JUNG'S THEORY
OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES.

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE
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JUNG'S THEORY OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES.

INTRODUCTION.

It is many years now since Jung first of all drew attention to what he believed to be of far reaching significance in the psychological understanding of human personality: the presence of two great psychological divisions of mankind, the outwardly-directed or 'extraverts' whose interests and activities turn mainly towards the outer world and whose lives correspond directly with objective conditions, and the inwardly-directed or 'introverts' who are influenced more by subjective factors, and whose attitude to the outer world is an abstracting and depreciatory one.

One might imagine that a theory of such undeniable importance would have received the closest scrutiny at the hands of the professional psychologist. It is true that reference is frequently made to Jung's theory in psychological writings, but there has been little in the way of critical commentary. With a few notable exceptions, the observations made on this theory possess a striking uniformity of expression. More often than not, they are a mere paraphrase of Jung's words, and betray an unmistakable reluctance to proceed any further in the way of critical exposition.

The reasons for this are perhaps not far to seek. Jung was originally a psychoanalyst, and still is so in the wider acceptance of the term. It has taken some time for the professional psychologist to become acclimatized to these doctrines, several of which must still be held to be of doubtful validity. Nor was it the custom of the psychologist, until recent years, to explore the field of
mental disease which had hitherto been left to the
psychiatrist who was as yet so enamoured of neuropathological
problems that he could not be got to grant to psychopathology
the status of a science; nor was he possessed save rarely of
the necessary equipment and training for so technical an
investigation. Meanwhile, the psychoanalyst proper who did
possess such training did not concern himself seriously with
Jung’s teaching, for it represented too grave a departure
from the accepted and inviolable Freudian creed.

But such blame as there may be cannot be entirely
apportioned amongst his readers. Jung’s theories have a
peculiarly thought-baffling quality. It is not that his
type of psychological types is at all vague. Chapter and
verse are everywhere quoted. He is a patient expositor,
‘line upon line, and precept upon precept.’ Nor does the
technicality of his language offer any obstacle to our
understanding. There is not a term which he does not define
and illustrate and interpret.

And yet Freud, in his Collected Papers, tells us that
he finds Jung incomprehensible. Perhaps the explanation is
to be sought in the very theory of opposed psychological
types which Jung has elaborated, in that fundamental difference
of viewpoint which makes us blind to the psychological truth
seen by our neighbour.

Be that as it may, our first duty in this enquiry into
Jung’s type theory is to clear the ground sufficiently to
enable us to have a proper view of it, and to consider from
what angles it may be best envisaged.

No approach can be made to the study of Jung’s theory
of psychological types without some knowledge of his general
psychological teaching. A detailed account of this would
involve us in the history of the founding of psychoanalytic
theory by Freud, the establishment of its many doctrines,
and the dissensions which led to the withdrawal of Adler
and of Jung who in turn instituted schools of 'Individual Psychology' and 'Analytical Psychology' respectively, thus relinquishing for their work the appellation of 'Psychoanalysis' (in its technical, if not in its popular sense) to Freud its founder.

It is no part of our present purpose to enter into a detailed exposition of this sort. Rather only such facts as may be deemed requisite to our present study will be selected, in order that a historical perspective may be ensured. Such an historical perspective, however, involves us in the very beginning with technicalities which it would be useless to pursue if the premises are inadmissible, and hence our first task will be devoted to the establishment of certain elementary principles lest these do not find acceptance later on: and in so doing we build our foundation on what is common to all the three psychological schools abovementioned.

This study is intended to be in the main a psychological one; and strictly speaking no critique, other than psychological, would be relevant to the examination of a purely psychological theory. Not infrequently so evident a truth is ignored, and criticisms, physiological in their purport, are brought to bear on purely psychological hypotheses.

So obsessed are many scientific writers with the physiological basis of mind that they rebel against any conception or description in mental terms of any process other than a conscious one. It is apparently their view that nothing occurs in the mind than occurs in consciousness, and that what is not conscious can only be described in some such terms as 'cerebration' or 'neural molecular activity'.

They do not see that psychological happenings require psychological explanations, and that a physiological
explanation is no explanation at all. Jung has a sentence to the point on this matter, on the question of phantasy: "The demonstration of a physiological source of the phantasy is a mere condition of its existence, not a law of its nature. The law of phantasy as a psychological problem can only be a psychological law." 1. The chain of conscious events is incomplete without its unconscious links. Even where we are conscious of the premises we start from and are aware of the conclusions arrived at, we are not aware of the intermediate process. "The unremembered past experience is not dead, but alive and active below the level of consciousness. In the debating chamber of the present, it may not speak, but it votes and its silent vote is often decisive." 2. Freud is unconcerned whether the Unconscious be regarded as mental or physical. He merely states that he is forced to describe such processes in mental terms as there is no other possible way to describe them. So the hypothesis of a psychological unconscious is forced upon us. In Aveling's words, "The Unconscious is a psychological hypothesis postulated in order to explain the facts of consciousness and subconsciously in purely mental terms. The hypothesis is necessary if Psychology is to be an explanatory science." 3.

"If we must assume persistent traces of some kind" says Mitchell, "it is better, if only on methodological grounds, to ascribe them to the mind rather than the brain, and the reasons for doing so are more cogent when we are dealing with the data of psychoanalysis....the hypothesis of brain traces would seem to suggest that when these are not implicated in any conscious mental event or process, they are entirely passive." 4.

2. Smuts "Holism and Evolution" p. 255.
4. T.W. Mitchell "Problems in Psychopathology".
Jung's own attitude to the respective provinces of physiology and psychological is thus defined: "But since we are convinced" he says, "that the unconscious processes belong to psychology and not merely as substratum processes to the physiology of the brain, we are forced to place our concept of energy on a broader basis. We fully agree with Wundt that there are dimly conscious things. We assume, as he does, a clarity-scale for conscious contents. But the psyche does not cease for us where black begins, but is continued into regions that are wholly unconscious. Moreover we leave brain physiology its share, since we assume that the unconscious functions go over into the substratum processes, to which no psychical quality can be assigned except in the way of a philosophical hypothesis of pan-psychism."

The acceptance of the hypothesis of the Unconscious will, however, largely depend upon what that hypothesis entails, and it is just in this matter of interpretation of its phenomena that such a sharp cleavage of opinion is to be found. With regard to the extent and nature and significance of the Unconscious, Jung's views differ profoundly from those held by Freud. In this, we shall follow Jung's interpretation. We shall therefore agree to accept the concept of an Unconscious extending beyond that of a purely personal one, to embrace racial memories and primordial images "the deepest, most ancient and most universal thoughts of humanity." This hypothesis of a collective Unconscious would seem to be rather an extension than a contradiction of Freud's theory. Jung regards primitive man as a person in whom the mental function is essentially collective. Being almost entirely identified with the collective psyche, he suffers no inner conflict. His virtues and vices are collective, and there is no inner conflict until the personal development of the mind reveals its presence. And the illustrations which Jung offers of the utterances of certain Dementia Praecox cases would seem to demand no less an hypothesis.

We shall also accept Jung's view that the personal unconscious does not merely comprise infantile wish-tendencies which have undergone repression, but that besides repressed material it consists of what has been forgotten and what has been subliminally perceived, thought and felt. In this lack of recognition of certain psychological functions by reason of incompatibility of the conscious attitude and their consequent maldevelopment, we see the first glimmerings of what was afterwards to form so substantial a part of Jung's theory of psychological types.

The stress laid by Freud on the exclusively psychosexual motivation of neurotic symptoms found its counterpart in the persistence with which Adler traced the same symptoms to manifestations of superiority on part of the ego. The incompatibility of the Freudian and Adlerian theories caused Jung ultimately to attain a standpoint which he believed to be "superordinate to both." Both theories appeared to him to contain truths not necessarily mutually exclusive. To Jung it seemed that Freud emphasised only objective values as aiding or thwarting the desires of the subject, whilst Adler laid emphasis on subjective values. To him the subject was of supreme importance, always and at all costs seeking its own supremacy. Jung did not regard these differences as necessarily opposed so long as they were merely technical methods of treatment; but as theories they seemed fundamentally opposed, and this opposition he regarded as evidence of two different types of mind. And so the technical contrast which he had already envisaged between two mental disorders, hysteria and dementia praecox, with regard to the libido movement found further substantiation in the antagonistic views of Freud and Adler. Freud, the 'extravert', found the determining factor in the object. Adler the 'introvert' discovers that only in the subject. So in the attempted reconciliation of these apparently irreconcilable views, Jung found a further demonstration of his theory.
The contrast which Jung envisaged in the domain of mental pathology, with regard to the libido movement, was adumbrated by him in an address delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress at Munich in 1913. The theory was presented to a select and specialised audience, but met with only a limited measure of recognition. It is true that technical psychoanalytical discoveries have become diffused amongst the public with astonishing rapidity; but in this case Jung did deliberately present his type theory to a larger audience. In his Foreword to "Psychological Types" he tells us that he felt it uncumbent upon him "to bring the experiences of the medical specialist out of the narrow professional limits into more general relations; relations which will enable the educated lay mind to make use of the experiences of a specialised terrain."

"I would never have ventured" he adds, "to attempt this expansion, which might well be misunderstood as an encroachment upon other spheres, were I not convinced that the psychological points of view presented in this book are of wide significance and application, and are therefore better treated in a general connection than left in the form of a special scientific hypothesis."

6. It will therefore be seen to be in conformity with the development of Jung's theory, that it should first of all be examined in its earliest formulation as a technical theory of libido movement explanatory of the phenomena of two forms of mental disorder, and then in its general connection as a theory of psychological types applicable to humanity at large.

I shall refer to these theories as Jung's 'early theory' and 'final theory' respectively. The latter is not perhaps an altogether suitable designation, inasmuch as Jung may quite possibly see fit to modify his views and transform his theories. He has said that classification of types
according to extraversion and introversion must by no means be looked upon as the only possible method. Any other psychological criterion could be equally well employed. Only it appeared to him that no other possessed so great a practical utility.

"Nature knows two fundamentally different ways of adaptation which determine the further existence of the living organism, the one is by increased fertility, accompanied by a relatively small degree of defensive power and individual conservation; the other is by individual equipment of manifold means of self-protection, coupled with a relatively insignificant fertility. This biological contrast seems not merely to be the analogue, but also the general foundation of our two psychological modes of adaptation........ On the one hand, I need only point to the peculiarity of the extravert which constantly urges him to spend and propagate himself in every way, and on the other, to the tendency of the introvert to defend himself from any expenditure of energy directly related to the object, thus consolidating for himself the most serene and impregnable position." 7.

To pursue the implications of this statement would prove a fascinating although somewhat perilous adventure. Fortunately, such is not required and could not contributed towards the elucidation of the type problem. The passage quoted does, however, allow the biologically orientated a glimpse of the foundations of the type theory as envisaged by the builder. Meanwhile, our concern is rather with the psychological superstructure.

CHAPTER I.

JUNG'S EARLY THEORY.

The core of Jung's early theory of psychological types, as indeed also of his later and final theory, is to be found in that sentence which McDougall professes to regard as the only illuminating and altogether acceptable statement on this topic: 8. "Hysteria is characterised by a centrifugal tendency of the libido, whilst in Dementia Praecox its tendency is centripetal." 9.

This is a theory within a theory: a theory of contrasted pathological syndromes, and a theory of 'libido' explanatory of the contrast.

Since libido movement is the essential hypothesis of this statement, Jung's conception of 'libido' must be mentioned. For Freud, to whom we owe the word, libido means the force by means of which the sexual instinct achieves expression. Jung protests against so limited a conception. Libido for him represents the perceived manifestation of psychic energy, to be likened to the élan vital of Bergson; and the energy of the sexual instinct is merely one of its manifestations. Jung is at pains to contrast his 'energic' standpoint with Freud's 'dynamic' one. The differences would appear to be largely verbal. Freud indeed seems to have approximated more to Jung's wider conception. One can understand Jung's castigation of an attitude which would explain all higher manifestations as "nothing but" the operation of sexual forces; but I prefer to think that Freud does not so equate them and that Jung does him less than justice in stating that his process of "reductio ad causam" is merely "an inept expression for the same old thing." 10.

These differences in the signification of 'libido' are reflected in the meaning which each ascribes to the term.

10. Jung "Contributions to Analytical Psychology" p.22.
'introversion'. The sense in which Jung uses this word which he himself coined is already apparent. For Freud, the word denotes "the deflection of the libido away from the possibilities of real satisfaction and its excessive accumulation upon phantasies." 11.

Freud envisages a conflict between ego and sex, interest and libido. These two undergo development side by side. The ego strives to adapt itself to the libido development or to adapt the libido development to itself. If the libido development does not proceed harmoniously with that of the ego, it will either be refused recognition, and so fall under repression, or it will achieve recognition and so undergo 'sublimation.'

Freud does not anywhere deal with 'introvert' as opposed to 'extravert' tendencies, but Miss Ikin has shown how such might be regarded from the Freudian angle: "Where ego instincts have repressed the sex instincts, the conscious reaction is introvert. If the ego fails to repress or utilise its libido in sublimated channels, then the object libido moulds the ego, depletes the ego, and adaptation is through feeling, the conscious reaction being extravert." 12.

It is the third possibility which Miss Ikin refers to that is of special significance, i.e., where interest and libido are harmonised, where both introvert and extravert reactions will be in consciousness and come into play according to the needs of the situation. The dual play and harmonious cooperation of these two mechanisms will be commented on at a later stage. Meanwhile, the sharp divergencies of Jung's teaching from Freud's in this respect must be noted. For Jung, repression is of minor importance, and he does not explain the contents of the personal unconscious as occasioned thereby, but rather that they are the consequence of a disproportionate mental development whereby certain potentialities

are neglected in favour of others, and the neglected functions tend to become unconscious.

"It is well known" says Jung, "that in their general physiognomy, hysteria and dementia praecox present a striking contrast, which is seen particularly in the attitude of the sufferers towards the external world. The reactions provoked in the hysterical surpass the normal level of intensity of feeling, whilst this level is not reached at all by the precocious dement. The picture presented by these contrasted illnesses is one of exaggerated emotivity in the one, and extreme apathy in the other, with regard to the environment." 13.

This contrast is one which the Freudian school have clearly recognised. Only of necessity their explanation of it, being in accordance with the particular sense in which the term 'libido' is construed, differs widely from that of Jung. Abraham, 14. writing from the Freudian standpoint, remarks that the dementia praecox case lacks the capacity of transferring libido to the external world, and in this way is fundamentally different from the hysterical.

The Freudian viewpoint on this matter is so dissimilar from that which we shall adopt that a further comparison between these two schools of thought must be abandoned. Jung deals with this pathological-type antithesis as illustrative of the presence or absence of the psychological function of feeling, and the presence or absence of this function he ascribes to the nature of the general attitude.

Feeling is the fundamental distinguishing function, and its presence or absence becomes the criterion of type differences; and so it came about that when Jung gave his theory its wider application, in the belief that normal persons were likewise characterised by the relative predominance of one or other of the two mechanisms - extraversion and introversion, he portrayed the extravert type as that in which

the fundamental function was feeling, and the introvert type as that in which thought occupied the foremost place.

"The one feels his way into the object, the other thinks about it. The one adapts himself to his surroundings by feeling, thinking coming later; whilst the other adapts himself by means of thought preceded by understanding." 15.

At this point, and before proceeding to examine the psychological characteristics of Hysteria and Dementia Praecox and to enquire into the validity of their contrast in terms of libido movement, it may be well to make clear certain difficulties in this early theory of Jung's. The presence or absence of feeling is the criterion of this type difference, that is to say, the presence or absence of its expression. An excess of feeling-expression is the mark of the extravert, a deficiency the mark of the introvert. The criterion is quantitative not qualitative. Can a quantitative theory reckon sufficiently with qualitative differences? That there are qualitative differences between the feeling of the normal extravert and that of the hysteric cannot be in doubt.

CHAPTER II.

HYSTERIA & DEMENTIA PRÆCox.

HYSTERIA.

To confine our attention to the psychological phenomena of hysteria. All recent investigation of this malady has supported Charcot's statement that hysteria is a psychological disease par excellence. In searching for the chief psychological characteristics of hysteria, we can have no surer guide than Kretschmer whose brilliant monograph on this subject is singularly free from unwarranted theoretical assumptions. The first point to be stressed is the type of person in whom hysteria is manifested. Clinical experience bears out Kretschmer's assertion "that hysterical manifestations are predominantly vague, impulsive ways of reaction occurring in simple, primitive or immature persons, and appear relatively seldom in enigmatic, highly differentiated personalities possessing intricate richness of experience." 16.

These psychic manifestations are described as resulting from a tense diffuse affective condition, and Kretschmer compares them with the subjective state of affairs in consciousness during the activity of a human instinct, i.e., "a diffuse, idea-poor, affective condition." Many symptoms of what are called the "hysterical character" are "nothing more than stationary residuals of an early pubertal psyche or unfavourable characterological modifications of the same under the changed demands of later life." Such an immature psyche necessarily shews a greater tendency towards impulsive discharges of affect.

Now Jung has stressed the exaggerated emotivity of the hysterics. He has not called attention to the immaturity

of the intellectual powers. He has therefore not chosen to
differentiate between the type of mind which shews marked
affective reactions in conjunction with marked intellectual
capacity, and the type in which this exaggeration of affect
is accompanied by relatively undeveloped intellectual powers.

Klages' criticism of Jung is to this extent cogent.
"We shall have to consider" he says, "whether it is a shallow
or a deep life of the Soul that by choice turns inwards. If
we distinguish between the possibility of an excessive
predominance of one or the other direction, then the
consequences will vary greatly in the two cases." 17.

Is the hysterical character, as Jung considers it to be,
an exaggeration of the normal extraverted attitude? The
statement is equivocal inasmuch as the normal extraverted
attitude has been deduced from the nature of the hysterical
phenomena. I am prepared to regard hystera as implying an
extraversion, a special kind of extraversion, not merely an
exaggeration of Jung's original extraverted attitude, but
one of 'feeling' extraversion modified largely by the fact
that the intellectual functions are largely undeveloped, and
by no means as being wholly explained thereby. The statement
that the intellectual powers in the hysteric are immature may
be challenged, and cases cited to the contrary. None the
less, I agree with Kretschmer on this matter, and with
Dubois who says "the hysterical patient is not as a rule
truly intelligent.... such patients have only partial
intelligence; they have not the robust good sense which one
often finds in uncultured persons.... a true savant or
intellectual man might be neurasthenic; he would never be
an out-and-out hysteric." 18.

Excess of emotional expression may commonly enough be
encountered in hysterics, but hysteria is not merely exaggerated

18. Paul Dubois "The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders" p.175
emotivity. I can even agree that the statement which McDougall so heartily endorses with regard to the centrifugal libido movement in the hysteric is very largely true. But it has not been accepted by all of Jung's disciples. Dr. Beatrice Hinkle, in her study of Psychological Types, is in agreement with Jung in her definition of extraverts and introverts, which, however, she subdivides differently, but she considers that the hysterical neuroses are found in their pure state chiefly amongst the extravert and emotional introvert types.

With regard to the latter, she writes:

"They are essentially introverts, but it is as though, in them, the emotions and feelings have escaped from the domination of the thought function, or have refused to be subjected to its dominion, so that they too often express themselves immediately in action and respond to contact with objects......closer study and comparison with the quality of the feeling reactions of the extravert, however, will soon reveal a marked difference in the character of the emotional introvert. A certain lack of differentiation, a too great intensity and over-emphasis, insufficient discrimination, an uncertainty in its expression, and a tendency to one extreme or another serve to distinguish its character from that of the extraverted type. Further, the feeling is never steady and dependable, for it is constantly interfered with in its relation to the object by the subject which always presses in between." 19.

Apparently, therefore, the distinction between what is called extraversion and introversion is one that has to be finely drawn and the presence of either mechanism, even in so pronounced a type as an hysteric, not by any means easy of ascertainment. I think that Jung would probably say that Dr. Hinkle had been more perceptive than judging in her assessment of that type where feeling is interfered with by

the interposition of the subject. I can picture just the sort of patient Dr. Hinkle has in mind; but her departure from Jung’s teaching on this matter is apparently due to mistaking unconscious attributes for the manifestations of the conscious attitude.

Personally, I am content to accept the view that hysteria is characterised amongst other things by a libido extraversion. The predominatingly extraverted attitude of the hysteric need not be questioned. The exaggerated rapport manifested in their social activities and the frequency of hysterical contagion are indubitable traits of hysterical subjects and of extraverts. This is not denied. What is denied is that the hysterical character is an exaggeration of the normal attitude, complicated by compensatory reactions from the side of the unconscious which bring about an introversion of psychic energy.

Admittedly, also, there is ample evidence of the occurrence of introverted phases in the hysteric, phases during which the patient is wrapped up in her phantasies and correspondingly loses all real touch with her environment.

These extraversion and introversion mechanisms occurring in hysteria have their correlate in the extraversion and introversion phases of the manic depressive group, as we shall see. Both groups appear to belong to the category of extraverts, but the argument here is that their extraversion is a departure from the normal extraversion and not merely an intensification of it. They are the product of an unknown factor acting on the extraverted character. The extraverted character may be presumed to be a condition for the existence of x; but it is x and not the extraverted character that gives these diseases their uniqueness.

If hysteria be characterised by an extreme extraversion of libido, is the converse necessarily true? Jung speaks of the hysterical character as an exaggeration of the normal extraverted attitude. If this were really so, then it would
follow that the exaggeration of the normal extraverted attitude would result in hysteria, which is a proposition to which one cannot give assent.

In this matter, I agree with McDougall, who says:

"Even the most extreme degrees in this scale must be regarded as compatible with health.... the conduct of the extreme extravert may be rash and hasty, his emotions violent and uncontrolled: but he remains, nevertheless, within the range of the normal. The correlation of the extremer types with functional disorder.... is due to the special susceptibility of these types to such disorders and should not lead us to regard the temperamental extremes as themselves forms of disorder." 20.

This "special susceptibility" may not be altogether enlightening, but it appears to me to be true. I believe it to be partly, but only partly, accounted for by the association of an affect excess with intellectual immaturity. Numerous illustrations might be given of this. A patient I have in mind had tormented her family for years by her hysterical tantrums. Peace could only be had by giving in to her, and this her father at least never failed to do. Serious trouble began when she had to quit the paternal home. As a hospital nurse her fabrications set the place by the ears. Finally, an attack on an associate, the outcome of an intense jealousy, necessitated her admission to a psychopathic clinic. What was not at first obvious was later quite apparent. She was a high grade mental defective; and it was to her intellectual inferiority that I largely ascribe her hysterical behaviour.

One might presuppose the operation of some hypothetical extraverting factor operating on a type peculiarly susceptible on account of its already innate extraversion. At this stage it does not seem necessary to assume, as

McDougall does, the existence of any such factor. I am content to regard hysteria as the reaction of a type whose chief characteristic is the combination of a special sort of exaggerated emotivity with intellectual immaturity. This helps to explain its so common occurrence amongst mentally defective and epileptic patients, and in addition, in those of more mature development in whom, none the less, the inability to think out a solution of the problems which confront them, and often to survey them adequately leads them to adopt a panic-like reaction, so characteristic of this disorder.

It follows from what has been said that a true introvert cannot develop hysteria. In this I am in entire agreement with Jung, but just what constitutes a true introvert will be found to be a matter of extreme difficulty of ascertainment.

One need not, of course, expect to find in types a clear cut demarcation. "The important idea about a type" Kretschmer reminds us, "is that it possesses a firm centre, but not hard and fast boundaries. Types as a rule can only be determined intrinsically; we cannot mark their boundaries. By 'type' we mean a 'nucleus' of more distinct, and among themselves quite similar, formations which have been deliberately lifted out from a sea of progressive transitions. This holds good for an anthropological type as well as a personality type, or a clinical reaction-type. We should not, therefore, desire to sharply limit the hysterical reaction-type by means of definitions, otherwise one will always cut through something alive." 21.

DEMENTIA PRÆCOX.

Owing to its fatalistic therapeutic implications, the appellation 'dementia praecox' has fast been losing favour with psychiatrists. The term 'schizophrenia' has been adopted in its place, and with the rechristening there has been an enlargement of the diagnostic boundaries, but the psychological reactions are the same. It was Bleuler who...
first shewed that one of the chief characteristics of this disease was a splitting of the psychic functions, and who further demonstrated the presence of schizoid tendencies in everyone. The schizoid type is described as withdrawn, secluded, and not in normal affective rapport with the environment.

The typical emotional state of the schizophrenic has long been described as one of apathy. Investigation of such patients shews, however, that this apathy is more a matter of impression than an accurate assessment of their inner experience. Brill recounts the case of a schizoid patient who suddenly heard that his child had died. He apparently shewed no 'affect' whatever, but about a month later fell into a deep depression. This is illustrative of the displacement of feeling which occurs along with the outward indifference so characteristic of these cases. 22.

Jung reminds us that the introvert can feel very deeply indeed: "the emotion is there but it all remains inside, and the more passionate and deeper his feeling is, the quieter is his outward demeanour." 23.

Jung is here speaking of the type which he later designated the "introverted feeling" type.

The loss of the natural and spontaneous affective contact with the environment may be accepted as the most insignificant feature of this disorder, amongst a great variety of other symptoms.

What are we to say with regard to the theory that schizophrenia is the evolution of a definite type? That a particular type, the 'shut-in' type, is peculiarly liable to develop it seems evident even although Hoch has been able to trace the existence of this type only in 51% to 60% of cases.

It is difficult to obtain accurate histories, but there is little doubt that the sufferer from dementia praecox has been from childhood a seclusive shut-in type. Where one can

23. Jung "Psychological Types."
depend upon the information, it is generally something like this - the history is one of a typical hebephrenic girl - "Even as a baby she was different from other children, always preferring to be alone. In everything she had to do she had to be coaxed. She never wanted to join other children in their play. She always came straight home from school, and was happiest at home and with her books. She was very shy."

Schizophrenia does not, however, appear to be the inevitable outcome of a libido introversion. If we were to admit that under a given set of circumstances acting as psychical traumata, bereavement, difficult home surroundings, harsh treatment, onanism and the like, such a type would develop schizophrenia, we would be admitting that the disease consisted merely of an extreme type reaction to experiential factors. But schizophrenia with its multifarious variegation of symptomatology is a far cry from a fully developed schizoid. Little enough is known about the pathology of this condition; and if, as is not unlikely, it were shewn that there were some causative germ for its production, or a toxic process or some inborn error of metabolism, or even, as has been suggested, an endocrine deficiency, then there would be a non-psychological characteristic imposed upon it from without, accentuating and distorting the psychological characteristics from within. A psychosis, in so far as it is organically conditioned, may so put its impress on a case as to make it well nigh impossible to see the individual reaction type below and beyond it.

But even if this were not so, and if it be said that a psychological picture demands its own psychological interpretation which Jung would advance in terms of the outcropping of the collective Unconscious, then it must be argued similarly as regards hysterics, that a profound introversion does not necessarily lead to the development
of dementia praecox. Here again one cannot deny the presence of introversion, but the introversion is of a peculiar kind—a divagation from normal introversion, not merely an exaggeration of it. Since schizophrenia is not to be regarded as the natural evolution of a type, where must we look for the extra causative factor which operates on a peculiarly susceptible introvert? I am inclined to find this in an organically conditioned lack of reserve psychical 'potential', and this deficiency is no necessary characteristic of the normal introvert.

There are patients, typically schizophrenic, whom I know, who illustrate this. A young woman, as classic a Dementia Praecox as one could wish to meet, wrapped up perpetually in her phantasies and almost totally unconcerned with her environment, had always been, according to her parents, abnormally reserved and incommunicative. Her early development however was so gravely retarded, she was so late in speaking and walking, that for a time mental deficiency was feared; but once development began it was rapid and she was well abreast of her associates at school. Then, at nineteen, she became depressed and 'peculiar', talking nonsensically, and shewing the typical emotional incongruity. It is difficult not to see in this case an initial deficiency of psychical energy, compensated by a 'spurt' which gradually faded with a falling psychical potential, so that the kinetic drive diminished to vanishing point as far as rapprochement with her environment was concerned.

I have seen several praecox cases occurring in brighter members of an otherwise mentally backward family. I have seen in such cases a discrepancy between ambition and capacity during school and college days, giving one the impression that such persons were 'all out' in their endeavours as compared with classmates possessed of adequate reserves and therefore with a high capacity-to-output quotient.
One can readily see the cogency of the Adlerian conception of inferiority here; the reservoir of psychical energy is of insufficient capacity for the outflow proceeding from it, with consequent striving to compensate a deficiency.

It would seem to me, therefore, that introversion qua introversion is insufficient to account for a fully developed schizophrenia. It merely constitutes a liability. An additional factor or additional factors are necessary for its full-development. Such a predisposing or precipitating factor may perhaps be found in some inherent insufficiency of psychical 'potential' or in some superadded pathological process.

I agree with Jung as to the tendency of the libido in such cases being centripetal, i.e., introverted. I do not regard this introversion however of being explanatory of the disease. Jung describes the 'tendency' of the libido. I wish to add to that, the concept of 'depth' or 'quantity'. When these are considered together, a fuller understanding of the regressive phenomena is obtained.

If the question be asked, Can a true extravert develop dementia praecox? the answer must be in the negative. Cases may indeed be instanced where schizophrenic symptoms appear in patients whom one might regard as extraverts, but I have become increasingly dubious of the accuracy of their early histories. However, such cases may be instanced. If it be the fact that true introversion should be manifested in early childhood, what are we to make of cases whose introverted disposition did not shew itself until adolescence or even later? Was the true type obscured all the time, even to members of the patient's family, or are there introverted and extraverted phases normally occurring in all lives?

Here are two cases apparently contradictory to Jung's hypothesis: "A nurse, aged 31, when admitted to the hospital was nonchalant in manner and indifferent to everything around
her. She had adopted a curiously affected style of speech. Her appetite had become more and more capricious and finally she had refused food, believing that it contaminated her and made her do "irregular things." Ill-defined persecutory ideas developed. Emotional incongruity was marked but definite hallucinations were not proven to exist. Such a reaction may unhesitatingly be accepted as schizophrenic, although the case cannot be regarded as a classic dementia praecox. It is true that the patient had the reputation of being dreamy and abstracted and very reserved. These characteristics, however, were not observed before puberty. Prior to that time she is described as having been an energetic girl, interested in all sorts of activities, lively and companionable.

A similar difficulty arises in this other case, that of a young man, aged 22, who is described as having been a natural healthy boy, interested in sport, frolicsome, fond of the companionship of other boys, and in no sense shy or retiring. In late adolescence there was, according to his mother, a radical change in his demeanour. He began to lose interest in his surroundings, and in his friends. Soon it was evident that he was suffering from a serious mental illness. He began to speak of his home as the mystery house, where people listened in and controlled his thoughts and made him say things that he had no intention of saying. He thinks he is the Unknown Warrior. He talks of a machine inside him making a whirring noise something like a clock. His food is poisoned and not fit for pigs. He must be X-rayed inside and outside. He has some awful disease. And in relating this, there is no evidence of real perturbation on account of such terrible happenings. On the contrary, he will repeat all such statements with a silly smile and appear more amused than otherwise. Such delusional ideas and hallucinations and apathy have continued, and there can be no doubt that his case is one
of the schizophrenic disorders.

Now it may be supposed that such a patient had shewn in early years the hallmarks of the introvert. On the contrary, all that we can glean from his family points in the other direction. If their account is to be relied upon, his boyish behaviour would place him in the extraverter category.

I prefer to believe that in spite of the history one is dealing with an introverted type whose introversion was overlaid by a spurious extraversion. Jung warns us that under abnormal conditions children can be coerced into assuming a type which entails a violation of their individual disposition.

Other cases occur to one of married women in whom a toxic confusional state at childbirth precipitated a schizophrenic reaction. These patients seem to have been of the introverted type; but exceptions can again be shewn, in one of which the patient is described by her husband as having been a leader in everything, quick to make friends, and with no trace of shyness, and this is borne out by her childhood's history.

It would certainly seem that a rigid demarcation of types is not by any means always to be come by. The pathological instances would appear to shew more often than is admitted the occurrence of mixed reactions.

Far apart as they are in their symptomatology and in their libido tendencies, hysteria and dementia praecox, in their symptoms which Kretschmer calls 'hypoboulie' in the former and which are generally designated as catatonic states in the latter, have much in common. In contradistinction to the 'purposive will', Kretschmer describes the 'hypoboulie' will as resembling "a mysterious second-self which pushes its pale delicate brother into the foreground. In all small matters, he apparently allows him precedence and a free hand. But with every decisive situation he presses the purposive will aside as a stupid phantom, and with one bound is in its place." 24.

Kretschmer admits that the whole process may be considered from the affective side, but this affect of the hysterical states he says, "is actually his will, and contains a striving, a resistance, a defense, a purpose." 25.

The mechanisms of the hypoboulic will and those of the catatonic states of schizophrenia may not be identical. They do, however, seem to represent in the former case a lower level adjustment because of lack of integration in a higher level response, i.e., as we have said, owing to intellectual immaturity, and in the latter case, a similar lower level reaction on account of a lessened psychical potential necessary for an integrated, higher grade response.

Hysteria and dementia praecox are avowedly the prototypes of libido extraversion and introversion respectively. Up to this point our argument has been directed towards shewing that these mechanisms are of a special kind, and that extraversion and introversion do not solely suffice to explain the observed phenomena. It would seem that they are highly suitable pegs on which to hang a theory, but not adequate to support the theory in its more general application. We have seen that hysteria seldom, if ever, occurs in definitely introverted types. If schizophrenia appears to occur in extraverted types, this may possibly be explained by the patient having assumed an extraverted attitude owing to the pressure of external events and in violation of their true type.

Jung speaks of extraversion and introversion as mechanisms, and of the preponderance of a mechanism as constituting an 'attitude'. Are we able to discover the operation of such mechanisms in other psychopathological states? It would appear so. Mania, in its milder manifestations (e.g. hypomania), and Melancholia illustrate mechanisms of extraversion and introversion, even though it may not be held that they constitute attitudes. Here again it is a case of a special kind of extraversion and introversion, but one worthy of consideration because of the similarity in many respects between mania and hysteria, and the quite common association of 'depressed' with 'apathetic' states.

Now the sufferer from simple mania, the hypomanic as he is called, would appear to illustrate just those qualities which are associated with extraversion. Such a patient will display a total absence of shyness. He is confident of his powers and full of self-assurance, and will talk on almost
any subject with remarkable fluency. His associative processes are active and easy, and in keeping with the mental animation there is a perpetual restlessness and activity. The affective functions are specially involved. The patient is in a state of elation. He has little judgment and no self-awareness.

This condition of simple mania may precede, follow or alternate with states of melancholia, in which the picture is just the reverse of what has been drawn. The sufferer from mild melancholia is abnormally reflective and brooding. His own thoughts occupy him to such an extent that he can never act decisively but always halts between two opinions. Contrary to the hypomanic, his associative processes are slow and laborious. It is difficult for him to think and he has no spontaneity or initiative. It is again the affective functions which are involved. Instead of elation there is depression, and where the other is completely unaware of himself, the melancholic can never get away from his self absorption and introspection.

At first sight it may appear unfortunate, as regards our present purpose, that Kretschmer's 'cycloid' type, a type prone to manic-depressive illness, is contrasted by him with the schizoid who is liable to develop schizophrenia.

Mania is quite obviously an extraversion and melancholia an introversion; but this must not lead us into the error of regarding the melancholic as an introvert; and further study will shew us that what contradiction there appears to be between the theories of Jung and Kretschmer in this respect is illusory, and based on a misapprehension of Jung's teaching. For first of all, we have to distinguish "mechanism" from "attitude" which it will be recalled Jung defines as the predominance of a mechanism.

The mania-melancholia contrast illustrates admirably the operation of opposing mechanisms, and were extraversion merely a mechanism then all hypomanics would be extraverts,
and all melancholics introverts. But we know from clinical experience how closely interrelated these two disorders are, so closely united in one and the same person that few would now deny the truth of the Kraepelinian teaching that they constitute phases of one disease - the manic-depressive psychosis. Now what is the prevailing attitude of such a sufferer when in a normal state?

Kretschmer describes the temperamental characteristics recurring amongst manic-depressive cases as follows:
1. sociable, good-natured, friendly, genial.
2. cheerful, humorous, jolly, hasty.
3. quiet, calm, easily depressed, soft-hearted.

"The first group includes the fundamental marks of the cycloid temperament - the characteristics which recur everywhere from the hypomanic and the depressive poles and give tone to the cheerfulness as to the melancholy."

He points out that circular depressive patients actually complain of their lack of warmth, of kindly feeling for men and things, a sign that their feeling is their very life element; and he goes on to add "Side by side with the clearly sociable natures, we often find also circulars...... people who take things rather to heart, who like to live their lives quietly and in contemplation. They may be differentiated from the corresponding schizoids in that there is no internal antipathy nor hostile turning-away from human society, but at most a certain melancholy and occasionally a feeling of anxiety and a tendency to inferiority. If one seeks their company, they are friendly, natural and approachable."

These observations by Kretschmer have been generally confirmed, but I may be allowed to allude to a further demonstration of their truth in an Introversion-Extraversion Test carried out by Neymann and Konlstedt. These observers

27. " " p.125.
noted that "depressions even when so deep as to form a slowing down of the entire psychomotor activity will give the typically extraverted responses", and they add, "we were often surprised at the affirmative reply of patients who were so depressed that they would hardly talk, to the question "Do you like to take an active part in all conversations going on around you?"

The extraverted attitude of melancholics is thus in accordance with clinical experience, and substantiates the truth of the opposed categories of cycloids and schizoids and a broad general relationship between these and the extraverts and introverts of Jung. Indeed the psychological contrast of the cycloids with the schizoids makes a readier appeal to practical experience, than Jung's comparison of the hysterics with the precocious dement. Quite apart from its correlation with physical types, Kretschmer's theory does not embroil us in the abstract perplexities of libido movement, and its ascertainment is far from difficult.

Of course there are many matters left unexplained, not the least of which is the case of the constitutional depressives. Of them, Kretschmer reminds us that "it is important to notice that one does not find constitutional depressives nearly so often in the region of manic-depressive insanity. One could collect a superb series of typically hypomanic temperaments out of our circular material, far more easily than a correspondingly large group of constitutional depressives." 29

To return a moment to the manic and melancholic states as indicative of mechanisms. If one keeps clearly in mind this distinction between attitude and mechanism, there need be no confusion such as might lead us to regard these states as illustrative of extraversion and introversion proper, i.e., as diagnostic of the extravert and the introvert.

Curiously enough, McCurdy regards the manic states as indicative of an introversion.

In that mine of psychopathological information "The Psychology of the Emotions," he describes how in manic states the attention tends to be turned from the environment to the patient's inner thoughts, and how a hypomanic case becomes more productive and emotional with an increase of absorption in his thoughts. One can see how introverted 'absorbed' manias are, but in the mild degrees of mania, as in hypomania, the patient is surely orientated by and related to the object.

Jung was good enough to write to me on this matter, as follows:

"Mania and Melancholia are the mechanisms of extraversion and introversion in a state of complete autonomy. In Mania an almost limitless extraversion prevails on account of an uncontrolled release of psychical energy. In Melancholia, an equally limitless introversion prevails on account of an almost complete compression of the production of psychical energy, but I think that extraversion and introversion are only symptomatic of a peculiar disturbance in the production of psychical energy. In both diseases, the peculiar behaviour of the psychical energy seems to be the essential point, while the extraverted and introverted aspects are merely secondary."

This passage clarifies the discussion, although I cannot regard the last sentence of it as being altogether enlightening. One might accept Jung's dictum of the peculiarity of the behaviour of the psychical energy in mania and melancholia, but why not also in hysteria and Dementia Praecox. As to the extraverted and introverted aspects being secondary in the manic-depressive syndrome, I am in agreement.

I have often wished that Jung had envisaged and worked out his theory in terms of a manic depressive - dementia.

praecox contrast, but it is not my purpose to examine the relationship of Jung's and Kretschmer's theories, except in so far as this is relevant to the present enquiry.

But by no means have we explored all the numerous by-paths opening out of the way we have pursued. Granted that the manic is an extravert, and mania an extraversion; and granted that the melancholic is an extravert, but melancholia an introversion. It is none the less notorious that a number of manic depressive cases shew pronounced schizophrenic reactions. Involutional melancholias manifest such traits as often as not. It would be logical to trace the melancholic or manic part of the syndrome back to an extravert type and the schizophrenic part to an introverted type. And as we shall see later, there are many persons who make use of these mechanisms to such an extent that their type is inclusive of both categories.
CHAPTER IV.

VALIDITY OF JUNG'S EARLY THEORY.

By Jung's Early Theory is meant that generalisation which he propounded with regard to humanity at large, that people belonged to either one or other of two psychological categories, that they were either extraverts or introverts, according as they made preferential use of one or the other of the mechanisms of extraversion or introversion, in their dealings with life.

We have seen that the origin of this theory lay in the contrasted pathological syndromes of hysteria and dementia praecox, the contrast being depicted by Jung in terms of libido movement. So far, our observations on this theory have been confined to an enquiry into the validity of that contrast.

Definite conclusions have been reached as regards the appositeness of the contrast drawn between these two disorders. We have, however, attempted to shew that there is no reason why we should accept hysteria as the prototype of extraversion (or, to be more exact, the hysteric as the prototype of the extravert) or dementia praecox as the original of introversion. The manics (and they may be taken to coincide with the manic depressive group) have every bit as much entitlement to be regarded as the true exponents of the extraverted type. Perhaps a different theory would have been arrived at if this group had been contrasted with the schizophrenics. However that may be, Jung has described the extraversion of the former as "peculiar". Equally well can the adjective be used to describe the extraversion of the hysteric or the introversion of the precocious dement. The contrast which Jung has portrayed as existing between hysteria and dementia praecox is a perfectly legitimate one; but in our opinion the particular quality of either of these
disorders is not wholly accounted for in terms of libido movement.

One can legitimately contrast extraversion with introversion, but one cannot contrast intellectual inferiority (which we have said was a stigma of the hysterio) with "lack of psychical potential" (from which praecox cases suffer). These are not in the same universe of discourse, and so allow of no comparison. If the contrast which Jung has portrayed is a valid one, it is valid only in so far as he is concerned with extravert and introvert phenomena as they occur in these disorders. But these phenomena do not exhaust the clinical picture by any means. The contrast depicted by Jung makes us suspect that he is excluding certain pathological features of these states from his mind and that he is forcing his theory on the facts.

The theory must be made to fit the phenomena, i.e., account for their presence and their quality. To my mind, it leaves many facts unexplained. But a pathological basis for a universally applicable theory, although insecure in its own sphere, may well enough wear a different aspect in its extended application. It requires, therefore, that it should be tested out on a larger more diverse and more normal population, and in this process of testing out we shall have recourse to the many writers who have made human character their study. In critical and biographical literature and in the study of fiction numerous examples illustrative of Jung's theory will be found.

But before doing so, it will be well to summarise briefly just what Jung's extended application of his theory amounts to. All humanity, according to Jung, are orientated by a general attitude of extraversion or introversion, and because of that, psychology requires two utterly different orientations. The extravert type gives to the object an unquestioned supremacy. The introvert type prefers to seek a higher value in the subject. A pure type making use solely of one mechanism never
occurs. In the most onesided types there are always fluctuations towards the other attitude than that by which the person is predominatingly oriented. The typical attitude thus indicates merely the relative predominance of one mechanism.

However remiss the professional psychologist has been in his attitude towards Jung's type theory, there has been something approaching enthusiasm in the acceptance of it, at any rate in its broad formulation, by numerous authors and critics.

The reinterpretation into modern psychological language of these lines from Hazlitt may serve as one illustration out of many. "Humour is the describing the ludicrous as it is in itself; wit is the exposing it, by comparing or contrasting it with something else. Humour is, as it were, the growth of nature and accident; wit is the product of art and fancy. Humour, as it is shewn in books, is an imitation of the natural or acquired absurdities of mankind, of the ludicrous in accident, situation and character; that absurdity by some sudden and unexpected likeness or opposition of one thing to another which sets off the quality we laugh at or despise in a still more contemptible or striking point of view." 31

The commentator adds a modern nuance to these words by shewing how aptly they fit in with these distinctions in human personality which Jung has portrayed.

"Humour is descriptive, external, accidental, imitative - that is, an objective faculty. Wit is introspective, comparative, analytical - that is, a subjective faculty. And the exercise of these faculties is appropriate to temperaments that correspond - to the objective man, or extravert, in the one case; to the subjective man, or introvert, in the other case."

31. Hazlitt. Lectures on the English Comic Writers "Wit & Humour".
It seems a little surprising that a theory so technical and so specialised should have come to have so wide a currency. That it has been so swiftly commandeered by writers at large is a sign of its appositeness and of its value.

The sweep of Jung's imaginative vision is nowhere better demonstrated than in his application of the theory of contrasted psychological types to humanity at large. His subject matter, ranging from the psychology of the classical age down to modern philosophy, embraces the fundamental theological and historical beliefs which have cleft asunder churches, and rent nations into warring factions. The Christian acceptance which led Tertullian to make the sacrificium intellectus, but which contrariwise caused Origen to make the sacrificium phalli; the Ebionitic creed of a purely human Christ as against the Docetic belief in a purely Divine One; the belief in transubstantiation which has proved through the ages an interminable source of controversy; Classicism and Romanticism; Schiller and Goethe - all such fundamental oppositions of men and schools come within the ambit of Jung's transcendent intellect.

On this broad canvas Jung has delineated with consummate skill those subtle but profound differences in the mind of man which are the origin of unending strife.

It seems a far cry this, from the specialised theory of libido-tendency occurring in mental disorder; but Jung is concerned in proving the universality of his type contrasts, and it must be admitted that his thesis thereby becomes immeasurably strengthened.
Very many writers, including writers of psychological works, ignore the fact that Jung made extensive alterations in his original, or as we have chosen to call it, his early theory. He found it impossible to identify the extravert with the “feeling” type, and the introvert with the “thinking” type. Moreover, he did not find that the classification of persons into one or other of the two “general attitude” types of extraversion and introversion led to any determination of their individual differences. In order to determine these, he had recourse to the study of what he has termed individual basic psychological functions.

“For in the same measure as outer circumstances and inner disposition respectively promote a predominance of extraversion or introversion, they also favour the predominance of one definite basic function in the individual.”

Of such basic psychological functions Jung distinguishes four, those of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition; and hence there are eight types in all, four “function” types all of which may be extraverted or introverted.

It is at this point that McDougall signifies his dissent. In his “Outline of Abnormal Psychology”, McDougall states that he cannot follow Jung in this elaboration of types, nor can he agree that the four psychological functions of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition can be validly distinguished and separated to the degree implied; and in a more recent publication he argues for the restriction of the terms introversion and extraversion to denote merely the various degrees of the freedom of outflow of affective excitement into action and expression.

34. McDougall “Journ. of Abn. & Soc. Psych.”
It might be well to have terms to denote such temperamental differences; but to argue that the terms introversion and extraversion be so applied is to miss the essential meaning of the terms as defined by Jung, and to mistake a common accompaniment of an attitude for the attitude itself.

Jung has always regarded the relationship of the unconscious to the conscious as compensatory. Nor need this be controverted. Hence the unconscious of an extravert is introverted; and where one definite basic function predominates in the conscious, the other functions will be found to be in the service of the unconscious. Herein arise other possibilities of error in type discrimination. There is no necessary sharp demarcation between what is 'conscious' and what is 'unconscious'. There is a constant interplay between these functions. Hence type diagnosis becomes the matter of the utmost delicacy.

The observer's attitude has to be determined. Does a type become known to him by judgment or by perception? A man's unconscious may make a deeper impression upon us than his conscious attitude, and therefore it is necessary to know whether it is the 'conscious' that has been judged or the 'unconscious' that has been perceived. In addition, the attitude of the observed has to be ascertained. Is the particular reaction in question the product of his conscious or his unconscious psychology? Moreover, each type shews a special tendency towards correction of its onesidedness, so that its true nature may be almost impossible to decipher.

The above resume of Jung's more fully elaborated theory will suffice to expose the complexity of the subject, and the aspects of it which call for examination. It would seem best to adopt the plan which Jung has followed and discuss first of all the 'general attitude' types and then the relationship of attitude to function, and such as exists between the several functions themselves.
CHAPTER VI.

THE GENERAL ATTITUDE TYPES.

What is not a little disconcerting is to find in psychological literature one and the same individual described as an extravert by some and as an introvert by others. Darwin is instanced by Jung as a typical "thinking extravert." McDougall claims Darwin as an introvert, and adduces in illustration of this his great susceptibility to neurasthenic disorder. McDougall's avoidance of the issues raised by Jung's final statement of his theory as it appears in "Psychological Types" has led him into this contrariety of opinion. Much of his criticism in the article above referred to consequently misfires. It is possible to be subjectively orientated in the study of objective life; but there is no evidence of Darwin's subjective orientation. A "thinking" type he certainly was and knew himself to be, and indeed he lamented the poverty of the development of his aesthetic sensibilities which his thinking processes had crowded out of his conscious attitude; but he was not a "thinking introvert", and it is just the consideration of such a case as Darwin's that makes us see how necessary it was that Jung should have had to abandon the identification of the "thinking" type with the introvert type.

And quite obviously, the fact that Freud has shewn an intense interest in the inner life of man does not prevent his being regarded as an extravert. It is the kind of interest that is shewn that matters. It is possible to be objectively orientated even in the study of the inner life.

As to the general attitude, this should arise from an innate disposition. "The decisive factor must be looked for in the disposition of the child." It would be necessary

35. McDougall "Outline of Abnormal Psychology" p.447.
to trace extraversion and introversion and affective experience in early childhood, taking hereditary predisposition as a basis. Such an examination does reveal the presence of two different attitudes towards life, one of immediate acceptance and assurance, the other with qualified acceptance and at least a hint of personal reservation and withdrawal.

I think that it cannot be denied that such typical differences do manifest themselves from the earliest moments of life, even, if it may be so expressed, 'anterior to psychology'. The extraverted child displays a quick outward reaction, and although he may be sensitive, and not blind to his own mental operations at times, his outlook is preponderatingly objective. For him, an object is an object. The introverted child is noticeably more shy, almost perhaps as quickly observant as the extraverted but less liable to communicate his observations. Also his acts are more unpredictable, and there is an unmistakable sense of something being held back. A very great deal is given to the outer world but not everything. I have known such children shew a marked tendency to regard their toys, and indeed any object with which they come in contact, as animate and so address them, and such an 'animation' of objects tends to endure for many years, whereas it is at most a fleeting phase in the extraverted child. Jung has quoted the instance of a young introverted girl who had to know the name of every article of furniture in a room before she could be persuaded to walk round it, and I believe also that the coining of words is much more pronounced in such a type.

It would appear that the inner world does exercise a greater pull and that some reassurance is required whereby the outer world must be propitiated.

What is to be selected as the criterion of extraversion and of introversion respectively? We are told that the extravert maintains a positive relation to the object; that
his subjective attitude is orientated by and related to the object; that he is open, sociable and serene; that he thinks, feels, acts and lives so as to correspond with objective conditions; that his interest and attention are primarily those of the immediate environment; that the moral laws governing his action coincide with the generally valid moral view point; that his most highly differentiated psychological function has a constantly extraverted application.

It ought not to be difficult, with this catalogue to guide us, to single out the extraverted attitude type in life or literature. It may be considerably more difficult to pin down one characteristic which may be accepted as the criterion of the type, but in any case the distinction is, frequently enough, one requiring the most delicate discrimination.

"Dear Walter Scott and myself" says Coleridge, "were exact but harmonious opposites in this: that every old ruin, hill, river and tree called up in his mind a host of historical or biographical associations, whereas for myself, notwithstanding Dr. Johnson, I believe I should walk over the plain of Marathon without taking more interest in it than in any other plain of similar features." 37 The inward looking mind, concerned with thoughts and fancies streaming up from the unconscious, stands in singular contrast here to the outwardly directed, observantly interested attitude.

The poet Cowper and his evangelist associate, John Newton, portray a similar antithesis. And yet, it is just when we examine into this antithesis that it becomes more apparent than real. A superficial study of the psychological reactions of these two men might lead us into the belief that the poet was the introvert and the evangelist the extravert; but we shall see. It is to be remembered that Cowper suffered from recurrent attacks of Melancholia. The quotations are from a recent fascinating life of the poet by Lord David Cecil: "in the social warmth of his friends' company, his spirit expanded" 38

37. Coleridge "Table Talk".
38. Lord David Cecil "The Stricken Deer"
(Compare Jung. "Give the introvert a thoroughly congenial, harmonious milieu, and he relaxes and expands to complete extraversion, until one begins to wonder whether one may not be dealing with an extravert." 39) and again "his anxious mind searching suspiciously for the thorn beneath every rose"; "my friends" said Cowper, "expect that I shall see again. I admit the validity of this reasoning in every case but my own." The biographer reveals to us his own attitude and perhaps his own psychological category, as well as the poet’s, when he says "Life is precarious, tragic, surrounded by dangers; and if delicate and highly strung people are peculiarly conscious of this, it is because they alone are fully alive to their true situation, and are not, like the healthy, the dupes of their own good digestions." 40

Now there are a number of indications of an introversion in these passages; and no one can deny that often enough the poet was introverted; but was his prevailing attitude one of introversion? If we recall again to mind Kretschmer’s temperamental classification of such cases, we find many of Cowper’s characteristics depicted. 'Delicate and highly strung' he certainly was, but I am not prepared to place him in Jung’s category of introverts.

Seemingly at the very opposite psychological pole stands John Newton.

To quote once more from this work:

"He (Newton) was primarily a man of action. If he thought he should do a thing, he did it; and he often did it without thinking about it at all. Nor did thought mean anything to him except in so far as it told him how to act. He was incapable of speculation or self-analysis. His own acts and opinions were directed by unanalysed instinct."

Newton’s childhood and boyhood were similarly conditioned by objective values. He has all the indices of the extravert. Now if Cowper be accepted as an extravert and Newton also, how

none the less totally different they were from each other!

It may seem curious to call Cowper an extravert, but I cannot escape from that conclusion. It will appear more curious, perhaps, to find that the sole enthusiasm in later life of Newton the extravert was to dwell in introspection and self-depreciation. "Anatomy is my favourite branch" he said. "I am a specialist in sin." Now this man's prepossession with the intricacies of the sinful heart and his enthusiasm for the salvation of his fellow men were the outcome of an introverting process, which proved to be a lasting one, far removed from his natural bent and apparently not innate.

I think it may be said of Newton that he was an extravert, 'as though' introverted, and Jung reminds us that "the introversion of an extravert is different from a genuine introversion." And the same may be said on other grounds of Newton's friend, Cowper.

The psychology of Wordsworth is a further example of the difficulty of type diagnosis. Was Wordsworth an extravert or an introvert? I can imagine either case being argued with an array of facts apparently incontrovertible. In much of what is said here, I am indebted to a recent brilliant critical study of the poet by Herbert Read. 41

No one will dispute the fact that Wordsworth was a Yorkshireman of pure northern stock and that his psychological characteristics were those typical of the Norse strain. "Yorkshiremen" says his biographer "are imaginative, like all northerners, but a matter-of-factness, a strong sense of objectivity, a faculty for vivid visualisation, keep them from being profoundly mystical. The same qualities make them wary in their actions, and canny in their reckonings. But their most extraordinary characteristic... is their capacity for masking their emotions. It is not a question of suppression, nor of atrophy; the normal feelings of the human being are present in more than their normal force, but banked up against this impenetrable reserve..... Wordsworth,

41. Herbert Read "Wordsworth" 1930.
as his sister Dorothy once said, was a man violent in affection. But it was necessary to affirm that fact. Outwardly he was cold, even hard. Inwardly he was all fire. Not even in his poetry, not even in the most inspired moments of his creative activity."

At this stage, where we are dealing with contrasted 'general attitudes', an examination of the psychological functions is not required; but it may be said that Wordsworth's objectivity, his acute sensational awareness, might lead us to place him in the category of "sensation extravert." But he had a magnificent intellect, and he had predominatingly a thinking orientation. At first sight, the facts appear to give colour to the correctness of the diagnosis of a "thinking-sensation extravert" with corresponding suppression of the functions of feeling and intuition. This indeed might seem to be Wordsworth's type did we not have contradictory evidence from the knowledge of his boyhood. In a note on the "Ode: Intimations of Immortality", Wordsworth, referring to his childhood, says:

"It was not so much from the source of animal vivacity that my difficulty came, as from a sense of the indomitableness of the spirit within me. I used to brood over the stories of Enoch and Elijah, and almost to persuade myself that, whatever might become of others, I should be translated in something of the same way to heaven. With a feeling congenial to this, I was often unable to think of external things as having external existence, and I communed with all that I saw as something not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature. Many times while going to school have I grasped at a wall or tree to recall myself from this abyss of idealism to the reality."

Does this passage force us to the conclusion, which his biographer accepts, that in his boyhood Wordsworth had no active sympathy with external things, that his state of consciousness almost withdrew him from life, and that he
therefore struggled to make the actual world as real as possible. I myself do not see why a normal extravert should not pass through in boyhood a phase of introversion; but if we are to find the indices of type psychology in early life then Wordsworth must unhesitatingly be named an introvert. Let us turn for a moment to Jung at this point:

"As a result of the ego’s defective relation to the object... a compensatory relation to the object develops in the unconscious which makes itself felt in consciousness as an unconditional and irrepresible tie to the object" 42

Jung is discussing the attitude of the unconscious in introversion. Objects possess terrifying and even magical powers for the introvert, such as, indeed, Wordsworth has so graphically described in these lines from the Prelude:

"... a huge peak, black and huge,
As if with voluntary power instinct
Upreared its head. I struck and struck again,
And growing still in stature, the grim shape
Towerd up between me and the stars, and still,
For so it seemed, with purpose of its own
And measured motion like a living thing,
Strode after me."

This experience, for we cannot doubt that it was real, unnerved Wordsworth for many days. A darkness hung over his thoughts, and

"No familiar shapes
Remained, no pleasant images of trees,
Of sea or sky, no colour of green fields;
But huge and mighty forms, that do not live
Like living men, moved slowly through the mind
By day, and were a trouble to my dreams."

I cannot think of a better corrective to an entire scepticism of Jung’s theory than the task of studying Wordsworth's psychology as revealed by himself and laying that study alongside Jung's description of the general attitude of consciousness and of the unconscious in the introverted type.

Introversion is described by Jung as a turning inwards of the libido whereby a negative relation of subject to object is expressed. Everyone whose attitude is introverted

42. Jung "Psychological Types" p.478.
thinks, feels and acts in a way that clearly demonstrates 
that the subject is the chief factor of motivation, while 
the object at most receives only a secondary value; the 
introvert's attitude to the object is an abstracting one, 
at bottom he is always facing the problem of how libido 
can be withdrawn from the object, as though an attempted 
ascendancy on the part of the object had to be continually 
frustrated. Furthermore, we are told that the introverted 
type is guided by that factor of perception and cognition 
which represents the receiving subjective disposition to 
the sense stimulus - that whereas the extraverted type 
refers preeminently to that which reaches him from the object, 
the introvert principally relies upon that which the outer 
impression constellates in the subject. "In an individual 

case of apperception the difference may, of course, be very 
delicate, but in the total psychological economy it is 
extremely noticeable, especially in the form of reservation 
of the ego." 43

Perhaps these last four words crystallise as well as 
any one phrase the core of the introvert's attitude. A 
stimulus evokes no simple response but seems to have 
penetrated to deeper levels and there to have activated 
unconscious processes. It is his sense of relationship to 
things beyond his sense perceptions that prevents a 
superficial response from the introvert. One might regard 
it as the imaginative clothing of the perception, as a 
process of projection of subjective contents into an object.

If Jung's meaning has been rightly apprehended, it 
would seem quite necessary that the extraverted and introverted 
types cannot be described from the affective side alone. 
If in any given case it is a question of attitude, then 
perception must be fully considered, and with it such other 
psychological functions as can be accepted as 'basic'.

43. Jung "Psychological Types" p.472.
The differential diagnosis.

The more that Jung's type distinction is examined and analysed the more elusive does its application become in any individual case. In accordance with Jung's teaching, it would appear that introversion or extraversion is innate. Environmental influences are not neglected and are assumed to play an important part in the development of any given type; but it is not uncommon to find a person passing as an introvert in whom the introversion seems purely the result of these outer circumstances and whose innate temperamental leaning would be unhesitatingly described as extraverted. It is this distinction between the innate types and the subsequently developed ones that makes their ascertainment so difficult, but a word of caution is necessary here. By innate we mean prior in time. Is the prior in time necessarily fundamental? Jung distinguishes between innate and artificially induced types. One may allow this and yet hesitate to deny that there may be normal 'general attitude' phases, so that say an introverted phase may be perfectly in accordance with the normal extravert's development.

Jung reminds us that the extraversion of the introvert is different from the extraversion of the extravert, and the introversion of the extravert different from the introversion of the introvert. Who is to say in any given instance whether an individual is really extraverted or 'as though' extraverted? How is the differential diagnosis to be come by? Jung tells us that it is a difficult matter to discover to which type an individual belongs, especially if oneself is in question. "Judgment in relation to oneself is always extraordinarily clouded." 44 And yet, in his discussion of the extraverted rational types, he states that he bases his judgment, presumably as to their rationality, upon what the individual feels to be his conscious psychology, for he alone can know.

44. Jung "Psychological Types" p.10.
CHAPTER VII.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS.

Jung tells us that no person is simply extraverted or introverted, but that he is so in the form of certain functions. This enables us to pursue the enquiry still further. Apparently the danger in ascertaining any given individual's type lies in the possibility of basing an estimate on that person's unconscious which has been intuitively apperceived.

Such apprehension of unconscious processes in another is surely not in need of verification. It is an everyday occurrence, but the matter will be discussed when intuitive processes are considered. It would seem then to be imperative to make a distinction between unconscious and conscious processes. In his 'Psychological Types' Jung describes the "general attitude" of the unconscious in both types, but in a subsequent essay he states that there is no general attitude of the unconscious, but only typically modified forms of unconscious functions; and he goes on to warn us that one can scarcely speak of typical unconscious functions, and that no more should be asserted with regard to the unconscious than that it has a compensatory relation to the conscious.

According to Jung, the superior function is always the expression of the conscious personality, its aim, its will and its achievement. The line of enquiry must now be the nature of these functions, their inter-relationship, and their relationship with the general attitude, and also their activities when 'inferior' and unconscious. Can the four basic psychological functions - thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition as postulated by Jung be accepted?

Jung divides his four basic functions into two groups, rational and irrational. Thinking and feeling belong to the

former, and sensation and intuition to the latter, inasmuch as valuations result from the acts of the first two, whilst in sensation and intuition, no selection is said to be made by the judgment: they are grounded exclusively on experience. No selection is made by the judgment, truly enough, but neither of these two functions merely registers passively what is presented to them. There is an element of selection, and this unconscious selective process is the outcome of the general attitude.

It does not seem of importance to discuss the grouping of these functions into the rational and irrational.

I propose to adopt Jung's classification of functions. They are already sufficiently recognised by psychologists. The inclusion of intuition might at first be thought doubtful; but intuition would seem to have a good right to a separate category. It cannot be classed as a type of sensation, for intuition accounts for many more 'tacit functions' of ours than arranging beforehand what we shall see and what we shall omit to notice in any sudden presentation of complicated material, and thereby is entitled to an independent category.

It is sufficiently clear that certain functions tend to become predominant, in which event the others, by reason of neglect and lack of use, become untrained and undifferentiated and relatively unconscious.

Thinking.

Jung makes special mention of the antagonism of thinking to feeling, and of sensation to intuition. When an individual is ruled mainly by reflective thinking in his approach to life's situations, he will fail in his adaptation to circumstances if his thinking keeps his natural feeling response in abeyance. More and more he will judge matters by a preconceived rule of rationality afforded him by his thinking, and more and more will his feeling-judgment become suppressed. By reason of this neglect of feeling, various
disturbances occur indicative of such repression. The unconscious feelings in the extraverted type, Jung describes as "highly personal and oversensitive, giving rise to secret prejudices, as for instance, a decided readiness to mis-construe any objective opposition to his formula, as personal ill-will." 46

Dickens portrays for us an extreme example of such a type in Mr. Gradgrind in "Hard Times". "Now what I want is facts" says Mr. Gradgrind, "Plant nothing else and root out everything else"; and Scrooge also, in "A Christmas Carol", is a similar type with inferior repressed feelings until such time as his visitation by Marley's ghost brought about an abrupt alteration of the conscious attitude.

The thinking introvert is more difficult to understand. His ideas are largely independent of objective data. His remoteness from actuality is evidenced by the boldness of his thinking which stands often enough in contrast to his fear when such ideas seem likely to materialise. We are told that in such a type there are repressed extravert feelings in the unconscious. In so far as the unconscious is compensatory one would look for tendencies towards extraversion and towards affective expression. The correction of an introverted thinking attitude would be an extraverted thinking attitude, and the correction of repressed feelings would be their expression. It is surely impossible to differentiate between unconscious thoughts and unconscious feelings in the way that Jung does. It is sufficiently difficult, often enough, to distinguish between a conscious thought and a conscious feeling. The distinction would seem to be best expressed by Dibblee: "So long as a connected group of compound sensations remain in our psychological time, they are feelings: but when we form any opinion about them other than a time modification, they are thoughts." 47

47. Dibblee "Instinct and Intuition" p.207.
Feeling.

When one looks around for examples of the types which Jung portrays, one is immediately struck with the appositeness of his description of the feeling types, both extravert and introvert, at any rate as far as his description of their conscious psychology goes. It must be that such types preponderate. Ferrière gives the relative preponderance of types in children in Switzerland as 25% to 28% sensation types, 55% to 60% conventional, 10% to 12% intuitive and 3% rational. 48 His 'type conventionelle' corresponds largely with Jung's feeling extravert type, and its frequent occurrence accords with our experience. The extravert feeling type is characterised by its establishment of rapport with the environment through the medium of feeling. One is not impressed in such a type by any originality of thought. Thinking follows in the wake of feeling. Their political views are largely the outcome of the standard generally accepted in their milieu, and it is the same with their views on religious matters and with artistic judgments. Nowhere better than in such types is Jung's view demonstrated of feeling being a valuation. It is easy to see how, owing to the predominance of such secondhand thinking, any real thinking that takes place and would tend to reverse the general attitude will be thrust out of awareness and relegated to the unconscious. Originally compensatory, the unconscious attitude becomes rebellious, and evidences of this are soon forthcoming. Owing to the ingress of pent up unconscious thoughts, there is liable to be an abrupt change in the conscious estimation of the object. Whatever be the real nature of these manifestations, Jung terms them 'thoughts'. They seem, at any rate when rescued from the subconscious depth, to have such qualities as to allow them to be so styled.

The introverted feeling type is the original model of the introverted type and is to be found mainly in women, and again the picture is unmistakable. Such an individual, even from very early years, shows a reluctance to express her feelings. She is difficult of access and seldom appreciated except by those who are really intimate with her, for it is an acknowledged characteristic of such an one that she should be genial and sympathetic only towards those who know her well, whilst to strangers she is withdrawn, and, so to speak, on the defensive. Their passion is not expended in a wide diffuseness, but runs in a deep cut channel.

So far, the description will be agreed on. It is the unconscious manifestations in such a type that are less readily understood. Jung states that it is unconscious thinking that is repressed. This is said to be projected and "consciousness begins to feel what others think". That such a type is unusually sensitive, often hypercritical, and tends to believe itself maligned by its neighbours, may be accepted as true: but I have to confess myself unable to discern in such an attitude the operation of unconscious thoughts. The feeling introvert is fully aware of the difficulty of rapprochement, and is a different being in congenial company. There she blossoms out, and it would seem that it is the expression of feeling and not of thinking that is required. Moreover, the feeling introvert is infinitely more reflective than the feeling extravert.

Sensation.

Jung's sensation types have always appeared to me to be too abstract. The extravert sensation type has much in common with the feeling extravert in living for the moment. It is a type characterised by absence of reflection. The acuity of the senses and his guidance by what is sensed are his chief characteristics, but I am not sure that the negative
qualities do not more largely account for the special features exhibited. Many of the qualities enumerated by Jung are rather to be explained by the lack of thinking than by the predominance of sensation, e.g., the credulity which such a type generally displays. It is not to be expected that a wellmarked sensation extravert should be able to accommodate himself to an experience which engenders a spiritual outlook. In the face of sorrow a 'magical' religiosity may develop. To Jung this would be an indication of the emergence of repressed intuition. It would, in any case, seem to be as much due to the inferiority of the conscious thinking as to the predominance of the function of conscious sensation.

According to Jung, sensation can be said to have a conscious function only in so far as the rational attitude of consciousness permits accidental perceptions to become conscious contents. One would rather say that it is the interests which determine what objects are attended to, and what ignored; and where the interests are such as engender a thinking which need rise little above the perceptual level, rational conceptual thinking falls in abeyance.

Nor do I feel convinced that sensation need always stand in diametrical opposition to intuition. Sensation, Jung states, "disturbs intuition's clear, unbiassed, naive awareness with its importunate sensuous stimuli." Jung would seem to be including feeling along with sensation when he says this. One may, however, admit this, and even agree that these functions cannot work synchronously, but my observations make me believe that they do sometimes work in such rapidly alternating succession that for practical purposes they may be considered as blended together.

The consideration of Introverted Sensation is even more difficult. Once under the thralldom of Jung, one is apt to lose all touch with reality. His psychological penetration and
his persuasiveness are such that the mind is held captive, entranced by the ingenuity of his schemata. I can sympathise but I disagree with William Brown when he says "if you fully agree with Jung, you lose all sense of truth entirely." 49

One must expect to be occasionally at sea when confronted with Jung's unique and colossal experience. It is not so much the nature of introverted sensation that is difficult to grasp, as the fine distinctions that are drawn between it and other functions. Its nature depends upon the undue prominence of the subjective factor in perception. One does not desire a painting to be merely photographically accurate. There must be vision, and in so far as there is vision, there is an unconscious projection of the artist's personality. It is the same with any other creative work. It is the nature of such vision, however, which I find it difficult to distinguish from an intuitive process. Probably Jung might regard it as a case of intuition availing itself of sensation. I would prefer not to believe that sensation and intuition are so opposed that they cannot blend and fuse under the synthesising control of the creative faculty.

There are undeniable evidences of repressed contents in such a type. One has come across this "amazing flair for every ambiguous, gloomy, dirty and dangerous possibility in the background of reality." Jung tells us that this is due to the presence of repressed extraverted intuition. 50

Intuition.

Jung's analytical genius is nowhere better revealed than in his description of intuition. This he defines as that psychological function which transmits perceptions in an unconscious way. It may appear in a subjective or an objective form; the former is a perception of unconscious psychic facts whose origin is essentially subjective; the latter is a perception of facts which depend upon subliminal perceptions

50. Jung "Psychological Types" p.504.
of the object, and upon thoughts and feelings occasioned thereby. Furthermore, Jung distinguishes the concrete and the abstract forms according to the degree in which sensation participates in the process, and of course also the extraverted and introverted applications of the intuitive function.

Putting psychological characteristics to one side, it would seem to be the cardinal feature of intuition that it is always on the search for possibilities rather than actualities, whether these possibilities lie in the objective situation or are the product of subjective imagery. Since this is so, the intuitive rebels against the closing down of possibilities. He must feel free and untrammeled, and able to exploit such chance situations as may appeal to him. Jung speaks of every actual situation as becoming a prison to the intuitive, burdening him like a chain, and prompting a compelling need for solution. The following passage on Coleridge well illustrates this characteristic: "This sublimely irresponsible creature could have no worse torture thrust upon him than the feeling of being bound by an undertaking. The thought of a duty to be fulfilled, or a task recurring regularly, cast a gloom over him and was enough to throw him into the clutch of a torment as paralysing as a remorse. He became a prey to unendurable anguish as soon as foreseen circumstances blocked out his future." 51

The nature of intuition is obscure but none the less quite unmistakable. Perhaps Jung's definition of it is too narrow. Jung speaks of intuition as availing itself of other functions, where one would prefer to regard these functions as capable of unconscious operation, and hence largely to be themselves regarded as intuitive. The unconscious elaboration of an intellectual problem may bring about a sudden solution surprising to the conscious mind, and may surely be described as intuitive, in which case one

51. John Charpentier "The Sublime Somnambulist"
should speak of intuitive thinking. Jung speaks of intuition as presenting thought with material. Just as often, however, does thought present intuition with material for solution. According to Dibblee: "The problem of perceptive intuition not only offers us a good example of the elementary action of the mind during its performance of necessary but extra-conscious and unthanked work for its master, but it leads us much further. I believe that the extra-conscious work of the mind, that is to say, of the intuitive faculty generally, extends beyond mere acts of presentation. It is even possible ... that presentations are not the most typical examples of that kind of extra-conscious thinking, which is of the essence of intuition." 52

In the meantime, one may abide by Jung's definition and follow his description of the extravert and introvert intuitive types.

The extravert intuitive scents out the possibilities of a situation. He has a flair for recognising just what sort of scheme will prove successful, and an uncanny power of bringing it to completion despite the warnings of his less gifted fellows. Largely his success depends on his instant apprehension of other people's natures and gifts. His arguments are persuasive, for they are based on his detection of chinks in his opponent's armour. He can arouse enthusiasm, and he is, as Jung says, "the natural advocate of every minority that holds the seed of future promise." 53 His too great reliance upon intuition constitutes his greatest danger. As an extravert, he is unaware of the modus operandi of such a faculty and comes too readily to rely on guesses, and so he forfeits all counter suggestion by way of reason.

Jung describes also the absence of correction by means of sensation which is said to be repressed, and he so explains the proneness of such a type to various uncomfortable bodily sensations.

52. Dibblee "Instinct and Intuition" p.88.
53. Jung "Psychological Types" p.466.
Just as the extraverted intuitive is drawn to a situation by reason of its possibilities, the introverted intuitive is fascinated by the images which arise from the unconscious. Jung describes the aesthetic type with its extraordinary esoteric artistic productions, of whom one may instance Blake as an example, and the "morally orientated" type whose fascination by and reliance upon his inner vision produces a type of mystical thinker, especially well illustrated in the poet-metaphysician, Coleridge.

Both the extraverted and the introverted types of intuition will be readily recognised. They are mingled in the following passage from "The Learned Knife": "To feel that a contact is somehow false, that one is for some obscure reason responsible for another, that two types of association are, all appearances to the contrary, really incompatible, that some pursuit must be abandoned for no reason that is apparent at the time - these are the kinds of intuitive apprehension which serve to render the timid soul uneasy and discontented, but which inspire a more positive type to destroy his existing world for the sake of a more fundamental order of coordination." 54

The life of Coleridge exemplifies the introverted intuitive type, whose mind was always drawn to the subtle interior aspects of experience. Coleridge was an introvert. He said of himself that he was driven from life in motion to life in thought and action. The outer world made but little impression upon him, as we have seen from the passage where he describes his unlikeness to Scott. Even from childhood he had never seen objectively with a clear hard sense of outline; nor did he accept his senses as the criteria of his beliefs. "To connect with the objects of our senses" he said, "the obscure notions and consequent vivid feelings, which are due only to immaterial and permanent things, is

profanation relatively to the heart and superstition in the understanding." 55

It may be difficult to realise, when one recalls the vivid picturesqueness of 'Kubla Khan' and 'The Ancient Mariner' that Coleridge's sensations were not naturally vivid. It was the vision of his inner images that was so startlingly clear out, and along with this his intuition which penetrated and illumined the reality underlying their appearance. And so we are enabled to comprehend what is difficult to conceive of in the abstract, the repression which Jung describes as falling on the sensation of the object, and can more readily understand his description of the compensatory extraverted sensation function of an archaic character in the unconscious. 'Kubla Khan' was the result of a free outpouring from the subliminal depths uncontrolled by any conscious elaboration; and the archaic quality of its imagery is uncontestable. In 'The Ancient Mariner' "the creative energy is both conscious and unconscious in one and the same exercise - controlling consciously the throng of images which in the reservoir have undergone unconscious metamorphosis." 56 How objective vivid is its imagery! Everyone know of Coleridge's unhappy addiction to opium. Here again we have an illustration of the compulsive neurosis which Jung describes as one of the morbid manifestations of such a type.

55. Coleridge "The Friend"
56. Livingstone Lowes "The Road to Xanadu" p.104.
CHAPTER VIII.

FUNCTION & ATTITUDE.

In so far as outer circumstances promote the prevalence of a general attitude, they likewise favour the ascendancy of one definite psychological function. Indeed, as Jung reminds us, no person is simply extraverted or introverted except in the form of certain functions. Likewise functional attitude types can be observed according to the degree of differentiation of any of the basic psychological functions, and so typical thinking, feeling, sensational, and intuitive attitudes are described. Jung also describes 'social' types, "for whom a collective idea expresses the brand." In certain cases he considers that the 'social type' outweighs the 'function type' in significance.

I think Jung's conception of attitude, conscious and unconscious, extraordinarily suggestive; but this grouping of types in accordance with the predominance of a psychological function, although at first it may appear to simplify matters by rendering specific what was rather vague and illdefined in the general attitude, really introduces fresh complications. By reason of the predominance of any such function, the general attitude itself undergoes a subtle but quite definite change. Extraverted Intuition, for example, is no mere conjunction of intuition with an extraverted attitude. I prefer to regard it as a new synthesis, compounded of the union of these two, and by reason of the infusion of intuition into the general attitude, the latter loses much of its original identity. Thus the intuitive extravert's contact with others is admittedly slight. He has many acquaintances, but few friends. So independent is he of the judgment of others that he tends to be remote from them. His extraversion is less apparent than his intuition. Indeed, in many ways, his life is nearer that of an introvert. It certainly does
not possess that blatant extraversion so evident in the feeling-extravert type.

One might put it this way: whether, is it more important about such an one that we should know if he is an extravert or an intuitive type?

Very often it may be impossible to determine that he is an extravert, but that he is an intuitive type cannot fail to be recognised; and my experience leads me to place more reliance on the certain operation of a definite psychological function than on the supposed existence of a general attitude. Besides, the intuitive process is a more or less constant one, whilst the extraverted or introverted attitudes fluctuate considerably.

Similarly with a thinking type. It is often more valuable to know that a person is an intellectual than to know his general attitude, the nature of which can best be determined by the nature of the particular material with which his mind is occupied.

Interrelationship of functions.

Absolute sovereignty belongs, according to Jung, to one function alone and can belong to one function alone. Where such naturally opposed functions as thinking and feeling have equally decisive power, we are said to be dealing with relatively undeveloped functions. The principal function may be aided by one not naturally antagonistic, and the pairing of such functions has been described at length. Thinking aided by intuition as conscious functions with feeling and sensation relatively repressed, etc.

I have never been able to bring myself to understand fully this theory of opposed psychological functions. Where a function has fallen into abeyance through disuse, one can appreciate the deficiency in the general attitude, but I cannot see that, say, feeling is repressed because thinking is in the conscious ascendancy. The ideal person would adapt
himself by thinking when the situation requires such, and by feeling when this is needed; nor should it be impossible that these should be so blended together that a fused thinking-feeling attitude prevails. These functions are so tightly compartmented for descriptive purposes that one too easily forgets how difficult it is to separate them in practical investigation.

It would seem to depend rather upon the nature of the problem which confronts the mind, whether thinking necessarily interferes with feeling, or vice versa. Moreover, certain types of thinking are less opposed to the presence of feeling than others. If one were to proceed to split up into their component parts each of Jung's psychological functions, one would get back ultimately to individual psychology. Jung has hinted at such a subdivision - the division of thinking into its speculative, mathematical and empirical forms, and similarly with other functions. With such subdivisions, the larger groups would be in danger of dissolution. Ultimately the science would cease to be the science of types and be purely that of individual psychology. None the less, the study of Jung's type psychology does afford an insight into individual psychological reactions which could not otherwise be obtained.

Personality Factors.

McDougall considers that much of the obscurity which surrounds this question of type psychology is due to the lack of consistency in the terminology employed. He would have us regard as independent variables in personality make-up the factors of intellect, disposition, temper, temperament and character. He charges Jung with confounding temperamental, dispositional and characterological factors. Jung, of course, speaks of attitude, which seems to me to be the best suited word for his purpose. McDougall considers that the position of any person on the extravert-introvert scale depends on temperamental factors. Temperament, he
defines as the influences, direct or indirect, of bodily metabolism (especially of the endocrine glands) upon the psycho-physical processes of the nervous system.

The word temperament has always had this connotation, comprehending as it does a mixture of the physical and the mental, but even though McDougall's definition were accepted, it is not psychological and not helpful. How can one know that any particular manifestation is the outcome of influences of the bodily metabolism? It would be well to trace the development of temperamental proclivities, but McDougall's definition precludes our doing so. Very little indeed is known of the influences he speaks of. In so far as endocrine influences are understood, it is only in their grosser bodily manifestations. The introduction of the physiological side of the question merely complicates matters. One might try to separate an innate psychological reaction from an acquired one, as for example, instinctive fears and derived fears. But even this is not always possible, for from the day of its birth the baby is subjected to environmental influences of well nigh incalculable importance for its future behaviour, and it is seldom possible to separate these from the deeper lying influences springing from temperament. Inborn and milieu influences blend imperceptibly, and it would seem that Jung is justified in preferring to distinguish his larger groups by general attitudes.
Jung's theory of psychological types is the culmination of his previous psychological theories; and these are so closely interwoven into its texture, that an attempt to separate them from it would inevitably destroy the whole fabric. The acceptance of the type theory implies, therefore, an acquiescence at least in the theories out of which it arose. None the less, it is just in its rudimentary state that one finds the theory least acceptable. One may applaud the stroke of genius whereby the psychological phenomena of hysteria and of dementia praecox are accounted for by the assumption that in one case the psychical energy is outwardly directed, and in the other inwardly, without going so far as to agree that the contrast is one that has its necessary counterpart in normal life.

There is no necessary reason for assuming that the libido movement occurring in hysteria and dementia praecox should operate in so widespread a fashion. There is certainly no reason for regarding such libido movement as being essentially the prototype of normal libido movement, and of stigmatising similar libido movement in other pathological states as "peculiar."

The extraversion and introversion which occur in mania and in melancholia respectively have every bit as much right to be regarded as the true counterparts of normal extraversion and introversion. According to the hysteria-dementia praecox contrast, attitudes, exclusive of each other, are to be sought for; for the hysteric does not suffer from dementia praecox nor the precocious dement from hysteria. Whereas if the contrast had been made between mania and melancholia, and a theory had been built upon the contrast, mechanisms occurring in the selfsame person would have received more attention than attitudes occurring in different persons.
This is not to deny that typical attitudes such as Jung has portrayed exist. They assuredly do. But typical attitudes are rare. One bears in mind that Jung says that the preponderance of the one mechanism over the other constitutes the attitude, but seldom is there such preponderance. Adaptation to circumstances, both of the outer world and the inner life, necessarily calls for the use of both mechanisms. No doubt the outer world is all too imperious in its demands and the inner life is apt in consequence to suffer neglect, and in our modern life extraversion plays too important a role. But there are many secret sources of nourishment of the inner life also, not by any means self-evident, which help to right the balance.

In its broad general formulation, the theory of types which Jung so brilliantly expounds appears so cogent as to force acceptance upon us; and it is only when it is submitted to a detailed and critical study, that doubts arise and our acceptance becomes qualified.

We know what is meant in popular parlance by extraverts and introverts, and we can see that in a rough general way mankind might be so classified. But we have to transcend popular phraseology and determine scientifically who are the real extraverts and the real introverts. We have to translate an abstract definition into concrete terms and to distinguish accurately between true types and false. And when we do this, when we search for the real extravert and the real introvert, we seldom succeed. Theoretically the preponderance of either mechanism would constitute an attitude, but practically this may be so slight as to make us prefer to regard persons as normally both extraverted and introverted.

Admittedly, there are striking exceptions, and Jung would seem to have built his theory on an intensive study of such exceptions.
Whether the theory of psychological types stand or fall is of little moment as compared with the unrivalled insight into the workings of the human mind which Jung's psychological writings in general, and his "Psychological Types" in particular, afford. Jung's great intellectual gifts have been of the utmost service to psychology. More than any other man, he has penetrated into the darkest recesses of the human mind, and has illumined these with the superb lighting of his imagination.

The abiding impression left by a careful perusal of "Psychological Types" is a very profound respect for Jung's analytical genius. It is a work whose merits are the more apparent by reason of its admirable English presentation.

It will be remembered that Jung could not allow his early theory to remain in the form in which he had propounded it. Further analysis revealed that the feeling type could not be identified with the extravert, or the thinking type with the introvert; and so recourse was had to still deeper investigation, and we are now told that in all doubtful cases - and they would appear to be numerous - an exhaustive examination of the psychological functions of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition is required before the category can be determined.

This is a somewhat difficult task, and often an impossible one, as these functions cannot be discriminated with such exactness as Jung would have us believe.

Moreover, this further elaboration and refinement of the general attitude theory has had the effect of dissolving, at any rate in part, the apparently solid truths of the earlier pronouncement.

It was in order to bring greater clarity to type diagnosis, that Jung found it necessary to introduce the consideration of psychological functions into his theory; and it is just this introduction that has made these functions
loom more largely in our vision and has caused the general attitudes to recede into the dimmer background. For, despite the difficulties of isolating these functions, it is true that the predominance of one function over another may be so marked in a person as to make it much more important that we should recognise its presence than be able to recognise a general attitude.

I may illustrate that in this way. Jung's insight into human psychology appears to be due in large measure to his unique intuitive powers. His whole psychological outlook is permeated with intuitively sensed knowledge. It is this that makes it so very difficult for anyone to apprehend his teaching and accounts for the fact that he has been styled a 'mystic' rather than a scientist. He is an intuitive who has been absorbed in the problems of the inner life; and if I had to hazard an opinion of his own type category, I would call him an Introvert Intuition type. For me, the fact he is intuitive is more important than that he is an Introvert. His intuition will always be in evidence, whilst his introversion will be shewn only when the needs of the situation call it forth.

And what, after all, do we know about a man when we know that he is, say, an intuitive introvert? I believe Coleridge to have been such; and yet how utterly unlike are Jung and Coleridge. It is the psychology of the individual that matters, not the designation of his type, and the especial value of Jung's type psychology is just the fact that it enables us to have a richer and deeper knowledge of individual psychology.

The theory of psychological types is an abstract theory. Jung tells us that there is no question of deductio a priori in his conception, but that it represents merely a deductive presentation of empirically gained understanding. Add to 'empirically', 'intuitively', and you have the explanation of the difficulty of applying the theory in practice. Such
intuitive apprehension as Jung possesses must be exceedingly rare. I must confess that I have not been able to apply this theory in psychiatric work, save in a very few instances, and when I hear people talking glibly of Jung's theories and of the necessity of determining a type category before applying treatment, I suspect that their observations have been superficial and their assumptions ill-grounded.

Certainly, we must learn Jung's theories; but in so doing, let us remind ourselves of his own words: "Learn your theories as well as you can, but put them aside when you touch the miracle of the living soul. Not theories, but your own creative understanding alone must decide." 57

57. Jung "Contributions to Analytical Psychology" p.361.