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Student Declaration

I, Evan Graber, am the author of the following submission. All work is my own and has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified. All included publications are my own work.
Thesis Abstract

This thesis will offer a survey of John McIntyre’s major theological works, argue for the presence of a single systematic project, identify the key components of that proposed theological system, and conclude by offering an evaluation of that system.

The survey of McIntyre’s works is not meant to be exhaustive, as this is not a historical presentation of McIntyre’s theology. The key purpose is to point out the unique characteristics of key works as components of McIntyre’s proposed theological system. It will be argued that this system stems from the monograph *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. This proposed system is then worked out in varying degrees of completion in *The Shape of Christology*, *The Shape of Soteriology*, and *The Shape of Pneumatology*.

The key component of this proposed theological system is the concept of imagination. Part of this concept in McIntyre is methodological. Part of this concept is epistemological. However, these aspects of imagination are derivative of McIntyre’s claim that imagination functions as a divine perfection *par excellence* and by extension is an integral part of the *imago Dei*.

The final aim of this thesis will be an evaluation of this system as it stands in McIntyre’s own writing, and in these works in particular. This evaluation will consist of identifying parts of the theological vision laid out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* that have not been fleshed out, namely a fully developed doctrine of God and doctrine of creation. The conclusion of this evaluation will identify key points for developing these doctrines along McIntyrian lines, specifically beginning with claims that McIntyre makes in *The Shape of Pneumatology* that point towards a doctrine of creation and claims in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* that point back to *On the Love of God* as an outline for developing a doctrine of God in terms of imagination.
Lay Summary

This thesis will offer an overview of the theologian John McIntyre to see if any of his books fit together as a series with a single aim. I am arguing that four books are at least functioning as a series with one idea and one aim.

The idea is that imagination is an attribute of God. That is to say that, just like God is merciful, gracious, *et cetera*, God is also imaginative. However, in McIntyre’s system God is more than just imaginative. In Christian theology it would be said that ‘God is love’ rather than that ‘God is loving,’ because God’s existence is equated with that attribute. This is called a divine perfection. McIntyre is making the claim that imagination is not just an attribute of God (God is imaginative) but in fact that imagination is a divine perfection (God exists in his imagination). As a consequence of this claim, imagination becomes important to who people are as people made in God’s image; and this in turn becomes important for how people can and should approach knowledge of God.

The problem is that there are some pieces missing for this group of books to cover the ideas that theologians would expect them to cover in a more complete theological system. What I will be doing in conclusion is identifying these gaps and proposing ways to fill these gaps in a way that is reflective of the ideas and methods that McIntyre used.
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List of Abbreviations

CDH: *The Christian Doctrine of History*
FTI: *Faith, Theology and Imagination*
SOC: *The Shape of Christology*
SOP: *The Shape of Pneumatology*
SOS: *The Shape of Soteriology*
Part I: Background

Preface

This thesis can be broken down into three parts with three aims. The first part is the survey. This survey will offer a brief biographical introduction to John McIntyre and a review of his theological publications. The purpose of these two components is to provide context for the argument that Faith, Theology and Imagination; The Shape of Christology; The Shape of Soteriology; and The Shape of Pneumatology are part of a single theological vision. Faith, Theology and Imagination lays out this vision, and the other ‘Shape of’ books are further developments of this singular theological vision.

The second part consists of chapters 2-5. These chapters are going to break down the components of this theological system. This starts with the theological vision that McIntyre lays out in Faith, Theology and Imagination. It will be argued that the key claim of this book is found in McIntyre’s definition of imagination as a theological category. This begins with the central and unique claim that imagination is a divine perfection of God’s being. This in turn informs the way that McIntyre begins to propose how the concept of imagination might inform and be formulated into a doctrine of God, a doctrine of creation, a doctrine of the incarnation, a doctrine of the atonement, and a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

It will then be argued that the ‘Shape of’ books are an outworking of this theological vision. This is done somewhat retroactively in The Shape of Christology, since the first edition predates the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination. That said, there are two reasons this is not necessarily problematic. One, there is evidence that McIntyre was working in the area and on the concept of imagination before the first edition of The Shape of Christology is published. Two, the second edition of The Shape of Christology is significantly reworked in ways that are compliant with the vision laid out in Faith, Theology and Imagination.

The other ‘Shape of’ books follow this pattern more explicitly, since they do not have the added complexity of timeline. Thus it will be argued that The Shape of Soteriology gives further shape and definition to McIntyre’s claim from Faith, Theology and Imagination that imagination is a category of the atonement. Key to this claim is the argument that McIntyre’s use of the concept of models function as a methodological placeholder for imagination. This is especially important in an evaluation of The Shape of Soteriology, since this is McIntyre’s most explicit and sophisticated presentation of the concept.
This second part will conclude with the argument that *The Shape of Pneumatology* is an outworking of McIntyre’s claim in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* that imagination is a category of the Holy Spirit.

The third and final part of this thesis will argue two things. One, it will argue that McIntyre’s theological vision laid out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* is incomplete. Specifically, it does not offer a complete formulation or outworking of a doctrine of God or a doctrine of creation. Two, it will argue that McIntyre provides a starting point for developing these two unrealized areas of his theological vision.

In *Faith, Theology and Imagination* McIntyre makes an argument for imagination being a divine perfection, but this claim and idea is not given fuller shape like the doctrines of Christology, pneumatology, and soteriology.

This is also true of the doctrine of creation, and this creates problems of consistency within McIntyre’s system. On the one hand, a fuller presentation of the doctrine of creation could be helpful in highlighting traditional notions of imagination and imaginative activity to the divine activity of creation. On the other hand, without a fuller presentation of the doctrine of creation McIntyre’s focus on imagination as a component of the *imago Dei* is absent, which is in its own right a foundational idea upon which McIntyre bases the idea that a theological method and epistemology should begin with imagination.

Once these gaps have been identified, the final task becomes proposing a way to fill them. The argument that this thesis will conclude with is two-fold. First, it will be argued that in order to fill the gap left by an undeveloped doctrine of God in McIntyre’s theological system in a way that is true to McIntyre’s own theological vision, a doctrine of God must be formulated in which imagination is a divine perfection and that his book *On the Love of God* must be re-interpreted in terms of imagination. This is what McIntyre has in mind when he is making the claim for the primacy of imagination in the being of God as a divine perfection.

Second, it will be argued that the doctrine of creation must not simply be a development of the outline provided in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. Any doctrine of creation developed along McIntyrian lines must take into account one of the major claims of *The Shape of Pneumatology*, that any full account of creation must incorporate the presence, activity, and agency of the Holy Spirit in the divine activity of creation.

Finally, it will be argued that McIntyre’s theology proposes a theological vision that is incomplete but also one that is still a live option. We are fortunate that McIntyre’s central claim is a beginning and not an end. The idea that imagination is a divine perfection of God is not a conclusion that simply adds to the list of tried and true divine attributes. Instead, it is a claim central to the being and activity of God that invites a total re-imaginations of who we understand God to be in those terms.
Chapter 1: Survey

This survey is going to provide background on McIntyre and his writings as well as a jumping off point for the overall aims of this thesis. First there will be a brief biographical introduction to John McIntyre. Since study and treatment of McIntyre has, up to this point, been rather limited, some historical and biographical context should be helpful to people less familiar with him and his work.

After that, there will be a review of McIntyre’s theological publications. The point here is not to be exhaustive. This is not a historical treatment of McIntyre. This is a systematic engagement with his thought. The aim of this survey is to provide the reader with enough familiarity with McIntyre’s publications to understand how Faith, Theology and Imagination along with the ‘Shape of’ books stand out as unique pieces within McIntyre’s broader corpus. This is in turn important for the reader to follow the argument that these books are part of a single theological vision.

This survey will conclude with a basic version of this argument in order to set up further support by treating these four books and their content in succession in support of this claim. The central claims of this argument are: 1) Faith, Theology and Imagination lays out an outline of McIntyre’s theological vision 2) The Shape of Christology gives shape to the way that McIntyre sees imagination as a theological category of the incarnation 3) The Shape of Soteriology gives shape to the way that McIntyre sees imagination as a theological category of the atonement 4) The Shape of Pneumatology gives shape to the way that McIntyre sees imagination as a theological category of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

1. Biographical Overview

John McIntyre lived from 1916-2005. His education began at Bathgate Academy before going to university at Edinburgh, where he received a First Class Honors degree in Mental Philosophy.¹ During this time he studied under A.E. Taylor and Norman Kemp Smith, the influence of whom can be seen at various junctures in his theological writing.² McIntyre

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¹ John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.2.6. This file contains original copies of McIntyre’s degree certificates as well as other documentation related to his academic performance at Edinburgh. These include letters from faculty, presumably letters of recommendation, that relate to the quality of his academic performance.

² Kemp Smith was primarily an influence in the way that McIntyre addresses topics relating to logic and epistemology. This makes sense given the extensive notes that McIntyre took and preserved while a student under Kemp Smith. McIntyre’s notes from Kemp Smith’s course on the problems of logic can be found in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.4.1 and his notes on Kemp Smith’s lectures on General Philosophy, History or Philosophy, Logic and Psychology can be found in The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.4.10. That said,
continued onto the B.D. and completed his study in 1941. In 1945, he was married to Jan Buick. They had three children together.³

From 1945-1956 McIntyre served as the Hunter Baillie Chair of Theology at St. Andrew's College in Sydney. During this time, McIntyre was active as an educator, administrator, and as a scholar. He taught a wide variety of subjects to ministry candidates, and served part of his time as the Principal of St. Andrew’s College.⁴ It was during this time, in 1954, that work *St Anselm and His Critics; a Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo* was published with Oliver and Boyd. Additionally, he became something of a public figure in Sydney through a series of public debates with John Anderson, the atheist philosopher who was the Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney at the time.⁵

The year, 1956, marked McIntyre’s return to Scotland, where he succeeded John Baillie as the Professor of Divinity at The University of Edinburgh, New College. The following year his monograph *The Christian Doctrine of History* was published with Eerdmans. From 1968 until his retirement from the university in 1986, McIntyre served in a wide variety of academic and administrative roles in addition to his teaching and research. He was the Dean of the Faculty of Divinity, the Principal of New College, Principal Warden of Pollock Halls, and the Acting Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh.⁶ Early in his time at the University, he published two works that continue to be a part of his legacy. His 1962 work *On the Love of God*, though not his most polished book, was widely read and used by ministers in the Church of Scotland. However, the publication of the first edition of *The Shape of Christology: Studies in the Doctrine and Person of Christ* was significant in establishing his reputation as an academic theologian. However, as a result of the significant demands of his administrative roles within New College and the University his output of publications was certainly diminished. It was not until after his retirement from the university that he published his next book.

McIntyre proved to be surprisingly prolific in his later years. His book *Faith, Theology and Imagination* was published in 1987, the year after his retirement. The book marked the culmination of a long-term interest in the topic of Imagination as a theological idea. This was followed by the publication of *The Shape of Soteriology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Death of Christ* in 1992 and *The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*.

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⁶ Ibid.
in 1997. The following year McIntyre released a second edition to *The Shape of Christology*. This second edition, though largely overlooked as a reprint, proved to contain significant movement from his conclusions in the first edition. These changes offer significant insight into the way that McIntyre’s theology developed, and they deal directly with the balance of maintaining a theological tradition and the task of (in McIntyre’s own terms) re-imagining theology.

2. Literature Review

Some of the earliest publications that we have of McIntyre’s writing are really rather limited in their ability to shed light on the future direction of his thought and career. Some of this is a direct result of his function as the Hunter Baillie Chair of Theology at St. Andrew’s College in Sydney. In these early years, McIntyre functions as a rather public figure. For instance, the first recorded publication that Gary Badcock hunted down was an address to the Conference of the Presbyterian Assembly of New South Wales from 1946. However, similar addresses and articles of a less academic nature and thematically separate from his academic work are common in these early years in Australia. Other citations that would fit in this category would be his two part series in *Australian Christian World* titled “In the Fullness of Life” and “In the Fullness of Time” in 1947 and the essay on St. Andrew for *The New South Wales Presbyterian* titled “St Andrew and 1948” published 1948.

A few of these articles do share some cross over thematically and are more directly related to his work and thought. Works that would follow this pattern would be his two addresses to the Student Christian Movement in 1948 and 1949. His 1948 topic of “Freethought and Christianity” shares important sentiments that McIntyre held about the importance of free inquiry not only in a Christian, theological context but also in a broader

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7 It should be noted that 1997 was also the year that *Theology After the Storm: Reflections on the Upheavals in Modern Theology and Culture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997) was published. Chronologically, it was published before *The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997); however this work is significantly different in nature to the other books that McIntyre published. The volume is actually a collection of essays from previously abandoned projects that were selected and edited by Gary Badcock. It contains “The Humanity of Christ” and “Theology of Prayer” which were originally written in (or around) 1970. The essay “The Cliché as Theological Medium” is also included, and was written for the publication of the book in 1997.


10 John McIntyre, *Australian Christian World*, *The New South Wales Presbyterian* (For a complete listing of these types of articles addresses etc., that have been published see works as a public figure). Note there are a large number of works that would fit this category in the New College Archives, such as McIntyre’s meticulous notes on his time as the chaplain for the Order of the Thistle in *The McIntyre Papers*, AA 4.6, and his time as Moderator of the General Assembly in *The McIntyre Papers*, AA 4.5.1.
Christian context, while at the same time offering a harsh critique of the ‘freethinking’ philosophy that was prominent in Australia at that time.\(^\text{11}\) This is followed by his 1949 address on the topic of “Christ the King in the Church, and in the World and History.”\(^\text{12}\) Here McIntyre is addressing themes directly related to his research on the importance of historicity to Christology.

This is a theme that is frequently present in his earliest publications beginning with what should probably be categorized as his first academic publication, “History and Meaning” which was published in 1947 in the *Reformed Theological Review*.\(^\text{13}\) This essay establishes two things that are significant for studying and understanding this early part of McIntyre’s career and the development of his early thought.

First, there is the theme of history and meaning. This theme stays with McIntyre throughout his career as a theologian. Even at this early juncture he realizes that he is going to have to deal with the issue of historicity as it relates to the atonement in order to do justice to the study of Anselm. This is something that he is actively working on when he writes this article, and we can see atonement and indeed Anselm in the background. While history is the theme, the real topic is atonement. This is true of all of McIntyre’s historical texts, and we can see a strong consistency among these texts beginning here and working all the way to 1957 and the publication of *The Christian Doctrine of History*. Some of the sources and arguments are identical to the ones that he employs in *The Christian Doctrine of History* a full ten years later. However, his insistence on the connection between historicity and atonement is a theme that extends well beyond this milestone in his career. Most notably in *The Shape of Soteriology* we can still see McIntyre addressing the problem that any atonement theology must overcome, the problem of making a historical atoning event accessible in the present in ways that are salvifically efficacious.\(^\text{14}\)

The key components of this focus in McIntyre’s theology are first a focus on the historicity of the incarnation itself. McIntyre never moves away from a thorough defense of a historical incarnation and a reliable account of it.\(^\text{15}\) The second focus is on the obscuring of the incarnation by history. This includes both an acknowledgement of the inherent challenges posed to knowing things that are obscured through the passing of time and an affirmation of the possibility of historical knowledge. McIntyre points to severe skepticism

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\(^{11}\) John McIntyre, “Freethought and Christianity: Being Two Addresses,” Delivered by Prof. J. McIntyre to the Student Christian Movement in the University of Sydney SCM (Sydney, 1948).

\(^{12}\) John McIntyre, “Christ as King in the Church, and in the World and History,” in John McIntyre et al., *Christ the King*, Australian Student Christian Movement (Sydney, 1949).


that calls into question any possibility of apprehending historical knowledge as an undermining of the possibility of all knowledge and learning.\textsuperscript{16} This brings us to the third component, where McIntyre addresses how the problem of knowing Christ is both a theological problem (i.e. How can we know God?) and a historical problem (i.e. How can we know anything about Jesus of Nazareth?). Consequently, in the case of the atonement, it is not simply a question of how God saves, or even how one is capable of accessing it; instead it is a question of how a historically salvific act can be accessed contemporaneously in the present.\textsuperscript{17} This is why McIntyre is not only concerned with the soteriological models themselves but also with the ways that these models are universalized in order to be universally accessible, are relatable to those people to whom they are accessible, and how they can be made contemporary. The encompassing concept that McIntyre chooses to represent this process is the concept of identification.\textsuperscript{18} This is a concept that McIntyre traces back to John McLeod Campbell.\textsuperscript{19} It is a concept that H.R. Mackintosh develops particularly to offer an account of the love of God.\textsuperscript{20} Finally, it is a concept that McIntyre himself employs liberally in his own account of the love of God.\textsuperscript{21}

Second, it is McIntyre’s first collaboration with the \textit{Reformed Theological Review}. In the 10 years from 1947-1957 McIntyre published ten articles and seven reviews in this, culminating in his three part series on “Christology and Revelation.” At the time the review was a relatively young publication. Founded by the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia (PCEA) in 1942 it was only five years old.\textsuperscript{22} When McIntyre arrived in Australia there was a certain amount of publicity around his appointment, and it was not long before McIntyre was something of a public figure.\textsuperscript{23} The fact that McIntyre was an interesting figure is not surprising given the closely linked history of the various Presbyterian denominations of Scotland and Australia.\textsuperscript{24} That said, there also may have been some affinity with the first

\textsuperscript{16} CDH, 20-34.
\textsuperscript{17} SOS, 103-108.
\textsuperscript{18} SOS, 108.
\textsuperscript{19} The root of this idea is a theme in John McLeod Campbell, \textit{On the Nature of the Atonement}. McIntyre traces this idea back to McLeod Campbell through the Scottish theological tradition in his pamphlet McIntyre, \textit{John Prophet of Penitence: John McLeod Campbell, Our Contemporary Ancestor} (Edinburgh: St. Andrew’s Press, 1972).
\textsuperscript{20} H.R. Mackintosh, \textit{The Christian Experience of Forgiveness} (London: Nisbet, 1927), 118.
\textsuperscript{23} John McIntyre, \textit{The McIntyre Papers}, AA 4.7.
\textsuperscript{24} A full account of the founding and history of the Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia (PCEA) is also provided by Rowland S. Ward in Rowland S. Ward, \textit{The Presbyterian Church of Eastern Australia 1846-2013} (Wantirna: New Melbourne Press, 2014). Ward demonstrates this close historical relationship through the involvements of the Church of Scotland, the Free Church of Scotland, and the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland in the politics of the PCEA and its preceding institutions.
editor of the journal, Arthur Allen. Allen was a PCEA minister at St. George's in Sydney when the review was founded, who had spent some time in Scotland both at the University of Edinburgh and the Free Church College.\(^{25}\)

The collaboration produced some of McIntyre's most concise and unencumbered work. His articles and reviews are incisive, thorough, and wide ranging both in the subjects selected and in his treatment of them. It is not until 1954 that McIntyre publishes anything (other than his monographs) anywhere else, and these are extremely limited until after his installation in Edinburgh.

Another significant track in McIntyre's thought also emerges in 1947 in the *Reformed Theological Review* with McIntyre's review of Cornelius van Til's book *The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner*. Given the biographical timeline it is not surprising that the reception of neo-orthodoxy in general and Karl Barth in particular is not surprising. However the tradition of engagement with Barth at Edinburgh ensured that this was a recurring theme throughout his career. Consequently, this early engagement with the conversation surrounding this theological movement proves insightful. Even at this early juncture, McIntyre shows skepticism about the neo-orthodox movement and Barth in particular. This is not to say that he is dismissive or Barth or rejects Barth out of hand. It is simply to say that he is sympathetic to some of the critiques raised by van Til, especially concerns raised by the lack of philosophical foundation for Barth and Brunner's neo-orthodox project.\(^{26}\) He writes that van Til "has demonstrated also the fatal nature of the results that ensue when theologians attempt to discard philosophy, or to show contempt for metaphysical or epistemological inquiry... [and] he has raised the issue which our generation has yet to solve-viz., how far the general analysis of the theory of knowledge affects theological enquiry into our knowledge of God."\(^{27}\) While McIntyre does not in the end agree with van Til's assessment it is telling that these are the points at which he takes issue with the neo-orthodox program.\(^{28}\)

The fact is that as a trained student of philosophy, McIntyre is constantly concerned with philosophical consistency and methodological groundwork. If anything, it can be said that McIntyre is primarily interested in the question of how our philosophical notions of epistemology relate to and form our knowledge of God. The fact that this is not necessarily happening in the equation of crisis theology, is both problematic for McIntyre and an opportunity to offer what we might call corrective engagement by providing philosophical


\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 40-41.
frames for neo-orthodox ideas. We can see additional engagement with these themes in McIntyre’s 1948 reviews of D.M. Baillie’s classic God was in Christ and Emil Brunner’s Revelation and Reason.

In 1949 McIntyre continues to address the theme of the relationship between history and theology, especially as it relates to Christology. At the same time that he is talking to the Student Christian Movement about “Christ as King in the Church, and in the World and History” he is also writing in the Reformed Theological Review on the topics of “Christianity and Civilization” and “Christ and History.” The bulk of this material makes its way into The Christian Doctrine of History, which is not published until 1957. That said, even at this early juncture McIntyre is dealing with the same problems that he is addressing in the later monograph. His is bothered by the skepticism that is being expressed in views and notions

29D.M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (London: Scribner’s, 1948). This was a work that continues to be widely influential, and the theology of John McIntyre is no exception. In some ways, McIntyre can be seen to be a torchbearer of the kind of theology and mediation that Baillie was in his own career. Baillie’s treatment of “Docetism” and the new “historical radicalism” closely resemble McIntyre’s own rejection of Christological ideas and themes for being either ahistorical on the one hand and a theological on the other. Barth for instance bears the brunt of both Baillie and McIntyre’s criticism on this exact point. For Baillie, “A toned down Christology is absurd. It must be all or mothering- all or nothing on both the divine and the human side” Ibid., 132. Baillie’s now famous turn engages with the conveyance of these things doctrinally as the doctrine of the Trinity emerges in response to the historical act of the incarnation, Ibid., 151. This Trinitarian doctrine in turn offers assurance of the fact that it was God who was with us in Christ and that it is God who is present now by the Spirit. Ibid., 154. This focus on the being of God, rather than detached personal treatments of the divine persons, is something that McIntyre also retains. While there might be some divergence between the two in their respective treatments of atonement, we can still see Baillie’s influence on McIntyre in his insistence on the fact that the atonement and forgiveness are Christological concerns.

30Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946). The fact that McIntyre engages with this book so early is significant, if for no other reason than the way that the Barth v. Brunner debates were so dominant on the theological landscape during McIntyre’s career. On the one hand, it is somewhat surprising that McIntyre does not take up Brunner’s side of the debate when it comes to the loci of revelation. Where Barth insists on revelation being in Christ alone, Brunner argues for a wider distribution by affirming the revelatory function of creation, the Old Testament, Holy Scriptures, the Church, and the Spirit. While Barth’s position is more nuanced on these topics, there is a definite resistance to anything that might be construed as Natural Theology or anything that is construed as revelation apart from Christ. Given McIntyre’s own criticism of this aversion to natural theology and advocacy for an increased emphasis on creation and pneumatology, this would seem like a natural fit. The problem for McIntyre with Brunner lies at a more fundamental level in their philosophical frameworks and their understanding of history. McIntyre is frequently wary of the influence of Kierkegaard and Buber on Christian theology, whereas these are the primary sources that Brunner turns to at these junctures. For McIntyre the existential nature of Kierkegaard and the skepticism that justifies it stand opposed to the realism and idealism with which McIntyre operates. S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Whereas for McIntyre Buber’s emphasis on the “I and Thou” is helpful to a point, but falls short of acknowledging the distinctiveness of the divine encounter. Martin Buber, I and Thou (New Yok: Simon Schuster, 1996). It is safe to say that McIntyre’s relationships with both Barth and Brunner are complicated. Brunner’s more familiar systematic format is undercut by key philosophical differences, while Barth’s shared theological convictions are often undercut by the unique conclusions that Barth’s system sometimes produces.

of history, which he associates with Collingwood. He is critical of the sources of this type of skepticism, which he consistently blames on Kierkegaard and his *Unscientific Postscripts*. That said, there are significant developments between these texts and their final form in *The Christian Doctrine of History*. The fact is that the content of these particular publications remains largely unchanged.

In this early period most of McIntyre’s original and academic writings are focused on themes related to the two concerns of history and the atonement. For McIntyre these two themes are never far apart. On the one hand, there are the traditional issues surrounding the mechanics of atonement. Concepts like satisfaction are certainly concerns. However, part of McIntyre’s thesis here is that this concept is not singular in describing the actions of God for the purposes of atonement. There are a wide variety of images that are employed to elucidate an understanding of what atonement is. Part of the challenge that is posed by the problem of atonement is that the actions and functions of the process of atonement are historically inaccessible to people today. Thus the contemporary problem of the atonement is the accessibility of the atonement. Through the process of history Christ has become just as abstract and removed from us as the God that Christ is meant to reveal to us.

This is why it is not surprising to see these themes treated in tandem during these early years of publication. He is at once dealing with aspects of Anselm’s theology and problems of history. One the one hand he is engaging with Anselm’s method in the essay of the same name, “Remoto Christo,” as well as a survey of philosophical proofs of God, among them Anselm’s ‘ontological argument’ is significant. On the other hand, he is writing about “The Incredibility of Faith” and Brunner’s ideas on Christianity, civilization, and revelation.

1954 signals something of a shift for McIntyre from a biographical perspective. It is at this juncture that there appears to be a turn back towards Scotland. With the publication of *St Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo*, McIntyre raised his profile as an international scholar. The book was widely reviewed to much acclaim from a range of established scholars. A field like Anselm studies is a crowded field, and it is rare

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36 Notable reviews include Stuart Barton Babbage, Review of *St Anselm and His Critics* (London: Oliver, 1954), in *Reformed Theological Review* 17, no. 2 (1958): 55-56. Babbage at the time would have been the Dean of Melbourne Cathedral and the Principal of Ridley College, where he preceded Leon Morris. This is before he would go on to be one of the founding faculty members at Gordon Conwell Theological Seminary. A notable, if not unsurprising, positive review J. Baillie, Review of *St Anselm and His Critics*
for a work to have major and significant. This book was seen as having this kind of impact early on, and that view has been confirmed in the widespread use of the text in contemporary scholarship. McIntyre changed the way that *Cur Deus Homo* was and is read.  

Central to his thesis is the claim that *Cur Deus Homo* is not a formulation of an atonement theory. The work is more than simply an early scholastic response to figure out the problem of atonement. This is not to say that Anselm does not treat the problem of atonement in a more specific and methodological way than his primarily patristic predecessors. It is simply to say that Anselm is not so removed from the patristic tradition and/or so completely steeped in the scholastic movement for this to be a theoretical philosophical treatment of the subject.

Significant themes that contribute to this thesis are 1) the diversity of expression in Anselm’s account of the atonement 2) the centrality of Christological questions in the text 3) the defense of the freedom of God’s actions and in Christ’s actions against Aristotelian notions of necessity.

The first is concerned with defending Anselm against mis-categorization. The trope is that Anselm develops the concept of ‘satisfaction’ into an account of how the sins of humanity are atoned for through the satisfaction of God’s wrath in the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. The idea presented is that Anselm systematically works out how it must be that Christ’s sacrifice becomes necessary for atonement. Thus presenting a theory of how it is that the work of atonement functions.

In regards to the first point here, McIntyre points to the employment of other images by Anselm in order to offer expression to what God is doing in the work of atonement. While there are many things that could be indicated as key, such as the fact that there are other values that Anselm associates with Christ’s death that are separate from concerns about satisfying God’s wrath, the presence of Christ’s death as an exemplary act in Anselm

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indicates in a clear and substantial way that Christ's death is not solely about satisfaction. As McIntyre states directly:

St. Anselm introduces the Death of Christ as an example of steadfast perseverance in the way of righteousness, no matter the misery or the suffering which it entails. The popular distinction is drawn between subjective and objective theories of Atonement, and it is therefore of interest that St. Anselm, who is normally presented as an exponent of the latter should find a place within his scheme for the former.\(^{38}\)

The logic being that if God’s wrath is satisfied by Christ's death, why would his death serve as an exemplary act at all? The whole point is that people do not need to act in order to satisfy God’s wrath, because Christ has already satisfied it once and for all. Thus when Anselm presents Christ’s death as an exemplary act that we should follow, it must be for reasons and values other than satisfaction. For instance, Anselm writes of this function of example:

The general contention is that the Death of Christ does not have only a God-ward reference, nor is its significance exhausted in the fact that Christ offers it up as a gift to God by way of private transaction. His Death is a public event, with, as it were, a horizontal reference. It provides an example of the price that is to be paid by those who earnestly seek to obey God’s Will.\(^{39}\)

As a result McIntyre is right id defending Anselm from the anachronistic criticism of the *Cur Deus Homo* as an atonement theory.

In regards to the second point, McIntyre makes a strong case that the central theme of *Cur Deus Homo* is not the atonement *per se* but is instead Christology.\(^{40}\) It is all about the necessity of the incarnation *for salvation*, not the other way around.\(^{41}\) Christology is the prime concern. The efficacy of our salvation is what is accomplished in and by Christ in his incarnation, life, and death.

In regards to the third point, this turns the notion of necessity around. It is not a deterministic, causal necessity in which Christ is the passive object in an act of divine providence of the Father for our salvation. Instead, it is Christ (the Deus-Homo) acting in complete freedom to do whatever was necessary for our salvation. It is not something that is forced upon him from some external circumstance or logical proposition. Instead, it is an internal compulsion on the part of Christ to freely act in accordance with his being.\(^{42}\) Thus

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40 Ibid., 121-135.
41 Ibid., 117-120.
42 Ibid., 164-167. This both encompasses an understanding of necessity that is meant to preserve the voluntary nature of Christ’s sacrifice and as a means of maintaining the aseity of God in this act.
Christ is not the logical solution to a soteriological problem, but instead the free initiator of a salvation that satisfies any conceivable condition necessary for salvation.

What continues to set this book apart, is not only the radical re-interpretation that it contains, but also the active engagement with contemporary theological writers and issues. Not only did the work satisfy the critical expectations of Anselm scholars, it also inspired admiration from the theological community as representing a historically engaged theology. Here McIntyre offers contemporarily relevant theological engagement with figures like Barth, while still actively engaging with Anselm directly.

The publication of Anselm and His Critics also coincides with McIntyre’s first publication outside of the Reformed Theological Review. While McIntyre continued to write significant pieces for the review, the publication of “The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought” in the Scottish Journal of Theology seems to signal McIntyre’s interest in moving on from being strictly an Australian theologian and from being strictly an Anselm scholar. While moving back to Scotland was a hard personal decision for McIntyre, and while the prospect of staying in Australia was an appealing one for the McIntyre family, there certainly does seem to be a shift here. By the time John Baillie reviewed St Anselm and His Critics in The Journal of Theological Studies in 1956, the two of them were in correspondence about the possibility of McIntyre returning to New College.

The final bit of overlap is a three-part article on Christology and revelation that McIntyre publishes in the Reformed Theological Review from 1956-1957. In these three articles, McIntyre lays out a survey of scriptural concepts of revelation, a survey of contemporary thought on the subject of revelation, an analytic of what is meant by revelation, and finally there is an evaluation of the Christological implications of this analytic.

First, while a number of authors are surveyed, it is clear that the survey is primarily a response to Barth, secondarily to Brunner, and thirdly in response to their respondents. In many ways, McIntyre is rejecting attempts to side-step Barth. In this way, we can see the manner in which McIntyre could be said to be a Barthian. His approach is not without substantive critiques, but his acceptance is not complete either.

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43 The fact is that this is seen in the reception of this book. We can point to the engagement with the text by an established authority like G.R. Evans to see the continued impact that this work has had in that field. We can look to the review by Cailliet to see its importance to a philosophical as well as a theological understanding of Anselm. Finally, part of the reason that Baillie has such high praise for the book is the way that it keeps a weather eye on the relevance to the contemporary theological conversation.
44 Ibid., 24-38.
46 John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.2.3.
The key distinction that McIntyre makes is that a function of revelation in scriptural terms must be based on the idea that the life and existence of Christ observed must reveal something true about the nature of God's being in order for someone to know Christ and receive from Christ what is intended to be revealed.\textsuperscript{47} Without this disclosure of God's inner being, revelation is nothing more than an appreciation on the human side of the exceptional character of Christ's life and work.\textsuperscript{48}

Thus in response to A.M. Fairweather's \textit{The Word as Truth}, McIntyre is critical of the claim that all knowledge of God must be mediated by that which is outside of God.\textsuperscript{49} As such, there is no account of divine action in revelation. God is not revealing himself directly, and that revelation is not being directed by God. The media of revelation are always outside of God. However, this rejects the idea that Christ incarnate is a medium of revelation or the idea that Christ is himself God.

For McIntyre, Brunner's assertion that "Through God alone can God be known" takes not only the completely opposite position but also commits the completely opposite error.\textsuperscript{50} That is that in focusing on how God is revealed through God alone, however there is no "account of the part played by the other-than-God in the situation."\textsuperscript{51}

Barth, on the other hand, offers a complete account of the Biblical notion of revelation. The fact that "God reveals Himself through Himself" shows both the fact God is revealing himself and that it is through himself that God is revealed.\textsuperscript{52} There is no lapse in the revelatory pattern.

The criticism is not with the pattern of revelation itself but instead with the notion that the content of Christ as revelation is identical with the inner being of God. As a result the content of both become an abstraction, because there is no account of the reality in which revelation occurs. As McIntyre puts it, "Barth's analysis is very partial, e.g., he neglects the historical situation which is the basis of the occurrence of revelation" and "He does not appreciate the non-analytical character of the identification of God as incarnate in Jesus Christ with the essence of God."\textsuperscript{53} This provides the same basis for the mechanism that McIntyre uses to criticize Barth on the topics of Natural Theology or general revelation and

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{50} Emil Brunner, \textit{The Mediator} (London: Lutterworth, 1934).
\textsuperscript{51} John McIntyre, "Christology and Revelation III," \textit{Reformed Theological Review} 16 (1957), 46.
\textsuperscript{52} Karl Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics}, 31 vols. (London: T&T Clark, 2009), I/1, §8.
\textsuperscript{53} John McIntyre, "Christology and Revelation III," \textit{Reformed Theological Review} 16 (1957), 46.
on the undue onus that Barth’s system places on the doctrine of Christ (not necessarily the person of Christ) to hold the weight of all revelation.54

1957 was the final part of this pivotal transition. Besides the two final installations of his series for the *Reformed Theological Review*, 1957 was the year that *The Christian Doctrine of History* was published and the year that McIntyre gave his inaugural address “Frontiers of Meaning” at New College.

The publication of *The Christian Doctrine of History* in many ways is the culmination of the work that McIntyre had been doing up to this point in that it still functions as a mostly academic exercise. If anything it represents the last point at which McIntyre is writing in order to think himself out of his qualms with Barthian Christology. Once again, this is not a claim that he abandons Barth at this juncture, nor does it mean that McIntyre does not continue to take issue with Barth at key junctures. Instead, it crystallizes the problem that McIntyre has with Barth’s notion of revelation. McIntyre cites the Barthian claim that “God is the Lord” is the sole content of revelation.55 While McIntyre is in favor of the idea that the Lordship of God, sovereignty, and providence are “integrally involved in and revealed through the Revelation in Jesus Christ,” he is also concerned that this ultimately makes the incarnation ahistorical.56 McIntyre is also concerned that calls for strictly historical accounts of Christ are either equally atheological, or at least theoretically reductionistic. For McIntyre, it is the convergence of these two things that affirm both aspects of the historical nature of the incarnation as temporal moment and a fulfilling moment of providential and sovereign act. He writes that:

> It is not only that we are first sure of salvation in Jesus Christ, and that we argue inductively to the Lordship of God and to His providential guiding of the Universe as the grounds both of the actuality and the possibility for us of this salvation, but that the manner in which God works and reveals Himself in Jesus Christ *is* the manner in which He works providentially throughout the whole of history.57

For McIntyre, the reality of God Himself working in and within history does not make sense of history in terms of a theological narrative. Instead, it creates new problems of theological challenge when on the one hand God’s presence in the story complicates the story by creating meaninglessness where there was none before and creates meaning where no other meaning could be historically found.58

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55 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I/1, §9.
57 Ibid.
58 *CDH*, 114-115.
As such the incarnation functions as the culmination of God’s involvement in history. It is not the only event of God’s involvement, and is thus not the sole revelatory act of God in relation to people. However, it is central in that it epitomizes the way that our understanding of history must completely change in relation to Christ. This is not to say that tried and true historical methods must be abandoned. It is simply to say that a Christian doctrine of history must give theological account of historical realities and in turn condition those historical realities with theological import.

It is not surprising then, that in his inaugural lecture “Frontiers of Meaning” McIntyre decides to touch on the way that the discipline of theology functions in relation to other fields.\(^59\) This lecture signals a few things for McIntyre’s thought and career. First, there is continuity with his understanding of the relation of theology and history. Second, there is the belief that similar types of convergence can happen between and among theology and other fields of study. Third, there is a two-fold defense of what might be called the unique methods of theology and their place (along with the place of all theological education) in the university.

The first part of this is important in that it shows McIntyre’s desire and attempt to be consistent. It also shows that McIntyre is committed to systematic thinking. McIntyre is not just trying to paint himself out of a historical corner. Instead, he is thinking at the macro level about what exactly theology is and how it relates to broader systems of knowing. Thus it is not just about how theology relates to traditionally associated fields like history and philosophy. It is also about the way that theology relates to scientific fields and fields not traditionally associated with theology.\(^60\) One of the key areas that McIntyre sees promise for these types of interaction is the realm of method. For him, method more than anything is a place where the exchange of ideas can happen. As McIntyre puts it:

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\text{…the Church must come to terms with the difficulties and problems which she shares with her contemporaries across the frontiers…. namely, that the relation of Church language to ordinary language is not that of two fields of knowledge separated by frontiers of meaninglessness… Thus, it will be seen that it is not some special theological speech that it to fulfill this role, but the ordinary language and terminology of every day.\(^61\)}
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Method is the ultimate transferable skill, and it has the potential to both enrich theology as a discipline and inform other disciplines. Consequently, McIntyre sees method as a key area for theologians to be working in order to demonstrate their worth and place in the university setting and to establish themselves at the frontiers of meaning.


\(^{60}\) Ibid., 180.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 187.
That said, McIntyre is also offering something of an apology for the continued presence and relevance of theology in the university. A key part of this defense, for McIntyre, is defending the methods that are unique to theology. Not only is methodology a place of convergence among fields, but it is also a place of divergence. McIntyre argues that each field and discipline has methods that are unique to its own specific set of problems. Physics is allowed unique methods, along with Chemistry, Biology, Medicine, et cetera. Honing in on the idea of Philosophy of Religion, McIntyre advocates a kind of methodologically rigorous scholarship that both helps the church grapple with the challenges that she faces, while also communicating her central ideas in transferable language.

Philosophy of Religion is the Church’s taking seriously her responsibilities to this task of proclamation… We must affirm that Philosophy of Religion represents the Church’s attempt to understand her own message… to understand her own methodology and particularly her own criterion of truth and her methods of proof.62 Consequently, theology should not be singled out for using unique methods. Methods informed by faith and with different philosophical foundations are not anathemas to the credo of the university. For McIntyre, “If Philosophy of Religion can assist the Church in honouring these responsibilities, she will have gone a long way in keeping open those frontiers between theology and those proximate fields of study and action.”63 Instead, they are simply the unique methods of a field that has much to learn and much to contribute in a vibrant university community.

In many ways these arguments set the tone for his long tenure at the University of Edinburgh, and he backed up these claims by consistently looking for points of convergence with thought and culture, consistently defending the unique content of Christian theology, and by being deeply committed to enriching university life through his service. So it is not surprising that McIntyre’s earliest publications while in his post at Edinburgh deal explicitly with these themes.

He writes about the relationship between science and religion, he delves into the methodological aspects of analogy, and focuses on the structure of theological education. In many ways these early years are an outworking of the manifesto of his “Frontiers of Meaning” address. There is an argument for increased integration between science and religion, even if bias and mutual skepticism persist.64 McIntyre is outlining what he thinks

62 Ibid., 188-189.
63 Ibid., 190.
theological education should be and could be. And his work on analogy provides an early, accessible, interdisciplinary work that proves significant, as McIntyre increasingly views the content of theological inquiry as referentially analogical to God. This is especially true as the notion that “with the exception of the statement about Being Itself, all language about God is analogical” becomes a premise of his theological method and the implementation of imagination as a theological concept.

1962 present a strange convergence of publications for McIntyre. On the one hand, there is the publication of On the Love of God and the two part series in the Expository Times on “The Place of Imagination in Theology.”

In On the Love of God, McIntyre draws on familiar themes from both Anselm and His Critics and The Christian Doctrine of History. When McIntyre writes about God’s love in terms of commitment, he interprets classical concepts of necessity and providence he originally treated in Anselm and His Critics and interprets them in terms of God’s love; and when McIntyre writes about God’s love as identification, he is developing the term that he uses in The Christian Doctrine of History to describe the historical nature of the incarnation beyond fulfillment. However, in On the Love of God McIntyre also develops themes that foreshadow his later theological method and areas of interest.

There are two things that stand out in On the Love of God in regards to the way that it is formative in the development of McIntyre’s thought. First, there are proto-elements of McIntyre’s mature method in the work. Here he is already using the notion of the given in much the same way that he does in his later works, and he makes reference to

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67 This is a line from Tillich that McIntyre references in SOC, 62. It is interesting to note that this is not the only time that McIntyre employs Tillich in an axiomatic manner while at the same time never offering any substantive engagement with his work. For Tillich “The knowledge of revelation, directly or indirectly is knowledge of God, and therefore it is analogous or symbolic. The nature of this kind of knowing is dependent on the nature of the relation between God and the world.” Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967), vol. 1, 131. While this might be viewed as a liberal statement in the context of 20th century theology, both authors refer back to the classical concept of the analogia entis to defend their respective positions.
68 John McIntyre, “The Place of Imagination in Theology I,” Expository Times 74, no. 1 (1962), 16-21 this was followed in the same year by “The Place of Imagination in Theology II,” Expository Times 74, no. 2 (1962), 36-39. These two papers consist of the content of the four lectures that McIntyre prepared for the McCahan Lectures in Belfast in May of 1962. This marks the beginning of the long saga of preparation that led to the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination in 1987.
69 That said, I would not agree with Kevin Vanhoozer, who at least implies, that McIntyre is already using the concepts of ‘models’ as a methodological device in On the Love of God (London: Harper, 1962). This mention of McIntyre’s presentation of loves as being presented in six models was originally published in his introduction to the edited volume Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); but it was placed in the broader context of his own work, First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: IVP, 2002).
understanding the love of God in terms of a variety of concepts being ‘multi-faceted.’ This is a concept that McIntyre uses heavily when discussing models later, especially in *The Shape of Soteriology.* That said McIntyre eventually uses the concept of models in a very particular and technical way in his later writings. The fact that McIntyre’s terminology in *On the Love of God* reflects his later terminology in the implementation of models is not the same as using models in general, especially as a highly developed methodological concept. Consequently, the idea of models should not be read back into *On the Love of God* too directly when one is interpreting this book as it was written.

Second, *On the Love of God* provides an insight into McIntyre’s thought in that it is his closest thing to a complete theology. Of all of his writings, it does the most to integrate the broadest range of doctrines into a cohesive whole. As such, it also contains his most complete and distinct doctrine of God. This does not mean that *On the Love of God* provides a complete doctrine of God or that it was ever intended to do so. What it does mean for this study is that it provides a broader theological context and framework within which to locate McIntyre’s Christology. It shows the prominence of Christology in his thought as a whole and provides reasons for why Christology is such a central focus of McIntyre’s work moving forward.

Despite the fact that *On the Love of God* is still not representative of McIntyre’s mature thought, I would still argue that it does signal the beginning of McIntyre’s constructive theological project. For example, it does not include any mention of Imagination, a fact that McIntyre himself later expressed as something he would have changed by the time he was writing *Faith, Theology and Imagination.* That said, the less measured style of this earlier work shows McIntyre at his most direct and impassioned. In many ways this allows *On the Love of God* to function as a manifesto of sorts, even if it does prove to be a mild one.

The fact that the essays on imagination are published the same year is significant, because this, more than anything else shows a distinct change in McIntyre’s thinking from 1962 to the publication of *Faith, Theology and Imagination.* On the one hand, there is consistency in the sense that the content of these essays are not substantially different from the content in *Faith, Theology and Imagination.* What McIntyre says in these essays is representative of his later position. What transpires over those twenty-five years though is significant, because it provides McIntyre ample time and opportunity to develop his thought. What emerge are not different ideas but an expansion of those ideas.

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72 This is in reference to his published works. There are notable exceptions that might be noted in McIntyre’s preaching, where his style is more direct. John McIntyre, *The McIntyre Papers* AA.4.1.11.
This happens to such a degree that in 1962 McIntyre is able to publish both *On the Love of God* and his McCahan Lectures on “The Place of Imagination in Theology.” By 1987 McIntyre is ready to re-write the entirety of *On the Love of God* in terms of imagination, as a response to the further development of the place and function as not only a divine perfection but a divine perfection that has an integral role in accounting for other divine activity. As a result, I am inclined to argue against any inclusion of *On the Love of God* as part of McIntyre’s systematic theological project. While valuable to understanding what McIntyre thought in a historical, developmental sense, there are key components of McIntyre’s systematic project that are certainly not in place at this juncture. In many ways the publication of the McMahan lectures makes this painfully obvious, in that McIntyre while heading in a certain direction is not yet willing to take imagination to all of the places the he is 25 years later.

It is not until 1966 that we see another major publication from McIntyre. The publication of the first edition of *The Shape of Christology* in 1966 marks the beginning of what might be considered McIntyre’s mature theological work. Originally developed as the Warfield Lectures, presented at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1965, this work marks the first that I would include in McIntyre’s overall theological project. It introduces a structure and method that McIntyre would go on to use in his treatment of soteriology and pneumatology. There is a consistent focus on formulating theology in light of the *given* of Christology; McIntyre is employing a fully developed method of using *models* to formulate that theology; he discusses different ways that the employment of models gives a shape and image to presentations of theology; and there is an employment of the type of *imagination* that McIntyre was a proponent of.

The only reticence that one might have in classifying this work as representative of McIntyre’s thought is found in the fact that the second edition of this work includes substantial additions to the first edition. Additionally, there is the question of time. It was not until 1987 that his next book, *Faith, Theology and Imagination*, was published; and it was not until 1998 that the second edition of *The Shape of Christology* was published. These gaps, and all that fills them, provide a particular challenge to treating the first edition of *The Shape of Christology* in relation to McIntyre’s other mature works, since it has its own distinct historical context. However, the similarities between this book and McIntyre’s later writings

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74 In fact, the only publication during that time period is John McIntyre, Review of *God is No More*, by Werner and Lotte Pelz (Philadelphia, 1962), in *Expository Times* 74 (1963): 230.
are much more direct that any associations that it has with the earlier writings already discussed.

This is highlighted by the fact that the two editions of *The Shape of Christology* are basically similar in the content that they share in common. The first edition was originally organized into seven chapters. In the second edition the first six chapters from the first edition are grouped into two parts. The first three chapters are grouped into a section on “Christological Method.” The fourth through sixth chapters are grouped into a section on “Chalcedon-Based Models” of Christology. The seventh chapter from the first edition serves as a conclusion to that edition, but it is used only as a conclusion to the first part of the second edition. As such, the first three chapters of the first edition and the conclusion to the first edition form the core of the common material between these two editions.

The main differences in content/subject-matter between the two editions are more directly related to the *Sitz im Leben* of each edition more than to drastic changes in McIntyre’s thought. For instance, when McIntyre is writing the first edition his primary points of interaction are with the traditional “Two-Nature Model,” “The Psychological Model,” and “The Revelation Model.” For 1966, these models are fully integrated into contemporary concerns about Christology. It shows an active interaction with the Barthian proponents of a revelatory Christology and the fallout that it caused. By the time McIntyre wrote the second edition, McIntyre is not content to rehearse these concerns. He offers an even larger evaluation of Process Christology and what he terms “Neo-Chalcedonian” christologies. These areas of concern are developments in the field that postdate the original publication and demonstrate McIntyre’s continued engagement with the field of Christology. However, the reception and reading of the first edition in light of the second edition is a broader topic than the one being addressed here. Suffice it to say that while not McIntyre’s final word on Christology, the first edition is a foundation and important work for understanding McIntyre, his theology, and all of his subsequent works.

Despite the fact that 1966-1987 represents a gap in the publication of monographs, McIntyre was very active during this period of time. It was during this time that McIntyre was

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76 By this McIntyre is simply referring to authors or works contemporary to him that support a return to or a reformulation of the Chalcedonian definition. While there are other authors and works that could have been used, McIntyre focuses on John Macquarrie, *Jesus Christ in Modern Thought* (London: SCM, 1990) and Gerald O’Collins, *Christology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995).
heavily engaged in a variety of administrative roles. This included his involvement in the administration of New College. He served as the Principal of New College and was the Dean of the Faculty of Divinity from 1968-1974. In this capacity he took on major renovations of the facilities and was active in managing the property. He is also notable for the introduction of Religious Studies as a subject at New College. It proved to be significant for the future of New College in offering a broader range of subjects and in diversifying the faculty to meet the demands of the new subject area. It was also significant that the theology and religions faculties were integrated, which was not the case at many universities. McIntyre was also instrumental in diversifying the theology faculty at New College by supporting the appointment of Noel O'Donoghue and James Mackey the first Roman Catholic to the New College Faculty and the first Roman Catholic to hold a chair at New College respectively.\textsuperscript{77} However, this commitment to expansion and innovation was always balanced by a commitment to the tradition of New College as a place of training ordination candidates for the Church of Scotland and to his role as an educator.

McIntyre also engaged in roles within the university outside of New College. He was the first Senior Warden of Pollock Halls and served in this capacity during construction. His place in the university is highlighted by his stints as acting Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the university at two key junctures, in 1974-5 and again in 1979, when the university was in need of someone to fill these roles. A tribute to the extent and appreciation of this service is the naming of the McIntyre Centre in Pollock Halls after John McIntyre. Given his extensive involvement, there was no question of whether the divinity faculty was fully integrated into university life.

In addition to his responsibilities within the university, McIntyre was very active as a minister in Church of Scotland. He frequently preached in churches around Scotland, and was involved in the training of ordination candidates. He served as both the Dean of the Order of the Thistle and as Chaplain to the Queen in Scotland from 1975 until 1986,\textsuperscript{78} and in 1982 he served as the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.\textsuperscript{79} It was in his capacity as Moderator that he welcomed Pope John Paul II in the New College courtyard, during his historic visit to Scotland.

The temptation biographically at this juncture is to acknowledge the gap in writing production and to attribute that relative silence to the busyness of McIntyre’s university and ecclesiastical career. This was a time that McIntyre took on major responsibilities for the

\textsuperscript{77} Gary Badcock and David Wright eds., Disruption to Diversity: Edinburgh Divinity 1846-1996 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996).
\textsuperscript{78} John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.6
\textsuperscript{79} John McIntyre, The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.5.1
college and for the university. His years of service and the toll they took on his ability to complete work and research should not be underestimated. However, I would argue that it also indicates a shift in the way that McIntyre approaches themes that he had already been thinking about, lecturing about, and to at least some degree writing about.

While the reception of the first edition of *The Shape of Christology* was largely positive, there is something to be said for the fact that, the reviews at least, missed the point.\textsuperscript{80} I think it can be argued that McIntyre was already working with the concept of imagination in place.\textsuperscript{81} The popularity of the concept of models at that particular juncture made his research seem apropos to the time, and I think that connection between the two things was implicit and obvious. The fact that the reviewers and his general readership did not see the connection or note that he was proposing and indeed doing something substantially different than his colleagues like Barbour, Ramsay, et al., posed a problem for McIntyre. In a sense the lack of comprehension of *The Shape of Christology* demonstrated to McIntyre the fact that he was going to need to provide his work with a much stronger philosophical, methodological, and conceptual foundation.

While it was certainly something that he had thought about, and it was certainly something that was part of his work as a lecturer and preacher, McIntyre was not prepared at that early juncture to provide that foundation. This at least contributes to the slow release of *Faith, Theology and Imagination* nearly twenty years later. It also explains why we see a

\textsuperscript{80} It is possible that the reception of the 1\textsuperscript{st} edition sends McIntyre back to the drawing board. While this is speculative, if McIntyre does have a larger agenda in mind when he writes *The Shape of Christology* there is no indication that is recognized in the reception literature. The reviews for the first edition are widely positive. C. Brown, Review of *The Shape of Christology* (London: SCM, 1966), in *Churchman* 80, no. 3 (1966): 224-225; E.L. Mascall, Review of *The Shape of Christology* (London: SCM, 1966), in *Church Quarterly Review* 167, no. 365 (1966): 499-501; and C. Miller, Review of *The Shape of Christology* (London: SCM, 1966), in *Reformed Theological Review* 25, no. 3 (1966): 111-112. All offer reviews of a positive but generally vague sort. The review, John Macquarrie, Review of *The Shape of Christology* (London: SCM, 1966), in *Expository Times* 78, no. 3 (1966): 78-79; is the most engaged and in some ways most critical. Macquarrie seems most aware of the implications of what McIntyre what is saying, especially in relation to the minority reading of Chalcedon that he provides in relationship to Ephraim of Antioch. Macquarrie makes some attempt to raise the alarm without attacking McIntyre too directly. However, Macquarrie's Christology is examined in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition and evaluated according to its accordance with the criteria of Chalcedon, which in turn prompted two reviews from Macquarrie, Review of *The Shape of Christology* (London: SCM, 1966), in *Expository Times* 110, no. 6 (1999): 193; and Review of *The Shape of Christology* (London: SCM, 1966), in *Theology* 102, no. 806 (1999): 138-139. If that is the case, it would make sense that McIntyre would need to offer additional signposting and background before moving forward with his theological project. *Faith, Theology and Imagination* certainly offers the context and background that the 'Shape of' books do not have without it. In the case of the 1\textsuperscript{st} edition, this 'background' is simply provided \textit{post facto}.

\textsuperscript{81} The McCahan lectures that are the original core of *Faith, Theology and Imagination* were first presented in 1962. What appears to be a slightly modified version of these is in *The McIntyre Papers*, AA.4.14.15. These are dated 1967-1969, and may be the lectures that McIntyre presented at the centenary celebration of St. Andrew's College, Sydney. In either case, the concept of imagination is firmly established as a theme in and around this same time period.
greater amount of focus in the smaller publications and the lectures that McIntyre produces during this time period.

One of the roles that McIntyre fills is that of a representative of both reformed and Scottish Christianity. One example of this is his being selected to represent religious life in Scotland in a series on “Current Theology Around the World.”\(^{82}\) It also falls to him to write an obituary for Karl Barth in *The Scotsman* in 1968.\(^{83}\) That said, there are still some example of his engaging with his own work outside of the classroom. This continues to be represented in a very wide range. One of the great honors that he received as an Anselm scholar was his invitation to contribute to the volume *Sola ratione: Anselm Studien.*\(^{84}\) This was a volume in honor of F.S. Schmitt in celebration of his 75\(^{th}\) birthday. Schmitt was the editor and translator of the authoritative Latin text of Anselm’s works. The community of Anselm scholarship always had a special hold on McIntyre, and this is an honor that shows how that relationship was reciprocated.

Another project that McIntyre held dear was his work on *Prophet of Penitence: John McLeod Campbell Our Contemporary Ancestor.*\(^{85}\) McLeod Campbell was a theologian that McIntyre admired tremendously. Not only was their overlap in the content of their theological interests, there was a shared outlook. McIntyre saw something of himself in McLeod Campbell that made this a deeply personal project.

Some of the publications during this time period are more mundane. McIntyre helped fill the pages of the *New College Bulletin; New College Newsletter;* and the *University of Edinburgh Journal.*\(^{86}\) However, McIntyre still managed to write on the topic of imagination. A sermon of his from 1973, “How Shall We Picture the Kingdom,” was published in *Liturgical Review,* and it contains the closest thing to a lay explanation of imagination that McIntyre provides.\(^{87}\) In it he clearly and concisely states how the images that God presents himself in are valuable as the images, as products of God’s imagination, and not just for what they signify.\(^{88}\) In a more academic context his essays “Theology and Method” and “New Help


\(^{88}\) Ibid., 18.
from Kant: Theology and Human Imagination" offer significant insight to the way that the concept of imagination is continuing to develop.\textsuperscript{89} While these two essays do not address the idea of imagination as divine perfection, they do show a significant maturation of McIntyre’s thinking on imagination.

This consistent treatment of the subject of imagination helped establish McIntyre’s reputation as an expert on theological imagination both before and after the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination.\textsuperscript{90}

With the publication of Faith, Theology and Imagination in 1987, McIntyre’s production of monographs increases. With the overarching structure of Faith, Theology and Imagination there does seem to be a more concrete direction. This is not to say that Faith, Theology and Imagination did not have a complex origin story of its own.\textsuperscript{91} It is simply to say that it marks the end of something of a drought, whether we attribute that exclusively to the business of his schedule and duties or whether we accept that this was the final result of a long, belabored labor of love.

Apart from book reviews, McIntyre only publishes one additional paper before the publication of the The Shape of Soteriology in 1992, and that is a return to the christology of D.M. Baillie in a volume organized by D.W.D. Shaw. The Shape of Soteriology itself is an interesting book in that there are two ways to read the book. The first is to read the book as a sort of introduction to the field of soteriology. There is a solid survey of traditional atonement theories. They are presented in almost exclusively positive light, even if structural shortcomings are acknowledged as each one reaches the limits of the analogy it provides. The second, takes a second look and realizes that McIntyre is slowly but surely making significant claims about the field of soteriology itself. It is an example of how McIntyre’s quiet, steady, unassuming style sometimes allows his ideas to fly under the radar.


\textsuperscript{91}This book notably began as the McGahan Lecture in Belfast in 1962. The content of this lecture was published in two parts in Expository Times in two parts under the title “The Place of Imagination in Theology.” This original core was later developed into a series of four lectures for the centenary celebrations at St. Andrew's College Sydney. Further development of the philosophical material took place in 1977-1978, which McIntyre spent in residence with the Philosophy Department of the University of New England, New South Wales, while on sabbatical. The remainder of his sabbatical was spent at Princeton Theological Seminary was spent developing the more theological aspects. The final stage appears to be a push for publication after this material was reworked as the Margaret Harris Lectures on Religion in 1984. It is this long path to publication that, in conjunction with other work and responsibilities, precludes any notion that this was a sparse period in McIntyre’s overall production. It is also clear that much of the material that he developed along the way influenced his course lectures on imagination, pneumatology, and hermeneutics.
Most of the reviews of *The Shape of Soteriology* are positive, however most of them only acknowledge the first reading to any significant degree.\(^2\) One notable exception on this front is David Fergusson, who is keenly aware of the fact the McIntyre is operating on two different levels.\(^3\)

Once again, there is a relatively short time between the publication of *The Shape of Soteriology* and *The Shape of Pneumatology* in 1997. Once again, the period between publications was not particularly full. With the exception of book reviews, McIntyre’s sole contribution during this period is a chapter on historical criticism submitted to a volume in honor of his former colleague and longtime friend James Barr.\(^4\) Barr was an early ally of McIntyre when he first returned to New College, and McIntyre hated to see him and his family go.

The year 1997 is a significant year for any treatment of McIntyre and his theology for a number of reasons. Not only did it mark the publication of *The Shape of Pneumatology*, but it also marked the release of *Theology After the Storm* which brought to light earlier works of McIntyre’s that had remained unpublished. The impetus for the release of this book was the work of Gary Badcock. He is credited with finding the manuscripts in a drawer at New College.\(^5\) He deserves additional credit for seeing the value of what he found, and putting in tireless work with McIntyre to bring them up to date for publication. Given McIntyre’s notoriously meticulous habits, attention to detail, and sometimes fastidious habits this was no small feat. In addition to this work, Badcock also offers the first critical introduction to McIntyre’s theology, which for many will be their first and in some cases only, exposure to McIntyre as an independent theological thinker. As such, it is in an invaluable resource. The book was released to unanimously positive reviews by David Fergusson, George Newlands, and Fergus Kerr.\(^6\)

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It also appears that the release of *Theology After the Storm* contributed to heightened interest in *The Shape of Pneumatology* given the fact that this is the most reviewed book of any of McIntyre’s works. Of these, it is the later review by Badcock that merits additional attention. Namely, Badcock deserves credit for noting the fact that the publication of *The Shape of Pneumatology* demonstrates the ‘Shape of’ books have graduated beyond the realm of occasional, unrelated publications. Badcock suggests that the ‘Shape of’ books in conjunction with *On the Love of God and Faith, Theology and Imagination* constituted the closest thing to a complete systematic theology to be composed in Britain in the 20th century. While this is a high claim, it illustrates the potential the Badcock sees in the constructive value of McIntyre’s thought.

The following year marks the publication of the 2nd edition of *The Shape of Christology*. This opportunity was something of a surprise for McIntyre. It was not something that he initially considered doing, but it was something that his publisher approached him about. McIntyre took full advantage of the opportunity and offered a significantly revised and updated version. Unfortunately, this was widely dismissed as a reprint. The major exception of this was John Macquarrie who wrote multiple reviews of the updated edition. His interest was somewhat personal. Macquarrie had been critical of the first edition, and his own Christology was subsequently featured in McIntyre’s updates. While the exchange remained civil, it is clear that Macquarrie took exception.

The remaining publications are primarily related to history, though there is some indication that McIntyre was developing something of an interest in the doctrine of creation. However, how involved this interest was remains unclear. While McIntyre published and spoke widely and freely, he carefully curated the final products. Each of the ‘Shape of’ books is the product of a long development. This is especially true of *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. However, it can also be seen in the exacting process of releasing *Theology*...
After the Storm and the thorough redevelopment of the 2nd edition of *The Shape of Christology*.

3. Summary

This concludes the first part of the thesis, which is the survey. This survey has offered a brief biographical introduction to John McIntyre and a review of his theological publications. The purpose of these two components is to provide context for the argument that *Faith, Theology and Imagination; The Shape of Christology; The Shape of Soteriology;* and *The Shape of Pneumatology* are part of a single theological vision. *Faith, Theology and Imagination* lays out this vision, and the other ‘Shape of’ books are further developments of this singular theological vision.

The second part will consist of chapters 2-5. These chapters are going to break down the components of this theological system. This starts with the theological vision that McIntyre lays out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. It will be argued that the key claim of this book is found in McIntyre’s definition of imagination as a theological category. This begins with the central and unique claim that imagination is a divine perfection of God’s being. This in turn informs the way that McIntyre begins to propose how the concept of imagination might inform and be formulated into a doctrine of God, a doctrine of creation, a doctrine of the incarnation, a doctrine of the atonement, and a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

It will then be argued that the ‘Shape of’ books are an outworking of this theological vision. This is done somewhat retroactively in *The Shape of Christology*, since the first edition predates the publication of *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. That said, there are two reasons this is not necessarily problematic. One, there is evidence that McIntyre was working in the area and on the concept of imagination before the first edition of *The Shape of Christology* is published. Two, the second edition of *The Shape of Christology* is significantly reworked in ways that are compliant with the vision laid out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*.

The other ‘Shape of’ books follow this pattern more explicitly, since they do not have the added complexity of timeline. Thus it will be argued that *The Shape of Soteriology* gives further shape and definition to McIntyre’s claim from *Faith, Theology and Imagination* that imagination is a category of the atonement. Key to this claim is the argument that McIntyre’s use of the concept of models function as a methodological placeholder for imagination. This is especially important in an evaluation of *The Shape of Soteriology*, since this is McIntyre’s most explicit and sophisticated presentation of the concept.
This second part will conclude with the argument that *The Shape of Pneumatology* is an outworking of McIntyre’s claim in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* that imagination is a category of the Holy Spirit.

This is the final piece that concludes the overall argument of part two that the development of imagination in McIntyre’s thought is a pivotal concept that allows us to see McIntyre’s work as a single project. Before the emergence of this concept that was not possible. It is only in light of this concept, that McIntyre’s works begin to take shape into a unified whole.

The third and final part of this thesis will argue two things. One, it will argue that McIntyre’s theological vision laid out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* is incomplete. Specifically, it does not offer a complete formulation or outworking of a doctrine of God or a doctrine of creation. Two, it will argue that McIntyre provides a starting point for developing these two unrealized areas of his theological vision.

In *Faith, Theology and Imagination* McIntyre makes an argument for imagination being a divine perfection, but this claim and idea is not given fuller shape like the doctrines of Christology, pneumatology, and soteriology.

This is also true of the doctrine of creation, and this creates problems of consistency within McIntyre’s system. On the one hand, a fuller presentation of the doctrine of creation could be helpful in highlighting traditional notions of imagination and imaginative activity to the divine activity of creation. On the other hand, without a fuller presentation of the doctrine of creation McIntyre’s focus on imagination as a component of the *imago Dei* is absent, which is in its own right a foundational idea upon which McIntyre bases the idea that a theological method and epistemology should begin with imagination. Ultimately, the lack of a doctrine of creation represents the fact that McIntyre’s system is by no means complete and is in need of significant development and rehabilitation before it can be formulated into any type of fully fledged theological system.

Once these gaps have been identified, the final task becomes proposing a way to fill them. The argument that this thesis will conclude with is two-fold. First, it will be argued that in order to fill the gap left by an undeveloped doctrine of God in McIntyre’s theological system in a way that is true to McIntyre’s own theological vision, a doctrine of God must be formulated in which imagination is a divine perfection and that his book *On the Love of God* must be re-interpreted in terms of imagination. This is what McIntyre has in mind when he is making the claim for the primacy of imagination in the being of God as a divine perfection *par excellence*.

Second, it will be argued that the doctrine of creation must not simply be a development of the outline provided in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. Any doctrine of
creation developed along McIntyrian lines must take into account one of the major breakthrough claims of *The Shape of Pneumatology*, that any full account of creation must incorporate the presence, activity, and agency of the Holy Spirit in the divine activity of creation.

Finally, it will be argued that McIntyre’s theology proposes a theological vision that is incomplete but also one that is still a live option. We are fortunate that McIntyre's central claim is a beginning and not an end. The idea that imagination is a divine perfection of God is not a conclusion that simply adds to the list of tried and true divine attributes. Instead, it is a claim central to the being and activity of God that invites a total re-imagination of who we understand God to be in those terms.
Part II: Analysis and Interpretation

Chapter 2: Faith, Theology and Imagination

1. Introduction: Imagination as a Theological Category

Here we begin to outline the key parts of McIntyre’s corpus that relate to each other as a cohesive theological system. The foundational claim for this cohesion is found in McIntyre’s definition of imagination as a theological category. This begins with the central and unique claim that imagination is a divine perfection of God’s being. This in turn informs the way that McIntyre begins to propose how the concept of imagination might inform and be formulated into a doctrine of God, a doctrine of creation, a doctrine of the incarnation, a doctrine of the atonement, and a doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Once this central claim has been established, it will then be argued that the ‘Shape of’ books are an outworking of this theological vision.

The important thing to remember with McIntyre is that imagination is not merely a methodological mechanism or an epistemological faculty. The central claim of McIntyre’s theological system is that imagination is itself a theological category. While imagination does play a major role in his theological methodology and is certainly a part of his account of epistemology, it is the claim that imagination is a part of the subject and object of theological inquiry that completely sets his understanding of imagination apart.

Whereas there is a long list of theologians who pay lip service to the importance of imagination to theology, the importance is solely about epistemology and method.¹ For

¹ This is true of the historical, philosophical development of the concept of imagination as well as more contemporary treatments. This is part of what makes MacDonald such an obvious ally for McIntyre. There are of course other possible historical allies. Kant provides some interesting possibilities, which McIntyre notes in John McIntyre, “New Help from Kant; Theology and Human Imagination” in ed. Mackey Religious Imagination (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1986). That said, it is not an avenue that he pursues further when he publishes Faith, Theology and Imagination the following year. This is probably related to McIntyre’s reticence to identify to fully with any philosophical framework. There is also Schelling, who Mary Warnock credits as the first and most significant innovator of relating the task of imagination to religion. Coleridge also provides a life options, but his Scottish counterpart proves a better ally. That said, Kant’s concept of imagination at its most compatible in The Critique of Judgement is still an epistemological exercise, even if it does offer us an account of encountering ‘the sublime.’ Schelling drawing on the idealist tradition, even in his application of similar epistemological functions to the divine as well as the sublime, does not transfer the concept of imagination as proper to the being of the divine in any way. Thus from a historical perspective, MacDonald does present as a singularly unique source. McIntyre mentions other sources that were contemporary to him. Alistair Hannay, Mental Images a Defense (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971); Ray Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination (New York: Herder, 1974); and David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1981). Tracy’s work
McIntyre, he is always moving the concept of imagination above and beyond mere methodology. For him it is more than actively working to understand God. Imagination is more than an affirmation of the human coefficient in knowing God. Rather, it is a radical affirmation of the belief that God is himself imaginative and that as a result the concept of imagination should be understood as a category of the content of theology itself.

First, there is the basic idea of imagination as a theological category. This is simply enough to distinguish McIntyre’s notion of imagination from most theological accounts of probably comes the closest to the type of imagination that McIntyre is interested in, in that it accounts for the analogical nature of imagination, which in the context of theology maintains an appropriate distance between the content of theology and the subject of theology. That said, this is still completely epistemological. Among his contemporaries, it is Mary Warnock who provides the most aligned stream of thought. Her highly integrated notion of imagination as not only epistemological but also creative and generative provided a compatibility with McIntyre’s thinking that was largely absent among his theological contemporaries. In more recent years, there are four authors whose works stand out as the most significant contributions when it comes to theology and the religious imagination: David Brown, Garrett Green, William Cavanaugh, and Douglass Hedley. David Brown’s project is the most ambitious in scope. His has two volumes that treat the topic of imagination in a theological context. The first volume, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), comprises of a two-pronged argument. The first part of this argument is that the Christological narrative follows common narrative, revelatory patterns, and that this provides an opportunity for current Christological investigations to incorporate and adapt contemporary equivalents. This does moves somewhat beyond the purely epistemological construction of imagination, in that theology is being formulated through the implementation of imagination. That said, at no point is there any indication that God is imaginative. It is only by appealing to other previous efforts at human, imaginative thinking about God that Brown advocates for similar types of anthropocentric endeavors. This is not to say that Brown’s account of imagination is not worthwhile. In the second volume, Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Brown offers a series of studies that function like case studies of his imaginative method. While the actual method might differ, such studies promise to offer invaluable insights to anyone exploring what an imaginative encounter with key theological themes might look like. Garrett Green’s study, Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), is notable for a number of reasons. His work comes close after McIntyre’s, but there is no indication that he is using McIntyre. This is perhaps an unfortunate oversight, given that there is much between the two that could be seen as compatible. Green roots his approach to imagination in the philosophical tradition, finds alliance in the implementation of imagination in the physical sciences, and even goes so far as to relate imagination to ‘The Meaning of Revelation’ and writes in this context about Christ as the image of God. However, after coming that far and that close does not extrapolate that to mean that the incarnation is an imaginative act on the part of God or that God would need to be imaginative in order to be present in and as such an image. The strongest conclusion that Green is able to make on this point is that "we only have access to the embodied image of God only by way of the imagination of the original witnesses." Ibid, 104. In some ways, Green is concluding this line of inquiry where McIntyre began The Christian Doctrine of History, the question of how we access a historically obscured revelatory act. Douglas Hedley is the most recent of these scholars. His work, The Iconic Imagination (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), is the most recent. While his work is more closely related to aesthetics and the ability to represent religious ideas in the form of images, this volume could prove an ally for McIntyre’s thought moving forward. The idea that art itself can be theological is very similar to the way that McIntyre writes about art. The key point of convergence that Hedley presents is the idea that divine attributes can be expressed as image. While this is still a matter of theology from below, this work does present a possible point for convergence. The reason that more time has not been allocated to these works within McIntyre’s account is that McIntyre’s account distinguishes itself as being singularly unique in attributing imagination to God as a divine perfection. These concerns raised by McIntyre’s predecessors, contemporaries, and successors are ultimately secondary concerns to McIntyre’s main thesis.
imagination. The challenge moving beyond this distinguishing characteristic is the locus of imagination. It is a challenge that McIntyre struggles with at a number of different junctures. The most crucial being when he relates imagination to the doctrine of God. Here McIntyre desperately wants to locate imagination as central and prime to God’s being and action, however he does not always do so consistently.

Consequently, we will trace that conflict here and offer a synthesis of McIntyre’s positions that offers a consistent framework of imagination that aligns with the more central locus of imagination as the impetus of God’s love. This central location of the concept of imagination within the being of God allows us to draw much stronger connections between the areas of theology that McIntyre does address, namely creation, Christology, soteriology, and Pneumatology.

For McIntyre, the task of theology and kerygmatic proclamation is not merely a prophetic task of espousing divinely dictated precepts of divine truth; instead it is the process necessary for working through the inherent difficulties of expressing that which cannot be expressed. That which one cannot know must be imagined, and God is indeed unknowable. McIntyre sees this task as so fundamental to the work of theology that he concludes in Faith, Theology and Imagination that Imagination is something that we employ when contemplating God, “whether we acknowledge it or not.”

What McIntyre does with Imagination, is to locate it at the very core of theology in God’s own existence, God’s work of creation, in the incarnation, in the work of atonement, and in the work of the Holy Spirit. In each instance the intensity and import of this imaginative element is heightened and elevated to something so pervasive that it permeates the entirety of the life of God and every human response that seeks to know and understand him.

Drawing on the tradition of 19th century British romantics, McIntyre finds an ally and impetus for his cause in the Scottish writer George MacDonald (most recently of C.S. Lewis fame). Here there are many points that McIntyre treats as touchstones, but there are some key discoveries that resonate throughout the rest of Faith, Theology and Imagination.

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2 John McIntyre, Faith, Theology and Imagination (Edinburgh: Handsel, 1987), 175.
3 George MacDonald, A Dish of Orts (London: Edwin Dalton, 1908). The influence of MacDonald on McIntyre is difficult to estimate. On the one hand, there are clear echoes of MacDonald’s view of imagination in McIntyre. On the other hand, it is unclear if MacDonald is a carefully selected ally or a seminal thinker in McIntyre’s development of the concept. MacDonald is quite different from many of the sources with whom McIntyre usually engages. As a 19th Century Scottish Romantic, MacDonald is enamored of his German Predecessors, especially Novalis. He is a poet and author of everything from children’s fairytales like The Princess and Curdie or The Light Princess, to dark novels like Lillith, and written sermons. In either case, MacDonald provides McIntyre with a number of things. First, he provides McIntyre with a relatively neutral interlocutor. Rather than dealing directly with Kant, Schelling, or Coleridge who all come with considerable philosophical, theological, and academic baggage;
The first point is that imagination is an attribute of God and is an integral part of the *imago Dei*; and as such, God is himself the ultimate source of imagination and is its ultimate subject. As MacDonald writes:

> The imagination of man is made in the image of the imagination of God. Everything of man must have been of God first; and it will help much towards our understanding of the imagination and its functions in man if we first succeed in regarding aright the imagination of God, in which the imagination of man lives and moves and has its being.  

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Here imagination is grounded in God’s being, and imagination is an expression of that being in people as God’s creation. This is something that resonates in McIntyre’s own subsequent writing on the subject and that McIntyre makes even more explicit in his presentation of imagination as a theological category.

The second point is rooted in MacDonald’s presentation of imagination as a task. This is certainly part of what McIntyre draws on in agreement with MacDonald, that there is a distinction between the real work of imagination and flights of fancy. The basic function of this idea, especially as it relates to knowing and even then particularly knowing and imagining God, is rooted in the inherently imaginative task of language. As MacDonald simply states, “The half of our language is the work of the imagination.”  

5 For him, there is no word ever spoken that was not first imagined. Thus all conceptual endeavors are a work of imagination and that work requires constructive effort.  

6 MacDonald writes:

> What we mean to insist upon is, that in finding out the works of God, the intellect must labour, workman-like, under the direction of the architect, Imagination. Herein, too, we proceed in the hope to show how much more than is commonly supposed

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MacDonald is generically influenced by idealism, explicitly Christian, and very original in his thought. Second, MacDonald is Scottish. While this is not a ‘be all end all’ criteria, it is certainly a boon for McIntyre whose primary context is the Church of Scotland. McIntyre is not unique in turning to MacDonald among Scottish Theologians. D.M. Baillie refers to MacDonald in *God was in Christ* (London: Scribners, 1948), as does his brother John Baillie in *Our Knowledge of God* (London: Scribners, 1959). The third thing that MacDonald provides is a clear advocate for the inclusion of imagination among the attributes. This moves far beyond a selection of convenience. The question still remains about whether McIntyre is using MacDonald as a source or an inspiration. In either case, McIntyre employs MacDonald’s thought to exemplify the highly integrated notion of imagination that McIntyre himself is working with and advocating in a theological context.


5 *FTI*, 7.

6 Allison Jack, “Theology, Imagination, and Scottish Literature,” *Theology in Scotland*, vol. XIV, no. 2 (2007): 33-50. This is a theme that Allison Jack takes up in her treatment of McIntyre’s concept of imagination as it relates more broadly to themes within the Scottish literary tradition. She does an excellent job of capturing the integrated nature of imagination and the pervasiveness of imagination that is present both in MacDonald and in McIntyre. It should also be noted that this specific volume contains the contents of a conference presented in memory of John McIntyre. Presenters also included D.W.D. Shaw, David Ferguson, and George Newlands. Their papers are also printed in the same volume of *Theology in Scotland*. These essays provide a small core in the relatively small amount of secondary literature on John McIntyre and his theology.
the imagination has to do with human endeavor; how large a share it has in the work that is done under the sun.\textsuperscript{7}

It is this idea that leads McIntyre to affirm the place of imagination in all works of inquiry including that of science and history as providing the framework for all of those efforts. It is part of what MacDonald terms “the intellectuo-constructive imagination.”\textsuperscript{8} In this construction imagination is foundational to all tasks of learning and knowing truth and transcends discipline and subject, a point that McIntyre also echoes. This is what lends the whole system analogous representation in a field like mathematics. Though the content of a field may be different, the process of pursuing truth is much the same.\textsuperscript{9}

The most direct connection between these foundational ideas about imagination and McIntyre’s broader theological corpus is McIntyre’s presentation of imagination as a theological category. The primary introduction to this notion is found in the third chapter of *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. This treatment begins by relating imagination to the being of God directly, by establishing imagination not only as an attribute of God but as one that is prime in and to understanding the nature of God as loving. This in turn is related specifically to the areas of creation, Christology, soteriology, and pneumatology. However, this account in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* is more of an outline of what McIntyre is proposing. So, we will attempt to offer a more complete account by filling out these proposals with the relevant content from *On the Love of God* and the appropriate ‘Shape of’ books respectively.

When McIntyre begins this task of arguing for imagination as a theological category by establishing imagination as an attribute and divine perfection, there are two separate but complimentary accounts of imagination that McIntyre offers. The first account is comprised of sections numbered 1-4 of the five full sections of the text. The first four are directly related to particular sections of Barth’s *Church Dogmatics* in which McIntyre addresses a place of compatibility for the language of Imagination to be employed. These include Barth’s treatment of the divine attributes: 1) Love, 2) Freedom, 3) Mercy, and 4) Patience. The second account of the relation of Imagination to the attributes of God is found in the fifth and final section under this heading. This section includes subsections a-e, which outline McIntyre’s proposal for integrating elements of Barth’s treatment of attributes in an account of imagination as an attribute itself. However, to fully delineate McIntyre’s position and to

\textsuperscript{7} *FTI*, 11.
\textsuperscript{8} *FTI*, 16.
\textsuperscript{9} This is a point that McIntyre argued in his inaugural lecture at the University of Edinburgh, “Frontiers of Meaning” *University of Edinburgh Journal*, Autumn 1956, 122-139. At that point his argument was primarily concerned with other humanities as an apology for the place of theology in the academy. However, it is not surprising that McIntyre finds and explores similarities in fields that are less similar in content.
present it consistently, both accounts of imagination in relation to God and his attributes must be examined.

2. The First Account: Imagination and the Attributes of God

In the first account, the main focus and argument is that imagination is a concept that is compatible with and finds affinity in Barth’s Church Dogmatics. This is a significant claim considering the aversion to analogical language that Barth had and that can be found in Barthian interpreters of McIntyre’s time. Key to this argument is the initial hedging that McIntyre employs. The first claim with which McIntyre hedges his argument is that Barth does not fully follow his own emphasis on Divine attributes being perfections, that is the idea that God is identical with his attributes. The classic example of this being the idea that “God is love.”

However, when this is extrapolated to other concepts attributed to God this becomes a more difficult position to maintain. Consequently, it is difficult for Barth to maintain this language of perfections and avoid the language of attributes. Love becomes a defining feature of which grace, mercy, patience, holiness, righteousness, and wisdom are referentially attributable. John Webster offers an account of this challenge by noting that:

Constructed with his characteristic layering of themes, Barth is trying to indicate the inseparability of divine freedom and divine love. Divine freedom, because it is not abstract but takes form in the acts of creation, reconciliation and redemption, is the freedom in which God loves. Freedom is not anterior to God’s love but its diving depth; divine love is the actuality (not the surrender or compromise) of divine freedom.

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10 1 John 4:9
11 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, §29. McIntyre is simply trying to point out the challenge of understanding these ideas as perfections rather than as attributes, rather than trying to diminish the idea that they should be viewed as perfections rather than attributes. If anything, this might be a place where Barth’s attempts to avoid certain categories create new challenges.
12 FTI, 43 McIntyre makes this claim in reference to Barth’s treatment of “The Perfections of Divine Loving” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, §30. The logistical challenge that McIntyre is referring to is that when there are multiple perfections, it is a challenge to speak of these perfections in relationship to each other. When one speaks of attributes of a subject, those attributes are easily related to each other in terms of their respective relation to the subject. Here, after Barth’s defense of perfections in §29, Barth is speaking about love (a perfection) in terms of grace and holiness, mercy and righteousness, and patience and wisdom. This raises the question of how mercy, for instance, can be a perfection of God if it is in turn an aspect (or attribute) of his love.
13 John Webster, Barth, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 2004), 86. For Webster the key to understanding what Barth is doing with this ‘layering’ is that ‘What is most important about the rather complex way in which Barth builds up his account is that it is mobile: the ‘point’ of the argument lies in its entire movement and in the intricate sets of echoes, backward and forward references, recapitulations and variations by which that movement is carried.” Ibid., 87. The fact is that I agree with Webster’s analysis here. It matches the kind of complex layering that McIntyre is both referencing and emulating in his construction of imagination as a divine perfection along Barthian lines. The problem is that this requires
Thus it is not surprising that Barth speaks of God’s freedom in similar terms of its unity, constancy, eternity, omnipotence, omnipresence, and glory all of which are referentially attributed to that freedom.\(^\text{14}\) Secondly, McIntyre hedges his argument with the claim that Barth, despite all of his focus on scriptural norms in theology, does not develop his own theology and its terminology completely within its bounds. McIntyre highlights this in relation to Barth’s concept of ‘freedom’, and the classical adherence to concepts of hypostasis and ‘trinity’. This second qualification is meant simply to handle criticism that his use of the term imagination is an infusion alien to scripture and thus somehow inherently incompatible with Barth’s theology.

With these qualifications of his argument in place, McIntyre begins the content of the first account with Barth’s focus on “the being of God as the one who loves.”\(^\text{15}\) McIntyre interprets the claims of Barth at this point to say that “God’s loving… is concerned with seeking and creating fellowship without any reference to an existing attitude or worthiness on the part of the person concerned.”\(^\text{16}\) Additionally, McIntyre highlights the importance of a range of images that Barth employs to illuminate the concept of God’s love including as a shining light and a bridge stretched over a crevasse.

McIntyre’s point here is two-fold. First, there is an inherent connection between the function of imagination and the function of love, especially the love of God. Love of this unmerited sort cannot be understood in terms of contractual rules of obligation, but instead it requires imaginative and generative beginnings that allow it to function without any merit of provocation. Second, love of this sort is of such a nature that the simple employment of the term love is insufficient to illuminate all that the term entails. This love cannot simply be stated. It must be illustrated; it must be given an image; it must be imagined. This in turn maintains the ethical dimension of love and prevents the concept of imagination from being an abstraction. Here imagination maintains a moral dimension by its relation to love.

However, even if the must is removed, the nature of this love warrants further explanation

\(^{\text{14}}\) FTI, 43. This freedom in turn is vitally important to Barth’s theological program as a whole. As Bruce McCormack highlights the idea that this freedom cannot be abstracted from Jesus, because it is this freedom that allows Christ to become both ‘form’ and ‘revelation’ in the stately expression of his divine and kingly freedom. Bruce McCormack, Ed. John Webster, “Grace and Being” The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 106.

\(^{\text{15}}\) FTI, 44

\(^{\text{16}}\) FTI, 44.
and illustration; and this sort of illustrative and imaginative work is not incompatible with Barth’s system, which presupposes the inadmissibility of such analogical approaches.

Secondly, McIntyre identifies an affinity of Barth’s presentation of the freedom of God with his own concept of imagination. For Barth, as McIntyre observes, the freedom of God “may express itself in his being present with that which is not God, in communicating himself in a way which entirely surpasses all that can be effected by way of reciprocal presence, communion and fellowship between other beings.”

For McIntyre, “this projection by God of himself into the state and condition of the other who is the sinner is an imaginative activity based upon this deep understanding of, and sympathy for, the other.” By making this act of God an imaginative activity, McIntyre is placing imagination very close to God’s own being and existence.

For McIntyre, this is very near to providing the basis for the claim of George MacDonald that imagination should indeed be considered to be one of God’s attributes. However, McIntyre finds one fault with Barth’s presentation of God’s freedom in this activity. Namely, he argues that Barth overstates the distance between humanity and God in the ability to relate to others in this way. For McIntyre, “The command, ‘Love one another as I have loved you,’ must allow for- and indeed requires -a measure of imaginative penetration by human beings beyond the frontiers which they often set up to keep out not only God but one another.”

Still he affirms along with Barth the idea that “it is in this process of indwelling through imaginative penetration, [that] God does not cease to be himself, nor does he turn into the other.” For McIntyre, this is very close to the concept of identification that he sees as the concluding and crowning aspect of God’s love; and it is this term that is key to understanding the love of God in terms of imagination.

The third point of contact that McIntyre claims for his own concept of imagination in Barth is his treatment of God’s mercy. In speaking of the merciful heart of God, and in criticism of Schleiermacher, McIntyre quotes Barth: “The source of the feeling of sheer dependence has no heart. But the personal God has a heart. He can feel, and be affected.” This claim, which stands in contrast to much of the historical tradition concerning the nature of God, opens up for Barth, McIntyre, and indeed all subsequent theological inquiry the possibility of speaking of God’s actions in terms of his feeling, his emotion, and his being affected. Consequently, there is room for language that acknowledges a process of deliberation in God that is not the sign of weakness and

17 FTI, 45.
18 FTI, 45.
19 FTI, 46.
20 FTI, 46
21 Karl, Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, §30.2.
indecision but is instead a mark of God’s strength as a God of mercy. As McIntyre concludes:

My conclusion is that when we have reached the point of using such language about God… we have achieved the possibility, or even, have accepted the obligation, to include in our description of God in terms of his attributes, that of imagination, which carries all these notions of penetration into the distress of another, sympathising with that distress, and providing the motivation for the relief of that distress. There is a sense in which it is imagination which initiates the several other activities and sustains them, through to the point where the relief of the distress is complete.22

Here McIntyre is claiming further that imagination is not only compatible with Barth’s presentation of God’s mercy, but also initiates and governs the implementation of that mercy, as well as other functions of God’s work, in accomplishing the work of mercy.

Finally, McIntyre relates his concept of imagination to Barth’s presentation of God’s attributes and to Barth’s concept of ‘patience.’ This is by far the vaguest of the attributes that Barth includes, and McIntyre’s use of this attribute does not escape that opaqueness. In some ways it is eschatological expectation on the side of God. Just as people wait expectantly for the realization of God’s work, so also God is waiting patiently for his work to be wrought in the lives of people. In this way it is an extension of and an intensification of God’s mercy. So McIntyre, relating this concept back to imagination, focuses on the point that “God’s mercy affirms the independence of the others, even in the moment of taking their plight to his own heart in patience.”23 This expression of God’s patience endows people renewed by it “with the fresh existence as objects of God’s patient mercy, living under God’s righteousness, and enjoying to the full the outworking of the encounter with God.”24

Using Barth’s treatment of the attributes of God as perfections, McIntyre seeks to interpolate the idea of imagination with more traditional attributes of God such as God’s Love, Freedom, Mercy and Patience. For instance, McIntyre focuses on Barth’s unequivocal and vigorous defense of God’s freedom, and notes the close relation of Imagination to what Barth is defending when he defends God’s freedom. It is in God’s absolute and unencumbered freedom that God is able and free to act in ways that are imaginative and unexpected. The work of God is not required to be predictable, whether to those expecting the messiah in the first century, or to our own theological systems today.25

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22 FTI, 47.
23 FTI, 47.
24 FTI, 47.
25 This is a point that McIntyre makes elsewhere, Faith, Theology and Imagination p.55, in his section on Imagination in the scriptures. This is a significant and interesting point, because it raises questions about whether or not the biblical texts themselves are imaginative works. In “Frontiers of Meaning” p. 184, McIntyre addresses this point as well and offers a clarification, which I would argue holds true in his later writing as well. That is, that the scriptures are also imaginative works, but their imagery has become normative in a way that transcends the imaginative work of theology today. This could also be said of
3. The Second Account: Imagination in Relation to Love

However, in the second account, McIntyre moves beyond associating imagination with these other attributes. He takes up MacDonald’s claim that imagination is indeed an attribute of God and argues for this, acknowledging the fact that he is drawing “assistance [from] Barth’s examination of the perfections of God.” The proposal that McIntyre puts forward are more particularly related to what McIntyre himself envisions and proscribes for an account of imagination in a doctrine of God.

Part ‘a’ of this second account begins by relating imagination to the love of God. Consequently, imagination must be related to all contexts of theology in which God has been spoken of in terms of love and of his loving. As McIntyre puts it:

a) The imagination of God is a direct derivative of the love of God, which therefore acts as a control upon all that we say concerning imagination. Equally, it gives imagination access to the whole range of the actions of the God who is loving.

There are three points that are key to taking this prescription into account. The first is the claim that imagination is derivative of God’s love. The second is that the love of God acts as a controlling concept of and over imagination. The third and most significant point is that God’s imagination can and ought to be related to all contexts that love have been related to and attributed to God, even in his own being.

In part ‘b’ McIntyre offers further context to this first claim by relating imagination to God’s actions towards sinners. This takes the concept beyond being a static attribute of God and relates it outwards in God’s action.

b) Imagination is the medium of God’s loving penetration into the world of the sinner. It is the form which God’s awareness takes of the condition of the other who stands over against him in rebellion and hatred.

The significant claim here is that imagination is both a medium and a form. First, it is the medium by which God loves, and second it is the form that God’s awareness of the plight of people in relation to sin takes. The first of these claims is related back to the first claim in regards to imagination is relation to God’s existence. The second moves forward by relating imagination to what McIntyre calls identification, especially as he presents it in On the Love of God.

McIntyre’s treatment of the Chalcedonian definition of Christology, especially in the 2nd edition of The Shape of Christology; since he sees the pervasiveness of this model as having a normative influence on the field of Christology.

26 FTI, 48.
27 FTI, 48.
28 FTI, 48.
Part ‘c’ moves the argument forward even further by clarifying the nature of this identification of God with humanity. Here McIntyre addresses the nature of this identification in terms of the immanence of God with humanity and in it. Here:

c) [Imagination] is the ground of God’s immanence in the plight of the sinner, immanence which nevertheless does not entail any loss on God’s part of his transcendence of all created reality.29

Thus the nature of God’s identification with people is such that God is immanent ‘in the plight of the sinner.’ However, there is still a degree of separation by which God does not cease to be transcendent of ‘all created reality.’ The key here is that God’s total identification with people in their sinfulness does not compromise God’s own transcendental nature. There is a sense that God is both fully within and fully without the humanity he has created and identified with. Thus McIntyre is able to maintain a high doctrine of God as wholly other, while still emphasizing the immediacy of God’s relation with humanity through his imaginative identification of himself with them, even in their sinfulness.

In this full identification of God with people and in his full encounter with them, even in the plight of their sin, God is stirred to act on the behalf of the humanity of which he has now become apart. It is telling of McIntyre’s emphasis on this identification that the maintained transcendence of God does not inhibit God’s actions in any way and that his identification is so complete that action creates a stirring to an action of involvement from his place of transcendence that seeks to ‘make good’ the state of those with whom he has identified who are in the plight of sin. McIntyre’s claim then is:

d) From God’s heart imaginatively stirred to take the initiative toward making good the state of the distressed comes the effective action whereby that end is achieved.30

What stands out in McIntyre’s claim here though is that this is an action that springs from the heart of God ‘imaginatively stirred.’ Here the Imagination of God has a central place and function in relation to the love of God. This is not God’s love wrought in an imaginative identification. Instead this is God’s Imagination stirring him to act in ways that are loving for the improvement of those with whom God has identified. The end here of ‘making good the distressed’ has its beginning not in the heart of God but in God’s Imagination which sees them through the lens of who they are, and indeed have always been, in God’s image of them, namely in God’s own image.

However, McIntyre acknowledges a danger here that the freedom of people, here noted as sinners, is in danger of being limited by their subjection under the image that God

29 FTI, 48.
30 FTI, 48.
has of them, even if this image is expressed in divine love. So McIntyre speaks of the nature of the process by which God acts in ‘making good’ the state of those distressed by the state of their plight under sin, when he writes:

e) But this process sensitively and imaginatively affirms and does not deny the independence of sinners, but patiently waits for their return to the Lord. The One who has stood in the sinners’ place has given them time and space in which to come to penitence, the One who has come out of the Father’s heart of love.\(^{31}\)

Here, the whole understanding of God’s Imagination from the human side is known, understood and experienced as a process. Here, process is meant to take away from the notion of direct dictatorial causality in which people are forcibly and instantaneously conformed to the image that God has for them. McIntyre describes this process as a patient process that waits for the return of the Lord. The conclusion of this process then is an eschatological hope in which the work of God’s love, stirred up by God’s Imagination, finds final expression without inhibiting the freedom of the sinner to act in defiance against. Here the victory of God’s love does not inhibit the freedom of people in their everyday actions. Instead, the love of God, informed by God in his full identification with humanity, creates “time and space in which to come to penitence.” Thus this is not only an eschatologically hopeful process on the side of people, in which they hope for the completion of God’s work in them; but it is also an eschatologically hopeful process on the side of God who creates this time and space in which he hopes for the repentance of sinners.

4. Inconsistencies of these Two Accounts

However, these two accounts pose two challenges. The first is that of determining the locus and role that imagination plays in McIntyre’s theology as an attribute of God. The second is that of determining the exact relation and function that imagination has in relation to the love of God, an attribute and indeed perfection that McIntyre strongly values.

In regards to the first of these challenges, it is not the particular content of either account; but instead in the consistency within and between the two accounts that poses the challenge. The subsections of the second account are related thematically to the main points of the first account, with the fourth point of the first account being broken up into subsections d and e in the second account. In each account God’s love, God’s freedom, God’s mercy, and God’s patience are presented in terms of Imagination. However, the locus and function of imagination are actually described in rather different terms between these two accounts and even within each account.

\(^{31}\) FTI, 48.
In the first account there are places in which McIntyre seems to treat imagination as a primary and secondary category of God's existence. In the first point of the first account in which McIntyre relates imagination to Barth's idea of the being of the God who loves, the place of Imagination as primary or secondary is ambiguous. Here, the being of God as the God who loves is expressed imaginatively. There are two options. Either imagination is expressed in terms of God's love, or God's love is expressed by God's imagination. Whether one has any sort of precedence over the other is unclear. Consequently the place imagination within a doctrine of God is something that is still up for discussion.

In the second point of the first account, there is a clearer emphasis on imagination as a category that deserves central place, role, and function among the other perfections within a doctrine of God. McIntyre here is relating imagination to Barth's concept of the freedom of God. Here McIntyre seems to suggest that freedom in terms of imagination can be understood to be and be developed into an attribute of God in its own right. As such it would function as a category of God's freedom and as a category that affirms the freedom of people as created in God's image. In this way, imagination as a perfection becomes the way that McIntyre accounts for God's freedom. God, in his imagination and as imaginative must be free. God's freedom is derived from God's imagination that is unencumbered by any further definition of specification. In the same way then, the freedom of people in relation to God is derived from the imagination that is theirs by nature of their being created in the image of the God who is imaginative.

The third point of this first account, offers further and more explicit affirmation of the primary function of imagination in McIntyre's employment of imagination in relation to God. The theme that McIntyre relates in terms of imagination is that of God's mercy. Here imagination is presented as being located in God's 'inmost being' and the place from which God's mercy springs. Additionally, McIntyre goes on to make the telling claim that Imagination is not only the place from which God's mercy springs, and is thus the prior category, but that imagination also "initiates several other activities and sustains them." While McIntyre does not specify what these other activities are, this is still a strong indication of the way that McIntyre sees imagination functioning. Imagination is a primary category that has a place and function that is prior to the activities of God that spring from it. The importance of this statement should not be underestimated, since it is one of the few places in which McIntyre makes a clear statement of his own position, which he does here by

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32 FTI, 47.
emphasizing the ability of imagination to “initiate” these divine activities as his “firm conviction.”

Thus when McIntyre moves on to the fourth and final point of this first account, he attributes this primacy to imagination again when relating Imagination to Barth’s concept of patience. McIntyre interprets the attribute of patience in God as being accentuated by mercy, which affirms that God’s mercy is prior to God’s patience. Since patience is affected by mercy in this way, patience is dependent upon the imagination from which this mercy that accentuates it springs. While indirectly, this claim once again affirms the locus of Imagination in the ‘inmost being’ of God.

It would seem then, that given the consistent inference of the centrality that McIntyre gives to imagination in points two through four the ambiguity of the first point on the relationship between divine imagination and divine love becomes clear. Imagination is presented in close proximity to love and in terms by which it is capable of “stirring” and “initiating” divine actions that we traditionally associate with and attribute to love. However, in the second account, where McIntyre lays out his own prescribed implementation of imagination as an attribute, McIntyre has points that seem to stand in direct opposition to this notion. The exact relationship between these two perfections is something that is not entirely clear at this juncture in McIntyre’s own work, and this is a relationship and function that needs clarification if McIntyre’s system is going to be developed further.

In part a) of the second account McIntyre begins by stating that “The Imagination of God is a direct derivative of the love of God, which therefore acts as a control upon all that we say concerning imagination.” This seems to stand in direct contradiction to the points and case that McIntyre seemed to making in the first account, where attributes and activities of God were springing out of God’s imagination. Thus it would seem that McIntyre, in his own implementation of the concept, has love is functioning in ways that are more familiar in that love is the central and initiating theme. Imagination, in turn, derives its form and function from the form and function of love. However, this creates challenges to the internal logic of McIntyre’s broader claim that imagination, like love, is a divine perfection. If both are indeed divine perfections, there should not be a first this then that relationship of initiation between the two of them. This is point at which McIntyre does not seem to be consistent within his own argument and position.

In part b) of the second account McIntyre makes two claims relating to imagination. The first claim is that “Imagination is the medium of God’s loving penetration into the world of

33 *FTI*, 47.

34 *FTI*, 48.
the sinner.”\textsuperscript{35} Once again, one divine perfection is presented as the medium of expression for the other. However, the second claim of this section is that “[Imagination] is the form of God’s awareness of the condition of the other who stands over against him in rebellion and hatred.”\textsuperscript{36} The particular use of the word ‘form’ here seems peculiar. It is the medium of one thing, and the form of another. There continues to be a back and forth. Imagination is first the medium of God’s love, then it is the form of God’s knowledge of the state of sinners. The fact that this shift is occurring is not acknowledged, and there is no explanation of what the significance or relevance of these various expressions might be.

This shift seems to be confirmed in section c) where McIntyre suggests that imagination “is the ground of God’s immanence in the plight of the sinner, immanence which nevertheless does not entail any loss on God’s part of his transcendence over all created reality.”\textsuperscript{37} The key statement here is: imagination is the ground of God’s immanence. This immanence then has two distinct parts. The first part of this immanence is the notion of immanence with the plight of the sinner. In and of itself, this would be a strong statement of the primary aspects of imagination in relation to the being of God, since the immanence of God is so closely associated with God’s being. However, imagination is not limited to having a function by which God is immanent. Instead it is the ground of God’s immanence, both in God’s ability to be immanent with sinners and in the transcendence that the immanence of God maintains. Imagination is presented here as a ground for both. It is both the ground of God’s immanence in the plight of the sinner, and it is the ground of that immanence in which the transcendence of God is also maintained.

Still further in section d) of the second account McIntyre proposes that “From God’s heart imaginatively stirred to take the initiative towards making good the state of the distressed comes the effective action whereby that end is achieved.”\textsuperscript{38} Here, more plainly put, salvation is achieved when the imagination of God stirs the heart of God to save those distressed by sin. By this point, the shift in the second account that began in section b) seems to have led to a complete reversal from the claim that “The Imagination of God is a direct derivative of the love of God” to the claim: God’s imagination stirs God’s heart to action.

Finally, section e) of the second account appears to follow this line of reasoning; since this section is dependent upon section d). Here McIntyre is writing on the process by which God makes good the plight of sinners in terms of God’s patience. Here imagination

\textsuperscript{35} FTI, 48.
\textsuperscript{36} FTI, 48.
\textsuperscript{37} FTI, 48.
\textsuperscript{38} FTI, 48.
functions to affirm the independence of sinners, and this process (which once again begins with this imaginative stirring) “patiently awaits the return of the Lord.” However, this is obscured by the fact that McIntyre attributes this work to the Lord, whom he describes as “The One who has stood in the sinners place’ and the One who has come out of the Father’s heart of love.” It is this Lord who “has given them time and space in which to come to penitence.” This obfuscation is present because McIntyre swiftly switches the focus from speaking of God to speaking of Christ as the Lord. Here the Son proceeds from the Father’s love and not from the Father’s imagination, which I think is an important distinction for him to make; but this does not cover the step in which imagination is present in this process in the same way that the other points preceding it would seem to suggest it is an outworking of God’s mercy.

Thus the question remains, where is the exact locus of Imagination in the being and nature of God. Or it is simply a matter of ordering, “Which comes first conceptually?” Or, less precisely “Which concept is McIntyre relying on primarily?”

The simple and straightforward way to answer this question is to look at the way that McIntyre continues to lay out his theological vision in relation to Creation, the Incarnation, Atonement, and the Holy Spirit. In each of these imagination continues to be and operate as a theological category.

5. Imagination and Creation

Here McIntyre expresses dissatisfaction with the standard ways in which the doctrine of creation is presented. The three-fold presentation of the doctrine ex nihilo, per Verbum, and Creatio continua is fully loaded with “impeccable doctrinal propriety” and yet “a certain vacuity in its presentation.” McIntyre lays blame, within Protestant circles, on the suspicion directed towards natural theology and a doctrine of dominion of people over creation that has been used to exploitive ends.

The first steps in moving beyond these shortcomings it to develop a doctrine of nature that is not fraught with the fear that it will turn into some kind of pantheism and working towards a true “re-discovering of God’s involvement in nature.” Such an idea is then not a far leap from the conversation, if we focus on God as Creator and the nature of that creator being imaginative. As McIntyre puts it “Somewhere in the middle of that

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39 FTI, 48  
40 FTI, 48  
41 FTI, 48  
42 FTI, 50  
43 FTI, 52
theology I want to find a place for the imagination of the Creator-God.”44 This in turn is a step towards providing a thoroughly Christian way of working for the preservation of this planet as the intertwined masterpieces into which God has woven together the resources for our life and living and as the “beauty of the world so imaginatively and profusely loaded with such splendour by God.”45

This requires a wide-spread response as an expression of the “whole of theology,” and this requires: 1) “a doctrine of nature” 2) a doctrine “of the God who so imaginatively created it.”46 Thus it is imagination that is the concept that McIntyre primarily relies on to make this argument.

6. Imagination and the Incarnation

In turn, there are two reasons that McIntyre claims imagination as a category of the incarnation. First, there is the singular and unique aspect of God sending his Son in the form that he does. God does not simply show himself as himself. God shows himself as us so that we can see him. As McIntyre puts it:

In a single act of what can with reverence be called daring imaginativeness, God resolved to send his Son in the form of a servant, the Word made flesh, yet a man among his fellows. The message, the Word, which somehow they had been unable to grasp when spoken to them was bodied forth, in flesh and blood, to be seen and heard, touched and handled, in a medium and in terms unmistakable; now, they would be without excuse.47

History and tradition may obscure the fact that is a shocking move. That the image, of all possible images, including God in all of his heavenly glory et al, is this image. Second, it follows that this act of God is completely unpredicted and unpredictable. For McIntyre:

There has to be a gap of discontinuity between prophecy and fulfillment; there is no point-to-point correlation between the two, so that if you have the one you can predict the other. The unexpected, the unpredictable, stands in that gap; and it is there that the imagination of God does that which far exceeds our aspirations or our deserts. That imaginative creativity which God showed in forming the beauty of the world about us, he demonstrated once again in the novel style of his intervention in human history in the form of the Word made flesh, and event so unexpected, so unpredictable, that those who might have done so because there were of his chosen company, failed to grasp the full wonder of what was happening before their eyes; while those who had read the signs and oracles, who knew their scriptures and were daily expecting a Messiah, brought him out to Golgotha to ensure that their rejection of him was total. I know of no better argument for placing imagination at the heart of

44 FTI, 52
45 FTI, 53
46 FTI, 53
47 FTI, 54
God’s dealings with us than the single, unique, unpredicted and unpredictable event of the Incarnation.⁴⁸

Here, imagination is not some afterthought. First, it is imagination rooted in the being of God. Second, it is imagination at the heart of God’s dealings with us. Finally, it is an imagination in which Christ himself is the image. He is the one seen. He is the medium. Thus it is the event of the incarnation that substantiates the fact that God is imaginative, because it is in the incarnation that we have tangible proof of his imagination.

As such, the incarnation is “a single act of… daring imaginativeness.”⁴⁹ It is in this single act that “God resolved to send his Son in the form of a servant, the Word made flesh, yet a man among his fellows.”⁵⁰ Here imagination is at the heart of the intra-Trinitarian relation between the Father and the Son, in which the Son is begotten and sent. While McIntyre does not state this directly, what we end up with is the second person of the Trinity existing as the self-imagination of God. The Son is the self-imagination of God as begotten, and the Son is the self-imagination of God fully human. This pattern is repeated in relation to the Holy Spirit, as will be emphasized further below, McIntyre’s provocative phrase of “The Holy Spirit is God’s imagination let loose and working with all the freedom of God is the world” is functioning as McIntyre’s account of the procession of the Holy Spirit.⁵¹

7. Imagination and Atonement

Atonement always holds a special place for McIntyre. Going back to his study of Anselm, it is the place he is most knowledgeable, most comfortable, and sometimes boldest. Thus the place of imagination in Atonement is not a stretch for McIntyre. It is easy to recast atonement theories as images, in turn to see these images as models, and in turn to see models as cumulatively insightful into what salvation really is.

It does not bother him that these images are ‘incomplete symbols.’ He knows better and more thoroughly than most that “they do not follow their own structures to their rigidly logical conclusions”⁵² Here the theories are not the outworking of a single image, they are various images that together “portraying to us, through these images, the way in which forgiveness works…, how forgiveness is appropriated…, the terms in which we proclaim the gospel…, [and] the media in and through which we present to others the story which will bring them to Christ.”⁵³

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⁴⁸ FTI, 55
⁴⁹ FTI, 54
⁵⁰ FTI, 54
⁵¹ FTI, 64
⁵² FTI, 60
⁵³ FTI, 60
As such, McIntyre claims for the images of the atonement a kerygmatic and expository role that places them at the heart of Christianity. As such they must remain as they are, as images; because as images “they represent the process initiated by God to give effect to forgiveness.”

8. Imagination and the Holy Spirit

There are two streams that McIntyre follows in his treatment of imagination and the Holy Spirit. The first is the predictable, Barthian, theological route. The second is a closer look at the Pentecostal and Charismatic movement. These in turn provide complimentary accounts of the manner of the imagination that McIntyre attributes to God’s being and his activities.

In the first case, just as McIntyre relates imagination directly to the act of incarnation, he draws similar lines in what would traditionally be called the procession of the Spirit. As such, McIntyre is in good company in basing the patterns of procession on the patterns of incarnation. McIntyre does this by appropriating the role of Christ in Revelation (along Barthian lines) to the role of the Spirit in this same act of revelation, and in turn relates this work of the Spirit back to an outworking of the divine attributes (also along Barthian lines).

The convergence of these things for McIntyre lead to three conclusions. That the modern account of the Holy Spirit’s involvement in the economy of salvation preserves a role for God’s imagination in terms of 1) “the projection of God into the situation of sinners, removing the blindness which prevents them from perceiving the revelation” 2) “God’s involvement with all the minutiae of the condition of sinners, in a manner of high sensitivity and receptiveness” 3) “the transcendent becomes immanent, without thereby losing his transcendence or being transformed into the other.” For McIntyre each of these functions is particularly suited to the concept of imagination. It is imagination that allows the Spirit to be in the situation of sinners. It is imagination that allows God to be involved with them in their lives. It is imagination that allows God to be present there immanently in his transcendence. However, it is not just a mechanism for explaining how God is present. It is also an explanation of why God is present, because his presence there is an expression of the imagination that is fundamental to who his.

In the second case, McIntyre offers a defense of the Charismatic movement as “yet another demonstration of the Spirit’s acting imaginatively” Drawing on its positive elements, McIntyre offers the ecumenical nature of the movement and the consistency of its
proclamation of the gospel that Jesus is Lord as a firm basis for the widespread acceptance of the movement within the church. For him it is truly reflective of the type of divine activity seen at Pentecost, which he describes as “the extravagant expression of God’s imaginative creative activity in the spiritual sphere, diverse, uncoordinated, and confusing to the tidy mind”\footnote{FTI, 64}

In each case, McIntyre is led to conclude “that the Holy Spirit is God’s imagination let loose and working with all the freedom of God in the world, and in the lives, the words, and actions of the men and women of our time,”\footnote{FTI, 64} I cannot think of a more unequivocal statement of the fact that the Holy Spirit is God’s imagination and that the Holy Spirit as the imagination of God is a free outworking of God’s own imagination in God’s own being.

9. Summary

The conclusion here is simple. While in the initial presentation there may be some ambiguity in McIntyre’s account of the imagination, further examination of what it means for imagination to be a theological category removes that ambiguity. In the broader presentation, it becomes clear that imagination is located in the very being of God; it is a divine perfection; it does come first conceptually; and it is the concept upon which McIntyre primarily relies to delineate the doctrines of Creation, Incarnation, Atonement, and the Holy Spirit. In doing this, McIntyre replaces love with imagination as the primary concept within his system. This is not to say that love is discarded. It is simply to say that McIntyre is using the concept of imagination in \textit{Faith, Theology and Imagination} in ways that he previously relied on the concept of love in \textit{On the Love of God}. Further, this is not merely a change in topic and verbiage. It is a deliberate philosophical and theological decision.

The prime benefit of this move, is that imagination, as McIntyre employs it, is a highly integrated concept. That means that it is able to function in such a way that it is capable of being an ontological category as an attribute and ultimately as a divine perfection. It is able to function as a faculty of people. This means in turn that it can be an aspect of our psyche, that is to say that imagination as an aspect of the \textit{imago Dei}, and it epistemological function, which is ultimately expressed in the attempt to know God.\footnote{FTI, 157.} For McIntyre, it is also a moral and ethical category. The ability to imagine is what allows us, and God, to think and act by identifying ourselves with others and choosing to be involved with them, whether that is vicariously or actually.\footnote{FTI, 76.}
While love remains the obvious choice and is indeed preferable due to its prominence in the Biblical texts and the theological tradition, imagination provides McIntyre with a language to speak about the love of God and how it is operating. In classical accounts of God, God is love, but God is also impassible and unaffected. By relying on Barth's notion that God is passible from within, rather than without, McIntyre is able to give an account of the ways in which God loves, rather than simply stating the essence of God's love as a monolithic and opaque ontological category.

The fullest expression of this account of imagination by McIntyre is its reciprocity. God being imaginative opens up how the love of God is defined towards us, and it is that same imagination in us through the imago Dei that allows us to imaginatively penetrate the processes of God's love that are given expression through an account of God's loving in terms of imagination.

What remains is to demonstrate that this theological system has continued and further outworking in the “Shape of” books, beginning with The Shape of Soteriology.

61 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, §30.2.
Chapter 3: The Shape of Soteriology

1. Models in McIntyre

Before we can undertake any serious treatment of any of the “Shape of” books, or *The Shape of Soteriology* in particular, we must establish a consistent understanding of what McIntyre means by models and how he uses them. In McIntyre’s thinking models are at once the basis of his theological method and merely a placeholder for imagination. They are both merely a mechanism in which they are simply models as models, and they demonstrate the way that images, analogies, et al correspond to reality in that they are referential. As such these are difficult waters to navigate.

The basics of McIntyre’s method are dominated, for better or worse, by the language of models. The technicality of McIntyre’s presentation of models and their function is something that can be quite off-putting to anyone attempting to discern exactly what it is he is trying to do with them and what he means by them. This is largely due to the fact that when McIntyre first employed the language of models they were very much in vogue. Ian Ramsay was a notable, early proponent. However, McIntyre also interacts with a range of authors like Max Black, the much later Ian Barbour and Colin Gunton, Janet Martin Soskice, and the Edinburgh Physicist Daniel Lamont.\(^1\) This was a fad not unique to theology. The idea of models as structures for representing complex data is still not defunct in some fields.

The problem that faced any theological appropriation of the concept was the fraught way in which concerns about metaphor, analogy, parable, and representation were seen to be in conflict or to interact with each other in specific and complex ways. This is where McIntyre diverged from the majority of his theological contemporaries. First, there was his assertion that models were implicitly an expression of the fact that theological speculation was primarily a work of imagination. The fact that models came into the conversation was secondary to that point. Second, there was his assertion that imagination was a category of the content of theology itself. While this was merely a methodological debate for some, this was a substantially theological debate for McIntyre. Third, McIntyre favored the more technical language of models in their most abstract form. It is this third assertion that needs more bearing out.

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The fact is that McIntyre does address a wide swathe of concerns that are raised by the debate about models that he found himself in the midst of. He makes bold assertions about the function of analogy in theology. He debates what makes a model normative. He talks about first order and second order models and how these might be related to each other in complex systems. He discusses novelties like Lamont’s notions about the polarity of a particular model in a field.

The problem with getting caught up in the particularities of this debate is that McIntyre is either increasibly accepting of everything that is being said, or in other words, dismissive of everything being said. That is to say, that he is very willing to listen to the positions being presented, but he is very careful not to adopt any one position too fully. The reason for this is that McIntyre intends to employ models with a particular theological inflection, and in order to do that he needs them to be free from the baggage with which these debates inevitably encumber them.

The fact is that he is not particularly concerned with the specifics of this debate, because he is interested in making the larger point about theology being a work of imagination. The fact that an invisible God needs to be given image follows quite well with the notion that abstracted data needs to be modeled and needs to be demonstrated. This is something that cannot be accomplished if he continues to be preoccupied with the particularity of the debate over models.

This is especially true when one realizes that at this juncture McIntyre is still talking about the nature of theology as the process and method of studying God, rather than any specific notion about knowing God himself. Thus McIntyre engages with questions of image, metaphor, and analogy as a way to demonstrate the place that imagination has in functioning in tandem with these already well-established notions of theological praxis.

This is of course not to say that McIntyre rejects the idea of models altogether. Instead, returning to the earlier point, McIntyre adopts the language of models in their most abstract form, which is the form of a mathematical model. Recurring language about ‘the given’ of a particular area of theology, ‘the problem’ posed within a particular area of theology, the idea of ‘the given as problem’ and ultimately the conclusions derived from that problem as falling within a ‘field of meaning’ all suggest this type of model as the foundation for McIntyre’s own understanding of models and his own association of them with his methodological concept of imagination.

As such, I would argue that McIntyre’s account of models “as models” is much more akin to the use of models in the realm of mathematics. Here the models operate as models. Thus eliminating any particular way that the models themselves correspond to reality. It is not that the models in McIntyre’s account of them do not correspond to reality. It is simply a
matter of this coming later in the process. It is only in examining all of the models in relation
to each other in a broader field of meaning that we can begin the process of discerning the
way or ways in which a model or series of models can be seen to correspond to reality in
any particular way. The benefit here is that the focus is on how the model or models
correspond to actual reality rather than to a conceptualization of what is real. In this way, it
could be argued that McIntyre demonstrates an even stronger commitment to realism than
many of his interlocutors by not assigning a particular relation of the models to reality and
allowing the models to operate as such.

To be clear, McIntyre himself never makes this claim about mathematical models.
But I am arguing that if we strip away the particular theories of the referential function of
models, which is what McIntyre does, what we are left with is far more similar to a
mathematical model than the scientific models upon which most of his contemporaries
based their own conceptions of models.²

My aim here is to provide a basic overview of what models are in the context of
Mathematics in order to demonstrate the way that the basic language of these mathematical
models is present in McIntyre. This is not to say that this is the type of model that McIntyre
is using. It is simply to say that this type of model has the greatest amount of overlap
between what McIntyre is doing with models outside of a theological context. As such an
understanding of this type of model is helpful in that it 1) Provides a comparative framework
that helps explain the basic structure of the concept that McIntyre is using 2) Provides a
consistent vocabulary to talk about models 3) Provides a critical rubric for evaluating the way
that McIntyre talks about models. This is especially important at this juncture, because there
is variation over the course of the “Shape of” books in the ways that McIntyre implements
and refers to models. All told, I am arguing that these are all consistent in their place-
holding function for the concept of imagination. That said, drawing this connection allows
me to talk about models themselves as themselves in a consistent manner.

2. Mathematical Models

The basic idea of a model in this context is any visual representation of a
mathematical expression. The most basic example of this is simply the process of graphing
a function or equation.

² Further excurse necessary to be clear here. The closest thing to an exception of this is Daniel Lamont,
whose models are based in physics, which is by proxy closer to the mathematical ideal. Daniel Lamont,
Christ and the World of Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1934). That said, his focus on polarities is much
more meta-physical than McIntyre is willing to be, which is why I maintain the uniqueness of the way that
McIntyre uses models within the realm of his theological and philosophical colleagues.
For instance, in this first and most basic example, the equation or function that one starts with functions as the given. That is, it is the information that one has at the beginning. Notably, this information is not an answer or a solution. It is a problem. There is something about it that is incomplete or needs further working out. For instance 5x5 is an arithmetic problem that has not been worked out. In the case of a basic algebraic function, like the one being considered here, this is usually represented by the presence of a variable. The variable is simply an unknown value that is present at any point in the equation.

In a simple (or simplified) algebraic function more information can be ascertained about the given problem simply by substituting different values in place of the variable. Thus 3y becomes 3(5), 3(8), or 3(965). However, this method is rarely used in mathematics, because there are no real values to assign to these variables. Y in a hypothetical sense can be assigned any value, unless it is defined otherwise. Thus it is primarily in the application of mathematics that such a substitution actually occurs, because the substitution can demonstrate something about the real values that variable might have. This is true whether it is the area of a parallelogram \((A=wl)\), the volume of a cube \((A=lwh)\), or Einstein’s mass-energy equivalence \((E=mc^2)\). The practical application of these variables have an actual value, i.e. a real length, a real width, a real mass etc.

The exception to this rule is graphing equations in the abstract, which is the most basic form of modeling. The idea here is that one is given a problem in the form of a function. At the outset the information is incomplete, and one does not know what will happen when the function begins to be graphed. This is especially true when there is more than one variable. In the simple function \(2x=y\) both \(x\) and \(y\) are unknown. By substituting a value for either variable the hypothetical value of the other variable can be found. If \(x\) becomes 5 the \(y\) becomes 10, on the other hand if \(y\) becomes 5 then \(x\) becomes 2.5. With each substitution more is learned about the nature of the function. In one direction there is a proportional increase, and in the other there is a proportional decrease. If one were to graph this equation, one would simply create a table of values by consistently substituting a variety of values for one of the variables.

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3 McIntyre talks about what the “given” is. In theology this refers to revelation, but I would argue that in the context of models he is actually talking about the input data in general. SOS, 80. While this would still be understood as things that have been given/revealed, McIntyre is not talking about the content of revelation in the same abstracted way as Barth etc. This is not to say that the data of theology is not uninterpreted, but instead that in function and method these givens still function as input data.

4 This is further supported by the way that McIntyre writes about the ‘given as problem.’ SOS, 8-10. It is in this exposition on the idea of the given as problem, which he learned under Kemp Smith, McIntyre refers to many of the terms that are being discussed here, for example: given, problem, solution, solved, solve, normative are all terms used in this context; and this framework is one upon which McIntyre consistently relies.
If \( x = n \) Then \( y = n \)  

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These points would then be plotted on an \( x,y \) axis, and one would find that the subsequent points would transect the convergence of the \( x \) axis and \( y \) axis at a steep angle in a straight and proportional line at an angle of 67.5°.

When faced with a problem that offered no further insight algebraically, providing substitute values for one variable provided hypothetical values for the other and consequently provided a visualization of what was previously an abstraction.

In reality, and practically speaking, only three points along the same trajectory are needed to establish this line and to know that the model of this function will always follow along this trajectory. Whether the variables represent varying amounts of cement and lime in concrete or the population of poodles and pussycats, this is just how this function works, and it will always be modeled this way.

Now of course the more complicated the function the more complicated the model.\(^5\)

Even within the relatively basic realm of algebraic functions, a significant amount of complexity can be added to the process of modeling a function if the function requires being modeled as a curve. On the one hand, little has changed. There is the given, which is a problem, and that problem is a function with multiple variables or unknown values. Since the values of the variables are hypothetical, values can simply be assigned to some variables in order to determine the hypothetical value of the remaining variables. These sets of values can then be used to model the function by graphing the points on the graph correspondent to the values.

\(^5\) McIntyre follows this pattern by offering increasingly complicated models to account for increasingly complex theological problems. While atonement is pretty straight-forward in that the ‘givens’ have already been simplified in the form of atonement theories, the models that McIntyre uses to reference the doctrine of the Holy Spirit are extremely complex by comparison. Whereas in The Shape of Christology McIntyre describes the increased complexity of Christology in comparison to soteriology in terms of the constraining influence of Chalcedon, \( SOC, 22-24 \), McIntyre refers to the “formidable problems which beset any attempt to integrate doctrinally the various views of the Holy Spirit” and the “immense variety” and “heterogeneity” that must be taken into account in order to generalize “models” of pneumatology in the first place, \( SOP, 21-22 \).
On the other hand, the added complexity of the problem requires more information and more input than the original example of the simple line graph. Specifically, more than three points are required to determine the shape of this equation when it is modeled on the graph. Three points on a curve, without the rest of the curve, is simply a triangle. The fact is that in this instance the more points one can graph the better. Each point that is added gives more clarity and shape to the corresponding curve. At a certain point the shape of the curve can be determined by inference, but the fact is that there will never be enough points on the graph to fully represent that curve. More and more points would be better and maybe even helpful, but each point from each inputted value remains separate from the rest. This works in the same way that digital images, no matter how saturated, are always pixilated on closer inspection and do not fully coalesce. Thus every point, no matter how insignificant, tangential, or seemingly superfluous is helpful in giving the fullest and most proper shape to the curve.

This is where the term ‘field of meaning’ comes into play. In mathematics, especially in regards to graphing or modeling, a field is the accepted range or possible range of solutions. A simple way to think about this might be to think of the field as a blank piece of graphing paper. Without any information, any point on any axis is possible.

However, with certain functions and with certain values input into those functions, a function may have limits. These limits may be self-imposed through the terms of the function itself or determined externally through a predetermined set of intervals that are apropos to the function.

In the case of functions that have externally imposed limits there are few examples that prove helpful. Here the primary area of concern would be an interval set. In an interval set, the possible outcomes of inputting data into the function are limited by only accepting values within a certain range. These limits can be imposed on either end of a function or in relation to both variables. So, when a function is expressed in terms of $a, b$ one could limit the set by placing a minimum or maximum value on either $a$ or $b$ or on both $a$ and $b$. For instance, one might only want the function to model positive values. Thus $a$ and $b$ must always be positive. That said, such limits do not need to be quite so limiting. For instance one could set the value of either $a$ or $b$ to $\infty$ or to $-\infty$. If $a$ or $b$ is set to the value of either positive or negative infinity, then the possibilities for that side of the set is infinite. In particular instances, it might even be helpful to set $a$ to $\infty$ and $b$ to $-\infty$. By doing this, one

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6 The field of meaning for McIntyre is simply the area of study that he is examining. Thus Christology, soteriology, and Pneumatology could all be understood as being distinct fields of meaning. This is a term that McIntyre uses consistently in the Shape of Books, Frontiers of Meaning etc., and it has a very specific meaning in mathematics when it comes to developing models.
can ensure that any result of the function will be a real number and that no imaginary numbers can be considered as an outcome of the function.

In the case of functions that have self-imposed limits there are certain types of functions that will always be modeled or graphed as a certain shape. For instance, certain types of functions will always be graphed as a parabola. Once one knows this and identifies this one knows that there are limits to this graph. In this case there will be no points plotted beyond the vertex of the parabola. The parabola is a curve that only moves in one direction and is symmetrical on each side. At no point will anything loop around and surpass the value of the vertex. The fact is that it just will not happen. In a more technical example, these types of limits are more generally understood as asymptotes. Asymptotes are in their basic form understood as limits as they relate to a curve. A vertical asymptote is the vertical line across which the modeled curve of a function will not cross by virtue of the parameters of the function itself. Similarly a horizontal asymptote is the horizontal line above or below which the modeled curve of a function will not cross by virtue of the perimeters of the function itself. However, due to this basic function of asymptotes, the term has come to more generally to refer to the inherent limitations of a mathematical function, equation, algorithm, etc.

To the trained eye, a function can quickly be identified as being a linear function, a parabola, an asymptote, or being notated as an interval set. Any point within the field that does not correspond to the type of function that is present can be immediately eliminated as a possible outcome of the function itself. Any point that is not in line with three points plotted using a linear function will never be an outcome of the function that plotted those three points. Any point in a field above the determined apex of a parabola will never be an outcome of the function that determined that apex. No point on an axis will be the result of an asymptotic function. These are things that are immediately evident, because they are not within the range of the field.

There are two other and final aspects of a field of meaning that must be understood before all of this can be applied back in the context of McIntyre’s theology. Both of them are concerned with the way that a field of meaning helps evaluate data in situations of added complexity.

The first, and most basic way that a field of meaning can help evaluate complex data is when multiple functions are modeled within the same field and range. In this situation, the field represents multiple functions of the same variable. Some of the functions may be linear, some of the functions may be parabola, and some may be asymptotic. The fact is that the result will be a sporadic assortment of points, of which, only some are related to each other. Each point plotted of each function is related to the other points representing
that function, but no other relation will exist as a result of the functions themselves. However, linear functions will shoot off into distant and deviant directs from the points of the parabola, once they cross the value of its apex. The parabola will have half over half of its value completely disassociated from the range of an asymptote. That said, by overlaying the models of each function within the same field of meaning one is able to determine what values the functions have most in common and consequently what values of the variables are most relevant to each function. Here, a close cluster of plotted points or even points of convergence among the different models can indicate a certain significance to the values of the variables associated with those points beyond the perimeters of any individual function that contributed to the convergence. Simply put, it is a way to get perspective on how the values of variables are related even when they are expressed in different relations to each other. The complexity of multiple models and multiple functions is streamlined through the identification of significant points of convergence.

The second way that a field of meaning can help evaluate complex data is when the equation or function is too complex to predict. This quickly happens when one moves beyond the realm of algebra and geometry into the realm of differential equations. The point here is not to fully elucidate differential equations, but to help understand how they account for increased complexity. At their core, differential equations are like the above equations in that they are functions. What makes them more complex is the fact that they are concerned with derivatives, or the impact that any derivation in the input data might have on the outcome. Essentially, this adds a completely new dimension to the equation in that it can account for things like speed, time, or movement. This focus on derivatives (the derivation, aka differential) is significant because these functions tend to be massively impacted by even a minute shift in input data. This is especially true of dynamic systems, that is, systems that take movement into account. The outcomes of these systems are notoriously difficult to predict due to the high number of variables that can influence the trajectory of movement within a given system. While there are many reasons why such a system might prove to be complex, a common reason is that there are simply to many trajectories. This sporadic and unpredictable behavior and the study of these equations that exhibit it is the

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7 This is essentially what McIntyre does in The Shape of Soteriology when he examines each of the atonement theories first in isolation in his treatment of “The Models of Soteriology,” SOS, 26-52 and then in conjunction in “The Logic of the Models,” SOS, 53-87.

8 This in turn is more reflective of the way that McIntyre approaches Pneumatology as a field of meaning. Given the complexity of the given as problem, McIntyre is content to focus on the extent of the data, in this case in two specific directions, rather than try to nail down any single point or idea. This is exemplified when McIntyre makes references like “There is another group of phenomena,” SOP, 35. Here McIntyre is not dealing with already established theories, models, etc. Instead, McIntyre is trying to group phenomena into manageable and treatable topics.
basis of what has come to be known as chaos theory. The point here is not that things devolve into chaos but that the scope of predictability is limited in a quantum universe.

The classical example of these equations and their erratic outputs is that of the double pendulum. To start a pendulum is that ever-reliable device that moves back and forth and runs clocks and that sort of thing. If one were to imagine that a pendulum were placed very near a wall with graph paper on it and a bit of pencil on the back, one would have a graph summing up the motion of a pendulum. There would be a nice curve that did not go any higher on one side than the other upon which all points would be equidistant from a static pivot.

The double pendulum is simply another pendulum added to the end of a pendulum hanging from a static pivot. This immediately implies that the pivot of the second pendulum is not static. This introduces the dynamic derivative of the function corresponding to the motion of this new apparatus. If one were to observe the movement of the two weighted ends (or bobs) of the two connected pendulums, one would immediately note the chaotic motion that immediately ensues.

Part of what is surprising is the immediacy with which the motion of the double pendulum falls into chaos. Part of this is an exhibition of the fact that the function and the apparatus are particularly sensitive to the initial conditions. The slightest change in the input data or in the maneuvering of the apparatus can change the outcomes drastically. Thus the results not only appear sporadic, but they are sporadic in that a double pendulum would only under the most unlikely of circumstances ever repeat the same pattern again. It is not just apparently sporadic; it is sporadic and unpredictable in fact.

Despite all of this talk about the sporadic, chaos, and unpredictability there are still limits to the possible motion of a double pendulum. The range of motion is of course more expansive than the old-fashioned pendulum (for instance both bobs are capable of rising above the pivot of the first pendulum). That said, it could never extend beyond the combined length of the two pendulums from the pivot of the first pendulum. It is both a physical and mathematical impossibility. In fact, if one were to repeat the practice of tracing the movement of a double pendulum one would get a very distinct shape. This shape, while not necessarily creating a distinct pattern of convergences, would be recognizably consistent with the shape created by a previous experiment with a double pendulum of a similar size.

In a similar way to multiple functions of the same variables being overlaid in the same field of meaning, a repetition of this experiment would readily offer insightful and significant insight into the limits of the equation. That is even with all of its sporadic, chaotic, and unpredictable aspects. This is concurrent with the fact that equations of this sort are frequently being addressed through the lens of probability. Here, probability boxes (or p-
boxes) serve as the parameters for a solution in a similar way to intervals in less complex equations. The size and shape of these boxes is determined by either the limits of all possibly outcomes or as a frame marking the limits of all actual outcomes. Either way, this probabilistic approach functions in much the same way that an overview of multiple functions with the same variables can be observed and compared within the same field of meaning.

3. Models in the ‘Shape of’ Books

Now, the language of models is almost completely confined to the text of the ‘Shape of’ books. The degree to which McIntyre refers to and relies on this language varies and in some instances adapts from book to book, but the basics of this method hold true. These examples will prove invaluable in understanding exactly what McIntyre means and the underlying concepts that he is referring to when he uses the language of models.

Broadly speaking McIntyre spends less time on the language of models as time goes on. The most clinical presentation of models is found in *The Shape of Christology*. This is where McIntyre focuses his attentions on the whole process from start to finish, from the ‘given’ to the end. That said, in *The Shape of Soteriology* models play prominently, especially in regards to the ways that different models relate to each other. In *The Shape of Pneumatology* McIntyre seems to largely abandon any large-scale treatment of models at all. Part of this is a matter of familiarity, but there is also a sense that many of the notions of the Holy Spirit that McIntyre wishes to discuss are too loosely defined to be anything so sophisticated as a model. He instead uses terms like ‘pattern’ and ‘mould.’ The free radical in this broad generalization is the 2nd edition of *The Shape of Christology*. Published in 1998, 32 years after its first publication in 1962, the 2nd edition features significant revision that both takes into account additional models and seems to offer a certain amount of reluctant and qualified deference to the Chalcedonian model.

4. Models and Imagination in *The Shape of Soteriology*

Much of this can be accounted for with the internal logic of the method. While aspects of this method in reference to Christology are particularly necessary to making this point, the area of soteriology provides an accessible entrée into the application of the material above in McIntyre’s theology.

Unlike the realm of Christology, which is bogged down with labored language and dogmatic definitions, the study of soteriology is largely unencumbered. This is not to say

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9 *SOP*, 21-22.
that the field is a blank slate, but those models that are present have not been codified, stratified, or dogmatized in any determinative way.

The traditional nomenclature for this field would be the doctrine of the atonement. McIntyre’s interest in the field is not surprising. The atonement is the major theme of Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo* which was the subject of McIntyre’s dissertation, which roundly rejected the notion that Anselm’s reflections on the atonement could or should be categorized as an ‘atonement theory.’ Plus it follows on quite well from a doctrine of who Christ is to a doctrine of how God saves. The fact is that atonement is relegated to a small selection of models concerned with blood sacrifice, whereas McIntyre’s book seeks to highlight a wide variety of models that do not necessarily highlight that aspect.

In *The Shape of Soteriology*, the given is not as clearly defined as it is in the book on Christology. It might be what one might call a complex given. That is that the given is not simplified or codified into simple expression. The given of soteriology in this context is the scriptures. The scriptures are full of imagery used to articulate the work of salvation. The models of soteriology latch on to these images and seek to formulate them into more systematic and comprehensive forms.

The models as that McIntyre classifies and addresses are: ransom, redemption, salvation, sacrifice, propitiation, expiation, atonement, reconciliation, *Christus Victor*, punishment/penalty, satisfaction, example, and liberation. The basic premise for addressing each of these models in turn is that “they are all germane” and that they should not be read in competition as an ‘either or’ dichotomy but rather as a ‘both-and’ heterogeneity.10

The suggestion that is made by this arrangement, when coupled with an understanding of the building blocks of McIntyre’s method, is that each of these models represents a different function that operates independently of the others. For instance, Jesus does not need to be a moral example in order for the inner machinations of the ransom action to take place. Each model is presented in its own terms, with its own variables, and with its own values.

What they have in common is that they are related to each other in that they address the same field of meaning. That is, they are all concerned with the same question of “the nature of the death of Christ, and by implication to the mediation of the forgiveness which that death has secured for God’s people.”11 Any theory, formula, function, or model that addresses that question will all correspond to each other simply by nature of being directed in the same direction.

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10 *SOS*, 28. Emphasis original to the text.
11 *SOS*, 28.
Imagine that the field is an $x,y$ axis. In this axis the top right quadrant represents the positive involvement of Christ’s death and the positive mediation of forgiveness. These two conditions can be said, in this example, to constitute the necessary requirements for a functioning soteriological model. If that model is not concerned with Christ and his suffering, then it is not a model of Christian salvation. If it is not concerned with God’s forgiveness being given to people, then it is not a model of Christian salvation. These limits are limits that are self-imposed, in the same way that set intervals are used to limit the results shown; but these limits are not arbitrary in that they are directly related to the values assigned to the $x,y$ axis, or the field of meaning. This is how that field is defined.

Now, the fact is that since each of these models is formulated and functions independently, one could in this example, take each theory and model it on the graph independently. If one did this, each model would have its own shape, form, etc. Some could be strictly linear, some could be parabola, and some could be asymptotic, veering very near the perimeters without ever crossing them. The point that McIntyre would want to make is that each of these models, so represented, would indicate things that are true and helpful in understanding the work of God for our salvation within this field of meaning.

On the one hand, the model of Christus Victor is very straight-forward. In it Christ has conquered sin, hell, and death. These have all been defeated, thus people are free from them. In being free from sin, they are forgiven. In being forgiven, they are free from hell. In being free from hell, they are free to live in Christ, by the Spirit, to the glory of God. On the other hand, the model of moral example is sometimes less clear and requires more nuance. It is often presented without the specifics of Christ’s death and sacrifice and thus seems tangential to the concern of God’s work of salvation. The fact remains that Christ’s moral purity before God is absolutely necessary to any understanding of Christ overcoming sin, or of being a suitable sacrifice for human sin, especially in regards to taking the place of humanity in judgment, or indeed in satisfying the wrath of a righteous God. Each model, either in its most direct or circuitous form stands to offer significant insight into an understanding of this field.

However, this carries with it the implication that each model is somehow lacking or incomplete and that indeed the existence of multiple models could prove helpful in elucidating the truths found within this field. In the examples of McIntyre’s models provided above, there were two ways that added complexity of this sort comes to light and is taken into account. This is the first of those two approaches, in which each of the functions are graphed independently and then observed in conjunction.

Following along with the hypothetical of being able to graph these soteriological models, imagine that each of the models can be graphed, once again in the same field of
meaning. This time, imagine that all of the graphs (models of the functions) and the correlating points of each are overlaid. What should appear are: 1) Points that are either the same or very similar in their value, orientation, and placement 2) Places where the lines, curves, and shapes of the graph overlap and cross 3) Points, lines, curves, and shapes that veer off into distinctly separate areas or directions. The challenge that is left is making sense of the jumble of shapes and points that have now been plotted.

This is why, in *The Shape of Soteriology*, McIntyre spends nearly as much time addressing the question of “How are the models related to one another?” as he does any other question. The basic options that McIntyre proposes are: pluralism, historical relativism, complementarity, dimensionality, and to a lesser extent perspectivism, centripetal axial reference, and horizons. Each of these might be seen as an attempt at developing a second-order model that gives an account of all of the data provided by the first-order models already discussed.

It should first be pointed out that these models of internal logic and relatedness are valuable in illuminating certain ways that the soteriological models interact. For instance, any attempt to relate these models would require some form of pluralism by the mere fact that these are all meant to be accepted as germane. That said, pluralism does little to integrate any of the models together. It gives an account of the different models, but does little to explain any points of connection and correlation as significant or meaningful. In a similar way, it is true that the relevance of these different models is conditioned by historical context. Anselm’s model is indisputably conditioned by the feudal context in which he wrote and the honor culture that was its foundation. That said, this does not mean that Anselm’s theory might not find relevance in honor based societies that continue to exist or might not have apologetic value in a culture where surprisingly cognizant understandings of feudal governance structures are just a binge-watch away.

With the exception of the centripetal axial reference account, which McIntyre is particularly dismissive of, the rest (complementarity, dimensionality, perspectivism, and horizons) do seem to point in the same general direction that McIntyre seems to go. Complementarity is the first to address the problem posed by pluralism in that it gives an account of how these different models do in fact converge at certain points and in doing so can function in ways that are mutually supportive. Dimensionality, especially as it is expressed by Daniel Lamont in *Christ and the World of Thought*, provides McIntyre an account of how the models can be both independent, in that they have been formulated and

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12 *SOS*, 53.
13 *SOS*, 54-57.
14 *SOS*, 60-62.
be seen to function separately from the others, and yet still connected to each other through Lamont’s concept of polarity. That is, that one independent thing can infer another, the prime example being N and S poles. Ultimately, McIntyre concludes that this account lacks familiarity. The fact is that these models have by and large been developed in plain view and knowledge of at least one of the others, if not in direct response to one of them. It is this familiarity that represents for McIntyre a notion of them each being a contribution to “the richness of the whole.”

Perspectivism and horizons are the most closely related in that they are each concerned with point of view. The only substantive difference being that perspectivism is a more static account than horizons. Perspectivism, while possibly enriched with understandings of cultural and psychological perspectives, is largely concerned with seeing things from one direction, for instance seeing a cut diamond from below. Some facets of the diamond will be visible, while others will be obscured. The various accounts of salvation represented by the models are offered explication as the same work seen from a variety of perspectives. Horizons takes this one step further by combining this idea with the idea that as one moves in relation to a horizon line, the horizon is in constant flux. To move toward the horizon provides new perspective and brings into view things previously unseen. In relation to soteriological models, the idea is that the models function as visible points of reference that, when approached, are capable of bringing the work of salvation ‘into view.’

Each of these is in turn rejected as providing a grand unifying theory, and McIntyre moves on to how these models might be related to the death of Christ, rather than to the particular points of the other models. It is here that McIntyre, in a move that could be easily overlooked, makes the case that the soteriological models are “imaginative constructs.” They are thus differentiated from being strictly a matter of analogy, metaphor or parable, though they share more in common with analogy than the rest. That said, further discussion of the correlation between notions of analogy and McIntyre’s particular view of models might be more appropriate to the subject of Christology. What is most important at

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16 SOS, 64.
17 SOS, 65.
18 SOS, 65-67.
19 SOS, 68.
20 It should be noted hear that McIntyre makes a caveat in the following argument regarding his own position on the *analogia entis* and the *analogia fidei*. In regards to the first, McIntyre offers a statement defending the *analogia entis*, because he sees it as being a safeguard against the models (and by implication any notion of analogy being applied in the realm of theology) being dismissed as “mental fictions or heuristic devices,” SOS, 69. The condition being that it is accepted in tandem with the latter, that is the *analogia fidei* “which contains the truth that it belongs to faith, inspired by the Spirit, to see the ordinary usages of language to be applicable analogically to what we say about the activities of God and his work in Christ,” SOS, 69.
this juncture is to say that models, like analogy, should not be understood to be literal language or dismissed as figurative language. Instead, they are meant to be indirect language only insofar as indirect language is possible, a notion wholly congruent with any theology circumspect enough to cede an apophatic space. The word that McIntyre chooses to describe the models is ‘interpretations.’ They in fact must be that, because the given data is not raw. It is filtered, modified, and formulated through the given of the phenomenological occurrence, the process of interpretation, and finally in interaction with the other interpretive models into a tapestry of ‘constellational richness’ and ‘nuclear profusion.’

In the end, the crux of McIntyre’s argument is that models are “a combination of given and interpretation” and that “both of which become modified through their interaction with each other” In the case of the atonement there are the events themselves. There are the events of arrest, trial, flogging, and crucifixion. These are indeed givens. But Christ himself incarnate is also a given of Soteriology. So we must at once make sense of the fact that Christ died, that he died for us, that this death had purpose and efficacy. This is interpreted widely in the various models. Some are interpreted through understandings of the old covenant notions of sacrifice. Some are interpreted into culturally and historically relevant analogies. Some are more speculative, while still others are pedagogical.

The point is that in this interplay between the two, we can see how God’s own imagination is active in the revelation of what is given. As such, “The models of salvation share in the reality of that which they, in a very real sense, embody.” As such the models are the embodiment of the reality of what God has done. In turn, what God has done is encapsulated in the “multidimensional event” that is 1) “the root and ground of our salvation” and 2) “all the things that we have been saying about it in the models.” For McIntyre, any explanation of the atonement that does not account for this event, or offers anything less, falls into the realms of ‘abstraction’ and ‘falsification.’ It is a striking reminder of the fact that it is God’s imaginative activity in that ‘multidimensional act’ that makes this more than a method for McIntyre. It is God’s imagination that gives the given and initiates. Our interpretation of that given is an imaginative act and process, but it is only that in participation with God’s own imagination.

22 SOS, B1.
23 SOS, B3.
24 SOS, B3.
5. Summary

In this chapter there are a few things that have been covered that help move this argument forward. First, we have delineated what exactly models are in McIntyre’s theology. It has been argued that these models are two things. One, they have been stripped down to their most basic form. This allows for McIntyre to employ them within his theological system without the connotational encumberment of concepts like ‘picturing’ or ‘disclosure.’ Two, they are a placeholder for imagination. Whenever McIntyre is using models he is indicating that these concepts as models are the products of the type of imagination that he is advocating and part of the overall methodology that he is employing.

The idea of mathematical models is mine. However, I think it helps illustrate how McIntyre is employing the models in their most basic form. While the focus on models in McIntyre’s context was on the employment of models in the context of science, I am arguing that this account of models is more analogous to what McIntyre is doing with models in particular. While the idea of mathematical models is alien to McIntyre conceptually in the ‘Shape of” books, they do provide a much clearer illustration of how McIntyre understands, develops, and employs models in his own works. However, it is my hope that I have indicated that there is language in McIntyre that would suggest that such a change in framework is not a complete stretch. The ideas of problem, solving, solution, field, etc. all indicate that such an interpretation is germane if not original to McIntyre.

This in turn informs how models are understood to function throughout the ‘Shape of’ books in ways that show both consistency and adaptability. In The Shape of Soteriology in particular, there is a clear picture of how these models are acting in the place of imagination and that this function is consistent with the function of imagination that McIntyre advocated in Faith, Theology and Imagination.

It is with this clear picture in mind, that we are able to explore McIntyre’s more nuanced and complex treatments in the other ‘Shape of’ books. Already, there are indications that such complications might arise, namely the question of whether or not any one model can have precedence over another.

In The Shape of Soteriology that is a question that is not particularly complex, because each model has, at least at this point, had its own life as an independent and contained account of salvation. Consequently, it is not controversial to say that one account covers more ground, or has enjoyed more longevity, or been more fully integrated into the worship practices of the church. Additionally, McIntyre makes a very good case that any model that can bring in other accounts, encompass them, or hold any number of models together can and should be given preference. This is not to say that they should be
neglected. In fact, they should still be a part of that ‘nuclear profusion’ that McIntyre refers to. That said, McIntyre has no qualms saying that any account of salvation must give an account of forgiveness if it wants to be a model at all. Thus, if we understand forgiveness to be a sort of model unto itself, all other models are consequently rendered subservient. This is a move that might not be well received by those who have a significant stake in any one of the models, and we can see that such an approach might have more significant fallout in the highly charged atmosphere of Christology.
Chapter 4: The Shape of Christology

1. Imagination in *The Shape of Christology*

   The method that emerges in the area of Christology functions in broadly similar ways, and it also shares its roots in a basic understanding of models. That said, there are key differences in the understanding of the given, the way that models relate to each other, and the degree to which a model can be said to be normative. These differences are further complicated by the differences between the first and second editions of *The Shape of Christology*. Thus an understanding of these two texts and their differences must be delineated at this point. The main question that emerges is whether Chalcedon either functions as a model among many, even if it is dominant among those models, or it distinguishes itself by being normative for the study of Christology, regardless of the model framework that one is using.

   What I will be arguing here is that McIntyre does in fact choose to give a place of prominence to Chalcedon as a normative model for all Christological inquiry. However, I will also be arguing that this only happens in his development of that concept in the second edition. This is a significant departure from the framework of the first edition of *The Shape of Christology* and is distinct from the framework of *The Shape of Soteriology* that has already been discussed. This initially seems to suggest a departure from the project laid out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* and the “Shape of” books that he had written up to this point.

   My argument is that this is not the case, specifically that this is not a departure from the structure of imagination that McIntyre lays out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* and it is not a departure from the methodological standard established, particularly in *The Shape of Soteriology*.

   The way that McIntyre does this is by elevating the content of Chalcedon as an account of Christ’s divinity and humanity by demoting the dogmatic nature of Chalcedon in order to preserve its function as part of the given of Christology. Rather than being definitive of who Christ is, Chalcedon becomes the problem which all Christology must encounter, the fact of the God-Man. This is turn is normative to all Christological formulation, not as an answer but as the question. As such the incarnation is not a matter of God giving himself to humanity in Christ, but instead a matter of giving Christ to humanity as the God-Man. As such Christ is the image/model. He is just the image/model of God’s imagination and not our own. This is why our thoughts and answers are always subject to the problem of himself. It is the problem of himself that is the ‘daring imaginativeness’ of the incarnation.
that McIntyre refers to in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*; and that is the idea that McIntyre is trying to preserve here.

2. Distinguishing the Two Editions

As was just said, the first step in drawing out these arguments is an understanding of these two texts and two editions. The two editions of *The Shape of Christology* are basically similar in the content that they share in common. The first edition was originally organized into seven chapters. In the second edition the first six chapters from the first edition are grouped into two parts. The first three chapters are grouped into a section on “Christological Method.” The fourth through sixth chapters are grouped into a section on “Chalcedon-Based Models” of Christology. The seventh chapter from the first edition served as a conclusion to that edition, but it is used only as a conclusion to the first part of the second edition. As such, the first three chapters of the first edition and the conclusion to the first edition form the core of the common material between these two editions.

The distinctive content of McIntyre’s Christology is rooted in the method that he lays out in the first section. McIntyre presents this method by first rejecting the idea that the Historical Jesus, God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, or an existential encounter of Christ in the here and now could independently or exclusively serve as the given of Christology. Instead, McIntyre argues for “a conclusion which somehow integrates them all.”

McIntyre continues along this line of argument by claiming that literary-critical methods, historical methods, geographical-cultural methods, liturgical methods, and ethical methods can easily “usurp authority and at once present a radically distorted or gravely diminished account of the Christological subject-matter” when used in exclusion. He goes on to write, “At one time or another in the history of doctrine or culture, this is exactly what happened.” With this rejection of these methods of Christology used in an exclusive capacity, McIntyre is arguing for the use of a variety of methods that can contribute to a more balanced method of Christology.

McIntyre’s view of what models are and how they can function in theology is heavily dependent on the work of Ian T. Ramsey’s *Models and Mystery*. Ramsay argues for the use of what he calls ‘disclosure models’ of which McIntyre summarizes as having three elements:

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1 *SOC*, 2nd ed., 22.
2 *SOC*, 2nd ed., 22
3 *SOC*, 2nd ed., 45.
4 *SOC*, 2nd ed., 45.
First, the phenomena which have constituted a problem for the scientist and defy either explanation of description in terms of known laws, principles or hypotheses; secondly, the model which displays some structural similarity to the phenomena; and thirdly, a theory or deductive system of a very complex nature associated with the phenomena, from which certain fundamental notions are selected in the model for simplified treatment.\(^6\)

The conclusion then is that these models are not merely descriptive of the phenomena, but they also help disclose the truth hidden in the complexity of the phenomena itself. However, it should be noted that McIntyre is developing the ideas of Ramsey in new ways. He accepts Ramsey’s position in regards to the way that models disclose information in a complementary fashion with what they actually model. For McIntyre, models move beyond disclosure and go on to offer analogy, to apprehend reality, are normative, and can be integrated. All of these are key functions of a model in McIntyre’s evaluation of the use of models in theology.

McIntyre highlights what role each of these functions plays in his conception of the use of models in theology. He begins by offering his own perspective on what models as “Media of Disclosure” are. In this section, the primary emphasis of models as disclosure is “that they exist to serve God himself, to be the media by which he is to be known, worshipped and obeyed.”\(^7\) This is the way that McIntyre sees a discussion of models move beyond a discussion of abstract methodology. He writes that:

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\text{Far too often the question of models is seen as a logical question, of how human language can penetrate to the heart of the divine mystery, of how a linguistic extrapolation is achieved so that, with human grammar and syntax, we are able to speak of God himself.}\(^8\)
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This continues to fit into McIntyre’s reading of Ramsey in which two points of context are allowed to have a synergistic effect pointing to some point beyond either one of them. McIntyre recognizes that the abstraction of this pointing has the potential danger of pointing in a variety of non-related directions, so he roots the direction of this pointing by placing it in a specific theological context. Thus these theological models are always pointing to the same subject, namely Jesus Christ. McIntyre concludes, “It is this uniform reference which saves (the models) from being a kaleidoscopic series of prettily poetic pictures.”\(^9\) McIntyre’s conclusion reflects the fact that the use of models must be used as a rigorous method that is seeking a theological reality. It must not degenerate into a convenient way to compose a cumulative mosaic of who God is perceived to be.

\(^6\) SOC, 2\(^{nd}\) ed., 51.
\(^7\) SOC, 2\(^{nd}\) ed., 53.
\(^8\) SOC, 2\(^{nd}\) ed., 53.
\(^9\) SOC, 2\(^{nd}\) ed., 56.
In his section on models and analogy, McIntyre recounts J.M. Keynes distinction between negative and positive analogy as it is presented in Susan Stebbing’s book, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*. In this account, the more positive analogies used, the closer one is to strictly describing something; the more negative analogies used, the closer one is to offering a fanciful description. Overall, “Proper analogy occurs in the middle range of this spectrum.”

This understanding of what analogy is leads McIntyre to make three major conclusions. One, arguments cannot be dismissed because they are analogical. Two, analogical arguments are refined by the combinative definition added by complementary analogies. Three, we never can grasp the mystery of the Word made flesh in the immediacy of non-analogical language. He even goes so far to agree with Paul Tillich’s line “that with the exception of the statement of Being Itself, all language about God is analogical.”

His section on Models as Media of Apprehension follows up by delving into the philosophy of his former teacher Professor Kemp Smith. In this section, McIntyre uses Kemp Smith’s theory about the ontological status of secondary qualities to illustrate the way in which models in theology aid in the apprehension of who Christ actually is. Kemp Smith’s theory is presented as a middle ground between the naïve realists, who argue for the reality of things in and of themselves, and the subjective idealists, who hold that secondary properties exist only in the mind.

For Kemp Smith, secondary properties do have an existence that is their own, but only insofar as they are appropriated through the sensory perception of people. In relation to Christology, McIntyre claims that there is not a necessary distinction between “talking about Christ, and [when] we are describing him in terms of the models.” Thus he concludes that “our models are controlled and indeed authenticated by the reality, Christ, whom we have come to know albeit through [the models].”

For McIntyre, it is important to note that his use of Kemp Smith is used only to illustrate the utility of models in apprehending a reality. While there can indeed be a disparity between reality and a sensory perception of that reality, he does not want to suggest that there is a disparity between the reality of Christ and the models through which Christ is perceived. It is this qualification of his use of Kemp Smith that leads McIntyre to return to Tillich’s exemption to the idea that “all language about God is analogical.” That is the

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11 *SOC*, 2nd ed., 60.
14 *SOC*, 2nd ed., 63.
15 *SOC*, 2nd ed., 63.
exception of when one is speaking of “Being Itself” in relation to God. McIntyre’s own position in this respect is that the theological language of analogy is grounded in the person of Jesus Christ. Thus “the terms in which we understand Christ’s character are the ways in which in fact he exists.”

McIntyre goes on to make the case that models of Christology have garnered a normative function that was previously unknown as they have been employed to fill the vacuum left by the abandonment of creeds and confessions as subordinate standards within particular traditions. This proves, in McIntyre’s evaluation, to be a double-edged sword in which an inter-traditional basis for ecumenical dialogue is opened by the use of common models and in which intra-traditional conflicts are established when a divergent set of models is used to formulate doctrine within the same tradition.

The normative function of models becomes closely linked with McIntyre’s presentation of the Integrative Function of the Models, which he sees as providing a unity of Christological formulation that did not previously exist. McIntyre describes this by writing that:

At one time, the contents of theology were presented as if they constituted the several atomic items of a series, a longer version of the Apostles’ Creed, with no internal coherence and no genuinely systematic structure. The fashion nowadays is the reverse: theology is highly integrated and carefully structured, and the medium of articulation is the theological model.

McIntyre goes on to illustrate how this unity is achieved in different areas of theological scholarship. In this, McIntyre argues that the unifying effect of models provides the basis for a contemporary theological acceptance of the Bible as a unified theological text, as providing a unified devotional purpose, offering a unified center to which all scripture can be orientated to, and by providing a unified presentation of scripture as a record of God’s mighty acts.

McIntyre concludes his presentation of Christological methodology and the place of models in this method with two complementary sections that summarize his prescriptive vision for what ought to be done in the systematic formulation of Christology. This prescriptive vision offers a series of four criteria that provides certain perimeters for the ways in which models ought to be used and introduces McIntyre’s own understanding of the role that imagination should play in the selection and employment of models in Christology.

“The first is that the model which correlates a higher proportion of the biblical material concerning Christ and the Church’s witness to Christ and obedience to him, than its fellows is more likely to gain allegiance.” The focus of this criterion is that for a model to function

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16 SOC, 2nd ed., 64.
17 SOC, 2nd ed., 68-69.
18 SOC, 2nd ed., 75.
in the normative and unifying ways that it would need to offer a comprehensive Christology it must be a model that is found frequently in Scripture. For McIntyre, it would be inappropriate to develop a Christology and to interpret the entire corpus of scripture using the obscure imagery of a limited model. To truly function as a normative and unifying model, the model would need to be frequently employed to illuminate the variety of dynamics necessary to fully develop a Christology and offer an interpretive lens for offering a unifying function to the Scriptures as a whole.

The second criterion is that, “The model which sets the phenomena of Scripture and of the life of faith in the Church based upon Scripture within the deepest perspective tends to gain ascendancy.” This criterion is centered on the setting or locus of the model. His use of the “deepest perspective” is meant to denote that the model cannot be superficial. It should be deeply set in the content being explored, namely rooted in God’s ultimate nature and in God’s work throughout history.

The third criterion is, “That model which is preferable which throws light on those areas of our religious thought and action to which we should have felt it to be immediately relevant.” This is not to say that the gospel is made relevant by the model. Instead it is the assertion that the model should demonstrate the inherent relevance of the gospel. An appropriate model should confront people with both its truth and with its application.

Thus the final criterion is that “The models which finally establish themselves in the Church’s understanding of the Scriptures and in its proclamation of the Gospel, are those which mediate Christ, his love, his forgiveness, his power and his truth; which sustain faith and renew it with the very life of Christ; which lead to fresh commitment to him for work to be done in his name and for his kingdom’s sake; and which issue in sincere obedience to Christ and his will.” In this McIntyre demands that a Christological model must offer insight into who Christ is and offer means of a fit and proper response to the proclamation of the gospel.

This is where there begins to be significant divergence between the two editions. The conclusion of the first edition is moved to the end of the first section of the second edition. Thus it ceases to be the primary aim of The Shape of Christology, and it serves as the transition from McIntyre’s section on method to his constructive claims. In the second edition this becomes McIntyre’s argument for the adoption of the Chalcedonian definition as the model of Christology.

In the conclusion of the first edition, he writes, “It would be wrong to attach a compulsive character to any one of the models (or to try to offer some brand new model to

19 SOC, 2nd ed., 76.
20 SOC, 2nd ed., 76.
21 SOC, 2nd ed., 77.
lord it over those we have examined).”\textsuperscript{22} In the second edition, he qualifies this by writing “that no compulsive character can be readily attached to the models unless they are thought of as the given.”\textsuperscript{23} This is the first indication that McIntyre is no longer simply arguing for the use of models; he is instead arguing that there is a model that is the given, namely the Chalcedonian definition. In this way, he is still echoing the conclusion from the first edition that “A self-critical examination of the models we employ in Christology ought of itself to put us on our guard against too facile switching from one model to another.”\textsuperscript{24} And he is explicitly restating and maintaining his conclusion that “The creation of models is part of the function which imagination fulfills in theological activity.”\textsuperscript{25}

This difference between the two editions is one that is key to understanding what McIntyre’s claims about imagination actually are. In many ways, it demonstrates the same hesitance that McIntyre has in \textit{Faith, Theology and Imagination} to fully implement the concept of imagination. While McIntyre does, in \textit{Faith, Theology and Imagination}, present a method that is dependent upon the full implementation of imagination as an attribute and divine perfection of God, there are still junctures at which there tends to be a certain amount of ambiguity. This ambiguity demonstrates McIntyre’s own hesitance to fully implement the concept across the spectrum of theological themes. Additionally, I would suggest that, at this juncture in the second edition of \textit{The Shape of Christology}, McIntyre is seeking something more permanent and foundational to which to attach this concept.

Since there are few places to which one can ground a concept so primary to his method, McIntyre seeks to ground imagination at the beginning point of the given. Here, McIntyre offers Chalcedon as a given of Christology in what he would term, the problem as given. Thus Chalcedon for McIntyre is not a definitive creedal statement of doctrinal definition to which one must adhere. Instead, Chalcedon represents the agreed upon elements upon which any Christology must be built. These basic elements, namely the affirmed humanity and divinity of Christ, must always be part of any formulation of Christology.

That said, McIntyre is quick to offer his own defense of his method despite his hesitations. There are two concerns about his method, especially in regards to the role of imagination that McIntyre is keen to address. The first is that the Holy Spirit is removed from having a role in the work of theology and that by introducing the notion of imagination into

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{SOC}, 1st ed., 172.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{SOC}, 2nd ed., 78.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{SOC}, 2nd ed., 173.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{SOC}, 2nd ed., 78.
the process of formulating theology too much credit is given to human faculties. He begins by addressing the concerns about the role of the Holy Spirit in this process.

The reality that McIntyre seeks to acknowledge is that for such models to act as a given, they must be perceived through a careful reading of scripture and must be illuminated by providing insight as they are systematically developed. McIntyre sees these requisites as work that requires effort and requires imagination. Paramount in this process, and in his argument for the use of imagination, is McIntyre’s firm assertion that theologians must “recognize that our theology, our Christology, is human thinking about God, human thinking about Christ.” This is explicitly not meant to diminish the work of the Holy Spirit; but it is simply affirming that the Holy Spirit is working in people as people, not by “dictating a series of propositions which man could faithfully repeat, but as working creatively, as it were, from man’s side.”

In regards to the concern about raising the status of human faculties in relation to knowing God, McIntyre, surprisingly, turns to Karl Barth’s observation that “The creaturely form which God’s revealing act comes to take in dogmatics is therefore not that of knowledge attained in a flash, which it would have to be to correspond to the divine gift, but a laborious advance from one partial human insight to another.” McIntyre offers his own evaluation of this statement where:

God in Jesus Christ [as opposed to ‘God in his revelation’] is the subject that dogmatics deals with; but it deals with this subject not by writing down as series of divinely communicated propositions, but by humanly and fallibly and painfully slowly thinking about them. Such thinking is a process involving perception and insight, both of which are, I should say, functions of imagination.

For McIntyre, this position of honest disclosure about the task of theology undercuts the ability of the theologian to level accusations against fellow Christians and theologians. It returns the focus of the Christian faith to Christ as its subject. Without the service to faith by the models, there is no place for them in theology. Thus it should be remembered that, “The only genuine purpose of a Christological model is to make possible the service and love of Christ, through a true understanding of him.”

In this vein, McIntyre sees models as a reconciling of the ‘theological schizophrenia’, which oscillates between maintaining a simple faith and embracing all of the complexities of theological method and formulation. For him: “Christological models, therefore, which are not derived from faith, will finally if they be true models find their place and their home in faith’s

\[26\] SOC, 2nd ed., 79.
\[27\] SOC, 2nd ed., 78.
\[28\] Karl, Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1, §1.2.2.
\[29\] SOC, 2nd ed., 79.
\[30\] SOC, 2nd ed., 77.
worship of and prayer to its Saviour and Master.” It is a part of McIntyre’s methodological posture to seek the fulfillment of theological inquiry through acceptance by and expression in the church, rather than in the self-assertion of the author. He is very direct in addressing his conviction that theologians ought to be honest about the limited scope and authority of their work.

This reshapes the second edition in two significant ways. First, it offers a new function to the sections on Chalcedon-based models, process Christology, and neo-Chalcedonian Christology. It accomplishes this by arguing for the use of the Chalcedonian as a meta-model that functions as the given, rather than just presenting a variety of models. However, it also refocuses what role the model plays in McIntyre’s thinking. Models cease to be only things that theologians formulate, and the meta-model of Chalcedon becomes a non-prescriptive norm that frames and shapes the formulation of subsequent models.

Thus in the first edition the two-nature model, the psychological model, and the revelation model are presented as examples of models that can be chosen and developed in a constructive theological project. They are presented with both the benefits and with the flaws of using them in exclusion. They are presented as helpful, but insufficient. This leaves a place for imagination in theology to reconcile variegated models and to, possibly, formulate new models. In the second edition, all of these models are presented as models that are firmly placed within a Chalcedonian context due to its normative function.

31 SOC, 2nd ed., 80.
32 This question of how Chalcedon can function in this way, allows McIntyre to entertain other responses to the classical problem of Chalcedon. Interestingly, this is one of very few junctures at where McIntyre allows himself to put forward a significantly different version of his own to address this problem, rather than simply evaluating and synthesizing other views and models already in existence. While McIntyre has a tremendous respect for Chalcedon and the normative role that it has provided throughout the history of the church and in Christological formulation, he draws from some unlikely sources to offer an alternative to the traditional formula, Ephraim of Antioch. Rather than simply affirming the two natures of Christ as existing in one unified hypostasis, McIntyre argues that the concept of a single composite hypostasis should be reevaluated. McIntyre first suggests this in the first edition in The Shape of Christology. McIntyre draws primarily on the presentation of this idea of a composite hypostasis as presented by Ephraim of Antioch and preserved in the writings of Photius of Tyre. This is a point highlighted in D.W.D. Shaw, “John McIntyre,” Theology in Scotland, vol. XIV, no. 2 (2007): 5-17. Shaw notes that while McIntyre “elucidates the patristic concensus... He [also] made a highly original contribution by his quotation of Ephraim of Antioch, via the writings of Photius of Tyre” with a “no-nonsense approach...to the widely discarded concept of ‘substantiality.’” Ibid., 8. McIntyre’s proposal for the acceptance of this concept takes place within his wider discussion of the Chalcedonian model of Christology and more specifically within his discussion of enhypostasis and anhypostaisa in both his contemporary context and in historical iterations. The basic notion of this argument is that Christ does not have two natures, a human nature and a human nature, in one single hypostasis. Instead, the human hypostasis and the divine hypostasis are fused into one composite hypostasis. In this way, there is no question as to whether or not the fullness of the human, including the human hypostasis, was assumed by the unification of God with humanity, especially in this particular man. Additionally, it helps defend against the claim that Chalcedon presents an impersonal (a person lacking a human hypostasis) Christ, as
The second section of the second edition presents a variety of process Christologies from David R. Griffin, John B. Cobb Jr., and Norman Pittenger. McIntyre presents these theologies in light of their attempt to move beyond the language and constructs of Chalcedonian theology, but he is also making the argument that with all of their striving to this end the process theologians are ultimately unsuccessful. They are unable to escape the inherent problem of Christology that is rooted in the Chalcedonian definition.

The general point here is that the cadres of process theologians were and are odd allies for McIntyre to engage with. If anything, what these theologians represent is the type of theology that would have been on the fringe for someone like McIntyre. This is not to say that we could not point to theologians who might be considered more extreme, or even extreme theologians McIntyre would have been more comfortable with. The point here is that the motivation is antithetical to McIntyre’s approach to theology. Yet he holds them and their thought up as exemplary of imaginative theology that is capable of raising questions, creating unlikely juxtapositions, and ultimately providing unexpected insights that would have otherwise remained unseen. In order to demonstrate that his acceptance of process Christology is complete, McIntyre devotes an entire section of the re-written second edition to the school of thought.

One chapter is dedicated to the treatment of John B Cobb Junior’s Christ in a Pluralistic Age.33 One chapter is dedicated to the treatment of David A Griffin’s A Process well as the contemporary connotations that are carried with notions of Christ being impersonal. It eliminates the bifurcated ways in which people tend to speculate on in what circumstances Jesus was acting out of his divine nature or out of his human nature, for the simple reason that Jesus is no longer imagined as having a human nature and a divine nature. Instead, Jesus has one nature. And from this one nature Jesus lives out his entire life. All of his preaching, teaching, healing, working, dying, and raising are lived out by this one man out of his one embodied nature. There is no question of kenoticism, where somehow the divine is diminished to make way for Jesus’ base human nature. There is no divine absenteeism that allows Jesus to be more human and to live more like the people he is around. Instead, each action and word is lived and spoken in the singular nature of a man in whom the divine and human are indistinguishable, even in his own nature. However, this distinct and basic union of the divine hypostasis and the human hypostasis also draw the divinity of Christ into a realm of immediate knowability on the part of people who encountered Jesus Christ of Nazareth. As McIntyre states: “after the incarnation it is the God-man who is the subject of what subsequently happens” and also, “The God-man may ‘have access’ to certain experiences because he is divine, and to others because he is human; but ultimately it is he himself, and not either of his natures, who has the experience and is the subject of them.” SOC, 101. It is then equally true that in all of the actions and works of Christ there is this same unified subject who is acting and working. Thus when the Christ acts, speaks, and works it is also God who is acting, speaking, and working. It is not possession, co-opting, or superseding the life of a human person; but it is instead God imagined as a human and knowable form. This is, of course, a minority reading of Chalcedon; and it is not something that McIntyre fully endorses or subscribes to. What this does illustrate is the way that McIntyre is willing and able to entertain other possible readings, given an emphasis on understanding Chalcedon as a problem rather than a solution. McIntyre again is following the governing intention of Chalcedon to force a real encounter with the divinity and humanity of Christ, rather than strictly adhering to Chalcedon as a specific conclusion.

Christology.\textsuperscript{34} Then the final chapter is devoted to a treatment of Norman Pittenger’s version of process Christology. McIntyre focuses this treatment on two of his monographs Christology Reconsidered and The Word Incarnate: A Study of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.\textsuperscript{35}\textsuperscript{36} In each chapter McIntyre works to demonstrate the pervasive and inescapable influence of Chalcedon on these theologians developing a principally un-Chalcedonian theology.

The third section of the second edition begins with a presentation of John Macquarrie\textsuperscript{37} and Gerald O’Collins\textsuperscript{38} as formulating Christologies from a “Neo-Chalcedonian” perspective. While McIntyre still reads these presentations with his typical analytical focus, he does use these presentations to make the suggestion that these models do have something to offer. In fact, he makes a convincing case that they have made Chalcedon relevant again.

It is in light of this cumulative case argument in which traditional Christology is done in a Chalcedonian context, modern theologies have not been able to escape the Chalcedonian definition, and that Chalcedon has been demonstrated to be relevant that McIntyre makes his own argument for Chalcedon as the given meta-model that shapes Christology. It is this argument that serves as the conclusion to the second edition.

McIntyre argues for this full and real Identification of God with people in the incarnation with Jesus Christ as the unified God-man on several bases. First, it is normative. This is the argument that he makes through much of the second edition. It is normative for those that acknowledge Chalcedon, but it is also normative for those who do not. It is truly a given as a normative problem. Though it is normative, McIntyre also argues that it is not prescriptive in that it does not “outlaw...all variants of the canonical terminology and cultural changes intended to clarify meanings.”\textsuperscript{39} That said, for McIntyre that does not mean that Chalcedon is lacking in theological definition. It still has definition, but it is a definition with latitude for interpretation, presentation, further definition, and further formulation.

McIntyre complies with the expectations that he had of models by relating the functionality of Chalcedon as a model to the edification of the church. He supports the idea that “the divine component [of the church] is Jesus Christ the incarnate Lord, and that the humanity which is the human members of the Church is related to Christ analogically to the

\textsuperscript{34} David A. Griffin, A Process Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973).
\textsuperscript{35} Norman Pittenger, Christology Reconsidered (London: SCM, 1970).
\textsuperscript{37} John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM, 1990).
\textsuperscript{38} Gerald O’Collins, Christology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
\textsuperscript{39} SOC, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., 316.
relationship of the human nature to the Word in the original Chalcedonian model.”

McIntyre continues in a similar vein in arguing that the Chalcedonian model does much to reconcile the “human element as well as the divine element in the Scriptures.”

It also does much to aid the church’s understanding of the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper as a communication idiomatum informed by the “hypostasis of both natures to be conjoined.” He continues, adding that Chalcedon serves as “the substance of Christian devotion, dedication and commitment.”

He continues this line of reasoning by saying that Chalcedon is the “core of the Christian tradition” and that it “has been the major force in sustaining the integrity of the Christian faith.” However, McIntyre also notes that it has still allowed an incredible breadth of pluralism within the Christian tradition; and he is convinced that this pluralism can serve as an apologetic basis for Christianity in a pluralistic society. For McIntyre, this is because “there remains at the heart of the faith the reconciling love which was the essence and prime motivation of Jesus Christ.”

The conclusion of this line of reasoning for McIntyre is that Chalcedon is “still a live option.” It is something that has demonstrated its function as a model, as given and problem, and has demonstrated its usefulness in the life of the church. He argues in his closing remarks that Chalcedon can be maintained, because of the inherent relation between words and things. He uses the logicians William and Martha Kneale to demonstrate this logical relation, especially in relation to a linguistic understanding of logic. This linguistic understanding of Chalcedon as relating the words of Chalcedon to the God they represent, for McIntyre, replaces the Metaphysical claims of Chalcedon. The divine claims are still relevant, but they are made because of what is being said, not because of some abstraction that exists. As McIntyre puts it:

It seems as if there is an inescapable link between the way we speak of things and the way they exist. Therefore, though we develop metaphysical theories which reject Aristotelianism, there comes a point in their development when we find ourselves - perhaps even involuntarily - using the logical/grammatical structures initially so closely associated with it. That would in itself account for the normative and prescriptive role which it, almost hauntingly, continues to play in the other christologies which we have been considering.

This language of Chalcedon being “inescapable,” “involuntary,” and “haunting” seems to become what McIntyre comes to understand of a true model, or in the terms used here,

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40 SOC, 2nd ed., 322.
41 SOC, 2nd ed., 323.
42 SOC, 2nd ed., 324.
43 SOC, 2nd ed., 327.
44 SOC, 2nd ed., 328.
45 SOC, 2nd ed., 331.
47 SOC, 2nd ed., 336.
meta-model. A proper model is truly normative and shaping at a meta-level that is beyond reformulation. Thus, "when we find that in our reference to the person whom the Gospels are ‘about’ we speak of him as Jesus Christ or the God-man or even the Word incarnate, we can conclude that the person so spoken of is not only possessed of two natures but is in his own person both human and divine."48

As such we see that McIntyre is accepting that authority and normative influence of Chalcedon. There is no attempt to escape the prominence of one hypostasis and two natures. The question is more one of what that authority means. Rather than viewing this definition as the conclusion to the argument, to which all people must adhere, McIntyre insists on affirming the governing intention of Chalcedon over all subsequent formulations. Such leeway is not new and can be seen even in some of the very earliest receptors of Chalcedon. From the very beginning Chalcedon suffered from questions surrounding what Aloys Grillmeier called “the binding character” of the decision. For Grillmeier this question is a question both of reception and hermeneutics.49 In order to make the case for a full acceptance of the Chalcedonian decision it must be adequately broadcast in order to fulfill both “legal and kerygmatic” preconditions,50 received and represented in the theological literature, and taken up into widespread spiritual practice. This is all before, the hermeneutic question is raised.

Part of the reason this challenge is so pervasive is the Chalcedonian formula itself. He writes that “the Chalcedonian Definition looks symmetrical and undynamic because of the juxtaposition of the divine and the human natures”51 and later “The Chalcedonian Definition may seem to have a static-ontic ring, but it is not meant to do away with the salvation-historical aspect of biblical Christology, for which, in fact, it provides a foundation and deeper insights.”52 The point in reference to McIntyre is that Chalcedon is intended to govern subsequent theological formulation, not quash it. The question that Grillmeier so excellently raises is whether Chalcedon is an end or a beginning.53 It is a fair question and a live question. The resounding answer from McIntyre is that it is the latter.

50 Historically speaking, it is failures at this juncture to fulfill the legal obligation that the council had to share their findings throughout the empire. Failure to communicate these decisions (and prior to incorporate full participation) mark the beginning of the isolation of the Oriental Orthodox Churches and other contemporary, non-Chalcedonian traditions. Despite enduring long-term dismissal as Monophysite (a term they reject as inapplicable) sects, these churches have persisted with alternative Christological formulations based on their own historical development. Recent history, as early as 1970, has resulted in resumed efforts at ecumenical relations with these churches. Ibid., 9. This is a purpose that McIntyre’s Christology could serve, given the way that he treats Chalcedon within his work.
52 Ibid., 553-54.
53 Ibid., 555-57.
3. Summary: A Middle Way

With this in mind, we return to the question of the method of imagination in *The Shape of Christology*, how it differs from that in *The Shape of Soteriology*, and how it is caught up in the scuffle between these two competing editions. The real question here is: what is Chalcedon in the field of Christological meaning? Is it a problem? Is it a given? Is it a model? Is it a definition? Is it dogma? Is it just an annoying nuisance?

First, it should be noted that Christology is substantially different from the realm of soteriology in regards to the strictures and parameters of the field of meaning in question. Here, there are rules. There are dogmas. There are creeds. There are controversies. There are heretics. All of these things add a different dynamic to the question, and the language of 'both-and' is not frequently a part of the vocabulary.

In order to navigate this minefield, I am going to permit myself some generalizations to help categorize the two editions and make a clear distinction between them. The first edition, in this sense, is similar to *The Shape of Soteriology*. Here, the field of meaning is occupied by different models that are all overlaid and have points of contact and convergence with one another. Thus there is an emphasis on those things that are most closely associated with one another. It is all about the connection, complementarity etc. that are present in the constellational richness of all points illumined by the various models.

The second edition, deviates from this narrative. In general terms, it plays with the role and function that Chalcedon has. It recognizes the fact that Chalcedon will always take a certain amount of precedence over other models. This is not to say that other models have not proven themselves extremely influential and successful. It is simply to say that none of them, regardless of their success, brilliance, or persuasiveness has ever fully escaped the long shadow that Chalcedon casts. The question becomes something along the lines of: What does that influence mean? Does it mean that this model stands above the rest in a hierarchy? Does that mean it has risen above the level of mere model?

The simplest way to answer this question is to simply say that Chalcedon is a model in the sense that it is an imaginative construct and can never be elevated to transcend that fact. However, it does appear to have a normative influence on the other models that goes beyond the simple interconnectedness of the constellation. To put McIntyre’s conclusion in his own terms, Chalcedon succeeds in that it was able to accurately and succinctly state the perennial problem of Christology.

In this way, the given of Christology must be understood differently than it was in the case of Soteriology, and the mechanism for taking the complexity of information into account must adapt to this change.
To go back to the mathematical analogy, to think of Chalcedon as the given changes the dynamic of the given. Here the given is not the raw data, nor is the given complex, in the sense that the given is coming from multiple directions. Here, the given is simple or at least simplified. It is distilled into the “formula” of two “natures” and one “person.” That is not to say that the given, in the sense of raw data, is not incredibly complex.

Christology is in fact marked by the complexity of the raw material that is present, and it is this raw data that leads McIntyre to first discuss the given of Christology as complex. This is true of both the first and second editions. What this does not account for though is the influence that Chalcedon has in McIntyre’s account of Christology as a field of meaning. The only thing that would account for this influence would be if it could be demonstrated that Chalcedon was somehow a part of the given.

This presents a challenge for McIntyre that he does not fully reconcile. He sees the influence. In fact, he spends much of the second edition pointing out the inescapability of Christological formulations from its verbiage and structure. Even alternative expressions of Christology, like the process Christology of Griffin, Cobb, and Pittenger fall into this category. However, McIntyre refuses to accept the notion that the place that Chalcedon has in the tradition of the church is enough to secure that same influence.

He instead relies on the logician Martha Kneale to maintain a connection between ‘words and things’ to suggest that the internal logic of the formulation of Chalcedon must be so closely representative of the reality that it cannot be discarded.54

The problem is that to one degree or another this represents an abandonment of McIntyre’s strict adherence to his method and the terms and structures that he already has in place. I would argue then that there is another option that is more consistent and does not pull back from his initial instinct.

In this account, imagine that the raw data is not the given, or perhaps more properly, that the raw data is an overly complex given. In mathematics, if one is given too much data or data that is too complex, the problem that data poses must be simplified. By simplifying the problem, one is able to determine what the key variables are and their most direct relationship to each other. In the best cases, incredibly complex data can be simplified into the most elegant expressions of direct relation. Think: $e=mc^2$. Five characters express the energy of an atom of any element. What must be an enormous amount of data collected about the potential energy of numerous elements in exponential correlation to each other is summed up in that simple expression.

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54 SOC, 2nd ed., 336.
In a similar way, Chalcedon takes an incredible amount of data about the life of Jesus, multiple gospel accounts, concerns about authenticity and canonicity, the kingdom of heaven, messianic expectation, logos philosophy, etc., and says the real question is how it is that Jesus Christ of Nazareth was both human and divine in a singular human existence. What must be understood, in this context, is that this formula is not the answer to a complex problem, it is the simplification and formulization of that problem. This is not the definition of who Jesus is and was; it is the problem that Jesus' existence poses to normal human experience. This is not the final dogmatic statement of belief, but it is instead the problem that begs the question and has begged answering through the centuries.

As such, Chalcedon is the given. It is the starting point. This is the source of its influence. Because no Christology, no matter how nuanced, qualified, imaginative, progressive, off-beat, traditional, or fundamental can ever escape the problem of knowing and understanding that Jesus is, was, and ever will be God and Man.

Either way this does seem to solve McIntyre's particular problem with Chalcedon. That is, how it can both function as a model and influence other models like a given. This is, of course, not to say that theology can or even should be expressed formulaically. It is simply a matter of saying that the method that McIntyre is proposing is analogous to processes used in mathematics. It creates the conditions of the entire process. The conditions of Chalcedon are the full humanity and full divinity of in the incarnation, and those conditions are stated in terms that are intended to make those conditions unavoidably integral to the problem.

Thus, if we are truly speaking of an incarnation of God, both the full humanity and full divinity demanded by Chalcedon are necessary in order to constrain our subsequent theological formulation. As such, Chalcedon, even as problem, which is not intended to be any kind of diminishment of its place or importance, continues to offer a safeguard against our Christology from devolving into some form or Docetism or Adoptionism, or as McIntyre might put it, Christology that is either ahistorical or at theological.

55 The fact that the Chalcedonian definition of who Jesus is in terms of person and natures has been problematic for theology and theologians is not new nor should it be surprising. Schleiermacher presents one of the most complete rebuttals to the specific notions of the personhood of Jesus and its relation to a divine and human nature, The Christian Faith, II.§96.1. If this formula of natures and persons is to be accepted as dogmatic, it should be noted that it poses severe problems of internal consistency, especially when put in conversation with similar formulae of the Trinity. However, if these terms of natures and person are understood to be placeholders or variables in the formulization of the Christological problem, then we can perhaps say, as Augustine did with Nicaea, “two what” and “one who” or in our mathematical model $2n = p$, De Trinitate, VII.3.7.

56 I think that it is an important point to make that McIntyre and his system in no way are intended to, or in effect, diminish the role of Chalcedon. If anything, McIntyre’s positing of Chalcedon as problem, or governing conditions, is intended to maintain the centrality of Chalcedon, even among less traditional Christological formulations.
The reason that this is so important goes back to *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. There it is the act of the incarnation that is an act of God's own imagination. In most accounts of theological imagination, imagination is part of the attempt to know God from the human side. In the case of McIntyre’s presentation here, it is a convergence of the two. God reveals himself as the God-man, which is itself problematic and challenging to our understanding of him. In the case of Chalcedon the divine and human natures are affirmed in such a way that neither can be denied. This forces any and all of our models of Christology to encounter directly the problem that the God-man himself imposes on us in the incarnation.

This Christology is primarily an outworking of divine imagination. For instance, the incarnation is ultimately an imaginative act of God, in which God gives image to himself as human.57 The human imagination is only involved secondarily. Here human imagination is necessary from the very beginning as the basis of human/ethical interaction in which imagination is necessary to identify with an other. Thus we could say, that imagination was required of the disciples in order to know him, and be involved with him. This would be true whether Jesus was divine or not, but the primary aspect of Christ’s divinity requires that much more in terms of the exercising of their imaginations.

In turn, imagination is required of us to know Christ in the same way. It is required at a basic, historical level; but there is an additional onus created by the fact that God is giving image to himself in Christ. This process is, of course, a fraught one. This is part of the reason that McIntyre maintains that part of the role of the Holy Spirit is “God’s making sure of us.”58 As such, the role of imagination in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit functions in much the same way. First, it is primarily the divine imagination at work in the sending of the Holy Spirit. It is only secondarily our imagination responding to God’s imagination in the person of the Holy Spirit who works first from above, as God’s self-imagination, and from below, as guiding the human appropriation of the divine self-imagination.

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57 *FTI*, 54.
58 *FTI*, 62.
Chapter 5: The Shape of Pneumatology

The Shape of Pneumatology is the least consistent among the other “Shape of” books, but it is also the most consistent with the theological vision outlined in Faith, Theology and Imagination. In the first instance, The Shape of Pneumatology demonstrates the willingness of McIntyre to engage the non-formulaic aspects of his method. My argument is that this is largely due to the different nature of the subject of Pneumatology in relation to Christology and Soteriology respectively.1 In the second instance, Pneumatology is a field within theology that does not have the same rigidity, tradition, or in fact systematized formulation as Christology and Soteriology. While in the first instance, this provides unique challenges for McIntyre in engaging with the widespread and free-ranging ideas about the Holy Spirit; in the second instance, it allows McIntyre a tremendous amount of freedom and leeway to express his doctrine of the Holy Spirit in exactly the terms that he means to. Namely, that the Holy Spirit is God’s imagination set loose in the world. This is a claim that 1) Is in complete continuity with Faith, Theology and Imagination 2) Is an outworking of the place of Imagination as a divine perfection 3) Shows a high level of integration in his ideas. While there may be any number factors that contribute to this, The Shape of Pneumatology is an example of McIntyre’s least encumbered and most mature theology.

1. Models in The Shape of Pneumatology

The non-formulaic aspect of McIntyre’s method is most aptly recognized in its application to the field of Pneumatology. This field poses a situation unique to the three areas examined in the ‘Shape of books.’ On the one hand, the area of Pneumatology is similar to the field of Christology in that the raw, un-simplified data is incredibly complex and diverse. One the other hand, it shares more in common with the field of soteriology in that it does not have the same dogmatic restrictions that are present in the realm of Christology. In

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1 This may also be related to the compiled nature of this work, coming from different papers, lectures etc. The source material for this book is less homogenous than the other ‘Shape of’ books. Whereas The Shape of Christology and The Shape of Soteriology were at least initially that product of lecture series, which served as the core material and framework for their development, The Shape of Pneumatology is largely derived from lecture notes. At least one of these lectures was developed into a publication: John McIntyre, “The Holy Spirit in Greek Patristic Thought,” Scottish Journal of Theology 7 (1954): 353-75. We know that this was originally a lecture from a manuscript in The McIntyre Papers AA.4.13.12. The published version of this lecture was included in nearly identical form in The Shape of Pneumatology. This fragmentary documentation in the special collections is atypical compared to the record left by the other ‘Shape of’ books.
fact, it is unlike either Christology or soteriology in that little can be said definitively or systematically about the doctrine of the Holy Spirit across the church as a whole.

This lack of definition in either direction results in there being an incredible amount of data that needs accounting for. First there is the raw data that is expansive, as is the case in both of the fields already discussed. However, this data has not been simplified either through a series of theoretical, interpretive models as was the case in The Shape of Soteriology; nor in the simplified, definitive formula as was the case in The Shape of Christology. Consequently, even the results of looking at the data are heavy with data that must be sorted through. This can be seen in the wide variety and sheer unpredictability of what can and has been said about the Holy Spirit.

In the realm of mathematics, such a situation would leave no option but to simply run as many calculations as possible, using as many variables as possible in order to track as many results as possible. These results, incapable of being simplified in the ways seen above, must then be evaluated through the lens of probability. In the context of differential equations, this would be done through the p-boxes, or probability boxes, mentioned earlier. Essentially, what these boxes do is identify clusters of significant data by defining fields of consistent, similar results as being probabilistically significant to the original problem.

For example, imagine that one was given a set of differential equations that are related to each other in the same field of meaning. Each equation is by definition complex and will consequently have sporadic and unpredictable results (like the double-pendulum). In order to have any idea what a model of each equation will be like, a large number of calculations will need to be made, in the same way more points are needed to graph a curve but in the context of a problem that is exponentially more complex. The challenge is that this only gives an indication of how that one equation would be modeled. Consequently, each result of the relevant equations must be plotted together within the same field. However, unlike the method of overlaying multiple models, one simply models all of the relevant points that are being indicated within the field.

The result is a single field with a mess of points plotted all over it, except that in this mess of plotted points there are clusters. It is still possible that these clusters do not mean anything, but with each added point in any given cluster the probability of that particular area sharing something that significantly links these equations becomes more and more likely. Probability boxes are simply drawn as a perimeter around these clusters as a way of identifying the range of these significant sets of data.

In a similar way, McIntyre approaches the complex field that is the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Because of the ‘heterogeneity’ of expression that the field of Pneumatology has within it, McIntyre does exert extra effort to schematize what he in other contexts simply
developed as independent models by sub-setting what he calls ‘patterns’ within broader categories that he terms models. This is especially helpful as he discusses the models in his own conclusions in that it allows him to make broader connections and more direct links between the heterogeneous expressions of Pneumatology.

2. Models of Pneumatology

One, there is the Definitional/Biblical Pluralist Model: Multiple Mutually Compatible Patterns. This model concentrates on the normative function of the biblical texts in providing definition to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. This model both acknowledges the variety of representations of the Holy Spirit in the biblical texts while affirming their basic compatibility within the biblical witness as a whole.

Two, there is the Trinitarian Hypostatic Model, within which are the Traditional Pattern and the Christological Pattern. This model is characterized by a focus on the internal logic of Trinitarian thought, which is then informed by the scriptural accounts of the Spirit. The Traditional Pattern finds its source in the presentation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Cappadocian Fathers and focuses on the internal Trinitarian logic of hypostasis. The Christological Pattern, on the other hand, finds its source in Jean Calvin and the Reformed tradition in which “The Spirit appears as completing and fulfilling the work of God in Christ, supplying the faith to accept the Gospel and the will to embrace the benefits of the Redeemer.”

Three, there is the Trinitarian Model, within which are the Revelation-soteriological Pattern, and the Emperichoretic Pattern. In some ways this model and the subsequent two patterns are closely related to the last model and its constituent parts. The Revelation-soteriological Pattern is really a development within the Reformed tradition by Karl Barth, and it focuses on offering an “account of the role which the Spirit plays in the atonement and revelation process.” McIntyre sources a contemporary form of the Emperichoretic Pattern from John V. Taylor and his book The Go-Between God. Taylor develops the concept of emperichoresis and the interpenetration of the triune persons and share in each other’s being.

Four, there is the Dynamic Model, within which are the Definitional Dynamic Model/Relational or Operational Patterns, the Ecclesial Polarities Pattern, the Charismatic Pattern, and the Liberation Pattern. The focus of this model and the subsequent patterns within it is on the operations of the Holy Spirit ad extra. The Definitional Dynamic Model/Relational or Operational Patterns focuses on the Holy Spirit operating as God

\[2\] SOP, 24-25.
\[3\] SOP, 25.
himself in relation to and with people in various forms. This is closely related to the Ecclesial Polari
ties Pattern, which focuses on the relationship between the Spirit and the Church.

Perhaps one of the more surprising inclusions is the Charismatic Pattern, since McIntyre is providing one of the first academic treatments of the Charismatic Movement from the Reformed tradition. McIntyre focuses on the way that the Charismatic movement has moved beyond the Definitional/Biblical Model. In a similar way, McIntyre acknowledges the development of Liberation Theology as creating its own unique perspective, since the Holy Spirit is often closely related to the concept of liberation and freedom.

Five, there is the Social-Trinitarian Model/Substantival-personal Pattern. The focus here is on Social-Trinitarianism. While McIntyre does include it as a model, he is highly critical of it as a system. For McIntyre the focus on the Holy Spirit being substantive veers very near tri-theism and “depends entirely on a revision of the notion of ‘person’ as used in the trinitarian context and therefore in relation to the Holy Spirit.”

Six, there is the Trinitarian Model/Attribute or Predicate Pattern. This model focuses on the relation of the Spirit to particular attributes of God within a Trinitarian context. The classic example is that of the Spirit as “The power and wisdom of God.” Here attributes like power and wisdom are both central to the existence of the Spirit, but more particularly of the Spirit’s existence in relation to God. It is both about the attributes themselves and the way they locate the Spirit within the Trinity. McIntyre also suggests an exploration of imagination as a pattern of describing the Spirit in this same way.

Seven, there is the Dynamic Model/Secular Pattern. While McIntyre does express some reticence about this model, it is obviously one that is very important to him and to his thinking. This model focuses on the work of the Spirit outside the context of the church and theology in the secular sphere. It is both an affirmation of the freedom of God to work beyond our understanding of him, and it is an affirmation of the “truth, beauty, goodness, justice, mercy, and love” of God wherever they are found.

These models, briefly outlined at the outset of McIntyre’s presentation of the field of Pneumatology are interesting in that they do not serve as direct outline of his treatment of the subject. As such, these summaries here do not provide an outline of the following summaries of McIntyre’s presentation of the field of Pneumatology. While some do have specific parallels later in McIntyre’s exposition of the subject, others do not. Part of this is to demonstrate that McIntyre is consistently trying to distill the subject of Pneumatology down

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4 SOP, 27.
5 1 Cor. 1:24. This is something that has been taken up by Augustine and in the Augustinian tradition.
6 SOP, 27.
7 SOP, 28.
over the course of his treatment to specific polarities that can be reconciled into an informed understanding of the person and work of the Holy Spirit.

i. The Definitional/Biblical Pluralist Model

When McIntyre begins with the *Definitional/Biblical Pluralist Model*, he tries to offer a thorough overview of common images of the Holy Spirit in the Old and New Testaments. The Old Testament section focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit in ordaining leadership, in inspiring and directing prophecy, in the role of Creation, as a motif of Messianic and Apocalyptic expectation, and as having an inspiring and instructing role in the arts and in work crafts.

The role of the spirit in ordaining leadership contains instances where the Spirit provides strength and power to warriors in battle as they take on leadership of the people of Israel in battle. It also includes the anointing of judges and kings to their position of authority, and it includes special works that highlight the anointing of the prophets to their prophetic roles.

This is distinguished from the role of the Spirit in prophecy itself, in which the role of the Spirit is more directly related to the act of revelation on the part of the Spirit. This includes the interpretation of dreams in cases like Joseph and Daniel, and it includes the giving of visions to prophets like Balaam.

These are distinguished from types of prophecy that are more closely connected to the idea of prophecy. These include instances like the anointing of Saul to prophesy that McIntyre identifies as being closely related to the prophecy of ‘oriental dervishes.’ Then there is prophecy as foretelling and prophecy that is specifically religious. This religious prophecy is more like proclamation in delivering a word of the LORD.

It is at this juncture that McIntyre moves to a more specific argument in relating the work of the Spirit to the realms of creativity and creation. McIntyre focuses his discussion on the role of the Spirit in inspiring creativity in the passages concerned with the construction of the Tabernacle and Temple. For McIntyre any defensible position affirming this creative

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8 *SOP*, 33.
9 I do not think that McIntyre takes this far enough. To affirm the role of the Spirit in creative work also affirms the role of the Spirit in areas of work and labor that are not traditionally (or at least contemporarily) associated with creativity. To limit the inspiration of the Spirit to the arts is to bar the Spirit from the sciences. This would seem to be not only a lapse in judgment, but also a lapse in exegesis. What may be described as craftsmanship today (masonry, metallurgy, etc.) would have been deemed quite technical fields in their day. What we must acknowledge is that the work of building the tabernacle and the temple respectively were both creative and technologically challenging endeavors and that the Spirit was involved in both. For McIntyre to be consistent with his own views on imagination and to account for this in the exegesis of these passages, the Spirit must be involved in both. It is the Spirit who inspires creativity and who reveals the secrets within the creation which was wrought by him.
and inspiring role of the Holy Spirit in the realm of human work is dependent on the questions of whether *creatio ex nihilo* is a concept present in the Old Testament and whether or not the Holy Spirit can be properly understood to participate in the work of creation in the Old Testament.

In response to the first question, McIntyre makes the argument that the concept of *creatio ex nihilo* is implicitly present in the Old Testament. McIntyre chooses to make this argument from a variety of texts in Isaiah, rather than resorting to the more readily available passage of 2 Maccabees 7.28, presumably due to his place within the reformed tradition and his own audience of primarily protestant readers.

In response to the second question, McIntyre does argue for the work of the Spirit in the work of creation. Here he cites the assessment of Alaisdair Heron in relation to Genesis 1 and 2 that “If God’s *ruach* is God himself in action, and if his activity includes creation, the doctrine of the Spirit as creator must follow, unless the Spirit is to be detached from God himself in a fashion running counter to the thrust of the New Testament.”

For McIntyre the position is not simply about the particular interpretation of particular texts, but is instead about the general ideas that seem to be conveyed by the biblical texts as a whole. He concludes:

> My own judgment then is that even if we allow that a full-blown Trinitarian interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis amounts to unwarranted eisegesis, we are not thereby obliged to reject the reference to the Spirit of God as present and operative in creation.

If for no other reason, McIntyre argued, there would be no other place to locate the creative work of the Spirit than in God’s work of creation.

This led to the final realm in which McIntyre examines the Spirit in the Old Testament, namely in regards to messianic and apocalyptic expectation. This begins with a focus on the ‘religio-moral’ quality of the influence of the Spirit in passages like Isaiah 1.11 and Isaiah 61.1, the latter of which Jesus is quoted as reading in the synagogue in Luke 4.18. These focus on things like wisdom, understanding counsel, knowledge, the binding up of the broken-hearted, the proclamation of liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to those who are bound.

The apocalyptic aspect is concerned with the sending of the messiah as an outpouring of the Spirit of God. For example, Joel 2.28 talks about the outpouring of the Spirit as precipitating a time of prophecy, visions, and dreams; and Ezekiel 36.26 talks about the gift of the indwelling Spirit. This outpouring of the Spirit, while having an apocalyptic

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10 *SOP*, 40
11 *SOP*, 40
focus, is presented within the context of messianic expectation of which this expectation of the work of the Spirit was a part.


McIntyre’s focus on the synoptic account (including Luke-Acts) looks at the role of the Holy Spirit in the birth, baptism, and resurrection of Jesus. McIntyre continues this historical focus in examining the role of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost and in the spread of the church in the account of Acts. McIntyre then switches his focus to teachings on the Holy Spirit in Paul’s letters. Here McIntyre briefly identifies themes and a pattern in which, “the Holy Spirit is: the guarantee, foundation, unity, medium, structure, morality, content, diversity and devotion of the Christian life of the person and the community redeemed by Jesus Christ.”

This view of the Spirit as being and having specific roles in the life of the church is complemented by the account of the Holy Spirit in the Gospel of John. While McIntyre does highlight the place of the Spirit in driving Jesus into the wilderness, Jesus’ focus on the Spirit in his conversation with Nicodemus, and in the commissioning of the disciples most of McIntyre’s treatment focuses on different aspects of the ‘upper-room discourse.’ Here the focus is less about these substantive roles of the Spirit and more about the relationship of believers to the Holy Spirit as the Paraclete who comes along-side them. For McIntyre this highlights the real, personal, and independent existence of the Holy Spirit as the “whole power of God operating in a third way, completing the work of the Son as the Son had perfected the work of creation.”

What McIntyre tries to draw out through this brief survey are points of disconnect between the role and function of the Holy Spirit in the biblical texts and general notions of the Holy Spirit today. McIntyre draws most of his conclusions on this point from the notion that the New Testament Church had “a sense of the widespread presence of the Holy Spirit throughout the Church, as if, almost in physical terms, he were the ambience in which they lived.”

For McIntyre there were three distinct functions of personal and definite roles of the Holy Spirit that were integral to the understanding of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament Church. The first is an ‘epistemological role’ in bringing people to knowledge of and belief in

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12 SOP, 61.
13 SOP, 71.
14 SOP, 71.
God. The second is a soteriological role in “opening the hearts of men and women to the Good News and in fulfillment in them the redemptive work of Christ.” The third is an ethical role in which the Spirit enables Christians to “live out their faith in the moral arena.” It was these beliefs combined with the expectation of the early church that the Spirit would act in these ways and the ubiquitous presence of the Holy Spirit that McIntyre found in the early church and finds lacking in his contemporary church.

While McIntyre still avoids calling this a ‘betrayal,’ he does see this as a major departure; and he questions what consequences the church has suffered from the vacuum left by the church’s “vacating of the realm of the Spirit.” It is here that I think the impetus for and the argument of the book become more clear, namely that McIntyre is gleaning the tradition of the church and new expressions of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit for ways to re-imbue the contemporary church with this permeation of the holy and the faithful expectancy that God will work in our midst.

ii. The Trinitarian Hypostatic Model

In this task, McIntyre turns next to the *Trinitarian Hypostatic Model* with its two patterns, the *Traditional Pattern* and the *Christological Pattern*. McIntyre begins with the traditional pattern as a way of providing both an account of the first theological model and pattern and as a way of providing the historical background and grammar for understanding and evaluating later developments in the field.

For McIntyre there are two main impetuses in the development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit historically. The first is the effect that the development of Trinitarian theology had on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit by implication, and the second was the later attempt to offer distinctions of the person of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

In the first of these two discussions, McIntyre is concerned with how the idea of the Holy Spirit developed within the context of the church’s formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity. For McIntyre, the verbiage of Trinitarian formulation itself offers insight into who the church has understood the Holy Spirit to be. This is especially true, not in relation to *essentia* or *substantia* of the Holy Spirit in the being of the Godhead, but in regards to the understanding of the Holy Spirit as ‘person.’ This challenge of speaking of the Holy Spirit as ‘person,’ *persona*, *prosopon*, and *hypostasis* is something that continue to affect the challenges developing a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

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15 *SOP*, 72.
16 *SOP*, 72.
17 *SOP*, 73.
These challenges are delineated in the way that the concept of person, in relation to the Holy Spirit, has effects on:

(i) the relations between the Godhead and the persons;
(ii) the relations which obtain among the persons; and
(iii) the relations between the Trinity as a whole and the world of nature and persons.\(^{18}\)

For McIntyre the relations between the Godhead and the persons can be developed in two directions. The first starts with the threefold nature of God and the subsistence of the three persons in the Godhead. The second starts with the existence of the three persons and works to the unity of the Godhead through the relations of the persons.

The relation among the persons are understood through both the equality of the persons, in which the persons are co-equal and co-eternal, and the distinctness of the persons, in which each person has a distinct identity. This includes the concept of distinct roles of each person, as in the concept of procession and the concept of *emperichoresis* in which the persons maintain their identity while dwelling within and interpenetrating each other.

The relation of the Trinity to the world is described in terms of the *opera Dei ad extra*. These works are understood to be indivisible, even when any particular work of God is understood to be the work of one person of the Trinity. Thus the work of one person of the Trinity is not a work of that person *personaliter* but is instead a work of that person *essentialiter*, which is in that person’s essence as God. For McIntyre, the challenges of making and maintaining this distinction in theological formulation are addressed in three main ways.

In the first, the Father as unbegotten and uncreated is associated with those things that generate *ex nihilo*. In the second, the person of the Trinity whose work is terminative or final determines the association of a particular person to a particular work of the Godhead. In the third, the entire Godhead is at work as threefold in each and every relation between God and the world around him.

For McIntyre, these ideas as they have developed in relation to the Trinity and the Holy Spirit have both a positive and negative legacy. The positive legacy is marked by two positive consequences. One, it records “the securing of the deity of the Son and the Holy Spirit as inalienable items of the Christian Faith;” and two, it marks “the securing of the Spirit, as far as he is essentially God, as equal with and to the other two persons.”\(^{19}\) The negative

\(^{18}\) *SOP*, 77.

\(^{19}\) *SOP*, 83.
legacy though is that of controversy, which requires a broader approach to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit that moves beyond simply understanding the Holy Spirit within the context of Trinitarian formulation.

This is what leads McIntyre to the second part of this Traditional Pattern of the Trinitarian Hypostatic Model that focuses on pneumatological rather than Trinitarian formulation. Here McIntyre is primarily interested in the patterns set forth by the Greek Fathers and the influence that it has had in subsequent formulations of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit by answering five questions:

(i) What is the evidence for the claim that the premise of the whole deduction is the unity of the Godhead?

(ii) What is the nature of the Divine Activity or energia(i) which plays so important a part in the second stage of the deduction?

(iii) What is the nature of the unity of this Divine Activity?

(iv) What is the nature of the inference from the unity of operation of the Divine Activity to the affirmation of what later generations were to call the ‘deity’ of the Holy Spirit?

(v) What is the validity of this inference as a means of establishing what the Greek Fathers were aiming at, in seeking to refute the Tropici, the Pneumatomachoi and the Macedonians?20

In regards to the question of the unity of the Godhead, the primary principle for the Fathers and for McIntyre is the indivisibility of the Triad. The distinction of the persons is something that can be found in the scriptures, but this distinction only serves to offer clarification of the unified Triad.

The subsequent question of the nature of Divine Activity is primarily focused on the works of God ad extra involving the whole Godhead. The Fathers focus on the work of all of the persons in each Divine work. This begins with Athanasius, but it is in Basil that McIntyre finds explicit reference to the work of the Spirit in the work of creation. So, the simple answer to McIntyre’s question is that “it consists of the whole Godhead acting in relation to the created order, in the several opera of the Three, which are nevertheless indivisa, that is, inseparable from one another.”21

This is followed by the answer to the unity of Divine Activity. The interesting thing here is that in regards to Divine Operations is that they are distinguishable but not separable. Consequently, one can recognize the work of the Father, Son, or Spirit without

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20 SOP, 86.
21 SOP, 88.
denying the inseparable involvement of the other two persons in that operation, even if those other persons are involved in ways that are different and can be differentiated.

This leads to the answer to the fourth question, which addresses the implications that the unity of operations has on the development of the deity of the Holy Spirit. The first part of this inference is that the Holy Spirit does things that only God can do and possesses the same attributes assigned to God. As such there is no room for the idea that the Holy Spirit is creature and not creator, and the deity of the Spirit must be affirmed along with the essential unity of the Spirit with the Father and the Son.

This leads to the final question of the validity and value of this inference. McIntyre argues that the position of the Fathers was based not upon,

…Metaphysical principles or logical concepts, but [on] the Christian understanding of baptism and liturgy, creation, incarnation, salvation, sanctification and eschatology. It draws out the fullest implications of the situations in which Christians find themselves in relation to God; and it finds the interpretation of these situations in Scripture, as the completion in their lives of the mighty working of God from before the foundation of the world.22

Within this presentation, there is still the ambiguity of what necessitates the deity of the Holy Spirit. While McIntyre notes that the fathers asserted that this could be derived from both the work of the Spirit in concert with the work of the Father and the Son and from the unique operations of the Spirit, McIntyre projects that the former has a greater consequence for subsequent theological formulation that treats the subject of the deity of the Holy Spirit.

iii. The Classic Trinitarian Model

From here McIntyre goes on to examine three principles of the classic Trinitarian mould. The first is the ontological, the second is the analogical, and the third is the question of filioque. The ontological principle is simply the principle that ‘knowledge of any one of the persons of the Triad is at the same time knowledge of the other two.’23 This is not to say that the whole knowledge of the Trinity can be derived from the knowledge of the Father, Son, or Spirit; but instead that knowledge of God and what God has done for people leads us to a more complete understanding of God in human relation to him. There is a sense in which the Son is made known by the Spirit and the Father is made known by the Son in which knowledge of one is the beginning of our knowledge of the others. This is for McIntyre the beginning of emperichoresis by which people are able to come to a knowledge of the Son and subsequently the Father by the work of regeneration begun in the hearts and lives of people by the work of the Holy Spirit.

22 SOP, 94.
23 SOP, 97.
The analogical principle is simply put the principle that the relation of the Spirit to the Son is analogous to the relation of the Son to the Father. There is of course a point of incompatibility with this principle and the idea that differentiation of the persons is only possible when these two relationships are unique. The fathers themselves were aware of this incompatibility and sought to address it by offering an account in which the Spirit was coordinate with the Father as well as the Son, but in which it was the distinctiveness of this coordination that provided the basis for differentiation among the persons. For McIntyre the purpose of this principle was apologetic in that it supports the deity of the Holy Spirit as being in special relation to the Son. The doctrinal implication then is nothing short of affirming the role of the Holy Spirit in perfecting the work of God in creation.

Finally, the principle of filioque is a principle that should not be attributed to the fathers despite the fact that there are points at which they show sympathy with it. In McIntyre’s interpretation, the position of the fathers is one that finds a middle ground between the subordinationism inherent in Cyril’s position in which the Spirit ‘proceeds from the Father through the Son’ and the wording of the doctrine of filioque in which the Spirit ‘proceeds from the Father and the Son.’ For McIntyre theirs is an account that avoids the oversimplification of these relations in terms of procession and embraces a more complex and rich account in which the scriptural affirmation of the close relation of the Son and Spirit, as well as the more nuanced scriptural concept of ‘sending,’ is preserved.

As a whole it is an account in which the Holy Spirit is bound up in all the works of God from creation to redemption and sanctification. It affirms the integral nature of the work of the Spirit with the work and person of the Son in redemption, while still maintaining the uniqueness of the person and work of the Spirit as a member of the Godhead in his own right.

iv. The Christological Pattern

It is here that McIntyre shifts his focus to the Christological Pattern that he first follows in the works and writing of John Calvin. Calvin himself does not attempt to stray from the teaching of the fathers, but he does draw on other sources, notably Augustine, and offers his own insights and develops new ideas, approaches, and emphases. While Calvin affirms the scriptural truth of a Trinitarian God, he faces the challenges of the heavy reliance on extra-Biblical language to speak of God as Trinity. For Calvin the use of these foreign terms must always subordinate themselves to the authority of scripture and must be understood as a necessity in articulating the faith in response to the challenges of heresy.

In keeping with this position, before expositing his own Christological pattern for understanding the Trinity, Calvin addresses the problem of the nature of ‘persons’ in
understanding the Trinity. Calvin affirms, in the same vein as the fathers, the divinity of the Spirit. The challenge comes in understanding how the Spirit and indeed all of the persons relate to one another. Here, Calvin affirms an *ordo subsistendi*, as opposed to an *ordo essendi*, in which ‘The Father, who is the Father of the Son, obviously has priority within that relationship and, since the Spirit is the Spirit of both and ‘from both’, he is the third in the order of subsistence.’

The danger here is the accusation of subordinationism, which has been leveled against Calvin. McIntyre defends Calvin against this critique by giving an account of the critique by Leonard Hodgson. For McIntyre, there are three rebuttals for this charge. First, there is the rigor with which Calvin defends the divine unity within which there is no room for subordination. Second, since Calvin makes this an order of subsistence there is no sense in his account in which the Father deifies or gives divine essence to the Son and the Spirit, which is one of the key objections to subordinationism in its earliest form. Third, McIntyre draws on A.E. Taylor’s notions of ‘a short way’ to say that Calvin’s notion of *principium* which is inherent in his view is not derived from the theological categories of the heresy of subordinationism but is instead rooted in the Scriptures in which there is clear language that shows an ordering of sorts in which the Father is primary.

Here, McIntyre moves on to focus on where he sees constructive development in Calvin. This focuses on the oft-quoted section from Augustine’s *De Trinitate*, where he noted the ambiguity of the term *hypostasis* where he writes ‘by those names [sc. Father, Son and Holy Spirit] is meant the relation by which they mutually bear to each other, and not the very substance by which they are one.’ McIntyre observes that while Calvin quotes this, this is a point at which Calvin significantly diverts from Augustine’s position. That is because Augustine is affirming that the persons are defined by their relations, while Calvin affirms that they are distinguishable because of the unique self-existence of each. For McIntyre this avoids the logical fallacy, noted by John Anderson, ‘that an entity is not definable solely in terms of the relations in which it stands to other entities.’

It is here that McIntyre turns his focus to the explicitly Christological pattern that Calvin’s pneumatology follows within the context of having this unique self-existence. Basically, this follows the analogical pattern put forward by the fathers in which the Spirit

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24 *SOP*, 112.
25 Leonard Hodgson, *The Doctrine of the Trinity* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944). This book was first presented as the Croall Lectures in 1942-1943. The primary texts that McIntyre relies on in responding to these attacks are in John Calvin, *Institutio I.13*.
26 *SOP*, 114.
27 *SOP*, 114.
28 *SOP*, 117.
29 *SOP*, 117.
follows a similar pattern of relation to Christology within the Trinitarian model. However, Calvin’s emphasis on the special relation of the Son and the Spirit creates a pattern in which the Spirit is integral in relating the efficacy of Christ’s work to people.

Thus the Holy Spirit is, according to Calvin, ‘the bond by which Christ effectually binds us to himself.’ Calvin then goes on to use a variety of images to illustrate various aspects of this work. The Spirit is the Spirit of adoption, because it is through the Spirit that people are made children of God. The Spirit is the water who nourishes people, so that they can bear the fruit of righteousness. The Spirit is the oil and unction, by which God heals people of their sin. The Spirit is a fire that kindles the burning of the love of God in people. The Spirit is the fountain and the hand of God from which the gifts of God’s grace and the divine life well up and are poured into the lives of people.

These roles and images are then related to three areas in which the work of the Holy Spirit is integral in communicating the work of Christ to the lives of believers. They are faith, the sacraments, and the scriptures.

First, it is the Spirit who gives people faith by which they can receive the work of the gospel. Within this there are two perspectives relating faith and the Holy Spirit that McIntyre focuses on. The first is that all faith is within the embrace of the Holy Spirit, and there is no other theological context within which faith can be spoken of. Thus it is the Holy Spirit who offers an assurance to faith, and transfers faith from the mind to the heart. McIntyre observes that sometimes in this respect people limit the work of the Holy Spirit by believing to easily and not allowing the Holy Spirit to offer assurance in the face of the hard teachings of the Gospel. The second perspective is that faith is the principal work of the Holy Spirit, especially in relation to justification. In justification it is Christ who imparts to people a righteousness that is not their own. While faith is an act, on the human side, by which people lay hold of the benefits that Christ offers, faith stands as a gift of the Spirit and stands ‘not in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God.’

The first principle of the sacraments is that the substance of the sacraments is first and foremost Christ, but it is the Holy Spirit who allows people to receive Christ into their hearts and “energises the faith that receives Christ and of the benefits of salvation” thus, “The sacrament has no inherent efficacy to confer the gifts of the Holy Spirit upon us; rather is it the function of the Holy Spirit to prepare our hearts for the entry of the redeeming, renewing Saviour.”

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30 SOP, 119.
31 SOP, 122.
32 SOP, 123.
This implies that the sacraments are not necessary for salvation. For McIntyre this has two consequences. The first is that unbaptized infants are saved from the ambiguous state of Limbo, which was a happy consequence for the reformers. The challenge in McIntyre’s own context is the 1995 decision of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to admit unbaptized children to communion.\footnote{The Church of Scotland General Assembly (Edinburgh, 1995).} For McIntyre, if the sacraments are not necessary for salvation there was no necessity to admit children to communion; and there was no reason that they should be put forward to receive communion when they had not first bound themselves to the Christian community in baptism.\footnote{SOP, 125.} Without the necessity of taking communion and the lack of commitment on the part of the children or their parents, he saw no reason to open up communion in this way.

The second consequence is that without this necessity of the sacraments for salvation, essentially the same thing was being offered to people in the receiving of the sacraments and in the hearing of the word. This accords with the ideas of Calvin and their subsequent result in the Church of Scotland of uniting the ministry of word and sacrament. However, as early as 1591 there is record of disagreement on this point, notably from Robert Bruce who was the minister of St. Giles in Edinburgh.\footnote{SOP, 126.} For Bruce, the very tangibility of the sacraments, especially communion, communicated the real presence in a way that the hearing of the word never could. For McIntyre, this was not a choice of either or. Instead it was an affirmation that each of these ministries offered a unique and complementary function in the receiving of all that Christ has to offer in the ministry of his church. In his own account not only does communion offer a tangible expression of Christ that a sermon never could but also the proclamation of the word offers a meaning to the sacraments that they can never have on their own. Word without sacrament is in danger of abstraction, and sacrament without word is in danger of meaningless ritualism. However, McIntyre is quick to qualify the certitude with which he makes this claim. He writes:

> We are speaking of the mercies of the living God, the benefits of our Saviour, and the limitless action of the Spirit and we dare not forget that these mercies and benefits are in his hand, and that the Saviour is not to be restrained even by the command he has given in the words of institution or by the mouth of prophet or evangelist. There is a place in the heart and the purposes of God for the uncovenanted mercies, which are but part of his unbounded love for all creatures.\footnote{SOP, 126.}
For the role of the Spirit in relation to the scriptures, McIntyre makes an analogous argument from the role of the Spirit in the sacraments. He starts his presentation of Calvin's position by noting that the basis for the authority of scripture is two-fold. One, it is dependent upon the idea that this is the word of God and that the scriptures should be heard "as if God had been uttering them." Two, it is the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit that affirms this authority in the reader.

While there is no contradiction between these two ideas directly, it does raise the issue of primacy when the formation of the canon is brought into question. Since the discussion and disagreement present in the formation of the canon is well documented, the role of the Spirit must take some precedence in offering an answer here. McIntyre notes that Calvin’s concept of ‘the instrumentality of men’ in the hands of God could offer an easy answer for Calvin on this point. Which suggests that the Spirit offered inspiration in forming the canon as well as in the writing of the texts.

What McIntyre wants to avoid is the idea within ‘Calvinism’ of verbal inspiration and the idea of infallibility. While Calvin did say, as noted before, that the scriptures should be listened to ‘as if God had been uttering them,’ verbal inspiration would say that God has uttered them and thus they are inerrant and infallible. For McIntyre this ignores the sense of what Calvin is arguing for, a sense of the immediacy of God’s speaking to us that is mediated by the text of the scriptures. Instead, it affirms the idea that the scriptures themselves are of some value in themselves and are capable of offering something to believers on their own.

McIntyre argues that this is very akin to “unreformed’ notions of the sacraments, which Calvin vehemently opposes, and that a proper understanding of Calvin would understand the role of the Spirit in interpreting the scriptures in a way analogous to the role of the Spirit in the sacraments. Thus it is not the Holy Spirit testifying to the authority of scripture. Instead the Spirit is working through the scriptures to lead people to ‘the living Christ.’ For McIntyre, it is only in the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the scriptures as the Word of God ‘that Scriptures are ‘authenticated’, and their true authority is recognised only in the part that they play within the circle created by the Holy Spirit.”

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37 SOP, 127.
38 It should be noted that in this context McIntyre is contrasting Calvinism as it developed as a system from the writings of Calvin himself. Additionally, his targeting of the concept of infallibility focuses on the original notion of the word which is more akin to the more contemporary word inerrancy, which McIntyre uses interchangeably with infallibility.
39 SOP, 130.
40 SOP, 133.
v. The Revelation-soteriological Pattern

It is here that McIntyre turns his focus to the *Revelation-soteriological Pattern* as presented in the theology of Karl Barth. For McIntyre there are two main aspects of Barth’s position that are relevant to the topic of the Holy Spirit. The first is Barth’s understanding of the Trinity and his focus on the role of the Holy Spirit in revelation. The second is Barth’s focus on the role of God as Redeemer. McIntyre then follows the implications of Barth’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit as it relates to the church, Christian love, and a variety of devotional aspects that McIntyre puts under the umbrella ‘baptism with the Holy Spirit.’ McIntyre is especially keen to highlight the influence of Augustine on Barth’s pneumatology throughout this process, which is especially important to his conclusions concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit.

One of the idiosyncratic elements of Barth’s treatment of the Trinity is his desire to use the language of ‘modes of being’ rather than that of persons. However, Barth is actually quite emphatic on his maintenance of the concept of the Father, Son, and Spirit having a personal, as opposed to impersonal, and unique existence. Thus Barth strongly defends the unique deity and personage of the Holy Spirit.

Here the Holy Spirit is the manifestation of God’s revelation of himself as the Redeemer. Barth describes the Holy Spirit as:

> God Himself, in so far as he is able, in an inconceivably real way, without being less God, to be present to the creature and in virtue of this presence to realise the relation of the creature towards Himself, and in virtue of this relation to Himself to vouchsafe life to the creature.\(^{41}\)

Thus it is all of the Godhead that is present with people. This is not some estranged part, appendage, or spark of the divine. This is God from above meeting God from below in the present reality of the Holy Spirit within the hearts of people.

It is the work of the Spirit in this integral nearness that allows people the freedom to receive the revelation of God, makes them capable of communion with the divine despite their fallenness, equips them to bear witness to the truth of the Gospel, and call them into relationship with God as his children. The totality of this work, for Barth “Could only be achieved by one who was in himself, and not by adoption or by any process of emergence, truly God, in unity of being with the Father and the Son.”\(^{42}\) For it is only by the work of the Spirit in the revelation of the Son that the church is able to confess that Jesus is Lord. This work of manifestation of this revelation works in such a personal and inward way that any

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\(^{41}\) Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I/1, §12.1.

\(^{42}\) *SOP*, 141.
notion of independent work or agency on the human side is relegated to irrelevance by the completeness of the Spirit’s work in completing this work of revelation.

Before moving on to the realm of the Spirit, beyond its place within Barth’s Trinitarian doctrine, there are two things that McIntyre addresses as key to understanding Barth’s position as a whole. The first is about method and focuses on the relationship between the immanent and the economic Trinity. The second is about the influence of Augustine on Barth’s theology of the Spirit, especially in relation to what is called the mutual love theory and the concept of filioque.

Barth directly relates the immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity by arguing that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity. What Barth specifically wants to argue against with this claim is the notion that the God we know is nothing like the God who exists in relation to himself. There is not a different God hiding behind the curtain pulling the strings. He also indirectly indicates a right understanding of the economic Trinity has direct consequence on any understanding of the immanent Trinity.

All of this is not to say that the two are identical. One is by nature eternal and timeless, and is not bound by the constraints of space and time. The other is bound up in all of the conditions necessary for relating and being real to people. McIntyre observes that this is not unlike Kant’s notion of ‘transcendental deduction’ in which things that are transcendent are always marked by the conditioned thought of people who live in a world constrained by certain factors. So, even an understanding of the mystery of the transcendent, immanent Trinity is conditioned by these things that shape human perception.

The influence of Augustine in Barth at this juncture is significant. Barth takes up two ideas from Augustine’s De Trinitate, the ‘mutual love theory’ and his affirmation of the creedal ‘filioque’ and integrates them that move beyond Augustine’s initial formulation of them. The ‘mutual love theory’ is that the Holy Spirit is the ultimate expression of the love between the Father and the Son. For McIntyre, and for Barth, this notion moves beyond the psychological and analogical context within which Augustine originally formulated it; and the idea that the Spirit is integral here to the communion between the Father and the Son moves it beyond some vague notion that the Spirit is ‘hypostaticized’ in their relation.43

It is this focus on the Spirit as integral to the communion between the Father and the Son that leads into the question of filioque. This phrase originates in the western churches

43 In Bruce McCormack, “Grace and Being,” The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge, 2000), McCormack argues against this interpretation of Barth which he traces back to Balthasar. For Balthasar, there is an inherent social aspect of the relations of the divine persons within the immanent trinity, thus when Barth speaks of a covenant ontology this would seem an inclusion of humanity into this set of relations. McCormack rejects this directly as expressions of an analogy of being “which remained throughout Barth’s life utterly foreign to his thinking.” Ibid., 109.
modification of the Nicene Creed and affirms that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Augustine’s defence of the Nicene position stems from the assertion that the Spirit is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, and attempts to bridge this affirmation with the language of Nicaea by pointing to scriptural references in which Jesus speaks of sending the Spirit.  

In taking up Augustine’s defence of the phrase *filioque*, Barth closely relates this with Augustine’s conception of the Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For him they are interconnected and indeed inseparable, reinforcing his own argument for the identification of the immanent and economic Trinity. Additionally, by relating the work of the Spirit to properly divine operations *ad extra* argues for the true divinity of the Spirit in relation *ad intra*. Here the Spirit is the commonality and the communion of the distinct modes of existence of the Father and the Son. Thus Barth, following his premise of the unity of the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity argues for the divinity of the Spirit and the role of the Spirit as the communion of the Father and the Son, works from the work of the Spirit *ad extra* to the mode of existence of the Spirit *ad intra*.

Where Barth moves the position of *filioque* even further is when he talks of the double procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. Drawing on the mutual relationship of the Father and the Son he argues that this double procession is not merely two processions from two sources, but instead as a single procession from one unified source. Thus the two ideas of the Spirit as proceeding from both the Father and the Son and existing in the mutual love of the Father and the Son are brought together. For Barth, both are necessary so that the communion of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit provide a sufficient basis and model for the communion between God and people.

**vi. McIntyre’s Barthian Synthesis**

It is with this view in mind, that McIntyre begins to explore the influence of Barth’s Pneumatology on the Christian church, in Christian love, and a catchall he calls ‘Baptism with the Holy Spirit.’

The starting point for Barth in relation to the church is that the church is a human and historical institution. It is then only in its role as the Christian church, or the church of Christ, because God is at work in the church and the work of the church is shaped by God. First, God is at work in the church by the Spirit, who is in this context, “the quickening power of the
risen Lord Jesus Christ.”45 Second, it is the human work of the church that God sees fit to occasion and shape.

This is followed by the affirmation that the church is both a communio sanctorum and a communio peccatorum. That is the visible church has a dual placement as the communion of saints within the salvific work of God by communion with the Holy Spirit and among those who are within the church and in fellowship with all of humanity through their sinful and fallen nature which persists despite the totality of forgiveness.

Despite the fact that Barth does focus on the Holy Spirit and develops a distinct pneumatology, it never completely escapes the Christocentric framework of Barth’s theology. However, this is not merely a decision of methodological consistency in which the Spirit must be developed in a Christocentric manner. It also reflects the closeness of relation and association that Barth consistently highlights between the Son and the Spirit. Here is Spirit is “the self-attestation of Christ” in making himself immanent with the church and in the building up of the Church by the Spirit.46 While the Spirit shares in the dual locus of being God on high and the immanent God, it is only by the Spirit that Christ is able to impart himself to the community of faith. It is this link that constitutes Barth’s view of the Spirit in the church.

When examining the relation of the Holy Spirit to the realm of Christian love, it should be understood that Christian love begins with the love of God that is essential to his being. For Barth, this love begins in the being of God, as has been shown before, is begun by the communion of the Father and the Son in the Spirit. It is then this divine communion upon which the communion of saints and their own love for God and others is based.

The love of God is completely self-giving. For God to love it must be a complete gift of himself as love. It encompasses all of the electing, purifying, and creative aspects of God’s relationship with people. God’s love is electing, because it is a free gift of himself by the Holy Spirit to sinful humanity and thus calls them to himself. It is a purifying love in that grace and judgment work together in it by the Holy Spirit in the lives of people. Finally, it is a creative work of love because God does not love simply to be loved in return. There is an expectation that his love will precipitate a new act of loving on the part of those who have received it that is freely generated by them but models God’s love to them all the same. It is the Holy Spirit who is the power through which human action reflects God’s love, and it is at once God’s love and the work of the Holy Spirit that are present in these acts.

In this way, Christians are bound by God’s forgiveness as the form of their sanctification to obedience, work, and service through the enlivening power of the Spirit who

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45 SOP, 156.
46 SOP, 156.
calls people into the reality of conversion and discipleship. The first act in this process is the sanctification of people in Christ. The second act is the total self-giving of God that in turn requires the total receiving of him on the human side. McIntyre sums this up by noting that for Barth, “in the Christian life justification and sanctification are but two distinguishable though simultaneous components of one single divine action effected by Christ through the Spirit.” This single divine action is the act of love.

McIntyre concludes by making two caveats at this point to affirm the freedom of these acts. First, there is the caveat that in this process humans are not merely instruments of God’s love. It is God who liberates them to engage in acts of love that are completely their own. Second, there is the caveat that this is not merely a love of emotion and sentiment and is instead a love of action and self-giving. For Barth, “The Holy Spirit is the quickening power undergirding, energising, directing and realising, the whole scope of the Christian life as devoted to loving both God and its neighbour, so he commensurately equips the Christian with the freedom, the ability and the motivation to achieve its God-given goals.” In this way love is able to both reflect the love of God as a love of action and self-giving and still maintain the freedom of a love that requires their own action and will.

This leads into the question of Baptism with the Holy Spirit, which simply put, is the question of how a person becomes a Christian. McIntyre notes that there are two presuppositions that are caught up in Barth’s response to this question. The first is that the power of the resurrection is the same as the power of salvation and that this power is universally available. The second is that the individual salvation history of one person is enfolded in the salvation history of Christ, who has been elected by God, by the power of the Holy Spirit. Thus McIntyre notes that for Barth:

Baptism with the Holy Spirit is the forgiving, cleansing and reorienting of those who are called to be Christians through the inward working of the Holy Spirit, who thus makes them free, willing, able, and equipped and ready for the entire scope of their transformed existence.

Additionally, he notes that this baptism is characterized by: a call to Jesus, the actualizing of salvation, gratitude and obedience, fellowship, growth and renewal.

In Barthian terms, this call to Jesus is the call of the word that is directed to Jesus and into direct and real relationship with him. This call to Jesus is the invitation to participate in the history of Christ’s life, death, burial, and resurrection in the salvation history of the individual that includes the entire scope of what is encapsulated in the work of salvation. This is a key component of the baptism with the Holy Spirit in that this is the beginning of the

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47 SOP, 158.
48 SOP, 159.
49 SOP, 161.
Spirit’s work in the life of an individual. Despite the language of baptism, this should not be confused with baptism by water by which one is admitted into an ecclesial community. Instead, this is the work of the Spirit in building a real relationship with people.

Thus the baptism with the Holy Spirit is the means by which the Spirit actualizes the work of God for salvation universally in the life of the individual. Unlike water baptism, where everything must be described in terms of sign and symbol, this work of the Spirit is an actual work of God in the lives of individuals. It is described by Barth as being divinely effective, divinely causative, and divinely creative as this work is brought about in the lives of people.

The actualization of the work of salvation in the life of the individual elicits a two-fold response that is itself a part of this baptism. This is the response of gratitude and obedience. Gratitude for Barth is an immediate and obvious response, but obedience requires what McIntyre calls the “invasive grace of Jesus Christ.” While Barth continues to maintain the freedom of the individual in the process, there is an aspect of this grace and its irresistible nature in that the freedom of salvation brings the individual to a point where the only decision is to choose obedience. This is in keeping with Luther’s notion of people having a will, but it by no means being free.

It is here that Barth notes that this baptism with the Holy Spirit is not an entirely individualized process. It is also an introduction into the fellowship of the whole of the church. It is this idea that requires the most explicit distinction of the baptism with the Holy Spirit from water baptism. Whereas water baptism is characterized as admittance into a ecclesial community “the baptism with the Spirit may express itself in the pouring down upon these changed people of charismata which, when variously distributed among them, will enable them either to serve the community in a specific way or to share in its total ministry.” Here McIntyre agrees but also offers criticism, since he sees Barth’s view as limited in the scope of the baptism of the Holy Spirit as an event that transcends individuality. He is especially critical of the lack of what he terms the ‘evangelical obligation’ of sharing the good news of Christ. While this may be assumed by some in Barth’s notion of what it means to grow in faith and in Christ, there is no explicit mention of it.

What Barth does cover, is the idea that the baptism of the Holy Spirit is also characterized by the growth and renewal of the believer. For Barth, there are two components of this aspect of the baptism with the Holy Spirit. The first is the component in which what is intended in this baptism is eternally accomplished by God once and for all. The second aspect is what has been described already, the experience of this in the life of the believer. While the other characteristics have lent themselves to being understood as

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50 SOP, 163.
51 SOP, 164.
event, the characteristics of growth and renewal point more to a process of continuation and repetition. While there may seem to be some contradiction between this idea of event and process, McIntyre argues for a more cohesive understanding of Barth on this point and draws attention to Barth’s idea that ‘those who receive [the baptism with the Spirit] live in a daily renewal to which the can never grow tired of subjecting themselves.’\(^{52}\) Thus this baptism is both once and for all and ongoing.

What Barth accomplishes by this approach is a real question. What McIntyre argues is that there are six implication of Barth’s approach that are helpful in moving forward toward a more comprehensive Pneumatology. In summary, they are:

1. The relations of the persons cease to be merely logical relations.
2. Love is made the central theme of all of these relations.
3. God’s existence as love ceases to be merely an attribute and becomes the essence of the relations of all three of the persons.
4. God is freed from the need of external objects of his love, since the persons of the Trinity are in themselves objects of their mutual love.
5. The intra-Trinitarian love among the persons is the same love reflected in the loving works of God \(ad\-extra\).
6. The works of the Spirit \(ad\-extra\) then are also the basis for human understanding of the love that God has within himself.

It is this ability to recapitulate a limited understanding of the works of the Spirit back into our understanding of God as he is, that is central for McIntyre in giving shape to his own Pneumatology.

Up to this point, McIntyre’s primary aim has been to locate his own thought within the context of the tradition and to glean what he can from it. The Barthian notion of the relationship between the works of God, and particularly the Spirit, \(ad\-extra\ and \ad\-intra\) operates as a function into which McIntyre can explore and propose other notions of who the Spirit is. He begins this process by exploring what he terms ‘relational patterns’ within a ‘dynamic model.’

In addition to this general mechanism of correspondence between God \(ad\-extra\) and \(ad\-intra\), McIntyre notes two ideas from Barth and Calvin respectively that serve as a point of departure for this exploration. The first is Barth’s assertion that ‘The Holy Spirit… is God himself, in so far as he is able, in an inconceivably real way, without being less God, to be present to the creature, and in virtue of this presence, to vouchsafe life to the creature.’\(^{53}\) The second is from Calvin’s \textit{Institutes} where ‘in each \textit{hypostasis} the whole of the nature of God is understood’ to which McIntyre adds ‘whether in \textit{opera ad intra} or \textit{opera ad extra}.’\(^{54}\)

\(^{52}\) SOP, 167
\(^{53}\) SOP, 172.
\(^{54}\) SOP, 172-73.
3. Relating the Patterns

With this framework in place, McIntyre identifies and addresses eight ‘relational patterns’ within this ‘dynamic model.’ The first three affirm that the Holy Spirit is God himself relating himself to, involving himself with, and identifying himself with various aspects of human life and existence. The next three are concerned with the role of the Holy Spirit preparing the lives of his people for right relationship with one another in fellowship, right relationship with him, and right relationship with the whole created order. The last of these patterns focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit in making the categories of human existence relatable and relevant to God and relationship with him.

These six initial patterns are complimented by two additional patterns that he sets apart as functioning in unique and different ways. The first is that of the ‘Go-between God’ proposed John V. Taylor, which McIntyre sees as including a variety of patterns previously mentioned in unique and valuable ways. The second is what McIntyre calls ‘the definitional substantive model’ which he sees as the product of a cumulative examination of relational patterns, including that of Taylor.

i. Relating to Personal Human Existence

The first pattern focuses on the way that God the Holy Spirit relates himself to the particularities of particular human existence. Drawing on the distinct, though interdependent, aspects of God’s actions in the universal and particular realms, this pattern relates the role of the Holy Spirit to the particularity of God’s work. Thus it is God the Holy Spirit who is at work in the lives of people within history and the created order.

ii. Relating to the Interior Lives of People

The second pattern focuses on the way that God the Holy Spirit is involved in the inner lives of people, that is their mind, will, and emotions. This radically advances from the first point, because it is here that the relationship of God with people becomes an internal relation. As McIntyre writes:

If [God] is afflicted in all their afflictions, he is afflicted from within their lives and not just from the outside. If he nerves the human will to greater effort, he does so from within the complexity of human motivation, and not as an intrusive, quasi-mechanical impulse, or even as gratia infusa given to top up the human endeavor. If he leads the human mind to deeper insights and wider vision, he acts in and through the process of human ratiocination. When he works miracles, he does so not as an alien irrupting into an order which forms a totally enclosed system and breaking laws that hold therein; but in accordance with fundamental principles of the universe which he has himself created and is still creating.55

55 SOP, 177.
It is this radical internalization by which God not only involves himself with and within people, but implicates himself in the basest elements of human existence. Here God is again exposed to misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and ultimately rejection by those whom God supremely loves.

Drawing on George Hendry, McIntyre seeks to use this to affirm notions of the human spirit and the image of God as positive aspects of human existence on philosophical, hermeneutical, and theological grounds.\textsuperscript{56} Here the aim is not to claim the primacy of any philosophical notion of the human spirit, but instead to demonstrate that this notion is integral to philosophical enquiry as a whole. Thus Scheler, G.F. Thomas, and Reinhold Niebuhr are all cited as proponents of this concept.\textsuperscript{57} On exegetical grounds McIntyre draws on the language of Bultmann to say that the human spirit “is the index of human self-transcendence… which relates to God when it receives the Spirit of God.”\textsuperscript{58} Finally on theological grounds, McIntyre focuses on the spirit of man as the subject of the address of God to people in Jesus Christ.

Perhaps the reason that McIntyre spends so much on this point is that an affirmation of human capacity for spiritual encounter and as bearers of the image of God is critical to McIntyre’s entire theological framework. It is not only important for McIntyre’s affirmation here of God’s involvement within humanity by the Spirit but also for his assertion that the imagination is a fundamental aspect of the image of God and the primary means by which people are capable of knowing him.

iii. Loving Identification

The third pattern is an even stronger statement on this point, wherein McIntyre focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit in God’s loving identification of himself with people. McIntyre uses this term identification in very specific ways dating back to his original employment of the concept in his book \textit{On the Love of God}. Here McIntyre places himself within the tradition of John McLeod Campbell and includes the more recent adoption of the term within liberation theology, particularly that of J.G. Davies.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57} There are three works of philosophy that McIntyre cites at this juncture to demonstrate particularly the ways this relates to human nature, especially in transcendent terms. They are: Max Scheler, \textit{On the Eternal in Man} (London: SCM, 1960); G.F. Thomas, \textit{Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy} (New York: Scribner’s, 1955); and Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{The Nature and Destiny of Man}, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner’s, 1964).
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{SOP}, 179.
\textsuperscript{59} The primary source for McIntyre’s concept of identification comes from John McLeod Campbell and his presentation of the atonement in \textit{The Nature of the Atonement} (Cambridge: MacMillan, 1856); but
For McIntyre identification is a ‘process of self-exteriorisation in which the agents involved project themselves into the condition or situation of other persons.’\textsuperscript{60} The agent does not become the object but instead inserts themselves into that situation of the other and thus identifies with them. However, for McIntyre this always remains a theological concept. It is not simply a matter of ethical consideration for those in need or crisis, but instead must always be understood first in the context of the incarnation in which Christ identifies himself fully with the humanity he has come to save. It is subsequently the spirit who is the medium of this continued identification with humanity, which McIntyre sees as the basic introduction of the concept of \textit{emperichoresis} to the work of God \textit{ad extra}. It is thus the Spirit’s work of identification that is the perfection of that identification of God with humanity that begins uniquely in the incarnation.

It is at this juncture that McIntyre shifts focus to the role of the Spirit in preparing the lives of his people for a series of right relations, the first pattern being concerned with right relationship with one another in fellowship and communion. Here McIntyre focuses on the the communion of the Holy Spirit. For McIntyre this has three senses. The first is simply the idea that people have with the Holy Spirit. The second is a communion that people have together that is enabled by the Holy Spirit. The third, is the idea that the Holy Spirit is the communion of those people together in a way that reflects the Spirit being the communion of the Father and the Son. Thus, in this patterns, “the Holy Spirit is to be seen as the condition of the existence of the institution [of the church], the means of its continuance and the ultimate goal of its fulfillment.”\textsuperscript{61} This is expressed in every aspect of the churches existence and life.

\textbf{iv. Preparing People for God}

The next pattern in turn highlights the role of the Spirit in preparing people for right relationship with God. On the whole, McIntyre is skeptical of this pattern. While he accepts it as a general notion, the implications of this pattern quickly lead to the analogy of ‘preparation’ to fall apart. It implies the work of the Holy Spirit in religions other than Christianity, which McIntyre sees as patronizing and paternalistic. It implies that this work is either limited or universal, which in turn implies that this work is either selective or resistible. In short it reintroduces themes of problematic forms of predestination that McIntyre clearly was trying to move beyond in a Scottish context that still bore the scars of certain Calvinistic

\textsuperscript{60} SOP, 181.
\textsuperscript{61} SOP, 185.
expressions. Thus McIntyre says little positive or constructive on this point, other than advocating a certain form of agnosticism in accepting paradox. For McIntyre, the problem of grace and freedom, or responsibility and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is a series of half-truths that must be taken together as an incomplete, perhaps even incoherent whole.

v. Ordering Human Relations

This is followed by the pattern in which the Holy Spirit works to put people “in a right and responsible relation to the animal and natural order.”\textsuperscript{62} Here the notion of stewardship of creation is moved beyond the realm of Christian ethics and indeed beyond a doctrine of stewardship. McIntyre identifies three theological ideas that have limited theological consideration for the role of the Spirit in this work.

The first is that the close association of the Holy Spirit with the Son has led to a focus on the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit in the cosmic salvation of a cosmic Christ but that this has not led to any notion of the Holy Spirit’s role in bringing about a cosmic consummation. The second follows that this close association of the Holy Spirit with the Son and the work of the Son has led to a neglect of the relationship between the Spirit and the Father. Thus the third is that the Holy Spirit has consequently not been regularly associated with the work of creatio continua, despite the fact that the Spirit is understood to have a role in creation.

For McIntyre, relating the Holy Spirit to a cosmic consummation within a cosmic salvation, to the Father as Creator God, and to the work of continuing creation provides a basis for examining the role of the Holy Spirit in placing people in right relationship with creation and within the process of continued creation. Thus the Holy Spirit makes people aware of the injustice of environmental and ecological sin, and convicts people to right and restorative action for the created order in the same way that the Spirit convicts and directs people in establishing, maintaining, and developing right relationship in communion with other people.

vi. Personality and Spirit

The final pattern that fits firmly within this model argues that it is the Holy Spirit who makes “the categories of personality and spirit… applicable to God.”\textsuperscript{63} While McIntyre acknowledges the fact that there has been significant development in the understanding of God having personality and being understood in personal terms outside of reference to any one person of the Trinity, especially in Paley and the implementation of Buber, it must be understood that it is the Holy Spirit who makes this possible. For McIntyre this is analogical

\textsuperscript{62} SOP, 190.
\textsuperscript{63} SOP, 193.
to the idea that God is understood as being the Redeemer, despite the fact that it is acknowledged as the work of Christ on the cross that accomplishes this. In a similar way, while it may be understood that God relates to people and can be understood in personal terms, it is the Spirit who accomplishes this work.

In a similar way, when God is spoken of as Spirit it is by the Holy Spirit that God is known to people as spirit and engages in that transcending work of the Spirit that transcends the boundaries that are constantly present in relations between one entity and another. Perhaps in a nod to certain expositions of Buber, McIntyre argues that it is this transcendent relationship that moves the relationship of the Ich und du into a real relationship, not simply with an other, but with ‘the personality’ that is God.

This is the last of the individual patterns that McIntyre examines in relation to this dynamic model. The final two are set apart in that they move beyond following one simple pattern. The first is that of the ‘Go-between God’ that incorporates a number of the patterns already mentioned. The second is even more comprehensive and represents McIntyre’s own synthesis of this vein.

**vii. Emperichoretic Function**

The source of the Go-between God is the book of the same name by John V. Taylor. What Taylor does is to develop the idea of *emperichoresis* into a broader concept that is more centrally located to a theological understanding of the Spirit and the relation of God to humanity by the Spirit. This takes up Barth’s innovation on the similarity of the being and works of God ad intra and ad extra. Just as the Holy Spirit is the communion between the Father and the Son, so too is the Spirit the communion between God and people.

However, this has interesting implications for the way that the Holy Spirit is understood. First, the presence of the Holy Spirit is not something that is felt, experienced, or known. Instead, the presence of the Holy Spirit is constant and allows people to hear and know the will of God. Thus the nature of our knowledge of God is not about how that knowledge is understood, since this has been explained in a number of ways. Instead, it is about the fact that no matter how this is understood it is the Holy Spirit who makes people aware of God’s presence and makes this awareness possible.

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64 Emphasis McIntyre’s. McIntyre offers consistent critique of Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Scribner’s, 1970). The primary concern of McIntyre’s critique is that the Ich und Du relation is a reduction of the relationship with God. God is not simply an other, with whom this type of relationship is possible. Instead, God stands apart and unique and any relationship with him must reflect the true distinctiveness of this relation.

For Taylor a key piece in understanding the Spirit this way is the idea of ‘bisociation.’ That is the idea that there is an immediate temporal, earthly thing associated with some eternal, heavenly thing that is inherent in the way that God does reveal himself. For instance, the parables have earthly stories that convey some other spiritual reality. The example par excellence is that of the words of institution, when Jesus says that this bread is my flesh and this cup is my blood. In a similar way, it is the presence of the Holy Spirit that mediates our earthly and temporal understanding of things to the things that God continues to reveal.66

viii. Absolute Freedom

Following Berkhof, McIntyre acknowledges that to speak of the Spirit being and acting in these various ways attributes a greater degree of autonomy than is usually associated with the Spirit. The threefold nature of God as it is understood in the language of the three persons does not denote this level of autonomy, and Berkhof suggests the revised language of ‘an autonomous substance.’67 While there are difficulties of adopting such language, the aversion should not, as McIntyre argues, be based on the question of autonomy.

Returning to his method of finding analogous ideas in Christology, McIntyre argues that the autonomy of the Son has always been maintained as a defense against Docetism. Without an autonomous existence the Son could never have been more than an apparatus by which God sought to appear as a person. Thus the autonomy of the Son is maintained with the understanding that Son operates “within a constant devotion to doing the will of God the Father.”68 Thus the Spirit can be understood to operate in unique and dynamic ways, such as those other patterns already mentioned, which move beyond limited understandings of the Spirit as merely an extension of the Father, Son, or the perfection of the work of salvation. Here the Spirit takes on that full role of agency and activity with which he is described in the Scriptures and yet operates, just as Christ did, within the will of God the Father.

McIntyre acknowledges then, that the implications of this defense of autonomy leads to a type of social theory of the Trinity which requires a re-working of the Trinity. McIntyre proposes two such options. The first, is to suggest that *persona* be translated as personality and be understood in the more modern context as being autonomous and substantiative. Thus

66 It should be noted that there is also an extensive treatment of Taylor’s examination of the reflection of certain ideas about mediated relations in nature and science. While there are certainly points worth exploring here, it does not serve in offering further explanation of this pattern.


68 *SOP*, 205.
the relations of the three is that of *societas* or fellowship. The second would be to say that the traditional notion holds *ad intra*, but in the works of God *ad extra* there is a change that occurs within the Godhead. Thus the Son in being incarnate takes on a human nature that he never loses. Neither is given immediate preference over the other.

Here McIntyre takes on the challenge of the inevitable charge of tri-theism in a way that I think demonstrates something much more fundamental to McIntyre's method and the way that it plays out. For him, a Christian doctrine of the trinity would never be tri-theistic. Thus this theory could never be tri-theistic, because it is a given within the parameters of the formulation that there are not three Gods but one. It is only in 'unravelling that unity' that the three-foldness of God is discovered in the works of Father, Son, and Spirit; and this can in no way diminish the unity which these three have in the mutual and interpenetrating communion, which is far more than an human society or fellowship that can be imagined.

4. The Resulting Polarities

However, this is not a complete account for McIntyre. Thus he moves forward from here to an exploration of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the church. This is itself an expression of the dynamic model, but takes into account four of what McIntyre terms 'Ecclesial Polarities.' The basic idea here is that different ecclesiologies offer different accounts of the relation between the Spirit and the church. The most extreme of these positions form 'poles' and other points that fall between these poles are located within the field of meaning these two poles creates.

i. Over or In the Church

For instance the first polarity that McIntyre examines addresses the question of whether the Holy Spirit is 'indigenous' to or *gegenüber*, over and against, the church. While McIntyre notes that the distinction is blurred by the diversity of each tradition, the pole of the Spirit being indigenous to the church is generally associated with the Roman Catholic tradition and the idea that the Holy Spirit is over and against the church is generally associated with the Reformed tradition.

In the first pole the Holy Spirit is indigenous to the church. The analogy for this that originates with Augustine is that the Holy Spirit is to the church like the soul is to the body. It is this position of the Holy Spirit within the church that is used to legitimate the church, her hierarchy, and her role in administering the sacraments. It is the Holy Spirit who makes the human membership of the institution of the church into the body of Christ and legitimates that body as the church. This subsequently is used to validate the church and her actions as
the will of God, since it is the Holy Spirit who has established this authority and is present in it.

The second pole by contrast focuses on maintaining the lordship of the Holy Spirit over the church, her hierarchy, and her administration of the sacraments. As the Lord is maintained as without and above, the church functions as an instrument of the Holy Spirit and operates in the triadic relation of the church, Christ, and the Spirit that he sent. As such, there is place for the Holy Spirit to be indigenous to the church in the same sense as that of the first pole.

While there are other polarities that McIntyre would seek to offer some conciliar position between the two poles, this is not one of them. McIntyre sees these two ideas as different at very fundamental levels that are not in need of integration but instead of mutual understanding and respect.

ii. Community or Institution

The second polarity in turn responds to the question of whether the Holy Spirit is expressed through a community (event) or an institution. In this polarity, McIntyre argues that the extreme affirmation of the expression of the Holy Spirit in an institution is unacceptable and largely non-existent. That said, it is characterized by major gaps between the laity and the clergy and a specific shape and internal structure of the institution established by the Holy Spirit. Conversely, even the most community focused communities operate with some hierarchy and structure.

Either way, the Holy Spirit must be seen as active and present in the institution of baptism, the laying on of hands, in conversion, communion, the proclamation of the gospel, the discipline and authority of the church, the ministry, and the gifts of the Spirit. As such, there is an implicit affirmation of these institutional aspects of the life of the church. Thus for McIntyre, hierarchies must not be viewed merely as necessary evils in a fallen world, as having a demonic nature, or as merely being sociological developments. Instead, they must always be understood as integral expressions of the theology, sacraments, and ministry of the church.

iii. Group or Individual

The third polarity in turn addresses the question of whether the Holy Spirit is present in the group or the individual. It is the question of within or among. The fact that McIntyre draws attention to is that there are strong cases for both of these positions. For McIntyre the answer to this question is best answered when there is a balance between the two. If there
is an overemphasis on the presence of the Holy Spirit within the individual there is the danger of neglecting the external and ethical responsibilities of the community. Conversely, McIntyre asserts that any focus on the ethical and communal responsibilities of the community must never deny the promise of the Holy Spirit to work in the lives of individuals.

The temptation here is to treat these two poles as separate concerns. However, for McIntyre these are two poles of the same field and thus the tension between the two must be maintained. For McIntyre, “If denominational loyalty or some other theological persuasion inclines us to one pole rather than the other, we must always acknowledge and react to the draw of the other. Both are necessary…” and either way “we still have to create within the group as a whole the expectation of possession by the Spirit and the empowering to do his will as individuals.”

The central point here is demonstrated by two questions. The first is reconciling the formulae and structure of the church with the freedom inherent in the being and work of the Holy Spirit. For example, how can the Holy Spirit be understood as present in either the individual or the group; since he is free to be present by any means that he pleases. The second question is that of making what is obviously true of the group, namely the presence of the Holy Spirit among them, into something meaningful for individual people. As McIntyre puts it, “the real problem is how the Holy Spirit can be the life-giver, the power of our own congregations and hardest of all the sanctifier of our own lives.”

iv. Charismatic Phenomena

The fourth polarity is one that is more specific than the others and addresses a phenomena that is not frequently addressed in the circles of academic theology. That is the polarity of speaking in tongues and being baptized by the Holy Spirit. McIntyre divides his treatment of this polarity into two polarities. The first is a first order polarity and deals with the treatment of the subject within the biblical texts; the second is a second order polarity and examines the poles present in contemporary discussions within Pentecostalism and between contemporary Pentecostals and mainline churches.

The first order polarity is concerned with two accounts of the process of conversion in Luke and Paul. Broadly speaking, in Luke there is the possibility of a person becoming a Christian without the Holy Spirit. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit is something that happens subsequently and can be separated from the ‘event’ in which one converts. The argument here is that the evidence of this subsequent event is that of a sign, usually speaking in tongues or some closely associated phenomenon. In Paul’s account, the order is reversed.

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69 SOP, 219.
70 SOP, 219.
The Spirit is sent first and it is this indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the process of conversion that leads to faith and a life of prayer. McIntyre draws on the analysis of Walter Hollenweger to maintain these two positions as a polarity, since the two seem to be offering irreconcilable accounts.\(^{71}\)

This then leads to the second order polarity of this discussion, which McIntyre locates within the contemporary ecclesiologies of churches in the Pentecostal tradition and the mainline tradition. The reason for this polarity is the resurgence of a two-stage (i.e. Lukan) view of salvation within the Pentecostal movement.

The Pentecostal movement however is not a homogenous entity, and there is a wide variety of positions that take some form of this view. The basic tenets of which are: a conversion experience, and a subsequent work of sanctification accompanied by signs. While different groups use different language and have different practices within this view, the emphasis is on the continued work of the Holy Spirit for the regeneration of the believer that manifests itself beyond a moment of conversion.

Rather than trying to trace this debate, McIntyre chooses to focus on a standard example in which there is a first event of conversion in which the converted person has received Christ as savior. There is then a second event when that person receives the baptism of the Holy Spirit, which is accompanied by speaking in tongues.\(^{72}\)

For McIntyre, there are two objections that are immediately raised by mainstream churches. First, there is the rejection of the idea that the gift of speaking in tongues does, or especially must, accompany or indicate baptism with the Holy Spirit. Second, there is the rejection of the idea that being baptized with the Holy Spirit is part of some added second blessing that is only given to some people.

On the other hand, McIntyre notes that there are things that the mainstream churches can learn from this understanding of the Holy Spirit and salvation. The first is that the language of being baptized by the Spirit is actually helpful in describing conversion and the role of the Holy Spirit in bringing about salvation in the lives of people. Second, it is helpful in indicating the ongoing process of salvation that is facilitated by the presence of the Holy Spirit. Finally, it offers a cautionary warning that speaking in tongues, as a biblical phenomenon, should not be dismissed or ridiculed as impossible today in the church or for the Spirit.

However, McIntyre considers this as more than a phenomenon that can inform and shape what he calls the mainstream churches. Drawing on the work of J.D.G. Dunn, McIntyre entertains the possibility that the Pentecostal movement has actually created a

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\(^{72}\) *Xenolalia*. 

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third pole within this field of meaning that is held in tension with Protestant and Catholic understandings of the Holy Spirit. The specific argument is that the Pentecostal position places emphasis on and gives authority to, if not in some cases precedence to, personal experience. This stands in contrast to and as a rejection of the sacramental and Biblicist views of the Holy Spirit that relegate the role of the Holy Spirit to the realm of the sacraments or the scriptures.

While this may be something of a caricature of the Protestant and Roman Catholic positions, there are several points that suggest that the Pentecostal movement represents a major shift from these two traditional notions. For instance, McIntyre points to the pre-eminent place of tongues in the life of the believer, the emphasis on spontaneous prophecy in worship, and the hurdles that are faced in incorporating Pentecostal ideas and practices into the liturgical practices all seem to point to the extent of this departure.

McIntyre concludes his exploration of this pattern by offering some concluding remarks on Pentecostalism in light of the original research question. For McIntyre, this concentrates on the question of how mainstream churches can incorporate a sense of the presence of the Holy Spirit within their own worship practices. This begins with creating a sense of expectation that the Holy Spirit will be present in worship by praying for the gift of the Holy Spirit, praying that the Holy Spirit will be present in worship, and praying to the Holy Spirit to fulfill his promise to be present with his people. It includes allowing for spontaneity in the practice of preaching and the delivering of sermons as a way of reclaiming the prophetic function of proclamation. Finally, it calls for a serious reevaluation of the liturgical place for the Holy Spirit in baptism, communion, and confirmation in the mainstream churches.

Ultimately, it is these three polarities of conversion, ecclesiology, and charismatic experience that constitute the clusters of probability. Despite all of the data, categorization, and exposition these three polarities manage to encapsulate the multiple ‘patterns’ of numerous ‘models’ in McIntyre’s methodological approach to this doctrine.

5. Summary

What emerges here is the final piece of the theological vision outlined in Faith, Theology and Imagination that McIntyre completes in his lifetime. In it he takes liberties with his method in order to adapt to the chaotic field of Pneumatology while adhering to a faithful fleshing out of the outline from Faith, Theology and Imagination.

In terms of McIntyre’s method the change can be observed in contrast to the other ‘Shape of’ books. Where The Shape of Soteriology is determined by models being viewed in the complex yet beautiful constellation overlay of their inputs, and The Shape of Christology is determined by the working out of the perennial problem posed by the simplified formula of Chalcedon, The Shape of Pneumatology is found only through the discernment of the work of the Spirit in clusters of expected and unexpected spaces within the whole realm of human and divine interaction. These clusters emerge as polarities of concentrated data that relate to the person and work of the Holy Spirit within the broader field of theology and the life of God in the church. While these clusters may not always be easily relatable to each other, the significance of the presence of the spirit in each is profound and undeniable.

In relation to Faith, Theology and Imagination, The Shape of Pneumatology re-asserts and expounds on the initial claims, patterns, and the outline of the idea of imagination as a category of a theology of the Holy Spirit. While the specific correlations between the outline and later work is not always a one-to-one relation in the cases of Christology and Soteriology, in the instance of Pneumatology McIntyre could not be more clear in his commitment to the first principles of his theological method and the system that he outlined in Faith, Theology and Imagination.

From the very beginning, McIntyre is very clear in Faith, Theology and Imagination that there is, for him, a close connection between the Holy Spirit and imagination. This begins with the idea that we need to fully integrate our understanding of the Holy Spirit with the imaginative work of Creation. It is also why there needs to be a better account of the Holy Spirit in a theology of work and art in which creativity and imagination are indispensable. It is why when McIntyre, as Moderator, advocates for a reform in worship his vision is for worship that is imaginative and Spirit-filled. For McIntyre these two things go hand in hand. When the Spirit is present, it is by God’s imagination; and when we see God at work in ways that are creative and imaginative, we can be assured of the presence of the Spirit.

Here, not the Holy Spirit is the imagination of God set loose in the world as one, an outworking of God’s own imagination, that is in his essence as a divine perfection; two, as

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74 The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.1.1. This was McIntyre’s address as the Moderator during the General Assembly as a sermon preached at St. Giles. Some of the language is quite forceful in calling out the Kirk for a style of worship that was stagnant and lacking in creativity. For McIntyre the solution of approaching new worship practices of imagination was a way of cultivating Spirit-filled worship in the Kirk.

75 The McIntyre Papers, AA.4.14.17. McIntyre echoes similar sentiments to his Moderatorial address in a more theological context that he gave as the honorary president of the Edinburgh Theological Society. This address is dated February 1994.
an outworking of God’s own imaginative nature; and three, an affirmation of the Holy Spirit’s own imaginative nature and function as a divine person. No matter what model or account of this essential outworking of God’s own self, in each instance there is work involved on the human part to see what cannot be seen, to know what cannot be known, to imagine what cannot be imagined. Our task is to faithfully trace their shape and to see in them the Spirit at work, set loose in the world around us.
Part III: Constructive Synthesis

Chapter 6: What is missing?

There are two things that appear to be missing from the original vision that McIntyre laid out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. First, there is no expansion of his outline for a doctrine of creation, at least not in the same way that there is for the doctrines of atonement, Christology, and Pneumatology. Finally, there is no complete formulation of a doctrine of God built on the claims about God that McIntyre makes in *FTI*. This creates a problem. Without these two components McIntyre’s theological system remains incomplete and his theological vision remains unrealized.

First of all, the absence of a doctrine of creation is problematic not only because it is a central doctrinal theme of any theological system. It is particularly important to McIntyre’s system, because it provides the basis for his theological anthropology in which imagination is the primary aspect of the *imago Dei*. However, McIntyre’s ideas about creation also teach us important things about his understanding of God. This is particularly true in his insistence on the role of the Holy Spirit in creation and the ongoing concern that God has for his creation.

Second of all, the prospect of laying out a doctrine of God in terms of imagination presents its own specific challenges. Part of the challenge is that the formulation of a doctrine of God is a more sensitive subject. In *FTI* McIntyre makes a very strong, clear and concise argument for the idea that imagination ought to be understood as a divine perfection, that is an attribute of God that is constitutive of his substance. Thus, just as God is love and not just loving, so also God is imagination and not merely imaginative. That is to reiterate that God’s imagination is constitutive of his being as a perfection and not merely attributive.

The implications of this claim are huge and far-reaching. It is a claim that could be applied in different ways. The question is how we, as receptors of McIntyre’s theology, think this claim ought to be perceived and applied. The closest thing that we get to a definitive direction from McIntyre is his own desire to re-write *On the Love of God* in terms of imagination.

The question then becomes a matter of how should these themes be developed in order to fill in the gaps left in McIntyre’s system. Part of this is taking cues from McIntyre in order to identify the gaps in the final outworking of his theological system and to trace the trajectory and shape of his ideas. The other part of this is a matter of identifying what
portions of McIntyre’s presentation of his system in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* and the ‘Shape of’ books give insight and direction into how these themes might be more fully formulated in McIntyrian terms.

This chapter will focus on these two topics as parts of McIntyre’s theological system that are not fully developed. This includes examining the pieces that are present and inform these gaps. In terms of creation, there will be an examination of specific sections of *Faith, Theology and Imagination* and *The Shape of Pneumatology* that are relevant. In relation to the doctrine of God, this includes a survey of *On the Love of God* as an outline of the components that McIntyre identifies as necessary for a developed doctrine of God.

As such, this chapter moves beyond a focus on interpretation. In the case of Creation, I am arguing that the theological vision that McIntyre presented *Faith, Theology and Imagination* is incomplete without a doctrine of creation. While some signposts are left by McIntyre is the outline of his proposal in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*, McIntyre’s system as a whole is incomplete without further work on this topic, especially since it encompasses the concept of the *imago Dei*, which is a significant bridge between and understanding of God in his imagination, an understanding of people as products of God’s imagination, and a theological anthropology in which people are bearers of the divine imagination.

This also highlights the gap left by the fact that McIntyre does not offer a more fully developed doctrine of God after *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. Fortunately, McIntyre has left us more to work with than in the case of creation. In his earlier work *On the Love of God* McIntyre provides a thorough account of God in terms of love. The argument here is that if we can understand both the role that McIntyre claims for imagination as a divine perfection and gain insights into his mode of operation in relation to a doctrine of God, some synthesis of the two is possible.

This chapter examines what is missing in terms of creation and what is missing in relation to Imagination and the love of God. If we can identify what is missing, we can identify what additional work is needed for further development of McIntyre’s system and thought.

1. Creation

When we examine the outworking of McIntyre’s system from his outline in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* into the ‘Shape of’ books, the first thing that is missing is a doctrine of Creation. While this is a key component of the system that McIntyre outlines in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*, there is no substantial follow-up to this.
There are two caveats that I would like to add to this. First of all, there is the distinct possibility that McIntyre simply did not have the time to fully realize his theological vision. There are two things that suggest this might be the case. One, if we examine a chronological list of the books that McIntyre reviewed there is some indication that the topic of creation was a topic that McIntyre was at least reading from 1999 on. This follows a similar pattern where McIntyre published reviews of books related to the topics of his monographs in a period before and after publication. This might suggest that McIntyre was at least exploring this as a next project.

The second caveat is that in Faith, Theology and Imagination McIntyre draws a strong connection between the Holy Spirit and the act of creation. This is a theme that McIntyre develops in The Shape of Pneumatology. As a result there are some indications of what a doctrine of creation might look like beyond the original outline in Faith, Theology and Imagination.

What we are left with are four select sections of Faith, Theology and Imagination and The Shape of Pneumatology that are directly relevant to the doctrine of Creation within McIntyre’s system.

The first of these sections is right at the very beginning when McIntyre is still directly interacting with George MacDonald’s essay on imagination. One of the ideas that McIntyre gleans from the essay and chooses to develop is the idea that imagination is the primary aspect of the imago Dei. First of all, while this is a significant decision, in some ways this is not much of a stretch. The alternative concepts, which are more traditionally associated with the imago Dei, generally deal with cognitive capacity and the human capacity to know God.

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1 There is at least some limited indication that McIntyre was considering a volume on creation. In addition to the doctrine of creation being one thing absent from the areas present in Faith, Theology and Imagination, in 1999 McIntyre published John McIntyre, Review of The Cosmos and the Creator: An Introduction to the Theology of Creation, by David Fergusson (London : SPCK, 1998), in Studies in World Christianity 5, no. 1 (1999): 117-119. As an isolated event, this might be dismissed as an excellent teacher taking interest in the work of a former student. But we can see that McIntyre often published reviews and papers on topics in and around the time that he was writing and compiling his books. Additionally, we know, thanks to the McIntyre papers that he was holding onto a manuscript copy of the Gifford Lecture series Genes, Genesis & God by Holmes Rolston, III. These are dated 1997. Finally, McIntyre’s last four publications from 2002-2004 are all directly related to the subject of Adam. They are: The Historical Adam,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 54, no. 3 (2002): 150-157. “The Real Adam,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 56, no. 3 (2004): 161-170. “The Real Adam and Original Sin,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 58, no. 2 (2006): 90-98. and “A Reply to the Responders,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 58 no. 2 (2006): 106-108. These may be well be an indication of a pattern heading in certain direction.


4 FTI, 114.
Things like rationality and reason are meant to reflect those gifts that God has given to people that set them apart from the rest of creation as fully sentient beings.

Imagination as a faculty of the mind and as an epistemological concept lends itself to a similar type of characterization. Imagination, understood in these cognitive-epistemological terms, is capable of replacing these types of concepts to describe these aspects of what God has imbued to us as our creator.

What changes things for MacDonald and in turn changes things for McIntyre is the way that the concept of imagination becomes fully integrated into a series of connections between God as creator and people created in his image. This begins in God’s own self as an attribute of God’s being. In MacDonald’s account, Imagination begins in God. It is God’s imagination that leads God to create, and it is in that act of creation that God makes people. It is in the creation of people, that God imbues them with his image, an image that must in turn include the same imagination that God has, or at least enough of an imprint of it, in order for them to reflect his being. God in turn makes himself known by giving image to himself, and people are capable of knowing God because they have within themselves the faculty of imagination (as an aspect of the imago Dei) which allows them to see the ways that God gives image to himself.

While this is something that McIntyre discusses in the context of MacDonald, this is not a concept that he develops much further and it is something that would be a significant contribution to an understanding of the doctrine of creation in terms of McIntyre’s system. Without further development, we do not know what that would have looked like. That said, if we take McIntyre’s utilization of MacDonald at face value, it is safe to say that any account of creation along McIntyrian lines, must include some account of imagination as an integral if not defining aspect of the image of God in people, as a product of God’s own creative imagination.

The second section is also from Faith, Theology and Imagination in which McIntyre is concerned directly with imagination as a theological category of creation. Part of this has already been discussed, but what we see in the outline that McIntyre provides here is a desire to move on from the three-form doctrine of creation ex nihilo, per Verbum, and continua, which McIntyre labels as being at once both doctrinally proper and vacuous.

McIntyre accuses this account of not providing any engagement with the creativity and imagination of God that must necessarily be present in order to create such a world as this, with all of its wonderful and imagination features, creatures, etc. In turn, this means

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5 FTI, 114.
6 FTI, 50.
that we have a doctrine of creation that does not engage in any meaningful way with the creation itself as a product of this mighty act of God.\(^7\)

McIntyre lays the blame for such inadequacies, especially in protestant circles, against skepticism of natural theology and an unhealthy understanding of humanity’s dominion over creation. In the first instance, McIntyre cautions against selling God short as creator in order to assuage anxieties about natural theology.\(^8\) In the second instance, the concept of taking dominion over creation has resulted in an abdication of our responsibility to creation.\(^9\)

For McIntyre the ecological crisis was one of the most pressing ethical issues of his day, and this is something that continues to be the case. Consequently, McIntyre advocates for a theology that is affirming of creation both as a beautiful creation by God and a theology that addresses the ecological crises from a thoroughly theological perspective. What McIntyre proposes is that the starting point for this process is “to get a right beginning in our doctrine of nature and of the God who so imaginatively created it.”\(^10\) Without an affirmation of God as creative and imaginative, it becomes an even greater challenge to affirm the goodness and beauty of creation as a product of God’s divine activity. It is only within a positive affirmation of God as creator that we can reclaim a positive view of his creation. The language that McIntyre uses is evocative.

We have to begin again to see nature as the Psalmist saw it, the handiwork of God which our ineptitude and greed are destroying; or as Christ saw it, with God clothing the lilies of the field in a glory which outshone Solomon’s finery, and having such a care for the minutiae of nature that he was aware of a sparrow falling to the ground, and, by implication, of ten thousand gannets destroyed by one carelessly released oil-slick. Somewhere in the midst of that theology I want to find a place for the imagination of the Creator-God.\(^11\)

The fact is that McIntyre does not make significant strides to this end.\(^12\) This is yet another area that needs additional attention.

\(^7\) *FTI*, 51.

\(^8\) *FTI*, 51.

\(^9\) *FTI*, 51-52.

\(^10\) *FTI*, 53.

\(^11\) *FTI*, 51

\(^12\) He does have an additional essay on the ecological crisis, John McIntyre, "The Theological Dimensions of the Ecological Problem," *The McIntyre Papers*, AA 4.3.10. However, he does not move these ideas much more than he does here. While there are more specifics related to how theology might approach environmental issues, these are not necessarily situated in the doctrine of creation. That said, McIntyre does raise issues about the challenges of addressing these problems in ways that are not anthropocentric. This is due to the fact that the strongest theological language provided for the protection and care of creation are rooted in God’s impartation of his image to humanity. As a result, he notes that a thoroughgoing ecological theology will have to overcome these obstacles in order to offer a theological approach that has an intrinsically high view of creation that is not dependent on any particular
Once again we do not know what McIntyre’s doctrine of creation might have been, but it should be clear that he intended to have one and that certain ideas would be a part of that equation. Namely, any doctrine of creation developed along the lines of McIntyre’s system would need to 1) positively affirm God’s imagination and creativity in the act of creation, 2) positively affirm the worth of creation as a product of God’s handiwork, 3) positively formulate theological responses to the ecological disasters of our times.

By the time that McIntyre writes _The Shape of Pneumatology_ it becomes clear that the Holy Spirit is going to be an important part of McIntyre’s solution to this problem. This brings us to our last two sections, which are both related to the doctrine of creation as it relates to the Holy Spirit.

The first indication that we have of this idea is also in McIntyre’s treatment of imagination as a theological category in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. Simply put, there is not any fully formulated idea present at this juncture. That said, it is significant to note that in his account of imagination as a theological category of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, John McIntyre associates the Holy Spirit with one, “God’s imaginative creative activity” and two, “imaginative creation.” In neither of these instances is McIntyre actually referring to the doctrine of creation. In the first, it is God’s activity in the “spiritual sphere;” and in the second, it is “in the spirits of believers.”

Consequently, the point here is that it is not surprising that when we begin to understand the Holy Spirit in terms of imagination that we also begin to see the works of the Spirit as creative. In turn, it is not surprising that when we begin to see the imaginative creative activity of the Holy Spirit that we begin to see that creativity as a significant aspect of who the Spirit is and what the Spirit does.

Consequently, it is not surprising that when McIntyre returns to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in _The Shape of Pneumatology_ that McIntyre’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as creative and involved in acts of creation has developed into an association of the Holy Spirit with the doctrine of creation. The fact is that McIntyre goes to some length in order to make a case for including the Holy Spirit in our doctrine of creation. Perhaps part of McIntyre’s reticence to say more in _Faith, Theology and Imagination_ can be seen in the way that McIntyre very carefully develops his argument in relation to particular textual interpretations.

The fact is that the textual issues, while important to McIntyre, are not enough to deny the activity of the Spirit in creation. While there have been irresponsible readings of anthropology (Note: this paper had multiple copies at multiple junctures in the files. AA 4.3.10 contains the copy that I first viewed. It was dated 1980, which is the earliest date I saw on any subsequent copies).

13 _FTI_, 64.
14 _FTI_, 64.
15 _SOP_, 35-40.
texts to make this point, McIntyre points to other texts that seem to associate the Spirit with the work of creation. All of this cannot stand up to the scrutiny of the inseparability of operations of the persons of the Trinity. The fact is that if God is acting all of God is acting. No one person can act independently. In conclusion, McIntyre asserts that this interpretation that incorporates the Spirit offers “the interpretation which the passage demands, namely, the valid account of how the writer of the book of Genesis pictures creation as taking place.”

Once again, this is one small piece of an incomplete picture. For McIntyre’s system to be complete a more comprehensive doctrine of creation is necessary. While we do not know what McIntyre’s doctrine of creation might have been, it is clear that the role of the Holy Spirit in creation is something that was important to him and to his system as a whole. Consequently, any development of a doctrine of creation along the lines of McIntyre’s system would need to 1) actively affirm the work of the Spirit in creation and 2) ground this creative activity of the Spirit in the imagination that is integral to the being of the Spirit of God.


When it comes to working out a doctrine of God in terms of McIntyre’s theology, the starting point is the affirmation that this is a doctrine of God in terms of imagination. The basic idea of this is laid out in Faith, Theology and Imagination when McIntyre presents imagination as a theological category. The key thrust of this thesis is a two-pronged argument. One, it is to establish the place and function of imagination as a divine perfection. Two, it is intended to raise the profile of imagination as a divine perfection. It is this two-pronged approach that leads Gary Badcock to conclude that imagination does indeed function “as a divine perfection- and perhaps even as the divine perfection par excellence.”

That still leaves a question of what this would actually look like. However, McIntyre does seem to provide some indication when he expresses an interest to “re-trace the map of the world of love” he would do so in terms of imagination. As such, it would seem that McIntyre, in affirming imagination as a divine perfection of primary importance, is suggesting that imagination as a divine perfection should 1) at least follow the same pattern of love and 2) that the shape of love in turn should be understood in terms of imagination. What we will be examining at the moment is McIntyre’s understanding of love in the first place and the

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16 SOP, 40.
17 SOP, 40.
19 FTI, 73.
relationship that has to McIntyre’s understanding of a doctrine of God. In order to do this, full attention must be given to McIntyre’s earlier work *On the Love of God*.

On the one hand, *On the Love of God* is one of McIntyre’s more comprehensive approaches to theology as a whole, but it is also less polished than some of his later works. The work seeks to answer the primary question: What is the love of God? To this question, McIntyre offers his simple answer: “Jesus Christ, as prepared for under the Old Covenant and present in reality and fulfillment under the New Covenant.”

To this end, McIntyre constructs a series of objectives and methodological constraints to govern his work.

The primary objective is, in a word, integration. It is an acknowledgment that “the Liberals were right in the place they gave to the concept of the love of God both in their theological constructions and in the proclamation of the Gospel.” It is an acknowledgement of the problems posed by that same theology. It is an acknowledgement that to re-introduce the primacy of the love of God “in our theological presentation then we must discover for it a content which will enable it to bear this responsibility.” The objective of integration is to bring all of these ideas into some sort of cohesion. McIntyre sets out to do this by showing “how the insights which theology has been given in the past fifteen years [1947-1962] or so may be employed to give the content to the concept of the love of God.”

The method that McIntyre proposes to do this is Christocentric but ‘not narrowly.’ For McIntyre this Christocentricism should be placed within the gospel story found in both the new and old covenants, and it should acknowledge the difficulty of using love in those contexts. As he writes, “we are admitting that ‘love’ is an enigma, a problem, and we are endeavoring to establish its meaning by putting it in the very closest relation to Jesus Christ.” In a move toward this method, McIntyre proposes that he will include in his “description of what the love means, not only certain attributes, but also actions, operations, purposes, relations, and attitudes.” McIntyre presents this broader approach as a way to come to terms with “the living quality of the God and Father of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.”

The structure of the remaining content is broken into seven chapters. Chapters two through seven define love in relation to the understanding of love in God. These are: Love is Concern, Commitment, Communication, Community, Involvement, and Identification.

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20 *On the Love of God*, 34.
24 *On the Love of God*, 34.
final chapter turns the focus to the love of God in humanity. Here love is offered definition as Response and Responsibility.

McIntyre begins his treatment of love as concern by drawing on the concept of concern developed by Paul Tillich. Tillich presents concern in light of God being the ultimate concern of people. McIntyre repurposes this in terms of its relation only in order to understand concern in light of the concern that God has for people. For McIntyre there are five chief features of this concern.

First, he writes “In a field of ultimate concern, the subject of such concern constitutes the centre of the field and all other interests are oriented towards it.”

Secondly, “the attitude of concern supplies meaning to the rest of life by giving it a centre of reference.”

Next, “the subject of the concern might be said to enter into its own rights and to exercise its own authority within the field” and in this way the field becomes dynamic.

Fourthly, “the emotional or affective and the cognition aspects” are added to the “conative and volitional aspects of personality.” Finally, “The character of the field is determined by the nature and reality of the subject of the concern.” This moves the field of concern beyond something that is merely happening in the mind of the subject. McIntyre notes that this is merely a pattern of concern in people. Thus one should be careful not to understand this, especially in relation to God, as something that is merely attributive or in anthropomorphic terms.

In order to understand this concern in relation to God, McIntyre breaks the concept of concern into five subsections on concern as: Understanding, Compassion, Value, Belonging, and Meaning. Understanding is put simply in terms of the idea, found in the Sermon on the Mount, where God “knoweth that you have need of these things.” The assurance of this understanding is found in Christ “has sojourned among us, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, living our life and dying its death.” This is closely connected to McIntyre's presentation of compassion as part of concern, in which “God’s compassion is never far from his forgiveness.” Thus compassion is the understanding that God has of human need for him and his love.

This compassionate concern then becomes the basis of the value that God places on people. As McIntyre writes that one “immediate result of the understanding and compassionate concern which God shows towards His creatures is that He invests them

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31 On the Love of God, 40.
32 Here McIntyre cites Matt. 6:32 in the KJV.
33 On the Love of God, 44.
34 On the Love of God, 45.
with value, and that they come to an awareness of their value in His sight.”\textsuperscript{35} In this the ambiguity of the value of a person’s life is removed from the realm of human evaluation and it becomes solely “a function of God’s concern for him.”\textsuperscript{36} This in turn is closely related to the idea that this value is found in belonging to God, and that this belonging is a demonstration of God’s concern for people. This then “gives us a sense of belonging, of being at home in this field of concern.”\textsuperscript{37}

Finally, McIntyre turns his attention to the idea of love as concern creating “a field of meaning.”\textsuperscript{38} McIntyre uses this phrase “to describe the integrating effect of God’s concern upon the lives of those who accept Him as the subject of ultimate concern.”\textsuperscript{39} For McIntyre, from this position within the field of God’s concern:

> We receive a centre of reference by which to regulate the motives and drives which control our lives. God becomes the supreme end by means of which all lesser ends of our existence are co-ordinated. In Him we find something, or more accurately, someone to live for.\textsuperscript{40}

For McIntyre, it is important then that this concern is not dismissed. So he goes on to defend this idea of concern against dismissal by notions of impassibility and immutability or by accusations of anthropomorphism. McIntyre posits that any such notions can be met by stating that God feels “in the manner appropriate to His nature, and according to the infinitude of His understanding and compassion.”\textsuperscript{41} Thus when it comes to concerns about anthropomorphism, one must understand the place of the truly human aspects of God’s relation to people in which God “calls now for the living response of wills conformable to His.”\textsuperscript{42}

It is at this point that McIntyre turns his attention from love as concern to love as commitment. In this exposition, McIntyre distances the concept of God’s commitment to people from being somehow historically or doctrinally necessary. Instead, he places this commitment as love within “the very quality of that love,” thus “The historical circumstance serves as a catalytic agent to bring into prominence something which is already there.”\textsuperscript{43} In exploring this theme, McIntyre offers further definition to the concept of commitment through

\textsuperscript{35} On the Love of God, 49.
\textsuperscript{36} On the Love of God, 51.
\textsuperscript{37} On the Love of God, 52.
\textsuperscript{38} On the Love of God, 53.
\textsuperscript{39} On the Love of God, 53.
\textsuperscript{40} On the Love of God, 53.
\textsuperscript{41} On the Love of God, 56.
\textsuperscript{42} On the Love of God, 62.
\textsuperscript{43} On the Love of God, 64.
commitment in terms of: choice and decision, pledging and promise, act, faithfulness, its multi-dimensionality, and personal knowledge and personal hazard. 44

Offering a number of scriptural examples of God’s consistent act of choosing people, McIntyre makes a straightforward case for this aspect of commitment. 45 Along this line, he concludes “The single uniform witness to the Hebrew-Christian God is that He has chosen us before ever we came to the point of choosing Him—if ever indeed it would be true to say that we did so.” 46 In close connection with this theme, McIntyre addresses its essential counterpart, commitment as pledging or promise. For McIntyre, this aspect of commitment is a point of integration in which along with this commitment “promise and sacrifice are bound up together in the love of God as we know it in Jesus Christ.” 47 Thus he presents the idea “that in promising to save sinners, God gave Himself as the pledged commitment that that salvation would come to pass” as “the given from which all theories of the atonement start.” 48

For McIntyre there is in this presentation an inherent promise from God “that He will do something.” 49 It is this latent action that McIntyre treats separately in the next section on commitment as act. This section focuses on the idea that commitment is revealed in action. The implied action mentioned accounts for this conceptually. But as McIntyre points out, “No one could have forecast the cross of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.” 50 In this way, the commitment of the love of God “laid bare the fact” that through “His action in Jesus… nothing less than His whole being was committed to man, to sinful man.” 51 This action, for McIntyre, offers a unique integrative function as well in that it has a unifying effect in relation to God’s past and future acts. This is presented as the inherently eternal nature of God’s love and commitment. 52

44 John, McIntyre, “The Problem of Herod,” The McIntyre Papers, AA 4.2.3. This is a theme that McIntyre takes up in his preaching. In an unexpectedly frank Christmas Eve service at St. Giles, McIntyre addresses what he calls “The Problem of Herod.” He reflects on the problem posed by the slaughter of the children in Bethlehem in light of the willful act of God to be born in that time and place. Here the themes of moral hazard, vulnerability, and exposure are united with the affirmation of the doctrinal necessity of even the most repugnant aspects of human existence. McIntyre states that “Our God is compromised. That is the risk he took in the incarnation. He entered history, our kind of history, and he was immediately exposed to its ambiguities and its misrepresentations, and its double-consequences. These facts are our evidence that he entered history, that he became bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. Without that, these would have no hope, no life, no light, no salvation.” Ibid., 7.
45 Ps. 135:4, Isa. 41:8, Amos 3:2, John 15:16.
46 On the Love of God, 64.
47 On the Love of God, 68.
48 On the Love of God, 68.
50 On the Love of God, 68.
52 On the Love of God, 71.
McIntyre goes on to look at this idea of commitment in terms of God’s faithfulness. McIntyre moves beyond a basic treatment of the faithfulness of God as a descriptive attribute by looking at the Greek term *aletheia*.\(^{53}\) McIntyre points out that this word, and its Hebrew equivalent, is translated in the Old Testament as faithfulness. However, when it is used in the New Testament it is translated as truthfulness. Here McIntyre offers a theological interpretation of this change to say that truthfulness is the fulfillment of faithfulness. Thus when we talk about faithfulness as the love of God as commitment, it is also the assertion that God demonstrates this faithfulness in the fulfilling truth of the incarnation.

For McIntyre, all of these aspects play into what he calls “the multi-dimensional quality of the love of God.”\(^{54}\) The key to these dimensions is the understanding of the love of God in reference to its object. Thus these dimensions are dimensions of the love that God has for people. For McIntyre, this means that the object of God’s love cannot be limited to the individual; it means that it must not be understood as strictly limited to the community; and that these two understandings of God’s love should not be understood as antithetical. McIntyre concludes, “Each existed as part of the other so that neither could be thought about or dealt with, without the other.”\(^{55}\)

Drawing on the Gifford Lectures presented by Michael Polanyi, McIntyre posits that this love as commitment includes a level of *Personal Knowledge* that must include, in God’s relation to people, an element of *hazard*.\(^{56}\) Despite the challenges of doctrines that can de-emphasize the personal nature of God’s relation to people, McIntyre holds that “Human sin, my human sin, creates the hazard in God’s commitment of Himself to me here and now which is the equal which He encountered” both in or prior to the incarnation.\(^{57}\) This hazard of relating with people becomes the point at which McIntyre returns to the idea of covenant in commitment and reminds his reader of “the obedience which God demands of His people is itself part of the covenant relation” thus “Christ is said to bring the covenant to its consummation by offering to God, by His life and death, that very obedience which Israel throughout her long and tortuous history was unable to give.”\(^{58}\) In this way, Christ’s act becomes the obedience necessary for this covenant. As McIntyre concludes:

\(^{53}\) On the Love of God, 73. McIntyre also references the Hebrew equivalent of *emunah*.
\(^{54}\) On the Love of God, 74.
\(^{55}\) On the Love of God, 75.
\(^{56}\) Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). This was the product of Polanyi’s Gifford Lectures from 1952. They were originally published in 1958 before a corrected edition was released in 1962.
\(^{57}\) On the Love of God, 78.
\(^{58}\) On the Love of God, 82-82.
Such obedience was the very thing which Christ offered in blood poured forth to the last drop, and the obedience was offered to God by Christ in the room of those whose humanity He bore. So firmly has God put this obedience in our human hearts that whenever we now seek to obey His will we must do so in the name of that obedience which is Christ’s.\(^{59}\)

In bringing the idea of love as commitment full circle in light of obedience as integral to this commitment as covenant, McIntyre turns his attention to love as communication. McIntyre sets this idea of God’s love as communication against the backdrop of cultural understandings of communication in which communication is presented as broken and the source of human suffering, or as a linguistic notion that is tied up in understandings of logical relations. For McIntyre, communication must break out of its logical-linguistic bounds in order to address the hurt of broken communication; and he seeks to do this in his own treatment of the love of God as communication.

McIntyre treats this topic within both biblical and theological notions of the phrase “the Word of God.” In this treatment McIntyre attempts to move away from “the mystique” that this phrase has been imbued with. In reference to biblical texts, McIntyre focuses on making the assertion that:

The form which God’s communication takes in His Word… it is seen to be historical occasion; it is something which happened; it is historical reality. When this interpretation of the factuality of God’s communication in His Word is held to be the key to the nature of his love, a sharp departure has been made from the notion that love is an attribute, a timeless and trans-historical existent.\(^{60}\)

Thus the content of this communication is not some abstraction, hermeneutic or otherwise, but it is instead the “specific life, death, and resurrection” of Jesus Christ.\(^{61}\)

In regards to theological notions of this phrase, McIntyre interacts primarily with the theology of Karl Barth and its particular understanding of the term revelation. Here McIntyre is more accepting of Barth’s position than he is in other writings. The point of contact for McIntyre in this favorable treatment seems to be Barth “conceding more to the doctrine of predestination” in *The Doctrine of the Word of God* than he does “in volume II/2 of his *Church Dogmatics.*”\(^{62}\) Here McIntyre notes Barth’s main intention “that the Word of God calls forth a response from him to whom it is addressed, and this response is tied up in an integral way with what the Word is that is addressed to the man” as well as the difficulty that Barth notes in understanding this communication by saying that “God’s language is God’s mystery.”\(^{63}\) This does not mean that McIntyre has abandoned the skepticism that he has of

\(^{59}\) *On the Love of God*, 86.

\(^{60}\) *On the Love of God*, 107.


\(^{63}\) *On the Love of God*, 113.
the onus that Barth’s system places on the doctrine of revelation. However, he does note places of convergence with his own thought, that understanding God’s love, as communication is key to seeing the way that God’s love mends the fragmented relationship of people with each other and mends the relationship between God and his people.

With this theme of mended relationship still fresh, McIntyre turns to the love of God as community. Here McIntyre begins to delve into the ethical aspects of the love of God for people and the reality of that love in relations with and among people. McIntyre begins this line of thought by pointing out the way that Christ creates a reality of community into which people grow. In this way, the love of God as community is not something that people make themselves. Instead, “Christ is the condition of continuance of a world which has contracted to the narrow dimensions which we now know.”64 The task of people then is a work of imagination that leads “to a new realisation that the barriers are down, because Christ has already removed them.”65

Here McIntyre again draws on Karl Barth’s presentation of predestination where he states that:

One of the profoundest insights of Karl Barth into the traditional problems of theology is his discernment that “elect” and “reprobate” are not names for two groups of people but of Our Lord Himself in His Incarnation and Atonement.66

From this McIntyre concludes, “If Christ really became the reprobate for us, then no one thereafter can ever stand under the absolute judgment of God as He did.”67 In this way, it is not the responsibility of people to create relations of community. Instead, they are made by Christ coming “into this far country which is the place of our abiding. So a theological pose can only become a reality in our world when it fulfills itself in a morality of community.”68

In this morality of community, it becomes imperative that the Christian community moves away from understandings of love as a private ethic of intimate relation, because this private ethic diminishes the responsibility that people have to others with whom they do not have such an intimate relation. McIntyre points to the “ruthlessness” of capitalism and the problems of irresponsibility in politics within Christian thought and practice as symptoms of this problem. Drawing on Reinhold Niebuhr, McIntyre challenges the antithesis of love and justice by arguing that justice is love at a distance, and as such Christians have a responsibility to love in an expanded “range” of influence and that this responsibility “is

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64 On the Love of God, 122.
65 On the Love of God, 122.
68 On the Love of God, 137.
absolutely normative now."\textsuperscript{69} What one is left with then is “the ethic of Jesus [which] is not a system of rigorous laws, such as was developed in the \textit{lex naturalis} theories, but rather a basis of imaginative insight into a whole new range of relations in which we stand to our fellows.”\textsuperscript{70}

Here, imagination plays a prominent role in the ethic of morality in the community. It is the way that “the agent may penetrate sympathetically to the heart of the situation in which he has to act;” “It leads to actions and courses of action, in which the ordinary concomitants of love are not at all observable;” and it “acquires a versatility, or adaptability, which particularly suits it in view of the vastly increased range of the community within which it has to operate.”\textsuperscript{71}

Imagination becomes an act of faith in which love as community can be expressed in the difficult places where there is “no clear biblical injunction to guide us.”\textsuperscript{72} McIntyre goes on to say then that “in the end it is faith and not moral sight, or even insight, which is going to be the probe whereby the Christian, under God’s mercy and at God’s command, penetrates to the farthest crannies which love in its inclusiveness has created.”\textsuperscript{73} This inclusiveness of love becomes the inclusiveness of all that God does, including his atoning work. It is in this way that the inclusive love of God as community becomes the means by which Christ’s atoning work is “an all-inclusive Atonement, without before or after, without higher or lower.”\textsuperscript{74}

Love as involvement then becomes, for McIntyre, the place where the love of God is put into action. This action is undertaken in the way that God becomes involved with humanity through Jesus Christ. McIntyre juxtaposes this involvement with “dogmatic theories about his assuming human nature” that do not engage with the complicated world with which Christ was involved.\textsuperscript{75} As McIntyre writes, Jesus was so involved “with the sinful nature that He has taken, and with the sorrow and suffering of humanity that He atoned for the one in the profoundest depths of the other.”\textsuperscript{76}

In McIntyre’s mind, this involvement clouds the clarity of revelation. Drawing again on Barth, McIntyre highlights the idea that “God reveals Himself in a situation which is also a veiling of Himself.”\textsuperscript{77} For McIntyre, this is not a Barthian dialectic. Instead, it is the

\textsuperscript{69} On the Love of God, 142.
\textsuperscript{70} On the Love of God, 143.
\textsuperscript{71} On the Love of God, 144.
\textsuperscript{72} On the Love of God, 146.
\textsuperscript{73} On the Love of God, 146.
\textsuperscript{74} On the Love of God, 149.
\textsuperscript{75} On the Love of God, 152.
\textsuperscript{76} On the Love of God, 153.
\textsuperscript{77} On the Love of God, 158.
recognition that “God whom the heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain is in the Person of His Son involved in the ordinariness of everyday life to the point of being incarnate.” This is not a sanitized revelatory concept. This is the revelation of God in the opaque and veiled realities of a world in which knowing itself is challenged by limitations of understanding.

Inherent in this involvement then is for McIntyre the “range of risk that [this involvement] entails.” McIntyre highlights this risk in two major areas. First, he highlights this in the area of history. Here he focuses on how “history is the field of ambiguity” in which interpretation and knowledge are tenuous at best. For McIntyre, “for our time the greatest risk is in the fact that Love has become involved in a person in history.”

Another challenge in this ‘range of risks’ is the problem of interpretation, that is the problem of interpreting who Christ was and what it meant for him to be human and divine. McIntyre addresses this challenge in the context of contemporary Kenoticism, which he accuses of “in its earnestness to ensure [the humanity of Christ], it [is compromising] the Deity of Christ.” In this compromise, McIntyre sees a denial of God’s involvement with humanity and consequently of God’s love for humanity. He writes that God “in giving Himself to mankind in the love that was in Jesus Christ, not only did He become involved in the totality of the human situation, in its sorrow and its sin as well as its hope and its joy, but He in His totality became involved.” For McIntyre, this ties into his presentation on the love of God on the whole. In his presentation of the love of God as fulfillment, “the character of God’s concern is now elucidated… It is a practical concern which takes the form of action… It is embodied, dynamic concern turning out from itself and passing over into the situation which is its object.”

There is then a reciprocal aspect of God’s involvement with humanity, and that is the involvement of humanity with God. From the perspective of this reciprocal aspect, McIntyre introduces three consequences. First, drawing on Leonard Hodgson’s *The Doctrine of the Trinity*, McIntyre writes: “the Christian is now gathered into ‘the social life of the godhead,’ and views the world from this quite new vantage point.” Secondly, there “is a renewal of

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78 On the Love of God, 158.
79 On the Love of God, 159.
82 On the Love of God, 170.
83 On the Love of God, 171.
84 On the Love of God, 176.
the contention that human nature has a place within the godhead.”

Finally, “in the Person of Jesus Christ there takes place the Revelation not only of God but also of man.”

This reciprocity, and the anthropological implications of the third consequence in particular, lead McIntyre to reflect on the image of the life of Christ:

Here, therefore, is the image that claims precedence over all the others which compete for the control of our imagination, and therefore of our wills, our desires, our affections and our reason... the image of man, the true man, Jesus Christ, which is likely to gain control of our wills and affections and reason, will be the specific image of Him of whom the Bible speaks, rather than the construct of the Councils. The latter may reinforce the former to some extent, but it can never be expected to replace it.

This assertion of the primacy of these anthropological aspects of Christ’s existences and its influence on both the formulation of doctrine and the interpretation of the scriptures is echoed in the final assertion that the culmination of the love of God is identification.

Here McIntyre uses the account of John’s baptism as, perhaps, the prime example of God’s love expressed through his identification of Christ with humanity. The focus of this presentation is that Christ, who had no need of righteousness, is baptized in the baptism of repentance to “fulfill all righteousness.” In this act, Christ identifies himself with humanity. McIntyre takes this a step further though, when he argues that this act is a baptism on behalf of humanity. His act becomes an act of repentance for the humanity with whom God has identified himself for the fulfillment of their righteousness. John the Baptist’s statement “Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world,” by occurring “in the context of the baptism does imply that it has the specific as well as the general reference.”

Thus McIntyre concludes from this passage that, “at the baptism began that overt identification of Christ with the sin of mankind which was to culminate in His crucifixion.” In this more comprehensive identification of God with man it becomes evident to McIntyre that “it is inaccurate to suggest that Jesus Christ in His life and death took upon Himself the consequences of human sin and wrong doing.” Christ identifies with humanity without precluding the possibility of encountering “all possible contamination from the sin for which He was dying.”

From here, McIntyre argues that identification “is the consummation of everything that had gone before” and that “there is not one of the previous descriptions of love which

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87 On the Love of God, 181.
88 On the Love of God, 182.
does not find its fulfillment here.” 94 He goes on to relate the other aspects of God’s love to the concept of fulfillment in terms of the “many faceted love of God of which we are here speaking.” 95 Returning to the theme of risk, McIntyre argues, “it is only love of this supreme [multi-faceted] kind which could take this apparently suicidal risk and emerge triumphant. Any lesser love would have been tainted with something of that in which it was being involved, or with which it sought to identify itself.” 96

However, McIntyre is quick to point out that God’s identification with humanity does not end with Christ, “the identification with mankind which took one form in the Incarnation, takes another form in the indwelling Holy Spirit.” 97 In this identification:

The Holy Spirit is the context within which faith is created; by Him we are led to Christ; and in Him do we live… For the more effectively He works, the more clearly do the life and passion and resurrection of Our Lord stand revealed before us, and make their offer to us and their claim upon us. 98

In this way, McIntyre notes the ‘transparency’ of the work of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit does not “add another voice to Scripture, but in fact facilitates the hearing of what scripture has to say. He removes every let and hindrance so that the Word of God may be heard in its own authority addressing us.” 99 McIntyre highlights the function of this transparency when he writes “when we are most in the Spirit, we should be least aware of Him, so attentive have we then become to God’s address to us in His own Word.” 100

This loving identification then is something that is a present reality for people that “On the human side… takes place by means of forgiveness.” 101 This forgiveness is offered freely and universally by the fact that God’s identification with humanity was total and complete. As McIntyre writes:

As Our Lord in His earthly life, death and resurrection made Himself one with humanity at the deepest point of its sorrow and suffering so now in that glorified life He continues that identification wherever need exists in the midst of His brethren. To this identification, there is not limit of race or class or creed. 102

For McIntyre, this forgiveness places an onus on people who have received this forgiveness to offer it to others as freely. This reflexive responsibility to forgive becomes the basis of our “response to Christ and responsibility to our brother.” 103

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96 On the Love of God, 203.
97 On the Love of God, 211.
98 On the Love of God, 215
101 On the Love of God, 221.
102 On the Love of God, 222.
103 On the Love of God, 222.
McIntyre frames this love as response and responsibility within the story at the end of the Gospel of John where Jesus repeatedly asks Peter “Lovest thou me?” and offers the command in response “Love my sheep.” In this passage, McIntyre argues that “There, then, is the character of the supreme response to Jesus Christ—that of love; and there too is the character of the obligation which Jesus Himself lays directly upon us, the moment that we declare that love.”

McIntyre first focuses on the response to Christ. He argues then that the supreme response to Christ is not faith, nor is it the knowledge of God, and that it is not even obedience to God. Instead, it is love. However, this is not just any love. This is the love that God has already demonstrated. As McIntyre writes, “we must say that as through His love God expresses His whole mind, will and heart to us, so through our love to Him do we express most comprehensively our response to Him.” In order to draw this out, McIntyre seeks to put love as a response to God in terms of the love of God that he has already laid out, except this time in reverse order. So, McIntyre commences of a presentation of Love as a response to God in terms of: identification, involvement, community, communication, commitment, and concern.

This recapitulation of the Love of God back on to him in response begins with identification in which baptism and communion become acts of participation on the part of people in the loving acts of identification which have already taken place in Christ. In a similar function to the one described above, this act of identification integrates all other aspects of this love. A loving identification with God is then the beginning of involvement with God from the human side.

Like identification, involvement is something that has been initiated by the love of God. It is highlighted here in terms of creation and redemption. Thus there is a two-fold aspect of this involvement. The aspect of creation reflects the universal involvement of people with God, whereas the involvement in redemption denotes “a more conscious, more explicit involvement on our part in the things of God… living the life for which we were intended when God created us in His own image.”

Thus community is discussed in terms of “our involvement” as “a life lived in fellowship with Him in Christ through His Spirit.”

In regards to love as communication, McIntyre simply states, “God communicates Himself to us in love. We respond to that approach by listening to what He has to say.” For McIntyre the primary act of listing is the reading of scripture. As he concludes: “For the
Christian in earnest about His response to Christ, there can never be any substitute for daily reading and study of the Bible, and no other means by which he may learn what God demands of him.”

In a similar vein, commitment is an act of continuing commitment. This continuing commitment is made up of “decisions and decisions.” There are those decisions of future commitment, baptism etc., and there are those commitments that are made by decisions in “countless situations which we cannot at that moment even imagine.” It is here that McIntyre includes the reflexive aspect of Covenant, in which the love of God as commitment in covenant “kindles love, [and] creates its response, within the fellowship, and in fellowship with Himself.”

This section concludes with the presentation of love in response to God as concern. For McIntyre this love as concern has two major elements. The first is the concept of love as concern that he borrowed from Tillich in the second chapter in which “the believer only truly loves God when God is for him the subject of ultimate concern.” However, in the overall context of his argument McIntyre believes that this idea moves beyond its formal structure and “embodies its proper content in the being of God.” The second element is that of caring that “entails becoming entangled, dependent, obligated.” This stands against an outlook of apathy in which people cannot be bothered to care about anything, even God. This caring love as concern is for McIntyre “an essential part of love for God, [and] is the antithesis of that sort of apathy.” It is the assertion that and the living out of the reality that “God matters profoundly.”

This cumulative love for God in all of its aspects stands against all attempts “to de-personalise this relation.” For McIntyre this danger can be plainly seen in the reduction of this relation to belief, credo, and intellectualism, intelligo. For him, reducing this relation to belief latently holds the possibility “that God becomes a means to his own private ends… that the image of God [of God in worship] becomes the substitute figure for the reality Who is God… [And] a tendency for the believer to invest his own preferences and intention with a sanctity that they do not merit.” For McIntyre, it is “love for God [that] provides the proper

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113 On the Love of God, 234.
114 On the Love of God, 234.
115 On the Love of God, 234.
116 On the Love of God, 236.
117 On the Love of God, 236.
118 On the Love of God, 236.
basis upon which to secure the truly person-to-person character of our response to God, in prayer and worship, in life and deed.”

It is the concern of the believer’s love for God that makes the believer loathe to compromise God’s character in any of these fashions. In a similar fashion the danger of de-personalisation of this relation in intellectualism is refuted by the infusion of love into the intellectual exercise of faith. Mcintyre’s conclusion states this strongly:

> It must be the Christian doctrine of the love of God which is our final theological justification for, or refutation of, the introduction of Aristotelianism, Neo-Platonism, Hegelianism, or Existentialism into the central doctrines of the Christian faith; and it is the criterion by which we judge all the other metaphysical concepts not obviously connected with any system which from time to time we employ to describe the faith to ourselves and others.

It is here that McIntyre concludes his section on love as a response to God and shifts his attention to love as a responsibility to others.

Here McIntyre follows a similar pattern to that followed in the first part of the passage. He seeks to place this love as responsibility to others in relation to the love that God has for humanity. He deems it necessary to order these in reverse order to the aspects of love as he finds them in the love of God. Thus he follows the pattern of discussing this love as responsibility in terms of: identification, involvement, community and communication, commitment, and concern. The specific content of this presentation and its constituent sections is not integral to his overall argument. However, there are three general observations that McIntyre makes that sufficiently make this point in relation to his broader argument.

The first is that love as responsibility to our brother is “integrally bound up” with the love of God. They cannot be separated as they share common content and function. Secondly, McIntyre makes the point that love as responsibility for the other is not equivocally the same as the love of God. For McIntyre to do so is to reduce theology to ethics, which is something that he opposes. Finally, McIntyre argues “the structure implicit in God’s love will provide the means whereby he may detail and specify the responsibilities which bind us to that brother.” Thus this love brings the love of God full circle to be an expression of the love of God as love for God expressed in the love of the other who is beloved by God.

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120 On the Love of God, 237.
121 On the Love of God, 239.
122 On the Love of God, 240.
3. Summary

There is a lot to summarize in this chapter. As a whole, this chapter moves beyond interpretation of McIntyre and offers and evaluation of his overall system, in light of what he proposed in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. What is evident is that there are things missing. McIntyre proposes a certain understanding of God in which imagination is a divine perfection. McIntyre proposes an understanding of creation in which imagination is a theological category. He then proposes that imagination is and should function as a theological category of Christology, the doctrine of the atonement and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. If we accept that the latter three are brought to life in the ‘Shape of’ books, we have to ask about the first two.

While there is some indication that McIntyre had intentions of writing a ‘Shape of Creation’ or equivalent, this does not happen. This leaves not only a gap in the vision laid out in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*, but it also leaves gaps in our understanding of imagination, which is intended to be a highly integrated concept. The problem here is that without a doctrine of creation, the concept of the *imago Dei* is also under-developed. This creates problems because of the role that the *imago Dei*, as a concept, plays in integrating the concept of imagination from God to humanity and creation.

That said, in the examination of the text of *On the Love of God*, there is more to work with when it comes to the topic of a McIntyrian doctrine of God. On the one hand, we have the account of imagination in *Faith, Theology and Imagination*. This provides us not only with McIntyre’s proposed concept, but it also provides us with additional context both from George MacDonald in the germ and with Karl Barth in the development of imagination as a perfection.¹²⁴ On the other hand, *On the Love of God* provides substantial insight into the way and manner that McIntyre thinks about the character and nature of God. As such *On the Love of God* provides a sort of complementary structure to the proposal in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* that would be requisite for any constructive development of a McIntyrian doctrine of God. This leads to the final chapter of this thesis that examines how these structure might work together in order to make constructive progress along these lines, including criteria for evaluating any such attempt.

¹²⁴ To be clear, Barth does not claim imagination as a perfection. McIntyre simply employs Barth’s construction of divine perfections in order to argue the fittingness of imagination as a divine perfection in Barthian terms.
Chapter 7: Imagination and God

At this juncture, we are moving beyond an interpretation of McIntyre and an evaluation of his work. What is being offered is a constructive reading of McIntyre. In this thesis I have argued that imagination is the central theme that allows McIntyre’s theology to be read as a cohesive whole; I have shown how imagination is developed in Faith, Theology and Imagination and the ‘Shape of’ books, and I have indicated what is missing from a full development of McIntyre’s theological system.

What I am arguing now is that by a rigorous development and application of McIntyre’s concept of imagination it is possible to both fill in the gaps of what is missing, in terms of creation and a doctrine of God, and provide additional consistency in language and method across the fields of meaning which McIntyre has already addressed.

1. The Place of Imagination

Looking back to the summary of On the Love of God, it can be seen that McIntyre goes to great lengths to integrate the love of God with and in every area and aspect of theological inquiry. It is the totality of God’s orientation toward humanity and in the totality of human orientation to God. As such, love is not and should not be a concept that can be replaced by imagination or any other concept for that matter. This is, of itself, an imaginative approach to and presentation of the theology of the love of God, but any re-interpretation of this love in terms of imagination would alter this narrative from concern to identification.

What must be understood is the fact this coup is not something that McIntyre has in mind. The goal is not to replace the love of God, but instead to give an account of how it is that God loves. Echoing the sentiment of the Psalmist asking, “Who are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them?” the question becomes why is it that God loves people in the first place? It is in response to this question that McIntyre finds imagination helpful in that if God first imagines himself on the side of people, then it follows that a loving concern for and ultimately a loving identification with people would be the result.

In turn, we can also look back to the summary of Faith, Theology and Imagination. In that summary, there are two accounts of imagination that McIntyre provides. The first is the account along Barthian lines, in which McIntyre makes his initial argument for imagination being a divine perfection. The second is McIntyre’s account of how to understand imagination as a divine perfection in relation to love as a divine perfection.

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1 Ps. 8:4.
This is a point at which I have been critical of McIntyre for a lack of precision in his language. This is an uncommon accusation against him, and it is not one that can be used at many junctures. Unfortunately, at this particular juncture there are aspects of what McIntyre is writing that are unclear. What is clear is that McIntyre is trying to offer an account of imagination as a divine perfection that is very similar to Barth’s treatment of the divine perfections. A key aspect of this understanding of divine perfections that McIntyre holds onto is the Barthian claim that God in his mercy is a “personal God [who] has a heart. He can feel, and be affected.” McIntyre sees imagination as a divine attribute as the way to defend this type of internal affectation. Where it is easy to observe discrepancies from one account to the other in which one perfection initiates another, McIntyre is trying to illustrate not just that God loves but to offer an account of how God loves.

As such, Imagination offers a space in which this feeling and affectation can happen and in which God can be moved to love. McIntyre’s elevation of the concept of imagination then is not a way of diminishing the love of God at all but is instead a way of providing insight into God’s love by seeing it in process and in action.

The function of this distinction finds analogous formulation in Jüngel’s Being Is in Becoming. For Jüngel:

God’s placing of himself in relation (being as event) qualifies God’s act of revelation as love. God acts as the loving one in that he wills to be ours. But since his being as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit God is already ours in advance, then in analogy to God’s relationship ad extra, it must follow from the relation of God’s three modes of being to one another that God acts as the loving one.

McIntyre instead would say that it is imagination that qualifies God’s act of revelation as love. He imagines himself in relation to us according to the love that he has already given both externally to us and internally among the persons of the trinity. Thus imagination replaces what Barth and Jüngel in turn called the ‘primal decision’ of God which is God’s ‘election of grace.’ God’s free imagining of himself on the human side leads to God’s election of humanity, which in turn leads to the continued fulfillment of the imaginative God who further imagines himself in the works of creation, incarnation, salvation, and the sending of the Holy Spirit. Thus the internal and external realities of God’s imagination are manifest.

In short, it is the self-imagining of the Son by the Father that leads to the love of the Son, and the self-imagining of the Spirit by the Father and the Son that leads to the love that they share in emperichoretic union. This same imagining is then made manifest in the sending of the Son and the Spirit to humanity to concretely establish this relation that always

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2 FTI, 47.
3 Eberhard Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 82.
was, in the here and now of time and space. In this way it becomes appropriate to speak of
the Son and the Spirit as the self-imagining of God, even in the acts of incarnation and the
sending of the Holy Spirit. These acts are the imagining (as event) of who God has always
imagined himself to be eternally as Father, Son, and Spirit.

It is this understanding of imagination that provides the framework for moving beyond
a vague notion of imagination as a theological category to a developed doctrine of God in
terms of imagination to a concept that can be worked out further in the areas of theology that
McIntyre addressed: Creation, Christology, Soteriology, and Pneumatology. The tenets and
conditions of this framework can by systematized into the following claims:

i. Imagination in God is primary in God’s being. Thus imagination is the locus and
beginning of all of God’s attributes and perfections including God’s love and God’s
freedom.

ii. Imagination in God is primary in God’s action. Thus imagination in God is the
locus and beginning of God’s loving, God’s creating, the incarnation, God’s act of
salvation, and the sending of the Holy Spirit.

iii. Imagination as the locus and beginning of God’s love as both being and act is the
locus and beginning of God’s concern for, commitment to, communication with,
community among, involvement in, and identification with people, and indeed all of
his creation.

iv. Imagination in people then is the primary expression of the *imago Dei* in them, in
which imagination is a meta-rational concept, which is prior to *ratio*, which is the
locus and beginning of all human knowing. This includes all knowledge about and
knowledge of God.

v. Imagination is the locus and beginning of all human responses to God in which
God’s loving imagination is shared in the ethical engagement of the self with an
other, and in which people love God by means of that love by which he first
imaginatively loved them.

This provides a systematic presentation of what is meant by imagination in McIntyre. If we
are going to read him systematically, we must apply these claims in order to demand
consistency from McIntyre throughout his treatments of creation, Christology, soteriology,
and Pneumatology. These systematized claims offer an understanding of who God is that
first reflects McIntyre’s own understanding of the love of God and secondly outlines how this
imaginative understanding of God’s love serves to inform the formulation of doctrines of
creation, Christology, soteriology and Pneumatology in terms of imagination.

With this synthesis firmly in place, we can return to the concept of imagination as a
theological category and trace it through from its beginning in the being of God through to
other areas concerned with his being and with his mighty acts.
2. Creation

This process begins with Creation. Creation, while not a theme that McIntyre takes up in the ‘Shape of’ books, is the first locus of imagination as a theological category that follows from his defense of imagination as a divine attribute and divine perfection. McIntyre begins his section on creation by first offering an evaluation of the traditional three-fold formula of that doctrine: *Creatio ex nihilo, Creatio per Verbum, and Creatio continua*.

On the one hand, this formula is a correct description of the Christian doctrine of creation. God is said to create out of nothing, if only to eliminate the possibility of an eternal material existence diminishing the eternally pre-existent nature of God, or worse pre-dating an ancient but not eternal God. By saying that God creates out of nothing both of these negative possibilities are eliminated.

God is also said to create by his word. This is largely derivative of the formula in the first account of creation in Genesis 1, where the pattern of “God said, let there be… and there was.” This of course does much to highlight the authority and Lordship of God over all creation in that it comes into existence not by his hard labor, or by the management of the hosts of heaven, but by the words of his mouth. This does however seem to overlook other key points of the texts presenting the work of creation. For instance, in the first account, God rests on the seventh day, an act that seems to suggest that even in creating by the word of his mouth, creation is an act of taxing toil and labor. Similarly, in the second account of creation in Genesis 2, there is the making of Adam out of the dust of the earth and Eve out of the flesh of Adam. If the making of people is meant to be understood as the work of creation, it should be noted that this creation is not described in the same terms of *Creatio per Verbum*. However, this has also been taken up as a way to relate Christ to the work of creation in response to this language being closely associated with the prologue to John’s gospel.

The function of *Creatio Continua* is merely meant to reject any notion that God abandons his creation after his initial work. This later became the position of the Deists, who affirmed that “when [God] first created the world, God left it to its own devices and withdrew into the solitude of his own being.” This came to be represented by the analogy of the watchmaker who makes the clock, winds the clock, and then leaves it because his work is done. *Creatio Continua* rejects this notion by affirming that God continues to be involved in and with his creation and that this aspect of the work of creation is an ongoing process.

For McIntyre it is a true but empty formula, and he cites Barth’s own frustration that “within the sphere of ideas possible to us, *creatio ex nihilo* can appear only as an

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4 *FTI*, 50.
absurdity… We have no analogy on the basis of which the nature and being of God as Creator can be accessible to us."\(^5\) However, McIntyre is not so quick to dismiss the impossibility of finding an analogy. He sees imagination as a way to side-step the formulaic presentation of the doctrine of creation and to reinvigorate it with new verbiage that acknowledges the role that imagination plays in any understanding of creative work. His simple solution is to affirm this in God, claiming, "God's creative action is consummately imaginative."\(^6\)

Once again, the concept of logical priority proves helpful in moving this towards a more systematic account of what McIntyre is proposing and provides a means of supplementing the traditional account of creation rather than by supplanting it. To do so, it must first be said that these aspects of the work of creation (Creatio ex nihilo, Creatio per Verbum, and Creatio continua) are predicated by the imagination of God, the same imagination by which the heart of God is stirred to love. Thus even these vacuous formulae are capable of being seen in a new light.

To simply restate the first formula, it could be said: God imagines all of this out of nothing. Doing so places emphasis on the fact that God imagines all of this. This is the primary statement. The concept of ex nihilo is relegated to a secondary role that only adds wonder to the spectacular uniqueness of this imagining. The all of this is simply a reference to all of the places and instances that we find the beautiful, wondrous, majestic, spectacular, creative, and imaginative in the world around us.

In a similar way, to restate the second formula, it could be said: God creates through the fullness of the imagination of the Triune God. Thus the work of creation is not simply the dictated commands of God on high. It is the ever involved and involving work of God as Father, Son, and Spirit. The authority of God is not diminished in this statement, and the suggestion that the Son as Word is present and active in creation is not abandoned. Instead, the work of God is enriched in an understanding of it as more than just the spoken word or the result of divine procession. It is God speaking, but it is also God forming and molding. It is God speaking, but it is also God creatively, lovingly, and imaginatively engaged in every detail of the glorious creation. It is every scent, texture, sound, taste, and sight; because the fullness of God's imaginative power has been exercised in its making. Additionally, it offers a corrective to what McIntyre identified as a serious oversight, that of the Holy Spirit being widely absent from formulations of the doctrine of creation.

The fact that God continues in this work of creation should then be obvious. To restate this formula, with imagination given its proper place, it could be said: the imagination

\(^5\) FTI, 50.
\(^6\) FTI, 50.
of God is directed towards continual concern for, involvement in, and identification of himself with his creation. In other words, God’s imagination has stirred the heart of God to a loving disposition to all that he has made, because he loved that creation in the first instance before it even came to be. This lovingly concerned involvement in and with his creation takes on a whole new life that is concerned with more than keeping the clock ticking or the world spinning on its axis. The continued work of creation is opened up to the surprising, unexpected, and truly imaginative works of God that culminate in the sending of the Son and Spirit into the world that he made.

There is one further formula that is related to creation that McIntyre does not treat directly in the context of creation, but is equally important to a constructive outworking of his approach to this doctrine. That is the doctrine of the imago Dei. It must be said that in the basic pattern that McIntyre follows, creation is the source of human imagination and that imagination is intended to be the prime aspect of the image of God. This God-given, human capacity for imagination places us in a unique position within the creation as both creatures who are a part of the creation and a creatures, by nature of this capacity, capable of being observers of this creation while still within it. Simply put, by nature of our having an imagination, we are capable of seeing what God has done and appreciating it.

Thus in a unique way the creation was meant for us. That is to say that the creation is not simply meant to provide a suitable environment for our existence, or to provide us with the necessary resources to survive and thrive in it. Instead it was meant for our seeing, our understanding, and our appreciation. We are the observers, spectators, viewers, and connoisseurs of the world around us that God has made. We were meant to see it and appreciate it.

The question then becomes: What were we meant to see? Surely, this must tell us something about the God who created it, who created it as it is, and who created it for our viewing. Surely, this must tell us something about who we are meant to be in this creation, given that we have a unique perspective on what it is we are seeing as imaginative viewers. This is certainly part of the conclusion that McIntyre has in mind when he refers back to Aquinas’ claim that God is known per ea quae facta sunt. That God would be known in his creation is an obvious fact.

Thus it would be absurd to hold to a doctrine that God created an observable world, placed people in it capable of observation, and yet deny that God intended for them to see something. In uncharacteristically impassioned tones McIntyre writes:

This is the kind of God with whom we have to do, who spreads forth beauty in such a lavish profusion. Our long-sustained strictures on natural theology, our almost

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7 FTI, 51.
pathological unwillingness to allow any way from the world around us to the God who created it, have together almost succeeded in killing within us any perception of the character of God as it is revealed in the beauty about us.\footnote{FTI, 51.}

For McIntyre this begins with the task of extricating concerns about natural theology from the formulation of the doctrine of creation.

However, this brings us back to the point about the \textit{imago Dei}. Along with an acknowledgement that knowledge of God is present in the work of creation, there must also be an acknowledgment of the fact that people are indeed capable of seeing and interpreting the creation in just such a light. At a fundamental level, this includes the ability to see God in works of his imagination. This is true whether that is in God’s self-imagination as Son and Spirit or in the act of loving imagination that is creation in all of its beauty and splendor.

If we again place imagination in a place of priority, traditional notions of the aspects of the image of God in people are relegated to secondary, if not tangential roles. If we say that imagination is indeed the content of the image of God, then it is also being said that being made in the image of God is not merely a matter of human intelligence, rationality, or even cognizance. Instead, a simple statement of being made in the image of God could be restated as: God has made us with his imagination, so that we can see him as he intends to be seen by us.

This changes the entire dynamic of what it means to be made in God’s image. To be made in God’s image becomes a matter of God making us in such a way as to be directed toward him. Further, this inclination is not about human ability at all. It is about God’s intention for us, namely to see him as he wants to be seen, or in seeing him as he intends for us to see him.

This change in dynamic has the added benefit of offering an account of being made in the image of God in terms of faculties that can be severely limited. Some people are not intelligent, and that is not and should not ever be a barrier to salvation or our understanding of it. Some people have severe handicaps that limit their ability to process information and make rational decisions. Such limitations are not and should not be understood as barriers to anything that God offers of himself to those he created in his image. Putting the image of God in terms of \textit{intelligo} and \textit{ratio} cannot evade such questions arising. When instead the verbiage of imagination becomes the defining aspect of that image, all people are equally in need of God’s intent to be seen and dependent upon the imagination he has given them.

Recognizing creation in this fuller sense, as an act of imagination, and understanding the human place in the creation as both creature and as those capable of appreciating what
God has for us in creation introduces a whole new realm of possibility for us as imitators of God.

3. Christology

Imagination as a theological category in the field of Christology is something that McIntyre develops more fully in Faith, Theology and Imagination and The Shape of Christology, but there are also very helpful ideas that can be drawn from his earlier work, The Christian Doctrine of History. These together provide a framework for a robust Christology in terms of imagination. This is largely due to the significant role that McIntyre saw the locus of Christology playing in his understanding of God as imaginative. McIntyre wrote in Faith, Theology and Imagination: I know of no better argument for placing imagination at the heart of God’s dealings with us than the single, unique, unpredicted and unpredictable event of the incarnation.9 In many ways, this is the starting point for McIntyre in the process of developing imagination as a theological category.

Thus if one accepts my claims that McIntyre’s concept of imagination must be integrated with and developed into the doctrine of God, there is first and foremost the challenge to relate imagination not only to a theological method but also to the content of theology itself. In the realm of Christology imagination must first and foremost be understood in relation to the incarnation as itself a work of God’s imagination. This idea is a notion that can be found in the scriptural affirmation that Christ “is the image of the invisible God.”10 The incarnation then is the primary way in which God gives an image and an icon of himself. It is the means by which the invisible and eternal God is made visible in time and space. It is the way that God imagines himself. More explicitly, it is the way that God imagines himself in relation to people.

For McIntyre, this is the premise of all Christological inquiry. It supersedes notions of Christological doctrine, including classical definitions of who Christ is, even Chalcedon. Christ incarnate first exists as an outworking of God’s eternal imagination before he can be understood in terms of dual natures and hypostatic union. No category of ontology and no product of experience can ever diminish the incarnation as a supreme expression of God’s imaginative love.

In this way the incarnation is the way that God makes himself known to people. While this is not an idea exclusive to McIntyre, the function of this revelation is distinctly shaped by imagination. For McIntyre, the incarnation is the way that God represents himself to people. It is a divine communication not simply as word and not formed by preconceived

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9 FTI, 55.
10 Col. 1:15.
notions of humanity, but it is instead God himself in a shape and image that can be received and seen. God’s revelation then is removed from the realm of abstraction by the very fact that this revelation is not the revelation of an unknowable God. It is instead God in a knowable form. It is God making himself known in a way that can be known simply and by all people.

In this way, imagination, before it can be understood in terms of human knowing of God, must first be understood in terms of God’s self-imagination in Christ. This self-imagination moves beyond the realm of what Ian Ramsey called “picturing models.”11 This is not simply a matter of Christ being a model of God in miniature. However, it is not simply a matter of what Ramsey terms “a disclosure model,”12 or what Max Black before him termed an “analogue model.”13 That is to say that it moves beyond the isomorphism of Black’s concept of analogy, and it moves beyond being a mere “structural echo,” as Ramsey states it. To put it more plainly Christ must share more with God than a mere similarity or imitation, as is true of an isomorphism; and Christ must be more than the subsequent echo of God’s involvement in the world, as Christ is more directly given that an echo or resonance and is more truly God than this terminology would allow or suggest.

God’s imagining of himself in Christ must transcend all notions of shortcoming that these ideas of imagination and modeling must maintain as merely methodological devices. This imagining, as a self-imagining, maintains a true likeness that is directly due to the will of the one who desires to be imagined. While God may not always be rightly understood from this imagining of himself, this is in no way the fault of God who not only imagines himself in Christ but also is himself in Christ.

This connection between the one who is imagining and the one who is being imagined as being both one and the same and yet distinct creates a link between that which is being imagined and that which is real. This real existence of that which is imagined, in the case of the incarnation, moves beyond any aspect of description that is usually found in concepts of models as a means of imagination. Thus for McIntyre, it must always be “God in Jesus Christ” and no longer “God in his revelation” that is the subject of dogmatics.14

Unfortunately, this level of certainty and the connectedness between what is imagined and the reality which it imagines is something that is not a clearly evident when the self-imagination of God in Christ must in turn be understood by means of imagination as a human faculty. In offering shape to this process of imagining and knowing, one must

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12 Ibid., 4.
14 SOC, 2nd ed., 79.
address three key points. First, there is the source of human imagination. Second, there is the process of human imagination. Third, there is the product of that imagination and imagining.

To address the first point, if one again begins with the doctrine of God in which imagination is a primary category of God’s own existence, which has been formulated above, one must also accept the claim that imagination is the primary way in which the image of God in humanity is manifest by means of imagination. Simply put the source of human imagination is God’s own imagination, and God’s own imagination is present in the image of God with which God imbues humanity as his creation. It is this fact that grounds human imagination in a reality that is beyond that type of speculative imagination that is often disregarded as being a flight of fancy. This faculty of imagination is rooted and grounded in God’s own being and self. In the same way, this faculty of imagination is sanctified and made holy by its source; and it is this sanctification of the imagination that makes it a fit and proper means by which people can know God.

To address the second point, the process by which this imagining and knowing of God takes place can be explained in terms that are both simple and complex. In the first instance, the knowing of a person is infinitely easier than the knowing of God. So, in its most simple form, knowing God in Christ is made possible by God being in the knowable human form with which all people are accustomed. It is this simplicity to which John refers in the first epistle when he writes, “We declare to you what was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, concerning the word of life.”15 Christ here is known in the simple, visible, and tangible life that he lived.

However, this process of knowing God is complicated in two key ways. First, people today do not benefit from this real, tangible and visible existence in the same way that John and his fellow contemporaries did. Secondly, there is the understanding that knowledge of other people is not always so simple.

The first problem is primarily a historical problem. This historical problem of knowing Christ is something that was always an interest of McIntyre’s, and it is this problem that is the primary motivation for his work The Christian Doctrine of History. What is significant in the way that McIntyre understands these problems is that he is not only concerned with the limitations of historical knowledge. In fact, he is quite opposed to an overly skeptical approach to history. Rather than focusing on the challenges of knowing Christ in relation to

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15 1 John 1:1.
distance from the event, the reliability and accuracy of sources, et cetera; McIntyre focuses on the uniqueness of the historicity of Christ as a point, act, and time of fulfillment.

The fact for McIntyre is that the incarnation within a Christian doctrine of history must be understood in terms of fulfillment. While there are aspects of this historical instance that can and should be understood in the same terms as all history and should in turn be approached through the same approaches as all history, there are aspects of the incarnation that are historical in a theological rather than chronological sense. However, this sense of fulfillment should not be limited to an understanding of the incarnation as being the culmination of messianic expectation. This fulfillment is both retrospective and prospective. It fulfills not only the past but also the future. It fulfills what has been promised in the Messiah, in that Jesus is the Messiah; but it also fulfills the perfect will of God to be united with humanity which point to a salvation that supersedes any notion of what was expected of Jesus as Christ. Thus the incarnation must also be understood in terms of: forgiveness, reconciliation, identification, and victory.\(^{16}\)

The second problem is both epistemological and psychological. It raises questions about what it means to know another person and how one can come to know a person in that way; and it raises questions about the human capacity to access the psyche of another person and the ability of a person to disclose their psyche to another person. It is this psychological aspect of personhood that has also been used to highlight the challenges of a contemporary understanding of Chalcedon, thus it is highly consequential within this discussion of Christology.

The third point is related to the product of this imagination and imagining. The point here is an acknowledgment of the limitations and benefits of the conclusions derived from this method. The limitations of this method are rooted in the acknowledgment that as products of imagination the conclusions of this method are limited in their authority and in their normative function. The products of this method are not intended to have authority over the conclusions of other methods or indeed over other products of this same imaginative method. They can still have a normative function, but this normative function is not a matter of authority but instead of continuity and fittingness. These conclusions can have a normative function that influences the outcomes of other explorations and conclusions in theology insofar as they offer a perspective on what is fitting within a broader imaginative context. Conclusions of this sort should not be in opposition to one another but instead should offer constructive and complimentary perspectives that offer collaborative insight into a particular subject or area. In this way the conclusions of even disparate lines

\(^{16}\) CDH, 77.
of imaginative inquiry can shape each other by means of this normative function of imaginative fittingness.

This, I would argue, offers a healthy perspective of humility to the conclusions of all lines of theological inquiry when faced with the supremacy and unfathomable expansiveness of the character and nature of God. However, dwelling on this limitation has its dangers and challenges. It would be easy to be overwhelmed by the fallibility and futility of such exercises. This is where the benefits of the imaginative method are found. By acknowledging the limitations of these conclusions there is an increased acceptance that the conclusions of this method will be limited and that when images are used in exclusion they will eventually prove to be wrong when the analogy eventually breaks down.\textsuperscript{17} The point of the exercise becomes to know God better, even if that knowledge increases only by the smallest of increments. It is freeing to know that all answers do not need to be provided but that the small insight provided by the development and exposition of any image old or new has real and significant impact on human knowledge of God as a whole. It is a holy boldness that dares to know God, despite the impossibility of such a task.

Ultimately, these challenges re-introduce many, though not all, of the difficulty found in knowing the unknowable God. Once again there is both a simple and complex approach to such a question. Jesus’ assertion to his disciples in the upper room discourse is “If you have seen me, you have seen the Father.”\textsuperscript{18} However, how it is that God can be known in, with, by, and through this person is one of the great mysteries of the Christian faith; and the answer is one that has engendered a significant body of speculation and formulation.

By the remoteness of history and by the frailty of human understanding in regards to knowing things in history, the knowable icon of God becomes remote and unknowable once again. However, the fact that God has imagined himself in Christ makes a re-imagining of Christ in the here and now a possible task. This task though must always then be shaped by the limits of imagination by which people come to know God in the icon in whom God intended himself to be known. In this way the theological schizophrenia of the simple and complex are reconciled: this is the way in which we know that when we have seen Christ, we have seen the Father.

\textsuperscript{17}This breakdown is inherent to any approach that incorporates any analogy, because all analogies breakdown at some point. Otherwise, the analogy would be the thing itself and not an analogy of a thing. The very nature of an analogy is that it is not the same thing as that which it is analogous to.

\textsuperscript{18}John 14:9.
4. Soteriology

Imagination as a theological category in the field of soteriology is unique in that, as McIntyre himself observes, “...the use of images, and by implication imagination, is almost universal in accounts of the atonement.” Here, McIntyre is referring to the evocative images of ransom, reconciliation, sacrifice, atonement, propitiation, salvation, redemption, Christus Victor, satisfaction, vicarious penitence, moral example, and revelation. They are imaginative interpretations, as McIntyre might have later termed them, to the problem of how the God-Man saves.

However, to truly understand imagination as a theological category of soteriology, it must first be understood how the work of salvation is an act of God’s imagination. There are three things that must be understood about the field of soteriology and McIntyre’s particular treatment of it: the freedom of God to act, his identification with humanity and for their salvation, and the forgiveness that God offers in that salvation.

First, it should always be understood that salvation is something that God freely chooses to do. This is not something that God must do, needs to do, or is compelled to do. God’s absolute freedom is maintained. This is true from the very earliest treatments of salvation and atonement as a doctrinal subject. For instance, Anselm spends more time defending God’s freedom and reconditioning concepts of necessitas in order to clarify that God is not obligated or bound to this work, even by his own nature and character. This vigorous defense is something that remains a hallmark condition of this field of theology. This is why Barth refers to this as God’s ‘primal decision’, that is a decision not conditioned or predicated by any other decision or act of God. In Jüngel’s terminology it is the first act of God’s becoming in which God becomes the saving God that he always was. God does not make the decision because of his nature and character, but instead God is further defined and confirmed in his nature and character by this decision to save.

Second, for McIntyre, identification is the basis upon which the whole of the doctrine of atonement rests. Without God’s identification with us there would be no atonement and no salvation. For him it is a pervasive notion that bridges the full spectrum of theological models and theological perspectives, and it is a term that recurs frequently and prominently in his thought. It is introduced in The Christian Doctrine of History, finds its fullest development in On The Love of God, it is descriptive of what God is doing in the incarnation and the sending of the Spirit, but it is here in the field of soteriology that it finds its most direct application.

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19 FTI, 56.
20 SOS, 108.
In *Faith, Theology and Imagination* it is a concept that McIntyre only briefly mentions the term in his outline of imagination as a theological category of the atonement. However, it is widely employed in the eventual expansion of this outline in *The Shape of Soteriology*; and it is heavily featured in some of McIntyre's most impassioned passages on the role of love effecting our salvation, in *On the Love of God*.

The basic idea, traditionally located in the language of 2 Corinthians 5:21, is that Christ becomes sin for us, so that “in him we might become the righteousness of God.” McIntyre chooses to focus on the story of Jesus' baptism by John. Here, Jesus chooses to be baptized in order “to fulfill all righteousness” despite John's protestation that instead it is he that is in need of baptism. For McIntyre, in choosing to partake of the baptism of repentance that is offered by John, Jesus is firmly identifying himself with sinners. It is an identification that bookends his ministry by beginning with his baptism and culminating in his death with sinners “outside the gate.” As he concludes in *The Shape of Soteriology*, “Jesus identified himself with the criminals, the rejects, all sinners at the point of their utmost dereliction and distance from God. He bore their griefs; he carried their sorrow; he descended into hell.”

However, identification is never an isolated concept in McIntyre’s thinking. Instead, it is the culmination and fulfillment of all of the other aspects of the love of God: concern, commitment, communication, community, involvement, and identification. In it the concern of God for us has “coalesced” out of the abstract sentiment “in One Who is the God-man.” His communication ceases to be sign and symbol; it ceases to be about meaning and interpretation. Instead, “the word and its meaning, the sign and the symbolised, the event and its significance have all become one” in Jesus Christ and his real, factual act on the cross. The boundaries between God and people being in community are rendered irrelevant by Christ being on our side and one with us. Finally, Christ was so involved “with the sinful nature that He had taken, and with the sorrow and suffering of humanity that He atoned for the one in the profoundest depths of the other.”

As the fulfillment of this profound account of the love of God, the identification of God with us is a profound act of risk and hazard on the part of God, who opens himself up to

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21 2 Cor. 5:21.
23 This is a reference to Heb. 13:12 that McIntyre uses multiple times in this context.
24 *SOS*, 107.
every chance at being misunderstood and rejected. Even to the point, as McIntyre daringly
claims, of Christ taking on our sinful nature. Thus:

His identification with sinners was… so obviously final and complete, that for them
[sinners] the issue was closed. But there is another side to involvement and
identification, to the self-veiling that took place even at the centre of the revelation: is
that it is only love of this supreme kind which could take this apparently suicidal risk
and emerge triumphant.

McIntyre in turn concludes from this total assumption of our sinful human nature and the
totality of Christ’s triumph, despite every hazard, that atonement in this vein cannot be
thought of as limited in any way. It leads him to hope that those previously “placed in what
you might call the dust-bin of damnation are wrongly so regarded.” In terms of an
elect/reject spectrum McIntyre argues that those deemed rejected are still subject to the
terms of elect and reject. It is not an affirmation of universalism, nor can it be rejected on
those grounds. Instead, it is an affirmation that the appeal of the gospel is applicable to the
most reprobate, for there will never be one more damned than Christ in his identification with
us. Limited atonement “prematurely and with insufficient evidence, reconciles the damnation
of so many with not only the love, but also the justice and the judgment of God.”

The third and final aspect of imagination as a theological category in soteriology that
will be examined here is that of forgiveness. It is easily forgotten that the fact that God’s
salvific acts result in our forgiveness is not a given and is instead a surprising and
imaginative act on the part of God. The first part of this surprising work is that God does not
simply offer forgiveness apart from the onerous task of incarnation and the suffering of the
cross. The second is that there is nothing prior to Christ to indicate that this would be God’s
course of action in offering us forgiveness. For McIntyre “wherever and whenever God
offers to men and women his forgiveness… that forgiveness springs from a love that is
costly. At no point say, in the previous history of Israel, could he be conceived of as
forgiving, other than at the cost of that cross” and that it is always a “forgiveness which is
both freely offered to us, and which is costly to God.”

This is the challenge that is posed to formulations within the field of soteriology: that
they are in danger of, when worked to their logical conclusions, making “it appear that
forgiveness on God’s part [is] no longer either necessary or possible.” Either God has

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28 The point here being that Christ must assume our sinful nature in order to redeem us from our sinful
nature. This follows from Gregory of Nazianzus’ maxim of “What has not been assumed has not been
redeemed.” This should not be dismissed as an attempt at being provocative.
29 On the Love of God, 203.
30 SOS, 126.
31 SOS, 127.
32 SOS, 115.
33 FTI, 60.
already done all that is necessary for our salvation by accomplishing what was ‘necessary’,
or in so doing render God incapable of further action for our forgiveness. For McIntyre then
the free act of God’s forgiveness must be defended in such formulations by formulating them
and interpreting them as “as portraying to us, through these [various] images, the way in
which forgiveness works…. how forgiveness is appropriated…. and represent the terms in
which we proclaim the Gospel of salvation by Jesus Christ.”

In this way, imagination also has a role as a theological category in our knowing,
understanding, and experiencing salvation. In terms of knowing and understanding the work
of salvation, it begins with the various models. As has already been discussed at length,
there is the methodological aspect of first formulating models and of relating the models to
one another in a logical field of meaning. In regards to content, it is a matter of seeing the
field as a whole, evaluating the value of each model in their unique and unifying aspects
within that field, and in finding value in both the individual models and in the whole.

However, for McIntyre the introduction of forgiveness introduces an aspect that must
be a component of the field of soteriology as a whole and an aspect of each model.
McIntyre presents these various models as relating to each other in ways that are
complimentary and help each other provide a more diverse nuanced image of what God
accomplishes in our salvation. Forgiveness, however, is the only term of salvation that
escapes this categorization as an aspect of atonement. Instead, forgiveness is the one true
thing that holds all of the images together. Whether God saves, reconciles, ransoms, et al.,
what God certainly does is forgive.

A model without forgiveness fails to be a model of salvation at all, because without
forgiveness there is no possibility of our salvation. The fact remains though that the scope
of forgiveness in light of the models, especially as McIntyre see them in concert with one
another, is vast. Thus:

One of the reasons for emphasising the importance of having all of the ingredients of
the nuclear event which is the death of Christ presented in the description of the
foundation and possibility of forgiveness, is that the different models, in addition to
being components in the event, also lay out the paths which men and women are to
follow to find their way to that forgiveness.

It is this kerygmatic element that for McIntyre has preserved the place and role of images in
the formulation of this doctrine, saved it from “aniconastic thought” and prevented it from
being “conceptualised into ineffectuality.” The point though is that this is the aim of
imagination and the models are not limited to knowing and understanding forgiveness.

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34 *FTI*, 60.
35 *SOS*, 117.
36 *FTI*, 60-61.
The aim and goal, on the human side, is to be led to forgiveness and to receive it. In turn it is through the "means of forgiveness" that the loving identification of God takes place. Thus it is the point of contact between the act of God’s imagining and our imagining of him. It is in this that all of the fruits of forgiveness are made available to us. In being forgiven our “sin is wiped” and “so, too, our guilt.” Thus our encounter with the loving imagination of God in his identification with us is a radical re-orientation of ourselves to God in a forgiveness that can "re-make the past, in the present and for the future." This radical re-orientation results in the “restoration of fellowship with God” that constitutes our freedom to participate in:

…a whole range of sustaining activities—of prayer and worship, of daily committed and obedient discipleship, a continuing sensitivity to the fact that forgiveness has to be constantly sought and acceptance constantly acknowledged, and through all in all, the entreaty that God should provide his Spirit as the only Lord and Giver of life, who will make such discipleship and friendship daily possibilities and realities.

However, forgiveness also calls for an outward imagination “to those about us” in participating in the divine life and work of God by “the mediation of forgiveness.” As such, we are not only offering our forgiveness to those around us for wrongs against us but also offering the forgiveness of God for all of their sins. This in turn requires our own task of imagining, in not only seeing God on our side but in seeing ourselves on his.

5. Pneumatology

The final locus of imagination as a theological category in McIntyre’s presentation is the Holy Spirit. To begin, the function of imagination as a category within the field of Pneumatology follows a similar pattern to that within the field of Christology. In the same way that Christ is the image of the Father and thus his begetting and incarnation are acts of God’s imagination, so to the Holy Spirit is the self-imagination of God in his eternal procession from the Father and the Son and in the sending of the Spirit by the Father and the Son to the church at Pentecost.

This is a claim that finds full expression in McIntyre’s first treatment of Pneumatology in terms of imagination in in Faith, Theology and Imagination, which carries over into The Shape of Pneumatology is that “The Holy Spirit is God’s imagination set loose and working with all the freedom of God in the world, and in the lives, the words and action of the men.

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37 On the Love of God, 221.
38 SOS, 128.
39 SOS, 128.
39 SOS, 128.
40 SOS, 129.
41 SOS, 129.
and women of our time." It is the claim that, in my mind, comes the closest of any theological statement to Jesus' words to Nicodemus “The wind blows where it chooses, and you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit.” It is a claim that encapsulates all of the spontaneity and possibility that characterizes the complex, sporadic, and indeed surprising instances that the Spirit is present and at work.

As has already been noted, what McIntyre has done in terms of methodology is to group and collate an impressively diverse and varied amount of data about the person and role of the Spirit in the scriptural texts and in theological formulation into various moulds and fields of polarity. What remains is to reformulate the function and roles of the Spirit in terms of them being expressions of this divine imagination set loose in the world and in our lives.

The basic frame though that McIntyre provides in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* and the *Sitz em Leben* that significantly influences his definition of imagination as a theological category of Pneumatology is based on two distinct trajectories of contemporary theological formulation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

McIntyre first notes a conservative trajectory of pneumatological considerations along the lines of Barth's two-fold presentation of the Holy Spirit in which the Spirit is both at work in revealing God in the life of believers and is also working in the lives of all to prepare the to receive the gift of salvation as it is “offered to us by a gracious God.” However, McIntyre here offers his own synthesis of these two ideas by saying “…the Holy Spirit is God from [below] meeting God from above, the God from within the sinful heart meeting the [transcendent] God coming down from heaven to be enfleshed, to suffer, to die and to be raised again, for the saving of men and women. When these two meet, salvation is effected.”

The other key expression of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit that McIntyre addresses in *Faith, Theology and Imagination* is the charismatic movement. While McIntyre shares concerns about the charismatic movement, especially in sectarian divisions of its Pentecostal expressions, he is also quite apologetic in his treatment of the movement. For one, McIntyre sees the transcendence of denominational barriers in the charismatic movement, while being controversial, as having a unifying aspect in creating common ground. McIntyre’s apologetic is also informed by a caution in dismissing the work of the Spirit. For him, this is an area that should be approached with wide tolerance. He proposes

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42 *FTI*, 64.
43 John 3:8.
44 *FTI*, 62.
45 *FTI*, 62.
that “the charismatic movement is yet another demonstration of the Spirit’s acting imaginatively” and warns sternly that “We may do well not to fight against the movement lest we be found to find against God himself.”

These two trajectories represent two interpretations of the work of the Spirit that have been set in competition with one another. On the one hand, there is a theologically rich and sacramentally grounded approach that represents the culmination, though not necessarily a final one, of a long tradition of the church informed by classical Trinitarian definitions and the best of the reformed tradition. On the other hand, there are these new and rich expressions that have highlighted the fact that God’s Spirit is present and active in ways that, while surprising and shocking to some, are in fact firmly grounded in the Scriptures, in a place no less foundational than Pentecost, and that open up new perspectives on the relational realities of being indwelt by the Holy Spirit of God.

The challenge that McIntyre undertakes in his multi-faceted approach is that of reconciling the fact that: “What look like two disparate series of phenomena are in reality the different expressions of the one single Person of the Godhead, the Holy Spirit” and arguing further that it is the Spirit “whose characteristic activity, the opus ad extra, to which he is appropriated is imaginative creation in the spirits of believers and of unbelievers in whom he works according to God’s uncovenanted mercies.

On the one hand there are the “traditional loci” and “traditional roles” (if we can call them that) of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is located in the Trinity, is present in the work of the incarnation and in the work of the incarnate Christ, is operative in the outworking of salvation, especially when this goes on to affirm the process of sanctification, and there is an understanding that the Holy Spirit is present in the Sacraments. Additionally, the Holy Spirit is understood to have a role in the interpretation of scripture, an ethical role, and a pastoral role.

On the other hand, there is an emphasis on the role of the Spirit in the mission of the church and in the spirituality of Christians that often ignores, or calls for the radical review and revision of, understandings of the Holy Spirit within the traditional loci.

The fact of course is that for McIntyre the Holy Spirit is present in all of these situations and is active in all of these roles. To say that the Holy Spirit is present in the Eucharist and to say that the Holy Spirit is present in the speaking of tongues is not antithetical. To say that the Holy Spirit is present in the reading and interpretation of scripture and to say that the Holy Spirit is present in one’s cathartic spiritual experience are not opposed. To say that the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity who proceeds from

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46 FTI, 64.
47 FTI, 64.
the Father and the Son, does not preclude that the Holy Spirit in the emperichoretic dance as the go between God. On the contrary, they are mutually integral to any understanding of the Holy Spirit that makes any serious effort at understanding the Holy Spirit as the Spirit is.

It is in the Epiklesis that the Holy Spirit is invoked as the prime agent both sanctifying the bread and wine and in administering it to us by grace. If God is the same yesterday, today, and forever then it should be no surprise that the gift of tongues should persist. If it is “the function of the Spirit not to add another voice to Scripture, but in fact to facilitate the hearing of what Scripture itself has to say,” then is it not also possible that the Spirit can facilitate the hearing of what God has to say in silence and meditation? The church is a place for both confessional affirmation in community and for a real expectation that God will be present in and among his people as he draws us into his divine life by the Spirit.

This is why the relationship between the Holy Spirit and imagination is so important for McIntyre. It serves as the place where God’s self-imagination and our imaginative reception of him connect. Here the Holy Spirit is both present in the imaginative act of loving identification and also “stimulates, controls, and confirms the imagination in the part that it plays in the Christian life.” It is this extreme proximity that leads McIntyre to write that,

Both the naturalisation of God and the deification of man are live possibilities in a situation in which God and man come so close to one another as they do in the presence of God with us in and through His Holy Spirit. It is, then, no exaggeration to say that only this God could escape those contrasting perils. So assuredly is He other than man, so completely his Creator, so unequivocally his Redeemer; so unalterable are the ultimate relations that hold between God and man; that when God elects in His own freedom to cross over to man’s side and complete the work begun in the whole Incarnation, and identifies Himself with us in His Spirit, there is never any suggestion that this identification in any way nullifies any of the original relations. In fact, it establishes them and secures them, and brings them home to us, with finality and decisiveness.

It is then the this convergence of proximity that in turn allows the imaginatively present Spirit to be both an expression of divine love and to “regulate what otherwise might become fantasy or extravagance.”

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48 This is a phrase by John Taylor in his book *The Go Between God* that McIntyre uses at length to discuss contemporary implications of *emperichoresis*.


51 *SOP*, 271.


53 *SOP*, 271. It should also be noted that critics of imagination as a faculty in this regard, might see this possibility of fantasy as a reason to abandon imagination as an appropriate term. However, as McIntyre points out here and elsewhere, to speak of knowing God by reason, intelligence, rationality, or any other faculty of cognitive function is equally susceptible to error and folly. In either case, it is the Spirit who redirects our attention and serves as a corrective to our misguided notions.
It is the Holy Spirit who mediates the historical nature of faith, in that it happens historically and happens in terms of history and fulfillment, and yet it is meant to be known and experienced personally. It is imagination that enables us “to transcend our rootedness in time.” It is what allows us to be present in and enter into the events of the mighty acts of God in and among his people Israel; it is what allow is to walk alongside Jesus in his life and ministry; it is what allows us to join in the early uncertain days of the early church; and it is what allows our own experiences of faith to not be relegated to the past of our remembering but to act as ever present reminders of God’s presence in and with us.

Finally, it is the Holy Spirit who “uses the imagination to create space, that is space for ourselves, for each one of us.” It is a space that we need in the midst of a busy, taxing, and often worry filled world. It is a space that is carved out to allow us silence in which to be and become who God wants us to be. It is the space of spiritual experience, the space of meditation from which the walls of the world fall away. It is the presence of the Spirit in this place that fills our human experiences of wonder, serenity, and vulnerability with the very presence of God.

Ultimately, for McIntyre these are not just aspects of who the Holy Spirit is and functions of what the Holy Spirit does. They are parts of a whole that must be viewed, accepted, and indeed believed together. Any omission of any of these parts diminishes our understanding of the Spirit and is a rejection of how God has imagined himself in the Spirit and his work. Any doctrine of the Spirit that can affirm with enthusiasm the presence of God in the sacrament but precludes any possibility of God’s presence through charismatic experience does not understand the Spirit through whom they are partakers of Christ. However, an equally cautionary note is that any understanding of the Holy Spirit that celebrates charismatic experience but denies that God is and always has been present in the church throughout history in the sacraments slights the faithfulness of God to be present ever and always, not just in moments of ecstatic awareness.

Our imagination of the Spirit must take all aspects of the work of the Spirit into account. For McIntyre, the frontier of this imaginative task is what he calls God’s “uncovenanted mercies.” It is a term often used in terms of the Christians hopeful longing for the salvation of the world outside of the church and outside of our understanding of the New Covenant made in Christ. However, McIntyre, cleverly, uses this in a broader sense to incorporate and affirm the experience of the Spirit in the charismatic movement. The aim being that in affirming and confessing our unknowing, that is in acknowledging the fact that God is capable of acting and indeed does act in ways that we do not understand and do not

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54 SOP, 274.
55 SOP, 275.
fit our theological schema, we can find a way of accepting the full expression of the imagination of God in the Spirit that is more than capable of encompassing all of our sisters and brothers along with it.

6. Summary

In summation, what separates McIntyre from his contemporaries in the realm of models and their implementation is that he both removes any connotative notion of their having any particular theological value in and of themselves in order to render them a purely methodological device and in turn uses them as a placeholder for the concept of imagination in his own writing. This allows imagination to take a prominent place in his thought not merely as a methodological device and to instead to be a category of the theological content that he addresses.

As such, McIntyre’s concept of imagination is not, cannot, and should not be understood strictly in terms of method. That is the function of models. Imagination transcends its epistemological function and becomes located in the content of theology itself.

While McIntyre does not always apply this concept consistently his elevation of the prominence of imagination into the very existence of God dictates that imagination must have a logically primary position in order to have the influence that McIntyre claims for it, even if he is sometimes hesitant to do so himself.

By placing this concept of imagination in relation to McIntyre’s concept of the love of God, we are able to synthesize a position that allows McIntyre’s concept of imagination to function in a way that is reflective of the prominent position that McIntyre claims for it. This in turn has a profound impact on the place the imagination has and the way that it operates as a category of theological fields across the frontier of theological inquiry.

If it is indeed God’s own imagination that stirs his heart to love both within himself in the intra-Trinitarian relations of the persons and in his love and loving acts ad extra then it follows that all of who God is and what God will be are marked by this imagination in the same way that the love of God pervades all of God’s being and action. Thus the work of God’s loving imagination must be seen in the work and act of creation, and creation must be understood both in terms of the love that is exemplified in the caring act of creation and in terms of the immense imagination that brings it to life. The incarnation becomes not merely an act of becoming flesh or of revelation but a profound act of God’s self-imagination and an act of pure love in God’s identification with us in this act of imagining himself with us and for our salvation.

Perhaps this loving self-imagination is epitomized in the absolute freedom of God to become all things to us and for us in the unencumbered work of the Holy Spirit, who is both
grace and the presence of Christ in the sacraments and the full expression of the charismata, the gracious gift of God himself in the lives of his people. These are graces that are beyond our expectation, beyond our explanation, and beyond our understanding of God who remains absolutely free in the fullness of God’s imagination above and beyond all that we ask or think.

This is the overall impact of imagination i. becoming a category of theology ii. being rooted in the doctrine of God through a synthesis of McIntyre’s claims iii. being formulated into a systematic set of criteria iv. applied consistently in the fields of creation, Christology, soteriology, and Pneumatology. Each of these fields are expanded by the facts that it is God’s own limitless imagination that is present, active and at work in them; and they are each seen in a new light as we see what God intends for us to see in them.

McIntyre earns the distinction of being the first, and to date, only theologian to formulate imagination as a divine perfection. In this, McIntyre emerges as an innovator in a tradition of thought that includes Kant, Novalis, Schelling, and George MacDonald. Not only does he claim a place in the development of the concept of imagination, but he also formulates a manner of applying that across the full spectrum of theological fields. The insight and filter provided by the lens of the imagination allows him to hold an open view of Christology that is both inviting of and provides a foundation for further Christological formulation. He has laid academic and theological foundations for Pentecostal and Charismatic expressions of the Holy Spirit to interact with and be mutually incorporated with traditional, sacramental understandings of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the church. He has demonstrated to a generation of students the systematic compatibility and integration of soteriological models in a field long dominated by a mode of mutual exclusion.

This provides opportunities for significant growth from a McIntyrian theological perspective. McIntyre’s contributions to Christology could prove increasingly helpful as additional pressure is placed on the Chalcedonian definition by contemporary and alternative Christology. It is hard to imagine that his work on the Holy Spirit will not be a necessary ally if liturgical and sacramental churches are going to fully embrace the Spirit-filled worship he always hoped they would have. It is possible to see McIntyre’s system as the basis for further developing other soteriological models and bringing them into the broader thought, life and worship of the church. McIntyre was always hopeful that new theological expressions would find their way into the heart of the church from outside of the traditional hubs of doctrine.

The main contribution in all of this is his work on the imagination. His work on Christology, soteriology, and pneumatology are all dependent on it; his work on history and the Love of God must be understood in light of it. While there are many lines of thought that
merit additional thought and pursuit, imagination is the one thing that opens up all of these
times. The first step in that process is going to be an in depth exploration of the implications
of an understanding of God that includes imagination as a divine perfection. The second
step is going to be determining where such a system would and should fit within the broader
context of the field of systematic and dogmatic theology. Further work on the doctrine of
creation and an explicit treatment of the *imago Dei* could prove helpful in shedding light on
what that might look like. This might mean an adaptation of existing systems, for instance
exploring how McIntyre’s imagination as perfection might fit into the multi-layered structure
of Barth’s account of the perfections. It might mean developing the idea as a separate
model in order to offer fresh insight and outside perspective. The lack of work done thus far,
means that the field is wide open.

The beauty of this system and this idea is that it is rooted in God’s imagination and
not our own. Imagination begins with God, and it ends with God. “For now we see in a
mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will know fully,
even as I have been fully known.”

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56 1 Cor. 13:12
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