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Abstract

This thesis examines the most powerful constructions of Soviet nuclear identity at three stages of nuclear decision-making (acquisition, the arms race, disarmament) throughout the course of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States from 1941 until 1991. Most importantly, it elaborates on the significance of this identity to the enactment and justification of Soviet nuclear policy from Joseph Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev. Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War was broadly attributed in the International Relations (IR) literature to security/deterrence concerns, the Soviet desire for ideological and military superiority over the US, and the psychology of the Soviet leaders. By adopting a poststructuralist gender-mindful identity-focused approach, this thesis explores not why these nuclear policies were enacted, but how they were made possible seeing nuclear identity as both constitutive of and a product of policy. This direction of inquiry has been traditionally overlooked within the literature on nuclear proliferation but can be utilised to answer important unanswered questions.

Through analysis of the official speeches, notes, private conversations, press releases, and autobiographical reflections of Soviet leaders, this thesis demonstrates that representations of identity mattered when it came to nuclear policy in the Soviet Union. First, it argues that the articulation of an aggressive, competitive, and hyper-masculine superpower identity grounded in the strength of the military-industrial complex was interlinked with nuclear weapons acquisition and with the politics of a rapid nuclear build-up. However, the evolution of Soviet nuclear identity enabled a different course of policy, moving from the rapid arms race to the most significant arms reduction in history under the leadership of Gorbachev in the late-1980s. Consequently, the second argument is that the continuous construction and reinforcement of a cooperative, ethical, and paternalistic nuclear identity grounded in human security and total nuclear abolition eventually made disarmament possible. In exploring various nuclear identity constructions in the Soviet Union over time, this thesis makes a significant contribution to ideational IR scholarship on nuclear proliferation as well as to the poststructuralist identity/policy literature and feminist IR studies. It deepens our comprehension of the Soviet case, with implications for
understanding nuclear states’ behaviour and the possible directions for achieving disarmament.
Lay Summary
This thesis explores decisions regarding nuclear weapons made by the Soviet Union’s government during the Cold War from 1941 until 1991. It does so by looking at how the Soviet leaders related themselves to being in possession of nuclear weapons through the process that is described as ‘nuclear identity construction’. Traditionally, nuclear policy in the Soviet Union was understood as a power-maximising practice and as a response to security threats posed by nuclear weapons in the United States. However, these explanations do not tell us the whole story. This thesis argues that the meaning of nuclear identity is determined by how leaders talk about their opponents in relation to themselves in the context of nuclear policy. It is through the way that they talk about themselves and nuclear weapons that nuclear policy comes into being.

This thesis uses what is known as ‘discourse analysis’, which looks at how people give meaning to things through their use of written and spoken language. It analyses Soviet leaders’ speeches, documents, notes, memoirs, and conversations to explore the specific structures of their language. This analysis examines three time periods when the most important Soviet nuclear decisions were made, namely, the decision to develop the first Soviet nuclear weapon in the 1940s; the decision to compete with the US by continuously improving and building more weapons from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s; and the decision to reduce the number of weapons in the late-1980s.

The analysis reveals that Soviet nuclear identity and nuclear policy were deeply interconnected throughout all three time periods analysed. This helps us to make sense of nuclear decisions that the USSR leaders made and how they made them. I argue that when Soviet nuclear identity emerged as competitive, aggressively masculine and grounded in military strength and power, it enabled the acquisition of nuclear weapons and a dangerous nuclear competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, changes in the direction of policy may occur as seen from the continuous arms reductions in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Thus, my second argument posits that when nuclear identity was constructed and reinforced as cooperative, peaceful, and grounded in protecting human life and abandoning nuclear ambitions, it enabled disarmament and arms control. As such, this thesis emphasises that change in how state leaders view the usefulness of nuclear weapons is possible and worth pursuing if we are serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Even though a nuclear weapon has not been detonated since 1945 and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis may now be considered ancient history to the young generation, nuclear weapons possession remains as one of the most serious security issues that the world is facing. Despite the tremendous efforts of anti-nuclear activists, academics, nuclear experts, international organisations such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and some state leaders, nuclear weapons are still here in quantities that would annihilate the whole civilization within seconds. At this very moment, Russia has 1,572 deployed strategic nuclear warheads (Kristensen and Korda, 2020: NP). Perhaps, they are there to protect the Russians from whoever dares to attack their land. But when accompanied by the president Vladimir Putin’s statements such as:

We are in the unique situation in our contemporary history in which they’re [the US] trying to catch up with us […] Our equipment must be better than the world’s best if we want to come out as the winners. This is not a game of chess where we can sometimes accept a tie (Putin, 2019),

and by actions such as the withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 by Russia and the US, then the events of the Cold War and the dangerous arms race between the Soviet Union and the US become more than just ‘ancient history’. It is history that we can learn from now, because the Soviet Union’s Cold War rivalries seem to remain in modern day Russia, as seen from Putin’s statement. If nuclear weapons remain a serious threat to humanity, then we need to learn how we got here not just in terms of the number of warheads, but in terms of the embedded understandings about Russia’s nuclear Self. International Relations (IR) literature on nuclear proliferation may provide some answers.¹

The ‘nuclear proliferation puzzle’ refers to the theoretical scholarly debate over how nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation can be explained and whether future proliferation can be predicted (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 43). According to Ogilvie-White (1996: 43), there is much confusion within existing literature on nuclear proliferation.

¹ Throughout the thesis I use capital letters to distinguish between International Relation (IR) and History as academic disciplines and international relations and history as subject matters.
First, the concept of ‘nuclear proliferation’ is not always adequately defined. Second, the literature does not always make it clear which aspect of nuclear proliferation (e.g. causes, effects or future predictions) is being addressed. Finally, the secrecy surrounding the subject of nuclear proliferation and scarcity of official documents leads to difficulties with establishing and, most importantly, accessing reliable evidence (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 43). When reliable information is difficult to obtain due to the limited number of cases of nuclear proliferation and secrecy “strategic concepts and heuristics developed by political scientists can become even more influential than would normally be the case” (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 44).

To avoid any issues with definitions, it is worth clarifying concepts relevant to this thesis before continuing. The term ‘proliferation’ in the context of nuclear weapons is not understood in its traditional non-nuclear sense as a rapid multiplication or increase, rather it is a process of acquisition, spread, and numerical expansion of nuclear stockpiles. In this sense, non-proliferation can be defined as refusal to acquire and the prevention of spread of nuclear weapons. Disarmament here is understood as numerical decrease in the number of nuclear weapons. Expansion of stockpiles by states that already possess nuclear weapons is referred to as vertical proliferation, the spread of nuclear weapons to other states - as horizontal proliferation (Gusterson, 1999: 114).

For many decades, the issues of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation in IR literature were understood through a materialist lens, predominantly neorealism and neoliberalism. The focus on security, rational deterrence, states’ power-maximising practices, and bureaucratic politics dominated thinking about nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union during the Cold War (see e.g. Berman and Baker, 1982; Cockburn, 1983; Jervis, 1978; 1982-83; Waltz, 1979; 1981). The collapse of the Soviet Union and a halt to the USSR-US arms race in 1991 raised questions about materialist understandings of states’ nuclear behaviour and opened up space for more critical IR paradigms to explore this issue and to take it beyond objectivist, positivist nature of rationalist approaches (Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2010: 2).² It is worth noting, however, that some non-positivist work has been done before the end of the Cold War.

² Throughout the thesis, ‘rationalist’ refers to the theoretical IR approaches that emphasise material power considerations over ideational factors, namely neorealism and neoliberalism.
(see e.g. Cohn, 1987), but it was often marginalized in journals that were not frequented by security scholars (Rublee and Cohen, 2018: 318).

The proliferation of research on the subject of nuclear politics since the mid-1990s until the present day seems to indicate that IR scholars moved away from conventional understandings of states’ motivations regarding nuclear weapons with many ideational factors coming to the forefront of their research. These include psychology of state leaders (see e.g. Hymans, 2006b), international norms (see e.g. Rublee, 2009, Tannenwald, 2007), beliefs (see e.g. Biswas, 2014), and identities. Among all factors, identity-focused approaches took centre stage in the ideational scholarship on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation (see e.g. Ballbach, 2016; Das, 2010; Duncanson and Eschle, 2008; Singh, 2006; Ritchie, 2008; 2010). This theoretically and empirically rich work has largely advanced our understanding of why and how states proliferate or forgo nuclear weapons acquisition, emphasising that if we are serious about achieving total disarmament, we must first understand how states’ identity constructions are embedded in their decisions regarding nuclear weapons.

In particular, poststructuralist and feminist IR approaches provide an in-depth understanding of *how we got here* in terms of states’ conceptions of Self and nuclear weapons. These scholars emphasise the centrality of discourse to the issues of nuclear proliferation. Notably, feminist approaches demonstrate that state leaders’ discourse about nuclear weapons is deeply gendered (see e.g. Cohn, 1987; Cohn et al., 2005; Duncanson and Eschle, 2008). They criticise rationalism for being gender-blind and overlooking the fact that powerful ideas about gender shape all aspects of states’ nuclear policy. In this sense, states can be seen to continuously attach masculine attributes to the possession of nuclear weapons, and within gendered hierarchies the more ‘masculine’ side is traditionally privileged over the more ‘feminine’ side (Cohn et al., 2005: 4). Understanding and deconstructing these hierarchies can help us progress towards disarmament. Poststructuralist approaches also emphasise that identities are hierarchical, whereby states construct the Self that is juxtaposed to the threatening external Other. As such, nuclear weapons proliferation becomes legitimate and necessary to protect the Self (Ballbach, 2016: 410). Both feminist and poststructuralist approaches are equipped to shed light on the blind spots left by rationalist scholars
and to uncover crucial aspects of how state identity constructions enable nuclear policy. Nevertheless, one state that we do not know much about when it comes to the relationship between identity constructions and nuclear policy is the USSR.

Much has been written in the IR literature about the fierce nuclear competition that took place between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War nearly bringing the world to the brink of a nuclear war. However, our understanding about the biggest proliferator of nuclear weapons remains rooted in rationalist paradigms, namely neorealism and the domestic politics approach. While these theoretical approaches offer an invaluable contribution, they do not provide us with the whole picture of what exactly happened in the Soviet Union. How did the Soviets make a decision to build the bomb? How did they end up with 45 000 nuclear warheads in 1986? How did they manage to significantly reduce this number?

Some answers are provided if we turn to the contributions of historians. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a great deal of documentation related to the Soviet nuclear project and the Cold War became declassified and available to public. Historical accounts capture evidence that was previously unavailable such as personal reflections of USSR’s leaders, notes from secret meetings, personal reflections of high-ranked Soviet military officials and nuclear scientists working on the Soviet nuclear project. This evidence demonstrates that Soviet decision-making during the Cold War was not always rational. For example, Holloway (1994: 365) argues that Soviet nuclear policy during the rule of Joseph Stalin was incredibly emotional and reflected not only Stalin’s “malevolent and suspicious” personality, but also a deep-rooted consciousness of backwardness vis-à-vis the West. In a related vein, Craig and Radchenko, (2018) attribute Nikita Khrushchev’s aggressive nuclear policy to his desire to be recognised as an equal by the US. Thus, History makes it clear that ideas, beliefs, and identities had an important role to play in Soviet nuclear policy-making. While identity-focused IR approaches to nuclear proliferation deepen our understanding of other cases of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation, they commonly overlook the case of the Soviet Union. It is this gap in identity-focused ideational literature on nuclear proliferation that this thesis takes as its stating point.
Why is it important to explore the connection between identity and Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War? First, because we live and will continue to live for a while with consequences of the decisions made during this turbulent period of our history and evidently there is more to Soviet nuclear policy than rational deterrence and security calculations. Second, it is important, because the Soviets went from stockpiling thousands of warheads beyond retaliatory capability to advocating global disarmament and rapidly reducing their nuclear stockpiles. This represents a crucial moment in nuclear history that we need to understand if we are to achieve change now. Third, rationalist explanations are self-fulfilling – if states have to arm in order to defend themselves, then we are stuck in never ending security dilemmas. If identity is important, it means the world can be different. Finally, there is an element of an academic curiosity. IR as a predominantly Western discipline tended to focus on the behaviour of the United States during the Cold War even in its more critical post-positivist studies (see e.g. Campbell, 1992). There is thus a space to fill in our knowledge of the ‘other side’ of Cold War identity politics.

Objectives, Arguments, and Approach of the Thesis

The main objective of this thesis is to explore the connection between identity constructions and Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War and to inform upon the significance of this identity to the making of Soviet nuclear decisions. An important aspect of studying and understanding identity is the realisation that shared meanings and intersubjective structures can shape international relations and objects of security just as much as material interests (Fierke, 2007: 56). Looking at the objects of security through the ‘identity lens’ allows to see them as being produced through a dynamic process rather than just being static: “The question then changes from one of who or what the referent object of security is, to how security identities are constructed” (Fierke, 2007: 99). Therefore, principally this thesis asks: ‘how was identity at the heart of Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons policy?’

This thesis is broadly situated within the body of ideational identity-focused IR research on nuclear proliferation discussed above to which it seeks to contribute. More specifically, it is situated at the intersection of two groups of overlapping identity-focused literatures. The first group is the body of poststructuralist research on
identity and policy, from which this thesis draws its theoretical understanding of identity as relationally constituted within policy discourses and performatively enacted through policy, and from which thesis derives its methodological approach and methods. Poststructuralism-informed approaches have been largely underrepresented in the ideational literature on nuclear proliferation. However, a handful of studies add a wealth of detail with regards to the mutually-constitutive relationship between identity constructions and nuclear policy. In order to provide a more focused account of Soviet identity and nuclear policy, this thesis adopts and elaborates upon Ballbach’s (2016) concept of a ‘nuclear state identity’ defining it as encompassing political elites’ beliefs in the historical connection between power, recognition, and nuclear weapons and as representing how elites perceive their state as a power in light of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. The second group of literature is the body of feminist IR research on nuclear proliferation and disarmament. Their contributions have been significant in drawing attention to how ideas about gender shape all aspects of how nuclear weapons are perceived and addressed by states and how the status of a nuclear power is constructed as a particularly masculine status. As such, a nuclear state identity is also conceptualised as masculine.

On the basis of these literatures and the gaps in the IR research on Soviet nuclear policy outlined above, this thesis seeks to answer three research questions:

1. How did the Soviet elites construct Soviet nuclear identity?
2. How did Soviet nuclear identity evolve over time?
3. How did nuclear identity constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions possible?

To answer these questions, this thesis draws on a poststructuralist discourse analysis, which it applies to the official Soviet elite discourse on nuclear weapons and non-official sources such as personal notes, private conversations between high-ranked Soviet officials, and personal written accounts of those directly involved in Soviet nuclear project. It also draws from a large number of secondary sources in order to situate Soviet nuclear identity and policy in broader historical and social contexts. This thesis focuses on three time periods when the most significant nuclear decisions in the
USSR were made. These are: the period of nuclear weapons acquisition (1941-1949); the period of the arms race or rapid vertical nuclear proliferation (1953-1964); and the period of détente and disarmament (1964-1991). At relevant moments, this thesis also consults texts from the main Soviet Cold War rival – the United States – in order to illustrate that nuclear identity constructions were not unique to the Soviet Union, which helps us to see the Cold War as not just the battle of material capabilities, but a battle of nuclear identities.

This thesis demonstrates that nuclear identity considerations were to a large extent at the heart of Soviet nuclear policy. It argues that when a nuclear identity emerges as competitive, hyper-masculine, and constituted in juxtaposition to the very radical external Other, it enables and necessitates nuclear weapons acquisition and the politics of aggressive nuclear armament. The simultaneous construction of moral superiority and responsibility to ‘save’ the world from the danger posed by the Other’s nuclear weapons further legitimises nuclear acquisition and the arms race, making it unquestionable and silencing competing discourses. When these constructions become dominant and stable, they preclude the possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control and disarmament. This thesis then argues that when nuclear identity constructions evolve to cooperative, paternalistic, peaceful, and constructed in relation to the Other that is still different, but no longer dangerous and threatening, it enables change in the direction of nuclear policy making disarmament desirable. It also argues that the simultaneous construction of ethics and responsibility to get rid of ALL nuclear weapons adds legitimacy to the politics of disarmament. However, this thesis cautions that despite the potential for change, powerful ideas of masculinity do not disappear from the way states perceive nuclear weapons and more needs to be done to devalue them.

By answering the three research questions outlined above this thesis makes several contributions to the field: first, it makes an empirical contribution by taking our understanding of the Soviet case beyond rationalist IR approaches to nuclear proliferation and by re-emphasising the significance of identity constructions to states’ nuclear policy; second, it makes a theoretical contribution to poststructuralist research on identity/policy nexus by expanding our application of poststructuralism to nuclear
identity and policy and by fleshing out the lesser known case; and third, it contributes to feminist IR scholarship on nuclear proliferation by exposing the gendered nature of Soviet nuclear discourse and demonstrating that the link between ideas about masculinity and the possession of nuclear weapons is prone to change and destabilisation.

Before continuing, I should clarify that this thesis presents an interrogation and critique of the rationalist approaches to Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War through its adoption of a poststructuralist, gender-mindful, and interpretive approach. While it intervenes at the level of the way nuclear weapons are talked about, it does not seek to advocate a particular policy solution. However, my own posture is antinuclear, and I am sympathetic with the feminist IR cause and the position of those who continue to struggle against the existence of nuclear weapons and to campaign for nuclear weapons abolition. Thus, what this thesis does advocate is that identities and nuclear policies are not fixed and are susceptible to change over time and space.

Structure of the Text

This thesis is organised into eight chapters, of which this introduction is the first. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 engage with rationale, theoretical framework and methodological considerations employed in this research. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 discuss the empirical evidence derived from the analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons discourse. Finally, Chapter 8 focuses on the conclusions that can be drawn from the discussion of Soviet nuclear identity and policy in empirical chapters and the implications of the findings for IR studies of nuclear proliferation and for the future research. The more detailed content of each chapter is outlined below.

The next chapter, Chapter 2, situates this thesis in the existing IR literature on nuclear proliferation. It discusses the key contributions to our understanding of nuclear policy in the Soviet Union that are rooted in neorealism and the domestic politics approach and elaborates upon the existing gaps in this body of research thus fleshing out the broad rationale of this thesis. Next, it focuses on the contributions of ideational identity-focused approaches to our knowledge of nuclear proliferation and restraint emphasising the significance of poststructuralist and feminist IR accounts to
understanding the close connection between identity constructions and policy. This chapter also discusses in greater detail the historical accounts of Soviet nuclear policy arguing that IR scholars have much to learn from their detailed examination of the Soviet case and the role that non-rational factors such as ideas and beliefs played in Soviet nuclear policy-making. It concludes by highlighting the utility of adopting a poststructuralist gender-mindful approach to achieve the main objectives of this thesis.

Chapter 3 delves into the poststructuralist gender-mindful theoretical framework through which this thesis seeks to explore the connection between identity and Soviet nuclear policy. Drawing from poststructuralism-informed understanding of identity, it discusses the implications of conceptualising identity as articulated through foreign policy discourses and constituted in relation to one or multiple Others. It also emphasises the understanding of identity central to this thesis as both a constitutive and a product of nuclear policy, and the importance of being analytically open to the more ambiguous ways, in which states may construct their identity and policy through the articulation of various Others along the three dimensions: spatial, temporal, and ethical. The chapter further highlights the relevance of incorporating a gender lens into the analysis in order to flesh out how identities in nuclear weapons discourse are constructed in hierarchical difference with the privileged masculine traits being traditionally attributed to the possession of nuclear weaponry. Finally, it clarifies the concept of ‘a nuclear identity’ conceptualising it as discursive, relational, and masculine.

Chapter 4 introduces the methodology and methods employed to achieve the objectives of this thesis. First, it elaborates on the significance of the concept of ‘discourse’ to poststructuralist research introduced in Chapter 3 arguing that nuclear policy is a discursive practice. Drawing principally on Lene Hansen’s (2006) poststructuralist discourse theory, it discusses the implications of adopting discursive ontology and non-causal epistemology highlighting the significance of language and the performative-constitutive relationship between identity and policy. On this basis, it develops an interpretive strategy that informs the analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons discourse. Finally, it discusses the practicalities of poststructuralist discourse analysis.
focusing on the process of selecting texts, applying the analysis to them, and important issues of reliability, validity, and generalisability.

Chapter 5 begins the empirical analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions focusing on the period of nuclear weapons acquisition under the rule of Joseph Stalin from the early 1940s until the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949. It explains that Soviet nuclear identity emerged within the dominant Soviet ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse four years before the first nuclear test. The chapter introduces the three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity that emerged from the analysis of relevant texts: competition, masculinity, and peacekeeping. It argues that when a nuclear identity is constructed as competitive, hyper-masculine, and threatened by the radical external Other, it enables and necessitates nuclear weapons acquisition. In addition, when this nuclear identity is simultaneously constructed as peace-loving, moral, and responsible, it adds legitimacy and necessity to the acquisition.

Chapter 6 continues to explore Soviet nuclear identity constructions focusing on Nikita Khrushchev’s rapid arms race between the USSR and the US from 1953 until 1964. It examines how the three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity established in Chapter 5 manifested themselves during this time period and notes that as the Soviets started to move forward in the competition with the US, their nuclear identity transitioned into an aggressively macho superpower identity. The chapter argues that these constructions enabled some of the most dangerous and bizarre events of the Cold War such as the testing of the militarily useless ‘Tsar’ Bomba’ and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It also argues that the existence of these constructions and the continuous aggressive ‘Othering’ of the US made the achievement of an arms control agreement difficult, if not impossible despite the Soviets simultaneously reinforcing the peace-loving dimension of their nuclear identity.

Chapter 7 focuses on the transition from Khrushchev’s arms race to the period of détente and disarmament under the leaderships of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1985) and Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991). It reveals that during Brezhnev’s rule Soviet nuclear identity constructions were particularly contradictory, because on the one hand it became less aggressive and competitive, yet, on the other hand, the Soviets continued
to arm at an ever more rapid pace. The chapter follows the complete transformation of Soviet nuclear identity from competitive to cooperative and from hyper-masculine to paternalistic grounded in human security and in the idea of being a global leader of disarmament. It also reveals that the Soviet external Other – the US – was no longer constructed as a radical aggressive Other, rather it was portrayed as non-progressive due to its negative response to disarmament proposals. As such, this chapter argues that the constructions of cooperative, peace-loving, paternalistic, and responsible nuclear identity acting in pursuit of human security and global disarmament enabled the change in the direction of Soviet nuclear policy.

The final chapter, Chapter 8, summarises the findings of the thesis and informs upon their significance to understanding Soviet nuclear policy. It then highlights the empirical and theoretical contributions that this thesis makes through its exploration of a lesser known case of nuclear proliferation and through the way it explains how change in the policy direction became possible. It concludes by recognising that identity constructions to a large extent shaped Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War and by emphasising that although challenging, the change is possible through the deconstruction of hierarchies existing in nuclear weapons discourse. Finally, it presents the potential directions for future research on the subject.
Chapter 2. Review of the Literature: International Relations Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation

Introduction
Chapter 1 established that this thesis examines the most prominent constructions of Soviet nuclear identity from the period of nuclear weapons acquisition in the 1940s through the rapid arms race until the disarmament period in the late 1980s. Its purpose is to investigate the significance of this identity to the course of Soviet nuclear policy in order to first, deepen theoretical comprehension of states’ motivations to go nuclear, to proliferate vertically, and to disarm; second, in order to expand our understanding of nuclear policy in the Soviet Union beyond accepted realist paradigm. To reiterate, this thesis asks: ‘how was identity at the heart of Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons policy?’ Broadly, it speaks to the IR literature on nuclear weapons proliferation and non-proliferation - a complex theoretical debate seeking to generate understanding of states’ motives for acquiring, forgoing, maintaining, and relinquishing nuclear weapons. This chapter examines key contributions and shortcomings of this literature. It does so to map out the existing explanations of nuclear proliferation and disarmament; to identify where among them scholars placed the case of Soviet Union’s nuclear programme; and to flesh out the connection between identity constructions and nuclear policy. Although these literatures provide an invaluable source of knowledge, they contain notable silences to which this thesis is designed to speak.

First, Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War has been traditionally examined by realist scholars and attributed to power-maximising practices and rational calculations of deterrence based on the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). This stance formed conventional wisdom on Soviet nuclear behaviour. However, the so-called widening and deepening of security studies agenda after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 revealed sufficient flaws in realist predictions and understanding of the logic of nuclear proliferation and international relations in general. As a result, a new strand of literature appeared that centred on the examination of ideational factors at the heart of states’ decisions to go nuclear or to disarm. However, these scholars have
not revisited the Soviet case. Therefore, our understanding of Soviet nuclear behaviour during the Cold War remains largely rooted in realist cost-benefit analysis. Second, constructivist identity frameworks utilised in ideational literature on nuclear proliferation can prove insufficient to capture the complex process of identity construction and its linkages to the enactment and legitimation of nuclear policy. This point will be addressed in greater detail in the third section of this literature review. Poststructuralist approaches, however, can provide a deeper insight into the connection between a state’s identity and nuclear weapons projects.

Scott Sagan (1996) developed three theoretical models for understanding why states proliferate nuclear weapons or choose restraint: ‘the security model’, ‘the domestic politics model’, and ‘the norms model’. This chapter is roughly structured around the key assumptions of each model and is divided into four parts. First, it critically examines neorealist approaches to nuclear proliferation (with emphasis on state security, power, and raison d’état – national interest) and outlines its contributions to knowledge about Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. Second, it looks at the domestic politics model of nuclear proliferation and restraint and its contributions to the Soviet case. Third, this chapter evaluates ideational literature on nuclear proliferation and locates identity-focused approaches within it. The last section presents a brief discussion of scholarship from historians. Evaluated sources provide compelling evidence that Soviet nuclear policy was not always rational or security driven, and identity constructions to a large extent shaped this policy throughout the Cold War. The conclusion section accentuates the utility of poststructuralism for a more in-depth understanding of identity/policy nexus and emphasises how this thesis on Soviet nuclear policy is designed to fill the existing gaps in the relevant literature.

*Neorealist Perspectives on Understanding Nuclear Proliferation*

Conventional IR wisdom about Soviet and US nuclear behaviour during the Cold War lies with one or another variant of realism, which sees security as crucial to states’ survival (see e.g. Frankel, 1993; Jervis, 1978, 1982-83, 1986; Mearsheimer, 1993; Thayer, 1995; Waltz, 1979; 1981; 1990). Neorealist scholars posit that nuclear

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1 ‘Ideational’ is understood here as idealist, which refers to a theoretical emphasis on the influence of ideas (identities, emotions, perceptions etc.) and generally encompasses critical IR approaches.
Weapons are acquired as a rational response to protect state interests through defensive and sometimes offensive means. States develop nuclear weapons when faced with a threat to their security, which cannot be resolved, and these weapons act as a deterrent in order to prevent armed conflicts between nuclear states (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 45), or to act as a deterrent against traditional armed conflicts (May, 1994: 534). In this sense, nuclear weapons are acquired as a response to emerging nuclear threats in order to balance power with the rival state (Sagan, 1996: 59). This often results in states being faced with the security dilemma, which exists when “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease security of others” resulting in competitive behaviour (Jervis, 1978, cited in Glaser, 1997: 171).

According to Suchman and Eyre (1992: 147), neorealist theories rely on the so-called logic of consequence, which means that the process of decision-making consists of, first, determining one’s goals and one’s options; second, determining how one’s alternatives map onto one’s goals; and finally, selecting an alternative that maximises the achievement of one’s goals. In this sense, nuclear policy is a rational and calculated practice. The security dilemma lies at the core of this logic – when a state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its rivals, it poses a nuclear threat to another state in the region, which then has to develop its own nuclear programme to maintain security (Jervis, 1978; Sagan, 1996: 58). The history of nuclear proliferation thus presents itself as a strategic chain and it constitutes essential empirical evidence that neorealists rely on. Figure 2.1 represents an example of this logic and its future projection.
Figure 2.1 shows that approximately every five years since 1945 – a year that marked the one and only usage of nuclear weapons in warfare by the US - a state has acquired a nuclear-weapons capability. From the neorealist perspective this ‘trend’ can be explained by the fact that these states either perceived a threat to their survival or were faced with the situation where nuclear weapons could “significantly increase their voice in matters that mattered to survival” (May, 1994: 534). For instance, after the US demonstrated that nuclear weapons were possible in 1945 and due to the emerging tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, it was strategically essential for the Soviets to develop nuclear weapons as a response to those newly emerging threats (May, 1994: 534). In the same vein, from the neorealist perspective, British and French nuclear programmes were developed shortly after, as these states needed to protect themselves from the Soviet Union and its nuclear weapons. As emphasised by Hymans (2006a: 456), neorealist logic relies on the notion that non-nuclear guarantees are insufficient for a state’s long-term security and that “friends today may become enemies tomorrow”.

The nuclear behaviour of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was commonly
understood by neorealists as a form of power-maximising practice and as a response to the growing security threats and competition with the US (see e.g. Jervis, 1978; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979, 1981, 1990). Kenneth Waltz (1990: 733) stresses that during the arms race of the 1950s massive retaliation was crucial for Soviet and US survival, because, adhering to the traits of defensive neorealism, one must have the capability to destroy an adversary in order to deter them from striking first. In *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz (1979: 185) claims that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantors of a state’s survival as they induce caution and restraint. In this sense, more nuclear weapons will be better for international stability. This position became known as ‘proliferation optimism’. Although nothing is guaranteed, in Waltz’s view, nuclear weapons do make wars less likely as they are associated with deterrent strategies, which promise less damage than war-fighting strategies (1979: 185). These strategies call for caution and hence reduce the incidence of war. The fear of escalation and disadvantages of striking first show that nuclear weapons reverse the logic of conventional wars. Thus, based on “easy calculations of what one country can do to another”, armed nuclear conflicts will be avoided at all costs (Waltz, 1990: 734). In accordance with this logic, the Soviet Union was acting rationally and defensively during the Cold War in order to ensure its survival and to balance against the US.

Offensive neorealist John Mearsheimer also sees security threats as the main determinants of states’ arming behaviour. However, in comparison to Waltz, he suggests that states’ ultimate goal is to increase their power, not to preserve it. In this case, in an anarchic international system, states will strive to achieve hegemonic status in order to gain maximum security for themselves (Mearsheimer, 2001: 21). Mearsheimer (2001: 170) posits that the Soviet Union was a great expansionist power and thus, its nuclear behaviour can be understood as a power-maximising practice in the struggle with the US to become hegemonic. It is only logical that in this case great powers would prevent the spread of nuclear technology to other states. In this vein, Potter (1985: 468) argues that Soviet non-proliferation efforts between the mid-1950s and early 1980s were driven by its military and political interest in preventing other states from developing nuclear arsenals and threatening Soviet security and expansion.

When assessing the efficacy of neorealist approaches to understanding nuclear
proliferation, critics often emphasise their poor predictive power, their inability to explain cases of non-proliferation, and their overreliance on security influences (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 48). For instance, Mearsheimer (1993: 50) argued that it was the US’s mistake to encourage Ukraine to abolish its nuclear weapons, as they are an imperative to maintaining peace between Ukraine and Russia. In addition, he predicted that Ukraine was likely to keep its nuclear arsenal despite what other states say (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 58). Mearsheimer’s predictions with regards to Ukraine were inaccurate, as it did transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994 – shortly after the publishing of his article.

Furthermore, Sagan (1996: 63) asserts that scholars relying on the neorealist paradigms obtain empirical evidence, first by looking at the statements of motivation issued by the key decision-makers, which may indicate that nuclear choices were made in order to serve national and security interests. Second, they analyse a correlation in time between the emergence of a plausible security threat and a decision to acquire nuclear weapons, which requires working backwards in time from a nuclear decision attempting to find a security threat that ‘must’ have influenced it (Sagan, 1996: 63). This constitutes a significant weakness of the neorealist approach as it limits the analysis of governmental decision-making down to security factors and overlooks other possible influences. In addition, despite neorealist predictions, nuclear proliferation still remains a rare occurrence.

Existing critiques of neorealism reject ‘proliferation optimism’, assuming that the likelihood of a nuclear strike will increase with the number of ‘nuclear club’ members – this position has been referred to as ‘proliferation pessimism’. Kroenig (2015: 112) argues that there is a significant logical contradiction at the core of the neorealist argument. He highlights that the likelihood of nuclear war is either zero or nonzero, but it cannot be both. In this sense, nuclear weapons should have no deterrent effect if the probability of nuclear war is non-existent:

States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale conventional wars against nuclear-armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing (Kroenig, 2015: 112).
On the other hand, if there is a probability of nuclear war, then the danger increases with the spread of nuclear weapons and neorealists cannot conclude that nuclear weapons would never be used:

In sum, either the spread of nuclear weapons raises the risk of nuclear war and, in so doing, deters large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used, and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international stability (Kroenic, 2015: 112).

Despite arguing that in some cases nuclear proliferation is essential, Mearsheimer (1993:51) acknowledges that “widespread proliferation would increase the number of fingers on the nuclear trigger” – this, he suggests, would consequently increase the likelihood of nuclear accidents, unauthorised use, and nuclear terrorism. Mearsheimer’s claims, thus, challenge Waltz’s notion of nuclear weapons being the ultimate guarantors of peace and stability.

As mentioned above, Waltz attributed nuclear non-use during the Cold War to rational deterrence calculations. However, some scholars contest this view arguing that deterrence may not be the underlying reason for states’ non-use of nuclear weapons. For instance, Tannenwald (2007: 2) argues that deterrence is an inadequate explanation. Instead, she suggests that the so-called peace was often down to sheer luck and a powerful taboo that has developed in the global system against the use of nuclear weapons and stigmatised them as unacceptable weapons (Tannenwald, 2007: 2). To develop the ‘luck’ argument further, some scholars emphasise that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the chances of accidents that could lead to major destructions. For example, Gusterson (1999: 123) notes that there have been at least 24 occasions of US aircraft accidentally releasing nuclear weapons and at least eight incidents where nuclear weapons have been involved in plane crashes or fires. In essence, neorealists heavily rely on good luck.

Furthermore, neorealist approaches do not provide an adequate explanation of vertical nuclear proliferation. As noted by Ogilvie-White (1996: 45), if the logic of deterrence is followed, then there would be no need for a nuclear arms race. If the US and the Soviet Union had been ‘rational’ during the Cold War, the rapid armament beyond second-strike capability would not have occurred. To illustrate, Figure 2.2 represents the history of global nuclear stockpiles. Deterrence and security explanations cannot
justify, for instance, Soviet Union’s decision to stock 45000 warheads in 1986 and an overall shrinking of nuclear stockpiles afterwards despite the continuation of the Cold War. This suggests that deeper non-rational motives may be at work.


Another issue is a substantial gap between technical potential and military reality, which neorealists do not always explain. For example, Figure 2.3 represents potential versus actual nuclear proliferation and shows that only about one-fifth of the states that could have built nuclear weapons have in fact done so. According to Hymans (2006a: 458) and Bajema (2010: 60), neorealists over-predict overall proliferation, which still remains a rare occasion, and struggle to understand empirical patterns of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation that raise additional questions such as why France, but not Germany or Japan? Why India in 1998, but not India in 1968?
Germany and Ukraine both perceived threats to their security yet abstained from acquiring nuclear weapons despite the technological capability. These instances all suggest that neorealism alone is not sufficient enough for understanding the complex dynamics of nuclear proliferation across different cases and across time.

Figure 2.3 Potential vs. Actual Nuclear Proliferation. Source: Hymans, J. E. C. (2006a) The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 4.

As a response to a portion of these criticisms, a number of contemporary scholars adopted revised realist frameworks in order to understand nuclear weapons acquisition and restraint. For instance, Paul (2000:14) suggests that the combination of prudential realism and liberalism offers a more comprehensive account of nuclear proliferation and restraint. His explanation of nuclear proliferation posits that states’ choices with regards to nuclear weapons will depend on “the degree and type of security threats that a non-great power state faces, and the conflict dynamics of the region in which it is situated” (Paul, 2000: 14). Nuclear restraint on the other hand is governed by considerations of power, norms and prudence. Paul (2000: 150) argues that nuclear non-proliferation regimes are not a determining factor in decisions on nuclear restraint or nuclear reversals but can play a facilitating role. He claims that the
NPT had little impact on states such as Canada, Germany and Japan, because they had already chosen to give up their nuclear options before signing the treaty (Paul, 2000: 151). However, he acknowledges that the NPT regime becomes more important once a state chooses nuclear restraint, as “it provides assurances of similar behaviour by other states” and exiting the NPT would “elicit harsher international reaction than if it had not joined in the first place” (Paul, 2000: 28). Monteiro and Debs (2014: 9) also build their approach on realist security-based view and integrate it into a strategic-interaction model. They state that nuclear proliferation is determined by strategic interaction between potential proliferators and their adversaries and draw on four independent variables: the level of security threat, relative power of proliferators, cost of nuclear programme, and level of an ally’s commitment to a state’s defence (Monteiro and Debs, 2014: 13). Monteiro and Debs (2014) test their theory on five historical cases of nuclear proliferation including the Soviet Union. They conclude: “Seen through the lens of our strategic theory, the threat to Soviet survival posed by competition with a nuclear-armed United States induced Moscow’s willingness to nuclearize” (Monteiro and Debs, 2014: 29).

After assessing evidence from the Soviet military archives that became available to the wider audience following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Jervis (2001: 58-59) revisited his own conclusions on cooperation under the security dilemma, adding that Soviet offensive actions during the Cold War were not only driven by expansionism for security purposes, but by the deeper ideological assumptions that the world was shifting towards communism and the Soviet Union had the responsibility to aid this progress. In this sense, it was not the anarchic international system that drove Soviet actions, but Soviet own perceptions of the system as a form of class conflict. Jervis (2001: 46-47) also emphasises that on top of ideological considerations, it was Stalin’s personality that made him insecure in the face of American nuclear monopoly: “How could Stalin of all people feel secure in a world in which the capitalists, but not the Communists, knew how to build nuclear bombs?” This demonstrates how stepping away from solely focusing on security and power and revisiting the Soviet case could produce a more in-depth understanding of Soviet nuclear behaviour.

To sum up, it is not my intention to deny the role of power politics and security concerns in Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. The neorealist systemic
approach with emphasis on the anarchic character of the international system helps us to understand states’ nuclear behaviour to a certain extent. One of the things to do, in order to avoid conflict, is balance power against each other in order to establish peaceful coexistence or, for more powerful states, great power cooperation (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 328). Nuclear proliferation by the USSR and the United States during the Cold War to an extent follows the logic of power politics and *raison d’état*. However, neorealism fails to explain adequately a great deal of state activity. While it focuses attention on the important supply side of nuclear proliferation, existing evidence about the limited number of states that do proliferate contradicts its intuitions about the level of demand for nuclear weapons. In addition, this section emphasised the neorealist oversimplification of deterrence theory, its preoccupation with power, rationality, and security, and its inability to adequately explain vertical nuclear proliferation. Hence, in an attempt to understand Soviet nuclear behaviour during the Cold War, neorealism can only provide a partial explanation.

*The Domestic Politics Approaches*

The domestic politics approaches to nuclear proliferation focus on the role of domestic sources that encourage or discourage governments from pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. For instance, by utilising organisation theory, Sagan (1996: 64) emphasises the influence of individual domestic actors, who may include professional militaries, political party leaders, and officials in state-run nuclear research facilities. Led by common interests, these actors form coalitions and become strong enough to control states’ decision-making processes either through direct political power or through their control of information (Sagan, 1996: 64). In this sense, nuclear weapons serve specific interests of domestic actors rather than national security interests.

Sagan (1996: 67) claims that the domestic politics approach is better suited to explain nuclear proliferation in India than approaches that rely solely on security, because the Indian nuclear project was developed ten years after the possible security threat posed by the Chinese nuclear testing. He argues that Indira Gandhi’s decision to conduct India’s first nuclear test in 1974 was, first, made with the help from a small group of personal advisers and scientists from nuclear establishments. Second, the decision was made rather quickly, which suggests that immediate political concerns had more
influence than long-term security and energy strategies. Finally, domestic support for Gandhi’s government was declining in 1974 due to severe recession and critique from domestic opponents. Conducting a nuclear test may have been one of Gandhi’s government’s strategies to gain public support and to restore the nation’s faith in her government, which indeed worked as support for Gandhi increased by one-third in the month after the nuclear test (Sagan, 1996: 68).

Some scholars utilised the domestic politics approach to explain nuclear restraint. For instance, Reiss (1988: 248-263) claims that domestic pressures such as public opinion, environmental risks, cost of nuclear weapons programme, and internal political changes may serve as sources of nuclear restraint. Sagan (1996: 69) develops this point further suggesting that major political changes within states could produce nuclear restraint due to several reasons: outgoing government not trusting the incoming government with nuclear weapons; a new government not pursuing the course chosen by the old government; and newly empowered actors choosing not to pursue nuclear programmes due to other interests. This puts an additional emphasis on the influence internal political characteristics of the state have on nuclear decisions. For instance, in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, nuclear restraint can be explained by the emergence of liberalising domestic regimes that value international cooperation and access to international markets more than arms racing and economically unproductive defence strategies (Chafetz, 1993:133; Sagan, 1996:71). Additionally, Ogilvie-White (1996:49) posits that South Africa’s nuclear restraint could be influenced by the transition from apartheid to democracy and newly elected de Klerk’s attempt to benefit from international economic and political cooperation.

Another contribution to explaining nuclear restraint using the domestic politics approach has been made by Solingen (1994; 2007). Solingen (1994: 137-140) develops a global integration model suggesting that liberalising coalitions within states who advocate integration into the global economy are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons programmes than inward-looking, nationalist, and radical-confessional coalitions within states that reject it. Solingen (2007) advances her argument by comparing nuclear decisions made in the Middle Eastern states to East Asian states. Her conclusions indeed suggest that states whose leaders or ruling coalitions favour integration into the global economy (mainly in East Asia) reject nuclear proliferation,
whereas states in the Middle East are more likely to adopt nuclear proliferation strategies due to the inward-looking reliance on domestic markets and nationalist values. Integrating domestic factors into the explanations of nuclear proliferation and restraint fills some gaps left by the neorealistic approaches, highlighting that not all nuclear decisions can be traced back to security threats or lack of thereof.

Some authors have used the domestic politics approach to explain the Soviet case. The main logic of this approach runs close to the foreign policy analysis literature on bureaucratic politics and the military-industrial complex, which focused on the Soviet and American military procurement during the Cold War (Sagan, 1996: 64). For example, Cockburn (1983: 12) argues that Soviet and US military policy can be explained better on the basis of bureaucratic competition between military services than as a response to external threats. He emphasises the enormous power of military officials and their influence on decisions regarding the Cold War arms race: “It may be that the military on either side is engaged not so much in an arms race as in simply doing what it wants to do for its own institutional reasons” (Cockburn, 1983: 12). According to Evangelista (1984: 601), this kind of approach posits: “weak political control over the military allows weapons to be procured that have no genuine strategic rationale”.

Consequently, focusing on internal bureaucratic and organisational factors provides a better understanding of the Cold War arms race between the US and the USSR than neorealist perspectives. A number of studies conducted during the arms race highlight the interaction between internal bureaucratic and external security-related factors that impact the qualitative aspect of the race and continuous weapons innovation (see e.g. Berman and Baker, 1982; Cockburn, 1983; Evangelista, 1988; Kolkowicz, 1971). The approach advanced by Berman and Baker (1982), although distinct from the rational-actor assumptions, combines the role of Soviet military tradition and organisation, geopolitical and historical factors, and perception of threats. They conclude that it is predominantly the changing nature of external threats that influenced the development of new and more sophisticated weapons in the Soviet Union. In contrast, Cockburn (1983: 13-14) argues that external security threats do not precede the decision to develop a particular weapons system: “The desire for the new weapon or longer production line comes first; only afterward is the threat discovered that the weapon is
supposed to meet”. Therefore, in comparison to neorealism, the domestic politics approach sheds light on the Soviet vertical nuclear proliferation during the Cold War and highlights that internal actors’ interests impact the course of the arms race on top of strategic calculations.

However, Evangelista (1984: 613) argues that the domestic politics approach to Soviet nuclear politics derives from analogy to the US and there is no reason to believe that the situation in the US would necessarily be duplicated in the USSR, because the US represents a weak state with a strong society, whereas the USSR seems to represent the opposite. Thus, one cannot assume that what is true for the US is true for the Soviet Union. While there is an obvious utility of bureaucratic politics approach to explain the escalation of the arms race, these accounts do little to explain how internal state dynamics shaped for instance the initial decision to acquire nuclear weapons in the USSR.

The domestic politics approach offers a compelling explanation of certain cases of states’ nuclear behaviour, where neorealist theories proved insufficient. For example, the US-USSR technological arms race, the emergence of the Indian nuclear programme without any significant security threats, or nuclear restraint in Argentina despite its defeat by a nuclear power - the UK - in the Falklands War. However, similar to neorealism, this approach to nuclear proliferation suffers from homogenous models of explanation that do not take into account the fundamental inside differences between states. Some accounts also assume that domestic actors are all rational actors and neglect the possibility that bureaucracies within states do not always behave rationally especially with regards to nuclear weapons (Ogilvie-White, 1996: 50). Biswas (2014: 113) emphasises that the domestic politics approach cannot account for the enormous ‘allure’ of nuclear weapons among political elites. Nevertheless, as noted by Ogilvie-White (1996: 49-50), the domestic politics model constitutes an important advance from neorealism in explaining nuclear decisions by departing from the assumption that state is a unitary actor, acknowledging that states have multiple goals, and reducing neorealist dichotomy between domestic and international politics suggesting that they are inevitably linked to each other.
**Ideational Approaches**

The end of the bipolar world order brought about new security challenges calling for a re-definition of security itself and raising questions about the logic of traditional approaches to IR. The reason the end of the Cold War brought about this re-think was because traditional IR theories such as neorealism failed to predict it and then had difficulty adjusting to the world defined not by great power politics, but by other matters (Gaddis, 1992-1993: 18). Out of this context, critical security studies emerged with the primary assumption that the international system is a social construction (Fierke, 2015: 78). Critical security studies scholars emphasise the way that the division of the world into units we call states is not natural or pre-given, but socially agreed upon state of affairs, and centering this insight leads to different approaches to global politics. To quote the canonical work of a constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt, realist notions of self-help and power politics do not derive from the anarchical international system, rather, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992: 424).

Motivated by the need to deepen scholarly understanding of nuclear proliferation, several studies have developed approaches incorporating this assumption as an alternative to traditional perspectives. They focus on how ideas, beliefs, and identities may shape interests and actors’ preferences and “…highlight the importance of decision makers’ attitudes about the utility of nuclear weapons for achieving political goals in the international arena” (O’Reilly, 2012: 767). A body of work on nuclear proliferation that emerged in the past three decades highlights the necessity to move outside the limits of rationalist assumptions and invites future researchers to re-think nuclear proliferation in general. These scholars aim to go beyond neorealism and bureaucratic politics to explain nuclear proliferation, suggesting that nuclear weapons may serve other less obvious functions on top of defence and that nuclear policy may additionally be driven by factors beyond national interest, security, and power calculations. These include norms (see e.g. Paul, 2003; Price, 2007; Rublee, 2009; Sagan, 1996; Suchman and Eyre, 1992; Tannenwald, 1999, 2005, 2007), emotions and psychology of state leaders (see e.g. Hymans, 2006b; O’Reilly, 2012; Lavoy, 1993), state identity constructions and beliefs in a certain non-material value of nuclear weapons (see e.g. Ballbach, 2016; Biswas, 2014, Duncanson and Eschle, 2008; Long and Grillot, 2000; Ritchie, 2010, 2013, 2017; Wilson, 2013b).
section begins with the discussion of psychological approaches to nuclear proliferation and then moves on to look at identity-focused approaches that are divided into constructivist, feminist, and poststructuralist contributions. It is worth noting that these ideational studies do not explore the Soviet case, which is why the Soviet Union does not feature in the following sections.

**Psychological Approaches**

Psychological approaches to nuclear proliferation emphasise the role individual personality types play in nuclear decision-making, building on the assumption that psychological traits and personal beliefs and political actions are interlinked. They stress the importance of psychology and human actors in nuclear proliferation phenomenon, because nuclear weapons programmes are under the control of political elites (Hymans, 2006a: 459), and nuclear decisions pose a momentous choice for leaders (O’Reilly, 2012: 769). O’Reilly (2012) advances a new analytical framework by applying a political psychology approach to nuclear decisions. He posits that leaders’ perceptions of themselves and others in the international system strongly influence their decisions with regards to nuclear proliferation. His key findings suggest that “the decision environment surrounding proliferation outcomes is a strategic one, where actions are taken not only based on one’s own interests, but also on the expectations and in anticipation of others acting in their own interests” (O’Reilly, 2012: 786).

Lavoy (1993) introduces the nuclear mythmaker model as a method of understanding both nuclear proliferation and restraint: “The strategic beliefs and political activities of highly motivated and resourceful individuals are where sources of nuclear proliferation can be found” (Lavoy, 1993: 192). He argues that due to the fortunate lack of experience with nuclear conflicts, leaders’ beliefs about nuclear weapons are sustained by logic and faith and thus constitute myth rather than fact (Lavoy, 1993: 200). Based on Lavoy’s model, a state is likely to go nuclear when national elites emphasise its poor international standing and advance the myth that nuclear weapons would somehow improve it. On the other hand, if policymakers or talented and well-placed experts cultivate the myth of insecurity through nuclear weapons, the government is likely to choose nuclear restraint (Lavoy, 1993: 199). For instance, he
discusses the role of India’s leading atomic physicist Homi Bhabha who supposedly persuaded Prime Minister Lal Bahadur to launch nuclear weapons programme in response to China’s nuclear test in 1964 by engaging in myth-making with regards to costs and timings of developing a nuclear bomb.

Drawing on what he calls “psychological constructivism” and positioning emotion at the centre of his analysis, Hymans (2006b) develops a model of leaders’ national identity-driven decision-making and conducts a case study of nuclear decisions made by leaders in France, Australia, India, and Argentina. He suggests that proliferation is rare, because very few leaders want nuclear weapons. In cases where proliferation does occur, Hymans (2006b) attributes it to the “oppositional nationalist” identity of a state’s leader. In Hymans’ view, leaders can be described as oppositional nationalists when they see their nations in ‘us against them’ terms, which generates leaders’ fear of the Other, and when they consider their nations to be equal or superior to the external Other, which heightens their feeling of pride. In this sense, fear and pride of oppositional nationalist leaders are the main drivers of nuclear proliferation. “Driven by fear and pride, oppositional nationalists develop a desire for nuclear weapons that goes beyond calculation, to self-expression” (Hymans, 2006b: 2). In the same vein, Hymans (2006b: 7) argues that nuclear restraint stems not from the external pressures of the NPT, but from “the hearts of state leaders themselves”. Thus, rather than compelling with the non-proliferation regime, states choose not to go nuclear due to the fact that “few state leaders have desired the things it prohibits” (Hymans, 2006b: 8).

Overall, psychological approaches to nuclear proliferation make an important contribution through their emphasis on the role of individual beliefs and identities in making nuclear decisions. However, Ogilvie-White (1996: 53) argues that these approaches are often too narrow to capture a complex dynamic of nuclear proliferation and the relationship between individual beliefs and other factors in the proliferation process such as domestic and international political circumstances, norms etc.
Identity-focused approaches

A growing body of literature places states’ identity construction at the heart of understanding nuclear policy drawing from several strands of constructivism, feminism, and poststructuralism. Scholars who utilise identity-focused approaches offer a deeper insight into why and how states choose a course of their nuclear policy. This sub-section outlines the key contributions of constructivism, poststructuralism, and feminism to understanding the connection between identity constructions and nuclear proliferation.

i. Constructivism: Norms and symbolic value of nuclear weapons

Constructivist norms-based approaches to nuclear proliferation see states’ behaviour as being determined by norms and shared beliefs rather than by bureaucratic and national security interests (Sagan, 1996: 73). When defining ‘norms’, Sagan posits that individual and institutional interests are shaped by routines, rituals and habits that “are embedded in a social environment that promotes certain structures and behaviours as rational and legitimate and denigrates others as irrational and primitive” (Sagan, 1996: 74). In this sense, the decision to go or not to go nuclear depends on what is considered appropriate and ‘modern’ behaviour. As additionally pointed out by Suchman and Eyre (1992: 150), states may acquire arms, because “such actions are an inherent part of the role of the independent, modern nation-state”. This takes a departure from the conventional realist logic of consequence (actors behaving rationally in order to achieve strategic objectives) to the logic of appropriateness (actors behaving in accordance with their self-defined identity and beliefs in what is expected of them or what is considered appropriate in a given situation). This constitutes the fundamental difference between materialist realism and idealist constructivism.

To illustrate, Sagan (1996: 78) discusses the emergence of the French nuclear programme in 1951, which through his norms model’s perspective was based on the French leaders’ belief in the direct link between nuclear weapons and a state’s position in the international system. The nuclear plan was put forward by Charles de Gaulle and served as a source of French independence and high rank of social importance. “As the curtain was drawn over colonial domination, it became clear that
the country's grandeur had to be nourished from other sources” (Martin, 1981, cited in Sagan, 1996: 78). However, nuclear proliferation history demonstrates that norms can be fickle. A major shift in nuclear norms in the late 1960s resulted in the decreasing legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the development of a strong anti-nuclear norm. Some scholars attribute this shift to the current non-proliferation regime (see e.g. Rublee, 2009: 222; Sagan, 1996: 76; Tannenwald, 1999: 436).

According to Paul (2003: 137), the nuclear non-proliferation regime constitutes a “set of norms, principles, treaties and procedures through which countries pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons or help in their acquisition by other states”. In their attempt to explain nuclear restraint, norms-based approaches tend to focus on the influence of the current non-proliferation regime (specifically its main component, the NPT) on states’ nuclear decisions suggesting that two types of norms have emerged with regards to nuclear weapons: non-possession norm and an uncodified non-use norm. For instance, through the lens of Sagan’s norms model nuclear restraint in Ukraine can be seen as compliance with international non-possession norms imposed by the NPT based on several arguments. First, newly independent Ukraine joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state in an attempt to distinguish itself from nuclear Russia (Sagan, 1996: 81). Second, the Ukrainian government did what it thought was best to enhance its international standing and to position itself as a responsible - that is, not rogue - state. The examples of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq (so-called ‘rogue states’) illustrated to the Ukrainian officials that nuclear proliferation may not always be a source of international prestige (Sagan, 1996: 81). Finally, the Ukrainian government experienced external pressures from the US who aimed to convince Kiev that nuclear weapons would never deter Russia and that not following the NPT norm would result in negative economic consequences (Sagan, 1996: 82). Sagan’s norms model brings a constructivist dimension into the picture by suggesting that nuclear decisions may be shaped by states’ beliefs in doing what they consider to be the ‘right thing’ or the norm.

Rublee (2009) develops the constructivist insight further by analysing five cases of nuclear restraint: Egypt, Libya, Japan, Sweden, and Germany. She concludes that in all five cases the nuclear non-proliferation regime did shape states’ interpretation of the value of nuclear weapons and, over time, most state elites “absorbed and accepted the
normative message of the nuclear non-proliferation regime during the course of rethinking what a successful state looked like” (Rublee, 2009: 222). Rublee’s conclusions suggest that in order to control nuclear proliferation one needs to understand how states conceptualise the value of nuclear weapons. The constructivist approach is useful for understanding why states remain non-nuclear despite changed security circumstances, although, as Rublee (2009) herself points out, it does not provide a complete explanation of nuclear behaviour, because it cannot explain why nuclear proliferation occurs in the first place.

Tannenwald (1999; 2005; 2007) made a major contribution to the discussion of the non-use norm, which she calls the nuclear taboo. Tannenwald’s theory is informed by a number of empirical anomalies within nuclear history that neorealists are unable to explain. For instance, it remains unclear why supposedly deterrent weapons have not deterred conventional attacks against nuclear states by non-nuclear states as seen in the cases of North Vietnam attacking the US in the Vietnam War, China attacking the US in the Korean War, Argentina attacking the UK in the Falklands, and Iraq attacking the US and Israel in the Persian Gulf War (Tannenwald, 1999: 434). Additionally, another anomaly is that in these cases nuclear weapons remained unused even though there was no fear of retaliation from adversaries. Tannenwald accounts these patterns of non-use to the development of a strong taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear taboo can be conceptualised as a de facto prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons that has developed in the global system (Tannenwald, 1999: 436).

Paul (2003: 146) and Tannenwald (1999: 463) claim that nuclear weapons acquired this status of ‘taboo weapons’ due to their unique destructiveness. In 1991 nuclear taboo became more embedded and internalised through processes of stigmatisation; those not complying with the taboo “risk being classified as outside the bounds of ‘civilised’ international society” (Tannenwald, 1999: 463). Similar to approaches discussed above, Tannenwald’s analysis brings to light an ideational component of nuclear decisions by pointing towards deeper constitutive effects that “create or define forms of behaviour, roles, and identities” (1999: 437).

In a related vein, Long and Grillot (2000: 27) present a model of ideas and outcomes that helps to locate beliefs within the nuclear decision-making process suggesting that they shape both states’ preferences and strategies. Figure 2.4 presents this model. It
shows how states form their preferences in accordance with their basic interests and causal beliefs, then, given the preferences, they search for the best available nuclear strategy, and finally, choose strategies based on beliefs about expected returns and strategic environment, in which decisions are made (Long and Grillot, 2000: 27).

States’ identities are reflected in their beliefs. Moreover, beliefs about one’s self or identity are particularly enduring. These beliefs help to shape basic interests into preferences and eventually become embedded in the state’s goals or preferences themselves (Long and Grillot, 2000: 36-37).

Long and Grillot (2000) use this model of nuclear decision-making to look at the cases of Ukraine and South Africa. It follows from their analysis that Ukraine’s and South Africa’s nuclear restraint was largely motivated by their leaders’ beliefs about becoming a part of the liberal democratic world. According to Murray (2010: 658), securing a stable state identity is an essential objective of states’ foreign policy that allows them to be an actor in world politics. In constructivist terms, ‘identity’ can be understood as “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self” constituted by both internal and external structures (Wendt, 1992: 397).

However, as Wendt (1992: 397) argues, identity is not a unitary phenomenon susceptible to general definition and the character of internal-external relationship varies.


Great powers have historically grounded their identity in military capabilities that were understood at the time as symbolic representations of their perceived great
power status (Murray, 2010: 665). When discussing characteristics of a ‘symbolic’ weapon, Wilson (2013b: 8) draws an analogy between nuclear weapons, dreadnoughts, and chariots suggesting that they share a lot in common by being “revolutionary, the newest technology, expensive, and impressive” at their time. Nuclear proliferation may be partially driven by state leaders’ beliefs in the symbolic value of nuclear weapons, which means perceiving them as a source of great power and a secure identity. Biswas (2014: 129) fleshes out this symbolic significance describing nuclear weapons as luxury fetish commodities, both valuable and deeply desirable by states. Nuclear weapons as fetish objects can take on symbolic significance through offering status and power:

Fetish objects can acquire symbolic value, but that symbolic value also serves to make power ‘real’. It is precisely because nuclear weapons have emerged as symbols of power and status that their acquisition (as well as rejection) confers ‘real’ power (Biswas, 2014: 130).

In a similar manner, Sagan’s norms model of nuclear proliferation holds that leaders’ beliefs in the symbolic significance of nuclear weapons may stem from normative underpinnings of nuclear proliferation as shown in the case of the French nuclear programme: “For de Gaulle, the atomic bomb was a dramatic symbol of French independence and was thus needed for France to continue to be seen, by itself and others, as a great power” (Sagan, 1996: 79). Neorealist explanations would suggest that states were forced to do so for survival, while the domestic politics approach would focus on the tangible benefits/self-interest. In contrast, constructivist accounts argue that states comply with the norm, because they believe it is right or admire those who have already done so. Constructivist approaches to explaining nuclear proliferation help contend that the normative status attached to nuclear weapons and/or non-proliferation has an impact on nuclear decisions. According to Biswas (2014: 114), “nuclear weapons can acquire meaning as a particular kind of object and marker of status, either in their possession or in their rejection”. These meanings do not exist in a vacuum. They are connected to an identity that a state wants to articulate. Such identity plays a crucial role in institutionalising certain understandings and practices that assign meanings to symbolic material objects such as nuclear weapons and construct some policy outcomes as feasible while marginalising others (Ritchie, 2010: 468).
In a series of studies, Nick Ritchie looks at the connection between British identity and the continuous maintenance of the UK’s submarine-based Trident nuclear weapons system. According to Ritchie (2010: 484), the core collective identity constructed by British political elites generates continuous national interest in remaining a nuclear power. Ritchie (2010: 484) shows how this collective identity manifests itself through four dimensions: first, Britain’s self-identity as a responsible interventionist ‘pivotal’ major power; second, Britain as a key ally to the US; third, Britain’s historical competition with France over the role of the leading defender of Europe; and fourth, New Labour’s ‘defensive’ identity. Ritchie (2008: 1) states: “Britain is a nuclear weapon state: this is an important part of its identity and it makes thinking about being a non-nuclear weapon state very difficult”. This exhibits the historic association between being a superpower and possessing nuclear weapons, which produces a significant challenge to the current non-proliferation regime.

Similarly to Ritchie, Singh (2016: 100) adopts a constructivist identity-focused approach to analyse India’s nuclear identity arguing that it was discursively constituted through the images of Self and Other. Singh (2016: 108) concludes that the international community’s gradual acceptance of India’s nuclear weapons and the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 in particular were enabled by “India’s strategy of constituting itself as a responsible nuclear power”. India’s quest for recognition of its nuclear status manifested itself through various means: economic, strategic, cultural, diplomatic, and also discursive. Singh’s insights provide a more in-depth understanding of the Indian government’s motivations to go nuclear than for example, Sagan’s domestic politics model, because, in line with constructivist arguments, it uncovers the connection between a state’s identity and interests suggesting that they are constituted inter-subjectively. The study argues that India’s nuclear choices arose from its understanding of itself and the world order and emphasises the role of recognition by others in this process. Indian government has sought this recognition through various discursive and material means such as projecting the defensive posture of India’s nuclear doctrine, the signing of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal in 2008, exhibiting adherence to non-proliferation norms, and calling for global disarmament (Singh, 2006: 101-102). Singh’s study emphasises the
significance of discourse to a state’s nuclear identity construction, because through the persistent non-proliferation peace discourse India achieved the recognition as the responsible nuclear power by the international community. However, her analysis shies away from defining what exactly a state’s nuclear identity is and how it connects with nuclear policy decisions.

Das (2010: 150) deepens the connection between state identity construction and nuclear proliferation. In her critical constructivist analysis of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear policies, she demonstrates how the constitutive nature of states’ identities may re-articulate (in)securities to justify nuclear policy. Drawing from the interpretive analysis of David Campbell, she suggests that there are no primary or stable state identities, and state insecurities are socially and culturally reproduced through representations of a dangerous Other (Das, 2010: 150). “Central to this process of constituting a state’s identity is its foreign policy and its construction of danger, which serve to consolidate the state’s identity” (Das, 2010: 151). Das (2010: 163) concludes that while there was a rational element of realpolitik in Indian and Pakistani nuclear politics, it is imperative to consider subjective issues such as a nation’s history, religion, culture, and ideology. Although both states justified their nuclear projects on the basis of geo-strategic considerations, they simultaneously relied on their histories, economic and developmental anxieties, and their political leaders’ ideologies in order to interpret their national identities and (in)securities (Das, 2010: 164). For example, Pakistan’s nuclear (in)security discourse was grounded in terms of Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ versus Indian ‘Hindu’ bomb. The approach of Das shows how engaging the material realm with the interpretive realm could help to better comprehend states’ nuclear choices, because it emphasises how when it comes to nuclear weapons, states’ considerations go way beyond security and geopolitical concerns.

ii. Poststructuralism

Ballbach (2016) also advances an identity-focused approach drawing on poststructuralism to explore North Korea’s nuclear state identity construction and how it interrelates with its nuclear policy. Ballbach utilises Judith Butler’s work on performativity – “the power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration” (Butler, 1993, cited in Ballbach, 2016: 394) and also draws upon Lene Hansen’s position that there is no causal relationship between states’ identity constructions and
foreign policies, but rather “identities are both a product of and a justification for foreign policies” (Hansen, 2006, cited in Ballbach, 2016: 396). This claim and its crucial significance to the theoretical framework of this thesis will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Seeing identity in line with poststructuralist assumptions as discursive and relational, Ballbach (2016: 410) concludes that North Korea’s nuclear state identity emerged through the citational practices of performativity:

As such, North Korea’s nuclear program comes into effect and is potentiated as an acceptable and appropriate measure for defending the threatened Self against specifically identified Other (s) – primarily the US – within framework and scope of specific foreign policy discourses.

Ballbach’s application of poststructuralism to understanding a state’s nuclear policy presents a direction of inquiry that is underexplored by IR scholars of nuclear proliferation. It sheds light on factors that were not formerly considered in relevant identity-focused literatures, such as how possessing nuclear weapons may constitute a particular trait of a state identity with policy being central to its reproduction. In comparison to constructivists, poststructuralists put more emphasis on the fact that identities are never fixed. For example, although Wendt (1992) posits that identities are important and understands them as non-unitary, he still tends to see them as somewhat fixed and pre-given. Ballbach (2016: 392) criticises Wendtian constructivist assumptions of pre-given identities, because it disregards the discursive nature of identities and the performatively-constitutive relationship to foreign policy. A poststructuralist approach, he argues, highlights the discursive construction of identities and may encompass both emotional and strategic considerations. Poststructuralists reject the conventional taken-for-granted assumption that foreign policy is an internally mediated response to the external world, instead they see foreign policy as a means through which a particular mode of subjectivity is produced and reproduced (Ballbach, 2016: 395).

Ballbach’s work is different from other authors in the ideational camp of nuclear proliferation studies, because in comparison to constructivism he adopts a non-causal epistemology and explores a constitutive significance of North Korea’s nuclear state
identity for formulating and debating its nuclear weapons programme. This helps to gather a richer understanding of the North Korean case and to take this understanding beyond material factors and causality. In addition, Ballbach (2016: 398) introduces the concept of a ‘nuclear state identity’, which he sees as a trait of the broader discursively constructed state identity associated with reframing Self in terms of a nuclear weapons state. North Korean security doctrines and nuclear tests can be understood as the performative enactment of this identity trait. Focusing on the constructions of nuclear state identity broadens our perceptions of North Korea’s nuclear project beyond the political-diplomatic, economic, and even military realm and presents a new perspective on the continuous conflict between the international community and North Korea.

iii. Feminism

Often overlooked by other nuclear proliferation scholars, feminist IR approaches have offered a crucial contribution to explaining how identity plays an important role in nuclear policy. These studies emphasise how nuclear discourses reproduce gendered hierarchies and demonstrate how a gender lens or gendered analysis can help uncover the ways in which identities are constructed in relation to difference. Following the ground-breaking research of Carol Cohn (1987), feminist IR scholars together with anti-nuclear women activists have highlighted the gendered nature of nuclear discourse and suggested that in order to understand nuclear proliferation, this ‘gender dimension’ needs to be taken into account (see e.g. Cohn et al., 2005; Das, 2012; Duncanson and Eschle, 2008).

For instance, Cohn et al. (2005: 1) argue: “ideas and expectations about gender are woven through the professional and political discourses that shape all aspects of how weapons of mass destruction are considered, desired and addressed”. To illustrate their claim, Cohn et al. (2005: 6-7) look at US post 9/11 nuclear discourse and show how it functions to justify the continuous development of nuclear weapons by equating it with manliness and potency, while disarmament is presented as feeble, wimpy or ‘lacking balls’. In addition, they highlight the significance of sexual metaphors used by political actors in their representations of nuclear weapons, which creates additional excitement and support for the weapons meaning that “the symbolic gendered dimensions of nuclear weapons are not trivial; they are an integral part of
accomplishing domestic and political objectives” (Cohn et al., 2005: 4).

In a related vein, Duncanson and Eschle (2008: 546) posit: “gender as a category helps us understand the ways in which individual (and collective) identity is socially constructed around and through assumptions about male/female sexual difference, or the categories of masculinity and femininity”. They use feminist analysis to flesh out the contradictions in British identity constructions in light of the UK government plans to renew the Trident nuclear programme in 2007. After conducting the discourse analysis of the White Paper on Trident, Duncanson and Eschle (2008: 562) conclude that in their articulation of Trident renewal, British officials were constructing an identity of a “responsible steward” yet remained attracted to the power status and strength that they believed nuclear weapons offer. Duncanson and Eschle (2008) make a similar point to Ritchie’s studies of the British identity discussed in the constructivist section. However, they draw attention to and emphasise how a ‘responsible steward’ is a gendered concept and a type of masculinity. This shows how states continuously explore different forms of masculinity in order to hold on to powerful weaponry, but at the same time construct Self that is ethical, morally sound, and responsible. The gendered dichotomised structure of nuclear weapons discourses, unveiled by feminist IR scholars, where a ‘masculine’ element is valued higher than a ‘feminine’ one helps us to understand states’ desire to acquire and hold on to nuclear weapons. Different forms of masculinity become a necessary attribute of a state’s identity that is constructed within security discourses. As such, feminist scholars offer an invaluable insight into the challenges of achieving disarmament.

Section Summary

This section established that when it comes to nuclear proliferation/restraint, ideas, beliefs, and identities constructed by state actors matter as much as security, power, and deterrence calculations. Ideational approaches discussed in this section present alternative viewpoints that are essential to consider if we are indeed aiming to obtain a fuller explanation of how, why, and when some states choose to go nuclear and how, why, and when some choose nuclear restraint. These approaches challenge conventional material understandings of nuclear proliferation and bring in a number of factors that may shape nuclear policies of states: psychology of individual leaders, norms, beliefs, and ideas about nuclear weaponry. Central to ideational approaches is
the notion of identity. Identity-focused studies produce an in-depth understanding of states’ nuclear behaviour covering the dimensions that were not in the foreground previously. For example, the objective epistemology of neorealist approach does not allow for consideration of subjective issues such as a nation’s history, ideology and culture that states draw on in order to justify their nuclear policies and to interpret their national selves (Das, 2016: 164). Thus, a state’s identity and nuclear decisions are closely interlinked.

This section also established that in comparison to different strands of constructivism, a poststructuralist approach takes our understanding of state’s motivations to go nuclear beyond causality and captures a complex interplay between discursive nature of state identities and their performative-constitutive relationship to foreign policy. In addition, feminist IR scholars emphasise the existing gender hierarchies within nuclear discourses and masculine attributes attached to nuclear weapons, which enable states to articulate masculinised identities and to construct nuclear weapons as desirable. Among other identity-focused approaches to nuclear proliferation, poststructuralist and feminist insights have often been neglected in IR studies of nuclear proliferation.

To recap, this thesis asks: ‘how was identity at the heart of Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons policy?’ Scholars discussed in this section posed similar research questions in their studies and produced compelling in-depth findings. However, their work does not explore the case of nuclear proliferation in the USSR, which means that the relationship between Soviet identity and nuclear policy remains underexplored. Conventional approaches leave a gap in our understanding of the vertical proliferation during the Cold War arms race or of the Soviet decision to radically reduce the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Can identity-focused approaches help us understand the Soviet case? What role have ideas about a Soviet identity played in the Soviet acquisition, development, and eventual reduction of nuclear weapons?

An examination of how historians have dealt with the Soviet case indicates that identity plays a major role in explaining nuclear behaviour. IR scholars have much to learn from their detailed examination of the role of norms, ideas, and beliefs in informing the actions and policies of various Soviet leaders and policy makers. This literature forms a rich source of data for this study and is also outlined in brief in the next section of this literature review.
**Contributions of Historians**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the openings of the Soviet military archives throughout the 1990s, scholars gained access to previously kept secret documentation related to the Soviet nuclear project, which greatly contributed to our understanding of the Soviet motivations and thinking about nuclear weapons. These sources capture the convoluted dynamics of Soviet decision-making and uncover various factors that shaped it. It is worth noting that this thesis does not attempt to challenge explanations offered by historians. It takes a different ontological and epistemological stance and poses a different set of questions. As such, I am not seeking to describe what happened and why in order to provide the most accurate historical account. Rather, I am interested in demonstrating to an IR audience the role that identity played in Soviet nuclear policy, in order to contribute to the IR scholarship that argued that we need to go beyond conventional logic to fully understand nuclear policy. This is important, because if identity matters, it means change is possible.

The contributions of historians to our understanding of Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War reveal the role identity plays in Soviet nuclear decision-making. They highlight that states’ nuclear decisions are not always rational or security-related and multiple factors can play a role in motivating them. As mentioned above, after the opening of the Soviet military archives, historians generated empirically rich and detailed accounts of Soviet behaviour. According to Zubok (2009: xxiii), these new sources reveal that the Cold War was much more than a clash of superpowers and an acquisition of deadly weapons – “every history is the story of people and their motives, hopes, crimes, illusions, and mistakes”. This section outlines some of the key histories of Soviet nuclear policy that I refer to throughout the thesis.⁴

Given the breadth of existing historical accounts of Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War, reviewed studies were divided into several categories relating to the individual leaders, the historic period covered, and concrete nuclear policy decisions. Some of these studies contribute to several categories simultaneously. Due to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union, the power of decision-making was often

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⁴ This body of literature is so vast that I cannot be sure that I have looked at them all.
concentrated in the hands of the few and reflected their personal backgrounds, views, and emotions. As a result, historians widely acknowledge the role of specific Soviet leaders either individually or in multiplicity (see e.g. Craig and Radchenko, 2008, 2018; Fursenko and Naftali, 2006; Holloway, 1988, 1989/90, 1994; Zubok, 2000, 2009; Zubok and Harrison, 1999). For example, David Holloway in his award-winning book *Stalin and the Bomb* provides perhaps the most comprehensive review of the Soviet nuclear bomb’s acquisition and the early stages of the arms race after Stalin’s death in 1953. Aside from security and resistance to political pressure from the US, Holloway (1994: 364-371) highlights an incredibly emotional nature of Soviet nuclear policy making. First, he argues that this policy reflected a deep-rooted consciousness of backwardness vis-à-vis the West and a necessity to overcome this backwardness, which was entrenched in the official Soviet ideology of being a socialist state that would lead the world from capitalism to communism (Holloway, 1994: 365). Second, the initiation of the Soviet nuclear project had a lot to do with Stalin’s “malevolent and suspicious personality” and his attempts to show the US that he will not be intimidated. Finally, Holloway (1994: 369) uncovers that Stalin’s motives to acquire the bomb actually included preparations for the new world war against the US, from which he believed the Soviets would emerge as a victorious superpower.

Holloway falls into the category of historians who also look at the sequence of Soviet policy-making focusing on decision-making processes, actions, and ideas in relation to the stage of acquisition of nuclear weapons (see e.g. Artyomov, 2013; Craig and Radchenko, 2008; Holloway, 1994, 1981). Some historians discuss the Soviet initial decision to go nuclear in the context of either broader Cold War politics or the general historical development of nuclear weapons (see e.g. Alperovitz, 1995; Bernstein, 2001; Cirincione, 2007; DeGroot, 2005; Gaddis, 1989, 1997, 2005; Grogin, 2001; Hanhimäki and Westad, 2003; Rhodes, 1988, 1995, 2007). The overall insight provided by these scholars emphasises extensive spy networks deployed by the Soviets during World War II to gather information about the US nuclear work due to mistrust existing between two sides. The aforementioned historians attribute Soviet nuclear weapons acquisition to Stalin’s rational security calculations, but also to various beliefs and emotions: first, to the Soviet leaders’ fears that the US would be ahead of
them militarily and thus would overpower the USSR in the post-war world order; second, to the Soviet historical quest to become a world superpower; and third, to Stalin’s belief that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US were an attack not against Japan, but against the Soviet Union.

Another group of historians focuses on the sequence of Soviet policy making during the arms race stage with Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘blustery’ personality on the one side (see e.g. Craig and Radchenko, 2018; Fursenko and Naftali, 2006; Holloway, 1984 Zagoria, 1961; Zubok and Harrison, 1999; Zubok, 2009) and Brezhnev’s pragmatic detente on the other (see e.g. Holloway, 1975; Zaloga, 2002; Zubok, 2009). These authors ascribe Soviet ‘irrational’ arming and dangerous moves such as placing of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 to first, Khrushchev’s political style of nuclear brinkmanship and ideological messianism; second, to the growing hostility of the US; and third, to the Soviet continuous striving for military superiority and superpower status. The important contribution here is that the US-Soviet arms race cannot just be understood as the action-reaction phenomenon, which puts neorealist logic of rational deterrence into question. Khrushchev’s era was characterised by the development of the MAD doctrine. However, there was a notable belief among top Soviet officials that the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war (Craig and Radchenko, 2018; Zubok, 2009). Despite Khrushchev’s aggression, his nuclear policy was largely driven by the desire of recognition as an equal to the US and an achievement of peaceful coexistence (Craig and Radchenko, 2018; Zubok, 2009). His beliefs, however, led to the most serious near miss in nuclear history – the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. After the crisis both the US and the Soviet Union fully accepted the logic of MAD, which offered a relative stability to the next three decades of the Cold War (Craig, 2013). This exemplifies the role that individual beliefs and identities played in the vertical nuclear proliferation.

The third sequence of Soviet nuclear policy-making is related to the politics of arms control and disarmament under leaderships of Brezhnev and Gorbachev. The disarmament period in the late 1980s coincided with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, it is only natural that it is captured in all general accounts on Soviet leadership and the Cold War. Some sources provide a more specific focus on Gorbachev (see e.g. Calingaert, 1991; Holloway, 1988, 1989/90,
These authors commonly explain Soviet disarmament policy being a result of the struggling Soviet economy and the key component of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ characterised by the politics of openness, restructuring, liberal ideas of peace and cooperation as well as Gorbachev’s personal fears of a nuclear war and scepticism about military force. Furthermore, during Gorbachev’s rule the USSR and the whole world were shaken by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on April 26, 1986. Gorbachev’s active pursuit of disarmament, as argued by some historians, emerged as a response to the catastrophe (see e.g. Rhodes, 2007; Zubok, 2000; Zubok, 2009).

This section provided a brief overview of existing historical perspectives on the Soviet nuclear behaviour during the Cold War. This literature presents a range of factors that determined a course of Soviet nuclear policy from the acquisition of nuclear weapons to the rapid arms reduction. Undoubtedly, security, power, and deterrence calculations significantly shaped Soviet nuclear decisions. However, what historians emphasise is that Soviet behaviour was not always rational, and it is important to take into account the powerful ideas and beliefs the Soviets had about themselves and where they wanted to be. These ideas were often a product of individual leaders’ worldview and the messianic character of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. Their prominence could not allow the Soviets to lag behind the capitalist West and drove their quest for superpower status. Zubok (2009: xxiv) stated that it is not possible to explain Soviet motives during the Cold War “without at least trying to understand how the Soviet leaders, elites, and people understood the world and themselves”.

**Conclusion**

This chapter established that IR literatures that look at states’ motivations for acquiring, maintaining, or forgoing nuclear weapons present a complex theoretical debate with numerous strengths, but also contradictions and weaknesses. Drawing from near enough every existing IR paradigm, these approaches provide a dynamic picture of nuclear proliferation emphasising that it is never complete and there is always a need to explore states’ nuclear motivations further, because nuclear proliferation remains as one of the major security issues in the world. This chapter demonstrated that, although there is a plethora of authors focusing on the nuclear behaviour of the USSR during the
Cold War, their explanations remain rooted in materialist rationalist frameworks that treat Soviet nuclear policy as a measured response to the external security environment and as a result of an internal bureaucratic struggle. Such approaches, although valuable, proved insufficient to fully understand Soviet nuclear motives due to an increased over-reliance on rationalist assumptions and their inability to explain vertical nuclear proliferation.

Ideational scholarship on nuclear proliferation emerged predominantly after the end of the Cold War and expanded our understanding of nuclear proliferation seeing the international system as a social construction and arguing that non-rationalist factors such as ideas, beliefs, and identities to a large extent influence nuclear behaviour of states. This gave rise to a large body of empirically and theoretically rich scholarly work that shed light on many previously unexplored cases of nuclear proliferation and restraint as well as augmented existing knowledge provided by neorealist and domestic politics approaches. Identity-focused literature offers an invaluable insight into how a state’s identity constructions are very much interlinked with the direction of its nuclear policy. Within this literature, constructivist, feminist, and poststructuralist approaches offer in-depth understandings of the connection between identity and nuclear proliferation by taking the connection beyond linear causal links and moving on from the assumption that all states exist and operate in an objective universal reality. However, scholars utilising these approaches to nuclear proliferation largely neglect the case of the Soviet Union revealing a gap in our understanding of this case beyond conventional materialist factors.

This chapter also showed that Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War has been a subject of numerous works of historians. These literatures demonstrate that Soviet policy-making was not always rational and had a lot to do with the ideological and totalitarian nature of the Soviet state and, most importantly, historians highlight how the way Soviets viewed the world and themselves played a crucial role in shaping the USSR’s nuclear policy. Therefore, there is no doubt that there were deeper non-rational motives to Soviet nuclear behaviour, which IR literature on nuclear proliferation fails to capture. By asking ‘how was identity at the heart of Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons policy?’ this thesis seeks to fulfil this gap. Its fundamental rationale is that no volume in IR literature has satisfactorily explored the significance of identity constructions to the
course of Soviet nuclear policy.

Finally, this chapter established that among ideational identity-focused approaches to nuclear proliferation, poststructuralism offers the most in-depth understanding of connections between nuclear policy and articulations of state identity, yet it is only utilised in a handful of studies. Feminist contributions to the field are also often overlooked, although these studies enrich our understanding of masculinised nature of state identities and the consequences this has for nuclear weapons policy. It thus follows that the second gap that this thesis seeks to fill is to expand our application of poststructuralism to nuclear weapons proliferation and to highlight the necessity of incorporating a feminist dimension into this approach. To conclude, while this thesis shares the basic assumption of constructivism that identity matters, it seeks to take the identity logic a step further by focusing on the discursive constructions of a nuclear identity and seeing how these constructions permeate the practices of nuclear policy. The next chapter outlines the details of this approach and presents the theoretical framework of this thesis.
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: A Poststructuralist Approach to Identity and Nuclear Policy

Introduction
So far, it has been established that the intention of this thesis is to examine the extent to which identity construction and articulation was at the heart of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons policy and how these concerns manifested themselves from the rule of Joseph Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev during the periods of nuclear weapons acquisition, the arms race, and disarmament. Chapter 2 articulated the core rationale for the analysis via comprehensive review of the existing relevant literature. It was demonstrated that in the case of the USSR’s nuclear decisions, material forces have been traditionally privileged over ideational in IR scholarship. However, this picture remains incomplete. As discussed, neorealism and domestic politics explanations do not always provide an accurate account of events and have multiple shortcomings due to their assumption that states are self-interested rational actors and due to their conceptualisation of security purely in terms of state military power and material gains (see e.g. Evangelista, 1988; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979; 1981).

Ideational approaches offer an invaluable alternative insight into other cases of nuclear proliferation and restraint through their emphasis on the socially constructed nature of security and the role of ideas, beliefs, and identity in nuclear policy-making (see e.g. Hymans, 2006b; Ritchie, 2008: 2010; Rublee, 2009). However, these literatures commonly adopt causal epistemologies and treat identities as pre-given, which, as argued in Chapter 2, does not always capture the complexities of identity/policy nexus. Furthermore, they overlook the case of the Soviet nuclear policy. The previous chapter also established that in comparison to constructivism, a poststructuralist approach moves away from the assumption of pre-given identities taking into consideration their discursive nature and the performative-constitutive relationship to foreign policy (Ballbach, 2016: 392). This provides for a deeper understanding of the link between a state’s identity and nuclear policy.

The main purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework through which this thesis seeks to explore the connection between identity and Soviet nuclear policy. Drawing on the works of poststructuralist and feminist IR scholars, it discusses
the value of focusing on the articulations of a state’s nuclear identity in order to gain an in-depth understanding of how nuclear policies are enacted and legitimised.

Although this thesis claims that identities are important in nuclear policy decision-making, it is imperative to highlight that they are not singular drivers of policy. As explained by Wendt (1999: 135):

the claim is not that ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are just as important and determining as before. The claim is rather that power and interest have the affects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.

The intention of this thesis is to provide a poststructuralist account of Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. It argues that understanding the co-constitutive relationship between nuclear identity constructions and articulations of nuclear policy provides for a more nuanced insight into states’ decisions regarding nuclear weapons.

This chapter thus proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the key premises and assumptions of poststructuralist theory and poststructuralist-informed understanding of a state identity as principally articulated through foreign policy discourses and constituted in relation to one or multiple Others. It then proceeds to discuss the relevance of feminist IR conceptualisations of gender within international security studies, noting that both rationalist and ideational nuclear proliferation scholars have largely neglected gender in their analyses. The prime purpose of this discussion is to show how incorporating a gender lens into a poststructuralist analysis of identity/policy nexus helps to flesh out the discursive constructions of identity in hierarchical difference. Second, building upon Ballbach’s concept of ‘a nuclear state identity’, this chapter defines ‘nuclear identity’ in poststructuralist terms emphasising its centrality and value for this research. The discussion then proceeds with the reiteration of the research questions established in Chapter 1 and in line with the poststructuralist approach. Finally, the last section of this chapter examines what Soviet nuclear identity is understood to be in terms of its relation to difference and key dimensions along which this difference is constructed.
Poststructuralism in IR: Key Assumptions

Chapter 2 has already gone some way in outlining the shortcomings of various mainstream IR approaches that have dominated the analyses of nuclear policy in the Soviet Union. Emerging in the 1980s, poststructuralist works sought to criticise the universalising, objectivist, and positivist stance of rationalist theories drawing attention to the power of language and discourse (see e.g. Ashley, 1984; 1987; 1988; 1989; Campbell, 1992; Der Derian, 1989; Hansen, 2006; 2012; Neumann, 1999; Walker, 1987; 1995). Inspired by poststructuralist philosophers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, these scholars discard what is taken for granted as assumed knowledge, arguing that knowledge is ultimately historically contingent. The key task of poststructuralist critique is:

- to expose the historicity – the arbitrariness, the political content, and the dependence upon practice – of the limits that are imposed in history and inscribed in paradigms of the sovereignty of man [...] the task is to come to terms with the knowledgeable practices by which limits are imposed and paradigmatically inscribed (Ashley, 1989: 284).

As such, poststructuralism seeks to deconstruct realist claims to objectivity and structural determinism and to bring out the political and historical contexts upon which our knowledge about international politics is contingent (Hansen, 2012: 99).

The theoretical starting point of this thesis is the poststructuralist conceptualisation of security as constructed rather than given – security is constituted in language as a discursive practice (Hansen, 1997: 381). This allows us to move away from linking security solely to the military and strategic means. Understanding security as a discursive practice implies that threats, insecurities, and identities come into being through the practice of security. However, security is not just discursive but also political, both are integral to each other:

By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’, a state – representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Waever, 1995, cited in Hansen, 1997: 376).
This highlights an intimate connection between material and ideational domains that poststructuralism advocates – material as in making a concrete policy decision.

Furthermore, poststructuralism rejects the assumption that the state is an essentialised presence. Poststructuralists argue that the state is never finished as an entity but is constantly in the process of being produced through a set of practices that establish identity and fix difference (Ballbach, 2015: 141; Campbell, 1992: 9-13). The state (here: the Soviet Union) is not treated as a pre-given subject that comes before policy decisions – it is a particular mode of subjectivity that is reproduced through the practice of foreign policy, which in its turn can be understood “as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of [American] political identity” (Campbell, 1992: 8). This demonstrates how foreign and security policies of states act as important practices through which states construct and reinforce their identities. Constructivists also emphasise identity as central to states’ foreign policies and argue against the always-rational nature of states’ decisions (Wendt, 1999). Some conventional constructivists even allow more scope for non-causal theory (see e.g. Katzenstein, 1996). However, they still broadly attempt to ‘test’ theoretical validity and privilege causal epistemological research (Hansen, 2006: 9; Wendt, 1999: 87). In comparison to most constructivist approaches, poststructuralism rejects causal epistemology arguing instead that “representations of identity are simultaneously the precondition for and (re)produced through articulations of policy” (Hansen, 2006: 10). This point will be discussed in greater detail throughout this chapter.

Another imperative aspect to highlight when adopting a poststructuralist theoretical framework is the shift from the positivist logic of explanation to the logic of interpretation. The latter, as explained by Campbell (1992: 4), does not concern itself with identifying the ‘real causes’ of for example nuclear proliferation, but with investigating the political consequences of different historical modes of representation. This emphasises the necessity of the transference from why to how questions, which has been largely neglected by nuclear proliferation scholars preoccupied with causality, as seen in Chapter 2. Doty (1993: 298-299) posits that how questions are concerned with explaining how meanings are constructed and attached to various subjects/objects, which make certain practices possible. In contrast to why questions, how questions present a more critical approach to the studied issue and explore the
kind of power that produces meanings, identities, and their interrelationships (Doty, 1993: 299). Posing how questions can help to “inquire into practices that enable social actors to act, to frame policy as they do, and to wield the capabilities they do” (Doty, 1993: 299). Thus, when interrogating the connection between Soviet nuclear policy and identity, this thesis asks not why the Soviets chose to acquire a nuclear bomb or to dramatically reduce their nuclear arsenal, but how these decisions were made possible. I will discuss the established research questions later on in this chapter, when introducing the concept of ‘a nuclear identity’.

Poststructuralists see language as constitutive of reality, texts mirror a world ‘out there’ (Agger, 1991: 120). Language carries ontological significance for poststructuralists. As Hansen (2006: 18) puts it: “it is only through the construction in language that ‘things’ – objects, subjects, states, living beings, and material structures – are given meaning and endowed with a particular identity”. The concept of ‘discourse’ is key to poststructuralist analyses of the relationship between identity and policy. Foucault (1972: 80) postulated that discourse can be treated either as the general realm of all statements, as a group of individual statements, or as a regulated practice that accounts for certain statements. It is through discourses that the material and the ideational are represented. Discourses play a central role in the conduct of international politics. As emphasised by Doty (1996: 5):

International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as “truth”. The goal of analysing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible.

In essence, poststructuralist scholars do not take objects and subjects of international relations as pre-given entities. Instead, through the analysis of international relations discourses, they seek to examine how these objects and subjects acquired their meaning in the first place, and what kind of possibilities for policy action these meanings enabled. For poststructuralism, discourses function as the primary sites for the exercise of power, and foreign policy acts as a discursive practice through which states construct and reproduce their own and others’ identities. Therefore, a
poststructuralist critique of mainstream approaches to nuclear weapons proliferation would postulate that through acquiring or not acquiring nuclear weapons, a state first, continuously reproduces and affirms its identity, and second, a state’s identity takes a form of representational practice that enables or precludes articulations of policy. This represents a significant departure from the key claims of nuclear proliferation literature discussed in Chapter 2, because this approach helps to understand nuclear policy as a dynamic process that is not fixed or universal but is constitutively linked to identity and is historically contingent.

It is imperative to note that the kinds of approaches that promote textual interpretation and abstain from the analysis of the material ‘real’ world attract a great deal of criticism in the field of IR. The poststructuralist shift away from the mainstream conceptions of security in military terms prompted some to argue that the field has been ‘seduced’ by poststructuralism. In the widely cited article that represents the views of a number of others, Walt (1991: 223) argues: “issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world”. However, this chapter and Chapter 2 have already gone some way in showing how preoccupation with causality and focusing solely on the objectivist, power-related, and material aspects of nuclear proliferation provide an incomplete picture of Soviet nuclear policy. Furthermore, in the direct response to Walt’s criticisms, Hansen (1997: 369) argues that poststructuralism is not a case for seduction and security studies would benefit from engaging with it more closely:

Poststructuralism advocates a position different from both the traditional realist and idealist perspectives in IR and offers important insights on the construction of national-international dichotomy, the relationship between national identity and security politics, the discursive character of the concept of security.

So far, this chapter has established that this thesis adopts a poststructuralist theoretical framework and problematises strictly positivistic and objectivist search for a singular definitive ‘truth’ about states’ decisions regarding nuclear weapons. While fully acknowledging the value of realist and constructivist accounts for understanding nuclear proliferation, it emphasises that preoccupation with universalist truths, causality, and pre-given identities, provides a somewhat limited picture. Instead, this
thesis treats identity as constructed through Soviet nuclear weapons discourse, meaning that it cannot exist outside of the discourse and cannot be used as a variable against which the behaviour of states can be measured (Hansen, 2006: 6). Furthermore, consistent with poststructuralist ontological emphasis on language, this thesis conceptualises identity as both a precondition for and as constituted through nuclear policy. Hence, the analytical epistemological focus is on how identity and policy are articulated within discourse. The implications of focusing on discourse and ontological, epistemological, and methodological considerations that it entails will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter. At this stage, the chapter turns to the poststructuralist emphasis on difference. It introduces the conceptualisation of identity as relational and highlights the significance of difference and Otherness to the articulations of foreign policy.

Identity, Difference, Otherness

Despite numerous debates regarding the role of identity in security studies, there is a general consensus that identity presumes multiplicity and is defined in relation to a series of differences (Fierke, 2015: 82). Difference is a central component of poststructuralist understanding of how meaning is constituted through discourse. Essentially, this means that language only establishes meanings through a series of differential signs or juxtapositions, and in so doing produces binary oppositions and hierarchies where one element is valued over the other (Agger, 1991: 113; Hansen, 2006: 19). These systems of signs are inherently unstable and are in need of support; it is through the articulation of difference that the meaning becomes temporarily stabilised.

To illustrate, a poststructuralist understanding of sovereignty implies separation and differentiation between domestic ‘inside’ and international ‘outside’; “the principle of state sovereignty affirms a specific account of who we are [...] and denies the possibility of any other alternative” (Walker, 1990: 12). The inside only becomes meaningful when it is juxtaposed to the outside. In this sense, the outside or the Other often takes on a form of not just being radically different, but also being constructed as evil and dangerous, as neatly epitomised by Walker (1990: 13):
"We" are rational, enlightened, and developed; We would be happy to cooperate with other peoples on the basis of rational and enlightened standards of civilized behaviour; but unfortunately "They" are uncivilized and irrational; consequently, We must resort to force in order to protect the standards We have striven so hard to maintain. Aspirations for peace are all very well, it might be said, but what about the ----- (fill in the name of your favourite enemy of the moment)?

This presents poststructuralist understandings of foreign policy as playing a central role in producing the boundary between inside and outside as well as producing the ‘we’ who enact this policy and the threatening ‘they’ who render security necessary (Hansen, 2012: 99). For the Soviet leaders, to speak of the capitalist, warmongering, the American, means to construct another identity as communist, peaceful or non-American, as will be illustrated in the empirical chapters of this thesis. These constructions are reproduced through foreign policy discourses and invoked as the precondition for policy action, which implies that identities are repeatedly executed rather than merely possessed. This sets out poststructuralist understanding of identity and policy as performative, meaning “constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (Butler, 1990: 25). As such, identities only become meaningful when they are performatively enacted through the formulation of policy.

In his seminal work *Identity/Difference*, William Connolly (1991: 64) stated that an identity could only exist when established in relation to difference: “Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty”. Inspired by the Derridean notion of *différance*, poststructuralist scholars propose several dimensions of the identity/difference nexus: first, the role of identity and difference in constituting ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of states; second, the role of identity and difference in reproducing hierarchies where one element is privileged over the other; and third, its role in constructing ethics, morality, and responsibility.

To build on the first point, Campbell (1992: 68), for example, explains that Otherness and the production of danger about the evil external Others are crucial for successful formation of a state’s identity. Looking at how the US historically constructed its identity, he claims that while identity need not require something radically different in this case there was a “temptation to treat difference as otherness” (Campbell, 1992: 56). These processes contribute to what Campbell calls a “well-established discursive
economy of identity/difference”, which in its turn triggers exclusionary practices of boundary-making (policies) and additionally reinforces the representation of fear and danger in society (Campbell, 1992: 145). As such, political leaders have historically legitimised their security policies by constructing spatial Others as threatening to the security of the national Self (Hansen, 2006: 38).

The ideological antagonism of the Cold War is an exemplary case of extreme othering, because the national Self (whether Soviet or American) was constituted vis-à-vis the evil radically different Other. However, as argued by Hansen (2006: 41), defining radical forms of identity construction as the only forms of identity construction results in a static view of foreign policy discourse as incapable to change. Identities are not always constructed in relation to evil or radically different external Others. Difference can take on more ambiguous and complex shapes and the degree of Otherness may also vary (Hansen, 2006: 39). In a similar manner, Guillaume (2011: 29) posits that if alternative mechanisms of constructing difference are possible, then othering represents only one mechanism in the process of “identity formation, performance and transformation, even though it might predominate in certain historical-intellectual contexts”.

Second, identities are constructed within foreign policy discourse not only though the articulation of spatial (outside) Others, but also in relation to temporal Others. Temporal themes may include development, transformation, change, or continuity (Hansen, 2006: 48). In this sense, articulations of difference may construct certain hierarchies and binary oppositions where the Other is inferior to the Self, one identity is valued over the other. Doty (1996: 2) refers to representations in the context of state interventions as “the ways in which the South has been discursively represented by policy makers, scholars, journalists, and others in the North”. Hierarchical representations and the construction of the Other as temporarily progressing towards, for example, the (Western) Self is a central component of discourses on democratisation, human rights, and legitimisation of interventions (Fierke, 2015: 82; Hansen, 2006: 40). For instance, Doty (1996: 2) argues that practices of representation of the Global South by the Global North contain certain representations that constitute the ‘imperial encounters’. As such, the relationship between the US and the
Philippines in the early 1950s was constructed in such a hierarchical manner that the US government was enabled to judge the internal situation in the Philippines and to embark on an interventionist course with little respect to Philippine sovereignty (Doty, 1993: 297-298). And this encounter constitutes the very meaning of ‘the American’ and ‘the Philippine’. This is relevant because, the Soviet leaders constructed the Self that was sometimes superior and sometimes inferior to the Other (the US), which served as both a precondition for and a product of rapidly increasing nuclear arsenals, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6.

According to Doty (1996: 3-4), identities are established through representational practices and binary oppositions act as legitimate ways to categorise certain parts of the world and to enable certain courses of foreign policy where the Self acts as a priori more superior and more developed than the Other. To illustrate, the binary oppositions found in, for example, intervention discourses may include rational/irrational, developed/underdeveloped, core/periphery, modern/traditional, to name but a few. However, temporal identity constructions need not always involve an external Other but can be based on the temporal construction of Self, becoming a better version of Self (Waever, 1996, cited in Hansen, 2006: 49). This shows how Selves as well as Others are in a continuous process of exploration and refinement.

Finally, aside from spatial and temporal dimensions of identity constructions, foreign policy discourses also articulate ethical identities. According to Hansen (2006: 50), political leaders legitimise foreign and security policies through the discursive constructions of responsibility, ethics, and morality. For instance, the emergence of development and human security discourses in the post-Cold War era point to the explicit exploration of ethical identities by states. Moving issues such as the violation of human rights or humanitarian disasters from the strategic self-concerned national realm invokes “a particular moral force, a call for action that in response constitutes the spatial and temporal identities of those involved” (Hansen, 2006: 50).

As this thesis is concerned with nuclear weapons discourses, it is crucial to consider spatial, temporal, and ethical identities that these discourses articulate. Similarly to discourses on development and interventions, nuclear weapons discourses establish
hierarchies. The discursive construction of a nuclear threat both highlights and represses its inherent dangers and demonstrates that various representations are present, often simultaneously. Despite the heterogeneous dangers of nuclear proliferation, the collective discourse often focuses on some dangers while ignoring the others. For instance, Gusterson (1999: 111) argues that there is a common perception in the Global North that nuclear weapons somehow become more dangerous in the hands of the Global South leaders. Thus, “while we can live with the nuclear weapons of the five official nuclear nations (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States) for the indefinite future, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nuclear-threshold states in the Third World, especially the Islamic world, would be enormously dangerous” (Gusterson, 1999: 112). Gusterson (1999) refers to this double standard on nuclear weapons as ‘nuclear Orientalism’, which can be conceptualised as a specific discourse that puts certain representations into circulation and in which, through the production of danger, the Self speaks of the Other reinforcing hierarchies and constructing identities. The analogous pattern can also be found in the Soviet nuclear weapons discourse, as Chapters 5 and 6 will articulate.

Furthermore, the non-proliferation discourse also reproduces hierarchies. For example, Paul (2003: 146) and Price (2007: 242) argue that unequal rights and obligations constitute a major shortcoming of the NPT regime, suggesting that it legitimises nuclear weapons of major superpowers while emphasising others’ weapons as a threat. Price (2007: 232) claims that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is suffering a chronic legitimacy deficit worldwide, which is caused by continuous possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states. He suggests that this legitimacy crisis has been deepened further by the US under the Bush administration recognising India as a responsible nuclear power and normalising its nuclear arsenal in 2005 (Price, 2007: 243). This change in perception constructs a notion within nuclear weapons discourse that nuclear weapons are not a problem if possessed by responsible, not rogue, states. The threat is posed by potential possessors and users, not by nuclear weapons themselves, which “amounts to a rejection of the bedrock premise of the NPT regime: namely, that nuclear weapons themselves are an international bad no matter who possesses them” (Price, 2007: 244).

The matters of responsibility have already been discussed in Chapter 2. Using similar
theoretical frameworks, Ritchie (2010) and Duncanson and Eschle (2008) claim that nuclear superpowers establish a Self that is morally good and responsible. This shows how nuclear weapons discourses articulate ethical identities. The essentialist premise of the Western discourse constructs leaders of countries in the Global South as somewhat lacking responsibility and both technological and political maturity to handle nuclear weapons (Gusterson, 1999: 114). This invokes the representations of the Western Self not only as more responsible, but also as a morally superior policeman of disarmament, enacting policy to halt nuclear proliferation in the Global South, while maintaining its own ‘safe’ nuclear weapons (Gusterson, 1999: 114). This is relevant, because a similar dynamic is seen between the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6.

To sum up, poststructuralism is always relational and is discursively constructed in juxtaposition to difference. This difference takes on varying degree of Otherness and through the production of threat and danger necessarily invoked by the Other, it stabilises constructions of the Self and acts as both a precondition for and a constitutive of foreign policy. As argued by Doty (1996: 3-4), identities of people or states are created through representational practices (e.g. political statements) that position subjects vis-à-vis one another. Thus, oppositions often act as legitimate ways of categorising certain regions or peoples of the world and are crucial for successful formation and functioning of a state’s identity.

Although identity always requires difference in order to be, the difference need not always be extreme. Seeing identity as only existing through radical difference produces a weaker reading of foreign policy discourse and prevents the engagement with the processes through which discourses become stable or change over time. Finally, in addition to the analytical concern with the varying degree of Otherness, it is imperative to locate difference in the three dimensions of identity construction: spatial, temporal, and ethical. Nuclear weapons discourses are known to articulate Selves and Others along all three of these dimensions, as noted above. Through the conception of space, time, and responsibility political communities argue and think about their boundaries, their internal constitution, and relations with the outside (Hansen, 2006: 46). This is important, because this thesis captures the time frame where significant shifts in the direction of nuclear policy have occurred meaning that articulated
identities have also transformed over time. Building on this, the next section of this chapter argues that gender intersects with the dimensions along which states construct their identities and foreign policies and thus, it is essential to include gender to the analyses of nuclear identity/policy nexus.

The Relevance of Gender for Understanding Identity Constructions and Nuclear Weapons Policy

Chapter 2 briefly outlined the invaluable contribution of feminist IR approaches to identity-focused nuclear weapons proliferation literature. Gender is seen to function as a symbolic system that reveals existing dichotomous structures within international relations, because the very meaning of masculinity and femininity is defined through its relation to the Other (Cohn at al., 2005: 1). Feminist scholars emphasise that ideas about gender are woven through policy discourses and shape all aspects of how nuclear weapons are perceived and addressed by states. As Duncanson and Eschle (2008: 546) posit, “discourses about nuclear weapons, amongst other things, are infused with a series of conceptual dichotomies which flow from and underpin the primary signifiers of masculine/feminine, with the masculine side of the dichotomy favoured over the feminine”. This section unpacks the significance of gender to understanding how identity and difference are discursively constituted and reproduced through practices of foreign policy, and how the status of a nuclear power is constructed as a particularly masculine status.

In a similar vein to poststructuralists, feminist IR scholars problematise the objectivist and positivist nature of conventional IR approaches widely arguing that they are gender-blind and thus provide a limited picture of global politics (see e.g. Cohn, 1987a; 1987b; Hooper, 2001; Enloe, 2007; 2014; Runyan and Peterson, 1991; Tickner, 1992; 1995). According to Enloe (2014: 352), “explanations of international politics that are devoid of feminist questioning are too-simple explanations. Such nonfeminist explanations shy away from complexity. They underestimate power.” Feminist IR critiques of realism hold that realists assume the world is divided into series of dualisms – men-women, peace-war, strong-weak, rich-poor – that inform concepts such as security and power, are patriarchal by nature, and privilege masculinity (Runyan and Peterson, 1991: 70; Tickner, 1995: 56). The notions of
morality and rationality prevalent in realist thought are built upon idealised traits of masculinity and international politics is ultimately seen as “a man’s world, a world of power and conflict in which warfare is a privileged activity” (Tickner, 1995: 53). Broadly, feminist IR scholars seek to deconstruct realist claims that are based on gendered assumptions, and similarly to poststructuralists, they emphasise the historic and cultural contingency of knowledge.

As a response to the objectivism, essentialism, and gender-blindness of mainstream approaches to IR, feminist IR theory seeks to introduce gender as a category of analysis in IR and to conceptualise gender as socially constructed rather than given. As explained by Sylvester (1994: 4): “By “socially constructed”, I mean that men and women are the stories that have been told about “men” and “women” and the constraints and opportunities that have thereby arisen as we take to our proper places.” Understanding gender as a social construct allows us to move beyond inherent and static notions of, for instance, women as more peaceful and men as more aggressive and warlike, and instead investigate how masculine and feminine traits are ascribed to subjects and objects in international politics such as nuclear weapons.

Another important aspect of understanding gender is its performativity. Judith Butler (1990; 2011) famously claimed that gender has no ontological status and is produced and reproduced through various discursive practices rather than through the inscription of meaning on a pre-given sex. Consequently, masculine and feminine identities are not located in the body, but constructed and sustained through performative acts (Butler, 1990: 136). This process is discursive, meaning that discourse is central to the constitution of gender: “Performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate “act”, but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (Butler 2011, xii). As such, gender is not a stable identity and only becomes meaningful as long as it is continuously performed. In line with Butler’s claims, this thesis theorises identity as performative meaning that articulations of identity within nuclear weapons discourse are only meaningful as long as they are performatively enacted through policy practices.
Ideas about gender are not understood here as ideas about women and men, their bodies, or their perspectives on nuclear weapons. Rather, ideas about gender represent the discursive constructions of masculinity and femininity as a differential system of signs that reinforces particular identities and enables political action. Feminist IR scholars point specifically to the gendered nature of these constructions claiming that gender operates as a site where identities are constituted in hierarchical difference. In the West dichotomies such as rational vs. irrational, objectivity vs. subjectivity, reason vs. emotion have typically been used to describe male/female bodies (Tickner, 1995: 57). In international relations discourses, characteristics associated with masculinity are predominantly valued higher than those associated with femininity. It is, however, important to avoid treating ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ as monolithic categories; international relations discourses produce different forms of masculinity and femininity that depend on circumstances and are subject to change and struggle (Hooper, 2001: 4). As such, the meaning of masculinity and femininity is not fixed or ahistorical and is open for a potential change. It is, therefore, important to be aware that Soviet nuclear weapons discourse may articulate different forms of masculinity, enabling varying courses of nuclear policy.

Of particular relevance to this thesis is Carol Cohn’s pioneering research on the gendered nature of nuclear weapons discourse. Cohn (1987b: 715) posits that nuclear discourse is an “emphatically male discourse” rife with images of competitive male sexuality and built on language that is abstract, sanitised, and full of euphemisms. In her detailed study of the language of nuclear deterrence employed by the American defence intellectuals, which she refers to as “technostrategic”, she concludes that beneath the abstraction and technical jargon lie “strong currents of homoerotic excitement, heterosexual domination, the drive towards competence and mastery, the pleasures of membership in an elite and privileged group” (Cohn, 1987a: 24). Cohn (1987a: 18) argues that incorporating sexual metaphors in the representations of nuclear weapons mobilises the association of these weapons with masculine traits such as strength, competitiveness, manliness, sexual potency, rationality, and power, which thereby supports their development and possession. As a result, “regardless of their military utility nuclear weapons are turned into the ultimate arbiter of political/masculine power” (Cohn et al., 2005: 4). This creates context for, first,
nuclear weapons being perceived as the preeminent symbol of state security and, second, for nuclear superpowers to ensure this symbol is secure by subordinating and emasculating other nations (Cohn et al., 2005: 4). In contrast, nuclear disarmament and those who oppose nuclear weapons are portrayed as irrational, unrealistic, emotional, idealistic, and “wimpish” (Cohn, 1987a: 24; 1993: 231).

Arms races are, to put simply, competitions. According to Wilson and Daly, 1985: 60), intense competitiveness is a predominantly masculine characteristic. Indeed, Cohn (1987b: 715; 1993: 236) argues that sexualised competition and obsessive concern with manliness constitutes the very nature of the elite nuclear weapons discourse. In addition, she posits: “within the defence community discourse, manliness is equated not only with the ability to win war; it is also equated with the willingness to threaten and use force” (Cohn, 1993: 236). This is connected to another defining feature of masculinity, which is bravado – the denial of fear and vulnerability. As defined by Trickett (2011: 287-288), bravado is a highly masculine attribute that ties in with the idea of being ‘tough’ and ‘fearless’. As shown above, possessing nuclear weapons is also associated with being ‘tough’ and ‘fearless’, among other aspects. These points are important, because the Cold War was the period of an intense nuclear competition between the Soviet Union and the US, where both sides often threatened to use force against each other. Naturally, identities constructed in and expressed through a set of Cold War foreign policy discourses were masculine. The persistent and pervasive representations of masculine attributes within nuclear policy discourses did not create a suitable space for effective disarmament policy, which is why perhaps very little was achieved to halt the Cold War arms race, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

To further illustrate the relationship between the construction of masculine identity and policy, Jutta Weldes (1999) provides an engaging gender-mindful account of nuclear identity/policy nexus. She focuses on the reading of the official US discourse during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, claiming that the narrative of the Cuban missile crisis was constructed around US state identity, which both rendered the crisis obvious and marginalised alternative accounts. More specifically, the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba made the “emphatically masculinist” US Cold War identity precarious. Constructing the events as crisis created possibility for the US to take
action (to manifest a forceful policy response) and thus to reassert and performatively reproduce this identity. Weldes (1999: 46) describes it not just as masculine, but also as “aggressively macho”, “The fear of appearing weak – whether of arms or of will – loomed large because such a feminine characteristic would excite not the desired respect, but only contempt”. Recalling the discussion of othering in the previous section, the production of crisis can be described as one of the mechanisms that enables state leaders to secure the Self vis-à-vis the external Other through the discursive production of threat and danger. This shows how in nuclear policy discourse the Other becomes radical and threatening, when masculinity of the Self is threatened and is in need of reassurance. This is important, because such dynamic enables particularly forceful policy action, which was prevalent during the Cold War.

Weldes (1999: 42-47) describes American masculinist identity as being discursively constructed within the Cold War discourse and built around: first, claims to leadership and credibility, particularly in the Western hemisphere; second, around being the defender of freedom and democracy; third, around reinforcing the overtly masculine elements such as strength, toughness, and will; and finally, this identity was built around the US taking on the ‘burden of responsibility’ due to its uniqueness and, to quote the US president John Kennedy, “the right to the moral leadership of the planet” (Kennedy, 1961, cited in Weldes, 1999: 42). While being aware of the presence of gendered hierarchies in the US discourse, the analysis of Weldes also neatly captures all three dimensions along which identities are constructed: spatial, temporal, ethical. The Soviet nuclear missile deployment in Cuba challenged and threatened all elements of US identity. Hence, these events have been constructed as a crisis. As a result, US interest in the crisis became maintaining and showcasing its credibility to the allies through the marginalisation of alternative narratives.

Furthermore, the US leaders construct Soviet missiles differently from their own. The Soviet missiles are (necessarily) offensive and by definition aggressive and illegitimate, whereas “because the United States had ‘commitments’ in which it engaged openly and without deceit, the extraterritorial missile deployments of the United States were (necessarily) defensive” (Weldes, 1999: 53). Overall, such practices enable the reassurance of state identity; “crises allow for the (re)articulation of relations of
identity/difference as a means of both constituting and securing state identity” (Welde, 1999: 58). The research of Welde demonstrates that masculine identities are always potentially precarious and are in need of constant reinforcement and stabilisation. Otherness both constitutes identity and threatens it. Therefore, when reading Soviet nuclear discourse, it is imperative to be mindful of practices through which states stabilise their identities such as the production of danger and crises, or the transformation of difference into otherness and vice versa. The last point is crucial, because, as will be shown in Chapter 7, constructing the Other as not so radical or even different enables significant shifts in the direction of nuclear policy.

This section demonstrated that “gendered discourse constructs a masculine identity around nuclear weapons that places firm parameters on what is considered appropriate and inappropriate behaviour” (Ritchie, 2008: 11). Gender shapes the way nuclear weapons are talked about and thought of, which reveals a distorted hierarchical nature of nuclear weapons discourse and policy. Thus, gender plays an important role in the construction of international politics, and a poststructuralist account of nuclear weapons policy must be gender-mindful, because powerful ideas of masculinity underpin nuclear discourses and identities and policies that it reproduces.

So far, this chapter has established that both poststructuralist and feminist IR scholars have sought to critique the objectivist, state and military centric views of security and nuclear proliferation. Conversely, these scholars emphasise the role discourse, identity, and gender play in constructing international politics. Security and gender are understood here as socially constructed and performatively reproduced, rather than pre-given. It has also been established that this thesis adopts a poststructuralist approach that is gender-mindful, arguing that identities are constituted through nuclear weapons discourse and established in relation to difference that takes on varying degree of Otherness. Identities serve as both a precondition for and a product of nuclear policy, meaning that the two are mutually constitutive and reinforcing. Furthermore, nuclear weapons discourses articulate identities along the three dimensions: spatial temporal, and ethical. Gender intersects with all three dimensions, and gender hierarchies reproduced through nuclear discourse shape nuclear
behaviour of states. A status of a nuclear power is constituted as a particularly masculine status due to state officials’ historical preoccupation with manliness, strength, and demonstration of power. The existence of such constructions makes nuclear proliferation possible and desirable, while simultaneously subordinating disarmament efforts, which are seen as a demeaning sign of weakness.

These are the primary theoretical roots of this thesis, which emphasises the centrality of identity and discourse to the course of Soviet nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War. This chapter now turns to the conceptualisation of ‘a nuclear state identity’ and describes how it enables the main research question restated at the beginning of this chapter to be answered.

*The Discursive Construction of a Nuclear Identity*

Chapter 1 already established that in order to explore the connection between identity and Soviet nuclear policy, this thesis specifically looks at how Soviet leaders constructed their nuclear identity across the span of the Cold War events, and how these constructions made Soviet nuclear decisions possible. Subsequently, drawing from Ballbach’s study of North Korea’s nuclear policy, Chapter 2 emphasised the utility of using a more precise formulation of ‘a nuclear state identity’ rather than just state/national identity when examining states’ nuclear policies. Ballbach (2016: 393) conceptualises nuclear identity as a particular trait of the broader state identity that is performatively constituted through foreign policy discourses and is imbricated with the reframing of the Self in terms of a nuclear weapons state.

Chapter 2 discussed how states have historically grounded their identity in the possession of powerful weaponry. The enormous destructive force of nuclear weapons carries a number of political, economic, and cultural consequences for their possessors, which reshapes state identity. All states that acquire nuclear weapons construct nuclear identities. While Ballbach (2016) offers a useful clarification of what it means to establish and reinforce Self as a nuclear weapons state, I will elaborate on the concept of ‘a nuclear identity’ and expand its meaning based upon the theoretical underpinnings of this analysis.
In the context of the subject matter of this thesis, the conceptualisation of poststructuralist identity/policy nexus and the socially constructed nature of international politics stimulates the asking of several interrelated research questions. First, ‘how did the Soviet elites construct Soviet nuclear identity?’ Second, ‘how did Soviet nuclear identity evolve over time?’ Third, ‘how did nuclear identity constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions possible?’ To reiterate, the main objective of posing how questions is to explore a complex interplay of facets that constitute nuclear identities (e.g. beliefs, gendered hierarchies, representations of Self and Other) and to investigate how these facets enabled nuclear policy in the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Nuclear identity encompasses political elites’ (general secretaries, ministers, top Communist Party officials etc.) beliefs in the historical connection between power, recognition, and nuclear weapons. It represents how elites perceive their state as a power in light of possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear identity can be understood in a poststructuralist sense as discursive and relational. It is discursive, because it is constructed and articulated through words and narratives that political elites use to talk about nuclear weapons, and to justify and legitimise decisions and practices regarding nuclear proliferation, arms control, or disarmament. Nuclear identities exist only as long as they are continuously rearticulated in discourse and enacted through policy decisions. As such, Soviet nuclear weapons discourse is broadly envisioned here as the articulation of ideas about nuclear weapons (both Soviet and others’), their value to the Soviet Self, and enunciation of Soviet intent and practice regarding nuclear proliferation and/or disarmament through the formulation of official foreign and security policy doctrines.

Statements have varying impact depending on who makes them. Foucault (1972: 50) claimed that in order to understand how certain discourses acquire meaning, we must first ask who is speaking:

Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it [the language] his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true? What is the status of the individuals who – alone – have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?
Political elites play a key role in constructing and reinforcing nuclear identities, as they are principal decision makers when it comes to foreign and security policy. Thus, nuclear identities reflect political elites’ vision or understanding of how being nuclear relates to their state being a recognised power. The status of political elite puts this group in the position of speaking and deciding for the state or the collective. For poststructuralists, knowledge can be accepted due to power and prominence of such actors. Given the totalitarian structure of the Soviet Union, political elite discourses can be considered hegemonic. In a Foucauldian sense, these discourses are the expression of Soviet totalitarian power conditions, in which the alternatives are silenced, freedoms restricted, and opportunities for action are blocked (Foucault, 1977).

Nuclear identity is relational, because it is defined in relation to what it is not, through relations of difference. The premises for self-definition are rooted in an ongoing process of selfcomparison with key Others. As Hymans (2006b: 21) puts it, “It is the identification of similarities and differences (real or imagined) between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that clarifies the sense of who we are”. In line with the theoretical discussion in the previous sections of this chapter, difference here is assumed to take on varying degree of Otherness. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that in order to flesh out the important political substance of identity construction, it is essential to consider three dimensions: spatial, temporal, ethical. Identities and difference are articulated in nuclear weapons discourses along all three of these dimensions. Hence, the examination of Soviet nuclear identity in this thesis employs spatiality, temporality, and ethicality as three analytical lenses.

Taking each of the three lenses in turn, first, nuclear identity constructions always involve the articulation of borders. For the Soviet leaders, the key spatial Other during the Cold War was the United States, but also anything that embodied capitalism whether it was other capitalist states or merely their beliefs that did not adhere to the Soviet socialist ideology. As noted by Hansen (2006: 47), spatial identities may be constructed as a combination of the geographically bounded and the abstract political. The fierce Soviet-American nuclear rivalry presents a particularly enduring occurrence, because it enables the most powerful constructions of spatial nuclear identity. Poststructuralist accounts are interested in how states construct identities for
themselves based on the Other. This is why looking at how the Soviet officials constructed their superpower rival and its ideology and nuclear arsenals in order to articulate Soviet nuclear identity, is an essential component of the empirical chapters to follow.

Second, nuclear identities are constructed in relation to temporal Others, whether external or internal. Progress, change, and transformation constituted an integral part of the Soviet post-revolution mindset. Hansen (2006: 49) posits that narratives of past struggles and defeats are essential for the establishment and refinement of the contemporary Self. Therefore, this analysis is mindful of the temporal articulations of the Soviet Self, because Bolshevik rule was undoubtedly the period of significant change and transition. Stalin, for example, frequently compared the Soviet Union to the Tsarist Russian Empire, whereas Khrushchev compared the Soviet Union of his present to Stalin's rule, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6. It is also important to pay attention to temporal constructions of external Others. The nuclear arms race was a competition where each side continuously tried to gain advantage and superiority over the other, meaning that there was a need for constant progression towards the Other. More specifically, one should ask whether the Self was articulated in a time different from the one of the Other. Or is the Other constituted as temporally superior to the Self thus enabling the search for progress and superiority?

Finally, in nuclear weapons discourse, difference can be located in ethical constructions of identity, because, as mentioned previously, states naturally articulate the Self that is a responsible nuclear state. Chapter 2 established that among other factors, national security concerns enabled nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Union. “For governments to legitimise their foreign policies as in the ‘national interest’ is to articulate a responsibility toward the national body politics”, which consequently signals (non)responsibility towards the Other (Hansen, 2006: 50). Moving beyond state responsibility towards the national community, nuclear weapons discourses also articulate explicit international responsibility whether to accentuate the importance of disarmament or the importance of protecting the world from the Other’s nuclear weapons. This establishes the Self within the higher moral ground and invokes a particular moral force on state actions. As such, it is important to pay attention to the
discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility in the Soviet nuclear weapons’ discourse.

Nuclear identity is masculine, because it is underpinned by powerful ideas of masculinity that state leaders attach to nuclear weapons. These ideas are woven through nuclear weapons discourse of superpowers such as the Soviet Union and the United States. Gender as a symbolic system intersects with all three dimensions along which states construct identity and difference. It reproduces particular hierarchies where the side associated with traditionally masculine characteristics such as strength, power, and sexual potency, is valued over the other side. As such, nuclear identities that enable nuclear weapons proliferation and arms races are a priori masculine.

However, the previous section stated that both masculinity and femininity are fluid and should not be treated as static or monolithic. As emphasised by Hooper (2001: 67), masculinities are constantly in flux, and dominant forms of masculinities “are constantly being challenged, reconstituted, and reinvented in different sections of society, in adaptation to changing economic, political, and social circumstances”. It is therefore important to pay attention to how the masculine nature of Soviet nuclear identity altered throughout the Cold War and the kind of political change that this enabled or precluded. As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis captures three different time periods of nuclear weapons proliferation during the Cold War, from the rapid arms build-up to disarmament and strict arms control measures between 1941 and 1991.

Changes in the direction of policy are made possible due to the changing nature of identity that enables them. Masculinity, as one of the primary characteristics of a nuclear identity, is also susceptible to change. Conducting a gender-mindful analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons policy allows us to examine discursive changes that facilitate policy adjustments. To quote Enloe (1993: 18-19), the Cold War itself is:

> best understood as involving not simply a contest between two superpowers, each trying to absorb as many countries as possible into its own orbit, but also a series of contests within each of those societies over the definitions of masculinity and femininity that would sustain or dilute that rivalry.

Applying the insights of poststructuralism and feminism, discussed earlier in this
chapter, Soviet nuclear identity is understood here to have always been the product of Soviet political elites’ nuclear weapons discourse. As such, nuclear identity is discursive, and it is articulated through words, narratives, and official policy statements and doctrines concerning nuclear weapons acquisition, nuclear build up, arms control, and disarmament. Soviet nuclear identity is relational, meaning that it only exists in relation to difference constructed by the Soviet officials. This difference is located in spatial, temporal, and/or ethical constructions of identity that exist in nuclear weapons discourse. The key external Other of the Soviet Self is the capitalist US. The way Soviet officials construct the Other establishes and reinforces Soviet nuclear identity thus enabling nuclear policy. However, this thesis takes into account that identity constructions involve multiple Others and varying degree of difference.

Soviet nuclear identity is also masculine, because of the symbolic link between ideas about masculinity and nuclear weapons. This link was particularly prominent during the Cold War arms race and as noted in the previous section, nuclear weapons discourse is oversaturated with masculine traits that render nuclear proliferation desirable and necessary. Masculinity, however, is in flux and is susceptible to change, which potentially enables a differing course of policy. This nuclear identity-focused poststructuralist approach arguably enables the analysis of the relationship between identity and Soviet nuclear weapons policy during the Cold War, which this thesis seeks to examine. Therefore, it makes an important contribution to our understanding of nuclear politics by first, fleshing out the identity construction of a lesser known in critical IR literature case; and second, by showing how the Soviet identity constructions fuelled nuclear weapons acquisition, the arms crisis and confrontational global politics, and actually helped to resolve this crisis and move towards disarmament.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlined the essential elements of the theoretical framework through which this thesis seeks to examine the relationship between nuclear identity constructions and Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. Theoretical roots of the analysis adhere to the works of poststructuralist and feminist IR authors. In IR terms, this is a poststructuralist critical security studies situated thesis. Rather than to replace, it seeks to problematise the objectivist, positivist, and materialist approaches to
nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Union prevalent in IR literature. This chapter has argued that a discursive gender-mindful approach that seeks to deconstruct the hierarchical representations upon which nuclear weapons policy is based is the most appropriate approach for this thesis.

Drawing from poststructuralist and feminist critiques of mainstream IR approaches, it has introduced international security as a discursive arena, where states establish and reinforce their discursively constructed and relational nuclear identities. These identities are both constitutive of and a product of states’ nuclear policies, meaning that the two are mutually reinforcing. Identities are not fixed or pre-given but are performatively executed through practices of foreign and security policy. This thesis problematises the causal relationship between identity and policy maintained by some constructivist approaches to nuclear proliferation, arguing that it leads to an incomplete and static understanding of identity/policy nexus. Instead, this thesis asks how the construction of Soviet nuclear identity made nuclear policy decisions possible.

Understanding nuclear identity as relational postulates that it is always constituted in relation to difference. However, in comparison to some poststructuralist scholars who generally focus on instances of extreme Otherness (see e.g. Campbell, 1992; Connolly, 1991), this chapter argued that difference does not always need to be radical, and it is imperative to take into account varying degree of Otherness along with the three dimensions of identity construction: spatial, temporal, and ethical. In Hansen’s terms such approach to identity/difference nexus provides a “theoretical double grip”. According to Hansen (2006: 51), this double grip:

not only provides substantial knowledge of the identity construction taking place within foreign policy discourse, it also provides a lens through which discursive differences, similarities, and changes can be studied, thus ultimately furthering theoretical understanding of the links between identity and policy.

Further to this, this chapter emphasised that gender intersects with all three dimensions of identity construction. Nuclear identities are necessarily constructed as masculine, and feminist approach that foregrounds gender is required in order to flesh
out the hierarchical structure of nuclear weapons discourse that makes nuclear weapons desirable for states.

Both poststructuralist and feminist scholars build on the Foucauldian idea that discourses produce modes of power and exclusion and their purpose is to critique and deconstruct the binary oppositions that underpin the processes of power and exclusion. Integrating gender into a poststructuralist account of Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War is imperative in order to uncover the dichotomous structures that are present in the Soviet nuclear discourse and to interrogate the ways, in which nuclear identities are constructed and articulated through relations of difference and the kind of policies this enables. Before continuing to this analysis, I first must outline the methodological considerations and methods employed in this thesis. While it has been intimated to some extent in this chapter, the conceptualisation of ‘discourse’ necessitates a more detailed examination.
Chapter 4. Methodological Considerations and Methods: Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

Introduction

Chapter 3 established that this thesis adopts a poststructuralist gender-mindful theoretical approach to explore the connection between Soviet nuclear identity constructions and Soviet nuclear policy across the span of the Cold War events. It emphasised the centrality of language and discourse to poststructuralist studies and introduced the concept of ‘nuclear identity’ as an entity that is continuously rearticulated in nuclear discourse and enacted or ‘performed’ through nuclear policy decisions. I argued that identity does not cause nuclear weapons policy or vice versa; rather, they exist in a mutually constitutive relationship and continuously reinforce each other. Before delving into the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity and policy, it is important to discuss the methods used to translate this theoretical perspective into empirical research.

This chapter presents the methodological choices made, and methods utilised to achieve the objectives of this thesis. First, it clarifies what is meant by ‘discourse’ in the context of this thesis and introduces a poststructuralist approach to discourse. Second, drawing principally on Hansen’s poststructuralist discourse theory and methodology, it elaborates upon the ontological, epistemological, and methodological premises of poststructuralist-informed understanding of identity as both constitutive of and a product of policy. Third, this chapter discusses the interpretive strategy and practicalities of poststructuralist discourse analysis focusing on text selection, the application of discourse analysis to texts, and issues of validity, reliability, and generalisability.

A Poststructuralist Approach to Discourse

Chapter 3 has already gone some way towards outlining the centrality of language and discourse to poststructuralist research. It has theorised nuclear identity and policy as discursive by nature with linguistic practices centrally involved in structuring international politics. To recap Doty’s formulation, “International relations are
inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as ‘truth’” (Doty, 1996: 5). As such, a discursive approach is particularly suitable for the investigation of the mutually constitutive relationship between identity constructions and nuclear weapons policy. It allows us to uncover how subjects and objects acquire their meaning and the kind of possibilities for action these meanings enable. The starting point of a discursive approach is that language and discourse constitute reality and not the other way around. “Our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating or changing them” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1).

On this basis, broadly speaking, a discourse(s) can be understood as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 1). More specifically, discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49), where meaning is constantly negotiated and established by the way language is structured into a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 4). As Howarth (2000: 102) exemplifies in a frequently cited passage:

Consider, for instance, a forest standing in the path of a proposed motorway. It may simply represent an inconvenient obstacle impeding the rapid implementation of a new road system, or it might be viewed as a site of special interest for scientists and naturalists, or a symbol of the nation’s threatened natural heritage. In short, the meaning or ‘being’ of the forest – what it literally is for us – depends on the particular systems of difference or discourses that constitute its identity.

Studying these “systems of difference” forms the basis of a discursive approach. In the context of the subject matter of this thesis, similar to the forest above, Soviet nuclear identity comes into being through multiple contradictory dimensions that are historically contingent. For example, Soviet nuclear identity may appear very differently to different audiences. It may appear as aggressively competitive and irrational or as reasonable and peace-loving. Contradictory elements can combine to constitute identity, which will be elaborated upon throughout the empirical chapters.
According to Milliken (1999: 229), seeing discourse as structures of signification which construct social realities is the first theoretical commitment of discourse theorists. The meaning is seen as established in structure and not in substance. Discourses are expected to be structured as a sign system where one object is distinguished from the other (Milliken, 1999: 229). Poststructuralists often draw on Derrida, who emphasised the oppositional nature of this relationship between signs exposing established relations of power where one element is valued over the other. This is important for poststructuralist conceptualisation of identity as relational. Chapter 3 demonstrated that foreign policy discourses establish identities in relation to radical difference in a hierarchical order through the juxtaposition of the national Self to the foreign Other (see e.g. Campbell, 1992; Connolly, 1991; Doty, 1993; Walker, 1990). This is particularly relevant to the classical discourse of national security. However, some discourses construct a more ambiguous form of difference that does not necessarily involve radical othering, power, or hierarchy (see e.g. Guillaume, 2011; Hansen, 2006). Furthermore, this difference is constructed along three dimensions – spatial, temporal, ethical – that intersect with gender. This provides a more substantial knowledge of identity constructions, going beyond the simple identifying of two signs as ‘different’.

As some discourses draw on more ambiguous constructions of difference, understanding identity cannot be solely accomplished through looking at juxtapositions and dichotomies, but through the location of signs within a more complex structure of linking and differentiation (Hansen, 2006: 41-42). As such, “meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs” (Hansen, 2006: 42). Hansen (2006: 21) exemplifies this process by showing how in the 19th century discourse through a positive process of linking the term ‘woman’ was defined as emotional, motherly, reliant, but these female series of links were at the same time juxtaposed to the male series of links, such as rational, intellectual, independent, through a negative process of differentiation. The key methodological point to establish here is that discourses construct identities within a web of signs that do not necessarily have to be explicit or to exist in the form of binary oppositions. The links between signs might become
unstable, whereby the negatively valued term of one discourse may become a positive sign within another. Therefore, to flesh out Soviet nuclear identity constructions, this relationship between signs in discourse needs to be carefully studied.

When talking about how discourses stabilise and fix meaning within a web of signs, different discourse theorists use different terms. For example, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 142) emphasise the significance of “nodal points”. To put simply, a nodal point is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 26). This often gives way to the construction of dominating or hegemonic discourses. However, an important aspect of poststructuralist understanding of how discourse operates is the assertion that discourses are fluid, whereby the meaning can never be fixed permanently and is inherently unstable (Doty, 1996: 6; Hansen, 2006: 21; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 111). Such conceptualisation reinforces the notion of discourse and identity as changeable and historically contingent. As explained by Doty (1996: 6): “Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it can only be partial in nature. It is the overflowing and incomplete nature of discourses that opens up spaces for change, discontinuity, and variation”. For example, understanding discourses as fluid allows us to see how the constructed meaning attached to nuclear proliferation in Soviet nuclear discourse might shift and destabilise over time. In this sense, the ‘positive signs’ linked to nuclear build-up might become unstable; or a negatively valued term previously attached to disarmament might be constructed as positive. This has implications for the discursive articulations of policies that these varying constructions enable, as will be exemplified by the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions under the rule of Gorbachev in Chapter 7.

**Ontological and Epistemological Premises of Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis**

One of the criticisms often levelled at poststructuralism is its denial of materiality, the ‘real world’ out there. This stems from poststructuralism’s explicit critique of universalism and objectivist search for a singular definitive ‘truth’, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3. For example, some critics describe the poststructuralist stance as “a radical idealist position, increasingly emptied of any intelligible meaning” (Guzzini, 2000: 148). However, it would be imprecise to claim that poststructuralism rejects materiality. Rather, as Hansen (2006: 22) argues, “the point is not to disregard material
facts, but to study how these are produced and prioritised”. Laclau and Mouffe (1995: 108) concur that the point is not to deny materiality of objects, but to affirm that these objects only acquire meaning through discourse. They explain:

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence (Laclau and Mouffe, 1995: 108).

Nuclear identity exists in a mutually constitutive relationship with policy. It only exists in nuclear weapons discourse, but it is enacted and reproduced through a set of material structures such as nuclear testing, the signing of a treaty or arms reduction, and so on. Therefore, identity and policy are ontologically intertwined, which leads to the conceptualisation of nuclear policy as a discursive practice. In line with Hansen’s and Butler’s formulations, identities come into being through the discursive enactment or ‘performance’ of policy, but at the same time these identities are constructed as legitimising the proposed policy (Butler, 1990: 25; Hansen, 2006: 26). The key task of discourse analysis is thus to show how policies acquire meaning within discourse drawing on a set of identity constructions.

An epistemological premise of poststructuralist understanding of identity and policy as mutually constitutive lies in the rejection of causality. This sets poststructuralism apart from rationalism and constructivism. Hansen (2006: 26) explains that in order to investigate a causal relationship, a dependent and an independent variable need to be identified, separated, and observed independently. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, neorealist approaches to nuclear proliferation may trace states’ nuclear decisions to a particular security threat or lack of thereof; the domestic politics approaches would look at the domestic structures and changes within states; and some constructivist approaches would look at the establishment of certain norms, codified or not, and hypothesise their causal effect on nuclear proliferation and restraint. In contrast, for poststructuralists, the two variables are ontologically
inseparable and enacted through discourse. As such, there is no identity existing independently or prior to policy (Hansen, 2006: 26).

Poststructuralist adoption of discursive epistemology is not a flaw, but a choice. It allows us to move from the positivist logic of explanation to the logic of interpretation. Rather than questioning why a certain policy decision was made, poststructuralists ask how it was made possible. Chapter 3 established the significance of posing how questions. As argued by Doty (1993: 298), how questions allow us to examine “how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others”. Posing why questions takes as unproblematic the possibility that a particular action could happen and instead relies on probability (Doty, 1993: 298). The review of the literature in Chapter 2 demonstrated that approaches utilising such explanations only provide a partial understanding of Soviet nuclear policy. Therefore, to recap the primary research questions outlined in the Introduction, this thesis asks, first, ‘how did the Soviet elites construct Soviet nuclear identity?’ Second, ‘how did Soviet nuclear identity evolve over time?’ Third, ‘how did nuclear identity constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions possible?’ Posing these questions allows for an in-depth exploration of the connection between identity constructions and Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War.

So, how does one go about answering these research questions? What are the methodological implications of adopting a discursive ontology and a discursive epistemology? The relationship between poststructuralists and questions of methodology and methods is not straightforward, because traditionally, poststructuralist research has not engaged with explicit methodological discussions, drawing on Derrida’s widely cited claim that methodology is bound with positivism and his own deconstruction is “not a method and cannot be transformed into one” (Derrida, 1991, cited in Peters and Biesta, 2009: 22). However, Hansen (2006: xix) argues that all writing must make methodological choices and no poststructuralist account can find a “space free of strategies, inclusions, and exclusions”. At the very least poststructuralist focus on discourse calls for attention to the methodology of text selection and methodology of reading. Indeed, her poststructuralist analysis of the
Western debate on the Bosnian war demonstrates that a poststructuralist theoretical position can be translated into a rigorous methodological approach that produces an empirically rich study. This thesis bases its interpretive approach on Hansen’s systematic examination of the political construction of identity, which will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.

Prior to discussing the interpretive strategy of this poststructuralist discourse analysis, it is worth reflecting that poststructuralist premise that objects only acquire meaning through discourse precludes the use of other forms of discourse analysis, such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). As emphasised by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 7), in contrast to poststructuralist discourse theory, CDA scholars treat discourse as just one among many social practices and insist that there are other dimensions beyond discourse. Because poststructuralism assumes that all knowledge is discursively situated, the purpose of discourse analysis is “to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible” (Doty, 1996: 5). To put simply, the purpose is not to capture ‘truths’ or fact check, but to offer an interpretation of events.

Interpretive Strategy

According to Fierke (2007: 82), discourse analysis is useful for “seeing the relational aspects of identity, or how identities have meaning vis-à-vis one another”. It serves the purpose of constructing a map of a particular world and allows the researcher to look at how power relationships and hierarchies hold this world together (Fierke, 2007: 82). Discourse analysis is an analytical tool for studying representations and constructions of particular ‘worlds’ through the emerging patterns across texts (Fierke, 2007: 84-85). However, I am cautious to refer to discourse analysis as a ‘tool’. For poststructuralists, there is a theoretical and methodological ‘whole’, meaning that theory and method are intertwined and based on philosophical premises regarding the role of language in the social construction of the world (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 4).

Poststructuralist discourse analysis looks for structures and patterns in texts through which identities and policies are articulated. As noted above, discourses never reach absolute fixity and stability. However, Hansen (2006: 29) posits that the analysis of
The interpretive strategy that I adopt reflects the main characteristics of a nuclear identity outlined in Chapter 3. To reiterate, a nuclear identity encompasses political elites’ construction of Self as a power in light of possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons; it is discursive, relational, and masculine. This chapter has already gone some way in elaborating on the poststructuralist understanding of identity as discursive. The other two aspects of nuclear identity need a little unpacking with regards to my research reading strategy.

Nuclear identity is relational and only established in relation to difference. Thus, locating the difference by focusing on the processes of linking and differentiation provides a starting point for my interpretive strategy. According to Hansen (2006: 44):

The processes of linking and differentiation provide theoretical concepts and methodological tools for conducting empirical analysis and they allow for a structured and systematic analysis of how discourses seek to construct stability, where they become unstable, how can they be deconstructed, and the processes through which they change.

Methodologically, I began the analysis of selected texts by identifying clear constructions of the Other – to the Soviets during the Cold War it was obviously the United States or capitalist states more generally or capitalism as an ideology – and clear constructions of the Self. This is done by highlighting the terms in texts that characterise the Other, such as ‘evil’, ‘aggressive’, ‘enemy’, ‘war-mongering’, ‘blood-thirsty’, and the terms that describe the Self, such as ‘civilised’, ‘rational’, ‘peaceful’, ‘invincible’. I also integrate the insights of Doty’s (1993) and Milliken’s (1999)
predicate analysis to compliment and deepen Hansen’s approach. This method involves focusing on language practices of predication, which refers to the attaching of verbs, adjectives, and adverbs to nouns. As Milliken (1999: 231) explains, “predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities”. As such, I look for the ways in which the key subjects/objects with which I am concerned – for example, nuclear weapons/proliferation, the Soviet Union, the United States, disarmament, arms control – are predicated upon particular signifiers, which attach certain attributes to them. At the same time, I note the manner, in which these subjects/objects are positioned in relation to each other (linking and differentiation).

It does not, however, mean that articulations of Self and Other are always explicit and synchronously present in all texts. For example, to construct the Americans as ‘evil’ does not mean that the Soviets always explicitly constructed themselves as ‘not evil’. When discourses are articulated through foreign policy decisions and debates, particular discourses may become so well-established that they are assumed to be obvious (Hansen, 2006: 44). It is also essential to be aware of discursive disappearance. Because identities are historically contingent, some may lose their importance over time or vice versa, previously non-existent identities may become important. Hansen exemplifies this with the case of monarchy-republic distinction prominent in the constructions of European identity in the 18th and 19th century, but ceasing to exist at present, because ‘monarchy’ ceased to carry significance for states to differentiate themselves from one another (Hansen, 2006: 44).

The next step of the interpretive strategy is to evaluate the degree of Otherness. In security discourses, the Other is often constructed as not just different, but as dangerous and threatening to the national Self, thereby capitalising on “a fund of generalised resentment from those whose identity is jeopardised by the play of difference, contingency, and danger” (Connolly, 1991: 209-210). Historically, states have legitimised their security policies through such constructions. On the basis of this, I search for the articulations of threats and dangers in Soviet nuclear discourse and clear constructions of the Other as an ‘enemy’. This, however, is not done to
establish the link between a security threat and nuclear policy, but to look at the kind of possibility for policy action that these constructions enable and preclude.

Chapter 3 argued that the difference between Self and Other need not always be radical. This foregrounds the importance of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities for the construction of identity and difference. Hansen (2006: 46) provides a useful explanation of this and it is worth reproducing at length:

Even abstract discourses constitute subjects by situating them within particular boundaries, by investing them with possibilities for change or repetition, and by constructing ethical relations. Turning to foreign and security policies, national security discourse can be seen as a particular spatial, temporal, and ethical instantiation: the space of the national community is sharply differentiated from the anarchic international realm; within this national space progress can unfold while it is deferred on the outside; and responsibility is situated between governments and citizens while ‘international responsibility’ is absent, perhaps even dangerous.

Methodologically, the constructions of space, time, and ethics are investigated through the analysis of the processes of linking and differentiation. But it is important to bear in mind that spatiality, temporality, and ethically are analytical lenses, not explicitly articulated signs (Hansen, 2006: 46). Furthermore, not all texts will explicitly articulate all three elements simultaneously. In terms of applying this to the reading of the texts, I, first, look for spatial identities, which are immediately identifiable in the constructions of other states or regions: the USSR, the United States, Europe, America etc. However, as Hansen (2006: 47) argues, spatial identities always involve a combination of territorially bounded and abstract political constructions. Thus, I also search for the signs such as ‘capitalists’, ‘communists’, ‘the peoples’, ‘humanity’, ‘barbarians’. These identities articulate geographical connections, but also constitute political subjects in their own right.

Second, I investigate how the temporality of the Other is constructed in relation to the temporality of Self. The key task is to establish whether the Self is constituted as an object in a time that differs from the one of the Other. This involves looking for articulations of development, transformation, change, progress etc. It is important to bear in mind that the Self may be constructed as less temporally developed than the
Other, which may be indicated by the use of terms such as ‘backwardness’, ‘underdeveloped’. Furthermore, because identities are always in the process of refinement, identity constructions need not always involve a spatial Other, but may be based on the temporal constructions of the Self. As such, I look at how the Soviets articulated their own past and future and whether they constructed themselves as inferior, superior, or identical to the United States.

Third, I search for the discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility in Soviet nuclear discourse. These include articulations of responsibility toward the Soviet state, ideology, or citizens as well as an international responsibility toward the humanity. It is thus important to pay attention to the way the Soviets framed their nuclear policies, whether it was constructed as serving a noble purpose beyond the borders of the USSR, and whether they constituted a Self that was responsible and ethical in relation to the Other. This also involves looking at how the Soviets constructed their nuclear weapons in relation to others.

Nuclear identities are also masculine due to a historical link between ideas about masculinity and nuclear weapons. Feminist IR scholars demonstrated that nuclear discourses are oversaturated with masculine traits that construct nuclear proliferation as particularly desirable and even necessary (see e.g. Cohn, 1987; 1993; Cohn et al. 2005; Duncanson and Eschle, 2008). It is thus essential to adopt an interpretive strategy that allows for an examination of masculinising and feminising practices. On this basis, I search for sexual metaphors and expressions of competitive male sexuality in texts. I also look at how constructions of Self, Other, and nuclear policies - for example, arms control, building more missiles, acquiring the bomb - are linked to terms that are traditionally understood as masculine or feminine. For instance, a practice of testing a new powerful bomb becomes a particularly masculine practice when it is linked to attributes such as invincibility, power, strength. Conversely, when disarmament is linked to terms such as weakness, emotion, or compromise, it becomes a more feminine practice, as the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 will exemplify. Furthermore, based on the feminist IR arguments discussed at length in Chapter 3, in nuclear discourse practices associated with masculinity are privileged over those that are associated with femininity. Thus, there is a need to pay attention to the way the
linkage of certain subjects/objects/practices to, for instance, power and superiority might be a way of masculinising them, or vice versa, the way of making something inferior might be a way of feminising it. Here, it is important not to conflate everything that is privileged and powerful with masculinity and the lack of power with femininity. These are not monolithic categories and they are subject to change and struggle (Hooper, 2001: 4). It is, therefore, essential to be mindful of different forms of masculinity and femininity that may be present in Soviet nuclear discourse and the varying courses of nuclear policy that they may enable.

So far, this chapter has justified the suitability of poststructuralist discourse analysis to achieve the main objectives of this thesis and to answer its main research questions. It has outlined the theoretical purpose and ontological, epistemological, and methodological premises of poststructuralist understanding of identity and policy. Drawing principally on Hansen, this section of the chapter has established the interpretive strategy used to translate this understanding into a viable empirical research. This chapter now turns to the discussion of the practicalities of poststructuralist discourse analysis relevant to this research focusing on the selection of texts, the actual application of the interpretive strategy to the texts, and issues or reliability, validity, and generalisability.

**The Practicalities of Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis of Soviet Nuclear Identity Constructions**

In order to investigate the constructions of Soviet nuclear identity and the enactment of nuclear policy, I applied the interpretive strategy outlined above to a broad spectrum of texts. Prior to discussing the selection of texts in detail, it is important to clarify the time periods that this thesis focuses on, or to use Hansen’s formulation to “map the key events”. ‘Key events’ refers to “those situations where ‘important facts’ manifest themselves on the political and/or the media agenda and influence the official policy-identity constellation” (Hansen, 2006: 32). I selected the time periods for this study on the basis that they were the periods when Soviet leaders were doing something relatively new and/or different with regards to nuclear weapons policy, such as deciding to develop these new weapons of unprecedented power; deciding to scale up the production to develop massive arsenals (vertical nuclear proliferation);
and deciding to disarm.

Considering the limitations of time and resources, these seemed the most important times of Soviet policy development to study and they capture various courses of nuclear policy. The three empirical chapters that follow cover one of these periods each and are structured chronologically: first, the period of nuclear weapons acquisition (Joseph Stalin), 1941-1949; second, the period of the arms race (Nikita Khrushchev), 1953-1964; and third, the period of détente (Leonid Brezhnev) and disarmament (Mikhail Gorbachev), 1964-1991. Throughout the thesis, I also refer to the time periods as ‘stages’. Next, through the careful reading of Cold War histories, I mapped the key events that took place within selected time periods, which included, for example, the signing of various arms control agreements, the testing of newest types of nuclear weapons, moratoria on nuclear testing. Each empirical chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the key events that occurred during each time period. The mapping of key events also informed my text selection process, because I looked for texts produced shortly before, during, and after each event.

Selection of Texts

Perhaps the main difficulty encountered when conducting research on nuclear proliferation is the lack of materials available to the public and secrecy surrounding this subject. In the case of this study, however, Soviet nuclear policy decisions that are of interest are now in the past and a broad range of source materials that were crucial for my discourse analysis have now been declassified and are accessible through state archives and numerous databases online. As noted by Hanhimäki and Westad (2003: xiii), there has been a revolution in access to Cold War historical sources in recent decades, which allows for re-evaluation and new interpretations of key documents on foreign affairs. This applies not just to the US and the UK where declassification has been mandatory for a while, but also to Russia and many other states around the world. Due to a number of personal constraints, it was not possible to visit the archives in person. Therefore, in addition to scanning all official online sources and through a lengthy and persistent search, I made sure to identify key authors who visited the state archives and I got hold of their work, because they often present

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5 This did not have a large impact on the final result, as much material is now digitalised, which also makes archival research more time-efficient.
excerpts from or full transcripts of speeches and scans of policy documents. I will elaborate on this in the sub-section below.

Poststructuralist discourse analysis does not rely on a fixed number of texts. It cannot turn to statistical significance as a measure for how many texts should be used (Hansen, 2006: 86). The main aim of text selection was to use the variety of sources to identify dominant discourses in order to explore Soviet nuclear identity constructions. The final selection of texts that I used in the empirical chapters were generally chosen, because they met three of the important criteria highlighted by Hansen (2006: 85): they had clear articulations of identities and/or policies; they were widely read; and they had a formal authority signalling the importance of status and power. However, some of the texts scored higher in, for example, clear identity articulations and formal authority, but were not widely read or known at the time due to the secretive nature of the Soviet government. In terms of identity constructions, texts were selected on the basis of their quality and diversity of articulations of Self and Other(s), the varying degree of Otherness, and expressions of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities. Particular care was taken to ensure that selected texts referred to the Soviet motivations and reflections on nuclear weapons proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. In order to capture relational aspects of nuclear identity, it was important to search for texts that referred to the American nuclear program, as the US was the Soviet key external Other. Additionally, at relevant moments I also looked at how the US constructed a nuclear identity to demonstrate that this process was not unique to the Soviet Union. I selected a few texts from the US official discourse to show the differences and similarities in their nuclear identity constructions. This section now turns to the discussion of the sources in more detail.

i. Official policy discourse

Official foreign policy discourse legitimises state action. It centres on political leaders who have the authority to sanction policies and those with central roles to execute them, such as high-ranked military staff and ministers (Hansen, 2006: 60). Due to the totalitarian structure of the USSR, policy decisions were generally in the hands of the General Secretary of the Communist Party, especially when it came to nuclear weapons. Thus, in the first instance, I searched for texts produced by general
secretaries themselves, including public statements, speeches (both domestic and international), transcripts of radio broadcasts, and official policy documents.

Then, I expanded the search to speeches of other Soviet officials who held highly ranked posts at that time. I was interested in general secretaries’ and their key ministers/policy advisors’ statements with regards to nuclear proliferation and how they used their position on nuclear weapons to construct and reproduce their state’s nuclear identity and policy. The key search criteria were statements related to nuclear weapons and made during the time period in question. It is important to note that the number of official statements used in each empirical chapter differs. Stalin, for example, rarely made official policy statements regarding nuclear weapons in public, whereas Gorbachev made so many that there can be no certainty that I found them all.

In order to locate texts, I searched for key words (e.g. Gorbachev nuclear weapons speech or Khrushchev American nuclear bomb) in several electronic archives, which were mainly US-based, but they contained large collections of Soviet documents translated into English. Russia also has a range of digitally accessible archives, which were all carefully searched. The list of electronic archival collections consulted included: The Cold War International History Project; The Marxist Archive; Atomic Archive; The Harvard Project on Cold War Studies; The National Security Archive; US Department of Energy, Office of History and Heritage Resources; Selected Documents on the Topic of the Atomic Bomb, 1935-1976: Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum; US Atomic Archive; Truman Library; Los Alamos Science; Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Complete Collection of Writings; The USSR Atomic Project Online Archive; Documents of the Soviet Epoch Online; and The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. Additionally, I conducted a general search through a web search engine using the same key words as above. Some speeches were located in newspapers. For instance, the majority of Gorbachev’s speeches was available through The New York Times website. I also searched through the digitalised archive of the Soviet newspaper Pravda, because it often published full transcripts of Soviet officials’ statements.
To collect texts from the US official discourse, I searched for relevant American Presidential statements in some of the above archival collections and in the large online database *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*. Additionally, I consulted some published official archival document series located at the Edinburgh University main library. These included: *The American Atom; The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts*; and *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*.

ii. Non-official texts

Non-official texts, such as routine correspondence between politicians, personal notes/remarks, letters, memoirs, diaries, provide a wealth of detail regarding how the leaders felt, thought, and acted in relation to nuclear weapons. These texts offer a ‘behind closed doors’ insight (and a wide range of Soviet decisions took place behind closed doors) and uncover identity constructions that may not be evident from the reading of official policy discourse. For instance, the articulations of Otherness may take on a different form without the presence of the wider audience. These texts were still produced by key Soviet decision makers at the time of the studied events and they were selected based on the diversity of identity articulations. Again, the number of texts selected for each time period differed. For example, very few were used for Gorbachev’s period, while a large number was included into the empirical chapter about Stalin’s nuclear policy, because he made fewer public statements on this subject.

Some of these texts, such as letters and diaries, I found in the aforementioned electronic archives using the same key word search. Generally routine correspondence between Soviet state officials, meeting notes, and records of private conversations are only available in print at the Russian state archive. However, as mentioned previously, there are numerous published historical accounts of the Cold War that reproduce these texts at length, because the authors visited the state archives in person. Here it was important not to be susceptible to historians’ interpretation of this primary evidence and to only use the original text that they reproduce. With the issue of reliability in mind, I only included texts that appeared either in the most
widely cited historical accounts or those that appeared in numerous sources. I will discuss these historical sources in more detail in the next sub-section.

One final note is with regards to memoirs. In this analysis I used three memoirs written by general secretaries: *Socialism, Peace and Democracy: Writings, Speeches and Reports* (Gorbachev, 1987); *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (Gorbachev, 1988); and *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Khrushchev, 1974). I also used two personal accounts of people involved in Soviet nuclear projects: *Vospominaniya. [Memories]* (Sakharov, 1990), Sakharov was a nuclear physicist in charge of the design and development of the first hydrogen bomb; *G. K. Zhukov: Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya. [G.K Zhukov: Memories and Thoughts]* (Zhukov, 1985) Zhukov was a Soviet general and Marshal of the Soviet Union, who also served as Minister of Defence. Hansen (2006: 61-68) notes that memoirs are well-suited for constructing legacies, for fleshing out the writing of the Self, and they are also important historical accounts of people directly involved in foreign policy decision-making. However, caution needs to be taken, because some memories may fade, some may be even fabricated, and memoirs often position the author in a favourable light (Fass, 2006: 121). Thus, only a very small number of texts was included in the empirical analysis of this thesis, but these sources provided, to use Hansen’s formulation, “a ‘raw and fruitful’ account of what war is really like ‘in the field’” (Hansen, 2006: 69).

As a native Russian speaker, I was able to select and study the relevant texts in their original form and language. At first, I made an attempt to only search for original texts and to translate them myself. However, due to time constraints and the amount of documents, I ended up using mainly the texts that have already been translated into English by others. Where it was possible, I checked the translations against the original and all of them accurately reproduced the key points the speakers were making including metaphors and idioms.

iii. Secondary sources

According to Hansen (2006: 83): the writing of good discourse analysis “requires knowledge of the case in question, and knowledge comes, in part, from reading
standard works on the history, processes, events, and debates constituting a foreign policy phenomenon”. In order to situate primary data sources within their historical context, I relied on secondary scholarship. Specifically, I selected a number of widely cited and well-known historical accounts of the Cold War and in particular major historians’ work on the nuclear project in the Soviet Union. These sources were used to look at the precise time periods chosen for this study and for the reading around these time periods to establish key events, key actors, and the chronology of Soviet nuclear policy-making. Historical accounts consult a range of official and non-official statements made by Soviet and American leaders. They focus on nuclear weapons decisions and give a wealth of detail with regards to how these decisions were made. This type of literature was particularly useful for this research, because first, it helped to situate Soviet nuclear identity constructions in relevant historical and social contexts; second, it provided a large number of primary texts that I could not access through digital archival collections, particularly those that were not a part of the official foreign policy discourse; and third, in some instances it pointed me in the direction of original texts.

In order to make sure that I obtained reliable historical information, I read through more than one historical account for each time period, generally 4 or 5. I only included the information that appeared in at least 3 of those. Historical accounts chosen for this study were written by most prominent and widely cited Cold War historians and historians specialising specifically on the history of the Soviet Union or on the history of nuclear weapons. These sources were predominantly in the form of published books, but also included articles published in peer-reviewed journals. All books were collected at the Edinburgh University main library.

**Applying Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis**

The first stage of the analysis constituted an extensive reviewing of secondary sources in order to understand the historical context within which key documents were produced. This was essential, because discourses have no inherent meaning within themselves and need to be located historically and socially (Hardy et al., 2004: 20).

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6 The sources I used, and their specific contributions are presented in detail in the last section of Chapter 2.
This meant trying to understand the periods before Soviet nuclear weapons acquisition and the entire Cold War period, not just periods selected for focused study, as noted by Herrera and Braumoeller (2004: 18), discourse analysis requires investigating where ideas and beliefs came from and how they changed. I began reading chronologically starting from the initial nuclear developments in the Soviet Union in the early 1940s until the end of Gorbachev’s rule in 1991 and noting the primary sources that the authors used.

Second, I applied the interpretive strategy outlined earlier in this chapter to the selected primary texts that were previously downloaded and, in some cases, printed. All texts were subjected to multiple readings. I investigated them for linkages and differentiations, various degrees of Otherness, spatial, temporal, and ethical constructions, strategies of feminisation and masculinisation. Patterns by which Soviet nuclear identity was constructed were identified through shared language that occurred across a range of texts. After several readings, I noted the re-occurring themes or dimensions of identity constructions. These formed the sub-sections of the first empirical chapter. The evolution of Soviet nuclear identity was analysed by examining whether these dimensions changed across different time periods and how these changes enabled varying courses of policy.

Issues of Reliability, Validity, and Generalisability

This thesis adopted an inherently interpretive approach, which raises questions regarding the issues of reliability, validity, and generalisability. As this is a poststructuralism-informed research, it is opposed to ‘scientific’ methods of positivist tradition and, in terms of reliability, postpositivist approaches do not seek to provide objective and replicable findings. The aim is to offer an interpretation of events. However, this does not mean that ‘anything goes’. Hansen (2006: 45) responds to the critique frequently levelled at poststructuralism regarding its lack of methodological rigour:

But this [the critique] is misleading insofar as the methodology of discourse analysis insists on reading based on explicit discursive articulations of signs and identities and that one has to pay careful analytical attention to how
signs are linked and juxtaposed, how they construct Selves and Others, and how they legitimise particular policies.

As such, what matters is that the analysis does not overlook important signs, does not downplay the degree of Otherness, and does not misinterpret the connection between identity constructions and policy. In this chapter, it was my duty as a researcher to clearly state ontological and epistemological premises that informed my interpretive strategy, to outline the processes involved at each stage of the interpretation including the commentary on the reliability of used sources. It was also my duty to present the quotes from selected texts as fully as possible in the empirical chapters. This opens up the analysis to scrutiny by the reader, who can either confirm or question the interpretation.

In terms of validity, the aim of this research is to explore discursive constructions of nuclear identity and policy, not to tell the story of what actually happened or to search for quantifiable ‘objective truths’. If validity is concerned with the appropriateness of methodology and methods, I made sure to present these as clearly as possible. This chapter demonstrated how the chosen strategy and methods enabled me to investigate the diversity of Soviet nuclear identity constructions in an effective way.

Finally, in terms of generalisability, conventional IR approaches to nuclear proliferation take on a positivist ontological position and assume an objectivist universal truth, which, as argued in Chapter 2, can be counterproductive in the nuclear proliferation context. This thesis does not seek to provide generalisable findings. Rather, it determines “motives, meanings, reasons, and other subjective experiences that are time- and context-bound” (Anderson Hudson and Ozanne, 1988: 511). Nuclear proliferation or non-proliferation is case specific and often models developed for analysing some cases do not provide the same results when applied to a different case (Sagan, 2011: 235). This does not indicate that these models are useless: they do contribute to our understanding of specific regional and national cases by developing new theoretical constructs (Sagan, 2011: 233). However, to get a full picture, there is a need for uncovering specific processes that have occurred in particular time and place and to hold off the assumption that truth and reality are
universal. It would not be possible, for example, to generalise the key findings of this thesis beyond the Soviet Union. Furthermore, when looking at discursive nuclear identity constructions, it is doubtful that there can ever be generalisability. Poststructuralism emphasises identities as complex, contradictory, historically contingent, and only existing in discourse. “There are no objective identities located in some extra-discursive realm, hence identity cannot be used as a variable against which behaviour and non-discursive factors can be measured” (Hansen, 2006: 6).

**Conclusion**

This chapter established the ontological, epistemological, and methodological premises of this thesis and introduced methods involved. It has argued that poststructuralist discourse theory based on discursive ontology and epistemology represents a viable approach to the analysis of the mutually constitutive relationship between Soviet nuclear identity and policy. The insights of Hansen’s research to a large extent informed the interpretive strategy and methodology of this thesis through its emphasis on the utility of analysing the processes of linking and differentiation, the varying degree of Otherness, spatial, temporal, and ethical identities. As poststructuralist research often faces criticisms due to its traditional lack of engagement with questions of methodology and methods, this chapter sought to present all the steps and thought processes that were involved in the selection and interpretation of texts as clearly and transparently as possible. The following three chapters present the results of the application of this interpretative strategy to selected texts. The next chapter will turn to the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions during the period of nuclear weapons acquisition from 1941 until 1949.

“Josef, it has burst, like the American one!” (Beria, 1949, cited in Streifer and Sabitov, 2013: 54).

Introduction

To reconfirm, the aim of this thesis is to explore the constructions of Soviet nuclear identity across the span of the Cold War events, and to demonstrate the significance of this identity to the enactment and justification of Soviet nuclear policy. Chapter 2 emphasised that much has been written about the need to go beyond rationalist conventional explanations for the development of nuclear weapons. Possessing and threatening to use nuclear weapons can be as much about ideas, beliefs, and identity as it is about security and self-defence. This chapter begins the empirical analysis of nuclear identity constructed by the Soviet political elites during the stage of acquisition of nuclear weapons in the USSR. It focuses on the emergence of this nuclear identity and establishes the main characteristics of its discursive construction.

The following analysis is mainly derived from the chronology of the Soviet decisions regarding the development and testing of USSR’s first nuclear weapons, secondary sources, and key speeches, notes, and discussions between highly ranked Soviet officials – mainly, but not limited to the three key decision-makers at that time, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Joseph Stalin, chief of the Soviet security and secret police (NKVD) Lavrentiy Beria, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. The chapter consults a range of texts stretching from the early 1940s until the first Soviet nuclear test on 29 August 1949. However, in order to flesh out the emergence and dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity, texts from the early 1930s and just immediately after the first test are also briefly consulted.

This chapter looks to uncover discourses that enabled the emergence and reproduction of Soviet nuclear identity and made weapons’ acquisition possible, desirable, and legitimate. Chapter 3 established that in line with poststructuralist and

7 At this stage during the 1940s, ‘nuclear weapons’ encapsulated atomic or fission bombs.
feminist approaches to IR, this thesis conceptualises nuclear identity as discursive, relational and masculine. In this sense, Soviet nuclear identity is understood as reproduced through elite discourses and constructed vis-à-vis one or multiple Others. This chapter also looks at a number of key documents and speeches from the US side in order to apprehend the inherently co-constitutive relationship between Self and Other and to show how states can be made foreign from one another through discourses of danger and difference.

This chapter argues that when a nuclear identity emerges as competitive, hyper-masculine, threatened by the radical spatial other, and acting in order to achieve admirable moral goals such as peacekeeping, it enables and legitimises nuclear weapons acquisition, simultaneously excluding the possibility of reaching an agreement on nuclear arms control policy. At a first glance, Stalin’s choice of post-war nuclear proliferation policy was one of *realpolitik*. It made sense to build the bomb in order to provide security for the Soviet Union and to balance power against the US. However, closer consideration of the motivations, justifications, and articulations of Soviet policy in this era, using poststructuralist discourse analysis, reveals there is more to the story than self-defence considerations. There are deeper underlying meanings behind Soviet political elites’ perceptions of the bomb and its future uses.

This chapter emphasises that apart from the obvious security/deterrence factor, Soviet nuclear policy decisions were additionally reliant upon particular ideas about leaders’ subjective understandings of Self and Other and their constructions of threat and danger. Soviet nuclear identity thus presents itself as a complex interplay of representations. This chapter is organised around three core dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity that emerged from the analysis of the Soviet officials’ discourse during the period of nuclear weapons acquisition. These are: competition with the US or ‘catch up and overtake’, hyper-masculinity, and peacekeeping. This chapter also discusses paranoia as a defining element of Soviet policy-making under Stalin’s rule, which constitutes a form of a discursive construction of threat and danger and defines boundaries between inside and outside. This practice was essential in order to establish a particular discursively constructed Soviet reality where nuclear weapons’ acquisition was desirable and necessary.
Historical Overview, 1941-1949

Before proceeding with the analysis of Soviet nuclear discourse, this chapter provides a brief historical overview of the Soviet atomic project at its initial stages. Soviet physicists were advanced in their research and knowledge of atomic fission and some work on uranium had already been carried out before and during World War II. Following the Nazi invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, the established Uranium Commission ceased to function, and most nuclear scientists abandoned their research for the war effort (Holloway, 1994: 75). Beria was first informed about the Anglo-American nuclear project in 1941 (Craig and Radchenko, 2008: 44-45). The information was passed on to him from NKVD residents in Britain and the US (Artyomov, 2013: 63). After gathering more intelligence and realising the advancement of uranium work in Germany, Britain and the US, Stalin instructed the State Defence Committee to revive the old uranium project (Craig and Radchenko, 2008: 49). Igor’ Kurchatov was chosen as a scientific director for the project. On the government’s side, Molotov and later Beria oversaw it. After the US dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the work on the Soviet atomic project was rapidly accelerated and generously sponsored by the Soviet state. Hiroshima and Nagasaki put a strain on the US-USSR wartime alliance and had a powerful impact on the Soviet officials, raising questions of whether the US could be trusted not to start another war against the Soviet Union (Zubok, 2009: 27-28).

The Soviet atomic project was kept under a veil of strict secrecy. It is worth noting that it was initiated during a particularly dark period in Soviet history characterised by the bloody war against Nazi Germany, the brutality and repressiveness of Stalin’s regime, and the devastated post-war economy. At the same time, the Soviet victory against the Germans raised not only Stalin’s status among the Soviet people and political elites, but also contributed to the belief that the Soviet Union was becoming a military superpower and a key actor in the international arena. Zubok (2009: 6-8) points out that it was during the war that the Russian term derzhava (‘great power’) entered the official Soviet lexicon. As a result, the Soviets expected to be treated like one in the post-war world and proceeded with the socialist expansionism into Eastern Europe.
The first Soviet atomic bomb was built in four years, contrary to Western predictions that a Soviet bomb would take ten, and successfully tested on 29 August 1949 (Holloway, 1994: 265). Prior to that, both the Soviets and the Americans attempted to put forward anti-nuclear and disarmament plans, but they never reached consensus. Notably, the Baruch plan of June 1946 was a failed US attempt to prevent the Soviet Union from developing nuclear weapons. The Baruch plan proposed a creation of a powerful international agency that would establish effective safeguards through inspections of nuclear facilities and eliminate nuclear weapons (Holloway, 1994: 162). Only after all states would agree to this plan, the US would get rid of all its nuclear weapons. Baruch also suggested removing the right of veto from the Soviet Union, which meant that if the US suspected that the Soviets had the bomb, they would take action (Holloway, 1994: 163). This plan clearly disadvantaged the Soviets putting them in a precarious position in the face of the American atomic monopoly without any viable defence. The Soviets did present the US with alternatives also emphasising the need to create an international control commission but leaving the development of atomic production in national hands rather than under international ownership (Holloway, 1994: 165). The Americans rejected these proposals. During this period the relations between the USSR and the US significantly deteriorated marking the beginning of the Cold War in 1947.

*Threatened Derzhava and ‘Catch up and Overtake’*

While the history of the Soviet atomic project dates back to the late 1930s, Soviet nuclear identity emerged when Soviet post-war self-conception as derzhava was threatened by the existence of the American atomic monopoly. This identity of threatened derzhava is crucial for us to understand when exploring Soviet nuclear identity and policy during the Cold War era. Much of Stalin’s policy making was about competing with the capitalists and establishing the Soviet Union as a global socialist superpower. ‘Catch up and overtake’ emerged as one of the dominant political discourses during Stalin’s rule, which continuously legitimised and maintained a large scale of Soviet industrial/military build-up and territorial expansion. This process contributed to the continuous reinforcement and re-imagination of Soviet state identity. This identity largely reflected and augmented Marxist-Leninist ideology, constructing a Self that was unique, morally sound, superior to capitalism, and en
route to its rightful superpower status and the achievement of the global communist regime. Below is an excerpt from Stalin’s speech outlining the results of the implementation of the Five-Year plan of 1928, which, as was repeatedly emphasised by Stalin throughout the speech, were attained in only four years:

The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to transfer our country, with its backward, and in part medieval, technology, on to the lines of new, modern technology. The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to convert the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak country, dependent upon the caprices of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful country, fully self-reliant and independent of the caprices of world capitalism (Stalin, 1933).

This quote captures the re-imagination of Soviet identity and its transformation under the rule of Bolsheviks in line with their ideological ideas and beliefs. This identity was constructed in relation to external difference – the capitalist countries, particularly the United States; but also, in relation to earlier ‘weaker’ Tsarist Russia that Stalin set out to transform into a military superpower. Competing with and overtaking the capitalists became a necessity in order for this Bolshevik identity to flourish. More evidence of the significance of this competition can be found in Stalin’s speeches in the early 1930s during the rapid acceleration of industrialisation in the USSR:

you need in the shortest period of time to liquidate its [our socialist homeland’s] backwardness and to develop true Bolshevik tempo and build up its socialist might. There are no other ways. This is why prior to October Lenin said: “It’s either death, or to catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries (Stalin, 1931).

This quote demonstrates the vital significance of winning the competition against capitalism. Constructing the Self as a mighty socialist state that would catch up with and overtake the West made Stalin’s policy possible, which in its turn reproduced and strengthened Soviet state identity. It can be seen from the quote above how Stalin constructed the Soviet identity vis-à-vis the USSR’s own pre-Bolshevik past. The simultaneous othering of capitalist states shows how temporal and spatial others can co-exist in the process of self-constitution. As we can see, Stalin frequently referred to pre-existing Soviet weakness and emphasised the transformation and progression of the Soviet Union from an old agrarian state to a mighty technologically developed
new one. In the same speech, he listed old Russia’s enemies and repeatedly made a point about its lost battles and the former backwardness of its industries. To illustrate:


Frequent use of the terms ‘beaten’ and ‘backwardness’ emphasises the difference between the Russian Empire then and the Soviet Union at that moment. Stalin was constructing an identity of a powerful state that transformed and would not be beaten or fall behind again. As a result, the Soviet Union was becoming: “a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern means of defence and of equipping its army with them in the event of an attack from abroad” (Stalin, 1931).

The new Russia being discursively constructed as different from the old ‘beaten’ Russia made the strengthening of Soviet industries and defence not only desirable, but necessary. There is an assumption in Stalin’s speeches that the Soviet Union should be ahead of everyone; its rightful place is above everyone else and particularly the capitalists. The ‘new’ Soviet state identity was built on the idea of Russian rebirth and future greatness as the world’s centre of Marxism-Leninism and socialism:

In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism (Stalin, 1927, cited in Kennan, 1946).

The construction of such identity enabled the course of Soviet policy of industrial/military build-up and post-war expansion into Eastern Europe. Everything was aimed at increasing Soviet strength and influence and the weakening of the capitalist camp. The Soviet victory against Nazi Germany had a profound impact on Soviet construction of Self as a triumphant superpower with strengthened international authority. For example, Molotov (1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 153) stated:
“Important problems of international relations cannot nowadays be settled without the participation of the Soviet Union or without heeding the voice of the country”. In his speech at the Bolshoi theatre in February 1946, Stalin criticised the nature of capitalism pointing out that its development “proceeds not in a smooth and balanced forward movement, but through crises and military catastrophes” (Stalin, 1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 150). In the similar manner, the head of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), Nikolai Voznesenskii (1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 151), stated:

monopoly capitalism is capable of giving rise to new aggressors [...] The Soviet people wishes to see its armed forces even stronger and more powerful, in order to guarantee the country against all contingencies and stand on guard over peace.

A close reading of the Soviet ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse suggests that it became a source of pride for the Soviet officials to stress the rapid pace of industrial accomplishments; the USSR’s new role as an important powerful actor in the international arena; and its ideological superiority and the inevitable victory of Marxism-Leninism over capitalism. These factors point to the exceptional character of identity that the Soviets were constructing. There was a belief that the USSR is a state like no other, although constructing a Self that is exceptional is embedded in discursive practices of most states. Oskanian (2018: 30) argues that Russian and Soviet exceptionalism took on a hybrid from, by being rooted in messianic civilising missions and in Russia’s distinct geographical position between Europe and Asia. Oskanian (2018) traces the evolution of Russian exceptionalism from Tsarist to contemporary Russia claiming that Soviet exceptionalism borrowed its imperial ambitions from the Romanov Empire. “Marxism-Leninism was an ideological peculiarity that enabled the imposition of a civilising project on often unwilling subjects in both West and East” (Oskanian, 2018: 35). This Soviet civilising project had two key directions: against capitalism and against the “backwardness of the traditional East” (Oskanian, 2018: 35).

Carleton (2017) claims that the triumph over Nazi Germany became a pillar of Russian identity due to the long-standing “belief [among Russians] in their special role in saving civilization from history’s villains”. In addition, this identity rested on the belief that no other state had been such a frequent target of attacks and aggression (Carleton, 2017).
This is echoed in Stalin’s speech about Russia being constantly beaten in the past. The victory against Germany and catastrophic losses that the USSR suffered during the war greatly intensified both beliefs. The quotes from Soviet officials discussed earlier referring to the future greatness, the new post-war role, and the USSR becoming the socialist centre of world significance show how the narrative of exceptionalism was embedded in identity that the Soviets were constructing.

It is worth noting that the US had of course also constructed exceptional conceptions of Self. What is particularly interesting is the different ways in which the two states carved out their exceptional identities. The US built an exceptional identity from its unique foundations of modern liberal and democratic principles, its claim to the world leadership, and the burden of responsibility for freedom and peace (Walt, 2011; Weldes, 1999). This is seen, for instance, in US president Harry Truman’s radio address to the nation after the bombings of Hiroshima:

> It was a victory of one way of life over another. It was a victory of an ideal founded on the rights of the common man, on the dignity of the human being, on the conception of the State as the servant - and not the master- of its people (Truman, 1945a).

Discourses of exceptionalism in the US did not include the notion of it being previously beaten or backward, which makes it almost the reverse of the Soviet exceptionalism. The development, testing, and the use of the first US atomic bombs in 1945 destabilised Soviet exceptional superpower identity enabling the diversion of all efforts from post-war reparation to the acceleration of the Soviet atomic project.

So far, this chapter has established that Soviet state identity went through transformation under the Bolshevik rule. Soviet state identity was constructed in relation to the key spatial Other – the US – and in relation to the Russian pre-revolutionary Self that according to Stalin was technologically backward and beaten by multiple enemies. As a result of these constructions, catching up with and overtaking capitalist countries became one of the pillars of Soviet state identity, which enabled increasing efforts to develop all of its industries. After the victory in the Great Patriotic War against Germany in 1945 and the strengthening of the international status of the USSR, the Soviet state identity evolved into an exceptional superpower...
identity. American success in developing first nuclear weapons had a profound influence on this identity. A nuclear bomb became an embodiment of the advances in Western military science and the hegemonic status of the US. In the eyes of Soviet officials, the US bomb made their earlier industrial/military accomplishments and the war victory look less significant. As recalled by the British correspondent Alexander Werth:

> the news [of Hiroshima] had an acutely depressing effect on everybody. It was clearly realized that this was a New Fact in the world’s power politics, that the bomb constituted a threat to Russia, and some Russian pessimists I talked to that day dismally remarked that Russia’s desperately hard victory over Germany was now ‘as good as wasted’ (Werth, 1964: 925).

As already noted, acquiring a modern means of defence played an important role in the re-invention of the Soviet Self as the global socialist derzhava. Thus, nuclear weapons were something that the Soviets desperately needed to possess in order to keep this superpower identity strong. The bomb was an essential tool that served a far greater purpose than defence: to not repeat the mistakes of the past and fall behind the capitalists again as well as to reaffirm the Soviet post-war greatness. Therefore, not rushing to acquire the bomb was a priori not an option for the Soviet government. Chapter 3 established that nuclear identity comes into being through the discursive construction of Self as a power in light of nuclear decisions. It can be seen from the Soviet officials’ public reaction to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and commentary on the American atomic monopoly that the Soviet leadership began to comprehensively explore its identity in terms of becoming a nuclear weapon state.

‘Catch up and overtake’ became one of the key elements of nuclear identity that the Soviets were constructing. This is reflected, for instance, in Molotov’s statement made in November 1945: “we will make up for everything, as necessary, and we will achieve the prosperity of our country. We will have atomic energy too, and much else” (Molotov, 1945, cited in Holloway, 1994: 144), or in Stalin’s speech in February 1945: “if we render the proper help to our scientists they will be able not only to catch up, but also to overtake in the near future the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country” (Stalin, 1945, cited in Holloway, 1994: 149). From this we can see that acquiring the bomb for the USSR was as much about the competition with the US as it
was about defending itself. More evidence of this can be found in the statement made by professor Simon Alexandrov, who was sent as a Soviet representative to observe the US atomic tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946: “I do not know whether we have an atomic bomb right now. Perhaps we have; perhaps we have not. But I believe that very soon, we will have everything that you have in the United States” (Alexandrov, 1946, cited in Streifer and Sabitov, 2013: 55).

The following quote represents the significance of catching up with the US in nuclear developments to the Soviet leadership. It featured in the article by Kurchatov’s assistant Igor’ Golovin, where he recalled Beria’s behaviour after witnessing the first Soviet nuclear test: “Did it look like the American one? Very much alike? We didn’t screw it up? Kurchatov isn’t pulling our leg, is he? Everything the same? Good!” (Beria, 1949, cited in Golovin, 1991: 21). Beria immediately informed Stalin about the test: “Josef, it has burst, like the American one!” (Beria, 1949, cited in Streifer and Sabitov, 2013: 54). To Soviets the atomic bomb was the symbol of advanced Western military science and Stalin’s government placed a lot of emphasis on military build-up and acquiring modern weaponry. Successfully building and testing the bomb that looked and burst “like the American one” meant that the Soviets started catching up with the US thus reaffirming their superpower identity.

This identity-construction process was to some degree different from that which was taking place in the US, because the American leaders had already constructed the identity of a state that was ahead and above everyone due to a belief in American moral superiority. The Americans did not refer to temporal constructions of the earlier Self that were weak or somewhat inferior. Rather, they constructed this exceptional identity around their unique history and a historic understanding of Self being an exceptional credible leader of the Western Hemisphere and a freedom’s defender as well as around qualities such as strength, rationality, and toughness (Weldes, 1999: 46-47). The atomic monopoly reinforced these qualities and American leadership and, additionally, placed an imaginary burden of protecting the free world on the US shoulders. For instance, Truman (1945a) noted: “We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force - to prevent its misuse and to turn it into the channels of service to mankind”. However, Soviet and American exceptionalisms are also very similar in a
sense that both states construct their Selves as responsible nuclear superpowers that can (obviously) be trusted with nuclear weapons and can even use it to service the mankind. This eventually enabled the expansion of both nuclear projects, which were presented as serving noble purposes. I will come back to this point several times throughout the empirical chapters, as it represents the important ethical dimension of Soviet nuclear identity.

To the Soviets, catching up did not just mean successfully testing one atomic bomb. That would not be overtaking. In 1949 the US was already in possession of around 170 atomic bombs (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 81). Therefore, it is not surprising that the Soviets kept their first nuclear test in August 1949 quiet until it was detected by the US three and a half weeks later (Holloway, 1994: 265). The Soviets needed to narrow a nuclear gap with the US before they could use the bomb as a tool to showcase their military might: “And if we trumpet it everywhere, the USA will so speed up its work that we will not be able to catch up with it” (Kurchatov, cited in Holloway, 1994: 267). There is certainly rationalist deterrence logic at work here, which cannot be overlooked. After the attack on Hiroshima, Stalin said to his government:

A single demand of you comrades ... Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The equilibrium has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will remove a great danger from us (Stalin, 1945, cited in Holloway, 1981: 183).

Despite the element of deterrence, there was an obsession with catching up and overtaking among the Soviet officials that seemed to override the need to “remove a great danger”.

In his speech at the thirtieth anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1947, Molotov stated:

A sort of new religion has become widespread among expansionist circles in the USA: having no faith in their own internal forces, they put their faith in the secret of the atomic bomb, although this secret has long ceased to be a secret [Emphasis added] (Molotov, 1947, cited in Holloway, 1994: 258).
This statement is important, because it came some two years before the Soviets tested the bomb, yet they were already constructing a nuclear identity, re-imagining the USSR as a nuclear weapons state. This shows how powerful some discourses can be; admitting that the Soviet Union was behind the US was unimaginable, because Soviet superpower identity needed to be stabilised and reinforced. As a result, Soviet officials started claiming that “the imperialist camp has lost thereby one of its most powerful means for blackmailing people” (The secret bulletin of the Central Committee’s information bureau, 1947, cited in Holloway, 1994: 258). The Soviet government kept the first Soviet nuclear tests under strict secrecy. However, after the US detected the test, the Soviet news agency TASS issued an announcement referring back to Molotov’s statement of November 6, 1947:

This statement signified the Soviet Union already had discovered the secret of the atomic weapon and that it had this weapon at its disposal. [...] Scientific circles of the United States of America took this statement by V.M. Molotov for bluff, considering that the Russians could not possess the atomic weapon earlier than the year 1952. They were mistaken, however, since the Soviet Union possessed the secret of the atomic weapon in 1947 (TASS, 1949, cited in Holloway, 1994: 258).

This statement exhibits how the discursive construction of Soviet nuclear identity preceded the construction of the bomb itself. The emergence of this nuclear identity was innately linked to the struggles of the post-war era, when the Soviet self-conception as a global socialist superpower was challenged by the existence of American atomic monopoly and had to be asserted. Stating that the Soviets possessed the atomic weapon earlier than predicted in the US reinforces the significance of ‘catch up and overtake’ and affirms the identity of a state that does not lag behind the capitalist US. Without a doubt, successfully testing a nuclear bomb provided certain security guarantees to the Soviet government and minimised the chances of a surprise attack by the US. However, the decision to build the bomb as quickly as possible was enabled by two prevalent ideas: ideas about the Soviet exceptionalism, and about catching up with and overtaking the West. These ideas were already deeply embedded into the Soviet construction of Self and enabled the emergence of Soviet nuclear identity. In this sense, nuclear weapons were not just security tools, but tools of superpower reassurance.
Hyper-masculinity in Soviet Nuclear Identity Constructions

Chapter 3 formulated the significance of gendered hierarchies to the construction of nuclear identity. To reiterate, ideas about masculinity and power shape political discourses about nuclear weapons, which creates context where these weapons are a necessity (Cohn et al., 2006: 4). What one sees as ‘feminising’ or ‘masculinising’ comes from the culturally embedded beliefs in what typically constitutes male and female bodies (Cohn et al., 2006: 2). Society traditionally associates traits such as strength, rationality, prudency, responsibility etc. with male bodies in opposition to weakness, emotions, irrationality, passivity, need of protection etc., which are believed to be female body characteristics. As seen in the previous section, Soviet leaders were constructing an identity of a tough and powerful state that would not be beaten or intimidated placing a lot of emphasis on military strength. This makes Soviet nuclear identity hyper-masculine by nature. Nuclear weapons were essential in order to maintain this type of aggressive masculinity, because American nuclear monopoly threatened it and made the Soviets look weak and emasculated. This ties in with the previously discussed theme of catching up with and overtaking the US; Soviet officials perceived falling behind in areas such as defence as backwardness and weakness. Chapter 3 emphasised intense competitiveness as a highly masculine trait. This can be seen throughout Stalin’s statements:

You fall behind, you are weak – so you are wrong, and you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty – so you are right, so we need to be wary of you. This is why we cannot fall behind anymore (Stalin, 1931).

Such rhetoric openly invites and encourages competition. In the context of Stalin’s speech, ‘might’ was linked to not falling behind the West in defence matters. This is interesting, because the nuclear identity constructed by the Other – the US – was also very masculine:

The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong, only the industrious, only the determined, only the courageous, only the visionary who determine the real nature of our struggle can possibly survive (Kennedy, 1962, cited in Weldes, 1999: 46).
Although Kennedy made this statement in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was a clear representation of the masculine character of US identity. As outlined in Chapter 3, Duncanson and Eschle (2008: 546) state that security discourses “are infused with a series of conceptual dichotomies which flow from and underpin the primary signifiers of masculine/feminine, with the masculine side of the dichotomy favoured over the feminine”. For example, the following dichotomies feature in Stalin’s speeches: weak/mighty, weak/powerful and self-reliant, unstable/has no fear of crises etc. To illustrate, I go back to Stalin’s speech discussed earlier that captures the results of the Five-year-plan implemented in 1928, which reflects masculine character of Soviet Bolshevik state identity:

Finally, as a result of all this the Soviet Union has been converted from a weak country, unprepared for defence, into a country mighty in defence. [...] The results of the five-year plan have shown that the capitalist system of economy is bankrupt and unstable; that it has outlived its day and must give way to another, a higher, Soviet, socialist system of economy; that the only system of economy that has no fear of crises and is able to overcome the difficulties which capitalism cannot solve, is the Soviet system of economy (Stalin, 1933).

The constructed Self was linked to traditional traits of masculinity such as pride, strength, and stability. In addition, the use of word combinations such as ‘a higher system’ or ‘the only system’ also illustrates the exceptional character of Soviet identity that Stalin was reinforcing. The Other – the US – was constructed through the process if differentiation as sensitive and emotional, the traits that are traditionally associated with femininity. The below quote equates being emotional with the danger of being dominated: “They, bourgeois politicians, are very sensitive and revengeful. You should keep your feelings under control. If your emotions rule you – you will lose” (Stalin, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2008: 58). In contrast, a ‘victorious’ Self was constructed as an encompassment of traditionally masculine qualities - determined, independent, impenetrable, and invincible: “Finally, the results of the five-year plan have shown that the Communist Party is invincible, if it knows its goal, and if it is not afraid of difficulties” (Stalin, 1933).

Both the US and the USSR constructed masculine nuclear identities in opposition to the external Other and they reinforced these identities in very similar ways by
constructing the Other as unstable, emotional, irresponsible, and so on. For example, the head of the Soviet Committee on Standards Vasily Emel’yanov noted when recalling the post-Hiroshima period: “The only possibility of restraining these new claimants to world domination [the Americans] and of cooling their ardour was to create our own atomic bomb very quickly” (Emel’yanov, 1975, cited in Holloway, 1981: 187). The need to restrain and to “cool the ardour” is the language that portrays the Other as emotional.

The US leaders also engaged in antagonising the Other as seen from Truman’s memoirs: “Force is the only thing the Russians understand” (Truman, 1955: 412) and in his diary entry that reflected the decision not to use the atomic bomb in Tokyo and Kyoto:

We as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old Capitol or the new […] It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this atomic bomb (Truman, 1945b).

The above quote reinforces the US ethical identity of a responsible nuclear state and a trustee of nuclear force implying that the USSR leaders would not be as ‘merciful’. In the similar manner, the US Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s reflected:

We must remember that she [Russia] has not learned the amenities of diplomatic intercourse and we must expect bad language from her […] There has been growing quite a strain of irritating feeling between our government and the Russians and it seems to me that it is a time for me to use all the restraint I can on these other people who have been apparently getting a little more irritated (Stimson, 1945a).

American officials constructed the Soviets as almost child-like differentiated from the paternal US, suggesting that they would not understand the diplomatic US language, but they would understand violence and force. Specifically, the Americans were infantilising the Soviets, simultaneously depicting themselves as more responsible and legitimately authoritative. Here, the language works to construct certain hierarchies and to boost the so-called ‘American manhood’. Doty (1996:31) argues that American manhood was linked to first, the competence to colonize and govern, and second, to democracy. The atomic monopoly also clearly reaffirmed this manhood as seen from
the US leaders’ assumed responsibility and leadership due to developing the bomb first:

this was a place where we really held all the cards. I called it [an atomic bomb] a royal straight flush and we mustn’t be a fool about the way we play it. They [the Soviets] can’t get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique (Stimson, 1945b).

The war with Japan was still continuing when Stimson wrote this in his diary, yet he was thinking about how to “play” with the US’ ally, the Soviet Union. In a way, the Americans were also indulging in competition, more specifically in being the leader of this competition.

The Soviet manhood as a consequence of the US atomic monopoly was somewhat crushed, which the Soviets actively hid. As a result, another factor indicating the hyper-masculine character of Soviet nuclear identity was bravado. Despite openly acknowledging the weakness of the USSR at earlier stages of his rule, Stalin and other Soviet officials did not refer to weakness so much after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki even though they were behind the US again on the means of defence. Instead, they continued to construct the identity of a fearless mighty state and even attempted bluffing. The Soviets had to reinforce and stabilise their post-war global superpower identity. To illustrate, in his speech to the UN General Assembly on October 29, 1946, Molotov declared:

It must not be forgotten that in response to the atomic bombs of one side atomic bombs, and perhaps something else as well, may be found on the other side, and then the final collapse of the calculations of certain self-satisfied but limited people will become more than obvious (Molotov, 1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 164).

More evidence of Soviet bravado can be found in Stalin’s interview with the Sunday Times correspondent Alexander Werth on the 25th of September 1946 published on the front page of Pravda:

Atomic bombs are intended to frighten faint-hearted people, but they cannot decide the outcomes of wars, and would under no circumstances suffice for this purpose. Certainly, the monopoly on the secrets of the atom bomb poses a threat, but against that there are at least two things: The monopoly on the possession of the atom bomb cannot last long; The use of
the atom bomb will be forbidden (Stalin, 1946b).

Again, Stalin was constructing an identity that was very masculine, reinforcing fearlessness and rationality. This made the bomb’s acquisition possible and necessary. To reiterate the argument of Cohn et al. (2006: 3) regarding political leaders’ “anxious preoccupation with affirming manhood”, not acquiring the bomb in Stalin’s eyes would be a ‘wimpish’ or a ‘soft’ move, and the Soviet Union needed to realise its discursively constructed identity of an invincible superpower, because the American bomb made this established masculine identity precarious and raised questions about Soviet strength and toughness. Soviet bravado and the public diminishing of the bomb’s significance was a part of this ideational project. To illustrate, a year after the nuclear bombings of Japan Stalin stated:

The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn’t. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon (Stalin, 1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 282).

Such discourse disguises the vulnerability of Soviet nuclear identity and seeks to maintain and reinforce its masculine attributes. In order to stabilise this identity, the Soviets needed to acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. This shows how the gendered nature of nuclear discourse and competitive hyper-masculine identity constructed within it enabled nuclear weapons acquisition in the USSR.

**Soviet Nuclear Identity as Peace-loving**

As with any identity construction, Soviet nuclear identity was highly complex and contradictory. Previous sections established that nuclear weapons were necessary in order to reproduce and affirm Soviet masculine and exceptional superpower identity. Acquiring modern means of defence and catching up with and overtaking the US was integral to the stability of this identity. A third element of nuclear identity that the Soviets constructed was that of the USSR as rational, responsible, and peace loving in opposition to the aggressive, imperialist, and warmongering US. These constructions particularly intensified after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when the
Soviets became fully aware of the bomb’s military and political significance. It was during the period between the end of World War II and the first Soviet nuclear test (1945-1949) that both the USSR and the US put ahead various plans to halt nuclear proliferation, as mentioned in the historical overview that this chapter begins with. Constructing a clear boundary between the ‘cooperative’ Self and the ‘aggressive’ Other made the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons legitimate and necessary, because if no agreement can be achieved then there was a need to defend oneself from “the instigators of war”. There is thus a contradiction at the heart of the Soviet nuclear identity construction – alongside the narratives of masculine military strength and superpower status discussed so far, the Soviets also constructed their identity through narratives of cooperation and peacekeeping. To illustrate, in one of his interviews to Pravda in 1948 Stalin stated:

>[T]hose in the United States and Great Britain who inspire an aggressive policy do not consider themselves interested in an agreement and in cooperation with the U.S.S.R […] What the war instigators who are striving to unleash a new war fear most of all is the reaching of agreements and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. because a policy of concord with the U.S.S.R. undermines the position of the instigators of war and deprives the aggressive policy of these gentlemen of any purpose (Stalin, 1948).

This constructed the USSR as peaceful, cooperative and seeking agreement with “aggressive” capitalists. The above passage also portrays Soviet policy as more rational and superior to that of the US and Britain, because the Soviets were the ones seeking a diplomatic route. In the similar manner, in another interview to Pravda in 1946 Stalin commented on Winston Churchill’s famous Iron Curtain speech:

>Mr. Churchill now takes the stand of the warmongers, and in this Mr. Churchill is not alone. He has friends not only in Britain but in the United States of America as well […] in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends (Stalin, 1946a).

Constructing the Americans as “warmongers”, and above all, comparing British and US leaders to Hitler a year after World War II ended, reinforced the oppositional identity of the USSR as peaceful and co-operative. This kind of representational practice presented Soviet leaders’ actions as reasonable, and their strategy of bomb’s acquisition as legitimate. Othering and the production of danger reaffirmed and
stabilised Soviet nuclear identity constructing the Soviet position as distinct from the US and morally sound. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fuelled these constructions. As noted by the Soviet marshal Georgy Zhukov in his memoirs:

It was clear already then that the US Government intended to use the atomic weapon for the purpose of achieving its imperialist goals from a position of strength in “the cold war.” This was amply corroborated on August 6 and 8. Without any military need whatsoever, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on the peaceful and densely-populated Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Zhukov, 1971: 674-675).

Accentuating the lack of military need for the bomb’s use portrays the US as violent and irrational in opposition to peaceful Soviets. “The greater the frenzy in the camp of the warmongers, the greater should be the calm and restraint in our camp of peace” (Malenkov, 1949, cited in Holloway, 1994: 269). A Soviet politician and the future short-term replacement for Stalin Georgy Malenkov actually made this statement after the Soviets tested the bomb revealing discursive structures that both highlight and repress the inherent dangers of nuclear weapons and demonstrating that various constructions can be present in the discourse, often simultaneously. In this sense, the Soviet bomb supposedly did not present any danger to the world, but the American bomb did. Additionally, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Washington Nikolay Novikov described American efforts to discuss international control of atomic energy as means to “somewhat ameliorate the aggressive character of the Anglo-Saxon alliance of ‘atomic powers’” (Novikov, 1946, cited in Holloway, 1994: 158). Soviet efforts on this matter were talked about differently:

Personages in the United States cannot but know that the Soviet Union is not only opposed to the employment of the atomic weapon, but that it also stands for its prohibition and for the termination of its production. It is known that the Soviet Union has several times demanded the prohibition of the atomic weapon, but each time this has been refused by the Atlantic bloc powers (Stalin, 1951).

Here Stalin projects an ethical identity of the USSR not only as a responsible and peaceful state, but moreover as opposing nuclear weapons proliferation. The narratives of American irrationality and aggressiveness legitimised and necessitated the Soviet nuclear project, to an extent constructing the Soviets as burdened by the
acquisition of nuclear weapons but acting in pursuit of peaceful policy goals such as the prohibition of nuclear weapons and defending themselves from the US threat.

Despite using their nuclear weapons against Japan, the US also constructed a Self that was ‘peaceful’ by juxtaposing it to the ‘irrational’ autocratic Other. For example, Table 5.1 displays attributes extracted from the Stimson’s (1945c) memorandum that were linked to the US and the USSR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a nation of free thought, free speech, free elections, in fact, a really free people; best efforts for coordination and sympathetic understanding with Russia; our system of freedom.</td>
<td>autocratically controlled system; a nation that is not basically free; systematically controlled from above by Secret Police; free speech is not permitted; policy cannot be permanent; tied up with the life of one man; forever resting upon every citizen, the stifling hand of autocracy; Russia’s Secret Police State; a nation whose people are not possessed of free speech; governmental action is controlled by the autocratic machinery of a secret political police; cannot give effective control of this new agency [atomic bomb].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 Attributes linked to the US and the USSR quoted from Stimson’s memorandum, July 19, 1945

Language in the table above is representative of what Chomsky (1982, cited in Dalby, 1990: 176) refers to as “the language of US moral exceptionalism”. This language manifests the idea present in US officials’ minds that the US was an exceptional state,
the pinnacle of democracy destined to show moral leadership in the world, whereas
the USSR was autocratic and thus inferior and could not be trusted with nuclear
weapons. These constructions legitimise one side’s weapons over the other and help
to flesh out the superior peaceful identity that is being reinforced. The US officials
even went as far as claiming that they used “the most terrible bomb in the history of
the world” for peace and common good (Truman, 1945b). Truman portrayed the
bombings as a tragic and inevitable burden that fell on American shoulders and
continued to reinforce the identity of a peace-loving, democratic and civilised nation:

We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the
lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans [...] I shall ask the
Congress to cooperate to the end that its production and use be controlled,
and that its power be made an overwhelming influence towards world
peace [...] Now let us use that force and all our resources and all our skills
in the great cause of a just and lasting peace! (Truman, 1945a)

This shows that essentially the US and the USSR were occupying different ideational
nuclear worlds. Their constructions of reality were completely opposed, yet at the
same time similar in a number of ways. Each portrayed the Other as danger to
international peace and stability, but they were going through identical motions of
constructing the Self that was peaceful. Such constructions enabled armament on both
sides. To illustrate, the below quote from Stalin reflects how the Soviets did not
approve of the American “just and lasting peace”:

By what right do the interests of preserving peace require such monopoly?
Would it not be more correct to say that matters are directly the opposite,
that it is the interests of preserving peace that require first of all the
liquidation of such a monopoly and then the unconditional prohibition of
the atomic weapon too? I think that the proponents of the atom bomb may
agree to the prohibition of the atomic weapon only if they see that they are
no longer monopolists (Stalin, 1951).

Similarly to Truman, Stalin attempted to construct a peace-loving nuclear identity thus
enabling the acquisition of nuclear weapons and making it legitimate and necessary.
Moreover, this quote implies that disarmament could paradoxically be achieved
through armament. While this has evidence of thinking along the lines of rational
deterrence, the previous two sections of this chapter established that Soviet efforts to
build the bomb as quickly as possible were enabled by the need to assert Soviet
superpower identity that was hyper-masculine, competitive, and exceptional by nature. The attempt to construct an identity as peace-loving was an attempt to legitimise Soviet nuclear weapons and to reinforce the USSR as a moral leader (just as the US did).

Paranoia and Discursive Constructions of Threat and Danger

Previous sections of this chapter showed how Soviet nuclear identity was established and articulated in relation to spatial, temporal, and ethical Others. Nuclear discourse served to distinguish the Self from the Other. Another integral characteristic of the articulation of Soviet nuclear identity was the discursive construction of threat and danger. The statements of Soviet officials related to the US nuclear weapons often exemplified a sense of paranoia. ‘Paranoia’ here is not understood in a clinical sense but is loosely based on what Hofstadter (1964: 77) called “the paranoid style” as a force in politics meaning “the sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”. He notes that this style “has more to do with the way in which ideas are believed than with the truth or falsity of their content” (Hofstadter, 1964: 77).

Paranoia is a particular dynamic of identity construction that characterised US-USSR relations during the Cold War: it is not just Self-Othering; it is a distinctly paranoid fear of the Other that enables policies and identities of the Self. It manifested itself through the suspicion and lack of trust not in the realpolitik sense, but the lack of trust and also fear of those who represent something different from Self. Naturally, the Soviets could never trust their allies. This stems from their historical understanding of the capitalist world as a radically different Other and persistent fears of falling behind, as seen earlier in the chapter.

Paranoia, as defined above, is evident from the expanded USSR spy networks. Intelligence gathering, particularly regarding new military technologies, was integral to the Stalinist state (Craig and Radchenko, 2008: 43). However, it is the resources that the Soviets invested into spying on their allies that raise additional questions. The Soviet officials were just as concerned about the secret work on the atomic bomb carried out by their allies in the US and Britain as by the work of their enemy – Nazi Germany. The Soviets were spying on both projects, but invested more funds in the former (Lota, 2002) and it was the Anglo-American project that enabled the speeding
up of the Soviet work on the bomb. Some officials such as Beria went as far as believing that intelligence information was purposeful disinformation. As reflected by the KGB officer Iatskov: “From the very beginning Beria suspected disinformation in these [intelligence] reports, thinking that the enemy was trying to draw us in this way into huge expenditures of resources and effort on work which had no future” (Iatskov, cited in Holloway, 1994: 115).

Soviet enhanced suspiciousness was hardly surprising. There was not much room for trust in the Soviet-American alliance due to their ideological rivalry. Representations of fear and danger were an essential instrument of the Soviet state that legitimised practices such as espionage. In the US, when it came to the bomb’s development, it became clear that not all allies could be trusted with nuclear secrets, as evident from the existence of an Anglo-American agreement about complete secrecy particularly against the Soviet Union. As pointed out by Hixson (2008: 135-136), American foreign policy before World War II was fuelled by enemy-othering of Bolshevism, which was described as “the negation of everything American”. American identity was reaffirmed through the construction of the USSR as “Godless Communism” and “pariah regime” (Hixson, 2008: 136). Despite US-USSR alliance against Nazi Germany, the prior existence of these constructions did not allow for trust and transparency.

Both the US and the USSR actively engaged in the production of danger against each other. Chapter 3 established that when an identity is threatened or insecure, as explained by Connolly (1991: 64), “the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or into one of its numerous surrogates”. Campbell (1992: 145) refers to this process as “well-established discursive economy of identity/difference”, which triggers exclusionary practices of boundary-making and contributes to the representation of fear and danger about the other.

Of course, the US had its own paranoia about the Soviet Other also known as the ‘Red Scare’, which came in two waves. The first wave occurred immediately after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and was conceptualized by Levin (1971: 29) as a
“nation-wide anti-radical hysteria provoked by a mounting fear and anxiety that a Bolshevik revolution in America was imminent”. The second wave, popularly known as ‘McCarthyism’, after Senator Joseph McCarthy, began after World War II and was to an extent caused by the US discovering the true size of the Soviet spy network and by the general fear and hatred of American Communist Party (Storrs, 2015). The main difference between American and Soviet discourse of paranoia is that Soviets had a clear definition of danger coming from the outside – the US. In contrast, the Americans were also fearful of the ‘enemy within’ (Storrs, 2015).

After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Soviet exceptional superpower state identity was threatened and destabilised, which intensified the discursive practices of representing the US as a threatening and dangerous Other. Moreover, Soviets considered the bombings to be an attack against them, which exhibited the deeply felt emotions that the Soviets had with regards to the American bomb. To illustrate, as recalled by Molotov in his memoirs:

[The bombs dropped on Japan] were, of course, not against Japan, but against the Soviet Union: see, remember what we have. You don’t have the atomic bomb, but we do – and these are what consequences will be if you stir (Molotov, cited in Holloway, 1994: 164).

Here Molotov described the Soviet existence as being essentially threatened by the American hostile practices. These representations are important to the construction of Soviet nuclear identity, because representing the Other as threatening is necessary to understand the Self as peaceful. Such discourses inform and legitimise practices that are aimed at countering the threat. To illustrate further, the member of Politburo Zhdanov noted:

On the heels of Churchill, the most venomous imperialist politicians who had lost their sense of balance, began to propose plans for the quest realization of a preventative war against the USSR, and openly called for the utilization of the temporary American monopoly of the atomic bomb against Soviet people (Zhdanov, 1947, cited in Gullion, 1947).

Production of danger about the US allowed for the (re)articulation of relations of identity/difference and helped to secure Soviet nuclear identity in the post-war period. It was a part of reality constituted by the Soviets. The radical difference between the
Soviet Self and the American Other reinforced this discourse of insecurity and enabled nuclear weapons acquisition and political practices such as active intelligence gathering before and during the wartime alliance with the US. Reinforcing the idea that the US leaders were plotting a nuclear attack against the USSR contributed to the legitimisation of the Soviet pursuit of the bomb and made it necessary.

**Conclusion**

This chapter established that constructions of Soviet nuclear identity emerged as part of the reassurance project for the Soviet post-World War II state identity. The Soviets constructed the Self as an exceptional superpower and a future global centre of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin’s rapid industrialisation policy in the early 1930s and later nuclear weapons project were enabled and co-constituted by the construction of this superpower state identity. Nuclear weapons were instruments for the affirmation of Soviet greatness and masculinity. US nuclear advances and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 threatened and destabilised Soviet state identity making it appear child-like and weak compared to the masculine US. The Soviet officials saw the bombings of Japan as an attack against the USSR, which required them to build the bomb as soon as possible in order to stabilise not only their threatened material security, but also their constructed superpower identity.

This chapter argued that early-Cold War Soviet nuclear development policy was determined by the nature of nuclear identity the Soviet leaders were constructing. During the stage of nuclear weapons acquisition, Soviet nuclear identity emerged as competitive and fundamentally reliant on catching up with and overtaking the capitalist United States, which was an integral element of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Stalin constructed the ‘old’ Tsarist Russia as weak, anachronistic, and beaten. The ‘new’ Soviet Union could not afford to be backward again. Hence, in Stalin’s eyes the USSR needed to match and surpass the capitalists, first to defend themselves from the “warmongering” and distrustful US, and second to showcase Soviet superiority, invincibility, and its exceptional character. This enabled the rapid acceleration of the Soviet atomic project. In comparison, the US did not need to compete with the Soviets or anyone else due to their atomic monopoly. But similar to the Soviets, the Americans constructed an exceptional identity based on its uniquely moral, democratic, and
enlightened foundations and its duty to lead the world to a more civilised condition. The bomb in this case was a vehicle for the reinforcement of their identity as the “leader of the world for the common welfare” (Truman, 1945a).

Soviet nuclear identity emerged as hyper-masculine. It was constructed around attributes traditionally associated with masculinity such as strength, toughness, invincibility, and bravado. A state that constructs a highly masculine identity is a priori in favour of nuclear weapons’ acquisition, because “political masculinity is linked with preparedness to use military action and to wield weapons” (Cohn et al., 2006: 3). In this case, abstaining from nuclear weapons acquisition was not possible for the Soviets, because falling behind was constructed as a weakness or wimping out. The American atomic monopoly threatened Soviet manhood. Thus, the Soviets asserted their masculine nuclear identity by feminising the US and constructing it as emotional, immoral, and irrational. Threatened manhood made bomb’s acquisition desirable and necessary. US nuclear identity was also hyper-masculine and they reinforced it by constructing the Soviets as irrational, soft, and child-like, which made the Self appear as strong and rational. This shows how two very different states can be essentially quite similar when it comes to affirming their manhood by means of acquiring arms.

Soviet nuclear identity was also constructed as peace-loving vis-à-vis the “aggressive” and “warmongering” US. These constructions made Soviet nuclear weapons acquisition legitimate, because the Soviets were acting in order to accomplish ethical goals such as preserving peace and saving the world from the evil imperialists who, in contrast to the USSR, did not understand the diplomatic language and would unleash war if their atomic monopoly remained unchallenged. As a consequence, Soviet nuclear weapons were constructed as peaceful, while the American weapons posed the real danger to the world. The US also constructed a peace-loving nuclear identity proclaiming Self as “a trustee of this new force” and the use of atomic bombs in the war against Japan was seen as necessary, because it was done to achieve the common good and peace for humanity. US officials constructed the Soviets as irrational and untrustworthy particularly when it came to nuclear weapons. The nature of nuclear identities that both states were constructing vis-à-vis their radically different Other made nuclear acquisition and build up necessary and undisputable, while agreeing on
arms control measures or disarmament proposals such as the Baruch plan was neither possible, not desirable.

Finally, the Soviet nuclear project came into effect as an appropriate and necessary measure for defending the threatened Soviet Self from the evil and dangerous Other – the US. The discursive construction of threat and danger was essential to the construction of Soviet nuclear identity, because it helped to establish the boundaries between Self and Other and legitimised political practices that are said to counter this threat – nuclear weapons acquisition. This chapter showed how incorporating an identity dimension is crucial to fully understand Soviet motives and behaviour, because, to the USSR, acquiring nuclear weapons held significance well beyond security and self-defence. The next chapter examines how the Soviets continued to reinforce and re-imagine their nuclear identity during the stage of Nikita Khrushchev’s arms race after Stalin’s death in 1953.
Chapter 6. The Arms Race – Nikita Khrushchev (1953 – 1964)

“Why do we need to make ‘cannibalistic’ weapons like this?! Let this device hang over capitalists, like a sword of Damocles” (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in Zubok, 2009: 123).

Introduction

Chapter 5 established that Soviet nuclear identity emerged when Soviet post-World War II superpower state identity became threatened and destabilised by the American atomic monopoly after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The decision to build the bomb was made possible by competitive hyper-masculine identity, grounded in military strength and ideas about the exceptional character of the USSR. This exceptional identity was constructed not just in terms of strength and power, but also in moral terms as peace-loving, which made the bomb’s acquisition legitimate. The Soviets articulated this identity through juxtaposition to the (very) radical external Other - the US. Discursive constructions of the Other as dangerous and threatening established Self as peaceful and further enabled the bomb’s acquisition, while simultaneously silencing and excluding possibilities of reaching an arms control agreement with the US.

This chapter resumes the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity construction and looks at how this identity continued to evolve during the stage of the rapid vertical proliferation from 1953 to 1964 with consequences for the direction of nuclear policy. More specifically, it focuses on the nuclear diplomacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, who came to power after Stalin’s death and a very brief succession by Georgy Malenkov in 1953, and some of the other top CPSU officials. The chapter consults speeches and texts ranging from the early 1950s until the forced removal of Khrushchev from office in 1964 as well as secondary sources and Khrushchev’s own memoir. Additionally, the chapter consults a number of documents and speeches from the US that still acted as the radical spatial other to the Soviet Self.

There is no denying that power, deterrence, and security concerns had an impact on Soviet nuclear policymaking during the arms race. However, conventional IR approaches are insufficient to fully understand events such as the detonation of the
militarily useless ‘Tsar’ bomba’; and a rapid increase in nuclear weapons deployment and stockpiling beyond retaliatory capability, or dangerous moves such as Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum and placing of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. A closer look at the motivations and statements made at that time, using discourse analysis, deepens our understanding of the key events of the early arms race taking it beyond the insights of rational deterrence theory and the domestic politics approach.

This chapter argues that first, Soviet nuclear decisions during the Khrushchev’s stage of the arms race were not only enabled by defence concerns, but also by nuclear identity that Soviet officials were constructing and showcasing to the ever more divided Cold War world. Second, this chapter continues to assert that representations of identity matter significantly when it comes to nuclear decisions; an articulation of an aggressive, competitive, and hyper-masculine identity that is reinforced in juxtaposition to the (very) radical external other is both constitutive and a product of aggressive politics of nuclear build up.

The analysis that follows demonstrates that the Soviet leaders continued to re-imagine the USSR as a nuclear weapons state. The three overlapping dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity identified in Chapter 5 (competition with the US, hyper-masculinity, and peace-loving) continued to be present in Soviet nuclear discourse. However, certain shifts occurred as the Soviets started to militarily ‘catch up’ with the US.

First, the very meaning of the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude changed due to the increasing recognition that the power of nuclear weapons was not in the number of missiles, but in their range and in the ability to retaliate. Once this capability was acquired, the Soviets began to establish themselves as a superpower no longer constructing their greatness in the future tense as seen in the previous chapter. Second, the masculine dimension became more prominent and very ‘macho’ meaning masculine in an aggressive and assertive way. Third, despite aggressive threatening rhetoric, the Soviets continued to project an image of a peace-loving state. The more weapons they acquired, the more they constructed the Soviet Self as a protector of peace beyond the borders of the USSR (similar to the US identity of the leader of the free world, seeing themselves as leaders and protectors of the communist world),
which was not in the foreground during the nuclear weapons acquisition stage. Consequently, the reiteration of the Soviet exceptionalism intensified. Finally, while production of danger about the US was still present in the Soviet discourse due to the relative instability of nuclear identity, its nature became less paranoid and rather more threatening. Ultimately, it is shown in this chapter that the combination of these shifts created a discursive space in which some of the most dangerous and aggressive nuclear policy decisions became possible.

Similarly to Chapter 5, this chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the key nuclear developments and events during Khrushchev’s rule and then it proceeds to discuss the three core dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity: competition with the US, masculinity, and peacekeeping.

**Historical Overview, 1953-1964**

In the early 1950s, atomic bombs such as the ones used in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki lost their utility. Both the US and the Soviet Union worked on the development of hydrogen thermonuclear weapons – 1000 times more powerful than the atomic ones (Holloway, 1994: 299). The Soviets, who just managed to produce a small arsenal of atomic weapons had to invest heavily into this new type of nuclear bomb. The thermonuclear project set off rapidly after Stalin’s death in 1953. According to statistics provided by Norris and Kristensen (2010: 81) in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the number of nuclear warheads in the US increased from 299 in 1950 to 31,139 (the largest amount they ever had) in 1965; in the USSR – from 5 in 1950 to 6,129 in 1965. Furthermore, the UK joined the ‘nuclear club’ in 1953 accumulating a total of 436 nuclear warheads in 1965 followed by the first nuclear tests conducted by France and China in 1964 (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 81). This created additional security concerns for the Soviet government.

In addition to the rapid armament, Khrushchev’s tenure encompassed some of the most notable Soviet accomplishments and absurdities of the nuclear arms race.

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8 From here onwards the term ‘nuclear weapons’ will refer to thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs that rely on nuclear fusion reaction and thus generate more explosive power than atomic bombs.
between the Soviet Union and the US. These included the development and testing of the hydrogen thermonuclear ‘super’ bomb in the early 1950s; the launch of the first inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the first satellite ‘Sputnik’ by the Soviet Union in 1957; the detonation of the ‘Tsar’ bomba in 1961 – the most powerful thermonuclear bomb ever detonated; and Khrushchev’s infamous nuclear ‘sabre-rattling’ that led to international crises such as the Berlin crisis of 1961, which culminated in the East German erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The latter occurred when the Soviets shipped their offensive nuclear missiles to Cuba and began construction of sites for medium-range missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (Grogin, 2001: 242). Khrushchev’s demand to the US government was the preservation of Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba and the removal of American missiles from Turkey. After 13 days of confrontation, US President John Kennedy’s careful diplomacy helped to avoid a nuclear catastrophe and the Soviets withdrew the missiles (Grogin, 2001: 250).

In comparison to the period of nuclear weapons acquisition, the main source of unease for both the Soviets and the Americans during the nuclear arms race was not whether the adversary had the bomb or not, but how many, and how powerful. Nevertheless, both states attempted to discuss the possibilities of nuclear arms control and peaceful coexistence throughout the 1950s (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 214-215). One of the most notable attempts was US President Dwight Eisenhower’s proposal Atoms for Peace presented to the United Nations in December 1953, which suggested the joint efforts of the US and the USSR to explore peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as pointed out by Zubok (2009: 125), subsequent American nuclear tests made this proposal look like a cover up for the demonstration of nuclear superiority. It was only after the most dangerous nuclear ‘near miss’ in history – the Cuban Missile Crisis – that the first breakthrough was achieved. On 5 August 1963 the US, the USSR, and the UK signed the Limited Test-Ban Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space (Zubok, 2009: 152). However, Khrushchev’s power never recovered from the Cuban missile crisis and the Politburo removed him from office in October 1964 (Grogin, 2001: 249).
‘Caught up and Overtook’ and Competition with the US

The desire to catch up with and overtake the US in the nuclear race remained prominent in Soviet nuclear discourse as the Cold War tensions escalated in the beginning of the 1950s. Similar to the acquisition stage, Soviet leaders and officials in charge of the Soviet nuclear project continued to construct a competitive nuclear identity emphasising the vital importance of winning the competition against the capitalist US. For example, the deputy head of the project Avraami Zaveniagin stated:

The Americans [after the first Soviet atomic test in August 1949] saw that their advantages had disappeared, and at Truman’s order began work on the hydrogen bomb. Our people and our country are no slouches. We took it up as well and, as far as we can judge, we believe we do not lag behind the Americans [...] its explosion will mean the liquidation of the second monopoly of the Americans (Zaveniagin, 1953, cited in Zubok and Harrison, 1999: 143).

Zaveniagin did not mention the potential danger that such powerful bomb poses. Emphasising that the Soviets are “no slouch” echoes Stalin’s speeches regarding Soviet backwardness discussed in Chapter 5. They could not fall behind and be beaten again as this carried consequences for both the stability of Soviet superpower identity and material security. As a result, the first Soviet hydrogen bomb designed by Andrei Sakharov was tested on 12 August 1953, which for a short period of time led Soviet officials to believe that they overtook the US (Zubok, 2009: 124). Khrushchev himself noted the following: “No one else, neither the Americans nor the British, had such a bomb. I was overwhelmed by the idea. We did everything in our power to assure the rapid realization of Sakharov’s plans” (Khrushchev, 1953, cited in Zubok, 2009: 124).

There is a theme of competitiveness and overtaking in this quote. It captures both the extensive effort that the Soviets invested into the bomb production, and that competing with the US was emphasised over security concerns. Khrushchev reports himself to be “overwhelmed” by the idea of overtaking rather than by security or a military advantage guaranteed by having such a bomb.
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the first successful Soviet atomic test in 1949, the US nuclear identity was threatened, because they were no longer the nuclear monopolists. Discursive constructions of the Other – the USSR – as immoral and godless reaffirmed the American Self as being the responsible leader of the free world and constructed further American armament as reasonable and necessary. To illustrate, US secretary of commerce Lewis Strauss wrote to Truman on 14 November 1950: “a government of atheists is not likely to be dissuaded from producing the weapons on ‘moral’ grounds” (Strauss, 1950, cited in Holloway, 1994: 301). Other examples are found in two memoranda circulated among US top officials. First, the Joint Chiefs’ memorandum of 23 November 1949 stated: “possession of a thermonuclear weapon by the USSR without such possession by the United States would be intolerable”. Second, an undated memorandum from December 1949 elaborated that such possession would have:

a profoundly demoralizing effect on the American people. It would have grave psychological and political repercussions which might raise serious question concerning the continued unity of spirit, confidence and determination among the nations of the Western world (Memorandum, FRUS, 1949, Vol.1, Doc. 223).

The end of the American atomic monopoly destabilised US nuclear identity creating the need for heavier arming and continuing to construct the Soviet nuclear weapons as dangerous in comparison to the American ones. Similarly, after the first Soviet thermonuclear test in 1953, following the rhetoric of ‘massive retaliation’, the US rapidly launched a new series of hydrogen bomb tests in 1954, exploding a 15-megaton bomb (Zubok, 2009: 125). Prior to the testing US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated:

The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an entire historical era," and we should do the same. They seek, through many types of manoeuvres, gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by overextending them in efforts which, as Lenin put it, are 'beyond their strength, so that they come to practical bankruptcy (Dulles, 1954).

This illustrates the instability of US nuclear identity after the Soviets caught up with the Americans again. The discursive construction of the Other as dangerous and threatening therefore acts as a stabiliser of this identity and establishes a particularly salient form of knowledge, which can be employed in the legitimisation of the course
of nuclear policy. This demonstrates that the escalation of the nuclear arms race was to a large extent identity-driven on both sides. This is similar to the Soviet representations of the US as aggressive and dangerous during the stage of nuclear weapons acquisition when Soviet triumphant post-World War II superpower state identity became precarious due to the American sole possession of the atomic bomb.

During the 1950s, the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude among Soviet officials went through a transformation. They kept going back and forth on their perception of nuclear war and deterrence and their thinking was rather contradictory. Holloway (1994: 340) described the Soviet attitude: “There appears now to have been a dual – even schizophrenic – attitude to nuclear war in the Soviet leadership: a recognition of its destructive consequences for the Soviet Union as well as the West, and an official position that nuclear war would mean the end of capitalism”. For example, Khrushchev stated that in the event of a nuclear war the “imperialists will choke on it” and it “will end up in a catastrophe for the imperialist world” (Khrushchev, 1954, cited in Catudal, 1988: 49). In the same vein, in his interview to Pravda Molotov asserted that in the event of a nuclear war “what will perish will not be world civilizations...but the decaying capitalist social system with its imperialist core soaked in blood” (Molotov, 1955, cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 443). Another example is Molotov’s speech at the Communist Party Plenum:

He [Marx] said that things are heading towards the collapse of capitalism and towards the victory of Communism... If we are now saying that some kind of war can allegedly lead to [...] the end of the entire civilization, this means that we have something quite opposite from the head on our shoulders (Molotov, 1955, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 213).

Several Soviet officials attempted to challenge this dominant discourse on nuclear war, showing that official discourses do not exist in isolation from discourses of resistance, although this was less obvious during Stalin’s rule. For instance, the chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov claimed that the continuation of the Cold War between the US and the USSR would lead to a disaster “which with modern weapons mean the end of world civilization” (Malenkov, 1954, cited in Zubok, 2009: 126). In the same vein, Major General N. Talensky stressed that nuclear weapons “by their very nature
enhance the danger of military adventures” (Talensky, 1955, cited in Zagoria, 1961: 19). The Soviet atomic scientists who tried to urge the government about the dangers of the arms race also shared this view: “Defence against such a weapon [thermonuclear bomb] is practically impossible so it is clear that the use of atomic weapons on a mass scale will lead to the devastation of the warring countries” (Malyshev et al., 1954, cited in Zubok and Harrison, 1999: 145).

The report containing the above quote was never published or discussed by the Soviet government. Moreover, Molotov and Khrushchev heavily criticised Malenkov for ideological heresy and for disputing the inevitable victory of communism over capitalism (Zubok, 2009: 126). Khrushchev (1955, cited in Zubok and Harrison, 1999: 147) referred to his statement as “theoretically incorrect and politically harmful”, while Molotov (1955, cited in Zubok and Harrison, 1999: 147) stated that it made it difficult “to prepare and mobilize all forces for the destruction of the bourgeoisie”. This can be read as the refusal to accept the idea of any vulnerability, which overpowered the concerns for the growing danger of mutual destruction in the case of a nuclear war.

Competing discourses were silenced, because they challenged the hegemonic discourse of the invincibility of the Soviet state and destabilised its identity of a state that caught up with and overtook the capitalist West in building sophisticated nuclear weapons. Without a doubt, catching up with the US in nuclear technology development provided certain security guarantees for the Soviet Union. However, it also helped to reproduce Soviet nuclear identity, and political elites’ perception of Self as a nuclear power was transforming into a superpower with more influence. It seems clear that overtaking the US outweighed the concerns for the growing danger of mutual destruction in the case of a nuclear war, because, as seen above, the alternative discourses were silenced and even scrutinised.

The significant change in Soviet thinking occurred after the Soviets successfully tested a 1.6-megaton bomb on 22 November 1955. This test demonstrated to the Soviet leaders that hydrogen bombs had no limit in their destructive power and according to the report on the test provided by Sakharov, the charge power was deliberately reduced by half because of the danger of causing too much damage (Sakharov, 1955). The report went on to describe the effects of the detonation of this bomb, claiming that the blast
shattered windows in settlements as far as 400 kilometres away. The realisation of the tremendous power of nuclear weapons forced Soviet officials to accept a nuclear war as an existential threat or as Craig and Radchenko (2018: 214) posit: it caused a shift from “the capitalists will die to we’ll all die”. For example, the head of the Supreme Soviet, Kliment Voroshilov stated that war was:

invented by savages. They moved from the bow to the powder, and now such a thing has been created, that it goes off once and destroys a whole city and destroys the population. We’ll all die in a few generations (Voroshilov, 1956, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 214).

In his famous speech at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev laid out his own understanding of the peaceful coexistence between the US and the USSR:

the situation has changed radically, because today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent imperialists from unleashing war […] we estimate that the [two] blocs presently possess such means of destruction as to make war unthinkable, if not impossible (Khrushchev, 1956a)

It is the Soviet officials’ belief in mutual assured destruction (MAD) that changed the nature of the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude. Having enough weapons to retaliate against the US attack convinced Khrushchev that only “insane imperialists” would now dare to attack the USSR. “There are only two ways, either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is not third way” (Khrushchev, 1956a). In July 1956 Khrushchev concluded: “The danger of a military conflict is absent” (Khrushchev, 1956, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 215). This profound shift in understanding of the potential grave consequences of a nuclear war for the Soviet Union destabilised Soviet nuclear identity, because it meant accepting that Self was also vulnerable and rejecting the notion of the Soviet invincibility. Thus, the Soviets needed to reassert this identity and to secure its precarious Self.

Historians often associate Khrushchev’s behaviour with dangerous nuclear bluff, boasting, and brinkmanship (see e.g. Zubok, 2009; Zubok and Harrison, 1999; Craig and Radchenko, 2018). This behaviour had very little material grounds, because economically and militarily the Soviet Union was not even close to overtaking the US
during Khrushchev’s tenure. Logically, the acceptance of MAD should have led to the moderate vision of nuclear deterrence, but the armament continued at a rapid pace on both sides expanding the number of missiles and their explosive power. Rationally, if MAD had been accepted, there should be no grounds for further armament. However, and with reference to the main argument of this chapter, it is through the reinforcement of Soviet competitive nuclear identity that this armament and consequential aggressive policy choices became possible. The Soviet leaders continued to reinforce the identity of a (now) nuclear superpower through their claims of superiority and invincibility over capitalist states. To illustrate:

Prominent leaders of bourgeois countries frankly admit with increasing frequency that ‘there will be no victory’ in a war in which atomic weapons are used. These leaders still do not venture to state that capitalism will find its grave in another world war, should it unleash one, but they are already compelled to only admit that the Socialist camp is invincible (Khrushchev, 1956, cited in Zagoria, 1961:19).

The constructions of Self as superior and more powerful than the Other affirmed Soviet nuclear identity. Ultimately, the Soviets asserted the identity of a state that finally caught up and overtook the West. “If Lenin would arise, he would have been pleased to see his cause become so strong, that the capitalistic world admits being unable to win the war against the socialist countries” (Khrushchev, 1956b). Thus, MAD became not just the reason for non-use or just something constraining the USSR, but a way for the Soviets to construct and reinforce the identity of itself as invincible.

Identity reproduced through such powerful discourse further enabled policy of rapid nuclear development, and in 1957 Soviet scientists achieved a technological breakthrough. The Soviets successfully tested the world’s first ICBM and launched the first satellite ‘Sputnik’ into space. As a result, the reproduction of nuclear superpower identity intensified. To illustrate: “Now, that we have the [inter-continental missile, we also hold America by the throat. They thought that America is out of reach. But this is not so” (Khrushchev, 1958, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 216).

The effect of this phrasing is to capture the magnitude of Soviet achievements and military might, to show the adversary that it is not safe anymore. This could imply that
developing ICBMs had more to do with status and identity constructions than with security; it was important for the Soviets to reinforce their winning position in the competition against the US. In his memoirs Khrushchev stated:

Of course, we tried to derive maximum political advantage from the fact that we were the first to launch our rockets into space. We wanted to exert pressure on American militarists – and also influence the minds of more reasonable politicians – so that the United States would start treating us better (Khrushchev, 1974: 53).

Overtaking the US brought the Soviet Union to a new place in the international arena. It reshaped its nuclear identity into a superpower. Khrushchev also attempted to reject Stalinist concept of capitalist encirclement, because it was “no longer clear who encircles whom” (Khrushchev, 1958, cited in Zagoria, 1961: 20). Nuclear weapons acted as tools of identity construction and reinforcement, because Khrushchev and other officials knew very well that in 1958 Soviet missiles were not capable of reaching the US. They also knew that the first Soviet ICBM was a highly costly and inefficient weapon (Zubok, 2009: 131).

As identified in Chapter 5, the Soviets were beaten by everyone in the past and could not afford to be beaten again, because their righteous – even exceptional - place was above everyone else, particularly the capitalists. While during the acquisition stage nuclear weapons were constructed as a symbol of future greatness of the USSR, during the arms race stage this greatness came to the forefront of Soviet nuclear identity construction. This can be seen in the following quote from Leonid Ilyichov, a Soviet philosopher and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

it [the sputniks and the ICBM] is not just a matter of an increase in the weight and prestige of one country. It is a question of a change in the balance of forces between Socialism and capitalism, of the strengthening of the former and the weakening of the latter (Ilyichov, 1958, cited in Zagoria, 1961: 21).

Although the Soviets were the first to launch the satellite into space and to develop the first ICBM in 1957, they technically did not overtake the US, but Soviet leaders erroneously reinforced overtaking on numerous occasions as seen from the above
quotes. They could not possibly admit that they were behind again. The ‘true’ figures were absent from the Soviet discourse, instead alternative truths were produced, which kept nuclear identity stable.

The ‘madness’ of nuclear decisions at this stage of the arms race does not fit within traditional, rationalist IR frameworks. It is evident from the Soviet nuclear discourse that nuclear weapons were not only serving a military purpose. In fact, their military value was not at the forefront: “Let these bombs lie, let them get on the nerves of those who would like to unleash war” (Khrushchev, 1955, cited in Holloway, 1994: 343) or “Let this device [nuclear bomb] hang over capitalists, like a sword of Damocles” (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in Zubok, 2009: 123). The use of Damocles metaphor emphasised the precariousness of the American situation in the face of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Khrushchev constructed the Soviet Union as peaceful and powerful in juxtaposition to the war-unleashing weaker US. This shows how meaning can be established through a system of differential signs where one element is valued over the opposite. The discursive construction of Soviet nuclear identity was both a constitutive of and a product of successful rapid nuclear development in the USSR:

now we have such a stock of rockets, such an amount of atomic and hydrogen weapons, that if they attack us, we could wipe out our potential enemies off the face of the earth... In one year, 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads came off the assembly line in the factory we visited (Khrushchev, 1959, cited in Fursenko and Naftali, 2006: 248).

Considering the above discussion about Khrushchev’s clear understanding of what MAD meant and of the actual disadvantaged strategic position of the USSR, such quotes emphasise the need for continuous construction and reinforcement of nuclear superpower identity. To illustrate further, after John Kennedy replaced Eisenhower as President of the US, Khrushchev continued:

I told him to let Kennedy know...that if he starts a war then he would probably become the last president of the United States of America. I know he reported it accurately. In America they are showing off vehemently, but yet people close to Kennedy are beginning to pour cold water like a fire-brigade (Khrushchev, 1961).
This superpower nuclear identity reproduced through the Soviet nuclear discourse is closely interlinked with the dangerous foreign policy decisions that followed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. One of the most salient examples is the Soviet test of a fifty-megaton bomb ‘Tsar bomba’ on 30 October 1961. It was the largest nuclear device ever detonated to date. The blast was so powerful that it shattered windows in Finland and Norway hundreds of miles away (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 225). The whole purpose of this explosion was to demonstrate the Soviet might to the US, because as explained by Fursenko and Naftali (2006: 410) ‘Tsar bomba’ was not a usable weapon at all. The Soviets did not even have a suitable aircraft to carry this bomb to the US if they were to ever use it (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006: 410). Historians describe this event as “a dramatic piece of political theatre” (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006: 410) or as Khrushchev’s “prestige-saving exercise” after the Berlin ultimatum (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 225). Only a couple of weeks before the test was conducted, Khrushchev stated:

We shall probably wind them up by detonating a hydrogen bomb with a yield of 50,000,000 tons of TNT. We have said that we have a 100-megaton bomb. This is true. But we are not going to explode it, because even if we did so at the most remote site, we might knock out our own windows (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in Adamsky and Smirnov, 1994).

Catching up with the US was not enough. It is the significance of overtaking that this quote re-emphasises. Constructing the identity of a mighty nuclear superpower enabled the testing of this very expensive yet militarily useless nuclear device making it both reasonable and appropriate. The rapid nuclear armament boosted the Soviet construction of itself as a superpower and the Other as an aggressor that was now behind. Again, it does not matter how far ahead or behind the USSR really was in comparison to the US; that was the Soviet reality and within this reality certain dangerous policy practices came about. The superpower nuclear identity made it possible for Khrushchev to come up with the Berlin ultimatum in 1958 requesting all Western armed forces to be withdrawn from West Berlin. This escalated into a 3-year crisis culminating in the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which divided the city for the next three decades (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 224-225). But Khrushchev’s most dangerous nuclear policy move was without a doubt the placing of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962. This is perhaps the most written-about episode of the Cold War. I will proceed to discuss it in the last section of this chapter,
because it represents the peace-loving element of the Soviet nuclear identity rather than competition.

*Macho-masculinity in Soviet Nuclear Identity Constructions*

Chapter 5 established that Soviet nuclear identity was very masculine by nature, which reaffirms the argument of feminist IR scholars about the gendered structure of security discourses and the dangers that this poses. Chapter 5 argued that acquiring nuclear weapons and liquidating the first American atomic monopoly reinforced the masculine identity of the USSR as a strong, rational, and impenetrable state. Falling behind and not initiating a nuclear weapons programme was constructed as weakness due to the “anxious preoccupation with affirming manhood” (Cohn at al., 2006: 2) that exists in national and international security debates. The masculine character of Soviet nuclear identity took on a new shape during Khrushchev’s tenure. As the quantity and quality of missiles increased, the masculine dimension of this identity became a more prominent and dominant feature of Soviet nuclear discourse, with effects on further direction of nuclear policy. The Soviets reinforced their masculinity through nuclear identity construction enacting and legitimising policy of further rapid armament.

In the first instance, it is useful to go back to several quotes discussed in the previous section. All elements of nuclear identity are interlinked and often reinforced simultaneously. Competitiveness itself is traditionally associated with masculinity and by placing so much emphasis on ‘catch up and overtake’ and rejecting the idea of falling behind in the arms race against the US, the Soviet officials were constructing a masculine nuclear identity. This enabled the course of the Soviet rapid armament policy and reinforced an even more aggressive macho-like identity through Khrushchev’s statements such as: “we hold America by the throat”, “the imperialists will choke on it”, “we could wipe out our potential enemies off the face of the earth”, and “the capitalist world admits being unable to win the war against the socialist countries”. These statements reproduce a self-identity that is dominant, threatening, powerful, and militarily superior in relation to the Other evidently being constructed as subordinate.
The second point to raise in connection with the previous section is to do with the nature of the Soviet armament itself and a constant desire to develop even larger more powerful missiles. For example, Khrushchev’s genuine excitement about developing the bomb that ‘no one else had’ or indeed detonating a militarily useless weapon such as ‘Tsar bomba’, demonstrates the symbolic importance of nuclear weapons, which as Cohn et al. (2006: 3) highlight, is deeply gendered. “Regardless of their military utility nuclear weapons are turned into the ultimate arbiter of political/masculine power” (Cohn et al., 2006: 4). Thus, not engaging in the arms race was a priori not an option at this stage, because the Soviets already had a small number of nuclear warheads and knowing that the US was ahead again would destabilise the masculine identity the USSR constructed during the nuclear weapons acquisition stage. The more they armed, the more they constructed Self as a nuclear superpower and hence the more prominent the masculine character of Soviet nuclear identity became, which in its turn led to even more arming and acquitting missiles in quantities that reached beyond retaliatory capability.

Soviet nuclear discourse during Khrushchev’s leg of the arms race was largely shaped by ideas about gender. The preoccupation with ‘affirming manhood’ is evident in numerous statements such as: “We must increase pressure and let our adversary feel that our strength is growing” (Khrushchev, 1962, cited in Zubok, 2009: 142) or “you won’t get anywhere without taking a risk. We cannot beg for anything from our opponents – we can only grab” (Khrushchev, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 219). Building up nuclear arms helped to reproduce the identity of a strong, aggressive state that was willing to take risks and, if needed, to use force. In addition, this can be achieved by incorporating sexual metaphors, which creates assent and excitement and helps to secure Self as dominant and even more powerful.

For example, when preparing to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev stated: “I am going to grab Kennedy by his balls” (Khrushchev, 1962, cited in Zubok, 2009: 14). The Soviets also asserted their hyper-masculine status by comparing their missiles to the American ones, naturally affirming that theirs were better and stronger. For example, Khrushchev (1959, cited in Safire, 2009) stated: “You want to threaten us indirectly. We have powerful weapons, too, and ours are better than yours if you want
to compete.” In another statement in 1961, he pointed out that war between the USSR and the US is “hardly possible, because it would be a duel of ballistic intercontinental missiles. We are strong on that... Americans would be at a disadvantage to start a war with this weapon... They know it and admit it.” (Khrushchev, 1961). The masculine character of nuclear identity that the Soviets were constructing made aggressive nuclear arms race possible.

The gendered nature of nuclear discourse and the equation of peace with weakness carries grave consequences for nuclear policy. Accepting the vulnerability of Self would mean accepting one’s weakness. As reflected by Khrushchev (1961): “I understand, comrades, and share this state of mind, that our enthusiasm for peaceful construction acts as poison, weakens our muscles and our will”. In the similar manner, Molotov stated: “but to ask for peace means to show one’s weakness. And to show one’s weakness before the strong is politically disadvantageous, inadvisable. It won’t do for Bolsheviks” (Molotov, cited in, Holloway 1994: 336). This also shows the contradictory nature of identity constructions, because seeing peace as weakness seems to contradict the peace-loving strand of Soviet nuclear identity. Nevertheless, masculine identity was reproduced even when the idea of disarmament seemed accepted:

They [the Americans] are all literally trembling... and suddenly we announce that we are prepared to destroy ballistic missiles and all rockets ... This is a powerful thing, and it will powerfully act on the conscience of any reasonable person, especially as our proposal is completely sincere (Khrushchev, 1960, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 222).

The idea of Soviet masculine power was grounded in the belief in superiority of Marxist-Leninist ideology as seen above, and in military strength. For example, Khrushchev (1956b) stated: “We have to do everything to strengthen defence, to strengthen the army. Without these things nobody will talk to us.” In the similar manner Sakharov reflected on the impossibility of reaching an agreement on disarmament with the US: “Any US move toward abandoning or suspending work on a thermonuclear weapon would have been perceived either as a cunning, deceitful manoeuvre, or as evidence of stupidity or weakness” (Sakharov, 1990, cited in Holloway, 1994: 318).
Such constructions evoke ‘feminised’ images on the idea of disarmament, silence alternative discourses, and as a result, impose particular constraints on the successful implementation of relevant arms control policies.

War is a traditionally masculine concept, because “war making is an activity primarily engaged in by men and governed by norms of masculinity” (Cohn and Ruddick, 2004: 408). But a nuclear war is fundamentally different from a conventional one. Engaging in an actual nuclear war in order to boost a masculine superpower status would indeed be suicidal and the Soviets understood this very well as evident from the discussion of MAD in the previous section. Consequently, safeguarding and reassuring a masculine nuclear identity was accomplished via different means. Khrushchev’s infamous boasting and nuclear sabre-rattling did exactly that.

Historians such as Zubok (2009: 130) and Craig and Radchenko (2018: 215) suggest that Khrushchev needed to convince the Americans that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons so that they would acknowledge the USSR as an equal; he rarely missed the opportunity to “frighten the others” (Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 215). For example, when Khrushchev tried to convince the Iranians to quit the UK-led Baghdad pact, he stated: “Would you find it very interesting to catch several hydrogen bombs in Iran? Are the Iranian people dreaming about this? I think not. Why, then, did you join a pact that aims at exactly this?” (Khrushchev, 1956, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 215). Neorealists would also claim that nuclear states engage in this kind of bluff, which is what the deterrence theory is based on. Khrushchev with his bravado and bragging style did the bluffing in a particular way. This is what indicates that it was not just a tactic, it was constitutive of Soviet nuclear identity. By reinforcing the preparedness to use nuclear weapons, Khrushchev was reaffirming Soviet manhood and strength. On another occasion, in a conversation with China’s Mao Zedong, in a bid to impress, Khrushchev exclaimed: “Three-four missiles and there would be no Turkey, ten missiles would suffice to destroy the UK” (Khrushchev, 1956, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 216). Considering Khrushchev’s certainty in MAD and his actual fear of a nuclear war, such statements were no more than bravado and a showcase of masculine identity. The Soviets were reproducing masculine identity even whilst admitting in between the lines that they had fewer missiles than the US:
I am not complaining – as long as the President [Kennedy] understands that even though he may be able to destroy us twice, we’re still capable of wiping out the US, even if it’s only once [...] We’re satisfied to be able to finish off the US the first time around. Once is quite enough (Khrushchev, 1974: 530).

This kind of language, along with the previously discussed ‘capitalists will die’ attitude, demonstrates the hyper-masculine character of Soviet nuclear identity. If nuclear war was not an option, then this identity could only be maintained through aggressive threats and readiness to use nuclear weapons, while looking towards disarmament would come across as ‘weak’ or ‘wimpish’. If the Soviets were indeed acting rationally, these statements would not exist. As Cohn (1993: 231) states: “the willingness to use force, is cast as a question of masculinity – not prudence, thoughtfulness, efficacy, ‘rational’ cost-benefit calculation, or morality, but masculinity”.

Soviets also attempted to reaffirm their hyper-masculine nuclear identity through frequent reiteration that the Other – the US – was fearful of the Soviet missiles. This also changed the nature of Soviet discursive production of danger about the US. While the Other was still constructed as warmongering and threatening, it was no longer too dangerous for the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviets secured their superpower masculine identity by emphasising that the Other was afraid, and inflicting fear is also an activity traditionally associated with masculinity. For example, in his memoirs Khrushchev (1974: 53) stated: “Now it was our enemies who trembled in their boots. Thanks to our missiles, we could deliver a nuclear bomb to a target at any place in the world”. On another occasion, after the erection of the Berlin wall and Khrushchev’s ultimatum failure, he pointed out: “The Americans, two weeks after the Wall went up, [wanted] to scare us but they ended up scaring themselves” (Khrushchev, 1962, cited in Craig and Radchenko, 2018: 225). Furthermore, after the first Soviet ICBM test, Khrushchev said: “main-street Americans have begun to shake from fear for the first time in their lives” (Khrushchev, 1957, cited in Zubok, 2009: 131). This enabled the construction of Self as fearless and powerful via the subordination of the Other seeing it as fearful rather than dangerous. This disguised the actual vulnerability of the Soviets.
Chapter 5 established that in addition to being competitive and masculine, Soviet nuclear identity was also constructed as peace-loving. Discourse analysis reveals that this dimension remained prominent throughout the stage of Khrushchev’s arms race between 1953 and 1964. However, due to the Soviet emerging nuclear superpower status, the Soviets constructed themselves as responsible not only for peace in the USSR, but also everywhere else in the socialist world. This can be observed in one of Khrushchev’s speeches: “In strengthening the defence of the Soviet Union we are acting not only in our own interests but in the interests of all peace-loving peoples, of all mankind” (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in DeGroot, 2005: 258). More evidence of this can be seen from the open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to all party organizations and all communists of the Soviet Union:

The peoples want disarmament and believe that the Communists are the vanguard and organizers of the struggle to achieve it [...] This truth has long been known to all genuine Marxists-Leninists, who are aware of their responsibility to the peoples and who for several years have been waging -- and will go on waging -- a hard and persistent struggle for general and complete disarmament, for prohibition of nuclear weapons and their testing (CPSU, 1963).

Here the Soviet officials constructed a peaceful ethical identity that was grounded in the struggle for disarmament and in the responsibility to liberate the world from the dangers of US threats and aggression. The Soviets constructed disarmament as a form of class struggle, grounding their responsibility in Marxist-Leninist ideology that is somewhat superior, more responsible, and more trustworthy than the capitalist US.

Soviet nuclear identity constructions continued to be contradictory. Despite projecting their strength through military/nuclear might and seeing disarmament as ‘wimping out’ as seen in the previous section, the Soviets nevertheless constructed Self as peaceful and cooperative and the Other as aggressive and warmongering:
The struggle for peace, for implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, is one of the most important forms of the peoples' struggle against imperialism, against the new wars it is preparing, against aggressive imperialist actions in colonial countries, against imperialist military bases on foreign territory, against the arms race, etc. (CPSU, 1963).

This captures the empirical complexity of identity construction. On the one hand through bragging about Soviet nuclear superiority and threatening to use this strength at any time, Khrushchev was constructing a hyper-masculine highly competitive superpower identity. On the other hand, he was projecting an image of a policeman for disarmament maintaining that the US could only be forced into disarmament talks by the growing socialist military force (Khrushchev, 1956b). As in the period of acquisition, Soviet nuclear weapons were portrayed as serving peaceful purposes, while American weapons were cast as tools of terror, threats, and aggression. To illustrate, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Anastas Mikoyan (1954, cited in Zubok, 2009: 126) stated: “Hydrogen weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union are a means for deterring aggressors and for waging peace”. In an analogous manner, Khrushchev reflected in his memoirs:

now that we had nuclear bombs and the means to deliver them, we had no intention of starting a war. We stood firm on Lenin’s position of peaceful coexistence. We only wanted to deter the Americans’ threats, their aggressiveness and their attempts to terrorize us (Khrushchev, 1974: 53).

Aforesaid constructions enacted and legitimised the arms race as it was carried out in the name of peace. The Soviets also reaffirmed their own rationality and morality when justifying the missile gap with the US: “What good does it do to annihilate a country twice? We’re not a bloodthirsty people” (Khrushchev, 1974: 530). Juxtaposing sagacious reasonable Self to the “bloodthirsty” radical Other kept Soviet nuclear identity stable and continuously enabled the arms race.

The construction of a peaceful and responsible nuclear identity that acts in pursuit of admirable goals presents certain policy directions as unquestionable and even necessary, because they serve a noble purpose of protecting mankind from capitalist aggression. For example, in the aforementioned open letter, the Central Committee of the CPSU described the Cuban missile crisis as: “a major victory for the policy of
reason, for the forces of peace and socialism; this was a defeat for the forces of imperialism, for the policy of war gambles” (CPSU, 1963). In the same vein, Khrushchev justified the testing of ‘Tsar bomba’ by emphasising that it was done in order to counter force “the enemies of peace”: “When the enemies of peace threaten us with force they must be and will be countered with force, and more impressive force, too” (Khrushchev, 1961, cited in DeGroot, 2005: 258). These constructions legitimised the arms race while excluding disarmament. The existence of the aggressive external Other that can only be countered by brute force would not make disarmament desirable.

Arguably, a belief and an attempt to construct the exceptional character of their state enabled Soviet leaders to take on the responsibility to protect the world form the evil forces of capitalism acting far beyond their borders. The roots of the Soviet exceptionalism were introduced in Chapter 5 as grounded in the Russian history of constant struggle against numerous enemies and in ideas about the superiority of the Soviet socialist ideology and its greater purpose to achieve a communist world. Catching up with the US and acquiring an enormous military power enabled the Soviets to act upon the purpose of defending the world from the “aggressive forces of imperialism”. This reproduced a nuclear identity that acted altruistically in pursuit of admirable Marxist-Leninist goals such as disarmament or helping Cuba to defend its socialist regime, rather than acting out of self-interest. This identity was secured and reinforced through the simultaneous construction of the US as aggressors who are naturally constructed as opposing such goals:

There are still powerful forces in the imperialist camp opposed to disarmament. But it is precisely to compel these forces to retreat that we must rouse the peoples’ wrath against them, force them to comply with the will of the peoples […] This struggle is in the interests of the working class, of all the working people, and in that sense it is a class struggle (CPSU, 1963).

The frequent reiteration of the term ‘struggle’ affirms this self-proclaimed ‘burden of responsibility’ that the Soviets were imposing on themselves. This echoes Truman’s ‘struggle’ with deciding on which Japanese cities to drop the atomic bombs, as discussed in Chapter 5. These constructions both highlight and repress the dangers of
the arms race. In this sense, the Soviet motives behind the arms race were constructed as fundamentally different from those of the US:

They use the arms race to enrich themselves and to hold the people in capitalist countries in a state of fear. But must we swim with the stream, must we follow in the wake of imperialism and refuse to mobilize all the forces to fight for peace and disarmament? No. That would mean surrendering to the aggressive forces, to the militarists and imperialists (CPSU, 1963).

But both states were engaged in the same process – constructing the Other as aggressor and the Self as reluctant, responsible possessor of nuclear weapons. The US nuclear discourse also constructed the US Self as peace-loving. In fact, their discourse during the Cuban Missile Crisis is the mirror image of the Soviet one. To illustrate, Kennedy (1962, cited in Eckhardt and White, 1957: 328) stated: “We challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race”; and again in 1963: “Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right – not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom” (Kennedy, 1963, cited in Eckhardt and White, 1957: 328). Similar to the USSR, the US was securing a macho-masculine identity of the leader of the free democratic world. The presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in close proximity from US borders inevitably destabilised this identity. Discursive representations of the Other as dangerous and aggressive reinforced the US identity as peaceful and stable. US officials constructed the Soviet Union as the enemy of peace and freedom: “The source of the world trouble is Moscow, not Berlin” (Kennedy, 1962, cited in Eckhardt and White, 1957: 328); “They will not settle for … a peaceful world but must settle for a Communist world” (Kennedy, 1963, cited in Eckhardt and White, 1957: 328). Constructing and reinforcing a peace-loving nuclear identity via the juxtaposition to the aggressive and radical external Other was both a constitutive of and a product of decisions to rapidly arm and to proceed with dangerous policies involving nuclear weapons. This section showed how the US and the USSR continued to see the Other as the main threat to international stability, while constructing Self as peaceful. These constructions made rapid armament on both sides possible and appropriate.
Conclusion

This chapter explored Soviet nuclear identity constructions during the stage of the arms race from 1953 to 1964 under the leadership of Khrushchev. Three overlapping elements of Soviet nuclear identity – competition, masculinity, and peace-loving - continued to evolve through Soviet nuclear discourse with consequences for the direction of nuclear policy. During the stage of acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Soviets established a nuclear identity of the exceptional, competitive, masculine and peace-loving state to ensure it did not fall behind the capitalist West. It procured arms at a record pace and at any cost, to affirm its post-World War II greatness and superpower status, but not simply for material security. In this sense, an identity that is grounded in the might of the military-industrial complex has a direct connection with decisions to procure arms and to enlarge nuclear arsenals. Continuous investment in military capability and acquiring more nuclear weapons was necessary not only to balance arms with the adversary, as neorealists would argue, but also to secure this established nuclear identity that the Soviets were already constructing. Moreover, the Soviets continued to explore their identity as a nuclear weapons state as they acquired more weapons, each dimension of Soviet nuclear identity transformed.

First, the Soviets were still in competition with the US. While it may have been sufficient for Soviet security to acquire enough arms for defence and deterrence purposes, stockpiling more than 6 000 missiles (or 31 000 in the US case) went beyond the need for retaliatory capabilities. Additionally, both sides accepted the doctrine of MAD, admitting that there would be no winners in a nuclear war, which rendered further armament unnecessary. However, due to the competitive nature of Soviet nuclear identity, simply catching up with the US was not enough. The Soviets continued to reinforce an identity of a powerful state that would not only match the US in military strength and influence but would also overtake it. Thinking, even if mistakenly, that they were ahead transformed this identity into the one of a nuclear superpower enabling even more dangerous policy decisions. The Soviets went far beyond security considerations by testing militarily useless ‘Tsar bomba’ as a way to reaffirm this identity or by posing an ultimatum in Berlin, which led to major instability and eventually to the complete split of the city. This shows that once
nuclear superpower identity was established, it needed to be nourished to stay stable; in the world where MAD was accepted and a nuclear war would have no winners, this could be done via other dangerous means that did not fall into the realm of ‘rational’.

Second, during the era of Khrushchev’s arms race, Soviet nuclear identity continued to be formulated around notions of hyper-masculinity, with aggressive and assertive traits. Accordingly, this chapter again emphasised the gendered hierarchical structure of nuclear discourse, where threatening to use force, emasculating the adversary, silencing disarmament discourses, and constructing the Other as fearful, were all tactics aimed at safeguarding an identity of a strong masculine state. Khrushchev’s infamous nuclear bluff and boasting may come across as confusing due to its lack of consistency and rationality. However, in the world ruled by men where nuclear weapons acted as the ultimate symbol of masculinity, these practices made sense and equating nuclear weapons acquisition with masculine power made rapid armament not only possible, but also necessary, whereas disarmament was seen as ‘wimpish’ and thus undesirable. Accepting the impossibility of a nuclear war did not make the world more secure, because as this chapter argued the masculine nature of nuclear identity was constitutive of dangerous policy moves such as the Cuban missile crisis.

Finally, the peace-loving ethical dimension of Soviet nuclear identity also continued to evolve during the arms race stage. Similar to the stage of acquisition, ‘our’ weapons were constructed as peaceful and ‘theirs’ as aggressive. Such discourse thus justified acquiring more arms, because it was constructed as reasonable and appropriate behaviour when aimed at achieving peace and stability. Moreover, with more arms Soviet nuclear identity transformed into an identity of the global policeman of socialism beyond the borders of the USSR. The Soviets constructed themselves as responsible protectors of socialism against the evil capitalists. This identity made the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba possible. Chapter 5 concluded that the USSR reinforced the idea that nuclear weapons were not just tools of security, but also tools of peace, which was also visible during the arms race stage. But acquiring more weapons that were even more powerful created possibilities for spreading this peace to other parts of the world, rationalising moves such as the one seen during the Cuban
missile crisis. Perhaps, the most comprehensive summary of Khrushchev’s policy making was provided by Kolkowicz (1971: 436): “Khrushchev tried to accomplish too much with too little, hoping to fill the gap between capabilities and objectives with a deceitful verbal overkill”.

All three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity were performed simultaneously through the enactment of dangerous policy that nearly brought the world to a nuclear catastrophe. After the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy finally signed the limited test ban treaty. This laid foundations for Leonid Brezhnev’s politics of détente and Mikhail Gorbachev’s disarmament. The next chapter continues to examine Soviet nuclear identity constructions during these leaders’ time in office.
Chapter 7. From Détente to Disarmament – Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev (1964-1991)

“Yet nuclear weapons are like a rifle hanging on the wall in a play written and staged by a person unknown” (Gorbachev, 2019).

Introduction

Chapters 5 and 6 established that the emergence of Soviet nuclear identity was inherently linked to the challenges of the post-World War II period, when the Soviet self-conception as an exceptional triumphant superpower had to be asserted. Soviet nuclear identity emerged as competitive, masculine, and peace-loving, constituted through discursive writings of Self and a radical external Other (the US), and the constructions of threat and danger that the Other imposed. Soviet nuclear weapons acquisition under the rule of Stalin and consequential arms race during Khrushchev’s epoch were enabled and potentiated as an appropriate and necessary behaviour to re-imagine the USSR as an exceptional nuclear superpower. It became the superpower that caught up with and overtook the capitalists and established Self as the global centre of Marxism-Leninism and the defender of socialism. To reiterate the main argument addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, the nuclear identity that was constructed vis-à-vis a very radically different Other and as competitive, hyper-masculine, and acting in order to achieve admirable goals such as the preservation of peace and stability, enacts and legitimises armament policies simultaneously excluding and silencing disarmament discourses.

This chapter continues to examine the evolution of Soviet nuclear identity and focuses on periods of détente and disarmament under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev who served as the General Secretary of the CPSU from 1964 until 1982 and Mikhail Gorbachev who held this post from 1985 until 1991. It examines texts produced during two interconnected periods of Soviet nuclear history. First, it looks at Brezhnev’s tenure which was characterised by the relative stabilisation and easing of post-Khrushchev tensions and strained relations with the US (détente), but also

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9 Yuri Andropov (1982-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985) briefly replaced Brezhnev in office, but their leadership was too short to make any significant impact on the construction of the Soviet nuclear identity.
paradoxically by the largest and the most expensive nuclear build-up in Soviet history.

Second, this chapter focuses on the stage of disarmament under Gorbachev’s rule from the mid-1980s until 1991, when both the USSR and the US managed to agree on the most significant arms reduction in nuclear history.

This chapter argues that nuclear disarmament efforts were made possible due to the evolution of Soviet nuclear identity that manifested itself in three ways. First, the competitive dimension of nuclear identity with the ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude at its core transitioned into cooperative. Second, the association of nuclear weapons with traditionally masculine attributes such as strength, competition, and superiority started to disappear from the Soviet nuclear discourse. Gorbachev was still constructing a masculine nuclear identity. However, it was no longer grounded in the might of the military-industrial complex, but in being the leader of disarmament with particular emphasis on the establishment of mutual trust and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Finally, while the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity remained prominent, there was no longer such a radical difference between ‘our’ weapons and ‘theirs’ – all nuclear weapons were perceived and constructed as equally dangerous to international security.

In this period, we see that while the Soviets’ traditional Other – the US – was still constructed as different, it was no longer constructed as a uniquely dangerous enemy. Rather, Brezhnev’s and particularly Gorbachev’s Soviet nuclear identity was more often temporally constructed in juxtaposition to the earlier Soviet Self that competed, threatened to wage war and to use nuclear weapons, and engaged in aggressive nuclear armament. US officials, on the other hand, remained suspicious of the change in the Soviet approach to nuclear policy and did not support total disarmament. This is also in part an identity-driven decision, because to follow Gorbachev’s lead in advocating disarmament would mean surrendering to the Soviet initiative. This chapter begins with a short historical overview of Soviet nuclear policy during Brezhnev’s and Gorbachev’s time in office followed by the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity construction during the détente stage. The chapter then proceeds with the discussion of each dimension of Soviet nuclear identity focusing on how it evolved during Gorbachev’s rule with consequences for nuclear policy.
According to Zubok (2009: 205), in 1965 and 1966 the Soviets doubled their arsenal of ICBMs catching up with the US strategic forces and consuming approximately 18% of the Soviet defence budget by 1968. To illustrate quantitatively, the number of Soviet nuclear weapons increased from 5 221 warheads in 1964 to 45 000 in 1986. Meanwhile, the US stockpiled 29 463 warheads in 1964 and this number did not fluctuate dramatically in comparison to the USSR with the total number of warheads reaching 23 317 in 1986 (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 81). Despite the increasing nuclear build-up, Brezhnev’s administration provided the foundation for future arms reduction agreements through the initiation of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the US government in 1969 that resulted in the signature of two agreements setting the upper limits on both sides’ nuclear arsenals and delivery vehicles in May 1972 (Atomic Archive, 2019). Notably, Brezhnev and US president Richard Nixon signed the SALT I Treaty limiting the numbers of ICBMs and the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems that limited each side’s ABM sites (Atomic Archive, 2019). The Soviet leader and US president Jimmy Carter held talks regarding an even more detailed SALT II treaty in 1979, but due to the newly rising tensions between two states after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the treaty was removed from consideration (Atomic Archive, 2019).

Historians note that Brezhnev’s epoch was characterized by the conflict and disagreements over the matters of national security and the formulation of military doctrine within the CPSU (see e.g. Kolkowicz, 1971; Strode and Strode, 1983; Zubok, 2009). There seemed to be a clear division into two camps. Strode and Strode (1983: 108) call them the Diplomacists and the Unilateralists, while Kolkowicz’s (1971: 446) formulation is the Conservatives and the Moderates. Regardless of the labels, the essence of this division remains the same. On the one side, there is the old doctrine calling for increased defence spending and caution with regards to arms control and the US; on the other, is the prevention of excessive military spending and the emphasis on diplomacy and arms control. Brezhnev was caught somewhere in the middle, which explains apparent contradictions in his statements across the span of almost 20 years in office. After 1972, détente began to decline, as did Brezhnev’s health and personal interest in politics, which largely impacted Soviet policymaking in
the late 1970s. The ‘hard-liners’ from the military industrial complex continued to affirm the importance of nuclear build-up and the dangers of dancing the “détente waltz” with the Americans (Zubok, 2009: 223). This eventually led to the economic crisis and to the deterioration of the relationship with the US, which left Brezhnev’s successors in a rather precarious position.

Brezhnev’s tenure marked an important transition period between Khrushchev’s brinkmanship and Gorbachev’s disarmament. Although total elimination of nuclear weapons had not been accomplished, as Gorbachev himself envisioned, the Soviets managed to initiate the most substantial arms reduction to date and a halt to decades of the Cold War arms race. Less than a month after becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev announced a moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and invited the US to follow suit (Mydans, 1985). He stressed the importance of the arms talks with the US that had already begun in Geneva in preparation for the main summit meeting with US President Ronald Reagan in November 1985 and called for a freeze on strategic nuclear weapons (Mydans, 1985). On July 29, 1985, Gorbachev announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that would begin on August 6 – the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima (Evangelista, 1986: 563). Gorbachev extended the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing in January 1986 and again in August 1986 even though the US continued their nuclear testing.

Historians sometimes attribute Gorbachev’s determination to reach an agreement with the US on disarmament to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 26, 1986 (see e.g. Rhodes, 2007: 25-26; Zubok, 2000; Zubok, 2009: 288). Zubok (2000) argues that Chernobyl forced the Soviets “to look at the task of disarmament as a moral imperative independent of political calculations”. It is also worth noting that one of the major security challenges for the Soviets during the 1980s was the American Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) nicknamed ‘Star Wars’, which was a controversial research project on developing a space-based defence system that could protect the US from a nuclear attack ultimately making it invincible (Grogin, 2001: 329). In addition to the Chernobyl disaster, historians also link Gorbachev’s eager insistence on total disarmament with his fear of the SDI due to expensive research the Soviets would
have to undertake to defend themselves and the fact that such a defence system would technically put the US into the position of striking first without fear of retaliation (see e.g. Azrael and Sestanovich, 1985: 482; Evangelista, 1986: 568; Grogin, 2001: 331; Zubok, 2000).

One of Gorbachev’s significant steps towards total disarmament was calling an emergency arms control summit with US president Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland. Both leaders met on the 11th and the 12th of October 1986 to discuss the prospects of arms control. After talking about mere reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, Gorbachev casually proposed to eliminate them all, to which Reagan responded positively (Grogin, 2001: 330; Zubok, 2000). However, when Gorbachev requested Reagan to give up SDI, he refused and the summit collapsed, ultimately ending in nothing. Eventually, Gorbachev’s persistence on arms control led to the signature of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on December 8, 1987 that obliged the US and the USSR to completely dismantle their medium and short-range nuclear missiles (Grogin, 2001: 331). This was the first arms-control agreement to require the reduction of nuclear stockpiles rather than mere restriction (Holloway, 1988: 75). The second important achievement was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) signed by Gorbachev and US president George Bush on July 31, 1991 right before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev’s forced resignation. The treaty limited both sides to 6,000 warheads each. These were very significant accomplishments considering that the Soviets reached an absolute peak of nuclear armament in 1986 stockpiling a total of 45,000 warheads. Due to the tremendous efforts of Gorbachev and his advisors, the number of warheads was reduced by two thousand every year until 1997 when the disarmament tempo had slowed down (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 82).

_Brezhnev and ‘Peace through Strength’_

Following the ousting of Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviet government faced the consequences of his aggressive threatening rhetoric and dangerous nuclear policymaking, in particular the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Khrushchev’s actions severely damaged Soviet superpower status and the credibility of USSR’s military forces, consequently raising the international standing of the US (Zubok, 2009: 193; Kolkowicz, 1971: 436). In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet identity of
an exceptional nuclear superpower was destabilised and threatened, because evidently the Soviet Union was not superior to the US in nuclear weapons technology or diplomacy, and the Soviets would not be the victors in a nuclear conflict.

Preventing similar crises from occurring became the priority of the new Soviet leadership and required significant changes in the approach to foreign policy and nuclear proliferation. As Brezhnev (1972, cited in Zubok, 2009: 192) noted to the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “We must conduct negotiations in a big way, not a small-minded way. And the arrangement we achieve should encourage tranquility in the world”. Brezhnev’s détente policy was seen as rather controversial both by the US government and by some more conservative Soviet politicians. Washington saw it as a camouflage for the Soviet plans of aggression and military superiority (Kolkowicz, 1971: 436). Brezhnev and his colleagues saw the growth of Soviet military power as the primary basis for détente, because it would make the US more accommodating (Holloway, 1988: 67). The ‘hard-liners’ of Politburo saw détente as a fallacy, because the Americans “strive for world hegemony” and the Soviet Union should neither accommodate nor trust them (Polyansky, 1964, cited in Zubok, 2009: 194). The existence of these various perspectives and constructions made Soviet nuclear identity during Brezhnev’s tenure particularly contradictory.

Historians often describe Brezhnev’s approach to policy-making as a “speak-softly-while-you-are-carrying-a-big-stick” policy (Catudal, 1988: 58; Kolkowicz, 1971: 437) and “peace through strength” (Zubok, 2009: 225). Kolkowicz (1971: 437) claims that the new government’s antidote to Khrushchev’s brinkmanship seemed to be “sobriety, pragmatism, and the establishment of credibility through the attainment of conspicuous capabilities to match objectives and declaratory policy”. Brezhnev himself noted: “We are striving to make our diplomacy vigorous and active, and at the same time we exhibit flexibility and caution” (Brezhnev, 1965, cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 437). In contrast to Khrushchev, Brezhnev constructed a nuclear identity not only in relation to the spatial radical Other - the US, but also temporally in relation to the earlier Soviet Self. Khrushchev damaged Soviet superpower identity and indeed the new Soviet government often publicly denounced his behaviour and policies in order to construct a refined Self. For example, as stated in an editorial in the
Communist Party’s main theoretical journal Kommunist, the approach of the new government was a policy of:

opposing aggressive imperialist circles without allowing itself any sabre-rattling or irresponsible talk... [designed to] assess the situation soberly and to find a precise orientation in it under all circumstances, favorable as well as adverse, [and] to weigh, in a sober manner, the possibilities which we have [rather than to] succumb to illusions (Kommunist XII, August 1965, cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 437).

The emphasis on sobriety and responsibility exemplifies how the Soviets constructed a Self that was cautious, responsible, and also rational in opposition to the sabre-rattling, irresponsible, and delusional Self reinforced by Khrushchev. By referring to “aggressive imperialist circles”, the Soviets also constructed their identity vis-à-vis the US, thus implying that the Self was neither aggressive nor imperialist.

More evidence of the Soviet temporal Other is found in statements made by Brezhnev and others where they frequently highlighted the ‘madness’ of Khrushchev’s policy-making in an attempt to show that this was not what the USSR stood for anymore. As emphasised by Brezhnev in 1966: “We almost slipped into a nuclear war! And what effort did it cost us to pull ourselves out if this, to make the world believe that we really want peace!” (Brezhnev, 1966, cited in Zubok, 2009: 203). And again in 1981: “It is dangerous madness to try to defeat each other in the arms race and to count on victory in nuclear war” (Brezhnev, 1981, cited in Catudal, 1988: 283) and “I will add only that he who had decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging victorious from it” (Brezhnev, 1981, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 91). In the same vein, Minister of Defence Dmitrii Ustinov stated: “Sooner or later it will become evident how completely hopeless it is to gamble on military superiority. Indeed, it is senseless in conditions where the available armaments are more than sufficient to make biological life on earth impossible” (Ustinov, 1982, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 91-92).

Here the Soviets constructed a Self that would not behave in an aggressive manner or threaten a nuclear war and indeed Brezhnev and his closest advisors never did. They kept reiterating the defensive nature of the Soviet nuclear programme: “The Soviet
Union does not threaten anybody, is not planning to attack anyone. Our military doctrine is of a defensive character” (Brezhnev, 1981, and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet government:

Concern for peace is the dominant feature of the Soviet Union’s policy. We are convinced that no contradictions between states or groups of states, no differences in social systems, ways of life or ideologies, and no transient interests can eclipse the fundamental need common to all peoples, the need to safeguard peace and avert a nuclear war (Brezhnev, 1982).

This echoes the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity established in the previous empirical chapters of this thesis. However, it was slightly different in this time period, because it was no longer attached to Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s aggressive othering of the US. Instead, it acknowledges that both sides’ nuclear weapons were dangerous, which as discussed later in this chapter, is an important factor for the enablement of decisive disarmament policies. In addition, Brezhnev’s rhetoric to an extent resonated with Gorbachev’s human security discourse, because he started to acknowledge that ideological differences should not be a hurdle to peace. The constructions of Soviet nuclear identity were always contradictory and during the period of disarmament, the peace-loving dimension started to dominate over the other two, whereas before it manifested itself to legitimise nuclear weapons, as seen in Chapters 5 and 6.

The above quote is an excerpt from Brezhnev’s pledge to the UN in 1982 where he declared that the USSR would not be the first to ever use the nuclear weapons. This illustrates how the Soviets continued to portray their nuclear identity of a peaceful nuclear state. Brezhnev constructed a superpower identity, but in comparison to Khrushchev’s boasting and threats, it was grounded in being the first state to declare the no first use. He constructed the USSR as a responsible state to be the world leader of peace negotiations. The ‘burden’ nature of this decision can be seen from the following quotes. First, as stated by Brezhnev in the same speech to the UN:

The Soviet Union is assuming an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, being confident in the power of sound judgment and
believing in mankind’s ability to avoid self-annihilation and to insure peace and progress for the present and coming generations (Brezhnev, 1982).

And second, as remarked by Ustinov shortly after:

In light of the growing aggressiveness of the policy of the United States and the NATO bloc it was not easy for the Soviet Union to take upon itself the unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (Ustiniov, 1982, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 101).

It can be seen from these quotes how the masculine dimension of Soviet nuclear identity started to take a different shape. The Soviets in this era began to construct an identity of a responsible, prudent, manly state – the protector of the world from nuclear dangers, while simultaneously insisting on the continuous possession of nuclear weapons. During Brezhnev’s tenure, some masculine characteristics assigned to nuclear weapons and armament were minimised. This is evident from the near absence of ‘bragging’ about nuclear achievements and threatening to use force against the US. Instead, the Soviets placed more evidence on peace and an absolute avoidance of war. This made the SALT I and SALT II negotiations between the USSR and the US possible and even fruitful considering the signature of the SALT I treaty and the ABM treaty in 1972, which limited the number of both sides’ defence sites and offensive nuclear weapons launchers.

However, these restrictions contained multiple loopholes that allowed both the Soviets and the US to continue with qualitative improvements and ultimately to keep developing new weapons (Catudal, 1988: 68, Grogin, 2001: 288). As remarked by the US political commentator George F. Will (1984, cited in Catudal, 1988: 73), “Americans see arms control as a way of freezing the status quo; the Soviets see it as one arena in a comprehensive, unending competition”. Despite constructing a Self that was peace-loving and similarly to the periods of acquisition and the arms race, Soviet officials continued to ground the superpower nuclear identity in the strength of the military-industrial complex with nuclear weapons still being perceived as the ultimate tool of political/masculine power, making the continuous competition with the US necessary.
The ‘peace through strength’ attitude prevalent during Brezhnev’s leadership demonstrates that the masculine dimension of Soviet nuclear identity was continuously reinforced, although in a less macho way compared to Khrushchev’s stage of the arms race. The Soviets still armed rapidly, but generally abstained from showcasing those achievements in an aggressive form of threatening war and nuclear strikes. Rather, expanding nuclear arsenals helped to reaffirm the identity of a ‘peaceful negotiator’, while still constructing disarmament as a weakness. For example, the head of the Committee for State Security (KGB) Yuri Andropov (cited in Zubok, 2009: 211) justified the continuous arms race during détente as: “Nobody wants to talk to the weak”. He also stated that the socialist achievements must be defended “if necessary, by the axe” (cited in Zubok, 2009: 213). Another relevant statement came from Molotov (1972, cited in Zubok, 2009: 227): “What should the Soviet Union fear? Only its own impotence, relaxation, laxity”. By ‘relaxation’ Molotov meant not carrying on with nuclear build-up. Moreover, linking it with impotence shows how despite the shifts in this era, masculine strength remained linked to military capability, competition, and superiority. This demonstrates that disarmament efforts continued to rest on a contradictory gendered assumption that peace could be achieved through the maintenance of military strength, because no one would dare to attack a heavily armed nuclear state. The presence of gendered hierarchies in nuclear discourse, where the more masculine side was favourable, made disarmament inappropriate.

This section has already established that Soviet nuclear identity during Brezhnev’s rule was constructed temporally in opposition to the previously erratic threatening Self, reinforced by Khrushchev. This does not mean that the US ceased to be perceived as the Other. The old enemy constructions remained deeply embedded in the Soviet nuclear discourse, which was both constitutive of and a product of continuous Soviet armament. To illustrate, as stated by Brezhnev (1981): “All of it [the policy of the present US administration] is actually an opposite to détente, blunt disregard for the striving of all peoples for lasting peace”. This constructs the US as ‘dangerous’ vis-à-vis ‘peaceful’ Soviets. More evidence is found in Andropov’s statement: “We know it is useless to buy peace from the imperialists. It can be upheld only by resting upon the invincible might of the Soviet armed forces” (Andropov, 1982, cited in Strode and
Strode, 1983: 114). The discursive constructions of the Other as warmongering continued to establish inside/outside boundaries between the USSR and US: “Unfortunately, the leading powers of the West, above all, the NATO bloc, do not show so far a serious interest in talks on all of these questions that are vital to mankind and its peaceful future” (Brezhnev, 1981).

Such discourses helped to reproduce an idealised image of Self, establishing the USSR as a peaceful state that cared for mankind, but was yet obliged to continue arming. As stated by the Defence Minister Andrei Grechko (1968, cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 445), “the Soviet Union has no right to ignore the constantly threatening danger of a new military attack by the predatory imperialists”. In this way, Soviet nuclear identity continued to be peace-loving and competitive simultaneously in ways similar to the acquisition and arms race stages discussed in the previous empirical chapters.

As mentioned earlier, nuclear identity construction during Brezhnev’s tenure was particularly contradictory. On the one hand, as shown through the statements above, Soviet officials emphasised the danger and the madness of a nuclear arms race. On the other hand, the pattern of Soviet military spending and the magnitude of nuclear armament suggest that a ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude was still salient, and the Soviets continued to ground their identity in military strength, which also reinforced its predominantly masculine character. For example, at the very beginning of his time in office Brezhnev stated: “history has taught us that the stronger our army is, the more watchful we are, the stronger the peace on our frontier” (Brezhnev, 1965, cited in Kolkowicz, 1971: 445). He maintained a similar view almost twenty years later towards the end of his tenure: “Competition in military technology has sharply intensified, often acquiring a fundamentally new character. A lag in this competition is inadmissible” (Brezhnev, 1982, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 109). In the same vein, Brezhnev stated: “And it would be better to abandon dreams of ensuring military supremacy over the USSR. If necessary, the Soviet people will find opportunities for making any additional efforts, for doing everything necessary to ensure their country’s reliable defence” (Brezhnev, 1981).
It is clear from these quotes that the emphasis on military competition and superiority continued to shape Soviet nuclear identity making further rapid armament possible and even necessary. A member of the Defence Ministry’s Military Institute Nikolay Azovtsev:

Under conditions of the rapid development of new weapons, radioelectronics and new combat technology, V. I. Lenin’s injunction that the army which fails to acquire all types of means and methods that the enemy possesses is irrational or even criminal, has become even more significant (Azovtsev, 1971, cited in Strode and Strode, 1983: 106).

These constructions served to help enable the arms race and simultaneously silence disarmament efforts. Furthermore, Soviet nuclear identity was still to a significant extent grounded in military capability; although not as vocal, the arms race carried on at a rapid pace and continued to be perceived as the determinant of masculine strength and superpower status. The previously established identity of a nuclear superpower was destabilised and damaged after Khrushchev’s dangerous policymaking. Thus, continuous investment into nuclear technology and reinforcement of Soviet rationality, sobriety, peaceful intentions, but at the same time military might was necessary in order to affirm this identity. In addition, the emphasis on military strength, competition, prudence, and rationality shows that nuclear identity constructed by Brezhnev and his advisors continued to be very masculine meaning that decisive steps towards disarmament could not come to fruition, because arms reduction was to an extent still perceived as weak and wimpish, such perceptions acting as, to quote Cohn (1993: 235), “a pre-emptive deterrent to thought”.

Lastly, while Soviet nuclear identity was constructed in relation to the earlier irrational and emotional Self of the Khrushchev’s era, the US continued to act as the key radical spatial Other in Soviet nuclear discourse. Constructing the Other as aggressive and dangerous reduced the possibility of disarmament, because it remained necessary to reach strategic parity and to go beyond it in order to defend the threatened Self. During the rapid decline of détente and a month before his death in 1982 Brezhnev declared that the US had “launched a political, ideological, and economic offensive” against the Soviet Union and had begun an “unprecedented arms race” (Brezhnev,

**Gorbachev and the Transition from Competitive to Cooperative Nuclear Identity**

The scope of this chapter and, in fact, of this whole thesis is too limited to capture the magnitude of Gorbachev’s restructuring and thinking about domestic politics, economics, security, and international relations. Nor is it possible to cover in great depths all the events that occurred as consequences of his ‘new thinking’ and revolutionary changes that he implemented into the Soviet policymaking. These include, but are not limited to democratisation of the USSR, the politics of glasnost (openness), economic restructuring, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the reunification of Germany, the end of the Cold War, and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This chapter is, however, concerned with nuclear identity that Gorbachev’s government constructed for the USSR and arms control policies that it enabled.

A closer look at speeches and statements made at that time, using discourse analysis, reveals radical shifts in thinking about the Self, the Other, and nuclear weapons during the disarmament period. Gorbachev’s rhetoric significantly differed from his predecessors, as did his policymaking. The architect of glasnost and perestroika (a series of political and economic restructuring reforms), he switched the policy attention from competition and deterrence to cooperation, and from military might to economic needs and democratisation (Holloway, 1989/90: 6). His willingness to eventually dismantle all nuclear missiles in the Soviet Union and to allow verification checks by the US puts the rational deterrence theory argument about the peacekeeping qualities of nuclear weaponry and their significance for national security to the test. When recalling the disarmament efforts of the 1980s, Gorbachev stated: “I am also convinced that nuclear deterrence, instead of protecting the world, is keeping it in constant jeopardy” (Gorbachev, 2019). These beliefs enabled constructions of a very different nuclear identity for the USSR and also reflected his policy-making.
Gorbachev was the only Soviet leader to ever publicly question the military usefulness of nuclear weapons. In comparison to the Soviet leaders during the acquisition and the arms race periods, Gorbachev and his advisors constructed the nuclear identity of a state that actively reduced its nuclear stockpiles, aimed to be free from nuclear weapons, and led by example encouraging disarmament everywhere else in the world. Gorbachev’s view of peaceful coexistence was not ‘peace through strength’, but peace through cooperation and the actual abolition of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ and new direction of policy transformed all three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity. This section focuses on the transition from competition to cooperation.

According to Holloway (1988: 70), the problems that Gorbachev’s administration encountered were not only practical, but also conceptual. Brezhnev’s legacy raised questions about the relationship between peace and socialism. Although peaceful coexistence was desired, it still existed as a form of the class struggle (Holloway, 1988: 70). The belief in the superiority of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology over capitalism was visible during Brezhnev’s rule as seen from the quotes in the previous section that reinforce the Otherness of the US. In Gorbachev’s view, Brezhnev’s administration put socialist values above common human values, which prevented not only decisive arms control and disarmament agreements, but also agreements more generally (Holloway, 1988: 70).

The evolution of Soviet nuclear identity from competitive to cooperative manifested itself in two interconnected ways: through the emergence of human security discourse and through the narratives of the universal danger of nuclear weapons. First, the emergence of human security discourse put emphasis on universal human values and emphasised security and survival of humans rather than security of states. To illustrate, during his first year as General Secretary, Gorbachev gave an open interview to TIME Magazine, where he stated: “While insisting on the cessation of the arms race, we also believe it is immoral to waste hundreds of billions on developing means of annihilation, while hundreds of millions of people go hungry and are deprived of elementary essentials” (Gorbachev, 1985c).
Disarmament was not only constructed as necessary in order to avoid nuclear war, but also as necessary in order to tackle other issues existent in the world: “The pattern imposed by militarism – arms in place of development – must be replaced by the reverse order of things – disarmament for development” (Gorbachev, 1987b: 44). This manufactured a new Soviet Self that was different to the one that engaged in an unprecedented expensive arms race.

Compared to his predecessors, Gorbachev entered the General Secretary office with the belief that socialism and capitalism did not develop in isolation and were part of the same human civilisation and their ideological differences should not affect their relations, because their values were the same (Holloway, 1988: 71). For example, Gorbachev (1987b: 37) remarked: “What is required here is that we should rise above national selfishness, tactical considerations, differences and disputes, whose significance is nothing compared to the preservation of what is most cherished – peace and a secure future”.

In the similar manner, the CPSU secretary responsible for ideology Vadim Medvedev (1988, cited in Holloway, 1988: 71) stated: “Today, when universal values are embodied with utmost specificity, primarily in ensuring mankind’s survival, they come to the foreground of international relations and constitute the nucleus of the new political thinking”.

This shows how during Gorbachev’s rule the Soviets continuously reimagined and explored their nuclear identity. The fundamental ideological difference between Self and Other was no longer reinforced in the form of competition. In fact, Gorbachev’s rhetoric suggests that those differences did not matter at all. Rather, what mattered was the preservation of human life across the globe:

Initiating active steps to halt the arms race and reduce weapons is a necessary prerequisite for coping with increasingly acute global problems – those of the deteriorating state of man’s environment and the need to find energy sources and combat economic backwardness, hunger and disease (Gorbachev, 1987b: 44).
This is important, because, as seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the arms race was to a large extent fuelled by the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism. As noted by Gorbachev himself (1985c), “our initiatives should wreck the version of the Soviet Union being the ‘focus of evil’ and the source of universal danger, which in fact underlies the entire arms race policy”. By saying this, Gorbachev was stripping the Soviet nuclear identity of the ideological dogma. This is not to say that Gorbachev’s rhetoric did not defend Soviet socialism at all. For example, Gorbachev (1985a) stated that the people and the Party “will do everything for our Soviet motherland to become still more rich and powerful and for the creative forces of socialism to reveal themselves more fully”. In the similar manner in his speech at the UN General Assembly, Gorbachev (1988b) stated: “We are not giving up our convictions, philosophy, or traditions. Neither are we calling on anyone to give up theirs. Yet we are not going to shut ourselves up within the range of our values”.

However, in comparison to his predecessors, Gorbachev did not stress the necessity to become the most powerful state or more powerful than the US, nor did he emphasise the superiority of socialism over capitalism. More evidence of this can be found in the following statement from Gorbachev’s abovementioned speech to the UN: “The very tackling of global problems requires a new "volume" and "quality" of cooperation by states and socio-political currents regardless of ideological and other differences” (Gorbachev, 1988b).

The second shift that made the transition from competitive to cooperative nuclear identity possible was the reiteration of dangers of nuclear competition, rather than a ‘catch up and overtake’ attitude. Previous Soviet leaders made nuclear competition necessary, because lagging behind would make the Soviets look weak and backward and it would “unleash US aggression”, “it won’t do for Bolsheviks”. Gorbachev constructed a different nuclear identity for the USSR as seen in his first speech as the USSR leader on March 11, 1985 where he bluntly laid out his disarmament intentions:

Never before has so terrible a threat loomed so large and dark over mankind as these days. The only reasonable way out of the existing situation is agreement of the confronting forces on an immediate
termination of the race in arms, above all, nuclear arms [...] An agreement which would help all to advance toward the cherished goal – the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons for good (Gorbachev, 1985a).

This sets out Gorbachev’s the desire to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, which was not in the foreground previously. All Soviet leaders talked about arms control and reduction; they also talked about the dangers associated with nuclear weapons and how abolishing them would benefit the world. However, as seen in the previous empirical chapters, the notion of total disarmament never figured to any significant extent to their construction of Soviet nuclear identity. Gorbachev presented the complete abolition of nuclear weapons as the “cherished goal” and “the central direction of [Soviet] foreign policy for the coming years” (Gorbachev, 1986, cited in Evangelista, 1986: 561). At the end of his first speech Gorbachev made a remark about the Soviet motherland becoming more rich and powerful as discussed above. This is important, because it shows that the superpower status was no longer associated with the possession of nuclear weapons, but in fact with their abolition. Gorbachev constructed a nuclear identity of a rational state with the aim to cooperate with the US rather than compete. He asked: “The question arises: Where further can we go, is it not time for those who shape the policy of states to stop, think and prevent the adoption of decisions that would push the world to a nuclear catastrophe?” (Gorbachev, 1985, cited in Evangelista, 1986: 561).

Constructions of cooperative nuclear identity made Gorbachev’s moratoria on Soviet nuclear testing appropriate and necessary in order to assert this identity. He stated that the Soviet Union was taking the action “to facilitate the termination of the dangerous competition in building up nuclear arsenals and wishing to set a good example” (Gorbachev, 1985b). Similar to the earlier USSR leaders, Gorbachev was constructing an identity of a responsible nuclear state that set an example to the rest of the world, albeit through different means. Rather than increasing the nuclear build-up, the Soviets were reducing it. “Undoubtedly, a mutual moratorium by the USSR and the United States on any nuclear blasts would be a good example also to other states possessing nuclear weapons” (Gorbachev, 1985b). Gorbachev was in fact reinforcing a superpower identity, but this identity was not affirmed by the size and achievements of the military-industrial complex. Rather, it was grounded in being the first state that
took decisive action to halt nuclear proliferation not just in the Soviet Union, but also in the world: “A complete end to nuclear tests would halt the nuclear arms race in the most dangerous area, that of qualitative improvement, and it would also seriously contribute to maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” (Gorbachev, 1985c).

Gorbachev constructed the Soviet Union as exceptional due to its unique peace and disarmament ambitions. Catching up with and overtaking the US was not being constructed as a key part of the Soviet exceptionalism anymore. Instead, Gorbachev continuously emphasised how dangerous a nuclear competition was for international security. Soviet nuclear identity evolved from being a competitive nuclear superpower that could not afford to lag behind the West to a state that cooperated, led the world towards disarmament and was ready to give up ALL of its nuclear weapons. To illustrate:

> It is clear to every sober-minded person that if we embark upon the road of deep cuts and then complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is essential to rule out any possibility which could be used by either the Soviet or the U.S. side for gaining unilateral military superiority (Gorbachev, 1986b).

This is an important shift, because previously Soviet leaders strove for unilateral military superiority, which enabled an aggressive armament programme. Instead, Gorbachev stressed the senselessness of seeking nuclear superiority, which shows how he constructed a nuclear identity in relation to the temporal Other, the earlier Soviet Self, and in relation to the spatial other, the US, simultaneously demonstrating that the USSR would not be senseless again and calling the US government to make that change too. To an extent, Gorbachev was taking a higher moral ground:

> It is a reality of today’s world that it is senseless to seek greater security for oneself through new types of weapons. At present, every step in the arms race increases the danger and the risk for both sides, and for all humankind (Gorbachev, 1986, cited in Evangelista, 1986: 561).

This resonates with what Hansen’s (2006: 50) notion of an ethical identity, as discussed in Chapter 3. To reiterate, articulations of an ethical identity imply discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility (Hansen, 2006: 50). In
this sense, articulations of policy invoke a particular moral force or a call for action. Gorbachev’s concern for humanity and continuous reinforcement of human security discourse helped to reproduce an ethical identity that enabled and legitimised his disarmament efforts. Earlier Soviet leaders as well as US leaders frequently expressed a moral responsibility to protect either the Self or the free people or the capitalist/socialist world from certain dangers that were naturally attributed to the Other. This has been discussed extensively in Chapters 5 and 6. However, these constructions enabled nuclear policies that were different from Gorbachev’s (e.g. the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the rapid arms race) due to a hyper-masculine and competitive nuclear identity that those leaders were constructing.

This section concludes that Soviet nuclear identity during the stage of disarmament was reconstructed and reinforced through discourses of human security, cooperation, and the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. Rather than projecting an image of a state that would not give up on the competition and achieve parity with the capitalists, Gorbachev’s government emphasised madness and danger of such competition to human life. The articulation of an ethical identity that is interconnected with cooperative and peace-loving dimensions that Gorbachev was constructing simultaneously constitutes and is a product of intensified disarmament talks and more concrete policy decisions such as the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing and the INF treaty, which will be discussed in detail below.

*The Soviet Union as the Peace-loving Global Leader of Disarmament*

The cooperation dimension of Gorbachev’s nuclear identity is directly interlinked with the peace-loving dimension. This section focuses on statements that refer more explicitly to peace. At all stages in their nuclear history, the Soviets constructed themselves as peace-loving. However, during nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race stages, the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity was asserted through the differentiation from the warmongering US, which made acquisition and further armament appropriate and necessary. In essence, Soviet nuclear weapons were seen as peaceful and serving noble purposes, while the American ones posed threats to international stability and security. During Gorbachev’s tenure, the Soviets also constructed Self as peace-loving, but this peace was redefined in the way that it was
not the Soviet weapons that would protect the world from a nuclear catastrophe, but a
total disarmament. The peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity was not
grounded in the necessity to counterbalance the US thus preventing a first strike, but
in the desire to cooperate with the US regardless of their ideological differences and to
eventually get rid of all nuclear weapons. To illustrate, Gorbachev (1987b: 45) stated:

In questions of preserving peace and saving mankind from the threat of
nuclear war, let no one remain indifferent or stand aloof. This concerns
all and everyone. Each state, large or small, socialist or capitalist, has an
important contribution to make.

This displays a significant shift from the rhetoric of saving mankind from the forces of
imperialism by means of arming, as shown in previous empirical chapters. As such,
the discourse reconstructs the Other – the US and wider West – from a reconstruction
of the Self, with previous binary oppositions becoming less prominent. Gorbachev’s
articulation of the commitment to peace, emphasis on the dangers of nuclear
weapons, and reinforcement of the need for total disarmament is what ultimately
constitutes the peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity at the disarmament
stage: “There is no shortage today of statements professing commitment to peace.
What is in short supply are concrete actions to strengthen the foundations of peace.
All too often peaceful words conceal war preparations and power politics”
(Gorbachev, 1987b: 45).

During the periods of nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race, the peace-loving
dimension came across as particularly ambiguous due to the simultaneous
reinforcement of highly competitive and hyper-masculine nuclear identity. Of course,
no state would construct a Self that is warmongering and threatening but framing
aggressive arming as means of pursuing admirable goals such as achieving peace and
stability or protecting the world from the US threat made the arms race possible and
desirable simultaneously reaffirming Soviet morally sound nuclear superpower status.
At those stages, the abolishment of nuclear weapons did not figure into Soviet nuclear
identity, whereas during Gorbachev’s rule it was not only the centrepiece of his
policymaking, but also the core of his nuclear identity:
By the end of 1999 there will be no nuclear weapons on earth. A universal accord will be drawn up that such weapons should never again come into being [...] the USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures (Gorbachev, 1986, cited in Evangelista, 1986: 565).

And in a similar manner he reinforced the necessity for the total disarmament a year later:

It is our duty to take full advantage of that chance [signing the INF Treaty] and move together toward a nuclear free world, which holds children, the promise of a fulfilling and happy life, without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons of destruction (Gorbachev, 1987, cited in Catudal, 1988: 298).

By frequently affirming their duty to eliminate nuclear weapons the Soviets not only constructed themselves as peaceful, but they also took on the responsibility of being the global leader of disarmament, being the state that sets an example. This demonstrates a continuous affirmation of Soviet ethical identity as discussed in the previous section of this chapter. To illustrate this further, Gorbachev stated:

The Soviet Union cannot indefinitely display unilateral restraint with regard to nuclear tests. But the stakes are too high and the responsibility too great for us not to try every possibility of influencing the position of others by force of example (Gorbachev, 1987b: 39).

In January 1986, Gorbachev became the first politician to come up with a precise and detailed proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons that would start immediately and end by the year 2000 (Gorbachev, 1987b 37-38). At the core of Gorbachev’s disarmament discourse was the rejection of the neorealistic notion that nuclear-strategic parity provides sufficient guarantees for peace, which completely redefined the Cold War concept of peace based on the doctrine of MAD. For example, he stated:

Even if one country would constantly be arming itself, and the other would do nothing, then this first country still would gain nothing. For the weak side may simply detonate all its nuclear devices, even on its own territory, and it would mean suicide for it and a slow killing for the adversary (Gorbachev, 1986, cited in Zubok, 2000).
The Chernobyl accident further enabled Gorbachev to make statements about the dangers of nuclear weapons in order to reinforce the construction of the USSR as a peace-loving state and as being uniquely qualified to lead the way on disarmament. This made future agreements on arms reduction even more necessary. To illustrate: “The accident at Chernobyl showed again what an abyss will open if nuclear war befalls mankind. For inherent in the nuclear arsenals stockpiled are thousands upon thousands of disasters far more horrible than the Chernobyl one” (Gorbachev, 1986a).

Previous empirical chapters have shown how the destabilised identity that was competitive and hyper-masculine by nature was asserted and reproduced through the formulation and legitimation of the rapid nuclear build-up. During the period of disarmament, in addition to human security, cooperation, and peace, Soviet nuclear identity was articulated through the discourses of danger that nuclear weapons posed to international security and through the rejection of realist notion that nuclear weapons were the ultimate guarantors of peace and security. Rather than boasting that the Soviet Union would catch up with and overtake the capitalists, Gorbachev constructed a Self that is correct and constructive in its course for disarmament and a Self that takes responsibility and a higher moral ground, as also seen in the previous section of this chapter. To illustrate, Gorbachev (1986, cited in Zubok, 2000) stated: “The discussion on nuclear disarmament has advanced to the new, higher level, from which we must expand further the struggle for liquidation and full ban on nuclear weapons, to continue actively our peace offensive”.

Gorbachev’s nuclear identity constructions re-imagined the USSR as a peacemaker in a new sense: as a world leader in peace and disarmament. This shows that the Soviets continued to reinforce an identity that was exceptional by nature, taking on the role to save the world from the dangers of nuclear weaponry. The reproduction of such nuclear identity to a large extent enabled a breakthrough in arms control agreements with the US and significant arms reductions during Gorbachev’s tenure.

Masculinity Reshaped: Strength in Cooperation, Peacekeeping, and Disarmament

The two preceding empirical chapters have explained how the masculine dimension of Soviet nuclear identity contributed to the formulation and legitimation of the
acquisition of nuclear weapons and the arms race with the US. Consequently, these policies reproduced and reaffirmed an identity that was hyper-masculine by nature. The first half of this chapter has shown how, during Brezhnev’s era, the association of nuclear weapons with traditionally masculine qualities such as strength, prudence, and rationality and the grounding of Soviet nuclear identity in military capability and competition, prevented decisive disarmament efforts and instead continuously enabled the arms race.

This section returns to some of Gorbachev’s statements already discussed above in order to flesh out the masculine dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity at the stage of disarmament. It has been noted that nuclear identity manufactured by Gorbachev’s government significantly differed from the earlier Soviet nuclear identity. In essence, the reshaping of the masculine dimension of the nuclear identity that Gorbachev was constructing is evident in all these shifts: competition transitioned to cooperation; ideological differences to the embracement of universal human values; peacekeeping through means of arming against the US to peacekeeping through means of disarming unilaterally and leading others towards disarmament; and the moral responsibility to protect the socialist peoples from evil capitalists to moral responsibility to protect the world from all nuclear weapons. However, this is not to suggest that this identity became ‘feminine’. Rather, Gorbachev constructed a different kind of masculinity that was not linked with preparedness to compete and threaten war, but with preparedness to disarm and preserve peace. To illustrate: “Why flex muscles needlessly? Why stage noisy shows and transfer the methods of domestic struggles to the relations between two nuclear powers? In them the language of strength is useless and dangerous” (Gorbachev, 1985c).

Feminist IR scholars explain how the gender-dichotomised pairings where traditionally masculine side is valued more highly than the feminine one are woven through national security and nuclear discourses – through the way we think and talk about nuclear weapons (see e.g. Cohn, 1993: 230; Cohn et al., 2006: 2; Duncanson and Eschle, 2008: 546). The previous two chapters have illustrated how during the stages of acquisition and the arms race a masculine side of Soviet nuclear discourse was associated with achieving military superiority and threatening to use force. This was
possible through the linkage of traditionally masculine characteristics (strength, power, might, rationality, prudence) to the possession of nuclear weapons and to the competition against the Other, the US. Gorbachev also constructed a masculine identity, but the source of strength in his discourse did not come from nuclear weapons:

In general, I would have to say that the Soviet Union’s strength today lies in its unity, dynamism, and the political activity of its people […] But we are opposed to playing power games, for this is an extremely dangerous thing in the nuclear-missile age (Gorbachev, 1987b: 59).

In a way, Gorbachev devalued the idea that nuclear weapons were the main source of strength, instead placing more emphasis on the importance of human security and peace as shown in the previous sections. According to Connell (2000: 30), “Some of the qualities in ‘traditional’ definitions of masculinity (e.g. courage, steadfastness, ambition) are certainly needed in the cause of peace”. Referring to his own approach as a ‘peace offensive’ shows how Gorbachev was still constructing a masculine identity of a rational strong superpower, but a superpower that waged peace, not war.

As seen from the quotes above, Gorbachev frequently reiterated that the arms race and nuclear weapons were senseless, while disarmament should be “clear to every sober-minded person”. Thus, what had changed during the stage of disarmament was not the nature of Soviet nuclear identity – it was still masculine – but the idea of what it actually meant to be masculine. The power games of the earlier Soviet Self were disparaged. They were hyper-masculine, excessively aggressive, and risky, compared to the rational, moderate, civil/political masculinity being constructed for the USSR by Gorbachev. This reshaped the masculinity that was woven through the other changed dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity, which made disarmament possible and even necessary.

The previous section established that Gorbachev was constructing a nuclear identity of a superpower that was the leader of disarmament as seen from numerous quotes where he asserted the Soviet duty and responsibility to disarm and to influence disarmament everywhere else. To reiterate, “But the stakes are too high and the responsibility too great for us not to try every possibility of influencing the position of others by force of example” (Gorbachev, 1987b: 39). Such discursive practices
constructed a nuclear identity that was paternalistic by nature. As explained by Hearn and Collinson (1998: 215), paternalism is a specifically masculine discourse that “seeks to exercise power by emphasising the moral basis of cooperation; the importance of personal trust relations […] that draws on the familial metaphor of the ‘rule of the father’ who is authoritative, benevolent, self-disciplined and wise”.

Indeed, as explained in detail above, during Gorbachev’s rule the Soviets constructed a cooperative and ethical identity with human security and total disarmament at its core. By maintaining that spending billions on dangerous arms races is senseless and immoral, Gorbachev was constructing the USSR as moral and wise. Central to paternalism is exercising power in ways that “enhance subordinates’ self-interest; such practices are usually represented as ‘benefitting’ and ‘protecting’ its victims” (Collinson, 1998: 216). Gorbachev’s human security discourse frequently highlighted the need to protect human life on earth and to save mankind from a nuclear threat, which was one of the ways to construct a paternalistic masculine identity. In addition, he emphasised the benefits this would bring to mankind – nuclear disarmament being a prerequisite for coping with global issues, such as economic backwardness, hunger, and disease – but also supposedly looked after the US interests. To illustrate, in his interview to TIME magazine Gorbachev (1985c) stated:

That is our firm position [ban on the militarization of space] and it is based on our assessment, an assessment that we regard as being highly responsible, an assessment that takes into account not only our own interests but the interests of the U.S. as well.

Gorbachev was moulding an identity of a responsible and rational superpower that took everyone’s interest into account and acted to pursue admirable goals such as tackling global issues as mentioned above. These constructions were in a way similar to the acquisition and the arms race periods, but the masculinity of Soviet nuclear identity was no longer reinforced through the showcase of military strength and competition, but through cooperation, peace, and disarmament. As stated by Gorbachev (1987a), “The new mode of thinking with its humane, universal criteria and values is penetrating diverse strata. Its strength lies in the fact that it accords with people's common sense”. This made policies such as the unilateral nuclear moratorium possible, because this is what a paternalistic state was meant to do – be wise and lead by example. In addition, as stated above, although the US was still
different it was no longer constructed as the radically different evil Other. This absence of a threatening enemy in the nuclear discourse also made disarmament agreements and verification inspections possible.

Regardless of a peace-loving cooperative nuclear identity that Gorbachev reinforced, nuclear abolition was never achieved. The association of nuclear weapons with masculine strength and disarmament with weakness did not completely disappear from Soviet nuclear discourse and particularly not from the American one. In fact, the connection between nuclear weapons and international politics in general and masculinity was too well established to perish. Partially this could explain why Gorbachev started to lose trust and popularity among his Soviet colleagues. To illustrate, the former Soviet foreign minister Gromyko stated: “I wonder how puzzled must be the US and other NATO countries. It is a mystery for them why Gorbachev and his friends in the Politburo cannot comprehend how to use force and pressure for defending their state interests” (Gromyko, cited in Zubok, 2009: 318).

Gorbachev’s colleagues frequently criticised him for the reluctance to use force claiming that he “had no guts for blood” or that he was “incapable not only of using dictatorial measures, but even of resorting to hard-line administrative means” (cited in Zubok, 2009: 319). This shows how gendered hierarchies continued to be present in Soviet political and security discourses. Friends and foes alike criticised Gorbachev’s disarmament efforts. For example, Cohn (1993: 235) discusses how American security specialists referred to Gorbachev and his entourage: “I’ve met these Soviet ‘new thinkers’ and they’re a bunch of pussies” or “They’re a bunch of pussies for pulling out of Eastern Europe”.

This demonstrates that despite the shift towards the construction of a different kind of masculinity, within the universal national security discourse the symbolic association of military force and nuclear weapons with masculinity remained strong. Cohn et al. (2006: 3) argue that the real barriers to disarmament “are created by the ways in which masculine identities and roles have become conjoint with weapons possession for many ‘male’ combatants”. This is one of the reasons why Gorbachev lost support at home. In their perception, he was too ‘soft’ to be in power and the US exploited his weaknesses to achieve their goals. As reflected later by one of the critics of
Gorbachev’s regime Russian politician Vladimir Lukin, “Firmness was necessary in such a country as Russia, not to mention the Soviet Union” (cited in Zubok, 2009: 319). However, reshaping of the masculine dimension of Soviet nuclear identity during Gorbachev’s rule is significant to our understanding of the symbolic value and meaning of nuclear weapons as a centre of disarmament efforts, because when this value was deflated and ascribed to cooperation, human security, and the abolition of nuclear weapons, the most significant disarmament agreements became possible and desirable.

The US as the Soviet Spatial Other

Lastly, this chapter looks at the Soviet key spatial Other – the US. In line with the poststructuralist insight that identities are always constituted relationally, Chapters 5 and 6 established that representations of the US were an important discursive characteristic of Soviet nuclear identity. The Soviet constructions of the US during Gorbachev’s rule were different from the previous Soviet leaders. In addition, the courses of both states’ nuclear policies drifted apart for a period of time in a sense that the USSR halted nuclear testing and started to take decisive steps towards disarmament, while the US continued testing and often rejected Soviet proposals.

As discussed above, the Soviet constructions of the US as a radical aggressive Other gradually disappeared from Soviet nuclear discourse during the early stages of détente under Brezhnev’s rule and more noticeably during Gorbachev’s time in office, which made certain arms control agreements possible. It is important to note that the US became the less radical Other once the emphasis on the ideological differences between socialism and capitalism started to disappear from Soviet nuclear discourse. To reiterate, in comparison to his predecessors, Gorbachev constructed a nuclear identity that was cooperative, peace-loving, paternalistic, and ethical with human security and total disarmament at its core rather than reliant on competition, military strength, and ideological/military superiority over the US. However, this is not to say that the US stopped acting as a key external other. Its differences to the Soviet Self to an extent remained and Soviet nuclear identity was reproduced vis-à-vis those differences. To illustrate, after the failure to make an agreement with the US in Reykjavik, Gorbachev stated (1986b):
What was being thoroughly disguised previously is now becoming more clear: among U.S. and West European ruling circles, there are powerful forces which seek to frustrate the process of nuclear disarmament. Some people began to assert again that nuclear weapons are almost a boon.

Gorbachev’s othering of the US was different, because he did not construct the Americans as a threat to the Soviet Union per se, which in the past would further enable the arms race, but as a threat to nuclear disarmament. The main differences between the US and the USSR during the period of disarmament were neither ideological nor related to the superiority/inferiority in a nuclear competition. Rather, the main difference was grounded in the US non-compliance with the Soviet disarmament initiative. As such, in Soviet nuclear discourse the US became hyper-masculine and attached to its nuclear weapons. Gorbachev reproduced Soviet nuclear identity by emphasising the main differences between the Soviet and the American thinking about disarmament. For example:

It would be irresponsible on our part to underestimate the forces of resistance to change. Those are influential and very aggressive forces blinded by hatred for everything progressive. They exist in various quarters of the Western world, but the largest concentration of them is observed among those who cater directly for the military-industrial complex, both ideologically and politically, and who live on it (Gorbachev, 1987a).

This quote shows how Gorbachev constructed an identity of a responsible progressive state rejecting the relevance of military strength and ideology. The US on the other hand was thus reinforced as being non-progressive and ideologically driven. In comparison to his predecessors, Gorbachev did not formulate the US as aggressive dangerous imperialists. On the contrary, he consciously refrained from aggressive rhetoric: “In this critical situation Moscow is trying to practice restraint in its pronouncements about the US; it is not resorting to anti-American campaigns, nor is it fomenting hatred for your country” (Gorbachev, 1985c). Soviet nuclear identity was no longer competitive or aggressively macho and rather than engaging in threats and insults, Gorbachev dismissed the American images of the Soviet Union without the need for affirming manhood: “If an evil empire does exist, let it exist. I’m sure re-
making the Soviet Union is not a goal of the United States” (Gorbachev, 1985, cited in Catudal, 1988: 278). More evidence of this can be seen from the quote below:

Militarist and anti-Soviet forces are clearly concerned lest the interest among the people and political quarters of the West in what is happening in the Soviet Union today and the growing understanding of its foreign policy erase the artificially created "image of the enemy", an image which they have been exploiting unashamedly for years. Well, it's their business after all. But we shall firmly follow the road of restructuring and new thinking (Gorbachev, 1987a).

The key difference between the Self and the Other reinforced during the stage of disarmament was related to the US non-compliance with the Soviet proposals of total disarmament or moratoria on nuclear testing and American continuous insistence on the SDI initiative. In a way, the US acted similar to the earlier aggressive Soviet self when it came to peacekeeping: “assurances of peace intentions, which we often hear from US officials are immediately accompanied, at one go, so to speak, by the lauding of ‘power politics’” (Gorbachev, 1987a). The new Soviet Self on the other hand rejected power politics: “But to play a power game, we do not want this. This is an extremely dangerous activity, in our rocket nuclear age” (Gorbachev, 1986b). The Soviets continued to reaffirm their ethical identity of the peaceful leader of global disarmament: “We were guided by the motive of freeing the European peoples from the fear of nuclear catastrophe and then could move on to eliminating all nuclear weapons” (Gorbachev, 1986b). This identity constituted and was a product of disarmament decisions such as continuous unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing and insisting on more arms control talks with the US in order to achieve results. This would not have been possible if the Soviet nuclear identity was constructed vis-à-vis a (very) radical dangerous and aggressive other, because as seen in the previous empirical chapters, such constructions enable more arming and aggressive policies.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined the articulations of Soviet nuclear identity during the period of détente under Brezhnev from 1964 until 1982, and the stage of disarmament under the leadership of Gorbachev from 1985 until 1991. It argued that the evolution of Soviet nuclear identity enabled a different course of policy, moving from the rapid
arms race to the most significant arms reduction in history from 1986 to 1991. First, it looked at Brezhnev’s tenure, which marked the transitional period between Khrushchev’s nuclear sabre-rattling and Gorbachev’s total disarmament initiatives. During the period of détente, the Soviet Union’s nuclear identity transformed from machoistic and aggressively competitive yet peaceful, to responsible, prudent, cautious, and masculine. These changes enabled an easing of tensions between the USSR and the United States for some time and made arms control agreements such as the ABM treaty and the SALT I treaty possible. However, these agreements failed to halt the arms race enabling both states to continue developing new missiles, which led to the Soviet Union stockpiling a total of 45,000 nuclear warheads in 1986.

Despite recognising the universal dangers of nuclear weapons and of the arms race in broad terms, during Brezhnev’s tenure Soviet nuclear identity continued to be grounded in the strength and might of the military-industrial complex and the ‘catch up and overtake’ the US attitude. Disarmament and falling behind in the arms race were still considered as weakness and many orthodox Soviet politicians still retained the old view of ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism constructing the US as warmongering aggressive imperialists. The existence of such constructions prevented decisive disarmament agreements that would actually compel both sides to reduce their stockpiles, and the arms race continued at a rapid pace. In addition, the continuous discursive production of threat and danger about the US made total disarmament undesirable, because the Soviets needed to arm in order to defend themselves.

This chapter demonstrated that nuclear identity constructions during Brezhnev’s era were particularly contradictory, which enabled a correspondingly paradoxical course of policy. On the one hand, Brezhnev announced the no first use policy and initiated a series of arms limitation talks. On the other hand, he approved an increase in defence spending and supported the most expensive and rapid leg of the Soviet arms race. Nevertheless, this transition was necessary to enable disarmament at a later stage, because a nuclear identity that was grounded in rationality and prudence did not constitute, nor was a product of aggressive war threatening rhetoric or dangerous policy moves as seen in the previous empirical chapters. Additionally, the Brezhnev
section elaborated on how the Soviet nuclear identity was not only constructed in relation to the spatial Other – the US – but also in relation to the temporal Other – the old Soviet self. This exemplifies the evolution of the Soviet nuclear identity, which made some agreements possible recognising the mistakes of the past. As pointed out by Bahr (1996, cited in Zubok, 2009: 226): “Brezhnev was necessary for transition to Gorbachev; what the latter accomplished, the former introduced. He was an asset for world peace”.

The chapter then proceeded with the analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions during the period of disarmament under the leadership of Gorbachev. This was when most significant transitions in the Soviet articulation of Self and Other occurred. First, the Soviets were no longer constructing a competitive identity of a state that could not lag behind the capitalists. Rather, Gorbachev constructed an identity of a cooperative and responsible state with the human security rather than ideology at its core. As a result, Soviet nuclear identity transitioned from the mighty military superpower to the global leader of disarmament. The frequent reiteration of the importance of peace and total disarmament enabled decisions such as a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing that the Soviet government put in place and extended twice. It also enabled active negotiations with the US that were previously not seen between the two sides.

Second, the Soviets still constructed a peace-loving nuclear identity. However, rather than constructing it vis-à-vis the warmongering US seeing their weapons as a problem and the Soviet ones as an antidote, Gorbachev stressed the dangers of ALL nuclear weapons. He constructed a nuclear identity with total disarmament at its core in relation to the earlier Soviet Self that heavily invested in nuclear weaponry. Gorbachev’s total disarmament discourse emphasised an ethical dimension to Soviet nuclear identity meaning that the Soviets saw themselves as the policemen of disarmament leading by example, invoking a particular moral force and responsibility, and encouraging others to follow suit. Such identity continuously enabled Soviet policy moves towards disarmament.

Third, Soviet nuclear identity during Gorbachev’s time in office was still masculine. However, the nature of this masculinity has changed with strength being associated
not with military or nuclear might, but with disarmament. This is important, because it illustrates the significance of the arguments advanced by feminist IR scholars, who emphasise that traditionally masculine attributes attached to nuclear weapons prevent decisive disarmament policy. Devaluing these associations and reshaping the national security discourse as seen in Gorbachev’s case, was crucial in order for agreements and nuclear stockpiles reduction to come into being. The masculinity of Soviet nuclear identity took on a paternalistic character, which was closely interlinked with the reinforcement of the ethical dimension. Gorbachev did not associate disarmament with being weak, but in fact with being strong and rational, and the core of Soviet strength was grounded not in the might of the military-industrial complex and ideological superiority, but in cooperation, human security, equality, and peace. This highlights how the forms of masculinity may shift over time, which is significant because, as pointed out by Hooper (2001: 76), the fluidity of definitions of masculinity and challenges to hegemonic masculine conceptions open up space for change. This provides feminist IR scholars and those struggling against nuclear proliferation with potential routes to develop their arguments further. The next chapter will draw conclusions and discuss the implications and contributions of this analysis to our understanding of the connection between identity constructions and Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War.
Chapter 8. Conclusions

Overview of the Thesis

This thesis set out to explore the constructions of Soviet nuclear identity across the span of the Cold War, and to demonstrate the significance of this identity to the enactment and justification of Soviet nuclear policy from Stalin’s nuclear weapons acquisition to Gorbachev’s disarmament. Much has been written about the need to expand our knowledge and understanding of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation beyond rationalist thought, as discussed in Chapter 2. Emerging after the end of the Cold War, identity-focused approaches to nuclear politics established that identity constructions significantly matter when it comes to states’ decisions to proliferate nuclear weapons or to disarm. These studies emphasise that nuclear weapons are much more than tools of security and power-maximisation, as materialist approaches such as neorealism would argue; they are to a large extent tools through the possession (or non-possession) of which states build and reinforce their identity. Yet, it remains unclear in the IR literature how this applies to the case of nuclear policy in the Soviet Union. Filling this gap in our knowledge of the Soviet case was the primary objective of this thesis. To achieve this objective, I asked: how did the Soviet elites construct Soviet nuclear identity? How did Soviet nuclear identity evolve over time? How did nuclear identity constructions make Soviet nuclear decisions possible?

My ambition was to present a poststructuralist, gender-mindful, and interpretive account of Soviet nuclear identity and policy during the Cold War. Chapter 3 conceptualised a nuclear identity as discursively reproduced through political elites’ nuclear weapons discourse and performatively enacted through nuclear policy. Nuclear identity is articulated in relation to a multiplicity of Others that take on different forms of Otherness. It was argued that it is imperative to be analytically open to articulations of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities in order to capture the complexities and ambiguity of identity constructions. Nuclear identity was also conceptualised as masculine, because it is reproduced through nuclear discourse that is underpinned by powerful ideas of masculinity, which state leaders historically attached to nuclear weapons. Such were the theoretical roots of this thesis.
Consequently, Chapter 4 developed an explicit poststructuralist discourse analytical methodology to go with the theoretical framework. Finally, to bring both theory and methodology together, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 engaged in a detailed analysis of Soviet nuclear identity constructions and the enactment of policy that took place during three different time periods: the bomb’s acquisition, 1941-1949; the arms race, 1953-1964; and détente and disarmament, 1964-1991.

This concluding chapter ties together the theoretical and empirical insights of this thesis and presents the conclusions that can be drawn from them. Firstly, it synthesises the key findings of the empirical chapters. Secondly, it fleshes out the specific contributions that this thesis makes to the IR literature on nuclear proliferation. Finally, it sketches out a set of suggestions for potential future research on the subject.

*Constructions of Soviet Nuclear Identity and Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev*

The poststructuralist discourse analysis of Soviet nuclear discourse revealed the extent to which identity played a role in Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War. Chapters 5 and 6 argued that an articulation of a competitive, hypermasculine superpower identity enabled and necessitated nuclear weapons acquisition in the Soviet Union in the 1940s and the aggressive politics of rapid armament from the early 1950s until the mid-1980s. Chapter 7 argued that a radical change in the direction of Soviet nuclear policy from the arms race to significant reductions of nuclear stockpiles and arms control agreements after 1986 was made possible and desirable through the continuous articulation of a cooperative, paternalistic, and peaceful nuclear identity. This section unpacks these two central arguments and reflects on how the findings discussed in the empirical chapters answer my three research questions outlined in the introduction. The first sub-section explains how the Soviet leaders constructed a nuclear identity for the USSR; the second subsection focuses on how this nuclear identity evolved over time and how it made Soviet nuclear policy possible.

*Spatial, Temporal, and Ethical Constructions: How was Soviet Nuclear Identity Articulated*

During all three of the time periods analysed in this thesis – nuclear weapons acquisition, the arms race, disarmament - Soviet nuclear identity was constructed and
articulated in relation to the key spatial Other – the United States. However, the analysis revealed that the Otherness of the US during the periods of nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race was constructed in a different manner than during the disarmament period. During the rules of Stalin and Khrushchev, the difference between the US and the USSR took on the form of extreme Otherness, with Soviet leaders constantly reinforcing its dangerous and threatening nature. As such, the Soviet ‘inside’ was sharply differentiated from the capitalist ‘outside’ who rendered security and armament necessary. The production of danger about the outside was prominent during these time periods in the Soviet discourse, as seen in the Soviet leaders’ portrayal of the US as dangerous, warmongering, threatening to the ‘peaceful peoples’, bloodthirsty, and so on. These constructions made nuclear weapons proliferation not only possible, but necessary. Moreover, the discursive constructions of threat and danger were essential for the successful stabilisation of Soviet nuclear identity and the legitimisation of Soviet nuclear policy. This goes in line with Campbell’s (1992) and Connolly’s (1991) arguments addressed in Chapter 3: political leaders have historically legitimised their security policies through the construction of spatial Others as threatening to the national Self. Soviet nuclear discourse was no exception, and these constructions appeared across a wide range of the analysed texts.

However, Chapters 3 and 4 also argued that identity constructions can take on more ambiguous forms, and the degree of Otherness may also vary. Indeed, what we see during the period of disarmament is that the Other – the US – was no longer constituted as radically different or dangerous and threatening to the USSR. Rather, it was constructed along the ethical dimension; as non-progressive and ideologically driven, due to their initial rejection of Gorbachev’s disarmament proposals. Arguably, when nuclear identity is constituted through relations that are not directly oppositional or threatening, it challenges the entire structure of dichotomous thinking, opening up spaces for cooperation and agreement.

Furthermore, Soviet nuclear identity was also constructed in relation to temporal Others. The themes of progress and development featured prominently in Soviet official discourse. For example, Chapter 5 argued that Stalin’s ‘catch up and overtake discourse’ constructed a nuclear identity that was temporally inferior to the Other –
the US – due to the USSR’s lagging behind the capitalists in nuclear weapons production. But because this nuclear identity also emerged as competitive and exceptional, these temporal constructions of the Other necessitated the rapid development of the Soviet nuclear program. During this period, the Soviets also constructed an identity in relation to the Soviets’ own pre-Bolshevik past. Stalin reinforced the idea that the new Soviet Self was superior to the old Tsarist Russia, which was underdeveloped, backward, weak, and beaten. Such temporal constructions enabled progressive politics, as seen in Stalin’s efforts regarding the rapid industrialisation of the USSR. Brezhnev and Gorbachev also articulated an identity in relation to the temporal Soviet Self, whereby the Soviet peace-loving, cooperative identity was juxtaposed to the previous, aggressive Soviet Self that was obsessed with nuclear armament and aggressive politics. These narratives of past struggles, defeats, or mistakes are essential for the establishment and the refinement of Self (Hansen, 2006: 49). This serves as a justification for policy action, because progress and change become necessary. The articulations of the new refined Self during the period of disarmament both enabled and resulted from the change in the course of Soviet nuclear policy.

Finally, the analysis revealed that, during all time periods, the Soviets constructed a nuclear identity through articulations of national and international responsibility that legitimised their choices of policy. During the periods of nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race, as Chapters 5 and 6 argued, this responsibility was grounded in ‘saving’ the socialist world from capitalist nuclear weapons by acquiring more weapons. The narratives of American irresponsibility and aggressiveness constructed the Soviet Self as acting in pursuit of admirable and peaceful goals, enabling and necessitating the production of nuclear weapons to defend themselves and to preserve peace and stability. During the period of disarmament, Soviet leaders articulated a Self that was responsible for freeing the world from nuclear weapons. The construction of the Other as still different, but no longer threatening or aggressive, enabled the changes in the direction of Soviet policy.
i. From competitive to cooperative nuclear identity

Chapter 5 argued that Soviet leaders began to re-imagine their state as a nuclear weapons state 4 years before the successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949. Soviet nuclear identity emerged within a discourse that emphasised the imperative to ‘catch up and overtake’ the US. This was in reaction to the US dropping two atomic bombs on Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Soviet nuclear identity emerged as highly competitive, because being behind the US in anything, particularly in the development of new weapons of extraordinary power was a priori not an option for the Soviet leaders. It undermined their self-conception as a global superpower following the Soviet victory against Nazi Germany in World War II. The analysis revealed that the ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse was grounded in Soviet leaders’ belief in and the desire to maintain, first, the ideological superiority of socialism over capitalism and, second, the exceptional character of the Soviet state. As such, ideas about Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet exceptionalism frequently figured in official governmental discourse throughout the period of acquisition and the arms race, fuelling the Soviet struggle for superiority and the construction of a competitive nuclear identity.

Over the course of the next 40 years, ‘catch up and overtake’ remained a dominant and relatively stable discourse. The totalitarian structure of the Soviet Union largely silenced competing discourses, leaving very little space for alternative identity constructions. Any attempt that was made never reached any discursive stability, as seen in the discussion of the Soviet attitude towards MAD in Chapter 6, whereby any comment on Soviet potential vulnerability to the American nuclear attack was seen as dangerous, because there could be no doubt that the Soviets would not win a nuclear war. The Soviets refused to accept any idea of vulnerability to an American nuclear attack, as this destabilised their competitive and exceptional nuclear identity. From Stalin to Brezhnev, the Soviets grounded this nuclear identity in the strength of the military-industrial complex, which, in turn, enabled the military-industrial complex to grow. This belief in Soviet exceptionalism enabled a long-lasting nuclear arms race, culminating in a peak of 45,000 nuclear warheads in Soviet stockpiles in 1986. Every time Soviet nuclear identity was destabilised as a consequence of US retaliatory
Arming responses, the Soviets reasserted it through aggressive Othering and the production of danger about the “warmongering”, “blood-thirsty” capitalists, which enabled and legitimised further aggressive armament and nuclear testing. Furthermore, the nuclear superpower identity that emerged during Khrushchev’s tenure, as the Soviets developed retaliatory nuclear capability, enabled dangerous nuclear politics, such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the testing of ‘Tsar’ bomba’ – the most powerful nuclear bomb ever denoted, albeit militarily useless.

However, in the 1980s we see a change of policy. Following Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985, there was transformation in the Soviet approach to international and domestic politics. He introduced considerable democratisation, namely the policies of glasnost and perestroika. In this era, we see the ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse lose its dominant status and give way to a discourse of cooperation. Rather than focusing on the importance of the competition with the US, Soviet leaders reinforced ideas of cooperation, human security, peacekeeping, and the importance of total disarmament. Moreover, the Self was no longer constructed as ideologically superior to the capitalist Other – it was of course different, but now articulated as an equal. Chapter 7 details this evolution in Soviet nuclear identity from competitive to cooperative, which over time enabled a halt to the nuclear arms race, moratoria on Soviet nuclear testing, and decisive steps towards disarmament talks with the US.

ii. From hyper-masculine to paternalistic nuclear identity

Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that Soviet nuclear identity emerged as hyper-masculine, with significant consequences for nuclear politics. Soviet leaders, to a large extent, linked the possession of nuclear weapons to traditionally masculine attributes, such as strength, potency, rationality, and invincibility. This identity was constructed in relation to the US, which it positioned as subordinate: as emotional, unstable, even fearful. The politics of nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race was constitutive of, and a product of, Soviet officials’ practices of ‘affirming manhood’. The arguments of Carol Cohn and other feminist IR scholars hold firmly, because the nature of the Soviet dominant competitive nuclear discourse was deeply gendered, with the masculine side being privileged over the feminine side. Nuclear weapons served as “the ultimate arbiter of political/masculine power” (Cohn et al., 2006: 3). Such
constructions evoked a ‘feminised’ image on any attempt to reach an arms control agreement or indeed disarmament, because to Stalin’s, Khrushchev’s, and to an extent Brezhnev’s governments, it represented weakness, lack of will and potency, and being a ‘wimp’.

During the period of disarmament, we see that Soviet nuclear discourse continued to reproduce a gendered identity. However, we can see a significant transition in how Soviet nuclear identity was constructed. It was still masculine, yet the ideas of what strength and power meant in Soviet nuclear discourse went through a noticeable transformation. The traditionally masculine attributes previously linked to the possession of nuclear weapons and aggressive armament were instead linked to disarmament and arms control. Gorbachev’s government constructed disarmament as a rational, strong, responsible, and powerful act rather than as a weakness. As such, gendered hierarchies, with a masculine side being privileged over a more feminine side, did not disappear from the official Soviet nuclear discourse. What changed was the source of this ‘strength’ and ‘power’. Referring to his own approach as a “peace offensive”, Gorbachev was still constructing a masculine nuclear identity, but it took on a more paternalistic form due to the reinforcement of global cooperation on disarmament and the evolution of Soviet identity from being a nuclear superpower to becoming a world leader of disarmament. This both enabled and resulted from a shift into the direction of disarmament and the easing of tensions with the US, with both states’ leaders eventually signing the INF treaty and starting to dismantle their nuclear stockpiles.

However, despite the shift towards the construction of a more ‘peaceful’ masculinity, Chapter 7 also demonstrated that the symbolic association of nuclear weapons with the traditional ideas of masculine strength and potency did not disappear from the Soviet nuclear discourse. This is where competing discourses became particularly prominent. Gorbachev and his closest advisors were emasculated by both the Americans and other Soviet politicians, and were accused of being ‘soft’, ‘weak’, and a ‘bunch of pussies’. This shows that the masculinisation of nuclear weaponry is deeply embedded in foreign policy discourses, but this does not mean that change is not possible. The most important point to make here is that the case of Soviet
disarmament in the 1980s demonstrates that when masculinity is linked to the practices of cooperation, conflict resolution, and disarmament, with the possession of nuclear weapons being continuously questioned and devalued by state leaders, changes in the course of nuclear policy become possible and even desirable.

iii. From the ‘peace-loving’ proliferator to the peace-loving leader of global disarmament

As with any process of identity construction, Soviet nuclear identity constructions were always contradictory. One notable contradiction was that during all of the analysed time periods, the Soviets constructed a Self that was peace-loving. However, the contradiction lies in the fact that, aside from the period of arms control and disarmament, constructions of a peace-loving dimension of Soviet nuclear identity also paradoxically enabled nuclear weapons acquisition and the arms race. Alongside the narratives of masculine strength and competition, as Chapters 5 and 6 established, the Soviets articulated a peace-loving nuclear identity through narratives of cooperation and peacekeeping. This identity was constructed in relation to the very radical ‘warmongering’ US, while the Soviet Self was portrayed as responsible and peaceful. It is through the peacekeeping discourse that the Soviets articulated their ethical identity and a higher moral ground. The frequent reiteration of the danger of US nuclear weapons and the aggressive nature of American politics legitimised and necessitated, first, the Soviet nuclear project, and second, both Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s arms race. These constructions attempted to reinforce the USSR as a responsible moral leader that would save the world from the capitalists’ nuclear weapons by means of arming. In this sense, the Soviet weapons were constructed as (necessarily) peaceful, whereas the American weapons were (necessarily) aggressive.

During Gorbachev’s tenure, peacekeeping discourse replaced ‘catch up and overtake’ discourse and became dominant. Compared to the period of acquisition and the arms race, the idea of ‘peace’ was redefined in a way that ALL nuclear weapons were dangerous; there was no longer a difference between the weapons of Self and Other. The Soviets still constructed themselves as peaceful and responsible. But this responsibility was grounded in the idea of disarmament, which continuously enabled and legitimised Gorbachev’s efforts to reach an arms control agreement with the US
government and to proclaim moratoria on Soviet nuclear testing. Through the articulation of these policies, Soviet nuclear identity kept evolving into an identity of a world leader of peace and disarmament with responsibility to influence disarmament everywhere else. Chapter 7 demonstrated that when ethical and peace-loving identity constructions take on the dominant form in the official policy discourse, the course of nuclear policy that remained static for 40 years may be reversed.

**Concluding Remarks**

Bringing together the key findings of this thesis, it can thus be concluded that nuclear discourses that reproduced a competitive, hyper-masculine identity constructed in opposition to the very radical dangerous Other, both constituted and were a product of the Soviet nuclear weapons acquisition and the rapid Cold War arms race. When these discourses became dominant and stable, they precluded the possibility of successful disarmament efforts. While the USSR leadership articulated the need for disarmament, the presence of these constructions made it far more difficult, if not politically impossible to achieve. All three dimensions of Soviet nuclear identity were performed simultaneously through the enactment of dangerous policy that nearly brought the world to a nuclear catastrophe during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. However, the constitution and reinforcement of a cooperative, peace-loving, and paternalistic identity constructed in relation to the Other that was not radically different or portrayed as a dangerous enemy, opened up spaces for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, enabling significant and continuous reductions of nuclear arsenals and the signature of the INF treaty in 1987. This demonstrates the role that identity played in Soviet nuclear policy during the Cold War taking our understanding beyond rationalist logic of rational deterrence and security. And if identity is important, it means that change is possible.

**Contributions of the Thesis**

This thesis makes several interconnected contributions to IR studies of nuclear proliferation and disarmament, and to the broader field of poststructuralist and feminist IR research on the significance of identity constructions in global politics.
First, it makes an empirical contribution by taking our understanding of Soviet nuclear policy beyond traditional, rationalist, and security-based explanations. By showing how identity constructions were at the heart of Soviet nuclear policy, it re-emphasises the key argument of ideational IR scholarship on nuclear weapons, which posits that not all nuclear decisions are rational or security-driven and identity constructions shape these decisions to a large extent. No volume in the IR literature has satisfactorily explored the significance of identity constructions to the course of Soviet nuclear policy. Traditionally, IR as a Western discipline has tended to privilege the study of the United States, and even critical works like those of Campbell (1992) tell us a lot about the US but very little about Russia. My research helps us understand this ‘other side’ of Cold War nuclear identity politics, which has previously gone under researched.

As such, this thesis makes an important contribution to IR literature on nuclear proliferation by fleshing out this lesser known case and showing how identity constructions can shape not only nuclear weapons acquisition, but also the arms race, arms control, and disarmament. It fills the gap in our understanding of the most aggressive vertical nuclear proliferation in history, which neither rationalist nor ideational scholars focus on in-depth. It also provides a better understanding of events such as the testing of strategically useless weaponry, emphasising that nuclear politics can be shaped by ideas, beliefs, and identities, just as much as by security and rational deterrence calculations. This is important, because if not all state decision-making regarding nuclear weapons is rational and security-driven, then our approaches to the politics of global disarmament cannot be solely based on deflating the security value of nuclear weapons. At the same time, if the biggest proliferators of nuclear weapons such as Russia ground their identity in the possession of nuclear weapons to such an extent as has been revealed by this thesis, then achieving total disarmament becomes particularly challenging.

This thesis also makes a theoretical contribution to poststructuralist and feminist IR scholarship, in two distinct ways. It expands our application of poststructuralism to identity-focused IR studies of nuclear weapons proliferation and disarmament, which have been dominated by various strands of constructivism. This thesis demonstrates that understanding identity as discursively constituted, relational, and existing in a
mutually constitutive relationship with policy, can take our understanding of the connection between identity and policy beyond causality. Such conceptualisations of identity enable a deeper understanding of how identities function in discourse and how policies are legitimised. It shows how ideas and material factors are intertwined to an extent that they become inseparable. This approach thus helps us to understand how some actions can be made possible, while others are precluded. Furthermore, the poststructuralist emphasis on the historical contingency of identity and policy challenges rationalist claims to objectivity and universalism, demonstrating how different historical modes of representation carry different political consequences. This is important, because it helps us to see nuclear policy and disarmament as dynamic processes that are not fixed or universal, which may explain why the latter presents such a challenge to its advocates. This thesis also demonstrated the importance of seeing identities as existing not only in relation to dangerous radical Others, because it helps us to engage with processes though which identities become stable and change over time, which is imperative to achieving any change in policy direction.

In addition, it contributes to feminist IR scholarship on nuclear proliferation by incorporating gender into a poststructuralist discourse analytical framework. By exposing the gendered nature of nuclear discourse, the analysis demonstrated that when the link between masculinity and aggressive nuclear politics becomes destabilised, there is a possibility for progressive change in nuclear politics. As such, it is possible to challenge traditional gendered hierarchies where a more masculine side, associated with possessing nuclear weapons, is privileged over the more feminine side, associated with disarmament. The change can be achieved through the deconstruction of traditional gender dichotomies and the encouragement of relations of mutual respect and non-radical Otherness between Self and Other.

**Future Research Agenda**

The last point to address are the kinds of questions and future research agendas which can be drawn from this thesis. This analysis only focused on a snapshot of a particular period of time in a particular state. More research can be done by expanding the time frame to modern day Vladimir Putin’s Russia and studying how Russian nuclear identity is constructed now and how it enables policy action, such as the termination
of the INF treaty in 2019. Similar research can be done in cases of any nuclear state. Exploring the historical development of nuclear identities can help us to gain a better understanding of how states’ nuclear choices come about and what particular constructions enable them.

At relevant moments, this thesis also explored the constructions of US nuclear identity to demonstrate that the mutually-constitutive relationship between identity and policy was not unique to the Soviet Union. As such, the Cold War could be understood as not just the battle of material capabilities, but a battle of identities. Future research could focus on fleshing this comparison out and focusing more on the US side. The Americans also reduced their nuclear arsenals in the 1980s and it would be useful to carefully study their identity constructions in terms of the degree of Otherness, the multiplicity of Others, and spatial, temporal, and ethical constructions of identity and difference. Furthermore, a poststructuralist approach can be adopted to study the Putin-Trump dynamic now and its consequences for the possibility of future disarmament or potential further armament.

Finally, this thesis emphasised that because identity constructions matter, change in nuclear politics is possible and pursuing it is worthwhile. Even the constructions of hegemonic masculinity in a totalitarian state such as the USSR were not monolithic and changed over time with consequences for policy. Important shifts in the meanings assigned to capabilities such as nuclear weapons can occur. As such, future poststructuralist and feminist IR studies could focus on ways of reconceptualising these meanings and advocating for the acceptance of a non-nuclear identity.
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