KIERKEGAARD'S CRITIQUE OF RATIONALISM

by

Alastair Thomson McKinnon

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"Every individual in each generation has every day his own troubles and enough to do in taking care of himself, and does not need to embrace all the contemporary world with sovereign and parental concern, nor to make an era or an epoch begin with his book."
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"This preface contains nothing but a solemn supplication that the reader will first put himself in training by laying aside a considerable part of his customary way of thinking. For otherwise the problem here presented will be non-existent for him---and that, strangely enough, because he has already disposed of it long ago, but in an opposite sense."

The Present Age, p. 79.
Chapter I

KIERKEGAARD'S LIFE AND WORKS:
A "DEFENSE" OF MAN

Introductory

Is it necessary to preface a strictly philosophical investigation such as 'Kierkegaard's Critique of Rationalism' with a reference to his life and works? Such a question may be unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative. There are for Kierkegaard no strictly philosophical questions. The problems with which he is concerned are primarily his own personal problems. "The stimulus, the primary stimulus, of all of his thinking does not come from books or other men's theories, but from his own personal life...." ¹ "It is his life which forms his thought." ²

With respect to his critique of rationalism the need for such a reference may be more specifically stated. His relationship to Hegelianism (or rationalism, to understand that word in a transformed sense) was essentially his relationship to his own imminent past, his attack upon rationalism his
attack upon that past. The 'dissolution' of the age he had personally experienced as a process both engendered and expressed by Hegelianism. 'The individual', the category with which he attacked both that dissolution and the System, was essentially the end to which the whole of his life and works were planned. Briefly stated, Kierkegaard's was an ethical or spiritual rather than an intellectual critique of rationalism and it was, as such, an intensely personal one. The very basis of that attack was his discovery of himself as a sinner before God, his experience of himself as a free and responsible individual. The entire authorship was, in a sense, his carefully formulated endeavour to promote that same discovery and experience within the life of his reader. Far from being a mere preface such a reference to his life and works becomes therefore integral to the entire investigation.

But is it necessary to set forth a recapitulation of those facts of his life and those broad interpretations of his work which have by now become the common property of all who are even vaguely interested? Inasmuch as I have already insisted that these matters are not irrelevant the questioner perhaps assumes that they have already been fully understood. And such an assumption would certainly not be surprising. On all sides one hears the protest that our age is better able to understand Kierkegaard than were his own contemporaries. More surprising perhaps but even more gratifying is the assertion that those of us who have been born on this side of "the dawn
of analytical consciousness¹ (surely a most marvellous dis-
ccovery!) have, by virtue of their supreme good fortune, a much
more perfect understanding of Kierkegaard than he had of him-
self. Between these two protests, hovering awkwardly in the
nether region between fact and fiction, scarcely knowing what
or how much to claim for itself, there emerges the revolution-
ary and all-important discovery that Kierkegaard was a hunch-
back.² Ergo.... Nor have his works escaped the ministrations
of those kindly but hardly Socratic midwives who, scarcely
remembering that the communication of the truth continues to
be a very difficult problem, have proceeded to reproduce his
thought in what has amounted to a flood of studies, summaries,
surveys, sketches, etc., etc. Indeed, there seems to be no end
of ways in which to discover in capsule form a problem which
its author was not able to formulate in less than a score of
works. And, in truth, it does seem natural to suppose that
'the secret' has by now been discovered—especially in an age
which has discovered it so often. So too it seems natural to
suppose that his thought has by now been completely understood
—especially in an age which "refuses to understand that there
is something which it cannot understand".³ Ours is truly a
fortunate age!

But all of these clamourous protests notwithstanding
it must be said that this recent torrent of scholarship has
served not to bring our age closer to a true understanding of
Kierkegaard but rather to make even more remote the possibility
of such an understanding. Nor can it be claimed that the contemporary schools of Existentialist philosophy have been any more helpful. The elaborate fortifications which once guarded both his life and works have been besieged: he whose life and thought were directed against the paragraph has himself been incorporated in the paragraph.¹ Instead of personal appropriation we now have reflection about personal appropriation: instead of inwardness we can now have knowledge about inwardness. Instead of one whose experience of freedom and responsibility, of true humanity, led him to reject the Hegelian philosophy we now have one who is neither free nor responsible. Instead of one whose thought was carefully formulated in order to force the reader to exist in the truth by himself, in order to prevent results, we now have one whose thought has itself become a result. Instead of one who could be understood by only a very few, instead of one who could be understood only by those who spiritually understood themselves, we now have one who can readily be understood by an entire age—and in half an hour.² Instead of one whose life and thought were a critique of rationalism we now have one whose life and thought have been rationalistically emasculated. And this is precisely the sum of our fortune!

Not for one moment do I wish to deny the value which many of these works have had and which, with due care, they may continue to have. Nor do I wish to deny or even to call into question the standards of their scholarship. The
question which must here be pressed is not one of scholarship but rather of the limitations of scholarship. It is the question of the limitations of the understanding or, to pass over the intermediate stages, it is the question arising out of the fact that Kierkegaard not only directed his life and works against the understanding but he explicitly rejected the claims of the understanding to deal faithfully with the essentially human. As we shall see he insisted that science can neither help one to choose freedom nor to understand the life which chooses freedom. These judgments were based upon his own experience of the opposition between freedom and philosophy, between humanity and Hegelianism. His own life he understood as that of an upward struggle from 'man' to man, from necessity to freedom, from that mode of being which is perhaps the legitimate concern of the scientist to that realm or extremity of human existence into which the scientist as scientist, the scholar as scholar may not pass. This boundary he formally expressed both in his refusal to allow the psychologist to trifle with the spiritual life of man and in his insistence upon the inability of the System to properly comprehend the historical. The expression of this choice, or rather, the consistent invitation to make this choice, for that is more properly the manner in which the authorship is to be regarded, had itself to break with the traditional modes of thought. To this end he devoted more than a score of works nor did he at any time concede that the problem could be expressed in briefer compass. His life he
understood as one lived against his own understanding and he also understood that that life could be understood only by another life which was itself lived against the understanding. His life he understood as a truly spiritual existence and he believed that such an existence could only be understood by another truly spiritual existence. It is this rather than the quality of the works themselves which is the real reason why even a flood of learned scholarship cannot in itself bring anyone, much less an entire age, appreciably closer to a true understanding of his life and thought. And this, I believe, is what Professor Swenson, himself the most faithful of all of Kierkegaard's interpreters, really had in mind when, in the midst of his own interpretation he said of Kierkegaard that "...he is his own best interpreter, nay, perhaps his only interpreter...."¹

A brief comparison of Kierkegaard's understanding of his task with that undertaken by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason will serve to indicate both the direction of Kierkegaard's departure from the main stream of Western thought and the nature of the transformation which is required in order to understand that departure. It will also, I believe, serve to call attention to the radical nature of his attack upon rationalism.

The profundity of its criticisms notwithstanding Kant's first Critique operates at least in large measure within an accepted framework. It assumes both the relative
validity of that which it attacks and the stability and meaning of the terms which it employs. It assumes that when something has been written it has been written. It is an appeal to the abstract intelligence. It is an intellectual critique of rationalism. Its general viewpoint is not inadequately described as that of critical rationalism. If for the moment we were to forget that Kierkegaard's is not a philosophy of results it would be possible to draw many interesting parallels between the conclusions of the Kantian critical philosophy and those which Kierkegaard himself appears to have reached. But as soon as this has been said it must immediately be added that while Kant's is quite properly a philosophy of results Kierkegaard's is rather a philosophy about the way in which each man is to arrive at those results for and by himself. "The communication of results", he says, "is an unnatural form of discourse between man and man...."¹ His is an attempt not to impart knowledge but rather to stimulate "the self-activity of personal appropriation...."² His is both a critique of rationalism and a critique of those assumptions upon which the more traditional critiques, and this is not to exclude the Kantian, are founded.

Formally at least Kant's criticism does not spring from his own personal life nor does the validity of its argument depend upon the moral nature of him who repeats it. For Kierkegaard the only finally valid critique of rationalism
is the moral and spiritual repudiation of the rationalist conception of man within the life of man. Kant assumes the reality of an objective and, comparatively speaking, non-human world and his works have, in a sense, their end within themselves. Kierkegaard, however, moves within a strictly human world which is rich in its variety, perversity and instability and his works have their end only within the life of their reader. Their appeal is directed not to the abstract intelligence but rather against that intelligence. Kierkegaard's is an appeal to the whole man to live the whole life of man and finally it was intellectualism alone which he felt compelled to attack. In this sense at least Swenson's reference to his "anti-intellectualism" is less misleading than the initially unsuitable title which I have purposely adopted.

Again, to understand Kant is primarily an intellectual task: to appropriate Kierkegaard is primarily a moral and a spiritual one. In principle at least it is possible to understand Kant by means of a resume of his thought. Neither in principle nor in practice is this true with respect to Kierkegaard. The most valuable statement which is ever made in any resume is the admission that Kierkegaard cannot be understood merely by means of such a resume. The only way in which it is possible to understand Kierkegaard is to understand his central problem and the only way in which it is possible to understand that problem is to
understand oneself. It is to understand oneself, or rather to understand man through oneself, as a free and responsible being. It is to understand man as something more than the rationalist conception of man.

But my principal concern is to call attention to the manner in which I propose to undertake the present study, to the manner in which, as I believe, such studies ought properly to be undertaken. I regard it as axiomatic that Kierkegaard's thought ought not at any price to be presented in the form of what he himself has already condemned as a "doctrinizing treatise". Both Kierkegaard's life and works were shaped to the end of assisting the reader to exist in the truth by himself: they were shaped to the end of refusing to furnish the reader with something within which he could exist. They were designed to destroy knowledge and to create inwardness. This was not an accidental feature of his thought but it was rather his first and last thought. It was something much more substantial and profound than mere romantic fancy which prompted him at the end of the Postscript to beg "that no half-learned man would lay a dialectic hand upon this work, but would let it stand as now it stands!" Again, and this too is neither romanticism nor obscurantism, the only way in which Kierkegaard's thought can be presented faithfully is by the adoption of some form of the method which he himself employed. Where this is neglected there can only be
knowledge about inwardness, reflection about personal appropriation, confusion without end.

This is to insist that Kierkegaard's thought is essentially poetic thought: it is to insist that there must be no prose rendering of that poetry. It is to insist that when the distance of poetry is destroyed so too is the nearness which is born of that distance. It is to insist that Kierkegaard in the form of results is not Kierkegaard. It is to insist that what I have called his 'critique of rationalism' is itself poetic in both form and content: it is to insist that a point by point, an objectively valid presentation of that critique is not his critique but rather a rationalist perversion of that critique. It is to insist that only through inwardness, only through personal appropriation is it possible for anyone to understand how a literature which scarcely employs the term 'rationalism' nevertheless concerns itself with rationalism. Ideally at least the present study, were it to be truly faithful to its inspiration and truly loving towards its reader, would mention neither Kierkegaard's name nor the word 'rationalism'. It would remember what Kierkegaard himself remembered: it would remember to speak in parables and myths, to speak so that those who had eyes to see might see, so that those whose minds could not understand might not understand. It would maintain its own poetic distance so that it might achieve something of the original nearness. It would speak
"without authority".¹ I say all this, I would repeat all this, not because I myself expect to attain to such faithfulness but because I recognise that this is the only way in which this study ought properly to be done. I say all this because should I be at all faithful it will require at least some degree of personal appropriation, of inwardness, to understand the manner in which Kierkegaard understands rationalism or even to understand the relevance of his critique. I say all this for the same reason and with as much reluctance as Kierkegaard wrote The Point of View for My Work as an Author.² And except to confess that I have not been able to show the same love towards my reader, except to say that I have not so long been able to refrain from speaking, perhaps no more ought to be said.

His Life

Kierkegaard understood his as a life of freedom and responsibility made possible only by God. It was this understanding of himself which led him to the denial of necessity within both the historical order³ and the life of man⁴ and which finally prompted him to insist that no man could either destroy or create another's faith in Christianity.⁵ And it was this same experience of freedom and responsibility, this discovery of himself alone before God which formed the basis of his attack upon rationalism.
The fact of human freedom, he believed, was the stone over which science and philosophy, over which human thought as such, had inevitably to stumble. And that he was perhaps not altogether wrong is in our own day ironically expressed by the fact that practically every study of his life and thought has manifested the same general proneness either, as in the case of the majority of the historical reconstructions to implicitly ignore or, as in the case of those physiological and psychological investigations to explicitly deny that freedom and humanity which was both the very breath of his life and the central concern of his works. Apart from Levin's protest that Kierkegaard's life is "so full of contradictions", apart from Dru's remark that "his life has really raised more problems than it has solved"---a remark which has already been sold in the service of a not too worthy cause---apart from the whole of Swenson's writings, the single exception to this general tendency has been Haecker's last work and this exception, itself directed against one of these attacks is, I believe, unfortunate in a number of respects.

It is no less than misleading when a scientist of some sort or other attempts to raise the question of whether or not Kierkegaard was a free and responsible individual. There are, I believe, but two methods of dealing with such intrusions and these are either to welcome them as "lies in
the service of the truth" which is certainly what Kierkegaard would have done or, and this is just as certainly what I propose to do, to let their proponents stand condemned as tumultuous scientists who have invaded the sphere of the existential.1 But even more if less obviously misleading is the attempt to defend Kierkegaard's freedom in what are still intellectual terms and it is particularly so when, as in the case of Haecker's defense, this is done in terms to the formal presuppositions of which Kierkegaard is finally as unalterably opposed as he is to those of Hegelianism.2 If science insists upon asking the wrong questions it is at least the duty of those who would 'defend' Kierkegaard not to answer those questions in the spirit in which they are asked.3 It is perhaps granted that Kierkegaard's freedom ought not to be intellectually denied but if this is so it must also be insisted that it certainly ought not to be intellectually defended. For him freedom was not an intellectual question and, at least with reference to his life, it ought never to be permitted to become such. And I would emphasise that the problem with which we are here concerned--with which, I believe, any real 'defense' must be concerned--is not the abstract, intellectual and ultimately irrelevant question of whether or not Kierkegaard was free, not whether or not he rightly understood himself but rather with the problem of whether or not there is some way in which we can understand Kierkegaard in the way in which he understood himself, with the problem
whether or not there is some way in which I can understand man through myself in the way in which Kierkegaard understood himself and man through himself. It is to this end that I understand Kierkegaard's criticism of those tumultuous scientists as having its most important relevance.

While every historical reconstruction and every scientific exposition of that life implies a threat against the reality of that life the real danger lies, I believe, not in these studies themselves, and this is certainly true of the former group, but rather in that misinterpretation of man of which these studies are but the natural expression. In disregarding Kierkegaard's freedom and responsibility or, as the case may be, in ultimately attempting to discredit his real humanity these studies are an expression of the projection of 'man', perhaps even of modern man, into the life of one who is essentially both an anticipation and a conscious denial of that man. And as much they are an indication of the direction in which, from Kierkegaard's point of view at least, a corrective must be applied.

Ideally I should prefer to press neither one of these charges. Not that against the historical reconstructions of his life because I am fully aware both of the value which such studies have had and of the extreme difficulty of expressing in any other manner the course of what was very much an historical existence. Not that against these
scientific and pseudo-scientific intrusions because Kierkegaard has already condemned them and because in whose eyes they are not thereby condemned they ought not, at least in his name, to be condemned. But both are directly opposed to the way in which Kierkegaard understood himself, to the way in which he insisted that the life of man must be understood, and they must therefore be made to confess if not their own guilt then at least that of an entire way of thought of which they are the typical representatives.

It is with a deftness of statement which says neither too much nor too little that Swenson has described the facts of Kierkegaard's life.

"(His) personal life...was the outwardly uneventful life of an unattached student and man of letters, an observer of his fellow men and a critic of his life and of theirs. A gifted, strict and melancholy father; a discipline in a Christianity that centred about Christ on the cross, mocked, scorned, derided, spit upon; a classical school; desultory studies at the University continuing for ten years or so; a brief excursion into dissolute ways of life; an engagement of marriage, broken after a year upon his own initiative; a collision with a popular journal of satire, resulting in his being caricatured for the mob; and finally an agitation that shook his little country to its depths, conducted with weapons of the spirit about things of the spirit--such were the chief outward facts of his life."1

It is in these facts--in the 'great earthquake', the breaking of his engagement with Regina, the affair of the Corsair, the clash with the established Church,--or rather, in his own intensely personal problems arising out of these facts, that Kierkegaard's thought has its immediate genesis and apart from a prior understanding of the nature of these
facts it would, I believe, be very difficult to grasp either the initial implication or the ultimate significance of that thought.

But the temptation which attends both the writing and the reading of every historical reconstruction of that life is that, allowing the present active tense of human experience to slip back into the perfect passive tense of history. It is to neglect Kierkegaard's insistence upon the freedom which prevails within the realm of the historical. It is to fail to distinguish between fact and event.

"Before my real activity as an author began there was an occurrence, or rather a fact (factum—to use a word which etymologically implies that I had an active part to play), since presumably an occurrence would not have been sufficient, for I had to be the active agent in the affair."1

Far from denying the reality of these occurrences Kierkegaard affirms that reality, but it should be noted, between that which is not event, between God and his own nature, within a context which translates those events into facts.

"If I were asked how I was educated to be an author, my relation to God apart, I should answer: by an old man whom I thank most of all, and by a young girl to whom I owe most of all—and to that which must have existed as a possibility in my nature: a mixture of age and youth, of the severity of winter and the mildness of summer—"2

Corresponding to the denial of these two aspects of occurrences there are two misinterpretations of history, or rather, two forms of the same misinterpretation and just as in his own personal life Kierkegaard sought to maintain both his
responsibility and his freedom, so too in his interpretation of history he sought the middle road between one meaninglessness and another.

"...the mockers and unbelievers...hold that the whole of human history hinges, upon pure trivialities, upon a 'glass of water'. Speculative philosophy represents the opposite position, since after depriving him of his soul, it attempts to transform the historical individual into a metaphysical determination, a sort of categorical designation for the relation between cause and effect, immanently conceived. Both are in error; the mocker does man an injustice, the speculative philosopher does God an injustice."

History, for Kierkegaard, is composed not of those events which are the blocks with which the historian constructs his castle but rather of the interpretation which the individual, claiming his freedom under God, is able to give to those events. Of that foreboding or dread in terms of which Kierkegaard himself accounted not only for his own sin but also for original sin he forthrightly declares that "...just as it can act as a deterrent so too it can act as a temptation...

A shadow of this same thought he cast again in The Concept of Dread, and, in even more basic terms, in The Point of View. Speaking of the necessity which characterised the System Kierkegaard satirically remarked that "it is lucky for the System that it has to do only with the dead, since it must be intolerable for a living individual to be understood in this manner."

It must be confessed that these occurrences are of tremendous importance. They are the stimulus of his thought,
the occasion^1 for his giving permanent form to that thought. But they are neither its cause nor its explanation. And this is precisely what every historical reconstruction is constantly being tempted to suggest. Every such reconstruction of a human life contains a threat against the reality of that life. In such a reconstruction "everything is understood behind-hand...it is forgotten that the dead were once alive."^2 It comprehends the past by viewing it as though it had never been a real present. It includes what it calls the person but excludes the reality of that person. It obliterates the fact of freedom. Both the threat and the degree of violence is increased in manifold proportion as freedom is the essential ingredient of that life. Much more important, therefore, than an understanding of these occurrences is the recognition that they are not necessary occurrences, that when they have been understood yet in a truly human sense nothing has been understood. Unless this is firmly and fully grasped Kierkegaard's life becomes that which neither it nor any other truly human life ever was: it becomes merely a stage upon which a cruel and tragic drama is played out to its bitter and predetermined end.

This is not a refusal to make these events decisive but it is a refusal to make them finally decisive: it is not a denial of their importance but it is an insistence that there was something about that life infinitely more important. It is, insofar as this is possible and legitimate, an attempt
to insinuate the fact of freedom within Kierkegaard's life. It is an attempt to suggest that a life which was itself free could hardly become otherwise by the mere fact of its having become a part of the past.\(^1\) It is an insistence upon his own distinction between life as it is lived and life as it is systematically understood.\(^2\) It is the protest that freedom forever bars its doors against the mere retrospective historian. It is an attempt to set a limit against the determinism of the scientist, a mark beyond which interpretation, if it is to remain a faithful servant rather than to become a tyrannical master, must not pass. It is the assumption that Kierkegaard was a real person, that, under God, he was a free and responsible individual. But it is also the suggestion that he who understood himself in 'fear and trembling' can perhaps only be understood in 'fear and trembling'.

A very different approach to the problem of Kierkegaard's life has recently been attempted in the form of an analysis of what, in that attempt, is designated as a 'psychological personality'. I refer of course to Friedmann's short sketch.\(^3\) This 'study' manifests a singular lack of both modesty and perception. As an absolutely complete misinterpretation of Kierkegaard which nevertheless is able to provide some show of evidence on its own behalf it is an interesting document. It is even more important as an example of the inability of the 'scientific' attitude to deal with this or
any other truly human life.

Despite the fact that he "came before the dawn of analytical consciousness" Kierkegaard's own works present a much more realistic and convincing account of the 'psychological personality' in the proper sense of that term—-if indeed there is such a sense. This is due perhaps not so much to the fact that Kierkegaard had personally known such a way of life as to the fact that he had overcome that way of life or, to state the matter in his own terms, not so much to the fact that he had doubted as to the fact that he had attained that point of view from which it was possible for him to view that doubt as despair. It was after Kierkegaard had crossed the threshold of this new life that he wrote The Concept of Dread which he described as "a simple psychological deliberation". This work sets the boundaries between dogmatics and psychology, between Kierkegaard and his own past, between that which is the province of the scientist and that which is not. Perhaps Friedmann was not aware of the significance of this work? Perhaps he was not conscious of its relevance? Perhaps he did not understand that it is Kierkegaard's express repudiation of the very kind of advance which he has made? In any event without either answering its argument or accepting its guidance he has presented Kierkegaard wholly in the light of a past against which the remainder of his life and thought, against which the essential Kierkegaard, was consciously directed. Significantly enough not one
of the works which followed this 'deliberation' are mentioned in this sketch. On behalf of such a chicaneur, to employ a word which Kierkegaard reserved for those who would prove to be his perverse interpreters, it can only be said that he has had the unknowing wit to account also for the relationship between God and Jesus Christ in terms of their homosexual rivalry! In anyone who understands anything of either Kierkegaard or Christianity this entire analysis will excite exactly the same reaction as the escape of a trustee from a reform school.

Kierkegaard had his own secret understanding of why his contemporaries could not understand him: he ascribed it to their "rudeness, obstinacy, envy"! I do not know that such a judgment will satisfy the psychologists of our age but I do know that this is essentially the judgment which Kierkegaard stands ready to bring against these psychologists. It is, in fact, the charge which he brings against both his age and our own: it is the charge which he brings against every age which denies the spiritual nature of man.

"...just as in a passionate age enthusiasm is the unifying principle, so in an age which is very reflective and passionless envy is the negative unifying principle. ..... The idea of reflection is, if one may so express it, envy...."4 But while, as Kierkegaard says, this "must not...be interpreted as an ethical charge"5 he goes on immediately to insist that "The further it is carried the more clearly does the envy of reflection become a moral ressentiment."6 In our
own age, and this I believe is the outstanding significance of Friedmann's analysis, that envy of reflection has been carried to the point where it has become a moral resentment. Infinitely more subtle and infinitely more cruel than the resentment of the Greeks\(^1\) that of our age has expressed itself in a moral resentment against real persons, in an analytical resentment against those who accept freedom and who demand responsibility that they might keep that freedom.

Like the ostracism of the Greeks such psychological studies are, from Kierkegaard's point of view, "a self-defensive effort...on the part of the masses to preserve their equilibrium in the face of the outstanding qualities of the eminent."\(^2\) They are, as such, ultimately personal attacks against personal reality. If a scientific age finds it difficult to conceive how such a judgment may be urged against a study which employs the apparently objective and impersonal language of science it is necessary only to reply that the very employment of such language with reference to the specifically human is itself, at least for Kierkegaard, an expression of antipathy towards real humanity.\(^3\) It is almost as if unknowingly Friedmann had quoted Schrempf\(^4\) who, without seeking the benefit of such disguise, openly conducted a bitterly personal attack upon Kierkegaard. Friedmann's analysis is a personal attack which has garbed itself in the cloak of scientific terminology. As such it says absolutely nothing about Kierkegaard but a very great deal about an
Friedmann,¹ nothing about the life of real man but a great deal about an age which too often resents the presence of such a man.

But it is perhaps fortunate that there is now in English, and in a book which "can easily be perused during the afternoon nap,"² a sketch which refuses to believe that Kierkegaard is not a fit subject for the analytical psychologist. Fortunate in the sense that having refused to heed every warning which Kierkegaard has given it has succeeded in rendering him completely meaningless and even demonically perverse. Fortunate in the sense that, conveniently to parody his own quotation of Schrempf's now (in)famous judgment 'he reduced Kierkegaard ad absurdum and (against his will but quite conclusively) (??) handed him over to the museum of psychological curiosities where, like all other curiosities, he is nothing more than interesting.'³ Fortunate in the sense that no one else should ever again have excuse to commit such a folly. Fortunate in the sense that it is perhaps no longer so difficult to agree that, as Kierkegaard said, he himself is really the only one "who is competent to furnish a real criticism of (his) work".⁴

All such studies are based upon the naively optimistic assumption that objective or scientific thought is able to pierce the innermost secret of man's existence. As such they are based upon a complete misunderstanding of Kierkegaard's life and a fundamental repudiation of his
thought. Kierkegaard charted the course of his life in the following remark taken from a letter which was written when he was but twenty-two years of age.

"Enthusiastic as I have been and still am about the natural sciences it seems to me, however, that I shall not make them into my principal study. Life has interested me most in virtue of reason and freedom, and to elucidate and solve the riddle of life has always been my desire."1

Three years later this opposition between the natural sciences and 'the riddle of life' had been deepened and extended so as to include that between the true life of freedom and philosophy itself.

"The fact that God could create free beings vis-à-vis of himself is the cross which philosophy could not carry, but remained hanging from."2

To this discontinuity between scientifically comprehensible existence and truly human existence Kierkegaard gave formal expression in his works. Science, he said, can neither help one to choose freedom nor to understand that life which chooses freedom. Respecting the former of these incapacities he wrote:

"Now how are the sciences to help? Simply not at all, in no way whatsoever. They reduce everything to calm and objective observation --- with the result that freedom is an inexplicable something. Scientifically Spinoza is the only one who is consistent."3

Again respecting the inability of science to assist in the understanding of freedom he wrote:

"And this is the wonderful thing about life, that every man who gives heed to himself knows what no science knows, since he knows what he
himself is; and this is the profundity of the Greek saying \( \gamma \nu \alpha \theta \iota \varepsilon \alpha \omega \upsilon \tau \omicron \) (know thyself).....\(^1\)

These are the warnings which are forgotten by the biographer who, jealous for the accuracy and completeness of his historical reconstruction, forgets that in such a reconstruction "the dead are not recalled to life, but only summoned to a fantastic-objective life,....."\(^2\)

These are the warnings which are perhaps not understood by the psychologist or, if inadvertently understood, are, like the protest that "psychology must stay within its limits",\(^3\) conveniently and hurriedly set aside. And because this has too often been the case, because these warnings have too often been neglected, it has become necessary to allow Kierkegaard to declare once again that "all such scientific methods become particularly dangerous and pernicious when they encroach upon the spiritual field."\(^4\)

There are, Kierkegaard says, two orders of causation which are appropriate to human life: that which is relevant to man as flesh and that which is relevant to man as spirit. That man who is only flesh, he who is the once-born man, is indeed the prisoner of necessity but he who has become spirit, he who is the twice-born man, has already broken these bonds.

"....the man who really becomes spirit....takes over his whole being (by choosing himself, as it is put in Either/Or) and reduces propagation to nothing but the lowest side of human nature."\(^5\)

This is the man who attains his freedom under God through the surrender of his 'freedom' to God. A scientific account,
whether historical, physiological or psychological is a pagan account: it lacks "the spirit's definition of the self"; it lacks an understanding of freedom. A scientific account of a truly human life is no account at all. The essentially human life of freedom and responsibility does not fall within the scope of the sciences. It is only in the synthesis of the physical and the psychical, only in the realm of the spirit, only where there is dread, and sin, and finally salvation that the true freedom is to be found. And it is only where there is freedom that the essentially human emerges.  

Our own age has manifested a tremendous interest in Kierkegaard's life and personality. This is precisely what Kierkegaard strove to avoid. It is, from his point of view, the reconstruction of the intellectual relationship; it is sheer idle curiosity. In this of course it resembles Kierkegaard's own age a fact which perhaps explains the heavy defences which he has already wheeled into position. It will be noted that this array includes both offensive and defensive equipment.

"...My facsimile with portrait, etc., like the question whether I go abroad with hat or with cap, could be the object of attention only for those to whom the indifferent has become important --perhaps as compensation for the fact that the important has become indifferent."  

"And then only one thing more. It goes without saying that I cannot explain my work as an author wholly, i.e. with the purely personal inwardness in which I possess the explanation of it. And this in part because I cannot make public my God-relationship. It is neither more nor less than
the generic human inwardness which every man may have, without regarding it as an official distinction which it were a crime to hide and a duty to proclaim, or which I could appeal to as my legitimation. In part because I cannot wish (and no one can desire that I might) to obtrude upon any one what concerns only my private person—though naturally there is much in this which for me serves to explain my work as an author.¹

"For an author, like any one else, must have his own private personality, but it must be his own Δυτορ; (i.e. Holy of Holies); and just as the entrance to a house is barred by the crossed bayonets of the guards, the approach to a man's personality is barred by the dialectical cross of qualitative opposites in an ideal equilibrium."²

Into this house, into this private personality, none may enter. Not the retrospective historian, not the physiologist, not the psychologist, not one of these may enter. For none of these will the word be spoken. Only for he who has his own house, only for he who has his own private personality, only for he who, sharing in that "generic human inwardness", does not doubt that another shares will the word be spoken. The way is not ON! not on to the discovery of a new secret, not on to the dawn of a new consciousness. The way, like the direction of Kierkegaard's life and the authorship itself, is BACK!³ back to the simple, back to what the simple man knows and the simple wise man knows that he knows,⁴ back to the religious, back to the altar.⁵ Back to man, back to God, back to man within God, back to 'the individual' "which corresponds to God."⁶

Kierkegaard himself stated the pre-condition for
an understanding of his life and works.

"Only the man who knows in his own experience what true self-denial is can solve my riddle and perceive that it is self-denial. For the man who in himself has no experience of it must rather call my behaviour self-love, pride, eccentricity, madness--for which opinion it would be unreasonable of me to indict him, since I myself in the service of the truth have contributed to form it. There is one thing unconditionally which cannot be understood either by a noisy assembly, or by a 'highly esteemed public', or in half an hour--and that one thing is the character of true Christian self-denial. To understand this requires fear and trembling, silent solitude, and a long interval of them."1

This demand has not been relaxed. Nor will it be relaxed. It is true, it will continue to be true that "only by closely attending to myself, can I arrive at an understanding of how an historical personality conducted himself while he lived."2 It is true, it will continue to be true that "...only 'fear and trembling', only constraint, can help a man to freedom."3 It is true, it will continue to be true that the understanding of Kierkegaard is essentially and necessarily a Christian task. The problem confronting anyone who would understand Kierkegaard's life is not primarily an intellectual problem. It is, instead, a moral and a spiritual problem. It is to understand oneself. And with respect to this problem, as indeed with respect to Christianity, all men are born equal.4 It was a most honest clue which Kierkegaard gave when he said "My need of Christianity is so great...that is why I am not understood."5 But to he to whom this is the clue it is not a clue at all.
His Works

Kierkegaard understood himself as the God-given 'corrective' to an age which was characterised by its rebellion against God and by its dissipation of the real life of man. It was to the fulfillment of this end that his life and thought was directed and it is in the light of this end that both he and his works must be understood. The historical setting of his task he set forth in the Journals, the Attack Upon "Christendom", The Point of View and The Present Age. These works record his critique of rationalism regarded as a social phenomenon—and that is finally how he did regard it—and so furnish the context within which his more specifically philosophical works—the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript—must be interpreted. But The Point of View also describes the inner structure of the early authorship and it is to this that we must first briefly turn.

The progress of the authorship Kierkegaard has described in the following manner.

"The movement described by the authorship is this: from the poet (from aesthetics), from philosophy (from speculation), to the indication of the most central definition of what Christianity is—FROM the pseudonymous 'Either/Or', THROUGH 'The Concluding Postscript' with my name as editor, TO the 'Discourses at Communion on Fridays', two of which were delivered in the Church of our Lady." 4

This was not a simple temporal progression. For the protest that he was "first and last a religious author" 5 Kierkegaard
found support both in the 'Two Edifying Discourses' which
had accompanied 'Either/Or' and in the purely aesthetic
piece 'The Crisis and the Crisis in the Life of an Actress' which
had accompanied the final devotional works. The
dominant theme of the early authorship was the strictly
religious and it was to this end that the pseudonymous works
were subservient. The aesthetic works were, he said, "a
necessary elimination"3, "a deceit in the service of
Christianity"4. The Postscript was also an elimination but
it was the last elimination: it prepared the ground so that
the machinery of war could be wheeled into position5: it
cleared the stage for the final presentation of 'the indi-
vidual'. It was the work which "set the problem, which is
the Problem &pi'ξονυ, of the whole authorship, namely
'how to become a Christian'"6.

This movement 'from philosophy' to the religious
he describes as "essentially the same movement as from the
poet to religious existence"7, again as "the same movement
in another sphere"8. But the following statement accounts
more fully for the complexity of this relationship. Speak-
ing of the 'Postscript' he says:

"Having appropriated the whole pseudonymous,
aesthetic work as the description of one way a
person may take to become a Christian (viz. away
from the aesthetical in order to become a
Christian), it undertakes to describe the other
way (viz. away from the System, from speculation
etc., in order to become a Christian)."9
This description reflects something of Kierkegaard's understanding of the real relationship between the aesthetic and the speculative. It makes allowance for the fact that the 'Postscript' "draws or edits the whole aesthetic production to its own advantage"\(^1\). This it is able to do because the speculative or that to which it is opposed is itself an expression of the aesthetic. But at the same time this description neglects the fact that the Postscript is "the turning-point"\(^2\) of the entire authorship. It neglects the fact that not only does this work describe "the other way" to become a Christian but that it describes what for Kierkegaard is the only way, that not only does it set the problem of the authorship but that it is the only work which can set the problem.

We have already sketched the course of the early authorship from the aesthetic to the philosophic and we may now turn to a consideration of the pseudonymous and indirect form of these works and of the relevance of that form in terms of his critique of rationalism. The importance of this apparently preliminary consideration stems from the fact that there is in the majority of Kierkegaard's writings an integral connection between the content and the form or, more specifically, from his own belief that he had found in the category of 'indirect communication' the means whereby to liberate both himself and his reader from the last trammels of aestheticism and intellectualism, of Hegelianism and
rationalism. But before passing on to this matter it is necessary first to call attention to the fact that although the Postscript was originally the concluding volume of a specifically religious authorship it now stands as, in several senses, the central volume of a larger and specifically Christian production. The later addition of the devotional and Christian writings has, however, served to emphasise rather than to alter the position of this work within the authorship in the same manner as the form of these later works has served to cast light upon the meaning and importance of the form of the earlier authorship. In discussing the relevance of the form of these works I shall therefore have reference to the Postscript both as the highest expression of an authorship which is essentially Socratic in form and as the central expression of an authorship which is essentially Christian in form. That this anticipates the very nature of Kierkegaard's critique of rationalism springs from the fact that, as I have already said, there is an essential connection between what is said and the way in which it is said.

All of the major works of the early authorship with the exception of the Edifying Discourses are pseudonymous and all of these works with the exception of The Concept of Dread employ indirect communication. Of that authorship Kierkegaard says:

"It began maieutically, with aesthetic works and all of the pseudonymous works are maieutic. That indeed is the reason why these works are pseudonymous—"
These two features are, as Kierkegaard suggests, integrally related. They are, in fact, two aspects of the same problem. That this is so is suggested by the fact that the pseudonyms are the medium by which Kierkegaard attempted to detach himself from his works while indirect communication was the means by which he hoped to personally relate his reader to these works or rather the means by which he hoped to relate the reader to himself (i.e. to the reader) through these works. It is most important to keep this relationship in mind as we turn to a consideration of the form of the works.

Kierkegaard described himself as a "religious author who...has never written anything aesthetic". In the "dust-cover" which he appended to the Postscript he protested that "...in the pseudonymous works there is not a single word which is mine...". In this same declaration he asked that any quotation from these works should be accompanied by the name of the respective pseudonymous author. And it was not without conviction that Kierkegaard later protested that he was misunderstood because people "confounded (him) as a matter of course with the pseudonyms". Similarly, the importance of the form of statement is repeatedly stressed by Kierkegaard in The Point of View and by Climacus in the Postscript. In that work Climacus protested that a dogmatising abstract gives "the most distorted impression of the book (i.e. of the 'Fragments') that it is possible to have". Again, he said, "...the abstract takes away the feature of
greatest importance and falsely transforms the book into a doctrinizing treatise...."¹ These remarks certainly apply to the Postscript itself and perhaps with equal relevance to the remainder of the pseudonymous authorship. The form of these works is an essential part of the works and these protests, far from being mere declamatory remarks, are, I believe, specifically intended to call attention to this form. They are signposts whose purpose it is to indicate what is at once both the distance and the proximity of Kierkegaard's thought from the works in which that thought is expressed. And if, as I believe, this is the case it remains only to add that there is a considerable amount of evidence to the effect that he who misses the signpost also misses the way.

But all of Kierkegaard's warnings notwithstanding it must be confessed that the form of these works has too often been regarded as of mere trifling importance. Dru has dismissed the pseudonyms as an "elaborate mystification" having "a purely ideal significance"². Allen has apparently failed to see that they have any real significance whatsoever.³ This latter view is essentially that of these German interpreters who see in Kierkegaard's employment of the pseudonyms nothing more than conformity with the Romantic fashion of the day.⁴ There is no need here to pause over these outstanding failures except perhaps to remark that Kierkegaard, having already anticipated such failures, has
quite forthrightly and explicitly ascribed them to the per-
versity of the interpreter.¹

But while it too finally misunderstands the sig-
ificance of the form of the authorship, Patrick's study can
at least claim to have avoided identifying the remarks of the
pseudonymns with the thought of their creator. He justly
professes to have observed the request that each word of the
pseudonymous works should be accompanied by the name of its
author.² But although he has formally acceded to this
request—a request which Kierkegaard elsewhere describes as
a "precautionary measure"³—his failure to understand the
importance of indirect communication which, as I have said,
is but the other aspect of this same problem, suggests that
he has not grasped the basis of this request. It was surely
nothing less than such a failure, a failure perhaps signified
by the absence of any specific reference either to the problem
of the pseudonymns or the use of indirect communication, which
prompted him to present the pseudonymous works in the form of
an "exposé"⁴. That he should have commented upon the form of
his presentation in connection with his exposition of the
works of Johannes Climacus, although in one sense obviously
the result of Kierkegaard's inclusion of his 'Declaration' at
the end of the Postscript, is, in another and deeper sense, perhaps a matter of no merely accidental irony. Not only
does such a resume transgress Climacus' own explicit warn-
ings⁵ but it is entirely contrary to the spirit of the
pseudonymous works. It may be, however, and this quite seriously, that the length of this work combined with its extensive quotation will produce the desired 'elimination' and thus compensate for the literal and somewhat heavy rendering of those signposts which are almost as poetic as the authorship to which they point.

The form of the authorship is of central importance and no real benefit can accrue from treating it either as an eccentricity or as a mere device. To forget this fact, to effect an easier solution, to misinterpret Kierkegaard's warnings offers itself too readily as an escape from a problem which at one and the same time obscures and reveals both Kierkegaard's and the reader's relationship to these works. This problem, I believe, may be stated from either direction but perhaps most clearly from the side of the pseudonyms. Although the relation of Kierkegaard to his pseudonyms, again of their thought to his thought, is one which, properly speaking, is almost infinitely dialectical, it is nevertheless necessary to formulate some positive view of Kierkegaard's relationship to the various pseudonyms. Apart from such a view there can be no ground for the interpretation of Kierkegaard's thought in the light of these works. Under such circumstances it is necessary either to accept the entire pseudonymous production, including those views expressed in the first volume of Either/Or, as an expression of Kierkegaard's thought or to reject this production, including the
two works of Johannes Climacus, as having no essential relationship to that thought. The former of these equally unsatisfactory alternatives neglects the importance which Kierkegaard attached to the pseudonymous aspect of his work: the latter neglects the importance of these works themselves. It remains therefore to attempt such a formulation.

The pseudonyms represent Kierkegaard's attempt to destroy his own authority in the eyes of his reader. They are his means of preventing an essential discipleship. They are his refusal to accept responsibility for his works in order that the reader might accept that responsibility for himself. They are his attempt to prevent the intellectual relationship between man and man and to promote the inward relationship of a man to himself. They are his endeavour to prevent knowledge and create inwardness. But they are also "personalities who think and speak for themselves." They are the ideal representation of a point of view developed and delineated with such consistency as to produce in the reader a definite moral judgment. They are the expression of a carefully formulated Socratic attempt to free men through inwardness rather than to enslave them through the knowledge by which they are 'freed'. They are the expression of his attempt to make each man exist in the truth for himself.

Kierkegaard chose the indirect form of communication because it was the only one which properly expressed that which he was attempting to convey. Objective knowledge may be
directly expressed because, as Climacus says, it "is not in the strict sense of the word a form of communication at all"\textsuperscript{1}. The expression of the objective does not involve the essential human reality of either the instructor or the instructed. It requires only the transference of knowledge from one intellect to another so that the emphasis is shifted from the world of man to that of abstract ideas. The expression becomes an end in itself. But Kierkegaard is concerned with ethical or ethico-religious knowledge and such knowledge is something not merely to be known but rather to be done. It is something to be achieved in the life of the individual, something to be appropriated by him in inwardness. Here the expression, far from being an end in itself, has but a relative status and the recipient, far from being a mere vanishing point, becomes the end in whom the communication is achieved. The appeal is not to the abstract intelligence but rather to what Swenson terms the "emotive will"\textsuperscript{2}. To the end of preventing his works from being interpreted as a mere addition to knowledge, to the end of promoting self-concern and inwardness within the reader, to the end of destroying the illusion that one is a Christian as a matter of course,\textsuperscript{3} to the end of completing the task undertaken by the adoption of the pseudonyms it was necessary to employ the maieutic method. Only thus did it seem possible to respect the individual's God-relationship,\textsuperscript{4} only thus did it seem possible to prevent the communication being transformed into a non-communication.\textsuperscript{5}
The Postscript is the fullest expression of the early pseudonymous authorship: it represents the culmination of what may be best described as a developing asymptotic approximation to Kierkegaard's thought. While the relevance of this description can only become finally apparent in the light of a somewhat similar approximation within the later authorship it is at least possible at this point to suggest the distinctive status which belongs to the Postscript and to Johannes Climacus who is its pseudonymous author.

There are innumerable minor indications of the singular role accorded to Climacus and his works. This has already been suggested in the three-fold division of the authorship and the unique position assigned to the Postscript within that division. This may be further seen in the fact that although as "a third person" who was "incapable of knowing anything about the aim of a work which was not his own" \(^1\) Climacus was nevertheless able not only to draw the aesthetic production to his own advantage but also to review their works and even to make minor corrections and adjustments in their statements.\(^2\) Furthermore it was with the Postscript that Kierkegaard had originally intended to conclude the authorship, an intention which he had signified in the title of the work itself. To the works of Climacus Kierkegaard appended his own name as 'responsible for publication'\(^3\) something which, he remarks, he did not do in the case of the aesthetic works.\(^4\) And this not surprisingly for the Fragments and the
Postscript were made to stand as the corrective to a philosophy which Kierkegaard regarded as the product and the distinctive expression of the age. Nor is there lacking an essential continuity between the Johannes Climacus who had originally been intended as the title of a proposed autobiographical novel and the Johannes Climacus who undertook the elucidation of the central struggle of Kierkegaard's own life: a struggle which Kierkegaard had originally viewed as that between speculative philosophy and Christianity and later as but the core of the struggle between man and God.

The centrality of the Postscript is further reflected both in the problem with which it deals and in the form of communication which it employs. Like the earlier pseudonymous works it maintains a perfectly consistent attitude toward the objects of its concern: it employs indirect statement in the strictest sense: it is a negative elimination. But at the same time it moves within another and an essentially deeper sphere and while it does not intrude upon the reader's freedom it does suggest thoughts which ultimately take their place in the strictly religious works. It is, both factually and poetically the turning-point of the entire authorship.

Climacus described his task as that of discovering "where the misunderstanding lies between speculative philosophy and Christianity". In this he was really carrying on the work of those earlier "pseudonymous authors (who) constantly
had existence in view, and thus maintained an indirect polemic (of their own) against speculative philosophy. But while his attack was carried out at a higher level the form which he employed was essentially the same as that of the earlier works. His explanation of the necessity and value of that form is therefore valid with respect to these works as well.

"...finally it became clear to me that the misdirection of speculative philosophy...must be rooted deeply in the entire tendency of the age. It must, in short, doubtless be rooted in the fact that on account of our vastly increased knowledge, men had forgotten what it means to EXIST, and what INWARDNESS signifies.

"When I understood this, it also became clear to me that if I desired to communicate anything on this point, it would first of all be necessary to give my exposition an indirect form. For if inwardness is the truth, results are only rubbish with which we should not trouble each other. The communication of results is an unnatural form of intercourse between man and man, in so far as every man is a spiritual being, for whom the truth consists in nothing else than the self-activity of personal appropriation, which the communication of results tends to prevent."

"If anyone were to say that this is mere declamation, that all I have at my disposal is a little irony, a little pathos, a little dialectics, my reply would be: 'What else should anyone have who proposes to set forth the ethical?' Should he perhaps set it objectively in a framework of paragraphs and get it smoothly by rote, so as to contradict himself by his form? In my opinion irony, pathos, and dialectics are precisely quod desideratum, when the ethical is quod erat demonstrandum."

The Postscript, and this applies equally to the other pseudonymous works within their own spheres, does not attempt the intellectual refutation of speculative philosophy. It
does not endeavour speculatively to prove that Hegelianism is in need of correction or adjustment. It seeks rather to disentangle the life of its reader from the moral and spiritual implications of that philosophy. Or, to state offensively its purpose with respect to rationalism, it seeks to effect such a transformation in the life of its reader that rationalism becomes the untruth.

But although the entire pseudonymous authorship was oriented in the direction of Christianity, although at its culmination it was able to raise the problem of Christianity, it was nevertheless essentially Socratic in its method. And Kierkegaard intended that this should be so.

"There cannot really be the least doubt that what Christianity needs is another Socrates, someone who could existentially express ignorance with the same cunning dialectical simplicity...."1

The situation within 'Christendom' was, he believed, fundamentally analogous to that which Socrates had encountered in Athens. It differed only in that, as he believed, those same trends had assumed even more monstrous proportions in his own day. This Kierkegaard attributed to the power of the anonymous press. But although he never failed to seize the opportunity for private conversation Kierkegaard secretly and reluctantly understood that the process of "dissolution"2 had gone so far that it could no longer be arrested merely by such means. He resigned himself to the fact that he lived in the age of the printing press and believing that an instrument which had been used for the enthronement of 'the public'3
could also be used for its disenthronepment he became a Socrates in print. And it was to the Socratic end of calling forth 'the individual' from out of the mob that the entire pseudonymous literature was directed.

The pseudonymous authorship does not give results: it refrains from offering 'positive' assistance: its confession is essentially that of ignorance or helplessness on the part of its author. It assumed that the truth lay within man and required only to be called forth: it was designed to promote inwardness and to prevent knowledge: it attempted to turn the reader in upon himself. Quite significantly these works were accompanied by the Edifying Discourses the standpoint of which is that of immanent religion.¹ This early authorship was essentially Socratic and in itself constitutes what is essentially a Socratic critique of rationalism. It was not until after the Easter experience of 1848² that Kierkegaard concluded that the indirect form was "ultimately rooted in human intelligence"³. And when he understood this he also understood that it was not the final form for a critique of rationalism. Nor was it until after this experience that there appeared a specifically Christian authorship which provided the new context within which the Postscript now stands or, as I believe, the context within which Kierkegaard had always hoped that it would be understood. But the most suitable point of departure for a discussion of the significance of these specifically Christian and often devotional works is
the person of Johannes Anti-Climacus who, as the pseudonymous
author of *Sickness Unto Death* and *Training in Christianity*
signalises the appearance of a new and deeper kind of indirect
communication and who, "being a Christian in an extraordinary
degree"\(^1\) is to Johannes Climacus the "opposite extreme"\(^2\)
within Kierkegaard's own nature. These are, of course, but
two sides of the same problem but it is from these two sides
that the solution of the problem must be undertaken.

Let us first consider Anti-Climacus' significance
as a pseudonymous author. The explanation which Lowrie gives
for Kierkegaard's early use of the pseudonymns and indirect
communication is basically a psychological one.\(^3\) It is true
that in his later work Lowrie briefly touches upon the
maieutic aspect of the authorship\(^4\) but he does not integrate
this into what, as it appears, he regards as the real
explanation. Quite naturally, therefore, he sees in the
Easter experience a metamorphosis which made it possible for
him "to speak out clearly"\(^5\), to renounce "essentially the use
of the pseudonymns"\(^6\), to indulge in "plain speaking"\(^7\). Again,
he says:

"It needs to be understood that S.K. wrote
all of these later works in his own person and
intended to publish them in his own name. Anti-
Climacus was an afterthought."\(^8\)

It must certainly be said that the *Journals* provide ample
evidence for this view. Perhaps it might even be said that
this is the explanation which they tend to stress, but at
the same time both the *Journals* and many of Kierkegaard's own works present quite another picture within which this psychological explanation attains whatever significance it is able to claim. In terms of this larger picture, a picture which because it is much more in keeping with Kierkegaard's thought is much more adequate to deal with that thought, Kierkegaard's use of indirect communication cannot finally be attributed to "his introversion". Unfortunately it is not possible to provide at this point the complete basis of this objection but it can be said that, in the fullest sense, Kierkegaard understood himself as a Socrates living within 'Christendom'.

His problem, to state it in what are at best but unsatisfactory terms, was not merely that of overcoming a personal introversion but rather that of overcoming a social extraversion. It was the problem of establishing essential communication and truly human relations between man and man in an age in which, as he understood it, man had become 'not-man'.

Lowrie says that "the Easter experience was a radical cure... he never again resorted to 'indirect communication', nor to the use of pseudonyms in the sense in which he had hitherto used them". In itself this statement is not factually incorrect but as preparatory to the view that the later works are non-pseudonymous and direct in nature it cannot pass unchallenged. It is true that this experience led Kierkegaard officially to renounce the form of the early authorship.
"The communication of Christianity must ultimately end in 'bearing witness', the maieutic form can never be final. For truth, from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it) but in a revelation which must be proclaimed."¹

But this 'renunciation' must not be misunderstood. From the side of the pseudonyms its nature is illustrated both in Kierkegaard's repudiation of the pseudonyms as devices behind which he could escape personal responsibility² and in his subsequent employment of Anti-Climacus as the pseudonymous author of two of his works. The relationship of Anti-Climacus to these two volumes is accidental not in the sense in which Lowrie understands it but rather in the sense that his name might as appropriately have been appended to almost any of these later works. The fact of the matter is that all of these writings are pseudonymous and that they are pseudonymous in precisely the same sense as are the writings of Anti-Climacus. (To this extent at least Geismar is justified in situating the writings of Anti-Climacus between the 'Christian Discourses' and the 'Edifying Discourses'.³) Anti-Climacus is a most valuable sign-post and it is a great mistake to dismiss him as an "afterthought"⁴. The nature of this 'renunciation' may be stated again, and this time from the other side, in Kierkegaard's own words.

"It may truly be said that there is something socratic about me.

"Indirect communication was my natural qualification. As a result of all I experienced, all I went through and thought out last summer on the subject of direct communication, I have made a direct communication (the thing about my literary
activity with its category: the whole thing is my education) and at the same time acquired a deeper understanding of indirect communication, the new pseudonymity.

The later authorship was, I believe, both indirect and pseudonymous and to state the sense in which this is so is the next problem.

The 'introversion' which Lowrie is concerned to set aside is, in reality, merely Kierkegaard's modification of the Socratic maieutic. It is not true that Kierkegaard either forsook Socrates or believed that he had done so. Rather is it true that the essentially Socratic aspects of the early authorship were taken up into his later writings where they were transformed in the light of the Christian revelation.

Listen!

"Socratic ignorance, but nota bene modified by the Christian spirit, is maturity, is intellectually speaking what conversion is morally and religiously, is what it means to become a child again."

The possibility of this transformation may be expressed in the following terms. Within the Socratic framework essential communication is possible only by means of maieutic instruction. Within the Christian framework, where there is the promise of a 'before God', essential communication becomes possible for a single individual who addresses his communication to the individual. The pre-supposition and end of the former is ignorance, that of the latter is faith. Within paganism, Kierkegaard says ignorance is the highest expression for the truth but within Christianity it is God who as the Truth makes
possible the communication of the truth.

"The truth can neither be communicated nor be received except as it were under God's eyes, not without God's help, not without God's being involved as the middle term, He himself being the Truth."\(^1\)

It is God, for Kierkegaard faith in the Christian God, which makes possible the reconstruction of essential communication between man and man.

Both the reality and the direction of this transformation may be expressed by the following comparison. The earlier authorship had employed "indirect communication" in order to place the reader before himself. The later authorship continued to employ this method in order to place the reader before God. The essential nature of the pseudonymous aspect was preserved in the Christian framework within which his thought was presented. Similarly the essential nature of the maieutic aspect was preserved in these works, and particularly in the devotional works, whose aim it was to change the life as opposed to the mind of the reader. The Socratic method was taken up into his teaching of Christianity where, from Kierkegaard's point of view, it was not destroyed but rather fulfilled.

These later works are of paramount importance for an understanding of Kierkegaard's thought. Stressing this fact, Swenson has written.

"No one can understand Kierkegaard who does not understand these devotional works, or assimilate
their content; they constitute the most adequate expression for his central thought, "the centre of gravity for his authorship." With respect to his critique of rationalism their importance is two-fold. They provide a new context within which the earlier works are given a fuller significance and, not at all unmindful of the value of the Socratic categories, they nevertheless bring new and sharper weapons to the battle. With the first of these matters we may deal very briefly. Climacus had undertaken the examination of speculative philosophy. The standpoint which he adopted was not that of the immanental religion depicted in the accompanying 'Edifying Discourses' but rather that of Christianity. These later works therefore in expressing the assumptions of the earlier provide the proper context in which the Postscript, indeed, in which the entire early authorship ought properly to be understood.

The later authorship is to the earlier as a Christian literature employing a transformed Socratic method is to an essentially Socratic literature oriented in the direction of Christianity. Its attack upon rationalism is no longer merely Socratic, it is no longer "rooted in human intelligence": it is based upon the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It does not seek merely to lead its reader to make a choice but it seeks rather to lead that reader to choose that which, in the history of the race, has already been chosen for him. It does not seek merely the transformation of a life (although this it certainly does) but it proclaims (and not
unSocratically) that every life has, in the person of Christ, been transformed. It does not look merely to a life in which rationalism becomes the untruth but it looks backward, and forward, to a life in which rationalism has become the untruth.

But the pseudonymns are important not only as a signpost for the interpretation of Kierkegaard's work, not only as an indication of what is at once both the proximity and the distance between the views expressed in those works and Kierkegaard's own thought, but also as an expression of the same relationship between their personality and Kierkegaard's personal reality. I employ the term 'personality' in connection with the pseudonymns in order to suggest that in themselves (and it should here be remembered that these works each have their own polemic against speculative philosophy) they constitute an unspoken challenge to the psychological misinterpretation of that term. I employ the expression 'personal reality' in connection with Kierkegaard in order at once to set him above and behind any and all of the pseudonymns. It is in the light of Kierkegaard's own thought, in the light of the relationship of the individual to the race, ultimately in the light of 'the individual', that his personal nature must be understood. Personality, when it is employed in the narrow or exclusive sense, is inadequate to describe that nature in precisely the same way that individualism is inadequate to describe 'the individual'.
It was one of the "dialectical opposites\(^1\) of this nature, one of the 'world-ward' shadows of this self, of a self which in being a real self could, under God, become more than a mere self, which he discovered in Anti-Climacus.

"In the pseudonymous works", Kierkegaard said, "there is not a single word which is mine."\(^2\) In contrast to this he said, "...I am quite literally the author of the Edifying Discourses, and of every word in them."\(^3\) But this distinction although quite valid in itself does not constitute a distinction between those works which present Kierkegaard's thought and those which present what may be described as his essential thought. This distinction I understand as approximately parallel with the earlier one between personality and personal reality. No more than the earlier pseudonymous personalities are to be equated with Kierkegaard's personal reality is their thought to be equated with his essential thought. Quite properly Swenson, speaking of the later devotional works, says only that "they constitute the most adequate expression for his central thought..."\(^4\) What all of these works do present, and this they do in varying degrees, is an aspect of, or rather, an approximation to that reality. Thus it is that at once they both reveal and obscure that rich multiplicity out of which they are produced. And Kierkegaard knew that it must be so. It was "the law governing (both) artistic production" and human relationships.\(^5\) "For an author", he said, "like every one else, must have his own private personality, but it
must be his own...."¹ It was precisely this private personality which he had attempted to preserve in the pseudonymns.

"If in this way anybody who is unacquainted with the educative effect of companionship with an ideality which imposes distance, has perverted for himself the impression of the pseudonymous books by an ill-conceived intrusion upon my factual personality, if he has made a fool of himself, really made a fool of himself by having to drag the weight of my personal reality instead of having the doubly reflected, light ideality of a poetically actual author to dance with, if with paralogistic insolence he has deceived himself by senselessly extracting my private singularity out of the dialectic duplicity of the qualitative contrast---then this surely is not my fault, who becomingly and in the interest of the purity of the relationship have for my part decidedly done all that I could to prevent what a curious portion of the reading world (God knows in the interest of whom) has done everything to attain."²

Nor did the Easter experience of 1848 serve to change his mind. More than a year later, and in a statement which was as prophetic for the future as it was true for the past, he wrote: "But nothing about my personality as an author."³

This is certainly not to say that the pseudonymns are irrelevant to Kierkegaard's personal reality. Indeed, they are shadows⁴ cast by that reality and it was within the penumbra of two of these shadows that Kierkegaard found an anticipation of his real self.

"To me there is something so inexplicably happy in the antithesis Climacus---Anti-Climacus, I recognise myself, and my nature so entirely in it that if some one else had discovered it I should have thought he had spied upon me."⁵

It was within the antithesis, within the penumbra of these two
shadows, rather than within either one of its constituents that Kierkegaard found the first substantial indication of his real nature.

"...Johannes Climacus...said he was not a Christian. Anti-Climacus is the opposite extreme, being a Christian in an extraordinary degree—whereas I manage only to be quite a simple Christian."1

It is within this antithesis that the secret, so far as it has been or will be revealed, is revealed. Climacus—Anti-Climacus forms "the dialectical cross of qualitative opposites in an ideal equilibrium"2 which bars the approach to Kierkegaard's personal reality. In themselves they are 'personalities' bearing witness to a personal reality. So intimately are they and their works related to Kierkegaard's personal reality, to his essential thought that they stand in open contrast to the other pseudonyms and their productions. They are, from either side, an approximation to that reality and their works reflect that approximation. They are, in fact, 'essentially autobiographical! But this description has yet to be placed within a much broader context.

It remains now to return briefly to the earlier description of the movement of the pseudonymous authorship as that of a developing asymptotic approximation to Kierkegaard's thought and nature and to the Postscript as the culmination of this movement. 'Approximation' because, like the later works, it merely approaches but does not attain. 'Developing' because, in contrast to the later authorship, it provides many
variations upon that approximation. 'Assymptotic' because Climacus and Anti-Climacus themselves meet not at the axis of the graph but rather at infinity. This construction emphasises rather than denies the centrality of the later devotional works which, in fact, give spiritual expression to those same thoughts to which Climacus and Anti-Climacus have already given what is by comparison an intellectual expression. And, for Kierkegaard, it is the devotional which is the higher expression. And it is this which Swenson implies when he says that these devotional works constitute "the center of gravity for his authorship".

Thus I reject Geismar's arrangement whereby he relegates the early pseudonymous works to a place "very much lower" than the later writings together with the static view of Kierkegaard's personality which such an arrangement both presupposes and implies. To a large extent I also reject Hirsch's suggestion that "if the ideas of Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus cannot be attributed to Kierkegaard at least those of Vigilius Haufniensis and of Anti-Climacus are his very own". It is not possible to discuss the matter fully here but it certainly must be said that "the ideas of Johannes de Silentio" were the very bases upon which Kierkegaard refused to heal the breach with Regine. The ideas of Climacus and Anti-Climacus, their relation to the ideas of Kierkegaard and their affinity to each other we have already discussed. But with the suggestion that "those of Vigilius Haufniensis...are his very own" there can certainly be no argument. And this precisely because the ideas expressed
there were first not his own. But therein lies our next problem.

The Individual and the Race

Thus far I have attempted merely to suggest the manner in which Kierkegaard understood his own life and works, or perhaps rather, the manner in which he believed that these ought properly to be understood. And having the problem of his critique of rationalism particularly in mind I have suggested that he is to be understood as a free and responsible individual, that he is to be viewed as the personal reality out of whom were produced the various pseudonymous personalities. It remains now only to sketch the context within which Kierkegaard understood his own life and that may most briefly be done by outlining his conception of the relationship of the individual to the race. This conception is important for any study of Kierkegaard: it is of particular importance for the present one. That importance may perhaps be suggested by the fact that this conception is itself a preliminary formulation of 'the individual', the category which constitutes the essential core of his offensive against rationalism. Furthermore it provides the perspective within which Kierkegaard understood himself, within which he believed that he had achieved his own freedom and, at least by implication, the perspective within which his reader must understand himself, within which he must achieve his own freedom and achieving
that freedom not deny it to another. That the importance of this conception is so repeatedly denied by the contemporary mind perhaps suggests something of Kierkegaard's judgment upon that mind and this in turn something of the manner in which a traditionally rationalist (or is it now romantic?) view of human nature must be altered in order to comprehend both the depth and the height of a life which was itself directed against such a view.

In contrast to both the Renaissance affirmation of the autonomy of the individual and the Hegelian denial of the reality of all merely individual existence Kierkegaard insisted that "the individual is himself and the race"1. And this, he says, "is man's perfection, regarded as a state"2. "The essential characteristic of human existence" he describes thus:

"...man is an individual and as such is at once himself and the whole race, in such wise that the whole race has part in the individual, and the individual has part in the whole race."3

Again, he says,

"Man is distinguished from other animals... qualitatively by the fact that the individual is more than the species. .......... it is perfection to be the individual."4

It is being the individual, it is understanding oneself as having a share in the race which constitutes that "perfection in oneself" which means "the perfect participation in the whole"5. It is this too which makes identical the history of the individual with that of the race.

"No individual is indifferent to the history of the
race, any more than is the race to that of the individual. While the history of the race goes on, the individual regularly begins afresh, because he is himself and the race, and hence in turn his is the history of the race."

The individual is related to the race as Adam is related to the race because both the individual and Adam is "himself and the race". And since "what explains Adam explains the race, and vice versa" it is also true that what explains the individual explains the race and what explains the race explains the individual.

For Kierkegaard it is sin, more precisely, the first sin, itself inexplicable, which explains both the individual and the race. It is this same sin, or rather consciousness of this sin—"the category of sin is the category of the individual"—which makes the individual to be the individual, which makes him aware of himself as the individual and it is through this sin, through his responsibility for his own sin, that he relates himself to the race. The basis of this relationship is pre-figured even within the immanent religion of the Edifying Discourses, but there the account is in terms of ideas rather than facts, there the "generation" or the age is made intermediary between the individual and the race. For Kierkegaard the primary relationship is that of the individual to the race and it is through this relationship that the individual is able properly to relate himself to the age. This prerequisite of real community is most decisively presented in Christianity which begins "by making every man an individual,
an individual sinner...."1

"Every man is himself a sinner. He is related, therefore, not as a pure man to sinners, but as a sinner to sinners: for this is the solidarity of all mankind in the fundamental relationship to Christ."2

It was, he believed, this 'fundamental relationship' alone which properly forged the bonds between man and man, between the individual and the race, between himself and his age. And it was in this relationship, in the discovery of himself as a sinner before God, in the confession of his solidarity with the human race3 that Kierkegaard discovered the possibility of real freedom and humanity.

Although it is only poetry or mythology which can faithfully present this conception the view that the history of the individual is identical with that of the race is neither a poetic intuition nor an abstract dogmatic proposition: it is the result of neither a pantheistic dieification of man nor of a mystical fusion of man with God or of man with the race.4 It is rather the reflection of Kierkegaard's own discovery that the Biblical categories were the categories of real humanity. It is the statement of his conviction that the spiritual history of the race is the true psychology, that freedom and responsibility have a divine rather than a human genesis. It is the result of his experience of himself as a sinner before God. It was his experience of sin which twice marked the boundary within his own life between Christianity and Hegelianism. He first embraced the Hegelian philosophy
when, in revolt against both his father and his father's faith, he rejected the essentially rationalist\(^1\) view of sin as sensuality\(^2\) and it was not until he personally experienced the relevance of the Christian view of sin as the opposite of faith\(^3\) that he broke with his Hegelian past and returned to Christianity. Then it was that reflecting upon his own past he was able to write:

"Every life has its Genesis and then its Exodus (when it goes out into the world), its Leviticus when the mind turns against heaven, its Numbers when it begins to count the years, its Deuteronomy.\(^4\)

But the Christian faith provided him not only with the proper categories with which to understand and to attack his past but, in its insistence upon the essential solidarity of the human race in sin before God, it also provided the vantage point from which he was to understand and attack his age.

I have already said that Kierkegaard's attack upon rationalism was an attack upon his own past. It was an attack upon a past which was both a particular past and more than a particular past, upon a past which was interpreted in the light of the spiritual pilgrimage of the human race. He had understood himself and the age through himself in terms of the race, in terms of the life of the whole man. He had lived through the age not at the level of the merely historical but rather at that of the "essentially historical", at a level where the age is known and judged in terms of categories which belong first to the race, at a level where the Cartesian doubt
is experienced as a form of despair\(^1\) and the Hegelian philosophy as a subtle expression of spiritual suicide.\(^2\) Thus it was that, as Kierkegaard believed, when in an age in which it was "a poetic and philosophic nature" which had to be put aside "in order to become a Christian"\(^3\) he was chosen for that task because he had himself first to put aside such a nature. The thing is this, what our age needs is education. And so this is what happened: God chose a man who also needed to be educated, and educated him privatissime, so that he might be able to teach others from his own experience."\(^4\)

The authorship he understood as the reflection of his own personal education and it was this which he expressed when he wrote, "...my ideas are always made out to the payee, not to the bearer; they are made out in a particular name even when I am anonymous."\(^5\)

Speaking of his own age Kierkegaard said that it lacked "religious education (understanding this word in the broadest and deepest sense)"\(^6\). And, he said, "....I am he who himself has been educated, or whose authorship expresses what it is to be educated to the point of becoming a Christian"? But while these quotations not inaccurately describe Kierkegaard's early view of the need of the age and the essentially Socratic authorship by means of which he endeavoured to answer that need they do not express his later conviction that it was something much more than education which the age required. What was required, he came to understand, was someone who had rediscovered the essential framework of humanity, someone who
in his own life had related Adam and Christ to the age, someone who could testify to the fact of sin and salvation, someone who could step forth as a "witness to the truth." What was required was someone who could relate the age to the race, someone who understood himself first in terms of the race and who was therefore truly able to understand the age in terms of the race.

"The human race, like individuals, also needs examination or examiners in order to preserve its continuity. Geniuses are really the examiners. They develop much more slowly than other men, they really go through all the fundamental forms of existence. And therein lies their significance as correctives. While geniuses prophetically show the future they do so in fact owing to a profounder recollection of what has gone before. Development is certainly not a step back but a return, and this is originality."

What was required he came to understand was that he should become the individual, the one who was both himself and the race, the one who understanding himself within the race was able to relate the age to the race and to God.

Of his relationship to Regine Kierkegaard confessed that it had always been kept in so vague a form that he had it in his power to give it any interpretation which he wished. And in a sense the whole of his life was itself so vague that it seems possible to give it almost any interpretation which one wishes. But this certainly does not mean that one interpretation is as valid as another. It was finally a deeply religious interpretation which Kierkegaard gave to his relationship to Regine and it is only such an interpretation
which is adequate to comprehend the whole of his life. Kierkegaard's was a religious existence, it was a religious existence quite consciously directed against the threat of a merely aesthetic or intellectual existence, and it cannot properly be understood in aesthetic or intellectual categories both of which are premature expressions of the religious. The religious is not comprehended by these categories but rather comprehends them and this not merely because it appears upon a higher plane but equally because it is grounded in a lower, not merely because it comes to flower in the life of the individual but equally because it has its roots in the life of the race, because it is nourished by God. Aesthetic and intellectual categories are inadequate to comprehend such a life because failing to reach its depths they cannot possibly attain to its heights.

Again, Kierkegaard understood his as a specifically Christian task and it is only the language of Christianity, the language of sacrifice and propitiation, which is adequate to describe that task. He was to be to his age as both Adam and Christ were to the race. He was to win again the fact of sin and salvation for an age which had "hoaxed" God which had refused the task of humanity, for an age which, if not more deeply perverse than any other, was perverse in what was at least a significantly different direction, for an age which belonged to the race in its sin but which yet was in some measure at least distinguished by the nature of its sin. It
was an age which had denied the reality of the individual\(^1\) and of the sin which in Christianity marked him as the individual. And understanding himself as the 'corrective' to this age or rather as the 'sacrificed'\(^2\) for such an age he resolved that he should himself become 'the individual'. It was to this end that his life was directed and it is in the light of this end, an end which has its genesis in the relationship of the individual to the race and its fulfillment in he who becomes Man or, more accurately, Son of man, that his life must finally be understood.

It is of course possible to 'understand' Kierkegaard's life and works in terms of some other end or principle. It is possible to forget his understanding of himself as a sinner before God, to neglect his sense of solidarity with the human race, to deny both the basis and the reality of his freedom and humanity. And it is perhaps not even permitted to insist that such 'understandings' are wrong. But it certainly is permitted to say that the Kierkegaard who is thus 'understood' is not understood in the way in which he understood himself, in the way in which he understood that he must be understood. And equally it is permitted to say that the Kierkegaard who is thus portrayed is not and cannot be the Kierkegaard who attacked rationalism but he is rather a Kierkegaard who has been attacked by rationalism.

It seems perhaps neither unnatural nor immodest to
assume that our own age should understand Kierkegaard better than any previous one. Such an assumption appears even to find support in Kierkegaard's own repeated insistence that he was merely a 'corrective' to the age. But this description, when understood apart from his deeper understanding of his task implies both too much and too little. Too much because secretly at least he understood that his primary task consisted in becoming the real individual, in establishing a barrier against his own past. Too little because he also understood that a profound criticism of one life was at the same time a relevant criticism of every other life, that a fundamental corrective to one age was at the same time a pertinent corrective to every other age. He was a 'corrective' to his own past, to his age, to every age because he was a 'corrective' to man's conception of what it is to be a man, of what it is to be a single existing individual. He was a 'corrective' to every age because his one problem is the single problem which is given to every man in every age and the age which better understands Kierkegaard than any previous age is an age which better understands itself than any previous age.

One more word in this same connection. Kierkegaard's is the genuinely existential formulation of a problem which every man must devise for himself, of a problem which is completely altered when its formulation is no longer existential. His life and works are a reflection upon this
problem, upon the problem of what it means that he—-that man---is a single existing individual. To this problem he brings no answers (at least not in the objectively valid sense of that word): in the world in which he moves there are no answers. He will not, for example, insist that man is free; he will not prove that God exists. He will not even grant that these are subjects for intellectual deliberation. But neither will he leave these problems without an answer. The answer which he gives—the answers which he is giving—are the answers which belong in the mouths of his readers; they are the answers of his interpreters. His is the genuine formulation, the formulation which compels the reader to give his own answer, to defend his own way of life. It is scarcely surprising that Kierkegaard has become the one in whom the age has declared itself, the one in whom Barth and Buber, Swenson and Lowrie, Haecker and Wahl, even the one in whom Allen and Friedmann have declared themselves. Nor does the adoption of the 'objective' attitude deliver the interpreter from the necessity of making his own confession. From such a one, from both the curious and the dispassionate, Kierkegaard will have an answer which is not less an answer merely because it happens to be the wrong reply to the proper question. It is Kierkegaard's works alone which give fair promise of explaining his life and thought and that because they turn the reader's attention in upon himself, because their's is the genuine formulation. Their promise is neither to the
credulous nor to the callous, neither to he who finds on every page a secret nor to he who finds for every secret an explanation. It is instead to he who comes to find himself, to he who knowing that he is not man asks "what is man?", to he who knowing that he is not free asks "what is freedom?", to he who knowing that he cannot ask another asks it of himself.

It remains only to turn very briefly to two other problems, to one which has already been raised and to one which has thus far been purposely neglected. Just as white light is diffused into its constituent elements by being passed through a glass prism, just as the Word of God, the Holy Bible, falls into its Genesis, its Exodus....its Revelation simply by becoming the Word of God for man, just as the history of the race is divided into its separate movements by having happened within time so too is the history of the single individual (The history of the race is the history of the true individual. "The myth represents as outward that which occurred inwardly."

broken and diffused into its disparate phases by being viewed from the world's side, by being understood by man within time. So too simply by virtue of its appearance in the world of factual existence is personal reality, cradled as it were in God, broken and diffused,—for Kierkegaard, broken and diffused into his many pseudonymns, into that multi-hued splendour the extreme phases of which border once again against the white light out of which they
were formed. Such were Climacus and Anti-Climacus the two pseudonyms which I have described as "essentially auto-
biographical\textsuperscript{1}. It is only in the light of the relationship
of the individual to the race or rather of the individual to
the age through the race that this description can achieve
its full significance because the antithesis thus formed (the
antithesis Climacus--Anti-Climacus in which Kierkegaard
'recognised himself?\textsuperscript{2}) was the antithesis in the life of his
own age even as it is the antithesis in the life of every
thinking man in our own age. It is the antithesis of the race,
an antithesis which is at least inadequately expressed by the
words 'East' and 'West'.\textsuperscript{3} Climacus--Anti-Climacus represents
the true union of the strongest elements of these two traditions,
the happy marriage of Socratic wisdom and Christian responsibility
a marriage which both preserves and unifies.\textsuperscript{4} In this it stands
in open and marked contrast to those two other unions of these
traditions, to the Thomist concubinage of Aristotelian science
and Hebraic legalism and the Marxist prostitution of Judaic
prophetism to modern positivist science.

Now only to add something resembling the Platonic
'good geneology'. It was when the account of Genesis had been
replaced by a myth of the understanding,\textsuperscript{5} when Socrates had been
systematised,\textsuperscript{6} when Christ had been taken for granted,\textsuperscript{7} it was
when the absolute had entirely disappeared from life,\textsuperscript{8} when the
concept of sin had been totally dissipat\textsuperscript{9} when "'grace' (was)
introduced as a matter of course",\textsuperscript{10} it was when the errors of
Descartes had become explicit in the philosophy of Hegel, it was in the year 1813 that he was born. It was of a breed which had outlived the native vigour of its youth, of a melancholy and morose father, of an almost unwanted mother, it was of a union which was indeed not a marriage that he was born. He spent almost the whole of his life within his own small land of Denmark, within his native city of Copenhagen, within a compass so small that he was able to observe at first hand the "demoralisation" toward which "the whole of Europe" was working its way. Indeed, he spent much of that life within his own family, within a family which itself expressed that "demoralisation". He spent all of his life within himself and because he had himself early achieved that demoralisation the remainder of that life was spent in making the return journey, in repenting himself back into the family, into the race, into God. And having accomplished this end he died in the year 1855 and thus fulfilled his own prophecy that he was an author "who historically speaking died of a mortal disease, but poetically speaking of longing for eternity, where he desires naught else but uninterruptedly to give thanks to God."
"No, the thing is that when 'science' is undoubtedly the highest then religion has as good as completely disappeared. Those are the two poles and one can certainly cast the horoscope of any generation with regard to their ethics and religion by discovering what they think about 'science' in the religious sphere."

Journals, 1054.
If for the moment we forget not only the word 'rationalism' but also those connotations which are traditionally associated with that word and if, to speak symbolically, we recall instead the original purpose for which Kierkegaard intended Johannes Climacus, we will more readily understand the sense in which it is proper, and equally the sense in which it is not proper, to speak of Kierkegaard as having been concerned with rationalism. Johannes Climacus, who finally came to birth as the author of Kierkegaard's two outstanding polemics against the Hegelian System, had originally been conceived as the title of a proposed work¹ which was to have been directed against the followers of Descartes. 'De omnibus dubitandum', the alternative title of this work,² in affording Kierkegaard the basis of his attack upon the Hegelian professors of philosophy of his own day³ further reflects this association. This
connection is, as we shall see, implicitly signified in the parallel criticism which he urges against both of these philosophies and particularly in his charge of their scepticism\(^1\) and his criticism of their failure to include an ethic within their systems.\(^2\) On the basis of these facts we may therefore proceed with our examination of the period from Descartes to Hegel. This period may most conveniently be divided in the following manner: 'Descartes to Kant', 'The Romantic Movement', and 'German Idealism'. This division is particularly appropriate with respect to the relationship of this period to Kierkegaard's thought and I would emphasise, it is from the point of view of that thought that I intend to trace this development.

**Descartes to Kant**

Descartes' discovery of analytic geometry and the elaboration of his famous 'cogito ergo sum' may be said to mark a new beginning in the history of Western thought. It was his successful application of algebraic formulae to the problems of geometry which served as the cornerstone of his physical science and, in freeing the age from the trammels of scholasticism, made possible the dream of a universal science. His 'cogito' implicitly identified the object as thought with the object as existent and thus established a trend which, with the exception of Kant\(^3\), was to mark the history of thought until the time of Hegel.
Despite the fact that the single debt which he acknowledged was that which he owed to Kepler for his mechanical conception of the universe and for his emphasis upon the concept of quantity, despite the fact that he attempted to explain not only organic life but even the human body in terms of purely mechanical laws, Descartes had no conception of the universe as essentially mathematical in its structure or nature. He was a mathematician whose immediate and avowed purpose it was 'to master and control nature' and who, to that end, like Galileo, imposed the language and method of mathematics upon the phenomena of nature. And, either because, as histories of philosophy are inclined to suggest, he remembered the fate of Galileo, or, as Kierkegaard holds, because he was a "venerable, humble and honest thinker", because he "did what he said and said what he did", because "he did not doubt in matters of faith", he protested that his method was not applicable to 'poetry, history and divinity'. It was this advice which was neglected by his followers and explicitly set aside in Leibniz and Wolff.

Leonardo da Vinci's disclosure by means of his mathematical method of the regularities and recurrences within nature and, within this method, the dominantly rationalist emphasis of Kepler and the empiricist emphasis of Galileo, were the historical antecedents of the mathematical method of Descartes. It was the former of these emphases which, having captured the imagination of Descartes, led him to strive for
the establishment of a science of nature which would be essentially deductive in its method. Despite his later concessions respecting the value of empirical investigation the general pattern of thought which he adopted was one of mathematical and, to that extent, dogmatic rationalism. In the flood tide of the mathematical method which followed rationalism appeared as the main current with empiricism as a mere eddy.

It was Descartes' failure to consider seriously the problems of metaphysics, and of ethics, together with the outstanding success of his analytic geometry which prompted him to deal with nature as with an essentially mathematical object. This same success, however, seemed to his followers to indicate that his method was nothing less than the key with which to discover the very essence of nature itself. The result was that for the Cartesians who adopted this new 'mechanical scholasticism' man, who for Descartes had been conceived purely in terms of thought, became but part of an exclusively mechanical universe in which everything was accounted for in terms of the geometrical properties of space and the physical laws of motion. Ethics, if considered at all, was dominated by the reigning rationalist temper while metaphysics was given over to the justification of physical science rather than to the examination of its presupposition.

Despite the ascendancy of Cartesian rationalism it remained for those who preferred the empiricism of Galileo to
prepare the way for Newton in whose physics the claims of rationalism and empiricism were reconciled. Although insisting upon the necessity of empirical investigation both as a means of arriving at principles and of obtaining final verification he was able, with his calculus, to provide evidence for the claim of mathematics to describe the motions of natural bodies. In thus accepting and validating the Cartesians' implicit assumption that the universe was ultimately mathematical in its nature he at once justified the method of Descartes and gave real expression to the highest hopes of his followers. Thus by justifying the employment of a mathematical logic through the elaboration of a mathematical metaphysics and by his synthesis of the rationalist and empiricist emphasis of the earlier scientists Newton marked the final triumph of seventeenth century science and equated as coterminous its two leading concepts, Nature and Reason, the rational and the natural.

Although the mathematical method was without metaphysical basis until Newton's discovery of the calculus it was already widely employed before his time. Whereas Descartes had thought it necessary to call upon God as the guarantor of his knowledge of the external world, Spinoza felt justified in assuming that the mind, because of the affinity of its structure with that of the universe, was capable of intuitively recognizing the truth. To him it appeared as indubitable that the surest foundations of truth lay not in an appeal to the fallible
testimony of sense experience but rather in the clear and distinctive intuition of geometrical propositions. It was but a short step from Spinoza's attempt to deal with the passions and emotions of men as if they were but a part of a geometrical system to Locke's expressed hope for a deductive system of religion and ethics. To him there appeared to be no reason why those methods which had been employed with so much success in the physical sciences should not be applied with equal success to human problems. It was this identification of the rational with the natural which, although not yet explicitly confirmed even within the sphere of the natural sciences was to characterise the thought of the age.

Leibniz represents a considerable advance upon both Descartes and Spinoza, a marked contrast with Newton and, in some respects, an anticipation of Kant. Whereas Descartes had merely employed a mathematical logic in his description of nature Leibniz posited a 'divine clock-maker' whose presence guarantees the harmony of bodies and souls, of truths of fact and truths of reason. In his universe of 'pre-established harmony' in which the objects of nature act in accordance with the pure laws of thought, creation is merely a transition from 'essence' to 'existence', from 'possibility' to 'actuality'. Nature is a product of divine mathematics. The eternal truths of reason constitute the essence of the divine mind. And, whereas Spinoza merely modelled his philosophy upon the science of mathematics Leibniz formulated the idea of a universal logic
and language which, because of the necessity and universality of its primary notions and its evident criterion of truth, was to be to philosophy as his calculus had been to physics. In contrast to the marked empiricism of Newton and his British contemporaries, and in anticipation of Kant's critical thought, Leibniz held that the mind has a creative function in the act of knowledge. Moreover, having asserted that such scientific categories as space, time and causality do not actually belong to that which is ultimately real, he was able to establish a distinction between those appearances which are presented to the sense and the realities which are known by the reason. This contrast he formulated in the opposition between the world of alleged and that of true scientific knowledge. Of special interest with respect to Kant is his concern with the nature of time and his essentially aesthetic intuition of existence. In Leibniz' theory of monads is to be found also the view that ideas are the constituent elements of life and that the relative darkness and clarity of these ideas are the determinative factors in the psychical life. These views, as they were taken up and reinterpreted by Wolff, came to exercise a profound influence upon the psychology of the German Enlightenment.

Although itself neither popular nor influential, the philosophy of Leibniz, as it was taken over and adapted by Wolff, gave expression to the unformed and inarticulate thought of the age and in so doing proved to be the decisive factor in
the formulation of the thought of two generations of German philosophers and theologians. It was, in fact, the central impulse of the Enlightenment or Aufklärung. Like Leibniz, Wolff judged the universe to manifest a perfect and pre-established order in which that alone is true which can be demonstrated with logical and necessary certainty. The universe he held to be the embodiment of a rational principle the logical basis of which is the principle of sufficient reason. Truth is rationally deduced from the innate contents of the mind: experience is at best contingent and confirmatory. 'Pure reason' is the way to truth and to God. Much impressed by the 'incontestible certainty' of the mathematicians Wolff sought to formulate his theology after the patterns laid down by the science of mathematics. By means of mathematical demonstration he attempted to present the Christian doctrine in such a way that it could not reasonably be rejected. The possibility of a revelation he attempted to prove on the ground that God can do anything which He wishes. Yet such a revelation cannot contradict reason nor any conclusion which may be deduced by reason. Thus it was that through Wolff the Christianity of the Enlightenment came to be primarily concerned with natural theology and morality. The age of the Enlightenment had now begun. Pietism had been overthrown at Halle. Natural religion became the most popular subject upon which to write. The Church became an instrument of the Enlightenment: its offices were filled by Wolffians who regarded as revelation only that
which satisfied the demands of reason and who held that the content of Scripture could be shown to be entirely in accord with reason. Christianity was made to conform with the religion of reason: its historical revelation was accorded the status of a mere announcement.¹

The tremendous influence of the Enlightenment upon the thought of the Church was due more than anything else to the fact that Pietism, which at the end of the seventeenth century had successfully vanquished Lutheran orthodoxy, had failed to provide intellectual leadership to fill the vacuum which it had thus created. The result was that the field was claimed by the champions of the German Enlightenment who, with their emphasis upon critical and constructive work prepared the way for a tremendous reconstruction in theology which was to spread throughout Protestantism. These men were concerned to establish the necessary character of religious truths on some bases other than that of revelation and in this attempt tended to stress theology at the expense of the spiritual aspect of religion. Dogmas came to be viewed apart from their spiritual import: philosophy became independent of Scripture and, in the form of theology, established the principles for its interpretation. Through the influence of Baumgarten

English Deism, principally in the form of Toland's Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) and Tindal's Christianity as Old as Creation (1730), had been introduced into German where it attained very great favour. These works asserted that whatever
is beyond the power of reason is superstition and must accordingly be abolished. Without denying Christianity they maintained that all which was valuable within it had already been presented in natural religion. In Germany itself the period was marked by the work of the church historian Johann Lorentz von Mosheim (1697 - 1755) and the rationalist Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694 - 1768), who explicitly made morality, immortality and the existence of the Creator the concerns of reason working purely within the context of natural religion. Mention must also be made of the textual and historical criticism of Jean le Clerc (1657 - 1736), Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687 - 1752), Jean Astruc (1684 - 1766), Edelmann (1698 - 1767), and, after the middle of the century, besides the work of Reimarus on the life of Christ, the critical work of Johann August Ernesti (1707 - 1781), Semler (1725 - 1791) and Johann Gottfried Erchor (1752 - 1827), as well as the more philosophical work of Gotthold Ephriam Lessing (1729 - 1781) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729 - 1786).

By the middle of the eighteenth century the philosophy of Wolff had been largely replaced by Wolffianism which was itself an uneasy combination of the systematised rationalism of Wolff as it had derived from Leibniz and the empirical philosophy of Christian Thomasius as it derived from Locke. Although in the course of its development this eclecticism adhered more closely to the rationalist than to the empiricist tradition its distinctive contribution lay in
the direction of empirical psychology rather than speculative metaphysics. Although this interest was in part due to the advance of English psychology the *decisive* impulse was imparted by Rousseau whose tremendous influence was in large measure responsible for the revision of the Enlightenment psychology. This advance is symbolised in Tetens' three-fold division of consciousness into the feeling, the understanding and the will, which was later adopted by Kant as the basis of his work. It was the clash of tempers between this and the succeeding age, between the rationalist and the romantic, which accounted for the preponderant importance attached to both the feeling and the understanding as opposed to the will and which, towards the close of the period of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the Romantic era, led to the full recognition of feeling as an independent aspect of the life of consciousness. The relevance not only of this distinction but of the independence of feeling is declared in the Kantian distinction between the theoretical and the practical reason and in the limitations which he attributed to the former.

But before it is possible to pass on either to a consideration of the Romanticism which replaced the Enlightenment or to Kant's justification of the Romantic protest of faith it is necessary to turn back in order to consider briefly the thought of Lessing, Hamann and Jacobi in whom is prefigured the shape of much that is to follow.

Lessing's was one of the most significant voices
raised against the Enlightenment from within the age itself. He rejected orthodoxy, pietism and rationalism. For him religion was essentially a matter of the heart, of feeling. It remained untouched by either historical or philosophical criticism. His religion was, to quote Garland, a "peculiar blend of faith and rationalism". The various positive religions he viewed as stages in the development of man. "All positive religions are true and false in equal degrees." The significance of religion for man is fundamentally ethical. The forms of the various religions are a matter of indifference as compared with the conduct which they inspire in their adherents. It is heroic obedience with which he is concerned: obedience to God's laws because they are God's laws and not for any accompanying reward or punishment. This attitude was reflected in his view of the Christian faith the most important part of which, he said, was its exhortation to love. Jesus he viewed as a moral teacher rather than the centre and object of a personal faith: the Scriptures he viewed as the exponent of natural religion and its morality. The revelation of the Christian faith brought to the human race nothing which human reason, if left to itself, could not finally discover. It serves only to accelerate the imparting of knowledge and when this has been once accomplished the revelation as such ceases to have any value.

Although he consistently opposed the Enlightenment theology which based its proofs for the existence of God upon
the purposiveness of nature he was, at least on his own confession, an adherent of Spinoza. For him, God, instead of being a personal diety, was the soul of the world. The 'one and all' which he derived from Spinoza was, after his death not only the source of disagreement and disappointment to Mendelssohn and Jacobi, but equally a source of inspiration and joy to Goethe and Herder.

Like Lessing, Hamann and Jacobi, who represent a pre-Romantic protest against the period, are essentially related to an understanding of Kant, of Hegel, and of Kierkegaard. It is Hamann who not only foreshadows the transition to the Romantic period but who stands himself as a source for both Kierkegaard and Hegel. And it was his 'philosophy of faith' which was for Kant the premonition of Hegelian Idealism which he finally and completely rejected in his Critique of Judgment. Jacobi saw that for Kant existence was not a real predicate, that it was not known in the same manner in which other things are known. He therefore declared that existence was known only through 'aesthetic intuition' or faith.

In opposition to the philosophy of the Enlightenment Hamann denied the claim of reason to comprehend reality within a logical system. Existence is prior to, greater than, and opposed to discursive thought. The historical revelation of the Christian faith is in direct opposition to reason. The historical fact of the Cross is the final refutation of the terminology of metaphysics. Reason he equated with the
mathematical thought of Cartesianism and Wolffianism: rational thought he characterised by its reliance upon the principle of contradiction. But such reason, he held, was given to man only in order to make him aware of his ignorance and his folly. Faith in contrast is a personal relationship with God which is the gift of God. It is something entirely different from morality which, no more than reason, is the way to God. It is faith which is the basis of life and the groundwork of knowledge.

Jacobi likewise distrusted the power of logical demonstration and denied the final validity of scientific laws with respect to man's knowledge of nature. Ultimate knowledge, he held, must come through the intuition. This faculty by which spiritual truth is perceived he first termed intuition, feeling or faith, but later, adopting the terminology provided by the Kantian philosophy, he designated it as reason in contradistinction to scientific reason to which he gave the name understanding. For Jacobi it is this faith or reason alone which sets a man before the Absolute and so makes possible the life of 'the whole man', and it is this reason, as opposed to the understanding, which is taken up through Fichte into Hegelianism where it forms the basis of human history and thought.

Jacobi confessed that he could neither refute Spinoza nor prove his own belief in a personal God existing apart from the world. As an alternative he took refuge in
his 'salto mortale' which, in a now-famous conversation, he advocated to Lessing as an escape from pantheism. But his eloquence was in vain: Lessing protested that his legs were too old for such a leap. It was the year following this conversation that Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared.

But meanwhile the blithe optimism of the Enlightenment was being sharply challenged from another quarter. Hume's sceptical attack upon the validity of the law of causality and the principle of necessary connection not only revealed the ultimate unacceptability of empiricism but also undermined the very foundations upon which Newtonian science and Wolffian rationalism had been founded. It was, on his own confession, this sceptical attack which awakened Kant from his 'dogmatic slumbers' in the school of metaphysical rationalism and spurred him on to the formulation of his own critical thought.

In opposition both the extreme emphasis upon deductive reasoning at the expense of empirical investigation and the dogmatic metaphysics of Wolffian rationalism Kant sought to arbitrate the claims of rationalism and empiricism and, at the same time, to free epistemology from its dependence upon the dogmatic assumptions which characterised the Wolffian philosophy of the Enlightenment. In contrast to both the rationalism of Wolff and the empiricism of Locke he maintained the validity of reason and the concepts of reason in so far as these are employed within the bounds of human experience. In contrast to the metaphysical or dogmatic
rationalism which involved the contention that the universe is the work of an infinite intellect Kant held that the truth of experience is self-sufficient apart from such assumptions. In short, he rejected the metaphysical rationalism of the older dogmatic systems and replaced it by a new attitude of critical rationalism according to which the limits of the knowledge of the theoretical reason are coterminous with the boundaries of human experience. He thus was led not only to dismiss as untenable the traditional proofs for the existence of God but at the same time to furnish the ground for the Romantic protest that man is something more than merely intellect, that, in a world where scientific knowledge was incapable of penetrating reality and existence, faith was finally justified.

The implication of Kant's critical philosophy may be best illustrated by recalling its actual genesis. Newtonian physics had assumed the validity of the law of cause and effect: Hume had denied that we can have knowledge of the operation of any such law: Kant, in contradistinction, sought to reaffirm the causal relationship as both necessary and universal. It was his attempt to justify the employment of this category which led him to the realisation that, far from having the burden of but one such proof upon it, "metaphysics consists altogether of such (i.e. a priori) connections." The required universality and necessity Kant achieved not with the demonstration that such universality and necessity inhere in the external world of objects but rather with the insistence
that the categories are the forms under which alone it is possible to have knowledge. Whereas he had earlier held that the world as known by the senses was merely phenomenal, while the world as known by the mind was, in actual fact, the real or objective world, he was now forced to conclude that we have scientific knowledge of the world of phenomenal experience alone. This final concession, and hence the entire critical philosophy, had to wait for the realisation that it is the pure concepts of the understanding alone which make possible objects as objects of knowledge. Kant's 'refutation' of Hume was not, therefore, to show that causality is operative in the noumenal or objective world but rather to demonstrate that, because these categories are the necessary and universal conditions of all knowledge, the objects of the phenomenal world appear to us, of necessity, under the forms of the categories.

Kant does not doubt that we have experience, perception or knowledge. With this as his starting point he asks only "What are the conditions of such experience?" In this respect he opposes at the very beginning his own critical or transcendental method to the rationalist method of Descartes and Wolff both of whom seek to deduce the fact of existence. Like Hume, Kant holds that the existence of an object is not deducible, that it is irreducible to a concept. This is the conclusion which is reached in the Critique of Pure Reason which maintains that man's theoretical reason enables him to
know or to have a rational experience of the object as it is known but never as it is, of the phenomenal object but never of the noumenal, of things as they appear to man's imperfect mind but never as they might appear to a perfect mind. In short, through the theoretical reason "we can only know a phenomenal world which we make in the act of knowing it"\(^1\).

It is this which in effect, Chestov confesses when he claims that Kant exiled his wonders into the field of the thing-in-itself.\(^2\) In contrast to this, the *Critique of Practical Reason* maintains that, through the exercise of the practical reason, which Kant identifies with the will or the source of dutiful action, man encounters the noumenal world, or reality itself, in his pursuit of ethical ends. Existence which escapes man's theoretical reason is morally experienced by the practical reason. God, for the idea of whom there is for the first Critique no corresponding objective existence emerges in the second as the source of moral law. Man is no longer confronted by God in the form of an object of theoretical knowledge, as the conclusion of a syllogism or as the result of a proof but he is instead confronted by God in the form of absolute obligation which, under the 'pressure' of the Kantian distinction between acting from inclination and from duty, is transformed into a mere respect for law. The dissipation of this valuable insight, the reduction of the life of man to the respectful acceptance of a legalistic formula was, to quote Professor John Baillie, "the last absurdity of the eighteenth
century. In place of the God of the Aristotelian and Anselmian proofs he posits a God who is a mere legislator, a God who becomes nothing more than the guarantor of private morals and public order.

One of the most significant features of Kant's thought is his attempt to seriously come to terms with the problem of time. Although, like his valuable insight into the nature of man's relationship with God, this insight is, partly through its Leibnizian inheritance, partly through his own intellectual background, finally dissipated: its recognition marks a significant departure from the distinctively Greek tone of post-Renaissance thought. The Hebraic-Christian view of time as given with and existing within the soul of man rather than, as in Greek thought, given prior to creation and having its own objective existence in nature, is recognised for the first time in Western thought by Augustine who held that time itself had a beginning and was therefore limited. This view is partially reflected in the Kantian view according to which time belongs to and has its existence within the soul of man rather than having its existence within objective nature. The importance of this question may be indicated by recalling that its cruciality was recognised and refused by Lessing, that the question was rendered meaningless by Hegel, that it was again accepted as critical by Kierkegaard and finally, that Nietzsche was so impressed by its importance that he
endeavoured to re-establish the cyclical time of the Greeks.

**The Romantic Movement**

Although the Romantic movement was finally to derive its justification from Kant's critical philosophy, it was, in its original manifestation, a literary revolt against the utilitarian rationalism of the Enlightenment. Rousseau's emphasis upon the importance of the feelings as opposed to the intelligence together with the Spinozism of Lessing and the quasi-artistic, quasi-biological naturalism of Goethe were combined in Herder through whom they formed the basis of a strong Romantic movement in Germany which was to overthrow the intellectualism and rationalism of the Enlightenment in the same way that Pietism, with its emphasis upon the feelings, had, a century earlier, overthrown Lutheran orthodoxy and scholasticism. It was finally taken up by both Schleiermacher and Hegel in whom it declares its own internal opposition.

In place of the mechanistic universe of the Enlightenment the Romantics saw striving and growth within Nature. The real world, they held, was striving toward the realisation of ideals and was, for this reason, to be known only in terms of feeling and personal aspirations. In place of the external deity of the rationalists, whether metaphysical or moral, they saw God as the soul or life of the universe. Of this universal life of God all things were a part but man was essentially the
highest expression. It was this Romantic identification of God with Nature which accounted for the tremendous popularity and influence of Spinoza upon the movement. The task of re-interpreting his scientific religion, of translating it from the terms of Cartesian science into those of Romantic poetry, was undertaken by Herder who, in his combining of all of these divergent elements became the father of German Romanticism. Like Rousseau however, and unlike Spinoza, he founded all truths upon the feelings. It was, he said, an inner un-analyzable certainty which was more akin to faith than reason. From Rousseau, Lessing and Goethe he derived his own interest in the forms of primitive life and it was from this interest that he was led to develop and formulate the idea of an historical evolution.

In addition to the thought of Spinoza and Rousseau Christian pietism was, for German Romanticism, as it had been for Kant, an important formative element. It was from the Pietist emphasis upon "the possibility of a direct and unmediated experience" of unity with God that the Romantic emphasis upon the individual was ultimately derived. It is in the thought of Schleiermacher that this relationship between pietism and romanticism became explicit.

Schleiermacher (1768 - 1834) had been educated by the Moravians, had later come under the influence of Wolff and Semler and finally emerged as the champion of Romanticism
within the field of religious thought. In opposition both to the orthodox view of religion as based upon assent to the truths of revelation and obedience to the will of God and to the rationalist view of religion as the acceptance of natural theology and its universal morality, he held that the sole basis of religion is feeling, more specifically, a feeling of dependence, and that this feeling finds its most adequate object in the Christian revelation. Doctrines are but the forms in which abiding truth expresses itself. Religion is not primarily a matter of conduct although right conduct flows from right religion.

**German Idealism**

Before it is possible to understand the relationship, or to speak more correctly, the lack of relationship, between Kant and the German Idealist philosophy it is necessary to distinguish between two alternative interpretations of the Kantian philosophy, between the critical interpretation which I have attempted to expound and the dogmatic interpretation which Fichte adopts and from which he proceeds with the development of his own thought. The special relevance of this distinction may be seen from the fact that, as we shall see, both of these alternative interpretations of the Kantian philosophy appear in Kierkegaard's own works. The explanation, indeed, the justification, of Fichte's interpretation is to be found in the fact that while the 'dogmatic Kant' is temporally
prior to the 'critical Kant' the older form of his thought is present along with, and at times, within the newer or critical formulation of his thought. It is this willingness to sacrifice consistency in the interest of comprehensiveness which provides a show of evidence for those who, on the one hand, claim that he was 'still in bondage to the thought which he was contro-

verting', and who, on the other hand, see in him merely the percursor of Hegelianism. That Kant was fully alive to the possibility of the Hegelian philosophy may be seen, as we have said, from his opposition to Hamann's 'philosophy of faith'.

The historical roots of German Idealism are to be found not in the 'critical Kant' but rather in Fichte's misinterpretation of Kant. Again, the real historical roots of German Idealism are to be found in Lessing and the Romantic movement and, in particular, in the Romantic adaptation of the thought of Spinoza. It is from these sources, from Lessing and Spinoza particularly, that German Idealism derives its Greek concept of time and its Greek mythos of life which was finally and fully revealed only in the thought of Hegel.

Within the Kantian critical philosophy the thing-in-

itself has a real if not a logically consistent function. It stands, as we have suggested, within his epistemology as the sign or symbol of the beyondness of all merely cognitive ex-

perience. Although this insight was not lost upon Kierkegaard it was for Fichte the 'Achilles heel' of the entire system upon which he fastened and which he rejected as being without
explanation or function. As a result, unlike Kant whose point of departure was his analysis of the act of perception, he adopted as the starting point of his philosophy the Ego which itself approximates to the Kantian unity of apperception. The Ego is the ultimate reality: it exists because it posits itself but it is known only in its positing of, or in its opposition to, the non-ego or the world of objects. The Ego is, in reality, merely an abstraction from the synthesis of opposites by which intelligence exists. The Ego and the non-ego, whose reality is subordinate to and dependent upon the Ego, are inexplicably bound together in perception: all reality is a reality within consciousness.

Both Fichte's dogmatic interpretation of Kant and his departure from this interpretation are seen in his solution of the epistemological problem. As an alternative to dogmatism which he judged to be incapable of passing from things to the consciousness of things, from the real to the ideal, he proposed an idealism which concerned itself only with the existence of things within consciousness rather than with the objective existence of objects as such, with ideal existence rather than with concrete existence. It is this implicit identification of ideal existence with real existence, this failure to distinguish between the object as it is known and the object as it is, which finally declared itself in the Hegelian identification of the rational with the real.
The Romanticism which was latent in the philosophy of Fichte boldly declared itself in the thought of Schelling who, in contrast to Fichte's provisional distinction between consciousness and the content of consciousness, declares that it is only by artistic intuition that we are able to conceive mind and nature, the subject and object in their inner unity.

In the later development of his thought which represents not only a reaction against Hegelianism but also to an appreciable degree, a movement in the direction of the thought of Kierkegaard, he explicitly admits the presence of "an irrational, i.e. a something which is impervious to thought...." This later development not only marks a reaction against Hegelian speculation and scientific emphasis but at the same time agrees with critical philosophy in its prescription of the limitations of knowledge.

While Hegel must be viewed in his relation to Romanticism and to the thought of Fichte and Schelling he is not to be properly understood apart from what he himself called 'the bath of Spinoza'. Unlike Kant for whom the problem of knowledge was the specific problem of philosophy and like Spinoza who denied the ultimate validity of the subject-object distinction Hegel explicitly identified the rational with the real. Spinoza had assumed that the structure of the mind was similar to that of the universe: Hegel declared that reason was the basis of being. Spinoza looked to the idea of a passionless truth: Hegel rejoiced in the advent of the long-awaited scientific truth. Spinoza formulated his 'Ethica' more geometrico: Hegel insisted that the Vorstellung
(pictorial representations) of religion must be replaced by the Begriffe (concepts) of the logical reason. Spinoza insisted that man must eliminate from his ethics all wishes, struggles and passion: Hegel taught that man must raise himself above the particular to the universal. Spinoza held that the science of mathematics must serve as the model for philosophy: Hegel identified man's highest self with universal reason. Spinoza had sought to prove not that God exists but that existence was God.  

Hegel attached great importance to the proofs, particularly the ontological, for the existence of God. Spinoza explicitly identified essence and existence: Hegel implicitly made this identification. But whereas Spinoza had held that both extension and thought are attributes of substance Hegel accepted only the latter of these attributions. And whereas Spinoza had conceded that "God's reason and will differ toto caelo from human reason and will," Hegel urged his 'universal reason' as a new concept for God. He had, as Buber says, "transformed the human essence from earth to heaven."

For Hegel it is this universal or philosophical reason, which he identifies with 'Spirit', which is the basis of being, the rational order of the universe, the a priori structure of reality. The medium with which this reason operates is that of the concrete universal concept in the unfolding of which the inner structure of reality is revealed. Each concept bears within it some aspect of the Absolute and,
when fully developed according to the pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is seen to be itself a part of that Absolute. Individuals and facts, insofar as they are merely individuals and facts, remain essentially irrational and unreal until they are viewed as aspects of a larger whole. The distinction between the created and the \textit{mn}-created is no longer valid. The rational order is only in part revealed in the order of chronological events. "History does not demonstrate: it merely illustrates." Truth and falsehood are no longer sharply differentiated: nothing is wholly false, nothing wholly true. Faith and knowledge are essentially one. Religion and philosophy have the same object and it is impossible that the content of positive religion should contradict human reason. Rational or scientific thought recognises the true religious content of Christianity and seeks merely to rid it of those imperfections which are inherent in the form of its historical development. It is philosophy alone which is capable of giving an adequate formulation to the content of feeling. The historical Christ is made to disappear and in His place there is posited the enshrinement of "a grand metaphysical idea"\textsuperscript{1}, the God-man as a living person is replaced by a logical construction of the universal reason.\textsuperscript{2}

Although himself a Romantic and ultimately not far from Schleiermacher\textsuperscript{3} Hegel insisted that feeling was the lowest form of consciousness while the imagination, understanding and reason, were the successively higher forms. Although each
of these has its role in religion neither the feeling nor the imagination are the proper seat of piety. The task for speculative philosophy is to reinterpret religion in the light of speculative thought. Thus the inevitable contradictions in which faith becomes entangled because of its absolute distinction between God and man are overcome by speculative thought. Faith possesses the right content but this content must be given its proper form by speculative thought. Hegel's accomplishment in this direction is signified in the closing words of his *Philosophy of Religion* where he says: "These lectures have had as their aim to reconcile reason with religion, and to interpret religion in its manifold forms as necessary."¹

Unlike Kant who recognised the significance of time Hegel knows only a time which is essentially circular in movement and which is therefore subject to logical predication. His failure to appreciate the significance of time is reflected in his conviction of the ultimate non-reality of history and in his conviction that the meaning of the universe is to be detected in an a priori structure which is apparent only to the universal reason, which, indeed, is itself the universal reason going its undeflectable way through history realising itself in the various contingent events of terrestrial chronology.
With regard to the whole of post-Renaissance thought T. E. Hulme writes:

"All thought since the Renaissance, in spite of its apparent variety, forms one coherent whole... It all rests on the same conception of the nature of man and all exhibits the same inability to recognise the meaning of the dogma of original sin. (In this period not only have) its philosophy, its literature and its ethics been based upon this new conception of man as fundamentally good, as sufficient, as the measure of things..."\(^1\)

What he calls "the essential unity... of the Renaissance tradition" is described by Patrick in the following words:

"In a very real sense, Hegel is the fulfillment of Descartes. Descartes gave modern European thought its two essential qualities of intellectualism and secularism, the first by his emphasis upon pure thought as the distinctive quality of humanity, the second by his deistic relegation of God to a place where, though formally recognised at the outset, He received no further consideration in the development of his system. On this basis, succeeding philosophers continued to build and Hegel achieved the most perfect structure of intellectualistic secularism which the world has known."\(^2\)

But while there is an essential unity in the Renaissance tradition there is at the same time an underlying diversity. It was this diversity which declared itself in Descartes' passion for certainty, in Spinoza's fear lest the passions of man should interfere in the discovery of truth, and finally, upon the broader stage of the history of thought, in the Romantic movement. Hegel is, therefore, not merely the fulfillment of Descartes but he is equally the fulfillment of the anti-thesis of Descartes: he is, in fact, the fulfillment of the Romantic protest against Descartes. He brings, therefore,
to the Renaissance not merely the simple fulfillment of its development but rather the transformation of its thought, the revelation of its own secret meaning. He brings a new significance to the word 'rationalism'.
"No, the whole concept of objectivity, which has been made into our salvation, is merely the food of sickness, and the fact that it is admired as the cure simply proves how fundamentally irreligious our age is, for that saving factor is really a return to paganism."

Journals, 1042.
Chapter III

KIERKEGAARD'S CONCEPTION OF RATIONALISM

To those familiar with Kierkegaard's works, and more especially to those aware of their real significance, it can only appear that we have immediately fallen into our own trap. Rationalism, be it confessed, is a term which Kierkegaard only very rarely employed: the fundamental inadequacy of the concept, be it also confessed, is both implicitly and explicitly maintained throughout the whole of his works. These objections are, however, comparatively superficial. The basic objection is to be urged not against the terms employed but rather against the approach which they signify. The real merit of our title consists in the fact that the inappropriateness of its terms serves at the outset to call attention to the unsuitability of that entire mode of thought of which those terms are but the traditional and logical expression. The necessity of making explicit the sense in which these terms must be understood is itself born of the deeper necessity of indicating the sense in which a traditionally rationalist attitude must be altered in order
to comprehend what, in the case of any other author, we might without hesitation designate as his conception of rationalism. Or, to state the matter in another way, we are here concerned not to expound Kierkegaard's conception of rationalism as such, but rather to show in what sense that with which he was concerned may be regarded as rationalism.¹

The term 'rationalism' appears most frequently in the Journal entries of the year 1835. This very fact—he was then but twenty-three years of age—means that these entries bear little direct relation to his final attitude in the matter. The real significance of these entries lies in their indication of his early personal interest in rationalism² and of his realisation, although this was perhaps not yet fully conscious, of the relationship between rationalism and Christianity.³ The word occurs neither in the Fragments nor in the Postscript—the two works of the pseudonym assigned to the critique of speculative philosophy. It is mentioned but once in his later writings and there it is made synonymous with "common sense".⁴

The fact that he virtually never employed this term is, when properly interpreted, itself an indication of the fact that it was rationalism with which he was primarily concerned. The refusal to employ this or any similar term was entirely consonant with his conviction that truth could not be directly communicated, that each man must exist in the
truth by himself, that, as Climacus said, "the secret of all
communication consists precisely in emancipating the recipient
....."¹ That emancipation was required not only in respect of
him who taught—-and hence his employment of 'indirect
communication'---but equally in respect of the idea which he
taught. And it was for this very reason that he refused to
employ designations which would have provided either the
prattlers with a position or the heretics with something which
they could understand.² Instead of this, his task, like
Socrates and Lessing, consisted in maieutically presenting
that which he was concerned to impart. Such a mode of
instruction alone could truly set free the real recipients and,
at the same time, confound those "repetitioners who reproduce
what is said like a prattling echo."³

Nor does he at any time define this term. To have
done so would have been both superfluous and dangerous. The
superfluity lay in the fact that, for those who had eyes to
see, its real nature was being revealed in the personal and
public life of his country and his generation. The danger lay
in the fact that its presentation in definitive form,⁴ like
the employment of the word itself, presented indifferently
the opportunity for either a gross misunderstanding or for a
truly sympathetic interpretation of that which he was attempt-
ing to convey. In the language of our own day—a language
which itself has Kierkegaard as its inspiration—that danger
lay in the fact that the presence of a definition afforded
the possibility of conversation without granting an accompanying guarantee of communication.

Again, that he should have refused to put forward any definition of rationalism in terms of abstract thought sprang not from his failure to understand its nature but instead from his conviction that he had truly understood that nature: not from his inability to comprehend the traditional rationalist conceptions of rationalism but rather from his judgment that such definitions were both ultimately inadequate and finally irrelevant to the truly human life.

But if the traditional and abstract definitions of rationalism were, from Kierkegaard's point of view, inadequate as description they were also, from the rationalists' point of view, an impregnable fortress of defence. And just as he had refused to conceive rationalism in abstract terms, he refused to attack it in such terms.2

"A scepticism which attacks thought itself cannot be vanquished by thinking it through, since the very instrument by which this would have to be done is in revolt. There is only one thing to do with such a scepticism, and that is to break with it."3

Indeed, even to accept the abstract conceptions of rationalism was to commit oneself to its ultimate acceptance. To this strange plight he gave both poetic and profound recognition.

"Once they accept the Cartesian scepticism they have upon their hands a doubt with which not even Satan himself could contend."4

It was, as Kierkegaard fully understood, in the very nature of
the case that either an abstract conception or an intellectual \textit{refutation} led inevitably to but another and yet more convincing victory for the forces of rationalism.

The above explanation of Kierkegaard's refusal to employ the term 'rationalism' largely anticipates those objections which he urges respecting the limitation of concepts in general. This has its explanation in the fact that the nature and extent of that limitation was first revealed to him in his own discovery of the complete inadequacy of the abstract concept of rationalism. That inadequacy, he was persuaded, consisted precisely in the fact that it bore no relation to its meaning in terms of the full context of human life. With the further discovery that such a life was lived in dimensions other than those presupposed by a shallow rationalist psychology came the correlative realisation that rationalism must be explained not only in terms of the fact of human existence but also in terms of the depths of that existence. And, with the final discovery that the truly human life was lived before God came the realisation that the nature of rationalism was not to be understood apart from its relation to the spiritual dimension of human existence. It was this conviction which was to prompt him to insist that it was not doubt but rather despair which lay at the root of the whole of contemporary thought.\textsuperscript{1}

His doubt as to the validity of abstract concepts
was based upon his personal experience of their irrelevance to the world in which men had their daily existence. His rejection of the concept of rationalism followed upon his unsuccessful attempt to achieve a truly human existence within its terms. His rejection of all such abstract concepts came with the realisation that he was an individual standing alone before God. With the discovery of each additional depth in the determination of his own existence came a corresponding revelation of the inadequacy of the concept. With his discovery of the final determination of that existence—the paradoxical accentuation of existence as that of a sinner 'before God'—came the justification for the final rejection of the validity of the concept as such. That this fatal objection against the claims of abstract thought was possible only with the aid of Christianity has its explanation, according to Climacus, in the fact that "Christianity paradoxically accentuates existence"¹, according to Anti-Climacus, in the inability of Speculation to "recognise the impotence of the concept in relation to reality".²

From the vantage point of the Christian faith it was not difficult for Kierkegaard to see that the strength of rationalism consisted in its own self-established immunity; in the fact that it had at the outset denied the essential determinant of man's existence, his truly spiritual nature. It had prudently obtained for itself a peaceful voyage by the simple expedient of leaving behind the only possible objector.
Here, Kierkegaard was persuaded, lay the strength of abstract thought as a whole—-that it had established immunity from attack by surreptitiously abstracting from the fact of existence, from the only possible source of its embarrassment. It was this insight into the illusory strength of rationalism which was to provide the central clue for his attack upon Hegelianism insofar as he consented to view it as an abstract philosophy.

Kierkegaard's refusal to consider rationalism as an abstract concept is to be explained quite simply by the fact that he had himself been a rationalist. Of equal importance, however, was the fact that in his youthful enthusiasm he had embraced rationalism, as he was later to embrace Christianity, as the idea "for which to live and die". For him it had been no abstract intellectual position but rather a living faith. For the doubt which lay at the root of modern philosophy he substituted a "concrete personal despair". For the age's frivolous questioning of the existence of God he substituted a practical atheism which brought him into marked and painful conflict with his own past. With a relentlessness which belonged to the spirit rather than the mind, with a zeal born of his youthfulness, he lived the life of the rationalist through to what appeared to him to be its real and ultimate conclusion. It was this concern to test in the arena of life the validity of this thought, to give existential expression to that which he had understood, which made of him such a man that he could say: "I have lived more poetry in one hour than
have most men in their whole life-time\(^1\). With equal justice, and for the same reason, he might also have claimed to have lived more history in his own life-time than had the entire age. The justice of such a claim is revealed in his conviction that suicide was the fitting sequel not only to his own life\(^2\) but also to the life and thought of his age:\(^3\) a conclusion which, although originally Greek,\(^4\) has become distinctively modern.

Nor is rationalism for Kierkegaard at any time merely a formal philosophy. It is, rather, a way of life which finds its justification, its apologetic—-even its expression—-in a formal philosophy but it is not itself that philosophy. Rationalism, at least in this particular context, may be expressed as that which is behind, and at the same time is expressed within the concept and the formal philosophy. The negative aspect of this relationship may be seen in Kierkegaard's insistence that he was not concerned with philosophy or with philosophical problems as such.\(^5\) He was, however, intensely concerned with Hegelianism or speculative philosophy but, it should be noted, not as such but rather as an expression of the temper of the age or, more accurately, if less obviously, as an expression of his own past. It is necessary to make this relationship explicit because, as we shall see, it is possible almost upon the basis of verbal equation, to show that Kierkegaard identifies rationalism with speculative philosophy. This identification is possible only through the medium of
Christianity as the middle term, only when, for Kierkegaard, both rationalism and speculative philosophy are seen in terms of their meaning for the life of man. This must therefore not be construed as an abstract identification of Hegelianism with rationalism—more particularly, with rationalism in the Cartesian or even the Wolffian sense—but rather as an indication that rationalism expressed itself through Hegelianism. And it was this rationalism rather than Hegelianism as such with which he was concerned. He was concerned neither with the speculative abrogation of the paradox nor with the Hegelian proposition that truth was an abstract identity of subject and object but he was intensely concerned with the implications which had such an abrogation and such a view of truth for the life of man. Formal philosophy was merely the expression of the disease: the philosophers merely those who expressed it. Kierkegaard's concern was with the disease itself: with that which was expressed. It is this which, in part, at least, explains his lack of concern with the history of philosophy, with logic and metaphysics, with formal statement and definition. All these led away from the real problem in the direction of abstraction. They suggested that the nature of rationalism was to be found in the direction of the objective of the abstract. But when, as he believed, the problem was itself a spiritual one such investigations were, like the historical introductions to Christianity, "a sheer waste of time". The real meaning of rationalism was not to be discovered in a more precise analysis of its objective nature but
in a more profound understanding of the rationalist. The direction for the search lay 'inward' rather than 'outward', 'deeper rather than 'farther'.

It is possible to neglect the essentially concrete reference of Kierkegaard's thought and to describe it merely in terms of its relation to formal philosophy: with respect to his theory of being, to Aristotle and Kant, with respect to the nature of man's existence, to the Cartesian 'cogito', with respect to the relation of logic and existence, to the Hegelian formula. There is, as I have attempted to suggest, at least some apparent justification for such an attempt. But Kierkegaard has furnished both ample warning and vehement protest against such a procedure. It is, he says, "precisely from existence that abstract thought abstracts". He was, on his own insistence, "first and last a religious author". And, more subtle and yet more decisive, he protested that it was possible to understand Christianity in such a way that the understanding becomes instead a misunderstanding. To place the primary emphasis upon what are ultimately but incidental resemblances or differences is to forget that Kierkegaard's thought has both its beginning and its end in his own personal problems: it is to forget that Kierkegaard's critique of rationalism is not ultimately an intellectualist critique. Nor do the claims of formal scholarship alter the situation. To view either Kierkegaard's problems or his 'solutions' apart from his own personal life is, initially, to make him say more
and, ultimately, to make him say less than is actually the case.

Nor are the traditional or orthodox forms of rationalism the concern of Kierkegaard's mature thought. The rationalism of the Cartesians he considered only briefly in the draft of an unfinished work. That of the Enlightenment, as it related to the life and teaching of the Church, he summarily dismissed in a short statement in his Journals and again, in his published work, in a proportionally brief treatment in the Postscript. He was not, therefore, primarily concerned with rationalism in the sense in which that term is commonly understood. This is a part of what is implied in the very rare occurrence of that word in his works. This may be in part explained by the fact that this particular mode of thought had already been largely discredited by the Kantian critical philosophy. But the real reason for Kierkegaard's apparent lack of interest in the rationalism of the Enlightenment was that he had discovered in speculative philosophy a much more formidable opponent of Christianity: he had, in fact, discovered in that philosophy the destroyer of his own Christianity, of his own humanity.

Rationalism, in the sense in which it may legitimately and profitably be regarded as Kierkegaard's serious concern, must be understood as his most inclusive characterisation of the age in which he lived or, rather, insofar as this is a
proper antithesis for his thought, as the distinguishing characteristic of his own rebellious past. But whether we look to Kierkegaard's own past or to his understanding of the age we are immediately confronted with his central thought, with the conviction that the Hegelian philosophy is the central expression, the most adequate formulation of man's revolt against God. It had been as a youth quite overcome by Hegelianism that he had forsaken Christianity and proposed to devote the remainder of his life to a study of the natural sciences. Looking out upon the age he saw that there too the Hegelian philosophy had been responsible for the public acceptance of the ideal of scientific truth and for that emasculation of the Christian categories which had been employed to justify the priestly perversion of the faith. That philosophy which had made him something less than a human being he now condemned as the outstanding expression of the age in which he saw his own past reflected. It was against this Hegelianism, against the Hegelianism of his past and of the age, that Kierkegaard directed the sharpest barbs of his attack. And it is from this attack that we must formulate his conception of rationalism.

Kierkegaard's attack upon the age, upon the Hegelianism of the age—his attack upon rationalism—was primarily an attack upon his own Hegelian past. His life, indeed, his works, were directed against the recurrence of that past in his own present. His attacks upon Hegel are, in the first instance, an attack upon that past: a past in which,
despairing of Christianity, he had dreamed of "a republic of science and letters..."¹, a past in which he had chided his master Socrates for his lack of positivity², a past in which he had denied Christ. Primarily his battle was not with Hegel as the symbol of the age but as the symbol of the age as it expressed itself and as it sought to express itself within his own life. It was this deeply personal experience as opposed to a merely cognitive knowledge of Hegelianism which accounted for his real understanding of the nature of rationalism.

It is scarcely possible to overestimate the importance which both Kierkegaard's Hegelian past and his conversion to Christianity had for his understanding of the nature of rationalism. It was these two phases of his life which combined not only to provide him with his insight into the nature of rationalism but to make him aware of the import of his opposition. This awareness, the fact that he understood his thought and that he understood himself in his thought, is indicated in his refusal to define or to attack rationalism in its own terms, in his refusal to employ the term 'rationalism' and at the same time to justify that refusal with the central formal protest of his critique, in his refusal, in an attack which had perforce to question the validity of abstract concepts, to give decisive employment to such concepts. Again, it was this awareness which, as something quite apart from the role which Governance had in the authorship, explains
the deliberateness with which it was undertaken. It was his own experience of Hegelianism which was reflected in the lucidity with which he formulated and the self-assurance with which he urged his charges. It was this experience which steeled him in the conviction that rationalism was neither to be understood nor overcome rationalistically, that it was to be experienced only in the depths of the life of the individual and that it was to be overcome only by becoming 'the individual'. And it was his conversion to Christianity which led him to the conviction that sin is guilt 'before God', that the history of the individual is identical with that of the race, that philosophy (or, in any event, the philosophy of his own past and that of the age) was but a subterfuge or rationalisation for a rebellion which, because man was ultimately spiritual, was itself spiritual.

This must not be misunderstood. To say that Kierkegaard was primarily concerned with his Hegelianism is not to say that he was concerned only with his own Hegelianism: it is rather to say that he was seriously concerned with the Hegelianism of the age. Again, and of equal importance, it is to say that he was seriously concerned with the sin of the race. Hegelianism was for Kierkegaard the specific immorality of the age^2 and it was by his experience of this immorality that he belonged to the age just as it was by this same experience of sin that he belonged to the race. His whole life was pointed towards becoming not a mere self but a real self,
not just a man but something closer to Man. In that life he saw the history of the race reproduced, the transgression of the age reflected. In himself he saw the one in whom the individual and the race were ultimately one, the one in whom the self and the age were not finally distinguishable. It was this experience of Hegelianism as sin which made it possible for him to view his autobiography as the history of the race and the history of the race as his autobiography. And it was this same experience which made it possible for him to understand the age by understanding his own past and to attack that past by attacking his age. It was in terms of the perennial conflict between reason and freedom, between philosophy and life, between security and loneliness, between man and God, it was in terms of its fundamental opposition to Christianity, it was in terms of the sin of the human race that Kierkegaard finally understood and attacked Hegelianism. And it was because he had understood rationalism in the depths of his own spiritual existence, because he had experienced its meaning at the level of the "essentially historical"¹ that he was able to urge his personal reflections as universal judgments and yet escape the frivolous charge that such judgments were but his own projections.

Of his own age Kierkegaard said that it was "stuck in the mud banks of reason"². It was, he finally confessed, an age of "rationalism"³. Of Hegel, who for Kierkegaard was the symbol of the age, he charged that he had made men "into
a race of animals gifted with reason". But Hegel was for Kierkegaard also a romantic. This apparent discrepancy has a two-fold explanation. On the one hand, as we have already suggested, Hegel's conception of reason is itself grounded in the romantic movement: it is derived from the 'faith' which Hamann opposed to reason in the Cartesian sense and, more immediately, from the 'reason' which Jacobi, adopting the Kantian distinction, opposes to the understanding. On the other hand this may be explained by the fact that Kierkegaard does not entrust his thought to abstract concepts. Such concepts, rationalism and romanticism, for example, are for Kierkegaard but ideal concepts: they signify ideal rather than factual existence: they signify a mode of knowing rather than one of being. Kierkegaard's thought is a protest against the final validity of such concepts: it is the denial of the real relevance of those categories and classifications which have traditionally been the mainstay of the historians of philosophy. It is with much justice that Swenson says that these categories "all seem somewhat lame and in need of revision when they are confronted with Kierkegaard's vital thought....." It is, although with very much less justice, that Rayner Heppenstall says something very much akin to this with respect to Existentialist thought as a whole. We have, indeed, almost become reconciled to this apparently modern refusal to accept our carefully planned hospitality. But while the inadequacy of our traditional accommodation is only finally
declared in Kierkegaard it is amply prophesied in Hegel who, years before Schelling, Kierkegaard or Marx were to attack his system, himself attempted to formulate the first genuinely existential philosophy in modern Western thought.¹ The conflict between rationalism and romanticism which is often regarded as the particular stimulus of Kierkegaard's thought² was, in actual fact, the problem undertaken and, in Kierkegaard's view, finally resolved by Hegel. This struggle which is vaguely present in the whole of Hegel's thought finally and formally declared itself in his 'Lectures on Religion' in which he felt himself compelled to combat the rationalists on the one hand and Schleiermacher on the other. And this with good reason for if, as Mackintosh says,³ he was not ultimately far from Schleiermacher in his interpretation of Christianity neither was he ultimately far from the rationalists. For Kierkegaard, insofar as he dared to concern himself with the history of philosophy, the significance of Hegel lay in the fact that he represented both the final fulfillment of the dream of the Cartesians and the full flower of the romantic movement. For Kierkegaard, and with this he was personally concerned, the significance of Hegel lay in the fact that he had combined both rationalism and romanticism, that he had transformed the one in the light of the other, that he had produced Hegelianism, a philosophy almost different in kind from either of the sources from which it had sprung.

These two divergent emphasis within the post-
Renaissance period—essentially an emphasis upon intellectualism on the one hand and aestheticism on the other—were first decisively joined in Jacobi who conceded the victory to aestheticism. From him the struggle passed to Hegel who, after permitting the conflict to disturb the peace of his early years\(^1\) effected a truce which promised equal spoils to both factions but which, in actual fact, at least according to Kierkegaard, gave the larger share to intellectualism.\(^2\) Hegel's merit lay in the fact that, to use his own terminology, he had effected a synthesis between the claims of rationalism and romanticism, a synthesis which accounted for both the thesis and the antithesis of the post-Renaissance era, a synthesis which was neither the one nor the other but which more closely resembled intellectualism than aestheticism, a synthesis which was the intellectual expression of aestheticism. It was this synthesis which was the formal aspect of the rationalism of Kierkegaard or, rather, the rationalism to which Kierkegaard was opposed. Thus it was that, prophetically enough, the first attempt at a genuinely existential philosophy resulted instead in the real rationalism which, insofar as that is possible, was the precise opposite of existential thought.

Kierkegaard was not seriously concerned with any but the Hegelian philosophy. It was for him a definite and permanent advance in the history of thought.\(^3\) It was man's most consistent declaration of his own self-sufficiency. It was the manifesto of man's adjustment to the world.
the philosophy of his own past. And Kierkegaard accepts, at least for the purposes of his polemic, this Hegelian synthesis. Indeed, he tends even to identify it with philosophy as such. This means that his problems are not the problems of Hegel. Their relationship in this respect may be stated in the following manner. The problem confronting Hegel was that of a choice between rationalism and romanticism both of which, to speak graphically, were positions on the horizontal axis equidistant from the vertical axis. The solution which he achieved was itself a position on the vertical axis and it was, for Kierkegaard at least, diametrically opposed to Christianity. Henceforth the real struggle was not that between rationalism and romanticism but rather that between Hegelianism and Christianity both of which were, to continue the figure, positions upon the vertical axis. It is therefore very misleading when Wahl writes:

"He (Kierkegaard) triumphs over Romanticism by the aid of Hegelianism; then he triumphs over Hegelianism by the aid of romanticism. But, in reality, he is as far from the one as from the other. Romanticism and Hegelianism have both contributed to destroy the specific character of Christianity, the one by making it an aesthetic adornment, the other by making it a logical construction. The one is confusion of feeling, the other is confusion of thought...."

Not only does Kierkegaard not triumph over either one of these points of view with the aid of the other but he does not even conceive of them as rival points of view. Indeed, much of his criticism of the Hegelian philosophy is directed against its fundamental aestheticism. It is Kierkegaard's criticism of this aspect of Hegelianism which, in part at least, seems
to justify Hirsch's view that Kierkegaard returns in the Postscript to the preoccupations of his youth. And it is in part Wahl's failure to appreciate Kierkegaard's understanding of the relationship between romanticism and Hegelianism which leads him to reserve his judgment on this view.²

Kierkegaard was not seriously concerned with either rationalism or romanticism in the traditional sense of those terms. Of his early aesthetic works he said that they were a "necessary elimination"³, that they were not essentially related to an understanding of the authorship.⁴ They were in fact finally but a concession to a public which lived "in aesthetic, or, at the most, in aesthetic-ethical categories"⁵, "who lived in categories quite foreign to Christianity"⁶. No more than these works achieve a resolution of their own problems do they raise what is for Kierkegaard the ultimate problem, the problem of Christianity. It is not until the Postscript, that work which lies between the aesthetic and the religious,⁷ a work which is both a "negative elimination"⁸ and "the turning-point of the authorship"⁹ that it is possible to "set the problem, which is the Problem καρ' ἐξ Βασιλείας, of the whole authorship, namely, 'how to become a Christian'"¹⁰. It is not until the reader has been propelled to the level of Hegelianism, to the intellectual expression of aestheticism, to that which negatively corresponds to the ethical, that this problem can really arise. And it is this rationalism or Hegelianism which itself underlies and gives expression to both
aestheticism and intellectualism which is the real enemy of Christianity. Or, to state the matter in other terms, it is Hegelianism which is the final expression for the destruction of the individual.

But this distinction between aestheticism and Hegelianism has a basis also in Kierkegaard's own past. This may be seen from the explanation which he gives for his refusal to condemn "Christian art" despite his opinion that it was "a new paganism in the midst of Christendom"1.

"...just because it is inconceivable to me I refrain from any condemnation, lest I do an injustice..."2

This self-confessed inability to conceive the artist's intention lay not in the fact that he had not been an artist but rather in the fact that he had not essentially been an artist, not in the fact that he had not lived in aesthetic categories but in the fact that his personal attack upon Christianity had not taken the form of aestheticism. It had rather taken the form of Hegelianism and it was from this past that there sprang his condemnation of that philosophy in the light of Christianity.

Christianity is the focal point of all of Kierkegaard's thought3 and it is only when this problem is made central that it is possible to properly arrange the various strands of his thought. It is only then that the real distinction between romanticism and Hegelianism emerges: it is only then that the essential continuity between rationalism (in the older sense) and Hegelianism becomes apparent.
"Speculative philosophy does not by any means say that Christianity is false; on the contrary, it says that speculative philosophy grasps the truth of Christianity." 1

The attitude of the rationalists is precisely identical.

"...[the rationalists] have tumbled upon the idea of declaring it (i.e. Christianity) a minor and in the custody of its guardians...." 2

It is, therefore, not "irrelevant that Hegel passed through a Romantic stage" 3 nor is it possible to concede that "the influence of the rationalistic period upon Kierkegaard was entirely negative" 4. Indeed, if these assertions were true, there would be, or so I believe, great difficulty in explaining the particular emphasis of Kierkegaard's thought.

For Kierkegaard the revolt of the age was expressed in the lives and teaching of the priests, in Hegel and speculative philosophy, and, in a more restricted sense, in the ascendancy of the sciences to a place of dominion. Yet it was in Hegel that the age found its most central expression, its most adequate formulation. Among the speculative philosophers he was pre-eminent: he it was who had prepared the way for the priestly perversion of the faith just as he had made possible the public acceptance of science. Hence, it was as the symbol of the temperament of the age that Kierkegaard attacked him. His insistence upon this relationship is implied in his charge that "the system is a plebian invention...." 5 In a day when men were concerned above all else to escape the burden of spiritual existence Hegel had made men "into a race of
animals gifted with reason." In an age which "made existence tantamount to thinking about everything"\(^1\) he formally equated thought with being.\(^2\) In a generation which "tends to put natural science in the place of religion"\(^3\), which was "desirous of a conceptual understanding of Christianity"\(^4\) he had completely rationalized the Christian faith.\(^5\) At a time when people ceased to care about the ethical\(^6\) he destroyed its significance by including it among the relativities of history.\(^7\) In a day when people's remarks were becoming anonymous and objective\(^8\) when they themselves were becoming impersonal and irresponsible,\(^9\) he himself lived in categories quite different from those in which he speculated.\(^10\) In a period when people were even too apathetic to attack their mortal enemy at the source of its strength\(^11\) he found it more convenient to continue to employ the traditional Christian terminology while he secretly robbed it of all of its meaning.\(^12\) Many other such parallels might be cited but, for Kierkegaard's thought, none more significantly than his view of the meaning of the Hegelian principle of mediation. "It is", he says, "the miserable invention of a man who became false to himself...."\(^13\) For an age which was primarily concerned to protect itself against the claims of both God and man the philosophy of Hegel seemed the most adequate expression.

Kierkegaard's descriptions of his age are the best possible means of showing what he understands by rationalism. It is, he says an age "...of understanding...perhaps, more
knowledgeable than any former generation"¹, an age "when passion has been obliterated in favour of learning"², an age which "at most has vitality enough to lay a wager"³. It was an age when objectivity was regarded as the highest thing,⁴ when, because of "a childish and superstitious overvaluation of thought" poetry and religion had been crowded aside as transcended phases⁵, when, "between poesy and religiosity, worldly wisdom presents its vaudeville performance"⁶. It was an age of shrewdness,⁷ of common sense,⁸ of intelligence.⁹ It was the age of a "universal superstitious belief in reason"¹⁰. Under the reign of man's intellect Christianity had been transformed from an existence-communication into a doctrine that asked only to be understood¹¹: the paradox had been suspended,¹² the element of offence had been destroyed,¹³ the concept of sin had been dissipated.¹⁴ Both the "wound" and the saving grace had been removed.¹⁵ The ethical had gone out of life,¹⁶ reason had "tyrannised" enthusiasm,¹⁷ the whole of man's existence had become "labour for a relative end"¹⁸.

"That is more or less where we stand now. Reason is everywhere; instead of love—a mariage de convenance, instead of unconditional obedience, obedience as a result of reasoning, 'instead of faith—reasonable knowledge, instead of confidence clever calculation, instead of action—events, instead of 'the individual'—several people, instead of personality—impersonal objectivity etc."¹⁹

And remembering the meaning of reason's dominion he cried, "Oh, the sins of the passion and the heart, how much nearer to salvation than the sins of the reason."²⁰
This was the age which, although he rarely used the term, Kierkegaard designated as an age of rationalism.

"All religion has to do with passion, with having passion. It will be true therefore of every religion, especially in ages of rationalism or common sense, that it has only very few genuine adherents."1

That this has direct reference to his own age may be clearly seen in the fact that the quotation appears in "The Instant"2 and in the fact that it was written at a time when his central thesis was "Christianity does not exist"3. But the value of this statement lies not so much in the proof that he so described the age as in showing that he equates rationalism with common sense and that he opposed both to religion.

Kierkegaard was, however, much less sparing in his use of the terms 'scepticism' and 'sceptical'. Although his description of the age is such as to lead one to concur in his judgment that it was an age of rationalism Kierkegaard formally attributed many of its characteristics to a fundamental scepticism. Descartes he regards as a sceptic.4 Scepticism, he says, "is inherent in the Hegelian philosophy"5. "The notion that pure thought is the positive truth for an existing individual, is sheer scepticism...."6 The relationship of the scientist to the problem of the meaning and significance of his life is one of scepticism.7 The levelling process, which is itself the result of the individual's refusal to be himself, finally achieves the destruction of that individual.8 This process, the "profound significance" of which Kierkegaard
holds, "lies in the fact that it means the predominance of the
category generation over the category individuality"¹, is it-
self sceptical.² The failure of the age,³ of speculative
philosophy,⁴ in respect of the ethical is foreshadowed in Des-
cartes⁵ and confirmed in Hegel.⁶ The age's concern to establish
the existence of God⁷ and the immortality of the soul⁸ were, for
him, certain indications of the age's real scepticism. Faith
had begun to lose its passion, it had begun to cease to be
faith.⁹

Yet this scepticism in no wise resembled that of the
Greeks, who, in order to give existential realisation to that
which they understood, attempted to abstract from their own
existence.¹⁰ The scepticism of the age was an attempt to
abstract from the spiritual aspect of man, to deny the spiritual
as a means of affirming the intellectual. Seen in the light
of their deepest meaning in terms of human life, rationalism
and scepticism are but two sides of the same coin: they are
the age's dancing partners. The history of thought is just in-
sofar as it records their alternate ascendancy. The sceptic's
denial of the existence of God is the world's answer to the
rationalist's affirmation. Against both of them, against both
of them equally, Climacus says "...one proves God's existence
by worship...not by proofs"¹¹. For Kierkegaard both are but
manifestations of man's indolence, of his worldliness, of his
desire to defend himself in the comfort of intellectual
categories, to flee the demand to become a spiritual being, an
individual 'before God'.

It is Kierkegaard's understanding of the nature and function of reason\(^1\) which is finally decisive for his conception of rationalism. And, in the sense that every definition of rationalism involves a reference to reason which is itself undefined, any single definition of rationalism is, for Kierkegaard, as satisfactory---and as unsatisfactory---as any other. And, in the sense that the whole of Kierkegaard's thought is a critique of rationalism it is itself finally determined by his view of the nature of reason. No more than he was concerned with rationalism as a mere philosophical doctrine was he concerned with reason as an abstract concept. Reason, for Kierkegaard, is essentially related to his own past and to the age in which that past was reflected: it is essentially related to the role which it had played in his own past and which it continued to play in the lives of those among whom he lived: it is essentially related to the Hegelian philosophy which, for Kierkegaard, was the fullest expression of the spiritual rebellion of his time.

Kierkegaard's view of the nature of reason, like his conception of rationalism, is to be discovered not in the form of a considered definition but rather from his observations, and his accusations, respecting its employment in the life of the age.

"...the 'in-and-for-itself', the absolute, has gone out of life, and reason has been put in its place..."
"The 'in-and-for-itself' ('the nerve of the N.T.') and reason are related to one another inversely, where the one is the other is not. When reason has completely penetrated all relationships and everything the 'in-and-for-itself' will have disappeared entirely from life."1

This same opposition between reason and the Christian revelation is again repeated in his judgment upon the doubt of the age.

"Ultimately all doubt has its stronghold in the illusions of temporal existence, such as that one is several people or all mankind, who can in the end thus overawe God (just as the 'people' overawe the King or the 'public' overawe the alderman) and oneself becomes Christ."2

The charge that reason is the ally of natural man in his war against Christianity becomes explicit in his later works. The speculative transformation of Christianity, the "counterfeiting of the concepts" is, he says, "precisely in the direction of human egoism..."3 For Kierkegaard reason is man's means of adjustment, his principle of worldliness, his faculty of shrewdness, his ability for compromise: it is his weapon against Christianity, his instrument for the affirmation of 'man', for the denial of God. And it is against this self-assertion of 'man' as man that Kierkegaard proclaims that "religion is the true humanity"4.

Swenson, who has perhaps understood this matter more profoundly than any other, describes this reason as the "concrete expression for what he (i.e. man) initially is, in contradistinction to what he strives in faith to become"5. It is, he says:

"...essentially identical with the passion of self-
assertion, self-justification, so that the conflict is between two passions, not between passion and abstract intelligence."

Reason, although ideally not a passion, becomes such in its opposition to passion. Or, to state this matter from its other side: "...man is planned with a view to being spirit." His refusal to become such a spirit is itself ultimately a spiritual refusal. This is the man in whom reason has become a passion, the one in whom, in the absence of true spirit, the helm is seized by reason or false spirit. For Kierkegaard the whole of man's nature is ultimately involved in every decisive choice: rationality, from the side of Climacus, and spirituality, from the side of Anti-Climacus, become indistinguishably merged in the life of man. But this conception of man in terms of rationality immediately breaks up into the two opposites which are contained within it, into obedient spirit and rebellious spirit, into pious reflection and superficial reflection, into the "understanding which is employed in order to believe against the understanding" and the understanding which "refuses to understand that there is something that it cannot understand." The former of these contraries describes man as he ought to be, as, under God, he has become. The latter is the man in whom reason is first allied with his struggle against Christianity and finally identified with man apart from Christianity. This is the man in whom "Reason" as that term is employed in the Fragments is identified with 'man' as natural man, in whom reason, or understanding, is identified with
'man'. And this is the reason which must be crucified,\(^1\) which must stand aside if man is to see God.\(^2\)

This matter may be much more briefly stated in its relation to the Hegelian philosophy. Hegel had equated reason, in the form of his universal or philosophical reason, with Reason, the Absolute or God.\(^3\) For Kierkegaard Hegel was himself involved in that reason: it was, he believed, a pure fabrication, a cloak under which to hide the spiritual treason of the age. So it was that not at all unaware of the sting of parody, he took over the Reason which Hegel had identified with God, which he had employed to destroy Christianity, and, in his own works, identified it with natural man, with man in his opposition to Christianity.

It is this essentially broader interpretation of reason which is involved in Kierkegaard's formulation of 'the absurd' a category which is itself too often misconstrued\(^4\) as Kierkegaard's attack upon what are, in such misconstructions, regarded as 'the laws of thought'. Kierkegaard is entirely unequivocal on this point.

"The absurd is not one of the factors which can be discriminated within the proper compass of the understanding: it is not identical with the improbable, the unexpected...."\(^5\)

Even in his strongest statement of the 'absolute paradox' he stops short of making it paradoxical or absurd in itself: it is, and this he does not fail to interject, paradoxical or absurd only in its relation to man.
"...that an individual man is God is Christianity, and this individual man is the God-man. There is neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor in the depths, nor in the aberrations of the most fantastic thinking, the possibility of a (humanly speaking) more insane combination."¹

Kierkegaard, in fact, refuses to do what so many of his critics on this point are so anxious to have him do: he refuses to identify the thought of man with the thought of God. Indeed, the 'absolute paradox'² is itself the protest against such an identification. It may not even be amiss to suggest that Kierkegaard has destroyed the very ground of those who are, on this point, attacking him. Nor is the paradox paradoxical only for a man of lesser intelligence. "The paradox", he says, "is not a concession but a category",³ it "is related to man as man"⁴.

The paradox, the absurd, is not the transgression of the law of contradiction⁵ which, significantly, Hegel set aside and Kierkegaard affirmed. It is instead the expression for the contradiction between man's true destiny and that which, as 'man', he chooses for himself.⁶ When, therefore, Kierkegaard speaks of "being nailed to the paradox"⁷, of "the crucifixion of the understanding"⁸, of "the martyrdom of faith"⁹ he is to be understood not as denying the validity of thought as such but rather as denying its right to pass beyond what he regards as its proper bounds. He is, in fact, denying the disinterestedness of thought. Likewise, when Kierkegaard insists that Christianity is the absurd he is not identifying Christianity with the abrogation of thought (an interpretation than which there could be nothing more absurd): he is rather affirming that Christianity offends, and must offend, man as Reason or reason
Rationalism is a way of life which finds its formal expression in the Hegelian philosophy, in man's 'organised' opposition to religion,² in his aggression against Christianity.³ It is the way in which Kierkegaard had lived, the way in which his age continued to live. It is the expression for the suspension of man in Cartesian rationalism, for the dissipation of man in German romanticism: it is the expression for the annihilation of man. Rationalism is the true anthropomorphism.
"The fundamental error of modern times (which runs into logic, metaphysics, dogmatics, and the whole of modern life) lies in the fact that the yawning abyss of quality in the difference between God and man has been removed. The result in dogmatic theology (from logic and metaphysics) is a mockery of God such as was unknown in paganism.... .......... and in ethics an impertinent indifference, or better still the complete absence of ethics. .......... The trouble in our times is not really doubt but rebelliousness."

Journals, 712.
Kierkegaard understood that he was to be a 'corrective' to an age in which, he said, because of its "vastly increased knowledge, men had forgotten what it means to EXIST, and what INWARDNESS signifies". In that it required a 'corrective' it was, he conceded, like every other age but in that it was precisely a corrective which it required it was, he was tempted to believe, an age which was somewhat peculiar in the extent of its perversion. Not only had the balance between the understanding, the imagination and the feeling been disturbed, not only had the understanding become too large, but that understanding had included the imagination and the feeling within itself. Science had organised "the moments of subjectivity within a knowledge of them, and this knowledge is assumed to be the highest stage...". It was an age in which the "one-sided individual...has faith and passion as transcended phases of his life..." in which "the abstractly all-sided individual imagines he has everything through the one sidedness of the
intellectual"\textsuperscript{1}. It was an age which had transformed Christianity into a doctrine, which had included reality within logic, which had conceived man apart from God and time apart from eternity. It had substituted knowledge for faith and thought for existence. In both theory and practice it had made man in the image of man.

The whole of Kierkegaard's thought is ultimately related to his conception of the nature of man or, more primarily, to his experience of himself as a single existing man, individual or subject. That man exists sets him beside the world of things which also exist but it sets him apart from God who, as eternal, "does not exist"\textsuperscript{2}. That he is a subject sets him beside God who is also a subject\textsuperscript{3} but it sets him apart from the world of things which are only objects. "...man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal..."\textsuperscript{4} As existing, as an individual within time, as one who is "himself existentially in process of becoming"\textsuperscript{5} his task is his existence and all of his thought must essentially express the fact that he is an existing individual. As subject, as a subject who has to realise himself in subjectivity, in inwardness, in passion, his "essential task...is to concentrate upon inwardness in existing..."\textsuperscript{6} As existing subject his task is "really to exist, so as to interpenetrate (his) existence with consciousness, at one and the same time eternal and as if far removed from existence, and yet also present in existence and in the process of becoming..."\textsuperscript{7}
For his insistence that man is essentially an existing individual, for his opposition to the age's concern with the objective and the abstract, Kierkegaard was able to find a precedent in Socrates "whose everlasting merit it was to have become aware of the essential significance of existence, of the fact that the knower is an existing individual"\(^1\). For his insistence that man is situated within time, for his protest that the age completely failed to understand the significance of this fact, he was able to find support in Socrates who had personally rejected the eternity of abstract thought in order to concentrate upon his own existence. But in an age in which everyone was a Christian as a matter of course Kierkegaard was also able Socratically to suggest that the matter was no longer one merely of precedent or personal choice.

\[\ldots\text{now existence has stamped itself upon the existing individual a second time.}\] \(^2\) "The eternal truth has come into being in time...now the eternal essential truth is not behind him but in front of him, through its being in existence or having existed, so that if the individual does not existentially and in existence lay hold of the truth, he will never lay hold of it"\(^3\). No longer is the individual free to take himself out of existence, to wander back into an eternity of recollection (and it was this possibility which was signified in the Socratic proposition that all knowledge is recollection\(^4\)): no longer is time merely 'optional'. No longer is the word 'recollection': it has become instead 'repitition'. \(^5\) Now

\(^1\) Kierkegaard, Works, 1:60.

\(^2\) Kierkegaard, Journals, 81.

\(^3\) Kierkegaard, Journals, 83.

\(^4\) Socrates, Protagoras 318b.

\(^5\) Kierkegaard, Journals, 84.
"the difficulty is greater than it was for the Greek, because still greater contradictions are enjoined, existence being accentuated paradoxically as sin, and eternity accentuated paradoxically as God in time"¹. The individual has been unconditionally bound within existence: the bonds of time have been doubly strengthened. To engage in speculation, although only highly suspect from the Socratic view, has now become "neither more nor less than confusion"². "The evasion by which speculative philosophy attempts to recollect itself out of existence has been made impossible"³.

There is, in Kierkegaard's interpretation, both an essential continuity and a definite break between the Socratic and Christian positions. This continuity---and it was this which was the implicit assumption of the argument of the Fragments---he expressed by saying that "the Socratic ignorance is an analogue to the category of the absurd..."⁴, that "the Socratic inwardness in existing is an analogue to faith..."⁵. It was this which he expressed again by saying that "Christianity is inwardness"⁶, that it "protests every form of objectivity; (that) it desires that the subject should be infinitely concerned about himself"⁷. But the break between these two positions is even more important and its extent may be most briefly expressed by a reference to their respective accounts of the paradox. In the Socratic world "the eternal essential truth is by no means in itself a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical by virtue of its relation to an existing individual"⁸.
In Christianity however "the eternal essential truth is itself a paradox". The paradox has been replaced by the absolute paradox, existence and time have been given an even greater significance, the inwardness which is proportionate to the paradox of which it is born will now be the most profound possible. The transition from the Socratic to the Christian is a transition from one existence sphere to another and it is to these that we must now turn.

Kierkegaard ultimately distinguished four separate existence spheres: the aesthetic or the aesthetic-metaphysical, the ethical, religiousness A (the Socratic religion of immanence) and religiousness B (the Christian paradoxical religion of transcendence). Either/Or raises the problem of a choice between the first two of these spheres, the Stages that of a choice between the first and the remaining spheres considered as more or less related to one another and the Postscript that of a choice between the first and the last of these spheres with the second and third included within but nevertheless made subservient to the fourth. These spheres are differentiated by the emphasis which they place upon time, "in accordance with their interpretation of what it is to exist." "In the same degree that time is accentuated, in the same degree we go forward from the aesthetic, the metaphysical, to the ethical, the religious and the Christian-religious." It is upon this same basis, more particularly upon the basis of the relationship which they establish between eternity and
time—"The apprehension of the distinction 'here' and 'hereafter' is at bottom the apprehension of what it is to exist."—together with the degree of inwardness which springs from that relationship that the last two spheres are differentiated from each other.

"The paradoxical religiousness defines the distinction absolutely by accentuating paradoxically what it is to exist. For as the eternal came into the world at a moment of time, the existing individual does not in the course of time come into the relation with the eternal and think about it (this is A), but in time it comes into relation with the eternal in time; so that the relation is within time, and this relationship conflicts equally with all thinking, whether one reflect upon the individual or upon the Deity." 

Although religiousness A "accentuates existence", although it "makes the thing of existing as strenuous as possible (outside the paradox-religious sphere)" it is nevertheless a religion of immanence which "has only human nature in general as its assumption" and in which, therefore, existence "is a moment within my eternal consciousness..." Religiousness B however paradoxically accentuates existence by marking the existing individual as a sinner and by so doing takes him out of the context of immanence which at most is able to impute guilt to the exister. Religiousness B proclaims that the Deity has entered into the world at a moment in time, that "there is no longer any immanent fundamental kinship between the temporal and the eternal, because the eternal itself has entered time and would constitute there the kinship", that man is "between time and eternity in time, between heaven and hell in the time of salvation". The individual is prevented from relating
himself backwards to the eternal and is required instead to come forward into being in order to become eternal by relationship to the Deity in time. Existence has been given its most decisive formulation: the greatest possible inwardness has been made possible.

These existence spheres may also be differentiated with respect to the dialectical nature of the existing individual. This springs from the fact that the individual's relationship to the dialectical is commensurate with his relationship to existence. Dialectic is the result of existence: "existence...is the dialectical moment." Within time there can be escape from neither existence nor dialectic but only interpretations of these and according to these interpretations the various spheres are chosen. "What constitutes the situation as aesthetic is the fact that the individual becomes undialectic in himself." "The specific thing about Christianity is the dialectical in the second instance." But the qualitative dialectic of the paradoxical religiousness serves both to differentiate this sphere from all of the others and also to separate the different spheres from one another. In this it resembles the absolute paradox which distinguishes religiousness B from religiousness A and at the same time provides the measure or interpretation of existence in the light of which the other spheres are judged. The sphere of the qualitative dialectic, of the absolute paradox, of the breach with immanence, is, for Kierkegaard, *index sui et falsi*. 
This, in very brief compass, is the framework of Kierkegaard's thought, the background within which his judgments upon both the age and its philosophy must be understood. Before passing on to those judgments it remains only to say that in Kierkegaard's view the Hegelian philosophy belongs essentially within the aesthetic-metaphysical sphere. It lumps together "everything (including the ethical and the religious) indiscriminately in the aesthetic-metaphysical". It is wholly unable to come to terms with existence.

"Speculative philosophy discounts existence; in its eyes the fact of existing amounts to having existed (the past), existence is a transitory factor resolved into the pure being of the eternal. Speculative philosophy as the abstract can never be contemporary with existence as existing but can only see it in retrospect."^2

From this fundamental inability to come to terms with temporal existence it followed that the Hegelian philosophy was wholly incapable of dealing justly with the God-man of the Christian faith. Quite naturally it conceived faith in terms of immanence, it abrogated the paradox, it equated thought with existence, it substituted a quantitative for the qualitative dialectic. So too it was for this same reason that "speculative philosophy prudently holds itself aloof from ethics, and...becomes ridiculous when it makes a trial at it."^4

Hegelianism was the intellectual as opposed to the artistic expression of aestheticism and it was, Kierkegaard believed, the outstanding expression of an age which lived "in aesthetic, or, at the most, in aesthetic-ethical categories"^5,
for an age which had "transformed Christianity into a philosophical doctrine that asks to be understood, and turned being a Christian into a triviality"\(^1\).

The main thrusts of Kierkegaard's attack upon the rationalism of the age were delivered against objective learning, speculative philosophy and "Christendom", against the natural sciences, Hegel and the priests. The entire attack was based upon his understanding of the nature of man, more specifically upon his understanding of this nature as it is accentuated by Christianity. That this basis should have become more explicit in its latter phase is, in part at least, a result of the method which he employed; a method as much the result of the obvious justice of his demands as of the exigencies of the battle. And because the entire attack was made in the name of Christianity it can perhaps best be understood by turning first briefly to those works in which the assumptions of that attack are explicitly declared. This necessity of turning to the final works in order fully to understand the earlier has its own interesting and significant parallel in Kierkegaard's own seriously expressed view of the Journals as a means of "knowing myself later on"\(^2\).

In "The Instant" both Kierkegaard's view of the nature of Christianity and his understanding of the extent of man's opposition to it are unequivocably stated. In the face of the phenomenon of "Christendom" he says:
"No, I confront them with the unaltered conviction that the Christianity of the New Testament is Christianity, the other (i.e. 'the Christianity of us men') being a knavish trick, and that they no more resemble one another than a square resembles a circle."}

Of the opposition of that Christianity to natural man he says:

"In the New Testament, Christianity is the profoundest wound that can be inflicted upon a man, calculated on the most dreadful scale to collide with everything--"2

That this does not represent any significant change from the view which he had held in his earlier years may be readily seen from his Journals where he says of Christianity that it emasculates man,3 that it is a "radical cure"4, that it is "really too holy for us men"5, that it terrifies instead of consoling"6. In such circumstances the problem, he says, "...for 'man', for the 'human race', for 'society', is to protect itself with all its might against Christianity which must be regarded as its mortal enemy"7. Indeed, he says, it was precisely in order to mitigate the blows of Christianity that the priests were brought into existence.

"This sort of Christianity was never...to man's taste, but was distasteful to him in his inmost heart, mortally distasteful. Therefore the upshot is that from generation to generation there lives a highly respected class in the community whose metier is to transform Christianity into the exact opposite."8

This function of the priest as the invention and servant of natural man he contrasts with his duty as a minister of the Christian gospel.

"All the shrewdness of 'man' seeks one thing: to be able to live without responsibility. The priest's significance for society ought to be to do everything
to make every man eternally responsible for every hour he lives, even for the least thing he undertakes, for this is Christianity. But his significance for society is: to make hypocrisy feel secure, while society shoves responsibility away from itself upon the priest."1

His charge against the priests is that instead of proclaiming the offence of the gospel, instead of insisting that "the human race is a lost race, that every individual who is born is by being born a lost individual"2, they have obliged with their accommodating and perverted view of the Christian faith. Instead of proclaiming Christianity in the interest of God they have preached it in the interest of 'man'.3

His ultimate charge against Hegel and the speculative philosophers is not essentially different. They too are the hirelings of natural man's egoism in his struggle against the Christian faith, in his revolt against the task of existence. Of the current teaching that 'history is the judgment' he says, "...but I know also that this is an invention of human shrewdness which does away with the God-relationship..."4 The real strength of Christianity lay in its early dogmatic terminology and to this strength speculative philosophy brings about an emasculation, simply by not thinking anything decisive in connection with the most decisive categories.

"To such concepts as faith, incarnation, tradition, inspiration which in Christianity must be referred to a particular historical fact, it has seemed good to philosophers to give an entirely different general meaning...."5

Hegel, he says, "has quite consistently volatilised every dogmatic concept just far enough for it to support life in reduced
circumstances..."1 The concept of sin, *"the conditio sine qua non"* of Christianity,² had been abolished. The paradox *sensu strictissimo* the speculative philosophers had swallowed up in their understanding.³ The distinction between knowledge and faith had been neglected.⁴ The "yawning abyss of quality in the difference between God and man"⁵ had been removed. This entire process, like the "counterfeiting of the concepts" through which it was made possible is, he says, "precisely in the direction of human egoism, so that he who is hoaxd by it is (if I may use the expression) the other party in the business of Christianity: God in heaven"⁶. And this process of "turning Christianity topsy-turvy"⁷, of "making a fool out of God"⁸, itself instigated by the pride of man, had been brought to its finest formulation. The human lie, the perennial revolt, had achieved a new state of perfection. In the speculative perversion of Christianity the age had discovered the means whereby they were able to defy God and to forsake existence and nevertheless claim His blessing for their revolt.

Kierkegaard symbolised the relationship between speculative philosophy and the scientific movement of his age in his use of the word 'uvidenskabelig' as a descriptive in the title of his formal attack upon the Hegelian system. Respecting the translation of this word Lowrie has written: "In English we have no other word to translate *uvidenskabelig* but 'unscientific'. The reference of this word is narrower, and yet it does not misrepresent the meaning of the title.
For it was principally against the natural sciences S.K. inveighed...."¹ And in support of this view Lowrie quotes from the Journals:

"Almost everything that nowadays flourishes most conspicuously under the name of science (especially as natural science) is not really science but curiosity. In the end all corruption will come about as a consequence of the natural sciences...."²

It would be possible even further to buttress this view simply by quoting Kierkegaard's description of the natural sciences as "ridiculous", as "nothing but a lot of jokes", as a "dreadful sophistry",³ as "scepticism" or "superstition"⁴. But all this, I believe, is to place an unwarranted interpretation upon Kierkegaard's thought: it is improperly to translate that thought into an objective result. Kierkegaard's opposition is not principally against the natural sciences but rather against man having his primary concern with these sciences. And this distinction is absolutely central for his thought. In actual fact his attack was upon the age's trust in objective scholarship, upon their preoccupation with learning, upon their confidence in science as a method⁵ and it is within this attack that his opposition to the natural sciences as, together with speculative philosophy, the outstanding manifestations of that preoccupation, must be understood. That this is so may be seen from the point of departure upon which he bases his criticism of these sciences.
Kierkegaard's attack upon the natural sciences falls within his attack upon the orientation of life in the direction of the objective and the abstract and this attack in turn is grounded in his insistence that the knower is an existing individual.

"... it is incredible that man who has thought infinitely about himself as a spirit could think of choosing natural science (with empirical material) as his life's work and aim. ... only to dig up things and be brilliant---not to understand himself.... the most frightful way of living: to fascinate and astonish the world by one's discoveries and brilliance, and not to understand oneself." 1

"All such scientific methods become particularly dangerous and pernicious when they encroach upon the spiritual field. Plants, animals and stars may be handled in that way, but to handle the spirit of man in such a fashion is blasphemy which only weakens moral and religious passion." 2

"The subjective thinker is not a man of science, but an artist. Existing is an art." 3 And simply because existing is an art, because man's one essential task is to become an existing individual, his concern with the objective and the abstract represents a retreat from his true destiny. His objectivity is in the direction of inhumanity, of impersonality 4; it leads away from decision 5 and from faith 6: it is irreligious, 7 it is opposed to Christianity, 8 it is a "drunken dream" 9, it is "madness" 10. It becomes "a kind of inhuman knowing for the production of which man's self is squandered" 11. It is man's perversion of his own destiny.

Of these three main thrusts against the age that
against the Hegelian philosophy was in every way central. It was directed against a philosophy which had furnished the apologetic for what its author regarded as the priestly perversion of the faith and it had also prepared the way for the public acceptance of the scientific or objective attitude toward human life and existence. Furthermore inasmuch as this attack maintains that dialectical balance which is lacking in the later attack upon the established Church,¹ inasmuch as it gives more explicit expression to the distinction between opposition to science as such and opposition to science as the primary concern of an existing individual, inasmuch as it always has existence in view it indicates the tone of the whole of his thought. As the central expression of his opposition to the age it provides the most suitable framework within which to consider his critique of rationalism, his attack upon the rationalism of the age.

Unlike many of those who lived in his age Kierkegaard had much too genuine an admiration for the Hegelian philosophy to regard it as one which might here be wrong and there in need of but a little adjustment. He was quite certain that nothing could be gained by a purely intellectual critique of Hegelianism (which, for Kierkegaard, was itself the epitome of intellectual thought) and even that such an attack "would leave everything essentially unaltered"². He attacked it rather as a philosophy which had forgotten what it means to be a single existing human being and those several
minute criticisms of the Hegelian terminology which are included are subservient to this end. His attack may be considered in the light of the framework provided by the three broad existence spheres, the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious or rather, according to those judgments which are perhaps particularly appropriate to the point of view of each of these spheres. This means that the Hegelian philosophy, the "objective tendency", is viewed from the aesthetic as "an essay in the comical", from the ethical as "a demoralising aesthetic diversion for the knowing subject", from the religious and this assumption, implicit in Climacus, becomes explicit in Anti-Climacus, as "an ungodly and pantheistic self-deification". These are however but separate phases of the same attack. "...the ethical is his complicity with God." Climacus' own thesis is, he says, "that the Hegelian philosophy, by failing to define its relation to the existing individual (and it is herein that it is comical), and by ignoring the ethical, confounds existence". Of these three phases the religious and the ethical are for Kierkegaard finally the most critical and it is in his category of 'the individual' that these receive their most decisive formulation. But before it is possible to consider even the preliminary expressions of these two levels it is necessary to turn to the first phase of the attack, to the protest that the Hegelian philosophy is "an essay in the comical", a charge which, Kierkegaard says, "also lies in the metaphysical".
"Modern philosophy", Kierkegaard says, is comical; it has "forgotten, in a sort of world-historical absent-mindedness, what it means to be a human being."¹ The speculative philosophers have made themselves "fantastic", "comical".² And so has Hegel. "...he is merely comic."³ "I simply cannot help laughing when I think of Hegel's conception of Christianity, it is so utterly inconceivable."⁴ "One thing always escaped Hegel—what it was to live."⁵ They are comical—and hence potentially tragic—because they have forgotten the meaning of existence. For Kierkegaard, in contrast, the fact that man exists is that with which all thought must finally reckon. It is this existence which prevents the truth from being an abstract identity of thought and being,⁷ which is the basis of the distinction between essential and accidental knowledge,⁸ which makes subjectivity to be the truth⁹ and objectivity a misunderstanding.¹⁰ It is existence which separates subject and object,¹¹ which makes an existential system impossible,¹² which makes reality such that it "cannot be expressed in the language of abstraction"¹³. It is this same existence, it is the fact that man exists, which invokes the "aut-aut"¹⁴ and reinstates the principle of contradiction¹⁵, which produces the paradox¹⁶ and prevents mediation¹⁷, which forbids the disinterestedness of abstract thought and the detachedness of pure thought¹⁸. Existence is, he said, "the category upon which pure thought must suffer shipwreck"¹⁹.

The first charge which Kierkegaard brings against
Hegel and the speculative philosophers is that they have failed
to understand the meaning of existence, that they have falsified
the nature of reality. In the Cartesian inference of existence
from thought, in the Hegelian identification of the rational
with the real, more specifically in his inclusion of a chapter
entitled "Reality" in his Logic\(^1\) he saw a comic forgetfulness
of existence, a disastrous falsification of reality and, it
should be noted, an unjustifiable invasion of the secure realm
of logic.\(^2\) Kierkegaard's reply was incisive and unequivocal
and that reply held that thought cannot think existence, that
logic cannot conceive reality.\(^3\)

Kierkegaard's protest that logic cannot conceive
reality is his point of departure not for an abstract criticism
of logic but rather for an attempt to, as it were, buy back
once again the reality which Hegel had put into pawn. He did
not underestimate the difficulty of that task; it will, he
said, "require some time to recall to mind what it is..."\(^4\)
The age had forgotten the meaning of reality because they had
forgotten the meaning of existence. Like all of Kierkegaard's
thought these terms refer primarily to the life of man and
when understood in this connection they are synonymous.\(^5\)

"Existence constitutes the highest interest of
the existing individual, and his interest in his exist-
ence constitutes his reality. What reality is, cannot
be expressed in the language of abstraction. Reality
is an inter-esse between the moments of that hypo-
thetical unity of thought and being which abstract
thought presupposes."\(^6\)

"The only reality to which an existing individual may
have a relation that is more than cognitive, is
his own reality, the fact that he exists..."¹

That what is reality for man is reality, that it is his own
existence, does not mean that reality has been fashioned in
the image of man. (Kierkegaard is not guilty of the ultimate
charge which he presses against Hegel namely, that his
"Reality" is shaped in the interest of rebellious man.)

Kierkegaard is not saying that reality as such is conditioned
by man; he is not saying that the existence of objects are
but mere analogies to that of man. He is merely insisting
that what is reality for man, i.e. that what is reality, is
determined by what man is, by the fact that he is an existing
individual, that he is in process of becoming, that he is
engaged in striving. "The only reality that exists for an
existing individual is his own ethical reality."²

Parallel with and giving further expression to the
protest that logic cannot conceive reality is that which holds
that thought cannot think existence. Again it is necessary
to point out that Kierkegaard's emphasis falls not upon a
criticism of thought as such but rather upon a basic distinct-
ion between existence and the concept of existence, between
actuality and possibility. By existence Kierkegaard means
empirical as distinct from ideal existence, he means factual
as distinct from conceptual existence, he means esse existent-
iae as distinct from esse essentiae,³ he means existence
which is irreducible to a concept as distinct from that which
has merely the existence of the concept. This is of course essentially the distinction set forth by Plato but for Kierkegaard it is the individual, the particular which exists, which has reality. By existence he means existence, he means that for which the "to be—or not to be" is of "quite decisive importance". "...existence corresponds to the individual thing..." "Existence is always something particular, the abstract does not exist."

In his insistence that thought cannot conceive existence or reality Kierkegaard is in essential agreement both with Kant's conclusion "that with 'existence no new measurement is added to the concept';" and with Schelling's "intellectual intuition" of reality which had employed this Kantian insight as a new point of departure. But whereas for Kant there is merely a cleavage between thought and existence there is for Kierkegaard a definite opposition. Thought he views as a dubious substitute for existence or reality: it knows these at the cost of knowing them as a possibility. "...it's (i.e. abstract thought's) concept of reality is a false reflection..." For him the question of reality, of existence, cannot properly arise in connection with thought or the concepts with which thought operates. Seeing therefore Kant's philosophy as a "misleading reflection which brings reality into connection with thought", his thing-in-itself as the temptation to which Hegel had succumbed he gave to the original Kantian insight a more positive formulation. "Nothing is
added to a concept whether it has existence or not..."1 "The only thing-in-itself which cannot be thought is existence and this does not come within the province of thought to think."2 But not only has reality no place within thought, not only is it merely to be excluded from thought, but it definitely has a place, and this not merely by default, within the ethical. It is, in fact, the ethical. Again, "The only reality that exists for an existing individual is his own ethical reality."3.

Now that existence and reality have been wrested from its province it may be asked what remains with which logic may concern itself. Kierkegaard's reply is that there yet remains all that properly belongs to its sphere, all that it is able to assimilate. Logic, he says, is concerned with that which is solely because it is as opposed to that which is because it exists or has existed,4 it is concerned with the realm of essence as opposed to that of existence.5 "Nothing must...be incorporated in a logical system that has any relation to existence, that is not indifferent to existence."6 Logic is concerned with the necessary but the real or that which exists is not necessary as is proved by the fact that it has come into being7 "i.e. has suffered the change involved in passing from potentiality to actuality (κινησις )"8. Nor do "contradiction, movement, transition, and so forth9" have any place in logic.

"In logic no movement can come about, for logic is, and everything logical simply is, and this impotence of logic is the transition to the sphere of being where existence and reality appear."10
Those transitions which do take place in reality, in the sphere of the actual, appear in logic, in the sphere of the possible, as a leap from one concept to another. Concepts do not change: it is reality which makes the transition. All transitions are actual rather than logical. Logic is wholly separate from the world of reality and to raise the question of existence in connection with logic is merely to confound discourse. Each of these realms has its own dialectic.

"Everything depends upon making the difference between quantitative and qualitative dialectic absolute. The whole of logic is quantitative or modal dialectic, since everything is and everything is one and the same. Qualitative dialectic is concerned with existence." This distinction is, and for the sake of both reality and logic must be absolute. Reality is existence: "The eternal expression of logic is...Nothing comes into existence, everything is." And it was this latter expression which "the Eleatic School transferred by mistake to existence...."  

To logic and thought Kierkegaard grants validity but, he says, "why confuse the validity of thought with reality?"

"Abstract thought considers both possibility and reality, but its concept of reality is a false reflection, since the medium within which the concept is thought is not reality, but possibility. Abstract thought can get hold of reality only by nullifying it, and this nullification of reality, consists in transforming it into possibility. All that is said within the language of abstraction and within the sphere of abstract thought, is really said within the sphere of the possible."  

"Existence is always something particular, the abstract does not exist. From this to draw the conclusion that the abstract is without validity is a misunderstanding; but it is also a misunderstanding to confound discourse
by even raising the question of existence, or of
reality in the sense of existence in connection
with the abstract."^1

Logic operates with concepts the medium of which is the pos-
sible.2 "All knowledge about reality is possibility."^3

Thought and logic therefore give "validity in the sense of
possibility" rather than "reality in the sense of actuality"^4. And this is precisely as it should be because aesthetically
and intellectually possibility is higher than reality which
is what Aristotle implies by saying that poetry is higher
than history.5 The intellectual is and ought to be indifferent
to reality or existence. As soon as this is forgotten, as
soon as a teleology is imposed upon thought, the ethical is
immediately present forbidding a conclusion which is "ethically
deceitful and metaphysically unclear"^6. The ethical however
does away with the disinterestedness of the possible and insists
upon the actual, upon existence or reality. "Ethically
regarded, reality is higher than possibility."^7

Before passing on however we may turn briefly to
several conclusions which have their basis in the general
point of view just described. From the denial of logical
necessity to the realm of the actual, from the insistence that
transition is actual rather than logical it follows that real
movement is once again introduced into existence, that the
actual is no longer to be viewed as necessary, that history
is a realm of freedom and meaning, that ethics becomes pos-
sible.8 Nor should it be forgotten that by this same
distinction Kierkegaard intended to free logic from the burden of reality in order that it might be free to pursue the lofty disinterestedness of the possible.¹ Again, from the conclusion that thought cannot reach through to existence it follows that existence cannot be inferred from thought. "The attempt to infer existence from thought is...a contradiction."² The Cartesian cogito is a mere tautology in which the first proposition says even more than the second.³ Spinoza’s essentia involvit existentiam is also a tautological proposition.⁴ Nor can any of the proofs for the existence of God succeed in establishing anything more than his merely conceptual existence which is however necessarily presupposed in the beginning.⁵ With respect to reality logical thought operates within an hypothesis and it is impossible to make the conclusion independent of that hypothesis.⁶ The confusion which surrounds the attempt to prove the existence of God, or, since "degrees of reality" within factual existence are really a misunderstanding,⁷ of anything else for that matter, "is the same as that involved in explaining reality within the realm of pure thought."⁸ So too from the fact that aesthetically and intellectually possibility is higher than reality it follows that understanding is the highest relation to a doctrine even as from the fact that ethically reality is higher than possibility it follows that to be a disciple is the highest relationship to an existential communication. The task is to understand Hegel: it is to become a Christian.⁹
The protests which we have just considered are essentially logical and metaphysical protests and so fall within a realm which is outside of or rather, an "abbreviation" or "priority" for the three existence spheres. The categories of logic and metaphysics belong rather to that realm which is indifferent to existence—-a fact carefully suggested by the absence of any specific work upon these subjects—they do not in themselves, strictly speaking, exist as such. Such judgments can therefore as well be made, or at least theoretically so, from the aesthetic as the religious point of view. But the real attack cannot fall within this realm for it is not here that man has his existence. The significance of these protests consists rather in that fact that, as we have seen, they are themselves a prior expression for the real attack. Nor can this attack occur within the aesthetic sphere for it is not here that man has his real existence. (The charge, it will be recalled, is that the Hegelian philosophy is itself essentially aesthetic-metaphysical in nature. The choice posited, it will also be recalled, is that between the aesthetic and the religious containing the ethical within itself.) It had rather to be urged from the ethical, and finally from the religious, and it was this which Kierkegaard suggested when, referring to the Hegelian 'Idea of universal history' he said: "It is not my intention to show how comical this is, but rather to try to make it clear...what objection Ethics and the ethical have to raise against this entire order
Basically this objection was that "the absolute ethical distinction between good and evil tends for the historical survey to be neutralized in the aesthetic-meta-
physical determination of the great and significant...."²

It is within the ethical that reality is first truly encountered:³ it is here that existence is first definitely accentuated:⁴ it is here that the real subject, the ethically existing subject,⁵ is discovered. The ethical is that subjectivity which is the truth, it is that inwardness which "is precisely the fountain which springeth up unto eternal life"⁶, it is itself "the very breath of the eternal"⁷, it is in the direction of the only true certitude.

"'The ethical alone is certain; to concentrate upon the ethical yields the only knowledge which may not possibly in the last moment transform itself into an hypothesis; to exist in the ethical constitutes the only secure knowledge, the knowledge being rendered secure by something else.'"⁸

Such certitude cannot come through the pursuit of the objective sciences: "...objective security cannot be thought in conjunction with existence"⁹. It "can only be attained by and exist in action"¹⁰. The ethical is the sphere of action: it is created in action and can maintain itself only in action. "Once a man acts in a decisive sense and comes into reality, existence can get a grip on him and providence educate him."¹¹ It "can be had only in the infinite, where he cannot as an existing subject remain, but only repeatedly arrive"¹². The ethical consists in realising the eternal in the temporal,¹³ in translating the possible into the actual. It is the precise
opposite of knowledge which "consists in translating the real into the possible"\(^1\).

From within the sphere of the strictly ethical Kierkegaard urges two quite definite charges against Hegel namely, that he had formulated an ethic within the framework of a fundamentally aesthetic philosophy and that, by equating the rational with the real, by transforming the historical into a realm of necessity, he had made any proper ethic impossible. In his transformation of Christianity he had of course also destroyed the true God-relationship which for Kierkegaard is the basis of the ethical but this we shall consider from the sphere of the religious. First we must turn to these two charges and, before proceeding to the religious, to his criticism of the Kantian rationalist ethic.

That, like Descartes,\(^2\) Hegel had completed his System without the inclusion of an Ethics Kierkegaard regarded as a serious error but he regarded as even more disastrous the fact that he had elaborated an ethic within the framework of his essentially aesthetic-metaphysical philosophy.

"The Hegelian philosophy culminates in the proposition that the outward is the inward and the inward is the outward. With this Hegel virtually finishes. But this principle is essentially an aesthetic-metaphysical one, and in this way the Hegelian philosophy is happily finished, or it is fraudulently finished by lumping everything (including the ethical and the religious) indiscriminately in the aesthetic-metaphysical."\(^3\)

Hegel had made the ethical commensurable with the world-historical, he had, by means of his principle of mediation
(which, for Kierkegaard was the core of Hegelianism), denied the absolute relationship of the existing individual to the absolute telos, he had related the individual to the absolute through the universal rather than to the universal through the absolute. (In this respect compare Kierkegaard's insistence that the individual is related to the age through his primary relationship to God, to Christ, to the race.) He had formulated an unethical ethics.

"The derelict Hegelian ethics, with its desperate attempt to make the State the court of last resort, is a most unethical attempt to reduce the individuals to finitude, an unethical flight from the category of individual personality to the category of the race...."

This Hegelian ethic Kierkegaard expressed by saying that "The ethical is the universal, and as such it is again the divine." And it was against this formulation of ethics, against this mediation of the absolute through the universal, against this positing of the world-historical as the ethical task for the individual, against this impersonally objective rather than a truly personally subjective determination of the ethical that he rebelled. For Kierkegaard the ethical borders upon the religious, upon the truly personal. It is related to faith; it is "his complicity with God." The ethical must be sought for itself; it is the protest against the immorality of the "results" criterion, against those who would become "world-historically significant." The ethical is action; it is freedom. There is nothing between the truly existing individual and God but the ethical. And, Kierkegaard says,
"If our age had not the distinction of simply ignoring the duty of existing, it would be inconceivable that such wisdom as the Hegelian could be regarded as the highest, as maybe it is for aesthetic contemplators, but not either for ethical or for religious existers."¹

But it was with a much more serious charge which Kierkegaard finally confronted Hegel, the charge namely that by his false interpretation of history he had rendered ethics impossible. As we have already noted the basis of this objection² we shall here be primarily concerned to understand its relevance in terms of the ethical. His criticism of that "anti-Christian evolution"³ which had already made its appearance in his own time is founded upon this basis. "What", he said, "will be the consequence for life of a theory which conceives the world as a necessary evolution? Must it not paralyze all activity?"⁴ It was this same ethical emphasis which afforded the basis of his criticism of the Hegelian interpretation of history which he regarded not as a philosophy of history in the meaningful sense of that term but rather as a philosophy of evolution which having attributed necessity to the past had denied freedom to the future and which, having confused God with man and Eternity with time, had quite naturally transformed Christianity (for Kierkegaard the proper juncture of God and man, of Eternity and time)⁵ into a transcended phase in the history of the human race.⁶ For Kierkegaard, as we have already seen, the historical is not,
and cannot be, necessary.

"...nothing comes into being by necessity, because becoming and necessity contradict one another.... still less, therefore, does anything become necessary by coming into being. The one thing that it is impossible to become, is to become necessary, because the necessary is always presupposed as being."¹

When, as in the case of the Hegelian philosophy, the historical is interpreted as necessary, when history is viewed from a point within time, the becoming which belongs to history is set aside and the possibility of ethical activity, of freedom, is denied.

"...everything said in Hegel's philosophy about process and becoming is illusory. That is why the System lacks an Ethic, and is the reason why it has no answer for the living when the question of becoming is raised in earnest, in the interest of action. In spite of all that Hegel says about process, he does not understand history from the point of view of becoming, but with the help of the illusion attaching to pastness understands it from the point of view of a finality that excludes all becoming."²

The Hegelian philosophy had conceived man apart from God, time apart from eternity. It had made history the judge. It had, and this was the charge, it had made ethics impossible.

For Kierkegaard it is the ethical which binds man to God; it is in his ethical activity that man expresses both himself and his God-relationship. The Hegelian philosophy he attacked because it did not permit expression of either the true self or the true God-relationship. And it was for both of these reasons that he also opposed the earlier rationalist ethic as it was given formal expression in the Kantian philosophy and practical expression in the age in which he lived.
Kant had insisted that man must act in accord with the dictates of reason, that he must act from a sense of duty or obligation, that he must act in such a manner that he could consistently will that his standard might be universally applied. This, Kierkegaard believed, was to conceive the ethical apart from God, it was to make God play a subordinate role, it was to understand both God and the ethical as wholly abstract. It could, he thought, lead finally only to "lawlessness or experimentation." The practical consequences of this type of theory he observed in his own age, in the fact that men had ceased to express themselves in their activity and had sought refuge in a principle. For such a perversion of the ethical Kierkegaard's condemnation is unequivocal.

"...a principle is something purely external for the sake of which he does one thing as willingly as another and the opposite of both into the bargain.... A principle, in that sense, becomes a monstrous something or other, an abstraction, just like the public."  

"'On principle' a man can do anything, take part in anything and himself remain inhuman and indeterminate.... one can do anything 'on principle' and avoid all personal responsibility. People pull to pieces 'on principle' what they admire personally...."  

The Kantian ethic was, he thought, together with the Hegelian philosophy, the appropriate expression of an age of anonymity, of objectivity, of impersonality, of irresponsibility, for a day of disobedience, of gregarious noisiness, of empty comraderie, for an age in which reason reigned as had once the law, for a day in which man had chosen his own abolition.

It is from the point of view of the strictly
religious, ultimately from that of the specifically Christian religious, that Kierkegaard makes his final attack upon the Hegelian philosophy. And the charge which he urged was that it had completely transformed Christianity, that it had falsified the true framework of human existence, that it was the ally of natural man in his struggle against God and against his true self. The judgments which he urges are spiritual judgments; they are based upon Christian insights and they employ Biblical categories. They are judgments which assume that man yet prefers the Law to the Gospel, the security of justice to the mercy of love, the comfort of knowledge to the risk of faith, the ease of thought to the demands of existence. They are judgments which assume that man's is a rebellious spirit and that his intellect is in the service of that rebellion. They are judgments which assume that Hegel was popular not because of the greatness of his philosophy but rather because he provided a refuge against the task of becoming a single existing individual,1 because his is the philosophy of inhumanity, of the mass, of 'the public', of 'the crowd'.

The religious, like the ethical, accentuates existence but it is distinguished from the ethical in that the believer, as opposed to the ethicist, is infinitely interested not in his own existence but rather in the existence of another, in the factual existence of the God-man.2 He is infinitely interested in the fact that God became man, that the Eternal came into time. He stakes his life upon this
absolute paradox, upon that which constitutes the break with all thinking, upon that which can be believed only by virtue of the absurd. The absolute paradox cannot be understood, it will not be understood: "...in connection with the absolute paradox the only understanding possible is that it cannot be understood". "...it...thrusts the understanding away in the interests of inwardness in existing." the essential paradox is the protest against immanence." It is God's defence against man, it is Eternity's defence against time, it is Christianity's defence against speculation. It is the final defence of existence against the deceit of the understanding.

The absolute paradox Kierkegaard regarded as the characteristic expression of Christianity, the Hegelian abrogation of this paradox as the decisive expression for its complete transformation. This transformation was given parallel expression in the Hegelian insistence that faith is prior to immediacy, that it can properly be replaced by the understanding. For Kierkegaard such a transformation was treason almost without equal. Hegelianism had related the paradox to the relative difference between man and man rather than to the absolute qualitative difference between God and man and in thereby destroying the absolute nature of the paradox it had hopelessly confused the separate existence spheres. It had transformed Christianity into a doctrine, it had transferred it to the sphere of the intellectual, it had set the wise man against the simple. Against this Kierkegaard holds that the
absolute paradox cannot be understood, that Christianity does not belong to the sphere of the intellectual, that faith, in the proper sense of that term, can never be replaced by the understanding. Faith properly belongs to the sphere of the paradoxical religious; it is, together with the paradox, the mark of man's existence in time, it is the means by which he is properly related to God. It is "not a class for numskulls" nor does it even belong within the realm of the intellectual. Indeed, "the maximum of attainment within the sphere of the intellectual... is in the sphere of faith at the opposite end of the scale." What is demanded in the sphere of the intellectual, in relation to a doctrine, is to understand but what is demanded in the sphere of faith, in relation to an existence-communication is to exist. Christianity belongs to the latter of these spheres and "every misunderstanding of Christianity may at once be recognised by its transforming it into a doctrine, transferring it to the sphere of the intellectual." This was of course precisely the charge which he laid against the Hegelians and he did not fail to add that they had transferred Christianity to this sphere that they might gain the advantage of seeming to understand it. And that, Kierkegaard says, is "merely an evasion of the task."6

It had been with the assistance of the principle of mediation that this transformation of Christianity had been accomplished and the result thereby achieved was fundamentally analogous to the havoc wrought within the sphere of the ethical
by this same principle. Within the ethical mediation had proved to be the rebellion of relative ends against the majesty of the absolute; within the religious it was the expression for the yet more fundamental rebellion of man against God. It is the means whereby the paradox is annulled, whereby faith comes to be but a transcended phase, whereby the existential requirements of Christianity are set aside. And it is, when all of these fortifications have been removed, finally the device with the help of which man imagines himself upon a level with God. This principle was, Kierkegaard believed, the typical expression of Hegelianism and of autonomous philosophy as such, of the age in which he himself lived and of every other age in which under the guise of intellectual doubt, man rebels against God. It is the means whereby man endeavours to "fraternize with God", to make Him commensurable with himself, it is his attempt to deprive God of his authority, it is his insistence that He should be directly cognisable. All this Kierkegaard implied when he wrote: "The idea of philosophy is mediation—Christianity's is the paradox."

To natural man's effeminate self-love, to his sensuous reluctance to be spirit, to his innate desire for security and certitude Kierkegaard attributed the age's concern to achieve a "legal security", to maintain God's existence by objective proofs, to act 'on principle', to be "instead of a self, a number, just one man more, one more repition of this everlasting Einerlei". So also it was to
this that he attributed their complacent satisfaction with the objective view of man, their willing acceptance of the abstract conception of truth. It was, he believed, this cowardliness which was the basis of the popularity of the objective sciences and Hegelianism. The latter of these Kierkegaard regarded as the shrewd expression of the revolt of natural man, as the formulation or rationalisation of he who in order that he might live in ease and security had chosen a world of death-like stillness, in order that he might be free from choice had chosen a world without choice, in order that he might always live in society had chosen a world without selves, in order that he might be 'man' had chosen a world without God. It was, he thought, the statement of man's impatience with time, of his rebellion against existence, of his abolition of his own true self from the universe. To this philosophy, and to that for which it is the expression, Christianity is unalterably opposed. It relates eternity to time within time, it paradoxically accentuates existence, it repudiates the security of the world of man, it rejects the false safeguards which indolent and superstitious 'man' sets against "the omnipresence of the dialectical". It insists that man is a spirit, that he must become 'the individual' alone before God. It is the mortal enemy of natural man. And it is the framework of true humanity.

Not only does Kierkegaard himself assume that "it is the God-relationship which makes a man a man" but he also
assumes that natural man himself understands this fact and that, understanding this, he has secretly resolved to achieve for and by himself that which God has promised to him in eternity. In this attempt to give the life of man a completely temporal orientation Hegelianism had been uniquely successful. It had succeeded in making over Christianity from what it really was, from the one really serious threat to the security of man's world, into an apparently indubitable guarantee of that security. It had refused the insecurity of history, it had destroyed the necessity for decision, it had substituted knowledge for faith, it had established its own false eternity within time. It had spurned God's affirmation of man and had substituted for it man's affirmation of himself. It had made of Christianity "a superficial something which neither wounds nor heals profoundly enough...." It was, he said, "the false invention of human sympathy which forgets the infinite qualitative difference between God and man."

In Hegel's substitution of knowledge for faith, in his promise of certitude, in his guarantee of security---in the fact that he had made the world over to man's own specifications---Kierkegaard saw the essential revocation of existence. In all this he saw an impatient flight from time to an eternity which far from being the fullness of time was instead the negation of real time. Kierkegaard's judgment upon this artful substitution---and hence his final judgment upon rationalism---follows from his adherence to the Biblical
view of sin as the opposite of faith. This same absolute opposition he posited between knowledge and faith. Knowledge is the secured possession, it is the blessing of eternity: faith is the mark of man's existence in time. Man's desire to live by knowledge, with guarantees, with probability, with certainty—-with security—-was sin: it was his anxiety to be done with time and to escape to eternity. It was impatience. That this receives yet more decisive formulation can be seen from Kierkegaard's own conclusion respecting the nature of that dread which he had earlier described as "the presupposition of original sin". "Dread", he says, "is really nothing but impatience."3

The age's demand for security expressed itself in its reform of the monarchy, in its plea for democracy and its passion for societies, in its concern with self-protective legislation and social guarantees but it was in "Christendom", in its attempt to identify culture with religion, that this demand achieved its fullest expression. It was here that man secretly confessed that he really wanted to abolish God; it was here that he whispered softly in His ear that the human race was, perhaps, after all the inventor of Christianity. "Christendom" is "precisely this deification of the established order which constitutes the constant rebellion, the permanent revolt against God". It is the complete absence of inwardness, it "is the invention of the indolent worldly mind, which would put itself at rest and imagine that all is sheer security
and peace, that now we have reached the highest attainment.\(^1\)

It is the final implication of objectivity in the sphere of the religious, it is that shrewd wisdom, that "empty externalism"\(^2\) the outstanding historical example of which is the conduct of the scribes and Pharisees.\(^3\) It is, in fact, Pharisaism, it is "just contempt for God"\(^4\), it is "the secularisation of everything"\(^5\). It is that "baptised paganism"\(^6\), which, simply because it is baptised, simply because it has judiciously arranged to have 'God' on its side, simply because it has remembered to have recourse to the traditional phrases and usages\(^7\) is, like that attitude for which it is the expression, "the true corruption, making every saving relationship impossible..."\(^8\) "The established order is the rational"\(^9\) and--listen!---the deification of that order is, in the sphere of the religious it is, rationalism. Such an illusion could not easily be overcome: it could certainly never be intellectually overcome. Indeed, looking back upon his task Kierkegaard concluded that it was "intelligence and nothing else that had to be opposed"\(^10\). It could, he had always known, be overcome only through religion\(^11\) and that, for Kierkegaard, finally meant Christianity. It could be overcome only by setting himself against it: 'the crowd' could be overcome only by 'the individual'.\(^12\)
"And every one who has even a little dialectic will perceive that it is impossible to attack the System from a point within the System. But outside of it there is only one point, truly a sper- matic point, the individual, ethically and religiously conceived and existentially accentuated."

Point of View, p. 131n.
Chapter V

RECONSTRUCTION: 'THE INDIVIDUAL'

'The individual' (Enkelte) is the direction in which Kierkegaard's entire life was oriented, it is the subject with which the whole of his writings were finally concerned, it is the point upon which all interpretation must ultimately be based. He did not claim to have achieved this category nor does he anywhere explicitly define its nature but yet it is of absolutely central importance for his life and thought. "With the category of 'the individual' is bound up any ethical importance I may have." The individual; now that the world has gone so far along the road of reflection Christianity stands and falls with that category." It is that [the anticipation of which] is set forth in the pseudonymous works, the final formulation of which in the specifically Christian. It is the concern of the "Two 'Notes' Concerning My Work as an Author" which are appended to The Point of View. It is the way which Kierkegaard symbolically indicated in his relationship with Regine, it is his opposition to 'the crowd'.

It is the central category, the focal point for the whole of his thought.

The progress of the authorship from the aesthetic through the philosophic to the religious has already been described and we may therefore now briefly trace this movement with reference to 'the individual' which is itself essentially a religious category. The preface of the first and each subsequent volume of the *Edifying Discourses* called attention to the fact that they seek "that individual' whom with joy and gratitude I call my reader". In the recurrence of this 'stereotyped formula' Kierkegaard found support for his contention that this category "is not a later invention of mine but my first thought". But it was not upon this alone that he based this insistence. 'The individual', he held, had been present throughout the whole of the authorship.

"In every one of the pseudonymous works this theme of 'the individual' comes to evidence in one way or another; but there the individual is pre-dominantly the pre-eminent individual in the aesthetic sense, the distinguished person, & c. ... The starting-point of the pseudonyms is the difference between man and man with respect to intellect, culture, & c; the starting point of the edifying works is the edifying thought of the universal human."  

This category was in fact present in the pseudonymous works, particularly in the pseudonymous aesthetic works, in the same sense in which the religious was present in these works: it was negatively present. The Postscript in contrast—it was the "turning-point" of the production—was at the same time
essentially related to his formulation of this category. Kierkegaard saw clearly that both 'the individual' and 'the public' to which it was opposed was "a thought in which is contained an entire philosophy of life and of the world"\(^1\). And he saw too that before it was possible even to begin to expound the final religious implications involved in becoming 'the individual'---a task which he did not attempt until the specifically Christian works---it was first of all necessary to bring into sharpest possible focus the opposition between these two thoughts. This was the task which was undertaken in the Postscript and it was this task which Johannes Climacus described as that of discovering "where the misunderstanding lies between speculative philosophy and Christianity"\(^2\).

Kierkegaard's 'the individual' is traditionally accounted for in terms of the indignities which he suffered at the hands of the public following his clash with the Corsair.\(^3\) There can be no doubt that this incident was instrumental in prompting him to give to this category a more specific formulation but as he has himself insisted, and as the Journals\(^4\) testify, this category had already been conceived years prior to this affair. His clash with 'the crowd' is merely the moment at which this thought was brought to birth and in order to fully understand its nature it is necessary to trace back to the moment of its conception, to his relationship to Regine. It is in his renunciation of the woman he loved that, as Buber has rightly insisted,\(^5\) 'the individual'
has its beginning and while we may not rest with his interpretation of that relationship, with his understanding of Regine, it is here too that we must begin.

Buber accounts for Kierkegaard's 'the single one' in terms of his renunciation of Regine and from this identification he concludes that 'the individual' is a category of exclusion,¹ that it is the sign of Kierkegaard's renunciation of the world of human beings,² that it is a "merely religious category"³. This is, I believe, a most feasible misinterpretation and because it is based upon a typical, I should say, natural misunderstanding of Kierkegaard's relationship to Regine a reference to it can scarcely be avoided. For Buber Regine is merely a young girl of seventeen, a girl who is beautiful and in love, a girl for whom there seems scarcely any conceivable end but that of marriage. This is perhaps very close to the Regine of the young Kierkegaard, of the Kierkegaard who is prior even to the writing of Either/Or but it is also very far from the Regine of the mature Kierkegaard, of the Kierkegaard who even after Regine was engaged to another did not cease to hope that she would yet become his 'that individual'. And it is, I believe, in terms of the Regine of this later Kierkegaard that 'the individual' must be understood.

It ought perhaps to be confessed that Regine seems to present the interpreter with even more problems than 'the
individual', that a reference to her seems often to obscure rather than to illuminate this category but it remains nevertheless true that she constitutes the central problem of Kierkegaard's life, that she is related to the early authorship at its end as is 'the individual' at its beginning, that if we are rightly to understand this category we must accept her as a necessary if ambiguous point of departure. Kierkegaard has however provided considerable assistance in *Fear and Trembling* and, perhaps less consciously, in the movement of the authorship from the aesthetic through the ethical to the religious. This movement was, in actual fact, the shadow of the progress of his relationship with Regine and it was this in part which he implied when he said of the authorship that it was the reflection of the education which he had himself received at the hands of Governance. This relationship is also suggested by the many obvious parallels between his account of his activity as an author and his relationship to Regine. It was during the course of the production that Kierkegaard came finally to understand himself in this relationship and it is in the end of this production that we will find the Regine in terms of whom his 'the individual' ought properly to be conceived.

The progress of the authorship is forecast in *Fear and Trembling* in which, under the guise of treating Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, Kierkegaard considered the problem of the justification of the breaking of his own bond
with Regine. The resolution of this work, for it is not too much to call it that, is that ethics are not supreme, that Abraham is not lost; it is that the religious is supreme, that Abraham and, or at least by implication, Kierkegaard himself is justified. For neither however can there any longer be refuge in the ethical, in the universally valid: both have acted by virtue of the absurd, of that which constitutes a break with all thinking and for such there can be no justification other than that of faith. All such actions are away from human standards and judgments, they are away from human thought and philosophy, they are away from immanence and immediacy. They are in the direction of transcendence and spirit. It was a religious justification which Kierkegaard gave to Abraham even as it was a religious interpretation which he gave to his own relationship to Regine.

In the public account of the authorship Kierkegaard insisted that the aesthetic works had been a deceit employed in order to meet the age upon its own terms, that, in reality, he was a religious author from first to last. It was a similar interpretation which he had already given to his relationship to Regine: his courtship, he acknowledged, had itself really been a deceit, he was, he confessed, really a religious lover after all. It was, however, with great care that he employed the word 'deceit' with reference to the authorship and that term must be understood with the same degree of care with respect to Regine. It was, he believed, in both instances a
deceit in the interest of the deceived. And this interpretation of the word is perhaps not less applicable to Regine than to the reader. To us she must appear as she to whom Kierkegaard was ethically false: to Kierkegaard she was the one to whom he was eternally responsible, to whom he was completely faithful.¹ She was the one in respect of whom he dared to set the absolute against the universal, the eternal against the temporal, God against man. She is, when thus understood, the Regine who corresponds to the strictly religious, the specifically Christian end of the authorship and she is, when thus understood, the Regine in terms of whom 'the individual' ought properly to be interpreted.

One more word in this same connection. Regine is the one whom Kierkegaard lost in this world; she is the one about whom the authorship was written. She is also the one whom Kierkegaard wooed for eternity; she is the one to whom the authorship was written. She is the first, the primary "'that individual' whom with joy and gratitude I call my reader"². No more however than his refusal to marry her prevents him from seeking her as 'the individual', no more than it prevents her from becoming 'the individual', does the fact that he seeks her first mean that he does not also seek another. He does in fact seek another and it is through Regine or rather through 'that individual' which is his veiled reference to Regine, that he seeks that other. It was through its concrete concern that the authorship achieved its wider
significance and so too it is through its intimate address that it achieves its universal relevance . . . to individuals.

It was as a result of the affair of the Corsair, of his own collision with 'the crowd' that Kierkegaard came finally to understand the extent of the dissolution of the age, that 'the individual' was brought to birth, that it was raised to the level of a category claiming a universal rather than a merely personal significance. Henceforth 'the individual' takes its emphasis from 'the crowd' rather than from Regine but before it is possible to have reference to this new point of departure it is necessary to see what it is that Kierkegaard means by 'the crowd', to see, for example that he does not and cannot possibly mean what the spiritually proud and the politically aristocratic mean by this term. By 'the crowd' Kierkegaard understands first of all the crowd of his own day and his own city, the mob led by the irresponsible journal of satire, the abstraction into which at the time of its attack his many friends had vanished. But at the same time he understands this crowd as any other crowd, as 'the crowd', as an anonymous, irresponsible, vulgar aggregate of individuals. And it was against this 'crowd', this anonymity, this irresponsibility, this vulgarity that his category, his 'the individual' was set.

"A crowd--", writes Kierkegaard, "in its very concept is the untruth, by reason of the fact that it renders
the individual completely impenitent and irresponsible...."1
It is the untruth because it makes the truth something which
is decided by a ballot, because it constitutes itself the
truth. It is the untruth because it seeks to establish dis-
tinctions within human life2—and on the pretext of affirming
equality. It is the untruth because it alone could crucify
the Truth.3 "By 'truth!', Kierkegaard says, "I always mean
'eternal truth'."4 'The individual' is the truth. 'The
individual' is the truth because he is "akin to deity",5
because his love for the other as 'neighbour' is "the
absolutely true expression for human equality".6 He is the
truth because he has his own hands and can repent of their
deeds, because he is not impersonal and irresponsible. The
task which is set for every man, the one task which is set
for every man is to become such a one, to become 'the individual'.
It is the task which is given to and possible for every man,
for absolutely every man. "....every man, absolutely every
man, inasmuch as he is a man, can be, indeed must be, an
individual."7 "'The individual' is the category through which,
in a religious respect, this age, all history, the human race
as a whole, must pass."8 "From becoming an individual no one,
no one at all, is excluded, except he who excludes himself
by becoming a crowd."9

No more than Kierkegaard's 'the crowd' will satisfy
the spiritually vain (there is always the possibility, indeed,
the hope that its individuals will yet be redeemed) will his
'the individual' satisfy the individualist. Indeed, 'the individual' is the exact antithesis of individualism and that precisely because it is always 'before God', because it affirms the spiritual nature of man, because it conceives all responsibility in terms of that nature. So too this category will be repudiated by the 'practical man', by the politician, by the leader of the crowd. And that quite naturally because "'the individual' is the category of the spirit, of spiritual awakening, a thing as opposite to policy as well could be thought of", because it is the witness to eternity from within time, because it is the true expression for what it is to be a man, because it is the orientation of life in the direction of the altar rather than of the ballot-box.

It was in its opposition to 'the crowd', to that which he regarded as the ultimate implications of Hegelianism that Kierkegaard finally viewed his category. There is perhaps but one other who has half so clearly understood the real meaning of Hegelianism and that, of course, is Marx. And it is through his work, through his deification of 'the crowd', that we stand to-day in the ambiguously fortunate position of being able to understand Hegelianism in those same terms. A very brief comparison with his thought will serve to relate Kierkegaard's 'the individual' and its "entire philosophy" to Hegelianism in the very terms in which he himself understood and finally attacked it.
The question of reality, of what is ultimately real, is of course the question of philosophy and the answer given to that question is the index to the philosophy which gives the answer. For Hegel it is the Idea or the rational which is the real, for Marx it is society or rather the economic structure of society, for Kierkegaard it is the individual. In neither Hegel nor Marx is the individual granted reality; in neither is he given responsibility or freedom. For Hegel the individual is and must remain incomplete and unreal, for Marx he is but the instrument of a vast ongoing process. Kierkegaard's judgment is that the Idea of Hegel and the society of Marx is an abstraction, that they do not exist as such, that they are a fabrication. For him it is the individual and the individual alone which really exists, which has reality in the sense of existence.

The nature of the dialectic presented in each of these philosophies itself reflects that reality of which it purports to be the dialectic. The Hegelian dialectic is one of thought, of the universal reason going its undeflectable way through history.¹ The Marxist dialectic is one of society, of the transformation of society through its various economic structures culminating finally in the socialist society.² The dialectic of Kierkegaard is the dialectic of the individual, of the development of the individual from the aesthetic (from light-heartedness), through the ethical (through striving), to
the religious (to maturity). Hegel assumes the independence of thought; Marx assumes that thought is merely the product of the economic structure of society, Kierkegaard holds that it is neither wholly autonomous nor merely rationalisation. "In existence thought is by no means higher than imagination and feeling, but coordinate."¹ "The task is not to exalt the one at the expense of the other, but to give them an equal status, to unify them in simultaneity; the medium in which they are unified is existence."² It has taken Marx to show what Hegelianism really means, to show that Kierkegaard was unmistakably correct when he termed Hegelianism the System, when he understood that it could be overcome only by 'the individual'. By the same token it has taken Kierkegaard to show that Marx merely turned Hegel "upside down", that he did not fundamentally break with him, that his materialism is not essentially different from Hegel's idealism, that 'the crowd' is still 'the crowd' when it is called the proletariat.

The moment is another of Kierkegaard's conceptions the importance of which ranks with that of 'the individual'. The moment³ is that alone which bestows real significance upon both time and eternity; it is the proper juncture of time and eternity; it is that in which history begins. It was due to the lack of this conception or, more primarily, due to the lack of spirit to which this conception is related that the Greeks were not able to do justice to either time or eternity.⁴ The moment is a Christian conception. It looks to the Moment,
to the God-man, to the appearance of the Eternal within time and through this appearance it sees in each moment the possibility of the transformation of a moment of time into one of eternity. It is "the finite reflection of eternity in time, its first effort as it were to bring time to a stop." It is "the fullness of time," "the concept around which everything turns in Christianity, the concept which makes all things new..." It is the defense which guards the concepts of Christianity from "heretical and treasonable admixtures." It is heaven's gift to the believer. The moment is when the right man is there. And in an age of reflection that "right man" is 'the individual'.

Kierkegaard was anxiously concerned for the authenticity of his category. Socrates and Christ he regarded as its standard and he was seriously disturbed lest it should seem that he had forced this category higher than they. His remark that Socrates "had no responsibility for his contemporaries but only towards the truth and towards himself," still more his confession that "even a deeper man may have moments when it seems as if Christianity were hostile to man" must be understood as at least in part questions directed toward himself with respect to his own 'the individual'. Buber holds that this category "is no longer of Socrates...it is of Christ." Leaving aside this antithesis for the moment---it is with respect to this category no proper antithesis---let us ask only whether or not it is true that "his category is no longer
Socratic. The most obvious contrast between Socrates and Kierkegaard is, of course, that with respect to marriage. This is directly related to 'the individual' and, if properly understood, will serve both to indicate the real significance of Kierkegaard's relationship to Regine and also to suggest the nature of the union of the Socratic and the Christian within his 'the individual'.

The essential contrast between Socrates and Kierkegaard with respect to marriage is not however the very obvious one that the former was married while the latter remained unmarried but it is rather what it is that each of these understands by marriage. For Kierkegaard marriage means responsibility for the other as spirit, it means encounter with God, it means complete self-revelation, it means absolute faith. For him marriage is conditioned by the establishment of essential communication and this in turn is conditioned by the presence of the Truth, of God as the middle term. Against such a scale poor Socrates fares rather badly. He lived in paganism where there was neither the Truth nor the possibility of essential communication founded upon the Truth. This he himself expressed in his profession of ignorance and in the fact that he had by this ignorance, "essentially nullified communication with all". And it was in virtue of this ignorance and this expression that he was once again in the truth...within paganism where there is not the Truth. It
would seem then that in the light of Kierkegaard's criterion Socrates had married almost thoughtlessly, that either he had not permitted his ignorance to interfere with his marriage or that he had completely lacked any conception of marriage which would have suggested that essential communication was its prerequisite. And that Kierkegaard was correct in holding that paganism had no true conception of marriage, that Socrates' was a merely biological union was decisively expressed in the fact that when in Plato the Greek mind first thought seriously about marriage it decided upon its dissolution.

In Socrates Kierkegaard saw an anticipation of Christianity; in Christianity he saw the fulfillment of Socrates. In the authorship his Greek master was made not only to indicate the direction in which Christianity must be interpreted but also the point along that road beyond which Christianity must pass if it is to be more than a mere baptized paganism and so too in the authorship the faith of Christianity is represented as both the fulfillment and the overcoming of the Socratic ignorance. This was again the reflection of the interpretation which he had placed upon his renunciation of Regine. This renunciation he viewed as the final implication of the Socratic ignorance and it is against this Socratic dissolution of personal relationships that his "Had I had faith I should have remained with Regine," must be understood. That faith was the basis upon which to
establish personal relationships, that it was the means whereby at once to overcome and to fulfill the bankruptcy of immanent paganism Kierkegaard did not understand soon enough to save Regine that she might be his wife but this he shortly came to understand and it was then that he attempted to save her—and through her all those who would come from out of 'the crowd'—for eternity. The authorship is itself a work of faith, of faith that there would be one who would be there, who would himself have faith and that through that faith essential communication could be re-established. 'The individual' which that authorship presents is a 'the individual' which is at once Socratic and Christian, which accepts the radical Socratic dissolution of the basis of personal relationships, which accepts this dissolution yet more radically than Socrates, and which nevertheless attempts through faith to overcome that dissolution.

'The individual' is a category born of its time. It was begotten of a refusal of marriage in an age in which there were no marriages, it was born as a witness to eternity in an age which no longer believed in eternity, it was a protest against 'policy' in an age which believed only in 'policy'.

'The individual' is the category of he who would introduce Christianity once again into Christendom, of he who would remove every trace of objectivity, of secularisation, of worldliness from the Church, of he who would tear that Church from the hands of men and give it back once again into the
hand of God. It is the attempt to found the Church again within the Church. 'The individual' is the category for the rehabilitation of man and, through that rehabilitation, for the reconstruction of society. It is a religious category but it is not a "merely religious category"; 'the individual' is "the transfigured rendering of that which the politician has thought of in his happiest moment...." It is first of all a category of refusal because it belongs to the age of Christendom, to an age of dissolution, because it understands that in such an age a difficult 'No' is the prerequisite of a meaningful 'Yes', because it recognises the distinction between love and sentiment, because it understands the place of silence in all speaking. It is the category by which it is hoped to win back marriage... by not marrying, to re-instate the ethical... by refusing it. 'The individual' speaks against an age which will not understand it, against an age which establishes its ethical standards upon the basis of statistical averages, against an age in which the problem of marriage, of real marriage, is and continues to be one of its most fundamental problems. 'The individual' speaks against our age. 'The individual' cannot be understood without reference to Kierkegaard's life but neither can it be understood merely with reference to that life. This is, I believe, part at least of what he himself implied when he said that his life had expressed this end "with tolerable precision".
'That Individual' was to mark his grave,¹ that he was not himself 'the individual' but that he would be such for his poet, "when he comes".² 'The individual' must be understood with reference to his life but it must not be understood merely with reference to that life. It must be understood with reference to my---to your---life.

'The individual' is Kierkegaard's offensive against rationalism.
# NOTES TO TEXT

## CHAPTER I

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<td>Swenson: <em>Something About Kierkegaard</em>, pp. 44-5. (Hereinafter referred to as Swenson)</td>
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<td>2 1</td>
<td>&quot;In fact the whole course of Kierkegaard's life, and the whole force of his teaching, is directed towards 'becoming a Single One'...&quot; Ronald Gregor Smith in translator's notes to Buber: <em>Between Man and Man</em>, p. 207, n. 9.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>See Rikard Magnusson: <em>S.K. set udefra (S. K. Seen from Outside)</em> and <em>Det Saerlige Kors (The Special Cross)</em>. For a discussion of this problem see Haecker: <em>Kierkegaard The Cripple (Der Buckel Kierkegaard's)</em>, translated by C. Van O'Bruyn.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Kierkegaard: <em>The Journals</em>, translated by Alexander Dru, 733. (Hereinafter referred to as Journals)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Cf. Kierkegaard: <em>The Point of View</em>, translated by Walter Lowrie, p. 3, quoted p. 28. (Hereinafter referred to as Point of View)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;The science which has to do with the explanation (that is, the fall) is psychology, which, however, can only explain up to the explanation, and above all must guard against seeming to explain what no science explains, and which only ethics explains further by presupposing it through what it owes to dogmatics.&quot; <em>The Concept of Dread</em>, p. 35. Cf. also pp. 43, 45, 97 et passim. (Hereinafter referred to as Concept)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Swenson, p. 35.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td><em>Postscript</em>, p. 217.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Swenson, pp. 135-58.</td>
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Cf. "If a man like Kant who stands at the pinnacle of scientific culture were to say regarding the proofs for God's existence, 'Well, I know nothing more about it except that my father told me it was so,' this would be humourous, and he would be saying more than a whole book on the proofs, in case such a book forgets this item." Postscript, p. 491.

Postscript, p. 252, cf also p. 245n.


Cf. "Without authority to call attention to religion, to Christianity, is the category for my whole activity as an author, integrally regarded." Point of View, p. 155.

Kierkegaard: Philosophical Fragments, Interlude, pp. 59-73. (Hereinafter referred to as Fragments)

To Anderson's complaints that genius could only develop in the warmth of admiration Kierkegaard was constitutionally deaf, he replied "that the spirit of man was not an egg." See Introduction to Journals, p. xxx.

Cf. Kierkegaard's own conception of his task. See Point of View, p. 155, quoted above.

"Anyone who wishes to deal with Søren Kierkegaard's life must take care not to burn his fingers—it is so full of contradictions—so difficult to get to the bottom of that character—......" Journals, Appendix I, p. 562.

Dru: Introduction to Haecker: Kierkegaard the Cripple, p. vi.

i.e. Haecker's last work on Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard The Cripple.

Cf. "But when, on the other hand, a tumultuous scientist seeks to invade the sphere of the existential, and there proceeds to confuse the ethical...." Postscript, p. 136.

I mean, of course, those of Thomism which although in Haecker's writings have been given an existential flavour, continue nevertheless to be the terms of Thomism.

"What a pity science cannot resolve to keep people under discipline and to keep itself in check! When someone asks a stupid question, we should take heed not to answer him, for if we do we are as stupid as the questioner." Concept, p. 45. Haecker apparently does not agree. Cf. "...for a question must be answered as it is put." Haecker: Søren Kierkegaard, translated by Alexander Dru, p. 25 (Hereinafter referred to as Haecker).

Swenson: Introduction to Fragments, p. xxix.
Point of View, p. 83. Cf. also "The whole thing is therefore an occurrence, a mere occurrence. There is no place here for that which corresponds with responsibility, namely, the free co-operation in his own death, which is properly self-sacrifice for the truth." Kierkegaard: The Present Age, translated by Dru and Lowrie, p. 105. (Hereinafter referred to as Age)


"A certain foreboding seems to go before everything which is to happen; but just as it can act as a deterrent so too it can act as a temptation, awakening in man the thought that he is,..." Journals, 101.

"The sight of the sinful may save one individual and hurl down another. A jest may have the same effect as seriousness and vice versa....To this there are no limits." Concept, p. 67.

"When this is given (i.e. such a pain and such a close reserve), it depends upon the personal characteristics of the individual whether this lone-some inward torment finds its expression and satisfaction in hating men and cursing God, or in the very reverse." Point of View, p. 79.

Cf. "...events, which in the case of most men would have been allowed to pass off without leaving a ripple on the surface of their lives, produced in him storms that stirred his soul to the depths...." Swenson, p. 46. Cf. also: "The whole of the later Kierkegaard is to be found in embryo in the two long Gilleleie entries. They come in marked contrast to the impersonal and objective letter to Wilhelm Lund. In Gilleleie Kierkegaard touches for the first time that fusion of thought and feeling which was afterwards to be the hall-mark of his writing; it also shows the first rejection of the purely intellectual solutions, and in it may be seen the first formulation of the existential philosophy which his life and work was to express: 'What is truth but to live for an idea?" Dru: Introduction to the Journals, p. xxiv. See also: Wahl, p. 49n, p. 51n. With respect to Kierkegaard's early formulation of his category of the 'individual' commonly ascribed to his collision with the mob (1846) Cf. Journals 515, also 116, Postscript, p. 126, Swenson, p. 21.

Postscript, p. 132n.

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<td>19</td>
<td>2 See Journals, 465, 194.</td>
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<td>3 Friedmann, Rudolf: Kierkegaard, The Analysis of the Psychological Personality.</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>1 Ibid, p. 9.</td>
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<td>2 Cf. p. 103, n. 1.</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>1 Cf. Journals, 1238.</td>
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<td>2 Friedmann: Kierkegaard, p. 28. Cf. also p. 42n.</td>
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<td>4 Age, p. 21.</td>
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<td>5 Ibid.</td>
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<td>6 Ibid, p. 23.</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>1 For after all the Greeks lacking Christianity and the spirits definition of the self really did not understand cruelty.</td>
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<td>2 &quot;In Greece, for example, the form of resentment was ostracism, a self-defensive effort, as it were, on the part of the masses to preserve their equilibrium in face of the outstanding qualities of the eminent.&quot; Age, p. 25.</td>
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<td>3 Cf. &quot;Under the guise of objectivity people have wished to sacrifice individualism completely.&quot; Journals, 631. Cf. also Journals, 1054, Postscript, pp. 33, 173, 175, 535, et passim.</td>
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<td>4 Friedmann; Kierkegaard, p. 50. Also quoted Haecker p. 57.</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>1 &quot;The man who told Aristides that he had voted for his exile 'because he could not endure hearing Aristides called the only just man' did not deny Aristides' eminence, but admitted something about himself. He admitted that his relation to distinction was the unhappy love of envy, instead of the happy love of admiration, but he did not try to belittle that distinction.&quot; Age, p. 25-26. Cf. also: &quot;Such works are mirrors: when a monkey peers into them, no Apostle can be seen looking out.&quot; Lichtenberg. Kierkegaard: Stages On Life's Way, translated by Walter Lowrie, p. 26; &quot;Admiration is happy self-surrender; envy is unhappy self-assertion.&quot; Kierkegaard: The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Walter Lowrie, p. 139; &quot;...and hence all this talk of my pride and arrogance, a condemnation of me which really amounts only to self-denunciation.&quot; Point of View, p. 126.</td>
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<td>2 &quot;He (the present writer) can easily foresee his fate, in an age when passion has been obliterated in favour of learning, in an age when an author who wants to have readers must take care to write in such a way that the book can easily be perused during the afternoon nap....&quot; Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling, translated by Walter Lowrie, Preface, pp. 6-7.</td>
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<td>3 See p. 22, n. 4 above.</td>
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|      | 4 Kierkegaard: Attack Upon "Christendom", translated by Walter Lowrie, p. 284. (Hereinafter referred to
24 1 Journals, 16.
2 Ibid, 204.
3 Ibid, 1051. Cf. ibid, 1054.

25 1 Concept, p. 70.
2 Postscript, p. 140.
3 Concept, p. 36.
4 Journals, 617.
5 Ibid, 1136.

26 1 Kierkegaard: The Sickness Unto Death, p. 73. (Hereinafter referred to as Sickness)
2 Cf. "Dread is the possibility of freedom. Only this dread is by the aid of faith absolutely educative, laying bare as it does all finite aims and discovering all their deceptions." Concept, p. 139.
3 Cf. "When people's attention is no longer turned inwards, when they are no longer satisfied with their own inner religious lives but turn to others and to things outside themselves, where the relation is intellectual...." Age, p. 49; cf. also, Postscript, pp. 290, 223.

27 1 Postscript, p. 550+2.
2 Point of View, p. 9.
3 Age, p. 51.
4 Cf. Postscript, pp. 161f, 204.
5 Point of View, p. 155, quoted p. 11, n. 1.
6 "'The Single One' corresponds to God..." Buber: Between Man and Man, p. 48. (Hereinafter referred to as Buber) Cf. also "But to God as the decisive factor corresponds the individual." Point of View, p. 136.

28 1 Point of View, p. 8.
2 Postscript, p. 131.
3 Journals, 1051.
4 Cf. "But becoming a Christian really is the most difficult of all human tasks, since although it is the same for all men it is nevertheless proportioned to the capacity of each individual." Postscript, p. 337. Cf. also, Concept, p. 95n.

29 1 Journals, 1056.
2 Cf. Attack, passim.
4 Point of View, pp. 146-7.
5 Ibid, pp. 55-21 et passim.

30 1 Ibid, p. 12.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, p. 73.
5 See Journals, 712.
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Note 6

Point of View, p. 149.

31

Ibid, p. 75.

Ibid, pp. 41-42.


Ibid, pp. 41-42. Cf. "My pseudonymity or polymony has not had a casual ground in my person ......... but it has an essential ground in the character of the production." Postscript, p. 550-1. Cf. also Lowrie: Kierkegaard, p. 286.


Postscript, p. 550+1.


Point of View, p. 126.

Postscript, p. 245n.

Ibid, p. 252.

Dru: Introduction to Journals, p. xliii.


See Lowrie: A Short Life of Kierkegaard, p. 154. (Hereinafter referred to as Lowrie).

Journals, 1238.


Journals, 1238.

Patrick, p. 251n.

See Postscript, p. 245n. quoted p. 33, also Ibid p. 252, quoted pp. 33-34.

Cf. "..... but the individual has a multiplicity of shadows, all of which resemble him and for the moment have an equal claim to be accounted himself." Kierkegaard: Repetition, translated by Walter Lowrie, p. 43. Cf. also "So does the possibility of the individual stray at random amongst its own possibilities, discovering now one and now another." Ibid, p. 44. Cf. also Age, p. 51, quoted p. 27.

Journals, 1000, quoted p. 52.

Cf. "As an author I am a genius of a rather singular kind--neither more nor less, absolutely without authority and continually assigned the task of destroying himself so as not to be an authority for anyone." Journals, 800. Cf. also Ibid 432, Postscript, pp. 226, 235, and Age, p. 63.

See Journals, 589.

See Age, p. 49, quoted p. 26, n3.

See Postscript, pp. 216-17, quoted p. 41.

Swenson, p. 17.

See Postscript, pp. 67-74.
"...the category of "indirect communication,"... is the logical outcome of the method of double reflection, and the consistent consequence of the thorough-going anti-intellectualism which Kierkegaard represents." Swenson, p. 140. Cf. also ibid, pp. 139-42, Postscript pp. 320-22, also ibid, p. 137, quoted p. 41.

Cf. also ibid, pp. 139-42, Postscript pp. 320-22, also ibid, p. 137, quoted p. 41.

Point of View, p. 13.

See Swenson, p. 238.

Cf. Point of View, pp. 22-27, 149n, et passim.

Postscript, p. 69.

See Swenson, p. 130.

Point of View, p. 13.

Cf. Postscript, p. 261, where Climacus suggests that the matter of marriage for the aestheticist is much more difficult than Judge Wilhelm has made it appear."

See also Thomte: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion, p. 37. (Hereinafter referred to as Thomte)

See the title page of the Postscript and the Fragments, also Point of View, p. 13.

See Point of View, p. 13.

Cf. Journals, 413.

Postscript, p. 216.

Ibid, p. 236.


Ibid, p. 137.

Journals, 733. Cf. also Haecker, pp. 14ff.

See Point of View, p. 132.

See ibid pp. 109-122.


See Lowrie, pp. 205ff.

Journals, 809. See also Postscript, p. 505.

Journals, 946.

Ibid.

Cf. "...his pseudonyms were for the most part personifications of aspects, or at least of possibilities, which he discovered in his own nature." Lowrie, p. 154. "His introversion for a long time inhibited him from using what he called 'direct communication', and so, making a virtue of necessity, he practised and extolled 'indirect communication', using the pseudonyms as instruments to this end." Ibid, p. 155. Cf. also Editor's Introduction to the Postscript, p.xvi.

See Lowrie, pp. 155f.


Ibid.


46 1 Journals, 809.
2 Journals, 939.
3 See Geismar's arrangement of Kierkegaard's writings cited Wahl p. 53n. See esp. 54, n. 3.
4 Lowrie, p. 217.

47 1 Journals, 1000.
2 See Ibid, 1232.
3 Ibid, 962.
4 Cf. "The Socratic ignorance is an analogue to the category of the absurd." Postscript, p. 183. "The Socratic inwardness in existing is an analogue to faith; only the inwardness of faith, corresponding as it does, not to the repulsion of the Socratic ignorance, but to the repulsion exerted by the absurd, is infinitely more profound." Ibid, p. 184. Cf. also Journals, 446.

48 1 Point of View, p. 119.

49 1 Swenson: Introduction to Fragments, p. xxvii.
2 See Journals, 1051.
3 See Postscript, pp. 226, 236.
4 See Age, p. 51, also Hirsch, p. 171, cited Wahl p. 51.
5 Postscript, p. 550+1.
7 Swenson: Introduction to Fragments, p. xxvii.
8 Age, p. 50-51.
10 Postscript, pp. 550+2-550+3.
11 Journals, 936.
12 See Repitition, p. 43, quoted p. 36, n. 1.
13 Journals, 1000.
14 Age, p. 51.

53 1 Ibid, 936.
2 Age, p. 51.

54 1 Cf. "Dialectically it is easy to see that Johannes Climacus's defence of Christianity is the most extreme that can be made and only a hair's breadth away from an attack." Journals, 994.
2 Swenson: Introduction to Fragments, p. xxvii.
4 "Dans ce dernier passage, Hirsch maintient que si les idées de Johannes de Silentio et de Johannes Climacus ne peuvent être attribuées à Kierkegaard, celles de Vigilus Haufniensis et d'Anti-Climacus sont bien les siennes. Il fait remarquer également que Johannes Climacus, c'est le Kierkegaard de 1837 vu par le Kierkegaard de 1844 (p. 749)! Wahl, p. 54, n. 1.
Or rather, "...the individual (regularly begins afresh, because) he is himself and the race,..."


Ibid.

Ibid.

Sickness, p. 198 n.


Ibid.

See "He (Adam) is not essentially different from the race, for in that case there is no race: he is not the race, for in that case there is no race: he is himself and the race,... Therefore what explains Adam explains the race, and vice versa." Ibid, p. 27.

See above.

Cf. "It is easy to see that the first sin signifies something different from a sin (i.e. a sin like several others), something different from one sin (i.e. No. 1 in relation to No. 2). The first sin is a determinant of quality, the first sin is the sin. This is the secret of 'the first', and the scandal of it for abstract intelligence, which thinks that once is nothing much, but that many times is something,..." Concept, p. 27. Cf. also ibid, p. 35.

"What happened in the beginning of days constantly repeats itself in every generation and in the individual, so that the fruit of knowledge is pleasant to look at." Kierkegaard: Edifying Discourses, translated by David F. Swenson and Mrs. Lillian Swenson, Vol. 1, p. 29.

Sickness, p. 200.

Age, p. 127.

The Danish equivalent of 'original sin' is Arvesynd. Literally this means 'inherited sin' and thus itself expresses the solidarity of the race in sin. Cf. Journals, p. 40, n. 1.

Cf. "According to the teaching of Christianity man is not to be merged into God by way of a sort of pantheistic disappearance, or by the obliteration of all his individual traits in the divine ocean, but through a heightened consciousness. 'Man shall give an account of every idle word he has spoken,' and although grace washes away sin, the union with God proceeds through personality, transfigured by that whole process." Journals, 220.

"...the rationalistic view that the sensual itself is sinful." Concept, p. 53. Cf. also, Ibid, p. 61, and Niebuhr: The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1, pp. 31-34.

Cf. "If a child were told that it was a sin to break its leg, what terror it would live in, and
Page Note

59 2 (cont'd) probably break it often....

"And sometimes people are led astray as to what
sin is, and the cause is perhaps some well-meaning
person, for example a man who has been very dis-
solute, in order to frighten his son from anything
of the same kind, might explain that sensual desire
was in itself a sinful...." Journals, 539.

3 Cf. "....no, the opposite of sin is faith, as is
affirmed in Rom. 14:23, 'whosoever is not of faith
is sin'. And for the whole of Christianity it is
one of the most decisive definitions that the opposite
of sin is not virtue but faith." Sickness, p. 132.

60 1 See P. 103, n. 1.
2 See p. 106.
3 Point of View, p. 73.
4 Journals, 645.
5 Ibid, 266. Cf. also Point of View, p. 73.
6 Point of View, p. 74.
7 Ibid, p. 75.

61 1 Cf. Point of View, pp. 132, 117.
2 Journals, 1003.
3 See Journals, 383.
4 Cf. Journals, 367, 428, 456, 748, 772, 1281, 1337,
and Chapter V, p. 173-7. Cf. also Ibid, 383, 444, 754,
905.

also, pp. 139-42.

63 1 Cf. Postscript, pp. 317f.
2 Cf. Journals, 1260, (1852), 1294, (1853). Cf. also,
Point of View, p. 79.

65 1 Cf. Journals, 1051.

66 1 Concept, p. 42.

67 1 See p. 53.
2 Journals, 1000, quoted p. 52.
3 Cf. "The whole of the pseudonymous production, and
my life in relation to it, was in a Greek mode:
"Now I must find the characteristic Christian
form of life." Journals, 612.
4 Cf. "The relation of this (i.e. Kierkegaard's)
dialectic to its objects and truths is quite differ-
ent from the Hegelian. It preserves and it does not
destroy. Once Hegel knows a thing or an object it
is really finished with, it exists no more, so to
speak, it vanishes in the dialectical process. Not
so with Kierkegaard." Haecker, p. 35.

5 See Concept, pp. 41f.
6 See Postscript, p. 131n.
7 Cf. "And now what about Christianity, how has it
been dealt with? I entirely agree with your
(cont'd) disapproval of the way in which every Christian concept has been so sublimated, so completely volatilised into a sea of fog that it is impossible to recognise it again." Journals, 88. Cf. also, Point of View, p. 160, Postscript, passim.

8 Cf. "...the 'in-and-for-itself', the absolute, has not only gone out of life, but has become something ridiculous in the eyes of men, a comic exaggeration, something quixotic which one would laugh at were one to come across it, though one never does see it because it has gone out of life." Journals, 1256.


10 Cf. "The whole of Europe is working towards its own demoralisation--but in Copenhagen conditions are so small that my observations and calculations are able to get complete control over them." Journals, 680.

1 Cf. Lowrie, pp. 63-66.

2 See "He repents himself back into the family, back into the race, until he finds himself in God." quoted Lowrie, p. 122.

3 Point of View, p. 103. I have quoted Swenson's translation from his Introduction to Fragments, p.xxx.

CHAPTER II

1 See Journals, 413.

2 Ibid.

3 Cf. Postscript, p. 315.

1 See Journals, 426. See also Postscript, pp. 34n., 275, 292, 297ff., 315. Cf. also p. 123ff.


3 "...German idealism where, with the exception of Kant, reason and being are more unqualifiedly equated than in Platonism." Niebuhr: The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, p. 20. Cf. also Gilson: God and Philosophy, p. 97.

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<td>83</td>
<td>1. For an acutely critical and subtly humorous account of this conversation see Postscript, pp. 91-95.</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>1. Baillie: <em>Our Knowledge of God</em>, pp. 158f. Cf. &quot;It is acting &quot;on principle&quot; which does away with the vital distinction which constitutes decency.&quot; A.A.S., p. 55, and &quot;Submission to the law is the beginning of all impiety.&quot; Chestov: <em>In Job's Balances</em>, p. 308.</td>
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<td>1. Ibid, pp. 60f.</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>2. Cf. &quot;The proofs of God ought to be taken in a general sense as expressing the elevation of the human spirit to God through the medium of thought.&quot; Hegel: <em>Philosophy of Religion III</em>, 164; I, 80, quoted Frank: <em>Philosophical Understanding of Religious Truth</em>, p. 46.</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>1. The reference has been lost.</td>
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<td>2. Buber; p. 146.</td>
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<td>103</td>
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<td>110</td>
<td>2. Ibid, p. 110.</td>
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An interesting analogy is afforded in the following remark: "Thus I always reason from existence, not toward existence, whether I move in the sphere of palpable sensible fact or in the realm of thought. I do not for example prove that a stone exists, but that some existing thing is a stone. The procedure in a court of justice does not prove that a criminal exists, but that the accused, whose existence is given, is a criminal. Whether we call existence an accessorium or the eternal Arius, it is never subject to demonstration." Fragments, pp. 31-32.

Cf. Journals, 16.

"...a number of its (i.e. Christianity's) illegitimate children (the rationalists) have...". Journals, 31. Cf. also "Les suites d'une telle union, du christianisme et de la philosophie, on les voit dans le rationalisme,..." Journals, I A 98, quoted Wahl, p. 586. See also Journals, 16.


Cf. Repitition, p. 149.

Cf. Concept, p. 131 where, in explanation of his reluctance to define his concept of 'seriousness' he says: "...when it is a question of existential concepts it always is a sign of surer tact to abstain from definitions, because one does not like to construe in the form of a definition which so easily makes something else and something different out of a thought which essentially must be understood in a different fashion and which one has understood differently and has loved in an entirely different way."

Cf. Ibid, p. 131 where, in the same connection, he says: "It is so serious a matter that even to give a definition of it is frivolous. I do not say this, however, because my thought is vague.... To my mind, what I say here proves better than any exposition of concepts that I know seriously what the question is about."

Cf. "...the fortunate thing...is that he (Trendelburg) has perceived that it will not do merely to tinker with Hegel's thought-structure..." Postscript, p. 100.


Cf. Training, p. 83. Sickness, passim. The importance of this vital distinction is set forth in the following. "The former (i.e. doubt or tivl) is the
(cont'd) despair of the intellect and hence belongs to the realm of logic and necessity. The latter (i.e. despair or fortvivlense) is despair of the personality." Thomte, pp. 36-37. Cf. also Kierkegaard: Either/Or, Vol. II, translated by Walter Lowrie, pp. 176, 181.


See Journals, 16.

See Ibid, 22.

Swenson, p. 111.


Cf. Journals. And I have lost the reference!

See Ibid, 53.

"Modern philosophy has tried anything and everything in the effort to help the individual to transcend himself objectively, which is a wholly impossible feat; existence exercises its restraining influence, and if philosophers nowadays had not become mere scribblers in the service of a fantastic thinking and its preoccupation, they would long ago have perceived that suicide was the only tolerable practical interpretation of its striving." Postscript, p. 176. Cf. ibid, p. 273.

Ibid, p. 274.

Cf. the declarations of both Johannes de Silentio, Fear and Trembling, p. 6, and Johannes Climacus, Fragments, p. 1, and Postscript, p. 548, to this effect.

Postscript, p. 248.

This is, I think, a criticism which must be made against Wahl's work as a whole, perhaps particularly against his consideration of the relationship between Kierkegaard and Hegel. See Wahl, pp. 86-158. Cf. "With all his learning, Wahl obscures this central concern which dominates every page that Kierkegaard ever wrote." Patrick, p. 299.

Cf. Journals (Haecker, p. 128 and pp. 86 and 127) quoted Wahl, p. 646.

Cf. Postscript, pp. 281f.

Cf. Journals, 497, 1027.

Postscript, p. 278.

See Point of View, pp. 15-21.

Postscript, passim.

Cf. Swenson, pp. 245f.

Cf. Journals, 413.

Cf. "The influence of the rationalistic period upon Kierkegaard was entirely negative; he repudiated even the attempt of the Church to counter rationalism by means of defensive apologetics, stating that faith needs no defense unless its love has grown cold." Patrick, p. 39.
"Rationalism, on the other hand, seems to cut rather a sorry figure. It receives its essential colouring through Christianity, and yet tries to stand on another footing.... The trouble is that it bases itself upon the Scriptures when they are in agreement with it, but otherwise not...." Journals, 16, quoted from Swenson, p. 10.

Cf. "From 1800 onwards, there was a general repudiation of rationalism throughout the Danish Church." Patrick, p. 34.

Cf. "But it was not rationalism but the speculative philosophy, associated with Hegel in Germany and Martensen in Denmark, which Kierkegaard regarded as the greatest enemy of Christianity." Thomtè, p. 11.

Cf. "...Kierkegaard also, saturated as he was with Hegelianism...", de Ruggiero: Existentialism, translated by E. M. Cocks, p. 27, also "...he had been intoxicated by Hegel." Croxall: Kierkegaard Studies, p. 63, and "His native dialectical powers were disciplined by a serious study of Hegel, and though emancipating himself from the tyranny of Hegel's dominant influence, he acquired through his aid the mastery of a precise and finished terminology." Swenson, p. 136. Cf. also Haecker, pp. 28f.


Cf. Ibid, 1050.

In his thesis for the university, On the Concept of Irony with Particular Reference to Socrates, 1841, Cf. Postscript, pp. 83n, 449. Cf. also "To go even further back, Socratic ignorance appears to Kierkegaard as a first sketchy attempt at the Christian paradox, on the occasions when, like Nietzsche, he ceases to look upon Socrates as the father of Rationalism." Mounier: Existentialist Philosophies, translated by Eric Blow, p. 27.

Cf. Chapter V.

See Postscript, pp. 309-12.

For this expression, and for an elaboration of the entire paragraph cf. 55-68.

Journals, 1249.

Journals, 1050.

"The time-honoured antithesis between Realism and Idealism, between Empiricism and Rationalism... all seem somewhat lame and in need of revision when they are confronted with Kierkegaard's vital thought." Swanson, p. 35.


"Le premier mouvement de Kierkegaard au moment où il constitue sa philosophie est un mouvement de refus, de négation vis-à-vis du romantisme et du rationalisme." Wahl, pp. 112-13.

Mackintosh: Types of Modern Theology, p. 108, see p. 95.


"If Hegel had written the whole of his logic and then said, in the preface, that it was merely an experiment in thought in which he had begged the question in many places, then he would certainly have been the greatest thinker who had ever lived. As it is he is merely comic." Journals, 497. Cf. Wahl, p. 95.

"En même temps, il se rendait compte que le hégélianisme, s'il eût été vrai, aurait constitué l'achèvement de l'idéal de la connaissance. En l'attaquant, c'est la spéculation philosophique dans son ensemble qu'il a voulu attaquer." Wahl, p. 132n.

The Hegelian philosophy culminates in the proposition that the outward is the inward and the inward is the outward. With this Hegel virtually finishes. But this principle is essentially an aesthetic-metaphysical one, and in this way the Hegelian philosophy is happily finished, or it is fraudulently finished by lumping everything (including the ethical and the religious) indiscriminately in the aesthetic-metaphysical." Postscript, p. 263n. See also, ibid, pp. 113-142, 262-5.

"E. Hirsch voit (p. 294) dans le Post-Scriptum un retour de Kierkegaard vers des préoccupations de jeunesse, son triomphe sur le romantisme s'étant affirmé plus tard et plus difficilement que son triomphe sur le hégélianisme. On ne peut accepter sans réserves ces affirmations." Wahl, p. 112n.

Cf. note above.

See Point of View, pp. 22-27.

118 5 Ibid, p. 25.
6 Ibid, p. 22.
7 Ibid, p. 13.
8 See ibid, pp. 13f., 41f.
10 Ibid, p. 149.

119 1 Training, p. 247.
2 Ibid, p. 249.
3 Cf. "Kierkegaard's problems are always Christian problems, and though they may be examined interestingly or fruitfully from other standpoints, the problems are essentially altered unless Kierkegaard's assumptions are ultimately recognised." Dru: Introduction to Haecker: Kierkegaard The Cripple, p. x.

120 1 Postscript, p. 200.
2 Journals, 31.
3 "Wahl does not, however, stress the point which alone concerned Kierkegaard, namely, that it is irrelevant that....." Patrick, p. 21.
5 Journals, 1339.

121 1 Postscript, p. 352.
3 Journals, 1036.
4 Ibid, 1288.
6 See Age, p. 16.
7 See Postscript, pp. 115-141.
8 Age, pp. 58f.
9 "All the shrewdness of 'man' seeks one thing: to be able to live without responsibility." Attack, p. 290. Cf. also Ibid, p. 265, Point of View, pp. 44, 114.
10 See Journals, 582.
11 See Journals, 88.
12 "In the same way people are quite prepared to leave the Christian terminology untouched, but are surreptitiously aware that it involves no decisive thought. And so they remain unrepentant, for after all they have destroyed nothing." Age, p. 21.

122 1 Age, p. 60.
2 Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling, p. 6.
3 Age, p. 61.
4 See Postscript, p. 520.
5 Ibid, p. 311.
6 Ibid, p. 408.
7 Kierkegaard: For Self Examination and Judge For Yourself, translated by Walter Lowrie, p. 119.
8 Attack, p. 185, quoted p. 123.
**Page Note**

122 9 See *Journals*, 1335, quoted p. 169.
    10 Ibid, 1118.
    11 See *Postscript*, p. 339.
    13 Training, passim.
    15 See *Training*, p. 139, See also p. 166f.
    16 See *Age*, p. 16. *Postscript*, passim.
    17 *Journals*, 986.
    18 *Training*, p. 118.
    19 *Journals*, 1256.
    20 Ibid, 1249.

123 1 *Attack*, p. 165.
    2 No. 6, August 23, 1855.
    3 *Attack*, passim.
    4 See *Journals*, 426.
    5 *Postscript*, p. 32n.
    6 *Postscript*, p. 275.
    7 *Journals*, 619.
    8 *Age*, p. 31.

124 1 Ibid, p. 28.
    2 Ibid, p. 31.
    3 Ibid, p. 16.
    4 *Postscript*, p. 506.
    5 *Journals*, 426.
    6 See *Postscript*, pp. 108, 110, 272n.
    7 See *Concept*, p. 125.
    9 "...when faith thus begins to lose its passion, when
    faith begins to cease to be faith, then a proof be-
    comes necessary so as to command respect from the
    side of unbelief." *Postscript*, p. 31.
    11 *Postscript*, p. 485. Cf. the remark of Anti-Climacus
    to this same effect. "And fear and trembling
    signifies that a God exists...." *Training*, p. 89.

125 1 The Danish 'Forstand'/'Forstanden' is translated in
    the 'Fragments as 'Reason', in the *Postscript as
    'understanding'. Swenson, pp. 218-223, and Editor's
    Introduction to *Postscript*, p. x. In the *Journals
    it is rendered as 'reason'.

126 1 *Journals*, 1256.
    3 *Attack*, p. 238.
    4 *Point of View*, p. 110.
    5 Cf. "'Reason'...is not to be taken in any abstract
    intellectual sense, but quite concretely, as the
    reflectively organised common sense of mankind, in-
    cluding as its essential core a sense of life's
    values. Over against the 'Paradox' it is therefore
    the self-assurance and self-assertiveness of man's
(cont'd) nature in its totality. To identify it with any abstract intellectual function, like the function of scientific cognition, or of general ideas or of the a priori, or of self-consistency in thinking, etc., is wholly to misunderstand the exposition of the Fragments." *Fragments*, pp. 99-100.

1. Swenson, p. 238.
3. "The soulish-bodily synthesis in every man is planned with a view to being spirit..." *Sickness*, p. 67.
4. "No despair is entirely without defiance; in fact, defiance is implied in the very expression 'not to will to be'." *Ibid*, p. 78.
5. Cf. "If I really have powers of reflection and am in a situation in which I have to act decisively—what then? My powers of reflection will show me exactly as many possibilities pro as contra....

"The absurd, or to act by virtue of the absurd, is to act upon faith, trusting in God. It is perfectly simple. I must act, but reflection has closed the road....

"There is nothing more impossible, or more self-contradictory than to act (decisively, infinitely) by virtue of reflection. If anyone asserts that they have done so that only gives themselves away...."

*Journals*, 871. Cf. also: "Faith is....not merely an intellectual observation but something which can be carried out." *Journals*, 446. Cf. *Training*, pp. 98, 185.

6. "It has constantly been maintained that reflection inevitably destroys Christianity and is its natural enemy. I hope, now, that with God's help it will be shown that a godfearing reflection can once again tie the knot at which a superficial reflection has been tugging for so long." *Journals*, 813.

7. See *Postscript*, p. 504.
9. See above.
10. See *Attack*, pp. 150, 222. Cf. also "Notre raison, dit Hamann, est précisément ce que Paul appelle la loi, et le commandement de la raison est saint, juste et bon, mais la raison nous est-elle donnée pour nous rendre sage? Aussi peu que la loi des Juifs était faite pour les rendre justes; mais pour nous faire comprendre combien notre raison est déraisonnable, et nous montrer que nos fautes doivent grandir par elle, comme les pechés ont augmenté par la loi.*


128 1. See *Postscript*, pp. 500f.
"Kierkegaard frequently used the term 'paradox' for divine truth, and as a system, that has more sense than the concept and term 'absurd', although it would be far from great Christian theologians to call Christian theology as a whole a paradoxical theology. For both God and man, the word 'absurd' can have only one meaning: it denotes irrationality; neither more nor less than irrationality itself. 'Absurd' is one of the few words which, in philosophical parlance, is particularly easy and unequivocal of definition. It denotes, as I have said already, the abrogation of the principle of contradiction, the denial of the principle of identity." Haecker: Kierkegaard The Cripple, p. 22. Cf. also ibid, pp. 14, 19, also Haecker, p. 61.

"The way into the Kingdom lies through the simple crucifixion of intelligence. Reason is stunned--rendered unconscious, as it were--by the logical enormities thrust upon it by the Gospel." Mackintosh: Types of Modern Theology, p. 247. Cf. also, Ibid, pp. 233, 246.

"Kierkegaard was thoroughly modern in his disparagement of intellect in favour of emotion. Not the dry light of reason is what matters, but the warm heart." Allen: Kierkegaard, p. 151. Cf. also, Ibid, pp. 69ff, 186f.

"Fear and Trembling, p. 66. Cf. "Mais si par la toute opposition entre Dieu et le monde est supprimée, on voit que l'opposition n'était qu'une opposition logique, et que l'opposition qui appartient aux intuitions religieuses-morales (pêché, etc...) n'est pas touchée. Ce qui s'explique par le fait qu'on n'est pas encore arrivé a elle." Journals, II C 57, quoted Wahl, p. 596. Also "...the fact that the truth becomes a paradox is rooted precisely in its having a relationship to an existing subject." Postscript, p. 176. Cf. also "The absurd is not irrationality; it is due to the discontinuity which exists between God and man." Thomte, p. 94.
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2 (cont'd) and man with respect to the fact that one
man has a little more brains than another. But the
absolute difference between God and man consists
precisely in this, that man is a particular existing
being (which is just as much true of the most gifted
human being as it is of the most stupid), whose
essential task cannot be to think sub specie aeterni,
since as long as he exists he is, though eternal,
essentially an existing individual, whose essential
task is to concentrate upon inwardness in existing,
while God is infinite and eternal."  Postscript,
individual gives up his understanding for faith and
believes against the understanding, he should not
think meanly of the understanding, nor suddenly
arrogate to himself a glittering distinction within
the total compass of the understanding; for after
all a higher understanding is also an understanding."  

Postscript, 633.


"Quelque christianisme n'ai pas dépassé le principe
de contradiction, cela montre son caractère


Postscript, p. 512.

Postscript, pp. 500f, 531.


"It is now high time to explain that the real reason
why man is offended at Christianity is because it is
too high, because its goal is not man's goal, because
it would make of a man something so extraordinary
that he is unable to get it into his head."  Sickness,
p. 134. Cf. also "Hence Christianity begins also in
another way, by declaring that there must be a
revelation from God in order to instruct man as to
what sin is, that sin does not consist in the fact
that man has not understood what is right, but in the
fact that he will not understand it, and in the fact
that he will not do it."  Ibid, p. 153.

See Attack, pp. 185f.

Cf. "It (i.e. the positive form of offence) declares
that Christianity is a falsehood and a lie, it denies
(denies that He existed or said He was what he said
He was) either docetically or rationalistically, so
that Christ either becomes a particular man, but only
apparently, or He becomes only a particular man, so
that He either becomes, docetically, poetry and
mythology which make no claim to reality, or rational-
istically, a reality which makes no claim to be divine.
In this denial of Christ as the paradox there is
naturally implied the denial of everything Christian;
sin, the forgiveness of sins, etc."  Sickness, pp.215f.
CHAPTER IV

131 1 Postscript, p. 216.
2 Ibid, p. 205.
3 Ibid, p. 311.

132 1 Ibid.
3 Cf. "God cannot be the object for man because God is the subject...." Journals, 620. Cf. also Ibid, 1376.

133 1 Ibid.
2 Ibid, p. 183.
3 Ibid, p. 186.
6 Cf. Thomte, pp. 71ff.

2 Ibid, p. 186.
6 Ibid, p. 201.
8 Ibid, p. 183.

2 Cf. Ibid, pp. 185f.
3 "But in spite of this triple division the book is nevertheless an either-or. The ethical and the religious stages have in fact an essential relationship to one another." Ibid, p. 261.

136 1 Postscript, p. 506.
2 Ibid, pp. 505-6.
3 Ibid, p. 509.
4 Ibid, p. 496. See also Thomte, p. 87.
5 Postscript, p. 508.
7 Ibid, p. 517.
8 Ibid, pp. 507f.

137 1 "This is the consequence of the Deity's presence in time, which prevents the individual from relating himself backwards to the eternal, since now he comes forwards into being in order to become eternal by relationship to the Deity in time." Ibid, p. 517.
Ibid, p. 496.
Ibid, p. 263 n.
Ibid, p. 506.

"Offence has essentially to do with the composite term God and man, or with the God-Man. Speculation naturally had the notion that it 'comprehended' God-Man---this one can easily comprehend, for speculation in speculating about the God-Man leaves out temporal existence, contemporaneousness, and reality." Training, p. 83.

Postscript, p. 506.

Ibid, p. 263 n.
Ibid, p. 506.

"Offence has essentially to do with the composite term God and man, or with the God-Man. Speculation naturally had the notion that it 'comprehended' God-Man---this one can easily comprehend, for speculation in speculating about the God-Man leaves out temporal existence, contemporaneousness, and reality." Training, p. 83.

Postscript, p. 506.

Postscript, p. 339.
Journals, 142.

Ibid, p. 258.
Journals, 30. (1835).
Ibid, 32. (1835).
Ibid, 752. (1848).
Ibid, 821. (1848).
See Attack, p. 226.
Ibid, p. 222.

"We men have dared to get Christianity almost egoistically into our power, we do not realise (what Anselm and the ancients realised) that Christianity is God's invention and, in a good sense, in God's interest." Journals, 1200. Cf. also Ibid, 1406.

Training, p. 182, where it is quoted from Schiller's 'Resignation'. It was also a pronounced feature of Hegel's doctrine, cf. Postscript, p. 126.

Journals, 88.

Journals, 479.
See Postscript, pp. 194-206.
Journals, 712.
Attack, p. 238.
Journals, 1266.
Ibid.

Editor's Introduction to Postscript, p. xv.
Journals, 617.
Ibid, 619.
5 Cf. Age, p. 139 n. 2, where Dru says, "S. K. does not mean the natural sciences. The word used is the same as the German Wissenschaft, which means science as a method. Occasionally I have used learning."

1 Journals, 619.
2 Ibid, 617.
3 Postscript, p. 314.
4 See Age, p. 59.
5 See Postscript, p. 33.
7 See Journals, 1054.
8 See Postscript, p. 536.
9 Journals, 1054.
10 See Postscript, pp. 173ff.
11 Sickness, p. 47.

1 See Dru: Introduction to Journals, pp. liii-liv.
2 "It is not impossible that within the sphere of pure thought many, many objections may be urged against the Hegelian philosophy; but this would leave everything essentially unaltered." Postscript, pp. 274-5. Cf. also Notes to Postscript, p. 556.

1 See Postscript, pp. 199f., 101; Concept, pp. 11-12, 32ff.; Sickness, p. 158.
2 Postscript, p. 112.
3 Ibid, p. 120.
4 Ibid, p. 112.
6 Ibid, p. 275.
7 Ibid, p. 112.
10 Journals, 497.
11 Ibid, 1052.
12 Ibid, 610.

Cf. "The tragic and the comic are the same, in so far as both are based on contradiction, but the tragic is the suffering contradiction, the comical the painless contradiction." Postscript, p. 459. Cf. also pp. 462f. Cf. too, "may it not be the case that the appearance of these fabulous pure thinkers is a sign that some misfortune threatens humanity, as for instance the loss of the ethical and the religious?" Ibid, p. 272.

"Not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject is an existing individual, and that existence is a process of becoming, and that therefore the notion of the truth as identity of thought and being is a chimera of abstraction, in its truth only an expectation of the creature; not because
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7 (cont'd) the truth is not such an identity, but because the knower is an existing individual for whom the truth cannot be such an identity as long as he lives in time. "Postscript, p. 176.

8 "All essential knowledge relates to existence, or only such knowledge as has an essential relationship to existence is essential knowledge. All knowledge which does not inwardly relate itself to existence, in the reflection of inwardness, is, essentially viewed, accidental knowledge; all essential knowledge is essentially related to existence. Only ethical and ethic-religious knowledge has an essential relationship to the existence of the knower." Ibid, pp. 176-7.

10 Cf. Ibid, p. 201.
11 Ibid, p. 112.
15 Ibid, pp. 270f., 293, 310 et passim.
17 See Ibid, pp. 177f., 357, 368, 375f. et passim.
18 Ibid, p. 278.
19 Ibid.

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1 See Concept, p. 9.
2 See Ibid.
3 "'Reality' cannot be conceived. This has already been shown by Johannes Climacus quite simply and correctly. To conceive reality is to reduce it to possibility—but in that case it is impossible to conceive it, because to conceive it is to reduce it to possibility, and consequently not to hold fast to it as reality. Compared with reality to conceive is a step backwards and not progress. Not as though 'reality' were not conceivable; not at all, no, the concept which results from reducing it to possibility by conceiving it is also in reality, but there is something more—that it is reality. To go from possibility to reality is a progress (except in relation to evil), to go from reality to possibility is a step backwards.

"But the unhappy confusion is due to the fact that in the modern world 'reality' has been included in logic and thus in distraction it is forgotten that 'reality' in logic is only a 'reality which is thought' i.e. possibility." Journals, 1054.

4 Concept, p. 10.
5 "Kierkegaard applied Schelling's philosophy of reality specifically to human reality, calling it existence." Beck, p. 294.
6 Postscript, p. 279.

1, 2 Ibid.

3 Cf. Beck, p. 287.

1 See Journals, 1027.

2 Ibid, 1027.

1 Ibid.

1 Ibid, p. 294.


4 Cf. Postscript, pp. 192, 226.

5 Ibid, p. 294.


8 Cf. "Common to Schelling and Kierkegaard is, that reason and understanding, though completely in their own in the sphere of ideas or essences (potentialities of thought), have, no access whatsoever to reality, that is to the esse existentiae as such." Beck, p. 294.

9 Postscript, p. 100.

10 See Fragments, 'Interlude', pp. 59-73.

11 Swenson, p. 150.

12 Postscript, p. 270. Cf. also Ibid, p. 299, Concept, p. 73.

13 Concept, p. 12.

1 Respecting the relationship of the particular and the universal Cf. "The general is only by the fact that it is thought or can be thought (not only in imaginary experiments--for what all cannot a man think!) and is as that which can be thought. The point in the particular is its negative, its repellent relationship to the general; but as soon as this is thought away, individuality is annulled, and as soon as it is thought it is transformed in such a way that either one does not think it but only imagines one is thinking it, or does think it and only imagines that it is included in the process of thought," Concept, p. 70 n. See also Postscript, p. 290, Beck, p. 286, Swenson, pp. 252-3 n.

2 Cf. Swenson, p. 147ff.

3 Journals, 584. Cf. "...if pure thought would accept the responsibility of explaining its own relation to the ethical, and to the ethically existing individual. But this it never does, nor does it even pretend; for in that case it would have to make terms with an entirely different dialectic, namely the Greek or existential dialectic." Postscript, p. 274.
(cont'd) Cf. also Sickness, p. 150.

Concept, p. 12 n.
Postscript, p. 292.
Ibid, p. 279.
Ibid, p. 280.
Cf. Swenson, p. 147f.

Cf. Postscript, p. 283. Also Concept, p. 9, where speaking of the inclusion of reality with logic, Kierkegaard says "It is not to the advantage of logic, for if logic has conceived the thought of reality it has taken into its system something it cannot assimilate, it has anticipated what it ought merely to predispose."

Postscript, p. 281.
Cf. Journals, 1027. Also Swenson, p. 150.
See Postscript, p. 298.
Cf. "...demonstration or proof with reference to existence is a misunderstanding. ...to speak of degrees of reality without clearly distinguishing between ideal reality and factual existence, involves a similar misunderstanding." Swenson, pp. 154-5.

Postscript, p. 298.
Cf. Ibid, pp. 243, 290f., 529.

Swenson, pp. 52f.
155 1 Postscript, p. 119.
Ibid, p. 120.

By reality Kierkegaard means "...the ethical synthesis within the individual of the ideal and the actual." Swenson, p. 51.
Cf. Postscript, p. 110.
Concept, p. 150.
Postscript, p. 136.
Ibid, p. 136. Cf. also "Ethics and religion are the only certainties." Journals, 617.
Postscript, p. 173. Cf. Ibid, p. 188.
Concept, p. 123f.
Journals, 1041.
Postscript, p. 75.
Ibid, p. 85.
Ibid, p. 280.
Postscript, p. 263 n.
1 "Mediation is a rebellion of the relative ends against the majesty of the absolute, an attempt to bring the absolute down to the level of everything else, an attack upon the dignity of human life, seeking to make man a mere servant of relative ends." Postscript, p. 375. Cf. also, Journals, 356.

2 "The principle of mediation proposes to make existence easier for the existing individual by leaving out the absolute relationship to the absolute telos." Postscript, p. 377.

1 See Fear and Trembling, p. 105.

2 See pp. 55-68.

3 Postscript, p. 450 n.

4 Fear and Trembling, p. 102.

5 Ibid, pp. 104ff.

6 Postscript, p. 138.

7 Ibid, pp. 121, 124f.

8 Ibid, p. 121.

9 Ibid.


12 Ibid, p. 264 n.


15 By thus positing that there is no change in God in regard to us we are led back to an entirely Kantian standpoint: we ought to better ourselves because our reason tells us to do so, and God ends by playing a very subordinate role." Journals, 7.

16 "Everything must attach itself so as to be a part of some movement; men are determined to lose themselves in the totality of things, in world-history, fascinated and deceived by a magic witchery, no one wants to be an individual human being. Hence
perhaps the many attempts to continue clinging to Hegel, even by men who have reached an insight into the questionable character of his philosophy. It is a fear that if they were to become particular existing human beings, they would vanish tracelessly, so that not even the daily press would be able to discover them, still less critical journals, to say nothing at all of speculative philosophers immersed in world-history.

Postscript, p. 317.


Age, p. 144. Cf. p. 150.

See Fear and Trembling, p. 104; Journals, 78.

"The immediate relationship to God is paganism, and only after the breach has taken place can there be any question of a true God-relationship. But this breach is precisely the first act of inwardness in the direction of determining the truth as inwardness." Postscript, p. 218. "Faith therefore cannot be any sort of provisional function. He who from the vantage point of a higher knowledge would know his faith as a factor resolved in a higher idea has eo ipso ceased to believe." Ibid, p. 540.

 Cf. Ibid, pp. 203f.


Ibid.

Ibid, p. 332 n.


Ibid, p. 332 n.

Cf. Journals, 630; Point of View, pp. 135ff.

Postscript, p. 407.


Age, pp. 146-160.

Cf. Postscript, p. 531.

Journals, 356.

See Training, p. 119.

"...he is too sensuous to have the courage to venture to be spirit or to endure it. ............

........ The soulish-bodily synthesis in every man is planned with a view to being spirit, such is the building; but the man prefers to dwell in the cellar, that is, in the determinants of sensuousness." Sickness, p. 67.

Postscript, p. 68 n.

Cf. Concept, p. 125.

See pp.

Sickness, p. 50.

Postscript, p. 35 n.


See Wahl, p. 153 n.

Training, p. 139.

Ibid.

Cf. "(just as all immanent speculation is essentially a revocation of existence, which is indeed what eternity is, but the speculative philosopher does not happen to be in eternity)" Postscript, p. 408.

Cf. Sickness, p. 132.

Concept, pp. 23-7.

Journals, 1039.

See Ibid, 88, 563; Age p. 61.

"...this culture and civilisation has at the same time produced a development of rational understanding which is in the process of identifying being a Christian with culture, and with intelligence desirous of a conceptual understanding of Christianity." Journals, 1288. Cf. also Postscript, p. 536.

See Point of View, p. 135.

Training, p. 89.

Ibid.

Ibid, p. 87.

Ibid, pp. 87ff.

Ibid, p. 93.

Ibid, p. 92.

Postscript, p. 329.

Attack, p. 207.

Postscript, pp. 209f.

Training, p. 91.

Journals, 1335.

"First of all the individual has to break loose from the bonds of his own reflection, but even then he is not free. Instead he finds himself in the vast prison formed by the reflection of those around him, for because of his relation to his own reflection he also has a certain relation to the reflection around him. He can only escape from this second imprisonment through the inwardness of religion, no matter how clearly he may perceive the falseness of this relationship." Age, p. 22.

See Point of View, p. 162.
"It is a pity that in the English translations of Kierkegaard no effort seems to have been made by the translators to avoid the use of the word 'individual', which is highly misleading. For every man is individuum, but not everyone is an Einzelner or Enkelte. In fact, the whole course of Kierkegaard's life, and the whole force of his teaching, is directed towards "becoming a Single One", and this is not a natural or biological category but, as Kierkegaard reiterates, is the spirit's category, and a rare thing." Ronald Gregor Smith in translator's notes to Buber: Between Man and Man, p. 207.

Cf. ibid, p. 21.

Postscript, p. 216.

See Swenson, pp. 21, 48, 96-100.

Journals, 515. See also his letter to his brother Peter quoted Journals, pp. 115ff.

Cf. 'His 'single one' cannot be understood without his solitariness, which differed in kind from the solitariness of one of the earlier Christian thinkers, such as Augustine or Pascal, whose name one would link with his. It is not irrelevant that beside Augustine stood a mother and beside Pascal a sister, who maintained the organic connexion with the world as only a woman as the envoy of elemental life can; whereas the central event of Kierkegaard's life and the core of the crystallization of his thought was the renunciation of Regina Olsen as representing woman and the world. Nor may this solitariness be compared with that of a monk or a hermit: for him the renunciation stands essentially only at the beginning, and even if it must be ever anew achieved and practised, it is not that which is the life theme, the basic problem, and the stuff out of which all teaching is woven. But for Kierkegaard this is just what renunciation is." Buber, p. 40. Cf. also p. 58.

Cf. Ibid, pp. 50ff.


Fear and Trembling, pp. 152, 172-5.
I am so pleased to have heard Schelling's second lecture—indescribably. I have sighed for long enough and my thoughts have sighed with me; when he mentioned the word 'reality' in connection with the relation of philosophy to reality the fruit of my thought leapt for joy within me as in Elizabeth. I remember almost every word he said from that moment on. Here perhaps is the dawning of truth. That one word reminded me of all my philosophic sufferings and pains—and so that she too may join in my happiness, how willingly would I not return to her; how willingly would I persuade myself that such was the right course. Oh, if only I could. Now I have put all my hopes in Schelling, ---but if I thought I could still make her happy I should leave this evening." (italics mine) Journals, 392.


I should like here to make reference to the fact that Swenson speaks of Kierkegaard's "individualism". This may perhaps be justified on the ground of Kierkegaard's protest respecting the futility of new concepts, perhaps on the ground of his prophecy of the advent of a new form of social life. In any event "individualism" in the sense in which Swenson employs this term is not inappropriate but at the same time it must be insisted that nothing is more remote from Kierkegaard's 'the individual' than individualism. See Swenson, pp. 232f., also pp. 28-32.

Cf. Point of View, p. 115.


Cf. Journals, 638, 1000, et passim.

Cf. Point of View, p. 21.

Cf. Buber, p. 139.

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<td></td>
<td>2 Ibid, p. 311.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3 For a discussion of the distinction between 'instant' and 'moment' see Swenson, pp. 209f. I have employed the latter term throughout the paragraph.</td>
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<td>182</td>
<td>1 Fragments passim.</td>
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<td>2 Concept, p. 79.</td>
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<td>6 Attack, p. 281.</td>
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<td>7 &quot;The Instant is when the man is there, the right man, the man of the Instant. ....... &quot;But when the right man comes, yea, then the Instant is there. For the Instant is precisely that which does not lie in the circumstances, it is the new thing, the woof of eternity---but that same second it masters the circumstances to such a degree that (adroitly calculated to fool worldly shrewdness and mediocrity) it looks as if the Instant proceeded from the circumstances.&quot; Ibid, pp. 280-81.</td>
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<td>8 See Point of View, pp. 139f.</td>
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<td>9 Age, p. 114.</td>
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<td>10 Training, p. 119.</td>
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<td>11 &quot;Kierkegaard's 'alone' is no longer of Socrates; it is of Abraham---Genesis 12. I and 22. 2, alike demand in the same 'Go before thee' the power to free oneself of all bonds, the bonds to the world of fathers and to the world of sons; and it is of Christ.&quot; Buber, p. 43.</td>
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<td>183</td>
<td>1 Ibid, p. 42.</td>
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<td>2 See Journals, 367, 383, 444, 754, 905, 1281.</td>
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<td>3 This he himself expressed in his profession of ignorance and in the fact that he had by this ignorance, &quot;essentially nullified communication with all&quot;. Postscript, p. 502.</td>
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<td>184</td>
<td>1 Cf. Postscript, pp. 183ff.</td>
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