AN EXAMINATION OF BOSANQUET'S DOCTRINE
of
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE.

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An Examination of Bosanquet's Doctrine of Self-Transcendence.

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Prefatory Note.

In undertaking this examination the writer was moved by a belief, formed in the course of earlier studies of Bosanquet, that the doctrine of self-transcendence would bear a scrutiny closer than any he had yet attempted, and should prove the more valuable and illuminating as an interpretation of what are called the 'higher experiences' of man, the further it was scrutinised. It appeared to be, in large measure, true.

After working for some time, not upon the doctrine especially, but upon the other characteristic doctrines of Bosanquet, his theory of identity, of the universal, of the judgment, of nature and mind, and his general theory of knowledge and its presuppositions, the writer found his initial prepossession had vanished, its place to be taken by a wonder that arguments which now appear manifestly false should have seemed so convincing.

It is impossible to conduct such a study as this in a purely impartial vein, for every issue it must touch is living and acutely controverted. It is surely best to avoid the pretence of neutrality and freely to take sides while according the best possible account on all sides and remembering that in grave issues final solutions are unattainable, and every serious attempt deserving of respect.
The task, therefore, is to recite sufficiently Bosanquet's doctrine of self-transcendence; to touch on the influences historical and philosophical that bear upon its formation; to show its intimacy with the rest of his system and especially its dependence upon certain 'logical' - in the wide English sense of the term - doctrines which are very probably false; and to show that in the event of their failure the doctrine of self-transcendence must, in its given shape, fall with them.

It is by no means a general truth that because the ostensible foundations of a doctrine are open to destruction the doctrine must itself be wholly false: it may, on the contrary be largely true, but upon other grounds than those destroyed. Where, however, a doctrine is as essentially connected with the surrounding tissue as is this that we are examining, a really radical defect anywhere in the system is bound to affect calamitously every vital detail. There can be no doubt that self-transcendence in Bosanquet's sense is vitally integrated with a more than questionable view of the universal, with the principle of individuality such which is, as Professor Webb observes, no principle at all.

1. 'Divine Personality and Human Life.' p. 229.
and with a metaphysical theory which demies all that is required to make either term 'self' or 'transcendence' intelligible. Nevertheless Bosanquet does cite in illustration of his doctrine situations which do seem genuinely to involve self-transcendence, and these we shall review after drawing our chief conclusions from a detailed examination of the doctrine in one region, namely that of knowledge.

The whole field covered by Bosanquet's speculation has been closely fought over in his lifetime and since. It is therefore unlikely that any important point can now be raised which has not already caught the attention of one or other of the interested students.

We may name as contributing richly to the study of this field the following: the late Professor J. Cook Wilson, Professor Pringle-Pattison, Professor G. F. Stout, Professor Clement Webb, Professor N. Kemp Smith and Professor Taylor. To these the writer would add Baron Friedrich Von Hügel, from whom he learns the more, the more closely he studies him.

These critics of Bosanquet do not take the same line of criticism, but there is a marked agreement that the root defect must lie in logical errors. To this we would add - what has not been emphasised - in a confusion of logic and ontology.
Since the whole philosophy of Bosanquet might be called an account of the many levels or stages of self-transcendence into which reality is driven in its own activity of self-maintenance it is obvious that the omission from our account of any essential detail of his whole system would be a fault. The only question we have to settle, therefore, is how far we may select, and how much can we omit. It is plainly impossible to give a decision on all of the grave issues that must arise, and there must appear a gap in the theme wherever such omission is resorted to.

Most of the writing about Bosanquet has been severely critical - with but a few notable exceptions - and in adding a word to the long indictment the writer recognises his debt. Bosanquet can be the more readily criticised when lesser writers are secure because he is farther out in the open than they, and presses his work more thoroughly. He knows the crucial points, and ranges freely about them. This is to the immense advantage of the student who comes after him.

In presenting this thesis the writer wishes further to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Professor Kemp Smith, and of the members of the Department of Logic in the University of Edinburgh.

Where, in the following, points are stated with the

1 Of course we take objection to this below.
appearance of dogmatism, the writer would have them qualified with a blanket admission of the tentative character of what is said. It may appear that Bosanquet is condemned before being heard, since the criticism advances from a particular point of view. But this is not so, since that viewpoint has only been reached by progressive departures from the position of the author criticised. We set out with a mind to defend a 'forlorn hope'; it is simply the fortune of war and the weight of the argument that brings us home with the host.
INTRODUCTION.

The doctrine of self-transcendence is no accident in Bosanquet's system; rather it is his whole philosophy viewed, as it were, through one of its windows. For this reason our study, although it is not nominally so far reaching would be defective did it not regard this whole and all the parts from its special point of view. Self-transcendence is present, Bosanquet maintains, in all experience of intelligent beings, in every pulse and movement of the brute creation, in every growing thing and in every process of inanimate nature - the burning of the sun, or the flowing of the streams. This universal scope belongs to self-transcendence because it is correlative and complementary to the principle of individuality under which Bosanquet brings all things.

It is the kind of monism to which Bosanquet holds that forces self-transcendence into such prominence. Monism, so late as 1908, could be called the dominant type of philosophy in this country; but not all were as uncompromising as that of Bradley, and of Bosanquet after him. Bradley's


2. We may, perhaps, regard F. H. Bradley as an antecedent of Bosanquet, for although the two seem to have arrived independently at similar conclusions from a concurrent study of the same authorities, and influenced one another throughout their lives, it was Bradley's "Principles of Logic" which called forth Bosanquet's first essay in philosophical logic. An interesting
concern is to show that, being wholly infected with internal contradiction, no appearance open to sense or understanding has any place as such in reality, which must be thought of, if at all - for in thinking of reality we seek to bring it into the infected area of appearance - as wholly coherent, internally consistent and non-contradictory. These last are the best analogies which thought and language (fit only for dealing with appearances) can find for the true character of reality - with the possible exception of an alleged pure unity of feeling. Bradley is not, especially in his later writings intentionally illusionist, but at bottom his theory insists that the real is nowhere truly represented in this, the only world we know. Since, therefore, for Bradley, this world comes scarcely short - if at all - of illusion, he has no strong motive to examine and order in a scale of being - which is not reality, but a distortion of it - the finite individuals of our experience. But in even so uncompromising

1. ctd. study may be made of the few points of divergence between them. In view of the current criticism of Bosanquet it is odd to find him mildly reproaching Bradley in 'Knowledge and Reality' for alighting the distinctions within the real - a difference which brought the one to insist upon the gulf between appearance and reality and the other to write freely of the 'value and destiny of the finite individual.' The difference is of emphasis only.

1. It may be doubted whether feeling is any better description of such a reality as Bradley takes the universe to be, and whether feeling is essentially unobjectified any more than thought.

2. Since an illusion is a mis-representation of something which is real.
an Absolutist much of his work is better than is his ultimate theory, and a full account would have to reckon with many fine utterances concerning the place and work of beings such as we.

Bosanquet, on the other hand, holds his ultimately Bradleian principles in abeyance, and assures his readers with ready optimism that 'this world is all the world there is' and that it is really disclosed in knowledge. He therefore proceeds without qualification to consider individuals and to assign their 'degree of individuality.'

"My study has mainly consisted," he writes, "in a critical survey of experience." To this we might retort that philosophy can consist of nothing else. This aside, however, Bosanquet does set himself a study significantly different from that of Bradley. The latter proposes not a critical survey of experience, but "A critical study of first principles." Thus he describes his 'Appearance and Reality,' but it equally describes his view of philosophy and his own work in it.

Philosophy obviously cannot get along without its principles, but no less obviously these cannot be arrived at, nor considered apart from the material of experience, in which they are embodied. In both of these respects Bradley seems

1. Meeting of Extremes p. xi.
to err; and his apprehension of the materials seems really
to be distorted by his one-sided emphasis upon first prin­
ciples, as if they were the rules to which experience must con­
form if it is to be accepted, instead of being, as they are,
themselves involved in experience.

Bosanquet, with the same principles as Bradley, and
believing with him in the one reality, the Absolute Individual,
and having a more acute sense of responsibility for the
variety of finite individuals, is moved to seek a mediating
principle by which the appearances may somehow be saved, and
the first principle vindicated; that is, by which he may sat­
isfy the claim both of the many and the one. Bradley adopted
the 'short way' with the problem by denying the reality of the
many; Bosanquet, less consistently but with a truer insight,
attempted their reconciliation by means of the doctrine of
self-transcendence. This and the principle of individuality
together constitute his solution of the whole philosophical
problem.

The latter if pressed alone would, if taken in Bosan­
quet's sense, make of reality an unmitigated unity; or if in
the sense in which individuality is the presupposition both of
life and of philosophy—namely the finite individual—to an
unmitigated multiplicity. The former points to the
reconciliation of the many and the one by showing that finite individuals transcend themselves in the effort of self-maintenance, and so break down the boundaries about the many and point to their unification in the whole. Reality as a whole, therefore, is sustained by a tension between the two poles of unity and multiplicity.

According to this account it is evident that finite individuals are not strictly individuals at all, though they are permitted the name because they exhibit in a limited and incomplete way the character of perfect individuality or wholeness. They are apparently individual because our intelligences cannot but isolate and treat them* as self-contained. This semblance of isolation the mind is then compelled to negate when contradiction and connection become explicit.

Likewise the 'principle of individuality' is not what the schoolmen meant by the 'principium individuationis': on the contrary its bearing is that there is no individual short of the Absolute. Bosanquet's system fails of any such principle.

Finite individuality consists, according to Bosanquet, in a claim to individuality - a claim never realised or realisable. On the other hand Bosanquet tells us that finite individuals are, as his scheme assigns place to them, 'all that they claim'. How these two can be held together is a mystery: a part, doubtless, of the mystery of finitude.

"Certainly for myself" he writes "if an idealist were

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1. I have maintained elsewhere that this fundamental of Bosanquet's view, that 'self-existence', 'independence' or 'isolation' is actually predicated and then negated, is false. See pp.120-122.
to tell me that a chair is really not what we commonly take it to be, but something altogether different, I should be tempted to reply in language below the dignity of controversy ... but when you come to ask further questions there is much more to be said. 1

If we indulge the fancy to ask these further questions there is no stopping short of knowing all about the Absolute. Every finite individual reveals this kind of connection with the rest of reality which, when questions are asked, drives us to ask of the Absolute what the individual really is. This is because the finite individual is not what it seems, but is rather undergoing self-transcendence towards individuality.

These two, then, together render a complete account of all process in the universe. Each implies the other, and is therefore, in a sense, a whole account in itself: but the two views they respectively afford throw light each upon the other. The principle of individuality according to Bosanquet is derived from the nature of the real which to form wholes within wholes, and of the lesser to form greater wholes: the doctrine of self-transcendence is derived from observation of the same character in its tendency to dissolve the boundaries of the lesser wholes in order to make them the greater.

1. ibid. p. 5.  2. To this Bosanquet is driven by his confusion of being and explanation, also, as Stout maintains, of being and the conditions of being. See also p. 102
The one might be regarded as the tendency of reality to form provisional wholes or individuals as 'way-points' to individuality: the other as the repudiation of this provisional individuality in the interest of a wider and compacter individuality envisaged and sought for. The individual, so-called, is individual only by isolation, by fixing for purposes of recognition and the like, of what is really a non-isolable element in a continuum of being.

The presupposition of philosophy is that there are finite individuals. Bosanquet, however, presupposes the Individual, and the doctrine of self-transcendence is his attempt at reconciliation of his presupposition with that which is the presupposition of all philosophy.

But we can no longer withhold an important criticism to which Bosanquet's account is liable. For self-transcendence to hold in any legitimate sense there must be a real, however subordinate individual to undergo this transcendence. When, however, all necessary qualification is made, Bosanquet's account is not of individuals undergoing self-transcendence, but of motions, tensions, expansions, contractions - all such spatio-temporal, mechanical similes though our only terms are themselves ultimately inapplicable - within the continuum of the

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1. See below p. 1. 1. See e.g. Principle p. 69, top of page.
real, a reality that admits of no distinctions deep enough to constitute a real but subordinate individual. Further, these motions, tensions, expansions and contractions Bosanquet erroneously terms self-transcendences, there being no selves to transcend but mere tendencies to selfhood, 'claims to individuality' never realised or fulfilled.

11. The following are comments on some of the historical affiliations - real or claimed by Bosanquet - of the doctrine of self-transcendence.

Bosanquet is fond of alluding to his manner of holding together of unity and multiplicity as "fully in the spirit of Plato" - this, or a kindred phrase. It may be ventured that his claim is ill-founded. Plato's ultimate principle of unity is the Good. But the Good is not God. He has nowhere worked out the relation of the two, nor of their relation to the world, but his whole attitude to the problem - especially if we can give weight to such a reading between the lines as Von Hügel, e.g. in his essay "Suffering and God" thinks proper - would certainly seem other than can be stated in the terms of Bosanquet's pure immanentism.

Bosanquet can lay solid claim to spiritual sympathy with Spinoza, whose Substance is, allowing for differences of

1. Value and Destiny p. 12. Also Logic 1. p. 73.
2. There may, e.g., be marked in Bosanquet the same genuinely religious spirit as that which so notably characterises Spinoza - and with it the same defects of theory calamitous to all that religion requires.
language, virtually identical to his own Absolute or Individual. Spinoza, however, saves himself some of Bosanquet's troubles by suggesting no process by which the finite modes are related to the infinite substance. If he had sought to work out the relation, then it is probable that a kind of self-transcendence such as that of Bosanquet would have been the result.

He has obviously drawn deeply, in matter and spirit, upon Hegel, both from the source and from the stream. He came eventually to say that what he had derived from Hegel might have been drawn at first hand from Spinoza; but this does not qualify his debt to the former, which in substance, method and terms is at times almost literal. The architec­tonic of his 'Logic' is a witness to the influence of Hegel; as is his notion of the function of logical science. His doctrine of self-transcendence does not differ radically from the 'Dialectic of Thought' which Hegel seeks to exhibit as the vital connection of all spheres of reality from mere being to Absolute Idea or Spirit.

Over the detail of his indebtedness to Hegelians it is not profitable to linger; but in one of them - R. D. Nettleship - we find a spirit with which Bosanquet was wholly in sympathy and from which he gathered suggestions profoundly influential in the development of his own system. We

1. For this see L. Roth in 'Mind' N.S. 36. p. 208.
therefore touch upon this connection. We may safely say that Nettleship is the proximate source of some of the most characteristic emphases of Bosanquet's maturest thought.

The dominating conviction in the writing of Nettleship is that all being is continuous; that there can be no lines drawn about any individual which are not arbitrary or provisional, and which the being so circumscribed cannot set at nought.

"We soon realise, on thinking, that there is no circle to be drawn round any one, within which all is 'personal', and without all is 'impersonal'. We realise what may be called the continuity of things." And "Everybody is continuous with a good deal more than the space six feet round him and the time an hour on each side of him." (Remains p. 5.) Further "I get to feel that what we call the 'individual life' is a merely arbitrary space round which we draw lines of our own ... The only real individual seems to be the Absolute." (p. 82).

Touching directly on the doctrine of self-transcendence we may remark in Nettleship the following:

"When a person makes a box, or a tune, or a law, does he 'take in' or 'give out' the most? It is impossible to make any distinction. You say indifferently, 'he puts himself into the wood' or 'he takes the wood into himself'. At any given point you can analyse it into 'wood' and 'him',

but it is only your analysis; the fact is indivisible, and that fact is just individuality. If he says indignantly "I am not a box" that is only because he is aware that he is other things as well." (Remains p. 55-56.)

"To be 'interested' literally means to be 'in it'. We experience a thing just in proportion as we are 'in it' or (to use another graphic phrase) make it our own." (p. 17) and "The less we 'get out of a thing' or the less we put of ourselves into it, the less we are, the less there is of us." (p. 16) This he gives with qualification "At least it is true, isn't it, that the times when one is most fully satisfied, most sure, most up-lifted, are just the times when one is least conscious of (our italics) any distinction between that in which one is satisfied and oneself." (p. 53) Without qualification "We are the thing which we understand." (p. 81) "I am what I realise." (p. 54)

Here we have before us the full material which later appears in Bosanquet's doctrine of self-transcendence. The thought they convey is not peculiar to Nettleship, but is common to the tradition he represented; the emphasis and the language, however, is precisely that which reappears in the Gifford Lectures where the doctrine is fully developed.

The insight which led Nettleship to this kind of
expression is most valuable to philosophy; but the ex-
pression itself is capable of various and perilous inter-
pretation. It is probable that Nettleship meant by these
what, in Bosanquet, we take to be erroneous; but it would
be unjust to press them as if they were - they make no pre-
bence of being - guarded philosophical utterances. We may
not take from the "Remains" more than their occasional
character warrants. But their similarity to statements
given absolutely and with the gravity of final philosophy
in Bosanquet is most marked.

While remarking this indebtedness we may point
several other similarities between these two writers.

"If it were possible" Nettleship writes "to
realise fully what one is, or what one is doing, at the
most commonplace point of one's life, one would realise
eternity - in fact, I suppose one would be God." (p. 69)

Against this we must maintain that there can be
no further end of finite striving than to be God-like.

Another passage conveying a thought similar to
that which appears in Bosanquet as the ground for his faith
in the security of 'values' in spite of the mortality of
of finite individuals:

1. See below pp.162-163.
"A being which was (so to say) always closing up with everything would change but would not die."

This, in Bosanquet's system, would stand without a 'so to say' except that which all 'spatio-temporal' predicates require. The doctrine of self-transcendence as it really stands (not as its name suggests) in the philosophy of Bosanquet is simply this 'closing up of everything.'

We may, to do justice to Nettleship, note as between him and Bosanquet a significant difference of tone and attitude in the midst of the tremendous problems he discusses; a difference not wholly accounted for by the diverse character of the writings we compare. Nettleship felt the provisional and limited nature of his solutions, whereas Bosanquet really believed that his solutions were, in the main, final.

"I'm afraid this raises that awful question of the Absolute being somehow or other present in every partial whole" (Remains p. 67 n.) Now this is an awful question: but Bosanquet regards it as simple and as settled out of hand.

In sum, notwithstanding these many signs of literal agreement between these two, it is probable that had

Nettleship attempted to work out in detail his philosophy which we only have before us in snatches not all compatible, he would have avoided some at least of the features which, as this essay proceeds, we shall point to as objectionable in Bosanquet. His loyalty to the immanentism of Hegel is put in question by his sympathetic discussion of Plotinus whom he recommends as the necessary authority for any student who would come to an understanding of the relation of God, Nature and the Self. The writer has no first-hand knowledge of Plotinus, but - relying upon the studies of W. R. Inge, C. C. J. Webb and A. E. Taylor - it seems manifest that Nettleship could not have followed him far and not fallen somewhat out of step with Hegel and with Bosanquet.

In respect of 'personality' also, Nettleship differs - probably not in terms only - from Bosanquet. "The only strength for me" he writes "is to be found in the sense of a personal presence everywhere." (Remains p. 72) Bosanquet finds in 'personality' a sign of that exclusiveness which is most destructive of individuality in his sense. On the other hand we find that, although his Absolute individual negates 'personality' and is scarcely a proper object for religious approach, he does hold toward it an attitude comparable to that of Nettleship's sense of a 'personal presence everywhere.'
20.

The Doctrine of Self-Transcendence in Knowledge.

It has been observed that the doctrine of self-transcendence is a necessary feature of a metaphysic which professes to show that the multiplicity of existents is really a unity of the type Bosanquet calls individual, and which proposes to indicate the general line along which the process to unification proceeds. We now turn to what Bosanquet recommends as a notable exhibition of the doctrine; for it will obviously not do merely to assert on the theoretical grounds as to what reality must be that these immensely varied things and selves with which we are surrounded somehow surrender themselves to super-ordinate wholes, and so finally 'make their contribution to the whole'. They must, so to speak, be caught in the act of self-transcendence.

The substance of his doctrine purports to be an account of the typical self-transcendences which occur at the

1. Strictly there seems no reason why, if the real be individual in Bosanquet's sense, there need be any process at all. But so to say would stop the game before it is played. Bosanquet would say that we start with process and infer individuality. But if individuality is inimical to process, and so it seems, what then? Bosanquet is rightly emphatic that necessity reigns: how then can we infer from process the sole ultimate reality of an individual to which process is not necessary, except, in some manner we cannot possibly find in our experience of it - i.e. as process within, which does not change the whole. In the world of appearances we must 'save' we have 'real process' only, and if individuality is inimical to this, then we must assume that there is something wrong with individuality. This may be mistaken, but the writer so thinks.
many levels of individuality - so called - which mark the way to, and comprise the one individual. For this reason a sufficient account of the self-transcendences characteristic of the human individual in his normal experience, private, social and religious will dispense with the longer story. There are self-transcendences of things as well as of selves, and we are plainly informed - as we must also suppose - that there are self-transcendences above the level of selves as we know them. But since this universal character is represented in the consciousness of the self-conscious finite individual it is a labour saving device simply to read off what is there written and so gain a clear account that will serve equally well for every other less explicit manifestation of the same. In self conscious mind, then, we see self-transcendence, as it were, under magnification, for here "the active spirit of totality, the nature of the whole working in the part" is not only explicit was working in the light of day, but, by virtue of the centre which it has evolved, enjoys immensely enhanced facility in its own exercise.

So, setting himself the task of "connecting in a single view the inherent factors of self-transcendence", he

1. Principle p. 112. 2. 'Factors' because there is really for Bosanquet only one self-transcendence as there is only one individual and one 'all inclusive judgment' (Meeting of Extremes p. 22. cf. "Essentials of Logic" p. 42) This one self-transcendence is the one movement of self-support of his 'differentiated whole', and the 'factors' are the self-transcendences of finite individuals. But surely the reverse of this should hold,
devotes himself especially to this one typical exhibition of it, in the whole experiential range of man, in cognition, affection, conation, his social relations and supremely in worship where, we are told, self-transcendence carries the individual past self-recognition.

We venture — before narrowing the field of our examination — to quote ‘in extenso’ several passages stating the doctrine as it applies to human finite individuals:

"The finite individual is a partial world, yet possessing within itself the principle of infinity, taken in the sense of the nisus towards absolute unity and self-completion." Value and Destiny p. 4.

"Belonging as it does to the continuum of the whole and unconsciously inspired by its unity, it is always passing beyond its given self in the attempt to resolve the contradictions which infect its being and obstruct its self-satisfaction." ibid. p. 12.

"Being double natured it is torn between its existence and its self-transcendence. For no finite existence as such can maintain itself in the whole without incurring contradiction, and the spirit of the whole, present in the finite mind, is bound in its intolerance of all contradiction to contradict its own existence. Thus the self, in the striving to...

2. ctd. since for self-transcendence to be intelligible there must be at once a self which is not the whole — and 'self-hood' is rightly denied of the whole — and something really outside of the self. In other connections Bosanquet remarks that this, as all his terms, is strictly inapplicable of the whole.
to complete itself will break in pieces every partial form of its own crystallised being, will welcome the chapter of accidents, and clothe itself in conflict and adventure."

ibid. p. 16-17.

It "fluctuates up and down the scale of reality" in "amplification and diminution of its microcosm."


And "As such, though fluctuating in range and energy, it has a relative and finite individual nature, an apparent individuality and a certain seeming persistence in time. Yet it has no barrier of division against the Absolute, with which it is continuous, so to speak in spatial and temporal similes, before and after, and on every side of its spatio-temporal being." ibid. p. 129.

"The finite infinite creature is always in a condition of self-transcendence. This is the same as saying that he is always endeavouring to pass beyond himself in achievement. That there is always scope for this, his membership of the universe guarantees. He is always a fragmentary being, inspired by an infinite whole, which he is for ever trying to express in terms of his limited range of externality. In this, ex hypothesi, he can never succeed. But this effort of his is never wasted or futile. It is a factor of the self-maintenance of the Universe, and so far is
a real achievement; and it constitutes ... an element in the Absolute." ibid p. 304

In these passages we have the doctrine - with all its difficulties 'in solution' - in its typical expression. We propose now to turn to self-transcendence as it is exhibited in cognition.

Any discussion, however, of Bosanquet's treatment of cognition either in this or in any other connection must be prefaced with the warning that it is impossible wholly to avoid ambiguity, since the accepted sense of all the language of apprehension implies a distinction of knower and known which Bosanquet in theory repudiates. For Bosanquet there is no reality whatever which stands simply in the situation of being known. The writer believes - as has been admirably shown by Cook Wilson - that "The genus consciousness and its species knowing are universals .. such that no account can be given of them in terms of anything but themselves. The attempt in such cases to give an explanatory account can only result in identical statements." The case of Bosanquet is even worse since it involves confusion of terms which for intelligibility must be deemed distinct. His 'explanation' of knowledge in the end simply runs together as applicable to the same process, knowing,

1. For justification of this see Logic 11. pp. 311 & 316.
expression and self-expression, sustaining, and finally creating. This being so it is surely beyond our power to give a clear rendering of an account in which all of these distinctions are slurred or wiped out. The only possible result, therefore of our detailed discussion may be that this confusion is made manifest.

Cognition Bosanquet treats as a sub-form of thought, and is a self-transcendence because it "emphatically exhibits the self-transcendent character of thought." "Not all thought is cognition" Bosanquet writes, "but all cognition is thought."

It is also a sub-form of conation which is itself "The operation of the nature of thought through the expansion of ideas into fact." Conation is not confined to cognition, but the latter is a special province of the former.

This is surely no more than another example of Bosanquet's method which he quite naively states in another connection as "Accepting ultimate Individuality ... to draw conclusions as to the nature and position of the .. beings to whom in a secondary sense we apply the term individuals."

1. In his "Meeting of Extremes" p. 7. Bosanquet insists that "The question of production against discovery, is neither here nor there in the problem of existence and reality." This is wholly misleading. If his own position be granted, which is that minds make, in some measure, what they know, then the distinction may be unimportant; but if it is in dispute, then this is the all important issue. We return to it below.
2. Principle p. 66. 3. ibid p. 65. 4. ibid p. 69.
here the subject matter is different but the treatment is the same. His running together of thought, cognition and conation is not the outcome of patient psychological research — by which alone can such a procedure be justified — but is demanded by his 'one factor' theory of the universe according to which all process must be shown to fall under the one formula of thought — 'the active spirit of totality present in every experience' — or the working, since it is active and not passive, of the Concrete Universal, or Principle of Individuality. Further it is surely an inversion which describes some thought as not cognition, but all cognition as thought. The contrary seems to hold; namely that all thought is cognition and that all cognition — even the most purely reflective — involves more than thought in so far as it is grounded in sense, which is not, Bosanquet to the contrary notwithstanding, thought.

Granted that the function of sense and thought is, in man, really one — and Bosanquet asserts that it is, as if it supported his case — it does not follow that the two are therefore really one. Differents can co-operate: for example, the function of a unit of cavalry is one, but the horse is not the rider, nor is the rider his horse. Sense and thought are both required for the simplest apprehension,
but neither is the other, even though it were shown that the two are historically connected.

For Bosanquet, however, the two are one: the whole range of conscious life, and the scale of apprehension from perception to scientific thinking are alike manifestations of Thought - the 'nisus to the whole.' This is the keynote of his theory of knowledge - a 'mystification' which he ostensibly repudiates. Sensation at its lowest in animal sensitivity is the operation of thought realising its universal nature in humble but genuine world building. The principle of non-contradiction is present in the avoidance of chemical impurity, in the approach to a source of light, or in the engulfing of food by an amoeba.

"Thought" Bosanquet holds "is a system of functions adapted to the removal of contradiction throughout experience and having always this complete systematic function operative in controlling specific responses or adaptations." In the higher levels of experience where the nature of thought is explicit, as, for example, in judgment, the same character of non-contradiction is precisely present. "Its underlying and continuous character is "the active form of totality, the nature by which all experience strives of itself toward the

1. Bosanquet insists that "Thought is not simply the separate faculty of something known as the intelligence" it is present in "every experience"(i.e. every real) "in the universe."
2. Logic 1, p. 272.
whole.\textsuperscript{1} It is the "reshaping of a world of content" (and its expansion) "by its own universal spirit."\textsuperscript{2} But as no judgment can ever be made which is not open to some contradiction the process of thought is in no peril of arrest. The whole process arises "from the perpetual presence of implicit contradiction in the nature of actual fact, a presence which becomes explicit on the slightest reflection and forces us to go farther in the hope of faring better."\textsuperscript{3} So with every state of mind, Bosanquet maintains, - i.e. non-logical elements in consciousness, as, for example, feeling - it is its "nature to be a perfect world."

We should now be in a position intelligibly to answer the question: "What is the self-transcendent character of thought which is basic to all self-transcendence?"

It is the character, Bosanquet tells us, of any being in the universe which, because of its inherent contradiction and defect is forced to seek completion by going outside of itself. This is to an unlimited degree possible because there are in the universe no boundaries of kind insurmountable if approached in the right spirit, i.e. if the attempted resolution of contradiction forces the being that way. (since this is so there is strictly no outside, nor inside, and

\textsuperscript{1} ibid. p. 273. \textsuperscript{2} Principle p. 332. \textsuperscript{3} Mind N.S. xv. p. 92. \textsuperscript{4} Whereas feeling, as we experience it, must 'approximate to thought' if it is to be 'great'; Thought must somehow ultimately i.e. as it is the "ultimately real" approximate to Feeling, and I suppose for the same reason i.e. that it is 'intensely blank.' See Principle pp. 64/5 and elsewhere.
therefore no real finite entities or beings at all; and this conclusion Bosanquet does not hesitate, at times to draw; but for the most part his discussion ignores it, and merely points out that to the expansion of a being there is no real boundary, and omits to say that there is therefore no such being as his discussion pre-supposes.}

There would, prima facie, appear to be no solider boundary than that between nature and mind. Their diversity goes deep enough to have caused many seriously to deem it an absolute dualism; but according to Bosanquet - since the distinction between them is wholly relative, a device of consciousness which finds itself better served by the relative opposition of the two within its own unity - there is nothing in nature that may not wholly become mind, nor conversely, in mind that may be regarded as nature; and indeed, a perpetual fluctuation between the two marks the history of every individual mind. The same obtains across all the apparent borders our isolating and abstracting intelligences discern. Thought can transcend them all. This is its métier, to effect the unification of elements within the universe set off from one another by their finitude; its business is to gather up what Bosanquet calls

1. See e.g. Principle 211 "The apparent dualism between matter and consciousness is an arrangement which falls within consciousness." Op. p. 361n & circa.
their 'contribution to the whole'. To these elements or finite individuals thought is the veritable touch of the infinite. It compels their 'self-transcendence' by bringing to light the provisional, merely apparent - or supposed - limitations; by pointing to their 'real' nature which lies beyond them in the whole.

The essence, therefore, of thought "lies in the passage of a being or content" (By a 'content' we take him to mean a 'being' in its capacity as a part of the furniture and composition of a mind.) "Beyond itself, in a word, ideality, adjustment, or the universal."

In its actual working thought nas - so far as we can follow its work in quarters open to our experience - very limited, and lop-sided individuals which, by their many defects and needs, give endless scope for reformation and approximation to individuality. And for every step of the way towards this goal we may register a stage of self-transcendence.

Cognition, then, as a sub-form of thought, exhibits the self-transcendent character of thought because in knowing the mind is driven to correct its affirmations and so make of its fragmentary 'data' - regarded otherwise as its self - a world. All that he affirms comes under contradiction sooner or later. What he knows as 'fact' can serve only so long as

1. Principle p.60
it is not cross-questioned. His facts - mere abstractions from the continuum of experience - do not contain enough to stand against interrogation, but point endlessly beyond themselves for explanation and supplementation. If we were fully to know one fact, Bosanquet is fond of repeating, we would be carried the whole way to the Absolute - a view we must return to, and resist, below.

This defect of given fact - and of the other or inward side of the same, which is the being of the particular mind - is not a defect in the real. Indeed it is the contradiction so provoked, i.e. by the affirmation as truth of what is largely, in its given shape, false, and the effort to remove it which the presence of thought compels, that sets up the movement of self-transcendence which effects, we are assured, the self-maintenance of the Absolute. The finite, in brief, must undergo this contradiction - involving at its acutest the full weight of anguish and evil in the world - that the infinite and absolute may stand. And in securing this

1. See on 'Contradiction and the Defect of Fact' below pp.111-126.
2. We may note, without prejudice of course, the contrast between this doctrine and the audacious Christian doctrine of the incarnation - that God, in one of His persons actually underwent immense suffering in order that men might be brought into communion with Him; and the further doctrine according to which their daily existence is only by His 'gracious providence.'
"exhibition of the Absolute in its many sided variation" the finite enjoys its own "apparent individuality and seeming persistence in time."

According to this account, therefore, since all cognition is thought, it resolves itself into judgment - the form into which every operation of thought falls - or inference, which is nothing else than judgment written in large letters. These are, of course, exhibitions of self-transcendence. And Logic, the science of thought, is at once a description of the distinguishable but not distinct levels or stages of the single movement which is both judgment and inference - that is, the many levels of self-transcendence, and - for this reason - an exhaustive account of the character of the universe.

Treating of inference Bosanquet writes as follows:

1. Though why merely apparent, and if so to whom, it is hard to see. Following Bradley, Bosanquet opposes appearance to reality - an opposition he tries to mitigate by treating the realm of 'appearances' as 'finite individuals'. But as we point out below (p. and elsewhere) the ambiguity of the status of these finite individuals bears witness again to the sceptical account of appearances upon which they rest. But to us it is manifest that 'apparent' and 'appearance' forcibly attest the two-fold reality of something which appears marked in recent writing (e.g. N. Kemp Smith's "Prolegomena" pp. 235-236) an appearance is a 'reality appearing'.
"This then is the nerve of logical determination, viz. the removal of error or contradiction by means of a positive union in which data or premises destroy each other's defects, and give rise to a new totality which transcends its factors. This is the essential process of experience throughout; and in all its kinds, and when traced and analysed in propositional form it reveals itself as logic - the creative and originative nexus of mind as such.

"It may be made explicit ... under the principle which, when abstractly stated, is called the principle of non-contradiction; but as we have seen, this principle is simply a formulation of the life of the whole ...

"The application of this principle cannot be escaped by what might be called logical quietism. You cannot say 'if I affirm little or nothing, I am safe from being forced forward into self-transcendence.' For all negation, all exclusion rest, as we know, on affirmation. You can never satisfy the principle which demands consistency, so long as anything remains outside your system."

Summarising thus far: Bosanquet's doctrine of self-transcendence in his own sense and use of the term - it remains to be seen whether it is a legitimate use or not -

This he takes out of its especial relation to 'thinking' as we generally use the term, and applies it indiscriminately to all process in the universe, and notably in all the aspects of consciousness and intelligence. These are all one uninterrupted work of thought construction, and between sensation and science there is no difference whatever beyond the degree of operativeness of the same principle.

The first detailed examination we must pursue is, therefore, into the propriety of his assimilation of sense and thought, and of his repudiation of anything other than the activity of thought in cognition. This we propose to forward by means of the question "Is there or is there not a 'given element' in knowledge?"

Note to Chapter 2.

"All self-transcendence is possible" Bosanquet observes (in 'Meeting of Extremes' p. 70) "because Thought is beyond thinking." We wish to trace the bearing of this upon the doctrine of self-transcendence:

Thought, we are told, is the "active form of totality, the nature by which all experience strives of itself towards the whole." (Logic 11. p. 272. Cp. Principle p. 264 etc) It is the 'nature of the whole working in the part.'

Thinking is this process as it occurs in particular finite minds. But particular minds are constituted jointly by the 'miraculous' presence of any thought, and the context -
wholly composed of 'what Thought affirms' — which the presence of Thought unifies or causes to form a centre of experience. (There is, according to Bosanquet's view, no reality whatever other than what Thought affirms — or other than Thought, since Thought is itself an affirmation.)

All the thinking going on in the universe other than in one particular mind is, so far as that mind is concerned, unappropriated territory into which it is farther and farther forced by its own internal effort at non-contradiction or self-containedness. The stuff of which it is made is of the same kind as all the rest of reality. And that which lies without its 'given' or 'provisional' being, therefore, is "intercommunicable and universal. It can be made over into the self". The mind, by following the path of self-completion, achieves these connections, and in so doing its boundaries, never really set, expand.

Self-transcendence is possible then, because there are more minds than one engaged in thinking. So, at least it seems at the level of finite 'appearances'. But these minds, from an ultimate — or true — standpoint, are one mind, since they are motivated by and are the expressions of the same spirit of the whole, which, in Bosanquet's sense of sameness —

i.e. inclusion within an individual - excludes particularity. They (if we may use the plural for them) are, moreover, composed of material or 'content' open to each other, so that if any mind were to complete its thinking it would cover the territory of all minds and be the Absolute.

Why, then, cannot our particular thinking (for, in the face of its theoretical denial, we must continue to consider it ours, since - however meagre the conclusion - we certainly can affirm "I think".) catch up with Thought, and, in becoming the whole, cease its self-transcendence?

To this Bosanquet replies "Because it is weak."

Finitude, that, consists for him, in impotence merely - an impotence not grounded in the essence of mind. Why then, we may well ask, should these minds be 'weak' or 'impotent'?

Are they not informed by the spirit of the whole, and composed of material wholly convertible into their own texture?

To this question, however, there is no answer. According to Bosanquet it merely is so, but is not essential, since in principle every mind is able to become the Absolute. The self-transcendence therefore, of finite individuals, which - we are in other connections informed - is the means of the self-maintenance of the absolute individual, is based upon an unessential character of the beings that transcend themselves. This appears to us to be an anomaly. And the
result of our discussion of the sentence at the head of the note is not to throw light upon the doctrine, but to point what seems to us a radical defect in it. So far as we can find Bosanquet gives no grounds of the failure of thinking to catch up with Thought and thus to guarantee the maintenance of self-transcendence. The impotence which is finitude is for him an ultimate mystery.

But why - may we ask - place the mystery here where it runs wholly counter to his principles? Would it not be more in keeping with our experience of ourselves no less than of things, to assert that finite beings are really finite - not really infinite and mysteriously impotent - that is, different in kind from the infinite being. Thus we have not banished mystery from our midst - we have at least the mystery as to why there is anything at all! - but we do not leave to be accepted as a 'mystery' something which violates our deep conviction - which grows rather than diminishes with deeper knowledge and appreciation of ourselves and our surroundings - of our essential finitude, and which, while it is necessary for the working of a theory in some of its parts, is no less fatal to others, if the mystery be permitted to go too deep; i.e. if man's mysterious impotence be erected to go into a principle such as to violate the 'spirit of totality', and its unlimited operation. Bosanquet's theory seems to us to amount to this. "The real nature of the self, or particular
mind, is to be the whole, but of course he can never attain to it." But why 'of course' we never learn.
Bosanquet's attitude toward the 'given' in Knowledge.

Our question is this: is there or is there not in perception an element which is not thought? There is no need to argue that all perception involves thought in so far as in its simplest sort it involves comparison, at least, which is an activity of thought. On this point there is no division of competent opinion. But granted that perception involves thought, can we go further and concede Bosanquet's principle that in perception there is nothing besides thought?

We are not to ask, then, whether there is ever knowledge which is untouched by thought, for it is agreed that there is none; but simply whether or not one of the conditions of, or factors in, knowledge is an element to which the mind is purely passive, receptive or non-originative. If this be thought a senseless inquiry we need only to be reminded that Bosanquet has answered our question by denying any such condition, factor, or element.

"We shall meet with uncompromising resistance" Bosanquet asserts, "the attempt to take any form of immediateness, understood to exclude mediation for an absolute and reliable datum ... in the form of an object of simple apprehension."

1. See e.g. J. Cook Wilson "Statement and Inference" pp. 46-47 & 339. To him the writer is much indebted. Also Professor Kemp Smith "Commentary etc." pp. xxxviii & xlii.

Against any such attempt we are wholly at one with him, and grant that against certain recent excesses of realism the resistance is necessary; but he, in resisting this extreme holds to the other, and no less objectionable, extreme by which not only is there no immediate 'simple object of apprehension', but likewise no given or immediate element in what comes to awareness as an object of apprehension. From the true assertion that all apprehension involves mediation he advances to the surely false extreme that all apprehension is solely mediate. That this is his intention it is not hard, from his many utterances, to show; but it none the less is a position that must violate not only the plain presupposition of knowledge but the simple requirement that language be used intelligibly and in its just sense. 'Mediation' requires that there be something to mediate; but where knowledge is a fabric woven throughout of thought, with no simply sensory element, where thought construction not only carries on, but begins the knowing process, there is clearly nothing to mediate. That this is not a misreading of Bosanquet may be attested by two observations.

The first is that Bosanquet slides away, in discussion, from the 'immediate and mediate in knowledge' - or from 'the given and its extension in thought' - readily substituting his formula of the 'self-transcendent character of thought', which, when read in his own sense - a sense we take to be illegitimate.

1. See below on 'The presupposition of knowledge' p.73ff.
rules out such a discontinuity as the former phrase suggests.

Self-transcendence, in his sense amounts simply to more or less of the same character or process, - he freely illustrating his meaning by such simile as the ebb and flow of the tide - and would be arrested by any radical difference between sense and thought, the 'given' and its extension. For the justice of this first observation we can only appeal to a knowledge of Bosanquet's writing, but it is illustrated by the second, which is readily accessible, and may be objectively judged.

Bosanquet, emphatically and repeatedly repudiates the term 'element' of the given or immediate in knowledge. There is no sense, he virtually asserts ('Logic' Vol.11. p. 300) "In speaking of the given when it is impossible finally and in principle (our italics) to draw a line between the given and the acquired." If there is this impossibility in principle, then Bosanquet's point is well taken, but the principle is in question. If there is a principle dictating that no line can be drawn between - in our sense, the sensory, non-originative side of knowledge - and its extension then it is surely strange that even he cannot escape the language which implies the distinction, but is driven to sundry expedients to avoid the full force of this implication. This he attempts by substituting the term 'phase' for 'element' when he refers to the given or the immediate in knowledge.

1. 'Logic' Vol.11. Chap. 10 throughout; p. 300 especially. Compare Kemp Smith 'Commentary' p. xlii "There is an immediate element in all our knowledge but our consciousness of it is always conditioned and accompanied by interpretative processes, and in their absence there can be no awareness of any kind." This well expresses the stand we wish to take.
but unfortunately no term can be found colourless enough to serve Bosanquet's use, which is to designate something - of which he must speak since without it he could never make a beginning in Logic - but which turns out to be in principle (i.e. in reality) nothing at all.

There is, however, a valuable truth pointed by Bosanquet's use of the term 'phase' in this connection, which we can well afford to grant. It is by confusion of the region to which this truth shall apply that Bosanquet falls into error.

In insisting that 'immediacy' is a phase through which all object matter of knowledge passes Bosanquet is justly recommending the success of the synthetic process of thought which is so thoroughgoing as always to present its product in the guise of and with the full force of an 'object of simple apprehension.' This is simply to say that whatever is apprehended at all is apprehended as a whole with connections and meaning ready made when it appears in the conscious field. In this sense every complex of thought construction passes through the phase of immediacy. Our actual world of any moment is, in this same sense, our given, until it is superseded by fresh syntheses. All the processes which give rise to the complex unity of the world we apprehend have dropped below, or have not /
not risen above, the threshold.

This is the quasi-given involved in all our perception, and what Bosanquet says of it is true and important. We accept the excellent expression it receives in his writing. For example:

"Nothing is more various, more relative, more progressive and personal, than the so-called simple apprehension of objects..."

"We create" (a term not strictly applicable to the situation, and no doubt Bosanquet comes to grief over it) "for ourselves by thought a new immediacy, a new 'given', a new basis of feeling and object matter of simple apprehension."

"Any mental object or complex may assume immediacy."

This quasi-given or 'new immediacy' is not what is meant in epistemology by the 'given element in knowledge'. Nevertheless, if we read him aright, Bosanquet has no sense of the distinction. This uncertainty as to whether at any point those who criticise him, and Bosanquet in reply, are


3. It does indeed appear, after close examination, that what Pritchard (and other realistic writers) is discussing is strictly not what Bosanquet is attacking. In other words, throughout the whole chapter (Logic 11. Ch. 10) Bosanquet has in large measure chosen to debate themes which are not in debate, and takes his victory in these to hold over the territory he neither defends nor disputes, but merely asserts. The point he consistently misses may briefly be put in the terms of this discussion as "Is there a passive side in apprehension." For further examination of the whole field see below "Bosanquet and the Realist Attitude."
envisaging the same problem and issue haunts our whole investigation.

By substituting 'phase' for 'element' Bosanquet is enabled the more readily to dispense with especial treatment of the 'given', or with the real distinction between it and its extension in thought. He is also thereby enabled to withdraw from the debate without touching the point at hottest issue, namely, whether or not there is, below the level of 'simple apprehension' or awareness of any kind a factor or condition which makes awareness possible but is not itself thought.

There is no need to trace in detail Bosanquet's objections to taking the given as an element in all knowledge because they all hinge on his supposition that these two phrases - 'the given element in knowledge' and 'the simple object of apprehension' mean one and the same thing, which they do not at all, and that the doctrine he opposes seeks to set up a 'given' which is such an 'object'. We cannot suppose that Bosanquet consciously evaded the issue by a verbal strategem - so to do were an impertinence - but we may conclude that he never escaped

1. The only 'given' for Bosanquet is what he terms "An unrest of cognition and action." (Principle p. 67.) But cognition is the compound from which we would analyse the 'given'. What he is speaking of is obviously not what we are; but his eye is fastened on the 'simple object of apprehension' which is, as he says, such an 'unrest' or such a partially specified, and largely confused situation out of which it is the business of thought to discriminate order - to discover the order the conditions of which exist in the situation.
the confusion of his school that because all perception involves judgment there is no need further to inquire what other than judgment is involved in it. Their massive contribution was to set beyond dispute the solid synthetic work of thought in any kind of knowledge and so to render impossible after them the kind of particularism and associationism that had served some before them. That they came to ignore the plain presupposition of 'construction' namely that it calls for 'materials of construction', or in other words, that mere process leads to no product, cannot be held against them: but the lingering influence of their error may well be pointed out if only to profit thereby.

By this simple confusion of the area of debate Bosanquet falls into another strange error, by which he attributes to those who have been drawn to criticise him a wholly wrong motive. It may be instructive to notice this also. It is clear by his whole line of defence that he supposes those who 'look backwards' for elements of pure givenness to be seeking reality in that direction. For example, the view he criticises - i.e. the realistic view that the reality known exists independently of our knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in its independence - "promises to common-sense a simple ultimate real, ensuring facility of treatment and

finality in apprehension." 1 This is not an unfair character-
isation of the prefatory tone of the American 'Six', and so
has some justification if read of them, but it scarcely holds
of the writer it is directed against, and more importantly,
has no bearing whatever upon the kind of view -certainly
realistic - which we would defend. we wholly agree with the
principle so well taken by bosanquet, that there is no way of
arriving at true knowledge of the real but by following the
advance of thought. bosanquet, however, supposes that the
attempt to discover what is strictly the given element in know­
ledge is one and the same endeavour with the search for what
is truly real. This is surely a confusion. The given is not
we would maintain, the real; but we get to know the real as
it reveals itself indefinitely (as opposed to 'finally') to
thought by means of a few simple given elements which present
themselves in inexhaustible variety of combinations, and which
never themselves come to awareness except in the form our
thinking makes of them, but which are nevertheless, upon
analysis of all awareness found to be its pre-condition,
and to compose its whole texture inasmuch as all our thought
is incurably pictorial. But its only pigment is what sense
supplies. A chemist does not need to isolate an element in a

compound to know that it is there, or to determine some, at least, of its properties; nor does he suppose for one moment that the reality of his compound - water, for example - will be found by analysing it, but rather by further and further exploring its properties. The same applies with respect to the given and its extension in thought.

The search for the given which may be found in but not separated from our every apprehension is not prompted by the supposition that in arriving, let us say, at 'sense data' we have reached a 'simple ultimate real' which, in Bosanquet's terms we may apprehend 'with facility' and 'finally'. This extraordinary misconception he puts in one connection thus: the realist (actually his axiom).

"Looks for reality in abstraction and isolation; rightly to accept the thing in itself as being what we know it to be; but without a shadow of justification or probability to assume that the being of the thing in itself is compatible with isolation instead of demanding as a condition of its existence the full context of experiential life." (This last he says recommending his alternative of the 'full individuality' of knower and known in their organic unity.)

On the contrary, however, we - with Bosanquet - follow

1. See below on 'Presupposition of Knowledge.' The reference is to Logic 11,p.306.
the advance of thought for our knowledge of the real, and do not seek it in abstraction; but we spend some time in making sure of this 'givenness' and of the side of passivity in our apprehension in order that at the farther stages of our journey we shall feel secure as to the reality we there apprehend. The motive of the 'backward look', in short, is to refute Bosanquet's doctrine that thought (which at bottom must be finite thinking such as ours) makes what it affirms or apprehends. It may not be too much to say that had the inquiry not been so sophisticated since Locke introduced the term idea, and since Hegel wrought further confusion by confounding Logic and History, we should not need now to look backward in order to be assured that when we follow thought forward we apprehend what we in no sense originate.

Against those, then, who seek or affirm an element of givenness in all knowledge, not as the real, but as the first condition or source of knowledge, Bosanquet advances the suggestion that all object matter of knowledge passes through a stage of immediacy or quasi-givenness, which is admitted, but does not meet the point; and further he tilts against such a given element as if it were supposed to be the sole ultimate real, which again misses the issue. He also clearly argues that because "It is vain to lay boundaries between the given
and its extension in thought," which is in a sense true inasmuch as in the vital movement of knowledge the two are organically connected and indissoluble — there is no given at all. This conclusion he must surely have deemed false had he not a prior metaphysical 'certainty' which made it seem self-evidently true. This certainty is that there is no ultimate reality but Thought, or, since a term belonging to apprehension cannot be used unambiguously in an ontological sense, what thought affirms.

1. Logic 1. p. 76.
2. His definition of philosophy in the impressive little book "What Religion Is" that one hold fast to the 'main certainty' while going out into the detail of explanation.

5. Against this ambiguous 'certainty' we have no possible weapon, as it does not give its reasons. It is of what Bosanquet calls the 'This or Nothing' kind, and behind it we cannot hope to penetrate so long as we remain within Bosanquet's presuppositions. Nor can we reduce the (for us) dualism between thought and what thought affirms, since they are not divided in Bosanquet's thinking, but are used inter-changeably where either suits best his particular purpose and context. We are told, e.g. in 'Meeting of Extremes' p. 51 that "Reality...is the object affirmed by thought." And further - it being noted that thought is the type of all-experience - that "Anything that can ultimately be, must be of the nature of...experience." Principle p.135.

Such 'mystification is incapable of solution: it must be traced to his doctrine of individuality as the only form of the real, and the only kind of connection.
Holding to this conviction, and conforming his system to its requirements it is manifest why Bosanquet does not waste time with the 'epistemological mystification' involved in the search for a real - even though incurably or inisolably compounded given, or in the attempt to trace any feature of sensation not snared by thought. But, although he fails, for these reasons to meet the precise issue here involved, it is nevertheless crucial to his whole case, including the doctrine of self-transcendence as it is supposed to be exhibited in the work of thought, which must collapse if to the sole operation of thought the givenness of sense be joined.

11 It is Bosanquet's contention that apprehension involves nothing but thought: against this it is ours that comparison requires something to compare, interpretation something to interpret; that is, thought presupposes material, not itself thought, to think about. This requirement of language, which to us seems also a requirement of intelligibility, surely reinforces our view; for the distinctions upon which language are in no sense arbitrary.

If we ask Bosanquet what is compared, what is extended in thought, he cannot, finally, if our reading of him is just, give any answer but that thought compares

1. See below on the "Presupposition of Knowledge." p. 73ff.
itself. Against this we maintain that thought compares universals — which are not themselves given as such, but which are directly grounded in the given. As has been noted above the given element in apprehension is not itself apprehended, but is abstracted from the complex or 'situation' which is apprehended. By abstraction, which is of the essence of thought, we are able to seize the factors or elements which are actually present only in their compounds as if they were separate. And these elements so abstracted are the universals which we use in the work of thought, in recognition and comparison, the factors of cognition.

Bosanquet in his polemic against the given assumes that what he calls 'thought extension' would — if there were a genuinely given to be extended — be away from the given: that there would be no likeness between the world apprehended at the end of the thought process and the world affording the given elements to the senses. And since we only have a world at all at the end of the process of thought, he asks why we should 'look back', as if the world lay behind, and not ahead. From this he leaps to the assertion there is no world but that which thought affirms — or which lies ahead and away from the given, which in turn is repudiated except as a phase passed through by thought, a provisional world momentarily rested in on the way to the real world.
But in all of this Bosanquet seems to be mistaken. Can thought progress except along lines laid for it by the given? We can apprehend nothing which affords us no universal features, nothing we can recognise, compare and so assign meaning to; nothing at all, that is, for thought, to utilise. In its highest flight it is earth-bound. It is our instrument for acquaintance with what is given to us, what we in no sense make. If thought were for a moment to escape from that which is or has been given it would fail as a wing in a void.

1. Cf. J. Cook Wilson, "Statement and Inference" p. 339. "Thought ... is not only impossible without perception, but has no more 'content' than we find in perception." This seems unquestionable, but Bosanquet could not say as much. We may recall also now emphatic Cook Wilson is upon the non-originative nature of perception.

Note a. We have insisted that Bosanquet, by assimilating sense to thought, is driven to deny any element of strict givenness in perception. If what we have written above is just he takes this step, and virtually repudiates the 'given'. Nevertheless, we can find much in the 'Logic' which would give the lie to all that we have urged. It is obvious that a logic could never be begun without assuming those 'positive contents which make naming possible' (See 'Logic 1. p. 21 et circa.) And these positive contents are not invented; they are given; as 'red' is given - the quality and colour of a surface. (Ibid. p. 17.) To the necessities of logic we refer further below in discussing 'identity', and our conclusion there is that Bosanquet asserts - as he must assert - what later finds no place in his ultimate theory. The same seems to apply here. Wherever Bosanquet discusses sensation as such we need not expect him to deny that sensation gives us something. Our only question is this: "Which of these sides, to which incompatible assertions belong, is essential to Bosanquet's philosophy?" To this there can be only one answer.
Note b. The writer was for long puzzled by the appearance at the head of Bosanquet's little book 'Implication and Linear Inference' the quotation culled from Professor Kemp Smith's "Commentary" p. xxxviii. which runs:

"Knowledge starts neither from sense data nor from general principles, but from the complex situation in which the human race finds itself at the dawn of self-consciousness."

The solution to the puzzle seemed to the writer to lie in the fact that the passage excellently states just what Bosanquet would say of knowledge, but which would mean somewhat different for him than it did to its author. The liberation both from crude rationalism and empiricism which appears in it is a manifest gain for philosophy; and the hand of Bosanquet may be traced in the work of liberation, but his metaphysical theory was more a hindrance than a help in the development of his insight in this direction. While it is certainly of profound importance to recognize that knowledge cannot arise from mere sense data it is of at least equal importance that the contribution of sense data to it be remembered in making a theory of knowledge. In this latter point Bosanquet gravely errs, and he is led to enunciate a doctrine in which it is impossible to find any satisfactory treatment - or just evaluation - of nature. Sense data do not come of themselves to the surface of knowledge, but they may be traced in it. Bosanquet is compelled simply to dismiss them since 'sentience and thought' thought 'alienated' in appearance are really exhibitions of the same process if viewed 'from a higher level'. (See e.g. Principle p. 63.)

But how Bosanquet can so admit concerning 'general principles' - whose whole metaphysics as well as his detailed view of knowledge, is supposed to be the exhibition of the one 'omnipotent principle' - Thought, the concrete universal, or individuality - is not as readily seen. Doubtless it is by his characteristic inversion, which enables him, though believing that 'anything that can ultimately be must be of the nature of mind or experience', to consider the history of the pre-human inorganic world, and the slow upward evolution of self-consciousness through the early stages of sensitivity and consciousness.
Bosanquet and the Sense of Passivity in Knowing.

The sense of passivity, of non-originativeness in apprehension is quite unquestionable. We cannot choose what we shall open our eyes to, though a complex of mental factors and an 'originative act of consciousness' does indeed determine how we shall perceive it. The only question we can ask concerning it is 'How explain it?' This sense of passivity we trace to the sensory medium of all our knowledge and thought; but Bosanquet denies the peculiarity of sense, and therefore cannot so account for it. And thought, for him, is wholly active; is the 'active spirit or totality present in all experience.' In so far as we are thinking beings we should, by his account, be conscious only of this pure activity. How, then, does he conform his theory to the sense of non-origination? By a 'tour de force' very characteristic of his method in other quarters. All our thinking may as well or better be stated as "Reality so thinks in me". This formula is not 'deduced especially to meet this situation, but, so far as our reading goes, is

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1. Compare his procedure in two quite different situations: in his 'capture of mechanism by freedom' which is, in the main, successful; and his development, though an idealist, of a psychology on wholly naturalist lines, the effect of which he turns by asserting that the body is the mind, and that the bodily process he has outlined is the work of thought immanent in a 'certain range of material'. In this he does not, we would say, succeed.
his only possible resort. But it proves too much. It
would make the finite mind purely passive in thinking, and
so radically different from infinite mind or Thought;
which Bosanquet would not for a moment allow. For us the
formula would express a certain truth, namely that we cannot
think at random; that the real world sets the problems for
and the solutions of our thinking. But we utilise this
truth only because we have a place in our theory of know­
ledge for something which is not thought, by which reality
imposes necessity upon our thinking. We can only think
in terms of what sense supplies.

Bosanquet, however, does not seem to be in a
position to utilise the limited truth of his formula be­
cause of his preconception that apprehension is simply
judgment or thought, which is purely active. His formula
merely heightens the ambiguity of the status of finite mind.
It is at once active since its essence is thought, and
passive because its thought is reality thinking in it.
Bosanquet explicitly holds that every particular mind makes
a difference to what it apprehends - it adds to its reality
really, if slightly; and he is the first to insist that it
is no excuse for an exception to or breach of a law that
it is a small one. Against this we find the attitude
expressed in the formula, that a particular mind is nothing but a focus in mind of the Absolute mind: (We might well ask focus in and on what?) or variously, an expression of the Absolute thought. But if this is the state of the finite mind how is it significant to assert that it makes a real difference to what it apprehends, and adds something to ultimate reality? As far as we can see there is no escape from this dilemma. Either the formula “Reality thinks in me thus and so” holds, in which event the finite mind is purely passive and radically different from the ‘universal mind’: or it does not hold, in which event we can find, in Bosanquet, no alternative account as to why we cannot apprehend what we choose.

Instead of the distinction of thought and sense which cannot, in an account of knowledge, be ignored or denied Bosanquet offers a distinction — which cannot be maintained — between Thought — the omnipotential principle — individual and our/thinking. His error here would seem to be threefold: firstly, his wresting of thought which is indissociably wedded to sense, from its context where it is active, but upon given material, to make of it an account of the activity upon itself by which reality supports itself: secondly, his return of this magnified thought as the sole constituent of human consciousness and knowledge, now
without its pre-condition of sense, and sense data, or any material to think about: thirdly, his readily understandable failure to maintain between Thought and our individual thinking such a dualism as might save both the undeniable sense of passivity and his theory of the pure, universal activity of thought. Finite mind and finite thinking is left in a hopelessly ambiguous position, being on the one hand active, with the 'whole' - its own 'reality' - somehow working in it; and on the other hand, as a merely passive vehicle for the Absolute activity. It is not merely passive, because it is able to make a real difference, a real 'contribution' to the whole. It is passive since its thought is "Reality thinks in me". It is 'a constituent of the Absolute energy' and is 'granted by the Absolute', two incompatible predicates surely. Bosanquet is here involved in what Nettleship feared as the 'awful question of the Absolute being somehow or other present in every partial whole', which, as remarked above, is no awful question to him. Evidently the supreme difficulty of such a notion escaped him.

1. See above p. 18 Introduction.
Bosanquet and the Realist Theory of Knowledge.

The concluding chapter of the second edition of Bosanquet's 'Logic' is, in the main, a polemic against the realist theory of knowledge (especially that of A. A. Pritchard in his "Kant's Theory of Knowledge") With the detail of Mr Pritchard's theory we are not especially concerned; but we wish to avail ourselves of the emphatic statement of Bosanquet's views which they provoke; and so further to draw our conclusions concerning them. In so far as Mr Pritchard is doubtful—which he may not be at all—of the non-subjective reality of the secondary qualities we feel that he weakens the realist conviction, and at once gives a powerful handle to his opponent who—in his own way—makes a show of accepting them as 'fully real'.

We have remarked above Bosanquet's evidently mistaken—except as against such a realism as that of Mr Russell, for whom reality is his 'logical atoms'—view of the realist motive in what he calls the 'backward look'. This we find, together with the novel suggestion that the misguided philosopher is doing harm to reality—is 'destroying' it—by his erroneous theorising in the following passage:

"You destroy all positive reality if you attempt to go back by simple subtraction to a point anterior to perception and say that the real is, what it is when perception
having misconstrued the realist motive in 'looking backward' he denounces the attitude in the following terms:

"Realism is the contradiction of this fundamental
principle" (i.e. that reality lies ahead not only of being
found thus, but as being there) "an outcome of theoretical
timidity and pessimism which prefers in a difficult situation
to seek safety in retrogression rather than in advance ... This
caracter is uppermost to-day." p. 301.

So far, then, his refutation of realism must seem to be wholly misdirected. He further shortly condemns the realist attitude thus:

"Realism rests on the fallacy that to find the
reality independent of experience you must have recourse to a reality apart from experience." p. 301.

But it is surely obvious that no one would be stupid enough to try to find reality apart from experience. Experience is, in us intelligent beings, our instrument of discovery of reality. And this that Bosanquet calls a fallacy arises only out of his own misconception of the function of knowledge. It is only a fallacy if we assume independent of or in the face of evidence that because we

1. Logic 11. p. 303, *Our italics*
only find reality by means of experience that there is no reality other than that which is experienced, or as we experience it. Bosanquet surely runs together what we know and how we know it. His 'fallacy' also assumes that what we know is somehow inside experience; whereas to us it appears that experience is just experience of that which is not, which is outside, experience. Our experience is also a reality, but its reality consists in just this intelligent response to and apprehension of that which is independent of it.

A fine passage from "Essays and Addresses" by Friedrich Von Hugel excellently states the point we would make and the position we wish to maintain. He speaks of:

"Our very vivid, indelible impression of the Reality of the External world and its appearances - not only of the organic world of plant, animal, man, but also also of the inorganic world of crystals and of rocks, of the air, rivers, oceans and the stars. And this impression extends also to the secondary qualities of things - to the tone and particular/inflection of my brother's voice, the leaping of my dog in the grass, the scent of the apricot on the old red-brick, sun-baked wall, the iridescence of this opal, the sound of the grinding of the pebbles on yonder sea-sno....

1. And which is thus, in a true sense, open to be called a means of 'self-transcendence' of the knowing mind. See below p.84.
"Again" we must hold "that the existence of the physical world is thoroughly distinct from our apprehension of it - that only as a subject matter for our human knowledge can it be known to man, can he affirm its existence."

The last assertion Bosanquet would negative; the former he would, in his own way affirm.

It is his stout repudiation of subjectivism, and his equally firm insistence upon the 'reality' of the world we apprehend that disarms the reader who accepts these without further enquiry as to their basis in Bosanquet's system. The writer admits having been beguiled by such well-seeming passages as the following:

"Such a speculative philosophy" Bosanquet writes, characterising his own system, "Welcomes the neo-realist's assertion that, splendours and values which we seem to contemplate directly are apprehended by us as they truly are." 2

With respect to 'secondary qualities' he agrees with Professor Whitehead's observation that "it seems an extremely unfortunate arrangement that we should perceive a lot of things that are not there." 3 He further continues, "The idea that things are somehow volatilised or made 'subjective' or non-existent, if to, say, one hundred accepted

conditions of their being you add a couple more, making a hundred and two, is one which must obstruct all sane philosophy . . . "

"The true axiom of knowledge is that we can know objects as they really are."

The point at which we must divide from Bosanquet is not that these secondary qualities - and the others follow them - are real; but how they are real. We are grateful, at least, that Bosanquet proposes to explain rather than repudiate; but are unable to admit his explanation. From the above it appears that, in knowing an object, the mind places the object under certain new conditions which condition its being. Thus an object (if it is an 'object' in the absence of a perceiver) is colourless until perceived, whereupon it takes on, subject to the new condition, a new character, and becomes red, or green, or some other colour. If the same object is at once perceived by a man of normal sensibility and by one colour-blind, it is at once both red and green - each of them 'furnishing some element which no other particular mind supplies.'

The kernel of Bosanquet's doctrine then, as to the reality, of what we know, is that its reality is, in

2. ibid. p. 6. 3. Logic 11 p. 309.
some of its being at least, contributed, or constituted by our knowing of it.

"Where precisely does Bosanquet take himself to part from Berkeleyian subjectivism?"

Subjective idealism is, he maintains, a valuable propaedeutic against realism, of which it is the nemesis. This is true of a realism which repudiates the secondary qualities; but of no other. Its valuable features are: insistence upon the vital continuity of reality and the conviction that the particular mind makes a difference to what it apprehends. Its excess, according to Bosanquet, is that it attributes to a particular mind what is really the work of all minds; to a 'phase of mind' what belongs to mind as such. It is not, he says, 'idealistic enough.'

"The stuff of each particular mind is only a very small contribution to the real world, yet it is a contribution, and is capable, in principle, of furnishing some

1. "In principle" because it is neither possible to augment or diminish the reality of the universe. So no mind does furnish a new element, though 'in principle' able so to do; nor does any destruction and consequent diminution take place. The difficulty that is raised by his denial of the immortality of finite minds he would doubtless overcome by assuring us that though as finite particular minds we are done for, our 'individuality' which was always 'taken up' in far more than we were aware of, still continues to express itself in other finite minds. But it is just the peculiarity of 'my mind' that his doctrine of individuality nowhere explains, but treats as if it were nothing; which it is not - whatever it may be.
element which no other particular mind supplies." The destruction of a single mind ... neither destroys the objects apprehended by it, nor again makes no difference to their existence. It diminishes, in principle, their amount of reality, and presumably, moreover, in doing so deprives them of some character which no other mind sustains in them, and the loss of which is therefore a genuine loss of being to the object."

How this system of Bosanquet's differs 'in principle

from that of the subjectivist we cannot see, except in so far as he abstracts finite percipience from its conditions in which we find it, and wrongly explaining it, applies it to 'all minds', by which he does not - indeed cannot - mean merely such minds as ours, but to hierarchies of finite minds wholly beyond our ken. Only by some such reference to the wholly unknown could he conceivably sustain those parts of his system which grant the existence of a non-organic world as a pre-condition of the emergence of finite minds.


2. See e.g. "The defect of 'Esse is percipi' is that thought may affirm what transcends perception, though not what transcends experience." 'Meeting of Extremes' p. 51.

That is, to think of, or to experience a thing, we must think of or experience it: but this proves nothing as to the 'Esse' of what we don't experience. For us to affirm the existence of a thing we must have experience of it. See below p. 69
It is a consequence of his doctrine that if all apprehension is withdrawn, no being remains. Bosanquet would substitute 'experience' for apprehension, but since for him the whole intellectual, experiential process is one, it matters not by what name, so long as it is truly applicable at any stage, we refer to it.

His explanation, therefore, of the reality of the secondary qualities as we perceive them, is that one of the conditions of the existence of the object, namely that we perceive it, so requires. The contribution of sentience to the object is merely one of the contributions by which mind, or experience, in all of its activity, constitutes reality. With all the metaphysical difficulties provoked by this explanation we do not pretend to deal. It is enough to point out that at bottom the theory asserts that knowledge makes its object. The resort to a multiplicity of minds to solve the errors of subjectivism leads finally to the denial of the reality of the finite subjective mind, since it is impossible to make any connection intelligible between the contribution of the one mind and the gift of the rest without recourse to

1. Bosanquet is quite unambiguous on this score. See e.g. in the 'Logic' (11. p. 264) "Reality is in an enormous degree dependent upon our act of judgment." or in the 'Essentials of Logic' (1871) "Every thought contributes something to the reality of what it thinks of." Take away all judgment such as ours and no reality remains.
the notion of 'concrete' connection, by which real division and distinction is denied. Sentience is one with thought, and somehow - we have no means of telling now, the reality which is constituted by the affirmation of one mind becomes objective to other minds merely add to what they receive, their little, characteristic colour. This can only obtain, Bosanquet justly asserts, within an individual whole where there is no ultimate distinction of knower and known. His salvation of the secondary qualities - which the writer at one time counted for righteousness - really amounts to no more than their assimilation in character to the primary qualities, and space and time, which are all alike 'modes of experience' 'real with the individual whole of experience' and so forth.

Faced with two diverse perceptions of the same object, one that of a normal man who sees an apple as red, the other of a man colour-blind who sees the same apple as green, Bosanquet suggests that the apple is both red and green, the colour-blind person making his contribution thus to the richness of the universe. We maintain, however, that the apple is red - (a true proposition not primarily because normal men agree that it is red, but because it can be defended in-
indefinitely by recourse to the whole relevant world of science) - not as conditioned by the perception of the normal man, but by virtue of its intrinsic character which we are truly apprehending; and that the apple appears green to the man colour-blind. It only appears green because, by definition in terms of scientific thought, the colour seen as green is red. The name is of course wholly indifferent, but the reality it represents, the object known, is one only, and not the other. The abnormal man may determine his green to be really red by tests with his camera.

According to this account apprehension is genuinely apprehension even so far as the secondary qualities are concerned. Our sensory equipment is not a final condition of the existence and reality of the object we apprehend, but our means of knowing it. The sense organ does not - as Bosanquet asserts - 'operate upon' the object: it operates upon the sense organ which is passive and receptive in respect of it, though, indeed as a receptor it is marvellously adapted to the true reception - which, with the work of thought becomes perception - of specific and inherent characters of the real. It is in terms, further, of these 'data' that we become aware of additional characters in the real which we call primary qualities, and time and space.
We can therefore turn the edge of what Bosanquet calls an 'elementary' and 'insuperable difficulty', which is that 'you cannot separate the cognitive apprehension of an object from the operation of the organ of sense upon it.' He develops his difficulty thus:

"That the object should be the same under these two conditions, of being known after being transmitted through the sense organ, and of neither being known nor transmitted through a sense organ is surely a physical impossibility. A physical object cannot be the same when a complex physical condition is superadded to it, and when that condition is withdrawn." This he reiterates in all his writing on this theme.

The obvious answer to this charge is that it begs the question by assuming the matter in question, namely, that knowledge is a condition of the existence of the object. The difficulty is only insuperable if its solution be arbitrarily set out of court.

Surely Professor Pringle-Pattison's retort to Berkeley's argument concerning the non-existence of unthinking things might apply precisely to that of Bosanquet in this


2. It doubtless sounds better in referring to the conditions of the existence of a physical object to call sensation a physical condition: but we must remember that the physical, for Bosanquet, falls within the psychical.
connection. He says:

"We cannot conceive the existence of material things apart from a mind which perceives or knows them, because, as Berkeley himself puts it, we are trying to 'CONCEIVE them existing unconceived or unthought of' which is a plain contradiction. But that of itself decides nothing as to the existence of things apart from their being known. Berkeley proves that they cannot exist in the knowledge relation without implying a mind," and "that we cannot say anything about them except as they are known, so that out of relation they are to us ... as good as nothing at all. But this ... cannot prove ... that being-in-that-relation constitutes their existence. On the contrary, we should say, prima facie, that being known makes no difference to the existence of anything 1 real."

With the non-essential exception that Bosanquet takes the knowing mind partly to make and partly to discover what it knows the above seems wholly to hold of him. 2 And

2. "The nature of reals is fatal to the axiom that we know things as they are apart from cognition." (Logic 11. p. 306.)

Whence, we may ask, does Bosanquet learn of the 'nature of Reals' but by knowledge? And, as Pringle-Pattison observes, it is not known apart from knowledge, but no more may be said as to its existence.
in addition, by his modification of Berkeley, by his teaching that what the mind does not make it can know by virtue of its solidarity with other minds he is pressed to the calamitous denial of the real individuality of any finite mind. The finite mind pays for a share in a common world by forfeiting its reality.

Against the above objection Bosanquet presses his point that if the known is apart from the knower, the universe is cut in two:—the 'continuity of the real' is broken, thus erecting once again, a condition of our knowledge— that it be a continuous process of interpretation— into a condition of existence. "No working logic" he truly asserts "can be put together on any other basis." But logic does not set the conditions of reality, it treats of our manner of arriving at truth. But Bosanquet regards it otherwise. Logic is for him the character of the real. "What we want is ... a logical character of reality..." This comes out very much

1. "This doctrine conditions reality" Bosanquet objects "by the withdrawal from experience, and so cuts the universe in two." (Logic 11. p. 311.) Not at all. The doctrine asserts that the universe is more than what is known, so asserting, e.g. the reality of the knower qua knower. The universe thus comprises both knowers and the known—no clef being set therein the real because between the two a systematic and consistent relation holds— and doubtless much else besides.
2. Logic 11. p. 320—namely that we arrive at truth by following the 'advance of thought.'

3. Logic 11 p. 307. Also; "Logic, in analysing the thought world, holds itself to be analysing the structure of reality." (Logic 11. p. 271) This is, of course, Bosanquet's fundamental view of logic. And "The logical spirit, the tendency of parts to self-transcendence and absorption in wholes ... is the
more explicitly in the 'Principle', where it is manifest that
his notion of reality is that which he derives from the method
of arriving at true knowledge. But the inference from the
means of knowing to the general and ultimate nature of the
known is by no means so direct; we find out what reality is
by following the path of thought, and not by the 'short cut'
of analysing the character of thought.

It is obvious that for a coherence logic to work
reality must be deemed truly self-revelatory, but the same
applies, of course, to any other; and reality must present no
'irrationality'. But rational connection is just that kind
of connection which we find in the universe, and that connection
is by no means all what Bosanquet terms 'individual'. If it
were, then his difficulty as to 'knowledge standing outside
reality' might have weight; and knowledge might be the expansion
of an individual by its own universal spirit (an expansion
balanced, we must observe, by some diminution somewhere). But,
other than the 'short cut' mentioned above, we have no ground
whatever for supposing that all connection is of this one kind.

1. ctd. life blood of stable existence." (Principle p. 24.)
Again "Truth in becoming complete becomes reality." (Value and
Destiny p. 214. our italics.)
1. It will be noted that, having for some time considered the
import of the "Nature of Universals" in Mind. xxxvi, the writer
is now realises the need for something other than 'individuality.'
There can be no such thing as 'independence' in the universe - though Bosanquet argues always as if every opponent of 'individuality' were bound to hold to 'atomism and independence' - but it is manifest that 'systems', by the fact that they are related are thereby 'apart'. And so our system of knowledge introduces no novel hiatus in the real by being itself ultimately other than that which is known. Our knowledge, so far as it is true, sustains a consistent relation with the world it knows, but any final sum of reality must take into account both knowledge and what is known; but the two are not, on that account absorbed in a single individual, however we soften the fact by calling it a 'vital' or living whole - surely the least applicable of all adjectives that might be used of a whole which is incapable of growth!

1. Logic. 11. p. 512. 2. See further below, p. 79ff.
For the sake of our argument we wish to defend the statement of the presupposition of knowledge which is suggested by Mr Pritchard, but is emphatically repudiated by Bosanquet. The statement runs as follows:

"Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the knowledge itself." Against this, which he denies, he suggests the alternative that, "'So far as we know things, we know them as they are.' and then more explicitly 'Knowledge presupposes that the system of judgments in which it consists can maintain itself against any contradiction, and that the reality known is unmodified by knowledge except in the direction of being revealed as more completely itself.'"

The first of these is valueless as it fails to show the issue between the two views. It might be granted by either, given that it be read in the light of their general theory. The second, however, brings out the issue clearly, and we can be thankful for it. It precisely states the view of knowledge we wish to refute, which is that what we know is a system of judgments. This is, to us the fundamental error.

The system of judgments, or our thinking, is the means by which we know. What we know is progressively defined as our system

1. 'Kant's Theory of Knowledge,' p. 118 quoted from Logic 11 P. 305.
2. Logic. 11. p. 305.
of judgments expands, or, as we observe and reflect. The assimilation of these two under the common head of 'knowledge' or more inclusively 'experience' is, as has been insisted in recent criticism of Bosanquet, and in the present paper, the root of most of that in him to which exception must be taken for the clarification of philosophy.

If, to take an example, I say "That apple is red", and someone asks "How do you know?" it will be necessary to give a sufficient system of judgments we both deem true in the context of which my particular judgment is seen to stand as involved in all the rest, and standing or falling with them. In so doing I go over again the steps, or sufficient of them, by which I came to know that "That apple is red". This is the system of judgments which according to Bosanquet is knowledge. But what I know, what I think or judge, what my knowledge is, is 'That apple is red'. We cannot, in other words, get around, or escape the presupposition of something known which is not the act of knowing. I do not know 'a system of judgments', I know things, more or less completely, and as thought advances I know them better.

Further from the same statement of Bosanquet we read that the presupposition of knowledge is that this system of judgments can maintain itself against contradiction. The

1. J. Cook Wilson's discussion of this I have found liberating and invaluable.
maintenance of a judgment against contradiction, i.e. the establishment of its coherence with other judgments; and the maintenance of a system of judgments is our test of the truth of the judgment or judgments concerned. It is the presupposition of Logic that true propositions can be made; and the business of Logic is to show how, in the course of thought, true judgments are made, and how their truth may be tested. It is surely this logical principle that Bosanquet has substituted for and confused with the presupposition of knowledge. The presupposition of Logic is that what we know we can know truly, and this might conceivably hold on the basis of a purely subjectivist metaphysic and theory of knowledge; the presupposition of knowledge is other than this, and is simply that there is something to know which is independent of the act of knowing, which takes us away from subjectivism, and from such an idealism as that of Bosanquet, according to which the knowing of all minds makes what they know - a view in principle subject to the same fundamental error of subjectivism as well as those peculiar to itself.¹

Our third criticism of Bosanquet's statement is that, strictly, the phrase 'and that the reality known is unmodified by knowledge except in the direction of being revealed as more completely itself' is unintelligible; and only has the

¹ See above, p.70.
semblance of meaning as we read it in the light of Bosanquet's system, by which we merely postpone our encounter with the unintelligible.

What these words actually convey seems to us to be this: the object known is not modified by its being known except that it is, by being known, revealed (i.e. disclosed - the knower being passive) as more completely itself: but in being known the object is, we are assured, changed or added to - it is therefore different from the object before being known, the difference being due to the activity of the knower: and in being so changed the object is not different really, but is revealed (made? we cannot penetrate beneath the confusion of these two) more nearly as what it is - the difference makes it 'more completely itself'. The violation of language involved surely bespeaks a similar violation of sense; but the key to the mystery is to be found in Bosanquet's doctrine of identity - into which we cannot fully go here - by which the reality of anything, its true identity, is not what it is which is the mere 'given' - its 'factual' being, but is the absolute to which, as the completion of itself the resolution of its own internal contradictions points. And the process of knowledge is, for Bosanquet, one/the factors, in a sense the whole, of the 'logical' movement by which reality sustains itself as the sole real individual.

But any reality is not a 'connection of universals': it is an individual, or entity the apprehension of which involves the connection of universals, recognisable points or characters abstracted from individuals already known, and become the means of knowing, to a greater or less degree of completeness, other individuals which display them as characters of their own individuality. If this is so, then Bosanquet's device to show that what is known 'shares the life and character of experience' and so cannot be deemed unchanged by the withdrawal of knowledge fails. But it is interesting to note that again, as always, Bosanquet's argument returns to its presupposition, that knowledge is either a factor in the individuality of the real, or that experience is the real.
Conclusions concerning Self-transcendence in Knowledge.

We should now be in a position to draw our conclusions concerning self-transcendence in knowledge. The issue seems to us to turn upon the answer that can be given to the question "Do we know that which is really without the mind?"

The long drawn debate since Descartes has had this for its first problem, and is a sufficient warning against supposing it easy of solution. Indeed, we may be sure that a solution which leaves no open questions in this region where mind and matter meet is unattainable. Our only certain conclusion may very likely be one ruling out some courses of explanation as violating the terms and the situation to be explained. We may be sure e.g. that no further light upon the problem will overturn our certainty that the knower and the known - whatever they are - are distinct.

As has been observed above, 'knowledge' for Bosanquet is a 'full individual' which cannot be divided into knower and known.

1. This view of knowledge Bosanquet expresses in a way which shows our point of departure very clearly. "Knowledge is not like a house built on a foundation which is previously laid and is able to remain after the house has fallen; it is more like a planetary system with no relation to anything outside itself, and determined in the motion and position of every element by the conjoint influence of the whole" (Knowledge and Reality p. 331, our italics.) As we have pointed out on p. 32 above Bosanquet seems to us to confuse the way we know with what we know. What we know is the real world; but our knowledge of this involves a texture of affirmations outside of which we cannot refer.
known. Knowledge and reality, so to say, 'grow together'.

the knower, therefore, according to him, does not know what is within him, but what is known is really within the individual. The individual, however, is not divided within itself, so that if either knower or known were subtracted something would remain. On the contrary it is Bosanquet's view of the individual that each 'part' - wrongly so called - is the whole. Thus the individual is what is known, and is the knower; both at the same moment. Each may be deemed a 'phase of the whole', covering or expressing its whole character without remainder.

Increase of knowledge, therefore, is the attainment of a 'fuller individuality'. How is this brought about?

By the working within the individual of the 'universal spirit' or 'concrete universal' which is the individual. This works toward the resolution of contradiction; and since the individual we refer to is 'finite', is less than the whole, this resolution requires the bringing into itself of contents or elements not hitherto contained within its circumference.

1. Csa. refer for verification of any single assertion we make about the real world. But each assertion refers to the real world; and because our explanation, our growth of knowledge, our defence against denial, advances from proposition to proposition and not - by some inconceivable leap - from one proposition to the real world as such, we must not therefore conclude, as Bosanquet undoubtedly does, that what we know is a texture of judgments. We cannot know what is outside knowledge, but it is surely essential to knowledge that it refers to something not itself.
And, otherwise viewed, the attainment of a 'fuller individuality' is 'the self-transcendence of the finite individual'. But whence do these elements or contents come?

From other individuals. These, however, are also 'organisms' of knower and known. Thus by taking over any new content or being to diminish the contradiction inherent in itself, the given individual is likewise taking on a wider being, an augmented individuality of its own. What it knows enters into its being; and so has being in more than one individual at once. In this manner, therefore, the being of one individual, in principle, flows in and out of every other individual, and actually so merges with many others. There is nothing known which is not equally knower in the alternative phase of its being, nor any being which is not at the same time another. This is what Bosanquet means when he says of the self in knowledge that "It goes out into a world which is beyond its own being, and what it meets there it holds in common with other selves, and in holding it ceases to be self-contained and repellent unit." And this, in brief, is the condition and basis

1. Value and Destiny p. 32. But according to this view, what is the 'it' that goes out? and what is ever 'beyond its own being', if the essence of the self is to be the whole? and, since the self never was a repellent unit, how does it so 'cease to be'? It seems that when once the distinctions fundamental to language have been given up - when we can no longer speak unqualifiedly of 'me', 'other', 'true', 'false', 'this', 'that', - and when the ultimate distinctions of philosophy - e.g. essence and accident - and of epistemology - knower and known - have followed them into the discard, we cannot say anything, much less can we advance philosophical theories, without first using them, and then repudiating them.
If this view is true, then we must depart from the viewpoint taken in opening this discussion, namely that knowledge is a process of a particular knower, of a particular mind, and must consider it as a single universal process, an organism (no organ of which is really different from another - which is an anomaly) or a single individual. We cannot intelligibly ask whether the knower knows what is outside of him, or within him, for the essential condition of an outer or inner, which is that we postulate some real boundary about a being, is absent. We cannot draw a line between what one finite individual himself sustains and what is communicated to him from other individuals at no point really divided from his being: nor between what he sustains for himself, and what for others. "In cognition" Bosanquet asserts, "we are co-operating in the self-maintenance of reality;" we are not "apprehending ab extra something finished and complete apart from us." So is it from the side of knowledge; and it is, of course, the same from the side of reality. "When we think of what we mean by reality we have to think of (feeling) sentience, and intelligence in their various grades of perfection as actually involved and operative in sustaining the real in corresponding degree."

Now if knowledge merely made a real but superficial difference to what is known - what is known having a root and basis of its own and other than its coming into knowledge - then knowledge might still involve, supposing no further hindrances, a real self-transcendence. In knowing the knower might know what was genuinely outside of (and other than) him. But since Bosanquet presses his conclusion to this limit, that if every contribution of finite experiencing were subtracted from the real then nothing would remain - in other words, by the terms of his theory of knowledge as 'a full individual' which dictates that the whole truth (i.e. the sum of knowledge) is the whole reality - we have no alternative to denying that knowledge is, if it is what Bosanquet asserts, a self-transcendence in any just sense. There is nothing really outside the being of the knower, for knower and known are coterminous aspects or phases of the same individual.

We have pointed out early in this discussion that Bosanquet's metaphysical views put self-transcendence in any of its supposed exhibitions out of court 'ab initio', since he denies the distinctions which make 'self' and 'transcendence' significant. To this general criticism we can now add further that Bosanquet's theory of knowledge (which in its development - as might be expected moves rapidly from analysis of a situation to the region of universal theory as to what reality must be) specifically denies the

1. See above p.12
distinctions necessary to self-transcendence, and which, we also hold, are necessary to knowledge.

It may, however, be remarked - though it does not belong to our precise province - that if we give up Bosanquet's theory of knowledge, then we may indeed apply the term 'self-transcendence' to our knowing in a valid sense.

As far as our experience is concerned we cannot ignore in the manner of Bosanquet the distinction between apprehended objects and apprehending minds. For the sake of a theory the temptation may be acute to identify the two, but unless resisted we have no possible chance of sanely interpreting the world we live in or the inner world of our own experience.

So long as we maintain this distinction of knower and known we can legitimately speak of the 'self-transcendence' of the knower in apprehending the known. This we may do because it is granted that the object is outside the being of the knower, yet is somehow present in consciousness. If a 'tertium quid' is resorted to; if what we know is an 'idea' of the object, then it involves no self-transcendence to know what is in the mind. But if we hold apprehension to be a situation 'sui generis' - a disclosure of objects to minds, which objects remain for themselves 'as they were' (Or, to allow for the qualification noted on the preceding page, which remain essentially as they were. Our view has been

1. See section above on 'The presupposition of Knowledge.'
stated above, and is that knowledge does not in any way alter the object. See p.67.) under this disclosure, then the bearing of the term self-transcendence is plain enough.

"It is not likely" Professor Kemp Smith writes, that the soul issues forth from the body and goes, so to speak, wandering in the heavens in order to contemplate these objects.

That is to say, the mind stays at home, while apprehending that which is outside of, and in no sense is, itself; and unquestionably undergoes a genuine self-transcendence. And because

1. Studies in the cartesian Philosophy 2nd Ed. p.116n.2. (App. to Ch. 3)
2. In the 'Logic' 1. p. 2. Bosanquet writes "If the object matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not only our analysis but thought itself would be unable to lay hold of reality." But if the object matter of thought lies genuinely within the system of thought, then how does it involve self-transcendence to reach it? and what is the 'thought itself' which, failing our thinking, might lose its hold of reality? But one 'lays hold of' that which is outside of one. Again language seems to be our ally. From this and similar utterances we gather that Bosanquet is unable to grasp a relation which is not fundamentally in an individual; that the possibility of its being the 'metier' of thought (together with sense) to 'lay hold of' that which is not itself simply does not occur to him. But the situation is surely plain enough in our every-day perception. Unfortunately it seems that his pre-conceived view of identity as the individual (with which is bound up his doctrine of the judgment and his sceptical view of all relation but assimilation within the individual) precluded from him the special (and for us so important) character of this situation.

We grant that it is mysterious that cognition should be 'sui generis', but on the same footing all being is mysterious, and we take it to be fatal to explanation to proceed to a theory of the whole by successively denying the uniqueness and radical distinctiveness of the differences which mark and constitute the profound interest of this our varied world.
this is so, Bosanquet is able to assert the self-transcendent character of knowledge and offer no affront to intelligence until we mark the bearing he gives the doctrine in his system.

In another, if somewhat less precise sense, we may speak of a self-transcendence involved in knowledge in so far as what we know has direct bearing upon what we are, (though we are not what we know) and when we know more we, in a genuine sense, become more, and so may be said to transcend our former being.

The admitted 'transcendence' however, which Bosanquet relies upon most heavily to establish his doctrine of the self-transcendent character of knowledge, and which gives to his account such similitude of truth until its underlying confusion is noticed, is this; that as Professor Kemp Smith writes:

"In the awareness of meaning the given, the actually presented, is in some way transcended, and this transcendence is what has chiefly to be reckoned with in any attempt to explain the conscious process."

All knowledge involves this process of transcendence; but Bosanquet is not in a position to avail himself of it, since, as we have striven to show, he denies the 'given' in the sense that is here intended. Without this the term is, again, unintelligible.

1. "Commentary etc." p. xlii. We quote him as 'on the other side' with respect to Bosanquet.
But, having emphasised this essential factor in knowledge, he transmutes it into a factor in the being of the individual, in the manner to which we have taken objection above.
Part 11. Logical Questions.

As has been manifest in the foregoing pages it is to his logical doctrines that we must look for the root of Bosanquet's philosophy. For Bosanquet, however, the line between logic and metaphysic is very elusive. In his earlier writings the two are entirely coterminous, and to the end we can for him draw no radical distinction between them. But we may say that the logic is fundamental because his endeavour throughout is to show "the logical character of reality", and because what we deem his deepest metaphysical errors arise from his attributing, as a character, to reality what he takes to be the essentials of logic. Actually it is a metaphysical preconception that rules, since it is metaphysical by reason of its universal scope; but we shall not err in tracing even these ultimate preconceptions to logical notions - in large part inherited - the importance of which deeply impressed him. His conviction e.g. that reality is continuous is based - wrongly we think - in his belief that only so could there be knowledge.

In the foregoing discussion of self-transcendence in knowledge we have driven to refer the issue to a logical decision, e.g. concerning identity. And so long as there is radical difference concerning the logical point there can be no agreement on the epistemological question. It is to the
logical groundwork, therefore, of Bosanquet's philosophy that we now turn.
The Doctrine of Identity.

Fundamental to Bosanquet's thinking is a peculiar view of the nature of identity. We have had occasion to remark it in several connections; and now propose to examine further those features of it which bear upon our theme; and to point the inconsistency which take to be necessary even to its statement. An application of the doctrine to which we have already taken exception is that knowledge is, as Bosanquet terms it, a 'full individual'. The effect of this is to slur the distinction between the means by which we know, and the character of that which we know, and so virtually to assert the identity of knowing and being.

To the influence of this view of identity well-nigh all that distinctive in the philosophy of Bosanquet (and of Bradley also) may be traced; and to the correction we venture to look as the pre-requisite of any adequate theory of this various world of ours. That the nodus of the problem lies here has been suggested e.g. by Professor Pringle Pattison, and has been fully shown in the articles by Professor Kemp Smith in Volume xxvi of Mind.

1. To these the writer is much indebted. His present point of view developed out of the attempt to defend Bosanquet from their chief contentions, and out of the more or less independent study of Bosanquet following the recognition of the essential justice of these contentions.
We need not, therefore traverse the whole area again; but in view of its centrality to our own field a sufficient re-
view we must undertake.

Its major tenet is that there is but one type of identity discernible in the world of appearances, namely that which he calls 'concrete' or 'lateral identity', and which is expressed in the character of the individual - a meeting point of differences which are assimilated in the character of the whole. This is the identity of the continuant individual.

Professor Kemp Smith traces this to the absorption of the interest of these writers in the Hegelian category of 'identity in difference', because of which they came to consider the two types of identity apparently present in our world - viz. that of the continuant thing or individual and of the character that recurs and which we recognise in many connections - as fundamentally exhibitions of the same principle. The only differentia they saw in the degree to which the identity dominated or was dominated by the differences. In consequence of this the type of identity in which differences tended to dominate the identity came to be regarded as the lower form - an imperfect manifestation of the true form.

Wherever, therefore, the 'lower' form of identity
appears we are assured that 'true' form lies beneath.

The 'orchidean order' or the 'Rose family', according to Bosanquet is an individual or concrete identity the genera, species or members of which are the constituent differences. There is no such thing in reality as mere recurrence, or mere identity of character. By this, in order to be consistent,


2. Bosanquet repudiates 'mere recurrence' as 'unspiritual'. (Value and Destiny p. 182 & elsewhere) It is 'unspiritual' because the 'spirit of the whole' is Thought, and Thought is, by hypothesis for Bosanquet, concrete connection or individuality - the nisus to the whole by which reality sustains itself. Thus mere recurrence, if it were real, would frustrate this upward movement, it would take no step toward the whole - being, so to speak, on the level - and must therefore be repudiated.

Bosanquet avails himself of our conviction that such an individual as, let us say, a master craftsman, embodies something unique and unrepeetatable, and extends it to effect the repudiation of all recurrence whatever. The destructive effect of this is seen when, having observed that "The ideal of uniqueness, if rightly understood, is in truth one which attaches to a perfect individual and its members" (Principle p. 104) he must hedge as between 'members' and 'elements' of this individual, and ultimately deny all but the individuality of the absolute. (See further text above.)

We may further remark how, having assumed that knowledge advances but by the 'operation of the concrete universal, which is individual, he observes that 'mere repetition' cannot carry knowledge forward and from this, unsupported by other testimony concludes that the supposition of such a repetition of being is unwarranted, and, in fact, stupid. (Principle p. 104.)

But the premiss from which this conclusion is supposed to follow Bosanquet cannot maintain. He is forced to admit that 'abstract universals' do have place in the advance of knowledge; but he calls them 'generalities based upon the repetition of similars (our italics) These effect the advance of knowledge by including 'within a single interpretation an area of experience which might have been discordantly apprehended.' Thus it effects 'so far as it goes, a
Bosanquet must insist that what we take for identity of recurrent character is similarity based upon a degree of individual identity. One rose is similar to another not because it embodies identical points or characters, but because the two alike are differences within the individuality of the rose family.

From this uniform appearance of lateral or continuous identity Bosanquet draws the inference that there is but one real individual which is the absolute and which alone is perfect, self-sustaining and self-contained.

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2. ctd. movement toward the completion of knowledge as a coherent whole.' (ib. p. 32).

1. In virtually all his detailed writing Bosanquet permits this conclusion from his doctrine of identity to lapse, but it is none the less there. Recommending his view he writes (in Logic 11 p. 259) "Our theory of identity lets one say, for ordinary purposes (our italics) what one likes about individuals as subjects of judgments and about other pluralities of terms." That is to say, what is essential to the formulation of logic - as to our knowledge and the 'realm of appearances' is not really true - but will serve for these purposes, which, it is understood, make no claim to truth or reality: or - in other words - that we must suppose and act as if there were pluralities of terms, but that philosophy knows better.

2. ctd. If however, cognition proceeds by recognition, then repetition must be the central nerve of knowledge, even though in reality no such character exists except in conjunction with others which together constitute an unique individual.
This is the framework of his theory of identity, and upon its acceptance he holds success in logic and metaphysics to depend.

It is, however, obvious at first glance, that this theory must come to some terms with recurrent identity since, as Bosanquet admits, we rely for knowledge upon our ability to recognise in new situations, characters which have come to us in quite other connections. His whole section on naming, as it appears in the Introduction to the 'Logic', is an extended admission of recurrence which, so far as the needs of knowledge are concerned, is strictly what it seems, i.e. of characters which in diverse contexts are 'the same'.

"The point and purpose of naming is," we are told" to refer to the same." And "That which the name signifies is, for us at all events" (last five words our italics - they show the qualification to which he must resort, even though he knows that knowledge needs points that are the same)" an identical character exhibited by different contexts or different contexts united by a common character."

Apart from the tell-tale qualification there

could scarcely be less doubtful admission of the fact of recurrence.

He speaks further without qualification of "two or more uses of the same content" and also thus: "If you try to elicit the basis of its" (i.e. an individual's) "identity you will merely pick on elements of identity (here recurrent identity) between different contexts." Or "All reds that match are the same."

If the full bearing of these passages is elicited we are undoubtedly brought to a view of identity quite other than that of Bosanquet. But although he must make these concessions in order to begin an account of knowledge, or construct a logic he does not - as the qualification noted indicates - intend to hold to this requirement of logic and knowledge as binding in the metaphysical sphere. Indeed, quite inconsistently with these utterances he turns, when in his more characteristic vein, these elements of identity into 'mere resemblances.' When commending the concrete universal, especially, does he fall into this depreciatory style. In the 'Principle' (p.52.) we read of that which "Passes for the characteristic principle of knowledge and intelligence - a principle depending on repetition of similars and recognition of them as they recur." The present writer, after much study,

1. ibid pp. 45 & 114 resp.
fully agrees with the observation of Professor Kemp Smith that these two veins may each be traced through the writings of Bosanquet, but that they cannot be anywhere found to be reconciled, or their reconciliation attempted.

The writer for some time sought, in keeping with the second line, to establish that Bosanquet's system allows for the identity through difference of context of the simple sense quality. But, unless the failure is accidental, it cannot be done. The best we can achieve is a selection of passages such as those quoted above which express, but not in a context of theory able to bear it, the identity of the recurrent character. The answer to the question whether for Bosanquet there is any identity 'unpenetrated by difference' must, we maintain, be answered in the negative. He is committed to the extreme view that all identity is penetrated by difference; but he seeks to save himself from nominalism by asserting his alternate form of universal which is at once the nerve of reason and the nature of the real. But upon examination it turns out that this concrete universal will not serve for knowledge, but must be supplemented by its 'weakened form' in order that by picking on (in the terms of his passage which we quote above) elements of recurrent identity we may arrive at the individuality underlying these apparently repetituous instances. The truth of the
matter seems to be that for knowledge we must have universals which are not, as such, individuals; and that in reality no universal is actual except as embodied in individuals which are not, as such, universals.

The effect of Bosanquet's concentration upon the continuant type of identity as the exclusive form - to the theoretical neglect - softened by occasional assertions of the sort cited above - of the recurrent type, is, by a nemesis peculiarly just, to do away with the type of identity it seeks to favour except as it is embodied in the one ultimate individual, or the absolute; or, in other words, to banish it from our world of 'appearances' altogether. And, if we pursue yet further, - as we propose to do in a note on 'difference' below - the effect of this same preference, we reach the conclusion that even this absolute 'individual' must be denied the character of individuality in the terms by which Bosanquet commends it to us throughout his philosophy. Individuality, we are assured, is 'identity in and through differences'; but by his account these differences are merely of degrees in the same scale - differences which cannot, we would urge, be deemed significant as constituting a differentiated unity a faint analogue of which is the organism, - sustained by heart, sinews, blood and bone, - that we call the body.
The point which, for our purposes, we draw from all of this, is two-fold. Firstly, in slurring the distinction between recurrent and continuant identity in favour of the latter Bosanquet is driven to deny - a step he does not hesitate to take - the self-identity of any thing. To this, with reference to our especial interests, he gives the most explicit utterance in stating his view against the objections raised by Professor Pringle-Pattison and debated in the symposium "Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?" he repudiates the 'popular attitude' which;

"Alike in contemplating the natural and the human world ... models itself on the apparent self-identity of the movable and self-coherent body" and which"is reinforced by the current conception, an alternative expression of itself, which confines identity to linear or successional continuity, the so-called existential or numerical identity of the individual thing." And over the page he objects to the "doctrine that identity is exclusively numerical..."

we may mark in this passage not only his depreciatory terms concerning 'apparent self-identity' and 'so-called existential or numerical identity',' which amounts precisely


2. The term 'self-identity' seems to us to serve in this situation better than the term 'numerical identity' which
to a denial of their reality; but also his characteristic
overstatement of the case - which is the same thing as a falsification - against him. To his opponent he ascribes a position not merely sufficient to contradict his own, but its contrary, which is no less clearly false. It is maintained, not that identity is confined to - or is exclusively - linear or recurrent, but that there are two types, of which what he calls the linear is one, and that neither can be ignored in an adequate theory.

Also we may note that it is his favoured type of identity that is condemned in the passage quoted, namely of the individual. But though this may be, according to his immediate vein, 'so-called'; in his logic, - which cannot apparently, move so far from the common point of view as can metaphysic - he must modify

2. ctd. is used both by Professor Pringle-Pattison and by Bosanquet when they discuss this issue. (See e.g. Logic 1. p. xii & Life and Fin. Ind. p. 106.) The latter emphasises a feature which follows from self-identity. The issue really is this: 'Is identity a misnomer, whether used of the contingent individual or of the recurrent character, except as it is synonymous with the one absolute individual? If the answer is 'Yes,' then philosophy is better without a term so useless and logic without one so deceptive.

In his "Essentials of Logic" Bosanquet speaks of the 'old-fashioned law of identity'. The law of identity certainly is not easy to state in an effective form, but that when we assert that A is A we mean something is no less certain; and this that we mean when we say A is A is just the truth to which Bosanquet's mind seems closed.

1. We can observe this same method in his discussion of the self. He takes all possible opponents to be urging that the essence of personality is exclusiveness.
his view in the direction of the deprecated popular attitude. He writes,

"A pebble or bit of rhomboidal spar ... has a self-relation, a characteristic peculiarity which makes it single and distinguishes it as a persistent universal," (we would say 'individual') "from things external to it."

In the realm of organism and intelligence we are assured that the self-relation and 'characteristic peculiarity' must be immensely more pronounced. But in this symposium where—admittedly—he is putting his case as uncompromisingly as can be he speaks thus of these same 'things'—pebbles and bits of spar:

"A thing as an existence, can have no claim to be an ultimate subject. There is no ultimate reason for taking one complex, at least below conscious individuals, as a single being more than another."

Then, why, we inquire, is it named a 'pebble' or 'a bit of rhomboidal spar'? and what is its self-relation if insufficient to enable us to predicate securely of it as a self-identical being so long as the appropriate conditions of its being are maintained? and what is its characteristic peculiarity, which we should suggest is the ultimate reason for deeming it a single—but not self-dependent being?

1. Logic 1. p. 217. 2. Life and Finite Indiv. p. 79.
This incompatibility of assertions concerning continuant identity we must read with those concerning recurrent identity, as representative of the two veins which nowhere meet in Bosanquet's speculation.

Secondly, since self-identity is denied there is no resort but to conclude that what appears to be individual is really the absolute. This region of Bosanquet's thought is internally confused, and cannot therefore be displayed consistently. Its fundamental argument, in one form or another reduces to this. Since the absolute individual alone is real; and these things and individuals ('so-called') about us must be real in some sense, it follows that when all accidents and illusions are stripped away, they are in essence the absolute. In this more usual, and less precise mode of utterance Bosanquet speaks not of the reality of the thing as the absolute, but of its perfection or completion which it more or less remotely anticipates. But if my perfection is the absolute, then essentially I am now the absolute.

The tangle of obscurity - verging, if so approached, on absurdity - in which speculation is involved if attempted upon this basis needs no pointing. Professor Stout touches the central defect which, if admitted seriously into philosophy would at once disallow it, when he says:
"If ... I am the universe ... I may legitimately mean the universe when I use the words 'I' or 'myself'."

But, for very good reason this cannot be seriously admitted into philosophy; and in consequence Bosanquet must play fast and loose with his own principles or he could not philosophise at all. In spite of the hard things he says of the finite individual, for example, in the Symposium, he nevertheless spends a large volume in discussion of its value - its substantive value even - and destiny. But the history of Philosophy is full of doctrines

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1. Life and Finite Individuality. p. 157. Professor Stout also points to the connection of this confusion and Bosanquet's failure to discriminate between the conditions of a being and the being itself. Because the finite individual "cannot be guaranteed to exhibit within itself (our italics) the conditions of the attributes we assign to it" Bosanquet concludes that it has no right to those attributes - that, in short, it has no definite being, no essence of its own. But except within the region set by his doctrine of identity, it is obvious that the conditions are outside of the being conditioned by them. The effect of these confusions may be seen throughout Bosanquet's writing. He holds, for example, that the soul is the body, because it is clearly conditioned by it. But the soul, whatever it is, is itself, and not the body that conditions this its terrestrial being. It is fundamental to all explanation - which is the business of philosophy - that these, the condition and the conditioned be kept distinct. What the soul is we must try to find out by study of its properties and activities, not by seeking fruitlessly to assign its full conditions, and then asserting these to be its being.

Bosanquet's position is manifest when he asserts that, "Its (the self's) true and ultimate nature lies outside it, in the whole to its dependence on which the defects of its impotence bear witness." (Principle p. 325.) That is, a being is that which it is dependent upon.
which, if applied, would cut the root of the tree that bore them.

In accordance with this doctrine of identity Bosanquet holds that there is but one ultimate subject of predication, from which it follows that all finite existents stand with respect to this subject in the status of adjectives. This view, applied to the 'self' is the theme of the symposium referred to above, and has otherwise been much debated. Our only concern in the discussion is this, that it is essential to the doctrine of self-transcendence, if it is to apply, that there be beings enjoying a real self-identity.

The adjectival view of finite individuals is expressed briefly thus: the finite individual enjoys "the character of being something which has its main being and value as a qualification of a whole which includes it." That is, the being and value of A is to be B or C, and as the residuary legatee of all being and value, to be the Absolute.

Then with what purpose do we call A 'A'? Why do we not call it B or C or the Absolute? It is obvious that there is some difference or distinction between these beings, or they would not have been named, nor would there be anyone to name them. Bosanquet certainly does not intend to deny their distinction, but he gives us, by his

1. Life and Finite Indiv. p. 85.
theory of identity, and his theory of the 'adjectival' being of individuals, no ground for asserting or accepting it. His theory states itself absolutely; finite beings are adjectival to the absolute; their 'being and value is to be the whole; but in the passage quoted above we may note a qualification the bearing of which is nowhere shown, but which seems to indicate a doubt on Bosanquet's part as to the ultimate success of his theory. The character of the finite is 'in the main' to be something other than itself. What account is to be given of the remainder of its being and value when the 'main' is subtracted? According to Bosanquet's only developed theory its whole being, leaving no remainder, is to be the whole; but this qualification is surely significant as showing that the adjectival theory cannot, even by its author, be stated with open eyes as to its consequences, in its naked and absolute fashion. If the being and value of this implied but neglected remainder were fully dealt with it is at least conceivable that we might arrive at an acceptable theory of the place and status of finite existence; but it would be one to displace, and not to set along-side of, the adjectival theory.
All difference is, according to Bosanquet, difference of degree; and the reality of which every difference is a degree is really continuous, or homogeneous. We wish to show — what scarcely needs to be shown — that if this were true there could not be significant difference at all.

Every identity, we are told, is an identity in and through difference. And this identity, which is variously called the individual is nothing but the differences which meet in it — these differences being assimilated to the unity (what Bosanquet calls the 'differentiated wholeness' of the individual.

Bosanquet's preference for the concrete universal he commends by pointing out that 'it takes all sorts (i.e. all kinds) to make a world'. The abstract universal, on the other hand, leads to 'class relations' only, or to 'mere generalities'. Its defect, in a word is that adds like to like. But the true identity, the individual or concrete universal is best described as a world or as a cosmos because it is the meeting point of differences. We agree that to constitute an individual differences of kind must meet, but Bosanquet has made unattainable for him the truth ne seeks to establish by insisting that all difference is of degree only. If the differences which meet in the individual are merely of degree, then at bottom his

1. Value and Destiny p. 12 etc. Against this we have the assertion that his philosophy "admits of genuine differences of kind within the whole." But seek as we may we shall find in
concrete universal or identity is what he deplores as characteristic of the 'abstract universal' — it is no more than a laying side by side of like and like.

His formula falls into this series. Differences are differences of degree of individuality; but individuality is itself constituted by differences which are themselves differences of degree of individuality... and so on... ad infinitum.

The moral of this must be that philosophy no less than life is helpless without differences of kind as well as of degree, since individuality (no less than system) requires more than the conjunction of like to like. We have noted above our acceptance of the point urged by Professor Kemp Smith that system as well as individuality must be deemed ultimate in the universe. To this we would add that individuals also must be considered to differ not merely in degree, but in kind. In degree they may differ within the limits of one kind, as, for example, one is more of a man than another (and one man more of a man at one time than another) and in kind as between men and animals. These are individuals, but of a really different kind, although it might be possible in principle to show a complete continuity his pages no word as to how, within the limits of his doctrine of identity and difference this has been achieved.
of history from stage to stage of organism and intelligence. Thus we have a system the members of which are individuals, each of them wholly dependent upon - and in a manner partially determinable - other individuals of like and of other kinds; in the case of man upon 'nature', his 'second nature' of society and institution, and by the mediation of all of these - and of further conditions so far unknown to him - upon God.
A Note on Relation.

With the whole of Bosanquet's view of relation we do not pretend to deal, nor with all the possible objections that may be urged against it; but some of its most notable features are worthy of remark as bearing more or less directly upon our theme.

The notion of individuality, for Bosanquet, swallows up all others. Purpose, Value and Freedom are all assimilated by this omniscient principle. So is it with relation. There is but one fundamental universal character, which is individuality; and one type of connection which is that which holds within an individual. All relation, therefore, at bottom, is the exhibition, more or less explicitly of individuality, and may be roughly designated 'inclusion', with the qualification that the type of inclusion is that which really assimilates and transmutes the element included. It is the sceptical conclusion which follows from this view of relation that destroys if it is true, the ground of distinction in the universe, and so compels all the terms of philosophy to be read with reservations, or in a 'Pickwickian sense'; and especially, puts the doctrine of self-transcendence out of court. It is this view of relation which makes of this world "appearance" - in Bradley's sense - and makes of our knowledge not revelation, as Bosanquet at times desires to
show it, but illusion. This gulf is fixed between our apprehension and reality by the evident fact that all of our thinking is relational to the bottom, and the conviction, above argument, of these two thinkers that reality must be non-relational. Bosanquet, writing about the persons supposed to enjoy a separate self-identity, puts this conviction emphatically.

"There is no such world of isolated terms in relations as these worlds" (i.e. the persons) "appear to be."

But unless we are prepared wholly to accept the extreme of scepticism there is surely a manifest misconception in this very objection of Bosanquet's to relation.

All terms, we would assert, are in relation, but none are isolated. Bosanquet, in keeping with his method in other connections urges upon his opponents an extreme they would never accept, and in refuting the one extreme supposes, apparently, that his own is established. If a term were really in isolation it would be out of relation; would be out of the universe. And if a term is in relation (as we are in relations of many kinds with our fellow men and with things about us) that is sufficient to deny its being in isolation.

Bosanquet makes a similar error when he remarks

parenthetically, "Social solidarity" has "no part in the relational world."

Surely social is inescapably relational, and loses all meaning if the relational element be denied. You cannot 'associate' with yourself, or where there is no other person or term with which to associate. Bosanquet however, insists upon his point yet further:

"In realised social morality... we have entered a sphere where relations are superseded by a true identity," i.e. by a concrete individuality taking over and superseding the 'persons' concerned.

Relation here is explicitly assimilated by individuality, as we observed in opening this discussion. But the objection taken above must hold, so long as the term social is used at all. Our inability to get away from the relational is evidenced again by the term Bosanquet uses of his own conception of 'realised social morality' namely "The World of Spiritual Membership." We have had occasion to note above the bearing of the term 'spiritual' for Bosanquet; it is especially provided to meet the requirements of his own theory. But the term 'membership' remains, and cannot be explained away. Again we have the alternative between sheer scepticism and the acceptance of relations as required alike for our understanding of and for the real being of the world.

Contradiction and the Defect of Fact

Self-transcendence is impelled by contradiction. The movement of non-contradiction which issues from the effort of thought to establish a world is the same process which, otherwise viewed, appears as self-transcendence. We have remarked above Bosanquet's draft upon Hegel for the essentials of self-transcendence; his debt extends, as might be supposed, to the negelian doctrine of contradiction. Bosanquet, in the 'Principle', quotes, as expressing his own view, from Hegel:

"What moves the world is Contradiction; it is ridiculous to say that Contradiction is unthinkable. What is true in this assertion only comes to this, that Contradiction cannot be final, and that by its own action it cancels while it maintains itself." "Whereas people say that Contradiction is not thinkable, the truth is that in pain which a living being feels it is actually a real existence."

In Bosanquet's hands this doctrine has two applications, one in logic, the other non-logical, both of which are put forward as basic to the doctrine of self-transcendence. Its logical bearing is illustrated in what we have called above the 'defect of fact'. Cognition, according to

Bosanquet, is an emphatic exhibition of the self-transcendent character of thought, "because in knowing the mind is driven to correct its affirmations and so make of its fragmentary data - a world. All that he affirms comes under contradiction sooner or later. What is known as 'fact' can serve only so long as it is not cross-questioned. His facts - ... do not contain enough to stand against interrogation, but point endlessly beyond themselves for explanation and supplementation. If we were fully to know one fact,... we would be carried the whole way to the Absolute."

Since the being of the self is nothing other than the apprehended world of a finite mind viewed, so to speak, from within, this expansion of knowledge, under the impulse of non-contradiction, is a self-transcendence.

But this view of the defect of fact is open to grave objection. In his "Knowledge and Reality", an early work, but one from the main positions of which Bosanquet never departed, he writes:

"I saw A.B. in Victoria station this morning ... Let legal importance attach to this statement and at once every detail becomes doubtful." We can, if cross-questioned,

1: See above. pp. 29-30
Bosanquet concludes, assert no more than that 'something happened'. "The something which is asserted with absolute certainty, and the definition of which our judgments try progressively to give, can never be defined accurately till it is defined completely. It would then amount to the entire ultimate Fact."

But in all of this Bosanquet must surely be mistaken. If 'legal importance' attaches to my statement, "I saw A.B. in Victoria station this morning", then there follows from the fact of my seeing him - which the statement simply asserts - consequence other than that which normally follows from such commonplace observation and assertion. No cross-questioning can ever throw doubt upon a single detail of the statement if ever it was true. But of the notorious dubiety of the ordinary witness before a court Bosanquet makes capital for his doctrine of the 'defect of fact' and of 'degrees of truth'. Logic is not required to take account of lying, and given the truthful intention of the witness, we are confined to two possibilities with respect to this statement - it may be either true or false. If cross-questioning is able to bring out a radical incoherence - as for example that A.B. died the night before - or that I am insane - then the statement is false or possibly

false: but if none of the readily determinable, and fully implied conditions — subject to which the event asserted in the statement is possible — can be shown to be absent, then it is true; and its truth is not affected, nor any detail put in question by the indefinite research into antecedent, concomitant, and subsequent events by relation to which this particular event may be 'explained' or viewed in its connection with the whole. Bosanquet's contention is that no true judgment can be made which does not exhaust the ultimate conditions of the occurrence of any being or event: that definition, in other words, is impossible. This denial of definition is the consequence of his prior denial of real distinction, and of his conviction — of which he makes a metaphysical axiom, that the real is a 'continuum.' Against this we must maintain, as a consequence of real distinction, the validity of definition, and our ability to judge truly of beings or events within the context that conditions them.

If we wish to know who was A.B.'s mother and by what train he reached Victoria station and the 'whole truth' about A.B., then our inquiry would, were it possible — to the absolute; but so long as we are content with the bare substance of our assertion we need ascertain no more than
that I intend the truth, that there is such a place as Victoria Station, and such a person as A.B. This assertion, and the event or fact it asserts, is subject to conditions, but is not subject to contradiction unless it is simply false.

So long, therefore, as the conditionedness of a being is not forgotten, and we do not judge of it as if of a being self-existent and self-maintaining, but with due regard to the system—whether spatial, moral, or some other—within which it stands, we can claim to make assertions which are ultimately—or without any modification either true or false. The subject of our predication is not reality as whole, nor the system with which it stands connected—that which conditions its reality—but of the being itself. Our fact concerning it is not defective, and we need not 'apply to the absolute'—as Bosanquet insists that we must—for certainty concerning it.

We therefore must deny that by our assertion of fact we are driven into self-transcendence by the immanent spirit of non-contradiction. Our real self-transcendence in knowledge—in terms of our note on page 84 above—is the consequence not of an inescapable logical law, but of our own intellectual curiosity and vigour, by which we
are provoked, having found something, to find out more about it.

Before leaving this point, we may reinforce our view by reference to another passage of Bosanquet concerning the 'defect of fact', which seems to us to reveal a quite extraordinary confusion.

"Facts, as we call them, are stable to a certain point, and will, so to speak, answer certain questions and meet certain needs, but when we transcend their several limits of stability by bringing them into connection with more of the real world, we become aware that none of them are sufficiently stubborn things to stand as finally coherent... to take an example, if we trust to man's living by bread alone - by bodily comfort - we shall find he cannot, and that though bodily nutrition is actual, we shall fall into contradiction - find that nourishment is not nourishment - if we take it as the exclusive mode in which human beings are kept alive. We shall find other needs asserted; what we took for our system of 'fact' will not give room for them. Our fact has broken down, and all our facts break down in some such way, and at some such point .... We must admit that what is experienced as actual fact may yet be self-contradictory .... We .. find

that action and argument. 'like the wind', take us outside it" (our system of fact) "and our petrified facts will neither serve our need nor maintain themselves."

Our interest centres upon the example by which Bosanquet illustrates the break-down of fact, and the contradiction with which the actual is charged. It seems to us an equivocation, hinging on the double use of the words 'bread' and of 'life' or 'living'. "If we trust to man's living by bread alone ... we shall find that he cannot." The bearing of the aphorism requires no commentary. But it is no less true, absolutely and ultimately, that nourishment is nourishment — all that it claims to be — to the normal body of man. So long as we assert of it only that which belongs to it we shall never 'fall into contradiction' concerning the ability of bread to keep a man alive, though in all else he be 'without God and without hope in the world.' None ever did trust to man's living by bread alone, in the one sense; but that the nourishing will nourish none ever doubted. As 'keeping alive' it may well be the 'exclusive mode'; but as feeding the whole man it obviously is not. And the only danger of

1. Just as we say that a squirrel 'lives on' nuts; or a Chinaman 'lives on' unpolished rice.
contradiction arises if these two senses be confused—a confusion into which Bosanquet apparently falls, for without this equivocation he could not, from the aphorism, point or illustrate his view. With a mere miscalculation of example we are not seriously concerned, but it appears to us that his doctrine of contradiction turns upon just such confusions as this.

His example, and the principle he draws once again from it Bosanquet rounds off thus:

"The whole difficulty springs from trying to attribute to given fact the features of ultimate reality."

But this is far from the mind of the man who says "Bread is food" and knows, as we know, what he means by it, namely, not the whole truth about bread, but something true of bread in relation to the bodily organism which it goes to support and nourish. We cannot adequately discuss the vexed question of the subject of the judgment; but we part radically from Bosanquet, and have indicated our point of departure. And our conclusion is that while any 'fact' covers but a narrow portion of the real world, and does call for supplementation if systematic or scientific knowledge is to be gained, it is not 'defective' in the sense of being internally or 'self'-contradictory.

And this contention, if true, cuts the root of his

2. Pringle-Pattison writes of this: "Surely this indiscriminate and unmediated reference to
argument to the self-transcendent character of knowledge in his own, but not necessarily in our sense.

With Bosanquet's second derivation from Hegel, and his second application of contradiction to the doctrine of self-transcendence we cannot be deeply concerned, though we take note of it, since, in the first place, it is non-logical; and in the second place is, we believe, unlikely to throw any new light upon our theme.

Just as the self-contradictory nature of fact issues, according to Bosanquet, in self-transcendence under the impulse of thought; so the contradiction inherent in the finite individual - his pain, repression and unsatisfied desire - forces his self-transcendence.

We quoted above from Hegel "in pain contradiction is a real existence." This Bosanquet repeats as "Logical contradiction in the forms of pain, dissatisfaction and unrest ... may almost (our italics) be called itself an actual existent." But it cannot, except in a quite loose - and therefore strictly false - sense, be so characterised. A term belonging to logic will not fit

2. ctd. Reality is as unnatural as e.g. Berkeley's attempt to resolve all the things and happenings of the external world into immediate acts of God. "Arist. Soc. Proceedings. Vol. p. 510. Against Bosanquet's doctrine that the truth is the whole, we are inclined to venture that "truth" has meaning only with respect to parts within the whole, as they stand in the situation of being apprehended by human minds. There is therefore no 'absolute truth' except of the kind which belongs to our least true assertion.

1. 'Mind' Vol. xv. p. 3.
in a psychological situation. Pain is not contradiction; it is the effect in sentience and consciousness of nervous stimulations of a certain sort. The further explanation of the matter is xxxxxx for psychological science - unless, as seems almost to be Bosanquet's view we are to draw no distinction between these - or any - sciences. A certain analogy - which is stronger if we concede Bosanquet's view of contradiction as the incoherence of a single judgment and the whole system of knowledge - between the situation in logic where contradiction obtains and that in which a creature in pain finds itself may be granted, but to press it as an illustration of a logical doctrine with wide metaphysical affiliations, is surely to go astray. But at best it can be no more than analogy, since, to repeat, a term of precise significance in logic cannot be borne beyond the bounds of that science and safely used as a key to a psychological problem.

Further, in discussing the "inherently contradictory character of all finite individuals" he observes,

"It is impossible but that they should have ascribed to them and ascribe to themselves a false character of self-existence."

That is to say, they assert of themselves more than they can sustain, and so are bound to suffer the penalty of false assertion, which is contradiction.

But the precise contrary seems to hold, viz., that no finite individual ever ascribes to itself, or has ascribed to it, self-existence. It is incredible, we hold, that such ascription should ever be made by or of any finite being. According to Bosanquet's theory we are, if we realised it, God himself; but the theory has never been reflected in the unsophisticated mind of man. We insist that the conditionedness and dependent nature of individuality is fundamental to and implied in all his consciousness. If we are justified in maintaining this conviction, then, as we repudiated the defect of fact - a defect which Bosanquet attributes to a pretension to qualify 'ultimate Reality' which cannot be sustained - we can also repudiate this defect of finite individuality, namely, that it sets up to be infinite but cannot sustain its claim.

Since Bosanquet's doctrine of self-transcendence heavily depends upon this erroneous view of the contradiction inherent in finite individuals, and it is by self-transcendence that they achieve their 'Value and Destiny'; we may observe that Bosanquet is committed to the extraordinary

1. See below p. 162ff.
doctrines that the attainment of the goal and good of finite striving is directly motivated and advanced by pride, pretension and self-sufficiency - in fact by those very vices which in well-nigh all developed religion are deemed the most fatal. We need not remark that Bosanquet would intend no such conclusion to be drawn thus baldly; but his very emphatic assertion of the correlativity of good and evil leaves us in no doubt as to his willingness, in the last resort, to allow even so seeming a paradox as that which we have just given.

Before concluding this section we wish to take leave to discuss the following passage.

"Are not those terms contrary which can in no wise be affirmed of one another, such as the circle and the square? Why, no. They do not impede one another or the process of thought unless we bring them together in a special form, to which their content is inadequate. They may quite well be conjoint predicates of the same complex term, and when thus affirmed, and protest by adequate distinction, have nothing in them contrary to one another ... There are places for all predicates and when all predicates are in their place, none of them is contrary to any other ... The essence of contradiction is the bringing them together
without adequate basis of distinction." And "When we find an implication that predicates can be antecedently "contrary" or "opposite," we may infer that contradiction has not been adequately analysed."

To this view we are wholly opposed. According to it, we can 'bring together' circular and non-circular as 'conjoint predicates of the same complex term' if we protect them by 'adequate distinction.' But, we urge, if thus protected they are not brought together, and if they are brought together they will contradict one another. If of an ornamental gate-post we affirm that it is both circular and non-circular (e.g., square); while in the sentence we affirm of the same subject, logically we affirm of one of its parts circularity, and squareness of another part, that is, of separate subjects. The only protection that will prevent these two from contradiction is that they be predicated of different subjects, each of which qua subject is simple. If we are right, there is no such thing in logic as a 'complex subject'; but there are complex reals of which we may predicate either as a whole - in which case they are logically simple, and no contradictory predicates may be brought together in our predication - or of the several parts of which we may predicate what would be contradictory if used
of the same subject. If we say "The gate-post is black and white" we are not falling into contradiction because it is understood that part of the post is black, and part of it is white. In grammar there is one subject involved; in logic there are two. Black and white paint can exist side by side on a gate-post without "contradicting" each other, because things are complex, spatial and divisible, but that part which is black - i.e. of which we predicate blackness - cannot also be white - i.e. we cannot without contradiction predicate of it whiteness. Things do not contradict one another, but universal characters, abstracted from things, can be contradictory.

According to Bosanquet it is merely 'lack of distinction' which causes contradiction between predicates; we maintain that it is predication of the same subject. Bosanquet's opinion is grounded, of course, in his belief that the absolute is the subject of all predication; and since this is so he does not see any difficulty in predicating of a gate-post as a whole that can be properly predicated only of a part of the post. If it is objected that it is only when, in Bosanquet's words "all predicates are in their place" that contradiction is wholly absent, we can agree if it be agreed, as Bosanquet will not agree, that the place of the
potentially contradictory predicates, if they are not to be actually contradictory, is as qualifications of separate subjects. What other arrangement will serve the same end we cannot see.

To the further question, which is really quite unfair, as to whether 'predicates are 'antecedently' contradictory; our answer is the same as that of Bosanquet, but its bearing is different.

No predicates are contradictory until they contradict. It is meaningless to speak of terms intrinsically contradictory, for it is only when brought tentatively into conjunction with other terms that they contradict at all. But when they are thus brought together they do finally and beyond 'protection' contradict one another, if the real characters to which they refer cannot co-exist in the same unitary being or situation regarded as a whole. Round and square are intrinsically contrary because each without the other would never contradict, and do not contradict at all except they be predicated of the same subject.

Bosanquet's example, "This colour is both beautiful and ugly, i.e. not beautiful". It ceases to be a contradiction if you say "This colour by daylight is beautiful and by candle-light is ugly". But he seems wholly to ignore

i. The question is, of course, simplified, as we put it.
the fact that the colour by daylight, and by candle-light is not the same subject at all. In common conversation, in which theory of light is not resorted to, we are likely to use such an expression; but as a logical example it is nugatory. What we are really predicing beauty or in the one case is not that of which we predicate ugliness.

In conclusion, it seems to us that Bosanquet is fundamentally mistaken in his view of contradiction; and where therefore he traces self-transcendence to contradiction he must also err.

Self-transcendence in knowledge is motivated, he maintains, by the self-contradictory nature, or the defect of fact. But facts are not defective in this manner, unless they are taken for more than they are - of which there is no risk whatever.

His further effort to show contradiction as actual in beings (and not in its true place as a character of propositions) and thus as the motive of self-transcendence in them, we take to fail entirely.
A Note on Negation and Negativity.

The doctrine of Negativity, as Bosanquet develops it, is an important supplement to his doctrine of self-transcendence. That the two are kinred is obvious from the following:

"Negativity, then, ... is fundamental in all that is real. ... It is the same characteristic which has been described as the fact experience is always beyond itself - the character, indeed, which we have described from the beginning as that of the universal, or in other words, the tendency of every datum to transcend itself as a fragment and complete itself as a whole."

From this - another exhibition of Bosanquet's previously remarked tendency to run together several terms of apparently disparate sense applicable of the same process or situation - it would seem that negativity and self-transcendence are one and the same. But the distinctions which give rise to language defeat this simple approximation here, as in other quarters of Bosanquet's system. As applied the doctrine of negativity is a supplement to, and a defence of self-transcendence.

1. Principle p. 231. 2. e.g. As of the "individual" to "universal"
It is another example of the 'pseudo-logical' notion in his philosophy. Its first derivation is from a restricted logical truth; but its application is of sweeping metaphysical significance. Upon it, there can be no doubt, Bosanquet depends entirely for defence against the objection so readily pressed against him, that his metaphysic abolishes real distinction from the universe: but that since there is distinction, from his theory is ipso facto false.

The logical truth from which - if we read him aright - Bosanquet (and, indeed, Hegel before him) derives his doctrine of negativity is this, that negation is a means of significant assertion. If, to cite the limiting case we say "There is no truth" we thereby assert the truth of this one proposition. This negation is assertion of the full strength of affirmation over the same area.

From this Bosanquet moves to the universal proposition that 'negative and affirmative grow pari passu.' The validity of this step we are inclined to question; but were it quite valid our principal argument would be unaffected; and we shall not delay to debate it. His next move is to transfer intact from the sphere of logic to the sphere of being or reality, this universal proposition. "Negativity" then becomes "fundamental in all that is real." And in the

Logic he writes, "Reality is a system, and you cannot have system apart from negation." 1

By this last we are brought to the purpose of this transplantation. As Professor Kemp Smith has pointed out, individuality in Bosanquet's scheme supplants system, and denies the differences and the relations which are necessary to it. But by his doctrine of negativity Bosanquet makes his attempt to preserve within the pale of individuality the differences and distinctions which so abundantly characterise the world as it discloses itself to us, and which it is the business of philosophy to explain without explaining away. It is, according to Bosanquet, by negation, by the "embodiment of negativity", that distinction is not done away with in the upward transformation into which every being is forced by the self-transcendent or non-contradictory character of thought, but is made more of in each successive level of individuality. On this point Bosanquet is justly most emphatic, since if he errs here he errs — and would no doubt immediately admit it once the error was conceded — in a manner fatal to his whole philosophy.

"It is a point which seems full of significance, and which can hardly be too much insisted on, that otherness and the not-self, the vastness of the universe with which

every self has to be reconciled, increases and does not
diminishing by the same movement by which friction, obstruction,
conflict, are reduced and removed.\textsuperscript{1}

With the general truth of this we are in complete
agreement. Our objection is merely that Bosanquet's
attempt to make room for it in his scheme of individuality
fails, on one count because it relies upon the misapplying
of a logical truth out of its proper sphere. Nor is this all.
His development of the thesis relies wholly upon the view
that contradiction is not a relation of mutual exclusion
between two propositions, but a character which is "actual"
as in pain, unrest, and unsatisfied desire.

His argument runs thus: the presence of contra-
diction and defect in the individual compels his self-
transcendence, but "something survives the resolved contra-
diction" which is a "successful embodiment of negativity." 
The characters or elements which jarred and were brought
together in a harmonious whole by the self-transcendence -
involving internal transmutation as well as absorption of
the 'de facto' other - of the individual, are not done away,
but are present in the new individuality by way of 'negativity'.
The limiting conclusion is that negativity is "deepest in
the most perfect experience", that is, in the Absolute.

By this means Bosanquet proposes to save 'otherness' in
despite - or he would say, in the terms of - individuality. The scheme of self-transcendence points to absorption - nor
does Bosanquet baulk at the term - ultimately in the
absolute; but, if the principle of negativity holds, all
that is absorbed is itself real as a "successful embodiment
of negativity".

We have two objections to urge, both of which
seem to us fatal to the doctrine, but which, though the
one in a sense follows upon the other, are independent one
of another. The first is a development of the objection
pressed against Bosanquet's doctrine of contradiction, viz.,
that it involves the confusion of logic and psychology.

We have remarked that it is erroneous to call
desire or pain 'contradiction'; it may further be urged
that it is a psychological absurdity to maintain that
desire is present by negation when it has been satisfied.
Desire (in its bodily and instinctive expressions which,
for the sake of simplicity we may solely concern ourselves
with) arises out of the constitution of the organism, and
when satisfied is absent though its permanent possibility
and recurrence may be predicated in view of the nature of
the organism. It is simply absent, and is not present
'by negation' or in any other way. Bosanquet speaks of a
of a 'harmonious world of desire' and it is true of the
civilised and cultivated man that his desires do tend in a
measure to conform to an inner harmony - that at least is
the goal of moral education. By this he would illustrate
the presence in a new individuality of elements once
seemingly in contradiction. But again - are the 'crude
elements' present by way of negation, or are they not? If
the moral education is successful - and Bosanquet insists
upon the possibility of this education perhaps more hope­
fully than we could admit - then the desires simply are not
there. The new character is reached only by way of the
old, but if it is a new character it is absurd to suppose
that the 'old man' is still present by negation. In real
life it is a fact that the old desires do crop up time and
again, but this is a sign of the defect of the 'harmonious
world' which thereby shows itself to be inharmonious after
all. But according to Bosanquet the presence by negation
of all the contributory elements is a factor of the per­
fection of the new individual or character.

So to with respect to pain. Pain is a sensory
phenomenon (and in man becomes either intensified or
relieved by mental elements). This again is either present
or absent, but cannot be both at the same time, as, according
to Bosanquet's theory, it is, and must be in any 'high experience.' There is a truth which may be granted, which is that the individual does 'learn by the things that he suffers'. He becomes more, his character deepens as a result of pain; and so, by remote simile we may say that the pain is 'present' in his character: but the simile is remote, and dangerous if applied in theory. Actually the pain is absent, wholly and beyond recall - though a similar pain may befall him - but its incidence was one of the conditions of his moral growth.

It is by these illustrations that Bosanquet commends his doctrine which is to save 'otherness' even in the absolute experience, and is to secure the eternal value of the passing individual (he has been called 'apparent' above!). Clearly they do not serve at all.

We thus come to our second objection to the doctrine of negativity. Not only is it inapplicable in those psychological situations where Bosanquet seeks especially to commend it, but he commits the further error of supposing it to obtain - on the strength of these illustrations and of his keen theoretical need of it - over

1. His belief in the effectiveness of this principle of negativity leads him to say - it being remembered that all reality is 'thought construction' - "If we construct in thought the materials out of which we construct have not lost their separateness when the fabric is finished." Note his use of the term 'separate' which is stronger even than 'distinction'. We are unable to feel that this assertion has place consistently with his theory of identity.
the whole world of process and reality or the whole field of self-transcendence. We have complained above that Bosanquet's doctrine of self-transcendence intends nothing less than the actual absorption of an individual in a super-ordinate individual, and this will be yet clearer in the illustrations quoted below. With this Bosanquet asserts, as the corollary of their absorption, that no being less than the Absolute is really distinct or self-identical. In other connections he assigns them 'adjectival' reality. In this connection he asserts the continued real presence of every distinction and difference absorbed to compose a high individual, not affirmatively, since the differences are absorbed, but by negation. It is by 'negation' that the finite individual enjoys his 'substantive reality and value' while he lives; and this reality and value endures to all eternity.

But in addition to the inappropriateness of this logical term thus used as of "a fundamental feature of Reality", may we not urge that it is mere assertion, unsupported by anything but the dubious illustrations drawn in a special sphere and referred to above, to say that - to take a low, but doubtless relevant example - a chicken eaten is as real a chicken as in the poultry run. Against this

view of Bosanquet we advance the alternative view that, so long as the appropriate conditions of the existence of a real individual or thing hold there can be no question as to its existence - except those which seek what it is - and that if its reality is really absorbed in that of another - as Bosanquet insists that all finite reality is and must be - then there can be no further ascription of reality to it either by way of negation or in any other way.

Bosanquet is aware that 'distinction and difference' are necessary to identity - that is to individuality or to system of any kind; and having repudiated them by the terms of his absolutism he seeks to assert 'by negation' what he denies 'by affirmation'. Thus negativity for him is that "Feature of experience" i.e. of reality, which assures the 'difference and distinctness necessary to identification."

"Everything contributes to the whole, and the friction or failure of adjustment, which made the contradiction or deadlock, no doubt represented and enhanced the distinctness of the two sides, which survives in and tends to perfect the completed union." ... "The qualification, whatever it is, can surely count and work only as it survives within the completed whole, and it is in the factors of this whole that we have to find the experience of negativity; which . . . is a character that is deepest in the most perfectly real experience."

But if our reading of his doctrine of identity, as outlined above, is just, then this last resort must fail. As far as we can judge the situation, Bosanquet's view of negativity is an attempt to save again the appearances which the fundamentals of a theory have repudiated. We have said that Bosanquet's emphasis upon the doctrine of self-transcendence arises from his more acute sense of the claims of finite individuality than, e.g. we find either in Bradley or in Spinoza; and have pointed out that in its development the doctrine does nothing to save the appearances, but actually denies the self-identity of any individual. This doctrine of negativity, we further venture, is resorted to to modify the effect of his application of the doctrine of self-transcendence. But this last is, for the reasons given above, an unsuccessful attempt.
Self-transcendence is theoretically necessary to Bosanquet's monism, and is, he maintains, the 'character of Thought' - a character further exhibitions of which he thereupon seeks to show in the remaining wide range of our experience. We have, however, some reason for supposing that the doctrine would not be formulated as it is, were it not for certain feelings of self-transcendence which, in several situations have been marked enough to force themselves into common speech. Certainly the phenomena of the life of feeling are the most readily accessible of the three factors of our consciousness.

Feeling alone does not wait for introspection to bring it to light in its true character. Knowing is wholly self-effacing: it directs the mind not to itself but to its object and the fact of its occurrence can only be brought to awareness by a separate and special act of cognition. Willing likewise is directed toward the restraint or effecting of change either in the outer or inner world; and the knowledge that accompanies it is directed toward the end willed. Thus in knowing, the object known; and the end that is willed holds the focus of consciousness. Feeling, on the other hand, does not
point away from itself, but thrusts itself forward in its own character - being intensified as our cognitive apprehension of that which awakens it advances. The fluctuating 'body' of feeling, therefore, bulks large in the factors lending self-consciousness to the self.

This fluctuating body of feeling, so largely determinative of the sense of self, may itself be noticed as now more, now less intense, then of one kind, and now of another; and so, by this dual fact of continuity with profound difference of feeling, affords what may very well be called a feeling of self-transcendence. The fact of continuity is wholly irreducible, for if were not it would not be the feeling of the same self; and on the other hand the difference is marked enough to make a sense of foreignness within our sense of self a well marked feature of much of our experience. To this language bears witness. For example,

"When the last note died away I came suddenly to myself!" or

"Under the spell of this beautiful scene I scarce knew myself."

These and many others of a similar sort testify to a feeling of self-transcendence which accompanies many of our intenser experiences. Bosanquet does not fail to

1. See below Chapters. 8 & 9.
make use of these in illustration of his doctrine; but close inspection of his application of the evidence so derived - which does not seem to us to be of much ontological value - discloses a deep and far-reaching confusion. It is surely manifest that the evidence drawn from a *feeling of self-transcendence* points incontrovertibly toward a self that maintains its centrality, that really is a self however much more of content the movement of self-transcendence brings within its circumference. If Bosanquet were prepared to do justice to the end to what he calls the *subjective centring of experience* - to the centres of consciousness the circumference of which must be admitted to fluctuate widely - then he might justly make use of these feelings of self-transcendence - so far as they are what they seem - which belong exclusively to the subject's point of view. But this, on other grounds of theory he is not willing to do; and his use of the self or subject's sense of self-transcendence is to illustrate a movement in reality by which the subject stands revealed no longer under its appearances of subject but - so he asserts - as it truly is, i.e. as an adjective. Or, in language less questionable, a movement by which a centre the circumference of which is wholly taken into a larger circumference, ceases to be or

1. See above pp. 100 & 104.
to appear as a centre because its content is gone to enrich some wider sphere.

To this procedure - which is patently improper - he can give the semblance of propriety only by changing the point of view from within looking outward, which is the subject or self's viewpoint where self-transcendence in some sense may very well be found, to a view from without looking on. From this latter prospect the absorption of the self in what is not that self, and its disappearance in the wider being is obviously less objectionable, since the spectator can console himself that there still is something. Most of Bosanquet's discussion of self-transcendence is from this external point of view, as if it could be seen going on all about us all of the time. But this is impossible. The notion of self-transcendence may only be intelligible, and is only possible of application so long as the point of view of the self is maintained. When what is meant is the 'cessation of the self', or its 'absorption' - even though softened by the concession of some 'contribution it brings to the whole' - in what is not (since the Absolute is opposed by no not-self, and so, while it is 'individual', has no self-noon) a self at all, it must surely be a radical misuse of language to say 'self-transcendence'. And to use the evidences of feeling - the most pressingly self-revealing and self-confirming of our experiences - in support of this
confusion is surely an aggravation of the error.

This illustration of the doctrine, however, which begins by departing from the point of view of the self, and ends by denying its reality is but a symptom of the _wrong deeper lying doctrine of identity_, which insists upon the ultimacy of but one kind of difference, one kind of connection, and so of only one real being.
Some of Bosanquet's Illustrations of Self-Transcendence:  
Society, Art, & Love.

This title would seem to plot an area too wide to cover in a brief chapter; but since—according to Bosanquet—the essentials of self-transcendence are the same in all of its exhibitions, and since all of these have been discussed somewhat carefully under the heading of 'self-transcendence in knowledge' our undertaking is not as ambitious as it appears. We are concerned merely to state, subject to the general criticisms for the most part sufficiently urged, a few of the wide range of illustrations by which Bosanquet so freely commends and seeks to enforce his doctrine.

As we suggested when offering our conclusions concerning knowledge it is possible that there is, in some of these situations, a real self-transcendence by which the doctrine may gain credence, but which may not properly be assumed by it because of fundamental defects in its basis and formulation and especially because Bosanquet repudiates self-identity.

There is a sense in which any real growth of character and personality may be called a self-transcendence, since it is at once the same and a different self subsequent to its growth. But so to say is to substitute for a term itself needing definition another even less unequivocal, and at the same time to suppose a self which is, so to
speak, static, or having known boundaries about it before and after its enlargement. But this is not true of the self; we never know either our own selves or another's well enough to set boundaries to their being and ability; and it is more probably true that the self is really without anything which may properly be thought of as a boundary. Its content and character is so fluid as never to set. In this we come near to what Bosanquet — when he forgets his extreme of scepticism concerning the self — says of it; but we do not need, indeed we must not follow him in saying that because actually the self has no boundary or, more certainly, because we never know its boundary, that there are no limits within the universe which the self cannot overcome in principle, and so become the absolute. We have repudiated this emphatically. All that we need assert is that actually we none of us are all that we might be. If time existed in moments it would, in strict theory be possible to say that at any given time the self is precisely bounded, has a momentarily definite being: but we have strong, indeed ample reason to believe that time does not exist in moments, but in a real continuum; and that therefore the self has no actual boundary short of the limitations, certain but largely beyond our apprehension except in some of their present and temporal effects, which its finitude assigns. The self, we would say, enjoys self-identity of its own kind, and
a real distinction from other beings, but its own being is essentially to be a life. Therefore we are on safer ground when we call the self simply 'growing' than when we seek to be more precise and call it 'self-transcending.' With knowledge we had a special situation where an object not the self was known, but where our terms are two levels of the same self, the term is not applicable. This is a touchstone we would apply to all of the supposed illustrations of self-transcendence, and by its use we may immediately put out of court a number of them, and, if we wish to apply rigorously Bosanquet's often repeated doctrine that the reality of one being is ideally that of any other and ultimately of the universe, we may make short work of all of them. But this last procedure is scarcely profitable since it would shut us out from whatever of valuable analysis Bosanquet brings to the service of his unacceptable theory.

It is by this doctrine fatal to all self-transcendence that Bosanquet, in his Logic, introduces the illustration from the individual's status in society and the state. He remarks

"A seeking on the part of the self for its own reality (our italics) which carries it into something beyond. And on this point social experience, like that
of art, is absolutely conclusive."

Bosanquet's view of the state, we scarcely need say is that it constitutes a higher approximation to individuality than does the particular individual within it. The state "strongly anticipates the character of its perfection" i.e. of the absolute; but it is, none the less "a phase of individuality which belongs to the process towards unity at a point far short of its completion." In the state "the body of particular centres begins to take on a distinct resemblance to what we know must be the character of the Absolute." And of the individuals within it the state "demands subordination and self abnegation." It is an important sphere of self-transcendence.

To this view of the state we are wholly opposed. It is a mere assertion to say that the type of unity effected by the members of a state is higher than that of the constituents themselves. We would not wish to minimise the part played by his social intercourse in the making of man, for it is obvious that without it he would never have been man at all. But if man viewed apart from his society (which is not, of course, equivalent to his

3. Value and Destiny p. 90.
state, but for Bosanquet the distinction is narrower than we should draw it) is an 'abstraction', so also, - and more eminently, - is the state and society an abstraction viewed without reference to its constituent members. We would urge that the former is a more generally permissible and fruitful abstraction than the latter; in so far as his society and the fact of his social co-operation is but one of the conditions of his existence, whereas the society (or the state) exists solely in and through the lives of its members. Recent writers and events have more than ever shown how dangerous a thing it is to say 'America' so desires, or 'Italy' so did: but it is manifest that we may without any risk of misunderstanding say that Mr Macdonald desires the passage of the Coal Bill, and Mr Snowden made the last Budget.

Bosanquet's misunderstanding of the relation of individual and state, - grounded, doubtless, in his metaphysical prepossessions, - goes very deep. He remarks, e.g. that "A great country does not represent itself by mapping itself on a portion of its surface, but by developing, say a university at one point, a church at another ..." But the country does not represent itself. The people who live in it carry on their activities, and

1. Principle p. 38n.
build up, not of course to any one person's plan, the institutions that suit them. All of them are the work of co-operation, but none of them are, so to speak, come down from above. If this were mere peculiarity of phrase on Bosanquet's part it would not deserve notice; but in point of fact it represents his real feeling and attitude toward the state, and to society. But any reading of history should show how particularly human are the most massive institutions. The 'unconscious element' in them is not the work of a 'teleology above consciousness' operative directly through the state - as it would according to Bosanquet's view - but the combined work, often at cross purposes, of countless particular consciousnesses. We cannot here elaborate and defend this point of view, but we may state it as against that of Bosanquet, from which he derives his illustrations of self-transcendence in the state, and in society.

His illustrations in this sphere rely upon the acknowledged fact of heroic self-sacrifice for the sake of the patria - or what is mistaken for it. There is no richer source of noble examples of self-surrender for a cause. But are these self-transcendences? If the state is the particular being's own reality it is
obviously not. Again, it seems safer to hold to the terms of our common speech with all their difficulties of definition than to run into deeper difficulty over the new. Self-sacrifice is a problem hard enough; but self-transcendence, so far as the writer can see, is enmeshed in hopeless ambiguity if applied in this connection. To the gain that accrues immediately or more or less remotely to society from the sacrifice of its members we can sometimes approximate, according to the length and breadth of our view, but not very often. The gain - if it be a gain - that comes to the particular self in its own surrender we cannot hope to know; nor can we speculate without presupposing an answer to the profoundest questions of metaphysics. But if we take this step towards speculation we are shut off from agreement or even from discussion with those who differ radically in their philosophy.

But - if the term self-transcendence is to be allowed in this or in any other connection - we must insist upon the maintenance of the point of view of the self. Where this cannot be done it is patently inapplicable. This is central to our thesis, and seems to us to be demanded alike by language and the claim that words shall only mean what they justly convey. And in this regard Bosanquet's
illustrations, especially in this sphere, seem to us to fail. We remarked above the essential likeness of all the exhibitions and illustrations of self-transcendence with which we have to deal. This follows from the universal application of the one principle of reality, or individuality. By this principle we are taken, Bosanquet observes, "into the region where we go out of the self and into it by the same movement, in the quasi-religion of social unity, in knowledge, art, and in religion proper." If we remain in the region of the fundamentals of Bosanquet's theory we need go no further; for it is evident that the same general criticisms will apply alike to situations differing only in degree of emphasis of the same principle. But it is possible that in the realm of art fresh and interesting features may appear for discussion.

Commending his general principle against possible criticism Bosanquet remarks:

"It is a fair rejoinder, and one not nearly enough relied upon, to say, 'There is nothing in the world worth having, doing, or being which does not involve a self-transcendence, and an enormous self-transcendence, of the type which you deny.' Think of the attitude demanded of one by, say, a masterpiece of art. You say you do not

want an absolute in which you do not recognise yourself.
But you scarcely recognise yourself when for a moment
Shakespeare or Beethoven has laid his spell upon you. It is
a difficult matter to deal with truths, which, as it sometimes
appears to the present writer, every one accepts, and no
one believes."

That the contemplation of a fine picture, the
reading of a great poem, or attention upon a master-piece
of music makes a change in us if educated to appreciate it
we would not dream of denying - our question again is
merely "Is this change a self-transcendence?" Having
established to his own satisfaction the broad lines of his
theory Bosanquet, however seems merely to assume that
where there is change there is self-transcendence - an
assumption which a multitude of illustrations fails to
make valid in the absence both of convincing basic argument
and of detailed analysis.

Aesthetic appreciation is a special co-operative
exercise of cognitive apprehension and feeling, in which
the latter dominates, especially in respect of certain forms
of art - as e.g. the musical. But as we have pointed out
elsewhere, cognition and affection imply someone to know and

1. ibid. p. 260.
to feel, and they remain what they are only as the activities of a being whose persists at least so long as the activities themselves. The writer is wholly incompetent to discuss the special nature and subject matter of aesthetics, but that these implications and requirements of the factors of all consciousness can be supposed no longer to apply in the special sphere must be assuredly false.

In particular we see no logical connection whatever between the fact - which none could wish to deny - that in deep aesthetic appreciation the focus of consciousness, the character of our feelings, is really other than that of our commonplace or otherwise specially engaged moments; and that in consequence - if we went to the pains of self-examination in the midst of it - we should notice the difference, and Bosanquet's conclusion that in this situation is a really irrefragable example of self-transcendence, and one clear enough to point the ultimate moral of absorption in the absolute as the perfection or highest point of our finite being.

1. We need, here as elsewhere, to distinguish between Bosanquet's theory, which is so unsatisfactory, and his attitude toward and personal response to all of these great things. We may cite, both in illustration of the theory and of the personal attitude, which is well-nigh religious, a sentence from a letter to Dr Creighton in America. "Does the conversation or value imply the conservation of personality? I picked up the December number of the Studio and found myself in a world of supreme values ...."
we further most willingly grant that great art
is one of the chief instruments of human ennoblement -
being both food and fruit of the soul - but for this
reason, if for none other, are less enabled to view it
as a commendation of Bosanquet's fundamentally sceptical
theory.

In the enjoyment of those forms of art which
call markedly upon the specifically cognitive element, as
e.g. a poem or drama, we may say that the self-transcendence
justly attributable to all knowledge, is present. But since
that which is apprehended is of quite a different kind from

1. etc. A philosopher is not made by looking; no doubt he
must think. Nevertheless if he knows how and where to look,
it seems to me that the inexhaustibilidade in values, of human
experience, is altogether beyond the need of reasoning. To
use a schoolboy phrase, 'There is plenty more where they came
from.' And the revelation that they bring leaves me, I confess
a little indifferent to the remoter inferences which we may
draw from it, and a little impatient of any discussion which
implies that we are not in the presence of supreme realities
and immeasurable values." Unfortunately his own 'remote
inferences' seem to us to endanger the validity of his own
conviction with which we are - in large part - at one. And
further; "We know that what we care for, in so far as it is
really what we care for, is safe through its continuity with
the absolute." But, as we urge, if the whole of
reality is really solely continuous, then what we care for is
not safe; it never was or will be; nor we ourselves either.

If, in appreciation of music we were really carried
beyond self-recognition, then on coming to ourselves we should
know no more about than - if we may be permitted a vulgar
simile drawn from the writer's acquaintance with British
Columbia miners and smelter-men - the man who says "I was
at a swell party last night!" but cannot say where or with
whom it was, or what happened there.
that which is before us when, say, we know the moon, or our neighbour, we should have to formulate our meaning to suit the difference of situation. It is a genuine self-transcendence, we maintained, to know the moon, or our neighbour, since these that we know are other than ourselves, but are, in apprehension, somehow present to us. Does this apply also in the case of knowing Hamlet? or, in other fields, in knowing the twice times table? These questions do not come within the region of our limited enquiry, but they are no doubt worth asking and answering in other connections than this. The fundamental point in our general contention is that self-transcendence is possible in respect of that which is real, and is not ourselves, and in so far as Hamlet and the twice times table are real, the knowledge of them involves us in the kind of self-transcendence we have referred to above.

Artistic creation is another situation from that of appreciation, but it is matter for fine psychological discrimination to assign the precise difference in the affective factors involved in both. So far as the writer has relevant experience it seems to point to a large degree of similarity between them. The conational side is so directed and attended by feeling appropriate both to the stage of achievement and the
ideal entertained; and with skill in technique its merely mechanical or executive factors are so subordinated, that, after all, artistic creation does not seem radically different from intense creation intense and sustained artistic appreciation. For all the labour that an artist puts in, his finest flashes of artistry seem to be those which come to him, so to speak, 'ready made'. In a large work there would be many of these, each lending to the whole a point of perfection; or a small thing, as e.g. a brief lyric poem, the whole labour of making it is achieved in pure appreciation of the gift it embodies.

The foregoing paragraph is something of a digression, but contributes this, that we need not discuss separately the self-transcendent character of artistic creation. With all knowledge and action it involves self-transcendence of the limited kind we have outlined, but none of the kind which points, as Bosanquet would have it, to real absorption in its object.

We do not propose to linger over further illustrations and enforcements of the doctrine of self-transcendence cited by Bosanquet, but a word or two is called for by that which he terms the 'typical self-transcendence', which is love. He writes, concluding his Gifford Lectures, as follows.
"Consider as a final example, only the case of love - the typical self-transcendence. No doubt it is the best thing, in a sense the only thing, in the world; but most certainly it is not to be had for nothing."

We have no desire to treat great matters lightly, and would avoid carping criticism where Bosanquet's sentiment is so largely right, notwithstanding his theory which is so inadequate. But the immediate, and to us certainly true retort must be that, so far as we understand it love is just one of those things we do get for nothing, and which we can reject - by which our character is most sharply tested, and in response so deeply enriched. Love, for Bosanquet, is the crowning example of logic, or the self-sustenance of the real; for us it is the crowning example of grace, which is an overflow from that which is already full. And this applies in our own region of human loving. It is actually this self-giving character of love by which Bosanquet seeks once again to commend self-transcendence; but it is our certain opinion that since Bosanquet's theory of the universe has no place in it for anything with no 'quid pro quo' he is simply disqualified from utilising the evidence drawn from this sphere.

1. See e.g. Principle p. 23 and circa.
There has been much discussion as to the degree of distinction necessary to love between individuals; as to whether they are one in any valid sense when in love, but we need not follow it out into its ramifications. Bradley is fully aware of the difficulty; more so, indeed than is Bosanquet. He writes:

"We do not know love as the complete union of individuals ... and if we extend the sense of love and make it higher than we experience, I do not see that we are sure of preserving that amount of self-existence in the individual which seems necessary for love."

This belongs to his latest, best, and least illusionist writing as it appears in some of the essays collected under the title of 'Essays on Truth and Reality'. On the one side it expresses a truth, on the other side it falls into his very characteristic assumption that the higher we go in the scale of reality the less does self-identity prevail.

Bosanquet, if we judge him justly is somewhat less consistent and less cautious also in the application of their common doctrines. He writes, therefore, as if our experience of love pointed really to absorption of two 'persons' in one individuality. Separateness is,

in any event, for him 'not an ultimate character of the individual, but is a phase of being... tending to disappear in so far as true individuality prevails.' And since love is for him, one of the highest of self-transcendences towards individuality, he definitely holds that as love grows deeper, the separate self-identity of those loving really diminishes, and in perfect love they would be really one. But, against this we can even cite Bradley, who realises that separateness is not accidental, but is essential to this finite love of ours; and for that reason he repudiates it as of the real world.

In the utterance of love it has been and is common to speak of the union of two or more beings; but from the careful or philosophic viewpoint we must maintain - what is really quite sufficient for the wants of love - that it is communion and not union that holds between them. The manner and degree of this communion must vary profoundly where men and women of various tempers and qualities meet. We would hesitate to set a limit to the measure of this communion, for in this region - as in others equally important - life and experience - our own and that of others in which we gratefully share - has a way of riding over them and revealing rich territory beyond. We do well not to be too sure of limiting interpretations in such spheres as these.

1. Value and Destiny p. 62.
In this region, however, Bosanquet is able to draw upon unlimited examples of self-giving, and - as we have remarked above - simply assumes that these exemplify and enforce his doctrine which, when pressed, is a denial of all that love is and requires.
Concerning religion as we find it discussed in the writings of Bosanquet we might well undertake an essay in itself, and the matter could not fail of deep interest and importance. That on almost all points we should differ would be rather a gain than a loss, since in Bosanquet the full and true effects of errors very easy to fall into in theological thinking are emphatically and variously expressed. If these effects are to be eschewed, then it is clear that they must be avoided not in their fruition but at the root. Our positive gain would be the knowledge of what will not do, which is a profitable introduction to the study of what will. But these alluring avenues would lead us far from the limited field of our theme, which dictates a narrower and less fruitful discussion.

We have this important point of agreement with Bosanquet (and perhaps even more explicitly with Bradley) that religion matters for philosophy as much as for life; and if, therefore, we find his theory out of step with religion we may press the claims of the latter and not violate the point of view he maintains.

Our fundamental criticism of Bosanquet's citation from the specifically religious expressions and attitudes of man as exhibitions and elucidations of his doctrine is the

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same as that which applies to his draft upon love. We have insisted throughout that self-transcendence requires three things, a self of irrefragable self-identity, another reality equally self-identical - the kind of which, however, may be what it will, and a genuine communication or communion, the presence of the one and the other not passively, but in some sort of responsive activity on the part of one or of both. Where these conditions obtain there may be - though we are not committed to the view that the term is at all luminous by way of explanation - a self-transcendence: where they do not the term is a misnomer, at least, and a very probable source of misunderstanding as to real bearing of Bosanquet's philosophy.

As to all of these conditions Bosanquet is wholly unsatisfactory. In denying the first two he of course rules out the third. We have observed above that, according to his theory, the reality of any finite individual is to be God or the absolute, and that between the absolute and ourselves there is neither real discontinuity of being nor distinction. Since this is his view he is by it shut off from reference to self-transcendence, and is, moreover, disqualified from the positively fruitful discussion of religion which cannot thrive on anything but communion
between two real beings.

1. Against this the great pantheist religions of the East may be urged. These explicitly regard union as the end of religion—and their philosophy affords scope for nothing else. Even so truly sensitive a writer as Rabindranath Tagore looks for liberation from the mystifications and exaggerations of the self in the realisation of one's self in the all-pervading God; between whom and us there is 'no break in unity'. (from 'Sadhanā')—but in so far as Tagore points the way to this end through 'knowledge, love and service with all beings' it is clear that real distinction of being is implied by and required for religion as he conceives it. Possibly he has no intention of denying it, but his language, modelled on the Upanishads, seems to us strictly to deny it—a conclusion in which we may be deceived by reason of the deep difference of meaning which a word may convey to minds of completely different cultures. Our belief is that so far as these great religions foster truly religious attitudes and expressions they are following impulses and implying distinctions which their theology or philosophy—for pantheism the two are, of course, one—does not take account of. The same could be said, we believe, of the undoubtedly religious attitude and temper which Bosanquet himself displays.

Much mysticism, even in its western development, is marred by this defect. Husbroeck, e.g. writing of the culminating vision: "What is this light, if it be not a contemplation of the Infinite, and an intuition of Eternity?" So far all is well, but he goes on "we behold that which we are, and we are that which we behold; because our being, without losing anything of its own personality, is united with the Divine Truth." To a rapturous utterance it is ungracious to take narrow exception; but are we not justified in inquiring of what kind is the union that leaves our own personality uninfriected? In even so generally balanced and admirable an exponent of mysticism as W.R. Inge the writer seems to discover trace of a similar confusion. Compare, e.g. these statements of a point both true and important in our present theme: "It is plain that we could not see God unless our personality remained distinct from the personality of God. Complete fusion is as destructive of the possibility of love and knowledge as complete separation." Or "if two beings are separate, they cannot influence one another inwardly. If they are not distinct there can be no relations between them." (with this we are wholly at one: they are found in his Bampton Lectures, pp. 158 & 241 resp.) and "I maintain that the foci (our ital.)
In Bosanquet's scheme of things there is no room for anything really finite. For this reason he hedges as to the status of 'so-called finite individuals' and terms them 'finite-infinite'. But since one of the terms is wholly unexplained or defined - finitude being for him an incident of weakness, an impotence entirely mysterious, not found in the essence of any being - this designation carries us no-whither. Man is essentially God, being of like kind with Him, and divided by an accident of weakness.

Against this, in his philosophy, we find the no less emphatic assertion that the infinite needs the finite for its self-maintenance and expression - which is quite out

1. ctd. of consciousness flow freely into each other even on the psychical plane, while in the eternal world there are probably no barriers at all.¹ or "In philosophy as in religion we had better follow the advice of the Theologia Germanica and Danisa, as far as possible, the words me and mine from our vocabulary." But how far is this banishment possible, and how far is it compatible with the sense of the first passages? And if the loci of consciousness really flow into each other, now shall the distinction of personality insisted upon above remain uninfringed?

1. what we would take to be the true account of the finite being's sense of his relation to God is not that God is his ultimate reality - his completed being, but, as the Psalmist so excellently says, that "All my springs are in Thee!" And for us this holds, not only of his sense of the situation, but its reality.
of harmony with the requirements of fully self-conscious religion, and, so far as we can judge, leaves the real status of the finite in even deeper ambiguity. If it is really needed it must in some more than accidental manner be real. Over the whole of this ground we cannot go again, but in this sphere of religion the underlying failure of theory comes very vividly to light.

That man is essentially God runs counter to the deepest demands of religion no less than does the assertion that God really needs man in order himself to be perfect. And these demands are uttered not only by the conspicuously religious sense, but by the less vocal yet well-nigh universal sense of creatureliness in sincere men.

For religion we must maintain the doubly difficult view that man is really finite, that his esse is not that of God, and that he nevertheless has in him some breath of and kinship with Him. If by this 'infinite' in him we are to mean anything compatible with the needs we have named, then our interpretation of this infinite element or participation must not be anything so simple as this plain identification or adequation which Bosanquet

1. We are not discriminating, as would need to be done in a full discussion, between God and the absolute.
emphatically asserts. Everything in our experience points toward our essential finitude, and leads to a deepening of our sense of the difference - which must not, however, obliterate a real but dependent kinship, such as that more or less adequately suggested by the Christian doctrine of the Father - between ourselves and God.

We must be sensitive to what Von Hügel insists upon as "The independence, and the awe-inspiring pre-eminence of God." And further to this that

"God is emphatically not simply our highest selves, heaven for us will not be a simple adequation. (even in kind, apart from all degree) of our nature with God's: religion is not simple and full intercourse of equals ... Man is not God, but has God's ends to serve."

Throughout his philosophy Bosanquet insists upon the continuity of the real; and this, we have observed, is essential to his sense of self-transcendence - which is not what its name requires - but for religion no less than for any real self-transcendence there must be discontinuity in the universe, and between the universe and God. Just how this shall be stated is the hardest problem of theism; but it is no solution to go back on the conditions which set the question

We may be allowed two other quotations from Von

1 Cited from the letters of Von Hügel.
Hügel’s letters which memorably put our conviction in this matter.

"We may well wonder at the mysteriously thin barrier between our poor finite relativity, and the engulfing infinite Absolute, a barrier which is absolutely necessary for us, for though God was and could be without us, God is no more God for us, if we cease to be relatively distinct from Him." And "We shall ever have to look up to God, to apprehend not comprehend Him. We are not and never will be God; but already here we can and at our best we are, God-like!"

We are thus brought about to the real self-transcendence which is in greater measure present in our religious life and our worship than in any other situation. Since God is other than ourselves, and is eminently Real, in our apprehension of and our communion with Him we undoubtedly transcend ourselves more than in any other knowledge or communion. And in the secondary sense to which we have referred, since we become more by reason of this communion, we may speak of our religion involving our self-transcendence. But it is probably truer certainly we think, safer to say that by our religion we grow - especially in what has been called the 'knowledge and love of God.'

As with devotion to the state, and with love, so with religion, Bosanquet is able to cite those examples of
self-giving which lend themselves, if taken uncritically, to the enforcement of his doctrine, but we insist that he is not entitled to use them.

Religion is not for Bosanquet sui generis, but is one of the high points of a process running through all reality, it is, in short, one self-transcendence out of the many, of essentially the same character as them all. We do not need, therefore to trace the examples he gives of self-transcendence in religion, nor his elucidations of religion by reference to its supposedly self-transcendent character.

By no means all that he has to say about religion is valueless, indeed - if the underlying presence of the pantheistic axioms be overlooked - some of it, his little book e.g. on 'What Religion Is' is singularly impressive. Its fundamental error - as of all his writing upon this theme - is, we would say, two-fold. It repeats his conclusion that the existence of God - i.e. the ontological side of religion - is wholly unimportant, that, in fact God does not exist, but that the all important thing is the maintenance of the 'religious consciousness.' And further it presses wholly beyond measure one side of the 'die to live' paradox - so profoundly true, yet so dangerous in the hands of the ultra monistically minded, from Hegel.

1. All of them, as Professor Webb observes, "Self-surrender for that which no person can enjoy. 'Divine Personality and Human Life' p. 245."
downward, who use it to force ontological conclusions which would be fatal not only to religion but to life also, were they really to hold.

What this 'religious consciousness' is he gives as follows:

"We have the essence of religion wherever certain characteristics are ascribed with a certain intensity by the finite subject to the object with which in his self-transcendence in thought and will - he unites himself, wherever, in a word, we have devoutness, devotedness, devotion, we have the primary features of religion." and "When you come to a serious and complete devoutness or devotion, in which the whole man feels himself worthless apart from the object to which goes out in will and conviction ... The attitude towards it cannot be denied to be religious."

"Wherever a man is so carried beyond himself whether for any other being, or for a cause or for a nation, that his personal fate seems to him as nothing in comparison with the happiness or triumph of the other, there you have the universal basis and structure of religion ... We can only be saved by giving ourselves to something in which we remain what we are, and yet enter into something new."

Without implying that such devotions and loyalties as these are slight things we must, however, insist that they are not religion. They enter into all religion, no doubt, but are not its essence, which cannot be defined without reference to God, whose existence is all important to it. "Here" as Von Hugel writes "existence matters; here, indeed it matters supremely." There can be no other resort for religion than the reality, untouched by any defect, of its object. For this reason any object, as Bosanquet urges, will not do. Men do, and will, give themselves to and for inferior objects, but this is not religion but a substitute for it - even though it be the exhibition and of a character and devotion to an object which we find wholly admirable.

"Nobody is anything except as he joins himself to something ... Strictly we need go no further." So Bosanquet briefly puts his point. To what we are joined is not, according to this view, essential. To us it is essential that the object be one to whom perfection is not only ascribed - as we are or are not disposed, or as we do not change our minds - but one to whom perfection belongs. Further in this passage we may mark that for Bosanquet religion is to be 'joined' to something - for us it must be 'communication or communion' between God and ourselves. And only - as we have
insisted above - if it is this last can religion really be a self-transcendence. As in knowledge, social relations, in art or in love, so in religion there must be entities which are really distinct - but nevertheless really in communion either by the activity of one or of both of them.

Religion, for Bosanquet, is the perfection or summit of our finite self-transcendence because it carries the individual beyond his powers of self-recognition. But, not only does it cease to be self-transcendence once the continuity of self-recognition is broken, but it is profoundly doubtful whether in 'real life' men are so carried quite literally 'beyond themselves' in religious devotion. To have any value for me, it must surely be my devotion, and not some other person's. We doubt whether we are carried past self-recognition; but we are certain that we cannot be carried past self-identity. This is here the crux no less than in every other field; since according to the dictates of his doctrine of identity, consistently applied, he is driven to deny those distinctions which are as essential to religion or any experience as to the constitution of any differentiated world such as this in which we find ourselves.
Note. We have not referred to Bosanquet's secondary title of religion as 'self-recognition' - a title he gives on the grounds that in religion the self knows itself not to be a self - which is really, except upon his assumption that my reality is the absolute, a complete misnomer. It seems to the writer wholly unhelpful either to an understanding of Bosanquet's case, or of the problem of religion. The reference is to Value and Destiny, pp. 18-19. "Self-recognition .. is another phrase for the religious consciousness, and to feel where his value lies" (and his reality, we may equally say - both of which lie in his being the whole), is the same thing with offering up his attainment to the whole by faith and worship, supported by and included within an ultimate sense of the inviolable unity (the sense of the absolute, as permeating and holding together opposites like good and evil, or human and divine.) on which all sanity and coherence, say, in the religious consciousness, ultimately reposes." To this we need add no comment more than has already been offered above.
Summary conclusion.

we propose very briefly to summarise the main course of the thesis.

Self-transcendence, in Bosanquet's scheme, is patently metaphysical; it is called for to reconcile the many and the one. But Bosanquet's view of the one as individual (excluding other forms of connection or of fundamental unity) makes self-transcendence - in the clear sense of the terms - impossible. It reduces to tensions, expansions and contractions within a continuum - which again appears to be an anomaly. Accepting, however, self-transcendence in this sense we examined his application of it to the field of knowledge - which, since for Bosanquet reality is of a 'logical character', is a typical field - and found that, since knowledge involves two factors - thought and sense - of a radically diverse character, and an element of genuine givenness to which our apprehension is wholly passive, self-transcendence in Bosanquet's sense could not possibly apply in it. And by insisting upon the 'full individuality' of knowledge he deprives himself - we sought to show - of those factors necessary if self-transcendence is to be possible; namely a mind to know which is not what it knows, an object to be known which is essentially distinct, even separate, from the mind which knows it, and a real communication between
the two. If these factors are maintained, then we may deem knowledge a real self-transcendence, though so to describe it is not especially illuminating.

We then turned to his doctrine of identity which is fundamental to all his thinking, in order to show sufficiently the justice of our contention that his system really does not so long as it is self-consistent permit of real distinctions such as to make self-transcendence possible in any sense. We pointed out the presence of assertions, especially in the introductory parts of his logic, which convey a contrary impression, and endeavoured to show that while indicating Bosanquet's awareness of the need of them they are not compatible with the central doctrines he enforces. In this doctrine of identity we have an especial interest because it is its parallel metaphysical principle of individuality of which the reverse side is the doctrine of self-transcendence, but which effectively puts out of court a self-transcendence in which the factors we have named are involved.

By his doctrine of contradiction Bosanquet seeks to show the motive of self-transcendence. But both in logic, where contradiction belongs, and in the realm of ontology, where it plainly does not, he fails if our criticisms are just to establish his case. Facts are not defective so long as we know what they are; but it is essential to
Bosanquet's argument that we must take them for more than they are. Contradiction is not 'actual' in any being; nor is pain or desire a contradiction. Further finite beings do not 'ascribe self existence' to themselves, and so do not fall into the contradiction – and its consequent self-transcendence – he asserts of them. Their essence is to be finite, and, where there is self-consciousness of our order, they know it. Bosanquet's denial of this we have, in several connections, held to be a fundamental error.

We have further ventured to discuss his doctrine of negativity, not in its precise logical applications especially, but as Bosanquet uses it in ontology. Our conclusion was that, like contradiction, it is out of place beyond the limits of logic, and that it does not suffice to preserve the distinctiveness (in one connection Bosanquet asserts the 'separateness') of beings which, by his own explicit statement, are 'absorbed' in their self-transcendence in the whole. Our conclusion in this field is – more than others – tentative, but so far as we see, it is just.

In the concluding chapters we have considered some of the fields in which Bosanquet takes his doctrine to be markedly exhibited, and have suggested that the situations he cites as illustrations, are not self-transcendences as he means them, but genuinely involve both self-surrender and growth of
the individual concerned. Whether the ultimate self-
surrender also involves him in growth or not we cannot decide
short of an ultimate theory; but in any case that theory,
if it is to maintain the connection of these two, must be
something other than Bosanquet's absolutism, based as it is
upon a defective view of identity and a certainly ambiguous
view of individuality. Wherever in these situations there
is cognitive apprehension there may be self-transcendence, and
so we may hold that religion does involve the maximum of self-
transcendence, but this again is not by our real union with or
absorption in God, but by our communion with Him.

The writer feels acutely the defects of what has been
written. Every issue raised is of the kind that is never
closed. But the attempt has been to show not only the objec-
tions which may be taken to Bosanquet's doctrine, but also the
direction in which the writer would seek a true solution.

It is comparatively easy to point out the failings
of Bosanquet, because in following his own insight he is un-
doubtedly led into assertions incompatible with his inherited
tradition, and the ambiguities of that traditions are thereby
brought into relief. For this, however, we have cause as much
to be grateful as critical, and can learn, even where we
differ from him.
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