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Authoritarianism reconstituted: ‘hollow statism’ and the crackdown on Islamic movements in Sisi’s Egypt

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I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

Neil Russell
Abstract

This dissertation analyses state-society relations in Egypt, focusing on Islamic movements and their social and religious service provision, as a lens to track changes in the form of authoritarianism deployed under the Sisi regime. Theories of ‘authoritarian upgrading’ posit that since the 1970s, economic readjustments and reduced levels of state welfare led to the encouragement of non-state – often Islamic - actors to perform these functions to ease the burden on the state. Despite allowing degrees of social and political liberalisation, Middle East regimes maintained their hold on power by using ‘indirect’ bureaucratic measures to ensure these actors did not pose a political threat. This dissertation identifies a shift in this form of control through a revival of more ‘direct’ statism, in which a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood – and Islamic movements more broadly – signalled a reorganisation of state-society relations that reconstituted authoritarianism in a structure I call ‘hollow statism’.

It shows that during the transitional period of 2011 – 2013, Islamic movements coordinated ‘self-organizational’ activities such as social welfare services, with ‘public sphere’ activities like mosque preaching, to further the Islamist cause during electoral cycles. Since the 2013 coup, the revival of statism has limited the prevalence of social and religious service provision by Islamic movements, either through nationalisation or an extension of the state’s institutional apparatus. These changes indicate that the political risks of ‘authoritarian upgrading’ had become too high, with new arrangements being put in place to reduce the reliance on private actors in service provision, and re-establish the state as the predominant actor in their place. The reorganisation of these relations between the state and Islamic movements indicates a more comprehensive form of direct state control as part of its reconstituted authoritarian regime, with echoes of the statism of the Nasser era. However, insufficient state capacity has meant Sisi’s regime has failed to achieve the desired levels of
predominance for the state. By engaging critically with the intersection of the empirical practices and production of discourses that help sustain authoritarian rule, this dissertation develops the concept of ‘hollow statism’, to show how the Egyptian state compensates for its incomplete implementation of controls over Islamic institutions, by continuing to project the attainment of these goals discursively through public pronouncements.

Based on a systematic review of open-source data including mainly Arabic-language newspapers and websites, data from Islamic associations’ web pages, statements and publications, with further data gathered from government ministries’ websites, this dissertation details the expansion of the activities of Islamic movements during the transitional period, and how the state curtailed these movements after 2013 by expanding its own infrastructure and denying them autonomous space to operate. This dissertation demonstrates how the Arab Uprisings created a juncture which has broken down existing theories relating to the role of non-state service provision in sustaining authoritarian rule. By investigating changing patterns of state-society relations between Islamic movements and the state, it contributes to our understanding of Islamic movement behaviour and dynamics during periods of transition, and also to explore the wider implications of these changes for theories of authoritarian adaptation after nascent democratization, applicable to other cases in the Middle East but also to studies of authoritarian regimes more broadly.
Lay summary

This dissertation analyses changes in the Egyptian state’s relations with Islamic movements since 2011, and what these changes have meant for the structure of its authoritarian regime under the Sisi presidency. It shows that revolutionary upheaval and the initiation of a democratic process enabled the expansion of the Islamic movement’s social and religious institutions. Additionally, the more open environment allowed them to engage in a level of discursive openness in their political activism that was not permitted under the previous authoritarian regime of Mubarak. However, with the resumption of authoritarianism in 2013 under Sisi, the state has countered these gains through a crackdown on the Islamic movement’s social and religious institutions. This strategy has entailed an increase in the state’s infrastructure in these areas, whereby its own institutions take up the space where these forms of civil society operate. The reorganisation of these relations between the state and Islamic movements indicates a more comprehensive form of direct state control as part of a reconstituted authoritarian regime, in a form termed ‘hollow statism’.

As an interdisciplinary work, this dissertation draws on political science, sociology, and Middle East Studies. In doing so, it engages literatures on Islamism, social movement theory, state-society relations, and authoritarianism. It is based on a systematic review of open-source data including mainly Arabic-language newspapers and websites, data from Islamic associations’ web pages, statements and publications, with further data gathered from government ministries’ websites. A key purpose of this investigation of changing patterns of state-society relations between Islamic movements and the state is to contribute to our understanding of Islamic movement behaviour and dynamics during periods of transition, and also to explore the wider implications of these changes for theories of authoritarian
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Abbreviations

AS        Ansar al-Sunna
DS        al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya
FJP       Freedom and Justice Party
GFNGOs    General Federation of NGOs
GS        al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya
IMF       International Monetary Fund
ISI       International financial institution
ILBRR     Legitimate Islamic Body of Rights and Reformation
NDP       National Democratic Party
NGO       Non-governmental organisation
SCAF      Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SSI       State Security Investigations

Currencies

EGY       Egyptian Pounds
GBP       Great Britain Pound
USD       United States Dollars
Note on transliteration

This dissertation follows the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*’ (IJMES) translation and transliteration guidelines. Diacritical marks and italics are used for transliterations in the references and within the text where appropriate, with the exceptions of proper names, places, and organisations, as well as certain common words considered exceptions to these transliteration guidelines found in IJMES’ word list (e.g. shari’a, shaykh, zakat). For transliterated personal names, I have chosen a single standard spelling (e.g. Muhammad). In instances where the same name is spelt differently, such as when taken from an English source, I use the more common transliteration or spelling from the original source (e.g. Mohamed ElBaradei, Mohamed Morsi). Where I deviate from the IJMES guide is in certain transliterations of the letter j or jīm, which is pronounced with a hard g in Egyptian colloquial Arabic. Therefore, I use g for personal names such as Gamal Abdel Nasser as opposed to Jamal, and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya rather than al-Jam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya. In cases where the word contains jīm but is not used in an Egypt-specific context, or referred to in a general way, then its normal use in standard Arabic is adopted, e.g. jam‘iyya.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research problem and questions

On 3 July, 2013, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, was deposed in a military coup. Over the following months the regime, de facto led by the-then Minister of Defence, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, undertook a series of measures aimed at eradicating the Islamist movement as a social and political force. Targeting its ability to function as an organisation, thousands of Brotherhood members were arrested as the Egyptian authorities banned the group and froze their assets.\(^1\) The source of its social base, meanwhile, was identified as stemming from the charitable and welfare services provided by a host of Islamic associations, or jam’iyyat, linked to the Brotherhood. As a result, in December 2013 the regime seized the assets of 1,055 Islamic associations with alleged Brotherhood ties, under the premise that they were being exploited as a means of generating political support.\(^2\) However, beyond targeting social institutions affiliated with the Brotherhood, the process was extended to include other Islamic associations and their institutions, such as social welfare charities, preacher-training institutes, and mosques, many without clear links to the banned organisation.

It may have seemed inevitable that the crackdown was extended beyond the Brotherhood as a political force to include social institutions, as the large-scale provision of

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social services by Islamic associations has been cited as an important factor in generating political support for Islamist parties. At the same time, however, it also appears counterintuitive, as Islamic associations may actually have contributed to regime stability by easing the burden on the state as it drew back on its own levels of service-provision. For example, Islamic associations have played an increasingly prominent role in welfare provision, particularly as the Egyptian state reduced its welfare function during periods of economic adjustment since the 1970s, and over subsequent decades. It has been argued that Arab regimes were able to avoid social decay by facilitating the growth of private charities and NGOs, particularly Islamic ones, to ease the burden upon their shrinking resources.

Rather than these new private institutions becoming potential sites of opposition, theories of ‘authoritarian upgrading’ posit that in fact these changes represented ‘controlled liberalization’, whereby administrative and bureaucratic regulation meant these groups could be controlled in an ‘indirect’ form.

The nature of the crackdown, however, which included the closure or assimilation into the state of more than a thousand Islamic associations, suggests a change in the method of authoritarian control. Although Islamic associations have been subject to periodic waves of suppression previously, the scale and breadth of the campaign under Sisi has been more comprehensive, targeting social and religious institutions simultaneously. This indicates that the pattern of control is moving away from an indirect form, in which the state accommodates Islamic associations who provide services while using bureaucratic measures to ensure they remain apolitical, to a more direct form of control, by limiting their prevalence and attempting to extend the state’s own institutional apparatus in their place. More broadly, these

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4 Steven Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’, Brookings Institution; Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 2007; Sean L. Yom, ‘Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World’, The Middle East Review of International Affairs 9, no. 4 (December 2005).
changes invite us to consider what this method of control vis-à-vis Islamic associations and their institutions means for the authoritarian regime being formed under President Sisi. The reorganisation of these relations between the state and Islamic associations may actually go beyond a mere resumption of the authoritarian order under Mubarak, to a more comprehensive form of direct state control with similarities to the statism of the Nasser era. It appears, therefore, that Sisi is ‘bringing the state back in’ as part of his reconstituted authoritarian regime.5

From the puzzle identified above this dissertation will answer the following main research question: How have state-society relations between the Egyptian state and Islamic associations changed since 2011 and what are the implications for the structure of Egypt's authoritarian regime under Sisi? This question has two clauses to enable an analysis of the crackdown itself, but also its significance for understanding Egypt’s authoritarian state under Sisi and how it differs from that of his predecessors in its management of the state’s relations with Islamic actors. To answer this question, it is necessary to pose a number of subsidiary questions that are addressed within individual chapters. The subsidiary questions are formulated to address the two main temporal periods addressed in the core chapters, first, the transitional period between the fall of Mubarak in 2011 until the deposal of Morsi in 2013, and second, the resumption of authoritarianism under Sisi from 2013 and beyond. The first sub-question relates to the transitional period: What changes occurred among Egypt’s Islamic associations during the transitional period between 2011 and 2013 and how can this help explain the crackdown under Sisi? To understand the form and scope of the 2013 crackdown and its aftermath, it will be crucial to first of all analyse the transitional period to discover why certain Islamic actors were viewed as such as threat, which went beyond the confines of

5 This phrase is borrowed from the book, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
the Brotherhood/FJP as an organisation, to include social and religious institutions. To answer this question a historical chapter is provided which details relations between the state and religion during the republican period from Nasser to Mubarak. Three core chapters then detail how these relations were contested and revised during the transitional period. Further subsidiary questions are developed to consider the crackdown from 2013 onwards. In what ways has the method of control over Islamic associations and their institutions changed under the Sisi regime? To what extent do they represent a change in the structure of authoritarian rule under Sisi? The first of the two questions invites an empirical contribution in the documentation of the scope and form of this crackdown, in which two chapters analyse the state’s targeting of social and religious institutions respectively. The second question aims to provide the main conceptual contribution relating to the form of authoritarianism being fostered under Sisi, for which the historical chapter and core chapters on the transitional period provide a basis for comparison. By tracking the ways in which the roles of Islamic associations and the state in the religious sphere have changed under Sisi, this can be used to identify areas which correspond with previous cycles of repression, as well as how they differ. This will be reflected on further in the conclusion, and the conceptualisation of ‘hollow statism’ which this dissertation offers.

1.2 Outline of main argument

The transitional period initiated by the deposal of Mubarak in 2011 presented a ‘political opportunity structure’ that allowed for the expansion of social and religious institutions affiliated with Islamic associations, the latest in a cycle of expansions, yet one that differed from those under previous regimes. The decline of the state’s capacity to control civil society
organisations during the transitional period meant that the growth of Islamic associations was much greater during this vacuum of state power than during the period of state-controlled accommodation. This meant that not only were Islamic associations able to expand their activities unilaterally without relative levels of state oversight, including social welfare provision during acute shortages in areas previously shut off to Islamic associations, but they were even able to contest the state’s control over associations seized under Mubarak, and also religious institutions such as preacher training institutes and mosques. Therefore, the balance of power in relations between the state and Islamic associations was being reorganised in favour of the latter in a flourishing of Islamic associational activity. A movement, which already enjoyed relative amounts of autonomy vis-à-vis the state in terms of its sources of organisation and financing, was able to extend this even further. The opportunities afforded during this period were not related only to expansion of social services. The pluralization of party politics and a less restrictive period generally for civil society meant that these activities could be exercised more overtly in the service of supporting the Islamist cause at the ballot box. The social capital gained via social movement activity and welfare provision came to be leveraged for political gain. This was performed directly by groups with political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, whose distinction between movement and party became increasingly blurred as widespread social service projects were launched during electoral cycles.

Prominent Islamic associations without political parties also performed a similar role, mobilizing their resources during elections. Most notably Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, two of Egypt’s largest Islamic associations in terms of networks and breadth of activity, who had who decided against formal political institutionalisation, effectively transitioned into political interest groups lobbying on behalf of their Islamist brethren. Even after electoral success, this utilisation of the resources of Islamic associations continued to be
exercised in the service of the Islamist-led government of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). During its brief one-year tenure, the boundaries between movement and party became even more porous, while electioneering utilising the Brotherhood’s social apparatus continued incessantly. In addition, the delivery of governmental services also overlapped with the movement, being attributed directly to a Brotherhood/FJP nexus, rather than as part of the state itself. As a result of this political opportunity structure during the transitional period, Islamic associations were able to combine what David Lewis calls the ‘self-organizational’ side of civil society, meaning the provision of services, with ‘public sphere’ activities’, referring to the production of autonomous discourses that may challenge the political order. As Lewis notes, it is when movements combine these dual aspects of civil society that they become particularly threatening to authoritarian regimes. The combining of these two aspects was developed during the transitional period to a degree which had not been possible under previous regimes.

The gains that Islamic associations were able to make in the period of expansion after 2011 partly indicate why they would become targeted to such an extent by the state under Sisi. As the political landscape changed after the coup, the task of undoing those gains became more pertinent for reconstituting the authoritarian order, and even extending it. The crackdown on Islamic social and religious institutions initiated in 2013 adopted distinct strategies to address the dual-aspect of civil society identified above. For the ‘self-organizational’ aspect of Islamic associations, which I identify as their social institutions of service provision, the state has attempted to ‘corporatise’ Islamic associations by deploying the ‘intermediary’ body of the General Federation of NGOs to undertake audits, leading to restrictions on the selection of leaders and sources of finance. Additionally, the Egyptian

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authorities have undertaken a process of nationalisation, with associations and their resources being subsumed into state ministries such as health and education. In a move to restrict access to an autonomous source of financing, new state institutions – Bayt al-Zakat and Tahya Masr - have been created for the collection and distribution of Islamic charity such as zakat. Rather than continuing to rely on private actors such as Islamic associations to ease the burden on the state by providing welfare services, the state under Sisi has launched several welfare schemes, echoing the ‘populism’ of the Nasser period and establishing the state as the primary benefactor of Egypt’s poor. The projects have been aided by changes in the norms of international financial institutions surrounding state provisions of welfare, even if neo-liberalism remains the predominant driver of its economic development. The increased controls over the organisation and financing of Islamic associations, with new state institutions to control religious charity, alongside a renewed emphasis on the state’s own provision of welfare that would seem to mitigate the effects of the crackdown on Islamic associations, indicate a more statist direction of the Egyptian authoritarianism under Sisi.

An increased role for the state can also be identified in the crackdown on the ‘public sphere’ or discursive space occupied by Islamic associations. As with the crackdown on social institutions, the statist logic has been used to prevent the existence of autonomous spaces for civil society by expanding the state’s own infrastructure. This three-pronged strategy applies not only to institutional control, but also discourse. The first target is the mosque, a key site for Islamic associations that allows for the ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities to be combined, in that it is a multipurpose site from which mobilization, learning, and worship can take place. A process of nationalisation has been initiated to transfer control of these physical sites from private to public hands. The second part of the state’s strategy has been to outlaw the provision of preaching and sermons by preachers without certification from state-sanctioned institutes, with only state-certified
preachers being allowed to deliver sermons. To further distance Islamic charities from these platforms, the licences of preacher-training institutes have been revoked (though in many cases, they continued to operate), to be replaced by the state’s own institutes. Finally, the three main official religious institutions – al-Azhar, Dar al-Ifta, and the Ministry of Awaf - have been utilised to promote a discourse of ‘official’ and ‘moderate’ Islam, legitimising regime policies, and standardising the topic and texts of Friday sermons in the country’s mosques. By doing so, the state appears to be trying to position these official institutions as ‘the sole interpreters of religious doctrine’. Taken together, these measures aim to extinguish any source of private and organised religious activism, controlling not only religious sites as physical institutes, but also the discourses transmitted within them.

Although the control mechanisms were in place under Mubarak, Islamic associations were managed in a more ‘indirect’ way and were even encouraged in order to play a stabilising role vis-à-vis a state undergoing economic restructuring. This process, which forms the basis of the ‘authoritarian upgrading’ theory, meant that the state was simultaneously retracting from its service functions whilst encouraging non-state actors to fill the void. The reverse of this logic, I argue, has been implemented in Egypt since 2013. To minimise the political risks incurred by allowing a substantial Islamic movement to provide social and religious services, Egypt’s authoritarian state under Sisi curtails the autonomy of that movement and even directly manages it, which necessitates moves to increase what Michael Mann calls ‘infrastructural power’, through institutions in the areas of social and religious service provision. These measures go beyond a mere resumption of the

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authoritarian order in place under Mubarak, and suggest a renewed emphasis on statism in Sisi’s authoritarian state.

The strategy of the crackdown on both Islamic social and religious institutions shares direct similarities with the Egyptian republic overseen by Nasser. The use of corporatism and nationalisation, and the attempt to dominate civil society by expanding the state’s own infrastructural apparatus in both welfare provision and religious bureaucracy suggest a return to Nasserist statism. However, questionable state capacity and availability of resources suggest that Nasserist levels of state domination are unlikely. Facing economic crisis, questions remain about the capacity of the Egyptian state to reach such levels of domination over civil society through state expansion. For the increase in some centralised welfare projects under Sisi have occurred simultaneously to the reduction in much relied upon subsidies, meaning the net effect may actually be quite modest. The response to the conundrum faced by Egypt’s authoritarian regime under Sisi has been to adapt with a form of hybridity that increases state control over society, with semblances of welfarism from the Nasser years, while essentially maintaining the neoliberal political economy inherited from his predecessors. Khalil and Dill conceptualise this hybrid regime under Sisi as ‘statist neoliberalism’, which sees austerity measures undertaken simultaneously to major development and welfare projects. In this dissertation, the Sisi regime’s crackdown on Islamic associations demonstrates how a seemingly contradictory hybrid of ‘statist neoliberalism’ can also be identified in terms of the structure of its authoritarian regime.

This dissertation conceptualises this authoritarian structure as ‘hollow statism’. Rutherford has argued that the statist ideology that had underpinned the Nasser regime was abandoned under Sadat and, subsequently, Mubarak. In this dissertation I argue that, under

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Sisi, the ideology of statism has been rejuvenated, particularly in the state’s attempts to counter the threat of the Islamic movement. However, as will be shown, the regime’s efforts to implement a statist domination of the social and religious institutions associated with Islamic movements has only been partially fulfilled. The extent to which this ideology has developed in praxis is limited. An increase in statist controls can be observed in the state’s attempts to dominate Islamic social and religious institutions. Despite the inability to fully realise these goals, the state’s rhetoric has maintained this statist guise, insisting on outright domination. Therefore, a distinction can be made between statism in practice, and statism as a rhetorical, discursive device. As a result, I conceptualise this form of authoritarianism as ‘hollow statism’, in that the infrastructural scaffolding of this statist project has indeed been initiated, but its foundations remain weak and not fully realised, rendering it ‘hollow’.

Statism as an ideology unmatched by its praxis.

Hollow statism has three defining characteristics. First, there is a discursive dimension, where a state projects its ideology as comprising centralised control of the state over the levers of the social and economic realms. In the Egyptian case, this is evidenced through a reinvigoration of ‘dawlatiyya’, or statism, in the public discourse, where the state is viewed as the saviour and solution to all the country’s problems. Akin to an ideology, the state disseminates this discourse by declaring complete control over entire sectors. The incorporation of direct state controls over Islamic associations and social service provision is buttressed by changing norms among international financial institutions over the role of the state in economic development. Further declarations proclaim total control over private religious institutions, such as mosques and preaching. The second characteristic is some evidence of the practical implementation of this statist ideology. Hollow statism is not merely a rhetorical device aiming at projecting power and obedience to the state but represents at least some attempt at institutional expansion. In the Egyptian case the statist ideology is
evident in practice through the assumption of direct controls over many Islamic associations, and the creation of new state institutions in areas such as zakat collection and preacher training.

The third characteristic represents the contradictory aspects of this type of authoritarianism which refers to the inability of the practice of statism to match its discursive dimensions. Here a gap can be identified between the discursive dimension and the state’s declarations of its statist achievements, and the extent to which this can be identified in practice. This occurs when an adapted authoritarian regime reasons that a statist expansion is necessary, yet lacks the means or capacity to fully implement these goals. Under Sisi, this is evident through the limited extent to which Bayt al-Zakat has been able to extract zakat donations from society, the incomplete attempt to control all of Egypt’s mosques, and the continuation of private preacher training institutes, despite public declarations regarding the revocation of their licences. So, while the reconstituted regime under Sisi may seek to increase its ‘infrastructural power’ in order to control Egypt’s Islamic movement, and reduce its reliance on private actors to provide services, at the same time, a lack of capacity may mean that an overt policy of ‘infrastructural’ expansion may in fact be incomplete, or ‘hollow’, instead underpinned by increasing displays of ‘despotic’ and repressive power. However, the discursive dimension may still project some obedience and worship of the greatness of the state. Increased direct state controls in social and religious service provision may cultivate increased levels of dependence and obedience. Moreover, it also appears to be an effective means of disrupting civil society networks that may pose a threat to the state. On the face of it, therefore, hollow statism does appear relatively strong. However, its foundations are weak.
This dissertation critically examines the crackdown on the Islamic movement in Egypt and its impact on state-society relations, as a contribution towards understanding the reconstituted authoritarian regime under the Sisi presidency. It is an interdisciplinary work, that draws on political science, sociology, and Middle East Studies. In doing so, it engages literatures on Islamism, social movement theory, state-society relations, and authoritarianism, to offer four main contributions.

First, it raises questions about the previously held view that the state’s management of Islamic actors is ‘indirect’ in order for them to play a stabilising role as service providers, as part of the argument of ‘authoritarian upgrading’. Instead, I show a shift to a more ‘direct’ form of control, which attempts to expand the state’s ‘infrastructural power’ through institutions, to enhance its penetration of society by corporatising relations with the Islamic movement, while at the same time denying autonomous space for Islamic movements to operate.

Second, this finding adds to conceptualisations of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian regime under the Sisi presidency. Recent studies have pointed to the militarization of the state, leading to an ‘exclusionary’ and increasingly repressive regime, exemplified by the crackdown on the Brotherhood, in what can be understood as a demonstration of ‘despotic power’. An increase in statism has also been observed in relation to Egypt’s political economy since 2013, in a hybrid form called ‘statist neoliberalism’. This dissertation extends this observation in its conceptualisation, by detailing statism in the regime’s strategy for managing Islamic movements, demonstrating an attempt to develop ‘infrastructural power’
by expanding the state’s institutional presence in the religious sphere. This strategy sees an attempt to extend state control over social and religious institutions related to the Islamic movement. However, the Egyptian state lacks sufficient capacity to realise these aims, rendering its statism to be ‘hollow’. Therefore, I have conceptualised this form of reconstituted authoritarianism as ‘hollow statism’.

Third, this dissertation offers empirical contributions surrounding intra-Islamic dynamics during the transitional period. Empirically, it shows that, despite debates over the extent to which the 2011 uprising represented a ‘revolution’ in the classical sense, Islamic movements were, nevertheless, able to take advantage of the political opportunity structure to expand their social and religious activities, and even contest the state for control of institutions. It provides in-depth analysis of two important actors in Egypt’s Islamic movement, Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, who have been understudied compared with Salafi movements who formally entered politics. I show that they played a prominent role during the transitional period, engaging in political activism in support of Islamists during electoral cycles. The analysis of the FJP also focuses on an understudied aspect of their governance, focusing on their service delivery networks through specific ministries. This is an area which could be explored in more depth in future research.

Fourth, I offer a theoretical contribution to understand the relationship between Islamic movements’ social and religious institutions. I use David Lewis’ conception of the dualistic aspects of civil society between ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities and apply it to Islamic movements in two ways. First, to make a distinction between social institutions related to welfare provision as being ‘self-organizational’, and religious institutions such as mosques as being ‘public sphere’ institutions. Second, I argue that these forms can combine through the ‘politicisation’ of ‘self-organizational’ activities, amplifying their benefit through ‘public sphere’ electioneering to support their electoral chances.
This dissertation provides a case study of an authoritarian regime’s strategy for adaptation in response to a significant threat to its foundation, necessitating a re-organisation of its relations with the religious sector. This is not a threat unique to the Egyptian case, and therefore there is much scope for expanding this analysis in future research to incorporate both other cases in the region, and Muslim-majority states more widely.

1.4 Defining terms

The terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘political Islam’ have been used by many scholars to understand how organised groups and movements have utilised Islamic symbols to meet political ends.\(^\text{10}\) In general terms, they refer to the idea that Islam provides a framework for the structure of politics and the state.\(^\text{11}\) The implementation of an ‘Islamic state’, therefore, is said to be ‘the central focus for Islamist energies’, which derive from a ‘preoccupation with capturing the state in order to change society’.\(^\text{12}\) The problem with this formulation is that it presupposes a state-centric path to Islamization, without incorporating the concurrent social activism that aims to change society from below. As Hirschkind highlights, the host of activities that comprise Islamic activism stretch beyond ‘Islamism’, ‘political Islam’, and trying to ‘capture the state’:

The vast majority of these movements involve preaching and other da 'wa (missionary) activities, alms-giving, providing medical care, mosque building, publishing and


\(^{11}\text{Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), ix.}\)

\(^{12}\text{Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 9.}\)
generally promoting what is considered in the society to be public virtue through community action.\textsuperscript{13}

Notice the citation of the Quranic concept of \textit{da’wa}, which has developed beyond its traditional meaning as the “call” to God and proselytization, to incorporate the idea of “activating” Islam through deed in all spheres of life.\textsuperscript{14} Janine Clark describes the redefinition as an attempt to create a ‘seamless web between religion, politics, and charity and all forms of activism’.\textsuperscript{15}

At the centre of this web are Islamic \textit{jam’iyyat}, or associations, which have been referred to using broader terms such ‘Islamic social institutions’\textsuperscript{16} or the ‘Islamic charitable sector’\textsuperscript{17} to reflect the diversity of their activities. The primary focus of this dissertation is on Islamic associations which are viewed as components of a wider movement. I use ‘Islamic movement’ as an umbrella term to refer to the wide and diverse range of activities engaged in by actors seeking to increase the presence of Islam in public life, whether that be on a social or political level, or indeed, via formal religious discourse such as through sermons. ‘Islamic associations’ are referred to as a specific form of social institution, engaged in the provision of a range of services, including charity, health, and education, that may or may not have direct links or affiliation with Islamist political parties (I clarify my understanding of the distinction between ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist’ in the next paragraph). Islamic associations are registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. They range from small, independent associations operating from a single site, such as a

\textsuperscript{14} Janine A. Clark, \textit{Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen} (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 14.
\textsuperscript{15} Clark, 14.
\textsuperscript{16} Clark, 2.
mosque, to nationally-networked associations without political affiliation and with branches across the country, such as Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya. A third category is determined by either formal or informal affiliation to an Islamist movement with a political wing, like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis of al-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya. Organisatonally, associations in this category can either be confined to a single site, in which Islamist movement members either work or volunteer, or be nationally-networked, such as the Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Medical Association, and its network of hospitals.

In addition, I use the term ‘religious institutions’ to refer to institutions engaged in the dissemination of religious discourse, whether that be through religious instruction, mosques, preaching, or preacher training institutes. Where appropriate, I make a specific distinction between private religious institutions associated with Islamic associations, and official religious institutions, referring to mosques and training institutes directly affiliated with the state, specifically, the three main official religious institutions overseeing them: the Ministry of Awqaf, al-Azhar, and Dar al-Ifta.

Also requiring clarification is the issue of whether an actor or movement should be considered ‘Islamic’ or ‘Islamist’. One approach is to refer to activism as ‘Islamist’ only when it is carried out by actors specifically seeking to further goals in the formal political realm. This has the benefit of providing a relatively easy process of categorisation. However, as discussed in the next section, there is also the issue that apolitical ‘Islamic’ activism may nevertheless positively contribute to the support of ‘Islamists’ in the political realm. To strike a balance, I make reference to Egypt’s Islamic movement as a catch-all umbrella term to denote the diverse range of activities these actors are involved in, whether they be ‘quietist’ Salafi scholarly networks, charitable institutions providing welfare services to the poor, or the mobilization of Brotherhood members seeking to promote their respective political parties during electoral cycles. Islamist parties have varying ties to networks of charitable
institutions who provide social welfare services, among other activities, such as collecting religious alms, building mosques, and establishing Islamic educational institutions and publishing houses. But only when referring to an actor specifically agitating in support of a formal political process do I use the term Islamist to denote that act.

Although I follow the conception of Islamic movements defined above, I make a further conceptual distinction in order to understand the patterns of repression of Egypt’s Islamic movement under Sisi. Introduced above, David Lewis adopts Iris Young’s ‘dualistic’ approach to civil society. This framework views civil society as comprising two types of association. First, those with ‘self-organization’, which are permitted by regimes, enjoy relatively autonomous decision-making processes, and which deliver services that state is unable or unwilling to provide, such as social services. Second are those which contribute to the ‘public sphere’, providing a space through which non-official discourses can be developed that may pose a threat to the political order, including political advocacy or human rights groups. Lewis suggests that authoritarian regimes follow a dual policy in ‘promoting non-governmental associations engaged in some measure of self-organization and service delivery, while restricting those engaged in public sphere discursive activities’.

Of the greatest concern to authoritarian regimes, he argues, is when self-organization is combined with the development of independent discourses that may challenge the official narrative of the state. In this dissertation, I apply Lewis’ distinction to Islamic movements in two ways.

First, as a way of distinguishing their social and religious activities, separated into ‘self-organization’, or social institutions, which provide services such as health and education, and ‘public sphere’, or religious institutions, concerned with religious discourse,

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19 Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’.
20 Lewis, 331.
21 Lewis, 332.
22 Lewis, 333.
such as preaching and controlling mosques. Islamic associations, by providing welfare services and also training and staffing independent mosques, combine the very ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ aspects of civil society that Lewis identifies as being particularly threatening to authoritarian regimes. The second way I use this distinction is by understanding the circumstances in which both sides combine. Lewis argues that authoritarian regimes actively try to prevent ‘self-organizational’ being combined with counter-discourses that challenge the legitimacy of the state. I argue this to be the case during the more permissive environment of the transitional period, in which these social and religious activities were politicised in the service of Islamist causes during electoral cycles. I find this distinction particularly useful, as it provides a way to conceptually understand the relations between the social and religious aspects of Islamic movements, their perception as a threat by authoritarian regimes, and their management strategies for each area.

The next section will provide a review of the literature, surveying the different ways in which scholars have approached these issues, before elaborating on the research problem introduced above. After an explanation of this study’s methodology and outline, this problem will then be picked up again in chapter two, which will provide a comprehensive explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation.

1.5 Literature Review

Scholarly analysis of Islamic movements has undergone significant change in the past 30 years. In their 1990 book, *Islam, Politics and Social Movements*,23 Lapidus and Burke III

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recognised a rather limited ‘New Orientalist’ lens towards the study of Islamic movements, featuring an emphasis on culture, symbols and beliefs in an attempt to understand the mindset of these actors, and citing scholars such as Gellner, Kedourie, and Lewis. Instead, they advocated for a ‘New Social History’ approach, focusing on the sociological aspects of collective action. To capture the ongoing significance of these activities, Edmund Burke III suggested that scholars move beyond tracing the origins of Islamic movements alone, and place their emphasis on the dynamics of the movements and what activists ‘actually do’. As a result, there was a methodological shift in academic approaches to Islamic movements, which came to be treated as social movements in their own right. An empirical example is found with Ibrahim’s 1988 study of the ‘Islamic resurgence’ in Egypt in the 1980s, where he examines the ‘mode of organisation, strategy, and tactics’ found in ‘establishment Islam’, ‘Sufi Islam’, and ‘activist Islam’. Within ‘activist Islam’, he identifies a sub-category of apolitical Muslim Brotherhood members, who dedicate themselves to the task of setting up Islamic ‘service institutions’ providing medical clinics and schooling at a low cost in 20,000 private ahli mosques.

The focus on activism continued, with Wiktorowicz using the term ‘Islamic activism’ to denote ‘the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes’. This was intentionally broad to accommodate the wide and divergent range of activities which have their roots in Islamic symbols and identities. As with Lapidus and Burke III, Wiktorowicz was concerned with the focus on the ideology and goals of particular movements that focused on ‘religious fundamentalisms’ and the ideological foundations and religious orientations, which he felt

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26 Ibrahim, 641.
emphasised ‘the comparability of ideas rather than the mechanisms of activism’. Concerned that, as a result, the topic had been isolated from wider conceptual developments emerging from research on social movements in a western context, Wiktorowicz’s edited volume *Islamic Activism* sought to develop a shared research agenda by further integrating the study of Islamic movements with social movement theory approaches. I agree with applying social movement theory to Islamic movements, and draw on its concepts in my theoretical framework. Yet, I am also mindful that setting too rigid a border between the realm of ‘ideas’ and the ‘mechanisms of activism’ may downplay the extent to which they intersect. This may particularly be the case after a revolution and initiation of a transitional process, in which a revision of ideas can lead to change both organisationally and in terms of relations with the political process and the state.

The volume of scholarly work focusing on Islamic movements has gone hand in hand with their rapid proliferation in the Middle East since the 1970s. The origins of this ‘Islamic revival’ have been traced to ideological changes in the post-colonial Arab state. As a result of the perceived failures of Arab socialism and nationalism, coupled with Arab defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967, the ‘situation was ripe for a new ideological basis for socio-political mobilization to emerge’. According to this view, Islamic ideas subsequently provided the main source of political mobilization for the region, either in national liberation movements or political opposition parties. Hamas and Hezbollah in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon respectively, fought prolonged insurgencies against occupation, whilst partial pluralization of the political field in the 1980s saw Muslim Brotherhood-style movements contest for parliamentary seats in Egypt and other Arab Republics such as Tunisia, but also in monarchies like Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait. While 1967 can certainly be viewed as a

28 Wiktorowicz, 3.
critical juncture in modern Middle Eastern history, the view that Arab nationalism was somehow supplanted by Islamism can overlook its antecedents in 19th century Islamic modernism, with a clear enunciation of Arab nationalism – influenced by Islam - only emerging in the 1920s.\(^\text{31}\) The first modern Islamic association in Egypt, for example, was the Muslim Benevolent Society, formed in 1879.\(^\text{32}\) Moreover, two Islamic associations that feature prominently in this dissertation – al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya and Ansar al-Sunna – were established in 1912 and 1926 respectively, predating the Muslim Brotherhood’s 1928 formation. While the rise of Islamic movements in numerical terms certainly begins in the 1970s, their historical roots can be traced several decades earlier.

Although the decline of Arab nationalism certainly helps us to understand the resultant rise of Islamism as a political ideology at a particular juncture, it does not explain why Islamic movements came to feature so prominently in the social realm. In this regard, structural factors are more instructive for understanding the rise to prominence of Islamic movements engaging in a variety of social work, such as charity and service provision. It has been shown how Islamic welfare providers emerged as an alternative to state institutions in the latter decades of the 20th century for several reasons. In countries such as Algeria and Lebanon, the destructive aftermath of conflicts hammered these states’ capacities to provide services, leaving a void for Islamic activists to fill.\(^\text{33}\) Financial crises suffered by ‘populist’ welfare states such as Egypt also led to a retraction in the welfare functions of the state apparatus in an era of economic privatisation.\(^\text{34}\) Loans from the IMF to address Egypt’s

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budget deficit were tied to stipulations that the role of the state in social services be reduced, whilst encouraging NGOs, private companies and community groups to take on some of the burden.\textsuperscript{35} Political calculations have also played a role in allowing the growth of Islamic movements, which not only eased the welfare burden of the state, but also provided it with legitimisation for its policies and a counterweight to leftist opposition.\textsuperscript{36} This partial ceding of space to non-state actors, owing to a combination of political and economic factors, led to an explosion of thousands of civil society institutions, including secular NGOs and Islamic associations, across the region.\textsuperscript{37} This demonstrates the multitude of factors that has led to the social prominence of Islamic movements, but also indicates a complex and varied relationship with the state, whereby their presence may be either wilful or enforced. As Amy Singer has described, Islamic movements have historically been prominent actors in the ‘mixed economy of charity’, with the extent of their involvement in service provision fluctuating in more or less terms vis-à-vis the state and its own service apparatus across different periods.\textsuperscript{38} But what is the political significance of these fluctuations and how does it impact on Islamic movements’ relations with the state?

Explanations for the political significance of Islamic movements involved in service provision range from those who view it as a means of generating political support for Islamist parties and mobilizing opposition to the state, to those who contend that such service provision actually helps to maintain the socio-economic stability of authoritarian regimes. Several studies have indicated that the increased provision of the social welfare by Islamic movements enabled the accumulation of political support among their beneficiaries. In Saad

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\item[38] Dr Amy Singer, \textit{Charity in Islamic Societies}, 1 edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.177.
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Ibrahim’s article, mentioned above, describing how Islamic service institutions provide medical clinics and low-cost schooling, he argues, that as a result of their independence from the state and by presenting an alternative to its institutions, Islamic associations accumulate ‘substantial socio-economic muscle’. Other works have made a similar claim that in the absence of the state, Islamic groups generate political support by filling the void, thereby securing loyalty. Challand, for example, locates political support for Islamic NGOs active in charitable work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as being a result of their activities in poor communities. In Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan’s *The Charitable Crescent*, they state: ‘as is well known, the Islamist movements, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, have achieved their salience and popular support through blends of religious, political and welfarist activism.’ Intuitively, this argument has some merit, in that the provision of much-needed services *should*, presumably, enhance favourability among recipients towards the provider, whether they be state or non-state. Yet, until recently, this tended to be assumed rather than demonstrated through empirical studies.

Recent works have sought to scrutinise the causal link between welfare provision and political support for Islamists, with electoral victories for Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia post-2011 providing new opportunities for case study work. Cammett and Jones-Luong ask if there is an ‘Islamist political advantage’ over secular rivals due to welfare provision, organisational capacity, and ideology. On welfare, they find a lack of empirical data demonstrating Islamists provide superior services over their competitors. Moreover, they point out that most Islamic welfare providers are independent, community-based

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39 Ibrahim, ‘Egypt’s Islamic Activism in the 1980s’, 643.
43 Cammett and Jones-Luong, 193.
organisations, rather than being part of organised networks, and so the actual connections can be hard to demonstrate. The networked charities, therefore, can only rely on a core support, which would be a sizeable minority, but not enough to generate broad mass support at the ballot box.\textsuperscript{44} Instead, the authors argue that in fact the main political advantage for Islamists is a reputation for ‘good governance’. Direct recipients of their aid maybe represent a direct link of support of the type described above. However, ‘the reputational effect enables Islamists to amass popular support and make electoral gains beyond those segments of the population with which they have come into direct contact or enjoy ideological affinity’.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, specific Islamist parties may benefit from the social activism of ostensibly apolitical movements that comprise the wider Islamic movement as a whole.

A more comprehensive treatment of the issue is provided by Tarek Masoud’s book, \textit{Counting Islam}, which builds on the conceptual ground covered by Cammett and Luong-Jones. Focusing on Egypt, Masoud seeks to test whether a direct link can be made between a host of Islamist activity and the generation of electoral support. He questions the extent of links between Islamist parties and Islamic charities, and argues that the former actually try to ‘tap into’ existing networks of charity that are ‘largely independent of those parties’.\textsuperscript{46} To measure voter preferences, Masoud uses survey data to show that Egyptians tended to identify the Brotherhood’s FJP and the Salafi Nour party with left-leaning policies of redistribution and welfare, due to their overall perception of Islamic social activism.\textsuperscript{47} Rather than voting as a result of being actual beneficiaries of Islamic welfare provided by the Brotherhood, voters chose them due to the ‘perception’ that they were heavily involved in welfare, and viewed the role of the state in the economy as being redistributive.\textsuperscript{48} These ideas

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Cammett and Jones-Luong, 198.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Cammett and Jones-Luong, 199.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Tarek Masoud, \textit{Counting Islam: Religion, Class, And Elections In Egypt} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 38.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Masoud, 147.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Masoud, 152.
\end{itemize}
of ‘reputational benefits’ and ‘perception’ among welfare recipients are important conceptual contributions to the literature, supported by robust empirical evidence. It helps to understand how the Islamic and Islamist may overlap in ways not intended by the activists themselves. It may also explain in part why many Islamic associations targeted during the 2013 crackdown and beyond were without discernible Brotherhood or political links, for if the logic of authoritarian control changes, then independent Islamic associations as a whole may be viewed as unacceptable, even if their focus is socio-economic, rather than political.

However, there is also a limitation to the conceptual idea of ‘reputational benefits’, in that it assumes an overtly ‘political’ Islamist movement, set apart from a separate and ‘apolitical’ Islamic movement. Indeed, Steven Brooke has recently shown how the Brotherhood’s welfare provision became more overtly politicised after 2011. But, as this dissertation will show, a similar pattern can also be identified with regard to ostensibly apolitical Islamic associations that decided against formal political institutionalisation, yet nevertheless revised their idea of activism to include political advocacy in the political sphere. Therefore, while political Islamists may indeed profit electorally from ‘reputational benefits’, a more permissive political environment may also enable them to benefit from the political activism of Islamic associations who choose not to formally enter politics.

As I make clear above, the ‘political’ need not only mean a formal entry to political structures, such as forming political parties. But viewing the political significance of Islamic activism solely through the lens of formal political structures has its own limitations, particularly in the context of poorly performing authoritarian regimes. Eickelman and Piscatori posit that political engagement may also take the form of a ‘politics of silence’ by engaging with alternatives to state institutions, such as alternative banking institutions or

relying on Islamic private voluntary associations, which imply a disillusion with state institutions.\textsuperscript{50} Salwa Ismail has posed a similar question regarding state withdrawal from welfare provision and employment, asking whether ‘economic disengagement leads to political disengagement, and, ultimately, resistance’.\textsuperscript{51} Setting too rigid a boundary between the political and social sphere may also miss important ‘political’ aspects, even if the issue seems to be apolitical, or activists themselves claim this to be the case.\textsuperscript{52} Charles Hirschkind has argued that as part of nation building, states have undergone a process in which they have developed institutions to oversee and regulate the procedures relating to education, health, social welfare, and religion more generally. This overlaps with much of the social activism pursued by Islamic activists, which is therefore necessarily political, as it engages with the political domain through activities that are subject to the legal and administrative structures linked to the state.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, if world-making projects of Islamic activists are to be successful, they must engage with the institutions of modern governance, whether they aspire to state power or not. Again, if the state changes its view of non-state welfare provision, then Islamic associations engaging in those areas may no longer be viewed as acceptable, even if apolitical in nature. This dissertation will show that such a calculation has been underway in Egypt since 2013.

At the other end of the spectrum, on the political significance of Islamic movements engaged in service provision, is the idea that rather than threatening authoritarian regimes, they may contribute to their stability. Pioppi, for example, has shown how the Egyptian state under Sadat and Mubarak encouraged the ‘revitalization of religious charity’ to manage the

\textsuperscript{50} Eickelman and Piscatori, \textit{Muslim Politics}, 109.
\textsuperscript{51} Salwa Ismail, \textit{Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State} (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2006), xxi.
\textsuperscript{53} Hirschkind, ‘What Is Political Islam?’
‘state retreat’ from social functions.\textsuperscript{54} Amidst a dire socio-economic environment, these regimes were keen to avoid social unrest as a result of declining public provision of social services, and sought partners in the private sector to alleviate these concerns. As part of this regime strategy, the Ministry of Awqaf encouraged the development of the Islamic charitable sector, and the transformation of mosques into ‘welfare providers’, as long as they were ‘depoliticised’.\textsuperscript{55} Pioppi, therefore, argues that the retreat of the state can actually be a conscious strategy. As echoed by Steven Brooke, ‘amidst a fraying public sector, Islamist social service provision may actually serve to reduce those grievances that have historically spurred anti-regime mobilization’.\textsuperscript{56}

Paradoxically, Islamic activism may simultaneously present a political threat to authoritarian regimes through expanding networks and generating political support among the populace, as discussed earlier, whilst also easing the burden on the state’s own service providing apparatus. As a result, authoritarian regimes have simultaneously sought to reap the benefits of private actors providing services, while at the same time introducing measures to minimise their political risk. This fits into a wider literature on ‘authoritarian upgrading’, which has shown how partial liberalisations can be enacted without ceding too much political control. This literature was a response to a popular view that emerged in the 1990s that neoliberal economic reforms and the promotion of civil society would lead to democratization, as an extension of the ‘Third Wave’ of democracy around the world.\textsuperscript{57} Norton, for example, cited the rise of a thriving ‘Arab civil society’ leading to authoritarian

\textsuperscript{54} Pioppi, ‘Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy: The Revival of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) in Egypt’.
\textsuperscript{55} Pioppi.
\textsuperscript{56} Steven Brooke, ‘Assumptions and Agendas in the Study of Islamic Social Service Provision’, POMEPS Reports, Islam in a Changing Middle East, 15 October 2014.
rulers facing societal demands like never before.\textsuperscript{58} As a result, ‘associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen’.\textsuperscript{59} Increasingly, however, the levels of ‘liberalisation’ cited in studies such as Norton’s were called into question, with the facilitation of civil society organisations said to instead represent a ‘tactic of control’.\textsuperscript{60} Steven Heydemann argued that regimes adapt to changing economic circumstances by allowing space for civil society organisations to be established. To ensure they do not present a threat to the regime, a range of measures are implemented, such as the reform of laws governing NGOs, so that their capacity to regulate civil society groups is enhanced, and regimes maintain control despite partial liberalisation.\textsuperscript{61} Instead of presenting a political threat to the state, civil society organisations must overcome a web of legal restrictions on their activities, which may result in a dependent relationship with the state, easing the task of their monitoring by the security services.\textsuperscript{62}

Applied to specific Middle East states, the practice of authoritarian upgrading is examined by Wiktorowicz in an empirical case study of Islamic movements in Jordan.\textsuperscript{63} He shows that Islamic NGOs proliferated in the country during a period of apparent ‘political liberalization’ during the 1990s. The study poses the question of why, if this new organisational space is offered appearing to demonstrate ‘liberalization’, do some groups still eschew formal institutionalization and continue to use informal networks of mobilization instead.\textsuperscript{64} It is argued that the Jordanian state used formal organisation as a ‘mechanism of state control’ rather than as a genuine avenue for independent organisation and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{59} Norton, 7.
\bibitem{60} Yom, ‘Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World’, 23.
\bibitem{61} Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’.
\bibitem{62} Yom, ‘Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World’, 24.
\bibitem{64} Wiktorowicz, 2.
\end{thebibliography}
empowerment. As part of the bargain of being granted legal institutionalization, NGOs had to adhere to administrative techniques, including bureaucratic procedures and regulations, which were used to ensure these associations are not geared toward challenging the political status quo. Wiktorowicz’s conclusion is that moderate groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were encouraged to organise, while more confrontational elements, like Salafists, found this space closed to them. This is termed by Wiktorowicz ‘the management of collective action’, in which the state manipulates bureaucratic processes to ensure compliance to the state.

Authoritarian upgrading provides an important contribution to our understanding of the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East despite (partial) social, economic, and political liberalisations. But the fact that Islamic activism may simultaneously present a political threat as well as a social benefit to the regime calls into question whether this form of authoritarian rule would be sustainable in the long-term, the danger being that the level of risk may eventually become too great to maintain. In some cases, Islamic movements have been able to defy aspects of the authoritarian upgrading thesis, demonstrating degrees of agency and influence due in part to the state’s socio-economic reliance on them. Cammett and MacLean have argued that over the long-term, non-state provision of welfare may ultimately lead to not only the lessening of the state’s capacity to deliver social welfare itself, but also its ability to monitor and regulate the non-state actors who do so. This can be observed in the case of Syria, where Pierret and Selvik have shown how Islamic associations under Bashar al-Assad, despite becoming partners of the state in welfare provision, were able

65 Wiktorowicz, 3.
66 Wiktorowicz, 3.
to exact their own political influence from these arrangements. The authors show how the Damascene Zayd movement was financed by local entrepreneurs through zakat and voluntary donations. Social capital was accrued by donations from the ‘pious bourgeoisie’, following the direction of Muslim scholars over whom the state had limited control. For the Zayd, this large, popular and economic base meant that although it cooperated with the state, it lent it only passive support. The provision of social services in the Syrian case may have provided a stabilising effect socio-economically as desired by the state. But the maintenance of an independent source of popular support and financing meant the maintenance of an independent stance politically, and thus, a potential threat.

The fact that Islamic movements continue to present a political threat to authoritarian regimes, despite easing the burden on the state’s welfare apparatus, begs the question as to the regime’s response if the costs of that threat are deemed to be too high. Again, in another study on the Syrian case, Pierret shows how the Ba’athist regime had from its inception in 1963, maintained a policy of ‘indirect rule’ in the way it managed religion, allowing a degree of autonomy in the financing and organisation of Islamic schools and charities, as well as preacher-training institutes. At the same time, the state’s own religious institutions remained embryonic due to a lack of investment. This changed under the presidency of Bashar al-Assad, as from 2008, a series of reforms was initiated to increase the state’s control over religion and curb the autonomy of private Islamic institutions. The Ministry of Endowments’ budget enjoyed sharp increases, as the regime moved to nationalise key aspects of the Islamic movement, including schools and preacher-training institutes. These changes,

69 Pierret and Selvik, 598.
71 Pierret, 84.
Pierret argues, have meant a form of ‘direct rule’ through the expansion of the state’s own infrastructure to provide a greater level of control, without the political risk of tolerating independent Islamic movements. In conceptualising the move to ‘direct rule’, Pierret draws on the work of Michael Mann, arguing that authoritarian regimes may increasingly look to develop their ‘infrastructural power’ as a means of penetrating and controlling civil society. This indicates that when the political risk of authoritarian upgrading strategies become too great for authoritarian regimes, Middle East states may seek to deny autonomous spaces for civil society to operate by expanding its own institutional infrastructure.

The context of the 2011 Arab Spring and the societal challenge it posed to authoritarian regimes further indicates that the political risks of ‘indirect’ control became too great. Robbins and Rubin have detailed an emerging trend in the Middle East where states have used ‘official Islam’ to ‘counter religious challenges’. Citing Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt, they argue that to control public space and legitimise their rule, these states have ‘allocated financial resources, political capital, and institutional power to elements of official Islam’. Further studies have focused specifically on the Egyptian case, again focusing on religious institutions such as mosques and preaching. Although there has been some focus on the crackdown on the social institutions of Egypt’s Islamic movement by Steven Brooke, there has yet, to my knowledge, been a detailed academic study of this.

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72 Pierret, 85.
74 Robbins and Rubin, 364.
76 Brooke, Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage; Steven Brooke, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s Social Outreach after the Egyptian Coup’, Working Paper, Project on US Relations
process and its implications for state-society relations in Egypt, nor an attempt to connect this process to that targeting religious institutions. This dissertation aims to redress this gap, arguing that the strategy of institutional power has served a dual and interconnected purpose, applied to both the social and religious institutions of Egypt’s Islamic movement.

1.6 Methodology

This dissertation is a response to a research problem identified in a specific case, Egypt, yet which speaks to wider theoretical debates on state-society relations and the adaptation of authoritarian regimes. As such, it is in part a single case study on Egyptian Islamic associations, their activities, and relations with Egypt's authoritarian state. However, in more abstract terms, it is also a case study of intra-Islamic dynamics during a period of transition, as well as how authoritarian regimes reconstitute themselves after a period of nascent democratization. Within social and political science, debates have circled around the merits of case studies for providing generalizable results that possess validity beyond the case in question. Due to the small number of cases under examination, there may be problems of representativeness when trying to understand the wider population of relevant cases. Case-study research provides a level of depth and insight into a particular topic or area of interest, which may be become more superficial if looking only at multiple cases as a means to understand a general theory. For example, what is being analysed may be a relatively recent phenomenon or be particularly complex and thus necessitate an in-depth examination of that


context itself.78 For ongoing processes, such as in Egypt, case studies can be the crucial first building blocks to understand new developments and theorise ‘what is happening’.79 This makes the case study a particularly useful approach for both ‘theory testing’ and ‘theory generation’ in light of new developments,80 which can then be applied to other cases, either in specific contexts or comparative work.

This study aims to respond to elements of both ‘theory testing’ and ‘theory generation’. On the one hand, it seeks to test existing theory by asking if authoritarian resilience is still based on a state-society balance where a regime encourages private actors to operate as service providers to ease the burden on its own resources. On the other hand, it seeks to contribute to the generation of theory by trying to conceptualise what these changes mean for state-society relations in an Egypt in which the state plays an expanded role as an actor in the social and religious sphere. Moreover, a reorganisation of welfare provision invites us to consider what this new phase may represent in light of previous phases such as ‘populism’ and ‘post-populism’. One of the criticisms of case study research is that its empirical base relies on a very small number of observations. However, this accusation is resisted by Gerring, who argues that a case study can generate multiple observations by looking at ‘within-case’ units either ‘diachronically’ over time, or ‘synchronously’ at a particular point in time.81 As a result, this study looks at the relations between Islamic associations and the state both synchronically during a particular phase (2011-2018) and diachronically over time during Egypt’s republican period. This will enable us to increase the number of observations and, consequently, the validity of the findings.

79 Yin, 5.
81 Gerring, 21.
Another issue highlighted by Gerring is that case studies suffer from problems of representativeness in trying to understand a wider phenomenon. As they only represent a single context within a wider population of cases, case studies cannot identify patterns and key variables that are relevant for a number of cases. However certain case studies, Gerring contends, overcome this limitation. For example, ‘typical’ cases can have a broad reach that can be particularly informative for a broad set of cases as they are ‘especially representative of the phenomenon under study’.\(^82\) Egypt is just such a case when it comes to Islamic associations and the state’s attempts to regulate and control them. Although there are several examples elsewhere in the region, studies of Islamic associations have been heavily concentrated in Egypt. Moreover, the legislation used by the Egyptian state to control civil society actors has been shown to be hugely influential elsewhere in other Arab countries. Egypt’s Law 32 of 1964, and its updated version Law 84 of 2002, resulted in a ‘diffusion of (shared) legal norms’ whereby states such as Jordan, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar adopted elements of these laws to limit the space of associational activism.\(^83\) Therefore, Egypt is a particularly valuable context for theory generation due to the potential influence it has for state-civil society relations elsewhere in the region and beyond. As a result, this study may serve as the basis for a future comparative exploration based on the findings presented here.

The initial intention for gathering data for this study was through an extended period of fieldwork in Egypt, to determine the fate of seized associations and its societal impact. However, during my first year of PhD study the University of Cambridge student Giulio Regeni was tragically abducted and murdered whilst in Cairo carrying out research. Due to these security concerns, my supervisors and I agreed that fieldwork would not be possible, and an alternative approach would be required. Although these limitations are not entirely

\(^82\) Gerring, 49.

\(^83\) Challand, ‘Comparative Perspective on the Growth and Legal Transformations of Arab (Islamic) Charities’, 299.
new in the context of the Middle East, they have been particularly acute in Egypt since 2013, and therefore pose a methodological challenge for scholars and the tools they use to study the country. However, this need not prevent us from addressing similar research questions, but reconsidering the data available and how it can be leveraged to provide inferences on the object under review. In a short workshop paper on new methods in the study of Islamism, Brooke stresses that although ‘the political and security climate has become hostile to the type of qualitative and ethnographic work that has long formed the backbone of Islamist studies’, the ‘rapid proliferation of publicly available data offers new opportunities to test and consolidate our existing understanding of Islamist politics’. With this in mind, the compromise I have settled on is a systematic review of text-based sources, mainly from Egyptian Arabic news outlets and websites. As well as news sources, I have also consulted the English and Arabic sites of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gamīyya al-Shar‘iyya, and user-generated data from social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Here I was able to gather speeches, statements, magazines, photographs and practical information about the structure of these organisations and relevant events during the period under focus. In addition, I have also gathered data from Egyptian government websites, including the breakdown on budget spending on individual ministries, Friday sermon texts, and announcements regarding new state institutions.

To gather the data, I followed a systematic process to cover editions of every source daily between February 2011 and December 2016, while less frequent searches were conducted between 2016 and 2018. For online searches I used key search terms in the online archives of newspapers that included the names of key actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwān), broader terms such as Islamic associations (jam‘īyyat), and the

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verbs used to denote the crackdown process, such as dissolve (*ḥal*).\(^{85}\) I also used Google Alerts on a daily basis from September 2015. Using terms such as these I was able to locate hundreds of articles detailing relevant events involving Islamic social and religious institutions. In the transitional period this included the formation of new institutions by Islamic associations and interviews with actors explaining how they had taken advantage of the new more open environment to extend their activities. After the coup, an abundance of material was available detailing the process of the crackdown, including locations, assets seized, the number of associations seized, and the state’s response in terms of their future management. Where this method is limited is in the verification of the data being gathered. For instance, if the Egyptian government announces that it has nationalised 50 Islamic associations or mosques, I was unable to physically attend these sites and verify how their operation has changed. To alleviate this concern, I have attempted as much as possible to cross-check these announcements across different sources, where interviews with concerned individuals are included.

Manual searches were conducted of the archive of *al-Ahram* newspapers at the British Library in London, whilst I also consulted the archives of Arabic newspapers at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel-Aviv University in Israel, which included *al-Masry al-Yawm, al-Dustour, Rose al-Yusuf*, and the Freedom and Justice Party’s official newspaper, *al-Hurriya wa al-Adala*. The two most frequently cited newspaper sources in the dissertation are the privately-owned newspapers, *al-Masry al-Yawm* (print and online) and *al-Yawm al-Saba’a* (online only), which represent the most widely available news sources and with the most advanced website archives. *Al-Masry al-Yawm* has one of the highest circulations of all Egypt’s print newspapers and is described by Reporters Without Borders as being

\(^{85}\) A full list of key terms used can be found in Appendix 1.
‘independent’ and ‘liberal’. It built a reputation as a critical voice during the 2011 Uprisings, acting as a counter to the misleading pro-regime reports characterising the protests as being supportive of Mubarak, or representing a huge ‘conspiracy’ against Egypt.

Although privately-owned, *al-Masry al-Yawm*’s businessmen owners include the vehemently anti-Brotherhood telecoms billionaire, Naguib Sawiris. The newspaper carried a decidedly critical stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood during the year of FJP governance and thereafter. Yet, this was much less than other private newspapers such as *Rose al-Yusuf*, which was much more vociferously against the group in its tone. For example, the standard description of the Brotherhood in *al-Masry al-Yawm* after 2013 was ‘the banned organisation’, whereas in *Rose al-Yusuf*, the adjective ‘terrorist’ is added as standard to make it “the banned terrorist organisation”. Despite this critical stance towards the Brotherhood, its otherwise independent reputation (from the regime), and comprehensive coverage of the crackdown process, make it a reliable and informative source.

On the other hand, *al-Yawm al-Saba’a* is a more controversial source. Its print version has a much lower circulation than *al-Masry al-Yawm*, but its impressive website is one of the most visited in Egypt. The ownership landscape of the Egyptian media under Sisi, however, has confused the distinction between private and public ownership being indicative of independence and editorial direction. *Al-Yawm al-Saba’a* is owned by the Egyptian Company for Press, Publication and Advertising, which itself is owned by the Egyptian Media Group, which belongs to Egyptian General Intelligence. Therefore, despite being formally private, *al-Yawm al-Saba’a*’s ownership is linked to the regime which is shown in its strong support for Sisi’s policies. Although not reflective of a ‘mouthpiece’ publication of the regime like

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state-owned newspapers such as *al-Ahram* and *al-Jumhuriyya, al-Yawm al-Saba’a* regularly publishes articles on events, official statements and announcements by the government and state ministries. But without investigating the actual events, *al-Yawm al-Saba’a* comprehensively reproduces the discourse of the regime on events, but often without actually investigating the events themselves. As a result, *al-Yawm al-Saba’a* provides some of the most comprehensive coverage of Sisi’s crackdown on Islamic social and religious institutions, particularly the state’s discourse on this process, but questions remain surrounding the evaluation of the claims being made.

As a result of the issues of reliability, the sources consulted and the claims being made must be approached with caution. Many of these news sources represent information communicated via the Egyptian government, and often repackaged as news articles uncritically. They therefore represent a claim made by the regime on its practices in the areas under observation here, which present a challenge in verification. Due to access restrictions, it was not possible to verify these reports in person. Therefore, efforts have been made to cross-check information wherever possible across sources, in order to provide an assessment of the veracity of the reports. In some instances, some level of verification is possible, such as in the public response of an affected actor. In these cases, it is therefore possible to state with some degree of confidence that the event has occurred in practice. In others, conflicting reports indicate that declarations from the regime, communicated via news outlets, have not actually been implemented on the ground, as is claimed. In these cases, therefore, a claim pertaining to disclose the occurrence of an event displaying a direct extension of state power, exists as a discursive device that gives the impression of a statist event having occurred, rather than in actuality. Therefore, within the sources there exists the need to decipher between praxis from discourse, what represents practice and what represents a discursive device. A discursive device gives the impression to the public of this statist project being
realised, when in reality, its implementation is only partial. This methodological distinction relates to part of the dissertation’s main argument of the regime’s reorganisation of state-society relations with Islamic associations as being indicative of ‘hollow statism’.

The approach adopted towards data gathering and analysis was informed by the method of process tracing, which provides ‘an in-depth within-case study method used…to gain a greater understanding of the causal dynamics that produced the outcome of a particular historical case’. Three main characteristics of process tracing are identified by Collier. Firstly, ‘causal-process observations’ that focus not only on outcomes and intervening variables, but the examination of ‘chains’ of causal mechanisms, the process through which an outcome comes to fruition. Bennett explains how the method of analysis in ‘process tracing’ moves ‘backward from observed outcomes to potential causes - as well as forward from hypothesized causes to subsequent outcomes’. This allows the researcher to identify the ‘intermediate causes’ involved between hypothesized causes and their effects. For example, in this dissertation, these ‘chains’ were examined in detail during the transitional period as a means of understanding part of the motivation for targeting the Islamic movement as a whole during the crackdown. The second factor identified by Collier is description: ‘Process tracing inherently analyses trajectories of change and causation, but the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described’.

Providing as empirically detailed an explanation as possible of the period under review has been provided to substantiate the theoretical validity of my findings. Finally, sequencing, whereby process tracing gives close attention to sequences of independent, dependent, and

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intervening variables: ‘As a tool of causal inference, process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events or situations over time...the descriptive component of process tracing begins not with observing change or sequence, but rather with taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments.’\(^\text{93}\) In my approach I have therefore sought to understand a particular causal outcome – the crackdown on Islamic associations and their social and religious institutions – by tracing changes in the relations between them and the state, first historically, and then during a key critical juncture – the transitional period. I have done this systematically utilising the available sources for each day during this period, as a means of providing a rich description and identifying the key events and changes which led to this causal outcome.

1.7 Outline of dissertation

The remaining chapters of this dissertation comprise a theoretical framework, a historical chapter, three chapters focusing on the transitional period between 2011 and 2013, two chapters on the Sisi period from 2013 onwards, ending with a conclusion chapter.

Chapter two provides a framework that lays out the theoretical underpinnings for each of the chapters that follow. It explains the change in state-society relations in Egypt from ‘statist’ to ‘societal’ corporatism, in which the ‘unincorporated’ Islamic movement emerged. Conceptualisations of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian regime are then provided, with a six-part strategy in extending state controls over Islamic social and religious institutions being outlined. An explanation of This statist strategy focuses on the development of ‘infrastructural power’ through the state’s own institutions. However, issues of state capacity

\(^{93}\) Collier, 823.
limit the extent to which such regimes can dominate civil society, leading to the conceptualisation of ‘hollow statism’. Social movement theory is used to explain changes in the Islamic movement during the transitional period, which saw the expansion of Islamic associations’ social and religious institutions, as well as the politicisation of the service provision of the Brotherhood in electoral campaigning and in the governance of the FJP.

Chapter three provides a historical analysis of the state’s relations with societal actors, particularly the Islamic movement, covering the republican era from Nasser to Sadat and ending with Mubarak’s fall in 2011. Here I show how these relations have fluctuated during cycles of suppression or accommodation, according to the state’s needs during periodic junctures. This chapter considers both regulation of social and religious institutions, and also the state’s own service-providing role in these areas, as this is key to understanding why suppression or accommodation is the favoured strategy.

The core empirical chapters of the dissertation limit their temporal focus from the point of Mubarak’s departure in 2011 until the end of 2018. This covers the two years of transition alongside five years of Sisi’s reconstituted authoritarian regime. Chapter four details the ‘political opening’ that emerged in 2011, demonstrating how this period provided the opportunity for Islamic associations to expand their own activities in both social welfare provision and religious instruction. In addition, they were also able to contest for control of state-led religious institutions such as mosques. Chapter five details the politicisation of two major Islamic associations targeted in the 2013 crackdown: Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya. Here I show, that despite deciding against political institutionalisation in 2011, these actors nevertheless took advantage of new freedoms to extend their service-provision and engage in political activism, combining ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities. In doing so, they effectively transitioned into political advocacy groups for Islamist
parties during electoral processes, including the referendum on constitutional amendments, and the parliamentary and presidential elections.

Chapter six examines the relationship between the Brotherhood as a movement and its political party, the FJP, to demonstrate the politicisation of service provision in its electioneering and governing strategy. Here I show how the Brotherhood’s social welfare activities became politicised to a degree not allowed under previous regimes, whereby the social capital gained via welfare provision was leveraged to support its political party during electoral cycles. In addition, during the FJP’s year in power, Brotherhood-affiliated associations were used in the service of its governance in conjunction with state institutions, but branded as part of an FJP/Brotherhood, rather than an apolitical state service. A similar practice is also identified as part of the delivery of public goods.

Chapters seven and eight examine the 2013 crackdown, focusing on state strategy towards ‘self-organizational’ social institutions and ‘public sphere’ religious institutions, respectively. In chapter seven, I demonstrate how the Egyptian government moved to curtail the organisational and financial autonomy of private Islamic associations, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya and Ansar al-Sunna, through a variety of strategies, including ‘corporatising’ their relations with the state, self-regulation, or outright nationalisation. I detail how the process of cracking down on Islamic associations has been paralleled with an attempt to extend the state’s control over Islamic charity and a widening of its own service-provision apparatus. It shows how the state has formed new institutions for the collection and distribution of Islamic endowments, examining Bayt al-Zakat and Tahya Masr. This statist approach is contextualised within broader attempts to reinvigorate the state’s service provision, which has been aided by changing norms among supporting external international financial institutions and regional state actors.
The crackdown on private Islamic religious institutions is addressed in chapter eight, the final core chapter of the thesis. This chapter shows how the Egyptian state under Sisi has attempted to extend state control over private mosques, preacher training institutes, as well as the discursive content of preaching and sermons. In addition to trying to deny autonomous spaces for Islamic associations to operate, the crackdown on Islamic institutions also aims at dominating the religious sphere with a discourse of ‘official Islam’. Chapter nine provides a conclusion that reflects on the significance of these campaigns for the form of Egypt’s authoritarian state under Sisi, which I call ‘hollow statism’.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter expands on the research problem identified in the literature review, and provides the theoretical framework that underpins the dissertation’s main chapters and claims. The first section contrasts the ‘statist’ corporatism found in Nasser’s regime with the ‘societal’ corporatism in state-society relations under his successors, Sadat and Mubarak. Here it is shown how Egypt’s Islamic movement emerged and grew into a largely ‘unincorporated’ sector of society, due, in part, to its ability to retain financial and organisational autonomy from the regime.

The second section provides a framework for the reorganisation of these relations under Sisi after a brief period of nascent democratization, aimed at restricting this autonomy. To offer my own conceptualisation of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian state under Sisi, I draw on Michael Mann’s concept of ‘infrastructural power’ and Charles Tilly’s idea of ‘war making and state making’, to lay out a six-part strategy to control Islamic social and religious institutions: eliminating internal rivals through nationalisations; corporatising relations with Islamic actors; extracting domestic resources; securing external resources; expanding state infrastructure; and developing the discourse of ‘official Islam’. However, state capacity is identified as a key variable limiting the implementation of this strategy. As a result, Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarianism has included a discursive component to make up for the gap between discourse and praxis, which I conceptualise as ‘hollow statism’.

To better understand the extent of the crackdown on Islamic social and religious institutions that was to follow, the third section provides a framework for understanding social mobilization during the transition. Drawing on social movement theory, this section
argues that the institutional shift from an authoritarian to transitional state provided a ‘political opportunity structure’ for Islamic associations to expand their activities organisationally, as well as a discursive opportunity to ‘frame’ their activities in a more overtly political manner. Although tolerated under Mubarak, the transitional period enabled Islamic associations to expand their social institutions further, and even contest the state for control of religious institutions. During the transition, the opportunity also emerged for Islamic associations to ‘frame’ their activities in an overtly politicised manner, enabling the combination of ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities deemed by Lewis as being particularly concerning for authoritarian regimes in two ways. First, Islamic associations who decided against formal political institutionalisation, started to engage in political activism in support of Islamists during electoral cycles, framing political acts as being tantamount to the performance of a Muslim’s religious duty. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to politicise delivery of social welfare services both in its electioneering and that provided by the state during the FJP’s year in power. The combination of these factors, I argue, meant that Islamic associations were viewed as representing a particularly potent threat to the reconstituted authoritarian regime being developed after 2013 under Sisi.

2.1 State-society relations: from ‘statist’ to ‘societal’ corporatism

Since the formation of a republic under Nasser, the Egyptian state has managed civil society actors through variations of a particular organisation of state-society relations known as ‘corporatism’. Corporatism tends to be associated with the strategies of authoritarian regimes that seek to ‘penetrate the life of the society’ in order to prevent ‘the political expression of
certain group interests’. In democratic systems, a plurality of groups abound, which are free to organise and express their interests in order to influence the political process. However, in authoritarian regimes employing corporatist strategies, groups’ interests exist in a dependent or subordinate relationship vis-à-vis the state. For example, ‘representative’ organisations are formed that act as intermediaries between the state and the groups they represent. Rather than being private groups, relaying the interests of its constituent members to the state, these intermediary bodies act as a ‘regulatory agency on behalf of the state’, influencing their members’ behaviour to enforce the political decisions of the state. While the state licenses such intermediaries to act on its behalf, these agencies likewise license (or restrict) the social actors under their umbrellas. A dependent relationship exists in both cases, in which economic benefits are distributed in return for the ceding of organisational autonomy, such as the selection of leaders, who work to ensure that their behaviour does not counter the state.

The concept of corporatism has featured prominently in analyses of the development of the Egyptian state in the republican period post-1952. Scholars have tended to draw on Guillermo O’Donnell’s distinction between the ‘state’ corporatism found in ‘populist authoritarianism’ – applied to Nasser’s regime – and the more ‘societal’ corporatism found in ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’, more closely associated with the eras of Sadat and Mubarak. Bianchi, for example, noted that Nasser employed an “inclusionary,” co-optive form of corporatism, promoting a broad multiclass alliance. Waterbury corroborates this view, noting that in an import-substitution phase of capitalist development, ‘all the corps are

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2 Linz, 161.
4 Williamson, 11.
5 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, 217.
accommodated in the expanding welfare-state system’. In Egypt, a ‘national alliance’ of workers, peasants, intellectuals, national capitalists and soldiers comprised the corps in the form of a single party, the Arab Socialist Union.

Corporatism was institutionalized through quasi-governmental organisations to represent voluntary associations. Decree 1303 of 1969 created the General Federation of NGOs, with a Cairo headquarters chaired by the Minister of Social Solidarity, and regional federations in the governorates. Associations were registered as members in the regional federation, with each having a representative on the general assembly alongside high ranking civil servants from MOSS, and the ministries of Health, Education, and Planning. Many of these state employees were able to double up as part of the board of directors for the regional federation, as well as the board of the associations in that area. Effectively, members of these corps – associations – were incorporated into state structures as mechanisms were implemented to ensure they complied with MOSS’s rules and remained quiescent to the state’s authority. Power over the selection of leaders, and having the ability to restrict access to financial resources were ‘reward mechanisms’ which allowed MOSS to co-opt associations. As the economy was opened up to foreign investment under Sadat, alongside a process of limited or ‘controlled’ liberalisation, the nature of the corps changed. Unable to pursue developmental and welfarist goals concurrently, state policy moved from a broad coalition of classes, to the promotion of a narrower state-business elite. This led to a form of ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’, which ‘relies upon an “exclusionary,” repressive form of

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9 Ibrahim, 47.
10 Ibrahim, 47.
corporatism, promoting a narrower transnational bourgeois alliance in favour of the “deepening” of industrialization through more capital-intensive production’.\(^{12}\)

If we understand Nasser’s corporatist regime as involving the ‘statizing’ of state-society relations, then the process of state privatization, initiated by Sadat and continued under Mubarak, reflects what O’Donnell calls the ‘privatist’ function of those relations, which ‘entails the opening of institutional areas of the state to the representation of organised interests of civil society’.\(^{13}\) As a result of these relaxations to group interests, the Mubarak period has been described as ‘loosely corporatist’.\(^{14}\) Bianchi, for example, described Mubarak’s first decade in power as a ‘heterogeneous system of interest representation, in which both pluralist and corporatist structures have played enduring roles’.\(^{15}\) Whereas groups such as the professional syndicates represent ‘corporatist sectors’, other sectors such as the business community and religious sector are what he calls ‘hybrid sectors’, within which ‘both pluralist and corporatist structures continue to coexist and compete for predominance’.\(^{16}\) It is in this hybridity of religious groupings in Egypt that we find the Islamic movement, which is able to operate with a degree of autonomy compared with some of its counterparts. Whereas the semi-official religious body of al-Azhar represents a corporatist entity due to state controls over its hierarchical structure,\(^{17}\) Islamic associations ‘constitute the most important sector of associational life in which pluralism remains the predominant mode of representation’.\(^{18}\)

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14 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, 351.
16 Bianchi, 21.
17 Bianchi, 179.
18 Bianchi, 178.
The pluralism and autonomy within the Islamic sector in Egypt, which includes private mosques, voluntary associations, and Islamic business enterprise, is described by Wickham as a ‘parallel Islamic sector’, enjoying relative autonomy from the state.19

Supporting this view, Sullivan and Abed-Kotob argue that the diverse array of groups that make up Egypt’s Islamic movement represented ‘a new class vis-a-vis the state, a largely “unincorporated” class’.20 Bruce Rutherford suggests that weakening of the public sector under Mubarak, and erosion of the statist ideology that had underpinned the regime since Nasser, created an opportunity for such competing ideologies and institutions to emerge. The emergence of ‘Islamic constitutionalism’, Rutherford argues, projected ‘Islamic conceptions of governance within the Muslim Brotherhood’ that grew into ‘meaningful alternatives to the declining statism of the regime’.21

According to Bianchi, the reason the Islamic movement remained unincorporated stems from the fact that it did not have to rely on government subsidies or direct government oversight of their funds.22 This was because they had two autonomous sources of funding. First, Islamic associations rely on wealthy sympathisers from Islamic business enterprises, including retail shops and factories, who provide funds for voluntary associations to operate without state assistance.23 Secondly, religious charitable institutions, such as zakat, allow Islamic associations to collect funds that do not come under the supervision of Law 32 that restricts the independent collection of funds.24 As a result, the Islamic charitable sector remained relatively independent from governmental control, compared with other civil society groups. At the conclusion of Mubarak’s reign in 2011, therefore, a diverse and plural

20 Denis Joseph Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs the State (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 34.
23 Bianchi, 54.
24 Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt, 100.
Islamic movement represented one of the most important sectors of associational life, and had managed to evade incorporation by the regime. However, as discussed in the literature review in chapter one, Egypt’s authoritarian regime may well have permitted the growth of the Islamic movement, yet ‘indirect’ measures nevertheless ensured that its constituent actors could not operate overtly in a political manner. The final sections of this chapter will discuss social mobilization during the transitional period, providing a model for understanding the opportunities that emerged for Islamic actors to not only extend their activities, but to frame them in a political way that would not be tolerated under an authoritarian form of governance. But first, the next section will lay out the main theoretical claims of this dissertation, by identifying the strategies of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian regime in controlling Islamic social and religious institutions, and its particular form of authoritarianism I define as ‘hollow statism’.

2.2 Reconstituting authoritarianism

As established in the literature review in chapter one, among the regime tactics identified in the ‘authoritarian upgrading’ literature is the ‘outsourcing’ of service provision to non-state actors. This partial liberalisation of civil society aimed to avoid the potential growth of political opposition through administrative and bureaucratic regulations. However, the political risk of this arrangement may not be contained indefinitely, leading to mass mobilisations, and in some cases, democratic transitions, as seen in the Arab Uprisings. But when a process of democratic transition is reversed, reviving the previous ‘outsourcing’ arrangements of authoritarian upgrading may be deemed unsustainable, due to the continued political risks of organized groups in society. Heydemann notes that in response to the
resurgence of mass politics, authoritarian elites ‘adapt’ and implement ‘potentially transformative, changes in their policies and their tactics to control and contain newly mobilized societies’. This may go beyond ‘business as usual’, he stresses, as the ‘upgrading strategies that served as an effective response to the challenges regimes confronted in the 1990s and 2000s, carried social costs that they could not contain indefinitely’. As a result, Egypt, along with other Middle East states, have been forced to reassess the basis of their authoritarian bargains with society.

The problem for Middle East authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, argues Heydemann, is that they do not possess the resources for widespread economic inclusion and distributive justice, but at the same time the social and political costs of relying on civil society actors may simultaneously be too high. Heydemann suggests that in cases such as Egypt and Syria, therefore, the authoritarian bargains of the past have been replaced by ‘repressive-exclusionary systems of rule organised in response to the threat of mass politics under conditions of poor capitalism’. Other works conceptualising the specific form of reconstituted authoritarianism being developed under Sisi’s presidency have also recognised the ‘repressive-exclusionary’ aspects of Sisi’s rule, particular with regard to increased militarization of the state. The capture of state power by Egypt’s military, starting in 2011, before being exponentially amplified since 2013, has been detailed at length by Yezid Sayigh. Not only has it adopted a central economic position, a degree of reliance on the military to deliver public goods and services, and to attain national development goals, it has reached and even surpassed those in the Nasser era. The increased prominence of the military is noted elsewhere. In a 2018 article, Bruce Rutherford offers a conceptualisation of Sisi’s

26 Heydemann, 17.
27 Heydemann, 18.
reconstituted authoritarian regime that sees a shift from a ‘provision pact’ under Mubarak, in which the ruling NDP party organised the distribution of patronage to the regime’s most loyal supporters, forging a durable relationship with key elites, to a ‘protection pact’, in which these elites back the regime because it provides protection against internal and external threats.\(^\text{29}\) In line with Sayigh, the ‘provision pact’ has seen an increase in the military’s power and resources, while the patronage-based ruling party has been dismantled, with the level of repression rising.\(^\text{30}\) The central threat that justifies this pact, according to Rutherford, is political Islam.

It is within this exclusionary approach towards civil society that the crackdown on Egypt’s Islamic associations can be situated. But I argue that preventing these centres of activism has gone beyond blunt repression alone, to entail an attempted expansion of state infrastructure in its place. To make this argument, I draw on Michael Mann’s typology of state power as being either ‘despotic’ or ‘infrastructural’. The ‘exclusionary’ and ‘repressive’ aspects can be understood as reflections of ‘despotic power’, identified by Mann as ‘the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups’.\(^\text{31}\) This type of power refers to the deployment of a state’s coercive apparatus, enforcing power through repression. ‘Infrastructural power’, meanwhile, relates to ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’.\(^\text{32}\) In particular, infrastructural power ‘denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure [emphasis added]’.\(^\text{33}\) This physical infrastructure enables the penetration of society through institutions in administration,


\(^\text{30}\) Rutherford, 198.


\(^\text{32}\) Mann, 189.

\(^\text{33}\) Mann, 190.
education, transportation, and communication, allowing states to ‘name, register, tax, police, educate their subjects’. High levels of infrastructural capacity – without a corresponding reduction in the reliance on despotic power – has been cited as vital for the durability of authoritarian regimes. As Slater and Fenner contend, ‘state power is the strongest institutional foundation for authoritarian regimes’ staying power’. In other words, authoritarian regimes can engage society through its own institutions, thereby denying autonomous spaces through which independent civil society actors can operate. In my conceptualisation of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarianism under Sisi, an increase in statism, understood as the extension of direct state controls over social and economic spheres, demonstrates an attempt to compliment ‘despotic’ exclusionary strategies by also developing ‘infrastructural’ power.

The development of infrastructural power as utilised here has echoes in Charles Tilly’s conceptualisation of state formation being a process of ‘war making’ to defeat external enemies, and ‘state making’ to eliminate domestic rivals and provide protection to the state’s ‘clients’. Tilly identified four sequences in his model. First, through war making states eliminated or neutralized their rivals outside their own territory. Second, they eliminated or neutralized their internal enemies through state making. Third, they provided protection to their clients by eliminating or neutralizing their enemies. Finally, through extraction from the population they acquired the means to carry out war making, state making, and protection. The final three sequences of the model – state-making, protection,

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37 Tilly, 181.
and extraction – I argue, can be identified in Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarianism, particularly its relations with Islamic social and religious institutions.

‘Protection’ corresponds with Bruce Rutherford’s conceptualisation of Egypt’s new authoritarianism as being a ‘protection pact’ to protect elites as part of the new regime coalition against political Islam.38 Here I add ‘state making’ and ‘extraction’, to show how this protection has been implemented, to eliminate or neutralise the internal enemies within the Islamic movement. In Tilly’s model, to finance external wars, states had to develop stronger infrastructural capacities, including more centralized state apparatuses. The process of eliminating rivals in the state-making process aimed to attain priorities that are national in scope, rather than local or sectoral. Central to this process was the transition from ‘indirect’ to ‘direct’ forms of rule. Tilly points out that every European government before the French Revolution relied in some way on indirect rule and policing through local magnates. These actors were collaborators with the government, as opposed to formal officials, meaning that they remained ‘potential rivals, possible allies of a rebellious people’.39

Applied to the contemporary period, this risk can also present itself in the ‘outsourcing’ of service provision to non-state actors. Although independent civil society actors may perform a useful function for the government, they nevertheless remain a potential threat, generating support or legitimacy through those services, which may in turn undermine the legitimacy or support for the state. Tilly argues that governments reduced their reliance on indirect forms of rule by extending their official presence in the local community, and creating police forces subordinate to the government, rather than individual local patrons.40 This process extended state power by co-opting or eliminating local rivals. In my model, a process similar to state making – expanding infrastructural power through direct controls over

38 Rutherford, ‘Egypt’s New Authoritarianism under Sisi’.
40 Tilly, 175.
social and religious service provision – also served to eliminate or co-opt the potential threat of local actors.

To engage in these state-making efforts, Tilly identifies extraction of financial resources from the population as a key element enabling the state to engage in national priorities and goals. Successful extraction led to further state making in the creation of agencies for tax collection, account keepers, and police to monitor the process. As Tilly argued, the sequences of war-making and state-making generally reinforce one another. Thus, ‘a state that successfully eradicates its internal rivals strengthens its ability to extract resources, to wage war, and to protect its chief supporters’. However, I argue that the eradication of internal rivals need not only preclude the ability to extract resources, but that the very process of extraction can itself be a means of eliminating those rivals. This is demonstrated by the attempt of the Egyptian state under Sisi to appropriate the resources of Islamic charity. Capturing greater levels of zakat donations denies an autonomous source of financing for Islamic associations, contributing to the elimination of the state’s perceived enemies. Moreover, securing these resources also enables the state to implement an additional revenue stream towards its own priorities, in the Egyptian case, the reinvigoration of its own service providing apparatus.

In the following sections I provide a model of reconstituted authoritarianism that responds to societal threats, by seeking to enhance controls over social and religious service provision as a means of neutralising rivals, and developing infrastructural power to increase the state’s legitimacy among its citizens. My model identifies six defining features of the strategy of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian regime in its attempts to control Islamic social and religious institutions.

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41 Tilly, 183.
42 Tilly, 181.
1. Eliminating internal rivals through nationalisations
2. Corporatising relations with Islamic actors
3. Extracting domestic resources
4. Securing external resources
5. Expanding state infrastructure
6. Developing ‘official Islam’ discourse

The Egyptian state under Sisi has sought to eliminate or neutralise internal rivals through (1) nationalisations of private Islamic associations, and their social and religious institutions. A strategy of co-optation has also been pursued towards Islamic associations that remained formally independent, by (2) corporatising relations to restrict their organisational and financial autonomy. Part of the effort to restrict financial autonomy has entailed the (3) extraction of domestic resources in the form of the Islamic charity of zakat. (4) Securing external resources from international financial institutions and foreign aid benefactors has contributed to the attempted reinvigoration of the state’s own service provision, with (5) new state institutions being created for the creation and distribution of zakat, as well as other social and religious services. Finally, (6) the support of official religious institutions has sought to bestow legitimacy on this process, by extending state controls over religious institutions and the discourses disseminated within them through ‘official Islam’.

An important caveat remains, however, as these represent the strategies undertaken by the Egyptian state, but not the efficacy of their implementation. The subsequent section specifies state capacity as the key variable limiting the implementation of these strategies. Insufficient capacity, it will be argued, has led to a final discursive aspect of the reconstituted authoritarian model, which I call ‘hollow statism’.
2.2.1 Nationalisation

Through nationalisations of social and religious institutions, states can eliminate rivals and increase their own sources of legitimacy in the process. Slater and Fenner identify ‘cultivating dependence’ as an ‘infrastructural mechanism’ which helps sustain authoritarian rule.\(^{43}\) State-provided services, such as social welfare and other services, can cultivate dependence by generating citizen loyalty. Mann has used this mechanism to explain the varied outcomes of the Arab Spring, with wealthier oil-producing states better able to increase ‘benefits in return for obedience’ than the post-populist Arab republics of Egypt and Syria.\(^{44}\) States with higher levels of infrastructural capacity, and the ability to provide public goods efficiently, were more insulated against societal pressures during the uprisings. As a result, in reconstituting authoritarianism, states such as Egypt may achieve higher levels of durability by relying not only on despotic power to quell the threat of political opponents, but also infrastructural power to insulate against socio-economic unrest. The generation of this type of capacity need not necessarily derive only from the state’s own resources, I argue, but via the penetration of civil society itself through nationalisations.

Cultivating dependence can also be reflective of state making to eliminate internal enemies, as state-provided services can also ‘disrupt alternative social-service networks, depriving nonstate organizations of one of their best tools for connecting and gaining credibility with the masses’.\(^{45}\) In the context of state society relations in the Middle East, social and religious service provision provide such a tool for Islamic associations to connect

\(^{44}\) Michael Mann, ‘The Infrastructural Powers of Authoritarian States in the “Arab Spring”’, 2014.
with society. To prevent this relationship, states can incorporate these institutions into the state’s own infrastructure. In terms of social institutions, such a process was undertaken in Egypt under Nasser (discussed in more detail in chapter three), with the formation of a welfare state and declaration that such services were the responsibility of the state, not society. When private welfare providers demonstrated significant efficacy in their ability to meet needs which were national in scope, the government stepped in to take over, turning them into appendages of the state. Authoritarian states can thereby cultivate their own infrastructural power by incorporating social service providing institutions into their own apparatus, a process which will be demonstrated further in chapter seven.

Incorporating religious institutions into the state’s own infrastructure provides another means to simultaneously seek legitimacy and eliminate rivals. In Richard Antoun’s application of the ‘bureaucratization of religion’, preachers are ordered into hierarchies, and the ‘state co-optation of religion’ prevents them from becoming political opponents. For co-optation, the government attempts to enlist movement members as bureaucrats into state-sponsored institutions. These bureaucrats, meanwhile, become intermediaries between the state and local communities, and ‘continually mediate between different societal levels and the bureaucracy’s cultural demand for unity at the highest (national) level’. In Egypt, the latter half of the 20th century has seen increasing absorption of mosques into the state’s own bureaucracy, with the Ministry of Awqaf becoming ‘the primary agency involved in an effort to incorporate mosques into a national bureaucracy and to regulate preaching throughout the

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49 Antoun, 369.
50 Antoun, 371.
Through nationalisations, therefore, authoritarian states can absorb social and religious institutions and social actors into their own bureaucracies as a means of developing infrastructural power, which will be shown in chapter eight.

2.2.2 Corporatisation

By utilising corporatist strategies, authoritarian regimes can still limit the financial and organisational autonomy of Islamic associations’ institutions not subject to nationalisation.

As introduced in section 2.1, corporatism sees intermediary bodies created to mediate between civil society and the state. A dependent relationship sees economic benefits distributed in return for the ceding of organisational autonomy, such as the selection of leaders, who work to ensure that behaviour does not counter the state. It has been shown in Jordan how corporatist bodies were used as ‘an instrument of state control’ in relations between the state and Islamic associations. In this context the General Union of Voluntary Societies assisted the Ministry of Social Affairs with the monitoring and regulation of Islamic NGOs, and decision-making over granting or licenses for new societies or extending the activities of existing ones. As will be shown in chapter seven, since 2013, Egypt has redeployed its own corporatist body created during the Nasser era, the General Federation of NGOs, to perform a similar function for Islamic associations. Organisational autonomy can be restricted by removing the management boards of NGOs, and replacing them with figures from state ministries or the military, ensuring quiescence. But recall that for Bianchi, the

52 Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, 217.
reason Egypt’s Islamic movement remained *unincorporated* compared with other civil society actors, stemmed from the fact that it did not have to rely on government subsidies or direct government oversight, enjoying funds from Islamic business and charity, thus granting financial autonomy.\(^{54}\) Therefore, penetrating this independent source of financing is crucial to restrict this aspect of the autonomy of Islamic associations, which leads to the next part of the strategy.

### 2.2.3 Extracting domestic resources

By extracting domestic resources, states can eliminate rivals by appropriating their own resource base, while generating a new source of finance for its own projects. Traditionally, extraction refers to the taxation of citizens’ incomes. In Muslim-majority states, however, the Islamic charity of zakat represents another financial resource which states have attempted to commandeer. Attempts to statize the collection and distribution of zakat has been attempted – with varying degrees of success – in numerous countries. In Malaysia and Pakistan, states centralised the collection and distribution of zakat donations, effectively turning it into a form of tax.\(^{55}\) State oversight of zakat donations is also commonplace in the Gulf, while Challand has identified an increase in this ‘statization’ of control over religious endowments in Jordan and the West Bank.\(^{56}\) However, Challand highlights how a practice that had previously taken place solely within society, was now taken over by the government, which led to its decline by as much as 50%.\(^{57}\) Chapter seven details the Egyptian state’s own attempts to appropriate

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\(^{56}\) Challand, ‘Comparative Perspective on the Growth and Legal Transformations of Arab (Islamic) Charities’, 303.

\(^{57}\) Challand, 303.
zakat, through the creation of a new institution, Bayt al-Zakat, for its collection and distribution. New state institutions to appropriate these financial resources can simultaneously restrict the autonomy of civil society, whilst generating a new resource for its own projects to further cultivate dependence and citizen loyalty through infrastructural power. But as will be shown, the Egyptian incarnation of the statization of zakat has faced similar problems to those identified by Challand.

2.2.4 Securing external resources

The statization of zakat represents an attempt to appropriate domestic resources. But states may also seek external sources of financial support to enable the implementation of their plans. Foreign benefactors, such as international financial institutions (IFIs) or individual state actors, can provide such a source. The extent to which statism is deployed within authoritarian regimes can be heavily influenced by relations with these external actors. For example, the conditions of external aid and loans from ISIs may also lead to economic restructuring and a retraction of the state’s role in the economy, witnessed during the Sadat and Mubarak eras, which will be detailed in chapter three. The nature of this relationship is somewhat cyclical, however, evidenced by changes in the approach from the IMF and World Bank towards Egypt since 2011. Momani and Lanz identify a less dogmatic view among IFIs of the state’s role in the provision of social services as part of development in the Middle East. Increasingly, ‘inclusive growth’ has been part of its strategy in dealing with the Arab world and Egypt, referring to inclusiveness or social protection during transitions in
economic markets.\textsuperscript{58} As a result, the potential social unrest prompted by a curtailment of service provision among non-state actors, such as the Islamic movement, may in part be alleviated by an increase in statist welfare as part of its developmental strategy. Chapter seven details attempts to reinvigorate the state’s own welfare providing apparatus, supported by IFIs.

Individual state actors can also play a prominent role in helping sustain the budgets of authoritarian regimes. The United States’ yearly donation of $1.5 billion to the Egyptian military has been well-documented, while in Jordan, Yom and al-Momani identify a link between international support and domestic regime stability.\textsuperscript{59} The Jordanian state was able to avoid substantial civic unrest after its 1989 economic crisis and resultant economic adjustments, due to donors such as the US, which was worried about the potential Islamist alternative to the existing conservative and compliant state apparatus. But regional actors can also be important benefactors, enabling like-minded states to consolidate their rule. Von Soest has termed this form of state-to-state support ‘authoritarian collaboration’, in which fellow autocrats provide support to maximise their survival of their own regime by preventing ‘negative spill overs from democratization’ or ‘political Islam’.\textsuperscript{60} This can be observed in Egypt from 2013, with Gulf donors providing substantial support and assistance, helping enable statist projects to be pursued.

\textsuperscript{58} Bessma Momani and Dustyn Lanz, ‘Shifting IMF Policies since the Arab Uprisings’, Policy Brief (Center for International Governance Innovation, n.d.).


2.2.5 Expanding state infrastructure

By securing new sources of domestic and external finance, Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian state can channel those resources towards its own priorities and goals. In addition to nationalisations, states can also reinvigorate and expand their own infrastructural power, and create new institutions to penetrate society, in the areas of social and religious service provision.

In terms of the social dimension, the appropriation of domestic resources through Islamic charity, and securing external financing from IFIs and foreign backers, can provide some of the means to engage in statist expansions, such as the reinvigoration of social welfare provision. The creation of a new state institution, Bayt al-Zakat, for the collection and distribution of Islamic charity, provides a new resource base to fund state-led, rather than private Islamic association led, welfare projects. As will also be shown in chapter seven, a further state creation, the Tahya Masr fund, represents another avenue for statist intervention into the charitable and business sectors, creating a further stream of financing that has been used to fund service provision in areas such as health and housing.\(^6^1\) Loans from IFIs have supported the reinvigoration of the state’s provision of health and education, whilst foreign aid from Gulf benefactors has been used for development projects.

Infrastructural expansion has also been witnessed with religious institutions. It has been recognised that Middle East states increasingly ‘counter religious challenges’ through the allocation of financial resources and ‘institutional power’ to control public space.\(^6^2\) As well as zakat collection, official religious institutions can be created to supervise mosques,

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regulate preaching, and disseminate fatwas, or religious opinions. The increasing
development of religious bureaucracies is found across the Middle East in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. Although Egypt already possessed an extensive official religious bureaucracy prior to 2013 – discussed more in the next section – new institutions to extend official state control over the religious sphere has also been pursued. In the area of preaching, new state institutes for training have been established, which seek to replace those private institutes operated by Islamic associations.

2.2.6 Developing ‘official Islam’ discourse

The significance of the state’s expansion of ‘infrastructural power’ through official religious institutions is not only institutional, however, but also entails a discursive element in which the state can foster its own ‘official’ version of Islam. By developing an expansive official religious bureaucracy, states can seek hegemony as the ‘arbiter of the “right” or “official Islam”’. Official Islam aims to give credibility to the regime, but also to limit the mobilizational ability of the Islamist opposition. This point is important, as it emphasises the dual-benefit of expanding the state’s religious bureaucracy: it denies institutional space to independent groups, which in turn prevents them providing independent discourses to the ‘public sphere’. The result of this, is that rather than using institutions to manage the religious

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66 Feuer, Regulating Islam.
space indirectly, they have sought to strengthen official institutions to ‘make them the sole interpreters of religious doctrine’.

The three main institutions of Egypt’s official Islam - al-Azhar, the Ministry of Awqaf, and Dar al-Ifta – have been deployed since 2013 to undertake a “renewal of religious discourse” to counteract what Sisi’s regime describes as Islamic extremism. Attempts by the Egyptian state to control the religious public sphere through al-Azhar have long been recognised since the Nasser era, whilst Dar al-Ifta’s role in providing the regime with supportive fatwas has also been highlighted. But the prominent role played by the Ministry of Awqaf in controlling religious space since 2014 has also been recognised by scholars. This fact has prompted increased competition and antagonism between the two institutions, who have both sought to lead this “religious revolution” called for by President Sisi. The most significant aspect of the attempt to disseminate the discourse of “official Islam” has been the move to standardize the topic and texts of Friday sermons by the Ministry of Awqaf. In doing so, the Ministry has sought to consolidate institutional control of Egypt’s mosques by extending state oversight even further through the discourses disseminated within them. But as with attempts to radically transform patterns of Islamic charity, actually ensuring compliance and the realisation of this policy has proven to be somewhat difficult.

Robbins and Rubin, 70.
This rivalry is discussed in more detail in chapter eight.
2.3 State capacity and the challenge of building infrastructural power

The previous sections specified the six-pronged strategy of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarianism in extending controls over Islamic social and religious institutions. However, as will be shown, the extent to which these have been implemented successfully has been mixed. It is, therefore, crucial to consider what factors limit the ability of authoritarian regimes to realise these goals. Assessing comprehensive state-led strategies for change, or ‘revolution from above’, may require an assessment of ‘the overall capacity of a state to realise transformative goals across multiple spheres’.75 The crucial factor, I therefore argue, is a state’s capacity.

Comparative analysis of Muslim-majority states demonstrates that institutional capacity can prevent the development of Islamic service providers. In the Gulf, considerable state social safety nets have negated the need for service provision to be ‘outsourced’ to non-state actors.76 In Indonesia’s New Order Regime, the developmental focus of its authoritarian regime similarly removed social service provision as a means of Islamist opposition mobilization, as ‘regime capacity seemingly forestalls the development of opposition providers’.77 Whereas in the post-populist republics of Egypt and Syria, financial crises led to the ceding of space to Islamic social services, the fiscal health of Gulf states and Indonesia’s New Order regime meant these regimes could more effectively co-opt potential challengers.

But what happens when Islamic service providers already exist, yet an authoritarian regime seeks to push back against their influence? Crucially, as Cammett and MacLean stress, once a state reduces its own service providing capacity, and begins to rely on non-state actors, a decline in the long-term capacity of the state to provide or regulate these services tends to occur.\textsuperscript{78} Therefore, once a state begins to outsource service provision – whether social or religious - to non-state actors, then its capacity to retake control over these sectors diminishes.

State capacity has been identified as a key factor when looking at Middle East states’ ability to incorporate religious institutions into their own bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{79} Baskan identifies two structural factors to explain why this process has tended to be non-synchronised historically. The first is the institutional capacity of the state, while the second is the internal organisation of religious institutions. If the independent institutions are hierarchical and well-institutionalized, then the state finds it difficult to incorporate them. If they are disjointed, then state incorporation is more likely, although this depends on the institutional capacity of the state. Baskan summarizes that, ‘As its institutional capacity increases, the state incorporates additional religious institutions’.\textsuperscript{80} Greater penetration of civil society – such as through corporatisation - can disrupt the internal organisation of social and religious institutions. However, the extent of nationalisation and incorporation of these institutions into the state’s own bureaucracy is tempered by state capacity.

The capacity of the Egyptian state to implement its goals to regulate Islamic associations and extend its own service provision, in light of both economic circumstances and the resources it is able to draw upon, as well as resistance from actors in the Islamic

\textsuperscript{80} Baskan, 137.
movement, will, I argue, determine its success. The extent to which the Egyptian state under Sisi is able to commandeer resources from the private sector, in the form of charity, may be one avenue to alleviate the limitations of its official budget. As Rueschemeyer and Evans note, ‘By augmenting the resources under the state’s control, intervention diminishes the state’s reliance on privately generated resources and thereby enhances autonomy’. If the state is able to commandeer more of these privately generated resources itself, rather than relying on private actors to provide services, then a greater level of autonomy may be achieved, and the statist project may thereby be workable. Having autonomous power in the form of being able to generate the resources to pursue development and welfarism concurrently, this contemporary Egyptian state would have sufficient capacity to achieve the level of domination over civil society it seeks, without relying on its repressive capacity alone. If it is unable to seize these new sources of revenue, then its level of autonomy will decline, along with its capacity to penetrate and control civil society.

There are reasons to question the capacity of the Egyptian state to exert direct state control over Islamic social and religious institutions, as well as the long-term sustainability of its attempts to oversee the practice of collecting and distributing charity in the country. In assuming control of private charity, and trying to centralise the process of its collection and disbursement, the Egyptian government is pursuing a top-down approach, which profoundly differs from traditional practice. Religious donations are largely a localised exchange, taking place on an informal level. As James C. Scott highlights, the history of Third World development is ‘littered with the debris’ of attempts at social engineering by authoritarian states. Such cases, he argues, fail because they try to make huge changes to working habits

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or living patterns, whilst ignoring the features that make a social order function, such as practical knowledge, informal processes, and improvisation. The danger is, that if the Egyptian government continues its crackdown on the private collection of charitable donations, but is unable to recreate the practice to collect and disburse it itself, then interactions may become more covert, and we may see the decline of Islamic charity more broadly. The ability of Sisi’s authoritarian regime to achieve a hegemonic level of state domination, reminiscent of the Nasser years, is therefore open to question, due to issues of capacity and its ability to generate sufficient resources to achieve its statist plans.

2.4 Hollow statism

The previous sections have set out the framework for the strategies of Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian regime to extend its control over Egypt’s Islamic social and religious institutions, namely, the development of infrastructural power through the state’s own institutions to eliminate internal enemies, protect clients, and extract internal resources. This significant wielding of the state’s power and institutions is statist in nature, with its attempts to extend direct state controls over various social and economic facets of public life. Yet state capacity, I have argued, may significantly restrict the ability of the Egyptian state from carrying out these plans. This section provides a framework for understanding how the Egyptian state has responded to these limitations, by developing the concept of ‘hollow statism’.

83 In a Foreign Policy report on the crackdown on Islamic charities, Nicholas Linn and Emily Crane Linn interview an al-Gam’iyya al-Shariyya volunteer who says that his branch were working to a third of their former capacity because of the reputational damage done to the organisation. Nicholas Linn and Emily Crane Linn, ‘Egypt’s War on Charity’, Foreign Policy, 29 January 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/29/egypts-war-on-charity-morsi-muslim-brotherhood/.
Santini, Polese, and Kevlihan pose the question of the tenability of the Weberian notion of statehood in the Middle East, in the face of a lack of capacity, that renounces action as a state across the board, instead projecting only some of its statist functions. But what if the state projects the breadth of its functions discursively, as a response to its failure to implement these functions in practice? In the case of China, Iza Ding explores how states respond when public expectations exceed their actual governing capacity. In this case the state struggled to meet citizens’ demands, but confronted strong public pressure to do so. Ding argues that the Chinese state responded by engaging in ‘performative governance’, featuring ‘the theatrical deployment of language, symbols, and features to foster an impression of good governance among citizens’. The ‘impression’ of the state has been recognised in other contexts. Timothy Mitchell, for example, notes the difficulty in identifying the distinction between the state’s boundary with society. Rather than a distinct border between two discrete entities, Mitchell argues that the state makes an ‘internal distinction appear [emphasis added] as though it were the external boundary between separate objects’. State institutions do provide a physical representation of the state, but also, potentially, a marker of its limitations. If the appearance of this boundary in terms of statist expansion fails to reach a certain level, then, states may engage in discursive and symbolic acts to likewise give the impression that the reaches of its boundaries extend further than its actual physical limits. In Wedeen’s study of the Assadist cult of power, a politics of public dissimulation exists in which ‘citizens act as if they revere their leader’. Through

hollow statism, I propose that states may discursively act *as if* the physical reaches of their institutional boundaries extend beyond that which they manage to achieve in practice.

I argue that when state capacity is low, but the perceived threat of societal actors engaging in service provision is high, then an authoritarian state may engage in hollow statism. In the Egyptian case, a new and consolidating authoritarian regime made declarations over the extension of increased controls over Islamic sociational institutions, and full state controls over private mosques and preaching, and the creation of new state institutions for preacher training. However, these declarations, as will be shown, exceeded its governing capacity. Despite this gap, the state continued to maintain the pretence of these policies being fulfilled. In Egypt under Sisi, despite the implementation of comprehensive state controls over Islamic social and religious institutions being incomplete *in practice*, the government continued to project the attainment of these aims *discursively* through public pronouncements. It is through this intersection of empirical practice, and the production of discourses that help sustain authoritarian rule, that I develop the concept of hollow statism, which has three main defining characteristics.

The first characteristic is discursive, where the state declares its intentions to utilise its own institutions to exert direct control over the levers of the social, political, and economic realm. Since 2013, a new discourse has been fostered that seeks to justify the consolidation of a new regime under the Sisi presidency by securing the state. Brumberg notes that, ‘the toppling of President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood was first and foremost about a resurgent Egyptian state. This huge entity is what both the military and millions of anti-Morsi protestors were most afraid of losing’. In support of this project has been a

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discourse of ‘dawlatiyya’, or statism, focused on ‘restoring the Egyptian state’s authority’. State actors have regularly deployed phrases around restoring the “prestige of the state” as being central to the Sisi project, which will be discussed in chapter seven. But as Adly notes, this discourse went beyond that of mere rhetoric as it ‘intimately links rhetoric with practice’.  

The second characteristic relates to the actual physical implementation of the statist strategy. In other words, the discourse of statism is not merely a rhetorical device aimed at projecting power, but there exists at least some attempt at institutional expansion. These statist dimensions of Sisi’s rule have been recognised in relation to the maintenance of public order, and its political economy in a conflicting form called ‘statist neoliberalism’. Under statist neoliberalism, Khalil and Dill identify that ‘[a]usterity measures are undertaken in parallel to major development and welfare projects - cuts on the one hand and increased spending towards the same welfare agenda on the other’. ‘Alternative avenues for resource mobilisation’ are directed by the state, including statist interventions into charity and business donations to fund welfare provision such as subsidies and housing projects. This political economy approach helps to highlight the contradictions in the statist expansion, particularly around questions of the state’s capacity to fulfil this project. But at this dissertation shows, the statist expansion in welfare provision intersected with attempts to control Islamic social and religious institutions.

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90 Adly.
93 Khalil and Dill, 588.
94 Khalil and Dill, 586.
The third characteristic refers to the inability to match discourse with praxis, leading to the reliance on another discursive dimension, or what Ding calls ‘performative governance’, to fill the gap. In the Egyptian case, this occurs due to a lack of capacity where the state has the will to undertake a statist expansion, but without the means for its full completion. Constructing favourable images of itself in its discourse, picked up upon through state or supportive media, has long been a feature of Egyptian regimes during the republican era. Menshawy has highlighted the way in which official discourses, disseminated through pliant media which publish all official statements and speeches, fills citizens with ‘daily doses of nationalism’.95 Mubarak, for example, used the 1973 war to legitimize his power and defend the regime’s policies through the macro theme of the war as an overwhelming and undisputed ‘Egyptian victory’, despite the modest achievements of that supposed military success.96 This framing was picked up by a sympathetic media, which became central to regime legitimation. In the contemporary period under Sisi, state actors similarly engage in discursive pronouncements that exceed that actual achievements the state has attained.

The move towards a renewed focus on statism represents a shift in the orientation of authoritarianism in Egypt. Rutherford has argued that, under Mubarak, the dismantlement of the public sector meant that the Nasserist doctrine of state-guided economic development, including state provision of education and health care, was cast off. ‘By abandoning any pretense of upholding the basic premises of statism’, Mubarak’s regime therefore ‘became hollow’.97 The statist strategy, in the crackdown on the Islamic social and religious institutions, is indicative of a re-engagement with the statist principles of Nasserism in some aspects of authoritarian controls. If the abandonment of the Nasserist doctrine of state-guided

economic development meant the hollowing out of its authoritarian regime, then the statism pursued by the regime under Sisi entails a renewed emphasis on the statist doctrine. However, insufficient capacity has meant these plans have only been partially fulfilled, leading to the scenario of hollow statism.

2.5 Social mobilization during transition

This section provides a theoretical framework for understanding social mobilization during the transitional period, to better understand why Islamic social and religious institutions were viewed as such a threat in 2013. Studies of social mobilization relating to the Arab Uprisings tend to focus on two main areas. First, there are those that examine how and why social and political actors mobilized to protest against authoritarian regimes. Studies such as these seek to understand the motivations of specific actors to protest and try to account for the reasons for their success or failure in generating revolutionary outcomes across different states. Second, there are those that examine subsequent social mobilization in the aftermath of the Uprisings, such as during transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. Here, the focus shifts to understanding why in some cases protestors became institutionalized social and political

98 These distinctions are made in Frédéric Volpi and Janine A. Clark, ‘Activism in the Middle East and North Africa in Times of Upheaval: Social Networks’ Actions and Interactions’, Social Movement Studies 18, no. 1 (2 January 2019): 2.
actors, and in other cases not. In this dissertation I take the latter focus, examining not the role that Islamic associations played during the mass protests which led to the removal of Mubarak, but their activities as social and political actors after the initiation of a transitional process prompted by Mubarak’s removal.

Social movement theory provides a range of approaches for analysing why social mobilization emerges and becomes institutionalised. Within the literature the three analytical approaches of the ‘political process’ model have traditionally been dominant: political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and framing. The basis of political opportunity structures is that the specific configuration of resources and institutional arrangements within a state either facilitate or constrain social mobilization. Resource mobilization sees the availability of specific material resources, such as organizing space, finances, equipment, or human resources such as relevant experience and skills, as being key intermediary variables leading to mobilization. Finally, collective action ‘frames’ refer to the production of beliefs and meanings among social movements that seek to inspire adherents and legitimate their activities. All three approaches have previously been adopted by scholars applying social movement theory to the study of Islamic movements.

However, the political process model has been critiqued for its inattention to the role of agency in social mobilization. Whereas structural approaches cite variables that delimit the scope of what is possible for social movement actors, constraining possible actions and

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outcomes, agency refers to the choices and actions which individuals or collective actors make in response to their environment.\textsuperscript{106} In this view, despite structural limitations, such as political opportunity structures or the adequate availability of resources, actors can shape their environment to alter the nature of political opportunities available to them.\textsuperscript{107} Although the emergence of these activities are, to a certain extent, contingent on external factors, by engaging in activism social actors can develop experience and innovations in tactics that ‘alter expectations about the possibilities for future action, thereby facilitating further agency.’\textsuperscript{108} Therefore, social movement theorists have increasingly sought to consider the ways in which structural and agency-based factors intersect.

Jasper and Volpi propose paying closer attention to the integration of macro and micro-level dynamics that take into consideration an ‘interactionist perspective’ in which social movement ‘players’ operate in ‘arenas’ in which they enjoy ‘agency, choices, dilemmas, and contingency’.\textsuperscript{109} Upheaval, such as the Arab Uprisings, generated multiple arenas of contention which ‘encouraged both anti- and pro-regime players to redefine their tactics, strategies, and identities’.\textsuperscript{110} In an article conceptualising the role of social mobilisation during and after the Arab Uprisings, Volpi and Clark identify several levels on which shifting dynamics take place, contributing to the shaping of a movement, its objectives, and its identity, arguing that a ‘turn towards agency has meant a far greater focus on the micro-level, on individuals, on groups and social networks, and on local causal

\textsuperscript{107} Volpi and Clark, ‘Activism in the Middle East and North Africa in Times of Upheaval: Social Networks’ Actions and Interactions’, 3.
\textsuperscript{109} Frédéric Volpi and James M. Jasper, eds., \textit{Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between Regimes and Protesters} (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2018), 23.
\textsuperscript{110} Volpi and Jasper, 24.
mechanisms’. This approach considers the role of networks and individuals, in order to add further players to the complexity of Islamic social mobilization during the transitional period. Internal dynamics, involving individual actors, help shape the group’s identity and practices, and its representation as a collective actor.

The framework developed below prioritises the political process model, but also attempts to incorporate an element of the ‘interactionist perspective’, to take into account the role of individuals and networks. First, using ‘political opportunity structures’, it argues that social mobilization is strongly affected by regime type, whereby the shift from authoritarianism to a democratic transition opens up new opportunities in both reach and form. Islamic associations were able to expand their presence in public space by extending the scope and reach of their social institutions, whilst contesting with the state for increased control over religious institutions. Moreover, a more democratic polity also opens up further discursive opportunities, broadening the range of discourses in which social actors can engage. Second, these discursive opportunities enabled new articulations in the ‘framing’ of Islamic associations’ activism, particularly over engagement in political advocacy in support of Islamists in the electoral sphere, and the explicit politicisation of service delivery. Third, to understand the success of Islamic associations’ social mobilization during the transitional period, I draw on resource mobilization theory, highlighting how pre-existing organisation provided an advantage over secular/liberal rivals. Finally, the role of internal dynamics is considered, emphasising the importance of the strategic role of individuals and movement networks in producing social mobilization outcomes.

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2.5.1 Political opportunity structures and regime type

In this section I argue that the extent and form of social mobilization is strongly influenced by the institutional arrangements within a state. Regime type, I contend, is likely to be a major factor in either facilitating or constraining social mobilization. As Alimi posits, ‘the overall character of a political regime strongly affects the possibility, form, and dynamics of contention’.

Due to their generally restrictive nature, in authoritarian regimes the availability of political opportunity structures are cited as key factors in facilitating mobilization. Writing on anti-Mubarak protests in pre-2011 Egypt, Killian Clarke suggests that under authoritarian rule, ‘a political opening is often a necessary precondition for mobilization’. Indeed, important opportunities for social and political mobilization can present themselves after the liberalization of the polity in authoritarian regimes. For example, Schwedler credits the formation of Yemen’s Islamist Islah party in 1990 with ‘the new political opportunities that emerged with Yemeni unification in 1989 and subsequent political liberalization’. The emergence of Muslim Brotherhood political parties elsewhere as the tolerated opposition in Egypt and Jordan have also been credited to the strategic decisions of regimes. However, the opportunities that help enable social mobilization are not only found in the political realm, but can exist in a variety of domains that present opportunities in other social and economic spaces also.

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115 Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*.
spaces’ in Turkey brought on through economic liberalization provided social sites as ‘vehicles for activism to disseminate meaning, identity, and cultural codes’. Economic opportunities have also been credited with forcing the hand of states to permit and encourage Islamic social actors in the provision of services. In sum, allocations of space within authoritarian regimes leading to opportunity structures, from the political through to the economic and social, are often crucial for initial mobilization.

If the controlled liberalization of an authoritarian polity enables some social and political opportunities, then the initiation of a transition may provide an even more open environment to expand social and political mobilization, both in terms of scope and form. A political transition presents the potential for ‘restructuring the public space, and the mobilization of all manner of independent groups and grassroots movements’. Goldstone highlights that ‘new movements emerge and proliferate in response to the new opportunities created by democratic institutions and the plurality of groups entering the political arena’. The shift to democratization sees social movement activity increase as ‘a complementary mode of political action’ as ‘movements engage in contention in various ways to influence the political system’. During periods of transition, therefore, opportunities may emerge for private actors to redefine institutions outside of formal politics, establish new organisations, and to use the new-found flexibility and openness in their environment to occupy and contest public space.

119 Pioppi, ‘Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy: The Revival of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) in Egypt’.
122 Goldstone, 336.
123 Goldstone, 337.
Within Egypt’s transitional process, I identify two specific types of opportunities that emerged, affecting the scope and form of mobilization respectively. Firstly, the incapacity of the Egyptian state during the early phase of the transition provided the opportunity to expand the scope of social mobilization through organisational expansion. Rucht specifies a reduction in the state’s ‘policy implementation capacity’, in which its power to perform its functions erodes, as a key factor providing political opportunities for non-state actors.\textsuperscript{124} State crises, Hassan notes, such as natural disasters or other major forms of disruption, may cause a temporary period of instability, in which the state is either unable or reluctant to provide essential resources to citizens. Citizens may in turn mobilize to support their own communities, an act that may endure beyond the period of the initial crisis via institutionalisation.\textsuperscript{125} The instability that resulted from the uprisings created just such changes in the institutional structure of the Egyptian state, and consequently, opportunities for new civil society actors to emerge and existing ones to expand their activities. Islamic associations expanded their engagement in providing community services and welfare provision through ‘popular committees’, as well as extending the breadth of their social and religious activism.

Institutional changes such as the lifting of emergency rule also removed restrictions on activism, while the first transitional government under Prime Minister Essam Sharaf eased NGO registration requirements. This provided new opportunities for NGOs in areas of political advocacy, which included drives to register voters and provide parliamentary training programmes.\textsuperscript{126} Civil society organizations prominently engaged in the transitional

phase, highlighting abuses of power and providing legal assistance. On the other hand, however, NGO Law 84 of 2002 remained in place, providing the continued means to disrupt projects and funding approvals for new organizations. A subsequent crackdown on the ‘foreign funding’ of Egyptian NGOs in December 2011 saw security forces raiding the offices of 17 American, German, and Egyptian NGOs, closing their operations, and charging 43 of their employees with receiving foreign funds without the required license. Therefore, remnants of authoritarian practices may still remain during transition. In the case of Egypt, this was particularly the case for secular political advocacy and foreign NGOs, with threats continuing alongside new opportunities.

The second type of opportunity that emerged, I argue, was discursive. Koopmans and Statham introduced the concept of ‘discursive opportunity structures’ to refer to how the attention of public discourse on key issues can affect the chances of success for a social movement. This idea has been adopted by others to demonstrate how social movements use discursive tactics in order to convince key political decision-makers to alter policy. However, I propose that the transition from an autocratic to more democratic polity can also present another type of discursive opportunity, as the range of discourses in which social actors can engage broadens. O’Donnell and Schmitter highlight that in transitions from authoritarian rule, change takes place not only on the elite level, in terms of governmental institutions, but also on the societal level through the public sphere. Under authoritarian rule, the production of discourse is defined by a public realm that is state-controlled, whereby ‘any discussion of issues must be made in codes and terms established by the rulers’.

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127 Brechenmacher.
removal of these impediments means that social actors can enjoy a new-found openness in the public sphere to articulate the meaning of their activities to their adherents and the wider public. Civil society organisations may transition from ‘agents of governmental control into instruments for the expression of interests, ideals, and rage against the regime’. This also includes religious groups, who may come to play a more prominent role in articulating ethical demands concerning the future of the state, even if they were previously known for their prudent accommodation of the authorities. As well as institutional change, therefore, capturing the breadth of change during the transitional period requires an examination of the extent to which civil society actors could use their presence in public spaces to engage in discursive activities that may otherwise have been denied them in an authoritarian context. The next section on ‘framing’ will explain in more depth the ways in which Islamic actors utilised these discursive opportunities in their activism.

2.5.2 Framing Islamic activism during transition

This section uses collective action ‘framing’ to demonstrate the ways in which Islamic actors articulated discursively their social activities during the transitional period. As introduced above, collective action ‘frames’ refer to the production of beliefs and meanings among social movements that seek to inspire adherents and legitimate their activities. Congruent frames, argues Diani, can intersect with political opportunity structures to lead to successful

131 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 49.
132 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 49.
133 Benford and Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, 614.
According to Benford and Snow, collective actions frames are generated by two processes: frame articulation and frame amplification.

Frame articulation involves the ‘connection and alignment of events and experiences’ which give a frame its novelty so that a ‘new angle of vision, vantage point, and/or interpretation is provided’. In the context of Egypt during the transitional period, Islamic actors recognised an historic opportunity to engage in the political process, to maximise the role of Islam in the social and political structures of the state. As Volpi and Jasper note, ‘Islamist motivational framing advocating electoral participation gained prominence, particularly in those situation of open multiparty competition’, such as in Egypt and Tunisia. As will be shown, this did not apply only to actors who entered the formal political arena, but also other Islamic associations such as Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya, who revised their position on da‘wa due to the changed circumstances to include political activism in support of Islamists during electoral cycles. This recognition of a historic opportunity to engage in politics – either formally or informally – speaks to the importance of subjectivity in initiating social mobilization. As Della Porta stresses, changes in the political opportunity structure ‘do not have any effect on a social movement unless they are perceived as important by the movement itself’.

Frame amplification, meanwhile, involves the invigoration of existing beliefs or values among social movement members to achieve the greatest resonation with potential constituents. Due to the faith-based nature of Islamic activism, frame amplification is often

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135 Benford and Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, 623.
136 Volpi and Jasper, Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between Regimes and Protesters, 22.
138 Benford and Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, 624.
prevalent. For example, in her study of how young students in Egypt’s universities were recruited to the Islamic movement in the 1980s and early 1990s, Wickham describes how ‘Islamists framed activism as a moral “obligation” that demands self-sacrifice and unflinching commitment to the cause of religious transformation’. In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood ‘asserted that every Muslim is obligated to contribute to the task of Islamic social and political reform’. The frames of ‘religious duty’ and ‘obligation’ were prominent in the activism of AS and GS during the transitional period. In particular, political choices in favour of Islamists were framed as a religious duty, equivocating the act of voting for Islamist candidates as being tantamount to adherence to one’s religion. This highlights the strategic dimension that is intrinsic to social movement framing. Benford and Snow note that framing processes are ‘deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed: Frames are developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose - to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth’. In this case, it was ensuring Islamist successes in electoral cycles.

The initiation of a transitional period also opens other discursive opportunities, such as the way in which non-state actors frame the delivery of their welfare provision. As discussed in the literature review, the link between Islamic welfare provision was not explicitly linked to Islamists in the electoral sphere. Brooke notes that under Mubarak, the Brotherhood’s social services ‘passively’ produced social capital via competent and depoliticised services. Freed from the restrictions of authoritarianism, however, the group was open to revise its frame articulation, to makes these links explicit in its delivery. Brooke explains, ‘the Brotherhood responded to these shifting political opportunities by deploying

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140 Wickham, 242.
141 Benford and Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, 624.
highly politicized mobile medical caravans to establish essentially clientelist linkages with Egypt’s poor’. Chapter six focuses on the relationship between the Brotherhood as a movement and its newly formed political party, the FJP, between 2011 and 2013, detailing the explicit politicisation of the movement’s service apparatus to serve the party in the electoral arena. Rather than passively generating social capital from Islamic welfare in general, the Brotherhood now directly communicated to recipients that the service was being provided by a movement/party seeking votes in a political campaign.

The politicised frame articulation of service delivery was also applied in the governance of the FJP during its year in power. The delivery of public goods by the FJP was framed in a similar way to attribute their delivery directly to the movement/party as opposed to the state over which they were custodians. It has been observed that Islamists have benefitted from a ‘reputational effect’ due to the perception that much Islamic - not necessarily Islamist - welfare is attributable to the Muslim Brotherhood. During the transitional period the relationship between movement and party sought to redress this gap in favour of a direct linkage to attribute, firstly, direct welfare being attributable to the Brotherhood during electoral cycles, and secondly, welfare and services provided via the Brotherhood as being attributable to the FJP as part of its governance. This served to portray an inextricable link between the movement, party and its governance of the Egyptian state, in the absence of effective control over state institutions.

The effect of the explicit politicisation of social activism in the framing strategies of Islamic associations would expose their social institutions to the contagion of the state’s crackdown on the Brotherhood in 2013 and beyond. As Lewis suggests, authoritarian regimes follow a dual policy in ‘promoting non-governmental associations engaged in some measure

142 Brooke, Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage, 121.
143 Cammett and Jones-Luong, ‘Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?’
of self-organization and service delivery, while restricting those engaged in public sphere
discursive activities'. Of the greatest concern is when self-organization is combined with
the development of independent discourses that may challenge the official narrative of the
state. The transitional period saw an increased overlap between self-organizational and
public sphere activism, first among Islamic associations formally outside politics, but who
engaged more in political advocacy, and secondly, through the Brotherhood’s politicisation
of its welfare provision. A movement, which was already a potential threat, had crossed an
important threshold, presenting itself – not just the Muslim Brotherhood – as a profound
threat to the reconstituted authoritarian regime.

2.5.3 Resource mobilization and pre-existing networks

Although the political opportunity model outlined above is important for understanding
changes in the form and scope of mobilization under different regime types, it also has
limitations, such as indicating the relative successes of individual social movements.
Goldstone argues that while political opportunities seem essential for the emergence of social
mobilization on a macro level, it is less instructive for understanding why, once access has
been initiated, ‘certain groups at certain times turn to protest to make it a larger part of their
repertoire of actions, or why certain groups, but not others, succeed in their goals’. To
understand this aspect, Goldstone argues, ‘a more detailed analysis of the specific context of
individual movements is required to understand their dynamics’. To understand the

144 Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’, 332.
145 Lewis, 333.
146 Goldstone, ‘More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to Relational
Fields’, 348.
147 Goldstone, 349.
148 Goldstone, 356.
dynamics of individual movements in this section I emphasise the importance of resource mobilization.

The successful expansion in social mobilization of Islamic associations during the transitional period also benefited from the resources on which these movements were able to draw upon. To reiterate, within social movement theory, resource mobilization is a key variable leading to mobilization, including material resources such as organizing space, finances, equipment, or human resources like relevant experience and skills among members. The organizational resources of Islamic associations have been highlighted, such as the availability of the mosque as a ‘religio-spatial mobilizing structure’ from which to organize collective action and connect communities of activists. The ability to institutionalize and build networks of activists under authoritarian rule, as discussed in the literature review, further demonstrates the significant resource mobilization Islamic associations were able to draw upon during the transitional period. Indeed, their long civil tradition prior to the Uprisings has been cited as a key advantage over their secular/liberal rivals. A study comparing Islamic and secular “popular committees” during the transitional period found that Islamists benefited from a strong financial and organizational infrastructure, whereas the new, locally-based leftist organizations had not yet evolved a sustainable financial and managerial model. Bremer points out that many of the popular committees providing services during the transitional period represented ‘Egypt’s first experience with organized civic activism emerging from the grassroots, rather than from the action of a religious organization, the state, or international actors’.

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152 Bremer.
draw upon pre-existing networks and associations, therefore, were better placed to succeed in their goals than their secular counterparts, who found institutionalising their activism, such as in popular committees, more difficult.

Relying on pre-existing networks may also provide advantages in relations with the transitional authorities. Volpi and Clark point out that state actors can respond to mobilization by a mixture of concessions, co-optation and coercion, aimed at fragmenting the uniting of protest movements whose shared target is the state. In this scenario, mainstream, institutionalized networks are better placed to attract new concessions from the state, as opposed to newer, potentially more uncompromising actors.  

As will be shown in chapter four, Islamic associations were not reportedly subject to the same levels of state oversight as their secular/liberal counterparts. The reason, I suggest, can be found within Joshua Stacher’s distinction of Egypt’s opposition movements as being either ‘systemic’, which applies to the Islamists, and ‘antisystemic’, applying to secular/liberal groups. Antisystemic opposition groups reject the formal politics of a transition led by remnants of an autocratic system, which they feel will dilute the ability to drive for outcomes beyond incremental change. By contrast, systemic opposition participate in formal politics and (mostly) adhere to a regime’s rules. Along with their Islamist associates, Islamic associations accepted the SCAF’s timetable for transition, focusing their activism on electioneering strategies through service provision, whereas secular/liberal NGOs focused on political advocacy and human rights were more likely to challenge the actual process of the transition. This potentially made Islamic associations, during the transitional period at least, less of a threat to the transitional authorities.

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2.5.4 Movement networks and individuals

The activities and agenda of social actors are also shaped by the networks in which they inhabit. Networks refer to the evolution of social relations, long-term ongoing relationships that ‘structure the interactions of the members and interactions that shape the more immediate activities and agenda of these actors.’ Within a network, the relations between individuals can be transformed as well as between networks as collective actors. The social ties between individuals and different types of networks can both facilitate and hinder action. Gade shows, for instance, how the demobilization and remobilization of Islamist networks in Lebanon was heavily influenced by individual activists’ relations with party and state officials. In chapter four, I detail the way in which the influential Salafi preacher Shaykh Hafez Salama used his decades long feud with the Ministry of Awqaf to mobilize his supporters to retake control of the Nur mosque in Abbasiyya. This episode represented a wider tussle between Islamic associations elsewhere and the state over control of mosques during the transitional period. The fluid nature of Salafi networks, discussed in chapter five, also highlights the prominent role that individuals play. Charismatic and influential individuals, such as the prominent Salafi preacher, Mohammed Hassan, who was an active member in both Ansar al-Sunna and al-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya, can play prominent roles in constituting the internal dynamics of a movement, but also in relation to other movements. Individuals such as Hassan, made strategic choices to emphasise Islamic unity during

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electoral cycles, despite the antagonism between specific factions. Individuals, as will be shown in chapter five, can also influence individual branches of collective actors, through ‘entryism’, in which groups such as the Brotherhood ‘reach the masses indirectly through preexisting Islamic social-service networks’.  

Networks are also important for constituting the identity of a movement and how they are perceived externally. For example, Donker identifies two fault lines in Syrian activism during the Uprisings; whether social activism is political or non-political, and whether activism is violent or nonviolent. The latter distinction provided a clear, practical demarcation line. But the former was more blurred, and tended to be defined by the discursive strategies emphasised by individual activists and their networks. Donker finds that as networks increasingly intersected, two types of discursive strategies emerged. On the one side, some activists began to emphasize the non-political nature of their mobilization. In effect, these activists distanced their activism discursively from rebel networks. On the other side, some activists emphasized a collective identity as a unifying framework for different types of activism. Donker argues that those emphasising collective identity ‘discursively bridged the two mobilization networks’ which were ‘types of strategic choices made by individual activists, related to the networked context in which they found themselves’.  

The engagement in discursive framing by Islamic associations during the transitional period, introduced above in the framing section and discussed in chapter five, was also influenced by the networked context in which specific organizations operated, as well as the strategic choices of individuals. This not only provided a source of campaigning support, but discursively emphasised the links between networks of Islamic actors. AS and GS made

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158 Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, And Elections In Egypt, 80.
159 Donker, ‘Between Rebellion and Uprising Intersecting Networks and Discursive Strategies in Rebel Controlled Syria’.
160 Donker, 18.
strategic choices by discursively bridging between their own social activism and the political mobilization of Islamist actors operating formally in the political sphere. Organizations that had previously been forced to emphasise the ‘apolitical’ credentials of their social activism under Mubarak, could now discursively emphasise the links between da‘wa, or their social activism, and providing support to the electoral game. They constituted themselves within a network of Islamic/Islamist actors to maximise the role of Islam in the new social and political structures of the Egyptian state and society. By doing so, they emphasised the collective identity of Islamic actors which project a sense and discourse of unity that belied the factional cleavages that emerged between the Brotherhood and Salafi parties.

2.6 Conclusions

The easing of state corporatism and abandonment of the Nasserist policy of statism created the environment through which a significant Islamic movement emerged, largely unincorporated from the regime. Despite its significance, it was kept relatively depoliticised through indirect bureaucratic controls that prevented the links between ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities being explicitly overlapped. Then, during the transitional period, a political opportunity structure emerged, via the fall of Mubarak, that enabled Egypt’s Islamic associations to not only to expand their unincorporated movement, but to develop a politicised framing of social activism that combined ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities. For formally apolitical Islamic associations, this took the form of political activism in support of Islamists during electoral cycles, while for the Muslim Brotherhood, this took the form of an explicit politicisation of its welfare provision as part of
the electioneering strategy of its political party. This strategy was then furthered while in government, through the politicisation of the delivery of public goods.

The relaxation of statism had thus put the Egyptian state in a weakened position in terms of its ability to compete for social control with increasingly strong societal actors, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the wider Islamic movement. In order to reclaim this authority, the reconstituted authoritarian state under Sisi is renewing the emphasis on statism in order to re-establish more direct relationships with the population, and to lay claim to the authority to regulate all social relations, by removing autonomous relations in civil society, particularly those of its key competitor, the Islamic movement. The way in which it has done this is a combination of ‘exclusionary’ and repressive ‘despotic power’, with an attempt to extend social control over the religious sector by increasing ‘infrastructural power’ through its own social and religious institutions.

States can increase their infrastructural power and increase their resource base by penetrating society, and securing sufficient resources to enable them to fulfil their goals. This comprises both a domestic aspect, such as appropriating resources from society through taxation, or, in this case, religious charity, but also an external aspect, through foreign aid from state actors, or loans from international financial institutions. This support provides an important resource base for regimes, but can also impact on the structure of the state and relations with society. In the Egyptian case, increased statism in the political economy is mirrored by statism as part of the political campaign to control the Islamic movement. The state not only commandeers private Islamic institutions, but increases its own presence in areas such as social and religious service provision, in which Islamic movements operate.

However, the extent to which the state has sufficient capacity to undertake these ambitious goals will shape the extent to which it is successful in this endeavour. In its
absence, the state can engage in hollow statism to compensate for this gap. In Egypt under Sisi, despite the implementation of comprehensive state controls over Islamic social and religious institutions being incomplete in practice, the government continues to project the attainment of these aims discursively through public pronouncements. In the face of the breaking own of existing theories relating to the role of non-state service provision in sustaining authoritarian rule, this dissertation argues that the pattern of adapted authoritarian rule features a novel combination of repression, infrastructural expansion, and performative governance through discourse.
CHAPTER THREE
CYCLES OF ACCOMMODATION AND SUPPRESSION FROM NASSER TO MUBARAK

To understand fully the changes that occurred in Egypt’s Islamic movement between 2011 and 2013, and the extent to which the state has been brought back in under Sisi, it is vital to first survey relations between the state and the Islamic movement. This will demonstrate how Sisi’s regime draws on the toolkit of control methods established by his predecessors, as well as serve as a basis for comparison when analysing the structure of the authoritarian state he has developed since 2013. These relations, I argue, can be understood as undergoing periodic cycles of accommodation and suppression, depending on the (sometimes enforced) requirements of the state during critical junctures. Islamic associations provide a useful lens to track changes in state-society relations due to their prominent role in providing social welfare as well as other religious services. In the case of Egypt, they represent important actors in the ‘mixed economy of charity’, as Amy Singer puts it, with the extent of their involvement in service provision fluctuating in more or less terms vis-à-vis the state and its own service apparatus. The particular mix of service-provision under different regimes can be used as a marker to conceptualise state-society relations and their methods of authoritarian control. For example, in the social contract of Nasser’s ‘populist’ regime, the state declared itself solely responsible for welfare provision in return for political quiescence, whereas in the ‘post-populism’ of economic restructuring and privatisation under Sadat and subsequently Mubarak, non-state actors, particularly Islamic ones, played an increased role in service-provision to fill the gap left by the retreating state. This chapter charts the trajectory of Egypt’s ‘mixed economy of charity’ between the state and Islamic associations during

1 Singer, Charity in Islamic Societies, p.177.
Egypt’s republican era, focusing on the regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. For each of their presidencies it considers the nature of its state and its relations with Islamic associations in both ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities.

3.1 Nasser’s ‘populist-corporatist’ regime

On 23 July, 1952, a group of young military officers, led by the charismatic Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, launched a successful coup d’état to end monarchical rule in Egypt. Within days the cadre, known as the Free Officers, had forced the abdication of King Faruq, and had begun their drive for the modernization of the state. Despite initially lacking a distinct ideological orientation, they nevertheless had a clear nationalist commitment to freeing the country from imperial domination, dismantling the economic control enjoyed by foreign minorities and the landed upper class, and sought to facilitate more opportunities for a burgeoning middle class, alongside social justice for the peasantry. But the changes Egypt witnessed during the Nasser period went beyond nationalist concerns and the reorganisation of the class structure, for the nature of the regime and its ramifications for state-society relations was also shifting.

According to Kirk Beattie, the Nasser years were characterised by an attempt at achieving Gramscian hegemony over civil society. In order for the ruling group to achieve supremacy and pre-eminence, control of political and economic functions alongside the coercive apparatus is important, but not sufficient. For this also requires the control of civil society, enabling the ruling group to establish some degree of ideological supremacy over its rivals. To achieve this, Nasser’s regime reorganised its relations with various civil society institutions, including private voluntary associations and religious institutions, to seek a level

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of domination that had not been achieved during previous rounds of state building. Subordination of civil society to state control was instituted in two ways. First, state-society relations were reorganised in a ‘corporatist’ structure to restrict the autonomy of private organisations, including voluntary associations and religious institutions, by implementing control functions over their leadership selection and funding avenues. Meanwhile, the eventual adoption of socialism as the guiding ideology of the state meant that areas such as health and education were rendered the sole responsibility of the government as it sought to reduce inequality and achieve social justice. As a result, the swathe of nationalisations that were imposed on privately-held lands and industry was also extended to include private voluntary associations involved in service provision and private religious institutions whose independence might have challenged the new direction of the regime.

Nasser’s regime has been described as ‘populist-corporatist’ due to its blend of redistributive policies and étatism. Economically, étatism entails a state-led industrialization process, with varying degrees of state control over economic and social policy. On the political level, it involved a corporatist ordering of state-society relations. Corporatism was institutionalized through quasi-governmental organisations which were created to represent voluntary associations. Decree 1303 of 1969 created the General Federation of NGOs, with a Cairo headquarters chaired by the minister of MOSA, with regional federations in the governorates. Associations registered as members in the regional federation, with each having a representative on the general assembly alongside high ranking civil servants from MOSA, and the ministries of Health, Education, and Planning. Many of these state employees were able to double up as part of the board of directors for the regional federation,

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7 Ibrahim, p.47.
as well as in the board of the associations in that area. Effectively, members of these corps – associations – were incorporated into state structures, as mechanisms were implemented to ensure they complied with MOSA’s rules and remained quiescent to the state’s authority. Power over the selection of leaders, and having the ability to restrict access to financial resources were ‘reward mechanisms’ which allowed MOSA to co-opt associations.

Corporatism in Egypt developed across two phases, with the first encompassing the consolidation phase of the revolution, in which the focus was placed on the key economic sectors, such as the labour movement and professional syndicates. This system was an ‘inclusionary’ national alliance, comprising workers, peasants, intellectuals, national capitalists and soldiers, combined in the form of a single party, the Arab Socialist Union. By the end of the 1950s, with the key associational reorganisations in place, attention then shifted towards what has been termed the more ideological areas of civil society; amalgamating private voluntary associations into regional federations, sponsored by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS). Group activity was gradually corporatised over a number of years, and by the mid-1960s had produced ‘a nearly universal system of functional representation under state control’.

New legal frameworks were implemented which provided corporatist structures with the means to control associational activity. Law 384 of 1956 authorised the state to dissolve any associations which either violated the law or posed a threat to state security. The more comprehensive Law 32 was instituted in 1964 and ‘provided a mandate for control of all PVOs [private voluntary organisations] in Egypt’. Article 30 gave the ministry power to

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8 Ibrahim, p.47.
9 Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt, p.132.
11 Bianchi, p.79.
12 Bianchi, p.72.
14 Ibrahim, An Assessment of Grass Roots Participation in the Development of Egypt, p.44.
merge associations deemed to be performing the same functions in communities.\textsuperscript{15} Islamic associations were prominent targets, as evidenced by the dissolving of al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya’s board of directors in 1966. Banned from performing its functions for several months, it was only allowed to resume its work under the supervision of a new regime-appointed chairman, General Abdelrahim Amin.\textsuperscript{16} In 1969 the assets of the politically-minded Ansar al-Sunna were seized and the group was forced to merge with al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya for a number of years.\textsuperscript{17} These laws thereby provided the legislative means to control the direction of Islamic associations and their activities, and limit their potential to become sites of political opposition.

Official religious institutions were also subject to corporatist restructuring, with al-Azhar being transformed into a semi-official organ of the state through these ‘reward mechanisms’. Financially, its autonomy was removed in 1954 when all remaining lands of the \textit{waqf} religious endowment, which at the time amounted to 12\% of all arable land, were effectively nationalised and placed under the authority of the Ministry of Awqaf.\textsuperscript{18} All schools, hospitals and other institutions financed by \textit{awqaf} were then transferred to public administrations, such as the ministries of health and education.\textsuperscript{19} Further reorganisation came in 1961 with a law granting the Egyptian president and the Minister of Awqaf authority over senior appointments to the institution, including its head, the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar.\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, the body’s High Council was also required to include three government appointments specialising in university education, as well as representatives from the

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\textsuperscript{15} Abdelrahman, \textit{Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt}, p.130.
\textsuperscript{18} Moustafa, ‘Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt’, p.5.
\textsuperscript{19} Pioppi, ‘Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy: The Revival of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) in Egypt’, p.132.
\textsuperscript{20} Moustafa, ‘Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt’, p.5.
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ministries of Awqaf, Education, Justice, and the Treasury. Al-Azhar was thus stripped of its independence and was increasingly exploited to provide a source of religious legitimacy for the policies of the regime.

Despite the authoritarian nature of Nasser’s restructuring of state-society relations, his regime nevertheless had a moral sanction in that it was driven by a desire to achieve social justice for all Egyptians. Nasser had the conviction that economic growth could be achieved alongside redistribution, although it was some time before socialism became the guiding ideological principle of the state. For the first four years after the Free Officers’ coup, economic development continued largely in the direction of ‘guided capitalism’, whereby the private sector was welcomed yet under close planning and stimulation by the state. At this stage, economic growth was prioritised above income redistribution. After the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, however, the state became increasingly étatist and by the dawn of the 1960s, socialist policies had become predominant, with the state assuming the functions of investment and production in an increasingly large public sector, demonstrated by the nationalisation of all major banks and industries. Traces of socialism could, of course, be identified from the first redistributive land reforms which had swiftly followed the coup, aiming to restrict the size of the agricultural holdings of large landowners, which in 1952 saw 70% of the cultivatable land being owned by 4,000 families, less than 1% of the population. But it was with the adoption of the first five year plan of 1959/60 – 1964/5, and a succession of nationalisations between 1961 and 1963, that socialism became the driving force behind the Free Officers’ plans.

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22 Beattie, Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics and Civil Society, p.1.
25 Ayubi, Over-States the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, p.208.
Achieving economic growth alongside redistribution to the poorest Egyptians led to a string of welfarist policies by the Egyptian government. The construction of a welfare state was thereby pursued. This consisted of two layers: industrial and residualist programmes.\textsuperscript{26} The former was specifically pro-labour, aimed at assisting Nasser’s drive for economic development, in the form of a programme of social insurance, food subsidies, and public employment. The benefits to the wider population were scant because the benefits only extended to organised labour among urban workers. Therefore, the residualist dimension aimed at redistributive justice, comprising a universal healthcare programme and a social assistance programme.\textsuperscript{27} Expenditure on healthcare increased by 34\% in the 13 years after 1952, and the number of public hospitals increased in urban areas from 90 to 116 by 1964.\textsuperscript{28} Meanwhile, the poverty alleviation schemes also expanded through the new social assistance Law 133 of 1964.\textsuperscript{29} The total amount spent on healthcare over the 70 years prior to the revolution was matched between 1961 and 1964 alone.\textsuperscript{30} The budget for health in 1951-2 was $19.35m and by 1963-4 it was $71.94m. From 1959 to 1965 the number of health care units doubled to 1,525, compared to 382 that existed on eve of revolution. This creation of a welfare state under Nasser positioned the state as the primary benefactor of Egyptians’ wellbeing.

The establishment of the state as the primary actor in welfare provision indicated that such services were not the responsibility of private associations, with ultimate responsibility residing with the state.\textsuperscript{31} In this regard similar process of nationalisation was applied to other sections of Egyptian society. For example, in the 1950s the directory of Social Agencies

\textsuperscript{27} Kawamura, p.74.
\textsuperscript{28} Kawamura, p.96.
\textsuperscript{29} Kawamura, p.98.
\textsuperscript{30} Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat, p.220.
\textsuperscript{31} Gallagher, Egypt’s Other Wars: Epidemics and the Politics of Public Health, pp.169-70.
listed more than 100 charitable organisations providing health services, with two in particular – the Mabarra Muhammad Ali Association and the Women’s Committee of the Red Crescent Association – being the largest and most active in providing large-scale relief to the needy.\textsuperscript{32}

In the early 1960s they were both nationalised, with few of the existing volunteers being kept on under government administration. The tendency of the government to annex voluntary associations that were particularly effective was reflected in Article 66 of Law 32 which accorded ‘public status’ for associations that demonstrated significant efficacy. Thus, when associations demonstrated their ability to meet needs which were national in scope, the government stepped in to take over, effectively turning them into appendages of the state.\textsuperscript{33}

Increasingly, voluntary hospitals and other service-providing associations were annexed,\textsuperscript{34} with the Nasser period thus being described as experiencing the ‘nationalisation of Egypt’s PVOs’.\textsuperscript{35}

The nationalisation trend can also be identified among private religious institutions, albeit motivated more by a desire to control discourse in the public sphere rather than by socialism. Mosques have been identified as providing an important link between Islamic voluntary associations and the institutional role that religion has played in welfare provision, as well as in worship.\textsuperscript{36} With the increasing prevalence of private \textit{ahli} mosques, the appropriation of private mosques thus became a key concern for extending control over not only religious practice, but the means of affecting public attitudes. In accordance with the Law 157 of 1960, many private mosques came under the administration of the Ministry of Awqaf. Across 1961 and 1962, there were 800 mosques annexed to the authority of the

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\textsuperscript{32} Gallagher, p.171.
\textsuperscript{34} During its confrontation with the government, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood’s welfare centres were seized with administrative control being placed with MOSA. See Mona Atia, \textit{Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt}, Quadrant Book (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), p.39.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibrahim, \textit{An Assessment of Grass Roots Participation in the Development of Egypt}, p.42.
\textsuperscript{36} Harrigan and El-Said, \textit{Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare Provision}, p.21.
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Ministry of Awqaf, followed by 200 in 1963 and around 500 annually for the following three years.\(^{37}\) In 1962 there were 2,997 governmental mosques, of which 44% had been taken over from private management in the previous decade under laws of 1953 and 1960, and accompanied by an increase of 80% in governmental mosque personnel.\(^{38}\) Despite this, the growth of private mosques in this period far exceeded the rate at which the state was able to incorporate them into its own religious bureaucracy. In 1963, for example, there were 3,006 governmental mosques and 14,212 private mosques.\(^{39}\) Nevertheless, what this demonstrates is the governmental policy of not only nationalising voluntary associations which were able to provide effective services, but also the desire to assume governmental control over institutions associated with them, such as mosques. Therefore, in attempting to achieve the hegemonic domination of civil society, Nasser’s regime drew upon the corporatist structures and legal frameworks which also extended to the social and religious institutions of Egypt’s Islamic movement.

3.2 Sadat: \textit{Infitaḥ} and ‘controlled liberalization’

The direction of Egypt took an unexpected turn on 28 September, 1970, when Nasser succumbed to a fatal heart attack, leading to the succession of its third president, Anwar Sadat. Having inherited a dire financial situation, with huge budget deficits, currency shortages, and a drastically underperforming industrial sector, Sadat sought to shift the orientation of the state from the socialism of his predecessor towards capitalism by initiating a process of economic liberalization, or \textit{infitaḥ}. Liberalization in the economic sphere was paralleled by an accompanying degree of freedom in the political and social realm, leading to

\(^{38}\) Berger, p.56.
\(^{39}\) Berger, p.16.
the renewal of the party system and the flourishing of civil society activity. The shifting orientations of the state’s infitah economic policy had a knock-on effect on Egypt’s fledgling welfare state, with underinvestment leading to a decline in health and education services. To help alleviate the burden, and reflecting the state’s new ideological outlook, private actors were encouraged in areas of service provision. Islamic activists were among the primary beneficiaries, in part resulting from Sadat’s political calculation that they could be an effective tool to dilute the oppositional impact of the Nasserist left. These efforts to undermine leftist opponents led to a shift in the orientation of the regime, from a secular to a religious one, which included the encouragement of an independent Islamic movement. The result was the expansion of a significant Islamic movement in Egypt, including a rehabilitated Muslim Brotherhood, growing largely out of university campuses and spreading in the form of voluntary associations and mosques.

The flagship policy of Sadat’s government was infitah, or the Open Door Economic Policy. Its basic aim was to cut back on the statist controls over the economy that characterised Nasser’s era, instead trying to stimulate increased levels of private investment. Through Law 43 of 1974 and its amendment, Law 32 of 1977, Egypt became open to foreign investment in numerous fields, with assurances given to investors regarding any reversion to nationalisation, and tax exemptions for new investments. Meanwhile, Law 97 of 1976 dismantled state control over foreign exchange by providing a free market, also allowing foreign investors to buy foreign exchange with Egyptian pounds. As a result, the Egyptian government surrendered its controls over the amount and type of imports. Infitah thus represented a departure from the state-led approach to development undertaken under Nasser,

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42 Hinnebusch, p.273.
with its logic of privatization having repercussions for Egypt’s ‘mixed economy’ of service provision.

The declining economic growth of the late 1960s and early 1970s, coupled with the changing economic outlook of the state, meant that Egypt’s socialist phase and its accompanying promises of extending basic welfare services to all was curtailed.\(^{43}\) This did not, however, constitute the complete dismantling of state welfare services, but rather an officially-sanctioned neglect that resulted in its deteriorating quality.\(^{44}\) State programmes of education and healthcare faced increased user demand with fewer resources, public hospitals were left in squalor with poor standards of sanitation, whilst there was a shortage in nursing and the quality of equipment was also deteriorating.\(^{45}\) Reflecting the wider economic outlook of the Egyptian state in the 1970s, the response instead was to promote the development of a quality private sector in these areas. New private clinics soon opened equipped with good quality equipment imported from outside the country, and plans were put in place to build major new private hospitals.\(^{46}\) Resulting from the decline of public welfare services and the emergence of these better-quality private services, a ‘two-tier social service system’ developed with parallel systems for different sectors of society.\(^{47}\) At one end of the spectrum, the expanding wealthy classes, who could afford to pay, benefited from the private healthcare

\(^{43}\) Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the political economy of two regimes*, p.223.

\(^{44}\) Despite the declining resources dedicated to some welfare services, the shifting economic priorities of Sadat’s regime could not undo the populist promises of Nasserism entirely. The idea of the state mediating to ensure some degree of equality endured, with the subsidies system remaining and even expanding in order to deal with the price instability incurred due to the free market system. For example, food subsidies were extended to include almost 20 food items which were made available to 90% of the population. When the Egyptian government tried to modify and cut some subsidies due to pressure from the IMF to gain loans, there were massive urban riots in January 1977, leading to government retreat. Thus, subsidies ‘had become a central tenet of an enduring social contract’. See Bayat (2006) p.139.


and education systems created to cater for them. Meanwhile at the other end, those who could not afford to pay were forced to rely on the underfunded and oversubscribed services provided by the state. When faced with declining resources, and thus the capacity to maintain Nasserist welfarist policies, or at least the public pronouncement of them, the response of the Sadat regime and its view of the state’s role in economic development, was to quietly withdraw from the goal of providing universal services to all, promoting private actors in their place. And with the embrace of religion as a foil to Nasserist opposition, Islam, as will shall be shown, would play a prominent role in this regard.

The new state policy of economic liberalization was also accompanied by a modicum of political pluralization, or what has been termed ‘controlled liberalization’. The single-party system represented by the Arab Socialist Union was dismantled, with ‘platforms’ (manabir) representing the right, centre, and left, being allowed to form, adopt political programmes and put forward lists for the 1976 parliamentary elections. This was the first step towards the resumption of a party system, through which various interests could be represented. Liberalization also led to the increased pluralization of civil society in the 1970s, with the emergence of professional syndicates, or interest groups. In the second half of the 1970s, for example, journalists, doctors, lawyers, and engineers enjoyed greater autonomy and were able to hold elections to the councils of their professional associations. Members of these various syndicates began to compete with candidates fielded by the president’s newly-created National Democratic Party in council elections. Not only representative of a greater pluralization of the Egyptian public sphere, syndicates also provided a new platform for mobilization against the policies of the state.

49 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, p.415.
The pluralization of civil society also extended to voluntary associations. By the mid-point of the 1970s the total number of private voluntary associations had nearly doubled to 7,593 in 1976. With infītah in full flow, the rate continued to rise with the figure reaching 10,731 by 1981, representing a 41% increase in that five-year-period. The principles of infītah, in both economic and political terms, enabled the pluralization of civil society. It will now be shown how the Sadat regime’s efforts to combat political opposition to infītah and manage the potential fallout from a reduction in the welfarist dimension of the state combined to provide the impetus for a significant expansion of a particular sub-section of this civil society: the Islamic movement.

To consolidate his rule and insulate himself from resistance to his shift away from Nasserism, Sadat had announced his ‘Corrective Revolution’ on 15 May, 1971, promising the termination of police state activities, a return to the rule of law, and the restoration of basic civil liberties. The more immediate concern, however, was the ‘de-Nasserization’ of the power centres inherited from his predecessor, with almost 90 figures associated with the Nasserist left being arrested. To further aid the transition from the policies of his predecessor, Sadat sought a new ideational base of legitimacy, by drawing upon Egypt’s religious culture to counter the secular leftism of Nasserism. Positioning himself as the ‘Believer President’, Sadat emphasised his adherence to piety and devotion in his daily life, drawing upon Qur’anic verses in his public speeches. More than just a rhetorical device, government policy began to mirror Sadat’s personal religiosity, becoming suffused with Islamic principles. The new constitution of 1971 included an article stating that ‘Islam is the

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state religion’ and ‘the principles of the *shari’a* [Islamic law] are a major source of legislation’. In Cairo, Sadat also ordered the construction of 1,000 new mosques to add to the 40,000 distributed throughout the city already. Islamic programming was also increased in the media, as were Islamic courses in schools and universities, whilst the call to prayer would interrupt even live presidential speeches. Religious themes were also used to justify the regime’s policies, such as the decision to go to war with Israel in October 1973.

Sadat’s embrace of religion in his approach to governance also extended to the promotion of Islamic actors in civil society, particularly among students. By 1970, university enrolment had been expanding quickly, resulting from the provision of free public education at all levels under Nasser. At this time, political activism on campuses was widespread, dominated by leftist and Nasserist students. However, another type of university group had also emerged in 1968 after the catastrophic military defeat suffered during the Six-Day War with Israel the previous year: small religious groupings known as *usrat* (families). Having faced restrictions on their activities under Nasser, the *usrat* were instead encouraged as Sadat and his advisors calculated their potential as a force to counter the leftists and Nasserists and the threat they posed in opposition to his plans. Thus, the regime facilitated these emerging student associations, allowing them to set up religious camps at universities during the summer months. The *usrat* would soon manifest into more significant organisational forms, with the official approval for the creation of the Cairo University-based *Gam’at Shabab al-Islam* being announced at the Conference of University Students Federations on 12 October,

56 Beattie, *Egypt during the Sadat Years*, p.102.
60 Beattie, *Egypt during the Sadat Years*, p.94.
61 Al-Arian, *Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt*, p.54.
62 Beattie, *Egypt during the Sadat Years*, p.103.
63 Beattie, p.103.
This was important, as its establishment represented the first active Islamic movement that was not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Shabab al-Islam would set the precedent for the new Islamic political organisations of the 1970s, a set of groups called al-Gamāʾaṭ al-Islamiyya, which spread across the country’s university campuses. These groups began preaching Islamic observance and social justice, while building support through the provision of social and community services to students.

The encouragement of Islamic activism on campuses also paralleled the rehabilitation of the Muslim Brotherhood following periods of severe repression under Nasser in 1954 and 1965-6. As part of the aforementioned ‘Corrective Revolution’, Brothers imprisoned since the 1965 abortive coup were gradually released, with the final wave of prisoners being set free in 1975. Members of the Brotherhood in exile were also granted permission to return, many of them had achieved financial success while abroad. These financial assets allowed the group to establish new business interests, and re-establish a network of charitable associations, after its previous infrastructure was seized and incorporated into the MOSS under Nasser. The Brotherhood’s magazine al-Daʾwa was also permitted, providing the group with a reach of 100,000. These factors allowed the Brotherhood to strengthen its organisational foundations and establish a social base that would serve as a precursor to its eventual political toleration under Mubarak.

The benefit of the Islamic movement to the Egyptian government went beyond their political utility, as it was recognised that they could also play a functional role in alleviating the potential fallout from declining state services. The ‘two-tier’ parallel system of services

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64 Beattie, p.106.
65 Al-Arian, Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt, p.59.
66 Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs the State, p.73.
68 Beattie, Egypt during the Sadat Years, p.114.
69 Atia, Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt, p.39.
70 Esposito, Islam and Politics, p.237.
did not remain a dichotomy between the poor-quality but free services of the state, and the better yet expensive standards of those in the private sector. Another trend also emerged in Egypt’s civil society sector to alleviate the impact of deteriorating public services, in the form of Islamic welfare.\textsuperscript{71} An initiative to ‘revitalize’ religious charity was pursued by the government to help alleviate the impact of its reduced commitment to service provision.\textsuperscript{72} Part of this strategy was the encouragement of private mosques to play an enlarged role in providing basic services to the population in education and health, with many of them associated with emerging Islamic associations.\textsuperscript{73} Mosque building was encouraged through the introduction of legislation that granted tax exemptions to buildings containing a religious site. Construction companies were thus incentivized to include new ‘mosques’ within new building projects, which in many cases amounted to small prayer rooms, known as zawiyas, in the basements of residential housing complexes.\textsuperscript{74} The expansion of private wealth due to economic liberalization partly enabled this trend, while the regional oil boom led to a major new source of capital in the form of remittances from Egyptian migrants working in Libya and the Gulf, some of which was invested in communal projects. The result was the doubling of private ahli mosques, which increased from around 20,000 in 1970 to more than 46,000 by 1981, with only 6,000 coming under any degree of supervision by the Ministry of Awqaf.\textsuperscript{75}

The rate of increase in new private mosques was also matched by that of private voluntary associations, particularly of those which were Islamic in character. Islamic associations benefited from being exempt from the fund-raising restrictions that were imposed on the voluntary sector by Law 32, and could operate not only with more financial autonomy, but also benefit from the increases in private wealth that were increasingly

\textsuperscript{71} Pioppi, ‘Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy: The Revival of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) in Egypt’, p.130.
\textsuperscript{72} Pioppi, p.134.
\textsuperscript{73} Pioppi, p.134.
\textsuperscript{74} Wickham, \textit{Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt}, p.98.
\textsuperscript{75} Wickham, p.98.
funnelled into Islamic institutions, such as banking.\textsuperscript{76} The number of registered Islamic associations as a proportion of the total number of voluntary associations rose from 17.33\% in the 1960s to 31.02\% in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{77} The expansion of this aspect of the Islamic movement therefore demonstrates how its encouragement by the state was due to a combination of functional as well as political concerns.

3.3 Mubarak and the policy of ‘selective accommodation’

Upon assuming the presidency in 1981 following his predecessor’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak initially cracked down hard on Islamists, arresting four thousand members of Islamist groups, with little discrimination as to their militant or moderate backgrounds.\textsuperscript{78} However, in the long-term he was faced with the problem of how to crack down on the extremist elements which had emerged within the Islamist movement, while avoiding the blunt repression across society, which had such fatal consequences for his predecessor. Mubarak eventually settled on a policy of ‘selective accommodation’ towards Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{79} But while the Brotherhood would be the primary benefactor of the regime’s new policy, its rise was paralleled by the continued proliferation of a burgeoning Islamic sector, initiated under Sadat but finding its fullest realisation under Mubarak, in the form of Islamic associations, private mosques, and Islamic businesses. Meanwhile, further economic restructuring would see the implementation of neoliberal reforms, including the further curtailment of the state’s service provision, which also

\textsuperscript{78} Atia, \textit{Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt}, p.41.
\textsuperscript{79} Wickham, \textit{Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt}, p.103.
contributed to the explosion of associational activity, particularly Islamic-based. Despite this rapid expansion in associational activity, the Mubarak period was not, however, one of unfettered civil society expansion, for various strategies were still devised for maintaining some level of control, albeit an ‘indirect’ one, either through the strategic allocation of resources or through bureaucratic and administrative legislation.

The openness towards the Brotherhood which began in the 1970s continued under Mubarak with several of its members being included amongst a wider release of political prisoners. The electoral law of 1983 would enshrine the political culture of ḥizbiyya, or partisanship, providing a ‘legal umbrella’ for the Brotherhood to operate and contest the parliamentary elections the following year for the first time since 1944.80 Toleration of the Brotherhood in the political realm also enabled the continued development of its tanzim, or organisation, as part of the group’s wider efforts for Islamic reform in Egyptian society. By the end of the 1980s, it comprised 11 different departments dedicated to social services, da’wa (proselytization), students, workers, teachers, faculty clubs, women, education, families, physical training, the Muslim world, and professional syndicates. Through the latter, the Brotherhood was able to continue the development of its organisation capacity and experience of electoral processes, assuming control of all major professional unions, such as doctors, teachers, engineers, and journalists by the beginning of the 1990s.81 Control of professional syndicates also provided an opportunity to expand their service-providing apparatus and middle-class networks. In 1988, a health care scheme was introduced into the medical syndicate, offering subsidised treatments in private hospitals to members and their families, with the number of beneficiaries reaching 17,600 doctors and 43,960 dependents.82

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82 Al-Awadi, The Muslim Brothers in Pursuit of Legitimacy: Power and Political Islam in Egypt under Mubarak, p.126.
The following year the programme was extended to the engineers’ syndicate, where a further 72,000 benefited from the scheme. The ‘selective accommodation’ of the Brotherhood thus enabled the group to not only make political headway, but also combine this influence to develop its social base, which it did through the expansion of its social service arm, particularly among a middle class who remained outside of the state bureaucracy’s patronage networks.

The re-emergence of the Brotherhood as a political actor was paralleled by the expansion of a significant Islamic movement, what Wickham calls a ‘parallel Islamic sector’, comprising private mosques, Islamic voluntary associations, as well as commercial and business enterprises. The parallel Islamic sector came to play an increasingly prominent role in Egyptian public life, particularly due to its quasi-autonomous nature, in which it became ‘largely independent of – and competitive with – the cultural, religious, and service-oriented arms of the Egyptian state.’\(^83\) The parallel Islamic sector was able to rely on significant funds generated by business interests and the growing significance of Islamic finance. Since 1974 numerous Islamic investment companies were established due to the \(\textit{infitah}\) investment laws. As many as one million Egyptians invested in these companies, many of which were founded by prominent Brotherhood members. This provided an important source from which to drive social and political Islamic activism.\(^84\) Parastatal banks helped to collect and distribute \(\textit{zakat}\), with 4,500 committees collecting more than £20 million EGY for the Nasser Social-Service Bank to distribute to Islamic associations who were operating nurseries and health clinics among other activities.\(^85\) These funds also helped to sustain the wave of mosque-building that had been initiated under Sadat, in which tax breaks and Gulf remittances led to their number more than doubling during the 1970s. That ratio of growth would continue for Mubarak’s

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\(^83\) Wickham, \textit{Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt}, p.95.  
\(^85\) Wickham, \textit{Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt}, p.100.
first decade in power. In 1981, there were 46,000 mosques, only 6,000 of which were directly administered by the Ministry of Awqaf. According to the-then Minister of Awqaf, Dr. Muhammad ‘Ali Mahgub, by 1991 the total had reached 91,000. The rise of the parallel Islamic sector resulted, therefore, from Islamic actors taking advantage of being allocated a modicum of political space, at a time of favourable economic opportunities. This diverse sector would find further opportunities to expand amidst economic changes befalling Mubarak’s regime.

Economic changes in Mubarak’s era also facilitated the growth of the Islamic movement. As with his predecessor, Mubarak was tasked with responding to the deficiencies of the regime he inherited. A collapse in oil prices helped to precipitate a crisis in external debt, rising inflation, and a huge budget deficit that rendered its balance of repayments unsustainable. Egypt’s petroleum revenues dropped by nearly 50% to $1.2 billion, whilst crucial Suez Canal receipts also dropped by 10%. By 1985 external debt had reached $33 billion, the servicing of which was consuming more than a third of the country’s annual account receipts. By the end of the 1980s bankruptcy seemed inevitable, until support for the allies in the first Gulf War afforded the opportunity for significant cancellation of Egypt’s foreign debt. A new economic reform programme was subsequently agreed with the IMF and World Bank in 1991 to restart the process of economic liberalization.

This new economic programme was known as the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Policy (ERSAP). Although infitah had heralded economic liberalization as far back as 1974, Ayubi suggests that it was only with the implementation of ERSAP that

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86 Wickham, p.98.
87 Harrigan and El-Said, Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare Provision, p.78.
90 Harrigan and El-Said, Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare Provision, p.78.
substantial restructuring and privatization truly got under way.\(^{91}\) In return for cancelling 50% of public debt, and IMF credit amounting to 60% of its contribution to the fund, Egypt was tasked with reducing import restrictions, initiating further privatizations and liberalization in the banking sector as well as in industry and new business.\(^{92}\) From a total of 22% of GDP in 1990-91, the fiscal deficit was brought down incrementally in the following years to reach 3.5% by 1995-96.\(^{93}\) Meanwhile, increasing integration into the international market was instituted by unifying currency exchange rates and raising local banks’ interests rates to make them more competitive on the international stage. Public industry was advanced by liberalising trade, reducing tariff rates, and limiting important prohibitions to 30% of domestic production.\(^{94}\)

A knock-on effect of the reinvigorated economic approach of pro-market, anti-\textit{etatism} was an increase in benefits being distributed in favour of capital and further decline in the welfarism of the state.\(^{95}\) Despite successes in raising the literacy rate and life expectancy, and reducing infant mortality, infrastructure in education, healthcare, and housing remained grossly underfunded, leading to further decline in the quality of these governmental services.\(^{96}\) Schools suffered from deteriorating buildings, overcrowded classes and teacher shortages, whilst public healthcare was similarly oversubscribed, with problems of hygiene within hospitals and long waits for treatments. The Egyptian state’s response to continually high levels of poverty among its citizens was to follow the principles of privatization and encourage societal actors to ease the burden on the state. This reflected the changing dynamics of international approaches to development, particularly the so-called Washington

\(^{91}\) Ayubi, \textit{Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East}, p.339.
\(^{92}\) Ayubi, p.346.
\(^{94}\) Hinnebusch, p.160.
\(^{95}\) Hinnebusch, p.161.
Consensus, adopted by the US and global financial institutions such as the World Bank, whereby the private sector is promoted for development by focusing on projects that support entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency. According to this line of thinking, integrating the poor into financial markets produces a more sustainable form of development than “handouts”. Aid projects in Egypt subsequently began to move away from welfare-and charity-driven cash transfers and instead toward privatized social services and various stages of “development” according to market principles.97

The Social Fund for Development, created in 1990 as a joint venture between the government and the World Bank, in order to disburse microenterprise lending among the poor to help them engage in small and medium enterprise, was one of the main initiatives reflecting the Egyptian state’s developmental agenda. The fund collaborated with hundreds of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to distribute these loans, reaching nearly half a million recipients to the sum of £880 million EGY by 2007.98 The Productive Families Initiative followed a similar theme, focusing on training and production in rural areas, implemented through a large network of NGOs. Aiming to create small businesses, over 3,000 training centres provided services, loans, and marketing devices as ‘part of the government’s strategy to remove employment pressure from the state and to turn the poor into entrepreneurs’.99 Foreign aid has been an important factor in these development initiatives, particularly through USAID, which has provided billions in loans and grants since 1979. USAID operates in various areas such as education, economic growth, health care, water management, agriculture, environmental resources, health care, as well as democracy promotion, often working in collaboration with partner NGOs.

97 Atia, Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt, p.37.
98 Atia, p.37.
99 Atia, p.36.
The promotion of NGOs became an important element of the Egyptian regime’s developmental agenda. From the late 1980s into the 1990s, the government adopted the phrase *majhud dhati* – self-help – as the basis of this strategy, with it appearing prominently in official documents and the press surrounding private entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency initiatives.\(^{100}\) The basis of *majhud dhati* was that society should provide the human and economic capital required to provide services that would otherwise be provided by the state. In other words, a private model was promoted to alleviate some of the disruption caused by a decrease in the levels of welfare previously provided by the state. The policy of *majhud al-dhati* was also extended to try and benefit from the burgeoning Islamic sector that was developing in the country. To do so, the Ministry of Awqaf pursued a policy which encouraged the transformation of private ahli mosques and the charities associated with them into welfare providers.\(^{101}\) Endowed with a small budget, the ministry sought to develop every mosque into a *masjid al-jami’*, a larger mosque which provide Friday prayers and sermons, and also offered a variety of services, including health, education, professional training, and childcare. By encouraging the use of private resources provided by worshippers, it was hoped that an apolitical version of the Islamic sector’s organisational strength could be utilised to alleviate the pressures on the state as it underwent economic restructuring.

The changes in the Egyptian state’s approach to development and poverty alleviation, and the policy of *majhud al-dhati*, have led to the dramatic expansion of associational activity since the 1990s. Across the first decade since ERSAP’s implementation, Egypt’s NGO numbers experienced one of their largest increases (in terms of overall numbers, if not the ratio of population per NGO). In Mubarak’s first decade in power, for example, the total number increased from around 10,000 to 12,832 by 1990, an increase of a little more than

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\(^{100}\) Pioppi, ‘Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy: The Revival of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) in Egypt’, p.135.  
\(^{101}\) Pioppi, p.135.
Within two years of ERSAP’s launch, however, this figure had reached 14,000 and by 2000 it had reached 20,000, representing an increase of nearly 55% since 1990. On the eve of Mubarak’s deposal in 2011, their number had continued to rise substantially to 30,000, maintaining a nearly 50% rise per decade, and overall an increase of around 1,000 per year over a 20-year period. Compared with the yearly increase of just over 300 NGOs per year during Mubarak’s first decade in power, this exponential increase during the ERSAP period indicates the relationship between these economic changes and the encouragement of NGO activity under Mubarak. Despite the ‘secular bias’ of the development industry, in which much foreign aid is directed mostly towards secular NGOs, these NGOs actually came to be dominated by religiously-based (mainly Islamic) associations. For example, in the mid-1980s Islamic associations represented about 35% of all voluntary associations, rising to 43% in 1991. By 1993 they comprised a majority - more than 8,000 out of a 14,000 total - a trend which has since increased to nearly two-thirds. Therefore, the changing dynamics of the state’s economy and its approach to development led to the proliferation of NGO-activity, in which Islamic associations figured in increasingly prominent numbers.

Control functions also accompanied the encouragement of associational activity under Mubarak. One way in which the Egyptian government under Mubarak tried to retain control over civil society was by extending the administrative and bureaucratic control measures available at the ministries’ disposal. Paradoxically, the move to replace Law 32, which had been in place since 1964, was sparked by the lobbying efforts of these new civil society

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103 Harrigan and El-Said, Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare Provision.
105 Harrigan and El-Said, Economic Liberalisation, Social Capital and Islamic Welfare Provision.
106 Atia, Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt, p.36.
organisations, who criticised the existing law for the level of interference it allowed official
bodies. Yet rather than freeing them from governmental interference, its replacement, Law
153 of 1999, actually extended state encroachment over these organisations. All the existing
rights of MOSA over civil society organisations were maintained, whilst the controls over
advocacy and human rights organisations were extended. Article 11 prevented NGOs from
engaging in any activity covered by laws governing political parties or any activity deemed to
be political. Thus, any activities that might be labelled ‘political’, according to the ministry,
were at risk of being closed.\textsuperscript{109}

After being challenged in the courts and found to be unconstitutional, Law 153 was
replaced by Law 184 in 2002; yet this merely restated the encroachment of the state over civil
society in a different form. Although this updated law lessened some of the worst restrictions
of its predecessor, Law 184 nevertheless retained a host of functions to enable MOSA to keep
the sector in check, including registration rules, governance structure, operations, and
fundraising.\textsuperscript{110} Violations could be subject to imprisonment, financial penalties, or dissolution
of the association. Further support in enforcement was provided by the State Security
Investigations Service, which acted as an informal mechanism of governmental control.\textsuperscript{111}
The main impact of Law 184, according to Atia, was to give the General Federation of NGOs
more power in regulating the work of NGOs. Even though the body was meant to act as the
representative body for associations and NGOs, it in fact acted as a supervisory agency on the
government’s behalf.\textsuperscript{112} While the pluralization of civil society rocketed under Mubarak, the
legal environment ensured that the extent to which associations could form a unified sector
against state authority was kept in check. The result of these control functions is what

\textsuperscript{111} Brechenmacher, \textit{Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia}.
\textsuperscript{112} Atia, \textit{Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt}, pp.45-6.
Brumberg has called a ‘strange limbo’ in which voluntary associations have proliferated, yet are ‘partly autonomous, partly captured’.113 As Harrigan and el-Said write, ‘the government has an ambivalent attitude towards NGOs. On the one hand, it often makes their operation difficult, on the other hand, its sees them as a vehicle for helping to control local communities, and it knows that the state itself no longer has the resources to match the welfare they provide to citizens’.114

Efforts to control civil society organisations were also paralleled by attempts to use control functions over private religious institutions. However, this process was emblematic of the scarcity of funds for state ministries. The regime attempted to incorporate mosques into the state’s own religious bureaucracy following the short-lived Islamist takeover of the Imbaba neighbourhood near Cairo in 1992. Following the debacle, in which a three-week security operation led to 100 deaths and the arrest of 600 militants,115 a plan was announced to incorporate all mosques into the network administered by the Ministry of Awqaf. Following a presidential decree in 1993, the head of the ministry declared 10,000 private mosques would be incorporated each year. Budgetary constraints and a serious ‘imam shortage’, however, meant that only a fraction of this figure was actually achieved. For example, the ministry attempted to hire 5,000 graduates of al-Azhar’s religious studies programme for the task, but little more than half of that figure reported for work.116 Following up on the presidential decrees of 1993, Law No.238 of 1996 tried to reinforce the policy of control over private mosques. Under the new law, imams preaching in any mosque were required to possess a formal qualification as well as a permit (tarkhīs) issued by the Ministry

116 Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt, p.106.
of Awqaf.\textsuperscript{117} Permits could be withdrawn following inspections of mosques, which were carried out through collaborations between Awqaf and State Security Investigations.\textsuperscript{118} The ministry announced a plan, accompanying the new law, to add an additional 30,000 mosques under its umbrella within five years. However, its ambitions failed to be matched by its ability to realise these goals, as more than four-fifths of all private mosques remained outside of state control.\textsuperscript{119}

3.3.1 Shifting sands in the 2000s

Despite the Egyptian government’s utilisation of control mechanisms, its enablement of Islamic actors would not come risk free politically. The final decade of Mubarak’s rule would see significant changes both within Islamic movements and in the state’s accommodation of these actors. Within the broader Islamic movement, two marked shifts can be recognised. First, unprecedented success for the Brotherhood in parliamentary elections, accompanied by increasingly forthright and vocal opposition to the government. Second, the rise to prominence of Salafism in the Egyptian public sphere. These two factors also prompted increased levels of state repression in response.

As mentioned at the beginning of the Mubarak section, the electoral law of 1983 introduced the political culture of \textit{ḥizbiyya}, which enabled the Brotherhood to contest parliamentary elections as independent candidates. But they had to negotiate a delicate balance between what el-Ghobashy calls the ‘electoral’ game and the ‘regime’ game;

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{118} Kienle, p.105.
\textsuperscript{119} Wickham, \textit{Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt}, p.107.
\end{flushright}
accommodate the regime enough to retain access to the system, but be bold enough to challenge the constraints of that system. \(^{120}\) In 1984, they contested elections for the first time in nearly 40 years, winning 9 seats in an alliance with the New Wafd Party. They built on this success in 1987, when they joined with the Socialist Labor Party in a grouping which named itself the ‘Islamic Alliance’, securing a total of 60 seats, making them the largest opposition bloc in parliament.\(^{121}\) This success in the electoral game stoked regime reaction, with incessant interference leading the Brotherhood and other opposition parties to boycott the 1990 elections. The Brotherhood re-entered the political field in 1995, when parliamentary and presidential elections took place in the same year. If the Brotherhood won more than a third, they could obstruct Mubarak’s nomination for president. There was unprecedented government intervention during the elections, with harassment and intimidation of Brotherhood supporters by state security and police, with hundreds of arrests of Brotherhood leaders and members alike. In the end the Brotherhood won only one seat.

In 2000, however, the Brothers who had been jailed in 1995 were released, and they resumed an active role in the group and helped orchestrate its campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Only 75 of 444 seats were contested, half of what the Brothers contested in 1995, with low profile local candidates chosen to stay under radar of state security.\(^{122}\) Despite more harassment of candidates and supporters, the strategy worked, and they won 17 seats, making them the largest opposition group in parliament for first time since 1987. In the 2005 elections the Brotherhood ran 161 candidates, more than double that of 2000, but again showed pragmatism by not running in districts where senior government candidates ran. Moreover, they did not contest more than one third of the seats so as not to


\(^{121}\) Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs the State*, 22.

challenge the NDP’s two thirds majority. On this occasion, the MB won 88 seats, eight times the number won by all of the country’s legal opposition combined.\(^{123}\) This success occurred despite regime tactics of voter intimidation and ballot stuffing.\(^{124}\) Despite being unable to pass or block legislation alone, the Brotherhood placed parliament as the driving force of political reform. Brotherhood MPs mobilised to prevent the renewal of politically stifling legislation such as the emergency laws. They encouraged other opposition parties to join the ‘Representatives Against the Emergency Law’ group, adding 25 independent and opposition party parliamentarians to the Brotherhood MPs.\(^{125}\) The group signed a petition against the renewal of the law, and took provocative steps such as invoking the name of the street protest movement, Kefaya, in their advocacy.\(^{126}\) The Brotherhood went beyond cultural issues typically associated with Islamists, to engage in cross-ideological coordination with opposition movements, to challenge the very basis of the regime’s method of rule.

The Brotherhood’s electoral success and increasingly confident opposition shocked the regime, leading to a succession of crackdowns on the movement, its leaders, and their finances. Arbitrary arrests followed the 2005 parliamentary elections, with over 800 detainees within months of a crackdown beginning in March 2006, including senior figures such as Essam al-Erian, a member of the political bureau, and Mohamed Morsi, head of the parliamentary department.\(^{127}\) Police roundups of Brotherhood members were particularly pronounced during times when controversial regime-sponsored legislation was due before parliament.\(^{128}\) In November 2006, state security arbitrarily disqualified students affiliated

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\(^{125}\) Shehata and Stacher.

\(^{126}\) Shehata and Stacher.

\(^{127}\) Shehata and Stacher.

with the Brotherhood from running in student union elections in national universities. The following month, hooded Brotherhood students marched through the main gates of al-Azhar University, before performing martial arts exercises reminiscent of similar displays by Hamas and Hizbullah. Within days, the students as well as 17 senior Brotherhood members, were arrested in pre-dawn raids. Hundreds more Brotherhood members were rounded up in the following weeks. Among those detained was Khairat al-Shater, a wealthy businessman, and the second deputy guide and the organization’s third highest-ranking official, with police confiscating three personal computers, two mobile phones and 60,000 Egyptian pounds in cash (slightly over $10,000). Al-Shater, and another prominent Brotherhood businessman, Hasan Malek, were later charged with money laundering, financing banned political activity, and trying to revive the Brotherhood’s paramilitary wing.

In January 2007, Egypt’s prosecutor-general froze al-Shater’s assets, along with those of 29 others affiliated with the Brotherhood. Businesses owned by Brothers, including several publishing houses and import/export firms, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer and a construction company were closed, with the merchandise confiscated. The motivation behind targeting financial assets, according to Shehata and Stacher, was that it would limit the Brotherhood’s ability to provide social services, drain resources for political campaigns, and discourage others from funding the organization. Further measures to target the Brotherhood as an organization soon followed. The Brotherhood’s status was downgraded in March 2007 after amendments were added to the constitution, going from legally banned to constitutionally prohibited, with Article 5 now stating that no group or political activity based on religion was permitted. Mubarak’s regime ensured that the Brotherhood’s success in the

129 Shehata and Stacher.
130 Shehata and Stacher.
131 Shehata and Stacher.
132 Shehata and Stacher.
electoral game would not be repeated. In June 2007, 16 Brotherhood figures ran for the upper house of parliament, all losing in rigged balloting. When municipal elections were held in April 2008, more than 6,000 Brotherhood members filed the required paperwork, yet only 20 made it onto the ballot after being excluded by the security services, with all losing. In the final parliamentary elections of Mubarak’s reign in 2010, many Brotherhood candidates were again disqualified before the beginning of the race. Although they eventually fielded 130 candidates, the Brotherhood would win no seats in the first round, before pulling out citing vote rigging and fraud. It would not be long, however, before the Brotherhood was able to test its electoral strength in open and free elections for both parliament and the presidency.

In addition to an increasingly confrontational political opposition in the form of the Brotherhood, the 2000s also seen the increased presence of Salafi movements in the Egyptian public sphere. Variants of ‘Jihadi-Salafism’ have long been recognised in Egypt, from al-Jihad, the group that assassinated Sadat, to al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and its campaign of militancy in Upper Egypt during the 1990s. After 2003 the latter transitioned into a social movement accepting of the Egyptian state, concentrating its efforts on charity and da’wa. But Egypt’s ‘quietist’ Salafi scene, in which adherents focus on piety and personal devotion, rather than political advocacy or violence, had actually been on the rise for several decades, particularly in the large cities of Alexandria and Cairo. Organisationally, the antecedents of Egyptian Salafism can be traced to the oldest overtly Salafi association, Ansar al-Sunna, formed in 1926. However, its most recent proliferation can be traced to Alexandria University in 1977, when students in the Faculty of Medicine formed the Saudi-oriented

134 Stacher.
135 Wickham, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood and Democratic Transition in Egypt’, 212.
‘Salafi School’, in response to the Brotherhood’s domination of Islamic activism, leading to the formation of al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya.\textsuperscript{137}

Despite ‘quietist’ Salafism typically being more accommodating of ruling regimes than the Brotherhood,\textsuperscript{138} Egypt’s Salafis would not escape periodic crackdowns as with the Brotherhood. For example, amidst a wider security crackdown against Islamists in 1994, al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya’s preacher training institute, al-Furqan, was closed along with its magazine. Prominent shaykhs were either jailed or received travel bans forbidding them from preaching outside Alexandria, and their appearance on religious TV channels also required prior permission.\textsuperscript{139} By 2004, all arrested shaykhs and activists had been released from prison. Throughout this decade Salafism became increasingly entrenched in the social fabric of Egyptian society, including the capital, Cairo. Gauvain reported finding Salafis prominently across the social spectrum, incorporating upper middle-class areas such as al-Muhandisin and Madinat Nasr, as well the working class areas such as Shubra, forming charities, schools, and mosques sympathetic to Salafi ideology.\textsuperscript{140} The relaxation of restrictions on Alexandrian Salafis also extended to the dissemination of Salafi discourse more broadly through telecommunications networks. Since 2006, several new Salafi satellite TV stations were licensed to operate, focusing on preaching prayer recitation and Quranic readings.\textsuperscript{141} Stations such as al-Nass, Mohamed Hassan’s al-Rahma, al-Hikma, and al-Hafez, came to draw huge audiences.

\textsuperscript{137} Omar Ashour, ‘Egypt’s Salafi Challenge’ (Brookings Institute, 3 January 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/egypts-salafi-challenge/.
\textsuperscript{138} See Meijer, ‘Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong As a Principle of Social Action’.
\textsuperscript{140} Richard Gauvain, ‘Salafism in Modern Egypt: Panacea or Pest?’, \textit{Political Theology} 11, no. 6 (15 December 2010): 803.
\textsuperscript{141} Nathan Field and Ahmed Hamam, ‘Salafi Satellite TV in Egypt’, \textit{Arab Media and Society}, 6 May 2009.
With the regime’s accommodation of Salafism coming roughly at the same time as the Brotherhood’s political successes were being cracked down upon by the regime, some analysts posited a state strategy to cultivate Salafism as a counterweight to the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{142} Indeed, Egypt’s quietist Salafis – at least during the 2000s - differed from the Brotherhood in terms of their view towards the legitimacy of political action. Saudi-influenced Salafism of this sort emphasises almost unyielding allegiance to the ruler, and avoiding engagement in politics and electoral participation, contrary to the approach of the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{143} Therefore, ‘allowing, or even encouraging, the growth of pietist Salafism offers a way to divert the rising religiosity of the Egyptian population into a direction without immediate political ramifications’.\textsuperscript{144} Whether or not this is true, it is certainly the case that Salafism presented a challenge to the Brotherhood in terms of its constituency. These Saudi-trained and influenced clerics created ‘a religious center of gravity that competes with the Muslim Brotherhood’s political Islamism’.\textsuperscript{145} But it was not only competition with the Brotherhood prompted by the rise of Salafism, for the institutions of ‘official Islam’ and the state would be threatened also. By 2010, even the more politically quiescent Salafis were feeling the brunt of government repression, with Salafi TV stations being closed in response to allegations of controversial statements regarding the Christian church.\textsuperscript{146} This was amidst what had been described as a ‘new ideological struggle’ between the religious scholars of official Islam and al-Azhar, and the growing Salafist movement.\textsuperscript{147} In April 2010, the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayyib, gave an interview to al-Arabiya News Channel in

\textsuperscript{142} Field and Hamam.
\textsuperscript{145} Brooke.
\textsuperscript{146} Gauvain, ‘Salafism in Modern Egypt: Panacea or Pest?’, 803.
\textsuperscript{147} Hani Nasira, ‘Salafists Challenge Al-Azhar for Ideological Supremacy in Egypt’, Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 35 (September 2010).
which he accused Salafis of sophistry, which might threaten ‘moderate thinking’. The same year, al-Tayyib decried the threat of Salafism due to its Saudi influences, juxtaposing the spread of the, by implication, extremist, ‘Saudi fiqh’ and its supplanting of ‘moderate fiqh’. The regime’s accommodation of Salafis, therefore, provided a counterweight to the political opposition of the Brotherhood, but towards a perceived ideological rigidity, that was viewed as a threat by the ‘moderate’ institutions of ‘official Islam’.

3.4 Conclusions

The Nasser years were marked by a comprehensive effort to extend state control over civil society. The adoption of socialist policies meant that in many cases associations became a part of the state itself through a form of nationalisation. The changes in how state-society relations were organised under Sadat were profound. If we understand Nasser’s corporatist regime as involving the ‘statizing’ of state-society relations, then the process of state privatization, initiated by Sadat (and continued under Mubarak), reflects what O’Donnell calls the ‘privatist’ function of those relations, which ‘entails the opening of institutional areas of the state to the representation of organised interests of civil society’. Despite retaining the legal means to suppress them at times when politically beneficial, the regime chose to facilitate the expansion of certain types of associations and organisations. Although the Sadat period represents an era in which the state legislated for the expansion and autonomy of civil society interests, including private voluntary associations and religious

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148 Nasira.
institutions such as mosques, it is important to note that it still retained the control functions which had been established under Nasser, available for use by the MOSS.

Thus, while Sadat initiated certain ‘inclusionary strategies’ for certain groups in society such as the Islamists, ‘exclusionary strategies’ remained in force against other groups, such as the workers and the Nasserists. Under Mubarak, the crux of the ‘inclusion-exclusion’ nexus became broadly oriented towards the Islamic movement, with the ‘moderate’ Brotherhood becoming the tolerated opposition, in an attempt to supplant the influence of more confrontational Islamists who were posing an issue for the government. The rise of the parallel Islamic sector demonstrates how the political calculations of successive regimes in their accommodation of Islamist actors intertwined with economic changes to produce a movement whose significance they could not possibly have predicted (and only begrudgingly welcomed). A modicum of political space was allocated, paralleled by favourable economic opportunities which Islamic actors took advantage of. In addition, the developmental approach of the state, reflecting international norms, came to promote the expansion of associational activity, including that of the Islamic movement, to play a role in service-provision to alleviate some of the pressure on the state. Yet this expansion did not take place in a vacuum, as the regime sought to use legal means in order to retain a degree of ‘indirect’ control over associations, even as it signalled its long-term intentions of increasing ‘direct’ state control over private religious institutions, such as mosques and their preachers.

By the dawn of the 2011 Uprisings, the final decade of Mubarak’s rule had featured an increasingly vocal and diversified Islamic movement in the public sphere, with both the Brotherhood and an assortment of Salafi movements. Unprecedented electoral success for the Brotherhood led to its most confrontational oppositional stance since being allowed in the

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150 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, p.219.
political sphere in 1983. The emergence of Salafi movements in the public sphere further indicated the diverse religious constituency within the country. However, these developments were also paralleled by an upturn in regime repression, with the tactic of targeting the resources of the Brotherhood movement, by seizing assets, as well as targeting individual members of the group, were initiated, and served as a tactic to be reused in 2013. And despite serving somewhat as a counterweight to the Brotherhood for the state, Salafis too were increasingly subject to restrictions on their activities. But despite this regime repression, the initiation of a transitional process brought on by Mubarak’s remove would soon present new social and political opportunities for this melting pot of Islamic activism.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE 2011 ‘POLITICAL OPENING’ AND THE EXPANSION OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Revolutionary upheavals, as Aristide Zolberg put it, produce ‘moments of madness’ in which participants believe that ‘all is possible’. In 2011 Egypt witnessed a revolutionary uprising in which the mass mobilization of protestors across the country resulted in the end of the 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak. Although the extent to which this outcome and its aftermath can be defined as a ‘revolution’ is disputed, Mubarak’s ouster still provided an opening through which the social and political structures of state and society could be contested. On the political level, this related to the pluralization of politics and the contestation of parliamentary and presidential elections. On the social level, the transition provided opportunities for actors to redefine institutions outside of formal politics, establish new organisations, and use these new-found freedoms to occupy and contest public space. This chapter demonstrates how Egypt’s different actors within Egypt’s Islamic movement used these opportunities to expand their networks of social and religious institutions, forming new associations engaged in security provision and social welfare in response to state incapacity, as well as contesting with the state over control of religious institutions including preacher training institutes and mosques, and the practices permitted within them. This restructuring of public space restricted the presence of the state in the management of Islamic social and religious institutions, strengthening the Islamic movement as a societal actor and weakening the state’s control over them in the process. These changes help us understand

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why the 2013 crackdown went beyond the Muslim Brotherhood towards a more comprehensive attempt to dominate Egypt’s Islamic movement.

4.1 State incapacity and political opportunity structures

On 28 January, 2011, the fourth day of the uprising, or the ‘Friday of Anger’ as it became known, the police disappeared from Cairo’s streets, leading to widespread fears of chaos and disorder. This initiated a period of government shutdown, whereby state incapacity, either wilfully or otherwise, was acute, and responsibility for the protection of citizens and for providing other government functions was effectively abandoned. Such changes in the institutional structure of the state may provide political opportunity structures for social movements and other forms of associational activity to emerge.\(^3\) Among the key factors which result in such opportunities is a reduction in the state’s ‘policy implementation capacity’, in which its power to perform its functions erodes.\(^4\) A temporary period of instability can be promoted by a state crisis, in which the state is either unable or reluctant to provide essential resources to citizens who may in turn mobilize to support their own communities. This act may endure beyond the period of the initial crisis, via institutionalisation, and the formation of permanent social institutions.\(^5\) The instability that resulted from the uprisings created just such changes in the institutional structure of the Egyptian state, and consequently, opportunities for civil society actors to emerge.

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3 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, p.3.
A major outbreak in associational activity emerged in 2011 in response to the absence of security and the vacuum left by the departing state in local communities. Many Egyptians responded by forming checkpoints in their neighbourhoods, known as lijān sha’biyya (popular committees, PCs). Although most of these groups only existed for a few weeks, disbanding after Mubarak’s resignation, and some degree of stability returned, many decided to institutionalise their activities by creating organisations that went beyond security to try and improve their communities in other areas. Growing beyond their initial security remit, they began to provide much-needed services, such as providing gas cylinders for cooking and heating, electricity provision and even planning sewage systems.6 The PCs shifted their focus towards the provision of services otherwise expected of the state, particularly in informal areas lacking basic infrastructure, including gas lines, lighting and health clinics.7 The spirit of civic activism reached such a height that PCs were able to hold a national conference to coordinate their activities in April 2011.8

Initially, PCs emerged as a grassroots form of civic activism, were comprised mostly of youths under 35 years of age and were largely independent of pre-existing organisations, such as faith-based associations, the state, or international NGOs.9 Despite their largely secular makeup, it was not long before Islamic associations began to follow suit by forming PCs, eventually surpassing the secular youth formations in size and reach. According to one national newspaper, for example, Islamically-inspired organisations comprised around 80% of the PCs in Alexandria in 2011.10 Islamic PCs were able to rely on important advantages over their secular counterparts as the nature of their activities shifted from security to service provision. Most of the Islamic PCs were formed by members of pre-existing Islamist groups

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6 Hassan, p.384.
8 El-Meehy, p.30.
10 Bremer, p.80.
and Islamic associations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya, Ansar al-Sunna, and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Already enjoying broad memberships and resources, these groups did not face the challenge of basic issues of organisation, as befell many of the new youth-dominated PCs. The importance of pre-existing networks appears to be a crucial factor for the successful institutionalisation of civil society actors during periods of transition. As well as these organisational advantages, members of the Brotherhood and Salafi PCs in Alexandria reported that, after the revolution, they were able to operate much more openly and build upon existing forms of organisation and networks, even without any formal change in civil society laws. The Islamic movement, therefore, capitalised on these new-found opportunities, resulting from state incapacity, to draw on existing networks to increase the reach of their service-providing activities.

The main function of Islamic PCs eventually became the distribution of much needed gas cylinders to provide gas for cooking. These cylinders had traditionally been distributed by the state at subsidised prices, but the service had ground to a halt during the uprisings. In addition, and as with other state subsidised goods, its distribution had fallen prey to corrupt practices with stocks being stolen and resold at inflated prices. Islamic PCs sought to present themselves as reliable and trustworthy intermediaries in their distribution. Youth members of al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, for example, ensured that cylinders were sold at subsidised prices,


ensuring they reached elderly communities without inflated prices. But a practice that began in response to state incapacity eventually developed into a semi-formal form of outsourcing from the state to the private sector. Ministry of Supply sources told al-Shorouk newspaper that the Brotherhood and other Salafi PCs such as Ansar al-Sunna had received a 30% share of government warehouse stock for distribution in several villages and cities. Despite official denials from the Ministry regarding the relationship, another report quoted a transport vehicle driver who attested to bypassing Ministry warehouses to place cargo loads directly with Brotherhood PCs. Mirroring the encouragement of Islamic actors as welfare providers under Mubarak, Islamic PCs effectively collaborated with the state to ease the burden on the state and meet a societal need during a period of acute crisis.

However, altruism appeared not to be the only motivation in the calculations of Islamic PCs in their provision of gas cylinders. With the 2011 parliamentary elections on the horizon, Islamic associations with linkages to Islamist parties were acutely aware of the potential benefits from providing these services. In her study of PCs, al-Meehy refers to both Ansar al-Sunna and FJP candidates making illegal gas cylinder purchases from official outlets, which were then distributed via neighbourhood mosques over the period of parliamentary elections between November 2011 and January 2012. Ansar al-Sunna would allegedly gather data on the poor and who needed such cylinders, by circulating forms with Ministry logos, recording household size, annual income and identification numbers. The

Ministry alleged the forms were faked and filed a complaint to the police.\textsuperscript{19} The practice of surveying residents’ needs is also identified by Brooke, who refers to how the Brotherhood would undertake geographic studies of the poorest concentrations in electoral districts, and direct targeted service provision towards those areas.\textsuperscript{20} If the success of the Brotherhood as the ‘tolerated opposition’ under Mubarak was in part due to ‘reputational benefits’ and the perception that they were responsible for welfare provision that in reality went far beyond its own networks, then the transitional period would see the movement seek to benefit from direct clientelist linkages.\textsuperscript{21}

4.2 Establishing new social institutions

The political opportunity of the uprising and transitional period also enabled the expansion of the social service activities of Egypt’s Islamic movement beyond PCs. In this regard faith-based organisations again enjoyed significant advantages over their secular counterparts. Even though no formal changes occurred in Egypt’s civil society laws during this time, different approaches can be identified in the state’s treatment of Islamic and secular civil society organisations. In the initial post-Mubarak period overseen by the SCAF, it appeared as though the secular civil society organisations, whose members comprised the backbone of the uprising, would play a leading role of the political opening and head efforts for Egypt’s democratic transition. Within months, however, these organisations were the subject of a state-led smear campaign, depicting them as ‘foreign agents’ intent on ‘destabilising Egypt’.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} al-Meehy, p.32.
\textsuperscript{20} Brooke, \textit{Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage}, 127.
\textsuperscript{21} I discuss this further in chapter six.
In July 2011, Egypt’s Justice Minister formed a committee to investigate the foreign funding of NGOs operating in Egypt. Eventually, 39 Egyptian and international NGOs were listed as operating without a license, 28 Egyptian NGOs as receiving foreign funds illegally, with others accused of political activities that violated the NGO law of 2002. By December 2011, the offices of 17 Egyptian and international human rights NGOs working on democracy promotion were raided, with files being seized and their offices shut. A further 43 organisations were charged with various offences the following year.

By contrast, the treatment of a more significant case in the foreign funding of an Islamic association was quite different. In late 2011, a fact-finding committee, formed by former Minister of Justice Adel El-Guindy, discovered that Ansar al-Sunna had received £296 million EGY ($49m) from Kuwaiti and Qatari charities, making it the largest amount of money donated to an Egyptian NGO in 2010 and 2011.23 Yet, in this case, punitive measures were light, with only five of the group’s workers being initially referred for prosecution. The case was eventually resolved without accompanying repercussions for the group itself, in contrast to what happened to the aforementioned secular NGOs. While it cannot be verified how the funds were used, Ansar al-Sunna was a prominent player among Islamic PCs distributing gas cylinders, while as will be seen in chapter five, its networks would also become mobilized during electoral cycles in support of Islamist causes.

Scrutiny of civil society growth during the transitional period also demonstrated the difference between Islamic and secular organisations. In a study on foreign funding of NGOs in Egypt, civil society actors told interviewers that whilst harassment of non-Islamic organisations increased after the revolution, conversely, tolerance of Islamic groups had in

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fact increased. Without the same level of scrutiny being applied to civil society organisations with a religious focus, this period witnessed an explosion of new Islamic organisations. At the beginning of 2011, the number of civil society organisations registered with the MOSS was estimated at around 31,000. Within 18 months, the Ministry reported that nearly 4,500 new organisations had been registered. A report by Amani Qandil of the Arab Center for Research and Studies analysed these new registrations and found that well over half of these organisations were Islamic-based, and largely concentrated in Upper Egypt and the country’s poorest governorates, particularly Sohag, Qena, Fayoum, and Minya. With 79, Minya would possess the third highest number of seized associations by governorate in 2013, indicating some correlation between this period of associational expansion and the subsequent crackdown.

The Muslim Brotherhood took the opportunity both to establish new associations and re-establish prominent associations that had been dissolved under Mubarak’s regime. In June 2011, three new centres in cities in Kafr al-Shaykh were the first phase of a series of social initiatives in the governorate, to be rolled out in other towns and villages over the subsequent months. These would even include the opening of its first women’s association affiliated with the Brotherhood, focusing on social welfare and medical convoys, among other activities. The first three centres were opened by the Brotherhood’s leader in the governorate, Dr. Mohamed Fawad, alongside Gamal Heshmat, an FJP parliamentarian and

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26 Qandil.
27 Moves to re-establish networks closed by the regime have also been shown in the Tunisian case. See Teije H. Donker, ‘Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity’, COSMOS Working Papers (European University Institute, 2011), https://bit.ly/2ZnlKLF.
board member on the Islamic Medical Association, the Brotherhood’s network of 27 hospitals. Also in attendance was Ahmed al-Shaykh Soliman, head of the al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya branch in Kafr al-Shaykh. Al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya had decided against entering party politics, yet the presence of its leaders in the opening of new Brotherhood centres indicates a degree of collaboration, which will be demonstrated further in chapter five.

As for re-establishing associations, a new board of directors for the Islamic Da‘wa Association was elected in June 2011 for the first time since being dissolved during the Mubarak era. The association had originated in Beni Suef in 1977, before developing into a nationwide network of schools, nurseries and medical clinics. Prominent Brotherhood leaders had served as the group’s chair, including Muhammad Badie, who became Supreme Guide in 2010. The association had been controlled by a state-appointed board of directors after State Security Investigations (SSI) removed the board appointed by the Brotherhood at the height of the state’s confrontation with Islamist militants in Upper Egypt in the late 1990s, with its running being taken over by the National Democratic Party in 2004. But with the departure of Mubarak, the Brotherhood triumphantly celebrated wresting back control once again, announcing a new 13-member board composed of Brotherhood figures, led by prominent Brotherhood figure Shaykh Abdul-Khaliq Al-Sharif.

Another prominent association reclaimed from state control was the Islamic Educational Association (al-Jam‘iyya al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya). Founded in 1992, the association was a network of schools all bearing the name School of the Muslim Generation (Madrasa al-Jeel al-Muslim). However, as with the Islamic Da‘wa Association, it was seized

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by the state, with its management being assumed by the NDP in 2002.\textsuperscript{33} But with the 
dissolution of the NDP, in March 2011 the Brotherhood moved unilaterally to retake control 
of the association and its schools. It would proceed to reclaim schools in other governorates, 
purging them of NDP elements. In Manufiyya, it decided to dismiss 85 teachers and 
supervisors, chief among them the former chairman of the board, Sobhy Amira, an NDP 
deputy, replacing them with Brotherhood members.\textsuperscript{34} This appears to be a reversal of the 
process in which the schools were confiscated in 2002, when all elements of the Brotherhood 
were dismissed and any projects undertaken by the association ceased. In social welfare and 
educational associations, therefore, the Brotherhood was able to reclaim control of key social 
institutions from state control.

It is also worth mentioning that the Brotherhood also moved to re-open business 
enterprises closed under Mubarak. Alongside Islamic associations and mosques, Islamic 
businesses were one of the rungs of Wickham’s concept of the ‘parallel Islamic sector’. In an 
interview with the Kuwaiti Islamist magazine, \textit{al-Mujtama’}, the Brotherhood’s deputy 
supreme guide, Khairat al-Shater, outlined the objectives of the group’s new projects, which 
included expanding the participation of both civil society and the private sector in promoting 
the country’s social and economic development.\textsuperscript{35} Al-Shater and another prominent Brother, 
the businessman Hassan Malek, had been imprisoned by a military tribunal in April 2008, in 
conjunction with the closure of over 50 companies associated with them and the confiscation 
of their assets. After being released by SCAF, both men began taking steps to reclaim these 
assets and to re-develop their business activities and their relationship with the \textit{da’wa} of the


\textsuperscript{35} Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, \textit{The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement} (Oxford: Princeton 
movement. Reflecting these goals, in March 2012, tycoon and Brotherhood member Hassan Malik, established the Egyptian Business Development Association, whose acronym ‘EBDA’ means ‘start’ in Arabic, modelled on Turkey’s MÜSİAD, itself affiliated with the Islamist AKP. According to one of its co-founders, Osama Farid, the umbrella group was set up to promote small and medium-sized businesses to combine profit-making with social responsibility and societal welfare. The extent to which EBDA enabled small and medium sized businesses to prosper, rather than merely promoting the business interests of the Brotherhood itself, is open to question. Stephan Roll, for example, argued that the Brotherhood’s leadership was chiefly interested in expanding relations with Egypt’s existing business elite, as evidenced by the number of established big business figures among EBDA’s members, including the owners of Egypt’s largest dairy and cable-producing companies. Yet, the reconstitution of the business enterprises of senior Brotherhood figures, and the establishment of EBDA, further demonstrates how the Brotherhood was able to assign itself a central role in its mooted social and economic development of Egypt in the post-Mubarak era.

The newly powerful Salafi movement was also demonstrating a similar strategy, particularly al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, out of which the Nour Party was born. DS established an economic institution under the name House of Business (bayt al-’a’māl) as an economic branch to support the activities of the political party, similar to the economic institution which businessmen of the Muslim Brotherhood used to manage the groups accounts. They put a request in with the Central Bank to establish a bank called Islamic Light. There were

160 contributors to the new institution, most of them Salafists, and some Copts. Their activities were twofold: charitable development business, and business management. Their aim was to invest in all areas including tourism, and to solve unemployment. They aimed to develop poor villages, and build hospitals and schools and develop informal settlements. Prominent actors in Egypt’s Islamic movement, therefore, joined the Brotherhood in establishing initiatives aimed at expanding their activities in the post-Mubarak era.

4.3 State incapacity and religious institutions

Egypt’s Islamic movement also benefited from state incapacity in the form of a decline in the surveillance and monitoring of religious institutions. In the aftermath of the uprising, ‘security sector reform became an immediate objective of both revolutionary and reformist forces’. The main target was State Security Investigations (SSI, in Arabic, mubāḥith ‘amn al-dawla), the main security and intelligence apparatus of the Ministry of Interior, and thus the central organ for surveillance of opposition groups in the Mubarak era. Described as a ‘formidable instrument of state repression’, the SSI had offices in every governorate of Egypt and an officer cadre in the multiple thousands. Organisationally, SSI comprised ‘general administrations’, which were formed according to region or thematic specialization. The largest of the ‘general administrations’ was tasked with countering religious extremism, with a specific department, known as al-nashāṭ al-dīnī, set up to specialise in religious-based activities.
activism. Other subunits related to Islamism included Countering Brotherhood Activism, Extremist Organisations, and even Prison Security, which worked to prevent Islamist activity within prisons.

The surveillance of mosques by SSI included both worshipers and those operating the mosque itself. A Human Rights Watch report from 2007 has detailed the methods used for monitoring and detaining young Egyptian men - particularly Salafists - considered religiously devout, and thus, potentially involved with Islamist groups.\textsuperscript{44} Egyptian human rights lawyers told how the SSI used a policy of ‘preventive investigation and detention’ in which private mosques were kept under surveillance, with detailed lists kept of who attends them, what their activities are, and who associates with one another.\textsuperscript{45} The lists themselves were collected by Awqaf Ministry bureaucrats, who then passed them on to SSI. The young men on these lists could periodically be summoned to SSI facilities to be questioned about their activities and acquaintances, be subject to random detention sweeps near mosques considered to be militant, or be arbitrarily arrested for being on one of these lists. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, tens of thousands suspected members of the Brotherhood, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad, were detained.\textsuperscript{46} According to reports of human rights groups, interrogations of these detainees routinely featured torture, in some cases leading to death.\textsuperscript{47} The collaborative practices of the Ministry of Awqaf and SSI worked to purge Islamists from mosques not controlled by the state, and to bring the mosque’s buildings under the direct administrative control of the ministry, with new state-certified preachers being deployed to assume sermon duties.

\textsuperscript{45} ‘Anatomy of a State Security Case: The “Victorious Sect” Arrests’.
\textsuperscript{46} ‘Anatomy of a State Security Case: The “Victorious Sect” Arrests’.
By 2011, the motivation for ending the practices of SSI was high among not only Islamists, but also various other sectors of society who had been subjected to their repressive practices. Protestors stormed their headquarters in Cairo, as well as regional offices in Alexandria, Asyut and other cities. In a move that met one of the main demands of Egyptian activists, the new Interior Minister, Major General Mansour el-Essawy, announced on 8 March, 2011, that SSI was to be dissolved and replaced with a new agency, Egyptian Homeland Security (qiṭā’ al-’amn al-waṭanī). The units responsible for monitoring Islamist activism were disbanded, with the security services withdrawing from their previous role in monitoring the affairs of mosques. Figures from the state’s official religious establishment also indicated that they did not wish to see a return to state security control. Awqaf Minister Dr. Abdullah al-Husseini stated that, “The grip of security over preachers has ended irrevocably after 25 January and we will not allow the intervention of the security services to impose its control again.” Furthermore, Dr. Salim Abdel Jalil, undersecretary of Awqaf for da’wa and preaching affairs, said that the ministry had decided it would no longer send the names of prospective imams to the security services.

Without the collaborative support of the state’s coercive apparatus, the relatively weak Ministry of Awqaf faced a significant challenge in maintaining the state’s controls over Egypt’s religious institutions in the face of an emboldened Islamic movement. Admittedly, the new Egyptian Homeland Security was, to an extent, simply a reorganisation of SSI under a new name, with much of the staff of its predecessor being retained. Nevertheless, its absence from the surveillance of Islamist activity is identifiable and thus the Egyptian state’s

capacity to implement its past policies of surveillance and control was eroded, providing political opportunities for independent Islamic groups to extend their presence in the religious sphere. Freed from the grip of the security services, Islamic associations were given free rein to challenge the control over religious institutions which the Ministry of Awqaf had been trying to incrementally establish for decades. Islamic associations took advantage of these new-found freedoms in the religious sphere in three ways. First, they challenged the state directly for control of Egypt’s mosques. Second, they took advantage of the absence of security monitoring to re-establish Islamic practices such as i’itikaf, which had been restricted under Mubarak. And thirdly, new preacher training institutes were established by Islamist groups, who had been forced to carry out the practice covertly and underground under the previous regime.

4.4 The battle for control of Egypt’s mosques

Non-official religious institutions will occupy the religious landscape in the coming years. The majority of them will occupy the minbars and mosques of the official religious institutions, along with the disappearance of the shaykhs of the regime and the NDP.51

This statement was made by Yusef al-Qaradawi during his appearance in Tahrir Square on 18 February, 2011, delivering the Friday sermon in his home country for the first time since 1981. His presence alone was symbolic of the new religious landscape, having been banned

from preaching following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. But his warning to the official
religious establishment was also indicative of the changes to come in the transitional period,
when Egypt’s Islamists would contest the state for supremacy over the religious field,
particularly in its mosques.

In the absence of security around Egypt’s mosques after the fall of Mubarak, various
groups seized the opportunity to take control of governmental mosques. Inside the Ministry
of Awqaf, officials described a state of “chaos” and “lawlessness”, receiving hundreds of
complaints from its imams who had been prevented from delivering Friday sermons, with
figures from organised Islamist groups muscling in to take their place.52 In Cairo and
governorates across the country, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and various Salafist
groups, including al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, expelled the imams
and general staff, replacing them with their own appointees. Among the more dramatic
episodes was the gathering, in the main square of Kerdasa in Greater Cairo, of more than 500
Brotherhood members who proceeded to march on a handful of nearby mosques, expelling
their appointed imams, and setting up their own religious rites.53 In the Giza neighbourhood
of Imbaba, Salafists even assaulted the state-appointed imam, removed him by force, and
destroyed the sign of the Ministry of Awqaf above the entrance, before pronouncing its
establishment as a Salafī mosque. A similar incident happened nearby, when 50 members of
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya retook control of the al-Iklhas mosque, which had been one of its
strongholds in the 1990s, before it was annexed by the government.54 Senior Azharite figures
stated that in the absence of the security apparatus, imams not belonging to the newly
dominant Islamist currents found it increasingly difficult, in the transitional period, to

52 Wael Faez, ‘wakil wazārat al-awqāf yarfuḍ al-istamrār fī manṣibih wa yuṭālib bil-taṣadā l-tayārāt mutaṭarafa
53 ‘taḥarukāt salafiyya wa a’iḍāt l-jamā’at al-ikhwān lil-sayṭāna ‘ala masājid al-awqāf’, al-Shorouk, 3 April 2011,
54 ‘taḥarukāt salafiyya wa a’iḍāt l-jamā’at al-ikhwān lil-sayṭāna ‘ala masājid al-awqāf’.
maintain their hold over mosques. These incidents were emblematic of a wider pattern, in which political Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and newly-emboldened Salafist groups, were able to establish a formal organised presence in Egypt’s mosques due to the incapacity of the state’s coercive apparatus at this time.

In the battle between the state and Islamist movements to control Egypt’s mosques, the conflict over Cairo’s Nur Mosque, in particular, encapsulates the struggle particularly well, both historically, and for the contemporary period. Prior to the 2011 uprisings, the sprawling complex of the Nur mosque in Cairo’s Abbasiyya district had become a most important symbol of the official religious bureaucracy, used yearly as the location for official Islamic celebrations. A tussle for control of the mosque had raged between its founder, Shaykh Hafez Salama, and the ministry for more than 25 years. Founder of Jam’iyyat al-Hidaya al-Islamiyya (the Society of Islamic Guidance), Salama spent years in the 1970s collecting donations for a huge mosque to counter the building of a Coptic cathedral nearby in Abbasiyya. By 1981, it had become a notorious centre for Islamists in Cairo, partly due to Salama’s vociferous leadership. However, he became embroiled in confrontation with the state in 1985 over a parliamentary motion to implement the sharia into Egyptian law. After parliament voted against the motion, he organised a series of demonstrations from the mosque over a two-month period, demanding its implementation irrespective of the ruling. In response, Salama was arrested on July 14, but then released a month later to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Upon his return, however, the Nur mosque was confiscated and annexed to the Ministry of Awqaf. In the subsequent years, Salama tried to use legal means

57 Kepel, 255.
as a way of reclaiming the mosque, including an unsuccessful lawsuit in 1994 against the Ministry.59 His fortunes appeared to change in 2001, with a favourable ruling from the Supreme Administrative Court, who ordered the Ministry to hand over all the buildings of the mosque to its founder.60 The ruling was not enforced, however, as it relied for its implementation on the Ministry, who instead continued to operate the mosque right up until the 2011 uprising.

The dispute resumed on the Friday following Mubarak’s ouster, when the renowned Salafi preacher, Shaykh Muhammad Hassan, delivered the sermon instead of the mosque’s state-appointed imam, Shaykh Ahmed Turak.61 Over the following months, Salafi supporters of Salama prevented Turak from ascending to the minbar to deliver the Friday sermon, with other notable Salafi figures taking his place each week.62 The absence of any security presence to assist Turak ensured that the Salafists were able to do so relatively unimpeded. However, the dispute escalated on 15 April, 2011, when Salama’s followers man-handled the respected al-Azhar scholar, 81-year-old Dr. Hassan al-Shafei, preventing him from taking to the minbar to deliver the Friday sermon, after being sent by the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayyib, to do so.63 In addition, Turak was subjected to verbal threats before the Salafi scholar Umar Abd Al-Aziz delivered the Friday sermon instead. Following this, Salama released a statement that his Society for Islamic Guidance had taken over control of the mosque. The response of the Minister of Awqaf, Abdullah al-Hussaini Halal, was to call

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60 Shaban.
63 Bahry, ‘“al-maṣrī al-yawm’ tāfth milāf ‘masjid al-nūr”: ḥakāyāt al-ṣīrā’ ‘ala “al-minbar”’.
for the Ministry of the Interior to intervene and retake control of the mosque from the Salafists who had become entrenched in the building. Yet his call went unheeded.

Without the security services acting as the guarantor of state control, the Ministry of Awqaf was unable to retake control of the mosque, and was forced to enter into negotiations over its future. The end-result was a type of power-sharing agreement in which overall de-facto power remained with Salama’s association, yet with a compromise over who would deliver the sermon each week. The Awqaf preacher Shaykh Ashari Omran was thus permitted to deliver the Friday sermon on 1 July, 2011, returning intermittently in between Salafi figures selected by Salama. The Ministry was thereby forced to acquiesce in the face of newly emboldened private actors who undermined the state’s policy of control over houses of worship. It no longer had the means to implement its policies, particularly in the absence of its guarantor, SSI.

4.5 Islamic rituals and the control of mosques: the case of i’tikāf

The withdrawal of state security from Egypt’s mosques also had an impact on Islamic practices. During the Mubarak era, mosques were subject to particularly high levels of surveillance during the holy month of Ramadan. Among the rituals sometimes performed during the month of fasting is i’tikāf, a retreat to a mosque to engage in worship, fasting, and Qur’anic readings, usually during Ramadan’s final ten days. During this period the observant

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66 Saad Ali, ‘Ramadan Culture in Modern Cairo: Young Females’ Leisure Patterns and the Politics of Piety, Unity and Authenticity’ (PhD dissertation, University of Groningen, 2010).
(muʿtakif) is required to reside within the mosque for the entire prescribed period, a practice based on a similar deed which the Prophet Muhammad himself performed.

Prior to 2011, iʿtikāf was subject to numerous restrictions by state security, suspicious that individuals displaying such levels of devotion may have potentially radical affiliations. Individuals who wished to participate, or groups looking to organise iʿtikāf in a particular mosque, were required to inform the SSI of the number of participants, as well as providing a copy of their National ID cards for inspection.67 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this led to a reluctance among many to perform the ritual, fearful of placing themselves under the surveillance of state security. Restrictions were also placed on the number of mosques available for performing iʿtikāf, with many being closed following prayers to prevent its occurrence.68 Those mosques that were made available by the Ministry of Awqaf were given set topics for sermons, as well as the lessons taught by shaykhs to the participating muʿtakifīn. Preachers known for their opposition to the regime were denied permits to participate, with only state-sanctioned imams being allowed within the grounds of mosques observing iʿtikāf. The combined result of the monitoring of the muʿtakifīn, along with the restrictions placed on mosques allocated for observing iʿtikāf, meant that its practice was a distinctly state-sanctioned affair, thus restricting numbers amongst worshippers.

Egypt’s transitional period provided the opportunity for the expansion of iʿtikāf, with even the support of state institutions. During Ramadan 2011, the head of the Ministry of Awqaf for Cairo, Shaykh Muhammad Abdelrahman, told the al-Yawm al-Sabaa newspaper that “the time of the security state has gone irreversibly” along with the security reports that had pursued observers during every iʿtikāf.69 Abelrahman explained that the ministry had

69 Ali and al-Bahrawy.
allocated 3,285 mosques for the final ten days of Ramadan in every governorate of the
country. Instructions were issued to all regional directorates of the ministry to ensure the
comfort of the mu’takifīn throughout the ten days, ensuring the continued opening of
mosques, along with their cleanliness and provision of sufficient water and lighting. The
absence of security checks, as well as the lifting of restrictions on private mosques from
carrying out the practice, led to a large increase in worshippers performing the ritual. In the
state-run mosque of Amr Ibn al-As, whose original structure was the first mosque built in
Cairo in the 7th century, more than 4,000 mu’takifīn participated, a huge increase on past
years.70

Individual worshippers gave a flavour of the new environment in interviews with *al-
Yawm al-Saba’a*. Among the mu’takifīn was a young man in his twenties, who told the
newspaper that “i’tikāf this year has a special taste, because all the mu’takifīn feel the
freedom that God gave to Egypt after the 25 January revolution”.71 He pointed out how the
situation had changed entirely since the previous year, with popular shaykhs giving lessons,
whereas previously it was forbidden for them to attend, with only those appointed by the
ministry being present. Another novel development was the significant increase in the
number of women seeking to perform *i’tikāf*. In the past, women’s lessons were prevented in
most mosques during the Ramadan retreat, whilst they were only permitted to observe the
practice during *laylat al-qadr* (Night of Destiny), until the morning.72 At the al-Rawas
Mosque in Cairo, however, 50 women attended workshops during *i’tikāf* in 2012 to
memorize the Quran, read verses, and interpret or tell a story of Islamic history.73

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70 Ali and al-Bahrawy.
71 Ali and al-Bahrawy.
72 This is believed to be the night when the Qur’an was revealed in its entirety to Muhammad by the angel
Gabriel.
73 ‘al-nisā’ al-mu’takafāt: zāhira maṣriyya jaḍīda ba’d al-thawra’, *al-Arabiya*, 14 August 2012,
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/14/232240.html.
transitional period thus represented, to some extent, the pluralization of religious practice in Egypt’s mosques.

It was not only, however, individual worshippers who took advantage of these opportunities, as Islamist movements also sought to use *i’tikāf* as an opportunity to increase their control over Egypt’s mosques. A prominent presence amongst followers of a particular doctrine became a means through which Islamists were able to establish a foothold in state-owned mosques. Whereas under Mubarak, the Ministry of Awqaf had sought to annex the mosques of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups, in the post-uprising period, these groups instead competed with each other for control of the state’s mosques. Particular targets were the larger ‘cathedral’ mosques, such as the aforementioned Nur mosque, because they were seen as symbols of state control. For example, in 2012, hundreds of Salafists descended on the Amr ibn al-As mosque, in order to perform *i’tikāf*. In addition, it was also reported that Salafists had also established a significant presence in other major mosques in Cairo, such as the Fateh mosque in Ramses, and al-Azizi Billah mosque in the El-Koba Gardens area. The schedule of speakers during the ten-days of the ritual included prominent Salafi shaykhs linked to al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, from which the Nour political party was born. Among the most prominent figures were Sayyid Abul Azim, Muhammad Hassan, and Muhammad Ismail. This was significant, as in the past these Alexandria-based shaykhs were unable to obtain security permits to leave their headquarters in the coastal city, whereas they were now delivering speeches in major erstwhile state mosques in the capital.

Although the restrictions previously imposed by state security were largely absent in 2011, there remained some instances reminiscent of the SSI monitoring of *mu’takifin* witnessed during the Mubarak era. Some citizens in the Giza governorate, adjacent to Cairo,

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74 Raheem, *miṣr tunāfis bayn al-ikhwān wa al-salafīn min ’ajl al-sayṭara ‘ala masājid al-dawla’.*
75 Raheem.
expressed their dismay at being asked to fill out a form giving their personal details and a copy of the national ID card. In response, Shaykh Abdelrahman, the head of Awqaf in Cairo, claimed that the procedure was for administrative reasons, in order to determine total numbers for food and insurance, rather than for security purposes. Whilst hard to determine the truth of the matter, it seems that some remnants of the previous regime’s practices may have continued. Despite this, the relaxation of state monitoring of mosques provided new-found freedoms for religious practices such as *i’tikāf*, as well as another means through which Islamic movements were able to compete with one another for control of Egypt’s governmental mosques in the post-Mubarak period.

4.6 Establishing new religious institutions

In addition to competing with the Ministry of Awqaf for control of mosques, Islamic associations also moved to establish new preacher training institutes (*ma‘āhid i’adād lil-du’āa*) to train religious specialists in their own doctrine. Previously, this task was permitted only in official institutes operated by the Ministry of Awqaf and al-Azhar, or certain officially-sanctioned institutes run by select Islamic associations. Again, in this revolutionary environment of 2011, Islamic associations were able to further expand their organisational activities in areas previously denied to them.

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Preacher training institutes are a relatively modern phenomenon, paralleling the ‘professionalization of preaching’ at the turn of the 19th century. Al-Azhar’s Department of Preaching and Guidance (Qism al-Wa’z wa al-Irshad), established in 1918, was the main outlet for this purpose until the Nasser period, when training and certifying religious specialists became part of the Ministry of Awqaf’s remit. With the mosque-building boom of the 1970s, the Egyptian state struggled to recruit enough certified employees in mosques, particularly as many al-Azhar graduates began to seek more lucrative jobs abroad. In response, more Awqaf institutes were established, while in 1977 al-Azhar set up a new school to train imams in the university’s old campus in the Old Cairo neighbourhood, named the College of Islamic Da’wa (kulliyat al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya). However, the Egyptian state continued to struggle to provide sufficient preachers to monopolise the field, resulting in a reluctant collaboration with private actors to fulfil the task. The acknowledgement of this practice was formalised in 1987 when the Minister of Awqaf, Dr. Muhammad Ali Mahjub, established a new body, Majlis A’ala al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya (the Supreme Council for Islamic Preaching), bringing together the leaders of the largest da’wa organisation, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya, and senior government preachers under the direction of al-Azhar. Its significance, according to Gaffney, was the ‘growing cooperation of preachers, official and lay’. Rather than the pluralization of preaching, however, this body constituted a strategic collaboration between the state and one particularly well-resourced organisation.

Beyond al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya, training of preachers independent of state regulation remained highly restricted, with institutes established by other Islamic associations subject to tight restrictions or closure. As mentioned in the previous chapter, al-Da’wa al-

79 Gaffney, 43.
81 Gaffney, 267.
Salafiyya’s preacher training institute, al-Forqan, had been forced to close in 1994. However, with the opening of the religious sphere in 2011, Islamic movements grasped the opportunity to establish new preacher training institutes as they sought to consolidate their independence and control over mosques. As well as the traditional quietist Salafi group Ansar al-Sunna, other more politically-minded movements, including the Alexandria-based Salafist group al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, and the Muslim Brotherhood, all made moves to establish new institutes to train preachers.

In a March 2012 interview with the Kuwaiti *al-Forqān* magazine, Ansar al-Sunna’s leader, Dr. Abdullah Shaker, explained:

> It is well known that there were different types of restrictions exerted over *da’wa* during the previous regime. After the end of the regime, we began to reformulate the work of *da’wa* once again, and one of the most important sectors we have focused on is *ma‘āhid al-shar‘iyya* (shari‘a institutes), where we have expanded the establishment of *da’wa* institutes which graduate preaching specialists. These institutes were present before, but were weak and few, the reason being that the security agencies did not allow their establishment in many places. Thanks to God, *da’wa* benefited greatly after the revolution, without a doubt. As the state security apparatus’ checks ended, the movement of preachers became wider, to the places we could not reach, and which were deprived of *da’wa* with shaykhs being forbidden from going to them. Now, we are moving all over Egypt.\(^82\)

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It can be seen that with the departure of state security from monitoring mosques, Islamic associations were freed to expand their activities. According to Ansar al-Sunna’s website, 25 institutes offer two-year programmes in Islamic sciences, the Arabic language, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and hadith. In addition, there are a further three institutes for a three-year duration of study, and two lasting four years. Ansar al-Sunna has also shown a willingness to promote da’wa, even in the absence of formal institutions, through the launch of ‘da’wa caravans’, which enable them to reach remote villages, such as in the Sinai region. Ansar al-Sunna also expanded the role of Quranic memorization workshops among youth gatherings, which had been banned under the Mubarak regime.\(^{83}\)

Establishing preacher training institutes was also a key component in the strategy of another major Salafi group, the Alexandria-based al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya. The foundations of this group stem from the student activism of the 1970s in Alexandria University which led to the creation of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Whilst many of its members subsequently joined the Muslim Brotherhood, others more influenced by Salafist thought, such as Muhammad Ismail al-Muqaddim and Ahmed Farid, chose instead to institutionalise their activities in their own organisation in 1980, under the leadership of Muhammad Abdel Fattah. In the realm of preaching, al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya opened its first institute, al-Furqan, in 1985. The initial batch of preachers graduated two years later, and the institute continued to produce around 50 graduates per year until 1994, when it was closed amidst security concerns sweeping Egypt related to radical Islamist movements.\(^{84}\) The Alexandria mosque where lessons took place was confiscated by the security services, with any subsequent study groups associated with the group being restricted to discussions of fiqh (jurisprudence). Al-Da’wa’s shaykhs were banned from travelling without permission and forbidden from delivering sermons except in

\(^{83}\) Ramadan.

certain Alexandrian mosques. To escape further repression the group moved its activities underground, maintaining a decentralised administrative structure, whilst keeping communications to a minimum.85

In 2011, however, al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya was able to re-establish al-Furqan, only now with much more prominence nationally than its initial incarnation. For not only was the group able to regain control of al-Furqan’s original Alexandria headquarters, but it also established a network of divisions in mosques across Egypt.86 As well as several branches in Alexandria, institutes were founded in the governorates of Buhayra, Ismailiya, Kafr al-Shaykh, Marsa Mutruh, Gharbiyya, and others, totalling 25 institutes. Al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya’s website states that the number of applicants to study at its main Alexandria base was more than 2000 men and 700 women in its first year alone, whilst the nationwide figure of enrolled students is put at 6,000.

As for the Brotherhood, it had long been aware of the necessity to train preachers according to their own outlook in order to maintain their influence. In 1951 the then Supreme Guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi, made the move of establishing a school in every administrative office of the group, concerned solely with training people in the Brotherhood’s da’wa, and a specific da’wa academy was set up in its Cairo headquarters two years later.87 Despite this, the Mubarak era saw the Brotherhood facing similar restrictions to those imposed on the Salafi groups under Mubarak. Since 1986 it had been forced to adopt an informal model of preacher institutes, under a system of ‘hidden camps’ (mu’askarāt khafiyya), in order to evade the suppression of the security services.88 Unable to meet in public, 142 of these small

85 el-Sherif, ‘Egypt’s Salafists at a Crossroads’.
86 ‘ta’sīs al-ma’āhid’.
groups were overseen by the Brotherhood, with lessons taking place in the houses of preachers, who each taught around 10 individuals.

Reflecting the competitive element with Egypt’s Salafist groups over the control of mosques, the Brotherhood acknowledged the necessity of keeping pace with Salafist groups over preaching. In the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, the Brotherhood moved quickly to establish 10 new institutes. In November 2012, meanwhile, Abdel Khaliq al-Sharif, the official in charge of spreading the group’s da’wa, announced a ‘da’wa project’ (mashrū‘ da’wa) to confront what he called ‘Salafi militancy’. The first phase of the project saw 4 new institutes being opened in October that year, with another 4 the following month, with each institute accommodating between 200 and 300 students. The overall target, al-Sharif explained, was to reach an additional 50 institutes, accommodating tens of thousands of students. It is unclear how close the Brotherhood came to reaching this target when it was ousted in the military coup of 3 July, 2013. Yet reports indicate that it did continue to establish new institutes for the remainder of its period in government, such as in the governorate of Kafr al-Shaykh.

4.7 Conclusions

In this chapter it has been shown that the deposal of Mubarak in 2011 led to a reduction in the capacity of the Egyptian state to repress the activities of Islamic movements. The withdrawal of state security in the monitoring of Islamic movements meant that state ministries, such as

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Awqaf, that were concerned with religion no longer had the means to maintain their previous policy of state control over Egypt’s private Islamic institutions. This provided opportunities for Islamic movements to extend their organised presence in Egypt’s mosques, and to establish new institutions, such as social welfare charities and preacher training institutes, which had previously been restricted. There are indications that while the security state did not disappear entirely, as evidenced by the continued repression of secular civil society groups active in democracy promotion, the purview of its lens appeared to be directed away from Islamic movements, thus facilitating the expansion of their activities. The incapacity of the state during the uprisings, therefore, provided an opportunity structure for Islamic associations to occupy public space, performing state-like functions in the distribution of goods and services.

Egypt’s 2011 uprising presented a significant opening for the discursive ‘public sphere’ activities of the country’s Islamic associations. State weakness and the withdrawal of security surveillance from its mosques meant that groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafi organisations were able to expand their remit and confront the state, as they sought to assert themselves in this new landscape. A host of associations began to confront the official religious bureaucracy for control of mosques, many of which had been confiscated under Mubarak. But mosques were also a site of contention and competition between those associations, many of whom would institutionalise politically, and who were thereby searching for increasing outlets from which to garner support. To consolidate their stamp further on the religious sphere, Islamic associations were able to engage in religious practices previously restricted under Mubarak, such as the i’tikaf celebrations during Ramadan. Furthermore, to consolidate their grip over mosques and to expand further their own doctrines, these associations also moved to establish new institutions to train their preachers and staff their mosques.
CHAPTER FIVE

BETWEEN DA‘WA AND POLITICS: COMBINING ‘SELF-ORGANIZATIONAL’ AND ‘PUBLIC SPHERE’ ACTIVITIES

The emergence of opportunities, due to changes in the institutional structure of a political system, relate not only to the expansion of organisational activity, but also to discursive activities in the public sphere. Capturing the breadth of change during the transitional period requires an examination of the extent to which civil society actors could use their presence in public spaces to engage in discursive activities that may otherwise have been denied them in an authoritarian context. David Lewis identifies the combination of functional ‘self-organizational’ activities among civil society organizations with the production of discourse in the ‘public sphere’ as being particularly threatening to authoritarian regimes. Under the repressive constraints of authoritarian rule, civil society tends to be unable to combine organizational self-governance with ‘discursive openness’. However, the initiation of the transitional period provided the political opportunity structure for civil society actors to overturn these restrictions.

This chapter focuses on actors within the Islamic movement who decided against formal politicisation, but took advantage of the opportunity structure to engage in political activism in support of Islamist political actors. Ansar al-Sunna (AS) and al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya (GS) were targeted as part of the crackdown on the Brotherhood in 2013, when hundreds of their welfare branches and mosques were seized. Why did these two actors, who decided to eschew potentially risky and contentious participation in electoral politics, become a target of the wider crackdown on the Brotherhood and Islamic social and religious

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1 Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’, 333.
institutions? This chapter shows how the changing political environment enabled both associations to match practices with their ideas. No longer forced to approach da‘wa as being strictly distinct from politics, as they were forced to under more restrictive environments, we see a blurring of the boundaries of what constitutes each field, leading to da‘wa being emphasised as a form of political advocacy. This meant that formerly ‘apolitical’ movements began to engage in political activism, and in doing so, married their self-organizational activities with the discursive, with the reinterpretation of the concept of da‘wa to include engagement in political activism.

These ideas received practical implementation through political activism, framing political choices as reflecting one’s religious duty, during three electoral cycles: the March 2011 referendum on constitutional amendments; the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections; and the 2012 presidential elections. AS and GS became instruments for the expression of the interests and ideals of the overall Islamic movement during the transitional period, proclaiming unity among its diverse factions, despite Islamist infighting amid the electoral contestation for power. Playing this role appeared to create the incentive for the regime to embroil both groups in the wider crackdown that was to follow under Sisi. This chapter begins by providing a brief account of the history and organisational structure of AS and GS. It then examines their relations with other Islamic actors during the transitional period, their stance on political participation, and the relationship between da‘wa and the political sphere. The final sections detail the practical implementation of these ideas during the three electoral cycles referred to above.
AS and GS are two of Egypt’s oldest and largest Islamic associations, nationally-networked with branches and mosques across all 27 governorates. Despite not being as well known as the Brotherhood, both organisations predate the better-known Islamist movement.

Established in 1912 by Shaykh Mahmoud Khattab el-Sobki, GS was one of the first new Islamic associations in Egypt to call for the revival of the *sunnah* and confronting *bid’ah* (innovation) in religious practices in the country. Against a background of colonial encroachment, GS sought to counter the displacement of Islamic law from public life and the path of national education, and a perceived campaign of Westernisation that included calls for the liberation of women and minimising the status of shari’a law in social, political, and economic fields. AS, meanwhile, was established in 1926 by an Azharite scholar, Sheikh Mohamed Hamid al-Fiqqi, who had been a student of the influential Islamic reformer Rashid Rida. Al-Fiqqi’s initial affiliation was with GS, but he contended that it had not countered forcefully enough these perceived corrupting innovations, and he differed in his interpretation of the attributes of God; in particular, in his doctrinal closeness to *ahl al-sunnah*. The result was the formation of a new association, AS, focusing on worship and behaviour, stressing strict adherence to *tawḥīd* (the oneness of God), and being particularly scathing of Sufism.

The more scripturalist motivations of AS were reflected in its activities, with behaviour and piety being prioritised over the more service-oriented activities of GS – a trend that has continued to the contemporary period. Although AS and GS would embark on their own paths, their trajectories have periodically overlapped. Under Nasser they would be

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3 Muhammad, 115.
4 Muhammad, 113.
targeted as part attempts to dominate civil society by imposing strict regulations on voluntary associations (see chapter three).\textsuperscript{5} The entire management board of GS was dissolved in 1966, only being allowed to resume operations under a new regime-appointed chairman, General Abdelrahim Amin, who would keep a close watch over its activities.\textsuperscript{6} Three years later the assets of AS were seized due to their political activities, and the group was forced to merge with GS for several years.\textsuperscript{7} After regaining its autonomy, AS tempered its political involvement under successive regimes, partly due to the influence of increased ties with the Wahhabi clergy of Saudi Arabia. AS scholars have travelled and lived in the kingdom since the 1960s, with the ideas of quietist Saudi figure Rabi al-Madhkali becoming increasingly prominent within the group. This led to a refusal among the group’s leaders to engage in any anti-regime activism. Notably, AS’s leader Abdullah Shakir even said in 2010 that he supported the hereditary secession of Gamal Mubarak to the presidency.\textsuperscript{8} In contrast to GS, who had developed increasing collaboration with the Brotherhood on charitable work, the trajectory of AS was to adopt a decidedly quietist position under Mubarak, with its method being mainly textual and academic, promoting debate over Islamic legal issues among its scholars and theologians.\textsuperscript{9}

With some of the Salafi concerns such as \textit{bid’a} which prompted the formation of both organisations, AS and GS are often referred to collectively as being Salafi movements. However, GS can be considered ‘less Salafi’ than AS, as the former is primarily concerned with setting up social welfare organizations and mosques than disseminating specific Salafi theology, and is less influenced by Saudi Arabian Salafi scholars, with many members being

\textsuperscript{6} Menza, \textit{Patronage Politics in Egypt: The National Democratic Party and Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo}, 73.
\textsuperscript{7} Gauvain, \textit{Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God}, 37.
\textsuperscript{8} Steven Brooke, ‘Islamic Groups’ Social Service Provision and Attitudinal Change in Egypt’ (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 30 June 2015), 26, https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-groups-social-service-provision-and-attitudinal-change-in-egypt/.
\textsuperscript{9} Brooke, 26.
traditional Azharite scholars.\textsuperscript{10} The Salafi credentials of AS is less in dispute, with Gauvain going as far as suggesting that among Egyptian Salafism’s various, AS is the most important.\textsuperscript{11} While certainly the oldest Salafi association in Egypt, the rise to prominence of al-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya may challenge this claim. Nevertheless, in terms of size and reach AS is one of Egypt’s most prominent Salafi organisations, while GS is not only one of the largest Islamic associations in terms of its engagement in social welfare provision, but among the largest of any NGO operating in Egypt.

Organisationally, GS is a sprawling network of more than 1,100 branches offering social welfare services, with a further 6,000 mosques under its umbrella offering religious services.\textsuperscript{12} Although smaller in size, AS nevertheless comprises a substantial 200 branches and 3,000 mosques. As has been noted in the previous chapter, both associations have actively trained and recruited their own preachers for these mosques, with 37 institutes affiliated with GS, and 32 with AS. Although GS’s work is focused primarily within Egypt, AS has a presence elsewhere in Africa through its Centre for African Education, which promotes its doctrine and Qur’ānic learning, most prominently in neighbouring Sudan. Both associations have monthly magazines with a large reach. Al-Tibyan is published by GS while AS’s publishes al-Tawhid, with a claimed distribution of 100,000 copies per month. In terms of social welfare programmes, although AS is involved in initiatives such as its Orphan Sponsorship Project, this pales in comparison with the much more substantial array of programmes undertaken by GS. It has been observed that GS’s extensive social welfare network has a budget that is bigger than that of several government ministries.\textsuperscript{13} With over 120 items for expenditure on welfare, the stream dedicated to orphanage sponsorship alone

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Gauvain, ‘Salafism in Modern Egypt: Panacea or Pest?’, 810.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Gauvain, \textit{Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God}, 34.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} The organisational structure of both organisations is described in detail on their respective websites, http://www.ansaralsonna.com/web/ and https://www.alshareyah.com/
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Menza, \textit{Patronage Politics in Egypt: The National Democratic Party and Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo}, 86–87.
\end{itemize}
exceeds the budget of the entire Ministry of Social Solidarity, the Ministry tasked with regulating the association.

Reflecting the scope of its activities, GS’s organisational structure is highly institutionalised. All 1,100 branches are represented by three members in a General Assembly, with one vote for each branch. They meet annually to approve the annual budget, appoint the treasurer and 15 member Executive Board, which is responsible for selecting the General Secretary from its members and monitoring and approving the bulk of the financial activities of the Society. 14 Other divisions include a senior ‘ulāmā’ committee, social projects, Branch Operations, Institute of Leadership Training, and a da‘wa division. AS’s 15 member Board of Directors is also chosen by a 400 member General Assembly. 15 Its executive body includes divisions for da‘wa, media, research, aid projects, finance, public relations, youth, and legal affairs.

Although their organisational structures are well-defined and hierarchical, both AS and GS’s ideological underpinnings and direction vis-à-vis Islamist actors has been somewhat fluid. For example, GS counts among its members traditional Azharites, Salafis, as well as Muslim Brotherhood members. Individuals can therefore be affiliated with GS due to their social work, but also seek ideological perspectives from more clearly ideological organisations like the Brotherhood or Salafī networks. As a result, its individual branches have been susceptible to what has been called ‘entryism’, a Brotherhood tactic ‘to reach the masses indirectly through preexisting Islamic social-service networks’. 16 Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary candidates often double up membership in the Brotherhood with charitable associations such as GS. 17 Al-Muhammadī ʿAbd al-Maqsud, a Muslim Brotherhood deputy from  располван in the 2005–2010 parliament, said that he became known

14 Menza, 87.
16 Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, And Elections In Egypt, 80.
17 Masoud, 83.
in his district by setting up a GS branch.\textsuperscript{18} However, the connection between the Brotherhood and GS goes back much further. Before it published its current magazine, \textit{al-Tibyan}, a GS shaykh had run another magazine in the 1970s called \textit{al-Itisam}, that became known as a mouthpiece for Islamist causes and the Brotherhood during the Sadat years. The magazine was forcibly closed in 1990, and it was not until 2004 that it was permitted to publish another official magazine.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, despite being formally independent from the Brotherhood, individual members with Brotherhood sympathies can lend support through GS’s own institutions, whilst individual branches have also been shown to be vulnerable to exploitation from Brotherhood figures.

Salafi networks such as AS are also notoriously fluid, with individuals cross-pollinating across different groups being a regular occurrence. Gauvain notes the informality of Salafism, with communities forming in ‘universities and colleges, workplaces of all kinds, and now, increasingly, on the worldwide web’ and such groups ‘may, or may not have, a connection to ‘Ansar al-Sunna, al-Gam’iyya al-Shari’iyya and the other main Salafi da’wa groups’.\textsuperscript{20} Gauvain continues that, ‘Salafism, in short, is an intensely social phenomenon that requires no special forum, or formal organization, to exist’.\textsuperscript{21} In other words, there are various outlets for those with sympathies towards Salafism to unite in different social settings, some of which might be – but not exclusively – Islamic associations such as AS. This informal nature meant that despite being an institutionalised organisation, individuals could also be active within AS and other organisations, which will be shown in the next section. Moreover, AS is also somewhat fragmented with individuals also having influence over specific branches, that may deviate from the intentions of the executive, which will be shown in chapter eight. Despite being institutionalised and hierarchical organisations, therefore,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{18} Masoud, 81.
\textsuperscript{19} Masoud, 82.
\textsuperscript{20} Gauvain, ‘Salafism in Modern Egypt: Panacea or Pest?’, 811.
\textsuperscript{21} Gauvain, 811.
\end{flushleft}
affiliation with GS branches has been used instrumentally by Brotherhood members, whilst the informal nature of Salafism also means AS has been a somewhat fragmented organisation.

5.2 Unifying da‘wa and politics

As with all Islamic actors, the initiation of a transitional process in 2011 provided the opportunity for AS and GS to reflect on the nature and scope of their activities. The erosion of repressive mechanisms and the liberalization of the political sphere enabled political Islamists to seek office in order to prioritise the place of Islam in the forging of new social and political structures of the state. Both AS and GS decided against formal political institutionalisation during this period, but nevertheless played prominent activist roles in supporting the actors which did so. They began by joining and forming new Islamic bodies to provide legal opinions on issues arising during the transitional period.

The first was the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and Reformation (ILBRR; al-hay’a al-shar’iya lil-huqūq wa al-īslāh), which positioned itself as an umbrella group for Egypt’s main Islamic factions, and sought to counter non-Islamic influence. The group was formed in July 2011 from 10 senior scholars and activists from AS, DS, GS, the Muslim Brotherhood, and some Azharite imams. Among the most prominent founding members were Yasser Borhamy, vice-president of DS, Talaat Afifi, who was a senior figure in GS and who would go on to serve as Minister of Awqaf in Mohamed Morsi’s cabinet, as well as AS’s Abdullah Shakir. Within a year its membership included more than 100 prominent Islamic figures, incorporating more factions such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. A later notable addition to its collective was the Brotherhood’s deputy supreme guide, Khairat al-Shater. The ethos of
the body was as a collective seeking to further the cause of the Islamic movement, and was
summed up by Borhamy in the following statement:

The aim of participating in this front is the formation of a Salafi Islamist bloc, in
a sentence, to multiply the spectrum against secularist attempts to exploit the
opportunity to modify some of the articles in the constitution and rob the will of
the *ummah*, and amend or cancel the second article in the constitution which
reads, “an Islamic shari'a reference”.

The second body of note was the Shura Council of Scholars (majlis shura al-‘ulāma),
established by senior figures within AS, tasked with providing legal opinions on the 25
January revolution and its aftermath, making regular forays into political debates. The council
was led by AS’s leader, Abdullah Shakir, with Muhammad Hassan, a prominent and
influential preacher within AS due to his appearances on the popular satellite channel al-Nas
TV, but who was also a prominent figure within DS, as his deputy. Other members included
Gamal al-Murakabi, AS’s former leader, the Islamic scholar Muhammad Hussein Yacoub, a
vocal supporter of the newly-formed Salafi party, al-Asala, Shaykh Ali Nais, who was elected
to the People’s Assembly as part of the Nour Party, and Sayyid Abdul Azzim, a prominent
DS leader in Alexandria. The council thus comprised several prominent Salafi figures, and
while being dominated by AS, also represented other important Salafi movements and
political parties.

The removal of constraints over discursive activity meant that the various factions of
Egypt’s Islamic movement could openly sanction and encourage widespread entry into the

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23 Field and Hamam, ‘Salafi Satellite TV in Egypt’.
political field. The ILBRR’s first published statement paved the way for the widespread entry of Egypt’s diverse Islamic movement into the political field.

Today, the ummah [Muslim community] has turned to change and reform in all its forms, and it cannot be hindered or slowed down. The implementation of justice, development, and the reform of the government and its institutions is the choice of the people, which represents their desired stability. These peaceful and disciplined demands are no longer a departure from shari’a, or a violation of Islamic law.  

Egyptian Salafists had long eschewed formal party politics for theological reasons, concentrating their efforts on changing behaviour and personal piety. But with the declaration from this body - which included all of Egypt’s main Islamic factions – that there was now no legal impediment to reforming the institutions of the state, it was clear their position had now changed. Alongside the formalisation of the Brotherhood’s political arm, in the form of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), three Salafī parties were formed: al-Nour (Light), al-Asala (Authenticity), and al-Fadhila (Virtue). Al-Nour was born out of the Alexandria-based Salafi movement, al-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya, and, along with al-Asala, formed an electoral alliance in parliament known as the ‘Islamist bloc’. The alliance was successful in the parliamentary elections in 2011/2012, and held the second largest number of seats in parliament after the FJP. Substantial Salafist sub-sections of Egypt’s Islamic movement, therefore, upgraded their status from largely ‘apolitical’ societal actors to institutionalised political actors, profoundly changing their relationship vis-à-vis the state, a shift given ideological backing by this newly-formed umbrella body.

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The significance of the institutional politicisation of Egyptian Salafism has been widely acknowledged.\textsuperscript{25} However, it was also notable that two of Egypt’s largest and oldest Islamic associations, AS and GS, decided against formal politicisation. Yet, both AS and GS restated their view on the relationship between \textit{da‘wa} and politics, to clarify their understanding of the relationship between \textit{da‘wa} and political activism. This was, in itself, significant, for both organisations had traditionally gravitated towards ‘quietism’ under Mubarak, a branch of Salafism focusing on piety and personal behaviour, rather than the ‘activist’ strand, which sees engagement with the political sphere.\textsuperscript{26}

Initially, after expanding its activities after 2011 and establishing more formal organisational ties with other Islamic movements, it appeared that AS would indeed form a political party like some of its Salafist contemporaries. In an interview with \textit{Asharq al-Awsaat}, Muhammad Hassan stated that Egypt was passing through a stage that required religious scholars to take action and direct people towards what they believed to be in the best interests of the country. As a result, he declared that AS would establish its own political party and field candidates for both houses of parliament.\textsuperscript{27} Although ultimately AS decided against formal political participation, it was not rejected as a legitimate avenue for others. The first statement from its Shura Council of Scholars, issued on 19 March, 2011, outlined AS’s position on the issue of political participation.


The right way to apply Islamic law is to educate Muslims on the doctrines of Islam, and its rulings and ethics, through the available legal means. We do not see any legal impediment to political participation in the People's Assembly, the Shura Council [upper house of parliament], and the local councils, because it is a means of enabling da’wa and spreading it among the different segments of society….We prefer scholars and preachers not to run for themselves so as not to distract them from da’wa, but rather to support those who adopt the issues of Islam and the interests of the nation. We call on Muslims to vote in the presidential elections for those who see it as more adopting the issues of Islamic law and the interests of the nation.\textsuperscript{28}

In choosing to prioritise da’wa over political participation, AS did not eschew politics, as was its tradition, but rather encouraged wider participation in the electoral field as a means of its advancement. This reflects Lacroix’s observation of DS’s view of politics as being a ‘purely instrumental approach’ that is ‘based on what was perceived to be in the interest of the Salafi Da’wa’.\textsuperscript{29} As well as establishing the legal permissibility of political participation in this service of their wider mission, the statement also includes a subtle reformulation of what \textit{da’wa} constitutes. In stressing that scholars who remain outside of politics should also support those Islamists who do run for political office, the Shura Council sanctioned engagement in political advocacy in the service of Islamist candidates in the electoral arena.

The second Shura Council statement, meanwhile, issued on 16 April, 2011, moved further in the direction of promoting cooperation and collaboration between the different


strands of the Islamic movement.\textsuperscript{30} It recommended that \textit{da ‘wa} organisations establish working committees in each governorate, combining representatives from different factions to cooperate over common goals. Here the reformulation of \textit{da ‘wa}’s meaning is extended to include organisational cooperation and collaboration between different Islamic associations. The Shura Council, with AS its dominant actor, thus outlined a framework for a politicised \textit{da ‘wa} that would be exercised across the Islamic movement, rather than in AS as a single organisation.

For its part, GS adopted a similar position to political participation, but was more forthright in specifying the way in which it viewed \textit{da ‘wa} and political participation as reinforcing one another. This is evidenced by a small booklet issued in September 2011 by the group outlining its position towards politics, titled, “The vision of \textit{al-Gam ‘iyya al-Shar ‘iyya} in joint Islamic action and party politics” (\textit{ru’yat al-Gam ‘iyya al-Shar ‘iyya fī al-‘amal al-islāmī al-mushtarak wa al-siyāsa wa al-ḥizbiyya}). The booklet explained how the changing environment post-Mubarak had necessitated a change in approach for Islamists more generally, but even for those who would forgo formal political participation.

The fall of this regime became a door to power in Egypt, open to all for the first time in many decades. The scales have tipped and the conditions have changed, so it has now become a duty [\textit{wajib}] for Islamists to race against time so that the events do not miss or overtake them. At the head of these changes was the Islamists’ view of party political action to attain rule of the country and establish a rational Islamic state governed by God’s shari’a. Al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya has considered that party politics is one of the developments which is a necessity to achieve the interests of Muslims, through the comprehensive vision of \textit{da ‘wa} and

through the principles of al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya in its daʿwa. The vision of al-Gamʿiyya al-Sharʿiyya in party political actions stems from its overall vision of joint action [al-ʿamal al-mushtarak].....Daʿwa is the base and party politics is a branch. You cannot talk about the branch in isolation from the base. Working in party politics at this stage has become a duty among the different branches of Islamists and their respective competencies and for that there are two directions. First, avoid spoilage by closing the door to non-Islamists to prevent them from reaching power. And second, bringing benefits by achieving our interests with the arrival of those who establish Islamic rule.\textsuperscript{31}

With the fall of Mubarak, entry into the political process was characterised as a ‘duty’ (wājib) for the Islamic movement, as it represents a genuine opportunity to establish a state governed by Islamic law. Despite choosing to remain in the area of daʿwa and education, the booklet makes clear that GS no longer viewed the work of daʿwa as being distinct from politics, as it was forced to do under more restrictive environments. Daʿwa and politics are intertwined, and cannot be considered in isolation from one another. Thus, ‘Joint Islamic action’ implies that daʿwa may advance the cause of Islam in politics, just as in turn, politics may advance the cause of daʿwa in the social fields. The implication is that even though both groups decided not to enter the political process themselves, they nevertheless displayed a new direction in how they framed their approach, which could now be used in the service of the cause of Islam in politics. GS’s leader al-Mahdy would later expand on the notion of ‘joint Islamic action’, stressing the necessity of different actors operating in the various fields of daʿwa to ensure coordination among them. He identified three fields: the “spoken daʿwa” (daʿwat al-khitab) (proselytization/education); “applied daʿwa” (al-daʿwa al-tabtiyya)

\textsuperscript{31} Muhammad, al-fikr al-siyāṣī li-ḥayārat al-salafiyya.
(service provision); and finally the work of party politics (ḥizbiyya).\textsuperscript{32} In al-Mahdy’s vision, different factions should identify which of these areas they would specialise in, while also working together to coordinate their activities. But crucially, these activities could be engaged in support of one another.

Al-Mahdy’s discourse on coordination and unity among different Islamic factions was furthered through the organisation of seminars and other activities. A seminar on the topic ‘The future of media discourse for Islamic movements’, brought al-Mahdy together with AS figure Muhammad Hassan and Essam al-Aryan from the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{33} In al-Mahdy’s address he outlined a plan for unity among Islamic movements in their discourse, in which they would use ‘one method’ in addressing people based on ‘moderate religion’ (al-dīn al-wasaṭī al-mu’tadil), and renouncing differences between them. GS also facilitated coordination with other Islamist groups by offering the use of its premises. Days after Mubarak’s departure, GS permitted the previously-banned al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya to use its headquarters in the Asyut governorate, where its leaders appeared in public for the first time in 20 years, and announced the resumption of their da’wa activities.\textsuperscript{34} Al-Gama’a had fought a violent insurgency against the state in Upper Egypt during the 1990s, before renouncing violence in 2002. The meeting was the first of a series to be held at the Asyut base over the following weeks as they met to discuss the future direction of the group, eventually forming the Building and Development Party (ḥizb al-binā’ wa al-tanmiyya) to contest the parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{35} Meanwhile, in April 2011, GS’s mosque in the Bulaq district of Cairo was used for what was described the ‘first Islamist conference’, featuring a number of


Salafi shaykhs. Among those to deliver lectures were Muhammad Abdul-Malik al-Zoghbi, known for his diatribes against Shias on the Salafi Fitna TV channel, Shaykh Adel al-Azzazy, who was one of the successful Nour Party parliamentarians in the 2011 People’s Assembly, and Shaykh Mahmood Shaaban, another Salafi firebrand who had issued fatwas sanctioning the killing of the leaders of the secular National Salvation Front, Mohamed ElBaradei and Hamdeen Sabahi. By providing an institutional base for Islamist groups and providing the platform for an assortment of confrontational Salafist figures to contribute their discourse to the public sphere, GS combined the organizational and discursive activities identified by Lewis, and acted as a conduit in trying to promote unity among Egypt’s diverse Islamic movements during the transitional period.

The reformulation of the meaning of *da’wa* adopted by both AS and GS is significant for how formerly ‘quietist’ Islamic actors are viewed. Even though they did not enter formal politics themselves, they reformulated their definition of *da’wa* in order that it may be used in the service of Islam in the political sphere. In particular, this is shown by the mobilization of their resources and engagement in discursive activities in support of the perceived goals of Egypt’s Islamist movements across three electoral cycles during the transition: the March 2011 referendum over the constitutional amendments; the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections; and the 2012 presidential elections.

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5.3 Political advocacy during electoral cycles

The changing political environment and pluralization of the political process provided the platform for AS and GS to play a prominent role in attempting to place Islam in the foreground of the formation of public policy and the selection of political candidates. This section argues that, during the transitional period, both associations effectively transitioned into political advocacy or interest groups, broadly defined as ‘voluntary associations, independent of the political system, that attempt to influence the government’. Hopkins identifies several advocacy approaches, two of which are relevant for the purposes of this section. The first is engagement in ‘demonstrations’ to rally public support around an issue or policy, whilst the second is ‘political campaign activity’, aimed as supporting (or opposing) political candidates. Political advocacy is cited by Lewis as among the public sphere discursive activities that authoritarian regimes tend to place specific restrictions on. The following sub-sections will show how AS and GS’s revision of da‘wa to include political activism led them to engage in such advocacy during three electoral cycles.

5.3.1 The March 2011 referendum on constitutional amendments

The first of Egypt’s electoral cycles which afforded the opportunity for Islamic associations to mobilize was a referendum on constitutional amendments. On 19 March 2011, Egypt held a referendum over a package of nine constitutional amendments, dealing mainly with the

conduct of elections and the powers of the presidency. For Egypt’s Islamic movement, securing a “Yes” vote was favourable for two reasons.

First, approving the amendments would facilitate a quick timetable for parliamentary elections, in which both the Brotherhood and the newly-formed Salafi parties would be well-placed to succeed, ahead of the secular and liberal parties, due to their superior resources and mobilising power. In opposition to the fast-tracked timetable was a secular coalition which included the future presidential candidate, Amr Moussa, the New Wafd Party, the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution, and el-Ghad Party, who favoured the drafting of a new constitution to regulate the electoral process more as well as requirements for members of parliament, aimed at preventing the felūl, the remnants of the NDP, from running again.

The second reason, however, does not become readily apparent when looking at the detail of the amendments, for no specific reference to religion is made. This, in fact, is the very point. Article 2 of Egypt’s constitution, amended under Anwar Sadat in a previous referendum in 1980, states that: ‘Islam is the religion of the State, Arabic is its official language, and the principal source of legislation is Islamic jurisprudence’. This article is key for Egypt’s Islamic movement, and thus Article 2 became a central issue in the debate over the drafting of the constitutional amendments. The fear was that drafting a new constitution may lead to the removal of this article, and with the proposed amendments making no reference to it, they became vocal supporters of a “Yes” vote. With any future parliament likely to be dominated by Islamists, a “No” vote may have been the only opportunity for the secular/liberal opposition to ensure the civic character of the state.

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Although mobilisation for the “Yes” vote was led by Islamists such as the Brotherhood, Islamic associations outside of the formal political field also actively campaigned to support it. Revisiting the Shura Council of Scholars’ first statement, we find the following proclamation:

We call on Muslims not to delay by voting to approve the constitutional amendments…because its advantages outweigh the negatives….The nation…will not allow anyone to change the second article of the constitution, or change it in any future formulation of the constitution.41

As with outlining their position on da‘wa and politics, AS would again be joined in its newfound political activism by GS, with its resources being mobilised on several fronts in advocating for a “Yes” vote. From its main headquarters in the al-Jalaa mosque in the

41 ‘al-bayān al-awwal l-majlis shūrī al-‘ulama’.
Ramses district of Cairo, on 16 March, GS held a seminar under the title, “The need to vote yes in the referendum over the constitutional amendments”. Al-Mahdy told the assembled religious scholars and journalists that going out to vote was a “religious duty” (wājib shar‘ī). Social media posts also indicate GS imams used their Friday sermons to urge worshippers to vote “Yes” on the day of the ballot. GS thus mobilized its resources to urge public support around the specific issue of constitutional amendments, marrying its organisational resources with discursive campaigning.

Furthermore, three days before the poll, GS sought a national audience with a front-page advertisement in al-Ahrām, Egypt’s most widely circulated newspaper. It stated that the January 25 revolution was a gift from God that had to be protected, with the only way to do that being to approve the constitutional amendments. Figure 1 shows the advert, with a key section in bold stating that:

The entire leadership of the association considers it to be an Islamic duty that every Egyptian voice his/her agreement to the amendments as a first step towards the later formulation of a complete constitution.

The emphasis on doing one’s duty reflects a common rationale among Islamic associations during the transitional period, equating a political decision as a religious act. Such an intervention by an ostensibly non-political group was striking, garnering much criticism in the secular/liberal camp, including by the Nobel Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, who in a tweet condemned the action as “scary and suspicious”. Yet, in a television interview responding to the criticisms, al-Mahdy was assiduous, stressing further this wājib for

43 Mena George, مسجد الجمعية الشرعية بأسيوط (أبو بكر الصديق) سمعتها في المايك, Tweets, @MSGeorge_ (blog), 14 March 2011, #Egypt #Jan25, https://twitter.com/MSGeorge_/status/47426110358683649.
44 Mohamed ElBaradei, "'إعلان من الجمعية الشرعية بالصفحة الأولى بالأهرام بأن التصويت بنعم واجب شرعي! أما مخيف ومريب، Tweets, @ElBaradei (blog), 19 March 2011, https://twitter.com/ElBaradei/status/49150249167630336.
Muslims was tantamount to performing a “shahādah”, the first of the five pillars of Islam, and the basic statement of faith that Muslims are expected to recite to demonstrate their commitment to their religion. GS and its leadership had thereby gone beyond the utilisation of its own mosque networks and publications in its advocacy, engaging in a national media campaign and television appearances in support of the cause.

Figure 5.2, street banner in Alexandria urging citizens to vote “Yes” in the referendum on constitutional amendments.

Framing the referendum as a “religious duty”, and implying that a “No” vote would somehow be a violation of their religion, was an interpretation shared widely by other Islamic associations in their advocacy ahead of the referendum. DS, for example, urged citizens to vote for the amendments based on the fact that “positive engagement” would be the most effective path for the implementation of shari’a law. In particular, they stated that the amendments were positive, precisely because they did not try to overturn Article 2, which

45 OTV, tuṣḥīh raʿis al-gamʿ iyya al-sharʿ iyya l-ma wa rad bil-ahrām (YouTube, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THythiQHagA.
would be the implication of a “No” vote. The campaign for “Yes” did not comprise statements alone, however, with the “religious duty” being urged by preachers in their sermons, while cities saw banners erected across their streets. In Alexandria, shaykhs of DS also framed the referendum in these terms, with Figure 2 above showing a street banner that was erected referring to the “religious duty” of voting “Yes”. Meanwhile, in the Manufiyya governorate, al-Gama’a al-Salafiyya (the Salafi Group) rented cars to broadcast propaganda from loudspeakers, and also put up banners which read “Voting Yes is a Religious Duty”. The association of political acts with the basic tenets of the faith, therefore, illustrates a prevalent “frame alignment” during electoral cycles.

AS’s Shura Council of Islamic Scholars’ very first meeting was to discuss its position on the referendum. In its subsequent statement, the “Yes” vote was linked to strong representation in the future for Islamists in the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council, and local councils. This was viewed positively “as a means of enabling da’wa and spreading it among the different segments of society.” Following on from its justification for supporting Islamists entering the political field more broadly, mobilizing AS’s followers to vote “Yes” is framed within the terms of utilising the political field instrumentally to assist in the future of da’wa activities. As the issue was debated in the public sphere, the particular interpretation of voting “Yes” as a ‘religious duty’ diffused across the discourse of Islamic actors, as evidenced by the discourse in the political advocacy of AS and GS, as well as other actors.

‘Religious duty’ as a framing strategy has itself been utilised previously in the Egyptian context, as highlighted by Carrie Wickham. In her study of how young students in

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49 ‘al-bayān al-awwal l-majlis shūrī al-‘ulama’. 

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Egypt’s universities were recruited to the Islamic movement in the 1980s and early 1990s, Wickham describes how ‘Islamists framed activism as a moral “obligation” that demands self-sacrifice and unflinching commitment to the cause of religious transformation’.\textsuperscript{50} In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood ‘asserted that every Muslim is obligated to contribute to the task of Islamic social and political reform’.\textsuperscript{51} Whilst the similarities are clear in this general frame, there are two novel differences in how this frame has been utilised by Islamic actors, both towards the constitutional amendments, and, as will be seen, the parliamentary/presidential elections. First, in Wickham’s example, specific groups like the Muslim Brotherhood adopted this frame to increase participation in their own movement, whereas in 2011/2012, a multitude of Islamic actors aligned towards a similar interpretation as a means of furthering the cause as a whole, rather than for their specific faction. Second, this framing was exercised not to enlist recruits to join the Islamic movement, but to encourage all Muslims to participate in a particular way in the political process, in order to advance Islam and its role in the state. This escalated the public presence and profile of ostensibly apolitical Islamic associations, who now played a greater role in the process of public policy.

5.3.2 Parliamentary elections, November 2011 – February 2012

In November 2011, Egyptians had the first opportunity to vote for their representatives in the political arena since Mubarak’s departure. Although now a unicameral system, at the time, Egypt’s parliament was bicameral, consisting of a lower house, the People’s Assembly, and

\textsuperscript{50} Wickham, ‘Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt’, 232.
\textsuperscript{51} Wickham, 242.
an upper chamber, the Shura Council. The elections for the People’s Assembly began on 28
November, 2011, with further rounds of voting continuing into the New Year. The Shura
Council elections began at the end of January 2012 and lasted for a month. The ‘collective
identity’ of Egypt’s Islamic movement was on full display in mobilising support for Islamist
candidates in each of the votes. On 6 November, 2011, in the city of Sohag for Eid al-Adha,
the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, al-Gama’a al-Salafiyya, and GS, formed a
union called the Islamic Action League (rāḥiṭat al-‘amal al-islāmī) to unite prayer in the
city’s main square. But what was billed as a prayer meet turned into an electoral platform,
as the 15,000 in attendance witnessed the presentation of the programmes of various Islamist
candidates for parliament. Among the shaykhs who spoke, it was stated that the candidate
must know God, and worshippers were urged to select candidates with an “Islamic
reference”.

The use of religious ceremonies as platforms through which Islamist electoral
propaganda was disseminated appeared widespread. It was reported that imams in thousands
of Salafi mosques were using their Friday sermons to urge worshippers to participate in the
elections. Rather than explicitly stating which parties and candidates to vote for, however,
many imams promoted the strong representation of Islamists in parliament in more general
terms. Worshippers and citizens were urged to vote for the candidates who called for the
application of Islamic law in their electoral programmes, and promised to maintain the
religious identity of the state. Electoral observers noted that some mosques of GS were being
utilised for political purposes during electoral periods. In one such case, the imam of a
mosque in Asyut urged worshippers and citizens, via loudspeakers, to give their votes to

52 Mahmood Maqbool, “‘al-islāmiyya” wa “al-ikhwān” wa “al-salafiyya” wa “al-shar‘iyya”…’yid wāhida b-
53 Hamdy Dabash and Osama al-Mahdy, ‘masājid al-salafiīn wa ‘aḍrahāt al-muṭiṣawifat fī khidmat al-
Islamist parties and not to liberal or secular parties. GS’s declaration of not discriminating between Islamist parties appears to have been borne out in how its institutions were used for electoral propaganda. For despite being historically more closely linked to the Brotherhood, and al-Mahdy expressing at least some preference for the group due to its long experience as a political actor, GS mosques were commonly found as propaganda outlets for Nour Party candidates, either as the starting point for rallies for specific candidates, or as sites distributing the electoral paraphernalia of candidates, as outlined by observers who tweeted about them.

Within AS, similar occurrences to that of GS were observed in their local branches, where candidates from the Brotherhood’s FJP cooperated to provide medical services in constituencies during electoral periods. Links between Islamist political candidates and AS also took other forms. Figures such as Hazem Shoman, an al-Nour candidate in Mansoura, and Mamdouh Ismail, a lawyer and al-Asala Party candidate, were placed on the electoral lists. To boost their profile, the logos of AS and GS were positioned at the head of their electoral lists distributed to voters. It is not clear whether this was officially sanctioned by either association. But considering the use of their offices for other campaigning activities, it seems unlikely this could have occurred without their knowledge. Indeed, Brooke has

57 The proportional representation system included both first past the post individual seats and electoral lists.
highlighted the practice of both Brotherhood and al-Nour candidates plugging their affiliations with AS in their biographical statements.\textsuperscript{59}

The political activism of Islamic associations during the parliamentary elections adopted a strategic rationale surrounding the fielding of Islamist candidates, displaying further unity and collaboration. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s presumed dominance, the pluralization of the party system led to fragmentation of the Islamist parties as well as that of the secular/liberal camp. Alongside the FJP, a further 11 parties with an Islamic reference contested parliamentary seats (there were 29 secular/liberal parties).\textsuperscript{60} Concerned about a potential split in the Islamic vote paving the way for secular/liberal parties to benefit, AS and GS both advocated for Egypt’s new Islamist parties to cooperate to ensure multiple Islamist candidates were not fielded in the same constituency, reflecting the idea of tactical voting. In this case, Islamic associations urged the parties themselves to depart from fielding their preferred candidate, in order to potentially affect the outcome of the election in favour of Islamists in general. It has been shown that the incorporation of such tactical thinking occurs where patterns of party system fragmentation rise, as the ‘large pool of available parties creates more opportunities to cast a tactical vote’.\textsuperscript{61} In the same way, the fragmentation of the party system in Egypt concerned AS and GS, who urged the implementation of tactical candidate selection as part of their pursuit of joint Islamic action. Both AS and GS promoted voting behaviour that accentuated a religious convergence, rather than consider the political platform of the individual religious party.

\textsuperscript{59} Brooke, ‘Islamic Groups’ Social Service Provision and Attitudinal Change in Egypt’, 21.
Ahead of the second phase of the parliamentary elections, AS figure and deputy leader of the Shura Council of Scholars, Muhammad Hassan, delivered the Friday sermon to 20,000 worshippers from the GS mosque in the city of Mansura, capital of the Dakahlia governorate. In his remarks he stated: “I do not want to see competition in the second round of voting between Islamists because competition breaks the Islamic voice to the benefit of others”. Hassan was advocating the formation of an Islamist tactical alliance, whereby different parties would cooperate to ensure only a single Islamist candidate ran in a constituency. GS also issued statements demanding one candidate from the Islamic current, with GS shaykhs stressing the necessity of unity amongst the Islamic movement to select one candidate, so that their voice was not dispersed, thus giving secularists the chance to rule the country. This would not only concentrate the vote on a single candidate with an Islamic reference and prevent fragmentation, but it would also ensure that secular/liberal candidates would not be successful in the event of a split Islamist vote. This demonstrates how AS and GS promoted a discourse of Islamic unity their political activism, rather than political factionalism, with their closest ideological bedfellows.

The ILBRR also embarked on the task of encouraging strategic voting, by asking for the leaders of the FJP, Salafis, and al-Azhar, to coordinate with each other during the elections. In particular, they implored the FJP and al-Nour to make mutual concessions in seats decided as individual districts, rather than electoral lists. ILBRR member, Dr. Hisham Nodah, declared that competition between a Brotherhood candidate and another Islamist in the presence of a rival against the application of Islamic law is considered ḥarām, because it may lead to fragmentation of Muslim voices in favour of that candidate. Initially it seemed

that their calls had been heeded. After forming an electoral alliance with al-Asala and al-Fadila, Nour indicated that similar coordination with the FJP was also being sought, facilitated by the ILBRR. Despite the formation of a joint committee to discuss the proposals, according to Nadar Bakar, a member of al-Nour supreme body, the FJP refused to give up seats to Nour, even though Nour had offered to concede three seats in return. In the end, both would run without mutual concessions.

Individual Islamic movements, as well as the new umbrella associations, released statements urging Muslims to select candidates with an Islamic reference. Like the campaign among the Islamic movement in support of a “Yes” vote in the referendum, Islamic groups not formally fielding candidates in the elections nevertheless promoted the Islamic vote by framing the decision facing voters in religious terms. The ILBRR issued a fatwa which stated that it is not permissible to cast a vote for liberal or secular candidates in the elections, because they embrace radical ideas that are far from the spirit of Islam, and they should not represent Muslims in parliament.\textsuperscript{65} ILBRR chairman Dr. Ali Al-Salous stated during its fourth public conference, under the title “Towards a fair election”, that: “God will hold us accountable for the votes we provide in the elections, because those who vote for an unjust candidate, he is attesting to perjury (shahādat al-zūr), which the Messenger of God warned us about.” Again, as with the framing of the constitutional amendments referendum, supporting the Islamist cause in electoral politics is portrayed as being the duty of Muslims, who would somehow be going against their religion if they were to base their choices on other factors.

AS’s Shura Council called on the Egyptian people to choose the “best candidates”, which it viewed as being the ones who have the “ability” and “integrity” to adopt Islamic

It called on the “brotherhood of candidates” to “preserve the identity of the *ummah*, and commit to the rules of the shari‘a”. In addition to their booklet outlining their position on politics, GS issued a statement, prior to the parliamentary elections, advising their followers on how best to select candidates. Whilst the statement did not specify any particular candidates or party, it stated that citizens should use their vote to elect candidates who will best serve the *ummah*. The first characteristic which it outlines as indicating such a candidate is he who is ‘with religion’ (*dhā al-dīn*). Both AS and GS sought to mobilise their followers in order to secure a dominant presence for Islamists in parliament. Instead of endorsing one party for the pious to choose, they instead promoted parties with a religious reference to encourage a religious cleavage.

The fragmentation of the party system during the transitional period prompted Islamic associations such as AS, GS, and the ILBRR, who did not themselves have a formal stake in the race, to urge the adoption of tactical voting and strategic candidate selections as part of a coordinated effort reflecting their collective identity. The individual associations then promoted a religious cleavage, before considerations of the political platforms of individual parties. The political advocacy of AS and GS served as a unifying factor for the Islamism of the Brotherhood and politicised Salafism during the parliamentary elections, further elevating their public role. The irony in their changing status was that in avoiding partisanship, and providing blanket support for Islamism as a whole, this elevated profile may have led to increased exposure to the contagion of a reconstituted authoritarian regime in 2013 and beyond.

Potential divisions between different Islamic currents during the parliamentary election were tempered by the goal of ensuring an overall Islamist victory. However, fissures began to emerge when these same actors were pressured to settle on a single candidate for president. In the lead up to the presidential elections, the Islamic movement initially displayed a degree of enthusiasm for continuing the cooperation and collaboration outlined above. In March 2012, DS launched an initiative for coordination among the different groupings to agree on one candidate, to ensure that votes for Islamists were not fragmented.\(^\text{68}\) Among those supporting the initiative was Egypt’s official religious body, al-Azhar, the Muslim Brotherhood, AS, GS, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the ILBRR, the Shura Council of Scholars, with the Islamist parties the FJP, al-Nour, al-Asala, and the Building and Development party also indicating their support.

The previous levels of coordination proved to be a step too far, however, as unlike in the parliamentary elections, the need to settle on a single candidate led to disagreement over who would be the most suitable. They were faced with a difficult decision in which they had to weigh normative goals against pragmatic considerations. Who was most likely to implement the fullest vision of Islamic law, but also succeed in a run-off against a non-Islamist candidate? If the Brotherhood were to field a candidate, then there was a strong chance they would be victorious. Yet the reformist ideology of the Brotherhood led to concerns in the Salafi camp over who most represented their vision. Thus, the Salafi-dominated ILBRR was the first to demand that the Muslim Brotherhood nominate Khairat al-Shater, who was a senior member in the body. AS, meanwhile, called for the nomination of

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the Salafi shaykh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail. For DS, Ismail’s brand of ‘revolutionary Salafism’ would not secure victory against a non-Islamist candidate. They then took the surprising move of supporting the former Brotherhood member and ‘liberal Islamist’ Abdel Moneim Aboul Futouh. The only faction not to name a specific candidate was GS, who stated only that they stand with the ‘Islamic trend’ and that ‘it is important that the banner of Islam be raised by the person chosen by the people’. The matter was somewhat settled by default, however, with the disqualification from running of Abu Ismail and al-Shater, who was the Brotherhood’s initial choice, for political reasons, under a technical pretext. The end result was the surprise nomination of Mohamed Morsi, an experienced yet uncharismatic parliamentarian, as the Brotherhood candidate for the presidency. When the second round of voting pitted Morsi against Ahmed Shafik, who had been a minister for nearly a decade under Mubarak, the realignment of the Islamic movement towards the shared goal of an Islamist presidency was resumed. With the disqualification of Abu Ismail, AS also urged its followers to support Morsi, on the basis that he now represented the best chance of advancing shari’a in Egypt.

Having previously defined participation in the referendum on constitutional amendments and parliamentary elections as a “religious duty”, even stronger connections were now being made between the tenets of the faith and ensuring Islamist electoral success. In its statement of support, the Shura Council of Scholars stated that Egypt’s Muslims would be performing a *shahādah* in voting for Morsi. The first of the five pillars of Islam, the *shahādah* is a basic statement of faith that Muslims are expected to recite to demonstrate their commitment to their religion. A vote for Morsi in the presidential elections was thus equated

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with the basic fundamentals of the faith, compelling Egypt’s Muslims to demonstrate their commitment to their religion through this political act. This frame of voting for Morsi in the presidential election as a *shahāda* was shared in the discourse of other preachers who campaigned under the banner of the ILBRR ahead of the ballot. A mass rally was held in the square outside of Giza’s main train station, under the title, “How to choose the next president?”.

Talaat al-Afifi, a GS figure who would become Minister of Awqaf under Morsi, addressed the crowd and stated that the choice of the president is a “*shahāda* and we are entrusted with it” and that the “*shahāda* is obligatory and the people should not abandon it”. Al-Afifi went on to make explicit the parallel between voting as a *shahāda* and the act of the traditional *shahāda*, “a worship in which a man draws closer to his God”. The effect was to make the presidential vote an obligatory act for Egypt’s Muslims as important as one of the fundamentals of the faith. Absence from participation, and performing this statement of faith by voting for Mohamed Morsi, would thus mean a failure to demonstrate their commitment to their religion. For its part, GS upgraded its initial support for an Islamist candidate generally, to put their weight behind the candidacy of Morsi for president. In a statement, they repeated the mantra of religious “duty” to “advise those who trust the jurisprudence (*al-fiqh*) of GS to stand with the representative of the Islamist project, Dr. Mohamed Morsi, in the hope of achieving the aims of the revolution and returning Egypt to its leading position as a beacon of Islam and Muslims”.

The consolidation of voting further demonstrates the way in which advocates of Islam tried to frame political acts with the performing of one’s religious duties. What the episode of division followed by realignment among Islamic actors, during the presidential election, also

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shows is that when faced with an issue where the ideological preferences of the individual groups emerge, such as selecting a single candidate, fissures between the different factions are more likely to emerge. But when the matter returned to promoting the Islamist movement as a whole, Islamic associations returned to their general approach of promoting religious unity, as the fault lines of the fight returned to the secular-religious divide. As has been shown, AS and GS were key proponents in communicating this discourse, mobilising their organisational resources to disseminate this discursive frame.

5.4 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the political opportunity that arose in 2011 enabled associations in the Islamic movement, particularly AS and GS, to complement the expansion of their organisational activities with extensive discursive activities with a particular focus on electoral cycles. Firstly, their revision of the relationship between da’wa and politics meant that, despite not forming political parties, da’wa could now include activism in support of the Islamist cause in the political realm, sanctioning their transition into advocacy groups in the service of Islamists during elections and on matters of public policy. Secondly, AS and GS promoted discursive frames emphasising unity and strategic actions among Islamic factions, whilst signalling to voters during the three electoral cycles that the political choices facing them reflected their religious duties. This intervention into voting behaviour went beyond the traditional remit of da’wa and the focus on individual piety and behaviour, as it now utilised several outlets to disseminate this discourse in the public sphere through newspapers and television, as well as the mosque.
Although formally-apolitical Islamic associations could be said to engage indirectly with the political domain, in that they competed with state-defined models of family and social responsibility, they had now become explicitly and directly political through attempts to shape public opinion on electoral processes, and to influence public policy. In this framing, the ‘self-organizational’ was married with the discursive ‘public sphere’ through the overt politicisation of da’wa activities previously framed within the context of personal behaviour. This re-framing led to a much more contentious discursive practice, potentially heightened by their proclamations of Islamic unity, with the potential to provoke repression by a reconstituted authoritarian regime seeking to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood and all its allies. By doing so, the public presence and profile of AS and GS was enhanced. This elevated profile would make it much more difficult to resist accusations of their political status in 2013 when they became a target of the state. And ironically, by supporting this broad-based Islamic activism, in 2013 they posed a threat to the al-Sisi regime in a way that the al-Nour Party and al-Dawa al-Salafiyya did not. Paradoxically, their non-partisan stance, which lent support to the Brotherhood as part of a wider ideal, left them exposed and open to state oppression in 2013.

75 Hirschkind, ‘What Is Political Islam?’
CHAPTER SIX
BETWEEN MOVEMENT AND PARTY: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, FJP, AND POLITICISATION OF SERVICE PROVISION

The relaxation of public space and the pluralisation of politics during the transitional period allowed for Islamists to form political parties and engage openly in political activism to support their ambitions. In the previous chapter it was shown how formerly apolitical Islamic associations combined ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ discursive activities by engaging in political advocacy on the behalf of Islamists in the political domain.

But political actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which had extensive experience of electoral campaigns, also revised its method of engagement with the political sphere, by adding a discursive component to its service provision. In a reflection piece on the Brotherhood’s downfall in Egypt in 2013 and after, Amr Darrag, a senior Brotherhood figure who served as Minister of Planning and International Cooperation under Morsi, acknowledged that ‘the FJP leveraged the goodwill that the Brotherhood had established and drew on the movement’s social credit in order to acquire legitimacy with voters’.1 Darrag was referring to the explicit politicisation of the social service provision of the Brotherhood, in the service of the political party. A service that had been provided pre-2011 as part of the social vision of da’wa, was instead tied directly to the political process.

This chapter argues that the Brotherhood and FJP’s electioneering and governing strategy entailed the politicisation of service provision, which represented a combination of ‘self-organizational’ with ‘public sphere’ activities, in that not only was a functional service provided to citizens, but the framing of its delivery discursively linked it to a political party

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1 Amr Darrag, ‘Politics or Piety? Why the Muslim Brotherhood Engages in Social Service Provision’, Rethinking Political Islam (Brookings Institute, April 2016), 7.
seeking votes. This provided the opportunity for the Brotherhood to exploit the social capital accrued through service provision, going beyond the ‘reputational benefits’\(^2\) of Islamic services, by making the source of those services explicit and central to the Brotherhood/FJP’s political message. But as Lewis maintains, such a ‘combination of organisational self-governance with discursive openness - the ability to develop and express alternative views...is viewed as potentially challenging by any non-democratic regime’.\(^3\) The costs of this strategy, therefore, were potentially high. The Brotherhood’s social apparatus was left exposed by its politicisation. And when the reconstituted regime’s crackdown began in 2013, it pursued not only the political organisation, but the social infrastructure of the movement also.

In this chapter, it is shown that the politicisation of social services emerged in the nexus of the Brotherhood/FJP relationship in two ways. Firstly, as a form of propaganda during electoral cycles, where joint campaigns featured the delivery of services and goods. The second form occurred through the practice of governance, where the movement and party similarly collaborated, only then over the provision of public goods. Yet this collaboration did not merely enable the FJP government to increase its capacity or efficiency of service. These services were similarly politicised, in that their delivery was explicitly credited to the movement/party, rather than the state. The chapter comprises four sections, with the first detailing the relationship between movement and party, and the politicisation of services during electoral cycles. The second section shows how the FJP sought to institutionalise partnerships between civil society organisations and the state, prioritising Brotherhood affiliates as part of its plans for governance. The politicisation of public goods is detailed in section three, focusing on the ministries of Health and Supply. Finally, section four details

\(^2\) Cammett and Jones-Luong, ‘Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?’

\(^3\) Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’, 333.
the FJP and the Ministry of Awqaf, showing how its policies enabled greater control over religious institutions for Islamic associations.

6.1 Movement, party, and politicising service provision

This section considers the qualitative change in the nature and form of the Brotherhood’s social service provision during the transitional period. As discussed in the literature review in chapter one, several works have speculated on the purpose and impact of the Muslim Brotherhood (and others’) social service provision. The assumption was that these activities served a clientelist purpose to generate political support for Islamists during electoral periods. This view assumed a political intent in those involved in providing services, but without clear empirical support for services being explicitly linked to voting behaviour. For example, Essam al-Aryan, when head of the Brotherhood’s political bureau, commented that under Mubarak the Brotherhood’s political candidates were forced to obscure their links to Islamic charitable associations, due to the potential for security service repercussions both for themselves and the associations. The result, argues Tarek Masoud, was that social service provision – even if delivered by Brotherhood members – was only of limited value during election times, as it was ‘strictly policed by the state’ and its ‘political potential consequently muted’. But as Brooke has noted, ‘we need to distinguish…between the [Brotherhood] organisation’s social service provision pre- and post-2011’. This section focuses on that provision in the post-2011 period, showing how it became more explicitly politicised during

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4 Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, And Elections In Egypt, 75.
5 Masoud, 79.
the transitional period, thereby combining ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ in a way that had been restricted during the Mubarak era.

To understand the politicisation of the Brotherhood’s service provision during the transitional period, it is important to provide some explanation of the formation of the FJP and its relationship with the mother movement. This helps to demonstrate how despite being formally separate organisations, they were in fact closely intertwined. The request to formally establish a political party for the first time in its 83-year history was submitted on 18 May, 2011.7 From the moment of its formal registration on 6 June, the FJP was able to draw on the significant organisational capacity of the movement and its ample resources, a significant advantage over its rivals. The FJP soon had its own TV channel (Misr 25), daily newspaper (al-Huriyya wa al-‘Adala), and distributed a host of propaganda material (flyers, posters etc). These advantages contributed to the FJP’s strong electoral performance, securing 43% - the largest share of votes - in the parliamentary elections of 2011/12. However, formal political institutionalisation brought with it questions around how independent this new political party was from the movement from which it emerged.

The official position from the outset was that the FJP was the political wing of the Brotherhood movement, which would focus on social and religious projects. The FJP’s founding statement reported that:

The Supreme Guide of the Gama‘a announced the foundation of a political party which believes in the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood and which builds on the Gama‘a’s vision in the party politics field.8

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It appeared that, although the movement and party were profoundly linked, they nevertheless represented distinct organisations that would operate respectively in the fields of politics for the party, and social and religious work for the movement. But as with the revision of da’wa among Islamic associations identified in chapter five, in reality, the distinctions between them were in fact opaque, with the relations and resources of the movement and party overlapping. Party leaders were chosen by the Brotherhood’s internal executive committee, the Shura Council, behind closed doors, rather than through elections. Mohamed Morsi was appointed as president of the party, with Saad al-Katatni secretary-general, and Essam al-Aryan vice-president for political affairs. All three were lower ranking leaders of the Shura Council, although their influence was curtailed by the Shura Council, which subsequently selected candidates for the legislative elections. As Zollner stresses, ‘it was the mother organisation that approved candidates and encouraged their selections, thus ensuring that the MB leadership continued to be able to shape party policy, electoral strategies and mobilization tactics’.10

Despite the insistence that the FJP was an independent political party open to all Egyptians, up to 70% of the party’s 9,000 founding members were active members of the Brotherhood.11 Full members of the movement were ordered by the Shura Council to take up party membership and run for specific party positions. As will be seen in more depth later in the chapter, the branding of the FJP would be synonymous with that of the Brotherhood, with both their logos appearing on propaganda material.12 Vannetzel writes: ‘Altogether, these technologies of branding presented the FJP as a part of the organisation and mission of the

9 Vannetzel, ‘The Party, the Gama’a and the Tanzim: The Organizational Dynamics of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Post-2011 Failure’.
11 al-Anani, ‘Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party: To Be or Not to Be Independent’.
12 Vannetzel, ‘The Party, the Gama’a and the Tanzim: The Organizational Dynamics of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Post-2011 Failure’, 223.
Gama’a [Brotherhood]. The result of these blurred lines, and subordination of party to movement, served to weaken the party and undermine its legitimacy. As Zollner argues:

The newly established party did not, at least not primarily, represent a voting constituency, but instead, the top-down will of the mother organisation as embodied by the organisation’s Guidance Council. Ergo, in the case of the MB and the FJP, the boundaries between social movement and party were in fact fictional. The FJP acted as a political arm of the MB.

Organisationally, the party and movement were effectively one. Whilst Zollner emphasises the fluidity of these boundaries with regard to leadership, this section will now show how the fluidity between party and movement was particularly evident during election cycles. Even prior to the formation of the FJP, the Brotherhood’s networks were already active in distributing goods in an apparent effort to sway voters during electoral cycles.

The first electoral cycle mobilizing the Brotherhood was the referendum on constitutional amendments in March 2011, as discussed in the previous chapter. One report details a campaign by the Brotherhood to distribute cooking oil and sugar, which coincided with campaigning on the referendum. From March 2011, the Brotherhood – in coordination with the FJP after its formation – undertook a widespread campaign of social service across Egypt’s governorates using mobile caravans (qawāfil). These mobile markets provided a wide variety of services and goods, from free medical care and prescriptions, to foodstuffs at wholesale prices, and gas cylinders. The health caravans typically involved a free medical caravan heading to poor, rural, villages in Egypt’s governorates. The caravans included...

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13 Vannetzel, 223.
volunteer doctors providing free medicine and prescriptions, covering obstetrics, ophthalmology, children, dermatology, radiology, bones and teeth, medical services which were often absent in these poorer areas.\textsuperscript{17} As part of its electoral literature ahead of the November 2011 parliamentary elections, the FJP published slides outlining the beneficiaries of mobile health caravans between March and October 2011.\textsuperscript{18} This campaign began in the Asyut governorate, expanding to include further governorates across the country over the following months. By November and the beginning of the parliamentary elections, the FJP/Brotherhood had provided medical caravans servicing thousands of Egyptian citizens in at least 19 of Egypt’s 27 governorates. This publicising of the movement’s service provision indicates the party’s strategy of drawing on the social capital of the movement ahead of the parliamentary elections to follow.


Figure 6.1, Joint Muslim Brotherhood/FJP medical caravan, October 2011
The frequency and breadth of Brotherhood/FJP campaigning increased as the elections approached. During Eid al-Adha 2011, which ran from 6 to 10 November, shortly before the parliamentary elections began on 28 November, the Brotherhood launched the “milīūniyyat al-khayr” (millions of goodness) campaign to distribute meat to the poor.\textsuperscript{19} Kareem Radwam, a member of the FJP’s executive committee, defended the campaign, insisting that it was charitable in nature, rather than linked to the elections or campaigning of Brotherhood/FJP candidates. Radwan claimed the campaign had been carried out annually, but in secret, due to the repression of the previous regime. However, his comments regarding the use of logos was telling in terms of the relationship between the movement and the party. He stated: “The charitable aim of the campaign does not prevent the Brotherhood’s logo from being attached to all its activities. Not for publicity, but to introduce the citizen to who is helping him, and I believe that the revolution contributed to the emergence of the Brotherhood and their charitable practices in public.” However, these caravans were not sole Brotherhood ventures, but openly advertised as joint efforts between the movement and the party. Figure 6.1 shows a medical caravan in the Asyut governorate in October 2011, with the signage showing the Muslim Brotherhood logo in the top-right corner with that of the FJP in the top-left corner. The FJP candidate in the district commented that the health caravan was a continuation of the health service that had been provided for by the Brotherhood previously, but now by the FJP.\textsuperscript{20} By specifying that the intent of the logos is to show citizens who is helping them, and to make clear that those services are a continuation of the Brotherhood’s provision, alongside the FJP, with its candidates seeking election to government in attendance, the campaigns took a more political form, indicative of the opportunities available in the post-2011 period. Where links between social service provision and political


\textsuperscript{20} Shahin, ‘500 mustāfīd min al-qāfila al-ṭabiyya al-ikhwān ’asyūt’. 

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candidates were previously obscured, the joint Brotherhood/FJP caravans now made those links explicit. This meant that the self-organizational activities of the movement were emphasised as part of the party’s discursive campaigning.

The campaigning strategy undertaken by the FJP in conjunction with the Brotherhood continued even whilst in government. To commemorate the celebrations of the 25th January revolution, in 2013 the FJP launched two large-scale social service campaigns with the Brotherhood. The slogan “millūniyyat al-khayr” was again used to embark on a wide range of activities, including: afforestation and cleaning the streets; caring for the poor and the needy; holding exhibitions of meat, clothing and food supplies; free inspection of patients through medical convoys and doctors’ offices, including treatment; repair and maintenance of schools, and beautification and painting of sidewalks and fences.21 The other initiative was called “maʿān nabnī miṣr” (Together We Build Egypt), which entailed a five-month long, nationwide campaign. According to official FJP figures, these joint initiatives had provided more than 2,000 medical caravans, over 250 veterinary caravans, 1,635 co-op markets, 1,534 school refurbishments, 827 beautification and cleaning efforts, and 257 craftsman convoys performing small household repairs.22 They were situated at local mosques after Friday prayers, with volunteers clad in MB and FJP vests, and banners and logos from both organisations. The campaign closely resembled the type of electioneering witnessed during 2011 and 2012, with speculation that it was to precede parliamentary elections later that year. Brotherhood officials denied that the campaign was related to any potential election, with some stating it was a response to the group’s failing political popularity. Steven Brooke notes

22 Brooke, Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage, 124.
how this massive outflow of resources relied almost entirely on the resources of the Brotherhood, but represented a ‘blatant mixing of politics and social service’ that ‘would have been highly controversial in previous periods, but during the Together We Build Egypt campaign it became ubiquitous.’

The campaigning strategy undertaken by the Brotherhood/FJP represented a significant shift compared with the pre-2011 period. Brooke further highlights that under authoritarian rule, the Brotherhood’s social services ‘passively’ produced social capital via competent and depoliticised care. Tarek Masoud also stressed that Islamist movements could not actively politicise social service provision. Freed from the restrictions of authoritarianism, however, ‘the Brotherhood responded to these shifting political opportunities by deploying highly politicised mobile medical caravans to establish essentially clientelist linkages with Egypt’s poor’. It has been observed that Islamists benefitted from a ‘reputational effect’ due to the perception that much Islamic - not necessarily Islamist - welfare was attributable to the Brotherhood. But during the transitional period, the relationship between movement and party, and its explicit association of social services being attributed to the Brotherhood/FJP during electoral cycles, communicated direct linkages to voters around the delivery of goods and services, thereby tying self-organizational activity with discursive public sphere messaging. These connections would not only be mobilized to secure the ascent to power through elections, but they were also envisioned as an integral part of the FJP’s governing strategy.

23 Brooke, 128.
24 Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, And Elections In Egypt.
25 Brooke, Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage, 121.
26 Cammett and Jones-Luong, ‘Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?’
State-society partnerships under the FJP

The close link between the Brotherhood’s provision of services and its political arm was reflected in the FJP’s manifesto for governance, which envisaged a prominent role for civil society organisations alongside close collaboration with the state. These collaborations would seek to institutionalise relations between Brotherhood-affiliated associations and the state. The manifesto was titled al-Nahda (renaissance), and was developed by the Brotherhood’s deputy chair, Khairat al-Shater. Initially the preferred candidate for the presidency, al-Shater was a wealthy businessman who had been jailed under Mubarak in 2007 (see chapter three). After his release from prison in March 2011, he conducted a comprehensive review of the movement’s overall strategy in post-Mubarak Egypt on behalf of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council. It was from this review that the al-Nahda Project emerged. On April 21, 2011, al-Shater gave a lecture in Alexandria entitled: “Features of al-Nahda: Gains of the Revolutions and the Horizons for Developing”, in which he outlined a holistic vision for social, economic, health, and educational development, stressing the role of the private sector and civil society, in conjunction with the state.27

An official document outlining the al-Nahda Project was published ahead of the 2012 presidential election, stating that it is “based on empowering the people and placing their destinies in their own hands, rather than the hands of a corrupt clique or a ruthless unscrupulous bureaucracy.”28 It identified three principle stakeholders in Egyptian society to drive the project: civil society; the private sector; and the state. Several “strategic paths” were identified, which included building the political system, transforming into a developmental

economy, and societal empowerment. In its explanation of societal empowerment, the document states:

Strengthening and enabling the civil society and institutions to safeguard democracy and preserve Egyptians’ energy so that they never allow the return of state control over this sector….Restoring the role of endowments and direct and indirect contributions from citizens to ensure financial independence of civil society and to limit the role of the state in coordinating and supporting the different components of this sector. This also includes encouraging and supporting our people, who for long have been deprived of volunteering, through their time or money, in activities for public good.

There was a clear emphasis on empowering civil society to aid economic development, bestowing it with greater levels of independence, and ensuring the state plays a less pervasive role in its operations.\(^{29}\) Further explanation of the FJP’s vision for civil society and societal participation in its governance of the state was outlined in an article in the party’s official newspaper from 29 October, 2012, headlined: “Societal participation is the basis of the renaissance of the new Egypt”.\(^ {30}\) The article stresses that societal participation is a necessity in the current conditions, going on to state that:

It is not possible to achieve a comprehensive \textit{al-Nahda} without concerted efforts from the institutions of society, networking them with the institutions of state,

\(^{29}\) There is a clear distinction to be made here between certain aspects of the Brotherhood/FJP’s view towards civil society, as between social work of the kind associated with the Brotherhood’s social arm and that of secular advocacy NGOs, attested by the FJP’s regressive approach to the redrafting the NGOs law, and highlighted in chapter one.

and spreading a culture of civic work and charity and development….

Developmental services, such as non-profit charitable works undertaken by parties to benefit society as a whole, have contributed in a big way to the development of a lot of civilizations and societies throughout the ages. These take multiple forms, beginning with self-help [al-musā‘ada al-dhātiyya], social responsiveness during times of adversity, relief efforts, and contributions in health and education, to solve disputes impacting the poor on a local, regional, and national level.

This passage illustrates the way in which the al-Nahda project envisaged the mobilization of civil society in the service of the state. To achieve this goal, an increased level of coordination would be required between civil society organisations and the institutions of the state. Intriguingly, this approach coincides somewhat with the neoliberal discourse of NDP governments under Mubarak, and the growing role of NGOs in their development strategies.31 It continues the emphasis on a bigger role for the private sector and civil society, coinciding with a reduced role for the state. The reference to “self-help”, meanwhile, echoes a prominent slogan deployed by the NDP under Mubarak in its encouragement of service-providing private actors.32 There are, therefore, striking parallels in the developmental economy and the utilisation of societal empowerment envisaged by the FJP, and that of its predecessor, which contrasted with the turn to statism and ‘direct’ control that followed in 2013 and beyond.

A key difference in the new coordination between civil society and the state would be the organisations at the centre of this collaboration. Nine NGOs were listed as being at the centre of the new state-civil society partnership: the Egyptian Food Bank, Resala, Misr al-Khayr, al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, I Love You God, the Relief Committee, El-Sawy Culture Wheel, Education is the Basis of al-Nahda, and the Islamic Medical Association. Both the Islamic Medical Association and Education is the Basis of al-Nahda were Brotherhood initiatives, the former being a network of hospitals first established in 1978, whilst the latter was established by the FJP after 2011 to develop schools and teachers. As discussed in the previous chapter, al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya mosques had been used to coordinate with FJP electoral candidates during the parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health worked alongside the FJP and the Relief Committee to provide free medical convoys to villages in Ismailiya lacking medical services. Most of these would-be partners, therefore, were either directly Brotherhood-affiliated or organisations that had demonstrated Brotherhood sympathies.

The three remaining organisations – two of whom, the Egyptian Food Bank and Misr al-Khayr, had collaborated closely with the government in the Mubarak era – appeared to rebuff the overtures of the FJP. In an interview with al-Masry al-Yawm, the Egyptian Food Bank’s Executive Director, Dr. Reda Sukkar, claimed in April 2013 that the FJP government had previously offered him the position of Minister of Supply, which he declined on the grounds that it would politicise the organisation. If accurate, this would indicate a failed attempt to co-opt an organisation that had played a similar role under the previous

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34 Both the Egyptian Food Bank and Misr el-Kheir benefited from fatwas issued by Grand Mufti Ali Goma‘a permitting the donation of Zakat to charitable associations, with both named individually. In Atia, Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt, 16.
authoritarian regime. However, it is possible that although the FJP remained in government at this time, its unpopularity may have led actors such as the Food Bank to distance themselves from the party. The head of Resala also distanced his organisation from the Brotherhood in the aftermath of the 3 July coup, although again, this may have been a result of fears of being caught up in the crackdown on the deposed movement. Either way, even though the structure of state-society relations in this regard remained relatively constant during the FJP’s governance, the key actors in this new collaboration would take a decidedly Brotherhood complexion, as attempts to co-opt Mubarak era collaborators were not fully realised.

After Morsi assumed office, the shift in key actors in this state-society collaboration became apparent in one of the first implementations of the Nahda Project, in the form of the “100 Days Programme”. The initiative comprised a series of pledges to solve daily problems for Egyptian citizens, focusing on five areas: security; traffic control; bread production and distribution; fuel; and waste collection. Mahmood Hussein, then Secretary General of the Brotherhood, stated that the movement would assist in engaging popular mobilization for the implementation of each area. In doing so, the Brotherhood increasingly came to represent what Hibou calls a ‘private intermediary’ or ‘go-between’ in which governance is outsourced to private actors.

Issues surrounding security and traffic control largely stemmed from the – at times wilful - incapacity of the police forces. In each governorate, Brotherhood officials and FJP members reached agreements with respective state directorates over its implementation, supported by volunteers from the Brotherhood and other Islamic associations. On traffic, agreements were reached between the Brotherhood and the General Directorate of Traffic to form popular committees to help areas in the Cairo, Qalyubiya, and Dakhalia governorates.

37 Hibou, Privatizing the State, 4.
noted for congestion. On security, the FJP had to rely intermittently on PCs to provide security, as it struggled to direct the formal security apparatus. In March 2013, police officers went on strike in more than a third of the governorates, including parts of Cairo and all of Port Said. As well as the Brotherhood, other Islamist organisations formed PCs, including the al-Raya party, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya. Deprived of control over the formal security apparatus, the FJP increasingly relied on PCs in a private outsourcing of security to preserve its failing government.

After Mubarak’s departure, rising inflation led to the latest in a long history of bread crises, which the FJP resolved to address as part of the 100-day project. Its response was to trial a system for subsidized bread, in which government bakeries would continue to produce loaves, but distribution would shift from government street stands to an independent form of distribution, in which loaves were delivered directly to the consumer. The reason advanced for this change was that the traditional form of distribution, in which those with ration cards collected loaves from street stands, was rife with corruption and exploitation, with duplications of ration cards leading to a black market in which subsidized bread was sold at inflated prices. In the new system, Brotherhood members began to deliver bread straight to the homes of registered users of the subsidy system. Over the following months this began

to take on an institutionalised form, with Islamic associations affiliated with the Brotherhood being used as distributors.

Ahmed Issa, a senior FJP official, told the *al-Wasat* newspaper that 500 associations had begun distributing bread since the campaign started. In the case of Alexandria, the government issued licences to distribute bread in the city to 50 associations, half of which were affiliated with the Brotherhood. Among the Brotherhood-affiliated associations was Light of Egypt, formed in 2011. The head of the association was Brotherhood-member Muhammad Gaber, who oversaw a team of seven distribution lorries. A whistle would alert recipients of their approach, with baskets being hung from windows with rope. The new arrangement included the cost of the bread as well as a monthly distribution fee amounting to less than $1. The local governorate office sanctioned Jaber and his team to distribute 10,000 loaves per day. In the area of bread, therefore, the distribution of a state-produced public good was in the process of being transferred to a private Brotherhood-led initiative. Although this may have gone some way to resolving a practical problem, it would establish the Brotherhood/FJP as the direct intermediary for citizens, indicating that the explicit branding of service provision as being Brotherhood/FJP was beginning to be implemented in the state’s distribution networks.

Waste collection saw a shift from public to private responsibility for service delivery, and the favouring of Brotherhood associations. The waste collection component of the 100-day programme was launched as the “Clean Homeland” initiative, beginning with a nationwide two-day campaign on 26/27 July 2012, to clean up the streets and plant trees on pavements. Despite being an FJP initiative, the resources of the Brotherhood movement were fully mobilized in support, with the youth wings of the movement collaborating with the

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administration of regional governorates, and youth activists of the Resala charity also being enlisted. Although a short-term and somewhat populist initiative, the Minister for Environmental Affairs, Dr. Mustafa Hussein Kamil, revealed that the mobilization of youth wings of the Brotherhood and other organisations was part of a pilot experiment aimed at enabling associations to take over responsibilities from the Ministry. In the long-term, the Ministry planned to train the activists of associations, supply them with equipment for collecting and sorting waste themselves, and identify suitable sites for recycling factories and safe-disposal landfills.

As well as associations performing ministry functions, Brotherhood-affiliated companies received government contracts to collect and recycle waste. In the village of Zayd in the Fayoum governorate, a company was formed to provide a door-to-door waste collection service for every household in return for a £5EGY fee. In November 2012, al-Masry al-Yawm reported that five Brotherhood cleaning companies were formed in the governorates of Cairo, Dakahlia, Kafr al-Shaykh, Sharqiyya, and Manufiyya. Sources from the Ministry of Local Development told the newspaper that local companies performing these services were prevented from operating, and as a result were forced to close. The new contracts were worth £20m EGY in each governorate, with an agreement for the companies to be paid a billion pounds yearly in every governorate for a period of three years, in return for collecting waste to recycle. In waste management, a shift from public to private service

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 provision occurred, among both Brotherhood associations and companies receiving preferential contracts.

As with bread, the issue of black market exploitation was a problem in the selling of fuel, with the FJP and the Minister of Petroleum pledging to stop the smuggling of gas cylinders and end the shortage crisis which had been exacerbated since 2011. The Morsi government’s 100-days response was to forge a coordination between the activists of the Brotherhood and the resources of the Ministry of Supply over the delivery of gas cylinders. The Ministry would first distribute cylinders to the governorates, where subsidiary warehouses would coordinate the distribution to citizens. PCs were then enlisted to assist in distribution. Although the Ministry insisted these partnerships were not allotted to specific groups, reports indicate that Islamic associations primarily benefited. By October 2012, liberal PCs formed by the April 6 movement complained that Brotherhood and Salafi PCs were dominating the distribution of gas cylinders in villages and cities. This claim is supported by an al-Watan report, where a driver affiliated with a government factory explained how twice-weekly he would transfer supplies to a PC supervised by Brotherhood members. The Brotherhood PC would then receive the cylinders and distribute them via its own networks. According to the report, Supply Minister Bassem Auda – a Brotherhood figure - was directly responsible for organising the distribution of the cylinders through the PCs.

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The 100-days programme, therefore, showed the practical implementation of the state-society collaborations identified in the al-Nahda project, and how the FJP situated its legitimacy in these collaborations with Brotherhood-affiliated associations. This demonstrates the transfer of responsibility from public to private for the delivery of services otherwise expected of the government. Crucially, this outsourcing established Brotherhood associations and companies as the main intermediaries. In the area of security, this was more out of necessity, as the FJP struggled to contain opposition within the state. Yet in areas relating to the distribution of public goods, such as bread and fuel, despite being short-lived, these arrangements were beginning to take a highly personalised form, in which the delivery of public resources was attributed directly to the movement/party, rather than the state. As with the electioneering strategy, the provision of goods and services was central to the FJP’s legitimacy. But its attribution to the party/movement, over and above the state, represented a further attempt at politicisation that added a discursive element to a functional, self-organised service. Mohamed Fahmy Menza has previously observed that in the NDP’s provision of services through local councils, ‘it was virtually impossible to draw the line between the jurisdiction of the party and that of the state or central government’. Through the 100-Days programme, it appeared that the distinctions between the Brotherhood/FJP and the state were becoming just as porous as those identified between the services of the Brotherhood movement and the FJP during electoral cycles. These collaborations were an early precursor to attempts to institutionalise further partnership between Brotherhood associations and state institutions.

55 Menza, Patronage Politics in Egypt: The National Democratic Party and Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, 118.
6.3  The politicisation of public goods

The success of institutionalising partnerships between state and civil society prioritising Brotherhood associations depended on the FJP’s ability to penetrate and control over state ministries. This process, in which Brotherhood figures were appointed to executive positions in the government, regionally in the governorates, and within state ministries themselves, became known critically in public discourse, as the “Brotherhoodization” of the state (ikhwanat al-dawla). The sacking of SCAF heads, appointments of governors and other public officials, and the composition of the new Qandil government being dominated by Brotherhood figures, led some to complain that the Muslim Brotherhood ‘is implementing a majoritarian, winner take all, attitude to democracy. Former ruling party officials often alleged that the Muslim Brothers did not just want to replace the government, they want to replace the state’.\(^{56}\) For its part, the Brotherhood claimed they were ‘unable to implement reforms and policies because of the “deep state” - where powerful Mubarak-era cronies continued to dominate key Egyptian institutions’.\(^{57}\) Therefore, the Brotherhood/FJP government faced resistance within the state apparatus.

The ability of the Brotherhood/FJP to gain control over state institutions, argues Haenni, depended on the strength of individual ministries and their ability to resist.\(^{58}\) When resistance was weak, or affinity with the Brotherhood was strong, then takeover strategies tended to be successful. Other ministries, particularly those associated with the “deep state”,


such as the security services, were more robust and resistant, and largely remained intact.\footnote{Haenni, 30.}

This distinction between strong and weak resistance is borne out when examining appointments to state ministries. In Hisham Qandil’s first cabinet after assuming office in August 2012, eight ministers were appointed belonging to the FJP.\footnote{Mustafa al-Marsafawy, Ayat al-Gal, and Amr Abdulaziz, “‘al-mašrī al-yawm’ tarṣūd ‘amaliyyat ‘ikhwanat” al-dawla fi 8 shahūr min ḥakm mursī’, \textit{al-Masry al-Yawm}, 14 February 2013, \url{https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/286656}.} Party members assumed the position of spokesperson in three ministries, while three more assumed the position of director of ministerial offices. Thirteen Brotherhood/FJP consultants were appointed across the ministries of Awqaf, Education, Finance, Trade and Health. The takeover strategy was particularly successful in three ministries. The first two – Health and Supply – were key in the delivery of social services, of deep interest to the Brotherhood, as well as the provision of public goods, which was also of keen interest for their commercial networks. The third, the Ministry of Awqaf, was perhaps the least surprising due to its religious remit. The remainder of this section will detail the takeover process of the ministries of Health and Supply before the final section of the chapter addresses the Ministry of Awqaf.

6.3.1 The Ministry of Health

Although the Health Minister, Muhammad Hamid, was an independent, several executive positions within the Ministry went to Brotherhood figures. Mohsen Abdel Halim was appointed Head of Pharmaceutical Affairs, a position he took after heading the Cairo Pharmacists Syndicate. Assistant Minister of Health for Health Insurance Affairs, Ibrahim Mustafa, was a director of the Islamic Medical Association. Similarly, Ahmed Siddiq, Assistant Minister of Health and Medicine Affairs, had been Executive Director of the IMA’s...
Central Hospital. Saad Zaghloul became Assistant Minister of Health for Curative Care, while Ahmed Amr was appointed official spokesperson for the Ministry. Brotherhood figures also assumed senior positions in the regional departments of health, such as Ibrahim Hindawi in Gharbiyya, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health Ayman Al-Khudari in the Red Sea, and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health Muhammad Abu Al-Dahab in Minya. Brotherhood/FJP members were thus appointed to key position for planning and providing services in the ministry. A group named Doctors Without Restrictions was formed to protest these widespread appointments, with one member charging that “The Brotherhood sought to control the Ministry of Health.”

![Figure 6.2](image)

Figure 6.2, joint FJP/Ministry of Health vaccination campaign against polio in children, April 2013

In the delivery of Ministry services, the overlap between movement and party identified in the first section, began to be replicated in an overlap between the party and ministry. For example, in April 2013, the Ministry of Health launched a vaccination campaign against
polio for children in the Greater Cairo governorate. Figure 6.2 shows the launch of the campaign from a health centre, with the main sign at the entrance to the facility advertising the initiative featuring the FJP logo prominently alongside that of the Ministry of Health. In attendance was Dr. Abeer Barakat, Assistant Minister of Health for Preventive Medicine, and at the same time serving as the head of the FJP’s Health Committee. The combination of Ministry and FJP logos blurred the lines between a state service and a specifically FJP-delivered service. Moreover, FJP paraphernalia was distributed to children undergoing vaccination, including face painting and balloons with the party emblem. This served to reinforce the identification of service delivery with the political party, discursively indicating where the loyalty of citizens should lie.

Figure 6.3, Facebook post from the Giza branch of the Freedom and Justice Party advertising free treatments for Hepatitis C patients

There also appeared to be some overlap between the delivery of state services and the

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political campaigning undertaken by the Brotherhood, as discussed in the first section. The medical caravans rolled out nationwide by the FJP also had some cooperation from the Ministry of Health. A report from March 2013 reported that the Governor of Aswan had sent a letter of thanks to the party’s general coordinator of the medical caravans, which had been organised in cooperation with the Ministry of Health in a campaign between 20-24 February. It is unclear whether state resources were used for the delivery of highly politicised service provision, such as the Together We Build Egypt campaign. However, other cases indicate that state resources were utilised in health service delivery, with scant explanation that the resources for these projects came from the state. In one instance, the Brotherhood’s Giza branch announced treatment opportunities, at the state’s expense, for patients with Hepatitis C who were not covered by health insurance. The project was part of a service campaign launched on the anniversary of the January 25 Revolution in 2013, titled “Egypt, your mother, your most important”. Figure 6.3 shows the announcement issued by the FJP on its official Facebook page for the Giza Governorate. It states not only that treatment would be free and at the state’s expense, but that those who wished to obtain treatment must present their papers to the home of one shaykh Rashid al-Sisi. This provision of a health service at state expense appeared to be an informal and highly personalised exchange delivered by the Brotherhood. Yet again, the line separating the Brotherhood from the FJP, and the FJP from the state, was increasingly opaque, demonstrating the politicisation of the delivery of public goods.

The coordination between civil society organisations and companies affiliated with the Brotherhood/FJP and the state was particularly prevalent in the Ministry of Supply. Brotherhood leader and Chair of the FJP’s Local Development Committee, Bassem Odeh, was appointed Minister of Supply, with Nasser al-Farras as his official spokesperson. It is via the Ministry of Supply that the strongest indications of utilising public resources for political gain is found. Control of the Ministry of Supply would provide access to food and energy commodities for redistribution to citizens. As is discussed in chapters 4 and 5 and earlier in this chapter, there were indications that an informal arrangement had seen Brotherhood and other Islamist networks distributing gas cylinders via the ministry. With control of the ministry, and the politicisation of state services branded as FJP/Brotherhood provision, there appeared to be the beginnings of a formal patronage network akin to that of the former ruling NDP.

Amidst the launch of the Together We Build Egypt campaign in January 2013, the Ministry of Supply’s activities were overlapping with that of the FJP and Brotherhood. Shortly after being appointed Supply Minister, Odeh began to engage in activities similar to those he oversaw during his time as head of the Brotherhood’s PCs in Giza. Odeh allocated 15 Ministry Cars filled with oil, sugar, and food commodities, which were received by members of the FJP in Giza, to be redistributed to citizens at discounted prices.64 One party member who spoke to al-Watan newspaper insisted that the goods were not meant to serve the party, but rather the party’s role in its distribution was a form of supervision only. In March 2013 it was reported that the Ministry of Supply had again handed over 30 cars with commodities to the FJP in Giza.

64 Saad et al., ‘al-ḥukūma tukhaṣas li-“al-ikhwān” sala‘an bi-‘as‘ār mukhaṣafa li-tawzī‘ha ‘ala al-muwāṭīnīn‘.
food commodities to FJP in Giza.\textsuperscript{65} Ahmed Orabi, deputy head of the PCs coalition affiliated with the Brotherhood in Giza (which was chaired by Supply Minister Odeh), said that the coalition supervised the distribution of these commodities to ensure that their prices were not tampered with by the distributors, keeping them 10\% below the market price. The Ministry’s official spokesman said that the cars for the sale of food commodities belonged to the Ministry, within a campaign organised to contribute to tackling the rise in commodity prices under the slogan: “The best products for the most honourable people”. This coincided with the Brotherhood's announcement that it had organised 1,635 markets to sell food supplies, including 131 markets in Cairo, 160 in Giza, 106 in Qalyubia, 121 in Sharqia, 103 in Gharbia, 576 in Alexandria, 44 in Fayoum, and 21 in Minya.

Residents commented that the subsidized Ministry products were used to promote the party for electoral purposes.\textsuperscript{66} Meanwhile, opposition officials bemoaned the fact that the Ministry’s resources were being used almost exclusively through Brotherhood associations, accusing them of seeking to advantage the FJP before a rumoured election. Allegedly, requests from associations affiliated with the Brotherhood were issued as standard, whereas others found the qualifying conditions harder to meet. Ahmed Salama, a veteran activist in the leftist Tagammu party, helped manage a charity in al-Qabari that was planning to participate in the bread distribution programme, but withdrew the request when the process was found to be overly restrictive. In May 2013, the governor of Alexandria accused his deputy Hassan al-Prince, a member of the Brotherhood, of favouring associations affiliated with the group. The complaint sparked a protest in Alexandria against alleged attempts to “Brotherhoodize” the local administration.

This “Brotherhoodization” of local administration, and the Ministry of Supply more broadly, can be identified in other areas of food provision. As well as ration cards for quotas of bread for families, the government also issued ration cards for other foodstuffs, such as flour, rice, sugar, cooking oil, and tea from designated shops. During the 1970s, the Egyptian food subsidy system was expanded to include additional food items. At one point, there were almost twenty food staples on a list that included red meat, chicken, lentils, beans, frozen fish, rice, cooking oil and yellow maize, in addition to those already provided under Nasser’s rule. As with waste collection, whereby initial grassroots initiatives on the part of Brotherhood associations were upgraded in status, reaching the level of contracts between state ministries and Brotherhood companies, the state’s food distribution networks too would see Brotherhood conduits acting as distributors.

In April 2013, the head of the domestic trade sector for the ministry, Muhib Abdel Sitar, submitted his resignation to Minister Odeh, protesting over what he described as the “Brotherhoodization of the sector” and the attempt to enable Khairat al-Shater, Brotherhood deputy head, and Hassan Malek, the head of the EBDA business association discussed in chapter 4, to control the market of distribution of foodstuffs. In a statement to al-Masry al-Yawm, Abdel Sitar said that the reasons behind his departure were down to the attempts by the FJP-led ministry to enable the gama’a (Brotherhood movement) in different parts of the Ministry. He cited the EBDA association, which was headed by Malek, and which signed a protocol with the Ministry allowing it enhanced control over activities in the food distribution sector. Meanwhile, the commercial supermarket chain Zad, owned by al-Shater, had sought to implement a project of special stores, where the shop’s logos would be placed on foodstuffs in exchange for the provision of stock for them. After 2011, the al-Shater family
opened 15 branches of the Zad supermarket across Cairo’s middle-class neighbourhoods. Plans were in place for the construction of granaries in step with an increase in Zad branches across the country. Prior to the 2013 coup it appeared that the foodstuff distribution networks being established by the FJP were on the cusp of being extended to other ministries, before the coup prevented this. On 25 May 2013, the FJP officially announced a protocol between the Ministries of Supply, Local Development, Agriculture, and Investment, to offer food and products of the Ministry of Agriculture at lower than market prices. Campaigns were organised targeting densely populated poor areas, with three campaigns, the first for ten days from 27 May, followed by another on June 25, before the whole month of Ramadan, during which food commodities and all kinds of products would be launched, as well as products of the Ministry of Agriculture, including dairy products, vegetables, and honey. While the implementation of the plan was cut short due to the coup, the privatization of state distribution networks seen in the Ministry of Supply may very well have been extended to other ministries thereafter.

In part, the Brotherhood’s penetration of the Ministry of Supply can be viewed as an example of economic gain through state privatization, for the benefit of Brotherhood-related businessmen. But as Adly has argued, this commercial sector relating to the distribution of foodstuffs represented a plan to increase political influence ‘to support a long-term populist agenda by entering into the process of providing foodstuffs to vast sectors of the population’. Although this plan was terminated due to the short life of the FJP government, what it represented was an attempt to institutionalise Brotherhood-affiliated companies as part of the distribution of public goods. And by politicising these exchanges via attribution of

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69 Amr Adly, ‘Investigating the Muslim Brotherhood Economy’ (Tahrir Institute of Middle East Policy, 7 July 2014), https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/investigating-muslim-brotherhood-economy/.
responsibility for their delivery to these affiliates, rather than the state, the FJP/Brotherhood could potentially generate enhanced political gain.

6.4 The FJP and the Ministry of Awqaf

While the al-Nahda project envisaged increased coordination between civil society and the state, the FJP’s control over the religious sphere would facilitate increased autonomy for Islamic associations and their religious institutions. But to do so, it would first have to assume the levers of control throughout the Ministry of Awqaf. As with other ministries, the FJP’s strategy to take over the Ministry of Awqaf centred on appointing either Brotherhood members, or other Islamists sympathetic to their interests, into prominent positions. In the process, those being viewed as being too close to the former regime were marginalised or dismissed. On 2 August, 2012, Mohamed Abdel Fadil was replaced as Awqaf Minister by Talaat Afifi. Although not formally a Brotherhood member, Afifi was widely viewed as being sympathetic towards the group. He had enjoyed an esteemed career prior to joining the Qandil government, having been dean of the faculty of preaching at al-Azhar University, a senior figure in al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, and had acted as deputy head of the ILBRR since its formation in 2011. Shortly after assuming his new post, ten senior civil servants were dismissed from the ministry, including two army generals. This was the beginning of what Haenni calls ‘exclusionary measures’ in which Sufis in particular were targeted, being perceived as allies of the former regime.70 Shaykh Salim Abdel Jalil, who had been a virulent critic of the Islamist takeover of state-run mosques after Mubarak’s fall, lost his post as Director of Preaching Affairs. Over the following months, several senior positions within the

administration of the Ministry were assumed by Brotherhood figures, including head of
da’wa affairs, religious endowments, pilgrimage, and several advisor positions. Further appointments were allocated to Islamist counterparts in other political parties. Muhammad al-Sughayyir, head of the Building and Development Party, the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya offshoot, was appointed as an advisor. Shaykh Mohammed Hussein Nawfal, an Asyut imam who was elected for the Salafi Nur Party, was awarded the post of head of religious endowments in the Wadi al-Jadid governorate. Within months of forming a government, therefore, the FJP had successfully implanted a host of Brotherhood and Islamist figures within the Ministry, which would assist in their attempts to reshape the religious sphere.

After assuming his position as Minister of Awqaf, one of the first moves al-Afifi made was to allow all mosques to open throughout the day. Under Mubarak, mosque opening times were restricted to prayer times and Friday sermons, with the security services enforcing closures during other times to prevent the potential organisation of politically-minded Islamists within their confines. Now Egypt’s mosques were to be freed from these shackles in one of the first steps taken by the FJP-government to increase their independence from state control. As well as easing the restrictions on mosques’ opening hours, the spread of zawiyas was also facilitated under Afifi’s ministership, with hundreds being opened in neighbourhood buildings, in apparent violation of codes requiring a certain distance between mosques. Restrictions on the institution of the mosque as a physical site were, therefore relaxed, lessening the extent of state oversight.

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The relaxation of state oversight of mosques also saw moves to actively reduce the state’s control over specific mosques. Ministry imams were dismissed and replaced with Brotherhood figures in large mosques across the country, such as those in the capital, like Rabaa al-Adawiya, the square which would become one site of massacres of Brotherhood supporters in August 2013, and the al-Fatah mosques in Rameses. In a symbolic move that seemed to signal that the Mubarak era was truly over, a Brotherhood imam assumed duties at the mosque of Omar bin Abdul Aziz, located adjacent to the presidential palace in Heliopolis. Other Islamist groups would also benefit. Ahmed Turk, the Awqaf imam discussed in chapter three, was formally excluded from the Nur mosque in Abbassia, while al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya pressured Afifi to appoint 250 of their imams to state-controlled mosques, and also return those who were dismissed and prevented from preaching in their mosques under Mubarak. This shows that the drive among Islamic movements to contest state control of mosques that began after the political opening in 2011, continued and was further facilitated under the FJP.

A more formal legislative change was made to formalise societal rather than state control over mosques, through a decree to reorganise the administration of mosques, in which elected boards would oversee their management. Decree no.75, issued on 10 March 2013, stated that each mosque would have a “Mosque Development Board” in which the worshippers themselves would elect a council to supervision operations. Seven candidates would be elected to each board, with the requirements including that they must be over 25-years-old, residents in the vicinity of the mosque, and a frequent attendee during prayers. In addition, they were required to be involved in the social, cultural, or health activities carried

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out as part of the mission of the mosque. The board would comprise a chair, vice-chair, general secretary, treasurer, and three ordinary committee members, and would last for a period of three years.

The idea of a mosque board of directors was initially created in the 1980s when the ministry faced difficulties in managing and funding Egypt’s growing number of mosques on its own. Local figures and businessmen helped to manage the mosques’ financial affairs, while the ministry retained exclusive rights to administer religious and preaching activities. Without a say in religious activities, the role of the board was limited to the management of charitable activities and other services. The boards were fully appointed by the ministry, which had the right to dissolve the board or revoke the position of board members. The security services also played a role in selecting and approving members, to ensure that the boards did not include members with Islamist affiliations. The operation of the boards was suspended in the mid-1990s as imams complained that they exerted influence beyond their remit, particularly due to the financial controls they enjoyed.

The motivation for reintroducing mosque boards followed a similar rationale to their original introduction, with a Ministry of Awqaf spokesman stating that it did have the capacity to supervise all mosques, either financially or administratively. In addition, it was argued that this decentralization of control would democratise the running of mosques, leaving worshippers free to choose who would run their services. The election of boards by worshippers would also remove the practice of the oversight by the ministry and security services, which, the spokesman argued, had led to a crackdown on preachers not viewed as being sufficiently loyal to the regime. This might have been true, yet critics of the move argued that it replaced state control over mosques with control by organised Islamist groups.

78 ‘izmat idārat al-masājid mustamira bayn markaziyyat wizārat al-awqāf wa maṭālib al-a’ima bi-l-istiqlāl’.
The protest group, Imams Without Restrictions, bemoaned that the reorganisation would increase the influence of organised groups within mosques, due to their superior ability to mobilize resources to dominate elections. They argued the move would threaten independent locally-run mosques that were subject neither to state nor Islamist control, and furthermore, would marginalize the role and independence of the imam. Amr Ezzat, an Egyptian researcher specialising on religious affairs, argued that rather than genuine independence of mosques, the move would result in competition across different factions of the Islamic movement for control over mosques. He argued that decentralization would appease Salafi allies and deflect accusations of the “Brotherhoodization” of mosques.

Ministry of Awqaf regional directorates began to alert mosques to start the implementation of the policy in May 2013, with the first elections held at the Omar Bin Abdul Aziz mosque in Heliopolis mentioned above. The policy of elected mosque boards, in its decentralization of state control over mosques, would represent a potentially profound shift in the balance of control between public and private in the religious sphere. However, as will be discussed in chapter eight, the policy would be short-lived.

6.5 Conclusions

This chapter has shown how the ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities of the Brotherhood/FJP were combined through the politicisation of service provision. This occurred first, as an overlap between the Brotherhood as a movement and as a party and exploitation of social services for political gain during electoral cycles, and second, an overlap between the Brotherhood/FJP nexus and the state itself, through institutionalised

79 'izmat idārat al-masājid mustamira bayn markaziyyat wizārat al-awqāf wa maṭālib al-a’ima bi-l-istiqlāl’.
80 Ezzat, ‘Searching for the Church of Islam’.
partnerships with Brotherhood-affiliated associations and the delivery of public goods. The provision of social services by the Brotherhood became politicised, with its delivery featuring an explicit branding that equated services with a political party, in a move that exploited the social capital garnered through service provision for political gain. In both its electioneering strategy and approach to governance, the politicised provision of services was central to the FJP’s legitimacy.

Once in power, paradoxically, the FJP continued the neoliberal policy pursued by the NDP under Mubarak, to promote civil society organisations as part of their development strategy. However, a qualitative difference came in the prioritisation and establishment of Brotherhood-specific civil society organisations as pre-eminent in this coordination between civil society and the state. The resulting movement acted as a private intermediary for the state, blurring the boundaries between ‘public’ and ‘private’, as well as between ‘economic’ and ‘political’. These newly in-favour Brotherhood-affiliated associations were awarded various contracts in public goods distribution networks. However, rather than being framed as the apolitical provision of public goods, these provisions became highly personalised and branded, in the same way as the provision of Brotherhood services during election cycles. This was extended to Brotherhood commercial companies, in an apparent attempt to develop a widespread distribution network of foodstuffs by Brotherhood businessmen, with the potential to exploit their position of governance, and establish distributive networks exploiting public goods in order to increase their social capital and, subsequently, political support. This was short-lived, but this combination of ‘organisational’ service delivery, first as a movement, and secondly as a government, overlapped with the ‘public sphere’

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82 Hibou, *Privatizing the State*, 3.
discursive, in the way that it branded public goods as being directly attributable to the Brotherhood/FJP.

For the FJP, foregrounding its legitimacy in the service provision that had helped generate support and a reputation for ‘good governance’ while in opposition, was a risk-laden strategy for power. In the pre-2011 context, the Brotherhood’s well-organised and efficient social service apparatus projected an attractive alternative to a poorly performing authoritarian regime, increasingly unable to fulfil the expectations of a redistributive social contract. Yet, in a more democratic context, in which Islamists could openly seek and attain power, voters’ expectations are raised in line with the burden to extend the service provision of a social movement level to a national state level. Unable to meet these expectations, then the reputation Islamists such as the Brotherhood developed while in opposition can quickly unravel in power, punishable by rapid loss of voter support.\(^{83}\) A further consequence in the strategy of politicising service provision post-2011 was that those services became exposed in a way that made them particularly visible and vulnerable after the 2013 coup and the resumption of authoritarianism, to which we now turn.

\(^{83}\) Cammett and Jones-Luong, ‘Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?’, 2.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CRACKDOWN ON ISLAMIC ‘SELF-ORGANIZATIONAL’ INSTITUTIONS UNDER SISI

On 23 December, 2013, the Egyptian government announced the seizure of 1055 Islamic associations for alleged affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. In accordance with a 23 September court ruling banning the activities of the organisation, the Ministry of Justice ordered the Central Bank to freeze the assets of Brotherhood-affiliated associations, which were then subject to a review process to decide their fate.¹ The stated rationale was the suspicion that these associations, in their provision of social services, had been exploited in order to provide a source of electoral support for Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and to support groups engaged in terrorist activities. If the transitional period enabled the expansion, and combination, of what Lewis calls the dualistic ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ sides of civil society activism, a combination viewed as particularly threatening by authoritarian regimes, then the crackdown on Egypt’s Islamic movement under Sisi represents an attempt to sever this combination to enforce state control. The crackdown entailed a comprehensive campaign to extend state control over Egypt’s Islamic movement, targeting both ‘self-organizational’ institutions engaged in service provision, and their ‘public sphere’ institutions involved in the output of religious discourse. This chapter details the campaign to control the ‘self-organizational’ side of the Islamic movement, that which engaged in social welfare provision through Islamic charities.

The crackdown, I argue, aimed to control Islamic social institutions, firstly by extending more ‘direct’ control via corporatism or nationalisation, and secondly by extending the state’s own infrastructural presence in areas of service provision to reduce the reliance on private actors for maintaining social stability. Before detailing the crackdown, this chapter begins by contextualising this strategy within the wider discourse of *dawlatiyya*, or statism, being espoused by Sisi and others within the state apparatus during the post-coup period. The following two sections focus on specific regime strategies for extending ‘direct’ statist controls over Islamic associations, detailing the process of seizures between 2013 and 2016. It shows attempts to install ‘corporatism’ into the state’s relations with them, limiting their financial and organisational autonomy. It also describes outright nationalisation, in which associations and their resources were incorporated into state ministries. The final two sections show how the process has paralleled similar statist changes in the wider socio-economic strategy of the Egyptian state. Enabled by changes in outlook among international financial institutions, a shift towards ‘inclusive growth’ has meant a renewed emphasis upon state welfare, and a reduced need to rely on private actors in these areas for social and political stability. To limit the financial autonomy of the Islamic movement, new officially-sanctioned institutions - Bayt al-Zakat and Tahya Masr - were been created for the collection and distribution of Islamic charity. The final section details how the state’s wider developmental strategy intersects with the crackdown and this attempt to appropriate the resources of independent Islamic activism.
7.1 The new statist discourse under Sisi

The deposal of President Mohamed Morsi on 3 July, 2013, and the reconstitution of authoritarian rule, was undoubtedly led by Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Defence Minister, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Yet in the immediate aftermath of the coup the consolidation of his governing regime remained in its early stages, with the ruling coalition of actors yet to be firmly established. Despite this, what was immediately clear was a concerted effort among Sisi and his associates to restore cohesion and a vertical line of authority among the institutions that constitute the state. Brumberg has argued that, ‘the toppling of President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood was first and foremost about a resurgent Egyptian state. This huge entity is what both the military and millions of anti-Morsi protestors were most afraid of losing’.² For Egypt’s military and generals, the very existence of the Egyptian state was at stake.

The prevailing ideology of the Egyptian state for much of the republican period led to ‘a sweeping conception of statism that created a vast and pervasive state apparatus’.³ However, under Mubarak, successive economic crises weakened the statist order. The dismantlement of the public sector detailed in chapter three meant that the state under Mubarak had effectively abandoned holding the basic premises of statism.⁴ The knock-on effect of political upheaval in 2010/2011 on the economy and the state was acutely felt. According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators – the standard by which state capacities are evaluated and compared – the Egyptian state’s core capacities in government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law, declined by almost half between 2010 and

³ Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak.
⁴ Rutherford, 190.
2014, reaching their lowest point since these measurements began in 1996.\(^5\) Therefore, after the toppling of Morsi, great emphasis was placed on restoring state institutions by Sisi and state actors. A prevailing discourse of *dawlatiyya* (statism) emerged from the president himself, and others within the state structure, with several phrases being used to signify the need to protect or save the state. References were made to the necessity of the “preservation of the state” (*al-hifāz ‘ala al-dawla*) or “state entity” (*al-hifāz ‘ala al-dawla*), as well as the need to restore the “prestige of the state” (*hibat al-dawla*) following its decay due to the 2011 Uprisings and FJP government. This discourse was prevalent within the executive and state structures, but also within pro-government movements, intellectuals, and newspaper commentaries.

Days after the removal of President Morsi, the-then Defence Minister Sisi spoke of the need to “preserve the entity of the state”.\(^6\) In the aftermath of the Rabā‘a al-Adawiya massacre of Morsi supporters, Sisi said: “The Egyptian armed forces and police forces will remain faithful to the protection of the Egyptian state and the protection of the people’s right to choose their rulers.” The following year when asked why he had decided to run for the presidency, Sisi responded: “The challenges which Egypt faces requires every responsible patriot to apply to run for the preservation of the state”. When asked by a journalist, “What is your vision?”, Sisi replied. “It is preserving the state…The people have assigned me a secret mission…to keep Egypt from falling and my vision is to implement that”.\(^7\) At his inauguration ceremony following his election to the presidency, as well as Sisi, the Vice-President of the Constitutional Court and former President Aldy Mansour, used phrases such as “The Egyptian state has proven unable to be broken”, “preserving the unity of the state”, and

\(^7\) ‘*khibra*’: al-dawlatiyya rakīza asāsiyya flī kḥītāb al-sīsī’.
“restoring the prestige of the state”. In an interview with al-Hayat, Mansour said: “Field Marshal Sisi’s mandate contains an important message that the state cannot remain idle in the face of the security coup in the Egyptian street, including sit-ins in Raba’a and al-Nahda and attacks on public facilities”. Mahmoud Badr, founder of the Tammarod movement credited with organising the mass mobilization against the Morsi presidency, commented that Sisi’s election in 2014 was “returning the prestige of the Egyptian state and its position among the Arab countries”.

Commentaries in official and pro-government newspapers continued to push idea of dawlatiyya and the need to re-establish the prestige of the state. In the state-owned al-Ahram, one commentator praised the “June 30 Revolution” as a corrective after the country had “witnessed the erosion of state institutions” and the “fall of its prestige”. According to the commentator, Sisi’s ascendance affirmed the “return of the state” and the “cohesion of its institutions”. Other fawning commentaries emphasised the need to preserve the prestige of the state. An al-Shorouk piece declared that “the prestige of the state is an issue that cannot be neglected or tolerated”, with the need to “rebuild the state that has been ruined for nearly half a century”. It continued, “State prestige is a matter of both institutions and legitimacy. If any institution loses its legitimacy, the prestige of the whole state is under threat”. This commentary harks back to the perceived glory days of the Egyptian state under Nasser, whilst arguing for a holistic restoration of state institutions. These commentaries amount almost to a kind of worship of the sanctity of the state.

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The discourse of “prestige” and “preservation” of the state espoused by the executive and the Egyptian media was mirrored on the level of individual state institutions with ministers detailing this goal in carrying out their duties. Within weeks of Morsi’s deposal, the Minister for Irrigation declared during inspect works of a canal project in Alexandria, that the next stage would be “to restore the prestige of the state, especially in protecting irrigation facilities that serve the agricultural sector and meet the needs of drinking water and industry”. The Minister of Awqaf, who we will see in the next chapter was responsible for the state’s drive to control religious institutions, adopted similar language when discussing the need to prevent political parties from using mosques to propagate Islamist propaganda. He said, “We will not allow mosques to be divided to promote ideas for groups or groups. There is no so-called religious authority in Egypt, but only state authority.” He added, during a public conference held in the village of Shatura in Sohag: “The prestige of the state will soon return stronger than it was. There is no place for the previous and former regimes in any way in the next stage, because the people have become more aware and aware of their national responsibility.” The prevailing discourse, therefore, within the executive down to individual state ministries, was centred on dawlatiyya, or statism, insistent on a holistic return of the “prestige” of the state. This discourse manifested itself in practical terms through the encroachment of the state into substantial portions of the public sphere in which civil society operated. As will now be shown, addressing the threat posed by social institutions with alleged affiliation to the Brotherhood, was among the primary targets.

7.2 Eradicating the social base of the Brotherhood

The deposal of President Morsi initiated a series of measures aimed at eradicating the Brotherhood as a social and political force. In his imprisonment, Morsi was joined by the organisation’s General Guide, Muhammad Badie, his deputy Khairat al-Shater, and the Freedom and Justice Party Head, Saad al-Katatni, among many others.\(^\text{15}\) Within weeks hundreds of members of the group’s rank and file were rounded up, accused of inciting or participating in violence as they protested against the coup. One of the country’s bloodiest days followed on 14 August, when security forces killed more than 800 supporters of the ousted president within a matter of hours during a sit-in at Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya Square.\(^\text{16}\) The method of clamping down on the Brotherhood did not rely on blunt force alone, with the initiation of a legal process to facilitate the dismantlement of the Brotherhood as an organisation and of all its resources. On 23 September, 2013, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters banned ‘all activities’ of the Brotherhood, including the movement, as well as ‘any institution derived from or belonging to the Brotherhood’ or ‘receiving financial support from it’.\(^\text{17}\) Meanwhile, on 9 October, Minister of Social Solidarity Ahmed el-Borai officially announced the disbandment of the Brotherhood’s NGO, which had only received formal registration for the first time in its history in March 2013. These rulings provided the legal basis for the campaign to dismantle the social base of the Brotherhood movement.

The crackdown on the Brotherhood’s social institutions stepped up a gear on 23 December, 2013, with the seizure of 1055 Islamic associations. The first step of the seizure


constituted the freezing of the associations’ bank accounts, with workers prevented from accessing them. Tamer Gama’a, Assistant Minister of Social Solidarity, insisted that procedures had been put in place to ensure that the work of frozen associations would not be impeded, and beneficiaries would not suffer as a consequence.18 This appeared to be in response to criticism of the move, with the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights warning of the repercussions of the move for the beneficiaries of the associations’ welfare provision,19 and with one news website describing it as a ‘war on the poor’.20 There was, however, a lack of clarity about what constituted a Brotherhood-affiliated association. Although the Brotherhood had been allowed to rebuild its social welfare apparatus under Sadat and Mubarak, this amounted only to tacit toleration, on the condition that they were not politicised. Islamic associations with Brotherhood links did not overtly bear the group’s logo. The list of seized associations, therefore, included several well-known Brotherhood affiliates, alongside a number of associations without clear ties to the Brotherhood.

The list of seized associations included hundreds of individual associations as well as branches of several larger nationally-networked associations.21 Some were well-known Brotherhood affiliates, such as the Islamic Medical Association’s network of 28 hospitals and health centres.22 Similarly, the inclusion of the Islamic Relief Committee, formed by Brotherhood member Issam al-Haddad in 201223 and identified as part of the FJP’s plans for the ‘revitalisation of civil society’, and branches of the Islamic Education Association, re-

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21 Islamic associations in Egypt tend to be either independent and located in a single location, or are part of a network. However, all civil society organisations must be registered in a single location. See Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs the State, 33.
22 The history of the IMA is dealt with in depth in Brooke, Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage.
established in 2011 by Brotherhood members, was not surprising. Yet, 138 of al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya’s 1100 branches were also seized, along with 7 Ansar al-Sunna branches. Some of Egypt’s oldest Islamic associations were also on the list, including 14 branches of the Islamic Charitable Association, whose 1878 origins make it Egypt’s oldest Islamic association, along with 4 branches of Sha‘aban al-Muslimin, formed two years before the Brotherhood. Despite the similarity in name, they were not thought to hold particularly close ties. For the many hundreds of other, lesser-known individual associations without such a national presence or profile, their status was more ambiguous, with low ranking Brotherhood members serving as volunteers or board members. The wording of the court ruling appeared to reflect this ambiguity, referring rather openly to ‘any institution derived from or belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood’, which provided a degree of flexibility in whom to target. As an Egyptian Human Rights Watch worker tweeted: “Freezing charity funds: There is no strong evidence of their proximity to the Muslim Brotherhood, and they have been seized for their approach. A new step in emerging fascism”. The list of seized associations, therefore, represented a diverse sample of Egypt’s Islamic movement, with varying degrees of demonstrable affiliation to the banned Brotherhood movement.

7.3 The outcome for seized associations

The outcome for seized associations was determined through regional committees formed in each governorate, comprising representatives of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS), the General Federation of NGOs (GFNGOs) - which is the representative body for civil

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society organisations - and other economic and administrative “experts”. A further committee, meanwhile, was formed under the guidance of Izzat Khamis, the First Assistant Minister of Justice, who chaired the Committee for the Management of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Funds, which ruled on the seizure of Brotherhood assets beyond associations, such as individuals’ wealth and commercial outlets. In each governorate, the ministry passed lists of seized associations on to regional branches of the GFNGOs, whose task was to audit the board of directors, their activities and financial positions, before providing recommendations regarding their future, following the conclusion of its investigations. The outcome of that process resulted in either: the corporatisation of associations via restrictions on their finances, or replacement of their board of directors; or a form of nationalisation whereby the association is dissolved with its assets being transferred to a relevant state ministry, or, alternatively, the continuation of their existing activities with full control being directly transferred to the state.

7.3.1 Corporatisation

In January 2014, the then Minister of Social Solidarity, Ahmed el-Borai, indicated he had received the first of the GFNGOs’ recommendations to remove the management boards of associations for ‘links to the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood and financial irregularities’. According to the ministry, the removal of the management boards would lead to the release of the associations’ financial assets, allowing them to continue to operate under the

supervision of new state-appointed boards of directors. Upon the announcement of the formation of the supervisory committees, GFNGO chair, Talaat Abdel-Qawi, stressed the importance of supervising the boards of directors of associations, and agreed with the decision to only release money once approved by the federation and ministry. Beginning in February 2015, el-Borai’s successor as Minister of Social Solidarity, Ghada Wali, provided near-monthly announcements of the numbers of associations which had been dissolved or had their board of directors replaced. By March 2016, 246 seized associations, roughly a third of those seized, were subject to the dismissal of their boards of directors, and replacements selected by the Ministry and GFNGOs. In performing this supervisory role, the GFNGOs fulfilled its corporatist functions by facilitating the removal of the financial and organisational autonomy of Islamic associations, making the release of funds contingent on the ceding of organisational autonomy, with the ministry selecting the management boards.

This corporatist strategy was deployed towards Ansar al-Sunna (AS) and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya (GS), two of the most prominent associations named in the list of seizures, and which had been particularly active in political activism during the transitional period. The state’s strategy towards them comprised similar measures to restrict organisational and financial autonomy, in an attempt to ensure they were domesticated and rehabilitated to state pliancy. Doing so would ensure their service-providing activities continued, yet with a level of state oversight to restrict their ability to venture into political activism. To do this, a collaborative process was initiated with the Ministry and GFNGOs, to ensure that the regional branches of each seized association were purged of Brotherhood elements. The oversight of the groups’ leaders and membership was accompanied by a licence to continue to solicit donations for their activities, yet under a detailed auditing process in conjunction

30 ‘waqf tajmīd ‘amwāl al-jam‘iyyat al-‘ahliyya b-shakal kāmal’. 

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with the Ministry. The corporatisation of the state’s relations with these associations, particularly GS, thus turned them into a depoliticised collaborators with the state under Sisi.

Upon the announcement that branches of AS and GS were included in the list of seizures, the GFNGOs’ chair, Abdel-Qawi, announced that the decision to freeze the assets of these associations related to some, but not all, branches of nationally-networked associations. Only those branches which were found to be directly related to the Brotherhood, in terms of its workers or finances, would be affected. In other words, AS and GS were not viewed as institutionally-Brotherhood-supporting associations, but rather large networked associations, whose regional branches had been infiltrated by the Brotherhood. Indeed, Menza has noted how dual membership between GS and the Brotherhood was commonplace under Mubarak, with many health care and educational centres being run almost exclusively by Brotherhood members. Despite this, both AS and GS rejected the premise that they had been associated with the Brotherhood, launching legal proceedings to reclaim their frozen assets from the government. Even though the courts found in both their favours, AS and GS embarked on cooperative processes with the government to purge their branches of Brotherhood influence, reflecting the methods of corporatist control.

Despite this legal victory, pressure remained on AS to demonstrate it had not been infiltrated by the Brotherhood. Ansar al-Sunna was accused by Salafi preacher Mahmood Abdel Razek al-Radwani of collecting funds to support the Brotherhood and he called on its leaders to ‘repent’ for deviating from the Salafi approach. Even its own members made

32 Menza, Patronage Politics in Egypt: The National Democratic Party and Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, 89–90.
public accusations against the association’s leadership regarding support for the Brotherhood. In 2016, as the then head of the Abdeen branch, Adel al-Sayyid, wrote to the MOSS Minister Ghada Wali, accusing AS and its two main leaders, president Abdullah Shakir and General Secretary Yassir Marzouq, of belonging to the Brotherhood and calling on Wali to investigate them.\(^{35}\) Al-Sayyid added that he had since resigned from the association. Al-Sayyid’s resignation sparked an internal rift, with his successor, shaykh Hassan Abdul Wahab al-Banna, ordered by Abdullah Shakir to evacuate both floors of the Abdeen branch shortly after assuming his post.\(^ {36}\) In his letter to al-Banna, Shakir stated that his removal was due to permitting unknown elements to use the headquarters, which threatened the security and interest of the association, whilst also cooperating with elements that operated counter to the method (\textit{manhaj}) of the association and in violation of the laws of the state.\(^ {37}\) It is clear, then, that despite successfully reclaiming its properties, AS has faced sustained pressure to distance itself from either perceived support of the Brotherhood, or infiltration of its branches by Brotherhood elements.

In the case of GS, prior to the seizure of their branches, GS leader al-Mahdy had indicated his willingness to collaborate with the state to show it would remain apolitical. He indicated that GS would send the names of the boards of directors of its branches throughout Egypt to the concerned authorities to demonstrate that they had no Brotherhood links, adding that anyone with political affiliation would be excluded from their mosques. Although it did not prevent the seizure of many of its branches, this pledge would eventually be realised in subsequent negotiations with the state over their fate. Al-Mahdy, in this move, thus sanctioned a new level of corporatist oversight over the activities of GS. Shortly after the


seizure of its branches, GS released a statement declaring that the crisis was over. Mustafa Ismail, the Secretary General and the official spokesman of the main body of GS, said in a statement:

The crisis is over...we thank the institutions of the state and we pledge to continue our services. The association extends its sincere gratitude to all state institutions and all sons of the ummah who were included in the crisis….GS announces the end of the crisis of seized funds officially in 970 branches across the country from Cairo to Aswan of a total of 1100 branches. As for the remaining 130 branches, the association is cooperating with various parties to solve these problems through a tripartite committee from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, the General Federation of NGOs, and a representative from the association for each governorate.  

In this case, GS went further than AS in their internal investigations, agreeing to collaborate with the Ministry and GFNGOs to purge its regional branches of these elements. An illustration of the outcome of this collaboration is demonstrated in the case of the el-Huda branch, where the board of directors was sacked and replaced.

As well as ceding organisational autonomy in the face of government pressure, further corporatist measures sought to restrict GS’s financial autonomy also. On 1 April, 2015, the MOSS announced it had granted GS a licence to raise £50m EGY (around $3m) for its activities over the following financial year. The granting of the licence was accompanied by stringent oversights over the collection and use of the funds. Mustafa Ismail declared that GS

38 Despite citing 130 branches the list of seized associations included 138 branches of GS.
would adopt ‘full transparency in our dealing with state institutions’, with receipts for all
donations and their spending within each branch to be handed over to the ministry for
auditing. Therefore, not only had GS agreed to cooperate with the GFNGOs and the ministry
over the selection of leaders in its branches, it had now also agreed to a strict scrutinization
over the collection and distribution of its finances for ongoing projects.

While cooperating with the government over its organisational structure and
financing, GS would establish further protocols with the Ministry from 2015 onwards. In
November 2015, GS released a statement headed ‘Trust from State Institutions’, announcing
a ‘protocol of cooperation’ with the MOSS over licensing of 717 water stations and their
purification plants for the provision of safe drinking water across the country. The
cooperation protocol involved the Ministry coordinating all concerned ministries for the
delivery of GS’s project. This was the first of a series of protocol agreements with the
Ministries of Social Solidarity, Health, and the Tahya Masr fund (discussed in more depth
later in this chapter).

Analysis of an editorial article on GS’s website, titled “al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya and
state institutions: respect and complementarity”, shows subtle but important adaptations to
the group’s position on politics and the state when compared with the booklet it issue during
the transitional period. It begins by stating that for a “strong, cohesive society…all
institutions must be linked by good relations…because al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya is aware of
this, it has good and distinguished relations with all state institutions”. The article goes on to
provide a list of principles that sustain those relations. In article three, the group’s main goal
is given as “social reform” requiring “complementarity with the state” which is “not an

42 ‘thiqa min #mu’asisāt #al-dawla’, al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya (blog), 11 November 2015,
objective of contradiction and conflict like political action” which is “based on competition and rivalry”. In contrast to the booklet issued during the transition, da’wa is no longer a complimentary accompaniment to divisive politics. Article four, meanwhile, utilises the same language as the booklet, yet instead of da’wa and politics being the root and the branch, state institutions are instead replaced as the root. It states:

State institutions are the roots, with their enormous capabilities and accurate, detailed data. Civil and charitable society are the branches, with their limited capacity. The branch must not dispense with the root. The branch has no option but to seek shelter from the umbrella of its foundations, and to comply with its objectives, mechanisms and legislations.

The result of this updated position is that complementarity is not that between Islamic social activism and Islamists in the political sphere, but between Islamic social activism and the state. Moreover, civil and charitable society, effectively al-da’wa, is no longer the root, but a branch, with ultimate deference given to the state and its umbrella. Therefore, corporatist controls enabled the state to effectively domesticate a movement that had been particularly active in political activism during the transitional period, by establishing it as an important partner with the state in its delivery of development projects.

7.3.2 Nationalisation

The use of corporatisation by the regime under Sisi established more direct control for the state in its management of Islamic associations, which yet retained their formal independence. However, the fate of the majority of seized associations was complete state control, in a form of outright nationalisation. For 743 associations, their registration was
dissolved, and their assets being transferred into subsidies for the MOSS to use in its partnerships with civil society organisations. A little more than 100 remained under review, although the process of adding new associations to the list continued, albeit at a much-reduced rate than that of late 2013. The financial assets, and any associated premises of dissolved associations, were transferred to the administration of the MOSS, to be used as subsidies for other associations. The reasons given for dissolution included the absence of discernible presence such as a headquarters or on-the-ground activities. There may be some credence to this justification. Several dissolved associations were categorised as ‘community development associations’, that were licensed to provide broadly-defined services to a specific community to improve their general conditions. However, as noted by Abdelrahman, community development associations were often formed for reasons of status or privilege by local notables who had little interest in active participation. Thus, many associations were dormant and existed in name only.

A different outcome befell those identified as ‘major associations’ with ‘visible activities’ such as provision of health or education services. It was decided that such active associations would be managed and controlled by the ministries of Social Solidarity, Health, and Education, among others. Most prominent in this regard was the announcement in January 2016 that the Islamic Medical Association’s branches of hospitals and medical centres would be subsumed into the Ministry of Health. The IMA was widely considered to be the largest medical charity owned by the Brotherhood, and the “jewel in the crown” of its social apparatus. Founded in 1978 by Ahmed al-Malt, a prominent member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, the IMA began as a single charitable medical clinic in the

46 Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt, 162.
Sayyida Zaynab neighbourhood in central Cairo, before expanding to provide high-quality paid-for medical services across 28 branches nationwide. The extent to which the IMA was revered within the Brotherhood was illustrated by comments from the association’s secretary general, Gamal Heshmat, a former Shura Council member and FJP politician. He wrote on his Facebook page following the announcement: “When I heard the news, I felt like they killed or arrested a son of mine. They are brutally demolishing all we ever built.” Despite the presence of Brotherhood members on the IMA’s board, Brooke argued that it had remained a decidedly apolitical association, with its workers being reprimanded for any attempts to exploit its services for political gains. Adding to the insult was the appointment to the chair of Egypt’s former Grand Mufti Ali Gom’a, who had provided Islamic legal justifications for the massacre of anti-coup protestors at al-Nahda and Rabaa al-Adawiya squares in August 2013. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s flagship social institution was not only taken over and run by a state committed to the group’s eradication, but its new figurehead was a prominent figure of ‘official’ Islam actively promoting that process.

Beyond the IMA, the process of nationalisation of hospitals and health facilities extended to a total of 50 hospitals. Meanwhile, more than 100 schools were placed under the administration of the Ministry of Education and 70 nurseries allocated to the MOSS. As well as social institutions, further nationalisations included the assets of more than 700 individuals, 532 companies, two factories, 14 exchange offices and their branches, 522

49 ‘Heshmat Condemns Coup Takeover of Islamic Association Hospitals’.
50 Brooke, Winning Hearts and Votes: Social Services and the Islamist Political Advantage.
headquarters offices, and 400 feddans of agricultural land. In this way, the crackdown was extended to include any aspect of the ‘parallel Islamic sector’, as Wickham terms it, which served to support the activities of the Brotherhood.

The crackdown also extended to the food distribution networks that were being set up under the FJP government. As well as distribution warehouses, the 15 Zad supermarkets owned by Khairat al-Shater, and discussed in chapter six were confiscated. Police forces raided and closed the 26 branches of the supermarket chain Seoudi, owned by Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Abdelrahman al-Seoudi. Eventually the Ministry of Supply announced that the two retailers would reopen under the control of the state-run holding company, the Egyptian Food Industries Holding Company, which oversees 650 wholesalers and 210 retailers across the country, with the aim of providing low-cost food items. This shows how the nationalisation strategy pursued as part of the crackdown on the Brotherhood sought to dismantle the nascent food distribution networks being set up under the FJP, only now being subsumed within state-run companies and for the benefit of Sisi’s regime. As will now be shown, this increase in direct state control of service provision networks extended beyond the crackdown itself and become part of the state’s wider developmental strategy under Sisi.

55 Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt.
7.4 Changing international norms: statism in Egypt’s developmental strategy under Sisi

The reduction in the reliance on private actors to provide services, and the increased role for the state did more than serve a political rationale to control Islamic actors in civil society. This shift also paralleled similar changes in the wider socio-economic strategy of the Egyptian state, as it began to incorporate increasing levels of statism in its development strategy. These changes are in part reflective of changing international norms regarding the state’s role in development. But they have also usefully served a political purpose that intersects with the crackdown on Islamic movements. This section outlines the first part of that process, showing increased levels of statism in Egypt’s developmental strategy.

Partly driven by Sisi’s populist rhetoric emphasising social justice, there was also an international dimension driving these changes. Increased commitments to welfare spending on health and education will be described, which alleviated some of the socio-economic impact of its crackdown on Islamic associations. However, it also highlights how these commitments of the Egyptian state have, in real terms, been relatively modest, and therefore, hollow, due to issues of state capacity. The subsequent section will show how the crackdown intersected with these changes in the developmental strategy, with attempts to gain control over Islamic charity. This allowed the state to limit the financial autonomy of Islamic associations, and also provide an opportunity to repurpose these resources towards state-directed projects, as part of its own developmental agenda.

The first indications of increased statism came via the rhetoric of President Sisi. References to ‘social justice’ prompted comparisons with the populism of Nasser as the
‘guardian’ of the nation. This characterisation was supported by Egypt’s new constitution, ratified in 2014, that set minimum spending levels for its budget on health and education. Over the previous decade, public health expenditures had averaged 2% of GDP, placing it towards the bottom of Arab states comparatively. In response, two articles in the 2014 constitution required the government to dedicate sufficient resources to health and education to reach global averages. Article 18 required the government to allocate no less than 3% of GDP to health, with Article 19 specifying that 4% must be spent on education. These modest increases render the comparison with welfarism under Nasser as being somewhat spurious. Nevertheless, in December 2014, Egypt’s Minister of Planning, al-Araby, continued to declare that future economic growth policy would be oriented towards ‘social justice’.

Beginning in 2015, meanwhile, a succession of agreements with international financial institutions provided more financial resources for this aim.

As detailed in chapter three, the role of international financial institutions in Egypt under Mubarak had been one of enforcing the rapid privatization of the state, and a reduction in social spending in return for loans to help balance Egypt’s budget. Yet, during the 2010s, the rhetoric emanating from the IMF and World Bank shifted somewhat, with a less dogmatic view of the state’s provision of social services in the developmental process. It has been noted that since the Arab Spring, the IMF has followed a path that is more mindful of the social aspects of the macroeconomic policies it promotes. Momani and Lanz note that prior to the uprisings, ‘inclusive growth’ was not part of its strategy in dealing with the Arab world and Egypt. In an analysis of IMF communications with Egypt between 2006 and 2013, there

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60 Momani and Lanz, ‘Shifting IMF Policies since the Arab Uprisings’.
61 Momani and Lanz.
were no references to inclusiveness or social protection during transitions in economic markets. In contrast, after 2013, international financial institutions began to promote some state welfare provision to help ease instability caused by economic reforms.

In a 2015 IMF economic survey on Egypt, reform – meaning reduction - in energy and fuel subsidies was welcomed, which, it said, would lead to economic stability and growth.62 Meanwhile, the IMF mission chief for Egypt, Christopher Jarvis, noted that, “to help the poor weather the reforms, the government is increasing cash transfers and spending on health, education, and infrastructure”.63 Also in 2015, at the Egypt Economic Development Conference, the IMF’s then Managing Director Christine Lagarde said that “inclusive growth” was an essential part of Egypt’s future, in which opportunities are provided for all in society, including women, youth, unemployed, and the disabled. “To achieve it,” she declared, “Egypt must nurture its social infrastructure, not just the physical infrastructure.”64 Lagarde continued that “there is also a role for social spending – both increasing it and improving its quality…If implemented efficiently, more spending on health and education could support higher and more inclusive growth, while preserving fiscal sustainability.”65 As we see from Lagarde's remarks, inclusiveness and social protection became clear components of the IMF’s strategy and policy advice in promoting growth. In contrast to its pre-2013 stance, the IMF ‘now makes explicit recommendations to expand health and education spending and services’.66

To secure loans from international financial institutions, Egypt had to undertake significant cuts to its food and energy subsidy system. In the 2012/2013 budget, energy

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63 ‘Egypt: Steadfast Reforms Key for Economic Stability, Jobs, Growth’.
65 ‘Moment of Opportunity - Delivering on Egypt’s Aspirations’.
66 Momani and Lanz, ‘Shifting IMF Policies since the Arab Uprisings’.
subsidies amounted to £120 billion EGY, whilst food subsidies accounted for £32.5 billion EGY of the state’s budget.\(^{67}\) In 2016, the IMF agreed to lend Egypt $12 billion over three years as part of its economic reform programme. In an IMF report looking back at the success of the agreement, it concluded that: ‘Phasing out fuel subsidies created more room in the budget for better-targeted social spending, as well as more investment in health, education, and public infrastructure’\(^{68}\). By the 2014/2015 budget, energy subsidies had dropped to £104.5 billion EGY, falling again to £93 billion EGY and £62 billion EGY the following two years. Spending on health, meanwhile, was at £31.6 billion EGY in 2012/2013, rising to £49 billion EGY by 2015/2016. Education rose from £73 billion EGY to £110 billion EGY in 2015/2016. By the end of the loan period, in the 2018/2019 budget, health spending continued to increase to £98 billion EGY, while education rose to £159 billion EGY.\(^{69}\)

The World Bank adopted a similar approach to Egypt, briefing that reforms enabling private investment in infrastructure would free up public funds for investing in education, health, and social protection.\(^{70}\) It provided the funds for a cash transfer programme aimed at mitigating the potential short-term, negative impacts of the subsidy reforms on the poorest sectors of Egypt’s population. The Takaful (insurance) and Karama (dignity) programmes were launched in 2015 with the support of a $400 million investment from the World Bank.\(^{71}\)

The fund provides family income support, aimed at increasing food consumption and basic nutrition of vulnerable families, alongside health care. The Takaful programme provides a


basic monthly cash transfer of £325 EGY with support for up to 3 children. The Karama programme, meanwhile, provides elderly citizens above 65 years of age, and citizens with severe disabilities, with a monthly pension of £450 EGY. Implemented in conjunction with the MOSS, by 2018 it had covered approximately 10% of Egypt’s population, or just under 10 million citizens. In 2019, the Egyptian government announced its intention to pass a bill amalgamating all of the country’s cash-subsidy schemes into the Takaful and Karama programme.72 Although the areas identified to benefit from these social safety nets come in the governorates with the most poverty, it has been reported that it aimed to fill the void left by closed Brotherhood charities, particularly in the towns and villages of Asyut, Luxor, and Sohag.73 Therefore, it is clear that there is not only a socio-economic calculation to the project, but a political one as well. The co-optation of GS was also further exemplified through the Takaful and Karama programmes through protocols between the associations and the Ministry of Social Solidarity and the Insurance and Pensions Authority.74

The World Bank was also a key actor encouraging Egypt to expand its provision of health insurance into a universal coverage. In 2015, the Bank published a report providing policy recommendations for achieving social justice in the health sector.75 The ‘roadmap’ recommended expanding its services and health insurance to cover the poorest governorates in the country, with the goal of providing universal health coverage that prioritises disadvantaged groups by 2030. In January 2018, Egypt’s parliament approved a new universal health coverage law, attempting to extend comprehensive coverage to every sector of society. The new health insurance system will be mandatory for all Egyptians, and based

on a fee-based system according to income. The World Bank provided an initial $275m to help implement these recommendations, specifically for the poorest 1,000 villages, based mainly in Upper Egypt. Then in May 2019 it provided a $300m loan to support health care in government hospitals.

Further increases in social spending were implemented in pensions. In 2014, the cabinet increased MOSS pensions by 50%, affecting 1.4m families with no other source of income. The state budget financed the £1.2 billion EGY increase in pension payments. In 2017, a further £20 billion EGY increase was announced by the MOSS, increasing pensions by 15%. The increase was in response to price hikes resulting from the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, part of the economic reform programme agreed with the IMF. A new Social Security and Pensions Act in 2019 further ratified increases, with a yearly rise of 15% alongside a minimum pension of 65% of the minimum wage.

As well as international financial institutions, other foreign actors have also supported welfare and developmental initiatives led by the state in Sisi’s Egypt. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have provided billions in aid, with estimates placing the total support from these Gulf countries at nearly $92 billion by 2019. Whilst the bulk of the investments and aid has been used either to buttress Egypt’s struggling

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economy, or to undertake eye-catching mega-projects, substantial sums have also been directed towards social development projects and charitable assistance. The main benefactor in terms of social projects and charitable assistance has been the UAE. In 2013, as the Egyptian government was cracking down on Islamic associations, the UAE announced a package of funds for developmental and charitable projects, amounting to 16.99b dirhams (around $4.6 billion). The vast majority - 14.62 billion dirhams - was spent supporting the foreign currency reserve and petroleum needs. The remainder, however, 2.37 billion dirhams, or around $650 million, was used for a number of social development projects which were completed in 2015. This included the refurbishments of ‘informal’ areas of Cairo, such as Manshiyat Nasser, which lacked basic services, and 36 charity projects, including the building of mosques and schools, and care for orphans. The UAE funding helped construct new housing projects comprising 50,000 houses for low-income families, 79 basic healthcare units specialising in family medicine, and one hundred schools across the country. In Luxor alone, 9 health centres and 28 schools were built, while existing health centres were also renovated. By 2017, a further 4 billion dirhams had been pledged towards 64 development projects across the country, including transport, housing, agriculture, energy, industry, education, and healthcare.

Despite these projects and budget increases, by 2019 the World Bank reported that the education and health sectors had yet to significantly benefit from resources freed up. As a percentage of GDP, the size of the education sector actually decreased from 3.6% in the 2018

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financial year to 2.5% in 2018. Health spending was only at 1.6% of GDP in 2018, meaning that both sectors fell below the constitutional targets set in 2014. Even after the loans from the IMF and World Bank, Egypt’s poverty rate actually increased by 4.7% over 2017 and 2018 to 32.5% of the population. Part of the problem was that public wages actually decreased as part of savings on the budget deficit. An inflation rate at more than 10%, and rising fuel prices concurrent to cutting energy subsidies, meant that the value of wages decreased even further. In 2014, when the first reduction of £30 billion EGY in energy subsidies was announced, a hike in energy prices ranged from 40 to 80%, including gasoline prices, diesel prices, fuel oil prices, natural gas prices, and increases in electricity prices for households and commercial sectors. On the face of it, therefore, compensatory policies were meant to balance out the fiscal changes by providing cash subsidies to ease the transition, but the cost of living had risen to such an extent that the value of those handouts was insufficient. Despite apparent increases in the state’s welfare apparatus, the overall net effect of statist interventions has not resulted in a vastly improved scenario for those in need.

7.5 Redeploying Islamic charity for statist projects

This chapter has so far demonstrated the increased levels of statism in controls over the Islamic movement, and the increase in statist projects as part of the government’s developmental agenda. This section will show that these distinct processes are also interconnected. The enforcement of statist controls as part of the crackdown on Islamic

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90 Mossallam.
associations necessitated limiting their organisational autonomy, but this required further
measures to limit the autonomous sources of financing, so crucial for sustaining the activities
of Islamic associations. Zakat, the third of the five pillars of Islam, compels Muslims to
donate 2.5% of their yearly salary to the poor, and is a crucial resource for the operation of
Islamic charity. This section details the Egyptian government’s attempt to statize the
collection and distribution of this religious endowment, and also shows how it attempted to
channel this vast resource towards statist projects associated with the developmental agenda
pursued under Sisi.

Shortly after the seizure of Islamic associations in December 2013, Minister of
Awqaf, Dr. Muhammad Mukhtar Goma‘a, made an announcement that the funds of all
Islamic associations were to be monitored, both in their spending and collection.91 The aim
was to prevent mosques being used for the collection of “illegal” zakat and ṣadaqah – a
voluntary charitable donation - for the benefit of Islamic associations. In the Qur’an, Surat al-
Tawba (9.60) specifies that zakat can be used ‘only for the poor and for the needy’. Yet the
verse also includes a more ambiguous reference to those engaged in ‘the cause of Allah’. The
result has been that Islamic scholars have taken interpretations in stricter or more flexible
terms. Official religious institutions have tended to provide interpretations that suit the
Egyptian government’s purpose on a specific matter.92 In the context of the crackdown on
Islamic associations, these groups were accused of the politicisation of zakat, and thus
viewed as having violated the terms set out in the Qur’an. The response was collaboration
between the MOSS and the regional offices of the Ministry of Awqaf to inspect the
collections of alms in mosques across the country. Under the chairmanship of shaykh

91 ‘al-awqāf tu’akid ahmi a al-jam’iyyat al-khayr‘iyya wa taḥadhir min tawżīfa hizbīan’, al-Masry al-Yawm, 3
January 2014.
92 Mona Atia, ‘Islamic Approaches to Development: A Case Study of Zakat, Ṣadaqa and Qurd al Hassan in
Contemporary Egypt’ (8th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Center for Islamic
Economics and Finance, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Qatar Foundation, 2011),
Muhammad Abdel Razek Omar, Head of the Religious Sector of the Ministry of Awqaf, a task force was formed, which was responsible for monitoring mosques, da’wa lessons, and prayers in all governorates in the republic, and for preventing any group or association from distributing leaflets, soliciting or collecting donations.  

The enforcement of restricting Islamic associations’ access to religious alms contained a coercive element, provided by the security services. In April 2015, security services were deployed in Giza to forcibly remove 75 donation boxes from inside mosques and 11 boxes situated outside. In Alexandria in October 2015, 7 donation boxes were seized from mosques in the governorate, followed by 13 in November. A more targeted campaign against al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya was also carried out in November 2015, targeting 49 mosques and 39 zawiyas associated with the group. These examples are indicative of the state’s strategy of preventing independent access to religious alms by Islamic associations. However, as the only examples discovered among the available sources, it is not clear to what extent the state’s resources were deployed to support it, and whether they represent part of a systematic campaign across the country. A question mark, therefore, remains about the state’s capacity to fully realise its stated intentions. What followed, however, was an attempt to go beyond merely restricting Islamic associations’ access to religious alms, by statizing its collection and distribution.

Part of the Egyptian government’s attempts to curtail Islamic associations’ access to an autonomous source of funding has been the creation of new officially-sanctioned institutions. Established in 2014, Bayt al-Zakat is an ostensibly independent body that oversees the collection and disbursement of zakat donations across the country. Its statutes define its organisational structure as being independent from the government, under the supervision of al-Azhar, and headed by Grand Shaykh Ahmed al-Tayyib. Considering the way al-Azhar has been incorporated into the state’s official religious bureaucracy since the Nasser era, the extent to which it can be considered a truly independent organisation is highly dubious. For example, the decree to formally institute Bayt al-Zakat was announced by President Sisi in September 2014, with its first meeting being held on 18 November, 2014, led by al-Tayyib. The board of directors includes al-Tayyib, a General Secretary, the Minister of Awqaf, representatives of other ministries, as well as a team of experts in administration, information technology, economics, and other fields. The strong representation of state actors is indicative of how it can be viewed as a state organ. External representation on the board also emphasises the state connection. The general secretary of the Kuwaiti Bayt al-Zakat, a semi-independent government institution on which Egypt’s version is modelled, is on the board. Further charitable initiatives established by Gulf monarchies are also represented, including the UAE’s Shaykh Khalifa Foundation, established by its president Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, and Bahrain’s Royal Charity Foundation, established by its king, Hamad bin Isa al-

Khalifa. The establishment of Bayt al-Zakat was, therefore, modelled on the governmental institution for collecting and distributing zakat in Kuwait, whilst the body would receive guidance from other Gulf states which had established strict oversight over charitable endowments within their own states.

Bayt al-Zakat’s method of collection was also announced following the body’s first meeting, with the opening of separate bank accounts for zakat funds and for ṣadaqah.\(^{102}\) Besides using bank branches to transfer donations or wire transfer, the body’s secretary general, Dr. Safwat al-Nahas, elaborated on other methods of payment, such as via a dedicated telephone line, or by SMS, with the price of one message costing £10 EGY, or through manual collection at its headquarters inside Al-Azhar.\(^{103}\) By encouraging these methods of payment, Bayt al-Zakat appeared to be encouraging a change in the behaviour of the practice of zakat, from traditional forms of informal, in-person giving, to a more electronic and monitorable form. In 2015, its first year of operation, Bayt al-Zakat revealed that its budget for the period from February to September was roughly £350 million EGY (around $20m).\(^{104}\) During this period, it revealed it had received payments in the millions from a number of businessmen, while the Bahraini Royal Institution and UAE had also made significant contributions.\(^{105}\) It is estimated that around 75% of zakat donations are made during Ramadan, which fell across June and July in 2015. Therefore, although this figure refers only to an 8-month period, the full accounts of this first year were unlikely to be substantially more than this £350 million EGY figure. By 2019, the yearly budget of Bayt al-

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Zakat had more than doubled to reach £800 million EGY.\(^{106}\) Although this increase is significant, it nevertheless remains a fraction of the estimated total figure of previous zakat donations in Egypt, with estimates of £17 billion EGY in zakat every year (some estimates go as high as £60 billion EGY).\(^{107}\) It might be expected that the statization of zakat, a typically local practice involving large swathes of the population, would enable the state to increase its ‘infrastructural power’ and ‘capacity’ to ‘penetrate civil society’, by inserting itself as the collector and distributor of this vast resource.\(^{108}\) Yet the fact that large portions of Bayt al-Zakat’s budget have come via the business community and external actors suggests that this has not been the outcome. Nevertheless, when analysing Bayt al-Zakat’s projects, regardless of the source of the funds, they have been used to support statist projects.

The nature of the projects undertaken with funds from Bayt al-Zakat include those charitable in nature, as well as others focused on economic development, reflecting the state’s wider developmental strategy. Traditional charitable handouts provide £209m EGY monthly, benefiting more than 81,000 of Egypt’s poor.\(^{109}\) However, Bayt al-Zakat’s statutes also indicate that part of its strategy is building a strong economy by using charitable funds for small income-generating development, establishing local projects aimed at reducing unemployment in some professions and trades, as well as for other educational, health and social projects.\(^{110}\) The use of zakat for developmental projects has been debated on the grounds it was not always possible to track the recipients to determine if they were needy Muslims. Yet successive Egyptian Grand Muftis have provided flexible interpretations, allowing for donations directly to the Egyptian Food Bank, as well as for the building of


\(^{107}\) Moussa and al-Ghareeb.


\(^{110}\) Ali, ‘shaykh al-”azhar yitarās ijtimā” majlis “amnā” bayt al-zakāa wa al-ṣudiqāt al-maṣrī’.
hospitals. Bayt al-Zakat represents a continuation of this trend. For example, £20 million EGY was used in 2015 for a joint project between Zakat House and the Holding Company for Drinking Water and Wastewater, to install home connections for water in several poor villages in the Sharqiya, Sohag, Asyut and Minya governorates. Also in 2015, Fouad announced that Bayt al-Zakat would allocate £100 million EGY as a first stage for treating people infected with Hepatitis C, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health. Funds have also been using to build more than 1,000 social housing units. Attempts to commandeer zakat funds, therefore, intersect with the developmental agenda of the Egyptian government. In this way, as Khalil and Dill argue, the Egyptian government ‘is creating alternative avenues for resource mobilisation, through charity and business donations, to provide welfare services and ensure the continuation of subsidies, housing projects, development of slum areas, and other statist interventions.’

The establishment of Bayt al-Zakat is thus a cursory attempt to create a semi-official institution to retrieve a proportion of zakat donations from private hands, and in the process, use it to assist in the developmental initiatives of the state, thereby easing their own reliance on civil society organisations.

7.5.2 Tahya Masr

A further initiative was established in 2014 that created ‘alternative avenues for resource mobilisation’ and was also promoted as an outlet for the collection and distribution of

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113 el-Hoty, ‘’amīn ‘ām bayt al-zakāa: 350 milīūn junayh al-mizāniyya fī 8 shuḥūr’.
114 Ali, “bayt al-zakāa wa al-ṣaddāqāt”: musā’adāt shahriyya l-’akthar min 81 ”alf mustaḥaq li-l-zakāa”.
religious alms. The Tahya Masr (Long Live Egypt) fund is the president’s own personal charity, and was formed for the purpose of funding projects to help boost the economy. As he announced its establishment on Egyptian television, Sisi pleaded for ordinary citizens and businessmen alike to donate to the fund, specifying a target of £10 billion EGY, and stating that he himself had donated half his salary. In 2016, Sisi launched a call asking Egyptians to donate £1 EGY per day by sending a text from their mobile phones. He said if just 10 million citizens participated, then it would generate £300 million EGY per month, amounting to £4 billion EGY per year (roughly $500 million). A 2016 poll suggested only 6% of Egyptians had taken him up on his plea. This appeared to be confirmed by Muhammad Ashmawy, executive director of the Tahya Masr Fund, who acknowledged the volume of messages received through mobile networks amounted to only 1.4 million, raising a total of £4 million EGY. As with Bayt al-Zakat, bank accounts were set up for donations, as well as an option to donate via the fund’s website. Egypt’s official religious institutions, meanwhile, were enlisted to add a veneer of legitimacy to Tahya Masr as being a worthy recipient of citizens’ zakat donations. During Ramadan, Al-Azhar, Dar al-Ifta, and the Ministry of Awqaf all released statements imploring Egyptians to donate their zakat - of which around 75% is donated during the holy month of fasting – to the president’s fledgling charity. This further indicates the state strategy of redeploying Islamic charity towards the state’s economic and developmental initiatives.

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By February 2016, Tahya Masr had received £4.7 billion EGY, with £1 billion EGY of that sum coming from the Egyptian armed forces. Much of the remaining sum was received via the business community.121 These interests may partly explain why much of Tahya Masr’s work has been directed towards large-scale ‘mega-projects’, such as the construction of a suspension bridge across the Nile.122 However, Tahya Masr has also included social projects, reflecting the developmental foci of the state. The fund’s executive head stated that the fund would embark on several social service projects in healthcare and urban planning, working alongside governmental institutions, resourced by a combination of charity and investments.123 In 2016, Sisi himself argued that state-led development projects could resolve the pressures the country faced, urging collaboration between local banks, businesses, the armed forces, municipal authorities and citizens, under the auspices of national development funds, such as the Tahya Masr fund.124

Tahya Masr has undertaken several social development projects nationally, in the areas of housing and health. One of its flagship health initiatives was a national project to eradicate hepatitis C and provide free treatment to anyone with the illness.125 In terms of housing, it announced the completion of a reconstruction project of 7,264 houses in 232 villages in 15 governorates, at the cost of £200 million EGY.126 In addition, 500,000 new

housing units were completed in April 2017. Further efforts by the Tahya Misr Fund to face slum issues included the development of infrastructure and educational and service facilities for ten additional villages in the governorates of Asyut, Sohag and Qena, serving 75,000 citizens and with a funding of £213 million EGY. In 2017, £100 million EGY was allocated to an emergency fund affiliated with the Ministry of Manpower.\(^{127}\) In cooperation with major civil development foundations, Tahya Masr provided funding of £250 million EGY to the Nasser Social Bank to support micro-financing projects.\(^ {128}\) These examples show how the appropriation of charity and business donations by the state was redirected towards the state’s development projects.

Tahya Masr’s funds were also directed towards state-pliant civil society organisations engaged in welfare and development projects. This appeared to re-establish the predominance of key associations known to be close to government circles during the Mubarak era, after the brief period under the FJP in which Brotherhood associations had enjoyed a privileged status, as discussed in chapter six. In 2018 Tahya Masr launched a charitable campaign to distribute free foodstuffs to poor areas in various governorates, in cooperation with Dar al-Orman, the Misr El Kheir Foundation, and the Egyptian Food Bank.\(^ {129}\) Dar al-Orman also cooperated with Tahya Masr to develop some of the poorest villages in 15 governorates - Fayoum, Beni Suef, Sohag, Minya, Sharqiyya, Qena, Buhayra, Kafr al-Shaykh, Asyut, Luxor, Aswan, North Sinai, Dakahlia, and Gharbiyya – by providing better housing options in rural areas.\(^ {130}\) The Egyptian Food Bank was criticised after pictures were posted online of its volunteers packing food into cardboard boxes bearing the logo of President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi’s economic


The Bank later acknowledged that it had agreed a deal with Tahya Masr worth £10 million EGY ($1.3m) to buy and distribute 200,000 discounted Ramadan boxes in poor areas. A 2018 report by Egypt’s Ministry of Planning also states that as well as the Food Bank, Tahya Masr also coordinates with the charity Misr el-Kheir to deliver food in poor areas across the country.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, GS signed cooperation protocols with the Ministries of Social Solidarity and Health over the delivery of social service projects. But the Islamic association also entered in several agreements with Tahya Masr in the same areas. One collaboration seen GS work with Tahya Masr to provide housing for 100 families from North Sinai forced to reside in Ismailiya due to conflict. Others have included the establishment of nurseries and equipping new GS medical centres in Upper and Lower Egypt. GS acted as a distributor of humanitarian provision provided as part of a Tahya Masr scheme, which included 200,000 chickens and 60,000 cartons of foodstuffs. It also participated in several other health and housing initiatives launched by Tahya Masr.

Establishing these state-preferred associations as an acceptable outlet for charitable donations was given support by pro-government media outlets. State-owned print and broadcast media in Egypt began to include increasing numbers of advertisements for Dar el-Orman and Misr el-Kheir. During a TV programme on the satellite channel Sada el-Balad – a private yet heavily pro-regime broadcaster - the journalist Ahmed Moussa warned...
Egyptians not to donate money to Islamic associations, but to “reliable” sources, such as Tahya Masr, Misr el-Kheir, and Dar al-Orman. These associations have long been linked with government circles. Ali Goma’a, Grand Mufti and head of Dar al-Ifta for 10 years under Mubarak before departing in 2013, supervises both Misr el-Kheir and the Egyptian Food Bank, whilst also serving as the more recent figurehead of the Brotherhood’s seized network of hospitals, the Islamic Medical Association. Dar al-Orman has also been described as choosing a strategy of ‘ideological co-optation’ vis-à-vis the regime, opening up access to funds in its charity and development activities. It was founded by two influential businessmen, with the business community driving business-skills and income-generation as important parts of their work. Dar al-Orman ‘has both welcomed and invited participation of the Egyptian government in its projects.’

Another key actor has both provided significant donations and also acted as a partner in the distribution of charitable donations: the Egyptian military. As well as aforementioned donations to the fund upon its establishment, the military further contributed £1 billion EGY to the Nour al-Hayat charity to provide prevention and treatment of eye impairment at military hospitals. In December 2016, trucks belonging to the armed forces distributed 8 million cartons of food bearing the Tahya Masr slogan across governorates at subsidised prices. During Ramadan the following year, millions more boxes were distributed at

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140 Sarah Elizabeth Yerkes, 'Pluralism, Co-Optation and Capture: Navigating the Civil Society Arena in the Arab World' (Doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University, 2012), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/557597/Yerkes_georgetown_0076D_11766.pdf.
141 Yerkes, 170–78.
subsidised prices, carrying the labels of the Armed Forces’ Supply Authority and that of Tahya Masr.\textsuperscript{144} The military has also coordinated with state ministries to distribute food and other services to citizens. Also, in 2016, the military joined with the Ministry of Health to distribute 30 million packages of infant milk at half price to pharmacies.\textsuperscript{145} In May 2018, it coordinated with the Ministry of Supply across various governorates during Ramadan, providing 1.7 million food cartons alongside 1 million from the ministry.

This increasing role of the military has developed more widely in food distribution networks in direct response to Sisi’s political directives. The National Service Products Organisation, established under Sadat to achieve self-sufficiency for the armed forces, manufactures military and civilian products. In 2016, its sale of food to civilian markets increased exponentially, providing 250 tons of meat and commodities daily at reduced prices through 700 outlets.\textsuperscript{146} In 2017, its director claimed it provided local markets with 300,000 tons of meat, poultry, cooking oil, through both its own outlets as well as those of the Ministry of Supply.\textsuperscript{147} This shows how the area of food distribution – identified as a particularly important area for the FJP-led government – has seen an increasing role for the military in solving Egypt’s socio-economic problems. In January 2019, 600,000 food packages were given as a religious donation to the residents of 18 “development communities” under construction by the Armed Forces’ Engineering Authority in north and south Sinai.\textsuperscript{148} These housing units were equipped with appliances donated with the help of the Misr al-Kheir association. Yazigh has observed that these giveaways have overlapped with periods of economic crisis, such as increases in fuel prices or devaluations of the

\textsuperscript{147} Sayigh, 275.
\textsuperscript{148} Sayigh, 252.
Egyptian pound. The coordination between Tahya Masr and the military, therefore, not only illustrates further the statization of the collection and distribution of charitable resources, but also represents a political calculation to avoid social protest and political instability.

Bayt al-Zakat and Tahya Masr demonstrate a desire to have state-controlled institutions overseeing the practice of charity from the point of collection through to its disbursement. In doing so, they aim to deny space to private Islamic charities with political affiliations, by occupying that space themselves with an extension of the state’s presence in the charitable sector. This represents a coordinated effort by Bayt al-Zakat, Tahya Masr, the armed forces, as well as national charities known for being close to the government, including the Egyptian Food Bank, Misr el-Kheir, and Dar el-Orman. Khalil and Dill deem this the creation of ‘alternative avenues for resource mobilisation’, in which ‘the state is no longer depending solely on the official budget, but rather is shifting the burden of social spending to Egyptians of all classes, who are all now encouraged to donate every penny to Tahya Masr for the betterment of the nation’.150

7.6 Conclusions

The crackdown on Islamic social institutions in Sisi’s Egypt has seen the state play an increasingly direct role in its management strategy. Although the breadth of the crackdown, stretching beyond the Brotherhood, was motivated by the gains Egypt’s Islamic movement was able to make during the transitional period, the regime’s strategy of control under Sisi indicates that the state has been ‘brought back in’ to a greater extent than that witnessed in recent decades under Mubarak. This is demonstrated by the attempts to corporatise relations

149 Sayigh, 252.
with Islamic associations, placing restrictions over their organisational and financial autonomy, as well as nationalisations of a host of Islamic service-providing social institutions. Attempts to limit the autonomy of Islamic associations have entailed not only a strategy of control over the associations themselves, but also over their funding avenues, by creating new officially-sanctioned state institutions for the collection and distribution of religious charity. This indicates increased direct state control over this process, whereby resource mobilization of charity is channelled and directed by the state itself, in state developmental and charitable projects via pliant civil society partners. Corporatisation has domesticated two of the country’s most prominent – and politically active during the transitional period – Islamic associations, AS and GS, to play this role, whilst Dar al-Orman, the Egyptian Food Bank, and Misr el-Kheir have become the preferred outlets for this state-led charity after the interlude of FJP-government had placed Brotherhood associations in a preeminent position. Furthermore, this campaign has taken place within the wider context of a political economy in which the state’s role in service provision is no longer taboo among international financial institutions. Therefore, increasingly direct state control over the use of religious charity is consistent with a state increasing its own service-providing infrastructure, and lessening its reliance on private actors to provide services, in order to maintain social stability. Under Sisi, therefore, the state has not only been brought back in to pre-revolution levels in its control of Islamic associations and the service providing realm, but has also been extending in terms of its management of Islamic associations, and its direction of religious charity and service provision, through an extension of its infrastructural capacity. As will be shown in the next chapter, the extension of direct state control did not apply only to ‘self-organizational’ institutions in the Islamic movement, but also ‘public-sphere’ religious institutions engaged in discursive activities. These too reflect attempts to bring the state back in under Sisi.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE CRACKDOWN ON ISLAMIC ‘PUBLIC SPHERE’ INSTITUTIONS UNDER SISI

On 3 July, 2013, the then Minister of Defence, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, in a televised address to the Egyptian people announced the removal of deposed President Mohamed Morsi and the suspension of the constitution. As he delivered his speech, Sisi was flanked by the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayyib. The presence of the head of Egypt’s pre-eminent and semi-official religious institution was indicative of the increased role for “official” Islam in Sisi’s Egypt and the management of the religious sphere. After assuming the presidency, Sisi called for a “revolution” in religious practice to counter what he called the threat of extremism.1 His vision, however, was not of a revolution of popular mobilisation among a religious constituency, but something more akin to a top-down ‘passive revolution’ in the Gramscian sense, featuring a government-directed process of change.2 With the state having moved to increase its control over private Islamic social institutions, a concurrent process targeting private religious institutions was initiated, following a similar statist rationale, through the empowerment of official religious institutions. If the crackdown on Islamic social institutions reflected Lewis’ ‘self-organizational’ side of civil society, then the crackdown on its religious institutions reflected its ‘public sphere’ side.3 For Islamic associations, the mosque represents the key site which enables the combination of its ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities. This chapter argues that to prevent these forms of Islamic activism

2 For an extended application of Gramscian theory on the Egyptian Uprisings and aftermath, see Brecht De Smet, Gramsci on Tahrir Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt (London: Pluto Press, 2016).
3 Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’.

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from overlapping, the Egyptian state under Sisi has attempted to extend its institutional control over private religious institutions, and the discourses espoused within them, to deny autonomous spaces for Islamic associations to operate.

This chapter identifies four main areas in the crackdown on Islamic associations’ religious institutions since 2013, with two sections addressing institutional control, and two addressing ideological control. Firstly, it shows attempts to extend state control over mosques, a process of nationalisation that reflects the statist encroachment over Islamic social institutions, detailed in the previous chapter. The second part of the state’s strategy has been to outlaw the provision of preaching and sermons by preachers without certification from state-sanctioned institutes, with only state-certified preachers being allowed to deliver sermons. In the third section, I show how the three main official religious institutions of al-Azhar, the Ministry of Awqaf, and Dar al-Ifta have been deployed to “renew religious discourse” by organising several initiatives based around the concept of wasatiyya, or moderation in Islam. Finally, the attempt to standardise the topic and texts of Friday sermons aimed to legitimate regime policies. Taken together, the state has tried to position these official institutions as ‘the sole interpreters of religious doctrine’. These measures aim to extinguish any source of private and organised religious activism, by controlling not only religious sites as physical institutions, but also the discourses transmitted within them. But, as will be shown, the extent to which this comprehensive plan to statize religious institutions, and control the discourses transmitted within them, has enabled Sisi’s regime to achieve hegemonic control over the religious sphere is open to question. Despite this, government officials continued to project the attainment of these aims discursively through public pronouncements.

The mosque, Gaffney notes, can be viewed as ‘both an institution and an idea’. Although Islamic revivalism in the 19th century extended activism beyond the walls of the mosque, it has not been confined to a ‘reserved ritual sanctuary’, but became ‘even more prominent in their encompassing activist program’. Mosques are, therefore, multifunctional in the way that they provide ‘a place for worship, learning, and mobilization’. Drawing on social movement theory, Wiktorowicz credits them as providing ‘resource mobilization’ for Islamic movements, enabling individual motivations to be transformed into organised contention. He explains, ‘[w]ithin the physical structure of the mosque, Islamists offer sermons, lessons, and study groups to propagate the movement message, organise collective action, and recruit new members. Mosques also provide an organic, national network that connects communities of activists across space’. The mosque is therefore the primary site through which Islamic associations are able to combine the ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public-sphere’ sides of civil society activism, engaging in social welfare provision as well as Islamic teachings. Enforcing state control over mosques as physical sites has, therefore, been a central component of the crackdown on Egypt’s Islamic movement.

Many of the gains achieved under Mubarak, in exerting state control over ‘public sphere’ religious institutions, had been significantly undermined during the transitional period. Islamic associations had seized the opportunity to expand their activities and compete

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with the state over control of mosques. However, accompanying the crackdown on social institutions, detailed in chapter seven, was a parallel campaign targeting the religious institutions affiliated with Islamic associations. In November 2013, Awqaf minister Dr. Muhammad Mukhtar Goma’a announced that the boards of 100,000 mosques would be dissolved, inviting mosques to reapply to the ministry’s regional directorates for review and approval. In effect, this ended the short-lived Decree No.75 of 2013, implemented by the FJP and discussed in chapter six, to allow worshippers to elect their own “Mosque Development Boards”. This initial announcement gave the pretence that some degree of autonomy would be maintained in the formation of mosque boards of directors. But by January 2016, the Ministry of Awqaf had announced its intention to directly select all boards.\(^9\) Placing control over the hierarchical structure of mosques with the ministry mirrors the corporatist controls over Islamic associations identified in chapter seven. In monitoring and selecting boards, the Ministry’s regional directorates acted as intermediaries in order to place restrictions on organisational autonomy. The FJP’s legislation had sought to institutionalise societal gains made during the transitional period, and enshrine in law greater autonomy of mosques with a shift in their control from the state to society.\(^10\) Undoing this decree and placing control over mosque boards with the Ministry was an important first step in reclaiming many of the mosques lost to private hands during the transitional period.

On 11 March, 2014, the Ministry of Awqaf announced its intention to annex (al-ḍam) mosques affiliated with the Brotherhood which, they argued, had been exploited by militants to spread extremist ideas. The breadth of the annexation plan was scaled up with Decree No.64, which declared that all mosques and zawiyas (small, neighbourhood prayer spaces)

\(^10\) Although the FJP’s move facilitated greater societal autonomy, it did not necessarily enable greater pluralization of the Islamic movement as the process of elections would overly benefit the Brotherhood and other organised Islamic associations.
were to be transferred to the control of the Ministry. The Ministry’s Central Administration of Mosque Affairs was tasked with developing a technical plan for implementing the decision, with regional directorates being ordered to redistribute workers in each governorate to ensure no mosque remained outside of state control. However, extending absolute control over mosques in Egypt would be a monumental undertaking. Official estimates place the total number in Egypt around 110,000, with a further 30,000 zawiyas. According to the Ministry of Awqaf, the number actually under some level of state control, with an imam in direct employment in 2014, was around 55,000. This would leave at least 55,000 mosques requiring a staff employed by the state.

The operation and maintenance of mosques is a costly undertaking, requiring a staff of between two and five workers, which might include a general worker, the muezzin (prayer caller), and the imam, as well as general running costs such as electricity and water. The most recent precedent in Egypt for such a plan reveals the scale of the task. Recall Mubarak’s presidential decree of 1993, discussed in chapter three, declaring the intention to nationalise 10,000 mosques per year. In the first year, only around a quarter of that figure was hired as imams from al-Azhar’s preaching institutes due to budget constraints and imam shortages. Although 2,500 is not an insignificant figure, it represents a ratio that would take decades to achieve the stated aim of complete state control. Therefore, to avoid the shortfalls of Mubarak’s efforts, significant investments would have to be made in Egypt’s religious bureaucracy to realise the levels of increase required.

Under the umbrella of ‘Youth, Culture, and Religious Affairs’ is the state budget for ‘Religious and Community Services’, which is divided between al-Azhar, the Ministry of Awqaf, Administration for the Propagation of Religion (da’wa), and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs. Table 1 shows the increase in spending on wages and provision of services for the Ministry of Awqaf and Propagation of Religion each year from 2010 until 2017. It shows that in the final budget of Mubarak’s reign (2010/2011) just under £3b EGY (approx. £150m GBP) total was spent in these two areas. As might be expected, a substantial increase took place under the Morsi government in the budget of 2012/2013, where spending reaches just under £5b EGY, representing a 70% increase from 2010/2011. Another substantial increase then takes place in the first budget of Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab’s government for 2014/2015, with an increase of 65% on even the Morsi government’s spending with a total just over £8b EGY (approx. £408m GBP). By the budget of 2016/2017, spending on the Ministry of Awqaf and Propagation of Religion had increased by a staggering 212% from that under the final Mubarak government. These figures are relatively modest when compared with the amount spent on health (£37.2b EGY) and education (£92.3b EGY) in
2014/2015. Yet, the rate of increase for the Ministry of Awqaf was much greater than that enjoyed by these other ministries, 21% for health and 9.8% for education, from the previous year. These figures, therefore, demonstrate a significant increase in, and emphasis on, the state’s religious bureaucracy in the first three budgets under the Sisi presidency.

It is not possible to state conclusively the exact number of mosques incorporated into the Ministry’s umbrella as part of the annexation process. Reports tend to centre on aspects of the policy itself and strategies used to fulfil it, rather than providing specific figures. However, in newspaper interviews, Ministry officials often refer to the total number of mosques affiliated with it. In a 2018 al-Araby al-Jadid report, a Ministry official placed the total number at more than 80,000. If correct, this would represent a substantial increase of at least 25,000 since 2014, and would go some way towards realising the aims of the annexation policy, particularly if the rate of acquisition were to continue at a yearly rate of 6,250, as this figure suggests. There are reasons, however, to doubt both the total figure as well as the yearly rate of acquisition continuing at such a level. Firstly, on 5 November 2014, the Ministry of Awqaf announced the closure of 3,400 mosques because their maintenance costs exceeded their budgets. At the same time that the Ministry was proclaiming its annexation of all Egypt’s private mosques, it was forced to close thousands of its existing mosques due to financial constraints. Secondly, by the end of 2019 a Ministry of Awqaf representative reported to the Egyptian parliament that only 4,258 workers had been appointed to mosques since 2016. This figure does not discredit the possibility that thousands of mosques were

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incorporated between 2014 and 2016, but it does indicate that the rate decreased significantly from 2016 onwards. However, in April 2016, Awqaf Minister Mukhtar Goma’a referred to an even lower figure than 2014, of around 53,000, suggesting that even the hypothesis of a huge increase during the initial years of the annexation plan is open to doubt.\textsuperscript{18} When looking in more detail at specific annexations between 2014 and 2016, an increase in the tens of thousands is even more questionable.

Although figures on the overall numbers of mosques were not available, several reports do refer to the annexation of mosques affiliated with Islamic associations. Outside of the Brotherhood, for whom numbers of affiliated mosques are unknown, roughly 14,000 mosques were under the control of four Islamic associations. Al-Gam'iyya al-Shar'iyya possessed the largest share with 6,000, Ansar al-Sunna had 4,000, 3,000 were affiliated to al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya, and 1,000 to the lesser-known Cairo-based association, Da’wat al-Haq.\textsuperscript{19} In the first move to exert control over their mosques, senior al-Azhar shaykhs were deployed to assume preaching duties at the Cairo headquarters of both al-Gam'iyya al-Shar'iyya and Ansar al-Sunna, and at the al-Galaa mosque in Ramses and the Tawhid mosque in Abdeen.\textsuperscript{20} Declaring control over the main sites for each group appeared to be particularly significant for the Ministry’s intentions. However, an examination of the subsequent rate of annexation of each group’s stock of mosques reveals a more modest picture. On 21 June, 2014, the Ministry of Awqaf directorate in the Qalyubia governorate announced it had taken over 341 mosques affiliated with various Islamic associations, 236 of

which belonged to al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya.\textsuperscript{21} But by November 2015, this number had only increased to 609, alongside 407 mosques under Ansar al-Sunna, and 70 mosques under the control of Da‘wat al-Haq.\textsuperscript{22} As for al-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya, 150 of their mosques had been confiscated in Alexandria with the closure of a further 500 zawiyas linked to them.\textsuperscript{23} The annexation process continued into 2016, with court decisions ratifying the annexation of 75 al-Da‘wa al-Salafiyya mosques and 21 zawiyas in the Buhayra governorate.\textsuperscript{24} According to these reports, only 10\% of mosques affiliated with Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya had been confiscated in a near 18-month period. This ratio of incorporation, particularly among the mosques of associations seemingly prioritised in the annexation plan, suggests it has fallen some way short of the target of complete state control.

By directly administering mosques, the state can increase its own religious bureaucracy, a process that can be understood, in the context of authoritarian states, as an extension of ‘infrastructural’ power. However, as has been shown, despite there being a stated process of complete state control over these institutions, insufficient capacity and resources suggest that these stated goals have yet to be realised. Consequently, with the inability to extend ‘infrastructural’ power, states may increasingly rely on ‘despotic’ power. The policy towards zawiyas is more indicative of the latter form of power. These small ‘corner’ or neighbourhood mosques, defined as less than 80 square metres, are often found in the basements of residential buildings, and are estimated to number around 30,000. Awqaf Minister Goma‘a announced that their opening hours would be restricted to prayer times, and


they were also forbidden from holding Friday prayers, under the pretext of “protecting young people from extremism”. Reports on its enforcement were most acute in Alexandria, where the stringent rules were subjected to legal challenge. However, in February 2015 a court upheld the Minister’s decision, citing a legal ruling from Dar al-Ifta, deeming the decision to be compatible with Islamic law.

The closure of zawiyyas is another example of undoing the policies implemented under the FJP’s Awqaf minister, Talaat al-Afifi. In one of his first moves al-Afifi had allowed such mosques to open throughout the day. Under Mubarak, mosque opening times were restricted to prayer times and Friday sermons, with the security services enforcing closures during other times to prevent the potential organisation of politically-minded Islamists within their confines. In part, therefore, the Ministry’s policy towards zawiyyas attempted to restore the balance of control towards the state, after the interlude of the FJP had enabled greater societal autonomy over their operation. In the context of the annexation policy, restrictions on opening times, and preventing Friday sermons, would not require the financial and human resources needed for larger mosques; yet the policy could also prevent their use by organised Islamist networks. Relying on this strategy entailed an exclusionary form of ‘despotic’ power through surveillance and repression, rather than the infrastructural form that engages society with the state through institutions.

Further cases of more exclusionary forms of control based on surveillance can also be identified. The regional directorates of Awqaf were ordered to carry out inspections of the libraries of mosques to look for “extremist material”. In the Qena governorate, five mosques belonging to al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya and al-Gam'iyya al-Shar'iyya were annexed, following

26 Muhammad, ‘masajid al-mahrusa taht hasar al-baa’. 
the discovery of books related to the Muslim Brotherhood. Hundreds of books were seized from inside mosque libraries, with titles including, “The Masterwork of the Ikhwan”, “Explaining the Doctrine of the Sunnis and Community of Ibn al-Uthaymeen”, and “In the Shade of the Qur’an” by Sayyid Qutb. This report indicates that the Ministry of Awqaf had resumed its collaborative role with state security, as highlighted in chapter four. In addition, these regional directorates again performed a corporatist role on behalf of the state. In another example of surveillance, Ramadan 2015 saw a pilot project with the installation of CCTV cameras in mosques to assist officials in their supervision of mosques. Although the report appears to be anecdotal, as it is not clear the extent to which the project was ever rolled out across the country, it represents another example of surveillance in place of direct administration of mosques.

Doubts over the Ministry of Awqaf’s ability to monitor Egypt’s mosques and ensure they remain free from outside influence are also indicated by the paltry resources allocated for supervision, itself a demonstration of despotic rather than infrastructural power. In November 2014, Egypt’s Minister of Justice, Mahfouz Saber, approved the request of Awqaf Minister Goma’a, to grant the status of “judicial seizure” to 140 inspectors from the ministry. This decision empowered the inspectors to arrest individuals contravening Law no.51 of 2014, regulating the practice of public speaking and religious lessons in mosques. The ruling allows the inspectors to seize mosques found to be without the required qualifications, and for using the platform for political or electoral purposes. Those with judicial prerogatives have the right to prevent violators and hand them over to the Public Prosecution to take the measures stipulated by the law. The law provides for the offender to

28 Wirtschafter and el-Tohamy, ‘Egypt Bans Sermons from Informal Mosques over Ramadan’.
be punished by imprisonment for a period of no less than three months and not exceeding a year, and a fine of no less than twenty thousand pounds ($2,800 dollars) and not exceeding fifty thousand pounds. Despite the ruling, the human resources seem highly inadequate, considering these officers, numbering only 140, would be responsible for the supervision of tens of thousands of mosques.

The state’s combination of ‘infrastructural’ and ‘despotic’ power, in its policies towards mosques, was also reflected in a rather symbolic move to remove any physical connection between mosques and Islamic associations. In June 2014, Muhammad Abdel-Raziq, Assistant to the Ministry of Awqaf for Mosque Affairs, declared that the signs of Islamic associations were to be removed from the doors and walls of mosques, and replaced with those of the Ministry of Awqaf. However, there is no indication from the reports that this process to remove signage was accompanied by an actual transfer in the administration of those mosques from private to state control. The relatively low number of association mosques annexed over the following 18 months supports this assumption. This is reminiscent of the symbolic politics identified by Lisa Wedeen in Hafez al-Asad’s Syria, where his loyalty-producing regime did not require citizens to believe the regime’s fictions, but to act ‘as if’ they do. In this case, in the absence of the actual control of the mosque by the state, the replacement of the signage gives the appearance of that process and, invites both those operating mosques, and those attending them, to similarly behave ‘as if’ that state was in control.

Gaps between appearance and reality can also be identified in announcements about the opening of new mosques during this period. In 2015, Awqaf Minister Goma’a announced that the funds for building and renovating mosques would increase by 200% from the

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previous year. On 21 January, 2016, Magdy Abu Eid, Head of Engineering Affairs at the Ministry of Awqaf, announced 10 new mosques would open in governorates every week across the republic. Weekly announcements were then made via the Ministry’s website with the names and locations of these sites. Between January and May 2016, 190 mosques opened in 25 of Egypt’s 27 governorates, while updates on new openings ceased after 18 October 2016, the 35th week of announcements. These mosques were described as being either entirely new buildings, or renovations of existing mosques previously forced to close because they were in disrepair. The relative weighting for was not specified. The ambiguity over their weighting gives the impression of an increase the stock of state-controlled mosques. It is likely, however, that the bulk of these mosques were, in fact, renovations rather than more costly new buildings, supported by the aforementioned fact that only in November 2014, the Ministry had been forced to close more than 3,000 mosques due to budget constraints. What appeared to be a (relatively modest) increase in state-controlled mosques may largely have been existing stock being put back into operation.

The rhetoric of Ministry of Awqaf officials around the annexation policy thus projected an impression of outright state control and domination over mosques. The substantial budget increases certainly indicate a government intent on going some way to realising these stated goals. Yet these increases do not appear to be of the level required to give the state the capacity to fully realise such a plan. The reality described gives a mixed picture, in which attempts to extend the state’s religious ‘infrastructural’ power, in terms of physical institutions, are combined with a ‘despotic’ power in the form of closures, and even symbolic forms of power to give the appearance of physical sites being the property of the state.

8.2 State control of preaching

Exerting state control over mosques goes beyond the physical site itself, with measures in place to restrict non-state-affiliated preachers from ascending to the minbar. In September 2013, figures within the Ministry of Awqaf were briefing that a large-scale ‘purge’ operation of imams affiliated with the Brotherhood and other pro-Islamist groups was imminent.32 Priority was given to excluding preachers who were involved in delivering sermons in support of the deposed president, Mohamed Morsi, and those mosques from which anti-coup protests were mobilized. The Ministry revealed it was conducting a census of preachers which sought to determine the extent of involvement in such “incitement”, ahead of final decisions over their exclusion from these mosques.

In January 2014, the Ministry of Awqaf announced that it would soon start to enforce a law making it illegal for any imams who do not possess a qualification from delivering sermons. There were 55,000 imams deemed to be in this position. That law came in the form of Decree No.64, which brought all mosques and oratories in Egypt under the Ministry’s control (formally, if not in practice).33 The decision represented an enforcement of Law No.157, which had never been implemented. Prior to leaving office in 2014, acting President Adly Mansour issued a presidential decree that banned all “non-certified” Islamic preachers from giving sermons in Egypt’s mosques, meaning only employees of the Ministry of Awqaf or Al-Azhar’s members could preach from the pulpits.34 The penalty for violation of the new law was announced, a fine of between £20 and £50 thousand EGY and a prison sentence of

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33 ‘dam jamī‘a al-masājid wa al-zawāiyya b-jumhūriyyat maṣr ila wuzārat al-awqāf’.
up to one year. Abdel-Raziq confirmed that the Ministry was seeking qualified preachers to cover the deficit, and was willing to pay £40 EGY for sermons by qualified Azharis with a preaching certificate, £60 EGY for those with a masters degree, and £70 EGY for others with a doctorate.\textsuperscript{35} The Ministry of Awqaf then stated that 17,000 graduates of al-Azhar’s training institutes would be hired to perform Friday prayers, with 5,000 more to be added throughout 2014. The Council of Ministers explained that this was in addition to about 60,000 existing imams and preachers, and part of a major step towards plugging the gap in qualified speakers, in order to tighten the supervision of the ministry on all mosques in Egypt. Around 12,000 non-Azharite imams were excluded from service, who would be replaced by the Ministry. According to the Ministry, this showed its ability to fill the vacuum and extend its oversight of all mosques.\textsuperscript{36}

The cost of salaries for mosques, alongside modest ministry budgets, has meant searching for ways to maintain some level of control over mosques on a budget. In the employment of an imam, a distinction is made between a ‘permanent’ and ‘paid’ imam, who is effectively a freelance contract worker hired to lead Friday prayers and deliver the sermon. Via decree no.64 of 2014, the Ministry increased the number of paid imams (non-appointed preachers who are rewarded for each sermon), from 21,000 to 38,000, so that the total number of imams was raised to around 96,000.\textsuperscript{37} The Ministry also opened the door to paid preaching positions (preaching only on Fridays) for al-Azhar graduates and preachers trained by institutes affiliated with its own preacher institutes. This seemed to enable the Ministry to cover all of Egypt’s large mosques, numbering under 80,000, during Friday prayers. This

\textsuperscript{35} Khalil, ‘awqāf al-qalubiyya tatsalam 341 masjidān wa-zāwiyyā tāba‘īn li-l-jam‘iyyat al-ahliyya’.
creativity in hiring imams has enabled the Ministry to overcome deficiencies in financial and human resources, and go a long way to realising its aims on preaching in Egypt’s mosques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ministry of Awqaf (Permanent)</th>
<th>Ministry of Awqaf (Temporary)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>37,467,000</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>40,617,000</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/2013</td>
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<td>2013/2014</td>
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<td>2015/2016</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/2017</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/2018</td>
<td>244,602,000</td>
<td>9,700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2, Annual budget (£EGY) for permanent and temporary staff in Ministry of Awqaf (Ministry of Finance, mof.gov.eg)

The increased reliance on casual workers is exemplified in the Ministry of Awqaf’s increased spending on this form of labour from 2014. Table 2 shows that between 2010 and 2013, just over £3m EGY was spent annually on casual workers. This dropped to £2.375m EGY in 2013/2014, before tripling in the financial year 2014/2015. This figure rose again in 2015/2016 to £9.75m EGY and remained relatively constant over the following two years, representing three times the average spend between 2010 and 2013. The increased reliance on temporary contractual workers in the public sector reflects the dual dimensions of Khalil and Dill’s theory of ‘statist neoliberalism’. Several studies have noted the link between neoliberalism and the shift from secure and long-term salaried employment to more ‘flexible’ labour markets, with an increase in ‘casualization’.\(^{38}\) Although it typically refers to the private sector, casualisation may also occur in the public sector. Such cases tend to be motivated by

'cost recovery principles’ and how ‘governments, like private sector firms, further the casualization of labour. That is, the consequence of recovering costs, in part by promoting short-term contracts for labour paid at minimum wage under precarious conditions’. Casuality of the public sector in the case of Egypt’s religious bureaucracy is also reflective of ‘hollow statism’. Despite these additions in labour, as part of the state’s religious bureaucracy, being indicative of an extension of its statism, the government’s reliance on these forms of employment to fill the gap is indicative of its lack of capacity to fulfil its infrastructural expansion.

Working practices and wages were similarly precarious, even for salaried imams and those on rolling yearly contracts. In 2014, a minimum wage of £1,200 EGY had been set for public sector workers in all state departments. However, by 2016 many imams complained that this minimum had not been applied to them, and that disparities existed in salary levels across the Ministry’s regional directorates. This prompted a series of protests by imams who assembled outside the Ministry’s offices, while hundreds more engaged in industrial action to demand wage increases and parity with their compatriots. The pay dispute continued to beset the Ministry until 2019, when President Sisi intervened to approve salary increases for imams. Yet the Ministry complained that it lacked the resources to pay these, leading to the exclusion of 8,000 imams, as well as administrative staff, from the planned increases, fuelling yet more anger among workers. To plug the gap, Sisi instructed Awqaf Minister Goma’a to improve the salaries of imams through the annual rent surplus for the waqf religious endowment. This instruction is evidence of the appropriation of zakat funds discussed in

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chapter seven for use in state projects, what Khalil and Dill call ‘creating alternative avenues for resource mobilisation, through charity’ as the state seeks resources beyond the official budget. The expansion of the state’s stock of imams, therefore, relied in part on casual forms of labour, while the funding of its own imams has begun to take on a similar neoliberal dimension.

Elements of co-optation can also be identified in the state’s strategy of managing preaching. In the absence of sufficient resources for a complete state annexation, co-optation of certain Salafi associations was pursued. In response to accusations that requiring permits from the state for preaching would eliminate religious pluralism, Muhammad Abdel Razek, Undersecretary to the Ministry of Awqaf for Mosque Affairs, stated that shaykhs associated with Salafi movements who are al-Azhar graduates could apply for a test in the Ministry of Awqaf or al-Azhar to obtain the permits. Whereas its Salafist counterpart AS was a target for the crackdown on associations, the Alexandria-based DS escaped any of its branches being frozen. The groups’ leaders had been keen to stress their willingness to act as a partner to the Sisi regime. Galal Murra, the General Secretary of the Nour Party, stated that the group worked under the umbrella of the state. He added that they were willing to consult and negotiate over the 30,000 mosques affiliated with the group, in order to root out militancy and secure permits for Salafi preachers.

In February 2014, it was revealed that 400 leaders and preachers from DS, had received permits to deliver sermons. These included vice-president Borhamy and al-Nour’s

leader, Dr. Yusef Mukhtar, even though they did not possess the relevant al-Azhar qualifications, and had not performed oration tests. The licences were granted on the understanding that they commit to the single sermon designated by the Ministry-designated every Friday, and refrain from using the minbar to politicise mosques. They also agreed not to criticise the religious authority of al-Azhar. In July 2015, the group announced its full commitment to the Ministry’s sermon for Eid al-Fitr, the celebration marking the end of Ramadan. In a statement, it said: ‘We will abide fully to the sermon to be determined by the Ministry of Awqaf, and all its elements’. The granting of permits to the Salafis of DS indicated that the state under Sisi calculated that, in the absence of complete state domination, the co-optation of key partners would be required. This reflects Lacroix and Zaghloul Shalata’s observation, that Sisi’s regime has moved to establish particular Salafi actors as legitimate substitutes for the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, members of DS have also cited this connection and the group’s desire to replicate the Brotherhood’s social activist approach.

Tilting the balance in preachers from the private sector to the state not only required sufficient resources for wages, and strategically co-opting certain Islamic associations, but also the ability to train and supply sufficient numbers of imams. As highlighted in chapter four, preacher training had traditionally been the remit of al-Azhar, but broadened after the mosque-building boom of the 1970s to include Ministry of Awqaf institutes. Despite al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf widening their own provision of preacher training,

shortages of officials imams remained, leading to the licensing of particular Islamic associations, in particular GS, to fill the gap. But as with the social service provision of Islamic associations, the goal of providing state-certified preachers for all of Egypt’s mosques meant a reluctance to continue the reliance on these non-state actors for service provision and the expansion of the state’s own infrastructure.

Many of Egypt’s private mosques were not only built by private Islamic associations, but were also staffed with preachers trained in their own bespoke institutes (ma’āhid). Islamic associations could thereby train preachers according to their own outlook, enabling them to contribute ‘counter-discourses’ to the public sphere, running counter to the regime’s own ‘right’ and ‘official’ version of Islam. In 2013, there were at least 72 such private preacher training institutes across Egypt, with only 19 affiliated directly with the Ministry of Awqaf. The latter went under the name of Islamic Cultural Centres, taught by teachers from al-Azhar and leaders from the Ministry. The former, meanwhile, were operated by Islamic associations, with 37 affiliated with GS, 20 with the al-Furqan Institute of DS, and 15 with AS. In terms of overall institutes, therefore, those centres operated by Islamic associations far outweighed those of the state. Even with sufficient resources for salaries, the state would be unable to achieve the ideological hegemony it sought without this disparity being redressed.

In March 2015, the Ministry of Awqaf announced that all Islamic cultural centres and preacher training institutes would be subject to review, ahead of the following academic year. Justifying the move, the Ministry said that Islamic associations had lost control of mosques, becoming “a backdoor for extremism or terrorism”. Similar to the corporatist review process that decided the fate of seized Islamic associations, a committee, comprising

49 Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’, 326.
representatives of the Ministry of Awqaf, al-Azhar, the Ministry of Social Solidarity, and Osama Al-Azhari, adviser to President Sisi, would report on these institutes to decide their fate. In October 2015, the Ministry of Awqaf announced that the review found that 68 of the 72 private institutes were not teaching the al-Azhar curriculum approved by the Ministry, a requirement of being granted a licence to train preachers. Moreover, the report concluded that these 68 institutes had evidence of “militant thought”, but nevertheless still decided to revoke the licences of all 72.\footnote{Sayyid Abdel Raheem, ‘ما شرط التكفل إقرار الحريات’ al-ṣubūb wa al-ṣawā‘ al-ṣalafiyya’ al-Araby al-Jadid, 30 October 2015, https://bit.ly/2SXOasX.} In a statement, the head of the sector for Religious Affairs for the Ministry of Awqaf, Muhammad Abd al-Raziq, said that, “the Ministry will not allow the establishment of parallel entities to it or al-Azhar”\footnote{Raheem.}. This remark, and the revocation of institute licences, is emblematic of the rationale behind the crackdown. David Lewis describes the ‘public sphere’ side of his distinction of civil society types as ‘a mediating set of institutions that ‘distils’ concerns from the private sphere and transmits them to a public sphere in an institutionalised form’.\footnote{Lewis, ‘Civil Society and the Authoritarian State: Cooperation, Contestation and Discourse’, 331.} Denying access to institutions such as preacher training institutes would deprive Islamic associations of this ‘institutionalised form’.

However, the application of the ruling on preacher institutes has been incomplete. Even though the ruling formally removed licences from all associations, with the Ministry insisting that they were thereby “closed”, reports indicate that implementation was not universal, with many continuing to operate despite government pronouncements. An analysis of available sources between the initial ruling in 2015 up until 2019 – including both pro-government publications and private outlets less likely to toe the government line - indicates that out of the targeted associations, the ruling was only applied and upheld throughout this period for GS. For the Salafi associations of AS and DS, closures were limited and
temporary, with quiet and tacit acceptance of their operations after a short period. Despite this, the discourse of government officials continued to proclaim that the ruling had been upheld and all association’s institutions having been closed, with new state institutes being opened in their place.

In a report from *Rose al-Youssef* in May 2016, a publication with a clear anti-Islamist stance, a reporter went undercover and attempted to apply to two GS institutes in east and downtown Cairo. In both cases administrators told the reporter that they were not currently accepting new enrolments as teaching was suspended, but that they hoped to reopen soon. It appears, at least for GS, that enrolment for its preacher training institutes has indeed been suspended since the 2015-16 academic year. On GS’s website, which was fully redesigned and updated in 2019, the description of the organization’s structure refers to it having 53 institutes for the preparation of preachers, with 10,151 students (male and female), and 37 institutes for Quranic readings with 8,413. However, an additional note adds that these institutes are currently suspended, with their affiliation transferred to al-Azhar, until they obtain the required licences. This suggests that al-Azhar has taken temporary charge of these institutes until GS can obtain a new licence. This is supported by Facebook pages of GS institutes, that refer to them as ‘Azhari’ GS institutes. This status was confirmed by GS’s secretary general, Mustapha Ismail, in an interview with the *el-Diyar* newspaper in January 2019. When asked about the status of closed institutes, Ismail responded:

The whole issue concerns the issuance of licenses for these institutes, and then their affiliation to al-Azhar al-Sharif, the beacon of knowledge, which is something that we fully welcome and accept. We are waiting to hear what the Shaykh of al-Azhar thinks

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in this regard…We are currently in the process of cooperating with al-Azhar in many projects, including affiliation to institutes.

An analysis of GS alone, therefore, suggests that the ruling to revoke the licences and close the private preacher training institutes was indeed implemented and maintained. Yet when the analysis is extended beyond these associations, it is clear this has not been the case.

Among the available reports, I have only been able to find one instance of an institute being forcibly closed, which again, was a GS institute. In an al-Yawm al-Sabaa report from March 2016, it is claimed that a GS institute in Alexandria had continued to operate despite the revocation of their licence by the Ministry.\(^56\) It had initially closed, then reopened secretly. The report includes photos of the incident, with Ministry figures removing the signs of the institute, and therefore appears to be reliable. However, this level of active enforcement was absent, or at least, was not upheld to the same extent, for Salafi institutes. In an interview with Arabi 21, the former secretary general of AS, Gamal al-Marakbi, said that the decision was only “temporary” and that “with time these institutes will return to work again”.\(^57\) The Aswat Masriya news website, an initiative set up by Reuters, conducted an investigation into the closure of institutes in a report published in March 2017.\(^58\) It found that despite Decree No.258 of 2015, many institutes continued to operate, including those of AS which it visited.

As for DS, indications are that most of its institutes continued to function after finding agreement with the government. In the Rose el-Youssef report, Dr. Ahmed Karima, a


Professor of Sharia at al-Azhar University, made the claim that not only were existing institutes permitted to function, but that new institutions continued to be founded with the authorization of the Ministry of Awqaf. Some caution is required for this claim, as not only would al-Azhar potentially feel threatened by the rise of Salafi institutions, but their professional rivalry with the Ministry of Awqaf may have led to such criticisms. An *al-Yawm al-Saba’a* report from April 2016 cited ‘Salafi sources’ who indicated that figures within DS would meet with officials from the Ministry of Awqaf to reach an agreement to avoid the closure of its institutes, converting affiliation of the al-Furqan institute to the Ministry of Social Solidarity and Awqaf. The sources expected that a number of branches of the al-Furqan Institute would be closed in some, but not all, governorates. At the same time as Ministry officials continued to insist that these institutes would not be reopening, DS figures told *el-Watan* newspaper that they had in fact reopened these institutes.

Part of the reason for this lack of implementation may be revised decisions on which actors to co-opt and which to exclude, with GS being viewed as closer to the Brotherhood, with Salafi groups a potential counterweight. But another factor appeared to be the incoherence of the state apparatus. Among the conclusions of the Aswat Masriya report was that there was little oversight from the Ministries of Awqaf, Social Solidarity, or Interior, to follow up the implementation of the ruling. Interviews with different state officials illustrate a lack of clarity over responsibility for implementation. A representative of the Ministry of Social Solidarity stated that they received a letter indicating that al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Academy was responsible for taking the necessary measures to close the institutes. Yet in

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59 Dahi, ‘al-salafiyya taghzū ma’āhid al-du‘āa’.
turn, Muhy al-Din Afifi, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Research Academy, denied the responsibility of Al-Azhar or the Academy to monitor institutes for preparing preachers, and that instead, were within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments. The Ministry of Interior similarly denied its responsibility for monitoring mosques, with an official placing responsibility with the Ministry of Awqaf. Two years after Decree No.258 had been issued by Awqaf Minister Goma’a, confusion remained as to who was responsible. In April 2017, Dr. Ghada Wali, Ministry of Social Solidarity, denied the responsibility of her Ministry, stating that institutes for training preachers were licensed by the Ministry of Awqaf. This jurisdictional confusion may stem in part from a systemic issue that has been identified within Egypt’s public administration, termed as ‘stove-piping’. This refers to the sharp division between separate ministries and departments, with ‘heat’ rising up the stoves, rather than laterally, whereby they exist ‘in grand isolation from one another, lacking horizontal channels of communication and coordination’. Nathan Brown deems this a ‘balkanized’ form of government, with much of the competition occurring between rather than within state ministries.

Despite the uneven application of closing private preacher training institutes, an expansion of the state’s own infrastructure has seen increasing competition with, if not total replacement of, private institutes. The Ministry of Awqaf announced in December 2015 that it had opened new Islamic Cultural Centres in 10 different governorates. Applications were invited for these new centres in Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Dakahlia, Gharbiyya, Sharqiyya, Manufiyya, Beni Suef, Asyut, and Sohag. Some of these governorates were among the most

64 Springborg, Egypt, 81.
65 Springborg, 81.
targeted during the crackdown on Islamic associations, particularly Sharqiyya, Dakahlia, Beni Suef, and Gharbiyya, indicating some correlation in terms of the strategy of where to open new institutes. The announcement included the call for imam applications, with applicants being required to have a degree from an Egyptian university and be under 50 years of age. In addition, it specified that the duration of study in the centres would be two academic years over four semesters, in the evening period of 4 hours, 3 days per week for each group. The Ministry announced that 9 other centres teaching Islamic culture courses, would also open, with 3-month courses covering topics such as “jurisprudence and building the family in Islam”, with two lectures per week. These centres are located in Qalyubiyaa, Buhayriya, Kifr al-Shaykh, Damyat, Port Said, Fayum, Minya, Qena, and Aswan.  

In April 2016, Awqaf Minster Mukhtar Gom‘a announced his intention to expand government institutes across each of the country’s 27 governorates. By August 2018, as he announced the development of the International Awqaf Academy for Training Preachers, Goma‘a added that 20 institutes had been opened for training preachers in which the period of study is two years, with a further 7 institutes for Islamic education, in which the duration of study is three months, with entry tests being held to select adequately qualified candidates.


On 20 January, 2019, the International Academy for Preacher Training was inaugurated in 6th October City in the Giza governorate. Described as the largest of its kind in the world at 11,000 square metres, the Academy was developed to the cost of £100m EGY (approx. $6m US) from the Ministry’s budget. A relatively modest amount considering the scale, the Academy was actually housed in a redeveloped existing building, rather than an entirely new development. Nevertheless, its interior was refurbished and equipped with modern equipment, departments for foreign languages, computer systems. The Academy trains imams from Egypt and foreign countries, allowing imams to live onsite for six months, and according to Ministry officials, is aimed at “providing a moderate vision in order to renew religious discourse and present a new vision that confronts extremism and terrorism”. In its first enrolment 130 were accepted, with a capacity of 500. Bizarrely, just days before the inauguration of the Ministry of Awqaf’s Academy, al-Azhar had in fact opened its own

71 Alim.
Academy to train imams and preachers with near identical aims. On the one hand this coincidence further demonstrates the institutional expansion of official Islam under Sisi. On the other hand, however, it speaks to the staunch competition between the two institutions to establish themselves as the leader in official Islam’s “religious revolution” called upon by President Sisi.

The opening of new state institutions for the training of preachers was not confined to male-only institutes. In her study of Egyptian women’s Islamic activism, Saba Mahmood identified in 1997 that GS was running six training centres in Cairo alone with 800 women enrolled in either two or four year programmes, while AS and Da’wat al-Haq also had their own women’s training centres, with the enrolment number apparently outnumbering that of the men’s institutes. It is not clear whether these institutes were included in the 72 private institutes operated by associations and targeted by the Ministry of Awqaf. What is clear, however, is that training female religious scholars was part of the Ministry’s plan. In 2015 during a forum held by the Ministry, recommendations were given for the provision of training for women to advocate their and children’s rights according to a ‘modern religious perspective’. By 2017, more than 140 female preachers had been licensed by the government to offer religious lessons to women, part of a wider plan to recruit more than 2,000 over the coming years. The female preachers are graduates of al-Azhar, with degrees in preaching or Islamic studies, and deliver exclusively to women in female-only sections of

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72 Alim.
prominent mosques on a range of topics twice a week. The establishment of new state institutes demonstrates the extension of the state’s infrastructural power in the religious sphere, despite incomplete efforts to curtail private Islamic institutions. With efforts to extend state control over religious institutions as physical sites, further measures have been deployed aimed at controlling the discourses espoused within them.

8.3 Expanding ‘official Islam’

The vehicle of change for Sisi’s “religious revolution” has been Egypt’s three main official religious institutions – al-Azhar, the Ministry of Awqaf, and Dar al-Ifta - empowered to increase the reach of “official Islam”. In doing so, they have served a dual function, in serving to provide legitimacy for the president and his regime in the religious sphere, and in disseminating a discourse of “official Islam” within religious institutions. This utilisation of official religious institutions fits the wider statist rationale of Sisi’s authoritarian regime, and its wider pessimism towards independent forms of organisation in civil society.

The prominent role played by official religious institutions in Sisi’s Egypt was indicated early on, when the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayyib, sat alongside the-then defence secretary Sisi, as he announced the removal of President Morsi and suspension of the constitution. Al-Tayyib, along with other official religious figures, would play a prominent legitimating role during the early phase following the coup and the consolidation

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of Sisi’s rule, particularly during the state’s repression of the Brotherhood.77 As pro-Morsi supporters organised demonstrations and sit-ins against the coup in August 2013, both Dar al-Ifta and the Ministry of Awqaf issued statements labelling pro-Morsi protestors as khawārij (heretics).78 When an estimated 1,150 were killed by Egyptian security forces at Rabaa Al-Adawiya Mosque, former Grand Mufti ‘Ali Gum’a and other prominent Azhari ulama based their legal arguments justifying these actions on concepts of nationhood and the nation-state.79 As well as legitimising the nature of Sisi’s displacement of the Brotherhood and ascension to power, Egypt’s official religious institutions also served to legitimise the crackdown on private Islamic social and religious institutions and accompanying state control over them. All three bodies, for example, were deployed to bestow legitimacy upon Tahya Masr as being a worthy recipient of citizens’ zakat donations. During Ramadan in 2016, al-Azhar,80 Dar al-Ifta,81 and the Ministry of Awqaf,82 all released statements imploring Egyptians to donate their zakat to the president’s fledgling charity. As will be shown below, such blatant manipulation of official religious institutions to legitimate regime policies can have paradoxical results.

As well as providing legal justifications for the state’s policies, official religious institutions have also been employed to project a particular religious discourse across society. In a speech to mark the Prophet’s birthday, on 1 January, 2015, President Sisi called on official religious institutions, headed by al-Tayyib, to “renew religious discourse.” In his speech, the president directed comments directly to the Grand Shaykh, stating that, “You and

78 Bano, 722.
80 Amin, ‘’ustādh sharī’a bi-l-’azhar: şundūq ‘tahya maṣr’ ”a’żam wa “ā” l-zakāat al-muslimīn”.
81 ‘al-zakāa l-şundūq ʿtahya maṣr’.
your preachers are responsible before God for renewing religious discourse and correcting the image of Islam...We should review our concepts.”

His comments implied the “correct” image of Islam had been distorted by Islamists, requiring an intervention by the preachers of ‘official’ Islam to guide the ‘right’ path. Sisi’s phrase of *tajdid al-khiṭāb al-dīnī* (renewal of religious discourse) would provide the slogan for several initiatives organised by al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf. Meanwhile, a conference held by al-Azhar called for a unified strategy among official religious institutions, with the concept of *al-manhaj al-wasaṭiyya* (the moderate way) being established at the forefront of ‘official’ Islam to protect the nation from “extremism”.

The term *wasaṭiyya* refers to Qur’an 2:143 and the phrase “*umma wasaṭa*”, meaning “moderate community”. Its contemporary usage can be traced to some of the leading theorists of the Islamic revival (*al-sahwa al-islāmiyya*) in Egypt, including Muhammad al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. After the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, these theorists among others, developed a ‘moderate’ or ‘centrist’ trend in order to distinguish themselves from radicals engaged in violent *jihad*. Extending beyond exclusively Islamic matters, it developed to accommodate liberal concepts such as democracy, pluralism, freedom of thought, and the rights of women and minorities. In 1996, a breakaway group of Brotherhood members developed these ideas into a specific political programme by forming the Wasat Party. The “moderate way” has therefore been highly influential within the Brotherhood and an important factor in extending its appeal in the political arena.

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86 Browers, 51.
Yet, the concept of *wasatiyya* has also risen within the institutions of official Islam. Al-Azhar, highlights Bano, has used centrism to position itself globally and extend its appeal beyond Egypt’s borders. *Wasatiyya* has enabled it to project a relatively modernist outlook, as opposed to the more prescriptive approach of the theocracies of Saudi Arabia and Iran.\(^88\) Al-Azhar’s centrism was based around issues of tolerance, such as engaging with the ideas of a diverse range of actors, including Shi’i scholars and Sufis, political Islamists such as the Brotherhood, and more typically rigid movements such as Salafis.\(^89\) In 2011 it released the al-Azhar Document that outlined a set of principles for post-Arab Spring reforms, such as there being a “democratic and constitutional” state, freedom of religion, and pluralism.\(^90\) A concept that emerged from ideological debates within Islamist movements was thus co-opted by the institutions of official Islam. And paradoxically, that concept – based on tolerance and pluralism – was to be used as an ideological justification for the exclusion of the group from whom its contemporary usage originated.

President’s Sisi’s call to “renew religious discourse” and use *wasatiyya* to counteract the “extremist” discourse of Islamists such as the Brotherhood was heeded by the three main official religious institutions. Later in 2015, Awqaf Minister Goma’a announced a development plan under the banner of “renewal of religious discourse”, including speeches from notable speakers, a series of Ministry publications on relevant issues, conferences and seminars, and also the continued training and “rehabilitation” of preachers.\(^91\) For its part, Dar al-Ifta announced it would also adopt the call by monitoring fatwas on *takfir* in print, audio, visual media and the internet, and issuing their own response according to disciplined

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\(^89\) Bano, 82.

\(^90\) Bano, 84.

methodology in line with the al-Azhar curriculum. Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf undertook a joint initiative for a comprehensive review of religious education in schools. In conjunction with the Ministry of Education, both parties began a programme aimed at introducing students to wasatiyya in Islam, with seminars and debates being held for pupils in schools. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Awqaf made al-Azhar responsible for developing the new curriculum for Islamic studies at all educational levels, as part of the president’s “religious revolution”.

The veneer of unity, however, between Egypt’s official religious institutions has been undermined by increased competition between the Ministry of Awqaf and al-Azhar, over the direction of this religious revolution. Although there were joint initiatives such as those described above, counter examples have also shown a lack of coordination between the two bodies. For example, in January 2015, the Ministry of Awqaf held a conference titled “Mechanisms of Renewing Religious Discourse”. The following day, the imam of al-Azhar held a conference on the very same topic, demonstrating an overlap and competition over who would lead the initiative. The ‘balkanization’ and ‘stove-piping’ within the public administration mentioned in the second section of this chapter is again relevant here.

Springborg notes that various ministries have long and entrenched ‘jurisdictional disputes’ in which they compete to control and extract resources. In this scenario, the Ministry of Awqaf is, strictly speaking, the main representative of the state in the realm of religious affairs, and can therefore make a case to be the main driver of the policy. On the other hand, al-Azhar can

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95 Springborg, Egypt, 82.
legitimately claim to be the superior and more influential Islamic body, yet it does have a more ambiguous status vis-à-vis the state. The minor episode of divergence in coordination described above was merely the beginning of increased competition and divergence between the two institutions. As we shall now see, the issue of unified sermons as a means of projecting this moderation would stoke further divisions between the Ministry of Awqaf and al-Azhar.

8.3.1 Unified sermons

These initiatives to renew religious discourse went some way to transmitting the state’s projection of wasatiyya in the public sphere. But they could not ensure that the discourse itself would be adopted by the state’s pool of orators in the country’s mosques. Establishing state control over mosques provided a form of institutional control, whilst statizing the training and provision of preachers would further increase the likelihood of the state’s official conception of Islam being transmitted into the public sphere. Yet these steps could still not guarantee strict adherence to the discourse being fostered by ‘official Islam’. Doing so would ensure not only institutional control, but also ideological control. The attempt to achieve this “guarantee” was pursued through an attempt to control the discourse delivered by preachers within mosques, particularly, in the weekly Friday sermons. In June 2014, Grand Shaykh al-Tayyib gave his first proscription over what could be delivered from the minbar, publishing a preaching code of ethics stipulating that topics relating to political, partisan, or electoral benefits were strictly forbidden. The following year, Awqaf minister Goma’a wrote in his book Toward the Renewal of Religious Discourse that it “shall not be left for unqualified and
non-specialist preachers or blasphemers who seek to shake Islamic fundamentals under the pretext of renewal.”

His remarks indicated that some may tread their own misguided path under the guise of “renewal”. To ensure sermons could not be exploited in this way, the Ministry’s response was to try and determine the actual words which preachers were permitted to utter by unifying Friday sermons.

A statement from the Ministry of Awqaf on 26 January, 2014 declared that from the following Friday, it would ‘unify the Friday sermon in all the mosques in Egypt’, meaning a set topic being provided each week by the Ministry. The justification for the move was to ‘modernize’ religious discourse and prevent political parties from exploiting religious platforms for ideological or sectarian purposes. The policy for set topics was connected to the annexation plan, with Awqaf Minister Goma’a stating that any mosque not adhering to the set topics would be a priority for annexation. From then on, the topics for each month were published a month in advance on the Ministry’s website, as well as in the magazine, Minbar al-Islam. The Ministry’s website provided a link to a PDF for each week’s topic that elaborated on the topic and suggested areas to cover. As well as the title, several sub-headings were provided, followed by passages from the Qur’an and Sunna relevant to each sub-heading. Finally, a suggested text is provided that synthesised the Qur’anic passages with an explanation of their applicability to the topic and contemporary period. At this stage, adherence to the suggested text was not considered mandatory, with a statement at the bottom of the web page stating that the preacher can “expand the elements, evidence, and subject…in relation to the place and society in which he is engaged, without prejudice to the core of the

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The Ministry of Awqaf formed a committee to prepare and formulate topics “in line with the spirit of the times”, including faith, ethical, humanitarian, life and daily issues. The topics at first appeared to be reasonably innocuous, with the first month of topics including “Hope and works”, “Logical thinking and sciences”, and “Environmental preservation and development”. However, more blatantly political messaging soon followed to serve as a legitimising tool for the state. Indeed, the Friday sermon has long been identified as a potential form of political communication by state leaders in Egypt. Borthwick described their use under Nasser as ‘an amalgamation of traditional Islamic concepts with the policies of the contemporary ruling elites, and is a channel of communication of the state’. More recently, the instrumental use of sermons has been recognised in Turkey under the AKP to develop a more religious form of nationalism that deviates from the traditional Kemalist conception. In the case of the Ministry of Awqaf under Sisi, Friday sermons can also be seen to have provided a form of political communication by the state to promote its policies, similarly utilising the concept of nationalism, in a reflection of the president’s own discourse at that time. The set sermon for Friday 29 August, 2014, was entitled, “Grand Economic Projects between Hope and Work”. Sisi’s presidency has become well-known for such national projects, and earlier that month, he had unveiled the plan to build a parallel lane to

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99 Bruce M. Borthwick, ‘The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication’, Middle East Journal 21, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 300–301.
100 Ongur, ‘Performing through Friday Khutbas: Re-Instrumentalization of Religion in the New Turkey’.
the Suez Canal to allow more ships to use the freight passage.102 The topic’s sub-headings included, “The Quran and Sunna are replete with work”, “The value of work in Islam”, and “The importance of supporting [emphasis added] grand projects”. In the suggested text, the basis for this support is grounded in nationalist terminology. It reads: “What pays for hope requires efforts and work in the interest of religion, the nation [al-waṭan], the individual and society. These are the major projects such as the Suez Canal Project, Toshka Project, East al-Uwaynat, the North Coast Development Project, and the Sinai Development”. Rather than an allusion to a desired behaviour through an abstract utilisation of religion to discuss the importance of work, the topic and its accompanying text make the reference explicit, by namechecking those specific projects which it was incumbent on the recipient of the message to support. Thus, Friday sermons began to be used instrumentally by the Ministry of Awqaf to support the national projects of the Egyptian state under Sisi. Awqaf Minister Goma’a acknowledged this himself, stating during a press conference that “the sermon will become a way to develop and unify the nation instead of being a source of fragmentation caused by talking politics”.103

Beyond legitimating state policies through the invocation of unity and national identity, politicised sermon topics also served to act as a forewarning against opposition to the state. For instance, the set topics for two sermons in January 2016, just prior to the anniversary of the January 25 uprising, a date that activists used to try and mobilize opposition, were used to dissuade people considering taking part. The first, on 8 January 2016, was titled ‘Line up to build and safeguard the nation – a legitimate demand and a

national duty’. Under the heading of ‘Love of the nation: protecting and defending it’ were further subheadings titled ‘Warning against targeting it [the nation] and attempting to dismantle it’ and ‘Warning against stirring up chaos and destruction’. Then the final two subheadings addressed ‘Calls to protest against the stability of the nation are suspicious, be wary of them and those who call for them’ and ‘Calling for the fall of the state is a jarīma sharʿīyya [religious crime]’. The invocation of nationalist terminology, and the need to maintain stability against ‘chaos’, seeks to undermine such protests among the population at large, while the ‘warning’ to protestors themselves is direct, not only citing the damage it would cause to the nation, but also stating it would be a crime against sharʿia (at least according to ‘official Islam’). The following week’s topic followed a similar theme. Within the topic of ‘The blessing of safety and security’ were subheadings that included ‘The security of communities and their safety is a great blessing that must be thanked and preserved’ and ‘Security and safety in dealing with people leads to the stability of communities’. These examples served to legitimate the use of security services intervening to stop such protests, and protect the nation from ‘instability’ and ‘chaos’.

Despite the instrumentalised political intent of the unified sermons, reports from several sources indicate that they were by no means universally adhered to. Significantly, resistance did not come solely – or even primarily – from the nationally-networked Islamic associations that have been the main focus of this study, but from independent imams, many of whom formed new movements of solidarity, and even within official Islam itself, in the al-Azhar branch. In February 2014, a Mada Masr report interviewed attendees at several mosques, who observed several ways that imams flouted the unified sermon policy. At the

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most basic level, imams defied the decision by addressing different topics to those specified by the Ministry. Others chose to adhere to the topic, but to undermine it by distancing themselves from the topic, telling worshippers: “This statement on hope and work is what came to us from the Ministry of Endowments [Awqaf].” Meanwhile, others decided to interpret the topics in a political way, such as by using the very first sermon topic on “the role of youth in developing society” to discuss violations against young activists. In another report covering the Dokki suburb west of Cairo, an independent imam’s rejection of the unified sermon typified the feeling among many of his associates, as he remarked, “I am an imam who follows the religion. I am not an imam who follow the authorities.”107 These examples show it was not only politically-minded associations rejecting the policy, but independents rejecting the politicisation of sermons, the very justification given by the state to justify the takeover the mosques in the first place.

Independent imams responded by forming organised collectives to resist the policy, and did not shy away from direct criticism of the president. The Free Imams accused Sisi of being responsible for the move, pointing to the sermon topics as being blatantly based on security and political instructions, calling it a “dangerous decision” that “silences imams” and represents the “occupation” of mosques.108 Imams Without Constraints was a movement established during the FJP’s year in power, amidst fears that the government’s policies on religion facilitated a greater stranglehold over mosques by networked Islamic associations, rather than independents. Now, fearing their marginalisation by the state, as opposed to Islamic associations, they directed their attention towards the Ministry of Awqaf, calling for the resignation of its minister Goma’a. Those affiliated with movements such as these

collectively refused to adhere to the guidelines over unified sermons. Imams Without Constraints’ general coordinator, Shaykh Ahmed al-Bahey, stated that they defied the ministry because it was incapable of actually monitoring and implementing the decision to unify sermons. A member of another group, the Imams Coalition Front, said that the decision could only be applied to larger, higher profile mosques, and could not be enforced among those in rural areas and in villages. Yet again, this would suggest that insufficient capacity limited the hegemonic ambitions of a policy aiming to monopolise religious discourse. And, as with the inability to fully enforce institutional control over mosques, while a concentration of that policy towards larger mosques with increased visibility may, on the surface, give a symbolic indication of the policy being realised, in fact its rollout across the country appeared to be much more limited. Defiance of the unified sermon did not exist in a vacuum, however, with reports of imams being referred to the ministry on charges of “inciting violence and calling for demonstrations against the government and insulting the army and police”. Imams in different governorates were summoned to the General Bureau of Investigation to answer for their refusal to adhere to the unified sermon. Yet the numbers in these reports were in single figures, well below the thousands flouting the policy, and further indicating a lack of capacity in enforcement.

Refusal to adhere to the unified sermons escalated in July 2016 when the Ministry of Awqaf announced that not only would the topic be unified, but that imams would also be expected to adhere to the pre-prepared text. Soon after the statement was issued, the hashtag #la_li-l-khuṭba_al-maktūba (no to the written sermon) began to circulate on social media

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109 el-Din, ‘Friday Sermons: All Together Now?’
among imams calling for its rejection. Those within the Imams Without Restrictions movement continued to flout the regulations after the implementation of a set text as well as topic, arguing that it would lead to a ‘freezing’ rather than ‘renewal’ of religious discourse, and a loss of prestige among imams. They also began to protest in front of the Egyptian parliament, calling for the retraction of the decision and Minister Goma’a’s resignation. There was even resistance from worshippers, who rejected the delivery of the scripts. In a village within the Buheira governorate, violent clashes broke out during Friday prayers between mosque-goers and the imam of its mosque, in a protest against the written sermon. Protestors objected to the sermon, due to its restricted length and benign topic, and threatened to prevent the imam taking to the minbar again.

The decision on written sermons even caused a fissure among the institutions of official Islam. The President of al-Azhar University ignored the pre-written sermon and delivered his own, arguing that the policy did not apply to al-Azhar’s preachers. Then, al-Azhar’s Council of Senior Scholars, headed by Grand Shaykh al-Tayyib, rejected the policy, stating that it would “freeze religious discourse”, be counter-productive, and make imams less capable at their jobs and less able to counter extremism. Instead, the Council recommended that imams should be provided with greater training and capabilities to tackle extremism. In the end, the Ministry was forced to yield to its more prestigious counterpart. The dispute also reflects the differing role both institutions have played, as part of the ‘religious revolution’ and ‘renewal of religious discourse’. Bano and Benadi have identified that al-Azhar has tended to be presented as the ‘legitimate voice’ of Egyptian Islam, whereas

114 Hassan, ‘aimat maṣr yarfuḍun “al-khuṭba al-maktūba al-mawḥada”.
the Ministry has taken on a more contentious political role (due in part to it being part of the structure of government as opposed to the semi-independent status of al-Azhar). They argue that this has boosted al-Azhar’s authority and made it the more effective actor for the state-legitimisation project.

Whether or not the Ministry has been leveraged against al-Azhar as part of a conscious strategy, its attempts to monopolise religious discourse bear the hallmarks of previous instances of governmental overreach that served to undermine regime attempts at legitimation in the religious sphere. In his study of the Egyptian state’s relations with al-Azhar, Tamir Moustafa describes how, after the 1961 reorganisation under Nasser, the institutional was aligned much more closely with the state, being used to provide fatwas to support Nasser and his successors. However, this manipulation of al-Azhar undermined its influence within Egyptian society and therefore ‘its ability to discredit opponents of the government’. The strategy of ‘domination’, encompassing ‘government interference, manipulation, and outright co-optation’ had the impact of tarnishing al-Azhar’s integrity and reputation among several sectors of Egyptian society. In the 1990s, when Mubarak faced an Islamist insurgency, the shift from ‘domination’ to a ‘cooperative relationship’ eased tight governmental controls, and enabled al-Azhar to provide a theological response to militant Islamists, as these groups had challenged its authority and integrity, as well as that of the state. The lesson for the Ministry of Awqaf is that ‘domination’ and too tight a control over the mosque, both as an institution and an outlet for discourse can lead to a decrease in legitimacy, creating opponents out of independents as well as the organised networks of

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118 Moustafa, ‘Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt’, 3.
119 Moustafa, 10.
120 Moustafa, 12.
associations that were the primary targets of the policy. Nevertheless, the policy remains in place, for as of April 2020, the topic and text of Friday sermons continue to be distributed to preachers. Its continuation without actual realisation is further indicative of the ‘hollow statism’ practised in Sisi’s regime.

8.4 Conclusions

This chapter has shown how the crackdown on Islamic social institutions has been accompanied by a concurrent campaign targeting religious institutions, particularly mosques, a key site that has enabled Islamic associations to combine ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ civil society activism. That authoritarian regimes view the combination of these aspects of civil society a threat is evidenced by the attempt to dominate the physical institution of the mosque itself, as well as the discourses disseminated within. In addition to attempts to extend state control over mosques as physical sites, further measures have been undertaken to try to expand the state’s religious bureaucracy, by placing restrictions on independent imams and getting the Ministry of Awqaf’s workforce to deliver sermons within them. To try to further facilitate this shift from private to public control, it was announced that licences had been revoked for the private preacher-training institutes from which Islamic associations produced pools of imams according to their own specific religious outlook. Moreover, new state-sanctioned preacher-training institutes had been established to increase the number of state-certified religious orators, demonstrating an increase in the state’s religious infrastructural apparatus. The crackdown on religious institutions, therefore, reflects a similar statist logic of control as that witnessed towards Islamic social institutions. A form
of nationalisation has been undertaken whereby autonomous forms of private Islamic activism have been curtailed in favour of an attempt at state domination.

This campaign is indicative of a state seeking to extend its infrastructural power in the religious sphere, by placing the primary actor in control of the institution of the mosque, of those religious specialists permitted to communicate with a mass religious constituency, and even of the specific discourse among them. However, there are indications that this ambitious plan of complete state domination may in fact have fallen short, due to a lack of state capacity and resources to enforce it, leaving it partly ‘hollow’ and even symbolic in some cases. The Egyptian state, facing economic crises in more crucial areas of its economy, simply does not possess the resources required to complete such a comprehensive domination of religious institutions. As with the aborted Mubarak annexation plan of the 1990s, which ‘existed mostly in form but not practice,’ there remains the question as to the extent Sisi’s regime can meet these lofty ambitions. This leaves us to ask if, in the absence of the necessary resources to fully expand its infrastructural power, and the continued pessimism towards autonomous forms of civil society potentially posing a threat to the regime, Sisi’s regime will abandon the pretence of its statism by way of infrastructure, and rely more and more on its despotic power. This mixed method continues the legacy of the form of hybrid regimes in the Egyptian state during the republican period.

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121 Fahmi, ‘The Egyptian State and the Religious Sphere’.
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

By analysing changes in the Egyptian state’s relations with Islamic movements since 2011, this dissertation has sought to determine what these changes mean for the structure of Egypt’s authoritarian state under Sisi. To contextualise the changes, the historical pattern of relations between the Egyptian state and (Islamic) civil society was examined in chapter three. It identified periodic cycles of either accommodation or suppression, with the relative balance of social and religious service provision fluctuating, depending on the requirements of the state during critical junctures. Nasser’s ‘populist’ regime tried to dominate these areas, declaring the state solely responsible for welfare provision in return for political quiescence. In the ‘post-populism’ of economic restructuring and privatisation under Sadat and Mubarak, the developmental approach of the state, influenced by the norms of external benefactors, promoted the expansion of associational activity, including that of the Islamic movement, to play a role in service-provision to alleviate some of the pressure on the state. Economic liberalisation was accompanied by the (partial) easing of political space, which Islamic actors benefited from. However, the regime relied on legal means to retain ‘indirect’ control over civil society. In contributing to the dissertation’s overall argument, this chapter identified the key factors which result in either accommodation or suppression of the Islamic movement, including structural factors such as the economic health of the state, the social needs that have to be met in order to maintain regime stability, as well as the necessity to minimise the political risk of allowing non-state actors to meet these needs. This analysis allows for the identification of yet another fluctuation in this cycle afterwards, during the transitional period, and then through Sisi’s rule.
Chapter four made the theoretical argument that state incapacity, in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, provided a ‘political opportunity structure’ for the expansion of the Islamic movement during the transitional period. Its empirical findings show that these opportunities were used by Islamic movements to expand social and religious institutions, including social welfare provision, *da‘wa*, and preacher training institutes. Not only were these opportunities used to create new institutions, but Islamic movements contested with the state over control of its institutions, including mosques, and the practices permitted within them. By restructuring public space in this way, the control mechanisms used to manage the Islamic movement had eroded, strengthening its position as a societal actor vis-à-vis the state. Whereas the cycles identified in chapter three were mainly state-directed, these changes during the transitional period were initiated by Islamic movements. This partly explains why the 2013 crackdown extended beyond the Muslim Brotherhood, to include the Islamic movement more broadly.

Chapters five extended and added to the empirical findings of the previous chapter. Focusing on Ansar al-Sunna and al-Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya, it showed how these two organizations, despite deciding against political institutionalisation in 2011, took advantage of the permissive environment to enthusiastically engage in political activism. In doing, they effectively transitioned into advocacy groups for Islamist parties during electoral processes, discursively bridging between Islamic networks and emphasising unity over and above factionalism between rival Islamist parties. Moreover, in their framing they equated the political choices facing voters with the performance of one’s faith. Through this interpretation of *da‘wa* and its relationship with politics, with social activism of both organizations combined ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities, raising their potential threat level for a reconstituted authoritarian regime in 2013. As well as the theoretical argument, this chapter draws on primary sources to add empirical detail to intra-
Islamic dynamics and their ideological revisions, particularly among relatively understudied
groups during this period.

The combination of ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ was identified in chapter six, through the Brotherhood/FJP’s politicisation of service delivery, first as an electioneering strategy, and second as part of its governance after attaining power. This chapter draws on primary sources to provide new detail on the FJP’s aims for civil society, as well as underexamined aspects of its manifesto and governing strategy. Its key argument is that under previous regimes, service provision was permitted as long as its delivery was not overtly politicised. This changed during the transitional period, as the Brotherhood leveraged the social capital it gained through welfare provision to support its political party during elections, and in government. In doing so, it combined the ‘self-organization’ of service provision by linking its delivery to its political advocacy efforts. This politicisation also left the movement’s social apparatus exposed, helping explain its subsequent targeting by the end of 2013.

The crackdown on Islamic associations in 2013 and beyond was examined in chapters seven and eight, detailing the state’s strategy towards ‘self-organizational’ social institutions on the one hand, and ‘public sphere’ religious institutions, on the other. Chapter seven focused on the ‘self-organizational’ side, providing an empirical collation of the outcomes of the initial batch of 1,055 associations, as well as those seized in the period after. It shows that the Egyptian government’s strategy relied on corporatist measures to curtail their organisational and financial autonomy, as well as nationalisation to subsume these private associations into the state’s own infrastructure. It situates these statist measures within the broader context of the state’s attempts to reinvigorate its social service provision, aided by changing norms among supporting external financial institutions. The links between this context and the crackdown are shown through the attempt to take control of religious charity,
through the formation of state institutions for its collection and distribution, the proceeds of which were used to support the state’s wider developmental strategy.

The crackdown on ‘public sphere’ religious institutions in chapter eight, continued to show how the Sisi regime’s strategy to control the Islamic movement focused on developing its own infrastructure in its place. Original data from the Ministry of Awqaf’s budgets was used to show the attempted increase in state control of mosques and provision of preachers. However, shortfalls remained, casting doubt on the government’s pronouncements of complete state control over Egypt’s mosques. Gaps between the claims of government ministries and the actual implementation of forcible closures of private preacher training institutes further exposed the hollow statism of the Sisi era. This chapter also detailed the use of official religious institutions to develop the discourse of ‘official Islam’. Part of this strategy included the attempt to control the discursive content disseminated within mosques through set sermons. That section analysed the content of these sermons, which have yet to receive detailed academic focus, to show how it aimed to legitimise the state’s wider developmental agenda. But just as chapter seven showed how the increase in statist service provision was undermined by neoliberal subsidy cuts, meaning the net result of ‘social inclusion’ was piecemeal, the same was also recognised in the attempt to control religious institutions, due to the huge financial and human resource base that would be required to complete such an undertaking.

Taken together, chapters seven and eight represent the dual aspect of the Sisi regime’s strategy for countering the strength of the Islamic movement: targeting their ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities, that is, both their social and religious service provision, by increasing the infrastructural power of the state in these areas. This dual strategy seeks to prevent these forms of activity from overlapping, and creating the autonomous space through which this aspect of civil society can operate. Although the
control mechanisms were in place under Mubarak, Islamic associations were managed in a more ‘indirect’ way, and were even encouraged in order to play a stabilising role vis-à-vis a state undergoing economic restructuring. This process, which forms the basis of the ‘authoritarian upgrading’ theory, meant that the state was simultaneously retracting from its service functions whilst encouraging non-state actors to fill the void. As this dissertation has shown, the reverse of this rationale has been implemented under Sisi through the application of ‘direct’ control of the development of the state’s infrastructural power.

Extending the infrastructural presence of the state in the areas of social and religious service provision has limited the public space available for civil society to inhabit. These measures go beyond a mere resumption of the authoritarian order in place under Mubarak, to suggest a renewed emphasis on statism in Sisi’s authoritarian state, with echoes of the statist approach under Nasser. Comparisons with the Nasser period have been made by scholars, referring to the populist characteristics of Sisi’s regime, its emphasis on hyper-nationalism, as well as increased statism in the economy.\(^1\) This dissertation has shown other ways in which Sisi’s regime has echoes of Nasserism, from the renewed emphasis on corporatism in state-society relations with the Islamic movement, nationalisations of civil society organisations, and paternalism around the state and its provision of welfare to citizens.

Despite the renewed emphasis on statism and the echoes of Nasserism in attempts to achieve hegemonic levels of state control over civil society, this dissertation casts doubt on the ability of the Egyptian state under Sisi to achieve these goals. It has highlighted that the Egyptian state’s ability to achieve such levels of domination are limited, meaning the scaffolding of this statist project is hollow. Without the capacity to meaningfully extend its

infrastructural apparatus, while simultaneously restricting the prevalence and independence of civil society, then what we are left with is a form of ‘hollow’ statism, as well as questions over the balance between ‘despotic’ and ‘infrastructural’ forms of power in Sisi’s authoritarian regime. If the Sisi regime’s opposition towards independent forms of civil society continues, and it is unwilling to tolerate non-state actors engaged in service provision, at the same time as its own infrastructural expansion remains limited, then the result may be, as Steven Heydemann has warned, an authoritarian regime increasingly reliant on ‘repressive-exclusionary modes of governance’. In that scenario we may see a state that is unwilling to tolerate the presence of private actors providing services, but which favours utilising its coercive apparatus over welfare provision in its response to societal demands, as it seeks to ensure its future.

If Sisi’s authoritarian regime comes to rely increasingly on despotic and ‘exclusionary-repressive’ forms of power, will this mode of authoritarian rule somehow be a stronger and more stable form of authoritarian rule? It might be easy to equate increased repression and blunt demonstrations of power with a more stable authoritarian regime. Yet this might not necessarily be the case. In their article, ‘Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World’, Goodwin and Skocpol undertake a comparative analysis to identify which regime-types are more susceptible to the emergence of revolutionary coalitions. They find that ‘inclusionary’ authoritarian regimes that sponsor mass political mobilization through single parties, or regulate bargaining among various social groups, tend to be more immune from revolutionary transformations. On the other hand, ‘closed’ or ‘exclusionary’ regimes are more conducive to the formation of revolutionary coalitions, as their rather narrow regime may become a highly visible focus of shared opposition, whilst

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economic grievances of groups excluded from the political system are more likely to become politicised.\(^4\) Indications are that Egypt’s authoritarian regime is becoming more of the ‘closed’ variant, as evidenced by factors such as the decision not to form a political party, widespread exclusion of civil society, and, particularly, the repression of the Islamic movement. If this continues, then the stability of this repressive, closed, authoritarian regime may become more susceptible to opposition and broad-based revolutionary coalitions.

This dissertation has demonstrated how the Arab Uprisings created a juncture which has broken down existing theories relating to the role of non-state service provision in sustaining authoritarian rule. By introducing the concept of hollow statism, it has offered a path to increased understanding of authoritarian adaptation after the Arab Spring, and the future role of service provision within the region. It has offered a novel approach by engaging with the intersection of empirical practices relating to the balance of service provision between state and society, and the production of discourses that helps to sustain authoritarian rule. To reiterate, this dissertation provided four main contributions. Firstly, it questioned the view that authoritarian regimes manage civil society in an ‘indirect’ form, as part of the ‘authoritarian upgrading’ argument. Instead, it has shown a shift to a more ‘direct’ form of control, which attempts to expand the state’s ‘infrastructural power’ through state institutions. Secondly, this finding was used to conceptualise Egypt’s reconstituted authoritarian regime under the Sisi presidency, adding to existing work in this area by other scholars. An increase of statism in the regime’s strategy for managing Islamic movements was shown, representing the concept of ‘hollow statism’ in its control of social and religious institutions. Thirdly, empirical contributions have been provided, detailing intra-Islamic dynamics during the transitional period. This included both formally apolitical actors and the Muslim Brotherhood/FJP during the transitional period. More research could still be carried out in

\(^4\) Goodwin and Skocpol, 496.
this area, particularly on the FJP’s approach to governance during its brief year in power. Finally, a theoretical contribution was developed to understand the internal dynamics of Islamic movements, and their relations with authoritarian regimes, by drawing on David Lewis’ dualistic approach to civil society, distinguished between ‘self-organizational’ and ‘public sphere’ activities.

These findings provide the basis for comparisons beyond the Egyptian case. Further research could consider whether ‘authoritarian learning’ has occurred, with other states adopting the strategies outlined here in their own relations with Islamic movements. For example, Saudi Arabia’s support for Egypt under Sisi has emphasised a deep anti-Brotherhood focus. What impact has this had on other contexts? The clampdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is suggestive of such a pattern. Another possibility for comparative work would be to abstract the object of analysis further, and consider this case in relation to authoritarianism more generally during specific structural changes. In particular, the research design could compare cases of reconstituted authoritarianism in states that have experienced a period of nascent democratization. This could potentially include cases from post-communist Europe, as well as Central and East Asia. This approach would extend the significance beyond the Middle East context, and enhance the theoretical leverage of the study.

APPENDIX 1

List of key search terms

Al-Azhar  
al-’azhar

Al-Da’wa al-Salafiyya  
al-da’wa al-salafiyya

Al-Gam’iyya al-Shar‘iyya  
al-jam‘iyya al-shar‘iyya

Annexation (eg. of associations)  
dam

Ansar al-Sunna  
anṣār al-sunna

Associations(s)  
jam‘iyyat/jam‘iyyat

Brotherhoodization  
ikhwanat al-dawla

Dar al-Ifta  
dār al-ifta’

Donations  
tibra‘āt

Dissolution (eg. of associations)  
ḥal

Distribution (eg. of bread)  
tawzī’

Establishment (eg. of associations)  
mu’sasa / ta’sīs / ‘inshā’

Freedom and Justice Party  
al-ḥuriyya wa al-’adāla

General Federation of NGOs  
al-‘itiḥād al-‘ām li-l-jam‘iyyat wa al-mu‘asisāt

Medical caravans  
qawāfil ṭabiyya

Ministry of Awqaf  
wizārat al-’awqāf

Ministry of Health  
wizārat al-ṣaḥa

Ministry of Social Solidarity  
wizārat al-ta’dāmun

Ministry of Supply  
wizārat al-tamwīn

Mosque(s)  
masjid / masājid

Muslim Brotherhood  
al-ikhwān al-muslimīn

Popular committees  
lijān sha‘abiyya

Preacher training institutes  
ma‘āhid al-da‘ā’

Provision (eg. of services)  
tawfīr

Religious discourse  
al-khitāb al-dīnī

Social services  
khidmāt ijtimā‘iyya

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Welfare
Zakat
Zawiyya(s)
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