

*Playing the Social Game: The Role of Prestige and Dominance Motives in
Predicting Individuals' Approaches to Obtaining Social Rank*

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Abstract

A recent synthesis (Suessenbach et al., in prep) proposes that the pursuit of social rank is driven by three distinct motives; dominance, prestige, and leadership. This paper considers whether the prestige and dominance motives reliably predict individuals' preferences for different rank-enhancing opportunities (*goals*) and means to pursue them (*method*). Investigating this, participants reviewed vignettes describing various goals and provided endorsement ratings for methods by which these could be achieved. Goals and methods were classified as prestige- or dominance-type, in line with previous behavioural research. Participants also complete scales for each motive (leadership included to account for collinearity). Results indicated that the relationship between dominance motive and endorsement rating is moderated by method type, with higher motive predicting higher endorsement of dominance-type methods. Unexpectedly, the relationship between prestige motive and endorsement rating was found to be moderated by goal type, but with higher prestige motive predicting higher endorsement of dominance-type goals. These findings indicate that the functions of the prestige and dominance motives, not simply orienting individuals towards related but distinct types of goal or behaviour. We propose that the prestige and dominance motives are functionally distinct, driving concern for long-term strategic social control and immediate tactical control respectively.

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Introduction

“Power is not a means; it is an end. [...] The object of power is power.”

- George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, 1949

Although often cited for his gaffes and iconic malapropisms, George W. Bush is also recognised for his successes in personal politics, first entering the White House at the head of a team of seasoned political allies (Greenstein, 2009a). Contrasting with this style, Barack Obama achieved significant recognition as both a charismatic orator and an accomplished community organiser, maintaining his steady composure whilst managing crises (Greenstein, 2009b; Genovese, Belt, & Lammers, 2015). Most recently, Donald Trump entered the political arena as a relative outsider and found electoral success in part due to his forceful, grandiose, and informal style that set him apart from other candidates (Ahmadian, Azarshahi, & Paulhus, 2017). That these men each achieved the highest position in US society despite vast differences in their approaches to social interaction, at the podium and in person, demonstrates a fundamental truth about social hierarchies; there is more than one way to reach the top. With multiple, seemingly equally valid, means of attaining social rank, this paper considers how individuals may come to choose a specific approach.

This issue is not confined to politics; hierarchical structures are pervasive throughout the social domain. It has been proposed that this ubiquity is a result of the fundamental role such structures serve in limiting the scope for conflict within groups, providing non-physical mechanisms for intragroup competition (Cheng and Tracy, 2014), and motivating prosociality by aligning the self-interest of ambitious individuals with those of the collective (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro & Chatman, 2006). Importantly, however, these beneficial effects are strongly moderated by the relative rank of the individual, with higher rank providing increased social security and preferential resource-access, in turn supporting higher levels of health and wellbeing (von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2011; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, Ickovics, 2000). Furthermore, this effect replicates across those non-human primate species which display similarly stable hierarchies that are maintained by non-physical competition, with more dominant individuals enjoying lower levels of stress and experiencing fewer stress-related morbidities (Sapolsky, 2005).

As these stable, communicatively maintained hierarchies benefit individuals who attain greater rank without critically undermining the group, it has been proposed that they constitute sufficient evolutionary pressure to promote the development of specific rank-enhancing cognitive mechanisms (Buss, 1991; Bischof, 2008). Indeed, evidence has been presented for the existence of a specific power

motive; a predisposition towards attaining influence and control over others (McClelland, 1975). However, whilst this motive may partially explain differences in individuals' ambitions for social rank, this singular motive conflates the various means by which rank may be achieved. Recognising the diversity in potential rank-enhancing processes, Suessenbach, Loughnan, Schönbrodt, and Moore (in prep) propose that there are instead three distinct motives that differentially drive individuals in the pursuit of social power. Drawing on this new framework, this paper considers whether Sueesenbach et al.'s distinct motives predict individuals' preferences for correspondingly distinct rank-enhancing strategies.

Pathways to the Top: Hierarchical differentiation

Hierarchies, defined as the social rankings conferred on individuals with respect to one or more socially-valued dimensions, are ubiquitous and yet there is significant variation across models intended to describe how they are established and maintained. In modelling this process of *hierarchical differentiation*, two particular frameworks have risen to prominence from contrasting theoretical perspectives; the “dominance/prestige” model arising from the evolutionary psychological literature (Henrich & Gil-White; 2001, Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) and the “power/status” model founded in the organisational psychology literature (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Blader & Chen, 2012).

The former framework, proposed by Henrich & Gil-White (2001), suggests that hierarchies are best modelled by two bases; **dominance**, the securing of others' deference by antagonistic or coercive means, and **prestige**, the voluntary deference an individual receives in recognition of their competence or virtue. In this evolutionary framework, prestige is considered to be a significantly more recent development in human psychology, emerging as an adaptation to the growing quality and quantity of information made available through the development of complex social learning abilities. Alternatively, Magee & Galinsky's (2008) model, developed from an organisational perspective, proposes that hierarchical differentiation occurs for the distinct bases of **power** and **status**. In this model, power is defined as the ability to influence others via asymmetric access to resources that may be used to reward or punish and status is defined as the rank-promoting respect afforded to an individual who demonstrates skill, virtue, or some other socially-valued dimension.

Although arising from different traditions, Suessenbach et al. (in prep) stress that these two models are not contradictory. Firstly, both models adopt the same basic structure, with hierarchical differentiation modelled as the product of distinct conflict-based (dominance/power) and competence-based (prestige/status) processes. Secondly, both models propose that the conflict-based process is founded on the individual's ability to impose their will upon others whereas the competence-based process is founded upon the voluntary deference afforded by other group members to a respected

individual (c.f. Cheng et al., 2013). Additionally, the two models are alike in their implementation of the competence-related base. Specifically, both models recognise that the respect an individual is granted based upon skill or virtue, whether labelled as status or prestige, is highly domain-specific and the deference commanded within one domain does not necessarily illicit similar deference across other domains (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

Where the models differ, however, is in the definitions and implementations of their respective conflict-related bases (Cheng et al., 2013). Where Magee and Galinsky's (2008) power base is predicated on the ability to both punish and reward, Henrich and Gil-White's (2001) dominance base is predicated *only* on the ability to punish or to threaten punishment. From this relatively minor difference, the models diverge significantly in interpreting how prosocial behaviours may be used to promote social rank. In the power/status framework, prosocial behaviours may express and improve one's standing by displaying power (as rewarding others demonstrates one's control over resources) or by displaying status (as acting selflessly is considered virtuous in many cultures; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Cheng & Tracy, 2014). Contrasting with this, the dominance/prestige framework only allows for interpreting prosocial behaviours as promoting rank via the prestige base, using the same consideration of virtue-recognition as the status-based interpretation. As the dominance base specifically relates to rank-enhancement by punishment or coercion only, there is no possible interpretation of prosocial behaviours producing improvements in dominance-based rank (Suessenbach et al., in prep; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).

This fundamental difference in the conflict-related bases also leads the two models to be better suited to describing different types of hierarchies. Specifically, formalised hierarchies such as the management structures of companies typically afford higher-ranked members more explicit control of the organisation's resources and may therefore be described more fully using the power-base. Conversely, informal hierarchies such as those that develop in peer groups rarely have such large resource disparities but are more readily moulded through each interpersonal interaction, whether they be respectful or coercive, and so are better described using the dominance base. Suessenbach et al. (in prep) therefore recommend that the models may be used in conjunction, mitigating each other's limitations.

Despite the various strengths of both models however, neither provides significant insight into how individuals come to select one path over the other or why some pursue their chosen path more effortfully than their peers. Cheng et al. (2013), for example, provide a clear and concise account of the contrasting leadership approaches of the dominant Henry Ford II and the prestigious Warren Buffett, emphasising the substantial influence both men wielded via vastly different means. However, they do not directly address the cognitive and social factors that directed these men along different pathways or how each achieved such considerable tenures in power despite a plethora of skilled individuals, all potential competitors, occupying subordinate positions. Do people simply take the path that is laid

before them by circumstance? Is every social actor seeking an opportunity to overthrow their superiors? Or are there substantive and measurable psychological differences that drive individuals in different directions and to different degrees?

Power Motives and Hierarchies

Addressing such questions, Suessenbach et al. (in prep) suggest that the distinct bases of hierarchical differentiation may be reflected in distinct motives for seeking social rank. In developing their motivational framework, Suessenbach et al. adopted the power motive as a foundation as it is the most thoroughly researched motive that is directly relevant to hierarchical relationships. First described by McClelland (1975), the general power motive is defined as the enduring predisposition of an individual that orients them towards and energises them to attain greater control over or respect amongst their peers (Winter, 1996). Additionally, the power motive may be described as functioning either explicitly - influencing conscious decision-making and goal selection - or implicitly - driving unconscious decisions and affective responses towards social power (McClelland, 1975; Schultheiss, Campbell & McClelland, 1999). Although the implicit power motive has been demonstrated to play a significant role in predicting both antisocial and prosocial behaviours (Magee & Langner, 2008) and facilitating learning in social competition (Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002), this paper is concerned primarily with deliberate decision-making and therefore focusses on the explicit power motive. In reviewing the research on power motives, Suessenbach et al. suggest that the general power motive is too heterogeneously defined when one considers the evidence for fundamentally distinct approaches to attaining social rank. Instead, Suessenbach et al. propose that the power motive may be better expressed as multiple distinct motives, reflecting the possible diversity in rank-enhancing strategies.

Drawing on the wider research on the explicit power motive, Suessenbach et al. (in prep) performed factor analysis on a range of scale items including both novel candidate items and those used in existing motive scales including the Unified Motive Scales (UMS; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) and the Personal Value Questionnaire (PVQ; McClelland, 1991) that related specifically to hierarchies or hierarchical features. They determined that responses to these items were best classified using a three-factor structure. Across further stages of review and refinement, Suessenbach et al. demonstrated the reliability of their three-factor model and went on to define them as the distinct motives of dominance, leadership, and prestige. In describing their dominance motive, Suessenbach et al. explicitly draw on the dominance base of differentiation, defining the motive to be the drive to influence others against their will, by way of manipulation, threat, or coercion. Similarly, the prestige motive is related to the prestige base and, owing to the conceptual overlap, the status base. The prestige motive is therefore defined as the drive to be recognised and respected for one's meritorious traits, abilities, and accomplishments. Having exhausted Henrich and Gil-White's model, there may be temptation to

similarly equate the leadership motive with Magee and Galinsky's power base. Indeed, Suessenbach et al. acknowledge that leadership positions do fulfil the criteria of asymmetric resource control but they stop short of equating the two, as one need not be a leader to achieve such control. Instead, the researchers define the leadership motive to be the distinct drive to be responsible for others, and to influence their will, by directing and leading the social group. Within this definition, Suessenbach et al. propose that, whilst the dominance and prestige motives preserve the differentiation framework that best describe informal hierarchical structures and processes, the leadership motive instead represents a separate layer of abstraction; a concern for more formalised systems of power.

Exploring how these motives function relative to one another, Suessenbach et al. (in prep) demonstrated that they are only moderately correlated with each other, and differentially predict a range of psychometric and behavioural measures. For example, in terms of personality traits (measured using the Big Five Inventory, BFI; Rammstedt & John, 2007), all of the motives correlate positively with extraversion to differing degrees, whereas agreeableness is positively correlated with leadership motive but negatively correlated with dominance motive. Turning to their behavioural correlates, both leadership and prestige motive are predictive of higher self-reported altruism, whilst only dominance motive is predictive of higher consumption of pornography. Having demarcated the three distinct motives, demonstrated their stability, and provided initial evidence of their utility for differentially predicting behavioural outcomes, Suessenbach et al. arrive at their *DoPL* (*D*ominance, *P*restige, *L*eadership) model of rank-enhancing motives.

Dominance, Prestige, and Leadership in Action

It is commonly suggested across both the literature on hierarchical differentiation (e.g. Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) and studies on the correlates of power motives (e.g. Stanton & Edelstein, 2009; Hofer et al., 2010) that status-striving mechanisms likely serve an evolutionary function in enabling competition between group members whilst still preserving group cohesion. The plausibility of this proposal, however, rests solely on whether these cognitive mechanisms can be shown to reliably promote specific behaviours that meet the specific evolutionary challenge (Buss, 1991). As the nexus of these previously separate literatures, the DoPL model is the most specific and nuanced candidate that may yet fulfil this this criterion. Regardless of whether of the evolutionary status of the DoPL framework, its usefulness as a set of measures rests largely on its ability to predict behavioural and functional outcomes. Herein, this paper considers how Suessenbach et al.'s (in prep) distinct DoPL motives relate to and predict divergent rank-enhancing behaviours.

As earlier noted, Suessenbach et al. (in prep) report several behavioural correlates of the DoPL motives. Of potential relevance to hierarchical processes, self-reported verbal aggression is predicted

most strongly by the dominance motive with only weak predictive effects contributed by the leadership and prestige motives. Contrasting with this, self-reported altruism is moderately predicted by the leadership motive with a weak predictive effect contributed by the prestige motive and no effect of the dominance motive. These findings may relate to tendencies to threaten and reward others, respectively. This interpretation is congruent with Suessenbach et al.'s specification of dominance being concerned with forcing others to accept one's will and the leadership motive being concerned with being responsible for others.

Whilst the nascent DoPL scales have seen limited experimental use however, various related power motive scales have been used to demonstrate relationships between power motives and hierarchically-relevant behaviours. Although these scales lack the granularity of the DoPL scales, by informing our understanding of the relationship between power motives and hierarchically-relevant behaviours they may provide a foundation on which more nuanced hypotheses regarding the specific and separate functions of the DoPL motives can be developed.

One such measure is the Unified Motives Scales' power subscale (UMS-pow; Schonbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). As one of the models drawn on in developing the DoPL framework, the UMS-pow scales demonstrates significant conceptual overlap and correlates strongly across the DoPL components (Suessenbach et al., in prep). Using this scale in investigating the role of power motives in moral decision-making, Suessenbach and Moore (2015) demonstrate that higher power motive predicts a greater willingness to sacrifice one person to save many. Contrasting with this, the UMS "fear to lose reputation" scale (UMS-rep; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) shows no such predictive property. Whilst not specifically measuring power motive, the UMS-rep scale measures motivational concern for maintaining one's reputation from potential threats and is therefore conceptually related to the DoPL prestige. This finding therefore demonstrates that motivational concerns for influencing others and maintaining reputation are functionally distinct, with only the former influencing individual's willing to unilaterally act upon others. Furthermore, this contrast is evocative of the distinction between the "self-actualised" conflict-based rank and "other-granted" competence-based rank that is central to both antecedent models of hierarchical differentiation (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). As the DoPL dominance and prestige motive definitions were directly informed by these models, a similar pattern is likely to be reflected. Specifically, higher dominance motive is expected to predict greater willingness to enact one's will on others whilst the prestige motive is not expected to demonstrate any influence on such decisions.

Investigating how the influence of the power motive differs by the type of moral judgement, Suessenbach and Moore (2015) found that this effect of increasing individuals' willingness to sacrifice others is enhanced when the decision-maker is one of the "many" at risk rather than an external arbiter, suggesting that power motive prioritises self-preserving strategies. This self-preservation effect is further demonstrated in tasks where a leader must make risk-based decisions for the group. Measured

using the Achievement Motivation Scale's dominance subscale (AMS-dom; Cassidy & Lynn, 1989), higher power motive has been shown to predict greater risk aversion in leaders' choices, but only when their authoritative position is not guaranteed (Maner, Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007). These findings indicate that power motives do not direct individuals to achieve rank for the purposes of leading the group to success, but rather that rank is itself the goal of these motives. Framing this in differential terms, this effect can be understood as a product of Magee and Galinsky's (2008) power base. As power-based rank is achieved by an individual having greater control of resources relative to others, regardless of the absolute amount of resource available, a power-motivated individual would be better able to ensure and promote their rank in future by retaining their relative control over a reduced resource pool. Only when there is genuine fear of a group-wide catastrophic loss of resources would one expect a power-oriented individual to take such a risk but this hypothesis has not yet been empirically tested.

Although a review of the literature demonstrates various behavioural and functional correlates of both explicit and implicit power motives (e.g. Winter, 1988; Stanton & Edelstein, 2009; Hofer, Busch, Bond, Li, & Law, 2010), only a handful of studies, as discussed so far, specifically consider the relationship between explicit power motives and hierarchically-relevant behaviours. Given this limit in the existing literature, we must instead consider other sources of insight. As the definitions and functional correlates discussed thus far indicate, the DoPL motives are expected to promote different types of behaviours and our hypotheses may be informed by considering the research classifying which behaviours impact social influence.

In studying the social consequences of different social approaches, Cheng et al. (2013) demonstrate that individuals perceived to be either highly prestigious (i.e. demonstrating expertise and receiving respect) or highly dominant (i.e. being assertive and invoking fear) command similarly high levels of influence in group decision-making, more so than members that are neither prestigious nor dominant. Furthermore, both prestigious and dominant individuals receive significantly greater visual attention than their peers, even after controlling for the proportion of time they spend talking. Where these two groups differ, however, is in likeability; prestigious individuals are significantly more liked by their peers whereas dominant individuals are generally neither liked nor disliked. This finding demonstrates that both the "other granted" competence-based and "self-actualised" conflict-based processes of hierarchical differentiation are equally viable in practice. With this evidence, it therefore seems reasonable to suggest that these distinct processes related to similarly distinct motives, specifically the homonymous DoPL prestige and dominance components.

Whilst dominant individuals may not garner positive relations however, they do commonly adopt competence-signalling behaviours, leading to them being perceived as more competent than they may deserve, based on their actual task performance (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). This suggests that individuals who pursue social influence via agonistic means are not socially tone-deaf and recognise some benefit in maintaining at least a moderate competency reputation, likely to ensure that their threats

or demands are afforded credibility. It may therefore be the case that dominance motive relates to an aspect of reputation other than likeability or virtue. The prestige motive, on the other hand, is likely to emphasise deserved reputation as, unlike with dominant individuals, the perceived competence of prestigious individuals does directly reflect their actual ability across various socially-valued tasks and attributes (Cheng et al., 2010; Reyes-Garcia et al., 2010).

This distinction between prestige and dominance social strategies has even been proposed to function at the level of simple body language, with both approaches enhancing individuals' influence but through quite distinct displays. Specifically, dominance is associated with expansive postures and lower vocal tones at the start of conversations that makes oneself appear more threatening. Conversely, prestige is associated with subtler yet similarly impactful stances that include expanding of the chest and tilting the head upwards to present oneself as confident and competent, but non-threatening (Cheng & Tracy, 2014).

Although limited, the available research does consistently demonstrate two distinct approaches to attaining social influence; dominance and prestige. Whilst prestige-based approaches garner social influence and attention through displays of expertise or virtue, dominance-based approaches achieve similar results through agonistic behaviours and displays of threatening ability. Given that individuals are typically accurate judges of their own social status and that overstating such status undermines their position (Anderson et al., 2006), we are justified in suggesting that these distinct strategies are likely consciously accessible and deliberately chosen by individuals actively seeking to enhance their social rank. Beyond the shared names, these distinct approaches also demonstrate the same “self-actualised” and “other granted” structure that is consistent in both antecedent models and the definitions of the DoPL dominance and prestige motives – a parallel that we expect to be functional rather than simply aesthetic. We therefore arrive back at this paper's central question; do the distinct DoPL components differentially predict individuals' preferences for these different means of securing rank?

In answering this, we decided to limit our focus to the dominance and prestige DoPL components to ensure that the experimental materials could be structured around previously established influence-promoting behaviours and to preserve the statistical power of the analyses. This study therefore considers how the DoPL dominance and prestige motives differentially predict individuals' decision-making in social scenarios that offer rank-enhancing opportunities.

In constructing the scenario vignettes used in this study, we distinguished between two features that motives are expected to influence; goals and methods. By goal, we refer to the specific rank-enhancing outcome defined in each scenario. As previous research suggest that power motives are primarily concerned with achieving rank for the sake of perpetuating rank (e.g. Maner & Mead, 2010), these goals were constructed to invoke the specific definitions of either the DoPL prestige or dominance motives and were coded accordingly for the analysis. For example, a prestige-type goal may depict

opportunities in which individuals could achieve greater recognition across their organisation. By methods, we refer to the specific behaviours by which individuals may pursue their goals. In this, we also adopt the “prestige/dominance” classification of behaviours that promote social influence. For example, a dominance-type method may depict the individual manipulating or threatening another person to enable them to succeed. With this structure to the vignettes, we are therefore able to investigate how the DoPL motives predict individuals’ preferences for each combination of dominance- and prestige-type goals and methods. Considering this goal/method structure, we propose three specific hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Motives predict distinct goal preferences

As the fundamental function of motives is to orient individuals towards specific goals (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008), both the dominance and prestige motives are predicted to orient individuals towards maintaining and attaining social rank. We propose that they will differ, however, in which pathways of social influence they will direct individuals towards. As the dominance motive is specifically concerned for influencing others against their will using agonistic behaviours, higher scores on this component should positively predict individuals’ desire for greater control of resources and information that may be used to coerce and control others. Conversely, the prestige motive is specifically concerned with gaining influence in recognition of one’s skill or virtue and so higher scores on this component should positively predict individuals’ desires for greater social recognition and access to opportunities for them to further demonstrate their competence.

Hypothesis 2: Motives predict distinct method preferences

In addition to goal preferences, we propose that the DoPL motives will predict distinct preferences for how these goals will be achieved in line with their basic definitions (Suessenbach et al., in prep). Specifically, higher scores on the dominance component should positively predict individuals’ preferences for using coercive and agonistic behaviours to achieve their goals whereas higher scores on the prestige component should positively predict individuals’ preferences for displaying their skills and virtues to achieve their goals.

Hypothesis 3: The three-way interaction of prestige motive, goal type, and method type

Whilst we propose that both motive types will differentially predict preferences for goal and method types individually, we also propose that highly-prestige motivated individuals will demonstrate a concern for the specific combination of goal and method types. Specifically, higher scores on the

prestige component will predict stronger preferences for achieving prestige goals by adopting prestige methods – proving oneself deserving of the recognition – and stronger avoidance towards using dominance methods to achieve dominance goals – being wholly self-serving by undermining others for one’s own benefit.

This hypothesis is founded on the assumption that the prestige motive is concerned with respect-based voluntary deference, requiring one to maintain a positive reputation. This argument is founded not just in the prestige motive definition (Suessenbach et al., in prep) but also in the reviewed research indicating that reputational concern is not associated with self-serving tendencies (Suessenbach & Moore, 2015) and that prestige-focussed social methods actively promote positive peer regard (Cheng et al., 2013).

A similar interaction is not proposed for the dominance motive as, with its concern for coercively obtaining others’ deference, it relies only on one’s agonistic abilities rather with no clear role for reputational concerns (Suessenbach et al., in prep). Furthermore, as dominance methods are directed towards immediate control retention (e.g, Maner & Mead, 2010), we expect that highly dominance-motivated individuals will preferentially adopt confrontational styles even if this risks undermining goal success in prestige-type goals where one is seeking to enhance their reputation with peers.

Methods

Ethical Approval

This study was approved by the University of Edinburgh Psychology Research Ethic Committee under application 220-1617/1.

Participants

One hundred and twenty participants (63 male) were recruited via the Prolific.Ac online participant pool. Participants received payment for their participation. A summary of the age and educational attainment of the sample is presented in Appendix A.

In addition to the participants noted above, one other participant's responses were collected but excluded from any analysis due to the questionnaire having been completed anomalously quickly and with frequent contradiction in responses, suggesting that the participant did not pay due attention in completing it. As per Prolific.Ac's Participant Terms of Service, this participant did not receive payment for their participation.

Materials

DoPL scores were measured using Suessenbach et al.'s six-item scales. Whilst this study was primarily concerned with the effects of dominance and prestige motives, all three of the component scales were included to allow us to control for collinearity between motives.

Vignettes were constructed representing eight scenarios, depicting four prestige-type goals and four dominance-type goals. Each scenario included two methods, one prestige-type and one dominance-type, which participants could endorse (via a 7-point Likert scale) in order to achieve the scenario goal. These methods were not exclusive and participants were free to endorse both or neither behaviour as they wished.

Further explanations of these materials and example items are included in Appendix B.

Procedure

Participants accessed the online questionnaire via an advertisement on the Prolific.Ac participant pool website. Participants completed the three questionnaires sections; basic demographic questions, the three DoPL motive scales, and goal/method endorsement ratings. The order of these sections was randomised across participants to minimise order effects.

Analysis & Results

Data Overview

Dominance, prestige, and leadership motive scores for each participant were calculated from the respective scales. Motive scores and goal-action endorsement ratings were mean-centred and standardised. The descriptive statistics of the pre-transformation scores are presented in Table 1 for reference.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics of motive and endorsement scores prior to scaling

	Mean	SD	Median	Minimum	Maximum	Interquartile Range
Dominance Motive	18.18	7.77	17	6	40	11
Prestige Motive	28.36	6.45	29	8	42	8
Leadership Motive	25.09	7.91	26	6	42	11
Endorsement	4.27	2.23	5	1	7	4

The DoPL motive scales demonstrated high internal consistency with Cronbach's $\alpha \geq .82$ across each scale (see Table 2). In line with Suessenbach et al.'s results (in prep), the motive scores showed only small to moderate positive correlation with each other (see Table 2).

Table 2

Cross-correlations and Cronbach's α of the DoPL motive scores

	Dominance	Prestige	Leadership
Dominance	(.88)	[.24,.54]	[.18,.35]
Prestige	.40*	(.82)	[.26,.55]
Leadership	.35*	.42*	(.90)

Note: Cross-correlation point estimates are presented in the lower diagonal ($p < .001$) with corresponding 95% confidence intervals presented in the upper diagonal. Cronbach's α presented on the diagonal.*

Analytical Approach

This study employed linear mixed-effect models (LMM), constructed using the *lmer* function from the *lme4* package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). LMM is able to account for crossed random effects caused by variation arising from both subject and stimuli sampling which allows for generalising beyond the specific material used here (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012).

Random Effects Structure

All models specified by-subject and by-vignette random intercepts and slopes for method type, and by-subject random slopes by goal type. This maximal structure was specified to minimise Type-I errors whilst maintaining statistical power (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013).

Model Analysis

In this study, several models were constructed beginning with a model that directly reflected the previously reviewed theory and subsequent hypotheses regarding the likely role of the DoPL motives in predicting goal and method preferences. This first model predicted endorsement ratings as a function of dominance motive, prestige motive, leadership motive, goal type, and method type, with interactive effects for each combination of dominance/prestige motive and method/goal type and the proposed three-way interaction of prestige motive, goal type, and method type (see Table 3). Note that in this and all subsequent models, the prestige condition was specified as the reference group for both goal and method types.

On reviewing this first model, it was evident that several of the parameters, including the three-way interaction, were likely not contributing to the model fit (for full model parameter, see Appendix C). Confirming this, the statistical significance of each parameter's estimated effect was calculated. Whilst calculating p -values for estimated effects in LMMs is contentious as calculating the necessary degrees of freedom is a nontrivial matter, we addressed this issue by adopting the normal approximation to the t -distribution, thus interpreting the computed t -values as Z -scores. This was justified by the large number of observations collected. Using this method, it was found that the proposed three-way interaction was not significant ($\beta = .021$, $SE = .051$, $p = .674$, 95% CI [-.078, .120]). These results therefore provide no support for our third hypothesis.

As there were several non-significant terms in this model, this analysis progressed by exploratorily refining the previously best fitting model; iteratively identifying and removing parameters that did not benefit the model fit. Model fit was assessed by comparing Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores between each model, with lower scores indicating a better fit. In total, five models were constructed, of which the fourth model (M4) provides the best fit for the data and will therefore be the focus of the rest of this section. Structures and fit statistics for all models constructed are presented in Table 3 for reference.

Table 3

Comparison of model structures and fitness statistic.

Note that only fixed effects are included in this table.

Coefficient codes represent the following: D = Dominance motive, P = Prestige motive, L = Leadership motive, M = Method Type, G = Goal Type. Colons used to represent interactive terms.

Model Number	Model description	df	AIC	BIC	LogLik
1	D, P, L, M, G, D:M, D:G, P:M, P:G, P:G:M	22	3543.92	3666.24	-1749.96
2	D, P, L, M, G, D:M, D:G, P:M, P:G	20	3540.46	3651.67	-1750.23
3	D, P, L, M, G, D:M, P:G	18	3537.10	3637.18	-1750.55
4	D, P, M, G, D:M, P:G	17	3536.41	3630.93	-1751.21
5	D, L, M, G, D:M, L:G	17	3548.26	3642.78	-1757.13

M4 predicts endorsement ratings as a function of dominance motive, prestige motive, goal type, method type, and the interactions between dominance motive and method type, and prestige motive and goal type. Full parameter statistics of this model are presented in Table 4.

Table 4

Model parameters of the refined model

Parameter	β	SE	Z-score	95% C.I.
(Intercept)	.649***	.062	10.505	[.528, .770]
<i>Subject Level</i>				
Dominance Motive	.012	.027	0.439	[-.041, .064]
Prestige Motive	.053*	.025	2.132	[.004, .103]
<i>Vignette Level</i>				
Goal (Dominance)	.096	.071	1.356	[-.043, .235]
Method (Dominance)	-1.394***	.151	-9.232	[-1.690, -1.098]
<i>Cross-level Interactions</i>				
Dominance:Method	.197***	.055	3.591	[.089, .304]
Prestige:Goal	.054**	.025	2.117	[.004, .104]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Firstly, this model demonstrates that endorsement ratings in the reference condition, where both goal and method types are specified as prestige-type, are positively predicted by the prestige motive ($\beta = .053$, $SE = .025$, $p = .033$, 95% CI [.004, .103]). It is noted that this effect was only significant following the removal of the leadership motive from the model, suggesting a notable degree of covariance between the leadership and prestige motives in predicting preferences in the scenarios constructed for this study. To confirm that the prestige motive was the stronger predictor, an additional model (M5) was constructed replacing prestige with leadership motive. Comparing the two models, M4 was indeed found to better fit the observed data and was thus retained. This finding therefore demonstrates that the prestige motive does predict willingness to pursue prestige-type goals via prestige-type methods, although this alone does not demonstrate that this effect is preferential. It is

noted, the dominance motive demonstrated no effect in this reference condition ($\beta = .012$, $SE = .027$, ns , 95% CI [-.041, .064]).

There was a significant interaction between prestige motive and goal type ($\beta = .054$, $SE = .025$, $p = .034$, 95% CI [.004, .104]). Unexpectedly, this effect is in the opposite direction of the hypothesis, with prestige motive instead predicting higher endorsement for dominance-type goals. However, plotting the simple slopes (see Fig. 1) of change in endorsement ratings predicted by prestige motive and goal type indicates that within the region of $\pm 1 SD$ prestige motive the interaction does not reliably produce significantly different endorsement ratings. Although contributing significantly to the model, this interaction therefore appears to be impactful only at very high or very low motive scores.




Figure 1 - Slopes of endorsement change by prestige motive, including main effect of prestige motive and interaction of prestige motive and goal type. Motive ranging from low ($-1 SD$) to high ($+1SD$). Error bars indicated 95% confidence intervals.

The refined model also demonstrated a significant interaction between dominance motive and method type ($\beta = .197$, $SE = .055$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.089, .304]), with a simple slopes plot indicating that this interaction produces significant differences in endorsement ratings at both high ($+1 SD$) and

low (-1 *SD*) motive scores as illustrated in Fig. 2. This is consistent with our hypothesis, with dominance motive predicting preferential endorsement of dominance-type methods.




Figure 2 - Slopes of endorsement change by dominance motive, including main effect of dominance motive and interaction of dominance motive and method type. Motive ranging from low (-1 *SD*) to high (+1*SD*). Error bars indicated 95% confidence intervals.

Finally, there was a significant main effect of method type ($\beta = -1.394, SE = .151, p < .001, 95\%$ CI [-1.690, -1.098], with dominance methods being endorsed far less than prestige methods. Given the magnitude of this effect, this model predicts that an individual of average prestige motive would have to be incredibly dominance motivated ($SD > 7$) in order to endorse dominance methods to an equal or greater degree than prestige methods.

Figures 3 and 4 present the endorsement ratings predicted by M4 for each goal-method combination as a function of prestige and dominance motive respectively. The interpretation of and implications arising from this model are discussed in the following section.




Figure 3 - Endorsement ratings for each goal/method combination as predicted by prestige motive scores. Endorsement ratings are calculated assuming average dominance motive scores.




Figure 4 - Endorsement ratings for each goal/method combination as predicted by dominance motive scores. Endorsement ratings are calculated assuming average prestige motive scores.

Discussion

In proposing their DoPL framework of specific rank-promoting motives, Suessenbach et al. (in prep) provide a potentially invaluable tool for predicting how individuals come to choose different means of pursuing social rank. This study investigated the role of the DoPL dominance and prestige motives in informing individuals' choices in hierarchical social structures. Specifically, we experimentally probed whether these two motives are functionally similar in predicting preferences for rank-enhancing goals and methods, differing only in the classification of those goals and actions.

Defined as a concern for influencing others against their will (Suessenbach et al., in prep), the dominance motive was predicted to impel individuals to seek greater means of controlling and coercing others, either ensuring their position of authority over others or obtaining resources or information that they might use to force others' deference. In pursuit of such goals, the dominance motive was predicted to promote the use of agonistic behaviours; threatening and manipulating others to accomplish their objectives. Contrasting with this, the prestige motive is defined as the concern for being held in high regard by one's peers and so was predicted to orient individuals towards opportunities where they might improve their reputation or admiration within the social group. It was also expected that the prestige motive would promote the use of displays of competence or virtue to accomplish these goals, as doing so would lead others to voluntarily defer to the prestigious individual. Additionally, it was proposed that there would exist a three-way interaction between prestige motive, goal type, and method motive such that highly-prestige motivated would be strongly driven to achieve prestige-type goals using displays of competence and would be strongly avoidant of pursuing dominance-type goals via agonistic behaviours due to the severe long-term reputational impact that would likely be incurred. Whilst this three-way interaction was not supported in this study, the other hypothesised effects of the dominance and prestige motives received partial support.

The Dominance Motive

As expected, there was no main effect of the dominance motive in predicting endorsement ratings in the reference condition of prestige-type goal and method. Contradicting our initial hypothesis, however, the dominance motive is not predictive of endorsement for dominance-type goals. Instead, the dominance motive only predicts individuals' willingness to use coercive or manipulative means to achieve their immediate goal, regardless of what that goal is. The implications of this finding relative to the unexpected effects of prestige motive are further discussed below.

The Prestige Motive

The prestige motive did demonstrate the hypothesised main effect in the reference condition, positively correlating with endorsement ratings for prestige-type goals and methods. However, the

prestige motive was not demonstrated to predict the hypothesised avoidance of dominance-type methods. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction of prestige motive and goal type but in the opposite direction to the hypothesis, with higher prestige motive predicting higher endorsement of dominance-type goals over prestige-type goals. Notably, simple slopes plots (see Fig. 1) indicate that this interaction does not produce significant differences in endorsement between goal types within a common range of prestige motive scores (± 1 *SD*, corresponding to approximately 68% of scores).

In interpreting this unexpected effect, it must be considered that this study may not have accounted for variation in hierarchically-relevant features aside from the goal/method classifications. Whilst Suessenbach et al. (in prep) define the prestige motive in as a general desire to be respected and admired by one's peers, the hierarchical bases of status and prestige from which this is developed are explicitly stated to be domain specific (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Simply put, the deference individuals receive in a specific domain of competence does not automatically afford them similar deference across other domains. It would be reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the prestige motive may demonstrate similar domain specificity, driving individuals to actively pursue a reputation for skill only within domains in which one is interested or believes oneself to be genuinely competent. In constructing the vignettes for this study, goals were typically situated in professional settings in order to ensure the goal and hierarchical structures were efficiently conveyed. On review, however, it seems likely that the prestige-type goals depict more narrow domains, describing scenarios such as seeking credit on a published study, whereas dominance-type goals were more generic, requiring fewer specifics to establish opportunities to obtain position or resources. It seems likely, therefore, that if one were to replicate this study but with matching scenarios to participants' individual domains of interest (e.g. targeting participants from specific industries) then this moderating effect of goal type would reduce or disappear as the main effect of prestige in the reference condition increased. However, this finding still indicates that the prestige motive predicts long-term goal seeking generally and is not exclusively concerned with reputation enhancement.

Additionally, the failure to evidence an interactive effect of method type and prestige motive may be a result of the questionnaire design introducing response bias. Although the means by which participants could pursue their goal were not explicitly dichotomous, as participants could endorse both or neither method if desired, offering the two choices simultaneously may have implied a "right" and "wrong" choice. In providing the two together, the contrast between the competence-focussed prestige-type methods and the agonistic dominance-type methods seems likely to have invoked a "moral/immoral" dimension. Despite the anonymity inherent in the online study design, it is possible that participants were artificially drawn to endorsing socially desirable prestige-type methods and were more avoidant of dominance-type methods than they would otherwise be, overstating the main effect of method type and obfuscating any potential interaction with the prestige motive. It is suggested,

therefore, that follow-up research should either consider methods in isolation or offer additional actions that are not aligned with either the prestige or dominance, thus breaking this artificial dichotomy.

Motive Functions: Tactical and Strategic Control

With these results providing varied support for our hypotheses, ranging from confirming to demonstrating the opposite effect, we are forced to reconsider our assumptions regarding how the dominance and prestige motives relate to each other. Whilst several methodological limitations have been noted, we do not consider it likely that remedying these would result in all the hypotheses being confirmed. Instead, these results indicate that the dominance and prestige motives are not simply parallel motives orienting individuals towards distinct but functionally similar types of goals and behaviours. Instead, we propose that the dominance and prestige motives demonstrate more distinct functionality, with the former impelling individuals to maintain immediate “tactical” control in each interaction whereas the latter orients individuals towards a “strategic” concern for long-term social control.

These proposed functions are first demonstrated by the relationship between dominance motive and endorsement ratings being moderated by method type but not by goal type. This finding is initially bemusing as motives are defined specifically as cognitive mechanisms orienting individuals towards specific classes of goals (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008), but upon further consideration instead suggests that our distinction between “goal” and “method” is not as simple as it first appears. Where we describe goal types, we are specifically referring to those classes of goals that enhance individuals’ capacities for long-term rank-enhancement. We defined methods as the means by which these goals are achieved. However, the described methods entailed achieving one’s goals by attaining immediate social control and may instead be interpreted as classes of goals relating to short-term influence. In this classification, dominance-type methods provide greater guarantees of control by forcing others to comply whereas prestige-type methods seek immediate social influence by appealing to others to voluntarily grant it. With this reconsideration of the goal/method distinction, we propose our results demonstrate that the dominance is primarily concerned with tactical social control, orienting individuals towards agonistic behaviours that provide greater certainty of immediate authority.

We further propose that the prestige motive orients individuals towards long-term strategic social control. This approach is best demonstrated by displays of competence which do not guarantee control in individual interactions but reliably contribute to one’s enduring ability to influence by inspiring the voluntary deference of one’s peers (as in Cheng et al., 2013). However, long-term influence may also be enhanced by obtaining position and resources that enhance one’s capacity for control without turning to agonistic means that have negative reputational impact. Whilst the results of

this study are not unambiguous, the main effect of prestige motive impelling individuals to pursue prestige-based rank enhancement and the unexpected moderating effect of dominance-type goals (i.e. pursuing position and resources) suggest a primary concern for long-term strategic social influence. Furthermore, we propose that if one were to implement the methodological improvements previously suggested to address response bias, highly-prestige motivated individuals would be demonstrated to be more avoidant of behaviours that damage their reputation, thus undermining their strategic interests.

This distinction between tactically-oriented dominance and strategically-oriented prestige remains congruent with Suessenbach et al.'s (in prep) initial definitions and research. In proposing these functions, we are refining rather than rejecting the existing definitions, as the dominance motive remains concerned with agonistic means of controlling others (as the most efficient means of social influence) and the prestige motive remains concerned, although not exclusively, with reputational impact (as this directly contributes to long-term social influence). Furthermore, just as Suessenbach et al. (in prep) suggest that the DoPL leadership motive is likely concerned with formalised rank, the prestige and dominance motives may be similarly concerned with strategic influence and tactical control respectively.

Alongside their initial DoPL definitions, Suessenbach et al. (in prep) report various correlations between the DoPL motives and existing motive measures in which we find further evidence of these distinct functions. Most pertinent, both DoPL dominance and prestige components are significantly correlated with the UMS "fear of losing control" scale, with only the leadership motive being uncorrelated. This implies that both prestige and dominance motives entail a concern for social control not found in the leadership motive. Furthermore, the prestige motive is equally correlated with both UMS-pow and UMS-rep scales, indicating an equivalent concern for both power and reputation, as required for long-term stable control.

Looking to the wider literature, this distinction between tactical and strategic influences preserves the structure of the conflict- and competence-based processes of hierarchical differentiation and may better reflect Henrich and Gil-White's (2001) claim that dominance-based processes are more rudimentary whereas prestige-based processes are more evolutionarily recent and rely on advanced social learning skills. Specifically, tactical social control requires few advanced cognitive mechanisms and is founded primarily on one's capacity to control the immediate situation without regard for wider affairs. Contrasting with this, strategic social control requires cultural transmission in order to support long-term social influence and complex planning skills to comprehend the future-value of position, resource control, or information access.

We recognise, however, that these distinct functions presently have limited evidence, relying on the results of this study and interpretations of a few correlations reported by Suessenbach et al. (in prep). To explicitly demonstrate these distinct functions, future research is required to investigate the

dominance and prestige motives demonstrate differences in short-term versus long-term outlook. It would be particularly insightful to investigate whether the two motives reliably predict differences in temporal discounting of influence-related social commodities. If these proposed functions are valid, we expect that highly prestige-motivated individuals will demonstrate significantly lower temporal discounting of the future-value of reputation or resource control whereas highly dominance-motivated individuals would be less concerned with future-value and would prioritise situational features that enable immediate and guaranteed control.

Although this study found limited support for our initial hypotheses, the unexpected results instead challenge our initial assumption that the prestige and dominance motives are alike in function, simply orienting individuals towards different classifications of goals and behaviours. Instead, our results indicate that there is a more fundamental distinction between the two motives, with prestige motive relating to strategic social control whereas dominance motive is concerned with immediate tactical control. Whilst these proposed functions have yet to be explicitly demonstrated, we believe that further research will validate this claim.

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Appendix A

Table A1

Demographic composition of the participants sample (n = 120, 63 males)

Age Group	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage	Level of Educational Attainment	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
18-24	20.8%	20.8%	Less than secondary	2.5%	2.5%
25-34	35.8%	56.6%	Secondary	30.9%	33.4%
35-44	22.5%	79.1%	Undergraduate	37.5%	70.9%
45-54	14.2%	93.3%	Postgraduate	23.3%	94.2%
55-64	6.7%	100%	Doctorate	2.5%	96.7%
			Other	3.3%	100%

Appendix B

DoPL Scales

Although this study was primarily focussed on the dominance and prestige motives, all three of the six-item short DoPL scales were used to account for the possible influence of the leadership motive as per Suessenbach et al.'s (in prep) comments on operationalising the scales. Using these scales, participants were presented with motive-centric statements (e.g., "I am happy when I can present my achievements to others.") and asked to rate their agreement with those statements on a 7-point Likert scale. Responses across each six-item scale were collated into individual scores for each motive. The three scales were presented as a single questionnaire section with the order of items randomised across participants to minimise demand and order effects.

Vignettes

Preferences for dominance- and prestige-type goals and methods was measured via participants' endorsement of goal/action combinations presented across eight goal-describing vignettes, each with two actions that may be endorsed to achieve those goals.

The eight goal vignettes, four each for prestige and dominance goals, were described situations in which the participant could maintain or improve their social rank or their access to opportunities for further rank enhancement. For example, a prestige scenario may offer the participant the opportunity to gain recognition for an accomplishment whereas a dominance scenario may offer the participant the opportunity to obtain additional resources, information, or position that they can hold over others.

For each goal vignette, two methods were presented that depicted either a dominance or a prestige behaviour that they might endorse to pursue the goal. For example, a prestige method may offer the participant the opportunity to perform a display of skill whereas a dominance method may offer the participant the opportunity to threaten another to achieve their goal.

With eight goals with two corresponding methods each, participants provided endorsement ratings (also using a 1-7 Likert scale) for a total of sixteen goal-method pair (four of each combination of prestige/dominance goal and prestige/dominance method). An example of one goal and the two corresponding actions is presented in Table B1. The order of vignettes was randomized across participants to minimise potential order effects.

Table B1

Example of goal vignette and method choices for participant endorsement

<p>Goal Type: Prestige</p>	<p>You work as a junior researcher at a highly competitive institution that is well regarded for its high-quality publications.</p> <p>You have completed the final draft of a major article that you have been working on and have submitted it. Another junior researcher, Charlie, helped you to perform some analysis in an unfamiliar computer program so that you could meet the deadline.</p> <p>On reviewing the draft publication, you see that your manager has submitted the article with Charlie appearing as the lead author and researcher rather than you.</p>
<p>Method Type: Prestige</p>	<p>Book a meeting with your manager to go through the research step-by-step, showing that you provided the key insights at each stage, thus making sure that your manager acknowledges your leading role in this research.</p>
<p>Method Type: Dominance</p>	<p>Tell Charlie that he must correct the error in authorship or you will report him to your manager for claiming credit and you will not assist him with his projects.</p>

Appendix C

Table C1

Model parameters of Model 1

Parameter	β	S.E.	Z-score	95% C.I.
(Intercept)	.667***	.068	9.787	[.533, .801]
<i>Subject-Level Effects</i>				
Dominance Motive	.004	.032	.134	[-.059, .067]
Prestige Motive	.063	.035	1.817	[-.005, .132]
Leadership Motive	.025	.021	1.163	[-.017, .066]
<i>Vignette-Level Effects</i>				
Goal Type (Dominance)	.060	.093	.646	[-.122, .241]
Method Type (Dominance)	-1.479***	.203	-7.272	[-1.878, -1.081]
<i>Cross-level Interaction Effects</i>				
Dominance:Goal	-.006	.028	-.231	[-.061, .048]
Dominance:Method	.215***	.060	3.597	[.098, .332]
Prestige:Goal	.046	.038	1.212	[-.028, .119]
Prestige:Method	-.056	.065	-.864	[-.183, .071]
Goal:Method	.171	.279	.612	[-.377, .719]
Prestige:Goal:Method	.021	.051	.420	[-.078, .120]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C2

Model parameters of Model 2

Parameter	β	S.E.	Z-score	95% C.I.
(Intercept)	.649***	.062	10.521	[.528, .770]
<i>Subject-Level Effects</i>				
Dominance Motive	.004	.032	.134	[-.059, .067]
Prestige Motive	.058	.033	1.786	[-.006, .122]
Leadership Motive	.025	.021	1.163	[-.017, .066]
<i>Vignette-Level Effects</i>				
Goal Type (Dominance)	.096	.071	1.356	[-.043, .235]
Method Type (Dominance)	-1.394***	.151	-9.235	[-1.690, -1.098]
<i>Cross-level Interaction Effects</i>				
Dominance:Goal	-.006	.028	-.231	[-.061, .048]
Dominance:Method	.215***	.060	3.597	[.098, .332]
Prestige:Goal	.056*	.028	2.018	[.002, .111]
Prestige:Method	-.045	.060	-.761	[-.162, .072]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C3

Model parameters of Model 3

Parameter	β	S.E.	Z-score	95% C.I.
(Intercept)	.649***	.062	10.519	[.528, .770]
<i><u>Subject-Level Effects</u></i>				
Dominance Motive	.006	.027	.233	[-.047, .059]
Prestige Motive	.046	.026	1.750	[-.005, .097]
Leadership Motive	.025	.021	1.163	[-.017, .066]
<i><u>Vignette-Level Effects</u></i>				
Goal Type (Dominance)	.096	.071	1.356	[-.043, .235]
Method Type (Dominance)	-1.394***	.151	-9.232	[-1.690, -1.098]
<i><u>Cross-level Interaction Effects</u></i>				
Dominance:Method	.197***	.055	3.591	[.089, .304]
Prestige:Goal	.054*	.025	2.114	[.004, .104]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table C4

Model parameters of Model 5

Parameter	β	S.E.	Z-score	95% C.I.
(Intercept)	.649***	.062	10.481	[.527, .770]
<i><u>Subject-Level Effects</u></i>				
Dominance Motive	.029	.027	1.062	[-.024, .082]
Leadership Motive	.025	.025	.988	[-.024, .074]
<i><u>Vignette-Level Effects</u></i>				
Goal Type (Dominance)	.096	.071	1.355	[-.043, .235]
Method Type (Dominance)	-1.394***	.151	-9.232	[-.69, -1.098]
<i><u>Cross-level Interaction Effects</u></i>				
Dominance:Method	.196***	.055	3.587	[.089, .303]
Leadership:Goal	0.042	.025	1.657	[-.008, .092]

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$