THEESIS

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THE RELATIONSHIP OF
INSTINCTIVE AND RATIONAL FACTORS
IN THE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE
-A PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY.
ANALYSIS.

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INTRODUCTION

Recent works on the psychology of religion all recognise that progress in this subject has depended largely upon the progress of psychologists in the sphere of instinct, emotion, sentiment, and their derivatives. They fail to recognise the great advances that psychology has made in the investigation on the intellectual and rational aspects of the mental life. It is the object of this thesis to show the incompleteness of the former, and the necessity for supplementing these by a proper appreciation of the higher aspects of man's nature.

Believing that the origin of religion has been wrongly sought in the instinctive side of man's personality, we have set ourselves the task of seeking a more satisfactory explanation. Our thesis is that in the course of evolution a point is reached, the highest stage yet attained, where there emerges a new capacity, a capacity for directing life by means other than those necessary to meet the present situation. It is this capacity that/
that makes man what he is. This capacity enables him to set his own course instead of, as in the case of animal behaviour, having it set for him by circumstances. This is only possible in so far as man can rid himself of the shackles of instinct. We find that in the course of evolution the life of the plant is restricted by position. The animal is not shackled to one point in space. Space is not a determinant of its existence, but a means to its higher life. The animal is in its turn shackled by its instincts and physical nature and its existence depends on its successful adaptation to its environment. For man, the physical nature is no longer a determinant of his conduct, but is reduced to a means for attaining an end other than that set... by the environment. This new capacity, which emerges in the evolutionary process when man appears, can best be characterised as the capacity to set an end for himself. The animal meets the situation, man can create a situation. Behaviour... is the highest term that can be employed to characterise the activity of animals. Man's activity may take the form of conduct; it can be directed by an ideal, by a conception of a better condition than the present, and this may pass into a purpose to attain the ideal. We are here at the budding point of man's creative or spiritual activity, of culture, which ultimately takes the form of knowledge for its own sake, art, morality/
morality, and religion. The characteristic of all these experiences is that they are not dependent on the actual and present, on the 'here' and 'now.' The biological categories of adjustment and adaptation are no longer applicable. The dialectic of evolution has carried us beyond these, to a stage where self-initiated ends determine life, just as life itself is differentiated from the inorganic world by the characteristic of self-initiated movement. When viewed from the stage out of which man has risen, the chief characteristic of the new conception is freedom, and what we are doing is to translate, into evolutionary terms, the interpretation of man which Kant from the metaphysical standpoint reached. The synthetic activity of mind, which, he maintained, man possessed, and which lifted him out of the causally determined concatenation of natural events, is just what we should call the creative capacity of man which is the source of knowledge, art, morality, religion. In our view the same emergence in the course of evolution gives us culture, morality, art and religion; they are but different aspects or forms which the same activity has taken. Thus if we can find how one originates, we have the method by which we may discover the origin of the others. We must trace how nature frees man from the shackles of instinct to allow for the emergence of this new self-directing power. This is the negative side of our task. Positively, we must try to observe the emergence of the new capacity and its influence on man's religious life.
INSTINCT IN GENERAL.

There is no more debatable ground in modern psychology than the meaning to be attached to instinct. Instinct, we may say provisionally, is the power of making specialised and highly complex movements without previous experience or practice, in a sufficiently definite and accurate manner to possess biological utility at the start. These modes of behaviour are hereditary, common to all members of the same species and more or less characteristic of the species. The ends of instinctive behaviour are not conscious ends, and the striking thing is, that the ends, towards which the behaviour is directed, remain essentially the same, and appear to be determined by hereditary tendency or impulse. What is really inherited, Dreyer argues, is an impulse or tendency in a specific direction, the specific behaviour itself being learned or acquired by trial and error or by imitation. A differentiation, which is helpful, has been suggested by Schoen, between "instincts as such," "instinctive behaviour," "instinctive tendencies to behaviour," the difference being in the degree of variability of the native behaviour. In the insects there is least variability, therefore we can speak, according to Schoen, of "instincts." In the vertebrates, there is more variability, therefore we can speak of "instinctive behaviour," as well as of instincts, instinctive behaviour subject to being influenced by environment and training. In man, there is most variability/1.

1. 'Instinct and Man.' Psychological Review, March, 1927.
variability, therefore we can speak of "instinctive tendencies to behaviour", as well as of instincts and instinctive behaviour, the specific form, which the tendency ultimately assumes, being determined by environment and training. There is something to be said for this differentiation.

Meanwhile, let us note that psychologists have generally accepted McDougall's definition of an instinct as "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possess- or to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." The relationship which he holds to exist between instinct and emotion is put thus: "Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it: and the emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion." Each instinct on this view conditions a corresponding emotion of a particular quality. Drever says, that, from the dynamic point of view, "an instinct is equivalent to

\[ \text{Social Psychology p.29} \]
\[ \text{op.cit., p.47 cf. Outline of Psychology p.325.} \]
a native tendency or impulsion towards a definite form of behaviour, and also at times the form of behaviour which this tendency or impulsion determines." Again he says, "Psychologically the only possible interpretation of instinctive behaviour seems to be in terms of specific impulse determining specific act, on presentation in perceptual consciousness of a specific situation." "The original human nature, with which the psychologist is concerned, consists, first of all, of capacities, such as the capacity to have sensations, to perceive, to reason, to learn and the like, and secondly, of conscious impulses, the driving forces to these activities without which the capacities would be meaningless. To the latter we are applying the term "instinct". It is in this sense that the term is used in this thesis. Drever says that, "The old and popular view that animals act by instinct and man in accordance with reason is very misleading", and is due to the biological view of instinct, which regards animal behaviour as "typically instinctive" and human behaviour as "typically intelligent," the instincts and instinctive tendencies of human nature being insignificant. In view of Köhler's experiments/

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1 The Psychology of Education p.47
2 Instinct in Man, p.107
3 Op.cit., p.150
experiments, to which reference will be made later, it cannot now be denied that intelligence is present in the behaviour of the higher animals, and in view of McDougall's work and that of his successors no one would deny an instinctive aspect in man's behaviour.

Instinct has been employed of late in so restricted a sense that the source of religion cannot be attributed to instincts. The characteristics of instincts, as we have seen, are, that they are shared with the animals, they are capable of but little modification, they belong to the mnemic rather than the creative and progressive side of man's life, where lies the source of religion in our view. As intelligence appears and develops in the course of evolution, the power of the instincts as instincts deteriorates. Intelligence will be taken to mean a greater modifiability or adaptability to meet a more complex situation. We note for example, the domestication of the higher animals. We see this, too, in the case of the higher apes, as Köhler illustrates. In regard to nest-building, he says, "If the material under consideration is anything like stalks or twigs, and if there is little of it, then we are confronted with the strange phenomenon that, whatever the circumstances, the first thing is never to make even a scanty support for the body to squat on, but to create a ring round the animal; this is always done first, and if there is not enough material, then the ring is the only thing that is made."

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The chimpanzee then sits contentedly in his meagre circle, without touching it at all, and if one did not know that this was a rudimentary nest, one might think that the animal was forming a geometrical pattern for its own sake." As Koffka says, "It is all too easy to believe that a real explanation can be avoided by merely labelling the action instinctive," and again, "The distinction between instinctive and intelligent behaviour must therefore be sought in the way in which one arrives at the end-situation from the beginning-situation. In the case of instinct, it is enough to present the beginning-situation to a living being and at once an activity is started which continues until the end is attained."

The instincts of man to-day are the same as in primitive man. The change that has been caused by the progress of the race is in the ease with which man may atrophy or redirect these. Rivers speaks about "adaptation to an arboreal existence by the suppression of inappropriate instinctive tendencies," and if man was/

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1 The Mentality of Apes p.94
2 The Growth of the Mind p.90
4 Instinct and the Unconscious p.67
was at one time an arboreal animal, then this process of adaptation must be continuous. Köhler supports this by his illustration of the apes and nest-building, which we have already cited. The original environment stimulating the instincts becomes modified, some instincts atrophy having lost stimulation, others require redirection to meet the new conditions. Stout, however, argues that in the human being the instincts are relatively few and unimportant, but this is due to a confusion of the instinctive tendency with "pure" instinct in the biological sense. 

McDougall's view has also been attacked by Bernard on the ground that the former's doctrine of the relationship of instinct and emotion does not function in sociological science. He states that "the category of instinct, which serves very well for purposes of describing the activities of lower organisms, proves to be entirely inadequate for an account of human social behaviour." 1 "The characteristic of an instinct/

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1 Instinct p.10
"instinct" he says "is that its organization, including all component structures or psycho-physical dispositions, is inherited and internally and organically organized. The fact of the external or social and abstract organization of the act deprives it of its instinctive character, making it acquired; for the definition of the act depends upon its organization."¹

Bernard's position is strongly anti-instinctivistic, but much of his criticism of the instinctivist school recoils upon himself, for his point of view is frankly behaviouristic. He would hold that human behaviour is explicable in terms of innately determined reactions to objective stimuli, and that instincts, like the instinct of flight, the gregarious instinct, curiosity, and others are unnecessary for the explanation of personality. On this account it would be manifestly impossible to account for any development or modification. His general position is that McDougall and others have founded their psychology on an antiquated, almost Lamarckian conception of biological heredity, whereas any satisfactory psychological doctrine of man's behaviour must be correlated with the Mendelian doctrine of unit character inheritance. The Mendelian view is that only unit characteristics are inherited by/

¹ Instinct, p. 313.
by man, and not such complex structures as are assumed by some of the extreme instinctivists. He gives numerous illustrations of the loose way in which the term "instinct" is used and of the numerous lists of instincts that have been given. Bernard would not agree that belief in God is a true instinct (i.e. based on an instinct)¹, a unit character in itself, but is related to "the attitude of self-abasement, this feeling of inability to cope unaided with the problems of life and death" which is, what he terms "an acquired habit complex."² Again he says, "This more recent misconception, that the instincts are generalized activity tendencies involving the whole organism instead of merely a part or a segment of it, is closely related to the view that the instincts do not function perfectly when they appear, but that they have to be perfected through learning.

The confusion here arises from the fact that the investigators failed to find the instinctive patterns functioning with mechanical exactness, as they had anticipated. Being unwilling to accept the obvious conclusion that the instincts are largely vestigial and disintegrated in the higher animals, especially in man, they modified instead their definition of instinct until it became a contradiction in its own terms of definition. They made/

¹ Brackets ours.
² Instinct, p.227.
made it a habit in fact but still called it an instinct, which is an inherited mechanism. Furthermore, the instincts cannot, as the metaphysicians of conduct would seem to imply, carry within itself either the consciousness or the determination of its end. Instinct arises from, and is most characteristic of, the adjustment needs of the lowest animals.  

Thus Bernard insists that "to speak of instinctive ideas is manifestly absurd. To call ideals or social and ethical values, negative or positive, such as goodness, criminality, democracy, or conservatism, instinctive or inherited is therefore manifestly unjustifiable."  

While accepting, for the most part, Bernard's complaints against the undue extension of the term instinct, and its employment as the sole principle of explanation of man's life and conduct, we should like to suggest that he has himself fallen into a similar error by his extension of the term "habit" and "acquired action patterns" to cover all man's higher activities and ideal constructions. Bernard himself, as Drever points out, "ignores any aspect or function of the living organism that might be described as distinctively mental."  

"The/.

1 Instinct, p. 450 - 2.
3 Mind: April, 1927, p.249.
"The actual instincts" says Bernard "are at once much simpler and more elemental and much more numerous than those set forth in the classification of such writers as McDougall, Thorndike, Woodworth, and other psychologists. There are probably hundreds or even thousands (if we include the reflexes under the general heading of instinct) of these inherited mechanisms."\(^1\) His view is, that "instinct deteriorates in the higher animals, and especially in man, in that proportion in which the increased flexibility of the nervous system tends to substitute habit organizations or mechanisms for the instinctive in functional adjustment to the environment........ Instinct, at least in the sense of complex and elaborate mechanisms, is a diminishing, if not a disappearing, category in higher animal forms, especially in the human!\(^2\) The progressive stages in this deterioration may be characterised by the use of the terms "instincts as such", "instinctive behaviour", "instinctive tendencies to behaviour".\(^3\) Bernard would limit the term to a too mechanistic use, a sense in which it is not accepted by most psychologists. It might be argued by some that this is probably less objectionable than extending!\(^4\)

\(^{1}\) Instinct p. 522.


\(^{3}\) Psychological Review, March, 1927, Article by Schoen, "Instinct and Man!"
extending the use of the term to include man's reason! Bernard almost goes the length of suggesting that "human" biology demands other and higher categories than "animal" biology. We should prefer to say that it is psychology that demands other categories than biology, and it is the restriction of the extreme instinctivists to the merely biological categories that has made them incapable of accounting satisfactorily for the higher mental activities of man. We have already insisted that no one can deny an instinctive aspect in man's behaviour, just as no one can deny an intelligent aspect in animal behaviour.

Bernard uses a most suggestive metaphor, and perhaps gives the clearest expression of what he means by instinct, when he says, "It is true that these habit complexes are built upon these elementary and relatively minute instinctive bases, but it does not necessarily follow that any particular habit complex is built directly upon any particular instinct or group of instincts. If we liken habit to a building which is reared upon a foundation constructed of stones corresponding to the instincts, we may compare various constituent habit complexes to the successive stories in a skyscraper. Some habit complexes are low down upon the bedrock of instinct and random activity and neural processes, while others are near the/
the top of the building and have only very indirect contacts with the basic instinctive and random tendencies. It is also well to recognize that in our modern civilization these skyscrapers of habit are sometimes built very tall. Some men live lives which are relatively close to instinct, while other men build story after story of culture and sublimated interests until instinct is scarcely discernible in them in its original forms. Each successive story of habit formation is built upon the next story below and not upon the native instincts and random tendencies at the base, although even the most cultivated man may, under the stress of great crisis or fear or illness, or other maladjustment, descend into the basement of the structure of his character and for a time live on a level with his instincts, forgetting his better and acquired nature. "The instincts," he continues, "are very early overlaid by acquired habits in the process of adapting the individual to his environment, and these habits are in turn overlaid by other tiers or stories of habit in which the native character of instinct ever constantly diminishes in proportion and intensity, until the child who has reached a rational age is reacting in nine-tenths or ninety-nine one-hundredths of his character directly to environment."

1 Instinct, p. 523.
environment, and only in the slight residual fraction of his nature directly to instinct. The influence of environment is cumulative in our lives and the decline of the influence of instinct is progressive.¹

While recognising the inadequacy of such an analogy, and even more so of its diagrammatic representation, and substituting the terms 'rational' and 'instinctive' factors for Bernard's terms, we would use his metaphor, and for convenience and simplicity we may be allowed to indicate the position, which we have reached, thus:

¹ Ibid., p. 524.
Rational

Rational  

Instinctive

Rational

Instinctive

Rational

Instinctive

Instinctive
The whole, it must be noted, however, is a unity. These are different stories of the one building, and are inter-connected. In man, the top story of the building, for example, would not be there without the bottom story as a foundation. Otherwise it would be the νόησις νοησέως, of Aristotle, an activity purely ideal.

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1 Metaphysica XI. 1074b Cf. Caird 'The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers' Vol.II. p.8 "It must be νόησις νοησέως, a pure self-consciousness, which has no need to go out of itself for an object, or, like our intelligence, to come to itself through the consciousness of an external world; but which is ever self-contained, ever one with itself, - an ἐνέργεια ἀκίνητος, an activity which is without movement or change, a peace which is not death but an infinite self-centred life."
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INSTINCT AND EMOTION.

We have dealt with the instincts or native tendencies. Now we must distinguish two great groups of tendencies which appear to differ fundamentally, the "appetitive" and the "reactive". The former are evoked by experiences which are disagreeable or agreeable, and include aversions as well as appetitions. The latter are evoked as the reaction to a certain object or situation, which is apprehended, while the end sought is with reference to that object or situation. Hunger and anger illustrate respective groups. Among the latter must be distinguished "simple" and "emotional" tendencies.

McDougall, as we have seen, defines an instinct as an inherited psycho-physical disposition, which determines its possessor, among other things, "to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality." He claims that emotion is the central and enduring element in an instinct, a position which needs to be examined. What do we mean by an "emotion"? We mean a complex phenomenon of experience, the chief marks of which are "a marked affective colouring, a "perturbation" of mind and body, and an impulsive force", all combined in the total mental state. Fear and anger for example, are emotions. It is to be noted that the affective/

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Drever: 'An Introduction to the Psychology of Education.' p.52.
affective element in emotion is specially strong, that an impulsion is involved, and that the organic disturbance, therefore, that takes place in emotion, while an essential element is not all.

What is the relationship between instinct and emotion? The nature of the relationship which McDougall holds to exist between instinct and emotion, that each instinct conditions a corresponding emotion of a particular quality, has elicited divergent views. But there may only be the same relationship between instinct and emotion as between emotion and the rational nature. Emotion is a factor in all mental activity. McDougall seems to think that it is peculiar to the instinctive activities. Drever uses "interest" to mean the affective element in instinct experience as such, and "emotion" as something in a sense secondary. The affective element in instinct experience becomes emotion, only when action in satisfaction of the interest is suspended or checked, when interest passes into tension. "We then seem compelled to take the view that the instinct-emotion is not an invariable accompaniment of instinctive activity, but that the instinct-interest is, that the instinct-emotion is due to what
we previously called "tension", that is, in the ordinary case; the arrest of the impulse to the denying of immediate satisfaction to the interest.¹ This, however, might be taken to mean that there can only be emotions of unpleasure. McDougall criticises this position, and refers to it as "a curious dogma", which "asserts that emotions are experienced only when our natural tendencies to action are obstructed or in some way suspended."² Dreyer has however modified this position. "Moreover", he says, "as regards feeling tone, the primary emotions always exhibit that bipolarity which is so characteristic of feeling—pleasure—unpleasure, satisfaction—dissatisfaction—and the organic resonance also seems in some measure to vary accordingly. Joy and sorrow are not individual emotions but opposite characters of all the primary emotions."³ McDougall has oversimplified the relation of instinct to emotion. Dreyer, for example, holds that some instincts have no associated emotions and some emotions have no associated instincts, and does not admit that "the emotion is a necessary integral part of, or at least the central and permanent element in, the instinct."⁴ The relation between instinct/  

¹ Instinct in Man, p.159
² Outline of Psychology, p.329
³ The Psychology of Everyday Life, p.32
⁴ The Psychology of Education p.56
instinct and emotion is not as simple as McDougall suggests, and with this criticism Shand agrees. Sometimes two emotions of opposite polarities are associated with one and the same instinctive tendency. Fear and anger, for example, are associated with instinctive tendencies, not as McDougall would associate them. Intensity is not the supreme difference, the difference is essentially one of polarity. For example, with the instinct of combat the intensity of the emotion varies according as the instinct is facilitated or obstructed. But the supreme difference is one of polarity, the one agreeable, the other disagreeable. This opposition is the universal characteristic of the life of feeling, pleasure-unpleasure, joy-sorrow, positive-negative. It would be truer to say that there are two emotions to each instinct, that an emotion takes on either of two polarities according as it is obstructed or facilitated.

McDougall has likewise over-simplified the nature of the complex condition which we call emotion. Several emotions cannot be included in such a scheme as his, for example, despair. Of course McDougall might reply here that this is a compound emotion. In his "Outline of Psychology" he introduces derived emotions, despair, surprise, expectation, hope, anxiety. Drever holds that "the emotion is always complex and not a simple feeling element" and that the affective element is not "emotion." It cannot be accepted that emotion is the affective element in instinct/
instinct experience, but it is a fact that there are certain
instincts, of which an emotion is one of the most prominent
characteristics. "The great instincts of human nature have
all their accompanying and typical emotion. We must, therefore,
in the case of man and the higher animals, distinguish be-
tween instincts which approximate the "pure" type and the
great instincts which are characteristically emotional"1

Shand's view of the relation of the emotions to
the instincts is that, instead of a specific emotion being
correlated with a specific instinct, as McDougall has contend-
ed, or instead of the bipolarity that Dreyer suggests, the
elementary form of the emotional life is a system, comprising
a quadruple arrangement, joy, sorrow, fear, anger. Every primary
impulse, whether it is independent or belongs to a primary
emotion, is innately connected with the systems of fear, anger,
joy, sorrow in such a way that, when opposed, it tends to
arouse anger; when satisfied, joy; when frustrated, sorrow;
and when it anticipates frustration, fear; these systems being
similarly connected together."2

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1 Instinct in Man p. 161
2 The Foundations of Character p. 38.
For Shand, emotions are forces, organised forces, which have both impulse and end, and for this reason "surprise" is not an emotion. He distinguishes between the emotions and the entire systems to which they belong, between, for example, anger or fear as we feel it, and the entire system of anger or of fear. The emotion is only a part of that system, the part which is present in consciousness, and there is another part in sub-consciousness or in the bodily organism itself. That is to say, the emotional system includes the instinctive or sub-conscious part, the conscious part, and the expression. The feeling-element in the emotion is termed the affect.

Instinct is an inherited disposition both to be excited by certain stimuli and to respond with a specific kind of behaviour or expression to such stimuli. Imitation, for example, and experimentation Shand calls "inherited dispositions," for they are not connected exclusively with any particular emotion but may belong to all emotions. He refuses the term "instinct" to these, because it would involve a too general use of the term.

The emotional systems of fear and anger contain other

\footnote{The Foundations of Character p.185f.}
and simpler instincts - as those of walking, running, creeping, throwing things about, which in the child are incomplete and fragmentary compared with the corresponding instincts of animals.

Instincts are more rigid in the animals. Human instincts persist as constituents of the more complicated dispositions that are slowly acquired. The inherited dispositions, among which are included the instincts, are not superseded, but only modified by habits, and by the acquired foresight of the ends to which they are directed.

With Shand, certain instincts are parts of the systems of primary emotions. With McDougall, primary emotions are parts of the system of certain instincts. Shand holds that what invariably initiates the operation of an instinct is not emotion but impulse, that an instinct may be excited without exciting an emotion, that in the system of an emotion there may be not only one but several instincts, that sometimes the same instinct may be found organised in the systems of different emotions. He notes the variability of behaviour under the influence of emotion, in contrast with the invariability of behaviour under the influence of an instinctive impulse. The behaviour of instinct corresponds to a type, and this type is common to all the individuals of the species to which the animal belongs. The same species of spider, however old and experienced, constructs/
constructs his web after the same hereditary pattern, but adapts it by his intelligence to the bush or place to which it has to be attached. The intelligence of the animal serves to make these adaptations, but cannot under the influence of an instinct alter the specific type of behaviour which the instinct is organised to produce.

"The functions of emotion and instinct are therefore different. The first provides a more general form of the end to be aimed at; the second a particularised form of it. In the second, this particularised form of behaviour is the end of the instinct; in the first, it is only one of various means or methods for the attainment of the end.......... Contrast this comparative freedom and plasticity of man with what usually happens in the case of an animal - the perception of danger, the response to one of the hereditary stimuli that evoke some instinct of escape, the flight or concealment, the concealment in a hole of the ground in the foliage of a tree, or by diving under the water, whichever it be, the animal confined to that method characteristic of its species, and not free to adopt other modes of escape."¹

"The primary emotion has a system of a higher order than the system of the instinctive impulse, because it is more comprehensive/

¹ The Foundations of Character, Appendix 1, p.531.
comprehensive and more plastic; just as the sentiment is a system of a higher order than the emotion. ............ For the instinctive impulse pursuing its particularised end by means of a specific mode of behaviour for its attainment has no point d'appui like emotion, for comparing different methods and for selecting that which is likely to be most successful in the situation, while the object and more generalised end of emotion both subserve this selection."¹ Shand goes on to point out that emotion may blunder, but that to blunder is better than to persist in the course of action that has led to failure, as instincts are apt to do. Hence the advantage which the system of the emotion has with all its defects, through organising a variety of different modes of behaviour to fit a variety of situations, over the instinct confined to one. But the full measure of its superiority is only manifested, when the emotion is organised in a sentiment, and obtains from this highest system the powers of self-control and reflection which it lacks itself.

Neither the primary emotions nor even the primary impulses can be rightly regarded as instincts, but only as parts of instincts, because instincts exist in us when they are not active. The systems of the primary emotions, and the primary emotions themselves cannot be regarded as instincts, because/

¹ Ibid., p. 532
because of the invariability of behaviour which instincts produce and the variability of behaviour which emotions produce, also because the instincts are directed to biological ends, while the systems of the primary emotions create other ends through their organisation in sentiments. Shand would not agree with McDougall, that the principal instincts, when in operation, elicit an emotion more or less distinctive of them, nor with Drever, that the great instincts of human nature have their typical emotions. Drever, while agreeing with Shand in his criticism of McDougall, would not accept Shand's interpretation of his own view, for he would not hold that emotion is the affective element in instinct-experience, but rather that there are certain instincts of which an emotion is one of the most prominent characteristics. Shand would retort, why then call them instincts and not emotional systems.
Is there an Instinct of Religion?

A definition of religion is given later, but let us say, tentatively, that religion is born in conflict, in a sense of incompleteness, and is the attitude which, recognising this incompleteness, finds satisfaction in a sense of powers or a Power other than itself. It is recognised that religion is a synthesis of faith, feeling and endeavour, or of belief, emotion and behaviour. The main topic of this thesis is at what level, instinctive or intelligent or rational, religion as such appears, and in what sense we can speak of instinct and sentiment in connection with religion. To the question, "Is there an instinct of religion?", we must reply in the negative. We can say, however, that the instinctive activities which serve, but do not determine, all human activity, also serve, but do not constitute, our religious life. The theory of a religious instinct is not now seriously maintained by any psychologist. Professor W. P. Paterson, however, holds that, "man, however he may now have acquired them is certainly moved by religious tendencies of the instinctive sort," and that this 'tendency' has been an important factor in the general human experience. "The age-long duration and world-wide prevalence of religion," he says, "raise a presumption that it has had a root in human nature, and that man has felt an inward constraint/.

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1 p.134-5.
2 p.140.f.
3 McDougall: 'Social Psychology' p.88
4 The Nature of Religion, p.99
constraint to lift up his eyes to the hills." He terms it "a Godward attraction of the human spirit," "the religious propensity," He cites Alexander and Lloyd Morgan in confirmation. "In virtue of an innate disposition man," he adds,"has been determined to pay attention to a class of divine or sacred objects, he has experienced a peculiar emotional excitement, and he has been instigated to act in a characteristic way." The religious instinct, Professor Paterson argues, has an affinity to the call of home, and he speaks of a similar home-sickness of the soul whose object is God. He seems, however, while arguing for a religious instinct, to be dissatisfied with the solution, and to be seeking for another explanation. To say that the world-wide prevalence of religion raises a presumption that it has had a root in human nature is a different thing from saying that that root is instinctive. We would more readily agree when Professor Paterson puts it in this way. "In the neolithic, and probably also in the palaeolithic age, there already existed ideas and practices of a character and complexion which justify the conclusion that man has had religious dispositions as long as he has been identifiable as man. Persistent in time, it may also be said to have the notes of ubique et ab omnibus. No doubt there are and always have been

irreligious

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irreligious individuals, but so also, as Hegel pointed out, has there always been a certain proportion of blind persons - not to speak of the small minority of human beings who seem to be destitute of moral sense, and the considerable minority for whom music is an unenjoyable pastime and a meaningless noise. "1 "The probable view is," he states, "that man was endowed with a religious instinct to the end that he might copy a useful constraint and guidance in the times of his irrationality and ignorance, and that reason was given for use in manhood, not that it might destroy, but that it might fulfill and justify the monitions and the expectations of the period of childhood. And even if there were no special religious instinct, it would still be a fact of no little significance that the common instincts have responded to the call of religion even as, in the Greek legend, the beasts were subdued by the harping of Orpheus and followed him whithersoever he led. "2 Professor Paterson seems to hesitate definitely to term religion instinctive. Too frequently it is assumed that, unless there is an instinct of religion, there is no religion. Does it not rather seem improbable3 that the influence of religion upon/

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1 The Nature of Religion p. 25
3 Ibid., p. 110
upon the instincts is such as no one instinct could exert upon another? It is because of the place and the power of religion in human life that we refuse to call it instinctive. The very fact that religion is capable of controlling these instinctive activities leads one to the strong assumption, that religion is something *sui generis* and cannot be resolved into them.

Starbuck, too, speaks of religion, as "a deep-rooted instinct. It exists and continues to express itself whether we study it or not. Just as hunger and the desire for exercise........" Ellwood says "The belief in God and the belief in the immortality of the soul seem especially to have the marks of instinctive beliefs, since in one form or another, they are found among practically all peoples, and we may safely conclude, therefore, that they are an outcome of certain instinctive tendencies of man in interaction with his self-consciousness and reason." Universality, in other words, spells instinctive. "We might even push this obliging interpretation or criterion of the instinctive - the universality of the practice or attitude - to the point of explaining the supposed French addiction/"

1 The Psychology of Religion, p. 7.
2 Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, p. 239.
addiction to absinthe, the English predilection for "ale," the German delight in beer, the Dutch love of gin, the Scots attachment to whisky.¹ Must a thing, because it is universal, be instinctive? It is the fallacy of the undistributed middle. The laws of thought and man's reason, because they are universal, must then be instinctive!

Instead of claiming, then, that religion is instinctive, we should rather ask what are the instincts, which serve the activities of man, and whether these in any way influence his religious life. It is essential to remember that the life of man cannot be divided into compartments or departments, and that religion does not deal only with one or some of them. To quote Thouless, "a man's mind works in the same way in his religion as it does in his other activities."² That is to say, there are the same common elements in all aspects of experience, but there must be something specific which enables us to characterise one experience as aesthetic, another as ethical, another as religious. The whole man thinks, wills, worships, and the whole man includes the instinctive nature. The instinctive activities do influence the religious aspect of man's life, as they influence all other aspects of his life,

¹ Bernard 'Instinct' p. 223.
² An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 9.
"the instinctive basis of a religious activity often gives its own colouring to that activity."¹ But that is different from saying that religion is rooted in the instinctive side of human nature. The instinctive activities, which are specially the associates of religion, are self-preservation, sex, gregariousness, that is, those connected with the preservation of the individual, the race, the herd, curiosity,² pugnacity, acquisitiveness, self-abasement, but these instinctive activities are also the associates of other activities and phases of man's life. The classification of instincts is a problem by itself, and does not concern us here.³

Perhaps it would not be out of place to draw attention to the question whether there is any specific emotion in the religious attitude of man. While refusing to admit that in this attitude there are any emotions peculiar to it, yet it is well to point out that reverence has been regarded as the characteristic emotion in the religious attitude. McDougall claims that reverence is "the religious emotion par excellence; few merely human powers are capable of exciting reverence, this blend of wonder, fear, gratitude, and negative self-feeling. Those human/

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¹ An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 126.
³ Brever 'The Psychology of Education,' Chap. IV.
human beings who inspire reverence, or who are custom and
convention considered to be entitled to inspire it, usually
owe their reverend character to their being regarded as the
ministers and dispensers of Divine power. ¹ The following
shows McDougall's view - the primary components being indi-
cated by small letters, the complex by block capitals.

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wonder
  X
subjection)
  X
  AWE
  X
fear
  R E V E R E N C E
  X
  GRATITUDE
  X
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Wonder is for McDougall a primary emotion connected with the
instinct of curiosity. Shand,² however, maintains that when
the impulse of curiosity is satisfied at once, wonder is not
elicited. Wonder is for him a baffled curiosity: it includes
surprise as well as curiosity and is a complex emotion, comprising
joy/

¹ Social Psychology, p. 132.
² The Foundations of Character, p. 442f.
joy, astonishment, and curiosity.

The emotions, then, that lie at the basis of all human activity are also to be found at the basis of our religious life. There is then no specifically religious emotion, and we cannot now so regard even reverence, which after all is perhaps only characteristic of religion in its purer forms. Recognition of the fact, that there are no "specific religious instincts" and no "specific religious emotions" in the commonly accepted sense of the terms, will prevent much non-psychological thinking. In the religious experience of man, as in all his other experiences, the same human nature is at work.
PART PLAYED BY

SPECIFIC INSTINCTS IN RELIGION

The origin of religion has been sought in some specific instinct. We shall consider the three most commonly referred to, the instincts of self-preservation, of gregariousness and of sex. It is essential to note Drever's warning that "the psychologist should set his face strongly against the prevailing tendency to speak of an instinct of self-preservation, an instinct of sex, a herd instinct." ¹

Part played by Self-preservation in Religion.

In this connection Thouless says, "The theory of Professor G. Elliot Smith and Mr W. J. Perry, that the first impulse towards certain early religions was the effort to find/ ¹

¹ An Introduction to the Psychology of Education, p. 48.
find givers of life which should preserve the individual's existence, would make such religions a growth from the instinct of self-preservation.¹ Rivers, referring to this instinct, mentions as the forms of self-preservation specially to be noted the danger instincts, flight from danger, aggression and others.² Closely associated with self-preservation is the idea that fear is the basis of religion,³ that "fear made the gods." Professor Paterson⁴ shows the two forms of fear, inducing flight from God and flight to God. Awe and reverence, however, transmute fear. It is questionable if fear in its pure form ever appears in religion. Lucretius said that fear was often the basis of worship. There is a truth here which must not be overlooked, though it is not the whole truth. We might say, with equal truth, that joy or elation or ecstasy was often the basis of worship. The one is the positive, the other the negative side of the same experience, self-abasement and self-elevation. It is of course quite true that in primitive forms of religion, and/

¹ An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 125.
⁴ The Nature of Religion, p. 81. 
and in primitive minds still, fear does influence the individual's conception of religion, and the form of that religion, but it is not the root or origin of it. Self-preservation and the fear of powers not understood have a very close connection, but are not essential elements in religion. They may survive in higher forms in self-expansion and reverence, but that does not prove anything as to the essential nature of religion.

When we think of what the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest meant to a former age, is it to be wondered that psychologically self-preservation was regarded by many as of supreme importance and as the origin of religion. Durkheim says that "the real function of religion is to aid us to live."\(^1\) Crawley contends that the sense of value, which is the origin of religion, is the feeling of the worth of life, and expresses itself in the demand for self-preservation. He traces back religion to the vital instinct. He identifies religion throughout with the basic biological impulses, for "man's daily bread becomes the object of innumerable acts of caution and superstition."\(^2\) Leuba\(^3\) says/

\(^1\) Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 416.
\(^2\) The Tree of Life, p. 217. Cf. 'The Mystic Rose'
\(^3\) A Psychological Study of Religion, p. 53.
says that religion is "a part of the struggle for life." and the reason for its existence is "its biological value." The tracing back of religion to self-preservation is the logical outcome of the vitalistic instinctivistic view. Crawley and Miss Jane Harrison have sought to give evidence that the crises of life, birth, adolescence, marriage, death, especially lead to cult and faith. Undoubtedly, these are the root of many rites and beliefs, but they do not account for the origin of religion.

To primitive man, for example, the food supply was a very necessary part of his life, for he lived continually in dread of starvation, and it is natural that destiny and providence came into his mind in connection with his food. All that this shows is that, in his desire for self-preservation, man revealed an attitude which is present at every stage of religion, an attitude which is exactly similar in higher types of religion, though assuming different manifestations. This attitude is what we are seeking to discover. No solution is afforded by stating that it has manifested itself in lower and higher forms. In an age when self-preservation really passed into self-expansion as a correlate, a different form of religion would appear. Our concern is not so much with development as with origin. According to Edward, McDougall's view is equivalent to saying that admiration made the gods.¹ Let us say/

say, for example, that fear made science. The ultimate answer surely is that no emotion can give rise to intellectual concepts. It is reason, it is man's spiritual nature that created the gods.

In some religions self-sacrifice and immolation have been the outstanding characteristics, consequently self-preservation cannot be the instinct at the root of religion. It is only a factor in religion. This is an example of the fallacy of making the part into the whole, and of neglecting the negative instances. The truth in this argument is that an ideal is a source of power or strength, and that this undoubtedly tends towards self-preservation. This conception gives man strength to proceed to the realisation of this in his own life. Thus, self-preservation is a mental strength which he gets from his religion, not self-preservation in the biological sense. It has a universality which holds for all.

Part played by Gregariousness in Religion

Professor Paterson finds the closest affinity between "the religious instinct" and "the gregarious instinct!" "There is in fact the same evidence," he says, "for holding that man has the one instinct that there is for crediting him with/
with the other. The conative reaction is the same: in one instance he feels the attraction of the herd, and is disposed to follow its lead; in the other he feels the drawing of God, and is disposed to yield to the impulsion."\(^1\) But, to compare "the gravitation of the individual to the herd" with "a similar gravitation towards God" is to compare things which are dissimilar. Besides, the gregarious instinct is not so universally accepted as Paterson assumes.\(^2\) Rivers and other recent writers regard this, not as a primary instinct, but as having come into existence to produce and to maintain the cohesion of the group. The necessity for this argument, to support the theory that religion is an instinct, reveals that instinct is not enough to account for religion. Animals have the gregarious instincts but do not have religion, hence our attempt to get another explanation than that religion is instinctive. What we have to discover is, how the conception of a better state arises in man. It is this which is his distinguishing feature and is not on a par with his gregarious instincts.

Ames holds a similar view, that religion is based on/ 

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\(^1\) The Nature of Religion, p. 102.

\(^2\) Cf. Bernard 'Instinct' p.528. and Drever 'Instinct in Man' p.186.
on the gregarious instinct, that it is the consciousness of the highest social values. "The religious consciousness is a most intimate phase of the group consciousness."¹ Again he says, "The origin of religion is to be sought in the origin of social consciousness. In other words, the religious consciousness is identified with the consciousness of the greatest values of life."² Religious conduct is on this view nothing but social conduct. This is rather a broad idea of religion, the idea of Crawley too, that religious emotion is the tone or quality of any feeling which results in making something sacred. "The original and perpetual spring of religion is therefore the life activity itself involved in procuring food, caring for young, acquiring and defending property, and in furthering social welfare."³ To call anyone religious, because he takes part in social life, is only to cause confusion and to fail to distinguish the origin of religion and the influence of the social environment upon it. The identification of the religious consciousness and the gregarious instincts is due to the common fallacy of oversimplification.

Trotter, too, would find the origin of religion in/

¹ The Psychology of Religious Experience, p.49.
in the herd instincts. "This intimate dependence on the herd is traceable" he says "not merely in matters physical and intellectual, but also betrays itself in the deepest recesses of personality as a sense of incompleteness which compels the individual to reach out towards some larger existence than his own, some encompassing being in whom his perplexities may find a solution and his longings peace...... Religious feeling is therefore a character inherent in the very structure of the human mind, and is the expression of a need which must be recognised by the biologist as neither superficial nor transitory."\(^1\) Again he says, "The child receives from the herd the doctrines that truthfulness is the most valuable of all the virtues, that honesty is the best policy (if we call this morality)\(^2\), that to the religious man death has no terrors, that there is in store a future life of happiness and delight."\(^3\) Without a doubt the herd instincts have their influence on religion, but McDougall's criticism of Trotter is to the point that his arguments tend to be "pervaded by the error of attributing to the 'herd instinct' every form of social relation and influence, in a quite undiscriminating manner/\

\(^1\) Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, p. 113
\(^2\) Brackets ours.
\(^3\) Op. cit., p.49.
The truth in this view is, that it is only through the strength of the social support that man achieved a culture, a morality. But the social predisposition is not the origin of religion. The same arguments have been advanced to account for sin, but, as Tennant says "The influences of social environment on which Schleiermacher and Ritschl have rightly insisted as an important factor in the explanation of the propagation of sin, are insufficient in themselves to account for its ubiquitous diffusion," and the same applies to the origin of religion. Woodworth states that "the gregarious instinct does not by any manner of means account for all of man's social conduct. It brings men together and so gives a chance for social doings, but these doings are learned, not provided ready-made by the instinct."

Of course, the gregarious instincts are strong in religion, but to base religion altogether upon them is unduly to stress one element. Durkheim finds in the sanction of the group, the objective reality of religion. He says "A religion/

1 Outline of Psychology, p.154.
2 The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p.89
3 Psychology: A Study of Mental Life, p.146
religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things." "At bottom the concept of totality, that of society and that of divinity are very probably only different aspects of the same notion." Again he says, "Whatever is obligatory is of social origin." Robertson Smith takes up a somewhat similar position, when he says that "a man did not choose his religion or frame it for himself; it came to him as part of the general scheme of social obligations and ordinances laid upon him as a matter of course by his position in the family and in the nation."¹ McDougall, Le Bon, and others also show the strength of the gregarious instincts, insisting rightly that crowd psychology is a very important factor in religious development, but that is not the same thing as saying that these instincts are the origin of religion. It is not within the scope of this thesis to deal with the power of the gregarious instincts in religion or to point to the influence of the crowd on revivals, emotional outbursts, persecutions and excesses.²

A distinct service, however, has been done by the recognition of the social character of religion, but this has been achieved at the expense of making individual religion an illusion/

¹ The Religion of the Semites, p.24.
² McDougall: 'The Group Mind',
illusion, just as one might argue that James, in stressing individual religion, did so at the expense of the social nature of religion.

Durkheim arrived at his conclusion that 'the religious' is identical with 'the social' by his study of totemism, which he regards as the most primitive form of religion. He proved too much, for all that he was justified in concluding was, that there is a definite relationship between social organisation and religion.

Robertson Smith's view that religion, especially primitive religion, is the concern of the community rather than of the individual, is true of all activities and not specially of religion. The social and the religious are not synonymous terms. Besides, this 'social soul' is a psychological myth and has no foundation in reality, just as, on the other hand, the individual without society does not exist. As Aristotle says, man apart from society is "either a beast or a god," ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

Again Comte and Leuba, for example, stress the social side to such an extent that traditional religions become the religion of Humanity, which takes the place of God. This view is to be distinguished from that of Durkheim.

1 Polit.1.2.1258a27.
Durkheim and his followers who regard religion as the deification of society. In the one case, humanity takes the place of and supersedes God, in the other, humanity is identified with God, the terms are synonymous. We must seek to distinguish, however, what religion is and what forms it has taken.

This view serves to emphasise that religion has a social side, but it is not necessary to base this social side on the instinctive aspect of man's nature. It can with more justification and more certainty be based on the rational or spiritual side of man's nature, for the characteristic of man's spiritual nature, for example in morality, is, that its laws are universal, that they hold for all. The spiritual and the social in man are therefore the convex and the concave sides of the same fact.

It may also be noted that all beliefs would be originally tribal. Primitive religion is tribal. The individual's strength is not alone sufficient to sustain non-physical realities. But if society is merely an extension of the herd instinct, it is an insufficient basis for religion. An absolute value cannot arise out of mere social values, out of the herd instinct. The highest form/
form of conscience, for example, is not a social obligation only. It is the same with religion. When the prophets dictate to the tribe, they become its conscience. They do the creating. Water cannot rise above its source. Society cannot rise above the highest individual in it. He determines the level. The prophet, saying, 'Thus saith the Lord,' is speaking sub specie aeternitatis, is thus in closer touch with the Absolute, and, like the philosopher-ruler in Plato, is truly universal. He does not speak in his own individual person. He is expressing what the ultimate purpose of things is more clearly. That is the pure form of religion.

Part played by Sex in Religion.

Again, the origin of religion has been sought in sex. Schroeder holds, that "all religion in its beginning is a mere misinterpretation of sex ecstasy, and the religion of to-day is only the essentially unchanged evolutionary product of psycho-sexual perversion."¹ Cohen's book, "Religion and Sex" gives all the illustrations that one could possibly need to show that there is a very real connection between religion and the instincts of sex, but it gives no assistance as to the real problem, of what nature is that relationship. It is a fact/

fact that religious experiences and sex crises are correlated, that at the age when the sex instinct is beginning to assert itself at its strongest, conversion takes place. Instead of religion being dependent on the heightening of sexual emotion, both are correlated with mental disturbances or excitability due to physiological changes in the organism at this stage of development. It has also to be remarked that there is the same heightening of the aesthetic feelings at adolescence. It is true that religious language and the language of the tender emotion are similar, often identical, and that religious extravagance has not infrequently been accompanied by sexual licence. It is also true that religion has tended to insist on chastity, on the suppression of the sex instincts. While all this is admitted, it is no proof that here is to be found the origin of religion.

Self-preservation and the perpetuation of the race through the sex instincts are fundamental laws of the animal life, and therefore important in man's life, and consequently in man's religion. But we cannot from this deduce the immediate dependence of religion solely on the one or the other.

Swisher would bid us note that 'sensual' and 'sexual' are not identical terms, yet he explicitly states that/
that "primitive religion originates in sex."\(^1\) His interpretation of the Garden of Eden narrative from this standpoint is certainly daring and provocative but it does not carry conviction. Even if his argument were conceded that sex symbolism predominates in primitive religion,\(^2\) that would not account for the origin but merely for the form of religion, and does not warrant so sweeping a statement as "religion is primary emotional and therefore is, in the broadest sense, of sex origin."\(^3\)

The Freudian school of psycho-analysis lays special emphasis on sex. Freud, Adler, Jung from different points of view deal with this subject. For Freud, the basal instincts are the primitive brutal tendencies, one of which is predominant, libido, the sexual character of which he emphasises:\(^4\) For him the content of the unconscious region of the mind is predominantly, though by no means exclusively, sexual. "The unconscious is the part of the mind/  

\(^{1}\) Religion and the New Psychology, p. 10  
mind that stands nearest to the crude instincts as they are inborn in us, and before they have been subjected to the refining influences of education. It is not commonly realised how extensive is the work performed by these influences, nor how violent is the internal conflict they provoke before they finally achieve their aim. Without them, the individual would probably remain a selfish, jealous, impulsive, aggressive, dirty, immodest, cruel, egocentric, and conceited animal, inconsiderate of the needs of others, and unmindful of the complicated social and ethical standards that go to make a civilized society. Yet, according to the findings of psycho-analysis, the results of this refining process are rarely so perfect as is generally supposed; behind the veneer of civilization there remains throughout life a buried mass of crude primitive tendencies, always struggling for expression, and towards which the person tends to relapse whenever suitable opportunity is offered.¹ The normal psycho-sexual development has been arrested, and this, according to Freud, is the cause of conflicts, nervous disorders, and abnormal symptoms. All neuroses, he claims, are due to the sexual colouring in the child's relations to his near relatives.

¹ Jones: 'Papers on Psycho-analysis' p. 124.
relatives, to incestuous fantasies. There is, too, the persistence of childish attitudes inconsistent with adult life, and these attitudes are predominantly sexual.

Jung\(^1\), however, disagrees with Freud and lays stress upon the "non-fulfilment of the life's task" as the real cause, denying that the psychic energy of the unconscious, the libido, is exclusively sexual. "With increasing experience in analytical work, however, I became aware" says Jung "of a gradual change in my conception of libido."\(^2\) He agrees that the incestuous fantasies occur, but they have no 'real' primary existence in themselves, and possess no dynamic initiative of their own.

Adler\(^3\), too, disagrees with Freud and stresses the "egotistic impulse" or "will to power" or "masculine tendency" as the main motive force in neurotic disease. "Every neurosis" he says, "can be understood as an attempt to free oneself from a feeling of inferiority in order to gain a feeling of superiority."\(^4\)

Rivers and others have freed the whole problem from/

\(^1\) Psychology of the Unconscious, Chap. 1 and 2.
\(^3\) Individual Psychology, Chap. 1. and 2.
from the narrow Freudian interpretation and made it clear that Freud's doctrine of the unconscious activities of the mind stands without the special interpretation which he gave it. It is admitted that the instincts of sex are among the strongest and perhaps the most difficult to sublimate. But other instincts cause neuroses and other such abnormal conditions through repression. "The relative simplicity of the war-neuroses," says Rivers, "is due to their origin in disturbance of the relatively simple instinct of self-preservation, while the great majority of the neuroses of civil practice depend on failure of balance between the less simple sexual instinct and the very complex social forces by which this instinct is normally controlled."¹

We have spoken of the infantile nature and origin of the unconscious. "The infantile character of the unconscious thus persists throughout the whole of life, giving an added signification to the old saying, that the child is father to the man."² Account must be taken of the view that/

¹ Instinct and the Unconscious, p.120.
that the origin of religion lies in the 'infantile' attitude to the world. Jones, speaking of the infantile mind, which is continued in later life as the unconscious mind and constitutes the essence of the latter, says, "Both the content and the mode of functioning of the infantile mind differ widely from those of the adult conscious one and the greater part of it becomes buried in later life, 'repressed' and inaccessible to consciousness, as the result of powerful forces acting in this direction. There is the strongest possible tendency to depreciate the significance of infantile mental processes, which are felt to be merely 'childish', so that any attempt to correlate them with important adult ones meets with instinctive incredulity. To take a simple illustration of this, if one were to correlate the abject fear of supernatural agencies that has been experienced so many countless times, and the fear than can still be experienced of the awful wrath of God, with the fear that the child may feel for his father, no one can well appreciate the significance of this who has not had personal experience, through psycho-analysis of the unconscious, of how intense the child's dread of the father can be."\(^1\) It is true that with many their thought/ 

thought of God is coloured by their thought of the father of their childhood, but it cannot be too strongly affirmed, that this only affects the way in which they think of God and is not the origin of the idea of God. For Jung, for example, God is a mere psychological function of an irrational nature, "the representative of a certain sum of energy," "a projected complex of representation which is accentuated in feeling according to the degree of religiousness of the individual." The ultimate result would be the main facts of religion would be explained away. The Oedipus complex would be the origin of religion and would explain such doctrines as the Fatherhood of God and the atonement. A father complex tends to be projected, according to this view, and formed into an objective reality, that of God. The real father is replaced by a more satisfactory figure, and at puberty the idea of God thus arises. "The religious life," says Jones, "represents a dramatisation on a cosmic plane of the emotions, fears and longings which arose in the child's relation to his parents." 

It may be true that, with some, religion does not get beyond this stage of infantilism, and that "man can remain a child for all time," but that is a different thing from saying, that all religion is based on infantilism or on a father complex, that "the religious instinct feeds upon the incestuous libido of the infantile period." 

This whole psycho-analytic view, with its emphasis upon the unconscious, proves too much. No one can deny the power of the unconscious, but it is going too far to regard religion purely as a means of sublimation or as an aspect of the unconscious. Religion might as well be regarded as a pathological state. It is wrong to say that religion consists in the sublimation of instincts. It were better to put it, that religion assists in sublimation. The fact is that religion is one of the most valuable channels for the sublimation of psychic energy. If instincts are repressed, psycho-analysis has revealed the results in complexes, hysterias, morbid fears, and such abnormal conditions. Instincts need to find expression, they cannot be completely inhibited, but in a civilized community that expression is controlled and disciplined.

disciplined. The instincts need to be sublimated and
religion is one of the noblest ways of doing so, but, to say
that the individual is religious, because his instincts
require sublimation, is equivalent to saying that man's lungs
made the atmosphere because they needed it to breathe.
Religion at its best is a release from repression and a means
of expression. One feels that the old theology by its
terrorising of the individual induced repression and thereby
failed. The question is not as to the use or the non-use
of the instinctive tendencies. That point simply does not
emerge. The point is the use or misuse of instinctive
tendencies. Religion must find room for all the instinctive
activities of man. "No heart is pure that is not passionate,
no virtue is safe that is not enthusiastic."¹ The only
religion worthy of the name is that which makes for the fullest
expression of the personality of man.

The importance of the psycho-analytic method cannot
be minimised. "It involves a radical change in our attitude
towards the questions of the structure and functioning of the
mind."² This is revealed by the writings of Pfister, Coriat,
Lay. Pfister treats religion from the psycho-analytic
standpoint.  

¹ Seeley: 'Ecce Homo' p. 9.
² Jones: 'Papers on Psycho-Analysis' p. 17.
standpoint, and his treatment is a most valuable contribution. "While psycho-analysis," he says, "may disclose the emptiness of religious errors, it is helpful to a healthy piety which increases moral strength. To me, it is a mystery how anxious souls can fear damage to religion and morality from psycho-analysis. How closely the results of the latter stand to the commands of the Gospel, is easily demonstrated."¹ Psycho-analysis has specially assisted in diagnosing many abnormal forms of religion, and in revealing various factors which undoubtedly determine to a great extent the form which religion takes. But, to hold that the origin of religion is sensuality and that sexual satisfaction is a substitute for religion, for that would be a logical sequence, or that religion is libido, is to go too far. Religion is not a subjective method of resolving unhealthy complexes. Religion of a wrong kind may create complexes, as the wrong use of any other of man's activities may. The Freudian school has failed to distinguish religion as normally expressed and religion in its abnormal forms. A similar charge might be laid to the door of William James in his "Varieties of Religious Experience."

¹ The Psycho-Analytic Method, p. 414.
While a study of the abnormal does reveal much that is helpful for a study of the normal, there is no necessity to deny the existence of the normal.

The truth here sought is, that the sex instincts, like all other human instincts, are factors in the religious life of the individual but they are not the only factors. The infantilism, on which Jung lays so much emphasis, undoubtedly, cannot be ignored in interpreting the religious life of man, but it is only one element, and we must avoid the fallacy of making the part into the whole. "We need not obstruct, but press into our service the passions of the soul; we can fill our sails with the very winds and gales which threaten the shipwreck of our lives; tap the resources of the lightning which ruthlessly destroys, and turn its electric power into the driving force of our enterprises."

Psycho-analysis has in fact revealed, that, in many cases, the religious convictions of the individual analysed are stronger after analysis than before, and certainly purer and more normal. One would expect from the ordinary psycho-analytic argument of the Freudian, that religion would cease to/

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to exist, once the individual was subjected to analysis. Rather what is false is revealed and removed, and what is true is strengthened. Future investigation will more and more detect the necessity of religion for the normal human personality. This treatment of religion is as extreme on the one side as the treatment by some theologians on the other. If the one errs in its subjectivity, the other errs in its objectivity. Both views are extreme.

The point has been overlooked that the unconscious really belongs to the instinctive side of our nature, and when religion is claimed to be instinctive, the danger, not the logical sequence, is, that religion is relegated to the realm where the unconscious holds sway. Our thesis, that religion belongs not to the instinctive, but to the creative, aspect of man's nature, saves it from this danger. This is Selbie's point when he states, "Strong instincts like those of fear and sex undoubtedly serve to determine the direction of religious emotions and impulses, and it is one of the differentia of humanity that these instincts should be so used. They are themselves, as it were, merely raw material, and it is the use of them that counts. The fact that religion is capable of sublimating primitive instincts like those of fear and/

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and sex shows clearly enough that it is not all compacted of them, but is something *sui generis*, and therefore able to use them for its own high ends."¹

What does all this amount to, this endeavour to find the origin of religion if not in a religious instinct, at least in one specific set of instincts, such as self-preservation, gregariousness, or sex. So many accounts prompt the suggestion that the origin of religion is to be found in no one set of instincts but that all these influences are at work in religion.² These only give the manifestations of religion in the various stages of its development, strands that are correlates of religious activity. Is not this whole attempt based upon the mistaken idea that man is a creature of instincts and nothing more? It is impossible, without laying undue stress upon certain factors, to attempt to explain all the facts of life by any one group of instincts. Our question is not what forms religion has taken or how it has taken these forms, but why has it taken any form at all. Again, it is the universality of religion that has led to the belief that it must be founded on the instinctive nature of man. But, if religion is rational, that is to say, founded on the rational nature of man, it has a universality that holds for all.

The Origin of Evil and of Sin.

It has been held that the instincts are in themselves good, and it has been maintained that they are evil. Both views are untenable. Instincts are in themselves neither moral nor immoral, but amoral. They are indeterminate. It is when man, for the gaining of his own soul, eats of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, turns out or is turned out of Eden, that the sense of sin emerges.

In primitive communities there is no individual wrongdoing or sense of responsibility. All dictates are tribal. It is a herd morality, and consequently there can be no sense of moral evil. Custom is so strong that individuals cannot break these dictates. There is no independent judgment. Evil begins when the sense of individuality appears. It begins, when man leaves the garden of Eden, when the citizens of Plato's state become something more than a community of swine, when Greek tragedy appears, when the sense of individuality appears in the child, previous to which we have the innocence of childhood, as expressed in different forms of literature. At this stage, error, bad taste, moral evil, sin appear. The development is really from generality or communality to individuality and then to universality. It is individuality that is a late growth/
Edward would appear to be wrong here in his sense of development when he says, "Religion itself was tribal. It was not until a comparatively late stage of religious and ethical development that the obligations of religion or morality were recognised as extending beyond the limits of the tribe. Universality is a late growth."¹

The animal is still in the Garden of Eden. It never reaches the stage of conscious individuality and is governed still by the herd instinct. There can be no sense of sin with an animal. There can be no consciousness of a law or of departure from a law. A dog may be aware that it has done wrong, but that is different from a sense of sin. It is pure behaviour reaction, perhaps a form of fear. The dog's action may be a defence mechanism to save its skin, a way of avoiding punishment. We see in man a creature emerging from a lower animal state, a self-conscious being, creative and endowed with imagination but not perfect. He is tempted to indulge freely the instincts and passions of his nature for selfish purposes, and at the same time his better self, his real self warns him not to do so. /

To gratify his animal nature in defiance of his higher self is moral evil. When he thinks of a Divine Being, whom he has offended, it is sin. As Browning puts it in 'Cleon':-

"In man there's failure, only since he left
The lower and unconscious forms of life."

"Sin," says Lloyd Morgan, "is disintegration at a higher level that events may run their course at a lower level. It is purely retrogressive, and in no valid sense contributory to progressive advance."¹

The sense of sin is less prevalent now, but the sense of moral evil is greater, the reason being that religion formerly designated the greater part of man's spiritual life, whereas morality has differentiated itself in these later times and occupies a more prominent place. The reference is now more to the moral standard, and the day may come when even the terms 'sin' and 'evil' give place to the term 'bad taste', when the aesthetic reference would be more common. To say, then, that "man is not worrying about his sins" contains a truth/

¹ Life, Mind, Spirit, p. 290.
truth. There is the same admitted wrongness in the action, no matter whether it is called sin, evil, or bad taste, depending on the object of reference.

Sin is the wrongness of an action from the religious standpoint. Wrongness implies the presence of rightness. Error is the same. There must be a standard of rightness, which can only be given by man's rational universal nature; it is the same for all of us. The decrease of man's sense of sin, commonly bewailed, is accompanied by man's increased sense of moral evil, showing that he has not lost his consciousness of defect or failing, but is merely applying different, that is, moral categories instead of religious categories. In certain circles, it is becoming customary to employ the aesthetic categories. Most people now think that they are beyond sin, and some, with Nietzsche, consider themselves beyond good and evil, but the universal sense of misgiving is greater than ever it was. An offence against the law of the land is crime. An offence against the moral law is evil. An offence against the law of God is sin.

Selbie says, "Sin only arises when in the presence of an inhibition, or of an impulse to some higher end, we yield/
yield to the call of the lower nature. It is with the capacity to choose between ends and the actions leading to them that the possibility of sin emerges,"¹ and again, "It is because of the fact that he is more than an animal and that his actions are never merely instinctive that man attains moral responsibility.......The failure to control the instincts, or the substitution of the animal for the rational impulse, is the beginning of sin."² "At the root of every sinful act or disposition lies an ultimate choice of the lower and an inhibition of the higher springs of action."³ We might put it in this way, that evil is the failure in the conflict between man's animal heritage and his higher nature. Without this conflict, there would be no evil. Had man only his animal heritage, there would be no conflict. The conflict is the result of the two aspects of man's nature, the lower and the higher, each striving for mastery, and evil and sin are the consciousness of failure in the conflict. Man has exchanged a life of/

¹ The Psychology of Religion, p. 228.
of animal contentment and harmony for one of moral struggle and effort.

It is interesting to recall in this connection Hegel's account of the Story of the Fall¹, that ancient story that belongs to the realm of primitive speculation and myth. Hegel speaks of the disunion in man's nature. "No such inward disunion is found in nature: natural things do nothing wicked."² The tales and allegories of religion are not to be set aside as antiquated even now. Dealing with the story of the Fall, he says, "in its instinctive and natural stage, spiritual life wears the garb of innocence and confiding simplicity: but the very essence of spirit implies the absorption of this immediate condition in something higher. The spiritual is distinguished from the natural, and more especially from the animal life, in the circumstance that it does not continue a mere stream of tendency, but sunders itself to self-realisation. The truth is, that the step into opposition, the awakening of consciousness, follows from the very nature of man. The sense of shame bears evidence to the separation of man from/  

¹ The Logic of Hegel, English Transl., Chap.11.s.24.  
from his natural and sensuous life. The beasts never get so far as this separation, and they feel no shame.

The hour when man leaves the path of mere natural being marks the difference between him, a self-conscious agent, and the natural world. But this schism, though it forms a necessary element in the very notion of spirit, is not the final goal of man. It is to this state of inward breach that the whole finite action of thought and will belongs...

Man in so far as he is spirit is not the creature of nature: and when he behaves as such, and follows the cravings of appetite, he will to be so. The natural wickedness of man is therefore unlike the natural life of animals." There is deep psychological insight here and especially in the detailed treatment of the story of the Fall, which in itself portrays in a suggestive way the awakening of human consciousness to the sense of guilt, and opens up a psychology of temptation.

F. R. Tennant¹ points out that there are few truths of the Christian faith, that have received more general acknowledgement, than the doctrine that the prevalence of sin is due to a fall from a pristine condition of innocence at the beginning of human history. Every individual, therefore, finds himself from birth in an abnormal moral state, a state displeasing/

¹ The Origin and Propagation of Sin.
displeasing to God, sinful. This doctrine of original sin is far more than the recognition of the all-pervading taint of moral evil in the heart and life of man. The two must be kept distinct. Sin is one thing; the origin of sin is another. It was natural to confuse the two, and to find the origin a simple matter, once it was held that man's first estate was one of innocence or moral excellence. But is this view of man's first estate correct? If he were "flesh before spirit, lawless (?)" impulse-governed organism, fulfilling as such the nature necessarily his and therefore the life God willed for him in his earliest age, until his moral consciousness was awakened to start him, heavily weighted with the inherited load, not indeed, of abnormal and corrupted nature, but of non-moral and necessary animal instinct and self-assertive tendency, on that race-long struggle of flesh with spirit and spirit with flesh, which for us, alas!, becomes but another name for the life of sin.

On such a view, man's moral evil would be the consequence of no defection from his endowment, natural or miraculous, at the start; it would bespeak rather the present non-attainment of/

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1 Brackets ours.
of his final goal."1 Tennant puts his finger on the one great difficulty that has always arisen in this connection, when he says, "Experience shows that all are tainted with moral evil, as if with an inborn disease: conscience asserts that each is accountable for his own sin as if it were solely his creation."2 Another origin of sin must be sought, somewhere in the choice, which man has to make, "between the ends, to which his organic nature blindly impels him, and the ends of altogether higher worth, to which the small but imperative voice of such moral law as he knows urges him without condition."3 Tennant quotes4 Archdeacon Wilson; "Man fell, according to science when he first became conscious of the conflict of freedom and conscience. To the evolutionist sin is not an innovation, but is the survival or misuse of habits and tendencies that were incidental to an earlier stage in development, whether of the individual or the race, and were not originally sinful, but were actually useful. Their sinfulness/

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1 The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p.11.
4 Op.cit., p.82.
sinfulness lies in their anachronism: in their resistance to the evolutionary and Divine force that makes for moral development and righteousness. Sin is the violation of a man's higher nature, which he finds within, parallel to a lower nature. "The origin of sin," says Tennant, "like other so-called origins, was also a gradual process rather than an abrupt and inexplicable plunge......and the first sin would rather be the least significant (conscious) of all."

Rather we should say there would be the least consciousness of sin. "We are natural before we are moral beings, and the impulses of our nature are in full sway before the moral consciousness begins to dawn."

"Until moral sentiment appears the existence of sin (evil) is of course excluded," says Tennant, "The source of universal sinfulness (evil) is the general failure to effect on all occasions the moralisation of inevitable impulses and to choose the end of higher worth rather than that which, of lower value, appeals with the more clamorous intensity." The Fall is exchanged/

1 Brackets ours.
2 The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p.91.
4 Brackets ours.
exchanged for an animal origin and a subsequent superposition or acquisition of moral rationality. Sin arises from "an internal conflict between nature and nurture, natural desire and moral end."¹ "A spark has disturbed our clod." The psychological genesis of evil, " says Pfleiderer, "is not difficult to understand, if we set out from the fact that the tendency towards the satisfaction of his natural impulses is as necessary to man as it is to every other living being. This tendency is not in itself evil...... Now however comes the law... and imposes a limit on naïve desire."²

Bernard quotes Herrick's view, that conflict is inherent in the cosmic process from beginning to end, "Conflict, then, lies at the basis of all evolution, and the factors of social and even of moral evolution can be traced downward throughout the cosmic process. The social and ethical standards, therefore, have not arisen in opposition to the evolutionary process as seen in the brute creation, but within that process."³

Evil is a recognition that a higher stage in evolution/

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¹ The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p.115.
² Philosophy of Religion, Vol.IV. pp.34-8
³ Quoted Bernard: 'Instinct', p.53.
evolution has appeared and is challenging the lower. Failure to accept the challenge is evil. An animal quality is in its right place in an animal; but, when in a human being it remains a purely animal quality, and does not become a human quality, that is evil. The Greek word 'hamartia' means missing the mark, and is translated 'sin' in the New Testament. It is a falling short of the standard that we know we ought to reach, and that standard, of course, becomes higher with the progress of the race. The mark, the standard is the rational or higher standard. Peake says, "Sin has its roots in self-love. Self-love is a perfectly natural and indeed commendable quality. The will to life, the instinct for self-preservation, the desire for self-gratification are implanted in us by nature, which thus secures the preservation of the species as well as of the individual. It is therefore not wrong in itself. But it may readily become wrong, if it collides with a higher law." The collision, the conflict makes sin possible. Hypothetically, after a certain action which before had been regarded unquestionably, a doubt might pass over the mind of the individual. Instinctive tendencies natural to man cannot be

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be indulged by him as an animal indulges them. That is not his whole nature. He is a man, not an animal, though his animal past persists. Evil, to repeat, is an anachronism, a survival, where there should be progress. It is the inclination to gratify the instincts inherited from his animal past, without regard to the distinctively rational or specifically human qualities. When the religious attitude is adopted rather than the moral, we speak of sin rather than of evil. Sin is unfaithfulness to personal perfectionability regarded as an offence against God. God has a wholeness or holiness which the moral ideal does not have. The question resolves itself into this.

To give an illustration, recognising monogamy to be the higher stage, "the real conflict is between an earlier phase of evolution and a later phase, the polygamous and the monogamous... the man who lives polygamously is not living "according to nature", as he imagines: he has simply failed to keep pace with nature. He has been arrested in his development, which should have progressed from the polygamous to the monogamous."  

Evil is due to arrested development, a survival where there should be progression.

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1 Hadfield: *Psychology and Morals*, p.108.
Sin and Moral Disease.

It is frequently stated that the new psychology reduces sin to a disease, but this is a misinterpretation. No one has done better service in this connection than Hadfield, who draws a distinction between what psychology would call 'sin' and what it would call 'moral disease'. "The man who deliberately embezzles, gets drunk, gives way to his temper, gratifies his passions is in a different category from the kleptomaniac, the alcoholic, or the victim of perverted sexual or angry passion. Moral disease and sin may give rise to very similar conduct, yet their origin is as different as in the other case." Of course, the idea that evil is a disease is to be found in Butler's Erewhon. With the Greeks sin was defective knowledge. There is in sin, however, the presence of the consciousness of the ideal. Sin is at the conscious level, moral disease is at the unconscious level. It is at the pathological level. Moral disease, according to Hadfield, is outside the category of personal responsibility, but sin is the result of deliberate and/

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1 Psychology and Morals, p.46.
and conscious choice. Our only criticism of Hadfield would be that his instances do not make the position clear enough. The extreme instance of a complex or of insanity will bring out the difference between moral disease and sin. In the one case you have a complex, in the other a sentiment. In the real complex the will is impotent, just as in the case of insanity, where you cannot tell a person to pull himself together. Insanity is moral disease. This brings out the distinction clearly, and shows that it is moral disease that is outside the category of personal responsibility, but it is not maintained that all wrongdoing is moral disease. But psychology has performed a real service in this connection. Alcoholic mania, post-epileptic automatism, paranoia, mania and melancholia come under moral disease. Brown says that "in addition to such cases as these there is a whole class of individuals who suffer from overwhelming compulsion to acts of a criminal nature, a compulsion sometimes so strong that the powers of control even of an otherwise normal man would be inadequate to hold them in check. Kleptomania is a familiar instance of this. In this disease a patient steals not for personal gain but under the influence of an uncontrollable/
uncontrollable impulse to collect a certain type of object; like a jackdaw, he may collect objects of no intrinsic value to himself, however valuable they may be to their original owners, and, having collected them, he loses all further interest in them. Thus, one patient, a woman, was discovered to have collected 130 parasols from various shops and hidden them in an attic. It is quite obvious that such a person could not be held responsible for a crime of theft in the same sense in which an ordinary thief is responsible.\(^1\) He concludes by emphasising that "modern psychology does not contest the reality of moral responsibility. It holds the view that criminals suffering from certain forms of mental disease are less fully responsible for their acts than are normal people. But it certainly does not countenance the view that all criminals suffer from mental illness, nor that mental illness is an invariably sufficient excuse for crime."\(^2\)

\(^1\) Mind and Personality, p.92.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.93.
THE SENTIMENTS AND RELIGION.

A later development in psychology has been the discovery of the sentiment, with the obvious conclusion that religion is a sentiment. The very haste shown in moving away from instinct deserves commendation, and reveals a desire to find a refuge somewhere else. This, as our thesis seeks to point out, is where the origin of religion is to be found, somewhere higher than instinct, and even than sentiment.

The instinctive tendencies, especially those with which the primary emotions are associated, are, as we have seen, the motive forces in human life. There is a further development of these forces, to which the term 'sentiment' has been given. Compared with an emotion, a sentiment is a relatively permanent condition, an enduring disposition. Love and hate are typical sentiments. The difference between an emotion and a sentiment is clear, when we compare the emotion of anger with the sentiment of hatred. It is to Shand that we owe this use of the term 'sentiment.'

Shand has pointed out that the emotions tend to become organised in systems about the objects that excite them, and to this organised system he gives the name 'sentiment'.

McDougall/ 

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1 The Foundations of Character, p. 35f.
McDougall, following Shand, speaks of "an organised system of emotional tendencies, centred about some object." This term has come to stay in psychology. Shand disclaims, however, any attempt to deal with the meaning of 'sentiment', seeking only to deal with the nature of Love and Hate and their distinction from the class of emotions to which they had hitherto been supposed to belong. He distinguishes a system of feeling from a compound feeling, and argues that it is not enough to call love, for example, a compound feeling. Love is a sentiment, love of self, sexual love, family affection, friendship. There is the sentiment for games, there are such great impersonal sentiments, like patriotism, and the love for some science or art. He also mentions 'respect for conscience' as such a system, and in most men it is combined with the religious sentiment. Hatred, too, is a sentiment. Shand says, "We have now studied in outline the two chief systems of character, the lesser system of the emotions and the greater system of the sentiments. Together they constitute its most important forces: the one the fundamental forces at its base, the other the organisations and growth into higher forms/
forms of these same forces."¹ Dreyer postulates that "a sentiment is to be regarded not as innate, like the instincts, but as a product of experience, and as involving the ideational, as distinct from the perceptual level of intelligence, and therefore a psychical integration that is on a higher plane altogether."² Shand holds that some of the sentiments are innately organised, and that the emotional systems of anger, fear, joy, and sorrow are innately connected with every emotional impulse and with one another. Dreyer disagrees, and states that any instinct may, in ideational consciousness, pass into a sentiment, and illustrates his point by showing that, if fear is so strongly associated with a certain object, that whenever the idea of that object rises in consciousness, the emotion to a greater or less degree is experienced; there seems no reason for refusing to recognise this as a sentiment. The difference between an instinct and a sentiment, according to Dreyer, is this "that the instinct 'disposition' is perceptual, that is, involves/

¹ The Foundations of Character, p.61.
² Instinct in Man, p.208.
involves only perceptual consciousness, while the sentiment 'disposition' is ideational and is a sentiment because it is ideational. This means that the sentiment 'disposition' may become active, and therefore its emotional tendency may be evoked, independently of the perceptual situation which is required to evoke the same emotional tendency in the case of the instinct."¹ Again, he claims that "the organised system may consist of a single emotional tendency, and that, in the human being at least, it is the idea of the object rather than the object itself with which it is associated."² Drever's point of view cannot better be understood than from the following statement. "For psychology, character is simply a psychical fact. As a psychical fact character implies a stability which natural tendencies functioning on the instinctive level can never possess. For in such a case, as we have shown, behaviour must necessarily be determined by the immediate environment. Stability will be secured when instinctive tendencies can be/

² The Psychology of Everyday Life, p.36.
be consistently inhibited or modified (that is, by an ideal)\(^1\) in a certain direction, no matter what the immediate environment may be, which can only happen when the instinctive tendencies evoked come into conflict, not with one another, but with emotional tendencies belonging to a permanent inner system, the activity of which is relatively independent of the immediate environment. The sentiment or interest is precisely such an inner system.\(^2\) A further distinction\(^3\) must be noted, that between 'interest disposition' and 'interest experience' in relation to particular objects. An instinct is an interest disposition, and this leads to a distinction between native and acquired 'interest dispositions.' The activity of a sentiment involves emotional excitement, whereas the activity of an interest disposition involves merely worthwhileness, 'interest experience.' The great sentiment complexes supply as it were the final reservoir of energy!  

\(^1\) Brackets ours  
\(^3\) Instinct in Man, p.212.
The sentiment, then, is a disposition, a highly complex disposition, not an experience or conscious process. "We may be clearly conscious," says Drever, "that we possess a certain sentiment, but the sentiment itself is never in consciousness; though determining consciousness, it is itself unconscious."

Typical sentiments are those of love and hatred, attraction and aversion, love of animals, love of the sea. Sentiments of 'value' involve primarily neither like nor dislike, love nor hatred. These constitute the most important group of all in the normal, developed character, the group to which the great sentiments, like the religious sentiment, the national sentiment and the self sentiment belong.

McDougall says, "The growth of the sentiments is of the utmost importance for the character and conduct of individuals and of societies; it is the organisation of the affective and conative life. In the absence of sentiments our emotional life would be a mere chaos, without order/"

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1 An Introduction to the Psychology of Education, p. 23.
order, consistency, or continuity of any kind; and all our social relations and conduct, being based on the emotions and their impulses, would be correspondingly chaotic, unpredictable, and unstable. It is only through the systematic organisation of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that the volitional control of the immediate promptings of the emotions is rendered possible.¹ Shand has placed the sentiment at the very foundation of character. "We can now see in a general way," he says, "what are the dynamical relations in which a sentiment stands to the character as a whole. For, first, it consists in an organisation of a part of the character, which it exercises and strengthens. But, secondly, the rest of the character, which is outside of its system, does not remain unchanged. For in proportion as the sentiment becomes predominant, the emotional dispositions which it does not need, atrophy; and those which are hostile to it are suppressed; while the great multitude of its qualities, as we have just seen, tend to counteract the opposite qualities of other systems; and even its virtues and vices have a similar influence. Thus, although a sentiment is only an organisation of a part of/

¹ Social Psychology, p.159.
of the character, it is in a dynamical relation to the rest, and gives a peculiar orientation to the whole; so that it becomes clear that there is a general law of the dynamical relation of every sentiment to the character in which it is developed.\textsuperscript{1} 

Sentiments do not function in isolation. They form a system or hierarchy with a dominant sentiment, the master sentiment. The organisation into sentiment certainly leads to unification. The control of the sentiments, according to McDougall, is here, but this position cannot be defended. "The ideal of character," he says, "is the synthesis or harmonised system of moral sentiments."\textsuperscript{2} But, as we shall see later, this is where the third and highest, the rational level of conduct, comes in, and the unifying factor is found, not at the sentiment level, but in the ideals or principles peculiar to the highest stage of development.

\textsuperscript{1} The Foundations of Character, p.122.

\textsuperscript{2} Outline of Psychology, p.441.
Again, the 'ideal' and the 'sentiment' are to be distinguished, for example, love of justice and ideal of justice. The ideal is more than the sentiment, and involves activity on a yet higher plane. Action determined by sentiment may show all kinds of inconsistencies and incongruities, whereas action determined by an ideal is consistent and harmonious. The ideal, therefore, represents a higher level of psychical-integration than the sentiment, just as the sentiment represents a higher level than the instinct. We come here to the highest level, the rational, the ideal, where we have ideals or principles. This happens when a rational self-conscious personality identifies the ideal with itself. Only some sentiments are capable of being identified with the ideal.

The self cannot be completely explained in terms of the mechanisms involved in the development of personality and/
and the psychologist must describe the facts as he finds them, "but these facts include, not merely the functioning of the individual mechanical systems, but the emergence of new functions with the appearance of psychic organisation, the synthesis of personality, and the dynamic of selfhood, leaving the ultimate explanation to the philosopher. The one certain fact which the psychologist can contribute to the solution of the problem is that the phenomena of personal behaviour, and of the personal inner life, cannot be derived from the functioning of mechanisms, either physiological like the autonomic system, biological like instinct, intellectual like the Herbartian apperception-mass, or pathological, like the 'complex,' 'formation,' or 'mechanism' of the psycho-analyst."¹ Dreyer is quite explicit on this creative aspect of personality. In distinguishing between a sentiment and an ideal, he says, "How is the ideal related to the existent world of external nature, the world of mechanism? Clearly it has no existence in that world at all. Yet it may profoundly modify the future of that world. In other words, as far as that world is concerned it is creative."²

This position is more defensible than that of McDougall/

McDougall. In his general scheme the master-sentiment which forms the basis of character is the self-regarding sentiment. He holds\(^1\) that, in comparison with the great sentiments of self-regard and of love and hate for persons and with the stronger of the crude instinctive promptings, the impulses of anger, fear, hunger and lust, in comparison with any of these, the moral sentiments are but feeble springs of action. "How is the conduct of a good man constantly regulated in accordance with his moral sentiments? By what magic do these relatively weak tendencies of the moral sentiments control those immensely powerful impulses?" He refuses to admit that reason has the control. All that reason he argues, does is to refine and harmonise the moral sentiments. It may help us to acquire a moral creed, a belief that some one formula may express the ultimate goal of moral effort, but reason is not a conative energy that may be thrown on this side or that, in our moral conflicts. What is this of which we are in search? According to McDougall, it is not, as with Shaftesbury, "good taste," or, as with Butler, "conscience," or, as with Adam Smith, "the impartial spectator within the breast," or, as with James, "the fiat of the will," but/

\[^1\] Outline of Psychology, p. 439f.
but "an impulse awakened within the sentiment of self-regard. It is the desire that I, the precious self, that being which I conceive proudly or humbly, more or less adequately, more or less truly, and more or less clearly, according to the degree of development of my powers, the desire that this self shall realise in action the ideal of conduct which it has formulated and accepted."¹ Thus, he describes conduct of the higher level, as "striving regulated in the choice of goals and means by the desire to realise an ideal of character and conduct, a desire which itself springs from an instinctive disposition whose impulse is turned to higher uses by the subtle influences of organised society embodying a moral tradition."²

Yet, in dealing with the freedom of the will, McDougall insists that the human mind, in its highest flights, creates new things, thinks in ways that have never been thought before, "If, then, the human mind is greatly creative in its highest forms and flights, how can we deny that it may be creative, in a small way, in the moral struggles of the common man. By a long series of such creative acts on the/

¹ The Outline of Psychology, p. 440.
on the parts of men both great and small, the moral tradition, the highest product of organic evolution, has been painfully and slowly evolved. Why should we doubt that organic evolution is a creative power and that Mind is the creative agency? We have no theory of organic evolution remotely adequate to the problem. But it seems clear that any theory which ignores Mind condemns itself to triviality,"¹ And the aspect of mind which is characteristically human is the creative aspect. We might add that any theory of man which ignores this aspect is condemning itself to triviality. McDougall's scheme of the organisation of the mind culminating in the "self-regarding sentiment" needs to be supplemented by the rational or creative factors. Brown is right when he says that the theory, that the self-regarding sentiment is "the source of the energy, which as an effort of will reinforces the individual's ideal impulse in its conflict with native propensity," is "too mechanical to be a worthy description of such a complicated organisation as that of the human mind."² although "to a certain extent it does fit in with what can be said about disturbance of volition in pathological/  

¹ Outline of Psychology, p448.  
² Mind and Personality, p.71.
pathological cases, through the existence of complexes.\textsuperscript{1} Thouless points out that in the sense in which emotion is used in psychology it is absurd to define religion purely in terms of emotion. "On its mental side," he says, "religion is clearly a sentiment, it is a system of emotional dispositions organising in its system a variety of different emotions. It is therefore correct to speak of the religious sentiment..... We may speak of the religious sentiment when we mean the system of emotional dispositions organised around the objects of religion.........Religion is one among many sentiments."\textsuperscript{2} Selbie holds that the origin of religion "is not probably to be ascribed to the working of a religious instinct, but rather to the fact that man's primitive instincts work in such a way as to point to a religious interpretation of the universe and of life, and so to give rise to a religious sentiment."\textsuperscript{3} "For religion," he says, "is not to be regarded as an instinct, nor does it belong to the instinctive side of our nature only. It is rather to be classed as a sentiment, i.e., a direction or/ \bigskip

\textsuperscript{1} Op.Cit., p. 78. 
\textsuperscript{2} An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p.100 
\textsuperscript{3} The Psychology of Religion, p.13.
or organisation of our instinctive tendencies in response to some specific stimulus or object. The sentiment of religion has as its object that which will secure the conservation of socially recognised values.  

Edward has dealt very fully with this point of view, and his position is, that "religion provides one of the highest and most enduring of the human values of which we have been speaking, and the sentiment in which that value is enshrined has been one of the great creative forces in the evolution of man's higher life. The religious life is the exercise of that sentiment. Worship is its outlet and expression. The activities and pursuits of human service which religion has at all times inspired and to which religious men have so freely given themselves are also its issue. And, above all, the character in which it issues marks it most of all as unique."

Using sentiment in the sense in which the term is now used by psychologists like Shand and Drever, we may speak/

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1 The Psychology of Religion, p.293.
2 A Student's Philosophy of Religion, p.222.
3 Religious Experience, p.114.
speak of the religious sentiment. It is certainly better to speak of the sentiment of religion than of the instinct of religion, but not even that meets the case. Our problem is, at what level does religion, as such, appear. That is a bigger question and takes us beyond the sentiments. We shall deal with that later and shall point out that there is a sentiment level in the religious attitude, and in this sense we may speak of the sentiment of religion. But there is a still higher level. Religion, as a group of religious sentiments, is at a lower level than religion as a system of religious ideals. It may be true that most religion is at the sentiment level, but, at its highest, religion is at the ideal level. Sentiments have not the necessity attaching to religion, of being grounded in the 'rational' nature of man. Conscience, as we see it in most people, that is, not at its highest, is at the sentiment level, but morality as such is at a higher level. We would not say that morality was a sentiment. It has a personal side, but it has also objectivity, which a sentiment does not claim to have. We might speak of an aesthetic sentiment, but art itself is something more. Our position becomes at once apparent, if we try to designate science as a sentiment. Religion, then, is no more a sentiment than science, though in the sense noted above, we may speak of a religious sentiment.
Meinong recognised the creative contribution of the mind in opposition to empiricism and to Hobbes' "Nihil in intellectu non in sensu" when he spoke of 'objects of a higher order'. Ward\(^1\) notes this. "By transposing a tune from one key to another," he says, "we may obtain two entirely diverse aggregates of notes and yet the melody may remain unchanged. On the other hand by varying the order of the notes, two distinct tunes may result from the same collection of notes. Sense furnishes merely the parts: whence then this identity of the whole inspite of their diversity, this diversity of the whole inspite of their identity. . . . . Of such complex wholes or combinations - as distinct from mere aggregates/\(^1\)

\(^1\) Psychological Principles, p.316.
aggregates or collections - there are many forms: as, for example, geometrical figures and patterns, motions and other changes, numbers, logical connexions, in fact, relations generally....The sensationalist from Hume onwards .....after vainly seeking the living whole among the dead particulars, next surmises that they generate it by their conjoint action!....... Combinations and comparisons then, we conclude, are not given, but 'grounded' on what is given, and is thus their fundamentum. Hence Meinong, who has studied the psychology of intellection with especial care, has called the new presentations due to this process of 'grounding', 'objects of a higher order', or 'ideal objects.' They have validity in respect of the particulars on which they are grounded, but not reality as data existing for perception alongside of such particulars."

Investigations on thinking by psychologists, like Watt and Bühler, have rediscovered the place of intelligence in psychology. Psychology has been slow to recognise the originative or creative aspect of mind. It has tried in every way to avoid doing so. Empiricism tried to build/
build up experience in a passive mind. Instinct was next resorted to, and it was not creative. The truth is, that the biological sciences have no place for creative activity. It is the unique experience with which psychology has to deal. There is no doubt that metaphysics in Kant was ahead of psychology. It was Kant's "synthetic activity" that made the later development of psychology possible. Behaviourism is not a broad enough category. A biological view of psychological things is inadequate and misleading. We have had a mental chemistry which is obsolete. A mental biology is also obsolete. We want a psychological explanation of psychological products and processes.

We might put it thus. At a certain stage of evolution life emerges; at a further stage mind or intelligence emerges; and in the higher aspects of mental life creative intelligence or reason appears. The old dualism of mind and body must give way to a trinity in the right sense of the term, not three independent isolated entities, body, mind, spirit. It is this creative intelligence which distinguishes/
distinguishes man from the animals: it is the distinguishing feature between homo sapiens and the apes. The distinction is one between intelligence and reason, reason being peculiar to man. As Wyatt says, "The progress of theoretical psychology is checked by a reluctance to acknowledge the distinctive character of the art or process of intelligence." ¹

The discovery of intelligence in animals is most important for our study, and we owe much to work done by Thorndike, Lloyd Morgan, Hobhouse, Washburn, Köhler and Yerkes. In this connection Köhler's work with apes, perhaps, is most apposite for our purpose. He has proved that the apes certainly have intelligence and not merely instinctive cleverness. This intelligence is at the perceptual level, and therein differs from human intelligence or reason.

An ape is shown a banana placed outside its cage and beyond its reach. Then it is supplied with lengths of bamboo rod, none long enough to reach the fruit. This ape has


² The Mentality of Apes, p.103f.
has not been known previously to employ a rod as a tool, and does not perceive any connection between itself and the fruit via the rod. It reaches through the bars of the cage in vain, then busies itself otherwise, and returns again and again to the fruit. If the rod itself becomes an objective, it plays with it, without reference to the fruit. But if the rod and the fruit are once associated, the situation alters, and the rod is used to secure the fruit. It may get the length of using two rods, a long one and a short one, the former being used to push the latter along the ground until it touches the fruit, which, however, cannot be secured. Now, what the ape is really doing is something quite new, immediately it sees the bearing of the rod on the fruit, the rod becomes definitely related to the situation. This in itself is a transformation in the situation confronting the animal. This is not a process of trial and error. It is intelligence, insight, at work. One clever ape, Sultan, discovered how to fix a short length into the hollow of a longer rod, thus making two rods into one.

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1 The Mentality of Apes, p.129f.
one, and with this it was possible to reach the fruit.
It is interesting that instead of the tedious trial and error
method, the ape invariably grasped the longer rod in his left
hand, and fitted the smaller one into the bore with his right
hand. Of course, "stupid" and "clever" errors were made,
but the stupid errors were fewer. In one of Köhler's
experiments fruit was hung from the roof near a wall too
high for a single box to give sufficient elevation to reach
it. The ape had not learned to put one box upon the other,
and it was a clever error when he braced the box in his arms
against the wall high enough for him to have reached the
fruit if the box had stuck there and he could have mounted it.
Another experiment revealed 'intelligence'. Fruit was
hung on the roof of the cage and the ape succeeded in reaching
it by piling box on top of box, until a four storey structure
was made, firm enough for him to balance upon and reach the
fruit. These and other experiments are enough to show
that there was an adaptation of old means to an entirely
new end, that genuine intelligence was present. The result was due to a greater adaptability
to meet a more complex situation and it is the adaptability or
modifiability/
modifiability to meet such a situation together with an awareness or appreciation of the situation, which is called intelligence or insight. In these experiments an irrelevant object is made relevant to the situation, and Köhler concludes that the animal's solutions involve an "apprehension of relations" with true insight.

The higher animals, then, in view of recent experiments, must be credited with intelligence. But that is not to say that any distinction between the animal and man disappears. It is a form of intelligence, perceptual intelligence, that the apes possess. They can do perceptual constructive work, but man differs from them, in that he possesses reason or creative intelligence at the conceptual level. The apes solve their problems with the aid of inner mental processes equivalent to those which we call reflection, but Köhler himself warns us that even behaviour with insight, which indicates intelligence, must not receive an interpretation too highly intellectualistic. He states, that "the time in which the chimpanzee lives is limited in past and future. First of all, the number of observations is small, in which any reckoning upon a future contingency is recognisable, and it seems to me of theoretical importance/
importance that the clearest consideration of a future event occurs then when the anticipated event is a planned act of the animal itself. In such a case it may really happen that an animal will spend considerable time in preparatory work, as when Sultan labours long to sharpen one end of a wooden board, so that it will afterwards fit into a tube and he can carry out his scheme with the double-stick. When such preliminary work, obviously undertaken with a view to a final goal lasts a long time, but in itself affords no visible approach to that end, there we have the signs of at least some sense of future. To be sure, there is, in the example given, the incentive of the visible reward, and all through his labour, he could glance from time to time at the fruit: anyone seeing an ape making preparations for an anticipated future experiment, the conditions of which are not at the time in sight, would be witness of a still higher achievement in the direction under discussion. Then the consideration of certain external circumstances in the near or distant future, not only of self-planned actions, would operate as a condition of the actual behaviour.\footnote{The Mentality of Apes, p.282. and footnote.}
It is pointed out by Professor J. A. Thomson that, while animals have language of a sort, no animal makes a sentence or expresses in a sentence a judgment of its own. They may learn to associate a sound or word with a certain thing, person or action, but that is not to have language as humanly used. Animals certainly communicate with one another in many ways, with and without vocal signals, but they cannot calculate or extract cube roots.

The crucial question is, Have animals reason or creative intelligence? Have they abstract ideas? The answer is in the negative. We have seen that there is no doubt that animals have intelligence, that in making perceptual inferences they employ insight at least, but they cannot think in terms of abstract ideas, as we are doing at the moment. They show intelligent behaviour but they do not rise to rational conduct. They could never, therefore, be regarded as moral agents. The possession by man of abstract ideas and ethical ideals separates him from the lower creation. "To go back to the past, to single out some particular occurrence and to think of it in its absence as the cause of an actual or of an anticipated experience is the prerogative of man only."  

Intelligence/
Intelligence in the animal is the power to appreciate a situation. All that we can be sure about is, that there is perceptual process involving insight, or intelligence at the perceptual level. That is not, as we shall see, intelligence such as is found in man. Problems with the apes are not solved ideationally. Köhler concludes that their ideational material is at best very rudimentary, and that so-called "images" are virtually a negligible factor in their experience. Koffka says that "Köhler's animals solve their problems with the aid of inner mental processes equivalent to those we call reflection. These inner processes can be regarded only as an equivalent, however, and are not at all identical with true reflection". The higher animals, then, in view of recent experiments must be credited with intelligence.

Stout, dealing with perceptual process contrasted with what he terms "trains of free ideas" says, "But perceptual intelligence, in its pure form, is exclusively concerned with the guidance and control of motor activity in relation to an immediately present situation and to its acquired meaning as conveyed by implicit ideas inseparably coalescing with actual sensations. Thus the perceptual consciousness cannot deal with past, future, and absent objects except in the act of dealing with what is given to it here and now. In the pursuit of/

1 The Growth of the Mind, p.206.
of ends, it is circumscribed by the necessity of always working forward step by step, from the actually given situation, through a series of others until the goal is reached. ¹ He continues, "Trains of free ideas are not, in this way, bound up with bodily behaviour in relation to a given situation and so confined to the point of view fixed by actual sense experience. Thought, which takes shape in a sequence of explicit ideas, conditioned by a sequence of mental images, can expatiate freely in the domain of the past, the future, the absent and the merely possible, in detachment from the circumstances of the immediate present. . . . . We are able mentally to cross a bridge before we come to it."²

The distinction between the animals and man may be stated thus. There are, however, ideas and values beyond the range of animal intelligence. Man can apply his intelligence to ideas as well as to concrete facts, whereas the animal is restricted, doubtless, in its use of intelligence to concrete experience. Whenever we meet an ideally represented situation, for example, a game of chess, by thinking things out, we are employing our intelligence at the ideational level. When we have to justify our conclusion and seek premises in support of it, then we are at the rational level, that is, we are/

² Ibid, p. 368-9
are dealing logically with the situation. In moral action, when we are conscious of the end which we have in view and are seeking means to attain that end, we are acting at the rational level. At this level, there is consciousness of an end as an end, there is conscious purpose. On the conational side, at this level, there is will as distinguished from impulse.

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1 The relationship of Instinct, Intelligence, Reason may be diagramatically represented thus:--

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptual</th>
<th>Ideational</th>
<th>Rational</th>
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<tr>
<td>concrete objects or experiences</td>
<td>ideas</td>
<td>values</td>
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- Instinct
- Insight
- Thought
- Intelligence
- Reason
THE RELATION OF INSTINCT TO INTELLIGENCE AND REASON.

While the constitution of man's nature is undoubtedly an important question, the supreme issue is the source of the directing force of man's activity, the main determinant in his behaviour, whether it is a vis a tergo or a vis a fronte. The view of McDougall and his followers represents the first position, and typical of this attitude is the statement that the instincts are the main agents in setting the direction of conduct. The underlying assumption, which of course is false, is, that instinct can set ends to itself. McDougall, for example, illegitimately imports into a statement on instinct the conception 'end', "the instinctive/
instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means. "Thouless in a lecture said, "Human instincts are general tendencies of behaviour essentially modifiable. They are sources of energy which could be switched from socially undesirable channels into directions of social usefulness." Now, we desire to know what controls the switch. McDougall appears to be begging the question in the use of the term 'ends'. An end that is not conscious is not an end for the individual who is acting. There are no conscious ends in instinctive conduct. "One step enough for me" is the law of instinctive behaviour. Those who take McDougall's view fail to realise the presence of a new and self-determining factor in human nature which is not instinctive in nature or in origin. To quote again from Selbie, who

1 Social Psychology, p.44.
2 The Glasgow Herald, Dec.4.1926.
who insists on this new factor, "Strong instincts are themselves, as it were, merely raw material and it is the use of them that counts. The fact that religion is capable of sublimating primitive instincts like those of fear and sex shows clearly that it is not all compacted of them, but is something sui generis and therefore able to use them for its own high ends."¹ We hope to show that in this new or self-determining factor lies the origin of knowledge for its own sake, art, morality, religion.

It is not instinct but reason that sets the end. Intelligence is not created by instinct to serve its ends; rather it directs the instincts. Reason cannot disregard the instincts, but it is not dominated by them. Culture simply means that man comes to live on the rational rather than on the instinctive level. The great human institutions may in their early stages have arisen out of the endeavour to satisfy organic impulses, but that is an entirely different thing from saying that these institutions in their developed forms are mere reactions to organic needs. We cannot neglect the influence and control of ideals and conscious aims.

aims. The force of the instinct remains, but the form of it is changed, changed sometimes almost out of recognition. As Thouless says, "But, while we recognise that much of his behaviour is not (at least in its beginning) intelligent in the sense that it is determined by previous experience, we must be on our guard against the opposite error of exaggerating the part played by instinct in the determination of human behaviour."¹

McDougall² holds that instinctive action rather than reflex action is the key to the understanding of human behaviour. The opposite view held by Bergson and others is that Instinct and Intelligence are two diverse developments of mind that have little in common, that in the course of evolution mind arrived at the parting of the ways, that there were two divergent paths Instinct and Intelligence; and that, while the insects followed the former and developed Instinct in a very high degree and Intelligence hardly at all, the vertebrates and mammals followed the other path and developed Intelligence till it culminated in the intellect of man. But McDougall holds strongly that Instinct and Intelligence/

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¹ An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p.123.
² Outline of Psychology, p.70.
Intelligence are not two diverse principles of action or of guidance of action, that instinctive behaviour is indistinguishable from intelligent behaviour by any outward mark. "Instinct requires and implies," he says, "the cooperation of Intelligence." "Intelligence operates only and always in the service of the instinctive impulses to action."\(^1\) Again, he states, "The instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct, every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end......all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfaction......Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would be inert and motionless, like a wonderful clock-work whose main spring had been removed, or a steam engine whose fires had been drawn."\(^2\) This subordination of reason to instinct cannot be accepted. It makes too much of instinct and too little of reason. It is interesting/

\(^1\) Outline of Psychology, p.93.
interesting to find McDougall saying that "a little dose of intelligence may modify the impulsive power of emotion or of instinct."  

Drever says that "psychologically Instinct and Intelligence cannot be placed in opposition." Now we have already said that Köhler's experiments with the higher animals show that intelligence is present in these animals, and no one would deny an instinctive aspect in man's behaviour. Bergson claims that instinct and intelligence are on different levels of evolution, basing his argument on the distinction between intuitive and conceptual knowledge. Psychologically, this distinction is unjustifiable. "Intuitive knowledge" says Drever, "is perceptual knowledge, qualified, if you like, by a feeling of its value and significance at the moment, but not thereby altered in its cognitive aspect." Bergson holds that instinctive knowledge is not of the same order as conceptual knowledge, and Drever replies that what Bergson calls instinctive knowledge is perceptual knowledge. "We have no/  

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1 Outline of Psychology, p.127.
2 Instinct in Man, p.89.
no right to speak of knowledge, as characterising the
operations of Instinct beyond the knowledge involved in
perceptual consciousness."\(^1\) Bergson says, that, "Instinct
is therefore necessarily specialised, being nothing but
the utilisation of a specific instrument for a specific
object. The instrument constructed intelligently, on the
contrary, is an imperfect instrument. It costs an effort.
It is generally troublesome to handle. But as it is made
of unorganised matter, it can take any form whatsoever,
serve any purpose, free the living being from every new
difficulty that arises, and bestow on it an unlimited
number of powers. Whilst it is inferior to the natural
instrument for the satisfaction of immediate wants, its
advantage over it is the greater, the less urgent the need."\(^2\)
Drever adds, "Understand 'perceptual experience' for 'the
specific instrument of instinct' and 'conceptual thought'
for 'the instrument constructed intelligently,' and everything
becomes clear and acceptable to any psychologist." Dewey
gives/

\(^1\) Instinct in Man, p. 107.
\(^2\) Creative Evolution, p. 148.
gives the same interpretation of Bergson's intuition, that it is equivalent to saying, that by instinct a bird knows how to build a nest and a spider to weave a web.¹

The point is, that in all intelligence you have less fixity but greater elasticity and educability. As man loses the power of instinct, his power of adaptability increases, his capacity for modifiability increases, which means that he can meet a rapidly changing environment. If the animal is faced with a too rapidly changing environment, it succumbs. Intelligence then means the power of adaptability or modifiability. Man is the most intelligent animal because he is the most educable.

Undoubtedly, much of the trouble in the question of Instinct and Intelligence has arisen through the varied uses of the terms. This is made abundantly clear in the statements by leading psychologists in the Symposium in the British Journal of Psychology.² Some would carry instinct right through to man's higher activities, belittling intelligence, others, Stout for example, hold that all instinctive behaviour is intelligently determined but that there may be intelligent/

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¹ Human Nature and Conduct, p.177.
² Vol.111. Part.3.
intelligent behaviour not instinctively determined. Stout, of course, regards the instinctive endowment of man as insignificant. Dreyer sums up his own position, agreeing thus far with Myers, that "there is no instinctive behaviour without an intelligent factor, and there is no intelligent behaviour without an instinctive factor."

It has been argued that intelligent behaviour is but a modification of instinct. But the essential characteristic of human instincts is that quite different modes of acting can be grafted on to them. If intelligence is not to be regarded as a distinct factor, then why recognise instinct as a new factor, different from purely mechanistic tropisms. Dewey says that "impulses are too chaotic, tumultuous, and confused to be able to know even if they wanted to," and only intelligence "notes obstructions, invents tools, conceives aims, directs technique." And again, he says, "Intelligence is concerned with foreseeing the future so that action may have order and direction. It is also concerned with principles and criteria of judgment." Koffka shows the distinction between instinctive and intelligent behaviour thus, "In the case of instinct, it is enough to present the beginning-situation to a living being and at once an activity is started which continues until the end is attained." There need not be consciousness of the end. He states, that in the solving of the problems set the apes by Kohler, "the essential thing about these solutions is not a new combination of/

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1. Instinct in Man, p.128.
of movements with which the animals were already familiar but 'a new configuration of the whole field.'"¹ With the apes there is a problem, a task, an end and the whole activities of the animal are determined by that and cease when the problem is solved. We might compare a man building a house with a bird building a nest. The bricklayers building a house, who do not know the plan, are in the same attitude as the bird setting out to build a nest, whereas the architect conceiving the plan is at the other end, at the intelligent end. Köhler's experiments show that the apes accommodate themselves to new situations and solve new problems by actually undertaking new modes of behaviour. This is vastly different from instinctive behaviour and is far removed from learning by trial and error. It is "intelligent learning," it is the solution of original problems by insight, and involves a new interpretation of intelligence. Koffka sums up Köhler's experiments thus. "In the achievements of Köhler's chimpanzees we find new creations of a pure type occurring in these experiments, quite/

quite free from chance. Instead of the solution first arising by chance, and thereafter becoming more or less "understood", understanding, or an appropriate transformation of the field, precedes the objective solution. We may therefore be permitted to call solutions of this kind intelligent performances of a primitive order."\(^1\)

Marshall maintains that there are two aspects, consciousness and behaviour, that is, the psychological and the biological. Instinct belongs to the biological and there can therefore be no conflict. He states that instincts are given to a race through inheritance,\(^2\) but again he contradicts this. "Not a few thinkers of the past have held that all our so-called unconscious instinct-actions have originally been intelligently acquired in the past. This view had its measure of support so long as it was held that habits acquired by an individual could be transmitted by inheritance as instincts. But modern studies have led us to see that such transmission of acquired traits is highly improbable."\(^3\) Marshall holds that it is the time-span/

\(^1\) The Growth of the Mind, p. 205.
\(^2\) Mind and Conduct, p. 32, p. 39.
span that makes the difference between instinct and intelligence. He assumes that instinct is immediate in the time span and that intelligence is delayed. We may compare immediate retention and delayed retention. But this is not so, because (1) instinct may be prolonged, as in the case of nest-building with birds and in all chain instincts; (2) intelligence may be almost immediate. Köhler contradicts this and maintains that it is 'insight' that solves the situation and shortens the span as against mere trial and error methods. Instinct and intelligence should not be opposed to one another but both might be opposed to learning by trial and error. Myers\(^1\) seems to have identified intelligence with consciousness. Marshall's view comprises anything of value in Myers. There is the level of experience or trial and error, then there is insight, still at the perceptual level. The rational level, that of abstract ideas is the highest. If you take as an illustration a human puzzle, you have the level of trial and error and that of/

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1 See 'The Mentality of Apes'.

2 Symposium 'Instinct and Intelligence', The British Journal of Psychology, Vol.111. Part.3.
of insight, but the creating of the puzzle is a distinctly higher level, the rational level.

"The truth seems to be," as Thouless puts it, "that the history of the mental development of a human being is the history of the replacement of purely instinctive behaviour by behaviour of the same kind determined by habit, and modified by mental processes of the complex kind which we may describe as intelligent thinking."¹ Intelligence, we should say, when it appears must express itself through a modification of an instinctive activity. It keeps shifting further and further from instinct. Instincts, as instincts, fall away. Mankind has so modified his environment that the animal is no longer living in a natural environment. Dewey says, that "man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct."² Rather, we should say that man is a creature of acquired activities. Intellectual activities are grafted on to instinctive forces. Intelligence and instinct are, therefore, not antagonistic or mutually exclusive, but complementary to one another. Graham Wallas points out how apt we are to conclude, "that 'instinct', or 'emotion',"³

¹ An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p.123.
'emotion,' or 'instinctive emotion,' was the 'power' required; and
that 'intelligence' or 'reason' was the machine. McDougall in his
Outline of Psychology' says, that 'it is a paradox of Intelligence
that it directs forces or energies without being itself a force or
energy.' Even the great physiologist, Sir Charles Sherrington, in
his Presidential Address to the British Association in 1923, spoke
of the human mind as 'actuated by instinct but instrumented by reason.'
David Hume, writing in 1739 expressed the same conclusion in terms of
the ancient industrial system based on slavery. 'Reason', he said,
'shas no original influence;' it is, and ought only to be the slave of
the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey them.' The result is that reason has been assigned a very
minor part, whereas really reason, not instinct, sets the end for the
individual.

The interesting point with Rignano is, that the presence
of intellect in the religious sentiment alters almost out of
recognition the emotions in it. 'Finally,' he says, "the intellect
renders possible that infinite variety of "nuances" which affective
tendencies can assume in man. For since it is able to observe from
different points of view, simultaneously or nearly so, each
complex environmental relation, it is capable of evoking diverse
effectivities/
affectivities at the same time; and these by association, combination, confluence, interference and mutual partial inhibition, as Bain would have said, finally produce an exceedingly complex affectivity which is therefore capable of showing the finest possible gradations from one case to another, according to the number and character of its component parts.

"Thus fear, anxiety and kindred feelings had already developed in animals from the instinct of self-preservation in its purely defensive form; but in man it gives rise to all the propitiatory affectivities in innumerable varieties and shades, such as prostration, humility, hypocrisy, flattery and the like. Even the religious sentiment in its lowest forms derives from this propitiatory affectivity, while the higher religious sentiment and the analogous feeling experienced in the presence of the sublime are its further and more highly developed forms. The noblest sentiment of justice is a very remote and hardly recognisable derivative of the same instinct.

"How high may be the degree of complexity which can/

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can thus be attained is shown, for instance, by maternal love, which has grown from the purely bodily necessity for lactation to the tenderest feelings of the noblest altruism: and especially by conjugal affection, which has been transformed from coarse brutal sexual appetite to amharmonious cooperation of the gentlest and most delicate moral affectivities.  

We may sum up by saying that the emotional systems are modified by rational factors. F. Matthias Alexander puts it thus: "As time went on, reasoning came more and more to illumine the creature's dull and limited existence...... The development and use of this reasoning process marked primitive man's differentiation from the lower animals, but it also marked - and this is even more important from the point of view of man's evolutionary history - the "beginning of the end" of the dominance of instinct as a controlling factor in human activity, so that from this period onwards man could no longer satisfactorily live and move by sub-conscious (better 'unwitting') guidance alone."  

The transition/

1 The Psychology of Reasoning, pp.19-20
2 Brackets ours.
3 Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual, p.44.
transition from the instinct level to the rational level is a change of front, from the *vis a tergo* to the *vis a fronte*. Ward says that, "instead of 'behaviour' determined largely by the *vis a tergo* of instinct or habit, we have conduct shaped by what is literally prudence or foresight, the pursuits of ends that are not esteemed desirable till they are judged to be worth what they will cost, conduct determined by ends that are judged to be 'binding' because worthy *per se*........ Primarily, as we have seen, it was the physical side that seemed to 'call the tune', but later on the higher levels of consciousness, the initiative lies with increasing frequency on the purely psychical side."

Marshall is wrong in maintaining that man is not a distinctively rational animal. "There is no ground for the claim," he says, "that the conduct of man is in general guided by reason, or that he is distinguishable from the animals as being a distinctly rational animal."2 "That we are often guided in our conduct by reason is recognised unhesitatingly by all men. In fact it is very commonly held among the less thoughtful that man is differentiated from/

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Psychological Principles, p.441.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\] Mind and Conduct, p.48.
from other animals just in the fact that he alone is a rational animal: and this notion is still clung to notwithstanding that the scientific observer finds it impossible to draw any line of distinction between the intelligent activities of man and those of animals: and notwithstanding that it is now generally realised that most of our conduct shows the marks of instinctive behaviour which of old was supposed to be the mode of action marking off animals from the members of the genus homo." He fails to recognise that there is a new factor in human reason which is not in the animals, the distinctively rational factors.

We may put it in this way. The instinctive activities supply the driving force, but reason sets the ends. Man, determined by instinct, is like a railway train on a railway track: its movements are restricted, and only certain destinations are possible. Man, controlled by reason, is like the motor car: its movements have a greater scope.

It is to be noted that, as Oman puts it, "Man with a taboo, which he would not break for any earthly gain or even to save his life, was no longer a mere animal whose only inhibition was the threat of suffering or the fear of death." So is it with man's/

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1 Mind and Conduct, p.189.
man's sense of shame and man's ideal of self-sacrifice, which cannot be explained by any instinctively initiated or directed activity. A writer¹ says, "The human child is probably the only animal in which the so-called "Oedipus" situation is possible, and this, necessarily, has a profound and far-reaching effect upon his social development. The factor of guilt, conscious or "unconscious", is of paramount importance." Man's business is really to shake off the shackles of instinct and free himself for his creative work. He wants something better than the perceptual. Wallace says, "This is, in a nutshell, the evolution of ethics. It begins when cooperative action first appears upon the scene and it marks the fact (first) that the single self has made a step forward, has broken the mechanism of nature, and assumed a direction, set forth an end; and (second) that it did so in a strength not entirely its own, through a will not completely self-centred: that it/

¹ Abstract of a Paper on "The Function of the School for the Young Child" by Mrs. Susan Isaacs, M.A., British Psychological Society, Education Section, May 9, 1927.
it depended on help, on cooperation, and thus submitted itself to a bond."\(^1\) Culture emerges because of man's creative capacity. The animals have not the power to create or construct a position different from the perceptual. They cannot form ideals. As Ward expresses it, "The whole experience of the animal, in a word, is marked by 'immediacy and isolation'; having no trains of ideas, the animal devises no plans - makes no tools and cooks no food, for example. Compared with a man even the highest animal resembles an automaton."\(^2\) He holds that "intellect does much more than devise and contrive in unquestioning subservience to the impulse of the moment."\(^3\)

"Whereas the mere animal practically begins and ends with the stability of its instincts and is from first to last confined to the level of its species, man only gradually achieves personal stability in passing from that level through/

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\(^1\) Lectures on Natural Theology and Ethics, p.124.
\(^2\) Psychological Principles, p.463.
through the instability of the imagery and desiring self of childhood to the stedfastness of a reasonable and autonomous being.\textsuperscript{1} And we find that Marshall\textsuperscript{2} draws a clear distinction between instinctive actions and adaptive or intelligent actions, the former influenced by the past, the latter by the future. Drever says, that, "an ideal as a creative factor may bring into being a complex coherent rational pattern of events which it would be wildly absurd to attribute to blind creative forces and mechanisms. The pre-existence of such a pattern as potentiality is only possible in the ideal: its actual realisation is made possible by a rational self-conscious personality, which identifies the ideal with itself. Only by such a Self as we have described could the coherence and rationality of the pattern be apprehended; only in such a Self could it exist as ideal.\textsuperscript{3}"

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\textsuperscript{1} Psychological Principles, p.464.

\textsuperscript{2} Mind and Conduct.

\textsuperscript{3} An Introduction to the Psychology of Education, p.138.
The Source of Religion - at the Rational Level.

It is, then, at this highest level, which we have called reason or creative intelligence, that we find the origin of religion. As Leuba puts it, "The existence of both magic and religion depends upon traits which animals lack." Religion, as such, is an attitude which finds satisfaction and completeness in a sense of powers or a Power other than itself, an attitude to an ideal construction. Ward says, "The truth is that reason which makes man capable of morality makes him also capable of religion." Religion emerges when culture breaks through. It is one aspect or product of man's creative intelligence. We come to the conclusion, that the process of evolution, which has produced man out of lower forms of life, has evolved a new function, for man, by his creative capacity, differs from the lower creatures, who, like him, have instinct and intelligence, but, unlike him, have not reason or creative conceptual intelligence. Browning says, "A man, for aye removed from the developed brute, a god though in the germ,"

1 A Psychological Study of Religion, p.57.
2 Psychology applied to Education, p.149.
and again,

"All tended to mankind
And man produced, all has its end thus far:
But in completed man, begins anew
A tendency to God."

We should rather say that in man begins the new tendency, the tendency to God. Chesterton illustrates our point. "Anybody might say, 'Very few men are really manly.' Nobody would say, 'Very few whales are really whaley.' If you wanted to dissuade a man from drinking his tenth whisky, you would slap him on the back and say, 'Be a man.' No one who wished to dissuade a crocodile from eating his tenth explorer would slap it on the back and say, 'Be a crocodile.'"

Percy Nunn draws a useful distinction. He speaks of the 'drive' or 'urge' in the incessant adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life and that are not purely mechanical processes. He gives to this element of drive or urge the term 'home'. It occurs in the conscious life.

1 The Religious Roots of Democracy, p.63.

2 Education - Its Data and Principles, p.22f.
Life of man and of the higher animals, in the unconscious activities of their bodies and the unconscious behaviour of lower animals. The term 'mneme' would be applied to the processes that are more mechanical. Using this distinction, we would say that we see the mnemonic principle at work in the instincts of animals, for example, in the nest-building instinct in birds. The mnemonic tendencies include the animal characteristics, the forces that make for sameness, inevitableness. The hormic tendencies include inventiveness in the physical sphere, and freedom in the moral. They form the basis of the progressive, elevating elements in man's life, and their products are culture, art, morality, religion. Both tendencies are present in human life. In basing religion on the instinctive side, the mnemonic side of man's nature, psychology has erred. The psychological bases of religion are the capacities belonging to the hormic or progressive side of man's nature. Religion, then, instead of being a force keeping man at the level of the brutes is a power raising him above that level. Now, this/
this hormone is seeking expression in the individual. In
the animal this 'force' expresses itself in the instincts.
It gets petrified in them, but, in the human personality,
it breaks through the instincts and emerges at a higher level.

The differentia of religion is that it takes its
creative construction as real, that is, the fundamental pre-
supposition of religion is that a better condition of things
than the present exists. It is therefore as natural for
man to be religious as it is for him to seek knowledge, to
appreciate the beautiful, to strive after goodness. This
gives a new meaning to the term 'natural' religion. As
Selbie says, "It belongs to the very constitution of his
nature that his reaction to the universe should find expression
in forms which we can only call religious."

"Man is by
nature religious and religion belongs to his normal relations
to the universe." Religion, then, is necessary to the
normal development of personality, as art, morality, culture
are.

Rignano, dealing with religion, says that it

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1 The Psychology of Religion. p. 2.
is here (i.e., in religion) that we find coming into play and affirming itself one of the most remarkable intellectual and affective differences between man and animals, on which in general sufficient stress is not laid. I allude to the mental and emotive form of the propitiatory act. This attitude, he contends, appears only in the struggle between man and man, that is, at the rational level, whereas animals ignore the propitiatory act. "It required", Rignano says, "a notable development of the highest intellectual faculties of observation, inhibition, and reasoning so that experience could teach the conqueror the advantage of sparing the conquered when he surrendered, and at the same time could teach the conquered the advantage he could secure to his safety by the very act of propitiation.... The first man who threw himself prostrate, but no longer before another man, was the first believer and the first founder of all religions."²

The distinguishing feature of *homo sapiens* from

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² Ibid. 153.
the ape is the possession of creative intelligence. This leads to conflict in human life, which is absent from animal life. Man is divided against himself, an animal with ideals, an idealist with instincts, a creature of two worlds. Plato in the Phaedrus has a beautiful metaphor of the human soul, like a charioteer, driving two winged horses, one mortal and the other immortal. If these are rightly controlled, and neither is vicious, then the soul abides in the realm where Truth, Beauty, and Justice are unimpaired. We might regard these winged horses or these unruly steeds as Reason and Instinct. Man's life is a tragedy as a result of these two forces. "Two of these isolated powers face each other, making incompatible demands. The competing forces are both in themselves rightful and so far the claim of each is equally justified; but the right of each is pushed in to a wrong, because it ignores the right of the other, and demands that absolute sway which belongs to neither alone, but to the whole of which each is but a part. . . . . . . . The end of the tragic conflict is the denial of both the exclusive claims."¹

There is no such conflict in animal life. It is here, it would seem, that religion is born, in this conflict caused by man's creative intelligence. The animals are finite, but their finitude causes them no unrest or dissatisfaction. Not only is man finite, but he knows that he is finite. There is real psychological insight in the poet, when Burns expresses this truth in his poem, 'To a Mouse':

"Still thou art blest, compared wi' me!
The present only toucheth thee:
But, ooh! I backward cast my e'e
On prospects drear!
And forward, though I canna see,
I guess and fear."

Hadfield says, "Subjectively considered, the basis of religion is the sense of incompleteness. Objectively considered, religion is that which comes to satisfy that craving for satisfaction and completeness in the human soul.... This craving of the whole personality for completeness and for satisfaction is the real psychological basis for religion."¹

This unrest and dissatisfaction are the sources of religion, art, morality, knowledge. The sense of incompleteness presupposes the existence, as every Hegelian would be quick to detect, although it may not be fully or consciously conceived, of the better state. Hadfield stresses the negative side. A true conception of the origin of religion would, while welcoming his testimony, stress the positive side. We might express it as the craving for wholeness. To satisfy this craving, man felt his need of powers or a power other than his own. The source of religion is the creative activity of human nature. The origin of religion is the sense of incompleteness. Religion is the attitude which, recognising this incompleteness, finds satisfaction in a sense of powers or a Power other than itself, in which its ideal is realised and from which it can derive help in realising it. As Dewey says, "The religious experience is a reality in so far as in the midst of effort to foresee and regulate future objects, we are sustained and expanded in feebleness and failure by the sense of an enveloping whole. Peace in action, not after it, is the contribution of the ideal to conduct/
Leuba says that "that, which differentiates religion from other forms of conduct, is the kind of power upon which dependence is felt and the kind of behaviour elicited by the power. A natural line of cleavage between religious and non-religious behaviour is made possible by the presence in man of ideas of forces of different character. Some of these forces are of the sort to which the name 'physical' is applied: others respond to intelligence and feeling, as if they themselves had mind and heart. Religion is that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of psychic nature, usually personal powers, (because creative)\(^2\) and makes use of them."\(^3\) But, when he goes on to say that "the reason for the existence of religion is not the objective truth of its conceptions but its biological value," we disagree. We should prefer to say that the reason for the existence of religion is its psychological necessity. There is a new note, a new emergence, something in religion, which cannot be psychologised into/

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1 Human Nature and Conduct, p.264.
2 Brackets ours.
3 A Psychological Study of Religion, p.52.
into anything simpler, with correlates, certainly, yet distinct from them. We have throughout insisted upon the power of instinct, emotion, sentiment, intelligence in human life, yet have refused to give pride of place to any of them in dealing with man. We have emphasised his creative intelligence, his ethical conduct, his ideals, as something distinctively his own. It is to this that we have traced the origin of religion, and we shall proceed to show that religion has many stages, and that it is not something subjective, a mere projection of man's own mind, but that it is as valid as knowledge or art or morality. Religion, as such, is then an ideal construction, not an instinct, emotion, or sentiment. It is better to call it an attitude to an ideal construction which is the product of man's creative activity. It is at the rational level that religion as such is found.

We now proceed to show the stages in religious development, in what sense we can speak of the instinct and the sentiment levels in religion.
Stages in Religious Development.

1 McDougall gives four levels or stages of conduct, (1) instinctive behaviour, (2) instinctive behaviour, modified by the influence of rewards and punishments, "conduct of the lower level", (3) conduct controlled by the anticipation of social praise and blame, "conduct of the middle level", (4) the highest stage in which conduct is regulated by an ideal of conduct, that enables a man to act in the way that seems to him right, regardless of the praise or blame of his immediate social environment, "conduct of the higher level." It is this fourth stage, that is the stage of conscience in its highest sense, where it is something more than the voice of conventionality. It is the moral stage. Shand, has three stages in the development of character, (1) where instincts play a more important part than emotions, in which, and as instrumental to their ends, are found the powers of intelligence and will, to which the animal attains, (2) a stage of sentiments, an interorganisation of these emotional systems, the basis of those higher and more complex systems, which, if not peculiar to man, chiefly characterise him; (3) a stage in which/

2 The Foundations of Character, p.173.
which the sentiments develop for their own more perfect organisation, systems of self-control in which the intellect and will rise to a higher level than is possible at the emotional stage. This third stage is the conscience or the moral stage. Shand notes the qualities peculiar to it, fortitude, patience, loyalty, and a relative ethics, that is in constant interaction with the ethics of the conscience, which is chiefly imposed upon us through social influences. Conscience depends not only upon training, age, country, sex, but also upon freedom or creative capacity. What Shand says about the prickings of conscience being largely confined to a man's dealings with members of his own tribe or nation, its rules not extended to all men, is only true of conscience in its less highly developed forms.

Davies recognises these phases or levels or stages of development. "Thus at the perceptual level the only motives which can operate are immediate feelings and crude emotion, because the mental life covers only the experience of the present moment; at the ideational level the development of sentiments becomes possible, and there is/
is escape from the slavery to immediate feelings and crude emotion; at the rational level even sentiment may be superseded by the ideal or principle, with which the individual after reflection has consciously identified himself.¹ Religion, then, as a group of religious sentiments, is at a lower stage than religion as a system of religious ideals. The ideal level is higher than the sentiment level. It may be true that most religion is at the sentiment level, as most conscience is, but at its highest, religion is at the ideal stage. Religion has doubtless similar stages to the stages outlined by McDougall, Shand, and Drever, but it is only at the highest stage that we discern what is really implicit in it, that is, the ideal factor. Only when man frees himself from the instinctive and perceptual, can real morality and religion appear, that is, only then can an end appear.

On analogous lines, we might suggest that the first stage in religion is the stage of habit, originated by suggestion and imitation. This habit level of religion has/

¹ An Introduction to the Psychology of Education, p. 63.
has given some justification to the application of the term instinct to religion. As Marshall puts it, "It is thus that I think it not improper to stretch a point, and to follow common usage in speaking of a religious instinct in man, that is evidenced by the habitual appearance of the behaviour characteristic which we describe as religious expression."¹

The second stage takes one of two forms, (1) intellectual and (2) emotional. (1) The intellectual form of this stage is that in which beliefs are accepted without criticism. "A large proportion of the members of the Christian community feel," says Marshall, "that they have a firm belief in all the statements in the Apostles' Creed which they repeat from time to time and have repeated since childhood. And what are these so-called beliefs? They certainly are not acts of believing such as concern us here. They are ideas which are so real that no doubt as to this realness is ever noted."² In dealing with intuition and reason, the same writer says, that "in certain/

¹ Mind and Conduct, p.35.
certain cases we formulate these habitual modes of thought, and then we are wont to call them "beliefs" which we look upon as intuitively given. Beliefs are thus named, because the ideas referred to are so real for us, that any question of this realness is at once rejected in an act of believing." He gives, as an illustration, our religious beliefs and the existence of the Gulf Stream. "Here we are dealing with an intuitive belief," he says, "that is based upon the teaching of little more than an generation of men. Such are the beliefs that support the taboo among unenlightened men; and, taking a great leap, such are the beliefs expressed in the creeds of the modern churches, clung to by the most enlightened of mankind. When question is raised as to their validity, the average man at once rejects the incompatible suggestions, and experiences the act of believing."¹

(2) The other form is above the instinct habit level, and is more emotional, and develops into a sentiment. There/

¹ Mind and Conduct, pp.208-9.
There is, too, a transition stage to be noted here. The belief aspect may become subject to criticism and pass into a higher stage, whereas the sentiment stage is not likely to develop beyond itself. This higher stage reveals the inadequacy of many of our beliefs, which require to be re-interpreted in the light of new knowledge.

The third stage, the highest, is characterised by the presence of an ideal, consciously adopted and held, and there is a challenge involved. This is how religion originated in its earlier forms, and these other stages are imperfect. That is real religion; these other stages are arrested developments. We must distinguish religion in its pure form and other forms which it has assumed. There is bad religion as there is bad art or science or morality. There is some truth in the statement that "progress in religion, in short, may be psychologically expressed as a progress from the infantilism of fabrication to the manhood of objective achievement in the realm of ideals."

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VALIDITY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

Much has been made of the argument that psychology has stepped outside its province in dealing with the objective reference of religion. This is not so, for the scope of psychology is wide enough to deal with this aspect. As Ward stated in his Article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, "as presented to the individual, 'the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth' may belong to psychology."¹ We cannot isolate certain forms of experience and say that they belong to the sphere of psychology, for psychology deals with the/

¹ Vol.XX. Article 'Psychology'.
the whole of experience. All human experience has its psychological side.

In a recent work, Edward states that "the fallacy of psychologism is at bottom a claim that which is an unnecessary hypothesis for psychology is an illusion. The idea of God becomes the foremost of all such constructs of human fancy, and is regarded as having no status in reality, because it is an idea which psychology cannot use."\(^1\) But, even if God is an illusion, psychology has got to account for this illusion, as it accounts for perceptual illusions. This writer says, on this line of argument, "to admit its major premise that psychology can only detect the divine by the presence of abnormal and inexplicable process is to admit that psychology possesses no adequate apparatus for the task it here assumes."\(^2\) But, anything that the human mind can conceive is matter for psychology. Psychology considers this experience from the mind's standpoint, The analysis of that experience from the objective standpoint is the work of/

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2 Ibid., p.174.
of science and theology. It is usually held that psychology has nothing to say as to the validity of knowledge or of religion. "Psychologists," Brown says, "have approached the question of the validity of religious experience along psychological lines, not always realising that by the very method they had adopted, they are challenging or denying that validity. In other words, just as psychology cannot do justice to the validity of knowledge, psychology cannot do justice to the validity of religion." But we insist that psychology can at least consider validity. If the validity of human experience is part of the human mind, psychology should not rule it out. It should explain what significance validity has for the individual mind. It is not its function to analyse the object of validity. Validity is the relation of the human mind to its object, and with that relationship psychology should deal. We would urge that the question of what is objective and true for all is coming more and more to be settled on psychological grounds. We claim that in the specifically human experiences the nature of/

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1 Mind and Personality, p.266.

2 Cf. Drever: 'An Introduction to the Psychology of Education' p.3. "So far even problems of value are not wholly independent of psychological investigation."
of reality is pre-eminently disclosed. Psychology determines how we come to recognise the existence of an objective reality at all. Psychology will ultimately determine what aspects of religious experience are objective, and what are not.

"The laws of nature", Marshall says, "are not themselves observed facts: in other words, they are not found in direct perceptual observation, but are mental constructs of what we call the conceptual order. William James in his psychological studies emphasised the fact that there exist many diverse "worlds of reality" or as I prefer to put it, many diverse "worlds of realness"; and he showed that given mental items that are very real in one of these "worlds" may be very unreal in another."¹ The physical objectivity of science gives only a restricted conception of reality. Truth, beauty, goodness, God are illuminations of reality. As Eucken says, "The religious interpretation of life bases human existence upon a deeper order of reality."² To the individual the Müller-Lyer illusion/

¹ Mind and Conduct, p.78.
² Main Currents of Modern Thought, p.108.
illusion, for example, from the visual standpoint is a fact, but it is an illusion, an error in perception, when viewed from the realm of realness of physical science. The lines in this illusion can be objectively measured and the illusion compared with physical reality. If there were no corresponding reality, it would not be known as illusion. So it is with delirium tremens, the objective reality is there for the individual suffering from the hallucination; the hallucination is real enough from the individual realm, but the social reference makes it hallucination. The absence of any objective reality is vouched for by other experiencing subjects. It is therefore a delusion, an error in judgment. A universal delusion is a contradiction in terms. That is to say, it is the most comprehensive system that is the ultimate realm of realness and here physical science is incomplete. Values are all illusory in the realm of realness of physical science, but the realm of physical science may be illusory to mystics and others, to their realm of realness. Professor J. Arthur/
Arthur Thomson makes very vivid an illustration, given by Pratt of a country where the majority of the people were blind, including all the philosophers. There were a few people whose eyes were not sealed and they spoke of the joy of seeing the sun. "But", said the philosophers, "you must not talk in that excited metaphorical strain. There is a diffuse warmth as we all know, but your talk about a visible luminous body is an antiquated objectivism. There is no sun." Yet, they asserted all the more that they saw the sun, and a psychological committee was appointed to investigate. They made many experiments and discovered that, whenever those whose eyes were not sealed said that they saw the sun, they had opened their eyes. The blind psychologists felt over the seeing faces, and they made sure that there was a precise correlation between the opening of the eyes and the sights of the sun. "Dear friends" they said, "you are suffering from an illusion; the image of the sun that you speak of somewhat unintelligently is produced by/

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1 Science and Religion, p.158.

2 The Religious Consciousness, pp.457-8.
by this trick of opening your eyes. Be honest, now and tell us if you ever behold the image of the sun except when you open your eyes." The simple seers said 'No' and the committee was well pleased with them and hoped that they would recover from their sight. The simple seers smiled to themselves and went away saying, 'We see the sun!' A fear is constantly expressed that psychology reduces religion to mere subjectivity. It is necessary to be careful in the use of terms. In much theology, the term objectivity has little or no meaning, and seldom gets away from some physical objectivity. This has been the counterpart of the view of some psychologists, that the reference to reality involved in religion is illusory. Religion is no more subjective than morality or art. Each depends upon the reality of the spiritual world. Every experience is actual, its degree of objectivity depends upon the extent to which it is a common or universal experience. When we get universal experience, for example, substance, which is found by everyone to be resistant we get objectivity. So it is with causality, so with a moral principle, so with religious/
religious experience, in so far as it is common to all men, an essential constituent of their spiritual nature. Religion, culture, morality, art stand or fall together. They are all products of man's creative intelligence or spirit, and these products are creative, universal, progressive, social, consequently objective. If religion affects mankind, then we may assume a cause adequate to that effect. Religion depends upon the reality of the object of reference. If humanity is essentially modified by religion, there must be a cause for this modification, and that cause is objective; it cannot be merely a universal delusion. The idea of one hundred dollars in the pocket is a different thing from possessing them, to use Kant's illustration. The proof is how they affect behaviour, if they pay their way. That is to say if one hundred dollars exist, anyone can deal with them. If they are merely an idea in a man's mind, they are of no avail in the everyday world. You may have an idea of God that is invalid, but if the idea can affect all men's nature, then it is objectively real. That is the pragmatic proof, and a stage in development. The difference between the pragmatist/  

1 It is significant that this use of the term is passing into current usage, for example, 'an objective history of the Great War'  
2 Critique of Pure Reason:— Transcendental Dialectic, p. 483, (Max Muller's Translation)
pragmatist and the idealist is the universality of the experience, and that is thrown back upon the nature of man.

The point is that there are specific data which furnish the basis for a religious interpretation of life. Taylor¹ makes a valuable contribution when he shows that the individual may mistake the vague stirrings of sex or aesthetic sensibility or even pure illusions of sense-perception as the self-revelation of the divine and that this may account for the puerility of many of the religious beliefs and practices of mankind. "The supposed data have been explained away, now as ordinary physical facts misunderstood by the curious but ignorant savage, now as vague emotional reactions to dreams, fear of the dark or lonely places, now as vague emotional reactions attendant on the different sexual modifications characteristic of adolescence, and in other ways. The question is whether all the known facts can be disposed of without remainder in this fashion. A priori we have no right to assume that this can be done. It may be/

¹ Edited by Selwyn.

Essays Catholic and Critical/The Vindication of Religion p. 73.
be true, for example, that "conversions" are more common at or shortly after the reaching of puberty than at any other time of life. It is equally true that the same period is often marked by the sudden appearance of other new interests or the intensification of old ones. Thus a boy often suddenly develops a vivid interest in literature, or a new sensitiveness to art, in the years of dawning manhood. Clearly, this does not prove that the qualities we admire in literary style or in painting or in music are not really there, but only supposed to be there in virtue of an illusion of sexuality. The real question is not whether emotions of this kind may not have influenced men's religious emotions and beliefs, but whether the emotions and beliefs, however they may have been developed, contain nothing more...or contain something else which is quite specific." The psychologist's fallacy is to assume that, because there is an analogy between our attitude to God and our attitude towards something we fear, or something that attracts us sexually, there is nothing in the/
the former not in the latter. It is this fallacy that Rudolph Otto has done so much to expose, viz. that there is nothing specific in religious experience.

Otto's purpose is to stress the essential element in the idea of the divine, and in so doing he introduces the category of the "holy," which he claims is equally rooted in human life with the ethical and aesthetic categories. The "holy" is a "category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion."¹

"In our inquiry into that element which is separate and peculiar to the idea of the holy, it will be useful to invent a special term to stand for 'the holy' minus its moral factor or moment, and, as we can now add, minus its 'rational' aspect altogether."² For "this 'extra' in the meaning of 'holy' above and beyond the meaning of goodness," Otto coins the term 'numinous' and speaks of a unique 'numinous' category of value and of a definitely 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever

² Ibid., p.6.
the category is applied. This mental state is perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined.\textsuperscript{1} Otto has rendered a distinct service by insisting that there is something in religion which cannot be psychologised into anything else, something specific, irreducible. As Harvey puts it in his translator's preface, "Just as the recognition and appreciation of beauty cannot be reduced to that of moral goodness, just as 'the beautiful' 'the good' are in the philosopher's phrase 'categories' in their own right, so, too, it is with religion. There, too, we have to deal with a peculiar and irreducible kind of apprehension - we employ or apply a distinct 'category'\textsuperscript{2}. Taylor puts it admirably when he says, that "the main point to be made is that, as far back as we can trace the beginnings of religion, the "holy", even if it is no more than an oddly shaped/

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\textsuperscript{1} The Idea of the Holy, p.7.\
\textsuperscript{2} Op.cit., p.XII.
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shaped stone, does not simply mean the strange or the formidable; it means, at the lowest, the "uncanny", and the "uncanny" is precisely that which does not simply belong to "this" everyday world, but directly impresses us as manifesting in some special way the presence of "the other" world. As such, it repels and attracts at once, is at once the awful and the worshipful, but above all in both aspects the absolutely transcendent and "other-worldly." At different levels of spiritual development, the object which awakens this special sense of being, in the presence of the "absolutely transcendent" may be very different. ¹ Taylor states that religious experience seems specially characteristic of man. As the Greeks said, "Man is the only animal who has gods." Otto is right in insisting that "all ostensible explanations of the origin of religion in terms of animism or magic or folk psychology are doomed from the outset to wander astray and miss the real goal of their inquiry, unless they recognise this fact of our nature, primary, unique, underivable from anything else -

¹ Essays Catholic and Critical, 'The Vindication of Religion' p.75.
to be the basic factor and the basic impulse underlying the entire process of religious evolution."1 This theory helps to explain why man, baffled by natural forces and events, finding himself at the end of his tether, intellectual, emotional, or practical, everywhere reached out to powers or a power other than his own, and to which he appealed. Religion, then, was not so much an inference drawn or a conclusion reached, it originated in an attitude to the 'wholly other', "that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar, which therefore falls outside the limits of the 'canny' and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment."2 In dealing with animism and such explanations of the origin of religion, Otto is emphatic, that these "representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of 'rationalising' a precedent experience, to which they are subsidiary........ They are the source from which springs, not religion, but/

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1 The Idea of the Holy, p.15.
but the rationalisation of religion." "Even on the lowest level of religious development the essential characteristic is, therefore, to be sought elsewhere than in the appearance of 'spirit' representations. It lies rather, we repeat, in a peculiar 'moment' of consciousness, to wit, the stupor before something 'wholly other', whether such an other be named 'spirit' or 'daemon' or 'deva' or be left without any name. Nor does it make any difference in this respect whether, to interpret and preserve their apprehension of this 'other', men coin original imagery of their own or adapt imaginations drawn from the world of legend, the fabrications of fancy, apart from and prior to any stirrings of daemonic dread."

Otto refuses to accept the position, that "according to Schleiermacher I can only come upon the very fact of God as the result of an inference, that is, by reasoning to a cause beyond myself to account for my 'feeling of dependence.' But this is entirely opposed to the psychological facts of the case. Rather, the 'creature-feeling' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of/  

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1 The Idea of The Holy, p.27.
of another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self."¹ "The numinous is thus felt as objective and outside the self." That is to say, in the numinous we have a specific way of experiencing reality. He quotes from James: "As regards the origin of the Greek gods, we need not at present seek an opinion. But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there', more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed."² "Above and beyond our rational being, lies hidden the ultimate and highest part of our nature, which can find no satisfaction in the mere allaying of the needs of

¹ The Idea of the Holy, p. 10
² Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 58. Quoted by Otto, op. cit., p. 11, footnote.
of our sensuous, psychical or intellectual impulses and cravings. The mystics called it the basis or ground of the soul."¹ This point of view illustrates the main contention of this thesis, that religious experience cannot be explained by reducing it to the level of instinct, emotion, sentiment, even intelligence, that, while these elements are essential to human experience and are strands in religion, there is even at the very beginning in religion something unique and it could not better be expressed than in phrases like 'the holy', 'the sacred'.

Ernest Jones speaks about the crudest form of the belief in a miraculous special creation as far as man's religious activities are concerned, that "man's soul, comprising his 'religious faculty' is divinely implanted as such so that it is both impious and fruitless to inquire into its origin: this naturally goes together with the idea that it is peculiar to man and not to be correlated with any manifestations such as fear, respect, and awe which we may find in other animals. The alternative view is the genetic one that religious manifestations, like all other/

¹ The Idea of the Holy, p. 36.
other human ones, must have developed out of simpler, and ultimately non-religious, forms of mental life.¹ Is that the only alternative? The religious faculty theory is no longer accepted, but we may ask is the only alternative to resolve religion into "simpler and ultimately non-religious forms of mental life?" Brown shows a better way, when he points out that "after the claims of what we may call the profane sciences have been met, there is something left over - namely, the distinctively religious experience itself."² The usual explanations of religious origins are along the line that the higher forms of feeling and insight are products of lower forms, that therefore religion grew out of forms of consciousness not distinctively religious, in other words, that there is nothing in religion irreducible or primary or unique. The same would be said, of knowledge, morality, aesthetics.

Otto has done much to show that there is a distinctly/  

² Mind and Personality, p.260.
distinctively religious experience, that at every stage of development, from the lowest to the highest forms of religion, no matter the influence of knowledge and experience, there is this 'numinous' attitude on a level with a cognitive attitude, an aesthetic attitude, a moral attitude. "Mysticism", Otto would say, "is the stressing to a very high degree, indeed the over-stressing, of the non-rational or supra-rational elements in religion: and it is only intelligible when so understood."¹ He denies that even mystic 'intuition' can dispense with the knowledge that comes through human reason and moral experience. "We must always understand by it (i.e., the holy) the numinous completely permeated and saturated with elements signifying rationality, purpose, personality, morality."² In fact, to him the relative rank of religions is determined by the degree in which rational and non-rational elements are jointly present, and the supremacy/  

¹ The Idea of the Holy, p.22.  
supremacy of Christianity over all other religions lies in the fact that "the lucid edifice of its clear and pure conceptions, feelings, and experiences is built up on a foundation that goes far deeper than the rational. Yet the non-rational is only the basis, the setting, the woof in the fabric, ever preserving for Christianity its mystical depth, giving religion thereby the deep undertones and heavy shadows of Mysticism, without letting it develop into a mere rank growth of mysticality."¹

Otto separates "the holy" from the ethical. His position is like that of Kant, who insists on the absoluteness of the moral law that needs no religious sanctions; but religion, for Kant, while not necessary as a basis of morality, may be necessary for a complete life, as happiness has to be added to virtue to make the moral life complete. What Otto is striving after is a unique object for religion, the sacred, as Kant sets up the moral law for ethics. It is not however the actual value which explains the sacredness for primitive man/

¹ The Idea of the Holy, p.146.
man. Objects are often very trivial, yet are valued above life, because they speak to the individual of a reality other than the physical. Again we are reminded of Kant. The act, in itself small, becomes of great moral significance because done from a sense of duty. The fact that primitive man embodied his religious experiences in crude forms means nothing. The idol for him was not God, but ... equivalent to an image of a general idea in the mind of a cultured individual. Many people employ images as a basis of thought, as primitive man employed idols.

The mark of the "holy", for Otto, is throughout the sense of a 'mystery' at once tremendous and fascinating, the 'numinous' being this kind of half-lit shadow, at once forbidding and attractive. That is to say, there was a valuation which spoke to man of an other reality than that which he experienced through the senses. It is this sense of a mystery, this valuation as sacred, which is the sublime attainment of human life. The awareness of the "other" world is given in and through the sense of the holy and the judgment of the sacred.
they are the experience of it. We cannot get away from this distinctive attitude, which Otto has called the numinous, and must put it on the same level as the cognitive, the aesthetic, the moral. Professor Paterson\(^1\) identifies the theory of a special religious sense with that of Troeltsch and Otto, which bears "the more imposing name of the doctrine of the religious A priori." "Had man not possessed in his constitution the element of the religious A priori," he says, "he would no more have been able to compound religion out of his sense-impressions than he is able to transmute the baser metals into gold or to manufacture something out of nothing: and it is because he still possesses this power that he may hope to seek to disengage real and abiding spiritual values from the flux and the mutations of history."\(^2\) Otto's view, however, cannot be/

\(^{1}\) The Nature of Religion, p.169.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., pp.169-70.
be said to be the same as that of a special religious sense. Otto rather means that there is something specific in religious experience, something irreducible, primary, as there is in other attitudes of life. But this term 'religious sense' suffers from the same defects as the term 'moral sense' in ethics. Burt has effectively critised this hypothesis and states, that "no reputable psychologist would now venture to support so primitive and figurative a view. Rather he would be tempted to declare that, if the moral imbecile is to be defined as a person born without a moral sense, then we must all be moral imbeciles, for none of us is ever born with it."

Likewise, art has a significance very much more important than that usually attributed to it: art must rank with science and philosophy as a way of communicating knowledge about reality. This is the view/

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view of the writer of an article on Beethoven's conception of art, as a way of communicating knowledge about reality. Eucken would use the term an "illumination of reality." There is no reason to believe in a specific aesthetic emotion excited by manifestations of the beautiful and by nothing else. Values will be established as inherent in reality. This is to contradict the present views of aesthetic theory, which have developed to accommodate themselves to a materialistic view of the universe, that "art is an activity expressive wholly of peculiarities of the human constitution. It is not a revelation of reality; the values attributed by the artist to nature are not inherent in nature. That the artist reveals to us the nature of reality or anything but the peculiarities of his neural organisation, is a notion incompatible with the scientific outlook on the world." After all, as this writer concludes, "those elements/

1 The Times Literary Supplement, December, 9, 1926.
elements of our experience that science ignores are not thereby shown to have no bearing upon the nature of reality. The fundamental concepts hitherto employed by science have been shown to be both unnecessary and insufficient. They are in process of being replaced by a different set; and it is perfectly possible that, when the replacement is complete, values will be established in reality. Even should science be able to progress without importing values into its scheme, that fact would afford no presumption against the existence of values. For one major result of recent physical speculation has been to show the precise nature of the limitations to scientific knowledge. Science gives us knowledge of structure, but not of substance. It may be assumed that this is the only kind of knowledge possible to us; but there seem to be no good reasons for such an assumption." It is equally true of much psychology and of much religion that the prevailing views have developed to accommodate themselves/
themselves to a materialistic view of the universe.

Brown holds that the task of psychology is to link up this mental attitude, which Otto calls the 'numinous', which is a definite or specific form of experience, with other forms of experience not generally recognised as religious. "Conversion", he says, "is a fundamental process in the religious life. It may be defined as a change of general mental attitude from the merely naturalistic attitude towards life to a definitely spiritual attitude. The individual finds the world so full of strange and wonderful things that his mind is at first mainly occupied with getting to understand and appreciate it in a profane way, but he discovers that this is not sufficient to give him true happiness. In spite of his most earnest endeavours to adjust himself to his physical and social environment and to be true to an ethical ideal, a feeling of insufficiency weighs upon his mind and produces depression from which he struggles to free himself. Peace may come?"
come in one way or another and the process of passing from such a state of conflict and strain to a state of harmony and peace is the process of conversion."

Culture, Art, Morality, Religion - Four Types of Experience.

The creative aspect of man's life, of which we have spoken, expresses itself in four ways. There are four types of experience, and psychology should consider how the one is different from the others, culture, art, morality, religion. There are four ideals for man, the True, the Beautiful, the Good, the Sacred, and four attitudes, the cognitive, the aesthetic, the moral, the holy. These divisions of experience are fundamental. Each is distinct from but not necessarily exclusive of the others. Truth is a value and its objective correlate is Reality as actual. There is something that is true. Beauty is a value and its objective correlate is Reality as/
as aesthetic revelation. Goodness is a value and its objective correlate is Reality as a moral order. The Sacred is a value and its objective correlate is Reality as a divine order or God. The Sacred is the object of religious experience, 'the holy' is what distinguishes it from the aesthetic, the moral, the cognitive. Oman says, that we should seem to have discovered in the sense of 'the holy', "a mark by which the sphere of religion could be defined so as to include what belongs to it and exclude all else.

When we speak of the sacredness of truth and beauty and goodness, we are, whether consciously or not, putting them into the sphere of religion. And there must be a sense in which this is right, because we cannot by any building up of natural values arrive at anything of absolute worth, and it is the sacredness of truth, in itself and for our own loyalty, which distinguishes it from mere facts in an encyclopaedia, while by the same mark beauty is distinguished from prettiness, and goodness from merely useful behaviour. But, while the sacred to which they appeal and the reverence they stir are from the world of/
of religion, it is vital to any right interest in them that each should be in a world of its own. We have the study of their norms or standards in logic, aesthetics, and ethics. Thus, on the one hand, even if their sacredness be in the same sphere as religion, they carry on their business in independence of it; and, on the other, religion is not a mere combination of them, nor yet something merely alongside of them. In seeking truth, we may not be influenced by religious considerations, but must regard only the reality we would know. And beauty, too, must just be beauty, and goodness goodness. If religion try to control such judgments, it corrupts them, and is itself corrupted. Therefore, while we cannot separate true thinking, feeling, and acting from religion without losing the absolute worth by which alone they can be valued, it becomes necessary to distinguish the business of religion from the business of logic, aesthetics, and ethics as sharply as we can.

"This distinction, however, depends neither upon the feeling of holiness nor the judgment of sacredness/
sacredness, but upon the reality to which these belong - the existence of the supernatural. The supernatural is the special concern of religion, and nothing else is concerned with it in the same way as religion. As here used, the supernatural means the world which manifests more than natural values, the world which has values which stir, the sense of the holy and demand to be esteemed as sacred."

Brown, in his most recent volume, deals with the relation of religion to other values. "The value-experiences of the good, the beautiful and the true, are not identical with religious experience although they are related to it. Religious experience," he says, "is not exactly on all fours with them; it is not on the same level, but is on a higher level still. Religious experience arises so far as the individual is facing the totality of existence. The feeling thus aroused, so far as the personality takes up a mental attitude/

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attitude towards the whole universe, is religious experience. There is the level of value, but the level of religion is higher than the level of value in the sense that it is more all-inclusive and more face to face with totality and the innermost mystery of existence. Thus there are aspects, ethical, aesthetic and logical, which are all aspects of reality, but religion itself is an attitude to reality in its concreteness. But an objection must here be raised. There are individuals without any sense of religion, that is to say without this specific attitude, for example, Herbert Spencer, and yet one could hardly deny to Spencer an attitude to the whole. Religion, we should say, is an attitude to the whole, but it is a specific attitude to the whole and there are other specific attitudes to the whole. It is not the whole attitude to the whole. James defined religion as our "total reaction to the whole", but this would not distinguish religion from other experiences.

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1 Mind and Personality, p.298.
experiences. His is the same error as Brown's. Yet there must be, as we have pointed out, something specific to distinguish religious from other experience, even at its very beginning. We might say, that the objects of religion and of morality are different aspects of the Absolute, religion taking its object as fully realised, whereas morality regards its object (i.e., its aspect) as still in process of realisation. The constituents of the ethical and of the religious might even be the same, and it might be the peculiar arrangements of these constituents that give to the wholes which they constitute their characteristic natures, just as the different arrangements of the same set of molecules constitute substances with quite different chemical properties.

In conclusion, then, we would say that even primitive man expresses himself in art, however crude his expression, seeks knowledge, however erroneous, strives after an ideal of conduct, however low, and worships, however imperfect the object of his worship. This/
This is the truth in Bosanquet's view that "religion is an experience of God, not a proof of Him." "The religious attitude," he says, "being at bottom a recognition of the nature of the finite and of an underlying reality which inseparably belongs to it, is an inherent character of experience......We are not, however, to say that religion thus taken is an arbitrary attitude of the finite mind, resting on no reality beyond it." As Professor Jones has put it, "Morality does not make a man his brother's keeper: it reveals the brotherhood which had been ignored. Philosophy does not devise. It discovers. Art is not artifice. It holds the mirror up to nature, and the beauty of nature passes into its face. Religion does not invent its God, it finds Him, and at its best it finds Him everywhere. The structure of things is spiritual."²

¹ The Value and Destiny of the Individual, p.255.
² Idealism as a Practical Creed, p.127.
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This is extended to be more semantically accurate. The Redeploy of Intelligence and Reason comes earlier, ending the section of the Relation of Instinct to Intelligence and Reason. Instinct and Sentiment - sense in which they are used is stated at the beginning of the respective sections. Intelligence and Reason. pp 100-106. Diagram on p 106.

Mind and Intelligence. Correction.

Have animals reason or creative intelligence? This was p 111 before alteration. Quotation from Streat missed.

Especially p 135 sense in which Religion used. Cf p 29.

Instinct and Sentiment - sense in which we speak of them in religion.

Correction. This was p 147 before alteration. If in human life there is a modification due to religion.
It is pointed out by Professor J. A. Thomson¹ that, while animals have language of a sort, no animal makes a sentence or expresses in a sentence a judgment of its own. They may learn to associate a sound or word with a certain thing, person or action, but that is not to have language as humanly used. Animals certainly communicate with one another in many ways, with and without vocal signals, but they cannot calculate or extract cube roots. The crucial question is, Have animals reason or creative intelligence? Have they free ideas? The answer is in the negative. We have seen that there is no doubt that animals have mind or intelligence, that they think in the sense of making perceptual inferences, but they cannot think in terms of general ideas, as we are doing at the moment. They show intelligent behaviour, but they do not rise to rational conduct. They are not moral agents. The possession by man of free ideas and ethical ideals separates him from the lower creation. "To go back to the past, to single out some particular occurrence and to think of it in its absence as the cause of an actual or of an anticipated experience is the prerogative of man only."²

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¹ Science and Religion, Chap. 5.
² Leuba: 'A Psychological Study of Religion', p. 64.
religious experience, in so far as it is common to all men, an essential constituent of their spiritual nature. Religion, culture, morality, art stand or fall together. They are all products of man's creative intelligence or spirit, and these products are creative, universal, progressive, social, consequently objective.\(^1\) If religion affects the individual, then we may assume a cause adequate to that effect. Religion depends upon the reality of the objective reference. If in human life there is a modification due to religion, we must assume a cause for it, and that is objective reality. You cannot have an illusion affecting conduct. The idea of thirty dollars in the pocket is a different thing from possessing them. The proof is how they affect behaviour, if they pay their way. You may have an idea of God that is invalid, but if the objective reality affects man's behaviour, then it is existent. That is the pragmatic proof, and a stage in development. The difference between the pragmatist/

\[^1\text{It is significant that this use of the term is passing into current usage, for example, 'an objective history of the Great War.'}\]