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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The Universal Phenomenon of Religion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>The Psychological Basis of Religion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>The Emotional Inhibition to the Spiritual Life</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Adolescent Scepticism</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The Unbelief of the Uneducated</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>The Spurious Atheism of the Passive Thinker</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>The Atheism of the Aggressive Thinker. Shelley</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Swinburne</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Nietzsche</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Charles Bradlaugh</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>Sigmund Freud</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I.

The Universal Phenomenon of Religion.

Tylor, in his well-known work "Primitive Culture," says that the question of the universality of religion has been affirmed and denied for many centuries "with a confidence in striking contrast to the imperfect evidence on which both affirmation and denial have been based." It may, of course, be possible in theory to assert that there are certain undeveloped tribes without any kind of religion, but up to the present no writer or traveller can give any conclusive evidence to prove this belief. To quote Tylor again: "It is not unusual for the very writer who declares in general terms the absence of religious phenomena among some savage people, himself to give evidence that shows his expressions to be misleading." (1). He cites Dr. Lang as an illustration of his argument. It appears that Lang contends that the aborigines of Australia have no religion; and yet in the very same book (2) he writes about their ascribing a disease like small-pox to an evil spirit, and their customs of appeasing evil spirits. Moffat is also criticised by Tylor for his astonishing lack of consistency. For instance, in his "South Africa," p.361, Moffat says that man's immortality was never heard of among the Bechuanas; but Tylor points out that "in the sentence read before (Moffat remarked) that the word for the shades or manes of the dead is liviti."

(1) "Primitive Culture." p.418.
(2) "Queensland." D. Lang.
After a careful perusal of the writings of men who contend that there are races without any kind of religion, I am of the opinion that they are guilty of three mistakes: (a) A misrepresentation of the facts they have chosen to handle. (b) Too great a dependence on the evidence of others. (c) A failure to understand the psychology of the people about whom they have written.

In the first place, if the investigators are looking for a religion that approximates to their own, they are bound to make wrong judgments and produce misleading statements. The bias in favour of their own religion blinds them to the facts which they set out to investigate; and this is one of the criticisms we must make of the theory of Sir John Lubbock in particular. He grossly misjudges the primitive races of whom he writes, because he fails to see an expression of their religious life that differed from his own. He writes: "It must, however, be admitted that religion, as understood by the lower savage races, differs essentially from ours; nay, it is not only different, but even opposite. Thus the deities are evil, not good; they may be forced into compliance with the wishes of man; they require bloody, and rejoice in human sacrifices; they are mortal, not immortal; a part, not the author of nature; they are to be approached by dances rather than by prayers; and often approve what we call vice, rather than what we esteem as virtue...... We regard the deity as good; they look upon him as evil; we submit ourselves to him; they endeavour to obtain the control of him; we feel the necessity of accounting for the blessings by which we are surrounded; they think the blessings come of themselves, and attribute all evil to the
interference of malignant beings." (1). We can understand why Sir John Lubbock believed that there were races which were atheistic, if this is the point of view which biassed him in his investigations. Atheism he defines as an absence of any definite ideas on the subject of the deity, not as a denial of his existence. As this chapter proceeds we shall see how he and others like him - e.g. D. Lang, Baker, Lindsay, and Moffat - were quite incapable of approaching the subject of their inquiry in any objective way because of their own subjective influences.

It may be advisable to define here what we mean by religion. All students of religion know that different writers give different definitions of religion, each expressing the point of view or interest of its author. E.g., Hegel says: "All peoples know that the religious consciousness is that wherein they possess the truth; and religion they have ever regarded as their true dignity and the Sabbath of their life." This is understandable of so great a philosopher, whose principle interest in life was purely intellectual. Schleiermacher swings to the other extreme and places all the emphasis on the feeling side of religion. According to him religion is neither knowing nor doing, neither metaphysics nor morals, neither dogma nor worship; it is our pious feeling, in so far as we are conscious of our feeling of absolute dependence. Durkheim defines religion as a "unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, by all those who adhere to them." Here again we see a reflection of the author's interest in the social significance of life.

Galloway's conception of life is wider in its scope than that of Hegel, (1) "Origin of Civilisation an Primitive Condition of Man." P.195.
Schleiermacher or Durkheim, and so his definition is more comprehensive: "Religion is man's faith in a power beyond himself, whereby he seeks to satisfy his emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service." Thouless in his definition puts this more succinctly: (Religion is) "a felt practical relationship with what is believed in as a super-human being or beings." There is much to be said for C.C.J. Webb's frank admission: "I do not believe that religion can be defined." Whatever definition we may offer, it must account for all the mental factors of man's mind: the cognitive, affective, and conative. I suggest the following: Religion is man's response to his felt need (1) for some explanation of his existence; (2) for an enrichment of experience; and (3) for a greater access of power to help him in overcoming or adjusting himself to his environment.

Any one of these three component aspects (Cognitive, Affective, and Conative) of the religious need may, at any given time, be in the ascendant, but can never be completely divorced from the other two without preventing the fullest possible satisfaction of the need as a whole.

In so far as the mind conceives (or apprehends) the essential relatedness of these goals it necessarily objectifies them under one unifying concept - that of a Supreme Being (usually personified as God but not necessarily so: vid. Buddhism) - knowledge of whom gives meaning and purpose to existence; - union with whom gives ultimate satisfaction to man's experience; and reliance on whom gives man the mastery over himself and his world.

Tylor, Flint, and Andrew Lang contend very strongly that some anthro-
polo logical writers, such as those already mentioned above, are definitely biased even before they begin their investigation of the facts which may prove or disprove the universality of religion. They attribute irreligion to races whose beliefs are unlike theirs, in much the same manner as theologians have so often attributed atheism to those thinkers whose deities differed from their own. For instance, when the ancient Aryans invaded India they described the original tribes as adeva, i.e., "godless;" the Greeks gave the corresponding epithet, ἀθεός, to the early Christians as unbelievers in the classic gods. In comparatively modern times disbelievers in witchcraft and apostolic succession were denounced as atheists; and even in our own day certain controversialists are apt to infer, as in past years, that students who support the theory
of evolution must of necessity hold atheistic opinions. On more than one occasion I have been told that my refusal to accept the "fundamentalist" interpretation of the Bible commits me to the ranks of the unbelievers.

Perhaps Sir John Lubbock, in his work "Prehistoric Times", is one of the greatest offenders in the misrepresentation of facts purporting to deny religion among savage tribes. For instance, in dealing with the tribes of South America he refers, among other sources, to a passage of Spix and Martius as saying that some of the Brazilian Indians were entirely without religion; but these two authors in the very same passage point out that the Brazilian Indians showed a certain reverence for the moon and particular stars, believed in a principle of evil, and had priests. The contradiction is obvious and needs no comment. When speaking of the Australians, (p.353), Sir John says: "They have no religion, nor any idea of prayer, but most of them believe in evil spirits, and all have a great dread of witchcraft. In fact, they have a remarkable superstition that no one ever dies a natural death." What are these words but a reference to, not a denial of, the rudimentary religious feeling of these primitive people? Superstition, we must agree, is only a false religion, and surely the evidences of its existence among the Australian aborigines are sufficient to prove the presence of some kind of religion, even though their beliefs do not harmonise with what we now regard as true religion.

In dealing with the African tribes Sir John makes a serious scientific mistake in misrepresenting Livingstone, who tells of an occasion when he spoke to a Bushman about God and after some time found that the
man thought he was speaking about Sekomi, the principal chief of the dis-
trict. This Sir John takes to indicate the ignorance of the Bushmen
about religious ideas, whereas it was probably only a difficulty of
conversational intercourse between the two men. He fails to mention
that Livingstone wrote something that leaves his readers in no doubt at
all about the religious attitude of the African tribes: "There is no
need for beginning to tell even the most degraded of these people of
the existence of God, or of a future state - the facts being univers-
ally admitted."

Professor Flint makes havoc of Sir John's claims, and vigorously
contends that his investigations do not seem to have proved that there
is any tribe or people entirely without religion. To quote his own
words: "the examination of Sir John Lubbock's instances, far from leading
me to his conclusion, leaves me with the conviction that, if there be
any such peoples, they must be very few indeed." And he adds that "if
there were such tribes it would not matter much as far as religion is
concerned; the circumstances might be so unfavourable, and the minds of
the people so undeveloped and inactive, that the religious tendencies
of human nature could not show themselves." (1).

Tyler is perhaps more caustic than Flint in his criticism of Sir
John Lubbock's conclusion, and also of others like him. In addition
to his criticism of Sir John Lubbock, Lang, and Moffat, Tyler mentions
Sir Samuel Baker, who in 1866 read a paper before the Ethnological
Society of London, in which he said that the most northern tribes of

(1) "Antitheistic Theories." R. Flint. (The Baird Lecture, 1877).
the White Nile have no belief in a Supreme Being, nor have they any
worship or idolatry. In answer to this claim Tylor points out that Sir
Samuel Baker ignores the existence of published evidence: "such as de-
scribes the sacrifices of the Dinhás, their belief in good and evil
spirits (adjok and djyok), their good deity and heaven-dwelling creator,
Dendid, as likewise Near, the deity of the Nuer, and the Shilluks'creator, who is described as visiting, like other spirits, a sacred wood
or tree." (1).

It seems as though Sir John Lubbock has either ignored or suppress-
ed facts contradicting his evidences, especially in cases where the
sources contradict themselves. He also seems to interpret his sources
wrongly, as in the case of Livingstone, or to accept too readily the
statements of people who concluded that the tribes they had visited had
no religion because they did not happen to find a religion that was akin
to their own. For example, he says: "According to Grantz, the Greenland
Esquimaux 'have neither a religion nor idolatrous worship, nor so much
as any ceremonies to be perceived tending towards it.' This statement
has been confirmed by many observers. Their burial ceremonies have,
however, been supposed to indicate a belief in the resurrection. They
generally bend the body into a sitting posture, bringing the knees up
under the chin, and then wrap the corpse in one of their best skins.
For the grave they choose some high place, and over the corpse they make
a heap of stones. Near the body some of them place the implements of
the deceased, and even sometimes, if he was a man, his kajak; believing,
as has been said, that they will be of use to him in the new world." (2).

(1) "Primitive Culture." p.425.

(2) "Prehistoric Times." p.409.
It is extremely difficult to see how Sir John Lubbock could fail to recognise in these facts the religious life of the people about whom he was writing unless, of course, he was looking for a religion which approximated to his own; or too ready to accept uncritically what Grantz had to say in support of his own belief. A more recent anthropologist, and one of great eminence, Professor E.O. James, of Leeds and Oxford, says: "Spiritual religion as practised in the higher systems is unknown in primitive cult.... Never theless, primitive man is a distinctly religious person, and his ritual is not mere ceremony since it is performed for the specific purpose of bringing him into contact with the supernatural or sacred world." (1). Again, (p.142): "Formerly it had been generally supposed that primeval man had no religion, because among the relics disinterred on the inhabited sites no materials were found which suggested funerary rites. But a fresh interpretation of the sepulchral phenomena associated with some of the skeletons from Palaeolithic sites leaves little doubt that in those far-off days man realised that he was composed of two separate entities - body and soul - the latter passing on to the world of spirits after somatic death."

The second obvious weakness in the investigations of men eager to prove the non-existence of religion among certain primitive races, is that they have principally depended upon the evidence of other people who had either themselves visited those races or had closely contacted those travellers who had had some first-hand experience of them. Lubbock quotes no less than twenty witnesses to the existence of tribes without religion in his "Prehistoric Times," and only one of these does he men-
tion as having lived a long time among the natives, and that is Father Baegert, who spent seventeen years in California. In his "Origin of Civilisation he even increases this number by mentioning others, one of whom is Lang. It may be true that Sir John Lubbock was extremely careful in argument, laborious in his collection of facts, and free from anti-religious feeling, but he was scarcely as scientific in the handling of his evidence - principally second-hand - as he was sincere in his purpose of showing the absence of religion among undeveloped races. Tylor says that Sir John arrived at his conclusion without sufficient facts to go on. This indeed seems to be the case in his treatment of the Indians of California and Canada. He quotes only those statements which deny religion to the tribes, and passes by those which offer a different kind of evidence. Besides, his evidences are not strictly correct. F. Ratzel gives a very different account of the religion of American races: "No race of America is devoid of religion. We find the belief in one or more higher beings, and in a host of inferior spirits; we find legends of creation and ideas of another world. The notion of a single deity floats indistinctly above sky or sun-worship. Nahua terms like 'endless Almighty,' 'Soul of the world,' 'Creator of the universe' indicate at least surmises striving to find expression. But the mass of mankind did not rise to such an elevation, and degraded the great spirit, the creator and orderer of the world, into foolish beast semblances and ignoble anthropomorphisms." (1).

I find that W. Lauder Lindsay also bases his claim for the absence of all religion in some of the lower races on the evidence of others, such as Baker and Moffat, whom Tylor criticises for their amazing lack

(1) "The History of Mankind." Vol. II. p.143.
of consistency. Lindsay trips up badly in a reference to Livingstone speaking of the Makondi natives of the Rovuma district — "They know nothing of a deity; they pray to their mothers when in distress; they know nothing of a future state, nor have they any religion except a belief in medicine......They blame witches for disease and death." (1). What other can the words "they pray to their mothers when in distress" be than a manifestation of religion in its earliest stages? It is in my opinion extremely unscientific to accept the evidence of men whose acquaintance with the people about whom they write is second-hand and often based upon the biased observation of missionaries, or of travellers who have made only a brief visit to the peoples whom they declare to have no religion. Tylor says: "Even where no positive proof of religious development among any particular tribe has reached us, we should distrust its denial by observers whose acquaintance with the tribe in question has not been intimate as well as kindly." (2). Up to the present, we may say, there is no satisfactory or conclusive evidence forthcoming to show that religion is not a universal phenomenon. In fact, what evidences are available make for the opposite point of view.

Finally, even if the observer's acquaintance with the tribe has been both intimate and kindly, and his purpose genuine and unbiased, he has other difficulties to overcome if he wishes to obtain an exact knowledge of the people's attitude towards religion. Before he can establish an intimate relationship with the natives, he will not only require an adequate knowledge of the tribal language to converse easily with them, but he must also win their confidence and know how to approach the

(1) "Mind in the Lower Animals," Vol. I.
(2) "Primitive Culture." P. 425.
individually. Often a mere observation of their way of living will not produce the knowledge the investigator may be wanting; it is a well-known fact that the savage tries to hide his gods from prying and contemptuous foreigners. The obvious superiority and authority of the white man cause him to shrink from giving information about his own primitive sacred and intimate observances and beliefs. Not every enquirer has succeeded in overcoming the serious obstacles in the way to a complete and scientific understanding of the life of primitive peoples of low intellectual development. No man who is merely a naturalist, or travelling for pleasure, a zoologist, or a merchantman, is qualified to understand the ways of primitive people. He must know how to approach them on their own level, and this demands some knowledge at least of their mental processes and characteristics. To know the psychology of men and women - their ways of thinking and modes of behaviour - is not something that can be achieved by casual observation or haphazard methods. It requires an intimate contact with those whom one wishes to know thoroughly, and to understand primitive people it is necessary to live among them for some considerable time, as Livingstone did among the Africans, and later Lawrence among the Arabs. It may be possible to obtain a superficial knowledge of some primitive tribe by spending a short time among them, but to know anything of their intimate thoughts and feelings, of their sacred ideas and customs, the investigator must meet them on their own level in such a way that they feel they can trust him. This surely is true even of the people we meet from day to day in our own country; of all subjects religion is the one they are most re-
luctant to discuss, or at least their own ideas about it. Scott Elliott clearly expresses this point: "Few travellers realise how many mistakes they would make if they tried to describe the real morality or actual religion of even their dearest friends; yet they think they can describe the beliefs of people belonging to a different race and in a lower stage of evolution." (1).

Through their failure to understand the psychology of primitive people, writers like Sir John Lubbock have made false statements that need much correction. For example, Sir John writes: "It has been asserted over and over again that there is no race of men so degraded as to be entirely without religion—without some idea of a deity. So far from this being true the very reverse is the case. Many we might almost say all, of the most savage races are, according to the nearly universal testimony of travellers, in this condition." (2). Had the writer been more critical of the testimonies offered by the travellers with whom he discussed savage races, instead of seizing them as evidence for what he wanted to prove, he would probably have noted a failure to realise two things: (a) The inarticulate ideas of the savage; and (b) the religious importance of his customs. When we are told that "those who assert that even the lowest savages believe in a deity," are affirming "that which is entirely contrary to the evidence," we discover that Sir John falls back upon the direct testimony of travellers and boldly asks "How, for instance, can a people who are unable to count their own fingers possibly raise their minds so far as to admit even the rudiments of

(2) "The Origin of Civilisation." p.467.
a religion? Now it may be true that a people who are unable to count
their own fingers cannot give any cognitive expression of their religious
practices and ceremonies; neither would it be expected of them to give
an intellectual appreciation of their social behaviour, but that does not
mean that they are devoid of herd feeling. Similarly, the fact that they
cannot "raise their minds so far as to admit even the rudiments of a re-
ligion" does not mean that they have no religious feeling, vague and in-
articulate though it may be.

Again, he quotes Father Baegert who, speaking of the natives of
California, says: "I made diligent enquiries among those with whom I
lived to ascertain whether they had any conception of God, a future life
and their own souls, but I never could discover the slightest trace of
such a knowledge. Their language has no words for 'God' and 'soul'. In-
deed the missionaries found no word which they could use for 'God' in
any of the Oregon languages." (1). But surely the absence of these com-
paratively high concepts of religious thought does not necessarily rule
out the possibility of a rudimentary religion existing among the people
of whom Baegert spoke. D'Alviella says: "Not only must these primitive
men (my italics) have been incapable of rising spontaneously to such ab-
stract ideas as are suggested to our minds by the words God, soul, infin-
ite, absolute, self-existence, and the like, but they could not even
have been in a position to comprehend them had they been suddenly com-
municated to them from without." (2). Lang makes this same mistake as
Lubbock when he contends that the natives of Queensland "have no idea of

(1) "Origin of Civilisation." p.204.
(2) "Hibbert Lecture, 1891." p.15.
a supreme Divinity, the creator and governor of the world, the witness of their actions and their future judge. They have no object of worship, even of a subordinate and inferior rank. They have no idols, no temples, no sacrifices. In short they have nothing whatever of the character of religion or of religious observance to distinguish them from the beasts that perish. They live without God in the world." (1). Doubtless Lang's observation was restricted by his own biased and hurried investigation; which is equally true of Lubbock in his desire to quote Lang as an authority.

Further, the above writers have disregarded the importance and religious significance of the customs that exist among the races about whom they have written. It must be obvious to anyone who has read Howitt's book, "The Native Tribes of South East Australia," that the life of the Queenslander is dominated by his customs. Marett says: "The religion of a savage is part of his custom; nay, rather, it is his whole custom, so far as it appears sacred - so far as it coerces him by way of his imagination. Between him and the unknown stands nothing but his custom. It is his all-in-all, his stand-by, his faith and his hope...... We may say that any and every custom, in so far as it is regarded as lucky, is a religious rite." (2). The same idea has been presented more recently by Professor James: "To the savage religion is but a series of ritual acts, a routine of worship, except perhaps as regards certain aspects of the All-Father belief." (3). Tylor says: ".......no evid-

(3) "Introduction to Anthropology." E.O. James. p.140.
ence justifies the opinion that man, known to be capable of so vast an intellectual development, cannot have emerged from a non-religious condition, previous to that religious condition in which he happens at present to come with sufficient clearness within our range of knowledge. It is desirable, however, to take our basis of enquiry in observation rather than from speculation. Here, so far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance; whereas the assertion of absence of such belief must apply either to ancient tribes, or to more or less imperfectly described modern ones.” (1). But Tylor, after refuting one ill-founded theory, creates another and spends the greater part of his famous work in proving that religion began in animism, a subject on which he discourses at length.

Professor James maintains that religion manifested itself in earlier forms than animism, and that, like all other attributes of the universe, it is a product of evolution, from simple beginnings to complex conceptions of man and his relations to the supernatural order. In his essay, "The Emergence of Religion," (2), he challenges the idea put forth by Tylor that religion originated in animism, that is, in a "belief in the existence of spiritual beings," which man arrived at through realising that within dwells a kind of phantom or ghost, which is capable of leaving the body during sleep, trance, or sickness, and finally going away altogether at death. Whilst recognising this to be true, and admitting

(1) "Primitive Culture." p. 425.
(2) In "Essays Catholic and Critical;" by Members of the Anglican Communion.
that many primitive peoples hold the same view today, James very much doubts whether this was the case when man arose from his mammalian forebears. He points out that from archaeological evidence the first indication of religion occurs in the Middle Palaeolithic Period (the Old Stone Age), when the prehistoric Neanderthal race lived in the caves of France and Spain - perhaps a quarter of a million years ago. These men laid their dead to rest with great care and ceremony. At Le Moustier there was found the skeleton of a youth, placed in the attitude of sleep, with an implement close by the hand, and other flints in the grave. This, along with other discoveries, shows that Neanderthal man had some conception of life after death, even though his conception reached only to a life like that to which he was accustomed.

Further evidence of the probability that religion emerged at a very early period in the history of mankind is furnished by the Piltdown remains, which were unearthed in 1912 on Piltdown Common, near Uckfield in Sussex; the skeleton of a woman who must have lived before the Ice Age, perhaps half a million years ago. This is thought to be a far superior type to Neanderthal man; the cranial capacity points to a much greater intellectual development than that of the Cave man. If, then, the Cave folk had some conception of religion, it seems highly probable, in view of this intellectual superiority, that in the much earlier period of the Piltdown race religious ideas had already appeared.

These appearances of religion in the earliest traceable modes of human life bring with them the suggestion that at the very beginning of man's history there was a tendency within him which caused him to think, to feel, to act about the unknown. Perhaps the Cave man's speculation
about the unknown went no further than the laying of his dead in a position of rest surrounded by implements, in the belief that the grave or death was not the ultimate and absolute end of human existence. It is certain that his mind was not concerned with the problems of theology, the nature of redemption and salvation. From the evidence which Professor James and other archaeologists offer it is reasonable to surmise that "the overwhelming awesomeness of Nature found a religious expression at a very early period." The thunderous noises experienced by the Cave man in his dwelling during a storm must have made him feel that he was surrounded by a power which he could not understand, but which terrified him. Compelled to explain, to himself at least, the mystery of the terror, he expressed himself in terms which gave some satisfaction to the primary impulse of religion within him.

There is no doubt that primitive man's response to Nature, and his endeavours to grasp the mystery that lay behind it, did much to inaugurate the earliest stage of religious evolution. Otto, speaking of this sense of wonder in the presence of Nature, says: "All ostensible explanation of the origin of religion in terms of animism or magic or folk psychology are doomed from the outset to wander astray and miss the real goal of their inquiry, unless they recognise this fact of our nature - primary, unique, underivable from anything else - to be the basic factor and the basic impulse underlying the entire process of religious evolution." (1).

In this chapter I am not concerned with the nature of the origin of

religion, except to note in passing that there are different theories put forward by different writers on the history of religion. As already hinted, Tylor believes that religion began in animism, and by that he means "not only the belief in spiritual beings, but also a 'general animation of nature'". Lubbock before him said: "The ideas of religion among the lower races of man are intimately associated with, if indeed they have not originated from, the condition of man during sleep, and especially from dreams. Sleep and death have always been regarded as nearly related to one another." (1). Marett, and later E.O. James, reject this view for that of Mana – a wonderful supernatural power which first manifested itself in what Marett calls animatism, the forerunner of animism. Durkheim expresses the same view, and when writing about Mana he says: "This is the original matter out of which have been constructed those beings of every sort which the religions of all times have consecrated and adored. The spirits, demons, genii, and gods of every sort are only the concrete forms taken by this energy or 'potent- iality,' in individualising itself." (2). Frazer argues for magic as the origin of religion, Jevons, and later Freud, for totemism, though Jevons recognises a pre-totemic stage, and maintains that its religion is a matter of conjecture.

Whatever the beginning of religion may have been is outside the scope of my purpose for the present. The point I want to make clear now is that archaeological evidence gives us fair reason for believing that, as far back as we can go in human history, primitive man had some kind of religion which, inarticulate though it was, nevertheless shows the

(1) "Origin of Civilisation." p.206.
(2) "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life." p.199.
emergence of an aspect of human life which was later to be developed and crystallised into more definite and higher forms. This fact completely refutes the contention of all antagonists who have misinterpreted facts at their disposal, who have been too easily satisfied with the second-hand information they have gathered from travellers and missionaries, and who have failed to grasp the mental processes at work in the savage belief in witchcraft, and to see that in the crude beliefs of the primitive peoples reported to them there were the beginnings of religion. Since however, the beginnings of religion can be traced to the prehistoric Neanderthal man, and since these early primitive beliefs (which, like all beliefs, are subjected to the laws of evolutionary growth), are now highly developed in the form of monotheism, how can it be argued either that there is, or there must be, some tribes or races without any kind of religion? The investigations of Lang, Lubbock, Baker, Lindsay etc., fail to produce evidence which proves their contention that there are tribes and peoples entirely without religion. But the investigations of modern anthropologists offer evidence to the contrary; the balance, then, must be tilted in favour of the belief in the universality of religion.

It may be of use to our argument to point out that one of our modern psychologists, C.G. Jung, contends that religious feelings and ideas are an aspect of the human mind. He says (1): "I do not, however, hold myself responsible for the fact that man has, everywhere and always, spontaneously developed religious forms of expression, and that the human psyche from time immemorial has been shot through with religious feelings.

(1) "Modern Man in Search of a Soul." p. 140.
and ideas. Whoever cannot see this aspect of the human psyche is blind, and whoever chooses to explain it away, or to 'enlighten' it away, has no sense of reality." Just as men like Prof. E.O. James have based their claim for the universality and development of religion upon the findings of archaeologists, so Jung argues from the investigation of symbols occurring in his analytical work. His method is empirical and scientific, and not from the philosophic standpoint. "Inasmuch as religion has a very important psychological aspect, I am dealing with it from a purely empirical point of view, that is, I restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I refrain from any application of metaphysical considerations." (1)

The religions of the very earliest peoples may well come into Jung's field of observation, because, like Otto, he believes in a luminous quality which "seizes and controls the human subject, which is always rather its victim than its creator." As a matter of fact he says that the religious symbol of a sun-wheel - a double cross contained in a circle, always associated with the idea of a world-creating deity - has appeared in every cultural region, even in the Rhodesian cliff-drawings of the Old Stone Age. And it is a symbol that stands for a psychic happening, "it covers an experience of the inner world," since it cannot have had its source in any experience of the external world.

Now the interesting feature of Jung's argument is that many of the dogmas which some people have thought to be peculiar to Christianity alone are to be found in much earlier religions. "They occur just as often in pagan religions, and, moreover, they can reappear spontaneously as psychical phenomena in all kinds of variation, as they have, in a remote (1) "Psychology and Religion." p.2).
past, originated from visions, dreams, or trances. Such ideas were never invented. They came into existence when mankind had not yet learned to use the mind as a purposeful activity. Before people learned to use thought the thoughts came to them. They did not think, they perceived their mental functions." (1).

Nevertheless, when speaking of the development of religious thought and feeling, we must not fall into the error of believing that every religious concept is the outcome of progressive or evolutionary thought. The messages of the Hebrew prophets were very different from anything their contemporaries knew. In a sense they coupled a pure ethical monothelism with the unscientific view of the universe and its causation which their day accepted. But the new theological concept which they declared was not the result of a close examination of the knowledge they possessed. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult to see how they could possibly have arrived at their teachings in that way. To quote Prof. James: "Clearly they did not derive it from the observation of the facts of nature, especially as righteousness and not mere benevolence was for them the characteristic feature of Yahweh. They give no evidence of possessing a knowledge superior to that of their age and environment, as in the case of the ancient philosophers. They were just ordinary men, distinguished only by their religious experience and spiritual insight.

Surely here we may reasonably claim to have a revelation from God to man independent of human reflection and discovery - 'a down-rush from the super-conscious,' rather than 'an up-rush from the sub-conscious.'" (2).

(1) "Psychology and Religion." P.56.
This argument obviously does not dispose of the idea of an evolutionary process in conceptual thinking, it refers only to the geniuses who are always in advance of their time and age.

Whilst subscribing to the viewpoint of those who believe in the universal phenomenon of religion, Jung maintains that the universal presence of the religious image is not in itself a proof of the existence of God. He says: "It would be a regrettable mistake if anybody should understand my observations to be a kind of proof of the existence of God. They prove only the existence of an archetypal image of the Deity, which to my mind is the most we can assert psychologically about God. But as it is a very important and influential archetype, its relatively frequent occurrence seems to be a noteworthy fact for any theologia naturalis." (1).

To sum up, the phenomenon of religion is much more likely to be universal than local and sporadic. The arguments of those anthropologists who have endeavoured to prove the absence of religion among certain primitive peoples are not sound; but their data contribute to the belief that man as a conscious self has always sought for a meaning of his personal existence, for an explanation of his feelings stimulated by his environment, and for a relationship with the Supreme Being behind everything.

Now the archaeologist has gone below the surface of history to the hidden depths of the past in his search for knowledge of the ways of living among the early peoples of the world, and he has by no means

(1) "Psychology and Religion." p. 73.
laboured in vain. For the purpose of my thesis the important fact that emerges from their investigations is the one already mentioned, that there are definite evidences of a religious life to be found among the very earliest human inhabitants of our earth. Baillie says: "It seems nowadays to be a matter of almost unanimous agreement among those competent to judge, that neither history nor geography can show us any tribe or people which is devoid of all religious awareness. We know of no human society, however savage and backward, which does not find itself confronted with the divine. It may be a matter of dispute whether all peoples are aware of deity as personal, or even as spiritual, being; but it is not disputed that all peoples have such an awareness of the divine as is sufficient to awaken in them what it is impossible to regard otherwise than as a typically religious response."

Alongside this fact we have the historical development of religious expression and conception for thousands of years, showing the progress made by man from his crude manifestation of a vague feeling within him to an articulate expression in worship of a definite religious feeling and desire, from the ill-defined idea of terror which pervaded the mystery of nature and life to the monotheistic conception of God, the Creator, Redeemer, Friend and Lover of all the souls of men.

The evidences both of modern archaeologists and of Jung point to a definite human urge compelling man to express himself in a way that is religious; and in the next chapter we will proceed to find out what the psychological basis of this urge may be.

Baillie
CHAPTER II.

The Psychological Basis of Religion.

The old controversy between religion and science is today being solved, at least in some of its aspects. It is now no longer necessary for the theologians to defend their belief in a Master-mind which planned the universe, its laws and their sequence, and all living things subject to them, because science has been compelled by its own discoveries to accept this point of view. A determinism based on a fortuitous collection of electrons and protons is no longer a tenable theory. Purpose is a distinctive feature of all life, and without a mind conceiving it purpose is not possible in nature, beast or man. We, as theologians, go further than the pure scientist by declaring that the mind which conceived the universe, about which we speculate so much, is the mind of one with whom fellowship is possible, and from whom we all gain power capable of releasing physical, mental and moral energies. In other words, we believe that there is something within man which can respond to the divine as the retina of the eye responds to light. What that something is it is now our intention to discuss; but, whatever it may be, we conclude from the previous chapter that it began to manifest itself in the very earliest history of mankind. Undefined and ill-expressive though it was then, it was nevertheless present as an aspect of human life. It first manifested itself through a crude and
primitive belief in life after death, later through a response to the mystery of nature and of life, and finally through an ethical monotheism which became more personal in the teachings of Jesus than in those of the prophets who first conceived it.

Some writers on the psychology of religion maintain quite vigorously that religion is based on sex. Others contend that it is definitely an instinct or a disposition of mind which impels man to organise his experience from a religious point of view, and others that it is in the nature of a sentiment. There are those who, like Jung and Otto, are satisfied that religion springs from a numinous quality of the human mind which is dynamic in its effect and breaks forth out of the deepest ground of the soul itself.

Now it does seem that the principal quarrel about religion among psychologists (i.e., among those who, unlike the Freudian school, do not try to explain religion away), is whether or not religion springs from an instinct, or is the result of sentiment formation. On one side of the fence we have McDougall, Drevcr, Shand, and Thouless; and on the other Starbuck, Hocking, Pratt, and, very definitely with both feet on the ground W.P. Paterson, who, in his book "The Nature of Religion," challenges McDougall particularly. The quarrel is by no means settled yet, but before stating what may be regarded as a satisfactory psychological basis for religion, let us examine critically the different theories put forward by certain psychologists. These are three: A. The Sexual Theory; B. The Specific Instinct Theory; C. The Sentiment Theory.

A. The Sexual Theory. This theory is put forward with the idea to
explain away religion as an illusion which is based on a sublimation of
the sex energies. Freud, in his " Totem and Taboo," has laboured to prove
that religion is reducible to the Oedipus Complex, and that Christianity
is a regression to the early primitive totemic beliefs and practices.
I will deal more fully with this point of view in a chapter on Freud's
unbelief. The fact that "conversion" generally appears at a time when
the sexual instinct is coming to its full development in adolescence
also gives colour to the sexual theory of religion. Evidence of this
(but not support of the argument) is given by Starbuck, in his "Psychol-
ogy of Religion," p.28: "Conversion is a distinctly adolescent phe-
omenon. It is a singular fact also that within this period conversions do
not distribute themselves equally among the years. In the rough, we may
say they begin to occur at 7 or 8 years and increase in number gradually
to 10 or 11, and then rapidly to 16; rapidly decline to 20, and gradually
fall away after that, and become rare after 30. The event comes
earlier in general among the females than among males, most frequently
at 15 and 16. Among males it occurs most often at 17 and immediately
before and after that year." And again (p.41): "Conversion and puberty
tend to supplement each other in time rather than to coincide." But,
according to him, they may, nevertheless, be mutually conditioned.

Further evidence for the belief in a sexual basis of religion is
the fact that mystics often clothe their imagery in erotic language;
for example, they speak of their spiritual marriage with Christ, and
frequently use love terms that suggest the inseparable unity of sex with
religion. It is true that in many ancient religions sexual elements,
and phallic symbols appeared. This is not difficult to understand when we remember that there is a mystery in both sex and religion, and that they were equated by ancient thinkers. But if religion was based on the sex instinct we should expect to discover among the findings of the anthropologists evidence that would confirm this. This, however, is not the case. Professor James says there is no anthropological evidence to support the sexual theory of religion: "Actually sex qua sex plays an insignificant part in the practice of religion, for while sexual symbolism abounds in myth and ritual, and ceremonial licence is prominent at seasonal festivals, both are directed primarily to specific ends, viz., the promotion and conservation of life, not the satisfaction of repressed erotic desires. Religion, in fact, has always endeavoured to exercise a regulative control over the instincts of sex by means of the elaborative system of taboos and sanctions with which it has controlled relationships within the kinship group, and inculcated within given limits the virtue of chastity."

There is no more reason for believing that religion is based on sex because sexual elements and symbols appear in religious practices, than there is for thinking that it is based on the ego instinct, since it is a known fact that the desire for self-preservation drives a very high percentage of men and women to religion as magic. Demonstration of this has been made recently, when this nation went to its knees in prayer.

Again, if religion were based on sex we should expect to find a much greater and freer expression of that instinct in religion; whereas

(1) "Comparative Religion," p.33.
what we do find is that religion in the past has led to sex repression. According to Louba virginity is not only sacrificed to the gods in order to secure freedom from the sex desires, but is actually enforced as a sacrifice to the gods because there is a definite antagonism between sex and virginity. Jung argues that religion is the only bulwark against the onrush of vicious sexual practices.

Another point which must not be overlooked is that, if the above theory were correct, we should expect to find a variance in the strength of religion equal to that which we find in the sex instinct; that is, we should expect stronger religious feelings in early adulthood, when sexual virility is stronger, than in later life. But this is not the case; if anything, it is the other way round. And those who are unusually strong sexually we should expect to be bordering on sainthood, which does not necessarily happen; though we must not ignore the fact that powerful instincts make for a strong personality, which may express itself not only in secular directions but also through religious practices. Nevertheless, the strength and activity of the religious energies largely depend on the use man makes of them. "(But) the conditions for the maintenance of this 'instinct,' for its perpetual regeneration, and withal for its growth, requires, as in the case of every instinct, that we take self-conscious possession of that which is by nature present; that this which is thought with shall be renewed also by being from time to time thought of and made an immediate experience." (1).

Some time ago I was almost driven to the point of view that there

is some inherent tendency within the sex instinct which expresses itself through avenues we call religious. This was after dealing with a number of both married and unmarried women whose breakdowns were due principally to sex repression. As the analysis proceeded and the positive transformation emerged, becoming stronger after each interview, a desire was expressed by one patient for some kind of physical manifestation of the instinct. A number of interviews were then spent in re-educating her in the control and sublimation of the instinctive energies. In all the cases, no mention of religion having been made, there was a complete swing over to Christianity from a subtle form of humanism, and one woman with certain hysterical tendencies brought into her letters to me images expressed in obviously erotic language; for example, "I could have written to you, but I was afraid I would love you with a guilty love, so now I constantly pray against myself because you are so lovely. I must keep dead inside and I seek where to follow Christ and I find no clear way."

"You have stirred me to the depths, so I turn once again to religion and find the Church, the Bride of Christ, waiting to sustain me...........I turn to the Heart of Christ, and behold I can love you selflessly from the pain of His Heart. My own pain and torture and love become His, and hiding my pain in His I can become a lover of all His creation." "I cling to the Cross, as I do now when you are away (on holiday), and Christ enlightens me more on His painful secrets. I am of the new birth, and old things are passed away and become new." "I pray that Jesus will give me a true friendship with you in His Divine Heart."

These quotations reveal a strong link between sex and religion in
this woman's life. She is married to a man whom she never loved, with
whom she is sexually frigid, and from him she has escaped into religion,
which is nothing more than a substitution for the real end. But there
were times when she embarked upon a kind of sex adventure with some
friend well known to her. Then her religious enthusiasm was on the ebb,
and it only began to flow again when for moral reasons she had to frus-
trate her sex desires. As the positive transference to me strengthened
and control of her instinct was necessitated, so her religious life
seemed to show signs of deepening, or perhaps it would be more correct
to say, became more disproportionate to her normal life. A closer ana-
lysis of the woman's religious life, however, made it quite clear that
her religious activities were the expression of a repressed sex feeling
which was assuming a pathological character. Her ideas lacked co-ord-
ination, and there was an obvious incapacity in her actions which she
was failing to see; for example, she very much resented her attention
drawn to her feelings of hate for the person with whom she wished to be
united "in the H heart of Christ." What the patient was doing was this:
she was taking certain religious images, chiefly used by the Church in
which she was interested, the Roman Catholic Church, (and this interest
had manifested itself only after her unhappy marriage was contracted),
and using them as an outlet for her frustrated sex instinct. The ener-
gies of the instinct were not being sublimated by being directed into
religious channels, (and this can be a perfectly healthy achievement),
they were simply engulfing the religious images and exploiting them in
the same way as impulsive stealing in a kleptomaniac is an exploiting of the sex instinct. The woman showed no signs of having had any religious experience; in fact it would be true to say that the religious feelings were inhibited by the sentiment of hatred towards her husband, and when she was led away from the religious terms and imagery she used in her letters and conversation she expressed herself in a manner that suggested atheism. What had appeared, therefore, in her case, to be evidence for the belief that religion is based on the sex instinct, proved to be the exploitation of religious imagery by the instinct, in much the same way as the ego instinct can exploit the noble virtues for its own purpose.

During the last ten years I have dealt with many cases of unmarried women who appeared to be devout and religiously sincere, but who broke down after a certain minister left the town. In the first place they were attracted by his preaching — so they believed — and became increasingly interested in his Church, and again — as they thought — in religion. During the analysis of these women it was established time after time that they never were interested in religion qua religion, they were interested in the man; and what they did for the Church was a way of serving him, not Christ, the Head of the Church; also an opportunity for being near to or with him. The primary response they made was a sexual one, and to his person, not a religious one to his teaching. When he left the basis of this religion was denied satisfaction, and they left the Church and flitted from one place to another, seeking satisfaction for their deserted feelings. The behaviour of these people had all the
appearance of religion, but it was really the manifestation of their unsatisfied sex feeling. One woman told me that she wanted "a more intimate religious feeling": i.e., a religious experience such as the minister had often spoken to her about, and preached about from the pulpit. During an interview with him she told him what she desired, and he offered to help her as far as he could, though she was to understand that finally the matter had to be left with her and God. She followed the instruction given her, and tried to prepare herself for what she hoped would be the fulfilment of her desire. But the experience she wished for never came. Why? Because the intimate experience she really wanted was with her minister, and not with God. Her religious desires and behaviour were clearly a rationalisation for her sexual desires.

Yet there is a true religion, which is neither a rationalisation for hurt sex feelings nor an illusion expressing itself through the imagery of sex and erotic language. It is as free from sexual yearnings as the herd instinct is when it prompts a man to move among his fellows and be active on their behalf, or as the ego when a man is fighting to preserve himself against the vicious attacks of his enemy. It has manifested itself in the line of the great saints whose instinctive response to God has produced a harmony within themselves which they retained in the face of persecution and death: e.g., Jesus, St. Paul, John Huss, Luther, and countless others. No illusion could have preserved for them this mental equilibrium in the moment of crisis. They were not indifferent, as an insane or pathological mind would be, to what was about to happen to them, they knew and felt everything; and with amazing courage
and confidence in Him whom they trusted they met the situation and without defeat.

B. The Specific Instinct Theory.

Bartlett, in his book on "Psychology and Primitive Culture", says: "As to whether there are sufficient reasons for assuming a distinct religious instinct or not we need not now inquire. But that there is a religious interest or bent, original, as far as the individual is concerned, stimulated by early training, but not wholly derived from this, and taking specific forms of development in different instances, seems to me indisputable." (p. 175). Whilst not committing himself wholly to the religious instinct theory, Bartlett's statement, particularly since he maintains that every instinct manifests itself through some specific interest, is tantamount to an acceptance of it. Dr. Hughes, without accepting the Specific Instinct Theory, says: "There is no reason, in the nature of things, why there should not be a religious instinct. If there is an instinct of curiosity prompting man to inquire into things and find out truth, why should we not admit also an instinct that prompts him to worship and fall down before something greater than himself?" (1). If, however, there is a religious instinct, then we should expect to find some manifestation of it (a) in animals; (b) in primitive man; and (c) in children.

(a) The answer to the first part of this difficulty is given by W. Lauder Lindsay, ("Mind in the Lower Animals." Vol. I), who very much inclines to the point of view that the dog at least displays a religious feeling towards his master, and to certain natural phenomena. Using

Flint's definition of religion and quoting "the human heart cries out for a living, personal God to worship," he says, (p. 220): "This is precisely what the dog does and the savage does not." And again, (p. 221): "Whatever be the definition adopted of religious feeling as it is exhibited (if at all) in lower man, we must admit that the same kind of feeling, the same moral or intellectual qualities, or blending of the two, are possessed at least by certain dogs, and by them frequently in a much higher degree and in a much more real sense than by countless thousands of men, including whole races thereof." He bases his claim on the following facts: (1) The dog's devotion to his master even after the latter's death. "Man's will is law, man's love is heaven, man's self is God." (2) The dog's ritual:"the dog engages occasionally in rites similar to those of negro fetishism, and of the dancing and howling dervish." (3) The dog's apparent superstition; many animals have in certain circumstances a feeling of dread or awe before the unknown. (4) The quality of the dog's love for his master; "its depth and purity, its sincerity and disinterestedness, is infinitely superior to the love of countless thousands of men either towards their fellow men or their maker." (5) The dog's recognition of the man's higher nature - his moral qualities. (6) The dog's sense of guilt and delight on being forgiven.

Lindsay endeavours to sustain his claim by contending that man's prayer attitude, kneeling and bending, is parallel with the dog's crawling to its master's feet and craving for affection; also by citing evidences for dogs' attending church services, like the dog of the Highland shepherd. I hesitate to commit myself whole-heartedly to Lindsay's
position, because it seems to me that he is crediting the dog with more intelligence than we have evidence for; also he is projecting to the dog what he knows of man's relationship with his God, and does not appear to discriminate sufficiently between what may be called "instinctive reaction" and "habit." D'Alviella (1) says that whilst it is a fact that animals experience joy or terror in the presence of certain natural phenomena, it is "doubtful whether they can reason beyond it, and still less try to enter into relationship with the mystery beyond it." Further, "The dog is not able," says the author, "to combine with his fellows to found a religion implying the desire to establish ideal relations with the mysterious higher powers."

But, on the other hand, if we admit Schleiermacher's definition of religious feeling, which is a "feeling of dependence" - "The common element in all pious states and consequently the essence of piety, is that we feel ourselves absolutely dependent, to wit, dependent on God" - then the dog manifests a religious feeling in much the same way as does primitive man.

(b) Manifestation of Religion in Primitive Man.

Now whether we accept the theories of men like Lindsay, who argue for the presence of a religious feeling in animals, or choose to qualify them, I see no reason for rejecting them in toto. The dog is the animal that lives in closest contact with man, and it may well be that here we have an opportunity of observing the religious nature in its pro-

(1) Hibbert Lectures. 1891. p.50.
primitive manifestations. We now know that there is certainly evidence of a religious tendency, in a meagrely developed form it is true, within the Cave man. In him it is emerging for the first time in a visible though very inarticulate fashion. "A day came for nascent humanity when our ancestors were no longer content like animals to look for the sun to warm them; to greet the dark-dispelling moon with cries of joy; to howl in terror at the rumbling of the thunder; to demand of the rock a shelter from the wind and rain; and to spy out the beasts of the forest so as to capture or escape them. The savage began to ask what were his own relations to the beings who thus affected his destiny; the mental process which gave him his answer differed in nothing save in complexity from that which contemporary thought accepts to explain the cause of phenomena in the last analysis." (1).

Primitive man, however, was quite incapable of forming any highly complex sentiment such as we know today, for the simple reason, surely, that his intellectual processes were not sufficiently disciplined and articulated. His religious feelings and behaviour were in keeping with his intellectual level. The argument for religion appearing in primitive the personality man might be put in this way. The beginnings of individual lie within the womb of a woman after conception has taken place. But those beginnings do not express themselves in any way that makes the mother feel that her child is an extravert or an introvert, that it is assertive or submissive, phlegmatic or sanguine, red-haired or black-haired. Development of the foetus must take place before any signs of individuality can appear; and even after the child is born some time must elapse before definite signs

(1) D'Alviella. loc. cit. P.51.
can be detected. But who would deny that the beginnings of the individual lie much farther back than the actual existence of the child before our eyes? Similarly, what reason have we for denying the beginnings of religion in the early forms of life, emerging at the lowest level of human life, inarticulately expressing itself through the early vague beliefs in life after death, and finally asserting itself through worship, definite religious customs, and dogmas?

(c) Now an important link in the argument for a religious instinct is whether the child manifests any of its aspects. We can say that the child's dependence upon his parents is the first beginning of his religious life; here we see an element of adoration, a belief in the parents' infallibility, omniscience, and omnipotence. "It is from them, (i.e., father, mother, or possibly nurse), that all blessings flow, and about them that most mystery centres. The child's attitude towards them is not usually called religion; but, (allowing for its simplicity and indefiniteness), it is psychologically the same in nature as the attitude which he will in future years come to have towards God." (1) Baldwin expresses a similar point of view: "The child's earliest expressions of reverence, love, devotion, trust, dependence, are directed to the actual persons of his environment." (2) It is only when the child learns the parents' fallibility that he ceases to place all his confidence in them. What, then, becomes of the religious instinct when the parents no longer stand for its objects? It may be said that it now finds an outlet through the child's imagination which (at about the age of three to six) corres-

(1) "The Religious Consciousness." J.B. Pratt. p.94.
ponds to the mentality of most primitive or "savage" people.

In a letter to a friend of mine on this very subject of religion in a child, Dr. Murphy of Manchester University writes: "A natural exercise of the imagination, in the child and primitive alike, is to personify, to think of any power in which he is interested at the moment as a person, that is, on the analogy of himself, as a being with life and will - to which, in fact, he may appeal, or which he may cause to do what he wishes it to do for him, or not to do what might harm him. By such simple anthropomorphisations or personalisations the unseen mysterious mana power, worked upon by the imagination, becomes the personal spirit which gives its name and character to Animism, the religion in all its various phases which characterises the innumerable tribes of the tribal stage of culture." The writer goes on to say: "It should be noted that imagination is not to be identified with fancy as the creator of illusion, but it is the creative activity of the mind par excellence. Secondly, this activity of the imagination, in the child as in the primitive, has the tendency, so invariable as almost to deserve the name of an instinct, to lay hold upon the reality of unseen powers, unseen beings, an unseen world. Thirdly, with this tendency goes the equally invariable emotional movement to associate with belief in such unseen power feelings of fear on the one hand, and trust on the other. Fourthly, there is the tendency to anthropomorphise, to personify, which raises the vague powers to spiritual deities, God. Here comes in the refinement and exaltation of the ethical." This view supports the belief that the child's religious life finds its expression through the avenue of the imagination after the
child ceases to deify the parents, and before he arrives at clear religious concepts. "So the child who gropes for his father, the savage who bows before his stock, the ecclesiastic who enforces a dogma, the pietist who lives on herbs - all these, as well as the mystic who contemplates the unseen, and the rationalist who still believes something he does not see, all of them are religious." (1).

However, whilst there is much to be said in favour of the Specific Instinct Theory, there is one insurmountable argument against it, and it is one which Irving King uses in his book "The Development of Religion."

"To hold that religion is an instinct, or that it develops from an instinct, can only mean that it is some physiological adjustment to the environment necessitated by the life-process, or, possibly, that it is some conscious attitude aroused by the failure of such an adjustment to function properly. In no intelligible way can the religious consciousness or religious acts be thought of as directly related to the biological struggle for existence. If religion is to be called an instinct it would certainly necessitate a new definition of instinct." (p. 26). This criticism is one to which McDougall, Drover, and Barnard would subscribe.

There are no grounds for believing that the religious instinct is scientifically objective, and for that reason psychology must either leave it alone or protest against the appropriation of a word which has a totally different connotation. "In so far as such a view (of the instinct) shuts the door against any scientific study of instinct it is, of course, quite inadmissible, and the psychologist, equally with the bio-

logist, must protest." (1) Other objections to the Specific Instinct Theory will now be discussed in the next section of the chapter.

C. The Sentiment Theory.

Objection is taken by McDougall and Drever and Selby to the use of the word instinct in stating the psychological basis for religion. In his "Introduction to Social Psychology," (7th Edition, 1915. pp.88-89), McDougall quotes Renan as saying that the religious instinct is as natural to man as the nest-building instinct is to birds; and in his reply both to Renan and to other authors who have written of religion as one of the fundamental attributes of the human he says: "But, if we accept the doctrine of the evolution of man from animal forms, we are compelled to seek the origin of religious emotions and impulses in instincts that are not specifically religious.......It is clear that religious emotion is not a simple and specific variety, such as could be conditioned by any one instinct; it is rather a very complex and diversified product of the co-operation of several instincts....." W.P. Paterson, when arguing for the presence of a religious instinct criticises McDougall's contention that the doctrine of the evolution of man from animal forms compels us "to seek the origin of religious emotions and impulses in instincts that are not specifically religious," by saying that this last objection is fatal "if we cannot call an instinct anything which did not exist in our prehuman ancestors." And again: "But man as we now know him, and as he has been known for thousands of years, is much more than an animal; and the question of real moment is whether on the human plane he has shown con-

(1) Drever: "Instinct in Man." p.77.
genital tendencies of a higher kind which are similar in structure to the instincts, and react in similar ways." (1). Here Paterson seems to concede more than is necessary to McDougall's position; this expression of his own position suggests that the religious drive in man is rather of the nature of a prolonged habit which might have been started in animism, and which may have the appearance of an instinct, but it is not necessarily an instinct, because its beginnings (or potentialities of a beginning) were never co-existent with life itself. I see no reason why such a concession should be made to overcome the difficulty of the apparent absence of religious emotion in animals, by one who is arguing for a religious instinct.

Dr. Drewer opposes the view that there is a specific religious instinct on the grounds that an instinct never involves an idea, and religion does. And since religion involves the idea of God it functions on a higher level than that of the instincts, and must be thought of in terms of a sentiment. Another reason, and one which Dr. Selby offers, for thinking that the true psychological basis for religion is a sentiment and not a specific instinct, is that religion involves the whole personality and not merely a section of it. This point of view is broadly summed up by Dr. Hughes: "All man's instincts are involved in it, because his whole being is involved. He is not religious in any one instinct only, but religious because every instinct, when it works normally, can work in a religious way. Every one of them, self-preserving, sex, curiosity, imitation, all of them can act and co-operate in a religious way, whenever

and wherever the appropriate situation or environment is found." (1).

Whilst the Sentiment Theory is in many ways more satisfactory than the Specific Instinct Theory of religion, it is, nevertheless, by no means free of certain difficulties. To begin with it is difficult to see in it why the idea of God ever came into being apart from something innately religious within man, and particularly when he was scarcely capable of clear conceptual thinking. None will deny that sentiments play an important part in the individual's religious life. But they exist as the products of some fundamental inner quality which I will discuss later in relationship to its environment. The formation of the religious sentiment, apart from the idea, is no different from that of any other sentiment; we have the idea, corresponding to the object God, and coconstituting around it are all the emotions of our whole being. Now if religion was nothing more than a sentiment we should not expect of it any greater influence on the personality than that of some other sentiment, and its absence would scarcely make for disintegration. In other words, to say that religion is only a sentiment to be classed among others would be to dispute the claim that a man without religion is an incomplete personality, since a man's personality is not necessarily the poorer because he does not happen to have some sentiment similar to that in the mind of his neighbour. John Newton did not have the sentiment of anti-slavery, but no one dare contend that his personality was incomplete for that reason. Pacifism is a sentiment which is very dear to some people, but it cannot be argued that those who are not pacifists are in any sense less dynamic as Christians than those who are. Is it not equally true that

if religion were only a sentiment the absence of it in the mind of an individual would not make for disintegration? But the failure of the individual to satisfy his religious yearnings does prevent him from becoming that personality he must be to adjust himself satisfactorily to his environment. The evidences of Jung (1), Hadfield, (2), and Brown (3) confirm this point of view. Jung maintains that it is only when a man is linked up to God that he can recover from his neurosis; and that only when the “numinosum” within him responds to God will he be an integrated personality. He says (p. 264): “Among all my patients in the second half of life— that is to say, over thirty-five— there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook.”

Further, the dynamic of a sentiment is never as vital as the relationship with a person. However strongly formed a sentiment may be, it does not stimulate human activity as does a living object. For instance, I may be moved to action by the sentiment of anti-vivisection, but the sight of an animal in process of being vivisected would move me much more than any sentiment. And why is that? Because the actual object associated with the sentiment completely arouses my feelings of tenderness and of pity for the helpless animal, and of anger towards those who

(3) “Science and Personality.” p. 221 passim.
inflict pain on it, and accordingly I act as best I can on its behalf. Similarly, my experience of the Supreme Being moves me being more than the religious sentiment can. Surely the difference between the religiosity, the man who is a conventionalist or theorist in his religion - whose religion is only a sentiment - and the man with a definite specific religious experience, like that of St. Paul's for instance, is that the latter is dynamic, and not passive in his religious life as is the former.

Having examined the three above theories, we must find an explanation for the psychological basis of religion which will recognize the validity of the experiences which the sex theory denies, which is more objective than the specific instinct theory, and which is more adequate than the sentiment theory which fails to explain why religion is a fundamental necessity to the human life. As already pointed out, Jung gives credence to Otto's view that there is a quality of life which impels man towards the Holy One, and which breaks forth among the deepest ground of the soul itself. Otto maintains that Schleiermacher's formulation of the religious principle was defective, not only because "the feeling or emotion which he really has in mind in this phrase is in its specific quality not a 'feeling of dependence' in the 'natural' sense of the word," but also because it does not account for the "creature-consciousness" which is "the emotion of a creature, abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to what is supreme above all creatures." (1).

Otto gives credit to William James for grasping this very fact in a passage in "Varieties of Religious Experience," (p.58): "It is as if there were in

the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there', more deep and more general than any of the special and particular senses by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed."

Otto, then, believes that this quality within man responds to a "nunus praecens," which on being experienced arouses the "creature-feeling" and also a feeling of dependence. Whether we agree with this mystical idea of Otto's or not, there is in my opinion something fundamentally religious in every one. In Neanderthal man it was quite elemental, a vague sense expressing itself in man in a reaching out beyond himself, and through an endeavour to make terms with the unknown. Let me quote David Yellowlees: ("Psychology's Defence of the Faith"): "If when you speak of a religious instinct you simply mean that the root, or part of the root, of religion is something primary and irreducible in the human mind, then there is a religious instinct, something as ultimate, and as unproveable as a sense of beauty. Call it a sense of obligation, a feeling of incompleteness, the numinous element, or anything else you like, but it is there, and no serious psychological study can ignore it."

Now there are two facts that lead us to suppose that there is something fundamentally religious in man: (a) The universality of religion; and (b) the evidence of those psychologists who like Jung, Hadfield and Brown, are satisfied that only when the individual is in touch with his God does he enjoy mental health. The concept "need" is one that may help to clarify what we mean by this "something fundamentally religious in man." Katz says: "It will be found as a matter of fact, that the idea of needs
will prove helpful in our attempt to find new explanations for certain types of instinctive behaviour." (1). The need I believe to be innate or like hunger and thirst, and not acquired during the life of the individual. It can be recognised internally by feelings, desires and sensations, in response to a stimulus situation, and externally by modes of behaviour which can be observed objectively. When this need began is, of course, purely speculative, and we might do well to have in mind the words of Renan: "the attempt to solve the problems of origin requires a keen eye to discriminate between things certain, probable and plausible, a profound sense of the realities of life, and the faculty of appreciating strange and remote psychological situations. And even with the possession of all these rare qualities, it is very difficult to attain certitude in the problematic situation. There must always be wide gaps and interspaces where one can only measure possibilities, draw certain inferences, note half-seen indications, and where, after all, we can but choose the least unlikely clue among many." (2). Surely this warning is never more needed than when an attempt is made to trace the origin of the religious need.

Now there are three aspects to every need: (1) The stimulus situation. (2) The physiological reaction at the moment of stimulus, plus the affect that goes with it. (3) The resultant behaviour tending to relieve the tension, or give satisfaction.

(1) The stimulus situation to man's religious need is his physical and social environment, and also an intellectual world which consists of or


(2) Quoted by E.O. James, in "Comparative Religion," p. 5.
includes his own sentiments and ideals. From the dawn of self-consciousness man has endeavoured to adjust himself to his environment; and as a result of the challenge which he felt the physical world presented to him his consciousness of values developed with their accompanying and corresponding sentiments. Gradually, through the progressiveness of the thought processes, man felt a need for an object inexhaustibly good and lovable, to make possible an endless growth in goodness and love, and an endlessly renewed self-losing and self-finding."

(1) Primitive man could not, of course, conceptualise this felt need as we now can; but it was nevertheless present and compelled him to find some explanation for the universe around him, and also for some assurance that his life had value, not only in his own estimation, or in that of others, "but also in the whole scheme of mental things." Stimulated by his growing environment man has come to believe that beyond his physical and intellectual worlds "there must be a Unifying Being, who not only gives meaning and purpose to his life, but also help in his distress and power to overcome his obstacles." Hence his need, at first impersonal, demanding an explanation of his own life in relation to his environment, now becomes personal in its desire to be related to God, who is above and beyond all things and also eternal.

(2) The physiological reaction of the religious need is to be found in the affective experiences at the moment of stimulation, which is not necessarily confined to any one time or place; the stimulus may be felt at any time and anywhere. The affect experiences are Awe, Reverence, Dependence, Trust. These experiences are derived from certain specific

(1) Grace Stuart: "The Achievement of Personality." p. 156.
instincts which are brought into action by the religious need in response to the stimulus situation. The emotions awe and reverence are reducible to more elementary or primary ones in the manner suggested by McDougall ("Outlines of Psychology." p.334). Awe is a blending of fear, wonder, and negative self-feeling. This emotion is clearly manifested by the savage in his religion. In the face of the illimitable magnitude and sometimes terrifying forces of his physical environment he gives due regard to his self-preservation; but he is also desirous of knowing it better, and curiosity urges him to obtain a satisfactory understanding of the world around him. Nevertheless the greatness and mystery of his environment make him completely submissive before it. The emotion par excellence of religion is reverence; and here we have not only the primary emotions fear and wonder and negative self-feeling, but also gratitude, which is found on a higher level of intelligence where man is capable of appreciating his debt to others. "These elements and forces of primitive religion (fear, wonder, and negative self-feeling - my own italics) have lived on, continuing to play their parts while religion rose to a higher plane on which tender emotion, in the form of gratitude, mingled more and more with awe, blended with it, and converted it to reverence." (1). Our felt gratitude is always greatest when we receive that help which we know ourselves incapable of providing; and in the higher forms of religion man recognises that his God is able to do for him something which he cannot do for himself. The emotional experience of the Christian before the Cross expresses the reverence he holds for the Saviour of mankind.

But the emotion of gratitude, which McDougall in his "Outlines of Psychology" claims to be a blend of tender emotion and negative self-feeling, presupposes a state of dependence which comes to man through a recognition of his utter helplessness to cope with external and internal forces: with his environment and his own nature. This derived emotion, as well as that of trust, also presupposes a certain level of intelligence where a measure of deduction is possible from certain past experiences. As already pointed out above, man through contact with his environment, through the felt tension between his mind and the stimulus situation, comes to recognise his need of a being that will give significant meaning to his existence, and make him feel that he is an integral part of the whole scheme of life. He therefore in times not only experiences awe when confronted by some manifestation of his God, but also dependence upon Him; and even though he cannot conclusively prove that the help he needs will be forthcoming, he nevertheless trusts that it will.

(3) The resultant behaviour of the religious need which tends to relieve the tension, or give satisfaction, is to be seen in religious practices and forms of conduct. Just as we have development in the religious thought processes towards the idea of God, and in the emotional experiences accompanying the need in relationship to its object, so we find it in the behaviour itself, beginning with the grotesque religious dances and revolting sacrifices of the totem clan or group, and progressing through different levels of "rite and spell" to the sacraments of the Christian; through the worship of the community to the prayer of the individual; through the tabus of the primitives to the moral code of the
higher religions; and thence to the faith of the Christian. It might be said that the resultant behaviour of the religious need is a means of obtaining satisfaction expressing itself through "practical forms of appeal to the Divine Being." Professor Paterson writes of four evolutionary ways that have been adopted to obtain the desired end (1); and for our purpose we could not do better than examine them as (a) The way of coercion; (b) the way of ingratiating; (c) the way of obedience; (d) the way of faith.

(a) To the primitive man coercion was a natural way of obtaining benefits from the higher powers. By using the magical word or the magical act he could achieve his end through gaining an influence over evil spirits, and therefore over his environment which is subject to them.

(b) The way of ingratiating is expressed through prayer, the offering and the sacrament. Through prayer one makes known one's request, and the more persistent it is the more likely it is to be heard and granted. Even in the prayer of adoration and thanksgiving we see a strengthening of the appeal of petition through the sincere recognition of the favour and good offices of the benefactor." Similarly, confession reinforces the petition by the appeal of negative self-feeling. Among the lower religions the offering was nothing more than a bribe to the gods, but among the higher "it can also have the gracious use of the token of affection and reverence, and the characteristic response to poverty or suffering."

The sacrament is a mode of behaviour calculated to gain favour with the Divine, as found among the Hebrews through their sacramental rite of a covenant-sacrifice. "The highest conceivable form is the achievement of (1) "The Nature of Religion." p. 337."
of essential union with the Divine Being, and this has been sought, both
on very low and on very high levels, by partaking sacramentally of a
divine food." (1).

(c) The way of moral obedience originated in man's belief that the
supernatural powers were much like himself, and to please them he should
do that which he knew to be right and avoid doing that which was wrong.
In all the higher forms of religion morality has had a significant place,
and in all but the very highest has been enforced by the idea of future
rewards and punishments. The Hebrew prophets brought religion and moral-
ity into close contact; similarly Mohammed, who, confident in a future
judgment, emphasised that God would judge man according to his works here
and now. This idea is also to be found in the teachings of Jesus: "Not
every one that sayeth unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the Kingdom of
Heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in Heaven."
(Matt. VII. 21).

(d) With increasing religious insight it became evident that the way
of coercion was unsatisfactory, in so far as man could not compel God to
do what he (man) desired. Neither was the way of ingratiating satisfac-
tory, since it smacked of bribery, and bred within man righteousness
and complacency. The way of moral obedience created many difficulties,
religious
particularly for Christian thinkers; e.g., Luther. Good works in them-
selves were not enough; besides, they were easy for some and difficult
for others; but even those who found it hard had their moments of illum-
ination and spiritual satisfaction. Further, it was a way open to ex-
ploration by those who desired the favour of God but were unwilling

(1) Paterson loc. cit. p.396.
to fulfil the greatest law of all, which is Love of God. Hence it became abundantly clear that a more purified form of behaviour was necessary if man were to satisfy the religious need within him. This necessity was fulfilled by the way of faith. The greatest appeal that can be made to any benevolent person is that based on the emotion of trust in him, and this man ultimately believed to be equally true of God as of himself. "Whenever the Divine Being was believed to be benevolent as well as powerful, it was a probable view that He was willing and waiting to bestow His best gifts, and that nothing is so pleasing to Him as that His children should confidently trust Him and humbly depend on His spontaneous favour." (1). Among the higher modes of religious behaviour faith was a characteristic of the felt need for a Divine Power or Being, and something of it can be found in Brahminism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and certainly in the Hebrew and Christian religions, where it plays an essential part in the life of their followers.

These four different forms of religious behaviour express at different levels man's need for favour, help, and unity with that mysterious Being he conceived as the power behind the universe. Just as man has progressed in religious thought and feeling, so have his needs become more refined and cultured. The religious need can never be permanently and finally satisfied, as this would entail complete identification of the self with God. But it can be partially satisfied by the progressive realisation of states of being, comprehension and power, previously apprehended as desirable; and this is essential if the whole personality is

not to suffer privation.

It is now my purpose in the following chapter to discover why the need in some people is unfulfilled because of a condition of unbelief.
CHAPTER III.

The Emotional Inhibition to the Spiritual Life.

The two previous chapters have, I hope, established as far as possible the universality of religion and the presence of a something, which I prefer to call a religious need, within man that compels him to seek after God, just as physical appetite drives him to seek for food. I am now faced with the problem of accounting for the scepticism we meet among people, their unbelief, and in some cases their systematic attempts to produce a conclusive atheism which will explain away religion as an illusion. One readily admits that some people do unwittingly respond to revelations of divinity embodying truth, beauty, and goodness. These qualities of holiness are diffused throughout life, and when man recognises them and is motivated by them he demonstrates the reactions of the need within his life, as well as a moral, aesthetic, and intellectual response. Yet we know that certain men and women, while having a profound appreciation of moral, aesthetic, and intellectual values, obstinately refuse all arguments for God, the Fatherhood of God, and His love for the things of His creation. Therefore, if our premises are valid, it is for us to produce some psychological evidence for religious unbelief. In using the term "unbelief" I mean the absence of what some may prefer to call "faith"; that is, a faith which is an active belief in the reality of God.

If William James is correct when he says in his "Will to Believe"
that faith is based on desire, and that we therefore disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use, then we must discover the reasons why men do not desire religion, and have no use for God, just as medical men seek to understand the underlying causes for the patients' aversion from food. Of course, some would say that James is wrong, that they themselves disbelieve in religion not because they have no use for it, but because of logical difficulties. But is this the true explanation for their unbelief? We admit that in the religious sphere there is not that logical exactitude to be found in mathematics and physics; but, as A.F. Taylor points out, the attitude of trust and faith is just as characteristic of science as it is of religion. "Outside the sphere of mathematics how far can we say that any of the propositions which make up 'the scientific view of the world' are strictly and rigidly proved? It is at least certain that most of them have never received, and do not seem capable of receiving, anything like demonstration. Thus it is a commonplace that all natural science is bound up with a belief in the principle that 'nature' is in some way 'uniform.' Without this conviction it would be quite impossible to argue from the handful of facts we have learned, by observation or action, about the little region of space and time open for our direct examination, to the structural laws of events in vastly remote spaces and distant times." (1). Further, in all important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the dark. Religion is an important, if not the most important, transaction in life; and if some people make it an exception to the rule and refuse to take any risk because of the insufficiency of evidence, we are not trespassing on human personality.

by contending that there must be some psychological reason for this religious unbelief.

Intellectual difficulties in the way of belief are very often valid only as defence reactions against some particular moral responsibility, or some disharmony within the mind itself. Some such difficulties are easy to understand, and can be resolved if the unbeliever is desirous of the help psychology can give him; others are difficult to understand because of the lack of opportunity to obtain the necessary psychological data; whilst others are obstinate because of their deepseatedness and the apparent resistance of the unbeliever.

The emotional tone of an instinct determines the individual's behaviour. For instance, a man who is troubled with a feeling of inferiority not only withdraws from society as much as he can and thereby inhibits the development of his herd instinct, but he also refuses to assert himself; and if the feeling is particularly strong he is likely to avoid every effort that calls for the use of his intelligence. On the other hand a highly elated feeling gives the individual a sense of well-being, urges him to go among others, and to speak and to act in a manner that suggests complete freedom of expression of the egoistic instinct. Similarly, where the sexual instinct is concerned the man who has a feeling of impotence towards his wife is unable to consummate their marriage. If the woman, on the other hand, is obsessed by fear of penetration or pregnancy she will be frigid with her husband, and her failure to make the necessary sexual adjustment for a happy marriage may conceivably cause each of them to repress their instinct and prepare the ground for a nervous breakdown. From evidence gathered in my psychological work it
would appear that complete repression - if this is a possibility - is much more likely to take place in the sexual instinct than in the egoistic or the social instincts. (For the sake of clarity I keep to the three primary instincts, the egoistic, the sexual, and the social or hero instinct, and do not enter into further classification). The individual who is dominated by a feeling of inferiority, or an inferiority complex, does at least assert himself in an environment where he is free of criticism and can do things unobserved. Even the extreme introvert, who is of all people the most prone to feelings of inferiority, can behave in a manner that obviously manifests an ego at work on the conscious level of his life. But from time to time I have dealt with cases which have shown a complete repression of the sex life.

For example, the case of M.S. revealed that she did not really know what a sex feeling meant, but thought that it was the desire to be loved by some man, and that this was a feeling that no woman should have until she was married. She came to me for treatment because each night on falling asleep she was awakened by a spinal spasm which her doctor and specialist put down to nerves. The attacks were more violent and frequent for five days before and five days after menstruation. This fact pointed to sexual repression, and an analysis of her dreams revealed certain fears associated with sex. Her paternal grandfather was an illegitimate - something about which the family never spoke, but which was told to M.S. when she was about twelve to fourteen years of age, in a way that made her feel the shame and disgrace of such an inherited misfortune. Her mother impressed upon her never to have anything to do with boys, and that it was sinful even to want to be loved by a man be-
fore being married to him. When the patient was eighteen and twenty-two of her 'girl friends were obliged to marry to save themselves from disgrace.' These experiences greatly impressed M.S., and despite her loyalty and affection for her friends she felt that they had both sinned against God. The fear, which began to take definite shape before the spinal trouble appeared, was that of allowing herself to be loved by some man before she was married, and of having an illegitimate child. Later, during sleep the sex feelings, seeking to obtain some entry into the conscious level of her mind, aroused the moral censor, which forced her feelings back and down with such violence that there was a concomitant effect in her spine.

A similar case was that of W.N., who was awakened from sleep by terrifying nightmares which had an obviously sexual significance. The analysis showed a dread of having sex feelings lest her mother should learn of it. There was also a definite unconscious desire for some kind of sex adventure, which was revealed and partly worked out in dreams, when the experience was promptly broken off (and almost forgotten) through the terror of seeing someone standing over her. W.N., also, did not know what it meant to have sexual feelings, though she could remember how she liked to touch her genitals when she was a young child. In both these cases there was an absence of any conscious recognition of the sex instinct, and obvious signs of its complete repression.

In much the same way a complete repression of the religious feelings can take place through some emotional conflict on the conscious level of life. A few years ago a young Cambridge student came to me for
psychological help. She was an avowed and professing atheist, and could produce cogent reasons for her unbelief. In the course of treatment she told me that she was once informally engaged to a boy whom she did not love or want to marry; but she did not like to break off the relationship since his family had intimate associations with her own, and because she did not want to feel guilty of any meanness. However, when the young man decided to go into the ministry she saw a way out of her difficulty. She told him that she was unfit to be a minister's wife. But why? Her answer was readily supplied; she did not believe in God. This excuse she had to substantiate, and by so doing she built up a system of thought which she came to believe was irrefutable. Once the lie was unearthed her unbelief collapsed, and later she expressed a desire for spiritual guidance. The foundation of her unbelief was definitely emotional, not rational, and the ideas which she produced repressed the religious feelings within her.

The self-regarding tendency plays an important part in the atheistic rationalisations of many people. For some specific reason the individual tries to preserve the good opinion of others, and rather than do anything that would make him appear before his friends as hypocritical or inconsistent he will adopt a course that will relieve him from the fear of being misunderstood and condemned by those who know him. In addition, the egoism of an individual is quite capable of driving him to justify to himself his rejection of religion. The narcissistic never like to think that they have let themselves down in any way, and if perchance their behaviour has been motivated by an unconscious desire to be perfect in all things, any suggestion of insincerity within the self
is dealt with in a rigorous and decisive manner, and things outside the self must come secondary to those which are primary and within the self. Dr. Taylor tells us that "the late Philip Gosse was at once a keen naturalist and a firm believer in the literary inerrancy of the Book of Genesis. As a naturalist he could not deny the genuineness of the discoveries of fossil remains which suggest that life on our planet had its beginnings at an era immensely more remote than any honest interpretation of the Book of Genesis will allow. As an amateur theologian he felt unable to deny the inerrancy of Genesis. Accordingly he reconciled his theology with his natural science by the theory that the earth was indeed created out of nothing a few thousand years ago, but created with fossil deposits ready made under its surface." (1). It is clear that Gosse was unwilling to give up these contradictory beliefs because they were part of his mental make-up, and to forfeit them would have been like tearing the flesh from the bone. It is for that reason that he compromises with the primary and the secondary things that interest him. He is then able to hold fast to the things that delight him, and at the same time appear consistent - which, of course, is equally important. In much the same way the individual who finds pleasure in being genuine and sincere in all that he does will even go so far as to distort that aspect of truth which contradicts the belief he treasures or condemns his behaviour. He loves himself more than truth, and will seek to hide from himself those things that will expose him to self-criticism.

Let me give a case which came to my notice when I was in charge of a church during my student days. The man was in every sense a very

(1) loc. cit. p.54.
worthy member of my diaconate. Gradually his religious interest waned; he resigned his office, and finally left the church, on the grounds of intellectual difficulties which he could not remove, and which he put forward with comprehensive and coherent arguments. It was not until I learned of the unhappy relationship between himself and his wife that I realised fully the false position he had created for his unbelief.

Quite recently an interesting case came my way, of a young woman who was much interested in her church and did a fair amount of social work among her church friends and their organisations. Her religious disposition was on the whole good, and though not committing herself to a profession of a definitely religious point of view, she appeared to maintain a steady passive allegiance. There came a day, however, when she was obliged to seek a special favour from her minister. This was granted, but it was also made perfectly clear that the favour could last for a period only because of other commitments. As the day approached for its withdrawal the woman was reminded of her responsibility, and advised what to do. She evaded the issue clearly put before her, and finally found herself obliged to act in order to save the situation. Two things embarrassed her greatly: A. That she was finally compelled to act; B. that she was made conscious of her ingratitude for the generosity which had been shown her. To defend her feelings of self-regard - both to herself and others - she abandoned her church on the real grounds of being embarrassed; but to her mind this was not a sufficient reason, another more dignified had to be found; and the reason she gave was that religion is a thing of the past and can now be explained away by science.
Now the interesting point in this case was that the woman had for some time past been hiking in the country with a group of young people who argued against religion, and among them were a few university students whose little knowledge of science gave them the appearance of omniscience before the rest of the group. The woman, however, adopted the attitude of passive resistance towards her unbelieving friends, and apart from occasional absences from the Sunday service she was comparatively faithful to the church. But soon after she was embarrassed by a situation of her own creation in the church she adopted the ideas of the atheists, because, as she remarked, they were much more progressive than those of church-goers. To anyone not knowing the history of this woman's unbelief her reasons would sound plausible if not sound; and the probability was that she would go out of her way to support them, involving herself in much arduous mental work to strengthen her arguments, and entering previously shunned avenues to escape from those who disapproved of her changed outlook upon religion.

It would be true, in a sense, to say that in all of the above cases of professed unbelief the religious need was not strong enough to resist the conflict centered in the self-regarding tendency, as when the sex instinct persists through masturbation even though the adolescent is troubled with remorse because of his habit. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that the need was still in a state of immaturity through the inability or failure of the individual to obtain a true spiritual experience. This comes, according to some, through "conversion". But conversion, strictly speaking, is an attitude of mind which may be towards, or away from, the idea of God. In the cases above it was the
conversion of turning away from God, and was easy because the religious need had never received a satisfying experience of its object. People whose religion has been concerned with ideas about God will always find it easier to repress the religious life within them than those who are concerned with God; and it is they who can produce, for themselves at least, a satisfactory atheism.

In the "Introduction" to "Psychology and Modern Problems" Hadfield says (p. 25): "Atheism itself may be a form of religion in which hatred of God is merely a reflection of hatred and fear of the father in early childhood, and therefore expresses a desire to get rid of him." How does this come to pass? Chiefly through the transference to the idea of God, unwittingly, of ideas associated with the father. "It is a tolerably safe assertion," says Tracy, "that a child who, for any reason, has never worshipped his mother, will be by so much the less likely ever to worship any other divinity." (1). The very first god the child knows is the parent. He is infallible and all-powerful, but if he is hated by the child because of his severe treatment and rigid methods, the image of the father which develops in the child's mind is one that arouses both fear and pain. In later years this image is unconsciously attached to the idea of God as Father, and the desire is then either to avoid Him or to embrace arguments that reject religion as an illusion. This reaction is much closer to psychological fact than the process which Freud describes when he tries to explain away religion in terms of the Oedipus Complex.

Miss S. tells me that she does not believe in a God; and her chief argument is that the people who believe in Him are no better than others. (1) Quoted from Pratt: "The Religious Consciousness." p. 94.
who do not. Analysis of her dreams made it clear that she had a feeling of hatred towards her father, who by this time had been long dead. He had frequently thrashed her for doing wrong, and punished her by sending her to bed when the rest of the children were allowed to play outside. She also recalled a text-card hanging on her bedroom wall, which bore the inscription: "God is your Heavenly Father." It was at this she often gazed when she lay on her bed sore in body and unhappy in mind. The painful associations with her own father were now gradually, but very thoroughly, attached to God. A complex system of ideas was being built up in her mind that later gave her a definite bias against religion; and it was unfortunate for her that the kind of religious teaching she met with in the years of adolescence confirmed the already existing feeling that if there was a God he was a dreadful tyrant. This now established conviction impelled her to an acceptance of the popular unbelief of the people with whom she worked.

The unconscious image of the father is the archetype for all fatherhood and authority. In some cases it completely determines the reactions of the individual to others - the young man's reactions to his employer and all in authority over him, also the young woman's choice of a husband or employer. In other cases it is less determining. A great deal will depend on the strength of the image, which is to say it depends on the forcefulness of the father's personality and the strength of the child's resistance. This consideration is important, otherwise we could not account for the fact that even in the same family are found varying degrees of strength of the father image in the different children. The assertive child is much less likely to be impressed by the
authority of the parent than the submissive child who accepts his punishment and his parents' judgments without question. The former rejects the parents' judgments in favour of his own, and resents the infliction of punishment. In this manner he resists the influence of the parent, and the image has less chance of impressing itself on his mind and becoming dominant in the unconscious. If the parent is a churchgoer the submissive child will also go to church because he dare not resist the parent's authority, and as his soul interests develop there so he will appear to be very religious; but with the death of the parent there will come a waning of interest and a slackening of enthusiasm. And if, perchance, he meets with some unhappy experience in the church — they are not uncommon — or encounters pagan influence outside, the dynamic of the painful father image will be released and will bias him against religion.

The tendency of the introvert is to embrace the father image and to transfer it unconsciously to others; the extravert rejects it, and rebels against everybody and everything associated with the father himself. This is clearly illustrated, I think, in the case of two sisters: the one predominantly an extravert, the other more of the introvert type. The extravert rebutted her father's influence even at an early age; as an adolescent she openly resisted him; later, caught up by the Oxford Group movement she tried to convert him. Finally she went to China, where she abandoned religion in favour of Epicurean humanism; and on returning home she went to live in the south away from her native north. But her sister remained at home, complaining bitterly about the way in which the father had treated and was still treating the family. Time after time her dreams revealed an unfulfilled death wish towards...
him. She became engaged to be married, and later broke off the enga-
gement because the young man irritated and exasperated her. The true deter-
mining factor in the breaking-off of the engagement was the unconscious
father image, which was being aroused by the imperious voice her lover
sometimes used in her presence. Had her father wished her to marry the
young man she would probably have continued with her engagement, but find-
ing every excuse for not marrying him. But since this was not the case
she was greatly relieved when the relationship came to an end - the rea-
sons she gave for this, however, were not the true ones.

Similarly, the individual whose mind has accepted an unhappy father
image is likely to break off his relationship with (the idea of) God
when there is no parental influence compelling him to live a religious
life - that is, of the conventional kind - and he will then try to just-
ify his decision: building up arguments that appear reasonable if not
logical and systematic, but which are nothing more than rationalisations
for the feelings of hatred towards his father. Just as a rationalisation
may threaten the herd feelings so it can threaten the religious feelings
the only difference is that when the herd feelings are repressed a man's
life becomes reclusive and he no longer enters into society, whereas the
religious feelings can be repressed without so obvious a disturbance
within the personality, but ultimately manifesting itself in a failure
to adjust the self to difficult and unexperienced conditions.

It sometimes happens that the fear of the father compels the child
to achieve 100% in everything that is attempted, and this is the stand-
ard not only for his academic life but also for the sphere of morality,
which is an inextricable part of the religious life, where any failure
engenders guilt and feelings of remorse. The painful nature of these feelings may drive the suffering individual to seek a way of escape, which he may discover through a complete renunciation of religion. The conflict can be expressed in such terms as these: "What use is religion if it constantly makes me unhappy? It is far better to live one's life apart from religion than to be dogged by what it teaches." Mrs. J. told me that as a child she feared her father, who demanded perfection in everything she did. On one occasion she proudly brought him her school report, which showed 60% or more marks in all her subjects. His response was: "That's nothing to be proud of. You will please me only when you have got a hundred out of a hundred." In later life she strove after perfection in her house-work and morals, and she dreaded incurring his criticism if she should fail to satisfy his demands. The fear was carried over into her religious life and compelled her to tread the strait and narrow path in a manner that became increasingly joyless and wretched. Soon after her father's death she revolted against religion, which, of course, was a much easier thing to do than to revolt against her father.

A common emotional basis for unbelief is due to conscience trouble, an acute feeling of guilt because of some sin. To remove this kind of guilt, which I believe to be an apprehension of divine punishment, and in some sense a fear of being found out, an individual will endeavour to get rid of the idea of God since he cannot, as he believes, hide his sin from Him. The case of Mrs. X., a Jewess, will explain what I mean. She was suffering from an obsession of neurosis, and was dominated by a fear of "fire." Every association with fire itself, and also with the word
"fire," terrified her to the extent of making her thoroughly unhappy and too wretched for any kind of social activity. If she saw the word "fire" or some association with fire in a book or paper she was depressed; she refused to go out in case she might see the word written up somewhere, and she would never stay alone in a room where there happened to be a fire. At night she dreaded going to bed lest she should dream of fire or of something about fire. Early in her treatment two important facts were noted: (a) That her fear of fire was of the nature of a phobia; (b) that the fear was not that something would happen to herself, but to her son. I suspected that both these facts pointed to a sense of guilt lurking somewhere in the unconscious. My reasons for believing this were in the first place that the phobia was of the straight, simple type, such as that of a claustrophobia I once removed in a patient whom I hypnotised and thereby traced the fear to its origin within three days; the dissociated memories were integrated into the conscious life, and the patient was again free to move and work in enclosed spaces or mix with the crowds at a football match. Mrs. X.'s fear was not the result of a dissociated experience, but due to repression and the repressed elements found an outlet through being directed to her son and away from herself. In the second place her anxiety for her son pointed to some sense of guilt which was yet to be made conscious. Incidentally it may be said that frequently in the case of a Jew repressed guilt manifests itself in anxiety for one or other of the patient's children. Probably this is due to the Jews' prevailing belief that the sin of the father will visit the children unto the third and fourth generation. I recall the case of a man - a Jew - who phoned me religiously
every day and often came in a state of panic to know how his daughter was progressing under my care. One day I encouraged him to tell me why he was so terribly anxious about the girl, and he confessed that he believed his daughter was cursed because he had sinned in his young days. Mrs. X.'s fear was repressed, only to reveal itself in what she called "an absurd terror of fire," over which she had no control, and which was attached to her son.

As the treatment proceeded another equally important fact emerged - for some years she had been an avowed atheist, but she chose to say little about it because she did not wish her husband to know. He was an orthodox Jew, religious in his synagogue attendance, from which she excused herself on the grounds of her obsession. The analysis interesting data for her atheism. As a child in Spain she listened to vivid stories told by her parents of how the Jews were burnt by the Spanish Inquisitors. Her imagination haunted her with agonizing pictures of what being burnt really meant, and this increased her fear of sinning against God, because He, too, punished with fire. At about the age of ten she left Spain for Constantinople, where she went to a Roman Catholic school. Here she was taught much of what the nuns believed, and again vivid pictures tortured her imagination. She left Turkey when she was fourteen, and with her family came to England and eventually married. After the first year of married life her son was born, and within the second year she discovered that she was again pregnant. Desirous of not having another child she brought about an abortion which left her extremely ill, and during this time she realised that she had committed "a dreadful sin against God."

The sin was unforgivable, since she had destroyed a human life. Her sense
of guilt troubled her acutely for some time, and to escape from the torment of her mind she read everything that came her way, including Karl Marx, whose vicious attack on religion greatly impressed her. The reason for this was that through atheism she could get rid of her fear of divine punishment for the wrong she had done. She accordingly built up a system of ideas that helped her to defend her atheism; but her deeply-embedded religious disposition conflicted with this newly-formed sentiment of unbelief and finally brought about her neurosis. Had she lived with an atheist she might have escaped her illness; but daily contact with her religious husband stimulated the unconscious remnants of her religion and made the conflict more distressing. Eventually she reclaimed her religion and the neurosis disappeared.

Even in cases where there is no apprehension of divine punishment there is, perhaps, the discomforting feeling of having let God down, which is capable of harassing the subject to such a degree as will compel him to abandon religion altogether. In such a case there is not the same desire to destroy the God-idea as in the case just quoted — it is a forsaking of it because of the feeling of unworthiness of the self; though it is not unusual for this abandonment of religion to be later justified by a systematic attempt to argue God out of existence. This point of view will be elaborated in a later chapter.

It may be objected, and with truth, that the cases I have quoted are pathological and ought not to be generalised. I readily admit that we cannot conclude that, because a few people are pathologically minded, therefore all others are so too. But it is fair to say that in the
pathological cases we have, thrown into relief, states of mind that are functioning in the apparently normal individual, and that, if we could only come into contact with them we should find very many cases with similar emotional inhibitions to the spiritual life as I have described above. Pierre Janet says: "don't let us forget that the disease only magnifies facts which exist in everybody." (1). Unfortunately for my present purpose, only those who break down mentally come to the psychologist for the kind of treatment that gives him the evidence for establishing the claim of a psychological explanation for religious unbelief.

But, while the claim cannot wholly be based on multiple evidences of the kind I have given, nevertheless we can deduce a great deal from observation. Three or four years ago, when I first began working on my thesis, I visited a large area of middle and working class people living around my church. About 90% of the people I interviewed put up defences against going to church; and most of these defences were based on the belief that folk could get on quite well without religion. The reactions of some of these people were definitely antagonistic and pointed to some underlying state of mind in revolt against religion; others complained of the failure of the Church, and condemned her leaders for making a living out of women and effeminate men who were too conventional to forsake the habit of church-going. What was significant of their reactions was their offensive emotional tone, which pointed to an internal disharmony. Had there been no emotional bias against religion we should have been met with at least an inquiry; but, instead of that, we met a definite resistance, either conscious or unconscious, to our invitations to worship with us.

(1) "Feelings and Emotions;" by 34 Psychologists. p.309.
Analysis destroys this resistance; and later there frequently comes some spontaneous remark such as: "Perhaps I am not as religious as I should be;" or "I wish I could get back to God." These utterances are not made to me because I happen to be religious, since I never mention religion to my patients until they first speak about it. Dr. William Brown, whose serious and well-considered judgment, after a notable and extensive practice of psychotherapy, demands our close attention, says, in his book "Psychology and Psychotherapy", that all men are at bottom religious. And it is fair, I think, to say that those who passionately denounce religion and deny all belief in God have some definite psychological reason for such an attitude of unbelief. My own experiences lead me to the conclusion that unbelief may have a surface origin; it may, on the other hand, be deep-seated, though I cannot claim to have met evidences in support of the view held by Jung.

Jung is at pains to make clear that, as a scientific psychologist, he treats only of facts. He does not consider, for instance, the truth or otherwise of the ideas of God, and of the existence of God; he deals only with the facts of psychical processes. He says: "I approach psychological matters from a scientific and not from a philosophical standpoint. In as much as religion has a very important psychological aspect, I am dealing with it from a purely empirical point of view, that is, I restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I refrain from any application of metaphysical or philosophical considerations." And again: "This standpoint (that is, the methodological standpoint of his psychology) is exclusively phenomenological, that is, it is concerned with

(1) "Psychology and Religion." pp.2-3.
occurrences, events, experiences, in a word, with facts."

According to him, the human personality is influenced and controlled by forces completely beyond its own conscious control; and the disbelief of a man may be due to such forces. On page 16 of "Psychology and Religion" he says: "It is, to my mind, a fatal mistake to consider the human psyche as a merely personal affair and to explain it exclusively from a personal point of view. Such a mode of explanation is only applicable to the individual in his ordinary everyday occupations and relationships. If, however, some slight trouble occurs, perhaps in the form of an unforeseen and somewhat extraordinary event, instantly instinctive forces are called up, forces which appear to be wholly unexpected, new, and even strange. They can no longer be explained by personal motives, being comparable rather to certain primitive occurrences like panics at solar eclipses and such things. To explain the murderous outburst of Bolshevistic ideas by a personal father complex appears to me as singularly inadequate. The change of character that is brought about by the uprush of collective forces is amazing. A gentle and reasonable being can be transformed into a maniac or a savage beast."

Jung has probed very deeply into the symbolism which expresses the processes of the unconscious, and his researches have led him far and wide among the beliefs of primitive and ancient races. He attributes to the unconscious not only the instinctive forces and the "shadow" side of life, but also an intelligence and a clarity superior to the actual consciousness: "My psychological experience has shown time and again that certain contents issue from a psyche more complete than consciousness. They often contain a superior analysis or insight or knowledge
which consciousness has not been able to produce. We have a suitable word for such occurrences - intuition." (1).

Jung's conception of the personality may strike the reader with wonder and some dismay, because it leaves us with the impression that we are helpless to deal with internal influences which are autonomous and beyond our control unless we submit to a prolonged analysis and thereby gain understanding. And yet, from the results he has obtained through his method of dream analysis based on his own particular theory, it is evident that we cannot afford either to ignore his hypothesis or be hasty in our condemnation of it. From the case he gives in his book he points out that among four hundred dreams submitted by his patient - "an intellectual, of remarkable intelligence and learning" - there were many which indirectly dealt with religion, and two, which he gives, that "obviously dealt with religion;" and from his analysis of the symbols they contained he eventually deduced the reason for the man's unbelief, and finally replaced his patient's neurosis, which was his defence against religion, with a religious experience. "It is a fact," he says, "that my patient felt a great deal better after the vision of the mandala. (An important religious symbol). If you understand the problem which it has settled for him, you can also understand why he had such a feeling of 'sublime harmony.'"

A comprehensive survey of Jung's findings about the unconscious life of the human psyche would take us farther than space permits and aside from my immediate purpose. But, as the passages quoted in this thesis (1) "Psychology and Religion." p.49.
show, his evidences are all in favour of the point of view that there is a psychology of unbelief; indeed it may be said that they strongly confirm that view. My own work on the unconscious, of which illustrations have been given in this chapter, is, I hope, sufficiently convincing as to the existence of an emotional inhibition to the religious life of the unbeliever, and to his unbelief as the conscious expression of an unconscious disharmony.
CHAPTER IV.

Adolescent Scepticism.

Whilst there is evidence for believing that "conversion" and adolescence often go together, it is no less clear that many young people begin to lose interest in religion about the age of adolescence, and this is more evident today than it was twenty years ago. The exception, perhaps, is to be found in Roman Catholicism, where there is no freedom of thought and where the religion is often based on a fearful loyalty to the Church as an institution, and not centred in a belief springing from a religious conviction or experience. Dean Inge says: "When a man who has been a Protestant becomes a Roman Catholic, he must learn a kind of submission that we in England or America know nothing of in any other relation of life, unless we are soldiers on a campaign. Where the Church has spoken, the loyal Catholic must obey without question." (1). Most adolescents - particularly those of the thinking type - experience doubt about religion, which may cause hesitation, and finally postponement of any decision where belief is concerned. Some, however, frankly contend that the human mind is incapable of discovering whether there is a God or not; a condition which Professor Flint calls "sceptical atheism." The adolescent, unfortunately, does not realise that such a contention really assumes a knowledge both of the limits of human attainment and of divine

(1) "Faith and its Psychology." p. 92.
power. Professor Flint says that no man has such a knowledge; no man can assign fixed limits to the advancement of the human mind, nor can a finite mind know the limits of Divine power. "When the atheist declares, therefore, that God cannot be known, he dogmatizes presumptuously as to the limits of human power; he arrogates to himself a super-human knowledge of the possible attainments of the human mind. But worse than this, while denying that an infinite mind can ever be known, he assumes that he himself knows what an infinite mind would be capable of. He tells us in one breath that we can never know even the existence of an Almighty Being, and in the next that he himself knows that God could not make His existence known to us." (1).

This doubt or scepticism constitutes a very serious psychological barrier to the continuance of an earlier religious life, and to the transformation of a religious disposition into a definite religious experience. Let me make clear what I mean by a religious disposition. I use the word "disposition" in the sense of sentiments unconsciously accepted by the child from others. Properly speaking, the "sentiment" is a consciously accepted idea or judgment around which constellate the emotions: e.g., Nationalism, liberalism, anti-vivisection, Churchianity, Christianity, ideas about God. The child brought up in a religious environment is likely to accept the sentiments of the parents and others around it, which in time will culminate in a system of emotionally-toned ideas within the unconscious, and influencing its life accordingly. But while the disposition may make the adolescent sympathetically interested in religion, it does not produce for him the vitality of the religious

(1) "Anti-theistic Theories." p.15.
experience itself. This is arrived at through contact between the need and its object, that is, through communion between man and his God. It is the experience which makes the difference between the religiously disposed and the religiously vital folk.

Religious experience, like every other experience, is subjective and unanalysable. To quote Jung: "Religious experience is absolute. It is indisputable. You can only say that you have never had such an experience, and your opponent will say: 'Sorry, I have.' And there your discussion will come to an end. No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it possesses the great treasure of a thing that has provided him with a source of life, meaning, and beauty, and that has given a new splendour to the world and to mankind. He has mystic and peace."

Some adolescents obtain this experience. Jesus had it. Pascal before he was twenty-four believed that God had called him to dedicate his life entirely to the service of Jesus Christ. Madame Renier says: "While he was not yet twenty-four years of age, the providence of God having caused an occasion which obliged him to read books of piety, God enlightened him in such a way by this reading, that he understood perfectly that the Christian religion obliges us to live only for God and to have no other object than Him; and this truth appeared to him so evident, so necessary, and so useful that it ended all his researches; so that from that time he renounced all other branches of knowledge in order to apply himself entirely to the one thing which Jesus Christ calls

(1) "Psychology and Religion." p.115.
A confession to a definite and heightened spiritual experience is given by one of the writers in "Under Thirty Speaks for Christ." She is twenty-five years old. "I am glad I was not asked two years ago to say what religion meant to me, because I would have said that it did not interest me at all, and the only reason for my going to Church on Sundays, being confirmed and receiving Communion occasionally, was not because I enjoyed going or understood anything about the sacrament, but because it seemed the proper thing to do. But now my thoughts are quite different, for I have discovered that Christianity is not merely a religion, but a life. God is not one of whom I think only on Sundays, but someone who is with me every moment of every day, helping me all the time, whether at work or at home. In difficult tasks He is always near: in fact, He is the very best Friend of all." (2).

But our problem is to see why other adolescents have not obtained this experience, especially in those cases where a certain measure of religious disposition was functioning before the age of puberty. Both Pratt and Starbuck agree in their treatment of the general condition of doubt which follows the mental storm and stress of adolescence; and Pratt presents three reasons to explain the religious doubts of young people. Briefly they are:

1. The physiological conditions which impel the adolescent to doubt everything in general and nothing in particular. (Starbuck seems to think this tendency is stronger in men than in women, who are prone

1 Quoted by Thouless in "An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion." p.207.

to anxiety. But from my own observation I believe the condition to be equally strong in both sexes today. The rights and privileges which women now share with men have made their intellectual and emotional balance approximate more closely to that of the opposite sex.)

(2) New intellectual discoveries and observations conflict with the religious teaching which the adolescent received as a child. This conflict produces a good deal of pain; on the one hand there is the desire to be loyal to one’s faith, and on the other there is loyalty to truth.

(3) The conventional notion that youth must pass through a period of scepticism makes the adolescent try to live up to expectation, and so the religious doubt produced by the two first causes is greatly exaggerated by mass suggestion, to which the adolescent is very susceptible.

To my mind this is a fair summing-up of adolescent doubt, and it explains why many young people lack stability where their beliefs are concerned. Though it is not without significance to consider that unless we have a revival in religion, and unless more attention is given by parents to the religious instruction of children, the conflict will become less. Already there are adolescents who show not the slightest interest in religion, and they certainly manifest no painful conflict. These are the children of 1920 - 1925, whose parents lost interest in the Church and became indifferent to the work of Sunday Schools. Since family worship has fallen into disuse in most homes children hear very little about religion, which means that they are now growing up with
only such awareness of religion as comes from broadcast services, the presence of churches, and a certain amount of Bible instruction in the Day School. This does not necessarily mean that the individual will be less religious, but that the religious conflict in the mind of the adolescent during the period of physiological and psychological unfolding will be reduced to a minimum. He will, of course, be restless, not only because of sociological reasons, but also because his religious instinct, now quickened like every other instinct, is compelling him to find God. I do not suggest that, in order that the adolescent may escape the religious conflict, no religious instruction should be given, because that argument could be carried into other knowable realms of his life. But I maintain that the right kind of instruction should be given; and here the leaders of the Church have much to do for the presentation of a religious teaching that will be far less contradictory than it now is and has been, particularly where prayer and Biblical criticism are concerned.

Returning to the question of doubt, we can see how the period of internal unrest due primarily to physiological conditions makes the adolescent dissatisfied with most things outside himself. His ideals, which are generally in the nature of sweeping reforms, are his projected desires for himself. He contends that everything in the world around him needs changing so that it will be a better place to live in, and this is the reflection of the inner state of his mind. Coo ("The Spiritual Life") points out that the adolescent’s doubt about things is not so much due to any reasoning or hard thinking on his part, but is simply a symptom of his physical condition, which frequently passes through a
state of nervous exhaustion and is often accompanied by bad temper, anxiety, and despondency.

Since religion is part of the "world's furniture" that must be changed for the adolescent, he seeks to put something in its place, and generally it is the idea of "playing the game", which is possible without religion. Also he feels that the inconsistencies shown by those who profess religion are proof that it cannot be real. He fails to see that religion is not false because his acquaintances happen to be false to it. He looks at it as something which should be rejected when it does not seem to be of any use, in much the same way in which he readily discards some article of clothing when it no longer pleases him. The doubting adolescent is not one with whom you can argue; his defence is "This is what I think and nothing will ever change my mind." To point out to him that his religious scepticism is due to to his internal bodily and mental condition will make him feel either that you are tyrannising over him or that you are not serious. He is much too restless to have patience enough to see the relationship of his inner discontent with his desire to change the world around him.

The age at which the adolescent begins to show doubt or scepticism towards religion is generally round about eighteen, when he feels that he must present some definite views about life as he seeks to converse with his friends, and especially with people older than himself. Before this age he is generally meditative, apparently trying to fit new ideas into the old scheme of his thinking, but as he seeks to take his place in society and to make his presence felt, he will endeavour to give articulate expression to his thoughts. His desire to break away from
everything traditional and conventional encourages him to cling to new ideas which, because of his age and lack of experience, he fails to harmonise with what he has already been taught about life. Further, his instinctive urges compel him to brush aside all teaching which tends to frustrate his desires, and if his religious disposition is not sufficiently strong to checkmate his desires he will, even though it may cause him pain, profess a dislike for religion and try to justify his attitude by adopting atheistic ideas. One young man known to me thought he could make money quickly by "horse-racing," the dynamic of which is gambling for high stakes of money. But he could not attend Church and carry out his desires in this direction, one or the other had to go. Here adolescent loyalty manifested itself; and since he felt there was a greater probability in "horse-racing" than in religion he decided on the former, supporting his decision before his friends by saying "You cannot prove that God exists."

Some adolescents adopt a sceptical attitude towards religion because they have a sense of guilt where masturbation is concerned. They have been taught - or at least made to feel by the disapproving atmosphere in which they have been brought up - that this particular habit is sinful. The strain of the guilt not only depresses them but also makes them feel that since they cannot break with the habit they had better drop their interest in religion. This decision is not sufficient in itself to make the adolescent produce reasons for his unbelief, but it opens the door to a whole realm of sceptical ideas about life, and once through it his mind will endeavour to justify his reasons for ceasing
to attend church; and if he wishes to exhibit his reasons, as some do, he will produce, according to his mental ability and training, ideas that will have some semblance of validity. It is unfortunate for many an adolescent that he meets no one who is able to discuss intimately his ideas with him, since the people with whom he associates are generally unable to deal with him; the result is that he continues to believe that his own ideas and arguments are irrefutable, and since there is no more to be said about them it is mere humbug, if not dishonesty, to have any dealings with religion.

University students are doubtless more privileged to produce cogent arguments for their unbelief than those who leave school (and most of them leave the elementary school) for some kind of occupation in factories, warehouses, workshops, coal mines, offices etc., where the intellectual standard is only mediocre. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the religious scepticism of the university student is chiefly conditioned by the new ideas which he contacts in his classes. With some there is admittedly a challenge to their views, especially if they study philosophy and read the works of such writers as Hume, J.S. Mill, Spencer, and Huxley. It is fair to say, however, that the number of students who arrive at a sceptical position as a basis for their behaviour, is comparatively small. At the present time there are among university students those who argue in favour of pre-marital sex-relationships and trial marriages, and, if their sexual urge is stronger than their religious disposition, they are prepared to participate in either or both. Having once committed themselves, and feeling that such practices cannot be
reconciled with religion, they begin to show interest in arguments against the latter and to produce ideas, mainly for themselves, to remove the religio-sex conflict. Of course, coupled with this motive there may be a rebellious attitude to parental authority which will increase the tendency to rationalise and to adopt arguments in favour of unbelief. So that where you may have a primary motive springing from the sex urge, there may accompany it a secondary motive emerging from the adolescent’s resistance to his parents’ teaching and influence. In which case the psychological compulsion to find arguments against religion is much the stronger and will easily conquer the religious disposition.

If, however, the disposition is strong enough to hold the adolescent to religion he will in all probability try to find arguments that will reconcile his conduct with his religious beliefs. Among a large class of young men about fifteen attended gambling schools, and when we met for religious discussion it was obvious that there was a conflict in their minds between gambling and their loyalty to Christ. This they tried to resolve by contending that there was nothing wrong with gambling, and the reasons they presented were unassailable to all who had not studied carefully the ethics of gambling. So, instead of forsaking religion and later constructing defences for their indifference and apparent unbelief, they held to both religion and gambling. But only for a time; sooner or later they had to develop one or the other. Some of them concentrated on religion, and they eventually saw that they were trying to justify something that was incompatible with the spirit of Jesus; but others became more absorbed in gambling, and they realised how impossible
it was to have at the same time dealings with the associates of gambling
school and with those who attended Church.

The same kind of justification is sought by those who wish to part-
icipate in sexual practices condemned by the Church. Late in 1939 a
friend of mine addressed a large congregation of students in Cambridge
on the subject of "Sex and Youth." After each lecture there followed
questions and discussion, much of which revealed a very strong desire in
many of them to reconcile religion with pre-marital sex-relationships.
I cannot quote the arguments which the undergraduates used, but from
what my friend told me they indicated a genuine desire to live morally,
and, providing the laws that govern sexual practices could be changed,
they thought there was no reason why they should forsake either religion
or their sexual conduct.

In addition to taking cognisance of the strength of the religious
disposition as it comes into conflict with the quickened instinctive
urges of the adolescent, we must also bear in mind his temperament if
we wish to understand his scepticism. My view is that adolescents, like
adults, can, where religion is concerned, be divided into three types:

1. Those who take the line of least resistance, by passively accepting
the objective and primitive religion of their childhood. They may
become Church people because of habit, or through interest in some
minister, or because of Church or denominational loyalty.

2. Those who suspend judgment, and continue to doubt the validity of
religion. These people are sometimes sympathetic towards the Church
but never keen enough to associate themselves with it, and they make
no effort to enquire about the possible removal of their doubts, once they have attained the adult stage. The hesitation of the adolescent mind has become a habit, and a barrier to further spiritual growth.

3. Those who in adopting an antagonistic attitude towards religion become avowed atheists, not because they are devoid of Godward tendencies, but because they are defending their egoistic rights against objective authority imposed on them from without.

It is very easy to see that those who fall into the first class are by nature more submissive than assertive. They are generally introverted at a very early age, and prefer to accept the authority of the parents (who are always infallible), rather than to suffer the pain of resisting them, which may mean losing their love, or being punished. With the growth of years there comes the unconscious transference of infallibility to others in authority, and an almost complete abandonment of the right to criticise. If religion has played an important part in the individual's life, the authority of the minister or clergy, Sunday School teacher or Class leader, is never disputed, unless perchance authorities conflict and then the individual leans to the one who is capable of arousing response to outside authority. The religion of this kind of adolescent is definitely objective and primitive. By "objective" I mean that it is the product of the religious environment into which the child is born; it is outside himself, like the furniture in his home, and he cannot escape it. And by "primitive" I mean what the child naively accepts from parents and teachers without question or criticism. Pratt says: "The child's
theology, like the rest of his store of beliefs, is emphatically based on authority. The reason for this is, of course, plain enough, and is to be sought in the very nature of the child's mind - in fact in the nature of mind as such. Implicit belief, the unquestioning acceptance of the presented, is the natural reaction of the virgin mind." (1).

Unless this adolescent meets with some force that will compel him to wish for something more than a conventional religion, he will continue faithful to his Church so long as some kind of authority persists there for him, or so long as his sense of loyalty to his Church is not weakened by unhappy experiences associated with it. He submits to authority, he is bound by loyalty, and if he can he escapes from pain instead of seeking to understand its causes and cope with them. The forsaking of religion has this explanation in the case of many people; some adolescents of the above type may marry early, they probably leave home, and gradually break away from external parental authority. Their loyalty to the Church of their childhood and youth is weakened by distance; and though the early influences and impressions make it impossible for them to become active unbelievers, they show an obvious indifference to what really matters in religion - personal contact with God.

J.B. was brought up from a very early age by an aunt and uncle, both aggressive, pernickety, pious and loyal to their Church and minister. J.B.'s religious activities were controlled by theirs. She attended Church services twice on Sunday, and also Sunday School. As she grew older she attended the monthly Church meeting and the sewing teas. For some years she was faithful to her Church and reliable in her Church

duties; but she was generally embarrassed when the conversation centred in religion. This suggested that she was still over-awed by the mystery of religion, which for her was something to act upon and not to talk about. When her aunt died her interest in the Church showed signs of waning, and it was never difficult for her to find some excuse for neglecting meetings and the work of the Church societies. She likes listening to the wireless services, they often arouse pious memories; and, lacking any initiative where the future is concerned, she delights in talking about the past when the Church was the centre of her social life. I could instance many such cases as this; they all confirm the view that some adolescents continue with religion because they submit to parental authority, and in time develop a loyalty to the Church which is quite capable of diminishing when certain external forces cease to operate or lessen in their influence, and when circumstances become painful, as they may, even in a Church.

In our consideration of the second group of adolescents - those who suspend judgment, and continue to doubt the validity of religion - we are thinking of the type which is unwilling to submit to authority, the individual claiming the right to think for himself, but unable to assert himself, partly because his personal make-up is lacking in the assertive quality, and partly because he is fearful of committing himself to any definite judgment. If he continues to show interest in the Church it is because of certain social ties; whenever he is approached to take a definite step in joining the Church he procrastinates, or evades the challenge by saying, "I don't feel good enough;" or "I haven't made up my mind yet." And he never will; the longer he postpones his decision the
stronger his hesitation becomes, with the result that he represses his religious instinct and bars the way to all spiritual growth.

J.T. confessed at forty-five that this was what had happened when he was eighteen. At that age he refused to submit to his parents' wish that he should join the Church, and this refusal coincided with his own desire to resist their authority and to break away from their mode of life. Unable to follow his own inclination he continued to suspend judgment: silently criticising his parents and all church-goers because of the impracticability of their religion, but fearful of openly making known his ideas lest the whole family should denounce him and make his life uncomfortable. The effect of his indecision was a gradual breaking away from organised religion, and a secretive interest in arguments for and against religion. But he could never make up his mind what to do. There was in effect a blockage in his mind which eventually manifested itself in a complete loss of faith in himself to make any serious decision about his life - his profession, his friends, and marriage. It is not every adolescent who suspends judgment about religion who breaks down in such a way that he is no longer able to make the necessary adaptation to the changing circumstances of his life; but the failure to arrive at a definite decision inhibits the development of the spiritual life.

The third and last group of adolescents is of special interest; here we can see the complete swing over to unbelief as a defence of egoistic rights against objective authority imposed by parents and others within the scope of the environment. Some years ago I met a young man who was obviously eager to let me know that his philosophy of life was
based on historical materialism. I lost touch with him for a time, and
then the acquaintance was renewed when he attended a Labour conference
near my home. He continued to defend his atheism, and the manner in
which he argued made me feel that his avowed atheism was a defence re-
action against certain childhood conditions. I could, however, do no-
thing then to confirm my suspicion, and it was no argument against his
position for me to tell him what I felt about it. But the opportunity
came when he wrote asking me to help him over a difficulty: how could
he, as a prospective parliamentary candidate, learn to address his audi-
ences without annoying them? Both in public speech and private conversa-
tion he was objectionably aggressive, and his manner was wrecking his
chances of success. This was what he wanted to see me about; but during
a number of interviews I learned, among other things, the cause of his
reaction against religion, and the real basis of his atheism. His mother
was a daughter of the manse, and his father the brother of a Scottish
minister. The mother was masterful, and not only ruled her husband but
also chose to direct and control the careers of her two sons, one of
whom she decreed to become a minister, (this was my friend), and the
other a medical missionary. As a young boy my friend really did desire
the ministry, but the intolerable religious and social conditions imposed
on him by his mother caused him to rebel and to refute the basis of her
authority, i.e., religion itself. Having much of his mother's nature
he adopted, unwittingly, an antagonistic attitude, because he was uncon-
sciously transferring to others his hatred of his mother; and he defended
his egoistic point of view against a religion which was for him not only
objective but also objectionable.
The above case throws much light on the conduct of many children of the insane. Religion for them is symbolic of the repressive forces that have curbed and restricted their liberty and freedom. When the influences operating in their childhood and early youth have been forgotten (though they are motivating the behaviour of the adolescent), religion still remains as an institution to be reckoned with, a controlling influence which is associated with feelings of frustration and remorse, and the embodiment of all those who exercised authority over them. The egoistic adolescent, entering upon his heritage when he claims the right to think and act for himself, but disturbed by the emotional upset within and unable to see the wood for the trees in a world with which he is dissatisfied and which he desires to change, attacks the first institution which allows him the freedom of criticism. He does not attack education, because that is behind him, and unless he enters the teaching profession all that was disagreeable there falls into the abyss of his mind. If he is sufficiently interested in politics he may hope to make changes through that avenue some day; and until he obtains a hearing he may continue to grouse about social conditions, hoping that in the future he will have opportunity to change them. But religion is at hand and he is still expected to attend church, though it fails to commend itself to his youthful mind now filled with new ideals of life. Here then is his first line of attack, and when he learns of the criticisms of religion and of men's beliefs about God, he uses them, as best he can, to remove a hindrance to his freedom and development. If he happens to work among men, (or women in the case of the girl), or associates with others who think as he does, his reaction is confirmed, and if he thinks systemat-
ically he endeavours to build up arguments that prove his point of view and justify his atheistic attitude.

The adolescent who is sceptical about religion either seriously postpones his spiritual development by blocking the instinctive urge towards God, or represses the instinct entirely by building up a system of negative ideas on an emotional basis which is likely to collapse under the pressure of stress and strain in later life. A real crisis in the life of every individual is always a searching test of his psychological make-up; the moment he breaks down by failing to adjust himself to his environment, or to some change within it, there are thrown into relief his delusional references both to himself and to the world around him; and in the case of the atheist whose bias against religion began in adolescence, the underlying foundations of his unbelief are laid bare.

Adolescent scepticism is not inevitable, if the conditions conducive to unbelief and destructive to faith are avoided at an early stage of the individual development. While it is true that adolescent doubt is something to be reckoned with, and is a feature of physiological causes, there is no substantial reason, if his religious environment is sound and healthy, for expecting in the adolescent a reaction against religion any more than a scepticism about the air he breathes. If he emerges from the storm and stress period with a perverted idea about sex, the perversion is not due to the instinct itself but to the kind of ideas his mind has absorbed relative to the instinct. (I recognise, of course, that an analysis is sometimes necessary in order to see what kind of ideas, and how they became bound up with the instinct, as, for example, in sadism or exhibitionism). And similarly we must recognise, when the
adolescent produces wrong reactions against religion, that the violation of the need is due to his early acceptance of false and conflicting ideas about God and His teaching which cannot be harmonised within the mind.

As already pointed out in Chapter II, there are reasons for believing that children display early manifestations of the activity of the religious need through their behaviour towards the parents, and the use of the imagination. Their interest in religion is probably as external as that in sexual objects. Starbuck says: "In fact, one of the most pronounced characteristics of the religion of childhood is that religion is distinctively external to the child rather than something which possesses inner significance." (1). But this external interest is no more motivated by curiosity only than is the interest in sex objects where the play of the instinct is present. In much the same way as with the latter, religious interests are entered into because of their appeal to the corresponding need. It is very doubtful whether any child has a direct religious experience with the object we call God, though we cannot deny the fact of the child's response to manifestations of the divine such as beauty and goodness. This is what I believe Starbuck means when he goes on to say: "The second most prominent feature is the close rapport of the child with a supernatural world." But before the child can enter into rapport with God Himself he must have some theological conception, as Dean Matthews would have us to understand. From the New Testament we learn that Jesus must have had some clear experience of his Heavenly Father before the age of twelve, otherwise he could not have

debated with the learned doctors in the Temple at Jerusalem; but it is fair to assume that at an early age he received religious instruction both from his parents and rabbinical teachers. In this country it would be difficult for a child not to learn something about God, since if he hears little about God in his home, he receives, let me repeat, same instruction in school. But parents who wish their children to grow up with a healthy religious disposition would do well to give the right kind of instruction as soon as the children are able to appreciate it. "The wise parents who wish their child's religion to be more than skin deep will take pains to let the little one see the expressions of their own religion, and will make these expressions more obvious than they would otherwise be." (1).

The main factors involved in the formation of a child's religious disposition via the environment are:

A. The religious instruction received.

B. The quality of the religious and social surroundings.

C. The influence of parents and teachers.

It is easy to understand from the data given by Starbuck, Pratt, and others, that the religious instruction received by a child may give it very conflicting ideas about God. The God of love, and the God of battles, plagues, sudden death, and terrible anger, are both presented to the child mind; and so it acquires a heterogeneous mass of religious ideas which cannot be consolidated into a healthy religious disposition. Also, the idea that God answers prayer will sharply conflict with the child's experience and start the very early beginnings of adolescent

doubt. Much solid work needs to be done in the religious education of children if later they are to escape the kind of scepticism that will retard their development instead of quickening it.

It is obvious, too, that any one of the above three factors may conflict with the other two. For instance, a child may grow up in a religious home where he receives careful instruction, yet the religious and social conditions outside the home may be definitely evil, and do much to negate the religious instruction and influence of the parents and teachers. This is the experience of many parents moved indiscriminately to new housing estates where the children find an environment which conflicts with their religious teaching. A child may hear and absorb the idea that a cunning lie is praiseworthy, or that stealing without being detected shows cleverness and courage. Such lessons are accepted uncritically by a child, and may become rooted in his character. Only later, during the adolescent period, are they recognised as at variance with Christianity; but by that time the child may be loath to let them go. Such misdirected interest can counteract or weaken any desire for religious conviction and experience.

Sometimes the quality of a child's religious and social environment is all that can be desired, yet its primitive religion is anything but healthy, because its religious disposition is constantly disturbed by the kind of teaching it later receives, and by the dogmas it fails to assimilate. The adolescent crisis is generally the test of the strength of the individual's religious disposition, because, as Starbuck says, during the stage of adolescence mental energy is drawn off in directions other than religious - the ethical, intellectual, and aesthetic interest
become prominent. Unless, therefore, the religious disposition is sufficiently integrated through reconcilable and harmonious teaching, the ensuing conflict will produce either doubt or a complete negation of religious faith. It is for this reason that assiduous care should be taken in the giving of religious instruction to a child; and much patience and frankness should be exercised in answering his questions, which often bristle with difficulties, particularly those of the inquiring adolescent. He not only wants to know, he also demands an answer to his questions, and any evasion of the issue in his mind arouses suspicion and distrust of religion itself.

This brings me to the last main factor in the formation of a child's religious disposition, that is, the influence of parents and teachers. This is highly important in preparing the child for the climax of its religious development, which ought to be the attainment of personal religious experience. Parents unwise in their relationships with each other and with their children, also impatient and badly instructed teachers, can do untold harm in preventing the divine nature of a child from blossoming later into the full flower of spiritual experience. If only we could establish intimate contact with those adolescents who have a definite sceptical attitude towards religion, we should probably discover that the first growth of their religious feelings was stunted or paralysed by parents or teachers who were lacking in the sympathy, understanding and patience of spiritually-minded people, indispensable for the delicate and skilful training of tender minds. Before the adolescent's religious life can come to the full flower of a spiritual experience he needs to have
clear ideas about God and his place in the world. To quote Dean Matthews: "It is surely a complete misreading of the order of events to suppose that experience comes first, and afterwards gives rise to belief about God and the world. On the contrary, ideas of God and of His relation with the soul, of redemption and the aim of life, are accepted from the social environment on authority. Experience grows then. The vigour of the religious life depends upon the degree to which these ideas become living centres of emotion and will, and progress in religion is closely connected with the work of the mind upon these concepts, whereby it deepens and purifies them in the light of the total experience of the self and its advancing powers of moral and intellectual insight." (1).

The idea that adolescents can be converted without due regard to the cognitive element in religion is totally misleading. Often what has appeared to be a religious conversion in adolescents has been only an emotional response either to mass suggestion, or to suggestions made by one in whom there is some fixated interest, like that of a girl who has a "G.P." on some mistress, or on her young clergyman. Hence the necessity for giving to the adolescent clear, simple, understandable ideas about God, the world and his place in it; and these ideas he must see working out in the lives of those who pass them on to him. The religious energies within him seeking their first full outlet will find their direction along the path of these ideas, and the need will finally attain its end through an experience that will leave no doubt in his mind about the reality of his belief and faith.

If adolescent doubt is to be converted into belief the adolescent

himself needs to be understood, and his reaction against religion must be recognised as a symptom of some underlying emotional conflict; confidence should be restored on the intellectual plane of life, which is sometimes possible through suggestion, and sometimes through reasoning. Further, we should not be unconcerned about those adolescents who adopt an attitude of passive acceptance, that is, who surrender themselves to an old and beloved faith without ever questioning its grounds, or resisting the authority behind it. These people may turn out to be good church people, but the probability is that they will be devoid of that solid religious faith which can withstand such doubts as are likely to appear on the levels of feeling and thought.

It has been my experience, during many years of pastoral work, that many of the people worshipping in our churches are spiritually unawakened. Pratt was mindful of the same fact when he wrote: "A man may go to church all his life as the conventional 'thing-to-do', he may repeat the Creed every Sunday and never doubt one of its assertions, and yet the problems of Nature and Destiny may be so far removed from all his thought and the God of whom the Creed speaks may be so unreal to him that he cannot justly be said to have any conscious attitude towards Him or any other cosmic reality. . . . . . . To such a man God is not sufficiently real even to be doubted." (1). When the moment of real crisis arises these people not only fail to understand why the crisis should come to them - faithful Church folk - they also fail to deal with it. The unhappy experiences that follow may give them a distaste for religion, and in some

(1) "The Religious Consciousness." p.5.
cases doubt takes the place of their previously accepted faith. Much better is it, then, to make all adolescents think for themselves. Let them with our help work out their own special religious problems, and let us at all costs avoid imposing upon their minds ideas which are confusing and couched in terms of mystery.
CHAPTER V.

The Unbelief of the Uneducated.

One is constantly reminded of the men and women who during the last war lost what faith or belief they had because, as they contended and still do, their prayers on behalf of their loved ones were never answered. These people are typical among a great number of reactionaries, who may be divided into three classes:

A. Those who are too uneducated, and whose minds are too undisciplined, to think through the difficulty of conflicting ideas and of unanswered prayer.

B. Those who are educated but fail to take life seriously enough to think through their dilemma.

C. Those educated people who, failing to see any further usefulness in religion, build up a definite system of ideas antithetic to the beliefs which they perhaps held when young.

As seen in the previous chapter, the early religious education and training which children and young people receive determines their adult attitude both to God and the Church in later years; and since there is no reason for believing that the minds of the uneducated or uncultured are any different fundamentally from those of their more fortunate brothers, it is as well to remember that they too are influenced in their unbelief by the unfavourable instruction they received in childhood.

Another fact to bear in mind is that whilst the child's religion is in
the main the result of imitation, and its conception of God is based on the authority of the parents and teachers, doubt in what is taught manifests itself at an early age, that is, as soon as the child is capable of detecting inconsistency between what it is taught and what it experiences. For example, my own child, Catherine, aged five and a half, frequently asks questions which show that there is doubt in her mind about God's love. "If God loves me, why doesn't He give me a new doll?" Or "Why does He send the thunder to frighten us?" Pratt says that "childhood doubts are of course of many sorts, but the great majority of them are due to one or other of two great causes. These are, conflict between authoritative theology and the child's own experience, and contradiction between the theological ideas taught him and his own growing sense of morality and justice." (1).

Some people, of course, would regard as untrue the statement that a child is capable of doubting religious ideas; but if they would study children carefully and get down to their level with a very sympathetic listening ear, they would discover that a young child of five often shows signs of perplexity about what it is taught, and that the thinking child is seldom blind to obvious inconsistencies where goodness and justice are concerned. If the child becomes aware of inconsistencies in his religious teaching he naturally begins to doubt, and when that happens he grows suspicious of what is taught him; he wants to criticise, and unless his doubts are detected, understood, and removed, he tends to adopt a sceptical attitude towards the religious life which he is ex-

pected to follow. "The religion of childhood is based on authority in a perfectly absolute sense. And so it continues to be until at length the child's attention is called to the fact of conflict between two entering ideas, or more likely between some new idea and some old belief. When this day comes the child begins to say farewell to his childhood. He has tasted of doubt and he must now begin to add thought to authority in his religion and in all his knowledge." (1).

Let me repeat what I said previously in Chapter IV, that in my opinion all adolescents do not necessarily pass through a period of doubt or scepticism in religion. Pratt, I find, says a similar thing: "I am not sure it is perfectly correct to say religious doubt is a regular and inevitable product of adolescence." But adolescent doubt is a fact, nevertheless, and many adolescents have carried over this doubt from childhood which is a serious handicap to the religious life. This is why it is highly important for parents and teachers to correct misconceptions, and to resolve conflicts, in the child's mind. Unfortunately for children brought up in uneducated homes and surroundings little serious attention is there given to this matter, and they are likely to pass into adolescence with an immature scepticism in religion which is increased by the "storm and stress" phase of their lives. But even in this phase, which is little appreciated by uneducated parents, they are left bewildered; and finding interests of an exciting and adventurous nature outside their homes and Church, they are prone to forsake religion, which offers them very little satisfaction; and so the drift from religion begins, and in time it becomes a thing remote from their lives.

(1) Pratt: loc. cit. p.100.
Pratt is right when he says it is a sad picture which the Rev. R.
Kleine Stadtrikar gives in the "Zeitschrift fur Religions-psychologie."
One hundred and four boys, from twelve to fourteen in age, after eight
years of religious instruction, are set to answer the question "What
value has religion?" "Out of the one hundred and four, sixty-six begin,
'Religion has absolutely no value.' Fifty-eight subjoin the reason, 'Be-
cause we can't use it in our business.' Twenty-five see in religion some
sort of ideal value, to be sure, which yet is minimised by all sorts of
limitations, since religion is useful only 'when you are old,' or 'when
things are going wrong with you,' or 'when you are away from home.' Fin-
ally a few, thirteen in number, regard religion as something 'which you
must know because it is God's word,' or 'because you can't go to Heaven
without it.'" These answers show the confusion in the minds of adoles-
cents, and their tendency to abandon religion completely as useless, or
to suspend absolute judgment in case there may be a need for religion.
It would be useful if one could establish personal contact with Stadtrikar
adolescents (as I have done with a number of young sceptics associated
with my work), because the unsatisfactory feature of the questionnaire
method is that one does not get to know what exactly is the basis for such
replies as are obtained. But I imagine that the basis in cases such as
these, whatever it might be, could be removed if individual attention
were a possibility, and that such a basis need not have arisen if clear
and harmonious ideas had been imparted to the child's mind.

In later childhood the individual becomes critical and reflective,
and he might just as well be given ideas that will stand the searching
tests of his thought and experience, as to be allowed to acquire others.
that cannot stand the penetrating light of criticism. When the adolescent shows signs of religious conflict, doubt or scepticism, he needs personal help, because he must be saved from the failure to solve his own difficulties, and also from the idea that to be a man he must abandon something which cannot be proved. As already pointed out, it is the misfortune of the great majority of young people living in poor and uneducated surroundings that they cannot get the individual help necessary to remove those doubts which later become the material of a thorough-going unbelief.

It is fair to say that uneducated unbelievers are generally those who will never make any effort to overcome difficulties that are remote from their lives. They will do a certain amount of thinking where domestic and work problems are concerned, but their attitude towards religion is no different from their attitude towards politics. They may visit the church for marriage or christening or burial purposes, or attend some service to oblige a friend. As children they probably went to some Sunday School and learnt much of the Bible. They received such instruction as led them to believe that God was some kindly, benevolent Father, whose love for His children was so great that He would not only forgive sin, but also grant the petitions of those who cry unto Him out of their despair and weakness. Whether closely or loosely associated with some Church, they throw overboard their belief and faith when they find repeatedly that their petitions are unanswered, or when in agony of mind they realise that the one for whom they prayed has suddenly died. These people, faced with a dilemma similar to that of Job, are not sufficiently alert mentally to think through their problem. The most that could ever be
said of their faith was that it was not so much simple as childish. For a time they may cry bitterly against the God who has forsaken them; but gradually their belief in His very existence fades out completely, and they remain unbelievers in attitude if not in confession.

It may be argued that among such people there are those who will never openly confess their unbelief, and that this indicates a deep inner religious feeling. This is a false assumption, surely, because those who are likely to question such men and women on their belief or unbelief would be of the believing class themselves, and it is not easy for an uneducated person to confess to what he knows is the very opposite belief to that of his questioner. Also, primitive fear of the unknown may inhibit the confession of unbelief, because an open confession means a final commitment.

In a questionnaire which I sometimes use when people consult me about mental illness, the patient is asked, "Do you attend church?" Unless the patient is associated quite definitely with some place of worship the answer is generally in the negative. I then ask "Do you believe in God?" Here the reply is often delayed. Why? Because I am a minister of religion, and the patient hesitates to say something that may condemn him in my eyes. The self-regarding tendency prevents him from saying anything that may bias me against him. As skilfully as I can I make him understand that it is as a psychologist and not as a minister of religion that I am enquiring about his life; and this almost invariably evokes the reply "No." Sometimes the patient says: "I believe in a God (meaning in His existence), but I never pray." Why is it that he does not pray? Be-
cause he does not believe that it is worth while to do so; or because there is some doubt in his mind, prejudicing him against all forms of spiritual exercise. Either the person has failed to see religious beliefs working in the lives of those who profess them, or, because of some disappointing experience - due to the wrong theology which he imbibed when he was young - in his own prayer life, he is driven to the opinion that a belief in God is not worth bothering about.

One young man, aged twenty-seven, told me that he had given up going to church because his father, who was a steward in a Methodist Church, spent much of his spare time in gambling on horse-racing, and showed very little interest in the home or sympathy with his family. The son's reaction was not the thought that his father was insincere, (as Jesus felt the hypocrites of His day were), but that he had been tied down by convention to something that was untrue. He himself, therefore, was not prepared to tie down his life to something that was just "as old-fashioned as wearing a beard, and without which society could now get along." Unless this young man can continue to get in touch with men and women who will compel him to think out again the case for religion, he is likely to remain influenced by his "so-far final" ideas about it.

The same thing is true of the psychological bias against religion in the minds of those whose bitter disappointment in prayer has led them to the belief that religion is false. The problem of unanswered prayer arises from a totally wrong conception of prayer itself, a conception that was, and still is among some people, based on primitive magic, and
in a way supported by the experiences of certain men and women who make claim to having had their petitions granted. But whilst there are some who speak of indisputable answers to their prayers - and indeed one hesitates to doubt their claims - yet it is a fact that many more cannot speak of any such experience, and their disappointment has made them sceptical of the use of prayer. Morse and Allen ("The Religion of One Hundred and Twenty-six College Students;" American Journal of Religious Psychology, VI. pp.175 - 194) report that of twenty-four respondents who had ceased to pray, five gave negligence or indifference as the reason, nineteen "disbelief in the power of prayer." One third of Pratt's respondents testify that there have been times in their lives when they were convinced that prayer was useless, and in all of these cases this conviction was dated somewhere between the thirteenth and twenty-first years. "The cause of it is regularly some form of adolescent doubt, either as to the existence or nature of God, or as to the reasonableness of prayer, and this sceptical view in many cases has its source in some antiquated teaching as to the nature of God or the purpose of prayer."(1)

Now it may be true that in very many cases disbelief in prayer does originate in adolescent doubt, as a result of wrong ideas conveyed through "antiquated teaching," but many adults have continued to pray despite what they thought to be untrue when they were young. This is due partly to habit, and partly to a feeling that there may be something in prayer "after all." It is not easy to break a habit that has existed in the life of an individual for many years, and when it is coupled with the feeling of mystery or superstition it tends to persist even against 

(1) "The Religious Consciousness." p.519.
rational ideas. For instance, few people will walk under a ladder even in these days, and there are still hotel proprietors who pass over the number thirteen when numbering their bedrooms. But what will break the habit is some definite emotional experience; and in religion the break will leave no doubt about what some people believe to be the magical nature of prayer.

A sudden breaking-off of any habit can be brought about by some painful emotional experience, one that wounds the self-regarding tendency. Dr. Drover says that giving toys can be a habit. Well, even this can suddenly come to an end if one discovers that his giving is exploited and his generosity flouted by avaricious people. I have known people attend a church for a lifetime, and then suddenly break off their attendance because of some offence given to them. However strong a habit may be, a strong emotional upheaval caused by disappointment or hurt to a man’s feelings of self-regard will flood the habit track and destroy it completely.

Since the last war there has been a definite falling-off in church attendance and apparent interest in religion, and one important cause for this is the felt futility of prayer, which is closely allied to the idea that there is no God, or if He does exist He is not sufficiently interested in us to make prayer worth while. Unless those people also find contact with others who are able to correct their wrong ideas about God, and give them some understandable explanation for unanswerable prayers, they too will drift into an attitude of definite unbelief; though some may suspend judgment because they are bound by the superstition
that there may be a God, and to deny Him completely may jeopardise their prospects of some safe place in the world hereafter.

Another cause for the lapse of prayer which may ultimately end in unbelief is fatigue. The uneducated are usually those who are engaged in heavy manual work, and the women folk are generally overwrought by the end of each day by their domestic responsibilities and ties, so that when night comes they are too tired to go through the ritual of bedroom prayers. In their case fatigue slowly breaks up the habit, and even though they may continue to promise themselves that they will pray the next night their weariness gains ascendancy, and their prayer life fades out. The religious instinct is in this way weakened and the mind become more susceptible to the ideas of unbelief. It is not unusual to hear uneducated people who have abandoned religion say "I have given up praying long ago," which means that they have ceased to believe in its importance; and since they seem to be able to carry on without praying they really do not see the necessity for it.

I think Pratt is overstating the case when he says: "In nature life the leading deterrent seems to be nervous fatigue, exhaustion, and ill-health of body and of mind. Confidence in the spiritual forces of the universe and love for them is one of the chief factors in earnest prayer hence anything that tends to make affection less warm and the emotional life less strong tends to weaken prayer...........some people, to be sure pray most when in ill-health, but the prayers made at such times seem to have relatively but little zest." (1). Naturally everything has "relatively but little zest" when one is ill; but once the illness passes

(1) loc. cit. p.320.
the former enthusiasm returns. Strange though it may seem in the light of what Pratt says, it is a fact that those who prayed before they were ill continue to do so during the illness itself, and their prayers are much more real to them than previously. It is the experience of men and women in pastoral work that people are much more for prayer when they are ill than when they are well. At one time, in my student days, I conducted some of the ward services on Sundays in the Edinburgh Infirmary; and one day I spoke to the chaplain about the interest shown by the patients in religion. He told me that he had found that the patients showed much more sympathy than he had expected; "You see," he said, "they have time to reflect, and their weakness makes them more dependent upon God." Among the poor and uneducated who are faithful to their religion there is always a desire for prayer on behalf of those who are sick; and sometimes, even though the prayer life has been allowed to lapse, much gratitude is shown by the sufferer when prayer is offered for him. It may be said that illness revives the desire to pray in many who have let go the habit because of fatigue and over-crowded days, and in this way individuals are saved from a neglect only too likely to lead them into the ranks of the unbelievers.

Among the uneducated the value of a thing is its usefulness. I do not wish to underestimate their sense of appreciation of beautiful things - but a thing of usefulness is to them a joy for ever; and the value of religion is for them definitely pragmatic. Before many of the ideas associated with heaven and hell fell into disuse, the uneducated desired to qualify for a safe place in the hereafter. Therefore, though it was evident that many - especially among the employers - failed to
practise what they professed, the belief still prevailed that if men and women were faithful to their Church and their prayer life, following the commandments of God embodied in the traditions and customs and laws of their society, they would find favour and earn a place in heaven. This point of view is clearly expressed in many of the negro Spiritual Songs - the idea that religion means that life is a period of discipline culminating in a system of rewards and punishments. Prymes Hopkins, in "The Psychology of Social Movements," (p.251), says: "Napoleon's great dictum about the Church and its possibilities is most revealing. Though he himself was a freethinker, he clearly perceived the value to the ruler of the existence of religion; saying, in effect, that it was the only thing which kept the poor man in his place. In that he was largely right.

But for the promises held out by religion, why should the poor man tolerate a world in which he shivered and trudged in rags while the Napoleons rode warmly clad in furs; one in which he and his children starved while Napoleons threw away at one meal enough to feed his family for a week? Resentment is inevitably felt by the weak and the oppressed against a world in which might is right and the strong take all, but the hope of heavenly compensation for their sufferings in this world has been found by some to make their lives more bearable."

So people were prepared to go on believing because the hereafter was for them an unshakeable reality. But when the emphasis came to be placed on the heaven and hell on earth and not in the hereafter, and on the necessity of living out one's religion in a social way, the falling-short on the part of many professing Christians gave to uneducated minds
the idea that either Christianity was impracticable or men and women were choosing to be hypocrites. Either of these ideas, or both, tended to weaken or destroy their hold on religion, the first because such minds have no use for something that is impracticable, the second because they will not choose to be hypocrites about something serious and sacred. Many uneducated unbelievers will confess to the greatness of Jesus' life, and also to the belief that if every one were to practise what Jesus preached the world would be a decent place to live in; but they subjoin, "It just can't be done." If they could express what they really believe they would say that religion is a piece of make-believe, in which most people used to believe but which they can now do without.

There are, of course, others who reject religion not because they believe it to be impracticable, but because they feel that it restricts their freedom and dwarfs their pleasure. This I believe to be a common reason for the unbelief of the uneducated. It must be noted that among the uneducated pleasure is more a matter of the sensations than it is among the educated, who are able to find their pleasures in the more cultured aspects of life which do not seem to conflict with the religious teaching: e.g., reading, music, plays, and certain games beyond the reach of the poor. The educated are, on the whole, much better able to adjust themselves to their leisure time, and know better how to amuse themselves without forfeiting their human dignity. The uneducated generally resort to the kind of pleasure provided by the club or the public-house, and also gambling, all of which they know to be incompatible with the teachings of religion. Among them are some who for a time may feel a conflict between the desire to be faithful to their religious institution and the
urge to go with the multitude, not only at holiday times but every day. But if the former is only a matter of tradition or convention with them the latter will gain the ascendancy because it is real. The conflict is between the social and the religious tendencies, and since the latter are less strongly developed they surrender to the urge of the herd, in much the same way as the sex instinct is capable of surrendering to the authority of those who hold distorted views of the purpose and nature of the sexual instinct.

But there are others who experience little or no conflict; their conventional religion is too weak to assert any influence over their conduct. They are perfectly free and happy in their pursuit of sensuous pleasures, and are seldom troubled by feelings of guilt unless they come into conflict with members of their own society, or break its laws. However much the religious instinct is repressed they are able to live in a comparatively healthy mental state, chiefly because their lives are largely confined to an ordinary narrow routine. They appear to be quite as happy as their religious friends, and are often easy to get on with; but no one could say of them that they are sufficiently concerned with progress to make any cognitive or conative effort towards it. In a sense they have ceased to develop, not only spiritually but also mentally. They are robots moving about within the limits of their own system, and so long as they can keep free from worry they seem to have good health; but when worry does set in they try to escape from it by throwing themselves further into their pleasures, until they are finally defeated by illness. Among this class of uneducated unbelievers you have not so much
a low level of intelligence (though this may be true of some of them), as a certain degree of degeneration, which causes them to be captives within a quasi-animal orbit, where they live to sleep, to eat, to work, to procreate, and to have pleasure. Some are born into it, they live and move in it, they die in it — and if perchance they move away from their particular soul-destroying environment they soon gravitate to another where similar conditions prevail.

Environment is an important factor in the consolidating of unbelief in the uneducated. Whilst it is true that a direct challenge to their minds might compel them to re-think out their attitude to religion, they on the whole are living among men and women who think and converse in terms like their own, who are no more interested in religion than they themselves are, and perhaps for similar reasons; or who, if they have any religion, are not sure of their own beliefs, and are not sufficiently educated to express clearly the ideas which direct their lives. They may listen to the wireless services, and enjoy the singing of the hymns, particularly if they are well-known, and hymns which they once sang when young. The prayers mean nothing to them, as is shown by the way in which people will carry on a conversation while the prayers are being said; and they will show some interest in the sermon or address only as it touches their lives in the way a secular talk appeals to them.

To sum up, it may be said that unbelief among the uneducated or uncultured is due to some prejudice born from some disappointment in prayer producing an emotional reaction against religion, or from a failure to see any obvious practical issue of religion. In some few cases unbelief may be due to a feeling of guilt, because such a feeling impels the
subject to build up a system of ideas with the purpose of dispelling the sense of guilt. But I may say that among the many young and middle-aged uneducated people whom I have dealt with during the course of some years, and who have been troubled with a sense of guilt arising from the practice of sex perversion, I have found only a low percentage of unbelievers. The sense of guilt may keep them away from church and other religious institutions, and deter their prayer life, but it does not necessarily make them unbelievers.

It is perhaps true that those people who forsake their Church and neglect their religious institutions have never had any definite religious experience, and never were convinced believers. But even so, the argument still holds that a basis of guilt for their unbelief is not general among the uneducated. To remove a religious belief by a system of ideas which is satisfactory to the mind involves a certain amount of clear thinking, a process which the uncultured mind finds difficult and alien from itself. Yet it cannot be denied that the guilt feeling may indirectly account for unbelief in some persons. By neglecting his Church and his religious ritual, including prayer, the individual grows indifferent to religion itself. This indifference may lead him to believe, through observation, that there is nothing in the "religious business", and gradually, if not imperceptibly, he abandons all belief, using what catch phrases he can glean in defence of his position.

Here is the case of J.H., a respectable working-man, who never objects to his wife and children attending church and other meetings, because they enjoy them, and so find something to do outside the home.
He himself has no use for the Church or religion, his attitude is one of unbelief. As a boy he was brought up in the Sunday School, and he enjoyed going to Church services. At the age of fourteen he began to masturbate, and as a result of reading erroneous teachings on this childish habit his conscience worried him. He believed that he was committing a sin, and was failing to carry out the teachings of the Church. He grew morose and depressed, avoided his Church friends, and finally stayed away from church because he would at least not play the part of a hypocrite. In this way he partly resolved the conflict between his religious disposition and the sexual perversion. Eventually he married, and as each child arrived and was taken to the church to be christened he found some excuse for not attending the service. He did not object to his children being christened, for two reasons: (1) He was still superstitious enough not to offer any real protest. (2) He did not wish to oppose or offend his wife and her people on the matter. Later, prejudiced against Christianity by his social and economic conditions - the responsibility for which is shared by many a Churchman - he concluded that religion was an escape for tired women, and a dope for the consciences of his employers.

Attitudes like this I encountered again and again when making the personal visitation previously mentioned of the district around my church. Sometimes the case was not so clearly stated as in the instance I have given, but, however inarticulate the argument brought forth, in many men and women I found underlying objections and an emotional bias similar to those of J.H.

In many uneducated women I have found a series of emotional react-
ions, all culminating in an attitude of unbelief - beginning in a sense of guilt which, through conflict, weakened their religious practices, and finally culminating in some experience of unanswered prayer. The problem of Job was beyond their intellectual grasp; and this last blow to a religious life already weakened by an emotional conflict in the moral life, left them with almost nothing to lay hold of in their need.

In this present time the problem of religious belief is bound to become more acute among less educated people, because fewer children now attend the Sunday Schools. The chances of building up a religious disposition in children are smaller and fewer than before 1920, which date marks the decline in Sunday School attendance, in England at least. Without such a disposition the people will have nothing to build upon, and nothing with which to call into question, or to counteract, the pagan practices which surround their lives.

From what I have said in this chapter it follows that some at least of the uneducated would stand a far better chance of developing their religious nature if in childhood they had received sound instruction. I am not suggesting that only the educated can qualify for a religious experience. This would mean a denial of my own basic beliefs, since I argue for a universal religious feeling within man. What I am urging is a healthy religious background to the cognitive life, that will guide the individual to a profound experience of God, and will stand the test of learning in other subjects. Shand says: "The young are not required to learn by heart the celebrated proverbs, fables and maxims of mankind, as Chinese youths are taught the ancient wisdom of Confucius and his
disciples, so that when experience of life is ripe, those great truths may come home to them which they might otherwise miss altogether." (1). This statement is equally true where religious teaching is concerned. It may be said that years ago, when education was less free and advanced than it is today, when only a hard backgrounding in the Scriptures was given to children, people were more religious than the present generation. But a statement like that needs qualification: in the first place less was then known of the universe around us and accordingly fewer ideas intruded upon the mind to cause doubt and dissatisfaction with one's religion. In the second place there were fewer social distractions than there are today. The life of the people was spent in home, work, and Church. Today men and women must adjust themselves to an age of new learning and multiple distractions unknown to their grandparents, and it is reasonable to conclude that their religious life is greatly encroached upon by external influences. Finally we need to be careful when we say that people on the whole were more religious in the past than they are today. If by that we mean attachment to some church, or to family worship, or Bible reading, we may agree; but if we mean the inner experience of the religious need in relation to its end, we must demur. Unquestionably some obtained this, despite the handicaps of learning, but others did not, for "by their fruits ye shall know them." Nevertheless, to help the individual to a complete religious experience a genuine knowledge of the Bible should be given to the child.

Our Roman Catholic friends pay special attention to the religious training of their children. Nazi Germany also pays special attention to

the training of her children and youth. But it must be recognised that
the latter makes its appeal chiefly to fear, and upon it builds up a
habit of allegiance to the state through the regimentation of the in-
dividual; whilst the former is building up a system of ideas that will
tie the child for the rest of his life to the Church as an institution
with its appropriate ritual and sacraments. The Roman Catholic is not
allowed to question or criticise his authority, he is allocated little
or no freedom within the realms of religion - the Church speaks through
the infallible Pope and his priests, and the individual obeys. Among
the uneducated people of my experience, which is comparatively wide, I
have found that the faithful Roman Catholics have no more idea of God
than their unbelieving friends; they are loyal to the Church in the same
way as others are to the state. But it would be false to claim that
they were for that reason more religious than those who kept away from
church.

If the individual is to develop his religious nature along healthy
lines he must be given freedom to think through and act on, as well as
to feel about, the spiritual issues of life. This he cannot do unless he
acquires a satisfactory background in religious knowledge. This I be-
lieve should be the responsibility of the state much more than it is;
though much greater emphasis is placed on Scripture teaching in Scot-
land than in England. It is evident that many children receive little or
no Biblical instruction in uneducated homes (or even educated, in many
cases), and the influence of the Sunday School is not as widespread as
previously, since the attendances have fallen off. In the Roman Cath-
clic Church, (and particularly in Nazi Germany), fear compels parents to send children for instruction; but no such motive now prevails among those Protestants who no longer believe in a hell or heaven hereafter.

Since, then, the religious training of children is not regarded by parents as their responsibility, and the influence of the Sunday Schools is waning, religious instruction should be imposed by the state as a subject to be taught like history or art, and to have its place alongside the other subjects in the curriculum. Many raise objections to putting religious teaching on an equality with other subjects, because they think it wrong to compel a teacher to impart a lesson the spirit of which he or she perhaps cannot feel. But no such difficulty need arise if the knowledge is given in an impartial way, and there is not the slightest reason why children should not be taught the Bible in a manner that will acquaint them with the history of the Hebrews, the historic fact of Jesus, and the rise of the Christian Church. The fear teachers have of conveying a false impression to their pupils is understandable; but why should it be thought that, in giving such instruction, they are committing themselves to an acceptance of religion, (which perhaps they would deny, or with which they would prefer not to identify themselves), any more than they are committing themselves to primitive man's conception of immortality? All that is required or asked for is a religious knowledge that will enable each individual to think clearly about one of the most fundamental issues in the life of man.
CHAPTER VI.

The Spurious Atheism of the Passive Thinker.

We now come to the second class of unbelievers - those who are educated, but too apathetic and indifferent about everything in life to think through their dilemma. "Edward Caird once said to his students that the curse of the present day is not that men love darkness more than light, or choose evil rather than good; it is that they do not choose at all." (1).

In the last chapter we were dealing with those unbelievers whose apathy towards religion was not only due to indifference, but was principally conditioned by their lack of mental equipment in the form of ideas. Here we are thinking of those who have the necessary equipment for thinking through their dilemma, but are too indifferent to make the effort. The religious urge is blocked by the immediate failure to understand apparently contradictory ideas of God, the seeming impracticability of religious teaching, and why prayer is unanswered. Effort is required to remove the emotional blockage produced by the confusion and disappointment; but this is what is lacking, or at least unexercised, because of the prevailing feeling of indifference.

This feeling of indifference points to one or both of two things:

(1) "Psychology and Religion." J. Burnett Rae. (In "Education and Religion;" edit. by Burroughs).
A. An inability of the personality to adjust itself.

B. A feeling of not-worthwhileness.

When considering A. it is as well to remember that the drive of the personality is largely conditioned by the glands. L.F. Shaffer says: "Even a conservative estimate must give considerable importance to endocrine disturbances in relation to personality and adjustment. Glandular dysfunction, especially of the thyroid, pituitary and sex glands, may cause a lowering of the energy available for adjustive attempts and hence lead to weak and non-adjustive attitudes and behaviour. Equally important are the secondary effects. The person who is slow, obese or fatiguable suffers handicaps in life for which he almost inevitably devises compensatory forms of behaviour." (1). In some people the degree of glandular activity varies very considerably, and with it the corresponding general activity of the individual. It is, of course, true that certain individuals manifest a particularly strong drive in some one direction, but this may be due to some blockage in other instincts, or to a redirection of the instinctive energies from their normal course to another. Some of the delinquent girls who have passed through my hands during the last five years showed an abnormal strength of the sexual activity, whilst in personal ambition and social enterprise - apart from contacts with the opposite sex - they were singularly weak. An analysis revealed the inhibitory factors which prevented the development of the instincts other than sex.

D.T. came to me after appearing before the magistrates in her home

town for the third time, with a recommendation for psychological treat-
ment. She had been with boys and had given her parents a considerable
amount of trouble. They chastised her and put her into service, where
she stole money to go off with a boy, an offence which she repeated for
the third time. The girl had a singularly good mind but she refused to
exercise it, and whenever faced with opposition she failed to meet it by
asserting herself. If she had any ambition it was definitely sexual,
and her social interests were primarily towards the satisfaction of these
desires. The analysis of her case showed that her egoist and social
activities were dwarved by a strong inferiority complex built up in her
mind from a very early age. Her parents, while concerned about her moral
behaviour, had little knowledge of how to rear and train their children
in a way that would give them a chance to develop along right lines.
This girl could not direct the energies of the sex instinct into the
other channels of her instinctive nature, because these were blocked by
the "complex" system of her mind. It is this condition which makes sublim-
ation almost impossible in many cases of abnormal sexual activity. For
successful sublimation of the energies of any one instinct, the personality
as a whole should have a measure of healthy integration. Nevertheless it
is frequently possible for those who have a partly blocked mental condition
to sublimate their energies, and in a way that gives reason for believing
that one of the instincts is definitely stronger than the others.

It is often thought that adolescents are egoistic because the instinct
with which that form of behaviour is associated is slightly out of con-
rule on account of the emotional upheaval within; but it may also be due
to a sexual tension of which the subject is perhaps unaware. This argument is elaborated by Shaffer, when he refers to the experiments of G.H. Wang: "In the adult female, sex motivation is of a slightly different type, cyclic rather than cumulative, and related to the periods of oestrus or 'heat.'" G.H. Wang (1925) measured the daily activity of adult female white rats by means of a squirrel cage, a drum which revolved as the animal ran. He noted cyclic changes in activity reaching peaks at intervals of about four days. Four days is also the period of the oestrus cycle of the rat, and furthermore, anatomical observations showed that the periods of greatest activity coincided with the times when the animal was in heat. Males and immature females did not show periodic changes in activity." (1). I have noted in my own work how, after a successful analysis, certain women patients showed increased activity during the onset of menstruation, and for about four or five days afterwards, when the sex activity peaks. Before the analysis, during these particular periods they were the victims of depression and irritability; the tension was blocked, and the alimentary canals between the instincts failed to receive the surplus energy of the sex instinct.

So it is evident that whilst the drive of the personality is primarily conditioned by the strength of the glandular system, it is also conditioned by its social environment, i.e., by certain experiences associated with it. It may seem that "Instinctive activity is independent of individual experience, and intellectual activity is activity which is acquired through individual effort and initiative. But further

(1) loc. cit., p.95.
thought in the matter shows that, on the one hand, instinctive activity, though it has a beginning independent of individual experience, develops rapidly under the influence of experience. The sex instinct, although its potentialities are inherited at birth, does not manifest in its complete form until adolescence. (1). The development of the instinct is not dependent upon certain definite experiences, yet nevertheless it is influenced by experience itself. "It (i.e., the cognitive instinct) cannot develop independently of experience because experience is the matter with which it deals, but it can develop independently of any particular experience just as much as the sex instinct can."

The child who is given many opportunities to assert himself, over his younger brother for instance, is more assertive when he goes to school than his dam, who is an only and exclusive child; the adolescent who associates with people older than himself, and who is encouraged to exercise a sexual interest in the opposite sex, is much more likely to develop the sexual instinct more rapidly than the young man who keeps very much to himself and avoids young women. In the latter case not only does the sex instinct lack experience, but the herd or social instinct also; by keeping away from people - and the desire to do so is probably motivated by fear - he stunts the growth and development of this instinct. A lack of experience relative to each particular instinct definitely retards the development of that instinct; on the other hand, when opportunity arises each instinct is quickened by the experiences that come its way.

It is clear, then, that the drive of the personality is determined

in the first place by physical conditions, and in the second by certain experiences within the scheme of the individual’s environment. Now the tendency for the personality - when the drive is weak - is to withdraw before the face of any difficulty, or dangerous situation. The general attitude to life is passive, and when the stimulus situation is too painful or uninteresting the defence mechanism of withdrawing is brought into action. This can be seen in exclusive and timid children. "The exclusive child shuns the company of other children, often remaining by himself during recess and play periods when most children are actively and socially engaged. He does not participate in games and sports but prefers solitary amusements such as reading, and plans games that can be performed by himself alone." (1). The same tendency to withdraw can be seen in adult passive thinkers who adopt a listless attitude towards social, political and religious problems. In conversation their contributions are sporadic and unsustained, and their interest is only maintained if the subject and the mode of its presentation are stimulating. In discussion they prefer to sit and listen, and when this demands too much effort they indulge in day-dreaming.

Now the religious need in its search for satisfaction is likely to encounter difficulties such as those already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, and it is dependent on the drive of the personality to overcome them. This the passive thinker fails to do, and consequently the need itself is denied the activity of striving for fulfilment. The thwarting of the need is manifested in a kind of unbelief that is much harder to detect in the passive than in the aggressive thinker, who never

(1) Shaffer; loc. cit. p.174.
hesitates if necessary to make known his unbelief. The passive thinker
will hesitate to declare what he believes about religion because to do
so might involve him in some argument which he is desirous of avoiding.
For this reason, then, he may appear to be religious, but really he is
not so in our accepted use of the word "religion."

But in addition to a weakness of the drive of the personality in
overcoming religious difficulties, another factor must be considered
when dealing with the unbelief of passive thinkers, and that is the feel-
ning of not-worthwhileness. According to Dr. Drevor, (1), the instinctive
experience is (a) a felt impulse; (b) a visually apprehended object or
situation; (c) a feeling of interest or "worthwhileness," passing into
"satisfyingness." That means that whatever experience comes to the in-
stinct it must bring with it the feeling of "worthwhileness" for the
subject, otherwise it is speedily abandoned; and if the instinct abandons
one apprehended object or situation after another because of "not-worth-
whileness," it will certainly be devoid of the necessary experience for
its development. Even though a certain measure of development may take
place because experiences are inevitable, nevertheless the instinctive
activity is retarded through the absence of others.

In much the same way the religious need will develop in every in-
dividual in response to certain experiences, and as they convey a grow-
ing feeling of worthwhileness the development will quicken and move away
in time from the traditional level to the rational, moral, and mystical
levels of religion. The child's religious life is traditional, one

(1)"Instinct in Man." p.135.
might almost say perceptual, since he responds to what he hears and sees in organised religion; but the experiences he receives must be "satisfying", otherwise he is likely to resist religious persuasion and instruction and so check the development of the need. We have already seen how this can be brought about - through unwise compulsion, or confusion of ideas, or wrong instruction. Wise guiding of the religious growth of the child will lead him safely to the rational level, where we have the beginnings of a personal religion. It is on this level that many find the obstacle of ideas irreconcilable to each other (i.e., for them), and if through some dissatisfying experience on the traditional level the development of the need has been retarded and weakened, the urge to remove the obstacle is feeble and the religious life becomes blocked.

There must be some satisfying purpose felt in religion before there can be any progressive activity, whether it be in the realm of ideas, in behaviour, or in seeking after some kind of mystical experience; this is the true mark of psychical integration. "Where the degree of psychical integration is high the 'worthwhileness' attaches primarily to the result as an end." (Drever: loc. cit. p.142). The desired ultimate end of the religious need is identification with its object, which is a personal relationship with God. Some people are content to use the religious energies in thinking about God, others in following out the social teachings of Jesus; but for them the idea that a personal or mystical experience is available for all seems too often over-emphasised, since it is only the privilege of those with the temperament of the saints. This claim I believe to be partly false, and based on a misconception of human life. It is as absurd as the idea that some are born to marry and to experience complete fulfillment of sexual desires, while others are destined only to think and write about love and to show an interest in other people's children. Those who deny to
themselves the possibility of a higher fulfilment of the religious need, are endeavouring to rationalise the tension which they feel, and are failing to understand the causes for the check to the "normal prosecution of the religious interest." But as far as the development does go some kind of satisfying interest is maintained, and without it I fail to see how any one can remain religious. The interest some people show in the Church I recognise, as one must if one wishes to be faithful to facts, as something that is much more social than religious in its appeal to satisfyingness; apart from the emotional experience there would be little or no interest shown.

It is this fact of the necessity for "a feeling dependent upon the whole relation of impulse to object" that makes it difficult to understand the conclusions arrived at in Thorndike's "Psychology of Wants, Interests and Attitudes," (pp.135-34): "There can be no doubt that our subjects could and did learn facts and skills that were useless and even harmful to them except for the money rewards and good repute as learners in the eyes of the experimenter and their own consciences. Probably never before in all their educational and vocational history had they spent time so profitlessly to themselves as in learning false dates, false biographies, writing with eyes closed, and typing words backwards.

Yet their minds learned this pernicious rubbish almost as well as the true dates, true biographies, and normal typing." The author goes on to admit that "some of the adult learners may have been somewhat inspired by the thought that they were participating in experiment useful for science and education," but he is not too satisfied about this motive, for he confesses that "It would be instructive to check the influence of
this by a parallel experiment in which the learning was announced as
paid by an insane man. I do not think the result would be altered great-
ly." The motive which he suggests might indeed have urged the learning
activity in some cases, but in those not possessing it there must have
been substituted some other motive, as no person will attend to anything
long unless he feels it is worth while and that he is deriving some
satisfaction from it, either altruistic or egoistic or both.

It may be said that some people attend to religious matters out of
habit, which none will deny; but the habit is not only a mechanical form
of behaviour, it is more; it is a ritual, often as compelling as the
ritual in obsessional neurosis. Just as the obsessional subject derives
satisfaction in knowing that he has washed his hands five times, so does
the ritualist obtain satisfaction from the knowledge that he has been to
Church and has gone through certain religious observances. Again, other
people are definitely influenced, perhaps on the traditional level of
their religious life, by a feeling that conveys worthwhileness; but once
that feeling passes into dissatisfaction with religion, and "worthwhile-
ness" gives place to "not-worthwhileness" they abandon religion alto-
gether.

Now there are individuals whose whole personal development seems to
have come to a dead end, and who are incapable of dealing with a dull or
remote situation, who live only in so far as they are compelled to do so
by the circumstances of their lives; they have principles but few ideals,
and even their principles are the moral conventions of the society in
which they have been brought up. These people are bound by tradition in
the things that are "worth while," and are lacking in the dynamic which
which urges the personality to reach out to ideals and to adjust itself to any intellectual difficulty which is beyond the scope of the present and immediate life. Throughout this kind of personality an attitude of not-worthwhileness prevails, and unless it is compelled to assert itself the personality remains inert. The case of L.H. is of interest here.

In one of her dreams she is packing her bag with winter clothing for a holiday on the continent. On arriving at her destination the weather is still cold, but next day it suddenly changes and is very hot, and the clothes she has brought are unsuitable and adaptation is impossible. The analysis revealed a deep-seated failure on her part to adapt herself to any change in her life. At times it was difficult to proceed with the analysis, because she was prompted by a feeling of not-worthwhileness, and she confessed that she frequently said to me - "under her breath" - "Oh, flip you!" - a phrase which meant to her, "Oh, I can't be bothered."

It must not be thought that such persons are lacking in assertiveness; in a time of danger the assertive quality will display itself, as in fight or flight. Even in argument they may assert themselves, particularly if the self-regarding feelings are at stake; or, if motivated by some feeling of exhibitionism, they will display themselves before others. If the stimulus is sufficiently strong, the self-assertive tendency will respond. Now in the sphere of religion the stimulus is not so much from without as from within, that is, from the desire itself to be in touch with God. Even the savage, in one sense, desires to be in touch with his god when he placates him with sacrifice and prayer. But when a dis-
appointing experience frustrates the desire and there is a resultant feeling of not-worthwhileness, the individual refuses to assert himself in thinking through the problem of unanswered prayer or the apparent impracticability of religious teachings.

The case of F.W. makes this point clear. She adopts the attitude of "not caring" when she is frustrated and when she feels that nothing can be done to give her what she wants. She was educated at one of London's best schools for girls, and at eighteen entered a bank where she remained until she was married. Her husband is moderately wealthy, extremely easy-going, complacent and undemonstrative, which annoys F.W. very considerably. Early in her married life she broke down in health, obviously, from the history of her case, through her failure to adjust herself to marital and domestic life. Certain obsessive thoughts appeared, and these drove her in desperation to God. Not having done any serious thinking about religion she was still on the traditional level and her faith was definitely immature. Realising that her prayers for the removal of her obsessions were unanswered, she turned away from religion completely, believing that there was nothing in it of value. When she first came to me the subject of religion was never mentioned, but later she confessed that the broadcast services irritated her, and she wished that her husband would not insist on listening to them every Sunday evening. F.W. 's behaviour was definitely marked by childish rage, but she would never proceed to remove the frustrating objects that enraged her, even though they clearly persisted after her emotions had regained their balance. She wished others to remove them for her, and if no one did so the difficulties were allowed to remain, and her atti-
tude towards them was one of "not-worthwhileness."

The failure of the individual to adjust himself to the things of
life that have no obvious utilitarian value appears to be innate in
some people, while in others it has been acquired. This observation is
very tentative, because there is little satisfactory evidence for deter-
mining whether this trait of character is inherited or acquired through
environmental conditions and influences. What is true is that every
form of behaviour necessitates for its performance an organic structure,
and that this structure is definitely influenced by heredity. But it
is equally true that the organism comes under the influence of the en-
vironment both before and after birth, an environment which includes
physical, parental, economic, social and educational factors. We may
say that heredity determines the degree of adjustability, and environ-
ment modifies it. Though, as Shaffer states, "family history studies
offer no conclusive evidence as to the relative effect of heredity or
environments on mentality or character," (1), it is at least evident
that the history of certain individuals reveals a reluctance, beginning
at an early age, towards any kind of adjustment.

One such case is that of M.P., who came to me because of homo-sex-
ual trouble. He was convinced in his own mind that his perversion was
something that was innate, and he felt despairingly about it. At first
I began to think that his contention was correct, as a treatment of the
more obvious causes failed to produce any result. The analysis was
taken much deeper into his mind, and then it revealed an extremely early
inability to adjust himself to any difficulty; and his mother confirmed

(1) "The Psychology of Adjustment." p. 349.
my opinion that she had had considerable trouble when weaning him from the breast to the bottle, and later from liquid to solid foods. When he went to school at the age of five he avoided other children, and when the time came for him to move from one class to another he was extremely unhappy. His intelligence was above that of the average in his class, but when the time came for him to qualify for a Secondary School scholarship he refused to do so on the ground that he was happy where he was and did not want to go to a new school. He left school at the age of fourteen and went to work in a drawing office, where he still is, though now in the position of a qualified draughtsman. He has always shown a dislike of meeting strangers, and in the presence of friends he is quiet unless provoked into an argument. At the age of puberty he was very shy of girls and kept away from them. During this period he had a number of erotic experiences with a cousin and an uncle, and later in his adolescent years he longed to be with them for a similar purpose. His failure to adjust himself to the opposite sex in the normal heterogeneous phase of life was not due to his homo-sexual experiences, but to an already existing feeble capacity of adjustment. The experiences became the compensation for this failure, and his belief that he was an innate homo-sexual was its rationalisation. Many boys have had, at some time or another, homo-sexual experiences, but very few have remained fixated to their own sex, or even been really retarded in their sexual development; and the reason surely is that they have been successful in making the necessary adjustment to the opposite sex. M.P. failed because of the reason stated above. He not only had sexual difficulties, but he also showed a complete indifference to religion, which he did not mention
for some time, and then only through the stimulation of the analysis. He told me that he had come up against certain religious difficulties, which can be summarized as (a) the confusion of theological ideas; (b) the problem of unanswered prayer; (c) the apparent impracticability of religion. He felt that religion had no value for him, so he avoided going to church with his mother, of whom he was very fond - in fact he was fixated to her - and closed his mind to any feeble appeal that she or others might make.

Now it may be asked: "If M.P. is one of the passive and inert thinkers who are never likely to overcome their religious difficulties, why did he exert himself to come to see you?" As already stated, he came because of the homo-sexual difficulty in his life, and not because he wished his religious problems to be solved. The homo-sexual trouble was touching his immediate life. A scandal in the city made him fearful lest he too should be publicly denounced. Fear was the motive of his action, not desire, and had it been safe, to his mind, to continue with his homo-sexual practices he would probably have been content to continue, as he had begun, his sexual life. The analysis over a period of three years has helped him to adjust more satisfactorily to his environment, but even now his adjustment is much too slow and cautious, and it would seem that an average adjustment would be unnatural to him.

But the feeling of "not-worthwhileness" may be acquired and not innate; it may spring from childhood, when the individual was discouraged in the effort to do things or to think for himself. Let me quote the case of E.M. Her mother died at the birth of E.M., who was then placed in the care of her paternal grandmother and grand-aunt. Her father, very
much dominated by his mother and aunt, left her to their discretion, which was coloured with over-cautiousness. The result on E.M.'s upbringing was a restriction on her activity. She was never encouraged to develop her personality, most things were done for her as a child, and later in life she was not allowed to act upon any personal decision until it had been approved by her foster-parents. She was sent to a Secondary School and, constantly stimulated there by her teachers and surroundings, she did moderately well. Eventually she went to work, but lost her position because she lacked initiative. This lack restricted her activity, gave her a feeling of uncertainty in herself. When opposed she offered no resistance; her tendency was to take the line of least resistance, and to accommodate herself to the wishes of others. On occasion she would assert herself, but only when there was an obvious attack on her feelings of self-regard. On the whole, however, her attitude towards life was, before the analysis, definitely one of not-worthwhileness, and this explained why she failed to make personal decisions or to make any kind of attack on her difficulties. Many similar cases could be cited, illustrating how such an attitude can easily be inaugurated and established in the personality.

One other case, however, might be mentioned. It is that of M.H., an Oxford graduate and teacher of Classics. Her failure to think through a number of intellectual difficulties associated with religion was due to a feeling of not-worthwhileness. She was satisfied that there was no answer to her questions, and it was only left for her to come down on the side of the unbelievers. As a child she showed definite signs of
launching out on a course of life which would be a departure from that accepted by her parents. They were uneducated, she wanted education and culture; they were conventional and bound by Victorian traditions - against these she felt she must revolt; they were religious, and therefore - so she thought - rigid in their discipline and puritanical outlook. This she determined to break away from as soon as she could or dared. However, before M.H. had reached the age when she was able to act upon her desires she was definitely influenced by the atmosphere of her home. Part of the libido was attached to the norm of her home life, and part of it strove to fulfil her ambition. She was sufficiently released to pursue fresh studies at the age of late adolescence, but the attachment that remained to her home made it impossible for her to escape the conflict of feeling that she was doing something that was disloyal to her people. As long as there was no real difficulty, academic or social, she was able to forge ahead with her new life, which eventually led her into the realm of philosophy and logic. Here she failed to harmonise her early religious concepts with the new learning she was rapidly acquiring in the endeavour to satisfy her desire for culture. This failure produced a difficulty which it was impossible for her to resolve, and for this reason: that the part of the libido still attached to the norm of her early home life was also attached to the accompanying religious ideas which she could not entirely abandon, while the rest of the libido was insufficient to cope with the apparent conflict between religion and logic. Feeling that she could not deal with the situation she preferred to come down on the side of unbelief. But why on the side of unbelief instead of on the side of belief? It will be remembered
that she had previously decided to break away from the norm of her family life because it lacked culture and breadth of outlook. This decision, now unconsciously influencing her attitude, was the deciding factor in the conflict. But the feeling of not-worthwhileness prevented her from building up a systematic argument in favour of atheism, and she was content to remain an unbeliever until she was troubled with an obsessional neurosis. Now she was prepared to re-examine religion to see if it could offer any way of escape from her illness, but the bias against it was much too strong and the effort was finally abandoned.

Whether we believe that there is a religious instinct or that religion is a sentiment, we must accept the fact stated by Dr. Dreyer that the activity of each instinct is determined by a feeling of "worthwhileness." Scientific argument is not necessary to establish this point of view; from observation and recollection we can see it at work. All active behaviour is directed towards some definite end which the individual regards as worth while. "It may be only a vague sense of need on the purely sensational level, but becoming on the perceptual level a dim feeling that there is something worth while in this particular object, and worth while with a view to the satisfaction of that dimly-felt need."

On whatever level, the purposive activity of man is determined by some feeling of worthwhileness; and this is also true of each adaptation the individual must make. For example, the child struggles to overcome difficulties only because he feels that on the other side of the difficulty there is something that will satisfy him. The scholar studying a language which does not appeal to him or interest him, recognises that

it is a means to some end that is worth while. He may during the process of study grow to like the subject, and will then pore over his book because it interests him. But if he must know it only for some further purpose his behaviour is determined by some object that is worth while. Marital adjustments are made by men and women because they feel that there is something worth while in their relationship.

The last and final adjustment in the process of individual development is to God; and man is prepared to make it only when he is satisfied that it is worth while, and that his religion is meeting some need within himself. Augustine was right when he said "Our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Thee." But that restlessness may very easily continue if man finds no satisfaction in that religion in which he was cradled and reared. And further, if his general attitude to the whole of life is conditioned by an unconscious feeling of not-worthwhileness, he will refuse to exercise any cognitive effort in the necessary rectifying of his religious ideas, and will continue to spend his days on the level of decent citizenship.

According to William Brown it would seem that the individual's refusal and failure to think through his religious and other difficulties are due to the feeble development of the cognitive instinct. "......... What I have called the instinct of observation, the cognitive instinct or tendency has also a developmental history, which is very susceptible to the process of education, and can be actually improved enormously by well chosen methods of education, but independently of such methods still passes through certain stages." (1) "Science and Personality." p.76.
Now whether we agree or not with the idea of a cognitive instinct, it is a fact that the human personality develops only as the cognitive aspect of his being develops. Unless man has the urge to think clearly, and to strive against the obstacles of his life, he remains on a level which is no higher than that of the animal; he eats, sleeps, works and procreates. He will be a creature of habits, and as long as he remains a member of a religious community his religion will be traditional, with no real significance except that it is part of the routine of his life. If for some reason he withdraws from his community he also forsakes religion, because it really means nothing to him. The reason for this inertness may be due to a weakness in the fundamental urge of the individual which will manifest itself in each of the instincts, or due to an innate weakness of the cognitive factor (or instinct, as Brown says), in particular, as in those who have an I.Q. almost as low as that of the mental defective. If the latter were true, such people would fall below the category of the uneducated, since their feeble mental calibre would hardly enable them to formulate any concept of belief or unbelief. On the other hand, some passive thinkers may be accounted for by fundamental weakness, or arrested development, of the cognitive instinct or aspect. If the weakness is fundamental, the defect is permanent; if it is a case of arrested development, the trouble is probably due to repressed complexes within the unconscious mind, and the inability to create a master sentiment which will dominate and integrate the whole personality, as, for instance, the love of harmony integrates the personality of the musician. Every thinking being must have sentiments, which, as Shand says, are organised systems of emotional dispositions constel-
lating about the idea of some object. These objects touch life at close range, and then radiate from the personality with a force proportionate to the strength of the fundamental urge within the instincts, modified by early experiences and education; much as the concentric circles spread out on the surface of a pool from the point at which the thrown pebble has entered the water. The force with which the pebble strikes the water is one of the factors deciding the extent of the circles; the tranquility of the water is another. The instinctive urge of man is one factor which decides the range of his sentiments; the harmony of his experiences and education is another factor. The greater the personality the wider the range of the sentiments. William Brown, in "Mind and Personality," chooses to call a "sentiment" an "interest;" "The word 'interest' is perhaps a better general term than sentiment." (p.63). He then goes on to say - "So one may conceive a mind as a system of interests with emotional reactions showing different degrees of unity in the systems of subordinate unitics; these systems being incorporated in wider systems, and these wider systems again being incorporated in still wider systems, till at last one has a total system dominated by one all-satisfying interest. In the philosopher one finds the love of Truth as that dominating influence."

The passive thinker is not concerned with a love of truth; that is much too remote from his life, and requires a mental effort of which he is incapable; the "system" which dominates his life has immediate relevance, to wit, his home, his friends, his work, or his sense of prestige. Here he is prepared to assert himself, to defend himself and his children, to play his obvious part in the life of the community, and to live
peacefully among its members. But his general attitude towards life is not one that adopts the line of least resistance, all emotional and intellectual difficulties he will avoid if he can, and unless he can feel that religion, as he knows it, is indispensable to him, he sets it aside as worthless.

It would be misrepresenting the position if we were to say that educated people who are passive in their thinking are so because their lives are influenced by a pragmatic philosophy such as that developed by William James. According to James, religion is true, on pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily. (1). But this method is based on systematic ideas of which passive thinkers are incapable. They adopt no consistent philosophy of life, because their minds are too inert to make the necessary effort; they are content with an "atmosphere" of thought and feeling. If perchance they live in an "atmosphere" which is pervaded by religion - traditional or otherwise - they are likely to go with the multitude, and suspend judgment about their doubts; but if their little community, or their circle of friends, is apathetic to religion, they will allow themselves to drift away from the Church of God. Their whole attitude to life may appear to be pragmatic, but their philosophy of life is a spurious pragmatism, based not on reason but on feeling.

(1) "Pragmatism." p. 388.
CHAPTER VII.

The Atheism of the Aggressive Thinker. Shelley.

Perhaps the class which is most difficult to account for psychologically is that of the educated who present many well-founded arguments for their religious unbelief. From my analysis of their theses I find that they are in revolt principally against the accepted or orthodox conception of God, and the pragmatic value of religion claimed by many Christian protagonists. The element of fear being now removed from religion, man feels freer to think out his position, and in the light of his scientific knowledge to re-examine the claims that have been made throughout the ages, and particularly by all Christian teachers. With regard to the uneducated and unthinking the question raised by McDougall is apt: "To what extent is the lapse from orthodox religious observances due to the general softening of religious teaching, to the lapse of the doctrine of divine retribution to a very secondary position, and to the discredit into which the flames of hell have fallen?" (1).

There is abundant evidence for stating that many people have become indifferent to religion because the fear aspect has disappeared, but these are mostly to be found among that section of each community which makes little cognitive effort to rise above the primitive level of thinking. At this level men and women are influenced both from without and

(1) "Introduction to Social Psychology." p. 512.
from within by fear. The recent response of the British people to the injunction of the King for a special day of prayer was motivated by the fear in the hearts of the people where the crisis of the moment was concerned. This is a truer explanation than the idea of any feeling of loyalty to the head of our nation - not that people are disloyal to him, on the contrary they are extremely loyal - but the fear which the nation felt as a whole seemed to find relief in the call of the King, and the way of escape was through a united national petition to God, whose cause the allies are defending against the evil enemy.

The fear of overwhelming circumstances may indeed at the present time drive some people to religion as a way of deliverance, just as the earlier fear of divine wrath and judgment made their forefathers placate their God because of what they believed to be their sin against Him. But whilst the latter fear has now lost its place in the hearts of most people it is conceivable that not even the former is a sufficiently strong motive of compulsion for those systematic, thinking men and women who feel that the human race has partly outgrown, and will eventually completely outgrow, the primitive need for a God upon whom they are dependent for their very existence here and survival in the hereafter.

It would, of course, be presumption to dismiss their claim simply by saying that there is a peculiar psychological twist in their thinking, and that the premiss from which they begin their reasoning is influenced by some strong unconscious emotional factor, without first of all examining their conclusions. Flint says: "I know no reason for suspecting the sincerity of these men or of their statements, and therefore I do not suspect it, neither have we any desire to attach to any man a name which
he dislikes, but a regard to truth forbids us to concede that atheism only exists where it is avowed." (1).

The conflict between science and religion has weakened considerably, even though "there are still fanatics on each 'side' of this supposed 'conflict' who would continually stir the flames of a distrust that, to the saner among the populace, is fast disappearing." No true scientist of the present day can be dogmatic about the illusive nature of religion, because "so revolutionary and in a sense contradictory are the findings, that physical scientists, for the most part, are compelled to postulate a Master Mind in order to invest the physical cosmos with even the semblance of rationality." (2). There is a reality in religion, through communion with this "Master Mind", which is as capable of demonstration and verification by the saints, as many scientific facts are by the physicists. And even though there may be differences in the nature of their experiences, these are so small that instead of making for disagreement they all subscribe to a truth which no fair-minded thinker can afford to ignore. A sufficient argument against those who contend that religion is an illusion is to be found in the following quotation from Dean Inge's "Christian Mysticism," (p.385): "It will be found that these men of acknowledged and pre-eminent saintliness agree very closely in what they tell about God. They tell us that they have arrived gradually at an unshakable conviction, not based on inference but on immediate experience, that God is a spirit with whom the human spirit can hold intercourse: that in Him meet all that they can imagine of goodness, truth,

(1) *Atheistic Theories.* p.3.
and beauty: that they can see His footprints everywhere in Nature; and
feel His presence within them as the very life of their life, so that
in proportion as they come to themselves they come to Him."

Of recent years Freud and his disciples have made a systematic at-
ttempt to show that man's idea of God is a simple wish-fulfilment; and
similar also it may be thought is the idea of the Kingdom of Heaven -
the one a fulfilment of the human longing for a perfect father, and the
other of the desire for a perfect state. Thouless has given a compre-
hensive reply to the claims of some of the psycho-analytical writers:
"The reduction of religious dogma to wish fulfilment - the belief in God
to the demand for a perfect lover or for the parent, the belief in im-
ortality to the demand for continued personal existence and for the
survival of those we love, and so on - cannot in itself be a valid log-
ical argument against religion, for it would only be effective as evi-
dence against religious truth if the hypothesis of the reality of God
were ruled out on other grounds." (1).

A more recent answer to the psycho-analytical theory of religion is
made by the Dean of St. Paul's in his article "Psychology and the Future
of Religion" (2): "There is a fundamental fallacy in every argument which
seeks to prove from psychological data that the object of experience is
illusory. It is possible to give a psychological account of the genesis
of any general and permanent belief, which account need contain no refer-
ce to any reality outside the mind, which leaves, in short, the prob-
lem of the validity of the belief entirely unaffected. Even if it were

(1) "An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion." p.265.
(2) In "Psychology and Modern Problems." pp.221 - 22.
established that the idea of God is a projection of the human mind, we should have no further light than we had before on the question whether the idea of God corresponds to any real being. Take, for example, the growth of the idea of an external world of things, and the further idea that this world of things constitutes an order of nature. We can trace the development of these concepts from their beginning in simple sense-data. But when we have completed our analysis, nothing follows from it of philosophical importance as to whether any objective world corresponds to this conception. The psychological account can be happily accepted by adherents of diametrically opposed philosophies. The realist is not shaken in his view that there is an independently existing external world, nor is the idealist less comfortable in his belief that reality is mental or dependent on mind. My point is simply this. It can be shown that the concept of nature is, in a sense, a projection of mind, but it would never occur to anyone to argue on this ground that therefore there is no such thing as an objective world or an order of nature. Why, then, is it assumed that the same kind of argument is valid in the case of the object of religious experience? On what principle are we to differentiate the logical character of these two bases of reasoning? I venture to assert that there is no distinction, and that the employment of this type of argument against the reality of God by those who would certainly refuse to admit its cogency when applied to nature, is an elementary logical mistake."

The verdict is against those who have striven to prove the illusionary nature of religion and the unreality of God. The word "striven" is used advisedly, because the attempt to explain religion away and to ana-
lyse away religious experience is based on some unconscious emotional reaction which if brought to light would cause the unbelief to vanish.

Let us look at Shelley's effort to prove the non-existence of God. In his pamphlet "The Necessity for Atheism," (1811), he argues that the grounds of belief are three: (a) Evidence of the senses; (b) the decisions of reason (which depends on the senses); (c) the testimony of other persons. None of these, he argues, affords any basis whatever for belief in the existence of a Deity. (a) does not, because "the God of theologians is incapable of local visibility." ("Queen Mab"). (b) does not, because it is easier to suppose that the universe has existed from all eternity than to conceive a being beyond its limits capable of creating it;" such being the two alternatives between which reason forces us to choose. In "Queen Mab" he adds "We must prove design before we can infer a designer. The only idea which we can form of causation is derivable from the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent inference of one from the other." And (c) does not, because it is intrinsically more probable that the witnesses "should have been deceived than that the Deity should have appeared to them."

Now what are the psychological facts of Shelley's life leading up to his pamphlet on the "Necessity for Atheism?" Shelley was born on August 4th, 1792, in the Sussex village of Barnham. He was the eldest of the family and was very much adored by his four sisters. "He was the companion of the little girls on walks; at other times he would sing for them; or, when his sisters came to the dining-room for dessert, would take one upon his knee and delight her with endless tales of mystery and wonder. Sometimes Bysshe and his sisters became a crew of super-
natural monsters: the little girls, in strange garbs, were fiends; Bysshe the great devil, bearing along the passage to the back-door a fire-stove flaming with his infernal liquid." (1). It would be extremely difficult for any boy of Shelley's temperament not to feel exalted by the admiration of his sisters, and to have a very high estimate of himself. Feminine adoration rapidly distorts a man's vision and makes him drunk with sparkling intoxicating pride. Many a man have I dealt with whose egotism was the outcome of a false value placed upon him when he was a child and a young boy, and some of the marriage failures who have consulted me have been men who were invested with "almighty power" in the eyes of their sisters, but who on trying to direct the lives of their wives met with resistance and conflict. I see no reason, then, for disputing the idea that Shelley's grandiose feeling about himself probably originated in childhood, and it was unfortunate for him that his emotional life was marred by an instability which made it difficult for him to make the necessary adjustments in his academic life and in society. At Syon House Academy, Isleworth, near Brentford, he displayed a sensitiveness of feeling that was exploited by his school-fellows, who delighted in provoking him. But once infuriated, Shelley would hurl the nearest object at his tormentors. Naturally, to avoid being annoyed and tormented, he kept away from his companions, but he was always "very amiable, noble, high-spirited and generous" towards those who were kind to him. Whatever degree of sensitivity Shelley might have inherited, it was, without question, exaggerated by the lofty conception of himself which the loyalty and devotion of his sisters had impressed upon him.

At Eton Shelley did very well in most of the subjects taught, and what little he knew of science thrilled him with delight. "For Shelley, as a boy, science transformed the world into a place of enchantment; it was the true nineteenth century magic; the bounds of existence receded before its touch, and the possibilities of human achievement became incalculable." (1). Left to himself the potential poet would enjoy the flights of his imagination, and often he appeared to his friends as though he were far away in a daydream. In many ways his imagination served the social life of Eton, for he certainly knew how to play his part in the public events of the school. But one thing which Shelley could not tolerate at Eton was "obedience to the orders of his fag-master." He regarded every attempt to curtail his freedom as organised tyranny. "Shelley, Mrs. Shelley says, 'refusing to fag at Eton, was treated with revolting cruelty by masters and boys. This roused instead of training his spirit, and he rejected the duty of obedience, when it was enforced by menaces and punishment.'" (2). It never appeared necessary for him to "fag" a great deal over his studies, because he displayed an amazing grasp of the subject he studied, and his early interest in Pliny and Lucretius earned for him the title of "Atheist." Hogg, in his biography of Shelley, maintains that the term "Atheist" was given to his friend at Eton, not because of any interest he showed in atheism itself, but because he did the most daring things against the authorities of the school. (3). Dowden doubts the opinion of Shelley's friend. Shelley's

(2) Medwin: "Life of Shelley." p.32.
(3) Hogg: "Life of Shelley". p.90.
interest in science was more of the emotions than of the intellect; to get down to the hard facts of the subject was more than his restless spirit could endure for long. It was the romantic or magical side of science that appealed to him, and his "nefarious scientific pursuits" excited much comment among his companions and masters. But at Eton Shelley began also to show an interest in religion of the superstitious type. According to Hogg "Shelley's turn of mind was towards superstition, not towards irreligion and materialism," which evidences a certain dissatisfaction with orthodox religion as he knew it at Eton. He also displayed an amazing interest, for a boy, in Godwin's "Political Justice," and on more than one occasion got himself into trouble with the school authorities for preaching its revolutionary ideas.

Shelley responded to the ideas of Godwin, whom he came to know personally after the rupture of his marriage with Harriet Westbrook, because already he felt keenly the injustice of life. Dowden says: "It was almost certainly at Syon House Academy - not at Eton - that suddenly the revelation came to him of the misery of the oppressors and the oppressed in the world in which he lived and moved, of the misery of his own extravagant and impotent rages; and with this discovery arose the resolve henceforth to be wise and gentle and just and pure." While on the one hand his lofty and exalted position as a boy among his four younger sisters contributed to his ego-centricity, the influence of his father and aunts made him a potential rebel.

Shelley's father was of the country squire type; on the one hand he was worldly, and on the other bound by the conventions of his society.
and Church. His attitude was a strange mixture of harshness and indulgence; for example, he would never pardon a misalliance, and yet he was generous in his provision for any number of illegitimate children. In the understanding of his son he was unhappily deficient, and failed hopelessly to see that the poet to be was unconventional because he was highly original. Young Shelley revolted against the early influences of his home life because they aimed at restricting his freedom and dwarfing his originality. Nevertheless the amount of indulgence shown towards him made leeway for the spearhead of his attack on all that savoured of artificiality and insincerity, qualities which were associated with his relations, who prized their position in society, their wealth, and the observance of conventions, above all other things.

It must have been increasingly evident to Shelley in the early years of his reflective moods, that his father and his relatives attended Church because the observance of religious conventions would bring to them worldly advantages. Like many an extravert in revolt against the early influences of his environment, he began to attack the institutions associated with his relatives. We must recognise, of course, without hesitation, that Shelley was gifted with the individuality of genius, and his love for truth impelled him to pierce every sham woven by society and ancient usage. This brought him eventually into conflict with religion, because what he had seen of it prepared his mind for a violent assault on an institution which was false to his way of thinking. He was obviously unconvinced of the soundness of man's belief in God when he entered the university, for the reading, with his friend Hogg, of Locke's
treatise "On the Human Understanding," and of Hume's "Essays," seemed to give him the very answer he had been seeking to his religious problem. Together the two friends prepared a careful analysis of these works, and from his notes Shelley drew up later his metaphysical essay in support of atheism. According to Hogg this effort could be explained thus: "Shelley had a passion for controversial discussion, not only with friends, but frequently with correspondents as often as not personally unknown to him."

In a mind less in revolt with surrounding systems of thought and forms of behaviour than Shelley's, the reading of Locke and Hume would arouse doubt in the orthodox views of the Church, but not necessarily unbelief. Most thinking students entering the university from religious homes, and reading philosophy for the first time, are not happy about their former beliefs; but it is the potential rebel who feels that religion is part of the environment which has repressed him, who comes down definitely on the side of atheism, and without learning more than he needs to know if he is going to build up a comprehensive argument for his position, he makes bold to parade his new discovery before others, and particularly before those whom he delights to shock.

But in the case of Shelley we must not overlook the unhappy emotional experience he suffered when his cousin Harriet Grove broke off her engagement to him. In his book on "Shelley's Religion," E. Barnard remarks (p.21): "Shelley's awakening was hastened and embittered by a disappointment in love." It appears that he propounded his unorthodox views in his letters to Harriet, hoping to convert her to them. He was
too much of an extravert to avoid doing this, and it simply "did not occur to him to abandon his heterodox opinions." In the autumn of 1810 "she became uneasy at the tone of his letters on speculative subjects." This led to the dissolution of their engagement, which intensified Shelley's reaction against society. In a letter to Hogg he swears "on the altar of perjured love to avenge"himself on intolerance. "What offence to reason, to virtue, was there in desiring the communication of a lengthened correspondence, in order that both she and myself might see if in coincidence of intellect we were willing to enter into a closer, an eternal union? No, it is no offence to reason or virtue; it is obeying its most imperious dictates; it is complying with the designs of the author of our nature." (1). This surely is the utterance of a rebellious adolescent, whose hurt has afflicted him deeply, and one is not surprised to find that the pamphlet on the "Necessity for Atheism" appeared only seven weeks later.

This reaction of Shelley against religion calls to mind the case of Dr. Bernard Hart (2): "One of my patients, a former Sunday-school teacher, had become a convinced atheist. He insisted that he had reached this standpoint after a long and careful study of the literature of the subject, and, as a matter of fact, he really had acquired a remarkably wide knowledge of religious apologetics. He discoursed at length upon the evidence of Genesis, marshalling his arguments with considerable skill, and producing a coherent and well-reasoned case. Subsequent psychological analysis, however, revealed the real complex responsible for his

(1) Hogg's "Life of Shelley." p.95.
(2) Quoted by McDougall in the "Outline of Abnormal Psychology."p.251.
"atheism;" the girl to whom he had been engaged had eloped with the most enthusiastic of his fellow Sunday-school teachers. We see that in this patient the causal complex, resentment against his successful rival, had expressed itself by a repudiation of the beliefs which had formerly constituted the principal bond between them. The arguments, the study, the quotations were merely an elaborate rationalisation."

In this case there was a direct assault on religion because "the girl to whom he had been engaged had eloped with the most enthusiastic of his fellow Sunday-school teachers." Here the agent for the conflict in the unbeliever's mind was closely and intimately associated with religion (in much the same way as the case quoted on pages 55-6), and the emotions aroused by the wounding of the self-regarding tendency confused the issue before him. If a representative of religion can do this, then there is little to be said for religion itself, so dispense with it and give your reasons why it should be repudiated. Now Dr. Hart says that the "resentment against the successful rival expressed itself by a repudiation of the beliefs which had formerly constituted the principal bond between them." But judging the case as it stands quoted, it seems to me that the wounded self was sufficiently alert consciously to ward off the charge of jealousy by avoiding any direct attack on his rival. It is the tendency of youth to cover up its wounded feelings and to put on a brave veneer; and for the young man to have condemned his friend would perhaps have evoked the ridicule of others, because "all is fair in love and war." One of two ways, therefore, was open to him: either to strangle his resentment, which later might, through the bonds of association, be unconsciously directed against religion; or to make a bold
frontal attack on religion for one of two reasons: (a) because it was insufficient to prevent his friend from courting his lover; or (b) because it was the scapegoat for his wounded feelings. What I wish to make clear is that religion itself is attacked, and not the belief that formed the principal bond between them. It is conceivable that the young man would not have abandoned a form of sport in which he and his friend were interested, because the latter had let him down. Then why this reaction against religion? Because religion is a more vital and urgent issue in the life of the individual than sport.

Whether a person will react against religion, or use it as an escape from some emotional crisis, particularly a sexual one, is principally determined by the manner in which religion has been commended to the individual when young. I do not think the matter of temperament enters into it a great deal. The extravert is quite as likely to turn to religion as a refuge from his conflict as is the introvert, but his reaction against religion is more obvious because it is overt in expression, whereas the introvert's reaction would be less obtrusive, a withdrawal from, not a distinct attack against, a belief in the Deity. Similarly the extravert's expressions of religious feeling are more flamboyant, when through them he finds a way of escape from the conflict which harasses his mind. For example, M. falls in love with a married woman, and as a result of his promiscuous relationships he grows unhappy. To escape his unhappiness he consults a minister, who persuades him to repent of his sin and accept the forgiveness of God. This he does, and later allies himself with the Oxford Group movement, in which from time to time he takes a leading part. The chief theme of his addresses is sin, with a special reference to sex.
An analysis later revealed the interesting fact that whilst he felt forgiven for the sexual sin he had committed with his married love, he was fearful of repeating the same moral fault, and his escape from the conflict was through projecting his own temptations to others.

To return to Shelley's atheism, it is fair to say that he did not repudiate the belief in a Deity because religion was associated with his cousin Harriet, though his sister Helen writes thus of the broken engagement: "his disappointment a few years afterwards in losing the lady of his love had a great effect on him." The rupture of the relationship with her embittered him and quickened his critical tendency, which was already directed towards an attack on religion, and which began to be more decisive after his reading of Locke and Hume. It would be an easier conclusion to say that his atheism was due to the disappointment in love, when we remember how strongly he associated ideas. His sister tells us that she recollects hearing how her brother married Harriet Westbrook because her name was Harriet; whilst Hogg says that Shelley never drank wine because "the sight of port wine reminded him of his father." Peacock also tells of an incident which shows how quickly and strongly Shelley's mind associated ideas. (1) Peacock recommended to Shelley a music-master whose name resembled very closely in sound that of a man whom Shelley disliked - a bailiff. The music-master went to see Shelley - "when Shelley's man opened the library door and said, "Mr. --, sir," Shelley, who caught the name as that of his Monsieur Tonson, exclaimed, 'I would just as soon see the devil!', sprang up from his chair, jumped out of the window, ran across the lawn, climbed over

(1) "Memories of Shelley." p.66.
the garden fence, and came round to me by a back path." But to try to argue that his attack on religion was the direct outcome of his disappointment in his cousin Harriet and her mother would be to ignore the facts that were taking shape in his life both at Eton and Oxford. This unhappy experience was the only spark placed to the inflammable anti-religious feeling already within him.

"The Necessity for Atheism", however, was never sustained, for two years later the essay was reprinted (with a few changes) as a note to "Queen Mab." On the line "There is no God - " Shelley preferred the statement - "This negation must be understood solely to affect a creative Deity. The hypothesis of a pervading spirit co- eternal with the universe remains unshaken." H.D. Hughes says that the main argument of the famous seven pages of "The Necessity for Atheism" is "that we can believe more easily in a world without a beginning than in the agency of a First Cause." (1). While Barnard says that "Shelley's aim in publishing the tract was not to overthrow orthodoxy, or to convert the world to atheism..........he is only seeking after truth."

Personally I think that both Hughes and Barnard are much too generous in their criticism of Shelley: they overlook the underlying psychological factors that motivated the essay, and that finally expressed themselves in an adolescent outburst against the authority which he felt was embodied in a religion whose first premises were invalid.

That there was a strong emotional element in Shelley's atheism it would be difficult to deny. He felt keenly the sham of his own people's religion, and for him it symbolised the authority which restrained and

destroyed the liberty of the individual. Hogg says: "I knew Shelley more intimately than any man, (which is probably correct), but I never could discern in him any more than two fixed principles. The first was a strong, irrepressible love of liberty: of liberty in the abstract, and somewhat after the pattern of the ancient republics, without reference to the English constitution, respecting which he knew little and cared nothing, heeding it not at all. The second was an equally ardent love of toleration of all opinions, but more especially of religious opinions: of toleration complete, entire, universal, unlimited: and, as a deduction and corollary from which latter principle, he felt an abhorrence of persecution of every kind, public or private." (1). This love of liberty and toleration was doubtless the result of his unhappy experiences at the hands of his father, strengthened by the strict discipline to which he objected at Eton. In one of his letters to Godwin, (Jan. 10th, 1822), Shelley says: "The habits of thinking of my father and myself never coincided. Passive obedience was inculcated and enforced in my childhood. I was required to love, because it was my duty to love; it is scarcely necessary to mention that coercion obviates its own intention." To a free loving spirit like Shelley's discipline was tormenting, he beat against it as a wild bird beats against the bars of its cage; and to obey authority, without any reason why he should submit to it, was exasperating to his sense of justice. It is not to be wondered at that he"was haunted with a passion for the wildest and most extravagant romances." Through his vivid imagination he escaped into a world of phantasy where he was free of discipline, restrictions, and prohibitions;

(1) "Life of Shelley." p.524.
and when he broke away from his father's influence he waged war against all systems which sought to restrain the freedom of his personality.

Shelley did not, as a result of his strict upbringing and unhappy experiences of painful duty at Eton, become an oppressor of the weak, as do some men and women when their pent-up anger and resentment find expression in forms of tyranny of which they were themselves once victims. Instead of transferring his feeling to others, he attacks the system which produced his enemies. "Tyranny produces tyranny, in common minds; and it is well-known in schools, that those boys who have been the most fagged, become the greatest oppressors; not so Shelley........like the martyrs, who smiled in the midst of torture, he sought refuge in his own thoughts, in the heaven of his own soul, and perhaps this inward life aided him in his search after the mysteries to which he afterwards clung with a faith so unshaken." (1).

Christianity was first presented to him by those who early sought to mould his character to the piously accepted standard of their day, and it was to his disadvantage that he saw only those stern and joyless features which characterised religion in the days of his young life. His attack upon religion was never as vituperative as Swinburne's, nor as fanatical as that of Nietzsche, and it would be correct to say that he never completely abandoned it as they did. It is, however, true that Shelley never did in later years accept the orthodox conception of God. Probably, having committed himself to a heterodox point of view, he was determined to pursue a search after truth, maintaining that the Deity could never be completely comprehended by the mind of man.

(1) Medwin: "Life of Shelley." p.33.
Nevertheless we cannot overlook the fact that his pursuit after truth in religion was motivated by a strong psychological resistance in the nature of a commitment. How strong this resistance can be is known by all psychotherapists. One of the most illuminating cases I have known was that of M.W., who tried to convince me that something was eating into her brain. Her illness began with knee trouble which was definitely "conversion hysteria," but which she said was due to rheumatism. She consulted a specialist who told her that there was no evidence of rheumatism to be traced. After seeing him a few times she fell in love with him, and wishing to see him oftener she asked him to take her into his nursing-home where he could give her further treatment. Here she met with disappointment, and realising that she had been "a fool" she tried to excuse herself by thinking that there must be something wrong with her brain that she had allowed herself to fall in love with a married man. Again she was assured that her brain was perfectly healthy, and that she had no cause for worry. A psychoanalyst was engaged, but he failed to remove the irrational idea because of her resistance to treatment. Her conscious pretence she maintained, and to persuade her parents that her own diagnosis was correct she exaggerated her symptoms and threatened suicide. I was consulted, and after interviewing her for some time I endeavoured to show her how the idea had been formed and was held in her mind. She agreed that I was right; but to return to a normal life would mean for her marrying the man to whom she had been engaged for twenty years, and whom she wanted to "give up" but dared not because of public opinion. Her defence against him was in the first place her rheumatic knee; the evidence contradicting this belief she could not reject, but
no one could prove to her that her brain was not diseased, and to avoid further treatment she stayed in bed. As a child she was always obstinate and desired much of her own way, and if necessary she resisted all who opposed her until they conceded her wishes. And now, having committed herself to a rationalisation of her true state of mind, she resists every effort to eradicate the idea.

In a similar fashion Shelley, having committed himself to the impulsive denial of the Deity in "The Necessity for Atheism," is unwilling to retrace his steps altogether; but it is interesting to note that his later references to the Deity were never connected with that essay. For example, "The Sensitive Plant," Part II. 11. 1-4:

"There was a Power in this sweet place,
An Eve in this Eden; a ruling grace
Which to the flowers, did they waken or dream,
Was as God is to the starry scheme."

His effort to maintain "the hypothesis of a pervading spirit co-eternal with the universe" suggests that he was not happy in his mind about his departure from the generally accepted religious views. In his preface to the "Revolt of Islam" he writes: "The erroneous and degrading idea which men have conceived of a Supreme Being, for instance, is spoken against, but not the Supreme Being itself."

Peacock tells us that amongst Shelley's schemes of life the most singular was that of entering the Church. "We were walking in the early summer through a village where there was a good vicarage house, with a nice garden, and the front wall of the vicarage was covered with corchorus in full flower, a plant less common then than it has since become. He stood some time admiring the vicarage wall. The extreme quietness
of the scene, the pleasant pathway through the village churchyard, and
the brightness of the summer morning apparently concurred to produce the
suddenly
impression under which he said to me - 'I feel strongly inclined to enter
the Church.' 'What!' I said, 'to become a clergyman, with your ideas of
the faith?' 'Assent to the supernatural part of it,' he said, 'is merely
technical. Of the moral doctrines of Christianity I am a more decided
disciple than many of its more ostentatious professors. And consider
for a moment how much good a clergyman may do.'" (1). Peacock was of the
opinion that it was just a passing fancy, but it is, as Weaver points out,
'significant", and points to a deep religious feeling, or at least to a
strong religious bond in his life. Weaver, in his study of the Biblical
colouring in Shelley's works, writes - "The past was as necessary to him
as last year's wheat is to this year's hunger. And though he ate of less
foods, it was inevitable that he should leave Godwin for Plato, and Plato
in part for a greater. It was inevitable that the influence of the Bible
upon his very processes of life should become so great and so vital that
not to understand this influence is not to understand him." (2).

Shelley's belief in immortality is another feature of his religious
spirit which Oxford did not completely destroy, and this we sense in his
glorious words

"Peace, peace! he is not dead, he doth not sleep -
He hath awoken from the dream of life -
'Tis we, who, lost in stormy visions, keep
With phantoms an unprofitable strife,
And in mad trance strike with our spirit's knife
Invulnerable nothings. - We decay
Like corpses in a charnel; fear and grief
Convulse us and consume us day by day,
And cold hopes swarm like worms within our living clay."

Adonais. St. XXXIX.

(1) "Memories of Shelley." p.54.
(2) "The Understanding of Shelley." p.237.
He rejected the idea of an anthropomorphic God whom all Christians worshipped. "The Revolt of Islam," Canto VIII, brings this out, and is a touch which anticipates Nietzsche. But he believed in an Eternal Love, a spirit of Good which he calls God, and which was opposed by some recalcitrant principle, yet never subject to it in its own nature, although its workings in the manifest world are. How much this idea of the Good Spirit - God - meant to him can be judged by his references to it in some of his greatest poems:

"Ode to the West Wind;"

"Wild Spirit, which art moving everywhere;
Destroyer and preserver; hear, 0 hear!"
I.11.13-14.

"Adonais;"

"He is made one with Nature: there is heard
His voice in all her music, from the moan
Of thunder, to the song of night's sweet bird;
He is a presence to be felt and known
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone,
Spreading itself wherever that Power may move
Which has withdrawn his being to its own;
Which wields the world with never-wearied love,
Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above."
St. XLIII.

"That Light whose smile kindles the Universe,
That Beauty in which all things work and move,
That Benediction which the eclipsing Curse
Of birth can quench not, that sustaining Love
Which through the web of being blindly wove
By man and beast and earth and air and sea,
Burns bright or dim, as each are mirrors of
The fire for which all thirst; now beams on me
Consuming the last clouds of cold mortality."
St. LIV.

"Ode to Naples;"

"Great Spirit, deepest love!
Which rulest and dost move
All things which live and are, within the Italian shore;
Who spreadest heaven around it,
Whose woods, rocks, waves, surround it;
Who sittest in thy star, o'er Ocean's western floor."

Epode II.B. 11. 149-54.

Flint calls Shelley a pantheist - "In our English speech pantheism has been sung by Shelley." Barnard objects to this viewpoint; but it is difficult to see how the charge can be denied, when one recalls, for instance, the closing lines of "Adonais" -

"Whilst burning through the inmost veil of Heaven,
The soul of Adonais, like a star,
Beacons from the abode where the Eternity are."

Whatever religious term we apply to Shelley's beliefs, a study of his theology suggests that he failed to dispense completely with the idea of God which could not be proved on rational grounds, and he therefore made a vigorous effort to compromise between the orthodox beliefs of his relatives and his own heterodox views. This is further evidence of his mental disharmony and emotional instability. Barnefield, ("Psychology of the Poet Shelley"), says that in his opinion Shelley was a paranoiac with persecutory delusions concerning his father, and his wife Harriet and Hogg. Personally I would hesitate to say that this is a correct diagnosis of Shelley's mind. He seems to me more of an obsessionalist with marked hysterical symptoms. Peacock says: "About the end of 1815 Shelley was troubled by one of his most extraordinary delusions. He fancied that a fat old woman who sat opposite to him in a mail coach was afflicted with elephantiasis, that the disease was infectious and incurable, and that he had caught it from her. He was continually on the watch for its symptoms; his legs were to swell to the size of an elephant's, and his skin was to be crumpled over like goose skin. He
would draw the skin of his own hands, arms, and neck very tight, and if he discovered any deviation from smoothness he would seize the person next to him and endeavour by a corresponding pressure to see if any corresponding deviation existed. His friends took various methods of dispelling the delusion. When he found that, as the days rolled on, his legs retained their proportion and his skin its smoothness, the delusion died away. (1). This is by no means a delusion of the true paranoiac type; it is one which I have met with in scores of obsessional people who show a high percentage of hysteria in their make-up, and who are motivated more by fear of what is likely to happen than by an immovable conviction of what has happened. Further, Shelley's opinions of his father, and of Hogg particularly, were not without foundation, and are to be regarded rather as exaggerated criticisms than delusions.

A careful study, however, of all his writings must surely convince us of the unstable condition of his mind; and in consideration of this, his attempts to repudiate a belief both in the existence of God and in a personal God cannot be taken seriously, neither can we say that his final conclusions offer any satisfactory evidence for a belief in atheism.

What definitely emerges from Shelley's writings, his letters, and the biographies written about him, is his inability to pursue for long any serious, systematic study of a subject, and also his unstable emotional condition. As already indicated, he had only an irrational or romantic interest in science, and he was never able to concentrate on the hard facts of either mathematics or the physical sciences. "He rejected with marvellous impatience every mathematical discipline that was offered;"

(1) loc. cit. p.33.
Not only in science did Shelley display an inaptitude for learning facts and concentrating upon the subject at hand, he also revealed an unreliability in any transaction. Hogg says: "He was altogether incapable of rendering an account of any transaction whatever, according to the strict and precise truth, and the bare naked realities of actual life; not through an addiction to falsehood, which he cordially detested, but because he was the creature, the unsuspecting and unresisting victim, of his irresistible imagination." (1). It was the perpetual flight of his imagination that made it impossible for him to concentrate for long on any one particular theme. This is evidenced time after time in his poetry: for example, his poem "Alastor" (1815), whilst revealing much of what he thought of being under the spell of an avenging deity, is diffuse and rapidly flits from one thought to another. The ideas he endeavours to convey are obscured by his continual flights of imagination into the realms of exquisite beauty of melody and rhythm.

Shelley's peculiarities and idiosyncrasies are known to all who have read the biographies of Dowden and Medwin, and of Hogg who says: "He took strange caprices, unfounded frights and dislikes, vain apprehensions and panic terrors, and therefore he absented himself from formal and sacred engagements. He was unconscious and oblivious of times, places, persons and seasons; and falling into some poetic vision, some daydream, he quickly and completely forgot all that he had repeatedly and solemnly promised; or he ran away after some object of imaginary urgency and importance which suddenly came into his head, setting off in vain pursuit of it, he knew not whither." (2).

(1) "Life of Shelley." p.314.  (2) loc. cit. p.497.
This I believe to be a fair criticism of Shelley's character, and however highly we appreciate his poetic genius, his love of children, and concern for the liberty of the individual, we cannot ignore his "will-o'-the-wisp" attitude towards life and its many problems. Where his theology is concerned, little credence can be placed in his views, for whilst he appears to begin his attack on orthodox religion with definite rational objections, such as he had garnered principally from Hume, he reveals an inability to sustain his arguments and we are left with gaps in his thinking. For example, "The testimony that the Deity convinces the senses of men of His existence can only be admitted by us, if our mind considers it less probable that these men should have been deceived, than that the Deity should have appeared to them." Here Shelley confusing the issue, because he wants to reject the evidence of men whose experiences are unknown to him.

It seems that Shelley's outburst against religion is typical of the adolescent who believes that he is called upon to set the world in order, and once it spent itself he in later life falls back on the conception of "an active Spirit of Good, unchanging and all-pervading." Barnard says: "The real Shelley did not come into existence intellectually until about 1815 - he is only judged fairly by his later work; there is a break between his earlier and later thought." If we are to agree with Barnard we can only conclude that it is fair to say of Shelley's atheism that it was the emotional reaction of an adolescent who was out of step and tune with the religious views of his day. It was the scapegoat for his reactionary feelings against those relatives
and acquaintances who denied him the freedom of thought he cherished, and whose intolerance of his views made him run "after some object of imaginary urgency and importance." It is beyond the scope of this chapter to criticise Shelley's theology after he emerged from the age of adolescence, except to point out that his religious need drove him on in search of religious truth just as his ego compelled him to speak in favour of liberty and freedom for the individual.
CHAPTER VIII.

Swinburne.

Swinburne follows closely in the footsteps of Shelley both as a romanticist and an antagonist of religion. It would be unfair to say that he was in any sense aping Shelley, for that would be to deny his poetic originality and genius, and his possession of these qualities none can dispute; they were apparent in his youth. Ruskin when writing to a friend asked "Have you read 'Atalanta'? The grandest thing ever done by a youth - though he is a Demonic Youth!" Doubtless the young poet was caught up by the reactionary movement of his age. In reference to "The Songs of Liberty," Lafourcade says: "...if the reader is to understand these poems he should be aware that Swinburne's view on European affairs between 1867 and 1870 (not before or after these dates) form a coherent whole: that they do not represent the disconnected ravings of a fevered brain, but that they were shared, rightly or wrongly, by a group of thinkers and patriots. What he added to those opinions was a superstructure of ideas and sentiments which did not materially affect them." (1). Swinburne probably believed that he had a great part to play in the cause of liberty and freedom, and this belief he has definitely revealed in one verse of "Siena?" and at a time when he was obviously conscious of his particular life purpose, and thought that experience had qualified him to speak.

(1) "Swinburne. A Literary Biography." p.150.
"Me consecrated, if I might
To praise Thee, or to love at least,
O Mother of all men's dear delight;
Thou madest a choral-souled boy priest
Before my lips had leave to sing."

Religion as he understood it was the antithesis of liberty, and so in his letters and poems he makes known his case against it. In a letter to E.C. Steadman, February 21st. 1875, (Vol. I of his Letters, p.208), he writes: "As my atheism has been so much babbled about, perhaps I may say here what I really do think on religious matters. Having been as a child and boy brought up as a quasi-Catholic, of course I went in for that as passionately as for other things (for example, well-nigh to unaffected and unashamed ecstasies of adoration when receiving the Sacrament); then when this was naturally stark dead and buried, it left nothing to me but a turbid Mihilism; for a Theist I never was; I always felt by instinct and perceived by reason that no man could conceive of a personal God except by crude superstition or else by true supernatural revelation; that a natural God was the absurdest of all human figments; because no man could by other than apocalyptic means - i.e., by other means than a violation of the laws and order of nature - conceive of any other sort of Divine person than Man with a difference - Man with some qualities intensified and some qualities suppressed - Man with the good in him exaggerated and the evil excised. This, I say, I have always seen and avowed since my mind was ripe enough to think freely. Now, of course, this is the exact definition of every god that has ever been worshipped under any revelation. Men give Him the qualities they prefer in themselves or about them - for example, the God of the Christians is good for domestic virtue, bad for patriotic............But we who worship no
material incarnation of any qualities, no person, may worship the Divine
humanity, the ideal of human perfection and aspiration, without worshipping
any God, any person, any fetish at all. Therefore I might call myself, if I wished, a kind of Christian (of the Church of Blake and Shel-
ley), but assuredly in no sense a Theist." In a footnote he adds: "That
is, taking the semi-legendary Christ as type of human aspiration and
perfection, and supposing (if you like) that Jesus may have been the
highest and purest sample of man on record."

Here we have a clear, concise statement of Swinburne's religious
position, written some time after his anti-religious poems in "Songs after
Sunset," which were published in 1871. But in the poems there is a tor-
rent of abuse and invective which at times sways even the thread of his
thought. In the poem "Before a Crucifix" he sings in bitter, proud
tones of the passing of the God of the Churches, of the Jesus of the
priests, a theme which he repeats in "Christmas Antiphones." In "Genesis"
he contends that God is the product of man's mind: "And God, the shade
cast by the soul of Man." "Nertha" and the "Hymn of Man" are of great
interest, because in the former he gives us almost a pantheistic con-
ception of not a divine being but man, and in the latter he exalts man
beyond decency. "Whatever Christians may feel, no one else can see more
than a naive and showy compliment in the end of the "Hymn of Man":
"Glory to God in the Highest! for man is the master of things." (1).

All students of religion who have read carefully "The Necessity for
Atheism" will at least give Shelley credit for an attempt at a systematic
thesis for his unbelief, however unsatisfactory they may think it to be;

but not even a generous review of Swinburne's poems, which purport to give the final blow to religion, can make us see anywhere cogent and logical arguments for his contentions. After reading the above-mentioned poems three or four times, with all the care and diligence at my command, I asked myself: "What is this man trying to tell me? Is there nothing more here than a hysterical outburst of the poet against a system of belief which he neither seems to understand nor is able to criticise?"

Unwilling to pronounce judgment too hastily I turned to Grierson's lecture on "Lord Byron, Arnold and Swinburne," (1), and I found a criticism which confirmed my own: "After the first tremendous impression of the daring as well as the craftsmanship of 'Poems and Ballads' and 'Atalanta in Calydon,' the experience of a reader of Swinburne was of growing disillusionment, till even 'Songs before Sunrise' read as a 'tale of little meaning though the words be strong.' A sense of emptiness haunts the student who turns back on much of the exquisite exotic craftsmanship of these last of the romantics."

Swinburne seems incapable of adapting his thoughts or emotions to the subject matter before him. His mind is allowed to be dominated by some fixed idea of the moment, and whether he is writing about politics or religion his delight is not in the truth but in abuse and invective. Harold Nicholson, referring to the "Songs of Risorgimento," says: "These political poems are not even accurate as a rendering of the then existent problems of the Italian situation: Swinburne writes of the events of 1867 in the spirit of 1848; the unreality of the experience is thereby intensified." (2). This passage cogently expresses what is felt to be true of

(1) Warton Lecture on English Poetry. Ch. XI.
(2) "Swinburne." Macmillan. p.150.
Swinburne's futile effort to convince his readers not by reason but by the force of unbridled emotion. When he endeavours to show how the conception of God was evolved by human fear, in his "Genesis," he overlooks the contribution which Jesus made to theological thought and which had its origin not in fear but in love. Emotionally he was attached to Jesus probably because of the latter's resistance to the religious conception of his day, and because, to quote his own words, "Jesus may have been the highest and purest sample of man on record." Gosse says "The only degree in which Swinburne to the very end of his life approached orthodox Christianity was in his reiterated expression of reverence for Christ as the type of human aspiration and perfection;"(1) but even so, he surely gave little or no consideration to the views Jesus expressed in His teaching. In his merciless attack upon human conceptions of God he revealed a mind (if it were ever open) closed to the religious ideas which were fundamental in the life he so greatly admired.

His method of approach to religion suggests a complete inability to sustain his thoughts for long, or to think systematically about what he is writing. "To say that 'all men born are mortal but not man,' as he does in "The Pilgrims," if ingenious, is nothing more, being a matter of words only. To compare men favourably with the gods, ancient and modern, is just and can be both amusing and inspiring, but assertion and asseveration are not beyond the strength of propagandists, though commonly they have not the solemn tones to pronounce for them, as in "On the Downs," that there is no God but man." (2) None of Swinburne's

(1) "Algernon Charles Swinburne." p. 310.
critics can speak of his philosophy as a clear system of thought, and his failure to think coherently manifested itself when he was at Oxford. As a student at Balliol he was asked by Jowett, who later proved a worthy friend to him, to write an essay on the Eleatic School of Philosophy. He read his composition to Jowett privately, but "the essay was a torrent of words read very rapidly and shrilly. When the poet had finished, Jowett said after a long silence: "Mr. Swinburne, I do not see that you have been pursuing any particular line of thought." (1).

But Swinburne not only failed to "pursue any particular line of thought," and to think through his subject in a reasonable logical manner, he also failed to regulate and marshall his emotions, which were allowed to squander his ideas instead of giving them the drive of forcefulness. Professor Holland, speaking to a friend of his impression of Swinburne, said: "I well recollect his dancing round the table, screaming abuse, and, I think, advocating the assassination of the Emperor Napoleon III." His emotions were as reckless as his ideas, and instead of serving him, as was the case with Byron, they were his masters, leading him into avenues of the wildest extravagance. At times he not only raged about mere incidentals, but expressed his beliefs in a feeble manner. To quote Professor Grierson again: "Swinburne writes of liberty as though she were his mistress:

"Ask nothing more of me, sweet;
All I can give you I give.
Heart of my heart, were it more,
More would be laid at your feet;
Love that should help you to live,
Song that should spur you to soar."

Such feelings 'which belong to us as political animals,' whose source

(1) Gosse: loc. cit. p. 58.
and sphere is national and civic life, the love of liberty, of justice, the passion of power, the hatred of oppression, and such passions, find their fittest utterance in the trumpet tones of the orator."

This anaemic and feminine handling of a strong-blooded, masculine subject like Liberty suggests immaturity, an arrested development of the whole personality, and along with his lack of cogency, points to the fact that little reliance can be placed on his attitude towards either politics or religion. No one wishing to build up a reasonable argument for his unbelief could find any satisfactory material from Swinburne's works, and if we are willing to ascribe genius to his "Hymn of Man" we cannot attribute clear thinking to its author.

The "Hymn of Man" expresses his belief in the dechristianization of God and the enthronement of man, but it would be difficult even for an honest-minded atheist to give credence to the views it expounds; it is not the product of his mind, but "the record of his emotions", excited by an attempt, as he thought, to destroy the liberty of man. The influence of Mazzini - the Italian prophet of the nineteenth century - plays an important part in the origin of this poem; about October, 1866, Swinburne had spontaneously turned from Rossetti and his followers in art (L'art pour l'art), to Mazzini and his interest in Italy. The prophet was disappointed when the unity of Italy was effected in a way which conflicted with his ambitions and hopes, and Victor Emmanuel was placed at its head. Through the influence of Napoleon Rome was retained for the Pope (Pius IX), who had been preparing from 1867 for an Oecumenical Council in 1869 - "to adopt, together with the dogma of infallibility the famous syllabus which condemned in the most intolerant terms the
liberal doctrine of the age; and these two measures were duly passed a few months later." (1). In the same year in which the Oecumenical Council was being held Ricciardi, the Italian Radical, organised an Anti-Catholic Council for Naples, which would sit at the same time as the former. Among other matters to be dealt with at this Council letters and publications of all sympathisers were to be read. Swinburne and his friend W.M. Rossetti wrote an epistle between them, and had it translated by an Italian friend. In the second part of this letter Swinburne himself declared that the Church and the priests are the enemies of freedom, which "expects no natural message from above or from without; but only that which comes from within - faith born of man, in man, which passes in contagious revelation from spirit again to spirit without, and without sign. Truth, Right, Freedom, are self-sufficing, and claim service from the soul that suffices to itself."

Soon after the Anti-Catholic Council met it was hastily dispersed by considerable disagreement between the French and Italian representatives. So the letter sent by Rossetti and Swinburne was apparently not read. Swinburne tried to get it published in England, but as there was no market for prose at that time he hastened with a poem which he had intended to be read at the meeting of the Council in Naples, and which he later called "The Hymn of Man." This work is one of his few poems associated with particular historical events, and it has a definite purpose, that of deifying man. But even here Swinburne is definitely swayed by Mazzini's doctrine: "Humanity is not an aggregate of individuals but a Collective Being.........Humanity is a man who lives and works for men

............The best interpreter between individual Man and God is human-

This view was, of course, not peculiar to Mazzini and his young disciples; it was that which had been expounded by Conti, but Swinburne appropriates and exploits it for a precise occasion, and in a way that suggests that he was doing everything possible to impress his master with his undivided loyalty, and also that he was delighting in his opportunity for an open attack on the Pope, whom he had previously denounced, in the "Halt before Rome," as a monster—".......

Who hath claws as a vulture, Plumage and beak as a dove."

This observation on his "Hymn of Man" leads us to a review of the influences that motivated his virulent anti-religious feelings and wild attacks on the Church. They were, doubtless, two: (a) The personality of Mazzini, as already suggested; (b) his own impassioned love of liberty. It is clear that the latter was strengthened by the former. In a sense Mazzini synthesised the riotous forces within the poet, and concentrated them on propaganda for political and individual freedom, and to have done this he must have exercised much power over Swinburne. Swinburne speaks a great deal of Mazzini's magnetic power over him: e.g.,

"I know, now I have seen him, what I guessed before; whenever he has said to anyone 'Go and be killed, because I tell you,' they have gone and been killed because he told them. Who wouldn't, I should like to know?"

In an unfinished volume of Italian Songs, which he dedicated and sent to Mazzini, he wrote

"Take, since you bade it should bear,
These of the seed of your sowing,
That the dew of your word kept growing."

Again, in the second part of "Tiresias," he represents Mazzini as an actor—"The living spirit, the good gift of grace." This fascination
which Mazzini had for Swinburne manifested itself when he was at Oxford. In his room he had a photograph of his idol, and before it he declaimed verses "with gestures of adoring supplication."

But it was not until March, 1867, that he was privileged to meet him personally, at the house of George Howard. His ecstatic delight was shown in a letter he wrote next day: "I unworthy spent much of last night sitting at my beloved Chief’s feet. He was angelically good to me. I read him my Italian poem all through, and he accepted it in words I can’t trust myself to try and write down. . . . . . . . Today I am rather exhausted and out of sorts. Il y a bien de quoi. There’s a tradition in the Talmud that when Moses came down from Sinai he was drunken with the kisses of the lips of God." This last phrase suggests the same lack of proportion or balance in his admiration for Mazzini as he displayed when at Oxford, where he positively astonished all his friends by his extravagant adoration before the prophet’s picture hung on the wall "in the place of honour in his sitting-room." Lefourc-Rade gives testimony to his unbalanced, almost frenzied devotion to Mazzini when he says that Swinburne overlooked the fact that both Mazzini and Napoleon (of whose death he spoke with "the worst of taste" in "The Descent into Hell"), had been dreamers and conspirators; both, though in a different degree, had loved Italy, and helped in the making of her unity. "When reading the Song, though the poet in no way sympathises, the sober historian remembers Racine’s line, and is forced to the conclusion that neither Napoleon nor Mazzini had deserved

"Ni cet excés d’honneur ni cette indignité."

(1). Why Swinburne was so greatly influenced in his love of Liberty by Maz-

(1) loc. cit. p. 179.
zini we shall see later, but for the moment let us see what Liberty meant to him. His "Song in Time of Order," 1852, very early expresses what freedom meant to him:

"Out of the sea with her there,
Out with her over the sand;
Let the kings keep the earth of their share,
We have done with the sharers of land."

According to Harold Nicholson, "For him (Swinburne) Liberty was a religion....With it were fused all his childhood experiences, the only experiences which he had undergone with any wholeness or intensity."

"Liberty to him is the symbol of youth and health and light, the symbol of his highest physical and spiritual enjoyments." (1). Whilst this may be a fair estimate of what liberty meant to Swinburne, it must be admitted that his approach to the whole subject was pathological in character, both in his denunciation of those who jeopardised it and in his own exaltation of it. Harold Nicholson puts it: "His loathing of all restriction, whether political, moral, intellectual, or social, amounted almost to claustrophobia." His reactions against all who restrict human freedom are violent and frequently out of all proportion to their offences against humanity. His vituperative words clearly indicate a condition of mind which is by no means balanced or healthy, and make his readers feel that liberty for him was not an ideal drawing forth the nobler qualities of his character, but an obsession goading him to make irrational utterances.

A study of his early life will help us to see how this obsession was formulated, and how his life was in constant riotous uproar against all authority or doctrine that restricted human freedom. In the first

(1) "Swinburne." p. 155.
place it needs to be understood that Swinburne was an epileptic, and of
the type that displays strong feelings of attachment to those who are
loved, and of intense loathing and bitterness for those who are hated and
counted as enemies, into which category came all those who "get in the
way." Delusions of persecution are present, and obsessional tendencies
drive the sufferer to extreme limits of action and emotional outbursts.
These features of the epileptic were unmistakably present in Swinburne,
though his environment no doubt had a heightening effect upon what was
part of his initial make-up. I can find no trace of epilepsy in the
history of his parents, but their influence was repressing in many ways,
particularly where his reading was concerned. Lord Redesdale, in a letter
to Edmund Gosse, wrote: "He was a very stay-at-home boy, shy and reserved,
not at all given to gadding about in other houses....... It was at Eton
that he began to feel his wings. His bringing-up at home was scrupulously
strict. His literary diet the veriest pap. His precocious brain had been
nourished upon food for babes. Not a novel had he been allowed to open,
not even Walter Scott's. Shakespeare he only knew through the medium of
his precious brown Bowdler." (1).

The information conveyed in this extract from Lord Redesdale's let-
ter, plus the record of his life at Oxford and afterwards, gives reason
for believing that Swinburne's early environment was too narrow for his
innate mental alertness. Further, the adventurous spirit of his father
and grandfather seemed to have found its abode within him along with the
dignity and elegance of his mother, who was associated with "a family
of stupendous antiquity." He was greatly attached to his mother, even

though she exercised a repressing influence over him. This filial attach-
ment to his mother is expressed in his letters to her (see Mrs.
Leith's collection), and is also reflected in the imagery of his poem
"The Triumph of Time," vv. 33-34:

"I will go back to the great sweet Mother,
Mother and lover of men, the sea;
I will go down to her, I and none other,
Close with her, kiss her, and mix her with me;
Cling to her, strive with her, hold her fast;
O fair white mother, in days long past
Born without sister, born without brother,
Set free my soul, as thy soul is free.

O fair green-girdled mother of mine,
Sea, thou art clothed with the sun and the rain;
Thy sweethearth kisses are strong like wine,
Thy large embraces are keen like pain;
Save me and hide me with all thy waves,
Find me one grave of thy thousand graves,
Those pure cold populous graves of thine,
Wrought without hand, in a world without stain."

It was she who decided the physical, mental and religious routine of her
son's life, but the emotional attachment between them safeguarded any
reaction in the young Algernon against her discipline. His riotous
feelings, however, found their escape when he got away from his mother's
influence, and his childish fury found vent in repeated outbursts in his
later life.

Swinburne's father seems to have played a far less conspicuous part
in his life than did his grandfather, probably because he was frequently
at sea as an Admiral of the British Fleet. To his grandfather the poet
makes many references, almost as warm in tone as his references to Maz-
zini. With him he spent much time in Northumberland, where the boy became
familiar with his republicanism, "his impatience of restraint, his love
of violent exercise." These are some of the characteristics of the poet himself, and if his impressions of his grandfather are correct it is easy to see why he patterned his life upon the man who had a lasting affection for him. To quote Swinburne's own words: "He was (of course, on the ultra-Liberal side), one of the most extreme politicians as well as one of the hardest riders and the best art-patrons of his time. It was said that the two maddest things in the North Country were his horse and himself. He was the friend of the great Turner, of Mulready, and of many lesser artists: I wish to God he had discovered Blake. He was most kind and affectionate to me always, as child, boy and youth. To the last he was far liker in appearance and manners to an old French nobleman than to any type of the average English gentleman." (1).

Swinburne showed very definitely these same interests, and they were awaiting development when he got away from the restrictions of his home life. All through his life Swinburne showed a strong affection for men older than himself, and though he displayed an unrivalled firmness and courage he was nevertheless dependent on others. "Under the influence of Jowett or Burton, of Rossetti or Watts-Dunton, Swinburne bowed his will in the direction of each of them in turn, dipping towards them like a magnetic needle towards its pole." (2). Here we see an unconscious transference of his feelings for his grandfather to those men older than himself who happened to treat him with kindly generosity; and it explains why his attachment to Mazzini was intense and exaggerated.

(1) Quoted by Gosse: loc. cit. p.5.
Had an analysis of Swinburne's dreams been possible we should have seen a displacement of the grandfather by Mazzini, who closely approximated to the image in the poet's mind of his beloved grandfather.

The assertive and adventurous qualities of his character Swinburne inherited from his father's side, and they were for ever seeking some appropriate outlet, chiefly through those interests which his grandfather had engendered in him; but in early life his mother must have bridled and held in check his instinctive energies. Evidence for this assumption comes not only from his strict upbringing and restricted reading, but also from his nervous condition as a child, his restlessness, and peculiar mannerisms. At school he was "a bag of nerves, and the smallest obstacle ruffled him." This failure to adjust himself to obstacles can only be explained by the repression of his instinctive energies. As a child he was a potential epileptic, and was strangely tiny - "His limbs were small and delicate, and his sloping shoulders looked far too weak to carry his great head, the size of which was exaggerated by the tousled mass of red hair standing almost at right angles to it." (Lord Redesdale). But "he grew up a healthy boy, and passed through his childhood without anything more serious than mild attacks of the usual infantile disorders." (1).

If Swinburne had shown an earlier resistance to his mother's influence, which he must have felt, but was too attached to her to display, the probability is that he would have been given greater freedom, because the persuasive influence of his grandfather might have been exercised over his mother. His resistance to authority, however, manifested

itself at Eton. Not keenly interested in Latin he objected to learning it, and "attributed his want of sympathy with most of the Latin classics to his having been forced to repeat them under compulsion." At Eton he was never particularly happy, and towards the end of his time there he grew rebellious, less amenable to discipline, and refused to work. He became so troublesome that he was advised to leave the school at the age of seventeen.

During the years of adolescence he showed signs of mental storm and stress. Bouts of moodiness, when he was painfully silent and irritable, were characteristic; at times he would sit gazing into space. "He would feel himself solitary and undecided, conscious of latent powers which nobody suspected, of ambitions which nobody comprehended. For the ordinary pursuits of young men at College he had a silent disdain." (Cosse, p. 56.) His "silent disdain" for the ordinary pursuits, which included games, of his fellow-students at Balliol might well have been his way of defending his puny physical build. His shortness of stature gave him a sense of inferiority which he tried to overcome by daring in riding, climbing, and swimming, against the advice of his friends: "To ride forbidden horses, and break bounds on days forbidden," and to "swim against a changing sea" — these were the ways whereby he proved to himself that he was a young man of courage like others bigger and older than himself.

At Oxford a number of his characteristics were thrown into relief by his inability to adjust himself to "the foggy damp of Oxonian atmosphere." Some of these were his exclusiveness, his love for older men, his resistance to authority, his inventive manner and style. He expres-
sed little sympathy with undergraduate life, and kept very much to himself. Besides refusing to take part in out-door games and rambles, he would have nothing to do with wine-parties, and breakfasted in his own room. He was by no means the social being Shelley was, and but for his "striking physical appearance" he would have been unnoticed. It was fortunate for his unhappy mind that he began to make friends at the beginning of his second year with Hatch, Nichol, T.H. Green and others, all older than himself. They apparently understood, persuaded and inspired him, and in many ways they gave to him at Oxford what he got from his grandfather in Northumberland when he was a boy. These friendships reveal his transference of feeling from the grandfather to others older than himself, which later expressed itself in extravagant ways towards Kazzini. But not even his friends, with whom he spent many mornings drinking coffee and reading poetry, could persuade him to conform to his college authorities. The adventurous spirit, now moving in circuitous paths and finding an outlet, even though it were through rebellion, was no longer to be held in check. He showed no inclination or willingness to adapt himself to the routine tasks set by his tutors. He preferred to follow his own course. It was at Oxford that Swinburne's opposition to religion first showed itself in his thorough dislike of the ecclesiastical side of college life; "his (only) offences consisted in a defiant neglect of morning Chapel and in a determined disobedience of regulations." The ripening of his intellectual powers was finding its expression through his interest in republicanism, which was another mode of his resistance to authority, and which, as already pointed out, he had acquired from his grandfather, who encouraged him to adopt extreme views
in politics, "telling the lad how in years long past he had repeatedly made himself liable to be impeached and executed for high treason by the outspoken republicanism of his sentiments."

Competing for the Newdigate Prize Poem in 1857 he produced some excellent work, but his poem, "The Discovery of the North-West Passage," was rejected; and here again we find Swinburne reacting badly and exhibiting that childish fury out of which he had never grown. The irritability he displayed at Eton when he was confronted with some obstacle is appearing again at Oxford, but in a more subtle way. Gosse says: "The rejection of the poem on which he had expended so much enthusiastic labour was an element in the repulsion which Swinburne conceived for Oxford, and for the language with which he now regarded his further career in the University." (1). In 1858 Swinburne seemed to lose what little patience he had with Oxford, perhaps because the restraining influence of Rossetti, Burne-Jones, and others who had "gone down" was no longer a factor of his college life, his attendances at lectures were irregular, and his conduct grew "turbulent and unseemly." The authorities regarded him as dangerous, and they were annoyed by his extravagances, and despite all that Jowett had done and could do for him he left Oxford in 1859 without having graduated. To quote his own words: "By Oxonian career culminated in total and scandalous failure."

But before he left Oxford for an enforced vacation in 1858, returning later and finally being dismissed in 1859, he ferociously displayed the weapon which he brandished later in his attack upon all enemies of liberty, both political and religious - the vituperative eloquence and invective which characterised his writings more than anything else. [10] t. c. i. b. p. 47.
else. On one occasion some of his friends, one of whom was later Lord Bryce, went to console with him for the rough treatment he had received at the hands of his college authorities. The young rebel "launched into a wonderful display of vituperative eloquence. He was not merely angry, but he enjoyed the opportunity, and the resources of his imagination in metaphor, and the amazing richness of his vocabulary, had never, I think, struck me so much before." Gosse, too, is of the opinion that Swinburne "enjoyed the opportunity to blaze in invective." If Swinburne's use of invective did not actually reflect his real mood in response to a given situation, little reliance can be placed upon what he has written against those statesmen and religious leaders who were opposed to his way of liberty. His utterances, both spoken and written, are sadistic, and had he been bigger physically, and uneducated, he would probably have exercised his sadistic tendencies in more brutal ways. It is a fact that both the dons and undergraduates at Oxford thought him not only excitable and irresponsible, but even mad in his use of extravagant language; and it was fortunate that one of his teachers, Jowett, understood him, otherwise he would have been "sent down" much earlier. There is evidence enough to show that Swinburne was pathological in mind, though there were periods of quiescence in his later life. Excessive rage was a distinct feature of his character, and caused him to be destructive in even his precious cause of liberty and republicanism. Shaffer says: "Goodenough (1951), in studies of the direct antecedents of anger reactions in young children, found that the enforcement of routine physical habits (often involving restraint), direct conflicts with adult authority, personal
inability to achieve some desired end, and conflict with other children over possessions or activities, were the most common causes. " (1). Unfortunately we have not sufficient detailed information of Swinburne's childhood to discover to what extent these "common causes" would account for his childish behaviour, apart from the report of the scrupulously rigid way in which he was reared. But we do know that he reacted against authority later in life, and behaved badly when he felt frustrated. There is little to show that he adopted the "problem-solving attitude" towards any real issue; but there is much to prove that his uncontrolled emotions made it impossible for him to be constructive or discriminative. The fires of his vituperative spirit were fanned by his inordinate attachment to Mazzini, who stood as a living and vital representation of the ideas he had absorbed from his grandfather.

It would be wrong to conclude that his reaction against religion was due to an over-dose of it in childhood. He showed considerable inclination towards Bible instruction. Gosse tells us that "into the religious exercises of Sunday he entered even 'passionately,' and when it was his turn to read the Bible aloud, or make a reply from the Catechism, those who listened early remarked how beautifully he did it. In particular, his mother insisted, and there was no need for her to urge on so ardent a pupil, that her eldest son should acquire an extended knowledge of the Holy Scriptures." (2). Biblical expressions and Biblical references are frequent in the poems, and, as already mentioned, his regard for Jesus as "the highest and purest sample of man on record" he maintained to the end of his day - though his reverence for the young Nazar-

(2) loc. cit. p. 9.
one was strangely contradictory to, or at least incompatible with, his own atheistic outlook.

It is perfectly clear, I think, that Swinburne's hatred and fierce denunciation of the leaders of religion to a great extent blinded him to religion itself. His unhappy experience at the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities at Oxford when he was an adolescent gave the first anti-religious direction to his childish fury. Conceivably he went through the adolescent phase through which most young men and women pass, and it was unfortunate for him that the bias was tilted against religion and prepared the way for a further damming up of the feelings, the repression of which doubtless increased the emotional tension within him. But a further factor influencing him against religion was his resentment because of his epileptic condition. The hot resentment which Swinburne expressed is typical of many epileptics. When discussing an epileptic patient with a friend who is a medical psychologist of eminence, I mentioned a few of the significant features of her character - extreme tidiness, fastidiousness, strong love and hate, delusional tendencies, and a resentment that fiercely expressed itself against everybody and everything that offered any resistance to her schemes or opposed her wishes. It was then pointed out to me that these were the features of every aggressive epileptic, and that if there were any attack on religion it was due to a confusion in the epileptic's mind between those who badly represented religion and religion itself. Mrs. Watts-Dunton, in "The Home Life of Swinburne," tells us that Swinburne was extremely tidy and fastidious. His room was very tidy; his books were arranged carefully, and he always had a gaily-checked duster at hand, with which he used to look after his books.
would carefully dust a book before giving it to anybody to look at. Swinburne never liked having his conversation interrupted — especially if he was holding forth on a favourite topic; and he became angry at once when people made literary lapses about authors. Enough has already been said in this chapter about his love and hatred for people; and an analysis of his attacks on religion makes it clear that he failed to discriminate between those religious people who restricted human liberty and religion itself. His lack of theology permitted him to blame even God for his own unfortunate health. Before the expression of his anti-religious views in "Songs before Sunrise," in a letter to a friend called Powell, written on the 13th of December, 1866, he says: "I have been bedridden and helpless upwards of a week with another of those damned bilious attacks which prove the malevolence of the deity." (1). These words suggest a belief in God at that time, and that he attributed human misfortune to Him — clearly expressed in "Atalanta in Calydon," where the great choruses, and tirades of Atalanta insist on the absolute negation of free will. However much mortals may strive they do so in vain, because "the gods love not justice more than fate."

The bias against religion was by now more heavily loaded, and it is understandable why he later blazed forth against all ideas associated with the Deity, why he proclaimed the scientific law of evolution in "Hertha," and why he condemned the Church and her Priests in "Before a Crucifix" and "Christmas Antiphones." It may be true that he found pleasure and delight in fluttering "the Philistines in Gath," but his main motive in attacking religion, the Church and her leaders, was to uphold the cause of liberty, which was later represented for him by Mazzini.

(1) Quoted by Lafourcade in "Swinburne. A Literary Biography."
But though this was his conscious motive, his childish approach to so great a theme as religion prevented him from sifting the grain from the chaff. "They thrash the saddle, knowing well they cannot thrash the horse" - Pareto. His virulent attacks on religion are no more to be taken seriously than his vituperative utterances against those men whose politics differed from his own or those of his much-revered Mazzini. They lack the foundation of clear thinking, and express the unstable emotions of a thoroughly disintegrated personality, ill-adjusted and distorted by his epileptic attacks.

According to Mrs. Watts-Dunton Swinburne was not the anti-religious rebel many writers have thought him to be, and he did not abandon his faith in immortality. She maintains that he was never correctly understood by his critics, and that their estimates of his religious views are biased by their over-emphasis on certain features of his life. She says: "I do not believe that Swinburne in his heart of hearts was as violently agnostic and opposed to Christianity as his hatred of the crimes of bigotry has led people to think." (1). Mrs. Watts-Dunton is basing this estimate of Swinburne not only on what she knew personally of his life, as a result of his living in her and her husband's home, but also on her knowledge of some of his letters to his mother. For instance, in 1885 Algernon wrote to his mother after the death of Victor Hugo:

"When I think of his (Hugo's) intense earnestness of faith in a future life and a better world than this, and remember how fervently Mazzini always urged upon all who loved him the necessity of that belief and the certainty of its actual truth, I feel very deeply that they must have been...

(1) "The Home Life of Swinburne." pp. 269ff.
right - or at least that they should have been - however deep and difficult the mystery which was so clear and transparent to their inspired and excited minds may seem to such as mine." (1). Again in another of his letters to his mother in 1892 he wrote: "It is so beautiful and delightful to think of 'being together when this life is over,' as you say, and of seeing things no longer 'in a glass darkly,' and all who have ever tried to do a little bit of what they thought right being brought together - if what they thought right was not absolutely wicked and shocking like the beliefs of persecutors - and understanding and loving each other - that I sometimes feel as if it ought hardly to be talked about." (2).

In addition to this point of view of Mrs. Watts-Dunton we have a similar one put forth by Coulson Kernahan. (3). He quotes the editors of "The Letters of Algernon Charles Swinburne:" "It may be truly said that in the deepest sense of the word, the later Swinburne was far more sensitive to religious influences, and far more spiritual in his attitude towards life than was the author of "Poems and Ballads."" Kernahan goes on: "To this I would add that Swinburne lived not only to change, some of his views, but also to deplore some of his earlier writings, especially those in which he had assailed Christianity and its Founder. He said to me once, that one poem in particular he would give a great deal to be able to recall."

Such a belief as Mrs. Watts-Dunton puts forth in her book, and

(1) "The Boyhood of Algernon Charles Swinburne." Mrs. Disney Leith. p.7
(2) Mrs. Disney Leith: loc. cit. p.213.
(3) "Swinburne as I Knew Him:" Coulson Kernahan. p.52.
which is confirmed by Coulson Kernahan, supports the view that Swinburne was only a superficial atheist, and that within him there was a religious nature which makes him what other men are. Had he been faithfully and wisely guided in the ways of the spirit when he was young, he might have used his genius on behalf of religion and not against it. His ravings against the Church and the clergy must therefore be interpreted as a violent reaction against "the crimes of bigotry;" and it is unfortunate that his lack of a true philosophic approach to life led to a confusion of the misrepresentation of religion with religion itself, and to a disposition which caused him to write:

"God is buried and dead to us,
Even the spirit of earth,
Freedom; so have they said to us,
Some with mocking and mirth,
Some with heartbreak and tears;
And a God without eyes, without ears,
Who shall sing of him, dead in the birth?"

"To Walt Whitman in America." v. 16.
CHAPTER IX.

Nietzsche.

The unbelief of Nietzsche is particularly interesting since it is the complete renunciation of what was once dear to him as a son of the "Mende." He was of Polish descent, born in 1844 at Röcken near Lutzen in Saxony. It meant much to him that he had Polish blood in his veins; in fact, it was his proud boast. The knowledge that a great Pole, Copernicus, had changed the cosmological conception by declaring "This earth is not the centre of the universe. It is only a satellite of the sun," that the Pole Chopin had challenged German music, led Nietzsche to the belief that there was no reason why he, also a Pole, should not correct many of the judgments of the world around him. At an early age he showed distinct tendencies which later found expression in his idea of the "Superman." As a young child he was slow in learning to speak, it was not until he was two and a half that he began to utter his first syllables.

His first teacher was his father, who was a Christian minister at Röcken, and later the local schoolmaster assisted in the instruction of his mind. When he was five his father died, and this tragedy of the family deeply impressed him, a thoughtful and sensitive child. His mother, unable to continue the struggle of rearing her children alone, went to live with her mother-in-law and two sisters of her late husband. Life in the town contrasted sharply with the country life at Röcken, and young Nietzsche
longed for the old home and its haunts. At the elementary school in Hamburg he showed great aptitude in his lessons and was praised as one of the best pupils. But like his English contemporary, Swinburne, he was not particularly attractive to his schoolfellows, partly because of his grave and premature sobriety of manner, and partly because of his love of solitude. He was frequently referred to as "the little parson," but "by his truthfulness and politeness he exerted an immense influence over his fellow-pupils, friends and comrades." (1). According to his sister he was, even as a boy, very pious, and exhibited the rare desire to put his piety into practice. It is not surprising, then, that "bad boys avoided one who said 'A Nietzsche does not lie,'" for the moral atmosphere with which he surrounded himself was suffocating to them.

In later life Nietzsche regarded lies as a mark of cowardice, which is the shirking of practising one's belief. At the preparatory school he showed amazing industry and progress in his subjects, particularly in religion and Latin, and his manners and conduct were beyond reproach through the rest of his school days. His friends were principally the women folk of his own family, and his chief amusements were playing at military games and listening to his grandmother's reminiscences of Napoleon, in whose days she suffered many hardships, but for whom she preserved a great affection. This latter interest reminds us of Swinburne's delight in listening to his grandfather's talk of his love of republicanism, and it is reasonable to believe that Nietzsche, like Swinburne, was greatly influenced in his attitude to life by what he was told as a child.

The first part of his adolescence Nietzsche spent at a public school, the Cistercian Abbey Pforta. Here he lived strictly, and was obliged to conform to an inflexible routine, which, though at first he did not like it, instead of discouraging him added to the toughness of his mind. About this time he interested himself in writing poetry, he showed a capacity for serious work in music, and an inclination to meditate upon problems which later largely occupied his mind. His strongest subjects at Pforta were Religion, German, and Latin; he was weak in both mathematics and Natural Science, and his hobbies lay much more in the creation of something, either a club or an essay, than in games; he "attained no skill in gymnastics, and was little better in swimming." Leaving Pforta in the September of 1864, he went to the University of Bonn, where he stayed for two terms of six months and matriculated in the faculties of Divinity and Philology, which "was to act as an ice bath, saving him from the fire of philosophical Exos." It was at Bonn that he met Ritschl, who became the greatest intellectual influence in his life, and also one of his closest friends. So strong was his attachment to Ritschl that he left Bonn and followed him to the University of Leipzig, soon after Ritschl had settled there as one of its professors. In 1867 Nietzsche met with an unfortunate accident while fulfilling his military obligation of one year's service at Naumburg. He was mounting his horse when he tore two pectoral muscles, which proved serious, and for the rest of his year of service he was incapacitated. Returning to Leipzig in the autumn of 1868 he was convalescent but utilised his free time in further philological studies. Unexpectedly at this time he was appointed Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel. He was then
only 25, and both he and his family had great satisfaction in this early academic distinction.

At one time during his adolescence Nietzsche showed an interest in the lighter and more pleasurable side of life, and as an idealist he sometimes defended and glorified what later disgusted him. When at Bonn he joined the Burschenschaft "Franconia," a student club, and tried to do things quite alien to his quiet and serious nature, such as drinking, duelling, etc. But soon he realised that his mind was in revolt against the wantonness and vulgarity of the members of the club. "I could hardly endure certain individuals on account of their beer-materialism." It was a serious step to break off one's membership of the University Club, but Nietzsche, with his usual love of sincerity, preferred not to compromise with a mode of living which truly conflicted with his idealism. He preferred to take the hard and bitter way through life so long as it led to truth, rather than adopt the easy-going existence which to him seemed purposeless. This view he expressed to his sister when he was at Bonn: "Is it of any importance to obtain that conception of God, the world and Reconciliation, which is the most suitable for an easy-going life? The result of all his researches is of no moment, and of no value to the genuine investigator. Do we expect calm, peace, happiness? No; what we desire is Truth, Truth only, even if it be something most frightful and most ugly." (1).

According to Mügge: "During this period Nietzsche's loosening from the dogmas of Christianity was consummated, though he still adhered to Christian ethics, and there was as yet nothing hostile in his attitude.

(1) Quoted by Mügge: "Nietzsche; His Life and Work." p. 29.
His mind, well-trained in history, although from another standpoint insufficiently historical, instantly detected all the foibles of dogma."

(1) About 1866 Nietzsche came under the influence of Schopenhauer, whose book, "Das Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," he found on the shelves of a second-hand bookseller with whom he was lodging. He found amazing comfort in this philosophy, and when he went to Basel it was with the intention of inspiring his students "with the ideals of classical antiquity and with the earnestness and grandeur of Schopenhauer."

On the surface it would seem that Nietzsche's unbelief was at first the product of adolescent doubt when he was at Bonn, and that his philosophical studies tilted his doubt to the side of atheism. In early adolescence, when he was seventeen, he and his friend Paul Deussen received Communion, and in it he received a feeling of rapture; but it is evident that the experience, whilst remembered in later life, was not sufficiently real to make him certain of its validity. It is true that his pronouncements have much more thought as their foundation than Swinburne's, but he deifies man just as the English poet did, and his Superman bears resemblance to the idea prevailing in the "Hymn of Man." But though in Nietzsche's case against religion the utterances of the thinker must be recognised, it is unwise to place confidence in his arguments, not only because, as we shall see later, they reveal many a conflict within his mind, but also because he was more ready to jump to conclusions than to work steadily towards them. As a thinker he was more intuitive than logical, and according to Mügge he could not live long in the lifeless world of abstract thought without colouring and shaping it to his art-

(1) Mügge: loc. cit. p. 29.
Jung classifies him among the introverted intuitive types: "He must surely be reckoned as an intuitive type with an inclination towards the side of introversion." (1). Also: "Nietzsche made use of the intuitive source in an incomparably greater measure, and by so doing was able to free himself from the purely intellectual in the shaping of his philosophical ideas; but he did this in such a way and to such a degree that his intuitionism went far beyond the limits of a philosophical system, and led him to an artistic creation; that is, to something which for the most part is inaccessible to philosophical criticism. (2). His ideas about both religion and ethics might have been more ordered and systematic if he had succeeded in controlling his poetic impulse instead of allowing it to tempt his mind with fanciful pictures. Very possibly his artistic temperament prevented him from attaining a clear historical view about any subject; for instance, had he given more careful consideration to what Christianity has achieved he would not have uttered the unfounded charges he so furiously makes against it. His impulse was to create and thereby to ignore what had been achieved by others. His manner is permeated with blatant egoism, and his criticisms of religion suggest that he had little patience to test his own ideas by those of men who held different views from his own. He reminds us of those men and women who in conversation have room only for their own opinions, and whose ears are stopped when their tongues are still.

Not only was Nietzsche unsystematic and untidy in his thinking, he was also inconsistent. A.R. Orage says that Nietzsche could never tell

(1) "Psychological Types." P. 183.
(2) loc. cit. p. 599.
what he meant by his Superman, any more than the Jews could the Messiah. He spoke of him with negative terms. "But by means of negatives it was possible for Nietzsche to define what the Superman was not." (1).

Further, he speaks of the Superman as an ideal to be aimed at, but precisely what this ideal is he never says; and yet he declares that it is a necessity for everyone "to sacrifice all, even one's self, to a higher, fuller, and richer life." He makes no attempt to relieve his readers of this obvious inconsistency, and the only explanation that can be given for such a confusion of thought is that in addition to his poetic impatience he betrayed an underlying belief in immortality which he was not prepared to forego completely. His negation of religion, according to Joccoli, was the result of a gradual series of abstract, historic, and sentimental motives, all of which reveal the very weakness of his position. To quote Mürge again: "It is true that Nietzsche never fights thoroughly and scientifically; he, the intellectual warrior, uses clubs and sledge-hammers, and not the rapiers of the Higher Criticism." (2).

It is sometimes said that Nietzsche's unfortunate health had a great influence on his thinking, which, of course, for our purpose is of special importance, when we understand that the condition of the human body has its effect upon the mind adversely or otherwise, though a great deal depends on how a man accepts or reacts against the fact of his suffering. Now in the case of Nietzsche we have an interesting example of the way in which physical suffering colours human thought and ideas. To estimate correctly the part his different illnesses played in his philosophy would be extremely difficult, and in fairness to his memory, and

(1) "Nietzsche." pp. 71-72.

also to truth itself, we must avoid attaching importance to certain facts which have no real value for our purpose. It is particularly unfortunate that the psychiatristsBinswanger and Wille have refrained from publishing the data of his case, for thus we are left to glean among the straggling reports and accounts of his illnesses for some information that will at least help us to see whether his outlook on life, including his violent attack on religion, might have been very different had he enjoyed good health. Dr. G.M. Gould maintains that the influence of Nietzsche’s disease on his character and writings is everywhere painfully manifest, and he says: "How far his cerebral irritation was responsible for his 'aristocratic anarchy,' his occasional lapses into egotistic disdain, etc., would be impossible to gauge. It surely was not inoperative. Stringency, hardness, radicalism it certainly helped to produce." (1).

He says also that Nietzsche’s earnestness was a further symptom of his eye trouble: "Driving his organism with reckless fury to its special work of erudition the young professor found that 'a horrible earnestness, 'a nervous excitability' seized him in everything he attempted to do. In almost every case of severe eye-strain there is a similar experience. I have found it in nearly all the cases of the literary workers so far studied who had great eye-strain." (2).

As a boy Nietzsche suffered from eye trouble, and having to study at Pforta with an inadequate light increased the trouble; and according to Gould this was the principle cause for his later migraine and violent headaches. Away from his studies Nietzsche had better health, as in 1866 when his academic studies were interrupted by his military service until he met with the accident which incapacitated him for a time. He later suffered from severe dysentery when serving in the Franco-German war,

and failing to take the necessary rest and precautions against over-fatigue he was attacked by jaundice in 1871. From this time onwards to his death his health suffered in no small way. His illnesses were both frequent and serious, giving rise to apprehension in himself, his mother and his friends. In a letter to one of his friends he wrote: "My father died at the age of thirty-six, of inflammation of the brain; is it possible that it may take me off still earlier?" The loss of Wagner's friendship also reacted badly on his health, and it was not until 1881 that Nietzsche had comparative freedom from his sufferings. From that time to 1887 he had scarcely more than fourteen days each year of ill-health. Lübbe makes a point of this, because "his purely philosophical works were written after (1861)." In a sense this is important, as it suggests that Nietzsche's thinking was not influenced by physical suffering present during that period; but the effect of his previous illnesses was by no means eradicated from his mind. The experience of personal physical suffering frequently hardens a man and destroys his sensitivity. The struggle to overcome his illnesses makes him more determined to achieve his purpose, and at the same time tends to destroy his sympathy for the weak, making him impatient with those who refuse to struggle against their handicaps. "The intellectual loathing and haughtiness of every man who has suffered deeply - the extent to which a man can suffer almost determines the order of rank - the chilling uncertainty with which he is thoroughly imbued and coloured, that by virtue of his suffering he knows, more than the shrewdest wizard can ever know, that he has been familiar with, is 'at home' in, many distant terrible worlds of which 'you know nothing!'"........"Profound suffering makes noble;...." (1). Nietzsche himself exhibited a mastery in striving, and was furious with

(1) "The Case of Wagner." pp. 77-78.
any institution that encouraged the softer qualities of the human personality. It was this attitude of mind that made him venomously attack the perpetually sick man. For example: "The sick man is a parasite of society. In certain cases it is indecent to go on living. To continue to vegetate in a state of cowardly dependence upon doctors and special treatments, once the meaning of life, the right to life, has been lost, ought to be regarded with the greatest contempt by society." (1).

But during the years when Nietzsche's health was comparatively good he became more addicted to drugs. In 1862 he began to take hydrate of chlortal, and later he confessed that it made him see "men and things in a false light." No wonder he made desperate attempts to give up the drug that was, so obviously to himself, impairing his judgment. In certain letters which he wrote to his friends in 1863 there are evidences of marked irritability "and often even traces of morbidness." Mügge, while stoutly defending Nietzsche from the exaggerated and ill-founded comments of Chamberlain and Nordau, is finally driven to the conclusion that "the serious affections of his eyes, head and digestive system, which were caused by his constant writing, compelled Nietzsche to bring together his notes with the least possible amount of work, and that from this cause many contradictions, illogical statements, and insufficiently modified assertions resulted. We are, however, bound to uphold our conviction that Nietzsche was never mad before the December of 1868, and we must call in question 'the existence of a thirty years' mental disease of which the stroke of apoplexy was only the visible effect.'" (2) Few, if any, will deny the crippling influences of ill-health on his body. To what extent he blamed the Almighty for his unhappy physical condition we cannot tell.

(1) "The Twilight of the Idols." p. 56.

(2) "Nietzsche; His Life and Work." p. 96.
for nowhere have we any direct reference to the sentiment which Swinburne expressed in a letter to one of his friends (already quoted in Chapter VIII): "I have been bedridden and helpless upwards of a week with another of those damned bilious attacks which prove the malevolence of the deity."

Besides the physical factor determining Nietzsche's mental outlook we have to consider the psychological factor, which for our purpose is even more important than the former. The contrast which he draws between Apollo and Dionysus suggests an interesting conflict within his own mind. A perusal of even some of his writings will tell us that Nietzsche was definitely of the introvert intuitive type, people who are usually less systematic and logical in their thinking than the corresponding thinking introverts, for the reason that they are more ready to create their ideas than to spend time correcting them. The critics of Nietzsche's work are in general agreement as to the lack of system and orderliness in his thinking, but all his readers must feel the forcefulness of his expressions. It is extremely difficult not to be arrested by what he says, but on reflection one wishes he were at hand in order to ask him what he means when he writes, for example, "The need of redemption is wrong psychologically;" or "The aim of modern science is that man should suffer as little pain as possible, live as long a life as possible - a kind of eternal blessedness, therefore, but certainly a very modest one as compared with the promises of religions." (1).

The forcefulness with which Nietzsche expresses himself in his writings suggests that there was a strong element of the extravert in him. On the other hand we can see how in his early life he must have

been introverted by his circumstances. The close watch that was kept over him before his father's death, which itself was cruel to one so young, the great emphasis placed on morals by his family, must have had an extremely tightening effect on his childhood, as also the perpetual influence of the women folk of the household, who would want to guard him from all danger and harm both physical and moral. As a boy he was a lover of solitude, which is only a generous way of saying that he avoided other children, he was never interested in games, and his excessive piety marked him off from his playfellows. When at Bonn he tried to shatter the chains that held him in psychological bondage by joining the "Franconia" club, and to break forth into the action of the extravert; but his training was too strong, and he turned away from the beer-drinkers with loathing and disgust. It is clear, however, that Nietzsche was resenting being closed up as in a prison; he wanted to be free, if not in action then certainly in thought - to be free in "unmeasured instinct" like Dionysos, who was the prototype of his Superman: "I, the last disciple and initiate of the God Dionysos: and perhaps I might at last begin to give you, my friends, as far as I am allowed, a little taste of this philosophy." (1).

Jung writes: "The Apollian state, as Nietzsche conceives it, is consequently the withdrawal into one's self, that is, introversion. Conversely, the Dionysian state, psychic intoxication, indicates in his view the unloosening of a torrent of libido which expends itself upon things." (2). What we deduce from this is that part of Nietzsche's disharmony

(1) "Beyond Good and Evil." p. 262.
(2) Analytical Psychology." p. 295.
was the result of his unhappily introverted nature, but that the cognitive factor was sufficiently strong to rebel in a way that gave an explosive effect to his writings: "...in him...iconoclastic revolt against the conventional moral atmosphere, and the acceptance of the ugliest men, which is Nietzsche, leads to that shattering unconscious tragedy presented in "Zarathustra." (1). His attack upon Christianity is directed not only against its appeal to the fine and tender qualities of human nature, but also against its restricting influence on those who believe in it. "But if the idea of God is removed, so is also the feeling of 'sin' as a trespass against divine laws, as a stain in a creature vowed to God." (2). Or again: "What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience trouble; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves - until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome way of perishing, of which Pascal is the most famous example." (3).

In his "Analytical Psychology" Jung points out that Nietzsche endeavoured to live "beyond instinct." "His horror of people, especially of the animal man who lives by instinct, was too great." (p.582). As an illustration of what Jung means, let me quote from "Zarathustra:" (p.61):

"I love the forest. It is hard to live in cities; there, there are too many of the lustful. Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer, than into the dreams of a lustful woman?"


(2) "Human, All Too Human." Vol.I. p.156.

And just look at those men! Their eye saith it - they know nothing better
on earth than to lie with a woman.

Filth is at the bottom of their souls; and alas! if their filth hate,
still spirit is it!"

Nietzsche did not deny the right of the instincts to express them-
selves, but he maintained that they should be controlled with an iron
will. No man should be ashamed of his native instincts: "The tired, pes-
simistic outlook, the mistrust of the middle of life, the icy negation
of disgusted ennui, all these are not the signs of the most evil age of
the human race: much rather do they come first to the light of day, as
the swamp-flowers which they are, when the swamp to which they belong
comes into existence - I mean the diseased refinement and moralisation
thanks to which the 'animal man' has at least learned to be ashamed of
all his instincts." (1). Whilst condemning all who are repelled, like
Pope Innocent III, by their own natures, Nietzsche makes it clear, in
"Zarathustra," p. 81, that the instincts must be accepted with innocence:
"Do I counsel you to slay your instincts? I counsel you to innocence in
your instincts." But, according to his observations in "The Will to
Power," the only way whereby the instincts can be brought under control
is by "hard, terrible and awe-inspiring"methods. Once the instincts are
under control, as they are in "the serious, the dignified and reflective"
people, they can be transcended. But, as Jung shows, Nietzsche could
only attempt to live above his instincts by resorting to a most careful
diet, living in choice climates, and above all by using opiates; and
"finally the tension of this living shattered his brain."

(1) "The Genealogy of Morals." p. 75.
What Nietzsche did was to contradict his own theory by denying his own nature. The very suggestion of trying to ascend beyond our instincts is a subtle way of trying to get away from them. In his attack on Wagner he tries to justify his own attitude towards the instincts: "Everything in him is false; what is genuine is hidden or disguised. He is an actor, in every bad and good meaning of the word." Also his words in "Zarathustra", p. 61, reveal a deep sex complex in his mind, which was probably the result of his early environment. He evidently felt that sex was abhorrent, and later in life he tried to rationalise his own emotional reaction against the instinct. His knowledge of human life made him recognise the presence of animal instincts in man, but wishing to transcend the animal he tried to evaporate the urge in philosophical speculation. The refusal to recognise his own animal or instinctive desires committed him to an unworkable theory. The failure of his own life is sufficient testimony of the impulsiveness of his speculations.

"The 'higher man' should be able to sleep without chloral, and be competent to live in Hamburg or Berlin despite 'the fogs and shadows.' He wants woman and offspring; he needs to feel that he has some value and position in the herd, he longs for innumerable commonplaces and not least for what is humdrum: it is this instinct that Nietzsche did not recognise; it is in other words the natural animal instinct for life." (1).

Apart from the repression of his sex nature there is a weakness in the social aspect of Nietzsche's whole life. As a boy he was a lover of solitude, and avoided other children outside his own family circle. At Pforta he tried to take his place in the life of the students there but

failed miserably. After joining the "Burschenschaft" he soon put it away from him as vulgar and philistine, and once more drew back into solitude, emerging only when he was certain that there was something of intellectual value in a friendship. If Nietzsche had not repressed his herd instinct he would not have perpetuated his early solitude; and if he were truly concerned with the acceptance of the instincts which he would not counsel any one to slay, it is astonishing that so profound a thinker as he failed to adjust himself to the people who shared his different environments. We may well ask with Jung: "How is it possible that human instincts could have led him so far from humanity into absolute isolation, into an aloofness which he supported with loathing and disgust?" (1).

Even if we accept Nietzsche's definition of instinct, which amounts to an inherited tendency established over a period of years in the life of man, we can bring the religious urge into his connotation and enquire why he repressed it to his own detriment. His plea for his Super-man suggests that he exalted or deified his own ego instinct and set himself in the place of God. This tendency to "God-Almightiness" is often found in men and women who are motivated by a perfection-phantasy, and who try to deny their own instinctive urges. A case a propos of this is that of N.W., who suffered from an inferiority feeling when she was young, and who later tried to impress others with the perfection of everything she did for them or before them. Her early training made her believe that no woman should feel a sex urge until she was married and desired to have children. After her thirty-fifth year she recognised (1) "Analytical Psychology." P. 302.
that her chances of marriage had gone, so she persisted in the belief that she was completely free from all sexual desires. During the course of her analysis she became aware of the repressive forces within her, and one day her eye caught a picture of Jesus on her mantel-shelf. She immediately became agitated and confessed that she felt Jesus would condemn her if she had sexual desires. I asked why she thought that, and she replied: "Because He never had any, and I want to be as perfect as He was." From further analysis it became clear that she was identifying herself with Him, and this accounted for her exaggerated remorse when she fell short of her own false estimate of herself. Before the analysis she had projected her self-condemnation to others and exalted herself in comparison.

Another similar case was that of M.S., a Jew who had broken down in health because of his failure to adjust himself to his work and to his school work. He was motivated by the desire to be perfect in all things, and he desired a prolonged analysis so that he might be incapable of making any further mistake. When I pointed out to him that all human beings are fallible, and that perfection is a progressive and not a static condition of life, he passionately declared - "But I want to be like God, one to whom people will bow. I want them to accept my authority." The recognition of his unconscious striving towards "God-Almightiness" removed all further desire for a continuation of the analysis.

In the case of Nietzsche we see a man who does not desire to be equal with God, but to be in the place of God. His super-man is a clear projection of his unconscious deification of himself, and a perversion of his religious feelings.
We may now ask how such a state of mind was engendered and developed. In the first place, Nietzsche's sincerity was very early observed by his playfellows and acquaintances. It is clearly seen in many of his works; for example, "Thoughts out of Season," Vol. II. p.100: Comparing the Greek with the Roman idea of culture he points out that "it was by a greater force of moral character that the Greeks were victorious," and that "everything which makes for sincerity is a further step towards true culture, however the sincerity may harm the ideals of education that are revered at the time, or even have power to shatter a whole system of merely decorative culture." For a boy his earnestness was over-emphasised, and we can appreciate why he was called "the little parson," and why he was anxious to understand as well as to practise the religious principles he was taught, when we remember the environment in which he was brought up. The over-emphasis of his sincerity we find in "The Will to Power." Vol.I. p.175: "Even the papacy has never been able to carry on politics in a Christian way.............and when Reformers indulge in politics as Luther did, it is well known that they are just as ardent followers of Machiavelli as any other immoralists or tyrants." (1).

In an article in the Quarterly Review, Oct. 1896, W. Barry says that Nietzsche was reared in the old German home, with added polish and artistic clearness of feature - a combination of the picturesque and the natural. Nietzsche and his sister were pattern children, bred in the atmosphere of Lutheran piety, spending their holidays with a clerical grandfather, or with a clerical uncle, sheltered from the world by aunts and other feminine kinred, who might sometimes read the newspapers, but

(1) Also p.76, pp.165-64, and p.193 of "Genealogy of Morals."
were zealous for converting the heathen. Young Friedrich, brought up in such an atmosphere, would indeed be persuaded to be a "nice, sincere boy" which was the impression he gave to his early acquaintances; and he caught, too, the itch to convert others, for when he was at Bonn he attempted to convert the "Franconians" (his student corps), but was repulsed.

Had this intense sincerity and desire to appear perfect in conduct before others, and to maintain the good name of the Nietzsche family which had found Royal recognition (his father, Karl Ludwig Nietzsche, was appointed tutor to the Princesses of Sachsen-Altenburg, and gained the friendship of Frederick William IV, who gave him the living at Röcken), been linked up with a determination to enter the Church, Nietzsche would have appeared as a defender of the Church. Unhappily, during his philosophical studies at Bonn he found himself in the midst of religious problems which vexed him, and not having a teacher to whom he could refer, he studied Christian origins, supposing, as he said afterwards, that history could give a direct answer to questions of religion. It became increasingly evident that his early Evangelical training could not withstand the Biblical criticism which was being taught by the eminent men around him, and confusion led to disorder. The usual stress of mind which follows adolescent doubt set in, and the characteristic painful experiences followed - "distress at home when his changed views were realised, a void in his own heart, and the loneliness of life intensified, the past melting as into legendary mist, the future a blank." (1).

Forsaking the path marked out for him by the feet of his grandfather and his father, he "joined that throng of bewildered and disorderly

pilgrims who have substituted inquiry for belief, and become seekers after the unknown." (1).

Here it appears that Nietzsche's love of sincerity made it impossible for him to continue to believe in anything which his mind could not sanction. He was enough of an extravert thinker to break away from the traditional teaching to which he had been subjected but against which he was silently revolting. This revolt found its expression when he attacked the Christian religion, St. Paul and Luther. Just as his virulent attack in "Zarathustra" on men who indulge their sex instincts reveals a sex complex at work in himself, so some of his violent outbursts against Christianity indicate an early objection to those teachings associated with it which irritated his young mind: "That was the most fatal form of insanity that has ever yet existed on earth:—when those lying abortions of bigotry begin laying claim to the words 'God,' 'Last judgment,' 'truth,' 'love,' 'wisdom,' 'Holy Spirit,' and thereby distinguishing themselves from the rest of the world; when such men begin to transvalue values to suit themselves, as though they were the sense, the salt, the standard, and the measure of all things; then all that one should do is this; build lunatic asylums for their incarceration. To persecute them was an egregious act of antique folly; this was taking them too seriously; it was making them serious." (2). This deliberate tirade is characteristic of his unbalanced denunciation of Christianity; and many other passages might be cited which support the view that in his "Criticism of Religion" Nietzsche is endeavouring to destroy a teaching which

(1) Barry: loc. cit.
gave him many an unhappy moment. Like Swinburne again, he showed a certain admiration for Jesus, of whom he probably treasured childish memories, and about whom he had heard interesting stories when a child: for example, "That which is wrong with Christianity is that it does none of the things that Christ commanded." And - "Christianity has become something fundamentally different from what its founder wished it to be." (1).

His thrust at the Christian teaching about sin is further evidence of his former passive resistance to early training. In his young life it was the proud boast of his family that a Nietzsche never told a lie, and in that sense never sinned; but he is later of the opinion that sin was invented in order that the Christians might speak of "salvation." This suggests that before his rejection of Christianity he felt the burden of behaving in a way that would never allow him to sin against God. He must have inwardly rebelled against a life that forbade him to live naturally: "What in sooth is this struggle 'against Nature' on the part of the Christian? We shall not, of course, let ourselves be deceived by his words and explanations. It is Nature against something which is also Nature. With many it is fear; with others it is loathing; with yet others it is the sign of a certain intellectuality, the love of a bloodless and passionless ideal; and in the case of the most superior men it is love of an abstract Nature - these try to live up to their ideal." (2).

It was Nietzsche's belief, or rather theory, that man should learn by experience how to accept and then to transcend his nature, how to adjust himself to the conditions of nature, and not to be subjected in a servile

way to laws imposed upon him from without, with either the promise of a heavenly reward or the fear of eternal punishment. On page 193 of "The Will to Power, Vol. I," he says: "Acts are mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the depths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter. A fit of temper, a gesture, a blow with a knife: how little of the individual resides in these acts." His attack on the Christian conception of sin is only the dark shadow of the disconsolate self that smarted under the lash of feminine threats in his childhood at Naumburg.

Young Nietzsche's fear of letting down the family ideal of practicing what it preached, his desire to be sincere whatever the cost, and to preserve the family tradition of standing up for one's principles (as one of his ancestors did when he, along with other Polish Protestants, conspired against the Republic and was obliged to escape with his wife and child into German territory) - all these produced in him a condition of anxiety and remorse. Whenever a child has set before itself too high a moral standard, it fears to fall short of it, and any departure from it produces feelings of guilt and their accompanying remorse. I have already pointed out that Nietzsche was afflicted with a perfection-phantasy; as a child he identified himself with sinlessness - to quote Barry, of him and his sister: "they feared no evil for they knew no sin." This is probably what he seemed to be to those outside his home, but it cannot be a true description of what he really was. With his alert mind he must have come into sharp conflict with the Lutheran piety of his home, and with the desire of his women folk to convert everybody. In the absence
of precise data it is reasonable to suppose that Nietzsche's young life was patterned according to the family mould, and that the threat of sin made him yield when he might otherwise have rebelled. Failure to conform to the family ideal aroused feelings of remorse, and according to McDougall remorse is a very complex state of feeling: of regret, self-reproach, and humiliation of the self-regarding tendency, which was strong in Nietzsche. (1). His complete negation of the idea of God, sin, last judgment, and eternal punishment, left him free to express what he had long felt against the forces which were crippling his nature, and also to pour forth a torrent of abuse against the Christian teachings that produce remorse. "To be able to have done with an experience is already a sign of decadence. This reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and depression, is an additional form of disease: no 'salvation of the soul' ever results from it, but only a kind of spiritual illness." (2). This was his reason for abolishing the Christian necessity for repentance, which is not the morbid thing he has made it out to be. Repentance is a frank and honest recognition of one's wrong against God, with the sincere desire to live differently, and it does not call for any "wallowing in self-contempt and depression." This misconception of Nietzsche mirrors the feelings that accompanied his own personal shortcomings in childhood and adolescence; and his condemnation of himself for allowing such morbidity is projected into Christianity. "Against remorse I do not like this form of cowardice in regard to one's own actions; one must not leave one's self in the lurch under the pressure of sudden shame.

(1) "Outline of Psychology." p. 342.
or distress. Extreme pride is much more fitting here. What is the good of it all in the end?" (1).

In his "Criticism of Religion" every violent attack which he makes is a revelation of some repressed emotion or conflict, and of the way in which, when his exaggerated sincerity made it impossible for him to continue to believe in something which his mind could no longer sanction, the floodgates holding back the torrent of his objections to Christianity were unlocked and thrown open. His attack upon "the seductive charm of this emasculate ideal of man" points to a self infuriated by its inability to resist and overthrow the feminine influences of his early life, and to an over-compensation for the effeminacy within himself. He condemns Christianity for the wrong that had been done to his own personality, and unconsciously transfers his anger from those who were instrumental in emasculating him, to that system which was responsible for their attitude: "Why are we not disgusted by it (this emasculate ideal of man), just as we are disgusted at the thought of a eunuch?...........

The answer is obvious: it is not the voice of the eunuch that revolts us, despite the cruel mutilation of which it is the result; for, as a matter of fact, it has grown sweeter.......And owing to the very fact that the 'male organ' has been amputated from virtue, its voice now has a feminine ring, which, formerly, was not to be discerned.

"On the other hand, we have only to think of the terrible hardness, dangers, and accidents to which a life of manly virtues leads—of a Corsican, even at the present day, or that of a heathen Arab........ in order to perceive how the most robust type of man was fascinated and (1) "The Will to Power." Vol. I. p. 192."
moved by the voluptuous ring of this 'goodness' and 'purity.'" (1).

The first part of the above quotation reveals what Nietzsche felt about himself; the second part, what he desired to be, and which he might have been, were it not for his Christian upbringing.

This desire to be a strong "he-man" I found in one of my patients, J.M., who took up strenuous physical exercises, but finally broke down with an obsession of a weak heart, which prevented him from pursuing his ambition. In one of the dreams he brought for analysis a castration complex was discovered. As a child he frequently wet his bed, and also his clothes, and this was a real annoyance to his mother, who one day said to him - "If you don't stop wetting yourself I'll cut it off."

This fact, unearthed from the unconscious, left him freer to follow his profession without trying to compete with his brother, who was "huge" in comparison with my patient, and who had more business acumen and drive. Nietzsche's compensation for a feeling of weakness was projected into the idea of the Corsican or "heathen Arab."

Nietzsche's physical weakness was apparently a source of concern to himself, and whether he was defending himself against any suggestion of suffering because of some sin we cannot definitely tell. But it is interesting to note that he has something to say about "the purely psychological practice of the Church," which he regards as dangerous. He maintains that "The whole process of spiritual healing must be remodelled on a physiological basis: the 'sting of conscience' as such is an obstacle in the way of recovery - as soon as possible the attempt must be made to counterbalance everything by means of new actions, so that there

may be an escape from the morbidness of self-torture." (1). He means us to understand that his own illness was not due to the "sting of conscience," or to any feeling of remorse, and prayer never could relieve him of his illness. "No invalid is ever cured by prayers, or by the exorcising of evil spirits." But again, it would be of value to know whether his pious relatives had attempted on his behalf what he vigorously denies and repudiates.

Nietzsche was nevertheless right when he wrote: "The purely psychological and religious practices which have existed hitherto only led to an alteration in the symptoms." We now know that "spiritual healing" as popularly practised, whether at Lourdes, or at Milton Abbey by Father Maitland, rarely produces a radical cure. But his venomous comparison of the Christian with the criminal gives rise to the belief that he was motivated by some unconscious conflict in his criticism of spiritual healing: "According to them a man had recovered when he bowed before the Cross, and swore that in future he would be a good man. But a criminal, who with a certain gloomy seriousness cleaves to his fate and refuses to malign his deed once it is done, has more spiritual health... The criminals with whom Dostoeievski associated in prison were all, without exception, unbroken natures - are they not a hundred times more valuable than a 'broken-spirited' Christian?" (2).

It appears from what he writes on this aspect of Christianity that he is stoutly denying any suggestion that he was afflicted with ill-health because of his repudiation of religion. Now unless someone other than himself had made such a suggestion to him, it must have arisen from his

own mind, and by condemning an already existing practice which was not based on physiology he at least satisfied himself that his illness was physical in origin and had nothing to do with sin, conscience, or remorse.

In "Ecce Homo," p. 24, Nietzsche says: "I never make personal attacks - I use a personality merely as a magnifying-glass, by means of which I render a general, but elusive and scarcely noticeable, evil more apparent. I attack only those things from which all personal differences are excluded, in which any such thing as a background of disagreeable experience is lacking. If I wage war against Christianity, I feel justified in doing so, because in that quarter I have met with no fatal experiences and difficulties - the most earnest Christians have always been kindly disposed to me. I, personally, the most essential opponent of Christianity, am far from holding the individual responsible for what is the fatality of long ages." I am quite prepared to accept Nietzsche's conscious judgment of his own purpose in criticising the prevailing systems of thought in his day, but I recognise that he was by no means enough of a psychologist to see that his criticism, especially of religion, was motivated by negative emotional reactions; and the very claim to be "the most essential opponent of Christianity" is the true mark of his rampant egoism. The whole of "Ecce Homo" is egotistical in tone, and supports the view taken by Jung that Nietzsche disposed of God and deified himself.

It is to my mind clear that had Nietzsche been brought up in an environment free from Lutheran piety and evangelical influences, he might have reacted differently at Bonn, when for the first time he seriously
came up against religious and New Testament difficulties; but the unconscious bias against Christianity, due to what he had experienced of its teachings as a child, tilted him to the side of atheism when in the period of adolescent doubt. If he can, the adolescent will seek to get away from the mental stress which doubt creates; and, according to my experience, the emotional bias helps him to a quick get-out of his intellectual difficulties. Once Nietzsche had cast the die in favour of unbelief, the way was open for him to release his pent-up feelings against a system which had crippled and frustrated his natural development.

But, having dispensed with religion and its "painful consequences", ("Human, All Too Human." p.151), Nietzsche never found the fulfilment of life which he tried to claim for his Super-man. Indeed, he found a despair and a soliteriness which had an even more disastrous effect upon his personality than he realised. Jung says: "He could not swallow the toad of which he so often dreamed, and which he feared he must yet gulp down. The Zarathustrian lion roared all the "Higher" Men, who craved for life, back into the common depths of the unconscious. That is why his life does not convince us of the truth of his teaching." (1). The ascetic ideal of the Christian religion he condemned, but no life could have been more secluded and withdrawn from the world than his was, and its closing years displayed a characteristic touch of the ascetic.

In 1897 he went with his sister, whose husband Dr. Förster had by this time died, to live at Weimar in quiet and solitude; here "he received his guests resting on a divan, dressed in a long garment of thick white 

(1) "Analytical Psychology." P. 382.
cloth, in the style of the garb of Roman Catholic priests." (1). At the age of fifty-six he died, broken like a reed in body and mind; and it is fair to conclude that the denial of his religious nature contributed to a practical negation of his belief in the "Super-man" who could be his true self without God. "Only he who has fully accepted himself has unprejudiced objectivity." (2).

This sums up Nietzsche's tragic failure in life.

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(1) Mügge: "Nietzsche; His Life and Work." p. 97.
In our consideration of Charles Bradlaugh's unbelief we deal with a man very different from the previous three writers. He is unlike Shelley and Swinburne, whose background failed to provide the muscle and sinew of a character like Bradlaugh's; and their emotional instability contrasts sharply with Bradlaugh's well-governed and well-regulated emotions. In the case of Shelley, and particularly in that of Swinburne, thought in the main followed closely on the heels of feeling, but Bradlaugh felt as he thought, and seldom allowed himself to be swayed by his emotions. Here also, he is superior to the German prophet of anti-religion, Nietzsche, whose feelings of loathing towards Christianity and its leaders clouded his reason and bespoiled his logic; for whilst Bradlaugh was capable of passionate and torrential outbursts, his masterly ability in making his feelings submissive to his will and purpose must be recognised. As far as any just comparison can be made it is true to say that Bradlaugh was much more integrated as a personality than either Shelley, Swinburne, or Nietzsche. He was a man of action; they were creatures of mood. His attack on Christianity was more persistent than Shelley's, more consistent than Swinburne's, and more reasonable than Nietzsche's. But to praise Bradlaugh in this way does not mean that there is no psychological explanation for his unbelief. If the main or basic argument of this thesis is sound, as I believe it is, and that within every human being
there is a religious need, some urge towards the divine destination of man, then we can approach Bradlaugh's history without any presumption whatsoever, and search within it for those psychological reasons that will explain his unbelief. This task I think is more difficult than that undertaken in the three preceding cases, because of the consistent uniformity of his attack and the balanced manner of his debate. He seems to have been inspired more by reason than by bitter feeling expressing itself through wild invective and vituperative exaggerations; but even calm reasoning can be motivated by an emotional conflict, as in the case of the Jewish woman (Chap. III, p.64-67), whose feeling of guilt drove her to produce atheistic arguments which became her way of escape.

The three biographical sketches that we have of Bradlaugh from the able pens of A.S. Hambling, his own daughter Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, and J.M. Robertson, in addition to his own writings, provide us with useful data from which to form our estimate. Born at Hoxton in 1833, Charles Bradlaugh was the eldest son of his namesake's family. His father was a solicitor's clerk, earning a poor wage, but fortunate in his wife, who knew how to run her home efficiently and to rear their family without getting into debt. The children were all baptised, but Charles Bradlaugh senior never went to church and was indifferent to religious matters. His main interest outside his work was centred in gardening and especially fishing, and not very much in his children. Charles, according to his daughter, always spoke of his father with tenderness, but he does not seem able to recall any other mark of his father's tenderness than being allowed to go with him on early fishing excursions. Mrs. Bradlaugh, practical in her outlook on life, was not
affectionate towards her children; she was severe, exacting, and imperious. Both she and her husband, whilst doing what was legally right by their children, never gave to them that warm feeling which is the delight of every child. The only demonstration of affection which young Bradlaugh experienced was that between himself and his sister Eliza; there was little, if any, bond of feeling between him and his parents, and if there ever existed an ideal love state between his mother and himself, as is conceivable in his case, it was early interrupted by the mother's domestic duties and the advent of other babies. This interruption would induce a sense of insecurity and grievance against the injustice of being neglected, and would in time produce an anxiety-reaction to life as a whole. The anxiety-reaction in an extravert child expresses itself through a desire to achieve something which will give a feeling of satisfaction and value in itself.

"I regard the struggle to excel as an anxiety-reaction to a particular mode of upbringing, and hence contingent upon certain cultural influences." (1) Here, then, we have a possible explanation of Bradlaugh's tireless activities in anti-religious propaganda, in law and politics. His life bears testimony to Suttie's contention that "mastery" and "excelling" are "merely one mode, and secondary at that, of recovering the sense of social security which is lost on the emergence from the unconditional love of (indulged) infancy into disciplined childhood." (2). None can deny that Charles Bradlaugh strove to master every situation into which he entered, whether it was on the platform in Hyde Park or

(1) Suttie: "Origins of Love and Hate." p. 41.
(2) Suttie: lpc. cit. p. 42.
in some hall, in the army, at the Law Courts, or in the House of Commons. His egotism is not so offensive as Nietzsche's, and indeed it would appear that egotism was not the motive for his constant and relentless effort to gain a victory over his opponent. There was something much more fundamental - his deep-seated longing for affection.

This underlying condition is capable of producing a kind of idealism that will call forth the energies of the individual, and frequently the idealism is an unconscious and disguised attempt to be what his mother wants him to be, and in that way regain her affection. The little Lord Fauntleroys strive to be gentlemanly and beyond reproach in all that they do and wherever they go, only because unconsciously they are striving to preserve the mother's affection by doing something which pleases her and fulfills her picture of what a nice little boy should be like. The characteristics of the parent can be assimilated by the child as he endeavors to hold fast to his mother's loving attitude towards him, and this often explains the adolescent choice of a profession. In the case of Bradlaugh we see that the father was genuine and reliable in his work, which was recognised by his employers after his death; the mother, though severe, was dominated by a sense of right, and her severity was probably exercised considerably when her children failed in their conduct. For example, Charles Bradlaugh's daughter records an incident of unjust punishment meted out to him and his sister. When they were children lump sugar was bought one day as visitors were expected to tea. After their arrival it was found that the lump sugar was nearly all gone. Charles and his sister were charged with stealing it, and duly dealt with, though they were not the guilty ones. And though later they often laughed about the incident,
at the time they were greatly upset and miserable because they were punished unjustly. The whole family lived in an atmosphere of law and righteousness - a thing was either right or it was wrong. Bradlaugh senior, with his legal mind, could not tolerate compromise, and his wife demanded fulfilment of every law of the home.

There is nothing in young Bradlaugh's history to show that, apart from what I have already cited, he was brought up in a home of emotional conflicts. No, his environment was consistent, and even though it had the characteristics of the laws of the Medes and Persians, it was nevertheless a good home; but it had an atmosphere that made him search for the rightness and wrongness of every issue, and which produced in him an attitude of moral sincerity in all that he undertook to do. This determination to decide the right or wrong of any issue is to be traced in all his activities, whether anti-religious, legal, or political; so, too, his determination to master any situation, and to hurl himself into it with unstinting devotion. When he was satisfied that a thing was wrong, and that it interfered with the lives of the weak and helpless, he spared no effort in his determination to denounce it publicly, to persuade others to his own point of view, and with their co-operation to abolish it.

This was the attitude of mind he adopted towards religion. "He was a democrat in religion as in politics. If truth was good for him, it must be equally good for the multitude so far as it was possible to enlighten them." (1). His devotion to each cause he represented was a matter of astonishment if not of praise to all who knew him, and on one

occasion he was commended by Father Ignatius, who when preaching at the Royal Pavilion, Brighton, paid him this tribute: "I do not condemn Atheists or unbelievers, I admire them because they have more pluck, more real energy to spread their views than we paltry, trumpery Christians have to spread ours. Oh, if men for Christ would take a lesson from Mr. Bradlaugh! If Christian women would take a lesson from Mrs. Law! If you were as jealous for Christ as Mr. Bradlaugh is for Atheism; if you women were as jealous for Christ as Mrs. Law is to dethrone Him, Christianity would be a different thing in our land." (1).

It is true to say that Bradlaugh reflected the vigour of his mother's character in the way he endured hardship and accepted sacrifice for his convictions. His struggle in the Law Courts and in Parliament on the oath problem reveals an unwavering determination to stand by what he believed to be right, and never to yield until he had gained the victory. Headingley says that he was involved in considerable liabilities as a result of law costs, but his results were satisfactory. "The one had obliterated from our statute book the last barriers remaining to the perfect freedom of the press, the other ended by banishing from our law courts the last religious disability that could impede the action of justice, but, like many other glories, these actions left Bradlaugh a poor man, crippled with debts and liabilities." (2). But the satisfaction of his triumphs did not blind him to his responsibilities, and here again we see how the assimilated idealism of his mother prevails; to meet his liabilities he lived in an East End lodging-house for three-

(2) Headingley: loc. cit. p.245.
and-six per week, though he was earning a considerable amount of money through his lectures in every part of the country. "Bradlaugh was earning not far short of £1,000 a year, and yet he contented himself with three-and-sixpenny East End lodgings rather than spend more than was absolutely necessary on himself while still encumbered with debt." (1).

Another feature of his devotion to what was right was the distribution of any "damages" he received from libel cases. This generosity we salute, even though we see that the satisfaction he obtained in winning his case compensated him for the lack of affection he felt when a young child.

Had Bradlaugh maintained his early devotion to religion he would have been one of the greatest preachers and devotees of the nineteenth century; but alas! there were certain events that drove him with his usual sincerity into the ranks of the unbelievers. As a boy he attended the National School in his home district, and the teacher who instructed him in Scripture "was of a dismal turn of mind." The class was asked to give coloured illustrations of such morbid subjects as the death of Ahab, and the death of Absalom. Mrs. Bonner says: "As an instance of the human nature of the teaching, I quote the text selected to shew off the handwriting: 'Then said Joab, I may not tarry thus with thee. And he took three darts in his hand and thrust them through the heart of Absalom while he was yet alive in the midst of the oak. And the young men of Joab smote Absalom and slew him.' As a lesson in sheer wanton cruelty this can hardly be exceeded." (2). In a highly imaginative and thinking lad this kind of instruction must have aroused feelings of repugnance, and pro-

(1) Headingley: loc. cit. p. 246.
(2) "Charles Bradlaugh." By Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner. p. 5.
Early problems of a religious kind in his mind, which he sought to understand later. At the age of fourteen, when he was showing signs of thinking for himself, his principal interests were no longer in dramatic performances of "The Miller and his Men," or in playing at sham fights with steel nips for soldiers, but in listening to an old man called Brand, an ardent Radical, who took an interest in him and explained the politics of the day to him. Young Charles was inspired to try to read Cobbett's "Political Gridiron," which he found amongst his father's books, and also to purchase a half-penny copy of the "People's Charter," which he could not at first understand. Whenever the opportunity presented itself he wandered to Bonner's Fields and elsewhere to listen to Radical speeches. But "his Sundays were devoted to religion; from having been an eager and exemplary Sunday scholar he had become a most promising Sunday School teacher, so that although discussions were held at Bonner's Fields almost continually through the evening of Sunday, they were not for him: he was fully occupied with his duties at the Church of St. Peter's in Hackney Road." (1). Up to the age of fourteen he remained faithful to his religious work, and endeavoured to defend orthodox Christianity before a group of thinkers who discussed many of the theological problems which puzzled his own mind. It is here to be noted that he did not obtain the help he needed from his religious leaders who might have resolved his religious difficulties and conflicts, without his having to seek the assistance of men already biased against theism.

As early as 1843 he was influenced by Free-thinkers. "He discussed with Colin Campbell, a smart and fluent debater; he argued with James

Savage, a man of considerable learning, a cool and calm reasoner, and a deliberate speaker whose speech on occasion was full of biting sarcasms; and after a discussion with the latter upon 'the inspiration of the Bible' my father admitted that he was convinced by the superior logic of his antagonist, and owning himself beaten felt obliged to abandon his defence of orthodoxy. Nevertheless he did not suddenly leap into Atheism; his views were for a little time inclined to Deism; but once started on the road to doubt, his careful study and - despite his youth - judicial temper gradually brought him to the Atheistic position." (1). The impression created upon his young mind, by Savage particularly, was sufficient to make him doubt the validity of orthodox Christianity and to turn his gaze towards Atheism. The belief in him that religion was primarily a thing of the intellect was never corrected in time, and in the debates that followed later, when he challenged the protagonists of Christianity, logic was the standard by which everything was judged.

Bradlaugh certainly felt that religion impeded the development of man, "and a full half of his activity - more than half in the later years - was turned to making life better and saner than it had been under the regime of religion; (2); but his chief objection to it was that it is illogical - "forced upon the child's brain as God's word by nurse and pedagogue; and the mode of thinking of the scholar is in consequence utterly warped in favour of the divinity of the book before his reason has opportunity to mature for its examination." (Preface to "The Bible: What it is," 1865).

It was to his advantage as a thinker that Bradlaugh was brought up in a home where law and order prevailed. His mind was both judicial and honest, and inquiry was its fundamental occupation. "He could not rest with his mind unsettled or undecided; he worked out and solved for himself every problem which presented itself to him." (1). Any door closed to his inquiring mind was abandoned, and he left it searching for reasons why it was closed, and not why it could not be opened to him. Not that he was intolerant, for that he seldom was, he tried to explain and respect the honest opinion of all who opposed him; but in the matter of religion he felt there was no answer to the arguments of the Free-thinkers. This doubt emerges when he was being prepared for Confirmation, along with a few other young people from the Church where he was a Sunday School teacher. In his study of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and of the Four Gospels, he found that the two did not agree and that he could not reconcile them. Perplexed, he wrote to his Vicar, Mr. Packer of St. Peter's, asking him to help him and to explain this puzzle. Mr. Packer wrote to Charles's father, and also suspended the lad from his duties of Sunday School teacher for three months because of his atheistic tendencies. Charles was horrified at being called an atheist, and forbidden his Sunday School he shrank from going to Church. The disapproval of his parents made him unhappy; and there is reason to believe that this was the most unpleasant incident in his early life, and would therefore leave its impression on him, and also create for him a distasteful association with religion. His asylum was Bonner's Fields, which he had visited in the week but never on a Sunday until now. Here

(1). Mrs. Bonner: loc. cit. p. 16.
he listened intently to anti-theological discussions. At first he was roused to defend his Bible and his Church and orthodox Christianity; but three factors prevailed against a continuance of his defence. These were (a) the malice of Mr. Packer; (b) the bitter opposition of his parents; and (c) the appeal to reason. Headingley suggests that Mr. Packer was responsible for Bradlaugh's atheism. He says: "It may be that had the Rev. Mr. Packer shown a little more self-control and discretion Bradlaugh might not have become a Free-thinker, and the thousands of persons whose opinions were changed through his influence might have remained Christian to this day." (1).

Mrs. Bonner rather objects to this point of view. She says: "It is now the fashion to make Mr. Packer into a sort of scapegoat: his harsh reception of his pupil's questions and subsequent ill-advised methods of dealing with him are censured, and he is in a manner made responsible for my father's atheism. If no other Christian had treated Mr. Bradlaugh harshly; if every other clergyman had dealt with him in kindly fashion; if he had been met with kindness instead of slanders and stones, abuse and ill-usage, then these censors of Mr. Packer might have some just grounds on which to reproach him for misusing his position; as it is, they should ask themselves which among them has the right to cast the first stone.

The notion that it was Mr. Packer's treatment of him that drove my father into Atheism is, I am sure, absolutely baseless. Those who entertain this belief forget that Mr. Bradlaugh had already begun to compare and criticise the various narratives in the four Gospels, and that it was on account of this (and therefore after it) that the Rev. J.G. Packer was

(1) Headingley: loc. cit. p. 22.
so injudicious as to denounce him as an Atheist, and to suspend him from his Sunday duties. This harsh and blundering method of dealing with him no doubt hastened his progress towards Atheism, but assuredly did not induce it. It set his mind in a state of opposition to the Church as represented by Mr. Packer, a state which the rev. gentleman seems blindly to have fostered by every means in his power; and it gave him the opportunity of the Sunday's leisure to hear what Atheism really was, expounded by some of the cleverest speakers in the Freethought movement at that time. But in spite of all this, he was not driven hell-maw into Atheism; he joined in the religious controversy from the orthodox standpoint, and was introduced into the little Warrer Place Hall as an eager champion on behalf of Christianity." (1). Here Mrs. Bonner is trying, I think, not to excuse Mr. Packer, but to justify her father's atheism on purely rational lines. She goes on: "Those persons too who entertain this idea of Mr. Packer's responsibility are ignorant of, or overlook, what manner of man Mr. Bradlaugh was. . . . . . . He moulded his ideas on no man's; he looked at the problem on all sides, studied the pros and cons, and decided the solution for himself." To admit that Mr. Bradlaugh departed from religion and orthodox Christianity because of some personal grievance would indeed have seemed, to Mrs. Bonner, to reduce his decision and course of action to mere childishness, and this would mean to debase him entirely. But Headingley's remark is probably nearer to the truth than Mrs. Bonner's account, for without the presence of some emotional element in the religious conflict it would be difficult to see why Bradlaugh, with his judicial mind, should have tilted the scale in favour of

Atheism and not in favour of Theism. A critical study of the four Gospels is not sufficient in itself to make any one an atheist, or there would be few men entering the Church at the present time.

Besides, have we not a glimpse of Bradlaugh's true and aggressive attitude towards his pastor in his first pamphlet, "A Few Words on the Christian Creed" (1850)? It was written when he was seventeen, and was prefixed by a Dedication

"To the Rev. J.C. Packer, A.M.,
(Incumbent of St. Peter's, Hackney Rd.)

Sir,

Had the misfortunes which I owe to your officious interference been less than they are, and personal feeling left any place in my mind for deliberation or for inquiry in selecting a proper person to whom to dedicate these few remarks, I should have found myself directed, by many considerations, to the person of the Incumbent of St. Peter's, Hackney Road. A life spent in division from part of your flock, and in crushing those whom you could not answer, may well entitle you to the respect of all true bigots. Hoping you will be honoured as you deserve,

I am, Reverend Sir,
Yours truly,
Charles Bradlaugh."

Mrs. Bonner admits two important facts which I believe were decisive in determining her father's choice of atheism—though not completely so, for there were other factors later which helped to consolidate Bradlaugh's opposition to religion: (a) Mr. Packer's treatment of Bradlaugh, also that of his parents; (b) Bradlaugh's attendance at Bonner's Fields on Sunday evenings. In the first place, then, Mr. Packer's attitude towards young Bradlaugh was characteristic of the clerical bigotry of his age. Religious inquiry, particularly by young people, was forbidden; the authority of the clergy was to be accepted without question or demur, regardless of whether or not the preacher understood everything he pro-
claimed. To doubt his word was irreverent. Therefore Charles Bradlaugh committed a serious offence when he asked for help in his theological difficulties, and Mr. Packer, not content with suspending him from Sunday School for three months, forced the issue by persuading his parents to hold over their son the threat of dismissal from the household unless he recanted; and this he determined never to do. In addition they allowed Mr. Packer to hang offensive texts in their home, such as "The fool hath said in his heart There is no God." To quote Mrs. Bonner's words: "Such stupid and tactless conduct would be apt to irritate a patient person and good even the most feeble-spirited into some kind of rebellion; and I cannot pretend that my father was either the one or the other. He glanced angrily at the texts, and was glad enough to put the house door between himself and the continuous insult put upon him at the instigation of Mr. Packer." (1).

This bitter experience marks the beginning of a perpetual struggle against life for Bradlaugh, and it was speedily followed by others that drove him desperately into the ranks of the unbelievers. In the coal business which he tried to conduct for a living he was persecuted because of his atheism; he was persecuted because of his interest in Hypatia Carlile, and forbidden to speak to his favourite sister Elizabeth by his parents. "She was peremptorily forbidden to exchange a word with him; when they passed in the street this loving brother and sister, who were little more than children in years, would look at each other, and, not daring to speak, would both burst into tears." (2). An experi-

(1) Mrs. Bonner: loc. cit. p. 15.
ence such as this must have left its mark, because it was the very denial of the affection he had longed for and missed as a child.

And in the second place, we are told that Bradlaugh bore no resentment towards his parents for their unlovable attitude; but if this be true he must have transferred his negative feeling to Mr. Packer, the instigator of his trouble and rejection from home, and also to religion with which the reverend gentleman was associated. An intense drive towards atheism was the visible outcome of such scandalous treatment. Already lurking doubt had made Bradlaugh inquire into the validity of religion as revealed in the Bible, and when his request for help from the man who represented religion was met with abuse and persecution both from him and other religious people, he sought solace for his mind in Bonner's Fields every Sunday evening. The cruel treatment he received from the representatives of Christianity intensified his doubt instead of destroying it, and his whole being rose up in revolt against a system which created those uncharitable and narrow-minded people. How could religion be right, if those who professed it behaved wrongly and forbade the liberty of the individual to think for himself? The adolescent not only looks for the truth of a thing, but also for its practicability. For him action speaks louder than words. In one of his dialogues, "Christian Priest and Sceptic on Christmas," ("National Reformer," Dec. 29th, 1884), we have a reflection of this attitude:

Christian Priest: True Christianity would in this world abolish war and uproot malice.

Sceptic: Would it? Why, then, do Christian nations make larger preparations for war than were ever made by any pagan peoples? Why do those gathered in Christ-
ian Churches pray for victory in war, and sing
Te Deum Laudamus when the carnage has been great?"

Whenever Bradlaugh was convinced on some definite issue he must act
on it. At the age of twenty-five he was the editor of the "Investigator,
and in one of its issues he makes clear his policy: "If we find a mind
bound round with creeds and Bibles, we will select a sharp knife to cut
the bonds; if we find men prostrating themselves, without injury, before
idols, our policy is iconoclastic - we will destroy these idols. If we
find a rock in our path, we will break it." (1). Adolescent determination
to act could not be more decisive than this. In his debate with
T. D. Matthias on the "Morality of the Four Gospels" he professes his
difficulty in reconciling Jesus's Gospel of love with some of his other
utterances. "Love and slaughter cannot go hand in hand. If Jesus were
simply a man, then you have here (the reference is to the cursing of the
fig tree) a proof that he was not a man sufficiently thoughtful, that
he was not a man whose thoughts and doctrines are calculated to benefit
us." (Previous to this remark he had said " - for manliness consists
in thought and action founded on thought.")

Unless belief can be transformed into positive and constructive
deeds the adolescent suspects it; and if his suspicion is supported by
some painful emotional experience he tends either to reject the belief
completely or to rebel against it. Now Bradlaugh was satisfied that
religion could not stand the test of reason, and that it was also im-
practicable. The former view was verified and vindicated in Bonner's
Fields, and the latter was being constantly evidenced by certain prot-

(1) Quoted by Mrs. Bonner: loc. cit. p. 79.
agonists of religion who publicly debated with him, and by others who sought to wreck his meetings.

However much we may admire Bradlaugh for his loyalty to truth, and for his refusal to slander his enemies and opponents with words or actions, we are obliged to recognise that he went to the Freethinkers finally to seek arguments in favour of atheism, because after the incident of being driven from home his mind was biased against religion in such a way that he could not believe that there was any more to be said in its favour. "Mr. Bradlaugh," quotes his daughter, "did not deny that there was a God, because to deny that which was unknown was as absurd as to affirm it. As an Atheist he denied the God of the Bible, of the Koran, of the Vedas, but he could not deny that of which he had no knowledge." [1]. But, we may ask, if he was so concerned with the truth of God's existence, why did he close his mind to the possibility of verification? The answer surely is that the emotional element supporting his original doubt formed an anti-religious drive which goaded him to toil laboriously for his belief that man would never be happy until he was free of priests and kings, of crowns and creeds; free in body and mind. To quote his own words: "We believe all the religions of the world are founded on error, in the ignorance of natural causes and material conditions, and we deem it our duty to expose their falsity. Our policy is therefore aggressive." ("Investigator." 1858).

But this aggressiveness is evidence of a one-track mind, and Bradlaugh got so deep into the track as an adolescent attending the meetings of Freethinkers that he failed to see that his conviction was negative.

([1] Mrs. Bonner: loc. cit. p. 87.)
in so far as it was a reaction against religion and not a positive contribution to "a world of thought." The social elements in his teaching would be embraced by most Christian leaders today; but the anti-religious elements point to an emotional explanation for his atheism. His unbelief is very much in the nature of an obsession - which compelled him to extreme action in its favour. Even if it be admitted that at first Bradlaugh's atheism was nothing more than a characteristic adolescent expression of sincere idealism, it became later in his life a fixed idea which he stoutly defended.

A perusal of his anti-religious writings will reveal that he saw only the defects of Christianity, which of course was what he wanted to discover in support of his arguments. With a great deal of what he says in "Humanity's Gain from Unbelief" fair-minded Christians will agree; but to condemn Christianity in toto because of these blots he mentions would be like condemning the whole of the medical profession because Charles Myers has something harsh to say about the interest shown in 1914 - 1918 by the leaders of the noble profession in shell-shock cases. Again, his negation of the historic Jesus, and his ridicule of the Gospel teachings, are based on too ready and too literal an acceptance of facts and statements in the Old and New Testaments. His attitude is that of the man heated in debate, obsessed with his own point of view, and seizing every word of his opponent, however irrelevant or wrenching from its context, to prove his argument. The way in which he treats the Sermon on the Mount is a clear manifestation of his anti-Christian obsession; and the words of T.D. Matthias in "The Credibility and Morality of the
Four Gospels," p. 14, are a fair criticism of Bradlaugh’s attitude to Scripture reading: "I do not mean to say that he has assented willingly, knowingly, and consciously an untruth, but possibly he may not have examined the subject with the fairness and fulness which such a subject imperatively demands." Every sincere student of the Bible and Christology in the light of modern research knows of the difficulties and discrepancies that stand in the way to a straightforward account of the life of Jesus and his teachings, in fact they now see more and know more than Bradlaugh ever did, but their approach is not one-sided as his was, neither do they feel disposed to reject the substance of the New Testament because of its numerous disharmonies. Matthias says: "......there are discrepancies in the life of Shakespeare and in the life of the great Napoleon, uncle of the present Napoleon. I say that if the life of Shakespeare and the life of Napoleon are to be taken in the same manner as my friend (Bradlaugh) attempts to deal with Christ, then we prove that Christ, Shakespeare, and Napoleon never existed, and did the things they are said to have done and wrought." (1).

There is no doubt that Bradlaugh was honest-minded, but the emotional reaction within him against religion made it impossible for him to be fair-minded and impartial in his criticism of the Bible. For instance to quote his own words: "But as the Bible is declared to be the revelation and representative of perfect intelligence to the whole human family; as it is placed by the whole of its preachers immeasurably above all other books, with a claim to dominate, and if necessary to overturn, the teachings of all other books; as it is alleged that the Bible is

(1) loc. cit. above, p. 27.
free from the errors of thought and fact more or less found in every other book; and as it is by Act of Parliament declared to be a criminal offence in this country for any person to deny this book to be God's Holy Word, it is not only a right, but it becomes an unavoidable duty on the part of a Freethinking critic to present as plainly as possible to the notice of people every weakness of the text, however trivial, that may seem to show that the Bible or any portion of it is fallible, that it is imperfect, that so far from being above all books it is often below them as a mere literary production." (1).

Now what is it in this quotation that will give us some clue to Bradlaugh's emotional reaction against religion? This attack is not against the Bible itself, but against those who claim for it an infallible revelation, and insist that it be accepted by all as God's Holy Word, against those who denied him the right to think for himself about the Four Gospels and the Thirty-nine Articles. Bradlaugh's purpose was obviously to undermine and destroy the influence of priests and kings who were misguiding and retarding, if not crippling, the progress of humanity; and this he did by trying to repudiate every argument for religion. Again it must be stated that the emotional feature of his unbelief prevented him from seeing the misrepresentation and misapplication of religion by men who were using it to satisfy their own desire or craving for power. A close parallel may be drawn between Bradlaugh and the people who condemn hypnotism because it has got into the hands of a few unscrupulous persons, and because of their difficulty in understanding the science. Their objection is an emotional one, and no amount of

(1) Preface to "The Bible: What it is." 1865.
argument will remove it, because argument appeals to the cognitive and not the affective aspect of the mind.

It is reasonably conceivable that with more generous treatment from his opponents Bradlaugh might have re-examined his religious position after emerging from the period of adolescence; but unfortunately this he did not meet, and consequently the unabated persecution that pursued him wherever he went put him further on the defensive and strengthened his conviction. Those who have had dealings with men and women obsessed with some idea know that the one way to strengthen the idea is to attack it. No obsession will ever yield to argument, because it is by constitution emotional, and since argument is an intellectual thing never the twain will meet. Abuse the obsessionalist and his obsession will grow stronger and more extensive. If the persuasive treatment fails, occupational therapy is the only wise course to adopt. Therefore if the religious leaders of Bradlaugh's day had shown more tolerance towards him, and more interest in his social efforts, they might in time have won him back to the Church, or at least to Christianity. The attitude, however, which they adopted was doomed to failure from the beginning of their attack on his atheism. He himself wrote: "I may be wrong, but I shall never be convinced of my own error by a mob of true believers yelling at my heels like mad dogs, under the leadership of a pious rector's trusty subordinate, or hammering at the door of my lecture room under the direction of an infuriate parson." (1).

It is hardly necessary to enumerate all the occasions when he was disgracefully treated by the clergy who opposed him in debate, and by

(1) Quoted by Headingley in "The Biography of Charles Bradlaugh." p.119.
their organised mobs who did not know the meaning of Christian charity; but one or two may be cited. When it was known in Dewsbury that Bradlaugh was going to lecture not far from the Public Hall the following announcement was displayed: "Great discovery! To be seen tomorrow, Sunday, not one hundred miles from the Public Hall, a fine specimen of the gorilla tribe, standing seven feet six inches in height, imported into England from Sheffield, the capital of the Hollyhock Settlement, in the interior of Africa, and brought to this town for public exhibition by Mr. F. Greenfield." (1). The lecture was accompanied by the usual rowdyism and the meeting was broken up. At Guernsey he was met at the quay side with a fire of rotten eggs, and with the cry "Murder the infidel!" Similar treatment was meted out to him at Dumfries, and at Burnley he was despicably handled by the Methodists, who even resorted to violence. One of the clergy whose deplorable conduct to Bradlaugh will always rebound to his dishonour, was the Rev. Bernard Grant of Sheffield, who unhesitatingly forsook the subject of debate to make personal attacks on his opponent. It is indeed to Bradlaugh's credit that he would slander no one who opposed him: "Towards priests as such he felt no malice. "In public or in private (he never talked) with malice, and seldom even with disgust of fanatics as such. He explained them and respected their honesty." But, as already pointed out, he was satisfied that they were the victims of a pernicious teaching written within the covers of the Bible; which I believe to be a rationalisation for his true reaction.

Now in addition to the obsessional factor in Bradlaugh's personal

make-up, and as accounting partly for his atheism, it is necessary to consider one other factor which has already been mentioned, namely, his urge to master every situation. This is evident throughout his life, and doubtless it sprang from the absence of affection which he probably felt as a young child. An incident worth recalling from his younger life is that told by Headingley, of the time when Bradlaugh was in the army in Ireland. The soldiers were expected to bring wood themselves for their fires during the last day or two before they left for new quarters; all of them did this except Bradlaugh, who did not know of the custom.

"When the enormity of his omission had been made patent to him, Bradlaugh felt that nothing but a deed of exceptional daring would re-establish his reputation. He therefore went out into the yard, crossed over to the quarters of the 17th Lancers, walked up to a dog that had the reputation of extreme ferocity, unfastened its chain, placed the kennel on his head, and marched quietly back to his own companions with the prize, which was broken up and burnt, amid the cheers and laughter of the company. So audacious was this deed, that when an inquiry was instituted as to the whereabouts of the kennel, no one revealed Bradlaugh's name, not even the Lancers, who must have seen him take the lost kennel away, for it was broad daylight at the time." (1). On more than one occasion when in the army he accepted a challenge to prove his courage and mastery. For example, he fought one of the best boxers of his corps, and was fortunate in bringing off a victory. Conscious of these and other successes he came out of the army confident of his own ability to face every situation that confronted him, and prepared to fight "for what he

believed to be right and true."

This urge to transcend and master every situation would be a compelling influence in Bradlaugh's atheism. An excessive drive of any one instinct is generally at the expense of another. For instance, C.G.'s drive was towards an exalted position in her profession. To quote her own words at twenty-three: "I have only one purpose or ambition, and that is to get a good job. Marriage does not interest me in the least." The idea of "a good job" was not in any sense a compensation for the belief that she never would be asked to marry, because she had already received more than one offer of marriage. Neither was the ambition an expression of the Diana complex, which is found in some women's minds. The purpose of her drive was to prove to herself and to others that she had ability and was worthy of attention - an attitude that began in early childhood when her young sister monopolised her parents, aunts, and uncles. Once the unconscious motivation was brought into the light of the conscious her exaggerated ambition gave place to a greater interest in the opposite sex and desire for marriage. Now Bradlaugh's religious nature was a drive sacrificed to his anti-theistic drive, which was characteristic of his whole activity - whether in religion or politics, or in social or legal interests. His untiring devotion to any one pursuit is the hallmark of his strong desire to master each situation as it arose. His regard for human personality saved him from any vicious attack upon his opponents; but he found an outlet for his urge to master in endeavouring to smash the systems which created them and roused his resentment and antagonism.

It must be recognised that he was never motivated by material bene-
fits; there was a deeper motive, and that was his love of power. To him
a victory over circumstances and in debate was a far greater satisfaction
than any accumulation of wealth. "Doubtless the excitement and gratifica-
tion of success as a public speaker incited him to a great extent." (1).
His drive against religion was at least precipitated by the Packer in-
cident, but its dynamic came from its obsessive nature and from the
desire to master and to excel, and having once discovered an avenue
through which he could express himself he was not likely to forsake it
for any other. His anti-theistic background loomed clearly behind his
politics, and his aggressiveness — which I regard as assertiveness plus
pugnacity — is clearly reflected in most of his writings. One is not
surprised at the amount of Biblical information which he garnered; it
was to his purpose in defeating his opponents on their own ground. His
defence of a position which was yielding profound egotistical satisfac-
tion in his adolescent years compelled him to enter every realm of thought
where he might sharpen his weapons for the fight against his adversaries.
He certainly was right when he said that he was never likely to go back
upon his anti-religious convictions: unlike his disciple Batchford, he
never did. But the remark is typical of a certain type of adolescent
whose fixed ideas yield him the satisfaction of honesty and sincerity in
thought. The emotional warmth the adolescent experiences in professing
his honesty and sincerity where ideas and judgments are concerned may
commit him to an egotistical position which he will not abandon later,
because to do so would mean letting himself down to himself and to others.
This position he must continue to justify, and in the endeavour to do
so he builds up a one-track mind, and the only points of contact with

(1) Headingley: loc. cit. p. 47.
other opinions not his own are his defences against them.

Bradlaugh's determination to master his opponent led him at times into strange confusion. For example, in his debate with T.D. Matthias on the morality of the Gospels, the latter mentioned the influence of the Sermon on the Mount on a number of Afghan chiefs when they heard it for the first time. On replying Bradlaugh said: "My friend told you how the bible had influenced some Afghan chiefs, but we need not go to Afghanistan for instances, for in our own sister country - in Scotland - we had an example last week of the effect of the sermon on the mount, which says, 'If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off and cast it from thee, for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.' In Scotland, as is well and thoroughly testified, a poor woman, the week before last, who had been affected by the revival movement, fancied that her right eye offended her and tried to pluck it out, and that her right hand offended her and sought to cut it off. They took the poor woman to a lunatic asylum where she endeavoured to bite it off. She then had a straight jacket put on, and bitterly she reproached them and told her keepers she must go to hell if it were not cut off. This is an anecdote as a set-off against the Afghan chiefs, and it has the misfortune to be nearer home, both as to place, time, and people." It is clear, surely, that Bradlaugh, enthused with his masterful purpose, failed to recognise that the woman was a psychotic and ought not to have been compared with the Afghan chiefs in Matthias's illustration, who, whilst enjoying a civilisation of their own, were at least normal and capable of normal reactions to what they heard.
Bradlaugh concedes little to his opponent, but expounds at length in favour of his own beliefs. For instance, in his dialogue "Doubts in Dialogue" he gives much more space to Unbeliever, Atheist, Infidel, and Sceptic than he gives to their opponents; and the arguments he lets fall from the lips of the latter are trifling, feeble, and anaemic. The strength of the unbeliever is seen against the exaggerated weakness of the believer in each dialogue; the defenders of religion he paints with insipid colours, and if he does not deliberately depict them as dwarfed in human intelligence, his pictures have been considerably influenced by an unconscious bias against them.

Not only does Bradlaugh substitute his attack on religion for an attack on its leaders, he is also afflicted with the omnipotence of his own thoughts. In the pure obsessionist we can see this feature perhaps more clearly. For example, M.H., obsessed with the fear of transmitting germs to others, is compelled to do things quite unnecessarily. The compulsion involves her in house-work, the doing of which she at one time resented - and still does. But the fear of germs emerges from a sense of guilt through the refusal on her part to carry out her parents' wishes for her. However much she is persuaded that she was justified in opposing her parents on a matter in which she felt she was right, she persists in holding to the point of view that she was wrong, and by refusing to yield to any other point of view she has a sense of personal value, even though the omnipotence of her own thinking creates for her much unhappiness. The sequence of ideas is this: the omnipotence of her own thinking compels her to believe that she did wrong
to her parents — having done wrong a feeling of guilt emerges — this is followed by the desire to atone, and so she cleans excessively — but the excuse for her abnormal actions is the fear of imparting germs to others.

The sequence of ideas in Bradlaugh's mind, as far as we can see, was this: his judicial mind made him quick to see discrepancies in the Bible — motivated by the desire to master his problem he seeks information which is refused — the opposition he evokes drives him to believe he is right — his resistance that follows is justified in his mind by the omnipotence of his own thinking — I, and all who think with ME, ARE RIGHT, therefore all who think differently are wrong — and to defend his omnipotence he perforce must prove the incredibility of the Bible, which involved him in astonishing feats of mental activity. The same psychological sequence is to be discovered in his law experience, when many a time he featured in some libel suit.

Now it may rightly be objected that if this be the correct explanation for his atheism he surely would sooner or later have broken down as a neurotic. There is a two-fold answer to that objection. In the first place, had Bradlaugh lived longer he might have broken down under the strain of the compulsion, but angina pectoris destroyed his life at the comparatively early age of fifty-five. And in the second place, his activities were his way of escape from the conflict. It is when the obsessionalist fails to perform his ritual that he breaks down and is obliged to withdraw from life. To the very end of his life Bradlaugh was a man of untiring action, and his activities on
behalf of the poor and down-trodden offered at least a partial sublimation for his religious feelings. His atheism was the manifestation of his omnipotence, his sacrifice was his devotion to it, his actions the fulfilment of its will.
CHAPTER XI.

Sigmund Freud.

"What Freud has to say about sexuality, infantile pleasure, and their conflict with the 'principle of reality', as well as what he says about incest and the like, can be taken as the truest expression of his own psychic make-up. He has given adequate form to what he has rooted in himself; ...... No experienced psychotherapist can deny having met with dozens of cases at least which answer in all essentials to Freud's description. By his avowal of what he has found in himself, Freud has assisted at the birth of a great truth about man. He has devoted his life and his strength to the construction of a psychology which is a formulation of his own being." (1).

Admitting the anti-Freudian bias in the mind of Jung against his former master and colleague, we recognise the wisdom of these words, and now proceed to test their validity by an examination of Freud's atheism and work. Jung was given a fair opportunity to estimate the personality of Freud when he co-operated with him in building up the "International Psycho-Analytical Association," of which Jung was the first president in 1910. However much the analyst tries to leave his work in the consulting-room when his day's work is over, he finds himself noting the reactions of his friends in conversation and discussion, even though they too may be analysts. So that Jung's appreciation of Freud's

psychology as a true expression of its creator's psychical make-up is helpful in suggesting that there may be reasons of an unconscious nature which can account for the Freudian attack on religion. Freud, we contend, in analysing away religious experience and basing it on a son-father relationship, shows his failure to understand what religious experience is; but that failure came about because there was a blind spot somewhere in his mental make-up, which I hope to show was as much an emotional inhibition or resistance as those we found in Shelley, Swinburne, Nietzsche and Bradlaugh. Valentine remarks of the Freudian school: "The inconsistency of their extreme position may not be evident to those who flout all philosophical supervision; nevertheless if, as they say, all thinking is rationalisation, then the very sweeping denunciation uttered by the Freuds may be dismissed as merely the symptoms of their own unresolved complexes. Freudian psychology, as a system of interpreting experience, may itself be but a piece of rationalisation. To press the point against the Freuds as they press it mercilessly against others, the preoccupation of Freudian psychology with sex would only indicate the sexual complex and obsession of the exponents of the theory." (1).

In his work "Moses and Monotheism" (p.203), Freud unwittingly admits the justification of the criticism that is made of his anti-religious theories. "The religious argument is based on an optimistic and idealistic premise. The human intellect has not shown itself elsewhere to be endowed with a very good scent for truth, nor has the human mind displayed any special readiness to accept truth. On the contrary, it is the general experience that the human intellect errs very easily"

without our suspecting it at all, and that nothing is more readily be-
lieved than what - regardless of the truth - meets our wishes and illu-
sions half-way." This statement we can well use in our inquiry, and ask
whether Freud's rejection of religion is also based on his own wishes
and illusions.

In "The Future of an Illusion" Freud seeks to explain religion away
on the grounds of projection and repressed wishes. As Crichton Miller
puts it: "In this essay Freud reduces religion as he sees it or knows it,
to the demand of social morality for instinctual renunciation on the
part of the individual, and the reduction of this conflict to terms of
the Oedipus situation." (1). According to Freud religious ideas "are
not the residue of experience or the final result of reflection; they
are illusive fulfilments of the oldest, strongest, and most insistent
wishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of those
wishes." (2). Religion is the outcome of human culture, whose raison
d'etre is to defend us against nature. But nature cannot be completely
vanquished. Earthquakes, floods, disease and death are beyond human con-
tr. "But if the elements have passions that rage like those in our
own souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous, but the violent
act of an evil will, if everywhere in nature we have about us beings who
resemble those of our environment, then indeed we can breathe freely, we
can feel at home in face of the supernatural, and we can deal psychically
with our frantic anxiety." (3). Through religion we are able to place
our trust and confidence in the divine providence just as a child does

(1) "Psycho-analysis and its Derivatives." p. 197.
(2) "The Future of an Illusion." p. 52.
(3) loc. cit. p. 28.
in the father. This is a continuation of the belief centred in Totemism, though it is difficult to see why the animal god did not suffice, unless through the processes of identification and projection man substituted the human image for the animal. What is evident, according to Freud, is that the relationship of man to his god is ambivalent: the child both loves and hates the father, and similarly men have created for themselves gods of whom they are afraid, but in whom they have faith that they will protect them against the adverse forces of nature, and in the hereafter duly reward them for faithfulness to the divine laws in this life.

"Thus the benevolent will of divine providence allays our anxiety in face of life's dangers, the establishment of a moral world order ensures the fulfilment of the demands of justice, which within human culture have so often remained unfulfilled, and the prolongation of earthly existence by a future life provides in addition the local and temporal setting for these wish-fulfilments." (1). The demand of the human race for a religion is understandable in the light of its development. Religion began its history in the wish-fulfilment of man, but at the present time it is of the nature of an obsessional neurosis; and here we see a parallel in the development of the child. "We know that the human child cannot well complete its development towards culture without passing through a more or less distinct phase of neurosis. This is because the child is unable to suppress by rational mental effort so many of those instinctual impulses which cannot be turned to account but has to check them by acts of repression, behind which there stands as a rule an anxiety neurosis. . . . . . Thus religion would be the universal

(1) "The Future of an Illusion." p. 52.
obsessional neurosis of humanity. It, like the child's, originated in the Oedipus complex, the relation to the father." (1).

Freud believes that gradually the human race will emerge free of its religious illusion, and will develop an adult attitude towards life because science, which "is our only way to the knowledge of external reality" is progressing, and man is being enlightened in a manner that will compel him to abandon religion, as a young bird on finding its wings abandons the nest in which it was born and reared. He says: "The scientific spirit, strengthened by the observation of natural processes, began in the course of time to treat religion as a human matter, and to subject it to critical examination. This test it failed to pass." (2).

Already religion "is not only less credible to people, but criticism has nibbled at the authenticity of religious documents, natural science has shown up the errors contained in them, and the comparative method of research has revealed the fatal resemblances between religious ideas revered by us and the mental productions of primitive ages and peoples." (3).

Just as in "The Future of an Illusion" Freud has endeavoured to explain away religion by declaring it to be the product of human wishes, beginning its history in totemism, so in his work "Civilisation and its Discontents" he proceeds to analyse the religious concepts of "guilt" and "conscience." The Super-ego is built up within the individual as soon as the child realises the pressure of external authority. Gradually the authority is accepted by the child, and becomes an internal voice which is called conscience. The super-ego is strengthened by each

(1) "The Future of an Illusion." p. 75.
(3) "The Future of an Illusion." pp. 67-68.
renunciation of some instinctual desire, and the impulse energy of the
instinct renounced is absorbed by the super-ego. Therefore the child
who renounces, for example, revengeful aggressive wishes against the
father, absorbs their energy into the super-ego, and conscience becomes
stronger and more vigorous. But in addition to old factors of renun-
ciation the sensitive temperament plays an important part in deciding the
strength of the conscience. It follows, then, that man may have a
strong conscience without having a religion if, in his early life, the
external authority of his environment, and later the internal authority
within himself, compels him to renounce time after time his own instinct-
ual desires; also his sense of guilt only arises when he wishes to go
against that authority which is the embodiment of what he loves and
fears........"guilt is nothing but a topographical variety of anxiety,
and in its later phases it coincides completely with the dread of the
super-ego." (1). Civilisation in its advancement has developed this
sense of guilt and has made for increased unhappiness; whilst "The dif-
f erent religions, at any rate, have never overlooked the part played by
the sense of guilt in civilisation. What is more, they come forward with
a claim to save mankind from this sense of guilt, which they call sin." (1
Freud refers to Christianity and its teachings as an example of this.
So the ideas of God, divine providence, immortality, conscience, sin, and
guilt are reducible to purely psychological terms and can be explained
without any reference to the supernatural, that is, to anything beyond
the nature of reality to which man should be educated through the aven-
ues of science.

(1) "Civilisation and its Discontents." pp. 125 & 126.
It is to be regretted that Freud turned his back on philosophy, and for that reason has made a futile and abortive effort to prove that religion is nothing more than an illusion. Jung says: "It was a great mistake on Freud's part to turn his back on philosophy. Not once does he criticise his premises, or even the assumptions that underlie his personal outlook." (1). Obsessed with his own view-point Freud has sought for the evidences he required among the abnormal. The facts he produces to support his theory are much more relevant to neurotic states of mind than to the healthy. He speaks of religion as an illusion and of God as a projection of a wish-fulfilment because of what he has discovered in totemism and in some of his patients; but he overlooks the fact that the child-father relationship is only a parallel to the man-God relationship, and not its origin. Moreover, he rejects the idea that man is dependent upon a being greater than himself; and to ignore this is simply to indulge in illusion. What is science doing for man if it is not to protect him against the adverse forces of nature, and to give him ease and comfort by making accessible the good things of life? In his book on "Freud and his Time" Wittels writes: "In modern days there is a general striving towards certainty and security. When we travel today, it is not only with greater speed than of old, but incomparably greater safety. We know to a pound the breaking strain of our bridges; we know that our boilers will not burst, that our trains will not collide, that our fields will not be submerged by floods. In so far as these dangers still threaten, armies of experts are at work so that day by day we are more adequately freed from imperfection. Preventive medicine has made

such advances that many diseases which were a terror in earlier times are now practically unknown to civilised humanity. Safety and security have been almost universally achieved except in one domain where achievement would seem especially simple. Here individuals strive with all their might to attain security, but the individual rarely has the luck to achieve his economic aim, to make his life economically secure. Society does not help him. Yet it is in keeping with the spirit of our scientific age that experts should guard each one of us from need.” (1)

This demand for security and protection Freud cannot deny. Even his patient, after going through a complete analysis is not self-sufficient, however much the sources of resourcefulness have been released; and if perchance his patient suddenly decided upon a life of perfect independence and isolation he would promptly be told that he was abnormal. Man has displayed a need for communion with the author of life from the beginnings of human history, and that need is as fundamental as the need for food or for society. If food did not exist, neither would hunger; and if communal life were an impossibility, normal man would be content to live alone. His need of God only exists because it can be satisfied, and if for some reason God himself, through being rejected by man, did not meet the need, then some substitute or another would be found. “Religiousness may have entered as an infantile disease into the development of the human race. But then man evolves a religious faith in his own work, progress, in transmissible culture. He torments himself his life long with the study of details and develops a noble frenzy against which there could be no objection if the investigator only knew that his

motive impulse lay in religion." (1).

It is true that Freud displays a lack of philosophical approach to his subject. He intrudes where he has no right when he declares that worship of God is nothing more than a form of infantilism perpetuated by religious authorities who should know better. His province as a psychologist - our psychologist, which he chose to be - is the study of those mental processes that operate during a religious experience, and not the question as to whether there is a God or whether religion is an illusion. "Psychology helps us to understand the way in which the experience works, but the experience itself speaks to the fact that man is by nature religious and that religion belongs to his normal relations to the universe, and is among the most potent factors making for his social, moral and spiritual development." (2).

Moreover, Freud fails to recognize that there is development in religion just as there is in science. Even in 1952 he held firmly to the belief that religion owes the greater part of its influence to the protection and comfort it gives. "In so far as religion brushes away man's fear of the dangers and vicissitudes of life, in so far as it assures them of a happy ending and comforts them in their misfortunes, science cannot compete with it." (3). But though primitive man enjoyed a childish relationship with his god, modern man has to a considerable extent rejected that for something more mature; but his longing for God still persists. He seeks, not God's protection but His guidance and inspiration. The child's feeling of helpless dependence upon his father none

(1) Wittels: "Freud and his Time." p. 49.
(3) "New Introductory Lectures." p. 206.
can deny; he looks to him for protection and comfort, until gradually he learns how to do things for himself and how to stand upon his own feet. But the independence which he acquires through experience does not end the child-parent relationship; this rather reaches a higher level where there is a mature fellowship and where the child in communion with his father learns from the latter's experience and knowledge. Such a mature relationship is a possibility between man and God, and has been enjoyed by the saints, whose lives are a sufficient answer to Freud's belief that religion is a neurosis. Crichton Miller expresses a similar point of view. Freud's work, he says, "appears to refer exclusively to the formal, behaviouristic and traditional elements in any religion, and completely ignores the higher elements such as disinterested altruism, creative vision, personal idealism, and intuitive valuations." (1).

The fact that there are still many people who hold infantile ideas about God and what religion can do for them, and who indulge in childish religious phantasies, is no more a proof of Freud's contention that religion is fundamentally an illusion than a tone-deaf person is right in saying that musical harmonies do not exist because he does not happen to hear them. Religious education is doing a great deal to correct the erroneous ideas men and women hold concerning God and the function of prayer; and the final test is whether a purified form of religion works in the life of normal people. Of this there is sufficient evidence for believing that it does. Professor W.K. Wright deals a decisive blow to the Freudian position. "Man is placed in a real environment, not an imaginary one. If there were no Being in man's en-

(1) "Psycho-analysis and its Derivatives." P. 197.
environment, to which the conception of God in some measure corresponded, man would not best succeed in adjusting himself to his environment by belief in God; such a belief would in that case be entirely quixotic in its effect on human conduct. But the opposite is the fact. Therefore there is a God. To be sure our ideas of God may not be very adequate. It may be as imperfect as the conception which we might imagine that the tiny inhabitants of a pool of water have of us. But every philosophical believer in God is ready to admit that our conceptions of Him are symbolic. The fact that the conception does work in human experience, that it does enable men to conform to the requirements of the world in which they are placed, and to achieve a fuller life is evidence for the contention that the conception is not an illusion, but that however inadequate it may be it is at least symbolic of ultimate reality.” (1).

When Freud speaks of the conscience as the function of the super-ego exercising the role of the censor, and of guilt as “a topographical variety of anxiety,” or as “a dread of the super-ego,” he does not remove the fact of God’s existence. What he is doing is to explain psychologically the meaning of these two terms used in religion; and whether we agree with his findings or not, I see no reason why we may not regard these functions as partly God’s way of working with us; that is, providing we recognise that the moral principle within man is not fully explained in this way. Man’s moral nature is not wholly determined by the super-ego, nor his sense of guilt by the ego’s dread of being threatened by the super-ego; the rational quality of his mental make-up compels him to supersede the authority of the super-ego, and his

(1) Quoted from Dr. Selby’s “The Psychology of Religion.” p. 299.
sense of guilt often extends beyond that authority, as it did in the life of St. Paul. Were it not so, Christians would still approve of slavery, and social reform would remain stagnant. "Creative vision, personal idealism and intuitive valuations" Freud has ignored, because he has allowed himself to be entirely influenced by the scientific spirit of his time, and to be obsessed with the determinative factor of human life. Further, his insistence on establishing evidences before attempting to formulate a theory about them has strangely eluded him in his endeavour to analyse religion away. Professor E.O. James proves my point: "There is no anthropological evidence for a 'dislocation in the family life of the primitive horde' as a result of the sex urge, the sons slaying their father in order to secure the women for themselves, and then inventing a ritual device to expiate and commemorate their crime. If a 'primal state of society' ever existed, characterised by a 'father horde' in contrast to a 'son horde' of expelled bachelors, at least no traces have been left of its occurrence in any human state of culture, and it has yet to be shown that religion in practice is an attempt on the part of the individual to be reconciled with his infantile father image." (1).

Freud has entrenched himself so deeply in his psycho-analytical work that he has not been able to see what lies outside it and beyond it. A passage from Jung (already quoted in part in Chapter I) is apt to my criticism here: "I do not, however, hold myself responsible for the fact that man has everywhere and always spontaneously developed religious forms of expression, and that the human psyche from time immemorial has been shot through with religious feelings and ideas. Whoever cannot see

(1) "Comparative Religion." P. 35.
this aspect of the human psyche is blind, and whoever chooses to explain it away or enlighten it away, has no sense of reality. The father-complex, fanatically defended with such stubbornness and over-sensitivity is a cloak for religiosity misunderstood: it is a mysticism expressed in terms of biology and the family relation." (1).

Let us now, as far as we can, proceed to search for the influences at work in the mind of Freud in the formulation of his anti-theistic theories. Goethe played an important part in his choice of study, particularly his essay "Die Natur:" "...it was hearing Goethe's beautiful essay on Nature read aloud at a popular lecture by Professor Carl Brucki just before I left school that decided me to become a medical student." (2). Wittels believes that it was the magic influence of Goethe himself and not the essay that influenced Freud, and that this explains to some extent (1) his prose style; "often what he says is not as important as the fascinating manner in which he says it;" (2) his belief in the purposive nature of the mind; "The imperishable value of the essay ("Die Natur") rests, however, in the recognition that nature has meaning. This thought inspired the youthful Freud and illuminated his investigations;" (3) his opposition to the main currents of thought in his time. Goethe, while being the pride and joy of the German people, took a definite stand against Nationalistic ideas at the time when the Prussians were preparing for the conflict against Napoleon, and when the philosopher Fichte said (in 1808) that the German language was not only better, more profound, more soulful than the French, the English, or the

(1) "Modern Man in Search of a Soul." p. 140.
Italian, but in every way incomparable. Freud met with serious opposition to his psychological theories in Germany and Vienna. "For more than ten years after my separation from Breuer I had no followers. I was completely isolated. In Vienna I was shunned; abroad no notice was taken of me. My "Interpretation of Dreams," published in 1900, was scarcely reviewed in the technical journals." (1). But he persisted with his special work and gradually won the sympathy of a number of interested men. "As soon as I realised the inevitable nature of what I had come up against, my sensitiveness gradually diminished. Moreover, my isolation gradually came to an end." (1).

This mystical relationship that existed between Freud and his beloved Goethe is significant; Freud's method of expression, and his manner of approach both to his subject and to society were influenced by an emotional link with the greatest of all German writers. He is not as detached in his study as his cold, relentless logic seems to suggest. For example, where did he get the idea that everything psychic strives? Not from his investigations of the human mind, but from Goethe who intuited the idea of evolution in nature. "Freud, in my opinion," writes Wittels, "was already convinced of the correctness of his findings before they had received this manifold confirmation, for he had access to a source which scarcely needs the testimony of observation and experiment." (2). That source of special insight, which Freud would have denied in himself, for as a determinist he could do no other, was doubtless tapped by the penetrating influence of Goethe, "who was great as a scientist

(1) "An Autobiographical Study." pp. 87 and 88.
(2) "Freud and his Time." p. 64.
but infinitely greater as a poet."

Now whilst Freud recognises and admits the influence Goethe exercised over him when he was young, an influence which persisted to the end of his days, he does not as clearly see how he was influenced in his scientific studies by the philosophy of his time, or, to be more precise, by the bias felt against philosophy in his time. Darwinism had been exploited to the denial of the spiritual world, and in favour of the belief that man is nothing more than a machine whose behaviour is influenced by glands. Religion was hurriedly dismissed by scientists who believed that outside of science nothing was of any value to man, and philosophy spoke about things it did not understand. There is no denying the influence this age of Freud had upon his attitude to learning; for example, in 1925 he wrote: "Even when I refrained from observation, I carefully avoided approach to actual philosophy. Constitutional incapacity rendered such restraint easy for me." (1) The opposition Freud expressed against philosophy persisted through his life, for we find him attacking it in his "New Introductory Lectures:" "Philosophy is not opposed to science, it behaves as if it were a science, and to a certain extent it makes use of the same methods; but it parts company with science in that it clings to the illusion that it can produce a complete and coherent picture of the universe, though in fact that picture must needs fall to pieces with every new advance in our knowledge. Its methodological error lies in the fact that it over-estimates the epistemological value of our logical operations, and to a certain extent admits the validity of other sources of knowledge, such as intuition.

(1) Quoted by Wittels in "Freud and his Time." p. 50.
And often enough one feels that the poet Heine is not unjustified when he says of the philosopher

"With his night-cap and his night-shirt tatters
He botches up the loopholes in the structure of the world." (1)

Wittels is of the opinion that Freud rigidly ignored his own poetical and philosophical qualities. "He is afraid of his own supreme talents, and throughout all his life as an investigator he has been imposing a curb upon himself. One who by temperament is a seer has been ardently devoting himself to the study of exact science by the ordinary method of scientific investigation." (2) Both from his autobiographical study and from some of his other works it is evident that Freud believed that he had a mission to fulfil, and for that reason committed himself to the laborious task of detailed research. If Cocteau influenced his choice of a career and led him to matriculate in medicine, his scientific interest decided the kind of work he would do here; and throughout his life he kept strictly within the bounds of science, confining himself to investigation and observation of mental phenomena. This method of approach to his subject he persuaded his students to adopt, he urged them to persist with their scientific enquiries and to leave the formulation of theories to philosophers. Though, strange to say, he departed from his principles as a scientist when he made the claim that religion is an illusion.

What is of special interest to our purpose is that Freud could not resist the temptation to trespass on the realm of religion by explaining it away. It would not be difficult to understand his motive here, if he had been content to attack Christianity only, because against this re-

(1) "New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis," p. 205.

(2) "Freud and his Time." p. 80.
ligion he was early biased. In his "Interpretation of Dreams" he mentions an unhappy incident told him by his father when he was young: "And now for the first time I happen upon the youthful experience which, even today, manifests its power in all these emotions and dreams. I may have been ten or twelve years old when my father began to take me with him on his walks and to reveal to me his views about the things of this world in his conversation. In this way he once told me, in order to show into how much better times I had been born than he, the following: "While I was a young man, I was walking one Saturday on a street in the village where you were born; I was handsomely dressed and wore a new fur cap. Along comes a Christian, who knocks my cap into the mud with one blow and shouts: "Jew, get off the side-walk." "And what did you do?" 'I went into the street and picked up the cap,' was the calm answer. That did not seem heroic on the part of the big strong man, who was leading me, a little fellow, by the hand. I contrasted this situation, which did not please me, with another more in harmony with my feelings - the scene in which Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear at the domestic altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Since that time Hannibal has had a place in my phantasies." (1). This is an excellent example of Freud's emotional reaction against the persecution of the Jews by the Gentiles or Christians, and it is well expressed in his own words: "Hannibal and Rome symbolised for me as a youth the antithesis between the tenaciousness of the Jews and the organisation of the Catholic Church." Freud was too systematic in his thinking to abuse Christianity in the extravagant and delusional way of Nietzsche.

(1) "The Interpretation of Dreams." p. 65.
or Swinburne; he curbed his resentment and marshalled its forces for a

definite attack which would, by virtue of its rationality, win the ap-

proval of all thinking people. In religion he would play the part of

Hannibal and enter Rome, which I believe to have symbolised for him the

seat of Christianity. "Thus the wish to get to Rome has become the cover

and symbol in my dream-life for several warmly cherished wishes, for the

realisation of which one might work with the perseverance and single-

mindedness of the Punic general." Hannibal, having sworn at the family

altar to take vengeance on the Romans, devoted his life to the endeavour
to fulfil that vow, and to enter Rome as the conqueror of the Romans;

and in a similar way, for Freud to strike at the seat of Christianity,
symbolised by Rome, would mean taking vengeance on those who persecuted
his people, the Jews.

Had Freud been of the hysterical type he would probably have ranted

in writing and speech against the tyranny of the Christians; instead of

this his mind worked unconsciously towards the complete destruction of
the system that was chiefly responsible for the insufferable persecution
of the Jews, of whom he was proud to be a member. To what extent Freud
felt the opposition to his work to be motivated by the fact of his being
a Jew we cannot be sure, but that he was conscious of a continuous per-
secution in the history of his own family he makes clear: "I was born on
May 6th, 1856, at Freiburg in Moravia, a small town in what is now
Czecho-Slovakia. My parents were Jews and I have remained a Jew myself.
I have reason to believe that my father's family were settled for a long

time on the Rhine (at Cologne); that, as a result of a persecution of
the Jews during the fourteenth or fifteenth century they fled eastwards
and that, in the course of the nineteenth century they migrated back
from Lithuania through Galicia into German Austria." (1).

From my experience of Jews I find, particularly in the analyses I
have made of a number of them, that there is a deep feeling of resent-
ment against their persecutors, and that as young children they are con-
scious of the hostility that surrounds them. This may be explained by
Freud's idea of man's archaic heritage. "In fact it seems to be con-
vincing enough to allow me to venture further and assert that the archaic
heritage of mankind includes not only dispositions, but also ideational
contents, memory traces of the experiences of former generations." (2).

It is nevertheless clear that in every orthodox Jewish home, such as
Freud himself was brought up in, there is an all-pervading atmosphere
that makes the children conscious of their hostile position and the ex-
clusiveness of their race. One of my friends who is a professor of Old
Testament in one of our universities told me recently that he invariably
finds every Jewish student sitting under him with the attitude "I have
nothing to learn from you, a Gentile," and the result of this over-com-
pensation for their inferiority is that at examination time they fall
short of even a pass mark. When Freud went to the University at Vienna
he was no doubt conscious of the disadvantage to which he was put as a
Jew. Here he "experienced some appreciable disappointment. Above all,
I found that I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because
I was a Jew. I refused absolutely to do the first of these things. I

(1) "An Autobiographical Study." p. 18.
(2) "Moses and Monotheism." p. 159.
have never been able to see why I should feel ashamed of my descent or, as people were beginning to say, of my race." (1). This experience was probably his first conscious confirmation of what he had been led to believe as a boy about anti-Semitism. It made him realise, too, what resistance he was likely to meet with in his search after knowledge. "These first impressions at the University, however, had one consequence which was afterwards to prove important; for at an early age I was made familiar with the fate of being in the Opposition, and of being put under the ban of the 'Compact Majority.' The foundations were thus laid for a certain degree of independence of judgment." (1).

The opposition which Freud met is a history if one is to judge from what he has written; though one suspects that he sometimes projected antagonism on to others. For example, he became an active worker in the Institute of Cerebral Anatomy, and Professor Meynert, who had given him access to the laboratory, proposed that he should devote himself to the anatomy of the brain, and promised to hand over his lecturing work to him. "This I declined in alarm at the magnitude of the task; it is possible, too, that I had guessed already that this great man was by no means kindly disposed towards me!" (2). After a study of Freud's own dreams I believe the latter part of his reason for declining the position offered him by Professor Meynert to be the true one, and it evidences the strength of his suspicion regarding others which was even greater than his desire to be a professor. This desire was obviously strong, as he admits in his dreams and references to them. Referring to one of his

(2) "An Autobiographical Study." p. 18.
dreams he writes: "We may conclude that the foundation of the dream was at first formed by a phantasy of overweening ambition, but that only its suppression and its abashment reached the dream content in its stead." (1)

In reality the opposition to Freud's work may not have sprung from any kind of race prejudice, but from the character of his unorthodox views (though I do not ignore the former possibility). The medical profession is never ready to tolerate any kind of heresy. We all know of the opposition which Elliotson met when he introduced hypnotism into his medical work, and the scepticism and positive antagonism which warned against Lister's first attempts to introduce the anti-Septic treatment in surgery. It is easy, therefore, to understand why Freud was excluded from the laboratory of cerebral anatomy in Vienna after he became a specialist in nervous diseases in that city. The academic authorities certainly would not provide him with facilities for his work and lectures when they thoroughly disagreed with his fundamental teaching. But this opposition, perhaps more articulately expressed than anything else of the sort Freud had previously encountered, was branded "persecution" in his mind because he was a Jew. Every painful experience which is directed to the ego gravitates to a central point within the early life of the individual. For example, a woman whom I treated for anxiety hysteria read into every real or suspected criticism an attack upon her because she was an illegitimate child. If she was overlooked when new appointments were made in her profession, it was for this same reason. Similarly the Jews, when rejected or opposed, excuse their failure by putting down the opposition to racial prejudice or anti-Semitic feeling.

(1) "The Interpretation of Dreams." p. 379.
Let me quote here some of Freud's own words from page 63 of the "Future of an Illusion:" "The one person this publication may harm is myself. I shall have to listen to the most unpleasant reproaches on the score of shallowness, narrow-mindedness, and lack of idealism and of understanding for the highest interests of mankind. But on the one hand these remonstrances are not new to me, and on the other hand, if a man has even in his early years learnt to face the displeasure of his contemporaries, what effect then can it have on him in old age, when he is certain to be soon beyond the reach of all favour or disfavour?" Now it seems to me that Freud failed to discriminate between what was real opposition to his theories and what was racial prejudice, and having once desired to play the part of Hannibal for the Jews his purpose was to strike hard at the seat of Christianity. His intuitive mind, fired by resentment (if not hatred) against the Gentiles, led him along a path where he could carry the destruction of Christianity even before he knew how the destruction could be wrought.

His obvious bias against Christianity is to be observed in "Moses and Monotheism." "Christian religion did not keep to the lofty heights of spirituality to which the Jewish religion had soared. The former was no longer strictly monotheistic, took over from the surrounding people numerous symbolical rites, re-established the great Mother Goddess, and found room for many deities of polytheism in an easily recognisable disguise - though in subordinate positions. Above all it was not inaccessible - as the Aton religion and the subsequent Mosaic religion had been - to the penetrating of superstition, magical and mystical elements, which proved a great hindrance to the spiritual development of two following
millenia." (1) But surely its accessibility to superstitions, magical and mystical elements was due to its universality, and not to any cultural regression, as Freud suggests.

Freud's scientific interests led him to a profound analysis of the human mind - he was searching for something. Was it for the purposive meaning of the psyche? Partly at least this was so, because of the influence Goethe had upon him before he matriculated, in the years of adolescence. But I believe that his scientific work and investigation were motivated by a much deeper emotional factor, or that this factor at any rate provided the dynamic necessary for their accomplishment.

In "Moses and Monotheism" Freud expresses what he felt about the Christian: "We must not forget that all the peoples who now excel in the practice of anti-Semitism became Christian only in relatively recent times, sometimes forced to it by bloody compulsion. One might say, they all are 'badly christianised;' under the thin veneer of Christianity they have remained what their ancestors were, barbarically polytheistic. They have not yet overcome their grudge against the new religion which was forced on them, and they have projected it on to the source from which Christianity came to them." (2). The obvious thing, then, since "The hatred for Judaism is at bottom hatred for Christianity," is to get rid of the latter.

Freud sums up his attack on Christianity in his "Autobiographical Study: "The totem feast was the commemoration of the fearful deed from which sprang man's sense of guilt (or 'original sin') and which was the

beginning at once of social organisation, of religion, and of ethical institutions. Now whether we suppose that such a possibility was a historical event or not, it brings the formation of religion within the circle of the father-complex and bases it upon the ambivalence which dominates that complex. After the totem animal had ceased to serve as a substitute for him, the primal father, feared and hated, honoured and envied, became the prototype of God himself. The son's rebelliousness and his affection for his father struggled against each other through a constant succession of compromises, which sought on the one hand to atone for the act of parricide, and on the other hand to consolidate the advantages it had brought. This view of religion throws a particularly clear light upon the psychological basis of Christianity in which, it may be added, the ceremony of the totem-feast still survives with but little distortion in the form of Communion. (1).

Freud is particularly careful to point out the indebtedness of Christianity to totemism much more than that of any other religion. I do not suggest that this was done deliberately with any kind of conscious resentment, but the manner of his attack reveals an unconscious bias against Christianity which, as already pointed out, was created by a complex formed, at the latest, in his early youth. In his book "Totem and Taboo" he says: "In the Christian myth man's original sin is undoubtedly an offence against God the Father; and if Christ redeems mankind from the weight of original sin by sacrificing his own life, he forces us to the conclusion that this sin was murder." In a final effort to prove the atavistic and illusory nature of Christianity he con-

(1) "Autobiographical Study," p. 124.
times: "Thus in the Christian doctrine mankind unreservedly acknowledges the guilty deed of primordial times because it now has found the most complete expiation for this deed in the sacrificial death of the son....

....Simultaneously with this sacrifice there follows the complete renunciation of women for whose sake mankind rebelled against the father. In the same deed which offers the greatest possible expiation to the father, the son also attains the goal of his wishes against the father. He becomes a god himself beside or rather in place of his father. As a sign of this substitution the old totem feast is revived again in the form of communion in which the band of brothers now eats the flesh and blood of the son and no longer that of the father, the sons thereby identifying themselves with him and becoming holy themselves." (1).

A detailed discussion and criticism of Freud's theory of Christianity would be out of place in this chapter, but it suffices to mention that, to prove his point of view, he has strained at points of similarity between the Christian religion and totem ideas and ritual. His reference to "the complete renunciation of women" is a wild statement which is simply not true, and which reveals his failure to keep at bay his dislike of the religion which he held to be responsible for anti-Semitic feeling.

It must be recognised that Freud tried to explain away by reducing it to terms of totemism, not only Christianity, but religion as a whole. He explains what led him to do this: (2). It was a chance observation made by Ferenczi of a child, Arpad, which made it possible to speak of

(1) "Totem and Taboo." p. 255.
(2) "An Autobiographical Study." p. 123.
an infantile return of totemism, supported by his own analysis of early animal phobias in children, in which the animal was a substitute for the father, a substitute on to which the fear of the father, derived from the Oedipus complex, had been displaced. In "Totem and Taboo", (p. 215), we read the following: "We may venture the impression that certain traits of totemism return as a negative expression in these animal phobias of children. (Referring to his own case, "Little Hans," and also to a case of M. Wulff). But we are indebted to S. Ferenczi for a beautiful individual observation of what must be called a case of positive totemism in the child." Here, apparently, began Freud’s first interest in a subject that was later to explain away religion; and "not much was lacking to enable me to recognise the killing of the father as the nucleus of totemism and the starting-point of religion." (1). But he confesses to a missing link in his evidence, and this he was able to supply when he became acquainted with W. Robertson Smith’s work, "The Religion of the Semites." "Its author introduced the so-called totem-feast as an essential part of the totemistic religion." (1). Freud also took into account Darwin’s conjecture that men originally lived in hordes, each under the domination of a single powerful, violent, and jealous male, and there arose before me out of all these components the following hypothesis, or I would rather say vision........ (1).

Freud goes on to give a brief account of totemism which, according to him, was the beginning of social organisation, religion, and ethical restrictions. Now I believe that Freud’s vision was the projection of a desire (or his own "wish") to deal a decisive blow at Christianity in (1) "An Autobiographical Study." pp. 123 & 124.
the first place, and that finally (for another reason which I will mention later) the desire embraced the destruction of the basis of Judaism and all other religions. His intuitive leap at the conception of the horde of primitive life was never the result of a prophetic vision, but was motivated by anti-Christian complexes in the realm of his unconscious. It is evident that he was too willing to be influenced by the anthropological conceptions of his time, without taking the pains to find out whether they could be verified. "M. Durkheim has been led astray, like Robertson Smith before him, and Freud in more recent years, by giving undue importance to totemism as a fundamental and universal feature in 'elementary forms of religious life,'" says Professor E.O. James. (1). And, according to this very learned anthropologist, Durkheim, Robertson Smith, and Freud, along with Frazer and F.B. Jevons, have all been misled by a deduction wrongly drawn from the "evidences from the Palaeolithic caves and Mesolithic and Neolithic rock-shelters of France and Spain, (and here, incidentally, Prof. James has done most of his research work), where animal figures and totemiform designs bore a striking resemblance to similar native paintings and markings in Australia and elsewhere and known to be of totemic significance. Upon a further examination, however, this interpretation of prehistoric art presented certain difficulties." It appears that these primitive people identified themselves with animal species because they "believe that in the mask and in the associated rites there resides the vital potency which passes into the dancer and makes him either a daemon or a controller of supernatural forces. But this is not totemism. Moreover, the occur-

rence of a great variety of animal designs in the same cave makes it highly improbable that any one species was regarded as a supernatural ally, since in a totemic community each group would have its own sanctuary where it performed the rites proper to the totem." These evidences are sufficient to dislodge the foundation of Freud's totemic conception of religion. But a further argument is even more decisive: "The representation of wounded animals is more simply and naturally explained in terms of hunting magic - on the principle that 'like produces like,' to depict in the inner recesses of a sacred cave a bison or reindeer in the act of dying, or to mark it with a spearhead in the region of the heart, would be thought to bring success to the chase by reason of the spell that had been cast upon the species." (1).

Even supposing that Freud is right in his basic contention that religion began in totemism, I see no reason why he should want to explain religion away unless it was because of some emotional inhibition. "The truth of a religion is not affected by the fact that we can trace its growth and determine its origin. We do not explain it away when we explain it. The story of religion is a story of a great process of discovery, which in some ways recalls the record of physical science.... ....So man's knowledge of God may have had the humblest origin, and may be traceable to the most elementary instinct and to the most primitive thought. But it does, nevertheless, progress, and its history is the record of a continuous discovery of God." (2). The basis of Freud's theory is as illusory as he would make religion to be, and he would have

(2) "The History of Religions." T.H. Robinson. p. 45.
us repress our religious feelings for reasons as false as those for which the Victorians repressed their sex natures. The foundation and form of Freud's theory have collapsed on the grounds of anthropology where he tried to construct his edifice; while the content is capable of other explanation, for points of similarity between two things do not necessarily mean that one has emerged from the other, or that the one is interrelated with the other. But in the mind searching for evidence to prove some theory already conceived — intuited, if you like — this fact is forgotten or obscured by the emotional content of this conception. Freud's dreams reveal him to be a man of emotion just as much as a man of intellect (e.g., see "The Interpretation of Dreams," pp. 545-50), and of a colossal drive towards his aims and ambitions (p. 356), which partly explains his intolerance towards all who opposed him: for example, his attitude towards Bleuler and Jung.

Now while we can see why Freud aimed a destructive blow at Christianity motivated by resentment, if not hatred, and not substantiated by his evidences, what was his reason for explaining away the basis of all religions? The answer to that question is, I believe, one of two alternatives: (a) To remove Christianity completely would mean removing Judaism also, in which Christianity finds its roots. (b) The removal of Judaism would mean, in addition to the utter destruction of Christianity, the probable end of anti-Semitic feeling. Freud was sufficiently acquainted with the history of Christianity to know that it was born and bred among the Jews, that its founder was himself a Jew, the background of whose religious thought and teaching was Judaism. The monotheism of
Jesus was that of the Semitic race, and the universality of his teaching emphasised the exclusiveness of the Jewish people. It would have been difficult for Freud to argue that the historical Jesus was a mere myth, because the weight of the evidence was, and is, definitely against the view adopted by Bradlaugh. Bradlaugh's way was not open to him: but that of basing the idea of original sin, the Communion Service, the Sacrifice, and the Atonement, on purely totemic conceptions was a possibility. All these features of Christianity are rooted in Judaism, which must also be broken up before the illusory nature of the former might be exposed. It seems to me that Freud had not much more difficulty in attacking the ground of Judaism than that of any other religion, since the religion of the Jews was largely responsible for their persecution.

This brings us to the second of the alternative answers to our question, which may be stated as follows: The persecution of the Jews was, in the main, due to their exclusiveness, which was the result of their belief that they were the chosen race of God. This is a point of view which Freud emphasises more than once in his book "Moses and Monotheism." For example, on page 147 he says: "I venture to assert that the jealousy which the Jews evoked in the other peoples by maintaining that they were the first-born favourite child of God, The Father, has not yet been overcome by those others." Again, (p.167), "There is no doubt that they have a very good opinion of themselves, think themselves nobler, on a higher level, superior to the others from whom they are also separated by many of their customs." And still again: "When one is the declared favourite of the dreaded father one need not be surprised that
the other brothers and sisters are jealous. What the jealousy can lead to is exquisitely shown in the Jewish legend of Joseph and his brethren.

...it was Moses who stamped the Jewish people with this trait, one which became so significant to them for all time. He enhanced their self-confidence by assuring them they were the chosen people of God; he declared them to be holy, and laid on them the duty to keep apart from others." If, then, the basis of Jewish exclusiveness was due to a false belief in an illusion, and if that exclusiveness, with its accompanying arrogance, led to the persecution of the race, the obvious thing to do was to remove the foundation-stone of Judaism and set the people free, not necessarily to mix with other races, but at least to be equal with them.

Now whether we believe that Freud's attack on all religion was due to Christianity having its roots in Judaism: since Judaism must go if Christianity were to be abolished, then all other religions must suffer the same fate; or whether we think it was motivated by the desire to put an end to Jewish persecution; in either case, there is, I believe, a definite emotional reason underlying his thesis. It is not enough to say that his unbelief was the product of his scientific mind and age; if that were so, we would expect to find a similar attitude towards religion in all scientists. But this we do not find in a man like Charles Darwin, for instance, who emphatically denied the charge of atheism. Some other factor, therefore, must be sought as the deciding influence in a man's rejection of religion, and his effort to explain religion away; and in the case of Freud I have endeavoured to account psychologically for his complete rejection and denunciation of every belief and faith centred in God.
CHAPTER XII.

Conclusion.

It will be remembered that I began my thesis with the assumption that religion is a universal phenomenon, an assumption based not only on the failure of all who tried to give satisfactory evidence to the contrary, but also on the results of reliable anthropologists and authoritative archaeologists, and on works like those of Jung. The attempts of men like Sir John Lubbock, Dr. Lang, Sir Samuel Baker and others to disprove the assumption were not strictly scientific, because in the first place they misinterpreted the facts they examined, and in the second place they were too willing to accept uncritically the statements of unreliable and biased travellers or missionaries. But the useful and valuable work done by archaeologists supports the view taken by Jung and myself that the history of man and religion are co-extensive.

This deduction led me to the position of believing that within man there is an innate urge towards a religious object, the ideas about which have through the process of time been purified and clarified. Some have chosen to speak of this urge as a tendency, others as a feature of the religious sentiment. I have preferred to call it an **need**, because so universal a **longing** as men feels for an object to worship, to depend on, and to converse with, is, I believe, sufficient evidence for stating that it is as innate as the need for personal advancement, for a mate, and for fellowship with others.
But whatever we choose to call this religious drive or urge within man, it is I believe universal. It is of interest to note that Julian Huxley, in the News Chronicle series of "God and the War," 14.2.41, speaks of a religious impulse. "The time is ripe for a real revolution in theological outlook; the idea of God will cease to have any real significance, except to a small minority, and the religious impulse will be checked by theological difficulties." - Though Huxley's conception of God would make it no longer possible for us to speak of religion, nevertheless his effort to make religion and science a unity shows that man cannot ignore the religious impulse, and that he must find some outlet for it.

During an intensive study of the human mind and character - over a period of at least ten years - I have noted carefully the ways in which the religious feelings can be repressed, and in many of the patients I have analysed and treated I have observed the primary and secondary causes for this repression. I have also observed how religious feelings can enter a cul-de-sac in the different realms of science, philosophy and art. There is a subtle truth in Goethe's words, acceptable to every serious student of religion:

"He who has Science and has Art,
Religion too has he;
Who has not Science, has not Art,
Let him religious be!"
In many adults the religious nature may find partial satisfaction through a devotion to the perceptible manifestation of the Divine. The scientist's search after the laws of nature brings him into touch with the Creator of the universe and the Author of life much more closely than he may be prepared to admit. The philosopher's apprehension of truth attunes his mind to the great Master Mind; and the lover of every fine art feels the divine beauty within him even though he may fail to recognise it. But these interests as substitutes for religion are unsatisfying, and will never provide the complete fulfilment of the personality. Nevertheless they are avenues through which we may find access to the religious feelings hidden away.

What I have endeavoured to make clear is that the importance of correct religious instruction cannot be over-emphasised; apart from my own observations and discoveries, the conclusions of the American psychologists who have studied "Religion and Psychology," point definitely to the now recognised fact that wrong and conflicting ideas about God and prayer can dam up the religious feelings just as much as false ideals can repress the sex instinct. The number of adolescents influenced by anti-theistic ideas, and of other atheistically-minded individuals, some of whom we have examined in Chapters VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI, are proof of this. Platitudinous dogmas, thread-worn creeds, obscurantism, and conflicting religious teachings do more to discourage man's religious development than any advances which science may make. Only too often has it been discovered that new scientific teachings easily disturb the belief of even educated people because their religious ideas have lacked harmony and co-ordination. And once their belief is destroyed their
feelings are dissipated and often misdirected. "It is also a fact that under the influence of a so-called scientific enlightenment great masses of educated people have either left the Church or have become profoundly indifferent to it. If they were all dull rationalists or neurotic intellectuals the loss would not be regrettable. But many of them are religious people only incapable of agreeing with the actually existing forms of creed. If this were not so, one could hardly explain the remarkable effect of the Buchman movement on the more or less educated Protestant classes." (1). To my mind this quotation makes loud the call for a new presentation of religious truths, and a franker and more co-ordinated teaching of the Bible, particularly the teaching of Jesus. Emotional inhibitions are likely to be fewer if this is accomplished, because they are principally based on ideas - for example, where one's sense of guilt is concerned. Though the fact of man's egotism will only be disposed of when it is recognised by him, and in some cases when an analysis destroys his unconscious "God-almightiness."

If the theory of the pure Freudians were true, it would be expected that each deep analysis would deliver the subject from all religious yearnings; but I have never found this to be the case in many years of analytical work. William Brown says the same thing: "If, therefore, the typical religious attitude towards life is explicable in these terms (i.e., projection and repression, and the influence of the Oedipus complex in a patient), the religious consciousness would be altered by analysis in the direction of elimination; one would expect, according to this theory, that deep analysis would leave the patient less religious."

than he was before. My own experience has been the exact opposite of this. After an analysis (for scientific purposes) by a leading psycho-
analyst expending over ninety-two hours, my religious convictions were
stronger than before, not weaker. The analysis had indeed a purifying
effect upon my religious feelings, freeing them from much that was merely
infantile and supported by sentimental associations or historical ac-
cidents. But the ultimate result has been that I have become more con-
vinced than ever that religion is the most important thing in life, and
that it is essential to mental health. . . . . In many patients whom I
have myself analysed I have found a similar result. Although mere emo-
tionalism and religiosity is diminished, the essentially religious out-
look on life remains unimpaired." (1). A similar conclusion is found
in Jung's works, viz. "Modern Man in Search of a Soul" and "Psychology
and Religion."

It may rightly be asked why many of the Freudian school remain un-
believers if the analysis removes the inhibitions to the religious life.
There is, I believe, one answer to this question, and it is that there
is an attitude of materialism prevailing through the analysis on the
part of the practitioner, which if not guarded against is absorbed by
the patient. The process of "re-education" is seldom entertained by
the Freudian analyst, and even if it were it is not likely that religious
direction would have any place in it. As long as the Freudians persist
with the idea that religion is an illusion no patient of theirs will
receive any religious guidance, and whilst relief and freedom may be
gained in many ways, the fulfilment of the personality will remain an

ideal still to be achieved. We recognise that it is not the concern of the analyst to give clear, harmonious and comprehensive arguments for religion, but he cannot escape the responsibility of giving direction to the instinctive energies of his patient. None would discourage the redirecting of the sex instinct after the repressive forces have been removed, and for the reason that sex is as much a reality as anything can be. But for the Freudian religion is false and an illusion, and he is therefore not in a position to give direction to the religious need. For him the need is non-existent, and man can live successfully without God. In fact he would say of all religious people that they are only sublimating their sex feelings. This was the chief criticism Freud made of his faithful disciple Pfister. But, further, it must be remembered that the analyst in a sense supplants God in the mind of the patient, and in a deep analysis the emotional bond between the analyst and his patient becomes very strong. One of my patients who was analysed by a Viennese psychologist - a disciple of Freud - for about seven years, never ceases telling me what Dr. X. did for her. Having to flee the country Dr. X. broke off the analysis at a point in her history where the child usually feels the omnipotence of the father. By now Dr. X. has displaced her father, and all her childlike feelings are directed towards him. She not only believes in his authority, but is dependent upon him for everything she does. His word is law, and his rejection of religion in toto has persuaded her that her Jewish faith is an unnecessary appendage to her life.

Now there are two interesting features in this patient's present
(a) She still feels helpless, and this she recognises; but it is not the ordinary helplessness of the average person, it is something much more exasperating, and at times makes her impotent to cope with anything. She says, "I want to be a child again," and though she constantly tells herself "Stand on your own feet," she is dogged by the same interminable question "If so?" Since the analysis she has repressed her religious instinct, to say to her that what she really needs now is God would promptly provoke the reply, "But Dr. X. did not believe in God."

Then

(b) She readily admits that her response to nature is now more complete than before she went to Dr. X. The sun, moon and stars arouse feelings of joy in her, the songs of wild birds thrill her with delight, and the country-side breathes peace and goodwill to her in a manner which formerly she never knew. She also admits that since her analysis she has been much more impressed by the "love" - as she calls it - of good Christian people than before the analysis began. Churches, clergy, and dogmas all mean nothing to her, but the life of a good Christian makes her feel that there must be some truth in Christianity not to be found in Judaism. For a few years she has read carefully the life of Jesus, and she confesses to a deep impression which His teaching and healing works have made upon her. Nevertheless she still remains in a dilemma between her response to Dr. X. and her response to religion as she sees it in certain Christian people. Had Dr. X. not been anti-religious this conflict would not now exist. But it is impossible for her to separate his atheism
from himself; to her they are one and the same, and to embrace religion would mean forsaking her own "god." Therefore it is fair to conclude that whilst the patient is being analysed to a very considerable extent he absorbs the attitude of the analyst.

My work has made me aware of one very significant fact that emerges after the analysis has been conducted for some time - the patient reveals either a strong positive feeling for myself, or a love of his own unconscious. He wishes to continue with the analysis either because he dreads being separated from me, or because his narcissistic interest urges him to further inquiry. It is at this stage of the analysis that the process of re-education begins; unobtrusive direction is offered, and each question is answered as impartially as is humanly possible, whether it be about sex, society, or religion. Persuasion is not introduced into this kind of treatment, in fact it is guarded against because the patient must be left free to choose the future course of his life. Guiding principles are given, but how they are applied is not the decision of the analyst. One of these is religious, not because it is a peculiar interest of the analyst, as gardening or fishing might be, but because it is a fundamental of man's life, and God is as much a necessity as any other object of cathexis. The patient, however, is left aware of his own needs, he is never forced to take religion any more than he is forced to take a wife. But it is my experience, confirmed by other analysts like Brown and Jung, that each person who has subjected himself to a deep or prolonged analysis shows the same practical interest in religion as he does in any other aspect of the human life.
Experience has taught me that many who are professedly interested in religion are as far removed from the \textit{fulfilment of the need} as the man who is anti-religious-minded. The religious energies can easily be misdirected into ego channels, thereby strengthening the egotism of the individual under the guise of pure religiosity. What some men have termed "the call of God" is no other than the call of the self to satisfy desires motivated by some unconscious influence. Many a clergymen would unobtrusively leave his profession if he were analysed; and, if perchance the analyst were a pure Freudian for whom he developed a strong affective attachment, he might conceivably forsake religion completely. It was my privilege to analyse a young clergymen who was troubled with the fear of being involved in homo-sexual practices. The analysis revealed a strong "parson-phantasy," which was encouraged by the patient's mother - a woman of strong, resolute will - when he was in the age of phantasy-making. At about eight years of age he joined the cathedral choir of his native city, and this gave him an opportunity of developing his phantasy. He showed an early interest in architecture, but it was confined to his beloved cathedral. Closely associated with this particular interest was the study of monastic life, which produced ideas of celibacy and led him to believe that a life truly dedicated to the service of the Church must entail a complete renunciation of matrimony. The pattern of the clerical life became clear as the different associations were synthesised, and the persistence of the "parson-phantasy" more or less determined his choice of the clerical profession.

His sex instinct was by no means repressed by the ideas of celibacy, and when at the university he fell in love with a girl. For the first time
he felt keenly a conflict between his religious ideals and the urge of his sex nature. Residing, however, in a hostel where celibacy among the students was encouraged, he eventually forsook his "lady-love" and strove to concentrate upon the ideal presented to him daily by the very atmosphere of his environment. His sexual feelings he tried to sublimate by a greater interest in his colleagues, and this doubtless engendered his fear of homo-sexuality. After some months of a searching analysis he saw the emotional basis for wanting to be a clergyman and a celibate. His fear disappeared, and so did his primary desire. He saw no reason why he should remain in the Church, and wondered whether or not he ought to look for other work. He was advised, however, to do nothing hastily, but to await further results of the analysis. Eventually there came a greater religious freedom, which enabled him to see that he could serve God as a clergyman quite as well as in any other profession. But there was this difference - he became more dynamic and effective in his work, whereas formerly he was conventional and typical of the traditional priest.

It follows, then, that even among those who are professedly religious there are some whose religious energies, whilst not bound up with anti-theistic ideas, are directed towards ego ideas, and for this reason their lives lack the completion found in a man who knows what it means to experience the presence of the living God. But the fact that some people have misinterpreted their egotistical aims and experiences as religious, does not mean for one single moment that religious aims are false and all experience illusory. Let me quote here the words of one
of the most outstanding of agnostics - J.B.S. Haldane: "Religious and moral experiences are facts. Most people can obtain a certain amount of religious experience by a very moderate effort. It would be ridiculous not to interpret it." (1). Haldane believes that the interpretation of religious experience is still in a pre-scientific stage, but this does not weaken the reality of the experience itself. "There is something true in theology, because it leads to right action in some cases, and serves to explain certain otherwise difficultly explicable facts about the human soul."

It surely would be ridiculous to dispose of the experience of God because we cannot fully explain what we mean by it, though it is never to be confused with an idea about God. It is indeed the delight and joy of theologians to speculate and to engage in intellectual contests on the nature of God, but even they may wander away from the real object of the religious life, and lose themselves in the labyrinth of theological ideas. The testimony of their lives is then of no more religious value than that of the philosopher - of a man like Croce, who argues that "religion is simply an imperfect and misleading form of philosophy, which can exist only so long as the human mind is unable to rise to a theoretical apprehension of Reality." (2). Now my reason for stating this fact is two-fold. In the first place, merely to argue about God and religion is never convincing, because religion means an attitude of mind and heart towards life in which God is both transcendent and immanent - transcendent in the sense that He is the author and creator of life,

immanent in so far as he is a part of man's environment. Then in the second place, an experience of the living God is more vital than any religious idea can be. To preach about the word of God can never be as convincing as proclaiming it through one's life. The religious experience, like every other, penetrates the whole of man's personality and is absorbed in his emotional make-up; but ideas are accepted by the intellect, and do not influence human behaviour to the same extent as the experience can. I do not deny the right of any thinker to speculate about the nature of the Divine Personality, so long as he remembers that he is engaged upon an inquiry which may be academic or otherwise. But theologians and philosophers would do well to remember Dean Matthews' words: "The opinions of 'ordinary men' in religion and morals are worthy of more attention than they commonly receive from philosophers, for, though they may lack logical consistency, they are formed in that commerce of the life of humanity from which our data in theology and ethics must be drawn. We shall find reason to believe that the plain man is right in this question of the divine personality. His conviction that God must be personal is based upon his own religious life and what he has gathered of the religious experience of others; but his suspicion that God must be personal in a mode different from that of human personality is also based partly on some moments of religious feeling as well as on the vague reflection that the divine Nature must be very different from ours." (1).

If, as we believe, religion is a natural function of man's life,

(1) "The Living and Personal God." p. 159.
those who wish to convert the heathen and direct the youth of Christian homes must be clear about two things: (a) That what they believe is transformed into action; (b) that their presentation of what they believe is simple enough for the ordinary mind to understand it. The apparent impracticability of religion is, as we have seen, a decisive influence in the shaping of the adolescent's mind towards unbelief. This is equally true of the uneducated atheist, and also of the passive thinker, whose mental inertness demands obvious verification of every statement or theory. Unless the pragmatic value can be demonstrated in an unmistakable way, those who make no claim to be seers or prophets will have little or no use for it. Shelley and Swinburne are our classic examples of the reactionary movement against religion in the last century, because those who professed Christianity not only failed to commend belief by the example of their own lives, but also hindered progress by hemming in human freedom. This failure on the part of certain religious people by no means confined to the age of Shelley and Swinburne was, and still is, partly due to a lack of altruism, and of control over human passions and desires, and partly to false and confusing predicates of God; which brings me to my second contention: if religion is to be commended successfully to men and women who have no use for it, it must be presented in a convincingly simple and understandable way.

W.E. Hocking says: "......atheism is truer than many a florid religiosity whose God is but a surfeited agglomerate of laudatory epithets. Atheism is the proper purgative for this kind of religion; and has been historically an indispensable agency in deepening and keep-
ing sound the knowledge of God." (1). Whether or not we also regard atheism as an indispensable agency for the future to bring theologians down to earth, we are compelled to admit that many of the terms used by religious thinkers and leaders have not only been unsatisfying, but vague and confusing as well. The "ordinary man" has been puzzled by them, and thinking that they had nothing to offer him he has either left religion alone or suspended judgment about it. To use glibly such terms as "justification by faith" or "the redemptive act of God" only confuses the minds of people who are not too clear of their meaning. There ought not to be an academic mystery about religion, particularly for those who are in touch with God and know what it means to experience His goodness and providence. It was not so with the Founder of Christianity. His religion could be clearly and simply stated - a belief in God as creator of the universe around Him, as the Father of all mankind, and one with whom communion is possible for all. In this belief He placed His faith, and upon that faith He based His words and actions without arguing about God or "the hereafter;" and the simple folk followed Him and many believed in His teaching. "Jesus Christ impressed men and women by the freshness and the confidence of His teaching. He did not repeat other people's opinions, and He did not speak hesitatingly. He spoke surely and out of His own experience. It was this which made Him such a force in the world of His day, and it is this which still attracts men to Him." (2).

make intelligible the great truths of religion which were enunciated by Jesus Himself, is to be accounted for, at least in part, by their interest in academic speculations, and by their mental gymnastics that have made it possible for them to hurl thought forms at their hearers, regardless of whether their congregations understood them or not. Milton put his finger on the difficulty when he wrote in "Lycidas" "The hungry sheep look up and are not fed." When the "common folk" heard Jesus they were glad. His teaching gave them hope and lifted them out of the despair into which the legalism of the Scribes and Pharisees had plunged them. But from what very many of the "common folk" of today have told me about sermons, either they are afflicted by them with acute mental indigestion, or they feel that religion is so remote or detached from ordinary life that it cannot have any usefulness for them. David Yellowlees hits the nail right on the head when he writes: "I wonder if ministers realise how many excellent people today are - to the great loss of all concerned - simply and deliberately refusing to think, to use their minds, about religion, because they cannot see how to square their early ideas, their loyalty to parents and teachers, their vague fears of the wrath of God towards unbelievers, and some of the doctrines which, rightly or wrongly, they suppose the Church to hold as fundamental, with their own observation of the world as it is and with such scientific and psychological knowledge as they may possess." (1). Not only is the teaching of the Church lacking in simplicity, it is also confusing. This men and women believe not because there are many different Churches existing side by side, but because of what they teach. The

(1) "Psychology's Defence of the Faith." p. 70.
distinct and unbridgeable gulfs between the Roman, the Anglican, and the Non-conformist Churches are incompatible with the teaching of Jesus. How then can any of them be true? When this verdict is passed people tend to dismiss the authority of the Church with a shrug, and though they may profess to be able to love God and worship Him in isolation, their religious lives suffer because they grow careless and indifferent to the things of the spirit, and their indifference leads to doubt which eventually inhibits all desire.

We have seen that the confusion of ideas about God, Christ, and the Church has largely contributed to the unbelief of adolescents and others. We may go further and say that as a result of this confusion men and women have wrongly conceived the application of religion, and wrongly anticipated the efficacy of prayer. Some kind of corrective was urgently needed, and the world is in a sense indebted to atheists like Nietzsche, Bradlaugh, and Freud who, whilst averting their own many mental conflicts through their violent attacks on religion, have done much to stimulate Christian thought and to compel us to state again what we mean by our terms. Nietzsche, the thinker, challenged our beliefs in God. Unmercifully he attacked the teachings of Jesus, and the Christian meaning of sin, redemption, and humility. His challenging attack compelled religious leaders to leave their respective camps and come out to meet a common foe. Bradlaugh quickened the interest of the common people in religion, even though they were aroused to indiscreet and violent action against him. And his criticism of the Bible, of the historical truth of Jesus, of the pitiful failure of pro-
fessing Christians to practise what they believed, roused religious leaders to defend the Church and her teachings against the terrific onslaught of his speeches and propaganda. Freud in his attempt to explain away religion as an illusion has brought forth archaeological evidences that upset his premises, and equally strong arguments from equally famous psychologists to repudiate his theories by pointing out that his conclusions are the projections of his own complexes, and his theory the reflection of his own unconscious. In meeting the challenge of such unbelievers as Nietzsche, Bradlaugh, and Freud, the defenders of religion have not only strengthened their claim to truth, but have also done much to purify our ideas about God and to clarify our thinking about religious experience.

All aggressive atheists have unwittingly made some valuable contribution to religious thought and action. Their criticisms have often been unbalanced and indiscreet, unsound and partial, but to my mind they reveal an inner restlessness that demands something more satisfying than the Church has offered or is now offering. Constructive criticism is helpful to all who are wise enough to accept it, but even negative criticisms have their value in so far as they provoke us to defend our theories, arguments and premises. But such an attempt on our part may easily reveal the weaknesses of our own position, and we may see thrown into relief the false elements in our theories, and the wide gaps in our thinking will become so obvious even to ourselves that we shall promptly attend to them and proceed to close them.

The silent withdrawal of non-vocal atheists is leaving the ranks
of religion numerically weaker, and the minority of succeeding genera-
tions of Christians will increase unless some effort is made to stop the
rot. In the light of modern psychology it would be both futile and
feeble to tell unbelievers that they must repent of their sins and turn
again to God. This kind of preaching and teaching has long become a
mere platitude. Nor is it enough merely to impress them with the fact
of man's failure to lift himself out of a ditch by pushing against the
straps of his braces. As psychologists as well as Christian teachers
we must recognise that there is some reason, usually of an emotional
kind, preventing the unbeliever from directing his religious life towards
its natural goal, and so long as the inhibitory factor or factors are
allowed to persist the individual will be incapable of responding to
any religious appeal. In past years the tendency was to condemn the
unbeliever, as did the Psalmist who wrote "The fool hath said there is
no God," to ostracise him as a true son of the devil, and to regard him
as an infidel who has chosen to set his will against the Holy One. To-
day we cannot even feel reluctance in admitting that the atheist is not
necessarily a fool, a wretched sinner, or a wilful defier of God. With
no thought of being charitable we must regard him as one whose reli-
igious life is repressed or misdirected for a reason that can be brought
to the light of the conscious mind - providing always that he is willing
to accept the help which the Christian psychologist can offer him.

Flint says: "......there can be little doubt that he (the unbeliever)
may so contradict himself, so violate the most essential principles of
his own nature as to persuade himself that there is no reason in the
universe higher than his own, no good which is not earthly and perishable, no righteous judge, no infinite and eternal God. The number of those who have gone this length may not have been so large as it has sometimes been represented. Many have certainly been called atheists unjustly and calumnioulsy. Some may possibly have professed themselves to be atheists who really professed a religious belief which they overlooked. But that there have been atheists - that there are atheists - cannot reasonably be denied." (1). Today we go further than Flint could go in his day; we not only admit the fact of atheism among us, but, if we have the opportunity, we search for its causes. Whether the atheist is capable of explaining and defending his unbelief, or whether he is passively content with his attitude of mind, we are now called upon to respect and understand him, and to explain his unbelief in terms of modern psychology. The method which has been used in an effort to explain away religion can be used to discover the conscious or unconscious motive urging the unbeliever to renounce and reject that aspect of human life without which no man is ever complete. This method is not to be confused with any of the "black arts" because psychology has not, as yet, established its claim to rank among the pure sciences; but it must be recognised and accepted as a knowledge that has evolved from the conscientious and meticulously careful experiments and observations of men whose approach to the subject of their enquiry is as sincere and discriminating in the cause of truth as that of the chemist or the physicist. Further, it is a method that can be used universally, and for the same purpose whenever necessary; for man wherever he may be is re-

(1) "Anti-theistic Theories." p. 6.
ligious in so far as he reaches beyond himself to a Being or Power with whom he feels an affinity.

In the Church there is a real need for the Christian specialist who knows how to deal with all who are desirous of removing their inhibitions and setting free their religious life. I do not suggest that every clergyman or minister should be a practising psychologist in the sense of being able to analyse away the unconscious conflicts of those who consult him; but he should be sufficiently equipped with a knowledge of the mental processes to be able to recognise that psychological condition which if allowed to persist will manifest itself in an attitude of unbelief. He can then advise those seeking his aid, and if necessary refer them to the highly skilled Christian psycho-therapist who regards his healing work as his special ministry. The Lambeth Conference recognised in 1930 the desire on the part of many leading Churchmen that the clergy "should be equipped by training in psychology and be given some acquaintance with the methods and principles of healing. Only so will the clergy be enabled rightly to direct the thought of their people on the subject and discriminate between truth and error." The clergyman or minister who has passed through an adequate psychological training is thereby much better able to appreciate the difficulties of the adolescents in his church or congregation, and will have learned not to expect too much from them in their response to spiritual teaching. He will treat with respect and caution the effervescent religious declarations of the adolescent - and of older people too - and will regard with sympathy and understanding the earnest enquiry or obstinate doubt of
others. One young woman came to me because she was suffering from epileptic attacks. She was sent to a medical psychologist, and later returned to me for a number of therapeutic talks which she afterwards confessed had helped her in a way that reduced the frequency of her attacks. During one interview she told me that her attacks only began after she had been at a Sunday School Conference where the need for a personal experience of God's grace was emphasised. She spoke to the leader of the Conference about her own desire for such an experience - but, "How can I get it?" The reply she received was: "Well, it just comes to you if you keep on wanting it." This intensely disappointed her, and she left the Conference frustrated and doubting whether there was any reality in the experiences professed by many religious people. Now I do not suggest that the Conference leader was indifferent to her inquiry, or that her sense of frustration was the precipitating cause of her epilepsy - that might have been just coincidental with the trouble. But had he approached her problem psychologically as well as spiritually he might have sensed the presence of factors inhibiting the fulfilment of her genuine desire.

Finally, the clergyman or minister with a psychological approach to his work in addition to his spiritual attitude, will give a heightened effect to the worship of his congregation, his pastoral work will be more effective and helpful, he will better guide his Sunday School teachers in their religious instruction of the young, will wisely counsel his leaders in their handling of the youth in his Church. There is room for a corrective psychology in the work of every Church, and this, coupled with a sound, reliable, and healthy religious teaching, will do much to eliminate the ranks of the unbelievers.
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