities, technologies, and agencies’ (Dean 2010, p10; also Collier &

23 Clearly late/post-modern writers, most obviously Habermas, are giving a much broader historiography of the political, or ‘public’, sphere and in tracing their formation also highlight their confines. The point is, ultimately, they return to the prospects for state governance and transformation, with Legitimation Crisis (1976) a case in point.

24 This draws on a large, established body of organizational sociology that analyses legitimation as process (e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Berger et al. 1998; Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Neilsen & Rao 1987; Ridgeway & Berger 1986; Suchman 1995; Thomas et al. 1986; Walker et al. 1986, Zelditch & Walker 1984. There is similarly an extensive sociology of the ‘everyday’ (e.g. de Certeau 1984; Douglas 1970; Goffman 1969; Jacobsen 2009; Smith 1988), although its limits must be noted as a presumed analytical category and indeed site of contestation (Gardiner 2000; Guillaume 2011).
Ong 2005), underscoring the heterogeneity of political action in the everyday. It also allows for a broadening of the notion of government, more explicitly than in some of Foucault’s own work, into a ‘calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge’ (Dean 2010, p18, emphasis added). Such a Foucauldian-derived approach, centred on regimes of practice allows Foucault not just ‘to travel’ to the geographical margins of contemporary politics and IR (Death 2013), but to return with vigour to the centrality of legitimation and its ‘how’ (see Chapter Two) as experienced in any part of the globe.

With regard to Bourdieu, the debt of this thesis to his ‘vocabulary for asking questions about power’ (Leander 2008, p11, emphasis original) is more pronounced. Bourdieu’s emphasis on state elites’ legitimation notwithstanding, his analysis melds the sociological sphere with the political, turning ‘sociology into a means of continuing politics by other means’ (cited in Leander 2002, p606). Bourdieusian analysis claims to focus on both the formal and informal practices and interactions that inhabit a particular social sphere, or ‘field’. A field is clearly structured and retains identity over time through a shared logic or ‘sense of the rules of the game’ (Salter 2013, p85), even if such rules evolve incrementally. Relations within this field are determined by the distribution between players of his different forms of capital. Whilst such language suggests prima facie a rather atomistic individualism, Bourdieu is explicit on the importance of *habitus*: how practices become internalized or ‘second nature’ (1990b, p56) over time. Whilst the actions of individuals are always visible, it is true to say that the Bourdieusian project as a whole privileges structure over agency. Whilst there are therefore challenges in its full application (to which I return), Bourdieu’s endowment to practice-based enquiry nonetheless offers a number of assets.

The first is the notion of the field itself, which has the potential to embrace the diversity and multi-faceted nature of socio-political life. Consequently, pertinent to this project, the field must retain a lateral landscape in scrutinizing the practices of a range of actors who, whilst differentiated within the field hierarchy with respect to the capital they bear, retain at least a similar aspect as to their key relationships and audiences. In this sense, the rules of the game are indeed shared to an identifiable degree. When the field is invoked in this way, it allows a necessary counterbalance to the *verticality* of epistemologies that inhere in much critical analysis, particularly with regard to the
governmentality school. This is not a self-evident reading of Bourdieu, in that his constraining brand of structuralism returns in the final analysis to that of class structure, specifically the domination on the part of elites. This current reading is thus a more pragmatic one, allowing the sensibility of the field to encompass the breadth of inter-agential relations. This sensibility, furthermore, supports the exploration of positionality, locale and the spatialized practices of legitimation. Such symbolism, interwoven with forms of materiality, ran through each of the practices that curate the empirical chapters.

The second, as noted, is Bourdieu’s expansion and refinement of the concept of capital, which, via habitus, captures the weight of time. ‘The social world is accumulated history’ and as such demands the ‘notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its efforts’ (1986, p241). Bourdieu appropriates this quintessentially economic language by broadening the notion of capital to admit of social, cultural and, most importantly for this thesis, symbolic forms, as distinct from brute materiality. He defines economic capital, as noted, as material wealth directly convertible into money or property (p242); social as relationships of acquaintance and recognition linked to membership in a group (p248); cultural as the acquisition of knowledge, education and other hereditary advantages over time (pp243-8); and symbolic as prestige, or recognition ‘as legitimate’ (1990, p118). Symbolic capital, therefore, is crucial to the work of legitimation and is patently not, as the empirical case studies will show, reducible to material wealth. Bourdieu advanced his broader conception of capital as an antidote to the dominant representation of the ahistorical, interest-maximizing individual (1986, p241), but also to expose how materiality alone cannot account for entrenched inequality. As such, his conception of the social world is distinctly richer for it.

Whilst Bourdieu, as noted, increasingly reserves symbolic capital to the lofty process of state legitimation (e.g. 1987; 1994), his capital inhere in everyday, symbolic legitimation practice as explored in this thesis. The ideational thus melds with the material, engendering the multi-faceted and variegated matrices of public action. Furthermore, his conception of capital as ‘accumulated labour’, either material or ‘embodied’ (1987, p131), neatly captures the considerable work and accretion on the part of non-state, as well as state, actors over time. Each form of capital can be ‘converted’, depending on

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25 Again, I distance myself from understanding legitimacy as belief, via recognition or similar. Recognition can rather be read as a conscious, even strategic affirmation but, as noted, there may not be time or space for belief to crystalize.
competency, into another (ibid. p252). To apply this reading to NGOs, organizational symbolic capital (prestige) can potentially be converted into economic capital (funding) and vice versa but neither is reducible to the other. An NGO’s ‘name’ or reputation, therefore, is existentially critical and must be closely guarded (Gent et. al 2015). The changing distribution of capital, therefore, regulates the choices open to actors at any one time as well as ‘determining the chances of success for practices’ (Bourdieu 1986, p242) which they embark on. As such, competition for symbolic capital, for recognition, in Tanzania’s institutionally saturated ‘fields’ becomes pronounced.

At the same time, there are limits to, and indeed contradictions within, the application of the full Bourdieusian project. The initial attraction of its seemingly comprehensive framework gives way to areas of ambiguity when applied in its entirety. The analytical nub, according to Bourdieu, lies within the structure of the field, in turn determined by its distribution of capital. A field, therefore, is ‘a structured space of positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of…capital’ (1990a, p64). The use of capital is only given meaning through interactions within the field so structured. Given Bourdieu’s structuralist emphasis over agency, however, this analysis is in practice corroded by its circularity. The distribution of capital is firstly methodologically difficult to identify without quantitative measures, meaning theorists tend towards mere acknowledgement that certain forms of capital are present. Secondly, and more substantively, when Bourdieusian analysis is scrutinized more closely, the distribution of capital is never evidenced in determining the rules of the game; indeed, such rules often appear to be structured by forms of power elsewhere.

In this way, analyses affiliated with Bourdieu within conventionally ‘political’ fields, often do not undertake his project in its entirety. Anna Leander, for example, more purist than most as to Bourdieu’s IR ‘potentials’ (2011), dispenses with capital completely in her analysis of private military companies (2005, p812), unnecessary in identifying the rules of the game. Such rules, it transpires, are determined by the ‘epistemic power’ of such companies to influence security and its discourse, seemingly in collusion with the state. Their practices ‘constitute what counts as legitimate expertise’ (p825), and yet symbolic capital, which Bourdieu deems as essential in understanding legitimation, is not invoked at all. Indeed, Leander’s conclusion could arguably be subsumed by Foucault in its focus on colluding elites to determine
knowledge and its resultant practice. Epistemic power, decidedly located beyond the field, is suffice to structure the fields of operation in the first instance.

Williams and Abrahamsen, also in the field of private security, afford more attention to the distribution and accumulation of capital (2010). The authors argue clearly how economic, cultural and symbolic capital are not the same, nor one reducible to the other, but rather how each manifests itself and plays a different role in the security field (social capital has dropped out of the analysis). At the same time, the actual distribution of capital is not quantified – a task nigh impossible in any case if its different forms are not directly fungible and thus incommensurable. In its place is a strong and persuasive account of how such forms are manifestly present. In a similar vein Neal (2012), examining the UK parliament, clearly demonstrates the entrenched inequalities of this field but with reference primarily to symbolic capital, which again begs understanding beyond the field alone.26

This is not, however, a symptom of incomplete applications of Bourdieu: the issue inheres in Bourdieu’s own work. In his analysis of the academic field in Homo Academicus (1984), the demographic and academic metrics of those who inhabit it are detailed and meticulous (pp43-6), but his presented forms of capital inconsistent, their transmutation implicit and their legitimation presumed.27 Bourdieu argues, again rather circularly, that the distribution of capital structures the field of power (p40). Yet it does not appear, nor indeed cannot be, the distribution of capital that determines the field per se. It is, rather, the acknowledgement of such capital that allows academic elites to wield very real forms of power. It is the symbolic ‘recognition of status’ (p93) that allows this field to function: of academics between themselves but also recognition of the field itself by other holders, or rather relations, of power. It is not, therefore, the distribution of capital that has determining value, but rather the skilful aggregation of capital by its most successful actors (in this case into the rather nebulous ‘academic capital’ p84). This recognition, however, their crucial legitimation, is dealt with only in passing (p48; p63; p98-9), when it is in fact analytically central to the functioning of the field itself.

26 Neal appeals to the ‘latent legitimation’ of parliament in its continuity and presence over time (2012, p363), but this itself requires understanding of political culture beyond the field.
27 Bourdieu introduces, for example, further capital of scientific power and prestige, of intellectual renown, of academic power, of political power (pp43-6), as well as the more familiar forms of cultural, social and economic capital.
Symbolic capital, therefore, confers recognition vis-à-vis its broader resonance with the historical, political and social context beyond the field. Bourdieu's answer to such structuration comes in the form of *doxa*. *Doxa*, for Bourdieu, embodies a 'primordial political belief' (1994, p15) but yet it is simultaneously one borne out of relations of domination. It represents the 'point of view of the dominant' (*ibid*.), when presented as universal or 'self-evident' (1977, p164). The term *doxa*, however, is employed more intermittently still by Bourdieu-affiliated analysis, and indeed by Bourdieu himself. Its diminished utility, when compared to his more prominent 'thinking tools' (see Leander 2008), is perhaps symptomatic of its deficiency in capturing the nature of structure and agency. *Doxa*, in its deficiency, fails to apprehend the full, interactive dynamics of recognition, and therefore the specific problem of legitimation.

Bourdieu's work, therefore, whilst placing increasing analytical weight on recognition, via symbolic capital and the legitimation it supports, nonetheless falls short in fully articulating legitimation. Indeed, legitimation through symbolic capital was initially introduced as something of an auxiliary form of capital: the privilege of those who could simply buy it (1990b p119). Over time, however, and indeed symptomatic of his rather mechanical conception of agency, it emerges as his core analytical problem. Legitimation, however, is patently not determined by field interactions alone and thus the urge to ground it remained. Bourdieu looked increasingly to the state as holding the ‘monopoly over…symbolic violence’ (1994, p16) in order to ground legitimation beyond the particularities of the field. *Doxa*, however, as the rather unthinking acceptance of the norms and ideas as articulated by the most powerful, does not do this process justice. Legitimation is negotiated and contested; as such it does not signify the unmediated view of the most powerful, nor its automated, ‘primordial’ consumption.

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28 The previously cited Bourdieusian-inspired analyses do not draw on doxa (Leander 2005; Neal 2012; Williams & Abrahamson 2010). Doxa is not invoked by Bourdieu himself in understanding the structural reproduction of the academic field (e.g. 1984, pp40-1; p53): that work is given to *habitus*. *Doxa* does not enter the fray until Chapter 5 of *Homo Academicus*.

29 Bourdieu firstly expounded on first cultural and social capital in 1977, more fully developed in his ‘Forms of Capital’ (1986). Symbolic capital was first mentioned in *Distinction* (1984) but not fully developed until *In Other Words* (1990a) and his later work on symbolic power and violence (1991; 1994).

30 This line of argument is central to Archer’s renowned critique of Bourdieu (e.g. 1995; 2012), in that human action in late modernity is highly reflexive and self-aware. Some Bourdieusian purists in response try to highlight the more ‘generative and creative aspects of habitus and action’, as opposed to habit (Akram & Hogan 2015, p610 drawing on Bourdieu 1977; also Adams 2006; Adkins 2003; Farrugia & Woodman 2015; McNay 1999; Sweetnam 2003). What becomes clear
Legitimation, to summarize, is a core component of the construction and contestation of the everyday authority to act: of crafting the space to govern. It is the symbolic rendering of power authoritative, and reproducing that authority once in place. It is symbolically spatialized, demanding the negotiation of inside and out; proximity and distance; entreaty and repudiation; Us and Others. Rather than leaning on implied content and form, however, this thesis places legitimation’s constituent practices front and centre. It draws, methodologically and substantively, on eclectic insights into legitimation practice, using these to scrutinize the practices of NGOs: their enactment and contestation at nested scales. It is informed by the legacies of Foucault and Bourdieu, and their contribution to practice-based enquiry, but solicits a more pragmatic adoption of their central ‘thinking tools’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p83; also Leander 2008; see Dean 2010 on Foucault). It thus settles on Adler and Pouliot’s key rendering of world politics ‘through the lens of its manifold practices’ (2011, p1), sharing their optimism of a productive concordance around practice-based enquiry (ibid. p3), interweaving the legacies of Foucault and Bourdieu.

Practice, as ‘competent performances’ which ‘embody, act out, and…reify background knowledge…in and on the material world’ (ibid. p4), thus pertains to legitimation. Its exploration through the arsenal of critical ethnography tempers the urge shared by Foucault and Bourdieu to reduce legitimation to the transmission and consumption of predominantly state-generated ideology. This is not, as noted, to disregard the role of the state in legitimating public authority. It is rather an acknowledgement that public authority is produced, shared and contested by a disparate range of actors in world politics. Critical ethnography, as explored in the next chapter, draws on the richness and proximity of ethnographic data whilst adding ‘wider social structures and systems of power relationships’ (Harvey 1990, p6). This allows us to move away from the vertical production and consumption of knowledge towards analysis that explores the complexity of fields within which ‘public’ interventions take place. It affords time to looking ‘sideways’ and ‘upwards’ at the multiplicity of institutions, actors and interactions that shape and constrain such activities at different levels. The horizontal 'noise' of the field that is routinely filtered out is the very context within which NGOs negotiate and legitimate their presence.

From this secondary literature, however, is that it takes a considerable amount of additional work to rescue Bourdieu from this charge.
My field of Bagamoyo district, Tanzania, as examined in the next chapter, serves as a microcosm of the ever-reconstituted public, rapidly inundated by development activity at various scales. Whilst, therefore, my Bagamoyo case study is uniquely coastal Tanzania, where there has been particular contestation regarding outsiders and their efforts to ‘develop’ reticent locals, there is nothing uniquely Tanzanian, nor African, about legitimation *per se*. The empirical data has been garnered from ordinary conversations with ordinary people situated, as far as possible, in their everyday lives. It is a modest attempt to explore the complexities that motivate people to act in an environment that is particularly saturated with NGO activity. Material interest, as Bourdieu convinced, is but one of a range of political, social, cultural and symbolic phenomena that intersect in new constellations of governance concerning NGO activity. This is reflected in the excerpts from the lives of people, from a diverse range of backgrounds, who continue to negotiate their position, livelihoods and security in competitive, often precarious environments.

**Conclusion: gaps and opportunities**

This chapter has laid the conceptual groundwork in order to explore how NGOs, as non-state actors, legitimate their authority to act within contemporary modes of governance. The thesis seeks to curate legitimation practices into symbolic sets of practices, imbued historically with forms of capital. These resonate with the specific cultural context but also provide an insight to the changing production of authority in the contemporary world. It has, in order to do so, identified a number of gaps in existing literature but also opportunities within exciting new avenues of enquiry. Such opportunities are part of a multidisciplinary concordance around practice-based exploration of the ‘political’, a wave which in turn is broadening and enriching the study of politics and IR, to which this thesis will ultimately return.

The first opportunity is the drive, against a backdrop of shifting global governance, to understand how public authority is indeed produced, shared and contested by new constellations, or ‘assemblages’ (Collier & Ong 2005), of actors. Legitimation as a practice of claim-making, imbued by social, cultural, symbolic and of course material
capital, is part of that (re)production of authority. It provides the basis on which the wielding of such is negotiated, contested, or indeed accepted. Legitimation comprises a diverse, highly symbolic set of practices. It is deeply performative in creating and sustaining spatio-temporal presence, through the symbolic positioning vis-à-vis other actors. The challenge, in this respect, is to extricate the normative from the empirical, in a subject area that has long melded the two. I have argued for a cautious return to Weber’s original aims, via practice-based enquiry, before Weber’s musings on legitimacy were commandeered by political and IR theorists, looking to consolidate a discipline (see Walker 1993).

The second, related point is that evaluations of legitimacy/legitimation, especially that of non-state actors such as NGOs, have overly emphasized the global or international realm. This relates, as explored, to state-based territorialism, and its concern for implications for the inter-national system. The toolbox for such evaluations tends towards the technical, but techne that embody the rational-legal state normativity. This reaffirms the predominance of this ideal type, but also neglects the considerable work that NGOs undertake, both ‘international’ and ‘local’, in crafting the political space to govern. NGOs are not just products of the global; they are appropriated, contested and reassembled within local contexts amid new modes of power and authority. This is not, therefore, to disregard the importance of the global domain, but rather to highlight reciprocities between it and the local. It is a response to Walker’s renowned call to undertake world and local politics at once (1993, p9), hamstrung to date by the conventional drawing of sovereignty (also Ruggie 1993).

In addition, the default analysis of the global sphere reaffirms a certain ‘verticality’ bias in the study of NGOs and their legitimacy. NGOs’ core constituencies, to which they must legitimate themselves, are located primarily upwards to typically international organizations, and secondarily downwards to their purported beneficiaries. Whilst these dynamics do indeed form a core part of legitimation practice, duly reflected in this thesis, this overlooks an additional domain of activity: that of lateral legitimation. NGOs must also legitimate themselves to their peers, collaborators and competitors, both government and non-government, as well as to other interested outsiders. As such, they are as immersed laterally in localized ‘fields’ as they are vertically, in what is now a highly complex, interconnected global aid industry.
The third related point is that the study of legitimation, when under the purview of politics at least, has tended to exclude the ‘everyday’, overstating the role of elites in its authorship. The neglect of the micro-level thus overlooks both the everyday discursive production of legitimacy but also, by extension, its negotiation in the everyday. This neglect has been particularly pertinent to studies on the African continent, amidst a recurrent drive to subsume such processes under elite-driven logics. African studies, alongside the global governance literature, has in the past denuded large swathes of groups of their agency and capacity to negotiate, contest and indeed reject, the authority of the non-state and/or state to intervene ever more deeply into their lives. The rebuttal from governmentality studies has provided only half an answer, in revealing the extent of the hidden workings of power but neglecting its limits.

The final opportunity is that of the promise of practice-based enquiry and its continuing enrichment of PIR. This research, in spotlighting legitimation practices in a shifting global context, firmly embraces this new avenue in IR theorizing. This is categorically not to reject the continuing efficacy of state power in the global system. It is rather an acknowledgement of new nexuses of governmental practice, within which both state and non-state actors participate. Indeed, as a practice-based enquiry, definitive typologies of the state and non-state spheres carry less analytical weight than the ideas, norms and practices such concepts give rise to. The ideational melds with the material, bringing ‘out in the clear’ (Taylor 1985, p104) the multi-faceted and variegated matrices of public life throughout the globe. There is potential in such an approach to embrace complexity but also to avoid pathology. It is more helpful to consider not what is exceptional about Africa, but what phenomena may be characteristic of broader shifts in the global order of things. The privatization, and indeed criminalization, of the ‘state’; the blurring of public and private; the ambiguity of public authority; are ascendant forces in many parts of the globe (see Mustapha 2002; also Comaroff & Comaroff 2012). The difference is the prejudicial drive to universalize such as the curse of the African condition.

This thesis, in its empiricism, aims to pull together these diverse theoretical threads and their new opportunities in a contribution to legitimation practice. Whilst such threads speak to each other in part, there has not been an attempt to bring them together in this way. Indeed, even where theorists have expounded the need to broaden ‘legitimation

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practices’ and their attendant politics, in Africa or elsewhere, the empirical content of what that looks like in the everyday has remained thin. With this in mind, and with a view to return to the politics of legitimation as a whole, it is to the methodological exposition of the project I now turn.
Chapter Two: 

Knowing legitimation: 

The ‘how’ of contemporary governance

This thesis, as set out in Chapter One, examines how NGOs, as non-state actors, legitimate their authority to act. Legitimation is a practice: an accumulative process of claim-making that is negotiated and contested in the everyday. This process admits of both state and non-state actors, given the ‘disaggregation of authority’ (Rosenau 2003, p228) and its reassembly at various scales. Legitimation, in this case on the part of NGOs, requires a considerable amount of work, and indeed creativity, rendered invisible by some methodologies to date. A practice-based approach serves to bring both author and audience to the fore, moderating the verticality of some readings of Foucauldian governmentality or indeed Bourdieu’s structural forms of domination. To this end, I adopt a critical ethnographic approach, linking ‘the detailed analysis of ethnography to wider…systems of power’ (Harvey 1990, p6). The locality of ethnography, and its attention to the complexity of every day social practices, lends itself in this regard. This approach laid the epistemological and methodological groundwork for the bulk of fieldwork in Tanzania.

The case, while uniquely Tanzanian, provides a microcosm of the reconstituting public. Tanzania has witnessed a marked proliferation in NGO registrations since its ‘liberalization’ from the 1990s. This has reinserted the global into the local and vice versa, in new and adaptive ways. NGOs, as such, must skilfully negotiate public/private, government/non-government and global/local divides. Bagamoyo district, in turn, has a distinct social, cultural and political context, much maligned in late modern(ist) history. Nevertheless, Bagamoyo encapsulates much of recent development politics in Tanzania. Mushrooming numbers of NGOs, alongside other development interventions, have moved into the district, forming competitive fields in which both vertical and lateral legitimation is pronounced. The thesis thus embraces the full ethnographic impulse to look vertically and laterally at the complex, overlapping institutional fields in which
NGOs entrench their presence. NGO staff, however, are not the sole authors of their authority; legitimation is an interactive phenomenon that demands the insertion of the collective. The thesis duly examines both district and village levels in this regard, which provide contrast and, unexpectedly, continuity in legitimation and its negotiation across three settings.

**Synopsis**

My main block of fieldwork comprised twelve months over an eighteen-month period 2012-2013. I draw additionally on formative discussions that took place in 2011 as part of my Masters by Research. In the main block of fieldwork, I undertook approximately 62 days’ observation, mainly of NGOs at work at village, ward and district levels, but with additional shadowing of governmental and private consultancy programmes. This comprised field visits, training workshops and inter-organizational and governmental meetings. I interviewed representatives of 33 NGOs as part of a ‘mapping’ exercise in conjunction with Bagamoyo’s civil society umbrella. This provided a springboard for follow-up interviews and observation, as well as generating secondary literature in the form of NGO reports, baseline surveys, minutes, profiles and so forth. I spent an additional six weeks living in two seemingly contrasting villages: Kiharaka and Kibindu. This comprised the observation of various interventions and their negotiation but also interviews and informal discussions. Lastly, I conducted a small number of ‘elite’ interviews, both with Bagamoyo district staff and NGO managers in Dar es Salaam. This main block of fieldwork, in sum, provided a rich and varied data set with which to explore the claim-making process.

In this chapter, I first outline the research’s epistemological assumptions, drawing on the strengths of critical constructivist thought, and specifically interpretivist praxeology. I review what critical ethnography offers, in this regard, and the data collection methods it comprised. I then examine the issues of research ethics and access, not purely from the perspective of ethical review, but also from that of the researcher’s identity and welfare, given the ‘multipositionality’ this thesis simultaneously examines and invokes.

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31 For clarity, this is observation on 62 separate dates, rather than 62 full days’ observations.
Lastly, I look at the data analysis process, more iterative than sequential, and how it both informed and was informed by, the study’s methodological and epistemological underpinnings. Whilst the chapter is disaggregated as per convention, the issues of epistemology, methodology and the ethics and politics of research are of course intertwined. As such, the chapter should be read as more iterative than inventory.

**Epistemology**

My research agenda speaks to two, intersecting sets of epistemological issues. In the first, I argue how, in placing legitimation as practice central to this study, I embrace the broader ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki *et al.* 2001) in social constructivist thought. This turn has been influenced by diverse theorists such as Taylor, Giddens, Bourdieu and Foucault, who hold very different epistemologies. Nevertheless, they share at least a movement from the social totality to ‘social practices ordered across space and time’ (Giddens 1984, p2): an interest in the ‘how’ as much as the ‘why’. In the second, I challenge the ‘vertical’, at times extractive, epistemologies that reside within not just development politics and its problem-solving, but also the mono-dimensional, elite-focused studies of legitimacy more broadly. Such theorizing has not embraced the breadth and diversity of legitimation practice: its negotiation and contestation in the everyday.

_Taking practice seriously_

Practices are ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’ that, when performed competently, embody existing knowledge in acting on the world (Adler & Poulit 2011, p4). The practice turn, therefore, emphasizes how the performance of social and political practices ‘not only organize the world – they are also the raw materials that make it up’ (Adler 2013 pp25-6). Practices, in other words, are not the inevitable outcome of premeditated calculation, but are constitutive of the social world itself. An interest in the performing of practices unites what are _prima facie_ incommensurable, or ‘incommunicable’ (Callewaert 2006, p76), projects in social research, whether Bourdieu’s structuralism, Foucault’s post-structuralist or Taylor’s interpretivism. Practices, and the
subjective meanings they are constitutive of, are the fundamental ‘pre-theoretical understanding’ of what goes on in society (Taylor 1983, p93).

The fact that Taylor, Giddens, Bourdieu and Foucault seldom engaged with each other’s writings obscured their concordance around practice-based enquiry. Taylor, in ‘Social Theory as Practice’ (1983), did remark, if perfunctorily, on the similarity of his project to that of Bourdieu (1977). Giddens’ ‘theory of structuration’ and Bourdieu’s ‘constructivist structuralism’ also bear more than a passing resemblance, in their move to explain the continuity and transmutation, through practices, of societal structures (Bourdieu 1984; 1989; Giddens 1984). They are similarly reproachful of Foucault, for his perceived amorality, over-abstraction and collapse into relativism. For Giddens, the ‘mastery of the language is inseparable from mastery of the variety of contexts in which language is used’ (1987, p200). For Bourdieu too, Foucault’s abstraction is circular, seeking the ‘source of understanding of cultural productions in these productions themselves’ (cited in Callewaert 2006, p77). Giddens and Bourdieu, therefore, hold much in common. And yet, despite contemporaneity and congruity, Giddens and Bourdieu did not enter a substantive dialogue.

To incorporate Foucault, the epistemological chasm is more challenging. His critical historiography of ideas using the tools of deconstruction and discourse analysis to reveal the power/knowledge nexus was central to his analysis. He was sceptical of any claim to access or represent practices directly, particularly via the project of rationalist social science. His project, however, still engages with historical modes of thinking by virtue of the fact that they precipitate particular institutionalized practices or techne.12 As such, the written text that takes centre stage in Foucauldian-inspired thought remains a ‘practical intervention’ of a kind (Callewaert 2006, p91). There is, in addition, a second area of Foucauldian inspired work, which places localized political and social practices more central to the field of analysis. This is not a bid to bolster or qualify policy-making, but rather a reversal of dominant, vertical epistemologies or, as Foucault puts it, the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (1976, p990). As O’Malley et al. point out, this element of Foucault’s work had been hitherto neglected (1997); indeed it is difficult to

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12 Foucault defines techne as ‘a practical rationality governed by a conscious aim’ (cited in O’Farrell 2005, p158).
see how the researcher might examine localized practices without the arsenal of critical ethnography.

This project, therefore, whilst mindful of these epistemological differences, locates itself within common praxeological ground. I focus on mainly informal, discursive practices on the part of NGOs, but also how these practices are negotiated, contested and appropriated by their intended audiences. Praxeology paves the way for critical ethnography, which explores ‘sideways’ and ‘upwards’ at the multiplicity of actors, institutions and their legitimation. It links the global with the local, without compounding unhelpful binarisms. In doing so, it enables a productive exploration of the interface between structure and agency, foregrounding the research subject as negotiator of the constraints and opportunities around them. Lastly, praxeological ethnography brings questions of ‘how’ to the fore, typically eclipsed by the ‘why’ in political science hypotheses (Dunn 2008; Gusterson 2008). As Dean argues, ‘[h]ow questions lead us to problems of the techniques and practices…identities and agencies by which governing operates’ (2010, p39). Ethnography, however, must ultimately share a confidence, albeit qualified, that a reality exists beyond our ‘egocentricity’ (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2000, p3), and indeed one that can bear data. It is thus an empirically grounded ‘how’ that runs to the heart this thesis: how NGOs, as non-state actors, legitimate their authority to act.

‘Vertical’ research and its epistemology

As Taylor argued, ‘[t]he identification of the subject…the most difficult problems, an area in which prevailing epistemological prejudice may blind us’ (1971, p5). In rural Tanzania, the construction of the research subject has historically been dominated by a developmental framework, with two contemporary, seemingly opposed, manifestations. The ‘practitioner’ constructs the target of intervention as actor, capital or asset to be supported, enabled or ‘empowered’, echoing waves of colonial intervention before him. The ‘critical’ school, however, tends to appropriate the subject as object: as victim, recipient, oppressed, subjugated through wider systems of power that are entrenched by the accumulating weight of development theory and practice.33

33 Opie makes a similar point on the appropriation of the subject within feminist scholarship (1992).
As such, neither school engages substantively with the key tenets of the other, beyond nods of acknowledgement. In another sense, however, and at the risk of caricaturing both positions, there are some shared tendencies. In developing their respective epistemologies, both schools cast roles on their 'subject' at a distance. Both draw upon and sustain hierarchies of their own, abstracted from the socio-political ‘noise’ that characterises the messy world of social interaction. These hierarchies manifest themselves in different ways with regard to research approach.

The practitioner school is highly empirical, often quantitative, using the tenets of scientific enquiry to depoliticise the content of their research. The large-scale development industry, currently focused on poverty reduction and which incorporates a wide array of government, non-profit and corporate entities, neatly intertwines theory and practice, problematization and policy. Yet, from a wider, politicized perspective, the hierarchies of power become apparent. The development agenda is inevitably forged in geo-political spaces far removed from their spheres of intervention. This agenda presents the parameters of research, reaffirming this stratification of power. Human experience is captured and evaluated only in relation to particular programmatic objectives, either past or future. In this way knowledge, or ‘ways of knowing’, remain highly verticalized, oriented towards development power centres and shaped by the weight of future policy-making.\textsuperscript{34}

In contrast, the critical school, insofar as it adopts unmoderated Foucault, is highly politicized in placing its own formulation of subjugating power central to its analysis. It can be devoid of empirical fieldwork, preferring the tools of historical deconstruction and discourse analysis to reveal the hidden workings of the power/knowledge nexus. There is also, however, an inevitable move to ‘reconstruct’: in this case an enduring power structure that pervades development in its entirety.\textsuperscript{35} Domains of study become fixed and all-encompassing: a new meta-narrative usurps the old (Jameson 1984; Agarwal 1996). This reductionist move inadvertently reifies those very systems, amplifying the interests of the few at the expense of the agency of many. We are left with ‘politics without actors’ (Larner & Walters 2004, p4) and a politics over-determined.

\textsuperscript{34} Mosse explores this point with regard to participatory consultation and planning techniques in development, which privilege particular kinds of ‘knowledge’ (1994).

\textsuperscript{35} Tvedt, for example, argues that aid must be understood as a single international system (1998).
by the past. In this way knowledge, or ‘ways of knowing’, remain as hierarchical and dehumanising as the modes of governmentality this school rightly seeks to challenge.

A practice-based, interpretivist approach is well-placed to challenge those epistemologies that privilege or project social systems as a unified entity.\textsuperscript{36} It is bolstered by at least the ‘vocabulary’ of Bourdieu (Leander 2008, p11), as well as the Foucauldian-derived ‘analytics of government’ (Dean 2010, p3), broadly defined. Moving from the totality of grand theory to the ordering of social practices enables a movement away from the vertical production and consumption of development knowledge in favour of analysis that explores the complexity of interventions as part of a wider socio-political environment and through this can still be critical. This requires attending to look sideways and upwards at the multiplicity of institutions, actors and interactions that shape and constrain developmental activities at different levels. The horizontal 'noise', routinely filtered out through vertical epistemologies, is the very context within which NGOs negotiate, legitimize and entrench their presence.

This is not, as a final comment, to presume ‘the native point of view’, as forewarned by post-structuralist challenges (Marcus & Fischer 1986, p25). This thesis is not social realist, holding a mirror to the beliefs of those who engage with NGOs. Firstly, this is mindful, as noted, that legitimacy as belief has long precipitated a ‘methodological impasse’ (Beetham 1991, p9), whereby such beliefs are not accessible or indeed related to action. Indeed in Tanzania, there would have been an additional difficulty whereby soliciting frank and direct opinion could transgress cultural norms. More substantively, however, as O’Kane points out, a belief in legitimacy merely begs the question on which grounds such beliefs are legitimated (1993; also Grafstein 1981). Rather than seeking to ground legitimacy elsewhere, this thesis has moved away from a foundational account. When constructed as practice, legitimation may be conscious and even strategic, but the belief systems and capital on which it draws may not. If public authority is legitimation’s ephemeral product, there is not necessarily the time or space for legitimacy belief to crystalize and endure. Critical ethnography brings such practices to the fore.

\textsuperscript{36} Interpretivism was pioneered by Weber, with roots in Marxist sociology regarding how social processes determine our forms of consciousness. It informs the work of Schutz, Husserl, Giddens & Blumer.
Methodology

As outlined, the thesis examines the how of NGO legitimation, including the intended audiences of such claims. Its empirical content, therefore, is the claim-making process, as well as its negotiation and contestation. Ethnography as a methodology is distinguished by similar objectives, which are ‘to understand the social meanings and activities of people in a given ‘field’ or ‘setting’’ (Brewer 2000, p11; also Hammersley 1998, p2). Ethnography is defined by its flexibility, locality and its attention to the complexity of everyday social practices as much as its various research methods, which extend beyond observation alone. In this way, one can speak of the ‘ethnographic sensibility’ (Schatz 2009, p5), of ‘deep hanging out’ (Gusterson 2008, p93 citing Rosaldo), in its approach to understanding the social world.

Ethnography, however, and its anthropological heritage, is not monolithic and has gone through a radical period of self-critique and indeed fragmentation. Epitomized by the ‘Writing Culture’ moment (Clifford & Marcus 1986; also Marcus & Fischer 1986; Turner & Bruner 1986), writers began to view ethnography as part of the wider power structures it sought to describe. It questioned the capacity of the discipline, with its particular fascination with writing and textual representations of social life, to access or aspire to some notion of ‘truth’. ‘Ethnographic truths are…inherently partial’ (Clifford 1986, p7), which in a sense poses a threat to the basis of empirical fieldwork. How can a methodology be purely interpretative and yet present its account as authoritative? How can ethnography answer questions with regard to replicability, generalizability and validity? Or if we, like Wedeen (2010), abandon the authority of the narrator, what can replace it?

Rather than entering embattled debates about whether ethnography is scientific, there are convincing arguments that undermine the metaphor with the natural sciences in the first instance. The ‘Newtonian’ conception of cause and effect has little relevance in the messy, complex and unpredictable world of the ‘sciences of man’ (Becker 1996; Taylor 1971). In addition, pertinent to critical ethnography, epistemologies rooted in rationalism are weighted towards the isolation and empirical measurement of such cause

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37 See e.g. Brewer 2000; Kubik 2009; Rabinow 1986; Shore & Wright 1997 for overviews on the changing faces of ethnography.
and effect, to the neglect of other kinds of knowledge and indeed the key ‘problems of our day’ (Taylor 1971, p45; also Agar 2004; Jackson 1996). The strengths of ethnography lie in its proximity to a particular ‘system of relationships’ (Becker 1996, p3), its reflexivity in making one’s own objectives and roles explicit, and its flexibility in accommodating the unpredictable or ‘ atheoretical’. These strengths bring new conditions of validity, in ‘sense-making’ from experiential meaning, in a way that still resonates with, rather than abstracts from, those experiences (e.g. Giddens 1976; 1984; Schutz 1964; Taylor 1971). In this endeavour, I share Latour’s optimism that there is scope for in-depth, critical empiricism beyond textual deconstruction (2004). There is value in varying perspective and approach to how we study the institutions and activities that intervene deeply into people’s lives.

The specific issue of generalizability, however, warrants a more detailed response. This is not in the scientific sense, which prevents generalising on the basis of a single case, but in relation to the ability of research to explore aspects of the ‘global’, or ‘macro’, via the ‘micro’, insofar as such geography holds. There is certainly a level of optimism amongst critical writers as to the value of such approach in revealing the wider workings of power. This is evident in responses to Nader’s renowned call to ‘study up’ (1972) and/or study wider relations of power and governance ‘through’ localized microcosms. This connects the local to the ‘translocal’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003, p172; also Appadurai 1996; Gupta & Ferguson 1997; Englund 2006; Rizzo 2017; Shore & Wright 1997): the village to the district and the district to the national/international. Indeed, as Ley argues, the division of such realms can itself prove delimiting; ‘the optic of transnational global spaces should not conceal the intersecting reality of circumscribed everyday lives’ (Ley 2004, p151).

Whilst care should be taken to avoid obscuring the research subject, critical ethnography links ‘the detailed analysis of ethnography to wider social structures and systems of power relationships’ (Harvey 1990, p6). As such, it is located at the interface between the micro and macro. A study of the practice of NGO legitimation, whereby different actors draw on different resources nested at scales, encapsulates this. In this way, multi-

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38 Gupta and Ferguson (1992) have forcibly challenged the representation of space in the social sciences away from discontinuity, as per the state system, towards of fluidity. Robinson similarly challenges state geography in search of shared social spaces (2002). Nonetheless, village, ward, district and national ‘levels’ are still, as noted, politically meaningful in Tanzania, with elites reconfiguring, for example, around district hubs.
site ethnography, in ‘imagination’ as much as geography, examines where different ethnographically conceived sites meet (Marcus 1998, pp3-4). It is characterized, therefore, by not just a plurality of conventional ‘sites’ but by ‘spatialized…difference’ (Falzon 2009, p13). Such a sensibility supports an alternate way of mapping and understanding power and practice (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003). Care should also be taken to ensure IR’s entanglement with ethnography is not about churning out data to ‘make constructivism whole’ (Vrasti 2008, p290). This sidesteps ethnography’s now established concession that the text must ultimately distort the reality that it so desires to capture (ibid. p291).

Vrasti’s strong post-structuralist charge is difficult to overcome, given that this thesis has not been visibly radical in its methods or presentation, or perhaps provocative enough in its conclusions (see e.g. Comaroff & Comaroff 2003; Denzin 2017; Marcus 2009). Nevertheless, I readily concede that this account of legitimation practice has indeed been partial. Certain voices, including my own, certain relationships and dynamics have taken a more central role than others, and the project not directly emancipatory in its aim. Legitimation practices, their interrelation and product are themselves contingent, and indeed temporarily configured, and so cannot be universalized. The broader, analytical thrust of this thesis is rather that legitimation practice, and its replication at different scales, remains decidedly absent from those disciplines which seek to ground legitimacy in universals, including IR. And when practices are absent, those who undertake and negotiate them are also absent, whether or not I can ‘represent’ them as truth.

In embracing critical ethnography as a window to practice, therefore, I cautiously affirm the insights it has offered new areas such as international relations and global governance (e.g. Ahmed & Shore [eds] 1995; Coles 2004; Schatz [ed.] 2009; Shore & Wright [eds] 1997), the deepening ‘aidnography’ of the development industry (e.g. Anders 2005; Crewe & Harrison 1998; Dill 2013; Dorman 2005; Englund 2006; Ferguson 1994; 2015; Gould 2005; Green 2014; Hilhorst 2003; Igoe & Kelsall 2005; Kelsall 2000a; Lewis & Mosse 2006; Li 2007; Mosse 2005; 2006; Sardan 2005; Watts 2005).

Marcus’ seminal work on multi-sited ethnography (1995; 1998) has spawned a huge development in ethnographic research. His work to ‘refunction’ ethnography (Holmes & Marcus 2005; Marcus 2009), has been the target of incisive critique, with regard to its delusionism, or indeed tacit holism (e.g. Candea 2007; Hage 2005). Falzon, amongst others, rebuffs such in that its holism is no greater than that of its single-sited predecessor (2009).
as well as ethnography’s enduring centrality to African studies. Such work draws on interactionist, interpretivist methodologies to examine the conditions of social and political action, its negotiation and contestation. It is ‘multi-positioned’ (Marcus 1995) in its perspective, in an attempt to interweave divergent accounts of legitimation practice: the macro with the micro. As such, the research is ethnographic in sensibility, whilst forsaking ambition to know or represent any culture or structure holistically.

Methods & Data Collection

Overview

My main block of fieldwork comprised of twelve months over an eighteen-month period between January 2012 and June 2013, with short trips back to the UK every three months. The first three months focused primarily on Swahili language training, in preparation for conducting observation and interviews. The majority of this language training, however, took place within my fieldwork site of Bagamoyo and thus offered additional time to familiarise myself with the context and establish networks. I also draw on informal, formative discussions that took place in May 2011 as part of my Masters by Research (see Appendix A), as well as a brief follow-up visit in September 2013.

In the main block of fieldwork I undertook an estimated 62 days’ observation, mainly of NGOs at work at village, ward and district levels, but with additional shadowing of governmental and private consultancy programmes. This included field visits, training workshops and inter-organizational and governmental meetings. I met and interviewed representatives of 33 NGOs May-October 2012, many more than once, as part of a ‘mapping’ exercise in conjunction with Bagamoyo district’s civil society umbrella organization. I spent an additional six weeks living in two separate villages: Kiharaka (October/November 2012) and Kibindu (May 2013), unattached to any NGO. This generated data both in observing various programmes and initiatives (as part of the 62 days) and also via interviews and informal discussions.

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40 For clarity, this is observation on 62 separate dates, rather than 62 full days’ observations.
Lastly, I conducted a small number of 14 ‘elite’ interviews, both with district staff in the District Commissioner, community development, water, health and planning offices, as well as NGO managers based in Dar es Salaam. Whilst the majority of interviews and interactions were recorded by hand, I digitally recorded just shy of 9 hours’ audio in Swahili and 11 hours in English, which were subsequently transcribed by paid services and analysed by myself. In summary, I undertook 84 interviews (see Appendix B), as well as 47 sets of informal discussions alongside the 62 observation dates, which are thus cited as part of ethnographic fieldnotes. This provided a rich and varied data set with which to explore the claim-making process, its negotiation and contestation.

Field site selection
As argued, critical ethnography allows us to explore the global through an in-depth, proximate examination of the particular. As ethnography delves into the micro, however, the problem of justifying case selection intensifies. Global political, institutional and policy processes refract and proliferate, resulting in infinite interactions, interpretations and representations ‘all the way down’. Conversely, local institutions reflect and/or appropriate macro power structures in a multitude of ways (e.g. Schatzberg 2001). In this way, the search is not for a substantive case of ‘x’ or point of comparison ‘y’, but for an alternate way of mapping and understanding power and practice. This kind of ethnography could take place anywhere where political actors and institutions converge, where ‘ethnographically conceived sites [are] juxtaposed’ (Marcus 1998, p4). As such, ethnographic research is inherently weak in (multi)site selection, but this does not necessarily compromise quality (see Mosse 2006).

If, however, paying heed to conventions of site justification, the Tanzanian state provides an interesting case given the recent proliferation of non-government actors in an apparent burgeoning of civil society. The founding president Julius Nyerere and the ruling TANU party’s inward drive towards autonomy, which had hitherto squeezed this space, gave way to the resurgence of international influence following economic crisis in the 1970s. The disintegration of Nyerere’s grip on power and his departure in 1985 paved the way for political pluralism in 1992, which, despite the remarkable resilience of the de facto ruling party (now CCM), nominally broadened space for civil society (Green 2010; Hyden 1999; Tripp 2000). Since then, Tanzania has been cited a ‘good governance’ success story, enjoying ‘star status’ with international financial institutions
as the consummate reformer (Mercer 2003, p749; also Hyden 1999; Rizzo 2017). Despite bullish growth, it remains a recipient of high levels of international assistance, with aid comprising a third of government expenditure (Green 2014, p3), Tanzania has consistently ranked low on human development indices (UNDP 2016).41 ‘Lived poverty’ for the masses continues to rise (Afrobarometer 2012). Tanzania continued to slide the wrong way down corruption indices in the 2000s, at the time civil society seemingly propagated.42

Given, therefore, that the countenance of reform has not necessarily been matched by a meaningful transformation in the day to day lives of many, there would seem to be something **prima facie** in Mamdani’s thesis of the limitations of reform and the hollowness of civil society engagement (1996; also Hyden 1999). Certainly, whilst the numbers of NGOs have burgeoned, there is considerable scope to be sceptical, given the parameters of their engagement were initially carefully policed by the state (Aminzade 2013; Hyden 1999; Shivji 2004; 2007). Aberrant NGOs were censured or deregistered. Trade union movements repeatedly struggled to get off the ground, lagging well behind the numbers of NGOs, with the first formal organization coming a full six years after multi-party politics (Shivji 2004). These unions struggled to gain meaningful autonomy from the governing party, again enforced by the sanction of deregistration (Tripp 2000, p202). Indeed, there are indications of returning to the authoritarian control of dissent under President Magufuli’s new ‘bulldozer’ administration (Paget 2017).

In the face of Tanzania’s resurgent centre, however, contemporary modes of governance fuse globalized templates such as ‘civil society’ with more localized phenomena. In the case of Tanzania, localized phenomena include that of ‘districtization’ (Kelsall 2000b; also Green 2010; Harrison 2008), whereby political elites have reconfigured around district centres. A district-level case study thus provides an important backdrop to the question of how (global) governance is actualized in Tanzania. Local government authorities (LGAs) form key decision-making and

41 In the last UNDP Human Development Report 2016, Tanzania ranked 151 out of 188 listed countries.
42 Tanzania was ranked 82 in Transparency International’s 2001 corruption ranking, slipping to 116/178 in 2010, recovering to around the 100 mark in 2011-12, before sliding back to 116 in 2016 following media crackdowns under Magufuli’s new administration. Data available http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi
administrative hubs, around which situated elites, including those of NGOs, are increasingly centred. The extent to which district councils wield real power is circumscribed, whilst financial oversight remains concentrated at the centre.\(^{43}\) Nevertheless, there has been a substantive and symbolic shift towards the district since local government reform was enacted from 1999 (ibid.; also Green 2010). District councils, rather than presidentially appointed commissioners, have been on the ascendancy as locus of local political power and, at times, house antagonistic relations between its constituent elected and bureaucratic officials.\(^{44}\) The district of Bagamoyo thus forms the geographical and notional field for the first of the three empirical chapters.

Bagamoyo encapsulates recent development politics in Tanzania. It is one of 127 administrative districts in Tanzania and one of six in the coastal region Pwani. The district is notable in several respects. Its population has grown rapidly since the completion of the sealed 65km road to Dar es Salaam in 2002, rising 26% to 290,000 by the end of 2012 (Bagamoyo District Profile 2011). The road extended the commuter corridor to Dar, bringing new wealth as well as land and housing pressures to the area. Bagamoyo has long been a popular area for tourism, with several historical sites relating to early Swahili culture, as well as the ivory, missionary and infamous, if overstated, slave trade (Fabian 2013) eras. There is a vibrant music and creative arts scene with residential music and arts colleges. Crucially, however, the incumbent president at the time of research, Jakaya Kikwete, hailed from the district. As such, Bagamoyo had returned into the political limelight as development agencies mushroomed, pilot development

\(^{43}\) As Venugopal & Yilmaz (2010) point out, LGAs collect only about 5% of public revenue (Bagamoyo managed almost 6% in 2011-2012) but are responsible for 20% of public spending. Typically district councils petition for resources up the chain, which are partially fulfilled (Bagamoyo has received around 60% of its projected budget in the last few budget cycles) and main funding priorities are set centrally.

\(^{44}\) The district commissioner (DC) is appointed by the president and is his representative at the district level – a ‘state guy’ (interview 82, Advocates International programme coordinator, 1 June 2013). The district council has both an elected and bureaucratic component, the latter divided into the relevant government ministries (e.g. education, welfare, community development) and is the administrative and financial hub for district developmental work. Contrary to Hoffman & Robinson (2009), the district executive directors (DEDs) do not report to the DC but have their own reporting line within the prime minister’s office.
initiatives, institutes, building works sprung up and a new international port, signed off by the Chinese premier, had been steered into the region.\textsuperscript{45}

These factors contributed to the continuing mix of cultures, local and transient populations, visitors, tourists, students as well as an influx of development and para-statal agencies that have marked Bagamoyo’s history over centuries.\textsuperscript{46} They have contributed to the complex and saturated aid environment, particularly with respect to NGO activity. As a rough indication, there were 124, mainly local, NGOs registered with Bagamoyo District Council at the time of research, a high number compared to other districts.\textsuperscript{47} A number of factors contributed to this. Firstly, the proximity to Dar encouraged the registration of NGOs within Bagamoyo as an extension of their Tanzania operations, giving donors and other stakeholders the impression of increased outreach.\textsuperscript{48} Secondly, there was an increased flow of professionals, consultants and entrepreneurs to and from Dar seeking opportunities in Bagamoyo, which performs poorly with regard to key human development indices.\textsuperscript{49} Thirdly, interest in Bagamoyo, given its historical legacy, arts scene and proximity to Dar and Zanzibar, has precipitated a steady flow of overseas visitors. This has led to a number of self-styled ‘saviour’ NGOs, established by Western expatriates with a piecemeal flow of volunteers and funding. Lastly, although it is difficult to verify, several informants suggested that President Kikwete’s roots in Bagamoyo influenced the flow of funding to the district, leading to a mushrooming of small NGOs. There is a certainly a correlation, given the majority of Bagamoyo’s NGOs have registered in that timeframe.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{45} A multilaterally funded health institute was established in 2005 (for which the decision preceded Kikwete’s inauguration but was subsequently expanded). Bagamoyo was one of only three districts included in the pilot of a large scale, World Bank-funded social security scheme from 2008. An $11bn, Chinese invested international port was signed by the Chinese premier in April 2013. 65% of land earmarked nationally for government investment to form Special Economic Zones (SEZs) lies in Bagamoyo district, including plans for an international airport. Plans were temporarily shelved in 2015, following the change in Premiership.


\textsuperscript{47} There are around 9,000 NGOs registered in Tanzania, giving an average of 70 per district and making Bagamoyo almost twice the national average.

\textsuperscript{48} ‘National’ NGOs are defined by the NGO Act 2002 as being operational in at least two districts.

\textsuperscript{49} For example 75% of Bagamoyo wards did not have a health centre, well below the national average (District Development Plan, p1). The adult HIV prevalence rate was 9.5% (\textit{ibid.} p2), well above the national level of 5.6% (UNICEF, 2009) at the time of research.

\textsuperscript{50} 77% of NGOs in Bagamoyo have registered since Kikwete’s tenure in 2005. This figure is based on a list of 63 ‘active’ NGOs, 43 of which have a known registration date, 33 of those registered in 2006 or after.
The impetus to explore a district, local government oriented case study is thus two-fold. The first is political in the conventional sense, mapping the power dynamics that accompany ‘districtization’. These dynamics are intriguing, given the authoritarian history of the state, but also, more importantly, central to the legitimation strategies of district-based development actors. The second point is more epistemologically substantive, running throughout the empirical chapters. As noted in Chapter One, there is a focus within empirical studies of NGOs on their role within verticalized hierarchies. NGOs legitimate themselves *downwards* via macro global developmental discourses, or ‘policy templates’ (Mercer & Green 2013, p106). At the same time, they legitimate themselves *upwards* through proximity to the ‘grassroots’, or micro, inserting the purported interests, perspectives and ‘voice’ of the poor and marginalized into global agendas. NGOs, therefore, play a verticalized interstitial role, transmitting, infusing and adapting interests, ideas and norms between actors and discursive regimes (Green 2003; 2012; Lewis 2002; Mercer & Green 2013; Williams & Young 2012).

Verticalized analysis thus typifies two key empirical omissions. The first is the interstitial work of NGOs in legitimating themselves to other NGOs and, crucially, to local government. This work forms the empirical backbone of Chapter Three. Contrary to the assertion, as per Mercer and Green, that NGOs’ interactions with local government are deliberately rendered invisible (2013, p113), NGOs’ lateral positionality vis-à-vis the district, as well as other key players, is a deliberately visible legitimation strategy. The second omission, addressed in Chapters Four and Five, is how legitimation practices are interpreted, affirmed and/or contested by ‘beneficiaries’, or the subjects of such will to improve (Li 2007), typically at the very bottom of the ‘vertical model’ (Mercer & Green 2013, p107). This omission inadvertently overstates the role of elites in legitimation’s authorship. This tendency has been pertinent to studies on the African continent, amidst a recurrent drive to subsume legitimation under elite-driven logics. This has denuded the many of their agency to negotiate, contest and indeed reject, the authority of development actors, both state and non-state, to intervene ever more deeply into their lives.

In Bagamoyo district, six key players emerged in the district as the most active from which the majority of interviews and observations are drawn, namely: Advocates International (AI); Voluntary Partnership International (VPI); Community Health;
Youth Health (YH); Gender-Net; Eco-Coast (all pseudonyms). The first two of these organizations were formally international but all depended on international financing. Most of the organizations focus on health objectives but all engage in ‘good governance’ and/or rights based work. All six NGOs had strong district presence, a relatively robust funding portfolio and evidence of delivery. There was therefore an element of self-selection as these organizations were happiest to open their doors, which led ultimately to in-depth ethnography. Whilst this might appear a ‘skewing’ of sampling, there was enough range but also continuity within these six NGOs with which to explore the multifaceted, oscillating nature of legitimation as practice. Six NGOs, in addition, proved to be the logistical limit in the given timeframe.

**Figure 2.1: Six selected NGOs in Bagamoyo (pseudonyms)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIV/Health</th>
<th>Advocacy (good governance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (Bagamoyo only)</td>
<td>• Community Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Youth Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (HQ outside Tanzania)</td>
<td>• Voluntary Partnership International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender-Net (also micro-credit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eco-Coast (environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Advocates International</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the selection of the two villages, I settled on two contrasting environments. The first, Kiharaka, a village to which I had been signposted by several NGOs during my first trip in 2011, is a rapidly growing village located approximately half way between Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo town. It is under increasing urbanization pressures, particularly with regard to private land acquisitions, and its accessibility means it is more frequently served by both government and non-government agencies. The second village, Kibindu, is at the outer boundary of the district, five to seven hours by public transport from Bagamoyo Town, remote and generally underserved. I had ‘entry points’ to both villages and provide detailed case profiles within the relevant chapters. Whilst these two environments were very different in a number of key respects, there was also surprising continuity between the sites and they provided ample opportunities with which to engage with people about their experiences on NGO and government activity.

There are a couple of excursuses beyond the above selections. In some cases, I capitalized on the opportunity to observe organizations entering a particular
geographical or notional ‘field’ *for the first time*, or early in their legitimation trajectory. The first of these, incorporated in Chapter Four’s Kerege, is the shadowing of Advocates International as it entered remote and underserved Talawanda ward in the southwest of the district for the first time. The second of these is the inclusion of Community Development Innovation Professionals’ (CDIP) activities in Chapter Five’s Kibindu, early in their operational journey. A third speaks to the inclusion of Bagamoyo’s umbrella civil society organization, particularly within Chapter Three’s district case study. The last of these excursuses was by design, through the regular ‘zooming out’ to the wider ward environment, including to adjacent villages, in which the two villages were situated. These aspects of fieldwork were generally more reactive and unplanned but nonetheless provided additional rich data in understanding: early legitimation work; the operations of younger players; and the localized ‘crowding’ and inter-organizational politics of particular geographical and notional fields. The data is incorporated at opportune moments in the relevant chapters.

*Participant* observation

Participant observation has been considered the hallmark of ethnography since Malinowski decreed it so (1922). In the main block of fieldwork, I duly undertook an estimated 62 days’ observation, mainly of NGOs at work at village, ward and district levels, but with additional shadowing of governmental and private consultancy programmes. This included field visits, training workshops and inter-organizational and governmental meetings. I spent an additional six weeks living in two separate villages: Kiharaka (October/November 2012) and Kibindu (May 2013), unattached to any NGO. This generated data both in observing various programmes and initiatives (as part of the 62 days) and via interviews and informal discussions.

Malinowskian-styled observation, however, rests on the assumption that it is possible to enter the lives of the people that you are studying and forge common interests or ‘ties’ (Wind 2008, p85). As such, the perennial ‘insider’/’outsider’ dichotomy is central to its dual activities of participation/observation (Spradley 1980). The reflexive ethnographer is well placed to straddle this divide, watching herself from the outside in. And yet, for anyone who as truly reflected on the status of ‘insidership’, even if apparently so by virtue of ‘traditional’ markers of race, gender or class, achieving such a state as a researcher is ephemeral at best (see e.g. Denzin 1992; Griffith 1998; Kondo 1986;
Narayan 1993; Zinn 1979). An ostensible insider status is refracted by divergent life trajectories, experiences, education and, ultimately, interests. Indeed, even for those who have been part of a community over an extensive period, the shifting layers and complexity of insidership means that even those deemed insiders by others can themselves feel frequent feelings of exclusion (Naples 1996). It is a conceit, therefore, to suggest that such divergent paths can be overcome through humour or ‘solidarity’ with the plight of others.

The fragility of my insidership, and therefore my capacity to ‘participate’, was laid bare during my short time with my initial host organization. All overseas researchers are obliged to apply to the Commission of Science and Technology in order to obtain research clearance and are required to name a host organization. Given that I did not wish to be assigned to any particular NGO, and that I had existing relations with Bagamoyo’s umbrella Civil Society Association (CSA), I used their contact information to issue the permit. The CSA’s purported role was to build the capacity of, and coordination between, Bagamoyo’s civil society, a natural starting point for collaboration. Our prior discussions, dating from May 2011, had centred on shared goals regarding the need to coordinate and ‘map’ NGO activity more closely at a district level. I was interested to see how much mapping the CSA had achieved to date and was willing to step in to continue the exercise with those organizations who had failed to respond. We were seeming collaborators in our desire to document NGO activity and in our tacit disapproval of their shortcomings in this regard. As such, I positioned myself within CSA in order to access member organizations and collect information on their behalf; but was also outside in my attempt to understand how other NGOs viewed the CSA.

I conducted the mapping exercise between May and August 2012, compiling a simple excel database, cross-checking available data from Bagamoyo District Council, the CSA and NGOs themselves of around 65 organizations. The data is not appended to this thesis for reasons of confidentiality and anonymity, but all interviews feature in Appendix B. I met representatives from 33 of these organizations, using the CSA’s own instrument. In doing so, I walked straight into a hotbed of issues regarding CSA, which, as explored in Chapter Three and elsewhere (Dodworth 2017), had fallen from grace. These issues had contributed to the low participation of members both in meetings and
in the completion of questionnaires and other information requests. As my understanding of CSA grew, our temporary alliance began to disintegrate. Its secretary continually pressed me for informal information about organizations to which he had no access. I was petitioned to write funding proposals, both for CSA, which had some relevance, but also for staff's other organizations, which did not. Reiterating my 'neutrality', research aims or ethics fell on deaf ears. Clearly, my positioning within CSA should generate more benefits than to me alone. After three months, I made the unusual decision to change my host organization. I handed CSA the data I had collated and stepped away.

Genuine participant observation, therefore, depends upon forging interests and ties, which, through the very act of conducting research, are diffused. Insidership presumes a contrivance of interests and life trajectories that ultimately diverge. Allegiance to any group is only ever partial; goals overlap temporarily. Wind critiques Malinowskian participant observation along similar lines (2008). In a UK hospital, the boundaries of where she could participate, even as a trained nurse, were clear and enforced. Whilst the boundaries for my participation were more permeable, the limits of how genuine participation could become remained the same. I was not solely an NGO worker, volunteer, villager, consultant, nor government associate, even though these facets were played on by myself and others. As such, Wind’s conception of ‘negotiated interactive observation’ is relevant beyond the medical sector. My access was also negotiated on a daily basis, interactive in that I was still a participant in my environment and the observation of others’ behaviour – their practices - how I spent the vast majority of my time. Such prolonged, negotiated observation circumvented the unhelpful binarism of oppressor/oppressed, embracing the complexity of legitimation practice.

Village interviews: semi-structured, unstructured, informal
Interviewing is a key part of ethnography. At the village level, however, this normally assumed the form of informal discussions, alongside observation. Out of the 84 formal interviews (Appendix B), only 27 took place in the village, given the intrusiveness of the engineered interview as compared to observation. When working with non-elites, a ‘question and answer’ interview can reaffirm power imbalances between the researcher and the researched (Smith 1988) and is necessarily artificial in its construction (Douglas 1985). It can also raise expectations and apprehensions: one community-based volunteer
hesitated she was not an ‘expert’ when asked if I might ask her questions about her work.\

51 Leander, citing Bourdieu, goes so far as to suggest the interview as a form of ‘symbolic violence’ (2002, p603), given the limits of informed consent and the uneven spoils of research. Formal interviewing was thus avoided where possible in the village setting. I opted for alternative modes of interviewing that sat alongside day to day life, rather than creating new spaces for research. This included the walking, or ‘go along’, interview (Carpiano 2009), but mainly informal discussions alongside sedentary work. This was interviewing as ‘a virtually invisible part of participant observation’ (Fife 2005, p101), recorded as part of fieldnotes. Indeed, much of the data generated during observation was derived from informal discussions and asides, highlighting a blurred division (Frey & Fontana 1994).

Nevertheless, 27 more formalized interviews did take place without prior meeting at the village and ward levels within a conventional question/answer format. These interviews were lightly structured, typically starting with the interviewee’s role, tracing how it changed and developed over time. As noted under Reflexivity, these were occasions where I felt somewhat complicit in Bourdieusian ‘violence’, whereby informants possibly did not feel able to refuse to take part, regardless of the compact of informed oral consent. I tried, however, to mitigate such over the course of the interview through empathy, for example, with the difficult position that volunteers found themselves in. Whilst it would be a conceit to suggest I achieved such, the tone of the interview would change once it became clear my purpose was not to scrutinize, as other visitors might. There were many cases where apprehension gave way to cordial, indeed frank, exchanges with unsolicited offers to keep in touch. Follow-up interactions, whilst never unproblematic, bolstered the notion that the interview sparks a longer relationship and conversation.

Elite interviewing

In contrast to the village setting, formalized, semi-structured ‘elite’ interviewing at the district or national level (for example NGO or government managers) proved the dominant, and highly effective, research methodology for a number of reasons. Firstly, semi-structured interviews are a good balance between enabling comparison, the collation of responses around broad themes and ‘fact-finding’, whilst at the same time

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51 Interview 42, Afia, health volunteer, Kiharaka.
allowing flexibility for the conversation to develop in new areas (Bryman 2001). I explored the complexities of relationship building, access and the legitimation of NGOs, with particular attention to the symbolic language of claim-making, as well as tensions between this and other, more official representations. This element is highly interpretative that would be difficult to explore using fixed interview scheduling.

Secondly, the interview did not signify such a pronounced ‘break’ in the natural order of business. Face to face meetings and communication are key mechanisms for planning and information exchange. District offices, for example, often house large queues of plaintiffs seeking the time of office bearers. Whilst this does pose challenges of access, confidentiality and possibly anonymity (see below), it does not challenge the appropriateness of interviews per se. Most government office bearers, as well as senior NGO staff, educated to tertiary level, are obviously at home with frank verbal exchanges. Given the pressures on their time, the expediency of the typical one hour interview proved the most appropriate method. In contrast to the village setting, any further observation (such as accompanying on activities or district meetings) was subsequent to relationship-building during the interview process.

Thirdly, somewhat related to the previous point, the ‘power’ balance differs in this setting. There is a danger here, however, as explicated by Smith (2006), of invoking over-simplified understandings of power, and elites as ‘possessors’ of that power. This is not, therefore, to disregard more sophisticated conceptions of power, nor to assume such power dynamics unique to studying up. Rather the point is that the act of interviewing in itself did not constitute the same spatio-temporal disruption. However, the exigencies of each interview played out, I needed to find strategies to engage these professional elites in at least some of the study objectives. There was therefore certain resemblance in my own behaviour to what I was studying in others: I had to ‘legitimate’ my presence and credibility with various institutions before moving forward. Both interviewer and interviewee, therefore, to paraphrase Gusterson, borrowed ‘complex repertoires’ to perform themselves (2008, p105): the very stuff of legitimation.

Documents

As discussed, there are different strategies of legitimation within different forums. There are ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ faces of development work. In this vein, therefore, it was necessary during data collection to draw on official NGO documents such as project
summaries, strategies, policy and planning documents in order to understand the ‘official’ face of a particular project, but also as a ‘bridge’ to the macro (Fife 2005, p129). In some cases, verbal descriptions, or representations, of a project, its contingencies, and exigencies, bore little resemblance to official documentation. In addition to fieldnotes and interview transcripts, I thus drew on ‘formal’ documentation as part of the competing representations that constitute the legitimation process, including wall charts; maps; volunteer lists; district and NGO profile information; NGO, district and village level budgets; existing NGO and district data sets and questionnaires; district and NGO planning and strategy documents; village visitor’s books, meeting minutes and other records; NGO meeting minutes; and NGO workshop flipcharts.

Data analysis

Legitimation is the practice of accumulative claim-making. It infuses the exercise of power with symbolic capital: norms, institutions and material resource that render it ephemerally authoritative and rightful. Legitimation practice is deeply performative in crafting and sustaining spatio-temporal presence, through symbolic positioning vis-à-vis other actors. The thesis curates legitimation into sets of symbolic practices, with particular attention to its negotiation in the everyday. This demanded the toolkit of critical ethnography, its limitations noted. These principles, laid out in Chapter One, duly guided the data collection process as well as its inductive, iterative analysis.

Different forms of ethnography, in turn, demand different kinds of analysis. Some in the interpretative tradition aim to build a unified account, as in the grounded school (Glaser & Straus 1967; also Clarke 2005; Charmaz 2006) whilst others have eschewed such in favour of ‘multivocality’ (Turner 1975) or ‘polyphony’ (Clifford 1986, p15). What is common to ethnography, however, is that interpretation and analysis is an iterative process, guided by the data rather than the imposition of theory. This is not, however, to say that the move from data collection to analysis is sequential, but rather the overall direction is ‘bottom-up’ (Brewer 2000, p108). At the same time, there is a
tension between adopting an inductive, or even ‘abductive’,\textsuperscript{52} approach at the same time
deriving concepts, in this case legitimation practices, which are not used as terms \textit{directly}. As such, I conceive the analysis process as iteratively giving shape and content to concepts/sub-concepts against the wider thematic backdrop.

With this in mind, I sought to move between the emergent six overarching practices: \textit{extensity, territoriality, state, representation, voluntarism and material resource}, and the micro detail, as captured primarily in field notes, interview transcripts and NGO and government documents. As Schatzman & Strauss explicate, field research is a constant movement between gathering and analysing data (1973; also Dunn 2008, p90). In this way, legitimation practices emerged through iterative fieldwork, which in turn shaped the direction of subsequent data collection. Eventually, hardcopy fieldnotes and transcripts were manually colour coded by legitimation practices. This primary analysis, ‘flagging recurrent patterns, variations on themes’ (Gusterson 2008, p107) allowed legitimation practices to crystallize. Primary analysis in turn enabled ‘secondary analysis’, forming patterns and relationships between practices (Fife 2005, p123), as I return to in the concluding chapter. Given my interest in the exploration of the macro through the micro, I also attended to specific case analyses, centring on a person or event, as a ‘vignette’ of rich qualitative description (Brewer 2000, pp112-113).

In this way, Kvale’s ‘ad hoc’ approach to interview analysis, drawing on the interplay of different techniques (1996, p203), has broader relevance. This interplay of techniques involves elements of \textit{narration, interpretation and condensation}. \textit{Narration}, expounded more fully by Mishler (1986), demands close attention to the temporal and social meanings of interviews as narratives, pertinent to unstructured, informal interviews as an ‘invisible’ part of observation. This situating of the interview in its wider context overlaps with \textit{interpretation}, and indeed interpretivist enquiry more widely, in locating symbolic meaning beyond what is immediately apparent or indeed vocalized. At the same time, the \textit{condensation} of themes and patterns are an inevitable part of narrating, selecting and interweaving material within the analysis, of ‘bringing order to the data’ (Brewer 2000, p105). An interpretivist, critical approach to analysing the ‘how’ is not, therefore,

\textsuperscript{52} Blaikie describes research as ‘abductive’, whereby accounts are grounded in the meanings and interpretations that people use in their everyday lives (2000, p114). I use the term cautiously given that interpretivist writers do not use the term and Blaikie ascribes abduction to a relativist ontology.
foreordained to relativism, if supported by both the weight of empirical data - Geertz’s ‘thick description’ (1973) - as well as a ‘reusable answer to the question’ (Dunn 2008, p92).

Reflexivity

Reflexivity, and the claims it gives rise to, has become a site of contention within ethnography, in its ‘home’ discipline of anthropology and beyond. It is primarily a methodological term associated with critical research, but for some the debate goes much further. Archer, most eminently, has argued that reflexivity is a condition, or rather ‘imperative’, of late modernity itself (1995; 2012). She defines reflexivity as ‘the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa’ (2012, p1). Such an ability is heightened in the late modern era as the ‘lack of fit’ (McNay 1999) between habitus and field, between identity and the categories that once defined us, become ever-more pronounced (see also Alexander 1996; Beck et al. 1994; Lash 1999). In a sense, therefore, we are all both participants in and critics of the ‘reflexive modernity’ (Beck et al. 1994) and its structures that once defined us with decidedly less complication.53

The notion that we might potentially be liberated from such structures in pursuit of a new, more transcendental viewpoint(s), indeed potentially bolstering the work of the social researcher, can be forcefully taken to task. Bourdieusian analysis, as noted in Chapter One, at times struggles to escape the agential impasses of structural determinism at all. And yet ‘reflexivity’, both epistemic and sociological/methodological, is associated with Bourdieu’s philosophy of research almost to the point of synonymy (Gingras 2010). Rather than becoming something of an inevitable marker of modern life, however, reflexivity is, for Bourdieu, something that takes persistent, and indeed laborious, effort on the part of the researcher. It demands painstaking and empirically grounded self-reflection: on one’s own role as a researcher, the forms of ‘capital’ that enacts that privilege, and the position within and impact on the ‘field’ in which one

53 Archer rejects Beck et al., arguing reflexivity to be an internal process rather than an external, sociological phenomenon. Nevertheless they share an engagement with reflexivity as condition of the late modern era.
works (e.g. Bourdieu 1984). Bourdieu’s increasingly explicit exploration of the conditions of reflexivity grew apace in the 1990s, spawning a vast secondary literature (see Gingras 2010 for a review; also Lynch 2000).

There has been, therefore, dynamic debate as to whether Bourdieu’s ‘sociology of sociology’ is possible. For some, including Archer, Bourdieu cannot ultimately capture or provide the means for agential self-reflection in contemporary social life (1995; 2012). Bourdieusian theorists, in response, have highlighted the more ‘generative and creative aspects of habitus and action’ (Akram & Hogan 2015, p610, drawing on Bourdieu 1977; also Adams 2006; Adkins 2003; Farrugia & Woodman 2015; McNay 1999; Sweetnam 2003). Even with these addendums in place, however, it remains vulnerable to stronger post-structuralist challenges. For Geldof and Martin, for example, Bourdieusian analysis is doomed to fail in its proclaimed reflexivity in its persistent ‘thetical’ style, divulging its ‘desire to speak the truth and to be the only one to speak the truth’ (1997, p41). The very act of invoking Bourdieu feigns textual ‘authority’ (ibid.) where there is none.

Whilst insights from poststructuralist ethnography are well-taken, embracing more dialogical and polyvocal forms of research, the charge of ‘theticalism’ is nigh impossible to overcome. This thesis’ presentation provides an account of legitimation practice. Its thetical ‘truth’ is that legitimation itself is a necessary condition of contemporary authority and the multifarious forms of governance it precipitates. Its actual content, however, remains contingent, shaped by the peculiarities of the field and as such, as argued under methodology, I fully embrace that contingency and partiality.

Furthermore, this account has been shaped by my insertion into the field and the peculiarities that both gave rise to and resulted from the research encounter. The question, therefore, is how to embrace reflexivity without oneself becoming the sole referent of research: to find an ‘informed’ or ‘reformist’ reflexivity (Davies 2012; Leander 2002; 2008). With regard to the current project, this falls under two main areas: methodological and substantive.

With regard to methodology, conventionally defined, this demands the critical reflection not just on one’s tools but also on the wider context of power within which the research encounter takes place. Bourdieu, as noted, drew attention to the potential ‘symbolic violence of interviews’ (cited in Leander 2002, p603), a concern taken up extensively within feminist literature. Whilst there were occasions where I felt somewhat complicit
in this violence, I tried to mitigate such over the course of the interview itself, making reference to such in the relevant empirical chapters. Whilst this does not absolve my complicity in invoking privilege, it at least highlights the complexity and protracted nature of negotiating access, circumventing simplistic binarisms of oppressor/oppressed. Moderating the mode of interviewing itself, as noted, rather than creating new spaces specifically for research, led to a less ‘violent’ encounter: indeed, my presence *prima facie* welcomed by certain groups.

Lastly, under this methodological component, critical/feminist/post-structuralist ethnographers make the case for more dialogical, rather than unilaterally extractive, forms of research. Rather, therefore, than rendering one’s own account as permanent and authoritative, research findings form part of an extended conversation with your informants. ‘Social analysis’, as Davies puts it, ‘must now grapple with the realization that its objects of analysis are also analysing subjects who critically interrogate ethnographers – their writings, their ethics, and their politics’ (2012, p21). This proved the most difficult element of ‘working reflexively’ (Leander 2008). Occasionally, such a conversation was established productively. In one instance, when a key informant asked for my findings at the end of my time in the field, I presented the legitimation practices that now run through this written account. ‘Yes!’, he exclaimed, ‘we do do that!’, in a succinct yet multifaceted exchange that at once validated my research but also held it to account.54 In addition, it highlighted the potential of practice as a point of meaningful, self-conscious reflection, rather than that of pre-reflexivity.

More commonly, however, informants, particularly those under ‘elite’ interviews, would interrogate in an assertive, if not admonishing, manner, irrespective of my documentation or informed consent. In one, particularly frank exchange, the interviewee asked me the point of volunteering any final comments:

I: If I give comments, what will they become? […] Now comments, then later - what will be in the impact on our side? If I give comments…?

K: I haven’t yet…

54 Interview 82, Programme Coordinator, Advocates International.
I: Because I mean research, academic research, most of the time its impact for the target person [beneficiary] is really low. You get your PhD, then you're off again.55

Elite informants would additionally interrogate my right to question, seen as a broader challenging of the validity of their work. ‘Who are you?’ to ask questions, asked one, ultimately refusing to share their organization’s constitution (theoretically a public document) until they ‘check who you are’.56 ‘This element of ‘working reflexively’ often came up short, as I lacked adequate responses to rightful questions regarding the division of research spoils. I often shifted to other means of self-legitimation in an attempt to mitigate such differentials.

The second, therefore, more substantive area lies in this curious case of self-legitimation within a study of legitimation more broadly. Whilst I endeavoured to curate the legitimation practices of others, there were certain themes in my own behaviour as I sought to construct my own authority to act in the name of research. By way of biography, after my Edinburgh undergraduate degree, I travelled extensively in Asia before completing a Masters in International Politics at Glasgow. I then moved into the international development sector, assuming several desk-based roles in London before moving in to the ‘field’. I had extended stints in Malawi and South Africa, with shorter visits to other African countries. This biography indeed formed part of how I inserted myself into my research field.

As I argue under Ethics, as well as elsewhere (Dodworth 2017), I thus legitimated myself in multiple ways; experienced NGO fieldworker or ignorant foreigner; high level doctoral researcher or lowly ‘student’; streetwise traveller or vulnerable female; object of lust, animosity or both; friend and confidante or steely professional. I drew on different facets of my biographical identity to negotiate a more open conversation. Negotiated access is thus the story of both invoking and revoking privilege: both entreating and inverting power relations. Legitimation is also reciprocal, demanding the affirmation of others. In this way, there is much to Gusterson’s observation that interviews themselves are ‘dynamic events through which the identity of the subject [is] performed and even co-constructed by the interviewer and interviewee’ (2008, p105). Such dynamism

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55 Interview 83, Bagamoyo District Council NGO Coordinator
56 Interview 48, founder and member of Kerege Development Organization.
resonates throughout ethnography’s constitutive methods more broadly and, indeed, runs to the heart of legitimation itself.

That I am able to reflect critically on the construction, maintenance and invocation of multiple roles is not an attempt to undo the partiality of this account. What it does allow, however, is the generation of data regarding the legitimation of myself and of others. The ethical truth, as argued, is that legitimation is a necessary condition of contemporary authority and the multifarious forms of governance it precipitates, which includes the academy. Legitimation, as a relational process, demands the insertion of the social self into the field, and with it the now familiar use of a range of capital. It is precisely this process, the ‘interaction between ethnographer-as-self and ethnographer-as-other that social knowledge of general interest and significance’ (Davies 2012, p189) is produced.

**Ethics, Access & Identity**

*Ethics & Access*

This thesis underwent conventional processes of ethical review with regard to potential risks, confidentiality, informed consent and conflict of interests, in line with university and funder requirements. Informed consent was obtained orally, with the script appended in Appendix D. Organizations and individuals are anonymized, given pseudonyms as per Figure 2.1 Anonymity is always limited in that certain staff members may be able to recognize their peers given the presentation of certain opinions and facts, but these are ones often shared in public forums to such peers. Crucially, however, these organizations and their volunteers are not identifiable to outsiders and will not return search results online. I have argued, however, as others, that conducting research and the methodological decisions therein, are inherently political. In this vein, research ethics goes beyond the procedures associated with conventional review to include the politics, instrumentality and wider impact of research itself. In this vein, there are two distinct but interrelated areas. The first concerns the process of ethics review as a form of regulation and protection. The second addresses the wider politics of research, in this case in relation to the aid environment.
With regards to ethical review, it has been the object of much debate as to whether current processes contribute to ethical, or indeed quality, research (Crow et al 2006; Hoonoard 2001; Murphy & Dingwall 2007; Shannon 2007). The relevance of the ‘biomedical’ consent model, particularly with regard to ethnographic fieldwork where the researcher cedes control of the environment, has rightfully been questioned (e.g. Bengry-Howell & Griffin 2011; Burgess 2007; Calvey 2008; Cassell 1980; Haggerty 2004; Miller & Bell 2002; Spicker 2007; Thorne 1980; Wax 1980). It is difficult to set clear project parameters where the researcher’s exposure is prolonged; to explain objectives when they are unfolding; to predict findings and their use. Furthermore, scholars have highlighted the expanding attribution of terms such as ‘harm’ and ‘vulnerable’ in the increasingly prohibitive process of review (Cassell 1980; Haggerty 2004; Hoonoard 2001).

With regards to the politics of research, for many living at the ‘margins’ in areas targeted by development agencies, a prolonged exposure to the industry has quite rightfully raised the question of ‘who benefits?’ This is no longer an academic debate but a highly visible experience of how spoils are distributed in the development hierarchy. Those who are consistently portrayed as poor or underserved are interacting with and resisting both this act of representation and the activities to which it gives rise. Feminist and post-structuralist thought seek to overcome the power asymmetries inherent in the research process by making their political goals more explicit (Gillies & Aldred 2002; Haraway 1988; Luff 1999; Opie 1992; Stanley & Wise 1990), but which is nevertheless still challenging when immersed into an environment laden with competing interests. Indeed, whilst circumventing some readings of harm, ethnographic research generates its own set of ethical concerns.

My experience with CSA typified the constant recalibration between ethics, interests, emotions and, of course, data collection that ethnography demands. My CSA affiliation immersed me very rapidly into a complex, politicized patchwork of inter-organizational, or interpersonal, alliances and rivalries. I got to grips with the politics of information sharing and its relationship to power and authority. Whilst, therefore, there were rewards from the perspective of quarrying data, however, my experience with CSA threw up new ethical and emotional demands. It was impossible to ascertain participants’ expectations and I therefore continually falling short in meeting them, or
reconciling our interests. I continually repositioned myself as knowledgeable, savvy insider or neutral, professionalized outsider. My use of Swahili or English could bolster either position, depending on the audience and circumstance. ‘You’re a real African woman’ I was told on multiple occasions, an ‘mswahili’ (coastal person – also derogatory term) in wry exchanges that simultaneously highlighted both assimilation and difference. My positionality was thus constantly in flux, even over the course of a single interview, and in a dislocating twist began to echo the very phenomenon of which I was studying in others.

**Access & Identity**

Access, therefore, is continually re-negotiated and only ever partial. Whilst ethnographers concede this, the ‘access’ debate has nevertheless been characterized by the quest for ever-better data. Ethnographers navigate the insider/outsider divide, uniquely positioned to excavate insights not visible to other modes of research (e.g. Davies 2012; Mosse & Kruckenberg 2017). Insiders, by virtue of membership of a particular group, have privileged access, insight and empathy. Outsiders, by virtue of their distance, are not overly familiarized with the setting and as such are able to offer new insights (see e.g. Hammersley & Atkinson 2010). Subsequent debate on the insider/outsider position has continued in this vein of methodological pros and cons, preserving social science’s ultimate aim of furthering knowledge of the world we live in (e.g. Aberese-Ako 2017; Brayboy & Deyhle 2000; Mercer 2007; Perryman 2011). As Merton expounds, we are able to transcend our placement of insider or outsider through academic training, ‘technical competence’ (1972, p41) and professional rigour. What unites this diverse body of work, however, is both that insidership and outsidership exist and such membership is not problematized. Thus we are members of multiple groups, resembling others in terms of race, age, sexuality and so on, but the membership status itself is absolute, its criteria bounded.

Clearly post-structuralists are obliged to take the framing of this debate to task on both counts. On the first, they would deconstruct the façade of an objective social reality that we are able to describe, to analyse and ultimately to know at arm’s length. Social realism is a delusion that is epistemologically arrogant at best and duplicitous at worst. It is a convenient fabrication that serves the interests of the most powerful, who seek answers to remediable ‘problems’, often targeted at society’s ‘margins’. As Denzin points out, the
‘realist, interactionist, social (problems) text reproduces a romantic overidentification with society’s undesirables…It is a romantic ideology woven through liberal and conservative political agendas that make individuals responsible for their problems’ (1992, p130). Social realists like Merton are unable to reflect fully on how our methodological toolbox, our ‘technical competence’, constitutes and reconstitutes the world: the Foucauldian nexus between power and knowledge. The very act of conducting research in accordance with these competencies, as Griffith describes (1998), is a particular positioning that reconstitutes the world in accordance with externally ascribed categories.

The second count, linked to this ontological scepticism, is that identity can be ascribed or bounded by our membership or participation in particular social groups. It is not simply, therefore, as Merton implies, that social life is complicated by our simultaneous membership of multiple groups (which researchers can and must transcend). It is rather that such groupings are inherently relational and in flux, and therefore cannot form the building blocks of a stable ‘identity’ at all. Rather identity is a continual process that draws symbolically from discursive frameworks, which indeed include traditional markers such as race, but also from temporal and spatial markers such as shared experience. Ethnographers who assumed they may be an insider by virtue of particular markers found that they were so only in some regards and at certain times (Griffiths 1998; Kondo 1986; Narayan 1993; Naples 1996; Webster & John 2010). Insidership, therefore, is only ever ‘partial’ (Narayan 1993, p676) and ephemeral. As such, if we reject the ‘social realism’ (Denzin 1992, p124) that underpins the insider/outsider dichotomy, we reject the possibility of insidership altogether. We are left with an ever-shifting aspect as we interact with a multitude of ‘Others’ (Griffiths 1998; also Kondo 1986) in a multitude of situations.

If, therefore, the critical turn in ethnography is to be fully embraced, with its ontological pluralism and ‘multiplex subjectivity’ (Narayan 1993, p676 [citing Rosaldo 1989]) there are implications, clearly, for the academic’s production of knowledge. There are also implications, however, for the researcher herself and her experience in the field, now more central to the production of the text. If identity collapses into a collection of

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57 It is a case in point that Merton tenaciously holds onto the term ‘Negro scholar’ into the 1970s, when it had already been forcefully rejected by Afro-American writers themselves, itself an act of power and positionality.
temporary ‘positionalities’, what then anchors the researcher as they navigate through new and challenging territory? How do you temper the heightened awareness of the role you play in a particular context and the impact you have on your informants’ lives as well as your own? For Kondo, the duplicity of her roles led eventually to the ‘dissolution’ of her ‘self’: an existential unease with very real psychological effects (1986). Whilst I never resembled a ‘Tanzanian’ in the way that Kondo looked ‘Japanese’, our experiences resonate regarding the constant tension in maintaining different personas: its ‘emotional labour’ (Hoschild 1983). Whilst writers like Narayan and Kondo seem celebratory at their liberation from the boundaries of identity and the millstone of ‘insider’, there is inevitably a cost to the researcher of fluidity of markers that once anchored with decidedly less complication.

Identity & Emotions

As such, my positionality was constantly, and deliberately, ambivalent to others and therefore to myself. It could change over the course of an interview. Expectations of both researcher and participant also fluxed, reducing the likelihood that they might be fulfilled. I felt mercenary in my pursuit of ‘data’ at the expense of my respect for people, even when people were sometimes as mercenary in their exercise of power over me. Relationships felt partial and friendship ‘faked’ (Duncombe & Jessop 2002), and I inevitably failed at maintaining sufficient contact with those who had offered me camaraderie. Stacey suggests that ethnographic methods in fact risk greater feelings of betrayal and ‘abandonment’ (1988): indeed one informant I contacted relatively frequently one day texted me ‘how have you abandoned me? Can’t you even find time to greet me by message?’ Whilst this was also a manipulation on his part, it hit its mark.

This element of fieldwork was difficult to deal with on a personal and emotional level. Part of this was due to the frustrations and limits of the relations I was able to enter and a feeling that I did not come close to meeting my and others’ expectations. Another part was accumulative, being isolated and having experienced animosity and circumvention over time. This was not, I felt, purely due to an insensitivity or obtrusiveness on my part, although I was at times persistent to the point of transgressing cultural norms. The primary reason was rather due to wider power relations given firstly my lack of any visible institutional backing, exacerbated by a deliberately nomadic role, not affiliated with any NGO for any substantial period. Secondly, as noted, it related to power.
relations regarding my place to ask questions of others. Thirdly, was the rather grey area around corrupt practices or, more commonly, the role of interpersonal networks, power and exchange in securing access.

By the time I finally left the field in June 2013, I was disoriented, having experienced a definite unravelling, or dissolution, of my ‘self’. I was exhausted, weak from weight loss and suffering insomnia. I felt disquiet at how I had managed and exited many of my field relationships. I had manipulated others but had been the object of manipulation. I had exploited others but been exploited. I had both wielded and ceded power. I had elicited and consumed feelings that were not genuine. On returning to the UK I was unable, for a period, to engage with my data nor listen to taped conversations that placed me back into the field. I tumbled down an ethical rabbit hole, chasing my tail on the same questions. I revisited literature on the ‘reality’, stresses and strains of fieldwork, which suddenly carried more meaning. I concluded that it is the management of relationships, whether or not they yield ‘data’, which comprises the bulk of fieldwork (Dodworth 2017). It is nevertheless rare to find accounts that capture the exertion of self-legitimation, with methodological textbooks airbrushing what can be a profoundly dislocating experience. As such, those who rightfully question the asymmetry of fieldwork spoils may do well also to audit the attendant costs.

**Conclusion: critically excavating legitimation**

This chapter sought to bring two, interlinked problematics to the fore. The first was that contemporary legitimation practice, as accumulative claim-making and its negotiation, has typically been rendered invisible to date. The second is a broader moral concern regarding the location of the research ‘subject’, also often in the shadow of theory-making or of developmental problem-solving. This chapter has argued that interpretive praxeology, bolstered by the ‘practice turn’, informed this research to speak to both concerns. When practices are present, brought out ‘in the clear’ (Taylor 1985, p104), those who undertake, negotiate and contest them are also present. Interpretive praxeology is not necessarily interpretive in the conventional sense of assuming and
representing the ‘native’s view’, but rather attending to practices as symbolic and performative, and therefore situational and interactive.

Interpretive praxeology in turn paves the way for critical ethnography, as ‘deep hanging out’ (Gusterson 2008, p93 citing Rosaldo), in its approach to understanding the social world. It is ethnographic not only in its embrace of participant observation, or rather ‘negotiated interactive observation’ (Wind 2008), but in drawing on a wide range of research methods infused with the ethnographic ‘sensibility’ (Schatz 2009, p5).

Ethnography, as ever, is marked by its proximity, flexibility and indeed reflexivity in the act of entering and shaping the field of study. It is critical in its exploration of the macro via the micro, in linking the particular to wider ‘systems of power’ (Harvey 1990, p6). It is critical, moreover, bringing the ‘how’ question to the fore: ‘the techniques and practices, rationalities and forms of knowledge, and identities and agencies by which governing operates’ (Dean 2010, p39).

Whilst such ethnography can take place wherever notional field sites meet, the Tanzanian case provides a neat microcosm of the reconstituting public, with the global inserted into the local in new and interesting ways. Burgeoning numbers of NGOs reconfigure around ascendant district centres, interacting with, mirroring and indeed co-producing the state in this forum. Bagamoyo in turn encapsulates recent development politics in Tanzania, housing ever-increasing numbers of prospectors, ‘for profit’ or otherwise. Its proximity to Dar in particular, alongside its autochthonous president has returned the ‘backwater’ of Bagamoyo to the spotlight, injecting considerable wealth but also inequalities and land pressures. Whilst a considerable amount of sifting was required through the district’s 124 registered NGOs, the study settled on primarily six active organizations as in-depth research subjects, each striving to legitimate their new or changing presence in innovative and adaptive ways.

The research embraced the hallmarks of ethnographic research, with negotiated, interactive observation of legitimation practice at its heart. This was duly supplemented by informal discussions, formal interviews and documentary evidence, however observation remained the driving force in understanding legitimation in the everyday. Analysis was a strongly iterative affair, present from the first day of ‘entry’ into Bagamoyo, giving shape and content to emergent practices against the wider thematic backdrop. This protracted, immersive process was not an easy one. I struggled to work
reflexively or indeed consistently as new ethical, emotional and mental demands presented themselves on a daily basis. At times, I contended with remaining anchored, especially as I began to see in myself the process I strove to observe in others. These trials and tribulations are common, airbrushed out of textbooks on doing research, yet particularly pronounced in this case given the topic of research. Nonetheless, this struggle only reiterated the truth that contemporary legitimation is the stuff of critical ethnography and critical ethnography the stuff of legitimation.
Chapter Three:  
Horizontal legitimation:  
Lateral thinking in Bagamoyo district

Development politics in Bagamoyo

Bagamoyo district is a microcosm of recent development politics in Tanzania. It is one of 127 administrative districts and of six in the coastal region Pwani. The district’s population has grown rapidly in the last decade, given its proximity to Dar es Salaam and its commuter belt sprawl (Dodworth 2014). This has brought a new wave of incomers, wealth and land pressures to an area characterized historically by migration, ethnic pluralism and aspiration as well as disparity (Allen 1981; Glassman 1995; Middleton 1992). Bagamoyo has recently proven popular for tourism, with sites relating to early Swahili culture, the ivory and infamous, if overstated, slave trades (Fabian 2013), as well as the missionary era. Last, but not least, Tanzania’s fourth president Jakaya Kikwete, who served two terms (2005-2015), hailed from the district. This returned Bagamoyo to the political limelight as state and non-state agencies mushroomed, building works sprang up and a new international port was steered into the region.58

The continuing mix of local and transient populations, tourists, students and development agencies has exacerbated the complexity of development activity in Bagamoyo, most recently with respect to NGOs. The historical significance and aesthetic of the town, as well as its proximity to Dar es Salaam, attracted a steady flow of ‘development entrepreneurs’ from both within and outside Tanzania looking to

58 Three quarters of NGOs in Bagamoyo registered after Kikwete entered office (based on a list of ‘active’ NGOs with known registration date). A large-scale, World Bank funded social security scheme was piloted in Bagamoyo as one of only three districts from 2008. An $11bn, Chinese funded international port in Mbegani was signed by the Chinese Premier in April 2013, set to eclipse the capacity of Dar and Mombasa combined.
establish operations. There were by 2013 124, almost entirely ‘local’,\textsuperscript{59} NGOs registered with the district council, serving a population of approximately 290,000. The majority of these, however, were not undertaking regular activities at the time of research, with less than half able to claim to have been ‘active’ over the course of fieldwork.\textsuperscript{60} Levels of activity, in turn, varied greatly within this group, with around a dozen with permanent operations and staffing.

This proliferation of very small NGOs competing for piecemeal pockets of funding, typically from the multilaterally funded Foundation for Civil Society, as well as the HIV/AIDS Rapid Funding Envelope,\textsuperscript{61} had thus contributed to this restructuring of the sector in Bagamoyo. There remained a sustained focus, therefore, on HIV/AIDS related activities as well as a movement towards the rubric of good governance, with its emphasis on accountability and community engagement, as in Tanzania more broadly (Mercer & Green 2013). The highest self-reported priority by Bagamoyo’s NGOs was thus in HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support (68%), followed by gender and thirdly group empowerment.\textsuperscript{62} Many organizations would combine their traditional focus, e.g. agriculture or savings cooperatives, with newly declared priorities in this regard, evidencing their multipositionality in this shifting environment. With the increase in registrations, institutional competition between active agencies in Bagamoyo was pronounced, with NGOs striving to craft superior claims to legitimate themselves to various audiences. The intensification of this work is rendered invisible by conventional project-based evaluative frameworks (Dodworth 2014; Mercer & Green 2013). This is particularly true of lateral legitimation practice, which cross-cuts the default verticalized logic of projects.

**Districtization and lateral legitimation in Bagamoyo**

\textsuperscript{59} Local, according to Tanzania’s 2002 NGO Act, is defined as operational in one district.

\textsuperscript{60} This drew on records from: the district council, civil society’s ‘umbrella’ association (CSA), donors and NGO self-reporting. 57 organizations were deemed active in having conducted activities in the previous year; a secretary and/or chairperson still undertaking administrative duties; a staffed, identifiable office. Interviews were conducted with senior representatives of 33 of these organizations.

\textsuperscript{61} Information available at <http://www.rapidfundingenvelope.org/about-rfe> (18 August 2016).

\textsuperscript{62} This is based on 38 active NGOs who self-reported their priorities to CSA 2012-13.
Legitimation, as expounded in the preceding chapters, is not simply about upwards ‘incorporation’ (Li 2013) into a global governmentality architecture; it holds substantive lateral as well as downward aspects. It is, in addition, an intrinsically partial socio-political process, ephemeral in its product of public authority. Such authority, via its legitimating claims of both entreaty and repudiation, is continually negotiated and contested by its intended audiences in the everyday. This obviously demands the insertion of the collective into its analysis, including contextualized social norms, thus yielding a broader encompassment. With this in mind, this chapter focuses on the lateral: the ‘district’ level in Bagamoyo. This is to embrace the full ethnographic impulse: looking laterally at the complex, overlapping multi-institutional environment in which NGOs negotiate and entrench their presence.

The motivation to explore a district level case study, as laid out in Chapter Two, is two-fold. The first is political in that Local Government Authorities, known as ‘the district’, are key administrative hubs, around which NGOs are increasingly centred. The second, as noted throughout the preceding chapters, is that empirical studies of NGOs tend to focus on their role within development hierarchies. This work focuses on the pronounced *verticality* of the development system. A recent case in point is Mercer and Green’s rigorous examination of the vertical ‘interstitial work’ that NGOs undertake between donors and those they work with (2013). There is, however, much in the way of lateral interstitial work as part of NGO legitimation practice. NGOs are as immersed laterally as they are vertically, which thus demands looking sideways as well as downwards at the multiplicity of institutions, actors and interactions that shape and constrain development activities. This 'noise' routinely filtered out through verticality is the very context within which NGOs negotiate and entrench their presence.

This lateral work, in legitimating themselves to other NGOs and, crucially, to local government, forms the empirical backbone of this chapter. It focuses on the claims that NGOs make in presenting themselves to interested outsiders, including myself. It includes legitimation vis-à-vis peers, including representatives of other NGOs, Bagamoyo’s umbrella civil society organization (the CSA) and, critically, to the district. The district, as will be explored, is a crucial gatekeeper in recognizing, legitimating, and indeed resourcing, district-based NGOs. The district Community Development Officer (CDO) controls access to the right meetings, consultations and, most importantly,
securing district staff participation in project activities. All of these are crucial for smaller NGOs’ prestige and, therefore, future funding prospects, demanding continual lateral legitimation within the district, as well as vertical towards potential donors. This district domain admits of situational hierarchies but the predominant aspect is one of lateral engagement between similarly positioned entities; it is negotiation, affirmation and repudiation as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699).

Data on lateral legitimation is derived from face to face meetings with representatives from over 30 organizations; observation in district inter-organizational meetings; training workshops; and the shadowing of NGO and local government visits. As laid out in the previous chapter, six key players emerged in the district as the most active from which the majority of interviews and observations are drawn, namely: Advocates International (AI); Voluntary Partnership International (VPI); Community Health; Youth Health (YH); Gender-Net; Eco-Coast (all pseudonyms, see Appendix C). Two of these organizations are formally international, but all six depend on international financing. Most of the organizations focus on health outcomes but also engage in ‘good governance’ and/or rights based work. Drawing from such, I curate these, mainly discursive, legitimation practices thematically in order to foreground the multiplicity of that process: its countervailing currents in the everyday.

Extensity: ‘we go to the communities’

In June 2012, I attended the debut of ‘Youth Health’ within one of the district’s key lateral forums: the quarterly meeting civil society organizations working on HIV/AIDS. It was attended by over a dozen organizations and chaired by district representatives. Whilst the purported aim was to improve coordination between organizations, the meeting had developed into a competitive forum in which to iterate organizations’ presence and profile, primarily through claims of extensity. One participating NGO Youth Health, as will be explored, had undergone a meteoric rise in the district, driven by the efforts of a development entrepreneur from Dar es Salaam. This manager thus spoke at length in the meeting, far longer than any other representative, uniquely furnishing attendees with a detailed written report. He emphasized the scale of their baseline study amongst 250
people designated most ‘at risk’; the preparatory training of their peer educators across all 22 wards; their distribution of T-shirts and information resources; and their claims of close collaboration, even partnership, with the district as well as key NGOs, including VPI and AI.  

This vignette, which will be revisited in more depth, neatly encapsulates the first legitimating strategy of NGOs that emerged from fieldwork: extensity. Extensity is the projection of scale as constituted in space and/or time. This admits of two identifiable, interrelated forms, which were recurrent themes throughout fieldwork: spatial extensity as projection of geographical scale and depth and temporal extensity as projection of longevity of presence.

The first form, regarding spatial extensity, resonates with long standing literature regarding the spatialized practices of (state) authority (e.g. Allen 2003; 2016; Engel & Nugent 2010; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Ruggie 1993; Sassen 2000; 2006; Sikor & Lund 2009) and, in turn, NGOs as adopters of such ‘state-like’ technologies of rule (Allen 2016; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006; Lund 2006a; 2011). NGO self-representation and claim-making with regards to working at scale and depth, in this case across Bagamoyo district, indeed deliberately invokes the omnipresence of the Tanzanian state. The state, whilst on the ebb since its socialist heyday, remains a highly intrusive instrument into many areas of social and political life. NGOs mimic the organizational structure of local government at district, ward and ultimately village-based levels. Their volunteers are drawn from these different levels, with trainings and seminars taking place at such and with organizations reporting regular monitoring and outreach activities within every ward. This projects an element of geographical ubiquity, or in Ferguson & Gupta’s words ‘encompassment’, (2002), working to align the NGO with the magnitude of existing state institutions. As Allen writes, regarding the construction of authority, ‘presence and proximity matter’ (2003, p3). Whilst there is a resonance, however, with ‘state-like’ spatial practices (see state), extensity is not reducible to the assumption of such characteristics. Indeed, it can also work in tension with the mechanics of the state itself.

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63 Fieldnotes from Kikao Cha Asasi Zinazojishughisha Na Masuala Ya Ukimwi (Meeting of Civil Society Concerned with HIV/AIDS), 15 June 2012.
The second, complementary form of extensity is temporal: the projection of an NGO’s continuity and presence over time. The interrelation of temporality with spatiality in legitimation is duly noted, as space itself provides the repository for the impression of the permanence of authority (Murariu 2012). Temporality thus interrelates with other forms of extensity, demonstrating viability and stability, reflecting and invoking that of the Tanzanian state given its endurance in, or indeed encompassment of, the post-colonial era. Nevertheless, as I return to, there is certain symbolic capital in simply surviving over time, and which may serve to differentiate oneself from more recent competitors. It is to ethnographies of the particular practices that comprise these two forms of extensity in the everyday that I now turn.

Spatial extensity: scale & depth
With regard to the projection of geographical ubiquity, this practice was neatly exemplified by the meteoric transformation of Youth Health (YH) during my fieldwork. YH’s transformation was chiefly the sum of the efforts of one, masters educated entrepreneur from Dar es Salaam, who used a dormant Bagamoyo NGO as a springboard for a proposal to Tanzania’s multi-nationally funded HIV/AIDS body: the Rapid Funding Envelope (RFE). Suddenly this new, hybrid NGO, which merged the entrepreneur’s existing ‘consultancy’ with the pre-existing NGO, became extremely visible at a district level over a very short period of time. No such NGO was so prominent as YH, for example, on entry into Bagamoyo town, with signs welcoming, or indeed almost ‘vetting’, new visitors to the district visible from every entry point (see Figure 3.1). The name of the organization has been obscured, but it sits alongside RFE’s branding and the content is reminiscent of government-sanctioned public health campaigns.

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In its office, Youth Health’s newly inscribed organizational structure was displayed as deeply interwoven with various district, ward and village level governmental institutions, with their voluntary ‘peer educators’ inserted at every level (see Figure 3.2). YH’s peer educators appeared under the district appointed ‘Ward Executive Officers’ (WEO). Community Change Agents (CCAs), rather confusingly, ‘belonged’ to another organization (Community Health) but featured in the chart under the district-appointed ‘Village Executive Officer’ (VEO). These lines did not, in practice, represent a reporting hierarchy but comprised a claim to an institutionalized relationship, scaffolded by pre-existing structures.
In addition, YH’s senior staff claimed to be fully operational in each and every one of the district’s 22 wards via a large number of stakeholders, volunteers and collaborators on the project, with the district council cited as its preeminent partner. The organization’s key protagonist, the MBA-qualified consultant from Dar, built interpersonal relations via the funding envelope, forging a rapid association with the national HIV/AIDS governing body, TACAIDS, at a regional level. By these means, he gained a foothold into TACAIDS’ district level monitoring team, meaning he paid monitoring visits to other HIV and health-related NGOs in Bagamoyo within months of his arrival. These developments were much to the consternation of other, longer established NGOs as to this entrepreneur’s credentials and authority to evaluate the work of others.

These interpersonal dynamics disclosed something of the undulating, situational hierarchies that form between ‘peers’. They form part of Lund’s ‘countervailing currents’ whereby NGOs, and indeed the district council, both entreat and repudiate

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65 Fieldnotes from Community Health Office, 20 July 2012.
67 Interview 54, VPI Country Director, 11 December 2012.
peers in an ongoing process of legitimation and contestation. This process, and extensity’s role in such, came so strongly to the fore within the district’s quarterly meeting on HIV/AIDS of the opening vignette. Whilst the aim was to improve coordination, the meeting had developed into a somewhat competitive forum in which organizations iterated their presence and profile. Despite being quarterly, members invariably reintroduced themselves in detail, as if for the first time, emphasizing scale of operations, year of registration and so on, in a show of spatio-temporal extensity. This ritual far outweighed that of reviewing action points from previous meetings or preparing new ones. Indeed, its cyclical nature had led higher profile NGOs to begin sending junior representatives as placeholders. Evidently, this forum afforded different opportunities to different players.

Youth Health’s opening gambit, their first appearance, thus involved a laboured and detailed statistical component regarding recent activities. It detailed precise numbers, for example, of Commercial Sex Workers, bar and migrant workers. This conveyed scale and presence, in contrast to smaller players who struggled to give detailed accounts. Claims of partnership with the district and with larger NGOs aimed to embed Youth Health as part of the institutional furniture, but also having been vetted and affirmed as a ‘serious’ player. In contrast to this move to entreat key players, however, there came their inevitable repudiation. YH had, as noted, negotiated to monitor key players such as long-established INGO Voluntary Partnership International (VPI) as part of TACAIDS’ team. Its focus on mobilizing ‘youth’, as well as stigmatized populations, formed part of its self-differentiation, even though all HIV-related organizations attempted to work with these groups. Some of YH’s claims were thus taken to task in the meeting by more established, vocal members, particularly VPI and the Civil Society Association. Such claims were also disavowed in subsequent informal discussions.68

Whilst YH’s upward vertical legitimation was strong, therefore, evidenced by its profile within and insertion into TACAIDS, its lateral legitimation floundered under the scrutiny of its guarded peers.

In a similar vein, Youth Health’s projection of extensity did not bear scrutiny from the perspectives of those with whom it purported to work, as detailed in subsequent chapters. YH’s staff were starkly absent from the ward and village levels and, indeed, the

68 VPI Country Director op cit. Fieldnotes from discussion with AI representative 26 May 2013.
organization as a whole was seen to circumvent normal government protocols, in contrast to Figure 3.2’s representation. Nevertheless, the organization’s positioning between regional and district levels had enabled it to gain a seat at the district table, the ear of key staff and to garner a sense of scale considerably larger than its operational reality. This form of projection was not unique to this particular organization, but YH’s new manager was particularly skilled in this respect over a short period. The rapid, extensive injection of funds into this previously dormant organization had of course also served to amplify its influence in the district. The point, however, is that one is not reducible to the other; in addition, certain forms of legitimation, such as claims to extensity, may bolster funding bids in the future.

Other NGOs in the district similarly projected extensity by representing themselves as ubiquitous both at scale across the district and in depth through their ability to ‘go to the communities’. It was, during introductory meetings with NGOs, very common to hear managers claim, as Youth Health, to be ‘active’ in every one of Bagamoyo’s 22 wards or, in some cases, its 97 villages (often used synonymously with community). This was also reflected in district council records, whereby roughly half of Bagamoyo’s established NGOs claimed to be operational in all wards. In addition to written records, scale and depth might be further represented, for example, by district-wide map displays in the NGO’s office, with pins representing a ward or village administrative centre or volunteer. Indeed, one NGO staff member, who was also the CSA chair, suggested that the scale and depth of NGOs at times surpassed the state’s armoury itself:

NGOs can reach areas that government cannot reach…so the government needs to stop seeing NGOs as their competitors.

This depiction, as in the case of Youth Health, seldom bore scrutiny in that no NGO, even those well-resourced, sustained coverage on a scale that surpassed the district. When taken to task on the claim, given their lack of visible presence on the ground, NGOs would typically claim outreach facilitated by virtue of their membership structure, via local volunteers or via partnership with local government or other member organizations. In addition, in terms of the value NGOs themselves placed on the need

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69 The District Council list of NGOs dated 2012 listed around half (32) as operational in all 16 wards (the number of wards has since increased to 22) (District Council, 2012).
70 Interview 1, chairperson of Bagamoyo Civil Society Association, 23 March 2012.
to ‘go to the communities’, there was a clearly perceived pecking order between NGOs who could realistically claim to be doing so regularly, even in part, and those without the capacity, strategy or intent to maintain a strong village-level presence. NGOs ranged from those deemed ‘serious’ by government staff to ‘seasonal’ or ‘briefcase’ NGOs, which remained the summation of one entrepreneur’s efforts, documents and indeed claim-making.71

The ability to ‘go to the villages’ was thus a critical, and indeed closely guarded, legitimation device. The criticality of this depth was encapsulated by a recent phenomenon, common across major NGOs in Bagamoyo, whereby each NGO had at least one of ‘their own’ trained volunteer at the village level. The claim was that a locally based representative for that NGO, selected for their affinity with the NGO’s values or perceived capacity for the ‘work’, could advocate for change in their communities from ‘within’. At the same time, this claim-making conveyed elements of consent and reciprocation from the community concerned, in that engagement is ‘voluntary’ but also institutionalized. In practice, as explored under voluntarism, village-level volunteers are inherently problematic, have a poor selection process and/or are hindered by the village leadership in their advocacy efforts. Nevertheless, the practice resounded clearly with an increasing depth of NGO presence and an emphasis on their community-facing aspect.

Bagamoyo’s most established INGO, Voluntary Partnership International (VPI), was strongly legitimated by its scale and depth in going ‘to the community’ across the district over time. As its (outgoing) programme coordinator iterated:

> For the organization it has been started to work now many years, like since…in Bagamoyo I can say since 2004…And their strategy was to provide education to the community so the community, they understand the problem of HIV, the consequences and all things involved in HIV and AIDS because already the community was already vulnerable for HIV and AIDS and for them…maybe the lack of knowledge, the lack of education, knowledge and skills on understanding the problem.72

The country director had similar comments on VPI’s ethos:

> We are looking always for the partnership from the community; yes of course the district but even at the grass-root level, so you know this process takes time.73

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71 Interview 23, senior district administrator, 20 August 2012.
72 Interview 27, (outgoing) VPI programme coordinator, 10 October 2012, English verbatim, emphasis in original.
73 Interview 54, VPI Country Director, op cit., December 2012, emphasis in original.
The extensity of VPI’s operations was implicit in its iterative narrative of ‘the community’ and ‘grassroots’. Part of this resonates with the idea of the grassroots as ‘virtuous location’ (Mindry 2001), whereby the village or community is continually reconstructed as devoid of the corrupt and politicking processes which characterise the higher echelons of power. For VPI, however, it was as much the actual extensity of its operations as its location, outstripping all other organizations. As one of its programme officers iterated:

Our old approach [training centrally] did not work. They [the beneficiaries] weren’t serious – they could just be three weeks staying at home. No one was going there, no one was monitoring. That is why we have decided to bring the training here: to the village. 74

Thus VPI’s programme officers spoke often, not without pride, of their resolve to visit each of Bagamoyo’s 97 villages at least once a year: its 22 wards at least once a quarter. One programme officer claimed of one particularly remote ward Talawanda, seen as an outpost in Bagamoyo due to poor access, that it’s ‘only us [VPI] and government’. 75 This claim was not true as Advocates International, as outlined in the next section, had a growing, territorialized presence in Talawanda. The point in hand, however, is that VPI’s unparalleled geographical extensity in the district, and its supporting claims, allowed it to differentiate itself from the glut of newer NGOs clustered around Bagamoyo town and its peri-urban areas.

VPI’s tenacity and depth of presence was clearly acknowledged and endorsed ‘laterally’ by district representatives, who reliably cited the organization as a bastion of good practice. As the district Community Development Officer remarked of the influx of Dar-based NGOs:

Can we entail the development agenda reflecting to the people towards the grassroots? To me it’s a major focus. So the question is does this non-governmental organization work…direct to the community?

He then responded to his own question, picking out VPI as a good example, as opposed to Advocates International (AI), the other international NGO in the district:

…VPI, if you can see, it also tries to work with the community initiative…they are engaging with the community plans because we need…if you are organized you should focus to the community problems, community plan, so empower the community [to] come up with their plans, that is a good process. Also maybe AI, these international

74 Interview 26, VPI programme officer, 4 October 2012, English verbatim, emphasis added.
75 Fieldnotes, 24th July 2012.
organizations, they are trying to come up, to go through, but they have…also agenda, their own agenda, their own programmes. 76

Interestingly, VPI was as international in form as AI, but had managed to ‘localize’ itself more effectively in the eyes of the district, primarily through the extensity of its outreach. This was in spite of, in the eyes of the CDO, originally coming to Bagamoyo from Zanzibar in a similarly tactical bid to extend outreach. Clearly, the CDO had misgivings regarding the strategic moves of NGOs to bolster extensity artificially without the requisite depth. This was, for him, manifest in the more recent influx of development entrepreneurs from Dar, where he noted:

It is a challenge. They are coming from the central [national level] to introduce themselves that, okay, they wish to work. They are requesting to work with the district. So we say “okay, we have about ninety seven villages. Not in this headquarter, there in the grassroots, so we wish you to go over there. That is our concern. And if you could even open an office there, maybe at ward level, because it is reflected with the community development, so it is better go there.” So when they introduce, sometimes they are saying they are just finding their resources, they never come. But we don’t have chances because they are in Dar es Salaam, most of them coming from Dar es Salaam, coming in Bagamoyo. 77

Nonetheless, whatever the perceived motives behind VPI’s extension to Bagamoyo in 2004, the organization was now clearly acknowledged and accepted as a government ally, as explored under state. Its extensity, however, formed a key element of this, rather than its mantra of community empowerment, as it was far from clear that either local government or VPI had a genuinely ‘bottom up’ approach to developing strategic plans. Other, more junior, CDOs shared this perception of VPI’s laudable outreach:

VPI I can see they work well because they get to that level of the community, right down at that level of the citizens. 78

Clearly, VPI had successfully legitimated itself in the eyes of the district and other key actors as a highly ‘localized’ NGO, with a scale and depth of presence that outstripped all others. This had helped to differentiate the organization at a district but also, as will be explored in Chapter Five, in remote areas like Kibindu. This is not, however, to argue its approach as therefore ‘bottom-up’: quite the contrary. Rather, that extensity through scale and depth across the district is itself a key legitimation device.

76 Interview 20, district Community Development Officer, 14 August 2012, English verbatim, emphasis in original.
77 Ibid.
78 Interview 61, district Community Development Officer for gender, 23 April 2013, emphasis in original.
Temporal extensity: continuity in time

There is additionally a substantial amount of capital garnered from longevity alone: the ‘latent legitimation’ derived from institutional continuity (Packenham 1970). This in a sense presumes other forms of legitimation through a proven ability to endure and negotiate unpredictable environments over time. The timeframe of NGO activity is relatively short in Bagamoyo, as in Tanzania more broadly. Nevertheless, representatives from NGOs formed before 2006, which is approximately less than a quarter of NGOs formally registered in Bagamoyo, were quick to emphasise their year of establishment. This was often accompanied by documentary evidence in the form of registration certificates framed on the wall and on file.

2006 formed a watershed as the first full year of Kikwete’s presidency, marking a subsequent mushrooming of NGO registrations in his home district of Bagamoyo. Some informants claimed that indirect or covert presidential influence bolstered aid flow to the district, although it was difficult to trace this influence in practice. Either way, these select NGOs worked to distance themselves from the glut of ‘opportunistic’ development enterprises that entered the market under more favourable conditions. Claims to longevity harked to a time of more genuine developmental need and positioned these NGOs as pioneers: ‘we were one of the first’; ‘we started on benches’. It were as if such NGOs were rooted in a more virtuous time, as well as space. These discursive practices were again further validated by ageing evidence of reports, photographs and strategic plans displayed on office walls.

The manager of hybrid Youth Health also emphasized its continuity under the previously dormant organization registered in 2008, which was still relatively early in Bagamoyo’s registration curve. He emphasized this pedigree, stating ‘[the now] Youth Health has been working since 2008, working on many issues.’ This claim served as a backstop to its concurrent claims of youthfulness and innovation. As noted, resurrecting a dormant organization was a useful strategy in securing funding by conveying institutional continuity and experience. Nevertheless, the organization was often derided

79 77% of NGOs in Bagamoyo have registered since Kikwete’s tenure in 2005. This figure is based on a list of 63 ‘active’ NGOs, 43 of which have a known registration date, 33 of those registered in 2006 or after.
80 Interview 7, Programme Manager, Community Health, 14 June 2012.
81 Ibid.
82 Interview 17, Youth Health Programme Manager, 27 July 2012.
in the district as inexperienced, rejecting any claims of longevity. In response to the chaotic organization of YH’s first district-level awareness event, in addition to its questionable decision to hire erotic ‘kanga moja’ dancers in this conservative area, brought in from Dar, most organizations mocked YH’s immaturity, laughing ‘they are still young – they don’t know! They will learn!’

Latent temporal legitimation was clear in how the more established AI distinguished themselves, in contrast with the less favourable characterizations coming from the district:

But also it depends who you are engaging, what times, are you one of NGO, you are based in Dar you come to Bagamoyo and do a meeting for one day and you are never seen until next year? I think those are the ones who are facing a lot of problems. But for those like AI who have continued and we stay there and we know the people we engage with every day, we know how we started with them, we know how we work with them – I find it very simple! They know very well how much we pay and it is consistent, we will never say ‘no, this is not what we want’. So I think there are two different dynamics in Bagamoyo. There are a lot of NGOs that are ‘one off’ and there are very few NGOs that are living and working in Bagamoyo consistently; those [who do live in Bagamoyo] I don’t think face a lot of problems.

AI therefore, as one of the largest district players, likewise presented themselves as consistent and rooted in Bagamoyo, with longevity bolstering claims of representation. As the national policy officer commented, interweaving representation with longevity:

Because we are a national organization…we are just a member to the international federation - that makes a difference. But also we have been working for some time, it’s not a new area that we’re just coming in.

Similarly, in response to a question as to whether having so few employees from the Bagamoyo district raised any challenges in its work, a senior manager of the long-established Eco-Coast replied:

But we’ve been working here for fifteen years! They say ‘Ah! You are Eco-Coast! You are one of us!’

This presentation of Eco-Coast, however, as will be explored, was not reflected in the coastal communities where the organization worked, given that it waxed and waned in

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83 *Kanga moja* means a single wrap, or ‘*kanga*’, worn, suggesting provocation when dancing.
84 Interview 49, Community Health Project Manager, 29 November 2012.
85 Interview 52, AI Programmes Coordinator, 6 December 2012, English verbatim, emphasis in original.
86 Interview 84, AI national policy officer, 26 September 2013, emphasis in original.
87 Interview 45, Programme Manager, Eco-Coast.
its project implementation. Formal longevity, therefore, is insufficient to backstop claims of continuity, scale or depth in practice. Depending on funding fortunes, an NGO may experience periods of expansion, remission or indeed complete dormancy, leading to one senior district administrator to pronounce most of Bagamoyo NGOs as ‘seasonal workers’.\(^{88}\) Indeed, formalization as an NGO \textit{per se} is a relatively new form of legitimation for development entrepreneurship. It was previously more common for organizations to register as a Community Based Organization (CBO) through the Ministry of Home Affairs until the late 1990s, when the process became relatively cumbersome and expensive.\(^{89}\)

Development entrepreneurs, however, were of course aware of the dilution effect on the NGO ‘brand’ given the rapid influx of newcomers. One such manager, running an early learning centre in some form since 1998, eventually rejected registration as an NGO \textit{to distance himself} from the district council. This was an unusual bucking of the trend through his attempt to remove his organization from the perceived politicking and grey, if not corrupt, practices of the recent NGO sector in Bagamoyo.\(^{90}\) It was a differentiation that this manager made clear to me, as well as to his existing and potential donors. He nevertheless keenly emphasized his initiative’s longevity \textit{outside} of the NGO mainstream back to 1998. The vast majority of NGOs, however, in the absence of such pedigree, sought to ratify themselves as NGOs as quickly as possible in order to access other forms of symbolic capital.

To summarise, the projection of extensity is one valuable form of symbolic capital, manifest in spatial and/or temporal forms. NGOs work hard to give the impression both that they are substantively greater than they are but also that they are embedded within the district’s institutional furniture. Clearly, extensity overlaps with other forms of legitimation: through its mimicry of the state’s machinery, through claims of \textbf{representation} and of course, \textbf{material resource}, which can conditionally buy a seat at the table. The point, however, is that none of these forms of legitimation is solely reducible to another. Well-resourced NGOs do not always successfully legitimate

\(^{88}\) Interview 23, Senior district administrator, 20 August 2012.

\(^{89}\) Fieldnotes discussion with Secretary Bagamoyo CSA. Fees to register as an NGO with the district were approximately £17, versus £41 as a CBO at the time of research.

\(^{90}\) Interview 22, Director of Bagamoyo Education trust, 18 August 2012.
themselves, whilst smaller NGOs may manage to purchase greater influence than their bottom line figure first suggests.

**Territoriality: ‘it is an AI village’**

Territoriality, as the, often exclusionary, creation and control of boundaries, provided a recurring theme in how development entrepreneurs represented spatial relationships. This included claims to be comparatively active and institutionally embedded within particular districts, wards or villages over others. NGOs regularly made claims to such domains, playing on boundaries of inclusion and exclusion at different times to different audiences. This form of territoriality can either bolster or disrupt the flow of other legitimation. Territoriality and representation, for example, may bolster each other in that an NGO’s positioning as more closely aligned with the needs of one community, village or ward works to the exclusion of another. At the same time, therefore, the move to territorialize within a district, thus conceding the non-representation of others, can disrupt claims of extensity across it. These NGOs, therefore, as non-state actors, regularly enacted practices that invoked and maintained exclusionary ‘turfs’ (2009, p14), lending a strongly territorial dimension to their claim-making.

This resonates with a growing body of work that challenges territoriality as exclusive purview of the state. Territory and territoriality are conventionally, if not quintessentially, considered state domains in its efforts to retain sovereignty in a globalizing world. Sack's ground-breaking sociology of territoriality, however, argued convincingly the traditional conceptual armoury around state sovereignty to be overly restrictive. Such practices are rather part of broader human strategies to affect, influence and control the behaviour of others (1986, p2; also Agnew 1994; 2005; Lund 2006a; Sassen 2000; 2006; Sikor & Lund 2009). The creation and control of boundaries is the 'primary spatial form power takes' (Sack 1986, p26) and is therefore related to extensity in creating and maintaining geographical sub-spheres of influence. Whilst extensity is characterized by ubiquity and universality, however, territoriality is rather the enactment

91 See Agnew’s (1994) eminent critique of IR’s foundational texts such as Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* and Keohane’s *After Hegemony*. 
of particularity and exclusivity: the creation of constituencies within the state architecture who bear further claim-making. As Sikor and Lund argue, ‘[b]y making and enforcing boundaries, by creating a turf…different socio-political institutions invoke a territorial dimension to their claims of authority’ (2009, p14). NGOs thus create such bounded constituencies, bolstered by claims of representation, then work to ‘fold them in’ (Allen 2016).

NGOs thus regularly performed territorial claims at a district, ward, village and sub-village level. In one case, the prestigious AI’s Programme Coordinator, narrating his organization’s relationship with Kiharaka village (the focus of Chapter Four), claimed his organization helped to found the very village itself the previous year: ‘you can say it is an AI village’. He explained that, with AI’s help, this village split from its parent village and had become a leading light of participatory democracy and a model for others.92 The village literally became AI’s poster child, providing case study material for glossy newsletters. The AI programme team continued to emphasise this ‘special relationship’ over my time in the field. It visited this village far more frequently than others. It was the selected site for key awareness events, meetings and, in one case, as part of its strategic review. As I explore in the next chapter, this relationship was validated to some extent by village residents, although not always perceived in the same terms.

Whilst this dynamic was rather exceptional, and exaggerated to some degree by AI, it was common to see smaller organizations stake such claims to unique, often exclusive relationships with particular groups at particular levels. The Community Health manager, for example, whose organization was somewhat under threat due to lack of funding, exclaimed ‘sorry – but these are my people’, when highlighting the challenge of multiple organizations staking multiple claims within a particular village or ward.93 His claim also suggested something of a more established relationship over time, crafting an impression of authority and control but at the same time that this authority was authenticated by his subjects. The NGO’s presence had been successfully vetted by their desired constituency, infusing the idea of territoriality with that of consent. This was

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92 Interview 52, Advocates International programme coordinator, 6 December 2012.
93 Interview 7, Community Health programme manager, 14 June 2012.
strongly apparent in the comments of a similarly-sized agricultural NGO, with the programme officer emphasizing:

I have been working with the same people for a long time…when I call them and say ‘come’, they come!  

This claim was made in a bid to illustrate what set his organization apart from more recent imitators. Whilst the comment is brief, the themes of longevity, but also territoriality and exclusivity with regard to a working, consenting constituency within a particular village were apparent. These themes were also discernible in a longer interview with the Community Health manager, whereby territoriality regarding a particular village constituency was taken to the point of exclusivity with regard to other NGOs:

The selection of the CCAs [Community Change Agents] was given to the communities. When we started working with village health workers there were very few, so we added CCAs. But then other NGOs went to work with people in the villages they chose the same person! Village leaders say ‘why every day is it the same person? Why are you milking the same cow?’

The same manager, exacerbated by his organization’s lack of funding, grew angrier on this topic over my time in the field. In response to the organization Kidz entering CH’s domain of Most Vulnerable Children, he exclaimed:

Kidz make me sick, because every district has their own community-based organization to perform these activities, so how can an organization come from another area where they don’t know the context and the culture?...Our volunteers were told to work with Kidz and must stop working with others so I asked them ‘why don’t you train your own people!’

This manager’s frustration at being usurped from his turf by an organization from another district was arguably valid. This unease over access to recruits more generally, however, with whom NGOs have invested time and resource, was common amongst smaller NGOs more broadly. Certainly, Kidz may have stood to benefit from using volunteers who had been previously trained multiple times in reporting the impact of its programme. What is interesting about these comments, however, was that they focused more on inter-organizational turf politics than the volunteers themselves. As I explore, volunteers had mixed feelings about working with multiple organizations, not always

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94 Interview 19, Agricultural cooperative programme officer, 2 August 2012.
95 Interview 7, Community Health programme manager.
96 Interview 7, CH programme manager, 14 June 2012.
negative, and certainly did not see themselves as exclusively aligned with, or ‘belonging’ to, one organization over another.

Territoriality, in the sense of drawing boundaries, or delimiting turf, also existed between perceived administrative levels. The extensive ability, indeed the right, to ‘go to the communities’ has been explored as a closely guarded resource. Community Health’s manager was similarly aggrieved by the incursion of Bagamoyo’s umbrella organization CSA:

You know, I suggest you advise the CSA to focus on their role, which is to access funds with which to build the capacity of NGOs, not to go to the communities.97

CSA, in turn, voiced similar concerns at the encroachment of international players like AI:

What are AI doing now? There is something wrong with how AI are working. They are skipping a level, going directly to the grassroots!98

Yet international organizations like AI and VPI counter-claimed the local for themselves:

Before [VPI’s project] there is no one at the grassroots who can support the people grassroots to reach their rights.99

This VPI programme coordinator suggested that it is only VPI who ‘use the community as they are working at grassroots level’.100 ‘International’ and local organizations alike, therefore, sought to delimit their geopolitical purview of claim-making, retaining the critical domain of the local for themselves. Indeed, VPI replicated this differentiation at different scales, with the director commenting on their unequal participation in a supposed ‘national’ coalition:

Sometimes, you know, they have a name…but for us we are a local NGO and I also feel this even in the national network, for example we are in the network for gender, CSO Gender Coalition is the name. Sometimes, and there are Concern, AI, Care, who else - all these big organization [that are] then also local but sometimes I feel just that

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97 Interview 7, Community Health programme manager, 14 June 2012. This was in reference to CSA’s new initiative dating from May 2012 funded nationally to arrange midhahalo (debates) on good governance and accountability at ward level.
98 Interview 18, CSA secretary, 1 August 2012.
99 Interview 26, VPI programme officer, English verbatim, 4 October 2012.
100 Interview 27, VPI programme coordinator, 10 October 2012.
they are doing their jobs and then they try to fill in the gaps involving you. It’s not a real work as a coalition.\textsuperscript{101}

For enterprising new organizations, such as the revived Youth Health, territoriality over domains was less concerned with previous investments of resource as with staking territorialized claims indirectly, via exclusive knowledge and access of particular groups. The manager, as noted, emphasized the depth of the organization’s baseline study of those most at risk to HIV infection (MARP) in Bagamoyo, such as bar workers, Commercial Sex Workers (CSW), substance users and migrant workers. He stressed the ‘ethnomethodology’ used in accessing these populations in ‘sitting at their tables’, identifying 50 CSWs, 70 bar workers, 80 migrant workers and 50 intravenous drug users across primarily urban or peri-urban areas in the district (Youth Health Baseline Study, June 2012). As such, this methodology and its resulting ‘knowledge’ constituted a unique claim to understanding these particular groups:

I know these people! I understand their behaviour.

This claim, highly authoritative in nature, underpinned further license to intervene extensively into others’ lives:

If I want to change these people, I need to diversify their income.\textsuperscript{102}

This remark divulges something of the sense of power and control of this particular manager, in this case founded on a purported exclusive access to particular groups. This baseline study, however, as explored in representation, and the knowledge claims thereof, did not demonstrate the rigour and nuance implied, indeed recycling tropes of behaviour associated with Bagamoyo and the Swahili coast. What was clear, however, was that this entrepreneur staked a boundary around his association with these groups, to the exclusion of others.

Similarly, territoriality manifested itself in a degree of jockeying over partner ‘grassroots’ membership and/or community-based organizations (CBOs). Whilst there had obviously been a glut of organizations positioning themselves in this way, there were really only two key, district-wide membership organizations that had become part of the

\textsuperscript{101} Interview 54, VPI Country Director, December 2012, emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{102} Interview 17, Youth Health programme manager, 27 July 2012, emphasis in original.
civil society architecture. The first was the HIV/AIDS organization *UWAMABA*, the second was Gender-Net - a women’s network. Both organizations were membership-based, providing advocacy, micro-credit initiatives, training and other services. Whilst Gender-Net is dealt with in more detail under representation, it is to influence over UWAMABA I turn.

UWAMABA was founded in 2006, claiming over 700 members, and was more recently endorsed and supported within the local government infrastructure (which awarded it a limited budget). Given this pedigree, there was a level of competition for organizations to embed partnership relations with UWAMABA, who arguably held a high degree of both perceived extensity and representation. UWAMABA was frequently cited by entrepreneurs soliciting incorporation, such as Youth Health and Community Health, as a key partner. Such claims could potentially generate symbolic capital from the representation of people living with HIV/AIDS, and as such were more prevalent in self-descriptions than could be realistically substantiated.

Despite multiple players claiming partnerships with UWAMABA, however, the organization was going through a turbulent period with uncertain funding, meaning travel to the villages had been impossible. It had gone from being relatively in demand, at the height of both VPI and AI’s HIV/AIDS care and prevention work, to being quietly abandoned by AI in 2011, as well as facing growing hesitation from VPI as to its dependency. VPI was paramount in UWAMABA’s inception, as part of its crafting nascent ‘civil society’ after its arrival in 2004. UWAMABA had remained historically quite reactive in either awaiting solicitations for partnerships from external organizations with funding, or via its role as a popular placement for overseas volunteers. When I asked the director, for example, as to future plans for the organization, he gestured to two American volunteers, working with the new programme coordinator, shrugging ‘I don’t know – they are working on it’.

As UWAMABA had thus been formed as part of others’ objectives, it had struggled in upward incorporation (Li 2013) towards becoming an organization in its own right. The hierarchy between it and prospective funding organizations remained pronounced, with

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103 UWAMABA (*Umoja wa Watu Wanaoishi na VVU - Matumaini - Bagamoyo*) stands for United People Living with Hope in Bagamoyo.

104 Interview 12, UWAMABA Technical Officer, 20 July 2012.

105 UWAMABA technical officer, *op cit.*
the coordinator pleading ‘we are working down here’ in a bid of authenticity but also lack of resources, amid protracted and circular conversations as to who was responsible for the organization’s growth.¹⁰⁶ VPI was voicing increasing frustrations that the organization still did not have the means to sustain itself. Advocates International’s quiet but sudden abandonment of UWAMABA from 2011 had left its once advertised partner in difficulty: ‘our work is now hard; we have only our office running costs’,¹⁰⁷ still underwritten by VPI with some irritation.

Territoriality can thus also manifest itself indirectly in jockeying and politicking over local partners. In this particular case the interrelationship between extensity and such practices is laid bare. Organizations are in effect bidding for exclusive forms of extensity and indeed representation. In this vein, AI was moving, somewhat counterintuitively, from its own extensive strategy, in which UWAMABA played a part in bolstering scale, towards a more selective, territorialized approach. This mirrored, as explored under state, its movement away from welfare and service provision, primarily in the area of HIV/AIDS, towards a ‘governance’ and accountability focus. This entailed the assumption of a more antagonistic stance vis-à-vis local government. In the words of their national policy officer:

As we changed our modelling into the new strategy…our main principle is to work within the human rights based approach. For it’s more empowering the communities and for the communities to take actions, rather than us being there and providing services.¹⁰⁸

In this vein, AI was becoming particularly involved in the issue of land, namely the dark underbelly of land appropriation in Tanzania by big business and rich individuals. This meant the organization had become focused around three or four ‘hotspots’ in Bagamoyo, including the village of Kiharaka, with which it claimed its ‘special relationship’, as well as the more remote ward of Talawanda. Interestingly, Talawanda was claimed by VPI and local government as not served by any other organization and yet AI consistently claimed a territorialized presence, as an exclusive champion of local residents’ land rights. AI began visiting the ward regularly, as well as successfully

¹⁰⁶ Fieldnotes from VPI, district and UWAMABA coordination meeting, 9 October 2012.
¹⁰⁷ Ibid.
¹⁰⁸ Interview 84, AI national policy manager, English verbatim, 26 September 2013.
advocating for villagers from the ward to be included in a parallel business entrepreneurial project, initially focused on more urban areas.\textsuperscript{109}

The territorality of AI’s approach, demarcating exclusionary boundaries within which it made \textbf{representative} claims, supported its increasingly issue-based advocacy and vice versa. It worked to identify where its strategic campaign issues, at international and national levels, had most local resonance. This then generated the case study and ‘real life’ empirical material it required to further stoke campaigns and pressure nationally. Its disengagement from direct service delivery, and therefore its natural complementarity with some \textbf{state} functions, no longer demanded a projection of presence that mimicked the Tanzanian state architecture. It sought instead to establish smaller enclaves within which to intensify and personalize relations and from which to springboard particular issues. Indeed, its new, reactive ‘free radical’ approach drew fire from peers, with VPI’s director commenting dryly of AI’s coordinator: ‘yes, I know, he is always busy on his laptop’.\textsuperscript{110}

To summarize, NGOs regularly exercise direct territorial claims over geographical, administrative or thematic domains. Territoriality manifests itself indirectly, as the visible incorporation of some groups as well as the attendant exclusion of others. The iterative demarcation of spheres of influence is thus a highly spatialized form of power (Sack 1986), although it is of course continually contested by peers and from below. Territoriality, therefore, as a recurrent but inherently partial practice, is not merely an inevitable outcome of smaller budgets, nor conversely extensity an intrinsic part of growing an organization’s portfolio and profile. Territoriality, therefore, is linked to \textbf{representation}, just as extensity links to the \textbf{state}, but neither is reducible to the other. Rather extensity and its counterpoint territoriality are particular legitimation devices that may be embraced or negated as the situation demands.

\textbf{Working state capital: ‘the government gives us identity’}

\textsuperscript{109} Interview 82, AI programme coordinator, 1 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{110} Interview 54, VPI Programme Director, 11 December 2012.
Working relations with the ‘template’ of the state, an institution that looms large in the Tanzania, formed one of the starkest and variable forms of non-state legitimation. Whilst the distinction between ‘state’ and ‘society has proven an enduring one in social science, these findings add to the growing corpus of work that blurs this divide, in Africa and beyond. Actors straddle this divide, garnering symbolic capital from both. This does not mark a continuing trend away from studying state institutions ‘at close quarters’, which Nugent noted as a concern (2009, p8). Rather, it is possible to study how institutions are constituted by foregrounding ‘state-like’ practices (Lund 2011, p75; also Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006; echoing Abrams’ ‘state-idea’ 1988 [1977], p79), undertaken by a broader range of actors. In this way, the study of self-proclaimed ‘civil society’, most vociferously NGOs, is not at the expense of conventional state-focused scholarship but is indicative of how the two are intertwined: how both are ‘reproduced through time and space’ (Nugent 2009, p8).

These changing dynamics will be explored by focusing on the two international NGOs: AI and VPI. To hypothesise, one might expect that when NGOs focus on public service delivery, welfare and civic engagement/responsibility, they are more likely to highlight a positive relationship (‘partner’) with local government and national policy: taking state-led development to the people. However, when the object of development intervention focuses on areas related to the good governance agenda (e.g. human rights, accountability and transparency), the focus is on representing/mediating local ‘demand’ to realise rights (‘advocate’): taking people-led development to the state. There was certainly evidence of such a division between VPI and AI practices whereby, true to form, VPI forcefully projected its partnership with the district council as AI increasingly distanced itself.

The point, however, is that such practices are fluid and not ‘locked in’. This state/society division is not fixed in time and space, but rather their imagined distance reproduced in everyday practices (Ferguson & Gupta 2002). This geography forms a crucial and continuing part of the political imagination in Tanzania (Dill 2013; Green 2010; 2014; Schneider 2006). The (re)production of distance, as explored in representation, forms part of how NGOs iteratively locate and position themselves,

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111 A reminder that there is little daylight between ‘government’ and the organs of the ‘state’ in Tanzania, with government (serikali) proving the default linguistic referent.
although this positionality is always temporary. Indeed, NGOs may draw on both kinds of relations to legitimate themselves in different contexts, as these two case studies disclose.\footnote{112}

\textit{Voluntary Partnership International: ‘50\% government’}

For Voluntary Partnership International (VPI), \textit{extensity}, \textit{voluntarism} and ‘community’ rhetoric marked key legitimation claims. Such devices, however, were problematic and inconsistent in their application. Most relevant here was the tension between ‘voluntarism’, as conventionally associated with civil society in the West, and VPI’s positioning with the Tanzanian government and its ability to compel. The close alignment with the district council was highly apparent in how VPI presented itself both laterally and vertically downward to key stakeholders and audiences. Its partnership with local government was imprinted on the side of its 4x4 vehicles; they frequently travelled and conducted training with district staff; they had a joint planning mechanism; and, uniquely, its calls for meetings and seminars to villages were issued by letter from the district Community Development office. This close relationship formed a prominent part of the verbal discourse surrounding the VPI’s work, heavily emphasized by its project and managerial staff. When I commented on its close relationship with the district, the (prior) country director said ‘that is the only way’.\footnote{113} The country director in post reiterated:

> The collaboration with the district [council] has been installed at the beginning of the project... the relationship with the district was from the beginning.\footnote{114}

The outgoing VPI programme coordinator, a Tanzanian member of staff, and previous/future government employee, had a very keen awareness of the legitimation benefits of close positioning to local government, reflecting:

> [S]ince I started to be coordinator I was trying to strengthen this collaboration [with the district] after looking at the advantages...Because we are registered under the government, it’s under the Ministry but it’s the government...fine we are working with the community, but under the Local Government Authorities. So we are working together to facilitate this community ...[but] government is...responsible. Government are responsible for their people, it’s a key for their people...So for my understanding it’s like NGOs is working to support government to achieve development for their people.\footnote{115}

\footnote{112} Much of this section formed the basis of my article ‘Working state capital’ (Dodworth 2014).
\footnote{113} Fieldnotes discussion with outgoing Country Director, May 2012.
\footnote{114} Interview 54, VPI Country Director, December 2012.
\footnote{115} Interview 27, VPI Programme Coordinator, October 2012, emphasis in original.
This alignment with government went beyond an operational decision and related to how the organization defined and legitimated itself to its peers. The coordinator was explicit on VPI’s preeminent recognition, adding:

The government is the one that give us identity, that we are the organization working here…even you when you come here to the district, if we are not working closely with them it means when you ask…to work with the organizations, an NGO, any NGO…if they don’t know us when you go there they can’t even mention us.

VPI’s director similarly emphasized symbolic recognition from the district: ‘to see you moving in Bagamoyo district’, thus seen as a serious player.116

The relationship was indeed keenly reciprocated and validated by government staff, as VPI was consistently mentioned as the largest player in the district (when in fact its budget was comparable to AI) and with the best, or ‘most serious’, approach to its work. Another district development officer, for example, in the context of endorsing VPI as part of civil society’s role to help government, surmised:

They say it [civil society] is the second arm of the government as government can’t do everything, so organizations help government to implement on many issues.117

The interweaving between lateral and vertical forms of interstitial work was laid bare in the following excerpt, whereby embedding relationships with the district bolstered claim-making both upward to potential clients and, as explored in subsequent chapters, downward along the development chain. One VPI officer, representing himself as ‘50% government’ in monitoring visits,118 emphasized later how closely VPI and government responsibilities are aligned, with a similar downward-facing aspect to the communities:

We saw that, that is our work, the work of the district, the work of VPI, so we think that is good if the district, they can allocate us a kind of budget where we can share the monitoring together… We need…money coming from the district to…support the people of the government to go down.119

Two points became apparent from this dynamic. The first is the continued blurring of the public and private, government and non-government, as VPI staff take up positions of authority within district committees, and government bureaucrats sanction VPI work plans. This echoes Green’s ‘legitimation as being part of government’ (2010, p19). The

116 VPI Programme Director, op cit.
117 Interview 26, district Community Development Officer for Gender, April 2013.
118 Fieldnotes VPI monitoring visit to Kiharaka, November 2012.
119 Interview 53, VPI Programme Officer, December 2012, emphasis in original.
second, noting the tension between **voluntarism** and (state) authoritarianism, is how legitimation via national policy and governmental structures begins to invoke a top down, authoritarian model: bringing state-led development to the people. This has been ubiquitous in the national development discourse since Nyerere’s post-independence project (Schneider 2006) and there remains residual symbolic capital in that regard.

Current close alignment with government institutions is not remarkable in international development discourse, with some donors promoting partnership with government as a funding criterion. In practice, however, VPI began to mimic or borrow heavily from Tanzanian state authority and its machinery. In drawing on and replicating state hierarchy, or ‘verticality’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002), it inverted its stated bottom-up ethos. The ‘development encounter’, as explored in Chapter Four, became highly authoritarian in reprimanding failure to enact government policy. At the same time, such an organization risks becoming beholden to state authority, increasingly constrained in their ability to highlight **government** failure or advocate in that regard.

> [I]t is very difficult to relate with them [district staff] because it is not the same level; we are not on the same level. There is always the feeling that ‘I [speaking as the district] am the Local Authority and you are an NGO and you come here and tell me what I am going to do but who are you?’ So if you want to avoid this you have to be very careful. There is this risk that they can say ‘who are you?’ But you evolve ways to find a compromise, it means…it’s a long process but it’s not impossible.¹²⁰

This dynamic was borne out in VPI’s annual stakeholder meeting, which became dominated by senior district staff regarding their demands and requirements for carrying out HIV/AIDS work in the district. The organization was unable to hold government meaningfully to account regarding its failure to fulfil its own obligations as laid out in national policy. Senior district staff gained control of the meeting agenda, stifling out the voices of other stakeholders until it assumed the form of bilateral negotiations between the district and VPI. Whilst the director suggested that ‘inside-out’ advocacy puts VPI in a better position to challenge government over the longer term, it was clear that the process was slow at best, and one that certainly would not take place in a public forum. VPI’s embrace of the bureaucratic machine at times left it stifled, opening more avenues for state sanction and control.

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¹²⁰ Interview 54, VPI Country Director, December 2012.
Lateral legitimation is not, therefore, positioning between equal peers, but discloses shifting, situational hierarchies that are both contested and affirmed. From a developmental practice perspective, positioning, or ‘partnering’ close to government has a strong upward legitimation effect, drawing on current thinking around building institutional capacity and sustainability. This positioning, however, infuses NGO practices more broadly, in borrowing from, and therefore replicating, state authority. As such, it defers to, thus reaffirms, the existing institutional hierarchy and can never fundamentally alter the configuration of the political economy: of power and resource.

This was again borne out clearly in the highly politicized issue of land. VPI, through its Women and Child Rights instrument, delivered training and other inputs designed to raise awareness of legal rights for women, including in relation to land. The idea was that this knowledge would empower women to assert their land rights claims, particularly with regard to inheritance in the event of their husbands’ death. This was in alignment with national laws and government policy, so there was nothing overtly ‘political’ in that regard. VPI layered on microcredit initiatives to redress forms of economic inequality. The land initiative, whilst not an ostensible priority, had the district’s tacit approval.

This relationship, however, was not solely one of state surrogacy (Jennings 2008) or co-option, although those aspects featured. It was rather situational as the context demanded. Firstly, both elites benefit from an external positioning as partners at times, whilst highlighting difference at others. It was beneficial for the district council to ‘outsource’ this kind of rights based work, which is thankless in terms of political capital and infamously difficult on which to gauge progress. Anger and frustration at the futility of the work on the part of village level volunteers, compounded by perceived insufficient allowances, could be neatly deflected by government towards VPI. There thus remained daylight between the two.

In the second, related, instance, given this distance from the workings of localized politics, VPI were unable to address the wider politicized environment in which women were expected to advocate their rights. Local power relations, in the form for example of influence over courts or police, may leave individual women thwarted at best or more physically and psychologically vulnerable at worst. Even the body where instances of corruption should be reported was dysfunctional, little known and located in Bagamoyo.
Furthermore, VPI was notably silent on much larger scale grey and/or corrupt processes of land acquisitions, for example, by speculators and investors. Advocacy at the micro-level has little transformative power if not matched by power and influence at the macro.

To summarize, VPI capitalized strongly on the residual symbolic capital of the developmental state in Tanzania. It claimed to support ‘government to achieve development for its people’, echoing Nyerere’s socio-political project. It sought to embed its initiatives at village, ward and district levels, invoking its partnership with the district council to compel the relevant leaders to act. Its close alignment with the district, joint implementation and the resource it committed to visit every one of Bagamoyo’s 97 villages at least once a year contributed to a strong impression of outreach and presence that mimicked the state architecture: indeed enabling its ‘co-production’ (Dodworth 2015). This afforded an ability to compel and reprimand village leaders and volunteers on the failure to deliver in accordance with government policy. VPI thus foregrounded practices of lateral interstitiality with the district, although such relationships were not necessarily ones of equality. Hierarchies were, as ever, situational as part of legitimation’s entreaty and repudiation.

*Advocates International: ‘between you and government’*

Advocates International (AI) underwent a strategic shift in focus from service provision towards advocacy during my time in Bagamoyo. Despite its attendant trajectory away from government partnership, however, its positioning remained situational, using different legitimation in different contexts. It was interesting to witness AI position itself as mediator during a village-level land rights dialogue, ‘between you and government’ and set apart from government representatives. This contrasted with its fleeting advisory, partnership role, sat alongside government in another meeting, when examining the quality of and access to primary school education. When I pressed the Programme Coordinator further to clarify their position:

> We are the bridge, bridging the gap as government are very far. NGOs are coming in to make sure people are close to government and government to the people…But we’re also working with government…

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121 Fieldnotes VPI monitoring July 2012.
122 Fieldnotes discussion with AI Programme Coordinator, English verbatim, August 2012.
The claimed interstitiality is prominent in this metaphor, as is the ambivalence in the nature of such relations. This ambivalence was also reflected, as will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters, in how AI legitimated itself at the community level. The organization drew on its government associations, yet stressing its independence as a ‘private’ charity. In another incident some months later, whilst in the AI vehicle, we took a short cut through the district bus terminal, normally out of bounds for private vehicles. When I asked the coordinator his reasoning he laughed, saying ‘[t]hey are government [licence] plates! We are working in the public interest!’

In practice, AI worked hard to reconcile this movement from government partner/advisor to watchdog/adversary and back. ‘Advocacy’ itself as a term seemed to delegitimate particular NGOs to key district personnel, with one key senior manager remarking ‘[a]dvocacy! What is advocacy? These advocacy NGOs – they are not serious!’ AI, quite unlike VPI, was never named as a major player, partner or exemplar of good practice. The tension between AI and the district became more conspicuous over the course of a year, the coordinator commenting:

You know it’s very tricky, when you work with them [local government]. They can be your friends now and next three months they’re not…and you find a way to get back close to them again, you get close to them again. That’s how it works; in and out, in and out. They are not consistently with you; one moment they are, one they are not.

The issue of land, however, previously out of bounds for NGO engagement, again made an interesting test case for AI’s increasingly abrasive relationship with government, at both district and national levels. Its focus on land governance issues, and in particularly the increase in ‘land grabs’ by national and multinational corporates, had come to a head in Bagamoyo, given the rapid development of its infrastructure during Kikwete’s tenure. As such, AI and government, at both district and national levels, had come to blows over highly politicized, often grey or corrupt practices regarding land acquisition by foreign and national investors.

In this vein, a 24,000 hectare and mainly fertile area of land in northern Bagamoyo district had been identified by successive foreign investors for the development of a sugarcane plantation for biofuel production. Originally the area had been leased to the

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123 Fieldnotes September 2013.
124 Interview 20, Senior community development staff, District Council, 14 August 2012.
125 Interview 82, AI Project Coordinator, 1 June 2013.
Zanzibar government in 1974 as a cattle ranch, *Ranchi ya Zanzibar* (RAZABA). The ranch degraded, was infested by tsetse fly and so given up in 1994, at which time the land was adopted by the ranch workers, new residents, charcoal producers and continuing pastoralists. Earmarked by several investors in interim years, a proposal from a foreign company was finally formalized with government in 2008 to develop an initial 7,800 hectares of land for large scale commercial and outgrower sugarcane agriculture, with an ethanol processing plant on site.

Key decisions for this initiative had been made at a national level, and there had been no inclusion or consultation of either civil society or local government until the initiative was well underway. The mandatory Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) had been undertaken by private consultants hired by the company and, whilst they consulted within the project site, did not consult larger NGOs based at Bagamoyo district centre. There were no other NGO or civil society representatives monitoring this process outside of AI, although there was a certain amount of NGO involvement to deliver particular socio-economic aims of the project, particularly around resettlement. In the early months of its involvement in 2012, AI focused its scrutiny on the accuracy of the ESIA, particularly around calculations for water usage, implications for food security given the transfer of land to sugar cane production and issues regarding migration and resettlement. A previous investor had been rightfully taken to task over the authenticity of its ESIA, which deliberately, if not fraudulently, downplayed the negative impact of the project, to the point where it failed to secure funding guarantees and withdrew (Havnevik & Haaland 2011). Given this context, the ability of large companies to maintain public and private copies of such reports and the lack of government scrutiny (or indeed interest) in the findings, the resulting public trust in the independence of the assessment process was low.

Over the year, however, as AI’s knowledge of the project, players and the wider political issues deepened, attention moved to the appropriation of 2,000 highly fertile hectares of land into the project site, apparently against the wishes of many residents. Whether this area was part of the original RAZABA site is difficult to verify, given accurate maps of the original site were resident with the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and not forthcoming from the District Land Office. Indeed, the lack of available information on the existing RAZABA site proved fortuitous as subsequent speculators adopted
conveniently loose definitions of the ‘RAZABA area’ to include contiguous areas. The very ambiguity of the project site was noted as a project risk in a draft ESIA conducted by consultants for previous investors but the note was removed from the final publication (ibid., p118). What is clear, however, is that this area west of a railway boundary that was, rightly or wrongly, understood to be the boundary of the RAZABA ranch was suddenly incorporated into the project area under the ‘former RAZABA ranch’ nomenclature. The disputed area was included in the current company’s mapping from the outset, bringing the proposed site close to 10,000 hectares.

In early 2013, the 2,000 hectares of land was reassigned as a sub-village from one village to another, seemingly without the full consultation of the leaders of the original village. In a highly irregular turn of events, the district commissioner (DC) attended this meeting and was minuted to declare the land’s reassignment agreed, despite this post having no mandate over local land issues. Even those employed under the Ministry of Land at a district level would have no remit over land allocations of this size and nature. It is not clear what the exact motivation was for the DC to attend this meeting. One informant, involved in resettlement planning, suggested that the leaders of the original village had been particularly vocal in their opposition to the project and so reallocation would remove them from the equation. Allegations of a sizeable payment made by the company to the DC were circulating both amongst civil society representatives but also more widely amongst Bagamoyo town residents. There was also awareness of presidential pressure on the DC to do whatever necessary to ensure the project’s progression.

Whatever the true sequence of events within this murkier side of ‘doing business’ in Tanzania, it was at least clear that due process with regard to land allocation had not been followed. The issue was not discussed openly with office bearers, nor did it feature in a meeting between the company and various civil society organizations that took place later in May 2013, at AI’s insistence. Whilst the meeting itself to take place was a hard won victory, it was steamrollered as a public relations opportunity for the company, with little time allocated for debate. In addition, national media was at that time distracting attention on to the resettlement issue within the project site, under the

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126 Fieldnotes May 2013.
127 Fieldnotes, discussion with local women’s group leader June 2013.
rubric of ‘land grabbing’, giving airtime to villagers falsely claiming to have been resident within the ranch for generations. In fact, there had been a huge influx of claimants into the area since it became earmarked for development, by both land speculators and those falsely vying for resettlement compensation from the government. Very few had been resident before 2009 and the company had a perfectly legal agreement to lease this land. The emotive rhetoric in the national eye around land grabbing, including the sizeable concessions given to foreign companies, had served in this instance to smokescreen the illegitimate and coercive appropriation of land elsewhere (see also Hall 2011).

In this case, the positionality of AI, particularly in relation to government, was again key in how it legitimated its presence and involvement. Civil society was claimed to reside in a particular ‘space’, counter-posed to abuses by big business and big government, and therefore automatically more closely affiliated with the interests of the citizen. This Tocquevillian conception of virtuous civil space was crucial to how AI legitimated itself in this instance:

> With this kind of project, you know, government is interested in the money, you know, the growth of the district, the infrastructure, the macro-physical things you know that’s what they are interested in, so anything coming on that side is good. That’s how they look at impact also, they don’t go into social, economic, the life of the people, that’s not their concern. So...I don’t feel there could be any counter-argument from the government in any way [to object to the project], no way, it can’t. So that was my expectation. So it is only civil society who can stand and be different.128

At the same time, AI moved to invert the vertical authoritarianism, positioning itself closer to the imagined ‘community’ realm:

> He [the district CDO] wanted the DED [District Executive Director] to be around, the DC to be around. He wanted people from National Environment Commission to be around, TIC [Tanzania Investment Centre] to be around...For me and the rest we were like ‘no, this is quite low level, because this is CBOs, we are talking about low level, civil society - we want our space’.129

It was not clear, however, that AI genuinely operated at a ‘low level’ or indeed that AI, CBOs (Community Based Organizations) and civil society could be used so interchangeably. Given AI’s national and international advocacy charge on issues of land rights, accountability and indeed taking on corporate power, the case of this land was a

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128 Interview 82, AI Programme Coordinator, 1 June 2013.
129 AI Programme Coordinator, *ibid.*
strong fit for the organization’s profile and evolving strategic focus. As the national policy officer described it:

I think that is one of the opportunities of being international, but we’re also national now as I’ve said. So we have more interest with our people at the national level so that gives us mandate as well to actualise. Because we are a national organization but we are just a member to the international federation - that makes a difference. But also we have been working for some time, it’s not a new area that we’re just coming in. 

Thus the interstitial work of AI between administrative levels, insofar as such geography holds, was keenly felt. The organization could draw on its considerable international profile and status, including its ability, ‘its people’, to generate national media attention on a particular issue, as a tacit threat to local office bearers. As a more junior AI staff member exclaimed, ‘they [government] are scared of us!’ It would be near impossible to shut AI down at a national level, in contrast perhaps to other national NGOs, such as BAWATA, who fell afoul of the state over the sensitive land issue in the 1990s. At the same time, AI could find itself temporarily crowded out laterally, through informal politicking at a district level. The political game it played in balancing prestige at these various levels in the system had become far more pronounced.

It was by virtue of this process that it formed the ability to challenge both the micro- and macro-social and political environment in which it operated. When asked if government relations, especially at a district level, were now more difficult to manage, the national policy officer replied:

It is tricky. It is tricky because you are dealing with power relations, you’re disturbing the status quo so it’s most likely you will be looked at as an enemy. Like you’re trying to change things and they would prefer if you are providing service delivery…so you would be complementing them.

Clearly, this ability to challenge was a strong exercise of power and prestige that originated in part higher up the development hierarchy. It would thus be indeed difficult to argue that AI constituted Mamdani’s ‘indigenous’ civil society (1996) and as such

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130 Interview 84, AI national policy officer, 26 September 2013.
131 An oft-cited example of the suppression of nascent civil society in Tanzania was the premature death of a national women’s council Baraza la Wanawake Wa Tanzania (BAWATA) formed at a conference hosted by the University of Dar es Salaam in 1994. BAWATA became increasingly vocal on the issue of land reform in the run up to the 1995 general election. It was attacked, both by MPs and state media, on the grounds of being overly ‘ politicized’ for an NGO and eventually de-registered in 1997 (Shivji 2004; Tripp 2000, p204-6). The irony was that BAWATA was originally formed in a movement away from party politics, which had been the dominant mechanism for women’s activism (see Geiger 1997; also Makulilo 2012).
132 Interview 84, AI national policy officer, 26 September 2013.
there were, as AI staff themselves conceded, implications for whether they truly
*represented* those on behalf of whom they claim to advocate. This was particularly true
when issues were intermeshed with wider international discourse (e.g. ‘land grabs’ and
‘food security’) when the very strong material incentives for people to sell their land
could not be easily discounted. Furthermore, AI, given its heightened territoriality, had
no prior existing relationship with either of the villages adjacent to the disputed 2,000
hectares and nor did the vast majority of the organizations that participated in the
meeting that AI pushed for with the company in 2013. The perspectives of the villagers
themselves were strangely absent from deliberations. AI staff had little familiarity with
the other organizations that it stood together with as ‘civil society’ over the issue. When
I asked the programme coordinator about the work of the other organizations in the
meeting, he replied:

I don’t know what the others are doing, I don’t know. I have seen some of the
organizations for the first time. And also it is not the matter of what you are doing, it is
a matter of how powerful you are in the district and how you are respected, what is
your reputation. Even if you had 20 NGOs with no reputation they’ll [government] never issue us anything. So I wish you had 5 strong ones – *that could make a change.*

In this instance, politics and influence pulled against representation and unanimity with
other players. It is fair to say that AI was more feared than ‘respected’ in this regard.
This is not a critique of AI’s particular operational aims in and of themselves. Rather it
is an examination of how it crafted its ability, often laudable, to take on highly
politicized issues that are often beyond the scope of ‘local’ NGOs, including VPI. Its
freedom and distance from the district council apparatus afforded it mobility and
territoriality, but this in turn could prove at odds with extensity and even
representation at a local and district level. It was also at the expense of recognition by
the district council themselves, who maintained misgivings at AI’s propensity to work
outside of ‘the system’ or, in other words, their control.

To summarize, it is more fruitful when interrogating the legitimation of public authority
to highlight ‘state-like’ practices rather than drawing institutional domains. The state in
Tanzania provides an enduring, symbolic template of public action on which different
organizations may draw. VPI’s replication of state-like practices conferred authority but
inverted its proclaimed bottom-up ethos, whilst AI’s distance from the state afforded its
own opportunities and challenges. At the same time, positionality vis-à-vis the state is
situational and may shift depending on aspect and audience. Furthermore, the state, via local government, is not impotent in this constellation of practices, equally participating in the lateral legitimation, affirmation or contestation of development agencies’ authority to act. The district as field highlights the complexity of contemporary legitimation in this regard, as actors skilfully navigate its many facets.

**Representation: ‘these people, they just sit!’**

Representation is a performance. It demands continual movement between claims to act or to stand for others: between distance and proximity. Nevertheless, both elements are intrinsic to representational practice in ambiguous contexts, with such continual movement proving pronounced during fieldwork. This oscillation, highly performative in nature, was starkly encapsulated by an encounter with Youth Health’s programme manager. As noted, he was educated to Masters level and, through fusing his Dar consultancy with a dormant Bagamoyo NGO, had secured a major grant focussing on ‘at-risk’ populations. In my first meeting, when asked about approach, he explained the ‘ethnomethodology’ of their baseline study. ‘We need to put on their shoes’, he explained, ‘we need to sit on their chairs and at their tables’ to understand the reality of their lives and experiences. He described how it had taken time to identify at-risk groups due to existing taboos but after empathetic perseverance he gained ‘insider’ status. His claim-making imparted a proximity to his constituents, thus an increased ability to stand for them.

When we stepped outside of the office, however, the NGO ‘hat’ was firmly removed. The manager had become increasingly assertive during the course of our discussions through requests for external help for his organization in return for access, which was not uncommon. On leaving the office, however, the conversation turned to the prospects of finding him an *mzungu* (white, western) wife. The turn in topic was so rapid and, to my mind, inappropriate that I struggled to negotiate the conversation. I attempted to deflect with humour, asking why he would want an *mzungu* when they are so much trouble. He began a torrent of abuse about how coastal women were ‘lazy’,

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133 Interview 17, Youth Health programme manager, 27 July 2012.
‘without goals’ or ambition and he would be totally unable to meet a woman of the appropriate level in Bagamoyo. In this exchange, the manager iterated the difference in status between himself and the Other he worked with, its alterity fixed and immutable. The Other’s inability to act for their own self-development necessitated his organization to act for them.

These representational practices, to act for or to stand for a definable constituency, have long been disaggregated in political theory, most notably in Pitkin’s seminal work (1967; see also Mansbridge 2003; 2011; Rehfeld 2005; Saward 2010; Vieira and Runciman 2008). Contemporary representational practice, however, pronounced throughout fieldwork, visibly moves to encompass both of these, manifest in fleeting positionalities of both distance and proximity. Distance manifests itself in claims of the need to act for a constituency, due to barriers to self-development, which is long embedded in colonial discourse around Tanganyikan trusteeship (Green 2014; Hunter 2015). Proximity, particularly prominent in NGO claims and in civil society more broadly, conveys ideas of resemblance: shared norms, traits or interests, which (uniquely) allow civil society to stand for those excluded by the chauvinist mainstream. The oscillation between these two positionalities mirrors legitimation’s repudiation and entreaty, as part of its countervailing currents.\footnote{134}

Representational practice comprises some of the most fiercely guarded claims by NGOs regarding their placement and ability to intervene on behalf of particular under-served populations.\footnote{135} Such claims fall into two stages: NGOs, through their intimate, more egalitarian relationship with their constituents at a village level, are able to directly access and understand their ‘developmental’ needs. Secondly, NGOs have at least a formalized relationship with government, in this case the district council, and so claim to be in a position to aggregate, amplify and advocate for their constituents’ claims. The rhetorical emphasis in such claims is the ability to stand for a collective. This representation ‘performance’ (Holzscheiter 2016) resonated strongly within the previous words of AI’s programmes coordinator:

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\footnote{134 Much of the following section formed the basis for BISA conference paper “‘These people just sit!’ Representational ambiguity in Tanzania” (Dodworth 2016).}

\footnote{135 For example: ‘NGOs, in theory at least, derive their legitimacy from the claim that they serve or represent sections of the public’ (Crewe & Harrison 1998, p5).}
NGOs are coming in to make sure people are close to government and government to the people...We are the voice of the people to government.\textsuperscript{136}

The coordinator emphasized how government fails to represent the interests of the masses, leaving civil society more proximate to stand for the people.\textsuperscript{137} Such claims far outweighed the role of resource transfer in legitimating AI, even though materiality was, as will be explored in Chapter Four, critical to underpinning downward representational claims.

The issue of representation, therefore, interweaves closely with the preceding themes of \textit{extensity, territoriality} and \textit{state} relations, as well as that of materiality. Indeed, Nyerere’s authoritarian populism instituted the ten-house cell system to manufacture the ‘consent of the governed’ (Aminzade 2013, p139). These relationships, however, have proven complex and often work in contradictory ways, given no development elite socially resembles the groups they work with: Pitkin’s ‘descriptive representation’ (1967).

NGO and government workers alike ritually bemoaned the trials of working with Bagamoyo’s ‘coastal people’. Given that the vast majority of professionals came from outside of the region, this had profound implications for claims that NGOs were indeed well-placed to represent the interests and attitudes of their constituents, towards whom they assumed a colonial-like aspect.

Whilst tropes regarding coastal, indeed Islamic, ‘backwardness’ have become embedded in the contemporary Tanzanian political landscape, perceptions associated with coastal people have waxed and waned according to the region’s politico-economic prominence. The term \textit{Waswahili} (Swahili, coastal people) oscillated in and out of fashion as signifier and of self-identification, depending on the area’s associated power and influence. Its association with \textit{Ustaarabu} (civilization: derived from ‘Arab’), the height of coastal civilization and aspirational migration quickly faded during the German then British colonial periods, wherein \textit{Waswahili} were stripped of their land rights (Fabian 2007b). Negative associations, including that of criminal and thuggish behaviour, crept in in the 1930s (Eastman 1971; Fabian 2007b). Fabian cites from archives a saying from the 1930s that \textquoteleft hapa Bagamoyo, isi tuhuliana\textquoteright: ‘here in Bagamoyo we steal from each other’ (2007b, p225). During the 1940s, nationalist African pride displaced \textit{Ustaarabu} and Arab

\textsuperscript{136} Interview 52, AI programme coordinator and programme officer, 6 December 2012.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}
paternalism, which had taken on connotations of bondage and racial victimization (Glassman 2011, p58).

As such, the rise to predominance of the up-country nationalist leaders began to eclipse the once coastal powerhouses. By the 1950s, the coast was viewed to have degenerated to a backward, ‘boorish’ way of life (Eastman 1971). Under Nyerere’s leadership, Swahili was decoupled from its coastal associations, appropriated as the language of unity and nationalism (ibid). The socio-economic decline of the coastal settlements accelerated in this political climate that focused on the industrial development of the north and the agricultural boom of the south west. By the 1960s, Bagamoyo was seen to be a backwater, ‘by-passed by modern communications’ (Iliffe 1979, p382), isolated from and impermeable to outsider influence. Posted government officials in the 1960s complained that locals were failing to participate in ‘nation-building’, lamenting that ‘Bagamoyo people have a belief that they know...the desire for them to learn or to adopt to new changes is very little’ (Fabian 2007b, p319 citing local government archives). For Fabian, this resistance was ‘no different from the resistance that all other outsiders to Bagamoyo Town had experienced throughout its history’ (ibid).

This palpable ‘inside/outside’ sensibility has endured to the present day. The state bureaucrats of the 1960s have been complemented by the non-government developmentalists of the last decade. These NGO elites, as their government and colonial predecessors, have received a formal, generally Christian, education. An overwhelming majority of NGO (and government) staff in Bagamoyo came from outside of the coastal region.¹³⁸ This is often true of any development context and has been thoroughly critiqued elsewhere (e.g. Ferguson 1994; Tvedt 2006). More uniquely to Bagamoyo, however, is the continuing palpable divide between inland and coastal culture that infuses every development encounter. NGO practitioners regularly articulated their frustrations with working with coastal people, suggesting that backwardness, culture, religion and lack of education were all barriers to their participation. ‘They just sit/remain’ (wanakaa tu), ‘they don’t understand’, ‘they are a bit behind’, ‘they are still in the box’ staff lamented as industrious trainings and workshops

¹³⁸ In my discussions with around 30 major NGOs I found 3 organizations with one local staff member.
crumbled into inactivity as participants return to coastal life. Cooper’s ‘modernizing bureaucrat’ persists in combatting the perennial laziness of the people (2002).

There is a clear tension, therefore, between claims of proximity, via an equal footing with constituents in order to stand for them, and claims of distance with perceived developmental failure of coastal people to adapt and to act by themselves. Nevertheless, both elements are intrinsic to representational practice in such ambiguous contexts, even over the course of a single encounter. Thus the opening vignette, detailing the encounter with Youth Health’s manager, encapsulates to the extreme the continued oscillation within the representational ‘performance’ (Holzscheiter 2016). The juxtaposition in this case was laid bare, between the NGO forging a common understanding with those it claims to represent and the individual entrepreneurial pioneer who, by definition, seeks no peers at all. This extreme example of representational practice and its instability spotlighted a persistent tension within legitimation more broadly: to both entreat and repudiate those they work with.

It was interesting to explore these issues of representation with Julia, an expat volunteer with Voluntary Partnership International who was, prima facie, a clear ‘outsider’. VPI, despite its successful ‘localization’, was an international organization, for which Julia was a volunteer for one year. In addition, she had not studied development studies as her colleagues, but had a background in anthropology. In her words:

I didn’t study, you know, international this, development that…I don’t have that framework, so I don’t fit in there [gestures to VPI office]. They all believe a lot…me, I don’t know.139

Julia had spent a year in coastal Tanzania prior to joining VPI. She not only had a strong command of Swahili but an exceptional ability amongst expats to read and decipher coastal ‘culture’. She was able to read the different layers of metaphor and irony, or at least was aware when she did not understand, which was challenging also for Tanzanian inlanders. Through this ability, she garnered a capacity to draw people to her from all walks of life. In addition, given her detachment from the development discourse, or in her words ‘framework’, she was freer from the compulsion to project developmental ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ onto social interactions.

139 Interview 11, VPI volunteer, 19 July 2012, emphasis in original.
Julia reflected often on the issues and paradoxes VPI experienced in their approach, explored already in part. She was particularly conscious of the tension between ‘mobilizing’ people to advocate for their ‘rights’ and whether this was really standing for their everyday needs, picturing in such circumstances:

> Even if I’m aware of my rights, in my daily life I have many other problems to solve, basic needs to solve. It happens that even if I know my rights, sometimes I forget. Not forget, I don’t have time to think about them.

Her contemplation on her own position, and VPI’s insertion into people’s lives more generally, was highly reflexive:

> So there are many things between them that make it very difficult to deal with, the issue of human rights. And me, I can’t understand it because I wake up, I eat, I have everything, so even when I stay in the workshop sometimes I feel very, very bad. I can’t believe sometimes what they are telling [regarding stories of domestic abuse]. But at the end of the day I can’t understand because I didn’t live their life; I don’t know which kind of problems they have every day.

She also reflected on the disruptive effect of pushing to act in the name of human rights, particularly regarding gender, and the contradictions of having locally placed volunteer ‘advocates’ to undertake such work:

> Julia: So we can do a lot of philosophy, but at the end of the day…

> Kathy: The reality…

> Julia: Yeah, the reality. So it’s very difficult, very difficult. Because we have also…cases of rape of children and parents, they agree to not enforce, to not report, having…wanakubiliana na mbakaji [they come to an agreement with the rapist]…and stop. And also there is the shame to denounce some cases. And then I think in the village it’s very difficult because everyone knows each other. I think in the village the structure of the village is also made of a sort of cooperation that sometimes doesn’t allow you to break some relationship, even if they are in a bad relationship. They need each other. It’s very difficult.\(^\text{140}\)

Julia was alluding to the often futility of dismantling community structures through what is essentially an individualistic perspective on training volunteers, couched in the liberalism of the rights-based approach. There is a contradiction in at once setting apart such volunteers as pioneers, whilst simultaneously reaffirming the importance of ‘community’ based change, as explored under voluntarism. Other staff, of course, were also aware of such challenges, but the willingness to challenge the established VPI script was limited. Furthermore, Julia’s self-critique was not necessarily shared by the

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\(^{140}\) VPI volunteer, op cit.
Tanzanian staff, who often defaulted to pre-existing stereotypes. When I asked, for instance, the VPI programme officer if he found the area challenging to work in:

It depends on the kind of people you are working with. When you work with women and girls there is no big problem or challenge. But when we work with directly the fishermen it’s a bit challenged because these people are always thinking about fishing. They’re not aware about other social problems like HIV and AIDS, they are not aware. They are aware, but they don’t care. They don’t care. That’s why going to an area like Saadani, you can get it in the story of gang raping, you see? So these fishermen, I don’t know, maybe because of the nature of their work, they’re a bit…I could say cruel, or what, I don’t know, I’m missing what to say. But they’re not frightened about social welfare, about social issues. There are really strict with their activities of fishing. They don’t care even about the families.141

Even for the (expat) Country Director, the failure of people to engage meaningfully on the issue of HIV/AIDS represented an inability in local people to see the scale of the problem. ‘It’s not my mother or brother who’s dying’ she lamented, in an aside that disclosed distance between her organization and those it claimed to represent. She later reflected, towards the end of her tenure, that there was a particular barrier to operating in Bagamoyo district, not least to do with ‘per diem’ saturation, meaning that no organization could successfully work there and that VPI would be better to leave.142

What set Julia’s reflections apart from other VPI staff was the attempt to empty out moralizing from these challenges, as well as the compulsion to consign causes of failure to outside the organization. What underlies many of the stereotypes of coastal people is a familiar form of moralizing around a particular work ethic, reminiscent of Weber’s writings on the subject (2001 [1930]). It focuses on the presumed reliance on fishing, as well as the purported rejection of kazi (work). Kazi translates in this instance more fully as manual labour, as associated with agriculture, rather than business or entrepreneurship. This came out explicitly in the words of a government employee, who was working on a World Bank funded welfare project:

It’s true! Coastal people are lazy you know, they don’t work like people of Iringa, I think you saw eh? The coastal women wake up, they put on their clothes and just want their men to bring them food… [Why is that the case?] This area is dominated by Arabs; they don’t like work, they like business.143

There is no perceived contradiction within such a view with the contemporary valorization of neoliberal development discourse, which includes micro-finance,

141 Interview 53, VPI Programme Officer, English verbatim, 11 December 2012.
142 Fieldnotes, discussion with VPI Country Director, September 2013.
143 Interview 80, TASAF research officer, 29 May 2013.
whereby business and entrepreneurship are actively promoted. Nor is there a contradiction perceived with the simultaneous emphasis on fishing. Bagamoyo is not, nor ever has been, reliant on mariculture, with fishermen forced to diversify throughout the ages (Fabian 2007b). Furthermore, the number of fishing villages on the coast is very small compared to the scale of Bagamoyo district. Nevertheless, this fixation on Bagamoyo fishermen and their perceived distaste for hard graft, alongside the supposed Islamic indifference towards the ‘right’ forms of education, were consistent themes within reflections of cultural barriers to development:

Well, Bagamoyo, if you look in Tanzania, the trend of development in many, many areas has been actually stimulated by influx of new people in the area. Bagamoyo has remained as a conservative area, you will find the majority of people are native. So intrusion from other areas is very, very minimal. This is one. But secondly, according to tradition and culture from people around the coast, they normally don’t send kids to schools, so this has also been one of the areas which made them to remain or lag behind. Thirdly is the notion of a fisherman area. There is a tendency of spending most of their time around the sea looking for fish and they become quite lazy so this is one. The other which is very, very sensitive but I think has also contributed is also most of the Islamic communities you find is also lagging behind. This, normally, we don’t put in writing because it is also very politically sensitive.144

But what is culture? It is something that is created. And you cannot separate it from people’s work and their livelihoods. Fishing is not like farming, where you get up early in the morning and go to the shamba (farm). There are no set times – there are tides. And so when the tides are not right the only thing to do is to come back and sit, play bao (draughts), sip coffee. And so people arrive and see them just sitting and say ‘Ah, these people are lazy!’145

The first set of reflections was made by an operations officer from a UN agency at the national level, reaffirming a number of coastal, colonial-like stereotypes. The tropes of laziness and Islamic backwardness are prominent, as part of a timeless, immutable cultural disposition.146 Bagamoyo must continue to depend on incomers to re-educate and indeed emancipate coastal people from their cultural shackles.

The latter set was made by an older, highly experienced and devout Muslim programme director for Eco-Coast. Although he himself was not from the coast, these reflections were clearly more empathetic in nature. Nevertheless, he reaffirmed the belief that those who partake in mariculture have more leisure time without labour, but also that they are not involved in other economically productive activities. It thus supported the

144 Interview 55, UN agency operations officer, English verbatim, 13 December 2012.
145 Interview 45, Eco-Coast Programme Director, English verbatim, 15 November 2012.
146 Becker also examines the interface between coastal Muslim areas and incoming development agencies since colonial times (2008; 2015).
assumption, despite the initial claim otherwise, that culture is fixed and demarcated. He added, ‘[c]ulture is who he is, he is a fisherman and that is his culture and he will continue to be so’. The fiction of the isolated, self-sufficient fishing community, impermeable to outside influence, is thus still regularly invoked as a significant impediment to working in the region.

Due to the nature of Eco-Coast’s work on coastal eco-systems, focusing on particular environmental ‘hotspots’ and the surrounding villages, its target areas were typically more remote and difficult to access. As such, its representative claims in acting/standing for the inhabitants of these villages, as explored, were more territorialized and contrasted with the extensity and uniformity of government. Indeed, Eco-Coast’s claims of proximity were also contrasted with those of newer NGOs, due to its comparative longevity in the region. As noted, when asked as to whether having so few employees from the Bagamoyo district served raised any challenges in its work, he replied:

But we’ve been working here for fifteen years! They say ‘Ah! You are Eco-Coast! You are one of us!’

The territorial form of representational practice, however, disclosed predictable countervailing currents. The Eco-Coast director was obviously cognizant that whilst claiming to stand for these constituents, overlooked by government designs, his organization was simultaneously bound to act for them. This was particularly true given the intangible, deferred benefits of ecological conservation. When pushed again if having no Eco-Coast staff from the region made a difference, he replied:

It makes a big difference. Even a new person in the village is viewed with suspicion. It depends on how you present yourselves. If you say you are there to bring development you are viewed with suspicion. If you say you are there to learn you can join them, be part of them. But this you build up slowly. For example if you want to bring toilets you don’t say ‘where is the toilet?’ You start by saying ‘where can I help myself using your facilities?’ And then you can start slowly putting your own agenda.

As such, these two kinds of representational claim, standing for and acting for, are often fleeting, with one collapsing and another taking its place. The tension between insider and outsider, proximity and distance, was keenly felt in this exchange. It is often,

\[147\] Ibid.
\[148\] Ibid.
however, the development expert and outsider, acting for the Other, that wins outright in forging the authority to act.

It was typically in such brief, informal moments where the performative element of proximity and standing for a constituency collapsed back into the need to act for the aberrant Other. An older, highly respected matriarch of civil society in Bagamoyo impressed on me the unique ability of herself and her NGO to access and relate to neglected areas and groups, particularly women.149 This script slipped in her anger, as workmen due to undertake work on a building she owned failed to arrive on time: ‘These people!’ she cried, referring to the Bagamoyo unwillingness to work, ‘it’s like a slave mentality!’ Similarly, after the tape had stopped running, an international NGO representative exclaimed:

You know these coastal people, they don’t want to do anything you tell them and do you know why? It is the legacy from slavery. They don’t want to do what you tell them to because they think you are enslaving them.150

In fact, the role of the slave trade in Bagamoyo’s pre-colonial history has been recently reconstituted and overstated for political and economic reasons (Fabian 2013). Nevertheless, it provided a convenient, if rarely spoken, trope on which to hang castigation. The frustration in governing the post colony thus continues, whereby local people are portrayed as marred, unable to identify that which is in their own interests, leaving elites struggling to bridge divides.

The tension between territorial representation and those whose interests are in fact represented remains problematic. For AI, it was true that relations between it and its beneficiaries became more personalized and, at times, more strongly reciprocated as people began to view it as their NGO (see Chapter Four). At the same time, given that these territories or turfs are sites where pre-identified advocacy issues play out, there is an ambiguity as to whose issues they are representing. As the AI national policy officer continued, in response to my question on the topic:

It’s a big challenge. For now it’s not their issue, they don’t see it that way. Apart from providing the right information, providing the capacity, and building. We have not been able to provide an alternative to community. Yes there’s ‘don’t sell your land for food security!’ but what next? I think we still need to work with the government to

149 Interview 1, chair of Civil Society Association, March 2012.
150 Interview 67, PSI programme officer, 3 May 2013.
bring the government on board. Because the alternative will also come from the
government, because if it’s really committed to transforming its community to see
agriculture as a real way of life.\textsuperscript{151}

This echoed the programme coordinator’s comments in the Bagamoyo context, when
asked about whether this issue of food security has resonance:

You are right. It depends on how you mobilize people to understand, they will be on
your side that this is wrong, this is wrong. And maybe you also start with the angle of
money, it’s undervalued, you are cheated. Because that’s where they will understand
better than food security, but you know very well your intention is food security but
will start that as the first and then the second one as food security and then mobilize
them in that way, they resist! They say ‘we don’t like that’, they want the money, that’s
the biggest thing. It’s very hard to mobilize people when things for them is very
difficult, short term reasons for them.\textsuperscript{152}

Clearly, the perennial development dilemma between ‘enlightening’ others on their true
interests and purer forms of ‘advocacy’ remains at play, particularly when working to
translate global development discourse. Staff were of course aware of the dilution effect
it has on representation, but were unable to stray too far from an internationally
mandated script. The ambiguity of the representativeness of advocacy work was laid
bare in the coordinator’s later comment, that it is ‘AI speaking through others’, whereby
local champions are identified, brought in to voice words that originated elsewhere. This
subtle, shifting positionality epitomizes the multifaceted, situational performance of
representational claims.

The issue of representation was contested much more visibly through various NGOs’
explicit rejection of Bagamoyo’s umbrella organization’s efforts, the Civil Society
Association (CSA), to position itself as mouthpiece of the district. The CSA registered in
2009 as part of a surge in the number of district network organizations. This was in part
due to recognition of the need for improved NGO coordination in rural districts like
Bagamoyo, but also of networks as a new opportunity for development entrepreneurs,
via small amounts of funding from the multilaterally funded Civil Society Foundation
(also Mercer & Green 2013). Indeed, its increasing activity and presence was spurred on
by the increasing influence of a rival, longer established network in a neighbouring
district at a regional level who had funding to build other district networks, much to the
CSA’s consternation.\textsuperscript{153} CSA’s more formalized claim of representing civil society was

\textsuperscript{151} Interview 84, AI national policy officer, 26 September 2013.
\textsuperscript{152} Interview 82, AI Programmes Coordinator, English verbatim, 1 June 2013.
\textsuperscript{153} Fieldnotes, meeting with CSA secretary, 1 August 2012.
thus existentially critical, to a level surpassing that of individual NGOs. Its claims of extensity and representation across the district, however, were belied by its negligible paid up subscription list, which was only 25: a fifth of its claimed membership base.¹⁵⁴

The CSA nonetheless described itself to others as directly improving the services of CBOs and NGOs, as well as building their capacity, placing itself ‘above’ and distant from civil society in a bid to act for it.¹⁵⁵ In a funding application to the UNDP, for example, the CSA claimed:

Civil society organizations, NGO, CBO and FBO leader showed no existing link whether horizontal or vertical between their organizations and the local government at various levels. And at grassroot level between communities to their leaders.¹⁵⁶

This challenging of existing CSOs’ representativeness and interstitiality would have been highly contentious if circulated, given such claims are likewise existentially critical for such organizations. In this way, the CSA was carving out sensitive space in which its unique interstitial work, laterally and vertically, was crucial to better governance.

The CSA’s precarious funding situation, however, had meant it had become highly reactive and moved into areas not expected by its founding members, causing confusion as to its overly proximate role. This had prevented it from conducting any serious capacity-building of member organizations, including in the area of fundraising, which was a key, if unrealistic, expectation. This had left members asking questions as to what they received for their dues. As explored under territoriality, NGO leaders like that of Community Health were pushing back against perceived encroachment by the CSA:

You know, I suggest you advise the CSA to focus on their role, which is to access funds with which to build the capacity of NGOs, not to go to the communities.¹⁵⁷

Thus, representational practice at this district level was directly underwritten by access to potential funding. As a programme officer of an agricultural organization retorted:

CSA…want to speak for me where in fact it is easier for me to speak for myself and it is easier for me to get money myself. For now they only get money from us and for what? And it’s hard for us to get that money.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ The CSA paid membership list was obtained late in fieldwork with CSA, reflecting its sensitive nature (fieldnotes 26 September 2012).
¹⁵⁵ Fieldnotes from period working with CSA June – September 2012.
¹⁵⁶ Fieldnotes, 26 September 2012, English verbatim.
¹⁵⁷ Interview 7, Community Health programme manager, 14 June 2012. This was in reference to CSA’s midhahalo (debates) initiative on good governance and accountability at ward level.
Similarly, in response to the CSA’s assumed interstitial, ‘coordination’ role, an (African) expat quipped, ‘what skills and experience do they have to coordinate me?’

In this way, organizations were actively rebuffing the CSA’s representational claims of distance and the need to act authoritatively for Others. They were rather viewed as overly proximate, not in a representational sense, but as a competitor similar in aspect. Once again, the intrinsic spatiality of representational claims, shifting, replicated and contested at different scales, was laid bare.

To conclude, development agencies, colonial and post-colonial, have performed proximity as well as distance to those they claim to represent. This is particularly true of NGOs in the absence of meaningful consent or formal authorization to act for others. The need to compensate is manifest in such claims to be ‘one of the people’, to be close to the people and ultimately to stand for the people. These claims, however, are fleeting and give way to the conclusive need to act for the people when situations of uncertainty and of perceived failure solicit a more authoritative stance. In this way, well-worn tropes such as laziness and backwardness continued to be recycled as barriers to Bagamoyo’s own development. NGOs, therefore, as their colonial and missionary forerunners, cast themselves as custodians of the people’s interests, past and future. This is not, however, a representational practice restricted to NGOs, however, as it is revealed to be an integral part of constructing one’s authority to act, from the global to the local.

**Voluntarism and virtue: ‘I don’t eat’**

The language of voluntarism was predominant throughout fieldwork, manifest in different forms and different forums. At the district level, managers reiterated how ‘I have volunteered’ (lit. ‘I have offered myself’), ‘I don’t get anything’, ‘I don’t eat’, in contrast to the perceived excesses of government elites and indeed larger NGOs. They emphasized the necessity of their work, driven by community needs irrespective of salary. This resonates with what Green discerned as deliberate placement at the bottom of the development hierarchy, in a bid to prospect partnerships with larger agencies.

158 Interview 19, agricultural NGO programme officer, 2 August 2012.
159 Interview 21, director of Hope Children Foundation, 17 August 2012.
(2012, p309) or Prince’s upward ‘incorporation’ (2015, drawing on Li 2013). Whilst these practices do indeed resonate with the internationalized, indeed verticalized neoliberal regime of good governance and its demands of an active citizenry, however, there are multiple registers at play.160

‘Voluntarism’, and its associated virtue, is a core legitimation device that has permeated ‘civil society’ since its inception in Western political philosophy. Civil society, as noted in Chapter One, has long been conceived as a distinct realm of public activity. The influence of the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, building on the writings of Locke, compounded this division, whereby society comes together as ‘one body politic’ (Locke 1948 [1689], p44) to institute, but also counterweight, government intervention into the lives of its citizens. This in turn, via Tocqueville (2000 [1865]), instilled civil society with the language of virtue and of community voluntarism in the face of state predation and amorality (see also Dorman 2005, p41; Lewis 2002; Weintraub 1997).

This template has been revived since the 1990s through the return of civil society as a concept again ‘useful to act’ with (Lewis 2002, p570). Civil society, predominantly via NGOs, has thus been aggressively promoted by international organizations to hold African governments to account (Mercer & Green 2013; also Abrahamsen 2000; Mosse & Lewis 2005; Williams & Young 1994). Voluntarism, as the ethic of giving unsalaried time and effort towards a perceived, or claimed, common good, has proven a resurgent legitimation device in this domain. In its most recent articulation, formalized voluntary work has become integral to a range of development interventions throughout Africa, promoted by donors, NGOs and government (Boesten et al. 2011). This recent wave of voluntarism has rightly renewed academic inquiry into such practices, scrutinizing for elements of continuity and change (e.g. Brown & Prince’s collection 2015). Such work, however, overemphasizes the verticality of neoliberal governmentality and foreshortens the importance of various lateral forums.

Mercer and Green, for example, emphasize voluntarism as part of the verticality of the development ‘contracting chain’, and the careful self-positioning by NGO elites within that complex (2013, p107). They argue that the language of voluntarism and of virtue serves to differentiate local civil society from ‘the perceived failures of government’

160 Material from this section forms some of the basis of my forthcoming article ‘Negotiating the public: voluntarism and its work in Tanzania’, *African Affairs* 116 (470), January 2019.
(p111), whereby government elites are set aloft in contrast to the virtuous ‘grassroots’ of civil society (citing Mindry 2001). This dynamic was indeed, as noted, borne out to some extent by discussions with NGO leaders in Bagamoyo district, where numbers are high and resources scarce. These managers reiterated how ‘I have volunteered’ (lit. ‘I have offered myself’), ‘I don’t get anything’, in contrast to the perceived excesses of government elites and indeed larger NGOs. They emphasized the necessity of their work, driven by community needs irrespective of salary. This indeed resonates with Green’s deliberate placement at the bottom of the development hierarchy, in a bid to form partnerships with larger agencies (2012, p309).

Whilst this is of value in some circumstances, however, continual lack of funding and discernible activity may also prove a source of embarrassment for NGOs, delegitimizing them from their peers and, crucially, from local government. Organizations without an office, regular operations or a permanent staff member were derided by district staff as ‘not serious’ or as ‘seasonal workers’. The district Community Development Officer (CDO) was sceptical, as explored, of NGOs entering on a speculative basis. With the CDO placed as the most significant gatekeeper for NGOs in the day-to-day, he controlled access to the right meetings, consultation and planning and, crucially, securing district staff participation in project activities. An NGO which consistently emphasises its low funding and inevitably voluntary nature, therefore, brings the District Council little to the table, preventing it from sitting alongside more ‘serious’ competitors.

Despite this growing ambivalence of voluntarism vs professionalization, it remained a pronounced legitimation device for the larger Voluntary Partnership International (VPI). VPI was voluntary in ethos in that, historically, it placed overseas volunteers alongside salaried Tanzanian staff on a programmatic basis to work on issues of ‘community development’, primarily HIV/AIDS care and prevention. In addition, it drew on their network of trained volunteers at village level, invoking voluntarism and its virtue to differentiate their organization and to promote, even instil, altruism over material interest in their recruits.162

161 Interview 20 with district CDO, August 2011; fieldnotes senior district administrator, May 2012.
162 Interview 26, VPI programme officer/workshop fieldnotes, 4 October 2012.
The expatriate country director, when asked why staff stressed the voluntarist ethic whilst introducing VPI in workshops, responded:

Yes, they [the programme officers] are also an example. Of course they have salaries but…they are not big salaries, not like other NGOs but [they don’t] complain if they have to work during weekends or after working hours. Also they are an example…to understand people that besides their daily lives, to go to the shop or whatever they do, there is something more that they can do. And no one is paying you to do this…As an organization we have a philosophy and VPI philosophy we want also to share with the community. Also because we are training people to do something…it’s not a work so that’s why they put an accent on this aspect that VPI is…voluntary, starting from the name and all people working with the organization. It’s one of the baseline for VPI…to be voluntary.163

Whilst it was true that VPI staff received lower salaries than their INGO counterparts, it was a surprising claim that this would forge affinity with their volunteers, given the obvious disparity in situations. The programme officer who ran the workshop was much more empathetic in her reflections, but ultimately voiced the same ethos:

It’s important [to stress voluntarism] because many people who called to the training or workshop, they expect a lot. Sometimes they think that they’re coming from home, they left their business or their activities there and they came to sit in the class without any…any income, so they expect more from many organizations. So even us they are not happy with 5,000 [Tanzanian shillings] as allowance, they are not happy, because other organizations when they call them sometimes they can give them 15 […] they can give them 10, so VPI we can’t. So when we give them the task, maybe to sensitize, like TOA to go and collect datas, we didn’t facilitate them in anything, we ask them to volunteer. That’s why from the beginning sometimes I prefer, even all the facilitators they need to clear this things.164

Indeed, as will be explored in Chapter Four, this claim that voluntarism and payment were mutually exclusive served predictably as a persistent point of antagonism in workshops. More pertinent to the discussion in hand, however, is that VPI and its voluntarism were strongly sanctioned by the district council with whom, as noted, it conducted joint activities. VPI’s unique placement laterally within the arms of the state, via the district, conferred vertical authority to its work, at times to the point of compulsion (Dodworth 2014). This was also true of their co-produced, virtuous discourse of community voluntarism as a recruitment vetting device. It was a constant endeavour in VPI workshops that the ‘right people’ were selected to do the requisite

163 Interview 54, VPI Country Director, English verbatim, 11 December 2012.
164 Interview 26, VPI programme officer/workshop fieldnotes, English verbatim, 4 October 2012.
work within their communities, supporting this core legitimation device in other forums.\(^{165}\)

There were several challenges, of course, with this idealized form of civic voluntarism packaged upwards to donors, co-produced laterally with the district and lastly downwards, to village recruits. Firstly, voluntarism, particularly in this context, played once again into negative stereotypes of coastal people within Tanzania, whereby people were viewed to have few other demands on their time. This was borne out by endless debates regarding allowances for conducting voluntary work within and between villages. VPI portrayed demands for allowances as dissonant with their voluntarist ethos, whereas their volunteers viewed allowances as an acknowledgement of their time and resource in working on what were perceived as external initiatives.

Secondly, it was based on a flawed conception of the village as a coherent, unitary community. NGO workers of course acknowledged the fractious nature of village level politics and had an intimate knowledge of local power dynamics. Nevertheless, the notion of a community volunteer is built on the assumption that the community both pre-exists and can be moved in a particular direction on a set of issues.\(^ {166}\) This further assumes that volunteers can endlessly detach themselves from and relocate themselves into that context. As such, the individualistic liberalism of the human rights framework clashes with the simultaneous invocation of the community collective and its imputed conservative fabric. The training of individuals as a means to both cohere and rupture the fabric of their presumed community was beset with contradiction. NGO workers informally acknowledged such tensions, even if formally they were compelled to continue to reaffirm the aims of the project.\(^ {167}\)

Lastly, there is an inconsistency in the invocation of voluntarism that is specific to the Tanzanian context, its symbolism entwined with post-independence socialism. President Nyerere’s \textit{Ujamaa}, or community socialism, was portrayed as a return to pre-colonial values of respect, communal property and communal work (1973 [1968]) pp334-340). ‘In traditional African society everybody was a worker’, Nyerere claimed early in his

\(^{165}\) Fieldnotes, VPI workshop, October 2012.
\(^{166}\) On Rose’s Foucauldian take, community assumes a disciplinary form, whereby it forms both the cause and solution of governmental problems (1999).
\(^{167}\) International VPI volunteer ‘you know this work is very hard…even if they can get motivated in the training you know when they get back to their lives, their daily problems…it’s very hard.’
state-building project (1968 [1962], p4), adding later that ‘we can work together voluntarily for our own benefit’ (1973 [1968], p347) at a time of material scarcity. Ujamaa, as laid out most explicitly in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, claimed a virtuous break from an exploitative past (Brennan 2006a, p398) and was a key instrument in the construction of public authority (Hunter 2008). Although Ujamaa failed in many respects, it did institute a regular, often weekly, graft of msaragambo, or public works. Village ‘voluntarism’ was thus state-sanctioned for almost three decades, outliving Nyerere’s time in office. It was on this basis that Advocates International (AI), quietly abandoned voluntarism. The incoming Programme Coordinator ended volunteering initiatives on assuming his post in 2012, reflecting later:

It is like this, in Ujamaa days, socialism in Tanzania is the period 1967 to 1977…it went on further to 1980s, during this period communities were one big family and that is how it was preached by our late Mwalimu, all very well united by our language. There was an official day called harambee where every villager will go out to do community work, being road construction, cleaning et cetera. I remember in 1980s in our village was always every Friday. This behaviour built up in people’s behaviour and eventually became community practice. Was no longer official but willingly people every Friday would go out and do voluntary work. For me, this is volunteering in Tanzania which by then we didn’t call it that name, was harambee or msaragambo. Later this practice died after communities started to lose trust from leaders they elected. In the 1980s and 90s a lot of public parastatals were dying, cooperative societies in villages and districts were pocketed by educated individuals through corruption or abuse of power. Since then the spirit of community, willingness to go out and voluntarily help in development work died. What I am saying here, the term doesn’t work, volunteer for who? Why volunteering while we know public money is not spent rationally?

For this staff member, therefore, if NGOs are serious about distancing themselves from the failed government of Tanzania’s past, they must also reject this flawed conception of voluntarism. In justifying his decision to abandon voluntarism, he submitted it was wrong of any ‘public’ actor to sanction such work onto the shoulders of those who could afford it least:

[T]hose who devotedly offer their time to volunteer are either those required to do so by virtue of their faith, religion, values or those who feel they are better off, they are wealthier than community they serve. You can’t volunteer from nothing, you studied primary by single meal per day, you got to secondary by paying your own fees through long hours of labour…[H]ow do you expect…most Tanzanian who have come from this tough road to eventually volunteer for others? This all makes volunteer idea so tough here. People will volunteer with pay and not without pay, and that is how volunteerism should be considered here.168

168 Email correspondence AI programme coordinator, English verbatim, February 2013.
AI, however, was alone in abandoning voluntarism in Bagamoyo and thus crafting distance from the District Council. For AI, it was no longer a legitimation device given its revised advocacy focus at various levels. It needed to be highly reactive to political events at all levels, seeking to convert such into leverage over government actors. As such, the extensity and endorsement proffered by large scale networks were no longer productive, superseded by a ‘free radical’ approach, forging fleeting alliances as necessary. Whilst AI’s abrupt shedding of its volunteers caused some consternation amongst existing recruits, as will be explored in the next chapter, it offered improved manoeuvrability and a cutting-edge brand of development advocacy, thus ahead of its peers.

Other organizations, however, with considerably less economic, social and symbolic capital than AI, drew consistently on the presence of voluntary networks as a legitimating device. This was not reducible to the ‘virtuous location’ (Mindry 2001) of the (fictional) community over centralized government, although this was invoked. It was, rather, that the existence of a voluntary network allowed development managers to convey further lateral legitimation to their district peers, as well as vertically to donors and the communities in which they work. The relationships between volunteers themselves and extensity, territoriality and forms of representational practice have already been explored. The institutionalization of voluntary networks duly conferred a scale and depth of presence; temporal continuity; boundaries of influence; and forms of consent. When Community Health’s funding had come to a close, for example, the manager continued to draw heavily on the presence and activity of its network to maintain an impression of temporal and spatial extensity. When asked if their volunteers were still working beyond the end of the project, he replied:

They are not tired, by the way. The way we are working with these people we say ‘you are working for your own people, who have honoured you!’

Building a voluntary network, therefore, is part of such contemporary projects’ infrastructure and yet unavoidably garners uncertainty and ambiguity within such boundaries and beyond.

It is evident, therefore, that voluntarism as a legitimation device is multifaceted and changing. AI rejected voluntarism as a break with the failed state-led development of

169 Interview 49, Community Health project manager, 29 November 2012.
Tanzania’s past, in favour of a new development template. VPI, in contrast, continued to embrace voluntarism and its virtue as an indispensable part of the ‘community-led’ discourse, which, contrary to Westernized accounts of civil society, it co-produced with the district council. This drew on residual symbolic capital from Nyerere’s era, in turn appropriated from colonialism, thus representing more continuity than change. Smaller organizations clung to their volunteering networks in the face of increasingly sparse funding, as a tidemark of their previous extensity and actuality. Voluntarism in Tanzania is thus not confined to civil society but forms a template for public action around which different actors coalesce. Furthermore, it is not merely ‘virtue’ but the social infrastructure of voluntary networks themselves that proffers institutional presence. These claims, however, are not unidirectional in their application but negotiated in the everyday by those subject to such, the focus of the next two chapters.

**Conclusion**

This chapter sought to explore legitimation practices at a district level, looking laterally across a distinct hub of activity around which local development elites are increasingly centred. In the words of a local government employee ‘the district level is really where you find all kinds of people; it is really the grassroots.’

The location of the elusive grassroots aside, the district provides a clear forum for the construction of public authority. The increasing number of players active at a district level accentuates this process of claim-making, as actors seek to legitimate themselves to interested parties, including peers and local government. With the district council and, to a lesser extent other NGOs, acting as gatekeepers to further legitimation, situational hierarchies accentuate the continual process of entreaty and repudiation of such players. This is part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699), which became apparent across each practice.

**Extensity**, in both its spatial and temporal forms, draws on the ‘latent legitimation’ (Packenham 1970) derived from institutional continuity. It is about forging and maintaining a presence, enabling symbolic representations of an organization’s actuality

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170 Fieldnotes, discussion with district officer at Eco-Coast offices, 9 April 2013.
in other forums. This process may take place in conjunction with other players, typically through the mirroring of the state architecture, or in competition, as players look to dwarf others, thus forming situational hierarchies. **Territoriality** is the counterpoint to extensity, whereby ubiquity of presence is replaced with exclusivity and the formation and maintenance of bounded spheres of influence. Extensity and territoriality are thus linked as primary spatial forms of power, but what is evident, as per Sack’s work (1986), is that such forms are no longer the purview of the state, nor of ‘high politics’. Non-government organizations equally seek the space within which to govern and such claims to govern are forged and experienced in the everyday.

The fluidity and ambivalence of legitimation practice is highlighted through the use of state relations. Domains between state and non-state are not fixed, meaning non-government organizations may also engage in ‘state-like practices’ (Lund 2011, p75; also Gupta & Sharma 2006) in legitimating their right to govern. Positionality vis-à-vis the district council was thus fluid amongst NGOs. If ‘government is the one who gives us identity’, this may be realized either through its entreaty, as in the case of Voluntary Partnership International, or its repudiation, as in the case of Advocates International. As noted, however, such relations are not entrenched and organizations may assume different aspects at different times. Extensity, territoriality and state relations interrelate with symbolic claims of representation and of voluntarism, which assume particular forms in the Tanzanian context.

The dynamics of entreaty and repudiation, of proximity and distance, are indeed most stark in relation to claims of representation. This discloses an intrinsic ambivalence in representational practice between claims to stand for and to act for a particular constituency. For development actors, whether NGOs, the CSA or the Tanzanian state, the logic of acting for the Other ultimately wins out, foregrounding distance from, and repudiation of, the groups which they mean to represent. Representational performance is thus particularly spatialized, which in turn enable claims of interstitiality. **Voluntarism** also has a spatialized component, conventionally portrayed in Western-centric thought as part of a civic sphere separate to and distant from that of the state. In the Tanzanian context, however, voluntarism in fact discloses an overlap with state-like practices. Voluntarism, in turn, affords other legitimation in the form of extensity as well as representation, proffering ideas of institutional infrastructure, consent and reciprocity.
In summary, creating the space to govern demands a multi-faceted positionality, and which in turn necessarily involves a lateral component. Looking laterally, however, does not imply equality amongst peers, even though actors can be similarly positioned. Situational hierarchies form as result of the continual construction of public authority ‘as an active and contested process of assertion, legitimization and exercise’ (Lund 2006a, p679). The countervailing currents of such legitimation are borne out in the twin processes of entreaty and of repudiation of other players within a field, which run through each legitimation practice. Legitimation practices, therefore, are not symbolically or substantively distinct, but in fact strongly interrelate and overlap within a complex but empirically discernible process.
Chapter Four:
Vertical legitimation:
‘To the communities’ and back

All the NGOs are at the district level – where are they working now? They are not working here! We have a lot of different issues here, but the organizations don’t come…What are the district doing now for us?

These are the words of the chairperson of Kiharaka village, Kerege. Kiharaka is a rapidly changing, highly politicized environment between Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam’s centres. In these comments, the chairperson strongly and succinctly repudiated the claims of NGOs resident at a district level, whether that of extensity, state, representation or material resource. Several organizations, as will be explored, cited Kiharaka as the exemplar of its work, whilst another as its most defective. The chairperson, however, discloses a keen awareness of the multipositionality of such organizations. Downward legitimation and its negotiation have been rendered invisible by the elite-driven accounts of legitimation to date. Rather than downward legitimation as unidirectional, put out ‘to the communities’ for consumption, it is negotiated by constituents in the everyday. Individuals affirm, contest and indeed reject, the authority of both state and non-state to intervene into their lives. Indeed, this has very real implications for the ability of organizations to effect the actions of others.

Whilst the previous chapter, therefore, centred on lateral legitimation practice at a district level, downward legitimation forms the empirical nub of both this chapter and the next. Lateral legitimation, between peers, collaborators and competitors, provides an additional forum for the entreaty and repudiation of other actors, as part of legitimation’s countervailing currents. Such claims are then projected vertically, both upwards to donors and the international sphere but also downwards to the intended subjects of governance. Whilst there is sufficient critique of how NGOs legitimate themselves upwards (e.g. Anders 2005; Gould 2005; Lister 2003; Mercer & Green 2013; Mosse 2005; Mosse & Lewis 2005; 2006; Ossewaarde et al 2008; Townsend et al. 2002;
Walle 1999), there is little on how discursive practices are negotiated at the ‘interface’ (Long 1989) between district and village.

In this chapter, I briefly revisit how NGOs legitimate themselves to their constituents but then, crucially, how these discursive claims are appraised and contested at the ‘local’ village and ward levels. This is in one sense a bid to ‘study up’ (Nader 1972), but also to counter the verticality bias of extracting data along a singular plane. The chapter thus continues, methodologically, to embrace the ethnographic ‘sensibility’ (Schatz 2009), looking laterally at the broader context of people’s lives. After providing an overview of Kiharaka’s rapidly changing socio-political environment, the chapter proceeds to explore how claims (re)produced at the district level are appraised and negotiated within each legitimation practice.

**Bagamoyo in miniature: legitimation in Kiharaka**

This chapter draws on four weeks’ fieldwork, primarily in November 2012, centred predominantly on Kiharaka village in Kerege ward. Kerege ward is situated approximately midway between Bagamoyo town and Dar es Salaam (see Figure 4.1). Bagamoyo’s influx of investment and population, alongside increasing inequalities, are encapsulated in the ward’s changing fortunes. It is at the furthest southeast corner of the district and directly borders Kinondoni, which is one of Dar’s three administrative districts. Kerege is nominally rural, but second only to Bagamoyo’s urban ward in population density, registering at 205 per km$^2$ (Tanzanian Census, 2012) (see Figure 4.2). It is one of the newest of Bagamoyo’s 22 wards, carved out of its parent ward Zinga in 2009. It houses some of the most rapidly changing peri-urban environments along the mushrooming Dar-Bagamoyo corridor, as well as remote and underserved communities along the coast (Dodworth 2014). As such, there is uneven distribution of development intervention across Kerege, from the sparse to the most heavily congested in the district.
Kiharaka village is almost five kilometres from the tar road at Kerege but is rapidly becoming a construction hotspot. Land pressures and urban sprawl from Dar es Salaam have intensified, with rich elites venturing further afield to secure affordable, expansive
and flat plots of land within commuting distance to town. Indeed, Kiharaka was due to be declared a ‘new town’, whereby land usage would no longer be under village governance. A strange juxtaposition had developed between the ‘village-like’ centre, with traditionally constructed stalls and eateries, and the enormous, multi-storey, gated villas dotted around the periphery in various stages of completion (see Figure 4.3). The land issue had thus become a highly charged one. Ongoing ownership disputes, and the broader contest regarding who should benefit from the land dividend, ran to the heart of Kiharaka village governance and politics. Disputed and fraudulent land claims were heard twice weekly by the Land Disputes Committee. At the time of research in 2012, the village chairperson was in a legal dispute regarding a Tanzanian investment company’s claim to a sizeable area of land, having passed a by-law to block it, which had escalated to the district court. The village office saw an almost daily stream of private cars and 4x4 vehicles with rich professionals coming to finalise land sales, building permission or to register as residents.

Figure 4.4: Picture of large gated villa behind the school near Kiharaka’s centre

The land issue thus forged a highly sensitive climate in which increasing numbers of NGOs sought to intervene. Indeed, land had a role to play in Kiharaka’s very inception as a village in 2009, breaking away from its previous status as a sub-village of

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171 Fieldnotes from Kiharaka land debate, 16 August 2012.
Mapinga. Advocates International (AI) claimed a pivotal role in this process, whereby Kiharaka villagers were successfully ‘mobilized’ to exercise their rights and to advocate for improved local service provision. This underpinned the AI coordinator’s claims: ‘You can say [Kiharaka] is an AI village’. The land issue drew AI to Kiharaka in the first instance, with their land governance component focusing on communities near Bagamoyo’s two tar roads. AI claimed that Kiharaka continued to serve as a leading light of participatory democracy and a model for others. The village chairperson had formerly been an AI Community Development Facilitator, receiving rights-based training on various legal and governance issues. AI emphasized its continuing ‘special relationship’ with Kiharaka, positioning itself as the mouthpiece for villagers’ interests and their efforts to secure rights to land in the face of big investors.

This is not, however, to conject that Kiharaka’s leadership was representative of a homogenous ‘community’, holding uniform interests regarding its land boom. Some villagers, especially those nearer access tracks, had benefitted greatly from the hike in land values, generating liquid assets through the sub-division of their small plots of land for sale. Village income was healthy, given the village is eligible for ten percent of land sales. It had a well-maintained and resourced village office with quality fittings, chairs and stationery as compared to the other 30 odd villages I visited and a budget in relative healthy surplus. It was also likely, however, that village leaders had benefitted individually from the grey area of land valuations, officially recording sales at less than the market price and extracting the surplus. The chairperson, for example, until an accident in 2012, was driving a large Cherokee Jeep, to the bemusement of visitors who associated this fortune with the land windfall. The headteacher, himself an ‘outsider’ as is often the case with teachers posted in Tanzania, rued how Kiharaka had squandered its land dividend until there was nothing left for sale:

To say honestly, there is a problem of leadership in this village. They have put the issue of land sales over the development of the village.

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172 Kiharaka had split from its parent village due to its growing population and local demands for services. The claim was accelerated by the construction and establishment by AI of a primary school, precipitating the need for it and its locality to be formally recognised by the state.

173 Fieldnotes, discussion with AI programme coordinator, 16 August 2012.

174 Interview 52, Advocates International programme coordinator.

175 Fieldnotes, discussion with headteacher, 15 November 2012.
He supported this with the fact that various village development committees, of which he was a member, had not met for a year.

It was impossible that AI staff would have been oblivious to this grey area of land sales in Kiharaka. At the same time, the village proved a useful and fertile testing ground for AI’s evolving strategic approach. Key relationships had been embedded, providing a conducive environment for innovative or high profile events. Any illegitimate income had not diminished the chairperson’s prestige as an advocate against larger scale land appropriation by big business, which had the perceived complicity of district level staff. His remarkable resilience in the face of higher authorities, using the district court case against the investment company as a soapbox, meant he was a continual thorn in the side of district executives. AI sought to position itself within, or rather ‘between’ such politics.

Whilst AI trumpeted its special relationship, strongly legitimated within the leadership, other NGOs experienced rather different outcomes. Kiharaka’s congested land development arena was mirrored by a high number of NGOs vying for influence. In Kerege ward as a whole, government staff reported the presence of 6 international NGOs at different times (Voluntary Partnership International, UNICEF, Red Cross, CAMFED, Pathfinder, AI and Population Services International) headquartered, with the exception of VPI, in Dar es Salaam. This meant that several large organizations were not registered with the district council (and so did not feature on the list of 124 NGOs). Pathfinder, for example, worked via an agreement with the district hospital. Others, like CAMFED, were registered at a national level but recognized and mandated via ‘working groups’ within Bagamoyo District Council. The majority of these international organizations focused on health, except CAMFED, which focuses on girls’ education. Ward staff named four other national/district level NGOs (GenderNet, UWAMABA, Kerege Development Organization and Youth Health) operating within the ward. The organizations reported to be operational in Kiharaka village differed again from that of the ward. The village chairperson named firstly and foremost AI and, when prompted, acknowledged the presence of Care International, Eco-Coast and Community Health, outright denying the presence of VPI. The difficulty in ascertaining which NGOs were operating at which levels was endemic in Kerege, as in Bagamoyo as a whole, reflecting

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176 Some of these organizations have been given pseudonyms – see Chapter Two.
reporting biases as well as the intermittent circumvention of local government by larger INGOs.

The predominant analytical emphasis on upward, and indeed formalized, legitimation renders other forms of legitimation, as explored, less visible. In particular, downward legitimation and its everyday negotiation have been starkly absent. Over my time in Kiharaka, I sought to explore the resonance of downward legitimation claims, produced primarily at the district level, for those that NGOs worked with. The different fortunes of VPI and AI in particular epitomized divergent vertical legitimation strategies in Kiharaka. In this way, the Kiharaka case provided a highly congested, politicized and polarizing environment, but one that encapsulated broader contemporary changes in Bagamoyo more widely. Such an environment brought such divergent legitimation practice and effect markedly to the fore.

**Extensity: ‘All the NGOs are at the district!’**

My first visit to Kiharaka had taken place as part of my Masters dissertation in June 2011. My curiosity had been sparked when both AI and Community Health had independently suggested I visited to gain a better understanding of their work. Having a volunteer at the heart of every ‘community’ was a key legacy claim of Community Health, with each one represented by a blue pin in every village on their map of the district. The manager pointed to Kiharaka’s pin, urging me to ‘ask for the health attendant; everyone will know him’. I arrived at Kiharaka village office, met the chairperson and spent the rest of the day in the company of a ‘Community Change Agent’ (CCA) named Akili, recruited and trained by Community Health. Akili suggested that I accompany him on home-based care visits to new or expectant mothers. We visited four households and I watched as Akili spoke with small groups of women about their health and their baby, discussing symptoms, hygiene, breast-feeding and so on, using a small flip-chart of images as prompts.

Despite his skill and knowledge, Akili appeared ill at ease in those localities and the relationships with the women laboured and uncomfortable. It was not until I visited him again in 2012 that I realised how far he lived from Kiharaka in Changwahela, a different
sub-village of their parent village Mapinga. As such, Changwahela and Kiharaka were formerly part of one enormous village, which spanned over 6,000 hectares (60km²) (Bagamoyo District Profile 2011). Since Kiharaka’s ‘graduation’ to full village in 2009, however, it had become a completely separate jurisdiction. Changwahela was over five kilometres away from Kiharaka (nine from Mapinga) across challenging, swampy and flood-prone terrain. Changwahela’s remoteness meant that it had markedly inferior quality of services, even compared to Kiharaka, with no clinic, school or potable water supply; water was biked in from six kilometres away. Akili seemed alien to Kiharaka because he was, coming to undertake health work with people who did not know or accept him. Akili’s aptitude for the work was negated by such competing formal jurisdictional authority.

This vignette encapsulates how district level claims of extensity, i.e. the projection of scale both spatially and temporally, faltered at the village level. In this case, understandings of formalized territoriality confounded Community Health’s projection of extensity, having repeatedly impressed that their agents worked at the heart of every community. As it transpired over time, only the village chairperson had heard of the CCA’s role, his name or Community Health and this lack of familiarity had hindered him on home visits in Kiharaka. The CCA’s ability to legitimate himself was undermined, compounded by his rejection by the village leadership: ‘that health volunteer?’ the village chairperson retorted when I subsequently asked after him, ‘He can’t work here anymore!’

Remarkably, given the remote location of Akili’s sub-village, he had worked tirelessly across the parent village as a health volunteer for five organizations, at times concurrently. Whilst there were some material benefits for this work, depending on the organization, Akili was emphatic of his motivation to help ‘the community’ as well as the satisfaction he derived from learning and utilising new skills (see voluntarism). As far as his work as Kiharaka CCA, however, Community Health’s optimistic claims were misplaced. Akili had long ceased working in the village, given the formal boundaries as well as the informal delegitimation of the project by its constituents and the village leadership. The blue pin in Kiharaka in the map displayed on the wall of the Community Health office supposedly represented Akili but in effect meant very little, even before

177 Interview 31, Kiharaka village chairperson, 25 October 2012, emphasis in original.
the villages’ boundaries were redrawn. The programme manager was not and could not be familiar with the political geography of individual wards, given the scale of the district. The broader point, rather, is that this claim of extensity had been explicitly rejected by many in Kiharaka for some time. This was unbeknownst to the organization who had recommended I visit there to understand the quality, scale and depth of its work.

Community Health was not the only instance whereby a claim of extensity had been strongly scrutinized and contested by the vocal Kiharaka leadership. The leadership strongly denied that VPI had any presence in their village at all, via their association with the Community Justice Facilitators (CJFs). When I asked the chairperson who was Kiharaka’s CJF he cried:

No! There is no CJF here! There was one in Mapinga. I was a CDF [Community Development Facilitator] for Mapinga and now, since I am the chairperson, there are two more CDFs in this village. Because CDFs are a product of AI; CJFs are a product of VPI.\(^{178}\)

This was a clear repudiation of VPI. The Village Executive Officer and headteacher also said they were unaware of the presence of VPI or any CJF. When VPI finally came to the village to summon their ‘stakeholders’ in a monitoring visit some months later, the chairperson did not attend despite the letter issued by the district council. The Village Executive Officer reported at the meeting that the CJF had been informed but had not been able, or had forgotten, to attend. In his absence, the VEO accused him, like others, of returning ‘silently’ from training, without feedback.\(^ {179}\) The delegitimation of VPI’s presence in Kiharaka despite, or indeed because of, its association with the district (see state) indeed precipitated informal strategies of silence and withdrawal. This flew in the face of one of VPI’s key legitimation practices, whereby it reached all areas of the district and was coextensive with the government machinery itself. As ‘proximity and presence matter’ in the construction of authority (Allen 2003, p3), it duly falters in their absence.

Prior to the VPI monitoring visit, I had found the name of Kiharaka’s CJF, Zawadi, listed on the wall of the Kerege ward office. When I eventually located him, he was returning home from a full day’s labour on a construction site in the village. He

\(^{178}\) Kiharaka chairperson \textit{op cit.}

\(^{179}\) Fieldnotes from VPI’s monitoring visit, 22 November 2012.
approached me with much caution and some animosity, founded on a concern that I had come to demand why he was not fulfilling his duties as CJF. The interview that followed left the greatest impression of my fieldwork. Once he understood I wished to empathise with his situation, he explained at length the futility of his task. He had been trained at the same time as the other CJFs in 2008. Although the new village boundaries had caused some confusion, it was the local leadership’s rejection of VPI’s work that had prevented him from assuming his duties. This rejection had had a prohibitive effect on Zawadi’s ability to undertake the work, as he lamented:

> After Mapinga split about two or three years ago I was sent to a refresher training [for CJFs]. I reported back to the village leaders but I have not yet been presented to the village…So often these days I no longer follow up [on this work] when the time comes to get my information…I feel bad that perhaps I have not followed up. But then I have still not been introduced to the community. I have asked ‘why have you not introduced me?’ but I still have not had a response.\(^{180}\)

Whilst not Zawadi’s key priority, the burden of this role had nonetheless proven the source of much frustration. It had evidently been demoralizing for this man, whom his VPI-associated peers in the ward had known to be a highly motivated volunteer. His absence during VPI’s monitoring trip to Kiharaka later that year was seen by their staff to be symptomatic of both the CJF and the wider village’s failings to engage with the appropriate work and, indeed, their own ‘development’. In fact, it was almost entirely symptomatic of the rejection of VPI’s presence in the village on the part of its leadership.

VPI’s spatial extensity, therefore, a key legitimation device in more remote areas, had faltered in congested Kiharaka. AI’s successful legitimation, in contrast, especially amongst the leadership, had worked to the exclusion of others (see territoriality). This was neatly captured by AI and VPI’s responses as to why their projects had so clearly succeeded or failed respectively; both replied ‘leadership!’ without hesitation. The village leaders were happy to service one NGO but not both. Indeed, given the chairperson’s acrimonious relations with the district, particularly in their criticism of unlawful land ‘grabs’, VPI’s close association with the district bureaucracy did not play in their favour. Kiharaka was, in return, seen as a renegade village, which consistently failed in the district’s development efforts (see \textit{state}).

\(^{180}\) Interview 33, Kiharaka CJF, 25 October 2012.
Members of the Kiharaka leadership were, in turn, highly sceptical of the perceived development ‘racket’ at a district level and the retention of resource at that level:

All the NGOs are at the district level – where are they working now? They are not working here! We have a lot of different issues here, but the organizations don’t come…What are the district doing now for us? We are the stakeholders. In fact, the district council contributes [to the issue] too. They don’t ask organizations what they are doing and where. It is an issue of district leadership. Every organization comes with their own plan, for example, ‘we are working on health – we have this plan’ or ‘HIV/AIDS – we have this plan’ but they don’t implement. Organizations are not doing the work; they write the reports, they get money and they eat. Eco-Coast came with their plan and we cooperated, in that mangrove project, but now they are missing. GenderNet said they would come but until now they are not here. They said to our mothers [women] to join and to organize and you will get a loan but until now [gestures empty hands].

Other organizations also failed this continuity test of temporal extensity, unpredictably coming in and out of focus over time. As Akili ruced of Community Health, whose project had disintegrated by 2013:

The Community Health project just died without notice. When we went to submit our information we just gave them to the guard. We still needed the project – we’d started to see changes. I was angry, I lost motivation. The training had given us a new way of educating the community…I don’t know why Community Health don’t communicate with their stakeholders inside [wadau wa ndani] – they only care about their external stakeholders [wadau wa nje] [Would you work with them again?] Community Health helped my kin. If they came again I would work with them again, but I would see the way in which they returned.

Akili was obviously aware of the claims communicated externally by Community Health, but the extensity and reciprocity projected by its manager had little resonance given the manner of their departure. Whilst this had served to delegitimate Community Health to some extent, however, Akili was open to a new negotiation, highlighting his agency to do so.

Another experienced health volunteer Afia, who had been trained by several organizations since 2008, most recently by VPI in 2011, was also not present at the VPI November monitoring meeting due to the leadership thwarting communications. Afia had earlier remarked how difficult it was to know which organizations were still current at any one time:

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181 Fieldnotes, Kiharaka Village Executive Officer, 29 October 2012.
182 Interview 36, CCA/CDF volunteer, 31 October 2012.
[Do you still work with VPI?] Yes, but it’s hard to know as they are very far away and there is little communication. But until now I am still working with VPI.

Afia added that, when speaking of another health organization Pathfinder, long periods of time passed between contact, whereby challenges arose and circumstances changed:

I haven’t sat with them. I haven’t sat with them and we have challenges. It’s better that we sit with them; it’s been a long time since we received the training on reporting and recording, a long time, and I haven’t received any follow-up training.\(^{183}\)

She noted at length how these issues of continuity were exacerbated by problems of coordination, as organizations etched small project ‘enclaves’ of influence where they were recognized and relationships embedded.

To summarize, the picture of spatio-temporal extensity, constructed by many NGO actors laterally at a district level as well as upwards to national government and donors, contrasted strongly with one of flux and discontinuity at the village level. NGOs’ claims of extensity, therefore, both geographical and temporal, were strongly contested by the Kiharaka leadership, as well as scrutinized by the volunteers these NGOs work with. Such contestation highlights a process of delegitimation of many organizations claiming Kiharaka operations, hindering their authority to effect behaviour in others. It also foregrounds the relationship between extensity as ubiquity and territoriality as exclusivity, as the competing spatial forms that power takes.

**Territoriality: ‘AI are very close to us’**

Territoriality and extensity are (inversely) linked as spatial forms of power. Whilst extensity is characterized by ubiquity, at district, national or international scales, territoriality is the bounding of sub-spheres of influence within a system. As explored, the district-wide extensity claimed by VPI and Community Health had been negated by key post-holders in Kiharaka. This had been in favour of a much stronger alliance with AI, to the exclusion of other players. Some of this, as I will explore, was underwritten by the levels of investment by AI, both in terms of material investment but also in its successful perception of continuity in time, which in turn bolstered claims of

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\(^{183}\) Interview 42, Afia, CCA for Community Health/ VPI TOA volunteer, 6 November 2012.
representation. The strong territorial claim made by the AI Programme Coordinator, that ‘you can say that Kiharaka is an AI village’, was clearly acknowledged by village leaders. As such, a mutual covenant was evident between AI staff and Kiharaka’s leadership. ‘AI are very close to us’, remarked Femida, a prominent leader and member of the village government when asked by a government-sanctioned researcher to name active organizations. ‘So AI is a major [big] institution?’ ‘Yes’, she replied, ‘they are in this village’.184

The basis of the contract, however, was expressed somewhat differently. Clearly, AI viewed their relationship with the village as intertwined with the personal leadership and qualities of the village chairperson, who graduated to the post with AI support and ‘mobilization’. They emphasized his prior role as a Community Development Facilitator (CDF), implying that AI provided him with the skills and knowledge he required to assume the role as chairperson and in turn to mobilize the community using a rights-based agenda. Whilst the chairperson did not deny his longstanding relationship with AI, and was candid about his previous role as CDF, the legitimation of AI’s presence in Kiharaka village was grounded firmly in resource transfer:

AI are mainly at the school. They have, for example, built over 70% of the school. But they have also had successes in the community, in enabling [people] to give their ideas and speak their minds.185

Other leaders, such as Femida and the Village Executive Officer, had a similar view:

We complained as mothers that we had no basic services and we’re so grateful they built us a school and there’s a pump. They’ve helped us a lot. So AI are very close to us.186

We thank AI! They’ve built classrooms, they’ve given us water, they’ve built teachers’ houses.187

AI regularly evaded in its lateral and upward representations the role that material resource transfer played in legitimating their local presence. It preferred to focus on its proximity to, and representation of, ‘the people’ and their interests, building enclaves in the face of government or corporate interests. AI, given its rhetoric of community

184 Femida, women’s group leader and village government representative, commenting in a consultation meeting for environmental research, undertaken with the District Council. Fieldnotes 15 November 2012. Emphasis in original.
185 Interview 31, Kiharaka village chairperson, 25 October 2012.
186 Fieldnotes, Femida, 15 November 2012.
187 Fieldnotes, Kiharaka VEO, 29 October 2012.
mobilization and bottom-up development, increasingly downplayed the child sponsorship component of its programme, as top-down resource transfer did not fit with its evolving discourse.

It was evident, however, that the regular transfer of resource to the school, via its child sponsorship programme, purchased the initial space, or territory, in which to deepen relations with key collaborators in the village. AI’s economic capital over time indeed converted to something more symbolic. It is not sufficient, therefore, as Bourdieu would emphasize, to argue that only ‘money talks’; AI volunteers, as those of other NGOs, were indeed clear that there are many motivations to work with a particular organization or initiative beyond material interest (see voluntarism). It is rather that the terms of Kiharaka’s contract with AI were different in emphasis from those projected laterally and upwards from a district level. AI’s legitimation comprised territoriality and representation, but which were tacitly underwritten by historically investing material resource.

Indeed, AI’s special relationship with Kiharaka and especially its school community could be unpicked further. The child sponsorship component of AI’s work demanded a large amount of data collection on each child every quarter. This process was affirmed and contested in different ways. The liaison for this was called the Community Resource Person, whom AI predictably emphasized to extend to the heart of the community to understand intimately the immediate environment. It was not until late in my fieldwork when I accompanied AI to Kiharaka for data collection that I discovered that their community resource came from the adjacent Mapinga village.\(^{188}\) The woman aided AI with several schools in Kerege and was adept at the work. The idea that the Community Resource Person was from Kiharaka’s community, however, providing tacit endorsement and legitimation of AI’s work, was not accurate.

The early process of crafting territory by AI, by then well established in Kiharaka, was brought into sharp relief through nascent relations within Talawanda, in the south west of the district. AI had recently identified Talawanda and its new neighbour ward Pera as ‘marginalized’ communities, with respect to political voice, government and NGO presence. The area was a strong fit for AI’s shifting strategic focus away from service

\(^{188}\) Fieldnotes, Kiharaka, 22 May 2013.
provision towards good governance and land rights. There was a large private firm prospecting and acquisitioning land at a rapid rate in the area, with the aim to build a cement factory. By May 2013, it had acquired 6,000 hectares and yet its original approval was for only 200. The acquisitions were at best below market value and at worst corrupt, as planning protocols and avowed hectare rates were not adhered to, seemingly without sanction from the district. AI was becoming intricately involved in championing their own construction of villagers’ rights.

I accompanied AI as they introduced themselves to a new village in Pera late into fieldwork in May 2013. It was a full village meeting, organized by the leadership at AI’s direct request. There were around 70 men, women and children present and the meeting lasted just over 90 minutes. Whilst the AI programme coordinator emphasized AI to be a ‘private’, charitable organization free of ‘politics’, he also emphasized close relationships with local government, particularly ward-level administrators and counsellors. The coordinator drew first on the Talawanda Ward Executive Officer and then an adjacent village’s chairperson, to introduce AI and its work to the Pera villagers. He further emphasized AI’s established relationship with Talawanda, Pera’s close neighbour and parent ward, in justifying its expansion into that particular village. In response to a comment of the WEO that AI works to help all children, the coordinator modified:

It’s true – it’s all children, all children of Tanzania, we’re in all areas. But for now, for these two or three years, we want particularly to focus on [lit. to hold on to] Pera and Talawanda.

189 Fieldnotes, discussions with AI programme officer, 22 May 2013.
190 Fieldnotes from sensitization meeting in new village, 9 May 2013.
AI’s practice of deepening territoriality, therefore, placing boundaries around the immediate political locality, played a part in building trust with villagers, the majority of whom had not heard of the organization, its activities or volunteers. Locating itself at the ward level, to the exclusion of other wards, was an attempt by AI to craft operational space whilst also distancing itself from district-level politik. Once again, the terms of the ‘special relationship’ with other villages in Talawanda projected at such meetings were affirmed, contested and indeed rejected within Talawanda itself. In one incident, for example, a family refused to allow photographs to be taken of their children or home in service of the child sponsorship programme, despite their children being part of the intervention. The AI officer commented, exasperated, ‘ah, they don’t know the benefits of the project’, with a local resident responding wryly, ‘oh, they know’.191

It is important to note, therefore, that despite the comparative success of AI over VPI in Kiharaka, legitimization did not hinge entirely on the views of the leadership. The legitimacy of Care International, for example, was explicitly rejected by the Kiharaka chairperson, saying:

191 Fieldnotes, 9 May 2013.
No one [from Care] has come to our office, which is a big problem. If they don’t come to the office they do not have the authority to work with the communities.192

‘Formal’ legitimacy, however, as argued in Chapter One, plays only a contributory role and is not decisive in contemporary legitimation. Non-state actors, for instance, are able to go around the organs of the state when expedient to do so, even if they borrow intermittently from state authority. Despite Care’s lack of protocol in accessing the village, delegitimising it to leaders, there remained a strong affiliation among a group of Kiharaka women to the legacy of a particular Care savings project, to which they continued to refer to as ‘Care’. The chairperson, having served as head of Kiharaka only, was likely unaware of the original project genesis, when Care operated under the jurisdiction of the parent village Mapinga.

This project was thus an anomalous fragment of an earlier Care programme, centred primarily on Dar municipalities but having forayed into adjacent districts. The project, however, had exited rapidly over the misuse of project funds, with several staff dismissed.193 As such, existing staff at Care’s headquarters in Dar were unaware of the previous project’s coverage in Bagamoyo district, and therefore the continuing identification with the organization of a group of women in Kiharaka. Some of the group’s members also mentioned that no one from Care had come for a long time, wondering what had happened. This identification with Care still served to exclude new NGOs seeking to implement savings projects with women. An endorsed territoriality, therefore, was reflected in the affiliation with Care and the scepticism of new prospectors. One leader Rahema, the chair of the group, told me, in response whether GenderNet had a presence among women in the village, ‘No - we are Care; they are GenderNet’.[gestures outside village].194

GenderNet, it transpired, had similarly attempted to organize groups but had failed to fulfil its promise of the timely distribution of funds, at the time of research. The network therefore, as explored in representation, failed to legitimate itself in Kiharaka. Whilst there were many reasons for this, a key factor was that many of the women were already part of the Care savings and revolving loan group. I attended several of the group’s meetings, which administered a savings and loans system seemingly flawlessly.

193 Interview 60, Care International Women’s Economic Development Officer, 19 April 2012.
194 Interview 40, Care group’s chairperson, 5 November 2012.
The group had a strong internal coherence and a high level of affiliation if not with Care staff, who had long ceased to monitor the programme, then the ‘Care system’ (mfumo wa Care) and retained a Care identity more broadly. The formal, if fluid, boundaries of the Care initiative, therefore, were still informally enacted by women in their everyday lives, unpredicted and, indeed, unnoticed by the organization. The endorsement of Care worked to the exclusion of other women’s groups, meaning a form of territorialized identity impeded others’ claims of extensity.

Whilst the use of volunteers has been examined as primarily a form of extensity, there is also an element of its counterpoint territoriality, as NGOs move indirectly to craft their own enclaves of influence: ‘these are my people!’ From volunteers’ perspectives, however, the overall impact of multiple NGOs building multiple spheres of influence, at times pulling in different directions, can be counterproductive:

You need to work together as a team...Starting from the members, yourself until you get a solution to the problem. Now you find you have lost each other, before you reach anywhere you have lost each other and then work becomes a burden to me; volunteering to report becomes difficult, and you have your own needs you see...advocacy is good but it requires hard work and for people to really work together.\(^\text{195}\)

The proliferation of these village volunteers, as each organization sought to craft and embed their own operational space, not only led to the dilution of such roles and responsibilities, it diluted the influence of these organizations. Indeed, it deflected responsibility away from the village government.

To conclude, territoriality provides a counterpoint to extensity through its exclusionary practices. Boundaries, at times formalized in juridico-legal practices and at others informally enacted, provide a primary form of power relations. This is not, however, purely material but admits of a strong ideational component; boundaries are social, not just physical, phenomena (Ruggie 1993). Whilst the AI example illustrated the importance of underwriting territorial claims with the investment of time and resource, therefore, the Care women foregrounded the importance of identity in the enactment of territorial claims. These women endorse and reciprocate particular boundaries in the everyday, irrespective of state and indeed non-state intervention. Such findings

\(^{195}\) Interview 42, Afia, CCA for Community Health/ VPI TOA volunteer, 6 November 2012.
contribute to the unbundling of state from territory, as per Sack’s work (1986), but also meld the formal with the informal, state with the non-state, ideational with the material.

**Working state capital: ‘We are between you and the government’**

Whilst the state continues to command a considerable amount of symbolic capital in Tanzania, relations with the state are increasingly ambivalent in their direction *downwards*. Thus NGOs, in turn, play with legitimation ‘as being part of government’ (Green 2010, p19), but also as being *part of its negation*. These strategies and claims formed a crucial role in how organizations sought to legitimate themselves in the Kiharaka context, but to varying degrees of success. For VPI, working state relations was very much the former: being part of government. The most visible act of affirmation downward was through conducting ‘joint’ activities. Letters announcing trainings and monitoring visits were issued through the District Council. The senior Community Development Officer (CDO) for Bagamoyo district issued the letters on government letterhead, explaining the purpose of the activity and who was obliged to attend. VPI, from 2012, conducted monitoring with normal rank and file CDOs, arriving in one vehicle ‘from the district’. As such, VPI had increasingly mimicked or borrowed from state authority: its ‘verticality’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) and its (conditional) ability to compel others.

The discernible blurring of the line between the district and VPI was thus evident in how VPI staff introduced their presence at its monitoring meeting, with a project officer stating at the village-level monitoring meeting: ‘I am not just VPI. I am 50% VPI, 50% government’.196 The officer later emphasized how closely VPI and government responsibilities aligned, but also their similar downward-facing aspect to ‘the people’:

> We saw that, that is our work, the work of the district, the work of VPI, so we think that is good if the district, they can allocate us a kind of budget where we can share the monitoring together…We need a certain percent of money coming from the district to support their people, not to support the people of VPI, just to support the people of the government *to go down*.197

196 Fieldnotes, VPI monitoring visit to Kiharaka, 22 November 2012 – comment made in relation to the officer’s membership of a district-level HIV/AIDS committee.

197 Interview 53, VPI Programme Officer, 11 December 2012, emphasis in original.
Thus the ‘development encounter’, focusing on the monitoring of state-sanctioned initiatives at the village level, such as HIV/AIDS management committees, became highly authoritarian in reprimanding continual failure to enact government policy.\footnote{198}{Practices of ‘admonishment’, as part of spatializing vertical states, are also explored in Ferguson & Gupta (2002).}

This one [monitoring activity] is a bit good because we go there with the team from the district level, and when the people in the community, I mean the stakeholders that we are monitoring, when they saw the people from the district level they saw that okay, this is a bit stronger than as we go ourselves. When you go there ourselves, it seems that this is our VPI work, it’s not the work of the district. So it’s a bit stronger when we go with the district people, and people consider it monitoring.\footnote{199}{Interview 53, VPI Programme Officer, English verbatim, December 2012.}

Indeed, the invoked hierarchy of VPI and local government’s condescension ‘down’ to the village was clear in the monitoring meeting dynamic. The villagers assembled were not familiar with the project officer and the atmosphere was uncomfortable, at times antagonistic, which contrasted with VPI’s warmer relations in other parts of Bagamoyo. The hierarchy, therefore, was most pronounced in cases of perceived failure to implement state-led development. The residual symbolic capital of Tanzanian developmentalism loomed large in the encounter; whilst the human rights discourse was different to that of Nyerere’s day, the mechanics were similar.

This is not, of course, to argue that the villagers were unvarying in their interests and perspectives, which were also manifest in the meeting. The additional authority, clout and scrutiny afforded by the presence of district staff led to discord as to who was to blame. The Village Executive Officer (VEO), for example, was eventually forced to concede that there was indeed a Community Justice Facilitator (CJF) in Kiharaka, despite being a ‘product’ of VPI. He suggested that the CJF had offered no feedback, in contradiction to the CJF’s own account that he had been repeatedly blocked (see voluntarism). Three women who had received training by VPI on the issue of child and women’s rights similarly challenged the executive officer’s claim that people ‘return silently’ from training, responding:

No! We reported to the VEO and the chairperson. We told them what we learnt and that we want put into contact with the rest of the village to share our training, but until today we have not been introduced.
The VPI officer, increasingly frustrated, chided the executive officer in the meeting, albeit indirectly by the use of the term ‘government’ to refer to the executive officer and indeed the absent chairperson:

So, you see, there is an issue. They do come and give feedback but they don’t get cooperation on the side of the government…If you get training you need on your return to announce what you have learnt. If you have difficulties, if there is an issue with cooperation then that is an issue for village government.200

The thinly veiled derision of the executive officer in such a public forum by the VPI officer produced some uncomfortable silences and snickers. The officer may well have been at fault, complicit with the chairperson in thwarting volunteers from assuming their activities, particularly those associated with VPI. What is relevant to the issue in hand, however, is that the VPI officer was able to assume a position of authority, legitimated and sanctioned by the state, in order to reprimand publically an employee on the governmental payroll.

Other volunteers in Kiharaka associated with VPI experienced similar barriers to their work within the village leadership. The health volunteer Afia, also trained by VPI on gender and child rights, declared in response to the question whether she worked with the CJF:

We participate together but his issue is the same as mine. We’ve been prevented [lit. defeated] from uniting as a team at every turn. If I may join with others here, to make this link, that link…I am not answerable for that. It’s not my job! So you become weaker without that [link]. This is everyone’s work. The plague of ignorance belongs to all; the plague of ill health belongs to all.201

Whilst therefore Kiharaka manifestly did not form a monolithic ‘community’ in their view of VPI, the village leadership was nonetheless flexing as gatekeeper in order to thwart VPI’s interventions. This was part of the wider malaise regarding both NGO and governmental projects being announced but resulting in few perceptible material benefits. Key benefits, as noted, were perceived to remain at the district level. In contrast, the strong relationships forged with AI were underwritten by a firm basis of resource transfer at the school. This had evidently deprived other organizations of operational space, or turf, including VPI, which operated, at least within the confines of this monitoring meeting, with the full force of the state.

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200 Fieldnotes, VPI monitoring visit to Kiharaka, 22 November 2012, emphasis theirs.
201 Interview 42, Afia, Community Health CCA/ VPI TOA volunteer, 6 November 2012, emphasis hers.
The failure of VPI to legitimate itself in Kiharaka, despite its association with the
district, was symptomatic of the fact that the village was somewhat out of step with
normal hierarchies. The chairperson was, as noted, involved in a legal dispute regarding
a Tanzanian investment company’s claim to a sizeable area of land, which had escalated
to the district court. The district authorities were perceived by villagers to be oblivious
to, if not complicit in, the appropriation of village land by big business. The chairperson,
with the support of AI, had become extremely vocal in that regard. Furthermore, given
Kiharaka’s location near Dar, the village was less beholden to district patronage. Land
sales had given a consistent level of income in absolute terms, despite seepage during
transactions. Small business owners benefitted from the proximity to town to access
goods and services. Kiharaka was increasingly integrated into Dar’s outreach, set to
become a ‘new town’ in its own right and so increasingly dubious of Bagamoyo’s ruling
elites.

This disconnect was quite neatly encapsulated in an exchange initiated by a district
Community Development Officer (CDO) for an adjacent ward who had also happened
to purchase land to develop in Kiharaka. I was party to her discussions with Femida,
who had an administrative role in the village government, as they spoke of the failure of
various NGOs to fulfil their promises. ‘But’, the CDO added, ‘people here also have the
tendency to invent stories’, suggesting that failure may lie with the villagers and their
ability to circumvent the district, to which Femida laughed heartily. The CDO
emphasized that ‘government designs projects’ for Kiharaka, to which Femida retorted
‘yes, they design projects!’ playing on the Swahili kubuni for design, which can also mean
invent or create. Her implication, on my interpretation, was the litany of projects
announced but never fulfilled, on the part of government or otherwise. Later, on the
bus returning to Bagamoyo, the CDO disputed this, suggesting the Kiharaka villagers
did not wish to implement the programmes brought to them.²²

In such a context, the close association of VPI with the district was not a productive
asset. The village chairperson did not even attend the monitoring meeting, nor were all
the requisite people informed. Towards the end of the meeting Femida declared, ‘we’ve
been reprimanded! (lit. beaten) We understand!’ When the village executive officer
closed the meeting, he said ‘we’ve listened and discussed important issues. After this, we

²² Fieldnotes, discussions at Kiharaka village office, 22 October 2012.
have work!’ After VPI had departed, Femida decried the state of Kiharaka’s various committees to the village executive officer and others but not without considerable irony. This generated more laughter and wry exchanges. The gathering dispersed, without any further discussion of what the ‘work’ might entail nor agreement as to next steps. The unwelcomed intrusion on the part of the district was something to be endured rather than acceded.

By contrast, the disconnect between village and district leadership was leveraged by AI. AI had an increasing propensity to skip district council engagement in favour of national actors, media and publicity. The programme coordinator, for example, helped to facilitate a national TV film crew to descend on a particularly destitute primary school in Talawanda ward, without a single permanent classroom. The news piece was enough to prompt an incandescent telephone call from President Kikwete to the District Commissioner as to how such a school could still exist within his home constituency. New classrooms were erected within a year. AI also remarkably facilitated the trip of the UK’s Labour shadow MP for International Development to Kiharaka in a bid to highlight the ‘land grab’ issue. This again put pressure on district bodies to monitor the case. The threat of AI’s ‘media button’ explained its officer’s comment: ‘they are scared of us!’

This circumvention of district authority was at the root of how Kiharaka’s leadership could be deemed ‘failing’ by VPI and district level representatives but ‘strong’ and exemplary by AI. Kiharaka’s leaders had an increasingly abrasive relationship with the district, as did AI. AI enactment of bureaucratic protocols was increasingly, by their own omission, for show. This was echoed by a façade of deference and protocol towards ‘the district’ on the part of the attending village leaders during the monitoring meeting. The increasing disconnect between Kiharaka’s perceived interests and that of Bagamoyo district, and its leadership’s dissent signalled, in AI’s words, a ‘model’ of participatory democracy. Kiharaka literally became AI’s poster child, providing case study material for glossy newsletters as well as playing host to several high profile land rights events, covered by national media.

There was, of course, both facets within the Kiharaka leadership: strength and weakness; subversion and compliance; mobilization and stonewalling; public interest and private. The point in hand, however, is how these different leadership facets were repackaged
and presented externally by NGOs. For VPI, Kiharaka epitomized developmental failure, whilst for AI it represented monumental success. AI staff did not know the issues faced by the VPI-associated volunteers, nor indeed were aware of CJFs in the first instance, despite the CJFs’ endorsement by the district council. VPI in turn had some idea of AI’s work but kept a critical distance, viewing it as lofty and removed from the hard graft of community-based work. These divergent representations are an enduring symptom whereby development narratives are constructed and transmitted vertically along the logic of projects, rather than laterally across the village as a whole. As such, these two narratives of Kiharaka existed in different forums and for different purposes. There was no instance whereby the two might meet and reconcile.

To summarize, the state continues to afford symbolic capital in Tanzania but such capital is conditional and situational. Proximity to the Tanzanian state can indeed legitimate authority in many contexts and NGOs can in turn replicate, or indeed ‘co-produce’, the state (Dodworth 2015). This may work via extensity, as explored in the subsequent chapter, or the discourse of community development (see voluntarism). In the Kiharaka context, however, the claims projected downwards by development actors such as VPI were strongly repudiated by villagers themselves, in particular the leadership. It was distance from government, therefore, as in the case of AI, bolstered by a record of resource transfer that engendered additional space within which to govern. The divergent fortunes of AI and VPI, reflected in their irreconcilable representations of the village, highlighted legitimation’s affirmations and contestations as part of its countervailing currents.

**Representation: ‘people still cling to their issues of the past’**

Representational practice, as explored in Chapter Four, is a performance and one predicated on ambivalence. It oscillates between claims of proximity to stand for the people and that of distance and the constructed need to act for aberrant Others. Growing formal space for opposition in Tanzania has served to undermine the state’s historical monopoly on claims to stand for all Tanzanians. It is within this space that most NGOs, borrowing from neoliberal registers of good governance and accountability, have
innovated representational claims of superior proximity to the people. Eco-Coast’s senior manager spoke of NGOs at the ‘micro-level’, echoing the AI coordinator’s comments of ‘low level’ space for NGOs and civil society more generally. Some communities, as AI’s programme officer mused of Maasai constituents, ‘feel like government hates them’. NGOs are thus better placed to stand for marginalized Others: to aggregate and amplify the concerns and grievances of villagers far removed from rich urban centres and the spoils of Tanzania’s new found economic growth. As the senior manager of Eco-Coast challenged, ‘who is the national interest, and where?’

Representational claims of NGOs, as they craft rhetorical ‘space’, are their most existentially critical and thus fiercely defended. NGOs’ claims of proximity to ‘the communities’ manifest themselves in two contrasting modes of interaction with local government. The first, uniquely Tanzanian mode - nominally the ‘VPI model’ - is that the breadth and depth of NGOs’ extensity, especially in hard-to-reach areas, complements and indeed co-produces government-led efforts to bring development initiatives to communities. The more neoliberal ‘AI model’, by contrast, is founded on the assertion that government, including district government, can no longer be assumed to represent the interests of vulnerable communities. Civil society’s NGOs, however, free from ‘politics’ and the pressures of patronage, can align with the interests of marginalized people. These models are deliberate abstractions, given no NGO engages exclusively in one or the other. No NGO staff member would assume government either wholly benevolent or malevolent, nor claim that personal interests do not intervene within every kind of institution. Nevertheless, elements of these two ‘ideal types’ were evident in how VPI and AI presented themselves to Kiharaka village and, critically, in how they were appraised and contested by villagers.

VPI, in its highly formalized engagement in conjunction with the state, aimed to redress anomalies and deficiencies within Kiharaha’s governance structures: the need to act for deficient Others. The distance between itself and Others was visible in how its visits and monitoring meetings were announced, as well as the hierarchical dynamic of such meetings in holding Others to account. In contrast, AI was highly informal in its interactions, exemplified by frequent texts, calls and the ability to ‘drop in’

203 Interview 82, AI Programme Coordinator, 1 June 2013.
204 Fieldnotes, AI programme officer, 22 May 2013.
205 Interview 58, Eco-Coast Programme Manager, 8 April 2013.
unannounced. The headteacher called the programme coordinator on a Sunday for an amicable chat that lasted ten minutes. ‘Don’t worry about my surname’, the coordinator informed new constituents: ‘just ask for John and you’ll get me’. Through consistent informality and inversion of hierarchy, AI successfully positioned itself inside Kiharaka’s politics, as aggregator, instigator and catalyst.

AI’s agitation thus found more traction than that of VPI’s shadowing of the developmental state in the Kiharaka context. Many in Kiharaka, in particular the leadership, were aware of the increasing distance and disconnect with the district level machinery. With regard to goods and services, such as specialist HIV/AIDS health services, Kiharaka was increasingly angled towards Dar es Salaam over Bagamoyo, with Dar’s Mbweni considerably closer. With regard to politicized issues such as land appropriation, Bagamoyo bureaucrats were perceived to be aligned with big business via ‘the national interest’ rather than with villagers in Kiharaka. Kiharaka, in return, was seen by the district as something of a renegade village, operating increasingly at the margins of Bagamoyo administrative control. AI thus successfully forged strong territorialized relationships within Kiharaka, via the leadership, to the point of exclusivity.

AI’s positionality as insider, however, standing for Kiharaka’s interests, was ever only relative and partial. AI, for instance, struggled to gain traction beyond the school and the village leaders. Whenever I asked people in the village centre if they knew of AI, they would generally hesitate before gesturing ‘they are at the school’. AI’s partial constituency within Kiharaka was neatly illustrated during a high profile land rights event hosted there with support from their national office to mark World Food Day in October 2012. Over one hundred guests and visitors from outside the village were present, including national media, a host of national NGOs, the district guest of honour and his entourage as well as villagers from other coastal districts. The theme was ‘land-grabbing’ and its relation to food security. A drama performed by Kiharaka villagers depicted the appropriation of land by outside investors, before a series of speeches and songs. The drama showed villagers gaining jobs with the investment company, becoming security guards of the land that their family once owned for generations.

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206 Fieldnotes, new AI village sensitization meeting, 9 May 2013.
The guest of honour was the district Community Development Officer (CDO), having stepped in at the last minute as the district commissioner dropped out. The CDO was poorly prepared and opened his speech with the wrong village name. ‘Never mind’ he joked ‘it’s all Bagamoyo’, further cooling his reception. The CDO then talked in general terms about the need to improve coordination around land issues between different parties and at different levels. His final task was to launch an online ‘portal’, spearheaded by AI, whereby villagers like those in Kiharaka would be able to register cases of land-grabbing, including by SMS text message, broadcasting such cases to a wider audience. The response as the CDO keyed the laptop was muted at best, in the midst of some confusion as to what the portal was or how it might relate to the event in Kiharaka. The whole task disrupted the event’s initial momentum.

AI’s programme coordinator, in contrast, communicated skilfully with the crowd and received an enthused response. This was in part due to his strengths as an orator, through his ability to speak authoritatively and dramatically but maintain humour. It was also due to established relationships with some of the villagers. He drew out and repeated a catchphrase from the drama: ‘do we protect [i.e. guard] or do we own [this land]?’, which roused guests and villagers alike. He addressed villagers and their specific concerns using the first person ‘we’, in contrast to the CDO. He set the scene for a village elder to stand to speak out about losing land to rich Dar residents, the ensuing disputes, spiralling prices and the incongruous villas. The elder finished by addressing the guest of honour as representative of government authority, shouting ‘tell the district commissioner that there is no benefit from investors in this village!’ He received the loudest applause of the day.

AI, to some extent, had successfully positioned itself inside this advocacy drive. Its role was part antagonist, part arbitrator and so duly performed its proclaimed interstitial positionality ‘between you and government’. It gave examples, with first-hand testimony from villagers from other districts, of its record of successful arbitration in land disputes: identifying, escalating and finally resolving such conflicts. It drew on this history, and impression of institutional continuity, in its efforts to embed itself into a similar domain in Bagamoyo. AI’s extensity with respect to presence in other districts, therefore, served to bolster its increasing territoriality within Bagamoyo. This placed
some symbolic distance between AI and the district authorities, as well as bolstering their representational claim with those people, on that issue, at that moment.

This display of unity, which had been gathering momentum, unravelled quickly when an unexpected event divided the audience. Just as I was scanning the crowd to ascertain who was from Kiharaka, a band of men from the village who had apprehended another villager burst through the performance area en route to the village office. The Kiharaka villagers watching the event were quickly caught up in the affair, whilst the hundred or so guests remained seated, uncertain if the fracas was part of the performance. The choir, with young people from several African countries coached by a young Dutch woman, pushed on hesitantly. It became clear, as the sea of people divided, that the main attendees comprising the dozen or so rows of seating were from outside of Kiharaka. The vast majority of villagers present had been ‘participating’, or rather observing, from the margins. The arrest of this villager, for a terrible assault on a child, made it highly visible as to who was a constituent of Kiharaka and who was not. It was only after the seriousness of the crime came to light, and it became clear that Kiharaka residents would not be returning, that the programme coordinator abandoned the event.

It would be a truisim to note that different parties had different priorities on the day of the event. The point is rather that representation is ephemeral and partial. AI was effective in forging accord and therefore representational assent regarding some aspects of land conflict, with some Kiharaka villagers at certain times. Interests, of course, are nebulous and diffuse and there are challenges to shoehorning complex issues into the rubric of ‘land-grabbing’ or ‘food security’. AI’s programme coordinator was keenly aware of this difficulty in balancing claims of representation with the pressures to fit an external advocacy strategy. When I asked him if villagers were furious at a prospective cement factory’s tactics he replied:

That’s another side of it. They are not very furious, they want the money. And some of those villagers who are not within the GPS marked area [of the proposed factory] complained - they want to be in! That’s why I wrote to AI HQ, food security – whose concern? Forgetting other issues around security, like poverty. I want to sell my land, I don’t care where I will get food from. But AI is like ‘you can’t sell because at the end of the day you have to cultivate, farm, you have to have food’. Food security – whose issue? That’s where we come…different dynamics are coming. It’s not something people own, their agenda.\footnote{Interview 82, AI programme coordinator, 1 June 2013}
As such, the AI coordinator, as his manager, described the delicate process of ‘making people understand’ their rights and interests over the long term. This indicated a subtle movement from the need to stand for others to the need to act for them. In this way, AI positioned itself as custodian of these villagers’ interests, present and future. Once again, the development outsider and the logic of acting for Others won out in forging authority, even for AI and its avowed progressive form of politics.

This oscillation, from standing to acting for Others, was prone eventually to collapse into well-worn tropes of coastal people, their inappropriate values and their inability to ‘develop’ themselves. Whilst senior AI staff spoke more judiciously of helping people to understand issues such as land rights and food security, a junior staff member was more vocal on the disjunction between coastal people and inlanders’ values. He explained to me, in a car journey back from Kiharaka, how culture and land ownership are interrelated, adding:

You know these people, Pwani [coastal region] is not really their place. Many people were brought here by slavery and so people are not having the same attachment or history with the land. So, people do not necessarily value the land in the same way.

The officer added by way of illustration the story of one villager who sold his small plot of land for ‘nothing but a second hand motorbike’. His comments strongly implicated right and wrong values, as well as frustrations with coastal inhabitants perceived to be on the wrong side of the divide.

As explored in Chapter Three, these perceptions of coastal life are still consumed and reproduced by Tanzanian mainlanders in political discourse and the media, despite being only partially grounded in truth. Bagamoyo, as noted, was historically as dependent on agriculture and its (valorized) graft as mariculture with regard to food production (Fabian 2007b). The role of the slave trade has been exaggerated in the making of Bagamoyo (Fabian 2013), dwarfed by the value of the ivory trade for which much labour immigration was voluntary. Nevertheless, this image of a slave town, inhabited by slavery’s wretched and hapless descendants, still looms large in the public imagination (ibid.). This augments the view of Bagamoyo as an historical anachronism, out of step with contemporary Tanzania. The continuity with British colonial and early post-colonial discourses regarding coastal backwardness, and even barbarity, is striking.

Fieldnotes, discussions with AI programme officer 22 May 2013
There is also an obvious inconsistency between the values lauded in some quarters by NGOs such as AI versus those denounced of coastal people. The majority of NGOs have absorbed elements of neoliberal discourse, particularly with regard to income generation, entrepreneurialism and access to credit for marginalized groups. The ability to engage in the production of commercial goods and services is deemed preferable, indeed more developmental, than a reliance on subsistence agriculture. At the same time, coastal people are disparaged for being too interested in ‘money’ and ‘business’ dealings, rather than a hard day’s graft in the fields. ‘Coastal people do not like work’ a Zanzibari friend laughed, ‘they like business’ rubbing his finger and thumb together to indicate money. This kind of business is not honest or virtuous, unlike working the land. As such, the values of commerce and business, at the apex of current neoliberal development thinking, are extolled in certain forums but decried within this moralizing domain. Business is less virtue than vice amongst the workshy coastal inhabitants.

It was instructive to watch how these particular discourses were interpreted and appropriated by people in Kiharaka and the surrounding Kerege ward. Visitors would often joke about coastal people being only interested in money and financial benefits, to the great amusement of villagers. In one example, a university researcher was visiting a group of prominent women in Kiharaka to gather data about the environmental challenges they were facing, arriving with district government staff. The group was debating whether the increase in pikipiki (motorcycle taxis) in the village presented an opportunity or challenge, with one mentioning that earnings have increased as a result. The researcher responded, ‘yes, coastal people like kisentensi’, using a slang term for money, to which the women laughed heartily. Bagamoyo people's love of money, of a quick financial win, of wheeling and dealing, was a trope regularly recycled and appropriated by local people themselves, with a heavy dose of irony and humour.

It was, however, not only incoming staff who navigated various stereotypes, continually repositioning themselves as insider or outsider. NGOs, striving to project an impression of extensity and mimicking the state before them, were increasingly recruiting their ‘own’ volunteers at the village level. This interweaves with representation through volunteers’ permanent presence as advocate and/or reformer in their own communities. These volunteers stood for the people, but also selected, in theory, for their affinity with the NGO’s stated values and endorsed as such by the village council. In practice, these
volunteers continually had to reconcile their position as village ‘insider’ and representative with that of ‘outsider’ expert, party to more progressive knowledge and ideals. Volunteers frequently pointed to low levels of education, understanding and motivation amongst their peers to work for the good of their own communities.

One such volunteer for VPI for Kerege ward, Dr Alima, who was a full time medical practitioner in addition to undertaking VPI’s human rights work, remarked:

> Bagamoyo, don’t you see, is divisible into different parts: there is here, the coast, and inland, on the way to Kibindu is Chalinze…we might call that mainland. Coast is *here*, our Bagamoyo and here, people they leave that issue of volunteering as too hard, different to inland…The villages there [inland], if you go there, they really respond to voluntary work, but here they are…we say that they don’t care, do you see? Even this issue of groups, if you look at here our place, these groups haven’t formed but there [inland] they are working. A lot of education has been given here, more, but people still like to cling to their same old issues of the past.

In this discussion, Dr Alima played with such stereotypes, focusing on the intractable coastal backwardness and lack of education, but also flipping between the first person (‘our Bagamoyo’) and third (‘people cling to their…issues of the past’). Other volunteers also continually negotiated the insider/outsider divide, carefully replicating the language of NGOs themselves regarding the prevailing lack of understanding and motivation in the areas where they work.

Stella, a Community Development Facilitator (CDF) for AI within Kiharaka, was a strong replicator of AI’s own language. When I asked why she volunteered, she said:

> As a CDF I look at the particular environment within the village, for example issues or challenges that were within the village and then to try and resolve them through the ‘circles’ [groups], circles of between 10 and 30 people, we sit together, we discuss and see what we can do; for example in our village or locality or our community we have children who don’t have school uniform.

Here, Stella positioned herself as *insider within* the community through her consistent use of the first person and as a collaborative facilitator, closely replicating the language of AI as a community mobilizer. At the same time Stella, originally from inland Iringa, was also an outsider, bringing in new ideas:

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209 Interview 34, VPI volunteer, 29 October 2012
In this community it’s hard, because people differ. It’s not everyone who has the awareness [mwamko lit. awakening] of the situations of others.\footnote{210 Interview 35, AI CDF. 29 October 2012. The translation is difficult here but the verb ‘to interact’ or relate is conjugated to imply reciprocity: a two-way interaction.}

Stella’s counterpart Aasim, the second CDF for Kiharaka and replacement for the village chairperson, drew some authority from his assumption of this post. His authoritative tone was captured in this exchange, when I asked him if there were challenges in working in his community:

Many villagers like it [working with them], only that many of them as I’ve said before is that they don’t understand. With everything that you tell someone, they see that it gets in the way of doing their own thing…time is money and yes, these resources are theirs but they must be used at a certain time and for something important.\footnote{211 Interview 37, Aasim, Kiharaka’s new CDF. 2 November 2012}

The collaborative element discernible in Stella’s comments did not feature in how Aasim described his interactions within the community. Aasim was more authoritative, using the verb to tell rather than, for example, to discuss. His tone was thus instructional, aspiring to direct Others as to how they would better allocate their own time and resources for a developmental good. Aasim in constructing his authority emphasized his training with and recognition from AI, as well as his replacement of the village chairperson into the CDF role. He was also a member of several other committees within village governance. Implicit in such detail was AI’s close proximity to, and endorsement by, Kiharaka’s leaders. Nevertheless, Aasim was assuming a clear need to act on behalf of aberrant Others.

In summary, NGOs’ representational practice is situational and ephemeral, melding positions of proximity and alterity. Proximity via insidership conferred in different ways: inversion of hierarchies through attentive relationship-building with village leaders, thereby understanding and amplifying their needs, overlooked by government; social, or Pitkin’s descriptive, representation, looking ‘inside out’ from the perspective of communities; placing volunteers at the heart of the village’s governance, successfully inducted into a developmental value system. At the same time, the converse is also true, whereby local communities do not understand or articulate their own interests, requiring input from outside. NGOs are thus obliged to provide these skilled outsiders, to the point where they inevitably recycle colonial-like tropes and staff’s own prejudices towards those perceived to have failed in their own progress. This movement towards
acting for Others was replicated by volunteers themselves. Volunteers surmised, to
audiences like myself, the failure of Others to engage with their work as part of a
broader developmental malaise amongst their communities. Developmental
intervention, as its colonial and missionary forbearers, melds claims to stand and to act
for the people, the latter winning out when situations of uncertainty solicit a more
authoritative stance. This colonial-like encounter, therefore, is ‘nested’ (Bakić-Hayden
1995) at scales, from the global to the village, as young volunteers negotiate their
shifting stances amongst peers.

**Voluntarism and virtue: ‘it wasn’t my goal to volunteer’**

The negotiation of voluntarism and its claims was integral to the experiences of
volunteers as well as leaders at the village and ward level. All organizations, as will be
examined, had at one time demanded the participation of village volunteers within the
ward. To be recruited as a volunteer was formally permanent, with no means of exit.
The contestation of voluntarism played out in my very first visit to Kerege ward,
shadowing Voluntary Partnership International monitor their women and child rights
programme. As we waited for the monitoring meeting to begin, one volunteer, a
Community Justice Facilitator (CJF) named Maya, began to take VPI staff through
pictures of children on the walls, previously identified as living in challenging
circumstances, explaining where they now were. This kind of information is critical for
reporting and the staff members wrote detailed notes. Suddenly, the woman tired of the
topic and the questions to which she did not always have the answers. She sat down and
declared, ‘I’ve been doing this work since 2005. I’m tired; I want to stop!’ 212 In this all
too common situation, voluntarism’s ambiguous and multifaceted compacts in this
context had broken down.

Voluntarism, via its recent incarnation within NGO interventions, plays on hybridized
registers in this context. 213 The ‘voluntary sector’, on the one hand, often used
synonymously with civil society in Western contexts, is perceived as an institutional

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212 Fieldnotes on VPI monitoring trip to Kerege, 18 July 2012.
213 Material from this section provides the basis of my forthcoming article ‘Negotiating the public: voluntarism and its work in Tanzania’, *African Affairs* 116 (470), January 2019.
space distinct from, and counterweight to, both state and market. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the symbolism regarding voluntarism has been entwined historically with the post-independence socialist project of the state. As the AI coordinator reflected in the previous chapter, communities were deemed ‘one big family’, with public works or msaragambo instilled as a weekly graft that outlived Nyerere’s time in office. This institutionalized form of voluntarism, and its virtuous association with the shared public good, was an everyday part of state discourse and practice, spearheaded by Nyerere’s speeches and works (Hunter 2008; 2015; Marsland 2006). Whilst the AI coordinator asserted these activities as willing and ‘voluntary’ on the one hand, they were still sanctioned by the state on the other, with penalties for non-compliance.

These variegated registers and their supporting claims presented more facets for negotiation and contestation. VPI’s moralizing on voluntarism, for example, served as a persistent point of antagonism when directed downwards ‘to the communities’ in workshops. Whilst it was true that VPI staff received lower salaries than their INGO counterparts, it was ambitious at best that this would forge affinity with their volunteers. In one workshop, a programme officer was forced to respond to angry questioning that the sheer scale of his work visiting all villages demanded a salary.\(^{214}\) In another, a Maasai leader angrily rejected that VPI staff and village recruits were working on the same terms, strongly echoing the Maasai’s rejection of colonial interventionism on that basis (Hodgson 2001).\(^{215}\) Another volunteer wrote directly to the district council to refuse to continue working under ‘voluntary’ terms. These incidents disclosed an interrogation, at times outright rejection, of this presentation of public authority and its supporting claims downwards by government and non-government alike.

For the AI programme coordinator, in contrast, voluntarism was part and parcel of state-led socialism and so fell from grace as the pillars of Nyerere’s project began to crumble. In his words, the ‘spirit of community’ work died, as it was no longer clear as to what people were volunteering.\(^{216}\) Nevertheless, despite voluntarism fatigue and scepticism concerning ‘community’ activism, symbolic remnants of Nyerere’s socialism remained. Kiharaka leaders, for example, in petitioning the district for funding, signed their letter ‘yours, in building our nation’. Nyerere’s portrait is still displayed in every

\(^{214}\) VPI workshop fieldnotes, May 2013.
\(^{215}\) Discussion with VPI volunteer, November 2012.
\(^{216}\) Email correspondence with AI programme coordinator, 16 August 2013.
government-affiliated venue and his name and teachings still referred to in public forums as part of state ‘representations of power’ (Green 2010; also Becker 2013; Kamat 2008). Msaragambo continues in many villages, meaning an association between the state and volunteering remains, despite its increased contestation. Such paternalist symbolism helps ‘produce a sense of historical continuity’ (Phillips 2010, p114) within the state architecture, rather than indicative of anything new.

This enduring association and indeed identification with the state was discernible among the Community Justice Facilitators (CJFs), who in theory reported directly to the district council, affording variable symbolic capital in this regard. When I spoke to Togo, CJF of Kerege ward, as to how she perceived the CJF programme and VPI’s subsequent involvement, she emphasized positively regarding state association:

_The CJF plan didn’t start with VPI, OK? CJF [project] started in the district council, that we are endorsed [lit. sponsored or guaranteed] by the Community Development Office._

This strong association was very different to how Kiharaka’s chairperson described CJFs as a ‘product of VPI’. In Kiharaka’s case, as explored, VPI’s close relationship with the district council, and CJFs’ association with both, prompted the leadership’s rejection of these initiatives across the board. The move to coalesce these as one ‘district’ elite was part of that delegitimization, whilst proving, as explored in Chapter Five, a mainstay of VPI’s legitimation elsewhere.

The negotiation of voluntarism and its constituent claims and pressures was thus an enduring feature of the experiences of volunteers, as captured in this section’s opening vignette. Whilst operation styles differed between organizations, all had at one time demanded the participation of village volunteers within the ward. This had left this extraordinary patchwork of voluntary initiatives, which had waxed and waned depending on funding fortunes. This often left volunteers’ roles in suspended animation, in the absence of communications, for extended periods. It also led to the situation whereby the same individuals were recruited for multiple organizations, either concurrently or consecutively after a project lapsed. Changes in project status were rarely communicated to volunteers. Such changes generated uncertainty, confusion and, at times, contradictory pressures for the volunteers concerned. Most importantly,

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217 Interview 39, Togo, Kerege CJF, 5 November 2012.
voluntarism in Tanzania is not necessarily an issue of consent, with recruitment sanctioned by the state and with no means to exit.

This context explains Maya’s fatigue in the incident before the VPI monitoring meeting: ‘I’m tired; I want to stop!’ The issue of voluntarism arose again at the start of the meeting as greetings were exchanged between international volunteer Julia and the Village Executive Officer. ‘Ah’ said the officer with a wry smile, ‘you have volunteered, like me’. ‘I have volunteered’, she countered, ‘I don’t yet know about you’ to which the group laughed. There was a considerable use of irony in the term volunteer by both parties, given the context of volunteering was so very different. As the international volunteer commented later, ‘I have volunteered because I have the power to make that choice’. The volunteer was also playing, however, with the fact that the meeting had not yet been presented with evidence of the man’s efforts, instantiating a state-like hierarchy. It disclosed that whilst the term might be invoked to support claims of parity, voluntarism in fact has multiple connotations, which also serve to highlight difference.

The issue of voluntarism re-emerged for a third time under less humorous circumstances at the end of the meeting, as the organization’s monitoring and evaluation forms were distributed to the volunteers. This sparked complaints that the information took time to amass and there were many organizations, each with their own forms. The discussion quickly returned to allowances and Maya reiterated she had been volunteering since 2005 and the difficulties of conducting that kind of work given the time and travel. A staff member countered that their organization was also voluntary and that people had come from overseas to help the communities of Tanzania. He added that those who wanted nothing but allowances were those who just wanted to ‘eat until they became too large to board even a bus’. At this point, the comparison was angrily rejected by the attending villagers, discussion descended into argument and the staff withdrew to complete other work.

Whilst VPI placed voluntarism and virtue at the centre of its downward legitimation, with varying success, AI’s coordinator, on assuming the post in Bagamoyo in 2011, quickly abandoned the practice of village-wide recruits and the language of

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218 Fieldnotes on VPI monitoring trip to Kerege, 18 July 2012.
Their Community Development Facilitators (CDFs) were no longer supported or contacted beyond a handful of villages, like Kiharaka, where they had gained traction. This caused confusion in other Kerege villages for seasoned volunteers like Akili, whereby CDFs suddenly ceased to be, left hanging in a state of uncertainty. Such changes brought the ambiguity, tensions and contestation of different forms of voluntarism to the fore. Volunteers’ own motivations and expectations often differed from those assumed of them.

The tensions around voluntarism, altruism and virtue were thus understood differently by volunteers, living in degrees of poverty themselves, thus with their costs keenly evaluated. There was no contradiction, therefore, in being remunerated for voluntary work. I draw here on interviews with two highly experienced Kerege volunteers who had been selected repeatedly by different village leaderships for different NGO work: Akili since 2003 and Zawadi since 1997. Both volunteers were skilled and knowledgeable about their work. For Akili especially, this has made him a desirable recruit for a range of health initiatives. Both volunteers, interestingly, had also been rejected by the Kiharaka leadership: Akili by virtue of living in a now separate village and Zawadi by virtue of his association with VPI.

Akili, as noted, was volunteering with multiple organizations including Red Cross, AI, Community Health, Kidz and Pathfinders International as a health volunteer. The different organizations came with different priorities, which translated into various pressures on and requirements of volunteers. As Akili noted of his most recent recruiter:

Kidz has really tough obligations. They only want us to work with children and child services. They don’t like to cooperate with the other programmes. They don’t interact with each other – Kidz works with children, Pathfinders with sick people [i.e. PLWHA]. Kidz doesn’t like to receive reports of both but just children but they are living in the same houses! I like to do all work – I like to work with children and with sick people but Kidz only wants to work with children. They gave us a contract form to sign to agree to stop working with sick people and Pathfinder. If you agree, you sign, but I refused to sign. [Why don’t they want you to work with both?] They said you cannot receive two allowances. Now I receive 55,000 (Tanzanian shillings) – Pathfinder pay 25,000 by Mpesa and Kidz 30,000 when we go every 3 months to report. If I was made to choose I would choose sick people because I received a lot of training for that and I am experienced and I’m known to government for that work.

219 Interview 4, AI coordinator, 11 June 2012
220 Interview 36, CCA/CDF volunteer, 31 October 2012.
In this instance, the ‘verticality’ of project pressures inhibited the ability to look laterally at the context of people’s lives. The organizations rebuffed the complex motivations for volunteering, strongly manifested in their deep scepticism over petitions for allowances.

I spent a day with Akili on the back of his motorcycle as he visited people living with HIV and AIDs across Mapinga village, both children and adults, some of whom were house or bedbound. His relations with these household members were warm, unlike in Kiharaka, and it was clear he was a regular and welcomed visitor. It became clear during our discussions over the day that the key for Akili was being able to do something highly practical to help others in their plight. He had a basic medical kit bag from which he dispensed medications, mainly for pain or skin lesions. At one point he was moved by the plight of a sick relative who was not on his ‘books’ and so gave them medicinal cream, telling me he would record it against someone else’s name.

In addition to the satisfaction of being able to take practical action was the time invested, through training and experience, in becoming a ward expert and also to have that role recognized by others: being ‘known to government’. His comments echo those of Togo, the CJF for Kerege Ward, who emphasized the direct relationship with the district, underscoring the overlap between voluntarism and the state.

Whilst many of these volunteers had garnered recognition amongst key stakeholders, Zawadi’s situation was somewhat different. Zawadi, the Community Justice Facilitator (CJF) for Kiharaka, had also ‘volunteered’ with UNICEF and VPI in rights work and another small organization in health. For him, the lack of recognition had stymied his efforts and ultimately his motivation:

The village leadership of Mapinga chose me [as a CJF] in 2008. They were looking for someone with good qualities to engage themselves with these kinds of voluntary activities. There followed two weeks of training where we came to understand the meaning of the CJF as a facilitator of the community, particularly regarding legal matters and knowledge of rights…After we got the training we returned to the communities to educate the villagers in order that they know their rights. It wasn’t that hard work at that time but for the fact that there was no allowance – you just volunteer…After Mapinga split about two or three years ago I went to a refresher training. I reported back to the village [of Kiharaka] but I have not yet been presented to the village…So now every three months I continue to report to Kerege [ward] - I am still working, but I have reduced the amount of work for volunteering.221

221 Interview 33, Kiharaka CJF, 25 October 2012.
The need for acknowledgement was reflected in the comments of VPI’s director on the frustration in directing their volunteers’ efforts away from the organization and towards their community. She conceded:

[Y]ou know the community itself maybe it’s not always recognising this figure in the community... And then they say... that they need to feel part of something so they say ‘OK we are working for VPI’ but the facilitator says ‘no you are not working for VPI, you are working for your community’; this is the mentality that we want to pass.

Clearly, this is something of a vicious circle whereby lack of community recognition leads to the need for greater acknowledgement elsewhere. Whilst Zawadi had originally bought into district-sanctioned voluntarism, his efforts were stymied by his immediate leadership. The lack of acknowledgement in Kiharaka meant that the opportunity cost of his time was more keenly felt:

If I got an allowance from the district for my time... if I use my time for those activities you see I can’t get anything for me. For my children... You know, it wasn’t my goal to volunteer. I was chosen by the village for the CBD training in 1997. I was chosen by the village for the training there at Montep [training centre]. The training was to help mothers with family planning. We got given contraceptives to distribute or we would advise people to go to the hospital. Then after time it was seen that I can do this kind of work, I had the heart [motivation] to volunteer. At that time ten were interviewed at the ward level and finally three were chosen to go to the training. I think I was shown to have this ability for this kind of work, but then, after 5 years, I stopped.’ [Did you see many changes?] ‘I can see that this project [CJF project] helps them – it helps the villagers to recognise their rights. It can work. But I ask the government to give an allowance to help keep us motivated – not a salary – but because each person has their own responsibilities. I have my wife and children. [Are you tired?] To get tired is to be tired in your head. That is where we decide. I need to do research to find out about, perhaps if a particular child has a problem or if this woman has an issue at home. But if I go here or there on this issue or that, what happens when I come home [gestures empty hands]? So often these days I no longer follow up. When the time comes to get my information I feel bad that perhaps I have not followed up. But then, I have still not been introduced to the community.\footnote{Kiharaka CJF, \textit{ibid.}}

Voluntarism for Zawadi did not differentiate state from non-state: quite the contrary. The civic discourse of voluntarism, for some time, had continued to find sufficient resonance to motivate him to act for the benefit of others, even if not originally of his volition. Consent, therefore, was not the decisive issue but the ongoing negotiation of recognition, reciprocity and exchange, long broken down.

Whilst an organization like VPI, therefore, seeks a permanent governance infrastructure at the heart of every community, legitimated by a language of voluntarism and
community spirit, it is unwilling, or unable, to acknowledge the impact of this on individual volunteers. Clearly, for these volunteers themselves the issue was not whether they were suitably capable of the work, nor whether the project goals were contestable: the simple language of project ‘success’ or ‘failure’. The question was how to navigate the demands of multiple NGO and district players on their time, each with their own approach and demands, each with a varying level of symbolic capital with their peers as well as village and ward government. This contrasted strongly with the NGO account, therefore, of industrious volunteers at the ‘heart’ of the village, endorsed and acknowledged by their community.

To summarize, Zawadi and Akili were not, by any means, representative of volunteers in Bagamoyo as a whole. In some respects, their motivations and tenacity for volunteering were exceptional, strongly subscribing to an ethic of community, or civic responsibility. Their comments, however, captured elements of voluntarism applicable more broadly. The first was the congruity of voluntarism with the developmental state, manifestly the district but co-produced by NGOs day-to-day. The second, related, element is the somewhat insidious, conscripted nature of voluntarism, underwritten by state coercion. Kujitolea, literally ‘to give oneself’, was work assigned by leaders in the service of the community. Such assignments were compelled by state sanction and its moralizing on community engagement, rendered permanent with no formal exit. Whilst this framing has faltered, it nonetheless retains resonance for some, subject to the fulfilment of particular criteria. This leads to the third element: that legitimation demands a continual negotiation, in this case between developmental actors and their subjects of intervention. If this breaks down, people inevitably seek strategies of withdrawal, regardless of what formal arrangements remain intact.

**Conclusion**

This chapter sought to foreground downward legitimation as a *negotiated* practice. Public authority, as the legitimated use of power, is not simply put out for consumption on the part of the masses but is continually appraised and contested. The chapter brought such practices to the fore by examining mainly vertical legitimation within a particularly
crowded developmental environment, and one politicized further on the issue of land sales and acquisitions. With a relatively large number of key players vying for influence, the negotiation of legitimation at this ‘interface’ (Long 1989) between fields is rendered visible by the ethnographic sensibility at the village and ward level. This helps to unveil what is concealed by vertical epistemologies that shadow the logic of the development project.

With regard to **extensity**, district-level claims of going ‘to the communities’, often by proxy via networks of volunteers posited as located at the heart of every village, are thus negotiated and contested at the village level by different groups. In the Kiharaka context, Voluntary Partnership International’s extensity, a key legitimation device elsewhere, was usurped by a more territorial relationship with primarily Advocates International. **Territoriality**, as the creation and enforcement of boundaries within a larger system, admits of strong ideational components as much as material, as in the case of the women who continued to align themselves with Care. Such practices are not solely the purview of the state, although they are indeed intricately interwoven into state relations.

The cases of VPI and AI thus highlight that relations with the **state** are ambivalent; legitimation may indeed comprise being ‘part of government’ (Green 2010, p19) but *equally of its negation*. In the case of Kiharaka, VPI’s positioning as part of the district apparatus strongly served to delegitimate it from the village leadership, seen as part of one unified, ineffectual elite. AI’s distance from government was therefore a more productive legitimation practice in this context. At the same time, AI nonetheless drew on the symbolic power of the state in certain circumstances, for instance in introducing itself to a new village in another part of the district. Relations with the state are not static, therefore, but continually recalibrated. This occurs even within the village, as highlighted by the contestation of the leadership’s claims of inactivity and ‘silence’ by volunteers themselves.

**Representational** practice is also predicated on ambivalence: the melding of claims to stand for and to act for Others. Claims to stand for, or to be proximate to, the people are key for all political actors but are existentially core to unelected NGOs. In most situations, however, the logic of the persistent need to *act for* the Other wins out, couched in colonial-like terms of constituencies’ failure and inability to self-develop.
Such dynamics are indeed replicated by volunteers themselves as they assume positions of authority over their peers. Representation is therefore a negotiation between these two, strongly symbolic positionalities that have endured within developmentalism for centuries.

Lastly, voluntarism also retains a strong ideational component that is interwoven with the symbolism of the post-independence state in Tanzania. Unsalaried public works formed a key part of ‘building the nation’, but which has faltered in recent years as the touchstones of Nyerere’s socialism eroded. Nevertheless, volunteers often still subscribe to a strong ethic of civic responsibility but one that must of course be acknowledged and reciprocated. When development actors, particularly NGOs, do not adequately acknowledge or fulfil their own responsibilities to volunteers, such volunteers are compelled to adopt their own informal strategies of silence or withdrawal. Voluntarism thus becomes a constant negotiation between development ‘outsider’ and village volunteer, but one that is fragile and prone to breaking down.

In summary, the negotiation of legitimation practice thus runs through the key practices of this thesis, rendered visible by ethnography at the interface of vertical development interventions. The claims that comprise legitimation are not, contrary to Barker, solely self-affirmations amongst peers and put out for unequivocal consumption on the part of the masses, but are affirmed and contested in the everyday. Village level leadership and NGO volunteer recruits are themselves part of Lund’s ‘countervailing currents’ (2006b, p699): legitimation as the construction and contestation of public authority. This demands the active construction, entreatry and repudiation of the Other, but with none able to stand alone.
Chapter Five:  
Legitimation on the edge:  
Space to govern

They’ve never arrived here, not even once!

Legitimation, as explored, is a practice that shifts in configuration, depending on the conditions of the ‘field’, geographical or notional. This chapter seeks to show the impact of such conditions through foregrounding a far less congested domain of activity. Its geographical focus is Kibindu ward, which is in many ways the converse of Kerege. Kibindu is the furthest from Bagamoyo town, the most remote, the least densely populated and one of the most underserved with regard to government and NGO service provision. As such, attitudes to developmental outsiders, whether government or NGO initiatives, notably diverged between Kerege and Kibindu. In Kibindu, where feelings of isolation and exclusion were high, district and NGO development workers were welcomed by leaders with cautious optimism. In Kibindu, there was considerable legitimation by virtue of arriving at all.

This chapter therefore spotlights this more open playing field, affording increased ‘space to govern’. It retains a similar methodological standpoint to the preceding chapter, but under these different conditions. Fewer development organizations vying for influence meant that legitimation claims became clearer cut. Legitimation was less diffuse, giving way instead to starker divisions between different agencies and their legitimation techniques. As a result, one key legitimation theme explored in the two previous empirical chapters, that of territoriality between organizations, proved mainly redundant in this context. Territoriality was rather subsumed by the importance of extensity, arrival and their more harmonious interplay with the state. After providing background to the Kibindu context, the chapter again examines vertical legitimation practices and their negotiation in the everyday. Whilst these are curated under the same themes, they hold very different results for Kibindu’s development entrepreneurs.

223 Interview 64, acting Kibindu WEO, 29 April 2013.
Kibindu: on the edge

The chapter is based on four weeks’ fieldwork in Kibindu ward, primarily April-May 2013 but with additional visits accompanying NGO staff from late 2012. Kibindu, as one of the remotest areas in the district (see Figure 5.1), has unreliable transport links. Whilst it is only 160 kilometres from Bagamoyo town, it takes five to seven hours by public transport. 100 kilometres of the journey is served by tar road, including the main Dar–Arusha artery, and so plied throughout the day. The final 60 kilometres, however, is served by a reasonable dirt road but one that navigates undulating hillside, meaning sections become unpassable during the rains. There is a daily bus link between Kibindu and Ubungo station in Dar, leaving at 2am in order to make the return trip the same day. There are no direct links to Bagamoyo. For those who wish to travel outside of this schedule, there are piki piki motorcycle taxis, which are expensive (more than three times the bus fare) and hazardous. The villagers of Kibindu were, at the time of fieldwork, mourning the loss of their highly respected counsellor who died in a piki piki accident on the road some weeks before my arrival. The bus comes with its own hazards, subject to robberies by bandits on isolated stretches at night.

Kibindu’s commercial links run primarily to Dar es Salaam, which is seven to nine hours by bus, and secondarily to Morogoro, lying three to five hours southwest. Bagamoyo is at best a tertiary link, most important for the women who sell dried fish in Kibindu village. Kibindu itself serves as a commercial hub for the two other villages in the ward, Kwamsanja and Kwamduma, but also for the various pastoralist communities, with a weekly market attracting several hundred from the surrounding areas. The ward is expansive, as the second largest in the district, with an area ten times that of Kerege. Its population density, as of the 2012 census, registered a mere 15 inhabitants per km², which is less than half of the district mean and a mere 7% of populous Kerege. The three official ‘villages’, Kibindu, Kwamsanja and Kwamduma, each has its own network of sub-villages, but distance between sub-villages is substantial – sometimes over 20km. This posed obvious administrative and communicative challenges, particularly given that two out of the three biggest cell networks did not provide reliable coverage.
Kibindu’s remoteness is palpable within everyday life. The schools and clinic are indeed understaffed, with Kibindu an predictably undesirable posting for public workers. In addition to this neglect, however, there is also a feeling on arrival that you have reached some kind of frontier. It is bordered by three different districts, which are located in turn in two other regions: Morogoro and Tanga. ‘We’re on the edge’ (lit. ‘in the corner’), people would bemoan, which equated to a lack of services but also administrative oversight. This sense of isolation translates into one of vulnerability, with issues of security and policing strongly vocalized by Kibindu informants. ‘People can hide!’ they complain, in the absence of a local police station, suggesting an issue with unmonitored incursions from other regions. Whilst movement between districts is of course commonplace in Tanzania, the fear of less desirable, possibly criminal, elements ‘infiltrating’ the ward provided a constant source of concern, giving the impression of a vulnerable borderland.
In a similar vein, illicit land appropriation provided the other perceived threat to local security. Pastoralist groups, predominantly Wamang’ati (or Barabaig) but also Maasai, as well as non-pastoralist groups, were seen to appropriate land illicitly, either through backdoor payments to officials or by squatting on land over long periods. Local residents had been recently incensed by the uncovering of the misuse of public office regarding land sales over a prolonged period by the Kibindu Village Executive Officer, who was from outside the area. The villagers, somewhat unusually, had entreated their right to have the officer revoked by the district, which was acquiesced. The villagers had since appointed ‘one of their own’ as the new VEO: a quiet, apprehensive man who served as a suitable mouthpiece to recite powerful villagers’ demands to outsiders. The acting Ward Executive Officer, in contrast, was a highly respected man who had lived and worked resolutely in Kibindu for over ten years. He had been adopted as one of Kibindu’s own, at least for the sake of government business, holding considerable influence and clout.

Whilst there were, therefore, obvious differences between the Kibindu and Kerege contexts, there were still some overlap in the concerns expressed by those who lived there, which have resonance more broadly in Tanzania. The key issue in both contexts was that of land, namely fears of its illicit appropriation by more mobile ‘outsiders’. Whilst in Kerege, however, the main perpetrators were wealthy Dar commuters or commercial interests, in Kibindu disputes centred on access to increasingly scarce fertile land for subsistence and small-scale agriculture. Kibindu, despite its small population in absolute terms, was experiencing the fastest rate of growth in the district, increasing 60% since the previous census, which included a great many incomers. This, in addition to the sizeable areas of forest reserve as well as culturally protected land in the ward, bisected by the main road and freely used by the Wamang’ati to herd cows, placed ever-increasing pressure on land access. Tensions continued to rise with the pastoralists.

There was certainly a shared concern, therefore, between Kerege and Kibindu regarding ‘outsiders’ and their efforts to access, indeed exploit, village resources. However, crucially for this chapter, attitudes to district as well as NGO developmentalists, as discernible outsiders, diverged between Kerege and Kibindu. In Chapter Four’s Kerege,

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224 Interview 75, Kibindu village chairperson, 17 May 2013.
225 Fieldnotes, discussion with WEO, 29 April 2013
distrust of the district council was high and, by association, of NGOs perceived as proximate to the arms of local government. In Kibindu, by contrast, feelings of isolation and exclusion meant that district and NGO development workers who ‘arrived’ were cautiously welcomed by local leaders, affording them greater space to govern.

**Extensity: ‘They come right to the villages’**

Extensity, as the projection of scale as constituted in space and time, came to the fore under such conditions. The challenging distances, terrain and isolation of Kibindu posed one of the greatest challenges to its inhabitants in terms of everyday socio-economic life and well-being. In this context, ‘presence and proximity matter’ decidedly (Allen 2003, p3), whereby the sheer act of arriving in Kibindu town in person was far more visible in comparison to Kerege’s daily flow of visitors. Arrival was an event that afforded considerable symbolic capital: even more so if on a regular basis. Visits were typically short, as guests, due to the lack of lodgings as well as the distance, opted to return to the tar road by evening, leaving their hosts feeling unable to host their guests properly. Nevertheless, despite their brevity, such visits had considerably more impact than in Kerege.

In this way, it was relatively straightforward for those in Kibindu ward in contact with various NGOs to differentiate between those that travelled to the provinces and those that simply hung around or ‘played with’ the district in Bagamoyo town. In the words of the acting Ward Executive Officer (WEO), who held considerable sway after his decade of service:

> You have these NGOs that come to the district, they cover the long distance to offer [services] from our ward, Kibindu, right up to their district headquarter, that is Bagamoyo. There are other NGOs that don’t arrive here; they live there in town, they conduct their activities there, day to day. So now you get very few here, than if you compare with those in town, so that’s what I meant when I said that this distance is a challenge.227

Voluntary Partnership International (VPI), one of Bagamoyo’s two key international organizations, had the capacity, and tenacity, to extend to this remote area. This

226 Interview 72, Athumani, Kibindu ward CJF 16 May 2013.
227 Interview 64, acting Kibindu WEO, 29 April 2013.
extensity placed VPI, for the WEO, head and shoulders above other NGOs in the district. When asked regarding the key NGOs operating in the area he responded:

Out of those NGOs that are here, that are working…with us here, I think maybe it’s VPI that gives training so often, they strive to come to us here, and even those that they’ve enabled [empowered] to help us, their TOTs [trainer of trainers] or animators [volunteers trained by VPI], they are here and every time, they try to educate others to help. So, in truth, if talking about a particular contribution to the villages here, they remember us a lot. VPI, we could say, is an organization that is really alive.228

VPI’s extensive presence, either directly or by proxy via its extensive network of trainees and volunteers, stood in stark contrast to Youth Health’s physical absence from Kibindu. Youth Health had burst onto the district stage (see Chapter Three), becoming highly prominent in a short space of time. Youth Health’s manager made persistent written and verbal claims at district level, laterally and ultimately upwards, about the scale and extensity of the organization’s operations, reporting activities across the breadth of the district and in all 22 of its wards. The WEO, however, was subtly disparaging of Youth Health’s approach of requesting and training volunteers centrally in Bagamoyo town, subsequently communicating with these volunteers directly and avoiding travel. As he listed out NGOs claiming operations in the ward:

And then…Youth Health. Youth Health from them I just got a letter…Physically, they themselves have never arrived here. I speak to them, they called my phone…[iterating later] So Youth Health, they’ve never arrived here, not even once229

The WEO’s contrasting acclamation of VPI’s presence in the ward was echoed by various NGO interlocutors in the village, whether working directly with VPI or not. When discussing with Haamid, the ward youth network representative, the relative merits of organizations he had been in contact with, he commented:

VPI, their strength is that they come right to the villages, yeah that’s the beauty of VPI. So I mean they might stay put for maybe two months and then bang, they come - say to Kibindu, they decide to do a training in Kibindu, they call people from Kwamduma and Kwamsanja [neighbouring villages], then they come do the training230

In a similar vein, ward Community Justice Facilitator (CJF) Athumani, seasoned Kibindu volunteer, noted:

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228 Kibindu WEO, *ibid.*
229 Kibindu WEO, *ibid.* Emphasis in original.
230 Interview 72, Kibindu ward youth network chair, 16 May 2013.
Between the organizations…VPI – there is no other organization that leads the way in giving training like VPI. If we gathered all of those who’ve been trained by VPI, I think across the ward it might approach three hundred.\(^{231}\)

Athumanı was originally recruited by UNICEF but remained sceptical of successor VPI. The extensity of VPI, however, both spatially and temporally, was nonetheless acknowledged by such leaders who worked with NGOs on a regular basis. This extensity as legitimation thus stood alone, separate to the question of the relevance of VPI’s training (see representation) or of VPI’s promoted voluntary ethos (see voluntarism), each negotiated separately. VPI’s extensity, the symbolic capital of arrival, thus remained an independent and pervasive basis for legitimation. Mosi, for instance, a CJF recruited by VPI in neighbouring village Kwamduma, found this extensity practiced by VPI, bolstered by the coverage given by its volunteers, had a positive effect:

\[\text{[VPI’s strategy] is good. It is good because firstly it’s an organization that strives to educate time after time, and then, its education is given to many. So, I mean if you take in my village, we are more than five or six, so carrying out the work becomes easier.}\(^{232}\)

For Mosi, having growing numbers associated with VPI within Kwamduma village built a momentum, legitimating their volunteering efforts as well as obviously providing more people amongst whom to distribute the burden. In addition, he alludes to the role of temporal extensity, whereby VPI can be relied upon ‘time after time’, providing continuity of presence. His reference to temporal extensity was shared by his peers and the WEO, which legitimated the efforts of VPI over and above its contemporaries. Haamid, in comparing VPI’s extensity to the departed UNICEF, also alluded to the importance of temporal extensity:

\[\text{I can see that VPI are really working hard. When UNICEF were working here it was also non-stop, but these days they’ve slowed down a bit.}\]

For Haamid, the abrupt discontinuation of UNICEF remained a source of confusion:

\[\text{The people from UNICEF, for a while, we haven’t heard from them. I don’t know now, within the district…I guess we’re far here.}\]

\(^{231}\) Interview 71, Kibindu ward CJF, 16 May 2013.  
\(^{232}\) Interview 62, Mosi, CJF for Kwamduma, 29 April 2013.
Whilst the temporal break did not preclude UNICEF’s return subject to a future negotiation, as explored previously in Kerege, it had served to delegitimate the organization to a certain degree in the meantime.

In the face of changing players in the ward, therefore, volunteers consistently emphasized VPI’s relative spatio-temporal extensity over others, in and of itself. This was separate to the actual relevance and efficacy of the kinds of education delivered. VPI, in close conjunction with the district government (see state), made efforts to serve Kibindu ward as any other: to incorporate it into district governance from the geographical margins.

Whilst VPI’s temporal extensity allowed it to institute itself within the ward to a certain degree, however, the product of legitimation is only ever partial. The Village Executive Officer, as in Kiharaka, denied the presence of VPI. For ward CJF Athumani, there were limits to the pursuit of coverage for coverage’s sake, particularly via trainings. He suggested how the seemingly constant training of new people, without proper follow-up, could lead to a dilution or lack of focus in efforts. When asked if there were confusion as to who would lead on what aspect, he replied:

Yes, it’s an issue, because for example they would take, like last year, peer educators from within the ward, maybe six. They go do the training, but still without follow up to ensure things run smoothly. That’s not done, so they just take six more for training. So you’re doing all that training work without implementation, no results of the training and that’s where the problem is. But they try to train a lot of people!

Whilst Athumani did not name VPI directly here, the comments were made in conjunction with his earlier commentary on the unique scale that VPI pursued. Other small to mid-sized NGOs, such as Youth Health, eschewed investing in physical extensity despite its claims to the contrary, to their detriment in the eyes of local leaders.

One small local NGO illustrated the interplay between extensity and other forms of legitimation, chiefly representation. Gender-Net indeed had its primary source of legitimation rooted in representation, as a network of women across the district governed ostensibly by themselves, aided uniquely by district, NGO and national funding. Gender-Net’s primarily representational legitimation, via its membership model, thus demanded in turn that of extensity. There was therefore the need for its

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233 Fieldnotes, 29 April 2013.
234 Interview 71, Kibindu ward CJF, 16 May 2013
district leadership to demonstrate presence in all wards equitably, if not equally. Gender-Net, with considerably less resource than VPI, attempted to extend to Kibindu with conflicting results.

I accompanied Gender-Net on my very first visit to Kibindu ward in October 2012, accompanying its secretary (who was partially salaried by donors), the chairperson (who received travel and subsistence allowances), and a paid consultant from Dar. The trip to Kwamsanja village specifically was with the purpose of delivering two days of training on entrepreneurship, the first day facilitated almost entirely by the consultant. The rationale to cover Kwamsanja, which Gender-Net’s secretary set out clearly in the days before departure, was that its focus to date had been on Kibindu village. There was a need to cover Kwamsanja also ‘so that they may get something’; indeed the women of Kwamsanja had been in regular contact to query why they had been overlooked. The visitors thus received a warm reception from the women, highly motivated to learn but also expectant of the availability of Gender-Net’s revolving loan fund. One woman intimated to me on the second day the group had hopes of purchasing a tractor.

The loan, however, had not materialized by the end of my fieldwork a year later, despite women of Kibindu village having received their tranche more than a year earlier. On my next trip to Kibindu one week after the training, a local Gender-Net leader asked me why there had been training in Kwamsanja with no such training given to Kibindu. What eventually transpired was that some groups in Kibindu had received their share of the revolving fund but little in the way of training; the women in Kwamsanja, conversely, had received training but awaited the funds. This point of contention grew until it culminated in an angry emergency meeting between the villages’ respective leaders in May 2013, demanding answers from the Kibindu ward secretary as to the missing loan, which were not forthcoming. In this way, the Gender-Net district leadership’s decision had rather unwittingly served to exacerbate tensions and resentment between the two villages. It had wielded its various project instruments inconsistently and unpredictably in the service of coverage, or rather extensity.

The feelings of neglect and marginalization, therefore, of Kibindu within Bagamoyo district were replicated at scales between Kibindu’s villages. Kibindu village was seen as

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235 Discussion with Gender-Net secretary, 1 October 2012
the focus of activity, to the detriment of Kwamsanja and Kwamduma. For many volunteers, NGOs were not sensitive to the geography of the ward and distances between villages, and so there was added potential symbolic value to NGOs extending their outreach beyond Kibindu village. As the ward’s youth network volunteer Haamid urged, even of the extensive VPI:

If it is possible, it’s better they deliver training in Kibindu, they pay a certain amount, then they go to Kwamduma, and educate there, they pay a certain amount, then if possible they go to Kwamsanja. So all villages finish together, better than calling Kwamduma and Kwamsanja to come to Kibindu.236

For Haamid, it was as much about equal recognition on the part of NGOs of the autonomous villages in the ward, and indeed those villagers’ time, as it was about logistics. VPI’s relative extensity, therefore, vis-à-vis its district contemporaries, was still only partial in the eyes of those from villages outside of Kibindu.

To summarize, with few developmentalists serving Kibindu, the arrival of those who made the journey was a highly visible event and one that helped to legitimate those NGOs in the eyes of those it aimed to work with. This extensity, the ability of NGOs to project presence, indeed to ‘encompass’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) the margins of the district as equitably as the oppidan, carried symbolic weight in and of itself. It was thus appraised independently to the quality, relevance and efficacy of NGOs’ actual programmatic content. In this setting, the supervision and oversight of the Tanzanian state was cautiously welcomed and solicited, either directly or via the organizations it sanctioned, rather than deflected as in Kiharaka. Extensity, however, as legitimation more broadly, is only ever relative and partial, with smaller villages feeling similar distance from Kibindu centre. As a whole, extensity must be accrued and maintained over time, with VPI’s spatio-temporal extensity proving somewhat exceptional in this context.

Territoriality: ‘we want new people’

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236 Interview 73, Kibindu ward youth network chair, 16 May 2013
The creation and control of boundaries is a primary form of spatial power (Sack, p26). It is therefore (inversely) related to extensity in creating and maintaining geographical sub-spheres of influence. Under the conditions of isolated Kibindu, where development workers arriving in the ward were so few, extensity, and indeed the equity it signified, eclipsed the legitimation proffered by territoriality. This redundancy contrasted strongly with Chapter Four’s Kiharaka village, which was immersed in the legitimation of a large number of NGOs: one organization’s legitimation served to exclude another. As explored, Advocates International’s substantial symbolic capital in that context, particularly amongst the Kiharaka leadership, compounded the repudiation of VPI and the district council. In such a competitive environment, relationships become more exclusionary, whereby NGOs like AI draw boundaries around their sphere of intervention. Those they interact with similarly sanction such lines of inclusion or exclusion. One organization’s legitimation, in such crowded environments, is at the expense of another.

Whilst Kibindu’s environment was much more sparsely populated, the recent entry of Community Development Innovation Professionals (CDIP) into Kibindu was duly accompanied by the familiar impetus to demarcate turf via their ‘own people’. Some of the existing network of volunteers had begun to experience this dynamic. This would confuse coordination efforts on the part of the Ward Executive Officer and other leaders to track volunteers’ activity, or to have key people leading on identifiable areas. As Haamid explained:

> These CDIP folk, we asked ‘why don’t we use those existing peer educators who already went for training?’ they said ‘we don’t want them – we want new young people to come so that we train them ourselves.’

Despite this nascent territoriality, however, there remained space across Kibindu as a whole for increased NGO and district developmental activity, which was cautiously solicited. The question was not, therefore, how one NGO could oust its competitors, via the staking of more attractive and robust claims over its constituents. The more pressing question was rather which NGOs and government initiatives passed the basic litmus test of equitable extensity, to Kibindu ward as any other. Whilst, therefore, there was an element of territoriality between villages in Kibindu, it did not override extensity as the primary form of spatial power. An NGO staking territorialized claims to work

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237 Interview 73, Kibindu ward youth network chair, 16 May 2013
exclusively with neighbouring villages Kwamsanja or Kwamduma, to the exclusion of Kibindu, would be well placed to legitimate itself in the eyes of those with whom it wished to work with. In the current climate, however, in the absence of pronounced competitiveness between NGOs, territoriality fell away as a basis for legitimation claims in the Kibindu context.

**Working state capital: ‘everyone’s goal is the same’**

Working relations with the state, which looms large in the political imagination, formed one of the starkest forms of legitimation in Kibindu. Tanzania’s developmental state retained particularly strong symbolic capital in that context. Its oversight was cautiously solicited, either directly or through its ‘co-production’ (Dodworth 2015) via the NGOs it sanctioned. In the words of one prominent Kibindu volunteer, multiple initiatives, if under the purview of the state, could co-exist harmoniously in a single direction: ‘everyone’s goal is the same’. This contrasted starkly with Kiharaka, of the previous chapter, whereby VPI and AI’s opposing positionalities vis-à-vis the state precipitated strongly divergent fortunes. VPI’s proximity to the district, borrowing and indeed co-producing governmental authority in an attempt to compel others to act, was inimical due to antagonism between Kiharaka and district leaders. AI, in contrast, leveraged discord to its advantage, positioning itself at a distance from the district machinery and more proximate to ‘the people’.

Kibindu’s solicitation of the state therefore contrasted with the situation in Kiharaka, but it was not without qualification. There was still some apprehension regarding the competency of ‘external’ district intervention in certain matters. With regard to Kibindu village, this had most recently manifested itself via illicit land sales, whereby the district-appointed Village Executive Officer had been recalled at the request of the villagers. To some extent, therefore, both Kerege and Kibindu shared a perception that outsiders including the district, unfamiliar with the local environment, may be hindered in their attempts to act in the interests of its inhabitants. This is a well-worn adage for any development context (see **representation**) and one rarely addressed in a meaningful way. Where the Kiharaka and Kibindu leaderships notably diverged, however, was in
levels of optimism that the developmental state held at least the potential to alleviate service and infrastructural issues. There was considerably more confidence in the roles that ‘government’ could and should play in Kibindu’s development.\textsuperscript{238} The state, therefore, was not intrinsically ill-placed to act on behalf of Kibindu’s residents, as in Kiharaka, but rather there was space and appetite for considerably ‘more government’ to fulfil its developmental remit within Kibindu. The state’s spatial extensity, co-produced by VPI, was thus continued grounds for sanguinity where other development actors had failed.

The state’s extensity admits of, in the words of one informant, many ‘streams’ of government.\textsuperscript{239} In the case of Kibindu, the influence of the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) ensured that the state’s bureaucratic arm, that of the district council, retained a strong presence. The WEO, given Kibindu’s remoteness, was resident and therefore, unlike Kerege, assumed a strong coordination, advocacy and authorizing role within his adopted community. The WEO had the best aerial view of the patchwork of initiatives in place across the ward. He was familiar with each NGO’s operations but also with their various volunteers. He had selected most of the volunteers himself, was aware of their circumstances and, to a degree, up to date with their levels of project activity.

There was no other person with such knowledge of ward initiatives, endeavouring to assimilate and connect them. He also served as a significant gatekeeper and, indeed, source of sanction.

Whilst the WEO’s predominance reflected his own competency and personal attributes, it was also in concordance with the increased space to govern. The symbolic capital of the state - so central to its anthropology in the everyday (e.g. Bayart 2009 [1993]; Cohn 1996; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta & Sharma 2006; Migdal 2001; Migdal & Schlichte 2005; Mitchell 1991; Scott 1998) - resounded clearly in these circumstances, paving the way for the WEO’s pre-eminence. The WEO, and those NGO collaborators who conformed to his idea of the state as patron and disciplinarian, were part of ‘doing the state’ (Migdal & Schlichte 2005, p14). Such practices, which included the creation and endorsement of particular networks of volunteers, in turn created and endorsed particular hierarchies.

\textsuperscript{238} Note, as earlier in the thesis, that there remains little daylight between state and government in the Tanzanian context, with government providing the primary linguistic referent.

\textsuperscript{239} Interview 73, Kibindu ward youth network chair, 16 May 2013
The WEO, by way of illustration, was somewhat agitated with Youth Health’s non-state, ‘remote control’ approach in which young volunteers were called to training centrally. In addition, it was a point of consternation that volunteers were selected without face to face consultation with ward representatives. Lastly, neither the volunteers nor the Youth Health managers kept administrative officers abreast of developments in the project along state reporting lines. For the WEO, Youth Health compared unfavourably to another youth-led HIV initiative, run by CDIP:

When CDIP came, they visited my office. I was impressed by them because first, they called us to Bagamoyo, the WEOs from all wards. We spoke with them there, and when they came here, they weren’t officially my guests [i.e. an impromptu visit], but we spoke with them, I told them ‘here there are two youths with Youth Health, but their work is like yours’, and they said ‘we’d like to see them’. So they spoke with them, that their goal was one and the same, so that when they do these works they might cooperate with each other; we’re all in the same place, so there CDIP satisfied me, they left their young people behind, with heart [motivation]. But Youth Health, they’ve never arrived here, not even once.  

For those volunteers not endorsed by the WEO, such as those of Youth Health, their role became more challenging still, as they were compelled to legitimate their presence by other means.

The role of WEO as coordinating gatekeeper was a conspicuous one and important given the confusion and uncertainty surrounding certain NGOs’ approaches, particularly that of Youth Health. Instead of the same people being recruited for multiple project initiatives, as was often the case in the Kerege villages, the WEO strove for coverage of volunteers across the three villages and that different people were recruited for different projects, as part of the extensity of state-making:

I spread them around…So CDIP here they have two people, Kwamduma one, and Youth Health here they have one and Kwamsanja one. So every village has one person to teach this [subject], because it is the goal of our ward. So, they don’t overlap; that one when he goes to Kwamsanja he asks the Kwamsanja one ‘where have you been, what kind of person have you spoken to, what difficulties have you had?’ They can explain so they can then do something else.

Some volunteers, in turn, attempted to work with each other, with the WEO providing a welcome steer, point of contact and source of recognition with regard to their endeavours. As Haamid, the youth coordinator described:

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240 Kibindu WEO, op. cit.
241 Kibindu ward youth network chair, op. cit.
So it was me, cooperating with the ward CJF…then me and the animator, a friend who went to training, so eventually it became necessary for us then to meet, we do the training, all of us [to plan] together. So the animator does her work and the CJF does his work and me, the peer educator, I do my work. So we proceeded well…I’ll have, perhaps a discussion with these young people, we'll give our education, we'll prepare a summary of the matters we taught on, we write in the file, when I finish there I take the issue to the WEO ‘sir, here’s the summary of the meeting’, maybe when I did it and he’ll tell you ‘fine, when you are required at the district you can go with the feedback’.

Haamid, as the WEO before, was speaking as much in aspiration as recollection, as coordination between volunteers was again beset with challenges stemming from divergent project strategies, timeframes and organizational interests. Nevertheless, the potential was acknowledged whereby the state, and the NGO practices which co-produced it, ultimately pulled in the same direction. Haamid was indeed keen for more rigorous state sanction at the apex of this development assemblage:

Maybe here’s a thought, for example, VPI were doing good work, meaning we were working in a formal contract with the district. Then when you leave the training, there’s a paper to sign when you do the work, then we [VPI] will come, we’ll inspect. Let’s see then if you don’t do the work: if not then it’s necessary to bring charges. Why did our fellow come to get training and then not work in the village? So people, when they came from there, they were motivated to work, and we ourselves worked well, but we saw that our fellows have stayed silent, until today, so we don’t know what the problem is.

Haamid’s comments noted the lack of coordination as well as alluded to the need for recognition (see voluntarism). More pertinent to the current discussion, however, was that Haamid was soliciting a greater role for government in surveying and sanctioning the harmonious development activities of all agencies. In this example, there is again little daylight between VPI and the district, once relations are formalized. Haamid’s comments echoed the appetite for increased centralization and bureaucratization for these villagers who felt neglect at the very fringes of governmental oversight. His language was forceful, emphasizing the formalizing power of the written contract. Ultimately, Haamid was calling for government not to only ‘own’ this data, but to incorporate disparate volunteering efforts into a single developmental drive, with the full force of state sanction. When reflecting, however, on the reality of government inertia:

242 Kibindu ward youth network chair, op. cit.
VPI can decide to do this [training], but government they just sit; they don’t know that we give trainings there or that maybe capacity has grown a little. They are restricted. So these organizations they help us to push government, to push our government.\footnote{Kibindu ward youth network chair, \textit{op. cit.}}

Here, Haamid highlighted the lethargy of government but also the potential of NGOs, particularly VPI, to supplement and ‘push’ government’s efforts but ultimately working \textit{towards the same ends}. VPI thus still co-produces the state, extending its existential tidemark.

Whilst VPI eclipsed all others in their capacity to co-produce the state, other volunteers agreed it feasible that multiple initiatives, if under the purview of government, could co-exist harmoniously and pull evermore strongly in a single direction. As Fatuma commented, a long-recruited VPI ‘trainer of trainers’ (TOT):

\begin{quote}
[VPI] are close, they really work close to government. They work really close to government, because many issues, how I see it, they involve the district council…this is good, because we don’t want them to say ‘we don’t know about that’, because everything they [VPI] are doing, they [government] must also know.
\end{quote}

She later added, when asked if it was difficult to coordinate, or for villagers to recognize, the efforts of volunteers from multiple organizations:

\begin{quote}
I think that everyone’s goal is the same, the goal is one, the wish to educate the community member, so he knows, he recognizes if there is an issue with HIV, with AIDS, he knows his rights.\footnote{Interview 74, Fatuma, VPI trainer of trainers, ex-Gender-Net chair, 16 May 2013}
\end{quote}

In the Kibindu context, therefore, the validation conferred by working close to the district council was an asset. Fatuma, having worked for many years as a WEO herself in other wards before returning home to Kibindu, saw no dissonance between the goals of NGOs and the district council. In this way, Haamid, and more clearly Fatuma, replicated the language of the district Community Development Officer, and indeed the Tanzanian government more broadly, whereby legitimate, or ‘serious’, civil society and local government were complementary. They remained thus insofar as the politically neutral language of rights, educating and mobilizing communities and poverty reduction was maintained.

VPI again fitted neatly into this mould. VPI monitoring visit to Kibindu, which took place in conjunction with district officers, took on its familiar authoritative tone. I accompanied staff on one such visit in October 2012, which aimed to evaluate the
activities of a range of rights and welfare committees, particularly the village HIV/AIDS committee, the Woman and Child Rights committee as well as of other key leaders and representatives. After a long wait, whilst the HIV/AIDS committee completed business with another visiting NGO conducting baseline research, the meeting got underway. The tone was terse from the outset, as VPI and district representatives requested a range of plans and documents, including the village development plan, none of which was available. It transpired the last village meeting had taken place in January, some nine months earlier.

Part of this stemmed from the recent governance issues, whereby the sitting VEO had been recalled and a gap left before his replacement was found. Part of the issue, as volunteers subsequently told me, lay with the time of year and the farming calendar, which prevented regular meetings from taking place. The distances within sub-villages, in addition, was a constant challenge to internal governance. The visiting district staff became quickly frustrated at the lack of meetings and the failure to produce the required plans or proof of activities. Some representatives, such as the village CJF, were not present at the meeting and the staff were told she was ill at home. The CDO took an increasingly reprimanding tone with the assembled group, asking ‘when these programmes finish, who will help you?’ He emphasised the need to report on all groups and initiatives. At one point, requests were made for so many roles – TOTs, TOAs, CJFs and so on – that the group started laughing at the sheer number of acronyms, each with attendant demands. The group hesitated as they recollected who was who.

Whilst the stringent hierarchy of the exchange resonated with the monitoring meeting in Kiharaka of the same month, the outcomes in the two settings diverged. In Kiharaka, the authority of the district council, and by association VPI, was challenged before, during and after the meeting by absence, silence and withdrawal. The exchanges that followed the meeting were perhaps the most revealing, as the group broke up laughing about the demands that had been made of them and the claims that they were ‘failing’ to administer the various initiatives. In Kibindu, however, the group endeavoured to defend their record more strenuously, even in the absence of the correct paperwork. ‘We are here’, replied one, ‘we are together; we are educating others’. The group was frustrated at one point with the focus on formalized groups and reporting, which devalued other forms of community work. ‘You must plan for every committee’ the
CDO said, ‘without a plan you can’t move forward’. A woman pointed out the existence of a local theatre group, which was not associated with these particular roles, nor did it plan or report in a formalized way. ‘We are here’, she emphasized, ‘and we are trying very hard’.

Whilst the group gently probed these accusations of failure, with their protestations mainly silenced, they nonetheless remained inside this process. There was no question that the authority of the CDO, and by extension VPI, might not be recognized nor abided by. The reprimands were taken seriously and were ultimately demoralizing for the assembled group. In this sense, the role of these external developmentalists was recognized and endorsed. This was confirmed in later interviews by the level of profile that VPI held across the ward, with the majority of leaders and volunteers aware of their work and their proximity to government. For friends Adira and Ruwa, VPI and CDIP volunteers respectively, the difference between their two organizations was clear:

Adira: CDIP is far, far from government
Kathy: And VPI?
A: At the moment, they are close to government, VPI
K: So the approach is different…?
A: A little…CDIP is a private outfit [lit. private person].

Whilst both agencies were legitimate in the eyes of their recruits, it was on the bases of different claims. In VPI’s case, its proximity to the district council served as a legitimation asset in the spacious Kibindu context. This proximity bolstered its ability to wield public authority to compel others to act, rather than conferring liability as played out in Kiharaka. The more ‘private’ CDIP’s legitimation, however, given its perceived distance from government, lay elsewhere.

In summary, Tanzania’s developmental state loomed large in remote Kibindu, whereby the appetite for remained strong. Government’s role was indeed ‘to achieve development for their people’. This resonated strongly with contemporaneous development discourses whereby civil society, most vociferously NGOs, supplement governmental efforts to bring such development to the people. Indeed, in extending the

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245 Interview 70, Adira (VPI animator) and Ruwa (CDIP volunteer), 15 May 2013.
246 Interview 54, VPI Programme Coordinator, December 2012.
reach of government, as explored under extensity, NGOs like VPI are part of ‘doing the state’ (Migdal & Schlichte 2005, p14), which can be as ‘state-like’ in aspect as much as in content. In this context, dominant development discourses, including that of the ostensibly bottom-up, rights-based approach, in practice supplemented that of top-down development, identifying once again failure, absence and deficiency at the hands of villages. This perceived unity allowed civil society and government’s developmental efforts to co-extend and indeed co-produce. In such a context, quite unlike Kiharaka, VPI’s association with the district afforded it considerable traction and influence in the absence of visible competitors. Green’s ‘legitimation as being part of government’ (2010, p19) was at its most pronounced, allowing VPI to craft considerable space in which to govern.

**Representation: ‘that’s not how it is here’**

Contemporary representational practice visibly melds positionalities of distance and proximity: to act for and stand for Others. Newer theories of political representation, as Holzscheiter details, have helped to recalibrate representation as a ‘dialectic of performative practices between representatives and their real or imagined constituencies’ (2016, p205). When understood as a performance, representation is revealed as an ongoing collection of claims and attendant positionalities. It is not, therefore, whether institutions or organizations choose either to stand for or to act for others, often disaggregated in political theory, but rather how agencies oscillate between such claims, negotiating and reconciling their contradictions over time. In Kibindu, where the developmental state predominated the space for public authority, there was less scope for its exiguous NGOs to leverage an oppositional stance via claims to stand for the people. The extension of the state, as examined, co-produced by VPI in particular, itself conferred an appearance of proximity in the face of geographical isolation. This was quite unlike Kiharaka, which housed growing opposition to government intervention in any shape or form.

This courting of the state resonated with the rather stable consensus amongst village leaders and volunteers themselves, who formed part of the developmental state’s
infrastructure. In their formulation, the main obstacle to Kibindu’s development remained the lack of education and understanding around key issues, including rights. To return to Fatuma’s comments, all development agents were able to pull in the same direction to tackle this shortfall:

I think that their goals are the same, the wish that education can reach the community member, he at the absolute lowest level, who doesn’t know anything. I think everyone has that goal, that that person gains education, that he knows himself, who he is and he has rights and is obligated to do this or that. I think all projects that have come focus a lot on that.247

This unison echoed the comments of the WEO, whereby the supply of quality, relevant training by VPI would be met by commensurate demand:

The training itself was good, and accessible, because that which we learnt was those very issues, gender-based violence, issues that have caused women [lit. mothers] to be kept behind. So, we sat for a long time on that and it was pleasing for people from here, if they [volunteers who were trained] come, it’s wanted, it’s really useful here in our place.248

Haamid, the youth coordinator, also reiterated that the challenge to ensure that the right education reached ‘the people’ in order to tackle key developmental challenges:

So I urge organizations to intensify their efforts; come with new things to teach, for example life skills; there are many subjects possible to teach.

These comments collectively affirm that the onus of development must be placed firmly at the feet of ‘the people’, albeit under state direction. The ‘problem’, as extensively explored in postcolonial literature,249 is constructed as a lack of expertise and understanding on the part of local people: in Fatuma’s words, he ‘who doesn’t know anything’. This lack, in turn, demands intervention on the part of developers to impart the right kind of education, in the right way, to the right people. Whilst the extensity of the Tanzanian state, therefore, here co-produced by VPI and its volunteers, resembles prima facie a proximity to the people, in reality it forms the basis for distance and disassociation. Extensity to the very furthest outreaches of the district bolsters knowledge claims of ‘gaps’, juxtaposed with the VPI’s expertise. Such gaps sustain the

247 Fatuma (VPI TOT), op. cit.
248 Kibindu WEO, op. cit.
249 This practice of ‘Othering’, following Edward Said’s lead (1978) has been vigorously deconstructed by post-colonial thought (e.g. Bhabha 1994; Cohn 1996; Coronil 1996; Doty 1996; Membre 2001; Ngũgĩ 1981; 1986; Paolini 1999; Thomas 1994). Tanganyika was the ‘paradigmatic development state’ (Green 2014, p17): a ward to be administered until it reached a level of political and economic maturity (ibid pp 22-23; also Hunter 2015; Schneider 2014)
case for intervention, whereby it is the responsibility of the developers to act for the interests of those unable to develop themselves. Post-colonial ‘development authority’, therefore, is ‘responsible for not to the rural population’ (Schneider 2014, p83, emphasis added). These developmentalists are, as their colonial and missionary forbearers, the custodians of their subjects’ wellbeing, present and future.

Claims to act for Others, replicated at a number of scales, therefore predominated in the Kibindu setting. Volunteers themselves, as Fatuma who was a VPI volunteer and ex-government employee, similarly took up the developmental mantle to counter the dearth of relevant knowledge and understanding in their own communities. On Rose’s Foucauldian reading, the disciplinary form of ‘community’ became both the cause and solution of governmental problems (1999), so-defined at a distance. This was not, however, a narrative acceded to or consumed without question by those subjected to such interventions. Villagers exercised strategies of withdrawal, silence or dissent to good effect. For some, for example, it was not sufficient that these various volunteers had been selected by the WEO, sanctioned by the relevant village committee, nor that they had received a particular training; their efforts to educate their fellow villagers were repelled all the same. Their charge as educators was questioned or at times not recognized, with suspicions of volunteers’ own interests. As Adira and Ruwa described it:

A: There are many challenges. Because many, they are malicious, those troublemakers. You get them if you go and you want to educate them, they say ‘ah, you you’ve spent [lit. eaten] the money’.

R: ‘You come to educate us!”

A: ‘You’re annoying us, we don’t want it!”

R: So it’s really hard

A: So some, when you find them, they don’t want it, others if you go there you educate them and they agree…

R: You can leave here, if you go to them there, you want to educate them but they tell you ‘ah you, go back to where you come from, we don’t want it, you’ve eaten the money you, and then you come to annoy us!”

They later described other strategies of withdrawal, when attempting to incorporate education items into public meetings:
Say you get someone, you call him to the public meeting, that person comes and you give him your education, it could be that there’s no problem and the person understands you. But [others] they boycott it. You can call come someone, and when you get to that part of the agenda where you educate them, they leave. So you’re left with just you and the executive officer; who are you going to educate then? So yes, they boycott it, especially at this time of hunger when they really don’t want to hear that there’s another meeting.250

This was echoed by similar experiences for Haamid and the other young peer educators:

We tried to run with this initiative but we failed, because the WEO he was supervising overall, but we ourselves were running it, we managed this well at the beginning; we convened our meetings, we met every month. But after some time, every time you convene a meeting people don’t turn up. Say you go around ‘guys let’s have a meeting’, you give them the info but people don’t come to the meeting.251

These recollections demonstrated one of the strongest, overt forms of withdrawal, at the same time raising questions regarding the relevance of the training. The interests of the NGOs, the volunteers and the villagers were not perceived to align. Volunteers were thus not seen to be standing for the interests of Others. Indeed, the question of the relevance of interventions came up in subtler ways in volunteers’ own commentary. For Mosi, CJF of adjacent Kwamduma village:

Education is indeed the backbone on which we depend, but there are many issues; we do advise them [the communities] but when we then ask communities ‘what do you say?’, they say ‘we’ve been advised to do this, but also we ask if possible for government to invest in farming’.252

He went on to explain that regular droughts in the area, whereby the soil had been exhausted and compounded by lack of rains, had led the crops to fail. Life skills and human rights work found little traction in this context. Despite his belief in the importance of education, Mosi was clearly sensitive to the needs articulated by his fellow villagers, as well as to whether his own developer role aligned with such.

Furthermore, given Mosi’s CJF work required him to advise others on their rights, for example when to escalate a complaint to the authorities, the lack of a nearby police station reduced potential for sanction and enforcement. The nearest police station was at Mbwewe, located approximately 60 kilometres from Kibindu. Whilst community-based solutions were encouraged, with the Mbwewe police indeed advising Mosi not to

250 Adira and Ruwa, op. cit.
251 Kibindu ward youth network chair, op. cit.
252 Mosi, Kwamduma CJF, op. cit.
escalate low-level complaints, the lack of police oversight had at times very serious consequences. As Adira and Ruwa described:

R: In February this year, in Mbele village, a woman was beaten until she died…The husband did a runner [lit. fled into the forest].

A: To the forest, so she was just buried and there was no case.

K: Goodness, is that true. Because there’s no police?

A: There’s no police.

K: But couldn’t someone go and report in Mbwewe?

A: They went!

R: You can go and report but that person himself wasn’t around anymore, he’d done a runner.

Such a context is inevitably more complicated for those trained to encourage vulnerable groups to advocate for their rights. Police diligence in rural Tanzania is inevitably patchy, but for Kibindu the complete absence of oversight of even the most serious crimes exacerbated feelings of isolation and vulnerability. Teaching villagers to advocate for rights, therefore, in the absence of basic formal institutions, felt futile and misplaced. Such advocacy added little to community incidents that would continue to be resolved internally by the village government. Indeed, human rights work, in continually asking whether villagers fulfil their civic duties in demanding rights, masks broader question as to whether government has fulfilled its basic duty to supply the means to protect their citizens.

Villagers’ strategies of withdrawal, therefore, marked a questioning of the priorities of external development actors. Even Haamid, who was previously zealous in stating the need for external education, questioned the repetitive messages of NGOs regarding HIV/AIDS:

So we’re trying, organizations are trying to increase so that we can try to educate others on many subjects, to be able to teach ourselves here. So people are trying; our fellows, they come, but maybe don’t come every day solely on the issue of AIDS, AIDS, AIDS. Every day, people understand, when they sleep, when they wake, they get what’s going on there [with HIV/AIDS]. There are other things that are more hidden, deep issues that are well hidden. For example, as we discussed, this male [patriarchal] system, where we force women to work so hard.253

253 Kibindu ward youth network chair, op. cit.
Each time the relevance of a training or intervention was questioned in this way, it served to highlight distance and dissonance between the interests of external developmentalists and those of the villagers they claim to represent. The discursive practices of NGOs, including via their volunteers, highlighted gaps in education and understanding between those deemed ‘behind’ and those deemed developmentally advanced. This distance, however, was camouflaged by claims of proximity to, and intimacy with, the concerns of ‘the people’, on which NGOs existentially depend.

This oscillation between proximity and distance, even over the course of a single encounter, was demonstrated clearly within Gender-Net’s two-day entrepreneurship training with the women in Kwamsanja village. As explored under extensity, this training was organized by Gender-Net with the aim of providing wider coverage across Kibindu ward. This expansion was in light of Kibindu village having been recipient to a greater number of interventions than Kwamsanja, including first access to revolving funds. The training went ahead so that Kwamsanja women too could ‘get something’.

Gender-Net, as a network of Bagamoyo women governed ostensibly by themselves, generated powerful feelings of identification and surmised to be strongly representative, descriptively, substantively and symbolically. Whilst Gender-Net had been established by Advocates International in a drive to work with local partners, its presence had become institutionalized within the district; its endorsement by the district was manifest in a rare financial contribution from their budget. As such, larger NGOs would often solicit Gender-Net’s involvement including ‘women’ or ‘gender’ components in their projects: legitimation ‘out of the box’.

The Gender-Net leaders and external consultant were excitedly welcome to the village, despite arriving almost three hours late. Interpersonal relations were strong, particularly towards the charismatic secretary Aisha who was known to all, liked and respected. The strength and genuine feeling in this welcome stood in notable contrast to the formalized, hierarchical exchanges that characterized most NGO interactions at village level. The women were highly animated by the prospect of the training and roused by the Gender-Net slogans and mottos, such as ‘women, we can do it’, already familiar to all. The secretary quickly fell into her role as orator and animator, tapping into the unique levels of identification with and allegiance to this organization’s ideals. The
comradery between women from across Bagamoyo, with their shared sense of the additional burdens and hardships that they faced, was very real.

The smartly dressed consultant from Dar, who delivered the first day’s training, sought to capitalise on this fervour. He made an early pitch regarding the relevance of this training in entrepreneurship, as opposed to typical NGO interventions. As he opened, after the formal opening and introductions:

> We know you have had so many trainings: trainings on malaria, on health, on HIV/AIDS, women and children’s rights. There are so many issues these days…but has anyone ever given you training on entrepreneurship?254

He received an emphatic chorus of ‘no, we’ve nothing here!’ in response, with others exclaiming ‘with entrepreneurship we’ll profit more’ and ‘entrepreneurship will make us money’. Whilst there was an initial appetite for this training, however, the divergence in interests and expectations became increasingly clear throughout the workshop. The women hoped, as they shared their expectations in the opening session, to improve their business, to gain understanding of entrepreneurship, to help their family and, above all, to access a loan.

The training started, after sharing expectations, with a discussion of the meaning of entrepreneurship itself, with the trainer eliciting ideas from the group. Some of the women suggested it was someone who committed themselves to different kinds of work, frequently mentioning ‘small businesses’. This alluded to a diversification of economic activities, which in the Kibindu context included small eateries, basket-making and selling goods sourced perhaps in Dar. The consultant, however, emphasized a much stronger ethos of risk-taking, breaking down the Swahili word *ujasiriamali* into its component ‘bravery’ (*ujasiri*) with ‘resources’, or capital (*mali*). He continually returned to the need to forge and seize opportunities locally, being creative, decisive and self-confident in doing so. This resonated with Nadai and Maeder’s governing of the ‘entrepreneurial self’, rationalizing one’s whole life ‘according to market imperatives’ (2009, p235; drawing on Foucault via Burchell *et al.* 1991; also Dolan & Rajak 2016).

The women became increasingly hesitant in their responses to the trainer’s questions, struggling to populate his desired list of ‘entrepreneurial qualities’. They began to ask for

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254 Fieldnotes from Gender-Net workshop, Kwamsanja, 10th – 11th October 2012
help in coming up with the right answers, even though the workshop purported to be based on ‘facilitated’ learning. When the consultant moved on to how to select a particular business idea, the women resisted, saying their business choices were shaped, even determined, by their local environment. Local demand was low as well as seasonal. The consultant catalogued determining factors, such as the availability of raw materials, investment capital and the running costs of particular business options. Again, the women resisted the relevance of ‘selecting’ a new business in that few choices were open to them, adding that every woman has a stake in a tea shop for that very reason. ‘That’s not how it is here’, (lit. that’s not our environment) one leader rued; ‘there is no capital here’. The women reiterated the demands of the agricultural calendar, which determines the time available for other activities, questioning if the trainer’s suggestions were feasible in their context.

Nevertheless, the trainer stayed on message, insisting that opportunities were there. The women increasingly questioned his assertions, with subtle but discernible refutations. The Gender-Net leadership, observing the growing distance between the women and the trainer, began to intervene. The chairperson echoed the trainer’s words, adding ‘you will awaken’, see reason or ‘come to your senses’, which restated the distance between the workshop leaders and the women. It resonated with the notion that the barriers to development lay primarily with the attitudes and attributes of local people themselves. After the issue of capital had arisen, it later served to reignite the dispute regarding the missing Gender-Net loan. A long, heated discussion ensued, questioning the actions of Gender-Net and the discrepancy in loan access between Kibindu and Kwamsanja. The leaders replied that each group would receive the loan once they were ‘ready’, with little explanation as to how a group would be deemed such and by whom.

The first day’s training was thus a highly demotivating experience for the women, who withdrew into silence in response to the trainer’s questions. It was becoming increasingly apparent that initial expectations would remain unfulfilled. The distance between the ‘life worlds’ of the women and the young Dar consultant was increasingly visible, if not insurmountable. The next morning one of the group’s leaders told me:

> Many organizations come with big words. Like Gender-Net said we are here to work with women so we thought we will organize ourselves and perhaps we will get a loan but until now…nothing. We have been forgotten about until now.
The women went on to cite ‘discrimination’ against Kwamsanja, adding:

The Kibindu leadership they say they represent all of the ward but they don’t represent us. They took the loan for the ward and distributed it amongst themselves.\(^{255}\)

The second day’s training was led by the charismatic Gender-Net secretary Aisha, following the consultant’s departure. This improved the tone of proceedings, but the underlying dissonance and dissatisfaction with the training remained. Aisha led a curious exercise whereby the women calculated the various costs and profits of their small business, predominantly of running a teashop. Each one of these exercises appeared to demonstrate the business was running at a loss, which was likely due to miscalculations along the way. Nevertheless, Aisha drew water from the exercise in a bid to demonstrate the lack of entrepreneurial skill in the area. Once again, this accentuated distance between herself, as Gender-Net leadership, with those hindered in their own development.

Whilst the women frequently questioned the relevance and applicability of the training in subtle ways, therefore, their doubts were deflected back through questioning the abilities of the individual women. ‘You will see’ or ‘you will awaken’ was part of a claim by the leaders to represent the future wellbeing and interests of these women. The women could not help, over the course of the long anticipated training, to begin to internalize these professed shortcomings. Despite the increased dissonance and incongruity between themselves and the leaders, the women asked at the end of the final session ‘when will we get education again? When will we be back in the classroom?’\(^{256}\)

Deflecting failure from the tutors to the tutees, as explored in previous chapters, encapsulated an age-old (post)colonial dynamic of the need to act for the Other. Indeed, for Said, the construction of the Other formed the very condition of such intervention (1978, p39). This practice incorporated familiar tropes around the poor work ethic of local people. As a VPI programme officer, unusually from Bagamoyo herself, lamented of their village volunteers during my first visit to Kibindu ward:

\(^{255}\) Gender-Net workshop, Kwamsanja, *op. cit.*

\(^{256}\) Gender-Net workshop, Kwamsanja, *op. cit.*
They are supposed to train and educate others but they don’t...We try to explain that the *wazungu* will return to their own place but the problems will still be here in the village.*257

VPI, as external developer, was unable or unwilling to address the various representational issues and gaps at various stages in the chain of command they sought to institute. VPI’s ability to reflect critically on its approach existed informally, over morning tea or evening beers, but without space for its formal incorporation. Its formally sanctioned narrative of community self-help, co-produced with local government, thus remained intact.

This conflict, as part of the broader struggle between representational proximity and distance, was indeed embodied in the experience of recruited volunteers themselves. The Kibindu leaders reiterated the importance of the community selecting their own volunteers, sanctioned by a public meeting. The WEO was particularly forceful, explaining that others were obliged to give them an audience in their new roles:

> They listen, they are happy and I told them ‘guys, these young people are from our area, we selected them, so when they come to your homes, don’t be surprised; listen to them.’

Describing the volunteers in this way bolstered claims that they *stood for* the people, as ‘descriptively representative’ (Pitkin 1967) of their community. At the same time, in both Kibindu and Kiharaka, such volunteers were simultaneously agents of change, privy to specialist knowledge and expertise and thus poised to *act* for others.

To summarize, there was thus much in common regarding representational practice in the Kibindu and Kiharaka domains. The key difference, however, was that in Kiharaka there was additional representational space in opposition to government, bolstering claims of standing proximate to ‘the life of the people’. In Kibindu, however, where the idea of the omnipotent developmental *state* resonated more strongly, there was little symbolic capital to be garnered from an oppositional stance from NGOs, given ‘everyone’s goal is the same’. Representational practice thus diverged substantially in content. Nevertheless, such practice shared an intrinsic ambivalence between claims to stand for and act for the Other. This was evident in vacillating positionality, both of

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257 VPI programme officer, fieldnotes 18 October 2012.
258 Kibindu WEO, *op. cit.*
organizations like VPI and Gender-Net as well as their volunteers: of proximity and
distance as part of legitimation’s ‘countervailing currents’ (Lund 2006b, p699). The latter
stance of distance, expert and outsider, central to the (post)colonial condition, ultimately
won out in forging the authority to act. These tensions played out in everyday
experiences of such work, with volunteers reflecting on the relevance of their training,
their frustrations with the limits to effect change and, in some instances, their ultimate
repudiation by Others in their community. It is to these challenges in navigating
voluntarism I now return.

Voluntarism: ‘we don’t have the means to volunteer’

Voluntarism, as the ethic of giving of time and effort towards a claimed common good,
has had enduring resonance in the Tanzanian political imagination. It has proven a core
legitimation device for public action, from the colonial to the contemporary, but one
intertwined with extensity, state and representation, as explored throughout this
thesis. In addition, voluntarism has incorporated new repertoires, including more
recently that of neoliberalism. Rather than being fixed in content, therefore, voluntarism
is a template in which multiple, at times conflicting, registers are at play. In this way, it
has the potential to both bolster and inhibit other legitimation practices, depending on
emphasis or aspect at any one time. Chapter Three examined how voluntarism as virtue,
differentiated from the Tanzanian state, legitimated piecemeal-paid district NGO staff
to a limited degree: ‘I don’t eat’. Chapter Four examined the alignment of the non-state
VPI with the district council in their shared instantiation of voluntarism, to the
consternation and eventual rejection of the local leadership.

For Kibindu’s volunteers and their leaders, however, the enduring congruence between
the omnipotent developmental state and voluntarism remained paramount in
legitimating action on the part of volunteers. There are, as examined, insidious, indeed
illiberal, forms of coercion at play in exacting people’s time. However, the Lockean ideal
of consent, which underpins the Westernized notion of civil society conferred upwards
to donors and the international community through representations of voluntary
networks, was not as pertinent to the minds of volunteers. There was little contradiction
in being chosen to undertake voluntary work and indeed chosen by the state, via the village leadership. Open refusal to undertake voluntary work was not possible, and the ‘resignation’ or replacement of volunteers rare, except in the event of chronic illness or moving out of the area. Voluntarism, therefore, whether government or non-government, was therefore underwritten by state sanction, challenging any neoliberal, donor-oriented presentation of voluntarism as consent.

Whilst the Lockean, transactional notion of consent was therefore mainly absent from such a negotiation, volunteers nevertheless had their own motivations for undertaking such work. This underscored that selection was not necessarily undesirable, and that Kibindu’s volunteers crafted their own strategies of engagement. Many of the volunteers endorsed elements of the prevailing self-help, community-led development discourse, promoted by state and non-state alike. They were therefore quite explicit about their motivations to offer time and effort within this co-produced civic sphere, but also to further their own personal ‘development’. Haamid, who was a particularly strong advocate of NGO initiatives and had been a volunteer for three years, was mindful of the positive impact of education on volunteers themselves. When asked if people felt reluctant when selected to go for training, he replied:

No, they go; they go. Because when you go there, you meet with your peers and you exchange ideas. You’re able to gain something that you didn’t already know - another will give you their ideas, so when you get back, you can share with others, it’s good. So people like to go, because you are surrounded by ideas, and you feel positive.  

Similarly, Safia, a recent VPI Trainer of Trainers (TOT) and herself a primary school teacher, enthused about her initial training:

I gained something. You know, because I knew about AIDS but...I didn’t know about gender abuse, woman and child rights; I learnt something there. So, I gained something new, at least.  

Their words echoed that of Mosi, CJF for neighbouring Kwamduma since 2004. Despite having volunteered for almost a decade, Mosi remained strongly committed to continue his voluntary work going forward:

K: So you’ve been doing work like this for nine years? How do you see it? How do you feel?

259 Kibindu ward youth network chair, op. cit.
260 Interview 65, Saphia, VPI TOT, 29 April 2013.
A: I still feel good in myself, I don’t yet have the heart to say ‘ah this work, that’s it, enough.’ Because I can see that it has many benefits, firstly at times I get education so that I can know a lot on issues of advocacy of various groups. So these benefits I see firstly help me, but then the very same will help the community that surrounds me. Yeah, so I still have loads of energy, to keep helping the community, though those issues themselves are voluntary.²⁶¹

Mosi was reflecting how voluntary work on net, even when offset by the costs incurred, was beneficial for the community as a whole. ‘Voluntary’ in this instance was a somewhat negative inference to non-payment, separate to the positive benefits of community-based work. Similarly, for Fatuma, seasoned volunteer and former government worker, volunteering came with inevitable costs, but such costs were no surprise to her vis-à-vis the demands of servicing a perceived public good:

> We decided to volunteer, because the organization said it didn’t have any money, and villages themselves are like that. So me, myself I made my contribution, as TOT [trainer of trainers], together with others, we volunteered and we didn’t get even five cents for it, so that the project’s message of education could reach those community members.²⁶²

For these volunteers, as in the Kiharaka context, voluntarism’s legitimation as civic virtue retained sufficient significance to influence the decision to act. Even for Adira and Ruwa, who were relatively new recruits but had already experienced many challenges to fulfilling their work, the issue was not that of voluntary work per se. They were strongly motivated by the aims of the project, particularly that of reducing violence against women, and when asked if they enjoyed volunteering replied:

> R: I love volunteering a lot.
> A: I love it.
> K: How come?
> R: Because it helps us reduce these kinds of epidemics.

Once again, there was no contradiction between being selected to volunteer, with little meaningful consent, and the enduring value that such work was seen to hold. In addition, volunteers acknowledged the almost inevitability of their being requested to volunteer, in light of their demonstrable disposition for such. As such, the voluntarism paradigm was not questioned per se, which meant in the Kibindu context that the Tanzanian developmental state remained intact. The issues that volunteers encountered

²⁶¹ Mosi, Kwamduma CJF, op. cit.
²⁶² Fatuma, VPI TOT, op. cit.
related rather to some of voluntarism’s ancillary assumptions, on the part of external
developers but also on the part of the village community, of which I note three.

The first and foremost assumption in Kibindu, as in Kiharaka, was the failure on the
part of government and non-government agents alike to acknowledge the opportunity
costs of volunteering. This manifested itself primarily through the perennial debate on
allowances. Voluntary Partnership International’s model of engagement was the clearest
target of criticism in this regard, in that they recruited large numbers of volunteers but
without providing what was perceived as the necessary support to do the task. Indeed,
one VPI officer drew on its district council sanction to deflect demands for allowances
in Kibindu.

The knock-on costs of this stance were compounded, in the Kibindu context, by the
sheer geographical scale of the ward, requiring volunteers to cover scores of kilometres
whilst nominally remaining in the same village. As the WEO remarked:

> These TOTs and animators, when they go to these seminars, when they return here
> they don’t have the means to undertake their activities. They are ready, with the
> material in their heads and they have the ability to do it, but to go from one place to
> another, to move to the village, they don’t have any support.263

Furthermore, as Athumani detailed, VPI’s lack of allowance provision outside of
training inevitably led to an erosion of motivation as well as ability to undertake the
work. When asked whether the Most Vulnerable Children (MVC) committee was
functioning, to which his role was central, he responded:

> A: The committee is working, but not to a big degree, because already the terms of
> volunteering are hard.

> K: They are tired…?

> A: They are tired. It’s got to the point where people are tired, for example if you go
> from here to get to another sub-village, at the border, it’s 24 kilometres.

Athumani emphasized strongly the decrease in motivation following UNICEF’s
departure, who recruited the first CJFs, and VPI’s subsequent entry and adoption:

> In truth, after UNICEF left, VPI came in - but with VPI, it’s got to the point where
> they are undermining motivation, because you can’t do that and have a normal life
> […] so in truth their approach is good, in that education has already reached lots of
> people, but already those empowered [to train], they should have better conditions, to

263 Kibindu WEO, op. cit.
energize them to take the message to the community. Now what’s missing is when they come, they lose motivation, I go and there’s nothing even to eat, it’s a problem, so now what you get is people just taking the exercise books [where they record activity], looks at it himself and then just puts it somewhere [laughs].

Fatuma, less sceptical of the voluntarism ethos than Athumani, had a similar view over the lack of allowances. When asked how she viewed VPI’s approach she responded at length, as a Trainer of Trainers (TOT), i.e. recruited to train others as facilitators:

OK, so VPI have volunteered for a long time and us too, we’ve volunteered for a long time. But the issue that’s intensified is that VPI, as VPI, is a voluntary organization, meaning when you leave the training, say you’ve already been trained in how to take the message again to the targeted groups, it becomes tough. You’ve been to the training, you get maybe six thousand [shillings] per day, to sleep five thousand, and whatever else, it totals fifteen thousand that you get there in Lugoba, when you return you get your fare to get you back, but when you get back here you’re stuck! Kwamduma you need a piki piki, fifteen thousand there and back, to go to Kwamsanja the same. You need to get the piki piki fare, otherwise the empowerment of the villages will be low. We complained that we that we wanted the villages [covered] also…So, we want them [VPI] to visit these village leaderships, so that they know that there are TOTs, there are animators [facilitators] so that when they ask for help that they are actually there, working, when they need any assistance from them, that they help us so we can reach the community. Otherwise, it’s the opposite, we’re stuck. VPI doesn’t give support to say that ‘you’ll go around your ward, maybe we’ll give you something, we’ll support you with some shillings’ – there’s nothing. And then, us TOTs, because for those upcoming seminars in this area, our ward, they could use us as facilitators, then you get some money to leave your other business, but it’s started now that even for facilitation, the facilitators come from Bagamoyo or Lugoba, or where, so you, you just remain behind as a TOT, waiting for information […] So, this too really damages morale to work, you know it’s my work completely, but I can’t do what’s expected.

Fatuma was highlighting the lack of recognition, of reciprocity, on the part of VPI but also local village governments, with regard to the financial and opportunity costs volunteers are asked to bear. This served to delegitimate the intervention to some degree over time. In addition, there was a lack of logical integrity within the project, whereby VPI seen to be investing in training but not implementation.

Several volunteers highlighted this disparity of conditions or assumptions. For seasoned volunteer Mosi, for example, VPI was not necessarily practising what they would have their volunteers preach:

We do voluntary work but it’s different now…if you look at VPI when they started, we were the first animators in Bagamoyo, but that time when it started it was much more intense…But now, that strength has decreased. And if you look at what we’re

264 Kibindu ward CJF, *op. cit.*
265 Fatuma, VPI TOT, *op. cit.*
talking about, issues of various rights etc., of mothers, of women and children, but those rights we’re talking about, they should be extended to those called to the training, that he gets his rights!266

Haamid noted a similar disjuncture:

I can see that they [VPI] go through a lot of expenditure, but then their allowances are really low.267

This disparity in how external agencies viewed allowances as compared to volunteers themselves was underpinned by a number of interrelated assumptions: firstly that there were fewer demands on villagers’ time, both volunteers and their intended audience. This often collapsed, as explored, into time-old tropes regarding laziness and an inability to self-help. As the government Community Development Officer asked rhetorically, ‘when these programmes finish, who will help you?’ Similarly, to return to the words of the VPI programme officer on my first trip to Kibindu:

They are supposed to train and educate others but at the end of the day, they don’t sit [i.e. convene]. When the wazungu come they [volunteers] expect to be paid, to receive allowances, even to volunteer here in Tanzania. It’s a big problem. We try to explain that the wazungu will return to their own place but the problems will still be here in the village.

The staff here alluded to the familiar (post-)colonial tropes of community inertia, greed and materialism, short-sightedness and ignorance. These tropes depend in turn on the devaluation of people’s time, whereby training and voluntary work do not incur a significant opportunity cost. These assumptions are inevitably repackaged in the language of an aspirational ‘sustainability’, whereby the project is set to continue after funding has ceased. In such cases, the contradiction of development agencies establishing claims of both their indispensability and expendability is not recognized.

The devaluation of people’s time was particularly acute in the case of young people. Community Development Innovation Professionals (CDIP), as noted, took a ‘peer education’ approach and had recruited three young people in their late teens in Kibindu, again via the WEO. CDIP had had several visits to Kibindu, which had, in the eyes of the WEO at least, served to differentiate itself from the deficient approach of Youth Health. In the middle of May 2013, a key time for working the fields and preparing for harvest, a CDIP programme officer called one volunteer, Mavuto, to tell them of his

266 Mosi, Kwamuduma CJF, op. cit. Emphasis added.
267 Kibindu ward youth network chair, op. cit.
visit. The three did not go to the fields that day, staying close to home and the village waiting for him to arrive. The officer, however, did not arrive that day. This extract is taken from fieldnotes on the following day:

I called Mavuto several times and he said in the morning that they [CDIP] were coming but by the afternoon they had had information that it had been postponed until the following day [the 16th]. Again, I spoke with Mavuto in the morning and at that point he said he had no further information. By the time I called again around 2.30pm he said he had heard that the contact had left Mbewe and was heading towards Kibindu. ‘Great’ I said, ‘I’ll be there in half an hour’.

When I arrived at Rahema’s house, she and Mavuto were already there and Majuto arrived soon after. This time they were confident the CDIP contact had got on a *piki piki* from Mbewe and was *en route*. They had the form, they were all wearing their [CDIP] t-shirts; we seemed set. For the first hour, we sat chatting happily. Majuto had some more questions: whether our monarchical system was democratic; whether neo-colonialism was still at work in Tanzania, given how people were still so poor as the few got very rich; whether I had experienced any kinds of racial discrimination. Four o’clock came and went – a short shower of rain prompted us to return to speculate on the CDIP staff’s travel. They still seemed confident he would arrive but I was starting to have my doubts that the return trip would be possible by this time […]

Finally, at 5.30pm Rahema received a call. She listened and at one point exclaimed in surprise. The CDIP was still at Kwamsanja, saying he had had three punctures, he was tired and he had no money to continue the journey. He was asking Rahema or one of the volunteers to board a *piki piki* to take the form to Kwamsanja. ‘How much is it?’ Rahema asked the others. I said five [thousand shillings]. The others said seven one way. Eventually the CDIP rep said he would call back.

After the call, the three young vols looked frustrated at each other. ‘Ah, it’s so annoying’, said Mavuto. ‘*Majakumu!*’ exclaimed Rahema, ‘*responsibilities!*’ ‘You know’, said Mavuto, ‘this is a hard time for work. It’s the season of hunger, we have a lot of responsibilities, our families. Two days ago, they said tomorrow morning. We were here, we were waiting. Then they said this morning…and now…’

As we walked back, I commented how I thought these things happen but how people should always give information. ‘Ah it’s normal’ he responded, ‘that’s how it is’, the irritation already leaving his shoulders. ‘You asked us the challenges!’ he laughed, ‘these are the challenges’. Another call came in – the form should be given to the bus driver leaving at 1am to be received by the CDIP officer at the bus stop in Dar. So, still more communications to be done and the work of submitting the form stretches into a third day.268

The second assumption, in conjunction with this devaluation of volunteers’ time on the part of developers, was the familiar expectation that communities themselves would provide the necessary recognition and endorsement of volunteers’ efforts. Given the questions that arose regarding the relevance of training initiatives, in relation to villagers’ own priorities, explored under *representation*, volunteers did not often experience

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268 Fieldnotes with three CDIP volunteers, 16 May 2013
endorsement from the broader communities; indeed, it was often the contrary. The Village Executive Officer, for instance, denied VPI’s existence in the village at all, which the WEO surmised was due to VPI not offering a specific ‘service’. This lack of recognition reaffirmed the need to look to external developers for such, which in turn augmented the debate over allowances.

The third assumption, related to both of these, was that communities formed an organic whole, of which volunteers formed a seamless part. The very notion of a community volunteer requires that such community both pre-exists and also can be moved in a particular direction on a set of issues. This further assumes that volunteers can endlessly detach themselves from and relocate themselves back into that context. As such, the individualistic liberalism of the human rights framework clashes with the simultaneous invocation of the community collective and its imputed conservative fabric.

The tension between these two positions was experienced, if not embodied, by volunteers in the day to day. Mosi, as explored in representation, was an ardent supporter of rights-based education, and yet mindful of the disjuncture with what members of his community told him they actually wanted, namely agricultural inputs. Similarly, Haamid was frustrated with the lacklustre efforts of his fellow trainees and their ‘slowness’ to uptake such education. He distanced himself from those who failed to embrace these new areas of learning:

> You get these ideas that stick, my dad did this, so I’ll do this as well, so the ideas get stuck in your head. Now, if we get education, we can increase, that the next generations come to know that, hey, there is this [alternative], then bam, people can adjust themselves.

At the same time, he empathized, in the case of HIV/AIDS, with a more general experience of ‘message fatigue’, to the neglect of other issues. Adira and Ruwa, who were keen to share their new education with peers, were continually thwarted by those who did not recognize or trust their efforts. Whilst the WEO, therefore emphasized that volunteers were ‘one of our own’, bolstering claims of descriptive representation, the work was often obstructed or denigrated by Others in the community. It is, of course, a truism to state that any given ‘community’, particularly one as geographically dispersed as Kibindu, has disparate interests, allegiances and expectations. Such diffusion is not,

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269 Fieldnotes, Kibindu VEO, 29 April 2013.
270 Kibindu ward youth network chair, op. cit.
however, a reality that a community volunteer model accommodates well, especially with regard to an intervention as intangible as human rights.

To summarize, voluntarism is a powerful template of public action and one that proffers a considerable amount of symbolic capital in different forums as virtue; as consent; as reciprocity; as extensity; and/or as representation. Whilst voluntarism as virtue was a limited register in the district forum, highlighting a disparity of resource and capacity between those positioned as voluntary and those they solicited, it formed a strong component for volunteers themselves in Kibindu. This comprised both the opportunity to contribute to the immediate civic sphere, but also an endorsement of the opportunity to learn and share experiences with others. Such a civic, public realm is no longer given adequate consideration in much analysis of African state and society (Dodworth, forthcoming) and yet is resilient in the Tanzanian political imagination (Hunter 2014). The important addendum, however, in Kibindu as much of Tanzania, is that the civic, virtuous sphere is shared, and indeed co-produced, by state and non-state actors like.

In such a context, the (neo)liberal ideal of consent falls away, again replaced by concerns of reciprocity and recognition of one’s civic efforts. The challenge for volunteers, therefore, as projects progressed, was in the conditions of such work and the distribution of the fruits of their labour. NGOs package community based volunteers to donors as key to long-term, sustainable strategies of behavioural change. Volunteers bestow an institutionalized presence, extensity by proxy, bolstering claims of scale, reciprocity and of course consent. Despite the benefits conferred to organizations, however, volunteers in Kibindu as in Kiharaka shared their frustrations at the lack of recognition, most manifest in the debate over allowances. The disparity between upwards representations of voluntary work and the perceptions of volunteers in the everyday served to delegitimate NGOs to a certain degree. Most volunteers alluded to the unfairness of resource allocation, where the personhood they advocate for others is denied to them. Such dynamics were often replicated as volunteers sought to work within their communities, at times thwarted or rejected as interests were seen to diverge. Such events laid bare the contradiction for volunteers to both remove and relocate themselves into their community environment in a bid to both act for and stand for their fellow villagers.
Conclusion

This chapter sought to foreground legitimation as a negotiated practice, but one that reconfigures in response to local conditions. Within the sparsely populated, geographically expansive ward of Kibindu, located at the furthest outreaches of Bagamoyo district, there lay considerable legitimation through the sheer act of arrival. Those few organizations who made the journey, especially if on a regular basis, experienced considerably more ‘room to govern’ than in Kiharaka of the preceding chapter. Legitimation, although intrinsically ephemeral and partial in product, nevertheless became clearer cut, with stronger contrast between those that successfully crafted such space and those who remained ‘playing with’ or hanging out in the district.

Extensity, therefore, as the projection of scale and presence primarily through the monitoring visit, proved a crucial legitimation practice that divided NGOs into those who arrived frequently, those who had arrived at one time and those, like Youth Health, who had never done so. Arrival under such circumstances was a highly visible event, legitimating in and of itself, symbolic in conveying an egalitarianism between the more urban and most remote wards within the district. In this respect, Tanzania’s socialist past continued to resonate strongly in the present, whereby egalitarianism across rural areas was still anticipated and solicited (Aminzade 2013, p163; also Kamat 2008). Extensity’s counterpoint territoriality, therefore, as the creation and enforcement of boundaries around sub-spheres of influence within Kibindu, was not as pertinent under such conditions. Whilst there was indeed potential for such, given currents between the ward’s three villages, on the whole this practice fell away as a basis for legitimation practice.

Furthermore, under these conditions and again in contrast to Kiharaka, the state’s oversight and intervention was solicited and welcomed by many of its leaders and volunteers. This meant that VPI’s positioning as part of the district apparatus served to legitimate it strongly to these leaders, as part of the enduring, highly symbolic developmental state. Under such conditions, there was considerably less demand for an oppositional civil society, in line with the liberal Tocquevillean formulation. Indeed, the
net effect was quite the contrary, with VPI co-extending and thus co-producing the Tanzanian state in effecting ‘development for their people’. This is part of what Migdal and Schlichte would term ‘doing the state’ (2005, p14), although such techne are situational and never fixed in form.

VPI’s extensity in arriving in Kibindu, in conjunction with the district council as the bureaucratic arm of the state, conveyed an egalitarianism between wards reminiscent of the purported comradery of Nyerere’s Ujamaa. This, in turn, proffered claims of a representational proximity ‘to the people’, which were of high legitimation value to VPI in district and international forums. In practice, however, as Nyerere’s project before it, alignment with the state replicates strong hierarchies. In this case, again unlike Kiharaka, such hierarchies are in the main acknowledged, endorsed and therefore reinforced: ‘he at the absolute lowest level, who doesn’t know anything’. Whilst they continue to be negotiated, they are done so from within existing parameters rather than rejected outright. This echoes a Bourdieusian conception of the field, whereby existing socio-political stratifications are contested but ultimately endure.

Lastly, voluntarism is a powerful template of public action and one that proffers a considerable amount of symbolic capital in different forums. Whilst it is a multifaceted legitimation practice at the district and international levels, however, it is one predominated in Kibindu by its association with civic virtue. Such a sphere is co-produced by both state and non-state, blurring divisions between such domains and consciously participated in by volunteers themselves. This civic realm is not given adequate consideration in many analyses of state and society in Africa, yet remains highly visible in the Tanzanian political imagination. Where negotiations within this realm break down, however, is not over questions of consent but of value reciprocity; where volunteers’ efforts are not acknowledged slowly serves to delegitimate organizations over time.

These practices, in summary, are variegated, melding the material with a strongly discernible ideational component. It is important not to neglect the power of such ideas, in the rush to render them legible via familiar logics of ‘doing’ African politics. These logics include strategies of extraversion, neopatrimonialism and/or (neo)liberal governmentality, which foreground elites and their predominately material interests within a highly verticalized ‘topography of power’ (Ferguson 2006, p90). This only
augments the continued neglect of the symbolism of the 'public' and the variegated practices that constitute it. In short, ideas matter (Mkandawire 2015, p598). Ideas are critical to understanding how public authority is actualized, legitimated and negotiated in the everyday. Whether organizations are legitimate enough to act depends on a (positive) balance between these practices, which strongly interrelate. It is therefore to the interrelationships between practices that I now turn in conclusion.
Conclusion: 

Legitimation as spatialized practice

This thesis foregrounded public authority as the legitimation of power; as such, it remains intrinsically one of politics. It began with the broadening of understanding power in the late modern era, which has been well-theorized and researched. This domain, via the practice turn, has benefitted in particular from the legacies of Foucault and Bourdieu. What has been neglected, however, is the empirical exposition of the ways and means by which such power is legitimated in the everyday. Public authority, at least in the Weberian sense, is the legitimated exercise of power that seeks forms of behaviour and/or compliance (1968; also Bulkeley 2012, p2429; Lake 2010; Lund 2006a). If new understandings, or excavations, of the workings of power have been conceded in politics, expansively defined, then the study of legitimation must broaden accordingly. This can only enrich the study of politics and international relations (PIR), bridging cleavages between it and multidisciplinary debates. This is not solely about facilitating the ‘travel’ of PIR to its hitherto geographical, and indeed theoretical, margins (Death 2013; also Cornelissen et al. 2012). It is rather to return with vigour to the centrality of legitimation as experienced by the governed in ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004): to Africa as ‘global condition’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012, p125).

This thesis, therefore, made the case for scrutinizing legitimation as practice: an accumulative process of claim-making. It converged with Barker’s exposition of claim-making only briefly, in its self-declared empiricism regarding this ‘central feature of governing’ (2001, p13). The necessary, indeed extensive, addendum to Barker is that legitimation is not an insulated, ‘self-referential’ practice of rulers. Conceptions of the full breadth of political legitimation, to date, have been confounded by conflations of ‘governing’ with formal ‘government’. Legitimation is rather undertaken by a range of state and non-state actors in a range of forums within the will to govern. It is, furthermore, an interactive process, which demands the insertion of the ‘collective’ in the affirmation or rejection of such claims. Emboldened by the practice turn, I strove to add to the corpus of late modern work, challenging such conflations. Legitimation, and
its replication and contestation at different scales, remained hitherto absent from work that ultimately sought to ground legitimacy in normative universals, not least that of Barker. 

In a sense, however, this thesis has a normativism, indeed ‘humanism’ (Denzin 2017, p10), of its own. This humanism is grounded in its attempt to incorporate the governed as well as governor, or more precisely, relations of governing. Legitimation is negotiated and contested; it does not signify the unmediated view of the most powerful, nor its automated, ‘primordial’ consumption. Practices are rather a point of meaningful, self-conscious reflection over pre-reflexivity, for the governed as much as governor. And when practices are absent, those who undertake and negotiate them are also absent, whether or not I as researcher can represent them as ‘truth’. I advocated, therefore, for the arsenal of critical ethnography as part of interpretative praxeology, multi-sited in content and form in bringing the ‘how’ of (global) governance to the fore. Ethnography’s hallmark participant observation, or rather ‘negotiated interactive observation’ (Wind 2008), echoed the multipositionality of (self-)legitimation itself: the dual process of moving inside and out. This demanded a degree of reflexivity and meta-analysis, but also a relinquishing of truth. Its thetical truth, therefore, remains merely that legitimation is a necessary condition of authority and the multifarious forms of governance it precipitates. Its content, however, remains contingent, shaped by the peculiarities of the field and I fully embraced that contingency and, indeed, partiality.

Aided, therefore, by a working, or ‘informed’ reflexivity (Davies 2012), I sought to bring the multipositionality of contemporary legitimation practice to the fore. Placing positionality as central to analysis, in turn, highlighted legitimation as a contested, at times contradictory process. Lund’s ‘countervailing currents’ (2006b, p699) thus formed the empirical mainstay of this project. In addition, its key findings underscored the profoundly and symbolically spatialized nature of legitimation in negotiating inside and out; proximity and distance; entreaty and repudiation; Us and Others. Legitimation comprises a diverse, highly symbolic set of practices. It is deeply performative in creating and sustaining spatio-temporal presence, through the symbolic positioning vis-à-vis other actors. It demands the continual entreaty and repudiation of (re)constructed Us and Others. As such, the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and human
geography are as critical as more purist renderings of ‘politics’ in answering how actors, both state and non-state, craft the space in which to govern.

This demanded that the thesis moved well beyond the technical managerialism that has hitherto dominated the debate regarding the legitimacy of non-state actors, especially NGOs. The ‘tickbox’ formulation of legitimacy reduces such to a collection of discrete, rule-based events such as audits, consultations and evaluations, a ‘democratic deficit’ to be redressed. This reduction had rendered the state of the debate distinctly poorer. Indeed, it discloses, on interrogation, a Westernized, deliberately abstracted brand of liberal democracy at the heart of the established inter-national order. This has proven to be at the expense of understanding how ‘global’ actors, including NGOs, create the space in which to operate and in which to exercise their own forms of governance. It neglects the role that actors under the rubric of development, both nominally state and non-state, play in the production and reproduction of subtler forms of legitimacy in their everyday work. Legitimation demands substantial, albeit less visible, work and indeed creativity on the part of NGOs, As such, this is demonstrably an exercise in ‘craft over compliance’ (Dodworth 2014, p22).

The Bagamoyo case study provided ample reasons why a Politics and International Relations thesis should care about NGOs and their constituents in coastal Tanzania. First and foremost, Tanzania has witnessed a marked proliferation in NGO registrations since its ‘liberalization’ in the 1990s, neatly mirrored in Bagamoyo. This proliferation has reinserted the global into the local and vice versa, in new and adaptive ways. Such insertions have indeed rearticulated verticalized development hierarchies: the ‘brokerage’ chain (Bierschenk & Sardan 2003, p163; also Lewis & Mosse 2006) or ‘contracted cosmopolitanism’ (Mercer & Green 2013). They have also led, however, to pronounced lateral collaboration and competition between organizations, particularly at the district level, thus precipitating similarly competitive legitimation. This leads to the second point, whereby districts themselves provide a distinct ‘field’ of legitimation practice, both geographical and notional. ‘Districtization’ in Tanzania, whereby situated elites have reconfigured around government centres, demands that development actors position themselves laterally vis-à-vis both peers and local government, even if not relations of equality. Lastly, Tanzania, as in African Studies more broadly, informs a rich supporting literature regarding the blurring of state and society, which again admits of a
lateral as well as vertical aspect. This case thus provides, whilst uniquely Tanzanian, a microcosm of the reconstituting public, as experienced in much of the world. Thus, IR’s tendency towards abstraction must be tempered by detailed, ‘local’ fieldwork to make sense of ‘complex empirical worlds’ (Death 2015, p6).

**Framing legitimation**

The thesis asked *how NGOs as non-state actors legitimate their authority to act* within contemporary configurations of governance. The empirical work, across three locales and both district and village scales, brought the practices of **extensity; territoriality; state; representation** and **voluntarism** to the fore. Each of these appeared in some guise in each of the three locales. Each of these holds a strong ideational as well as material component. Each of these practices, as part of the ideational, has a symbolic spatiality, bringing the importance of positionality and locale to the fore. Each of these practices, as viewed from the district level, involves the construction and maintenance of lateral constituencies, which included other NGOs, the civil society umbrella and local government. It also involves vertical practices, upwards towards donors and the international but also, not least, towards their intended subjects of rule. These practices thus demand a considerable amount of interstitial work, laterally and vertically. Such practices, however, are situational, demanding the continued repudiation and affirmation of Others, even within the space of a single encounter. Such oscillation encapsulates the deeply symbolic and spatialized nature of legitimation’s countervailing currents.

*Symbolic spatiality*

Nowhere was symbolic spatiality more prominent than in the practices of **extensity**, as well as its counterpoint **territoriality**. Extensity, at the district level, comprised claims to be operational in, and/or to extend to, all wards and, for some, all villages. NGOs projected geographical ubiquity through signs, maps and claims enshrined in district records. In this, NGOs could be ‘state-like’ in aspect as well as content, projected at
scale across as well as at depth into the ward: the capacity ‘to go down’. Countervailing extensity, however, were territorial practices in constructing and maintaining an exclusionary ‘turf’ (Sikor & Lund 2009, p14) or ‘terrain’ (Elden 2010). Such turf could admit formal administrative levels, such as the village, which may be ‘imagined’ but retain social meaning. Indeed, such levels form part of constructing, claiming and counter-claiming the local. Territoriality could also comprise indirect claims via particular groups or partners, such as the membership-based UWAMABA or Gender-Net. Irrespective of content, however, territoriality necessarily comprises an inclusion of some to the exclusion of others. As such, territoriality and extensity proved, in these cases, to be competing forms of spatial power.

Chapters Four and Five examined the replication of these spatialized practices at scales. In Chapter Four’s Kiharaka, territoriality came to the fore, eclipsing extensity. In such a politicized, congested and polarizing environment, claims of spatio-temporal extensity resident at the district level strongly contrasted with a picture of flux and discontinuity, particularly within Kiharaka village. This strongly contested space, between NGO and government, formal and informal, meant that loyalties and turfs mattered. Sometimes this ran along the grain of formalized, bureaucratic boundaries; sometimes this was informal. Either way, countervailing currents were very much cognizant to leaders and volunteers in the day-to-day as they sought to navigate civic sensibilities, organizational demands and, most importantly, precarious livelihoods. In Kiharaka, the territorialized Advocates International was at the direct expense of Voluntary Partnership International (VPI) and its state-like uniformity.

In distant Kibindu, in Chapter Five, the situation regarding these two international NGOs was quite the contrary. There was a distinct lack of ‘arrival’ for the most part of those claiming operations throughout the district. This yielded, for those who made the journey, increased space to govern. Arrival, primarily the domain of VPI and secondarily that of the district council, was a much more symbolic event. This symbolism admitted of a perceived equity between village and town; rural and oppidan. Indeed, Tanzania’s socialist past resonated in the presence, whereby the egalitarian provision of public services across villages was still anticipated and solicited (Aminzade 2013, p163). VPI’s arrival, too infrequent in the minds of Kiharaka’s leadership, was thus exceptional in

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271 Interview 53, VPI Programme Officer, December 2012, emphasis in original.
Kibindu, placing it ahead of its peers as uniquely ‘alive’.\textsuperscript{272} Whilst there was the potential for future territoriality within Kibindu ward, fuelled by inter-village politics, it largely fell away in favour of extensity as a basis for legitimation in this context.

At the nub of these divergent legitimation trajectories were divergent relations between these two villages and the state.\textsuperscript{273} Both villages housed leaderships with natural misgivings about the capacity of outsiders to deliver real and relevant benefits to residents. In remote Kibindu, however, despite trials with district-appointed officers in the past, villagers retained cautious optimism about the potential of the developmental state. Developmentalism, via the state and its purported egalitarianism, was thus quietly solicited, with Nyerere’s legacy still fundamentally intact. VPI thus contributed unproblematically to the state’s co-production in Kibindu, whereby ‘everyone’s goal was the same’.\textsuperscript{274} Many within peri-urban Kiharaka, however, spurned the state-like practices of both district and VPI, due to the state’s more limited repercussions for lives and livelihoods. The explicit rejection of VPI in that context, manifestly via rejection of its volunteers, was an indirect repudiation of the district and, in turn, the development state as a template for meaningful improvements in villagers’ lives.

At the same time, loyalties and hierarchies are fluid and situated. State relations, therefore, were not concrete allegiances: some duly exhibiting ‘legitimation as being part of government’ (Green 2010, p19), whilst some through its negation in favour of a new developmental template. All NGOs partook in the entreaty as well as repudiation of Others, a process that necessarily included the state in the form of the district council. INGO Advocates International assumed a conciliatory, ‘partnership’ stance alongside the district at times, as well as its more familiar antagonistic ‘advocacy’ role at others. Voluntary Partnership International could be ‘state-like’, manifest in its ‘verticality’ (Gupta & Ferguson 2002) high aloft of Kiharaka, whilst at others through its successful proximity and localization, extending deep into Kibindu’s systems of governance. These twin processes of entreaty and repudiation, of symbolic proximity and distance, form part of ‘how it works: in and out, in and out’.\textsuperscript{275}

\textsuperscript{272} Kibindu WEO, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{273} Note, as per pages 11–12 of this thesis, that there remains little daylight between government and the state in the Tanzanian content, with ‘government’ providing the primary linguistic referent.
\textsuperscript{274} Interview 74, Fatuma, VPI trainer of trainers and ex-Gender-Net chair, 16 May 2013
\textsuperscript{275} Interview 82, AI Project Coordinator, 1 June 2013.
And so, these spatialized forms of power work though, by and indeed against the state. Similarly, the symbolic spatiality of representation, negotiating inside/out, proximity/distance and, ultimately, to stand for/act for Others, proved particularly stark in this coastal case study. NGO staff at the district level consistently emphasized claims of proximity as ‘voice of the people’, in the face of government neglect. Yet, in the final reckoning, NGOs were similarly bound to concede distance, as the necessary custodians of the people and their interests. This persistent need to act for a certain constituency, hindered by their own barriers to self-development, is long embedded in the colonial and post-colonial discourse. ‘Empire as tutelage’ (Hunter 2015, p88) is to this day replicated at scales, as mainlander Tanzanian developmentalists lament of ‘these people!, ‘just sitting’ in the face of benevolent intercession (Dodworth 2016).

This colonial-like encounter is replicated at times with great subtlety: a movement from ‘we’ to ‘they’, ‘descriptive’ to ‘substantive’ representation, on the part of even the most outwardly progressive NGOs. This vacillation between proximity and distance was in turn replicated by individual ward and village volunteers themselves, in legitimating their own authority. Volunteers were assumed, and crucially claimed, by district NGOs to be at the heart of every community, conferring proximity, extensity and reciprocity. Such volunteers, however, were similarly obliged to craft representational distance from their peers, as claims to knowledge, interests and ‘civics’ inevitably diverged.

Representation thus remains a negotiation between these positionalities that have endured within developmentalism for centuries. The distance of acting for Others, however, ultimately wins out, particularly when situations of uncertainty solicit a more authoritative stance: ‘they cling to their issues of the past’. Representational practice, however, is not automated in its consumption. It is negotiated, contested and indeed rejected: ‘You come to educate us!”

Lastly, the words of volunteers have been central throughout the empirical chapters. Their testimony demonstrates how voluntarism, a resurgent legitimation device within neoliberal development work, is nonetheless variegated and multifaceted in Tanzania. Voluntarism, as the ethic of giving unsalaried time and effort towards a common good, does indeed resonate with the globalized regime of good governance and its demands of

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276 Interview 52, AI programme coordinator and programme officer, 6 December 2012.
277 Interview 34, VPI volunteer, 29 October 2012
278 Adira and Ruwa, op. cit.
an active citizenry. Nevertheless, it is hybridized in the Tanzanian context, drawing on multiple registers; global and local; colonial and contemporary; state and non-state; ideational and of course material. At a district level, those who staffed local NGOs, typically on a piecemeal, ambiguously ‘voluntary’ basis, may well have legitimated themselves upwards via voluntarism to certain constituencies in some respects. However, local NGOs that emphasized their voluntary nature brought materially little to the district table, thus *delegitimating* and foreclosing lateral avenues of influence. Nonetheless, impecunious local NGOs clung to their voluntary networks in the face of sparse funding, as a tidemark of their previous actuality. The social infrastructure of voluntary networks proffers institutional spatio-temporal presence, extending beyond the life of the conventional project.

Voluntarism at a village level, however, instilled multifaceted civic compacts, towards organizations, the district, village leaderships, communities and even the ‘self’, which were difficult to fulfil. It is again spatialized in that volunteers, navigating both civic lives and material livelihoods, work ‘interstitially’ (Mercer & Green 2013) to link constituencies as well as discursive regimes. Whilst there were key differences between the two villages, the twin motifs of community- and self-development were strongly discernible amongst both sets of volunteers. Rather than speaking to Lockean ideals of consent, volunteers were rather explicit about their motivations to offer time and effort within the established, if faltering, civic sphere, as well as towards their own personal ‘development’. Such work, however, was conditional on both its value acknowledgement, via its various constituencies, as well as remaining within the boundaries of a ‘normal life’.\(^\text{279}\) Indeed, the irony that recent interventions in the name human rights could circumvent such boundaries was laid bare. Once such social compacts erode, volunteers of course find their own strategies of silence, subversion and withdrawal, regardless of what formal arrangements remain in place.

*Interstitality, morality and agency*

Each of these practices, therefore, precipitates the construction and management of multiple constituencies. This process of entreaty and repudiation demands ‘interstitial’ work not just vertically, as per Mercer & Green (2013) (echoing Ferguson and Gupta [2002]), but laterally within villages, wards and districts, as people work to ‘fold in’

\(^{279}\) Interview 72, Athumani, Kibindu ward CJF 16 May 2013.
Others (Allen 2016). This is not, as noted, to imply a field of equal players, but rather that actors must look laterally as well as vertically up to donors and down towards their intended subjects. The notions of space, locale and spatialized politics are thus helpful when conceiving of legitimation in the everyday, as crafting the space in which to govern. The will to act for/stand for Others, centre stage in representational practice, is thus of broader relevance to the (post)colonial condition. Colonialism, or more accurately alterity and the practice of Othering that underpins it, admits of scales. In this case, it is on the part of inland elites’ efforts to develop the ‘backwater’ of Bagamoyo. It is as ubiquitous, however, in the governing of under-served and under-represented groups in any part of the world, from The Bronx to Bangladesh, Kenya to Kensington.

This thesis, however, whilst informed by the insights of post-colonialism and its poststructuralist forbearers, does not embark on an unmoderated excavation of governmentality and the will to govern. The prevailing thrust of textual poststructuralist work, as explored in Chapter One, has not paid sufficient empirical attention to the individual, albeit situated, agency of people in their day to day lives. The notion of NGO as neo-colonizer, for instance, neglected the appropriation, contestation and reassembly of power and authority in context. Furthermore, whilst insights regarding the inextricable link between power and knowledge are well-taken, we do people and their politics a disservice in reducing public interaction to the pursuit of material interest or indeed power. Materiality of course ran through each of the legitimation themes, with the ‘politics of distribution’ (Ferguson 2015) playing a crucial role in the acknowledgement and reciprocity of value. To render such, however, as subordinate to familiar logics of ‘African’ politics, notably strategies of extraversion and its various tweaks, serves to sustain the monotonous narrative of the continent’s predatory elites. Such analyses lose sight of the enduring symbolism of the public sphere in many contexts and, indeed, of the variegated matrices of social action more broadly.

This thesis thus endeavoured to retain sight of the public, the untold ‘concerns for the public good’ (Werbner 2004, p2), and its attendant civic sensibilities, in all their localized forms. This is in line with recent, indeed revisionist, efforts to rehabilitate such in the face of the corrosive, omnipotent neopatrimonialism (e.g. Englund 2011; Hunter 2008; 2015; Macola 2010; Werbner 2004). It duly did so at the interface between developers and constituents, district and village, self and Other, where moral repertoires gain
particular content, traction and indeed resistance. In this way, it echoes Englund’s call to move from the mere ‘celebration of agency and resistance to harder questions’ (2013, p685). For Englund, these questions were around ‘the place that the liberal values of equality and freedom might have’ (ibid.) in the search for more progressive, but localized, forms of politics. For this thesis, the core question was the symbolic means more broadly, as ideational as material in content, through which development actors, including NGOs, create the space in which to govern. This must not, however, erase the governed from that space, but rather foreground how governor and governed enact, negotiate and at times contest this space and the claims that precipitated it.

Whilst there is something demonstrably unique, therefore, in the symbolism of the public in Tanzania, there is nothing unique in how the public, and its supporting claims and obligations, are affirmed or contested in the everyday. A truly progressive politics would indeed be better served by placing the political practices of non-elites as centre frame as those of elites: a division that is itself contingent and situational. I argued, as others, that a methodological ‘middle way’ enables such a politics. This path applies insights from Foucauldian-inspired critical theorists, whilst affording methodological space to Bourdieusian-like practices of legitimation ‘claims’ in the everyday. The everyday indeed should not be overly romanticized as an ‘inherent locus of resistance’ (Guillaume 2011, p460) to presentations of global domination. Some resistance is ‘volitional’, some ‘intentional’ (Scott 1985, p292) and some actions should not be deemed resistance at all, in the rush to aggrandize. Nevertheless, this hybridized sphere is inhabited by real, multi-dimensional people who live political and globalized lives, as well as localized social, cultural and economic ones. Efforts to foreground such lives’ content form an ethical challenge to the purportedly neutral division between high and low politics. This division has masked the violence of discursive structures - of ‘abstraction’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2003) – but also the agency of those who negotiate increasingly globalized phenomena.

**Linking legitimation**
Each chapter mapped each legitimation theme along its respective ‘plane’, either laterally to peers or vertically towards ‘the governed’ and back, insofar as this geography holds. If this planar work at times replicated particular hierarchies, it was never its intention. Its intention was rather to bring legitimation and its interstitial work to the fore.

Legitimation practices, whilst discernibly distinct, are intricately interrelated; they sit in congruence and at others in dissonance as the situation demands.

The interrelationship between the six legitimation themes is portrayed in Figure 6.1 below. The arrowed lines represent predominant relationships in the Tanzanian context, but do not map relationships exhaustively. Whilst materiality, as noted, cross-cuts all themes, it is added separately for clarity.
Extensity and territoriality, for instance, in the case studies explored, appeared to be naturally antipodal: the former characterized by scale, depth and inclusivity, its counterpoint by boundaries and exclusivity. There are cases, however, principally at the level of the imagined nation-state, whereby territoriality and extensity have proven more congruous. States, made manifest through diverse practices and indeed actors, strive to extend up to and to subsume its purportedly sovereign borders. Indeed, the remote hinterlands must be governed even more strenuously than the metropolis; sovereignty, conventionally drawn, is challenged by and submit to tracts of fluidity, mobility and negotiation, of ‘space-of-flows’ (Ruggie 1993, p172) at the geographical margins. In such cases, extensity becomes a form of territoriality and vice versa. The concluding points,
however, brought out most clearly in Kerege, are firstly that this is not necessarily so. Secondly, states are not the only actors to partake in such practices.

The spatialized practices of extensity and territoriality are nonetheless customarily tied to the history of state-making, in all its forms. There is a strong and compelling corpus of literature in this regard (e.g. Allen 2003; 2016; Engel & Nugent 2010; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Ruggie 1993; Sassen 2000; 2006; Sikor & Lund 2009), which applies to the Tanzanian case as any other. Nominal non-state actors, however, most vociferously NGOs, may borrow from existing bureaucratic boundaries in constructing their own exclusive turfs or they may move to construct new enclaves. They may choose state-like practices of extensity, as in the case of Voluntary Partnership International and, to a lesser extent, Youth Health, or they may eschew them as situations and resources allow, most notably in the case of Advocates International. Such practices, as Foucault illuminated regarding power more broadly, are situated and relational. Whilst the fluidity of the non-state is thus ceded, its positionality vis-à-vis the state remains nonetheless deliberately visible, interweaving different developmental templates in crafting the space to govern.

The ability to extend to, indeed ‘encompass’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) one’s borders is in turn related to crafting superior claims to representation. There was a time when the perceived state monolith worked hard to monopolize claims to political representation in Tanzania (Aminzade 2013). Trade unions and women’s organizations struggled to gain meaningful autonomy from the ruling CCM (ibid., Geiger 1997; Shivji 2004; Tripp 2000). Even as the numbers of NGOs burgeoned from the mid-1990s, the parameters of their engagement were initially policed effectively by CCM (Dodworth 2014, p26; Shivji 2004; 2007). There are indications of returning to the discernibly authoritarian control of dissent under new President Magufuli’s recent ‘bulldozer’ administration (Paget 2017). Nevertheless, contemporary modes of governance are able to fuse globalized templates such as ‘civil society’ with localized phenomena such as, in Tanzania, ‘districtization’, slowly prising representational claims from the exclusive grasp of once highly centralized government. Who now speaks for the ‘the people’ in Tanzania? ‘[W]ho is the national interest’ asked a key interlocutor, ‘and where?’

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280 Interview 58, Eco-Coast Programme Manager, 8 April 2013.
For some informants, local government, in the form of the bureaucratic arm of the district council, extends to, speaks for and thus represents the people. Indeed, some claimed the district as authentically local: the ‘real’ grassroots.\textsuperscript{281} NGOs, such as the extensive VPI, are welcome to join in that work, co-producing the district in the eyes of its constituents. For others, the now defunct remnants of the development state must give way to the more authentic representational claims of burgeoning civil society, broadly defined. Thus, the local and its authenticity are constructed, claimed and counterclaimed at various scales, including the district, in crafting representational space to govern. These claims, however, are inherently partial, regardless of their situation and aspect. As Advocacy International staff conceded themselves, its leading-edge brand of advocacy was really ‘speaking through others’,\textsuperscript{282} whereby local champions voice words that originated elsewhere. AI thus indeed speaks for the people, but only when particular repertoires are successfully aligned. Representational claims must thus navigate between the established, state-like developmental template and innovated, neoliberal-like competitors. Indeed, as brought out most clearly in Chapter Five’s Kibindu, contemporary human rights work, in continually asking villagers to fulfil civic duties in demanding rights, masks broader question as to whether government has fulfilled its basic duty to protect their citizens. Clouding representation may have real knock on effects in clouding responsibility.

Similarly, in the case of \textbf{voluntarism}, the development orthodoxy in Tanzania demanded its \textit{congruity} with the state. This has been strongly shaped, as most prominent in Chapter Five on Kibindu, by Tanzania’s socialist post-independence history, contrasting strongly with Westernized, idealized notions of the voluntary sector. Nevertheless, the interrelationship between the state and the non-state is not unique to the Tanzanian context. The ideas of the state and non-state strongly interrelate in (global) political practices more broadly, to the point of their co-production. The navigation between orthodox and pioneering developmental templates again demands a similar oscillation vis-à-vis voluntarism. This negotiation was manifest in its wholesale or partial adoption, as in the case of many of the volunteers whose words populate the village case studies of Chapters Four and Five. It was also manifest in the strong

\textsuperscript{281} Fieldnotes, discussion with district officer at Eco-Coast offices, 9 April 2013.
\textsuperscript{282} Interview 82, AI Programmes Coordinator, English verbatim, 1 June 2013.
interrogation, indeed explicit rejection, of voluntarist claims to public authority, even when state-sanctioned, most notably within Chapter Four’s Kerege.

Lastly, all of these practices hold a strong material, as well as symbolic, component. Information itself is a **resource**: a source of economic capital and the most directly fungible into funding contracts. The politics of distribution (Ferguson 2015) was replicated at every level, from the construction and contestation of ‘truth’ in reporting development work at the village level, to the packaging of project success, innovation and exclusivity to international donors and back again. The politics of information-gathering and sharing, most prominent in the HIV/AIDS district coordination meeting of Chapter Three, thus mapped onto that of public authority more broadly: who could ask others for ‘their information’. Extensity, territoriality, representation, voluntarism and, of course, governing the ostensible state, all have discernible material costs and are subject such distributive politics. Nevertheless, a core purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate that legitimation and its work is not reducible to material interest. The ‘public’, in the name of which authority is (re)constructed, layers the ideational on to the material and back again, retaining a strong and indeed socio-politically meaningful component.

**Coda: a return to Politics and International Relations**

This thesis aligned itself with a relatively new area of IR research, whereby understanding world politics has gravitated away from a rather insular focus on the traditional ‘great powers’ (Waltz 1979, p73) and their inter-state relations, towards global phenomena as locally articulated. There are indeed established debates on the nature of ‘Africa’s International Relations’ (Death 2015). Africa-oriented work has varied in approach as to whether Africa poses a fundamental ‘challenge’ to established IR theory (e.g. Dunn 2000; Dunn & Shaw 2001; Cornelissen et al. 2012; Nkiwane 2001); whether there are merely supplemental lessons for IR research (e.g. Lemke 2003, drawing on Clapham 1996; Englebert 2000 amongst others); or whether the ire driving much Africanist IR literature is something of a misdirect, meant for neorealism rather than an ‘IR theory’ strawman (Brown 2006, p119). In embracing this new area of theorizing,
however, the hope is that ‘rich local research informed by extensive fieldwork can produce theoretical innovations’ (Death 2015, p6), in Africa and beyond. Theory production thus increasingly aspires to an ‘ex-centric’ vantage (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012, p113), without erasing the situatedness of one’s view.

The centrisms in IR, from which the Comaroffs seek to emancipate, have of course most prominently included that of the state. State-centrism, however, has been less eclipsed in this thesis than formed one part of legitimation practices in the everyday. This is not to reject the continuing efficacy of state power in the global system: far from it. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of new nexuses of governmental practice, within which both nominally state and non-state actors participate. Thus Migdal’s ‘state-in-society’ approach points to the ‘process of interaction of groupings with one another and with those whose actual behavior they are vying to control or influence’ (2001, p23, emphasis in original). Indeed, as explored in empirical detail, the once-definitive typologies of the state and non-state spheres carry less analytical weight than the ideas, norms and practices to which they give rise. There is the capacity within such a practice-oriented approach to embrace complexity but also avoid pathology. It is more helpful to consider not what is exceptional about Africa, but what phenomena may be characteristic of broader shifts in the global order of things.

The litmus test for this research will therefore be its generalizability. This is not, as argued in Chapter Two, generalizability in a scientific sense but in relation to the so-called single case’s ability to bear the exploration of the global. In this instance, it admits of two facets: firstly, that of applicability beyond Tanzania but secondly, and more ambitiously, beyond non-governmental organizations. With regard to the first, as argued in the opening chapter, the legitimation claims curated in this thesis are part of a reconfiguration of (global) governance as experienced by the governed in ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004). Public authority is produced, shared and contested by an increasingly disparate range of actors, converging around ‘templates’ of practice (Lund 2006a, p675; also Best & Gheciu 2014; Collier & Ong 2005; Sassen 2006). Legitimation has evolved accordingly, around common symbolic practices, but which are locally multivalent in nature.

With regard to the second, more challenging point of generalizability, insofar as non- and para-statal organizations assume state-like positionality in the public, they will draw
on similar veins of symbolic capital, rearticulated in accordance with local contexts. Whilst it is up to the relevant area studies to give these practices historicized content, there will always be configurations of extensity/territoriality; the state/non-state; representation/exclusion; voluntarism/virtue; and materiality/resource. For more robustly ‘private’, profit-making organizations that increasingly encroach on once-perceived public roles, such as: private military companies providing specialized security; mining and extraction companies contributing to infrastructure; or large-scale agriculture catalysing industrialization through local processing; the findings beckon additional research. Whilst declared goals and appropriate procedures between agencies thus will differ, however, this approach is intrinsically comparative in bringing such commonalities to the fore. The ‘how’ of global governance, so often eclipsed by the ‘why’ of political science, compels us to examine ‘the techniques and practices, rationalities and forms of knowledge, and identities and agencies by which governing operates’ (Dean 2010, p39). Each of these terms must be expansive in its remit but in addition, through the explicit and recurrent insertion of the collective, the panopticism of unmoderated Bourdieu or Foucault can be circumvented.

As a final comment, this thesis’ theoretical ‘truth’ remained consistent throughout: legitimation is a necessary condition of contemporary authority and the multifarious forms of governance it precipitates. Its analyses shared the foregrounding of not just types of actors, but of particular clusters of activity within the public at any one time. Practice, as ‘competent performances’, ‘simultaneously embody, act out, and…reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (Adler & Pouliot 2011, p4). The exploration of such practices illuminates how the ‘global condition’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012 p125) is actualized in the everyday. The public continues to evolve as a set of variegated, symbolic practices, in which the material and ideational meld. As legitimation as symbolic practice evolves accordingly, it remains crucial to closely scrutinize its content. This is in order to understand how public authority is actualized but also, most importantly, the repercussions for those whose lives are intervened upon on the basis of such claims.
Appendix A: Preliminary interviews during scoping visit

Interviews held during 2010-11 Masters by Research scoping visit

Bagamoyo, May – June 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role(s)</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior administrative officer</td>
<td>Bagamoyo District Assembly</td>
<td>27/5/2011</td>
<td>Overview on NGO activities, coordination and processes, administrative structure in Bagamoyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior manager</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>28/5/2011</td>
<td>Overview on INGO’s activities, issues of coordination from INGO perspective, district specific challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior manager</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>28/5/2011</td>
<td>Discussion around NGO legitimacy from the village perspective, local understandings of legitimacy ‘uhalali’, working with foreigners, local politics and administrative structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme staff (2)</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>30/5/2011</td>
<td>Programme activities, mainstreaming of governance into all activities at all levels, working with local partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting chairperson</td>
<td>Civil Society Association</td>
<td>30/5/2011</td>
<td>Overview of CSA’s activities, coordination and monitoring issues across the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Issues</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior manager and programme manager (2)</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>30/5/2011</td>
<td>NGO’s approach and philosophy, coordination issues across the district and different levels, duplication and gaps, inter-NGO competition and politics, challenges with CSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community officer</td>
<td>Bagamoyo District Council</td>
<td>1/6/2011</td>
<td>Proliferation of NGOs, inactive NGOs, issues of coordination, duplication and gaps, lack of integrated planning or reporting, lack of lateral authority, vertical planning and authority mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Change Agent</td>
<td>Kiharaka Village</td>
<td>2/6/2011</td>
<td>Role and activities of CCA as outlined in Chapter 4</td>
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Appendix B: Full list of interviews, with pseudonyms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Interview No</th>
<th>Interview Date</th>
<th>Interviewee Post</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Length (Min)</th>
<th>Recorded</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Programme officer</td>
<td>BAGEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>BACAO</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>19/07/2012</td>
<td>(International) volunteer</td>
<td>VPI</td>
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### Appendix C: List of abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Advocates International</td>
<td>One of two key international organizations in Bagamoyo. Pseudonym</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
<td>A group of symptoms eventually resulting from HIV.</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Community Change Agent</td>
<td>Volunteers trained by Community Health</td>
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<td>Community Development Facilitator</td>
<td>Trained by AI but no longer supported.</td>
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<td>Community Development Innovation Professionals</td>
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<td>Community Development Officer</td>
<td>District employee normally appointed to each ward as well as thematic ones at a district level.</td>
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<td>Community Health</td>
<td>Small local health organization. Pseudonym</td>
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<td>Community Justice Facilitator</td>
<td>Originally trained by UNICEF, now monitored by VPI and the district</td>
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<td>Civil Society Association</td>
<td>Civil society umbrella organization in Bagamoyo. Pseudonym.</td>
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<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>Includes CBOs, (I)NGOs and FBOs</td>
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<td>District Commissioner</td>
<td>Presidentially appointed district head.</td>
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<td>DED</td>
<td>District Executive Director</td>
<td>Head of the bureaucratic arm of the district council.</td>
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<td>ESIA</td>
<td>Economic and Social Impact Assessment</td>
<td>Assessment required by law for large scale national and foreign-owned developments</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith based organization</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
<td>The virus that leads to AIDS</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-government organization</td>
<td>In Tanzania this means headquartered outside the country.</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Authority</td>
<td>Precipitated by local government reform in 1999, known as the district council.</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organization</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>Politics and international relations</td>
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<td>TACAIDS</td>
<td>Tanzanian Commission for HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>Community animator</td>
<td>VPI village level rights-based volunteer.</td>
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<td>Trainer of Trainers</td>
<td>Trained by VPI to train other volunteers</td>
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<td>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UWAMABA</td>
<td><em>Umoja wa Watu Wanaoishi na VVU na Matumaini – Bagamoyo</em></td>
<td>United People Living with Hope in Bagamoyo: Bagamoyo's HIV/AIDS network.</td>
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<td>Village Executive Officer</td>
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<td>Voluntary Partnership International</td>
<td>One of two key international organizations in Bagamoyo. Pseudonym</td>
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<td>Youth Health</td>
<td>New NGO merged from existing Bagamoyo NGO with Dar consultancy. Pseudonym.</td>
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Appendix D: Oral consent script

Project description

I am a student at Edinburgh University in the UK. I am interested in learning more about your role and how things are here in x. I am interested to hear how you find working with non-government organizations and their ways of working.

I’m a researcher and I don’t work for an NGO or the government.

Your participation

If you let me record our discussion it means you’ve agreed to take part and I can use the recording for my research. I won’t use your real name, so what you tell me will be in confidence. If there’s something you don’t want me to use you can tell me not to include it.

You don’t have to remain involved and you can change your mind at any time.

Do you have any questions?

May I start the recording? (If yes start recording).

“I am with [participant’s name]. I’ve explained the use of the tape.

Is it ok if I tape this?”

283 [Name of village or district here.] ‘How things are’ is the translation of a question that has relevance and meaning. When people travel to new areas they are asked on their return ‘how things are’ referring to a broad spectrum, from climate to standards of living.


———. 1996. “Culture’s In-Between.” In *Questions of Cultural Identity*.


Dodworth. 2016. “‘These People They Just Sit!’ Representational Ambiguity in Tanzania.” In *British International Studies Association*. Edinburgh.


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