The Education of the Ethical Consciousness.

A Study of the Growth of the Ethical Consciousness in the Individual.

By

John Macdonald,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.

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The growth of the ethical consciousness in the individual has not been adequately studied by the psychologists. The question has indeed attracted the attention of several writers but the treatment of it has been on the whole unsatisfactory. For this there are several reasons. In some cases the problem has been examined in a more or less incidental way in connection with the discussion of some special theory or theories. The problem is too comprehensive, however, to admit of being adequately treated in this way. Where it has been more directly attacked, two things have detracted from the value of the discussion. Either the writer has failed to preface his genetic account with an analysis of the developed ethical consciousness or, where such an analysis has been offered, the view adopted of that consciousness has been too narrow to enable one to see the genetic problems in their true focus. In the former case, where no analysis is given, the writer either assumes that the ethical consciousness is too familiar a fact to require elaborate analysis; or he considers that this analysis has been sufficiently carried out by the philosophers who have made Ethics their special province. The history of ethical theory from Socrates onwards, is a standing refutation of the notion that we can safely dispense with the analysis in question.

It can be said, on the contrary, that there is no question of general philosophic interest that makes a severer demand on the resources of the psychologist.

When the writer, again, simply leaves the genetic student to garner from general ethical theory his ideas as to what is involved in the developed ethical consciousness, another difficulty presents itself. This is the difficulty of focussing the broad and largely non-controversial questions that primarily
concern the geneticist. In ethical theory as such, where the writer's interest is not in some special problem such as our present one, the natural tendency is to concentrate on certain problems of a more fundamental character; such, for example, as those at the root of the rival ethical systems of Hedonism, Eudaimonism, Intuitionism and Rationalism. The final settlement of these more basic controversies is fortunately not a necessary preliminary to such an account of the developed ethical consciousness as will set the genetic psychology of ethics its task. Moreover, preoccupation with such questions tends to foster a somewhat abstract and artificial view of the ethical consciousness itself.

The second kind of defect which we have mentioned is that which results from a narrowing of the sphere of action with which ethics is supposed to be principally concerned. It is not uncommon, for instance, to find ethical growth described and explained as the process of 'socialisation'; and this term is then interpreted in too narrow a sense, unless indeed it is understood in so wide a sense that it becomes too vague to be helpful. The view adopted for the purposes of the present essay seeks to avoid any narrowing of the so-called sphere of ethics and at the same time aims to do justice to the actual concreteness of content found in the ethical consciousness. If our view as to the nature of the problem of ethical growth be questioned, our answer is, that not only can such a view as the one we advocate be justified by a consideration of the actual questions that have engaged the attention of the ethical thinkers, but that it is the only satisfactory view where the interest is primarily genetic. It presents the problem in its true focus, indicates where and how results of ethical significance in the education of the individual are secured, and avoids that one-sidedness of emphasis or barren
generality of treatment which has seriously detracted from the value of most discussions of this problem. It may be stated here that this result is in the main secured by broadening the concept of 'ethical' good in such a way as to make it in a certain sense inclusive of other non-moral values, such as the values of science and art. The precise relation of the ethical good to these other goods will be examined and a general justification of the broader concept of the ethical good will be offered. To this part of our task we may now proceed.

An analysis of the developed ethical consciousness involves, to begin with, the examination of the different uses of the terms 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong'. To say that this consciousness is developed is tantamount to saying that the individual's way of living reflects the true meaning of these categories. As Socrates clearly saw, it does not necessarily follow that he can give a reasoned and consistent account of them. There are excellent reasons, as we shall see, why, as a rule, he cannot do this. Nevertheless, it is necessary, if we are to appreciate the real nature of the ethical consciousness, to isolate the universal elements in the correct particular judgments which right conduct implies.

Now, of these notions, the most fundamental appears to be the notion of 'good'. The view taken here asserts both the logical and the psychological priority of this notion. We shall therefore begin with an analysis of this concept. The difficulty this meets us at the outset is precisely that which engaged the attention of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, namely, that of distinguishing the derivative, secondary senses of the term from its fundamental and primary sense. Ordinarily, we talk of a good wine, a good dinner, a good horse, a good book, a good man;
and it is interesting to remember that this diversity in the term 'good' is reflected historically in ethical theory in a variety of versions of the ethical end.

Much of the confusion with regard to the connotation of this term is due to a failure to distinguish sharply between two very different senses in which we may say it is primary and fundamental, namely, the psychological sense and the ethical sense. We may well say, for example, that the ultimate sense of the term is a purely psychological one. In this sense it has no meaning that we could call ethical, and yet we may quite legitimately speak of a fundamental ethical sense of the term. We then have in view a derived or later meaning in which we can detect, for the first time, an ethical import. This would represent its primary ethical sense.

The fundamental meaning of 'good' is 'satisfying'. The object or situation which is good is one which confers satisfaction. This may appear vague or, rather, clear only in so far as it is tautological. As it stands (and it has too often been left standing at this) it is open to this charge. But the further step of giving psychological content to the term satisfaction (content which does not involve us in a circle) proves that it is not only not tautological but that it is the only correct way to describe a certain purely psychological fact or situation to which all the different meanings which we come to attach to this term can, in the last analysis, be traced. What then do we mean by the 'satisfying'? It means that object or situation which is appropriate to an impulse or need in the sense that it naturally brings this impulse to an end. Nothing is intruded into the argument by the terms 'appropriate' or 'naturally'. We begin, at the lowest terms, with
an organism and its environment. The organism is in a state of
greater or less adjustment. Maladjustment announces itself in
the organism in the form of felt need or what for the present
we shall broadly call impulse. All that is implied by
an object 'appropriate' to an impulse is the broad correspondence
between organism and environment which means that the existence
of an impulse implies the existence of an object which will
satisfy that impulse; all that is meant by bringing the impulse to
an end 'naturally' is the adjustment which such an object
secures, as contrasted, for example, with the 'unnatural'
termination of the impulse as the result of persistent and
effective thwarting of it. 'Good', then, as applied to the
object or situation means that it is appropriate in this
sense; as applied to the experience, it means simply the
fact of adjustment itself. We have, in short, a purely
psychological concept applicable to all organisms as such.

But we hope to shew that the meaning of good is not
radically changed when it comes to have ethical import, that
it still retains this identical core of meaning. Further, we
cannot lose sight of this purely psychological situation
without creating a serious hiatus in our ethical thinking.

A critic might remark at this point that we are merely, in
a roundabout way, identifying the 'good' with the 'pleasant'.
While a full discussion of hedonism, psychological or ethical,
would be out of place here, it is perhaps important that we
should refer to certain psychological considerations with regard
to pleasure. Normally, pleasure is the accompaniment of successful
activity; and successful activity would ultimately mean adjustive
activity. It is the index in consciousness of an activity which
further the life of the organism. Moreover, in the case of
a highly specialised organism, such as the human, a distinction can be drawn between the pleasure which is the accompaniment of successful activity and the pleasure which results from the stimulation of specialised bodily organs such as the organs of sense. It is the natural supposition that the distinction is an incident of the evolution of the organism, and that in more rudimentary forms of organic life the distinction does not exist. Further, with the highly developed organism, where the distinction exists, it is reasonable to admit that the feeling in each case, strictly qua feeling, is the same (that is, if by an abstraction we think of it apart from the cognitive and conative elements of the situation) and yet on the other hand to give full weight to the consideration that, qua total experiences, the two situations may well present radical differences from the standpoint of their significance for the life of the organism. Lastly, we would refer to the importance for ethics of certain direct and immediate effects of pleasure for which there is experimental evidence - effects which we may describe generally as a temporary stimulation of organic processes or heightening of organic 'tone'. The point is important as it seems to furnish a reasonable psychological basis for the admission of pleasure as one among the goods or values which will presently engage our attention.

These considerations with regard to pleasure enable us to make the following statements, which follow from our view of the meaning of good as described above. (1) The husteron proteron of psychological hedonism is clearly brought out - the thing normally desired is the object itself, whatever it happens to be, and not the pleasure incidental to the realisation of the object. The fallacies in the theories that seek to base a
hedonistic view of the good on ultimate psychological facts
have been already sufficiently exposed by those writers who
have examined the general psychological basis of ethics and
that question need not detain us here. (2) It is left open to us
to say that in certain cases, as perhaps in the case of the parental
impulse to protect the young, even the existence of this
incidental pleasure may be questioned. (3) It is reasonable
to assert a broad general correspondence between pleasure on the
one hand and, on the other, those activities that make for ad-
justment or satisfaction in the sense of that fuller, more
complete life in which we would find the real meaning of the
term 'Happiness'; as well as the ultimate meaning of 'goodness';
while at the same time an attempt at anything in the nature
of an exact quantitative statement is out of the question.
This account of the relation between goodness and pleasure
is admittedly rather vague or, at least, non-committal, but
the history of ethical speculation seems to suggest that
this is perhaps about all that can be said with confidence
on the problem - at least on purely empirical grounds. We
may add here that we shall have occasion to examine
later an interesting genetic question with regard
to hedonism, namely, the question as to the psychologi-
ical influences that lead the individual practically to adopt
such a view or, in other words, to live a life which
implies it!(1)

So far we have given to the notion of good an essentially
objective meaning, but at the same time a meaning
which has yet no ethical implication. Under what conditions
does "good" come to acquire an ethical significance, however.

(1) see FP 270--274
rudimentary? What is the fundamental ethical, as distinct from psychological sense of the term? To answer this question, we note in the first place the existence in the organism of a multiplicity of impulses, each terminating in or pointing to its own satisfying object or good. It is clear, then, that there is the possibility of a conflict - a conflict which, viewed from the side of the organism, is a conflict of impulses, and, from the side of the objects, is a conflict of 'goods' or aims. We need not labour the familiar notion of impulses which are either mutually incompatible or which in a lesser degree tend to impede one another. The outcome of such a conflict is some kind of organisation of the impulsive life; it is saying the same thing from another point of view if we call it an organisation of objects on the basis of degrees of attractiveness. Now, it is in connection with this organisation that the ethical meaning begins to show itself. A fundamental distinction, however, must be drawn here. As regards the emergence of the ethical meaning, the essential question concerns the manner in which this organisation takes place. It may be purely the result of organic memory. This would mean that past experience is available only in the sense that response to the present stimulus or situation is modified by the persisting physical effects of previous stimuli. This is the kind of organisation which we have in view when we talk of the training or 'education' of animals. Here we are still on a level which is non-ethical. But a factor may appear which opens up new vistas of adaptive behaviour. This is the factor of Representation. Representation, imagination, ideation (as it has been variously and loosely termed), the power of imaging objects or situations in the absence of their presentation in sense-experience, is the necessary condition of
that organisation which has ethical import. The conflict of impulses or goods in this case assumes a different character. The object that promises satisfaction is judged, more or less explicitly, in the light of a previous experience represented in consciousness. Further, the same power increases indefinitely the possibility of comparison and contrast of objects in respect of the satisfactions they promise. In the sequel we hope to show in a more exact way, how closely the ethical growth of the individual is bound up with the development of this representative activity. Here we would insist that the existence in consciousness of a previous experience in the form of representation and the modification of reaction in the light of it (carried out of course with any degree, from the lowest to the highest, of deliberation or 'awareness') is the first appearance of what later becomes the consistent determination of conduct by general rules, laws or principles. In the individual's development, behaviour comes for the first time within the sphere of Ethics, in the sense that for the first time it has ethical import or significance, when the presented or represented object which offers satisfaction to impulse, is modified in respect of its satisfying quality by another object more or less clearly represented in consciousness, and when consequently the impulse itself is modified by such representation.

The analysis offered here agrees in several important particulars with that which we find in Taylor's 'Problem of Conduct', but on the essential question as to what constitutes the simplest form of ethical situation we find ourselves at variance with him. Taylor finds the ultimate ethical fact in the 'simple sentiments' of approval and disapproval, approbation

(1) PP 108-109
and disapprobation. Of them he says: "Approval and disapproval belong to a more developed and reflective type of mental life than the simpler experiences of pleasure and pain; they imply the possession of "representative" mental images or "free" ideas. Approbation implies pleasure arising from the contemplation of some experience belonging to the past or the expectation of some experience awaited in the future; disapprobation, similarly, implies pain arising from similar sources. It is not, even in the simpler cases the immediately present of which we approve or disapprove but the immediately past or the momentarily expected. In the simplest form to "approve" our present state is to contemplate its continuance with pleasure; to disapprove it is to view its continuance with displeasure". Now this description of the approval-attitude agrees with our account of the ultimate psychological meaning of 'good' with the reservation, however, that we cannot accept the statement that the attitude is necessarily concerned with either past or future and not with present experience. The approval-experience does not seem necessarily to imply the possession of "representative " mental images or "free " ideas. The sight of food by a hungry dog would seem to represent in all essentials the same situation. We agree, of course, with the importance Taylor attaches here and elsewhere to the power of representation, but our position is that such representation is not necessary for the experience of approval, but that it is necessary in the case of an approval which has ethical significance, however rudimentary. Taylor again says: "Wherever you get the comparison of an idea with present reality, if the idea is condemned as nugatory, you have the beginning of science; if the reality is condemned as falling short of the idea you have the beginnings of morality. As
science begins in disappointed expectation, so morality begins in dissatisfaction." This statement is more adequate, as it suggests the comparison of object with object and the resulting modification or regulation of impulse - the situation in which we have found the primary fact of ethical development.

Hobhouse, in his essay on the "Rational Good", similarly tries to reduce the notion of good to its simplest terms and arrives at a conclusion substantially identical with that outlined above. Take this sentence, for example: "A judgment of the form, 'this is good' is an assertion but something more than an assertion. Unless qualified by some saving clause that makes it "good for someone else but not for me", "good from your point of view but from mine", it is the expression of a practical attitude or disposition. It is an acceptance of something propounded to the mind, an acceptance which may be expressed in the most general terms by saying that something fits in or harmonizes with a mental disposition." The only difference between this account of the judgment: 'this is good' and the analysis we have offered is a difference of terminology. Hobhouse's notion of the expression of a practical attitude or disposition is conveyed in our account by the idea of that 'correspondence' between object and impulse which we have in view when we say that the impulse finds satisfaction in the attainment of that object. We have avoided at this stage the use of the term 'mental disposition' (a term which has fallen into disrepute, perhaps not altogether deserved) because we have been occupied with the most elementary fact of the relation of a particular impulse to a particular object or situation, which

(1) Ibid p. 109
in the last analysis seems to be the psychological fact - a fact of structure - implied in the phrase 'disposition'. Further, just because we have been dealing with the most elementary form of the 'good' experience, the conative aspect implied in the phrase 'practical attitude or disposition' has been emphasised more than the cognitive aspect in virtue of which the judgment is "an assertion of a fact". So far are we from minimising the importance of this latter element in the light of subsequent development that in the sequel we shall find it necessary to protest at some length against recent tendencies in psychology to belittle its importance if not even actually to leave it out of the reckoning.

Again, we find this statement which is clearly explicable on our view. "Whether we think of the judgment 'this is good' as an assertion or as the expression of an impulse feeling, it must, to be rational, have a ground and the ground must be universal. The end or act or feeling that is good as such must be good wherever and in whomsoever found and that which is good under given conditions must be good wherever these conditions obtain". On our view this universal element, in virtue of which the judgment remains true "wherever these conditions obtain" would be accounted for by saying that in so far as the particular impulse has not been fundamentally modified by experience, it will continue to find satisfaction in its special object or situation. The judgment 'this is good' expresses a relation which holds universally wherever this impulse and this object are found.

Summing up, we would express the ethical situation as that of the pursuit of certain special objects or ends which promise satisfaction to the felt needs or impulses of the individual and the realisation of which involves more perfect adjustment and the (1) Ibid P.78
consequent achievement of a more complete exercise of function, a fuller measure of life. On the subjective side it involves a twofold process of repression and development, on the one hand the process of inhibiting and modifying, on the other, that of broadening, deepening and redirecting the needs or impulses of the individual, and thus it results in an organisation or systematisation of the life of impulse, which we may regard as an inner adjustment proceeding pari passu with the adjustment to the outer objects or situations which the environment presents. In the language of Hobhouse, the process would "involve a double harmony -harmony of the mind with itself and harmony of the mind with the world, and in both relations the mind has to bend and be bent in order to attain its good." The ethical situation, reduced to its lowest terms, would reveal the representative activity of the mind functioning to secure the comparison of one good with another, the choice of one good in preference to another and the inevitable modification of impulse itself which such a choice involves. At all levels of ethical behaviour, from the lowest to the highest, this core of meaning persists, and represents the ultimate consideration that constitutes the act a legitimate object of ethical judgment.

We may anticipate at this point the objection, if it can be considered an objection, that the terms 'adjustment', 'harmony' 'satisfaction' indicate the identification of the 'good' with the 'useful'. Now, it would seem almost desirable to rule the term 'Useful' out of court in any discussion of the ethical problem. Its introduction seems to be due to a confusion of thought. The term 'useful' implies a very definite distinction between means and end which does not hold in the field of ethics, not at least on our interpretation of the ethical facts. The object of which (1) The Rational Good £.80.
we predicate 'good' in the above sense is not strictly a means to anything beyond itself, to any final or ultimate good which the individual is striving to attain. It means simply a partial realisation of such a good. The distinction is one of whole and part and not one of end and means. In the second place, it may be pointed out that in strict biological sense of the term 'useful' (i.e. conducive to the actual physical preservation of the organism or the species) we certainly do not assert an identity between the useful and the good. The next chapter will make it clear that the activities in which the ethically developed individual seeks to find his good or satisfaction are such as to make possible a considerable degree of divergence of the good from the biologically useful.

So far we have described the form of the ethical life. It is a life directed to certain ends or objects which are preferred to other ends or objects because they are in a fuller degree satisfying or good. It remains now to give content to this form. We begin this part of our task by asking the question: What, then, in the concrete, are these ends or objects which are valued as good? The answer to this question, which will occupy us in the next chapter, will incidentally reveal the actual richness of content of the developed ethical consciousness.

(1) c.f. the following: "Our duty is merely that which will be a means to the best possible ...... The only fundamental distinction is between what is good in itself and what is good as a means, the latter of which implies the former." (G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 167, 168.) A careful examination of this "fundamental" distinction will, we believe, shew that it refuses to work as a fundamental distinction, and that it reduces itself to the kind of distinction drawn in the text.
CHAPTER II

The developed ethical consciousness, as we conceive it, presents a rich variety of content. It reveals the existence of a number of goods or satisfying activities each of which has at least a prima facie claim to equal consideration with the others. The first fact to be noted is that the satisfaction, the nature of which we desire to investigate, is the satisfaction of a human being. Among the activities of which the human being is capable there are some that he shares with species lower than himself. The satisfaction of the appetites such as hunger, thirst, sex, represents a class of goods which leads us to attach a very definite and concrete significance to Spinoza's "homo pars naturae." Now, it is clear that in his quest of the good, of those activities that are to afford the maximum satisfaction, the individual is not thrown on his own resources. The general route has been already mapped out by what we may call the consciousness of mankind, meaning by that the race experience in so far as it is mirrored in the social group or, more broadly, in the civilisation with which he is identified. He comes to realise that the good must represent a distinctively human satisfaction or excellence, that a higher value attaches to the peculiarly human activities. He is not left, however, to make this discovery for himself; for this general estimate of the worth of satisfactions is the contribution of the race experience to the solution of his problem - a contribution transmitted by 'social' heredity. We are not at present attempting to gauge the truth or error of the estimate; we are merely insisting that as a matter of face it exists.

These distinctively human pursuits, which commend themselves to the developed ethical consciousness as good, are represented by the so-called human values which we may enumerate and classify as follows: (1) The scientific value, (2) The artistic or aesthetic value, (3) The religious value, (4) The Philosophic value, (5) The
social values (including moral values, in the narrower sense to be presently explained, (6) political values, (7) economic values.

We have said that the ground of his faith in these values is largely to be found in authority and we shall return to this statement in connection with the problem of Duty or Obligation. In the meantime we have to mention the further basis of belief, namely, that his own experience, in so far as ethical development has proceeded, tends to substantiate and confirm this deliverance of authority. Mere subservience to authority as such is an attitude foreign to the ethical consciousness.

According to the ultimate meaning which we attach to ethics, the fundamental significance of these activities is ethical, ethical in the sense that they represent, in their own fields and according to their methods, a contribution towards such a synthesis of the elements of experience as will result in the final harmony, that satisfying completeness of life, however we may phrase it, which is what we must ultimately mean by the ethical ideal. The dumb striving of Humanity towards the realisation and satisfying exercise of its vital powers has achieved a measure of articulation in these values. Hobhouse says that "the Practical Reason is the effort of the mind towards harmony with itself and with nature. This harmony the mind does not find but creates or, rather, let us say that it finds it in dying cadences and catches of which it seeks to make a music universal." And from our point of view these values may well be considered the "cadences and catches" of that final harmony of the mind "with itself and with nature" which is the consummation of human striving.

We may sum up the situation so far as follows: (1) These activities or pursuits which we have classified as the human

(1) The Rational Good: p.81
values represent the 'appropriate objects' which we have found to be implied in the predicate 'good'. They furnish therefore the content of which the concept of satisfaction or harmony expresses the form.

(2) The matured ethical consciousness is most concretely described as a certain attitude to these values. It is the attitude indicated by the fact that in his deepest volition the individual wills these activities, that he believes in their capacity to confer the truest satisfaction, in short, that he accepts them for what they are, namely, the permanent values of human life. Hence, a certain attitude to life as a whole, defining and particularising itself in the relation of the will to these values, would represent in the concrete the meaning of "the good will". In this sense the good will would be the ultimate object of ethical judgment and would merit the supreme importance attributed to it by Kant.

(3) But this attitude, as it occurs in practice, can be still further defined. Needless to say, it does not mean the equal acceptance in the sense of the equal pursuit of these values. To describe the ethical ideal as the complete realisation in the individual life of each and all of these values would mean a statement of the ideal in terms of what is really an abstraction. For the individual in the concrete, the ethical problem is that of the best possible adjustment, and the nature of this adjustment, i.e. the emphasis which is to fall on any one of these particular values, will vary according to circumstances and, fundamentally, according to the circumstance of the individual's native endowment. As will be explained more fully in a later connection, these values are data, content of experience, to be moulded and hewn into the structure of a Personality.

(4) When properly conceived and carried out, the process of
education not only creates this general attitude but defines it for the individual in the sense that it makes possible his discovery of what, in the light of his special circumstances and native capacities, is the true line of adjustment for him.

We shall presently develop more fully the implications of this position in order to obviate misunderstandings and to answer possible objections. Before doing this, however, let us examine these values more closely so as to realise just what they involve and to make good the claim that they are a synthesising of the elements of experience that makes for a fuller, a deeper, and more satisfying existence.

The Scientific or Knowledge Value

The coordinated human activities (with the resulting body of organised knowledge) that are indicated by the term Science are too familiar to call for detailed treatment. It is necessary, however, to make clear what is meant when it is said that this value has an ultimate ethical significance. Let it be understood at the outset that there is no intention at all of imposing upon Science a standard or criterion which is alien to it. On the contrary, the preservation of the purity of the scientific motive is essential to the very existence of this value.

The ultimate motive-force or impulse of which Science is the expression is usually described as the 'curiosity' impulse, the impulse which prompts us to know purely for the sake of the satisfaction conferred by knowledge as such. We may for the present accept this term to describe the impulse in question. The original character of this motive is well indicated by Taylor in the passage already quoted where he says: "Wherever you get the comparison of an idea with present reality, if the idea is condemned as...

(1) But see p.105 for examination of what is implied in the notion of 'curiosity' in this connection.
nugatory, you have the beginning of Science." The intellectual need which desiderates the harmony of the idea with present reality is the motive of Science in its pure form. In its effort to reach its ideal of completely systematised knowledge, it adopts certain fundamental concepts and a certain method and it seeks to demonstrate their validity in every field of experience. By means of them the understanding seeks to cope with the manifold of qualities and relations which objects present. In the measure in which this task is achieved, the intellectual need or impulse is satisfied.

This is the fundamental motive in Science. The claim is very commonly advanced, however, that the so-called utilitarian motive is the ultimate justification of scientific enquiry. We cannot of course deny that the practical applications of scientific knowledge represent the most obvious way in which Science contributes to a fuller satisfaction and more complete harmony. In fact, there appear to be two distinctly separate motives in the acquisition of knowledge. The first is that which we have already described. The second is that which makes knowledge purely instrumental, that is, consciously directed to the satisfaction of needs other than the need for knowledge itself. On the one hand, curiosity leads to the acquisition of knowledge of the qualities and relations of objects. On the other hand, knowledge is acquired in the interests of some particular adjustment, in other words, with a utilitarian motive. It must be admitted that in practice the two motives are very closely bound up with one another. The necessities of the practical life have repeatedly furnished science with definite problems. In spite of this, however, one finds that the scientist himself is inclined jealously to insist on the freedom of science and to resent any de jure urging of the utilitarian motive.

(1) We are not here concerned with the problem of the
ultimate validity of the concepts, i.e. the question as to the kind of knowledge which they yield, as to whether it is the only kind, and so forth. These are metaphysical considerations.

Further, with the advance of science, the tendency is for the question of practical applications to give rise to subsidiary and relatively independent sciences. The essential thing from our present point of view is that knowledge is pursued as a value only in so far as the motive is the pure impulse to know. Pursued merely as an instrument, knowledge is not valuable but simply useful -- a case where the distinction between means and end is legitimately drawn.

Lest it appear that we are unduly labouring this point, let us remark that, while in our view of the ethical training of the individual this motive is of supreme importance, educational theory often dismisses it with the lip service of a passing reference, tends to lay an exclusive emphasis on the appreciation of knowledge as an instrument, and to find in that factor the ruling motive for its acquisition. A very real element in the developed ethical consciousness is the love of knowledge if we mean by that phrase such a fruition of the primary curiosity impulse as will mean the capacity and inclination to find satisfaction or a 'good' in knowledge as such. The tendency to neglect or belittle this motive is probably due to the impression that the existence of it in a pronounced degree is comparatively rare.

On this we would remark, in the first place, that the important consideration for ethics is not so much the strength of a motive but, given its existence and the possibility of its being fostered, its intrinsic value. In the second place, its apparent rarity is largely to be explained by the fact that more than any other impulse, perhaps, this one is usually allowed to atrophy from lack of effective exercise. Finally, the subtle, elusive
manner in which it operates in the different spheres of human action leads us to overlook its importance if not even its presence. In the political and social life, for example, we assume that the knowledge which the relevant sciences, psychology, sociology, economics, etc., seek to discover has the purely instrumental importance of contributing to the realisation of some constructive social purpose: but we are apt to overlook the fact that our very social and political experimentation, our restless growing for more satisfying social and political forms is itself largely motivated by something at least closely akin to curiosity, by a persistent desire to discover that adjustment of human relations which is true; in other words, there is a certain challenge to the scientific as well as to the moral interest in these relationships.

The exact nature of the ethical import which we have attributed to knowledge as such will become apparent if we consider for a moment the statement usually made as to the function or meaning of Science and the comparison usually drawn between this and the other values. It is usual to say that Science aims at the exact statement, in the form of general laws, of what uniformly happens - it seeks to answer the question: what is? From this standpoint it is contrasted with what are called normative sciences, which set out to answer the question: what ought to be? We have no quarrel with this mode of statement, as it serves to bring out the twofold character of the ultimate end or interest -- on the one hand, the need to make the idea conform to the reality, on the other, to make the reality conform to the idea. The normative enquiries would be represented by Logic, Aesthetics, and what for the present we shall call Morality. This division is explicitly admitted in the present essay. But our objection begins with the identification (usually made at the outset but not consistently
maintained) of morality with ethics. One serious difficulty is that, when we attempt to find a basis or ground for the 'ought' of morality, we are either forced to fall back on a more or less unconvincing intuitionism or we are driven to accept such an extension of the concept of morality as will no longer leave it one value among others but will represent it as somehow concerned with all the other values; and in this latter view there is implicit the wider notion of 'ethical' which we have outlined. The sequel will show that considerable confusion of thought has resulted in ethical theory at this point through a failure to formulate the ethical question correctly at the outset. We need only remark here that the emphasis on individuality implied in our statement of the ethical ideal can, we believe, be justified even in the face of the criticisms that distinguished ethical thinkers have levelled against such an "individualistic" conception.

So much for Science. Let us next consider Art and enquire as to how, generally, this value makes for kinds of activity which give it ethical import. We can distinguish at least two fundamental way in which Art contributes to a fuller exercise of distinctively human capacities. The first and less important function is that of simple expression. Here the artist devises a medium and a technique for the adequate expression of emotions which the individual actually experiences and with which he is more or less familiar. In this case, it is expressive rather than creative, and is represented by the simpler, more unpretentious kinds of artistic production. Inasmuch as it serves to give some form of articulate expression to feeling (remembering the psychological fact that the normal terminus of feeling is expression, that is, in a wide sense, action) of some kind), this form of Art contributes directly to the

(1) See foot-note to page 62.
individual's inner adjustment. We are not concerned here with the source or explanation of the satisfaction, the question, for instance, as to whether this satisfaction is altogether traceable to the mere fact of emotional expression, or whether there is a more distinctively intellectual element present such, for example, as Aristotle urges, viz., satisfaction accruing from the intellectual apprehension of the fidelity or appropriateness of the expression. At the same time, while we may admit the existence of simpler or lower levels of Art, of which the function seems adequately described as the expression of feeling, it must be pointed out that to identify the function of all Art as such with the expression of feeling (in the sense that the artist finds an expression for the feelings which the individual experiences but cannot himself express) is altogether inadequate. Except in a sense too obvious to have any point, Art is not exactly an expression; but even though we were to grant that it is, it is not the expression of mere feeling or emotion.

We have, in fact, to recognise the second, and much more fundamental role of Art, in which it is, in the fullest sense of the term, creative. Art creates feeling; in virtue of the special and new combinations of the cognitive elements of experience, its special synthesis of the presentations and images, it brings into being new affective experiences which represent a genuine widening and deepening of the emotional life. This is true generally of the creative artists, in Literature, Painting, Music, Architecture and Sculpture. It remains to add (although it would take us too far afield into a discussion of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment to justify the statement) that in the artistic situation the affective and the cognitive factors are so bound up with one another that

(1) *Poetics* 4, 1 Rhetoric 1371 b 4. (Jebb)  
(2) See criticism by P. Leon in 'MIND' N.S. No. 120. PP 435-443
it is idle to try to separate them and to find the artistic fact in either in the one or in the other. Our concern here is with the reality of the creation, intellectual and emotional, in Art, and with the enhancement of human capacity which such creation implies. It therefore possesses direct significance for the ethical life.

Whatever view we may take of the many special psychological problems raised by the existence of Art, it is clear that Ethics is concerned with Aesthetics in precisely the same way in which it is concerned with the other values. The situation is justly described by Sentayene when he says: "In Aesthetic activity we have accordingly one side of rational life; sensuous experience is dominated there as mechanical or social realities ought to be dominated in science or politics." (1) As to the source of the satisfaction conferred, while recognizing the sensuous element in aesthetic enjoyment, it may safely be asserted of Art generally that this satisfaction proceeds fundamentally from the fact of the free exercise of human capacity as an end in itself. It is an "activité de jeu", its psychology being essentially the psychology of Play. As Bosenquet puts it: "The delight in art is no mere psychical accident" but the manifestation of joy in self-expression, the ultimate root and ground of aesthetic pleasure." (2) On the view we have adopted, it is clear that this side of human activity cannot be a matter of indifference to Ethics. It might of course be said that the view we have taken of the ethical ideal as the harmonious realization in a single life, according to the special capacities and circumstances of that life, of the human values is itself the expression of

(1) Life of Reason: p. 171
(2) History of Aesthetic, p. 67
embodying the principle of 'unity in variety'; and we have no objection to this purely formal identification because, while it does not help us much, it is at least intellectually innocuous.

We come now to the question of the religious value and its ethical significance. It is not difficult to shew that the activities properly described as religious are valuable in our sense of the term, that is, they make for the satisfaction of a permanent need of human nature, and, in their own way, achieve a synthesis of the conflicting elements of experience. The term 'religion' itself has suffered equally at the hands of enthusiasts and detractors because of the wide, vague and often definitely mistaken meanings which have been attached to it. In the present connection we have to do two things: (1) to analyse the psychological situation in the religious experience so as to isolate the distinctive elements of it and thus to define the kind of situation which normally tends to give rise to this particular kind of adjustment; and (2) to justify our view of religion as simply one value among others—coordinate with the others and having no prima facie claim to supremacy; and to indicate what is really meant when, as so frequently happens, such a claim is asserted.

On the cognitive side, we have the individual standing in a certain relation to an object of a special kind. It has been said that religion presupposes the concept of a personal God as its object, but the existence of Buddhism, numerically speaking the greatest of the world's religions, and with it a religion without a personal God, serves to disprove this. But the object must have sufficient affinity to personality to be conceived as capable of influencing and being influenced by human behaviour. As such, it represents a kind of supplementing of the individual's personal powers. This is well brought out by Galloway when he says: "In
all religion we have a subject, an object, and a bond of relationship between them. On the subjective side, the consciousness of this relation is piety, and it appears as worship, reverence and adoration. In the individual himself there is always a sense of need, a feeling of defect of some kind, which impels him to go beyond himself. Then, on the other side, the object worshipped is always the embodiment of a value which distinguishes it from other things, and it is believed to be able to do for the worshipper what he could not do for himself. And through the fulfilment of the religious relation, man wins an inner satisfaction, a harmony with himself and his environment, which lies beyond his own powers."

So much for the cognitive side of the religious situation. With regard to the affective aspect, a difficulty, which would seem to be somewhat gratuitous, has been found by several writers in the attempt to answer the two questions: (1) is feeling the distinctive, peculiar fact of the religious consciousness? and (2)

(1) Principles of Religious Development: ch.2, p.58. c.f. Leuba: "That which differentiates religion from other forms of conduct is the kind of power on which dependence is felt, and the kind of behaviour elicited by the power. A natural line of cleavage between religious and non-religious behaviour is made possible by the presence in man of ideas of forces of different character. Some of these forces are of the sort to which the name physical is applied; others respond to intelligence and feeling as if they themselves had mind and heart" (A Psychological Study of Religion p.52)

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c. f. also Santayana: Life of Reason: Reason in Science p. 235

An excellent account of the synthesis which Religion seeks to achieve will be found in Boutroux: Science et Religion pp.383-388. This account is interesting also as illustrating a failure to distinguish clearly between the 'ethical' and the 'religious'.
is the emotion in religious experience simple, ultimate, unanalysable, or can it be shewn to be a blending of complex of more elementary emotions? The first question must be answered, as we answered a similar question with respect to Art, by pointing out that the separation of the emotional and the cognitive, which is implied in the question, is sheer abstraction, calculated to lead us very far from the psychological realities of the situation. When Bradley, for example, says: What, then, in general is religion? I take it to be a fixed feeling of fear, resignation, admiration, or approval, no matter what may be the object, provided only that this feeling reaches a certain strength, and is qualified by a certain degree of reflection."

(1) his meaning is rather ambiguous, for everything depends on how much we read into the phrase: "no matter what the object may be". If the phrase be understood literally, we have only to point out that the fixed feeling only appears when the object is broadly speaking of a certain kind; so that there is no good reason for finding the essential fact in the "fixed feeling" more than in the fixed object. But if he means, as the context seems to suggest, that the object, while always remaining the same in certain general features, may vary immensely with respect to its particular content, just as, for example, the puissant but erratic spirits of the savage differ from the God of Christianity, then it is beyond question that the feeling undergoes profound modification together with the object and retains its identity just to the degree that the object retains it.

The second question as to the possibility of the analysis of the religious emotion into simpler constituents need not detain us. We may admit such an analysis as that of Bradley, for instance, who finds its roots in fear and admiration, or that of MacDougall who resolves reverence, which he calls the distinctively religious, (1) Appearance and Reality p.439 note.
attitude, into "wonder, fear, gratitude, and negative self-feeling" (2)

With regard to the whole question of 'complex' emotions and their 'analysis' into more elementary constituents, it is perhaps permissible to submit a caveat. Are we not here possibly the victims of an analogy or, perhaps, of a figure of speech - a source of error against which MacDougall has himself given us a very necessary warning? (2) For example, it is not clear that introspection detects the presence of these constituent emotions. Are they then inferred from the presence of certain features in the complex object? In any case, whether this difficulty is or is not real, we can safely describe the religious emotion as 'sui generis' in the sense that it represents the affective aspect of a total situation possessing distinctive, peculiar features.

It remains to consider briefly the view of religion that regards this value as in some way higher than and inclusive of the others; and the question here really concerns the exact sense in which this claim to supremacy is meant. In so far as the issue is purely metaphysical, it is irrelevant to our purpose, which seeks to estimate the general rôle of religion in the actual economy of the individual life, and which must therefore attach to the term such a meaning as will faithfully represent the actual cases of its effective operation. The 'raison d'être' of religion is often found, for example, in the notion of the conservation of the human values and we may admit that this is probably the deepest, most permanent "motif" in religion. But to say, as Hoffaing says in his Philosophy of Religion, that "the feeling which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence

(1) Introduction to Social Psychology p.132.

(2) See interesting and important remarks in 'Body and Mind' pp 155-156.
(of these values) is the religious feeling (1), is unsatisfactory—it looks perilously like the tautological assertion that the human values are appreciated as valuable. It is only when this concern about the fate of the values results in the ideal construction of an order (of whatsoever kind it may be) in which they are conceived as permanently rooted and conserved that the distinctively religious attitude appears. A consideration of the nature of this ideal order and of the motive which underlies its construction enables us to understand the real significance of the fact that the religious value is regarded as somehow concerned with the whole of life, not merely with a particular phase of it. In this respect it resembles the ethical value from which, as a consequence, it is not clearly distinguished in the ordinary consciousness. Philosophically, however, these values are to be distinguished. The ethical consciousness decrees that a certain kind of life is good. This judgment is based, as we have seen, partly on individual experience, but partly, too, on authority. The ethical life is a progressive verification or vindication of this judgment. But as far as the individual is concerned, this verification is in the nature of the case never complete. The externality of the authority is never completely and finally overcome. The need is felt for a justification once and for all of the verdict of the ethical consciousness and the ideal order of religion is the outcome of this need. Nor is it surprising that this order should often be so conceived as to motivate the will in a peculiarly direct and effective way. This is particularly true of the lower levels of ethical life. But it would seem that even at the highest levels of ethical development this need for an ultimate

(1) The Philosophy of Religion: p 104
(2) Needless to say, we are only arguing here the significance of religion, not its origin in history.
rationale will still be felt. In this sense we may admit the supremacy of the religious value and interpret its claim to concern itself with the whole of life. It represents, however, neither the sole nor the primary source of the truly ethical individual's allegiance to the values. While all the activities of the religious man are doubtless shot through and through with strands of the religious spirit, the appreciation of any particular value ought to rest mainly on the peculiar satisfaction which that value confers. Religion is itself only one value among others and it achieves its own particular kind of adjustment. In the sense in which we have interpreted the religious value, we shall recognise in the sequel its importance at certain stages in the ethical growth of the individual.

The philosophic value may be briefly mentioned. The need which finds its more or less adequate satisfaction in philosophic pursuits is the need to think experience as a whole and to find it coherent and self-consistent. Philosophy is rooted in that furthest demand of the intellectual part of our nature, the demand that knowledge should grasp the innermost informing principle underlying the intellectually unsatisfying manifold of experience and giving it unity and self-coherence. It is thus at the very outset concerned to characterise the ultimate nature of reality. As professor Baillie expresses it; "Philosophy seeks to secure a special kind of mental satisfaction and the pursuit of this satisfaction is in the long run literally a matter of selective choice on the part of the individual. Philosophy at its best seeks to supply a connected intellectual grasp of the world which will satisfy a man's capacity for thinking out the nature of things. When attained, it brings a peculiar consciousness of intellectual repose in
face of the changing course of events and the endless array of finite phenomena." But when the same writer asserts: "The philosophic mood has no better justification than any special instinct or than any mere intuition; it forces itself on some minds, and these minds must follow it if they are to fulfil their peculiar mental needs," he appears to confine the philosophic mood to the full-blown philosopher. We may admit at the outset that the cases in which this interest dominates are rare, but this does not justify the denial of its universality. The supposition is reasonable that the definitely philosophic interest is inseparable from human consciousness as such, admitting that in most cases it is perhaps represented by little more than a permanent mark of interrogation--a mark which, it may be conceded, the mind of the average individual does not seem to find unduly disturbing.

We come now to consider the social and the political values. Although the meanings of these terms overlap to some extent, on the whole there is justification for according them separate treatment. The root fact of which all the social and political values are the outgrowth is that, among the many and diverse objects or situations to which the individual is called upon to react, there is one object which possesses special interest and significance for him. This is his fellowman. The member of his own species represents an object or situation which demands some kind of adaptive response. Further, this object is peculiar by reason of the unexpected complexities which it often presents, of the numerous possibilities of maladjustment, of the nearness and urgency of it, and of the subtle and far-reaching

(1) Studies in Human Nature, p 203
(2) Ibid. p 198.
effects of faulty response on the development of the individual's human capacities as a whole. Consequently, it possesses a special interest for the student of genetic ethics. In its efforts to cope with this highly intractable object, mankind has arrived at certain generalisations which claim to be at least a partial solution of the problem. These generalisations are represented by the rules, principles or standards of conduct which aim to regulate the relations of men with one another. This is the true meaning or function of the so-called "social virtues"—landmarks to point the most promising path through the arduous regions of social relationships. And (if we be pardoned for sustaining a somewhat commonplace metaphor) these landmarks have been erected partly by the painfully garnered experience of ordinary men but mainly, perhaps, by the intuitions and reasoned insight of the thinkers and teachers of the race. Here and there these landmarks may have become overgrown and obscured, or changes have occurred in the terrain itself—changes of which a custom-loving creature like man fails to take note; and hence they no longer guide the traveller as unerringly as heretofore, and some alterations ought therefore to be made. But in the main they indicate the true direction.

We would distinguish between the social and the political values by saying that the latter are incidental to man's life as a member of a group, while the former are concerned with the relations of individuals as such. Examples of this distinction will be given presently. There is, of course, no question of any absolute distinction; but a distinction between the problems incidental to the more personal or individual relationships and those that arise in connection with the political or group life is desirable, partly because the distinction is commonly
recognised in moral theory and partly because it enables us to envisage more clearly the history of the individual's ethical growth.

Again, with reference to the social values, it remains to point out that, to be strictly consistent with our general view, we ought to talk in the singular of the social value by way of indicating the special, peculiar type of situation to which satisfactory adjustment is sought; and the different values of the social life would rather represent the special forms in which the single ideal of social adjustment presents itself. The fundamental value, which embraces the particular social values, we might designate in a broad way as 'social intercourse'. Social intercourse, in the degree to which it is truly realised, involves the quickening, development, and satisfying exercise of human capacities and is thus ultimately 'good'.

The general nature of the satisfaction to which this value finally leads is probably best illustrated by the ideal of Friendship as it presented itself to the mind of Aristotle. (1) In the account of perfect friendship in the Ethics, we have simply an outline picture of such perfect adjustment in the case of two individuals. Needless to say, under the rubric of the social value is included what is ordinarily termed morality. Our reason for not using the term morality to designate this value is that the common usage of the term gives it a denotation which is somewhat too narrow, for its etymological (and very often its practical) identification with 'mores' tends to obscure the more fundamental implications of the term.

As already pointed out, the so-called social virtues are to be considered here; that is, the virtues which have directly

in view the relations of the individual to others and which "have no meaning except on the supposition that the individual man is acting in social relations with others." As these have been described in detail in the standard works on ethical theory, only brief mention of them need be made here.

Justice. The widest sense of this term, familiarised by the 'Republic', the sense in which it seeks to express the essence of the entire life of virtue, is of course not intended here. The narrowest sense in which it essentially refers to the making of laws and the impartial administration of them, is more properly treated under the rubric of political value. There is an intermediary sense which shades into these two extremes and the nature of which is adumbrated in the Benthamite formula: "everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one"; or in Sidgwick's 'maxim of equity' (2). As Rashdall puts it: "As subjects of mere natural, spontaneous emotions, one man's or one woman's satisfaction may be more to us than that of a thousand others. And yet there is something in the intellect which protests against acquiescence in the view that thousands should be sacrificed to one" (3). The statement illustrates the nature of the demand made by Justice in this sense although we do not commit ourselves to the Intuitionist theory lurking in the phrase 'something in the intellect'. Here, as in all similar cases, we are on safer ground if we hold to a thorough-going teleology in trying to understand the

(1) Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct, p. 218.

(2) "It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there being any difference in the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment." (Methods of Ethics, Bk 3, p. 380)

(3) Is Conscience an Emotion? p. 163.
Benevolence. The active promotion of another's good is one of the values of our social life. Sidgwick indicates the nature of this value in his 'Maxim of Benevolence' which, however, expresses it from the standpoint of 'duty': "Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him." For our purpose it is sufficient to recognise the demand that, under conditions, the individual should actively interest himself in the good of others, without committing ourselves to the exact sense of Sidgwick's qualification.

Veracity. Though it is possible to consider this virtue as already implied in Benevolence, the situation which it has in view is sufficiently specific and familiar to justify independent mention. It is not difficult to see why the standard of conduct erected by this virtue (which disapproves on the one hand the misleading of others by the wilful distortion of the facts, and, on the other hand, the failure to correct our neighbour's mistake when such correction is immediately possible and desirable) should have been accorded a prominent emphasis in the pursuit of the social value. As Paulsen says, the disregard of it in social life: "it destroys faith and confidence among men; and consequently undermines human social life, the foundation of all real human, of all mental-historical life. And this explains its particular reprehensiveness". And Rashdall, who would of course

(1) Methods of Ethics, Bk.3, p 362.
(2) System of Ethics, p. 666.
unreservedly accept that statement, would do well to remain content with it instead of proceeding to the following highly debatable assertion: "I believe that we do on reflection recognise something intrinsically fitting in the rule which prescribes that a rational being, endowed with faculties which enable him to pursue, to communicate, and to love the truth, should use those faculties in that way rather than for the purpose of making things appear otherwise than as they are. So much appears to me to be the clear result of introspection, and to be implied in the strongest moral convictions of other men". To say that introspection discovers an idea is in itself to say nothing about how that idea came to be there. Is it not better to surrender altogether the somewhat naive claim, implied in the above statement, that we can somehow stand outside of the content of our ethical consciousness, that we can so externalise it as to be able to discriminate between a 'fitness' that is 'intrinsic' and a fitness that is the result of authoritative teaching plus the individual's own reflection upon and more or less partial appreciation of the teleological sanction of such teaching, or, if we may so express it, its justification by its results.

The Political Values. It is permissible to regard these three values, Justice, Benevolence, Veracity, as fundamental to the pursuit of social satisfaction, although, indeed, as in the case of all terms which imply generalised psychological attitudes, the meanings shade into one another and no very precise definition of boundaries is either possible or necessary. The endless refinements of the individual's social reactions we may regard as exemplifying special developments of the attitudes implied in

the pursuit of these values. Coming now to the political value, we would describe the pursuit of this value in a general way as the progressive discovery of the best form of group life. Social anthropology reveals the fact that some form of organised group life is to be found at all known levels of human development, and hence in this sense at least we may say that group life is natural to man. Hence, again, do we find that the long process of political experimentation, guided and inspired by the insight of the thinkers and teachers, has resulted in the placing of a premium on certain kinds of behaviour or, to express the same fact from the subjective point of view, on certain qualities of character. Here, therefore, we find another direction in which true ethical training demands the appreciation and practical acceptance of certain values. We may mention the following as more fundamental illustrations of them. It will be seen that they simply convey the basic ideas on which rests the system of so-called political rights and duties.

Justice. As already suggested, we use this term here in the narrowest sense, the sense in which it is strictly a demand of the political life. Here it has in view the impartial framing of laws, and demands that the incidence of these laws on the individual should not be affected by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. What considerations are extraneous and constitute, therefore, an interference with the course of justice is a question of practical interpretation, the fundamental ground for the decision of which is to be found in the true appreciation of the further, more basic political values of (1) Equality, (2) Liberty, (3) Loyalty or Fraternity. Hence we may concern ourselves with these three.
In a sense the notion of equality simply reaffirms the notion of justice -- the very essence of any law is that it decrees equality in a certain sphere of conduct; and the demand of justice is simply that practical effect should be given to the decree. The more positive and deeper implications of the idea of political justice are best indicated in connection with the notions of equality and liberty. The root notion in equality, again, is that of men as the bearers of a common personality, that implied in the dictum that "men are unequal but they are all men", and this notion as applied to the political life gives rise to the demand for some practical realisation of the equality idea, such, for example, as would be implied in the phrase 'equality of opportunity'. Consider also the value of liberty. The negative aspect of this value is adequately summed up in the statement that it involves the removal of all unnecessary obstacles to the free, untrammelled development of the individual. Some of these obstacles are incidental to defective group organisation and therefore conflict in a more obvious way with the ideal of liberty. Other obstacles such as lack of knowledge, lack of training, removable taints of heredity and so on, present a problem for education.

But if we look for the fundamental positive implication of liberty, we seem to strike the bed-rock idea of true political life in the notion of self-government or autonomy. As far as the ethical life as a whole is concerned, Kant has familiarised us with the notion of the autonomous will. The group life presents a special field for the operation of the principle of autonomy -- a field in which the problems raised by this principle are of a special kind and are becoming more insistent and more clearly articulated. The underlying
demand is that the laws or standards of the group or community should not be felt by the individual as a purely external control but rather as somehow expressive of his own deepest volition. There must be fundamental consent to, if not actually the sense of authorship of, the laws which he obeys. The realisation of this ideal will doubtless involve a long process of political experimentation and individual training; nevertheless, it is only in the degree to which we approximate this ideal that we achieve the organisation of the group on an ethical basis. Again, there is another aspect of self-government, an aspect which emphasises not so much the notion of 'self' as the notion of 'government'. Healthy group life not only involves the consciousness, on the part of the individual, of the group standards and laws as his own, but it demands his identification of himself with them in the sense that he obeys them even though obedience involves the sacrifice of present impulses and inclinations. Here the emphasis falls on that aspect of the political conscience which stresses the idea of duty rather than that of right. The same notion is still further emphasised in what we have classified as the third political value, viz. loyalty, sympathy, or fraternity. Any one of these terms may be conveniently used to indicate the demand made on the individual by a kind of association with his fellows which is both initiated and regulated by conscious community of purpose. It is perhaps better, however, to avoid the term sympathy which is so commonly used to express the mere fact of gregariousness; and it may be remarked that the present essay agrees with the vigorous protest of a recent writer that our social psychologists have lately done much to distort our views of human association.

(1) Follet, The New State.
by giving almost exclusive attention to the 'herd' or 'mob' factors in social psychology. As we admit elsewhere, such factors to some degree enter into and colour all forms of association; nevertheless in the experience of the normal individual, there occurs a kind of association, the conscious, deliberate association for the prosecution of a common purpose, where the influence of those factors is of very minor importance. The terms loyalty or fraternity indicate what is demanded by participation in such associations, namely, the capacity and preparedness to think and act in the light of a purpose, the achievement of which concerns more than the individual himself, may involve the sacrifice of immediate personal satisfactions and calls for effective cooperation with others.

The Economic or Material Value. We come now to the last of the principal human values specified above, viz. the 'economic' value; and all that is necessary here is the specification of the exact meaning which we attach to that rather ambiguous phrase, to point out the precise sense in which it is legitimate to speak of a 'value' of this kind. Among the manifold needs of the organism there is a group which is biologically basal, in the sense that it directly concerns the physical existence and well-being of the organism. These needs assert themselves as the principal bodily appetites, hunger, thirst, sex, sleep. The objects or situations appropriate to the appetites (for the hungry animal, food, for the tired animal, cessation of all but the automatic bodily activities and so on) are 'valuable' or 'good' directly and absolutely. But if we thus find the ultimate meaning of the economic value in the struggle with the physical environment, we may logically extend our conception of the pursuit of the value to include the wider range of activities which seeks
to further to the utmost limits the comforts, conveniences, amenities of modern civilised life. Our vast modern industrial system is in large measure the outgrowth of this interest. We have already seen how this interest diverts to its own use the activities of science in its effort to achieve the maximum of mastery over environment with the minimum of physical effort.

The assertion is commonly made that the economic goods are not in themselves valuable but are merely instrumental to the pursuit of the other values. We may accept this if we are clear as to what exactly is meant. We have pointed out how certain objects or situations satisfy certain fundamental and permanent bodily needs and are valuable or good simpliciter. Further, these bodily needs, when denied proper satisfaction, become increasingly insistent and imperious and occasion a consciousness of maladjustment so acute as completely to monopolise the attention. We can therefore say that a certain degree of economic or material well-being is a condition of effective interest in the other values, in other words, is a condition of ethical growth. In short, we need not try to improve on Aristotle's sane deliverance on this question when he says: "Man, as being human, will require external prosperity. His nature is not of itself sufficient for speculation, it needs bodily health, food and care of every kind. It must not, however, be supposed that, because it is impossible to be fortunate without external goods, a great variety of such goods will be necessary to happiness ....... It is enough that such a person should possess as much as is requisite for virtue".

We recognise, of course, that under the conditions of modern civilised life, there are economic activities that

(1) Nicomach. Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 9.
are merely instrumental in the strict sense, i.e. they contribute to non-economic interests. These activities find their justification in the value they are intended to further and raise no new considerations. Finally, the need is becoming increasingly urgent for a just estimate of the importance of the economic interest in modern life, and especially pertinent at the present time is the question as to whether the more and more engrossing pursuit of this interest is not exacting a toll on our energies out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance. Ethics, with its insistent "quo vadis"?, invites us to scrutinise and evaluate the nature of the life-synthesis, of the ideal, which is implied.

Before leaving our statement of the values, there is one further point to be considered. That is the question as to the rôle of pleasure. We have already referred to the fallacy of psychological hedonism and pointed out how pleasure is an incident of successful activity - activity directed normally to an end other than pleasure. But we must not forget that pleasure may be and often is the deliberated object of choice. The anticipated affective thrill( the fact is obvious enough at least in connection with the pleasures of the senses) sometimes does constitute the actual content of the object. Now, the psychical and physical effects of pleasure, the extent to which and the conditions under which it is beneficial to the life of the organism as a whole, is a point which is still obscure. But enough is known to make it a reasonable supposition that the psychical and physical processes are beneficially affected by the pleasure experience. Critics of Hedonism have been given to striking the pessimistic note and urging the unsatisfactoriness of pleasure; and their view is amply justified of psychology
where it is a question of the systematic pursuit of pleasure. But experience seems to shew that the occasional choice of pleasure is possible and natural, possessing, indeed, a value which may be described as **recreative** in the strictly literal sense of that term. It is of course a far cry from this admission to the attempt to elevate pleasure into the one worthy object of human endeavour.

**Chapter 3.**

We have already explained how ethics is concerned in a special way with the human values outlined above. It is concerned to conserve them, to assert their claims where social or political circumstances might lead to neglect of them, and to commend them to the individual will as the true and worthy objects of its allegiance. The ethical value, therefore, is not to be regarded as one value coordinate with the others. It is misleading, perhaps, to speak of it as a more ultimate value; for we can call it more ultimate only in the sense that it represents the unifying principle which seeks to construct out of these different values an ideal of the best life,—best, that is, with regard to all the special circumstances of the individual himself. Now there are some additional points of interest with reference to these values which we may mention here as they are further illuminative of the general situation.

To begin with, our conception of these values and of their relation to the ethical value enables us to envisage in a clear way the ethical aspects of the problem of progress. Each of these interests or pursuits, the scientific, the artistic, the political, etc., tends to become more and more highly specialised and to develop independently of, and it may be at the expense of, the others. We must therefore, in the first place, think of human
progress in the plural as consisting of different 'progresses' -
progress in science, progress in art, progress in religion,
progress in political forms and so on. It must be further
remembered that one kind of progress has no connection, at least
prima facie, with any of the others and indeed may actually come
into conflict with them. Historical illustrations are not far
to seek. Among the Greeks, for example, where society was based
on slavery, it might fairly be said that a high level of progress
was achieved in certain values at the cost of the sacrifice of other
values. The devotee of religion would probably find the high-
water mark of religious development in the Middle Ages, --that
period of the saint, the mystic, the hermit, the period in which
the resources of the Church were organised on so comprehensive
and effective a scale, and in which the choicest intellects
were enlisted in its service; but the ethical thinker, interested
in the human values as a whole, would protest against the
relentless intolerance that sought to fetter science, and
against the indifference, if not antagonism, to all attempts
at the amelioration of the social and economic condition of
the masses. The conflict between science and religion in the
nineteenth century is interesting from the same point of view.
Under the stimulus of its many and great successes, science
sought, justifiably enough, to extend its own point of view
over the whole field of experience, and to impose its own
particular kind of synthesis on every department of life.
But it sometimes went on to advance the claim, with all the
symptoms of arrogance and intolerance, that that synthesis is the
only one possible. Pragmatism, as a philosophic theory, is
probably to be traced to an ethical motive, that is, to a demand
for the recognition of all the human values, leading to such a
conception of the nature of truth itself as would, if we may so express it, guarantee by definition the human values as a whole. The criticism, from an ethical standpoint, of the political and economic life of our own day raises some serious questions. It is a pertinent question whether the ideal of maximum economic production, often implicitly accepted in practice if not in theory as a just and reasonable end for society to propose to itself, is compatible with an ethical organisation of the human instruments of production. Such an aim makes for an organisation which tends to deprive the workers of all real opportunity or inclination for self-culture. Further, it produces a few who become so filled with the zest of the industrial battle (itself an engrossing thing under modern conditions) that another equally one-sided type is the result. And we have the large parasitic class which is not called upon to pull its own economic weight, whose only conception of well-being is the exploitation of the comforts and pleasures which economic progress has made possible, and which frets under the weight of a leisure it has not been trained to use. Hence the melancholy spectacle of vacant and aimless lives, of lives clouded by ennui and indifference, which is perhaps the most disquieting commentary on the ethical results of our educational system.

Again, it would be easy to give instances, from Plato onwards, of the magnification of the political value or values. What appears to the present writer to be a good example of the tendency to invoke one principle of really limited application to effect the solution of our multiform social problems is to be found in a recent work, the thesis of which will serve as an illustration of the main point of this section.

The writer finds the panaceas for our social ills in the thorough-going extension of the group life and the group spirit. By the group life is meant that kind of association which originates and is controlled by "collective ideas", "collective feelings" and "collective will". The "collective idea" is the resultant of the deliberate interchange of ideas, with the consequent modification of individual ideas, among the members of the group; and hence emerges a 'composite idea', not identical with any one of the individual ideas. Tacitly, it is assumed to be somehow superior to them. Similarly arise 'collective feelings' and 'collective will'. We are told that "the object of group life is not to find the best individual thought, but the best collective thought". Further, on the ground that, from the very beginning, the individual life is indissolubly bound up with a social milieu, that it is impossible to abstract from the social relations and to think of the individual 'in vacuo', the conclusion is drawn that the only true and adequate kind of life is to be found in the group activity thus described. We learn also that the thorough-going and, indeed, exclusive fostering of this group attitude will resolve immediately the 'old' difficulties of the individual and society, egoism and altruism, self and other, etc.

(1) The New State p. 9
Now, this writer has analysed in a very thorough manner one special form, and admittedly a very important form of political activity. In this form there is fully effective cooperation in the determination of the ends themselves as well as in the prosecution of the activities which are the means to those ends. But in practice, the extent to which this kind of group life can be realised would seem to be somewhat limited and, besides, there are other important factors in human association which have to be taken into account.

We cannot assume that the "collective thought" is the be-all and the end-all of human association. The "best individual thought" ought sometimes to prevail - in other words, real leadership on the one hand and intelligent obedience on the other are attitudes occasionally demanded in our complex political life. Again, while we admit at once that the mere individual in abstraction from all social relationships is a myth, nevertheless individuality, involving at least the distinction, if not necessarily the conflict, between the individual and society, between self and other, is a fact which appears later as a result of development within this social environment. On the further statement: "our sundering [of the individual and society] is as artificial and late an act as the sundering of consciousness into subject and object", we would remark that, while it is certainly a late distinction, it seems fundamentally mistaken to consider it artificial in the sense of unreal. It would seem, on the contrary, that the distinction foreshadows one of the basal problems of ethics; and in practice the problem
somehow always recurs. To call it artificial and so to dismiss it is a method of solution which seems much more artificial than the problem itself.

We have thus shown how each of these values in the growth of society tends to develop independently of the others and to extend its dominion as widely as possible. The converse process is also worthy of mention, that is, the process by which the ethical interest, strictly in our sense of the term, tends

(1) Consider, also, this passage: "Properly understood, the interests of "the individual" are the interests of society. We are here talking not of two things but of two aspects of one thing. Oppositions there are within society numerous and endless, but these are all partial..... They will be discussed in their proper place - here we need only shew .. how the doctrine of essential opposition distorts our practical philosophies." (MacIver, Community, Bk.2, ch.1, p.90.)

Now it is doubtful whether such statements as this do not obscure much more than they illumine. "Two aspects of one thing "implies a dangerous metaphor. Does the writer not really mean that in an ideal society, the kind of society towards which it is permissible to hope that Humanity is slowly groping its way, the interests of the individual and the interests of society would be two aspects of one thing? Or, could we but discover the nature of the true life for the individual, we would solve ipso facto the problem of social organisation. But as things are, these oppositions "Within society" may well prove "essential" - essential in the sense which the "practical philosophies" probably had in view.
positively to assert itself and in more or less subtle ways to interpenetrate or permeate the other values and thus profoundly to influence what we might call the purity of their motive. Two illustrations - one from art, the other from religion - will make this clear. ... It will be recalled that the ethical interest is the practical interest in these values as a whole, the interest that seeks to fabricate out of them a unitary ideal of personal life. Now, in the world of literary art, for example, the artistic production which makes for a general depression of our sense of the value of human life as a whole, whether by means of a pessimism which preaches the final frustration or meaninglessness of human purposes and ideals, or by means of a cynicism which would mock into unreality those fundamental qualities or traits of our human nature which we have learned to value, generally finds its claim to be placed in the highest rank of art disallowed. However perfect the technique, however skilful the execution, it encounters an antagonism of a permanent kind. It would be generally admitted, for instance, that one important element in the secret of the abiding appeal of the Shakespearean tragedy is the fact that the aneantissement of human effort and human life which is there depicted is never absolute. Though the denouement presents what appears to be a final defeat of the dearest purposes of the actors, and the curtain finally falls on a stage blood-drenched in the best Elizabethan style, nevertheless there remains, after the long story of weakness, misfortune and futility has been told, a subtle, pervasive, but unmistakable impression of the inalienable human dignity of those actors and of the essential worthwhileness of their torn passions and defeated hopes. Santayana says: "A child
plans towers of Babel; a mature architect, in planning, would lose all interest if he were bidden to disregard gravity and economy. The conditions of existence, after they are known and accepted, become conditions for the only pertinent beauty."(1) And we may adapt that statement to our present topic by arguing that the consciousness of mankind is dissatisfied with the artist who constructs in defiance of the spiritual gravitation represented by these permanent values. In short, into our judgments concerning the higher levels of art, there seems to enter a factor which is not really rooted in the artistic impulse itself but which represents an underlying ethical demand. In art, as we have seen, we have a certain synthesis of the cognitive and affective elements of experience, and the ethical demand is not merely that this synthesis should not finally and patently conflict with the other kinds of synthesis to which the human mind is impelled, but that it should in some measure contribute in a positive way to their furtherance. (2)

An even more obvious instance is to be found in the case of religion. While it is true that religion has played a noteworthy part in the drama of human progress, we are apt to forget that religion itself has frequently had development thrust upon it by the growing ethical consciousness of mankind, with the result of a profound modification of the contents of the religious consciousness. Galloway says: "It is now generally agreed that the movement towards a higher stage of religion did not have its origin in a conscious and deliberate criticism of traditional beliefs, but arose out of the practical needs which accompanied a fresh advance in social organization. It

(1) Life of Reason, Reason in Art: p. 221.
(2) c.f. the development of this point in Ruskin's "The Seven Lamps of Architecture."
was the emergence of new wants and the rise of larger ideas, through the blending of tribes in the greater social whole of the nation, which became the ground of a further development of the spiritual consciousness." (1)

We may now proceed to elucidate further our conception of the nature of the ethical consciousness and of the ethical ideal. This part of our task will be best achieved by a defence of our position as already stated -- a defence which will serve to indicate its more important implications. The topic will be developed along three principal lines. (1) We shall endeavour to justify our view with regard to the place which it accords to the different values, and especially to science and art, in the conception of the ethical problem. (2) One important implication is that the ideal must be conceived and expressed in terms that are intimately personal or 'individualistic'. This implication is essentially bound up with the notion of the social and political values as co-ordinate with the other values and acquires considerable importance in the sequel. Hence it will be desirable to offer some further justification of our general viewpoint. We have


c.f. also MacIver: "The power and the claim of ethical thought is most triumphanty revealed in the transformation of religion. Even though religion continues to provide a sanction for conduct, it is the ethical spirit that is the primary, the transforming power in the creation of that sanction. Religion is brought into harmony with that spirit, for its conception of deity cannot resist the fierce ethical claim of awakened personality". (Community, Bk. 3, ch. 5, p. 295.)
hitherto avoided the use of any one formula in which to express the ethical ideal. If any one term is to be used, the above account of the ethical problem clearly points to the term 'self-realisation'. We shall endeavour, then, to justify this much abused term, as it appears to represent the only possible formula for the expression of the ideal. Incidentally, we shall attempt to indicate the ultimate meaninglessness of certain other forms of statement which pretend to a greater concreteness and adequacy. This does not mean, however, that we are subscribing to any particular ethical theory. The term self-realisation is fully recognised as representing a purely formal statement of the ideal. As regards the content which we have ascribed to the term, it is submitted that this content would \textit{in practice} be acceptable to the advocates of rival ethical theories.

(3) Our third task will be to raise the question as to what, precisely, from the present standpoint, is involved in the consciousness of moral obligation', the 'ought' consciousness, and as to how, metaphysical considerations apart, its existence in the individual is to be explained.

With regard to our first problem, we would preface our remarks with the following statement of Santayana: "It seldom occurs to modern moralists that theirs is the science of all good and the art of its attainment; they think only of some set of categoric precepts or of some theory of moral sentiments, abstracting altogether from the ideals reigning in society, in science and in art \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots. They divide men into compartments and the less they leave in the one labelled 'morality', the more sublime they think their morality is; and sometimes pedantry and scholasticism are carried so far that nothing but an abstract sense of duty
remains in the broad region which should contain all human goods." This stricture on modern moralists is possibly an overstatement, but there is some justification for it. The same writer argues that the primary question is, not "what ought I to do?", but "what ought to be"? In other words, what actually are the activities or pursuits which Humanity values? The strictly ethical question remains still to be formulated, viz., taking into consideration all the relevant facts of my special capacities, circumstances, and opportunities, is the attitude of my will to these values what it ought to be? From this point of view, the question of ethical responsibility is seen to be double-edged. There is not only the question of the individual's responsibility for living up to the light he possesses, but also the question of society's responsibility for making this light available in as full a measure as possible.

The chief source of the difficulty is the idea, either taken for granted or explicitly argued, that the field of ethics is essentially social. It is held that ethics is concerned from first to last with the relations of the individual to his fellow-men. In short, the field of ethics is regarded as co-extensive with what we have described above as the social and the political values. When this is the conception of ethics, the existence of activities such as are represented by science and art invariably constitutes a difficulty. Various attempts

(2) ibid.  
(3) For one among the many cases of the occurrence of this difficulty in ethical theory, see Green: Prologomena, Bk.3, sections 289 and 390, and note.
are made to surmount the difficulty. For example, the facts of experience are strained and it is argued that the life devoted to scientific or artistic pursuits is indirectly contributing to the service of others and that the ethical import resides in this fact of the individual's relation to his fellows. Or, again, the clear verdict of the ordinary ethical consciousness that 'pushpin is not as good as poetry', that it is somehow the duty of the individual to develop that part of his nature to which science and art appeal, is explained by resort to the unconvincing argument that such personal self-culture adds to the individual's capacities for social service. Let it be clearly understood that we do not mean to deny that there is an important element of truth in these arguments. Our contention is rather that the partial nature of the truth which they express points to an inadequacy in the original conception of the ethical problem.

Consider the following statement of Rashdall: "We shall attach a high intrinsic value to such pleasures as actually include a benevolent element, and a lower degree of intrinsic superiority to such pleasures as are actually conducive to the public good, though the public good may be no part of the motive of the person indulging in them. Under the first head we should include the actual pleasures of benevolence or personal affection, and even to some small extent the pleasures of sociability and friendship in so far as these imply some degree of unselfish good-will to others. Under the second, we should include the pleasures of ambition or emulation and the whole range of aesthetic and intellectual pleasures ....... In this way it would probably be possible to justify, on the whole, that preference for what are commonly called higher
pleasures which is so clear an element of the ordinary moral consciousness; since it will be generally admitted that in the long run indulgence in social and intellectual pleasures is more beneficial in its indirect social effects than indulgence in mere sensual gratification or unintellectual amusement." Now the fact that this writer is here concerned with the special question of the relative value of pleasures does not alter the general effect of the statement; and that effect is to darken counsel on a basic question. For the suggestion is strongly conveyed, (though it is probably not intended in this case) that these indirect social effects actually constitute the fundamental ethical justification of these intellectual pursuits. The real nature of the ethical situation is more adequately suggested in the following statement of the same author: "There are intellectual and other accomplishments, to which I at least cannot refuse the title of virtue. But I cannot assume that, without exception, these must all somehow add to what is called social welfare; not, again, do I see how to make a social organism the subject which directly possesses them. But, if so, it is impossible for me to admit that all virtue is essentially and primarily social". If we are driven to insert the thin end of the wedge in this way, is it not better frankly to recognise at the outset that the field of social relations is only one source--admittedly a most important source--of those values with which the ethical consciousness is directly concerned.

Another method of meeting the difficulty presented by those valuable pursuits which are not in their essence social is to resort to the distinction between two classes of virtues, the social and the self-regarding virtues; and, on the whole, this

(1) Theory of Good and Evil, vol p.73
(2) ibid vol 2, p.87.
line of argument can give us a sufficiently accurate picture of the ethical situation. But for several reasons the distinction is unsatisfactory, and principally because it suggests an essential difference between the individual's attitude in the one case and his attitude in the other. From the standpoint of the outside observer, the distinction seems to be valid and useful enough. But from the point of view of the agent, in truly ethical behaviors there would appear to be no such clear consciousness of distinction between self and other. In the one case as in the other, the individual identifies himself with an end of felt value, and, ultimately, the one attitude is no more 'personal', 'individual', or 'self-regarding' than the other.

In some cases the present difficulty arises as the result of a form of statement which carries a misleading suggestion. Consider, for instance, the following statement: "Virtue is fundamentally and always personal; and when we have discovered the law of the individual life, we have already discovered that of the social life. Since men are not mere individuals, but the bearers of a common personality, the development in the individual of his true selfhood means his emancipation from the limitations of individuality, and the path of self-realisation is through the service of others." Now, translating this statement into the terms of our own thinking, we would recognise a fundamental truth in the assertion that the discovery of the law of the individual life is ipso facto the discovery of the law of the social life; and in the notion of the emancipation from the limitations of individuality if by this phrase we understand the complete identification of his will with any

(1) Seth, Ethical Principles, Part 2, pp 275-276
or all of the human values as such; then, indeed, will he find his true nature by losing himself in the pursuit of intrinsically valuable objects. If, however, the phrase is to be interpreted in the narrower sense, it can only mean the development of his sensitivity to what we have called the social and political values, and the phrase, 'the service of others; is to be construed in the ordinary philanthropic sense in which it expresses the ideal of self-sacrifice or benevolence. In that case, may we not ask whether the service of others, in the restricted sense, is necessarily the path to self-realisation? May it not happen that 'the law of the individual life,' in the case of a particular individual, is such that the service of others is not for him the main road to self-realisation? An obvious case, for example, is that of the individual who is exceptionally one-sided in native endowment, so that in certain directions, e.g. the social and political values, he can only achieve a minimum of adjustment, while in other directions, e.g. science or art, he is capable of contributions which, though the benefit of others may be no part of his motive in making them, may nevertheless be well characterised as 'the service of others' in so far as they further those interests which are of vital and permanent concern to humanity as such. Or, without these loftier capacities, his nature may be only specially responsive along the line of these latter interests. In either case, his ethical growth need not directly or essentially involve the service of others. While self-realisation, then, must always be the expression of the form of the ethical ideal, just what kinds of activity are predominantly to furnish the content of the ideal, just what the balance is going to be among the different values, is a question which cannot be answered in general terms. From
first to last, the answer is conditioned by the individual's native endowment. The education which society provides ought to furnish the means for the discovery and actualisation of this endowment; it is in this sense that society shares with the individual himself the responsibility for his ethical development.

We have seen, then, that the attempt to make the individual's social relations the primary and essential factor in ethics cannot be consistently maintained. As Bradley shows in that very significant contribution, the 'Ethical Studies', (1) the effort cannot avoid doing violence to the deliverance of the ordinary ethical consciousness. As he very definitely expresses it: "The realisation for myself of truth and beauty, the living for the self which in the apprehension, the knowledge, the sight and the love of them finds its true being, is (all those who know the meaning of words will bear me out) a moral obligation, which is not felt as such only so far as it is too pleasant.... It is a moral duty for the artist or the enquirer to lead the life of one, and a moral offence when he fails to do so. But on the other hand it is impossible, without violent straining of the facts, to turn these virtues into social virtues or duties to my neighbour. No doubt such virtues do as a rule lead indirectly to the welfare of others, but this is not enough to make them social: their social bearing is indirect, and does not lie in their very essence. The end they aim at is a single end of their own, the content of which does not necessarily involve the good of other men."

In justification of the attention which we have given to this point, we can but plead again that the ignoring of it has done much to produce a one-sided picture of the ethical growth of the individual.

(1) See especially Essay 6, on 'Ideal Morality.'

(2) Ethical Studies, Essay 7, p.201.
in the case of the few writers who have dealt with the problem.

One of the chief difficulties in the way of an account of the ethical consciousness which will be at once wide enough and yet will not appear to do violence to what people actually feel on the subject is really to be found in the ambiguity of the term morality. It is a term which passes easily from a narrower sense in which it is essentially concerned with social relationships to a much wider sense in which it is somehow concerned with the whole of the individual's behaviour.

The following statement of a recent writer makes it clear that the difficulty is not gratuitous: "It does not seem right to speak of a moral faculty as something coordinate and competing with the rest—that is, philosophic, artistic, scientific and like them capable of being the source of special interests. Morality or character pervades the whole man and all his pursuits and transfuses and gives them value. According as he is moral or not, his pursuits have moral value or not, and it is doubtful whether, if he is moral, they are not all alike valuable without a hierarchy of higher and lower values. On the other hand, if he is not moral, whatever his pursuits are, they are equally valueless morally". It is clear, however, that we must specify much more exactly than it is customary to do just what is meant by this "morality or character" which "pervades the whole man and all his pursuits and transfuses and gives them value." Such an analysis (attempted in the proceeding pages) would seem to suggest that the absolute disjunction,"either moral or not moral, either morally valuable or morally valueless" is hardly applicable to the normal human being.

(1) P.Leon, in Mind n.s. vol.28, p 436
It might be objected at this point that our own view is in manifest conflict with the verdict of common sense. Is it not the case, it might be urged, that the ordinary ethical consciousness considers those standards, which seek to regulate social relationships, in some way fundamental to ethics, even though some degree of ethical significance cannot be denied to the other values? Is not the individual's susceptibility to the values of science and art much more a matter of indifference to ethics than his attitude to the social and political values? Is ethics not much more concerned, for example, with his love of veracity than with his love of knowledge? Now, we may admit at once that such is ordinarily the case, but we would suggest that this deliverance of the ordinary consciousness is largely the result of extraneous considerations and that it represents rather the more unreflecting, superficial pronouncement than the better-considered and deeper convictions on the subject. Society is, of course, much more immediately and directly affected by the individual's attitude to the latter values and is therefore more vitally interested in securing a certain minimum of adjustment to them. For the same reason, it is in connection with these norms that regulate social relationships that the 'ought' of the ethical consciousness becomes, for the first time in the individual's ethical history, more or less, clearly defined; and, indeed, it too commonly fails to pass beyond this restricted reference. If it be argued that acceptance of these social values and conformity to the standards of conduct arising out of them is essential to the very existence of all social, and hence of all distinctively human life, it seems sufficient to answer that it appears equally difficult to conceive a human type of existence from
which any or all of the other values would have completely disappeared. In fine, each of the values, without qualification of more or less, is essential to distinctively human life.

With regard to the 'ought' consciousness, again, it may be further pointed out that, just because the social effects of the individual's attitude to the other values are, as we have seen, essentially indirect and often remote, it is not surprising that the 'ought' in the ordinary consciousness should, as a result of social forces, tend to become associated almost exclusively with those behaviour norms which are more or less explicitly social. Again, (and here we seem to touch the substratum of truth in the common-sense attitude) indifference or opposition to existing social values is construed, and as a rule rightly construed, as indicating a general disposition to flout all authority as such. We have already pointed out that, even in the case of the fully developed ethical consciousness, a certain element of submission to authority is inseparable from the individual's attitude to the human values; and on the whole, it is a sound intuition of common-sense that finds in the individual's indifference to the ordinary definite valuations of the social life a fairly reliable symptom of a disposition inimical to the growth of that sense of personal responsibility, to the development of that spirit of seriousness in deliberation and choice, which is of the very essence of the ethical attitude.

But while these considerations serve to explain the paramount place accorded to the directly social values, even the ordinary, unsophisticated ethical consciousness, when it begins to reflect on the ethical situation as a whole, does not hesitate to admit that something more than a merely supplementary importance attaches to those other values of the
more strictly individual life. For example, common-sense rightly insists that a certain measure of acceptance of the current values of the social life is a sine qua non of morality. But if it be pointed out that something more is needed than this minimum of social adjustment, and the question be asked as to what constitutes a high degree of ethical development, it is true that common-sense might offer the answer that this higher ethical development is to be found in the furtherance of these social values to the fullest possible extent, that is, in effect, in the active promotion of the good of others. In short, it might identify the ethical ideal with an ideal of consciously benevolent activity. But, on the other hand, if we pointed out that the successful prosecution of such an ideal presupposes certain special qualities and aptitudes which can only to a very limited extent be cultivated by training, that these qualities are often absent in individuals who possess valuable aptitudes of a different order, and that the conception of the ethical ideal exclusively or essentially in terms of the social values, would preclude the possibility of the higher ethical development in the case of such individuals; then common-sense would recognise that a far broader conception of the ethical life had been implicit in its ordinary judgments of 'good' and 'bad', and 'right' and 'wrong'.

Our notions of the demands of the ethical life and our conception of the nature and method of ethical training are in danger of dwindling into a mean and shabby preoccupation with what we may call the bare minimum of negative morality. To train the individual so that he will not openly disregard the more obvious social restraints and standards, to guarantee, in a word, that he will not prove positively troublesome to society, that is the spirit in which the end of ethical training tends to
be conceived. It is little wonder that we often find high value attached to attitudes of mind and forms of behaviour which represent only the spurious sociality of the herd. The profounder vision of the meaning of ethical training would look forward to the time when the wilful failure on the part of the individual actively to identify himself, in the degree to which his capacities and circumstances allow, with these permanently valuable pursuits will be visited with a judgment of condemnation as direct and uncompromising as is at present evoked by, let us say, the dishonest repudiation of a debt. This may appear an Utopian view of the issues involved in ethical training, but it is the only view that promises results which, however partial or incomplete in the light of an ideal standard, will nevertheless be profoundly and permanently valuable.

We have suggested that, if any one term is to be used, the term which best expresses the nature of the ethical ideal is the term 'self-realization'? This "ambiguous, mysterious term", as Rashdall calls it, has been subjected to a considerable amount of what appears to be rather irrelevant criticism (1) A consideration of these criticisms suggests a misunderstanding, wilful or other, on the part of the critics as to what the self-realisationist really means to assert. It is contended, for instance, that the phrase amounts to "self-contradictory nonsense" because "you cannot make real what is real already, and the self must certainly be regarded as real before we are invited to set about realising it". But all that is meant, of course, (2)

(1) For a summary of the usual objections to the term, see Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil, Vol.2, pp.62
(2) Ibid.
is that certain kinds of activity mean a fuller and more satisfying life for the self than is enjoyed when these pursuits are omitted, and, far from finding any absurdity in that notion, we must confess to an utter failure to find even a difficulty in the idea. Or, it is suggested that it may mean an all-round, equal development of all the capacities of the self, and it is then promptly pointed out that such impartial development involves the realisation of the immoral as well as of the moral propensities and that this "leaves out the whole differentia of Morality". We need only remark that no self-realisationist, with any pretensions to a consistent ethical theory, has ever really suggested this sense of the term. Against the notion of a 'harmonious' development of capacities, the harmony involving modification and repression of certain tendencies, it is objected that the formula 'self-realisation' gives no indication as to how this harmony is secured, as to what tendencies are to be fostered and what tendencies must be repressed. This objection is pertinent, but the point of it disappears when we admit that the concept of self-realisation is in itself purely formal, and if we proceed to give content to this form. This we have endeavoured to do in the above account of the nature of self-realising activity. The human values, with the pursuit of which we identified the Good, must be regarded as a more or less partial realisation as well as an indication of the nature of the best impulses, the most abiding needs of the self as a whole. On the other hand, the description of the end as self-realisation, though in itself formal, serves an important purpose. It gives to the enquiry its true orientation at the outset by its recognition of the fact that, whatever be the ethical ideal, its ultimate nature must be somehow expressible in terms of individual excellence; and (1) Opp. cit.
that emphasis is desirable for many reasons. As one writer eloquently expresses what appears to be essentially the same idea: "Upon what basis does that historic claim to liberty rest if not upon the truth, seen darkly by some, by others clearly envisaged, that freedom for each to conduct life's adventure in his own way and to make the best he can of it is the one universal ideal sanctioned by nature and approved by reason; and that the beckoning gleams of other ideals are but broken lights from this? That freedom is, in truth, the condition, if not the source, of all higher goods, apart from it duty has no meaning, self-sacrifice no value, (1) authority no sanction".

It remains to deal more fully with an aspect of our subject which we have hitherto mentioned in a merely incidental way. This is the question as to the kind of consciousness implied in our use of the categories 'right' and 'wrong', the 'ought' consciousness, or, to use the customary phrase, the consciousness of moral obligation. At this point in our discussion, the question is: What, as a matter of psychological fact, is the origin and meaning of this consciousness? Our question is not: what psychological conditions must be present, what level of general mental development must be attained, before this consciousness matures?


C.f. also: "We must insist, in the face of misinterpretation, that the service of one's fellows or one's country or one's race is not the complete end of life, nor fitness for such service, "fitness for citizenship" , the complete end of education. To make such fitness for service the ethical end is to reason in a circle, and to darken the very meaning of that vital fitness for service," (MacIver, 'Community', Bk. 2, ch. 1, p. 91).

C.f. also the very clear statement of the same point by Guyau, 'Education and Heredity', p. 81.
That question will occupy us later. Still less are we concerned with the purely philosophic question: what is the ultimate significance of the fact that such a consciousness appears at all?

We have indicated how the striving of Humanity towards a more expansive and satisfying exercise of its powers has become articulate in certain activities which represent the ultimate objects of which the term 'good' is predicated. Behaviour which is more or less clearly apprehended as promoting the good in this sense is summed up in certain rules, principles, or generalisations -- a synthesis of experience which represents a social heritage of which the individual must be led to possess himself. It is, of course, in connection with these standards which are already operative in his social environment that the consciousness of obligation appears. Partly because of his own unreflecting imitation, and partly because of express social compulsion, the individual more or less conforms to these standards. But if ethical growth is to take place at all, his conformity must not remain either a matter of mere imitation or of mere compulsion. It must be conscious and deliberate, and the authority vested in these standards must not remain purely external. If the standards themselves reflect the permanent needs of human nature and thus represent a truly ethical synthesis, (however incomplete it may be) the individual learns not merely to react to them as external controls, but to appreciate them, and to find their authority rooted in the fact of their abiding value. The authority is then self-imposed, the will is autonomous. But none the less, the consciousness of obligation remains; for the character is still in process of formation, that is to say, the organisation of impulses is still incomplete; so that the isolated impulse may still claim that independent
satisfaction which is authoritatively denied to it by the standards of conduct which have become operative in the individual's life. The consciousness of obligation or duty is thus inseparable from, and is the reliable symptom of, real ethical development. It is also clear, then, that the ultimate ethical category is not that of 'right', but that which was made basal in Greek ethical speculation, namely, the category of 'good'.

It might be objected that we have not laid sufficient emphasis on the notion of the development of qualities of character, the development of the so-called virtues, as the end of ethical training. The reason, however, ought to be now apparent without further elaboration. The viewpoint which stresses the development of such qualities or virtues as the end of ethical training really represents an abstraction, and an abstraction which is particularly unfortunate when the interest is in the genesis of ethical behaviour. The virtues represent different forms of organisation of individual tendencies, an organisation incidental to the pursuit of the good. They thus represent the inner aspect of the general process of self-realisation. Superficially, and for practical purposes, we may say that these qualities of character, the virtues, are ends in themselves. More careful reflection might suggest that they are means. But the fuller understanding of their significance would shew that both views are an abstraction; these qualities not only grow out of the pursuit, but they furnish the guarantee of the continued existence, of these values. And the special virtues but represent specially significant contours, so to speak, of the whole personality which we are concerned to describe.

This examination of the ethical consciousness has necessarily involved a statement of much that is now commonplace in ethical theory. It has been necessary also to omit, as irrelevant to our
main interest, the detailed consideration of many questions which we have raised by implication and which are rich in controversial matter for the professional student of ethics. But the general outcome of the process of ethical growth has been indicated, and may be briefly summarised. The individual experiences impulses or needs which crave satisfaction. This satisfaction of impulse is ultimately what we have in view when we characterise an experience as good. The individual further becomes familiar with the fact that one line of satisfaction may be incompatible with another, that one kind of activity may involve a satisfaction which is less immediate but eventually greater than that conferred by some other kind of activity, and so on. Further still, he comes to find that there are certain kinds of activity on behalf of which the claim is advanced, with all the authority of social experience, that they confer a truer and more lasting satisfaction—a claim which, as a rational being, he cannot altogether ignore, and the recognition of which, partial or complete, generates that sense of duty or obligation which is henceforth a permanent element in his ethical consciousness. The ethical problem, the problem of the practical reason, is for him, in the first place, the identification of his will with these valuable activities. In the second place, however, the problem of ethical development is in essence individual or personal—it is his problem. That is to say, it is that of fabricating out of these values (with his inherited equipment and his special circumstances as conditioning materials) the structure of the best possible life, the life which will mean the maximum satisfaction on the whole, in a word, the realisation of his highest self-hood. As we have shewn already, the details of the ideal life cannot be filled in by general theory, just because this detailed content is to be the
expression of a true individuality, and the process of self-
realisation is actually the process of discovering this content.
Now, that kind of attitude to life as a whole which is here
implied - the attitude which attaches fundamental significance to
the alternatives presented to the will, to the processes of
deliberation and the acts of choice - is the distinctively ethical
attitude, and, as suggested above, we may regard this attitude as
a working description of the somewhat mysterious 'good will' of
ethical theory. Needless to say, it is not contended that
behaviour, to be ethical, must be uniformly on this elevated
plane. But this attitude, in an explicit form, must be a
frequently recurring factor in the individual's experience, and
whenever "live options" are presented to the will, the choice,
however immediate and apparently unreflective, must embody
the results of this attitude -- in which case the choice is
implicitly ethical.

The interpretation of the nature of the ethical consciousness
which has been elaborated in the preceding chapters has many
advantages from the point of view of the geneticist. Some of
these may be mentioned at this point.

It supplies, for the process of ethical training, one aim
at least which is capable of being definitely conceived and stated.
viz., that of so presenting, in education, these valuable objects
or pursuits to the individual that we may actualise the relation
which potentially exists between these basal values and the
permanent needs of his nature. But in connection with the
accomplishment of this general aim, it focusses certain important
psychological considerations, such, for example, as the question of
the special psychological characteristics of the different periods
of development -- characteristics which will profoundly affect the
strength of the appeal of these values at different stages.

Again, with regard to the problem of the method of training, and especially with regard to the rather unnecessarily vexed question of the possibility and desirability of direct moral instruction, it is clear that, if the general nature of ethical development is justly conceived, the question suggests its own answer. The fundamental method, it would seem, must always be that which is called or rather, perhaps, miscalled indirect. It would seem, also, that direct moral instruction, that is, the effort to impart an understanding and an appreciation of values or standards by verbal teaching, is incidental to the general process. Though incidental, however, its role is important. For instance, in acquiring the knowledge of language generally, not only does the word serve to sum up in a readily available way a certain mental content, but also the strange or relatively strange word constitutes a direct stimulus to further mental exploration and thus accelerates general mental development. Similarly, in direct ethical teaching, the individual is incited to a fuller apprehension and appreciation of values which he has hitherto but vaguely felt. In general, we may say that direct moral instruction represents the stressing of the element of authority which we found an inseparable feature of the ethical consciousness; and indirect training training would be the process by which this authority is stripped of its externality, and tends to be self-imposed. Both methods would, therefore, be necessary in ethical training.

The most important corollary, however, which our point of view suggests is the fact that ethical development must be conceived as in some way a function of the growth of the individual's mind as a whole, and not merely a function of the development of certain specific tendencies, however fundamental. While there can be little
doubt that historically, the tendency has been to lay exaggerated emphasis on the purely intellectual factors, it seems clear that recent tendencies reveal a movement towards a different, but an equally false simplification of what we have shewn to be a highly complex process. For example, the 'instinct psychologists', as they have been called, have beyond a doubt made a permanently valuable contribution by directing attention to man's instinctive equipment and urging its importance for all later development. But in the present essay we hope to shew that the interpretation of the part played by these instinctive factors in the development of personality (in the few cases where an attempt has been made to deal systematically with this problem) has given us a picture the broad outlines of which seem to be falsely drawn. Essential factors in the process -- factors which are not instinctive in any ordinary sense of the term-- have been either ignored or obscured, with the result of a one-sided emphasis which is likely to prove as barren as the intellectualism against which it protests.

In connection with our next topics, viz, native endowment and motivation, we shall meet cases in point of the tendencies in question.

CHAPTER IV

Native Endowment and the Problem of Motivation.

Our general criticism of the writers who have treated the problem of the genesis of the ethical attitude is to the effect that their contributions suffer from an attempt at over-simplification. This takes the form of using one principle of explanation so widely that not only is there a strain put on the interpretation of the facts, but the principle itself loses all real explanatory value. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish the theories which we
have principally in view as 1. 'Sympathy' theories, 2. 'Imitation' theories, and 3. 'Instinct' theories. In 1. and 2., we find a particular instinctive impulse, in 3., we find the concept of instinct itself, magnified with respect to its significance as a principle of explanation. To begin with the last-mentioned class, we have the most distinguished and influential example of this class in McDougall's 'Introduction to Social Psychology'. Now, as the title (1) states and as the author elsewhere reminds us, this work is intended rather to outline the groundwork or first principles of a social psychology than to represent an actual contribution to that science. Still less is it intended to be an explicit treatment of the problem of the growth of the ethical consciousness. On the other hand, this justly famous work does treat the problem at least incidentally; and, moreover, the position taken up on certain fundamental psychological issues is of vital concern to any treatment of our problem. Hence we may fairly regard it as at least in broad outline a contribution to genetic ethics and shall therefore examine certain of its more fundamental contentions.

McDougall's account of the original instinctive and impulsive endowment has occasioned a considerable amount of discussion in recent psychological literature. Criticism of his position has ranged from an attempt to modify and supplement his account of the instincts to a challenging of the validity of the very concept of instinct. It does not fall within the scope of this essay to offer any direct, systematic discussion of this problem. We shall merely outline the general view of native endowment which we are prepared to accept; and our discussion will be more particularly concerned to shew the significance to be attached to these native factors in subsequent development.

In fact, it may be definitely stated at this point that we see no adequate reason, in the present state of psychological knowledge, to dissent in any fundamental way from McDougall's account of the instincts; but we shall have to take serious exception to the weight of explanation which is thrown upon them. Generally, then, we would accept the account of instinctive endowment as offered by McDougall and as modified and supplemented by Drever. Drever's revision of the innate tendencies (1) seems adequately to supplement McDougall's account, and, pending further investigations of an experimental kind along behaviouristic and neurological lines, we may safely accept this account of man's instinctive endowment.

There are, it is true, certain tempting psychological questions raised in connection with some of the instincts which these writers recognise. For example the recognition of the twin instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement might well raise a question. Whether the facts of behaviour, which the advocates of these instincts have in view, are properly to be attributed in each case to a separate instinct seems a debatable point. While it does not appear necessary to enter into a discussion of special points of this kind, it does seem desirable, on the other hand, to come to terms with certain attacks of a more radical kind which have recently been made from two directions on the very concept of instinct itself.

G. C. Field sees in the procedure of these psychologists a movement in the direction of resuscitating the fallacy of the Faculty Psychology. While accepting the notion of 'instinctive' as legitimate and fruitful, of the notion of particular 'instincts' and the practice of explaining behaviour by means of them, he says:

(1) Instinct in Man, ch. 6.
"But now what happens when we cease to talk about Instinct and begin to talk about the instincts? What information does it convey to us when we are told that a certain action is due not only to Instinct but to some particular instinct? If such a statement is to give us any real information, it must tell us something more than the general facts which are conveyed to us by saying that the action is instinctive, and what is more important, it must tell us something more than we can gather from an inspection of the action itself. Thus if we see bees building cells and someone tells us that they do this because they have a cell-building instinct, the word "instinct", it is true, tells us something important about this action, but the word cell-building is entirely superfluous and tells us nothing at all that we did not know directly from the inspection of the action. Particularly it must be remembered that, when we are talking of our own actions or of those of being like ourselves, the ascription of an action or of any kind of conscious experience to any particular instinct must, if it is to give us any genuine information, tell us something that cannot be derived from an inspection of our own consciousness (1) at the moment of the experience. The criticism of the Instinct Psychology implied here is serious and, indeed, fatal, if it be valid. McDougall's own answer, however, to this line of criticism seems to meet the needs of the situation. He points out that the ascription of an action to a particular instinct does indeed give us important additional information about it, as it serves to connect the action with the larger whole of action to which the term 'instinct' refers and thus really makes prediction to some degree possible.

(1) Mind, July, 1921, "Faculty Psychology and Instinct Psychology".
The 'explanation' in such a case takes the form of connecting the isolated act with other acts and shewing that these supposedly separate acts are special manifestations of something more basic or general, -- in the case quoted in the note, the impulse to shield.

(2) Note: McDougall's reply is as follows: "Mr. Field is mistaken in supposing that the ascription of an action to a particular instinct conveys no more information than can be attained by the inspection of the action or conveyed by the statement that it is instinctive or due to instinct. Consider a concrete example. I return to its cage, after handling it, a young white rat. Its mother hops about it in an agitated manner, then seizes it in her mouth and drags it to the back of the cage. An onlooker, knowing that rats when short of food sometimes eat their young, says: "She is going to eat it". I reply confidently: "No, it's all right. It's the maternal instinct". In saying that I imply much that is given neither by simple introspection of the action nor by the statement that the action is instinctive. If the mother rat proceeds to devour the young one that shews that I was mistaken. But if I had merely remarked that her behaviour was instinctive, I could not be accused of error: for the act of dragging the young one to the back of the cage was instinctive in this case also, though perverted; was an expression, not of the maternal instinct, but of a very different one, the food-seeking instinct. Thus, in such a simple case, the correct ascription of an action or of a phase of behaviour, to a particular instinct enables us to forecast the further course of the train of behaviour, and enables us, if desired, to intervene to modify the further course of behaviour." (Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, Dec. 1921, March 1922.)
or protect. In principle, this kind of explanation seems identical with that which 'explains' the fall of the apple by connecting that phenomenon with planetary movements.

We may admit, then, the legitimacy of the concept of a particular instinct and also of the practice of psychologists in attributing explanatory value to such a concept. On the other hand, Mr. Field's caveat is well-timed in view of the extent to which certain psychologists have apparently been obsessed with the idea of the enormous significance of certain particular instincts. Mr. Field himself quotes an unmistakable case in point in Trotter's "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War". Here we find levels of behaviour, ranging from the simplest herd activities of the animals to the most highly socialised activities of man, 'explained' as due to the operation of the gregarious instinct. While we would agree with Field as to the futility of this procedure, we would suggest, however, that the fallacy here is not that of the Faculty Psychology; for the gregarious instinct, like the other instincts, has a certain explanatory or prognostic value.

The fallacy is that of using a principle, which possesses a certain limited explanatory value, in an unlimited manner. The difficulty, for example, is not that the gregarious instinct is not a factor in the highly developed socialised behaviour of man, but simply that it leaves the really important aspects of such behaviour unexplained and without even a hint of explanation. In itself it tells us nothing, and apparently cannot tell us anything, as to why its operation in one case, namely among the lower animals, results in one kind of behaviour, and in another case, i.e. among human beings, in a kind of behaviour which presents new and special characteristics too obvious to be denied.

The second line of criticism of which we have made mention
is that which boldly denies the very fact of instinct, conceived as an inherited response, and asserts that the phenomena treated under the rubric of instinct are in the last resort phenomena of habit. In a recent contribution (1) Mr. Zing Yang Kuo takes up this uncompromising position. The so-called instincts are here regarded as highly complex responses which have been integrated, in the course of the individual's experience, out of numerous units of reaction; these units of reaction are described as "what we find in the child's spontaneous activities and random acts". (2) "Such spontaneous and random acts are all that we can credit to the native endowment of man". (2) It is not relevant to our problem to undertake a full consideration of Kuo's interesting article. The following comments will suffice for our purpose: A much more exact study than psychology has yet attempted of the details of the neuro-muscular processes in instinctive behaviour is urgently needed, but, at the same time, is unfortunately a matter of extreme difficulty. In the absence of this more exact knowledge, which is needed if we are to distinguish sharply between reactions which are really inherited and reactions which are grafted on them as the result of experience, it is of course difficult directly to refute Kuo's position. But even though we were to admit that the so-called instincts are in reality acquired reactions, integrated in the manner of habits out of more elementary units, we have still to explain the inevitableness, so to speak, with which these highly specialised reactions are acquired by all the members of the species; and if we attempt to explain this, it seems very difficult to avoid reintroducing somehow the notion of an inherited predisposition to certain

(1) *Journal of Philosophy*, Nov. 24, 1921.

kinds of reaction. Kuo's notion of a similar environment acting upon similar organisms (1) does not escape the implication. It lurks both in the idea of similarity of organic structure and similarity of environment. Similarity of original nervous organisation, with the 'selection' which this entails, is connected causally with environmental similarity. But Kuo takes exception to any kind of a priori relation between organism and object. He says: "To assume any inborn tendency is to assume a priori relation between organism and stimulating objects..... such an assumption is no less objectionable than the theory of innate ideas" (2). Kuo himself assumes here that any theory of innate ideas must necessarily be objectionable -- a most unwarrantable assumption. For modern psychology has employed the notion of innate ideas in this special sense only after rejection of the tabula rasa theory for which Kuo apparently pleads. In fact, he cannot logically adopt this line of criticism, for his own notion of original units of reaction seems equally open to it. If we mistake not, the real difficulty which Kuo has apprehended here is the very fundamental 'structure and function' difficulty; the question as to the priority of the one or the other (3) He is simply assuming the priority of the structure concept, while a consideration of the more ultimate biological aspects of this problem suggests the unwisdom of any dogmatism concerning it.

Thorndyke has endeavoured to show that the objects and responses in instinctive behaviour are much more specific than they appear to be in McDougall's and Drever's accounts. Thorndyke's attempt to carry out a more precise analysis of the behaviour

(2) Journal of Philosophy, Nov. 24, 1921.
(3) c.f. the more fundamental aspects of this difficulty as stated by (a) Childs, Senescence and Rejuvenesencepp26-31 and (b) Russell, Form and Function, ch.17.
facts represented by the various instincts is a valuable contribution, and further study along such lines is desirable. But with regard to the problem of the ultimate psychological facts in instinct and of the correct enumeration of the instincts, it is fortunately not necessary for our purpose to await its solution.

It will be helpful, however, to summarise what appear to be the general lessons of the discussion in the following propositions:

1. No enumeration of the human instincts ought to be construed as other than a provisional working hypothesis, pending further examination, with all the resources at the command of a scientific psychology of the exact nature of the mechanisms involved. 2. The tenor of the discussion as a whole gives nothing but support to the view which the present essay will develop as to the basic nature of our habit adjustments. 3. The more precise investigation of the processes ultimately involved in instinct may well uncover more basal difficulties; such, for example, as the question of the validity; for the more ultimate purposes of science, of the ordinary distinctions of 'inherited' and 'acquired', organism and environment. (1)

The real issue for our purpose, however, is the question as to the soundness of what is perhaps the central contention of McDougall's account: viz, the explanation of motivation at all levels of behaviour in terms of instinct and instinctive emotion. As against this contention it will be urged that, while there is a sense in which McDougall's position is sound, the problem of motivation on the higher levels of human behaviour is considerably more complicated than it is represented to be by McDougall; that there are factors concerned in motivation of which he takes altogether insufficient account; and that, therefore, his statements as to the role of instinct in motivation are not so much wrong

(1) For an interesting discussion of the meaning of these terms, see Art. in Journal of Abnormal Psychology, July-Sept. 1922. "The meaning of Inherited & Acquired in reference to Instinct." (Wells)
as seriously misleading. The examination of this problem of motivation, to which we now proceed, will reveal, not the error, but the incompleteness of McDougall's statement of native endowment in so far as the human being is concerned; and the more complete statement of human native endowment, which is demanded by the facts of motivation, will be attempted.

We may quote in full the important passage in which McDougall defines his position,—a position which he has not appreciably modified in later contributions. (1)

We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.

Now, there appear to be two quite clearly distinguishable senses of the term 'motive'; and the above statement obscures, if it does not ignore the distinction between them. The first sense is the literal one, viz., that which 'moves' or urges the organism to action. The reference here is to those original tendencies in virtue of which the organism does not remain "inert and lifeless like a clock whose main spring has been removed". The existence of some such original tendencies seems in the last analysis inseparable from the idea of an

(1) c. f. 'Mind', July, 1920: "Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion"
organism as such, that is to say, something that makes more or less adaptive responses to changing environmental conditions. It may be admitted that these tendencies are the basis of all later activities in the sense that in their absence these activities could not have come into being. It may further be granted that their influence continues to make itself felt on the higher levels of behaviour, although we shall find it necessary to take issue with the Instinct psychologists on the question of the precise manner and the extent of this influence. These tendencies, therefore, represent in some way the ultimate origin or source of what has been called the element of 'drive' in behaviour. They have been likened by Woodworth to the motive power which drives a machine. Using Woodworth's analogy, we would point out that there are three factors of which account must be taken, viz., the motive power, the mechanism and the work done or result produced by the machine. In the human machine (on the higher levels of behaviour), this result is foreseen; and, further, the notion of 'motive' is often identified with this 'object' or 'end' of activity. There are thus two senses of motive between which a prima facie distinction at least must be drawn. As one writer expresses it (2), there is motivation in the sense of the 'vis a tergo' and in the sense of the 'vis a termino.' From the phrasing of the passage quoted, it is clear that McDougall considers that the explanation of both forms of motivation is to be found in the instincts.

We have admitted, of course, the existence of native impulses of the kind described by McDougall, so that our present concern is rather with these objects, ends, or aims which the individual

(1) Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 2, p. 44.
(2) Psychological Review, July, 1921.
comes to value and which, therefore, are ordinarily said to motivate him. The fundamental question then appears to be: is the problem of motivation satisfactorily solved if we shew, as McDougall has attempted to shew, that these valuable ends or activities can be analysed into elements which appeal to one or more of the instincts? In that case, inasmuch as these objects represent simply a later development and organisation of the primary instincts, the problem of motivation is to shew exactly what organisation of primary instincts is represented by these objects. Let us put our question from a somewhat different angle and ask: what factors go to determine or constitute these valued objects or ends of activity? In answer to this question, it will be argued that the factor which the Instinct psychologists exclusively stress, namely, instinct, is not the sole and not even the most important factor. Analysis will reveal the fundamental influence exerted in the determination of ends by two other factors, viz., what we may refer to as the intellectual factor on the one hand, and the factor of habit on the other.

Let us consider the intellectual factor first. The modification of the ends which are set by native impulse, in so far as that modification takes place on a distinctively human level of behaviour, is clearly a function of a certain intellectual process; without the intellectual process, this particular kind of modification would not occur. In the case, for instance, of a conflict between two incompatible impulses, A and B, the resulting action may be either (1) the simple suppression of A and action in the line prompted by B. This process may be predominantly determined by either (a) organic memory as when the dog's impulse to pursue a rabbit is immediately checked by the 'memory' of a whipping; or the kitten's impulse to 'paw' a wasp on the window is
arrested by a similar kind of bodily reminiscence; and (b) an ideational or representative process, as when the child overcomes the seductive influence of a can of jam through the representation of a similar situation in the past and of the consequences of yielding to temptation. Or (2), the action may involve the complete suppression of neither impulse, may be of the form A\textsubscript{1} B\textsubscript{1}, involving a modification of both impulses in a more or less successful attempt to reconcile them. This may possibly take place within narrow limits on the level of organic memory, as, perhaps, in the case of the well-trained dog that, immediately after a misdemeanour, obeys his master’s call with a complicated series of movements, approaching, withdrawing, crouching, moving in a circle, and so on. But an effective adjustment of this character would seem to demand a fairly high level of ideational or representative activity; as when the child, instead of immediately yielding to his impulse to steal, postpones the act to a safer occasion. In discussing a similar illustration\textsuperscript{(1)}, McDougall makes his own interpretation clear; he would say that the end is the possession of the jam and that the rest of the process (where, he would admit, intelligence appears) is merely the means for the realisation of this end. But a truer interpretation would say that the end itself has been altered. The child no longer wills ‘the jam here and now’ for the fact of punishment is now seen to be an inseparable aspect of this end; the end as it has now been constituted is” the jam-without-the-punishment-an-hour-hence.” This end is an intellectual construct. If we apply a similar analysis, not to a simple choice of this kind, but to those permanent ends which have been constituted as the result of long experience and repeated reflection, the case becomes clearer.

\textsuperscript{(1)} Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 178.
We shall then see that the notion of instinct as determining the end and of intelligence as solely concerned with the means is based on a falsely accentuated distinction between means and end. The limits within which this distinction is valid and serviceable will be presently considered.

We seem to have here only a special case of the old fallacy of completely separating the intellectual or cognitive factors in experience from the affective and conative factors. Another form of this fallacy is the assertion that, because we can analyse the object of sense-perception into certain sensational elements, these sensational elements therefore constitute the object; whereas apart from the synthesising, integrating activity of the mind with respect to these elements, the object as we know it could not appear in our experience at all. We may recognise this psychological fact without committing ourselves on the question of its philosophic implications. Moreover, as Hobhouse reminds us,(1) the situation is similar with regard to the objects or ends of volitional activity, and the thought process interpenetrates the impulse-feeling process in same way. Hence the first step in any approach to the study of the ends with which volitional activity is concerned is to recognise the basic fact that, "as, in the construction of the percept out of the original sensation, the ego recognises, discriminates between, selects from and combines the sensations presented, and thus forms out of them an object of knowledge; so, in the construction of the end out of the original impulse, we find the same recognition, discrimination, selection and organisation of the crude data of sensibility."(2)

There is a factor here, therefore, which we have referred to

(1) The Rational Good, chs. 1 and 2
(2) Seth, Ethical Principles, pp 195-196.
above as the intellectual factor, of which account must be taken in explaining how the objects or ends of volitional activity are determined. It is desirable to examine this factor more closely in order to indicate in a precise way the nature of it and the process by which it modifies the ends of behaviour.

Common-sense would dismiss the problem with the assertion that, in the case of human behaviour, intelligence exerts or may exert a determining influence on the ends or purposes of conduct. While that is the conclusion at which we shall arrive, we must nevertheless describe the kind of psychological processes we have in view when we make that assertion. Whatever attitude we adopt to the recent efforts on the part of psychologists to find some reliable and readily applicable objective tests of intelligence, it must be admitted that their researches have at least indicated the complexity of the processes concerned in intelligent behaviour. There are apparently many aspects of intelligent activity and, further, the question as to which aspect we are going to make prominent is largely determined by the special nature of the adjustment which is under consideration. This point is unaffected by the truth or error of any particular theory, such as the unifocal theory. For example, in the case of opening a puzzle-box and in the case of intelligently resolving a conflict of impulses (such as we have illustrated above), different aspects or, if the term 'aspects' is vague, different special processes in the group of processes which constitute intelligence seem to become prominent. Our concern here is therefore to shew what special features of the process of intelligent adjustment are to be emphasised when intelligence is concerned with competing ends of behaviour.

Taking the more satisfactory of the various definitions of
intelligence, we find one feature of the process uniformly recognized, sometimes emphasised. This is the notion of the conscious, deliberate use of, or reference to, past experience in effecting present adjustment. In connection with the intelligent reaction to a conflict of impulses, to mutually incompatible objects of choice, such intelligent reaction seems to be bound up with the question as to the sense or way in which past experience becomes available for the solution of the present problem. Past experience may, of course, operate through organic or 'habit' memory. When the reaction is determined in this way, we have the operation of what is commonly referred to as sensori-motor intelligence. But in the conscious resolution of a conflict of the kind suggested, intelligence is usually taken to imply or presuppose what we have previously referred to as representative activity. Apart from the level of ideational development implied in such representative activity, no conscious, deliberate use of past experience would appear to be possible. But this representative activity itself may be found in various stages of development, ranging between two extremes. At one and the lowest extreme, there is the mere ability to conjure up objects or situations not presented in sense experience. At the other extreme, we have highly controlled representation, in which the objects or experiences represented are recalled only with respect to their essential features and in which there is an appreciation of their temporal and causal relations. This level implies the possession of 'free' ideas in the technical sense, the sense according to which "elements of the whole situation and the corresponding reaction must be selected and then these elements must be freed from their connection with any series or situation."(1)

(1) Kirkpatrick, Genetic Psychology, p. 131.
To quote the same writer again: "The process of forming free ideas by both men and animals involves attention to the elements of the situation, and reaction to these elements not simply as a part of one situation leading to an end of a certain kind, but as elements in a variety of situations leading to a variety of ends." (1) The most highly developed form of representation implies that the objects or situations represented are 'free' in this sense, that they have been integrated into a well-ordered series, and that the individual apprehends the temporal and causal relations between the members of the series.

The bearing of these remarks on our present problem is twofold. In the first place, genetic psychology can describe, with a fair degree of accuracy, the growth in the individual of this capacity for the higher form of representative activity. In the second place, with regard to this ordered, highly synthetised representation, we can, without serious error, simply identify 'intelligent' modification of behaviour with modification by a representation-series of this kind. But this synthesis or ordering of the elements of the individual's experience is to some degree, probably to a large degree, affected by definite educational influences. Hence a genetic psychology of ethics must give an account of these influences. It must be recognised, of course, that the degree to which these environmental influences prove effective in particular cases depends on some ultimate, innate individual peculiarities, the nature of which is obscure, but which we must regard as, so to speak, setting a limit a priori to the degree of intelligent control of which the individual is capable. The recognition of this fact, however, will make no difference at the outset to the question of our use of the

(1) Kirkpatrick, Genetic Psychology. p. 133.
various educational means, for it is only in the individual's reactions to such means that these innate limitations reveal and define themselves. In any case, it is clear that the study of the intellectual factor in choice has unmasked a problem which is profoundly relevant to the study of the development of 'conduct' or ethical behaviour.

McDougall's statement that instinct determines the end while intelligence is only concerned with the means doubtless possesses the merit of simplicity. But this simplicity is extremely misleading. Take, for example, his valuable conception of a sentiment as the organisation of primary emotional tendencies around certain objects. Clearly the object may be either (a) perceptual or concrete as when we develop a sentiment of love for some individual, or (b) conceptual or abstract, as when a similar sentiment develops with reference to such objects as Justice, Truth, Human Perfection and so on. As far as the conceptual or abstract type of sentiment is concerned, the role of intelligence is clear. It is an essential condition of the existence of such an object at all.

Intelligence, then, modifies the simple object or end of the present impulse by expanding and complicating that object. Beginning with an impulse and a certain object which will satisfy it, the lessons of past experience are intelligently brought to bear on the present situation with the result that a different kind of response, from which is anticipated a greater satisfaction, is substituted for the original act; and this is tantamount to saying that intelligence is an important factor in determining the kind of activities from which the individual is to anticipate satisfaction.

The main source of the confusion in this connection turns
out to be the ambiguous use of the terms 'end' and 'means'. This distinction has been already referred to as a fruitful source of fallacy; and we may attempt to shew here the precise sense in which the distinction is valid and useful. We have seen how the raison d'être of all behaviour is the satisfaction of some need or needs. Such a satisfaction may involve a more or less protracted process, consisting of what is to all intents and purposes a series of separate acts. Merely to say that the satisfaction is the end and that the separate acts together constitute the means, is a false method of statement. The satisfaction is the raison d'être of the activity but the end is the attainment of some object, in fact, it is somehow a part of the total activity. Hence the distinction between means and end falls within this series of separate acts. Further, the distinction is relative -- relative to the kind of need which is in process of being satisfied. Now, certain of the acts of the series constitute a partial but more or less direct satisfaction of the need. Each act of this kind which partially satisfies the need is a part of the end, and the end itself is simply the sum-total of such acts. There are certain acts of the series the performance of which does not in itself confer a direct satisfaction. But the performance of these acts is seen to be a necessary preliminary to the performance of the directly satisfying acts. The former, therefore, are properly to be regarded as purely instrumental, in other words, they constitute the means. For example, when the artist is painting a picture, the actual process of painting involves a long series of acts. The satisfying end is the totality of these acts. But such an act on the part of the painter, as for instance, taking a journey to secure some necessary materials would obviously be described as part of the means.
Again, just because the distinction is relative in the sense described, just because it has a subjective and not an objective existence, it is true that we cannot in any particular case lay down a rigidly exact line of demarcation between the means and the end. Nevertheless, the distinction is real and important. Two kinds of error have been commonly committed with respect to it. In the one case, the end has been understood in too narrow a sense and an absolute distinction implied; in the other, an attempt has been made to deny all validity to the distinction. With regard to the first kind of error, the instinct psychologist seems guilty of this when he says that instinct exclusively determines the end. This may mean, for example, that a certain object $O$ arouses an impulse $I$ in virtue of an inherited disposition. Owing to intelligent deliberation, however, instead of the simple situation $I \rightarrow O$, we have the complex situation, $I \rightarrow I_1 \rightarrow I_2 \rightarrow I_3 \rightarrow 0, O, O_2, O_3 \rightarrow M, M_1, M_2, M_3$. The instinct psychologist says that the end is simply $O$, and that the entire remainder is of the nature of means to attain this end. Our view asserts that the end is to be found in the complex object or situation $0, O, O_2, O_3$, and that we find the means in certain special acts, $M, M_1, M_2, M_3$. The point is that the mere fact that an instinct has initiated a certain train of activity does not of itself mean either that it solely determines the end or that it solely sustains the activity -- a truth of which we shall presently give illustrations.

With regard to the second type of error, this takes the form of arguing that the distinction is purely artificial inasmuch as any activity can be resolved psychologically into a series of separate acts or immediate ends; and hence the true distinction is said to be that between nearer ends and ends that are more remote. If we are to talk in the singular of the end, the term
must refer to the activity as a whole. Such is Dewey's view of
the distinction. "End", he says, "is a name for a series of acts
taken collectively, like the term army. "means" is a name for the
same series taken distributively -- like 'this soldier' 'that
officer'. To think of the end signifies to extend or enlarge
our view of the act to be performed ............ To say that
an end is remote or distant, to say in fact that it is an end
at all, is equivalent to saying that obstacles intervene between
us and it. ........ As soon as we have projected it, we must
begin to work backward in thought. ........ The end thus reappears
as a series of "what nexts", and the what next of chief importance
is the one nearest the present state of the one acting"(1)

This seems sound as a piece of psychological analysis but
it in no wise abolishes the possibility of drawing a distinction
-- a distinction both real and important-- between means and end.
The important fact, which the distinction tries to express, is the
fact that the realisation of any purpose implies a process, and
the separate stages or steps of the process may shew any degree
of intimacy of connection with the overt, avowed purpose; the
nature of the connection may be anything from a purely external,
accidental connection to a closeness of connection which
constitutes the acts an integral part of the purpose itself.
The example already given of the artist's painting of a picture
makes this clear. Certain acts which do not really constitute
a part of the satisfying end are nevertheless, owing to the
accident of circumstances, a precondition of its being realised.
The distinction between means and end is useful as indicating
a situation of this kind.

This suggests the correct use of the distinction in Ethics.

(1) Human Nature and Conduct: p.36.
The ethical end is essentially of the nature of an activity, it is a certain kind of life. Certain actions or decisions appear to have no discoverable effect on the realisation of this kind of life. They seem neither to hinder nor to further it, and are therefore classed as ethically indifferent actions. The question as to whether my afternoon walk is going to be to the farm or to the river means a decision of this nature. Under special circumstances, of course, such decisions may become ethically significant. Certain other actions, again, do not appear to constitute directly a part of the kind of life which is the end, but these actions must nevertheless be performed. If I am actively interested, for instance, in schemes of social reform I must be willing to undergo a certain amount of perhaps highly specialised training with a view to the successful prosecution of this kind of activity. Such a training might reasonably be considered in the light of mere means. But the distinction here is purely relative. The relativity of it becomes apparent when we raise the old question: does the end justify the means? The real fallacy in the argument that reprehensible means is justified in the light of the worthy end, is found in the fact that in such a case, when the entire process of means and end is viewed as one whole of action, it is seen to be inherently self-contradictory. The same fact is expressed from another viewpoint—the inner or subjective viewpoint—when we say that the carrying out of the reprehensible means tends to affect the character in a way that is incompatible with the kind of character or self-hood, which has been accepted as the ethical end. Ethical development, indeed, may be viewed as the process by which this very distinction between means and end is gradually transcended in all its phases and finally vanishes before such an appreciation of the organic
inter-relatedness of the elements in the life of thought and action, such a capacity to see life singly and see it whole, as can find in the details of conduct the reflection of those larger, permanent issues, of which they are, in however small a degree and however indirectly, the partial realisation.

It may be concluded, then, that the attempt to use the notion of instinct to account for the existence of the larger ends of human behaviour is based on a superficial reading of the distinction between means and end and is in practice seriously misleading. We have seen how Intelligence, in a sense of the term which we have tried to explain, operates in a fundamental way to constitute these ends what they are. It remains to consider a further problem, a problem which arises out of the first meaning of the term 'motive' which we distinguished. This first meaning represents the more fundamental and correct sense of the term. The problem may be formulated thus: given certain more or less complicated activities or objects, representing the valued ends which the human being endeavours to realise, in virtue of what quality or qualities do these objects attract the individual? Supposing that, at the end of a process of intelligent deliberation, we decide: 'this is the line of conduct that will confer the truest satisfaction', the question remains for the psychologist: 'what is the basis or explanation of this satisfaction? Intelligence, working on the basis of satisfactions experienced in the past, pilots our route to future satisfactions. As Practical Intelligence, it is not concerned with the primarily theoretical question of the psychological basis of such satisfaction. In fact, we have now to consider the old, but still involved and vexed question of the dynamics of behaviour. Our question is as to the source of the
'urge' or 'drive' (to use terms recently much in vogue in psychological literature) which prompts us to seek satisfaction in certain directions rather than in others. In connection with this question we shall suggest our next thorough-going modification of the position of the Instinct Psychologists. Just as we have attempted above to reinstate the intellectual factor in its true place, so in the following chapter we shall endeavour to accord a much more fundamental rôle to the factor of Habit.

CHAPTER V

Some of our most familiar experiences seem to illustrate the main thesis of the present chapter. This is, briefly, that there is a source of impulse, of urge or drive, which is, strictly speaking acquired, and which must be therefore distinguished from the congenital sources of impulse, namely, the instincts and inherited appetites. Consider some familiar experiences: a man has become habituated to sleeping with the head of the bed in a certain position relative, let us say, to the window. An alteration of this arrangement perturbs him to a degree which appears to the onlooker utterly irrational. The boarding-house resident finds that a change in his accustomed position at the table occasions a discomfort for which he cannot find any obvious explanation. The city man may take a long time to discover the fact that he walks to business every morning on the same side of the street and probably makes the discovery only when for some reason he is compelled to walk on the opposite side; at the same time he makes the further discovery that he entertains a more or less intense aversion to the new arrangement. It is notoriously difficult to persuade people to consent to be taught a new game - at cards, for instance - a game for which they
...eventually develop enthusiasm. The cyclist finds in himself a dislike for the illegal side of the road and attributes this to a law-abiding disposition.

Such examples, which could be multiplied without end, are commonplaces to the psychologist, commonplaces which have been used to illustrate a variety of theories. Common-sense finds the explanation of all experiences of this kind in the notion of habit; and it would seem that here, as in the case of the meaning of the ethical consciousness, a careful psychological analysis will justify the common-sense explanation so far as it goes; but it will also find that there are implications in the common-sense category which must be made explicit and which, when thus made explicit, reveal the fact that the category has a much more comprehensive and penetrating application than was suspected by common-sense.

We need not offer at this stage any formal definition of habit. The meaning which we attach to this term does not involve any serious departure from ordinary psychological terminology and that meaning will become sufficiently clear as the discussion proceeds. McDougall began by according to somewhat half-hearted recognition(1) to the rôle of habit in furnishing part of the dynamic of behaviour, but that recognition has been definitely withdrawn in a later contribution.(2) In the later discussion, McDougall challenges the position, as argued by Woodworth in particular, that habit is in itself a source of drive, and he confines the discussion to the simple case of a simple motor habit. For the sake of clearness, we shall examine the question in connection with a particular instance of habit. We shall take the case of a simple motor habit, and, as a result of examination of it, we shall

(1) Introduction to Social Psychology. p.43
(2) Mind, July, 1920: "Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion"
endeavour to answer the question which is fundamental to the whole of our subsequent discussion; viz., under what conditions does habit involve such a drive and in what sense, precisely, can such a drive be said to be something acquired, something actually created by experience itself and in no real sense a datum of our native endowment? And what is the basal significance of the fact in ethical development?

Woodworth asserts that any new mechanism of response which we acquire involves the acquisition of a corresponding drive. He says: "Drive, as we have been led to conceive it in the simpler sort of case, is not essentially distinct from mechanism. The drive is a mechanism already aroused and thus in a position to furnish stimulations to other mechanisms. Any mechanism might be a drive". (1) We gather from this statement that drive means that when any particular mechanism is active, its activity is sustained by its own particular urge. This is stated explicitly where he says: "As a general proposition we may say that the drive that carries forward any activity, when it is running freely and effectively, is inherent in that activity. It is only when an activity is running by its own drive that it can run thus freely and effectively; for as long as it is being driven by some extrinsic motive, it is subject to the distraction of that motive". (2)

As a result of his reconsideration of the question of drive in connection with acquired mechanisms, McDougall, on the contrary, assures us that he is forced to the conclusion that a habit-mechanism involves no dynamic of this kind. He instances the motor habit of repeating the alphabet, and points out that in repeating the alphabet up to a certain letter in

(1) Dynamic Psychology, p.42.

(2) Ibid, p.70
order to determine the immediately preceding letter (as is often done in using the dictionary), he can find no evidence of an impulse or urge to carry on the repetition beyond that particular letter. He concludes, therefore, that the drive is not inherent in the habit itself but is purely a function of the particular end or purpose for the sake of which we set the mechanism in operation. (1) Several critical comments on this line of argument immediately suggest themselves. In the first place, the evidence of introspection on a question of this kind is more than usually unreliable. The habit is of a highly specialised nature, and any drive involved in it would be hard to detect by introspective means. It is possible that an experimentally obtained record of the movements of the vocal organs by delicate apparatus (such as the Behaviourist desiderates to establish his contention with regard to implicit word habits) would indicate the opposite conclusion. In the second place, the habit in question represents a motor series which we are so accustomed to interrupt or break off at different points that the absence of noticeable drive is understandable. Finally, McDougall admits that if he begins the repetition with the idea in his mind of arriving at the end of the alphabet and the repetition is interrupted, he can then detect the element of drive. But is not such an anticipatory idea of the end, with a more or less vague, schematic representation of the whole activity, an essential feature of the true exercise of any habit?

The most reasonable view of the whole question, however, would appear to be that the amount of drive which the habit involves, if not even the very existence of a drive at all, is

(1) Mind, July, 1920: Motives in the Light of Recent Discussion.
entirely a question of the nature and extent of the coordinations involved. If we think of the drive rather in terms of the greater or less degree of satisfaction which is conferred by the carrying out of a particular set of acquired coordinated movements, the whole problem of the drive inherent in habit becomes more intelligible. The exercise of one habit—for example, the dexterity of tossing a number of balls into the air and catching them—must be regarded as in itself conferring a certain measure of satisfaction just because it represents the exercise of certain capacities which the organism possesses. The exercise of another habit, figure skating, for example, may confer a much greater satisfaction. If we are asked why the satisfaction here is greater, we can answer in a general way by saying that the measure of satisfaction is greater in this case either because of the number of the capacities involved or because of the special nature of them, or for both reasons. A detailed answer to the question would call for the thorough psychological study of all the special adjustments involved, and an investigation of the basal reasons for their satisfying quality. For example, it would mean, among other things, a full understanding of the basis of the satisfaction which seems inherent in rhythmical movement as such.

For our present purpose, it is sufficient to admit the fact of a drive in Woodworth's sense and to regard that drive as an illustration of the general principle that any free, effective exercise of capacity is satisfying, the degree of satisfaction depending on special factors in every particular case. Habits, though they cannot be themselves described as native capacities, are nevertheless to be regarded as representing the more or less satisfying integration of such
elementary native capacities. The question as to the nature of those inherited capacities of which our habits are the expression inevitably leads us to adopt a much wider view of the native endowment of the human organism than is taken by the Instinct psychologists. Woodworth's, in fact, suggests a more satisfactory survey of that organism's inheritance. As he expresses it: "Besides sensations, emotions, and reactions, native equipment also includes aptitudes or 'gifts' for certain activities or for dealing with certain classes of things. We recognise this type of native aptitude when we speak of one person as having a natural gift for music, another for mathematics, another for mechanics, another for salesmanship. No doubt many such aptitudes are complex and demand analysis at the hands of the psychologist; but it is equally true that there is something specific about many of them such that an individual who is gifted in one direction is not necessarily gifted in another."(1) Now we consider that this suggestion is in the right direction. When we have completed our examination of certain further fallacies and ambiguities touching the question of native endowment and motivation, we shall attempt a more precise statement of what we consider to be the essentials of human native endowment, conceived in this broader way.

We are now in a position to state definitely our basal position with respect to the motivating value of habit. On the basis of its rich native endowment, the organism builds up organised reactions of a more or less complicated kind. These reactions are satisfying in a greater or less degree for the reason that, as we expressed it in an earlier chapter, they

(1) Dynamic Psychology, p. 59
(2) See pp. 153-155.
mean simply the realisation of a fuller measure of life. Now, from the statement of Woodworth quoted above (1), it appears that this writer considers that the drive or urge in habit is something experienced only when the habit mechanism is actually in operation. This is further borne out by the fact that elsewhere he accords to McDougall's instincts the role of initiating the process. But there is an additional point which does not receive adequate recognition from either McDougall or Woodworth. This is the fact that not only are these habit-activities satisfying when actually operative and there is thus an impulse to continue the activities, but they further tend to generate a permanent conscious need for such satisfaction. It is this permanent sense of need for such exercise of capacity as these organised activities afford - a need created and fostered by experience -- that represents for us the most significant meaning of the dynamic of habit. Here we have one sense at least in which it is profoundly true that education is something more than a mere process of development. In a real sense it involves creation. Apart from actual experience--an experience involving the development and satisfying exercise of these native capacities - we may well hold that no conscious need for, or urge towards--such satisfying activities would appear. But where the experience and training have been effective, these acquired needs or drives may become dominant motive forces in life.

In this manner, an acquired vis à tergo, if we may use such a phrase, results from habit. This source of motivation may be an important factor in enabling us to understand why, in a particular case, when he is actually faced with alternatives, the individual finds one line of action preferable to another.

(1) Dynamic Psychology, op. cit.
But it helps us to understand motivation in a further important sense, namely, in the sense in which we might say that the organism, as it were, 'goes out to seek' satisfying experiences. In other words, it offers a purely psychological interpretation of the notion of self-activity. This interpretation, moreover, does not necessarily commit us to any strictly vitalistic hypothesis. The conations which it has in view are considered as having originated in experience itself. The differentia of a vitalistic hypothesis, on the contrary, is that there is an urge or drive which is not altogether accounted for by the action of external stimuli; such stimuli serve only to give it particular determination or direction. Dewer states the essence of vitalism, as far as psychology is concerned, when he says: "A very strong case can be made for the view, that our whole experience is determined by an activity which is also experienced, but which does not arise from experience. For the origin of this activity, we must look, as it were, behind experience." (2) All that our own view has asserted is that there are urges, impulses, conations, felt needs, (whatever term we use to express the fact) which have been brought into being by the particular kind of organised activities which the individual has come to acquire. These activities are the result, generally speaking, of the nature of his whole environment, and, more specifically, of the consciously educative, directive influences to which he has been systematically subjected. On the other hand, a more ultimate consideration of all the facts of behaviour which the psychologist sets out to discover, the fundamentals of sensation, movement, and so on, might very well

(1) See p. 240 for illustration of what is really meant by this phrase.

(2) Instinct in Man, p. 84.
commend some form of vitalism to us as a philosophic hypothesis.

For in the last analysis, the question turns out to be: why does the organism act or respond at all? We simply put the same question when we ask: what is the fundamental fact underlying all organic behaviour? Or, simply, what is life?

The philosopher is free to formulate some special hypothesis such as vitalism to enable him to connect together in thought all organic phenomena. The psychologist may or may not subscribe to such a hypothesis. But as far as science is concerned, the hypothesis formulates the basal problem of a particular science, and that science is, not psychology, but biology.

In the present connection, the important point is that the idea of such a relationship between organism and environment as is implied in McDougall's definition of Instinct does not seem necessarily to imply a vitalistic hypothesis. For this definite and complex kind of relationship is considered as being itself the product of race experience. Hence, when we endeavour to trace the relationship to its origins, we seem to be brought back to such elementary facts of organic behaviour as the sensitivity of a receptor organ to changes in the physical environment, the connection of such receptors with effector organs, the tendency of a satisfying response to be 'selected', -- in short, the fundamental of sensation, affection and movement. It is at this point that the psychologist may resort to some ultra-experiential hypothesis, such as vitalism.

We are now in a position to indicate the connection between the preceding discussion of the motivating value of habit and our account of the ethical consciousness. Part of the native endowment of the human organism is of the nature of special capacities which seem to be peculiarly human.
Such is the capacity for language which involves, among other things, the capacity for a vastly extended and varied social experience. Other examples are the capacities to apprehend and be interested in the causal aspect of objects, -- their seeming dependence on one another- to apprehend and be interested in their numerical aspect, and so on. A statement of what appears to be the most fundamental of those capacities will be found on page 153-155.

Each of these capacities, of course may in itself present the psychologist with a special and complicated problem. But for our present purpose, it is enough to recognize their existence; our problem is rather to appreciate their subsequent importance. We are probably not far from the truth in suggesting that they are all inherited in much the same sense as language is inherited. That is, the essential mechanism is inherited but the activities themselves are learned; in other words, they are essentially habit phenomena.

Further, the integrations or syntheses which have been achieved out of these elementary capacities are satisfying in a peculiar degree. This means that they represent par excellence the source of our higher acquired motives, impulses, or needs, in the sense already explained. Now, the activities which we have designated the human values and of which we have endeavoured to shew the vital importance for ethics, must be regarded as themselves the progressive integration, in the race experience, of these elementary capacities into the most satisfying reactions. These valuable activities are thus of the nature of race habits, acquired race adjustments, transmitted by the process which has been called 'social heredity'. The individual, as the result of a process of education, must make these adjustments his own.
But he must not do this in any merely mechanical way. He must appropriate them in the deeper sense that he comes to acquire a permanent impulse towards, or need for the kind of satisfaction which these activities offer.

An important incidental result, we believe, of the foregoing discussion is to shew the somewhat ambiguous or unilluminating, and, perhaps, essentially misleading half-truth which we express when we say that our actions proceed from inherited motives. The statement is misleading not because it is not correct so far as it goes but because of what it omits. How such statements conceal the real complexity of the motivation question is well shewn in the use to which McDougall puts the curiosity instinct in finding in it the principal motive-force in that disinterested pursuit of knowledge represented by science and philosophy. Many other writers would follow McDougall in thus accounting for those higher human activities. But it would seem that the motives that actuate the scientist are considerably more complex than this. That the curiosity instinct is not the sole factor and probably also not the most important factor in the higher scientific pursuits becomes clear the moment we reflect that a large endowment of curiosity finds adequate satisfaction in some cases in a daily round of gossip and small talk, while in other cases it produces a Darwin. The scientist himself, when he considers the question, is apt to offer an explanation which points rather to psychological factors other than the curiosity instinct. Poincaré, for example, tells us: "The scientist does not study nature because it is useful to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure in it, and he takes pleasure in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful it would not be worth knowing, and
and life would not be worth living. I am not speaking, of course, of that beauty which strikes the senses, of the beauty of qualities and appearances. I am far from despising this, but it has nothing to do with science. What I mean is that more intimate beauty which comes from the harmonious order of its parts, and which a pure intelligence can grasp. It is this that gives a body, a skeleton, so to speak, to the shimmering visions that flatter our senses, and without this support the beauty of these fleeting dreams would be imperfect, because it would be indefinite and ever elusive. Intellectual beauty, on the contrary, is self-sufficing, and it is for it, more perhaps than for the future good of humanity, that the scientist condemns himself to long and painful labours." (1)

The question really concerns the psychological interpretation of the term 'beautiful' as used in this passage. An appreciation of what is implied in this use of the term will make it clear that the phenomenon under consideration is very inadequately described as curiosity satisfaction. Two things must be remembered about the satisfaction in such cases. 1. It is a peculiarly systematic kind of satisfaction, and the 'curiosity' grows by what it feeds on'. 2. It is peculiarly specialised. The absorbing curiosity is limited to certain special parts or aspects of reality and the satisfaction is somehow a function of this specialised content. This consideration suggests the direction in which we must seek an explanation both of the nature and of the peculiar strength of the motive. The underlying fact is some peculiarity of native endowment but not, however, in respect of some instinct or instincts. The essential congenital fact is the existence of a special capacity which will mean that a

(1) Science and Method, p. 22.
particular kind of synthesis not only tends to be carried out with peculiar ease and effectiveness but also tends to confer a peculiar satisfaction. Take, for example, the mathematician. The important fact of endowment is his possession, in an exceptional degree, of the capacity to apprehend and find satisfaction in dealing with the number and the space aspects of the objects of the external world. This will mean that the syntheses based on these aspects will prove peculiarly interesting and satisfying, but it will mean something more. The individual will be particularly quick to detect and highly sensitive to gaps or lacunae in a synthesis of this kind; and he will feel powerfully impelled to try to complete the synthesis. The discovery of a new fact which exactly fills the gap will occasion a profound satisfaction. The reason for this satisfaction, however, is not to be found in the intrinsic interest of that fact, in the removal of the particular question to which that fact supplies the answer. The reason is rather to be sought in the completion, per se, of the intellectual structure. The mind finds satisfaction in the achievement and contemplation of the new and seemingly perfect synthesis. What is the ultimate basis of this satisfaction? This, again, raises a complex psychological issue. The full treatment of it would involve the discussion of the principle of 'unity in variety' and of the pleasure proceeding from the discovery of an underlying principle which serves to bind together a large aggregate of isolated facts and enables the mind easily to view them as a whole. But if we are to appeal to any particular instinct for the explanation of the satisfaction incidental to this process of synthesis, one instinct largely concerned is probably the instinct of construction. The innate tendency to construction or experimentation, would seem to be fundamentally
concerned in the pleasures of scientific discovery as well as in those of artistic creation. The antithesis here between 'discovery' and 'creation' is only apparent. When it is a question of the scientist's personal satisfaction, it must be remembered that the joys of creation belong to him in as real a sense and as full a measure as they belong to the artist. As in our illustration of the mathematician, specialised native endowment determines the direction in which this creative tendency will assert itself. When Poincaré, then, says that the scientist finds nature 'beautiful' he means that it lends itself or yields to the special kind of synthesis which he tries to impose upon it, and thus affords him a pleasure essentially akin to the pleasure of artistic creation.

It would seem, therefore, that the part played by curiosity in knowledge acquisition has probably been much exaggerated. Dreyer has pointed out one kind of motive which cannot be classed under the rubric either of utility or of curiosity. (1)

We have suggested above a much more thorough-going revision of our ideas as to the real nature of motives which are commonly traced to the curiosity instinct and so dismissed. Garnett, in discussing this same problem of the nature of the motivation in scientific pursuits, realises the complexity of the processes involved. Garnett's primary interest is in his special hypothesis as to the neurological basis of the scientific impulse. With this we are not concerned. But he concludes by using the term curiosity to cover the complicated kind of process which we have discussed above (2). On this we need only remark that the term 'curiosity', used in this sense, can no longer be taken to refer to a single primary tendency.

(1) Instinct in Man, p. 202
(2) Education and World Citizenship, ch. 13.
It seems better to reserve the term curiosity to indicate the primary instinct which man shares with the higher animals. As regards the higher intellectual processes, the analysis of them would present a special psychological problem. We have suggested above the general lines which such an analysis would follow. Finally, it may be remarked that the present discussion explains why we have talked of developing in the individual the 'knowledge' or 'scientific' interest instead of talking of the development of the 'curiosity' instinct.

Needless to say, the foregoing remarks are not intended to mean a denial of the statement that in such an activity as scientific pursuit special instincts, such as curiosity, self-assertion, pugnacity and so on, are involved. It is the assertion that such satisfaction of specific instincts is coextensive with the total satisfaction involved that is denied. Such instincts may be and often are the means of initiating an activity; they may also serve as reinforcements when the activity flags; but we can hardly accord them a more fundamental rôle without straining the facts.

The argument of the preceding pages suggests a wide view of the meaning of habit, and it seems desirable at this stage to indicate more precisely what is included under this rubric. While habit includes, of course, all the acquired bodily coordinations, it seems impossible, on the principles of a scientific psychology, to avoid a much wider use of the term. In its most fundamental significance, habit appears to mean any acquired synthesis of experimental elements which has become more or less stabilised. Any acquired adjustment which has become relatively fixed or stereotyped by repetition, the exercise of which possesses a certain satisfying quality and involves an
organisation of capacities on a more or less comprehensive scale, would be classed as habit. For this reason it is necessary to extend the concept to include phenomena of the intellectual and emotional life. As regards the intellectual life, this usage is already explicitly recognized in psychology, when we talk of habits of thought and contrast them with physical habits. In the case of such habits, Stout's statement applies: "a comprehensive habitual tendency realises itself on special occasions by means of special processes which are not habitual." An instance of such a habit would be the habitual tendency to seek out and carefully weigh evidence before drawing conclusions. But it would seem that there is a somewhat more fundamental sense in which we may apply the concept of habit to the intellectual life. The whole process of the organisation of our ideas into systems is best regarded as a process of intellectual habit-formation. Stout defines Apperception as "the process by which a mental system appropriates a new element or otherwise receives a fresh determination;" and we learn in the same connection that "a mental group or system is a grouped or systematised tendency" (the context stresses the tendency notion). We are therefore not seriously in error if we regard these mental organisations known to Psychology as apperceptive systems in the light of habit phenomena. They are intellectual habits in process of formation. These mental systems are assuredly of the nature of acquired adjustments to certain problematic situations with which the environment has confronted the organism. Moreover, they are adjustments which tend to become, under certain conditions more and more stereotyped, impervious to further modification. It must be noted, however, that a considerable degree of fixity or stability

(1) Analytic Psychology, vol.1, p 262
(2) Ibid vol.2, p 112
must be reached before we are justified in describing them as habits. Otherwise, we are in danger of depriving the term of its usefulness, if not of its meaning.

Looking at the matter from this point of view, we can detect, and express in the language of modern psychology, the basal truth in the Herbartian view of action as the inevitable outcome of 'the circle of thought'; and we can understand the enormous importance attached to 'instruction' in his conception of moral education. For the overt act would represent simply the terminal point in the operation of a habit,--a habit of thinking, believing or judging.

Whatever attitude we adopt to the behaviourist view of the nature of thought (i.e. the identification of thought with the operation of language mechanisms), one real merit of Behaviourism is the fact that it assigns such a fundamental role to habit. In dealing, for example, with the problem of the "Aufgabe," the central problem, purpose or end which dominates the thinking activity, the consistent Behaviourist would explain this as a total, unique bodily 'set' or attitude. He would then describe the whole process as the unrolling of a mechanism-series associatively bound up with this attitude. This thinking process would involve the conflict between more or less antagonistic motor mechanisms, and the outcome of the process would be a more satisfying muscular series, involving the partial modification of existing muscular (or glandular) adjustments. This view at the least serves to emphasise the truth that the natural terminus of a process of thinking is somehow a larger adjustment, a fuller satisfaction; that the process proceeds on the basis of already existent adjustments, which are of the nature of habits, and that mental growth itself finds its raison d'être either in the inadequacy

(i) C.F. Davidson: A New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology. 0 p. 100
of existing adjustments to meet the demands of new situations, or in their failure to afford the organism a sufficiently satisfying exercise of its capacities. And, indeed, a similarly wide view of the role of habit is frequently found, in an explicit or implicit form, in psychological theory. Such a view is implied, for example, in Baldwin's account of habit and accommodation, especially in his distinction between the self of habit and the self of accommodation, in his account of invention, and in other connections.

But the concept of habit must be regarded as having a still wider field of application in mental life. Not only does habit appear to be the basic fact in intellectual organisation, but the organisation of the emotional life seems to reveal, on a final psychological analysis, the operation, on a large scale, of the same principle. In their valuable discussion of the sentiments, both Shand and McDougall have taught us how these sentiments are essentially of the nature of the organisation of emotional dispositions around certain specific objects or situations. The root notion of McDougall's entire theory of emotional development is that the primary instinctive emotions, originally bound up with the presentation of certain specific objects, develop through a gradual extension of their objects, with the result that, for example, the parental instinct and its 'tender emotion', originally the characteristic response of the parent to its offspring, may come to function in connection with much more highly generalised situations such as cases of social injustice, of the oppression of the weak by the strong, and so forth. (1) A process of growth or expansion around the original nucleus of the original primary emotion and its specific object is thus the explanation of the rich variety of subsequent affective experience.

(1) Introd. to Social Psychology. pp. 73-74.
Now a closer examination of this whole notion suggests some interesting reflections relevant to our present topic. In the first place, it is clear that the fundamental method of this process of expansion is really identical with the method of the so-called conditioned reflex. In Pavlov's well-known experiment, it is shown how the action of the dog's salivary glands, originally associated with the actual sight of food, comes to be directly provoked by the ringing of a bell which has hitherto preceded the actual presentation of the food. Other experiments of a similar kind have shown how our simple reflexes come to be 'conditioned' in this manner, that is, actuated by a stimulus other than the specific ones. Behaviourism would trace a very large proportion of our habit reactions to this process of conditioning reflexes; the remainder of our habits it would explain by the principle of the integration of the original random movements of the organism. While we do not mean to subscribe here to the Behaviourist account of the nature of emotion any more than we agreed above to its account of the nature of thought, nevertheless it would seem that we must, from the point of view of a scientific psychology, regard this extension of the object of emotion, which McDougall has described, as identical in principle with the process of conditioning a reflex. In other words, it is the same principle of habit that is operative in both cases.

Again, the instinct psychologists appear to regard this fact that the specific objects of the instinctive emotions become thus extended and profoundly modified in experience as itself proving the truth of their contention that these primary instinctive emotions are the sole springs or motive-forces in action. The argument is that the satisfaction, for instance,
of the public man in the plaudits of his admirers is still merely the satisfaction of the self-assertive instinctive, but with the specific object modified by experience. But may we not suggest that the really important consideration is not the fact (admitting for the sake of the argument that it is a fact) of an identical core of instinct underlying reactions from the simplest to the most complex levels, but the fact of the enormous extent to which the original inherited reaction has been modified. Moreover, if we ask how far this modification of the object can go, whether that object always retains some discoverable resemblance to the original object, or whether it can be modified to such a degree that all trace of the original object is lost, we find no clear answer to the question. But the facts of experience seem clearly to suggest that the modification may be so complete that the instinctive origin cannot be detected from an inspection of the act itself. In any case, our main contention here is that the evidence of experience, even as marshalled by the instinct psychologists themselves, goes to shew that the fact of habit permeates our mental life to a much greater degree than the fact of instinct; and while we do not consider that the recent radical attacks on instinct have done anything more than indicate the advisability of still further and more careful study of that phenomenon, nevertheless the whole trend of recent psychological discussion seems to suggest that the concept of habit is fitted to bear a heavier weight of explanation with respect to the facts of both the intellectual and the emotional life than the concept of instinct. (1)

(1) (Footnote) Consider the following statements from Bertrand Russell's 'Social Reconstruction': "The chief source of good relations between individuals are instinctive liking and
a common purpose. Of these two a common purpose might seem more important politically, but, in fact, it is often the outcome, not the cause of instinctive liking or of a common instinctive aversion," (p. 34) And again: "A nation when it is real and not artificial is founded upon a faint degree of instinctive liking for compatriots and a common instinctive aversion for foreigners. When an Englishman returns to Dover or Folkstone after being on the continent, he feels something friendly in the familiar ways; the casual porters, the shouting paper boys, the women serving bad tea, all warm his heart and seem more natural, more what human beings ought to be than the foreigners with their strange habits of behaviour". (p. 37) And yet again: "Instinctive liking, resulting largely from similar habits and customs, is an essential element in patriotism and indeed the foundation on which the whole feeling rests". (p. 37) The last statement is an admission of the unpsychological use of the phrase 'instinctive liking' in the preceding statements, and the three statements present a convincing illustration of the penetrating influence of habit and of the dynamic created by it.

Note 2. An interesting illustration of the topic under discussion is afforded by one part of the problem of the psychology of laughter, namely that part which treats of the nature or the essence of comedy. A large variety of theories of the ludicrous has been offered, from Aristotle's somewhat narrow principle which traces it to "the contemplation of some defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive", to Bergson's comprehensively philosophical notion of the imposition on life of a mechanism which is radically alien to it and into which it cannot be made to fit. In philosophy, in addition to the authorities mentioned, the distinguished names of Kant and Schopenhauer, Hobbes, Bain and Spencer are associated with the discussion of this problem. Now the notable thing in connection with all these theories of the comic is the fact that it is so easy, however comprehensive (1) Poetics, 5, 1. (Butcher)
the theory may be, to adduce instances which the theory can only meet by an obvious strain. The explanation probably is that no single formula can be found to cover all the possible instances; and the reason for this seems to be that the things we laugh at are so radically influenced by social training or education, in other words, by habit. Remembering that the punitive or 'social censure' function of laughter is probably fundamental, it seems clear that the occasions of laughter will be intimately bound up with the whole fabric of values of a particular community or civilisation. This means two things. First, that the study of the laughter of a particular people or race will be likely to throw important sidelights on the nature of their valuations; and, second, that the traditional quest for the 'essence' of the comic is foredoomed to only a very partial success.

To sum up the results of the present chapter. Habit, in the sense of relatively fixed or stabilised acquired adjustments, is of basic importance for several reasons. Whether we are considering habit in the more elementary sense of simple motor habit, or in the sense in which it reveals itself in intellectual and emotional organisation, it represents an acquired coordination of elementary capacities, the exercise of which is per se satisfying. The degree of satisfaction which such an exercise affords is a function of the nature and extent of the coordinations involved, that is, of the degree to which they represent the expression or realisation of the organism's capacities.

There are thus three ways in which habit gives rise to a dynamic or drive in mental life. In the first place, there is the familiar, basic fact of the tendency, disposition or
impulse to carry out a particular response merely because it
is the one which we previously carried out, — the tendency,
other things being equal, to repeat the previous reaction.\(^{(1)}\)

(1) This aspect of habit is well expressed by McDougall
himself in the following passage the sense of which we find
it very difficult to reconcile with his position on the
question of a habit dynamic: "A universal tendency which is so
familiar as to run the risk of being neglected, must be briefly
mentioned; namely, the tendency for every process to be repeated
more readily in virtue of its previous occurrence and in pro-
pportion to the frequency of its previous repetitions. The
formulation of this tendency may be named the law of habit,
if the word "habit" is understood in the widest possible sense.
In virtue of this tendency the familiar as such is preferred
to the less familiar, the habitual and routine mode of action
and reaction, in all departments of mental life, to any mode
of action necessitating any degree of novel adjustment."

(Introd. to Soc. Psych. pp 115-116.) In the light of this
passage McDougall's refusal to attribute dynamic value to habit
can only mean that he would regard as separate and distinct
phenomena: 1, the general tendency to habit formation, that is, the
tendency described in the quotation; and 2, the impulse or tendency
to continue the exercise of a particular habitual activity which
one has begun. It is this second tendency that he would deny.
But is not the distinction itself in the last analysis unreal?
And if we admit a dynamic in the one case, must we not logically
admit it in the other? Let us state the situation in this way.
Of two actions, A and B, A is preferred because it is the action
previously performed. This is the tendency admitted in the
quotation. The performance of (an acquired activity) involves the
performance of a series of acts, \( a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4 \). Now \( A \) was chosen because there was a readiness of the neural connections to function in the direction of \( A \). But we must also admit, then, that when \( a \) is performed, there is a readiness of the neural connections to function for the performance of \( a \), and then of \( a_2 \) and so on. In short, this is the habit dynamic for which we contended in the present chapter. McDougall's denial of this dynamic would really seem to imply that kind of partial, abstract view of an act which leads, for example, to a sharp separation of act and motive, to the failure to see that the inner and outer parts or aspects of an act are not really separate or separable facts, but integral parts of a single unitary act.

When dynamic value is attributed to habit at all, it is usual to allow a dynamic in this sense at least. As we have seen above, the motive of habit in this sense is an important factor in the explanation of many of the satisfactions and dissatisfactions of later life. The sequel will shew, moreover, that the fact is of special interest in connection with our present purpose. For the strength of the habit motive in this sense seems to vary considerably as between one stage of the individual's development and another.

There is a second, more fundamental sense, however, in which we may conceive the dynamic of habit. This is the sense already explained in which the satisfaction conferred by the habit depends on the degree to which it gives expression to the organism's capacities. It is evident that the problem of the dynamic has here brought us back to the question of native endowment. The important thing is to be clear as to the precise sense in which this factor of native endowment comes into the question of
motivation. In point of fact, in connection with any question of this kind we are necessarily driven back upon the fact of the native constitution of the particular organism under discussion. Now part of this native endowment, namely the instincts, is of the nature of adjustments already highly stabilised and prepared to function apart from training. If we merely say that all our habit adjustments are formed in the service of these, then the statement that our actions proceed from inherited motives is both intelligible and legitimate. But we have seen that we cannot truthfully say this. A large number of the capacities to which our acquired coordinations give satisfying expression are such that they probably would not make their appearance at all as conscious needs or impulses (and certainly not as strong needs or impulses) had it not been for a process of training or education in the carrying out of certain organised activities. Such activities must be therefore regarded as carrying their own dynamic. They are directly, intrinsically satisfying. Specific instincts may be incidentally involved in the exercise of these capacities, and the satisfaction of such instincts forms part of the total satisfaction. But the essential quality of the satisfaction is bound up with the exercise of these capacities themselves. Any refinement of psychological analysis which can throw further light on the ultimate reason for this satisfaction means a further step in the direction of a complete understanding of the essential nature of the organism with which we are dealing. But the bedrock psychological fact for ethics is that there are certain pursuits, activities, adjustments which are not merely acquired, but, further, acquired as the result of a protracted process of training or education; that the verdict of the race experience declares these activities basal to the ultimate satisfaction.
of the human being; and that this verdict is confirmed in the experience of every individual who has been successfully habituated to these activities.

The third sense in which habit has dynamic value has been implied in the preceding paragraph, but for the sake of clearness we may give it separate mention. Not only is the repetition of the previous reaction as such satisfying, and not only is this satisfaction enhanced in proportion as the activity expresses the more basal of the organic capacities, but, when this satisfaction has been experienced, a conscious need for it tends to be generated, the organism tends to acquire a permanent urge towards the securing of such satisfaction.

CHAPTER VI

In the two preceding chapters we have been concerned to shew the failure on the part of those theories, which make the concept of instinct the basic principle of explanation, to do justice to certain aspects of mental development which possess special interest in connection with the problem of ethical growth. In the present chapter we propose to deal similarly with theories which select one special instinctive tendency and find the basic principle of explanation in it. These theories may be conveniently classified as either 'Imitation' or 'Sympathy' theories, although that classification by no means covers all the theories in question. But it covers the most important of them. The suggestion is not intended that any one of those theories does not make use of the concepts used by the others, but
that it lays special stress on one concept and attaches a more fundamental explanatory value to it. The general outcome of this has been, as we shall see, the obscuring of the meaning of what are perfectly legitimate terms by the lack of proper restraint in the use of them. As a consequence, the psychological literature of imitation, for example, makes somewhat bewildering and tantalising reading for anyone accustomed to a more precise use of psychological terminology.

We shall endeavour to shew that, underlying the wide use of these terms, there are indeed certain fundamental facts or processes to describe which various terms have been used,--terms such as imitiveness, sympathy, suggestibility, gregariousness, according to the special viewpoint or interest of the particular writer. We shall further attempt to distinguish such more fundamental processes from certain phenomena of a more particular character, which are also frequently designated by the same terms. The result will be to indicate just how far any one of these terms can carry us in the matter of explanation, just what group of facts of our mental life we can legitimately adduce these terms to explain. We shall scrutinise in particular the terms 'imitation' and 'sympathy' and indicate their value and their limitations in accounting for the growth of personality.

The best attempt to grapple with the problem of genetic ethics is that of Baldwin who has endeavoured to state the fundamentals of the problem in his "Mental Development" and has given us the detailed application of these fundamentals in the "Social and Ethical Interpretations". Many psychologists have discussed in a more or less casual way the growth of what they call moral ideas, but Baldwin's work is one of the few that deserve serious notice, for the reason that here we have a
manifest appreciation of the basal character of the questions involved and a real attempt to arrive at a statement of illuminative fundamental principles rather than a tinkering with the details of ethical growth. But there are certain features of Baldwin's treatment which seem to us very unsatisfactory, inasmuch as they make to create a general impression of the process as a whole which does not seem true. The points especially open to criticism seem to be (1) his use of the term 'imitation', and the radical importance which he attaches to this process, and (2) his use of the term 'social', and the false perspective which is likely to arise from the way in which this term is employed. With regard to the second point, the present essay as a whole will furnish the justification of this criticism. The former line of criticism we may proceed to examine here.

In general, Baldwin uses the term imitation in a wide sense in which it includes the phenomena of Sympathy and Suggestion as well as the phenomena to which the term imitation is, as we shall see, more commonly applied. It is true that he refers specifically to suggestion and offers a definition of it, and that he devotes a separate section to sympathy. Nevertheless, considering the basic conception of imitation which is implied in his account of the "circular reaction", and considering that he talks of imitation as "covering all the phenomena of social contagion and atmosphere", and considering that he regards it as the method of all mental growth, it seems clear that the prominence given to the term is due to its use in the wide sense suggested. Now, used in this wide sense, what does it really amount to? To what basic fact does it serve to draw our attention?

(1) Mental Development, pp 101-102.
(2) Social and Ethical Interpretations, p.229.
(3) Mental Development, pp.250-251
(4) Social & Ethical Interpretations, p.238
It means simply that the individual is directly affected by other individuals in the sense that he tends to reproduce in himself some of their mental states and some of their actions. He responds especially in this way (assuming that we are dealing with the human individual) to members of his own species. This is simply a basic fact which underlies the possibility of his development into a human being at all. For the psychologist it raises a very definite problem: viz., what is the explanation of the fact that this imitativeness has for its object (or not to assume its innateness) comes to have for its object? Predominantly the members of his own species? To say that this imitativeness is a function of the direction of the attention is not, of course, to answer the question. The phenomenon to be explained is indeed better described as the tendency to direct the attention especially to members of his own species. Two answers have been suggested. According to the first, there is an original, native tendency to such direction of the attention and this native tendency is further strengthened and confirmed by experience. As Thorndyke puts it: "The original attentiveness of men to the acts, movements, positions, sounds and facial expressions of other men and the original satisfyingness of the approval so often got by doing what other men do, are really the tendencies or predispositions or potentialities that do the work in question." (1) The second answer would attribute the tendency entirely to an experience of the satisfying consequences of directing the attention to other human beings, that is, it would be regarded as a habit phenomenon. A thoroughgoing behaviouristic explanation, such as we considered

(1) Educational Psychology, vol 1, p. 117
in an earlier passage in connection with the problem as to the nature of instinct, would advocate such a view. It must be conceded, indeed, that certain experimental investigations, for example, with regard to the nest-building, the singing, and the mating of birds, as well as certain considerations of a more general kind, ought to make us cautious about the use of the notion of innate endowment in connection with a problem of this kind.

But whether or not we admit an original, innate attentiveness to the members of his own species, there can be no doubt as to how we must account for the fact that the direction of the attention comes to be specialised to such a high degree, that is, how we must explain the extent to which the individual comes to be especially responsive to the presence of members of his own species. To begin with, there is the question as to the kind of responses which the human organism as such is capable of making. It is inevitable that the responses resulting from the direction of the attention to objects other than the members of his own species should prove largely abortive and be eliminated; while responses based on attention to members of his own species would naturally result in successful, satisfying exercise of capacity and be 'selected'. While such an explanation makes the fact under discussion essentially a phenomenon of habit, it is not incompatible with the admission of an original, innate factor such as Thorndyke suggests. Baldwin's own account of the manner in which the child comes to distinguish between persons and things and proceeds to imitate persons appears to assume, as the only definite innate factor, the well-known reflex which might be described as saying that moving objects tend to be
brought into the focus of vision.  

But however we explain it in detail, the fact itself is incontestable that at a very early age the child displays a special interest, a peculiar responsiveness or aptitude when the actions or mental states of the other human beings around him are concerned. Now it seems to be this root fact that we find in psychological literature masquerading under various names. Baldwin can make good his claim as to the radical importance of imitation only by using the term to mean this fundamental fact. But certain other terms might with equal justice be used and, indeed, actually have been used in the very same way in which Baldwin uses the term imitation, and on examination they turn out to be simply different ways of expressing the same fundamental fact. Terms which have especially been used in this manner are these:

1. Gregariousness, 2. Sympathy, 3. Consciousness of Kind, 4. Suggestibility. We may examine a case in point with regard to each of the first three of these terms. This will not only make clear our own attitude to these principles, but it will serve to illustrate a tendency which has seriously detracted from the value of certain contributions to our particular problem; viz., the tendency towards a false simplification of the issues by a somewhat exasperating lack of precision in the use of certain highly elastic terms.

Take gregariousness. A glaring instance of the defect in question is to be found in the main thesis of Trotter's "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War". In this work gregariousness is called in to explain not only the simpler facts of animal behaviour, but highly complex and distinctively human phenomena.  

(1) Mental Development, pp. 119-120.
Consider, for example, the following passages: "Conscience, then, and the feelings of guilt and of duty are the peculiar possession of the gregarious animal".(1) "This intimate dependence on the herd is traceable not merely in matters physical and intellectual, but also betrays itself in the deepest recesses of personality as a sense of incompleteness which compels the individual to reach out towards some larger existence than his own, some encompassing being in whom his perplexities may find a solution and his longings peace."(2) "He is more sensitive to the voice of the herd than to any other influence. It can inhibit or stimulate his thought or conduct. It is the source of his moral codes, of the sanctions of his ethics and philosophy."(3) We have already commented on the fallacious procedure exemplified here; viz., the use of a principle of explanation in such a way that the things of greatest consequence are left unexplained. Here it is more pertinent to remark that, as far as concerns the element of truth in Trotter's position, this is simply an insistence on the fact which Baldwin has argued at length in his account of the development of the 'socius', the fact of the ultimate social origin and reference of our judgments of value, the fact which Adam Smith, as we shall see, has really in view when he assigns the fundamental role to sympathy. Basic to all these positions is the psychological fact of man's special susceptibility to the mental states and the actions of his fellows, the fact that such states and actions are specially meaningful to him and come to be peculiarly the objects of his attention.

Take again the concept of sympathy as handled by two

(1) Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War, p. 40
(2) Ibid, p. 113
(3) Ibid, p 114
writers, Adam Smith and Leslie Stephen. Adam Smith’s reduction of all forms of sympathy to reflective sympathy (resulting from an indirect process of representing or 'imagining' the other's situation and how we would feel in it), has been sufficiently criticised by the psychologists. That such is indeed his view of the whole phenomenon is clear from the fact that when he does recognise the apparently direct transmission of feeling in certain cases, he proceeds to explain it in accordance with his own principle. For example, he says: "Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any person at once affect the spectator with some degree of like painful or agreeable emotion."(1) But instead of leaving this sound observation as it stands, he hastens to add: "If the very appearances of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe them: and in these passions this is sufficient to have some little influence upon us."(2) At the same time, too much may be made of this psychological flaw. It does not affect the main thesis which he has in view in his use of the concept of sympathy; and, as has been pointed out, (3) it is the sound thesis as to the essentially social nature and origin of our judgments of moral value. The basic kind of process which he seeks to describe

(2) Ibid. part 3. p 162
(3) Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy,p 214
by the term sympathy becomes apparent when we consider, for instance, a passage such as the following from his discussion of the sense of duty: "Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror he wanted before." (1)

In the "Science of Ethics", Leslie Stephen attaches an equally basic meaning to this term. (2) Stephen's interpretation of the term is important and, in our opinion, fundamentally just. He states it as follows: "Hence it would appear that sympathy is not an additional instinct, a faculty which is added when the mind has reached a certain stage of development, a mere incident of intellectual growth, but something implied from the first in the very structure of knowledge. I must be capable of representative ideas in order to think coherently or to draw the essential distinction between object and subject. I must be able to regard certain modes of thought and feeling as symbolic of modes present in other minds, and to my own in other positions. To realise the world as a material whole, I must have representative perceptions of time and space. To realise the world of thought and feeling, that world upon which my life and happiness depend at every instant, I must have

(1) Theory of Moral Sentiments, part 1, p 6.
(2) C. F. whole section, pp 219-229
representative emotions. 'Put yourself in his place' is not merely a moral precept; it is a logical rule implied in the earliest germs of reason or a description of reasoning itself, so far as it deals with other sentient beings. To know that a man has certain feelings is to have representative feelings, not equal in intensity but identical in kind. Sympathy and reason have so far an identical factor—each implies the other."(1)

Giddings finds in the notion of the 'Consciousness of Kind' the foundational principle of his sociological theories. It is not necessary to criticise in detail his wide use of this concept. One quotation will suffice to illustrate the point. "The consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animate it marks off species and races; within the race it marks off ethnical and political groups, and social classes: it is therefore the psychological ground of social groupings and distinctions. The consciousness of kind, again, continually moves men to act as they would not if they were governed altogether by considerations of utility, fear, loyalty or reverence; it continually prevents the theoretically perfect working of economic, legal, political and religious motives: it is therefore the cause of the distinctively social phenomena of communities."(2) To show how little such statements explain, how much they leave unexplained, and how largely they suggest false explanations, would be an easy task,—a task, however, which would draw us aside from our purpose. He tells us, again, that he "could not adopt Adam Smith's word "sympathy", or the familiar term"fellow-feeling", as a name for the primary social phenomenon, because it was necessary to recognise the element of perception."(3)

(1) c. f. whole section, pp 220-221.
(2) The Principles of Sociology, Preface.
In so far as this 'element of perception' is intended as something more than an innate tendency to direct the attention to members of one's own species, in so far, that is, as it implies the possession of some special knowledge or insight, there appears to be neither necessity nor firm ground for the supposition. On the other hand, in so far as the hypothesis of the consciousness of kind is well-founded, there can be no mistake as to the fundamental truth on which it rests; and this is the truth which we found so variously expressed by different writers; by Baldwin, in the notion of an incessant, ubiquitous imitativeness on the part of the child, an imitativeness directed essentially to his human environment; by Trotter, in the notion of an all-pervading gregariousness instinct, by Adam Smith and Leslie Stephen in the notion of a sympathy which is the presupposition of all distinctively human development; and further illustrations could easily be given from psychological literature.

With regard to our own problem, the lesson of the preceding discussion is that none of these terms can be used by itself to cover all the phenomena involved; that each one of them, when it is properly defined, can be used to account for certain special phenomena; and (a point to be demonstrated in the sequel) that all of them together are still inadequate to cope with the phenomena which, as we have seen, they have been singly called to explain.

We may now proceed to a statement of the precise significance which we intend to attach to these widely used terms. With regard to the distinction between imitation, sympathy and suggestion, the most serviceable distinction would appear to be that which confines imitation to the reproduction of another's actions, suggestion to the acceptance, under certain conditions,
of another's ideas, opinions, beliefs, and sympathy to the reproduction of another's affective experience. We may commence with this as a working distinction which is accepted by McDougall, Drover and others. Needless to say, it is not intended as an absolute distinction in the sense that any particular response may be mere imitation, mere suggestion or mere sympathy. Psychologically, every act involves an inner and an outer aspect, the mental process including affective elements, and the overt behaviour; and, strictly speaking, the entire process is one and continuous. Nevertheless, the distinction is valuable. It is really a question as to what aspect of the total act happens to be the object of the individual's attention, what aspect is focalised. When the individual's attention is focussed on the other's overt behaviour and the starting point of his own behaviour is the effort to reproduce this behaviour, we would call his act imitation. And so with suggestion and sympathy. But the exact scope or significance of these terms demands further investigation. We may begin with the term 'imitation'.

There are few terms which have been so largely used and so inadequately scrutinised by psychologists as the term 'imitation.' We may rule out, to begin with, meanings which are obviously too wide to be serviceable. A classic example is the riotous use of the term in Tarde's "Laws of Imitation". In so far as we have been able to attach any meaning at all to the term as used by that writer, it would be applicable to any form of repetition whatsoever. Thus he would call memory a species of imitation - self imitation. The temptation to commit such excesses in the use of the term will be avoided by recalling the essential fact concerning imitation. As Mitchell puts it: "We imitate so far only as we are aware of a model, present or
absent, and seek to reproduce it. "(1) Accepting this as the differentia of an act of imitation, we come to what appears to be the real source of our difficulties with regard to this concept.

This is the confusion of two things, namely, first, the purely *descriptive* psychology of imitation and, second, the *causal* or *explanatory* psychology of it. A purely descriptive psychology would rightly give prominence to the concept of imitation, for a very large proportion of our activities is of an obviously imitative character. This is the reason for the large part which the concept of imitation plays in the writings of the social psychologists. They are concerned in the main with description of social behaviour. But they cannot well avoid altogether the question of explanation. They must consider the 'why' as well as the 'what' of social behaviour; they must account for this ubiquitous imitation. This demand is readily met by resort to an 'instinct' of imitation. There may be no further enquiry as to the existence of such an instinct. The fact of imitative activity itself is taken as the proof of the existence of this instinct. It does not seem unfair to suggest that this procedure is not distinguishable from the procedure of the Faculty Psychologists.

It is essential, however, that we should come to terms with this question as to the causal factor in imitative activity. For the question as to whether we shall regard imitation as one of the factors in motivation or, on the other hand, merely consider it as a behaviour phenomenon of which the motivating factors are to be sought elsewhere, will be decided by the conclusion at which we arrive about the causal psychology of it.

If there is indeed an instinct of imitation in thesense

(1) Structure and Growth of Mind, p. 143.
indicated above, then the difficulty is removed. We must then reckon with imitation as one of the most fundamental sources of motivation. But the existence of an instinct of imitation in this sense is more than open to question. McDougall rightly points out that "underlying the varieties of imitative action, there is no common affective state and no common impulse seeking satisfaction in some particular change of state." (1) Imitative acts, in other words, are due to different kinds of conation, and hence the explanatory psychology of imitation will concern itself with the study of these conations. McDougall himself proceeds to give a description of some different types of imitative activity, but he does not specifically examine the kind of conation, the kind of vis-a-tergo, which is operative in particular types of imitative activity. Now this is the really important thing, and it must be considered here.

To begin with, is there an instinct of imitation at all? McDougall denies that there is a specific instinct at all, and, accepting his own view of the nature of instinct, we cannot agree with him on this point. There are certain imitative acts which it seems impossible not to attribute to a specific instinct. Such are the imitative reproduction of vocal sounds and facial and lip movements. The range of movements to which this kind of imitation extends is not clear. McDougall does indeed suggest that this kind of imitation is due to a specific instinct, but grudgingly characterises it as "an extremely simple, rudimentary instinct". (2) The exact point of this reservation we cannot exactly see. In this sense, then, we would admit a specific instinct.

(1) Introd. to Soc. Psych. p 103.
(2) Introd. to Soc. Psych. p. 106.
(3) Thorndyke would deny the existence of an instinct even in this sense, but Drever's answer on this point seems conclusive. (Instinct in Man, p. 231)
and the conation underlying such imitation is of course the impulse of this instinct.

The next type of imitative activities is rightly to be classified as simple ideo-motor actions. Any action which is for some reason closely attended to, tends to be reproduced directly without any express volition. The phrase 'spontaneous' imitation is perhaps the best term to describe this kind of response. As McDougall says: "It seems to be in virtue of this simple ideo-motor imitation that a child so easily picks up, as we say, the peculiarities of gesture, and the facial expressions and deportment generally, of those among whom he lives." (1) The conation in this case is to be found in that general tendency in virtue of which any action which is closely attended to, which, in other words, causes a narrowing of consciousness by a monopolising of the attention, tends to be reproduced. We distinguish this from the first kind of imitative acts mentioned because the latter seem to be of a more specialised kind and may appear at a much earlier age. It must be pointed out, too, with regard to spontaneous imitation in general, that such imitation comes later to be largely directed to the reproduction of actions the constituent elements of which have been already separately learned. One may thus easily exaggerate the importance of this kind of imitation in the learning process. Where we admit it above as a separate or distinct native tendency, we are referring to the simplest, most elementary forms of ideo-motor action; the reproduction of the more complex patterns would in the main be otherwise explained. (See par. 2. below).

So much for the simpler forms. It is when we come to consider so-called conscious or deliberate imitation that the

(1) Introd. to Soc. Psych. p 105.
difficulty arises. McDougall denies the existence of a specific instinct of imitation here and in this he is doubtless correct. But he postulates instead "a general innate tendency" to imitate and to this we must take exception. That there is an innate factor of some kind involved we do not deny, but we propose to give a different account of it. Let us take typical examples of deliberate imitation and enquire into (a) the kind of conation involved in each and (b) the general significance of each in mental development.

1. A child reproduces his father's movements in unbolting the door. He does so because he desires the result of the open door and the removal of this impediment to his own freedom of movement. Further, he reproduces his father's movements because he knows no other way of achieving this result. He is really adopting the only means at his disposal to secure an ulterior result which is the real object of his striving. To explain the conation here would mean to explain the attractiveness of this ulterior object. As far as the description of the act is concerned, it is deliberate imitation in the strict sense, for it involves the comparison of his own action with the pattern or model. To describe this action as imitative, however, indicates nothing concerning the nature of the conation involved.

Now when Baldwin characterises imitation as the "method of all mental growth," he has very largely in mind actions of this sort. What is the real interest or significance of such actions? It is that the child is inevitably dependent to a very great extent on his social environment for the discovery of effective means of realising his own purposes. The devices thus discovered prove satisfying and therefore become habitual. Hence one obvious reason for the prevalence of imitative activity.

(1) Regal and Eth. Inter. vol. 111, etc.
But the really important consideration is this dependence on his social environment for the attainment of his objects. This dependence is itself the source of a habit -- a habit which, as we shall find in the sequel, is of radical importance in later development. A habitual attitude of submission to society begins to develop and finally becomes fixed and ineradicable. We may sum up the situation, in fact, by saying that the notion of social authority begins to germinate in the child's mind in connection with imitative acts of this kind. In its final fruition, this sense of authority means that the ideas, opinions and actions which he finds in society are unreflectively accepted as valuable.

(2) A child sees his father occupied with pencil and paper, seizes the pencil and proceeds with every symptom of satisfaction to execute his own meaningless scrawls. Here there is no persistent attempt to reproduce any copy or pattern. The real motive force here is the desire for the new experience of grasping and manipulating the pencil. Action of this kind is essentially symptomatic of a rapidly growing self which is reaching out for new and satisfying experiences. The conation in this case is to be found in the fact of growth manifesting itself in a need for experiences that are new and interesting; and there is again to a large degree the same significant dependence on the social environment for the suggestion of new lines of exploration and experimentation. Baldwin discusses this kind of process at some length and closely associates it with what he calls invention. In point of fact, Baldwin's account of imitation and invention seems simply to amount to this: invention means imitation looked at from the inside, from the point of view of the experiencing and interpreting child rather than from the point of view of the outside observer -- from
the latter point of view it would be called imitation.\footnote{1}

(3) A teacher adopts a new way, let us say, of wearing his watch-chain, knotting his neck-tie or brushing his hair. He finds very soon that the new way has been adopted by an observant class. What is the nature of the conation involved in imitation of this kind? Actions of this sort are usually 'explained' as the result of 'prestige suggestion', but this fails to make clear the real origin or significance of such actions. It would seem that the true interpretation of this apparently simple act of imitation is extremely instructive. Such action is the expression of a powerful conation which has been essentially \textit{created} as the result of a long experience. To begin with, we observe that the satisfaction resides in a faithful reproduction of the pattern act. Exact reproduction of the pattern is the \textit{terminus} of the process, the end which presents itself to the individual as valuable. Hence the act is imitative in the full sense. With regard, however, to the conation implied, this fidelity of reproduction is the motive\textit{(to recall a distinction already drawn)} only in the sense of being the 'terminus \textit{ad quem}'; the 'vis-a-tergo' of the act has yet to be explained. What is it that gives to this intrinsically valueless result a high value in the eyes of the child? The answer would seem to be found in the growth of that habitual attitude to which we referred above. In virtue of this habit of mind, which has now become firmly established, not only may the judgments, opinions and beliefs of society be accepted without question, but trivial acts of behaviour, such as we have instanced in the present paragraph, tend to acquire a high indirect or associative value. This means (1) that habit

\footnote{1} c. f. Social and Ethical Interpretations, pp 106-029; especially p.114 and pp 128-129.
is fundamentally the principle to which we must resort for
the explanation of imitative acts of this kind; and (2) that the
real significance of such acts is that they are, so to speak,
symptoms; they are symptomatic of the success with which
the process of socialisation has been carried on. Imitation
of this kind would therefore stand to imitation of the kind
discussed in par (1) in the relation of effect to cause -- the
latter type of action, in connection with which the child
learns to look to his social environment for the means of
realising his purposes, would be a main cause in the fostering
of that attitude which gives rise to the type of imitative
action discussed in the present paragraph. Hence when the
child's imitativeness in this latter sense is pointed to (as
it very commonly is) as a means which can be effectively used
by the educator for the purpose of 'socialising' the child,
it would seem that the argument implies a curious circle. The
socialisation process must be well advanced before the child
really becomes imitative in this sense, that is, before 'prestige'
begins to work.

(4) A child sees a clown at the circus perform an acrobatic
feat, such as turning a somersault, walking on a tight rope, and
so on; and he practices strenuously until he can himself reproduce
the performance or until dissatisfying results lead him
to desist. The interest here is in the successful exercise
of his powers in order to produce a definite and difficult result.
It is the interest in achievement as such or for its own sake,
and the satisfaction accruing is probably a special case of
satisfaction of the constructive instinct. "The pleasure
of feeling oneself a cause", that is, the pleasure resulting
from the satisfaction of the experimentation tendency, would
appear to be the main factor in this case. If we admit an independent instinct of self-assertion, the satisfaction of this instinct would also be an important part of the process.

(5) There remains to be mentioned what is perhaps the most interesting and significant class of imitative acts. This is the kind of act which we can describe only by saying that the individual desires to reproduce an experience which has direct value for him. The value of the object in this case is not (as in the case discussed in par. 3) indirect or associative but direct or intrinsic. An individual may strive imitatively to reproduce, for example, a gait, manner, gesture or tone of voice which has had a directly pleasurable effect on him. This need or impulse to reproduce an object which has intrinsic value underlies a most important class of imitative activities. We refer to the kind of 'imitation' which is found in art. The horse, for example, is an object which interests or possesses direct value for the child, and therefore the child attempts to draw it. The landscape possesses a peculiar value for the artist - he therefore must needs reproduce it, and the success of the reproduction is measured by the degree in which the original value-experience is recovered. The dramatist similarly seeks to recover the peculiar value-experience of a certain human situation. Now imitation of this kind would appear to be simply a specially important case of the basic psychological principle according to which we tend to continue or persist in a pleasurable activity. Some writers, indeed, such as Baldwin, would incline to regard this continuance of or persistence in a pleasurable activity as itself a fact of imitation. But this seems improper and confusing; the term imitation can only be used to refer to that very special manifestation of this motive
which we have indicated. To explain fully the original conation in this case would mean an investigation of the ultimate psychological factors in aesthetic enjoyment.

We have thus recognized in different types of imitative action conations or motives of different kinds. It is hardly necessary to add that in any particular case, more than one of these motives may be and, in fact, usually would be operative. Further, the analysis of these different types leads us to the conclusion that in deliberate imitation as such there is present no inherited factor in the sense of an innate tendency to imitate.

What, then, is the special congenital factor implied in deliberate imitation? In addition to the instinctive impulses which we recognize (see p.), there is implied the inheritance of a special capacity. This is the capacity to carry on a process which represents an essential aspect of the activity of reason, namely, the process of active comparison of objects so as to discriminate identities and differences. This means fundamentally the capacity to carry on processes of abstraction and generalization. Hence one thing with which we must reckon in our attempt to trace to its source the activity of deliberate imitation is the inheritance of the capacity to carry on processes of this nature. Given the motivating factors, inherited and acquired, which have been already discussed, given also the fundamental fact of which we have already examined the significance, namely, the fact that for the human being the behaviour of members of his own species possesses a peculiar interest, and given, finally, the capacity to carry on the rational process considered in the present paragraph, then no new problem is raised by the fact of deliberate imitation. From another point of view, it might be said that such imitation is merely a special case of the
essentially rational activity of consciously adopting and adapting means for the attainment of ends. An illustration will indicate the relation in which it stands to the higher processes of thinking. When the engineer constructs a bridge in accordance with a model which has been put into his hands, his thinking is essentially of the type involved in deliberate imitation; and it might be described by that phrase to distinguish it from the case (which would be considered a grade higher in the scale of rational activity), in which he is called upon first of all to construct the model itself.

In the sequel, we shall in the main be concerned with the specific causal factors underlying ethical growth. For this reason the word 'imitation', which covers such a variety of specific causal factors and which, indeed, properly belongs to the vocabulary of purely descriptive psychology, will by no means figure so largely as it usually does in discussions of this kind.

Sympathy. We may now proceed to consider the concept of sympathy. In the present chapter we have already discovered a special and, it would seem, distinctively human capacity, the capacity to have "representative emotions," to use the phrase of Leslie Stephen. We would agree, also, with that writer that this capacity must be included within the total of capacities which go to constitute rationality. As Stephen says: "It is a description of reason itself, so far as it deals with other sentient beings." (1) This capacity is the basic fact underlying the growth of what has been called 'reflective' sympathy. Reflective sympathy, in the strict sense, implies the reconstruction or representation of another's affective state as a consequence of the representation of this other's

(1) Science of Ethics, pp 220-221
circumstances or, simply, of the observation of his overt behaviour. The latter phrase might suggest that we are confusing this form of sympathy with "primitive passive" sympathy, but, as will presently appear, we are not forgetting the distinction between these two different phenomena; on the contrary, we shall find it necessary to reassert the distinction with emphasis.

In reflective sympathy, the intellectual or cognitive factor is more or less pronounced. Implicitly or explicitly, the process involves inference or judgment. There are two cases to be considered. In the one case we have a representative experience of the other's situation; in the other case, we may not be aware of this situation but we observe in the individual certain signs which have become for us significant of a certain emotion. In both cases we make the implicit or explicit judgment that the individual is experiencing this particular emotion and hence we 'understand' his emotional state. The question arises: What is involved in 'understanding' in this sense? Does it necessarily imply the representation to some degree of the emotion as such, the reproduction of it, so to speak, in ourselves? The answer appears to be that originally such representation of the feeling itself would be fully carried out and that it is perhaps always present to some degree. But in the course of experience, the representative feeling as such becomes increasingly schematic in proportion as the term which denotes it becomes more and more directly and immediately bound up with the appropriate reaction. This would seem to be in accordance with the general rule that imagery tends to play an increasingly unimportant role in the thinking of the trained mind, such imagery, however, being more or less recoverable when the need appears.
Reflective sympathy implies a considerable degree of mental development. This fact is emphasised by Sully, who also draws attention to the prominence of the representative or intellectual factor. Sully says: "Since sympathy with others is only possible when we imaginatively represent and realise their affective states by help of our own similar experiences, it can only reach a similar development after a certain accumulation of emotive experience through the gratifications and disappointments of the more instinctive emotions, and when the general representative power of the mind attains a certain strength."(1) The same writer is careful to distinguish, however, between sympathy and mere intellectual apprehension: "While sympathy and intellectual apprehension are thus closely related they are not identical. In each case there is the representation of another's mind or feeling but the mode of representation differs. In sympathizing with a person we are occupied with his feelings as such and are ourselves in a state of resonant feeling; in the understanding him we are intellectually active, fixing our attention on the relations (causal etc.) of his mental states."(2)

Baldwin also suggests the relative lateness of the appearance of reflective sympathy by connecting its rise with the growth of the notion of self; and he suggests, too, the social origin of it.(3) It has already been pointed out that Adam Smith took account only of reflective sympathy. Even though he noted the fact of what we would now call primitive passive sympathy, he attempted to explain it in terms applicable only to the reflective type.(4) Nevertheless, his

[3] Social and Ethical Interpretations, p.233
Discussion of the latter is beyond question a valuable contribution. We have already expressed our concurrence in the more liberal interpretation of this writer's position—the interpretation which sees in it an insistence on the ultimately social origin of our judgments of moral value. Here we would urge that his emphasis on the representative factor in reflective sympathy is sound. On the other hand, it must be granted that his account of this process of 'imagining', as he calls it, (an account which seems to picture it as at all times an elaborate and even tortuous process) produces indeed the impression of that artificiality to which his critics have taken exception. This defect is corrected, however, if we remember that, in the course of experience, the process of sympathetic apprehension of another's feeling comes to be short-circuited, so that actual representation may be extremely schematic, if not entirely absent. Let us repeat, then, the possibilities: (a) We may represent the object or situation which our fellow-man is experiencing; this may involve in addition the representation of its affective value for him. This latter representation means the "representative emotion" which Leslie Stephen describes with profound truth as "reason itself so far as it deals with other sentient beings". (b) Certain phenomena of behaviour have come to function as expressive signs—expressive of a certain emotional state; on observation of such behaviour, we represent, in a more or less direct or immediate way, according to our own level of development, the emotional condition which they express,—again the representative emotion the capacity for which is inherent in the capacity for reason itself.
With regard to sympathy in the sense of the 'contagion of feeling', or the 'sympathetic induction' of emotion as it has been called, we need only admit the fact of this kind of sympathy without attempting to add anything to the account usually given. If we are to talk of a sympathy instinct or instinctive tendency, the terms ought primarily to denote an experience of this kind. It seems clearly to satisfy one of McDougall's criteria of the primariness of an instinct in that human beings share it with the higher animals. McDougall's description of it as "the experiencing of any feeling or emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion." (1) is satisfactory so long as we are careful not to misinterpret the phrase "when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion." This sympathy experience must not be confused with the higher inferential process described above. What then is the general significance in human development of this primitive passive sympathy? We are not concerned here with any hypothesis as to its underlying mechanism though it may be remarked in passing (a) that McDougall's suggestion of "a special perceptual inlet" associated with each of the primary instincts and adapted to receive and elaborate the sense impression caused by the expression of that same instinct in animals of the same species" (2), represents at least an interesting hypothesis; and (b) Sully's attempt to account for it as an indirect process due to the imitative reproduction of these expressive gestures has this in its favour that observation of children would seem to indicate that such contagion of feeling does not clearly antedate

(2) Ibid. p.93.
imitation of gestures. At any rate, the imitative reproduction of expressive gestures must be regarded as partly at least accounting for the intensity of the transmitted feeling, for the thoroughness, so to speak with which the transmission is achieved.

From our point of view, the fundamental role of this primitive passive sympathy is to add to the raw material of feeling out of which the higher form of sympathetic apprehension is subsequently built up. Just as the higher levels of cognitive life presuppose a wealth of cognitive material traceable ultimately to sense-experience, so the capacity for the higher process of feeling presupposes a broad foundation of affective experience of the more primitive type. This contagion of feeling, then, is a principal means whereby the affective life of the gregarious animal is extended in range and its development hastened.

It remains to consider briefly a phenomenon which does not appear to be exactly identifiable with sympathy in either of the senses discussed above, though its development is closely bound up with these two forms of the feeling. This is the phenomenon which McDougall discusses under the rubric of active sympathy. He describes it thus: "it involves a reciprocal relation between at least two persons; either party to the relation not only is apt to experience the emotions displayed by the other, but he desires also that the other shall share his own emotions; he actively seeks the sympathy of the other, and, when he has communicated his emotion to the other, he attains a peculiar satisfaction which greatly enhances his pleasure and his joy or, in the case of painful emotions diminishes his pain."(2) Now we would submit that this familiar and important sense of the

term represents a less fundamental notion than that which we have found to be implied in the concept of reflective sympathy. The basic fact in reflective sympathy is that we are able to apprehend, to realise the nature of, another's affective experience. We are clearly taking a further step when we not only have this sympathetic apprehension of the other's emotional attitude to a certain object, but when we actually come to adopt the same attitude ourselves. Now this further step is a result which may or may not come to pass. Mitchell seems to distinguish between the two phenomena but apparently considers that the name 'sympathy' is a misnomer except as applied to the full-blown case of active sympathy, "We may think [another's] thought," says that writer, "without having his feeling; and we may also know and understand his feeling, but instead of imitating it we may be indifferent or laugh at it, or be repelled by it." (1) But this knowledge and understanding of the other's feeling, which has involved the representation of that feeling, if not now, then on former occasions, is, as we have seen, something more than a merely intellectual operation, and, on a broader view, would be the root fact to which the term sympathy in the higher sense ought primarily to refer.

Perhaps no more telling illustration could be found of a tendency against which it has been part of the main object of the present essay to protest. We refer to the tendency on the part of the instinct psychologists so to present their admittedly strong case on behalf of the importance of instinct in all later development as to create a general impression or picture of this development which does much less than adequate justice.

(1) Structure and Growth of the Mind, p. 148. (italics ours)
to the role of the higher intellectual or rational processes. With the majority of the instincts, no doubt a plausible case can be made out for the contention that all the higher forms of their manifestation can be traced, by insensible gradations, to their cruder forms in animal life. But in the case of sympathy, the gap between primitive passive and reflective sympathy is more difficult to bridge; and it can hardly be denied that ethical import attaches only to the latter.

The process discussed in an earlier chapter in virtue of which reason or intelligence may with strict accuracy be said to determine the ends of the higher forms of human behaviour is well illustrated here. The representative activity of the mind, stimulated, sustained and controlled, for example, by the spoken or written word, that is, directly through intercourse with our fellow-men, or indirectly through the suggestions of literature, yields its rare fruit in a deepening and expansion of the life of feeling itself, which is inevitably reflected in the objects or ends of human striving.

The capacity to "put yourself in his place" which is the activity of reason itself with the sentience of our fellow-men for its object opens up new vistas of value to which the instincts as such and in themselves could not have piloted the will, and remoulds the objects of our striving so as to rest both their attractiveness and their obligatoriness on the sure foundations of our rational nature.

Gregariousness. It is not necessary at this juncture to do anything more than indicate the restriction of meaning which he put upon this concept. When it has been said that gregariousness is the instinct that impels the animal to seek the proximity - the mere physical proximity - of its
kind, we seem to have said all that can safely be
said in so far as the definite instinct is concerned. McDougall's
account, which makes it clear that sociable qualities in the
ordinary sense are by no means implied, its impulse being
adequately satisfied by mere physical proximity, seems
satisfactory. We have already commented on the violent straining
of this concept by certain writers. Scientific psychology,
which should aim to secure the fullest possible measure of
precision in statement, can have nothing to say to such
uncritical procedure. The instinctive impulse, as we shall see,
is by no means unimportant, inasmuch as it is one of the
'urges' that bring about and maintain human association.
But we are verging on looseness when we attribute more to
this instinct than this function of merely initiating or
helping to initiate, the process which terminates in
socialisation. It would seem that McDougall himself sets
the example of what at least looks very like an illegitimate
extension of the concept. In his treatment of active sympathy,
he raises the question as to the explanation of the familiar
fact that normally the individual feels the need of having
his sentiment reciprocated by his fellows and that such
reciprocation intensified the feeling. He is willing to
find part of the explanation in the fundamental reaction
of primitive passive sympathy, but argues that further explanation
is necessary and suggests the notion of a specialisation of
the gregarious instinct, as if it were, each of the special
instincts, rendering complete satisfaction of their impulses
impossible, until each animal is surrounded by others of the
same species in a similar state of excitement." (1) Hence
"we may see in this instinct the principle that we need for
the explanation of the development of active sympathy from
the crude sympathetic reaction or mere sympathetic induction
of emotion"(1) We would suggest, however, that this kind
of speculative extension of the concept of gregariousness,
an extension which is apt to be looked upon not so much as
a legitimate hypothesis, but as an explanation which tends to
preclude further pursuit of the problem, is not in the best
interests of scientific psychology. Instead of connecting the
phenomenon in question with the gregarious instinct, is it not
safer to regard it simply as a special case of the basic tendency
of an organism as such to adjust itself to its environment? That
is, we would begin by recognising the existence of the capacity
for reflective sympathy in certain animals, i.e. human beings.
How the capacity came into being, in what way it has grown,
if it has grown at all, out of primitive passive sympathy, we
are not yet in a position to say. But the fact of
its existence means that, for the creatures that possess it,
a new world of objects, so to speak, is opened up. By
reflective sympathy he apprehends the emotional states of his
fellows and these emotional states constitute new objects
to which he feels the need to adjust himself. In seeking
adjustment either by trying to realise in himself the states
of his fellows or by trying to produce in them states
similar to his own, it would seem a reasonable suggestion that
his behaviour is to be accounted for mainly by habit; i.e., by
the growth of that habitual attitude to his fellows which we
mentioned in connection with our discussion of imitation.
The result of this deeply rooted habitual attitude is, as we
pointed out in the earlier passage, that he feels the need

(1) Introd. to Soc. Psych. p
to put himself into accord with the values or, in other words, with the feelings of his fellowmen. He has doubtless had abundant experience of the satisfying consequences bound up with this social attunement. This would mean that active sympathy is not really something innate, but essentially a result of the general process of socialisation. This point will be recalled when we come to treat in a later chapter the question of moral defectives, and we shall find that the above view enables us better to understand the real character of the defect in such cases.

In so far as there is a further motive, it would be accounted for by primitive passive sympathy itself. In any case, it seems safer to limit the gregarious instinct to the function at the most of simply initiating the process by keeping him in contact with his fellows. In a similar way, it may be recalled, we attributed to the curiosity instinct the function of initiating activities to explain which, in their subsequent developments, we need to fall back on other tendencies than the curiosity tendency.

The third innate tendency, suggestibility, may be briefly mentioned. We have already subscribed to the limitation of that term to cover only the special phenomenon of the tendency, under certain conditions, to accept with conviction ideas or beliefs in the absence of reasoned or logical ground for such acceptance; and we have here to propose a still further limitation of the meaning of this term. It is no part of the object of the present essay to discuss the psychology of suggestion as such; it is sufficient simply to state the sense in which the term will be used. This sense is adequately conveyed in the words which we have just used, except for
one ambiguity which it seems worth while to point out.

This ambiguity lies in the interpretation of the phrase "in the absence of reasoned or logical grounds." When this logical background is absent in the nature of the case, as in the case of the very immature child, it would seem reasonable to argue that the acceptance of the 'suggested' idea is really a special psychological phenomenon; and, moreover, that this phenomenon is not on the same mental plane as that in which such acceptance is due strictly to 'dissociation', i.e. to the more or less temporary inaction of existing idea systems or, in other words, to the suspension of the critical attitude. It is usual to say that children are highly amenable to suggestion because of the paucity of their ideas and of the consequent rudimentariness of their critical faculties. But if this be the reason for the acceptance of the suggested idea, and if, as appears to be the case, the fundamental phenomenon in suggestion appears to be dissociation, then there would seem to be little point in talking about 'suggestion' or 'dissociation' in the case of the young child. Dissociation of what? In the act of suggestion as ordinarily understood, there is usually implied not merely the fact of the uncritical acceptance of an idea, but the fact that other ideas, which might possibly occasion conflict, exist but are for some reason inoperative, and that the critical faculties, although more or less developed, are for the time being in abeyance. It would appear that this process is sufficiently distinctive and important to call for a special term, and the term suggestion, both in popular thinking and in abnormal psychology, carries
already this twofold implication, i.e. the more or less temporary inhibition of the critical attitude, of dissonant ideas, and the resulting acceptance, with full conviction of the 'suggested' idea. If, however, we extend the connotation of this term, as is commonly done, to cover all cases of mere uncritical acceptance as such, then in the nature of the case the process of knowledge acquisition, as far as the child is concerned, is in the main to be described in terms of suggestion. The objections, however, which have already been urged against the over-extension of the meanings of terms would then be applicable to our use of the term 'suggestion'. In the case of the child, we are dealing with an organism which is in process of rapid growth, which is reaching out for new experiences to feed its rapidly emerging capacities; and this 'elan vital' (if we may adapt that phrase to a purely psychological use) together with the paucity of existing idea, accounts for the avidity with which the actions of others are imitated and their ideas accepted. As far as concerns this tendency to an uncritical acceptance of ideas, some term such as 'primitive credulity' indicates the psychological situation more accurately than the term 'suggestibility'. Further, it is sometimes pointed out as a phenomenon of suggestibility that the ideas accepted by the child at this stage tend to maintain themselves even in the face of critical or contrariant ideas which are later presented to him. But, as we saw in the exactly parallel case of imitation, this tendency is at bottom a habit phenomenon and is not to be ascribed, as it usually is, to some superior efficacy on the part of the suggested idea as such.

In the present essay, therefore, while the importance of suggestion in ethical education will be fully recognized,
the term will be used to refer to the kind of process indicated above.

We are now in a position to state specifically the essential facts of native endowment. This statement would recognise 1. reflexes and random movements, 2. appetites, 3. instincts, 4. capacities. As regards 2 and 3, Drever's tabulation seems the most useful. It is a psychological classification; and it provides also for the fundamental pleasure-pain reactions. To this we will append a statement of what we have classed under 4. as 'capacities'.

Innate Tendencies.

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<tr>
<th>Appetite Tendencies</th>
<th>Instinct Tendencies</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Seeking for Pleasure&lt;br&gt;Avoidance of Pain)</td>
<td><strong>General</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Play)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Hunger&lt;br&gt;Thirst&lt;br&gt;Sleep&lt;br&gt;Sex&lt;br&gt;Nausea)</td>
<td><strong>Experimentation</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Imitation)*&lt;br&gt;Sympathy&lt;br&gt;Suggestibility)</td>
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<tr>
<th>'Pure'</th>
<th>'Emotional'</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Probably numerous though difficult to distinguish from reflexes and may perhaps be classed as:&lt;br&gt;Reactions of adjustment and attention&lt;br&gt;Prehension&lt;br&gt;Locomotion&lt;br&gt;Vocalisation)</td>
<td>(Fear&lt;br&gt;Anger&lt;br&gt;Hunting&lt;br&gt;Acquisitive(1)&lt;br&gt;Curiosity&lt;br&gt;Gregarious&lt;br&gt;Courtship&lt;br&gt;Self-display&lt;br&gt;Self-abasement&lt;br&gt;Parental)</td>
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* The first modification which we would make is to include under 'general' tendencies the tendency to habit formation.
* The second modification which we find it necessary to make concerns 'imitation'. Our discussion of this phenomenon (pp 130-134) suggests the following modification: Imitation will appear (a) among the specific instincts (p. 132); (b) among the general innate tendencies, and here it will refer to the innate tendency to what is called

(1) See however, discussion on pp. 196-203.
ideo-motor activity; and (c) among the 'capacities' where, in accordance with the results arrived at on p. 'deliberate' imitation will be provided for.

What appears to be one further source of dynamic may be mentioned here. This is emotion as such. It will be recalled that we accepted the view which regards emotion as incidental to the obstruction or thwarting of a conation. The objection might be raised that the apparent increase of dynamic under emotion is not really due to the emotion itself, but is simply the manifestation of the underlying conation which is obstructed. The objection is answered by pointing out that the obstruction of an obviously trivial conation may occasion an increase of effort out of all proportion to the importance of that original conation.

We have to add the statement of what appear to be fundamental inherited capacities. These we may state as follows:

1. The capacity for representation, including
   (a) representation of cognitive or ideational elements.
   (b) representation of affective or emotional elements. (Reflective Sympathy.)
2. The capacity for language. By this we mean, of course, more than the mere innate tendency to vocalisation.
3. The capacity to apprehend, to abstract and to be interested in space relations as such; add also the capacity to be emotionally affected by certain spatial experiences (the so-called elementary aesthetic forms)
4. The capacity to apprehend, abstract and be interested in the number aspects of objects.
5. The capacity to apprehend, abstract and be interested in the 'sequence' aspect of objects. (the time sense)
6. The capacity to apprehend, abstract and be interested in the causal aspect of objects.
7. The capacity to be affected in a peculiar way or to a peculiar degree by the sensuous aspect of objects, especially by colour and sound experiences.
(8) The capacity for conscious comparison and contrast of objects, and the discrimination of identities and differences; better described, perhaps, in general terms, as the capacity for abstraction and generalisation. This capacity manifests itself throughout all mental life; but a special manifestation of it is to be found in the important activity which we have called deliberate imitation.

Now it must be clearly understood that this statement of inherited capacities makes no claim to be considered exact from the standpoint of technical psychology. It is immediately obvious that many of these capacities are not independent of one another. Some of them, also, such as the capacity for representation, are obviously more fundamental than some others. But the investigation of their ultimate nature and of their interrelations is a problem for the psychologist. It may be that some still more fundamental concept, such as the concept of rhythm, for example, will eventually explain several of them. In any case, pending further investigations, a statement such as we have given is both legitimate and necessary in the interests of our special problem. In the discussion of that problem, we are largely concerned with these capacities as we find them integrated and developed in the higher human activities.

We have now treated in some detail the problem of the psychological basis in the light of more recent tendencies and controversies in psychology. The discussion has foreshadowed our position with regard to certain aspects of the general problem of ethical growth. The following chapters will develop fully the principal ethical implications of that discussion. Now, as we have already urged, the unsatisfactoriness of even the best discussions of ethical growth is in the main traceable to a lack of thoroughness and precision in the examination and
statement of the psychological first principles, resulting in a
faulty focussing of the ethical problem itself. It seems desirable,
therefore, to summarise at this stage our conclusions so far
and to re-formulate our problem with still further precision.

Motivation or the Springs of Action. The question as to
the dynamic of mental life, the sources of the urge or
driving power which initiates and sustains mental activity,
in short, the question as to the genesis of all conation,
involves the recognition of (a) an original or inherited
equipment of impulse or tendencies to action and (b) acquired
impulses or tendencies, not satisfactorily accounted for as
mere modifications or disguised forms of (a). The former group
is represented by the native endowment of (a) instincts, (b) appetites,
(c) reflexes, and (d) random movements. It is permissible, perhaps,
to assume that further psychological investigation will reveal
the reflexes and the random movements to be at bottom
identical phenomena. With regard to the statement in detail
of these inherited tendencies, we found no reason why we
should not accept McDougall's statement with the modifications
and amplifications supplied by Drever. Considered simply as a
statement of what these inherited tendencies are, irrespective
of questions as to their significance or role in the general
economy of the mental life, this statement would seem for
our present purpose a sound working hypothesis. Confining
ourselves to these more complex specific tendencies, the
instincts, (which are the real casus belli among the psychologists)
we found reason to disagree with McDougall's central thesis
as to the basic and permanent role of these tendencies in
furnishing the dynamic of mental life. Our general conclusion
was to the effect that, when they appear to be basic, they are
really so only in a chronological sense by which we mean essentially that they represent the original or earliest sources of motivation. Experience, however, involves the gradual acquisition of new urges or drives.

What then is the nature and source of this acquired dynamic for which we cannot account in terms of the specific instincts per se? We found that the answer to this question involves a recognition of the basic nature of habit as a psychological category, of its penetrating influence at all levels of mental life, of the reality and, in a sense, the primariness of the dynamic which it engenders. We saw that the only scientific way of conceiving habit, the only way which holds out any hope of consistency, is to identify it with all the integrations of more elementary reactions which have been achieved during the individual's experience and which have acquired a relative stability. Such integrations originate in different ways:— (1) the extension and general modification in experience of the original objects of the instincts, and the extension, complication and stabilising of emotional reactions — a phenomenon finely discussed by McDougall but apparently not regarded by him as a habit phenomenon; (2) the integration of the numerous reflexes and random movements into ordered activities; (3) the later integration of representative elements — images, 'free ideas', concepts, — into stable ideational trains. We then distinguished degrees of strength and permanence of the habit dynamic: (1) at the lowest level there is the tendency of any integration, merely as such, to express and maintain itself when an appropriate situation occurs; (2) at the highest level, where the integration involves capacities of a more comprehensive and deep-seated
kind, we have not only the experience of a deeper satisfaction but also the generation of new needs and impulsions. We are thus brought back to the notion of native capacities to which the habit-integrations give satisfying expression. A tentative statement of these fundamental and, in large measure, distinctively human capacities has been given. Humanity, in its restless pursuit of the means whereby these capacities should be realised and given effective, satisfying expression, has groped its way to certain higher integrations, certain ordered pursuits or interests which we have designated the human values; and social heredity has transmitted these racial habits and perpetuated the conviction of their absolute, inalienable value.

It was then pointed out that the integrative process—a feature of mind at all levels of development—comes, in the case of the human mind, to be subject to a special kind of systematic control or direction made possible by the growth of representative activity. The most significant effects of this latter phenomenon are to render possible (a) the conscious, deliberate application of past experience to the determination of present choice; (b) the grasping of causal and temporal relations between different experiences, and hence the apprehension of consequences of behaviour; and (e) the reconstitution of the objects of choice, the ideal construction of permanent ends,--ends which draw their dynamic from the sources described above but derive the possibility of their being constructed and projected at all from the operation of this intellectual factor. In this sense we found that the intellectual factor may be described as a determiner of ends. Further, we found reason to ascribe to it this determining role in a deeper sense. The ideal manipulation of the elements of
of cognitive experience (1), and the extension of representative activity to the facts of the emotional as well as of the intellectual life, (2) involve an expansion and deepening of the life of feeling itself, and hence a dynamic value of a more ultimate kind.

We may now formulate our problem as follows:

(1) We have to trace the growth of a kind of consciousness an essential element in which is the sense of authoritativeness or obligatoryness attaching to certain human interests, pursuits or values. These values, as they present themselves to the ethically educated will, appear vested with an authority that has been in part directly inculcated, in part indirectly suggested throughout the process of education, so that it is now inwoven into the very texture of the mind as an awareness of certain objective conditions or situations which somehow limit the will, and furnishing the support for that judgment which condemns caprice or frivolity in the face of life's alternatives and in a sense prescribing the very content or substance of that life itself.

(1) See remarks on art, p. 22-25 cf. also. McDougall: Soc. Psych. p. 73. "The similarity of various objects to the primary or natively given object, similarities which in many cases can only be operative for a highly developed mind, enables them to evoke tender emotion and its protective impulse directly etc."

This statement well illustrates the basic role of the intellectual factor; we have only to add that we would disagree, on general psychological grounds, with the implication that the "tender emotion" thus later evolved by the new object is at all identical, as an affective experience, with the primary "tender emotion" from which we are assured it is derived.

(2) See discussion of reflective sympathy, p. 146
(2) We have also to trace the process by which this external authority comes to be internalised. This is the process by which the individual comes to make these values his own; appreciation supervenes upon mere acceptance of authority as such. This appreciation, rooted in part in the individual's direct personal verification of 'worthwhileness', and in part in his sympathetic assimilation of the experience of his fellows, is not incompatible with the continued consciousness of obligation. On the contrary, it intensifies and deepens this consciousness inasmuch as it finds a rationale for it. Moreover, a certain externality always attaches to this consciousness, for isolated, unorganized impulses are at any time liable to assert themselves in even the most highly moralized individual. Nevertheless, the sense of the abiding worth and dignity of these objects has taken deep root in his consciousness. Philosophers have at all times found something to conjure with in the vague phrase 'love of Humanity', and have for different purposes identified it with various orders of conduct, ranging from the benevolent impulse of the good Samaritan to the professed devotion to a more or less nebulous ideal of ultimate human Perfection. Do we not attach to the phrase a significance which is at once comprehensive and concrete if we denote by it the practical allegiance of the human will to those cherished products of human striving?

(3) But we have seen that these values are relatively independent of one another and hence so far we have only the consciousness, as it were, of a number of separate or disparate 'obligations'. We have not touched the very core of our problem until we approach the question of the synthesis of
these 'obligations' into a single obligatory ideal of personal life. The structure of a personality -- a personality which will be at once the expression of true individuality and the embodiment of universal laws or principles of ethical growth must be fabricated out of these seemingly disparate values. This really involves the study of certain fundamental aspects of the growth of the Self. We must concentrate particularly on the study of

(4) representative activity. Here we must take account of the process by which the representative elements come to be ordered or systematised on the basis of (a) temporal relations and (b) causal relations. The former phenomenon we may conveniently refer to as the growth of the time-senses; the latter represents the growth of reason, in so far as reason is concerned with the synthesis of the representative elements with one another and with the facts of perceptual experience.

Hence with reference to each stage of the individual's development, we shall ask:

(1) What are the principal agencies by means of which the 'authority' consciousness described above is developed and how do these agencies operate?

(2) To what values are these agencies especially directed, that is, on what values is the emphasis especially laid in the fostering of the consciousness of obligation, and how far ought the process of education to be modified in this regard?

(3) How far, at each stage, is the internalisation of this authority possible?

(4) What is the nature and extent of the general synthesis at each period? And by what educational influences can this synthesis be furthered?
(5) In what ways and for what reasons may the process of ethical education fail to achieve its desired results? With these general questions in mind, we may now proceed to the more detailed consideration of ethical growth.

CHAPTER VII (The Significance of the Infancy Period)

It is customary to distinguish at least four periods or stages in the individual's mental development. We may refer to these stages, in a semi-technical manner, as (a) Infancy, covering approximately the period from birth to the age of six or seven; (b) Childhood, from the age of six or seven to the age of twelve or thirteen; (c) Adolescence, lasting until about the twenty-fifth year; and (d) Adulthood. Needless to say, these distinctions do not imply any real breach in the continuity of mental growth. Still less do they imply the notion of any rigorous uniformity in the mental development of individuals. On the other hand, the practice of distinguishing such stages in the individual's mental history means more than a mere methodological device. Its justification is to be found in phenomena of growth which seem to be specially associated with such stages. Furthermore, from the standpoint of general genetic psychology, that is, the detailed discussion of the growth of the mind as a whole, a more precise distinction of stages would be advisable. The period of infancy and that of adolescence would each reveal at least two stages or phases presenting special characteristics and often referred to respectively as early and late infancy, early and late adolescence. From this point of view, the most scientifically useful demarcation of stages is perhaps that adopted by Kirkpatrick. Here we have a recognition of six stages:
three stages in infancy, the childhood stage, from six to about twelve, and two adolescent periods. (1) It is noteworthy that there is general agreement as to the homogeneity of the period of childhood, from six to twelve. The variety appears on the whole in connection with the infancy and adolescent periods in which the phenomena of growth are such as to suggest that here, if anywhere, such distinctions of stages are essentially mere devices of method. In the present essay we shall adopt, for the purposes of presentation, the broad, fourfold distinction indicated above, but we shall try to do justice to the further distinctions in so far as they are based on phenomena relevant to our present enquiry. The period of early infancy, especially the period prior to the acquisition of language, is mainly and most directly interesting to the general psychologist as such. Modern psychology is only beginning to realize the enormous amount of acquisition or integration that takes place during this period. Recent controversies suggest, for example, that the settlement of such a problem as that of the nature and number of the human instincts and the more precise definition of the concept of instinct itself is bound up with the scientific, experimental investigation of these early adjustments. Although it may be granted that this period is of direct interest only to general psychology, it seems a mistaken corollary.

(1) The Individual in the Making, pp. 59-60; c.f. also Comenius, stages recognized in The Great Didactic: 1-6 years; 6-12 years; 12-18 years; and Claparede, Psychologie de l'Enfant, p. 65; and numerous other suggestions in the same direction in educational literature, all of which are in fairly close agreement with one another as regards the stages distinguished.
that this stage is, as a whole, "of trifling ethical significance." as MacCunn puts it. \(^{(1)}\) Indirectly, its significance is far-reaching. There is one adjustment or habit of permanent and fundamental significance which would seem to have its roots in this period. Within the continuum of his external world, the child first discriminates persons, and his almost complete dependence on the human element in his environment for the carrying out of his adjustments forges the first strong links in that chain of processes by which the satisfaction of his needs or impulses becomes inseparably bound up with his consciousness of a social milieu. What becomes later the sense of the authoritativeness and the value of a social environment has its furthest roots in the totally unreflective attitude of dependence to which he is beginning to be habituated at this early stage.

With this recognition of the significance of early infancy, we may proceed to the later phase when language has been acquired and when the operation of directly ethical influences can be discerned. In accordance with our general plan, we have to consider (a) The social agencies which are operative, (b) the different values, and to enquire into the manner in which the notions of authority and worth come to be associated with them; and (c) the nature and extent of the general synthesis during the period.

The most important social agency at this stage is the family. Although the school or Kindergarten exercises a direct influence even at this stage, the contribution of the latter is not yet comparable in importance with that of the family. \(^{(2)}\)

As regards the social influences outside of the family and

\(^{(1)}\) The Making of Character, p. 159
\(^{(2)}\) cf. Hetherington and Muirhead: Social Purpose, pp 141-142
the school, these have hardly begun to operate. Taking the first of our values, the knowledge value, we find that the family tends to generate the notion of authority or 'obligation' in two ways. By direct exhortation the notion is to some extent impressed upon the mind of the child. It is true that at this stage social exhortation or direct suggestion, as it may be called, is directed in the main, and often indeed exclusively, to the insculcation of the social values. Perhaps the school is more important than the family in this connection in so far as the former is more or less identified in the child's mind with the pursuit of knowledge. But indirectly, the family may exert an abiding influence in this respect. In so far as the content of the childish world of fancy, the world of story, fairy-tale and legend, is regulated at all by external, adult influences, knowledge may well be idealized through those beings -- to the child the very real beings-- who people that world. Again, knowledge is associated in the child's mind with his elders and of course derives a value from that fact itself. It is true that the limitless knowledge which the child attributes to his elders is a main source of his attitude of submissive admiration, but the converse is also true. His elders, whose superior powers and prowess are everywhere and at all times manifest to the child, reflect a lustre on that knowledge which he peculiarly associates with them.

On the other hand, as far as this first period is concerned, there seems to be little or no need for this extra assertion of the claims of knowledge. All observers are agreed as to the potency of the curiosity impulse during this stage. The general rapidity of growth characteristic of the
period makes itself felt on the cognitive side in a
tireless groping for new knowledge, in a seemingly insatiably
need for mental adventure. Knowledge is now in the strict
sense a value; it represents the object which furnishes the
natural, appropriate satisfaction to an impulse or need of the
organism. We have already seen how the so-called (and, as we
argued, falsely so-called) suggestibility of the child is
incidental to a condition in which the eager seeking for
knowledge is combined with the absence of existing idea systems,
with the result that new ideas, as such, are accepted at their
face value. This interest in knowledge is of course to a
considerable degree practical, or, at least, explicable by
motives other than curiosity. But (with the important qualification
which is explained in the next paragraph) it is very largely
a genuine theoretical interest. As Sully puts it, "Yet from the
earliest, a true speculative interest blends with this
practical instinct. Children are in the completest sense
little philosophers." (1)

While a failure to accord full recognition to this aspect
of the child's mind can hardly be laid to the charge of
psychologists, nevertheless they seem to have been somewhat
undiscriminating and uncritical, on the whole, in their recognition
of it. We have not only to recognize the fact of the child's
supreme versatility (relatively speaking), but also the fact of
the disconnected, unorganized congeries which tends to result
from these still largely aimless though vigorous movements of
his mind. In other words, the phenomenon under consideration is
the satisfaction of 'mere' or 'pure' curiosity. This kind
of satisfaction is essentially an ad hoc satisfaction.

(1) Studies of Childhood, p. 79
A plentiful and frequent supply of isolated scraps of knowledge furnishes satisfying mental pabulum. We are still far removed from that fruition of the curiosity impulse into a complexer need, of which curiosity is only one, and probably a minor element (1). Mere curiosity in itself holds out little hope of permanence in the knowledge interest, for the impulse, as the child experiences it at this stage, is but an incident of a period of overwhelmingly rapid growth. To prepare, and to present to the child, the body of knowledge in such a way as to generate the higher need of which we spoke is a problem which has engaged the attention of great educational thinkers in the past and which still vexes educational science. In the degree to which, sooner or later, a measure of this attitude or need is engendered will that synthesis represented in knowledge acquisition carry its own dynamic and insure its own progressively deepening satisfaction.

Art. This relative absence of any regulative or unifying principle is still more apparent in the child's whole-hearted, undisciplined enjoyment of those creations which may be taken as representing in the main his world of art. The creations of fancy in story, myth, fairy-tale and legend not only quicken and develop the emotional life, but also supply a congenial world in which this rapidly expanding life may regale itself without let or hindrance. The child's world of art, like that of the adult, is in its own way a supplementing of the deficiencies and an overcoming of the obstacles of real life. As Sully points out, in discussing the child's make-believe (a special and more complete expression of the need we are discussing), "the scenes he acts out, the semblances he shapes

(1) See PP. 105--108.
with his hands, are not produced as having objective value, but
rather as providing himself with a new environment............. the
pleasure of a child in what we call 'dramatic' make-believe
is wholly independent of any appreciating eye." (1) We shall
discuss later the limitations which further development must
overcome before the value of this activity becomes directly
ethical. We need only remark here that indirectly a far-
reaching ethical import attaches to this free ranging of the
mind and its self-identification with a larger, richer world
of feeling and action. As one writer puts it: "As indirect
experiences grow, or in other words, as he hears or reads
more stories, his ideal widens and his knowledge of the
problems of life is enlarged. This is the raw material of
morality, for out of his answers to these problems he
builds up standards of conduct and of judgment. He projects
himself into his own idea, and he projects himself into the
experiences of other people: he lives in both; this is
imagination of the highest kind, it is often called sympathy,
but the term is too limited, it is rather imaginative
understanding." (2) It may be remarked that the capacity here,
which the writer quoted feels is inadequately described by the
term sympathy, is evidently that higher capacity which we
discussed under the head of 'reflective sympathy.' Furthermore,
it would seem that any form of educational theory or practice,
(the Montessorri system appears to be a case in point) which
would neglect and starve this side of the child's nature, is
sowing the seeds of a stunted ethical growth.

(1) Studies of Childhood, p. 326
With regard to the religious value, it is desirable to indicate the actualities and possibilities in childish experience at this stage. The psychological facts would seem clearly to warrant only one conclusion: viz., that the religious need in the strict sense is not a fact of childish experience. It is true that the literature of child psychology shews that the idea of God is normally a part of the young child's acquisitions, but the variety of forms it assumes and the odd uses to which it is so frequently put suggest the essential externality of it. Sully points out how the child becomes at an early age interested in questions of origins, productions, or creations; and we would add that the 'God' concept supplies a solution which is probably more convenient to his harassed elders than satisfying to the child himself. If we are to attach any significance to the childish questions which are parried on the part of his elders by a resort to this concept, we would see in them the expression of a need much more akin to science or philosophy than to religion. Rousseau seems to place the emergence of the capacity for the distinctively religious attitude in late adolescence; and although in so doing he probably exaggerates the lateness of its appearance, his error is not so great as the error of those who associate a religious attitude with the early period under consideration. In other words, this value is peculiar in the sense that it cannot become 'inner' at this stage. According to Starbuck, "religion is distinctively external to the child rather than

(1) Studies in Childhood. p. 79.
something which possesses inner significance."  

Tracy appears to attribute a religious need and a religious experience to childhood, but such a view seems to involve the surrender of the serviceable precision of meaning which we have tried to reserve for the concept "religious". He says:

"Even the little child has some intellectual power, and exercises some measure of direction over his feelings and behaviour. In so far as these are consciously directed and adjusted to God, the life is genuinely religious."  

Now it is true that when the idea of God is offered to the child-mind (in answer to a type of question which is hardly the expression of even a rudimentary religious need), it will endeavour to assimilate this as well as any other new idea. But the satisfaction which the idea affords does not seem to be at all germane to religious satisfaction. We appreciate this writer's insistence on the fact of continuity in mental growth, but this continuity, truly conceived, does not preclude the emergence of what are practically new needs or impulses at certain stages of growth. Coe's use of the term "religious" in so wide a sense as to include all that we mean by "ethical" puts his discussion as a whole outside the purview of the present essay.

(1) Psychology of Religion, p. 194. This is essentially the view, also, of Amea (Psychology of Religious Experience, ch. 11.); and Pratt's statement (The Religious Consciousness, c. f., especially 98-99) is not really at variance with the view of the text. There are interesting and important remarks in the same vein in Oppenheim's "The Development of the Child," pp. 150-158.

(2) Psych. of Adolescence, p. 135.

(3) Opp. cit.

(4) See especially statement on p. 29 (Education in Religion and in Morals).
Needless to say, this does not mean that the child remains unaffected by the religious factors of his environment. As long as the attitude and the behaviour of his elders testify to the value which religion possesses for them, the sense of authority -- albeit an external authority -- will be generated and kept alive in the child's mind in connection with the activities, ideas, and even the phrases and words of the religious life. (1) Religious ritual and ceremonial are doubtless peculiarly effective in this regard. This experience functions as more than a mere preparation for the stage when an inner significance will be apprehended in these things; it hastens the onset of that stage. On the other hand, the ethical value of the attempt to inculcate definite, explicit concepts is, to say the least, doubtful. The child's faith in his elders is, as we have seen, almost without bounds; but not altogether so, and it may well be undermined by unwisdom in this respect. Tracy, for example, says in reference to the idea of God; "No difficulty is experienced........... when he is told that God can see him though he cannot see God; and that God is very near to him all the while. Either he does not raise the question how God can be near him and yet not be seen; or, if the question is raised, he is very easily satisfied with the answer he gets. It may be glaringly illogical or obviously inadequate, to the adult mind but to the child it is quite satisfactory for the time being." (2) Now if there is one thing more than another which modern psychology teaches us about the child, it is perhaps this: to suspect him most then he appears "very easily satisfied" with explanations which are "illogical or obviously inadequate " to our own minds.

(2) Psych. of Adolescence, pp.187-188
On the whole, the facts seem to justify the conclusion that religion remains essentially external at this stage; in this case, as distinct from the cases of knowledge and art, the need has not yet appeared which will give real inner significance to it.

Social and Group Values. At this stage, however, as also at the next, the real weight of social authority is thrown in the scale on the side of the social values, Justice, Benevolence, Veracity. The sense in which Justice is used here has been already explained. Baldwin seems to have traced this value to its true source far back in the child's mental history at the very dawn of his knowledge of self and of his distinction between self and other. In the 'dialectic of personal growth', as he calls it, the child's knowledge of the other grows by his projection into that other of his own affective, cognitive and conative experiences, and, conversely, his realization of their experiences is reflected back to illuminate and expand his consciousness of self. In this process of expansion, the three factors of imitation, suggestion and sympathy are operative. With regard to sympathy, we have to recognize (a) the expansion of the emotional life by the operation of primitive passive sympathy or feeling contagion, and (b) emotional expansion by the way of reflective sympathy. It is clear that the continuance of the dialectic of personal growth presupposes the existence of this latter capacity the kinship of which with the capacity of reason has been already explained. Hence, though the

(1) See p. 34.

(2) Soc. and Eth. Interpretations, par. 2; also, Mental Development, pp. 119-120.
instinctive factor (which must be identified with primitive sympathy if we are to have regard to consistency in the use of the term 'instinct')
adds to the child's raw material of feeling, it is clearly of only minor importance in ethical growth.

Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of Justice, we would point out what appears to be the fundamental significance of Baldwin's account of the dialectic of personal growth and of the 'socius' which is the outcome of this process. The process, in fact, makes it inevitable that all the child's standards and values should henceforth have a social reference. Attributing to others what he finds in himself and finding in himself what he has apprehended in others describes the twofold movement of mind by which his knowledge of self and other grows. But this mental movement becomes a fixed, ineradicable habit. Hence it would seem that we find here the real psychological origin and meaning of the fact that later, to put it in very general terms, what he wills for himself he ipso facto wills for others and vice versa.

We do not intend to raise here any abstract ethical questions centring around the problem of the nature and validity of ethical judgments. The point which is emphasized is the fact, already commented on, that ethical judgments always possess this implicit or explicit social reference. The martyr, for instance, in electing the stake, does not will the stake for his fellows. What he does regard as binding on them as well as on himself is the uncompromising devotion to the ideal; and we are merely offering a suggestion as to when and how this attitude originates in the individual's mental history.

May we not find here the origin and explanation, at least in so far as they concern the psychologist, of certain later deliverances of the ethical consciousness which are sometimes pointed to as direct intuitions and sometimes as pronouncements of pure reason? When I will a good for myself I ipso facto concede to my fellowman the right to will it too, when I prescribe a rule for my fellowman, I ipso facto prescribe it for myself.--have these statements, for instance, their real basis or support in pure reason? The question may occasion some awkward difficulties as to what precisely we mean by 'reason'; but do we not save ourselves from what is perhaps a somewhat sterile discussion by recognizing the psychological origin and hence the inevitableness, under normal conditions, of the mental movement in question?

In this way the so-called dialectic of personal growth might be connected with the discussion of broad questions of abstract ethics. But to return to the problem of the genesis and development of the idea of justice, we are still very far from the emergence of anything in the nature of a conscious standard. The nature of the demand which Justice makes has yet to define itself for the child's consciousness. In point of fact, the period is, on the whole unfavourable for this development on a large scale. The second half of the period, from three to six years, is markedly individualistic. As this individualizing stage, as Kirkpatrick calls it, (1) the child is largely engrossed in the exercise and expansion of his numerous acquisitions, especially his sensori-motor acquisitions. The recognition and utilization of this phase of his development is the

(1) The Individual in the Making, p. 60.
special merit of the Montessori system. There is hardly yet the need, even if there were the opportunity, for the larger social experience which comes from the association with children of his own age. It would seem indeed to be at this period in his history that the family, with its very limited but peculiarly intimate kind of social experience, plays its most important role. We can distinguish several ways in which the family functions to bring this value into consciousness.

In the first place, the family familiarizes the child with the fact of authoritative control in connection with social situations. He has already learned the lesson of the inhibition of impulse in connection with his exploration of the material world. His social environment presents a class of objects, the behaviour of which often appears peculiarly incalculable, but to which he must needs adjust himself. The direct assertion of the family authority, most commonly taking the form of definite prohibitions intended to safeguard the claims of other members of the family, gives to the child his earliest, vague realization of the fact that there are certain uniformities or principles governing the behaviour of the family group; and he feels the impulse to discover these principles for the same reasons that he feels the need to understand and to master his physical environment.

(1) c.f. Mumford: "The Dawn of Character in the Child," pp. 94-98. One of this writer's statements, however, (emphasized by italics) implies what would seem to be a serious misinterpretation. The statement is: "Some
things, he learns, are right or wrong independently of external authority, others right or wrong merely because they are ordered by someone in authority. Some actions constitute mere good behaviour, others are part of good conduct. The ultimate sanction for right or wrong conduct he finds within himself." (p.96) The incidents which are thus interpreted are these: (a) the child remembers one night that he has left his toy soldiers on the floor, in contravention of the nurse's instructions to put them away. The only disturbance, however, which this occasions him is a certain amount of anxiety lest the nurse should discover them and inflict the recognized penalty of depriving him of his toys for the following day: (b) the child remembers one night that at tea-time he told the nurse a lie. This occasions a lively discomfort described as "a horrid pain inside", and he cannot rest until he has confessed and has been forgiven. The writer's conclusion is, as stated above, that the child finds within himself a sanction for truth-telling; and this would seem to be rather a serious misreading of the situation. As a matter of fact, the sanction in both cases comes from the same quarter. But, as we pointed out on p. 175,181, social authority, including the authority of others besides the nurse, has been especially directed against lying. In his experience, too, the child has doubtless found all the signs of specially grave disapproval evoked by lying. Hence the difference of attitude. This inner sanction appears indeed with later development, but at the stage of which Miss Mumford is speaking, the child is still far removed from any such sanction.
It is not difficult to understand the exact sense in which an idea such as that of the claims of others must, to begin with, be actually taught to the child. Supposing that his desires encountered no obstacle in the shape of other people like himself who also have desires to gratify, we can hardly imagine that an idea of 'justice' would take root in his mind. The first step towards the apprehension of the idea is taken when the presence of these others obstructs his activities. Reflection upon his own claims arises when he is confronted by the claims of his brother or sister -- claims which are sustained against his own by parental approval and support.

When we say that reflection arises under these circumstances, the suggestion is not intended that such reflection is at all very explicit or deliberate. The child for the present is living predominantly on the perceptual level. At the same time, reflection tends to appear to some extent; and the important thing is that, as has just been suggested, this reflection is fostered and quickened by the fact that his elders continue to direct his attention to the existence and the claims of his brother or sister. It is also true, without doubt, that at the outset his dawning sense of justice is keenest when it is a question of contending for his own rights. Nevertheless, in spite of this rather unmeritorious level of justice, his powers of representation have been directed, through the influence of his educators, to the apprehension and appreciation of the desires and feelings of others, and thus the essential step has been taken.
Again, the social situations in connection with which the family authority is exercised are relatively simple and easy to grasp. Hence it is easier for the child to detect the identical element in seemingly different situations, in other words, to carry out a process of abstraction and generalization in reference to them. Finally, the narrow and intimate character of the family group facilitates the appreciation of the teleological significance of the value in question. The disharmonies resulting from a disregard of it are manifest and acutely felt. In other words, there is even now some progress in the direction of the internalization of the authority attaching to this value.

Evidence of the child's need and persistent effort to discover the rationale of the controls or standards which he finds around him is forthcoming in a characteristic which appears at this stage and which, though noted by several writers, seems in every case to be not altogether correctly interpreted. This is the child's rigorous insistence on the strict observance of routine or custom in the matters of everyday life; and his manifest discomfort when he finds any departure from such routine, however trivial such departure may seem to the adult. Sully, in discussing the phenomenon of what he calls the "binding influence of a repeated, regular manner of proceeding," says: "Yet I believe the facts point to something more [than "a reflexion, by imitation, of others' orderly ways"], to an innate disposition to follow precedent and rule, which precedes education and is one of the forces to which education can appeal. This disposition has its roots in habit, which is apparently a law of all life: but it is more than the blind impulse of habit, since it is
reflective and rational and implies a recognition of the universal." (1) It is usual and natural to consider this tendency as representing the inauguration of the imperious sway of custom or habit; nor does Sully's more careful and discriminating statement appear to differentiate it sufficiently from habit. That the habit interpretation is mistaken seems clear if we remember the two relevant facts, (a) that the peculiarity is often extraordinarily marked and associated with great intensity of feeling, and (b) that it occurs during a period which is par excellence the period of rapid growth and of mental flexibility and which is therefore unlikely to manifest a habit phenomenon of this kind.

The true explanation is probably to be found in the fact mentioned above that a dominant need or interest of the child at this period is that of understanding his social environment, of finding that 'method' which he feels exists underneath its seeming aberrations. His mind eagerly seizes upon the uniformities of the ordinary daily routine, for they hold out the promise of that mastery for which he is striving. Hence it is not surprising that he is the implacable enemy of "the exception"; for the exception profoundly disturbs that hard-won and still growing sense of his personal bearings.

The same motive appears in the child's so-called 'keen sense of justice', -- his quickness to detect any departure from the canons of justice which his elders have imparted to him and which, because of his very rudimentary powers of abstraction and generalization, he is apt to interpret

(1) Studies of Childhood, p. 261.
in a disconcertingly literal manner. So also when he feels that he has been unjustly treated, his tendency is to brood over the circumstance to a degree which may appear altogether unreasoning and perverse. To attribute to him a keener sense of justice than is possessed by the adult is to use that phrase either equivocally or incorrectly. The explanation is to be found in something more general. His efforts to understand and to enter into the ideas and purposes of his social environment have been rudely baffled and thwarted, and he suffers under a keen, rankling sense of disharmony, of personal impotence, in the presence of an environment which has suddenly shown itself so uncongenial to his spirit.

Benevolence. With regard to this value, little need be said at this stage in the child's career. The fundamental capacity which is implied is that which we found presupposed in the understanding of justice, namely, reflective sympathy; and the agencies operating to vest the value with authority are the same. By force of precept and example, the consciousness of a duty or obligation to consult and promote the happiness of others is beginning to make its appearance. Moreover, the child finds this quality of benevolence glorified in the ideal creatures of his legendary and fairy lore. As in the case of justice, the relatively small family group offers special facilities for the appreciation of this quality as something conducive to a more perfect social harmony.

Veracity. The study of the child's attitude to this value has received special attention from the psychologists, and a considerable amount of evidence has been accumulated
of the topic of 'children's lies'. Directly or indirectly, the psychological facts brought to light are of ethical interest. Statements to the effect that the child's natural, original impulse is to tell the truth and that lying is one of the unhappy results of his social experience are of course not to be taken seriously by the psychologist. They probably echo the philosophic or semi-religious preconception of child nature as essentially and primarily 'good'. From the psychologists's viewpoint, this notion is no less devoid of justification or, indeed, of meaning, than the opposing theory of the child's original 'badness'. The simple psychological fact which might be thus falsely interpreted is the fact that prevarication involves an intellectual process, a conscious manipulation of the facts, which can find its motive only in social relationships and which of course will not occur apart from such motivation. On the other hand, when such a motive is present, there can be no conceivable reason in the child's own consciousness (social training apart) why he should not distort the facts to effect his adjustment. Again, the so-called 'unconscious falsehood' of children is not exactly in point here. For this represents, on the one hand, a special case of the child's impulse to a free, untrammeled exercise of his capacity for imaginative construction -- and this we have already discussed -- and, on the other hand, an example of a highly imperfect synthesis, manifesting itself in a failure to distinguish consciously between his ideal and his real world. 'Day-dreaming', again, is a special kind of falsification, already referred to, the significance of which will be indicated later.
The exercise of social authority is especially directed against the manipulation of the facts with the conscious intention to mislead others; and the child therefore early learns to identify lying with action of this kind. Such technical lying occurs either by way of averting punishment or of securing some personal advantage. Such personal advantage may involve nothing more than the attraction of others' admiring attention to himself,—a source of satisfaction which is more readily accounted for if we admit an instinct of self-assertion. But this conscious manipulation may well proceed from other and less discreditable motives. As Miss Drummond points out, the desire to preserve social harmony may prompt him to falsehood. (1) The interest of this motive lies in the growing appreciation, which it implies, of smooth-working, harmonious social relationships. In other words, his social development has proceeded to a point at which the internalization of the authority attaching to veracity can to some degree be achieved. The child is beginning to realize in some measure that the disregard of this standard entails friction and disharmony in his social environment. While we may admit, therefore, a certain measure of appreciation of this value, it must nevertheless be pointed out that at this stage its authority is essentially external. As in the case of the other social values, a fairly protracted social experience is necessary before there can be much real appreciation of how the continuance of those manifold and satisfying activities of his social life is bound up with a regard for veracity on the part of himself and others. Nor must we confuse this true appreciation, (rooted in well-established, satisfying habits (1) Five Years Old or Thereabouts, p. 141.
of social action) with a seeming appreciation that is really a matter of direct sympathetic reproduction of the feelings of others. The young child may very well assume a markedly emotional attitude to lying, but such feeling at this stage is doubtless to be ascribed to the operation of primitive, passive sympathy, in virtue of which the feelings of others tend to be directly induced in the child. (1)

(1) Note. A full discussion of lying in all its important aspects will be found in an essay by M. Duprat, 'Le Mensonge'. These aspects are numerous enough fully to justify our inclusion of 'veracity' as a separate value along with justice and benevolence which themselves, theoretically speaking, imply veracity. In a special section on children's lies, M. Duprat refers to the investigation of 250 cases of children's lies which are classified as follows:

| 42 négatifs  | (26 de dénégation) |
|             | (6 de disimulation) |
|             | (10 d' attenuation) |
| 141 positifs| (70 d' invention mensongère) |
|             | (21 de faux en écriture) |
|             | (4 de simulation) |
|             | (18 de déformation) |
|             | (18 d' exagération) |
|             | et environ 75 mensonges mixtes. |

Such investigations are numerous and their interest consists in the fact that they bring out the variety of the forms which the lying of children assume. M. Duprat rightly remarks that the actual figures have not much scientific value because parmi tous les mensonges connus de lui, un instituteur ou un père de famille relate celui ou ceux qui lui paraissent les plus intéressants pour une raison ou pour une autre, ceux que l'expérience antérieure, les préjugés, les tendances predominantes
At the same time, making all allowance for this very real source of error, the preponderance of the positive type of falsehood is significant. M. Duprat sums up the general situation in these words: "Il semble qu'en général, chez les enfants, les imaginatifs, inventeurs de mensonges ou fourberies, soient plus nombreux que les négateurs et les dissimules, mais ce qui est surtout digne de remarque, c'est qu'on trouve chez les enfants comme chez les adultes anormaux une quantité déjà notable de menteurs sans imagination vive, sans pouvoir créateur, plutôt dénegateurs systematiques, à opposer à une quantité très notable de menteurs par imagination, par jeu plus ou moins malin, par rupture d'équilibre mentale au profit de l'invention illusoire." (pp. 56-57) The latter type of falsehood is unquestionably the childish type; the former (négateurs) M. Duprat correctly accounts for as "héréditairement craintifs, débiles ou victimes de la brutalité de leur proches." (p.59)
We may pass over what we have called the group values, in so far as the present stage is concerned. On the whole, it may be safely said that the child, during this period, hardly becomes conscious of these values. It is true that the school or kindergarten, with its wider social circle, may, under certain conditions, foster this consciousness even here; but it is not until the next period that these values become really important. Group games, which are pre-eminently the educative agencies in this regard, are not characteristic of the present individualistic period -- a fact which is recognized and perhaps overemphasized in the Montessori system.

We come now to the question of the integration or general synthesis during the period. Hitherto we have considered the 'value-stuff', so to speak, with which the child is called upon to weave the texture of an ethical self-hood. The development of such a self-hood is essentially a question of the integration of these diverse values into some kind of unity; and from that point of view the period presents characteristics of peculiar interest.

Fundamentally, it is a period of almost complete intellectual and emotional in-coordination. We have already seen how the mental life at this stage is a life of "many-sided interest" in one sense -- the superficial sense -- of that famous phrase; and it remains to point out how far the period falls short of that intellectual and emotional unity or coordination which, whatever else it intended, the Herbartian ideal certainly implied.

In his world of knowledge, of creative imagination or of social relationships, the child is still eagerly groping for new experiences and reveling in the exercise of his new-found capacities. The boundary lines between the real and
ideal world are uncertain, indistinct. -- in fact they have still to be drawn. The non-coordinating, non-systematising, in a fundamental sense, the non-critical character of his activity is well revealed in his attitude to what we have called his world of art. The satisfactions which he derives from this source are in one way not dissimilar to the nature satisfactions of later years. But they are totally uncritical of their own nature and worth. His facile imagination is exercised, in a veritable "all-or-none" manner, to supplement, or compensate for the deficiencies of his real world. The more basic need for new and satisfying experiences is thus for the time being abundantly satisfied. As his development proceeds, his attitude to these satisfactions reveals an increasing discrimination in proportion as they are harmonized with the needs and demands of life.

It seems a point worth emphasizing that this stage of intellectual and emotional incoordination, of versatility, of breadth without depth, of shallow many-sidedness of interest, of 'scrappiness', as it has been variously described, is to be regarded as a normal incident of the child's mental growth. To make no provision for it is to impoverish the soil from which the ethical self-hood must spring. The Mother School curriculum of Comenius, therefore, (in spite of what may appear to us now as that writer's somewhat preposterous pansophic ideal) seems to reveal a truer educational instinct than the Montessorri curriculum. It does not seem unfair to suggest that the latter realizes a premature unification or integration only by too early a pruning of the rich overgrowths of the child-mind. Montessorri's exclusive attention to only one side of the child's constructive activities seems to justify this criticism, though it would be fully conceded that she has
practically solved the problem of the particular aspect of mental growth with which she deals.

This lack of coordination of his multiple interests is but the outward expression, the symptom, of an inner integration which is only in its most incipient stages. The process of selection and synthesis of experiences, finally resulting in the organization which we call the 'self', is in its very beginnings. This development is bound up with the growth of representative activity. In connection with the growth of representation, there are two processes to be considered. First, we have to consider the integration of representative elements into an orderly temporal series; i.e., a series based on the fact of mere sequence in time; second, we must consider the integration of representative elements on the basis of the apprehension of causal and logical relations.

The former process is represented in the growth of the so-called memory series or train, and we may consider it first. The selection and integration of past experience which is given in the memory series is the basis of the child's apprehension of temporal relations or, to use the common phrase, of his time sense. Hence the development of the timesense may be taken as a direct indication of the growth of representative activity.

The question of the child's level of development in this respect is basic to the problem of ethical growth; for in the absence of such a representative train, which preserves and makes available for the present direction of conduct special experiences from the past, we cannot strictly regard the present act as consciously expressive of the individual in the sense in which an ethical act is considered as expressive of the whole individual. Of course, it is true that any act, psychologically
considered, is simply an expression of the sum-total of the individual's adjustments; past experience, in the form of representative or organic memory makes the act what it is. But from the ethical viewpoint an act, if it is to be regarded as thus expressive of the self and hence to become the object of ethical judgment, presupposes the preservation of the past to some degree in representative form.

The development of the time sense in the child, which may be taken as indicative of the degree of representative growth, has received some attention from the psychologists. They are unanimous as to the relatively late appearance of anything in the nature of that precise apprehension of temporal relations of which the adult is capable. Meumann(1) and others have pointed out that the child's apprehension of temporal concepts is limited to very short periods, such as a day, while concepts such as a week, a month, a year, fifty years and so on tend to be vaguely referred to the past without any real discrimination between them. The "long, long ago", which officially opens the childish tale is thus fully justified of psychology. So also with his understanding of future references. Excellent indirect evidence of the practical non-existence for the young child of that kind of integration implied by the possession of a time-perspective is supplied from a study of the story preferences of children.

Many factors, of course, affect such preferences. But an analysis of these factors seems to confirm in an interesting way conclusions about the time sense of the child which have been arrived at by other means. In the matter of story preferences, a significant feature of this stage is the child's practical disregard

of the time factor. In the subsequent periods also, as we shall see, the growing appreciation of temporal relations is reflected in story preferences. (1)

It may be concluded, then, that the child has not yet achieved the integration of representative elements into a stable memory series. He is capable, however, of recalling isolated experiences and, further, his representation of these is frequently characterized by such a vividness and fidelity of detail as to conceal the essential rudimentariness and inadequacy of his representative processes. Such vivid representation is accompanied by a correspondingly vague location in time. As Kirkpatrick suggests, the child in such cases is possibly not at all "thinking of the past as past, but merely living it over again by the help of words and images without recognizing that it is a reproduced rather than a real experience." (2)

Still more defective is the child's apprehension of causal and logical relations and his capacity to integrate experiences on the basis of such relations. This kind of integration is obviously a higher and later achievement that the temporal series, for it implies both a wider experience and a certain development of 'free' ideas. (3)

The general outcome of this intellectual limitation of childhood -- undeveloped capacity for representation-- may be summed up by saying that the child's reactions tend to be predominantly of the perceptual type. Generalization and abstraction

(1) See _Stories in Children's Science and History_ [University of Wisconsin Press]. This is an extensive investigation of the question as to the stories that are preferred at the different stages. A consideration of the results seems fully to justify the statement in the text.

(2) The Individual in the Making, pp. 104-105.

(3) see p. 86.
have, of course, been operative throughout in the sense that he has been learning to react to the general features of situations. But these general features have only to a very limited extent been consciously isolated and apprehended. In other words, his development hitherto might be described rather as a process of training, in the sense in which that term might be applied to one of the higher animals, than as a process of education. It has been shewn, of course, that in certain essential respects he is already far ahead of the animals but he is still far from having freed himself completely from the limitations of this perceptual level.

It is in connection with the social values that this intellectual limitation is most apparent. We have already seen why these values should long remain essentially external to the child; it remains to point out that not merely the appreciation but even the apprehension of them must be a difficult process. He must learn to isolate and attend to situations so as to grasp the general or universal element in them; he must learn to detect identities that are overlaid by very obtrusive differences. This necessitates powers of abstraction and generalization on a somewhat higher plane than are needed for the apprehension of the general features, and hence for the classification, of the objects of perceptual experience. It is important to remember, however, that in both cases, language performs the same essential function. As already pointed out (1), this function is twofold; viz., that of expressing or summing up the generalizations already achieved and that of stimulating the mind to further exploration. This second function of language is apt to be overlooked; the new

(1) See p. 70.
word offers the active mind of the child the stimulus of a new problem. Hence one justification of direct authoritative exhortation, at least in an occasional way, in connection with moral terms of which the meanings are but dimly apprehended. Froebel had probably this important psychological fact, among other things, in his mind in his discussion of the inter-relations of religion, nature and language. The terms of morality, meagre without doubt in point of intellectual content, but rich with the authority and prestige of their social source, initiate those higher processes of mind which will eventually uncover the bed-rock principles on which all true human association is founded.

Definite limits, too, will obviously be set to the development of his emotional life. As we have seen, this is a period of rapid emotional expansion, but its characteristic limitation appears when we consider the question of emotional organization. Sentiment formation or the organization of the emotions around definite objects is of course only in its incipient stages. Moreover, the kind of object which can become the centre of such an emotional organization is limited to the class of concrete objects which are presented in sense experience. The sentiments formed with reference to abstract objects clearly do not pertain to this period.

The position as a whole may therefore be summed up as follows: There is little or no integration of experiences into a stable representative series on the basis of temporal and causal bonds. That synthesis which gives to life its perspective, which gives to experience its meaning and its value and which controls the individual in the choice of his ends and

(1)cf. Education of Man (Hartmann's trans.) esp 881
(2) But see ch XI
guides him to his true satisfaction, is only in its sporadic, fragmentary beginnings. In discussing the primary fundamental meaning of 'good' in our first chapter, we distinguished between two senses in which the notion might be said to be primary; a psychological sense, in which there was yet no direct ethical implication and in which 'good' was identified simply with the satisfaction of impulse; and a primary ethical sense, according to which this satisfaction was found to be determined with conscious reference to past experience: i.e., the available whole of experience is appealed to. Only to a very limited extent can we regard the actions of the young child as being of this nature. At this stage, therefore, he cannot on the whole be considered as a proper object of ethical judgment, despite the fact that his experience is, as we have shewn, replete with ethical significance. For the same reason, those special organizations of impulse implied in the possession of the 'virtues' are only in the embryo stage. For the growth of these character traits which are considered 'virtuous' or 'good' likewise imply representation and organization inasmuch as they imply the capacity to evaluate immediate in the light of remote satisfactions and to act for remote ends. In our last chapter we discussed the kind of deficiencies of endowment which may preclude altogether the attainment of the truly ethical stage. It will suffice to indicate here the general reason why the child is not yet a proper object of ethical judgment. From first to last, ethical shortcoming or failure is associated with obedience to the dictates of the isolated impulse. But in their very nature the impulses of childhood are isolated, isolated in the sense that there is yet no hierarchy or system which furnishes a principle of control or inhibition.
Here at least is a fundamental sense in which we would agree to the sharp Freudian contrast between the child's absorption in the 'Pleasure' principle and the adult's subjection to the 'Reality' principle. George Eliot, that excellent student of childhood, touches the core of its psychology when she talks of "the dim guesses, the strangely perspectiveless conception of life that gave the bitterness (of childish grief) its intensity".

(1) The Mill on the Floss, chap. 7.
Chapter 8

Ethical Development in Childhood

Our discussion of the ethical growth during the second period---the period of childhood proper---will be governed by what appear to be the two dominant facts concerning the period. viz., (a) there is comparatively little growth in the sense of expansion, of assimilation of new experiences, and (b) development in the sense of the integration or synthesis of experience occurs on a very large scale. Hence the discussion may be conveniently divided into these main topics: (a) a consideration of the direction in which actual expansion occurs; (b) the study of the integrative process during the period, the process which in the earlier period we found only in its most rudimentary beginnings; and (c) the further study of the process by which the individual's consciousness of the authority attaching to the values is deepened and of the extent to which the authority is still further internalised. Real expansion appears to take place only in one direction, but the kind and degree of development achieved in this direction is supremely important from our point of view. Associated with this stage is participation, for the first time, in the kind of activities from which emerges the consciousness of what we called the group values. Our first task, therefore, is to study the rise of this consciousness.

Emphasis must be laid on the point that the development of this group's consciousness is a gradual process. Statements to the effect that at this stage the child is essentially individualistic and that a truly social consciousness does not appear until early adolescence, are beyond question mistaken if they are intended to mean that there is a sudden emergence of social consciousness at the later stage. We may grant that the observation of children's play during the second
half of the childhood period clearly confirms the view (quoted by Stanley Hall) according to which, "from seven to twelve, games are almost exclusively individualistic and competitive but in early adolescence.....the plays are predominantly team games, in which the individual is more or less sacrificed for the whole." (1) Kirkpatrick too, emphasises the importance of the competitive or rivalry motive in the play of the child and, indeed, in his activities as a whole at this stage. "The most prominent new tendency," he says, "that appears during the period is the tendency to compete with others in all lines." (2) But while we may admit that it is only about the beginning of adolescence that we find evidence of a keen group consciousness, this does not mean that such a group consciousness supervenes suddenly on an earlier period of individualism. Such a notion really belongs to that type of psychology which finds the all-important principle of mental growth in the appearance of definite instincts at certain stages and pays scant heed to processes of habituation that have been steadily going on in the meantime.

The "social" consciousness of early adolescence is discussed more carefully later. Here we may remark that this consciousness is essentially the fruit of the early social experience and training which we consider in the present chapter. The group consciousness, as it appears in the adolescent, is in no sense to be identified with a mere gregarious instinct, although probably an instinctive factor of this kind enters into and colours it. A process of training has developed this consciousness out of the individualism of the earlier period. By calling the infancy period truly individualistic, we mean to say that social, in the sense of corporate activities have not formed part of the infant's experience

(1) Youth; Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene; pp 83-84.
(2) The Individual in the Making; p. 166.
at all. Hence one important aspect of the childhood period. It represents the more or less gradual transition from a stage of practically non-existent group consciousness to a stage of group consciousness which is well-marked. (1) The process of socialisation goes on pace throughout the whole period. An essential aspect of this process is the gradual development in the child of an attitude in the growth of which there are really two stages: (a) the tendency to discontinue activities which bring him into conflict with his fellows; and (b) the tendency to attach value to ends or activities which do not involve conflict with his fellows but which, on the contrary, may be, and often must be, pursued in co-operation with them. Value will not normally be attached to ends to which his fellows are clearly indifferent. But among the ends which they value, he finds that there are some which are 'non-competitive'; the pursuit of them does not bring him directly into conflict with others, and such pursuit may admit of co-operation with others. This attitude, as we shall see later, is an essential aspect of the ethical attitude and is, of course, the outcome of the entire process of ethical training. But the foundations are laid in the period at present under consideration.

Now the above paragraph really states all that we fundamentally mean when we say, for instance, that during this period, the 'possessive' or 'acquisitive' instinct is disciplined or repressed. In point of fact, we may best deal at this juncture with a tendency which, as commonly treated by the economists and psychologists, is apt to occasion a serious confusion of thought. We refer to the so-called acquisitive or possessive instinct. An examination of this so-called instinct at this point in our argument will, we hope, achieve two results: (a) the indication of the real nature of the

(1) a.f.Welton: Moral Training, P.121.
development at the present stage of childhood, -- a development usually associated in psychological literature with a loose and vague discussion of an instinct of acquisition, possession or ownership as it is variously called; and (b) an explication of the real origin and significance -- especially ethical significance -- of the kind of behaviour which the advocates of this instinct have in view.

Our examination of this 'instinct' will lead us to the following conclusions: (a) It is possible that there is what we may call a 'collecting' or 'hoarding' instinct. (b) If there is such an instinct, the significance of it, except for special pedagogical purposes, seems to be trivial. (c) Such a mere 'collecting' instinct must be clearly distinguished at the outset from the acquisitive or possessive 'instinct' in the sense in which the latter refers to a fundamentally important fact of psychology which possesses basic significance for social science. (d) A rigorously scientific psychology would incline to deny the existence of an instinct in the latter sense and would hold that what we have here is a powerful 'tendency' which is the product of experience. The innate basis of it would be traced to certain elementary ways of reacting to objects, --- ways already provided for in the statement of native endowment. (e) The connection between this important tendency and the 'collecting' instinct (if there is one) seems at the most incidental and superficial.

Let us consider the difficulty as it appears in connection with the fully developed forms of this acquisitive or possessive tendency. The individual who devotes the bulk of his energies to the amassing of wealth, to the extension of his property in land, to the securing of rare art specimens and so on, would be said to be actuated by a powerful possessive instinct. Other motives might of course be admitted, but the acquisitive instinct would be regarded as the
dominant motive. On the other hand, when Darwin devotes his life to the acquisition of knowledge of a certain kind, no one thinks of accusing him of being actuated by a strong acquisitive instinct. Nor is the charge forthcoming in the case of the man who travels round the world in order to 'acquire' interesting experiences. There is 'acquisition' in some sense in both cases and, in the former case, the acquisition is said to be the manifestation of an acquisitive instinct, while at the same time the conduct of the individual concerned would be held ethically reprehensible. Neither judgment would be made with regard to the latter. What is the real difference between the two cases?

Clearly the first difference concerns the kind of thing that is being acquired. In the former case, what is being acquired is certain means to possible interesting experiences. Moreover, the possessions acquired are physical or material possessions in some form. We do not, for instance, talk of a man as having a strong acquisitive tendency because he is fond of power and strives for positions of authority. Now, just because these possessions, which the acquisitive man seeks to secure, are material possessions, they represent 'competitive' objects. That is, the supply of them is usually limited and one man's possession essentially means other men's deprivation. At the level of acquisition of which we are now speaking, that will normally be the case, for at this level men will, broadly speaking, strive for the possession of the same kind of material objects. That is, they will strive, in the main, to secure the 'valuable' material objects. Hence, when we describe conduct like this as the manifestation of a possessive instinct (at the same time regarding it as more or less reprehensible, ethically considered), we seem to have three things in our minds. (a) The objects are material objects and hence the supply is limited. (b) The acquisition of them
brings the individual into competition or conflict with his fellows. (c) The objects are means to possible satisfying experiences in the future, that is, they are means which will 'keep'. We submit therefore, that there may be abundant reason for ethical condemnation of the pursuit of such objects; but where, exactly, is the justification for calling the pursuit of them the manifestation of a special instinct of acquisition? In the mere fact that the objects are material objects? If so, then we show below good reason for holding that, in the main, this pursuit of material objects can be explained without the assumption of a special instinct. The only instance where this explanation is perhaps unconvincing is to be found in the phenomena indicated by the 'collecting' or 'hoarding' instinct; and these phenomena we shall discuss separately.

Let us try to get back to the psychological beginnings of this acquisitive tendency. The question which we must try to answer is: is there an innate or instinctive sense of the 'meum', an unlearnt or directly innate tendency to distinguish between 'meum' and 'tuum'? That is the form in which the question is usually put and, as a rule, answered with a careless affirmative. But how, in actual fact, does this 'meum' and 'tuum' situation arise?

Thorndyke describes the earliest manifestation of acquisitiveness thus: "To any not too large object which attracts attention and does not possess repelling or frightening features the original response is approach or, if the child is within reaching distance, reaching, touching and grasping. An object having been grasped, its possession may provoke the response of putting it in the mouth or of general manipulation, or both." (1) So far we have only a satisfying experience resulting from response to an object by means of ordinary reflexes and the curiosity impulse. But Thorndyke's next sentence requires careful scrutiny. "The sight of another human being going for the

(1) Educational Psychology, vol. 1. p.61.
object or busied with it strengthens the tendencies towards possession. (1)

What is meant by "strengthens the tendencies towards possession"? We presume that this means that the child, if he happens to be holding the object, grasps it more firmly. But is this not a direct habit reaction due to his experiences in the past with human beings, experiences involving the drawing of objects away from him, putting them out of his reach and so on? A crucial test would be whether the child would thus react to the presence of another human being before he had experiences of that kind to any extent. This is an obvious test, though somewhat difficult to arrange, and we are not aware that there is any information on the point. Hence not only would the presumption be to the effect that this reaction is based on past experiences but this ought certainly to be the attitude of the scientific psychologist. We would thus trace the acquisitive tendency back to its origin in certain elementary tendencies already provided for. The ultimate origin of it would be found in the simple grasping and manipulative movements described above in the quotation from Thorndyke. But we can hardly say that these early movements represent the beginnings of a special acquisitive 'instinct'. They are simply the expressions in certain satisfying ways of tendencies already recognised.

The situation, then, is simple enough. The child receives satisfying experiences from grasping and handling an object. A possible obstruction to this pleasureable activity appears in the shape of another human being. The conation is therefore intensified or strengthened just as any conation whatsoever tends to be reinforced when it meets with an obstacle. Thorndyke's next sentence makes this clear: "To resistance the response is pulling and twisting the object and pushing away whoever or whatever is in touch with it." (1)

Now have we not here all the psychological ingredients, so to speak, of the 'meum' and 'tuum' situation? They would be, in effect: an

(1) opp. cit.
object from which interest, satisfying experiences are being either experienced or anticipated; another human being, reacted to (owing to habit) as an actual or possible obstacle; hence the object more tightly grasped or more vigorously striven for. This kind of situation is multiplied endlessly in the child's experience. The situation acquires a peculiar emotional tone or value and this, in effect, is the feeling of 'mineness' as against 'thinness'. The entire psychosis is the product of experience and calls for no new instinct to explain it. The more elaborate acquisitive activities which we considered above are in the direct line of its growth. Furthermore, the tendency is in its essence anti-social, but it is so in the sense, exactly, that other human beings are essentially regarded as obstacles. Hence, when Bertrand Russell distinguishes between the creative and the possessive impulses and asserts that "The best life is that in which creative impulses play the largest part and possessive impulses the smallest," (1) the statement might almost, in the light of the above discussion, be described as a truism. For the possessive impulse, by definition, is a powerful tendency, generated and developed in experience, to pursue objects of a certain kind in opposition to or in competition with our fellowman. Nothing that is here said is incompatible with the notion that the later expressions of this tendency may give occasion for the development of character traits (e.g. perseverance) which are in themselves admirable. (2)

The possessive or ownership 'instinct' is commonly said to be very marked during the period of childhood with which we are occupied in the present chapter. What does this statement mean on our view? In the first place, we would point out that the satisfaction of an instinct of possession is commonly confused with the satisfaction of

(2) F. Dreyer, Instinct in Man, p. 169.
a very different impulse, namely, the constructive or experimentation impulse. The latter, as will presently be seen, is important at this stage. For example, when the boy builds a hut or constructs a raft, the essential satisfaction lies, not in the fact of ownership, but in the fact of creation or authorship. It is not the "it belongs to me" but the "I made it" that occasions the thrill. In the second place, the dominance of the tendency at this stage is to be closely connected with another characteristic which we discuss in the present chapter, namely, the boy's preoccupation with the physical or material world. (1) After what has been said above, it is unnecessary to point out the connection between the two tendencies.

One aspect of acquisitiveness has not yet been mentioned. This is the fact that the acquisitive tendency may be directed to an extraordinary variety of objects, including objects of the most useless description. (2) The question really raised by this fact is the question as to whether there is not a 'collecting' instinct which would account for irrational acquisitions of this sort. Such a 'hoarding' instinct appears to exist in the case of a large number of animals and there would be thus some ground for presuming that it exists in man. Assuming such an instinct, what relation are we to suppose to hold between it and the acquisitive tendency discussed above? A fertile source of confusion is the fact that they are as a rule tacitly identified with each other; and even when they appear to be distinguished, they are again confused in the course of discussion. (3) As a matter of fact it does not seem at all clear that we ought to identify them. For the collecting instinct appears considerably later than the possessive tendency and, moreover, it seems to follow a

(1) see pp 211-213.
(2) Some idea of this variety is given in "Child Life and Education". (Stanley Hall) pp. 210-211.
(3) ibid. Compare the essay on 'The Collecting Instinct' with that on 'The Psychology of Ownership'.
relatively independent course, reaching its maximum intensity at about
the age of ten and then declining. (1) At any rate, if we do identify
these tendencies, the natural thing would be to regard 'collecting' as
a special and later offshoot of possession, and hence, if our original
argument is sound, not really instinctive. In point of fact, the
possibility of accounting for the collection of seemingly useless
objects without the supposition of an instinct to collect has not been
sufficiently explored. The degree to which the manifest 'uselessness'
of the objects collected furnishes evidence for the existence of an
instinct has been much overestimated by the psychologists. Drever
points out that the evidence suggests that any object whatsoever may
be collected, and this observation seems sound. (2) As regards the
'uselessness' of the kind of object which the child may be found
collecting, this 'uselessness' looks dangerously like an adult
projection into child life. There may be excellent reasons in the
child's own mental history, for the 'value' which these things have
acquired. In other words, this value may be purely an 'individual'
affair, and not the racial value of mere collecting; that is, it would
be explained in terms of experience and not instinct. It would be
doubtless difficult to discover, in any particular case, just what
the reason is for this emotional 'fixation' on that 'useless' object.
But we must recognise that the psychologist's task is often a
difficult one, unless indeed he makes a practice of resolving his
difficulties by means of a 'deus ex machina' of special instincts. (3)

While, however, we are willing to admit the possibility of a
collecting instinct, we are not really called upon to investigate the

(1) c.f. Aspects of Child Life and Education: compare p. 208 and p. 256.
(2) Instinct in Man. p. 188.
(3) c.f. the manner in which the Freudian Psychology would account
for these fixations.
matter. Our concern is essentially with the tendency which is of prime importance in ethical growth, namely, the tendency which we have discussed under the head of the possessive or acquisitive tendency. The question might be asked: in view of the fact that this tendency becomes very powerful in later life, what do you gain by showing that the tendency is a product of experience and not the manifestation of a specific instinct? This question, which brings us to the justification of the entire discussion, may be answered briefly.

(a) The most important outcome is a correct interpretation of the ethical situation itself. We can now realise that, when we find an individual predominantly interested in acquisitive activities, we are not at all in the presence of an original instinct which is inordinately strong and against which the individual himself has perhaps been fighting a losing battle. We have, rather, a case in which real ethical education has been lacking. This tendency, which originated in and was fostered by experience, ought to have been and could have been disciplined and controlled by a sounder ethical training. The difference in point of view here is obviously of the first importance.

(b) We get a scientifically correct view of the tendency in question and this is the first duty of the psychologist. We may add, too, that in the case of this tendency a rigorously exact statement of its real nature makes a vast difference to the way in which we interpret many important phenomena in which economic science is interested. (1) The meaning of these behaviour-phenomena is now seen to be that the other tendencies, self-display, constructive instinct, etc. which we have

(1) The reader will perhaps be more convinced of the truth of this statement if, with the logical implications of the above discussion in mind, he reads, let us say, McDougall, Introd. to Soc. Psych. ch.14; Bertrand Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp.234-236; Parker, the Casual Laborer and other Essays, pp. 145-146. c.f. especially in the light of the foregoing discussion, Veblen's account in "The Theory of the Leisure Class: Ch.2"; and in "The Instinct of Workmanship, p. 217" (the misdirection of the Workmanship instinct).
already recognised, have been directed to a particular class of objects.

We may now proceed to consider the specific socialising influences brought to bear on the individual during the period of childhood. It will be remembered that the fundamental values of the political or group life were described as justice, equality, liberty, loyalty. The implications of these terms were also considered. While certain demands of the group life are reflected in the terms 'justice' and 'equality', nevertheless the deeper implications of them are to be found, as we saw, in an appreciation of the essential content of the notion of political liberty. Our examination of the attitudes and conceptions which are fostered in the individual by active participation in group life will serve as an explication or illustration in detail of the idea of political liberty as applied to the group unit.

In passing from infancy to childhood, the individual passes from an intimate but restricted, into a much wider sphere of social relations. Incidental to this transition, certain special maladjustments may occur, the nature and significance of which will be considered in a later chapter. In the meantime, we confine ourselves to a consideration of the manner in which the consciousness of the group values is developed as a result of this larger social experience. Two agencies are of outstanding importance in this connection and we shall consider their respective modi operandi. The first is organised or group play, the second is the school itself.

The importance of play for mental development in general has been very properly stressed by the psychologists. It is not, however, the innate play tendency, as such, that is under consideration here. Our concern is with these organised group activities into which the play instinct has been elaborated and which realise developmental purposes far in excess of those subserved by the instinct in itself. This

(1) See ch. XI.
aspect of play has not perhaps received the attention it deserves. If the Groos theory be true, the general form of such play will be largely determined by instinct, but from our point of view, the interest centres on those features of the game which are of directly social origin and which are transmitted, often with an interesting conservatism, from one generation of childhood to another. From the moment he begins to play the game or games proper to his age, the child finds himself heir to a fairly elaborate system of rules, and standards. These "rules of the game", which are his social play inheritance, are of peculiar importance for several reasons. To begin with, they are generally definite and detailed, and in this respect they are to be contrasted with the at least seemingly vaguer and more variable prescriptions which have hitherto claimed to control his activities. In another respect also these rules of the game are peculiar. They are enforced with a fine stringency that refuses even to contemplate exception. As a participant in the game, the child finds himself a member of a group, the watchword of which is justice and equality; in the incidence of these rules, all distinctions vanish, everybody counts for one and nobody for more than one. To ask the psychological explanation of children's extreme punctilio in this regard is to propound an interesting question. The more immediate explanation is to be found in the fact that this unrelenting stringency in the enforcement of rules is itself an integral part—prominently emphasised—of his social inheritance with regard to the game. But while it is true that he by no means evolves this conception of stern justice out of his own consciousness, but simply accepts it as unreflectively as he accepts the rules themselves, nevertheless nothing is clearer than the fact that he finds this rigid application of the rules congenial and satisfying. Why? The sections which follow will, we believe, furnish the fundamental answer to this
question which is not so simple as it may perhaps appear.

Attitudes and habits are therefore developed in strict accordance with the meaning of political justice and equality, and the child is familiarised with the notion of laws and standards which are impartially enforced within a given group. But the training in group life goes deeper than this. Just as the meaning of political justice and equality is directly apprehended by the child in connection with games, so also in the same connection he comes to realise in a practical way another fundamental fact of group life, namely, the fact of the essential inequality necessarily implied in the healthy functioning of the group. In the game, he is speedily made to realise his personal level, to apprehend his personal capacities and limitations and thus to discover his proper niche in the group. He realises that, if he is not to forego the many satisfactions of the game, he must limit and control himself in certain ways. He must follow, obey, imitate here, while he can dictate and initiate there. (1) It is no mere exaggeration to say that nowhere is political liberty, in its essential implications, better exemplified than in this kind of activity. The essence of liberty, in so far as group life is concerned, is the unimpeded exercise of capacities, subject to limitations which are accepted as necessary and beneficial in the light of the larger satisfactions arising out of concerted action for the sake of a common purpose. The discipline of the playground thus early engenders habits of social action and standards of judgment which are the starting point for the articulate political ideals and standards of later life. In a similar manner, the appreciation of the value which we described as 'loyalty' or 'fraternity' has its origin here. Play offers the earliest opportunity for conscious, deliberate cooperation with others for the realisation of a common

purpose and gradually habituates the child to that willing negation of purely individual impulse, which such cooperation involves. In fine, the organised play group may be said, in one essential respect at least, to represent an ideal form of association; for of the play group it is true, par excellence, that the individual is and feels himself to be at once means and end. The presence of individuals who are mere means is completely alien to the spirit of this group. To be in it is to be of it; such is the first principle of this form of association.

The educational limitations of play, however, must be recognised. These limitations are inherent in its very nature. The nature of play seems adequately characterised by saying that the satisfaction resides in the activity itself, while the end to which the activity is consciously directed has only a make-believe value. This is an obvious inversion of the order of things as the child will find them in real life, where he will be called upon to prosecute activities not directly or in themselves satisfying for the sake of an end of value. With regard to the education in the group values, to which we are for the present confining ourselves, the training afforded by the school itself approximates more closely to the conditions of real life. At the same time, the degree to which the school will furnish a training which is systematic and intelligent, instead of haphazard and blind, will vary enormously according to the principles underlying its organisation and inspiring its activities. Some modern educational thinkers, among whom Dewey deserves pioneer credit, (1) have rendered signal service to education by the impressive emphasis they have laid on the function of the school as a training ground for the cooperative activities of later life. Preparation for group life by means of participation in group

(1) c.f. Democracy and Education, p.416 et al.
activities at the school stage is the watchword of these thinkers. They would replace the individualism of school work by activities of a consciously cooperative kind. In other words, the school would, as far as possible, create situations or problems resembling those situations in real life which are not to be met by the individual in his own strength, but which demand cooperative effort. This would seem an eminently sound plea for the direct inculcation of the group values at a stage at which, as we have seen, the numerous benefits and satisfactions of group activity are already beginning to be appreciated, but appreciated, however, in connection with a kind of activity which is psychologically remote from the situations of real life. Yet there is one respect in which the group training, which these educationalists desiderate from the school, falls short, even at its best, of realising the conditions of later group life. We have seen that in the play situation we have a make-believe end and a valuable or satisfying process and, also, that in real life we have an end of value while the means to its attainment may be intrinsically unattractive. The school situation is not exactly identical with either of these situations, but seems indeed to involve the defects of both as far as the child's sense of value is concerned. The difficulty is that the ends to which the cooperative activities of the school would probably in the main be directed could only within limits be appreciated as 'real'; but at the same time they would not exactly be in the class of 'make-believe' ends. To use an apt phrase, they would be largely 'fictitious', (1) and this very fact of their fictitious character—a fact which is often more apparent than it need be—undoubtedly detracts from the general efficacy of school training. One habit of mind, of fundamental importance in later life, can only to a limited extent be fostered in connection with

(1) Darroch: Psychology & the Teacher (quoted by Adams: Evol. of Educational Theory, P. 226.)
the problems and tasks of the school. This is the habit of mind in virtue of which the individual tends to trace and appreciate the connection between the end of felt worth and the uninteresting, unsatisfying, perhaps even repugnant process involved in its realisation. One difficulty in making the ends of school activities appear 'real' to the child is that, when he has arrived at the stage of development which we have under consideration, he has already grown highly sensitive to the attitudes and opinion of his elders, and his sense of the 'reality' of an end is influenced in a marked degree by the attitude of his elders to it; and this attitude, as he sums it up for himself, may be considerably at variance with the assertions they may make with respect to the value in question.

Recognising this difficulty, however, we must at the same time point out that there are ends, which, though not exactly play ends nor yet 'real' ends in the above sense, nevertheless represent real ends for the child. Such are especially the ends which furnish satisfaction to his constructive or creative instinct. (1) The constructive impulse of the child may be made the basis of the corporate activities which we have discussed; for this impulse may receive an even greater satisfaction

(1) C.f. this statement of Thorndyke which rightly warns against the possible error of making too much of this fictitiousness of school values: "The reasons for the good showing that Arithmetic makes are probably the strength of its appeal to the interest in definite achievement, success, doing what one attempts to do; and of its appeal, in grades 5 to 8, to the practical interest of getting on in the world, acquiring abilities that the world pays for. Of these the former is in my opinion much the more potent interest. (The Psychology of Arithmetic, p. 212.)"
from corporate than from mere individual activities. This becomes clear when we consider the special kind of integration which the child is rapidly achieving at this period of his development.

The question as to the nature and extent of the integration at this stage is most conveniently approached from two points of view. The unification of interests or values is one aspect of the problem, the other aspect is found in that inner synthesis which represents the content of the idea of self.

With regard to the former question, let us consider the transformation which the knowledge value undergoes during the period. This transformation may be described by saying that, during the period from about six to about twelve years, the restless, undiscriminating curiosity of infancy is more or less rapidly superseded by a much more limited interest in knowledge. This restricted interest is sometimes described as essentially a practical interest; knowledge is said to be interesting in so far as it is seen to contribute towards the attainment of practical results or objects. There is an important ambiguity, however, in the term 'practical' in this connection. One meaning of the term 'practical' we may pass over as irrelevant here. This is the familiar sense of practical in which we apply the term to the individual who is skilled and interested in mere technique as opposed to the individual who is interested in underlying principles. From our point of view, 'practical' activities may mean activities that are intended to minister to material needs, needs of the kind that we have already considered. (1) To say that the child's interest in knowledge is practical in the sense that he is interested in it as a means to certain ulterior rewards involves a superficial and false reading of the psychology of childhood. It is to mistake an occasional motive, largely indeed artificially forced on the child by ourselves, for a deeper, more

(1) see pp. 40--42.
permanent motive. But 'practical' as applied to children, may mean the tendency to find satisfaction predominantly in the manipulation of material objects, that is, objects of perceptual experience. The need which motivates such 'practical' activity may itself be far removed from the 'practical' in the former sense of the term. The motive, in fact, turns out to be wrongly described as practical, though the activity itself may conveniently be so characterised. The truth appears to be that one of the noteworthy facts of development at the present stage is the growth of what has been called the 'experimentation impulse', the impulse which finds its satisfaction in achievement as such, in having created something, in "feeling oneself a cause". This is the impulse to which reference has been made several times in the foregoing pages and which we have designated by the commoner terms 'creative or constructive instinct'. We have already seen that this creative impulse may function in an important way in connection with the manipulation of other than physical objects. (1) Why is it particularly directed during this period, as it appears to be, to the physical world? The answer is to be found in another fundamental need of the present period, the need for physical activity, for the free exercise of the physical capacities of the organs. The creative impulse is determined, as regards the kind of objects with which it will occupy itself by this need for physical activity. Or, conversely, the need for physical activity is determined as regards its expression by the creative impulse. In point of fact, this preference for the objects of sense experience does not seem fully accounted for by the fact that these objects afford scope for physical activity. The preference is doubtless influenced by other organic needs; the investigation of the precise nature of these needs is a problem for the psychologist. It may be remarked in passing that we have here another illustration of the complicated character of the factors (1) see p. 108.
involved in motivation and of the danger of over-stressing any one factor.

Whatever be the ultimate explanation of it, this feature of the present stage seems clearly pronounced. The experimentation impulse is powerfully operative but limited in a characteristic way to the manipulation of the physical environment and to the production of physical results. Hence, while we may agree with Kirkpatrick that "during no period before this are there so few changes in the instinctive tendencies of the child,"(1) we must not forget this important phase of his growth. Moreover, among the arguments which have been adduced in support of the Culture-Epoch theory, perhaps there is none more plausible than that which points to the child's manifest delight in out-of-doors pursuits, in climbing trees, wading streams, making caves and so on. Satisfaction in such activities is doubtless in the main to be traced to the needs mentioned above.

When it is asserted, then, that the child's interest in knowledge tends to be an essentially practical interest, what is meant or ought to be meant is that he is mainly interested in knowledge in so far as it furthers this dominant interest. As compared with the earlier period, there is thus a considerable narrowing of the knowledge interest. The curtailment of this interest is one aspect of the integration or unification which occurs during the period. The final result, as will be seen, is a kind of life which is at once relatively narrow and self-sufficing.

The same process is again revealed in connection with the growth of the art interest. Here, too, we find the versatility, the many-sided responsiveness of the earlier stage replaced by a more restricted interest. The artistic value becomes integrated with other values to form an element in a unity which is being rapidly fabricated out of the distinction between the ideal and the real worlds. In healthy develop-

(1) The Individual in the Making, p. 169.
ment (1) this line of demarcation is truly and clearly drawn, and is henceforth never to be erased, although the limitations which it prescribes may often, and with beneficent results, be deliberately ignored or overcome. The child's attitude to the ideal world, as that attitude is revealed in his reactions to stories, shows a transformation the stages of which are clearly marked. The first symptom of this dawning realisation is the question: "is it true?" with which, sooner or later, the child comes to respond to these stories, hitherto merely accepted and enjoyed. "Is it true?" is symptomatic at once of this growing realisation of the fact of two worlds, and of his need to come to terms with the distinction between them. The kind of integration which finally occurs here is similar to that described in connection with the knowledge interest. The interest in the ideal world becomes likewise restricted within fairly well-defined limits. Examination of story-preferences at this stage reveals the fact that the preferred stories possess certain well-marked characters which reflect in an interesting way the mental needs of the period. These stories present an abundance of incident, idealising physical prowess and achievement on the one hand, and, on the other, certain definite qualities of character. The significance of this latter feature will be shown presently. A further noteworthy feature is the fact that the growing time-sense is making itself felt in the same direction. Interest in stories which disregard this factor tends to disappear. The apparent preference for the biographical form of story is, of course, partly to be explained by the relative simplicity which makes the situations in this form of story easier to grasp. But unquestionably there is another factor at work, namely, the effect of the growth of the time-sense on the notion of the self. As explained below, one aspect of the integrative process is the construction and

(1) see p. x.
stabilising of the ideational train which gives meaning to the concepts of past and future. This process has proceeded far enough to render biography intelligible and satisfying while at the same time biography, with its picture of completed lives, stimulates and furthers the integrative process itself.

As far as religious development is concerned, the present stage appears to present no new characteristic. Although this value still remains essentially external, there is a continued deepening of the sense of its authoritativeness in so far as the child continues to be subjected to certain social influences. The external forms, the ritual, the words and phrases of religion continue to amass these associations which may leave them for all time profoundly charged with their peculiar suggestions of mystery, solemnity and value. Thus, the mere fact of bowing the head and clasping the hands may to the last occasion a wave of feelings which have their origin in early experiences. These feelings will in due course colour the object of the developed religious consciousness, but for the present the intellectual attitude accompanying them is probably at the most but an attitude of vague interrogation.

But perhaps the most interesting aspect of this synthesising process is to be found in connection with the moral values, the values of the social and group life. The child's persistent efforts during the earlier period to find some order in the apparent chaos of his social relations have been already discussed. By the end of the present period, these efforts have resulted in the growth of what is to all intents and purposes a definite moral code. The term 'moral code' seems best to describe the kind of integration which the child achieves in respect of the numerous prohibitions, standards and regulations to which he has been subjected in his social relationships. It cannot be called a
systematisation of these controls, for it may possess but little inner coherence. Reflection is seldom brought to bear upon it, its inconsistencies and deficiencies for the present pass unobserved. The earlier tendency to ruminate over the social standards and values, occasionally revealing their incoherencies in a flash of unwelcome childish logic, has given way before the dominant practical interest. The interest in moral standards, like the interest in knowledge and art, has been trimmed to much narrower proportions. The code of morals, while thus restricted, is nevertheless definite and well-calculated to meet the demands of the familiar, regularly recurring problems and situations of the practical life. (1)

To appreciate the significance of the moral development, we must answer three questions concerning it.

(1) Why is such a code elaborated or constructed at all? What fundamental need or needs lead to this empirical and seemingly final solution of the moral problem?. This question has already been answered.

The contents of this code are not difficult to describe. On the side of the social and group values, we find disapprobation of very definite and obvious departures from the fundamental standards of conduct. For example, cheating, lying, stealing, cruelty, clearly marked selfishness, disloyalty and so on, are condemned. Again, there is some development of what McDougall calls 'sentiment for self-control.' This approbation of self-control occurs in connection with the child's activities generally, but more especially, perhaps, in connection with the duties and tasks of the school. 'Diligence' is a quality of which the importance has been steadily inculcated by his elders. This code of morals, moreover, becomes modified in certain ways to suit different parts or sides of the social environment. Thus, special modifications occur in connection with the family relation, the playground relation, the 'chum' or friendship relation. As regards school life, for example, an interesting appreciation of the boy's moral code is given by Rev. William Temple (The Modern Teacher, p. 264) This statement has in view a somewhat later age than is contemplated in the present chapter, but it illustrates well the general nature of the moral code of boyhood.
The child's code of morals is the fruit of long effort to come to terms with the intractable social environment, with its numerous baffling restrictions and prohibitions, standards and values. The fundamental need is best described simply, as the need for adjustment, for adaptation to environment, social and physical. Assimilation or mastery of certain elements in this environment (coupled with a temporary waning and loss of interest in other elements of it) and the integration of interests in the manner described, have resulted in an adjustment which is relatively complete and satisfying. Mental as well as physical growth often appears to have come to a standstill. This fact of the seeming completeness or self-sufficingness of the life of later childhood has been commonly remarked. Some writers--Stanley Hall, for example,--explain this fact by the hypothesis that the stage recapitulates a stage in race history when maturity was reached at this earlier age.

(2) What is the significance of this moral code for later development? Or, what is the permanently valuable result secured by it? The answer to this question is to be found in the far-reaching results of the habits which become firmly established. Habits of action in accordance with certain well-defined standards or principles have become deeply ingrained. Certain definite forms of response come to be directly bound up with the varied situations which the social environment presents. Nor is the process of habituation confined to action as such. Habits of judging social situations and problems in the light of these moral standards develop in the same unreflective, uncritical manner. Now enough has been said in the earlier part of this essay concerning the dynamic or drive generated by habit to make it unnecessary here to labour the importance of this solid groundwork of social or moral habits. As we shall see, these very principles and standards, which have controlled the formation of the habits of social behavior, are likely themselves to be called upon to justify their
existence and their claims before the impatient tribunal of dis-
satisfied youth. Nor will youth suspect, when it endeavours to re-
vitalize them and to elevate them to the level of its own ideal, 
instead of rejecting them as impostures, that their suggestive value, 
their power to attract the will, is largely founded on the routine 
of these early habits. (1)

(3) Our third question is: What is the sanction of this code? 
The sanctions mainly effective at this stage can be distinguished 
as (a) fear of punishment and hope of reward; and (b) fear of 
disapproval and desire for approval, i.e. the sanctions of social 
censure and social praise. We may pass over the first, partly because 
it plays only a minor role towards the close of the period, and partly 
because it raises no special difficulty. The problem of the ethics 
of punishment, that is, the question as to its true aims, - retribution, 
deterrence, or reformation - can hardly be said to arise in regard to 
the punishment of children. The sole justification for punishment 
here is obviously reformation. Punishment is valuable in so far as 
it leads the child to take the first steps towards the inhibition of 
impulse and in so far as it serves early to instil the vivid 
consciousness of an external authority. So also reward. This has 
its value in furnishing an effective motive for the postponement of 
present gratification for the sake of a more remote satisfaction. 
But the fact that this satisfaction is something external to the 
activity, something arbitrarily imposed from without, limits the value 
and points the danger of this kind of motive. The patent danger, of 
course, is that of fostering a habit of looking outside the activity 
to purely ulterior objects and of withdrawing attention from those 
activities which do not manifestly offer such definite personal gains. 

(1) c.f. Boyd: The Modern Teacher p.244; also Kirkpatrick: Fundamentals 
of Child Study; "The formation of habits is the most important thing in 
the preparatory stage of Moral development, since they will ultimately 
determine motives to moral ideals". p.186
But the dominant sanction towards the end of the period at any rate is susceptibility to social approval and disapproval. Two forms of this sanction must be distinguished; the child is not only sensitive to the judgment of his elders but also to the judgment of his equals. This stage, indeed, appears to be characterised by special susceptibility to the judgment of equals. (1) McDougall investigates in an interesting way the question as to the psychological explanation of this susceptibility to public opinion which we now find for the first time operative as a normal, regular motive. According to McDougall's analysis, the basic factors in the development of this attitude are the instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement. (2) We have already accepted, provisionally at least, the hypothesis of these instincts. But we are probably exaggerating the role of these instincts when we make them the essential factors underlying our susceptibility to social praise and censure. McDougall apparently assumes the identity of the self-assertive instinct in man with the display tendency which Darwin and others attribute to certain of the higher animals. Granting such a display tendency, we would naturally expect to find a similar instinct in man. But such an instinct would assert itself rather in an occasional way and more particularly in connection with the sex impulse. In point of fact, it appears to be at the stage at which this latter impulse is maturing that we find the most marked manifestation of the display impulse in the human being. The tendency to self-display, especially in the presence of members of the opposite sex, is very striking, for instance, in the young adolescent. Such occasional experiences, again, as the glow of exhilaration which many people experience when they suddenly find themselves in the limelight, or the painful shrinking and confusion of others under similar conditions, are neatly explained

as due to the existence of the two instincts of self-assertion and
self-abasement in different degrees of strength in different individuals.
But these two instincts do not seem to furnish convincing explanation
of the value which the individual comes to attach to public approval.
For here we are dealing with an attitude which appears relatively early
and, instead of weakening with age, becomes increasingly marked. The
logical outcome of an explanation in terms of a display instinct would
really be something of the nature of the Freudian hypothesis of the
radical and permanent role of the sex interest at all stages of growth. (1)

As a matter of fact, the phenomenon under discussion offers an
excellent illustration of the general position taken up in the present
essay, and exemplified in our treatment of tendencies such as imitation
and sympathy. There seems no good ground for denying that an instinctive
factor is operative. But on our view the role of this factor would be
relatively minor. To magnify its importance by finding in it the
'explanation' of the all-important tendency we are discussing is to
distort the picture of mental development. Is it not more convincing
to regard as the accumulated result of social training and experience
this value which the individual comes to attach, largely without
reflection or question, to public opinion. In other words, it would
represent essentially a habitual attitude. Certain instincts may
function to facilitate its formation but it does not seem right to
describe it as based on these instincts. For it is clear, when we
consider the mental history of the individual, that the development of
an attitude of this kind is inevitable, apart altogether from the
existence or non-existence of special instincts of the kind discussed.
From earliest infancy, the individual has been subjected, without inter-
(1) The special meaning of 'sex' in Freud does not affect this state-
ment.
mission, to experiences calculated to foster a 'social' consciousness of this kind. A basic feature of this process of socialisation is the growth of what is a mental habit, the habit of conscious social reference with respect to all his valuations. By a very natural process there grows out of this the habit of attaching value, or attempting to attach value, to those objects which are valued by the social environment. Among the judgments of society to which he comes to attach value or significance is society's judgments concerning his own conduct. That such a habit of mind should become ineradicably fixed is not surprising when one remembers how absolute, from infancy onwards, has been the individual's dependence on society for the satisfaction of his manifold needs. Dr. Jones, in discussing the child's dependence on society, denies that the effect of it would be to develop a habitual attitude of submission. He says: "The infant's needs are so automatically satisfied and the distinction he draws between self and the outer world is so rudimentary that he is much more likely to have a sense of power than of helplessness," (1)"; and again Dr. Jones tells us that "the fact that he has to rely on parents for his material welfare, food, clothes and so on, he takes very much for granted and it does not produce much psychological reverberation". (1) This appears, however, to misjudge the situation and to imply a mistaken conception of the kind of process involved in the growth of this habit. The formation of this habit by no means implies that the fact of his complete dependence is normally present to the child's consciousness. On the contrary, in so far as his elders continue to supply his wants as fast as he makes them known, he may certainly develop an illusory sense of his power. (1) British Journal of Psychology: July 1922, p.44. Dr. Jones does not deny, of course, the child's keen sense of dependence, but would explain the fact in terms of the psycho-analytic concept of the Oedipus complex.
Nevertheless, this incessant and necessary dependence on others for the satisfaction of his needs and for assistance in the prosecution of his purposes does its work. The accumulated result of these oft-repeated acts of dependence is a habitual attitude of mind of which the principal ingredient is a submissiveness to society's judgments and a tendency to experience a lively sense of value in connection with them. That this interpretation, rather than that of Dr. Jones, is the true one seems to be shewn, for example, by the extreme distress which so often overcomes the young child when he finds himself temporarily left alone in a strange place. In his general bearing at such a time there is little suggestion of personal power or self-sufficiency. It may be recalled that the principle under discussion was used in the explanation of one type of imitative activity.\(^{(1)}\) The objection might be raised that the kind of public opinion to which the child is most sensitive at the stage which we are considering in the present chapter is the opinion, not of his elders, but of his equals. But the fact that the susceptibility to the opinion of his equals is relatively the more marked at this period is due to special circumstances of growth which we have discussed in connection with group life. We have shown that for the first time he is experiencing and exploring the many satisfactions and pleasures of group life, and the habit of mind implied in his sensitivity to the opinion of the group is very rapidly and noticeably developed out of experience of the satisfactions and dissatisfactions bound up with behaviour approved and disapproved by the group. As far as the approval and disapproval of his elders concerned, the importance of it continues to be taken for granted. But their approval and disapproval are limited to the observance of certain well-defined standards or rules of behaviour. In the nature of the

\(^{(1)}\) See p.136.
case, therefore, the opinions of his elders do not concern him so intimately as the more minutely exacting and ever-present criticism of his peers.

So much for the general problem of the integration of values. It remains to consider the inner or subjective aspect of this integration, namely, the synthesis of the ideational or representative processes. In this respect, also, great advances are made. As in the case of the earlier period we may consider two important aspects of this ideational synthesis: (2) the ordering of the representative elements into a stable series on the basis of temporal or causal relations; and (b) the growth of the powers of abstraction and generalisation. With regard to the former, the degree of development is indicated by the rapid growth of the time-sense. Representative memory in the complete sense, involving not merely representation of past experiences, but their more or less definite location in the past, has undergone considerable development. The kind of representation needed for a more adequate apprehension of the distinctions of past, present and future is now possible. One important result of this development is that it renders possible the projection of a practical ideal of self. We say practical ideal by way of contrasting it with the mere fantasies of the previous stage. The growth of the time-sense at the present stage means the projection of ideals which are felt to have some connection with present realities, however slim that connection may be. The value of certain kinds of literature, and especially of biographical literature, in this direction has been already suggested. Such literature not only in large measure furnishes the content of childish ideals but also stimulates and quickens the growth of the time-sense itself. For it furnishes concrete examples of the larger integrations which the child is beginning vaguely and dimly to apprehend.

It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that the time-sense
reaches its full development here. On the contrary, it is still found to be highly imperfect. The concepts of past and future are still far from the precision which they will presently attain. Representative activity is still too undeveloped and the content of experience too meagre to admit of the formulation and projection of a completely practical, that is, a strictly and fully ethical ideal. The ideals of the child of twelve may well reveal a considerable uniformity and consistency with respect to their general nature, for they represent the projection on the grand scale of those activities and qualities which have become the central, unifying factors in his life. The ideals, too, may be vividly conceived. But they are still largely divorced from the actualities of his existence, for there is yet but little of that backward movement of the mind, as Dewey describes it, from the contemplation of the end to the serious consideration of the means for its attainment. In other words, these ideals have only to a very limited extent become the real principles of volitional control.

In the development of a relatively stable ideational train, there is implied, of course, a corresponding growth in the capacity for abstraction and generalisation. The degree to which abstract moral standards have been already appreciated is proof of rapid development in this direction. No better illustration could be given of the child's progress here than the fact that he has now normally achieved a very considerable feat of abstraction and generalisation: he has grasped the 'ought' concept. The 'ought' notion has been disentangled in particular from two other notions with both of which it possesses affinity of meaning, without being identifiable with either. The "I ought" has been distinguished from the "I must" and from the "I desire to" or "I am inclined to". Where our concern is purely with the psychology of the process, we must keep in mind that the child acquires the 'ought'.

(1) see p. 91.
concept precisely as he acquires the meaning of any other word. He finds it applied to certain kinds of situation and, given that he is capable of the necessary processes of abstraction and generalisation, he can learn to identify these situations. Moreover, these 'ought' situations involve consequences of a special kind,--different consequences, for example, from those involved in the "I must" or in the "I am inclined to" situations. It is clear that the "I ought" is concerned with the most elusive and complex of these three situations. As we have pointed out, it has a certain affinity with the other two, and the child finds it in his experience now clearly affiliated with the one, now with the other. In the bewildering variety of situations, he is called upon to apprehend the universal of the 'ought'; and this obviously demands high powers of abstraction and generalisation.

Taking this period as a whole, it might fairly be said to represent the completion of the first phase or movement of the ethical life. Without suggesting any complete break in the essential continuity of that life, we must nevertheless recognise the relatively complete integration that has been achieved. One characteristic which is commonly noted is symptomatic. This is the tendency, most apparent towards the close of the period, to the temporary withdrawal of interest from the activities of the adult social environment. At no time in the child's growth is his interest in his elders less than during the two or three years which precede the commencement of adolescence. This does not necessarily mean any diminution of the importance or value which he attaches to the judgments of adults in so far as these judgments are directly brought to bear on his own conduct. On the contrary, there is no period in his development during which he entertains such an implicit, unquestioning respect for his adult environment as now. But this environment is essentially represented for him in well-defined conduct
controls; these he has mastered and cherishes with a conservatism which is prophetic of the last stage when growth will have finally come to an end. Except for this narrowly practical interest in his elders, his attention is predominantly directed to his equals. The fundamental reason for this is to be found in the completeness with which he has integrated the impulses and needs of his nature and has found satisfying expression for them. Only with the disturbing, disintegrating effects of those further needs and impulses which a new phase of development will presently bring into being will his attention turn again, with listful enquiry, to the larger world of his elders.
CHAPTER IX

Nowhere does the practice of distinguishing special periods of growth appear to be better justified than in the case of the adolescence. Adolescence presents what is probably the most interesting, if not the most important, period of ethical development. To call it the most important period would perhaps be rash, for the ethical significance of the two earlier periods is far-reaching and profound. For this reason, it would be a serious mistake to suppose anything resembling a complete break in the individual's development. The notion of continuity in development is no mere hypothesis; as will be fully shewn in the following chapters, there is abundant evidence of an underlying continuity linking together stages apparently so diverse as adolescence and childhood. At the same time, the numerous and profoundly significant changes which occur during the period of adolescence must be recognized. These changes may well be striking enough effectually to conceal the essential continuity of personal growth; and, in any case, they are such as to lend a peculiar interest to this period from the point of view of ethical development. Mental growth is rapid as in the infancy period; but in adolescence the
different phases of growth can be better observed and more accurately interpreted.

The descriptive literature of adolescence is still far from voluminous. A study of this literature reveals a very encouraging measure of agreement on the part of the different writers as to the phenomena specially associated with the period. This is doubtless traceable in large degree to the influence of the great pioneer in adolescent psychology, Stanley Hall. No writer could afford to undertake a descriptive psychological account of adolescence without first reckoning with Stanley Hall's monumental contribution in this field. This common fountain head of information partly explains, then, the uniformity to be found in the different accounts. The real explanation, however, is to be found in the fact that the characteristics of the period are peculiarly marked, easily described and, in fact, already largely familiar from the treatment of them in general literature.

It would seem, however, that much remains still to be done with regard to the interpretation of this considerable body of valuable descriptive material that has been accumulated. In the present essay we shall be mainly occupied with this question of interpretation. An attempt will be made to appreciate the more basic psychological principles underlying adolescent phenomena and to offer an explanatory account of certain mental movements which characterize the period as a whole. The material now available in the descriptive literature appears on the whole adequate for this purpose. Our special problem, however, is to trace the further development of the ethical consciousness. In one sense, this does not involve any narrowing of the range of our enquiry; for ethical growth is a function of the growth of the mind as a whole. In another sense, however, our enquiry is restricted. While it is
concerned with all aspects of mental development, it is interested only in the elucidation of their bearing on ethical development. This development, it will be remembered, involves the fabrication of a personal ideal, the content or stuff of which is to be found in those fundamental values which we discussed in an earlier chapter. Certain of those values which we passed over as relatively of little or no importance during the two previous stages, may now come to play a profoundly significant role in the individual's development. We have now to reckon with all the values and a broader synthesis is demanded. Part of our task will be to apply the ethical criterion to the kind of synthesis which the individual finally achieves. The mental conflict incidental to adolescence may find its solution in various ways. By applying the ethical criterion to the final outcome of this conflict, we mean that we must ask whether the integration is in the spirit of the demands of the ethical ideal as we have conceived it. In this connection, we shall consider some typical outcomes of the conflict which in different ways fail to satisfy the ethical 'ought'.

Within the period of adolescence, again, special stages of growth have been distinguished. There is general agreement, for instance, as to the existence of three stages or phases which are described as early, middle and late adolescence. While there is good evidence that such a division has a basis in the facts of development, the boundary lines are uncertain, and individual variations are too great to admit of any rigid interpretation of these further distinctions. For the purposes of our present problem, it is more important to remember that the upper limits of adolescence cannot be rigidly fixed. It is usual to regard the period as terminating, broadly speaking, about the ages of
twenty-four or twenty-five. The close of the period cannot, however, be externally fixed in this way, for the real meaning of adolescence is to be sought in certain phenomena of the intellectual, emotional and conative life which may occur earlier or later according to circumstances. The essential point is that the mental movements which we have now to consider are movements in the direction of a more comprehensive, a more complete and, it may well be, a final synthesis. Adolescence is rightly considered as terminating with the achievement of an integration of this kind. To say that the synthesis achieved at the close of this period is necessarily final would be incorrect. A more or less thorough reconstruction of the ethical life sometimes occurs during adulthood. The influences which bring about these later changes are usually of an exceptional kind and, in any case, lie outside the purview of the present essay. Normally, the ethical life of the adult is foreshadowed in that synthesis which marks the close of adolescence.

In Adolescence as a whole, two great mental movements are clearly discernible. The first is a movement towards disintegration and dissolution of existing adjustments, the second a movement in the direction of re-integration of the elements of the immensely enhanced life of thought, feeling and will. Certain needs and impulses begin to assert themselves now with peculiar force and certain intellectual capacities undergo a very rapid development. The adjustments of childhood prove unequal to the strain of mental growth. A period of maladjustment ensues, which may be of short or protracted duration. This is the 'storm and stress' phase which lasts, broadly speaking, from the onset of adolescence to about the sixteenth year, with variations incidental to special circumstances, and especially, of course, variations dependent on
The second phase of adolescent development, which may also be short or protracted according to special conditions of endowment and circumstances, involves the more or less successful adjustment of the individual to his new environment with its larger opportunities and more exacting demands. Our discussion, then, will be directed specifically to a consideration of: (1) The factors that make for disintegration. In this connection we shall consider (a) special impulses and intellectual capacities which either appear for the first time or acquire peculiar importance at this stage, and (b) the modus operandi of certain social factors in the causation of this maladjustment.

(2) The factors that make for integration. Under this head will be considered (a) psychological factors. Here we shall consider the psychological development which renders possible the fuller appreciation of the essential human values; and attention will also be given to the further growth of the self concept. (b) Special social influences. This will involve, in particular, a consideration of the integrating influence which may be exerted by participation in certain kinds of associations, such as, religious, cultural, philanthropic and economic associations.

(3) Types of ethical failure. We can distinguish typical ways in which the final outcome of the process of synthesis may be ethically defective. In particular, three types of ethical failure will be considered: (a) false integration, that is, a unification achieved by the undue curtailment or narrowing of interests; (b) failure to integrate: in this case, no real unification, nothing approaching consistency or singleness of purpose, has been achieved; (c) partial and relatively independent integrations. We refer here to the kind of life which presents several syntheses which subsist together, although
more or less incompatible with one another. Whether mutually compatible or not, they are in any case not taken up into the larger synthesis of a unitary ideal.

Special causes which contribute to bring about the more serious defects of synthesis will be considered and an attempt will be made to appreciate the significance of such failure for the ethical life as a whole.

1. The sex impulse. The development of the sex impulse and the emotional expansion associated with that development have been sufficiently emphasized in the literature of adolescence. The emphasis has perhaps been exaggerated, with the result of conveying the false impression that the sex impulse appears now for the first time. There is a sense in which this is true, and also a sense in which such an idea is at variance with the facts. According to the authoritative view of Moll, certain processes which are, so to speak, in the direct line of the sex instinct, begin to make their appearance before the eighth year and continue to occur periodically during the ensuing years until adolescence. The real nature of these processes can be understood only by recognizing the equivocal implications of the term 'sex impulse' itself. Two kinds of process are indicated by this term and these may occur independently of one another. In the first place, we have the appearance of processes of a purely physical or physiological kind which are technically referred to by the term 'detumescence.' The term 'conctrextation, again, is used to designate processes of a psychical kind, such as love, shame, modesty; and so on. While phenomena of both kinds may occur long before adolescence, what appears to take place at the earlier stage is that these physical and psychical processes tend to occur independently of one another. They
need not be at all coordinated or associated. At the adolescent stage these processes tend to become coordinated and synchronized. Furthermore, the impulses associated with both groups of processes begin, at this stage, to be more specifically directed to individuals of about the same age belonging to the opposite sex. In this last-mentioned tendency, of course, there is much that is not really instinctive but is the result of social influences. What concerns us for the present, however, is the justification for the common view that there is an important development of the sex instinct peculiarly associated with adolescence. The psychological basis of it is to be found in this fact of the tendency towards coordination, synchronization, and specific direction of the various impulses arising from sex.

Admitting, then, the fact of an important new development in this sense, the transformation which occurs may be more or less sudden and complete. One of the most significant features of that integration which is achieved towards the end of childhood is the apparent absence of the sex interest. The child's interest in the opposite sex probably reaches its lowest ebb at this stage. The sudden recrudescence of interest at this stage, with the consequent appearance of new impulses and needs, the meaning of which is but little understood, is beyond question one of the most potent factors in the breakdown of childish adjustments and values. With regard to the growth of this impulse, however, two errors of interpretation are possible, In the first place, while there is little danger of over emphasizing the imperiousness of this new impulse, there is often a mistaken tendency to regard it as the only factor involved in the present maladjustment. Thus the influence of other psychological factors is underestimated or ignored. The above discussion
of the early occurrence of sex impulses and of the real meaning of sex development in adolescence strongly suggests that the importance of the sex factor in the explanation of special adolescent characteristics has been overestimated.

A second type of error is to be traced to the influence of the Freudian psychology. In this case, it is denied that the sex interest on the part of the adolescent is a new phenomenon, and it is said that what occurs is simply a redirection and localization of an impulse which has been powerfully operative even from infancy itself. This point of view, needless to say, implies much more than the mere recognition of continuity of growth. The latter idea would in general be admitted in some sense. It is not the early occurrence of something in the direct line of the sex impulse that is difficult to accept. The Freudian idea not only implies continuity but also finds the basis of that continuity in the all-pervading influence of the sex impulse; and that impulse itself is held to be powerfully operative even in early infancy.

A careful examination of this hypothesis as a whole is too large a task to be adequately undertaken here. In chapter 11, we consider the Freudian psychology with a view to indicating certain conceptions which seem permanently valuable to general as well as to abnormal psychology. But the concept of the 'libido' can hardly yet be regarded as one of these. For the present, we need only remark that this concept seems much in

(1) It is difficult to be quite sure as to whether Freud really does mean to minimize the importance of other instincts in the interests of the sex instinct; or whether the prominence accorded to the latter is not due to the fact that the novelty of his viewpoint made a special emphasis necessary, while hostile criticism, being mainly directed against his 'sex' hypothesis, has still further contributed to give prominence to this instinct.
the same position as certain other concepts which have been already examined and which involve such an extended use of familiar terms as to deprive them of all serviceable precision of meaning. No denial is here intended of the reality of many of those experiences to describe which the term 'libido' is used by the Freudians. But the whole sex hypothesis of this school is at present too purely speculative and has been subjected to too little scientific scrutiny to be practically helpful to the general psychologist. According to the general acceptation of the term, the instinct of sex is identified with that particular kind of interest in the opposite sex which is first normally manifested at the beginning of adolescence. All that is meant by saying that the sex interest is a new phenomenon now can be well seen by observing the difference in the behaviour of a party consisting of children of both sexes and of a party of adolescents of both sexes. In the former case, a somewhat unsociable atmosphere of indifference presently gives place to an outburst of romping and horse-play. In the latter case, however, the youth is from the first obviously interested in the members of the opposite sex and just as patently aware that he is an object of interest to them. By the development of the sex instinct in early adolescence, we mean the facts of mental and physical growth which account for this change of attitude.

Special Capacities.-- Representation. Certain special capacities undergo rapid development during this period and generate a more or less vaguely felt need for a fuller, more satisfying measure of self-activity than the adjustments of childhood can offer. Let us consider first the growth of the representative powers. We have seen that there are two forms
of this representative activity which are intimately bound up
with the individual's ethical growth. In the one form, representative
activity is occupied with cognitive content, in the other it
is concerned with the affective or sentient life. The latter form
of representative activity was designated by the term "reflective
sympathy." Needless to say, this distinction does not mean that
either can occur without the other. But they must be distinguished.
There are two capacities involved, one of which may attain to
a much higher level of development than the other. The individual
who has reached a high standard of precision and comprehensiveness
in the representation of ideational content but whose powers
of apprehending and entering into the emotional life of others
are sadly limited is not so uncommon as some simplifying
psychologies would have us believe.

Both capacities normally undergo rapid development during
adolescence. The nature of the ideational development will
be more fully considered later in connection with the growth of
the Self concept. As for the growth of reflective sympathy, this
expresses itself in a new and vastly more adequate response
to the world of art. The adolescent begins now to apprehend
and identify himself with a world of feeling and emotion of
which he has hitherto known nothing or at most but vaguely
suspected the existence. This broadening of the affective life
proceeds, of course, from the adolescent's direct personal
experience of a larger range of feeling. But the widening of the
field of direct personal experience does not of itself imply the
sympathetic development which we are considering, although it makes
that development possible. The narrow confines of direct individual
experience are broken through under the stimulus of growing
representative powers which crave satisfying exercise; and thus
the rich world of indirect emotional experience, the world of art, begins to beckon the mind with a new and more urgent appeal. The final outcome of this new élan will normally be the development of a permanent and truer appreciation of the values of art. But for the present, the appearance of these new needs and impulses serve only to intensify further the growing consciousness of maladjustment.

Space and Time Concepts. Connected with the growth of the representative powers but deserving of separate mention as a specially important phenomenon, is the development of the capacity to apprehend the larger conceptions of space and time. Space and Time ideas, which were either meaningless or altogether inadequately grasped in childhood, acquire now an interest and attractiveness of their own. This, however, is only the most striking aspect of an intellectual development which appears to be general. Tracy summarizes the situation well in the following statement the items of which are based on experimental evidence: "Many forms of mental activity appear to reach a sort of culminating point in their development (apart from what may be accomplished by special training) about the age of fifteen or sixteen years. The curve of accuracy in judgments of quantity does not rise so rapidly, if at all, after this age has been passed. Estimates of the number, size and distance of objects, are greatly increased in exactness through the entire teen age, but especially about the middle of the period. Moreover, not only is the mind better able to judge the quantitative relations of objects and events within the more limited spatial and temporal dimensions, but a lively interest is awakened also in the vaster areas of space and the greater periods of time. The imagination revels in the tremendous distances of the heavenly bodies, their vast proportions
and their tremendous orbits; and quantitative comparisons are indulged in with much zest. (1) This expansion of intellectual capacity is the basis of a new and more adequate appreciation of the knowledge value. New fields of profoundly humanizing knowledge are thrown open. At this stage ought to begin the education which will finally lead the mind to discover a profounder significance and deeper satisfaction in History, Astronomy, Geography, and kindred branches of knowledge. But this result will come later. For the present, the effect of these dawning intellectual interests and needs is in the direction of disrupting still further the relatively narrow intellectual adjustments of the child.

Development of the critical powers. One of the most potent forces that operate to undermine the authority of childish values is a marked development of the reasoning powers. This shews itself in an increased capacity for comparison and contrast and may be described roughly as a growth of the critical processes. The root psychological fact here is the further development of the capacity for abstraction and generalization. The mind begins now to move more easily in the realm of abstract and general ideas; and the generalizations of morality are among the first objects to attract the critical attention. The moral code to which the child has hitherto not only adapted his conduct but bowed his mind may now be subjected to a kind of scrutiny which it is ill-fitted to bear, and which may temporarily deprive it of much of its sanctity. It will be recalled that the main sanction of that code lay in the child's habitual subjection to social opinion. But for reasons which we shall

(1) Psychology of Adolescence, pp. 96-97.
consider more carefully in the next section, there is a tendency
towards a considerable diminution of this respect for his elders
(the actively critical attitude now assumed to accepted moral
standards, with its outcome in a more or less clear apprehension
of their deficiencies and shortcomings is partly effect and
partly cause of this diminished respect.) Stanley Hall is emphatic
on this point. For he tells us that children "respect all we
smile at or even notice, and grow to like it like the plant
toward the light. Their early lies are often what they think will
please. At bottom the most restless child admires and loves
those who save him from too great fluctuations by coercion,
provided the means be rightly chosen and the ascendancy extend
over heart and mind. But the time comes when parents are often
shocked at lack of respect suddenly shewn by the child. They have
ceased to be the highest ideals. The period of habituating
morality and making it habitual is ceasing, and the passion to
realize freedom, to act on personal experience, and to keep a
private conscience is in order."(1) We shall consider in due
course the question of the "private conscience" and the mode of its
acquisition. Our interest for the present, however, is in the
more destructive and negative phase of this development, and
it will be instructive to examine this more closely.

One of the most important results, from the viewpoint of
ethical development, of this increase in the power to generalize
and abstract, to discriminate identity in difference, is observable
during the first half of adolescence. This is the ability to
discriminate easily between the external act and the motive or
intention, and the tendency to view the act as a whole which

(1) Youth: Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene, p. 207.
possesses an inner or subjective as well as an outer or
objective side. There arises an appreciation of the act in its
real psychological nature in place of the earlier interest in
the merely external, observable part of it. Still more important,
perhaps is the fact that, where there is manifest discrepancy
between the external act and the intention, the tendency is to
judge the intention rather than the act itself. Stanley Hall
quotes the results of an interesting practical investigation
which proves the appearance of this trait. (1) Only the children
of adolescent age considered the praiseworthy intention rather
than the harmful result in meting out punishment. This is
in marked contrast with the attitude of childhood. To the non-
introspective and uncritical child, nothing appears more 'natural'
than that punishment or blame should be determined by what
the individual actually does. Equally natural, too, does it seem
to his unreflective mind that the sole and sufficient reason for
not doing certain things is to avoid punishment or censure and
for doing other things is to win reward or approval. For this
reason the child is not normally disturbed by discrepancies and
contradictions underlying many of the ordinary moral standards
and judgments of his elders. To the adolescent, however, who is
becoming increasingly capable of a larger and more critical view
of conduct, the many illogicalities and shortcomings of current
morality begin to reveal themselves. He finds that there are
apparent limits to the application of the canons of justice
or fairplay; for he finds many things in his environment
incompatible with a thorough-going application of these
standards. Dishonesty is sternly condemned in certain relations
while in other relations it is condoned, or even approved

as smart business. He finds kindliness and benevolence preached, but much callousness and selfishness practised. Moreover, the wider knowledge of the world at large which he is acquiring through literature may still further undermine the foundations of his belief in the recognized code. For he encounters much that might suggest that morals are after all something fluid and variable,—a matter merely of race, country or social caste.

We do not of course mean that the average adolescent perpetrates a masterly feat of destructive moral criticism. But his intellectual impulses are for the moment in that direction, and, what is more important, he derives a considerable satisfaction from the exercise of his new-found critical powers in this way. This latter fact is only one of several adolescent characteristics which have been frequently observed and which have a common psychological origin. We may mention here the most important of these adolescent phenomena and thereafter attempt a psychological interpretation of them. They are; (a) the 'ganging' tendency; (b) a new and actively critical interest in adults with the growth of a new kind of sensitiveness to their opinions (c) the tendency to an exaggerated, impracticable idealism; (d) adolescent altruism; (e) introspectiveness; Let us consider first the general psychological principle which we shall use in our discussion of these characteristics.

The underlying fact is that of a maladjustment, the consciousness of which is becoming increasingly acute. Beginning with this fact, we would account for what happens by recalling certain points concerning the general psychology of Desire. Desire has its source in some failure of adjustment which shews itself first in a condition of restlessness and in a tendency towards seemingly aimless and incoordinated activity. The individual may
or may not be aware of the meaning of this restlessness. That will depend on the extent of his experience and on the nature of the unsatisfied need. In any case, his first step will be to represent some sort of object or end from the attainment of which satisfaction is anticipated. This object becomes forthwith the conscious object of desire. It is more likely than not that this object, when attained, will fail to allay the unrest. That depends, as has been said, on whether the individual knows the real meaning of his dissatisfaction and, (even supposing that he knows this) on whether he is in a position to project and realize an end adequate to the needs of the case. At any rate, the object has become the real, conscious terminus of the desire and for this reason alone its attainment will mean a certain measure of satisfaction. Let us suppose, however, that the object falls far short of representing the real object which would satisfy the desire. In this case, the restlessness will continue; new objects will be projected, and a kind of activity, which is aimless and incoordinated on the whole, will be the result. (1)

Obviously, we have here an illustration of that double implication of the term 'motive' which was discussed in an earlier chapter (2). There we distinguished between motive in the sense of the 'terminus ad quem' and the 'vis-a-tergo' of action. Moreover, the phrase 'conscious' object of desire has been used. This suggests the use of the phrase 'unconscious' desire to indicate the vis-a-tergo side of the process. But the distinction between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' (a distinction as dangerous as it is convenient) is applicable to the desire only in the case, which is common enough, in which the individual fails to realize or makes a mistake concerning the kind of object to which the impulse is

(1) The role of the sex impulse in this connection is of course very important. c.f. King, The High School Age. pp. 100-102
(2) see p. 81.
prompting him. In reference to such a case, we may conveniently talk of conscious and unconscious desires. This use of the term 'unconscious' at least avoids the undesirable suggestion that in some mysterious way the impulse exists while the individual is not conscious of it. The individual, on the contrary, is very intensely conscious of this 'unconscious' impulse. Finally, the above statement admits the value and importance of the distinction, which Bertrand Russell discusses and illustrates, between 'primary' and 'secondary' desires. (1)

But we would make two remarks with regard to Bertrand Russell's discussion. (a) It treats of the case where the real object of the desire is not present to consciousness because it has been 'repressed'. As that writer is careful to point out, this does not exactly mean that it has previously been in consciousness and has been deliberately rejected. In the illustration he has taken, the real object of the desire, owing to its repugnant nature, has simply not been contemplated at all. The 'unawareness' that we are considering, however, is not due to repression of this kind. But the general effect is similar in both cases; and that effect is at once to stimulate activity and to render it rather incoordinated and aimless when viewed as a whole.

(b) In so far as primary desire is understood as desire proceeding directly from inherited tendencies, from instincts or inherited appetites, the distinction between primary and secondary desires does not exactly illustrate our whole point of view. For according to our view, the persistent baulking of a system of habit tendencies could generate the same restlessness and occasion the same kind of mental process as we have described above. (2)

(1) Analysis of Mind. pp. 73-74
(2) As an illustration of the point, cf. quotation on p. 114 (Russell)
Now the adolescent is peculiarly subject to the influence of unconscious motives in the sense explained. He is at a stage of transition, the transition from childhood to maturity. Owing to his expanding capacities, childish values have largely shed their attractiveness. But the adult world is still spiritually remote from him and does not yet receive him on an equal footing. The result is a restlessness of spirit, an eager groping for satisfaction, and a ceaseless projecting of new ends and purposes. Several characteristics find their explanation in this general mental condition.

Consider first the so-called 'ganging' tendency. This means the tendency, among certain classes of youth, to the formation of organized hooligan gangs. The general character of such gangs is described by Stanley Hall. We are concerned here only with certain special features of them which appear to illustrate well some of the general principles of ethical growth discussed in the present essay. In the first place, the descriptive accounts of these gangs show that they often present many of the characteristics of a fairly well-developed social or communal life. As Slaughter says: "Studies made of boys' gangs in the great cities show that provision is made for all the requirements of a social group, such as a place of meeting equipped with congenial literature, a primitive kind of leadership, secret call signals and hostile encounters with other groups."

Another important fact which gives evidence of the self-sufficiency of these organizations, is that they are not amenable to the usual penal methods. The saving fact about boys' gangs is that they are highly amenable to guidance and their energy can

(1) Youth: Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene, pp. 131-134. A valuable descriptive account (which however is negligible as an attempt at psychological explanation) is given in Puffer's "The Boy and His Gang."
This statement summarizes certain features which are important for the psychological interpretation of the tendency. Concerning the amenability to adult guidance, we shall say more presently. The relative complexity and self-sufficiency of these groups, the capacity and need for a fuller kind of social life which they imply, are to be interpreted in the light of a development which we have already considered in connection with the earlier period. This is the developing consciousness and appreciation of what we described as the group values. Although the first manifestations of this development are to be found in childhood, it is only towards the close of that period that we find this consciousness well developed and beginning to assert itself in spontaneous and definite forms of group activity. About the age of twelve years, this tendency has begun to express itself in ways that are fully characteristic of the general integration which we associated with that period. The group consciousness, however, reaches its culminating expression in the more compact and highly controlled group activities of adolescence. The ganging tendency, then, is but symptomatic of the first peak-point of a development which, as we shall find, becomes in its later manifestations a factor of prime importance in determining the final outcome of ethical growth.

While this is doubtless the explanation of the social forms which the activities of the youth are apt to take, it still remains to consider the actual nature of these activities.

(1) The Adolescent, pp. 76-77. Puffer remarks (opp. cit. p. 9) that in the classic literature of boyhood 'ganging' plays an inconspicuous part. Among other stories, he instances "Tom Brown". This story, however, ought rather to be considered as illustrating the point that where provision is otherwise made for the social impulses of the period, such a phenomenon as 'ganging' would not appear.
In the majority of cases, the various forms of free adolescent associations, that is, associations not instituted and directed by adults, but spontaneously formed by the adolescents themselves, are directed to special kinds of activities. This is true both of the organized gang and of the more loosely knit and more casual associations. Broadly speaking, these activities are directed to the outraging, in more or less flagrant ways, of the restraints and standards of the adult environment. This defiance may assume trivial or serious forms, ranging from noisy and harmless pranks to predatory or destructive attacks on property and even to serious forms of personal assault. The general explanation of such conduct is, as Tracy puts it, "the love of excitement and need of vigorous action and strong emotion." Underlying this need is the fact of rapid intellectual and emotional growth. This fact also accounts for a further characteristic of ganging activities: they are in large measure dramatizations of interesting situations and incidents. The gang plays many parts, (marsuing Indians, pirates, etc.) which are in the main suggested by the congenial literature already referred to. This fondness for dramatization has already been mentioned in connection with the infancy period. The interesting point with regard to its manifestation now is that we have the same fundamental need availing itself of the resources of social or corporate action to secure a fuller, more adequate expression.

A more significant feature, perhaps, of these activities is the fact that they are largely directed against the peace of the adult community. The impulses of the gangs composed of younger children tend to find adequate outlet in hostile encounters with

(1) C.F. Puffer: The Boy and His Gang, chs. 4 & 5.
other gangs. But the older adolescents are likely to engage in activities of a more directly and more deliberately anti-social character. This is only a special and regrettable manifestation of an adolescent characteristic already mentioned, viz., the redirection of the attention to the adult world with new interest and enquiry. The underlying cause of this new mental movement is the general maladjustment which the adolescent is trying to overcome. These anti-social activities are thus to be interpreted positively as indicating a renewal of interest in the adult world rather than negatively as suggesting a mere indifference to adult pursuits and values. The best evidence of this is the readiness with which these ganging propensities yield to adult direction and control. One way in which the renewed interest in the adult world manifests itself has been already considered. We refer to the actively critical attitude which tends to be adopted to accepted moral standards and values. But there is another and less negative aspect of this interest. The adolescent develops a new sensitiveness to the opinions of his elders, a fact which is not so incompatible with the critical attitude as it might at first appear. To the child, the opinions of his elders are as a matter of course valuable and important; hence the approval and disapproval of his elders enter always into his reckonings. With him this is a deeply rooted habit of mind the origin of which we tried to explain. The adolescent, however, is acutely conscious of two things: of his own inexperience, awkwardness or inadequacy and, at the same time, of his capacity to enter more fully into the life of the adult world, of his need to be taken seriously by it, to be taken into its confidence. It is the period at which the craving for sympathy is strongest. Hence there may develop an almost morbid
sensitiveness to criticism, to petty personal slights, to coldness and neglect. Hall and Tracy both comment on the new interest in and need for adult companionship. (1)

The next characteristic which we would interpret as arising directly out of the general maladjustment is what we may call, for lack of a better word, the 'idealizing impulse' of youth. The tendency of the adolescent towards a thorough-going and, it may be, recklessly impracticable kind of moral idealism is highly interesting from a psychological viewpoint. The tendency may assert itself in various ways. It may take, for example, the form of an almost morbidly strict and literal interpretation of ordinary moral values, such as veracity, or, again, it may express itself in the projection and serious contemplation of a personal ideal which is depressingly lofty and remote. We have described it as the 'idealizing' impulse because, whatever form it may take, it always involves the application, with a vigour altogether ideal, of the ordinary moral standards to which his previous social training has been gradually habituating him. Herein lies its interest for the psychologist. To get the clue to the mechanism of this process, we would recall the main point of the above statement with regard to the psychology of desire. It was there shown that the original condition of restlessness or dissatisfaction prompts the individual to project the idea of certain ends, objects, or activities from the attainment of which he anticipates satisfaction. These become, therefore, the conscious objects of desire, and, in so far as they are successfully pursued, some measure of satisfaction will result in accordance with the general psychological principle that successful mental activity as such is satisfying. But the degree

to which the original impulse is satisfied depends, as we pointed out, on the adequacy of this conscious object, considered in the light of the real origin or source of the original dissatisfaction. In the case of the adolescent, two things are important here. In the first place, the restlessness has its origin in a maladjustment of a general kind, due to subtle processes of mental and physical development. In the second place, his limited experience has not yet discovered the direction in which permanent satisfaction is to be found. This discovery, if, indeed, he ever makes it at all, will mark the culminating point in his ethical development.

We would expect, then, a trial-and-error kind of activity, taking the form of a spasmodic pursuit of various ill-coordinated ends; and to some extent this is what we find. In point of fact, however, the adolescent's activities at this juncture are controlled, the directions in which he will look for satisfaction are determined, in a manner that merits attention. The determining factor here is his existing consciousness of values. We have seen that, by the end of the childhood period, certain values have been firmly impressed on his mind. To a considerable degree, these values are still essentially external, that is, they have been implicitly accepted, through direct and indirect suggestion, from social sources, but only in a partial way have they been understood and appreciated. We have seen further that they may be subjected to a somewhat annihilating criticism which might conceivably mean the final undermining of his faith in their worth. But this faith is preserved by one all-important fact, namely, the fact that these values already largely rest on the sure foundations of habit. He cannot now escape the controlling influence of those habits of acting and of judging which have
been unreflectively built up during the earlier stages; and the
effect of these habits has been to generate a strong disposition
to conduct in accordance with certain moral standards.

These habit tendencies more than counteract the destructive attack
of the intellect on the moral standards themselves. These standards
in other words, however much the intellect is tempted to repudiate
them as arbitrary or illogical, still retain an attractiveness for
the will. But this value is not ultimately based on the apprehension
of their true significance or meaning. In the technical sense
of the phrase, their value is 'suggestive' and the source
of this suggestive value is habit. Thus the dissatisfied mind
of the youth, ever alert to project objects which promise
satisfaction, turns its attention to these standards. But now
it is not to criticize, it is to idealize them. Life is unsatisfying,
he feels. What of that? Satisfaction is to be found in the
whole-hearted, single-minded devotion to certain supreme principles
of conduct. The value of 'benevolence' may be interpreted to
mean nothing less than the complete abnegation of self in the
devotion to the service of others. Altruistic ideals, the
impracticability of which is compensated for by their intense
sincerity, are peculiarly associated with this period. The virtue
of 'self-control' may be glorified into an uncompromising resolve
"to scorn delights and live laborious days". Truth-telling may
be similarly transformed and may reappear as an almost morbid
insistence on literal exactness of statement, or as a somewhat
unhealthy propensity to analysis and criticism of his own motives.
The valuable aspect of this latter process has already been mentioned
The moral standard is applied to the inner as well as to the
outer aspect of the act, as it must always be in truly ethical

(1) c.f. Drever: Instinct in Man, p. 244.
behaviour. In adolescence, however, the tendency to look inward may develop to an unhealthy degree. This introspectiveness of youth has been commonly pointed out and the appearance of such a tendency seems natural in the light of the many mental conflicts to which the adolescent is subject. But the introspectiveness also proceeds from the tendency towards 'idealization' to which we have referred and which makes for a rigorous 'purism' in the application of moral standards.

One further characteristic must be mentioned, the psychology of which may be interpreted in a way similar to that suggested above. This is the tendency - beyond question peculiarly marked during early and middle adolescence - to form friendships of a very devoted and intimate character. We are not referring, of course, to love between the sexes, not to l'amour, but to l'amitié, to the close friendships formed between members of the same sex. Compayré, in his little book on adolescence, (in the main a resumé of salient points in Stanley Hall's work) is right in pointing out that this is the only characteristic of adolescence which Hall's contribution leaves without adequate treatment:

(1) Compayré himself, however, except for a few rather vague generalities and some references to illustrious friendships, makes no attempt to fill the lacuna. The psychological interpretation of this tendency, which is primarily our present concern, seems clear in the light of our preceding discussion. Friendship provides a definite, concrete form of expression for the idealizing impulses of youth and in this manner an incomplete or faulty adjustment to the social environment as a whole is compensated for by the narrower but more general.

(1) L'Adolescence, ch. 8. Compayré says, "Une lacune grave qu'on est étonné d'avoir à constater dans le livre de l'Adolescence, où l'auteur a pourtant entassé tant de choses, c'est de n'y pas trouver un chapitre spécial sur l'amitié. Quelques lignes à peine consacrées à un sentiment dont le développement est assurément une des caractéristiques les plus frappantes de l'adolescence, c'est vraiment trop peu."
intimate adjustments of friendships. In this relationship, too, the youth may learn to bring his ideals down to the solid earth of everyday practice and prove their value and their limitations. Such friendships furnish the basis for his first adequate appreciation of what we described in an earlier chapter as the social value, and out of them may arise the vision of larger and more perfect adjustments to his fellow men which point him far beyond the social routine to which he is already habituated.

It would seem then, that many of the most commonly remarked characteristics of youth are best interpreted in the light of these three principles; an original condition of faulty adjustment giving rise to a state of dissatisfaction, hence the conscious fabrication and projection of ends from which satisfaction is anticipated, and the general determination of the character of these promising ends by the existing consciousness of value. Some general implications of this viewpoint may be noted. In the first place, it allows for the fact of continuity and interprets this continuity in a profoundly significant sense. For it finds the main thread of continuity in the habits of action and judgment which the earlier training has fostered. It is to these habitual tendencies that we ought to look for the really effective links that connect childhood with youth and youth with adulthood. This continuity is usually taken to refer to the unfolding of the instincts and the fundamental inherited capacities, and we are told that no period of growth involves the sudden appearances of impulses and needs that are really new. Now, while it must always be remembered that we are dealing with a continuum throughout, nevertheless the notion of continuity in this latter sense may be easily overemphasized.

As far as the manifestation of inherited impulses and capacities
goes, there may be conspicuous differences between one period and another. Regarded from this standpoint, adolescence, for example, seems very remote from childhood. The important bond of connection is to be found in the acquired adjustments and dispositions, in other words, in the habits. Nor can we exactly say that this kind of continuity implies an underlying continuity in the growth of capacities. Habitual modes of action are carried over from the earlier to the later period, but these modes of action, in virtue of the new intellectual and emotional growth, come now to acquire a richer and deeper significance. This brings us to our next point.

The mere habits of social and corporate action have developed a propensity or dynamic which prompts to such action and gives it value. In an earlier chapter, we found it necessary to examine at some length the psychological justification of that statement. The conclusions arrived at in that chapter have a highly significant application here. Under the stimulus of mental development and conflict, these habit propensities tend to develop into fully conscious ideals. In this manner, the earlier, unreflecting obedience to rule and precept may blossom into devotion to an ideal, and the routine of conduct which, qua routine, is proving inadequate to the growing needs of the self, is enlarged and revivified. This is the essential sense in which ethical growth is a continuous process. Behind this growth of the self-conscious ideal there lies a very considerable development of impulses and capacities, but the fabric of this ideal itself, in which the new powers of the self seek to express themselves, is of the stuff of these early values.

There is one further point of interest in this connection. It is not only the moral habits, that is, the habits of acting and
judging in social relations, which acquire special significance now. The youth's attention is now turned with a keener scrutiny and a warmer interest to many of the ideas of the earlier period which have hitherto failed to secure his appreciation. Certain values, as we have seen, have remained largely external to him. Religion is a case in point of a value around which vivid suggestions of authority and worth have gathered even though the value itself has remained external to his consciousness in the sense that it has not yet fulfilled a need of his nature. The process by which this and other values come to be fully internalized will be considered in the next chapter. In the meantime, it is worth remarking that the knowledge interest or value does not as a rule loom so large in his consciousness at this stage as it ought to, considering the general level of his mental development. The reason is not far to seek. In the case of the religious value, for instance, the individual has been subjected throughout the entire period of childhood to powerful suggestions of a direct and indirect kind with the result that the authority -- albeit the essential external authority -- of this value has impressed itself on his consciousness. With regard to the knowledge value, however, such suggestions have been brought to bear to a much more limited degree and in a manner less systematic and effective. One inevitable result of the child's docile acceptance of social judgments is this: the things that his elders take seriously, he will take seriously himself; and though he may not yet apprehend the seriousness of them, this initial set of his mind is the important thing. If there is point to a criticism suggested in chapter 3 and referred to again in our next chapter, the youth's failure to take the knowledge interest seriously need not occasion surprise. But this is a matter to which we shall recur.
New avenues of valuable experience have been thrown open
to the mind of the youth and, in its own restless, spasmodic way,
it has sought to explore them. In the assimilation of new
experiences and the pursuit of wider ends, the narrower life
of childhood has been left far behind. But the life is still
essentially fragmentary, disjointed, unorganized. The evidence
is all too frequently forthcoming of an underlying fragmentariness
of aim, of the absence of any lasting synthesis. Our next
task is to study the process by which the many diverse capacities
and interests are integrated into the unity of a permanent ideal.
The outcome of this ethical synthesis is an attitude of the
will such as we have tried to describe in our introductory
chapters. Here we approach the study of the final movement in
ethical development and, when we have completed this study, it
will remain to consider some of the sources from which
serious discord may be introduced into the life to the permanent
marring of its harmony.
Chapter 10.

A study of the process by which the elements of the adolescent life are integrated to form the substance of the ethical ideal will be best undertaken along two main lines. We shall consider first the development that occurs in the individual's attitude to the human values and shall endeavour to show how they come now to acquire a deeper significance and to play a larger role in his life. The manner in which these values are finally internalised and become the basis of firmly fixed and satisfying habits, will be studied as the first part of our problem. We shall therefore examine these values in detail and try to appreciate in an exact way just the kind of appeal which they individually make at this stage. This examination of each individual value, in order to appreciate the fuller significance which it now acquires, is an important part of the study of the integrative process itself. Our second problem, however, is to study the process of integration more directly. Here we shall be directly concerned with the ethical question as to the way in which the individual adjusts himself to these values as a whole. They are not equally significant for him, and therefore cannot enter equally into his life. His integration of them means that he must discover the best adjustment for him. Our second problem, then, is to examine the various influences which may operate to determine the character of this integration.

The Knowledge Value. In the preceding chapter we commented on one result of the rapid growth of the representative powers, namely, the vastly more adequate apprehension of space and time relations. Conceptual space and time now become real to the individual, this development throws open new fields of knowledge. Consequently, we find that the normal youth is now capable of a far more adequate and absorbing interest in such branches of knowledge as treat of the past history of
peoples of civilisations, of the human race and so on. So also with spatial conceptions. A science such as Astronomy, which has little to offer that the mind of the child can assimilate, may present a fascinating field to the mind of the youth. Formal education has always been primarily directed to the furtherance of the knowledge value. The pity of it is that, in the vast majority of cases, formal education is dropped just on the threshold of that stage of mental development when knowledge is only beginning to reveal its real treasures to the mind. At the same time, there are other reasons than this, as we shall see, why the knowledge value frequently fails to find the appreciation it deserves. In any case, these large excursions into the world of knowledge not only lay the foundations of a permanently valuable interest but have a further effect of a more directly ethical kind. They tend to deepen the consciousness of the worth and the dignity of human life as a whole.

Perhaps the most important consideration, however, is that this is the stage at which normally appears the knowledge interest in the deeper sense of a conscious, permanent urge towards the pursuit of knowledge. In an earlier chapter"(1) we pointed out the complexity of the motivating factors underlying the knowledge interest in its fully developed form. We considered there an example of the highly specialised kind of curiosity which gives rise to the systematic and absorbing pursuit of knowledge in scientific enquiry. Now it is frequently pointed out that adolescence is the period during which deep-seated inherited traits and aptitudes definitely reveal themselves. With regard to the pursuit of knowledge, peculiarities of native endowment may assert themselves now in a tendency towards what is at once a narrowing and an intensifying or deepening of the knowledge interest. In so far as this narrowing of the range of the individual's interest in knowledge is simply the result or expression of specialised capacities, it is "(1) see pp. 104-107.
entirely in the direction of true development. From the standpoint of the ultimate ethical results, it is not that this or that branch of knowledge is in itself valuable; the only ultimately valuable result is the development and free exercise of human capacities. Knowledge is intrinsically valuable when it contributes to this building up of "neurographies", (1) if we may borrow the phrase of Garnett. It will depend altogether on the peculiarities of the individual's native endowment whether this building up process is to involve concentration or restriction of interest, which might superficially be mistaken to mean narrowness, while in reality it makes for depth. Mitchell's statement would apply to specialisation of this kind: "A life devoted to one pursuit may not only feel a deeper interest, but find a greater variety of interest within its pale, than many a life that looks many-sided... It is only depth that commands variety in the long run." (2)

Such concentration, of course, is most apparent in cases of highly specialised native endowment. But in principle the above remarks are equally relevant to so-called average cases; and the point of our whole argument is that knowledge represents one highly important avenue of expression for the individual's human capacities. The discovery of the true place which this value ought to occupy in his life is a duty which concerns not only the individual himself, but also the society responsible for his education. The exact measure in which society incurs responsibility for the individual's failure in this regard can only be determined, of course, by a full consideration of each particular case on its merits.

(1) see p. Education & World Citizenship: ch. 13 et al.
The Art Value. The mental development in adolescence involves, as we have seen, the possibility of a great expansion in the range of artistic feelings. There are several manifestations of this growth of artistic sensibilities. One important change that is clearly marked is a change in the attitude to Nature. The attitude which now makes its appearance for the first time is characteristically the attitude of the artist. Slaughter neatly expresses it as "a change from the projection of images to the projection of moods". (1) Tracy summarises the special facts of development which affect the appreciation of art: "So by the medium of the ear, as by that of the eye, the world of nature and art makes a more powerful appeal, and elicits a more complete and comprehensive response. Finer distinctions are made in tone, accent and inflection; and there is a much better appreciation of totales and aggregates, in which the relations of a number of sounds to one another, either simultaneous or successive, constitute the chief feature. (2) Finally, Stanley Hall describes an important aspect of this development as follows: "Adolescence is the golden age of this kind of dreamery and reverie which supplements reality and totalizes our faculties, and often gives a special charm to dramatic activities and in morbid cases to simulation and dissimulation. It is a state from which some of the bad, but far more of the good qualities of life and mind arise." (3) The real significance of this artistic development from our point of view will become clear if we examine more carefully the process at which Stanley Hall hints in this passage. We have to describe, in effect, the fundamental change of attitude which occurs with respect to this value. The period of early childhood, as we saw, is characterized by a failure to differentiate clearly between the ideal and the real worlds. The demarcation of the one sphere from the other

(1) The adolescent; p. 31.
(2) Psych. of Adolesc. p. 87.
(3) Youth; Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene, p. 128.
which precedes their effective synthesis, can hardly be said to take place at that stage. Hence the absorption of the child in the world of imagination tends to be absolute while it lasts. The attitude of the young child to the imaginative creations of art presents what looks like a clear case of the principle of dissociation; and from this point of view we might say that in the young child's enjoyment of these creations, his dissociation from the real world, though temporary, is practically complete. In his case, artistic illusion would perhaps be more accurately described as delusion. These two worlds are at length distinguished and, as was pointed out, more or less integrated in later childhood. The synthesis, however, is narrow and reflects the limited range of the child's emotional life.

With the onset of adolescence, the attitude again undergoes change. In our discussion of the psychological meaning or origin of certain adolescent traits, it was suggested that the world of imaginative creation would naturally present itself as one way of escape from the strain of internal conflict. In so far as the adolescent begins to find the world of reality difficult or inadequately responsive to his needs, he tends to be thrown back on his own inner resources and to seek compensation and satisfaction in a world of creative fancy which he fashions to meet the larger needs of his mental life. His developing representative powers enable him to construct his ideal world on a more generous scale and to identify his mind more completely with its satisfying situations. This tendency towards a condition of relatively complete mental dissociation is sometimes described as a reversal to an infantile level of mind; and, indeed, the general resemblances between the present period and the period of early childhood need not be denied. But it is easy to overlook a fundamental psychological difference between the two cases. In infancy the complete absorption in the ideal

(1) But see p. 252.
world rests on a failure to discriminate between the two worlds, and hence to describe the young child's attitude as a case of 'dissociation' seems to imply a loose, inexact use of the term. Moreover, with the normal child, the attitude is only occasional, for the real world is still new and engrossingly interesting. Hence in the case of the normal child, this 'dissociation' occurs as a perfectly natural and healthy experience. With the young adolescent, however, the underlying psychological fact is of a different order and may well be fraught with more serious consequences. For the two worlds must now be dissociated by a definite mental act or process carried out in a more or less conscious and deliberate way. In other words, we have here an act of dissociation in the technical sense. The motive is essentially the same as that which actuates the child. It is a motive that lies at the root of all artistic enjoyment at all stages of growth, viz., the impulse or need to supplement reality with a synthesis of experience which is richer in emotional value and more satisfying. Even at the maturest levels of artistic enjoyment, dissociation seems to be the basic phenomenon. But the degree of this dissociation and the manner in which it is brought about make a vast difference to the way in which this attitude affects the personality as a whole, a vast difference, in other words, to its ethical value. As has been pointed out, an important phase of adolescent development is an impatience with the world of hard facts and a more or less acute consciousness of maladjustment to it. This may well lead to a mental withdrawal from reality in favour of the more facile satisfactions of his ideal world. Professor Valentine would seem to be right when he interprets the "repression" which causes dissociation, as a fixed mental habit of diverting the attention from unpleasant facts or experiences. (1) It is possible then, that the

(1) Dreams and the Unconscious, pp. 32-33.
youth may develop an insidious mental habit of this kind.

While this possibility must be recognised, it would seem a serious mistake to make too much of it. Notwithstanding the formidable evidence adduced by the psycho-pathologists, it must be urged that in the vast majority of cases, nothing of this kind has been proved to take place to a serious extent. On the contrary, the facts of mental development at this stage on the whole militate against an unhealthy excess in the direction of these inner satisfactions. That development is many-sided and, moreover, as we shall presently see, the real environment offers many new interests and attractions which compel the youth's attention. What happens, then, in normal development is that during adolescence, the art value becomes increasingly integrated with the other values or interests of life. This means a further change -- a subtle and profoundly significant change -- in his attitude to art. Artistic enjoyment still implies an act of dissociation; but this now means the deliberate, self-conscious detachment or withdrawal, of which the real 'motif' is a return to the world of actualities, to the serious business of life, with a mind reinvigorated and charged with a deeper sense of the worth and the dignity of life. Art really becomes what Matthew Arnold called it, "a criticism of life", but not now in the sense that it throws into relief only the drabness and the inadequacy of that life. Rather does it invite the mind to dwell on life's limitless possibilities, its mystery and its greatness. The synthesis of art has become a permanent need with its own role in the general economy of life. In other words, it is become integral to the complete expression of ethical self-hood.

Religion. All authorities are in agreement as to the large role that religion plays in the life of the adolescent. Pratt has
well pointed out, however, that much of the mental distress and conflict of a religious character which commonly appears at this stage is not really a necessary, inevitable incident of mental development. The conflict is largely traceable to the disturbing influence of certain specific theological ideas which were inculcated, without being adequately understood, during the previous stage. The following statement of Ames sums up the essential facts of the situation with regard to the religious development during adolescence:

"Statistical enquiries, which are likely to be extended in a much more comprehensive way by future observations, are already sufficient to show in broad outlines that for the individual religion originates in youth. There are foregleams of it in late childhood and marked developments of it in mature years, but the period of original, spontaneous and vital awakening is the teens. This religious experience, however, is not an inevitable and uniform occurrence in all individuals. It is conditioned by training, environment, physical development and social influences." Our task here is simply to point out the principal facts of general adolescent development to which we would trace the growing interest in religion. Reference must again be made to the growth of the representative powers, and especially to the more adequate ideas of space and time which are bound up with that growth. To begin with, the youth is now for the first time in a position to cope with the purely intellectual or cognitive side of religion. Many ideas, closely associated with the religious life, (ideas such as 'eternal', 'omnipotent', 'omniscient', 'infinite', and so on) can now meet with some measure of apprehension. Rousseau had doubtless this fact in mind when he denied the possibility of real religious experience or education prior to the age of eighteen. If the specific object of the religious consciousness was

(1) The Religious Consciousness, p.113.
truly described in our earlier chapter, one would naturally infer that religious experience is a phenomenon of comparatively late appearance in mental development.

Closely bound up with the growth of the religious interest is the development of the larger social interests, including the sex interest. The social aspect of religion will be considered more fully later. For our purpose, the important problem is to appreciate the way in which religion comes to fulfill a real need in the life of the adolescent. Apart altogether from the facts of mental development which render religious ideas intelligible, there is the question as to the function which such ideas perform in the scheme of life, the question as to how they come to acquire permanent ethical significance. This question would be answered in a general way by saying that the individual comes to adopt an attitude of mind which is in its essence religious. He looks to the ideal order of religion for the permanent justification or ground of his developing ideals. As we have seen, his values are habit-rooted, either directly in the sense that he has tested or proved them in his experiences or indirectly in the sense that they have taken deep root in his mind because of an essentially habitual mental subjection to his social environment. The diverse, isolated interests of life are becoming increasingly integrated, and this is tantamount to saying that there is a deepening conviction of the value of life as a whole. Nevertheless, as was pointed out in our discussion of the fundamental significance of the religious value, he fails to find in experience itself any definite ground on which this growing conviction can consciously rest or support itself. On the contrary, he continues to find in experience much that would make to undermine this conviction of ultimate value. The conception of the ideal religious order
supplies him with the conscious rationale for which he is seeking and thus furnishes further and highly effective sanctions. Hence at this stage religion may function as a great organising, unifying agency; and in this way the forms, ritual, usages, phrases, around which had developed a vivid sense of authority, acquire a deeper significance and offer a definite concrete outlet and socialised form of expression for many new-born impulses and needs. In so far as religion performs this function, we may say that the authority of the religious value is internalised.

An interesting reflection of the intellectual expansion in adolescence is the appearance of a genuine interest in the larger problems and syntheses of philosophy. The intellect of the adolescent is impelled by the need for completeness and finality, and the vast unifications of philosophy evoke a ready, if somewhat uncritical response from his mind. He may even rush into system-making himself, undeterred by an intellectual humility which is proper to a later age. He is likely to be as unconscious or as impatient of intellectual obstacles here as he is of the practical obstacles which lie in the way of his moral ideals. As Slaughter says: "Many adolescents rush into it very early if their struggles with scepticism have been very severe--a life-boat seems to be coming which will pick them out of the sea and the assurance with which the professor of philosophy navigates his craft gives them boundless hope".

The social Values. The 'social' values are understood here in the narrower sense explained in chapter 2. The reference is to these values which underlie the development of a more perfect adjustment of individuals as such to one another. It was found convenient to draw a distinction between social values in this sense and 'group'

(1) The Adolescent, p.56.
values, which more specifically concern the prosecution of corporate activities. Moreover, the values of veracity, justice and benevolence were found to be basic to the social values in the sense that all other values that regulate social relationships could be considered as special manifestations of these. The social values need not detain us here as we have already indicated the advance that is made at this stage in the direction of their fuller appreciation.

Adolescent friendships represent at once the manifestation of a need for a fuller adaptation to one's fellows and at the same time the most effective school in which these basic values are learned and appreciated. The additional point may be mentioned here that the larger resources in literature which mental development has made accessible, serve further to enrich and expand the consciousness of their significance and worth.

The Group Values. The important development in this direction will be fully explained in the next section when we come to treat of the ethical influence exerted by special kinds of associations. The psychological facts underlying the expansion of the group life at this stage have been already discussed.

Material or Economic Values. We return here to a value which was discussed in connection with our analysis of the ethical consciousness but which has not since engaged our attention. We would refer the reader here to our discussion of this value in chapter 3. It is important that the precise meaning which was there attached to the notion of the material value should be recalled.

For the final outcome of ethical growth is intimately affected, in fact it is in large measure determined, in a society such as our own, by the kind of permanent attitude which the individual adopts to the satisfactions associated with the pursuit of this interest. The
Material value was not considered in connection with the period of childhood for two reasons, one of which at least is obvious enough. For the average child the question of the pursuit of this value does not arise inasmuch as the measure of his material satisfaction is determined for him, not by him. Normally, this measure is adequate to his needs and he is left free to pursue his own childish ends. Hence follows our second reason for disregarding this value in our discussion of childhood. Certain influences which operate in the case of the youth and the adult to render the final outcome of ethical growth abortive are normally not brought to bear upon childhood. Such influences, as we shall presently see, are those that go to produce the 'materialist' or the 'hedonist', if we may use the terms loosely for the present. An unwise training, of course, or an unhappy combination of circumstances may give even the mind of the child an irremediable bent in the direction of distorting his sense of relative values.

At the stage of youth this value may begin to assume a paramount importance. There are two aspects to the pursuit of it, and it will conduce to clearness if we separate them. In the first place, we have the necessity imposed upon the individual to "earn a livelihood" in the strict and narrow sense of the phrase. If he works not, neither shall he eat, is the inexorable fact he is called upon to face. In other words, there is the **minimum** demand that the individual pull his own economic weight. But in addition to the mere question of earning a livelihood, there is the further question of securing a share in what we may call the luxuries of life, meaning by that phrase in the present connection the numerous personal comforts, amenities and pleasures which material or economic development has made possible. Not only a livelihood but a 'good' livelihood
is the way in which the economic value may present itself to him; and the growth of a healthy ethical self-hood is closely affected by the way in which he responds to the demands and opportunities of the economic life.

Let us consider first the question of earning a livelihood. Under existing conditions, it may well happen that this demand can only be met at the cost of the sacrifice, at least to a large degree, of higher ethical possibilities. Equally true it is, too, that under the insidious influence of a materialistically-minded social environment, the mental outlook may be distorted and material satisfactions may come to acquire an importance altogether out of proportion to their intrinsic worth. The conditions under which this is likely to happen are discussed below. Here we would consider the more valuable consequences for ethical growth of this necessity which is now imposed upon the individual, the necessity of earning a livelihood. It is at this point that the individual encounters the fact of obligation itself in its most direct and inexorable form. At first sight one would be inclined to conclude that we are dealing here with the fact of mere necessity or compulsion, with a kind of obligation which is altogether external and which therefore can in no sense be regarded as a form of moral obligation. This, however, would be a mistake. In a society like our own, the obligation to take part in the economic life of society is not simply identical with the necessity imposed upon Robinson Crusoe to rear goats. In the last resort, it doubtless amounts to this kind of necessity. But the important thing is the manner in which this obligation is realised in the actual consciousness of the individual. In point of fact, as far as the individual consciousness is concerned, this form of obligation is normally realised and accepted in precisely the way
in which other admittedly 'moral' obligations are realised and accepted. We have seen that the entire education of the individual has made for his acceptance of social values. One aspect of this fact is that the prosecution of the economic activities of society is accepted by him as a valuable end. His acceptance of this value is intimately bound up with his acceptance of other values. This explains how the obligation here comes in actual fact to be felt as a moral obligation. Conformity to this demand is not really due to the realisation of the terrible alternative, starvation, although that is probably how the individual himself would explain or 'rationalise' his conformity. It proceeds from the fact that this conformity has come to be, often very vaguely it is true, associated in his consciousness with the continued existence of any or all of the values of social life. Hence there is a real sense in which the obligation to 'work' is self-imposed. When the individual appears not to accept this obligation, his protest is really directed against the special conditions under which he is compelled to fulfill the obligation.

Work, however, acquires its full and explicit ethical significance only when the vague consciousness of value and obligation is clarified into a definite sense of the larger social issues involved. The lustre of these larger, ultra-individual ends is reflected back to illumine the common-place activities of livelihood and to transform them into explicitly ethical activities. This might be expressed by saying that the economic activities of the individual are integrated with other ends which possess unconditional value for him. In simpler forms of society than ours, this integration is easier. The mutual dependence of individuals, the corporate or
group aspects of work, in short, the organic inter-relatedness of
the community elements, are manifest at the simpler levels of
community life in a way that they cannot well be in the case of our
own intricate economic organisation. A grave problem, indeed, of
our own day arises out of the high degree to which our economic
activities are specialised. This is the problem of avoiding, or,
failing this, of compensating somehow for the depression of the
sense of personal worth, of personal dignity and responsibility,
which the vaster economic organisation inevitably tends to produce.
It is when the individual loses sight altogether of these larger
ends that the obligations of the economic life tend to assume the
form of mere external compulsion, and the activities of that life,
sinking to the level of mere means, are stripped of direct ethical
significance.

Whether the ends be conceived in a broad or a narrow way,
it remains true that economic activities involve some measure of
direct training in the inhibition and control of impulse, in the
postponement of present gratification in favour of the remoter
satisfactions. As we have seen, this is the fundamental ethical
fact, the basic virtue of which all the particular virtues are special
manifestations, when we regard the ethical life from the inside, as
the process of character-formation, rather than from the outside as
the pursuit of objective ends. From this point of view, the economic
life is itself a school of the sterling virtues. In this connection
we would recall again the fact of the essential continuity of ethical
training. We have found an example of this continuity above in the
fact that the individual's consciousness is already prepared to
accept the fact of economic obligation. Another aspect of this
continuity presents itself here. The need for the inhibition and regulation of present impulse in the light of remoter ends is most directly brought home to the individual in connection with the necessity of earning his livelihood. But if ethical training has proceeded this demand for self-control is not now encountered for the first time. If it were, to expect the individual adequately to meet the demand would be to ignore the fact that such control is itself the outcome of a long process of habituation. The individual's earlier training, and especially that part of his training for which the school is directly responsible, ought to have already habituated him to a control which is now demanded in a larger degree. Insistence on this fact is desirable even in the face of possible misunderstanding. There is a noticeable tendency in pedagogical literature, and to some extent in pedagogical practice, to misconstrue the real meaning of liberty and to interpret superficially the psychology of interest. Dewey and others have well shown that the true interpretation of these terms is incompatible with the practice of "soft pedagogics".

In the foregoing paragraphs we have been occupied with the higher ethical possibilities of the fact that the individual must take his part in the economic life of society. But the realisation of these higher possibilities presupposes a true attitude of the individual's will to what we called the material value. The general nature of these satisfactions which we summed up under the head of 'economic or material value' has already been indicated. We considered, moreover, the sense in which this value might be regarded as 'instrumental' without contradicting the notion of 'value' itself. (1) At the present stage in the individual's development, a

(1) pp 40--41.
consideration of prime importance is the settled attitude of the individual's will to this value, his final estimate of its relative worth. What influences contribute to give rise to a faulty estimate of its worth and hence to a false integration of the values as a whole? As far as the ethical life is concerned, the term 'materialism' raises no special philosophic difficulties but, on the contrary, admits of a very definite interpretation. Materialism would mean the magnification of the intrinsic worth of the kind of satisfactions at present under consideration. In practice it means the undue preoccupation with the pursuit of what are essential appetitive pleasures, the appetites themselves being either inherited or acquired. The life which is ordered on this plan is a practical illustration of hedonism.- In one very definite sense of that term. What are the influences which go to produce an integration of this character, in which the consciousness of the other values tends to disappear before the engrossing pursuit of material satisfactions? The unethical character of the integration is due essentially to the fact, pointed out in an earlier chapter, that this value, while not in the strictest sense instrumental, is nevertheless subsidiary in the sense that it is a precondition of those activities which humanity has pronounced to be good rather than an integral part of them. Even admitting, as we did in that chapter, that there is a sense in which such satisfactions may be pronounced good simpliciter, nevertheless, the preponderating interest in this kind of good indicates an organisation of values which is essentially unethical. Now this result is probably to be traced partly to the influence of two specific factors, which begin to operate during adolescence and may permanently undermine the ethical sense, and partly to a more general kind of influence which has been exerted throughout the c.f. Brever, (1) Instinct in Man, pp.254-256.
entire course of the individual's development.

In the first place, this kind of materialism or hedonism, (whichever term be preferred) may be the result of a kind of emotional and intellectual exhaustion. The strain of mental adjustment incidental to the adolescent stage may involve a reaction which takes the form of a virtual surrender of interest in the higher values and the more or less deliberate acceptance of the attractively simple plan of life which this kind of materialism seems to offer. It is true that the moral and intellectual scepticism of youth is, as a rule, only provisional and temporary when it is not merely a pose. Not infrequently, however, this negative reaction is more serious and more permanent, involving the gradual loosening and weakening of the moral fibres. It is here that some special integrating influence, such as religion, finds its greatest justification and value.

The second specific influence which we would mention is incidental to untoward economic conditions. The extent to which this influence is responsible for the undoubted prevalence of a materialistic attitude is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated. We refer to the fact that, owing to cruel economic conditions, there are too many who find even a moderate and legitimate share of material satisfactions difficult to procure. One of the sources of the spirit of materialism is beyond question to be sought in the bitter and long-continued fight on the part of the workers for a more equitable distribution of economic goods. The original motive of such a demand may have been of the worthiest kind, a desire to secure the means of a fuller, more adequately human life. But the means which has proved so hard to secure, this more generous share of economic goods the claim to which has in practice at least been stubbornly disputed, has doubtless acquired a disproportionate value in the eyes of the
combatants. In any case, the entire atmosphere of our industrial disputes, charged as it is with the spirit of materialism, makes to distort the ethical outlook of our age.

And this brings us to the third factor which we described as operating in a larger, more general way to undermine the judgment of value. An essential contention of the present essay has been that ethical development is incomplete when it has not resulted in the appreciation of essential human values such as knowledge and art. This means in effect that the consciousness of duty or obligation would grow up around these values in the same sense in which it develops in connection with the values of the social and group life. Translated into practical terms, this simply means that the individual ought to feel it a duty to interest himself in these values to the degree that his special circumstances permit. On the other hand, nothing is more patent in our own day than that the practical attitude of the individual or, we might say, of society as a whole, to the opportunities for self-development and self-culture which such interests offer, falls far short of meeting the demands of a true ethical ideal. Not the least serious of our social problems is to secure that, with the general extension of the leisure part of life (that is, technically, leisure from direct economic activities), there should be provided the means of worthily using that leisure.

When Spencer dismissed the so-called cultural subjects of study with the remark that "as they occupy the leisure of life, so they should occupy the leisure of education," the specious logic of the statement concealed a far-reaching fallacy. Materialism, in the ethical sense, would mean either of two things with regard to the individual's conduct of his life. Either too much of his time is

(2) Education: p.63.
occupied with actual economic activities, in which case the leisure of life is sacrificed to the pursuit of ends which are merely subsidiary; or a leisure which is itself adequate, is frittered away in the pursuit of 'pleasure', in other words, in the preoccupation with the material value, in our sense of that phrase. We have this second alternative mainly in view when we characterise our age as an age of materialism.

Here, then, we would find the general explanation of the fact that an ethically false integration is too frequently the outcome of the process of development traced in this essay. If the point of view which we have consistently maintained be sound, it would follow that the subjection of the individual, from the very beginning of education, to a powerful indirect suggestion can only have one result. In truth he is largely subjected to such an indirect suggestion, namely, the suggestion as to the paramount importance of the material value. The suggestion is indirect, for the express teaching of society may well be otherwise. But the important thing is the kind of interests or ends with which society in actual practice is seen to be most strenuously concerned. There is thus nothing surprising in the fact that an age (might we say a civilisation?) which at least acts as if the material value were supreme should too often find that the product of its ethical training is an individual who can hardly even apprehend what is meant by a reprehensible use of leisure which need not involve any breach of definite moral standards. Nor is it difficult to see that this attitude, were it to become sufficiently widespread and permanent, might fatally undermine the vitality of our civilisation by converting that civilisation into an elaborate mechanism for the satisfaction of lower needs.

There are influences, however, of a special nature which may
largely contribute to obviate this result and to lead to a truer integration. The existence within society of subsidiary social groupings which identify themselves with the prosecution of one or more of the larger ends of social life may have important consequences for ethical development. We may attempt to indicate here how, fundamentally, these associations exert their ethical influences. These subsidiary social groupings, with which the individual may come to be more or less intimately identified, are usually referred to as the voluntary associations. The principal voluntary associations which are of special interest to the student of ethical development may be classified as 1. Economic; 2. Cultural; 3. Religious; 4. philanthropic or Humanitarian. Wundt, in his discussion of voluntary associations, uses the term 'cultural' to indicate all forms other than the economic. The viewpoint of the present essay would demand that 'cultural' association should more narrowly apply to an association the raison d'être of which is the interest in knowledge as such. Wundt, moreover discusses these associations only from a broadly social or sociological point of view and seeks to indicate their true place and value in the life of the state. He does not consider the question in which we are mainly interested, i.e., the specific ways in which participation in such associations affect the development of the individual.

All the voluntary associations, irrespective of the varying character of their ends, contribute alike to one general result. This may be described as, first, the further development and discipline of the group spirit and, second, the integration of the group values

2) A thorough investigation of this aspect of the voluntary associations will be found in "The New Statesman"; Sept. 25, 1915; Oct. 2, 1915; April 21, 1917, April 28, 1917.
With one or more of the other values. Ends which have hitherto presented themselves merely as private concerns or at the most as things in which society as a whole was vaguely felt to be interested, now definitely reveal themselves as the avowed objects of corporate striving. Thus, by a process of indirect suggestion such as has been mentioned above, the value of these ends for the individual is greatly enhanced. The voluntary associations, therefore, are an important means of securing the final internalisation of the authority attaching to these values.

But they perform another important function. Not only do they furnish the individual with definite, concrete opportunities of self-expression, but they may function to assist him in the discovery of his own individuality. We have seen that the nature of the final ethical synthesis must vary according to the peculiar aptitudes and capacities of the individual himself. The process of education as a whole, of course, ought to be directed to the bringing out of individual peculiarities of endowment which are of fundamental significance; but this result is often most effectively achieved by active membership in the voluntary associations. Other results of a more specific character may be mentioned in connection with the discussion of the special types of association.

Economic Associations. Under this category we would include all types of voluntary association which have for their primary object the furtherance of the economic interests of their members. All forms of trade associations, such as trades unions, guilds, etc., professional associations of doctors, lawyers, teachers, property-owners, employers, etc. would be included under this head. It might be misleading, indeed, to classify these simply as economic associations; for associations of this kind may have
objects over and above the merely economic object. Thus a professional association has for one of its objects the furtherance of professional knowledge and technique. The term 'occupational' association used by Wundt and others, would therefore be more satisfactory purely from the point of view of classification. But we are classifying here entirely on the basis of the primary object or purpose of each association, and we are thus interested in the above associations only in so far as the object is economic. It is characteristic, indeed, of all the voluntary associations, economic, cultural, religious, philanthropic, that they tend to concern themselves with objects or, what is the same thing, with aspects of the individual's life, other than that which is the raison d'être of the association. This very characteristic, as will be presently shown, may be fraught, according to circumstances, with beneficial or detrimental consequences for ethical growth.

In the light of our discussion of the economic value in the preceding pages, we need not devote any further attention to the economic associations here. Having recognised their value in the quickening of the group consciousness, in the training and habituation in group activities and in group modes of deliberation, it need only be pointed out that their further ethical value depends essentially on the degree to which the activities of such associations come to be widened so as to include objects of higher intrinsic value. In so far as the object remains purely and frankly economic, however legitimate that object may be in the light of special conditions obtaining in society, the fact remains that the object represents what has been called a 'competitive' good. In so far as this competitive aspect of the economic good is present to consciousness, the ethical value, which we have found to reside in the corporate
character of the associational activities is discounted by the implied antagonism, or, at least, the negative attitude to the rest of society. Under such circumstances, the dominant motive is furnished by the acquisitive tendency which we found to be in its essence anti-social. The full ethical value of corporate activities is realised only in those associations which have for their object the promotion of non-competitive or social ends such as knowledge, art and religion.

**Cultural Associations.** Under this head would be classified all forms of association which aim primarily at the development in their members of a fuller acquaintance with and appreciation of the world of knowledge and art. In practice, the object may be of a general or of a more specific character. Reading clubs, literary societies, historical, philosophic, scientific associations, societies for the study of Einstein or of Shakespeare, would all be included in this category. We have remarked that, in the case of the professional associations, that the cultural aim may be combined with the economic. But even in these cases, it is not uncommon to find the two aims kept apart by the growth of independent associations.

The cultural associations represent, *per excellence*, the *humanising* associations. Whether the interest centres on a present-day scientific theory, or a present-day movement in art, or on some branch of knowledge that leads the individual to probe into some corner of the past of mankind, some glimpses are forthcoming of those permanent, universal ends or interests from which in the last resort life derives its dignity and its worth. The cultural interest is *humanising* because it is 'pure',—it represents the *disinterested* interest in humanity and, moreover, this humanity is approached through the study of its finest products. There is possibly a certain truth in Huxley's pessimistic remark: "I know of no study which is so saddening as that of the evolution of humanity as it is set forth in
the annals of history. Man is a brute, only more intelligent than other brutes;" and perhaps some excuse for his readiness to "welcome a kindly comet to sweep the whole affair away". Probably, however, an 'uncertain half-truth' would better describe such an interpretation of the annals of history. It is from these same annals, which preserve the record of man's multifarious strivings and reflect his more or less dimly conceived ideals, that the individual may rise with an invigorated sense of the essential, inalienable dignity of human life.

The question of these larger ends brings us to the consideration of the religious associations. We have already explained the sense in which it might truly be said that religion makes these immaterial ends its special province. The essential function of religious associations is twofold. They perform the distinctive function of fostering a vivid consciousness of an ideal order in which, as we saw, religion finds the ultimate justification of the pursuit of immaterial ends. In this way, as MacCunn puts it, they "bring their members to live for distant and unseen ends". Here too, as in the case of the other voluntary associations, belief is strengthened in so far as it is shared, and the value of the end is enhanced by the mere consciousness of a common or corporate interest in it. A further function, too, the religious association is peculiarly fitted to perform. The real ethical danger incidental to the wide cultural interest which we have described in the previous paragraph is not really the danger of a relapse into pessimism concerning humanity as a whole. The real danger lies in the tendency towards a depression of the consciousness of individuality, a depression of the sense of personal significance and hence of personal responsibility before the immensity of the world which knowledge reveals. The religious life, and especially the

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(1) Quoted by Bury; The Idea of Progress, pp.344-345.
(2) The Making of Character, p.130.
associational form of it, may furnish a valuable counteractive to this enervating influence. The object of the religious consciousness, we found, is conceived somehow in personal terms, and the thing that religion essentially stresses is the reality of the individual's personal relation to this object. The question is both pertinent and interesting, whether the continued need for the kind of synthesis presented in religion does not ultimately imply an ethical defect. That, however, is really the question as to whether the religious need is a permanent, essential need of human nature,—a need which the human being cannot shed without laying aside an essential attribute of his humanity. In the broad sense in which we have interpreted it in the present essay, the religious value would represent a kind of synthesis to which, it would seem, human nature as such is committed.

Philanthropic or Humanitarian Associations. The value of such associations in ethical growth has been already touched upon in the present chapter. Like the religious associations, they furnish a definite, concrete outlet or means of expression for the altruistic impulses which we have found to be associated with adolescent development. Everything that has been said about the cultural and religious associations in connection with (a) the fostering of the group spirit, (b) the direction of corporate activities to the pursuit of immaterial ends and (c) the enhancement by indirect suggestion of the value of these ends, is applicable to the present type of association. There is one aspect, however, of these philanthropic associations which calls for remark in the light of our general position. As has been pointed out the voluntary associations as a whole are an important means whereby the individual may be led to discover his true individuality. From our point of view this essentially means the discovery of the kind of integration of values
to which his capacities, to which his special training and circumstances point the individual. This will normally mean that some one of these values will tend to become central and the others will occupy a subordinate place. Now it may appear that we are perpetrating an outrage on common-sense ethics when we suggest that, according to circumstances, the individual may or may not make active benevolence a controlling interest of his life. Is not the active interest in the promotion of the good of others founded upon the universal with which the ethical life is concerned? Are we not here in the presence of that "homelier infinite" which concerns all alike, as distinct from the remoter, more 'exclusive' infinite of science and art? The general answer to this question has already been given. A practical illustration of our general position is in point here. It depends altogether, of course, on how much we mean by the benevolent or philanthropic interest. A certain measure of that interest is inseparable from the ethical consciousness. But in practice the interest may adequately reveal and express itself in a willingness and preparedness to minister to others' needs incidentally as the clear occasion presents itself. After all, this has its exact parallel in the case of the art interest, in the willingness to devote a larger portion of one's leisure to Shakespeare than to Bridge. But when it is a question of the more complete identification of the self with one of those interests, a question, for example, of the active pursuit of art or of philosophy as the dominant interest in life, the matter is different. In our intricate society, with its delicate adjustment of psychological forces, active philanthropy (under which would be included the larger projects of the social reformer)

(1) c.f. Whyte and Macbeth: The Moral Self, p.177.
(2) see chs. 1, 2, and 3.
demands no less than does the active pursuit of art the native aptitude and the specialised training. Philanthropy has its failures no less complete than the failures of art; and there is the important difference that the former are always less obvious and as a rule more dangerous to society as a whole than the latter. Thus the philanthropic associations, in so far as their activities are conducted with prudence and worldly wisdom, may usefully discipline the impulses of the aspirant to social service and perchance lead him to find his own true place and function among the highly diversified ranks of society's workers.

Again, looking at these voluntary associations as a whole we must take account of the fact that the individual may, and normally does, belong to more than one association at a time. This may react upon his ethical growth in either of two ways. It may make for a still more comprehensive integration, for the development of a more adequate, more balanced ideal. On the other hand, it may function in the opposite way, and the kind of adjustment or harmony achieved may cover an underlying disunity of a more complete and permanent character. The nature and the significance of the ethical failure here will be considered in connection with the general question as to the typical ways in which ethical development may be arrested or mis-directed. Finally, the voluntary associations, in so far as they cut across class divisions in society, class divisions which purely occupational associations tend to accentuate, operate directly in the further break-down of what Hobhouse calls "group morality" (which civilised society tends to resuscitate in new forms) and thus they accelerate the movement in the direction of that Universalism which, according to Hobhouse, has already "made great inroads".

(1) Morals in Evolution. p. 316.
We may at this point return to the consideration of that aspect of the general integrative process which has not yet been considered in connection with the adolescent stage. This is the inner aspect of the process of synthesis. As explained elsewhere, by the inner aspect of this process we mean the enlargement, stabilisation and systematisation of the ideational or representative train (with, of course, its accompanying affective quality) which furnishes the essential content of the 'self' notion. The general intellectual development has been already considered. Two aspects of this general intellectual growth are of interest here. The time-sense is now fully developed. Past experiences are preserved in representative memory and integrated into a stable and orderly series. Moreover, the growth of the powers of generalisation and abstraction has led, as already explained, to a more adequate apprehension of causal relations and to the integration of experiences on the basis of such apprehension. On the ideational side, therefore, the content of the self idea is given in this ordered memory series; the members of this series are the past experiences of the self and these are apprehended in their temporal and causal relations. Thus we have one sense in which behaviour may now be regarded as fully and explicitly ethical, a sense in which behaviour has been fully transformed into conduct. Past experience is available in full measure for the determination of present choice. But there is another aspect of this conduct. The fact that behaviour has become ethical in the full sense does not mean exactly that choice is determined with conscious reference to past experience whenever an alternative presents itself. Past experience is the fundamental determiner of choice, but it is an essential characteristic of the ethical life that the lessons of past experience have been elaborated and projected into the future, to form ideals of conduct.
Through these ideals past experience is consciously brought to bear upon present choice. In other words, the self has not only a past, it has a future. The development of the time-sense and the more adequate grasp of causal relations mean that this projection which we call the future reveals in a varying degree certain characteristics or marks which are, so to speak, an index of the completeness of ethical development. Let us explain.

That train of projected experiences of which the future is made up is in the nature of the case relatively unstable and changing as compared with the train which constitutes the past. Now the ethically significant aspect of the future is that portion of it which has been in a greater degree stabilised, and represents the kind of projection which we call ideal. But what is the nature of this projection? No term is more common both in ethical theory and in everyday speech than the term 'ideal'. Ordinarily the term presents no difficulty. But a more careful consideration of its exact psychological meaning proves instructive from our point of view for, in considering it, we are brought back to the notion which we have made fundamental in the present, - the notion of 'integration'.

As far as Ethics is concerned, the meaning of an 'ideal' seems to be clear enough. An ideal means the conception of a kind of activity or a kind of life from which supreme satisfaction is anticipated. As will be presently shown, something more than this is needed to constitute the ideal a strictly ethical ideal. At present we would insist that an 'ideal' refers to the projected satisfaction of conative dispositions. From this point of view, it would be distinguished from the notion of 'sentiment', which refers essentially to an organised emotional disposition. The term 'disposition' as used in these two connections is somewhat confusing. But conative
Disposition means simply that the individual 'has' or actually experiences certain needs or impulses which impel him to seek satisfying ends or activities. By emotional disposition is meant that in presence of certain objects or situations, the individual is likely to have a peculiar emotional experience. Needless to say, the conative and the emotional dispositions are intimately connected with one another. But at the same time it is confusing not to distinguish clearly between the two psychological facts: an organisation of emotional dispositions, giving us the notion of a 'sentiment'; and the organisation of conative dispositions, which underlies the development and projection of an 'ideal'. Dreyer states the distinction between a sentiment and an ideal as follows:

"The Sentiment 'love of justice' is a disposition constituted by certain emotional tendencies; that is, those characteristic of 'love' sentiments, associated with the abstract idea of justice. The ideal of justice, on the other hand, involves reflection upon the meaning of 'justice' and the acceptance of justice as a determining end of action, that is, recognition by the 'self' of justice as representing law for the self." The important point here is the fact that in the case of the ideal of justice, 'justice' is accepted as a determining end of action, as a law for the self. This statement, however, must not be taken to mean a minimising of the importance of the intellectual factor ("reflection upon the meaning of justice") in the determination of the ideal. The role of this factor has been described at some length in ch. IV - a role which we there found to be wrongly described as merely instrumental. What is insisted upon in the present connection is the fact that, when the ideal has been constituted, when it has finally taken shape and form, it presents itself as the conception of a kind of activity or life which the individual sets himself, to some degree at least, to (1) Instinct in Man, pp.214-215.
'realise', to bring nearer somehow to the actual conditions of his existence.

Hence 'sentiment' and 'ideal' both imply organisation or synthesis but the two notions are on a different psychological plane. 'Sentiment' refers to an emotional synthesis, while 'ideal' means a projected synthesis of conative tendencies. Although the sentiments intimately affect the development of the ideal, we must recognise the distinction between the two syntheses and recognise further that in Ethics we are primarily concerned with the latter. It would follow that McDougall's apparent interpretation of ethical development in terms of the growth of a hierarchy of sentiments does not seem exactly in the right direction. It is permissible indeed, to doubt whether such a hierarchy as he indicates exists. At any rate, the notion of the 'hierarchy' is speculative, and while it is doubtless legitimate as a hypothesis, we submit that it does not appear to become more convincing the more closely it is examined.

Our next step is to indicate how we would appraise the ethical worth of any particular ideal. Two things must be taken into consideration in judging the worth of an ideal: (a) the nature and the number of the conations which are represented in it, and (b) the degree to which the ideal has been integrated with the real or actual life of the individual; in other words, the degree to which it has become the object of actual, effective volition. The first point has been considered throughout the present essay as a whole. The second point was discussed in connection with the two earlier periods of growth, and we must add a few remarks relevant to the final stage now under consideration. In our discussion of the childhood stage of development, it was pointed out that the child's ideal or ideals, even at the close of the period, possessed ethical value

only to a limited degree. The meaning of this limitation was found in the fact that these ideals are only to a small degree synthesised with actual activities, that is, they are only to a very limited extent the objects of effective volition. A larger appreciation of means and end, based on more adequate and more highly controlled representative processes, is necessary before the influence of the ideal projection is reflected in the control of present behaviour. One of the essential marks of ethical maturity is this appreciation of a vital connection between the actual and the ideal. With such an appreciation, the ideal comes to represent the object of actual volition or, in other words, it becomes ethical in the complete sense. The extent to which this occurs is one important measure or criterion of the completeness of ethical development.

But while the thing of central importance is the ideal which has become the object of practical effort or pursuit, we must at the same time recognise the role in the individual's life of ideal projections which are not ethical in the full sense but which may nevertheless have indirect ethical value or significance. For example, I may construct in imagination the picture of a life such as that of Livingstone or Abraham Lincoln and find satisfaction and inspiration in the contemplation of that life. But I need not by any means accept that kind of life as my personal ideal. I may recognise the total impracticability of that life so far as I am concerned. In a real sense, however, this life may be truly said to represent an ideal. Our discussion of art has indicated the true place of such imaginative constructions in the ethical life. Their ethical value is indirect and depends on the degree to which they are somehow assimilated to or brought to bear upon the construction and the pursuit of my practical or directly ethical ideal. In so far as
they provide mere satisfaction, they have some ethical value, however indirect; but in so far as they afford inspiration (by which is really meant the extent to which they are integrated with my practical ideal) they acquire a more direct and explicit ethical significance.

Towards the close of the adolescent period, the process of ethical growth, considered in its inner aspect, means the development of an ideal which becomes the synthesising principle of the volitional life. The ideal at this stage is to be contrasted with the earlier ideals of childhood in respect of the feature discussed in the preceding paragraph. The mind of the youth, as contrasted with that of the child, is capable of forming and projecting ideals which are ethical in the full sense. This later ideal sums up, as it were, the entire ethical content of the 'self' notion. This is commonly expressed by saying that the self comes to identify itself with certain activities and ends. It may be remarked that, in the present essay, we have consistently avoided a form of statement which is very common in discussions of this kind. We refer to the common method of statement according to which the individual comes in the course of his development to be motivated by 'the idea of the self'. We have avoided this way of expressing the matter because it is liable to mislead. The mere idea of self is apt to be regarded in a vague way as one of the factors to be separately considered in the psychology of motivation. The truth is, of course, that the mere idea of self has no such motivating value. A less dangerous and, indeed, an accurate way of describing ethical behaviour is to say that such behaviour is motivated by an 'ideal' of self. But what are we really saying here? There may be nothing seriously misleading about this method of statement, but at the same time, if we scrutinise it, it does not seem really exact
as a psychological statement. Conduct is motivated by the idea of certain activities or ends, which have been integrated in certain ways, which appear valuable and which are therefore willed. To say that the self identifies itself with them is simply to repeat that they are willed. The self is identified with them because they have already been willed; it is not that they are willed because the self finds it possible to identify itself with them. To say that the self finds it possible to identify itself with the idea of certain acts is of course only another way of saying that the acts can be accommodated to or harmonised with that relatively stable organisation of tendencies which has been so far achieved. Now all this may appear only a question of the method of statement, but, on the other hand, there may be a real confusion lurking in the background. In point of fact, this method of statement may easily lead our minds to a husteron-proteron like that of psychological hedonism, where the thing willed (which in reality is certain objective activities or ends) is said to be 'a state of the self'. Ethical growth is usually associated with and, indeed, is rightly said to be a function of, the development of what is called 'self-consciousness'. In the present essay, we have described the development of that kind of organisation or synthesis to which the phrase 'self-consciousness', as far as the psychologist is concerned, ought to refer. Less than the usual prominence has been given to the term 'self-consciousness' itself. Although convenient and valuable when used in the strict psychological sense, even the psychologist finds it difficult to resist certain suggestions which lurk in this phrase, suggestions which tend to obscure that all-important fact of the ethical life, namely, the fact that the individual's attention is directed outward, that his will expresses itself in the pursuit of objective ends or
values, that he loses himself or, for that matter of it, loses his 'consciousness' of self in the single minded pursuit of these ends. Nothing is farther from the mind of the moralist than the intention to approve the 'self-consciousness' of the prig. At the same time, it is easy to fall into forms of statement or expression which unwittingly point to a kind of super-prig as the ethical ideal.

This chapter may be concluded with a brief statement on the question of ethical failure. By ethical failure we mean here, not the casual, occasional lapse from accepted standards but the permanent arrest or misdirection of ethical growth. Taking 'integration' as the keynote of the ethical life, we may consider some fundamental ways in which ethical education may fail to achieve its desired results.

The first and very common type of failure is that which we would describe by saying that no real and final integration has been achieved. This means the type of life characterised by no real unity or singleness of purpose. A certain measure of synthesis, of course, there must have been in the nature of the case, but not enough to impart to the life any stability or consistency. Many factors may contribute to produce this result. The fault may lie, for instance, with the process of training as a whole in that it has failed to habituate the individual to the control or inhibition of impulse which is implied in the sustained pursuit of an end. Or the fault may be found in a failure to emerge successfully from the intellectual and emotional unrest of the adolescent period. It is not impossible, again, that the general weakening of the moral fibre is to be traced to a still more specific failure, such as the failure to face some specific crisis, the shirking of a clear duty,
the evasion of some momentous decision. Jung considers that an experience of this kind may occasion one of those repressions which undermine subsequent mental well-being. Without necessarily committing ourselves to the psych-analyst's concept of repression, we may admit, on general psychological principles, that the memory of such a specific and serious abnegation of clear duty might persist as a disturbing influence and react adversely on the mental life as a whole. Not infrequently the final outcome of such a life without purpose is, as we suggested above, the relapse to a level of purely material interests or satisfactions, or, in other words, the relapse to a level of practical hedonism. But this need not happen. The individual may, on the contrary, display intense enthusiasms, but these enthusiasms are fitful and fleeting. He flits restlessly from one interest to another and, in general, presents the distressing spectacle of a life without plan or aim.

A second form of ethical failure may be said to represent the opposite type of failure. In this case integration has taken place, but it has taken place on too narrow a basis. One value has become dominant to the extent of involving the sacrifice of all practical, effective interest in the other values. The synthesis in this case may be effective and permanent but it is the outcome of a mere curtailing of interests, a mere ignoring of certain sides of human life which cannot be disregarded without loss to the personality as a whole. The degree to which such restriction or curtailment of the self's activities would be considered in practice to involve real ethical failure depends, of course, on the nature of the interest which has come to play the governing role. There are those,
for example, for whom the mere externals of our social life, the round of social entertainments, functions, parties, etc. etc. offer an all-absorbing occupation! Such a worship of mere 'outward shows' stands condemned before the ethical judgment, for only a starved personality could find its food in the mere husks of the fundamental value which we described as 'social intercourse'. In the same ethical category is the individual for whom a narrow sphere of politics contains all that is of interest in life. At the other extreme, the artist, the scientist, the philosopher may fall into a kind of preoccupation with their special pursuits which involves an impoverishing of the personality. Theoretically, of course, the specialised pursuit of one of the basic values need not entail a blunted sensitiveness to the varied interests of life. For these values, as we have shown, permeate or affect each other in subtle ways, and there is a sense in which it is true that, as Mitchell puts it, "it is only depth that commands variety in the long run". It is equally true, however, that devotion to one pursuit may lead to a much narrower kind of depth, involving a real shrinkage of personality.

The third type of ethical failure which we have to consider is beyond question the most interesting type. While ethical theory may recognise the prevalence of this type, the real nature or meaning of it is not, as a rule, adequately appreciated. It is usually described as a disharmony of the character as a whole, but this description fails to distinguish it from the first type we considered. In the latter case, the disharmony was found to be due to an absence, (1) see p. 33.

relatively speaking, of any real principle of synthesis. But in
the case we are now considering, the life is apparently well
synthesised; but it is synthesised along different lines or on
different principles which, in turn, are not synthesised with one
another. At the same time, there is no consciousness of disharmony
on the part of the individual himself. Serious disharmony may be
implicit in the life but this disharmony is not apparent except
to the onlooker. To the latter, the life may present the spectacle
of partial integrations which are seemingly independent of one
another and possibly (except for the individual himself) more or
less plainly incompatible with one another. In short, we have here
the case not of the life without aim, but of the life with more
than one dominant purpose, these purposes not being themselves
coordinated because fundamentally not admitting of such coordination.
This kind of ethical failure -- a life implicitly at war with itself--
is referred to commonly enough in the literature of Ethics. But
the psychology of it is not clearly explained nor is the frequency
of its occurrence appreciated. To the more glaring examples of it,
common-sense applies the opprobrious term 'hypocrisy'. But a very
different kind of adjustment is really implied in hypocrisy, which
is compatible, as a matter of fact, with a complete singleness of
purpose. Examples of the kind of adjustment we are considering are
not far to seek. The man who is an ardent and active supporter of
the Christian Church and its teachings and is not scrupulous on the
score of hard bargaining or even sharp practice in business; the
Philanthropist who can combine cruelty or callousness at home with
genuine charity abroad; the politician who can combine a stern moral
rectitude in private life with a frank indifference to moral
principles in the sphere of politics; the otherwise strictly honest
and upright citizen who is prepared to prevaricate shamelessly to customs officials and Railway Companies; these represent only more obvious examples of an inconsistency which may be latent in the volitional as well as in the intellectual life.

What is the psychological interpretation of an adjustment of this kind? The answer would seem to be found in a concept which is now familiar in psychology but more familiar in abnormal than in normal or general psychology. We refer to the concept of 'dissociation'. This extraordinarily fruitful concept has been sufficiently discussed in psychological literature to render unnecessary any elaborate discussion of it in the present connection. Dissociation implies a more or less permanent 'split' in consciousness, so that a system of ideas (or, as we must add in the light of more recent investigations, a system of impulses) becomes under certain conditions inoperative. In virtue of this dissociation of an entire system of organised tendencies, seeming inconsistencies of behaviour such as we have illustrated above, become possible. At present we need only remark that we must accept from abnormal psychology the concept of dissociation, and recognise the explanatory value of it in regard to so-called normal behaviour. In the next chapter, we define our position with respect to certain further psychological considerations of a more or less speculative character which have been advanced by the students of abnormal mental phenomena. Here we may conclude with a final illustration which indicates the meaning and range of this principle of dissociation. Take, for example, the 'economic man' of Mill and the older economists. Psychologists, and especially the Instinct psychologists, have made this notion the special butt of their criticisms. Their attack is of course justified when directed against the notion as ordinarily understood. In so far
as these economists assumed that "man is a reasonable being who always intelligently seeks his own good or is guided in all his activities by enlightened self-interest", (1) then it is in point to retort that "mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways". (1)

We need not consider here whether the economist has not after all the right to 'abstract', so to speak, the 'reasonable' side of man and to base his science upon this abstraction, precisely in the sense in which the mathematician is allowed to concern himself with the abstraction of space. To a large extent, indeed, this seems to be what the political economist actually does, judging from the very casual and hesitant way in which, for example, advertising, as a factor in economics, is treated in the literature of that science. But in so far as Mill or his readers hypothasised this abstraction, that is, asserted that this abstraction represents the real man and the whole man, the fallacy is clear. On the other hand, the interesting fact is usually overlooked that the 'economic man', precisely as the older economists pictured him, is a reality with which we must reckon in practice. For example, a man may be fully and sincerely convinced of the importance of education and the wisdom of spending money in the cause of education; and, if approached at the right time, may give generous practical proof of his sympathy. The same man, acting on a business commission, may be found behaving in a spirit of narrowly calculating self-interest, plainly impervious to all wider considerations of public or social utility. To advance any consideration that does not obviously appeal to his self-interest is useless. It is not that the wider and higher interests have lost their hold over his mind; it is rather that under certain circumstances their appeal is in vain. The 'atmosphere' is fatal to them.

(1)Mc Dougall; Introd. to Soc. Psych. p.11.
It would seem then that in this sense the economic man is a fact. But he is a fact to be accounted for by the notion of dissociation; the economic man may thus be a thoroughly 'real' man, despite the fact that he is not the 'whole' man.

The principle of dissociation, to which we have resorted for the explanation of the last-mentioned type of ethical defect, clearly brings us to the very ill-defined boundaries of what is called abnormal psychology. We must now raise in a more explicit way certain questions in this field which have a direct bearing on our general problem. In the remaining chapters we shall therefore consider (a) certain important concepts which have been largely used in modern psychology, especially in the discussion of abnormal phenomena; and (b) the nature of what has been called moral deficiency, moral blindness, or moral idiocy, all of which terms indicate a permanent incapacity, partial or complete, to benefit by the ordinary process of moral education. This discussion will serve both to sum up and to indicate some further applications of the principles which have guided our entire discussion of ethical growth.
Some Further Aspects of 'Integration'.

The object of the present chapter is to take account of certain recent developments in psychological science which bear on our own problem in a way that cannot be ignored, and to define, as precisely as possible, our attitude to them. The movement to which we refer may be conveniently designated the Freudian psychology.

Let it be understood at the outset that we use the phrase 'Freudian psychology' as a matter of convenient description to indicate the entire movement known as psycho-analysis. The term 'psycho-analysis' itself is ambiguous, inasmuch as it means both a body of doctrine and a definite technique. We use the descriptive phrase 'Freudian psychology' merely to indicate the general movement initiated by Freud.

Moreover, we would be explicit on the point that the present chapter is in no sense intended as a discussion, much less as an attempt at an evaluation, of the Freudian psychology as a whole. Such an attempt would be entirely beyond the scope of the present essay. The aim of the chapter is to explain, as precisely as possible, where our account of ethical development stands with respect to certain important concepts or principles which, in one sense or another, are central to Freudianism. To anyone who has given attention to the theories and hypotheses on which psycho-analysis is based, it is clear that some of the concepts employed are already more or less familiar in general psychology, but in the light of the Freudian psychology, they may be found to possess a much more basic significance for general psychology than has hitherto been suspected. We may state here the conceptions of the Freudian school which we shall isolate for consideration. They are (a) the notion of the paramount importance of the infancy period for all later development; (b) the concepts of 'repression' and 'dissociation;''
the concept of compensation. Other notions familiar from the Freudian psychology, such as the notion of 'mental conflict'; 'complex' and so on, will arise incidentally in the course of our discussion. Our main purpose will be to explain the exact sense in which we have accorded recognition to certain of these principles in the foregoing pages. Incidentally we shall indicate some distinctive features of Freudianism concerning which our attitude must be, not exactly hostile or sceptical, but merely interrogative. Some of the advocates of psycho-analysis appear to be rather unscientifically sensitive to criticism; their case would be better served by a frank recognition of the fact that, while the general psychologist must take the whole movement very seriously, the situation by no means justifies the acceptance in toto of their fundamental tenets.

Let us consider first what is perhaps the most interesting and suggestive aspect of Freudianism, namely, the supreme importance attached to the period of infancy. (1) We have already stressed the importance of this early period in connection with the acquisition of habits and habitual attitudes. An important lesson to be derived from recent controversies on the topic of instinct is to the effect that a much fuller and more exact investigation than has yet been found possible of these earlier years must be carried out before such an important question as that of the nature and number of the human instincts can be finally settled. (2) It may be asserted that the general tendency in present-day psychology as a whole is to lay the emphasis on experience rather than on inheritance, and to discountenance the practice of freely attributing to native endowment certain specific reactions simply because we find them in operation at an early age. Consistently with this general tendency, we have laid the

(1) cf. Pfister. The Psycho-Analytic Method: ch. VI; also Mitchell. The Psychology of Medicine, p. 164 & 165
emphasis on habit rather than on instinct. In particular, we have looked to the period of infancy to find the main source of certain habitual attitudes, such as the responsiveness of the individual to the attitudes, feelings, opinions and beliefs of the social environment. What is the relation of this general psychological standpoint to the Freudian hypothesis with respect to the infancy period?

According to Freud, the supreme importance of infancy is to be traced to certain developments of the emotional life which occur during the period. Emotional organisations of a very special kind occur, — organisations that are at least analogous to the later organisations described by the term 'Sentiments.' (1) The former, however, are peculiar in that they represent unconscious emotional organisations. These unconscious organisations are designated 'complexes'. The significance of these complexes is that they may operate in such a way as to prevent integration of the elements of the personality. This might be expressed by saying that, according to Freud, special emotional attitudes are unconsciously developed and become firmly established during the period of infancy. Again, not only have these attitudes been unconsciously formed but, unless eradicated by special means, they persist throughout life as a disintegrating influence. But their continued existence in later life is not at all patent either to the individual himself or to the observer. They manifest themselves only in various indirect ways and especially in the appearance of peculiar character traits which, in their turn, do not reveal their true origin to ordinary observation. Some further remarks on the meaning or origin of these attitudes will be offered presently.

In the meantime, we would point out the sense in which the

(1) For the relation of these two concepts, see p. 312.
Freudian hypothesis goes beyond the position we have taken up in the foregoing pages.

It may be recalled that we found a main characteristic of the infancy period to be emotional instability and incoordination. This trait of the period would, of course, be fully admitted by the Freudians. But their explanation of the trait is distinctive. The manifest instability of the emotional life of infancy would be held to be due to the existence of these unconscious attitudes to which we have referred. The lack of stability and coordination would be explained as the effect of special emotional organisations which, for reasons to be presently mentioned, have been carried out below the level of consciousness.

Now we have here a definite and, it must be admitted, an extremely interesting and suggestive hypothesis as to the origin or explanation of a definite infancy trait on the existence of which psychologists are agreed. Nor need we deny that the evidence adduced in support of the hypothesis is impressive. At the same time it must be considered to be still sub judice. While mechanisms of the kind that Freud has described may indeed be at work, it would seem that a reasonable explanation of the trait in question is possible without a hypothesis of the kind. It can hardly be doubted that the general failure to synthesise in early childhood is due, in large measure at least, to certain further characteristics which we found to belong to the period. Certain fundamental facts of the psychology of childhood, which have been fully treated in the foregoing pages, would seem, when taken as a whole, adequately to account for this trait. We have pointed out, for example, the feeble and often inaccurate representative processes ("that
strangely perspectiveless conception of life") (1) his very limited power to appreciate the meaning of his experiences and especially of certain experiences incidental to his social relationships, the seeming variability in the behaviour of his human associates, coupled with their immense power to create emotional experiences for him; factors such as these would go far to account for the lack of synthesis in the life of the young child. This means, in effect, that the instability and incoordination would be regarded, not as an abnormal or pathological fact (which is essentially what the Freudian view would amount to) but as the normal outcome of the low level of general mental development.

The next concept of the Freudian school which bears on our problem is the concept of repression. It is important to note the special sense in which this term is used by the Freidians. In their sense of the term, it is by no means identical with that inhibition or checking of impulse with which we have been hitherto concerned. It is true that certain authorities -- Bernard Hart, for example,--- use the term broadly not only to cover the kind of process which Freud has in view but all cases of inhibition or thwarting of impulse. The distinctive feature of the Freudian repression is that the act of repression is unconscious. 'Repression' in Freud always implies 'unconscious' repression, -- a fact which his critics not infrequently forget. Such unconscious repression causes dissociation,-- a condition in which a tendency or system of tendencies becomes severed from the main stream of the conscious processes, refuses to be integrated with them and continues to exert a disturbing, disintegrating influence on them. We have already made use of this concept in a special explanatory way in connection with the problem of final integration(2) Infancy, according

(1) See p.133
(2) See p.10.
to Freud, is par excellence the period for repressions of this kind. The reason is to be found in the fact of the child's subjection to the Pleasure-Principle, - a fact which is continually bringing him into conflict with certain standards or prohibitions.

Before we further examine repression in this sense, it will be well to explain the sense in which the notion of 'repression' is fundamental in ethics and to point out the sense in which it has been fully recognised in the foregoing discussion. In this latter sense 'repression' would refer to a conscious process., the process of conscious inhibition or checking of impulse. Inasmuch as 'repression' has come to bear the almost technical Freudian meaning of unconscious repression, it seems desirable to use a different term to indicate the conscious process, and hence the term 'suppression' is used by some writers to refer to the latter process. We may, however, continue to use the term 'inhibition' to indicate the kind of conscious or deliberate act by the repeated performance of which suppression is eventually achieved.

Now inhibition of impulse is inseparable from the process of ethical growth. Such inhibition means, to begin with at least, nothing more than that an impulse to perform a certain act is checked and hence that particular act is not performed. Such inhibition of impulse is the condition of all education and training. But what of the impulse which is thus denied satisfaction? Whether it is going to persist as a disturbing factor in personality would depend on two things: (a) the nature of the impulse and (b) the manner in which the inhibition of it was brought about; (a) will be considered presently; concerning (b) the situation seems clear as far as ethical growth is concerned. For the kind of inhibition which is
integral to the ethical life is that in which an impulse is checked because it is brought into relation with a larger organisation of impulses in the light of which it loses its attractiveness for the will. Now inhibition in this sense is no mere incident of ethical growth. It is ethical growth itself, looked at, so to speak, on its negative side. Character-formation on its positive side means the harmonising of the life of impulse; on its negative side it means the repression or inhibition of particular impulses. So far this represents what would be the ordinarily accepted view. But the point is not always sufficiently appreciated that the entire tendency, if we may so express it, of the Freudian psychology (at least as the present writer understands it) is to justify inhibition in the above sense and fully to vindicate the claim of the ethical consciousness that such inhibition is inseparable from healthy, harmonious development. This statement may look like an exaggeration, but it is not difficult to justify it when we consider from this point of view two notions to which the Freudians attach fundamental importance; (a) the notion of bringing back into consciousness an impulse which has been "repressed into the unconscious" and of so making the individual aware of it as the disturbing factor in his life; and (b) the notion of 'sublimation'. (a) Here we have the Freudian method of effecting a 'cure', of finally resolving the mental conflict. This consists essentially, as has been said, in making the individual fully conscious of the real character of the tendencies in question and of their connection with his particular disorder. Jung, it is true, goes farther and holds that, after the individual has been brought to face the fact of the existence of these impulses, he must forthwith take the final step of consciously and finally repressing or, simply, of suppressing them. The
important thing, however, is that deliberate inhibition of impulse in the sense in which, as we saw, it is integral to the ethical life, is recognised here as the way of return to health and balance of personality. There would seem, then, to be no real basis or justification in the Freudian psychology for the corollary that is often drawn from it, namely, that all checking or inhibition of impulse is dangerous, and that all impulses, of whatsoever kind, should be satisfied. What this psychology does assert is that some means of expression should be found for them. But the kind of 'expression' which is meant is essentially that implied when we say that the individual is brought to face them and recognise them for what they are. Sublimation, of course would mean a still further expression of them.

We may now return to the question of 'unconscious' repression. The phrase is a dangerous one and may open the door to all manner of speculation. Keeping the discussion strictly to the concrete, we would lay down that one fundamental principle, at least, stands out clearly; this is the principle according to which the mind tends to turn away from the unpleasant as such. This general tendency to withdraw the attention from the unpleasant and as far as possible to hold the pleasant in the focus of consciousness would be the psychical parallel to the physical shrinking and withdrawal from a physically painful stimulus. It represents the 'general appetite tendencies recognised in the statement of native endowment on'. The biological value of the tendency is obvious. Moreover, unpleasant experiences which tend to be forgotten in virtue of a withdrawal of attention from them might with propriety be said to be 'unconsciously' repressed; for beyond this turning away from the contemplation of them (a mental movement which may well become habitual),

(1) See Hadfield: Psychology and Morals. This interesting contribution came into my hands only after the present chapter had been completed. The point in question is fully and clearly explained. (pp.100-101). I leave the statement in the text as originally written.

(2) cf. Valentine, Dreams and the Unconscious, pp.32-33.
there is no express, deliberate effort to repress them.

In the notion of repression, the Freudians would include an unconscious repression of this kind; and they also imply more. But as regards this 'more', we prefer for the present to adopt a non-committal and interrogative attitude. One remark, however, is in point here. If repression does occur in the further, more comprehensive sense intended by Freud, then it would follow, on our general view as to the nature of ethical growth, that we would be forced to admit the truth of Freud's contention that such repression would tend to undermine the possibility of healthy ethical growth. It might indeed be objected that, in the nature of the case, it is not clear that such repression ought to be considered injurious. Admitting, as the fundamental cause of repression, the tendency on the part of the mind to turn away from the unpleasant, why should such repression, which would appear to have a distinct biological value, be held to work havoc in the mental life as a whole or be even considered dangerous? There is, however, no real difficulty here. The 'unpleasant' from which the mind turns away in the present case is not really the biologically unpleasant, it is an 'unpleasant' which is occasioned by the existence of certain artificial standards and restraints. In point of fact, the mind in reality is turning away from the biologically pleasant (the satisfaction of instinct) and endeavouring to act in the line of the biologically unpleasant. Or, to put the matter in another way, the unpleasantness which repression removes is the unpleasantness incidental to mental conflict. And this solution of the conflict could be considered biologically valuable even although it involves consequences such as the development of a neuroses, of peculiar character traits, etc., which we would recognise as injurious in
the light of existing social conditions to which the individual is called upon to adjust himself.

Closely connected with the above discussion is the definite sense in which we accepted the notion of an 'unconscious impulse' and of an 'unconscious desire'; and also the sense in which the existence of such an impulse or desire might be held to involve a disturbing, disintegrating influence on the personality. (1) We found that the individual might fail to realise the true significance of a sense of dissatisfaction which is felt acutely enough; that this sense of maladjustment or need may prompt to the pursuit of certain objects; that these objects may not be the true or appropriate objects of the impulses in question; and hence that, after the attainment of these objects, the dissatisfaction or restlessness will continue and a condition of general mental instability may ensue. The significance of this kind of situation for general mental development has been already considered. Here we would point out an important difference between our position in this respect and the Freudian position. Take the case -- apparently common enough -- where the individual's continued ignorance of the real significance of his impulse is traceable to the fact that the impulse itself is of a character which would be repugnant to him, inasmuch as it runs counter to certain standards which he has come to regard as authoritative. In this case, the real nature of his impulse simply does not occur to him, or if it does, he promptly dismisses the suggestion of it and, in doing so, may be acting in perfectly good faith with himself. Now we would naturally expect that such a situation would occur only in the later stages of mental development; and during these later stages it seems clear that this kind of situation does commonly arise and does actually lead --

(1) See p. 212.
at the very least -- to mental instability. But Freud's conception
of infancy as the period par excellence of repressions and distur-
bances of this character is, to say the least, hard to accept on
general grounds and, as we have stated, it must await evidence of a
more compelling kind than has yet been adduced. For example, granting
that the child experiences an impulse which we would recognise as
incestuous, why should it be repugnant and thus repressed at all?
The Freudian answer would seem to be that there is an inherited
aversion to incest. But social anthropology, while it presents
numerous examples of customs which in point of fact make for the
avoidance of incest, would furnish no real support for the notion
of such an inheritance. In the present state of the evidence con-
cerning human inheritance the notion seems hardly legitimate as a
hypothesis and certainly not as an assumption. It is in fact as
unscientific as the notion of an inherited 'moral sense' to which,
as we shall point out in the next chapter, certain authorities resort.

The Freudian psychology performs a distinct service in
vividly reminding us of the number and difficulty of the adjustments
which the child is called upon to make under the complex conditions
of modern society. In particular, this school of psychology draws
out attention to the special danger points, so to speak, of the
child's development, -- the stages at which maladjustment of a more
or less serious kind is apt to arise. As we have already indicated,
two stages are specially significant from this point of view. One
is the transition from infancy to childhood proper and the other
is the stage of adolescence when the individual is struggling to
achieve his final adjustment to social conditions. With regard to
the transition from infancy to childhood, failure of adjustment
would be peculiarly apt to occur in connection with the transition
from the small and intimate family circle, with its larger measure
of personal freedom, to the wider social circle of the playground
and the school. Needless to say, it is not necessary to adopt the
Freudian viewpoint as a whole to appreciate the danger here. On
any view of mental development, this stage would be considered
critical. The Behaviourist, for example,

(1) cf. Mitchell: Psychology of Medicine, p.170.
(2) cf. Fraser: Psyche's Task, ch. IV: also Wundt: Folk Psychology,
(3)
would describe the situation by saying that many old habit-systems must now be discarded and new habit-systems acquired. Further, the importance of this transitional stage has been long recognised by educationists, although perhaps not adequately recognised. The Freudian psychology, too, gives a special point to the insistence, on the part of some educational thinkers, on the necessity of a closer approximation of school work and school conditions to the work and conditions of real life.

The transition, for example, from an artificially sheltered school life to the more rigorous and exacting conditions of real life is probably the occasion of numerous failures of adaptation.

This brings us to the next concept of this school of psychology which we would connect with our own account of development. We refer to the notion of 'compensation', of the development of compensating mechanisms. It is not necessary to our purpose here to consider the many forms in which compensatory mechanisms are said to assert themselves. But there is one important group of phenomena, belonging apparently to this category, which is of special interest. Failure of adjustment means that the individual is thrown back, so to speak, on his own inner resources for the solution of his difficulties and the attainment of satisfactions. Hence there may develop a tendency to become altogether preoccupied with these inner resources, and to seek and find adequate satisfaction in an imaginative world constructed entirely in harmony with the dictates of the Pleasure Principle, as Freud would call it. Without committing ourselves to special hypotheses such as will be presently mentioned, we accorded full recognition to this fact in our account of ethical development. Identifying in a general

(1) cf. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist pp.415-420
way the motive underlying the construction of a world of ideal satisfactions with a motive which is fundamental to what we called the art value, we found that true ethical development demands that this value be integrated with the other values of life. In our outline of the history of this integration, we pointed out that the young child's reactions to the ideal world tend to be wholly uncritical, and are explicable by the fact that the distinction between the ideal and the real has not yet been achieved. As mental development proceeds, this distinction is normally achieved, and we found that in later childhood the attractions of the imaginative world have considerably waned in face of the immensely increased interest in or preoccupation with the real. Towards the close of the adolescent period, the final integration, as was explained, is attempted and happily achieved. The attitude is now discriminating and critical. The ideal world not merely offers a temporary escape from the stress of the real, although it continues to do this; but it proves itself an inexhaustible source of fresh inspiration and deepens the consciousness of the value of life as a whole. To retain our own terminology, the individual has achieved a true and lasting synthesis of art and the other values, and thus his enjoyment of art possesses fundamental ethical significance. This was expressed in an earlier passage by saying that for those ideal projections which are essentially of the nature of mere phantasies,—that is, they are divorced from the actualities of life—-he has come to substitute a practical or ethical ideal; and art is an important fountainhead from which inspiration is drawn in the projection and pursuit of this ideal.

The meaning of a failure or an arrest of development
in this respect is now clear. Let us suppose that the conditions of real life make demands to which the individual cannot respond. A serious misdirection of the course of development may occur. In passing, for instance, from the family circle to the school, too many new adjustments may be called for and called for too suddenly. Upon the failure of the child to adjust himself, there may supervene a general mental withdrawal from the activities of real life. He may thus become engrossed in his world of phantasy and find a dangerously adequate satisfaction in it. Such is often, in all probability, the psychology of the child -- seemingly quite normal -- who holds aloof from the games and sports of his fellows and who -- his teacher will tell you -- is "really quite happy". There is no need to suppose that he necessarily develops into a hopelessly incompetent adult. What probably happens in most cases is the development of an attitude which finds in the demands of real life only a troublesome distraction which should receive at the most but a necessary minimum of attention and interest. Clearly the growth of an attitude of this kind undermines in a fatal way the development that we found to constitute the ethical attitude.

So far we have considered only a kind of process of which any psychologist must take account. The Freudians, however, go much farther than this in their treatment of phantasy. They not only stress the importance of phantasy satisfactions in the life of the child, but assert that these phantasies represent the expression and satisfaction of special unconscious 'complexes'. We have, for example, phantasies expressive of the 'Oedipus' complex, the 'Electra' complex, the Narcissistic complex. These complexes represent an emotional and conative organisation which has occurred below the level
of consciousness. They might be described as 'unconscious sentiments' except that this phrase only emphasizes the emotional organisation and hardly brings out the notion of the unconscious conative organisation which seems to be implied in the complex. (1)

It would not be possible within the limits of the present discussion to examine the evidence for the existence of such complexes. This would involve an examination of the entire Freudian position. On the whole, however, while it must be admitted that the evidence adduced is impressive, the position must still be regarded as speculative. If we accept the Freudian account of unconscious complexes, we stand committed, it would seem to his view as to the predominating role which phantasy satisfactions play in the life of the young child. And this is a further point which, in the present state of the evidence, we find it difficult to accept. The point of view of the present essay, which has avoided as far as possible explanations of a speculative character, would attach much greater importance to the adolescent period with regard to the role of phantasy satisfactions. Our main reason for this would be not merely that the existence of such unconscious complexes is speculative, but also that the Freudians probably exaggerate the extent and seriousness of the maladjustments of infancy; while in the case of the adolescent, there is not only a greater a priori likelihood of serious maladjustment -- a point to which we would not attach much importance--but, as a matter of fact, emotional disturbances and general maladjustments are distinctly in evidence at that stage. Moreover, inasmuch as the young child has not really achieved the distinction between the ideal and the real, his self-surrender to the illusory satisfactions of the ideal can hardly be considered as other than a perfectly

(1) For discussion of whole question of the relations of 'complex' and 'sentiment', see Brit. Journal of Psych. Oct. 192
normal or natural mental phenomenon; while in the corresponding case of the adolescent, the line of demarcation, which had presumably been drawn, has been largely obliterated or at least rendered ineffective under the pressure of needs which have failed to find normal expression and satisfaction in the situations of real life. Hence that mental withdrawal, which we found to be fraught with baneful consequences for ethical development, would be more naturally associated with the later than with the earlier period.

The psychologist may thus find certain fundamental concepts of the Freudian psychology extremely useful and suggestive in his account of many important phenomena associated with what would be described as normal mental life. Without committing himself to the distinctive theories of that school, he may adapt to his purpose certain terms such as 'mental conflict', repression, dissociation, compensation, phantasy', and use them definitely to refer to certain processes plainly recognisable in everyday life, processes which may or may not be the superficial symptoms of more deep-seated activities in the unconscious. His acceptance of the latter hypothesis will depend upon his ideas as to what constitutes adequate evidence.

Reference may again be made to a concept which is fundamental to our whole position and which is in full harmony with the general conception of the Freudians as to the meaning of sound ethical development. This is the concept of integration. In point of fact, it is our study of the operation of this principle in normal life that led us naturally to raise the questions considered in the present chapter. The notion of integration, as the essential fact of ethical growth, development, is of course nothing new in ethical theory. It is implied in the conception of the 'good' life as the life which is 'whole',
or characterised by singleness of purpose in the broad sense
that the isolated impulses have been organised and harmonised
in the consistent pursuit of a personal ideal. It would be
difficult to conceive of a more vivid justification of this
conception than that which is afforded by the Freudian psychology(1)

CHAPTER 12.

MORAL DEFICIENCY.

The object of the present chapter is to bring into line with our general position the problem of what may be called permanent moral deficiency. There is some difficulty in finding a suitable term to designate the individual who, owing to apparently irremediable defects of endowment, is not amenable or responsive to those educative influences which foster the growth of the ethical consciousness in the normal individual. The term 'moral defective' has been used although there are objections to the use of such a term. "Mental defective' is a term already in recognised use to designate an individual who is subnormal in respect of mental endowment. The subnormality may be of a general or of a specific character, but, whatever be the nature of the defect, it involves the permanent inability to profit by the ordinary processes of training and education in order to adjust himself to ordinary environmental conditions. The use of the term 'moral defective' might convey the false impression that the problem with which we are concerned in the one case is independent of the problem raised in the other. The two problems are best considered as standing to one another in the relation of genus and species. A main part of our contention has been that the problem of ethical growth involves somehow the question of mental development as a whole and, consistently with this general stand, we shall affiliate very closely to one another the problem of the mental and that of the moral defective.

Moreover, the problem now before us will offer a convenient occasion for summarising the general position taken up in the present essay. While ethical development has been treated as a function of general intellectual and emotional growth, peculiar
importance has been attached to certain special tendencies and capacities, inasmuch as they seem to condition in a fundamental way the final outcome of ethical training. Our discussion of the problem of moral deficiency will serve to illustrate our hypothesis with regard to the role of these factors. In these tendencies and capacities we would find the real meaning of that moral nature which the normal human being may be said inherently to possess. The enquiry of the present chapter has therefore a twofold interest, a theoretical and a directly practical interest. The theoretical interest consists in the fact that the enquiry will bring into closer range the question which Intuitionist ethics raises for the genetic psychologist. Recognising that there are different forms or interpretations of the Intuitionist theory, all forms of the theory would be at one in holding that there is some sense in which the categories of 'right' and 'good' are simple, ultimate, irreducible. In that case, the question is raised: when and how do they make their appearance in the child? At one point in our discussion direct reference was made to this problem and a line of solution suggested. But what appears to be the complete answer to the question (in so far as the psychologist as such can return an answer to it) is implied in our discussion as a whole. Here we are concerned rather to summarise what appear to be the essential preconditions of the apprehension and appreciation of those categories.

Our discussion, then, really aims at offering some explanation of what is meant by this 'moral nature' which the normal human being is held to possess. But the explanation which we seek to offer is an explanation in psychological terms or from the psychological viewpoint. The fact of moral educability presents

(1) See p.173.
the psychologist with a real problem, but the possibility of any fruitful discussion of it and the possibility of understanding the limitations of the psychological viewpoint itself, depend upon our putting the question in the right way. Consider, for example, the following statement of the issue: "passing now to a brief notice of the moral nature of childhood, I must first of all express my strong conviction, based upon observation as well as upon abstract reasoning, that moral ideas do not require to be created or implanted in the minds of children by their elders. Nothing is more certain than that the child is born potentially a moral being, possessing a moral nature which requires only to be evoked and developed by environmental conditions. If this be not true then neither is it true that he is born potentially an active being, possessing a volitional nature which requires only to be evoked and developed by suitable conditions. If no amount of training can ever make a moral being of a dog, it is because he possesses no moral nature to begin with. If a child is capable of attaining to advanced moral ideas and distinctions, it is because he possesses at the outset a moral nature upon which instruction and discipline can take hold." (1)

Now it is possible that this statement is meant to suggest that there are metaphysical implications involved in the mere fact of moral educability. If this be the writer's intention, then we do not deny that the statement possesses a real significance but a significance which the psychologist as such is not called upon to consider. Or, again, the statement may be the reflection of some theological prepossession about child nature in general. In that case it is equally outside the purview of the psychologist, Considered from the purely psychological standpoint, statements of his kind seem to be devoid of any real meaning.

(1) Tracy: The Psychology of Childhood, p. 179.
For example, what meaning is to be attached to the phrase: "potentially a moral being"? What does this phrase tell us except that, under certain conditions of training and education, what we call moral behaviour normally appears? And this we already know. 'Potentially a moral being' tells us nothing new; it simply reminds us that there is a problem. For some reason or other the child is capable of developing into a moral being or, in other words, he possesses "a moral nature to begin with."

What, as a matter of psychological fact, represents this "moral nature to begin with"? Or, what test or criterion will enable us to say whether or not, in a particular case, the capacity exists? In so far as statements such as the above are intended to suggest that this latter question cannot be answered by the psychologist, then he must perforce reject them as misleading and unscientific. For he finds, as a matter of fact, that this same capacity appears to be wholly lacking in some cases.

Examples occur of a thing variously referred to as 'moral blindness', 'moral imbecility', 'moral deficiency', 'moral abnormality', and so on. His attitude to such cases, and, especially, the possibility of his usefulness to society in its attempts to deal with them, will depend upon his adoption of a truly psychological viewpoint at the outset. In the following pages an attempt will be made to point out precisely the lines along which the scientific investigation of such cases would proceed.

The problem of an original moral nature clearly raises the question as to the facts of native endowment which affect fundamentally the moral development of the individual. Native endowment itself, as we found, is a complex affair and we found, too, that the problem of the congenital factors directly and fundamentally involved in moral development is far from simple.
We would expect, however, in the light of our entire discussion, that moral deficiency would somehow be a function of a number of factors. The various possibilities, with regard to the nature of such deficiency, may be stated as follows:

1. Deficiency in the equipment of instincts
2. Abnormal strength of some special instinct or instincts
3. Special deficiencies of representative powers; which deficiencies may take the form of
   (a) Incapacity to build up an ordered representative memory train
   (b) Incapacity to represent consequences of behaviour
      (Fundamental to (a) and (b) would be the incapacity to carry out processes of generalisation and abstraction.)
   (c) Incapacity to represent emotional experiences of others; i.e., incapacity for Reflective Sympathy.
   (d) Incapacity for 'active sympathy', i.e., unresponsiveness to the feelings of others, the absence of any felt need to adapt or accommodate oneself to the emotional states of others. This does not necessarily imply any incapacity to apprehend others' emotional states. The failure to distinguish between (c) and (d) leads to a failure to discriminate between two very different sources of chronic delinquency.

Needless to say, moral deficiency, as ordinarily considered, obviously means something narrower and more specialised than is implied in our notion of ethical failure as discussed in the foregoing pages. Such delinquency essentially concerns the individual's social reactions and, from the broader standpoint of this essay, would be described as the incapacity to achieve the necessary minimum of adjustment to a special class of values, namely, the
values of the social and group life. The present chapter is explicitly concerned with moral delinquency in the ordinary sense.

If we consider fundamental those deficiencies of endowment which have been classified above, the general position might be summed up by saying that, owing to the fact of the individual's deficiency in one or more of the capacities mentioned, society finds it peculiarly difficult or even impossible to foster in him those fundamental habitual attitudes, those habits of acting and judging, which moral education aims to create.

What evidence can be adduced to show that the psychological basis of moral deficiency is to be found in the defects of endowment which have been stated above? A consideration of the problem of delinquency as it presents itself to the authorities who have made a special study of mental deficiency in general, and an examination of their descriptive accounts of the typical or, at any rate, the frequently recurring cases, suggest clearly that the psychology of the problem is far from simple and that our analysis is at least on the right lines. We would refer, in particular, to the investigations of three authorities, Tredgold(1) Goddard(2) and Healy(3). Taking the accounts of these authorities as a whole, we find substantial corroboration of our broader notion of the psychological basis of moral deficiency.

Tredgold draws a distinction between the lack of 'the moral sense' and the lack of what he calls 'wisdom'. (4) The latter means for him essentially the capacity to foresee consequences of behaviour hence the capacity for what is commonly called 'prudential morality'. Defect in this direction is described in our statement

(1) Mental Deficiency, ch. XVII
(2) Juvenile Delinquency
(3) The Individual Delinquent
(4) Mental Deficiency, pp.358-360.
as a fundamental defect of the representative powers. Tredgold truly points out that the possession of 'wisdom' in this sense does not constitute the individual a moral individual in the strict sense although it may serve "to curb primitive instincts in such a way as to keep the individual within the codes prescribed by society."(1) On the other hand, the absence of this quality will effectively preclude the possibility of any real moral development. In an abnormality of this kind, then, we would find one fundamental reason for the incapacity for moral education. Tredgold sums up the underlying causes of moral deficiency in these words: "Misconduct my result from three abnormal psychological conditions. From the presence of morbid or abnormal impulses which directly lead to anti-social acts; from a defect of moral sense, in consequence of which the primitive moral instincts remain unneutralized by any consciousness of social obligations; from a defect of wisdom in consequence of which the individual is unable to utilize his experience so as to control and coordinate his behaviour to his ultimate advantage and well-being."(2)

With regard to the first condition, our own statement represents this as (a) a deficiency in the instinctive equipment and (b) abnormal strength of some special instinct or instincts. It is well to recognise both aspects of the abnormality in instinctive equipment. The absence or marked weakness of a special instinct, such as curiosity, repulsion, or self-abasement, seems in many cases to be the determining factor. On the other hand, there are numerous examples of a failure of moral training which is traceable to an abnormal strength of a particular instinct, such as, the

sex instinct. The point here is that the individual is not

(1) Opp. cit. p. 358
(2) Ibid pp.359-360.
(3) c.f. Healy, The Individual Delinquent,p.534; also chs. XXIII et
necessarily lacking in the moral sense, which we discuss below, and may be acutely aware of the seriousness of his seemingly unavoidable lapses. We have already commented on the significance of Tredgold's third condition, defect of 'moral sense'.

Tredgold well describes what we may call the symptoms of this lack of moral sense, "As children they have been wayward, intractable, intolerant of all restraint and regardless of all discipline............. Some of them may have stolen, or have tortured dumb animals, or have been guilty of acts of violence, or cruelty to their younger companions. They have persisted in these things in spite of the tears and entreaties of their parents, and in spite of being punished, and they have done so simply because they have been unable to realise that these acts were wrong, simply because they had no moral sense."

And again, "It is, however, usually after leaving school that this moral defect begins to attract serious attention and it then shows itself in the complete absence of any consideration for the rights or feelings of others, the total disregard of all authority, the absence of any real affection for relatives and friends, the utter incapacity to grasp any ideals of duty, honour, obligation or patriotism, and the repeated commission of vicious and illegal acts." (2)

What kind of problem is raised for theoretical psychology by the abnormal behaviour thus excellently described by Tredgold? Clearly the question is: What is the precise nature of the deficiency here when it is reduced to its lowest psychological terms? To say that it is due to a "lack of the moral sense" does not in itself carry us far: it only indeed restates the fact that the individual is prone to perform a large variety of anti-social acts. In point of fact, we must here take exception, from a psychological standpoint, to one part of Tredgold's discussion of the whole problem.

(1) Opp.cit.pp.366-367

(2) Ibid. p.367.
This is the part in which he suggests that the normal individual inherits -- in the strict biological sense -- an aversion to certain kinds of behaviour, that such an aversion has been 'evolved' in the technical sense. The following statements show that such is really his view: "It is probable that primitive man had little, if any, moral sense. He was an egoist pure and simple." (1) "Since then it [the moral sense] has undergone a very great development, and there can be little doubt that it is to the gradual evolution of this sense that civilization as we see it today is in great measure, if not entirely, due." (2) "It seems likely that, phylogenetically, moral sense was developed at a later stage than many other human instincts, and there is no doubt that the degree of its present evolution varies very greatly in different races. Among many barbarous races, polygamy is a virtue, lying and thieving commendable acts, killing no murder, and torture, even cannibalism perfectly right and proper. The consideration and forbearance, the sense of right and justice of the English stock as a whole is today proverbial, and yet even in England it is only a few generations since it was considered perfectly right to torture and put to death those who held heterodox theological views, to burn so-called witches, and to hang the child who stole an article to the value of a few pence. The recent war has revealed the extent to which a whole nation, which has reached a high degree of intellectual development may still be behind in this respect." (3)

It is apparent from this last statement especially that Tredgold has lapsed here into a loose and vague use of the term 'moral sense'. Surely the truth is that polygamy, lying, thieving, cannibalism, religious persecution, burning of witches, etc. could become recognised practices only because of the existence of 'moral sense'. The paradox is merely apparent. The quotation from Tredgold

(1) Opp cit. pp. 354-355
(2) Ibid p. 355
(3) Ibid pp. 355-356.
reminds us forcibly of the extent to which the individual's conceptions of what is "right and proper" are determined by the feelings and beliefs of his social milieu; the normal individual feels impelled to conform to these social values. Now, in the case of the particular individual who is lacking in moral sense, the conspicuous thing is somehow an original lack of this very sensitiveness which renders him capable, according to the circumstances of his training, of burning witches or of going himself to the stake for an ideal. Tredgold confuses here two very different questions. The first is a purely psychological question: in the case of the so-called "moral imbecile," what is the nature of the psychological defect which underlies the incapacity for moral education? The second question properly belongs to ethical theory: given human beings with a moral sense, what kind of conduct is approved by this moral sense when it has attained to the fullness of its development? The answer to the latter question would be doubtless determined by racial experience in some sense; but racial experience in this connection essentially means those ideas, beliefs or values which are transmitted by 'social' and not by biological heredity. Hence the customs described by Tredgold point to a faulty 'social' inheritance, a faulty moral 'education,' and not to weakness of moral sense in the fundamental meaning of that phrase which we are considering here. We do not mean to deny that some biological variation occurs and is transmitted; but such knowledge as we possess concerning the nature of biological changes and the conditions of their transmission clearly discredits as loose and vague the idea of an inherited moral sense.

On the other hand, in the case of the moral imbecile, a psychological defect exists and the defect is somehow a defect of inheritance. What is the precise nature of it? Tredgold himself
puts the matter accurately when he says: "In such cases we are compelled to assume a psychological defect, that they are lacking in the very germ of capacity to develop moral sense."(1) What, then, is this germ of capacity which is lacking? We have already admitted the possibility of fundamental defects of representative powers, such as are implied in the incapacity for what Tredgold calls 'wisdom' or merely prudential morality. The incapacity for moral education in the ordinary sense may indeed be due to a purely intellectual defect of a fundamental kind. Throughout our discussion of ethical growth, we have pointed out the basic part which is played by the capacity for abstraction and generalisation, and we have shown how ethical development proceeds pari passu with the growth of the individual's powers in this respect. It has further been shown that the apprehension of ordinary moral standards implies a fairly high development of this basic capacity. Hence we find that 'feeblemindedness' or general mental deficiency is associated with a distinct incapacity for moral 'education' in the strict sense. Moral 'training' of a kind appears to be possible. That is, the feebleminded are capable of what might be described as a merely perceptual type of morality. By this is meant that the environment is made easy, the situations are simplified and limited in number. Habituation to this relatively small number of simple situations is possible.

A fatal defect of another kind may be present, again a defect of the representative powers. We refer in this case to the incapacity for reflective sympathy, in our sense of that phrase. The individual may be incapable or, at best only very inadequately capable, of representing or 'understanding' the feelings of others. "Put yourself in his place" would imply a mental act of which he is more or less completely incapable. The fundamental importance of the capacity

(1) Opp cit. p. 356 (italics ours)
which is lacking here has been fully explained in the foregoing pages; and doubtless many of the cases of moral deficiency illustrate a defect of this kind.

At the same time, it must be recognised that such cases do not exactly represent what the authorities have especially in view when they talk of moral deficiency. The typical case of the lack of moral sense appears to be that of the individual who is seemingly capable of apprehending the feelings of others but for whom those feelings possess no significance as conduct controls. There is no impulse to conform to or take account of the feelings of others. This might be expressed by saying that the capacity for 'active' sympathy is absent but, in point of fact, this way of expressing the matter fails to indicate the fundamental character of the defect; and a few further remarks are desirable.

In Chapter VI, we discussed at some length the significance of a tendency in the human being to direct attention to the members of his own species and to find their behaviour in some way specially interesting and significant. We admitted, moreover, that the tendency may be, as Thorndyke asserts, original or innate, while we recognised also the possibility that it may be of the nature of a habit which has been very early established. In any case the tendency itself is a fact which we found to possess an altogether basic significance; for it is basic to the development of that sensitiveness to social judgments of value -- to feelings, beliefs, attitudes, etc., of the social milieu -- which we have found to underlie the entire ethical development of the child. Now the general nature at least of the abnormality implied in the lack of moral sense, in the special meaning of which we are at present considering is clear. Owing to a defect of endowment the exact nature of which the neurologist or psychologist of the future may reveal, the
the individual is lacking in this original responsiveness or sensiveness to the social environment; and hence there is nothing on which, as Tracy has put it, "instruction and discipline can lay hold" in order to foster those habitual attitudes the development of which we have found to constitute the meaning of ethical growth. This is fundamentally what we mean when we say that the moral sense is lacking -- lacking, that is, to a degree that constitutes the individual a moral defective. It might be objected that our discussion adds nothing to the ordinary view which accounts for the moral defective simply by saying that there is a lack of the moral sense. The objection is not well-founded for two results of at least theoretical importance have been achieved.

(a) We have indicated the original, fundamental character of the psychological defect implied; and this defect has been accounted for in a way that is consonant with the fundamental explanatory principles on which we have relied throughout our entire discussion of ethical development. Our discussion, then, constitutes a warning against the wholly deceptive simplicity of the notion of "a lack of moral sense." (1), and

(b) while admitting our ignorance of the ultimate basis of the defect, we have at least indicated the lines along which, it is permissible to hope, the neurologist and the psychologist of the future may cooperate to remove that ignorance.

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