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The Politics of Intervention: 
Political Parties’ National Roles Conceptions 
in Foreign Policy Narratives on 
Military Intervention in Ongoing Conflict 

France, Germany and Libya 2011

Sissela Hannah Matzner

PhD Politics and International Relations 
University of Edinburgh 
2018
Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

Edinburgh, October 2018
Abstract

This doctoral thesis asks what ideational factors underlie parties’ national role conceptions in narratives on violent conflict and crises abroad. It explores French and German parties' national role statements in the case of the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The thesis lies at the intersection of Foreign Policy Analysis research focused on domestic foreign policy actors, International Relations studies on ideas in international relations and Party Politics scholarship looking at international issues in party campaigns and competition. It develops a theoretical framework using role theory and combines it with scholarship on international norms and ideologies. It contributes to role research on domestic role contestation and role socialisation. It adds a study of parties' national roles to this scholarship. It also advances the conceptual development of the role theory approach through an exploration of the responsibility concept within national roles.

The main finding of the thesis is that parties often agree on the national role but sometimes interpret the same role differently. Moreover, sometimes parties can propose alternative national roles. The theoretical framework permits to trace variation in role interpretation to foreign policy traditions, international norms and ideologies. The central argument is that parties do not necessarily agree on the national role and its interpretation even when confronted with the same situation and events. It suggests that variation in national role interpretation can matter because parties contest the national role and, thereby, may point to role conflicts and dilemmas that may have an effect on future role selection and performance.
Acknowledgements

The support and guidance of a number of people has made this PhD thesis possible. In particular, I thank my supervisors Juliet Kaarbo and Andrea Birdsall in the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. Their supervision was decisive for the maturing process and coming together of this thesis. They gave me tremendous support throughout the project on academic and professional matters. It is only with hindsight that I understand the subtle ways in which some of their guidance took place. I am grateful for their approach to teaching and supervision. This type of training allowed me to discover ways of research myself rather than being told how to do it. I firmly believe that while this may take more time during the apprentice period, it is more sustainable by helping me to develop into an independent researcher. In this way, Julie and Andrea’s supervision was also a great example to follow in the future.

I am also thankful for the academic community in the Politics and International Relations department. I received excellent guidance and comments on research in progress by senior research staff. I learnt to overcome fear of presenting and discussing drafts in the research groups, observing that everyone starts from raw drafts. I was fortunate to meet colleagues and even make friends among my PhD student peers. May Darwich’s early encouragements and regular meetings with Hsinyen Lai to go over weekly progress, discuss challenges and encourage each other at the later stages of our PhD were of particular value to me. Last but not least, as a self-funded student, I appreciated the support of members of staff who gave me opportunities to work for them and guided me in new tasks. I am thankful to Eve Hepburn who was the first to hire me based on an application to an administrative assistance job that led to many other opportunities. I also thank Elizabeth Bomberg for her help and support throughout.

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I thank interviewees for their time. They have helped humanise faceless research. I also thank my mother’s friends Doris Bertrand in Paris and Eva and Walter Lack in Berlin who so kindly hosted me during my fieldwork!

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Last but not least, I am forever grateful for and to my close family and friends who supported and encouraged me through this process. I thank, in particular, Nora Frohnecke, Carmen Navarro and Orna Young.
Dedications

I am also eternally grateful for and to my mother Gabriele Matzner for her constant belief in me, her encouragement and for her moral support. She has read many of my drafts and has endured the development of my thoughts on the subject of this thesis and during my previous degrees. Although she claims to enjoy proofreading and editing, I can only thank her for trying to get to the bottom of my messy thinking (and writing).

I dedicate this PhD to her and my late father Egon Matzner whose opinion on this thesis and everything else in my life and in this world, I would do anything for and would be forever grateful for. I miss him daily and wonder who I would be if he was still here today.
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Acronyms

CDFP  Common Defence and Foreign Policy
CDU  Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CSU  Christlich Soziale Union Deutschlands
EU  European Union
FDP  Freie Demokratische Partei
FGR  Federal German Republic
FN  Front National
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis
GAL/TAN  Green-Alternative-Libertarian versus Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist
GDR  German Democratic Republic
IR  International Relations
LR  Les Républicains
MP  Member of Parliament
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC  Nouveau Centre
NTC  National Transitional Council
PCF  Parti communiste de France
PS  Parti socialiste
R2P  Responsibility to Protect
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
UK  United Kingdom
UMP  Union pour un mouvement populaire
UN  United Nations
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
US  United States
WWII  World War Two
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Dates

Dates in brackets designate:

Time of event occurrence, for example: French Revolution (1789)

Existence of the institution, for example: German Democratic Republic (1949-1990)

Length of a period, for example: WWII (1939-1945)

Time in stated office and not life dates, for example: President George Pompidou (1969-1974)

Notes on Translations

All primary source translations in this thesis are mine and I take full responsibility for all errors. I am a native German-language speaker and grew up bilingual, partly in Vienna, Berlin (1986-1992), Bratislava and Tunis. I was schooled entirely in the French school system. These experiences provided me with linguistic and cultural proximity to this thesis' subjects of enquiry and, at the same time, the variation in cultural experiences provided critical distance.

The reader may find the French parties’ statements extra-ordinary. As Chabal (2015, xii) notes: 'The high drama of much French political rhetoric often sounds odd or mildly amusing in English.' French political language is particularly flowery, awash with metaphors, historical references and allegories. While some of it plays a dramaturgical role in the context of parliament, this literary language is generally understood and represents familiar tropes that are believed, despite sounding mightily exaggerated to non-French-language ears.

Translation difficulties are noted as part of the research design and where relevant in the empirical chapters. Reflecting on and addressing translation issues resolves them temporarily.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In February 2011, protesters in Libya took to the street after the spread of a popular uprising that had started in Tunisia and had ousted the long-term dictator there. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya responded quickly with violence to suppress the protests. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was fast to denounce the violent reaction and take action against the Libyan regime. UNSC resolution 1970 was unanimously adopted on February 26. It condemned the government’s use of force on protesters, imposed an arms’ embargo, travel bans and asset freezes, and referred the situation to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UNSC 2011a). On 17 March, 10 UNSC members voted in favour of resolution 1973 (UNSC 2011b), the first to invoke the responsibility to protect (R2P) to authorise a military intervention in a state without its consent (e.g. Bellamy and Williams 2011). The resolution passed with permanent UNSC members China and Russia abstaining, alongside Brazil, Germany and India.

The German decision led to domestic debate and international criticism (Spiegel Online 2011c; The Guardian 2011c). Germany was a non-permanent UNSC member. The occasion had been seen as a chance to show cast Germany’s readiness to take on more international responsibilities. Policymakers attached hope to the country’s UNSC tenure, given its regional role and its ambitions for a greater global role. In the first phase of the protests and escalating violence, Germany led calls for sanctions against Libya a few days after the Libyan regime’s violent reaction to protest (Die Zeit 2011; Reuters 2011a). In a second phase, France and others argued in favour of and took steps toward military intervention. In a first in contemporary German history, the country did not align itself with any of its three main alliance partners (e.g. Oppermann 2012; Brockmeier 2013). The dual decision to abstain and not participate led to domestic and international criticism.

France’s decision equally led to domestic controversy and international criticism in the lead up to UNSC resolution 1973 (Le Monde 2011b; Spiegel Online 2011a). As a permanent UNSC member, France was quick to demand firm action, when the Libyan regime responded with violence to domestic protests. A week after the protests had been met with violence, president Nicolas Sarkozy declared that Gaddafi had ‘to go’, effectively calling for regime change without as yet defining how (Reuters 2011b). France was the first state to recognise the National Transitional
Council (NTC) as legitimate Libyan government on March 10 (BBC News 2011). It led the drafting of UNSC resolution 1973 and, on 19 March, French armed forces started the air campaign to impose the UN-mandated no-fly zone. The president and key policymakers quickly carved out a leader role for France. The French response came after policymakers had controversially offered help to the besieged Tunisian president, when he faced growing unrest in his country, a former French protectorate, at the start of the uprisings (Le Monde 2011a). The decision-making on Libya was unexpected and contrary to past intervention cases (e.g. foreign minister de Villepin’s statements to the UNSC on Iraq, The New York Times 2003; Davidson 2013). Criticism in the Libya case focused on the need to militarily intervene and the process and style of decision-making. The domestic controversy cast doubt over the existence of a French elite foreign policy consensus.

There is a relative absence of research on domestic controversies that surrounded the decision-making in the existing literature on French and German foreign policy on the 2011 Libya intervention. Most studies focus on explaining decision-making. They stress the national interest and identity, individual leaders and domestic political incentives, with regional and national elections due in 2011 and 2012 in the two states. Scholars also focus on whether the decision-making constituted foreign policy continuity or change.

This thesis addresses the gap that this relative dearth of research on the domestic controversies represents. It offers a study of domestic debates. It proposes that such debates are instances in which actors can express criticism and contest foreign policy. It suggests that it is worth studying these instances in their own right. They can influence future decisions by putting new ideas and perceived dilemmas into the public domain, even if they did not influence decision-making in this case.

1. Research question, aims and relevance

France and Germany took decisions on Libya that led to domestic controversy. The research on these decisions largely focuses on the state- and elite-level, identity, interests and causality. I propose to pay attention to the party-level1 to unpack state elites, and to hone in on the domestic criticism and contestation.

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1 Chapter 3 discusses caveats to studying parties. Chapter 7 makes suggestions on future research unpacking the party and paying more attention to intraparty processes and actors.
This thesis explores a two-pronged research question:

(1) What ideational factors shape and interact in influencing political parties’ foreign policy stances, national role conceptions and domestic role contestation?

(2) How did parties frame the situation of violent conflict and ‘crisis’ in Libya, and how did they come to think about military intervention as the appropriate policy tool (or not) to address the situation?

The thesis examines how we can make sense of the decisions and the ensuing domestic controversies. It explores how domestic differences on foreign policy affect the construction of narratives and the selection of foreign policy tools. The study focuses on ideas underlying views about the state’s role in the world rather than on causal explanations for the state’s decisions. The thesis pays attention to parties’ national role selection and national role conceptions, i.e. their ideas about what types of decisions and actions are appropriate for their state (Holsti 1970).

1.1. Research aims

A first aim is to unpack the ideational layers contributing to parties’ understanding and framing of situations and events abroad. Through parties, the thesis adds a multi-level dimension. It explores ideas from the domestic arena that influence how actors make sense of international relations and events, and it examines ideas from the international sphere that interact with domestic ones.

A second goal is, thereby, to contribute new empirical evidence to existing findings, building on the increasing number of challenges to the waning assumption of elite foreign policy consensus. The thesis also adds to claims that challenge that military intervention is an a-political foreign policy tool and practice, and assumptions that decisions on the use of military force are not contested between parties. It adds to evidence that foreign policy and military intervention are contentious issues that parties contest as part of their national role proposals.

A third aim is to demonstrate the usefulness of role theory for studying parties and foreign policy. Role theory is used to analyse how domestic policymakers define their respective state’s national role, and to explore the domestic and international sources of these definitions. The thesis proposes that a role theory is useful because

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2 Political party/parties are thereafter referred to as party/parties.
parties need the state to operationalise foreign policy. In the current international system, parties are likely to express their foreign policy positions in narratives that include national roles, using the state as the actor through which to enact foreign policy. Using role theory also adds to studies of parties and foreign policy. Such studies often focus on causality traced in decision-making processes, and on explaining parties' left-right positions on an issue. Role theory offers tools to unpack contested positions and decisions. It can also help understand criticism and controversy, despite party agreement on policy positions and decisions.

1.2. Thesis relevance

So what if parties disagree on national roles and role enactment ensuing from foreign policy decision-making? This thesis adds to understanding parties' military intervention stances and position-taking more generally. Unpacking political elites and a focus on the differences in how parties conceptualise their respective state's role can inform about variation in decisions and outcomes. Focusing on parties' national role conceptions in decision-making cases that engendered domestic controversy can also help to identify domestic role conflict that may lead to role change (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011). Moreover, a study of parties' national role conceptions can provide insight into cases where decision-makers selected a national role and sought the state to perform it but other actors considered the role inappropriate. Such situations can lead to failed role location when powerful other states in the international system refuse to accept another state's role selection. (Thies 2012) This can add to understanding role conflict and role change.

In these ways, this thesis can improve explanations and lead to a higher degree of accuracy in predictions of continuity, nuance and change between governments and legislative majorities regarding role selection, conflict and change. A better grasp of the ideas underlying national roles, their contested and evolving nature can explain changes and inconsistencies and can improve predictions based on who enters government after an election (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016c). Thus, a focus on parties' national role conceptions can advance understanding of party differences on military intervention and foreign policy more generally.

Having established research aims and the thesis' relevance, it is opportune to point out what the intention is not. First, the aim is not to argue that parties and ideas matter to foreign policy decision-making and outcomes. Studies already indicate
that they can matter and influence foreign policy decision-making and outcomes, as will be outlined in this chapter (part 3). Parties have opportunities to shape and incentives to pick up cues on foreign policy. Hence, they are not irrelevant in foreign policy. Instead, the evidence that they can matter is taken as the starting point to explore parties and foreign policy in more depth.

Second, the goal is not to demonstrate that the ideas that underpin national role expressions have causal power or are solely constituent of actors’ stances and decision-making. Foreign policy decision-making is complex and a variety of factors interact for anyone decision to be taken (Breuning 2007; Alden and Aran 2017). Rather, this thesis focuses on the step before such causality takes place, looking at the ideas evident in domestic controversies surrounding decisions.

Third, the thesis does not deny the importance of material factors, interests and human rationality in foreign policy decision-making. Strands of party research have long posited that parties are rational actors that seek to win elections to get into or retain power (e.g. Strom 1990). This study does not deny these objectives. It suggests that in a complex electoral context various factors can impact how the situation is analysed and what policy position is chosen. The thesis assumes statements about actors' rational interests and aims reveal the expectations of the person making the statement rather than necessarily interests and aims of actors.

The thesis starts from the perspective that material factors do not acquire meaning and value un-mediated and that reasoning is not an abstract, subjective process. Human actors engaging in rational choice decision-making are constrained by their context and positionality and with regards to foreign policy, access and distribution of information. Thus, actors are situated. (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012) This situatedness and issue complexity matter when accommodating and addressing material factors, and when claiming actors' rationality and agency. Rationality is bounded. Thus, actors' policy positions and decisions uttered as part of debates are inherently based on ideas that give meaning to the material world. This is not to argue that there is no commonality between actors or a shared understanding of the value of material objects. It is to posit that even shared meanings build on preconceived ideas that evolve and are not static across time and space.

Fourth, it is not the aim to establish universal patterns and to generalise across all possible parties and military intervention cases or to provide a comprehensive
study of the 2011 Libyan conflict and intervention or of French and German decision-making. This thesis pays attention to controversies that surround decision-making instances to explore whether parties differ on the national role and whether they contest other parties on this, in these particular cases. Yet, if partisan contestation, or its absence, and ideational sources can be identified in these country and party cases, there are grounds to explore others.

Finally, it is also not the goal to identify and trace the sources of role change. However, the thesis can improve explanations for incremental role change, casting light on alternative roles and role contestation that can lead to future perceptions of dilemmas, if the public and/or other parties recognise raised issues as such.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. After part 1 spelt out the research questions, aims and relevance, part 2 defines parties for the purpose of this foreign policy study. Part 3 presents an overview of scholarship. The chapter closes with the thesis chapter outline.

2. Defining parties for foreign policy research

What are parties and what do we know about their foreign policy stances? Partly, this thesis seeks to answer the second part of this question. Before turning to the literature on parties and foreign policy, part 2 addresses the first part of the question. The aim is to define parties. Party research provides some insights that are relevant and build the basis for the definition of parties in this PhD study.

2.1. Party origins and representational functions

Party scholarship casts light on the origins, types, structures and inner workings of parties. In particular, parties' societal origins are of relevance to the study of foreign policy. Parties formed along cleavage lines, aggregating group interests and, thereby, organising social conflicts, mobilising and integrating groups into the state along those conflict lines. The existence of diverging and conflicting interests between groups in society led to the emergence of multiple parties and a party system. Parties express those conflicts and lead to the articulation of underlying interests. Thus, parties have a representational function. (King 1969; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Inglehart 1971; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987)
Parties’ representational function makes them links between domestic society or societal groups and the state’s political institutions (e.g. Duverger 1954; Katz and Mair 1995). This linkage function is arguably declining. However, there is evidence that parties still connect to the public, linking society/societal groups to state institutions. Moreover, parties do not only learn and feed back between these levels on domestic but also on international issues (Lawson 2006). Parties are also present on the supra-national level. They form international or regional groups (e.g. Hill 2003; Pettitt 2014) and are elected into supra-national institutions. Parties are intermediaries, linking between the domestic, supra-national and international levels. This adds a multi-level dimension to parties' representational functions.

2.2. Party cleavages and party competition issues

The nature of cleavage and conflict lines shift in the evolving makeup of modern societies. This leads to the emergence of new parties and party competition issues. Earlier cleavages were mainly material, over territorial control and socio-economics (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). New dividing lines emerged after the post-WWII economic growth years and relative economic security ended in the 1970s. They contrasted material and post-material issues, such as women's rights, and centred on the environment and immigration. Recently, the European Union (EU) has become a dividing issue, as part of the GAL/TAN cleavage (Green-Alternative-Libertarian/Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2017; Katsanidou and Otjes 2016).

There is a rich body of party research on old and new cleavages. There are studies of the Europeanisation process, positions on Europe and European integration within and across party-systems or of one party-family or type of party (e.g. Ladrech 2002; Dunphy 2004; Külahci 2011; Charalambous 2011, 2013; Grande and Hutter 2016; Holmes and Lightfoot 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2017). There is also literature on parties and globalisation (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2005). A large body of scholarship is concerned with the populist type of party (e.g. but not exhaustive Mudde 2007, 2010, 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Schulz et al. 2017). Such parties have been particularly apt at setting the agenda and framing issues in novel ways (e.g. Balfour et al. 2016; Meijers 2017). They use trans-national issues.
In sum, trans- and supra-national changes affect the rise of cleavages and parties, creating new competition issues and political incentives for parties to campaign on issues. Research on parties and foreign policy is slowly forthcoming.

2.3. Parties as carriers of ideas and thesis' party definition

Parties are also ideas-based actors. An understanding of human nature, the nature of society and of change influences parties. Morse (1896, 68) defines the party as ‘[a] durable organization which, in its simplest form, consists of a single group of citizens united by common principles [...]’ Founding ideas mostly remain unchanged. Policies deducted from principles shift with time and context.

This thesis defines parties as having emerged from social conflict around interests of segments of domestic societies. They have representational functions that link between different levels and provide opportunities to learn and feed back. They are intermediaries. Parties seek votes to gain or retain office to represent the interests of (parts of) the electorate and to exercise power. Thus, they take cues from the public on salient issues. Yet, founded on, influenced by and carriers of ideas, parties can also try to shape public opinion based on principles and convictions. In sum, parties are defined as organisations with societal functions, motivated to seek positions of power to represent societal interests and shaped by and carriers of ideas. This definition has consequences. Parties need to balance their functions and the different levels on which they operate, between members, voters, internal divisions on issues and cues and pressures on their respective states. This makes parties a complex level for foreign policy analysis.
The above definition also implies that choices had to be made on which element(s) of the definition to focus. The stronger focus on ideas rather than other definition components is not a value judgement. Instead, a choice had to be made for focus reasons. Where relevant and possible, the other elements will be addressed.

Having defined parties, the next part turns to the state of the art on parties and foreign policy. The aim is to stress the insights and strength of the scholarship on which this study builds and to stress literature gaps this thesis is seeking to address.

3. Foreign Policy Analysis and Party Research

Research on parties and foreign policy evidences that they compete on foreign policy issues and that there are ideological differences between parties on these issues (e.g. Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017a, 2018). There is a large body of literature on the practice of and decision-making on military intervention, including on domestic actors and processes. A small part of it takes parties as the unit or level of analysis. Within this small field, attention is paid to differences and effect of ideology and parties' stances on decision-making procedures. New research on parties and military interventions provides insights into the relevance of ideology. However, the scholarship still lacks an engagement with different types or combination of ideas, such ideology and the international normative dimension. This thesis seeks
to address this gap and to strengthen the empirical literature linking parties, ideologies and international norms.

Part 3 introduces Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and the reasons not to study parties and foreign policy. Then, it makes the case for this study mirroring the definition of parties (table 1.1.). Part 3 ends on parties and military intervention state of the art.

3.1. FPA: parties' opportunities, incentives and ideas

This is a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) study. While classical realism includes domestic social groups' beliefs (e.g. Morgenthau 1963), liberalism recognises the importance of public opinion, domestic actors, culture and political structures (e.g. Moravcsik 1997) and constructivism assumes agency and domestic actors' roles in the norm construction (e.g. Katzenstein 1996), FPA moved beyond International Relations (IR) state-level wedged analysis.

A major contribution of FPA was to unpack the state 'black box'. It focused on decision-making processes, dynamics and actors to explain policy behaviour or outcomes. FPA scholars are concerned with processes and actors within the state. They pay attention to individuals and groups, societal and institutional factors. They also take into consideration the sources of foreign policy decision-making, including ideas. FPA's strength is its recognition that foreign policy decision-making and contexts are multi-factorial and multi-level. FPA can explain variation and change, has room for agency without neglecting structural constraints and it permits the integration of approaches within IR and the political science field. FPA stands between grand theories that seek to generalise about the universe of cases and the specificity of each case. Most FPA remains positivist in its endeavour to establish patterns and find explanations for foreign policy decision-making. (Hudson 2014, 2005; Breuning 2007; Rosenau 1968; Alden and Aran 2017)

Parties stand out by their relative absence in FPA studies. This is surprising given the domestic turn in IR (Kaarbo 2015). To be sure, parties' indirect influence is felt in various studies, including on political systems, domestic norms and the role of public opinion (e.g. but no exhaustive Maoz and Russett 1993; Auerswald 1999).

Part 3 covers three FPA research strands in which parties' influences on foreign policy decision and by extension behaviour and outcomes can be discerned. The
three strands are identified as the basis for this thesis. The next sections begin with a discussion of the common assumptions that this thesis indirectly challenges.

Assumptions about parties and foreign policy

There are two relevant arguments against the study of parties' foreign policy for a military intervention for proclaimed humanitarian reasons case. They are mostly implied in IR realism. The first holds that foreign policy is fundamentally different from domestic policy. The second view is that where differences on foreign policy exist between parties, they do not matter to decision-making or outcomes and/or are set aside in times of crisis when state security or survival is at stake. Foreign policy is portrayed as consensual because state interests are considered immediate and obvious. Realist build this view on the assumption that states are rational actors. In an anarchical international system, states' primary aim is survival and security, and state interests and decisions derive from this. Domestic institutions and values have little to no influence on how states conduct international affairs. Where differences exist they are rarely expressed and dissent often framed as reckless and feared to reveal weakness and providing other states with an advantage to exploit, as Gaskarth (2016) describes was long the case in the UK. The domestic-foreign policy dichotomy assumption has long been challenged (e.g. recently Charillon 2017) and Putnam (1988) described how foreign policy decision-makers play two-level games, performing at once to an international and a domestic audience. Other IR theorists stress that domestic values and institutions can matter to relations between states (e.g. Wendt 1992; Owen 1994). Even classical realists accommodated the notion that the domestic level is not without effect on international relations (e.g. Morgenthau 1963). Yet, most IR theories remain focused on relations between states and do not look at the domestic level.

Another related assumption was that the public is not interested in foreign policy (e.g. Merle 1978) and, hence, international issues are less salient. From a rationalist perspective, this increases parties' costs because they need to invest time in developing foreign policy programmes without reward from voting behaviour. Public opinion and research on voters challenges this assumption of voters' lack of interest or the low priority of foreign policy issues compared to domestic ones. It shows that electorates are interested in foreign policy issues and that these can become salient (e.g. Eichenberg 2017; Coticchia and De Simone 2014; Oppermann
and Viehrig 2009; T. Jäger et al. 2009; Clements 2011). Moreover, evidence exists that parties compete on foreign policy (e.g. Fordham 2002). Studies also suggest that foreign policy issues and decisions can impact election outcomes (e.g. Gartner and Segura 2008). Finally, social cleavages and party competition around transnational issues add to blurring the distinction between domestic and foreign policy.

The assumption about essential state survival function and security arguments does not apply to the 2011 Libya case. Humanitarian military interventions are by definition not about the intervening state’s survival or security. They are about saving strangers (Wheeler 2002). Hence, the notion of a national defence crisis that requires a nation to hold together and implies one course of action did not apply.

Party competition was mentioned among the incentives of policymakers in the two selected country cases. A non-territorial defence and state survival case may allow for more open domestic disagreement on policy goals and tools.

Having addressed key challenges, the following sections turns to the question 'why parties?' Parties have opportunities to influence foreign policy decision-making, incentives to position and campaign on and ideas about foreign policy. This justifies a closer scrutiny of parties' foreign policy.

**Opportunities to influence foreign policy**

FPA casts light on the relationship between democratic institutions and foreign policy. It notes that bargaining over foreign policy decision-making takes place in political institutions in contemporary democracies. This adds to parties’ linkage functions described. This section stresses that the sites in which parties operate can constrain and influence foreign policy decision-making. This provides parties with opportunities to try and shape foreign policy. It increases the likelihood of parties expressing views on foreign policy. Moreover, parties’ presence and activities in these locations add to parties as links between international and domestic levels.

FPA research on coalition cabinets interrogates why and how coalitions' foreign policy can differ from single-party government decision-making (Oktay 2017). It shows that junior partners in coalitions can exert influence (Kaarbo 1996; Kaarbo and Lantis 2003). This influence can take place at different stages, for example when coalition programmes are being negotiated (Joly and Dandoy 2018). It can also take place through different mechanisms and processes once a coalition
government is formed (Oppermann and Brummer 2014). Coalition influence can have an impact on the type of decisions taken. Coalition research suggests that coalition cabinets are likely to be more extreme in whichever policy they select (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Beasley and Kaarbo 2014). Evidence exists that ideas matter to party influence type and outcome. Moreover, ideological composition and fractionalisation impact influence (Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Clare 2010; Oktay 2014; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Brummer 2017; Oppermann, Kaarbo, and Brummer 2017; Oppermann, Brummer, and Van Willigen 2017; Evans 2017).

FPA research on parliaments demonstrates the existence of checks and balances, enhancing foreign policy decisions' democratic accountability and scrutiny. It also shows variations between states on 'war powers' (Wagner 2017). It illustrates that this variation is subject to change (Clare 2014; Shea, Teo, and Levy 2014; Peters and Wagner 2014; Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2015; Raunio 2016; Raunio and Wagner 2017; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Mello and Peters 2018). In some states, opposition parties have more opportunities to contest and influence governments' foreign policy decision-making. While such agency remains contested (Auerswald 2017; Mello 2017), it has increased in some traditionally weak parliaments. In the UK parliament, such a trend can be traced back to the 2003 Iraq intervention and increased public scrutiny since. The 2013 Syria vote illustrates this. (Ihalainen and Matikainen 2016; Strong 2015b; Gaskarth 2016; Kaarbo and Kenealy 2015)

The coalition and parliament literature shows that parties can exert influence on foreign policy agenda setting and outcomes. The research reveals that parties can matter to decision-making, that there is not necessarily party consensus on foreign policy and that even small parties can influence foreign policy decisions.

**Incentives to position on foreign policy**

Parties are also motivated to express difference and campaign on foreign policy because international issues can be salient to the public. Parties’ incentives link back to the party definition. This section illustrates this point with contemporary political incentives for parties to position and campaign on foreign policy and, in particular, on humanitarian military intervention.

The post-material cleavage issues provided the basis for the rise of the notion of *humanitarian* military intervention, centred on protecting human rights abroad
and ‘saving strangers’ (Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017b). This incentivised parties to express and frame foreign policy in humanitarian and ethical terms. Some party scholars argue that new cleavages appeared and centre around protest against the status quo, the EU and constraints on domestic policy-making (at least framed to be) imposed by European integration (e.g. Katsanidou and Otjes 2016; Otjes and Katsanidou 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2017; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). European and international economic integration, as recent protests against free trade agreements, party-positioning on and the ‘politicisation’ of the issue showed (e.g. Jančić 2017), and related issues can incentivise (some) parties to establish links between domestic policy-making, and international developments.

Populist parties tap into the public’s interest in international issues, often framed in terms of domestic security. The success of such parties is not only measured in electoral victory but also in their ability to set the agenda and frame issues. Populist parties have been particularly apt at doing this on trans-national issues, such as migration, security and European integrations. There is still little research on populist parties’ capacity to influence foreign policy (Balfour et al. 2016; Chryssogelos 2017). If the influence of some populist radical parties as junior coalition partner is an indication, such parties have foreign policy agendas and seek to exert influence (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Coticchia and Davidson 2016).

Populist parties illustrate the potential effect of the (framed) tension between a foreign policy geared toward ‘saving strangers’ and domestic welfare spending cuts. As Western European democracies experience a resurgence of material inequality and social cleavages around material issues, decisions to commit budgets to foreign policy increasingly need to be justified against reductions in domestic spending. This contest for state resources can make humanitarian military intervention a salient topic. This salience can incentivise parties to position on foreign policy. This motivation adds to parties’ likelihood to express and campaign on foreign policy, given that foreign policy issues can be and have been framed as relevant to cleavages that shape party systems and competition.

**Ideas about foreign policy**

Some of the literature reviewed point to ideas, suggesting that ideology matters in foreign policy. Studies of coalitions, parliaments and public opinion propose that ideas are important and sometimes relevant to policy decisions and outcomes.
(Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Clare 2010; Oktay 2014; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Brummer 2017). There is research looking at the relevance and effect of ideology on foreign policy preferences and positions (Nincic and Ramos 2010; Rathbun 2007; Rathbun et al. 2016). Moreover, there is evidence that ideology can shape government foreign policy orientation. Brommesson and Ekengren (2013) show that ideology matters to foreign policy change between predecessor and newly-elected governments, albeit that political culture and institutions constrain impact. They find that foreign policy ideology can change in majoritarian systems (UK). It can also change in consensus-oriented political systems (Sweden). The authors explain this finding of alteration in less confrontational systems with contextual factors and a shift in foreign policy reorientation.

Research shows that there are domestic ideological differences on international issues. There are differences on Europe, as noted above. There are also ideological differences on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Hofmann 2013, 2017), international political economy (Haupt 2010), trade (Milner and Judkins 2004), foreign aid (e.g. Thérien and Noel 2000; Carbone 2007; Allen and Flynn 2018) and the use of force (Martini 2015).

These strands of ideas and foreign policy research reveal the importance of beliefs and principles in foreign policy decision-making. Table 1.1. illustrates the links and mirroring effect between the party definition (part 2) and this three-step review. For this study, parties, defined as founded on principles, shaped by ideologies and carriers of ideas, are: ‘ideas through the front door’ (Rathbun 2004, 7).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party research</th>
<th>FPA</th>
<th>Example of topics</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Opportunities to influence foreign policy decisions</td>
<td>Coalitions, governments, parliaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage function between levels: society and state</td>
<td>Incentives to position on foreign policy issues</td>
<td>Public interest and opinion, salience of foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded on principles and a view of human nature and society</td>
<td>Ideas about foreign policy, ideology and foreign policy</td>
<td>Left-right divide, foreign policy values mirror domestic policy values etc.</td>
</tr>
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Table 1.1. Mirroring party definition and foreign policy research

3.2. Parties and military interventions: State of the Art

Parties and military interventions scholarship is still relatively small but growing. There are some studies directly concerned with parties (Carbone 2007; Heffington 2016). These studies provide insights into the contentious nature of interventions and stress ideological differences between parties. Yet, they mostly focus on individual parties or party systems. They largely neglect the domestic ideational context in conjunction with the international ideational context.

A key study of parties and military intervention remains *Partisan Intervention*. Challenging the assumptions to the study of parties and foreign policy, Rathbun (2004) demonstrates that ideology matters in defining the national interest, to parties' foreign policy stances and states' decision-making on what he calls peace enforcement. Examining parties' positions in France, Germany and the UK, he finds evidence that they are based on ideology. Crucially, he also notes that foreign policy ideology stances mirror domestic policy. 'The values that parties represent in domestic politics, which rest on particular moral understandings of how society should be ordered, are often the values underlying their foreign policy as well.' (2004, 2) His study challenges the claim that an unmediated national interest or
national identity can causally determine foreign policy positions. He disproves the party consensus assumption on humanitarian military intervention.

Rathbun (2004) finds a tendency on the left to be sceptical of the use of force and that right-wing parties have fewer problems with military means. He argues that parties face dilemmas when deciding support for military interventions. Left-wing parties pit a definition of the national interest that includes welfare and human rights of people outside the respective jurisdiction of their state against a general scepticism on state use of force. Right-wing parties see a conflict between a narrow definition of the national interest as concerning the nation and the need to be perceived as strong through using force. Rathbun posits that moderates/centrists are more likely to resolve such dilemmas because they are better at evaluating complexity and learning lessons from past experience in government.

Research substantiating the central finding that parties differ on foreign policy and that ideas matter was published recently. Ostermann (2016) challenges elite consensus assumptions that foreign policy stances are evident and immediate, based on interests or identity. He traces variation in that French parties’ discursive construction of the 2011 Libya intervention. Such constructions would not be necessary if interests were clear. He shows that parties differed on and contested other parties’ framing. Wagner et al (2017a, 2017b) provide fresh evidence of left-right differences between parties in positioning on military interventions. Their studies substantiate previous findings that parties across Europe have different stances and that they contest military interventions policy on substance and procedure. Their findings support the claim that parties’ positions are based on ideologies. They confirm a tendency of left-leaning parties to be more sceptical of military intervention. Right-leaning parties are more pro-interventionist. However, they also find support for military intervention strongest among centrist parties and that support gradually declines toward the fringes of the political spectrum. This suggests a convergence of policy positions at the centre and at the extremes. This finding mirrors Rathbun's dilemma resolution claims.

A Partisan intervention (2004) weakness was the prima facia assumption of the existence of humanitarian as distinct from other forms of military interventions. Thereby, it failed to recognise the political and contested nature. Despite the overall argument and evidence that ideas underlie parties’ definitions of the national
interest, the book rejects the notion that international norms could have mattered in the 1990s context analysed. While it notes that the end of the Cold War was a 'window of opportunity' and recognises the role the evolution of domestic norms can play, the book denies such norms’ relevance in case of military intervention (2004, 31). Equally, it downplays the role of ideas and ideology in actors’ lesson learning; implying, instead, that there were no other lessons to be drawn from the 1990s genocides than those of centrists who argued in favour of intervention.

Moreover, Rathbun’s (2004) normative commitment is clear, when he argues that 'idealists' do not recognise dilemmas between principled concern for the welfare of all and scepticism regarding the use of force. He reasons that unconditional attachment to principles was why they rejected interventions. So-called moderates in centrist parties, by contrast, had the capacity to evaluate policy and situational complexity. He notes the creeping in of ethical foreign policy without critically assessing its underpinnings. He seems to claim that ‘whatever works’ pragmatists in parties are non-ideological while idealists are inflexibly ideology-led. This is a fallacy because the assumption that there is a non-ideological political concept or position is in itself an ideological standpoint (Freeden 2008). It reveals the author’s view of ideology as essentially negative and its possible absence.

This thesis does not accept the existence of humanitarian military intervention as more than its proponents’ belief in the possibility to differentiate between forms of military interventions based on motives. Rather, it takes these claims as part of the normative context in which interveners act in accordance with norms and proclaim motives in order to be seen as acting legitimately. The aim is not to diminish the belief of those favouring such interventions, but to accept that the normative power of ideas is not necessarily based on inherent goodness or on alleged non-ideological nature. Centrist and moderates are idealists in pragmatists’ clothing. The idealist-pragmatist dichotomy is as misleading as the claim that there is no ideology.

Centrist parties’ 'ethical foreign policy' is steeped in ideology. Chandler (2003) proposes such foreign policy defined humanitarian military intervention as the

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3 It refers to humanitarian military intervention not as a separate practice. The intervention in Libya are called humanitarian only to denote actor invocation of a motive or a distinction in the literature. Humanitarian military intervention is preferred to humanitarian intervention to make clear that there are civilian, non-military forms of intervention in conflict and that humanitarian largely refers to non-partisan, non-violent work, such as that of the red cross or doctors without borders.
expression of a foreign policy that proclaims not to pursue any national interest. Instead, this foreign policy is framed as a fight for the lives and human rights of others, based on principles and values (Wheeler 2002). It was a reaction to what was perceived as ‘politicised’ era of bipolarity. Non-state actors had tried to ‘depoliticise’ foreign policy through a stress on ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ as anti-ideology. (Chandler and Heins 2007) The politics-morality dichotomy is contested. Jahn (2012) argues that it is a fallacy. It was constructed to present humanitarian military intervention as moral as opposed to political. Scholars also argue that such foreign policy was part of an ideational crisis and loss of mission experience by the centrist left and right parties (e.g. Vickers 2000; McCormack 2011). They propose that in the perceived absence of a domestic political project and vision, after the end of the Cold War, some parties turned to foreign policy to fill the void, find validation and a new project. Such missions resonated with segments of the electorate concerned with post-material issues and were under less domestic scrutiny and control if they went amiss. While most ethical foreign policy studies do not directly look at parties, their focus on ideas and political frameworks links it back to parties, in particular Third Way left-parties (e.g. Gaskarth 2006a, 2006b, 2013) but also centrist parties more broadly (Beech 2011; Beech and Oliver 2014; Daddow and Schnapper 2013).

In sum, research on parties and military intervention provides insights into the ideational foundations and differences between parties. This thesis builds on the recent resurgence of research on parties and foreign policy of military intervention. It adds a focus on contestation when a domestic controversy on decisions arises.

4. Overview of arguments and contributions

The present study makes several contributions to the growing research on parties, foreign policy and military intervention. The thesis adds to empirical evidence on parties’ foreign policy contestations. The theoretical framework is a contribution to FPA role theory research. Finally, some practical implications can be identified.

4.1. Research on parties’ foreign policy and intervention

This study contributes empirically to scholarship on parties. It adds to research unpacking the state in foreign policy decision-making by focusing on parties. It speaks to the proposition that:
In many respects, political parties can be seen as the key site for a number of activities attributed in FPA to domestic sources of foreign policy. These include the simultaneous role of political parties as agenda setters in foreign policy, through ideological discourses reflecting their distinctive political orientation (e.g. rightist or leftist), as agenda followers in foreign policy, and through their positions as interest aggregators derived from the support they court from within domestic society. (Alden and Aran 2017, 81)

The thesis contributes a cross-spectrum study of parties' foreign policy on the issue of military intervention to the growing scholarship on parties and foreign policy in comparative politics. Most work on foreign policy partisanship so far is on the United States (US). Research on European parties and international issues often focuses on the topic of Europe, from the Europeanisation process, left-right variation on the EU or parties’ and Euro-scepticism, to stances on current salient issues, including on the European Common Foreign and Security Policy or the effects of the 2008-2009 economic crisis (e.g. Ladrech 2002; Külahci 2011; Grande and Hutter 2016; Kriesi et al. 2005; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Tavits and Letki 2009; Dunphy 2004; Charalambous 2011; Holmes and Lightfoot 2016; Chryssogelos 2015). Other studies on European parties and foreign policy concentrate on one party family (e.g. Charalambous 2013; van Kersbergen 2003; Bailey et al. 2014) or on individual parties (e.g. Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011) or one political phenomenon (e.g. populism Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017).

The thesis also adds to party and foreign policy research on France and Germany. In the case of France, it adds a more direct engagement with domestic politics and parties as potential domestic foreign policy actors to studies of French foreign policy mostly focused on the state, elite or individual president-level. In the case of Germany, the thesis adds to research already covering domestic foreign policy actors. The thesis finds that there are differences in foreign policy stances, despite parties' relatively small role in decision-making in this case and in general.

This PhD also contributes theoretically to research on parties and foreign policy. It adds role theory to the toolset. This contribution begins from the observation that within role theory research, including recent advances, there is no direct focus on parties as potential drivers of domestic role contestation (e.g. Özdamar 2016; Gaskarth 2016). The scholarship on parties and foreign policy, including on military interventions, is also still relatively small. Recent advances have noted that parties compete on foreign policy issues and that there are ideological differences between them that can influence decision-making. Studies look at parties' contestation of
intervention and the drivers of such differences, noting positions on the process of
decision-making and the content of decisions (Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2018). Others show that radical parties as junior coalition partners can exert influence on
foreign policy decision-making (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Coticchia and Davidson
2016). The comparative studies indicate partisan variation on foreign policy across
different political systems. The single country studies find that parties’ strategic,
negotiation position in political institutions and their ideological positions on the
left-right spectrum can impact government agreements and priorities (e.g. Joly and
Dandoy 2018). Research shows that parties can disagree on foreign policy, and that
differences are to be expected based on political incentives, opportunities and
ideas. Yet, much of the scholarship is focused on parties’ influence on decision-
making processes, and explaining parties’ positions and their voting decisions.

The first rationale for using role theory for parties and foreign policy research is
that, in the current international system, parties need the state to enact foreign
policy. Hence, they are likely to express foreign policy proposal using the state as
the actor, proposing national roles for it. Role theory is actor-orientated, leaving
room for parties’ agency to define national roles. A second reasoning is that the
strengths of role theory and parties and foreign policy research resemble each
other. Role theory is lauded for bridging the agent-structure debate and for
recognising ideational and material factors as relevant. Similarly, some party
research in FPA stresses that parties are actors with some agency and
opportunities that can (directly or indirectly) influence foreign policy decision-
making. They are domestic actors operating on and influencing states’
international-level behaviour. Moreover, while parties are carriers of ideas, they
are also constrained (and motivated) by material demands, incentives and
objectives, such as winning elections and holding office, and constraints posed by
other parties, the party and political systems. The foreign policy and parties and the
role theory foreign policy research strands, thus, both focus on the domestic and
international level, material and ideational factors, and actor agency and structural
constraints. Bridging and complexity make their combination interesting.

Thus, this thesis proposes to use role theory to delve deeper into understanding the
ideational factors shaping the variation between parties, building on the parties
and foreign policy research. It explores ideational sources away from the pressures
to establish influence or explain decisions. It argues that a role theory approach is
a useful lens and starting point for doing that because it is in national roles and role statements that more general and abstract ideas about foreign policy become concrete for foreign policy actors and relevant for a particular case. Thus, identifying variation in national roles and national role conceptions, and exploring domestic national role contestation can help locate differences between parties. This variation may else go undetected, because of assumed or surface consensus on policy, i.e. agreement on the need to militarily intervene or not. Role theory helps make policy positions become more concrete and can help with identifying the sources of consensus and contestation.

4.2. Foreign Policy Analysis' role theory research

The thesis makes two theoretical contributions to FPA role theory, an approach that focuses on decision-makers’ own definitions of their state’s role in international relations.

The first contribution is a focus on parties’ national roles and speaks to the suggestion that:

> an examination of the domestic political conflicts over roles would provide role theory the underlying mechanisms to account for the emergence of shared roles, the imposition of a dominant role, and the changes in roles and foreign policy when domestic political conditions change. (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016c, 16)

Parties are an understudied foreign policy actor in role theory. Building on FPA's domestic actors and ideas research and role theory's recent advances on domestic role contestation, this thesis argues that parties are a useful entry point for unpacking the elites, dominant roles and assertions of role consensus. In party-based democracies, foreign policy stances and decisions mature within parties and are (in most cases) taken by party politicians. The argument is that differences in how national roles are interpreted play a central role in domestic controversies on state decision-making and that these differences can (in part) be traced to ideologies and engagement with international norms. This thesis demonstrates that there is variation in how parties interpret national roles, including dominant, salient ones. Ideas from multiple levels influence national role interpretations, affect domestic differences in role socialisation and domestic role contestation. A focus on parties can help identify underlying ideas, informing about the origins of national role conceptions and domestic role contestation.
A key finding of this thesis was that parties disagree on the priorities and how the role is to be performed, despite consensus on terminology and the national role to perform. They propose variations of the same role that merit a qualification of the agreed upon role. In France, parties of the centre and the radical left agreed on the leader role. However, they disagreed greatly on how such a leader role ought to play out in practice. There was evidence of the same foreign policy tradition in all three parties under study. Again this did not lead to the proposal of the same national role in detail. Parties interpreted it differently and chapter 4 suggested that this was due to ideological differences and international norms engagement.

In Germany, all but one party agreed on the alliance partner role but differed greatly on how they defined it. Chapter 5 suggested that this was in part due to different foreign policy traditions on which parties drew and ideology and international norms. The empirical analysis, thus, suggested that at least three ideational layers can be traced in parties’ national role interpretations in the context of the Libya 2011 case.

This leads to the central argument that foreign policy traditions, international norms and ideologies are key sources of the domestic contestation of national roles. The research conducted also shows that contestation takes place in different ways: as the criticism of past roles performance and alternative national role proposals or based on different priorities within a role consensus.

A second theoretical contribution to role theory is a discussion of responsibility and the problematisation of the concept. It followed the empirical observation is that national role conceptions include and are related to notions of responsibility. The argument is two-pronged. First, responsibility is central to national roles and variation in responsibility definitions links to divergences on national role interpretations. This conceptual, theoretical contribution speaks to the proposition that role theory can benefit from engaging with international norms (e.g. Breuning 2011; Hansel and Möller 2015). The concept of responsibility shapes views on how the state ought to act. The present study suggests that paying attention to the definitions of international responsibility in role statements contributes to a better understanding of the variation in national role interpretations. Also, it proposes that invoking responsibility in national roles has a political function.
4.3. Practical contributions: policy implications and uses

This thesis first practical contribution is a better understanding of differences between parties’ foreign policy stances and national role conceptions can inform about variation in foreign policy decision-making and outcomes. Thus, this PhD framework can improve explanations and increase prediction accuracy about change and continuity between governments and legislative majorities.

The second practical contribution is an improved grasp of foreign policy narratives for expert-practitioners. In many states, foreign policy bureaucracies and practitioners stay in place when governments change. They put into practice, explain and sometimes defend administrations’ decisions. They can benefit from tools to identify implied national roles and the nuanced differences between parties or different political actors.

This thesis can also be useful for expert-practitioners and expert-commentators as it can provide a map on how to influence parties’ (and other political actors') national role conceptions and selection. It can point to where to link in with novel ideas to create or point to dilemmas and the need for new frames and solutions.

Thesis outline

Chapter 1 introduced the research questions, aims and discussed the relevance of the thesis. In a next step, the chapter situated the thesis in the FPA scholarship and reviewed the state of the art on parties and military intervention. The chapter argument was that existing research on parties pays attention to the domestic level processes and ideologies, but neglects the interplay between domestic and international-level ideas. The chapter closed with the theoretical and empirical arguments of the thesis and its contributions to scholarship.

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework. Starting from a theoretical discussion of role theory, in particular, advances in research on role socialisation and domestic role contestation, it points to the relative absence of parties in role research. The chapter then discusses the theoretical research on international norms and ideologies, R2P and humanitarian intervention. It highlights the overlap between national role conceptions, international norms and ideologies, as ideas about appropriate behaviour of inherently contestable nature. The central argument is that role theory is a useful lens and that national roles are a useful focus
to pin down parties’ proposals of policy action because this approach as actor orientated theory recognises agency in defining roles for the state that translate into policy proposals. Role theorists recognise that ideas influence actors’ definitions of appropriate behaviour for their state. Combining role theory with an international normative and ideology framework helps identify the ideational layers in national role expressions. This can help grasp parties’ understanding and framing of conflict situations and events (and proposed solutions).

**Chapter 3** is devoted to methodology and the research design. It operationalises the theoretical lens and details how parties’ national role expressions, variation and contestation will be identified. The argument is that an interpretive methodology and a narrative focus are suitable for a study focused on identifying and analysing national role statements and on extracting ideas. This chapter also addresses the epistemological challenges of the thesis. It presents the research design. It closes with the case selection, providing detail about why the intervention in Libya and French and German parties with respect were chosen.

**Chapters 4 to 6** are the empirical chapters. In chapter 4 and 5, role theory is used as a lens. The chapters trace the foreign policy narratives and role statements. Role interpretations and contestation are identified and ideational sources are discussed. Chapter 6 explores responsibility in role statements identified in the narratives in the preceding chapters. It is experimental, combining role theory with a conceptual discussion. It builds on the observation that the concept of responsibility is ubiquitous. The key contribution is the linking of national roles and responsibility. The argument is that paying closer attention to responsibility in role statements, i.e. how it is understood and what ideas underpin its definitions, contributes to a better grasp of role interpretations and contestation.

**Chapter 7** discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis. It draws conclusions on the expectations in the theoretical chapter. In this chapter, I also address the limitations of the thesis and propose further research avenues.
Chapter 2: A role theory framework for analysing parties and military intervention

The previous chapter described the aims of this thesis to contribute to the growing literature challenging the elite foreign policy consensus assumption. It proposed to focus on parties’ national role conceptions. It posed research questions seeking an answer to which ideas shape domestic national role interpretations and contestation. The review of the FPA scholarship on domestic sources of foreign policy decision-making pointed to the relevance of parties and ideas. The state of the art on parties and military intervention further revealed the thesis' potential contribution.

This chapter develops a theoretical framework that uses role theory. It proposes to combine it with an ideational approach. The aim is to identify ideas sustaining parties’ national role statements. Role theory is a bridge between theories that are reliant on interests and those focused on identity and ideas. It takes into account the complexity and social nature of the international system. The developed approach is an answer to calls for more dialogue between role theory and FPA research on domestic foreign policy sources. It follows challenges to role theorists’ tendency to black-box domestic elites assuming a horizontal role consensus (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016c). The framework also integrates the international normative context (Breuning 2011).

The central argument is that international norms intertwine with ideologies’ international dimension in parties’ national roles. Teasing out these ideas points to the potential factors influencing domestic actors’ national role socialisation. Exploring parties’ role statements provides information about the range of domestic carriers of roles and the (political and ideational) nature of domestic role contestation. The inclusion of multi-level ideas seems particularly relevant because of the challenges to the liberal ‘consensus' that has dominated debates about military intervention.

The theoretical framework makes an original contribution to role theory. Drawing out the overlap between the role theory socialisation and international norms research fields, it combines them with FPA research on parties and ideas and research on ideologies. It adds to knowledge on the domestic origins of roles, effects of role socialisation on domestic actors, domestic carriers of roles and the drivers of domestic role contestation (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013).
Part 1 introduces role theory and its utility for this study. It discusses role socialisation and role contestation. Parts 2 and 3 turn to the ideational layers that form the context in which parties operate. Part 4 points to overlap between the role theory, international norms and ideology research. The chapter closes with expectations.

1. Role theory, parties and ideas

In his seminal article National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Holsti (1970) imports and adapts role theory from sociology and cognitive disciplines to the study of international relations and the behaviour of states. His approach provided a novel way of looking at foreign policy decision-making by way of focusing on foreign policy decision-makers’ image of their state and its place in the world.

The role theory approach borrows from theatre postulating that actors are provided with a role script, information on how it has been played before and expectations on how it ought to be played. Holsti (1970, 245–46) defined national role conceptions as:

[...] the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of functions if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external world.

Role theory is a social theory. The roles foreign policymakers define in national role conceptions are a state's social positions in the international system and socially recognised categories of actors (Thies 2013). In Holsti’s adaptation of role theory to foreign policy, the state is the actor (also called ego). The state is confronted with other actors in the system (called alters) from which expectations in forms of role-pressures are emanating. Roles, inherently relational/social, are the awareness of ego’s position in relation to alters and of the expectations toward the state in question. Roles manifest in an enactment that becomes visible as state behaviour.

Role theorists expect causality between national role conceptions and state behaviour. Holsti argues that policymakers’ national role conceptions affect foreign policy role performance, i.e. decisions and actions, including patterns of attitudes, responses, functions and commitments (1970, 245). National role conceptions shape interests and policies (Krotz 2015). Ego- and alter-role cues exert influence on decision-makers’ perception of appropriate behaviour in specific situations. There is a socialisation effect via interaction with external and demands of domestic actors (Harnisch 2011).
Holsti identifies ego and alter national role conception sources. Ego-sources are domestic sources. These include a number of ideational factors like ‘[...] national values, ideology, traditional roles, public opinion [...]’ (Holsti 1970, 245) and material and other factors like political needs (see image 2.1) Krotz (2015, 3) adds to these ego-role sources 'historically rooted and domestically anchored views of self and purpose.' A policymaker's national role conception is also influenced by alter-role prescriptions. Sources include ‘[...] system structure, system-wide values, general legal principles, treaty commitments, informal understandings, “world opinion” [...]’. (Holsti 1970, 245) Thus, national role conceptions and alter-role prescriptions include domestic incentives for parties, for example, in the shape of public opinion and political needs.

![Image 2.1. National role conceptions and prescriptions, Holsti (1970, 245)](image)

The following sections review role theory's core concepts, role socialisation and role contestation. The assumption is that parties also experience alter-role expectations and the pressures exerted on the state to comply with role performance. However, it is further assumed that parties can also experience role conflicts and contest roles.
1.1. The role theory revival and its relevance to this thesis

Early role theorists focused on the constraining nature of the international system while later studies focused on agency and actors’ role conceptions without ignoring the systemic constraints (Breuning 2011; Thies and Breuning 2012). Later and recent role theory coincides with the rise of and shares affinities with IR Constructivism due to its focus on identity and ideas. Yet, early role theory was by no means a move away from IR Realism. Instead, Holsti and others sought to refine existing theories. In his discussion of state role socialisation, Thies (2013) shows that the choice and selection of roles and role socialisation are conditioned on material capabilities. He (2010, 690) suggests that ‘[…] material factors constrain ideational factors’ and that the study of roles may be a bridge between Constructivism and Realism. Role theory has also been welcomed as a bridge between IR and FPA because it focuses on domestic actors’ agency and systemic pressures (Thies and Breuning 2012). Role theory’s attraction is the potential to overcome structural IR theories and approaches overestimating agency and ideational factors because decision-makers have a level of agency to define and enact roles, despite the constraints role scripts (Hollis and Smith 1986).

Role theory experienced a recent revival. Research has looked at the system level and role socialisation (Thies 2010, 2012, 2013). Studies focus on the domestic level. A particular innovation has been the challenge and calls to test assumptions of vertical (between elites and public) and horizontal (among elites) role consensus (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016c). This led scholars to explore role conflicts and role contestation. The present theoretical framework builds on this recent role theory research strands.

The role theory revival also demonstrates the eclecticism and scope for development and application of the approach. Some scholars continue to challenge IR assumptions (e.g. Gigleux 2016) and propose to combine role theory with other FPA subfields (e.g. Harnisch 2012 on policy learning; Jones 2017 on bureaucratic politics). Role theory has moved beyond US and Euro-centrism (Adigbuo 2007; Shih 2012; Wehner 2011, 2015, 2016; Thies 2012, 2014) and away from its state-centrism to role conceptions of/in regional institutions (Aggestam 1999; Flockhart 2011; Bengtsson and Elgström 2011, 2012; Chelotti 2015; Koenig 2016) and of aspiring states (Beasley and Kaarbo 2017; Beasley, Kaarbo, and Solomon-Strauss 2016). The renewed interest has led to a number of edited volumes (Elgström and Smith 2006; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull
2011), a *Foreign Policy Analysis* special issue (Thies and Breuning 2012) and a *Role Theory and International Relations* series (Routledge 2010).

This thesis builds and contributes to this research. I challenge assumptions of elite role consensus and the irrelevance of elite disagreement, implicit in some role theory studies. I propose to unpack elites. I selected a central actor among national elites in representative democracies to disentangle ego and take a closer look at role consensus and contestation. The next two sections discuss two role research strands of particular pertinence for the aims of this thesis: role socialisation and domestic role contestation.

### 1.2. Role socialisation

Thies (2012, 29) defines role socialisation based on the role location process:

> Role location refers to the process whereby a social actor locates a suitable role in a social structure. The role location process is where role expectations of the self and other, role demands of the situations, and cues from the audience all come together to produce a role for the actor and set the conditions for its appropriate enactment. Suitable roles are determined through the interaction of relevant actors in a role bargaining process. Socialization itself is essentially a role bargaining process.

This definition has two implications for the study of parties' national role conceptions. First, in 'expectations of the self' we can assume domestic actors' self-views are aggregated, including parties. Second, in 'cues from the audience' we can include domestic audiences, i.e. electorates and public opinion, given the demands of domestic audiences and international actors (Putnam 1988). Thus, the role socialisation is relevant because it implicates domestic electorates and decision-makers, hence, by extension, parties. This is, not to argue that ego-internal, domestic role expectations are more important than alter-role expectations or the international audience and opinion. However, a focus on parties unpacks the ego in role socialisation processes.

Role socialisation focuses on the role relationship side of ego-alter. National roles are inherently social. There are different ways in which the social nature of roles plays out. Thies (2013, 3) describes a '[…] role bargaining process in which ego and alter ego interact to determine an appropriate role.' He locates this game at the heart of role socialisation. Actors select a role for a situation. Thies suggests that role learning can take different forms, including role imitation if states are novices in the system. Yet, if a state selects a role considered inappropriate by dominant others in the system this role selection can be challenged, leading to diverse outcomes, including punishment:
If the role selection is determined to be inappropriate, then, we should expect socialization activities to prevent the state from enacting the role. If the role is enacted inappropriately, then we should see socialization activities to bring behavior in line with expectations. Socialization activities could include the full spectrum of behavior from diplomacy to war; [...] (Thies 2010, 697)

Harnisch (2012) proposes that role learning sources emerge from the interaction of ego with the international structure. He suggests that actors 'make roles'; '[w]hen embedded in social interaction, role making implies that an agent sets out to reconstruct a role, setting in motion a reconstruction of counter-roles or commensurate roles.' (2012, 49) The implication is that a process of role learning takes place as part of role making and taking. Roles can also be adapted by changing strategies and tools of role performance (Harnisch 2011). This social interaction, as part of role relationships and role location, implies that roles come with counter-roles or in role sets. To be socialised there must be a socialiser and a to-be-socialised actor.

While Thies (2013) focuses on relations and interactions between states as the actors in the role location process, he also notes that his model provides a bridge between different levels of analysis '[...] from the individual to the state to the international system.' (2013, 29) This accentuates the relevance of role socialisation, as parties are located between these levels and even incorporate or link between them. In his approach, Harnisch (2012) seeks to take into consideration the social structure of states (egos), as he proposes that '[...] in many political systems, interaction between individual citizens, parties, and political institutions may reshape the domestic institutional roles that inform the process of foreign policy role taking and making.' (2012, 51) While his own studies mention parties only in passing (e.g. Beneš and Harnisch 2015), this recognition provides further encouragement for this thesis.

Moreover, and finally, role socialisation research is at least doubly relevant for the study. Focusing on novice states, Thies (2012, 2013), analyses how the US and Israel emerged into the international system and were socialised into roles. This happened sometimes against the role they had selected. His research provides insight into the process by which dominant states perform socialiser roles and stresses the role expectations such states derived from an emerging state's capabilities. It explains why even dominant; materially resourceful states are constrained in the roles they can select for themselves. Apart from dealing with novice states' role socialisation, Thies also clarifies that such socialisation is a general, ongoing process and that role location bargaining can take place with more than one role, sometimes at the same time. The
interaction shapes the socialisee and the socialiser. The relevance of these findings for the study is, first, that the case selection includes two regionally strong states, one on the ascent (Germany) and one arguably showing resilience and resistance against its descent (France). They may at once be socialisees in relationships with stronger states in the international order and socialisers in their region and, thus be shaped by both roles. They may even compete as socialisers within the region (Koenig 2016).

Second, a military intervention case situation puts pressure on such states to perform certain roles, especially where international norms on behaviour in such situations exist and if socialiser states perceive a state as having the capabilities to act. This could mean that dominant socialisers expected Germany and/or France to perform certain roles. Simultaneously, as was alluded to before, domestic audiences’ role expectations may pull national role performance into other directions, creating domestic tension and controversy, if not all experience these two-level pressures in the same way.

The next section explores domestic tensions in more depth, introducing to role conflict and domestic role contestation.

1.3. Domestic role contestation

Role conflict is inherent, because of roles’ social nature and competing pressures on role holders on which role to select and how to enact it. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016d, 5) define role conflict as:

(...) a clash between domestically defined national role conceptions and externally defined role expectations [...] as a clash between two role prescriptions for the same situation; or a clash between elements of the same role.

Role conflict occurs between role-performers (ego) and those with role expectations toward them (alter), in what is known as intra-role conflict. Role conflict also occurs when an actor (ego) plays more than one role and these roles can be or become perceived as in conflict, in what is termed inter-role conflict. Role conflict results from the complex structure of roles that are composed of several core tenets, values and beliefs. This diversity and actors’ agency in re-interpreting roles can engender the perceptions of contradiction over time (Harnisch 2011; Bengtsson and Elgström 2012; Kaarbo and Cantir 2013; Wehner 2016).

Domestic role conflicts can lead to domestic role contestation. Domestic role contestation occurs when elements of a role or several previously performed roles are
seen to be in contradiction with each other. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 2016d) propose that to pay attention to the domestic origins of role conflict permits to unpack the state and to explore domestic role contestation. This can reveal the nature of role conflict; who carries the role(s) and how they are framed (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013).

The occurrence of role conflict and domestic role contestation challenges assumptions of domestic role consensus. In a recently edited volume *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations* (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016a), the authors give empirical credence to the proposition that this assumption of consensus needs testing. They demonstrate that role conflict and domestic role contestation can take place in a number of circumstances and that exploring such contestation can help identify role continuity and change (Breuning 2016; Hirata 2016), explain change in inter-state relations (Özdamar 2016) and impact on the capacity to act (Koenig 2016). They further show that the entrenchment of conflicting role conceptions can persist in national crisis situations (Hagan 2016) and that the emergence of the electorate’s role contestation (vertical role contestation) can precede intra-elite role contestation (Gaskarth 2016). The volume provides the empirical evidence that domestic role contestation takes place and that it can have effects on policy outcomes. This research demonstrates that the public and elites do not always or necessarily agree on national roles and that this disagreement can impact decision-making. Exploring parties’ roles contributes to this research. The thesis focuses on parties’ national role statements and examines if national roles, like foreign policy stances, differ between parties.

Existing role theory research on parties is encouraging. A number of authors point out that parties can be central to domestic role contestation (Brummer and Thies 2016; Gaskarth 2016; Hagan 2016; Hirata 2016; Özdamar 2016). Özdamar (2016) shows that Turkey’s AKP rise and the consolidation of its domestic political power allowed it to alter long enacted Turkish roles with effects on decision-making. He demonstrates that parties can change long-established and expected national roles, despite constraints due to role performance history and roles institutional embedding. He also provides evidence for such change prompting horizontal role contestation by opposition parties, despite their lack of power to affect the role location process, role selection and/or role enactment. Brummer and Thies (2015) find instances of domestic role conflict and contestation in the interaction between (and within) government and opposition, hinting at parties as carriers of roles and drivers of role contestation. Brummer and Thies (2016) also show that domestic
actors can use institutional positions to push roles. They demonstrate that domestic actors contest roles even in the absence of chances of success, i.e. despite their lack of influence on decision-making and role performance. These studies point to parties and political ideas affecting domestic role contestation.

Yet, parties remain relatively understudied in role theory research. This is the case, despite the growing recognition of the variety of national role holders (Wehner and Thies 2014; Paris 2014; Walker, Schafer, and Beieeler 2016; Jones 2017) and despite FPA evidence that parties can be foreign policy actors, as discussed in chapter 1. Parties are often at most mentioned in passing (e.g. Beneš and Harnisch 2015; Oppermann 2012). Role theory research remains devoted to the individual, elite, state or supra-state level. Its negligence of parties may stem from the type of research questions posed and the decision to black-box elites for research purposes. Yet, explicit dismissals also hint at continued assumptions of role consensuses, based in part on claims that deep-rooted national identities and histories shape the construction of roles, hence, explain their longevity and acceptance (Krotz 2015).

1.4. Roles and ideas: traditions, international norms and ideologies

Role theorists have long explored the link between national roles and ideas. Holsti’s (1970) ego- and alter-role sources already included such ideational factors as ideologies and system-wide values as seen above.

Foreign policy traditions

Wehner and Thies (2014) argue that foreign policy traditions and dilemmas are useful tools to look at the sources of policymakers’ national role conceptions:

[...] actions and practices of individuals are explained in reference to traditions and dilemmas. This tradition encompasses the historical inheritance (or patterns) as the starting point of human activity, in which individuals act and reason. Traditions are sets of understandings an actor receives during socialization. (Wehner and Thies 2014, 6)

Their approach is ego-centred, exploring the bounded agency of foreign policy actors to interpret and re-interpret inherited foreign policy traditions that provide role scripts and patterns of past behaviour that actors are likely to orient along or against.

The concept of dilemma adds to their approach an element that can engender and explain gradual role change. Wehner and Thies note (2014, 7):
Whenever a new belief, idea, or practice emerges through the interaction of agents situated within an existing tradition and the new repertoire stands in opposition, then it tends to exert pressure on the agents to either accommodate the new belief into the tradition or to adopt a more radical posture of reforming the tradition. In either case, change takes place as the existing tradition evolves to incorporate a new idea.

They suggest that dilemmas and change are constant, given actors' agency. They propose that when actors face dilemmas and role conflicts based on foreign policy traditions and when new ideas emerge, national roles are likely to change or be adapted. The authors argue that a focus on traditions and dilemmas is a good way to explore domestic contestation over the national role.

Wehner and Thies' (2014) import of foreign policy traditions and dilemma to role theory draws the two fields of role socialisation and domestic role contestation together. They emphasise that ideas and, in particular, new ideas can shape how domestic actors view the national role in a given situation and they suggest that there are various and competing domestic voices over what this role ought to be. The authors also note the presence of 'liberal', 'socialist' and other traditions.

Parties may be some of these competing voices engaging with old and new ideas of how the state ought to act and adapt to new ideas and contexts. Moreover, this chapter will suggest that foreign policy traditions are not necessarily ideologies but that some can be traced to ideological families. In this thesis, foreign policy traditions are part of a wider category of political traditions that can build on other concepts and individual legacies. Necessarily, such traditions include views about the domestic and international society based on ideologies, as defined in this chapter.

**International norms**

Some role theorists also focus on the impact of international norms. In a study devoted to the impact of embeddedness in multiple institutions, each with their own norms, rules and principles, Barnett (1993) shows how states can be exposed to multiple and diverse role expectations and demands. While his study does not incorporate the domestic level, it raises awareness of competing role pressures, role conflict and effects that such competing institutions can have on role performance or state behaviour in general. More recently, Hansel and Möller (2015) demonstrate that the emergence of norms can intensify intra- and inter-role conflict. Focusing on India, they show that norms, such as R2P, can stress role conflict. While the non-use of force
dimension of R2P resonated with Indian role conceptions, such as the developing nation role, the force dimension clashed with long-held views that interventions serve selfish interests, reframe state sovereignty and pose a threat to equality between states in the international system.

**Domestic ideas and ideologies**

The proposition in this thesis is that role expectations and demands also emanate from the domestic level where party competition and public opinion can put pressure on decision-makers. Only rarely does role theory focus on domestic actors and ideas pay attention to parties, as described above. Most studies combining a roles and ideas approach are on the UK’s foreign policy (e.g. McCourt 2013, 2011a, 2011b; Gaskarth 2014). Mostly focused on leaders, it hints at parties as carriers of ideas and foreign policy actors. Gaskarth (2016) shows that New Labour’s 2003 Iraq invasion changed the parameters of foreign policy decision-making and led to increased vertical role contestation that led to more horizontal role contestation in parliament between MPs and within some parties. His study also indirectly focuses on international norms. He demonstrates that ideas of humanitarian military intervention resonated with elites in the UK, such as that of a human rights defender, but that the negative experience of interventions saw the public emerge as relevant other to elites’ role conceptions.

In sum, taken together, role theory research on traditions and dilemmas, international norms, and, indirectly, on parties and ideologies is promising. This thesis contributes a study of parties and focuses on ideologies and international norms as ideational factors interacting with foreign policy traditions and influencing parties’ role socialisation, selection and potentially domestic role contestation. Image 2.1. illustrates this ‘ideational triangle’. This thesis does not make a judgement on which ideational layer came first. Hence, there are no arrows in the image. I propose that these ideas influence and reinforce each other. A party selects a national role appropriate to a certain situation and event from possible and plausible national roles for their state. A party’s ideology in tandem with international norms providing more precise rules on how to act in the type of situation influence role selection and the way in which a foreign policy tradition is adapted to the present situation and contemporary context. The role selection and role performance of a governing party or coalition of parties then become part of the tradition repertoire for future situations and role selections.
2. International norms, local actors and contestation

Research on international norms increased with the emergence of Constructivist approaches in IR in the late 1980s and 1990s, focused on the social construction of international relations, intersubjective meanings and identity (e.g. Kratochwil 1989; Wendt 1992; Checkel 1999). International norms are included in this theoretical framework because of the existence of such norms on the legitimate use of force and given the explicit reference to the R2P norm in UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) mandating the implementation of a no-fly zone in Libya.

International norms are shared ideas about appropriate behaviour. They can be codified in law (Legro 1997) In the current international legal system, it is illegal to interfere in another state’s internal affairs, wage war or otherwise use force against another state, unless authorised by UN Charter chapter VII provisions, i.e. in the case of confirmed threats to or breaches of international peace, or in self-defence. This order is based on the concept of state sovereignty building on and guaranteed by the principle of non-interference (United Nations 1945, 3, Chapter I, Article 2.4 and 2.7). In IR, ‘international norms’ include non-legal norms. In the current system, a widely held view is that it is legitimate, as opposed to strictly legal, to militarily interfere in

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4 International norms, hereafter, designate non-legal norms, unless otherwise stated.
another state under certain circumstances and under certain conditions (Kennedy 2006). R2P and humanitarian intervention are not international law.

The international normative evolution is the subject of norm life cycle research. Finnemore and Sikkink trace how international norms emerge, spread, cascade and become taken for granted. These ideas do not emerge by themselves or in a vacuum. So-called norm-entrepreneurs actively construct new frames through which to view an issue. Successful international norms resonate or are made to resonate with domestic norms. Thus, as part of the norm life cycle process, old norms are challenged. New norms can provide new understandings (e.g. Legro 1997; Panke and Petersohn 2012) and once taken for granted norms can also regress (McKeown 2009; Barnes 2016; Birdsall 2016). The norm life cycle demonstrates that for novel ways of addressing an issue to become a shared understanding, other norms have to be actively contested and challenged. It points to the local contingency of such norms.

2.1. Norm contestation and domestic actors

Acharya (2004, 2011) demonstrates that international norms are not simply adopted. Sometimes they are rejected, despite the work of norm-entrepreneurs, challenging existing norms and pointing to dilemmas. He argues that this is the case when local actors perceive these new norms as imposed by powerful states and in conflict with older norms. In other cases, domestic actors actively adapt new norms to fit with domestically held and accepted ones (Acharya 2004; Vieira 2013). This process can lead to the reconstruction of international norms intermeshed with local ideas. This can lead to variations in norm interpretation and implementation that is traceable to domestic norms (e.g. Cortell and Davis 2005; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007).

The rejection of international norms points to the agency to resist and contest norms. It raises the question of which international norms are pushed and by whom. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) observe that what motivates norm entrepreneurs is a strong sense of ‘appropriateness’, driven by empathy, altruism and ideational commitment. In their discussion of humanitarian military intervention, they suggest that an intrinsic quality marks successful international norms. While it is important to unpack states and institutions to look at the individual and domestic level to analyse norm success and failure, the focus on righteous individuals conceals the interests and power of those promoting international norms. Nadelmann (1990) argues that while
promoted norms reflect promoters’ beliefs, they also ‘[…] tend to reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant members of international society.’ (1990, 480)

The adaptation of international norms points to the importance of interpretation. Wiener (2009) argues that the meaning of norms is particularly contested situations when additional pressure to apply the norm is applied. The meaning of international norms is essentially prone to conflict and contestation. She notes: ‘[…] while a norm such as human rights may be agreeable within an international negotiating setting, […] the actual meaning of this norm may differ in the actual contexts of norm implementation.’ (2009, 117)

Resistance to and the essential contestability of international norms raise the stakes for domestic actors. It encourages closer scrutiny of domestic actors’ engagement with international norms. While much of the pertinent literature focuses on local actors in states resisting new norms, this thesis takes a closer look at domestic engagement by parties in two powerful states. This follows recent foreign policy research on domestic contestation over international norms when coalition parties disagree (Kaarbo 2017; Brazys, Kaarbo, and Panke 2017).

2.2. Norms on the use of force: R2P and humanitarian intervention

Interferences in other states have de facto always taken place and interventions with a humanitarian rationale can be traced across the centuries (e.g. Jahn 2012). It is the conditions under which such interventions are considered legitimate and permissible that changed (e.g. Finnemore 1996). Humanitarian military intervention became popular in the 1980s and 1990s. R2P is the most recent evolution of such intervention. It was a response to experiences. It transformed what some perceived as a non-legal right into a non-binding responsibility. It was a compromise between states who wanted to do something to end violence and other states’ unease with intervention and continued criticism of selectivity and power politics. (Doyle 2011; Welsh 2011)

R2P is broader than humanitarian intervention. It includes preventive and reconstruction elements. It is also more precise. The first responsibility is a state’s vis-à-vis its own population (pillar 1). A state can also call upon the so-called international community for help (pillar 2). As last resort the international community is implicated
R2P identifies four crimes: war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide and crimes against humanity, and conditions collective action on a UN mandate.

The strength of this international norm is evident in the process of local adaptation underway in some sceptical states. States upon which R2P casts a role expectation, given regional status, global ambitions and more powerful states' pressures, engage in R2P reinterpretation. In 2011, shortly after abstaining on UNSC resolution 1973 as a non-permanent Security Council member, Brazil proposed the 'responsibility while protecting'. China has since come up with 'responsible protection'. Meanwhile, India and Russia contest the concept (Job 2016; Stuenkel 2016; Tourinho, Stuenkel, and Brockmeier 2016; Prantl and Nakano 2011; Liu and Zhang 2014; Garwood-Gowers 2012, 2016; Kurtz 2014; Aneja 2014; Kurowska 2014). Thus, R2P still sets the agenda and frames the debate on intervention, despite controversy over its implementation in Libya and the failure to in Syria, making it a powerful and relevant norm.

2.3. The contestation of R2P (and humanitarian intervention)

R2P remains contested because it challenges an existing international norm and a traditional interpretation of international law. It reframes state sovereignty as responsibility and, instead of replacing sovereignty, it reframes state sovereignty as conditional (Deng 1996). Pillar 3 involves a violation of a central building block of the current international legal system and order. It instigates a clash of norms.

Another challenge concerns the action-inaction dichotomy on which humanitarian intervention and R2P are often premised. Orford (2003) argues that the international community is active in most regions prior to crises. She observes that it is often involved and ‘[...] is already profoundly engaged in shaping the structure of political, social, economic and cultural life in many states [...]’ (2003, 17, also 1999)

Moreover, R2P and humanitarian intervention critics contest the proposition that they mark progress. Jahn (2012) argues that this implies the conviction that this type of intervention is morally right. She contends that the success of the concept is due, in part, to a gradual separation of politics and morality and the construction of a tension between them. Humanitarian military intervention is framed as overcoming a violent,  

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3 As this thesis is concerned with R2P as invoked in UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) and implemented in Libya, R2P henceforth designates pillar 3 and the use of force for humanitarian reasons, unless otherwise indicated
immoral past in which politics trumped morality. Jahn (2012) argues that morality and politics cannot be separated, because morality is the basis of all politics.

In sum, R2P is contestable and political. This relates the practice of humanitarian military intervention back to questions of power and structural injustices that norm contestation scholarship raises. The contestation of such norms also calls for a closer look at the domestic political level, criticism and opposition to international norms and political frameworks underpinning the promotion of such norms. Parties are likely to engage with international norms, as domestic foreign policy actors and carriers of ideas.

3. Political ideologies

Research on ideologies as constitutive and instrumental. The key ideology theorist Freeden (1996, 2008) defines ideologies as constructed views of the world upon which individuals and groups act. They constitute patterns that organise ideas and political concepts into systems of thinking. They are reflections, mediations of the nature and structure of society. Ideologies do not emerge out of a vacuum. They are themselves products or further developments of ideologies.

Ideologies are constructions of reality, describing a view of the world. They are functional, simplifying, ordering and legitimising existing orders and/or actions. They are conscious and unconscious ways of managing plurality of ideas in human society, providing a common language and a shared lens through which to view and interpret reality. Ideologies are by definition social, relational, intersubjective understandings and views of the world, shared by groups. (Heywood 2003; MacKenzie 2003; Freeden 2008; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009)

Some Marxists, liberals and conservatives denounce ideology and claim the possibility of its absence. Some Marxists portray ideology pejoratively as imposition of consciousness by the dominant class on the subordinate one. Some liberals and conservatives denounce the term in order to denigrate political opponents and their ideas, while portraying themselves and their own propositions as non-ideological and common sense pragmatism. (Freeden 2013; MacKenzie 2003)

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6 Political ideologies are thereafter only referred to as ideology/ideologies, there are no other ideologies in the definition used in this thesis.
I take a neutral view of ideology, as neither good nor bad. In a study variation between parties and challenges assumptions of role consensus, it is useful to investigate ideologies in foreign policy stances. The claim is not that the researcher can stand outside looking in, identifying and analysing ideas. The aim is to identify ideological markers in parties' national role statements. This is not to imply that only parties have such markers in their national role interpretations. The next sections define ideology by breaking it down to operationalise it.

3.1. The morphological approach

In his theorisation of ideologies, Freeden provides a conceptualisation of ideologies that permits to study them beyond temporal change and cultural, national aspects. He proposes to look at the morphology of ideologies, as MacKenzie (2003, 10) notes:

> Morphology refers to the study of form and structure and it is Freeden's contention that the study of ideologies must address ways in which ideologies are structured by the linkages between the concepts that make up any particular ideology.

Freeden (2008) suggests that the study of morphology is a way to focus on the changes and differences within ideologies. There are a variety of combinations of concepts. They are not necessarily exclusive to one ideology. Freeden observes that the compatibility of concepts with each other depends on how they are interpreted and, thus, on the structure different concepts form with each other and the meanings attached to them. This means that the identification of a political concept does not, in itself, identify a particular ideology. How concepts relate to each other and what meanings adherents attach to them delineates membership of an ideological family. These relations between concepts and meanings are contingent on time and place.

Such concepts can be found in Rathbun's (2004) operationalisation of ideology for his study of parties and military intervention. He identifies values and describes a fundamental 'value' conflict that leads to the dilemmas parties face. He proposes: '[...] a theory of partisan preferences based on three foreign policy continua that can be traced to the fundamental values of equality and liberty.' (2004, 19) In political science, 'values' are often referenced. However, it is difficult to pin down a satisfactory definition of values, as van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) demonstrate. Given, also, the normative dimension of values, as a desirable and 'valued', I prefer the term 'concept' when describing ideologies. An actor's concept selection implies that he/she values it.
Freeden (2013) proposes that each ideology is made up of distinctive combinations of political concepts. He suggests to view ideologies as fluid rather than contained by strict boundaries or totalising. He analyses ideologies as structures along two axes. The first axis consists of the concepts and their micro-components and what he calls ‘macro-conceptual concatenation’, better explained as which concepts connect to each other in the ideology under scrutiny. The second axis (image 2.2) runs between core, adjacent and peripheral concepts within an ideology.

**Image 2.3. The morphological approach**

Freeden (2013, 124–25) notes:

> The relationships among concepts are decisive here: the relative positioning of concepts is not set in stone and will fluctuate [...]. The notion of core concept signals its long-term durability [...] and suggests that the concept is present in all known cases of the ideology in question.

Adjacent concepts refine the meaning of the ideological sub-variant, providing different directions within ideological families sometimes perceived as contradictory. They temporally impart shared meaning. Peripheral concepts provide time and space contingency, i.e. they are contextual and explain cultural variants of ideologies.

The advantage of Freeden’s morphological approach to ideologies is its usefulness for deconstructing ideologies. Rather than assuming that all parties share an ideology based on their use of the same concepts; identifying core, adjacent and peripheral concepts helps differentiate between similar statements.
3.2. Ideology contestation and deconstestation

Ideologies and their component concepts are contestable, contested and subject to change. Freeden (2008, 4) notes that the ‘[…] indeterminate range [of ideologies] is the product of the essential contestability of political concepts, and essential contestability provides the manifold flexibility out of which ideological families and their sub-variants are constructed.’ This inherent contestability of concepts explains the diversity within ideological families, such as conservatism or liberalism, over time and across space. It points to human agency in concept re-interpretation and the development of ideologies across time and their variation between countries.

It is a marker of ideological deconstestation to claim that an ideology does not exist. Freeden defines it as ideological deconstestation when a viewpoint becomes so shared that it is taken for granted and accepted as common sense on an issue. He notes that such deconstestation is temporary because ideologies remain essentially contestable: ‘[e]ven the micro-level complete agreement on the meaning of a concept does not eliminate its principled and potential contestability; it merely points to the intellectual emotional force of the deconstestation […].’ (Freeden 2013, 124)

For this thesis, the morphological approach helps differentiate between similar expressions of ideas in national role statements. It brings forms and changes within ideologies into relief and delineates the different levels of priority of concepts within one ideological sub-variant. It allows carving out of the difference where statements resemble each other and point to identical ideological underpinnings by reference to the same concepts. It also permits to trace ideological contestation and deconstestation.

There is relatively little research on ideologies’ international dimension (e.g. Martill 2017; Farneti 2012; Soborski 2012). However, ideology is sometimes referred to as variable in foreign policy studies. The next section returns to military intervention. It also discusses the ideological basis of the international normative context.

3.2. Military intervention and ideology

Rathbun (2004) demonstrates that parties’ stances on military intervention are shaped by definitions of the national interest which, in turn, are based on ideologies, and on political concepts. He argues that humanitarian military intervention creates dilemmas. He proposes that the central concepts on which parties’ positions differ in substance or in order of importance are those of equality and liberty. According to him
the left is more egalitarian and the right is less active on equality. Liberty is more complex with the right positioning differently in different spheres (e.g. social versus economic ones) and given views on liberty affect how state sovereignty is defined and positions on multilateralism. Rathbun argues that two central foreign policy tensions are on whether the national interest is seen as inclusive (across borders) or exclusive, and whether the use of force is acceptable. A third tension is the preferences of unilateralism or multilateralism. These tensions lead parties to being more or less likely to be in favour or against intervention. Rathbun contends that ideological positioning on intervention is based on the concepts of equality and liberty. His operationalisation of ideology for his study aligns with the morphological approach above, as he recognises that the concepts of equality and liberty can take different meanings and priorities. Without using the morphological approach, he demonstrates that for some parties the core concept appears to be liberty and that equality becomes one of several adjacent concepts, while for others equality is the core concept and liberty a qualifying concept. One weakness of the study is the claim that humanitarian military intervention exists and the neglect of the international normative context.

This international normative context is marked by the success of liberal ideology. Liberalism’s core concept is liberty/freedom and the individual; ‘[…] at the heart […] a fundamental commitment to the importance of individual freedom and to the principles of individualism.’ (Heywood 2003, 18) For the international system, liberal theories posit in various forms that rules and cooperation through trade and institutions form the basis for peace. More, liberals argue that the spread of democracy reduces the threat of war as democracies do not fight each other (e.g. Doyle 1986).

The practice of humanitarian military intervention and the norm of R2P build on liberal ideas. Debates in IR include liberal interventionism (e.g. Clark and Reus-Smit 2013), liberal humanitarianism and internationalism (e.g. Wheeler 1997) and liberal peace-building (e.g. Richmond 2007; Paris 2010; Campbell, Chandler, and Sabararnam 2011). Liberal ideas underpin the contemporary approaches to conflict.

**Ideological contestation or decontestation?**

Liberalism’s core concept of liberty is present in other ideologies and/or their sub-variants. Claiming that R2P, humanitarian military intervention or ethical foreign policy are liberal does not mean that only liberal parties support or accept intervention as necessary. As Rathbun’s (2004) study illustrates some left-wing
parties support humanitarian military intervention and propagate an 'ethical' form of foreign policy. Studies of UK foreign policy show that support for such foreign policy enterprises can be found on the left and on the right. Some social democratic, green and neo-conservative parties support ethical foreign policy and humanitarian military interventions. Moreover, the qualifier *liberal* indicates that there are other approaches to internationalism, humanitarianism, peacebuilding and intervention. In his analysis of different positions underlying intra-party debates on the international, Sylvest (2004) shows that there was more than one internationalism in the UK Labour Party in the past, denoting a pragmatist and the idealist approach to internationalism.

This section's purpose was to show a connection between international norms and ideologies. Part 4 returns to role theory. It maps the overlap between national roles, international norms and ideologies and closes this chapter with the link between these three kinds of literature.

4. **Role theory, international norms and ideology**

Having reviewed role theory, international norms and a useful approach to ideology and their international dimension, I now turn to the overlap between national roles, international norms and ideologies. Part 4 refines the theoretical lens of this thesis. The aim is to demonstrate that it is time that role theory explores parties’ national role statements because of functions, operation at different levels of analysis (domestic mass-elite-international) and as carriers of ideas.

4.1. **Ideas about appropriate behaviour**

International norms, ideologies and national role conceptions are ideas about appropriate behaviour. National role conceptions define the actors’ ideas about the appropriate behaviour of their state in the international realm. As was discussed (image 2.1), material and ideational factors influence ego’s national role conceptions, including worldviews and international norms/rules. These materialise as alter-role pressures. Moreover, foreign policy traditions also shape actors’ role conceptions.

International norms are ideas about the behaviour appropriate for states or categories of states in international relations. They are more general than national role conceptions. Some norms create particular pressures on some categories of states. R2P can in practice only be enacted by states that have the material capacities and political will to do so, while in principle postulating a responsibility for all states. R2P
creates a role expectation towards states who can implement it and may wish alter-role recognition by assuming responsibility.

Ideologies are ideas about how society works and ought to work. They include and inform organised action, similar to national role conceptions and international norms. Unlike these two, ideologies are not restricted to state behaviour, i.e. acting in accordance with shared ideas about appropriate behaviour of states and/or a particular state. Yet, most ideologies are not limited to views of domestic society either. They are world-views, i.e. reasoning about the nature of international society, the working of the current international systems and how it could and ought to function differently/ideally. They contain ideas about what creates conflict and how conflict can be resolved or managed.

The closeness of international norms and ideology is apparent when considering R2P and other humanitarian intervention norms. I assume that international norms build on ideologies and the concepts they are composed of. Thus, ideologies can be traced in international norms. Variants of liberalism, such as liberal interventionism, underpin R2P and humanitarian intervention.

**4.2. Role contestation, contested norms and decontested ideologies**

National role conceptions, international norms and ideologies are also inherently contestable and contested. The theoretical discussion of this chapter revealed this contestability and actors' bounded agency in interpreting and re-imagining national role conceptions, international norms and ideologies.

National role conceptions are views about states' social positions in the system. It was stressed that role conflict is inherent and can lead to the domestic contestation of national roles. Similarly, it was emphasised that international norms emerge out of an evolving ideational context in which notions about the appropriate behaviour change when new contradictions become apparent or new contexts make new rules necessary. The contingency of international norms and the variation across space make them contestable and contested. Finally, the number of variants and possible variations of ideologies also makes them contestable across time and space. Role theory and a focus on national roles may, thus, also be a way of looking at the domestic contestation of international norms and of ideologies.
The discussion on ideologies also added the notion of decontestation, i.e. when an idea becomes so accepted or common sense that it is - temporarily - no longer contested. Added to national role conceptions and international norms, it suggests that when inherently contestable phenomena appear to no longer be contested and become accepted we could speak of decontested national roles and decontested international norms. The identification of such decontestation does not mean consensus but rather points to the dominance of one ideology over all other ways of framing narratives about reality and how it should look like.

4.3. Parties: role conceptions, international norms and ideologies

The domestic level of analysis and parties are the third component that draws national role conceptions, international norms and ideologies together. In this chapter, I sought to carve out that relevance of the domestic sphere and parties. They have agency in how they interpret national role conceptions, engage with international norms and combine ideological components. They can adopt, adapt and reject ideas, and may identify dilemmas in and between foreign policy traditions, international norms and ideologies. Parties can be domestic national role holders, international norm entrepreneurs and are organised around and driven by ideologies.

Conclusion

Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework. It introduced role theory, role socialisation and domestic role contestation. It proposed that parties are still largely missing in these role theory fields. It was further noted that this thesis builds on the existing research on ideational sources of role socialisation and role contestation and the (indirect) inclusion of parties in analyses. The second and third part of this chapter introduced to international norms and ideologies, based on the focus on Libya and parties, respectively. Part 4 closed this chapter with a brief overview of the overlap between national roles, international norms and ideologies. It suggested that these triple ideas about appropriate behaviour are usefully combined in this theoretical framework to study role consensus, contestation and potential decontestation.

Based on chapter 1 and chapter 2, this thesis expects that different parties in one polity will express different national roles and/or have different role priorities and that they will contest national roles. The expectation is to find evidence for the challenge to elite role consensus. This builds on parties having different views on foreign policy. The expectation is, further, founded on the assumption that the state is instrumental for
parties to act out their ideas about foreign policy. In an international system based on states, parties have to funnel ideas through the state as the principal actor in the international system. Parties formulate objectives, priorities and strategies for their state. Roles are the operational side of these ideas.

There is a caveat to this expectation, some research also suggests that differences on military intervention do not always exist. Thus, it is possible that I will not find evidence for variation in parties' national role statements. There may be agreement on a role and/or its interpretation across parties. This possibility is anticipated. Yet, based on the norm life cycle and the discussion on ideological decontestation, any significant absence of variation and/or contestation will be subject to added scrutiny.

The next chapter is the research design for this theoretical framework. It introduces the interpretative methodology and closes with the case selection and background.
Chapter 3: Methodology and research design

The previous two chapters introduced the thesis, located it in existing scholarship and developed the theoretical framework. The thesis proposed to study parties’ foreign policy using role theory combined with a focus on ideas. Chapter 2 carved out the overlap between role conceptions, traditions, international norms and ideologies.

This chapter discusses the methodology. It proposes an interpretive approach. The aim is to identify parties’ foreign policy narratives and national role statements. The argument is that using content analysis is best suited for this goal. It helps to carve out plausible evidence of ideas about states’ appropriate behaviour and points to the sources of parties’ national role socialisation, interpretation and contestation. The methodology and research design build on existing role theory studies. The aim is also to contribute to the systematisation of the role theory toolkit. Thus, it also addresses the criticism that role theory is methodologically poor which scholars continue to point out as a challenge for role theorists to tackle (Breuning 2011; Thies 2013).

The chapter proceeds as follows. Part 1 discusses the interpretive methodology. It reflects on ontological assumptions and epistemological challenges of studying the actor ‘party’ and of analysing ideas. It points out caveats. Part 2 presents the research strategy and design: data types and generation methods and the methods of analysis. Part 3 is the case selection.

1. Methodology, ontology and epistemology

Many role theorists use methodologies by which they identify roles verbatim from actors’ self-definitions or from the occurrence of key vocabulary linked to a role. They follow, add to and refine existing typologies. Some role theorists employ interpretive methodologies (e.g. Wehner and Thies 2014; Teles Fazendeiro 2016; Shih 2012; H. Müller 2011; Maull 2011; Wolf 2011). This thesis uses an interpretive methodology to identify national role conceptions in parties’ foreign policy narratives.

1.1. Interpretive methodology and narrative research

The selection of an interpretive methodology was made in recognition of the focus on parties as foreign policy actors and on national role statements in narratives. The aim is to show that political elites do not necessarily agree on national roles and national
role conceptions. Interpretive approaches are concerned with actors’ interpretations. Hence, this actor-focused methodology appeared suitable.

An interpretive approach is suitable because it assumes the importance of ideational contexts. Interpretive approaches recognise that the meaning of words, situations and events are subjective and contextual. While interpretive scholars assume actors reproduce meanings and structural constraints, they also acknowledge that individuals are not passive receivers of ideas; people can modify and change inherited norms and language. Yet, actors have this agency within contexts and contingencies; their agency is situated and their rationality is bounded. (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012) Parties’ context is formed by the international and domestic, party-systemic and party-internal/historical contexts. Parties’ agency is embedded in complex contexts and multiple contingencies affect it.

Foreign policy researchers have used interpretive approaches, building on Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2008) for some time (Bevir, Daddow, and Hall 2013; Bevir and Daddow 2015). Interpretive approaches are also increasingly employed by role theorists (e.g. Wehner 2018; Teles Fazendeiro 2016; Wehner and Thies 2014; Shih 2012; H. Müller 2011; Wolf 2011). Wehner and Thies (2014) note that an interpretive approach introduces a focus on and the conceptualisation of beliefs, traditions and dilemmas. The authors posit that these concepts are useful tools for the identification of domestic role contestation. Foreign policy beliefs and traditions are similar but different to ideologies. Foreign policy beliefs are assumptions about how foreign policy in general and specifically related to the state in question. Foreign policy traditions are views on and lessons learnt from past foreign policy decision-making and outcomes. They are often associated with individuals or key events. They can be a role scripts source and can introduce path dependency and alter- and ego-role expectations toward a state's international relations. Previously held and/or shared beliefs and practised traditions can become viewed as dilemmas and challenged by new ideas. This can induce role contestation and lead to role change. (Wehner and Thies 2014)

**Foreign policy narratives**

Narrative analysis is an increasingly popular method in politics and IR research. The use of narrative analysis often happens in parallel and frequently in tandem with the use of interpretive methodologies in foreign policy research and role theory studies. The interest in parties’ interpretation of national roles, the meaning parties attach to
them and in the ideas underlying their role selection, interpretation and contestation justify a focus on parties' narratives. Narratives are the level of analysis. It is within narratives that I look for the expression of national roles and their contestation.

The following discussion engages with the existing research narratives in IR and FPA to situate the thesis in the growing field. Narratives are accounts of events, phenomena or situations (Suganami 1999). IR scholars using narratives argue that they are fundamental to human experience and explanations, building on narratology and narrative analysis in other fields (Suganami 1990, 1997b, 1997a, 1999, 2008; Spencer 2016; Oppermann and Spencer 2016, 2018a, 2018b). Storytelling is a process of making sense to self and to others. Narratives are part of everyday life. They are not only told retrospectively; they constitute how humans experience and understand the present situation, and provide the basis for action. (Browning 2008) Narratives are central to causal reasoning and play a key role in the human cognitive activity. Through them, the human brain captures, organises and breaks down complexity. (Webster and Mertova 2007; Browning 2008; Subotić 2015; Oppermann and Spencer 2016, 2018a) Humans tell different stories about the same event or situation, and causes. Thus, a focus on narratives can only half explain causes; it gets at how humans construct meaning from what they know and judge relevant.

I use Wehner and Thies' (2014) definition of foreign policy narratives. This definition speaks to the above conceptualisation of narratives. Its selection is also in recognition of the authors' efforts to adapt interpretive methodology and to stress the importance of narratives for role theory. Wehner and Thies (2014, 11) define narratives as:

[...] the beliefs and stories told by actors to comprehend and frame the world in which they interact. They provide the background for elites to construct worldviews in foreign policy [...] Narratives are thus understood as strategies constructed by political agents that speak on behalf of the state, in internal and external relations, to frame and cast roles and achieve specific goals and interests.

Narratives are structured; they are composed of building blocks for making sense of causes. Suganami (1997b) notes that they require background, and the triangle (1999) of coincidence, process (structure) and responses to these factors by key individuals (agency). The presence of these elements shape narratives but also means that narratives on an event tend to resemble each other, with some room for interpretation and difference on who engaged when, how and why, and to what effect. Oppermann and Spencer (2018a, 2018b, 2016) suggest that narratives are made up of and sit at
the overlap between setting, characterisation and emplotment and that these key elements are what foreign policy decision-makers and commentators contest. Thus, analysing narratives can proceed through the identification of background or setting, processes and chance occurrences that engender or accelerate a situation and key individuals. The way in which these elements combine begins to explain cause and effects for the individuals involved and/or observing. This means identifying how parties narrated the 2011 Arab uprisings and the Libyan conflict can reveal what parties perceived as the causes and how they reasoned about their states' roles.

The centrality of narratives and the selected definition raise the question of whether they are conscious strategies or not, and whether this matters. A number of scholars studying narratives in IR and FPA argue that there are 'strategic' narratives (e.g. Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Schmitt 2018). Actors use narratives with a purpose and to an effect. Suffice it to say here that it does not here if parties' narratives were strategically selected. It is assumed that parties are rational actors, but that they are situated and their rationality bounded. This means that it is possible that the stories they told were crafted and strategically deployed. However, it is also assumed that parties' narration happened within the range of possibilities for each of them. Finally, it is assumed that rationality does not preclude principled views.

Narratives are related to discourses which have also been used in IR (e.g. Milliken 1999; Hansen 2006; van de Wetering 2016). However, narratives are distinct. Oppermann and Spencer (2018a, 2018b, 2016) reason that narrative analysis is used to explore discursive constructions. They suggest that it is a specific form of discourse analysis. They propose that narratives socially construct foreign policy phenomena. Via narrative analysis, the discursive contestation of such constructions can be traced. Thus, Oppermann and Spencer relate discourse and narrative. Similarly, I view discourse as narrower than narrative. At the same time, a narrative is more concretely concerned with telling a particular situation or event. Discourse is a system or pattern of thinking about an issue. Discourse analysis often focuses on how language creates and influences how we understand the world. It also focuses on practices and patterns, and the social structure formed by them. (Hyland 2013) Critical discourse analysts examine the use of language in relation to social and political issues and explore the links between the use of language and its context. The assumptions include that discourses construct and reflect these issues; it negotiates and performs power relations; it reflects and reproduces social relations, and its use reproduces and
reflects ideologies. The aims of critical discourse analysts include making of links between practices and values apparent. (Wodak and Fairclough 2009; Paltridge 2013)

In sum, the focus of discourse analysis is less on the story told and more on how it is told and what patterns this reveals.

The recent use by role theorists of narrative analysis has shown that a focus on the utterances and the sense-making of foreign policy actors’ can reveal ideas underlying and evolving in national role conceptions. Wehner and Thies (2014) illustrate how new ideas can rise from the domestic context when long-held and widely shared interpretations of history become challenged. They note that such ideas can also emerge from the international level challenging foreign policy traditions. Domestic foreign policy actors can pick up these new ideas. This can lead to domestic role contestation and even role change. More recently, Wehner (2018) refined the use of narrative analysis and interpretive methodology for role theory. He suggests that a focus on ruling narratives of foreign policy elites permits the tracing of how these actors understand the present and constantly reinterpret the past in light of dilemmas that emerge from domestic and international contextual changes that challenge established foreign policy traditions. This thesis adds to this a closer examination of horizontal variation on these processes of narration and reinterpretation. It assumes that not all foreign policy relevant actors agree on the interpretation of a dominant foreign policy tradition in the first place, nor view new ideas and evolving contexts in the same light, due to other ideational differences.

In sum, I focus on the stories parties – their representatives – tell about conflict and intervention in Libya. The assumption is that these narratives can reveal how parties make sense of events, i.e. how conflict emerges, escalates and can be resolved. It is further assumed that embedded in these stories are role(s) their state played, can play and ought to play, as part of reasoning about cause and effect. It is in parties’ narratives that national roles can be identified, and variation in interpretation and the ideas underlying it can be studied. Thus, a focus on national roles in narratives can improve understanding of how role socialisation can vary among elites. This can improve our understanding of the roots of domestic role contestation.

The unit of analysis is national role statements in parties’ foreign policy narratives. The narrative method is used to identify national role statements within reasoning on
conflict and intervention, and within ideational context(s). It is within narratives that ideas about appropriate behaviour become meaningful.

An interpretive approach and narrative analysis focused the stories of the 2011 events parties told, seeking to identify national role expressions embedded in these narratives, requires a reflection on ontology and on the epistemological challenges the interest in interpretations and ideas pose. Taking statements seriously poses problems because of the domestic political role parties play and the various (rational) strategies they may employ to win elections and/or hold on to positions of power. Moreover, ideas are slippery, seeking to pin them down can seem ephemeral and can pose problems to generalisability and reconstruction of research.

1.2. Ontology and epistemology: reflections and caveats

Underlying this thesis’ interpretive methodology is the assumption that reality cannot be known unmediated and that social actors interpret it and construct a narrative about it to make sense of it. This is not to argue that there is no material world and reality outside the human mind or the rejection of objectivity and embrace of absolute relativity. Rather, it is to suggest that the physical world cannot be known unmediated through language and the concepts it provides. This assumption implies that the researcher cannot study the social world from outside it. Just as the subject of my enquiry, I am situated. While uncovering other actors’ interpretations the choice of subject and line of enquiry are already shaped by who I am, my assumption about human nature and society, and so are the results. The point is to recognise this embeddedness and reflect upon it and its inevitable effects on the subject and process of my research, because it is impossible to escape it (e.g. Lynch 2008). Being transparent and making this reflection explicit helps to reconstruct the research process and trace the reasoning behind the analysis. The assumption that reality is constructed does not mean it cannot be studied. If positivists assume that the social world can be studied like an abstract phenomenon, this thesis is based on the recognition that reality can be studied but not without a form of bias.

The main ontological and epistemological challenges are addressed below. The concluding chapter provides reflection on my personal subjectivity.


**Studying ideas**

This thesis' subject of inquiry leads to several epistemological challenges of which the three main ones will be addressed hereafter. The first concerns how to study ideas and make inferences from them. This conundrum can be illustrated using ideologies. Chapter 2 discussed that they, while shared by/in groups, take a number of forms and variants. Crucially, individuals interpret political concepts differently, even if similarly, if they share an approximate worldview. Patterns within individual parties and party families remain discernible in a form of family resemblance. Ideologies are also not closed and separate entities. They are social, inter-subjective, evolving and forming sub-families. Some separate ideological families are rooted in the same events or contexts. They took different forms, combining and interpreting political concepts differently and drawing different, sometimes nationally bound conclusions from them. For example, ideas of reform and progress influenced liberalism and socialism. Yet, socialists and liberals have different views on whether and how progress and reform can be achieved. Hence, it is not surprising that adherents of these two ideological families have similar value-systems and use comparable vocabulary. This makes studying ideas and making inferences from the presence of concepts complicated.

I take the position that words and political concepts are expressed within a context of their use: nationally, in the institutional setting of parliament and foreign policy decision-making, but also within the context of a party and its history of understanding of specific concepts. I assume that I can trace plausible meaning through an analysis of the use of words and concepts in relation to each other and based on knowledge of the specific context. I also assume that parties and their sympathisers share an approximate understanding of the meanings of particular words. This is because language is interpersonal and expressions are embedded in the same/similar environments. Where there were strong inter-party differences on the meanings of relevant concepts there will be traces of debate in the literature.

**Interpreting statements**

A second, related challenge is how to know what is in the minds of those speaking and acting for the party. It emerges from giving 'voice' to parties by studying their role expressions. There are two concerns in particular. For one, by analysing national role statements in narratives, I am interpreting others' interpretations of situations, events and concepts. This runs the risk of bias, as I select and focus on what appears relevant.
by having already framed the issue, even if based on my reading of an authoritative body of literature. This thesis is not an intellectual history, tracing interpretations to their original source. Instead, it makes inferences from traces in parties' role expressions. This is a challenge I seek to lessen by reflecting on my biases during the research process. I accept that studying ideas means plausibility rather than certainty.

Moreover, politicians, and by extension parties often stand accused of dishonesty, cynicism and stances calculated to gain votes. Their public statements may not reveal what is really in their minds and what really motivates a stance and action. I assume that emotive foreign policy issues, such as using force, can lead to less premeditated statements, more conscientious expressions and, in some cases, even opposition to party lines where possible, or silence, where impossible. Furthermore, parties' and those speaking on their behalf are likely to stay within acceptable party lines. Where this is not the case there may be notable intra-party contestation. Even if speakers do not believe what they say, this study assumes that statements reveal dominant and acceptable ways of thinking about the issue in the party and parts of the electorate. As Wehner and Thies (2014) note political actors cannot come up with random narratives. They draw on cultural registers to resonate with and convince an audience. However, dominant and acceptable does not mean everyone in a party agreed. Intra-party disagreement is likely, despite the existence of dominant views. Moreover, it is possible that there was little consultation within a party to come to an official party line or the statement put forward by key speakers during parliamentary debates and in press releases.

I do not pass judgement on honesty because the aim is not to ascertain if what was said at the time or during interviews was genuine. Instead, I take parties' statements seriously because they are indicative of an agreement on the acceptable.

**Identifying roles: interpretations, identity and policy**

The third epistemological challenge is how to know a role. What is the difference between national role statements and policy proposals? How are national roles to be distinguished from role performance, national identity and national interest? What is the distinction between roles and role conceptions?

There are analytical differences between roles and policy proposals. Roles are the link between identity and policy proposals, decisions and actions. (Breuning 2011) Thus,
policy proposals will contain role statements. Parties are likely to position on foreign policy and need the state as an actor to implement their ideas. Parties policy proposals contain role statements but are not roles or role interpretations themselves. Policy proposals are data sources in which roles can be identified and roles are the operationalisation of ideas on the international in policy proposals. In practice, this means that within a policy proposal, for example on military intervention in general or in a specific situation, we can identify role statements that give indications about how a party interprets this role by looking at the further content of the proposal.

There are analytical differences between national role, role conception and role performance/enactment. Roles are social positions, while role conceptions are the actors' own definition of a role. Role performance is action and behaviour with role prescriptions being norms and expectations. (Holsti 1970) Aggestam (1999) conceptualises national role as the bridge between perceptions of national identity and interests, and foreign policy behaviour. National roles base themselves on perceptions of identity. But, they are more concrete 'roadmaps' to decisions and actions. This distinction is important for understanding the differences and relationships between concepts that are related but analytically separate.

How to differentiate between a national role and a role interpretation in practice? This challenge relates to the position and agency of the researcher. Holsti categorised national roles that were already in existence and used by states. By their social and intersubjective nature, there is a shared understanding of a variety of roles and what they imply. A role conception is the policy makers' take on an already existing national role. It adapts a role to the state in question. Any (party) role statement, therefore, is a role conception, rather than the national role itself. National role interpretations are (ego) variations in the definition of the national role conceptions.

Fazendeiro (2016) notes the difficulty ascertaining and naming a national role. How can we know which role is being enacted from the way a state is acting? This naming process implies assumptions about which decision and actions are leader behaviour and, by extension, which are not. Fazendeiro observes that role ascriptions, by foreign policy actors and researchers, and the systematic generalisation it implies in practice can influence how actors understand themselves. Roles, role conceptions and role interpretations are part of the process of sense-making in human narratives. Fazendeiro argues that, while scholars and state actors use national roles to improve
the understanding of decision-making, roles also inherently generalise and over-
determine how actors understand themselves and others. Consequently, the
researcher, by ascribing national roles to actors' statements, partakes in the
construction of reality.

I take this challenge seriously. Scholars have ascribed master roles in the country
cases and foreign policy actors often repeat these same roles in their statements on
foreign policy. I cannot escape the challenge that by ascribing national roles, I partake
in the process of normalising meaning. However, the focus on parties, based on the
assumptions that they are role holders, socialised into roles and drivers of domestic
role contestation, is part of seeking to move beyond the role ascriptions that erase
domestic actors and differences.

**Caveats to studying parties and expecting contestation**

There are in-built limitations to this thesis. The need for focus required the black
boxing of *the party*. The aim to unpack the state and challenge an elite-consensus
assumption via parties runs the risk of portraying parties as unitary actors. It was also
decided to concentrate on one defining characteristic of parties: as carriers of ideas.

It is not the aim to argue that parties are homogenous and consensual entities. Party
research vividly demonstrates that there many types of parties and that they have
different internal processes and structures, within the same party system. The
influence of individual leaders, leadership groups and/or members varies
considerably. Programmatic processes differ. Moreover, parties are not internally
united on all policy issues. In political systems that encourage the formation of catch-
all parties, in two-party systems and those with inbuilt hurdles for the representation
of smaller parties in parliament, parties can consist of official and informal fractions
that can substantially differ on many issues, including foreign policy. Finally, parties
and party systems undergo changes. For example, in the case of France, the party
system changed across the entirety of the Fifth Republic with new parties emerging
and others being pushed to the margins. In Germany, the Green Party underwent an
internal struggle the 1990s between those accepting the use of force and those
rejecting in it on principle that still divides the party. Parties are not closed and unified
units that can easily be generalised about.
For the purpose of focus, parties are taken as the level of analysis. This research is not concerned with intra-party-level processes or the effects of party structures. I am interested in the traces of multi-level, diverging and persistent ideas in parties’ national role expressions. Thus the research traces role interpretations that are shared within a party. It is assumed that positions expressed in military intervention cases are not internal general programmatic debates per se. Those speaking on behalf of parties present positions agreed upon internally or at least shared and in accordance with party programmes and manifestos. In cases of competing views and role statements, these are expected to be reflected in the data. Where leaders have a strong voice in foreign policy, an agreement on positions is to be expected. Lack of access and/or party-discipline may at present prevent a closer look at possible intra-party differences in case of apparent absence of competing views. Given that I focus on an instance during the parliamentary calendar rather than an election campaign, I assume that calls for party unity may not have been strong and that where parties allow diverging positions these will be discernible.

To counter the possible criticism of black-boxing the party, disagreement is noted where discernible and individual voices were they stand out. Intra-party consensus on the state’s national role is unlikely. Moreover, party-internal role contestation between factions and individuals is a likely constant and part of role location processes within parties. This is true even if roles are temporarily pinned down in party documents and parliamentary debates. It is plausible that internal dynamics influence parties’ role conceptions and contestations (e.g. Hazan 2000).

A final, related reflexion is on the absence of role differences and/or contestation. What if parties do not express different national roles and role interpretations and/or do not contest the national role? What if there is no evidence for the influence of international norms and ideologies? The absence of such differences in the Libya case does not mean the absence in all other cases. Consensus on national roles and role interpretations also raises questions. Related, it is unlikely or, in my definition of ideology, impossible that role statements do not express a worldview. Given the diversity of parties, plausible intra-party differences and the variety of possible views on the issue of military intervention, it would be puzzling to find no variation at all between otherwise diverse parties. This would at least raise questions about the freedom to express inter- and intra-party different views and about a dominance of one narrative in public debate. It would suggest the existence of role decontestation.
This conceptualisation of no apparent disagreement on a national role may be more analytically useful than the claim of role consensus.

2. Research strategy and design

The research methods are guided by its focus and aims. Most role theory is qualitative research with some quantitative exceptions (Chelotti 2015). Role theorists use a variety of methods to analyse national roles. There are some discursive studies (e.g. Nabers 2011; Shih 2012). However, most role theorists use content analysis of narratives and process tracing methods to identify roles and/or their effects on foreign policy (e.g. Krotz and Sperling 2011; Gottwald and Duggan 2011). The majority of studies consult leader and/or official statements as primary sources to study national role conceptions. Some role theorists also refer exclusively to secondary sources reporting on primary sources (e.g. Thies 2014).

I focus on one intervention case and two states’ respective parties across the political spectrum. The intention is to identify the plausible ideational factors underlying national role interpretations. Part 2 outlines the research strategy and design. The thesis is a qualitative case study. It uses primary documents as the main data source and relies on content analysis as the chief method of analysis.

This research was conducted with a data collection plan and coding manual developed as part of the methods process. The aim was to structure and focus the case studies. Lack of methodological rigour and systematic description of methods has been a noted weakness of and challenge to role theory. Scholars call for more systematic empirical studies and hypotheses testing (e.g. Thies 2013; Breuning 2011). The annotated interview questionnaire and the codebook are in the annex.

2.1. Qualitative research

The case study method

This thesis is a small n case study. It understands case as ‘[…] an instance, or a data point, […] [obtained] through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating either the phenomenon or the context.’ (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 372) This case study design is suitable for the thesis’ aims. It permits thick description which is useful for identifying ideational layers in parties’ narratives on national roles and for noting
variations in the roles proposed and/or in their interpretations. It also allows the observation of domestic role contestation.

A quantitative large N case study was not selected, because the complexity of analysing how ideas intermesh and feed back renders in-depth study using a large case sample difficult. The single case study was also discarded of, as I seek to analyse the ideational layers interplaying in more than one party's role interpretation and in more than one country case. The aim is to achieve a higher degree of generalisability without seeking to generalise across all possible cases.

A possible criticism of the case study design is the focus on one particular episode and on a short period of time. Party stances and individuals' positions evolve. The ability to generalise about national role interpretations and their inevitable changes across time, beyond the actual case, is therefore intrinsically limited. The focus on role expressions at one chosen moment is, thus, limited. Role selection and interpretations may even have shifted during the short Libyan episode (February-October 2011).

Yet, the aim is to identify the ideational layers underlying national role interpretations, affecting role socialisation and domestic role contestation. The intention is not to ascertain national roles and interpretations once and for all. The role location and selection process is only ever temporarily resolved. This means that national roles are not fixed. States can change national role or be forced to switch. National roles may also undergo a process of reframing across time. Harnisch (2011, 9) clarifies: a role defined as a social position is 'limited in time and scope and it is dependent on the group's structure and purpose'. Similarly, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) note the temporality of role selection. By concentrating on one intervention instance and a short period of time the analysis achieves depth instead of breadth. This can point to the type of ideas underlying role conceptions at other times. Besides, to alleviate above-mentioned shortcomings, two country cases and parties across the political spectrum were selected.

**To compare or not to compare**

This thesis contrasts parties’ national role statements and role interpretations while not being a formal comparative case study. The purpose is to establish whether there is variation in and domestic role contestation based on different role interpretations.
There is, hence, a comparative element within country cases and between parties across the spectrum in the respective states. This increases the number of cases.

Building on Wehner and Thies’ (2014) narrative approach, the aim is thick description for inferences on ideas underpinning the interpretation of events. This also requires the tracing of the events to contextualise parties’ interpretations. The research strategy’s aim is a deeper understanding of the cases, context and differences (Bennett and Elman 2007b). It can help identify shared meanings (Stake 2000; Hollis 2002). The purpose is a theory-informed exploration and reconstruction of how parties make sense of situations and events and interpret their state’s national role. The aim of the inferences is description. It is not to claim causality between ideas and outcomes, or even between ideas and interpretations. Similar political concepts and reliance on the same international norms can evidently lead to different interpretations. This means that I make inferences about unavailable data (for example a debate explicitly about the principles or ideas underlying the national role). I make inferences about concepts from observations in parties’ statements on military intervention that include national roles. The challenge is to identify recurring ideas and worldview patterns instead of noting every concept. (Burnham et al. 2008)

The thesis is not a country case comparison. Formal comparative methodologies use various models, such as most similar-least similar cases, to isolate causal variables (e.g. described in Levy 2008; Bennett and Elman 2006, 2007a; Lijphart 1975, 1971; Przeworski and Teune 1970). However, the aim is not to establish causality between parties’ national role selection, interpretation and/or contestation and foreign policy decisions and outcomes. Thus, the object is also not to identify the variables that explain causality. Moreover, there are considerable, relevant differences between France and Germany, detailed in the case selection in this chapter. Hence, it would be difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from a formal country comparison. Consequently, I am not seeking to advance comparative case methodology.

Instead, the case selection was based on the position of the state in the international and respective regional system, domestic controversy and their role in the UNSC decision-making on the Libya intervention. Yet, the weakness of French parties and parliament, arguably, make France a least-likely case for parties’ to rationally invest resources to formulate foreign policy positions and to contest each other on them. Thus, if variation in national role selection and interpretation, and contestation can be
identified in this case, it is likely that parties in other states of similar status and with similarly weak parties also differ on national roles. Germany is a likely case for partisan differences. However, as the case selection will detail, parties have relatively less influence on actual decisions that often claimed. Moreover, it is often stressed that there is a foreign policy consensus, even if evolving, on the use of force. Thus, if variation in the case of Germany is identified, it is likely to be found in other states of similar status as Germany. This finding is relevant, as Germany's material/economic power has only risen since unification. Thus, to find a central issue contested and political, in a state of rising and consolidating strength in Europe and internationally, can help formulate expectations toward similar states.

The two cases are contrasted with each other in the case selection in this chapter, despite the declared aim not to compare France and Germany. Moreover, chapter 6 on national roles and responsibility introduces a comparative element by analysing the country cases in parallel and on a common theme. Finally, general conclusions on the usefulness and theoretical advantages of the case selection will be drawn in the final chapter to explore the scope for generalisations and expectations for similar cases. Given the two states’ pivotal role in European integration history and their special relationship with each other since WWII, such conclusions are particularly relevant, e.g. with respect to questions of future European defence.

2.2. Content analysis

The data analysis method was content analysis. It entails making inferences from the text on the meaning of words in communication. (Hermann 2008) Klotz and Lynch (2007, 53) describe the process as:

[...] to identify a basic template that designates an actor’s view of a fairly narrow issue [...] and other key assumptions that reflect strategies for manoeuvring through the policy-making process and promoting specific prescriptions for action.

Burnham et al (2008) and Hermann (2008) each provide steps for content analysis. These were adapted. The first step was the identification of the fairly narrow issue of national roles within the context of the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The step further consisted of the development of the research questions and aims.
The second step was the identification of the materials and sampling methods. At this stage, the decision to paper code was taken based on the small number of sources and time-cost efficiency concerns.

Saldaña (2016) describes coding as cyclical; he proposes two cycles adaptable to various types of coding. I used two cycles. They are described in more detail next.

**Cycle 1: the structured coding of national roles based on the literature**

The third step was an initial definition of the coding categories and coding procedures, described in the coding manual. Its purpose was a more precise and systematic process to make the research findings more intelligible. Part of this step was the case study preparation and the review of the secondary literature. This step consisted of identifying national role statements and associated vocabulary in academic literature. It set the thesis up to be deductive. This created expectations for when the primary sources were first approached. The coding categories were organised into national roles, narratives, ideas and context.

The fourth step was the first coding cycle: the identification of national role expressions in party statements on the military intervention in Libya.

**Cycle 2: the refinement of the structured coding and recurring themes**

The completion of the first coding cycle led to the conclusion that the initial categories based on the secondary literature did not capture variation in national role interpretations. I decided that a fifth content analysis step would be the second coding cycle. The focus was not on frequency of the mention of a national role but rather depth or intensity. It was assumed that the more attention a party paid to a role the more likely it ranked high in role priority and/or it was contested. It was also assumed that important points are not necessarily repeated but rather given more space when they were raised. Thus, attention was paid to the detail provided in definitions and justifications of national roles. The appearance of words together and of adjectives used with keywords and themes was noted as part of this step.

This second coding cycle was also structured. This time, two additional measures were taken. First, the four organisational categories (national roles, narratives, ideas and context) were coded one by one instead of together. The assumption was that this would increase the focus and the understanding of these narratives. Second, within this measure, the coding was party by party.
The result of the second coding cycle was national role qualification. The decision was taken that where an agreement on the national role seemed to exist, it was preferable to note such agreement through the addition of an adjective. This made the contrast with the alternative role proposals clearer.

During the first coding cycle and role qualification, themes emerged. The frequent use of analogical reasoning, references to past interventions, lessons learnt from past experiences, the notion of there is no alternative, the description of alternatives and the use of war or the avoidance of the term were noted. Moreover, the recurrence of responsibility in connection with national roles was observed. Part of coding cycle 2 was dedicated to these themes and, in particular, the reference of responsibility.

**The final step: the content analysis**

The analysis consisted of summarising and interpreting the findings from the coding cycles. The aim was to track spread and definition of words and linked national roles and to understand them within their context. This final step led to further refinement of the role qualifications and included the analysis of the findings from the coding.

2.3. Data sources

**Documentary research**

The majority of the generated data was text-based and represented the spoken and written word of parties’ functionaries and spokespeople in 2011. The timeframe was from the start of the uprising on 17 February 2011 until the violent death of Gaddafi on 20 October 2011. The main focus, however, was on the period around the vote on UNSC resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 (and in the case of France, the military operation prolongation vote in July 2011). The analysis of the data also drew on other primary sources in order to test for consistency.


The advantage of documentary research is that data is in existence and relatively unaffected by the research process (Bowen 2009; Platt 1981). The data sources were
parties’ official statements and press releases relating to their state’s decision-making (McCourt 2011 and 2013 on an eclectic mix of primary sources and also extensive use of secondary sources). The focus was on minutes of parliamentary debates, as FPA scholarship suggests that they are locations where parties are likely to express, debate and contest foreign policy (Strong 2015a). Speeches, press conferences and interviews were also included (e.g. Hermann 2008). The advantage of the described documents is that they provide an immediate – if in sometimes scripted – reaction to the situation.

The rationale for the inclusion of government, president/chancellor and foreign ministers’ speeches, statements and press releases was the assumption that they reflect the ideas of governing and coalition parties even when expressed on behalf of the state. White papers were considered but ultimately not included, because they are more durable policy proposals and not immediate reactions to specific events and situations. Their production process also means that they are less party-political.

The inclusion of party manifestos and other party materials on military intervention was based on the rationale that they permit to identify recurring ideas, despite not being a reflection of the specific case. However, they were handled with care given that their relevance to policy-making is arguably limited and dependent on context. The decision was made not to include Manifesto Project, Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Eurobarometer sources, as manifesto materials were only drawn on for consistency.

There were limitations to the types of documents gathered and some choices were made on the basis of access to the type of materials across the cases.

I also used academic literature on foreign policy and national roles, as secondary sources. Such literature was used to contextualise the case and as the first content analysis step of the traditional role ascription identification.

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7 In Germany party manifestos are distinct from electoral manifestos and, in some parties, members have more say on content and overall direction of programmes than in others. In France, such party documents are highly personalised electoral pamphlets with little policy relevance.

8 Foreign relations committee meeting minutes were read for background but not included. They were only available for France. Similarly, memoirs were not included, because the relative recent history and some political actors still being active politicians meant that memoirs were not available for all relevant party actors.
Complementary semi-structured interviews

A possible drawback of primary documents, despite the extensive use of secondary academic literature to contextualise the case, is that such data sources do not always provide sufficient information or detail (Bowen 2009; Bechhofer and Paterson 2000; Bryman 2012). To address this, semi-structured interviews with party officials and foreign policy experts were conducted in May and June 2017.

The aim of the interviews was to gather additional information and detail, respectively clarification. Not being primary data sources for analysis, the interviews were timed toward the end of the research project. This reduced the risk of systemic error in the sample, given unequal access to interviewees in targeted parties (Burnham et al. 2008). A challenge was the time elapsed since 2011. This increased possible misrepresentations, memory lapses and hindsight, given the evolution of the situation. Moreover, terrorist attacks in France and Germany further complicate recollections and assessment. However, reflections, distorted memories and hindsight can be interesting sources of how the past informs the present. Libya today has become an analogy to draw lessons from for Syria and other conflicts. The questionnaire used for the interviews was focused, consisting of two open questions and two targeted role theory and partisan foreign policy questions (see annex, appendix 2).

Another aim of the interviews was to gauge the context in which the primary documents were produced and to add dimension by gaining more insights into some key actors’ interpretations (Bowen 2009; May 2001). Interview responses are more spontaneous than speeches or press statements that are more reflective of what the party wants to project (Hermann 2008). Thus, they provide a good source of triangulation of more scripted party statements.

An unintended consequence of interviews was the provision of voice to actors and, thus, a richer picture of the context (e.g. Brummer and Thies 2015 on adding voices of contemporaries through memoirs). This reduced the likelihood of distortion, providing a more balanced representation of parties’ national role statements.

The interviews took place over the course of six weeks in May and June 2017 in Paris, Berlin and over the phone. Each took between 30 minutes to an hour. Taking into account the time elapsed since the events and the timing of the interviews half a year before parliamentary elections in Germany and shortly after the presidential elections.
and the less significant parliamentary elections in France, a relatively low response rate was not surprising. Four interviews were conducted in France, one with a communist and three with Parti Socialiste (PS) representatives. There were no positive replies from the Union pour un movement populaire (UMP), the governing party in 2011, renamed LR (Les Républicains) since. This was the case despite contact via gatekeepers. It was not surprising given the legal proceedings some associates of former president Sarkozy face over the Libyan case (e.g. The Guardian 2013; Le Monde 2016; Mediapart 2017) and the developments in Libya. Yet, given that governing party representatives and ministers took up most of the time during the parliamentary debates, this absence was less significant for the analysis than if all potential interviewees of the former opposition parties had declined to talk to me.

In Germany, nine interviews were conducted, with members of all parties, one representative each from the two largest parties, and two to three each from the smaller parties, including the junior coalition partner at the time. The smaller number for the two largest parties was not considered a problem, given that there is more data on their policy proposals and stances, allowing for context and narrative analysis.

3. Libya, France and Germany: case selection

Part 3 provides the rationale for selecting the 2011 Libya military intervention case and for focusing on French and German parties. The intervention in Libya was the motivator for this thesis. However, personal interest in the region and this case does not suffice for a scholarly effort. The academic rationale for this case selection starts from it being the first time the UNSC invoked R2P in a resolution mandating the use of force against the will of the target state. The unusual nature of French and German foreign policy decision-making, as described at the start of chapter 1, forms the bedrock for the country case selection.

The case selection locates the Libyan case in the scholarship on French and German foreign policy decision-making. It offers background on the French and German political and party systems and on past roles and foreign policy decisions toward the region in which Libya is located to contextualise the intervention case and the country case selection. While I am not strictly using a comparative qualitative methodology, part 3 provides some insight into why contrasting the two states makes theoretical and methodological sense. Thus, the case selection proceeds by drawing out notable variances and parallels between the country cases.
3.1. UNSC resolution 1973 and the military intervention in Libya

This section addresses the question: 'why the 2011 intervention in Libya'. The rationale is threefold. The first reason is the potential for contention and, thus, the nature of intervention decisions per se. Second, UNSC resolution 1973 mandating the intervention was the first time R2P was invoked without the consent of the target state. The third reason relates to France and Germany being comparable in capability or position, and UNSC members at the time.

Military interventions: instances of domestic controversy

Decision-making on the use of force is prone to be controversial. As one aim of this thesis is to study the factors underlying parties' ideas about foreign policy and to argue that there are differences between parties on foreign policy such a case study can be particularly productive. Since in democracies parties can matter in foreign policy decision-making it is arguably time to look at them in more detail. Thus, the case selection for such a study ought to be one in which difference is likely. Hence, the choice of an instance surrounding a military intervention decision. Such decisions are likely to lead to controversy and disagreement, as military interventions bear a financial burden and often also the risk of loss of human lives for the intervening state. As military interventions for proclaimed humanitarian motives are by nature not responses to immediate national security threats, these costs are more likely to be seen as a burden and to be politicised in electoral competition. Moreover, moral opposition to such forceful interventions can also be based on the expected or real loss of human lives in the targeted state, the risk of a moral hazard, with insurgents escalating violence in the hope of such intervention, in their favour and a risk of aggravating conflict rather than to managing or solving it. At the same time, there is a strong moral case to be made in favour of intervention as well. These factors all lead to an increased likelihood of domestic debate on military intervention cases.

UNSC resolution 1973: R2P first

The Libya intervention case instance is particularly relevant for the international norm of R2P and, thus, a good case for looking at the influence of an international norm on parties' national role conceptions, role socialisation and role contestation. UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) was the first (and so far only) to invoke the norm to mandate the use of force against a UN member-state without its consent. It was the first
practical application and test of this emerging, controversial and much discussed international norm. The invocation, application and, as some argue, misuse of R2P in Libya links this intervention case to R2P’s future fate. The intervening coalition's pursuit of so-called regime change went beyond the UN mandate and has arguably increased reticence concerning R2P, notably in China and Russia. Resolution 1973’s crucially hinged on these two permanent UNSC members not making use of their veto power by abstaining. Some speculate that the military action in Libya at least influenced if not determined international decision-making on Syria. The further development of the R2P norm also is likely to hinge on the evolution of events in the North of Africa and the Sahel. This includes instability and unrest in, e.g., Mali due to fighters and weapons emanating from Libya, a now essentially failed state which also fails to control its territory and borders and coasts. The Libyan case and its consequences are thus essential for R2P’s future as a norm.

**Libya, France and Germany**

The final selection criteria of the Libya intervention case links it to the country cases. R2P is ultimately reliant on state action. It invokes a responsibility of the so-called international community to act. Given that not all states have the resources to conduct a military intervention, R2P in reality only implicates certain states. This creates role expectations for states capable (and willing) to act. France and Germany are two such candidate states. France is a residual global and regional power, with nuclear power status and a permanent UNSC seat. Germany is a regional power with a strong economy and global ambitions. In 2011, it was a non-permanent UNSC member. Based on the type of states they are, we can expect role expectations from other states and domestic actors to conform to R2P’s responsibility demands, i.e. to vote in favour of a relevant resolution and/or to fulfil the UNSC mandate. We may, thus, observe R2P’s influences on domestic role socialisation and role contestation, due to such pressures.

**3.2. International relations, and national roles in the region**

France and Germany's history of relations with the Middle East and North Africa region provide the context for the 2011 decisions. This section reviews the history of French engagement in the Arab World and Africa, and Germany's tackling of the question of the use of force and German participation in interventions. The aim is to contextualise the decisions and to locate it in country cases' history of foreign policy.
France in the international system: a challenged power

France is a nuclear power with a permanent UNSC seat and, hence, a great power by status and capability. Successive US administrations challenged its role selection in the second half of the twentieth century by not providing the role recognition French presidents craved. Yet, successive French presidents did not give up on the pretence of a global leader role via a European leader role (e.g. Hoffmann 1974; Krotz 2015).

While France has some capabilities that provide it with a high status it lacks others. Its economic deficiencies appear in dissonance with its global role leader ambitions. Pressures from significant others and powerful socialisers in the international system for France to comply and act according to its limited capacities rather than its aspirations are probable if not inevitable, as was the case in Franco-American relations since the 1950s (Krotz and Sperling 2011). This challenges contemporary pretences of independence. It also makes domestic disagreement over more likely.

In 2011, France's woes were at least twofold. The European dimension had become a challenge, since the rejection, in 2005, of the European Constitutional Treaty in a referendum. Germany took the lead in the management of the so-called Eurozone crisis (e.g. Koenig 2016). France's declining influence in the 2000s threatened its role in Europe and affected Franco-German capacity to shape European politics together. The 2011 context, included the perceived need to balance against Germany as the emerging European hegemon (Simón 2013).

As part of this handling of its European challenges, France renewed Franco-American relations. In 2009, it decided to fully reintegrate into NATO military command. The decision led to political debate and opposition party criticism. In 2011, Sarkozy was initially not keen on NATO command of the Libya mission (The Guardian 2011b). Eventually, he had to concede on the matter, in part for financial reasons, as the UK and France did not have the means to carry the operation. NATO's implication also showed the US’ continued strength vis-à-vis Europe and, in particular, France.

Germany in the international system: a rising power

The German 2011 context differs from that of France. The international context changed since the end of the Cold War. After German unification, the state was freed from the immediate international constraints of limited sovereignty and the bipolar world order. Maull (2006) notes that Germany faced a post-1990 dilemma between 'normalising' as a
state of its material capacity, and continuing in the path and role that it was socialised into since the WWII. There was and still is a German preoccupation with how decisions and behaviour, i.e. role performance, could be viewed by significant and relevant others. The role socialisation also engendered strong domestic role pressure.

Still, realist IR scholars expected Germany’s behaviour to normalise and realign with realist expectations of states with great power capabilities (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993). They assumed that Germany would return to an assertive, forceful role, given its economic strength. To be sure such predictions were not immediately realised. Maull (2006) observes that continuity marked German foreign policy. Germany even further embedded itself in multilateral cooperation, limiting its regained sovereignty. However, while deterministic and antagonistic, these realist expectations of Germany’s reassertion of great power rank were cast into the future and may yet prove partly accurate. Constructivist, institutionalist and culturalist scholars assumed that Germany’s socialisation into the civilian power role had altered its national interest to the extent that its foreign policy was more likely to continue than change (Maull 1990, 2000b; Krotz 2015) The strength of this role socialisation was assumed as largely responsible for Germany’s resistance to allies’ demands and expectations for it assume a greater role to address global challenges and work toward international peace and security, i.e. to contribute more militarily and not only financially in the changing international context. (Otte and Greve 2000; Philippi 2001) At the same time, Germany did not act as expected by multilateral partners on a number of occasions since unification (Crawford 1996), weakening the socialisation arguments, and showing that foreign policy decision-making is complex, involving domestic and international level factors.

If the context and international and domestic expectations toward German foreign policy changed after the end of the Cold War, it was further complicated in the new millennium. Germany’s transatlantic relations suffered and the EU was split over the issue of the Iraq invasion post-September 11, 2001. The SPD-Green coalition refused to participate in and support this military action, consternating the US, a key partner. There is no scholarly or political agreement over whether the decision constituted a radical change or modified continuity, and some scholars revealed themselves normatively committed pro- or contra-intervention (Maull 2006). The post-2001 'War on Terror' era marked another change in the international environment and expectations toward allied states with Germany’s capacities and, in particular, toward Germany as an alliance partner. Germany refused to comply with expectations, while also trying to mend relations with partners.
By 2011, the context had again changed with effects on Germany, its relations with others and alter-role expectations and perceptions. At least since the 2008-2009, Germany was/is in a dominant economic position in Europe. As a driving economic force in the EU, it took on a central role in managing the Eurozone crisis. This European position and role opened a policy field for Germany in which it could enact a leader role without immediately being perceived as a threat or needing to use conventional violent means. It arguably also permitted Germany to successfully refuse other alter-role pressures and expectations. It was arguably one reason why chancellor Angela Merkel priority in 2011 was not the Libya conflict, leaving decision-making largely to the foreign minister, and why Germany could confidently reject pressures to share the tasks of military intervention. Yet, it also created international pressures to more consistently and comprehensively enact a leader role and act according to Germany's – newly and now more clearly predominant - position in Europe and to its economic capabilities superiority. Despite expectations and pressures, Germany remained – at least performativity wise – a hesitant, reluctant hegemon (Paterson 2011; Bulmer and Paterson 2013).

Then, in 2011, Germany was elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC. This provided Germany with the opportunity to live up to alter-role expectations based on its economic position in Europe and the international system, given its material capabilities. It also suited German ambitions successively stated in coalition agreements for Germany or, since the signing of the Lisbon Agreement 2007, for Europe in its place to be granted a permanent seat in a reformed Security Council that gradually emerged in Germany after unification (SPD-Bündnis 90/Die GRÜNEN 1998, 45, 2002, 72; CDU/CSU-SPD 2005, 158; CDU/CSU-FDP 2009, 113; Andreae 2002, 2; Schmidt, Hellmann, and Wolf, Reinhard 2007, 36; Hellmann and Roos 2007). UNSC membership provided the opportunity to show that Germany could meet international expectations.

Thus, it was in within this context that Germany decided to first pursue a leader role pushing for sanctions and a non-violent solution to the emerging conflict in Libya (Harnisch 2015). It was also as a UNSC member, exposed to various role demands and expectations, and with its own ambitions, that German decision-makers decided to abstain on resolution 1973 and not to participate in the military mission.
Germany's struggle over the use of force

The 2011 long view context needs the inclusion of Germany's struggle over the use of force. Since the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy did change. Germany accommodated some demands of its allies, such as participation in military operations, under some circumstances and in some cases. Yet, most changes remained incremental and modifications rather than policy revision. Maull (2006) suggests that there is a paradox between Germany's traditional civilian power role and the demands of the changing international context in which there are pressures on Germany to give up its 'culture of restraint' and 'assume responsibility'.

Gradually, in the post-1990 era, domestic expectations toward Germany normalising emerged on its contributions to 'peace enforcement.' At the same time, the desire to be (seen as) normal and to eschew German exceptionalism (Sonderweg), created a dilemma or tension with the drawing of lessons from an apparently unique history on which this desire to (appear) to fit in allegedly derives. Consequently, Germany has continued to cultivate a benevolent, economic power image, embedded in European institutions and primarily a trade and good – mostly civilian – alliance partner.

Parties were instrumental in the debate on German participation in military missions. This indicates that parties played a role in shaping orientation and changes, beyond the actual decision-making on cases. The CDU/CSU initiated the debate to initial criticism from the other parties, in particular on the left. At first, Germany, in the 1990s, increased financial and material contributions to military interventions (1991 Gulf War, 1995 Bosnia). The SPD and the Green Party took the landmark decision to participate in military missions (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001). This required a substantial reconsideration of the policy orientation and context in previously fewer interventionist parties, especially in the Green Party which was, in part, based on a pacifist tradition (Rathbun 2004, 2006; Brunstetter and Brunstetter 2011).

Scholars are divided on the degree to which the 1999 decision was an abrupt or gradual fundamental change of foreign policy orientation and whether or not it is, at all, a departure from the past. Suffice it to say that the acceptance of military intervention as last resort and the decision to participate in such missions enjoy cross-party consensus, bar one (Die Linke). All other parties accepted the need to sometimes intervene, nevertheless, they position differently case-by-case for political and declared principled reasons. In 2003, the centre-left coalition decided not to
participate in the invasion of Iraq alongside Germany's key allies UK and US. This decision was criticised by the opposition CDU/CSU. The argument was the same as the centre-left parties' criticism of the 2011 Libya decision not to align with key partners.

Some scholars suggest that elite consensus waxes and wanes, in part with salience and acuteness of issues, and that there is no real consensus on priorities between the parties with government experience (Crossley-Frolick 2013). Other scholars propose that, where differences between parties emerge, the existence of variation tends to gradually erode toward consensus. Different parties have at different times initiated foreign policy changes, but eventually, all but the fringes followed suit. (Karp 2005)

Arguments stressing elite consensus often remain incomplete. A tendency toward consensus does not mean that party differences do not exist, nor do such arguments help to understand which stance will become the new consensus. Moreover, culture such as that of 'restraint' can be interpreted in various ways (Link 2015). Thus, a consensus on a culture or shared use of vocabulary do not mean the same foreign policy conduct in practice. Agreement on policy details in practice (e.g. pre-emptive strikes) also does not necessarily imply agreement on the actual policy (e.g. intervention) nor do they prove the irrelevance of domestic politics. (Harnisch 2004)

Even accepting the tendency toward consensus, there are still ideological differences between parties (inter-party). The literature suggests a tendency on the left to prioritise civilian conflict prevention (Rathbun 2004; Forsberg 2005; Allers 2016). The shift from the rejection of participation to, sometimes, acceptance of the need to participate also illustrates that parties' stances can evolve. Finally, despite the evolution on the issue toward an acceptance of intervention for humanitarian reasons, parties also remain internally divided on the issue (intra-party). Contradictory statements in the case of Libya illustrate this vividly. A key foreign policy representative of the governing CDU/CSU criticised the government's abstention vote decision (FAZ 2011). Some in the foreign minister's party criticised him, voicing concerns about consequences for elections and the country's reputation (Spiegel Online 2011e). The SPD and the Green Party immediately welcomed, then later condemned the German UNSC abstention vote, and even criticised the criticism (dpa, Reuters, and AFP 2011; Spiegel Online 2011b, 2011c, 2011d).

The literature remains divided over whether civilian power is still the German master role and the degree to which a consensus on it exists or existed. To be sure, the
existence of such a consensus strongly depends on what one looks for agreement on. On the one hand, if one allows pro- and anti-intervention stances to coexist within the civilian power role, it is easier to observe continuity and consensus on the role. On the other hand, the continuing rejection of military action by one party and the discrepancy between the public and a majority of the political elite on participation in such interventions, suggests that there is no elite-public consensus on this matter, despite gradual evolution toward tolerance of such missions. Moreover, an apparently shared 'culture of restraint' and vocabulary associated with the civilian power master role do not necessarily mean that there is agreement on the practical implications of the role. The analytical usefulness of such a master role must be questioned if it can include contrary positions on the central issue of participation in military intervention and can lead to divergent decisions.

The review of the evolution of stances on the use of force among German parties and the still existing tensions it reveals shows that there is a preoccupation with alter-role expectations toward Germany. In its international relations, including the use of force in a number of cases since the end of the Cold War, the salient relations appear to be less with the states at which interventions are aimed and more with key partners. By contrast, France's international relations and its elites' perceived role expectations are defined by a long history with states in regions in which France intervenes.

**France's international relations in the region**

France's embeddedness and relations in the international system and the link to its economic situation and dependencies are also important for the 2011 context. Its relations to North Africa and the Middle East complete the context. Successive presidents conducted so-called Arab policy (*politique arabe*) and cultivated relations with former French colonies in Africa as African policy (*Françafrique*). These relations continued after the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and the 1956 North Africa decolonisation wave. (Bozo 2016; Charillon 2011) They reveal a pattern in its relations with the Arab World, and with Africa. They also suggest that it has a history of colonial and post-colonial ties and of role performance with states in the region.

and the country's dual dependency on oil-producing states in the Middle East for the French balance of payment: energy supply for France and arms exports to Arab states. François Mitterrand (1981-1995) continued these policies. Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) relaunched Arab policy as part of his ambitions for France. Like his predecessors, he considered French influence in Africa as a means to power. These ties reveal dependency relations on Arab petrol and arms' sale revenue. (Cohen 2013; Chenu and Krulic 2013; Banégas and Marchal 2013; Filiu 2013; Grosser 2013)

Successive presidents claimed to reform relations with former colonies to make them equal and less based on patronage. However, they largely failed in their attempts. Military interventions to protect dictators went counter such reforms. Giscard-d'Estaing oversaw a number of military interventions to protect dictators in former colonies, in Zaire (1977, 1978), Mauritania (1977) and Chad (1978, 1980). Mitterrand maintained France's presence in Africa and French military interventions continued (e.g. in Chad 1983 and 1986).

In the 1990s, democratic conditionality emerged as part of an international trend in the 1990s. France also sought diversification of relations toward non-Francophone Africa. This was in parallel to its reduced material capacities to maintain its presence in former colonies. International organisations, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, complemented France's ties to African and Arab states, creating new dependencies on international funders in these states. Chirac sought to Europeanise France's foreign policy. Yet, contradictions and ambivalence, between military assistance to besieged dictators and talk of democratic and good governance, continued. From 2002 onward, the retreat from former colonies was being reversed. Chirac positioned France as an advocate for African interests. From 2009 on, it became apparent that the implication of the EU and Europeanisation of African policy had also failed and unilateral French military action in Africa rose again. France failed in its attempt to use the EU in Africa for its global leader role. Françafrique revealed the country's lack of power and failures rather than its global presence, influence and power. (Banégas, Marchal, and Meimon 2007; Koepf 2012) France also largely failed in its Europeanisation of Arab policy, alternating between a shared European and a national approach (Müller 2013).

France’s history of Arab and African policy and relations with states in Libya’s dual regions (Arab World and Africa) show a pattern of French military interventions to
protect dictators, the use of Africa and the Arab World for aspiration to a global role and, recently, a pattern of democratic governance rhetoric. In 2011, France had been dependent for decades on petrol and the revenue from arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa as part of the French arms industry's clients (Krotz 2015). Such deals, clientelism and military interventions still mark French relations with these states.

The 2011 context circle closes in 2007 when Sarkozy welcomed Gaddafi on a state visit to Paris (The New York Times 2007). By 2011, the reception pomp was a source of embarrassment for the president and he was facing low approval rates. It was in this context that France acted in 2011. It drafted UNSC resolution 1973, coordinating with the UK and the US, and on 19 March started the military operations. On 22 March, the first debate on this military mission took place in parliament, after the prime minister's government declaration, as the Constitution requires.

3.3. Political system constraints on parties' foreign policy influence

The previous sections highlighted how different Germany and France's positions in the international system are, despite being similar types of states. The background on Germany also showed that parties played a central role in moving the debates on military intervention participation forward in the 1990s. By contrast, the literature on France shows continuity and path dependency that is hard to overcome regarding its relations and its use of military force in its zone of influence.

This section notes that the French and German political systems are different. France is a presidential system. The Fifth Republic (1958-) was intentionally designed to give the president executive power and to sideline parties and parliament. Germany, by contrast, is a parliamentary system. The political system was specifically designed to spread and balance power, rather than centralise it in one institution and person.

*The French presidential prerogative: inbuilt limitations in the political system*

Why study French parties and foreign policy? Given the constitutional limitations to French parties' influence on foreign policy decision-making, their relative absence from scrutiny is unsurprising. The political system of the Fifth French Republic was intentionally designed to sideline parties. The experiences of the Third (1970-1940) and the Fourth Republic (1940-1958) imprinted in many the perception that parties were self-serving and irresponsible and the source of political instability.
In the midst of decolonisation, the Algerian War (1954-1962) and state of emergency crisis that shook France, Charles de Gaulle, the General celebrated for his contribution to the liberation of France during WWII, conditioned his return to politics on the reform of the political institutions via a new constitution. In particular, the president as a unifying actor, stabiliser and independent of party interests must be strong. He argued that this was necessary for France to take its rightful place/position in the world, play its role and achieve grandeur. (Hoffmann 1974; Cerny 1980; Gordon 1993)

The president’s predominance in French politics was consolidated through reforms across the years, such as direct election (1962). This increased the presidential figure’s authority vis-à-vis the head of government through the impression of a direct link between the president and the public. The 2000 reforms to the electoral calendar, the holding of presidential and legislative elections in a short sequence of each other, further consolidated the president’s role. The side-lining of parties reduced their function to that of an instrument for personal presidential ambitions, providing the knowledge and personnel for presidential bids. Moreover, the institutional framework made the president the centre-stage of French politics and his/her election the key moment of the political calendar, thereby also side-lining parliament. (Bell 2000; Knapp 2002; Elgie 2003; Howarth and Varouxakis 2003)

This political system hence made the president the key figure and foreign policy decision-maker. According to the 1958 Constitution, he/she is commander in chief of the armed forces (Article 15) and guarantor of national independence and integrity of the national territory (Article 5). The president negotiates and ratifies treaties (Article 52) and is responsible for their respect and implementation (Article 5). At the same time, the side-lining of parties and parliament was achieved by strengthening the role of the head of government, creating a dual executive, a hybrid presidential system.

The effect of this dual executive is that when the prime minister and the president are of the same party, the president is traditionally in charge of ‘high politics’. He/she has the power to appoint a loyal prime minister who is acceptable to the parliamentary majority (Article 20). Yet, the president’s influence is limited by the international, domestic and party-internal contexts and momentary situations or events. (Howarth and Varouxakis 2003) It has waxed and waned during the course of the Fifth Republic. Elgie (2003) argues party system composition and dynamics played a role in this. Parties are critical for the president’s exercise of power, as he/she is dependent on a
working majority in parliament to implement his/her policies. It matters whether this majority is provided by a single party or a coalition/block (so-called *fait majoritaire*) and what the nature of the coalition is and whether the dominant party is fractionalised or united. Arguably, intra-party division and coalition politics can weaken a president’s foreign policy prerogative, even when the government is of his/her party and commands a majority in parliament.

A second effect is that the president’s influence is limited, when, in so-called *cohabitation* (1986-1988, 1993-1995, 1997-2002) the prime minister is not of the same party. This can be a challenging period for the presidential prerogative. The president’s authority is highly dependent on the working relationship between him/her and the prime minister in question. Yet, there have been cases in which president and prime minister of different parties worked together well and some cases in which president and prime minister of the same party were less compatible. Despite this, cohabitation weakens the president. The presidential image of non-partisanship and authority is reduced because he/she has less control over policy initiatives. (Elgie 2003) Moreover, there are constitutional power overlaps between the institutions that are more consequential during cohabitation. The 1958 Constitution states, e.g., that the prime minister is responsible for national defence (Article 21) and involved in drawing up treaties (Article 52). This overlap creates the potential for conflict between the two figures.

Even so, during the course of the Fifth Republic, the president has remained the key figure and his/her authority was further consolidated with the 2000 constitutional change that reduced the seven-year term to five years and sequenced presidential and legislative elections within a few weeks of each other, making the parliamentary elections, effectively, the confirmation of the president. (Costa 2013b, 2013a) This reduced the likelihood of cohabitation in the future, more likely to provide the president with a *fait majoritaire* in the parliament.

**German government prerogative and inbuilt limits to its power**

The centrality of the president in French political life and foreign policy decision-making contrasts with the key actors and processes in Germany. This section reviews the German government, constitutional and parliamentary powers in foreign policy, pointing to the role or options for parties to influence the process. The government formulates foreign policy, principles and guidelines of which are declared in
government programmes. It also takes the decisions in the policy field (Oppermann and Höse 2007; Brummer and Oppermann 2017 for overviews of the domestic context and actors of German foreign policy). However, the need to form coalition governments, for stable parliamentary majorities that increase the likelihood of legislation passing, decisively influences foreign policy decision-making in Germany. The necessity of having two (or more) parties in coalition puts constraints on decision-making. The junior coalition partner has relatively greater influence if this party can credibly threaten to end this pact. While such threats depend, inter alia, on the ideological proximity and salience of issues, it is not without consequence in coalition bargaining processes. Foreign policy can become a site of contest between parties in government. In practice, the foreign ministry was for a very long time habitually allocated to the junior partner, providing smaller parties with relatively more influence and expertise in foreign policy and with the opportunity to carve out a 'statesman' profile via the engagement with international politics (Kaarbo and Lantis 2003; Paterson 2010; Oppermann and Brummer 2014; Oppermann, Brummer, and Van Willigen 2017).

The German Constitution (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: [vom 23. Mai 1949 (BGBl. S. 1) 2015) puts restrictions on the deployment of the armed forces based on a German history of aggression in Europe. In the early 1990s, a debate was started whether or not Germany ought to and was constitutionally enabled to participate in out-of-area missions, as envisaged by a reformed NATO-doctrine. International and domestic pressures to 'normalise' after reunification were important factors. Parties played a role in putting this issue on the agenda. The CDU/CSU pushed for participation in military intervention, in part due to international/partner pressures and in part because of such decisions corresponded to the party's ideological acceptance of force as a means in international relations. (Létourneau and Räkel 1997; Forsberg 2000; Lantis 2002) A 1994 constitutional court decision, reinterpreted the German Constitution to allow out of area missions under the condition of the parliament's approval and within collective security institutions (Article 87, Article 24). A 2005 law (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) forms the legal basis for parliament's role in such decisions (BGBl 2005). (Wagner 2006; Peters and Wagner 2011, 2014; Brummer and Oppermann 2017)

Parliament, and through it parties, has a say in the decision. Despite the legislative having a special role, as the only directly elected federal institution, the prevalence of
coalition government with majorities in parliament means that, in effect, opposition parties have little actual influence through the parliamentary process on decision-making, as was noted above. Governments can put decisions on the deployment of the armed forces to a parliamentary vote but are likely to receive approval given their majority in the legislative. Governments can also use the parliamentary votes on foreign policy for party discipline or to quell intra-party disputes (chancellor Gerhard Schröder, e.g., called for a vote of no-confidence on Afghanistan 2001).

3.4. Parties' influence on foreign policy decision-making

French and German parties are not irrelevant though they are constrained in actual influence on foreign policy decision-making. France appears to be a least likely case for parties even investing resources in expressing foreign policy narratives. Germany is a more likely case for foreign policy stances and narratives because parliament provides parties with the opportunity to influence foreign policy decisions. However, in France, parties in opposition have more avenues to influence foreign policy outcomes than expected; in Germany, the coalition majority in parliament actually reduces opposition parties' direct influence on foreign policy decision-making.

**German parties and decision-making on the use of force**

At first, Germany as a case for studying parties and foreign policy is obvious because of the parliamentary deployment powers. At the same time, agenda-setting and decision-making remain the government's reserved domain. Moreover, a coalition government with parliamentary majorities is a constant. Thus, parliament's and opposition parties' capacity to exert influence on foreign policy is limited by a de facto governmental majority in parliament. This requires case selection justification. Hence, this section provides background on the potential role of parties in foreign policy decision-making. Germany is a more likely case for criticism and role contestation than France, because parties here have a more prominent position and role in politics, despite the described constraints. These limitations are not relevant here, as this thesis is not concerned with actual decision-making but public disagreement that has the potential to influence future policy articulation and decision-making.

German parties' lack of actual influence through the mechanism provided by the political system does not equate to irrelevance. Two (or more) parties form coalitions. In ministerial offices and through bargaining power, junior parties can shape foreign
policy under certain circumstances and if they have interest or incentive to do so. Moreover, parties can also call upon the constitutional court to assess foreign policy decisions and, in particular, out-of-area deployment on a case-by-case basis. Two recent examples include the radical left’s lawsuit regarding German participation in the interventions in Syria or the Green Party’s lawsuit against the coalition’s 2011 decision to use the armed forces to evacuate from Libya without a prior vote in parliament. (Spiegel Online 2009; TAZ 2016; DW 2016; Spiegel Online 2015; FAZ 2015; Zeit Online 2011; Bundesverfassungsgericht 2007, 2015) Thus, it can be proposed that this court is a domestic actor that governments and legislators have to take into consideration when making decisions and limiting the scope of foreign policy decision-making of any government. (Daase and Junk 2012; Oppermann and Höse 2007) As Risse-Kappen (1991, 488) notes: ‘[...] parties constrain both the legislative and the executive branches.’

German public opinion and the public are important domestic others. Parties are links between the state institutions and the public. They seek electoral success. At the same time, international issues can be salient. Thus, parties have incentives to be attentive to public opinion. Risse-Kappen (1991) suggested that public and elite opinion is divided and that the public’s relevance increased. Parties became more ‘democratic’, taking cues from the voting public. Oppermann and Höse (2007) suggest that the societal context can influence formal foreign policymaking via informal processes. Public opinion, guided through media reporting, restricts German foreign policymaking. They also note that this restriction is not uniform and highly dependent on the issue and its salience. In the hierarchy of priorities foreign policy often ranks lower than domestic issues and while there is an interest in foreign policy, its potential utility for mobilisation is limited. Yet, the public’s relative interest that can force governments and opposition parties to consider public opinion, because foreign policy can become an issue. This is especially the case when reporting on an instance increases, there are clear alternative proposals and differences between parties, and it is used by at least one as an election mobilising issue. Salience increases with stronger (and more vocal) disagreement between government and opposition parties. At the same time, the more the issue becomes salient, the more likely parties will disagree on it. Such disagreements can be used for party political purposes. (Oppermann and Höse 2007) Thus, public opinion can indirectly influence foreign policy through parties. Public opinion is relevant because Germany’s electorate is less
inclined than its parties to use military force abroad and military interventions have been used for inter-party posturing between the two larger parties (Paterson 2010). The issue of military action interests the German public (Mader 2017). In sum, the public attitude toward the use has long been ‘dovish’, remains sceptical and is a domestic restraint on national roles.

**French parties and foreign policy decision-making**

Despite the side-lining of parties and the relative limitation of the parliament in the legislative process compared to other states, parties are not irrelevant in foreign policy. First, presidential candidates usually come from within parties or form parties for their purposes. This means that the president needs a party machinery to get into office (Howarth and Varouxakis 2003). But a candidate must transcend party lines to get elected in the two-ballot system requiring alliances in the second round. Elections are more a contest between individuals with a government programme than between parties, but candidates are still associated with a party (Elgie 2003).

Second, cohabitation provides parties, and potential presidential candidates, with the opportunity to carve out a profile and influence foreign policy decision-making. Such governing constellation offers parties, via government office, the chance to exercise some influence on foreign policy in a bargaining process with the president. Third, constitutional reforms have affected parties’ capacities to exert such influence. They have gradually increased parliament’s influence in policy-making in general. A 1995 constitutional reform led to professionalization, giving MPs more means to hire qualified staff, prolonged the sessions from three to nine months, introduced weekly questions to government and prioritised private members’ bills in one reserved session a month. This increased MPs capacity to scrutinise legislation. While their powers to bring government to account remain limited, there are now new mechanisms for scrutinising government policy, including asking oral or written questions or to amend legislation. Kerrouche (2009, 67) notes: ‘[...] the position of the National Assembly and its members has evolved [...] and has entrenched, or even accentuated, the indirect influence MPs have over legislative processes.’ The role and perceptions of parliament have undergone change with the legislative body becoming a partner (rather than a key actor). Research proposes that the number of questions put to the government increased and that there are right-left differences in how the scrutiny of government policies is exercised. A more recent constitutional revision
(2008) further increased parliament's and MPs' power and suggests that the remaining constraints to parliament's influence on foreign policy decision-making may not be set in stone. For example, the government is now required to declare to parliament the deployment of the armed forces and to allow a debate on the issue. Within three months of such deployment, the Constitution now also requires the government to allow a vote on the prolongation of the mission. Yet, parliament's powers to legislate and/or exercise control remains limited and weak compared to other European parliaments. (Kerrouche 2009)

However, even relative increased opportunities to shape policy-outcomes raise questions about parties' place in parliamentary politics. Elgie (2003) suggests that party politics dominate the parliamentary 'game' with office- and policy-seeking motives. Parties must negotiate and cooperate to achieve or block legislative successes. While the Constitution provides the rules, parties play the game and shape parliamentary politics. Government parties seek to limit opposition powers and use constitutional means (Article 49) to pass bills as an issue of confidence. He argues that parliament is not weak because of institutional limitations but because parliamentarians are not focused on exercising an independent parliament role. Kerrouche (2009) points out that MPs often find themselves in the centre of conflicting political powers and use a range of indirect means to influence them. Oral question time is a good way for opposition parties to broadcast alternative views and be heard. It is an indirect means to restrain and moderate government decision-making, appealing directly to the public. Thus, these increased opportunities also provide parties with incentives to position themselves and oppose government stances.

French parties differ on foreign policy issues, despite parliament's relative weakness in the legislative process and parties' limited influence. Rathbun (2004) argues that despite suggestions that Gaullism shapes foreign policy and the institutional framework constraining parliament's and parties' role, parties formulate distinct foreign policies based on political concepts and ideologies. He finds evidence for more or less interventionist stances. According to him the domaine réservé of the president in foreign and defence policy is rather a shared domain, at least in times of cohabitation, and while all parties may adhere to a form of Gaullism, interpretations thereof vary. More recently, Ostermann (2016) shows that parliamentarians' stances differed on the 2011 Libyan intervention and that a dominant discourse espoused by the governing party coalition was contested in the debates. He points to the influence
of international norms and the construction of self-images that are based on political concepts drawn from and linked to French history.

This country case selection argues that French parties play a greater role in foreign policy than often acknowledged. Their positions are not only shaped by personal ambitions and the electoral calendar but also based on ideas. The fact that parliament and parties are weak does not mean that they are irrelevant to French politics and policy-making. MPs' powers gradually increase, including in foreign policy decision-making. Challenges to parliament’s limited role are likely to put pressure on granting parliament more power of scrutiny and decision making in the future. Parties are important for realising the personal ambitions of individuals and new parties emerged and shape the narratives and policy-making, despite the inbuilt constraints of the political system. (Knapp 2002)

In sum, parties make up the parliamentary opposition. MPs and government ministers are dependent on parties and their structures for political careers, like presidents (and MPs). Their positions and decisions have to stay within what is acceptable for or expected of the party to stay credible, for the party membership base and for the public to retain support. This implies a certain policy coherence across the party and across time and the need to construct continuity between otherwise different stances.

3.5. Party-case selection: the 2011 actors

The party-case selection below provides some background to the key actors in 2011 and the party system in which they operate.

The French party-case selection: all or some parties?

The Fifth Republic party system was intended as a counter-design of the multiparty 'polarised pluralism' system of the Fourth Republic. (Knapp 2002) Its two-ballots principle shapes party competition and the entire party system. The first round/ballot of legislative or presidential election is more about the party, the second more about ideology (Lewis-Beck and Chlarson 2002). The first round encourages fragmentation. For the second round, parties and candidates form pacts and alliances and negotiate public support for the closest ideological party or candidate. This system consolidates a left-right-divide, cross-right/left cooperation to form majorities in parliament.

In the early Fifth Republic, a 'bipolar quadrille' monopolised 90 per cent of the vote with two major parties on each side: the PCF (parti communiste de France) and PS (parti socialiste) on the left and the Gaullists and non-Gaullists (both with changing
names) on the right. This system waned and disappeared, due to fierce competition and rivalry between the parties and to the major decline of support for the PCF from the 1970s onward and PS' monopolisation of the left. (Knapp 2002; Sauger 2009)

The emergence of new cleavage lines and issues saw increased party realignment and the rise of new parties in the 1980s. This development was further encouraged by changes to party funding laws to curb illicit financing and by the model of the European Parliament elections held under a proportional representation system. The effects of the two-ballot system, providing smaller parties with more publicity to carve out a profile and lowering their entry costs, became diluted. At the same time, the first ballot of the national elections gradually developed into a protest vote mechanism for increasingly dissatisfied voters. A rise in abstention and protest votes for parties outside the established quadrille like the extreme right Front National (FN), led to the first cohabitation in 1986. Despite such deep changes, some argued, the party system was stable and resilient. Party coalitions continued to exist and were necessary for a governing majority. One party still dominated each side and the left-right divide survived, despite policy convergences at the 'centre'. (Knapp 2002; Knapp and Sawicki 2008; Sauger 2009) Some argued that the 2007 elections re-bipolarised the system leading to an imperfect two-party system between the PS and the UMP. (Grunberg and Haegel 2007) A point that appears in need of new scrutiny and possible revision with the 2017 victory of the centrist Emmanuel Macron and a new period or even form of cohabitation, as Macron has invited personalities from the PS and the right-wing LR (Les Républicains) into the government cabinet of his 'movement'.

The party cases included are the UMP, PS and PCF. In 2011, the UMP was in government, having won the 2007 elections and holding a majority of 313 of 577 seats in parliament. It formed a parliamentary group and held the presidential majority of 345 seats together with smaller centrist parties. The PS was the main opposition party and formed the parliamentary group groupe socialiste, radical, citoyen et divers gauche, today's Nouvelle Gauche, with 186 seats. The PCF was also in parliament, with 15 seats. It led the parliamentary unit groupe de la Gauche démocrate et républicaine, comprising smaller radical left parties.

My focus is primarily on the UMP and PS, given their relevance in French party politics and having provided all but two (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Emmanuel Macron) of its presidents since 1958. The smaller coalition parties, such as the Nouveau Centre
are not included in the analysis, despite MPs speaking during the debates, because they publicly only concurred with the official presidential, government and UMP line.

The reasoning for including the PCF, despite its arguable electoral irrelevance, is the relevance of the deep historic divide of the French left (e.g. Agulhon 2007) and the PCF’s dominance of the left in the Fifth Republic until the late 1970s. Moreover, I wanted to include an alternative voice that was raised during the debates. While it may not have been relevant or picked up at the time, it stands representative for the possibility of alternative national role propositions from the radical fringes. Radical alternatives and their presence (despite non-representation in parliament until 2012) in the public debate on various policy issues that can be linked to foreign policy, as research on the influence of the extreme right FN suggests. This concerns, e.g., the issue of security and its possible impact on policy-making (Shields 2008, 2014; Marlière 2009; Mondon 2013, 2014). Such parties can be in setting the agenda.

With international issues increasingly salient and radical populist parties positioning and campaigning on them, as discussed in chapter 1, the inclusion of an alternative voice seemed reasonable. This is by no means to argue that the far right and far left are in any sense equivalent, except for their location at the party system fringes and, in some cases, their populist strategies and radical demands. I am also not suggesting that the PCF is the most radical of the highly divided left in France. The aim is also not to implicitly claim that the far left had as much of an impact on agenda setting as the far right in recent decades. Yet, as the success of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the 2017 presidential election with nearly 20 percent of the first round vote in fourth place and ahead of the PS candidate at ca. 6 per cent (The Guardian 2017; Observer 2017; France-Presse 2017) and other radical left wins or increased support in Europe (notably Syriza in Greece, Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal and Podemos in Spain) suggest, it is far from impossible for such parties to become relevant in the near future. At the very least alternative national roles or radical national role interpretations and such parties' national role contestation put these in the public domain to be picked up by the voting public and mainstream parties in forthcoming debates or stress potential dilemma creating inter- or intra-role conflict over time.

**The German party-case selection: all parties in parliament**

The German party-case selection is less complex. Unlike the French electoral system that creates (or used to create) two blocks in which numerous smaller parties found a
place, the German electoral system has created a relatively stable multi-party system. The threshold to enter parliament has meant that a relatively small number of relatively large parties regularly enter parliament. Hence, parliament is not composed of two larger parties and many smaller parties, like in France. Furthermore, the proportional system requires parties to form coalitions after elections to govern. Thus, in 2011, six parties were in parliament.

My focus is on the CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, Green Party and Die Linke. The party coalition composed of CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) and CSU (Christlich Soziale Union) were the largest party after the 2009 parliamentary election with 33.8 per cent of the vote (239 of 622 seats). In party family classification literature, this party coalition is habitually characterised as Christian Democratic. Christian Democracy is then related to but more or less distinct, depending on the author, from the conservative party family. (Pridham 1977; Hanley 1996; Gottfried 2007) They formed a government coalition with the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei), which had come third with 14.6 per cent (93 seats). The liberal FPD held the foreign ministry (Guido Westerwelle) and the CDU’s Thomas the Mazière was Defence Minister (from early March 2011). The parliamentary opposition was composed of the Social Democratic SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and Die Linke. In 2009, the SPD had come second with 23 per cent (146 seats), Die Linke fourth with 11.9 per cent (76 seats) and the Green Party last with 10.7 per cent (68 seats). (Tagesschau.de 2009)

The parties were all included, given their relative strength and historic relevance to the party system. They span the political spectrum, with Die Linke on the left fringes, the SPD and Green Party centre-left, FDP economically liberal centrist, and the CDU/CSU as moderate, centre-right, middle-ground party. Conspicuously absent in parliament at the time was a more right-wing party.

These parties are all historically relevant. The CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD have deep roots in the history of the second half the twentieth century Germany, alternating in government coalitions throughout. The Green Party emerged later, with the new cleavages described in chapter 1, and has been in coalition with the SPD twice (1998-2002, 2002-2005). The Green Party’s Joschka Fischer was the foreign minister in both

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9 Referred to as CDU/CSU and one party hereafter for simplicity reasons, despite differences between CDU and CSU.
governments. Die Linke formed in 2007, from a merger of the German Democratic Republic's party SED's (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) successor PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) and a smaller West German radical left party. Its inclusion is also justified because it is the only remaining party categorically against German participation in military interventions.

3.6. The 2011 domestic context in France and Germany: incentives

The case selection started with the international context in 2011. To close, it looks at the 2011 domestic context. This gives credit to the arguments that parties' narratives may have been strategic and that the positions and national roles embedded in and justified through these narratives were too. It addresses motives and incentives and provides background on public opinion and the electoral calendar.

A foreign minister struggling party-internally and electorally?

In 2011, regional elections were upcoming and Germany was two years before the next parliamentary election. The junior coalition partner and, in particular, its foreign minister, was allegedly struggling in the poll predictions. (Koenig 2016; Bucher et al. 2013) At the same time, military intervention remains a central issue in foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The continuity and change literature frequently focuses on it, described in the international relation context. The topic also still sparks domestic debate and criticism. While most parties accept that Germany is expected to sometimes participate in interventions, the public is still largely opposed, and parliament and the constitutional court still play restraining roles, as outlined above.

It is within this domestic public attitude context that 2011 provided political incentives to the governing coalition. After the 2009 general election, the FDP had taken over two key institutions of the foreign policy executive: the foreign ministry and the ministry for economic cooperation and development. Within these, it could to shape German foreign policy (Oppermann and Brummer 2014). The FDP foreign minister Westerwelle (2009-2013), was reportedly the driving force behind the decision-making on Libya. Although decisions were allegedly coordinated with the chancellor (Miskimmon 2012). Given the 2011 context and the public's scepticism regarding German participation in military intervention, Westerwelle was accused to have used Libya for electoral strategy.

These claims have been challenged on the basis that the government would have likely taken a similar decision without regional elections immanent (Hansel and Oppermann
2014) and that positions were consistent with Westerwelle's record (Brummer and Oppermann 2017) and suit the chancellor and her priorities set on the management of the Eurocrisis. Yet, the accusations are part of the domestic context, since they were expressed by scholars and political opponents during the debates.

**A president in need of a boost to his presidential image?**

In 2011, France was one year before the presidential election and president Sarkozy's approval rates were plummeting. It is probable that he used diversionary tactics to improve his image and his chances of winning the 2012 election. The public is socialised into recognising as presidential certain symbols and acts. (Koenig 2016) It has been proposed that Sarkozy's personal style as hyperactive president and the public's and elites' presidential role expectations may, in the end, have cost him the victory in the 2012 presidential election (Cole 2012). In 2011, however, Sarkozy arguably also had other political incentives to appear as if acting decisively on Libya: He had to compensate for his government's first reaction to the so-called Arab Spring (Le Monde 2011a). Another possible motive may have been connected with Gaddafi's alleged funding of Sarkozy's 2007 presidential campaign, as later emerged (The Guardian 2013).

Be that as it may, public opinion on military intervention in Libya was not stable. A poll in early March 2011, suggested that the public was initially against it. (IFOP 2011a) Approval rates improved as the media and politicians expressed support for a military mission and once it was underway (Bucher et al. 2013; IFOP 2011b, 2011c, 2011e). It declined once the intervention continued into the Summer and French casualties made the news (IFOP 2011d). The evolution of public opinion supports proposed that Sarkozy's strategy was to improve his own ratings. It also showed that a majority of the public was not against military interventions in principle. Finally, it indicated that the president and his government had relative freedom in how to act in the case of Libya, because public opinion is easily swayed, so long as an operation is short and perceived as a success. This means that public opinion was probably not a strong domestic pressure for or against a more interventionist role selection, because it so easily shifts.

**Conclusion**

The country case selection’s international background and context to the 2011 intervention provided insight into the history of relations and interventions. It aimed to provide background on the country and party cases, and the 2011 international and domestic contexts, and to show that each country case selection is justifiable in itself.
As noted in this chapter, the thesis is not a formal case comparison. Yet, there is some advantage in selecting France and Germany as country cases. The two are middle-range powers with status and/or capabilities to back up this position in the international system. They have a history of conflict and of cooperation with each other via European institutions and integration in the twentieth century. In 2011, the two states were UNSC members. Expectations arose from these positions. The case selection also showed that there are significant differences between the two states in terms of the political system and the role of parties in decision-making. The next three chapters present the empirical evidence of the two country cases selected in this chapter and provide the analysis using the framework presented in chapter 2.
Chapter 4: French parties’ national role conceptions

This chapter explores French foreign policy, focusing on parties and national role statements. It applies the theoretical framework to the controversy surrounding the 2011 Libya decision-making. The unpacking of the state, including the focus on domestic actors, opportunities, incentives and ideas, and processes influencing foreign policy decisions are FPA contributions. A strength of role theory has been to argue that identity alone does not prescribe actions and that national role conceptions are links between national identity, and policy ideas and behaviour. Yet, much of the role theoretical work and other foreign policy research on France still stresses identity and interests as key.

This chapter finds that all three parties under study expressed a leader role. While all welcomed the Arab uprisings and condemned the violent reaction of the Gaddafi regime, they did not agree on the means and process for addressing the situation. The two main parties were in support of UNSC resolution 1973 (2011). They agreed on the need and the decision to use force in Libya, but disagreed on the process, style and preferred partnerships. The PCF disagreed on the use force, while also condemning the regime and its use of violence and proposing alternative roles. This chapter shows that while parties largely agreed on France's master-role, confirming its strength, parties disagreed on its interpretation. This suggests that role consensuses need closer scrutiny.

The consensus on the leader role masked inter-party differences. A closer examination of what was implied in this national role conception and deducted in policy means from it revealed the existence intra-role contestation over the leader role. Parties disagreed on how to interpret the role and how to enact it in practice. The chapter qualifies the leader role to make sense of differences. The aim was to uncover ideas underlying parties' national role conceptions. The analysis of the sources of role interpretations suggests that there were differences in role socialisation and that foreign policy traditions, ideology and international norms mattered to which national role is selected, how parties interpreted and whether they contested the role.

Part 1 reviews existing role theory literature on France, and studies on the French decision-making in 2011. Part 2 traces narratives and part 3 identifies parties' national role statements. It qualifies the leader role and points out role contestation, suggesting that parties interpreted the same role differently. Part 4 analyses these findings using the layered ideational theoretical framework.
1. French foreign policy: role theory and 2011 Libya studies

There are relatively few French foreign policy studies using role theory (Thumerelle and Le Prestre 1997; Aggestam 1999; Krotz 2001, 2015; Krotz and Sperling 2011; Hagan 2016; Koenig 2016). Existing role research focuses on the state as the unit level and/or national elites as unitary actors. The reasons for this range from the need of focus to the arguments against studying parties. The argument in this literature review is that even studies explicitly stressing elite role consensus or excluding the possibility of meaningful domestic role contestation, provide some ground for a closer look at parties.

1.1. Role research in foreign policy analysis of France

A key study supporting the argument that there may not be an elite consensus is Hagan’s (2016) analysis of role contestation during the 1914 crisis. He provides credence to the assumption that parties can select different national roles and can interpret national role conceptions differently. He notes that even in the case of a powerful French president, national roles were contested and role performance was far from determined by who the president was. He finds that political elites challenged and contested the meaning of the ally role and of alliance in the early twentieth century and that rival conceptions were entrenched, predated the crisis and intensified rather than muted during/ by it. Hagan’s study is on the Third Republic. The institutional parameters have since changed. However, even in the current Fifth Republic, the president is not all powerful, other domestic political actors are not powerless and parties are not irrelevant. Thus, Hagan’s findings are taken as indications as to the possibility of variation in current national role conceptions, with the caveat that they are not simply transferable to the Fifth Republic.

Role studies focussing on the Fifth Republic stress France’s leader role conception. In an early role study, Thumerelle and Le Prestre (1997) identify roles from policymakers’ statements in the early post-Cold War period. Their study provides an inventory of roles along national, European and international dimensions. In a later study on national roles and identities in the EU, Aggestam (1999) stressed France’s independent role, building on Holsti’s (1970) typology.

The most extensive study of the French role, combining leader with independent is Krotz’s (2015, see also 2001; Krotz and Sperling 2011 for a similar conceptualisation of roles). He describes the role as France’s self-view ‘[…] of an active and independent regional leader with ambitions of global scale and presence.’ Krotz argues that while
adjustments to self-view and roles have taken place, the key ingredients ‘[...] reach deep into French history.’ (2015, 66) The role is domestically rooted and constructed. Krotz characterises the dominant interpretation of history, its meaning and implications as ‘Gaullist consensus’. He recognises that this phenomenon predates de Gaulle but he singles de Gaulle out because he fused different elements into France's role conception.

Krotz (2015) provides an insightful engagement with French history and the origins of contemporary role elements. He recognises the possibility of domestic groups' and societal influences that can affect the evolution of historically rooted role constructions and can lead to role transformation. Yet, he argues that dominant frames of interpretation shape perspectives and delimit the interests such societal groups enter politics with.

Despite its strength, this study suffers from omissions and weaknesses. First, while noting disagreement on Sarkozy's 2009 decision to reintegrate France into NATO command (2015, 88) which was seen as in contradiction to a key element of de Gaulle's role conception for France and his legacy, Krotz fails to discuss this disagreement and its possible meaning for an assumed national role consensus.

Second, Krotz overly relies on de Gaulle's legacy for his historical framework. He does not engage with discussions of de Gaulle's legacy or the myth created around him (Hazareesingh 2012). Gaullism is arguably an empty vessel. Some even argue that the so-called Gaullist consensus never existed. Profound political fissures persisted, sometimes behind closed doors. (Howorth 1984) Thumerelle and Le Prestre (1997) note that the consensus was at best superficial. Controversies over France's role dominated post-Cold War debates and are not separable from domestic politics and disagreement on values and ideology. Arguably, the only consensus was on what France's role was not. Others propose that the consensus was a constraining myth. It hindered political and foreign policy reform. Policymakers pay lip-service to Gaullism, a framework that allows ample room for interpretation. (Menon 1996) It was Gaullism's lack of specificity that allowed consensus. But, it only half masks inter- and intra-party disagreement and contestation.

Third, Krotz's account of French history is extensive but selective. Two points bear particular importance with regard to a French national role notion and the case of Libya. Krotz does not mention the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Yet, it was the notions of progress and universality that informed revolutions and much of French intervention rhetoric derived from it. Instead, he traces these notions back to the French Revolution.
He provides, moreover and more crucially, little discussion on the Third Republic or republicanism. For him, the second half of the nineteenth century was only one in which France expanded its colonial empire and sought worldwide 'radiance' (2015, 47). Yet, republicanism is a key tradition informing French political debate (Chabal 2015). The omission of republicanism and of a thorough discussion of the Third Republic is surprising. Their symbols are central elements among Krotz's key historical reference points, such as the 'indivisible model republic' (2015, 71). While republicanism has arguably been fused in/with Gaullism there is a public debate on it (Chabal 2015).

Fourth, Krotz speaks of dominant interpretations of history, ignoring the advances in French historiography and the debates in France that new historical research on de Gaulle and republicanism offers. The debates on the largely contested colonial legacy are a particular omission since that legacy links back to the Third Republic, on which much of today's republican tradition draws on. And it is this tradition that Krotz derives the master role's central vocabulary from, mirroring French colonial expansion at its peak. These historical debates spill over into politics, for example through historic political apologies for the past, such as for the crimes of the Vichy regime or colonialism. Such debates can have ramifications for identity construction and role interpretations.

History, undoubtedly, matters to national role conceptions and interpretations. Krotz's approach runs the risk of simplifying the complex discussions and negotiations that take place (nationally and, not without national impact, internationally) on national histories. Paraphrasing Rathbun (2004): while all parties may agree on the historical sources of national roles and key vocabulary associated with a national role, they may not interpret these roots and words in the same way. Aggestam (1999) stresses this point when she defines national role conceptions as categories that allow for a 'certain flexibility of interpretation'. Krotz's treatment of the Gaullist consensus, of history and identity, as largely agreed upon is not unique to him or role theory studies of French foreign policy. The point is that different actors draw different lessons and priorities for foreign policy and France's role from the same reference points, including de Gaulle and the Republic.

Koenig's (2016) multilevel role contestation analysis is the only role theory study on the 2011 Libya intervention decision. She provides insights into why the EU did not act decisively and member states failed to find a common stance and course of action. According to her, foreign policy elites in the three key states (France, Germany and UK) contested the role of the EU and held diverging conceptions of it. For reasons of focus,
Koenig does not explore domestic level disagreement and role contestation further than noting that 'France's military leadership was largely uncontested internally in France.' She claims that '[...] the elite consensually backed the military intervention'. (2016, 165) In her account, only the public disagreed by changing tack on the issue from support to rejection. This framing of an elite consensus depends on who one includes in the elite(s) and whether one factor in differences in process, in addition to foreign policy goals (stopping mass murder) and tools (military intervention). The inclusion of other parties than the governing and the main opposition party, for example, would not have allowed the conclusion that the elite consented on military intervention as the appropriate tool or on how French leadership in the case of Libya should have manifested itself.

1.2. Foreign policy analysis of France and the 2011 intervention in Libya

Studies of France's decision-making on the Libya intervention concentrate on the state or elite-level and the president. Many explanations for the decision are founded on realist premises, focusing on geopolitical strategy, national interests, and strategic reorientation towards NATO and the US. They emphasise the French desire to balance Germany's rise and its ascension to European leadership since the 1990s and during the 2008-2009 economic crisis, and since the US' weakening process following the 2003 Iraq Invasion (Simón 2013). French decision-making in 2011 is seen as about France's position and intra-European rivalry. It aimed at a realignment to counter the European hegemon. Other explanations are based on culturalist assumptions arguing that national history and identity played a major role. France is characterised as acting value-based and as seeking to spread its values (Belkin 2011). Some scholars combine the two explanations: the decision was based on national principles deemed universal and on material interests, in North Africa, including the desire to contain refugee movements as consequences if Libya lost control over maritime borders (Davidson 2013; Tertrais 2013).

Sarkozy's personality and personal ambitions are other explanations, often combined with analysis on the elite or state-level. The reasoning is based on the strength of the president in general and the character and style of Sarkozy in particular. His pro-active or even 'hyperactive' personality and aggressive foreign policy style are referenced alongside his political incentives. A possible aim was to compensate for his government's handling of the situation in Tunisia where his foreign minister offered help to the besieged president (Le Monde 2011a; The Guardian 2011a). He also needed to boost his
presidential image as his popularity was plummeting ahead of the presidential elections in 2012 and, last but not least, he allegedly desired to cover up Gaddafi’s funding his 2007 presidential campaign. The individual level reasoning explains the style or process by which the case was handled and some motivations. Yet, they do not explain why Sarkozy and his government chose to pursue their argumentation line (Ostermann 2016).

The existing studies of French foreign policy and Libya 2011 only capture part of the picture. There were controversy and differences between the parties on the decision. Ostermann’s (2016) analysis of MPs' discursive construction of the intervention substantiates this. Some explanations underestimate the political ideas shaping interests and decisions. Others are too deterministic, overstressing the influence of culture, history and identity. This thesis proposes that assumptions of a strong national identity based on consensus on national history and symbols do not correspond to the complexity of French political and public debate. There may be a common set of historical references, but different parties interpret it differently, drawing different lessons from the same past (Rathbun 2004).

The overview of role research on French foreign policy shows that, on the whole, there is recognition of partisan differences and contestation of foreign policy and that some scholars even note domestic debate and dispute on national roles (Thumerelle and Le Prestre 1997; Hagan 2016). The most extensive and/or contemporary studies, however, black-box the state or elites, and argue the existence of a national role consensus. Yet, intellectual and political history of French politics suggests that this is a deterministic reliance on a common history, culture and notion of identity. The review of the literature on the French decision on Libya shows that parties are the great absentee in the analyses, despite evidence of contestation and differences between parties. The next part delves into two central parliamentary debates on Libya. Part 2 traces parties’ foreign policy narratives and part 3 identifies the national roles and role conceptions they selected within their stories on the 2011 uprisings, the Libya conflict and intervention.

2. French parties’ narratives and agreement on the national role

Parties agreed on role elements in the context of the Libya intervention decision-making. There was consensus on the need for international legality and cooperation, on the condemnation of the Libyan regime's violence, and on France's leader role. Part 2 traces these foreign policy narratives of the uprisings and the Libyan conflict.
There was also a French leader role consensus. The UMP, PS and PCF agreed that a leader role performance was expected, pointing to perceived alter-role prescriptions as part of the national role conception and selection. The parties recognised that it was within France's capacities and shared the view that the role would enhance France's reputation.

The UMP, PS and PCF agreed on the importance of international law and cooperation. France ought to stay within the international legal framework and refrain from acting alone (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880; Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883). This pointed to a consensus on a good international citizen role (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012). The parties recognised that France's credibility as a leader was dependent on respecting international rules and collective decisions. One PS MP noted:

This resolution provided in effect an incontestable legal framework to the allied intervention in Libya. A legal framework that was necessary as well as the multilateral framework that guarantees optimal political leadership of the operation. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225)

This chapter traces the parties' narratives to locate national role statements as part of the reasoning on the Arab uprisings and the conflict in Libya and to make sense of differences between parties. The narratives showed that parties agreed on some elements, such as the removal of Gaddafi from power but also that there was disagreement on the process and tools. The major differences were on appearance, damage to France's reputation, and on what and why it ought to lead. Parties expressed different interpretations of the leader role. These leader roles were in part incompatible with each other. This role interpretation variation can improve our understanding of the differences in policy preferences and the opposition's criticism of the government. It also represented domestic role contestation.

2.1. The governing party's uprising, conflict and intervention narratives

The UMP viewed the Arab uprisings as aspirations to liberty, democracy and dignity (Juppé (UMP) 2011b, 5235; Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1882; Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5219). The party's ministers and MPs reasoned that North Africans and Arabs, including Libyans, were protesting for liberty and democracy. The party held these values to be universal and the Arab uprisings in the name of these values as proof for their universality. The prime minister noted: 'Since the beginning of 2011, the wind of democracy and liberty blows in the Arab World.' On Libya, he continued:

[...] unfortunately, the Gaddafi regime decided to drown in blood the revolt that threatened him. Within two weeks, the hopes of the Libyan people were
transformed into a nightmare. Last Thursday, Benghazi was the last refuge of liberty in Libya, risking to fall into the hands of the troops loyal to Gaddafi. The revolution seemed to live its last hours. Two days later, in Benghazi, hope was reborn. The French flag was waved, the flag of another Libya was waved, carried by dreams of democracy and modernity. (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877)

The narrative put a stress on the support of what was viewed as reform, progress, and modernity leading to a new era. The prime minister stated that: ‘[...] France aspires to pacifism, solidarity and progress in Mediterranean region.’ (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1879)

The UMP reasoned that the conflict in Libya began when Libyans called for liberty, democracy and dignity and the regime met the protests and demands with violence. The conflict narrative was essentially based on the reasoning that progress was met with the violent reaction of a regime. Where self-criticism figured in the narratives, it was muted by a focus on EU failures in its neighbourhood policies and Mediterranean initiatives not going far enough. Some criticism also concerned France's past relations and support of dictators in its sphere of influence in Africa and the Middle East, and the prioritisation of stability over human rights and democracy.

UMP's MPs asserted that the use of force in response to the regime's violent reaction and threats followed careful risk and consequence analysis, and the exhaustion of non-violent means. UMP ministers and MP stressed that France and its allies did not want to impose on Libyans. The intervention was the precondition, preparing for a diplomatic solution and for Libyans to make their own decisions. This intervention narrative showed a belief in the prospect of a political solution after taking a side in what several in the party recognised to be a civil war in a divided and tribal society. (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877, 2011b, 5218; Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883; Teissier (UMP) 2011b, 5232)

2.2. The PS' narratives on North Africa and Libya

The PS' Arab uprising narrative was similar. It also viewed the protests as about liberty, democracy and dignity. Equally, it viewed France's role performance as in defence of the liberty that was spreading in the world at this moment (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880). One MP stressed that ‘[...] through the uprisings in the Arab World, the Arab peoples expressed a legitimate aspiration to liberty and democracy.’ (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225) Similarly, and more explicitly than the UMP, the PS drew comparisons to French history and, in particular, the French Revolution (1789) (confirmed in interviews with PS officials, May 2017). The party viewed France as a model, leading by example (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882). In the two parties' uprising narrative, the construction of a democratic-
self mirroring the protests in North Africa and Libya came through (Ostermann 2016). The protests reinforced beliefs in progress and universal will to liberty and democracy.

The PS also agreed with the UMP that the conflict in Libya was caused by a dictator reacting to legitimate calls for liberty and democracy of Libya's oppressed people. It was a reaction to peaceful protest for liberty and democracy (Lequiller (UMP) 2011a, 1739; Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881; Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5217). Within this context, France's role was carved out. The PS shared the view that this role was to be a leader and Universal-French values defender. This role implied elements of liberator, saviour or protector that the party explicitly rejected (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880).

Like the UMP, the PS MPs argued that France was creating the conditions for Libyans to liberate themselves. It agreed that military intervention was a precondition for a political solution. It welcomed the intervention and the UN mandate (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225). The party had called multiple times for a no-fly zone since February 2011 (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880; Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225). The party's MPs implied that the PS would have liked France take the initiative earlier. The parliamentary group leader and the later foreign minister under President Hollande noted that France had nearly acted too late. He argued that it was important to weaken Gaddafi militarily and diplomatically isolate him to force a political process. (Ayrault (PS) 2011) Another MP, a later prime minister under Hollande, noted in July that the operation could not be the end in itself. He claimed that the conditions for a political solution that ends the operation needed to be created to allow Libya to become a state based on law, democracy, justice and liberties, through negotiations. The PS recognised that the political exit needed to be defined, arrived at within a multilateral frame and in cooperation with the African Union, Arab League and EU (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5226–27). Implied and sometimes explicit was a criticism of the government, asking for political priorities clarification and diplomatic and political progress acceleration (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881; Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225).

2.3. The PCF's narratives on Arab uprisings and the conflict in Libya

Lastly, the PCF agreed on the leader role selection. It welcomed UNSC resolution 1973. However, it stressed its non-violent measures. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011) Its narrative of the intervention was different from the other two parties. It rejected the use of force. The PCF did not view military force as a precondition for a political solution. It called the intervention a 'war' and stressed the escalation risks and the likelihood of a prolonged engagement. One MP quoted Algerian poet Boualem Sansal: 'war of good against evil has
only ever benefited evil’ and paraphrased Rony Brauman, president of médecins sans frontiers (1982-1994): ‘never have bombardments allowed the instalment of democracy or pacified a country.’ (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1885) MPs argued that violence produces more violence. Its MPs stressed that conflict resolution required a political solution:

To really protect civilians – and that has to be our common goal – we have to find a political solution. Only the diplomatic solution can bring about a lasting and just end to the conflict that allows the Libyan people to live in security and to freely choose its future while respecting territorial integrity. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229)

The PCF contended that civilians could not be protected through the use of force. One MP stated: 'A bombing campaign cannot serve to protect civilians.' (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5226) The party further noted that Arab League criticism soon after the operation began. The organisation had expressed fear of Western imperialism and noted that the mission was already going beyond its mandate. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1884) The PCF sided with the intervention's critics, including Brazil and Germany who had expressed fears of increased tensions at the expense of civilians. One MP noted:

It suffices to remind ourselves of the position of global powers such as India, China or Russia who refuse to support a military offensive. But the attitude of other countries is even more significant. First, there is Germany [...]. In this Germany joins Brazil [...]. [...] Importantly, this military offensive troubles the people of the region who reject Gaddafi but also refuse all Western imperialism. The head of the Arab League of Nations [...] criticised the Western bombing of Libya [...]. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1883–84)

The party also feared consequences in the region and stressed the potential harm the intervention's repercussions would do to the Arab uprisings’ prospects of success.

This narrative was informed by the PCF's reasoning about the Arab uprisings. It viewed them as a struggle for liberation but also a rejection of authoritarian regimes and of neo-imperialism. The party's MP noted: 'This debate is another occasion to express our solidarity with the Arab peoples' struggle and, more precisely, with the Libyan people, moved by the wind of liberation, as deep as legitimate.' (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1883)

This part noted the role consensus and the variation in parties' narratives about events. There was some agreement on the causes of the uprisings but also disagreement on the events in Libya and how to address conflict once it arises. The chapter now unpacks the apparent role consensus. This becomes in part necessary because parties disagreed on the need to intervene (PCF) and criticised the government on the process, timing and style (PS). This suggests that role consensus claims miss nuances.
3. French parties’ national role interpretations and contestation

There was a clear leader role consensus within the above narratives. This part describes the French leader role as opposition parties criticised the government’s role enactment and disagreed on policy tools, process and style. This part unpacks the role consensus, identifying role elements and hierarchies. Thereby, it notes parties’ role contestation. It proposes that the French leader role is a relatively empty shell, more pronounced on procedure than content. It qualifies the role, proposing that the UMP defined the leader role as an activist while the PS stressed it as independent and European. The two parties then agreed to fill the leader role with the Universal-French values defender role content and purpose. By contrast, the PCF proposed a conflict resolution-mediator, and UN defender and reformer French leader role. This part closes on the role contestation these variations in interpretation represented. It was focused on the process (PS) and on the means (PCF) of role performance, and on the content/purpose of the leader role.

3.1. The UMP’s activist leader role interpretation

The UMP argued that France had performed the leader role since the start of the violence in Libya. Government officials and MPs noted that France was the initiator of the UN and military action. It was the first state to recognise the National Transitional Council (NTC) as legitimate Libyan government and lead efforts to protect civilians and find a solution to the conflict (e.g., Lequiller (UMP) 2011a, 1739). The foreign minister noted that not only had France led the initiative on the intervention, it would also lead to organise peace in Libya (Juppé (UMP) 2011a, 1891).

The UMP made multiple references to R2P. This was indirectly about France’s leader role. MPs noted the pioneering nature of UNSC resolution 1973 invoking R2P (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1882). The president of the foreign policy committee argued that the resolution vote was a major turning point in global governance (Muselier (UMP) 2011, 1888). The UMP’s R2P narrative further added a pioneer-leader dimension to the initiator-leader role.

France was not only leading; it was enacting an activist leader role, according to the UMP. MPs and ministers used words to the effect that France was taking the initiative, fighting, persevering, convincing, influencing and shaping. This conveyed the impression of persistence. The prime minister (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877) noted:
[…] France fought relentlessly to convince within international frameworks [...]. France refused this fatality [the threatened mass murder], The president chose to act. He and the foreign minister, whose determination I applaud, convinced the UNSC to refuse the unacceptable.

The parliamentary group leader (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883) argued that France was not giving up and continuing efforts to organise and lead a firm response to the situation and events in Libya:

[t]his intervention [...] is the fruit of long diplomatic persuasion work. France for more than 10 days is at the head of the Libyan dossier [...] With perseverance France pursues its diplomatic work at all levels [...].

MPs and ministers argued that France was cooperating with international and European partners. One MP noted that it was leading its partners (Lequiller (UMP) 2011b, 2200). France was convincing partners and working ‘[...] with all its Western, Arab and African partners, in the UNSC [...]’ (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877 but also 1878) The UMP highlighted the multilateral framework that they argued was increasing France’s actions’ legitimacy and its credibility (e.g. Fort (UMP) 2011, 2206). The party argued that the UN mandate and international legal framework enhanced France’s credibility (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1882, 1883, 2011b, 5223, 5224, 5238; Muselier (UMP) 2011, 1888; Teissier (UMP) 2011a, 1890; Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878). These emphases on partners, legitimacy and credibility suggested the relevance of alter-role perceptions in UMP statements, as credibility is about how others/partners view state actions.

This leader role interpretation and enactment were adding to France’s respect and voice. One MP noted: ‘[…] the positive image they [the president and the foreign minister] have given France in the eyes of the international community.’ (Teissier (UMP) 2011a, 1889). Another MP stressed that the president ‘[...] shows us that the voice of France is listened to and respected in the world. He shows us that our country can convince and lead other nations, in the service of human rights and the respect for international law.’ (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1882) Finally, the prime minister emphasised the reception of these efforts in Libya: ‘In Benghazi, the tricolour flag has been lifted and this gesture reminds us of our duties.’ (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1880) Thus, France’s role enactment had been well-received by the international partners and Libyans, and this was taken as evidence for its reputation and alter-role expectations toward the state and its duties in the world.

The party also showed an awareness of domestic leader-role expectations and for the potential of contestation of its role interpretation and enactment. Traditionally, the leader role includes a European element and a distancing from US and NATO. France’s
leader role performance is made possible through a regional leader role assertion. In the case of Libya, France failed to unite European partners. Sarkozy was accused of consternating them through lack of communication and cooperation. Instead, his government accepted NATO leadership of the operation from 31 March 2011. UMP MPs and minister expressed regret over the failure to convince European partners and downplayed the extent of NATO involvement. This showed the relevance of domestic audiences and political opponents’ perceptions and criticism in national role statements.

The PS and PCF criticised the government’s leader role performance. They thereby contested its leader role interpretation and revealed their leader role interpretations.

3.2. The PS’ independent and European leader role interpretation

The PS agreed on the leader role. It focused its criticism on the process, alter-role perceptions of the performance and the European dimension of the leader role. The party’s leader role interpretation was revealed in its UMP’s role performance criticism. The PS stressed that France’s decision-making had been inconsistent, incoherent and erratic from the start of the Arab uprisings. The leader of the PS group (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1880) noted:

Three long weeks passed before the adoption of UNSC resolution 1973. At the time, the regime’s opponents were at the doors of Tripoli. [...] we have not been easy on the government, I have contested firmly with my friends in our parliamentary group the ambiguous position of the president. We have deplored the silences, the complacency and misinterpretations of Mrs Alliot-Marie [the then foreign minister] when the Arab world was – and still is – at a historical moment. We have denounced France’s loss of credibility [...].

The PS criticised the government’s misjudged reaction regarding Tunisia and its slow response on Libya. The UMP had misinterpreted the situation and the historic moment. The PS claimed that it had recognised the significance of the uprisings, expressed support for the revolts from the start and called for a no-fly zone in Libya as soon as violence erupted (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225). Through the claim that France had lost credibility and that the PS had recognised the historical nature of the events, the PS showed an awareness of the relevance of others’ for France’s role recognition as a leader, and the PS’ own claim to government responsibility. In short, it showed a recognition of the social nature of national roles. The PS considered France’s successful leader role performance not only as based on capabilities and a perception of activism but also on credibility in motives, evidenced in policy coherence and action consistency.
The party noted that consistency and credibility were harmed when France overstepped the UN mandate, as the party had feared (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881; Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5227). For the PS, France's leader role was conditioned on the good international citizen role performance. The party considered the breach of UN sanctions mandates through the delivery of arms of rebel groups and the possible expansion of the mission beyond the mandate as damaging France's reputation and, by extension, the potential for its recognition as a leader. This damage was viewed as especially dangerous, because of the fragility of public support for the intervention in Arab and Western states.

In addition to the perception- and recognition-based criticism, the PS disapproval of the government’s role performance, also revealed its stress of the EU and NATO dimension. The party noted that France had failed to lead and unite its European partners. Franco-British cooperation and the unilateral recognition of the NTC had been done without communicating with EU partners. This failure had damaged Franco-German relations and harmed France's ability to lead. One MP noted that Libya was evidence for the state of Europe of defence and in particular the Franco-German relations (Boucheron 2011, 5239). Another MP noted that the 2009 NATO command reintegration had been justified as appeasing EU partners who had considered French aloofness from this organisation as an obstacle for a common European security and defence policy. At the time, the government had argued that this step would breathe new life into EU foreign policy and that it would also improve Franco-American relations, making the two states more equal partners. The PS observed that Libya had made the failure of this dual strategy obvious.

The EU was the great absentee and EU diplomacy lacking:

[...] we miss a Europe of defence, a European diplomacy. One cannot but notice that the EU is the great absent in this operation: it has no visibility, it does not manifest a coherent European vision, by contrast to what [the government] promised, when it reintegrated NATO command. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5226)

The MP argued that Franco-American relations remained unequal and the Libyan case had shown that the US was not interested in renewing these transatlantic ties. More, NATO involvement risked weakening France’s position and uniqueness:

' [...] following systematically the more powerful of its allies, France risks losing its uniqueness that so often led it, in grave crises, to hold discourses that the peoples of the world learned to love about it.' (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225)

In sum, France had failed to credibly enact a European or even European leader role, once considered a cornerstone of its global leader role. At the same time, it had sacrificed uniqueness for unreciprocated closeness to the US. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5226)
proposal of a *European* and *independent* from the global hegemon leader role was a form of intra-role contestation. The PS contested the government on its *activist* leader role performance and the UMP on this role interpretation.

### 3.3. Why lead? Role consensus on the *Universal-French value defender*

Despite the variation in role interpretation and the role contestation, the UMP and PS agreed on the reasoning for and purpose of the leader role. It was France's mission to lead. The two parties viewed this mission as a *Universal human rights defender* role. It was based on an essential belief in the place and role of France in the world because *it is France*. The UMP's parliamentary group leader argued that France's role enactment was *France's* leader role: 'France was keeping its rank and enacting its leader role.' (Jacob (UMP) 2011b, 5223) As part of this, the two parties referred to honour and pride. The foreign minister expressed pride in France's leader role (Juppé (UMP) 2011b, 5235). One MP spoke of France's honour in relation to the values-based role. He argued: 'When our soldiers are engaged in the defence of our values of democracy and liberty [...] it is the honour of France that is at stake.' (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1882) He further noted: 'We want to express our pride in seeing France assume its values of liberty and democracy, its values of dignity and respect.' (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883) While the PS' emphasis on pride and honour was less pronounced, one MP indirectly referred to the honourable goals of French leadership: 'the defence of France's message in the world, of its values, of its rank as power has a painful counter-party: the sacrifice of our soldiers abroad who perish for peace and security to progress in the world.' (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225)

A second reasoning for this role conception is linked and explicitly about values traced to a particular history and what France is perceived to represent in the world. France is a leader because it is *France and its unique and special history*. It is France's destiny to support and defend its values derived from it. The two parties stressed that these values are universal *and* quintessentially French. The Arab uprisings in the name of these values were further proof for universality. The prime minister noted that the president had acted loyal to the values that founded the nation. He continued by noting the historic nature of the events and the universality of the ideas invoked:

> The entire region is undergoing a powerful democratic shock wave. Its scope is historic. Even if all are unique, these movements are based on the power of universal ideals, these humanist ideals too often mocked, too often accused of being the privilege of our old democracies. But no, these ideas are present in the
hearts of all peoples and they can rise and change history. (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1877)

The prime minister observed the relevance to universal values motivating the military intervention: 'It is in these cities [the military intervention had helped protect] that a part of the future of the universal values that have long been ours is played out. It is in these cities that the perceived binary choice between authoritarianism and Islamism will play out.' (Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5219)

The PS stressed that the military intervention was supporting Libyan's aspirations to universal values of liberty and democracy, and protecting and saving lives. The party drew a link between France's past and values and what Libyans were demanding:

We are the country of liberty. We believe we wrote everything. Other people rewrite in their language in their alphabet the formidable energy that inspires us since 1789. It was our responsibility that it did not stop at Benghazi so that the Arab Peoples can write their history. Our pride is to accompany them without preceding them nor abandoning them. For us today, the struggle for liberty has a name: Libya. (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882)

The PS also argued that this role led it to support and would accompany the democratic transition and developments in the region as part of the defence of liberty:

[...] the idea of liberty is gaining new grounds. Our strategic vision has to lead us to accompany the Arab World in the implementation of principles that we believe to be universal. Today, this is happening through the protection of populations who without international intervention would have been promised to barbarity. Tomorrow, this will happen through the support of all liberated people to consolidate democracy, favouring economic development, and assuring cooperation with partners who no longer want to be treated as simple demanders/obligated [obligés]. We have to support a process that can allow the emergence of the rule of law while preserving the liberty of conscience and the separation of state and religion [le temporal du spirituel]. (Interruption) Democracy, liberty and economic development are the best barriers to fanaticism and terrorism. (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881–82)

Consequently, the demands and aspirations for liberty and democracy, and the perceived analogy between France's revolutionary history and the events in the North of Africa, the two parties viewed France's value-based role called for and even expected of France. This also showed the strong perceived alter-role expectation of this national role conception.

Despite the two parties' disagreement on the leader role interpretation and enactment, they agreed that France was performing its Universal-French values defender role: ' [...] we had a few days to assume our responsibility. And we assumed it. Our country was at
the rendezvous with its values.’ (Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5220) PS group leader (in the citation above) appeared to agree that France had enacted the role.

This agreement on this role's enactment suggests that it is was or is independent of the leader role and that it can be enacted, even if the leader role is not performed well. For this role, the stress was on the realisation of the military intervention, rather than the decision-making process, who it was realised with, the credibility of motives and consistency of decisions and behaviour. Yet, one PS MP noted that the government's initial hesitations had tarnished the robust message France should have sent:

[...] we wanted to deliver the message to a youth moved by justice and liberty that we would support them and that we would not arm those repressing the protests. However, your government at first went through a period of U-turns. [...] Some of your ministers behaved as if the Arab revolutions were aimed at creating chaos and would spread Islamism. We would have preferred France deliver a different message to the youth of Tunisia, to the youth of Benghazi, to the youth of Egypt, that there is no antinomy to the respect of human rights and the universal values that we have always carried within us [...]. (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225)

This echoed the noted importance of sending a signal to other dictators (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881–82) and the implications of France's decision/compulsion to perform this role (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878). It was indicative of France's role enactment on Libya being about more than the immediate need to protect and save Libyan civilians.

3.4. The PCF's conflict resolution-mediator, UN defence and reform leader

While the PCF agreed on the leader role selection. It contested the role interpretation and performance of the other two parties. It proposed that France ought to lead on negotiating a peaceful solution and transition. Beyond that, the party argued that France ought to lead in the defence and reform of the UN.

The PCF filled the leader role with content/purpose arguing that France should lead to mediate a political solution to the conflict. This was part of the party's narrative on the use of force and its prospect for sustainable peace and conflict resolution. It viewed violence as engendering violence and intervention as an act of war.

Not unlike the PS, the PCF emphasised the European dimension. However, it argued that France ought to cooperate with EU partners in order for diplomacy and negotiations to succeed. One MP noted that such an approach had been rejected from the start and:

We propose that France takes the initiative with the EU to call for an international conference at the highest level under the UN framework or solicits a special session
of the UN General Assembly. The Libyan protagonists will be called upon to participate with the support of the Arab League of Nations and the African Union. We will need new international power relations for a non-ambiguous resolution, clearly delimited and under the aegis of the UN and not NATO. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229)

This leader role was congruent with PCF calls on France, as a UNSC member, to lead in the defence of the UN, through guaranteeing and defending international law:

France ought to be – given its role at the heart of the UNSC – the guarantor of the fundamental pillar of the UN charter, especially article 2, paragraph 4 that forbids all state the use of force or the threat of the use of force. In favouring UNSC resolution 1973, France failed in its international obligations and participated in the instalment of the new global governance of the law of the strongest. Thereby, it contributed to the challenging of international peace and security. There can be no international legality in the destruction of a UN member state. Such a goal is counter-productive [...]. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229)

The PCF argued that France had not enacted its leader role. France's actions had harmed its credibility. The decision to intervene in Libya was part of a pattern of selective military operations. Selectivity was framed as inconsistency. More, the party argued that France's foreign policy was contradictory because it was supporting some authoritarian regimes while seeking to overthrow others (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1883, 1884). One MP described this pattern: 'Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case: it summarises France's relations with the dictators of this world. [...]’ (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5228) Instead of a Universal-French values defender role France had enacted a neo-colonial or imperialist role. The people in the region had cautioned against new expressions of Western imperialism and viewed this intervention as nothing else than interference by the former colonisers. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1884)

The PCF raised the involvement public intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy (BHL) in the NTC recognition, while the French foreign minister was meeting European homologues to discuss a common approach to Libya, as illustrating France’s incoherent foreign policy, the party argued, was the announcement, by, of France’s NTC recognition as legitimate. Similarly, the party raised Gaddafi’s invitation to Paris by Sarkozy in 2007 when arms deals were concluded, as part of a pattern of inconsistent and contradictory foreign policy. The selectivity of France’s Middle East policy, intervening in some cases of human rights abuses and staying aloof in others, damaged its credibility and thereby respect for its leadership. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1884–1885; Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5228) The raising of these points showed that likely alter-role perceptions of France's decisions and actions mattered to how the PCF viewed its role performance and recognition. This was
also evident in the PCF's criticism of France's perceived closeness to the US. It accused the government of pretending to play a leader role while the US was leading from behind. Thus, France was performing a leader role, fulfilling a cover function to the US.

Beyond the case of Libya, the PCF argued that France ought to lead in the defence and reform of global governance, including the UN. One MP noted:

[...] based on a renewed doctrine of multilateralism, let's realise friendship between nations within the framework of a democratised UN that will no longer be the tributary of some few. To find a respectable and respected voice again, France has to call for the reform of global governance that today serves the interests of a close circle of great powers. The decision-making organs of the UN, the IMF and the World Bank need to be democratised urgently. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229)

In sum, the PCF contested the leader role interpretation of the two other parties. This was not evident in the proposal of an alternative leader role and criticism of the government's actual role enactment. Yet, the PCF's role selection stayed within the master-role, showing the strength of this national role conception and consensus on it.

Having traced the narratives, identified and qualified the national role interpretations and contestation, the chapter now turns to the potential sources for variation and disagreement on the leader role and the roles that give it purpose and direction.

4. Why lead: sources of role interpretations and contestation

The final part of the chapter traces the plausible sources for role selection, interpretation and contestation after this chapter identified national role statements, interpretations and contestation. It begins with the Gaullist role consensus and the role elements found in parties' role statements. It shows the relevance of international norms in parties' filling the leader role with meaning and purpose. The chapter ends with a look at the consensus on the Universal-French values defender role via a focus on ideology. It argues that this role consensus is evidence for role decontestation.

4.1. Foreign policy tradition in the leader role consensus

The first discernible foreign policy tradition was the Gaullist leader role that still informs parties' view that France ought to perform a leader role in international relations. It forms part of de Gaulle's vision of France's role by which France had to act as if it was a great power in order to be recognised as great power, even in the absence of the material resources to be one (Hoffmann 1974). The chapter's identification of this role conception
reinforces claims that it is deeply rooted in culture and history (e.g. Krotz 2015). It strengthens assertions that elites – and the public – are socialised into this role, and expect and view it as expected of France. In particular, the PCF agreeing on the leader role seemed to substantiate this. Thus, at first, this chapter confirmed the consensus on France as: ‘[…] active and independent regional leader with ambitions of global scale and presence […]’ (Krotz 2015, 66). Parties agreed that France's inherent and/or capability-based role was a leader role.

The different leader role interpretations and intra-role contestation raised questions over the sources of such variance, the possibility of inter-role conflict on role elements and ensuing dilemma solution, and the validity of claims of leader role consensus.

**The Gaullist tradition and the UMP's leader role interpretation**

Activism is an element of the Gaullist foreign policy tradition. It corresponded to Sarkozy's personality described as hyperactive (Rémond 2007; Cole 2012) and to his domestic need to portray himself as an activist statesman ahead of the 2012 presidential elections. Koenig (2016) suggests that this was a plausible reason for his stress on and performance of the leader role. Using foreign policy as a way of improving domestic approval ratings had worked in the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict when Sarkozy took the initiative to mediate between the conflict parties. The emphasis on this role element was also in line with Sarkozy's 2007 electoral campaign in which he had promised a break with his predecessors' foreign policy that he had described as fatalist and failing to actively shape the forces of globalisation (Le Monde 2007; Rémond 2007). In his activism, Sarkozy deviated from a widespread defeatist attitude, concerned with domestic crisis and declining status (Hazareesingh 2015; Chabal 2015; Maclean and Szarka 2008; Sonntag 2008). He expressed the desire to show that France was a contender for a global leader role, able to shape and not suffer the consequences of globalisation. This wish was reinforced by the perceived side-lining of France in the management of the Eurozone crisis. France's activist leader role definition under Sarkozy and the UMP can be seen as a contemporary attempt to act as if to be recognised as state its leaders want it to be.

The 2011 activist leader role enactment can be viewed, similarly to the 2009 decision to reintegrate NATO military command, as an 'update' of the Gaullist tradition. While this step corresponded to Sarkozy's reported pro-Americanism and admiration for the US (Lepri 2010) it also followed from the waxing and waning relationship between France and NATO since de Gaulle's retreat from this command in 1966 (Vaïsse 2009). It was an
attempt to mend relations with the US strained since the 2003 fallout over the French decision not to participate in and to criticise the Iraq invasion (Bozo 2016). Thus, the activist leader role interpretation, and choice of the UK and the US as preferred partners, can be rationalised as a continuation of a Gaullist foreign policy tradition.

The UMP contested a traditional definition of the leader role. The weakening of the EU in France's leader role was a shift in the traditional leader role-enactment (Koenig 2016). It was a break from role conceptions as allied but not aligned to the US. (Krotz and Sperling 2011 refer to former foreign minister under Chirac Hubert Védrine, in particular). By the time France reintegrated into NATO military command, it was clear that NATO had not disintegrated after the Cold War as some expected. It had found new tasks, with new, loyal alliance partners in East Central Europe and it was there to stay. De Gaulle had used the EU as stepping stone and means to balance against the US global power and NATO in Europe, to assert France's rank and carve out a global role. With the rise of Germany, not least during the Eurozone crisis, the permanence of NATO on European soil and the weakening US in a multipolar world, the need to balance against the US decreased while the need to contain Germany increased. The 2009 decision was a change of tactic that consisted of attempting, in this new context, what de Gaulle had failed to achieve: shaping NATO from within. Steps toward this had already begun under President Chirac (Vaïsse 2009; Bozo 2016). Thus, the 2009 decision was not a rupture with the independent foreign policy tradition not a radical change from past Franco-NATO relations. Previous presidents had already worked on improving cooperation. Chirac reframed NATO relations for a new context and as part of Europeanisation and the professionalization of French armed forces. He saw the alliance as part of France reasserting its rank. (Bozo 2016; Charillon 2013) Within this context, Sarkozy reached for the opportunity, in 2011, to perform the activist leader role that suited him together with NATO partners, without viewing it as non-compliance with French independence.

This reasoning on NATO was not shared by all. The 2009 decision was hotly debated and contested at the time (Assemblée Nationale 2009). In 2011, France's closeness to the US and NATO were points of contention between parties. The opposition parties prioritised independence over activism and stressed the European leader dimension of the role, suggesting inter-role conflict and dilemma over these role elements and prioritisation as a consequence. This also pointed to the UMP contesting past leader role interpretations.

*Foreign policy tradition in the PS' leader role interpretation*
The PS role element priorities and criticism of the government’s leader role performance were also based on Gaullist foreign policy tradition. De Gaulle’s key objective had been an independent role for France. Independence reasoning in the leader role was founded on his desire not to be dominated by the US but equal to it. To conduct an active and independent foreign policy, France had to emancipate itself from the US. As the country lacked other capabilities, the means to achieving independence was diversifying relations, never becoming dependent on one other actor, avoiding cooperation that could not be undone and acting as if France were a great power. It has to project grandeur. Moreover, in the 1960s, the means to this effect was nuclear power status, a precondition for the retreat from NATO and distance to the US. The PS’ criticism of NATO involvement as harming France’s uniqueness can thus be traced to the same foreign policy tradition as the government’s activist leader role interpretation. French credibility was linked to its independence as the basis for its influence in the world (Interview with PS, May 2017).

The European dimension is also based on Gaullist tradition, i.e. his conceptualisation of Europe as a tool for France’s leader role, as a stepping stone for its global leader role (Aggestam 1999). European integration and the Franco-German alliance were also tools to emancipate France and reshape trans-Atlantic relations (Hoffmann 1974; Cerny 1980; Krotz 2015; Gordon 1993; Bozo 2016).

In 2011, the PS argued that perceptions of closeness to the US and the weakening, through bypassing, of the EU as a global actor, had diminished France’s leader role. It contested the successful enactment of the activist leader role without credible independence from US/NATO and focus on the European dimension. France’s role ought to have been that of an ally rather than aligned as it would necessarily be perceived in the case of NATO involvement in Libya (Interview with PS, May 2017), echoing former PS foreign minister Hubert Védrine (1997-2002) (Krotz and Sperling 2011). The failure was dual: the EU’s influence, and by extension, France’s were reduced by NATO’s command. This also harmed France’s credibility as independent, in particular in the Arab World where support was crucial for the legitimacy of the military mission.

**The PCF’s twist on the Gaullist foreign policy tradition**

The PCF also prioritised independence in its leader role interpretation. Arguably the party also source its leader role from the Gaullist foreign policy tradition. This suggests that de Gaulle’s foreign policy reasoning had a lasting impact on foreign policy thinking (also confirmed in an interview with a former PCF official, May 2017). The relevance of
Gaullist foreign policy tradition rather than a different source for the leader role conception, was evident in the assertion that France could regain a respectable and respected voice, implying that it once had one and lost it. (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229)

The PCF paired the independent leader role with a negotiator-mediator role. It asserted that only if France was perceived to be free from outside influence and from bias, via association with the US and NATO, can it enact a bridge role between conflict parties.

The republican tradition underpinning the Universal-French values defender role

One source of the Universal-French values defender role was the republican political tradition. This showed that role was distinct from the leader role, even if compatible. This tradition has experienced a revival since the 1970s. In his analysis of neo-republicanism, Chabal (2015) notes two distinct, overlapping narratives. Transformative republicanism focuses on values from the French Revolution and their transformative power. Institutional republicanism is focused on the institutions associated with the Third Republic. The former is clearest in the values-based role expressions of the two parties. Remarkable is that the UMP and PS’ role statements were near-interchangeable. Chabal proposes that the neo-republican revival has seen republican symbols become ubiquitous and consensual, merging in parts with the other times’ rival Gaullist tradition.

4.2. International norms in French parties’ role interpretations

Parties not only agreed on the leader role. There was also a consensus on the good international citizen role. Like the negotiator-mediator and Universal-French values defender roles, it complemented and lend the leader role credibility and respect. References to this role showed the importance of others recognising France as acting legitimately and an awareness that France’s leader role acceptance by others hinged on this recognition. The presence of this role suggested that international norms and rules of behaviour were important in parties’ role selection. It reinforced that such norms socialise domestic foreign policymakers into national roles and shape role conceptions. Expectations as to role performance exercise pressure on all states and, in particular, on those with the capabilities and seeking a leader role recognition. The socialising effects of international norms are felt through pressures to comply to general behaviour requirements for respected members of the international society and to special action of those aspiring and capable of leader role enactment. It is within this context that the need for legality (international law and UN mandate) and legitimacy (multilateral decision-
making and action) and the socialising effect of norms as specified (other actors) and unspecified (general rules) was discernible. The UMP anticipated criticism of government leader role performance when it stressed that France was not acting as part of ‘a disorganised and individual initiative.’ (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883) The good international citizen role, and in particular multilateral cooperation, also illustrate the importance of France's relations and position in the international system.

Yet, there were also notable differences in international norms. Positions on such norms influenced the proposal of the national roles filling the leader role with purpose. The PCF proposed a negotiator-mediator role, as seen above. It did not support R2P, in particular, its third pillar. It rejected the other parties' humanitarian rhetoric advocating the use of force. It stressed norms of multilateralism and international law but viewed France as failing in its obligations, by supporting a global governance based on the law of the strongest and violating international law.

The UMP and PS viewed the capacity and willingness to intervene militarily as part of the leader role. They were proponents of the Universal-French values defender role. The UMP repeatedly mentioned R2P. These references made the distinction between R2P and humanitarian intervention [ingérence humanitaire] and intervention [ingérence tout court] clear (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883). The PS only indirectly referenced it, mentioning 2005 UNGA resolution 60/1 paragraph 138 (Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5225) R2P had not played a part in the party's deliberations, because R2P corresponded to the default French position and was part of France's UNSC membership duties (Interview with PS official, May 2017). The UMP and PS showed an acceptance or adherence to international norms that propose to intervene militarily to protect and save civilians. Such norms are widely shared in the international community and create an expectation toward states with the capacity to act to comply with them. This revealed the influence of international expectations whereby states with the capacity to act ought to take steps to achieve security and order. The UMP and PS, aspiring for France to be recognised as a leader, came to accept, the need to comply with the expectations such norms create. It was within this normative context that the two parties stressed multilateralism as providing legitimacy and the UN mandate as the basis of the legality which military intervention necessitates to avoid accusations of self-interested actions.

The two positions on the use of force reflect old tensions in political debate and a more recent shift. This re-connects the international norms influence on national roles to
domestic political traditions. From the 1980s onward, *devoir d'ingérence* (duty to interfere/intervene) or *droit d'ingérence* (right to interfere/intervene), were topics of debate. A mixture of field practitioners and legal scholars, mostly associated with the left, initiated the debate and (re)-launched the concept in the 1980s (Bettati and Kouchner 1987; Bettati 1991, 1996). It was conceptualised as an answer to the twentieth-century genocides and the ongoing of human rights violations, an emotional call *to do something*. When R2P was launched in 2005, initiators and proponents of the French concept argued that R2P was the successor of the French version which they viewed as the same as the Anglophone 'humanitarian intervention'. (Kouchner 2005; Bettati 2007)

For the longest time, such ideas and an ethical foreign policy rhetoric did not have a major impact on French foreign policy decision-makers. This changed during Sarkozy's presidency. He appointed Bernard Kouchner, founder of Médecins sans Frontières and 'co-inventor', as foreign minister. This appointment allegedly corresponded to Sarkozy's own beliefs, his closeness to US-neo-conservatism and his announced break with his predecessors' 'pragmatism' in relations with dictators and lack of activism.

The PS and UMP concurring on the Universal-French values defender role suggest that the concept launched more than two decades ago has finally had an effect on the leader role, perhaps through its maturation into R2P in 2005. However, ethical foreign policy declarations raise questions about domestic politics. The next section turns to the ideologies underlying French national role conceptions and interpretations.

### 4.3. Ideologies: common ground and difference between parties

The final layer of ideas identified as relevant in the theoretical framework is ideologies. The narratives indicated that there were similarities and differences. Complicating the analysis, the three parties referenced similar political concepts: liberty and democracy. Even so, this chapter proposes that ideologies influence which tradition is drawn on, and which elements are prioritised, but also how parties engage with international norms.

*The Universal-French value defender role: making sense of consensus*

As noted the Universal-French value defender role can be traced to republican tradition. Yet, the consensus between the two mainstream parties was remarkable, despite this clear source, especially because the two parties contested the meaning of the leader role. Libya can be seen as ethical foreign policy – and as noted above R2P – arriving in decision-making circles. Its narratives are based on claims of policies without alternatives and
moral duty to 'save strangers' (Wheeler 2002). The idea that one/international community cannot stand had come to challenge and replace earlier norms of non-interference and reframed sovereignty. The idea resonated with evolving frames about humanity (Finnemore 1996). In his analysis of ethical foreign policy, Chandler (2003) adds a domestic political dimension to the argument. He proposes that it became attractive, because, unlike domestic policy, its success or failure could not as easily be subject to scrutiny at domestic ballot boxes. He argues it is a symptom of political crisis, especially of ideas for domestic politics and of centre-left parties, that marked the end of communism and the 1990s. In this vacuum, seemingly apolitical ideas of care for a shared humanity and to do something that resonates emotionally made sense. Yet, these ideas were not apolitical. They emerged during the consolidation of a liberal consensus and that was only apolitical in the sense that it spread across the political spectrum and found adherents on the conservative right as well as the centre-left.

How to make sense of this in the French context and in light of the late arrival of such narratives in decision-making circles? Chabal (2015) points out that neo-republicanism masks the understated, reviled, yet ubiquitous, liberalism in French political thinking. He suggests that the constant talk of crisis and reform, that lives along grand-standing, republican references, is liberalism. Chabal and Chandler on otherwise different points and contexts mirror each other. They both point to the ideology on which the values-based role was based as likely being liberalism.

This suggest that the role consensus needs to be interrogated. Does the difficulty to differentiate between the two parties on this point in this case suggest a form of role decontestation? Moreover, does it mask a deeper political crisis, and lack of ideas, at least of the two main parties of the time? With the benefits of hindsight, the difficulties these parties encountered in 2017 presidential and legislative elections, and the rise of a movement more aligned with liberal political ideas could confirm this.

**The PCF: solidarity, peace and reform of global governance**

The PCF's detailed and complex narrative of France's complicity in creating and escalating the situation in Libya through the roles it performed and that the PCF rejected revealed its worldview. It is based on an understanding of the world as interdependent. PCF prioritised the concept of solidarity (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1883). The solidarity sentiment was reiterated: 'The solidarity with the Libyan people demands the greatest determination for the bombing to end, for the NATO forces to retreat and for calling for
an immediate multilateral ceasefire.’ (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5229) The core concept of solidarity was paired with adjacent concepts such as cooperation, democracy, popular sovereignty, peace and liberation rather than liberty. These concepts showed a traditional left-wing, socialist ideology. Solidarity and cooperation point to an understanding of human nature as constituted and constitutive of human relations and equality between peoples. The belief in popular sovereignty and democracy derives from a conviction about an essential equality between human beings. (Freeden 2008; Heywood 2003) This worldview also linked back to the party’s priorities and traditional interpretations of international law and norms of state sovereignty and non-interference. It lay beneath an analysis of the current international system and organisations as contributing to global inequalities, poverty in the Global South profiting the North, including France.

The ideology in its analysis led to the PCF’s proposal that France, given its capacities and continued respect in many countries (Interview May 2017), should enact its leader role to reform the global governance system, basing it on equality and solidarity. It also underpinned the PCF’s proposal of non-intervention for fear of escalating the violence and suggestion of a French negotiator-mediator role. This was based on the reasoning that France had caused or aggravated the conflict via weapons’ export, and on the belief that conflict is not solved by siding with one party but by creating negotiation channels.

The PCF’s ideology shown through its elected concepts in its narrative mattered to which international norms the party preferred and how it defined them. Ideology also mattered to the party’s interpretation of the leader role. The PCF defined the role around the concept of solidarity with the Global South and peoples rather than the West and alliance partners. France had to be seen as acting and leading independently from the hegemon. Ideology was relevant to how the party viewed France’s current role. In its analysis of actual role performance and in role interpretation, the PCF exhibited anti-Americanism. Linking ideology back to tradition; it proposed that the US is imposing a world order and its value system on others. Often framed as anti-imperialism; it was also apparent in the PCF’s rejection of what it perceives to be France's current neo-colonial role performance.

Conclusion

This chapter traced French parties’ foreign policy narratives and national role statements within. It established the causal reasoning of the parties on the events in North Africa and Libya and their thinking about how to address and resolve conflict. It noted a role consensus on the good international citizen and leader role. At the same
time, the opposition parties' criticism of the government and rejection of intervention suggested that there was disagreement on the leader role performance and domestic role contestation. The chapter then proceeded to take a closer look at parties' leader role interpretations. It qualified them. The UMP proposed and argued France had enacted an activist leader role. The PS preferred an independent, European leader role while the PCF proposed a mediator-negotiator and UN reformer leader role. The chapter ended with the tracing of plausible sources for the role selection and role interpretations. This suggested that a Gaullist tradition underpinned the three parties' leader role choice. However, the election of different role elements also points to the possibility that these components are seen by some as in conflict with each other and posing dilemmas solved through prioritisation. The source analysis also showed parties' engagement with international norms and the relevance of ideologies in role selection and interpretation.

The chapter contributed to foreign policy analysis of France a closer look at the assumed role consensus. It showed that the same foreign policy tradition can lead to variation in role interpretation. It pointed to the relevance of ideology and international norms for role socialisation and how the leader role is filled with purpose. The role consensus on the Universal-French values defender role and its foundation in republican political tradition and liberal ideology also led to the proposition that this role was decontested between the two major parties at the time, showing its (momentary) pervasiveness, but also pointing to its political nature and essential contestability.

Finally, the differences between the parties, the opposition's criticism of the government in style, process and instruments may simply be opposition at work. However, the differences went beyond who was in government. It can be speculated that a PS-president and led government would have performed the leader role differently. It is likely that the PS would have put more stress on and an effort in finding a common European position and strategy. Such a government may have tried to work with Germany, at the expense of the Anglo-Saxons. Thus, while France would have plausibly still led the drafting of a UNSC resolution and perhaps even the military mission, it may have done so without being seen as non-cooperating and, thereby, harming the EU (and its own pretension to European leadership). Given the PS' criticism of the decision to deliver arms in breach of UNSC resolutions, it may also have refrained from such actions, as they were seen, as harming France's a good international citizen and leader credibility.
Chapter 5: German parties’ national role conceptions

This chapter adds to existing role theory studies of the German decision-making on Libya (e.g. Harnisch 2015; Beneš and Harnisch 2015; Koenig 2016; Oppermann 2012; Brummer and Oppermann 2017). It focuses on the controversies surrounding the dual decision not to participate and to abstain on the UNSC resolution 1973 vote. It also builds on the existing research that considers domestic and international contextual pressures on German foreign policy decision-making, in particular regarding military intervention. It adds an exploration of a domestic controversy, and of the ideas invoked and underlying it. As such, it is a study of German parties and their foreign policy. It draws out differences between parties on foreign policy by analysing parties’ national role statements.

This chapter finds that the parties disagreed on Germany's role, despite near consensus on the alliance partner role between the government and main opposition parties. German parties were divided over the dual decision regarding the UNSC resolution. The coalition parties were against participation and, in their view consequently, for abstention. Die Linke welcomed the decision, on different grounds. The SPD and Green Party criticised the decision to abstain, however, they remained internally divided over participation. This chapter shows that while parties largely agreed on Germany's role, confirming the strength of the alliance partner role, parties disagreed on national role interpretation. This suggests that role consensuses need closer scrutiny.

The parties contested each other on the meaning of the alliance partner role in practice. There was intra-role contestation over this role, pointing to potential inter-role conflicts and dilemmas. The chapter qualifies the role to make sense of the differences. There was also inter-role contestation, as one party proposed the selection of an alternative role. The chapter aim was to uncover ideas underlying parties’ national role conceptions. The analysis of the sources of role interpretations suggested that there were differences in role socialisation and that foreign policy traditions were drawn from party-particular histories, and that ideology and international norms also mattered.

Part 1 reviews existing role research on Germany with a focus on parties and military intervention, and the case of Libya. Part 2 traces narratives and part 3 identifies parties’ national role statements. It qualifies national roles conceptions, proposing that parties interpreted them differently. It points to role contestation. Part 4 analyses the findings using the layered ideational theoretical framework.
1. Role research in foreign policy analysis of Germany

There is an abundance of role theory studies of German foreign policy. Until recently, role theorists focused on the state or elite level and stressed an elite consensus on the Germany national role, despite its considerable evolution since the end of the Cold War (e.g. Maull 1990, 2000b; Krotz 2001, 2015). More recent studies note that there is not necessarily a consensus and that German national roles can be contested and different actors select different national roles or rank their priority differently, often case by case (e.g. Oppermann 2012). The following literature review describes the commonly referenced German national role and role theory studies of the 2011 decisions on Libya.

1.1. Civilian power role and evolving stances on military interventions

Maull (1990) developed the concept of civilian power to describe Germany's evolution in the second half of the twentieth century. He argued that historical experiences restrained the state's use of military force, and led it to thrive for more international cooperation, interdependencies and legal rules. Maull (1990, 92–93) describes civilian power role as:

- acceptance of necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
- the concentration of non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction;
- a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.

This national role conception was shaped in contrast to Germany's recent history of aggressive behaviour, and the pursuit of power and territory, since the second half of the nineteenth century. History is central to this role conception. It is a construct and product of a learning process (e.g. Maull 1990; Krotz 2015). The role conception and the alleged consensus 'culture of restraint' underlying it, explain why Germany did not return to its old pattern of goals and behaviour after regaining full sovereignty in the 1990s.

Role theory's contribution to explaining German foreign policy is that neither the role selection of civilian power nor its continuity after reunification can be understood without a consideration of its relations and interactions without other states. The national role was selected in part due to the awareness of past roles and relations toward significant other states (Harnisch 2014; Beneš and Harnisch 2015). Létourneau and Räkel (1997) also stress the role of economic and political interdependencies Germany has entered as part of the European integration process and international institutions.
They argue that this focus was part of avoiding the perception of isolation and to reassure neighbouring states of German intentions by cultivating relations and building trust.

The civilian power role also has an international dimension. Létourneau and Räkel (1997) propose that the role focuses on solving global problems and addressing collective security challenges. This led to dilemmas after reunification. The 1990s shifts on participation in military interventions challenged elements of the civilian power role. While such military missions still required a legal basis in international law and a multilateral cooperation framework, i.e. Germany would not act alone, some argued that they are contrary to the civilian power role and the stress on other, non-military means of foreign policy behaviour. Every case of German real or possible participation engenders legal debates and raises the usual questions of whether Germany finally 'normalising' and whether it is still a civilian power.

To be sure, decisions to use of military force without UN mandate raise serious questions. Addressing this essential question, Maull (2000a, 2000b) concluded that after the 1999 watershed Kosovo decision to participate in an intervention Germany was still a civilian power. He argued that the role conception allowed for such a shift to forceful behaviour, so long as the embeddedness in international law and multilateralism role elements remained intact. Others concurred that Germany's master role remains civilian power and that there still is widespread consensus on it. Krotz (2015, 62–63) recently wrote:

"Central domestically anchored German role components include (1) the notion of "never on our own"; (2) promotion of an increasingly precise legal framing of international relations and support for broadening the legitimacy of the international order; and (3) a generally restrictive attitude toward the use of military force, particularly by individual states.

The civilian power role conception builds on culturalist assumptions and the claim that the past shapes a widely shared culture on which there is a consensus. The room for inclusion of essentially contrasting positions on the central issue of the use of military force, raises the question of the analytical usefulness of the concept. If the civilian power role can accommodate these disparate policy practices, is it surprising that analyst note a domestic consensus on this national role? The 2011 case of Libya and the controversies over German decision-making promise to cast new light on this.

1.2. Role theory and the 2011 case of Libya

Studies of German foreign decision-making surrounding the 2011 Libya intervention do not spare the domestic level. Explanations focus on the foreign minister, domestic
motivations and the last-minute-timing of Germany's partners' decision-making, and the constraints this posed to German foreign policy-making. The foreign minister had incentives, given the public's scepticism toward German participation in military interventions, immanent regional elections and poor polling results for his party. He had reason to believe that his stance and decisions would be well received by the public. Such explanations substantiate claims that German foreign policy is becoming politicised, with domestic matters taking precedence over accommodating or managing the pressures of alliance partners (Oppermann 2012). Explanations focused on timing suggest that the timeline and information-sharing were crucial to the decision to abstain. The German government was taken aback by the speed by which France and the UK came up with the UNSC resolution and Germany was informed too late of the US decision not to veto it. This meant that there was not enough time to debate the issue of German participation in parliament (Brockmeier 2013; Harnisch 2015).

There are many state-level analyses. They explain the dual decision by reference to culture or identity and try to assess whether it was a political failure or the legal decision or to establish the impact on German reputation (e.g. Katsiolis 2011; Rühl 2011; Stahl 2012; Pradetto 2014). A number of other analyses focus on the domestic level. Such studies provide important insights into the plurality of audiences (domestic and international) and issues to consider (other than foreign policy) and the relevance of a mandatory parliamentary process on decision-making rapidity and autonomy of the government. Moreover, the question is raised if decision-making on Libya constituted continuity or whether it signalled change and was an out-of-the-ordinary case, given Germany's non-alignment with allies. Some stress that the decisions followed a pattern (Daase and Junk 2012). Thus, like every decision on the use of force since the 1990s, it raised the questions: was this change toward 'normalisation' or was it continuity?

Role theory studies of the 2011 Libya case note a lack of elite role consensus. Koenig (2016) observes role contestation over whether Germany ought to have voted in favour as part of its commitment to multilateralism and whether such a decision would have permitted a choice on participation. She notes criticism and debate over whether the decision was right that went beyond party and bureaucratic lines. She argues that the decision can be explained via domestic political needs and incentives, given the low approval rates of the foreign minister, the chancellor's party division and her lack of firm positioning. Koenig further suggests that the US' late volte-face explains the coalition's decision-making and role performance, despite these parties' traditional Atlanticism.
Koenig's study provides insights into the domestic political environment and incentives in 2011. However, she overestimates the incentives and fails to take into account the FPD's consistent positioning on the use of force. Harnisch (2015) reasons that the electoral incentives arguments do not hold. Chancellor Merkel had guaranteed alliance partners that Germany would vote in favour of the resolution, should its passing depend on the German vote. Moreover, public attention was on the Eurozone crisis and the nuclear catastrophe in Japan, and, thus, little advantage could be expected from an anti-interventionist stance in this case. Hansel and Oppermann's (2014) counterfactual analysis further proposes that the electoral interests of the FDP are not sufficient to explain the decisions to abstain and not to participate. They argue that the foreign minister and his party's position was consistent with their position on the Arab Spring more broadly. Moreover, the party's scepticism regarding outside intervention can be traced to other cases. It mirrors a long-standing position on the use of force. The foreign minister's restraint was founded on his declared personal convictions and the party's foreign policy tradition. Hansel and Oppermann suggest that intra-party and coalition politics did not matter to the outcome and conclude that the decision was not taken out of immediate electoral incentives. Finally, Oppermann (2012) argues that the decision-making on Libya was part of a trend. German foreign policy is normalising and politicising. The traditional national role is gradually eroding and no new master role has yet emerged. Oppermann notes that parties proposed different national roles and that the coalition enacted a normal alliance partner role (Brummer and Oppermann 2017).

The existing role theory studies of the dual Libya decision-making show that domestic factors and actors were relevant in the national role selection, and that role contestation took place. Thus, this chapter starts from the expectation of difference between parties, within a possible consensus on the civilian power master role, given its breadth and malleability. It adds to these studies an assessment of national role consensus and the role contestation between parties. It explores variation within the civilian power master-role and the alliance partner role expected in a case calling for military intervention. While most role theorists observing these roles describe party differences on military intervention policy means and practice, and a gradual evolution on the issue, they do not look at parties and, in particular, opposition parties' role selection nor at what parties mean when they express the same role.
2. German parties' narratives and agreement on the national role

Parties agreed over role elements in the context of the decision-making on Libya. They consented on the need for international legality and cooperation. This indicated the continued relevance of the civilian power role and its elements or at least vocabulary. Part 2 traces the foreign policy narratives on the uprisings and the Libyan conflict.

There was an agreement between all parties that Germany needs to act within the framework of international law and in cooperation with other states. They all stressed the centrality of multilateralism and cooperating with European and other partners. The foreign minister stated: 'We stand on the side of international law.' (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11137) The coalition parties noted that the UNSC resolution provided the necessary legality for Germany to even debate the issue. (Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11148; Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43) The agreement on these civilian power role elements suggests that there was an agreement on a good international citizen role, as Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) describe it.

There was also consensus between CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD and Green Party that Germany ought to perform the alliance partner role. They agreed that this role performance was expected of Germany by its alliance partners. Die Linke did not agree on this role and rejected such role expectations. The difference on which national role to select and, within the same role selection, how to interpret it and enact it led to role contestation within one role (intra-role) and between different roles (inter-role).

To identify the national role statements as part of reasoning on the situation and events in Libya, this chapter traces the foreign policy narratives. These revealed that parties agreed on the situation and on the need to condemn the Libyan regime's violent reaction. They also agreed that Gaddafi had to go but disagreed on how and under what conditions. (Ströbele (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10478; Gloser (SPD) 2011a, 10484; Hoff (FDP) 2011, 11477; Stinner (FDP) 2011d, 11477)

The major differences were about the conclusions on how to react. Yet, there were also subtle differences in how the parties reasoned about the uprisings and the conflict. In these narratives, parties expressed different interpretations of the alliance partner role or proposed alternative national roles. This role interpretation variation can help to understand the differences in policy preference and the criticism directed at the coalition government. It also represented domestic role contestation.
2.1. The governing parties' foreign policy narratives

FDP and CDU/CSU agreed that the Arab uprisings were a positive development and a historic moment. The foreign minister and colleagues drew parallels to Germany. The foreign minister (2011, 10814) noted:

North Africa and the Arab World are going through a historic break. The freedom movement that began as jasmine revolution in Tunisia has reached many other states. As democrats, we stand on the side of democrats. We Germans had the luck of a peaceful revolution in our own country that led to reunification and the unification of Europe. Our country is built on the values of liberty. It is these values that now millions of people in North Africa and the Arab World demand. As the German Federal Republic, we will support these peoples. The longing for liberty is not limited to one culture, one region or even one religion. It is wrong belief that there are cultures in which human beings can be unfree indefinitely. There is no culture of non-liberty.

The two parties agreed that these uprisings were demands for liberty and democratic transformation and participation, about dignity and justice (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 10821; Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815).

The CDU/CSU was also cautious about the uprisings bringing only positive change. Some MPs noted that the question had also to be whose liberty and more attention ought to be paid to the identity and demands of the protesters. In particular religious' freedoms, women's rights and the threat of radicalisation were concerns the party expressed as part of its uprising narrative. (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 10821; Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10826)

**Democratic transformation support and partner, and trade partner roles**

The coalition parties proposed and selected a democratic transformation support and partner role and trade partner role to the North African states (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816). They suggested that Germany had already started enacting them. One CDU/CSU MP noted:

[...] the leading role the government has taken to support the historic transformation in the Arab World in the last weeks. The transformation partnership with Tunisia and Egypt initiative successfully by Germany is an example for cooperation with other states [...]. (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 10821)

The democratic support and trade partner roles were not about the decisions on Libya. Yet, they provided insights into the alternative national roles these parties advocated. They revealed how these parties understood the causes of the uprisings which they
viewed as escalated into violent conflict in Libya, and how to best support them. Finally, they showed how the coalition parties viewed Germany's role in a future Libya. The democratic transition and support role was premised on the recognition of democracy building is anchored in civil society and takes time. The parties stressed that Germany was taking the initiative and leading on proposals of a new EU neighbourhood policy that needed to be conditioned on progress on democratisation, human rights, the rule of law and combating corruption. The uprisings were framed as a new start for relations with North African partners. German support was listed be political, economic, financial and humanitarian. While the parties stressed that this was a common EU role, they also argued that Germany ought to perform a leader role, not to leave the EU's North Africa policy to former colonial powers. The parties stressed that Germany could play a positive role in bringing about peace and prosperity via support with institutional and constitutional reforms, and supporting self-help and agency in these states rather than dictated changes. The parties also recognised that mistakes had been made in the past and Germany's role performance had been lacking. It had prioritised stability and authoritarian regimes' support in combating violent extremism and terrorism over people's welfare. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816; Hoyer (secretary of state, foreign ministry, FDP)) 2011, 10469; Selle (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10483; Fischer (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10486; Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011a, 10477, 2011c, 10821; Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10826, 10827; Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011a, 10480, 2011b, 10831)

The two parties identified the German political foundations\(^{10}\) as key to enacting this role. These institutions are linked to the main parties. The coalition parties suggested that they could provide support to expand civil society and democratic structures, for example, help prepare elections and build party structures. Already present in these states, the foundations already have contacts and networks. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816; Schuster (FDP) 2011, 10830; Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 10821; Fischer (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10486; Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011b, 10831)

The coalition parties coupled a trade partner role with this democracy support/partner role. This role reflected the reasoning in the two parties’ narratives that the uprisings were not only calling for liberty, democracy, and dignity but caused by economic insecurity. Indeed, this understanding of the uprising was shared across parties (Schmidt

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\(^{10}\) CDU/CSU's Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, SPD's Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, FDP's Friedrich Nauman Stiftung, Die Linke's Rosa Luxemburg, and the Green Party's Heinrich Böll Stiftung.
From the government parties' perspective, the EU had to open its markets for trade and economic cooperation to help create employment in these states. This was framed as a chance for North Africa and for Germany. A belief in mutual benefits of free trade underpinned this national role proposal and interpretation. It meant that the role was in line with a value and interest-based foreign policy, these parties advocate. (Kopp (FDP) 2011, 10483–84; Schuster (FDP) 2011, 10830; Hoyer (secretary of state, foreign ministry, FDP)) 2011, 10469) The foreign minister noted:

This is also a chance for Germany. If these societies develop in freedom all their creativity and talent, the new middle classes of North Africa can become our partner, our economic partners. In return, we can improve the economic chances of these people through investments and trade. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816)

The coalition parties' conflict and intervention narratives

The democratic support and trade partner roles could not immediately be enacted able vis-à-vis Libya. The coalition parties' narratives on Libya differed from that on the Arab uprisings. Yet, the viewed the conflict as the escalation of an uprising that had been caused by similar demands as in other North African/Arab states. The government parties raised risks and uncertainty of success as the reasons for their restraint and the decision not to participate in a military intervention. MPs referred to the conflict as a civil war and the result of Gaddafi’s violent reaction to the uprising. He warned that a no-fly zone was not as harmless as it sounded: 'Its implementation means a military operation and the first step toward a probable extended military engagement. The implication into the Libyan civil war would almost certainly be the consequence.' (Stinner (FDP) 2011b, 10823) The risk of loss of civilian lives as a result of military intervention was also raised. Lessons from past interventions were noted as part of the decision-making process (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138). In sum, the FDP backed the assessment of the foreign minister that the risks outweighed the benefits.

The CDU/CSU’s narratives resembled that of the FDP. A difference lay in its support for the military intervention, despite the noted risks and uncertainties. The party was less against the intervention as such and was more concerned with German participation, conditioning it on regional support for and participation in it. This showed that, unlike its coalition partner, the CDU/CSU viewed intervention as a possible precursor for a political solution and settlement as part of a declared, common goal, marking a central difference to the FDP’s approach to the situation and events in Libya.
The coalition parties' narratives and the reasoning they expressed formed part of these parties' alliance partner role interpretation, as will be discussed further in this chapter.

2.2. SPD and Green Party narratives on the uprisings and Libya

Like the coalition parties, the SPD and Green Party viewed the uprisings as based on calls for liberty, justice and democratic participation. The historic moment symbolised progress. One SPD MP stated that the uprisings were the Middle East’s people’s ‘pursuit of liberty, justice, but also social progress. [...] perhaps unusual and surprising, they are also fighting for universal human rights.’ (Gloser (SPD) 2011b, 10827) Like the government parties, SPD and Green Party MPs expressed support for the changes. One Green Party MP noted: 'We are witnesses to historic change. Millions of people in the Arab World are standing up against oppression and against corrupt leaders. These people fight at the risk of their lives for liberty and democracy. We owe them all our respect and solidarity.' (Schmidt (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10824)

The two parties agreed with the government that it was Germany's role to support these transformations and that help should be offered for self-help. They also identified the central role political foundations could play in building civic and political institutions. Some key terms were international community unity and cooperation. These parties also identified key issues underlying the uprisings, other than the nature of the regimes, as being lack of economic growth, unemployment and trade conditions. The SPD and Green Party, like the coalition government, also addressed past mistakes in Germany's and EU relations with these states such as trade conditions and support for dictators for stability. They went further in criticising EU policy as a contributing factor to poverty and unemployment in the region in upheaval but also suggested that new relations would be mutually beneficial. Yet, this criticism did not make a direct link between the economic and social conditions in the region, and the uprisings. The demand for democratic participation and liberty were seen as the key motivator.

The Libyan conflict and intervention narratives echoed the uprising narrative of the SPD. One MP noted that the priority was a civilian and peaceful solution to the conflict and, as part of this, that it was important for the international community to remain united. He argued that unity was an instrument to exert influence. He contested the foreign minister's rejection of the no-fly-zone tool, arguing that as part of remaining united as an international community, all UN Charter sanctioned instruments should stay on the table. (Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 10819) When prompted to provide a clear
position on the dual decision Germany had faced, the SPD's MPs avoided answers by pointing to divisions on the issue in other parties and the difficult nature of decisions on military intervention. One MP argued that voting in favour of UNSC resolution 1973 could have led to change in the behaviour of the Libyan regime, thus, prevented the eventual use of force (Mützenich (SPD) 2011b, 11139–41). Another MP explicitly supported the resolution and the intervention (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11145). These positions showed some support for the use of force and Germany's participation in the military intervention. They suggested that the use of force was seen by some as a precondition for finding a civilian solution to the violent conflict, i.e. that it would force the regime to surrender or to the negotiating table. Yet, these statements were also indicative of intra-party division on the issue of intervention in Libya. This mirrors a history of party division and unease over Germany's use of force, but potentially also an awareness of public opinion's reluctance and restraint on German use of force. Yet, it was in this reasoning, the SPD's alliance partner role interpretation became apparent.

The Green Party's conflict narrative also echoed its view of the causes of the uprisings. The noted difference was the violent reaction of Gaddafi's regime to peaceful protests. The party supported non-violent measures to stop the conflict. However, it accepted that there needed to be a discussion on legitimate uses of force as an instrument to stop the violent reaction of the regime. Thus, the intervention narrative proposed that while non-violent tools of intervention were to be preferred. It was possible to end the conflict using force from outside. One MP noted that a discussion about a no-fly-zone was right, especially because the Arab League had called for it, despite scepticism over the actual implementation and its effects on the ground (Schmidt (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10825). After UNSC resolution 1973 passed, another MP lent Green Party support for it and recalled the dilemma between risks of military intervention and not intervening, when a dictator threatens to murder civilian populations (Künast (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011). Aside from revealing reasoning about the causes of the uprisings and the conflict, the narratives showed a recognition of the dilemma posed by the use of force. The initially tentative positioning on intervention was also indicative of internal divisions and inner-personal struggles over the contested issue. Yet, the timing of some statements also suggested the importance of others' decisions and behaviour in the party's positioning. It was indicative of its alliance partner role interpretation.
2.3. Die Linke's narratives on the Arab uprisings and the Libyan conflict

Die Linke also viewed the Arab uprisings as calls for freedom and democracy, but for social justice too. One MP stressed Germany's negative role in the region and argued that Germany was partly responsible for the oppressive regimes because it had backed, supported and made deals with them (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10821). The MP also noted that German policies contributed to the food price rises that meant that many people could no longer afford food and that as part of Germany's future role enactment, this had to change, alongside internal transformations of the Arab countries (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10823). There was a clearer link made between German and EU policies and the causes of the uprisings. The ability to make such links could have been indicative of the party's absence from federal coalitions rather than other parties' lack of recognition of such links, to be explored later in this chapter.

Die Linke's conflict narrative built on different reasoning on the causes of the uprisings. The party argued that Germany was already responsible for escalating the conflict because it had supported the regime through arms trade deals, as recent as the last legislative period under the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition. The party's intervention narrative also went further than the other opposition parties'. Mirroring in parts some FDP MPs, Die Linke representatives called the intervention a 'war'. The parliamentary group deputy leader clarified what a no-fly-zone meant and would lead to: 'This war engagement is wrong. It will lead to more bloodshed and bring more suffering and destruction to Libya.' (Van Aken (Die Linke) 2011, 11145) Through these narratives, Die Linke revealed its conception of Germany's past role. It rejected any form of the use of force as complicity for civilian death. The tracing of the narratives and identification of national role statements further exposed the party's alternative role proposal to the alliance partner. The chapter now turns to the parties' role statements within these narratives.

3. German parties' national role interpretations and contestation

Within the above narratives, there was a near consensus on the alliance partner role. This part describes and qualifies this national role conception. It unpacks the apparent role consensus and notes role contestation. It identifies role elements and hierarchies. Rather than qualify the role parties selected as the normal alliance partner, it proposes that the coalition parties defined a responsible alliance partner while the SPD and Green Party stressed a unity and loyal alliance partner. As noted above, the coalition parties
complemented the alliance partner role with a trade and democratic transition partner role. These parties' role statements were about the region rather than focused on Libya. The FDP added a negotiator role to address the situation in Libya. Finally, Die Linke proposed a negotiator-mediator role as an alternative to the alliance partner role. This part ends on the forms of role contestation identified.

3.1. The coalition's responsible and supportive alliance partner role

The coalition parties agreed that Germany was enacting the alliance partner role and even a leader role. The two parties stressed that Germany was quick to support the uprisings and to initiate clear positions as an EU and UNSC member. Sanctions were noted as a Germany success. 'We took action in our hands and were not influenced by member states with their own agenda.' (Schuster (FDP) 2011, 10829; similar lines of reasoning Stinner (FDP) 2011a, 10482; Hoyer (secretary of state, foreign ministry, FDP)) 2011, 10469; Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815)

The two parties' role statements further suggest that they interpreted the alliance partner role as an independent, responsible, and supportive alliance partner. They stressed that Germany had to take independent decisions. One CDU/CSU MP remarked:

> Alliance does not mean that German has to participate in all NATO missions. Else we would not need a parliamentary vote on this matter and could say: NATO in Brussels decides all this and we will participate. (Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11145)

Independent decisions were viewed as essential for a sovereign/self-determined state. Moreover, Germany had to act responsibly. The government parties emphasised the lack of information and clarity on the situation in Libya. They expressed concern over the success of any military intervention limited to a no-fly zone. Their assessment was based on past experience and lesson learning. (Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 11151; Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43, 11145; Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011b, 10476) The two parties, thus, concluded that restraint was the responsible decision.

Key elements of this role interpretation were consistency or coherence and credibility. They were indicative of others' perceptions and possible role expectations. The FDP and the CDU/CSU argued that German credibility relied on not being perceived as selective and acting on self-interest, referring to the natural resources in Libya. (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138; Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43) A CDU/CSU MP noted that Germany's interests in the region were not met via participation in military intervention, while the foreign minister was concerned with how Germany would be
viewed if it changed position last-minute. Rather than increase the image of reliability as an alliance partner, it would diminish it, as Germany would be perceived as a follower (Interview with former FDP MP, June 2017). Equally, the coalition parties were concerned with consistency and coherence of argumentation on the UNSC resolution. They argued that if Germany was not participating in the intervention, it was consequential not to vote in favour. They recognised the legality of the operation but argued that it was not befitting of Germany's status to vote in favour and not participate. (Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11147,11148; CDU/CSU-Fraktion 2011)

The two parties were not against military intervention. In part, their positioning can be read as an attempt not to criticise Germany's alliance partners. However, it was also consistent with these parties' principled support of military operations under certain conditions. The CDU/CSU was most willing to participate and kept the option open, the chancellor allegedly open to German participation in the later stages of the operations (Harnisch 2015). The party welcomed the operation. Its main precondition for any German action was for Arab and African states to first take responsibility for a conflict situation in their region. (Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11144) Equally, the foreign minister made regional support for and participation in the intervention a condition. Yet, the FDP was more sceptical of the potential for success of the operation and less inclined to agree to German participation. MPs kept stressing the risks and impact on the Arab World. (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138)

The two parties struggled for Germany not to be perceived as moving away from alliance partnership. They stressed that the abstention vote was not a vote against Germany's partners: '[t]he abstention was not a turn away from the goals of the West [...]. Germany stands in solidarity with its alliance partners, who are fulfilling the mandate [...].' (CDU/CSU-Fraktion 2011) One FDP MP stressed Germany's loyalty (Bündnistreue), given the German soldiers active every year in the world. (Hoff (FDP) 2011, 11478) Equally, the parties stressed the legality of UNSC resolution 1973 and the military operation. They noted that the government shared the goals and expressed respect for the alliance partners who had come to different conclusions in their assessments of the situation. Further suggesting the relevance of significant other alter-role perceptions in the parties' statements, they also noted that the alliance partners had expressed understanding and respect for Germany's decisions. (Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11147–49; Merkel (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11251; Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138)
Complementing this role interpretation, the coalition parties viewed Germany's role enactment as supportive of the alliance partner. The parties stressed that the abstention vote was not 'neutrality' or inaction. Germany was assuming its responsibilities. The government was communicating with and providing support for allies. It reinforced its presence in Afghanistan to allow EU and NATO partners more flexibility for the mission in Libya. (CDU/CSU-Fraktion 2011; but also Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 11152; Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138–39; Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11147–49; Djir-Sarai (FDP) 2011, 11488) At the same time, Germany was providing non-military support, allowing partners to use German bases and not voting against the operation within NATO. (Bundesregierung 2011a, 2011b; Stinner (FDP) 2011c, 11149)

3.2. The SPD and Green Party's united and loyal alliance partner and the human rights defender

The SPD and the Green Party expressed early support for the government's decision and its initial role enactment. In February, one SPD MP noted that the events were an opportunity for Germany to play a stabilising role in the region (Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 10821). The party largely shared the government's assessment and restraint, given the lack of information. It long argued for a peaceful solution without rejecting other options (Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 10819). Like the coalition parties, it viewed the responsibility for addressing the situation with the regional organisations and states. (Interview with former SPD MP, June 2017) Likewise, the Green Party welcomed the government's efforts to perform a leader role on sanctions and the implication of the International Court of Justice. It stressed the risk of escalation and of a no-fly zone. (Ströbele (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10479; Trittin 2011b, 2011a; Koenigs 2011)

The SPD alliance partner role statements suggested that it viewed the role as a united alliance partner. The party remained unclear on whether it favoured Germany participation, admitting intra-party division (a point stressed during an interview with a former MP, June 2017). EU and international community determination and unity were important to the party, noting that unity was a policy tool for influence on global events (Gloser (SPD) 2011b, 10828; Mützenich (SPD) 2011a, 10819) The contentious point regarding the UNSC resolution vote was the deviation from a united position. Germany ought to have voted in favour, because there was no legal automatism to participate thereafter (interview in June 2017: note as the opinion of senior diplomats), to show
unity. The SPD also criticised the lack of EU unity. The party argued that the abstention was the basis for the lack of a common EU position. One SPD MP asked:

> On which side do you want to stand in the UNSC? Do you want to be on the side of the ten states including three Europeans, three Africans and one Arab who voted in favour? I think you should have pointed to this dilemma [...] He [Westerwelle] said: we cannot intervene everywhere. But he did not answer why the government did not want to draw a conclusion (interruption) to want to be on the side of the majority in the UNSC. [...] Our problem, the problem of Germany, is that there is no common European position any more. (Interruption) We did not manage to keep all European states together. [...] The question of national sovereignty does not follow from how we perhaps decide on different questions in the UNSC (Interruption). National sovereignty follows from how we justify having diverged from our European partners. (Interruption) [...] (Mützenich (SPD) 2011b, 11140–41)

The concern with unity and being perceived to be united with alliance partners and EU members were indicative of the importance of others perceptions of German role play. Further, it showed that the SPD viewed Germany as responsible for EU unity, despite others also defecting from the Franco-British position. This was indicative of an underlying European unifier or unity, and perhaps a regional leader role conception. The abstention vote was not compatible with the SPD’s alliance partner role interpretation. The party directly contested the role enactment and interpretation of the coalition.

The Green Party’s alliance role interpretation was similar. However, it appeared to prioritise solidarity and loyalty over unity. Thus, the party proposed a *loyal* alliance partner role. It was a nuanced, marked difference to the SPD. The Green Party was clearer in its support for the military intervention and in its criticism of non-participation. While it was initially hesitant, once UNSC resolution 1973 passed, it criticised the abstention as not standing on the 'right side' and risking Germany be perceived as not standing up for human rights. The party viewed the absence of European unity as de-solidarisation (*Entsolidarisierung*) and as an example of German exceptionalism (*Sonderweg*) (interview, June 2017). In the Green Party’s alliance partner interpretation, the relevance of others’ perceptions of German decision-making and actions was clear. It suggested that Germany’s role enactment had damaged its reputation as a reliable alliance partner. The party defined this as acting alongside key partners, on the 'right side'. Thus, the Green Party contested the alliance partner role play and interpretation of the coalition.

The SPD and Green Party complemented their alliance partner role interpretations with a human rights defender role. While the coalition parties expressed support for human rights and showed care for the safety of civilians in their narratives and role statements,
they did not explicitly define Germany’s role as human rights defender in this case. As mentioned, they stressed transformation supporter and trade partner roles instead. The two opposition parties, however, expressed a more muscular support for human rights. One Green Party MP asked early on asked whether the Libyan regime's violence constituted mass murder or genocide (Nouripouri (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 10358). The two parties kept all options on the table, despite risk recognition. After UNSC resolution 1973 passed, the two parties' support for an intervention increased. MPs from the two parties referenced R2P in their statements. The expressed support was again indicative of the significance of others' perceptions of Germany, as being part of a value-based community. The two parties' MPs expressed surprise and shame. The Green Party co-leader noted that the foreign minister ought to be seen to fight for human rights. (Künast (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 11149–50) One SPD MP argued that abstaining implied accepting human rights violations and that Germany had failed to perform credibly a human rights defender/supporter role. (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11146; Wieczorek-Zeul 2011) Like the united and loyal alliance partner role interpretations challenged the coalition parties' role interpretation, the proposal of the human rights defender role was an additional contestation of the governments' role performance.

3.3. The FDP and Die Linke’s negotiator and mediator role proposals

The FDP and Die Linke also expressed a negotiator-mediator role. This role conception differentiated the FDP from its coalition partner. The CDU/CSU was open to intervention and one MP had indicated that one could not negotiate with the Libyan regime (Selle (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10483). FDP MPs consistently stressed a non-violent role for Germany. This spanned from the democratic transition supporter and trade partner roles to actively pursuing dialogue with states in conflict, to advocate ‘national dialogue, to find national solutions and through foreign troops.’ (Westerwelle (FDP) 2011, 11138) MPs noted that Germany was enacting a leader role to de-escalate violence and find a peaceful solution in Libya (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815; Schuster (FDP) 2011, 10829).

Likewise, Die Linke proposed a similar alternative national role for Germany. Like other parties, it noted the negative past roles Germany had performed. It stressed that double-standards had damaged Germany’s reputation and credibility. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011a, 10477–78) One MP argued that ‘[…] we are responsible for these regimes […] we held their hands, we made deals with them.’ (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10822) Instead, the party argued that Germany ought to perform a negotiator and mediator role:
We have to think what the alternative to military and war could be [...] negotiating, mediating between the civil war parties [...] That is not easy but that could be a role for Germany to get this through in the UNSC. Mediation is in such a situation better than have people shoot at each other. Those who really want to save people need to plead for mediation. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10822) The party further suggested that Germany ought to become a leader in these roles. It "[...] should take the initiative to find a negotiated solution in Libya.' (Gehrcke 2011) Die Linke, thus, paired its negotiator-mediator role proposal for Germany with a leader role. While its role selection was consistent with Germany's master civilian power role, it was not compatible with the alliance partner role. The party contested this role selection and its performance, as part of its principled rejection of military intervention as a foreign policy tool. Die Linke criticised the coalition for its continued cooperation with NATO and the permission to use German bases for the Libyan mission. (Van Aken (Die Linke) 2011, 11146) Thus, the party contested the form and type of Germany's alliance partnerships (interview June 2017 with one Die Linke MP).

In sum, part 3 showed that parties' role statements remained within the framework of the civilian power master role. However, their role selection and interpretations within differed considerably, adding to suggestions that this role's analytical use is debatable. Moreover, the variation in interpretation of the alliance partner role and the intra-role contestation of its meaning in practice further suggest that alleged role consensus needs to be unpacked. Finally, proposed alternative roles that can contest (Die Linke) or appear to be compatible (FDP) with the alliance partner role suggests the occurrence of inter-role contestation. The consensus between Die Linke, who lacks federal government decision experience, and FDP on an alternative role suggests that it is a viable option.

4. Source of the variation of role interpretations and contestation

The final part of this chapter explores the foundations for parties' role selection, interpretation and contestation. It begins with the foreign policy traditions evident in the role selections and variation in role interpretation. It shows the importance and use of international norms in parties' role conceptions and contestation. It ends on the relevance of the ideological dimension.

4.1. Foreign policy tradition in the selected German roles

The first notable tradition was that of the civilian power master role that still prescribes the use of force restraint, respect of international law and multilateral cooperation, and
is concomitant with the good international citizen role in other states. This tradition was the basis of all parties' role statements. The consensus on this master role was indicative of the depth of role socialisation of German political elites (and the public) and the scope of the acceptable for German foreign policy today via reference to a shared vocabulary. This was also evident in the need to portray decisions as consistent, credibility and in the relevance of alter-role expectations and perceptions in parties' national role statements.

The prevalence of the alliance partner role further suggested this role conception's strength. The majority of the parties viewed being perceived to act alongside key partners as part of enacting Germany's role. Two such partners had initiated the UNSC resolution, the US had voted in favour and many regional organisations had called for a no-fly-zone and African and Arab states had supported it. This put pressure on Germany to perform the alliance partner role, and not to be perceived to contradict its partners. This was evident in the role expressions of the four parties' who supported the alliance partner role selection. Their statements pointed to the importance of domestic and international role expectations and perceptions, and the relevance of international recognition (image and reputation) for role compliance, and of domestic rewards (votes), despite the coalition's refutations of electoral motives and research challenging the impact of such motives on role selection and performance.

The different alliance partner role interpretations and intra-role contestation raised the question of the sources of such variance.

**The impact of foreign policy tradition on the coalition parties' role interpretation**

The civilian power role and, in particular, the alliance partner roles are founded on post-WWII relations and, in particular, the Atlanticist tradition. The CDU/CSU's responsible alliance partner role statements revealed a pragmatist approach to this tradition. The party had no strong opinion on how to act in this case. MPs expressed a willingness to join the operations, should its conditions be met. It was reported that the chancellor moderated the foreign minister's stance and was at the basis of the decision to abstain on rather than vote against UNSC resolution 1973. She had signalled to allies that should the passing hinge on one vote, Germany would vote for it. (Harnisch 2015)

Atlanticism is a key foreign policy tradition for the CDU/CSU. Former chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) and Merkel are key proponents of it. The party was the source of greater involvement in NATO from the 1990s on. The party's stance toward this tradition
can be described as *pragmatic*, as it served its needs in 2011. In opposition, it had been critical of the decision not to join Germany's allies in the 2003 Iraq invasion, precisely for the same reasons as the opposition was now stressing. It had damaged Germany's reputation and credibility as an alliance partner. In 2011, Germany was chiefly concerned with Eurozone crisis management. Scholars have speculated that this was a reason for the CDU/CSU's lack of concern for Germany's alliance partner credibility. This argument is in line with claims that decision-makers are no longer prioritising alliance partnership over other role performances and arguments of normalisation or the politicisation of foreign policy. (Oppermann 2012) This can also explain why European unity and a common European position were of little relevance. Consequently, in 2011, the CDU/CSU paid lip-service to *Atlanticist* tradition but saw more urgency in addressing a European crisis, thereby also revealing European unity on Libya as a secondary issue. While thus contesting its own past and opposition parties' alliance partner role interpretations, the CDU/CSU's role interpretation and selective, pragmatic use of *Atlanticist* tradition also showed its role conception for the EU as a more normative, civilian power, mirroring the German civilian power role, rather than the more militarised European role that France was conceiving.

The FDP bases its foreign policy tradition on its former foreign ministers of which Westerwelle viewed himself as heir: Klaus Kinkel (1992-1998) and, in particular, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1982-1992) (Heumann 2015). Based on these men and their foreign policy conduct, the FDP's traditions can also be described as *Atlanticist* and *Europeanist*. Genscher's aim was to attain independent decision-making (*Handlungsspielraum*), despite Germany's position in the international system between the two great powers. He and his colleagues sought relations with the Soviet bloc, yet remained committed to the West and multilateralism as a means to an end, but not the end in itself. Instead of consensus and unity, their stress was on interaction, shared rules and trust-building, to increase Germany's image of a reliable partner. (Schieder 2015) This tradition provided a role-script for the FDP in 2011. It was echoed in the foreign minister and his MPs' stress on communication with and support of alliance partners, and their continued trust and respect for independent German decisions. Both coalition parties also argued that only an independent, sovereign state could act responsibly and, thus, be held accountable for its actions. In an interview with a former FDP MP, he confirmed that Germany had shown more sovereignty than usual in its role performance and had, thereby, not followed a traditional role script. The country had shown emancipation. He speculated that maybe
it had gone its own way in the context of Libya, in part, because it was performing a leader role in Europe at the same time. (June 2017) Moreover, in the trade partner role, and in a subsequently published government strategy, the focus on relations with other states, and rising powers suggested that the FDP and its coalition partner were diversifying Germany's partners (Bundesregierung 2012). In line with Genscherist tradition, this was room for manoeuvre and a move from overreliance on one alliance/partner. During the Cold War this was a necessity to achieve independence; in 2011, Germany's sovereignty, economic power and the increasingly multipolar world aided such a strategy.

Another foreign policy tradition apparent in the FDP's alliance partner interpretation and enactment and, in particular, negotiator-mediator role proposal was that of restraint. It forms part of the civilian power role. In turn, this corresponds to the liberal political tradition of the primacy of politics (Primat der Politik, referred to during an interview with a former FDP MP, June 2017). The foreign minister had a preference for non-violent means of policy-making, building on his FDP predecessors and the general German foreign policy tradition to prioritise civilian means (Heumann 2015).

Die Linke's mediator-negotiator role foundations

As the FDP's traditions show, Die Linke's mediator-negotiator role selection was based on foreign policy tradition and, thus, its potential enactment was plausible. During the Cold War, Germany played an East-West bridge role (Die Linke MP interviews, June 2017). SPD foreign minister (1966-1969) and chancellor (1969-1974) Willy Brandt and his minister for special affairs and economic cooperation (1972-1976) Egon Bahr and their foreign policy conduct form the basis for this tradition. They shaped Ostpolitik to relax relations with the Soviet Union and reduce the security threat it posed to Germany. This policy was aimed at securing peace and security through a gradual approach, consensus-seeking and communication with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Brandt also viewed good relations with the US as the precondition, despite tensions in his relations and view of the US, based on domestic considerations, personal socialisation, and ideology (Rother 2014). A similar bridge role was notable in Die Linke’s role statements on Libya. A precondition for its enactment was that Germany stopped selling arms and using military force, undermining international law and UN authority. Then, it could perform a mediator-negotiator role and be respected for it by its alliance partners. According to interviewees, Germany could play a role akin to Ostpolitik again.

SPD's potential for intra-role conflict: contradictory foreign policy traditions?
The SPD has several foreign policy traditions to draw on and role enactments to consider for role script. The plurality of traditions may have been the source of lack of clarity on SPD’s position and its stress of unity and consensus instead. The first tradition was outlined in the foreign policy tradition underlying Die Linke’s role statements. The second tradition is based on former chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005). His SPD-Green Party coalition had taken the 1999 landmark decision to participate in the military operation in Kosovo. It pledged solidarity to the US after 9/11 and joined allies in 2001 in the intervention in Afghanistan. The differences between the traditions are stark. One leans toward cooperation, solidarity, dialogue and restraint, the other toward cooperation, solidarity, unity and the use of force. Thus, they provide contradictory, potentially contradictory role scripts in a context that has evolved since the early 2000s.

These diverging foreign policy traditions plausibly underlay the SPD’s stronger focus on form and perceptions (unity through a vote with partners) rather than the content of the decision (intervention and participation). There was no consistent and united position. This suggested that there were inter-party differences. It is possible to infer that these role scripts, related continuing inter-party divergences since the 1990s shifts towards a more interventionist stance, and the lack of early clear US position led to this incoherence. It further suggests that the party was reliant on others to guide its stances.

The focus instead on international, alliance and, in particular, European unity pointed to the Atlanticist and, especially the Europeanist tradition in the party. European unity was a means to an end (influence). Its MPs stressed the division of Europe and the harm this had caused to the EU’s capacity to act and shape events in North Africa. The lack of unity had damaged Europe’s reputation. (SPD 2011; Gloser (SPD) 2011b, 10828) At the same time, European unity was seen as the end. The European unity dimension showed a national role conception linked to Europe and Germany’s European identity and role. Germany sovereignty is conditioned on Europe, consistent with the SPD’s perception that in the ‘first global century’, Germany can and should act only as part of Europe (SPD 2009, 14). This was in line with a general social democratic tendency to tone down national sovereignty/identity in favour of a European federal state/identity.

The stress of unity revealed the different interpretation of the alliance partner role. The SPD defined alliance and cooperation as unity and consensus. This implied that diverging situational assessments and decision-making stand in the way of finding a common solution and achieving a common goal. It appears to transport the notion of
explicit domestic consensus as a source of strength to the supra-national level. It is a
harmony-seeking approach to foreign policy that revealed the SPD’s interpretation of
sovereignty and independence as contrary to that of the coalition parties. The united
alliance partner becomes a follower role. Puzzlingly, this role stands in contrast with
the European leader role some in the party allude to: ‘We did not manage to keep all
European states together.’ (Mützenich (SPD) 2011b, 11140–41) This implied an EU
uniting, leader or manager role. This role, others have argued, is precisely the one the
coalition was taking on in the Eurozone crisis management (Oppermann 2012).

The Green Party’s foreign policy traditions

The Green Party’s human rights defender role and nuancedly different alliance partner
role interpretation were plausibly based on the foreign policy tradition drawn from its
the Balkan Wars, in a radical turn-around on the party’s principled rejection of the use
of force. It went from ‘never again war’ to ‘never again Auschwitz’ (Rathbun 2004,
2006).\(^\text{11}\) Yet, the party remains internally divided on intervention (Green Party MPs
interviews, June 2017). Shifting stances and variation in position for intervention and/or
on the abstention vote substantiate this. The co-leader whose debate statements were
clearly favouring intervention, given R2P and in condemning the German decision to
abstain on the UNSC resolution vote, changed to this position (Spiegel Online 2011d).

Another source in the party’s role statements was a solidarity/loyalty and a Europeanist
tradition. This was clear in the stress of acting with partners, and an awareness of
history, German isolation via exceptionalism, and alter-perception of unreliability and
threat if Germany acts alone and not according to shared rules. At the same time, the
party was concerned with how European disunity would be perceived. In sum, the Green
Party came to a different conclusion on how coherence, consistency, credibility,
predictability and reliability can be persuasively enacted.

4. 2. International norms and German parties’ role conceptions

International norms were evidenced in the role elements of the civilian power role. They
also transpired in the other role statements. The SPD, the Green Party and Die Linke

\(^{11}\) One Die Linke interviewee noted that It went from never again German army on the soil where the
Wehrmacht Nazi forces had been to a notion of German responsibility to react especially where the
German army had fought during WWII
referred to and supported R2P. Die Linke rejected R2P. The coalition parties indirectly engaged with R2P and sovereignty norms.

**The human rights defender role’s basis in international norms**

The Green Party and the SPD referred to conditional sovereignty and R2P. The two parties most clearly adopted R2P and engaged with it in this case. The Green Party spent the most time and effort on R2P. Yet, the party also remains divided. Its representatives often clearly state R2P endorsement and the notion that state sovereignty is conditional.

The SPD was more reserved. During the debates, there was a division of labour between MPs: one criticising the government on procedure and motives without a clear statement of the party’s position and another raising R2P as a matter of image suggested that it was not so much about R2P than about alignment with partners. In an interview for this thesis, a former MP noted that R2P is not international law, but that it creates an obligation for which there is a majority in the party, despite continued scepticism as to its practice. Many in the party consider R2P to be a pretext. Yet, there is a majority position in favour of Germany no longer being able to stand apart all the time. The SPD views Germany’s role as beyond Europe. It has to prevent and negotiate first, and views military solutions as ultima ratio, stressing it was never pacifist. (Interview, June 2017)

Despite hesitations over risks and consequences, intra-party divisions and personal dilemmas, the two centre-left parties had the strongest affinity toward an ethical foreign policy definition of the civilian power role. This showed the influence of international norms and the normative context in shaping the two parties’ views on foreign policy and how Germany ought to act to be perceived as performing the expected national role. Alter-role perceptions and perceived prescriptions were important in showing the international norms’ socialisation effect. The two parties in support of R2P and a muscular human rights defender role were openly concerned with how Germany was being perceived for not acting with others and for not intervening to protect civilians. This was also evidenced by the references to shame for being seen to not act.

**Rejection of and an indirect engagement with R2P as part of role interpretations**

Die Linke rejected R2P in principle as not replacing international law and the UN Charter, and on its own terms in the case of Libya. One MP argued that R2P is first preventive then non-military. It is also based on clear criteria that the Libya case did not meet. Thus, even if one was to accept R2P as a norm governing international behaviour, this case did not
meet its criteria. The party also argued that consequence of applying R2P to every case of human rights violation would be many wars (Liebich (Die Linke) 2011, 11150–51). Die Linke’s R2P reference and explicit rejection showed the inescapability of the norm. While the party may have had to refer to it in this case, because of UNSC resolution 1973, it is likely that without the resolution’s basis, other parties may have still referenced it, given the conflict and the calls for military intervention similar situations engender.

The coalition parties did not mention R2P during the two parliamentary debate or in press releases on the UNSC resolution vote, despite one MP asking in an earlier debate whether Libya was an R2P case (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011a, 10356). The parties may have not mentioned R2P, because they supported it in principle and, thus, wanted to avoid having to position for or against it in this case. However, R2P was implicit in the coalition parties’ role statements. The engagement with R2P was discernible in the framing of Arab responsibilities. The two parties challenged a traditional understanding of R2P defining the responsibility to protect as that of a state and the international community. They added a regional or kin-group responsibility, detailed in chapter 6.

4.3. Ideologies: common ground and difference between parties

The last layer of ideas in the theoretical framework are ideologies. Reasoning about human nature and society, and about the world and international relations was evident in German parties’ national role interpretations. This chapter suggests that they influence which tradition is followed and how it is understood and adapted, and if and how parties engage with international norms, as they also form bases of norms.

*The coalition parties’ role interpretation sources: liberalism and conservatism*

The first ideology underpinning the responsible alliance partner role interpretation (and the trade partner and democratic transition supporter) was *liberalism*. The coalition parties also described independent decision-making as underlying the possibility of responsible behaviour. The core concepts the role interpretation was liberty and, in particular, individual liberty. This was also evident in the two parties’ narratives on the uprisings and the demands that had caused the unrests. Moreover, it was discernible in the parties’ reframing of R2P, as an Arab responsibility or regional or kin-responsibility. In this R2P framing, they referred to an individual responsibility (*Selbstverantwortung*). Such a notion was consistent with the frequently mentioned concept of individual responsibility in the two parties’ 2009 election manifestos, cross-cutting all policy areas
This corresponds to a long-standing FDP vision of society in which responsibility is individual and not nationalised/collective:

The greater freedom; the greater responsibility. It is the ethical foundation of the free citizen society [freie Bürgergesellschaft]. The principle of "freedom through responsibility" founds this society, in self-organisation and solidarity [Mitmenschlichkeit] [...] The liberal citizen society demands and supports the taking of responsibility of the individual [...] Liberalism is freedom to responsibility instead of freedom from responsibility. Freedom is not egoism. Freedom is responsibility. (FDP 1997, 5)

In 2009, the two parties also stressed that foreign policy ought to keep a balance between national, economic interests and international responsibilities (CDU/CSU 2009, 57; FDP 2009, 67, 69–70). Translated to the Libyan conflict, a focus on individual capacity to self-help, self-improvement and emancipation would postulate that Arab states as individual actors and together should take charge of addressing the Libyan crisis.

The complementary trade partner and democratic transition supporter roles were also based on liberal ideology and the notion the democracy and interdependence through trade would lead to prosperity and social and regional peace. These roles were also compatible with foreign policy as being mutually beneficial.

Liberalism was not the only ideology underpinning the coalition’s alliance partner role interpretation and its pinning of responsibility to act on others. Conservativism was also discernible in how the parties framed R2P. Conservative ideology accepts inequality as a state of nature and builds on hierarchical/order understandings of society. They tend to define community narrowly. Allegiance is first to family, kin-group, nation and region before a global community can become relevant. In the Libyan case, the two parties’ stress on Arab responsibility can therefore not only be understood as a liberal approach but also a conservative view.

These R2P frames freed the parties from pressures to enact a more interventionist role. In the CDU/CSU case this and the role played in Europe helps to understand why the party rejected an alliance partner role definition that would have seen Germany enact another role in Libya. The FDP combined the reframing of R2P with a restraint foreign policy tradition to reject the use of force as an instrument for ending the violence.

The left’s ideological sources for national role conceptions and interpretations

The SPD and Green Party’s human rights defender role was the proposal of an ethical foreign policy. Such policy has been linked to liberal interventionism and, thus, shows
that a different variant of liberalism underlay the two parties' role selection and logic. Such foreign policy can point to a domestic and ideational crisis (Chandler 2003). The intra-party divisions and, more significantly, the shifts and lack of common position on the decision to intervene also point to a form of crisis and soul-searching on this issue. While it is certainly the case that the decision to intervene is and ought to be difficult, the two parties struggled more than others to find a stance and clear role statement on it. The proposed roles and role interpretations were largely about appearing to be on the right side, by being on the same side as partners, rather than making an independent judgement about which position and decision to represent. Complicating such judgement is the absence of principled rejection of intervention because it makes case-to-case assessment necessary. Yet, the coalition parties did not appear struggle over this.

Further substantiating the suggestion that a variant of liberalism underpinned the two parties' roles was the centrality of the liberty concept in their narratives. The SPD and Green Party additionally stressed a value-based society, human rights and use of force as last resort in recent election manifestos (Bündnis 90 Die Grünen 2009b, 204–5, 2011–2212; SPD 2009, 81–85). The SPD also emphasised social progress and justice pointing to a left-leaning, social democratic liberalism based on Enlightenment advances. Equally, the stress of compromise and unity, pitted against confrontation can be understood as the difference between (reform) social democracy and (revolutionary) socialism.

Die Linke challenged the conservative and the various liberal reasonings. The party's key concepts were also liberty, democracy, social justice and, in particular like the Green Party, solidarity. Yet, the party's analysis of the socio-economic causes of the uprisings (confirmed in interviews, June 2017) suggested in particular socialism based around concepts of equality, social justice and solidarity with the uprising people. One MP noted that Germans could learn from the courage these people showed in challenging regimes. The party viewed violence as reinforcing inequality in the international system. It stressed that Germany ought to perform a role that showed solidarity with oppressed people and states. In its non-violent solidarity, the party drew on left-wing pacifism.

Finally, Die Linke's principled position was not a neglect of the dilemma between the concern for other peoples' welfare and human rights, and the rejection of force (Rathbun 2004). The party's analysis of complex causes of conflict and the proposal of a plausible, if currently unlikely, alternative national role, suggests that the party understood the dilemma but that its perspective was both looking back and looking forward long term.
The party focused on interdependencies between states and different policy areas (such as trade and economic policy, interview, June 2017). This showed a sophisticated understanding of complexity. The party considered Germany's past trade partner roles (including but not reduced to arms) as part of the causes of violence and conflict.

**Conclusion**

This chapter traced German parties' foreign policy narratives and national role statements within. It explored the causal reasoning of the parties on the events in North Africa and Libya. It noted a role consensus on the civilian power master role and a near consensus on the alliance partner role. At the same time, the opposition parties' criticism of the government and Die Linke's rejection of intervention suggested that there was disagreement on role performance and intra- and inter-role contestation. The chapter then proceeded to take a closer look at parties' alliance partner role interpretations, additional and alternative role proposals. It qualified the alliance partner. The coalition parties proposed and argued Germany had enacted a responsible and supportive alliance partner role. The SPD and Green Party preferred a unity and loyal alliance partner. While the Die Linke – along with the FDP – proposed the alternative negotiator-mediator role. The chapter then traced plausible sources for the role selection and role interpretations. It suggested that the civilian power role tradition is strong but flexible. Moreover, Atlanticism, Europeanism and traditions drawn from past Cold War and 1990s foreign ministers were discernible. The chapter noted in particular that the CDU/CSU was pragmatic in its approach to its traditions and role elements to stress. It stressed that in particular the SPD and Green Party struggled and that this in part can be traced to shifts and contrasting foreign policy traditions as part of these parties' histories. The source analysis also showed the socialising influence of international norms through active engagement with them, and adoption, adaption and rejection of them. Finally, the chapter ended on a closer look at traces of ideologies concluding that variants of liberalism are pervasive and Die Linke showing a closer affinity to alternative ideologies.

The role interpretation variation finding adds to the recent literature on German national roles that detect and discusses a shift in international-domestic priorities. This thesis remains agnostic on whether domestic issues trumping international pressures. In this case, a discussion of the interpretations and contestation and of the ideational sources can also inform about the direction the role shifts may go in the future. The coalition's more confident German role selection and performance, and its contestation of previous
role enactment suggests that Germany may, yet, challenge conceptions of how it ought to act. While Germany has special constraints to return to a more assertive role, and may, thus, be or pretend to be reluctant, its uniqueness creates tensions regarding the enactment of prescribed/expected roles, between being ‘normal’ and never normal again. This poses dilemmas to German foreign policy decision-makers and parties to grapple with and come to ever new conclusions on.

Finally, the differences between parties, opposition criticism of the government may simply be opposition politics. However, it is possible that a SPD-led government would have taken different decisions, given ideological affinities with France, UK and the US at the time and to meet perceived alter-role expectations, be perceived as united alliance partner and maintain an image for Germany. Yet, it is difficult to ascertain this given the variety of foreign policy traditions and past role performance of this major party.
Chapter 6: National roles and responsibility

Emmanuel Macron's assertion that colonisation was a 'crime against humanity' caused considerable controversy during the 2017 presidential campaign. He made the remark in an interview with an Algerian television network after stressing the elements of civilisation and barbarism of colonisation in a 2016 interview (Le Monde 2017; Libération 2017). Attacked by his opponents, the then presidential candidate retracted again to stress once more the positive side of colonisation, such as 'modernity', teachers, doctors and farmers (Huffington Post 2017). His remarks about France's colonial past implied a coloniser role, and his qualification of colonisation as crime (against humanity) implied a notion of responsibility as culpability.

German federal president Joachim Gauck's talk at the 2014 50th Munich Security Conference was aptly entitled Germany's role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances. In this speech, he noted that Germany was a '[...] reliable partner in Europe and the world: an equal partner with equal responsibilities.' (Gauck 2014) In his comments, he overtly anticipated the interpretation of responsibility as the mere sharing of burden and costs. This pointed to domestic differences over how to view Germany's roles and over the notion of responsibility.

These two examples are not extraordinary. They stand in as illustrations of the implicit and sometimes explicitly made link between roles and responsibility. The French controversy and the German anticipation of different meanings cast light on domestic debate and the contestation of the concept of responsibility linked to national roles.

The present chapter builds on the previous two empirical chapters. It is an exploration of a recurring concept in national role statements in parties' foreign policy narratives. The previous chapters traced narratives, identified parties' national role statements, interpretations and contestation. The chapters demonstrated that parties interpreted master roles differently. Some parties proposed alternative roles. The tracing of role sources showed that some of these were viable, plausible alternatives.

The content analysis brought recurring themes to the fore. Responsibility was most prominent. It also figures in the literature on French and German foreign policy and national roles. Its apparent ubiquity is the basis for this chapter. It identifies responsibility, derived and similar words in national role expressions and narratives. It seeks to unpack its many meanings through in parties' statements.
The chapter makes a conceptual contribution to role theory. It engages with a frequently used concept and proposed that each notion of responsibility gives rise to a range of possible decisions and actions. References to responsibility assume that there is an agreement on its meaning. The chapter argues that responsibility is central to national roles per se and to understanding variation in role interpretations and role contestation. At the same time, responsibility becomes more tangible through reference to national roles. It is in national role conceptions that ideas about responsibility are translated into practice and policy tools for its implementation become apparent. Responsibility is important for understanding national roles, role interpretation and domestic contestation.

I define responsibility as open to the invoking actors' own interpretations rather than assumed and defined by the most powerful actors in the international system. The rise of new powers suggests that the powerful actor club is in the process of gaining new members. These powers have potentially different conceptions of responsibility and engage with and challenge existing conceptions of responsibility. The prospect of a new era of multi-polar order, thus, raises questions about the future of dominant meanings of responsibility. Will new great powers adapt and be socialised into accepting the definition? How far will they redefine it to address domestic and regional, political or cultural needs? Or will these states and their clubbing together while on the ascent allow them to withhold pressures to conform and be socialised into dominant meanings of the power role and its responsibility? The scope of this thesis and chapter does not allow to answer these questions. However, they invite an engagement with alternative responsibility meanings to better understand potential future debates, controversies and developments. This focus is further called for given the thesis looks at two middle power states with varying claims to great power status. It is also timely, given the rise of new political parties that challenge status quo conceptions of foreign policy and definitions of responsibility.

Part 1 of this chapter reviews responsibility and roles in IR theories, IR responsibility and role theory. Establishing a connection between responsibility and roles is one of the contributions of this thesis. Part 2 and 3 illustrate this link. They identify types of responsibility in the parties' narratives and show their connection to the national roles, role interpretations and role contestation discussed in previous chapters. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the key findings and arguments.
1. Responsibility in IR and role theory scholarship

Responsibility is ubiquitous. The word is often combined with adjectives such as corporate, social, individual or collective etc. Responsibility can be forward looking, planning and anticipating for the future and coming generations. It can also be understood as accountability for past events and damages. Its use criss-crosses all policy areas. Politicians frequently speak of 'responsibility' and 'responsible' decision-making, responsible as they claim to be for the delivery of policy programmes in government or toward their constituents. The scope of this thesis is not to review the wide use and variety of the responsibility. The aim is to focus on the use and meanings of responsibility in international relations.

1.1. The concept of responsibility in IR

IR theorists mention or imply state responsibilities in and for the international system. They base such responsibility on different sources and vary in reasoning for such claims. The concept frequently figures in studies of states described as great, rising or regional powers, such as in recent years Brazil, China or India (e.g. Kenkel and Martins 2016; Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006; Narlikar 2011; Loke 2016). Some scholars unpack, map and problematise the concept of great power responsibilities (Loke 2016) and special responsibilities (Bukovansky et al. 2012). They note an absence of conceptual IR scholarship on responsibility. This is surprising, given its frequent use and ubiquity in policy narratives.

This chapter does not have the space for a discussion of all the different literatures. The focus is on responsibility associated with states, the reasoning for it and possible links and combinations with national roles. The attention is on moral responsibility, because the legality of the military intervention, at least of the initial mission, was not disputed.

The review of responsibility in IR theories is limited. It is focused on key authors, rather than intra-theory debates and nuances. This sketch bears the risk of caricature. However, the point is to give an overview of explicit and implicit responsibility notions.

*Responsibility in IR realist theory: instrumental and political*

Realists understand responsibility as political as well as *instrumental*. A basic premise of realism is that the ultimate goal of states is survival in an anarchical state system. This goal shapes all states' national interests. Thus, realism assumes state interests in
the system and in any given situation. There is an assumption that it is in the interest of states to maintain the status quo of the system and to perform actions, even at the detriment of state interests, for the long term goal of safeguarding the system that serves state needs. In particular, great powers with the capacities to maintain the state system have this self-interested responsibility. Structural or neo-realists, like Kenneth Waltz, view such responsibility as independent of states. Waltz (1993, 55) notes:

Some countries may strive to become great powers; others may wish to avoid doing so. The choice, however, is a constrained one. Because of the extent of their interests, larger units existing in a contentious arena tend to take on system-wide tasks. As the largest powers in the system, the United States and the Soviet Union found that they had global tasks to perform and global interests in mind.

Responsibility is thus instrumental, meeting states' intrinsic power interests and needs for security in an anarchical system. States who come to the position of powers in this international system are self-interested to maintain the status quo and participate in any institution that provides for this maintenance.

Classical realists, like Hans Morgenthau, agree on the ultimate state goal of power in an international system characterised by balance of power politics. In such a system, states with the capacities must accept limits to power and must sometimes restrain themselves. Morgenthau (1963, 228) notes:

Superior power gives no right, either moral or legal, to do with that power all that it is physically capable of doing. Power is subject to limitations, in the interest of society as a whole and in the interest of its individual members, which are not the result of mechanics of the struggle for power but are superimposed upon that struggle in the form of norms or rules of conduct by the will of the members of the society themselves.

Even in a system in which responsibility is instrumental for the maintenance of the system, states have a political responsibility to consider the consequences of their actions. Morgenthau (1963, 10) argues:

There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics.

In sum, IR realism accepts state responsibilities on a spectrum from instrumental for meeting state interests to political or moral responsibility for the consequences of state actions. Thus, for realists, state responsibility has at least two meanings: political for the consequences of action and instrumental for the maintenance of the system.
Responsibility in English School’s concept of international society

English School theorists, such as Hedley Bull, also view the international system’s state of nature as one of anarchy. However, they consider it essentially as a society. The maintenance of order in an international society is, thus, as relational, social enterprise. Like realists, responsibility assumptions for system order are instrumental. Yet, they are premised on a common, rather than individual state interest. Bull (1995, 63) notes:

Within international society [...] as in other societies, order is the consequence [...] of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life; rules prescribing behaviour that sustains these goals; and institutions that help to make these rules effective.

He recognises that states’ interests vary, but argues that the common interest is to maintain the social life between them. States as the primary members will create rules for interaction to function. Bull argues that three rules are essential. The first identifies states as the members of international society and recognises the social nature of their relations (Bull 1995, 65). The consequence of this rule is that states are the bearers of rights and duties under international law. A second rule concerns coexistence and restricts violence and war, defining the causes for which sovereign states can wage war. Implicit in such a rule is the respect for state sovereignty and equality between states. Bull’s third rule regulates relations between members of the international society for cooperation. He suggests that these rules provide a more precise notion of how states should conduct themselves in society. He notes that states are: ‘[...] chiefly responsible for performing the functions of helping to make the rules effective; they do so in the absence of either a supreme government [...]’. (Bull 1995, 68) Thus, the instrumental responsibility of states is to spread the rules and enforce them.

Within this international society states differ in qualities and capacities, despite nominal equality. This inequality of power is where Bull derives great power responsibility from. Defining them, Bull (1995, 196) asserts:

[...] great powers are powers recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great powers, for example, assert the right, and are accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole. They accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies in light of the managerial responsibilities they bear.
English School theorists and realists concur that great powers have special responsibilities to maintain order (whether in what is conceived of as international society or system) and that it is attributed to them by virtue of their capacities.

**Roles in the English School’s responsibility conception**

The English School’s account comes close to the social, relational dimension of role theory. A state with the capacities is not immediately a great power. It needs the recognition of others as such. With this recognition come expectations toward it on how to act as part of a collective, common goal. In a segment in *The Anarchical Society* aptly titled ‘The role of great powers’, Bull (1995, 200–201) notes of great powers: ‘

[...] they may play a role in the promotion of international order by pursuing policies that work for it rather than against it. Great powers contribute to international order in two main ways: by managing their relations with one another; and by exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole. [...] It is [...] a statement of the roles they can, and sometimes do, play to sustain international order.

As part of this horizontal (between themselves) and vertical (within the entire society) relations management responsibility, great powers have a number of concrete tasks. Bull includes the preservation of general balance, avoidance and control of crises, limitations of war, the attribution of regions or spheres of influence to great powers and management of order in these regions and the possibility of a concert between the great powers. In these tasks, some of Holsti’s (1970) roles discernible. The regional leader or protector corresponds to the attribution of spheres of influence, in which great powers have interests and responsibilities to sustain order as part of regional leader roles. All tasks that imply the avoidance of the outbreak of violence, friction between great powers and other states also suggests the regional protector role.

In sum, English School theorists suggest that the politics of great power should be one of responsibility politics. The School's institutional international society view suggests that status assigned to great power states entails material and social responsibilities. This means that responsibilities are attributed to such states because the social nature of society and that the conditions of the international state of nature can be altered and actors are socialised into roles.
**Responsibility in liberal and constructivist IR theories**

Liberal IR theory proposes that cooperation, institutions and trust-building can overcome anarchy between states. A feature of IR liberalism is the value placed on individualism and liberty and a conviction that the rule of law can check unconstrained power, constituting progress toward an ideal society (e.g. Doyle 2016).

Inherent in liberal theory is also the belief in the capacity of democratically governed states and of free trade between states to lead to prosperity – and a stake in maintaining the thus created order – and world peace. Doyle (1983, 1986) suggests liberalism is by no means peaceful and liberal states are even prone to wage war against non-liberal ones. This proneness and the premises of liberal peace imply a responsibility for democracies to democratise others for world peace. In practice, domestic constraints on armed force deployment limit such a responsibility in democratically rules states.

International rules of behaviour, i.e. laws and norms, form part of liberal institutions. Robert O. Keohane (2012) notes an increase in legalisation and moralisation in the decades since the end of the Cold War. The legalisation of international relations includes many legal institutions that are about human rights or the punishment of their violation. The moralisation, in turn, covers international norms, such as R2P.

Social constructivism's premise is that meaning is socially constructed, mutually reinforced through practice. Alexander Wendt (1992) famously argued that anarchy is what states make of it. States do not only react to other states' material capacities. They also consider ideational factors. On responsibility, Wendt (1992, 400) writes:

> Competitive and individualistic systems are both "self-help" forms of anarchy in the sense that states do not positively identify the security of self with that of others but instead treat security as the individual responsibility of each. [...] This contrasts with the "cooperative" security system, in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all. This is not a self-help in any interesting sense, since the "self" in terms of which interests are defined is the community; national interests are international interests.

Responsibility suggests the notion of an international society in which the interests of each states, most of the time, becomes the security of all, from which a responsibility derives. Wendt's theory is a social theory (1999) about state's relations with and perceptions of each. Constructivism is concerned with how states as the actors of international relations are socialised into behaviour. Like the theories outlined above,
it presumes that institutions require the recognition of actors in the system in question, in which meanings of institutions are intersubjective or widely shared.

In liberal and constructivist theories there is a large body of scholarship on international norms that shape meaning and understanding of situations and events. R2P is an explicit forward-looking responsibility. It includes a prevention that entails means to minimise the risk of four crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity) occurring. The use of force is the last resort and requires UNSC authorisation. R2P builds on international law and the UN Charter provisions for peace, security, human rights and state sovereignty. To recall, it consists of three-steps: (1) it is each state’s responsibility to protect its populations, building on the state sovereignty norm. (2) It is each state’s responsibility to ask for help to fulfil the first responsibility should it not be able to otherwise do so. (3) The international community’s responsibility to take action to protect kicks in when the state in question fails to assume its responsibilities.

R2P reframes the international legal norm of state sovereignty and freedom from interference, as was outlined in chapter 2. State sovereignty becomes conditioned on responsibility to protect. Yet, R2P is not law. It is a moral responsibility, building on humanitarian rationale. Unlike its predecessors, R2P is more complex with its preventive and reconstruction elements.

R2P creates expectations toward the international community and able and willing states to take action. The pressure to act is toward great, regional and rising powers. As such, R2P is in principle a general but in practice a special responsibility, given that not all states can perform such an R2P enforcer role, even as part of multilateral coalitions.

This review of IR literature shows that state responsibility is an important concept. Sometimes explicit, often implied are roles state responsibility expectations give rise to. The next section looks at the references to responsibility in role theory.

### 1.2. Responsibility in role theory

Kal J. Holsti (1970) refers to responsibility, its derivatives and related terms such as duty or obligation more than a dozen times. Regional leader, regional protector, anti-imperialist agent, liberation supporter, defender of the faith, mediator-integrator and the protectee role include a responsibility element. Holsti also notes that some states
have rights, duties and special responsibilities, established by the UN and NATO Charters and based on material capacity, history and virtue.

**Responsibilities create role-expectations**

Such duties and responsibilities, most clearly of the permanent members of the UNSC, but also powerful non-members with the practical capacities, create expectations toward such states to perform certain roles. Cronin (2001) describes the position in which some states find themselves (as hegemons) as creating pressures due to the expectations to meet obligations toward the international community. This means that states in this position are alter-socialised into leader roles and endowed with a greater influence on the system. At the same time, they are expected by institutional precedent and their own capacity to provide collective goods and offer leadership. This constrains even the most powerful states:

> [...] a hegemon's authority is derived from its role in the international society of states [...] Accompanying this authority is increased obligation. While its economic and military strength provide a wider range of options for pursuing its foreign policies than that afforded to other states, it also faces greater constraints. This tension between greater opportunities and greater constraints is the paradox of hegemony. (Cronin 2001, 111)

Cronin suggests that responsibility, perceived to be that of such states, and leader role obligations toward the international system constrain these states' role performance: 'Within this context of a hegemonic system, great power also means great responsibility.' (2001, 112)

Holsti and Cronin's account of special responsibilities of some states mirrors some of the discussion of responsibility in IR. They too link some roles with some states' responsibilities toward the international collective or system.

Recent theory studies also quote responsibility in their role descriptions and analysis. Wehner (2015) suggests that Chile sees peacekeeping missions not as Brazil's the sole responsibility as the regional leader. Instead, it considers such missions a UN initiative in which Chile and Brazil share leadership and responsibility for peacekeeping missions. Thies (2014) proposes that president Hugo Chávez of Venezuela’s role statements include a regional leader role that includes special responsibilities and a developer role with duties or obligations to assist other states' development. Shi (2012) remarks that there are external expectations toward China based on its capacity and pressure on China to conform to such capability-based responsibility. As China aims to
project the image of a responsible power, it is confronted with these responsibility expectations and what they entail in practice. (See also Harnisch 2012)

These examples of the link between roles and responsibility in role theory studies mirror the proposition that some states are expected to assume greater responsibilities and perform predetermined roles to maintain the international system. This does not suggest that other states reference responsibility less in national roles statements. However, the observation that the assumption of special responsibilities appears associated with states of greater material capacities suffice here, because the focus in this thesis is on two regional and/or aspiring global powers.

**Role socialisation into responsibility?**

The discussion of the observed existence of special responsibilities attached to certain states that are expected to perform specific roles raises the questions: how do states know which roles to enact and based on what or which responsibility? In his discussion of role socialisation, Thies (2012) notes that great power states have the responsibility to socialise regional powers and other less powerful states into the international system, and of regional powers to do the same in their regional system. Cronin (2001) argues that role prescriptions emerge through common practice and custom that reflect the conditions that lead the establishment of such institutions as rules and practices. The presence of powerful states is not different, as like other states in the system, powerful states rely on the recognition of their position by others. Obligations and responsibilities are attached to powerful states through institutions: 

> Often role prescriptions emerge through common practice or custom, both of which reflect the initial conditions that led to the creation of the institution. Practices that are established during the early period of an institution's development can set precedents and create widespread expectations of future behaviour. Once established, however, institutional norms and roles can become "sticky" thereby generating and constraining future behavior. (Cronin 2001, 110)

The historic rise of responsibility created an understanding enshrined in institutions, law and, in particular, contemporary organisations like the UN. A regional or global power state today is confronted with such institutions. Its recognition and capacity to act as a power is in part dependent on its own adherence to institutions and their rules and the assumption of the responsibilities as attached to states of its capacity.

Via the institutionalisation of responsibility and roles in this manner, responsibility and power roles are not only about material capabilities or capacity to perform such roles.
They are also normative (Thies 2012, 2013) and value-based (Thies 2014). Responsibility as part of the immaterial concerns that drive actors in learning and taking up new roles (Harnisch 2012). Thus, responsibility beyond the material capacity is also a role selection and learning process.

This section showed the centrality of responsibility for (at least some) role conceptions. It also pointed to the socialising effects of dominant meanings of responsibility that link back to the discussion of responsibility in IR. Much of the responsibility implied or explicit in national roles is instrumental to maintaining the international system or society. Yet, responsibility is at the same time also normative and values-based. The next section looks at IR literature focused on the concept of responsibility.

1.3. IR responsibility scholarship

Bukovansky et al (2012) provide the historical context on great power special responsibilities. Such responsibilities first emerged explicitly in 1814-1815, in the context of the Vienna Congress after the Napoleonic Wars, along with great power rights. At that time, the responsibility for the maintenance and management of peaceful relations between great powers and between other states in the system was noted. Special responsibilities were gradually institutionalised and written into international law. In the second half of the twentieth century, such rights and responsibilities became recognised in UNSC permanent membership. The relatively novelty of enshrined great power responsibilities i.e. obligation to maintain and manage the international state system in return for recognition and rights, suggests that its meaning is not set in stone.

Debates on the possibility and assignment of responsibility in international state conduct suggest that the issue is complex. Erskine (2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2008) argues that moral agency and responsibility are central questions of international relations. She develops a model for institutional moral agency at which's core is the question of who or what can even be held responsible. Can non-individuals have moral agency? Included in the range of institutions are states. Erskine proposes that a focus on moral agency allows for more attention paid to identifying who is capable to responding to calls to action. Erskine (2003b, 4) notes:

[...] divorcing questions of moral agency from assertions of responsibility means that blame can be carelessly, and often creatively, directed and apportioned. [...] When one builds policies on assertions of either duty or blame, clarity requires [...] recognition of the relevant actors involved.
Roles are implied in this moral agency and responsibility. Erskine notes that moral agency means expectations toward a moral agent prescribing or evaluating action. They form part of what actors' behaviour amounts to: role performance.

Moral responsibility is problematic. While the states 'acts' in the world, individuals (alone or collectively in governments) take decisions on the state's behalf and to a varying degree of responsibility for the state's actions. Thus, there is a difficulty to identify who exactly is to take the responsibility for state action and whether or not there is collective responsibility, e.g. of governments or citizens (e.g. Runciman 2003; Harbour 2003; Parrish 2009).

There are also other issues with moral responsibility. Ainley (2011) discerns a shift from state responsibility to holding individuals accountable for inherently collective actions. She notes a reliance on law to address political questions of the culpability of collective actors. She suggests to focus attention on political responsibility which would include actors that individual criminal accountability does not include. Similarly, Hoover (2012) observes the proliferation of moral responsibility and the establishment of legal institutions to address it. However, he suggests that there are serious problems, not least the focus on individuals in practice. Hoover (2012, 234) notes:

[...] emerging understanding of responsibility in world politics have been too focused on the action of individuals, leading to the neglect of structural causes of mass violence and more indirect lines of responsibility revealed by attending to the wider social context.

He continues that this neglect is the political dimension of responsibility. The focus on individual failures to uphold state obligations covers 'power inequalities and particular interests that are served by focusing on individual actors over enabling conditions and social structures.' He suggests that the difficulty in finding peaceful resolution of conflicts illustrate the troubling down-side of the emerging moral responsibility in international politics. He asks: what purpose does holding actors accountable serve. Hoover (2012, 236) argues:

[...] the national and autonomous agent presumed in practices of responsibility in world politics is inadequate in its inattention to the socially embedded nature of responsibility and for that reason obscures that these practices affirm particular political ends and limit the critical reach of our attempts to pursue responsibility. [...] the responsible agent is a socially constructed agent and the act of holding responsible is a coercive and creative political act. [italic in the original] [...] Holding an agent responsible moulds her agency in a particular way, and when this process is not consciously acknowledged the ideals, institutions
and social structures that form our understanding of moral agency are withheld from scrutiny and tacitly reinforced. This political account of responsibility adds a further functional dimension. It addresses questions about what underlies the occurrence of atrocity than individual and collective depravity. It raises questions about types of responsibility. Lu (2011) looks at historical responsibility for colonial injustice and how it should be addressed in the contemporary world. She argues that beyond the attribution of responsibility of individuals and states, this injustice was reliant on structure that enabled and encouraged wrong-doing. This is relevant as it points to the historical, structural dimension of responsibility for conditions that may lead to situations in which violence erupts. This again raises the question of who is responsible for action and how to deal with such responsibility, especially if not regulated by law, like in the case of R2P.

The responsibility in IR research also addresses great power's special responsibilities (e.g. Lee and Thompson 2017; Neack 2017; Loke 2016; Morris 2013; Bukovansky et al. 2012; Claude 1986). This literature frequently mentions 'roles' great power states have (e.g. Bukovansky et al. 2012, 9; Loke 2016, 6). The great power status itself encases a notion of great power role. While this literature begins to unpack a concept, it suffers from a dual weakness. The first is a focus on the international system structure, state capacities and its influence on responsibility notions. The meaning of responsibility should not be seen as immediate and implied. The second, related weakness is a normative assumption of what great power responsibility behaviour ought to look like. Yet, expectations toward 'responsible states' changed since the responsibility language emerged, 200 years ago. A shared understanding of responsibility understanding across time and space does not seem to exist.

This review showed that responsibility is an important concept for understanding and explaining state relations and behaviour. The survey also implied that responsibility often appears to be a guide to action. Foreign policymakers are likely to consider responsibilities when taking decisions and acting on behalf of the state. Chapters 4 and 5 took note of role expectations toward France and Germany. In the two country-party cases responsibility was present in national role statements.

This chapter proposes that national roles and role conceptions are bridges between preferred responsibility and actual behaviour. Even concrete responsibility, such as R2P, is operationalised through and materialises in national role statements. Thus, a role approach to responsibility contributes to understanding how responsibility is
transformed into action. At the same time, a focus on responsibility helps to understand the underlying reasoning for role selection and interpretation.

This chapter uses the same empirical data as the previous two to look at 'responsibility'. The above discussion created expectations of French and German responsibilities, given their positions alone in regional and international systems: (1) as European powers and (2) France primarily as UNSC permanent member and nuclear power and Germany as economic power. Part 2 and part 3 respectively begin with a review of the country-specific scholarship. The aim is to provide some background for the findings the debates and the differences in the conceptualisation of responsibility in roles.

2. French parties and responsibility in national roles

In role theory research on France, responsibility premised on position, status and values is notable. Thumerelle and LePrestre (1997) identify duties and obligations in relation to France’s regional leader role, its need to increase power and influence in line with its capabilities and as part of a protector of French culture role. Moreover, a value-based responsibility is implied in the claims that foreign policy builds on an identity based on humanism and that French foreign policy is benefitting humanity rather than meeting interests (also in Krotz 2001, 2015). In studies of French foreign policy, responsibility is evidenced in on France’s permanent membership of the UNSC and at the same time seen as building on it. This is due to an UN Charter derived responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

In sum, in the literature on France, responsibility creates an obligation to fulfil in international relations. This responsibility is derived from material capabilities, status due to nuclear power and UNSC membership and a history of great power status in Europe and through nineteenth century colonialism in Africa and the Arab World (and Asia). This also creates alter-role prescriptions for France and, domestically, the perceptions of alter-role expectations. Therefore, French policymakers can be expected to perceive the assumption and taking of responsibility as part of France’s role. Chapter 4 suggests that these perceptions about France’s responsibilities as part of the national role may have been reinforced through debates on humanitarian intervention and R2P.

I identified two types of responsibility in the French parties’ Libya narratives. It was France’s responsibility is not to stay inactive, it had to act. This was part of the UMP and PS leader role interpretations and linked to the Universal-French values defender role.
Related to it was responsibility as culpability. If France did not intervene, it would be moral responsible for the deaths of Libyans and other civilians oppressed by dictators. The notion of responsibility was also notable in the PCF narratives. The party viewed France as culpable for escalating through its past and current role performance.

2.1. A French responsibility to do something

The first responsibility was that France ought to do something. The reasoning for action was that something terrible was about to happen and that it was morally wrong to be inactive. This responsibility was part of the reasoning in UMP and PS' leader role. The responsibility was positive and morally justified. This was apparent in the description of its opposite: moral failure. Such failings were considered greater than the calculated risk to civilians through the military intervention.

An analogy and link was drawn between Libyans' concrete plight and the French democratic self and history. This was part of 'discursive construction' of a mirror-image between Libyans and a democratic, history French self (Ostermann 2016). It formed part of the perceived legitimacy of the intervention: because Libyans asked for it, France had to intervene. The link was not only between Libyans and a French self. It referred to those yet to call for liberty and yet to liberate themselves from oppression: 'Other people rewrite in their language in their alphabet the formidable energy that inspires us since 1789. It was our responsibility that it did not stop at Benghazi, so that the Arab Peoples can write their history.' (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882) Equally, this French self was extended to Europe and its historic example: 'We need to exercise all our responsibility and never forget that Europe is itself a successful peace process. It is from this perspective that our duty is to give an example in this part of the world and on the basis of our common heritage.' (Ameline (UMP) 2011, 2210)

These quotes revealed that this responsibility to do something was founded on values. Universal-French values and their implications in the protests that led to the conflict, legitimised the intervention and created responsibility. One PS MP noted that France was fighting '[...] in the name of universal rights.' (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1881–82) The prime minister argued:

[...] we had a few days to assume our responsibility. And we assumed it. Our country was at rendezvous with its values. With the international community we have to stay mobilised to support the Libyan people, and to help them realise their dream, that is not unrealistic: a free Libya, a democratic Libya and a Libya ruled by law.’(Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5220)
This responsibility was, thus, linked to the value-based role that filled the leader role with purpose, described in chapter 4. It was based on France’s capacity to intervene, perceived Libyan and international role expectations toward France as the beacon of universal values. This built on a self-image as democratic pioneer. It was a special, moral responsibility.

2.2. France's responsibility as culpability

The second responsibility was culpability or accountability. The UMP and the PS used it to describe what the consequences of doing nothing would be. The PCF outlined the consequences of action prior to and while using military force.

**UMP and PS' responsibility as culpability**

The UMP and PS argued that not to assume responsibility was equal to doing nothing or inaction. They thereby defined ‘something’ as intervention and inaction as not to intervene. The flipside of the responsibility to do something was culpability. This was a negative responsibility. It was moral failure. One UMP MP stressed the responsibility to do something and also noted that failing to act (intervene) was morally wrong and would send the wrong signal to other dictators. Thus like the first responsibility the avoidance of culpability was about the bigger picture than Libya:

> We have no right to let a massacre happen in Libya that would hinder democratisation in other regions too [...] our responsibility is to stay vigilant and to not be inactive [...]. (Lequiller (UMP) 2011b, 2200)

> I admit that we cannot Intervene militarily everywhere, against all despotisms. However, they have to know that they cannot massacre their own populations without us reacting to it. (Lequiller (UMP) 2011b, 2202)

Similarly, the prime minister argued:

> Not to intervene is giving carte blanche at the regime of Gaddafi and his sides. It means signalling to all those who want democracy and the respect for human rights that these uprisings were not to be successful. Not to intervene is to note that the wall of oppression is stronger than the wind of liberty. We could not accept this scenario. (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878)

> The party's MPs viewed inaction as detrimental to the success of the Arab uprisings '[...] how could we have let a massacre of civilians take place in front of our eyes? [...] aside from the humanitarian drama, this would have meant the end of the Arab uprisings.' (Teissier (UMP) 2011a, 1889)
Equally, the PS argued that there was no other alternative prevent mass murder in Benghazi than to intervene militarily, as one MP’s quote on the duty to make sure that the 1789 spirit was not stopped at Benghazi indicated (Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882).

This responsibility as culpability was linked to the responsibility to do something. It was a future responsibility and accountability for what would happen if there was no intervention. It linked France’s moral standing to performing a leader role in doing something. Thereby, this invocation of this responsibility revealed perceived role pressures toward France for having the capacity to intervene and the moral basis not to stand by. It was also a responsibility toward others who face a similar threat and whose regimes may be deterred in knowing that France will react to protect ‘strangers’.

**The PCF’s responsibility as culpability, complicity and accountability**

The PCF’s responsibility as culpability was focused on past and present role performance that the party viewed as detrimental to peace. According to the PCF, violence leads to violence. Thus, to implement the no-fly zone was to cause harm:

> We remain convinced, with Algerian writer Boualem Sansal, that ‘war of good against evil has only ever profited evil’. For us, the decision to bomb Libya is immediately linked to the question of spiralling out of control violence and of the risk of a wider military confrontation, with all the disastrous consequences for the civilian populations. [...] If France puts the finger in the spiral [...] France will have to bear the responsibility of failure, in front of the Libyan people as well as the French. (Muzeau (PCF) 2011, 1885)

Responsibility as culpability became complicity for the loss of civilian lives: ‘We are complicit in the death of on all sides: [...] the people who are rebelling against Gadaffi on one side, and those who die of NATO bombs on the other side.’ (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5228) The complicity also included the escalation of violence because of what the academic literature describes as moral hazard, a known dilemma of military intervention (e.g. Kuperman 2008). The PCF argued that the France’s actions led to rebels to retaliate with violence, provoking a spiral of violence and calls for outside intervention, as a consequence.

The PCF also raised arms sales as a French responsibility for civilian deaths. Again, the meaning of responsibility is complicity through past role performances. In a 2011 debate on the relations to and arms trade with the United Arabic Emirates, one PCF MP noted: ‘When you see what happened in Libya where Sarkozy sold war materials to the
tyrant Gaddafi - still there - with the dramatic consequences that we now know, we can only have worries with this short-sighted [...] policy.' (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 4148)

Chapter 4 described the alternative national role that the PCF paired with the leader. It defined responsibility as culpability and complicity. An implication was France ought to be accountable for its decisions and role performance as arms trader and intervener and the harm caused by arms sold and bombs dropped. The party argued that France's responsibility was to lead on calls for an immediate ceasefire and a political solution (Candelier (PCF) 2011, 5227).

In sum, focusing on the presence and meaning of responsibility in French national role statements helped clarify the reasoning or narratives on the conflict and intervention. The attention paid to responsibility and its various definitions helped understand the variation in alternative roles selected to fill the leader role with purpose. Responsibility formed part of parties' causal reasoning to make sense of the events.

3. German parties and responsibility in national roles

German responsibility and conceptions of responsibility are explicit in role theory studies of German foreign policy. Maull (2015a, 2015b) makes the (normative) case for a leader role based on responsibility. He draws this role conception from the:

[...] material, moral and psychological impact of the catastrophe that National Socialism had brought over Germany and Europe. The notion of "German responsibility" has its roots in a sense of German collective guilt and projected desire to atone but also to regain political respectability and agency. (Maull 2015b, 11–12)

Maull (2014) also notes that German role responsibility is first toward Europe and Israel, and only then toward the wider world. The basis for this prioritisation in responsibility is its historic role as threat to neighbouring states and its Nazi past. As was seen in chapter 5, this type of responsibility to refrain from repeating history translates into the civilian power role. The dual responsibility for and based on the past is one of culpability and accountability. It has a moral dimension. It is linked to perceived alter-role expectations and the perception of others as threat and the need to be perceived as reliable partner. It required credible trust- and institution-building. This explains the need to avoid acting alone and isolation, in what is commonly referred to as German exceptionalism (Sonderweg).
The German foreign policy and role theory literature also refers to a growing German responsibility. The scope of 'responsibility' expanded from the 1990s. Changing role expectations evidence this. Krotz (2015, 134) notes the evolution of Germany's civilian power role that went '[...] hand in hand with subtle domestic reinterpretations of the meaning of “responsibility,” with the term now frequently coupled with the idea that Germany should have a greater say in international affairs.' Harnisch (2001, 49) finds growing expectations toward Germany: '[...] a strong influence of alter-expectations can be identified in central terms such as ‘Germany's (grown) responsibilities’ or ‘new German duties’ during the phase of unification.' The roots of this German responsibility, not least for the domestic audience, are the violent recent past. Yet, the growing alter-role expectations of Germany assuming responsibility draws on its economic strength and regional position, i.e. on material capabilities. Structural realist Waltz (1993) noted that Germany's rise to great power status was inevitable once it regained full sovereignty. Given Germany's capacities there are expectations toward it to assume a greater share or burden of the responsibility for the maintenance of international order, peace and security. In common understanding, this responsibility implies the willingness to finance and use military force when necessary, under certain conditions.

I identified three types of responsibility in German parties' narratives as part of or linked to national role expressions. It was Germany's responsibility to do something. This was clearest in the Green Party's statements and also present in the SPD's, and linked to the human rights defender role that completed the parties' alliance partner role interpretation. Another German responsibility was culpability and complicity. This was central in Die Linke's reasoning about events in Libya and German role proposal as negotiator-mediator. Finally, the coalition parties' raised the responsibility of others. The responsibility to do something was pinned on other states as part of the CDU/CSU and FDP's interpretation of alliance partner role as responsible and supportive.

### 3.1. A German responsibility to do something

The Green Party and SPD argued that Germany ought to do something. One Green Party MP noted that 'we'-Germany had a responsibility to assume responsibility because Libyan people were asking for help, and the Arab League, African Union and regional states were supporting a no-fly zone. She used others in support of her argument that Germany had to assume its responsibility:
It is necessary. The dilemma we all experienced: Gaddafi is shooting at his people instead of protecting them. [...] It is at this point, our responsibility to defend human rights and not only with words but also with UN-resolutions and other means. [...] need to be humble [...] and know of our responsibility [...] (Künast (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 11149–50)

In this quote 'our responsibility' suggests an inherently German responsibility, plausibly the responsibility for and based on the past to prevent the repeat of history (confirmed in interviews with former MPs, June 2017 and consistent with manifestos (Bündnis 90 Die Grünen 2002, 2009a)). It revealed a self-image based on German responsibility. It links past self and its crimes to present others and their fates. It is a form of reparation for the past for what can never be repaired or repaid. This responsibility linked to the human rights defender role. It was invoked along with R2P. This suggested that the party also viewed Germany's responsibility within the R2P framework and as part of the so-called international community and its norms.

Yet, the party's notion of responsibility was about more than defending human rights and acting in accordance with international norms. The above quote continues:

How can we avoid the perception that Germany does not care enough about human rights there? [...] We want to see the foreign minister fight for human rights. We want that Germany stands (Wir wollen, dass Deutschland steht) [...]. (Künast (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 2011, 11149–50)

The reference to standing and fighting for human rights also links to a notion of German responsibility based on its capacity, status, image and alter-role expectations. Yet, it was about more than the capacity to intervene, it was also about being seen to care about and to fight for human rights. It was about others perceptions of Germany and standing on the right side, with Libyans but also with alliance and European partners. In part this was can be attributed to the desire to avoid isolation and exceptionalism (confirmed during interviews, June 2017). In other part, doing something to be seen as doing may be part of role performance role for oneself more and others rather than the people allegedly saved or protected (e.g. Fassin 2013).

The SPD's responsibility to do something was less explicit. Like the Green Party there was a desire to be seen to do something and to be on the right side. One MP asked why Germany did not want to be part of a majority when it voted in the UNSC. He continued: what would the people in North Africa who had welcomed the foreign minister with cheers think now? He suggested that they now would have a different view of Germany, given it did not align with its European partners and did not dare vote against a dictator.
The SPD and Green Party's stress on being seen to do something and being on the right side, i.e. the same as key partners linked the responsibility to do something back to the united and loyal alliance partner roles.

One SPD MP mentioned R2P. A responsibility to act and do something when dictators attack peaceful civilians, was implied: ‘[...] I think it is a shame that the government as member of the UNSC abstained in such a situation. There is no abstention vis-à-vis despots on such a decision.’ (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11145) Finally, the expression of shame indicated a moral dimension to this responsibility notion. The Rwanda analogy (Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) 2011, 11145) pointed to past failures and the need to learn lessons from policy mistakes. Moreover, the party’s self-reflection on mistakes such as supporting North African regimes for stability reasons implied a form of acceptance of responsibility. These notions to the conception of responsibility as complicity that will be reviewed next.

3.2. German responsibility as culpability, complicity and accountability

Responsibility as complicity and culpability was not only discernible in parties' references to Germany's past mistakes in relations with North African regimes. It was also integral part of Die Linke's understanding of Germany's role and responsibility.

Key to understanding the party’s responsibility was its description of Germany's past role performance as supporter of regimes like Libya and as arms trader. One MP noted:

I also do not believe that Germany was involved positively in the uprisings. [...] We share responsibility for all those regimes. We supported them, we strengthened them, we held their hand, and we made deals with them. That is also part of the truth. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10822)

In response to the SPD reference to R2P, another MP said:

I have to tell SPD something. [...] when you speak of R2P, I want to remind you that it was when you were government minister that Germany exported weapons to Libya. (Applause) Under the grand-coalition, weapons worth 86 million Euro were exported to Libya which are now being used against the insurgents. That is the responsibility of the SPD. If you are now saying, after we exported weapons: “then we will fight them with our armed forces” then that is – the word I want to use I am not allowed to – but that cannot be topped. (Applause) By the way, I am of the opinion that Germany should not export any weapons [...]. (Deutscher Bundestag 2011, 11146 Van Aken)

In relation to the military intervention in Libya, MPs argued that it was irresponsible to send German soldiers to fight against the Libyan forces armed with German weapons.
Another German responsibility concerned its economic policy and trade partner role. It was implicit in Die Linke’s criticism of German domestic economic and export policy. It argued that these policies had led to the food prices rise that triggered the Tunisian uprising. (Gehrcke (Die Linke) 2011b, 10823) The party directly linked the Arab uprisings to German policy-making. This notion of responsibility was consistent with Die Linke's 2009 manifesto and its worldview of interdependence and materialism that implied a link between the economy and other policy areas.

Die Linke's German responsibility conception was clearly linked to past and present German roles and role performance. Responsibility was backward looking and a form of accountability for past decisions. Assuming responsibility would be to refrain from such decisions in the future. The party's alternative role proposal was also a challenge to the dominant view that assuming responsibility necessarily means using force in international relations (interview with a Die Linke MP, June 2017). Underlying the party's role contestation through the proposal of the negotiator-mediator role was a contestation of dominant definitions of responsibility and resistance against the role socialisation coming from international norms and other states that expect Germany to assume such responsibility and play more forceful roles in the future.

3.3. Others' responsibility

The coalition parties agreed with the SPD and the Green Party on the responsibility to do something but viewed it as the primary responsibility of the Arab and regional states. Recognising Germany's responsibility as UNSC member, the foreign minister noted:

As member of the UNSC Germany has special responsibility for international security in this difficult situation. We respect and welcome the resolution of the Arab League of last weekend. However, we see the responsibility for further action of the international community firstly with the states of the region. This will influence our positioning in New York. (Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10815)

His Arab responsibility conceptualisation was echoed by party colleagues and the coalition partner (FDP 2011; Westerwelle, (FDP) 2011, 10816; Stinner (FDP) 2011b, 10824; Silberhorn (CDU/CSU) 2011; Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10826; Götzer (CDU/CSU) 2011b, 10830; Polenz (CDU/CSU) 2011, 11142–43).

One CDU/CSU MP explained:

[The Arab League] has to be ready to implement a no fly zone. The Arab League requested UN mandate is a necessary first condition. Decisive, however, is the Arab self-responsibility to protect the civilian populations in Libya. [...] If the
Arab League’s expectations is solely toward NATO and the EU as a consequence of its declarations, then I must say: there is no such division of labour with us. The Arab League must, if it demands a no fly zone, not only politically but also militarily take responsibility for the implementation and its possible consequences. In particular, [...] those who have the military capacities and modern air force need to step up. The Arab League spoke at its foundation of the unity of the Arab nation. Why are the Arab states that have overcome the colonial heritage not willing to come to the help of the threatened Libyans? That would be an Arab and not again an outside intervention. (Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) 2011c, 10820–21)

Another MP noted that Germany assuming its responsibility was contingent on the Arab League first assuming its responsibilities. (Mißfelder (CDU/CSU) 2011, 10826)

Chapter 5 argued that the coalition parties’ engagement with R2P led to a reframing of the concept in the case of Libya. The two parties proposed a regional or kin/ethnic responsibility as an intermediary step between a state’s and the international community’s responsibility to protect. This reframing was a self-responsibility in line with these parties’ view of German responsibility and the responsible alliance partner role interpretation. It was congruent with their individualistic and conservative views. It is a type of responsibility that is narrow on the self or the state and that then expands layer by layer: state-region-world. In this case this meant that it became others’, i.e. an Arab, responsibility to do something about Libya before Germany would. This notion of responsibility was indicative of resistance against alter-role prescriptions based on Germany’s material capacity to intervene, its status as a regional power and stated global ambitions. The coalition rejected the dominant meaning of responsibility for itself, casting it onto others. It justified this by reference to past interventions’ failure, Arab public opinion and Arab’s states need to take the actions they are calling for.

Discussion and conclusions

This chapter was an exploration of the concept of responsibility and its meanings in parties’ national role statements. It showed that all French and German parties referred to responsibility in their narratives but disagreed on its meaning. This chapter suggests that there were similarities between the centre parties in France and Germany. They were focused on the responsibility to do something and of portraying non-intervention as inaction and morally irresponsible. The UMP, PS, SPD and Green Party shared this view. At the same time this responsibility had strong alter-role expectation and perceived role-performativity components. The parties wanted their states to be seen to act in a certain way. This type of responsibility was linked to two ostentatiously values-
based roles: Universal-French values defender and the human rights defender roles. In the two country-cases, these roles gave purpose or added meaning to the master-role. In the case of France this responsibility and its associated role also revealed a tension at the heart of French history. MPs portrayed the role enactment as an honour and filling them with pride (Jacob (UMP) 2011a, 1883; Ayrault (PS) 2011, 1882). They spoke of the choices France had made: 'This is the choice of responsibility.' (Fillon (UMP) 2011b, 5219) At the same time, assuming responsibility and the use of force was described as duty and compulsion without alternative (Fillon (UMP) 2011a, 1878; Cazeneuve (PS) 2011, 5227). While this tension may have been based on rhetoric and the political need to justify the decision, it may also reveal a tension at the heart of the responsibility to do something (and R2P) and raises the question of whether this poses role conflict or dilemmas.

Interestingly, the CUD/CSU and FDP did not share this notion of responsibility entirely. They also rejected inaction but, like the PCF and Die Linke, argued that not intervening was not inaction. The coalition parties revealed a different definition of international responsibility challenging dominant views of whom and to whom responsibility is owed. This responsibility conceptualisation connected with their responsible alliance partner role interpretation and the contestation of this role as understood as follower. These parties' responsibility definition and the linked role raise questions about the future of German role performance and whether it will continue to contest dominant views of the meaning of international responsibility.

Finally, the chapter found a second near consensus on the radical left. They argued that responsibility was not only to do something in the moment, but also to act in certain ways before and in the future. It was a responsibility understood as complicity, culpability and accountability for past decisions and actions. It called for restraint on role patterns. They also appeared to agree on national variants of the negotiator-mediator role. This points to the sharing of narratives on the causes of conflict and effects of intervention, similar engagement with international norms, like R2P, and the relevance of socialist ideology.

In sum, this exploration of responsibility began to unravel the links between national roles and definitions of responsibility as part of foreign policy narratives and national role statements. It showed that taking a closer look at responsibility can help understand reasoning beneath national role socialisation, selection, interpretation and contestation.
Chapter 7: Conclusions

November 2011 marked hundred years of bombing from an airplane. In a coincidence of history, the first such air bomb was dropped in 1911 on an oasis in Libya from an Italian machine. It was the beginning of a new form of making war (OpenDemocracy 2011). In March 2011, bombs on Libya marked another first in the use of force and modern warfare, albeit of a different type. R2P was invoked for the first time in a UNSC resolution to mandate a no fly zone to incapacitate a country’s armed forces and authorising a military intervention in a state without its consent. Thus, nearly 100 years apart, Libya was being bombed from the air by European states again. This near-centenary bombing repetition was met with domestic controversy in a number of these states and some international and regional organisations, such as the African Union. Also, non-intervening states criticised the mission from the start or shortly after it appeared to expand its remits from protecting civilians to regime change.

This thesis aimed to cast light on domestic controversies around foreign policy decision-making in France and Germany in the context of the 2011 Libya military intervention. Such domestic debates were conceptualised as instances of potential party disagreement over foreign policy and as moments in which parties are likely to express – and contest – national roles. The intention was to pay attention to parties, as an often overlooked political actor in foreign policy studies, as much as to domestic controversies as underrated moments, often overshadowed by decision-making itself and thrive for causal explanations for decisions.

The thesis found that French and German parties did not always agree on the national role and sometimes also interpreted the same national role differently and, that they directly and indirectly contested the national role. The central argument was that this variation is based on ideas as much as on domestic political needs and international role socialisation pressures. The reasoning for this was that parties have to rationalise even political necessities in acceptable and compatible terms for themselves and for their various domestic and international audiences. Ideas underlying national roles in foreign policy narratives influence the selection and definition of these roles. Domestic role contestation can be part of the role location process. The pressures of role socialisation are felt unequally within a party system. Ideologies and international norms and foreign policy traditions are ideas that underpin role socialisation, selection, interpretation and contestation.
The thesis contributed to an increasing body of research on parties and foreign policy. Chapter 1 noted that FPA provide evidence for parties' indirect influence on foreign policy decision-making. Parties have opportunities to shape foreign policy decision-making and incentives to express stances on foreign policy. Moreover, such positions also correspond to ideas about human nature, society and the international system. This thesis added to the existing scholarship on parties and military intervention. It took the opportunities of and political incentives for French and German parties as justifications for the country case selection. The thesis' focus on ideologies, norms and foreign policy traditions added a multi-level ideational dimension to existing parties and military intervention studies.

The present study also made a contribution to role theory, developing and using a multi-level ideational role theoretical framework. The study filled a research gap by focusing on parties. It unpacked the state and national political elites. The empirical chapters carved out differences in national role socialisation and variation in role interpretations. They traced the differences to underlying ideas that shape parties' role selection and interpretations and can be the basis for domestic role contestation. This helped reveal parties' understandings of and frames for the conflict in Libya.

The thesis illustrated that even in cases of apparent elite national role consensus, such as in France and Germany, as some would argue, a closer look at the details and the practical implications of proposed national roles revealed the existence of differences and domestic role contestation. The focus on international norms and ideologies proved valuable for identifying this variation, effects of role socialisation on different parties and the sources of parties' domestic role contestation. The inclusion of foreign policy traditions, as a form of past role script for parties to select and interpret in light of the new context, was suitable to better account for national differences.

This final chapter draws conclusions from the thesis. Part 1 summarises the findings. Part 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual contributions. Part 3 addresses the obstacles encountered during the research process and revisits the challenges and limitations presented in chapter 3. Part 4 closes this thesis with questions raised that the thesis' scope did not allow to address and proposes future research opportunities.
1. Assessing findings and making arguments

The key findings were that there was agreement on the national roles between parties. Sometimes parties proposed additional or alternative national roles. They did not interpret the national role in the same ways and contest each other on this. Ideas are a source of role selection, interpretation and contestation. Some conclusions can be drawn from studying French and German parties together.

1.1. Party agreement on national roles in the context of Libya

The first finding was that there was role consensus between most parties on the master role. The three French parties all stressed France's leader role. In Germany, all but one party defended agreed on the alliance partner role. This agreement was expected from role theory and foreign policy literature. Yet, this thesis started out questioning the likelihood of role consensus. The evidence suggests that national roles are deeply rooted, at least within the political elites. This points to the strength of path dependency and of culture and identity. Moreover, it is indicative of the importance of the perception of consistency and credibility in international relations as part of national role selection. Despite the prevalence and strength of French and German master roles, a closer look at additional and alternative roles some parties proposed suggests that there is disagreement within the apparent consensus.

1.2. Parties' complementary roles and alternative roles

A second finding was that, on the one hand, parties sometimes proposed roles which are complementary to the main national roles in the context of Libya, and on the other hand, some parties expressed alternative roles. In France, the PCF complemented the leader role with a UN reformer and mediator role that no other party explicitly shared. The PS emphasised a European role as part of the leader role. The UMP and the PS also expressed regional protector and defender of Universal-French values roles. In Germany, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition proposed an alliance supportive role and a trade partner and democratic transition supporter role, in addition to the alliance partner role. The SPD and Green Party, instead, stressed a human rights defender role, as part of the alliance partner role. Die Linke proposed an altogether different role, as one of negotiator and mediator, that the FDP also hinted at.

This variation in national role proposals was expected as part of this thesis’ challenge to assumptions of elite role consensus. These differences suggested that parties have
different role priorities and perceptions, even as they agree on the national role appropriate to perform in the specific 2011 context. The evidence of different combinations of roles, further, points to underlying differences in goals and means and to potential variations in role interpretations. Thus, it can be concluded that parties sometimes disagree on the national role to perform in a specific context. This was the first evidence of parties' national role contestation.

1.3. Parties national role interpretations and contestation

The third finding of this thesis was that parties sometimes interpreted the same national role differently, in the 2011 Libya case. In France, the UMP defined and defended an active leader role, downplaying traditional European elements and NATO's involvement in an attempt to counter anticipated domestic criticism. The PS and the PCF proposed a credible leader role. The two defined credibility as leader as acting independently. They differed on how this credibility played out practically. The PS conceptualised this role as European and consistent with the defender of Universal-French values. The PCF also interpreted the role as acting consistently but its addition of a UN reformer and mediator role suggested that the party viewed the means of role performance different. In Germany, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition parties defined and justified a responsible alliance partner role, complementing it with alliance supporter, trade partner and democratic transition support roles. The FDP added a negotiator and mediator role similar to that of Die Linke. The SPD defined a united and the Green Party a loyal alliance partner role. The two parties viewed a human rights defender role as forming part of this national role.

The qualification of the national roles the parties proposed helped identify the variation in interpretation of the same roles, as did attention paid to connected complementary roles. The evidence for this variation suggests that even on national roles which are nominally the same there can and was disagreement. The existence of these differences in national role interpretations between parties was the second evidence for domestic role contestation between parties. The findings further suggested that not only opposition parties contest national roles but also governing parties invest time and effort in justifying their role interpretations against expected contestation, i.e. claims that the state did not perform its rightful role, within anticipated criticism of foreign policy decision-making.
The findings suggested that parties contested the national role. While the master roles (leader and civilian power) were agreed upon, all parties contested dominant and/or other parties’ role interpretations and, if applicable, the governing parties’ role performance. In other words, despite agreement on terminology and the master role to perform, parties disagreed on role priorities and how the role ought to be enacted.

The role contestation took at least one of two ways. First, some parties selected and proposed alternative national roles to other parties. Die Linke contested the alliance partner role, despite appearing not to contest the civilian power role. Second, most parties contested each other from within the agreement on the role to perform in the case of Libya specifically. All other German parties agreed on the alliance partner role but contested each other within. The CDU/CSU and FDP coalition partners contested traditional role interpretation as follower, defining the role instead as independent, responsible alliance partner. The SPD and Green Party contested the governing parties on this. In France, all three parties agreed on the leader role but proposed varying degrees of different role priorities and interpretations of it.

1.4. Ideologies, international norms and traditions

The central argument of this thesis was that ideologies, an engagement with international norms and foreign policy traditions underlie parties' national role selection and the role interpretations based on which parties select the same national role. Parties engage with international norms from an ideological basis and select roles that correspond to their understanding of conflict and of the international system. Foreign policy traditions serve as past role enactment scripts but they are selected and also interpreted in light of the new context. Parties have a level of bounded agency to select national roles from a range of past roles and/or perceived role performances and to interpret them. This leads to a domestic role socialisation process that can shape variation in role proposals and interpretations.

A second argument was that parties propose and interpret national roles, despite not having influence on actual decision-making in a specific case. This indicates that they do this as part of a process of foreign policy position finding and expression, automatically so-to speak. However, they are limited, in the range of roles they can thus propose, by the need to remain credible domestically (and internationally). Similarly, they could be signalling to other states their disagreement with government role performance in an attempt to soften the criticism of the state's decision-making
or to maintain international networks and perceptions. However, this thesis argued that such domestic political needs and international role pressures from other states' expectations or system-wide ideas about how a state of a certain type ought to act are rationalised through ideas' frameworks such as the one proposed in this thesis.

1.5. Comparing French and German parties

The case selection of France and Germany, French and German parties inevitably added a comparative element, despite the thesis not being a formal comparative study. Some general conclusions can be drawn from it. The least-likely of France, because parties have little to no influence on foreign policy decision-making outside of presidential and government tenure, showed that parties still interpret the national role differently as part of different foreign policy narratives and contest each other on roles. Thus, it is likely that parties in other states of similar status and with similarly weak parties also differ on national roles in the ways identified in this thesis. In both country cases, one recurring claim is the existence of a strong national consensus on foreign policy and on national roles. The varied role interpretations and role contestation identified in both cases suggest that consensus has to be questioned, even in cases in which it appears strong. This is particularly interesting to observe in states of the position, status and ambitions like France and Germany, and in phases in which such powers are challenged or consolidate, are on the descent or the ascent. It showed that in both cases, a central issue to international relations, like the use of military force, is. becomes or remains contested and political. Differences exist and persist, despite or because the stakes and expectations are so high in states with the capacity and sometimes the willingness to use force. The thesis, thus, can help formulate expectations toward similar states, in Europe and in other regions.

In sum, this thesis found evidence for domestic role contestation and differences in role socialisation, in France and Germany, on the domestic level. The research was not designed to compare nor to make causal claims or predict future outcomes. Yet, France's role enactment and opposition parties' contestations of the national role interpretation it represented suggests that this role was being reinterpreted and that no consensus had been reached. The German decision to abstain and not participate in the mission can also be understood as national role reinterpretation. It was an effort to reframe responsibility norms and expectations toward aspiring, rising powers such as Germany, but also China, Brazil or India. It can be speculated that differentiated
domestic role socialisation can have effects on decision-making and on international normative development, and future alter-role socialisation pressures towards states with the status and/or capabilities such as the two studied here.

2. Contributions

This thesis contributed to role theory a direct study of parties and a conceptual discussion of responsibility within national roles. It also added knowledge to research at the intersection of FPA and party research.

2.1. Role theory: parties as the level of analysis

Role theory has made important contributions since renewed interest in the approach began. Some scholars have worked on the socialising effects of the international system and other states. They have focused on the role location process and the pressures on states due to their social position and capacities in the international system of states (e.g. Thies 2010, 2012, 2013). Other scholars have looked at assumptions of role consensus within national elites and between elites and the public. Unpacking ego, they have located domestic role contestation in a number of states (e.g. Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016b). Moreover, role theorists have started focusing on the sources of national role conceptions, paying attention to foreign policy traditions, international norms and ideologies within foreign policy narratives (e.g. Wehner and Thies 2014; Hansel and Möller 2015). Some of the existing scholarship paid indirect attention to parties or mentioned parties in passing (Brummer and Thies 2015). However, parties remain largely overlooked.

Thus, through a focus on parties, this thesis adds to research on role socialisation, a domestic level study that can refine the role location process. Parties were shown to select different roles and react differently to the same/similar alter-role expectations. These expectations and those based on international norms had different effects on different parties. This was based on ideological predispositions, an engagement with international norms and the selection and interpretation of foreign policy traditions. Related, this study of parties adds to research on domestic role contestation. It found that parties sometimes select and/prioritise different roles in the same situation (inter-party contestation) and/or interpret them differently to other parties (intra-party contestation). The focus on parties was doubly interesting. This thesis added to knowledge on horizontal role contestation. Through parties' link and representational
functions, it also provides indications of vertical role contestation and indicated the presence of the public as a significant other putting pressures on parties. Finally, the use of narrative methods contributed to systematising this role theory tool.

2.2. Role theory and the concept of responsibility

Role theory approach studies rarely focus on concepts within national role conceptions. Some scholars, using the interpretive methodology, identify differences and dilemmas between domestic actors. There is a large body of IR research on concepts such as responsibility. This particular concept is also omnipresent in studies of French and German role research and foreign policy analysis. This seemed to suggest that it is central to understanding these two (and other states') foreign policy actors' national role conceptions. However, there is an absence of studies looking at key concepts within national roles in general or in the case of particular country cases.

This thesis addresses this gap with an exploration of the concept of responsibility in national role statements of French and German parties. The choice of responsibility as the theme to explore in more depth was based on content analysis. The ubiquity of responsibility and related words in the primary data was not surprising. Closer attention suggested that parties interpreted it differently. This had an effect on which national roles were selected and how they were interpreted. The argument of this exploration is that national role statements include and are linked to responsibility. How parties define responsibility can be traced in their narratives. The concept of responsibility appeared to shape parties' views on how the state ought to act. Thus, studying responsibility in role statements can grasp variations in role interpretation and the sources of domestic role contestation. It can also inform on domestic differences in role socialisation, when parties interpret responsibility differently and, hence, engage with a concept or international norm such as R2P differently.

This thesis could also add to the study of responsibility in IR and challenge scholarship that assumes a definition of responsibility and responsible behaviour for states of certain capacities and social positions in the international system.

2.3. Parties and foreign policy of military interventions

This study makes contributions to parties and military intervention studies. Some new studies started looking at military intervention as policy issue across the spectrum. (Wagner et al. 2017a, 2017b) This study added a study of French and German parties
across the political spectrum and foreign policy and a closer look at underlying ideas in national roles regarding one specific policy issue. It further substantiates that left-right typologies are hard to make on military intervention as much as on national roles or interpretations. This thesis provides empirical evidence for differences between parties on military intervention based on ideas through a national role lens. It confirmed an ideological convergence at the centre where a pro-interventionist stance was notable and combined with ethical reasoning. There was also a stark ideological divergence within the left, with radical left-wing parties rejecting intervention on similar bases across borders and centre-left parties seemingly in favour for similar reasons and more influenced by innovation in the international normative context.

A second contribution is a focus on parties and foreign policy more generally. Moreover, much of the research on European parties and foreign policy focus on Europe, or rather the EU, as a policy issue. Second, this thesis confirms that role theory is a useful tool for studying parties’ foreign policy stances and underlying ideas, because parties channel their ideas on the international and foreign policy agenda through the state lens. They need the state to put their foreign policy programme into practice and formulate their ideas in terms of national roles. It was noted that radical left parties are more likely to present generalizable national roles, albeit they also put a national twist on these roles. For example, in France and Germany, the radical left proposed a negotiator, mediator and/or UN reformer role based on ideologies. However, they too specified that their states could be leaders or initiators enacting these roles. All parties defined the proposed roles in reference to past role enactment and based on foreign policy traditions.

3. Reflections on challenges and limitations

The research process met with challenges and the thesis reached limits at various points. The following sections outline difficulties and limitations. Part 4 seeks to translate the potential weaknesses into future research ideas.

3.1. Naming parties’ national role interpretations

A first difficulty was describing the national roles parties were interpreting. As Fazendeiro (2016) notes, ascribing and categorising national roles comes with various challenges. Each role already implies assumptions. For example, stating that someone is performing a leader role evokes an image of what a leader looks and ought to look
like. This is particularly relevant for the case of France, where the state and its presidents have been ascribed leader roles. Moreover, an expectation of what leader-like behaviour looks like seems to exist. Identifying and analysing variation in national roles and role conceptions proved particularly challenging in this case, because the role ascriptions and the role elements appear so fixed (rather than deep-rooted as I contend). Fazendeiro argues that by providing typologies and generalising roles, the scholar contributes to normalising particular views of what each role implies. This reduces the possibility or the parameters for the reinterpretation of roles in practice and, thus, can have real effects on the scope of the possible and actual role selection. There seemed little escape from this limitation, other than a reflection on the author’s part in fixing meaning to roles.

This thesis refined the identified national roles with adjectives. This qualification where national roles resembled each other but differed in detail and implications contributes to more open, less fixed definitions. In practice, this meant that role description changed throughout the research and the writing process. Reflexion on assumed role elements and how appropriate performance looks like through such refinement can also contribute to consideration and debate on national roles, as goals and means are not fixed in meaning.

3.2. Identifying political concepts

Another related challenge was the identification and 'categorisation' of political concepts. The morphological approach outlined in chapter 2 was presented as a useful tool because it allows the differentiation between at first similar ideologies through identification of central and adjacent concepts. However, in practice, parties referenced and appeared to stress the same political concepts, in debates and manifestos. Inference-making from apparently central concepts that often come in tandem with the same set of other political concepts difficult.

Reading a greater variety of party materials and coding the documents party by party, rather than in the order of speaking in debates or document type by type addressed this practical difficulty. Through these adaptations, a grasp of the differences in how parties understand human nature, domestic and international society's respective nature and problems of and the ideal society was achieved.
3.3. Self-reflections on the subject of research

A third challenge of the research process was my 'situatedness'. Personal interest guided the choice of military intervention and Libya, as part of my teenage years were spent in neighbouring Tunisia. I have personal opinions on military interventions. While not entirely against the use of force, I am sceptical of its immediate and long-term effectiveness in bringing about peace and a sustainable political settlement. Moreover, I come from a family history of party activism, heterodox economic perspectives and foreign policy practice. It was challenging to keep the normative claims thesis to a minimum and to take a step back from personal political opinions on the historical division on the left on foreign policy. This particular closeness bore the danger of being not enough or too critical of my own political preferences and party affinities. A lifetime exposure to criticism of mainstream economic policy-making has instilled me with an exaggerated perception of the importance of minority views and the view that it all boils down to the economy and, hence, an overly materialist perspective. Finally, my experience of foreign policy practice in a country not under study brought a sense of understanding that could obscure the view on other possible ways of grasping the cases in this thesis.

Identifying these personal challenges was the first step to address them. In practice, self-reflection has meant trying to keep normative claims to a minimum. It has also implied curtailing the desire to give an alternative, radical, in the two country cases left-wing, voices too much space. I had to balance representing these parties with over-representing them, given political realities and their actual and plausible future influence. I also tried to learn as much as possible on foreign policy decision-making and the role of parties in France and Germany to avoid over-relying on knowledge of party politics in Austrian foreign policy practices.

3.4. Can we generalise from two countries and one intervention case?

A first limitation of the thesis is its generalisability. One possible challenge could be that it only explores one case of intervention in two country cases and, by focusing on detail and thick description, it may say little beyond the Libya and France and Germany case. An early ambition of this research project was to include an analysis of other recent cases such as intervention or non-intervention in Ivory Coast, Mali and Syria to contrast with the Libyan intervention. This would have served as context and
could have helped establish consistency. Space and time, and the thick description of the Libya case precluded the inclusion of other cases in a satisfactory way.

The limitation of the study based on the number of intervention cases is regrettable. However, the declared aim was to provide thick description and analysis of one case, instead of a multitude of cases. Given the relative absence of role theoretical studies on parties, international norms and ideologies, this thesis was the first step, prior to more comparative and more generalisable studies. Moreover, as indicated above, some general conclusions can nevertheless be drawn from the case selection. Finally, the concluding remarks situate the thesis' broader relevance and implications and stress the usefulness of selecting France and Germany as the country case studies.

3.5. Foregoing explanations and causality

A second limitation of this study is its lack of explanatory power. One charge could be that it is irrelevant for understanding decision-making, decisions and outcomes. Moreover, not seeking to establish causality between parties' national role selection, interpretation, domestic role contestation and policy decision-making may overestimate the importance of parties and the relevance of divergences in national roles and role conceptions. However, research indirectly suggesting parties' influence exists and was the starting point for taking a step back to look at a moment prior to or detached from pre-occupation with such influence. Parties' opportunities and incentives to shape foreign policy decision-making, and distinct ideology-based ideas about foreign policy were taken as the starting point for an exploration of parties. Domestic controversies were taken as an opportunity to look closer at the differences that could shift, shape or influence foreign policy decision-making.

It was never the intention to prove that parties shifted, shaped or influenced the debate in this decision-making case. The research question and aims were ostensibly not to uncover causal links and explain role performance. It was also not an aim to prove that parties are the only or even the most important drivers of foreign policy decision-making. The research strategy and design of such a project would have been different. The timing of the debates and controversy in the country cases would have complicated such a study. In Germany, the government did not put the case for intervention to a parliamentary vote, given that it did not seek approval for an out-of-area mission. Moreover, the debate before the UNSC resolution vote was held under
the widespread assumption that the US would veto it. In France, the debates took place after the country had started the military campaign.

Taken together these challenges and limitations of a thesis that is the first step in role theory application to parties and foreign policy point to possible future research.

4. Future research

The motivation for the PhD application was an interest in the events in the North of Africa in 2010 and since, and a concern for the impact of the 2011 events in Libya on the region, not least because I spent some years growing up in Tunisia. As the research project narrowed down in its first year, some elements and initial ideas were abandoned and other components were added. This process felt natural and never imposed. However, some of the early elements kept reappearing as possible future research during the PhD process and new research ideas emerged as I was facing the challenges and limitations described above. Finally, the research process and discussions with others about drafts also raised some of the questions I propose as future research opportunities.

4.1. Exploring causal links

A first research avenue is to explore the link between partisan national roles and domestic role contestation, and decision-making and role performance. It could take a closer look at the period before the governing party or parties took a decision and trace whether domestic partisan role contestation affected the eventual role selection. Another possible research project could pay attention to the possible causal link between domestic political factors, such as party competition, the electoral calendar, and partisan role selection and role variation. It could explore, in a next step whether such factors affected foreign policy decision-making and behaviour.

Such research could add to understanding the different domestic political factors that make up the sources of role contestation. As with a better grasp of the ideational sources of domestic role contestation, this could help make predictions of change and variation in role expression and state action. (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016b) Such a focus could also cast light on the still largely overlooked vertical role contestation between electorates/the public and elites via parties and domestic political contexts.
4.2. Unpacking the party

A second research project is a study intra-party difference in national role preferences, interpretations and eventual temporal selection. It could take a closer look at intra-party fractionalisation, role contestation and selection processes and bear in mind the impact of key individual’s legacy and influence in parties. Such a study would unpack the party that I largely treated as an entity and unitary actor. While I did mention intra-party and generational differences and individuals that emerged as significant in national role conceptions or appeared important to role location processes, the party in this work remained a closed unit across the political spectrum and borders. This invariably obfuscated party structure, hierarchy and decision-making diversity. It neglected the fact that parties are invariably institutions with a number of members, with varying degrees of influence, and whose programmes are shaped by members, functionaries or leadership individuals in various ways.

A study taking a closer look by unpacking the party, using role theory, could further add to understanding the ideational and political factors which shape domestic actors’ role conceptions and the processes by and conditions under which one role and/or role interpretation are selected over others. This could add to the predictability of change and future dilemmas (intra-role and inter-role conflicts).

4.3. Types of parties and national roles

The third idea for future research concerns national role conceptions and types of parties from left- and right-wing parties to nationalist, secessionist parties. Such research could ask: Are there left- or right-wing interpretations of the national role? How do regionalist and secessionist parties select national roles? And, if they are elected to central parliaments: how do they vote on foreign policy if dominant national roles for the central state differing from their preferred aspiring state role?

There is relatively little research on parties and foreign policy, in general. Most existing research focuses on parties across the spectrum or on individual parties or single issues, inviting a closer look at one party family or side of the spectrum. A study of left- or right-wing parties’ (or one party family's) national role conceptions in more depth could advance understanding on how ideology affects foreign policy proposals and stances through a focus on more tangible national roles, and help predict decision-making outcomes and how international relations may be shaped in the future.
There is research on aspiring and novice states' role socialisation and selection processes, some of which mention the dominant nationalist parties' role conceptions. (Thies 2010, 2012, 2013; Beasley, Kaarbo, and Solomon-Strauss 2016; Beasley and Kaarbo 2017) Focusing on the national role conceptions of aspiring states' nationalist/secessionist parties active in central and regional legislative institutions could increase knowledge on role socialisation processes by adding a potential domestic role negotiation and selection process in such aspiring states to the equation.

4.4. The state, parties and multiple role conceptions

Another idea for future research is based on the observation that this thesis about national role conceptions is centrally about the state and ideas about the state: how to shape it and act through it internationally. A corollary contention of this thesis is that national conceptions about roles in the international sphere are connected through ideologies or worldviews to ideas on the domestic role of the state. Parties are not only potential foreign policy actors, but they also have roles to play within the state in political systems and, thus, have views on their own domestic role. Moreover, parties, as part of their ideologies but also shaped by international norms about state responsibilities and sovereignty, have views on the role of the state in domestic society. Thus, it would be interesting to contrast these three 'role conceptions' and their contestation (each party's role conception of parties' role in domestic society, their conception of the role of the state on domestic affairs/individuals' lives and their national role conception for the state internationally).

This could be combined with a study of one party family. A study of liberal parties, for example, could help to contrast their relation to the state as a domestic actor in their ideologies and policy proposals versus as an international actor in their national role conceptions. Such a study could carve out ideological underpinnings and discrepancies and inherent dilemmas in national (and other) role conceptions. This could add depth to the understanding of the role of the state in different ideologies by combining different levels of analysis.

4.5. Roles and responsibility

Chapter 6 explored the concept of responsibility in national role expressions on military intervention and argued that a closer look at its definition helped to understand the variation in national role selection and interpretations between
parties. A final future research opportunity could broaden this exploration in at least two ways. First, it could look at and compare the place of the concept of responsibility in other policy areas. Economic policy (within the EU and regarding other states, e.g. in the form of development, patronising) and development policy are other policy areas in which the language of responsibility abounds. A look at them could help develop a more solid understanding of responsibility notions and the function and effects of its invocation in various policy debates and policy-making. Second, future research on roles and responsibility in the case of military intervention could include more intervention cases for a better cross-time understanding of the place of responsibility in policy debates and policy-making. It could trace the evolution of debates on military intervention by analysing the presence and interpretations of responsibility of those in favour and those against such operations.

Conclusion: the broader relevance and some implications

The thesis took a domestic controversy instance as the entry point to study parties and military intervention by way of looking at national role statements in foreign policy narratives. It found variation in role selection and interpretations and different forms of role contestation. It traced these back to three ideational layers. So what, one may ask. So what that French parties disagree within their agreement on a French leader role? So what that German parties disagree on how to interpret the alliance partner role or propose alternative national roles?

The concluding paragraphs suggest that the thesis’ findings matter because France and Germany are two key EU member states with ostentatiously different perceptions of the EU’s common defence and foreign policy’s future direction. Given the two states’ pivotal role in European integration history and their special relationship with each other since WWII, any conclusions on their national roles in relation to issues foreign policy are relevant for the union’s future. The EU and the respective other state also figured prominently in the national role statements and foreign policy narratives of French and German parties, suggesting the continued relevance of the other. As other authors suggested, EU member states tend to project their national role onto the EU-level as the EU’s role (e.g. Koenig 2016). This was arguably evident in the case of Libya in which Germany proposed a non-violent approach and France went for a more proactive, interventionist leader and protector of a neighbouring, strategically important region role. The Libyan case also arguably affected, if not damaged, the future of the
CDFP. Thus, a better grasp and closer attention to how national roles are selected, debated and contested domestically could inform about the direction of EU policy. To know more about the contestation of roles projected onto the EU can improve understanding future developments and the ideational sources of any proposed projected role. Moreover, it can contribute to a better understanding of the differences in international norm contestation and local adaptation between EU member states and, thus, inform about what direction of debate between the EU member states may take and how the EU may act (or not) in situations similar to Libya in the future.

The discussion on responsibility and the findings on different meanings and attempts of, in particular, German mainstream parties to reinterpret German responsibility in combination with the redefinition of R2P adds a layer of information on how international norms and ideologies interact with foreign policy traditions in local actors, such as parties, to shape role socialisation. It was timely to look at a rising and an old regional leader and the definitions of responsibility put forward by their parties, especially as a number of other regional leaders emerge as new global or great powers and challenge taken for granted international norms. While the thesis does not suggest that role socialisation pressures of current great powers are irrelevant or even diminished, it will be interesting to follow any challenges to dominant meanings of responsibility attributed to great powers as special responsibilities, and Western states like Germany's role and contribution to such challenges and shifts.

From the domestic-level perspective, the inclusion of radical parties added alternative understandings of the situation and role selections to the thesis. This was timely, given the more recent rise of populist actors from the party system fringes and from within some mainstream parties. This upsurge raises questions about the future of foreign policy in a number of states across the world today, including some of the largest and key EU member states. Across the political spectrum, such parties have in common a criticism of the national and international political order and an emphasis on 'the people' (defined in various ways). This thesis only lightly touched upon how different their national role proposals and their narratives are to centrist parties. The tracing of ideas underlying these alternative national roles suggested that these are viable and plausible for the state in question and can align with ideas and values others share. Thus, they may represent popular alternatives.
In final conclusion, this thesis did not set out to be a normative project or prescriptive in its findings, arguments or contributions. However, it is the belief of the author that debate is not only healthy in but necessary for democracy. Taking an agonistic view, along the lines of the political theorist of democracy, Chantal Mouffe (2013), it is proposed in conclusion that foreign policy is intrinsically political. The discussion of policy options and alternatives, moderately to radically different views of what society and/or state we want to be and which role we want to perform in the world, and the contestation of these options, is crucial for coming up with new ways of thinking about foreign policy, roles or role interpretations and different policy tools as those already tried but repeatedly failing to meet (declared) goals of a less violent world.
Annex

Appendix 1: list of primary documents (last accessed 6 Jan 2018)

Party materials and statements

**Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Heinrich Böll Stiftung**


**CDU/CSU and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung**

Die Linke and Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung


Die Linke. 2009. Bundestagswahlprogramm Der Partei DIE LINKE.


———. 2011. Program Der Partei DIE LINKE.

———. 2011. "Die Waffen Nieder!".


—— —. 2011. "Deutschland Muss Initiative Für Verhandlungslösung in Libyen Ergreifen."
—— —. 2011. "Deutsche Außenpolitik in Der Libyenkrise Völlig Überfordert."


FDP

SPD and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung


**PCF**


———. 2011. "*Libye: Le PCF Exprime Son Opposition Totale à Toute Intervention Militaire.*” Communiqué de presse.


**PS**

Le Monde. 2007. "*Les cent propositions du 'pacte présidentiel' de Mme Royal.*"

**UMP**


**Parliamentary sources**

**Assemblée Nationale**


**Deutscher Bundestag**


Official sources

France

France Diplomatie. 2015. "La Politique Étrangère de La France : Quelle Autonomie Pour Quelle Ambition ? - Intervention de Laurent Fabius Au Sénat (15.10.15)."
———. 2008. Sarkozy : "Notre Détermination Est Totale"
Le Monde. 2007. "Le discours de politique étrangère de M. Sarkozy (intégralité)."

Germany

Appendix 2: semi-structured interview

Introduction
The rationale for semi-structured interviews was laid out in chapter 3. Part 1 details the preparation and provides an annotated questionnaire. Part 2 is the list of interviewees.

Preparing the questionnaire
The interviews were organised around two main questions based on the breakdown of the research questions and aims of the thesis laid out in chapter 1. The aim was to word open, non-predetermining questions to have the interviewees feel at ease to talk about their experience of the period, their understanding of the situation and events, and national roles.

The need for follow-up questions was anticipated and they were prepared to ask for clarification when interviewees evoked central concepts and themes drawn from the secondary literature and text-based primary sources. These questions were asked based on the comments the interviewees made and clearly marked them as such in the notes. Interviewees were asked to clarify concepts or explore themes in more detail and depth. The aim was to refine understanding of their perceptions and interpretations. These questions were also designed to probe the nuanced interpretations of roles.

Two secondary questions were prepared. They were direct queries about national roles, in case the interviewees did not mention key themes and concepts. In the end, all interviewees were asked these questions even when key themes and concepts came up during the interviews.

The interviews were conducted in French and German respectively. The questions were translated and adjusted for each country, to each party and individual.

The following is an annotated sample template of the semi-structured interviews:

Opening the semi-structured interviews
Each interview began with an opening statement. Interviewees were told about the thesis and verbal agreement to conduct the interview was asked for. The interviewees were asked about their confidentiality requirement and granted anonymity. It was mentioned that there would be no recordings and notes would be taken by hand. Interviewees were, further, told that extracts would figure in the thesis and that they could interrupt or end the conversation at any point.

Main questions about national roles and national role conceptions
Question 1: Can you tell me your recollections of the conflict in Libya 2011, your party or your parliamentary group’s view on how to address it and why, and how your country decided and acted?

This question was worded bearing in mind Holsti’s definition of national role conceptions:

‘[...] the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of functions if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or subordinate regional systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external world.’ (1970, pp.245–246 emphasis not in original)

These questions were formulated in general terms to elicit an account that would permit the identification of conflict and intervention narratives. They asked about perceptions of the state’s decision-making and action to get more detail about how it was viewed at the time and how it is viewed with the benefit of hindsight. The purpose was to prompt national role statements by indirectly asking about national roles and role interpretations.
Possible follow-up questions included whether the decision and action corresponded to their personal or their party's expectations, represented continuity and what implications the decision and action had for Syria, future conflicts and their state's responses to them. In order to broaden the context, interviewees were asked to elaborate on narratives and, if they mentioned them, on analogies and learning.

The central concepts and terms identified prior to interviews for follow-up were: (1) role, (2) duty, obligations, (3) expectations, (4) responsibility, (5) identity and (6) alternatives.

**Question 2: What was the process by which your party or parliamentary group came to their position on the way forward to address the conflict?**

This question was designed to gain more insight into party-internal functioning regarding positioning on foreign policy issues in general and specifically in the case of Libya, and the part national role conceptions play in this. While this thesis is about the party and not party-internal processes or differences, this question was aimed to get an understanding of the degree to which there were intra-party discussions and agreement. Questions included the process to get more detail on how party-internal mechanisms worked in the case of Libya and to find out when the party started discussing the issue and whether the decision on positioning was taken by an individual, small group or through more formal party internal processes and to learn more about intra-party differences, factions and how disagreement is settled. This question also had the potential to elicit role statements especially if parties had clear principled positions on the issue of military intervention or had started discussing the case of Libya in advance of events. Secondary purposes were to find out if manifestos and other policy documents were referenced, the views on electorate’s foreign policy opinions, expectations and role conceptions, and the part they played in parties’ rationale.

The possible follow-up questions were: (1) whether there was agreement (2) how disagreement was settled and (3) whether alternatives, the opposite position and consequences for Libya and the respective state were discussed.

**Secondary questions on national roles and national role conceptions**

**Question 3: Do you think the role your country played in addressing the conflict in Libya is consistent with your country's traditional role in the world, and why yes or no?**

This question was added for the case the interviewee had not mentioned or alluded to national roles in the answers to the main and to follow-up questions. Unlike the two first questions, it directly asks about national roles. In effect, this question was asked even if national roles were mentioned to clarify what interviewees meant by them and to lead them to statements about their parties' views on the 'traditional' national role contrasting them with the role played in Libya and detailing what their parties' national role conceptions are.

Possible follow-up questions focused on perceptions of other parties' role propositions in the case of Libya. The central concepts and themes that prompted follow-up questions for clarification included: (1) responsibility, (2) duty and (3) obligation.

**Question 4: How do you think parties disagree on foreign policy in your country? What are the key differences in terms of foreign policy between the parties in your country? Are these nuances, differences in priorities or fundamental differences?**

The final question was designed to elicit parties' account of other parties' foreign policy positions. The aim was to have interviewees provide statements about the foreign policy consensus in their state. Another intention was to indirectly prompt them contrast and carve out their own parties' positioning on the central foreign policy issue of military intervention.

Possible follow-up questions were: (1) queries about the roots or origins of these differences, and (2) whether there are foundational texts or personalities that shaped the party's or factions of the party's positions on foreign policy and in particular the issue of military interventions.
Interview partners (alphabetic order)

**Assouline, David (PS) May 23, 2017**
2011: PS senator since 2004. From May 2012 to April 2014, he was PS spokesperson.

**Ayrault, Jean-Marc (PS) May 9, 2017**
2011: Leader of the PS parliamentary group from 1997 to 2012. In 2017, he was PS foreign minister under president François Hollande.

**Boucheron, Jean-Michel (PS) 23 May, 2017**
2011: PS member of parliament. In 2017, he was strategic affairs and defence adviser to president François Hollande.

**Fath, Jacques (PCF) May 24, 2017**
2011: PCF member of the national council, executive committee and national coordination, in charge of international relations. In 2017, he was no longer in any party function or a party member.

**Gloser, Günter (SPD) June 7, 2017**
2011: SPD member of parliaments, 2005-2009 secretary of state for Europe in the foreign ministry. In 2017, he was retired from parliament.

**Hunko, Andrej (Die Linke) July 4, 2017**
2011 and 2017: member of parliament since 2009.

**Koenigs, Tom (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) July 4, 2017**
2011: since 2009 member of parliament. Previously a high functionary of the UN, he was special envoy of the UN secretary general for Kosovo and later Guatemala. From 2005 he was the German government's envoy for human rights and humanitarian aid in the foreign ministry. From 2013, he was human rights speaker of the parliamentary party.

**Neu, Alexander (Die Linke)**
2011: 2006-2013 he was security policy officer in the parliamentary party. Since 2013 where he is member of parliament and Die Linke chairperson of the defence committee and deputy member of the foreign affairs committee.

**Nouriipour, Omid (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) July 3, 2017**
2011: member of parliament since 2006. In 2011, he was also member of the defence committee. From 2014, he was a member of the foreign affairs and the human rights and humanitarian aid committees.

**Polenz, Ruprecht (CDU) June 7, 2017**
2011: chairman of the foreign affairs committee 2005-2013, delegate to NATO parliamentary assembly. In 2017, he was retired from parliament.

**Schuster, Marina (FDP) June 12, 2017**
2011: member of parliament (2005-2013); party speaker on human rights and humanitarian aid; and member of the foreign affairs and the human rights and humanitarian aid committees.

**Stinner, Rainer (FDP) June 7, 2017**
2011: member of parliament 2002-2013; member and FDP chairperson of the foreign affairs committee and deputy member of the defence committee. He did not stand for re-election in 2013.

**Van Aken, Jan (Die Linke) June 6, 2017**
2011: member of parliament since 2009. From 2011, deputy leader of the parliamentary group and from 2012 its foreign policy speaker. In June 2017, he was still member of parliament, however, he did not stand for re-election in 2017.
Appendix 3: annotated coding manual

This appendix provides the coding manual, describing the coding instruction evolution and coding decisions taken, across the three coding cycles. The coding cycle 1 and the first part of cycle 2 were conducted over a period of two years (2014-2016). The process was interrupted several times for weeks during cycle 2. These breaks made the process longer but also meant that coding was approached with fresh eyes several times. The final coding took place over in mid-2017.

The annotated coding manual is structured along these cycles. Cycle 1 details, first, the rationale for coding categories. It was based on the review of the literature and the aims of the study. It also provides the structure of the manual along four coding chapters: national roles, narratives, ideas and context. Cycle 2 shows the evolution and precision of the coding manual and describes the themes of the last coding stage.

Cycle 1: the structured coding of national roles

Document specific questions helped their orderly recording. They included:

- Which state?
- Who speaks, who for (government party, parliamentary group, personal capacity) and in what function (minister, parliamentary group speaker)?
- Type of document?
- Date of document?
- Is this document about the 2011 Libya intervention or other?

In practice this meant that for a debate in which six people spoke, six digital documents were created into which the coding manual template was copied. They were saved as date_party_document_type_speaker (if applicable).

Coding chapter 1: national roles

The next step consisted of identifying national roles in sources. A role was roughly identified by the mention of France or Germany, the government or head of state, associated pronouns (we, us) or references to ‘the people’, in relation to an action or social position, such as ‘the French led the initiatives’.

What national role conceptions or national roles are invoked?

- Dropdown menu of pre-determined roles for each state (see below for coding expectations/categories)
- Other, specify

- More than one or others?

- How? (e.g. others' expectations, others' perceptions, who is the other, relationship with other)

- Other evidence?
### Coding expectations/categories based on the secondary literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French national roles</th>
<th>Key role components</th>
<th>Literature sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional leader with ambitions of global presence</td>
<td>activism, independence and presence</td>
<td>Krotz (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active independent</td>
<td>distance from US and NATO to find middle power in bilateral world and maintain independence of decision-making</td>
<td>Thumerelle and Le Pestre (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional leader</td>
<td>Europe as stepping stone for global leader role</td>
<td>Thumerelle and Le Pestre (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global leader</td>
<td>presence, nuclear power, UNSC permanent seat</td>
<td>Thumerelle and Le Pestre (1997), Krotz (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation supporter</td>
<td>implicit in value orientation of 'common democratic self'</td>
<td>Krotz (2015), Ostermann (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good international citizen</td>
<td>implicit in the construction of the intervention in Libya as international community driven and law based</td>
<td>Ostermann (2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German national roles</th>
<th>Key role components</th>
<th>Literature sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian power</td>
<td>multilateralism, international law, restraint in the use of force</td>
<td>Maull (1990), Krotz (2015), Maull (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>also: regime builder, promoter of the rule of law, regime enlarger, supporter of strong UN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance partner</td>
<td>part of the civilian power role focused on relations with significant others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good international citizen</td>
<td>part of civilian power role focused on international institutions and legality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal ally or country</td>
<td>normalising German foreign policy whereby</td>
<td>Oppermann (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
it competes with domestic political needs

| European leader | Harnisch (2015), Paterson (2011) |
| Economic hegemon | Paterson (2011) |
| Supporter       | Brockmeier (2013) |

**Coding chapter 2: conflict and intervention narratives**

Stances on and approaches to violent conflict abroad were divided into smaller categories prior to coding cycle 1. The rationale was that these narratives would provide information about how parties understand intra-state violence and what ideas inform this understanding and the policy approaches to conflict. It was anticipated that parties’ framing of conflict would be related to the type of national role they proposed. The mention of Libyan actors was part of this coding, in part to identify perceived alter-role expectations and perceptions of ‘other’.

**Guiding questions**

- How did parties understand the conflict, its origins and possible resolution?
- How did parties describe the conflict and intervention evolution and process?
- What Libyan actors are mentioned, including Gaddafi, insurgents and civilians, and how?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding categories</th>
<th>Detail and examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origins of conflict</strong></td>
<td>Does the speaker address root causes of the conflict? How?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict resolution</strong></td>
<td>Does the speaker refer to and how the conflict could end?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict evolution</strong></td>
<td>How does the speaker explain conflict from Winter to Summer 2011?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention evolution</strong></td>
<td>Description of the military operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional developments</strong></td>
<td>Does the speaker consider and refer to the region? How?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International initiatives</strong></td>
<td>Is there any reference to the international community’s actions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention justification</strong></td>
<td>What is the argument in favour or against military intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternatives considered</strong></td>
<td>Does the speaker refer to alternatives to approve or reject them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risks and future</strong></td>
<td>Does the speaker address the risks and consequences intervention or non-intervention?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>Does the speaker detail the planning and overall strategy of the interventions or alternatives considered?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationships</strong></td>
<td>Are regional, inter-state, Occident-Orient, or other relationships referred to?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Coding chapter 3: ideational layers**

The primary sources were also coded for the direct or implicit mention of international norms and for key concepts and their relationship to each other. Moreover, direct or indirect references to foreign policy traditions were also noted, for example, if a speaker directly referenced a former president or foreign minister or one of their key foreign policy 'doctrines' or ideas. The rationale for coding for ideas was based on the theoretical framework, detailed in chapter 2.

**Guiding questions**

- What ideas were invoked?
- What was the relationship between them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding categories</th>
<th>Detail and examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political concepts</strong></td>
<td>Democracy, justice, legitimacy, liberty/freedom, human rights, solidarity etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International norms</strong></td>
<td>R2P, humanitarian intervention, state sovereignty, non-interference, international law, legal obligations or duties etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>History and culture</strong></td>
<td>National histories, wars, colonisation etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative key words (as experienced by speaker)</strong></td>
<td>Challenge, fatality, doubt, guilt, impotence, fear, threats, weakness, oppression etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive key words (as experienced by speaker)</strong></td>
<td>Courage, determination, dignity, honour, pride, hope, modernity, progress, success etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key themes</strong></td>
<td>Were they any recurring and apparently important key themes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coding chapter 4: domestic context**

Attention was paid to the domestic processes and events mentioned, given the focus on parties, their domestic roles as interest representing and office seeking and given the likelihood of intra-party differences. This coding chapter was also part of an effort not to black-box the party entirely. Intra-party processes where they were mentioned seemed important, because they provided indication of salient audiences and political costs and incentives to position on issues, for example, if decision-making and programmatic processes are top-down or bottom-up provides indications of the role and relevance of the party-internal membership audience. Traditions of party-discipline or freedom of expression and conscience on some issues also provide information about whether or not expression of party internal disagreement is encouraged and, hence, more likely to surface in primary sources.

**Guiding questions**

- Was there open and direct intra-party disagreement?
- Was there evidence for responsiveness to audiences?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding categories</th>
<th>Detail and examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-party processes</td>
<td>Evidence of formal or informal debate and position-finding, information about intra-party processes and prerogatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-party differences</td>
<td>Expression of disagreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party history</td>
<td>References to party materials, manifestos, key personalities etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>References to public opinion, media coverage, public debate etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other domestic actors</td>
<td>Mention of parliament, presidents, courts etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral calendar</td>
<td>Elections (reference to and actually on the radar)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coding cycle 1 challenges**

A first difficulty was that "we" and "us" is often used without apparent indication of whether "we" refers to party or state through preceding or following sentences. The decision whether quotes were the expression of a national role or a party policy proposal justification was made on a case by case basis, looking at context, the specific issue addressed and whether party or state made more sense in each case. Eventually, the assumption was made that even if "we" referred to party's programmatic proposal on the state's best action, it was still a reflection of the party's national role conception, as it was likely to project a partisan national role proposal onto the state.

The most important challenge was the finding that the national role categories expected could not capture what appeared to be important differences between parties. During the first coding cycle, it became clear that parties often agreed on the national role. However, they differed on the details, implications and sometimes means. This meant that parties did not agree in practical terms on what a same national role entails. The initial national roles identified in the literature appeared inadequate for capturing these differences. The decision was taken to qualify these roles with adjectives that describe them rather than invent a new national role typology or add to the inventory of national roles for the two country cases. The rationale was that parties often agreed on the same national role but not on its interpretation. Thus, cycle 2 was an inductive approach. It was expected to refine the national roles in light of how the parties interpreted consented on roles. Only alternative national roles were given separate names and not qualified unless several interpretations over them were apparent.

At this stage of the coding and gathering of evidence, no judgement was made on whether such a national role proposals were a viable option for the state in question. This was left to the analysis stage in each empirical chapter.

**Cycle 2: the refinement of the structured coding**

The second cycle was focused on adding precision and identifying the differences between parties who seemed to agree but contested each other on the national role. During the second coding cycle, less attention as paid to the mention and frequency of mention of national roles. Instead, the focus was on recurring arguments and themes, on what words appeared together and how did parties justify or defend their national role selection. The below coding categories and guiding questions were designed to refine and specify the roles and gain a better grasp of parties' reasoning behind national roles.
Refining roles: coding for parties’ national role interpretations

- What role topic does the speaker address?

- How was the role justified or argued in detail? (justification for or against, alternatives, objectives/goals)

- Is there a possible redefinition of the national role? (qualification or descriptor)

Relation between national roles and ideas

- What political concepts were mentioned as part of national roles?

- What international norms were mentioned as part of national roles?

- What is the relationship between these ideas?

Structured coding of the recurring theme

The final coding paid attention to these recurring topics with particular focus on responsibility. They included:

- Past interventions
- Analogical reasoning/lessons learning
- TINA (there is no alternative)
- Alternatives
- War/not war
- Responsibility

The coding question for the identified themes in national roles were

- Did the party (representative) mention one or more observed themes?

- What is the relationship between the themes?

- What is the effect/function of the themes?
### Appendix 4: chronology of events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>IOs, region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17/12/10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisan protests start</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/01/11</td>
<td></td>
<td>French foreign minister offers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>President Ben Ali help (^{12})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/01/11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisan president ousted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/02/11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Benghaz protests start</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/02/11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-governmen rally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/02/11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany threatens sanctions (^{13})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/02/11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU passes sanctions, freezes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Libyan assets, demands an</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>immediate ceasefire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/02/11</td>
<td></td>
<td>France demands sanctions</td>
<td>Germany calls for EU sanctions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sarkozy declares Gaddafi has</td>
<td>to include an arms embargo (^{15})</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to go (^{14})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/02/11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNSC resolution 1970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/02/11</td>
<td>NTC asks international</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/03/11</td>
<td>France first to recognise NTC as legitimate government&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/03/11</td>
<td>European Council declaration &lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/03/11</td>
<td>Arab League calls for no-fly-zone&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/03/11</td>
<td>France calls for no-fly-zone&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>GB: Libya on the agenda but no consensus &lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt; but leaders ask Gaddafi to step down&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>16/03/11</td>
<td>Parliament discusses situation in Libya</td>
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<td>17/03/11</td>
<td>UNSC resolution 1973</td>
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<td>18/03/11</td>
<td>Parliament debates German abstention vote</td>
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<td>19/03/11</td>
<td>Starts aerial bombing</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/03/11</td>
<td>Governmen t informs parliament of</td>
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<sup>18</sup> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12723554 (01/12/2015)

<sup>19</sup> http://www.reuters.com/article/us-g8-libya-idUSTRE72E0BX20110315 (23/07/2017)


<sup>21</sup> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13572830 (23/07/2017)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14/04/11</td>
<td>Sarkozy, Cameron and Obama publish 'Pathway to Peace' in the New York Times calling for regime change²²</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/07/11</td>
<td>Parliament votes on prolongation of mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>20/10/11</td>
<td>Death of Gaddafi</td>
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</table>

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Sissela Matzner | PhD Thesis


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