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THINKING FOR THE BOUND AND DEAD: BEYOND MAN(3) TOWARDS A NEW (TRULY) UNIVERSAL THEORY OF HUMAN VICTORY

BY MIRON J. CLAY-GILMORE

Ph.D. in Philosophy, The University of Edinburgh, 2023
Acknowledgements

This project is dedicated to the lives and memory of my brother and sister: Kaelin Gilmore-Mitchell and Harryl Tate. This endeavor would not have been possible without the love and support of my wife, Lauren, our children (Kae’Mariah, Kiya and Justice) and my parents. I could not have undertaken this journey without the help of my dissertation committee: Drs. Tommy Curry, Amir Jaima, and Norman Ajari. Words cannot express my gratitude for their patience and feedback throughout this process. I am also grateful to my (academic and nonacademic) mentors. Their sound advice and belief in me has kept my motivation high and refocused me on the things that really matter when my morale was low.
Abstract/Lay Summary

This project is a blend of Africana intellectual history and philosophical anti-humanism. The opening chapter seeks to contextualize the thought of Huey P. Newton in the Black nationalist tradition outline his conceptualization of US empire – ‘Reactionary Intercommunalism’. I use the second chapter to explore counterinsurgency as a historical phenomenon that laid the basis for European colonization and the civilizing mission during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries and the modern phenomena understand as racial violence. The third chapter analyzes how gender ideological have been deployed toward this end historically and through contemporaneous Black scholarship before using the final chapter to introduce the theory of killology or MAN3. This theory advances the claim that counterinsurgency as a modality of warfare be understood as the contemporary fountainhead of western humanism and thus as the primary force of social regulation which proleptically organizes modern civilization on a spatially and temporally indeterminate basis to defeat/subvert insurgent populations before they are ever mobilized towards resistance through the application of technology, deadly force to those constructed as threats and control of the information environment towards this end.
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The new millennium has set the stage for Black philosophy to realize the potentiality of evolving beyond a deadening stasis of under-specialization and dereliction. Emerging as a professionalized area of study after the push for new structural foundation to American society in the protests of the 1960s, Africana philosophy began as a response to calls “for new ways of thinking about race, racism and the historical struggles” of African/African-descended peoples around the world. Black social scientists and psychologists contributed to the development of new patterns of thought and radicalism by drawing on thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X and Kwame Ture, while philosophers turned their attention towards the study of the organization and function of racism, its expressions in imperialism, colonization and globalization by formulating themes and establishing the idea that Black literature, autobiographies and narratives signified a unique kind of existence which fractured the normative ideals and concepts assumed to apply to all people without particularity in the discipline. However, their reliance on continental philosophical methods and the canonical pressures American (white) philosophy imposed on Black thought towards assimilationism delimited this rupture in thought. Thus, despite a promising start and the acknowledgement that white philosophy “is in many respects a toxic enterprise in which the souls of Black folks are in a continuous very real danger of deformation by disciplinary agendas” that are indifferent and hostile to “the lives and articulations of folks of African descent,” Black philosophy never actualized a divergence from disciplinarity to develop culturally specific methods that contribute to a study of Blackness. Rather, Black philosophical inquiry has been characterized by a “derelictical crisis” since the 1970s wherein Black thought is read against and legitimated by European continuities. Consequently, foundational debates became refocused and sought to determine whether (or not) Black thought “lived up to the standards of white questions set as being traditionally philosophical” – leaving Black philosophy “overburdened by the need to prove” its “legitimacy to the white philosophical academy.” This methodological quandary has been intensified by a normative mandate that censors the theoretician through imposing a teleological drive on the study of Black people towards the racial status quo or assimilationism. As Tommy Curry explains in On Derelict and Method (2011),

“In this problematic, African-descended people are studied not as they are but as the inquirer thinks they should be given the political and ideological goals of post–civil rights discourse about race. In other words, inquiring into Blackness, or asking the “how should” question asserts a propagandist frame where racism is assumed to be a no longer impeding remnant of a distant past. When we ask “how should we understand race?” or “how should we understand African/Black culture?” or “what is race?” the answers to these questions are conditioned by the teleological impetus to assimilate Blacks into American society—in other words, there is a decidedly
political and ideological temperament to the study of Blackness that axiomatically asserts the transformative success of America’s integrationist policy.”

The intense deradicalization and repression of Black thought by American philosophy – its imposition of integrationist ideology through the demonization of knowledge grounded in the Africanity of Black thought and the historical or psychical consciousness of the African diaspora as essentialist, illegitimate, anti-American and deficient in rigor – “must be appreciated as an epistemological and ontological achievement” that undoubtedly stems from its Cold War predecessor. Under this onto-epistemological milieu, philosophy’s disciplinary myth of origin as a product of Western civilization’s “Aryan heritage,” its doctrinaire “appeals to a shared philosophical anthropology” and “metaphysical structure of the world” remain unshaken by the challenge of the anti-colonial/Black Power/Human Rights movements of the 20th century. This disciplinary and ideological configuration of the philosophy has produced studies of Blackness and Africana thought within a scope that restricts the exploration of Black nationalism or the Black radical tradition that exceeds the categorical boundaries of western/American liberalism. Said differently, disciplinary mandate that Black philosophy censor itself to “not stray too far away from established canonical traditions and figures” has led to the propagandistic establishment of liberalism and racial integration as the apothecary of Black nationalist thought as opposed to its antithesis. That is to say, despite their awareness of “the illusory claims and delusional character that accompany the philosophical project” and its predication on the white racial experience, Black philosophers have solidified the truncation of Black diasporic thought into western philosophical anthropology, liberal (especially Rawlsianism), pragmatism, feminism, assimilationist/anti-essentialist paradigms and moralistic discourses.

Against the disciplinary dogma of academic philosophy, this work exemplifies a new development in Black philosophical thought – the emergence of “a necropolitical moment” – that focuses on “life-and-death situations as definitional features” of the Black social condition and racial violence rather than instances of individual “discrimination and exclusion in terms of access” or gender to contribute to a greater understanding of “race, racism and dehumanization.” Rather than reifying the racial normativity of the Cold War cum analytic American tradition, attempting to pluralize political philosophy by deracializing liberalism through non-ideal theory or deploying “navel-gazing” methods that are “unabashedly a priori” and rooted in white humanism, this study begins by filling the gap in knowledge in the aftermath of Black philosophy’s dereliction by conducting an intellectual history of one of the most neglected thinkers of the 20th century: Huey P. Newton. Newton (along with the entire Black radical tradition he represents) has been so effectively demonized and discredited by scholars since his targeting by the US government under the illegal COINTELPRO program that studies of his theory of ‘intercommunalism’ or the Black Panther Party writ large have been overdetermined by the phobias of white America of him as a ‘folk-devil’ or super-predator who merely aped theories of revolution from the Third World, was a misogynistic ‘Black macho’, lacking in rigor and originality, and who ultimately desired “the eventual destruction of the white race.” Indeed, even scholars who query Newton’s theory of empire beyond these phobias resort to a comparative analysis of his model with those of European leftists and elide an understanding of the historical genealogy or philosophical anthropology of Newton’s framework that stems from patterns of thinking in the broader Black consciousess of Afro-Americans or the US Black nationalist tradition going back to the chattel enslavement period. Despite the caricatures of him produced by scholars as a sophomoric thinker, the first
chapter will argue that Newton’s theoretical model of intercommunalism constitutes an original contribution that analytically sophisticated internal/neo-colonialism theory (the framework used by Black nationalists since the 19th century to understand the Black American condition) and identified counterinsurgency as the “unprecedented concept” that drove the counterrevolutionary foreign policy and domestic managerial techniques of the US as an empire to “control all the world’s land and people.”

The second chapter will counter dominant trends in Black thought that deploys standpoint epistemology and gender theory to motivate theorists’ call for an intersectional analysis which would act as a corrective on the focus on Black male vulnerability to state violence and racism which renders those with intersecting identities (historically, culturally and politically) invisible, to aid in “combating Black male sexism”, participation in patriarchy and the incorrect association in the mind of the public of Blackness as solely connoting maleness by pluralizing it with multiple varieties of identity subordination as opposed to single subordinate group identities. In an effort to advance our conceptual acumen and rebuff the reification of western philosophical anthropology and epistemology (MAN) rife in Black studies/thought since the 70s, I build on empirical findings in history, Social Domination Theory and Black Male Studies to argue that counterinsurgency is the basic organizing principle of western defense, military and policing apparati as it relates to racialized populations. Furthermore, I defend this claim by providing a comprehensive account of how counterinsurgency has developed historically to secure the emergence of colonial empires from the 17th through the 19th centuries and how it was reconceptualized in the context of the ‘Cold War’ in the 20th century as a remedy to Third World anti-colonialism, the threat of Black Power and the broader global human rights movement, then recapitulated as the basis of the (still ongoing) ‘Global War on Terrorism’.

The paradigm of Black Male Studies has been formulated as a rupture to negate the “ideological determinism operating within the current gender paradigms” and racist caricatures of black masculinity that guide Black scholarship today. The intellectual genealogy provided by Black Male Studies scholars thus far demonstrates the genesis of many of the basic suppositions and tropes (particularly the intra-racial rapist and racial-sexual stratification theory/Black patriarchy) still dominant in Black (studies) feminist theory and literature, but I aim to make this rupture more complete by contextualizing the emergence and dependency of Black feminist criticism on criminological theories and deterministic caricatures of Black males as an artifact of US counterinsurgency operations on Black Americans and other potentially dangerous populations in the decades thereafter. Indeed, the emancipation and protection of darker races of women from “allegedly over-sexed, barbarous male enemies” justified the civilizing mission and the western colonial endeavor more generally. The broader discourse that undergirded colonial counterinsurgencies “designated the white male “superior” to the “inferior” dark male” and these logics motivated the institutionalization of rules and statutes that defended (white) women’s “honor”—a discursive strategy used by European (men and women) towards “undermining the enemy and weakening his legitimacy.” The third chapter will argue that despite the scholarly consensus that it is essentially a radical development, the defection of Black feminist literature from the Black nationalist aesthetic (and Black Studies in its original conception), its reliance on racist criminological theory to understand Black maleness, the strategic function of the Black Buck and intra-racial rapist tropes to discredit Black militancy, and its role in furnishing whites with pathological caricatures of Black males must be understood within the broader counterinsurgent
agenda of the US state since the 1970s and its reliance on modernization discourses of cultural pathology. The continuities between the colonial discourses of women’s degradation and Black feminist criticism are undeniable: Black women are understood by the latter as essentially domesticated subjects whose brutalization via intimate partner violence and ‘femicide’ can only be stopped by a more effective police state that can penetrate the domestic sphere on their behalf. Just as the role of women’s emancipation in colonial domains was aimed at delegitimizing insurgencies on this basis in service of assimilationist politics, Black feminism has not only negated the iconography of the Black male militant (especially the leaders of the Black Panther Party) fighting for decolonial self-determination but also performed a function key to successful information (psychological) operations in modern counterinsurgencies: the targeting of the perception through narratives of populations to deter fighting, induce surrender and secure ‘popular support’ for the counterinsurgents.

The final chapter of this work builds on philosopher Sylvia Wynter’s identification of the classarchy of the white male/female subject as the basis of the ‘Millenium of MAN’ and its ontological negation of Black being. Wynter’s framework of MAN has been a central focus of Black studies scholars, but the focal point of engagement with it thus far has been little more than an attempt to use this theory as the basis for reasserting Western gender categories, Black/decolonial feminist theories of subjectivity and intersectional theories of oppression to make concrete the reanimation of Black (female) humanity. Against these tendencies, I argue that Wynter’s problematic MAN2 foreshadows the emergence of a new proleptic being—MAN3—a kind of MAN that exceeds the political and economic iterations of the 19th and 20th century by the extent to which counterinsurgent forms of democratic liberal development, imprisonment and killing are all simultaneously deployed as the primary forces of social regulation. The reification of the 20th century dominant western genre of humanity — Man 2 — underwent an epochal transformation in the 1950s and 60s as a consequence of both the emergence of the US as our species’ first extra-territorial or planetary empire and one which mastered conditioning the nervous systems of its military/police agents to “kill the enemy” (MAN as Praetorian) along with its spearheading of the western liberal response to anticolonial insurgencies (and then all such threats into our current millennium) through a mastery of population-centric warfare with assistance of cutting edge technology with a basis in police-military professionalization whose destructive capacity is conditioned on the racialized construction of threats via counterinsurgency warfare, or killology. Thus, I posit that the new struggle for the human of this millennium (its primary ontological/epistemological contradiction) is between the imperative of securing the well-being of our present normative Western bourgeois civilizational construct of the human, MAN3 (MAN as defender of the status quo/homo homini lupus or man as wolf to other man AKA the Praetorian) informed by a mastery of counterinsurgency and killology as the basis for liberal civil society and social development) which overrepresents itself as if it were the human as it actually exists, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves (in its innumerable plurality).

This new order of knowledge-being has preserved the ontological negation of racialized populations (African/African descended peoples with a particular intensity) as its opposite through a framework of cultural inferiority (as opposed to its previous criterion of eugenic selection/dysselecion). On this basis, MAN3 sociogenically construes racialized populations as monstrous threats to the social order (i.e. the “terrorist”, “immigrant”, “[black] criminal or super-
The planetary proleptic elimination of this threat – what I term killology - has been electrified to an unprecedented degree by the implementation of new kinds of psychological, surveillance and military technology (prison, surveillance, drones and other kinds of semi-autonomous lethal weapons and the strategic deployment of classical and operant conditioning to propagandize and desensitize the nervous system of agents of the state towards the killing act, along with a new and deadlier white power movement). A new population-centric approach to black militancy and thought (along with a strident resistance to the criminalization of self-defense, and a new Black consciousness or set of ‘inner eyes’ based on revolutionary suicide) with the masses as its center of gravity will be the basis for a cultural-logical contribution toward accomplishment of a new truly human theory of victory—the accomplishment of a new Human. Any rebuttal to this position is simply out of touch with the current order of knowledge-being and its basis in the civilizational mastery of counterinsurgency in the late 20th century in response to anticolonialism and any (physical or ideational) threats to the social order thereafter. Rather than simply positing new hermeneutics or endeavoring to humanize Blackness with feminist/gender theory, Black thought must formulate a new population-centric theory of humanity (sociogeny) with a basis in Black militancy. Only from this foundation, I argue, can a new theory of victory to the indeterminate global war against terrorism be accomplished and ensure the introduction of a new cognitive order in which we, as a species, breach the full dimensions of our human autonomy and knowledge can be rewritten accordingly.


Chapter 1: Approach to Danger – The Study of Huey P. Newton as the Study of Amerikkka’s Archetypal ‘Super-Predator’

“A genuine intellectual possesses at least two characteristics—the desire to tell the truth and the courage to do so. Consequently, this individual is inevitably considered a “troublemaker” and a “nuisance” by the ruling class seeking to preserve the status quo.”

—— Judson Jeffries

“Then this is the knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having double use military and philosophical […]”

—— Socrates

“Rome lasted for six hundred years, and we are just coming on to our two-hundredth. That doesn't mean that we have four hundred to go. We have to step back and look at ourselves protectively… How much of this dissent and revolution talk can we really stand in a healthy country? Revolutions always start in a small way… Economic conditions are bad; the credibility of government is low. These are the things that the homegrown revolutionary is monitoring very closely. The FBI's attention must be focused on these various situations. If it weren't, the Bureau wouldn't be doing its job for the American people… The American people don't want to have to fool around with this kind of thing and worry about it; they don't want to have to worry about the security of their country… We must be able to find out what stage the revolution is in.”

—— Edward Miller (former assistant director of the FBI in charge of the Intelligence Division)

Introduction – Phallicism as a Decolonial Hermeneutic to Understand the Demonization of Huey Newton from the FBI’s COINTELPRO to Contemporary Scholarship

Though the US had already instituted a doctrinal agenda of global police counterinsurgency before their emergence, the practice of population centric warfare was modernized after being calibrated to surveil and militarily subvert the Black community the Civil Rights cum Black Liberation Movement, and any other revolution outside of the Western liberal civilizational schema. As part of their plan to destroy the Black Liberation Movement in particular – which the Black Panther Party (BPP) proclaimed itself the vanguard of – the FBI’s Division Five administrated a counterinsurgent ‘COINTELPRO’ program whose activity reflected the basic patterns of thinking of agency officials’ anxieties about the potentialities of an insurgent international movement led by Black males. Subsequent to the murder of Martin Luther King Jr., the BPP and Huey Newton in particular became an obsessive object in the minds of US security bureaucrats, epitomized as a potential “black messiah” who could “unify” and “electrify” the black masses and thus a ‘folk devil’ in the broader American psyche: the figure of the ‘bad nigger’ or super-predator whose ultimate aim is to accomplish “the eventual destruction of the white race” and as such is the “greatest threat to the internal security of the nation” was the dominant trope used to rationalize the demonization of Newton by security agency officials. To accomplish the neutralization of the threat of this potential ‘black messiah’ required a broad variety of counterinsurgency techniques which were later institutionalized as part of the fabric of American governance through the artifice of crime control. During this process, Newton and other Black
male militants (potential Black ‘messiahs’) were stereotyped as criminalistic zealots – “rantin’ and ravin’ radicals” and “hypocritical, ideological misogynists” – who not only represented a threat to women and children in their own communities but were nonrational entities whose philosophical justification for the organization of human society on revolutionary humanist and socialist principles were dismissed by agents of the state as simply excuses to rationalize “any unlawful or violent” act by criminals who sought to justify “terrorist-type” activities. vii Thus, the racialization of the criminal trope was crucial to COINTELPRO and rationalized a host of operations imposed on the Black community—at its climax FBI and CIA officials held the “view that blacks represented a greater threat to white America than did communists” or even white power/KKK-type white supremacists. viii

As part of its “frontal assault” style counterinsurgency campaign against Black Nationalists and African America as a population, COINTELPRO spearheaded a discreditation campaign centered on Huey Newton as the chief theoretician and Minister of Justice of the BPP. ix This operation sought to have a “3-pronged effect of creating divisiveness among BPP members concerning Newton, treat[ing] him in a flippant and irreverent manner, and insinuate that he has been cooperating with police to gain his release from prison.” x The administration of this program of discreditation produced grim results. According to FBI documents, they effectively induced Newton into the exhibition of “paranoid like reactions to anyone who questions his order, polices, actions or otherwise” displeased him within the BPP. xi FBI operatives not only acknowledged the impact of their activities on Newton but sought to intensify these maneuvers after establishing their success. To understand the totalizing impact of these operations along with prolonged periods of solitary confinement, and a “gruesome mind-altering medical experiment” conducted by the US on Newton as an individual over the course of his life, consider the words of John Stockwell (a former station chief of the CIA in Angola): "I want to say this to you...the Huey P. Newton that people see today is the direct result of operations run by the Central Intelligence Agency to insure that he would turn out the way that he is." xii To be clear, although the COINTELPRO operations which aimed to “demythicise” Newton and “hold him up to ridicule” began with US security agencies deploying criminalistic (and homoerotic) caricatures of him as an “enemy of the state”, I argue that this objective is now primarily achieved through the production of scholarship which has been key to ensuring the “ongoing phenomenon” of the Panthers (and especially Huey Newton) being reduced by intellectuals to demonic figures which are simply converted to reflect “the projections of different fears and anxieties” of the white American psyche. xiii It was formally ended in 1971, but COINTELPRO and the array of programs which followed it as part of the US’ doctrinal application of counterinsurgency techniques to crush the Black Liberation Movement and the “thought of assertive Black manhood” it represented (the Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force ‘JATTF’, Prison Activist Program ‘PRISAC’, Operation Newkill, The ‘Black Program’ BLACPRO, etc.) has had the cumulative effect of overdetermining the disciplinary narratives, debates and conceptual formulas through which scholars appraise Newton’s philosophical ideas. xiv The delimiting of Newton as a worthy subject of study should not be surprising given that the same agency that spearheaded the counterintelligence war against him has also functioned as “the most dedicated and influential forgotten critic of African American” literary and intellectual production since its founding. xv

thought was a primary function of the FBI from its historical beginnings as the General Intelligence Division, whose “filing and long study of African American writers was tightly bound to the agency’s successful evolution under Hoover.” Importantly, Maxwell explains that the Bureau’s urge to surveil and manipulate Black writing stemmed from early ethnological understandings of Blacks’ lack of racial manhood. Within (racial) ethnological thinking of the FBI, the African race was understood as having an “especially “emotional nature” and thus prone to sedition given their status “as both the lady and [thus] the extremist of the races.” Said differently, Blacks were understood by FBI officials as entities who resided on a lower anthropological register and thereby “designated as female as a mark of its uncivilized lack of” manhood. This racial-ethnological notion that Blacks’ lack of manhood made them potentially deviant and unfit for citizenship was folk wisdom at the birth of the young republic and produced an intellectual legacy in the US that “stigmatized enslaved blacks as incipient insurrectionist and brooding rapists” – only close “supervision and control and the threat of severe punishment, including castration for sexual as well as other offenses” could keep Black men “in check” as potential security threats. Thus, the long range surveillance of the Black population by the FBI was rationalized in the minds of agents of the state, (for whom the racial strata of American society was “applied to foreign problems without fear that the concept itself would arise domestic controversy”) as a rational product of the ethnological inferiority of the black population which made them less able to handle the burdens of citizenship in a republic premised on white manhood. However, after the ‘racial riots’ of the Red Summer and the developments of the New Negro/Garvey movement in Harlem J. Edgar Hoover instituted a shift within the newly established agency to surveil Black activists, writers and intellectuals that would last into latter parts of the 20th century when Newton was targeted for his activism on the basis of criminalistic stereotypes. As Maxwell explains,

The FBI’s prying into this modernism entailed its first counterliterary step to convert black literary innovation into criminological capital. Refining the nineteenth-century conception of the criminal as a “type of species, the ‘dangerous individual’”, the Bureau transformed the arrival of Claude McKay, Langston Hughes, and their New Negro peers into the birth of a new criminal genus, one whose deviant literacy, independent of any felony, endangered national security in place of bygone slave codes.

Many of the ethnological tropes of the late 19th century, which were responded and refuted by Black male thinkers such as Claude McKay, Langston Hughes, W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey served as the basis of the mid-20th century criminological tropes deployed to demonize Black Power militants. Said differently, negativistic psycho-sexual logics of dehumanization in two specific iterations (ethnological and then eugenic) of Black men white prefigured them as always already potential threats to society whose surveillance and eradication through, killing and imprisonment functioned to rationalize the repression of Black (male) Nationalists throughout the late 19th and 20th century: from Marcus Garvey to Malcolm X. Accordingly, despite his synthesis of Black Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism to translate the historical consciousness or “historical experience of black people”, his revolutionary humanism, egalitarian conception of Black manhood (in line with 19th century Black nationalists), or his novel philosophical theory of US empire, Huey P. Newton remains to be thought of as a tragic and ultimately violent-type character whose adaptation of the Black nationalist tradition of armed self-defense has been simplified into a masculinist endeavor whose goal was accessing “the same patriarchal privileges
they saw white men enjoyed”, allegedly rudimentary aping of Marxist dogma, improper use of anti-colonial theories like semi-(internal) colonialism and a criminalistic personal tendency that scholars repeatedly cite to belittle Newton “for lack of originality and rigor” and “disregard him as a scholar”, author or important philosophical thinker in any regard. xxiv Rather, Newton has been deemed a “Black macho” and “plain old thug” whose comparison to “Dr. King or Malcolm [X] is downright blasphemy” notwithstanding the latter being cited as the spiritual basis of the BPP by Newton himself. xxv In response to journalist Ken Kelly’s editorial on Newton’s legacy just three weeks after his death in the *East Bay Express* magazine, Carl Miller aptly characterized what would become the dominant image of Newton and the BPP in public consciousness and academic literature. Miller wrote that Newton was “more than just another a thug” but is still a tragic figure whose “tactic of armed resistance was contradictory, at best counterproductive, and for sure downright dangerous.” xxvi As a result of this ideological consensus, the study of Dr. Huey P. Newton is the study of the ‘bad nigger’ or the archetypal super-predator. His stereotyping is one of a “stone cold predator” and ultimately a subject beneath scholarly investigation or intellectual historical treatment xxvii The Black male as a savage or super-predator (thug-criminal/terrorist) whose death is necessary to prevent “the deviant impulse and birth” of this group has overdetermined the militaristic disciplinary agenda of Liberal scholars as it relates to Newton. Consider the fact that an American academic published a comparison of Newton’s philosophical thinking with Osama Bin Laden’s (in 2007) 6 years before the first scholarly monograph to conducted a comprehensive and analysis of the history and politics of the Black Panther Party. xxviii To put it another way, the thinking leading theoretician of the vanguard group of the Black Power movement was compared to a figure who was considered “the most wanted man in the world” as a result of his role in the 9/11 attacks on the US and the archetype of evil across the Western world until his murder in 2011. That such a study was published is emblematic of the fact that Newton and the Panthers have reached “the status of “folk devils” in the American psyche” and the role of scholarship in overdetermining Newton’s image as an internal terrorist/criminal. xxix

Though many authors claim to have such an intention as the object of a given study, scholarly works on Newton are mired in negative valuations of Newton’s personal character rather than providing a cogent intellectual history of Newton as a philosophical thinker who was subject to the most lethal and repressive state techniques of the 20th century. Following the crushing counterinsurgency tactics of COINTELPRO, white writers (many of whom were former radicals turned right wing pundits) provided a hungry American public various ideological justifications of the repression of the Panthers (the Black Liberation Movement and the mass criminalization of Black Americans writ large) in a spate of works published in the 70s which depicted the Panthers in general and Huey Newton specifically as archetypally violence-prone, corrupt, and terroristic. xxx Such a representation echoed a general tendency that took shape in American thinking in the 20th century as “crime began to be equated with young Black males” and racial thinking shifted to fixate “on the criminality of the “young black male” to acquire the mass support for “extreme levels of coercive control applied to a substantial proportion of the African American population.” xxxi This period dawned an era in which “policing was counterinsurgency” and “proactive policing tactics and special units, acquired military-grade weaponry and crime reporting technologies, and advanced paramilitary deployments” to patrol in high-crime (i.e. Black American) areas were adopted and institutionalized to make crime-control a new device of social engineering to criminalize Black people en masse. xxii As a result of this application of population centric methods of counterintelligence and counterinsurgency operations on the Black community,
the entire Black radical tradition in America became subjected to a process of negation with the intent to “dampen, discredit and demonize the revolutionary potential of African-Americans.” Accordingly, after his death in 1989, a “near flood of commentary on the Panthers” that published which converged on negative characterizations of Newton as a one-dimensional drug addict, murder, and reckless firebrand. This literature was combined with “a group of articles written over a 10-year period, by various writers, including Kate Coleman, Paul Avery, Peter Collier and David Horowitz, that charged Newton with being the cause of the death of a number of people.”

These demonic caricatures were absorbed and recapitulated by Hugh Pearson in his biography of Newton, *Shadow of the Panther (1995)*, which had the effect of giving a new veneer of legitimacy to right wing interpretations of Newton and the BPP authored decades before. That is to say, the book is a repeat of the claims made by Horowitz, Collier, Coleman, Avery and Ken Kelly “under Pearson’s name” and “written in a manner that seeks to raise a serious of accusatory statements that were generally ignored outside of right-wing circles, to (now that they were being fronted by an African-American), historical truth.” The impact of the ideological and racist impulse to understand Newton (and thus the Panthers) as concrete instances of the super-predator has made the presentation of “a fair and balanced portrayal of the Panthers” a “major challenge to mainstream perceptions and scholarship” (in the rare cases when Newton is subject to intellectual study) despite the negative response to Pearson’s work from academics. Conceptualized to survey “the sexual discrimination and death of Black males within a militarized police state that constantly subjects such bodies to violence and brutalization”, phallicism is an appropriate historical and conceptual stratagem to chronologize the negative sexual accounts of Huey Newton (the Panthers and Black males in general) in American scholarship, and understand the role scholarship continues to play in providing rationalizations of Newton’s repression by the government and the institutionalization of these techniques at the heart of government policy towards the Black population as being in service of “protecting women, society and civility” and ultimately necessary in the minds of US security officials and citizens alike.

Building upon the arguments presented in *The Man-Not (2017)*, philosopher Tommy Curry advances the theory of phallicism first by providing an outline of how western knowledge has concretized the idea of the Black male as a threat to white civilization due to his lack of manhood (gender) and subhuman status. As Curry explains, during slavery “the ethnological consensus was that he [the Black male] was simply not Man.” Due to his effeminacy, the Black male was thought to be unfit for civil society and his emancipation from slavery to be antecedent to the “doom of white civilization” by unleashing “the primordial rage of the Black male rapist” that was constrained by the institution of chattel enslavement. Within the regime of enslavement, ethnologists argued that Black males’ lack of racial manhood/patriarchy made them developmentally determined to evolve into rapists as part of their nature. Black men shared distance from Western (white) man and the patriarchal races a priori. Said differently, the “ontogenesis of this creature was from the feminine-male-savage to that of the rapist” – his “maturation and growth toward adulthood” was “marked by the onset of puberty” that “devolved him to his most basic sexual instinct” which made freedom incompatible with the nature of the race. Ethnology lost favor in the mid-1900s and in its placed emerged anthropology, sociology and social science to account for Black males’ “temperament and psychical dislocation” to solidify
“the categories founded upon white anthropology or that of the human” which is a bourgeois order of being (kind) over and against the ontological condition of Black male being. xlili

By the mid-1930s, ethnology would come to be replaced by a more psychoanalytically driven sociology in the United States which “introduced the idea that Black men were primarily motivated to violence through their internalized hatred of whites” under Jim Crow. xliii Scholars such as John Dollard, Abram Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey deployed psychoanalysis to diagnose the maladjustment and specific psychoses created by Jim Crow segregation using ethnographic from Southern whites and Blacks to analyze the drives and desires of these populations. In this literature, the social isolation and inferior caste position of Blacks under this regime was posited as producing a “distinctive psychology” within the Black race that made violence a racial trait: thus, “Black men were culturally predetermined by the racial order to be violent” to others men and women in their community “and psychologically disposed to such aggression by their repressed want of vengeance against whites.”xliiv More generally, Black males were held to be “socially, politically, and interpersonally impotent” by white social scientists.xlv These deficits, stemming from structural and psychological factors, led to the infantilization of Black boys along with “various dependency and antisocial complexes, while nonetheless hyper-sexualizing them.”xlvi Thus, into the 1970s, Black men remained to be problematized based on their lack of manhood: understood to be “sexual predators and hyper-sexual” given their fatherless homes, family disorganization and “weakened ego formation” rooted in their effeminacy.xlvii Thus, the 20th century “caricature of the feminine Black male reiterated the ethnological thinking of Black males in the nineteenth century as a maladjusted psychologism” – this group had no functional familial role and suffered from a female personality disorder that matured into hyper-masculinity.xlviii Despite its roots in “a racist trope that hold Black boys to be culturally deformed and socially deviant”, hypermasculinity was the “dominant view of Black men from the 1930s to the late 1980s.”xliv Importantly, this view was posited as a product of Black males’ “neurosis and cultural marginalization, which increased their propensity for delinquency” given their inability to achieve manhood in society.1

Like other racial phobics that emerged to facilitate the colonization of European empires more broadly, “white sociologists and racists were firmly committed to the racial inferiority and sexual effeminization of Black males”, meaning that the idea that they were patriarchal could not “exist within the white sociological, psychological, or historical accounts” of Black males in the 20th century.li Specifically, the emergence of Black feminist literature the idea of Black male patriarchy (over and against Black women) was birthed as a reaction to men like Eldridge Cleaver and Huey Newton’s prominence during the Black Power era whose assertive iteration of Black manhood (and Black nationalism) was interpreted as “hopelessly dependent upon Black Macho—a male chauvinist that was frequently cruel, narcissistic and shortsighted.”ll Though recanted, this assessment has solidified a link between “theories of Black men’s hyper-masculinity and deviance in the late 1970s and 1980s” fundamentally to their quest for political power and human rights that remains the guiding proposition to understand Black manhood in Black Studies today: the “mimetic thesis, or the idea that Black males seek to emulate and ultimately realize themselves as patriarchs next to white men.”lll Through an intellectual genealogy of Black feminist theory and the ethnological, psychoanalytic and criminological ideas which it is indebted to, Black Male Studies functions as a refutation of the assimilation of errant theories about Black males in Black
thought. To remedy the gap in knowledge engendered by the dependence of race-gender theory on the Black Macho trope, Curry postulates the theory of phallicism.

Curry formulates phallicism in response to intersectional theories of oppression that proceed from the use of static axioms about the nature of intra and intergroup stratification. His conceptual method to displace the dominant rubrics of race, class and gender which engender this problem is Social Dominance Theory (SDT). SDT is a tripartite conception of group-based hierarchies in western capitalist, racist patriarchies. SDT theorists argue that there are three domains of stratification: age, sex/gender, and arbitrary-set classification – this last axis of stratification being the repository of the greatest degree of violence. Furthermore, arbitrary sets are typified by divisions between in and outgroup males and “presents an insurmountable border between the men and women of the dominant group and the males of inferior groups.”

To explain why “males suffer more occurrences of outward discrimination and lethal violence than” females of subordinate groups, SDT theorists posited ‘the subordinate male target hypothesis’.

The explanatory force of the SDT framework caused intersectional theories of oppression to undergo a recalibration, moving “away from additive and interactive explanations of Black female disadvantage towards notions of invisibility.”

This new approach is characterized by intersectional invisibility (II) theory, which argues that outgroup males’ greater death and dying by lethal force be understood as a consequence of their visibility or privilege as males in an androcentric society. However, Curry takes issue with both SDT and intersectional invisibility. The latter “must presume that racialized males are dehumanized – that they possess a lesser life – for the calculus to work.”

Moreover, the association made by the intersectionality invisibility framework of androcentrism, non-prototypicality and invisibility is contradicted by SDT as a theory of intergroup prejudice: gender differentiation within the dominant group sparks a complementary dynamic that allows dominant group women to function as triggers of male aggression towards subordinate males. But both assume a heteronormativity that has led SDT and II theorists to ignore the “rape and sexual violence historically perpetuated upon racialized male bodies.”

However, Curry argues that the peculiar sexual configuration of racialized males stems from “a structure of patriarchal imposition and imperial conquest which rationalizes the disposability of male victims of genocide or conquest as a honorific, insofar as the elimination of the male threat is ridding the world of primitivity, or evil, while nonetheless denigrating their flesh by sexual violence.”

As a result of this duality phallicism assumes a seemingly contradictory character wherein “males of a subordinate or ethnicized group are simultaneously imagined to be a sexual threat and predatory, and libidinally constituted as sexually desirous by the fantasies or fetishes of the dominant racial group.” This is expressed in a complementary inter-group dynamic that imposes “the brute power of white patriarchy” through various forms of violence (police murder, prison, etc.) “while having these brutish acts rationalized in service of protecting women, society and civility.” As a result of its conceptual rigor and empirically systematic analysis of the dehumanization of Black men, I posit phallicism as a socio-diagnostic (sociogenic) framework through which the demonization of Newton in academic writings as the archetypal super-predator or folk devil of the white Amerikkkan imagination be understood. This fiendish figure—the super-predator—is a phobic of the white imagination which functions to solidify a negative framing in academic literature of Huey Newton that contributes to a general view which is ultimately a reflection of whites’ group based racial consciousness and the ontological (counterinsurgency)
program produced as a result of the long range development of the US’ security agencies as subterfuges of domestic warfare which enforce the normative stratification of society “into superior and inferior classes of people.” In other words, the organizing principle maintaining Newton’s ontological negation prefigures him a priori “just a plain old thug,” and thus “as the inadequate”, the “conceptual antithesis” and reference by which American society and Western civilization defines and understands itself in a positive way.

Huey Newton epitomizes a (human) being that is not allowed. Rather than reifying the phobic of the super-predator/folk devil who is dedicated to “the eventual destruction of the white race” or an assimilationist agenda more common to American philosophy by converging Newton’s thinking into a [white] Leftist or western humanist tradition, this chapter will go beyond previous studies by establishing an intellectual genealogy of Huey Newton as a philosophical thinker within the American Black Nationalist tradition and positing his theory of US empire (intercommunalism) as a positive analytic development in Black Nationalist thought.

Newton’s philosophical theory of intercommunalism is best understood as a sophistication of the core framework of Black nationalism going back to the 19th century: internal colonialism theory. Starting from this basis, Newton matured his thinking to argue nations no longer existed because the US was the species’ first truly global empire.

The first section will offer an outline of the intellectual history of Newton’s philosophical thinking in the context of the cultural-logics of African-descended people in the US and the Western Hemisphere more broadly. This culturological context will show how Newton’s thinking was typified by the adaption of concepts and ideas towards the basic problems facing Black America and reflects their historical cultural group consciousness within a larger Black nationalist philosophical tradition of theorizing mastery/self-governance/self-defense going back to chattel slavery. With this intellectual history laid bare, Newton’s theory of ‘Intercommunalism’ can be properly understood as an analytic account of US empire which was formulated to explode the dominant theoretic used to by his contemporaries and Black nationalists going back to the 19th century: the internal colonialism model. For Newton, self-determination is no longer viable through the creation of a Black nation but must be secured through the accomplishment of revolutionary intercommunalism and the expropriation of technology from the US ruling class. Just as Newton adapted upon and stretched the fundamental concepts in Black nationalist thought, the paramilitary organization of the BPP also represented an evolutionary extension of the Black revolutionary nationalist tradition of armed self-defense. Together, these elements show that Newton’s philosophical theory of intercommunalism is the product of his synthesis and sophistication of armed self-defense and historical patterns of thinking present in Black America’s cultural consciousness going back to chattel slavery, translated through the framework of Marxism-Leninism.

The second section will dive deeper into Newton’s theory of intercommunalism. I outline its logic, methodology, emphasis on technology and underscore once more how these elements culminate into Newton’s theoretical explosion of the basic categories of the (neo) internal colonialism thesis in the tradition of Black nationalist thought. I will then outline the philosophical anthropology of revolutionary intercommunalism (will to power) and go about distinguishing particular tendencies of Newton’s thinking and dialectics from other dialectical materialists (Lenin, Mao, Fanon and Nkrumah). Undoubtedly, these and other anti-colonial theorists influenced his thinking. However, scholars’ overdetermination of Newton as a sophomoric
theoretician have led them to simply accuse him of aping Soviet doctrine, Maoism or Fanon’s lumpen-vanguard schema for revolution in Africa and erroneously applying it to the geography of North America to conceptualize intercommunalism. But a closer look at Newton and other anti-colonial thinkers who took up dialectical materialism shows this depiction to be false. Despite Fanon’s influence, Newton’s dialectical model for world revolution, categorical explosion of nationhood/neo-colonialism based on the development of US technology nor is his philosophical anthropology present in the works of any other dialectical materialists in the Third World. In the end, not only does Newton’s theory offer a unique dialectical account of US (global) empire but also an analysis of how the limited liberal democratic organization of the US is antecedent to the deployment of tactics like interagency cooperation to construct, arrange and implement security institutions towards counterinsurgent endeavors that ensure the criminalization and purging of Black (male) militants from the society. Despite its neglect and the assimilationist agenda of Black philosophers and Black Studies over the last four decades, intercommunalism stands as a damning diagnosis of American (limited) Democracy and the unprecedented global reach of US imperialism.

Section One: Clarifying the Intellectual History of Huey P. Newton

Huey Newton’s philosophical thinking unfolded in a Black Nationalist tradition that has its roots in negating the 19th century ethnological debates and 20th century social sciences asserting that “asserted that the Black race was congenitally inferior”, that African/African descended peoples had no history, that they be understood as barbaric entities whose ontogenesis had no capacity for the development of self-reflection and thus that all “proposals for emancipation were scientifically pointless.”lxvi As religious ideas waned in prominence, western taxonomy or philosophical anthropology became the basis for rationalizing the dehumanization, colonization and chattel enslavement of the darker races of the globe. In this intellectual milieu, ethnology emerged as a basis for the idealization of slavery as a hallmark of liberal modernity and solidified the broader “philosophical architecture of order of Man on the backs of enslaved African peoples.”lxvii Negating the basic principles of slavery and thus white civilization, the theories of freedom developed by Black thinkers converged on the notion that the Black race had the capacity and right to rule themselves. Refuting the ethnological arguments and origin stories of whites that Blacks were mere beasts, the revolution in Haiti against slavery crystallized the idea of Blacks possessing the capacity of the race for self-rule and their worthiness of “absolute freedom” from slavery in the US.lxviii For Black thinkers, the race had “a natural tendency towards liberty” and “was not intended by God to be the slaves of whites.”lxix Said differently, the various theories constructed by Blacks based on self-governance/self-determination were in contradiction to the aspirations of white assimilationists who argued for the internal colonization of Blacks in the US South and provided the basis for early ideas American Black Nationalism by directly challenging ideas of white military supremacy and the notion that freed slaves and free people of color were incapable of sustaining independence.”lxx In the wake of the Haitian revolution, major slave rebellions were conducted at the same time that Black nationalists converged on the “philosophical outlook committed to the view that the Black race could realize freedom through the action of Black peoples”, making concrete an intellectual shift in how they engaged white ethnology.lxxi By the mid-19th century, Black nationalists had combined this emphasis on self-determination with an analysis of history, government and political economy that understood the “myth of Black inferiority as nothing more than the deliberate policy of white tyrants that mirrored how nations
throughout history have created political classes of people they deemed to be inferior.” lxxii For example, David Walker and Martin Delany both diagnosed the condition of Black people in North America as a consequence of the government policy and the stratification of citizens and slaves on the basis of race. In his Appeal (1830), David Walker – “one of the greatest ideologists of African liberation of the nineteenth century” – argues that an anthropological dictum that “all the inhabitants of the earth, are called men, and of course are, and ought to be free” except for Black people and their children who are classified as “brutes.” lxxiii This philosophical anthropology legitimized their exploitation and cemented Black people in a “the most wretched state of slavery” wherein whites are able to use the law and the State to treat them “more cruel” than any historical class of slaves in the history of human civilization. lxxiv After historically surveying the treatment and reduction of ethnic groups to slavery of Israelites in Egypt, in Rome and the Helots in Sparta, Walker concludes that Americans punish Blacks through slavery for economic gain and social cohesion. In his own words, “they (Americans) have, and do continue to punish us for nothing else, but for enriching them and their country.” lxxv In his refutation of the ethnological arguments and rationalizations of slavery in Thomas Jefferson’s in Notes on Virginia, Walker emphasizes freedom as self-determination, “African autonomy and Pan-African revolt” as aspirational ideals. lxxvi Walker writes that Jefferson’s claims ought to be “refuted by the blacks themselves,” but avers the intellect and genius of the group has not had “a chance to develop[e], in consequence of” slavery. lxxvii However, Walker continues, when such suffering comes “to an end” Black people “will want all the learning and talents among” themselves ‘and perhaps more, to govern ourselves.” lxxviii In the decade after Walker’s Appeal was published, Black militants and nationalists like Henry Highland Garnet, Martin Delany, J. Theodore Holly and Henry Bibb suggested that for “colored people of the United States” to elevate themselves and control their own destiny, they must consider mass emigration to more hospitable environments,” they were “appealing to notions of “peoplehood,” resistance, and self-determination” that emerged as the core values of Afro-American culture during the antebellum period.

In his work The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States (1859), Martin Delany exemplified a contemporaneously emergent but now more than “180 year old tradition” of Black activists and intellectuals “viewing African American as a “nation [within] a nation.” lxxix Theorizing the sense of “peoplehood” that had developed among the African-American population in the 19th century, Delany argues that Black people are just one instantiation a tendency present “in all ages and in all countries, in every quarter of the habitable globe, especially among those nations laying the greatest claim to civilization and enlightenment,” to create through policy classes of people who are “deprived of equal privileges, political, religious and social.” lxxx Thus, historically “in almost every nation“ there existed a class like African America — “a nation within a nation — a people who although forming part and parcel of the population” but yet formed “no part, and if any, but a restricted part of the body politic of such nations” as a result of their “deprivation of political equality with others.” lxxxi Continuing, Delany explains that such classes are also denied as having a common humanity the superior classes, and are “looked upon as inferior to their oppressors, and [thus] have ever been” consigned within the political economy as “domestics and menials of society” who are to do the “drudgery of those among whom they lived, moving and existing by mere sufferance.” lxxxii Giving examples of this phenomenon, Delany avers that the aforementioned criteria fit “the Poles in Russia, the Hungarians in Austria, the Scotch, Irish, and Welsh in the United Kingdom, and such also are the Jews.” lxxxiii Just these nations are stratified within the United Kingdom and aspire to achieve a “national
position of self-government and independence.” African America is not only “deprived of equal privileges” and self-governance in the US but whites assert their “inferiority by nature as distinct races.”

But this assertion of racial inferiority, Delany argues, follows from a general “policy of all those who proscribe any people” because it “induces them to select as the objects of proscription, those who differed as much as possible, in some particulars from themselves” and thus engender a “greater prejudice.” In short, nature (racial inferiority) cannot explain the slavery and internal colonization of the Black masses as a ‘nation within a nation’. In his own words,

“[…]as a policy, we the colored people were selected as the subordinate class in this country, not on account of any actual or supposed inferiority on their part, but simply because, in view of all the circumstances of the case, they were the very best class that could be selected. They [whites] would have as readily had any other class as subordinates in the country, as the colored people, but the condition of society at the time, would not admit of it.”

Though assimilationism is the dominant ideology through which Black thought is interpreted today, Black scholars have long-established Black nationalism as “one of the two main trends among Black people in America, even antedating the integration trend.” As a conduit of expression of “group identity and collective consciousness through conversion of the “Negro” as a socially defined category into a socially determined group of Black people”, Black Nationalism has historically sought to refute the civilizational impetus of white modernity and forged a common (folk) cultural vision of Blacks as ‘a nation within a nation’ in the early 19th century. The slave system necessitated that the “African and his descendants were conquered, enslaved, demeaned, and then converted to accept their low status” and “told that they had no history, no culture and no civilization”, and from this context Black Nationalist thought “arises, looking inward to historical and social traditions in order to overcome” the slave mentality and imagine “a new vision predicated upon collective traits of social distinction.”

Despite its ideological varieties and organizational expressions since the late 18th and 19th centuries, self-determination (autonomy) has remained the basic proposition of Black nationalism. As a cultural ideal, Black autonomy emerged out of the “unity of being” enslaved Africans in North America cultivated through the cultural practice of the ‘ring shout’ (associated with burial practices and the notion of spiritual transmigration) — the “single most important cause of the formation of a common consciousness and ethos” among them — and has been reified by Black nationalists from the 19th century going forward. Thus, the historical intellectual attributes of Black nationalist philosophy reflect basic patterns in the historical folk cultural consciousness of African descended peoples in the US. As American historians William L. Van Deburg and Lawrence Levine demonstrate in their works on the Black Power movement and Black Consciousness in the US, the distinctive culture of African descended people in the US laid the basis for the Black Power movement which Newton was the center of as an autopoietic endeavor which was rooted in the idea of self-determination/actualization of Black people based on the positive attributes of Blackness and a new group consciousness for the 20th century. Rather than emerging out of a vacuum, Van Deburg shows, the roots of the Black Power thought were not a “single individual spark or individual prime mover” but “was the product of generations” of Black people dealing “with powerlessness—and surviving.” Said differently, Black Power should be understood “as [an] essentially cultural” revolt. Various strands of separatism, revolutionary nationalism,
cultural nationalism and an emphasis on the forging a “black self-definition ethic” that “stressed group responsibility, unity and pride” were posited in the 19th century as a counter to the “Anglo-Saxon assumptions of intellectual and cultural superiority.”

These tendencies, especially self-defense and self-determination, continued to be expressed in the early 20th century. As Van Deburg explains, the Black culture of the period “proved that Afro-Americans would continue to put forward bold counterpoints to the demeaning racial caricatures.” This materialized in the New Negro movement and yielded an intellectual and philosophical development in how Black activists, scholars, writers and artists conceptualized the Black human condition as typified by a “double consciousness” or hybridity—the problematic of “being both black and American at the same instant.” Building on a distinctively forged culture since enslavement focused on self-mastery and self-definition, Black Power sought to initiate a process of self-actualization based on the positive attributes of Blackness and a new Black psychology or “Black consciousness.” Black psychologists and educators constructed models of the psychological processes that result from the forging of Black consciousness. Drawing on the revolutionary humanism, sociodiagnostic (or sociogenic) method and conceptualizations of Frantz Fanon, Black social scientists and intellectuals of the Black Power generation developed an approach to understanding the Black condition that was not trapped by the binaries of white American social science. Rather than human beings who have the right to determine their own destinies, white social scientists had converged on the notion that African descended peoples in the US were either “black Anglo-Saxons” whose highest aspirations was full assimilation into American society or entities who needed rehabilitation from whites due to their inner desolation and ultimately tragic “case studies in pathology.”

For their part, Black intellectuals and nationalists in the US (along with colonized people around the world) synthesized Fanon’s ideas with the experience gained “from their immersion in the rapidly changing world in which they lived” to formulate a four-stage transformative process to achieve Black consciousness. Broadly speaking, Black consciousness was based on four assumptions: 1. That to become conscious of blackness was a “healthy psychosocial development”; 2. That “black self-actualization was accompanied by a corresponding questioning and rejection of many normative values forwarded by the majoritarian society”; 3. The reversal of traditional color associations and the seizing and validating of the Black image “via a wide array of cultural productions”; and 4. The accomplishment of “collective manhood”—this meant that Blacks as a group had “to be assertive, to take pride in heritage” and “remove the negative connotations of race which long had served as a constraining psychological and social force.” Rather than a gendered or masculinist endeavor, Black activists and intellectuals conceptualized the recognition of black manhood as calls for “the acknowledgement of the human rights of both black men and black women.” Accordingly, Black consciousness “posited the divinity (spirituality) of human beings; the essential oneness of humankind with nature and the universal and the interdependence of Africans worldwide.” Contrary to contemporary accusations that the Black Power theorists and Newton in particular simply dismissed the idea of Black culture as a conduit to revolution, because of Fanon’s influence on Black Power ideology “the notion that black culture could play a major role in the militant freedom movement was widely accepted.” Young militants of the generation adapted Fanon and forged a philosophical basis for identifying “with the colonized of the world” and affirming “the notion that violence could spur mental
catharsis” and merged these with the idea that “their own – their distinctive Afro-American culture—very well might turn out to the most essential weapon in the struggle for Black Power.”

In his investigation of Black culture for what it can reveal about the historical consciousness and folk thought of Afro-Americans during their experience in the US, Lawrence Levine’s findings on Black cultural consciousness further clarify the relationship between Black culture and Black nationalist thought. Broken into two periods (enslavement and post emancipation), Levine finds major continuities across the phases of history observed. The continuities include: (a) hybridity; (b) a quest for self-mastery/control and (c) an emphasis on communalism. The characteristic of hybridity is expressed in both historical phases. Within the context of slavery, an Afro-American culture was forged through an adaptation of the traditional African worldviews from which enslaved peoples came to a new environment based on interactions with that of the Euro-American world into which they were carried. The transformative character of Black culture is evidenced in slave cosmology and music. As Levine explains, for “all of its horrors, slavery never was so complete a system of psychic assault that it prevented the slaved from carving out independent cultural forms.”

The fact that slavery “never pervaded all of the interstices of their minds and their culture” allowed enslaved Africans the space to synthesize independent cultural forms and a cosmology which reflected “patterns of verbal art that were so central to their past culture.” Though oral tradition was the bedrock of Afro-American cultural consciousness, spirituals and sacred folk beliefs gave form and content to the ethic of self-mastery and control of phenomena as a normative ideal. The slave institution “forced its victims into a severe state of dependency,” resulting largely in a “lack of control” and “absence of power” that helped perpetuate African-descended peoples sacred conception of the universe and intensified “their search for supernatural aid and solutions.” Using indigenous African and Christian myths, magical folk beliefs helped “slaves to exert their will and preserve their sanity by permitting them to impose a sense of rationality and predictability upon a hostile and capricious environment” – while Christianity provided “assurance of the ephemeral quality of the present situation and the glories of retribution to come, both in this world and the next,” folk beliefs “offered the slaves sources of power and knowledge alternative to those existing within the world of the master class.”

The ethic of self-mastery and power to control phenomena was a dominant theme in the cultural consciousness of the African descended population in the US. As Levine writes,

“...In their religious songs and sermons slaves sought certainty in a world filled with confusion and anarchy in their supernatural folk beliefs they sought power and control in a world filled with arbitrary forces greater than themselves; and in their tales they sought understanding of a world in which, for better or worse, they were forced to live. All the forms of slave folk culture afforded their creators psychic relief and a sense of mastery.”

This theme persisted beyond the period of enslavement and into the post emancipation period. As Levine shows, it is evidenced in Black music most of all: allowing Blacks “to express themselves and assert their feeling and values, to communicate continuously”, to “perpetuate traditions to keep values from eroding” and continuing a rich internal consciousness. Communalism is also documented during enslavement and post emancipation periods. From the sacred world of the slaves to the rise of a secular worldview in the 20th century, “Afro-American
history is in itself evidence of the retention and development of forms of communal consciousness and solidarity among a group." However, American historian V.P. Franklin demonstrates the Levine’s dualistic framework of Black folk culture is somewhat misleading. In chapters two and three of his work *Black Self-Determination: A Cultural History of the Faith of the Fathers* (1984), Franklin provides evidence “of a flourishing secular folk culture” which was “largely unrecorded because Afro-Americans were reluctant to share these songs and stories with whites.” Emphasizing the continuity of values among the emerging Black nation in the enormous shifts in their lives from formal chattel enslavement to an internal (emancipated) colony, Franklin writes, “[W]hile emancipation brought about a profound change in the status of the vast majority of Afro-Americans, it did not bring about a significant change in the predominant cultural values and attitudes of within the black community.” Because a shift in their material conditions did not occur, there was “great continuity” in Afro-American social values – “survival with dignity, resistance against oppression, religious self-determination, and freedom” – from slavery to freedom.

Theorizing the historical incongruity of Black (nationalist/self-determinative) cultural patterns of thought and Western (Liberal and Marxist) thought as “logical at a deep structure level”, philosopher Sylvia Wynter also argues that chattel slavery laid the basis for a diasporic tradition from which Black thought emerged as “a cultural counter-world to the pervasive dominant world of Western rationality.” Rather than being amenable to western world-thought systems, Black thought historically developed as a (sociogenic) rupture in the “relation between the individual psyche and the overall social/structural culture.” These factors stabilize a given social order and are reflected in the perception of people in the daily run of things by the “mental, sexual and cultural structures” of the world. Outside of the taxonomy or philosophical anthropology of the Western conception of the human self, society and knowledge, Wynter explains that Black thought spawned as an artifact of resistance “over and against” this construct of MAN (humanity) and the world-thought system that was established after the Western world’s attempt to reduce African descended peoples to the ultimately non-human (liminal) status of the nigger. This laid the basis for the impulse in Black thought towards a “counter-invention of the self” that has become solidified as “the central and universally applicable strategy of the “politics of black culture.” As a result of this impulse towards autopoiesis, the symbolic transformation of the self takes on a revolutionary character: negating the plantation order and its framework of the human and cosmos. Said differently, black culture has “as its function, the symbolic subversion” of the signifying chain (sociogenic code) which the nigger or “the nameless pieza (slave), is constituted” – to do this and “to deconstruct and subvert the cultural signifying system of the dominant order, was/is one and the same process.”

Thus, Black nationalist thought is a kind of “total critique” which seeks to bring an immediate end to the “material and psychic dispossession” of African descended people as “the conceptual antithesis” of the normative community within a given society. The apotheosis of Black nationalist thought and organizing was typified by Marcus Garvey’s ‘Universal Negro Improvement Association’ (UNIA) which “sprung from the cultural seedbed of this tradition” and laid the basis for the emergence of the BPP as a paramilitary cadre based organization seeking to achieve the self-determination of Black people. Garvey “established military organizations with the ultimate goal of the reconquest of Africa” and organized the first International Convention of Negro Peoples of the World which made the self-determination of all peoples a chief aim. However, after Garvey’s deportation and sabotage by the US federal government,
black nationalist sentiment reached an all-time low in the United States.” During this period, W.E.B. Du Bois was at the forefront of theorizing the Black condition and pushed to formally designate Black America as an internal or semi-colonial nation within a nation. Despite his international efforts at organizing Pan-African congresses and tying the collective interests of Black America to anti-colonial struggles around the world Du Bois “never commanded the support of large numbers of people as had Martin Delany, Henry M. Turner, and Marcus Garvey.” There was also a second wave of repression “during the early part of the Cold War” that led to anti-colonial/Black nationalist thinkers, intellectuals and activists facing “revocation of their passports, court assaults on their patriotism, isolating propaganda campaigns and even physical attacks” which suppressed militancy among the Black population and temporarily severed “the conceptual connection [based on internal colonialism theory] between the African American battle against Jim Crow and emerging international independence movements.”

This repression imposed an ideological vacuum that led to the overshadowing of Black nationalists during the height of the civil rights movement and the emergence integration as “the dominant ethos of the black movement between 1930 and 1965.” Once it became clear that the efforts from integrationists left “the relative economic, political, and social statuses of black and white Americans” virtually unchanged, Malcolm X galvanized the imagination of the Black masses and augmented the resurgence of nationalist ideology to an intensity unseen since Garvey. Black nationalism was at the forefront of his thinking. Consequently, Malcolm advocated strongly for Black autonomy and self-defense. More than any other individual, “he changed the direction of the black movement from an emphasis on assimilation through integration to black liberation through black nationalism” – he was “very clear on the colonized nature and condition of Black America” and infused Black consciousness with “a strong Black nationalist ideology” that laid the basis for the emergence of the Black Power movement. Importantly, Malcolm’s keen intellect, focus on self-defense, analytic diagnosis of America as a police state, and his push to understand the black struggle for self-determination in the context of an anticapitalistic and “international struggle for human rights” foreshadowed an analytic sophistication of Black nationalist thought along the lines of internal colonialism theory by Newton.

The “considerable amount of dynamism” exemplified by the revolutionary nationalism that comprised the ideological basis of Black Panther ideology and Huey Newton’s philosophical thinking reflect the profound influence of El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz (Malcolm X). And like Garvey and Malcolm before him, Newton’s effort to conceptualize the US police state from the (liminal) existential perspective of Black America stood between two antagonistic forms of Western world thought systems whose underlying philosophical anthropology was hostile to it: corporate/capitalist democracy and statist authoritarian socialism—both forms of rule Newton and the BPP argued were “fundamentally hierarchal and elitist.” Furthermore, not only did Newton argue that the BPP be understood as existing in “the spirit of Malcolm” and a “living testament to his life work”, but as the leading theoretician of the Party Malcolm’s ideas on internal colonialism and the US police state functioned as an ideational catalyst for his own theories and led him to reason that the social control agencies of the state be understood as “colonial agents” whose brutality agitated residents of the ghetto to engage in “spontaneous outbursts” and riots to “reaffirm local rather than foreign control of the community.” As the Party gained national prominence, the foundation of Newton’s Black nationalist philosophy that guided its organizational modus operandi was the analytic identification of police in Black communities as occupying armies. With
internal colonialism as its conceptual anchor, Newton’s philosophy posited white police officers as an instrument sent into the Black community to “keep Black People quiet and under control” by the US power structure and thus that oppressed black people are oppressed by the US military state just as “people of color in Southeast Asia”, Africa, and around the world. Malcolm’s influence wasn’t just theoretical though. Newton’s class analysis and argument for understanding the lumpenproletariat as vanguard led him to recruit “those blacks whose backgrounds were similar to a young Malcolm X: the unemployables, gangsters, hustlers, and convicts” along with ex-military personnel. Despite these and many other similarities, Newton’s iteration of Black nationalism was a unique phenomenon. It included sociological, theological, pedagogical, existential, and Platonic elements. As intellectual historian Judson Jeffries explains, Newton’s brand of black nationalism stressed, among other things, race consciousness, intraracial cooperation, and the building, controlling, and maintaining of black institutions. Under the auspices of black nationalism, he argued for decent housing, jobs, education, exemption of blacks from military service, and all-black juries, but most of all for the ability of black Americans to control their own destiny. Like Malcolm X, Newton embraced black nationalism’s emphasis on black pride, black self-esteem, black solidarity, and veneration for Africa, even though he rejected mass black emigration to Africa. Newton’s emphasis on black nationalism at that time is understandable. He believed that in order for blacks to achieve full equality, a revolution would have to take place within the black community whereby blacks would unite on all fronts— economically, politically, culturally, and ideologically. Once this took place, blacks would be ready to lead an effort to overthrow the ruling establishment of the United States.

Though he eventually attained his Ph.D., Newton was also like Malcolm with respect to education. Despite his early experience of school as a negative environment and beginning adulthood functionally illiterate, Newton developed as one of the few thinkers of the Black Power tradition who attempted to provide a philosophical basis for his actions and ideas. According to Newton, he taught himself how to read by going through Plato’s Republic “about five times”, working “through the book word by word with the help of a dictionary”. During his time as the BPP’s chief philosopher he constantly added more sophistication to the Party’s original iteration of militant Black nationalist philosophy, taking the organization “through ideological metamorphoses, experimenting and wrestling with a number of theories aimed at finding solutions to problems such as poverty, racism, classism, and sexism.” An openness “to change was a characteristic that enabled Newton to redefine and reevaluate conditions and situations on a continual basis.” Scholars have some disagreement over how to properly characterize the relationship between black nationalism, the broader philosophical trajectory of Newton’s thinking and his tendency towards critical thinking and reflection and the continual adaptation of knowledge to construct theory in the interests of people of African descent. Whereas most scholars have asserted an either four or five stage model: Black nationalist, Revolutionary Nationalist, Internationalism, and Intercommunalist/Communism, Matthew Hughey has cogently established an eight-stage model. The stages are: Black nationalism, Revolutionary Nationalism, Revolutionary Socialism, Revolutionary Internationalism, Revolutionary Intercommunalism, Death of the [hero] Subject, Existentialism, and African Socialism.
Hughey explains that during his Black nationalist phase, Newton was able to contribute a “critique of white supremacy and Eurocentric epistemology” by developing a Black-centered critique of how racism organized American society. He also adapted the Black nationalist tradition of armed self-defense. For Newton, the people must have the knowledge and power to “face the enemy on equal grounds.” Thus, the power to control phenomena and manipulate reality would result from “power wielded through not only weapons and force, but through a knowledge of entitlement to those forms.” As he developed into a revolutionary nationalist, Newton synthesized insights from Fanon’s analysis of the psychosocial or sociogenic impact of colonization on the minds of the colonized and “refuted prior Marxist thought on the role of the underclass” in the Black revolution. However, the view of the BPP as the spearhead or revolutionary vanguard “changed to a conception of the party as” a force “that would be an educational tool, vehicle to provide services for the survival of the lumpen” and as “a revolutionary organization that would depend on unity across national borders.”

By 1968, “Newton was immersed in the study of the Russian revolution of 1917 and the principle of equal distribution of land and income” and began to envision “a future whereby, through the BPP educational endeavors, the lower classes, Black, white, Latino, etc. would seize the means of production from the capitalists, an action often referred to as syndicalism” – this led to coalitions with “organizations representing oppressed communities in the US (many of which took inspiration from the BPP).” Newton’s hybridity, typified by the constant development and manipulation of language and concepts to describe the ever changing nature of reality and his eventual disposition towards notions of socialism and communalist ideas remains perceived as an “abandonment of Black nationalism” and it’s emphasis on the transformative potential of black culture, spurring much debate over the viability of Black liberation and the idea that Black America was an internally colonized nation whose liberation would be achieved through anticolonial nationhood.

Nevertheless this ostensible “divergence from Black nationalist thought, was simply that of a reconfirmation of Malcolm X’s philosophy” and Newton’s synthesis of the ideas from a variety of revolutionary anti-colonial thinkers – like Mao Zedong, Frantz Fanon, Harold Cruse and others – whose efforts over the decade preceding the emergence of Newton and the BPP laid the basis for an articulation of “a common link” between the oppression experienced by Black Americans and colonized peoples around the world in militant anti-colonial terms. These expressions took a more aggressive shape as the revolutionary governments of Algeria and Cuba sought to export anticolonial insurgency and provide “practical and ideological support for” Newton’s generation of Black activists in the US. Going beyond Malcolm and Fanon, Newton’s appraisal of the US black lumpenproletariat as a revolutionary force for global change laid the basis for his unique of adaptation of Black nationalism to “Marxism-Leninism” and a synthesis of host of anti-colonial ideas that included: “the cleansing force of violence which frees one from despair and feelings of inferiority, adopted from Martinique psychiatrist and author Frantz Fanon; the power of gun from Mao-Tse Tung; death with honor from Che Guevara; feeding on the brutality of the occupying army Ho Chi Minh; terrorizing, disruption, and destroying from Al Fatah; and autonomy, integrity and responsibility of the Party from Kim II Sung.” After the revolution and subsequent development of China without assistance from white/western countries after 1949 failed to be explained in Eurocentric/doctrinal Marxist terms and forced a paradigm shift in western counterinsurgency thinking, Mao’s conceptual ingenuity inspired
revolutionaries in the both the broader Third World and African America to adapt socialist and Marxist ideology towards anti-colonial, guerrilla and revolutionary nationalist endeavors.

Following up on the theoretical and institutional frameworks of Black thinkers like Malcolm X, Robert Williams and Harold Cruse, Newton’s internationalism expanded upon these earlier iterations by placing an emphasis on understanding African America as an internally colonized nation within a larger global context by using local examples to demonstrate connections to other struggles and the need for the transformation of American society more broadly. Within this context, Newton’s revolutionary internationalism “was more of an expansion of Black nationalism’s tenets of self-determination, than a negation of its principles as a whole.” By means of the dialectical materialist method, Newton began to “view blackness as both an ontological and axiological supposition” within a broader framework that predicted that capitalism would “self-destruct” and lay the basis for “a revolutionary socialist consciousness to emerge.” However, Newton’s shift towards revolutionary intercommunalism solidified his explosion of the basic categories of internal colonization theory and the colonizer/colonized distinction at its core. But the fact that Newton has come under so much criticism for this theoretical move towards planetary humanism and socialism has obscured this qualitative development. Now “recognized as the centerpiece of Newton’s philosophy,” intercommunalism is “signified by the demise of nations as significant economic and political forces due to the interpenetration of technology, media and commerce, as the modes and means of the production and distribution of power and domination predicated by” the US ruling class. This leaves us in a situation where national liberation is no longer a viable objective for Black self-determination because nations no longer exist. As Newton explains,

The situation is this: a people can look only backwards, to history, to really speak of its nation. We call these former nations communities. All these territories exist under the threat of being brought into or, in fact, being a part of the United States Empire. Some of the territories are liberated, such as China, the northern halves of Korea and Vietnam, or Albania. But the weapons of conquest, the war weapons produced by modern technology, are in the hands of the United States. Not even a liberated territory can lay claim to sovereign control of its land, economy, or people with this hanging over its head.

Thus, for Newton “there are no more colonies or neocolonies” and the world is comprised not of states but of “a dispersed collection of communities” who want to determine their own destinies that are locked in a struggle with “the small circle that administers and profits from the empire of the United States”: the world’s first truly global empire. Furthermore, it was this stage of his thinking that yielded his dialectical account of Black consciousness given the rising cases of Black male suicide and oppressed condition of Black people politically and economically in the early 1970s.

Newton’s writings suggest that the existential negation of the “lower socio-economic Black male” is central to his thinking early on. Due to the racist structure of American society, Newton understood that the Black male as finding “himself void of those things that bring respect and a feeling of worthiness.” As he explains, society “responds to him as a thing, a beast, a nonentity, something to be ignored and stepped on”—placing him in a position of being compelled to “respect
laws that do not respect him,” to “digest a code of ethics that acts upon him, but not for him” and thus leaving him “in a constant state of rage, of shame, of doubt.”

With no positive social models to identify with and no economic basis to participate in the broader society as a breadwinner for his family, the Black male, Newton argues, is “viewed as quite worthless” by the society, his wife and his children. Using the dialectical materialist method, Newton blended this existential diagnosis of the Black male’s condition as “invisible, a nonentity” whom society “will not acknowledge” as a man with findings from a study conducted by Robert Hendin, Durkheim’s insights on the nature of suicide and elements of Platonic philosophy to create a theory of Black consciousness: revolutionary/reactionary suicide. Reactionary suicide was materialized by the black man “who takes his own life in response to social conditions that overwhelm him and condemn him for helplessness.” After reflecting on how American society deprived the young Black men in Hendin’s study of human dignity and denied them of their right to live as proud and free human beings, Newton theorized Black maleness as having “a particular relation to racial oppression, a specific suffering inflicted on the Black man as both Black and male that was conditioned by both his lack of work and his determination as antisocial and deviant.”

Within this genre of being, “deprivation of human dignity and the negation of the Black male’s humanity converged within his own psyche” – the existential assimilation of the externally imposed “societal rage against him, his interiorizing of the racist misandry used to justify violence against him, ignites his motivation toward suicide.”

Deploying an existential analysis “to differentiate the reactionary nature of oppression from that of poverty” which used Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment as an analogy, Newton argues that even in poverty a “man can attain the innate nobility of the soul that is not possible in beggary; for while society may drive the poor man out with a stick, the beggar will be swept out with a broom.” The primary difference between the poor man and the beggar is that the latter “is totally demeaned, his dignity lost” and “bereft of self-respect, immobilized by fear and despair” which drives him to self-murder: this is the essence of reactionary suicide. Said differently, the reactionary suicide is the “vacating of self-worth by the society that is thereby internalized by the Black male individual that makes suicide appear as a tenable escape from dehumanization.”

Connected to reactionary suicide “although even more painful and degrading, is a spiritual death that has been the experience of millions of Black people in the United States.” For Newton, this “death is found everywhere today in the Black community” because its “victims have ceased to fight the forms of oppression that will drink their blood.” Exemplifying Newton’s influence by Platonic philosophy on Newton’s view of the self and society, the notion of revolutionary suicide is also partly modeled on “Plato’s Socrates and Socrates’ notion of the philosopher king” who is tasked with placing their lives in danger and dedicating their lives as the “price paid for freedom, justice, and the ability to perceive reality outside of the shadow world of the cave” [of ignorance]. For Newton, “Plato’s cave allegory as an analogy for the plight of Black America” lays the basis for Newton’s theory of revolutionary suicide and broader axiological vision of revolutionary suicide. Like Plato’s liberated prisoner, the liberated man is “no longer content to live in the cave” but fulfilling their “mission to free others from the cave” which “will always put them at risk of derision, violence and even death.” In his reworking of the analogy of “the cave into a racial metaphor”, Newton argues that through revolutionary suicide Black people ought to “conduct an assault on the Establishment” because “it is better to oppose the forces that would
Despite risking the “likelihood of death, there is at least the possibility, if not the probability, of changing intolerable conditions.”

This is not a fatalistic philosophical outlook. Revolutionary suicide is not “a death wish”, but the expression of “such a strong desire to live with hope and human dignity that existence without them is impossible.” This proximity to violence and dehumanization make Black revolutionaries a group whose “lives are in constant danger from the evils of a colonial society” and necessary for them to “accept the concept of revolutionary suicide.” The existential elements of Newton’s thinking became a primary theme as his view of the nature of the human subject shifted alongside with his view of the nation-state as an artifact of history. Hughey calls this stage the ‘Death of the [hero] Subject’. During this phase of his thinking, Newton not only “worked to destabilize the centrality of “theory” that was becoming a powerful force as academics and intellectuals took up critical interest in the 1960s” because this was according to him “overly theoretical” and “also overly individualistic and reductive in approaches to social movements.” Consequently, Newton began to emphasize the “need to remove attention on individual leaders and to instead direct attention toward the collective consciousness of the people.” Individual leadership was a product of the nation-state that was superseded by the technology of US empire and its control of all the world’s land and peoples. Furthermore, Newton felt that the messianic attraction of “individual leaders was dangerous, as it forced people to follow in their leaders’ footsteps, and arrested the critical imagination of the people—removing responsibility for action and placing it within the domain of singularity” stemming from Newton’s jailing exemplified these problems. After his jailing for the alleged murder of Officer John Frey, the ranks of the organization swelled with people who “never met Newton and knew him only by his increasingly growing narrative of accomplishment and resistance with the police and the “system” at large.” This led to the party suffering from a ‘cult of personality’ and Newton feeling that “there was too much pressure on him [as an individual] after his release jail in 1970.” His experiences in Cuba and his time in graduate school also influenced Newton’s thinking during this period. It was during the period he fled to Cuba that “Huey’s notions on “sovereign individualism” began to fade away” as he “melted into the ranks of the Cuban working class” – undergoing a “collective experience” that alleviated a feeling of existential alienation present in the US due to the structural organization of the society. He described Cubans as a people “interested in each other’s life in a brotherly way.” Newton further “nurtured his fascination with existential philosophy” during this time in Cuba and returned to his academic studies upon his return to the US. During his graduate studies, “existentialism was a key subject of interest for him” and he “wrote many papers” on the topic. An inquiry into its history and the application of existential questions to practical matters led him to partner with famed evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers and “develop scathing critiques of classic [Western] philosophy,” arguing against “Hobbes’ theory on the state and subject” as “nihilistic and short-sighted.” Newton also “redefined the Oedipus complex from being centered on sex, to that of a focus on power, which Newton” synthesized with notions from Locke and Rosseau that “one is born free” and “that the state’s duty was to preserve its citizens and to ensure that every person is afforded an equal opportunity to live a prosperous and harmonious life.”

As he developed intellectually, “Newton continued to write on topics such as Nietzsche and psychological warfare, Bakunin’s fatalistic view of revolutionaries, Plato’s “cave” analogy,
Marx’s theories on existence and social consciousness, and the role of language, education, and power."clxxxvii But around the early 1980s, his “life began to slide into drugs and alcoholism” whereby “he abandoned much of his scholastic and socio-political activism and writing.”clxxxviii During this period, the government’s counterinsurgency programs “had effectively destroyed the political potency of the BPP” and many maintain that “the government used a variety of tactics directed at” Newton: namely “espionage, micro level “chemical warfare,” and even psychological warfare designed to split the party politically and morally and with the intent of mentally disturbing Newton.”clxxix Because of these factors, it was not “until the last months of his life that Newton began to rearticulate his sociological views of the world.”cx By the 80s, Newton “moved back into political life” and began to be involved “with the African People’s Socialist Party (APSP) and the Uhuru House when it was headquartered in Oakland, California.”cxc During this time, he took part in a project for the homeless, Community Control initiatives, and the creation of the “Bobby Hutton Freedom Clinic.”cxii This phase of this thinking “can be characterized by a return to the political base of Black Nationalism and the Afrocentric turn” wherein Newton adopted “a positive outlook on such traditional institutions as the African-American church and locally-owned African American business ventures.”cxcii Newton’s last public speeches “were made in the Uhuru House in Oakland” a few months before his murder. cxiv Generally speaking, Newton’s philosophical project was centered on “the idea of a people’s autonomy that resides in critical self-reflection that facilitates emancipation from dogma.”cxcv From this epistemological basis, Newton theorized a nomenclature or philosophical anthropology of humanity that was geared towards the power to determine external phenomena as opposed to other people. The dialectics of reactionary intercommunalism, he argued, would eventually foster the contradictions that sow the seeds of its own destruction into revolutionary intercommunalism. At this phase of human society, the technology that is currently controlled by the US ruling circle will be seized by the masses of humanity and lay the basis for “the people of the world to develop a culture that is essentially human and would nurture those things that would allow the people to resolve contradictions in a way that would not cause the mutual slaughter of all of us.”cxcvi

Just as Newton’s philosophical thinking was characterized by the expansion and adaption of Black nationalist thought towards dialectical materialism and revolutionary intercommunalism, his thinking around self-defense is also an evolution of a black nationalist tradition of arms in the US. In their works, American historians Nicholas Johnson and Christopher B. Strain show that a black tradition of self-defense/arms emerged out of response to the internecine violence of slavery and Jim Crow and developed into a warlike opposition to the US government during the Black Power movement by Newton and the BPP. Rather than the Black freedom movement being essentially characterized by a nonviolent Christian civil rights protest, the militancy expressed by Newton (and the broader Black Power generation) has its roots in an indigenous tradition of arms premised on self-defense birthed in organized and personal resistance against the slave system that was pioneered in the 20th century by radicals like Malcolm X and Robert Williams. Detailing the particulars of the black tradition of arms and its genesis in the same Convention Movement that Black nationalists converged around the conception of African America as a ‘nation within a nation’, Johnson explains that the “black tradition of arms elevates and enshrines the distinction between self-defense against imminent threats and organized political violence”, but in the context of resistance against slavery, “there was little concern for that distinction” practically.cxvii In the 19th century, revolutionary Black nationalists, abolitionists and fugitives like Martin Delany, David Walker, and H. Ford Ruggles “cast resistance to slavery as straightforward warfare.”cxviii
These ideas were reflected in the character of slave rebellions as well as early Black political activity like the Black Convention movement. As historian Kay Wright Lewis explains, internecine war was “an essential part of the institution of chattel slavery from the very beginning” and racial extermination was seen as a serious threat by African descended peoples. Nevertheless, as early as 1851 “the black state convention officially endorsed physical resistance to slave catchers” and the emerging tradition of black arms became concretized as a mainstay of Black resistance despite the failure of Nat Turner’s rebellion and “the curtailment of the belief in a Haitian model of liberation working” in North America.

After the civil war and the failure of reconstruction internecine racial terrorism reigned, and Black leaders responded to the threat of genocide by embracing the gun once more. But instead of being based on the model of a “Haitian style revolution” like during the chattel period, they qualified their violence on the basis of a distinction between individual/community self-defense and offensive military action that persisted into the next century. As it developed, this tradition was pioneered and readapted by new generations of African Americans into the 20th century. Prominent Black intellectuals and activists of this era like W. E. B. Du Bois, Hubert Harrison, Marcus Garvey, and A. Philip Randolph solidified the emergence of ‘New Negro’ (Black militant) consciousness centered on armed self-defense whose roots were clear “as early as T. Thomas Fortune’s 1889 declaration that the old shuffling generation was done.” Importantly, Johnson notes that these figures had diverse ideologies. As he writes,

[T]hey were divided by profound philosophical differences. But on the basic point of personal security and response to the hazards that plagued Negroes, they found common ground. Harlem poet and Jamaican immigrant Claude McKay captured the general sentiment in a poem that circulated broadly in Randolph’s Messenger and was widely reprinted. It was a paean to Negro manhood that closes with this: “If we must die, let it not be like hogs, hunted and penned in an inglorious spot. . . . Like men we’ll face the murderous, cowardly pack, pressed to the wall, dying but fighting back.” McKay was extolling and encouraging the fighting spirit of the New Negro.

Even the groups associated with the nonviolent Christian movement later in the 20th century, rose to prominence in the south by practicing and defending the black tradition of arms and community self-defense. Like they did in the century prior, Black men like Robert Williams sustained a dominant role in the Black tradition of arms in the Civil Rights cum Black Power movement as internecine violence subtended race relations in Jim Crow America. However, it wasn’t until the emergence of the Black Power movement that the tendency of those within the Black tradition of arms to mark and maintain the “boundary between self-defense and political violence” was no longer the core framework through which the problems of Black people were approached. Though this was not the first time in history where political violence found popular appeal to the black masses, groups like the Deacons for Defense “generated a relatively rich documentary record.” From their start from “a failed attempt by the Jonesboro Police to co-opt rising black activists by deputizing them and assigning them to interdict and arrest civil-rights-rights protesters,” the Deacons spread across the South and attracted the attention of the FBI as a potential threat to national security. For Johnson, the Deacons were part of an emerging militant trend and despite their organizational complexity lost “control of their image” and began to be
depicted by whites as “dangerous, separatist militants” – similar to those used to describe Newton and other militant Black radicals like Robert Williams. Despite these demonic caricatures of their militancy, after meeting Bobby Seale a prominent figure in the Deacons Earnest Thomas concluded that Seale, the BPP and the Black Power generation “were too radical for the Deacons.” Indeed, Black radicals “undercut the core distinction that had sustained the black tradition of arms” thus far: they invoked self-defense “as a justification for overt [organized] political violence.”

In his study of the American tradition of self-defense from slavery up to the Black Power movement, Pure Fire: Self-Defense as activism in the Civil Rights Era (2005), Christopher B. Strain demystifies the history of Black self-defense since slavery and demonstrates that the deep historical roots of this tradition to explain the militancy exhibited by the Black Panther (and Black Power generation more broadly). Though it has a unique focus on how military force and violence comprised the basis of slavery and the racialization of self-defense in US history and has an emphasis on clarifying the philosophical and practical emergence of nonviolence in the Civil Rights Movement, Strain’s monograph reiterates the basic findings of Johnson’s study and sustains the claims that armed self-defense has been a dominant tradition in the Black community. However, Strain argues for an evolutionary account of Black self-defense as opposed to the dichotomous framework Johnson’s work suggests. Rather than reifying popular depictions of them as antagonistic phenomena, Strain shows that civil rights and Black Power militancy emerged from the same soil: the US south.

As Strain explains, the issue of armed self-defense “has been a central theme in Afro-American history since its earliest days.” Because slavery “was a social relationship grounded in force,” armed and physical self-defense emerged as just one of many forms of resistance that emerged from Africans/African descendent peoples to combat it. However, as “slavery sank its roots deep in American soil, the idea of self-defense became racialized in the United States to the point that a severe double standard existed: that is, white persons could legally defend themselves but black persons could not.” Despite a century of repression, African America’s freedom struggle and embracing of physical and armed self-defense of the 20th century was sustained after the assassination of Malcolm X by groups like Deacons of Defense and the BPP. But as opposed to a disruptive or treacherous element of the Black freedom movement, Strain argues that given its genesis in the violence of chattel enslavement, the logic of armed self-defense was one which the BPP simply extended to its natural conclusion in the form of a warlike guerrilla challenge to the American system itself. Personifying a trend going back to Marcus Garvey, the Deacons of Defense deployed a strategy of “collective self-defense, in the guise of citizens’ patrols, [that] represented a de facto expression of black self-determination.” In doing so, they challenged Klan ascendancy and “signified a new era in southern race relations in which Afro-Americans developed increasingly more organized, collective forms of armed self-defense.” This trend was enhanced to “its zenith” by the BPP into an even more militant posture in the context of the ghetto riots of the decade beginning with Watts, California. Though it is often explained as a spasmodic and unprecedented event, Strain shows that “what happened in Watts was itself a kind of collective self-defense, not entirely unlike what the Deacons did in Bogalusa and what the Black Panthers would attempt to do in Oakland.” To be clear, the “so-called riots of the 1960s marked a turning point in the civil rights movement and in Afro-American history in general” by spurring a “shift toward a more destructive kind of protest by the nation’s poor” and an “intolerance of
violence as a mode of expression by the nation’s white middle and upper classes.”

They also reversed trends in the perpetration of racial violence. Earlier in the century, “race riot” generally referred to a “group of whites wantonly killing and destroying property in a local black community.”

Introducing a paradigm shift, Black residents of the 1960s “were attacking whites and destroying white property” in the ghetto. Like others of the decade, the Watts riots were triggered by the violent conduct of a white police officer during a routine traffic stop during his arrest of Marquette Frye. After the altercation, “word quickly spread that the officers had manhandled a pregnant mother.” After that, pleas for peace were not heeded. The damage from the mayhem was considerable. As Strain avers,

“When the flames had died and the smoke had cleared, at least thirty-four persons were dead. Thirty-one persons had been fatally shot by law enforcement officers, national guardsmen, and “persons unknown” during the rioting; one sheriff’s deputy, one policeman, and one fireman were also killed. There may have been additional deaths, uncounted by official statistics. The number of people involved is muddy: studies indicate that at least 31,000 black people actively participated, and double this number—between 64,000 and 72,000 persons—may have been involved as close spectators. Sixteen thousand National Guardsmen, Los Angeles Police Department officers, California Highway Patrolmen, and other law enforcement personnel participated. There were 1032 reported injuries, including 90 police officers, 136 firemen, 23 government personnel, and 773 civilians; 118 of the injuries were from gunshot wounds. More than six hundred buildings were damaged by burning and looting; of this number, more than two hundred were totally destroyed by fire. Total property damage was estimated at around forty million dollars.”

No sooner than the rioting came to a cease, Governor Edmund G. Brown “appointed a commission to investigate the riots.” Named after John A. McCone “a former CIA director and staunch conservative,” a report was produced to explain the events. Members of the Commission struggled for answers. The problems of Watts “were not readily noticeable to the casual observer,” but Watts was rotting from the inside out and underneath a “veneer of middle-class normality” was “the “serious deterioration” of living conditions and facilities in the affected area, particularly as related to employment, education, transportation, business, welfare, health, and housing.” Despite these conditions, Commissioners could not understand why the riot happened and clung to the notion that Black “civil unrest was necessarily irrational, self-defeating, immoderate, senseless, formless, malign, incoherent, destructive and somehow different from the normal group processes of society.” In the end, the McCone Commission concluded blandly that “there was a need for leadership from “Negro leaders” to ameliorate conditions in Watts” and stopped short of recommending any adjustment in the behavior of police in the ghetto. Despite its dehumanizing views of participants for their ostensible “criminal activity” and descriptions of “the happenings in Watts that mirrored British characterizations of the Mau Mau rebellion in East Africa,” the majority of white America “seemed content” with it and the report’s findings came to typify conventional causal explanations of the Watts inferno. But Strain points out two major flaws in this account. To begin, the report “focuses on surrounding social
conditions, rather than on reasons given by participants and observers themselves. While structural conditions do contribute to a more “complete understanding of the standard of living in America’s ghettos,” they don’t explain “what motivated Watts inhabitant to act with violence when they did.” Thus, the attempt to provide a blanket structural causal analysis “had an obscuring effect:” rather than clarifying the cause of the violence, the “underlying prompts became murkier, clouded in a complicated skein of interwoven contributors” that ranged from education, breakdown of the family unit, bad police-community relations, etc.

Secondly, this conventional explanation failed to address “one key element in the riot: Marquette Frye’s arrest.” Though important, the sociological intricacies and studies collated on Watts ignored “Frye’s arrest and perceptions of that event.” Using the law of parsimony to reestablish the immediate causes of the event, Strain ascertains that the Watts riots were triggered not by “internal factors of deprivation and neglect, but by an external factor, a foreign presence—namely, the heavy-handed, violent intrusion of the police” which the residents reciprocated. This view is verified by interviews “of participants and witnesses” which suggests that “participants were not instigating a riot so much as they were responding to an invasive white presence in their community: law enforcement personnel.” Thus, “the Watts conflagration may have been not so much a “riot” but a defensive reaction: a collective expression of self-defense.” Strain explains that many participants used the rhetoric of self-defense to express themselves and explicitly referred to the Deacons for Defense and Justice. It was this social and political consciousness, “centered on the question of self-defense, that would give rise to the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.” Drawing on an indigenous tradition of collective self-defense, the BPP began as a self-defense group “in the tradition of Robert Williams, Malcolm X, and the Deacons” and “evolved into a warlike challenge” to American society. As the lead philosopher and theoretician of the organization, Newton placed self-defense at the cornerstone of the Panthers’ Ten Point Program and “engendered a cult-like respect for firearms as key to black liberation.” Newton’s justifications of self-defense grew out of theoretical and experiential influences. Though historians often emphasize Newton’s adaption of Fanonian ideas of anti-colonial violence, Strain clarifies that Newton also drew on the “violence settings of his adolescence: street corners, parties, local clubs and bars.” As a way of making sense of the world, “violence made the most sense to the Panthers” and they embraced it as a condition of human relationships. Newton argued that violence imposed on the Black community, “in any shade or form, necessitated defense from that violence.”

This view of violence stretched conventional notions of self-defense to include offensive, retaliatory, “guerillalike sniping and other acts of violence” against the police. They also transformed the idea of self-defense from a personal prerogative to “a collective measure of survival.” Said differently, “as the Panthers understood it, self-protection was defense of the community.” In Newton’s thinking, self-defense was key to the political viability of the Black community. In his own words,

To be political, you must have a political consequence when you do not receive your desires—otherwise you are nonpolitical. When Black people send a representative, he is somewhat absurd because he represents no political power. He does not represent land power because we do not own any land. He does not represent economic or industrial power because Black people do not own the means
of production. The only way he can become political is to represent what is commonly called a military power—which the BLACK PANTHER PARTY FOR SELF-DEFENSE calls Self-Defense Power. Black people can develop Self-Defense Power by arming themselves from house to house, block to block, community to community, throughout the nation. Then we will have a representative and he will state to the power structure the desire of the Black masses. If the desires are met, the power structure will receive a political consequence.

Taken together, Newton’s synthesis of elements of Black nationalism (especially internal colonialism theory) towards the self-determination of Black people and the tradition of armed self-defense form the basis of his dialectical thinking and his philosophical theory of intercommunalism. Rather than simplistically aping Marxist doctrine, importing Fanonism and relegating Black history and culture to the margins of Black liberation, Newton posited intercommunalism as an analytic sophistication of the dominant concept in Black nationalist thinking up to that period: internal colonialism theory. With a focus on philosophical anthropology, dialectical materialism, the accomplishment of revolutionary intercommunalism (an “essentially human” culture) and interagency cooperation as a tactic to repress Black militancy, Newton’s theory of empire is a philosophical articulation of Black Americans’ cultural (existential) group consciousness translated through Marxism-Leninism that posits a qualitative leap and change in the organization of human society globally based on the historical and technological development of America as the world’s first truly global empire.

Section Two: Intercommunalism – An Analytic Sophistication of Internal Colonialism Theory

Across his writings, Huey Newton makes clear that the thesis of intercommunalism which diagnoses America as the world’s first truly global empire has three parts: “imperialism leads to ‘reactionary intercommunalism’ to ‘revolutionary intercommunalism’ to pure communism and anarchy.” The situation of reactionary intercommunalism generated from a “technological network emanating from America” which functioned as the image of the Liberal “Free World” to negate the influence of the socialist image of “‘The New Man” and international proletarianism” around the world during the Cold War. With this basis technology, Newton argued that through foreign policy “the United States has assumed the role of a great” world power which has taken liberty to consistently oppose “the major social revolutions” around the world, “in violation of the principle of self-determination” – using military, diplomatic and economic force “to crush or cause grave setbacks to these revolutions, whether in Russia, Mexico, China, Cuba, Greece or Vietnam.” Locating this tendency in the broader nexus of the Cold War, Newton avers that in accordance with Cold War policy US foreign policy has “embarked on a course of overseas economic expansion following the closing of the geographical frontier more than seventy years ago.”

The institutionalization of a militaristic foreign policy “organized around the unprecedented concept of counterinsurgency” that runs “directly counter to the high [democratic] ideals of the American republic” is to be explained by reactionary intercommunalism. In this situation, Newton argues, “there is a group wielding predominant power in the American polity whose interests run counter to America’s high ideals” but nevertheless have the power to “impose
its own interpretation of the American tradition onto the framework of the policy-making in the state.\textsuperscript{ccliii} The prevailing ideology of this class is “expansionist, anti-revolutionary,” and militaristic and its locus of “power and interest is in the giant corporations and financial institutions which dominate the American economy, and moreover, the economy of the entire western world.”\textsuperscript{ccliv} After the US “replaced Britain as the guardian power and policeman of the international system of property,” the corporate sector “has less and less been able to entrust policy to indirectly controlled representatives and has more and more had to enter directly [into] the seats of government itself.”\textsuperscript{cclv} In the postwar period, “strategic agencies of foreign policy—the State Department, the CIA, the Pentagon, and the Treasury, as well as the key ambassadorial posts—have all been dominated by representatives and rulers of America’s principal corporate financial empires.”\textsuperscript{cclvi} Nevertheless, representatives from these organizations and institutions need not occupy every seat in government “to impose its own national interest on American policy” because the “prevailing ideology of U.S. politics in general, and of the federal government in particular, is corporate ideology, reflecting the corporate outlook.”\textsuperscript{cclvii} Thus, the “framework of articulated policy choices lies well within the horizon of this outlook.”\textsuperscript{cclviii} In addition to those already noted, Newton argues that there are two principal ways by which corporate ideology prevails in the mainstream of American thought, politics and society: the “corporate (and upper-class) control of the means of communication and the means of production of ideas and ideology (the mass media, the foundations, the universities, etc.).”\textsuperscript{cclix} Secondly, is the fact “that the dominant reality of society is corporate, and therefore political “realism” dictates for any statesman or politician that he work within its framework and accept its assumptions.”\textsuperscript{cclx} Said differently, if the basic framework of private property in the means of production is accepted, then the “national” interest which representatives of the state invoke to rationalize their official actions “necessarily coincides with the interests of corporations, the repositories of the nation’s wealth, the organizers of its productive power and hence the guardians of the material basis of its strength.”\textsuperscript{cclxi} Thus, the “corporate outlook becomes as a matter of course the dominant outlook of the state in foreign affairs.”\textsuperscript{cclxii}

To reiterate, the “chief function of corporate ideology” is to “make an explicit identification of the national tradition and interest—the American Way of Life—with its own particular interest” by means of economic determinism. This determinism, Newton explains, “takes as its cardinal principle that political freedom is inseparably bound up with corporate property: that a “free enterprise” economy is the indispensable foundation of a free polity” and modern society.\textsuperscript{cclxiii} Furthermore, it is this premise and that since the 19th century has driven American policymakers to maintain that “an expanding frontier of ever new and accessible markets is absolutely essential for capitalist America’s domestic prosperity and hence, that the extension of the American system and its institutions abroad is a necessity for the preservation of the American, democratic, free-enterprise order at home.”\textsuperscript{cclxiv} This was originally formulated as “an “Open Door” policy, to prevent the closing of the external frontier by European colonialism, and to ensure American access to, and eventual domination of, global markets, this policy has become in the postwar period a policy of preserving and extending American hegemony and the free enterprise system throughout the external frontier, or as it is now called, the “free world.”\textsuperscript{cclxv} Moreover, this is “the core of America’s messianic crusade: that the world must be made over in the American image (read: subjected to the American corporate system) if the American Way of Life (read: corporate economy) is to survive at home.”\textsuperscript{cclxvi} This stake in the global wealth and resources of the external frontier lays the basis of the US’s militaristic “commitment to the worldwide status quo (though it
may not always provide the whole explanation for particular commitments or engagements).

And it is this commitment, Newton argues, that is both “the very source of Cold War conflict” and a “permanent menace to mankind’s survival.” Contra modernization theorists, Newton argues that the penetration of underdeveloped countries by American capital has been deleterious, unproductive and “to an overwhelming degree not produced beneficial results on the whole” – leaving “almost everywhere a status quo of human misery and suffering.” Theorists who rationalize America’s expansion as a positive transfer of “industrial technologies and skills, and the flow of wealth generally from the rich world to the poor” understand revolutions in these regions to be “either misguided or sinister in intent, and contrary to the real needs and interests” of the people involved. It is even popular among those who hold this view to understand revolutions as essentially “alien-inspired efforts aimed at subverting and seizing control of the countries in question during periods of great difficulty and instability prior to the so-called takeoff into self-sustaining growth.” However, Newton argues that this view (modernization theory) is false. American expansion, not revolution, is the true culprit in putting a brake on the wholistic development of societies. In his own words,

“In fact, this view rests neither on historical experience, which shows the presence of foreign capital and power to have had a profoundly adverse effect on the development potential of the penetrated regions, nor on a sound empirical basis. Far from resulting in a transfer of wealth from richer to poorer regions, the penetration of the underdeveloped world by the imperialist and neo-imperialist systems of the developed states has had the opposite effect. As a result of direct U.S. overseas investments between 1950 and 1965, for example, there was a net capital flow of $16 billion to the United States, and this was just a part of the negative transfer. Similarly, when looked at in their political and economic settings, the much-heralded benefits of the advanced technologies transplanted into these areas, but under the control of international corporations, also tend to be circumscribed and even adverse in their effects. Indeed, regarded in terms of its impact on total societies rather than on particular economic sectors, the operation of opening the backward and weak areas to the competitive penetration of the advanced and powerful capitalist states has been nothing short of a catastrophe.”

Collectively, these material and ideological factors driving American policymaking at the core of the state apparatus and its crusade of global counterinsurgency comprise the “crisis” of reactionary intercommunalism. From a basis on Black nationalism, Newton arrived at his diagnosis of human society and American imperialism using the dialectical materialist method. Because he conceptualized the world as being “in a constant state of change,” this method is “employed as a framework of thinking that can put us in touch with the process of change.”

Beginning with an a priori commitment to materialism, Newton’s concept begins with two stipulations: “that a material world exists and develops externally and independent of us all” and that “the human organism, through its sensory system, has the ability to observe and analyze that material world.” Furthermore, dialectical materialism suggests the notion that “everything in existence has fundamental internal contradictions.” What this means is that there is a “struggle between mutually exclusive opposing tendencies within everything that exists” and this internal struggle “explains the observable fact that all things have motion and are in a constant state of
transformation.” cclxvi Explaining further, Newton writes that things “transform themselves because while one tendency or force is more dominating than another, change is nonetheless a constant, and at some point the balance will alter and there will be new qualitative development” which usher new properties into existence, “qualities that did not altogether exist before.” cclxvii Newton also qualifies this description, arguing that they “do not represent an iron law that can be mechanically applied” to social processes because there are exceptions. cclxxviii To maintain methodological integrity then, dialectical materialists emphasize the need to “analyze each set of conditions separately and make concrete analyses of concrete conditions in each instance.” cclxxix Newton also concedes to readers that his deployment of materialist dialectics is essentially ideological, but maintains that “it is superior to other ideologies because it puts us more in contact with what we believe to be the real world; it increases our ability to deal with that world and shape its development and change.” cclxxx Despite his attempts at offering an explanation, Newton’s outline of dialectical materialism is not systematic and has chronological issues. cclxxxi For instance, in speech delivered at Boston College: November 18, 1970, Newton incorrectly argued that the method stems from Karl Marx’s integration of empiricism with Immanuel Kant’s theory of rationale to solve problems inherent in the scientific method. As Newton writes, empiricism “tells you very little about the future; it tells you only about the past, about information which you have already discovered through observation and experience.” cclxxxii On Newton’s account, Marx integrated these with Kantian pure reason. As he explains, “Kant called his process of reasoning pure reason because it did not depend on the external world” but instead “depended on consistency in manipulating symbols in order to come up with a conclusion based on reason.” cclxxxiii Through the integration of empiricism and pure reason (dialectical materialism), Newton argues, “not only are we in touch with the world outside of us but we can also explain the constant state of transformation” and “make some predictions about the outcome of certain social phenomena that is not only in constant change but also in conflict.” cclxxxiv

However, as political scientist John McCartney aptly notes in his work Black Power Ideologies (1992), “nowhere does Marx incorporate Kant’s theory of pure reason.” cclxxxv In fact, Kant and Marx disagree on the configuration of the mind and body. While Kant “believed in the strict separation between mind and body,” the notion that we come to know the world through sensory data was rejected by him. cclxxxvi Rather, Kant argued that “the senses are disorganized” and that the “mind then comes in and organizes them” – thus, what we know indeed comes from our minds rather than the world. cclxxxvii Whereas Marx argued that “senses are already organized because the world is orderly,” thus sensory organization is a “product of development, not a snapshot of with an eternal form.” cclxxxviii Further, McCartney also correctly points out that Newton’s identification of Marx as the first theoretician of materialist dialectics is historically inappropriate. As he explains, “Marx’s first statement about “dialectical materialism” was made between 1844 and 1848,” after being stimulated by Feuerbach’s materialist interpretation of Hegel. cclxxxix As philosopher Richard T. De George demonstrates in his study, Patterns in Soviet Thought, the lack of systematicity on behalf of Newton is not a unique weakness to thinkers in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. In fact, the nonsystematic nature of Marx’s writings led to Marxism-Leninism as a doctrine being typified by selective dogmatization and interpretation of the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin by the Soviets. Importantly though, De George does confirm that Hegel was the fountainhead of Marx’s philosophical thinking – the latter was a “both a disciple and opponent” of the former. ccxc Hegel’s influence is evident as early as Marx’s dissertation and particular aspects of Hegelian thinking are central to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. These include
theology, idealism, dialectics and views of world history. Dialectical materialism at “once constitutes Marx’s greatest debt to Hegel and is a source of many of his most serious philosophical difficulties.”

Hegel’s dialectics are also inconsistent, but can be understood in three stages: (1) an initial stable stage; (2) the initial concept is partial and leads to a second, contradictory stage in which what has been posited is negated; (3) the negation is also partial and demands a negation of the negation – the final stage is richer than the two previous ones since it contains the positive aspects of both. While Hegel’s dialectics is premised on an abstraction which leads to an “all-inclusive concept of the absolute,” Marx’s use of dialectics was based on material phenomena, “things, objects of experience, actual men in their real circumstances” – a fact Newton rightly points out. De George also verifies that Marx’s development of materialist dialectics draws on the criticism waged by Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach attacked Hegel on three main issues: (1) he attacks Hegel’s starting premise; (2) Hegel’s theory of perception; (3) and he attacks the notion of the absolute.

Rather than starting from ‘pure being’ like Hegel, Feuerbach argues that philosophy ought to begin “not with an abstract concept but with what is given in our actual experience: that is, one should begin with man as he is and as he is experienced.” This initial rejection of Hegel’s idealism leads Feuerbach to reject Hegel’s theory of perception. The problem with Hegel’s analysis here is that it starts “not with an object which is the real term of our experience, but with the “thought of the other-than-thought,” or with the object-as-thought-of.” But Feuerbach maintains that this is not what is given to us in our experience. Rather, “we experience the object first, then think it.” Thus, for Feuerbach “reality begins with individuals and nature” whereas Hegel “is unable to adequately explain nature” because he cannot derive it a priori by deductions. Said differently, from a mere abstraction one “cannot derive the contingent concrete” objects found in nature. The third element of Feuerbach’s attack on Hegelianism is a rejection of the Absolute “as that which is ultimately real.” Hegel, “he claims, has gone somewhat beyond ordinary theology by holding the union of man and of God in the Absolute.” However, he argues that “God and man are one, but since God” is an “abstraction, if man be part of Him man must be an abstraction” as well. This doesn’t logically follow given our experience of the real world, so he rejects the entire notion. In response to Feuerbach, Marx surmised that his “materialism was insufficiently dynamic and abstract”, so both him and Hegel had to be corrected and completed: the task Marx sought to accomplish. To update materialism to account for the errors of Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx argued that: (a) objects exist outside of the mind and are not dependent on it; (b) consciousness depends on matter for existence; (c) no purely spiritual entities exist; (d) the correct approach to practical problems is through an analysis of actually existing entities and conditions. To this philosophical materialism is added dialectics, interpreted materialistically: (a) man is active and not passive in his knowing and doing; (b) he is dynamically interrelated with other men and nature; (c) human reality is permeated with antagonisms or contradictions which provide the motive force for change and progress.

Therefore, despite his lack of precision in tracing the historical development of dialectical materialism Newton’s deployment of dialectics remains logically valid and an original formula to the extent that it allowed him to analyze the subjugation of Black America and the suffering of the people of the world through a new theoretical lens: revolutionary intercommunalism (then pure communism and anarchy). Rather than adopting foreign models alien to the historical development of America, simply aping Fanon, Soviet doctrine or other anti-colonial thinkers, Newton deployed
the dialectical materialist method to account for the transformative nature of US technology which facilitates his functional explosion of the categories of internal colonialism theory. As Newton explains, at the start of the Party, they “were what one would call black nationalists” because they believed the oppression of Black people—as a ‘nation within a nation’—could be alleviated “when we established a nation of our own, composed our own people.” From this, they became revolutionary nationalists and theorized that because Black people did not have “the geographical concentration that other so-called colonies had” that they were “a dispersed colony” who ought to join with “other people of the world struggling for decolonization and nationhood.” To properly express solidarity with the people of the world facing the same kinds of oppression as Black Americans, they changed their self-definitions once more and decided to call themselves internationalists. But, based on the dialectical development of the global situation Newton concluded that his analysis was erroneous. The conclusion that “people could solve a number of their problems by becoming nations” relied on the mistaken assumption “that the conditions under which people had become nations in the past still existed” – to qualify as “a nation, one must satisfy certain essential conditions, and if these things did not exist or cannot be created, then it is not possible to be a nation.” Historically, “nation-states were usually inhabited by people of a certain ethnic or religious background,” and they were “divided from other people either by a partition of water or a great unoccupied land space.”

These conditions allowed for the nation’s dominant classes and the people more generally “a certain amount of control over the kinds of political, economic, and social institutions they established” – it gave them “control over their destiny and their territory.” But the development of technology led to a “qualitative transformation of relationships within and between nations.” As technology advanced, “there was an increase in military capabilities and means of travel and communication” and some nations “began to control other territories, distant from their own.” This implied the control of these distant lands by “sending administrators and settlers, who would extract labor from the people or resources—or both,” this is the phenomenon of colonialism. The control of a seized land a people became so complete that it was no longer necessary for the administrator or settler to be present to maintain this system of exploitation. The conquered people became "so integrated with the aggressor that their land didn’t look like a colony any longer” but it also didn’t look like a legitimately free nation-state either. This led some theorists to call these lands “neocolonies.” But through “the dialectical materialist method,” Newton argued that even the United States no longer fit the definition of a nation. Newton reasoned that it was in fact “more than a nation” because it had “not only expanded its territorial boundaries, but it had expanded all of its controls as well.” These conditions made it the first truly global empire. Clarifying the difference between the US and other historical examples of empires, Newton explains that, “Now at one time the world had an empire in which the conditions of rule were different—the Roman Empire. The difference between the Roman and the American empires is that other nations were able to exist external to and independent of the Roman Empire because their means of explorations, conquest, and control were all relatively limited. But when we say “empire” today, we mean precisely what we say. An empire is a nation-state that has transformed itself into a power controlling all of the world’s lands and people. We believe that there are no more colonies or neocolonies. If a people is colonized, it must be possible for them
to decolonize and become what they formerly were. But what happens when the raw materials are extracted and labor is exploited within a territory dispersed over the entire globe? When the riches of the whole earth are depleted and used to feed a gigantic industrial machine in the imperialist’s home? Then the people and the economy are so integrated into the imperialist empire that it is impossible to “decolonize,” to return to the former conditions of existence. If colonies cannot “decolonize” and return to their original existence as nations, then nation no longer exist. And since there must be nations for revolutionary nationalism or internationalism to make sense, we decided that we would have to call ourselves something new.”

guided by dialectical materialism, this logic led to Newton’s turn towards ‘intercommunalism’ and his explosion of the categories deployed to understand Black America as a nation within a nation going back to the 19th century. Within the “age of reactionary intercommunalism,” a “small group of people [the US ruling class], control all other people using their technology.” However, this same technology “can solve most of the material contradictions people face” and allow the “people of the world to develop a culture that is essentially human and would nurture those things that would allow people to resolve contradictions in a way that would not cause the mutual slaughter of all of us”: this culture would signify the emergence of the age of revolutionary intercommunalism. Because of its own internal contradictions, Newton understands US empire as having laid the foundation for its own negation through “world communism.” Through its cutting edge communications and military technology, “the world is now integrated into one community” and “peoples of all cultures are under siege by the same forces and they all have access to the same technologies.” After “the people seize the means of production and all social institutions, there will be a qualitative leap and change in the organization of society” which ushers in revolutionary intercommunalism and eventually to the establishment of communism. At the final stage of communism, people will “be free to re-create themselves” and ensure that “human values will shape the structure of society” before laying the basis for yet “a still higher level” of development “of which we can now know nothing.” Despite scholarly narratives that seek to explain intercommunalism through “character assassination, petty fault-finding” or the notion that it signified Newton’s lack of attention to the specific development of American society, Newton’s views on technology is centered specifically on US history. For instance, in the technology question: 1972, Newton argues that “slavery proper but also chattel slavery followed by wage slavery” provided the US with a reservoir of resources that allowed Americans to “produce the kinds of experimental agencies and universities that created the information explosion.”

This technological explosion must be taken seriously because it forms the basis for the reactionary intercommunalists—US capitalists/imperialists—to “dominate world markets” and “discredit socialism and communism via foreign aid made available—or unavailable, as the case may be—to developing countries.” As he explains though, this situation of imperialism has within it the seeds of its own negation. US rulers have seized the resources and goods of all the people of the world “with the gun” and the “abundance of bounty from robbery has built a monster of technology” that in the future will supply the people of the world with their basic needs. As it stands, technology allows the US to produce more with poor land than continents with good land. This further motivated imperialism because the US ruling circle has the capacity to yield
consumable products and thus need new customers. That is to say, "wester capitalists need people in order to have buyers at too-high prices for their ever-expanding market." The issue of technology is so crucial that it supersedes the basic category of nationalist thinking: land. Revolutionary intercommunalism will imply the overthrow of the reactionary forces using their technology to expropriate them and then dealing with the land question on that basis. In his own words, if “the question of liberating land is not placed in this context, then those who struggle run the risk of engaging in meaningless battle, and worse, failure.” Without control of technology, even if there is a "liberation of land," a given people will “remain dependent.” The factor of technology underlies Newton’s claim that “there are no longer nations; there are only communities under siege by the reactionaries,” or reactionary intercommunalism.

This unique development of technology, Newton argues further, has allowed the US to succeed “in what Hitler attempted to do” and install a system wherein Blacks were exploited (like the Jews) to build the state and national economy. On behalf of Hitler this “was all done as a forward thrust to shackle the world” and in turn raise the standard of living for the average German who supported the Nazis no matter the expense. Though they helped in his defeat, Newton continues, the US “took up the same Weltanschauung” and “raised the standard of living, using the same method Hitler instituted” starting with military contractors. In the case of the US though, the “situation becomes highly complex” and the industrial advancement is tied “arm-in-arm with forcing” people around the world to buy American goods. The primary goal of the US empire is to “make the people of the world adjust themselves to whatever kind of exploitation is required for consumption” beginning with “the advancements in the latest war equipment.” This situation leaves the “technological question unopposed—as far as who benefits from it, because we all do at one level or another—that so it becomes very difficult to deal with.” Through centralization and the welfare state, “Americans are in a position of dependency on the people outside” the US who are getting ripped off. This has placed the world “in a predicament” and left “we, the people” without a cohesive worldview. Realizing that the telos of reactionary intercommunalism is the psychologizing of all the world’s people into the habits, ideals and desires of Americans, Newton maintains that the only proper response to this is a revolutionary intercommunalist approach based primarily around the seizing by the masses of US technology and the creation of a truly human culture, not the liberation of land or struggles premised on internal colonialism theory or any other kind of anticolonial nationalisms. Though scholars have a tendency to compare Newton’s ideas to philosophical thinkers in the Western tradition of political theory or simplify his theory as a recapitulation of Maoism, Fanonianism other anticolonial theorists, his originality, humanistic telos and theoretical ingenuity of Newton’s thinking is also expressed in the philosophical anthropology undergirding the intercommunalist framework and in the logical trajectory of his dialectics. Though he is committed to philosophical materialism, Newton’s conceptualization of the human retains spiritual attributes. Indeed, Newton argued that despite generating from “a natural and material universe” whose first principle is female, people are “distinguished by their spiritual attributes, which alone make them what they are.” Additionally, another “distinguishing characteristic of people is their constant quest for answers to the unknown” and the power to free themselves from external controls.

In accordance with this view of humanity, Newton argued in prison, where is thy victory?: January 3, 1970 that the power structure of the US erroneously assumes that “since it has a
person’s body it has his entire being, because the whole cannot be greater than its parts.”

However, Newton argued that the “dignity and beauty of man rests in the human spirit, which make him more than simply a physical being” and unlike a mere physical object, “the human whole is much greater than the sum of its parts” because man can draw on “ideas and beliefs” that have the power to “sustain him, even when his body is confined.” Newton’s theological tendencies emerge when he outlines the second distinguishing characteristic of humanity: the will to power or “drive to explain [and control] the unknown.” For Newton, people are both “the sole entity in the universe that is constantly engaged in this quest but also the only agent capable of finding solutions to the questions that surround the unknown.” Furthermore, the accomplishment of this knowledge and control of the unknown constitutes “the mystery of God.” As Newton explains, “when all of the questions are not answered, when the extraordinary is not explained, when the unknown is not known, there is room for God because the unexplained and the unknown is God.” But when revolutionary intercommunalism is transformed into pure communism and anarchy, Newton surmises that “we will finally move to a stage called “godliness,”” because “man will know the secrets of the beginning and end and will have full control of the universe”—meaning all motion and matter.

In his extended conversation with psychoanalyst Erik Erickson, *In Search of Common Ground* (1973), Newton outlines his view of humanity and its drive to discover the unknown in terms of a ‘will to power’. Rather than a Freudian or Darwinian schema based on latent sexual urges or the view that the drive to secure one’s material provisions fuels human consciousness, Newton’s reading of Friedrich Nietzsche leads him to posit that an unconscious will to power motivates man to liberate its existence from all recognizable controls – internal and external. However, this drive does not necessarily end “in the domination of one group of people by another.” Due to a lack of knowledge and technology, the “natural drive for control has been distorted into a desire for power over people rather than a desire for power over things.”

This natural drive is the locus by which Newton envisions the ruling circle (external controllers) of reactionary intercommunalism to be eliminated completely rather than replaced by new controllers who expropriate others. The role of Newton as a theorist and the BPP more generally in this schema is to raise the consciousness of the black community (and humanity more generally) so that they are aware of these external controls and seek to usher in revolutionary intercommunalism – ensuring that the people will “become the controller” as opposed to being controlled. Newton’s philosophical anthropology also laid the basis for his rejection of the Cartesian concept of the human mind. In *the mind is flesh: 1974*, Newton dialectically subsumes “nineteenth-century breakthroughs in biology, anthropology, psychology and epistemology” to posit a tripartite framework of human consciousness. As Newton explains, western philosophical thinkers have converged around a bifurcated view of the human that depicts body and mind as oppositional. In his own words, western thought holds that while “human bodies exist in space and are subject to mechanical laws that govern all other bodies in space” minds do not and thus the “workings of our minds are not witnessable by other observers.” This dualism leads to a situation where man is thought to live “two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind” – one public and one private. Underlying this representation is an assumption about the ontology of the human: some things exists at the level of the physical, and some at the level of the mental. This “polar opposition between mind and matter” is also joined to the assumption that the mind is the brain. Using the dialectical method, Newton argues that the mind is in fact a process of creativity instantiated in a particular
spatial field of relations endowed with the “racial potential to overcome alienation at all levels of abstraction.” Seeking to “find the balance, the dialectical and analytic relationships between various orders of abstraction inherent” in the mind-brain-body process, Newton turns towards an analysis of the body. Newton writes that,

“The body that is animated by the time lag between the world and the nervous system. Thus, everything is memory, as we know phenomena. "There is no such thing as was--only is. If was existed there would be no grief or sorrow." Faulkner’s reading, with italics applied for emphasis, of the vicissitudes of memory, is magisterial. Memory makes men sick, repression of memory makes men sick, yet, to be well, the sufferer must remember both more and less,”

Elaborating on the body as a site of existential memory and philosophical inquiry, Newton explains that it is neglected in western civilization’s attempt to conceptually define the human. As a natural condition, the body is in a state of neurosis: it “craves for those never-to-be recaptures caresses and states of childhood, but it also translates into fantasy and projections its abnegations and renunciations.” Such a yearning is first “represented by images, by the feeling of nostalgia, and finally by rebellion. Together, the “contrariety between the body and its memories (both real and regretted)” are the basis from which the human self (the I) selects its memories. This mind-brain-body dynamic renders the human schemas of Western philosophy tautological and points us toward new horizons of instantiating human freedom outside of the alienation of modernity. In a demonstration of the regressive and ethnocentric ideas concerning the taxonomy of humanity, Newton provides readers with an exposition of extant literature authored by elite intellectuals, private defense contractors and US government officials that signify a desire to manipulate citizens according to a cartesian-bifurcated model of mind. In addition to initiatives by agencies within the federal government (specifically the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the National Security Agency), the work of Dr. Robert Schwitzgebel, Barton L. Ingraham, Dr. Jose Delgado, and Dr. William W. Herrmann’s work in behavioral engineering and counterinsurgency typify such a tendency. For his part, Schwitzgebel, the “chief apostle” of behavioral engineering, argued for the “government to consider increased use of devices “designed to control group behavior.” While Ingraham, a criminologist at Berkeley at the time of Newton’s publication, defended the complete and continuous surveillance of those who have demonstrated criminal tendencies through such devices using electrophysiological technology. This way, the government may be able to impose deterrents to such behavior “by electronic stimulation of the brain prior to the commission of the act.” Delgado’s research at the Yale School of Medicine successfully “implanted radio transceivers into the heads of his experimental animal subjects so he can monitor and control their activities from a distant location.” Newton avers that,

“Computers have already been tested on subjects in mental "hospitals." The machines are programmed for undesirable behavior and send out inhibitory instructions. In Physical Control of the Mind, Delgado-whose work is also funded
in part by the government-predicted that ESE [Electronic Stimulation of the Brain] could become a "master control of human behavior by means of man-made plans and instruments."

While Herrmann, “a “counter-insurgency specialist” for SDC (the System Development Corporation) told the Los Angeles Times that a good computer intelligence system would “separate out the…activists bent on destroying the system” and then develop a master plan “to win the hearts and minds of the people.” These examples verify the aspiration on behalf of the US ruling elite to control human bodies, and to mobilize technology that will ensure the preemptive elimination of dissent on the assumption that the mind-brain is separate and distinct from the body and the environment. Rather than unprecedented developments, they are conceptualized by Newton as extensions of the epistemological and cognitive mandate that white supremacy grafted onto the bourgeois and biologically reductive notion of what it means to be human since the 19th century. Thus, the tendency towards dehumanization and genocide of the darker races of humankind by whites lie at the very “origin of the modern method: complete ethnocentrism; class blindness; and the seeds of modern, “enlightened” colonization and enslavement. Against the cognitive, ontological and anthropological schemas of Western Man, Newton urges the “wretched of the earth” to break with the thinking of their oppressors as it relates to the notion of the mind-brain-body process using the dialectical method so that they may develop human consciousness to a new echelon. This improved consciousness must be “diligently applied to understanding the world and controlling ourselves, but resolutely prevented from interfering with activity properly left to automatic behavior.” Furthermore, this entails Black thought to contribute to an anticolonial “human agenda” which forms the basis for the construction of new models of being altogether “that are [now] totally obscured by bias” — models that can “generate a new sort of man, capable of preserving, amplifying, and passing to our human or posthuman followers the striving for mastery of reality, while preserving its elements of intellect, character, freedom and joy.”

To reiterate, like other Black thinkers, Newton’s intercommunalism is “belittled for lack of originality and rigor”, and simplistically depicted as erroneously applying ‘foreign’ ideas like internal colonialism to the Black population in US and seen as legitimate to the extent it converges and demonstrates continuities with white political or philosophical schools of thought. Indeed, there are many similarities between Newton’s theory and others who deployed dialectical materialism as a method. But the fact that Newton’s dialectical thinking was unique and that his theory of intercommunalism translated the Black American experience through the framework of Marxism-Leninism is beyond doubt once the arguments of other notable dialectical materialists of his generation are considered alongside his own. For his part, Vladimir Lenin used the dialectical materialist method to argue against the conflation of anti-colonial nationalism and that of Western European imperialist states. Based on the nature of its internal contradictions, Lenin argued that the same nationalism fueling European colonialism by Western states will be the basis for worldwide communism once the right to self-determination is actualized by the darker nations who were denied it. As he writes, the proletariat of oppressor nations “must demand freedom of political separation for the colonies and nations oppressed by “their own” nation.” Rather. Lenin argues that it is the duty to do this so that “full and unconditional unity, including organizational unity, of the workers of the oppressed nation and those of the oppressor nation” can be accomplished. More generally, Lenin divides countries into three types: advanced capitalist
states who ensure that other nations “both in the colonies and at home” are oppressed and exploited; Eastern European countries like Russia, Austria, and the Balkans whose task is to unite the class struggle with workers of oppressor nations and that of the workers of oppressed nations; and colonial/semi-colonial countries. In the colonized nations, “bourgeois-democratic movements have hardly begun, or still have a long way to go,” but this development must be encouraged because once class antagonisms solidify within them a proletariat class will emerge who will then join the international struggle against capital and imperialism. In this way, the imperialism of the capitalist states will dialectically lay the basis for its own negation through the imposition of capitalist development onto colonized countries. However, unlike Newton, Lenin’s arguments for materialism “stresses that matter is primary and that ideas are derived from it” but never insists on the spiritual nature of humankind. In Lenin’s view, a more complete materialist dialectics are the basis for freedom because they yield knowledge of the material laws of the universe and the manipulation of them towards one’s own ends.

Like Lenin, Mao Zedong (Tse-tung) also defended a materialism that asserts the primacy of matter. However, Mao synthesized the material ontological unity of the world an epistemological dualism wherein “one could speak of a distinction between thought and matter.” In a similar manner as Newton, western scholars have been quick to judge Mao’s thinking as essentially an imitation of Soviet doctrine and philosophical sources. However, philosopher Nick Knight demonstrates in his work Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism (1990) that his writings constitute a “single intellectual enterprise” which reflect an original philosophical contribution despite Soviet influence. Knight concedes that Mao’s use of the three laws of materialist dialectics (the first being the most pronounced in his thinking): the law of unity; the law of the transformation of quality into quantity (and vice versa) and the law of the negation of the negation, verify a deep Soviet influence on him. Nevertheless, a consideration of Zedong’s writings as a single corpus reveals idiosyncrasies in his philosophical views. For instance, Mao’s epistemology presents us with a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. As Knight explains, “on the one hand it is rationalist: the universe is a rational order; the relationships between objects in the universe constitute a rational structure; the universe and its constituent objects are ordered according to a series of objectively existing universal laws, these laws providing criteria of truth by which propositions about reality are to be evaluated; thought (as matter) is structured in a way which parallels external reality; phenomena possess “essences” not immediately apprehendable by sensory perceptions.” However, these rationalist dictums are complemented by empiricist ones which hold that: “knowledge derives from experience; the first stage in the knowledge process is perceptual knowledge; perceptual knowledge is transformed into conceptual knowledge; the criterion of truth for conceptual knowledge is practice; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is “under normal conditions” the principal aspect; knowledge of reality is progressively deepened through a process of practice in which reality and the subject of cognition are transformed; and so on.” Thus, the influence of Soviet doctrine as it relates to ontology and revolutionary class struggle was synthesized with “the existence of a rationalist element in Mao’s thought indicates that his actions were driven by theory, often at a very abstract level.” Taken together, rather than evidence of mimicry Mao’s reliance on Soviet sources reflect his own specific thinking which “drew on a number of sources” and thus “is more than the sum of its constituent influences.” Importantly, Knight explains that references to Soviet sources were common among Chinese Marxists in general – specifically Li Da and Ai Siqi who were very influential in the development of Chinese Marxism. However,
Mao departed from the Soviets in a crucial manner. Whereas Lenin argued for the progressive development of semi-colonial and colonized nations as an initial step towards the accomplishment of world communism, Zedong’s revolution inverted the relationship between development and national liberation. For Mao and other anticolonial nationalists after him, “the revolutionary capacity of the peasantry was not dependent on the urban proletariat” and this notion ushered in a reshaping of Marxism-Leninism to accommodate population-centric revolutionary guerrilla warfare methods that would allow “for a small weaker actor to override a more powerful enemy by the means of will, time, space and propaganda in the absence of initial fire power capacity” through a three stage process: (1) strategic defense, (2) stalemate and (3) strategic offensive.

In the initial stage insurgency is conducted by “a small armed force which attacked and makes a gradual retreat before the strong retaliation of the enemy’s army.” This leads to a stalemate “in which the guerrilla tactic of quick strike and quick retreat” as the primary mode of military operations fosters a “sense of futility” among conventional troops. Together, these first two stages can be summed up by Mao’s famous dictum: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." This dynamic causes the conflict to “reach a state of equilibrium with insurgents controlling little land but maintaining positions of tactical” advantage. With the “increase in the frequency and spatial scope of insurgent-guerrilla warfare comes the beginning of large-scale mobile warfare and the creation of regular army units” by the insurgents. At this stage, the strategic offensive, “positional warfare dominates the mode of conflict” and guerrilla operations become “only complementary” as the “insurgent army is ready to pursue the successful termination of war.” Despite the refusal of Eurocentric Marxists, the white American Left and ideological adherents of the Communist Party USA like Angela Davis to acknowledge Maoism as a “true extension of Marxism-Leninism”, it went on to inspire “most of the world to seek revolutionary socialism and Marxist ideology” and gained an audience “among black radicals” in Africa and the US who began to debate class struggle and what role Black Americans will play in world revolution.

Given the numerical majority of the peasantry in African countries, revolutionary leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon also adapted dialectical materialism and strategies of guerrilla warfare towards anticolonial endeavors. Nkrumah’s philosophical ideas took root after being introduced to “Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Marx” during his time as a student in the US. Though he was initially a Ghandian, he eventually took a materialist stance in defense of revolutionary anti-colonial violence. For Nkrumah, philosophy is inherently social, and this lays the basis for what he considers to be the two basic questions of metaphysics: ‘what there is’ and ‘how what there is can be explained’. These questions, he thinks, will guide us to explore what is ultimately real. Given his adoption of materialism, he too attacks idealism. Nkrumah dismisses it for two reasons: (1) solipsism and (2) its efficacy as a theory of perception. As he explains, there are two types of solipsism: complete and incipient; (1) stems from a situation wherein “the individual is identified with the universe following from a ‘depressing scepticism’ about the external world while (2) is basically a kind of Cartesian view of the self – I think, therefore, I am. On his view, the first is incoherent and the second is fallacious. Complete solipsism is incoherent because it cannot explain “the idea of attached experience.” On the other hand, incipient solipsism is criticized based both on its speciousness as a methodology which fallaciously moves “form I can think of myself without any of the senses” to “I can think of myself
without a body” but also based on what Nkrumah sees as its lack of a warrant for the notion that existence can simply be inferred “form the fact of thinking as Descartes has done.” Nkrumah argues that Descartes begged the question of existence and “has only succeeded in demonstrating the existence of unattached experience.” To undermine the notion that bodily existence, he posits ten premises to attack this claim. The most important is premise four: “perception occurs only through the sense” – which for him is more cogent than incipient solipsism. Furthermore, he argues that henceforth “the ontological existence of matter should be separated from the epistemological question of how it is known.” Like other dialectical materialist thinkers, Nkrumah also agrees that materialism is the only serious metaphysics and affirms both (1) the independent existence of matter and (2) the primary reality of matter. But Nkrumah also seeks to explain phenomena that isn’t reducible to matter like energy or consciousness through the notion of categorical conversion. This describes the “process by which the category of secondary reality (consciousness/spirit) is derived from that of primary reality (matter).” With this ontological schema, Nkrumah’s deployment of dialectical materialism contributes to a unique project that, unlike Mao, completely jettisons idealism and contours Marxism-Leninism towards the social transformation of Africa as the intellectual basis for philosophy through what he terms conscienicism.

Consciencism is based on two premises that typify Nkrumah’s own eclecticism: (i) the absolute existence of matter and (ii) the capacity of matter for spontaneous self-motion. This framework was envisioned as “a map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest the Western and the Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality.” Like Mao, Nkrumah defends materialism on the basis that “materialist philosophy has always been in partnership with egalitarian ethics in the history of thought.” But for Nkrumah, this link is evidenced in the writings of Thales and Anaxagoras. Both thinkers, he argues, forged thought towards the brotherhood of man and transformation of society from “a democratic one into a socialist society.” However, his embrace of socialism differs from Marx’s historical materialism because for Nkrumah socialism “is derived from a moral conception of society” and nature itself has a humanist impulse – having as its natural telos not “a profiteering accomplishment, but the affording of ever-increasing satisfaction for the material and spiritual needs of the greatest number.” Moreover, while Marx and Lenin suggest that the proletariat state “creates the conditions for its own disappearance” by eliminating classes and destroying their structural foundation, Nkrumah argues that in Africa societies already have socialist principles. Thus, Nkrumah argues that what is needed is the “centralizing of the means of production to meet modern standards and prevent the development of ‘class cleavages’ which had never existed.” That is to say, the “state becomes the guide to prevent the development of class” antagonisms which may emerge due to the activities of neocolonialists and the indigenous bourgeoisie. Indeed, this thinking undergirded Nkrumah’s guiding theoretic of neocolonialism. Introduced in his text, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965), the neo-colonialism thesis is outlined as follows: “the essence of neo-colonialism is the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from the outside.” The technology of the western powers, particularly the US, is an important aspect to neo-colonialism. As Nkrumah explains, the second world war intensified the need by the west for military technology, “vast quantities of equipment and the supply services that were ancillary to
the purpose of wiping out people and cities.”

“Before the war, industrialised countries relied largely upon their own reserves of iron ores or on those of other Western sources. Today the giant iron and steel corporations of Europe, America and Japan, in addition to their investments in Canada and Australia, are turning more and more for their base materials to Africa, where cheap labour, tax concessions and supporting government policies have opened up avenues of richer profits from huge, untapped resources.”

Furthermore, Nkrumah identifies America as “the very citadel of neo-colonialism” which “directs all other Western intelligence set-ups either by persuasion or by force.” The resolution to this contradiction is “African unity” which “would destroy neo-colonialism in Africa” once decolonized nations begin “acting on a Pan-African scale” and install a union government to challenge Western economic imperialism and ensure the recovery by Africans of their self-determination. Despite his awareness of US technology as a primary factor in maintaining western dominance, Nkrumah never considers it to be something that outmodes the very concept of the nation like Newton. Even when his initial view of the Black state as a means of preventing class antagonisms in Africa is recanted, the state is still a viable concept in Nkrumah’s thinking. For instance, in Class Struggle in Africa (1970) Nkrumah revises his former views and argues the state is “the expression of the domination of one class over the other classes” and that the working class is the vanguard “agent of transformation of a bourgeois state to a proletariat state.” This class, a later Nkrumah argues, must derive strength from an international (working class) movement and combine itself with the majority population in Africa – the peasantry – “by taking the revolution to the countryside.” Despite these changes, it is clear that Nkrumah’s dialectical thinking is based on his unique synthesis of a strict materialist ontology and an idealism based on “the need for the restitution of African humanism” which ultimately give meaning to life. Unlike the aforementioned dialecticians though, Frantz Fanon’s dialectics begins with an explicit critique of the racial taxonomy of liberal humanism at the heart of the western philosophical tradition and its depiction of human consciousness. Despite the universalist tendency of western academics to interpret Fanon as simply a racialized instantiation of Hegel, Fanon’s dialectics begin with an attack on Hegel’s racist philosophical anthropology. As philosopher Adebayo Ogungbre explains in his work Fanon’s Anticolonial Critique of Hegelian Dialectics (2018), Fanon’s earliest work, Black Skin, White Masks (BSWM), laid the basis for ideas he would develop later in Wretched of the Earth (WOTE) by taking the position that the relationship between the white “master” (colonizer) of the Black “slave” (colonized) is one fundamentally different than the one described by Hegel. As Fanon argues, for Hegel there is reciprocity between the slave and the master. However, the “absence of reciprocity between the “master” (colonizer) and the Black “slave” (colonized) makes the Black “slave” contemplate “on the “master” whereas the “slave” in the Hegelian dialectic focuses on the object of consciousness.” Undeniably, anthropological hierarchies informed how Hegel understood which racial groups had the capacity for consciousness. For instance, Hegel justified the enslavement of Africans in the Western Hemisphere by employing “ethnological views of race about Black people” that understood them as being absent “of any formalized ontological category” and having “weak moral sentiments.” These negative ontological features, for Hegel, were proof positive that Black Africans/African-descended people were “outside of the realm of consciousness and as such can be reduced to a
Thus, the Hegelian formula for dialectics stems from a taxonomy that impedes the recognition of Black people’s humanity to articulate a theory of (white) human consciousness. Against this racialized construct of being that stem from the material “concretization of colonialism,” Fanon posits a new dialectical model: the colonizer and the colonized. As Ogungbre makes clear, Hegel’s dialectics is about power. It is “about who has the power to determine who is human and who is subhuman.” Accordingly, Hegel used his system of dialectics to theorize about the axis of being and the logical structure of self-consciousness” using the terms “master” and “slave.” And on Hegel’s account reason plays a “pivotal role in the process of how the self-consciousness of the Absolute spirits (of white humankind) develop into full consciousness; in fact, it is what makes recognition possible for being-in-itself.” But, as Fanon argues, the Hegelian dialectic is functionally inapplicable to Black people who are “already excluded from the category of being and rationality based on Hegel’s anthropological” schema a priori. This observation drives Fanon to reject the assumptions of Hegel, conceptualize what he terms ‘the zone of nonbeing’ and diagnose the dialectics of Hegel as the instantiation of Western civilizational violence against colonized people. For Black (colonized) humanity to escape the zone of non-being, they must make themselves known to the colonizer through violent struggles for liberation because “the element of recognition is lacking in the relationship between the white “master” and the Black bonds-person “slave”.” This is a radical departure from the Hegelian formula because Fanon’s argument holds that in response to the negation of Black being from Hegelian dialectics, Black people must use violence and impose another negation. Said differently, “force can only be resisted and transcended with counter-force” to accomplish the negation of the negation. Thus, “anticolonial struggle is an inevitably dirty and violent process.” Moreover, the social system that is premised on the negation of his being leads to neurosis in the colonized after being imposed on him. To remedy to this quandary requires a total “existential substitution of one “species” of humankind by another – one that is “absolute, total and seamless” by way of violence.” As Ogungbre writes,

“For Fanon the racism—on a material and particularly on a psychological level—denied the colonial subject his/her freedom and authenticity as a human being by reducing him/her to an object forced to live in a state of inauthenticity. The racial hierarchy at the heart of the colonial system relegated those subjected to colonialism to the status of subhuman. This explains why Fanon affirms that the system of colonial logics/dialectics is not really about ‘rationality’ or ‘consciousness’; it is about the clash of opposites. Thus, “challenging the colonial world is not a rational confrontation of viewpoints. It is not a discourse on the universal, but the impassioned claim by the colonized that their world is fundamentally different. The colonial world is a Manichaean world”—a world of conflicting opposites. This class of opposites, a crisis of existence between whiteness and Blackness, must, in the words of Fanon, “include violence.”

In his work, Decolonizing Dialectics (2017) George Ciccariello-Maher verifies the intellectual genealogy of Fanon’s dialectics outlined by Ogungbre. The ontological negation of

‘thing’ and ‘object’ of no value.” Hegel would later elaborate on this idea and argue that “the attainment of Absolute spirit and the expression of consciousness” is “the ultimate marker of being human.”
Blackness comprises the basis for Fanon’s dialectics and his philosophical break with the universalism (white humanism) of Hegel’s. Rather than a teleologically bound framework, Fanon’s begins and remains open-ended and defers “universal reconciliation” by projecting “outward onto the global movement for decolonization.” To reiterate, whereas Hegel’s philosophical anthropology presumed a racially “shared basis for reciprocity and ultimately recognition, Fanon diagnoses the existence of a zone of nonbeing” inhabited by racialized populations who are reduced to objects that don’t meet the taxonomic threshold to participate in Hegel’s dialectic a priori. The resolution to this problematic – the zone of non-being – requires violence and self-assertion of Blackness because within this register of negation, there is a lack of reciprocity between the master and slave and an inferiority complex imposed on the colonized subject that leads them to either (1) accept their “subjugation as deserved”, (2) futilely attempt to “sneak into the realm of Being by becoming “white”” or (3) busy themselves with violently fighting for liberation. Overcoming the obstacle of ontological negation constituted by the zone of nonbeing through force has two implications: forcing the white “master” to open their eyes to Black Being; while simultaneously cleansing the neurosis/inferiority complex of the Black “slave”. The second implication is tied Fanon’s sociogenic view of human consciousness. For Fanon, the consciousness of the individual and the situation/consciousness of the society are reciprocal. Thus, to assault the structure of colonialism/oppression in the real world simultaneously purges the psycho-existential contours of the mind of the colonized subject and lays the basis for the emergence of a new (revolutionary and egalitarian) conception of the human/taxonomy. Using the Algerian revolution as a case example of this process Fanon writes that once “the degrading and infantilizing structures that habitually infest relations between the colonized and colonizer were suddenly liquidated” through combat, Algerians were then in the position to bring “into existence a new, positive, efficient personality” that embodied a new national consciousness. Reiterating the symbiotic relationship between national (social) and individual consciousness in his exposition of how this sociogenic process generates new schemas of truth and being into existence, Fanon emphasizes the totality of the war that must be conducted against colonialism. In his own words,

“This refusal of progressive solutions, this contempt for the "stages" that break the revolutionary torrent and cause the people to unlearn the unshakable will to take everything into their hands at once in order that everything may change, constitutes the fundamental characteristic of the struggle of the Algerian people. And the moudjahid which sets forth this position, defends it and makes it triumph, introduces a new element into the classic dialogue of the dominated and the oppressor. The liberation of the individual does not follow national liberation. An authentic national liberation exists only to the precise degree to which the individual has irreversibly begun his own liberation. It is not possible to take one's distance with respect to colonialism without at the same time taking it with respect to the idea that the colonized holds of himself through the filter of colonialist culture.”

Importantly, the zone of nonbeing is only an initial obstacle. False universalism (white humanism) is a second one and a third is a premature conclusion to the dialectic once it is underway. The second obstacle reifies the white human and reinforces the ontological stratification of the colonizer/colonized bifurcation by “masking it beneath a false universalism” of legal
equality/humanism that can “freeze dialectical movement at the level of” a formal equality which leaves an essential quality “lacking from the emancipation process itself”: struggle on behalf of Black people.\textsuperscript{cdxxviii} As a “gift bestowed by masters (in both the concrete and ontological senses),” leaves the colonized in a situation where new values are not engendered “from the systolic gush of his blood” but from liberal universalism which does not entail a shift in mutual self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{cdxxix} To be clear, formal solutions imposed by the colonizer are understood as barriers to a “life and death struggle” that is prerequisite to any universal future” – robbing former slaves “of the chance to fight for and win their equality.”\textsuperscript{cdxxx} The third obstacle consists of a foreclosing of the transformative potential of sociogeny by overdetermining and subsuming race/Blackness to a teleological class struggle: the latter being “a broader, world-historical dialectic” and thus, “the dialectical progression, the end of history.”\textsuperscript{cdxxxi} Fanon does not call for a static formula that essentializes race but instead one that opens towards sociogeny and the accomplishment of a true universalism. This does not imply that he claims that “class—and much less, economics—is irrelevant to the colonized,” but it does resist the notion that “race is subjective and particular whereas only class is objective and universal” which would elevate a “particular component of European historical development to the status of world-historic universal.”\textsuperscript{cdxxxi} With the overdetermination of Blackness as a register of existence totally negated as its basic premise, Fanon’s dialectics imply a universalism only accomplished subsequent to the rupturing of the structures of the world under white supremacy. While his earlier works like \textit{BSWM} are concerned with the alienated middle class colonial subjects, \textit{WOTE} would turn towards the masses of the colonized peasantry of Africa, more explicitly to analyze colonial counterinsurgency and sociogeny or the view that “social structures are themselves the root cause” of the psychoexistential afflictions of the colonized.\textsuperscript{cdxxxii} In his treatment of the decolonized nation and national consciousness, Fanon articulated what is the most distinctive aspect of his dialectics. Unlike Nkrumah’s initial idealization of the “Westphalian nation-state, [Fanon’s decolonized nation] is something more constantly in motion and grounded not so much in force monopolized from above as on violence dispersed from below.”\textsuperscript{cdxxxiii} For Fanon, national unification is but a steppingstone towards the accomplishment of a new world order and definition of humanity. Said differently, anticolonial violence is sanguine — reversing the Manichean logic of the colonial order sets in motion a process that begins violently outside of ethics but moves forward towards a revolutionary humanism. It “is only through the absoluteness of the Manichean inversion of the first (national) stage that the dialectic can gain the momentum necessary to catapult beyond that stage (toward social revolution).”\textsuperscript{cdxxxv} The uniqueness and plasticity of Fanon’s decolonial dialectics places the lumpen at its wellspring for guerrilla warfare against the counterinsurgency of the colonial state. It is this violence that performs the creative (autopoetic) functions associated with sociogeny: “striking fear into the heart of the colonizer, and thereby creating the basis for a symmetrical struggle.”\textsuperscript{cdxxxvi} With the nation decolonized and liberated to become static and unified on that basis is undermined by Fanon and the nation concept is conceived beyond geography with rural, semiurban and native elites all coalescing into a coherent people, unified in guerrilla struggle against colonial counterinsurgency.

All in all, the new independent government “in its dealings with the country people as a whole is reminiscent of certain features of the former colonial power.”\textsuperscript{cdxxxvii} This situation plays into the hand of the former colonial power who can divide and manipulate the various interests of the parties and trade-unions outside the purview of the masses (whose hostility could be provoked by legislation aimed at bettering the living conditions of the most favored elements of the nation).
The etiology of this volatile situation “shows the objective necessity of a social program which will appeal to the nation as a whole” as opposed to the instrumentalization of the masses as an inert and brute force which eases the possibility for the colonized elite to compromise with the oppressor. This “horde of starving men” – the lumpenproletariat – will be the spearhead of revolution. As Fanon explains, the lumpen are a phenomenon in and of themselves whose very presence endangers the counterinsurgent security apparatus of the system of colonial domination as it spreads from the countryside to the towns. In his own words,

“So the pimps, the hooligans, the unemployed, and the petty criminals, urged on from behind, throw themselves into the struggle for liberation like stout working men. These classless idlers will by militant and decisive action discover the path that leads to nationhood. They won't become reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers. These workless less-than-men are rehabilitated in their own eyes and in the eyes of history. The prostitutes too, and the maids who are paid two pounds a month, all the hopeless dregs of humanity, all who turn in circles between suicide and madness, will recover their balance, once more go forward, and march proudly in the great procession of the awakened nation.”

With no organizational program, the natives aim at materializing and securing the new nation but the optimism that characterizes the initial outbreak of warfare is dissipated by heavy losses and “bodies mown down by machine guns.” Citing Angola as an example, he notes that the masses used spontaneous violence in successive waves against the settler and sustained many losses; “thousands of Angolans were mown down by colonialist machine guns.” Thereafter, the national army was reorganized using guerilla techniques and a new paradigm of engagement based on population-centric approaches to victory. In other words, rather than a national army of liberation being one which engages in enemy-centric operations, it fights on behalf of and alongside the colonized masses going “from village to village, falling back on the forests[...].” Astute leaders, Fanon argues, operationalize the structure of the national liberation army to educate and indoctrinate the masses to control and direct their violence based on “clear objectives, a definite methodology, and above all the need for the mass of the people to realize that their unorganized efforts can only be a temporary dynamic.” Resentment won’t win national wars of liberation, but the raising of the standard of consciousness of the rank-and-file can inoculate the people against techniques of pacification. Cognizant of the two-pronged approach of colonial counterinsurgency, Fanon notes that as decolonial wars develop the enemy pairs “his policy of brutal repression with spectacular gestures of friendship, maneuvers calculated to sow division, and “psychological action.” Through these and other methods like the deployment of agent provocateurs and other collaborators, counterinsurgency operations center the masses (the lumpen). Thus, Fanon argues that “any movement for freedom ought to give its fullest attention” to this class and if they are ignored, the colonialist will be able to manipulate and organize them to fight “as hired soldiers side by side with the colonial troops.” With Algeria, Angola and the Congo as case examples, Fanon shows that logics of colonial warfare are population-centric and uses the naïve spontaneity of the masses as a dynamic to ultimately defeat their struggle for liberation and impose neo-colonialism. As he writes,
The enemy is aware of ideological weaknesses, for he analyzes the forces of rebellion and studies more and more carefully the aggregate enemy which makes up a colonial people; he is also aware of the spiritual instability of certain layers of the population. The enemy discovers the existence, side by side with the disciplined and well-organized advance guard of rebellion, of a mass of men whose participation is constantly at the mercy of their being for too long accustomed to physiological wretchedness, humiliation, and irresponsibility. The enemy is ready to pay a high price for the services of this mass. He will create spontaneity with bayonets and exemplary floggings.

But the dialectics that accomplishes the decolonized nation guided by a unified approach to guerrilla warfare that allows the masses to decipher social reality beyond strict nationalism is only half of the story. Through this struggle “the people realize that life is an endless combat,” and that combat is no more and no less than “the motor force of an equally endless dialectics” that continues towards the decolonial unity of the entire Third World against imperialism and neocolonialism. Thus, national decolonization leads to a leap from national consciousness to social consciousness and the decolonial unity of the darker (Third World) against “the ontological hierarchy of the modern/colonial (white) world.” This global zone of non-being will be the wellspring form which a new truly universal humanism springs – allowing the existential content of the colonized to generate “a new humanism, a new theory of man,” which “has its root in man” and not the idealization of white being and civilizational prestige of the West.

It would be incorrect to claim that Huey Newton’s dialectics take no inspiration from the above-mentioned theorists, particularly Frantz Fanon. However, that Newton’s dialectics begin with and is fueled by “the primal act of insurrection” on the existential and then collective level by the Black lumpen against the white oppressor has deep roots in the American Black nationalist tradition. From this basis in resistance, Newton’s dialectics moves towards communism or the accomplishment of a truly ‘universal identity’ (humanism) outside of the model of being that sustains reactionary intercommunalism. For Newton, the examples of guerrilla warfare that successfully “liberated their territory and have established provisional governments” that “represent the people of China, North Korea, the people in the liberated zones of South Vietnam, and the people in North Vietnam” should “be followed so that the order of the day would not be reactionary intercommunalism (empire) but revolutionary intercommunalism.”

Like Fanon, Huey envisions violence as laying the basis for the dialectical transformation of the organization of society towards “a culture that is essentially human” and egalitarian in an open-ended fashion. Once all of the people violently “seize the means of production and all social institutions” from the reactionary intercommunalists (the US ruling class), “then there will be a qualitative leap and change in the organization of society” that will allow the masses of humankind to “be free to re-create themselves and establish communism, a stage of human development in which human values will shape the structures of society” and on to “a still higher level, of which we can now know nothing.” Furthermore, like Fanon Newton argues that a shift in the interiority of the oppressed masses is symbiotic with the application of revolutionary violence to “expropriate power from the ruling circle” to “bring about the necessary transition in the world.” The conditions of imperialism imposes an attitude of helplessness on the slave who will never expropriate “power from the master until he realizes that the master is not God and not bullet-proof.” Thus, it is the role of the Black Panther Party to teach the Black masses (and the people
of the world) “that they do not have to accept life at the cost of the loss of their dignity” through examples of people “who say if they cannot be free, then they will die trying.” The necessity of violence for Newton is demanded based on “concrete conditions and the reality of the situation” which demand that the Black people use “violence in order to eliminate it” and reach a stage of human development where contradictions can be “resolved in a peaceful way.” Newton makes it clear that he condemns violence. But this is qualified with “a distinction between the violence of the aggressor (oppressor) and the self-defense of the people.”

Using slavery as an example, Newton explains that “the slave master kidnapped people, split up their families, forced them to labor, shipped, tortured, and killed them, stole all of the profit from their work.” In such conditions, violent revolt implied Black people “defending themselves against murder” and provide the truth conditions for the claims “that oppressors have no rights which the oppressed are bound to respect.” Thus, within Newton’s dialectics the observation that “material conditions produce the violence of the aggressor and the self-defense of the victim” which imposes on the people “an obligation to resist attack upon their attempts to change the material conditions of their lives.” Under the technocracy of reactionary intercommunalism, the bourgeois abstraction of human identity/being centers on a view of the “self-made man” – “a type of person who by temperament and opportunity can make of himself pretty much what he wants to and who considers” other kinds of people to be those “who cannot do all of that for reasons of race or class or type or weakness or something else.” But the downfall of this genre of human consciousness “is going to be that people will rebel against him because of his insistence that he has all of the answers.” Once the “control of the means of communication and the means of production of ideas and ideology (the mass media, the foundations, the universities, etc.)” are expropriated and in the hands of the masses, a new theory of man will arise based on a universal identity. Without this universalism, “we will have cultural, racial and religious chauvinism, the kind of ethnocentrism we have now.” The thrust of this dialectical transformation of society for Newton too are the Black lumpen. But these similarities don’t warrant the claim Newton’s intercommunalist theory is the product of a selective or ad hoc adaptation of Fanon’s (or anyone else’s) model for revolution. Newton’s deviation from Fanon and other dialecticians reflects his own specific thinking in the form of a unique dialectical schema that is not defended by any other thinker of his generation. For instance, unlike Fanon’s rural lumpen, Newton’s lumpen is urban Black America: constituted primarily by “brothers and sisters off the block.” For Newton, Black people are “the vanguard of revolution” in the US and “since no one will be free until the people of America are free,” Black people “are the vanguard of world revolution.” This position has been inherited based on their historical development as a group “internationally dispersed by slavery” and who “can easily identify with people of other cultures.”

For Newton, this historical and existential (subjective) configuration of Black Americans has led them to have qualities that contribute to their “vanguard position” in bringing about revolutionary intercommunalism: due to slavery they are unattached to the nation-state construct, have the tendency to think internationally and idealize egalitarianism. As Newton explains, we yearn “for the yoke to be released,” and “to live with other people” on the basis on equality. Thus, Black people have to have their consciousness raised “first because they were carrying the [revolutionary] banner first.” Again, the importance of raising the consciousness of the people plays a role in Newton’s dialectics is also absent in Fanon and other anti-colonial dialecticians.
because Newton’s view of philosophical anthropology centers on what he considers to be humanity’s primary drive for knowledge and power to control phenomena. This ‘will to power’ drives humanity to free themselves from both external and internal controls and “reverse the dominance in nature—to become the controller, to become the father, to become God.”

Newton’s dialectics are also unique in that they imply the categorical explosion of a basic unit of analysis that remains central to all theoreticians before him: the nation. Analytically, Newton understands US empire as “a nation-state that has transformed itself into a power controlling all the lands and people” of the earth. Going further than dialectical materialists and anti-colonial theorists from Africa, Asia and even those in the US, the logical implication of the fact that nations no longer exist leads Newton to reject the existence of neo-colonialism. Leaps in the technological capacity of the US as an empire means that dialectically, “there are no more colonies or neocolonies.” Through its conversion into the world’s first imperial power to transcend geographical boundaries, the US consequently “transformed other nations into oppressed communities,” defined as small units “with a set of institutions that exists to serve a certain group of people.” As opposed to a neo-colony/Western world or colonizer/colonized bifurcation, Newton’s dialectics posit the primary contradiction in the world to be between the people of the world constituted a “dispersed collection of communities” and the “small power elite that administers and profits from the empire of the United States.”

This technology is deployed around the world in the form of US mass media, control of knowledge production via universities and police. As he explains, the US police “are everywhere and they all wear the same uniform and use the same tools, and have the same purpose: the protection of the ruling circle here in North America.” To remedy this situation requires a resistance which “seeks the goal of a collective society,” as opposed to reimposing “terms of separate entities, as [decolonized] nations.”

Newton spoke of the need for unity and a positive collective relationship among all the communities of the world due to US imperialism in this way:

We [Black people in the US] are a collection of communities just as the Korean people, the Vietnamese people, and the Chinese people are a collection of communities-a dispersed collection of communities because we have no superstructure of our own. The superstructure we have is the superstructure of Wall Street, which all of our labor produced. This is a distorted form of collectivity. Everything’s been collected but it’s used exclusively in the interest of the ruling circle. This is why the Black Panther Party denounces Black capitalism and says that all we can do is liberate our community, not only in Vietnam but here, not only in Cambodia and the People’s Republics of China and Korea but the communities of the world. We must unite as one community and then transform the world into a place where people will be happy, wars will end, the state itself will no longer exist, and we will have communism.

Though it draws on many sources for influence, it is beyond a doubt that intercommunalism “is an important and original contribution to revolutionary political” and Black nationalist philosophy; constructed as a “counterideology, the core of which is an unyielding commitment to break loose from the chains of U.S. imperialism, the end result of centuries of slavery, and from other forms of domination suffered at the hands of the white oppressor.” Deriving a justification for global revolution based on “the glaring discrepancy between the so-called American Dream and the dismal political, economic, social and psychological realities that people
of color and oppressed people in general experience on a daily basis,” it is more than anything else an analytic sophistication of the previous theoretic deployed by radical Black thinkers to understand and interpret the conditions of their people going back to the 19th century: internal colonialism theory. Furthermore, its distinctive class analysis of the urban Black lumpen translated the Black American experience through Marxism-Leninism and “tapped into a sector of the population that society had deemed to be beyond rehabilitation and transformed them into productive social-change agents” who would function as the vanguard or spearhead of revolutionary intercommunalism by organizing, uniting and channeling their ontological negation “in a way that achieved productive revolutionary ends” that implied the inclusive transcendence of “racial, class and gender lines.”

**Conclusion: Reckoning with the Strange Fruit of (Limited) Democracy – Intercommunalism as a Diagnosis of Counterinsurgency-Style Repression as the Logical Consequence of American Limited Democracy**

Despite its neglect and Newton’s long-range demonization as essentially unintelligent, violent and sexist, intercommunalism provides a historical diagnosis of US society that debunks the assimilationist idealization of liberal democracy that has guided Black philosophical thought since the 1970s. As Newton argues, American society is arranged towards the mastery of techniques of repression despite its institutionalization on the basis of a democratic government. Although its founding documents signify an aspiration for the high ideals of democracy, US society is in fact configured to violently repress and purge certain segments of the population based on the restricting the application of these same ideals. Said differently, the emergence of liberal capitalist social orders simultaneously spawns and rationalizes the institution of totalitarian regimes of repression. In the specific case of the US, two primary contradictions exist at the basis of the American social structure towards this end: (1) “class and racial cleavages which have historically been the source of division and bitter antagonism between sectors of American society;” and “the inherent and longstanding distrust held by the American ruling class of any institutionalized democracy involving the mass population.” These were rationalized by the founders of the state as the most desirable given that the US was structured to be a ‘limited’ democracy. Africans, Natives and to a lesser extent women were held in disrepute and placed beyond the horizon of the democratic ideals enshrined in the founding documents of the nation. Furthermore, these exclusions concretized these groups—especially Black Americans—as the US’s “original wellspring of dissent.” Thus, “Americans of different classes and races [are] either directly engaged in social warfare or forever poised in a position of battle” because of “a systematically cultivated polarization which has predisposed the population to varying but continuous levels of warfare.” This violent “social antagonism has been recast with the changing mold of each different epoch of American society.” However, military technology and the desire for a “semi-dignified clean-hands image of themselves” has made direct and unconcealed brute force less acceptable; Americans today are “more inclined to issue endorsement to (state security) agents and agencies of control” which carry out the tasks necessary to repress the populations who pose a threat to the status quo. For Newton, this phenomenon “is largely responsible” for the rise of counterinsurgency “control tactics heavily reliant upon infiltration, deliberate misinformation, selective harassment, and the use of the legal system to quell broad-based dissent and its leadership” applied to the Panthers and other groups during the 1960s.
Once these excluded groups are constructed by the state as enemies, the majority (white) public is whipped into a fear-driven frenzy and to “maintain and assure its inequitable position” in the society allows its security agencies to repress dissent by any means, legal or extra-legal. But the application of such techniques are so consequential that the repression is difficult to carry out “without a resulting loss of cherished freedoms for the entire society.”

Outlining a historical account of repression in America, Newton clarifies that the “tactics and strategies used against the BPP have been employed by the government since the nation’s founding.”

Beginning with the Haymarket Incident, Newton explains, “American workers, led by social revolutionaries, focused their struggle on the eight-hour day” in Chicago. Newton recounts that a “mass meeting in support of the eight-hour day was held on May 3, 1886” and while “August Spies of the Social Revolutionary Club was speaking to the crowd” a special detail of “200 police arrived and, without warning, attacked the strikers with clubs and revolvers, killing at least one striker, wounding five or six others, and injuring an undetermined number.” The next day, another protest meeting was called at Haymarket square. As police began to disperse a “dynamite bomb was thrown” and one “policeman was instantly killed; six later died; about seventy were wounded” – immediately afterwards “police open fire on the crowd, killing and wounding an unknown number.”

A “nationwide wave of repression followed the Haymarket incident” which led to socialists and anarchists being “rounded up indiscriminately.” As Newton writes, “Raids were staged; homes were broken into and searched, without warrants; suspects were beaten; and "witnesses" were bribed and coerced. Thirty-one persons were indicted; eight stood trial: August Spies, Albert Parsons, Samuel Fielden, Michael Schwab, Adolph Fischer, George Engel, Louis Lingg, and Oscar Neebe. Although only two of the defendants, Spies and Fielden, were at Haymarket Square when the bomb exploded (Fielden with his wife and child) and although the state never established any connection of the defendants with the incident, an openly-biased, hand-picked jury convicted them solely on the basis of their political ideas. Worldwide efforts to free them failed and on November 11, 1887, Parsons, Spies, Engel, and Fischer were hanged. Lingg had committed suicide. It was not until 1893 that Neebe, who had been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, and Fielden and Schwab, who had had their death sentences commuted, were pardoned by Governor John Peter Altgeld.”

Continuing, Newton explains that the years 1908-1936 saw the institutionalization of “a secret political police force” – the FBI. When first created, the bureau was established within the Justice Department “to fill the gap caused by Congressional prohibition of using the Secret Service for investigation and intelligence activities.” In their initial operations during WW1, they were “aided by the volunteer American Protective League” and “investigated the activities of thousands of German immigrants as well as thousands of Americans accused of draft resistance.” With the espionage and sedition acts as their legal justifications, Bureau “agents raided offices of the Socialist Party and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), the Wobblies, across the country in a concentrated effort to gather evidence for a mass trial of 166 IWW leaders.” In response to the widespread strikes in 1919 and rising “socialist-and communist-led uprisings” in Europe, the Bureau shifted its attention from critics of the war to the activities of political groups” and created a special division for radical activities.
Division (GID) went on to compile “a massive card index containing 450,000 entries on individuals, groups, publications, and “special circumstances” and also collected information on “matters of an international nature” as well as “economic and industrial disturbances.” The Justice Department (via the GID) and the Bureau of Investigation went on to coordinate “a nationwide drive to deport foreign radicals from the U.S.” This “drive to deport radicals culminated in the Palmer Raids of late 1919 and early 1920” – the first of which took place in November, 1919 when “450 people in 18 cities were arrested.” The following January another 10,000 persons were rounded up in 33 cities. Following the Palmer Raids, “every major American city police department created intelligence divisions.” Despite protests, the Bureau “continued its illegal activities” and “increasingly relied on the use of agents of paid informants, especially between 1921 and 1924.” Though the organization’s “domestic political intelligence function was greatly curtailed from 1924 to 1936,” these efforts were “continued by state, private, and military intelligence agencies” and the “Bureau retained the massive files it had accumulated in the period from 1916 to 1924 and readily transmitted data to other agencies.” Despite there being “no federal law” authorizing it, events in Europe in 1936 “provided the rationale for the resumption of domestic investigations” and President Franklin Roosevelt requested the FBI to once again “gather intelligence on “subversive” political organizations.”

The outbreak of WW2 spurred the creation of a new iteration of domestic intelligence. The Alien Registration Act (aka the Smith Act) and the Voorhis Act, both passed in 1941 made it illegal “to teach or advocate the “duty, desirability, or propriety” of overthrowing the American government by violence” and required the registration of all organizations with foreign links who advocate the violent overthrow of the government. With this legal framework in place, these sanctions “were extended to include supporters and even latent sympathizers” and ensured an increase in the arrest and deportation “of radicals and “undesirable” aliens” at the close of the war. The communist party became “a major target of repression” during this time and in addition to several US Senate investigations of communism, the Smith Act was used to uphold the convictions of Party leaders. This “red scare” continued into the 1950s and the outbreak of the Korean War. Turning towards the repression of Black Americans, Newton explains that slavery is the fountainhead of repression of this group. Despite their dehumanization as chattel property, “slaves and their descendants vehemently resisted their oppression and for this resistance,” they “suffered beatings, torture, castration, lynching, and other forms of violence.” Black leaders and athletes were among the earliest targets of the FBI upon its founding in the 20th century. Foremost among them was Marcus Garvey. But as Newton explains, Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson were also “singled out for harassment for their association with the U. S. Communist Party.” Others like Adam Clayton Powell and Malcolm X, whose political views “helped to inspire the founding of the Black Panther Party” were “under constant police surveillance” for their views about the oppression of Black people. Before the emergence of the BPP though, the civil rights movement was targeted by the FBI. As Newton writes, groups like “the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Deacons for Defense, the Republic of New Africa (RNA), and the Nation of Islam”, as were individuals like H. “Rap” Brown, Stokely, Carmichael, Elijah Muhammad, and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. were singled out by COINTELPRO operatives. Rather than being an unprecedented development, Newton argues that COINTELPRO was simply a product of the long-range tendency to impose lethal force on the Black population with an added intensity: methods used against foreign entities were intentionally integrated into domestic
operations which sought to “discredit and destroy” Dr. King and the entire civil rights cum Black Power movement.\textsuperscript{dxviii} The repressive tactics of the government also made the United Farm Workers (UFW) and the American Indian Movement (AIM) targets. Led by Cesar Chavez, the UFW “fought for over a decade for decent wages and living conditions for American farmworkers.”\textsuperscript{dxxi} But the “strong opposition of business interests” to their work made them a “constant target of government and intelligence repression” through the use informants, “undercover agents, and provocateurs” who “continuously infiltrated” them “in an effort to destroy the union.”\textsuperscript{dxx} American Indians, a group “murdered, tortured, and isolated by the United States government longer than any other group of people” in the country had vicious wars launched against them before they were forced “form their lands in the latter part of the nineteenth century” and placed on “reservations” “operated by the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs.”\textsuperscript{dxxi} In 1970, the AIM “was founded by Russell Means and Dennis Banks.”\textsuperscript{dxxii} Shortly thereafter, Means, Banks and other leaders were designated as “prime” targets of COINTELPRO and thus have been victims of “numerous false allegations, imprisonment and murder.”\textsuperscript{dxxiii}

Importantly, Newton’s intercommunalist assessment of COINTELPRO documents the ideological and administrative techniques deployed to conduct the counterinsurgency war against the BPP by the US government. Newton explains that “a crusade against criminals and terrorists” was the public rationale offered for these operations.\textsuperscript{dxxiv} Rather than fighting ideologies, as they did earlier in the century, security officials would “fight “crime’” by “pinning the label “criminal” on the BPP and its leaders.”\textsuperscript{dxxv} To achieve this, the government employed a technique of ‘interagency cooperation’: using the FBI, CIA and IRS to seize on “a narcotics “cover” to expand domestic counterintelligence operations” against the BPP and other groups.\textsuperscript{dxxvi} Furthermore, this dynamic “of employing narcotics and crime “covers” reached its climax with the creation of a new intelligence superagency—the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).”\textsuperscript{dxxvii} This new organ of repression was multifaceted and deployed a range of tactics to crush dissent. As Newton explains,

“At the time of its formation, the DEA employed more than 4,000 agents and analysts— including some 53 former (or detached) CIA agents and a dozen counterintelligence experts from the military or other intelligence agencies. The DEA had the authority "to request wiretaps and no-knock warrants, and to submit targets to the Internal Revenue Service." With its contingent of former CIA and counterintelligence agents, it had the talent to enter residences surreptitiously, distribute "black" (or misleading) information, plant phony evidence, and conduct even more extreme clandestine assignments.”\textsuperscript{dxxviii}

This new ‘superagency’ was spawned “to direct the counterintelligence activities against the BPP and other dissident groups was an indication of how badly the federal government wanted to destroy the Panthers” and ensure the successful “coordination between law enforcement agencies” – a function which is still “not yet clear, largely because documents showing this direction have yet to be discovered.”\textsuperscript{dxxix} Nevertheless, it was these tactics used to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of Black nationalists” like Martin Luther King, Jr. and then Huey P. Newton as potential ‘messiahs’: “a charismatic Black leader who might “unify and electrify”’ the masses.\textsuperscript{dxxx} In sum, this deep rooted impulse towards the elimination of dissent laid the basis for the government founded on liberal (limited) democratic tenets of freedom to simultaneously institutionalize “tactics of totalitarian regimes” to first criminalize and then
purge Black (male) and other militants from society.\textsuperscript{dxxxi} The historical and contemporaneous application counterinsurgency warfare by the US and other liberal societies as a managerial technique to conquer, repress and brutalize racialized populations identified by Newton as a unique product of ‘limited democracy’ is explored in the next chapter and posited as an analytic framework to properly grasp the militaristic nature of western civilization and its conquest of darker races of people from the colonial era to the present.


Curry, The Man-Not, 112.


Majors, “Stealth History,” 2.

Ibid, 3.

Ibid, 5


Curry, “Killing Boogeymen,” 16.


Ibid, 24-25

Ibid, 25

Ibid, 28


Curry, The Man-Not, 193.

O’Reilly, Racial Matters, 297.

Curry, *The Man-Not*, 44.


Curry, “Hayti Was the Measure,” 75.


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Ibid, 79


Walker, *Walker’s Appeal in Four Articles*, 10.

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Walker, *Walker’s Appeal in Four Articles*, 17.

Ibid, 17


Ibid, 4

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Ibid, 59


Van Deburg, *New Day in Babylon*, 59

Ibid, 60

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Ibid, 63

Ibid, 115

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Franklin, *Black Self-Determination*, 146.


Wynter, “We Know Where,” 1977, 22.

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Ibid, 42

Ibid, 48-49

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Ibid, 3

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Ibid, 58


Jeffries, Huey P. Newton, 66.


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Matthew Hughey, “The Sociology, Pedagogy,” 646.

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Jeffries, Huey P. Newton, 75.


Malloy, Out of Oakland, 46-70.


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Chapter 2: Take It in Blood: War, Counterinsurgency and the Militarized Police Repression of the Savage/Nigger/Criminal/Terrorist as the Basis of Western MAN

Counterinsurgency has not been thoroughly analyzed or discussed as an aspect of American racism over the last sixty years. Despite the growing consensus surrounding the failures of civil rights era reforms, the increased militarization of the police and the white citizenry of the United States, counterinsurgency and the varying stratagems of modern military occupation have been ignored by modern-day scholars. The recent *U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* defines an insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region” which may also refer to specific groups. It's operational negation, counter-insurgency is understood as the implementation of “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes” which proceeds via “asymmetrical warfare by a powerful military against irregular combatants supported by a civilian population.” Though it was officially coined in the late 1960s by President John F. Kennedy, counterinsurgency has “long been a mainstay of colonial warfighting and imperial policing.” With roots in the colonial encounters of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, counterinsurgency, asymmetric or ‘savage warfare’ animated how French, British and American colonial expansion campaigns were conducted in the nineteenth century. As European empires and nation-states were consolidated, western militaries and police forces professionalized and insights that yielded success in the colonial theatre of war were recapitulated and “canonized not only in doctrine manuals—the French David Galula’s in the 2006 US counterinsurgency manual, the British Kitson’s in Britain’s – but also in a more enduring fashion in embodied practices and institutional memories of men who fight.”

The 21st century iterations of counterinsurgency are thus new installments of the colonial warfare tactics of previous eras of European imperial expansion which rationalized “the establishment of small wars as a discrete category of warfare in France and Britain” – one that “required a special doctrine” (counterinsurgency) given the racial inferiority of the populations according to the classificatory logics or philosophical anthropology of the colonizer.

The contemporary levels of violence and managerial techniques of the state towards Black people demand that explanatory theories of anti-Black racism place the category of militarized extermination at the fore of their understanding of these phenomena. The emergence of colonial wars saw the adaptation of tactics to concretize a dual standard of warfare which understood victory in industrial conflicts with other Europeans as distinct from those against nonwhites, the latter being premised on the application of brutal violence imposed on “an enemy viewed as culturally, racially, and morally inferior, and whose subjugation was approached in the spirit of total war.” As a response to the anti-colonial revolutions across Latin America, Africa, and Asia...
in the 20th century, the civilizing mission and explicitly ethnocentric doctrines that gave form and content to the aims of colonial counterinsurgencies for most of the 20th century was doctrinally reformulated by U.S. administrators under the paradigm of developmental theory which seeks to modernize “traditional societies, nation building, or the stimulation of self-sustaining economic growth in once stagnant economies.”ix At the basis of the modernization developmental process was the United States’ perfection of new “techniques of counterinsurgency” and a willingness “to apply them on behalf of people struggling against subversion to build “a democratic, open society.”x But the application of counterinsurgency war tactics against Black populations in the Western Hemisphere go back to the chattel enslavement period. In *A Curse Upon the Nation* (2017) historian Kay Wright Lewis explains that most historical works on antebellum slavery and post-emancipation “allude to a rhetoric of a war between the races” but fail to “analyze it from the African American perspective nor trace its origins back to Africa or Europe, where practices of petite guerre (guerrilla warfare) were organized out of already established cultural traditions.”xi Ideas of a race war were linked to extermination and the deliberate killing of women, children, and old people, a lineage linking past to future that stands powerfully for that horrific objective.”xii Thus, rather than being at its periphery, Lewis shows that internecine war was “an essential part of the institution of chattel slavery from the very beginning.”xiii The quotidian concerns about the possibility of a race war which were communicated by whites also concerned African descended people who “viewed the possibility of racial extermination as a serious threat throughout the nineteenth century” and was still registered as such into the late 20th century.xiv Thus, chattel slavery provided an institutional basis for the transplanting “of exterminatory warfare employed by the peoples of Europe and West Africa in their own countries [which] reemerged around the African diaspora over the issue of black freedom and the institution of enslavement.”xv

Our ongoing interpretive schemas in Africana Studies and Black philosophy often elide the insights of Black nationalists and anti-colonial thinkers, preferring reformist strategies and emphasizing intersectional coalitions that imagine identity rather the systematic reproduction of racialized and expendable populations as the basic factor in the United States’ campaign of racist domination.xvi Drawing on “a 180-year-old tradition of black activists viewing African America as a “nation within a nation””, Black nationalists and radicals of the 1960s theorized the enduring continuities between colonial warfare tactics used in South America, Asia and Africa, strategies of dehumanization and those employed to maintain white supremacy in the United States going back to chattel slavery under the paradigm of internal colonialism theory.xvii The compiled speeches of Malcolm X, the works of Harold Cruse, Robert Allen’s *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*, Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton’s *Black Power*, and George Jackson’s *Blood in My Eye* all demonstrate a convergence on the notion of internal colonialism by Black Power thinkers as a diagnostic for understanding the structural relationship between the broader US society and Black people historically.xviii Though he is erased from the dominant intellectual genealogies of Black thought produced in scholarship today, Huey P. Newton exploded the paradigm of internal colonialism theory and posited his own — intercommunalism — that identified the basic principle of the US empire and its national defense program (the largest program of any nation in history) as being “organized around the unprecedented concept of counterinsurgency.”xix The ferociousness with which Western powers have imposed violence against Black, Brown and African/Indigenous populations around the world during and after the colonial era can be better understood if placed within the strategic framework which these campaigns were/are conducted. Despite their centrality to US Cold War policy, Newton argues that counterrevolutionary foreign
intervention has “been a characteristic of U.S. foreign policy ever since the United States embarked on a course of overseas economic expansion following the closing of the geographical frontier” at the dawn of the 20th century and follows from the fact that there is “a group wielding predominant power in the American polity” who exercises its might by imposing “its own interpretation of the American tradition onto the framework of policy-making in the state.” Despite Newton’s identification of a symbiosis between counterinsurgency and militarized managerialism, race theorists and scholars theorizing contemporaneous instances of racial-colonial warfare, criminalization and state violence have yet to grasp, much less inquire about, the relationship between counterinsurgency, colonial warfare and the logics used to maintain the violent repression and subordination of racialized populations today in any systematic way.

An overview of the concepts used to understand racism and repression today signifies a large methodological incongruity between Black power thought (which extended the egalitarian philosophical anthropology and ethos of self-definition characteristic of Black thought going back to the 19th century) and contemporary thinking. Racism is centered as an object of analysis, though it is rarely analytically defined or engaged through structural analysis, which indicates that the relationship between the US and people of African descent is still properly characterized as “one of colonizer and colonized.” Rather, racism is often viewed as one iteration of a broader matrix of intersectional oppression that targets Black people in tandem with other systems of stratification like misogyny, homophobia, or sexism. As opposed to theorizing population-level conditions and how Black people are negated and killed as a consequence of them, contemporary theory is overwhelmingly focused on existentialist problematics and individual choices subordinated individuals make that reify dominant structures of oppression. Thus, theorists erroneously emphasize the moral culpability and privilege of oppressed actors rather than how the structures in place motivate and determine choices available to them in the first place. Methodologically, such an approach deploys standpoint epistemology to motivate theorists’ call for an intersectional analysis which would act as a corrective on the focus on Black male vulnerability to state violence and racism which renders those with intersecting identities (historically, culturally and politically) invisible, to aid in “combating Black male sexism”, participation in patriarchy and the incorrect association in the mind of the public of Blackness as solely connoting maleness by pluralizing it with multiple varieties of identity subordination as opposed to single subordinate group identities. Nevertheless, understanding the dominant frameworks used to understand racial subordination, criminalization and repression are necessary to advancing our conceptual acumen.

As an implication of the contemporary deployments of intersectional invisibility and struggles for a particular race/sex recognition as the basis of liberation, a crisis emerges when Black theorists suggest whites’ focus on Black males confers a positive visibility due to prototypical maleness as opposed to deleterious implications for the entire group, emphasize identity politics as a remedy to Black men’s “habitual sexist ways of interacting with and oppressing Black women” and neglect the empirical data that demonstrate Black men are uniquely targeted with negative stereotypes, represented as low prestige (as opposed to high status) threats who are more physically formidable by whites and as the sex-group that endures the most lethal forms of state violence, a robust conceptualization of racism as an instantiation of warfare (counterinsurgent or otherwise) is elided or trivialized. Accordingly, internal colonialism, the primary theoretic of Black radicals since the nineteenth century, in its 60s/70s or more
contemporary iterations is dismissed without engagement or consideration of the empirical basis which is provided to support the thesis. Even when explicitly acknowledged and repurposed, scholars de-emphasize paradigms of war and fascism introduced by Black political prisoners to make the paradigm amenable to the suppositions of intersectional invisibility and Black feminist precepts about the nature of patriarchy, which lead them to conclusions about the nature of settler colonial/racial violence that is contradicted by the epidemiological, sociological, historical and gendercidaul dynamics that have been demonstrated as determinants of the phenomena they purport to explain. Drawing on the insights from internal colonialism theory, along with interdisciplinary research in social psychology, sociology, genocide studies, history and other areas of inquiry, the concepts with the most explanatory power confirm an understanding of racism as “low-level warfare” and that a grammar of warfare is necessary to apprehend the deployment of dehumanizing caricatures, concentration of negative social value and various forms of state (and extra-state) violence imposed on racialized populations historically and contemporaneously. However, all of these concepts stop short of providing a systematic account of the phenomenon of racism through the framework of counterinsurgency warfare. In the second section, I will attempt to remedy this gap in knowledge by providing a comprehensive account of how counterinsurgency has developed historically to secure the emergence of colonial empires in the 19th century and how it was reconceptualized in the context of the ‘Cold War’ in the 20th century as a remedy to Third World anti-colonialism, the threat of Black Power and the broader global human rights movement, then recapitulated as the basis of the (still ongoing) ‘Global War on Terrorism’. With this framework demystified, the various phenomena offered by theorists and scholars as instances of dehumanization (criminalization), state-sponsored repression, imperialism, (neo) internal/colonialism and arbitrary set violence imposed on the Black community can be unified within one overarching framework that has and continues to function as the organizing principle of western defense, military and policing apparatus.

“Hand Me a Nine and I’ll Defeat Foes”: (Mis)Understanding Racism and White Supremacy as War in the 21st Century

The disciplinary agenda of philosophy is characterized by inclinations towards assimilation and the reification of Western bourgeois abstractions of the human or MAN. Black Studies, as a product of radical Black Power and anticolonial movements which gripped the US in the late 1960s, called into question the overrepresentation or “monopoly of humanity” which idealized white populations (over and against nonwhite, especially Black/African ones) and the disciplinary epistemologies assumed by Liberal universalist, Euro-American mainstream scholars to maintain this normative vision. In its original form, the paradigm employed historical-sociological methods of inquiry and spearheaded an emancipatory rupture in Black thought. As Sylvia Wynter explains in her work, On How We Mistook the Map for the Territory (2006) the Black Arts, Black Aesthetic and Black Studies movements were part of a broader phenomenon linked to “the global field of anti-colonial movements” of the 20th century which all “had a major impact on our ways of knowledge.” Wynter argues that the “explosive psychic cum political emancipation” that followed the epistemological shift of Black Power’s challenge to Western civilizational thought was short-lived both as a result of the “imperviousness of our present disciplines, to phenomena that fall outside their predefined scope” and the reluctance of intellectuals to perceive a relationship “between the epistemology of knowledge and the liberation of a people.” Academic philosophy historically resisted this challenge. Thus, a practice of epistemological convergence as an “ethic
discourse that demands anti-essentialism, humanism and a shared philosophical anthropology on a continuum with past [scholarly] practices” combine to form structural impediments to Black thought and function as obstacles for Black philosophers to think beyond the normative ethics of Western humanist sciences despite their critiques of white taxonomy and indictment of the dominant ideas within the discipline as racist.\textsuperscript{xxviii} The discursive custom of epistemic convergence has been facilitated by Black and white intellectuals’ organizing of Black philosophy towards continuities with liberal (white) humanism. Once these ideas are confirmed as legitimate, they and the individuals who authored them are deemed appropriately “philosophical”. As Tommy Curry explains,

“This assimilative phenomenon, where the actual thought of Black thinkers are distorted so that they can be framed within the disciplinary structure of philosophy, is what is I have termed “epistemological convergence,” or the condition through which Black cultural perspectives are only given the status of knowledge by the extent to which they extend or reify currently maintained traditions of thought in European philosophy. Epistemic convergence maintains that what counts as knowledge is determined not to the extent that it accurately depicts the set of relations in the world, but to the extent that it takes up an ideological perspective from which the world is to be viewed. This argument does not necessitate that Black thought derives from European thinkers, but maintains that in order for Black thought to gain a philosophical status, it must be describable by an established European philosophical stream of thought. In other words, Black knowledge is only knowledge insofar as it converges with a higher anthropological order established in the history of European philosophy.”\textsuperscript{xxix}

This difficulty of legitimization is an epistemological quandary that also spurs a normative problematic wherein a “fixed racial normativity has predetermined the final aims of African American [philosophical] thought to be integration prior to any actual investigations of Black thinkers’ thoughts on the matter.”\textsuperscript{xxx} Together, Curry shows, epistemological convergence and racial normativity stemming from the disciplinary agenda of academic philosophy delimits inquiry into Black reality through categories of white being. In other words, Black thought is unable to contribute new schemas of knowledge or being outside of the reification of normative ethics, concepts of Western humanist sciences and its basis in white philosophical anthropology (liberal humanism). Characteristic of this tendency, philosopher Charles Mills provides readers with a masterful overview of the development of what he terms “racial liberalism” in his work \textit{Black Rights/White Wrongs (2017)} to characterize the historical contradictions of liberal thought but is ultimately neglects to inquire into the implications of the emergence of liberalism within a broader framework of colonial warfare and empire building.\textsuperscript{xxxi} As he writes, liberalism has “historically been predominantly racial liberalism, in which conceptions of personhood and resulting schedules of rights, duties and government responsibilities have all been racialized.”\textsuperscript{xxxi} Continuing, Mills summarily establishes the symbiosis between liberalism, slavery, and capitalism as extensions of the racial order of thought/governance and that still present a problem for theorizing justice today. In so doing, he diagnoses the illusory universality of mainstream academic political philosophy and how it functions to allow contractarian liberalism (a unique strand that emphasizes moral equality) to derive its analytical content from the subjective white experience of the dominant racial group in the US. As Mills writes,
“For the Lockean and Kantian contracts that (in conjunction and in competition) define the mainstream of the liberal tradition— but not for the Hobbesian contract— moral equality is foundational. The social ontology is classically individualist, and it demands the creation of a polity that respects the equal personhood of individuals and (whether in stronger or weaker versions) their property rights. Basic moral entitlements for the citizenry are then juridically codified and enforced by an impartial state. Economic transactions are, correspondingly, ideally supposed to be nonexploitative, though there will, of course, be controversy about how this concept should be cashed out. So fairness in a broad sense is the overarching contract norm, as befits an apparatus ostensibly founded on principles antithetical to a non-individual-respecting, welfare-aggregating utilitarianism. The moral equality of people in the state of nature demands an equality of treatment (juridical, political, and economic) in the liberal polity they create.”

Under these anthropological and conceptual axioms, Mills argues, academic political philosophy orients inquiry into the nature of justice and a basis of a well-ordered society by abstracting away the systematic and structurally organized dehumanization of Black and other nonwhite groups that give content to the basic structure of US society under the paradigm of ideal theory. Within these normative debates, that the “actual liberalism that has been historically dominant since modernity” has been one that restricts “full personhood to whites and relegated nonwhites to an inferior category” is made auxiliary to theorizing justice. But what thinkers have not reckoned with, Mills continues, is that the dehumanization of nonwhites is in fact congruent “with racialized liberal norms, since by these norms nonwhites are less than full persons.” In his own words, “…racism is not an anomaly in an unqualified liberal universalism but generally symbiotically related to a qualified and particularistic liberalism” of our current dominant order which has the historical tendency to limit “property rights, self-ownership, and personhood” on racialized anthropological grounds.

However, at this stage of the analysis Mill’s commitment to epistemic convergence and the reification of the human construct emanating from western disciplines becomes explicit. Mill’s resolution to the taxonomic contradictions that structure liberalism as a body of ideas historically is to commit the same tendency towards abstraction that he criticized mainstream white scholarship of and “deracialize” the concepts, schemas and categories of liberalism so that contract theory can accommodate the oppression of subordinate groups. To this end, Mills reinterprets the telos of Black nationalist political theory as the extension of liberal concepts to emphasize the significance of his project. Echoing a major revision of Africana intellectual history that is dominant among academics, he argues that “the struggles of people of color for racial equality over the past few hundred years” can in fact be viewed “as just such a project”. Additionally, Mills posits this methodological shift as reframing the conceptual terrain and providing “a way of translating into a mainstream liberal apparatus—social contract theory—the egalitarian agenda and concerns of political progressives”. The historical and theoretical reality of liberal ideas as the basis of the western imperial civilizing mission, ethnological and eugenic theories of governance/racial development and legislation that codified slavery, Jim Crow, the inhibition of self-determination for colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the modern black underclass which has “been
written off as an insoluble problem” don’t warrant a delegitimization or rupture of western concepts of knowledge or being according to Mills. Rather, a new kind of liberalism is proposed which incorporates Black cultural perspectives on the nature of white supremacy to the extent they can sanitize (or correct) the anthropological, moral and legal nexus of ideas that form the base of western liberal thought—maintaining an essential convergence with the established schemas of thinking and avoiding disciplinary issues of legitimacy. In the prologue in which he outlines what this new kind of Black radical liberalism would entail, Mills argues for two new conditions based on his reading of Black nationalism (via Du Bois), Marxism and liberalism (via Kant). In his own words,

“Black radical liberalism both (a) recognizes white supremacy as central to the making of the United States and (more sweepingly) the modern world, and (b) seeks to rethink the categories, crucial assumptions, and descriptive and normative frameworks of liberalism in the light of that recognition. Black mainstream liberalism either (a) refuses to recognize white supremacy (for example, by endorsing the “anomaly” view of US racism), or (b) even if it does give lip service to its reality, assumes nonetheless that the categories, crucial assumptions, and descriptive and normative frameworks of liberalism can be adopted with little change to the task of getting rid of it. All three components are therefore crucial. The importance of liberalism is that it is the most successful political philosophy of modernity and is now globally hegemonic. Liberalism provides the most developed body of normative theory for understanding the rights of persons and the conceptualization of social justice. Marxism, on the other hand, is the most developed Western oppositional critique of liberalism and the analysis of the materialist undermining of liberalism’s ideals by the workings of capitalism.”

At this level of abstraction, Mills’ framework is unable to grasp the nature or implications of colonial/counterinsurgency wars and how they reflect deeper contradictions inherent in US civil (limited) democracy despite his identification of white supremacy as “central to the making” of the US and the modern world. To fulfill his assimilationist aims, the central aims and concepts of Black nationalism are propagandistically reinterpreted and truncated to fit within non-ideal theories of rectificatory liberal justice and the paradigms of being that reify white philosophical anthropology or MAN (liberal humanism). The key normative tool within his framework is a black radical Kantianism which “corrects” the concept of persons that was qualified by Kantian racial anthropology (ethnology) towards “substantive racial inclusion” of Blacks within civil society. With these, Mills derives principles of corrective justice that can supplement the Rawlsian notion of justice with “the historic realities of white racial domination.” Using this approach, the thought experiments from which the thinker is to use to derive at principles of justice for a well-ordered society plays out in ways that allow for the consideration of which measures which ostensibly work “to dismantle a racialized basic structure and a racialized social ontology founded on a racial [domination] contract”. The three proposed by Mills for readers strive for correspondence with (as opposed to an explosion of) Rawlsian principles of ideal distributive justice so that they may be actualized towards the accomplishment of racial justice—reifying the dominant normative ethical and anthropological paradigms of Western thinking. Within these conceptual confines, Mills’ thinking is never penetrated by the repression of the Black community using counterinsurgency tactics via police, how his framework is vulnerable to the participatory
dynamics of pacification which is a part of the emergence of the contemporary paradigm of liberal imperial governance concurrent with the accomplishment of liberalism as a “globally hegemonic” or dominant body of ideas for understanding the rights of persons and the theorization of social justice under the framework of developmental or modernization theory. More than anything, Mills’ patterns of thinking that leads to the convergence of Black nationalism and western liberalism demonstrates the extent of the assimilationist crisis of Black thought in academic philosophy in our current historical moment. The disciplinary agenda of Africana philosophy has imposed the propagandistic truncation of Black nationalism – a tradition of resistance forged in slave revolts as an “expression of unity by a people in their struggle for self-determination” against Western civilization and European colonization – into the very liberal tradition it emerged to negate.

In a more comprehensive manner than Mills, Angela Davis links racism, the global expansion of prisons, and the broader economy of punishment to global capitalism—putting us closer in contact with the concrete institutions that have been deployed by the state to manage Blacks as insurgent threats to the social order and their roots in colonial conquest. However, she positions her paradigm as contra to Black nationalism which she considers to be “obsolete” and exclusionary on the basis of identity politics centered on gender and sex. The outcome is her guiding theoretic: the prison industrial complex which is produced as the result of a failure to implement what she calls ‘Abolitionist democracy’. In her text, Are Prisons Obsolete? (2003), Davis dedicates the monograph to questioning the assumptions about the role and nature of prison in American society. To this end, she conceptualized and introduced readers to the notion she terms the ‘prison-industrial complex’. She argues that since the postbellum period the criminal justice system was adapted to integrate Blacks and exploit/control their labor. This system laid the basis for the contemporary private prison system which allows for the recapitulation of patterns of punishment with the institutional edifice that comprises the prison-industrial complex at its core. Framing the prison industrial complex as a problem for thought that has acquired a synergetic relation with racism (and misogyny), she writes that it denotes punishment in the context of economic, political, and ideational structures. In her own words,

“Because of the persistent power of racism, “criminals” and evildoers” are, in the collective imagination, fantasized as people of color. The prison therefore functions ideologically as an abstract site into which undesirables are deposited, relieving us of the responsibility of thinking about the real issues afflicting those communities from which prisoners are drawn in such disproportionate numbers. This is the ideological work that the prison performs—it relieves us of the responsibility of seriously engaging with the problems of our society, especially those produced by racism and, increasingly, global capitalism.”

Contextualizing the emergence of prisons as a form of punishment in the intellectual deluge of enlightenment ideas about taxonomy, the human concept, and the genesis of capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, Davis notes that detention and imprisonment were “instituted in Asia and Africa as an important component of colonial rule.” But it came to become the ruling form of punishment in Europe and America during this same period, replacing forms of capital and public corporal punishment. This move to incarceration was a reflection of a new capitalist bourgeoisie who conducted a “radical shift in the social perception of the individual that appeared in ideas of
the era” which were “memorialized in the French and American Revolution.” Though they were qualified to only apply to certain classes of white men, this contemporary notion of incarceration wouldn’t make sense before a shift in European humanism. Before this period “the individual was not perceived as possessing inalienable rights and liberties”, so “alienation from those rights and liberties by removal from society to a space tyrannically governed by the state would not have made sense.” In addition to the abstract quantification of prison sentences associated with the “age of reason,” convicts, Davis notes, “were primarily male.”

With this historical basis in enlightenment thinking and colonial expansion, prisons have been a conduit for the bedrock of ideas that inspired it and given substance to a model of solitary “super-maximum” prisons which aim for total control of prisoners in the 20th and 21st centuries. Initially conceptualized as a religious form of self-reflection towards self-reform by John Howard, penal reform was then reconsidered by philosopher Jeremy Bentham premised on a model he called the panopticon. Under this paradigm, “prisoners were to be housed in single cells on circular tiers, all facing a multilevel guard tower.” By way of “blinds and a complicated play of light and darkness” the prisoners would be unable to see one another whatsoever but from “his vantage point, on the other hand, the warden would be able to see all the prisoners.” But, because each “individual prisoner would never be able to determine where the warden’s gaze was focused, each prisoner would be compelled to act, that is, work as if he were being watched at all times.” While John Howard’s ideas informed the introduction of the Penitentiary Act of 1799, Bentham’s notion took root in England and eventually the US. Despite its dehumanizing consequences, administrators understood this revolution in ideas about punishment to be progressive and the “most suitable form of punishment for a democratic society.” The posterity of these early penal institutions are the super-maximum-security prisons of modern America which are relied upon to punish Blacks and Latinos in a unique way. As Davis argues,

“The current construction and expansion of state and federal super-maximum security prisons, whose putative purpose is to address disciplinary problems within the penal system, draws upon the historical conception of the penitentiary, then considered the most progressive form of punishment. Today African-Americans and Latinos are vastly overrepresented in these supermax prisons and control units, the first of which emerged when federal correctional authorities began to send prisoners housed throughout the system whom they deemed to be “dangerous” to the federal prison in Marion, Illinois. In 1983, the entire prison was "locked down,” which meant that prisoners were confined to their cells twenty-three hours a day. This lockdown became permanent, thus furnishing the general model for the control unit and supermax prison. Today, there are approximately sixty super-maximum security federal and state prisons located in thirty-six states and many more supermax units in virtually every state in the country.”

Apart from a comprehensive intellectual history that ties the emergence of our current paradigm of the human to the forms of colonial punishment that were reconfigured and then applied within European/imperial Western states to citizens generally, Davis uses the notion of the prison industrial complex to analytically connect racism, the global expansion of these super maximum security form of punishment and the relationship these racialized forms of punishment
have to the global capitalist economic and social order. She argues that the notion of a prison industrial complex

“…insists on understandings of the punishment process that take into account economic and political structures and ideologies, rather than focusing myopically on individual criminal conduct and efforts to "curb crime." The fact, for example, that many corporations with global markets now rely on prisons as an important source of profit helps us to understand the rapidity with which prisons began to proliferate precisely at a time when official studies indicated that the crime rate was falling. The notion of a prison industrial complex also insists that the racialization of prison populations—and this is not only true of the United States, but of Europe, South America, and Australia as well—is not an incidental feature. Thus, of the prison industrial complex undertaken by abolitionist activists and scholars are very much linked to critiques of the global persistence of racism.”

This system is understood to be symbiotic with the military industrial complex because she notes that they are mutually supporting of “each other and, in fact, often share technologies.” But they also share important structural similarities which “generate huge profits from processes to social destruction” which facilitate the “transformation of imprisoned bodies—and they are in their majority [male] bodies of color—into sources of profit who consume and also often produce all kinds of commodities.” Delinking the implicit association between crime rates and imprisonment rates, Davis observes that during the same “period when crime rates were declining, prison populations soared.” This prison infrastructure is undergoing a shift towards privatization which have patterns that are “reminiscent of the historical efforts to create a profitable punishment industry” during the Jim Crow era. Thus, the prison industrial complex denotes the fact that the global economy is structured by the US approach to punishment and its approach to extracting profit from prisoners. This includes the “F-type” prisons administrated in Turkey and South Africa which are “inspired by the recent emergence of the super-maximum— or supermax—prison in the United States, which presumes to control otherwise unmanageable prisoners by holding them in a permanent solitary confinement and by subjecting them to varying degrees of sensory deprivation.” This global prison order is centered on the cultural and normative thinking that stabilizes US society: Nonwhite males ought to be in prison. As she explains,

“The dominant social expectation is that young black, Latino, Native American, and Southeast Asian men and increasingly women as well—will move naturally from the free world into prison, where, it is assumed, they belong. Despite the important gains of antiracist social movements over the last half century, racism hides from view within institutional structures, and its most reliable refuge is the prison system.”

These elements of society are sent to prison not “because of the crimes they may have indeed committed, but largely because their communities have been criminalized.” In her book length-interview, Abolition Democracy: Beyond Empire, Prisons and Torture adds more content to Davis’ theoretic of the prison industrial complex. Tracing the intellectual genealogy of this idea to her extended engagement within a “tradition of black critical philosophy”, Davis explains that the thought of Frederick Douglass and W. E. B. Du Bois laid the basis of the theory. While
Du Bois’ work helps her discern the “historical links between slavery, the failed reconstruction, the turn of the century lynchings, the emergence of the KKK, Jim Crow, the riots of the post-civil war period, and the rise of racial ghettos in all major U.S. cities”, Douglass “represents an existential concern with freedom” that Davis has been critical of on account of its narrow focus on and overconfidence in the law “as a mechanism to bring about justice and democracy for Black Americans”. Through her reading of Du Bois, Davis has been able to synthesize the insights of Douglass while being critical of his “naive trust in both the economic and political independence of post-slavery blacks” and a “critique of the ways in which the state was a direct party to the preservation and mutation of slavery.” With this conceptual foundation, the prison industrial complex functions to delimit the participation of prisoners/people of color from civil democratic institutions (disenfranchisement); extract capital by both “exploitation of prison labor, but also by appropriating black social wealth”; socially brand segments of the population with an intense amount of negative social value; justify a racially hierarchical social contract (in which the social, political, cultural and economic reality in which it is more advantageous to be white than a nonwhite person due to the fact that the punitive dimensions of society are focused on dominating racial minorities “by domesticating the civic imagination of white Americans”; to allow the enacting of ritualistic violence that “cleanses and expiates the social order”; imposing forms of sexual abuse/coercion; and to constitute an surplus regime of repression that has been positioned in the mind of the citizen to be a “logical and evident way to deal with crime”; and is symbiotically connected to the ‘military industrial complex’. The resolution to this schema of oppression is what Davis terms ‘Abolition democracy’— “the abolition of institutions that advance the dominance of any one group over any other.”

There are many positive aspects to Davis’ paradigm. For instance, Davis is able to identify the tropes and psychic projections of Black males as brutes, beasts and demonic entities that laid the basis for the construction of the national threat to security in a variety of forms: communist, terrorist or criminal. The pursuit to administrate and subdue unruly segments of the population induces moral panics which are manipulated to affect the dehumanization of these groups and then recapitulate this logic into the broader US cultural imaginary. In her own words, these moral panics have a historical precedent in the US since the abolition of chattel slavery and are fundamentally “related to the problem of managing large populations” who have “been rendered dispensable by the system of global capitalism.” Thus, the construction of the internal threat of the Black rapist provides the historical-psychological “terrain for the production of the terrorist as a figure in the American imaginary” which draws on previous moral panics like those related to the “the [Black] criminal and the communist” of the 1960s. Davis is also able to conceptualize the emergence of prisons and torture units around the world as expressions of the US imperialism transferring technologies of repression mastered in southern prisons during Jim Crow and thereafter to affect the subversion of all groups deemed to be a threat within the security paradigm of the war on terror. Demonstrating the global reach of the prison industrial complex, Davis argues that despite their bureaucratic distance the growth of ‘outlaw’ or black site prisons are intrinsically connected to the domestic punishment paradigm of US democracy. She notes that the Federal Bureau of Statistics includes “state and federal prisons, county jails, jails in Indian country, detention centers run by the Department of Homeland Security, territorial prison in areas the U.S. refuses to acknowledge as its colonies, and military prisons—both within and outside of its borders” in its annual census. Davis goes about solidifying this connection further by highlighting the recapitulation of supermax prisons in South Africa, Turkey and Cuba. Writing that,
“… the prisons, their architecture, their technologies, their regimes, the commodities their populations consume and produce, and the rhetoric that legitimates their proliferation all travel from the U.S. to the rest of the world. Why does a country like South Africa, which is in the process, we hope, of building a just society—a non-racist, non-sexist, nonhomophobic society—need the repressive technologies of the supermaximum prison? Why does Turkey need U.S.-style F-type prisons? The introduction of these prisons into Turkey provoked a long hunger strike—a fast to the death—in Turkish prisons; some 100 people died as a result. It is important to think about all of the different layers of this global process. How do we recognize that the prison in Guantánamo, for example, or the Abu Ghraib prison just outside Baghdad, reflect and extend the normalization of torture within domestic prisons? As horrendous as recent revelations about the treatment of prisoners in Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib may be, this treatment of prisoners is not qualitatively different from what happens in U.S. prisons.”

However, Davis’ analytical commitment to gender theory and feminist analyses of patriarchy, her propagandistic account of Black nationalism, her idealized resolution to the prison industrial complex, abolitionist democracy; her inattention to the relationship between incarceration and counterinsurgency and her erasure of Black thought via epistemic convergence leave huge gaps in her analysis. Gender theory is a major part of Davis’ guiding notion. In her work Are Prisons Obsolete?, her chapter on how gender structures prison demonstrates this emphasis. Her feminist pretensions lead her to argue that Black men experience racism which historically animates the massive growth of the prison industrial complex, men are overrepresented as subjects of punishment which marginalizes Black women (and other women of color) as victims of domestic and state punishment. For her, “[t]o assume that men's institutions constitute the norm and women's institutions are marginal is, in a sense, to participate in the very normalization of prisons that an abolitionist approach seeks to contest.”

Though she maintains that gender is not limited to women, she examines sexual assault only as an instance of female subjugation going back to slavery. As she writes,

“If we expand our definition of punishment under slavery, we can say that the coerced sexual relations between slave and master constituted a penalty exacted on women, if only for the sole reason that they were slaves. In other words, the deviance of the slave master was transferred to the slave woman, whom he victimized. Likewise, sexual abuse by prison guards is translated into hypersexuality of women prisoners. The notion that female deviance” always has a sexual dimension persists in the contemporary era, and this intersection of criminality and sexuality continues to be racialized. Thus, white women labeled as "criminals" are more closely associated with blackness than their "normal" counterparts.”

Under the punishment regime that coded criminalized sectors of women as falling short of the social standard of womanhood, Davis observes that Black and native women were often masculinized when imprisoned and “tended to be disproportionately sentenced to men’s prisons.” Citing the rise in women’s detention rates, Davis also argues that female prisoners
are beginning to look demographically similar to their male counterparts. But this analysis elides the sexual assault of male prisoners and represents the massive expansion of prison and the warehousing of Black men in prison as generic. As a matter of fact, the normalization of male criminality is an obstacle to the sexual exploitation rampant in women’s prisons. She cites criminologist Elliot Currie to shed light on the growing number of Black female convicts (recorded at 8 per 100,000 in the WWII era and contemporaneously at 51 per 100,000). Nevertheless, the fact that one in nine Black males “is currently in prison or jail, with a greater portion on parole or probation”, that Black America went from four times to seven or eight times more likely to be in prison than whites since the 70s or that the homoerotic sexual coercion of the convict leasing system recapitulated from chattel slavery escapes her. As Robert Perkinson documents in his comprehensive overview of the growth of the US’s prison empire, convict leasing was installed to punish “poor Black men on the margins of society” after slavery. As he explains,

“Carried out in the fields or back in the quarters at night, whippings were perversely intimate affairs. Guards and convicts shared the noise, sweat, blood, and smells, though not the pain. For some bosses, lashing flesh took on twisted, even sadistic homoerotic qualities. When officers wanted to convey special dissatisfaction, they stripped off a convict’s clothes and let loose on the “naked hide.” Other prisoners were made to watch or help pin the naked victim to the ground. After one particularly bloody episode, a manager had other convicts parade before him to “smell . . . the bat.”

Continuing, he explains that

This stagecraft of dominion and degradation did not stop with whipping. A prisoner on the Johnson Farm claimed he was forced to “eat his own droppings.” On the Clemens Farm, several convicts charged that Captain Grace punished sodomy by forcing suspects to engage in humiliating public sex acts. After being caught “playing man and wife,” reported one prisoner, the captain “whipped me about 45 licks” and then “made me kiss the other fellow’s tail.” Calling other prisoners to gather around, Grace had one “Negro hold a light,” while he made “me drag my tongue right through the hole.” “Now, don’t that taste good, you[…].”

Rather than being a consequence of positive male visibility, Perkinson shows, the incarceration regime of the US targeted Black males for labor exploitative and homoerotic sexual logics and expanded the character of its repression of Black males after the eradication of Jim Crow in the late 20th century. Not only are Black males still overrepresented in jails and prison, but evidence of their sexual vulnerability continues to be documented. For instance, recently collected data on the issue of sexual misconduct in prisons shows that female staff are often perpetrators. After the ratification of the Prison Rape Elimination Act in 2003 to understand the extent of sexual violence in prisons, the Bureau of Justice Statistics released a report in 2006 which indicated that in 2005 “67% of the overall victims were male inmates and 62% of the overall perpetrators were female staff.” These historically documented sexual logics and elided by the gender-based assumptions of Davis’ ‘prison-industrial-complex’. That the feminist notion of patriarchy leads to a bio-logic in which sexual violence is synonymous to the body of the woman in Davis’ thinking is signified by how she describes the sexual violation of men in Abu Ghraib.
Despite Barbara Ehrenreich’s observation that feminist thinking about “men as the perpetual perpetrators, women as the perpetual victims, and male sexual violence against women as the root of all injustice” has muddled how we understand issues of sexual violence, Davis argues that such a premise was abandoned by feminists “a long time ago.” Nevertheless, Davis anachronistically explains the violence imposed on male detainees at Abu Graib along the same essentialist train of thought. For her, these don’t indicate instances of patriarchal violence imposed on racialized males but are simply “misogynist strategies and modes of violence” which are available to (white) men and women.

The gender concept and its presumption of patriarchy as a class-sex antagonism is at the core of Davis’ position here. As she explains, her approach remains feminist by attempting to understand “the production of gender in and through institutions” administered by men and women. To be clear, Davis maintains that there is a conceptual link between the “everyday tortures experienced by the inhabitants of domestic prisons in the US” which generates the logics which “enable the justification of the treatment meted out to prisoners in Abu Graib and Guantanamo Bay, but her theoretical paradigm fails to ascertain the sexualized/homoerotic character of violence expressed by incarceration as a kind of punishment since its introduction in counterinsurgent colonial wars or wartime violence against men and boys generally.

As Tommy Curry explains in _Thinking Through the Silence_ (2020), the female gender has a monopoly on sexual victimization in the thinking of scholars who study these phenomena across disciplines. Feminist analysis perpetuates the idea of gendered violence is a static and essentialist manner, leaving men and boys who are sexually violated unthought in this regard. Citing the work of Amalendu Misra to reinforce this point, Curry explains that there is a deficit in the thinking about the documented instances of “male rape in war and genocide” that amounts to “a challenge to many of the established theories of gendered violence.” Because “previous scholarship simply assumed that women were rape victims and men were the perpetrators”, the “discovery of male victims of rape has forced” many thinkers to reconsider their older theories beyond the binary which a understands males as pre-determined “perpetrators of rape in theory.”

Though Curry’s research focuses on how these feminist assumptions of gender that make rape (even the rape of men) a consequence of misogyny, in the Holocaust and slavery, his historical insight into the sexual vulnerability and victimization of racialized men across the centuries shows the gap in Davis’s thinking about the repressive state apparatus and the operation of racism towards Black men more generally. These pillar of assumptions and their logics impede the study of the rape and sexual violence of Jewish men and boys in the holocaust by scholars, but they obscure perceptions of male vulnerability of males to these phenomena writ large. Accordingly, they function in Davis’ thought to support the two-pronged (racism and misogyny) notion of the prison industrial complex which understands sexual violence (despite the documented history of homoerotic violence going back to slavery and contemporary empirical evidence of male sexual vulnerability) as a unique expression of institutionalized misogyny ignored due to its presence in women’s prisons while racism is thought to explain the mass warehousing of Black (and other racialized) males in the last sixty years. On this combination, she writes that,

“[…] the institution of the prison has stockpiled ideas and practices that are hopefully approaching obsolescence in the larger society, but that retain all their ghastly vitality behind prison walls. The destructive combination of racism and
misogyny, however much it has been challenged by social movements, scholarship, and art over the last three decades, retains all its awful consequences within women's prisons.”

But this pitfall leads to another major drawback in Davis’ analysis. Like Mills, Davis provides an ideological account of Black nationalism. But her reliance on gender theory leads her to portray it as a priori masculinist, sexist and limited in scope. Following the dominant disciplinary pseudo logics of Western thought, Davis takes the ahistorical position that Black nationalism has historically “excluded” women and “foreclosed” inquiry “regarding gender and sexuality.” In some sense, Davis argues, Black nationalist thought as “become obsolete” and this observation leads her to position her work as contesting the ostensibly masculinist slant in the tradition. Exposing the latent bio-determinism of gendered categories in Western thought on which Davis relies, Oyeronke Oyewumi in *The Invention of Women* (1997) diagnoses the tendency to universalize gender concepts as a consequence of its historical genealogy. As Oyewumi argues, this kind of “body-reasoning” has expressed itself differently at different points in time. In her own words, “[I]n the span of Western history, the justifications for the making of the categories "man" and "woman" have not remained the same. On the contrary, they have been dynamic. Although the boundaries are shifting and the content of each category may change, the two categories have remained hierarchical and in binary opposition.” Untangling the understanding of gender stemming from modern feminist discourse, she explains that there is a dichotomy presented between biologically rooted explanations and socially constructed ones. But this presentation is misleading because they “have been two sides of the same coin, since both ideas continue to reinforce each other.” She writes that, “[W]hen biological interpretations are found to be compelling, social categories derive their legitimacy and power from biology. In short, the social and the biological feed on each other.” Nevertheless, we should not let the feminist origins of this debate lead us to conclude that the gender categories of the West are universally applicable. They are not.

Querying the implications of a wholesale application of these categories onto peoples with a different cultural logic using the Yoruba people as her case example, Oyewumi dislodges the essentialist application of gender. She shows that “body-reasoning” is in fact a cultural approach to interpreting reality – not a universal. That this asymmetry has not been explored or been completely mimed by African Studies scholars motivates Oyewumi to turn once more toward documenting how scholars have naturalized “Western social hierarchies such as gender and race” which generate from the dictum of biology as destiny and a privileging of the visual over other senses in Western culture. For her, the promotion of these culturally relative hierarchies and theories “derived from the Western mode of thought at best makes it difficult to understand African realities.”

Suggesting a fundamental inapplicability of the gender concept throughout history, Oyewumi shows that the gendered gaze of the white/Westernized anthropologists has an impulse towards a metaphysical overrepresentation, seeking to apply its culturally relative conception of anatomical sex based social distinctions to all of human history – an essentialist fallacy. Greg Thomas’ *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire* (2007) traces this tendency in Western thought towards overrepresentation/supraculturalism intellectually and connects it to the broader promulgation of an essentialized western specific anthropology through racist erotics within canonical discourses of the academy which delegitimize all radical Black nationalist thought. Opening his study,
Thomas observes that despite its obfuscation, the “rule of Europe has assumed a notably erotic form.” Surveying the sociogenic reproduction of these erotics within academic discourse, Thomas observes a recapitulation of the basic dogmas of Occidental historiography. Scholars simply represent the history and categories of Europe/Anglo-North America as representative of the entire human species. Thomas locates the origins of this impulse in “a basic anthropological hierarchy” in which the “master race of Europe is canonized as the paragon of social and biological development” – embodying certain universal laws of human civilization. Attentive to the epistemological implications of such a view (which he terms aptly as Aryanism), Thomas argues that this fallacious reasoning allows the categories of sex and sexuality to be disassociated with empire and the colonial racialization itself and a dichotomy between hetero and homosexuality to be realized. Giving some substance to the nature of this essentialized anthropomorphic system, he explains that a “transcendent approximation of objective reality is asserted in a manner that represses the ideological agenda of such a posture.” A “supernatural force of reason is supposed to provide access to some truth whose scope is boundless in both space and time. Partiality and relativity are anathema to this perspective, which presumptuously claims to cover all people and all places beyond all conflicts of culture and history.”

Continuing, Thomas explains that “Man”—the dominant normative conception of humanity stemming from Europe in the 14th through the 19th centuries—was said to progressed from a matrilineal stage of social organization to a final patriarchal one which was exemplified in the “evolutionary schemes of anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan and Fredrich Engels.” Thus, the paradigm of Western civilization and its sexual modalities are racial in origin. Temporally, the matriarchy of Africans is considered a savage precursor of the white modern, patriarchal forms of social organization. This kind of sexual imperialism was affirmed “by making aboriginal peoples stand for savage promiscuity (matriarchy).” Thomas goes on to give readers a focused examination of how academic discourse naturalizes the concept of gender through the construction of narratives that rhetorically reinscribe the categories of (white) humanity as opposed to illuminating their historical particularity. Thus, Thomas and Oyewumi show how the previously outlined gender analysis by Angela Davis falls short. In the end, Davis “presupposes manhood and woman as absolute monoliths” from the start and thus reflects the bio-logic of Western anthropology/thought. In his concluding chapter, Thomas argues that the consequences of Western commercialized academic epistemologies of Aryanism are best illustrated by the systemic vilification of Black nationalist/militant thought based on its ostensibly virulent sexism, patriarchy and homophobia. As a result of this ideological assault, “many people come to see Black “nationalism” as synonymous with any given evil” and it is often simplified alongside various ideological kinds of militancy. Theorizing the disciplinary assault on Black nationalism/militancy as an intellectual consequence of COINTELPRO, Thomas draws on the work of political prisoner Dhoruba Bin-Wahad and his analytic of ‘democratic fascism’ to indict academics for dismissing the body of ideas in toto.

“While some anti–Black nationalist critics have made clichéd references to gender or sexuality and COINTELPRO, they do so in a campaign against militants which condemns militants more than it does J. Edgar Hoover, his FBI, and the U.S. imperialist state. It is as if Black militants are to blame for sexual ideologies embedded in the history of colonial empire and employed to ravage Black people in and outside revolt. Rarely are Black militants imagined to reflect on this process
themselves, in the spirit of a continuing Black militant praxis. Yet those who do have advanced powerful reflections that are completely absent among academics, who assume a monopoly over the power to think, especially when it comes to gender and sexuality, nationalism, and COINTELPRO.”

These academic narratives (which Davis inevitably contributes to in her offhand dismissal of Black nationalism as obsolete based on its lack of engagement with gender and sexuality) truncate the intellectual diversity of Black militant thought, erase Black women from Black nationalism, and reify the systemic problematizing of blackness (maleness) as pathological despite evidence of anti-homophobic, anti-sexist revolutionary embodiments of gender in the works of Black militants. In addition to her essentialism, Davis’ demonization of Black nationalism may help explain the abstract and superficial posture she takes when positing a solution to the problem spurred by the military/prison industrial complex. Rather than advocating community self-defense or challenging the taxonomic basis (the notion of the human) which gives content to the register of metaphysics or being that sustains the contemporary order of knowledge, she argues for the accomplishment of abolition democracy. Because Davis understands prisons as reservoirs in which racialized elements of the population were hoarded after being freed with no resources to maintain themselves, abolition democracy entails “the creation of an array of institutions to solve social problems that set people on the track to prison, thereby helping to render the prison obsolete.” On this connection, she writes

There is a direct connection with slavery: when slavery was abolished, black people were set free, but they lacked access to the material resources that would enable them to fashion new, free lives. Prisons have thrived over the last century precisely because of the absence of those resources and the persistence of some of the deep structures of slavery. They cannot, therefore, be eliminated unless new institutions and resources are made available to those communities that provide, in large part, the human beings that make up the prison population.”

Said differently, the emergence of social institutions that solve material issues related to deviance ought to make it possible to render the prison itself obsolete. But through her focus on decriminalization as a method of mass integration into civil society, Davis idealizes US democracy for the purposes of inclusion. But this occludes the fact that it is structurally premised on “limited democracy” which stems from a unique ethnocentric vision of a well-ordered society as one premised on the ontological stratification between the superior and inferior races/classes and socializes its population into patterns of warfare to mitigate internal threats to rule through republican-style “representative” democracy. Thus, rather than a new vision for the social, epistemological, and ontological order, Davis offers us a rather narrow and abstracted socialistic remedy. These idealizations combined with her antagonism towards Black nationalism limit Davis from any consideration of internal colonialism theory and the domestic war program that undergirded its evolution in the late 20th century: COINTELPRO.

Like Mills in this respect, Davis’ thinking is never penetrated by the unprecedented application of foreign military tactics of subversion to the Black community, or the broader intellectual tradition spearheaded by prisoners analyzing the structural-theoretical relationship between the internal colonialism of Black America, the prison and the global capitalist order. In
Abolition Democracy, the term ‘counterinsurgency’ is used once in reference to a specific incident in the repression of the BPP and other activist groups of the 60s. Beyond that, the eradication of the BPP and the Black Liberation Movement using a variety of techniques stemming from counterinsurgency approaches to war – manipulation of media; chemical warfare; infiltration; neutralization of supporters; provocation of ingroup murders; raids and pretext arrests; malicious prosecution; and even assassinations – are not commented upon by Davis. Following her commitment to epistemic convergence, Davis commits intellectual erasure and replaces concepts, debates, and the historical trajectory forged by the experience of Black political prisoners over the last 60 years with European philosophical anthropology and a conceptual framework out of the continental philosophical tradition. Accordingly, there is no mention of the works of George Jackson, Eldridge Cleaver, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Dhoruba Bin-Wahad or any other Black political prisoners/prison intellectuals.

However, in his most popular collection of prison writings Soledad Brother (1970) George Jackson frames the Jim Crow racial system as one which seeks to organize the interiority of Black males for life in prison from birth in line with the broader logics of internal colonialism. As he explains, for the prison to be properly understood there must be a break with western disciplinary systems of knowledge (with an emphasis on criminology) and an examination of the sociogenic tendencies that derive from the basic social structure of the “Amerikan historical experience.” Racism, Jackson explains, is a basic disposition of the society and its expression of fascism. As he explains,

“After one concedes that racism is stamped unalterably into the present nature of Amerikan sociopolitical and economic life in general (the definition of fascism is: a police state wherein the political ascendancy is tied into and protects the interests of the upper class — characterized by militarism, racism, and imperialism), and concedes further that criminals and crime arise from material, economic, sociopolitical causes, we can then burn all of the criminology and penology libraries and direct our attention where it will do some good.”

The telos of the Black colonial situation and its expression through the punishment and incarceration of Black males is to make them asocial beings. In his own words, Jackson explains that prison leaves none of the men who enter it unaffected making them bring out their best or rendering them “broken men” who “are so damaged that they will never again be suitable members of any sort of social unit.” Continuing, Jackson provides a depiction of the depth of violence Black men are subjected to and its impact on the existential contours of their existence under Amerikan colonial logics, analytically defined as fascism. For instance, in Soledad prison he reports repetitive beatings, being stripped naked and skin-searched arbitrarily by administrators/guards and a social stratification between kinds of men premised on their race (Blacks were at the bottom) and labor value within the prisons. Jackson argues that western education and its university system is one which socializes Black students into reifying the conceptual patterns and metaphysical categories of the dominant racial group over their own. Thus, he recognizes the assortment of western disciplines in the American academies as ideological projections that systematically erase the historical contribution of Black people to human civilization altogether. As he writes, the “young black who comes out of the college or the university is as ignorant and unlearned as the white laborer. For all practical purposes, he is worse
off than when he went in, for he has learned only the attitudes and ways of the snake, and a few well-worded lies.”

Jackson’s reflection on time and the imperative of survival in the now also urge the need for a break with futurity as a feature of the philosophical anthropology of white (human) colonial society. In the context of the Amerikan prison Jackson explains that the prisoner’s existential dynamics generate a crisis of being—namely, confusion, hunger, defeat, and fear. Giving substance to the anthropomorphic discontinuity with time/futurity explicitly in gripping language, he writes that “everyone in here is locked up 24 hours a day. They have no past, no future, no goal other than the next meal.” In another section he specifies the relationship Black males have temporally to the anti-Black anthropological projections of modernity, writing that “many times in the history of our past — I speak of the African here in the U.S. — many times we were presented with this choice, too many times, too many of us choose to live the crippled existence of the near-man, the half-man.”

In later portions, Jackson reiterates a break with the philosophical anthropology of Western humanity. His descriptions of Jim Crow (and thereby prison) portray a basically anti-ethical instance of life for Black men—where the strong simply conquer the weak. This kind of brutality targets the full subjective experience of Black males, seeking submission from them in body and spirit. For Jackson, this function of Jim Crow is evident in the men of his father’s generation and is a core component of how Blacks have been racially subjugated in Amerika. In a letter to his mother, he writes that

“For us blacks in particular this is a nightmare proposition of Amerikan materialism. When this standard, this criterion for the measurement of individual merit and worth in this society is applied to us, measured against our standing or holdings, we cannot help but come out with a very low opinion of ourselves. From the womb to the tomb this plays in our minds. We are not worth more than the amount of capital we can raise. That is why you see blacks pretending to be doing all right. That is why a black man will buy a new car (status symbol) before he will buy food for his child or clothes for his wife. And again with blacks this whole thing goes even deeper. No man or group of men have been more denuded of their self-respect, none in history have been more terrorized, suppressed, repressed, and denied male expression than the U.S. black.”

The machinations of Jim Crow entail a bifurcated social system that negates the existence of Black males. Once subjugated at such a low level of existence, Black men’s sense of self and manhood is completely denied. They are treated as nonhuman entities. Again, within this matrix of death, Jackson makes clear that Black males constitute the bottom caste among the prisoners and describes the network of moral obligations generated at the core of Amerikan society as ultimately aiming to place them outside of any boundaries of human reciprocity. This fundamental dehumanization of Black males is what doomed non-violent protest strategies of the Civil Rights movement in his estimation. Jackson argues that this is because it presumes a non-existent moral/ethical relationship between whites and those races they have conquered across the landscape of Africa, Asia, and South America. As he writes, while some may assume the “existence of a restraint mechanism that in other breeds and other animals precludes the harming
of one’s kind” from whites, “history shows no justification for so wild a presupposition” given the brutality of the colonial situation. Blacks should understand their colonial administrators as flat out “merciless” from the start rather than gambling with such ideals. Thus, the terms of Black (male) existence are formulated on an internal colonial structure that yields bifurcation that accepts Blacks “only on a master-slave basis.” Revolution is the resolution to this quandary for Jackson, who envisaged his resistance as the eradication of the “slave mentality” which inflicts Black men and denatures them into pursuing “the favor and affection of an insensitive and implacable opponent[...]

Though Soledad Brother is his most popular monograph, Jackson considered Blood in My Eye (1971) to be his magnum opus. Published just days after his assassination, Jackson uses the text to build on the internal colonialism thesis as a framework for the “Black Colony” within a broader paradigm of fascism and to outline the guerrilla tactics necessary to win a revolutionary people’s war. With dialectical materialism as his philosophical methodology, Jackson begins with an identification of property relations as the basis of American colonialism which cements Black males in the position of the slave and, dialectically, the consciousness of the slave as fascinated the eradication of this condition—revolution. Extending his anthropological break with the temporal schema of the white human, Jackson argues that to “the slave, revolution is an imperative, a love-inspired, conscious act of desperation.” The historical relation of the Black Colony to the superstructure of the US state has made it the “principal reservoir of revolutionary potential in Amerika[...]” This considered alongside its “numerical strength” and “the fact of its present status in the creation of wealth force the black stratum at the base of the whole class structure into the forefront of any revolutionary scheme.” All that is needed, in Jackson’s estimation, is the correct application of an indigenous guerrilla foco theory (which implies the implementation of a revolutionary vanguard) to spark the development of a revolutionary culture among the Black masses. In his own words, “the objective conditions are present here in the Black Colony for revolution” and the anticipation of repression which is “indeed a part of a revolution, a natural aspect of antithesis, the always-to-be-expected defense-attack reflect of the beleaguered, toothless tiger.

A materialist analysis leads Jackson to note a shift in the class contradictions of American society. As he explains, the Black revolutionary has the recognize the fact that the working class in the US has shifted to reflect the interests of the security bureaucracies. The working class “can be realistically divided into two mutually exclusive and conflicting sections, one right-oriented and conservative, the other left to neutral.” Qualitatively, this right wing oriented “a new class, a new pig class” which includes the “factory or construction worker, the ubiquitous civil service employee, the retired military career man, the man who sells used autos or insurance, the sock clerk or longshoreman about to be replaced by a machine.” The security apparatus containing the bureaucratic agencies—the ones “that are given over to the maintenance of law and order” tend to “draw their principal personnel from the pig class and consequently are an expression of that class’s mentality: a stagnant, even atavistic, mentality that is completely dependent upon regimen and rote to perform the simplest of functions.” With this, Jackson outlines the principles of guerrilla insurgency before making concrete the humanist telos of the Black struggle against colonialism. As he explains, the principles of guerrilla warfare can be summarized around the following themes: mobility; infiltration; ambush tactics; camouflage; and autonomous infrastructure. Together, Jackson argues that these tactics can fill a vacuum that “exists in the Black
Colony” and lay the basis for the creation of “the consciousness that comes from the introduction of people’s government.” The world situation makes revolution the only viable choice. The reactionary and brutal assault of the US military against the people of the world in counterrevolutionary wars in Africa, Latin America, Indochina and Asia makes it an imperative for “The Black Colony” to “enter the war on the side of the majority of the world’s people, even if it means fighting the U.S.A. majority.”

Returning to the nature of fascism (which will never have a complete definition due to its constant motion and adjustment to the status quo) and its characteristic expression of racism, Jackson builds on internal colonialism theory to give an account of how fascism is expressed as “economic reform” which has functioned to “disguise the opulence of its ruling-class leisure existence by providing the lower classes with a mass consumer’s flea market of its own.” The highest development of fascism, on Jackson’s analysis, is within the US at the conclusion of WW2. The essence of this arrangement is to conceal itself behind the “illusion of mass participation in society” while tolerating the “existence of no valid revolutionary activity.” Once the ruling class is organized to seize power and exert influence (what Jackson terms positive mobilization), the reinstallation of the ruling elite entails “an even greater hold over the direction of the economy, with class interest generally working a compromise” with the final result involving an even “higher degree of centralization of power and control (this is termed contra-positive mobilization).”

Thus, with each threat to its dominance, the fascist social structure fractures the working class—in the US context, using the “pig class” element to extend and develop itself and make the “marriage between the political elite and the economic elite” more concrete. After Jackson’s assassination, political prisoners continued to engage with internal colonialism theory to explain the integration of counterinsurgency warfare tactics to repress Black America in the wake of the Black Liberation Movement of the 1960s. But contemporary scholarship has failed to transmit these insights into the new millennium, even when they make explicit appeal to internal colonialism and other radical theories of empire.

Dylan Rodriguez’s recent work drawing on principle authors of the internal colonialism thesis and other Black radical theorists, White Reconstruction: Domestic Warfare and the Logics of Genocide (2021), demonstrates this idiosyncrasy. Rodriguez opens the text by explaining that its aim is to analyze “the structural and symbolic rearrangements of gendered anti-Blackness and racial colonial violence that have seemingly replaced prior “classical” models” of white supremacy/anti-blackness. Towards this end the author provides readers with five chapters, each focused on specific historical moments which give content to the long range (re)constitution of White being and the contemporary iteration of what he terms “the reconstructionist dream.”

The text begins with a consideration of the implications of the body, its sociality (or lack thereof) under conditions of antiblackness and racial-colonial power. Through a close reading and counter narration of the Los Angeles Police Department’s diversity initiative, Rodriguez argues that these programs enhance (rather than distend) racist counterinsurgency, criminalization and domestic war as a primary condition of urban social order. Rather than alleviating the police repression of Black communities, evidence shows that “initiatives such as Join LAPD are modest revisions of a white supremacist institutional phenotype, modeling a method of racial reform that has gained traction since the successful mid-1990s neoconservative attacks on affirmative action.” Building on Fanon and Wynter’s concept of MAN to re-read the archives of liberal reformation to consider how White Being reconceptualizes upon an encounter with its own demise. Connecting the
emergence of the Freedman’s Bureau and the colonization of the Philippines, Rodriguez makes important connections between how techniques of pacification and global forms of power were challenged and thus recalibrated to form the basis of white supremacy’s plasticity and overarching normativity “as an aspirational historical telos of racial progress.” However, in accord with feminist suppositions about the mimetic nature of Black males/masculinity, he indicates no knowledge of how ethnological thinking targeted and studied Black male bodies as instantiations of the deficiencies of the Black race, and thus were the basis for the rationalization of an inordinate amount of violence imposed on them as heads of families and war veterans in the postbellum period who posed economic and social threats to the status quo, configuring them (and as a result the black race as a whole) as ontogenetically defective “Black beasts”/rapists whose primitive instincts required slavery because they “did not yet meet the evolutionary register to be “men””; nor does he indicate any awareness of how Black men responded to ethnological claims of racial inferiority by codifying their “demands for recognition of black manhood” as “calls for an acknowledgment of the human rights of both black men and women” in his claim that emancipation functioned to validate “a masculine longing for authentic Black civil subjectivity” under “patriarchal normativity” to reinscribe “rather than resolve[s] the gendered/masculinist position of black male non-personhood” – leaving those [Black men] who were formerly negated by the cultural and legal structures of the society ultimately protected and humanized by it.

Continuing, Rodriguez takes Barry Goldwater as a case example in the elasticity of white supremacy and its logics of dehumanization to spearhead the creation of grammars, lexicons, and approaches to being ‘post-racial’ to reinforce and commit the genocidal violence that characterizes it. On his analysis, it is clear that post racial discourse, despite its superficial colorblindness is “mutually reinforced by the proto-genocidal logics of gendered racial criminalization/incarceration and the expanding apparatuses of anti-Black, anticolonial domestic and global warfare.” More than anything, the inquiry into Goldwater shows that White Being is one that is “at war with its own obsolescence.” Rodriguez’s use of the notion of “proto-genocide” stems from his claim that the modern concept of genocide is ultimately incomplete and thus unable to capture the particular dynamics of racial-colonial warfare. Departing from the “hegemonic discourses” he sees it generating, he argues for a genocidal poetics that allows the term to be repurposed for the purposes of freedom and liberation. Rodriguez’s preference to ground genocidal poetics in the notion of evisceration as opposed to genocide studies is based in ideology. The former “alludes to the unbreakable connection between spiritual, psychic, affective, and physical-biological experiences that include cross-generational, epigenetic inheritances of world-deforming systems of dominance, displacement and terror”, with deleterious implications “even in the absence of direct physical brutality.” While the latter is registered as a hegemonic gender narrative stemming from the work of Adam Jones who avers that genocidal violence is characterized by the indiscriminate killings of noncombatant battle aged males ages 15-55—“the most vulnerable and consistently targeted population group” during times of war. Such a claim, in Rodriguez’s estimation, is “far less credible…when accounting for the long genealogies of eviscerating (and arguably genocidal) anti-Black racial-colonial violence.” Here is where the gender essentialist logic and ideological commitments underlying Rodriguez’s understanding of racialized violence through the notion of evisceration becomes the most explicit in his equivalence of gender with the nonmale/noncis body. As he explains, cultural and juridical attacks on the “biologically and discursively essentialized female womb”, the legal doctrine of partus sequitur ventrem under chattel slavery, and the “discursive constructions of women and gender-queer
people as objects of specific forms of genocidal violence reflect the logic of evisceration as an actively gendering form of power” and lay the basis for a rejection males as the primary targets of genocidal violence more gender and under chattel slavery specifically.\textsuperscript{cxliv} Clarifying his point, he writes that, “[R]adical feminist and queer conceptions of bodily/sexual violence, for example, challenge the notion that rape and sexual brutality are merely tactical or preparatory elements of racializing regimes; rather as forms of collective evisceration, such gendered sexual violences are ends within themselves, enacting anti-Blackness and racial-colonial dominance as conditions of both intimate and systemic bodily subjection.”\textsuperscript{cxlix}

Upon closer scrutiny though, it is Rodriguez’s notion of evisceration that falls apart when considered alongside the empirical evidence of genocidal and racial violence, not Jones’. The imposition of racist violence on Black people in the Americas has been administrated with a misandric orientation. Apart from misrepresenting Jones’ understanding of rape, sexual violence, gendercidal violence (sex-specific killings of males) and ‘root and branch’ killings (Jones never argues that rape is a “tactical or preparatory” element of genocidal conflict nor does he imply that only men are killed), Rodriguez engages in a contradictory reification of feminist/essentialist and homoerotic presumptions that is debunked by the historical evidence collated on the phenomenon of genocidal rape and sexual violence during chattel slavery. Thus, Rodriguez suggests that violence against Black women/queer bodies under slavery and patriarchy is evidence of their evisceration, while greater levels of lethal violence against Black men in the same society is a reification of their privilege as men, not their dehumanization. To be clear, Jones has argued that “[s]exual violence often involved purposeful action aimed at maintaining male supremacy through intimidation, abuse and repression.”\textsuperscript{cli} But, Jones avers, the fact that “males are frequently, indeed disproportionately, victimized by other males with these same intentions in mind” has been ignored by scholars whose inquiry derives from a feminist theoretical foundation.\textsuperscript{cli} Though there is a legitimate basis for understanding the confiscation of outgroup women in accordance the “spoils of war” practice (in which women are captured after males are liquidated), the historical evidence suggests that for centuries, “men and boys who were captured in, or as a result of, combat became “body servants” (sex slaves) of western warriors, or the “brides” of warriors in Mesoamerica.”\textsuperscript{clii} Thus, men and women have been subject to wartime sexual violence given that “an important aspect of conquest involved turning male enemies into feminized subjects.”\textsuperscript{cliii} Moreover, the evidence presented in the genocidal studies literature has empirically verified contemporaneous instances of “the systematic sexual victimization of males” and male genocidal rape in the Balkans conflicts and Rwanda but also “in the more distant past, for example in Ancient Persia, and the Crusades, as well as by the Ancient Greek, Chinese, Amalekite, Egyptian and Norse armies.”\textsuperscript{cliv} Nevertheless, male sexual victimization “is not recognized in the law” and due to the female-centric discussions of sexual violence as a result of feminist groups’ contouring of international criminal law, the assumption that males are solely perpetrators has led to a tacit institutional dismissal of their victimization because of the “expectation that, since women are commonly the victims of genocidal rape, they are the only victims.”\textsuperscript{clv}

These dynamics are further verified, not contradicted, by the scholarship on slavery in the New World. Under the regime of chattel slavery, the “sexual assault of enslaved men took a wide variety of forms, including outright physical penetrative assault, forced reproduction, sexual coercion and manipulation, and psychic abuse.”\textsuperscript{clvi} As Thomas Foster explains \textit{The Sexual Abuse of Black Men under American Slavery}, “it would be safe to say that, regardless of location and
time period, no enslaved man would have been safe from the threat of sexual abuse.”

For Thomas, this historical fact “points out cracks in the marble base of patriarchy that asserts men as penetrators in opposition to the penetrable, whether homosexuals, children or adult women.” In line with ethnological thinking of the period, the cultural basis of chattel slavery understood the effect of power over Black males as antecedent to “control their women and children” and targeted Black males with a sexually specific stereotype of ‘Sambo’ “to render the black male powerless as a potential warrior, a sexual competitor, and as an economic adversary.” Though women were subjected to a stereotyping process, “their image in the culture was far more complex” which accorded them a “serious and respectable mien” that shielded them from being completely negated in “their role as the matrix of family structure.”

This dynamic also was seen in the sexualized dynamics of the auction blocks, “the main place where Africans were made exchangeable and substitutable.” Inverting the feminist supposition posited by Rodriguez that Partus sequitur ventrem laws signify a sexualized basis to the evisceration of Black female slaves, this legal doctrine was in fact crucial to the fungibility of Black males “because, unlike enslaved women, their participation to both the conception and the raising of children was perceived as contingent” which led them to be “more integrated and valorized in the slave market.” Accordingly, male enslaved bodies were “accessible to their clients’ appreciation in every possible way” — “buyers ran their hands over the bodies of the [male] slaves, rubbing their muscles, fingerling their joints and kneading their flesh” in ways a “puritan ethos of the antebellum South did not allow publicly in relation to the female body.”

In line with the gendercidal logics documented by Jones and others, the chattel slavery system was structured to target Black men as the focal point for the application of brutal force with various methods from spectacles of “flogging, burning, castration, and execution” to indirect killings through overwork which were adapted as enduring methods of “discouraging leadership and group cohesion within the slave population.” The tendency to apply brutal force on Black males as a prerequisite to the subordination of the entire Black community continued to characterize racial violence in the postbellum period in the US South. As historian Kidada E. Williams makes clear:

Postbellum southern whites did not fail to observe and understand the power of African American families, institutions, and communities headed by black men. In fact, most postemancipation racial violence involved whites attacking and killing off the black veterans, politicians, contract negotiators, labor organizers, and aspiring entrepreneurs who insisted on asserting their authority over their own lives and those of their families. Accordingly, whites often attacked black men while they were performing the very gender roles and conventions designed to safeguard their own and their family’s freedom. Indeed, conservative whites saw as threats black men who carried arms, lobbied for the right to vote, disputed labor arrangements, or protected women and children from harm. These whites thought the right to exercise these privileges should remain in the purview of white men. Preserving these activities for white men, they believed, was the best way for whites to retain their power. Black men’s refusal to submit to white supremacy—as seen through their attempts to fulfill their roles as defenders and providers of their families—was the antithesis of white folks’ ideas of acceptable behavior for black men. This clash of interpretations about freedom put African American men on a collision course with whites and drew violence down on them and their families.
Not only were these propensities towards killing and incarcerating Black men transmitted into the post-chattel enslavement into Jim Crow and the broader social organization of US society, but so were Black men’s sexual vulnerabilities to lynching and rape by white men and women. Reflecting the dynamics of gendercide noted by genocidal studies scholars, under Jim Crow the dominant view of Black men “was as an emasculated figure.” Despite their characterization by scholars as “incapable of being victims of rape or the objects of sexual coercion by white men and women”, Black men “have long written about their sexual vulnerabilities to whites.” Under the regime of Jim Crow, his sexual submission was strictly enforced and the broader paradigm was “deliberately designed to destroy the will the black males.” Any exhibition “of independence by black men “[was] immediately recording in threatening judgements of his behavior of the type we already know, he [was] said to be uppity or getting out of his place.” Another theorist whose insights on speciation and white humanism are integrated into Rodriguez’s analytical framework of white reconstruction, Frantz Fanon, argues (contra the gender schema of Rodriguez) that under the colonial milieu the Black male is targeted by a latent homoeroticism and is interpreted as the embodiment of the white man’s forbidden sexual desire. So, for Fanon racism “the aversion the white male has to the Black man, is explained not solely by his hate for the Black male but also by his fear of, and desire for, him.” As a phobogenic object, the Black male triggers a “pre-rational fear in the mind of the white” which in turn typify the Black male existence, effectively “overdetermining his being as the phantasm of the white mind.”

Thus, Rodriguez’s notion of evisceration and its account of colonial/anti-Black violence is an abstraction of history grounded in intersectional/feminist presuppositions. It cannot account for the evidence which shows that Black men and women were sexually vulnerable under American slavery nor the enduring misandric orientation of brutal violence and stereotypes that fueled the institution, the postbellum era/Jim Crow system that followed or current expressions of racial violence. Contemporary population level data on Black men’s sexual vulnerability to contact sexual violence cannot be explained by this notion because it suggests a view of women/queer bodies having a unique relationship to sexual violence based on sex or gender identity. In fact, over a twelve-month period, Black men report the highest rates of contact sexual violence, which included rape, being made to penetrate, sexual coercion, and unwanted sexual contact. The evidence also shows that women are most of the perpetrators of sexual violence against men in instances of made to penetrate violence, sexual coercion, and unwanted sexual contact. As a result of an analytical commitment to gender essentialism, evisceration is not a reflection of how racial/sexualized violence occurred historically nor how it is expressed contemporaneously. Rodriguez may be correct that the notion of genocide is incomplete. Nevertheless, genocide studies provides a more empirically substantive and explanatory framework than the one Rodriguez provides readers to account for the gendered dynamics of anti-Black racial/colonial violence. In his final chapter, Rodriguez critically analyzes how mass incarceration and the narrative it reifies functions as a modality of liberal humanism that obscures the reality of anti-black carceral warfare. This term invokes a crisis that was unprecedented as opposed to the outcome of the state’s push to repress insurgent populations while positioning reformism that intensifies policing as a premise and method of reform. By domestic war, Rodriguez is “referencing the dynamic ensemble of state technologies that attempt to discipline, contain, and socially/politically neutralize the creative, insurgent (and often criminalized) socialities enabled by ongoing liberation and self-determination of oppressed, colonized, and displaced (incarcerated, segregated, colonized) peoples.” By engaging in a rhetoric that “fraudulently universalizes the fallout of carceral domestic war” and
labeling this “complex totality in the most reductive possible terms” – “mass incarceration” – and the narratives that sustain it does nothing to alleviate conditions of domestic warfare. Though Rodriguez is able to penetrate narratives of the state by showing how the rise of the US carceral regime “cannot be attributed to any growth in “crime rate” (which have declined over the period in question)”, noting the race-gender specificity of incarceration (as a violence that targets Black males and females more aggressively than other groups) and the application of counterinsurgency techniques of pacification on the Black community historically, he never explicitly connects the phenomenon of incarceration (or racial colonial violence more generally) to the doctrinal reconceptualization of counterinsurgency warfare of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

The biggest pitfall in race-gender scholarship has been a dearth of theoretical methodologies that can explain racism as warfare in any internally consistent manner. Again, like Davis and Rodriguez, most scholars deploy gender theory and hold on to a tacit premise that is contradictory at heart: violence imposed on Black males is evidence of their positive representation or privilege while violence imposed on queer/female bodies is evidence of their oppression. Black Male Studies scholars have pointed out the large asymmetry between the population level indexes of death and dying and popular approaches to understanding racial subordination by emphasizing the importance of social dominance theory (SDT). Social dominance theorists have documented a tendency in patriarchal capitalist societies in which “subordinated males seem to the consistent target of most egregious forms of violence and death” within the broader system of intergroup social hierarchies. Noting the persistence and enduring markers of discrimination, bigotry, genocide and oppression of various groups, social dominance theorists explain that their paradigm “argues that societies producing stable economic surplus contain three qualitatively distinct systems of group-based hierarchy: (1) and age system, in which adults have disproportionate social power over children; (2) a gender system, in which men have disproportionate social, political, and military power compared to women; and (3) an arbitrary-set system” in which groups constructed on ad hoc bases (not linked to the human life-cycle) have “differential access to things of positive and negative social value” and may be defined by “social distinctions meaningfully related to power, such as nationality, “race”, ethnicity, class, estate, descent, religion, or clan.” Despite their functions in the stability and reproduction of the society, they note that each system “is qualitatively different, and hence one system cannot be regarded as merely a special case of another.” They not three major differences: flexibility, level of violence and focus. While age and gender systems exhibit some flexibility in who is considered a child (as opposed to adult) or a female (as opposed to male), the “arbitrary-set system is distinguished by a very high degree of plasticity, both in terms of which group distinctions become socially significant and in the permeability of the group boundaries.” They also make it clear that while “coercion and violence are used to maintain the age and gender hierarchies, “the degree of lethality associated with the arbitrary set-system is often orders of magnitude greater than that associated with either the age or gender system.” Thus, these systems are the only type of system in which “total annihilation is found” being that there “are no known cases in which adults killed all the children, or men killed all the women, in a society.” Lastly and most importantly, social dominance theory argues that arbitrary set violence “primarily focuses on the
control of subordinate males by coalitions of dominant males” and is properly characterized, “as a form of low-level warfare directed against outgroup males.”

This, in fact, is a primary reason that arbitrary-set hierarchy is associated with extraordinary levels of violence."

Providing readers with several examples, the SDT theorists show that men are the most frequent perpetrators of lethal interpersonal and intergroup violence ranging “from military campaigns to gangs to lynchings” and are “also the primary lethal targets” of this violence. This pattern is observed in “Black US lynching victims between 1882 and 1927” (69% of whom were men) and even in instances of genocidal rape wherein the “raping of enemy women during war often appears to be intended to dishonor and humiliate the rape victim’s male relatives.” They argue that this male-on-male focus of arbitrary-set violence is seen at “the level of social stereotypes” and note that “negative national stereotypes are really differentiated stereotypes of men in those nations.” The evidence that these tendencies are present at individual and institutional levels, social dominance theorists posit the thesis known as the subordinate male target hypothesis which expresses that “both arbitrary set violence and arbitrary set discrimination are primarily male-on-male projects.” Thus, the thesis demonstrates that “racial arbitrary sets actually invert the gender relations of the patriarchal society and generate “the counterintuitive prediction that minority men, not minority women, should be expected to be the primary targets of racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination.”

In a more recent update of the subordinate male target hypothesis, the thesis grounding their framework, social dominance theorists further qualify the distinctions between sexism (patriarchal) and arbitrary set hierarchies—offering us a grammar of war to understand the dynamics of the latter. In their work, Developing a Theory of Gendered Prejudice, social dominance theorists argue for racism and ethnocentric be understood as gendered phenomena. As they outline it, SDT argues that males are predicted to be the primary targets and agents of arbitrary set discrimination. On this basis they posit the subordinate male target hypothesis, which “simply states that it is men, not women, who will serve as both the primary targets and agents of prejudice and discrimination against racial minorities.” Despite the considerable amount of empirical evidence behind this thesis, they use this article to submit theoretical clarifications and extensions of it. The first is the reiteration of an “early and critical observation that in-group favoritism is distinct from out-group denigration and aggression.” Contrary to popular assumptions in the field of intergroup relations, evidence indicates that the two phenomena have no systematic correlation and so social dominance theorists see no basis to predict that prejudice “defined as in-group favoritism, to be gendered in that there should be few, if any, gendered differences in the levels of in-group favoritism among men and women, nor with respect to the gender of the targets of in-group favoritism.” However, when prejudice is understood as out-group aggression and social predation “men are expected to be both the primary agents and targets of intergroup predation and aggression” but they explain further that there need not be power asymmetries between groups “in order for negativity toward the males of other groups to be expressed, that is, the targeted group need not necessarily be subordinate, as the SMTH implies.” They also clarify the claim that men and not women will serve as the primary targets and give an account of how women may also exhibit prejudice toward out-group men. Thus, [in-group] “men and women both have cause to act as agents of prejudice toward out-group men, with the qualification that the underlying motivations for this prejudice are gender specific.” In the case of in-group males, the driving force is aggression against and dominance over men in arbitrary-set groups, women’s
prejudice is “more likely to be characterized by wariness or fearfulness of such men.”

With a theoretical and empirical basis in sexual selection and parental investment theory, they argue that the original SMTH be set aside for a new thesis – the theory of gendered prejudice – which asserts three claims:

(1) outgroup men serve as the primary targets of intergroup prejudice, especially when this prejudice is expressed as out-group denigration and aggression; (2) although both men and women may serve as agents of intergroup prejudice, as expressed by in-group bias and in-group favoritism, men will tend to be the primary agents of prejudice, as expressed by out-group denigration, intergroup domination, and social predation; and (3) men and women’s out-group prejudice is driven by different underlying motivations—out-group prejudice among women is significantly motivated by fearful avoidance, whereas out-group prejudice among men is more likely to be motivated by a combination of aggression and social dominance.

After a comprehensive consideration of the empirical evidence that supports these claims, they observe that the results warrant a revision of the SMTH proposed by SDT and that their modification places SDT on “firmer conceptual grounding in evolutionary theory, namely the theories of parental investment and sexual selection.” Importantly, this modification does not jettison the identification of warlike aggression having a systematic relationship to arbitrary-set violence. Rather, it places the role of males in the context of intergroup conflict on more solid ground by demonstrating how intrasexual competition motivates “risky and competitive behavior” in the “service of promoting the acquisition of mating opportunities.” In sum, this new thesis – the theory of gendered prejudice – emphasizes an understanding of “intergroup prejudice as a functional endeavor in which men and women, through different mechanisms, cope with the gender-specific threats associated with intergroup conflict.”

The authors conclude by resisting a determinist posture or tone. They also emphasize the lack of comprehensiveness their account has for accounting of prejudice in all of its forms and maintain that more research is to be done on a female specific psychology of prejudice or proxemics and the logics of segregation given evidence on the function of “fear and avoidance of out-group members” as “limiting contact with groups that have been exposed to parasites or diseases to which one’s group has not developed an immunity.” Nevertheless, they leave us with an internally consistent and integrative theoretical framework supported by empirical evidence to explain racial subordination in racist, capitalist, patriarchal societies. Black Male Studies scholars have drawn on SDT to explain the speciation of Black males as a threat to the patriarchal order.

In his work titled *Killing Boogeymen: Phallicism and The Misandric Mischaracterizations of Black Males in Theory* (2018) Dr. Tommy Curry verifies the epistemological lineage of the guiding paradigm of Black Male Studies – phallicism – to social dominance theory. He begins by tracing the deployment of stereotypes against Black males through academic theory and argues that it has been marked by a process of ungenderization whereby their condition “marks a boundary between civil society—the world of work, citizen, and life—and phantasm.” Curry continues, grounding his account “begins with the socio-historical structures of society—its group-based activity” to empirically debunking the application of hegemonic masculinity theory to the historical, subjective and material realities of Black males. The dominant academic accounts of
Black men understand them as beneficiaries of patriarchy and male privilege (however marginally so), rather than entities constituted on a different register and thus subjugated by the dominant group. Despite its reification by intersectionality, Curry shows that there is simply no evidence for the notion that Black males seek hegemony or hold the attitudes found in ruling class white men or women. In light of the evidence on Black male social and political attitudes alongside the acknowledgement that the notion of hegemonic masculinity was formulated to suggest that Black men “show the most potential to overthrow the global reach and dominance of hegemonic masculinity” as opposed to emulating it, Curry debunks the application of it to Black males. In his own words, “[O]ften the accounts of Black masculinity offered by gender theorists are reductive and assume that Black masculinity itself is anti-woman, antigay, and anti-feminist. No such claim can be established empirically.” Contrary to its application within Black feminist literature, hegemonic masculinity was intended to be an account of ruling classes and the ideational implications of patriarchy in modern capitalist societies, so “it does not make any specific claims concerning interpersonal relationships toward women or sexist ideas concerning women.” In research that does inquire into negative stereotypes and personal expressions of sexism or misogyny, findings suggest that “similar attitudes within the respective age groups and economic or educated cohorts.” Furthermore, they are clear that “the negative stereotypes Black people have of each other are forms of internalized racism” and when the sexual singularities of stereotypes are accounted for among Black populations, “anti-Black male attitudes are held by Black men and Black women, but are more prevalent among Black women than men.” Though, these show a minority of cases and are not indicative of the entire Black population which “generally have positive views of each other, and when they do not, negative perceptions of Black men are more widely held than negative perceptions of Black women.”

In the subsequent section Curry offers a history of negative sexual accounts of Black men. As he explains, after the dissolution of chattel slavery the modern concept of gender was deployed around two concerns: manhood and Black male citizenship in the post emancipation south with a special focus on the relationship between whites and the Black male savage outside the cage of slavery. Ethnology was the initial late 19th century intellectual axis through which Black males were projected as both savage/monstrous and feminine/sexually vulnerable. But it gave way to early 20th century social sciences (sociology, economics, criminology, etc.) and then to gender theory in the form of hyper-masculinity in response to the politics of Black feminism. He explains that current theories of [Black] hyper-masculinity which are a product of Black men’s low self-esteem “were based on the idea that Black men wanted to be white men because they had no actual role models (as in fathers), or idea to aspire toward but that which oppressed them and confined them within segregated ghettos and poverty.” The existential angst of this condition and the cultural marginalization from which it stems was thought to increase Black men’s delinquency. Accordingly, there exists “no social scientific account or theory of Black (male) patriarchy prior to the various Black feminist reactions to Black Power.” For most of American history, “sociologists and racists were firmly committed to the racial inferiority and sexual effeminization of Black males” and so “the idea that Black men were patriarchs simply did not, or could not, exist” in the academic theory (sociological, psychological or historical) of the 20th century. Thus, Curry argues, Black feminism “singularly birthed idea Black male patriarchy” as a response to the prominence of Black Panthers like Eldridge Cleaver by drawing on “theories of Black men’s hyper-masculinity and deviance in the late 1970s and 1980s linked to Black men’s quest for political power and civil rights.” This zenith in Black feminist theory lay the basis for Curry’s
epistemological identification of anti-Black misandry. As he explains, these myths which have been asserted by scholars as theories “accounting for Black males violent, dangerous, and predatory nature as rapists and killers” alongside the “historical and contemporary rearticulations of these ideas that present themselves as obvious facts concerning the deviant and flawed nature of Black males, are evidence of a peculiar anti-Black, racial, or perhaps more accurately stated, a racist misandry operating throughout the centuries in the United States.”

However, it is only after his analysis of the analytic failures and heteronormative commitments of theories like intersectional invisibility and social dominance theory that Curry posits the racially subjugated male thesis or phallicism — the guiding theoretic of Black Male Studies. Taking issue with the “bio-logic” assumptions about theories of patriarchy that animate intersectional invisibility, or the accounts of sexual violence found in social dominance theory. One assumes that male genitalia must be “conceptualized as a weapon wielded against women by a body prone to rape and violence interpersonally” while the other simply theorizes arbitrary-set and other genocidal forms of violence along heterosexual lines of deadly violence. Curry proposes that “racialized maleness suffers from impositions of social force that denature Black male flesh into phantasm”, such an entity doesn’t exist “within the mind of individuals as an expression of particular wills or lusts, but rather is positioned as an imagination of the society, whereby individual Black men can all be substituted for the activity of the imagining interpersonally.” Thus, Black manhood is “framed by this irredeemable confinement” and “indicted for being of such savagery that it is an idea no male could wish to possess.”

Phallicism refers to the condition by which males of a subordinated racialized or ethnicized group are simultaneously imagined to be a sexual threat and predatory, and libidinally constituted as sexually desirous by the fantasies or fetishes of the dominant racial group. This concept is meant to guide a seemingly inexplicable tension if not contradiction between the description of racialized males under repressive and murderous regimes and their hyper-sexualization as objects of desire, possession, and want. The racialized male is conceptualized as the substantive (social) meaning of rape, while simultaneously being subjugated to rape by both the male and female members of the dominant group who disown their sexual violence because the hypervisibility of the racialized male is only as the rapist. The peculiar sexualization of racialized men and boys as objects has routinely been dismissed because savage men are thought to be super-agentic—choosing their prey, not being victims of predation. The idea of the rapist imposed upon racialized men from Africa, Asia, and Indigenous America suggest there is a structure of patriarchal imposition and imperial conquest which rationalizes the disposability of male victims of genocide or conquest as a honorific, insofar as the elimination of the male threat is ridding the world of primitivity, or evil, while nonetheless denigrating their flesh by sexual violence.

This concept suggests that the function of rape and the simultaneous stereotyping of Black maleness as a sexual threat operates beyond the lethal and genocidal logics that are the object of knowledge within the paradigm of social dominance theory. Rather, Black maleness describes a “register of sexual inversion to the established modern gender hierarchies suggested as universal
to all sexed bodies in which maleness is the category of societal violence and inter-personal imposition, and transubstantiation in which racialized maleness is transfigured as” as un-gendered as “not male, and feminine, while not female but rapist.” Because phallicism builds on the SMTH and SDT, it is an empirically grounded notion that advances our understanding about the nature of inter-group or population centric conflict in racist, capitalist, western societies. It is also sensitive to the how the historical projections of western MAN prefigure Black males (and as a result, Black people in general) as threats to the social order and in need of military style repression. But despite the empiricism relied upon by the scholars who have advanced these frameworks, the closest either paradigm gets to explicitly theorizing warfare is ‘arbitrary set violence’. Again, for SDT theorists, this kind of violence amounts to “low-level warfare against outgroup males.” But the exact kind of military action that guides this warfare is never conceptualized. For its part, phallicism conditions intergroup violence in the US as being conditioned on projection of Western MAN—the concepts and disciplines of liberal humanism—by outlining the historical phenomena that gave rise to our current sets of knowledge/being which dehumanize Black males as outgroup threats to the patriarchal kinship collective. But this is insufficient in that it does not explain how Western projections of humanity have guided the application of managerial techniques and military strategy to install and maintain European/American dominance over nonwhites/arbitrary-set groups.

Section Two – Warring for the Control of the Bodies and Souls of Men: Counterinsurgency, Western MAN and the Racialized Anthropological Nexus of (Police) Repression

“The greatest weapon the colonial powers have used in the past against our people has always been divide-and-conquer.” Malcolm X

“This is a rough, tough, dirty business, and dangerous. It was dangerous at times. No holds were barred . . . . We have used [these techniques] against Soviet agents. They have used [them] against us . . . . [The same methods were] brought home against any organization against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough business.” – William Sullivan, former Assistant Director of the FBI’s Intelligence Division

To understand counterinsurgency (COIN) at a basic level, one factor must be remembered: regular soldiers train and prepare for large-scale industrial conflict. However, counterinsurgency (commonly referred to as ‘small’ wars) is premised on the pacification of irregular foes comprised of entire populations through population centric warfare. As Counterinsurgent strategist and American military specialist David Kilcullen explains, counterinsurgency “is simply, whatever governments do to defeat rebellions.” Thus, it is “at heart an adaptation battle: a struggle to rapidly develop and learn new techniques and apply them in a fast-moving, high-threat environment, bringing them to bear before the enemy can evolve in response, and rapidly changing them as the environment shifts.” Contrasting counterinsurgency with a ‘body count’ or attrition style approach to warfare, Kilcullen emphasizes that the application of deadly force be ought to be done as “precisely and carefully as possible” because the goal of pacification is the eradication of the networks guerrillas use to thrive within a population and secure popular support for the counterinsurgent. Putting the goal of counterinsurgency in more general terms, Kilcullen writes that a victorious counterinsurgency seeks to both “discriminate with extreme precision
between reconcilable and irreconcilables, combatants and noncombatants, but do this to ‘protect’ the population and “make it as easy as possible to leave or opposed the insurgency, and as hard as possible to stay in or support it.”

In this way, COIN is an endeavor in socially engineering racialized and formerly colonized populations. Though scholars have provided rigorous explanations of COIN spanning two centuries and identified it as the primary method of engagement used by European empires against racialized populations outside of imperial metropoles, they have yet to explicitly understand this framework as the basis of managerial techniques used by the US state to control racialized populations internally despite the copious amount of evidence demonstrating this phenomenon. In his article, The 19th century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine (2010) German political scientist Thomas Rid presents a historical account of how civilian racialized populations became central to counterinsurgent activity. The notion that the “counterinsurgent competes against the insurgent for the trust and the support of the uncommitted, civilian population” has become “a core conceptual foundation of today’s counterinsurgency debate and doctrine.”

Popular accounts trace this supposition of a military focus on populations to the work of David Galula, a French military officer who served in Algeria’s Kabylie region as company commander of the 45th Colonial Infantry Battalion who theorized victory as “conditional on the isolation of the insurgent from the population, an isolation not enforced by external actors but maintained by and with the population.” However, Rid shows that Galula’s ideas were “hardly innovative” and reflected the French (and British) experience with “irregular warfare and counterinsurgency in North Africa and elsewhere” from the 19th century. Showing how colonialism informed European modern operational military thinking and tactics, Rid shows that beginning in the 1830s French officers spearheaded the initial thrust of modern colonial (counterinsurgency) warfare through an adaptation of the relatively non-lethal ‘ghazya’ tactic of the indigenous Algerians into ‘razzias’ that conducted indiscriminate slaughter and produced terror among the colonialized population. In its initial formula conducted in pre-Islamic Bedouin nomadic societies, the ‘ghazya’ was a kind of competitive exhibition wherein “marauding expeditions of clansmen seized camels, goats, and livestock” from other groups—rarely resulting in death. As opposed to conducting war in a regimental or industrial manner, a new standard of warfare was operationalized as tactics became centered on racialized populations who unlike those in ‘civilized’ nations, victory necessitated violence being imposed on the multitude.

Importantly though, the razzia was just one dimension of this new approach to war with nonwhites. On the other hand, the French instituted the bureaux arabes, an organ of civil-military administration which drew on ethnological sciences to provide an apparatus which would administer the broader colonial population. Though seemingly opaque from modern military strategy, Rid explains this corollary method of pacification stems from the same thinker who adapted the razzia strategy: General Marshal Thomas Robert Bugeaud. As Rid writes, The French Army’s “organization of the bureaux arabes tried to emulate the local society’s tribal structures” which “became particularly apparent when Bugeaud’s reinvigorated campaign crushed Abd-el-Kader’s main force in 1843.” “To administer them,” Rid continues, “it was necessary to procure intelligence not only on the country’s physical topography, but also its social and political constitution.” Bugeaud thought that “the new government system should not paternalistically impose a new system, but that it had to reflect established forms of authority, traditions and costumes.” Thus, the “same fierce general who elevated the brutal razzia to a systematic method to deal with adversarial tribes also understood that a more civil and cooperative method
was required to deal with cooperative tribes and populations.” Tied to the deadly tactic of the razzia, this bureaucratic apparatus laid the basis for the unity of command – brute force and civil governance – as a dualist method of pacification. After successful application of these techniques in Madagascar, colonial French officers conceptualized the emerging role of populations in ways that have established the basic assumptions in counterinsurgency doctrine today.

As they understood it, a two-step approach is required to secure victory: the conquest of land (bodies) and the conquest of morals (souls). The first is secured by battle, the second is secured by the manipulation of the subject population’s ideas. As Rid observes, in “Sudan, Tonkin, and in Madagascar, this line of thinking was developed further.” General Joseph-Simon Gallieni and his disciple, Colonel Hubert Lyautey, clarified, “developed the oil-slick/stain method and regarded the population as the central battleground that needed to not only be secured and protected from insurgent violence – but persuaded that working with the French was better for them than letting the rebels take over the government.” This paradigm of conquest was premised on cleaving the insurgent from the broader population which they need for support. Attacking the insurgency’s foundation meant a pivot away from enemy-centric warfare towards an objective of growing and extending “the secured and economically active zones from the center to the periphery, like oil spreads out on water.” The introduction of these colonial methods were met with prejudice by many officers in metropolitan France due to the fact that “European was enthusiastically approaching the apex of industrial war” at the time when they were conceived. While “the industrial model of civil-military relations clearly delineates the civilian and military spheres; the colonial model [of war] breaks down the line between soldier and civilian…” Thus, counterinsurgents argued, those who “fought on a daily basis in remote lands against ferocious enemies and the equally relentless elements” were “neither military nor civilian any more, but simply colonial.”

Verifying the long range development of counterinsurgency tactics from French colonial campaigns up to the US War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, Douglas W. Leonard in Escaping the Bind: Comparing Twenty-First Century US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the French Response to the Algerian Revolution, 1955-1956 (2014) takes the position that US military forces – like the French counterinsurgents before them – are failing to appreciate sophistication of insurgent revolt despite their deployment of cutting edge social science and the Human Terrain System (HTS) to better understand native populations engaged in insurgency. Tying the contemporary counterinsurgency practices together from the colonial period and its reliance on ethnology in its application by the French to its reformulation by US Army General David Petraeus, Leonard writes that Jacques Soustelle (the Governor General of French possessions in Algeria) “sent members of his staff into the Algerian countryside to live among and better understand the population, the US military directed its members to collect “ethnographic intelligence” via “conflict ethnography”, a deliberate approach to incorporate anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s “thick description” to describe the “deeper social and cultural drivers of
Accordingly, the “US Marine Corps advised its personnel to analyse the “cultural landscape” in Afghanistan or future sites of conflict, as “the cultural landscape is filled with readily visible signs that can be interpreted, monitored, analyzed, and mapped.””

Anthropologically, strategists and doctrine “writers in the US Army and Marine Corps found Geertz a useful guide to understanding and unravelling the fixity of culture through symbolic interpretation, particularly as it played out in and on the surroundings.” To supplement warfighters in this endeavor and “remove the “burden” of such analysis from the average military member, the US Army initiated HTS to “support operational decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share sociocultural institutional knowledge.”

With the study of entire populations, the colonizing force (be it French or American) aspires to acquire “the ability to “improve” subject populations to a modern, Western standard while dividing local groups into categories for easier political control” – ultimately in service of discerning “the causes of revolt via a ground-up study of the population.” But Leonard continues to show how US adaptions of counterinsurgency retain some fatal methodological assumptions of the former colonial applications, particularly the view of culture as a “discrete entity” that is basically fixed. This led both the French and Americans to “generalize, overlooking the nuances of individual and group motivation that could have become apparent with deeper investigation.”

As Iraq metastasized into a full blown insurgency in 2004 and 2005, US military planners struggled to find answers and “convened a so-called “brain trust” of like-minded, highly educated officers and scholars” to spearhead a new approach “in the American approach to counterinsurgency.”

This new methodology “focused on close contact with local populations” spurred by a “deeper ethnological or anthropological understanding of their social networks” which ostensibly would lay the basis to “rebuild Iraqi trust in government, mediate and eliminate disputes, and reconstruct Iraqi governance from the ground up” in a mold America saw fit. In addition, “they sought to destroy insurgent networks by exploiting ethno-cultural differences and targeting key leaders of the movements.” Culture, Leonard explains, was a foremost concern for building a better counterinsurgency force and generation Western style “development”. As he explains, leading authors of the new doctrine “called for a deliberate view of the construction of political legitimacy.” Because a counterinsurgent “must instill “a culturally acceptable level or rate of political, economic, or social development”” then “Soldiers and Marines must understand demographics, history, and the causes, ideologies, aims, organizations, capabilities, approaches, and supporting entities for every player in the conflict.”

Despite the fact that the “authors never offered a definition of “development”, though presumably they meant efforts to make political, social, and economic structures resemble those employed by European states and the USA.” In sum, the “vast knowledge required of each counterinsurgent would go towards this end, the “improvement” of Iraqi or Afghan conditions of life and governance.”

Contrasting this push for a new doctrine in the Global War on Terror with French concerns in Algeria, Leonard avers that colonial French military thinkers held a similar paradigm of civilizational development and viewed Algeria as having “fallen behind the “modern” world of Europe” and in need of their assistance. Only through careful surveillance, close contact and examination could the accomplish full pacification: “fostering “the evolution of ideas, of values, and of legislation.” Because every society was thought to have the capability to reach the status of “civilization”, Western intellectuals could discern the unique arc each society was on towards
the accomplishment of civilization “through intensive observation and information gathering.”

As Leonard writes, “strong empirical study [was thought to] enable social scientists to observe and understand “total social phenomena” that encapsulated all of the basic precepts of a society.” Such an approach was thought to allow for an understanding of change in Algerian society and ultimately yield methods “to control and accelerate that change.” These approaches were refracted and adapted upon by American thinkers directly. In their 21st century doctrinal approaches, America’s primary theoretical model generated from insights of “former French officer in Algeria and RAND-sponsored author David Galula.” But this engendered a problem in and of itself. As Leonard explains, “in Galula’s theories were inequities in the colonizer–colonized relationship; those power imbalances altered the dynamic of counterinsurgency warfare unless the postcolonial counterinsurgent intended to radically reorganize local social structures to match those found in the colonial period.” For his part, “Galula described his intent as understanding and prescribing techniques for “counterrevolutionary warfare in the areas called ‘colonial’ and ‘semi-colonial’ by the Communists, and ‘underdeveloped’ by us’” and US planners “based much of their strategic outlook on concepts derived from the very particular circumstances of the Cold War in a late-colonial state.” The problem though, Leonard explains, is that such a “strategy avoided any real theoretical rigor in its approach to local populations; rather than consult or apply any advanced anthropological theory, it grew from the writings of a like-minded military practitioner.” In the end, Galula “relied on the time-worn colonial rubric of divide and conquer, instrumentalizing and objectifying Algerians without truly understanding the society.”

Thus, Americans and French alike “proposed to study, understand and rule” enemy or racialized populations via “networks of like-minded people” and the gathering of information. But Americans did so by developing a HTS which stemmed in part from the Vietnam-era CORDS/Phoenix Program which sought to identity and target Vietnamese insurgency leaders. With the HTS paradigm, anthropological “intelligence thus could assist in preparation of the operational environment; further study would yield greater intelligence and more refined information on local conditions.” Nevertheless, Leonard maintains that this new approach has a large theoretical gap because both efforts “ultimately failed to recognize one fundamental truth: anthropological information gained in an observer-observed environment always tilted towards the observer due to power inequality.” As a result, the authors of the new US counterinsurgency paradigm proceeded “around a series of paradoxes” – one which “pushed for a "bottom-up flow of intelligence" which held that each Soldier or Marine, “from private to general, could and should act as a sensor to feed into the larger network” which would be combined with the work of trained HTS scholars and “yield a more comprehensive view of the subject society and make each combatant more effective in achieving strategic ends.” This approach does not address the “potential error introduced by the wearing of a uniform or the carrying of a weapon to discussion”; and despite being ostensibly novel, the bottom-up approach closely resembled “French ethnological collection in Algeria.” Emphasizing the role of professional scholars and anthropologists in the application of the HTS, Leonard notes that US scholars have voiced concerns with the paradigm based on “ethical and moral rather than purely methodological or theoretical grounds.” Without their support though, Leonard surmises that HTS “will fail to live up to stated requirements” and HTS planners will continue to recreate “some elements of the colonial and immediate post-colonial networks of ethnological and historical information exchange.” Clarifying that failure in the French case was due to “Soustelle’s form of ethnological governance” and his assumptions about “local political and social forms”, he
maintains that both approaches to counterinsurgency have “suffered from the general view of their subject as unmoving and relatively unsophisticated.”

Characteristic of the dissent of US anthropologists and social scientists mentioned by Leonard, Roberto Gonzalez verifies the relationship between the newly configured counterinsurgency doctrine by the US Army and Marine Corps and western humanist sciences in Towards Mercenary Anthropology? The New US Army COIN Manual FM 3-24 and the Military-Anthropology Complex (2007). Outlining a trend that has increased since 2001, anthropological knowledge has been key to waging the war on terror, and thus knowledge has been militarized in a new way. Querying these developments and the outlining the new counterinsurgency handbook published by the US military, Gonzalez shows the centrality of cultural knowledge to the overall paradigm. As he writes, “cultural knowledge is highlighted in the first chapter” and elaborated in chapter 3 which “defines terms including society, social structure, language, power, authority and interests.” Another chapter informs readers “that they should develop countermessages and counternarratives to attack the insurgents’ ideology” – “understanding local culture is required to do this.”

After overviewing the observations in the manual on “HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signal intelligence), OSINT (open-source intelligence), IMINT (imagery intelligence), MASINT (measurement and signal intelligence), GEOINT (geospatial intelligence), and 'intelligence collaboration' between US agents and ‘host nation’ officials”, Gonzalez argues that the chapter is not innovative and is “essentially a primer on cultural relativism and social structure.” Continuing, he writes that “some concepts are incomplete or outdated” and on the whole and leaves from its idea of culture “the notion of culture as a product of historical processes – in spite of the fact that for at least the last quarter century anthropologists have stressed that culture has been profoundly shaped by capitalism, colonialism and other political and economic forces on a global scale.” Thus, US counterinsurgency prefigured “underdeveloped” groups as bounded, static and rigid. Emphasizing the work of David Kilcullen, who coauthored the manual that detailed the new American approach to counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3 – 24 and argued for it to be understood as “armed social work”, Gonzalez notes that it encourages the co-opting of women and children to divide and isolate insurgents. In his own words, “a section advises counterinsurgents to ‘engage the women; be cautious around the children’.”

Though “homesick soldiers are often tempted to ‘drop their guard with kids’, the appendix warns that insurgents might use children as agents; therefore, children should be treated cautiously.” Continuing, Gonzalez avers that the same “section also recommends ‘co-opting neutral or friendly women through targeted social and economic programs’” and “advises counterinsurgents to ‘have local forces mirror the enemy, not US forces’.”

As opposed to training local security “and police in US-style tactics, the appendix recommends that they be encouraged to imitate ‘the enemy’s capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent’s role’” while “another section suggests that small-scale programmes be given preference over large ones, since ‘local conditions’ favour success.”

Narratives are key to US counterinsurgency operations as well. As Gonzalez explains, the “appendix emphasizes narrative” as something to be undercut for effective exploitation and erosion of insurgent influence. In Gonzalez’s estimation, “FM 3-24 generally reads like a manual for indirect colonial rule” and the authors “draw historical examples from British, French and Japanese colonial counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya, Vietnam, Algeria and China” – yet they “never mention empire” explicitly. Observing the implications of the militarization
of knowledge itself that is a at the basis of this new iteration of US counterinsurgency, Gonzalez notes the phenomenon of a the “warrior-intellectual”. In accordance with military interest in culture, a “small band of warrior-intellectuals” have rose to power in the “post-Rumsfield era, led by US Army General David Petraeus, who has a PhD in international relations from Princeton” and who has spearheaded the assembly “of social science PhDs who have risen to prominence as the Bush administration desperately seeks to improve the situation in Iraq.”

The foreword to FM 3-24, coauthored by General Petraeus and Lieutenant General James Amos (USMC), argues that “conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders…” but Gonzalez points out (like Leonard) that this “new” approach to culture rests on an antiquated concept “and a reinterpretation of T. E. Lawrence’s counterinsurgency tips from the 1910s” (recapitulated in the work of David Kilcullen).

And so, like “the colonial administrators of yesteryear, today’s ‘nation builders’ find practical use in a one-dimensional culture concept.”

The application of anthropological knowledge on the battlefield by the US is conceptualized in terms of ‘human terrain’. As Gonzalez recounts, the human terrain system strives for ‘unbiased’ notions of culture, but “appear to provide ideological justifications for military occupations through appeals to orientalist stereotypes.”

But a focus on government agencies is ultimately too narrow because contractors to the military “are probably employing many more anthropologists as the privatization of the military grows apace.” With counterinsurgency consulting being the cutting edge and “latest phase in the weaponization of anthropology – a process by which military and intelligence agencies employ social science as just another weapon on the battlefield”, Gonzalez argues that such factors represent a “grave breach of the AAA’s (American Anthropology Association) code of ethics” and transforms scholars into “cultural mercenaries – hired to design or implement culturally specific counterinsurgency campaigns or extreme torture tactics.”

Even more alarming is the tendency of counterinsurgents to “mirror their enemies” and resort to the very terrorist tactics of those they aim to subvert. Given the recent historical examples of this phenomena (in Guatemala, Vietnam, Algeria, Northern Ireland, East Timor, Chile and Argentina), Gonzalez concludes emphasizing the need to “extend and amplify dialogue among social scientists around issues of torture, collaboration with the military, and the potential abuse of social science in the ‘war on terror’.”

Thus, Rid’s genealogical account of colonial warfare is confirmed in the literature through a consensus on the pioneering of counterinsurgency techniques by French expeditionary forces, “whose experiences with counterinsurgency was rich and diverse, perhaps more so than any other European nation”, in Algeria and the continuation of these practices into warfare campaigns into the current millennium despite conceptual and methodological maladies. But the British army also cut its teeth on irregular as opposed to conventional industrial warfare. Though a formal doctrine was not published until the late 1990s, Colonel Charles Callwell’s Small Wars “is generally agreed to be the start point for British irregular warfare writing.” Published in 1896, Callwell argued for a framework of warfare that emphasized the need for irregular tactics and strategy. A modern regular army faced unique challenges when faced with a “savage” enemy: “poor intelligence, the difficulty of designing a strategy and applying it through operational art and tactics, communications, logistics, and security.” He also observed the devastating nature of these operations, noting that “the laws of regular warfare do not sanction” such methods but that they are ultimately “necessary to bring about the enemy’s defeat.” However, his fundamental point is that despite similarities small “savage” wars “cannot be approached in the same way as...
conventional conflict” and are “profound enough to demand specific training and preparation” so that soldiers’ skills can be readily applied to a unique strategic environment.\textsuperscript{ccxciv} To be clear, the lethality of these colonial war-fighting techniques were conditioned by the racialized dehumanization of the enemy – and Africans were seen as especially barbaric/savage. The idea of what it means to be human – a question of philosophical anthropology – was and remains at the core of how threats and logics of warfare have been materialized as the construction of the enemy in modern Western military thinking. Reframing the role of colonial hierarchies of racial difference and anthropology at the high point of British empire, Kim Wagner in Savage Warfare: Violence and the Rule of Colonial Difference in Early British Counterinsurgency (2018) resists the dominant academic characterization of the British imperial legacy as not particularly violent. Rather, the author shows how colonial epistemology – which understood Africans and other nonwhite races as biologically akin to savages as opposed to being properly human – established a principle of anthropological difference that impelled British military thinkers to reconceptualize warfare itself. These caricatures of “uncivilized people, which buttressed the imperial project more generally, were at times further framed within an evangelical context, allowing British officers to present their conquest of ‘savages’” as divinely ordained."\textsuperscript{ccxcv} Based on taxonomical differences between whites and nonwhites, a “fundamental difference between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ people” was erected and provided the guiding principle that spurred the racially determinist logic of General Callwell’s classic work on colonial military doctrine: Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896). Savages were less rational, so whites needed to communicate using the only language these beings understood – brute force. As Wagner explains, in savage/colonial warfare “the basic aims of military operations differed from conflicts between ‘civilized’ nations, as did the means by which victory could be achieved."\textsuperscript{ccxcvi} When engaged in combat “against ‘uncivilized’ people, who did not possess formal government institutions, regular troops were, according to Callwell, ‘forced to resort to cattle lifting and village burning and . . . the war assumes an aspect which may shock the humanitarian.’”\textsuperscript{ccxcvii} Furthermore, “[o]ne of the key tenets of savage warfare, as defined by Callwell, was in fact the great principle of ‘overawing the enemy’” and because “‘[u]ncivilized’ people were, as we have seen, not considered as rational political actors and could accordingly not be negotiated with; the only language ‘savages’ understood was violence.”\textsuperscript{ccxcviii}

As a result of this introduction of a population-centric approach to subduing the enemy, the distinction between a counterinsurgency strategy of winning ‘hearts and minds’ to persuade and win over the local population from militants as opposed to more lethal approaches akin to total war and the complete annihilation of the enemy that alienates them is less stable – a distinction scholars are eager to make contemporaneously. Racial ethnological knowledge licensed such an incredible amount of dehumanization that these styles of war were effectively equivalent. The implementation of Dum dum (hollow tip) bullets (and other cutting-edge avionics technology) for use on the battlefield emerged out of this bifurcated colonial context of the human and savages. As Wagner explains, the notions of the ‘savage’ and ‘fanatics’ were commonly used to conceptualize “non-white enemies within the Empire “and were synthesized with “different discourses relation not only to racial and cultural difference, but also to medicine, anatomy and ballistics” – “Central to this line of reasoning was the constant comparison between ‘savages’ and wild animals.”\textsuperscript{ccxcix} Explicating how dual standard of humanity (and warfare) was negotiated by the British empire endured into the development of avionics into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Wagner writes that “when rules of war were being codified for conflict between ‘civilized’ nations, the British
thus refused to commit themselves to any such limitations on the levels of violence that could be utilized in savage warfare.” At the dawn of the 20th century, the deployment of airpower within the British Empire the continuing distinction between the military technologies that could be deployed against ‘civilized’ and ‘un-civilized’ populations” and gave way to a new lexicon – from ‘small wars’ to ‘imperial policing’ that was “followed after the Second World War by ‘counterinsurgency’” – but the basic principle of anthropological difference has “remained largely the same.” Thus, the construction of the nonwhite enemy as uncivilized and as a population of lower instantiations of humankind has functioned to infuse military doctrine and tactics with imperatives that “dictated and justified techniques of violence that were by the same token considered unacceptable in conflicts between so-called ‘civilized’ nations.”

In his informative and detailed monograph *Colonial Empires and Armies (1815-1960)*, V. G. Kiernan provides an account of colonial warfare that further substantiates the links between the intellectual underpinnings of the concept of (white) humanity, the savage trope, the civilizing mission and the military organizational dimensions of counterinsurgency warfare. Kiernan writes that because Europe’s “armies grew out of a feudal order of society whose aristocratic spirit long outlasted it; they preserved in simple stereotyped form the grand social division between nobility or gentry, representing quality (a term which in England could signify the upper classes), and plebeian mass.” On top of this division there was added another: a shortage of “numbers, need to economize costs, climate and disease, were all arguments for use of native troops.” Explaining how this system lubricated colonialized militarized forces, he writes in “their clashes in India the French and British pioneered the system of ‘sepoys armies’, from then on an indispensable part of Europe’s ability to go on conquering.” Continuing, he explains that “Afro-Asia was taught to conquer itself for foreign pay, most of it taken out of Afro-Asian pockets. Soldiers might be recruited form the debris of defeated forces; resistance could thereby be abridged, and resentment allayed.” India was “particularly fertile recruiting-ground” and following the “Roman example, and Napoleon’s within Europe” other Western nations “depended on for some of their manpower on compulsion in their colonies as at home” – making the slave soldier figure “prominently in the indigenous military tradition of much of Afro-Asia.” As imperialism developed, long drawn-out engagements were warned against and spurred the introduction of new technologies to ostensibly lessen bloodshed and make war more humane, a theme still prominent in counterinsurgency literature. Adding more context to the potency of the dehumanizing logics of the civilizing mission and colonial military strategy Kiernan explains that along with the ‘dum-dum’ bullet, the machine gun was a leap in technological capacity which was “directed very much towards a European market and an African field of action” and without “Africa as a target, indeed, the machine-gun might have evolved far more slowly; their destinies were interwoven” – the “black devils” only understood properly applied force.

The application of similar techniques (i.e. racialized dehumanization and conscription) are part of a broader continuum of counterinsurgency since the imperial era. But despite long-range continuities into the present, the development and application of counterinsurgency techniques has not been static. Close to attention to the development of western military thinking around three axes: the popular base of an insurgency (national annihilation), the social bond between rebels and the population (mild and extreme strategies including isolation) and the military and political cadres demonstrates the heterogeneity of counterinsurgent thinking since the 18th and 19th centuries. In his work, *The Evolution of Counterinsurgency Warfare (2011)*, Oscar Palma Morales...
provides such an analysis. As he explains, early responses to insurgencies were characterized by “brutal excesses, indiscriminate force, and repressive methods.” These methods were applied in Europe during the Napoleonic expansion, American expansion into the Western territories and the Philippines and across Africa by German, British and French regiments. During this period European powers “experimented with strategies aimed at breaking the bond between insurgents and their communities, but methods employed, rather than being mild, were intrusive and disruptive of” the community’s lives. Isolation and relocation of entire communities “from their original locations to areas where they could be controlled by the counterinsurgent” was done to isolate “rebels in spaces where it was possible to search and destroy them.” Columns were then deployed to “pursue guerrilla bands, while food denial programs were applied in order to starve insurgents off” to avoid the possibility of rebels supplying themselves with essentials needed to continue the resistance. In most cases this caused problems due to the appalling conditions people were forced to suffer under. But in the case of American settler colonization and the emergence of Indian reservations things were different because “elements of a ‘civic action’ campaign were applied, including sanitation measures and public works; a vision which would later constitute a civic approach of American COIN.” As mentioned earlier, reinforcing manpower with locally trained security squads and conscripts was also a staple of COIN during the 19th century. The British “mastered the process of using locals in Abyssinia, Malaya, Egypt and Sudan” while the French “included natives in North, West and Central Africa.” Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal and the US “depended on largely native military and police forces” during this period. Both of these tactics – resettlement/food denial and local conscription – “were to become central tenets of COIN practice for years to come and important instruments to break the bond between rebels and populations.” Though practitioners saw the futility of repressive methods, a shift away from reliance on brutality in COIN strategy did not occur right away. But during the interwar period of the 20th century, a new vision of COIN emerged “focused less on the direct eradication of insurgents and their base of support, and more on breaking the bond between insurgents and the population by winning people’s hearts and minds.”

Despite institutional roots in the French and American colonial experience through the implementation of civic action and ‘oil-slick’ methods, the interwar period saw insurgency come to be understood as campaigns to be won by the winning of the “hearts and minds” of the subject people. As Morales writes, this shift allowed the introduction of two new elements: “propaganda, as the instrument to sell ideas while diminishing those of the enemy; and intelligence, as a mechanism to raise awareness about the realities of the enemy and discover how to better confront it.” Spearheading this new approach, liberal democracies “like Britain and the United States were moving closer” than others by focusing “on winning the support of the population.” However, the doctrinal innovation of Maoism forced yet another paradigm shift. Mao’s theory provided a model “for a small weaker actor to override a more powerful enemy by means of will, time, space and propaganda, in the absence of initial fire power capacity” through a three staged process (strategic defensive; stalemate; and strategic offensive). Because Maoism became the main paradigm of insurgency warfare throughout the colonized world, COIN evolved to respond and negate it. Motivating the need for techniques deployed by the French in Algeria, the US in the Philippines and the British in Malaya, Maoism demonstrated that “COIN strategies which focused directly on the eradication of the rebels and its popular base were counterproductive.” Thus, COIN was adapted to fit new schemas and effect the synthesis of security institutions with a “wider range of state and even societal organizations” that pacified the subject population.
clear, brutality was still valid. But Maoism demonstrated the importance of factors previously ignored by counterinsurgents. Indirectly fighting insurgency assumed greater importance as well during this period, and COIN was thought of as a “dialectical fight to win the acquiescence of the populace” which demanded new theoretical guidelines “centered on population support.”\footnote{cccxxii} With the conclusion of the Vietnam War, Palmeres (and other COIN scholars argue), “insurgency and COIN were practically marginalized in the strategic international agenda” and largely relegated to operations in Latin America before reemerging in the 21st century wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a global program of pacification in accordance with US security interests.\footnote{cccxxiii} Outside of a passing reference to “applications of military technology developed during the Cold War” to “urban populations, especially in the “ghetto unrest that erupted in the wake of the Vietnam War”, there is no grasp in the literature on the extensive manner in which counterinsurgency techniques of warfare have been and continue to be applied to Black populations in the US.\footnote{cccxxiv} Though pacification and surveillance tactics were imposed on Black people in the late 19th and early 20th century, a closer look at the rise of Maoism and the spread of anti-colonialism during the Cold War period is necessary to understand how counterinsurgency methods were fully integrated into domestic tactics of racial control.

Dr. Laleh Khalili details how mass detention and confinement of both combatants and large groups of civilians have become permanent artifacts of liberal ‘asymmetric’/counterinsurgency warfare. Against the arguments of western theorists and practitioners of counterinsurgency that incarceration ‘protects populations’, she shows how explicit racial hierarchies and their justifications for colonialism were restated by the West in cultural terms due to both embarrassment in the aftermath of the Third Reich’s pogrom of Jews and the rise of anticolonial nationalisms and their use of Maoist guerrilla techniques who used race to criticize liberal civilizational modalities in the international arena. Additionally, Khalili note the sexual emphasis of counterinsurgencies by explaining the tendency for them to be conducted by mass sweeps of men “of a certain age.”\footnote{cccxxv} Moreover, Khalili writes that “in Iraq, and indeed all counterinsurgencies anywhere, “any male was fair game.”\footnote{cccxxvi} On the recapitulation of eugenic logics into a development or modernization framework, they write that there was indeed a restatement of “colonial policy in nonracial terms.”\footnote{cccxxvii} Anti-colonialism necessitated a that “colonialism’s justificatory narratives had to be adjusted.”\footnote{cccxxviii} Awareness of white supremacy and racial segregation on a world stage was an embarrassment. Thus, the legitimacy of British, French and US colonialism “was made to hinge on ideas of economic and political development in the colonies on the one hand and protection of minority groups on the other hand.”\footnote{cccxxix} Throughout the western world then, “past intimations of racial inferiority gave way to a language of developmental backwardness” which allowed taxonomic and biological notions of differences to be “translated into cultural difference.”\footnote{cccccxx} Accordingly, cultures were ranked in line with “an exclusive set of criteria that in a predetermined fashion placed European and American cultures on one end of the spectrum and colonized on the other end”, so that cultural difference could now be “used to provide the basis for counterinsurgency action.”\footnote{cccccxi}

The notion of development (officially coined as modernization theory by Walt Whitman Rostow) then, was the part of a broader paradigmatic response to an insurgent darker world spearheaded by John F. Kennedy who was crucial in reconceptualizing counterinsurgency during the Cold War period. Verifying the relationship between modernization and a new approach to counterinsurgency theory and praxis highlighted by Huey P. Newton, Michael Hunt explains in
his work Ideology and Foreign Policy (2009), that developmental policy “entered its golden age in the early 1960s under John F. Kennedy’s patronage and the challenge of the Soviet-backed wars of national liberation.” It’s logics led to a situation in which “all foreign aid was now devoted to this new battleground, and social scientists” were crucial to this struggle. Their expertise was the key to “that would set off “the revolution of modernization” and win the hearts and minds of the Third World.” Despite the opposition of the Communists, it “was up to the United States to perfect the techniques of counterinsurgency and stand ready to apply them on behalf of people struggling against subversion to build a democratic, open society.” Hunt also emphasizes how important the recapitulation of eugenic logics of racial stratification into new terms was to the new approach to counterinsurgency. As he explains, developmental theory “can be seen as a response to fourth wave of revolutions Americans had to confront” spurring “across the face of Latin America, Africa, and Asia” which “raised for American leaders the specter of Soviet meddling at the same time it directly challenged American values.” In a frantic search to install order, American policymakers employed a variety of strategies. This “might mean striking collaborative bargains with dictators who could bring their careening countries under control and provide enlightened direction to people unready to manage their own affairs” or it may have meant “working with colonial powers to win time and hold down the Communist element until the “natives” were ready for independence.” Once the Communists were eliminated from the picture, US policymakers reasoned, “these new nations could move with greater assurance and security towards the creation of that condition” of ordered liberty more amenable to American imperial interests. Undoubtedly, “developmental theory also carried forward the long-established American views on race” and “by recasting the old racial hierarchy into cultural terms supplied by development theorists.” Outside of the old vocabulary of Jim Crow white supremacy, racial stratification was communicated through “the attributes of modernity and tradition that fixed a people’s or nation’s place on the hierarchy.”

Accordingly, “Black Africa occupied the lowest rung, just as black ghettoes represented the lower reaches of American society” and thus the “change in vocabulary had not altered the hierarchy; it had simply made more plausible the denial of any links to an unfashionably racist world view.” Giving substance to the scope and aims of this new doctrinal approach to COIN by the US in the post WW2 period, Africana Studies scholar Stuart Schrader argues against the conventional academic interpretation of the rise of the carceral empire which understands that counterinsurgency practices used in foreign territories were transferred and instituted within the US as policing against the possibility of Black Power insurgency and Black militancy. This is a partial truth. As Schrader shows in, Badges Without Borders (2019) policing and foreign policy experts utilized a singular lens of vision that made no distinction sensitive to region when reformulating counterinsurgency tactics in response to anti-colonialism. Thus, the notion that freedom movements and other radical elements spurred a response essentially misrepresents the fact that US administrators formulated a new counterinsurgency doctrine for application within a singular domain (the entire planet) before and during insurgency in the Third World and the ghettos in America. With a base in policing power, the eradication of any capability to act offensively against the world system put in place by the liberal capitalist order was made concrete—making insurgency practically impossible. As Schrader explains, for US policymakers the crushing of “counterinsurgency in Third World countries” was “uncompromising police, professionally trained and equipped on a US model.” Although, Schrader clarifies, the “term “counterinsurgency” was a misnomer, because the insurgency to be countered was one that had
not yet occurred” at the time of its application by security specialists. Nevertheless, the notion did “refer to specific practices that joined security imperatives to controlled uplift through economic development.” As Schrader explains,

Counterinsurgency was directed at a wide target—“the people”—and aimed to prevent civil violence, meaning symbolic and other violence against people and property that was organized, collective, and addressed to capital and state. Such prevention occurred by investing the people in their own security through calibrated penalties and rewards. Yet this procedure often sparked the activities labeled insurgency. Atrocities commonly associated with counterinsurgency flowed from failures to achieve pacification. Counterinsurgency was imperial. It occurred in dozens of countries that fell into the national-security purview where no US troops ever fired a gun. The behemoth national security state would weave together intelligence gathering and covert action with unhampered military outlays.

With policing as the basic modality of global counterinsurgency, an economic oriented philosophical anthropology was infused with military organizational tactics to achieve the overarching goal of pacification. This new philosophical anthropology was premised on rational choice theory—spearheaded by Harvard trained economist Charles Wolf. As Schrader writes, “Wolf’s initial foray into applying rational-choice thinking to counterinsurgency came in a bracing 1965 report, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities.” Wolf “questioned the role of popular support in the success of insurgencies” and “dispensed with the premise that counterinsurgency required winning hearts and minds through the provision of social welfare.” Rather, he posited that what was needed was not an increase of assistance to peasants and a betterment of their livelihood to ensure loyalty but rather “certain inputs” including cheap food, information, and recruits. He also “argued that the costs to insurgents of obtaining these inputs “may be ‘reasonable’ without popular support for the insurgents” and that “the costs may be raised considerably” by the government “without popular support” for the government.” Wolf’s analysis led to a reassessment of the “three pillars of common thinking behind pacification: the beliefs that insurgents and counterinsurgents vied for popular support because they both required it to succeed; that neutralizing popular support for insurgents could be achieved by providing economic and social benefits; and that socioeconomic aid was essential for counterinsurgency.” Thus, the best way to see to it that aid hastened pacification was “to condition its provision upon “the kind of behavior the government want to promote among the people”—a program of behavior modification. Under the theoretical framework that understood insurgencies generating from inputs (food, intelligence, etc.) to outputs (sabotage, terror and attacks on the state), Wolf argued that focusing on the latter was labor and capital intensive. It was better to focus on the former, “which did not necessarily require military intervention” and sought to modify a population’s behavior to fit the needs of counterinsurgents. From this, it followed that a new cost-benefit counterinsurgency was needed—which they termed “rebellion (R) versus authority (A)”. As Schrader outlines,
“noise” to “R’s information system.” Third was military “counterforce,” reliant on sound intelligence to avoid “targeting error” where “targets are closely collocated with the people.” Finally, passive and active defense measures composed the fourth vector: either improving fortifications or “strengthening local paramilitary and police units” for “local defense.” In the political realm, Leites and Wolf recommended “certifying” with the government’s “adherence to law and order in contrast to R” that “it should be governing because it is governing.”

Though it underwent some scrutiny, this rational choice cost-benefit framework came to replace ‘hearts and minds approaches’ and was translated into domestic policing under a counterinsurgency paradigm under the aegis of broken windows policing which changed how US security specialists thought about crime. As Schrader explains, COIN logics applied in foreign territories against insurgencies and domestic policing under the framework of broken windows policing. Its basis derived from a philosophy of ‘order maintenance’ policing which “relied on economistic, methodologically individualizing determinations of how behavior would be affected by punishment or reward” and “assumed its object to be the permanently surplus, whose behavior signaled their economic marginalization and participation in informal economic circuits.”

Such behavior “could be detrimental to property owners, tourism, and real estate interests” and was understood through a “similar structural-functional quality” as counterinsurgency. Inputs of minor offenses were understood to transform in a developmental sequence into outputs of even greater harms. So, “a punitive response to a small offense, the theory suggested, would dissuade the rational actor from committing a greater offense.” Thus, like its military forces, US police were modernized and instituted as complementary COIN forces within the US which seek to modify behavior through a proleptic battle against crime and other potentially insurgent activities that “have yet to occur.”

With this added context, the imposition onto the Black community and the Black Power movement in the 60s through the present with an array of military style operations like COINTELPRO (the Counterintelligence Program), BLACKPRO (or the Ghetto Listening Post Program) PRISAC (Prison Activist Program), JATTTF (Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force), operation ‘Newkill’ and other programs/social policies that laid the basis for the mass incarceration/criminalization the Black population can be understood for what they are: a logical extension of the application of new doctrinal techniques of population centric counterinsurgency warfare by US empire “that were tried and tested over the years” in foreign domains.

Though it was just one among many, COINTELPRO is a notable iteration of this domestic war agenda. In a report to the UN high commissioner for human rights, authors of COINTELPRO: The Untold American Story (2001) explained that FBI operations during the decade of the 60s were aimed at filling its historical organizational role as the political police. As it relates to the specific program of COINTELPRO administrated between 1956 and 1971 – its goals were stated thusly, “to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize enemies of the state.” The provide details on the broad measures of applicability and brunt of lethal state forces imposed on black people during this period but admit that the consequences are not easy to evaluate. Black and Native Indian scholars’ surmise that they accomplished the goal of breaking “the momentum developed in black communities in the late fifties and early sixties” and facilitated a kind of psychological fatigue that has set it. One Native American tribal elder reported that in the aftermath of federal repression, “the movement itself kind of disappeared.” From its earlier days, the FBI has
operated on a “doctrine that the “preliminary stages of organization and preparation” must be frustrated, well before there is any clear and present danger of “revolutionary radicalism.” In its more extreme form, “dissidents have been eliminated outright or sent to prison for the rest of their lives”, while many more were subdued via “intimidation, harassment, discrediting, snitch jacketing” and other “authoritarian and illegal tactics.” However, “neutralization” is a more general enterprise which effectively makes the target “incapable of engaging in political activity by whatever means.”

Detailing how COINTELPRO practitioners sought to make the neutralization of the Black community and other insurgent movements of the 60s concrete, the authors describe the use of tactic like: murders and assassinations, agents provocateurs, the training of the extreme right wing paramilitary groups (specifically the KKK and Secret Army organizations), snitch jacketing, the subversion of the press and the intense accumulation of political prisoners. As it relates to the Klan, the authors explain that it “has had a contradictory relationship with the national/federal government: as a defender of white privilege and the patriarchal status quo, and as an implicit threat, however provisional, to federal power.” Adding clarification to this complicated relationship, compare the treatment of the Klan to the Black Freedom Movement. They write that, vigilante terror often was “supplemental to official violence, or kept on the proverbial short leash.” In this surrogate role, the Klan enjoyed wide free reign. But “when it moves into an oppositional mode and attacked key institutions of national power, Klan paramilitarism – but not its overt white supremacist ideology – is treated as an imminent threat to the social order” and suppressed “but never destroyed, unlike other COINTELPRO target groups.” This is reflective of a ideological convergence between senior government officials, field agents and Klan values which was “evident during the civil rights struggles of the sixties, when Freedom Riders and local community activists directly confronted hostile police forces – many of whom openly allied with the Klan” and “refused to protect civil rights workers under attack across the South.”

In contrast, the actions on behalf of FBI officials as it related to radical Black groups like the Black Panther Party (BPP) (particularly leaders like Fred Hampton and Huey P. Newton) were coordinated, gruesome and bloody. Most of the political prisoners amassed in the aftermath of the program came from their organization. But they were not the exclusive targets: a host of actors in the Black liberation movement were. As the authors of the report observe, between the years of 1968 and 1971 a host of BPP leaders were killed. In their own words, “FBI-initiated terror and disruption resulted in the murder of Black Panthers Arthur Morris, Bobby Hutton, Steven Bartholomew, Robert Lawrence, Tommy Lewis, Welton Armstead, Frank Diggs, Alprentice Carter, John Huggins, Alex Rackley, John Savage, Sylvester Bell, Larry Roberson, Nathaniel Clark, Walter Touré Pope, Spurgeon Winters, Fred Hampton, Mark Clark, Sterling Jones, Eugene Anderson, Babatunde X Omarwali, Carl Hampton, Jonathan Jackson, Fred Bennett, Sandra Jane Pratt, Robert Webb, Samuel Napier, Harold Russell, and George Jackson.”

In his article, To Disrupt, Discredit and Destroy: The FBI’s Secret War against the Black Panther Party, Ward Churchill provides a historically informed analysis of FBI repression and its counterintelligence/counterinsurgency war against the BPP. Verifying the observations of the UN report authors, he explains that the bureau was founded as the US’s foremost political police force with roots in monitoring those who professed ideals of anarchism, socialism, communism and syndicalism in the early 20th century. He also explains that there is a unique white supremacist orientation to the bureau – “any sort of activity which might disturb the rigid race/class hierarchy
of American life constituted a “threat” and was subject to targeting by the Bureau.” With this rationale—stemming from its ideological fountainhead of J. Edgar Hoover—the organization sought to subvert Black nationalists across a wide spectrum from its earliest days: from Marcus Garvey to the United Slaves (US), to the BPP. As Churchill explains, “Hoover was committed to “the repression of any black dissident who challenged second-class citizenship,” irrespective of their ideological posture or the mode by which their politics were manifested.”

Despite a long history of surveilling Black activists rooted in the early 20th century, Churchill makes clear that the specific program of COINTELPRO generated from operations that were initially conducted on the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) and the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) during the red scare period (1946-1954). Rather than being limited to the foreign policy domain however, these tactics were applied to independence movements abroad and to the dissident groups in the US in three parts: 1) Leftist Groups; 2) Black Nationalists; 3) white hate groups. Under this framework Black leadership was targeted across a wide spectrum using a variety of illegal tactics by 1967. Churchill writes that by March of 1968, the program was “expanded to include all 41 FBI field offices” to specifically target “the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Philadelphia-based Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) and the Nation of Islam (NOI)” along with “[s]cores, perhaps hundreds, of individuals” who “were shortly added to the various lists of those selected for personal “neutralization,” as were organizations like the Republic of New Africa (RNA) and Los Angeles-centered United Slaves (US).” He also notes that,

During the spate of post-Watergate congressional hearings on domestic intelligence operations, the FBI eventually acknowledged having conducted 2,218 separate COINTELPRO actions from mid-1956 through mid-1971. These, the Bureau conceded, were undertaken in conjunction with other significant illegalities: 2,305 warrantless telephone taps, 697 buggings, and the opening of 57,846 pieces of mail. This itemization, although an indicator of the magnitude and extent of FBI criminality, was far from incomplete. The counterintelligence campaign against the Puerto Rican independence movement was not mentioned at all, while whole categories of operational technique—assassinations, for example, and obtaining false convictions against key activists—were not divulged with respect to the rest. There is solid evidence that the other sorts of illegality were downplayed as well.

By 1968-1969, the BPP and its leaders were targeted as the primary threat to the US social order. This is reflected in the fact that the bulk of COINTELPRO operations were conducted against them specifically (233 out of 295 according to records cited by Churchill). These attacks constituted a war on the BPP and were so comprehensive that they stand as a sort of “textbook model of modern political repression.” In the end, it is clear that these operations crushed the Panther leadership and facilitated the emergence of an incarceration state that provided the basis for the implementation of isolation units modeled on “judicial counterinsurgency” (p. 41). In his own words, US administrators followed “the example set by West Germany at its notorious Stammheim Prison” and “begun to proliferate entire institutions devoted to the “isolation model of judicial counterinsurgency.” The first iteration of this “this was the “indefinite lock-down” of the federal “super-maximum” facility at Marion, Illinois, to which Sekou Odinga was sent, in
By the 1990s, this trend was “consolidated to the point that entirely new high tech “campuses” were opened by the federal government at Florence, Colorado—Mutulu Shakur, among others, was sent there—by the State of California at Pelican Bay, and by the State of New York at Shawanga.” The US Bureau of Prisons institutionalized this agenda and has “stated straightforwardly that a major objective of such prisons is to force the “ideological conversion” of those confined within them. In the alternative, the goal is to reduce prisoners to “psychological jelly.”” Despite protests from international and private organizations charging the US of human rights violations, the government has responded by increasing the degree to which the penal system as a whole relies upon the isolation model; over the past decade the idea has been extended to include even local jail facilities. In his work, Racial Matters: The FBI’s Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972 historian Kenneth O’Reilly provides a magisterial account of how the security apparatus of the US was reconfigured to surveil and subvert the Black Freedom Movement and the Black community more generally, further substantiating a deep symbiosis between colonial population centric approaches to warfare and the managerial methods of racial control institutionalized by the US government since. Though the frontal assault on Black America officially began in 1963, O’Reilly shows that the roots of the executive branch’s war on Blacks lie in the early 20th century. As early as 1917, state officials concluded that “second-class citizens would have second-class loyalty” and “dismissed every Black dissident as subversive, every criticism of American policy as un-American.” At the same time, the FBI took the position that Blacks were not worth protecting – so they dismissed white racial terrorism, lynchings or other kinds of violence perpetrated against the Black community. This trend developed into maturity as the century proceeded, reaching its apex during the height of the Civil Rights Movement and its transformation into Black Power into a full-fledged counterinsurgency war. Showing how comprehensive this war became in response to ghetto “riots” starting in 1963 and the March on Washington, O’Reilly demonstrates how the FBI came up with a plan to destroy Jim crow and the Black Freedom/Nationalist movement.

Importantly, O’Reilly notes how sexual anxieties modulated and gave substance to the rationale used to surveil and subvert Black leaders from Garvey to King Jr. to the BPP. Thomas Dixon’s trope of the Black brute rapist was firmly implanted in the mind of Hoover that “oversexed black men posed” a threat to white women and led him to rationalize the racial terrorist attacks on blacks by whites in the early 20th century as directly caused by “the numerous assaults committed by Negroes upon white women.” This also led Hoover to consider charging Garvey with the Mann Act. As O’Reilly explains, “Hoover tried to prove Garvey was an operative of the British and Canadian governments. He even pursued a “white slavery” case – a favored approach that may have reflected his own sexual anxieties. The White Slave Traffic Act, also known as the Mann Act, made it a federal crime to transport a [white] woman across state lines for immoral purposes.” Importantly, O’Reilly conveys how the vision of America that guided the mass surveillance of Blacks was premised on their threat to what administrators and policymakers saw as the “real America”—white America. This laid the basis for to surveillance becoming entrenched “in the governing process” as a whole and reflected in the population centric nature of the community surveillance programs headed by special agent William Sullivan’s Division Five (which spearheaded the COINTELPRO program). As O’Reilly writes, “with the Great Society consensus crumbling amidst burning cities and war in Southeast Asia, the FBI launched a new counterintelligence program, patterned after the Communist Party and Ku Klux Klan operations, that targeted civil rights movement leaders and black power advocates under a “Black Hate Group”
caption” but “[a]t the same time, the FBI targeted all of black America under a series of community surveillance programs.”

Tying the Great Society programs to the emergence of the police state, O’Reilly explains that “even before the riots and the antiwar movement” the FBI director found tolerance from President Johnson to “imagine dissent as a gigantic conspiracy led by his enemies”—giving counterinsurgency a proleptic orientation. Thus, the executive branch “centered on black activists and black people in general, emphasizing a black menace almost to the exclusion of the communist menace” and formulated a mass informant program termed “BLACKPRO.”

Under the program, “informants reported on “obscure community activists” who might “become agitators for violent protest”, and they allowed the Bureau to position itself “ahead of the growth of these groups and leaders and to record their development and demise.”

O’Reilly continues, explaining that in October of 1967 “FBI officials launched an even more pervasive informant program—a “Ghetto Listening Post” or a “Ghetto Informant Program.” He explains that “recruits for the Bureau’s “grass-roots network” included employees and owners of taverns and liquor stores, drugstores and pawnshops, candy stores and barbershops, and other ghetto businesses; honorably discharged veterans and especially members of veterans organizations; janitors of apartment buildings; newspaper and food and beverage distributors; taxi drivers; salesmen; and bill collectors” while also steering “these sources toward “Afro-American type books stores” to identify their “owners, operators and clientele.”

With a broad population-centric focus and expansive institutional basis, the government implemented counterinsurgency and used COINTELPRO as just one part of a long-range plan to prevent the growth and unity among Black groups, in addition to the rise of a charismatic leader—a messiah. Using the Smith Act (1940) and Reconstruction Era Statutes as the basis of their legal assault, their “basic policy was to divide and conquer” in the words of one Division Five executive. While Black Americans struggled for equality, “political violence…was a central part of the FBI response to that struggle—something located within the mainstream of government policy towards blacks” in the years to come.

**Conclusion**

The current US program of COIN and its location within the broader framework of the Global War on Terror – a global program of pacification geared towards the permanent repression of unruly populations within a singular domain (the entire planet)— and its validation by policymakers and members of the armed forces “as a panacea for fighting global terrorism” is qualitatively new, but not without precedent. It is a recapitulated framework from the US’s emergence as the dominant global power after WW2 and its move to master counterinsurgency during the Vietnam era and manage the global flow of threats to US security interests. Premised on the supposition that military force and operations function to protect vulnerable populations and the combination of “the use of force with the engineering of consent through the development of so-called information operations” US counterinsurgency functions as a spatial and temporal indeterminate aspect of modern liberal governance. Despite the evidence of its indeterminate scope, weaponization of the western humanist sciences and explicit congruency with methods employed by Euro-American empires since the 19th century, scholars have yet to conceptualize the managerial techniques of violence deployed by the US state to maintain the marginalization of the Black community as counterinsurgency. Popular approaches to inquiry into the phenomena
understood to be expressions of racism generate from a bedrock of gendered and feminist presuppositions that obscure the militaristic nature of white supremacy and sustain a large methodological gap between Black Power theorists (who demonstrates a grasp of the nature of counterinsurgent conflicts) and contemporary schemas of thought (whose basis is largely in identity politics and gender theory). Even more empirically oriented concepts which suggest a grammar of warfare fail to explore or theorize the frameworks of war employed to maintain the subordinate status of minority/racialized groups in western, capitalist, patriarchal societies since the colonial era going forward. However, various phenomena analyzed by theorists and scholars as instances of dehumanization (criminalization), state-sponsored repression, imperialism, (neo) internal/colonialism and arbitrary set violence imposed on the Black community are in fact expressions of a broader framework that has and continues to function as the organizing principle of western defense, military and policing apparati – counterinsurgency warfare. In the next chapter, I argue that a neglected feature of the counterinsurgency war waged on Black America and other formerly colonized/Third World populations are gendered narratives and ideologies that structure the information environment to prevent insurgency – particularly, Black feminism, women’s emancipation, etc. While Black Male Studies scholars have identified the conceptual indebtedness of Black feminist theory to racist criminology and white feminism, authors have yet to explicitly theorize the emergence of gendered ideologies like Black feminism as a stratagem of counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, the emancipation of dark women from their brutish and savage male counterparts has been understood by western powers as a marker of successful counterinsurgencies since the 18th century.
1 US Department of the Army, *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy Headquarters, 2014), 1-2
3 Khalili, “Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency.”
7 Porch, *Counterinsurgency*, 1
8 Ibid, 76
12 Lewis, *A Curse*, 5. Genocide Studies scholars have noted the deep historical roots of gendercidal targeting of a community’s adult males, usually accompanied by slavery and/or concubinage for out-group women and “root-and-branch” killings of the entire group. However, Errol Miller notes that New World (as opposed to practices in antiquity) inverted the historical tendency to value women as slaves and preferred African males for the intensive labor of the plantations. This male bias and the labor required in New World Slavery may have incentivized “root and branch” killings wherein the women, children and elderly connected with battle aged out-group males were killed along with them. Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006) 326. Errol Miller, *Men at Risk* (Kingston, JAM: Jamaica Publishing House Ltd., 1991), 131-132.
13 Ibid, 5
14 Ibid, 7
15 Ibid, 59
20 Newton, “Intercommunalism”, 3.


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Mills, Black Rights, 29.
cxi Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, 91

cvii Ibid, 91

daliv Newton War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America (Santa Cruz: University of California, 1980), 3

cxv Ward Churchill, To Disrupt, Discredit and Destroy: The FBI’s Secret War Against the Black Panther Party (Routledge, 2005).

cxvii Dalitso Ruwe, “The Colonial System Unveiled: Towards New Perspectives on Slavery” (Forthcoming).

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cxi Jackson, Soledad Brother, 22

cxvii Ibid, 28

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cxix Ibid, 50

cxx Ibid, 64

cxxi Ibid, 103-104

cxxii Ibid, 126

cxxiii Ibid, 141

cxxiv Ibid, 102

cxxv Jackson, Blood in My Eye, 9

cxxvi Ibid, 10

cxxvii Ibid, 28-29

cxxviii Ibid, 63

cxxix Ibid, 63

cxxx Ibid, 64

cxxxi Ibid, 71

cxxii Ibid, 73

cxxiii Ibid, 118

cxxiv Ibid, 138

cxxv Ibid, 145

cxxvi Ibid, 152


cxxix Rodriguez, White Reconstruction, 29

cx Ibid, 29

cxii Ibid, 51

cxiii Ibid, 104


cxiii Ibid, 134

cxiv Ibid, 134

cxv Ibid, 170

cxvi Ibid, 171

cxvii Ibid, 171

cxviii Ibid, 172

cxix Ibid, 172


cxiv This is by no means an exhaustive list. Though it is not as the same rate of violence of sexual violence against women, male sexual violence has been recognized “as regular and unexceptional, pervasive and widespread. See: Sandesh Sivakumaran, "Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict,” The European Journal of International Law 18 no. 2 (2007): 257.


cxvii Foster, “The Sexual Abuse,” 448.

cxviii Ibid, 448


cxx Boskin, Sambo, 15


cxxii Ajari, “Black Male Fungibility”

cxxiii Ibid, (Forthcoming).


cxxv Williams, They Left Great Marks, 23.


cxxvii Curry, “He’s a Rapist,” 133.

cxxviii Ibid, 144

cxxix Ibid, 144

cxxx Curry, The Man-Not, 88

cxxxi Curry, The Man-Not, 89


cxxiii Rodriguez, White Reconstruction, 182.

cxxiv Ibid, 182

cxxv Ibid, 201

cxxvi Curry, The Man-Not, 176.


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Chapter 3 – A More Complete Rupture: Contouring Black Male Studies as a Diagnostic of the Function of Black Feminist Theory as a Stratagem of Information Warfare or a Counter-Insurgent Ideology

“The most important cultural form for counterinsurgents to understand is the narrative...a story recounted in the form of a causally linked set of events that explains an event in a group’s history and expresses the values, character, or self-identity of the group...commanders should pay special attention to cultural narratives of the HN [host nation] population pertaining to outlaws, revolutionary heroes, and historical resistance figures. Insurgents may use these to mobilize the population.”

“Black “nationalist” militancy, however internationalist, Pan-African, and anti-nationalist, and despite anti-sexist, anti-homophobic, and gender-revolutionary embodiments, is presented in essentially negative terms by hegemonic gender and sexuality discourses which turn out to have a great deal in common with J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI, and the U.S. imperialist state. They leave the white power of the West unchallenged as they vilify Black Power wholesale. Black popular culture is equally negated, by extension. Neither sexism nor homophobia (nor nationalism) is criticized as a result so much as Black people’s cultural and political insurgence, real or imagined. [...] This is counterinsurgency. simply put. Blackness is presented as the problem, at bottom, not whiteness, colonial nationalism, or imperialism and its colonizing sexism, misogyny, heterosexism, and homophobia.”

“This enabled the colonial administration to define a precise political doctrine: "If we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the women; we must go and find them behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where the men keep them out of sight." It is the situation of woman that was accordingly taken as the theme of action [for counterinsurgency]. The dominant administration solemnly undertook to defend this woman, pictured as humiliated, sequestered, cloistered ... It described the immense possibilities of woman, unfortunately transformed by the Algerian man into an inert, demonetized, indeed dehumanized object.”

Introduction

Since the emergence of Black feminist theory and literature on the heels of the root and branch counterinsurgency waged on the Black Power movement in the late-1960s, it has been institutionalized as the fountainhead of Black Studies at the same time that the discipline was domesticated away from the revolutionary Black nationalism that spawned it, has “sustained African American cultural theory” in the academy and cemented gender and sex as the central tenets around which discussions and inquiry about Blackness is organized. That the stratification of Blackness on the basis of sex and gender stems from Black feminism’s commitment to
incorrectly characterizing Black Power, the Black nationalist aesthetic and its corollary Black Arts Movement (and virtually every Black male militant of that generation) as essentially sexist, masculinist and exclusionary while completely ignoring “where black women had played as creative a role as the men” has not motivated thinkers to move beyond any of its basic suppositions or challenge the assimilationist trajectory it has helped solidify in Black thought. Even acknowledgement of the fact that the institutionalization of Black feminist criticism functioned as an ideological rationalization of US counterinsurgency around the world by supplying the state with a veneer of multi-cultural humanitarianism through its “intra-racial frame” of reference centered on violence within the home and the proliferation of “pathological representations of Black husbands and fathers” to white audiences has not motivated scholars to examine the field anew or consider it alongside the enduring utility of women’s ‘emancipation’ ideologies that have justified population-centric managerial techniques of counterinsurgency around the world by the US security apparatus since the Cold War and colonial counterinsurgencies going back to the 19th century. Rather, the scholarly consensus since its emergence has been that Black feminism is unduly criticized and remains a reservoir of revolutionary potential that provides a register of “insurgent grammars” that offer a radical response to the emergence of the counterinsurgent US state and a framework whose characterizations of Black militancy (and Black male militants more generally) are ultimately necessary to correct the heteronormativity, misogynoir, and gender-based violence endemic in the Black community, the historical prefiguring of Black intellectualism as a male-centric endeavor and the broader intersectional invisibility of the suffering/murder and “radical agency and intellectual contributions” of Black women.

Rather than a simplistic repackaging of intersectional logics, Black Male Studies scholars have challenged these sanguine interpretations of the field and argued that Black men constitute a “cardinal defect” for Black feminism given theorists inability to conceptualize the group as anything other than a derivative of white masculinity and on this basis has endeavored to affect a theoretical rupture with this framework and the criminological caricatures on which it has depended to articulate the vulnerability of Black women to rape and domestic violence from men in the Black community. Towards this end, philosopher and Black Male Studies scholar Tommy Curry has spearheaded a decolonial intellectual genealogy of Black feminism. As he shows, the common-sense “understanding of Black male patriarchy through violence in intersectional analyses is a product of Black feminism’s reliance on subculture of violence theory and what came to be understood as racial-sexual stratification within racial minority groups.” Outlining the epistemological lineage of intersectionality, Curry explains that key tenets of Katherine Mackinnon’s dominance feminism was adapted and synthesized into the work of Kimberle Crenshaw – particularly the notion that “women are a class defined by their subordination in a patriarchal world ruled by men.” For Mackinnon, “woman” is “an entity that is forced to relate to the world not only through asymmetrical relationships with men but defined by their susceptibility to violence from men”, so violence that affects them “marks out their difference from other kinds of beings.” Specifically, the idea that “woman” refers to an ontologically subordinated group via domestic violence and rape by men is taken up by Crenshaw who does not see Mackinnon’s idea as an essentialist construct centered on white women’s experiences but “as a theory articulating the susceptibility womanhood has to violence such that all bodies designated by “woman” are also designated in relation to “men” and other bodies by the violence “women” experience.” The influence of this categorical logic and a commitment to subcultural (criminological) violence theory is evident in early Crenshaw’s work wherein she cites Williams and Holmes’s The Second
Documenting the long-range development of these logics in Black feminist and intersectionality theory more generally, Curry highlights the enduring reification of “the racist theory that Black male identity is primarily driven by the imitation of white masculine norms” in contemporary race-gender scholarship. The criminological roots of their claims, he explains, stem from subculture of violence theory – which was integrated into theory first by white feminists who praised its authors for their “ability to create a theory of lower class male culture linking physical and sexual aggression, gangsterism, and masculinity together.” The integration of cultural criminological theories of Black males by white feminists replaced those of previous eras premised on ethnological and eugenic caricatures. Though the work of Martin Wolfgang, Franco Ferracuti and Menachim Amir on subcultural socialization and intraracial patterns of rape laid the basis for an initial thrust by arguing that as an intra-racial phenomenon “rape is produced by the culturally peculiar notions of masculinity found within the Negro subculture”, criminologist Lynn A. Curtis’ contracultural theory solidified the replacement of the ethnological Black primal rapist with that of the (culturally pathological) intra-racial rapist “which would motivate the next several decades of feminist theorization in the United States.” Curtis’ analysis took Black masculinity to be a discrete entity of pathology due to “Black males’ distortion of white patriarchy”, which for him “best explained their higher rates of rape perpetration.” This deduction of Black masculinity as an endogenously pathological object broke with earlier iterations of subculture of violence theory by substituting causal explanations centered on socialization for one which posited a bi-conditional relationship between criminal behavior and poor Black males. As Curry writes, Curtis argued “that Black women had no role in the transmission of subcultural values of violence, because poor Black males – their masculinity alone—were the origin and cause of the disproportionate rates of homicide, rape, and sexual assault compared to other racial groups in the United States.” Though now a common refrain among gender theorists, Curtis was the first to envisage Blacks’ defective masculinity had its basis in the imitation of white patriarchy. The degraded and compensatory nature of Black masculinity explained its deadly dimensions. Though this criminological theory solidified a view of Black masculinity as seeking to reify white masculinity with deleterious implications on Black women and girls, it also laid the basis for the emergence of racial-sexual stratification theory and dominant views of Black patriarchy. Racial-sexual stratification theory sought to explain how “relationships between all the men and women of white dominant racial groups as well as the relationships in subordinate Black and Brown minority groups were determined by the act of rape.” Extending Curtis’ contracultural theory, Williams and Holmes prefigured masculinity as an idea shared between dominant and subordinate groups. Accordingly, this theory allowed greater “frequency of sexual violence, homicide and deviance in Black communities to be interpreted as the consequence of gender rather than racism and poverty.” Despite admission by its authors that there was “no empirical evidence” nor “any empirical validation for either the myth of Black male sexuality or that of sex as a compensatory behavior”, racial-sexual stratification theory has nevertheless become concretized in feminist explanations of patriarchy in Black, Brown and white communities as the same dynamic.

Against the “ideological determinism operating within the current gender paradigms” and the racist caricatures of Black masculinity proffered by criminologists and white feminists which “provides the substance for the categories being deployed in intersectional analyses of Black
manhood", Black Male Studies is posited by Curry as rupture. While the intellectual genealogy provided by Black Male Studies scholars thus far helps demystify the genesis of many of the basic suppositions and tropes (particularly the intra-racial rapist and racial-sexual stratification theory/Black patriarchy) still dominant in Black feminist theory and literature today, its push for a rupture will be more complete once the emergence and dependency of Black feminisms reliance on criminological theories and deterministic caricatures of Black males (and especially Black Power militants) are contextualized as an artifact of US counterinsurgency operations on Black Americans and other potentially dangerous populations in the decades thereafter. Towards this end, I argue that Black feminist theory has functioned as an ideological stratagem of the latest iteration of counterinsurgency warfare being waged on Black people in the US. Women’s emancipation and protection from “allegedly over-sexed, barbarous male enemies” justified the civilizing mission and the western colonial endeavor more generally. The broader discourse that undergirded colonial counterinsurgencies “designated the white male “superior” to the “inferior” dark male” and these logics motivated the institutionalization of rules and statutes that defended (white) women’s “honor”— a discursive strategy used by European (men and women) towards “undermining the enemy and weakening his legitimacy.” The first section will historicize the deployment of the twin caricatures of the native woman in need of ‘emancipation’ and the ‘primal rapist’/”barbaric racialized male’ in European colonial counterinsurgencies going back to the 18th century up to current global war on terrorism. Ethnological and colonial discourses centered on the ‘civilizing mission’ consistently prefigured nonwhite women as victims of their men as part of counterinsurgent war policies in Australia, Africa, Asia and the Americas. The logical consequence of women’s ‘emancipation’ was the mastery of social engineering: ensuring the expansion of the western state into the private domains of the colonial subject through the weaponization of native women as a ‘third force’ who would act as auxiliaries of white imperialism within the domestic sphere while also furnishing whites with cultural information that would ensure that the native’s social relationships could be more effectively penetrated by the counterinsurgent and manipulated accordingly. Today, the stereotype of the barbaric male enemy of the previous epochs has been transformed into the justificatory basis of the unprecedented war on terror, depicting Muslim males as sexually demonic and fanatical figures who seek “to repress and oppress women.”

Building on this historically substantiated tendency, the second section will argue that the defection of Black feminist literature from the Black nationalist aesthetic, its appropriation of criminological theory to understand Black maleness, the strategic function of the Black Buck and intra-racial rapist tropes to discredit Black militancy, and its role in furnishing whites with pathological caricatures of Black males must be understood within the broader counterinsurgent agenda of the US state since the 1970s and its reliance on modernization discourses of cultural pathology. The continuities between the colonial discourses of women’s degradation and Black feminist criticism are striking: Black women are understood by the latter as essentially domesticated subjects whose brutalization via intimate partner violence and ‘femicide’ can only be stopped by a more effective police state that can penetrate the domestic sphere on their behalf. Just as the role of women’s emancipation in colonial domains was aimed at delegitimizing insurrections in service of assimilationist politics, Black feminism has not only negated the iconography of the Black male militant (especially leaders of the Black Panther Party) fighting for national self-determination but also performed a function key to successful information (psychological) operations in modern counterinsurgencies: the targeting of the perception of
populations through narratives to deter fighting, induce surrender and secure ‘popular support’ for the counterinsurgent. In this way, Black feminism’s assimilationist influence on Black Studies foreshadowed the emergence of feminism and the infusing of womanhood and femininity with technological potential in aiding 21st century counterinsurgent victories for the US in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the globe. Scholars readily acknowledge that the US’s 21st century doctrinal formulation of counterinsurgency directly draws on colonial campaigns, but there is a failure to recognize that many of the approaches to ‘women’s empowerment’ in these modern campaigns have been institutionalized realities in Black America since the emergence of Black feminism’s christening as the penultimate domain through which the complexities of the Black condition are explored. Contemporary arguments in Black feminist theory demonstrate its enduring utility as a counterinsurgent ideology and a continuing reliance on (ethnological and criminological) tropes – the Black Buck (the militant nationalist patriarch), the intra-racial rapist, and that of the ‘counterinsurgent girl’ who’s education is institutionalized as a ‘force multiplier’ that will lead them to oppose the pathological culture of the males of their group and resist participation in insurgent (terrorist) activity – that rationalize the further penetration of ‘domestic spheres’ in the Black community by the counterinsurgent (police) state to secure the (public) visibility, liberty and bodily integrity of Black women and other non-prototypical bodies against the violent intra-racial hierarchies that facilitate their deaths.

Section 1 – Girls in the Front: The ‘Emancipated’ Dark Woman as the Embodiment of the Civilizing Mission

“One justification for Western colonialism was formulated in terms of protecting primitive women from various forms of social, economic, and sexual mistreatment. For over a century, Westerners had presumed that primitive women were overworked, sexually abused, or otherwise badly treated by men of their cultures.”

xxv – Louise Newman

“The women are submitted to unjust drudgery. This I believe is the case with every barbarous people. With such, force is law. The stronger sex therefore imposes on the weaker.”

xxvi - Thomas Jefferson

Despite the tendency of Black race-gender scholarship to read feminism into history as an egalitarian paradigm, western gender theory has been pivotal to the diffusion of stereotypes of nonwhite men (and women) that rationalized colonial-imperial state building. The late 18th century and 19th century paradigms of progressivism and ethnology (and then sociocultural evolutionism into the 20th century) used to interpret and understand the dark male savage understood his “customs relating to women, marriage, and the family as critical links in a never-ending chain of degradation” that resulted in their women being the subjects of their tyranny.xxvii Indeed, ethnologists of the 19th century argued that the primitive or savage dark males’ defective moral nature was best apprehended by his “‘frequently brutal’ and at best unsympathetic” behavior toward women. These behaviors were then posited and conceptualized as taxonomic characteristic of this creature.xxviii Generally speaking then, ethnologists and sociocultural evolutionary thinkers after them posited that (male) savages had the following features: being “dark-skinned and small of stature, unattractive, unclothed and unclean, promiscuous and brutal with their women, they worshipped the spirits animating animals or even sticks and stones—their smaller brains enclosing
and enclosed within the mental world” of the primitive man.xxix Thus, the white man’s burden of colonization was understood as offering not simply social development, but a moral imperative whose resulting civilizational accomplishment of patriarchy would secure the protection of (white and nonwhite) women “from the violent sexuality of the primitive male.”xxx Giving substance to the “tortured relationship between powerful white women and subjugated women of color,” there is ample evidence demonstrating how white imperialists (men and women) sought to forge a ‘civilizing’ mission to develop ‘uncivilized’ nonwhite people and cultures in Asia, Africa, Australasia, and North and Latin America.xxxi Key to this civilizing agenda were the “bodies and stories of women from ‘Other’ places” who were stratagems “used by colonial masters and their agents in the production and projection of difference, between the white and non-white [males], the barbaric and the civilized, the spiritual, the passive and strong.”xxxii The white man’s and woman's burden offered a “sense of mission to those primarily interested in colonies for a career; this included politicians, missionaries, social reformers and, indeed, academics”; thus colonialism was not just administrated by “the brave [white] knight who arose and fought to save women in the colonies, white women – ‘imperial ladies’ – also donned this cloak” by functioning as agents of enlightenment for dark women “whom they considered to be more badly treated than themselves” and in need of saving from both their backward cultures and dark barbaric males.xxxiii In their work, The White Woman’s Burden: From Colonial Civilization to 3rd World Development (2011), scholars Jawad Syed and Faiza Ali outline how white women functioned as agents of imperialism in a variety of colonial domains. Rather than being passive beneficiaries of slavery and colonialism, white British feminists constructed and instrumentalized the trope of a “powerless Indian womanhood” in the south Asian context to solidify their own roles as colonizers alongside men.

As Syed and Ali explain, for their own “emancipation and empowerment, different sub-groups of British feminists collaborated in the service of empire, reproducing the moral discourse of imperialism and embedding white feminist ideology within it.”xxxiv Once the ideological justification was complete, white British feminists spearheaded discourses around the practice of sati (wife burning) that led “to the enactment of a series of protective laws” of Indian women which “may be viewed as a typical case ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’” while ignoring what the testimony of women on this subject which “consistently reflected the actual adversities and societal expectations attached to widowhood.”xxxv In the African context, the “racialism of the white woman in the colonies comprised several components: over-compensation for an inferiority complex (relative to the white man), the desire to show her superiority over native women, and, in issuing tyrannical orders to native males, an unconscious urge to dominate” racialized males.xxxvi This tendency towards domination of racialized males was present in the Australian context as well. Wedded to the mission of ‘improving’ Aboriginal women’s lives, white feminists had a tendency “to speak for—rather than with—Aboriginal women” in their endorsement of female emancipation from the misogyny of racialized males.xxxvii White feminists functioned paradoxically due to their the fact that they “struggled for female emancipation at the same time they sought increased surveillance of women’s lives” and “argued for respect and positive appreciation of Aboriginal culture at the same time they stereotyped and deplored male dominance in Aboriginal societies” – effectively functioning to reify the colonial apparatus rather than disrupting it even when they called for an end to the state’s policy of forced removal of aboriginal children from their parents.xxxviii
In their treatment of the role of white women in settler colonization in the North American context, Syed and Ali are somewhat misleading. They begin in the 20th century in their analysis of the institutionalized chasm between African American and Euro-American women, writing that “the tortured relationship between women of colour and white women is also visible in public policy, where there is very little literature about the experiences of African American mothers and how their positionality may have a different view of motherhood ideology and gender” than those commonly held by whites. They also explain that white women were prominent in the “removal of American Indian children” in their roles as missionaries and reformers through discourses that focused “on the supposed deficiencies of indigenous mothers, the alleged barbarity of indigenous men, and the lack of a patriarchal family.” Enthused by the maternalist movement of the 19th and early 20th century white women eagerly carried out these policies of child removal in the US, serving “as surrogate mothers to indigenous children” and carving out “promising careers by participating in colonial projects.” As reformers, white women like Estelle Reel “considered it her moral duty to save Indian children from a ‘savage’ background and to raise and educate them instead in a ‘civilised’ environment” away from their families in white-run boarding schools. In campaigns of counterinsurgency against indigenous peoples like the Southern Ute in southwestern Colorado, officials at the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) employed methods reform the group’s sexual and marital practices through “coercive measures against them for violations of Office [white Christian] expectations concerning sex and marriage.” In accordance with colonial counterinsurgencies across India, Asia, and Africa, whites prefigured Indian women as a proxy force for the civilizing and morally improving the group. To actualize their potential, the OIA “hired Euro-American women known as field matrons to instruct Southern Ute women in Euro-American gender roles and homemaking practices” while “Southern Ute children went to government schools to learn how to think and behave as Euro-Americans.” As American historian Katherine M.B. Osburn explains, most of the punitive policies to impose “marriage and divorce laws” on behalf of the Office “were directed only at Indian men.” These policies imposed “fines and hard labor and withholding rations from the offending man until he dissolved the illegal unions.” They also “withheld rations from any man who failed to support his wife and children.” Though there was one penalty that didn’t specify or make any sex/gender distinctions, “in practice” these policies focused [punitively] on Indian men – implying they were lustful and irresponsible, would seduce and abandon women, and would not support their children.

At the same time men were stereotyped as sexually deviant, Indian women were targeted as a “force for “moral uplift” on the reservation” and consequently “agents, field matrons, and school personnel focused on women as the appropriate agents of change in sexual matters.” Foreshadowing modernization programs yoked to COIN tactics deployed in 21st century wars against terrorism, whites (men and women) in their institutional roles as administrators, school workers and teachers deployed a divide-and-conquer gender strategies which stem from the justifications of settler-colonial war through narratives and notions of girls who [after a western education and the adoption of gender norms] could overcome “the toxicity [or savageness] of their own communities” to facilitate surveillance of those communities and the destruction of the anti-Western elements therein.” Office officials argued for the “regeneration of the [Indian] race through the women,” and maintained that if the Office improved the morals of women “the men will follow.” Although, white feminists’ role in the colonization of North America was not limited to indigenous peoples, as Syed and Ali’s work suggests. In the postbellum period after the
US Civil War and the destruction of chattel slavery in its original formulation, white women aided in the internal colonization of Blacks in in the US by conceptualizing ‘women’s liberation’ via feminism as a political and evolutionary (ethnological) necessity – targeting Black men with dehumanizing caricatures that legitimized policies which inhibited their economic advancement and social mobility and thus energized white power in the US. As Tommy Curry explains, the freedom of Black men in the US south fueled the theorization of the modern gender concept. The threat of Black male citizenship “inspired ethnologists and feminists to give accounts of femininity that were vulnerable to [Black] male violence.” Building on 19th century ethnological thinking which converged on the brutality of the savage dark male towards women, white women established themselves as complementary constituents in the perfection of white patriarchy and thus as effective colonizers next to white men. Accordingly, they argued that they were “racially— hence, morally and intellectually—superior to newly enfranchised Black men” yet vulnerable to this entity through the perpetuation of “the idea that their virtuous womanhood was, in fact, the target of his savagery.”

Under this schema, the primal Black rapist was deployed by white feminists to justify the notion that Black men more generally were “unfit for freedom in the republic but also that their demise was necessary for the entrance of white women in the public square of governance.” In other words, “the entrance of the white woman into the (perilous) public from the (protected) home required white men to make the political space safe, or to execute the white woman’s primary social threat: the Black male rapist.” The consensus among white men and women on the threat of the Black primal rapist made lynching as a punishment for the crime of rape a “racial rallying point” for them as a tool of social control—empowering “white women to stand above the now unsexed (castrated) Black male as a patriarch and more man-like master who has conquered the savage Black male beast.” Like the demonization of racialized males by white women in colonial domains around the world, US (white) feminists also set out to convince the world “of Black men’s antagonism to women’s rights” as part of their broader program. As a result of this, efforts “to depict Black men as threats to the unifying force of white supremacy politically and the intimate lives of women, both Black and white, were popular throughout the South” during white women’s reaction to emancipation of Blacks from slavery and Black men’s push for suffrage. Because this trope of the Black male primal rapist worked within a dualistic framework which also positioned the women of the darker races as victims of these barbarous males, US imperialism was also fueled by calls to intervene in the darker portions of the world “to save primitive women from the violence of savage men.” As Curry writes,

“The influence of social Darwinism among white feminists and ethnologist presumed a linear developmental schema. The position of a civilization was often assessed by the status of its women, so it is not surprising that “one justification for Western colonialism was formulated in terms of protecting primitive women from various forms of social, economic, and sexual mistreatment. For over a century, Westerners had presumed that primitive women were overworked, sexually abused, or otherwise badly treated by men of their cultures.” While women from the darker races were not thought to be evolved women who could appreciate the need for homes and the evolutionary import of patriarchal order, it was the belief of suffragettes that primitive women need help from the civilized races to fend off the attacks of their savage male counterparts.”
Thus, the “alleged savagery of non-white men gave white feminists an imperial an internationalist cause” that supplied legitimacy to their presence within colonies. As American social historian Joan Jacobs Brumberg explains in her work, Zenanas and Girlless Villages: The Ethnology of American Evangelical Women, 1870-1910 (1982), the diffusion of ethnological schemas was by no means an endeavor taken up by a few social reformers. In fact, by the late 19th century the masses of American women embraced the study of ethnology “precisely because they were interested in the similarities and dissimilarities in women’s position in other cultures of the world.” Rather than something peripheral to the broader cultural milieu of the nation, the trope of the ‘battered native woman’ was at the core of the American cultural imagination by the dawn of the 20th century. As Jacobs Brumberg writes, American women “were familiar, if not conversant, with an entire vocabulary that implied the degradation [of dark] women: zananas and harems; the seraglio and the bagnio; female infanticide and sutee; concubinage and polygamy; bride sale; foot-binding and ear and nose boring; consecrated prostitution and sacrifice; bastinado; child marriage and slavery.”

Essentially, evangelical ethnology redeployed stereotypes that had already took root in the American mind during the antebellum period. Religious ethnology embraced by white women in the postbellum era simply “gave new credence to long-standing cultural observations” with a new “distinctive focus on women’s status and roles” in the darker portions of the world. Through a network of foreign missionary crusades led by white women via collections of sisterhood agencies that developed after the Civil War, ‘heathen’ atrocities were disseminated with a spirit that reflected the authors’ anxieties about their own social positions and middle class aspirations within the republic. Although, the content of these reports reflected a deep continuity with the ethnological tracts of French and British colonials conducting counterinsurgencies during the same period. Accordingly, the ‘savageness’ of racialized male populations and the development of a need for an Christianized emancipation from the “oppressions of the ‘ethnic religions’” were pervasive messages of missionary ethnology – catalogs of heathen activities perpetrated against women “constituted the central proof of the evangelical charge that heathens (dark men) were, by definition, misogynous.” As Jacobs Brumberg explains, white women had a “faith in the misogynistic core of all who were not Christian” and drove the production of their missionary literature on three general categories of heathen female debasement: intellectual deprivation, domestic oppression, and sexual degradation.

The absence of the Bible among native peoples substantiated all claims about the “general intellectual deprivation of heathens, be they female or male”, but observers consistently reported sexual differentials in literacy. The broad consensus on women’s lack of access to educational opportunities led to the establishment of schools for girls assuming a particular importance and being “touted as an important cultural advance” among missionaries. Within the domestic sphere, white women noted that in Muslim and Hindu societies, there were “set limitations between women and men outside of certain well-defined categories” – the zenana was among one of the limitations they noted. Zenanas were segregated living spaces for the use of women and the males they could see without violating cultural codes of modesty and varied depending on one’s social class. Wealthy individuals had separate entrances and luxurious apartments while among the urban poor “purdah might be observed by seclusion within a single room, by limiting male entrance to the house, or by simply hanging a curtain.” In addition to being stratified by class, zananas also incorporated different female age groups: among Muslims purdah restrictions...
began at puberty while among Hindus seclusion generally commenced with marriage. Within the zenana, “women engaged in traditional women’s work: cleaning and maintenance of house possessions, child care, food preparation, spinning, sewing, weaving, and other handicrafts.” Such exclusion intellectually degraded native women, missionaries argued, and its envisaging as a “place of indolence and monotony” led to develop into mainstay in ethnological literature whose penetration by white Christian womanhood (men could not enter) “became an important strategic implement in the evangelical arsenal.”

In this way, colonial counterinsurgencies included the instrumentalization of outgroup women as proxies for military victory and stratagems of social engineering – something many scholars assume is an artifact of modern campaigns in the US Global War on Terrorism (particularly in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan). Towards this end, white women’s ethnological missionary reports “attested to the authoritarianism of heathen husbands.” Additionally, they emphasized the “use of women as beasts of burden in agricultural areas of Africa and Persia” who were reduced to slavery by racialized men and subjected to labor more suited to animals than women. Domestic violence was also a central theme in these reports. According to observers, married heathen women were subjected to “abuse and wife beating” and murdered within the heathen family as a result of “male tyranny” that needed to be amplified due to the social invisibility of these women.

Alongside religious traditions that reinforced misogyny, domestic violence and intellectual deprivation, observers expanded their conception of dark “women’s oppression within marriage” based on their social invisibility and polygamy. Throughout Africa, the Middle East and the Orient this was posited as a need because these men never “introduced their wives to either friends or strangers” in social situations. Additionally, polygamy was a common leitmotif in the social construction of sexually insatiable racialized men. Polygamy also supported the belief that “Muslim males inevitably translated their financial success into sexual excess, meaning additional wives” who had to compete amongst one another and were thus deprived of “in their role as wives of the “domestic felicity” that was part and parcel of the Christian companionate marriage.” The generational relations among native women also “underscored a lack of common interest and even a duplicity” with their own oppression in the eyes of whites. For instance, accounts of orphaned ‘heathen’ girls adopted by the Methodist missionary groups and their physical mutilation, “primarily in the form of Chinese foot-binding and Burmese ear and nose boring, was also linked to the initiative of older women, particularly mothers.” Typical of 20th and 21st century feminist thinking, rituals and rites of passages for women were framed in a bifurcated manner: the women who did not want to embrace emancipation from these practices were the victims of a false consciousness and thus agents in their own oppression. As Jacobs Brumberg writes, among darker women “so the thinking went, the mother’s self-hatred and low expectations resulted in the passing-on of her afflictions” which explained their contribution as mothers who buttressed the “victimization of their daughters, insuring the cycle of female abuse continued.” As it relates to sexual degradation, the final categorical theme in this literature, reports were less straightforward. Victorian standards of “propriety among the missionary ethnologists and their
readership precluded overt discussion of sexual acts” so neither “heterosexual intercourse nor rape” were explicitly discussed.\textsuperscript{lxxxii}

Despite this cultural pretension, evangelicals created an impression of sexual degradation among heathen women through the relationship between native culture and the female life course. According to this logic, the “evangelical case for female sexual degradation centered on the early loss of virginity through child marriage, which in turn implied the loss of “girlhood” or adolescence as well as premature aging.\textsuperscript{lxxxiii} Periodicals authored by white female ethnologists “were uniformly preoccupied with the heathen practice of child and infant marriage” which functioned as “a popular justification for the missionary school program overseas.”\textsuperscript{lxxxiv} The consequence of child marriage “were to be found in the “girlless villages” of the Middle East and Far East” – a trope “signifying the perceived absence of female adolescence in non-Christian society.”\textsuperscript{lxxxv} In essence, “female vulnerability was seen as the consequence and the burden of life in a non-Christian society” which reduced women to that of “a scandal and a slave” whose subjugation had to be stopped for the civilizing mission to be accomplished.\textsuperscript{lxxxvi} Again, in Western ethnological thinking (and the eugenic and modernization thinking that emerged in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century), the status of women was/is regarded “as an index of national accomplishment” and social Darwinism fueled the claim that “the treatment of women in Protestant Christian lands marked the Anglo-Saxon race as further up the ladder of social evolution” and civilizational development.\textsuperscript{lxxxvii} This led white women to simultaneously reinforce white patriarchy at home while encouraging a critical perspective towards “women’s oppression” in the colonies. This combination of a Christian inflected foreign missionary crusade and the impetus to emancipate darker women from heathen males’ exploitation geared US public opinion towards imperialist ends with a veneer of humanism and moral rhetoric. Thus, rather than being an auxiliary influence, white women’s ethnology was “infused into the larger culture and ultimately, it helped to shape an American self-definition.”\textsuperscript{lxxxviii}

To reiterate, the deployment of women towards the effective colonization of the darker world was not unique to white Americans. The European colonial-empire building endeavor of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} century saw the emergence of counterinsurgent warfare tactics by the French and British that also spurred a surge to initiate white women as agents of imperialism and reinforce white patriarchy. In their monograph, \textit{French Women and the Empire: The Case of Indochina}, Marie-Paule Ha shows that French women were inducted into the life of the empire for military purposes through what Ha terms “the twin discourses of the colonial feminine mystique and the white woman’s burden”; a double mission that beaconed French women to claim their roles in the civilizing efforts of “both the backward races and the white enclave through the reconstruction of the metropolitan social and cultural habitus in the colonies.”\textsuperscript{lxxxix} Through an analysis of promotion and advice literature aimed at a female French audience during this period, Ha shows that the would-be female emigrant to the colonies took on the figure of a feminine mystique: “middle class wife heading off to the colony with her settler husband.”\textsuperscript{xci} With this, French women assumed a new social significance as an “indispensable collaborator of colonization in her capacity as wife and mother.”\textsuperscript{xci} Through her transplanting of domesticity to the colony, she laid the basis for a proxemic order that reproduced the empire and its citizens by having children and suffusing the metropolitan within habitus of the home. Part of her reproductive function was also her proper education of native women who were understood ethnologically as tending towards mimicry of the white mother who provided a proper example, the white woman was thus charged with carrying
herself with dignity and authority and delegating tasks to servants to ensure their proper development. As Ha explains, source materials outlining the art of imperial homemaking for British and French wives detailed that they were to “replicate the empire on a domestic scale – a benevolent, much supervised terrain where discipline and punishment is meted out with an unwavering hand.” With this new reproductive modality installed in the colonies abroad, the white family was now “the primary site of replication of the metropolitan socio-cultural milieu in the colony” and was “intended to serve a number of objectives, one of which was to sharpen the racial divide between whites and non-whites.” Another was to reify the logic of the civilizing mission, which required the French to “convince themselves as well as their colonial subjects of their own cultural pre-eminence if they were to impose their ways on the latter.” This was the impetus behind the large displays of “the colonial good life” – such spectacles of grandiosity “performed the highly political function of enhancing the colonizers’ dignity and prestige” by providing Europeans with more comfort in one’s life whether in Africa, Asia or the Antilles.

In addition to the discourse of the feminine mystique: which urged a domestic function which laid the basis for the emergence and stabilization of a gendered/civilized proxemic order in the colonies, the discourse of the white woman’s burden also emerged during this period. Thus, in addition to their aforementioned domestic role, “French women were also called upon to serve as emissaries of progress, ideally suited, because of their sex, to represent the superior morality of the mother country and exert a salutary influence on native societies.” The trope of the ‘native woman’ was crucial to this discourse. Both British and French colonists theorized victory against the native “on the assumption that a culture could not be properly understood “until the ‘domestic’ had been opened up to scholarly (or governmental) scrutiny.” In other words, like modern counterinsurgencies, colonial counterinsurgency depended on “knowledge of the domestic qua female realm” which would “serve as a conduit to governing a people” accordingly. Colonizers understood that native women “wielded a great deal of influence in the home” and strategized winning over the goodwill of dark women as a subterfuge to “serve the long-term interests of France” based on the supposition that in her role as wife and mother she could “prevail upon her husband or father; and better still, her child” and lead to the production of “future generations of men better disposed to accept the established [counterinsurgent] order.” In essence, the use of native women as proxies “of the imperial cause” gave white women a role to play cells to recruit them. Native women were thus prefigured as reservoirs of cultural information that could be exploited by white women to achieve long-term victory. With “her great charm, the coloniale would be able to “penetrate” into all feminine milieus, including the harem” and then extend the conquest of hearts and effect the task of civilizing the native society. As Ha makes clear, within the colonial imagination the native woman was a fixed image within a “tradition/modernity binary in which tradition was invariably associated with the colonized cultures and represented as stagnant, obscurantist and primitive.” Like white American colonists, European women were focused on the situation of native women and frequently cited “female circumcision, child marriage, and polygamy” as practices of savagery that victimized women in foreign cultures. To ensure its fulfillment throughout the French empire, the discourse of the white woman’s burden was formulated with enough plasticity to deploy the trope of the ‘battered and degraded’ native woman whose false consciousness inhibits them from being aware of their own oppression took shape with a variety of ethnic, cultural and religious particularities. Though, Muslim women assumed a prominence in the French imagination. As Ha explains,
“The privileging of this particular group could be partly explained by the longer French presence in Algeria. Subsequent to the establishment of civilian rule in the North African colony in 1870, the colonial gaze, Clancy-Smith points out, began shifting its focus to Muslim women, who gradually found themselves transformed into one of the most intensely scrutinized objects in official, scientific, and imaginative writings. In these narratives, the Arab woman was invariably represented as either an “object of luxury” leading a life of seclusion in the harem, or “beast of burden” slaving away for her husband. These Orientalist images of Muslim women were often uncritically recycled in the turn-of-the-century colonial literature written for women. For example, in a talk entitled “La femme égyptienne” given by Marguerite Clément, agrégée of the University of Paris, to a group of Egyptian women in Cairo, and reprinted in the BOCFF, the speaker tried to convince her listeners that they were in fact “prisoners” of their own social customs even though they might not fully realize it. Clément then proceeded to give them advice on how to improve their lot and seek their own emancipation. A similar diatribe on the brutal treatments of Moroccan females was composed by Commandant G. Reynaud for the same periodical. According to his expert opinion, irrespective of their backgrounds, all women in Morocco suffered the same “dreadful plight”: those from the lower class were treated as a “beast of burden” while the wealthy were nothing but a mere “object of luxury.” Living in “absolute ignorance,” they all accepted passively their slavery, which they thought to be “the normal condition of woman.”

The misogyny and tyranny of racialized men was by no means unique to Muslims. African women were also prominently portrayed as victims in the discourse of the white woman’s burden. African women were portrayed as “victims of the barbaric feudal traditions of their cultures” and because of this “were said to be totally lacking in knowledge of homemaking, childcare and hygiene.” On the whole, “only a few were spared the victimization discourse” and there was a consensus among advocates of the white woman’s burden that darker women around the world “would need to learn from their white sisters.” In the roles of mother, wife and elder sister, white women would provide education to the native woman and spearhead humanitarian interventions on her behalf. In the first instance, the curricula tasked to the white female colonizer was that of taking the “lead in providing hygiene and childcare education to native women.” While philanthropic initiatives (most of which were subsidized by the state) centered on “the plight of abandoned mixed-blood children”, particularly girls who were purported to be “reared too often by amoral [native] mothers” and thus “pushed by fate toward dire” circumstances. A third domain mapped out for action in the discourse of the white woman’s burden was that of healthcare. Not only could females seize on a lucrative career option as a healthcare worker, but medical care to the natives was thought to “also bring significant political payoff through the influence a French female physician could exert over the indigenous population” through the physicians’ penetration “into the natives’ private lives” and her acting “as their advisor on all familial matters” which would lead to their ultimate allegiance to the mother country. Thus, the entire premise behind the infusion of white women into the imperial endeavor was a military one that would actualize the civilizing mission: transforming the native woman into a “collaborator for Frenchification” or assimilation. Despite its humanitarian posture, the ultimate goal was to education and propagandizing of native women to “promote pro-French feeling among them” and the acquisition
of valuable information from them which would ensure the application of deadly force to those who posed a threat to white rule.\textsuperscript{cxi}

However, the 20\textsuperscript{th} century wars of decolonization spurred another rationale for the counterinsurgent conscripting of native women for French colonials: to negate iconography and potency of the female insurgent. As military historian Douglas Porch explains, as counterinsurgency theory took a more explicit population-centric trajectory in Algeria French tacticians explicitly argued for the embarkation of “a program of women’s liberation” to delegitimize the ALN/FLN.\textsuperscript{cxii} Citing the writings of David Galula, a French counterinsurgent theorist and tactician in the 45\textsuperscript{th} Colonial Infantry Battalion whose ideas went on to be heavily influential to US iterations of counterinsurgency in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Porch explains that his prescriptions stemmed from a recognition that “Muslim women were vital to the success of the insurgency” and appealed to them using the tenet that placed “French counterinsurgents, along with Simone de Beauvoir, in the feminist vanguard.”\textsuperscript{cxiii} The use of feminism as a counterinsurgent ideology by Galula was done with objectives similar to those of colonials in the generations before him: the penetration of the domestic space and social relationships of the colonized using the native woman as a proxy. As Porch makes clear, the deployment of Galula’s “divide-and-rule gender strategy” premised on women’s equality “would translate into girls’ schools, clinics, and army-sponsored sewing circles, which might prompt women to put in a good word for the French at the dinner table.”\textsuperscript{cxiv} The push to constitute native women as a ‘third’ or auxiliary force to negate the impact of women in the liberation struggle spearheaded by the ALN/FLN in the context was not one simply administrated by infantry battalions. Despite their ultimate lack of effectiveness in stopping the decolonization effort, these strategies stemmed from the heart of the colonial administration and sought to achieve the policy of integration promoted by the French colonial government through a host of reforms from the right to vote for women, changes in marriage and divorce law, and the appointment of three women as deputies in the French National Assembly – one of which (Nafissa Sid Cara) who became the first woman minister of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Republic. As historian Ryme Seferdjeli argues, these policies were applied to constitute native women as a “third force” in the French counterinsurgency who added legitimacy and support to “the policy of reforms and in the integration of Algeria to France, thus opposing the independence of Algeria” from colonial occupation.\textsuperscript{cxv} Additionally, the Seferdjeli notes the reforms almost “certainly constituted a response to the involvement of young Muslim women in the FLN.”\textsuperscript{cxvi} The right to vote, one of the first reforms treated by Seferdjeli, was a stratagem of French colonial policy from its inception. Despite the irony that “most women were illiterate and only a few spoke French”, the result of the first referendum in 1958 saw women overwhelmingly support Algeria remaining French.\textsuperscript{cxvii} Despite the “basic abuses the French subjected women to during the elections”, colonial authorities interpreted the results that women’s voting ‘yes’ was essentially them voicing aspirations “for a freer life and the desire for the emancipation of women.”\textsuperscript{cxviii} Thereafter, women’s emancipation was an objective that the French envisaged as “something that should be exploited” to achieve victory over the ALN/FLN.\textsuperscript{cxix}

Before the push for decolonization/self-determination by the ALN/FLN, the French government “had long neglected the education of Muslim girls.”\textsuperscript{cxx} However, the war effort spurred an increase beginning around 1958 when “school became compulsory for Muslim girls” and the French began to “promote the women’s workforce and to encourage women’s integration into the civil service.”\textsuperscript{cxxi} Female training education and integration into the labor force was
implemented to “open the way for a new lease of French colonial rule in Algeria” by applying propaganda (psychological action) “first in school, then through women’s movements” to undermine the popular support of the insurgents.\textsuperscript{cxxxii} Despite its egalitarian rhetoric, educational and workforce initiatives did little to challenge “traditional views by discriminating against women and confining them to ‘specifically women’s positions’” although it “offered women opportunities for the first time and provided them with greater access to education and employment.”\textsuperscript{cxxxiii} But marriage reforms went further. These reforms represented a step “forward in the integration of the Muslim in Algeria because it “interfered in the Islamic law that up to then regulated personal matters among Muslims.”\textsuperscript{cxxxiv} The core of these changes centered on “registration of the marriage at a registry office and on the appeal to a court to dissolve a marriage.”\textsuperscript{cxxxv} Despite the practical lack of impact of these laws on women – “French law, as far as matrimony and divorce were concerned, remained for the majority of Algerian women an institution that barely touched their lives” – the symbolism of these reforms were powerful because they reified the trope of the emancipated dark native woman saved by white patriarchy.\textsuperscript{cxxxvi} As Seferdjeli explains, gender relations were at the core of how the French rationalized the colonial endeavor “mainly because orientalists and colonial administrators have often employed the subordination of Muslim women as a legitimation for Western presence and interference” and “inequality between the Muslims and the European population” more generally.\textsuperscript{cxxxvii} In sum, these reforms aimed at “women’s emancipation were clearly heading towards an integration of Algeria into France” and instrumentalizing women as a ‘third force’ which pushed against national self-determination advocated by the ALN/FLN.\textsuperscript{cxxxviii} Within this paradigm, the veil was a “symbolic barrier between” the colonizer and the colonized: in the eyes of the French, “it was the last bastion of Muslim resistance – since it was regarded by Muslims as a way of protecting their culture and religion from the outsider – and its removal opened the way of reforming the status and condition of women.”\textsuperscript{cxxxix} Thus, the powerful icon of the assimilated, unveiled and ‘emancipated Muslim woman was weaponized to negate the burgeoning “image of the young woman fighter in the FLN.”\textsuperscript{cxxxi}

The characteristic trope of the assimilated Muslim woman was not only a significant component of French war policy but also personified by the first three Muslim women deputies (two of which had backgrounds in the assimilated native elite): Khadira Bouabsa, Rebiha Kebtani, and Nafissa Sid Cara. All three have some commonalities worth noting in that they all were unveiled and self-described as culturally French, advocates of the use of women as a stratagem to achieve a colonial victory and integration (as opposed to national liberation) and deployment by the French as “an alternative to the FLN.”\textsuperscript{cxxxi} Nafissa Sid Cara stands out among the three not only because she was the first woman to be a minister in the Fifth French Republic – exemplifying the ‘emancipated native woman’ – but also because she exemplifies the superficiality at the core of France’s commitment to women’s plight. Seferdjeli explains that her role in government could be understood as “purely symbolic”, though she did promote marriage reform, political advancement of women and education and employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{cxxxii} Family members echo this sentiment, revealing that Sid Cara herself felt that she was simply “being used” by the French and not integrated to have a legitimate impact on governance.\textsuperscript{cxxxiii} Nevertheless Sid Cara “symbolized what had been achieved since May 1958” and thus was “the embodiment of the civilizing mission in Algeria” and a stratagem in French counterinsurgent policy that foreshadows the deployment of women as weapons against the Black nationalist liberation movement later in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and the insurgencies of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the
In fact, the oppressed dark woman has been central to the global war on terror as a talisman that distinguishes western human and civilization from modern savage and dangerous male enemies. The repressive society embodied by the savage (Muslim) male delimits the existence of truly free women who can actualize their liberty “through physical display” which is verified by western-style “sexual autonomy and participation in consumer markets.”

Section Two – Making ‘Her’ Visible: Black Women Writers and the Humanitarian (Gender) Politics of US Imperial Counterinsurgencies during the ‘Long War on Terror’

“…as David Kilcullen (a contributor to the manual and former Senior counterinsurgency advisor for General Petraeus) first put it, 'covet your enemy's wife'. And, in this, the USA counterinsurgency practices conform to colonial practices and philosophies of war. As the architects of the French counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria and elsewhere, Galula and Roger Trinquier were strategists for whom victory was denoted by the virgin, as opposed to 'rotted', state of the population, one undefiled by insurgency and penetrable by the French. The inheritance of these theorists, writing almost half a century earlier, is apparent in the repeated homage to Galula in FM 3-24 as the most 'important', 'influential', and 'valuable' of predecessors. It is also traceable in the instructions delivered to soldiers in Afghanistan. Kilcullen writes, 'win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population'. Indeed, Kilcullen is echoing the instructions given by Galula to cleave Algerian women from the men by emancipating the women.” – Helen Kinsella

Despite claims that it is a revolutionary enterprise concerned with the intricacies of white racism/imperialism, the historical tendency to weaponize racialized women as proxies of white imperialism to secure victory in counterinsurgency campaigns has not been acknowledged in Black feminist literature. Neither have scholars whose works document the late 20th century institutionalization of the modern police (counterinsurgent) state in anticipation of the Black Liberation Movement countenanced the weaponization of gender as a technology of counterinsurgency in any theoretically rigorous manner since the Cold War period. Black feminist theoreticians and authors have been either dismissive, indifferent, or wholly naive of the possibility that their theoretical agenda is an auxiliary of a counterinsurgent campaign aimed at containing the Black population in the US since chattel slavery or the US imperial agenda more broadly since the doctrinal reformulation of counterinsurgency theory in the 20th century as a response the anti-colonialism of the Black Liberation Movement and the Third World using cultural discourses of modernization. Rather than critically analyzing the emergence of the US counterinsurgent state and its links to colonial iterations of counterinsurgency warfare, Black feminists have mapped an assimilationist trajectory: making clear that a principal aim of their literature is the undermining of the figure of the Black Buck – the mythological heterosexual Black male (nationalist) whose primary aspiration is a mimetic endeavor “to emulate and ultimately realize themselves as patriarchs next to white men.” It was this nationalist, “cruel, narcissistic, and short-sighted” archetype, they have argued, which functioned as an organizing principle of Black manhood in the 20th century and led to the subjection of Black women to “chattel-like roles” in the Black liberation movement in accordance with a “macho philosophy” that delimited inquiry into “the complexity and vitality of the Black female experience.” With the publication of
Ntozake Shange’s *for colored girls who have considered suicide/when the rainbow is enuf* and Michele Wallace’s *Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman*, Black feminists introduced gender and sex as the causal factors to explain the failure of the Civil Rights Movement cum Black Power Movement and as the basis of how Blackness would be discussed and studied in the public and the academy. Despite backlash against these writers by the Black community (men and women) who charged that “whites within the media were “using black women as a backlash against the black male’s dynamic assertion of manhood during the 1960s” as an extension of colonial COINTELPRO tactics, scholars have dismissed such a notion altogether – the ties between white feminists like Gloria Steinem who promoted Wallace’s baseless work and the CIA notwithstanding. Despite Wallace’s admission in 1990 that her work’s central notion of Black Power manhood as essentially misogynistic is “impossible to substantiate at the level of sociological, historical or journalistic data”, Black feminist writing (and Black feminist theory’s ascension more generally) inspired by it has been posited as an essentially positive development that has allowed Black women writers to declare their “independence like never before”, gain influence and “be seen and felt in areas of American society which have heretofore been barred to them” and wrest “recognition from the white literary powers that be” as the foremost interpreters of Blackness.

Any critical enquiry into these writers’ representation of Black men as abusers, rapists, ‘toxic’ and patriarchal simply registers as an expression of Black men’s “notion of supreme self-importance”, their “philosophy of manhood that relegates women to the back burner” and their jealousy that an unprecedented mass presence of Black feminist writers since the late 70s have been able to “enjoy a large popular audience” and “a heterogenous readership of both blacks and whites, women and men.” Unabashedly, Black feminists furnished this audience with writing that was and remains “critical of Black men” due to their patriarchal subjugation of women – using the tenets of racial-sexual stratification theory to emphasize the “meanness they (Black women) experienced and still experience at the hands of Black men as well as white men.” Accordingly, the subjugation of the Black woman within the race and racism from whites without form the cornerstones that have structured the theoretical trajectory of writing by authors in the tradition.

The renaissance of Black feminist writing has generated a perspective and landscape of global literature of women of color who are ostensibly centered on two main tasks: (1) the illumination “of white male and female racism and imperialism over dark people and (2) the “specific liberation/elevation of women of color from the fetters of both white and black male supremacy.” Characteristic of a continuity in the global feminist imaginary spearheaded by Black feminist thought and its emphases on the specter of the Black Buck, racial-sexual stratification theory and identity-based vanguardism in Black feminist thinking over the last four decades, the authors of the Combahee River Collective (CRC) Statement convened a fortieth anniversary retrospective that verifies the global reach of Black feminist thought. The panelists sought to answer three questions: 1. How has the CRC statement transformed feminism?; 2. What is the intellectual genealogy of women of color feminisms?; 3. What is the relationship among women of color feminisms?; In addition to these questions, panelists spoke on two key concepts that were advanced upon by Black feminists after the original statement: intersectionality and identity politics. In response to the first question, the panelists begin by making it clear that Black feminism is at the basis of a series of feminisms that have emerged around the world in the last forty years. For instance, panelists noted that Korean and South Asian feminists “have taken a chapter out of Black feminist work” and emphasized that the work of Francis Beale was key to their understanding and undergirds the original statement’s claim that if “Black women are free, it
would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the
destruction of all the systems of oppression.” Despite its lack of empirical validity, this
identity-based logic of female vanguardism has the status of mantra within Black feminist thinking –
centering Black women in one’s theoretical analysis is thought to be antecedent to “all of the
components of liberatory change” against “colonialism, racism, poverty and other oppressions” a
priori. It is this proposition, they explain, that has “laid the groundwork for Kimberle
Crenshaw’s elaboration of the theory of intersectionality” and thus has reshaped “feminist and
anti-racist scholarship and practice.” This periodizing of the logics of intersectionality (alongside identity politics) follows from the fact that both the original CRC statement and
intersectionality theory “begins with the experiences of US Black women” to properly analyze the
specificity of the “layered” historical and contemporary experience of Black women as opposed
“of offering an argument in favor of “hierarchies of oppression.””

In response to the second question, the panelists read the CRC’s original statement back to
abolitionists of the 19th century. Though they qualify that there are multiple genealogies in
accordance with various strands, most emerging in the late 20th century. However, in response to
the final question the panelists demonstrate how easily Black (and other women of color) feminist
thinkers reify and integrate gendered tropes that legitimize modern US counterinsurgency. The
panelists emphasize heterogeneity despite various feminisms being “inextricably linked” – most
notably, only native American indigenous feminisms emphasize national sovereignty as an
aspiration. Though this is qualified by a coherence with Black and other feminisms about the nature
of intraracial subjugation of nonwhite women by racialized men, particularly around “higher rates
of sexual violence and reproductive rights.” Said differently, despite many differences these
various feminisms converge on assumptions grounded in racial-sexual stratification theory (the
patriarchal functioning of racialized males intracommunally) and is “based on an awareness of
shared precarity.” But they also converge around the iconography of the ‘counterinsurgent girl’. Scholar Molly Geidel uses the term ‘counterinsurgent girl’ to refer to the enduring divide-and-conquer gender tactic that gives meaning to US/Western counterinsurgent military strategies which provides justification for the “never-ending, geographically unbounded killing of” (male and irreconcilable female) enemies of western governance. Rather than simply being a “victim in need of saving”, girls of the targeted population are encouraged to overcome “the toxicity of their own communities,” to “facilitate surveillance of those communities and the destruction of anti-Western elements therein.” Geidel explains that this tactic of “empowerment through self-surveillance” that implies the “outsourcing” of the native/racialized girls is evident in policy makers’ arguments which justify using girls’ own efforts to learn and flourish as props for military endeavors and towards the accomplishment of a new two-part “civilizing process.” As Geidel explains this new civilizing endeavor first takes shape as “first “a commitment to beauty . . . [ that] becomes the guarantee of her dignity and the substance of her claims to rights,” and second, “the wish to extend an enlivening beauty to others, to constitute a community of care among disciplined subjects who serve their own self-interest in sustaining the beautiful.” But, Geidel continues, “this enthusiastic desire to perform surveillance suggests” the acquisition of “not only postfeminist discipline, but also a drone-like sensibility” after having “been educated into alignment with Western forces, she fantasizes about an unlimited view from which she might appraise the anomalies of an entire population (“look over all the health problems of all the women in the Braldu”) in a way that mirrors the function of a surveillance drone.”
Accordingly, these gendered counterinsurgent strategy seeks to seize on narratives and discourses of resilience and extract surplus value from those engaged in “the work of self-overcoming.” Because a generative component of this trope is the production of literature and ‘resilience’ narratives from women of subject populations, these furnish white/western audiences with stories in which they overcome the ‘toxic’ men of their communities to achieve an education, complete the “civilizing process” and effectively function as an emissary of (western) progress thereafter in their own communities. The need for this figure is so insatiable that even women who try to subvert this narrative end up being incorporated by its logic when their stories are consumed by westerners. Malala Yousafzai is proof positive of this dynamic. Despite the narrative structure of her book deviating from one of resilience that stabilizes the iconography of the ‘counterinsurgent girl’, her writing has still been weaponized towards this end in US media as a reflection of the “overcoming” telos of the counterinsurgent girl or the educated girl in whose name the US fights. To accomplish this, Yousafzai’s indictment of the US role in funding Pakistan’s intelligence agency and the Taliban forces who attacked her are abstracted away from in the American popular imagination. As Geidel writes, Yousafzai “refuses to perform the antipolitics of the “educated girl” narrative, withholding from Western readers a smooth story of overcoming damage and thus a story of “our girl” and “our” values.” However, Yousafzai story is the prototype for an educated ‘counterinsurgent girl’ narrative that is not only reflected in fictionalized popular media representations of her as an aspiring western subject with an “imperious drive for beauty” but also as one who “will call for the drone strike that kills (the males) of her family” for her own freedom. But the diffusion of the this trope is not limited to the western/US publishing industry or white controlled media networks. Black feminists as panelists and authors of a joint statement on the impact included in this reconfigured Yousafzai to emphasize the necessity of global feminism as a unified vision based “on the awareness of a shared precarity” which should be used as a conduit of “education, micro-lending, pacifism and sovereignty.” In her own words, Tiffany Willoughby-Herard explains that the central premise of Yousafzai’s work *I Am Malala* is one which her US students already agree: “Of course girls should be educated. We have what they lack and they should have it too.” Like western media representations of Malala, Willoughby-Herard abstracts Yousafzai’s indictment of the US counterinsurgent state as partly responsible for corrupting the local institutions of her home country and replaces this with a portrait and “story of a girl who is fighting for her rights to go to school then getting shot and not giving up” – the story of the counterinsurgent girl.

However, modernization theory must be explicated to properly understand the role of Black feminism’s theoretical agenda as a stratagem of US counterinsurgency, its embracing of the iconography of the counterinsurgent girl, its basic tendencies towards pathological (criminological) cultural representations of Black Power masculinity (and Black males writ large) and the US’s doctrinal mastery of counterinsurgency theory to subvert anti-colonial threats to its hegemony around the globe. Modernization theory introduced a new model of development into counterinsurgent thinking that would function as the procedure by which “peoples still laboring under a traditional way of life would acquire modern institutions and outlooks, the best guarantees of stable and free [liberal] societies.” In this “process American institutions would provide the models, and American experience would serve as the inspiration.” During the decade that this view of social development matured (the 1960s) “as a response to the fourth wave of revolutions
Americans had to confront” roiling within Black ghettos and “across the face of Latin America, Africa, and Asia”, it also “carried forward the long-established American views on race” through a recasting of “the old racial [eugenic] hierarchy into cultural terms supplied by development theorists.” Thus, the new iteration of counterinsurgency saw the emergence of a change in vocabulary that did not alter the “bedrock of American thinking on race” which understood Black Africa as occupying “the lowest rung” of the international order, “just as black ghettos represented the lower reaches of American society.” It is from this framework of cultural developmentalism (modernization) that the theorization of criminological theories of Black masculinity emerge and Black feminist criticism developed to function as a link through which Black women’s writing integrated its logics to produce theories and narratives that proliferated “pathological representations of Black husbands and fathers” to white audiences. Clarifying the relationship between modernization discourse and counterinsurgency, sociologist Stuart Schrader explains that it “conferred upon the United States the exceptional, self-justifying capacity to be the overall arbiter of other lands’ closeness of fit with its model” of civilization. Thus, in the “contest between universality and particularity, the United States would be the judge, since it was the bearer of universality.” With a new globe-spanning applicability, US counterinsurgency “as policing, was the gritty practice ensuring that the model of modernization applied” by integrating cultural information to “provide a basis for counterinsurgency action” with more effectiveness just as colonial iterations of counterinsurgency used ethnology to penetrate the social relationships of the native and manipulate the population accordingly. Scholars’ attempts at conceptualizing white counterinsurgency against Black people have heretofore simply failed to critically analyze gender discourses stemming from the academy as part of this phenomenon. When they have introduced gender/feminist discourses as a theme, readers are expected to believe that Black feminism is a ultimately an unprecedented and groundbreaking development – despite its historically unsubstantiated demonization of revolutionary Black nationalism, unabashed proliferation of caricatures of Black men, the documented fact that modern US counterinsurgent policies of the 20th and 21st centuries integrated and improvised on colonial counterinsurgent doctrines conducted by Britain and France before World War II and the enduring utility of gender as a mechanism to delegitimize and fracture insurgent groups by counterinsurgent forces around the globe.

For instance, professor of law William Chin conceptualizes American society as one characterized by “a history of enduring conflict between Black insurgents and white counterinsurgents” born from the military conflict that was chattel slavery. As Chin writes, slavery is best understood as a counterinsurgency imposed on Black people by whites whose goal was mastery over them as chattel property. This aspiration produced a racial conflict at the chassis of American society that like other counterinsurgency campaigns around the world evolved in a “protracted and arduous” fashion. Any successful counterinsurgency “requires “bringing all instruments of national power to bear”” and in line with this reasoning US counterinsurgency doctrine “recognizes the law as a “powerful potential tool” to use against insurgents.” The dichotomy between conventional and unconventional foes supports Chin’s proposition to understand the structural relationship between Blacks and whites as asymmetric or counterinsurgent-insurgent conflict. As he explains, the US was spawned out of an initial conflict of an “insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle between colonial insurgents combating the counterinsurgent British Empire.” But after independence, this nexus became one between “white insurgent colonists who were the counterinsurgents battling black insurgents who sought
their own freedom” from slavery. The crafting of an oppressive legal regime was a primary method towards the success of the white counterinsurgency. A counterinsurgent agenda is evident in the founding documents of the nation. The US constitution “entrenched slavery” and “obligated the national government to assist states in suppressing domestic disorders—including slave insurrections.” The Declaration of Independence echoes this orientation towards Blacks, voicing a fear of Black rebellion in its accusation of King George of exciting “those very people [the imported slaves] to rise in arms among us” in an early draft. Chin takes a comprehensive and long-range approach to substantiate his view. Dividing American history into three broad periods: (A) the slavery period; (B) The Civil War Period; (C) The Post Civil War Period. Importantly, the Chin notes that the “outsourcing of the rendition of Blacks” by other Africans to procure slaves on the continent; the constant and systematic oppression of Black revolt; and the dividing and conquering of slaves on plantations throughout the south – particularly the undermining of kinship groups, the constant recruiting of “blacks to spy on other blacks” and the fracturing of the slave population through the imposition of a “hierarchy of personal servants, household servants, drivers, and field workers” who were all pitted against each other – as evidence of the application of doctrinal tenets of counterinsurgency being evident throughout the enslavement period.

The Civil War period was a turning point in operations because the slaves were able to function in a conventional military force. Through their participation in the Norther (US) army, “Blacks were able to generate a conventional force” and participate what “can be considered as the “greatest and most successful slave revolt”” in US history. But this victory was not decisive. In the postbellum era, the same US army conducted pacification campaigns of Blacks (internal colonization) in the US south, while the federal government sat by and watched the emergence of racial cleansing riots, lynchings, and spearheaded intelligence operations and police modernization against Blacks. All of these phenomena are part of counterinsurgent doctrine published in unclassified US military manuals. As Chin explains, racial cleansing riots can be understood as an iteration of what US counterinsurgency doctrine calls the “clearing” method to combat an enemy. This entails the removal of “enemy forces from an area by capturing or forcing the withdrawal of insurgents.” US counterinsurgency manuals also argue that effective operations also include “the application of paramilitary actions” like those applied to Black people by the KKK. Police are also a cornerstone of counterinsurgency. The development of an “effective police force “is of the highest priority” counterinsurgency tasks according to US manuals. Within the context of the US counterinsurgency on Blacks, Chin explains that local policing is buttressed by an FBI which has “engaged in a pattern of systematic sabotage against black activists” and a military force organized to help “overcome the black insurgency” and carry out counterinsurgent missions. Lynchings typify the outright killing of insurgents while detention and prison infrastructure has become so focused on controlling the Black population that the US has imprisoned “a larger percentage of its black population than South Africa did at the height of apartheid.” With an overarching focus on protecting the populace, US counterinsurgency doctrine has developed within the country to use the war on drugs as a platform to militarize the police and conduct “a war on blacks” through federal policy. Chin reiterates that counterinsurgencies understood as long-term conflicts to emphasize his position before arguing that the “enduring and pervasive” nature of anti-Black racial violence in the US is one more feature of this racial conflict – exemplified by the stereotyping of “Blacks, especially Black males as violent and dangerous.” However, outside of this singular mention of misandric
caricatures that drive the application of negative stereotypes towards the Black population, Chin’s analysis is does not treat any of the gendercidal processes which drive the counterinsurgent operations against the Black American population. Not only were Black men targeted with specific gendercidal practices during the chattel enslavement period, but in the decades thereafter Black males were understood as threats to the social order that required “the implementation of policies of direct force to keep him at the margins” and “ensure that he does not encroach” upon the dominance of the white power structure. Neither does Chin dedicate any attention to the gendered strategies of counterinsurgency which draw on colonial counterinsurgency doctrines which advise the disbursal of funds to co-opt neutral or friendly women “through targeted social and economic programs.” Attention to how colonial era divide-and-rule gender strategies continue to inform modern US doctrine is key not only because they emerged during the COINTELPRO programs deployed to crush the Black Liberation movement (particularly the Black Panther Party) but also because of how they continue to target women to “be reshaped, altered, even ‘liberated’ into understanding that the US forces are there for their benefit” by inserting the counterinsurgent “into the private spheres where women dwell” through the use of feminist ideologies, female combatants and education initiatives toward this end.

In *The Other Side of Terror* (2021), Erica Edwards argues that the making of US empire as a way of life throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries (what she terms the ‘long war on terror’) has transformed Black writing. While Edwards doesn’t ignore gender or the rise of Black feminist writing alongside US counterinsurgency as themes of inquiry, she merely reifies the doctrinaire narration of Black nationalist thinking and aesthetics as essentially misogynistic, patriarchal, and degenerate that has typified Black feminism since the publication of Wallace’s *Black Macho.* Consequently, the central thrust of her text expects readers to simply believe that the basic tenets of Black feminist theory and literature have spawned fundamentally ‘insurgent’ writing that overtook a Black nationalist imaginary of the 20th century which prefigured Black women as “responsible for reproducing the nation and, at the same time, the bearer of every pathogen—social, political, biological—imagined to be the source of a larger, cultural pathology.” In this context, Black women were only left to “fulfill one of two functions in the struggle: the loyal supporter in a struggle that essentially belongs to the Black man or the betraying Jezebel literally in bed with power.” On Edwards’ account, Black feminism overtook a Black heteropatriarchal nationalist tendency in Black thought that diminished the “gender and sexual heterogeneity of Black life”, circumscribed “the scholarly and popular histories of social movements” and ultimately limited “the imagination of resistance to anti-Black terror.” Mapping the shifts in campaigns of US counterterrorism/counterinsurgency both at home and abroad – beginning in 1968 with the FBI’s COINTELPRO war against Black nationalists and proceeding through the War in Vietnam, the Iran Hostage Crisis, the first Gulf War and the contemporary War on Terrorism after the 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington DC. Additionally, Edwards argues that poetry, fiction, television and film during this period reveals what she calls the imperial grammars of Blackness. In her own words, these grammars are “the cultural production and public discourse linking the rationalization of US imperial violence abroad to the US’s public sphere’s manipulation and incorporation of Blackness as the sign of multicultural beneficence.” Inverting the historically substantiated logics in counterinsurgent campaigns over the last two centuries (in the Global South and Black America alike) as affairs wherein any male is “fair game”, Edwards argues that Black men’s assimilation into US empire via patriarchy – not their intense targeting by the US security apparatus – has buttressed US
domination. As she writes, Black feminism has spearheaded the imagining of “a kind of social life that refuses the imposition of militarized security as the necessary precondition of human being-together” while the “glorification and performance of Black heteropatriarchy” had the effect of smoothing “the incorporation of Blackness into the signs of empire, and in turn lubricated discourses of US exceptionalism” against which Black feminists have “long honed a collective critique of” to ultimately refuse “the invitations of US empire.” When considered alongside Edwards’ admission that Black feminist literature was domesticated at the same time that it was institutionalized as a “lifeline for Black women writings struggling in the US publishing industry”, her reading of this tradition as insurgent and one which ultimately reversed the trends that “by 1975 had jeopardized the survival of black studies” falls flat. In her own words, Edwards explains that the domestication of Black feminist criticism has two meanings:

“I mean “domesticated” here both ways: the public discourse about Black women’s writing often isolated that work from the leftist, often lesbian Black feminist collectives that supplied the context for its production and its reception, taming its challenges to white heteropatriarchy; and the same discourse limited the terms of discussion to a national, intraracial frame centering around matters of home, specifically, what many readers saw as pathological representations of Black husbands and fathers voiced by pathological, overly masculine women.”

To be clear, Edwards’ periodization of counterinsurgency as the fountainhead of US imperialism and social control in foreign and domestic domains is cogent. However, she neglects the fact that Black feminist criticism arose as a dominant theme in Black studies at a juncture in its development that facilitated the divorcing of the discipline from the Black Power nationalism from which it spurred. The instantiation of this assimilationist schema “chilled out” Black thought and solidified the survival of Black Studies premised on its “mitigating nationalism and dropping community education” from its agenda. There is also a gap in Edwards’ analysis based on her apparent lack of understanding of how western counterinsurgency doctrine has historically developed the tactic of cleaving “women from the men by emancipating the women”, triggering a “battle of the sexes” within subject populations to achieve victory or how FBI officials reified this strategy by deploying stereotypes of Black Panthers as men who were brutalizers “of women and children” to rationalize the application of military violence. With this, her argument that Black feminists pioneered a diagnosis of this modality of control (via June Jordan and Gloria Naylor) is hardly persuasive. This claim – which much of her study is dedicated to proving – ignores that fact what she identifies as Jordan’s insurgent grammars are rudimentary recapitulations of Black nationalist theories of empire posited decades before her and Naylor’s respective publications. Police repression, the function of prison in US society, US imperialism (foreign policy), surveillance, the historical development of fascism in the US, and the necessity of women’s equality are dominant themes in the writings produced by male Black Power militants of the 1960s –particularly from revolutionary Black nationalists who emerged after the assassination of Malcolm X. To maintain that the elaboration of these ideas be understood squarely within the emergence of Black feminist writing as if they weren’t engaged more rigorously by Black nationalists decades beforehand reeks of intellectual erasure. More troubling than all these gaps though is Edwards’ reliance on the trope of the intraracial rapist and racial-sexual stratification theory to sustain her argument and her outlining of these as significant components of Black writing today. Despite a thematic focus on counterinsurgency/counterterrorism, she demonstrates
more than anything else the enduring significance of these suppositions and tropes of Black manhood in the contemporary Black feminist imaginary and thus its functionality as an artifact of counterinsurgency doctrine as opposed to being an ‘insurgent’ development. Grounded in the broader pluralization of Blackness away from essentialism and masculinism assumed to be the inheritance of Black Power and “into the world of proliferating intraracial difference”, Black feminist criticism has spearheaded a transformation in Black writing and cultural production and guided it towards a new agenda. In her own words, during “the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Black feminists predicted, nurtured, and advanced the post-civil-rights critiques of racial essentialism based in mainly literary value that often suffused the rhetoric of the Black Arts Movement, the critiques that would become commonplace not only in Black feminist discourse but, more importantly for us, throughout critical discussions of African American literature, in the decades of new Blackness that followed.”

Again, Edwards position is that the “troubling” of Blackness christened by Black feminist criticism and its characteristic trope of the intraracial rapist has positively shifted “contemporary African American literature as an event that brings into focus the post-civil-rights fractures within and between Black American subjects and communities, and, to some extent, between Black Americans and oppressed peoples of color around the world.” It does so in its reflecting of the “historical conditions between post-Blackness and postracialism and to recast those historical conditions within a longer history of Black intimacy with state-sanctioned terror and state-sponsored projects of counterterror” on the basis of its exploration of “generational gender-sexual crises” that emerged after the Black Power movement. However, the tenets of racial-sexual stratification theory, the trope of the intraracial abuser/rapist and the reification of counterinsurgent ideology through the propagandistic demonization of Black male militancy isn’t limited to the domain of Black feminist fiction literature. Using intersectional invisibility as a precept, Black feminist theorists have shifted from their initial focus on domestic violence towards the phenomenon of intimate partner homicide or Black ‘femicide’ to articulate Black women’s vulnerability to Black males. The continuities between (colonial era and modern) western counterinsurgency rationalizations of emancipating the sexually degraded dark woman whose liberation requires the penetration of the native’s social relationships and ‘domestic’ spaces by the western state and the arguments for Black ‘femicide’ are conspicuous. Seeking to explain the phenomena of intimate partner homicide as Black ‘femicide’, Black feminists posit the primary causal factors precipitating the murder of Black women by Black men as the victims’ gender, the intraracial sexual hierarchies of the Black community and the indifference of the criminal justice apparatus of the state towards Black women rather than poverty, structural inequality or ecological dynamics. To resolve this problem, they argue, requires amplification of the Black woman’s subjugation by men within the private sphere of the home and a more effective police/carceral (criminal justice) system to aid her when in need. In her work, Shatema Threadcraft has advanced this argument by taking a position that problematizes the “centrality of necropolitics on the contemporary political stage” which points out how a concentration on “the slain body privileges how cis [Black] men die, how young men die, how able-bodied blacks die over all other black dead.” After reflecting on what she takes to be successes of #BlackLivesMatter, Threadcraft expresses concern that the movement will ultimately fail Black women by its lack of intersectional understanding of the ways the bodies of dead Black women are produced. The rise to fame of the BLM organization, for her, is evidence that issues of state power’s intersecting with the Black male body is something that the broader Black community and the nation more generally seeks to
understand – but the “disproportionate sexual assault, community violence, and public sexual aggression” experienced by Black women is ignored because the state rarely kills Black women. Hilary Clinton’s “racial justice” platform in the 2016 presidential elections and the social media discourses driven by “Black Twitter” are offered as proof of a broad concern for dead black male bodies. Despite the concession that Black women experience less lethal violence from the state, Threadcraft suggests that the intraracial stratification of Black women causes issues for BLM and “how the movement can respond to existing hierarchies and prejudices in the wider Black community regarding the meaning of living, which holds fast to bodies, even in death.”

The claim that there is a lack of concern for the dead who are not cis-gendered and male is posited to highlight limitations of the BLM movement even further. On Threadcraft’s account, it cannot account for the Black community’s intraracial contradictions (its homophobic and sexist tendencies) which renders non-cis male bodies invisible in death. As she writes: “[F]emale embodiment (as well as gender-nonconforming embodiment and trans embodiment) “heightens the risk that any given subject’s dead body will not be counted, will go unrecognized.” As a result of this, those concerned with violence against Black women “must take seriously the significant distinctions between homicide and femicide” to properly amplify the issue and “what that will mean regarding an intersectional approach to confronting black femicide.” As opposed to adopting a “what happens to men happens to us” approach, Threadcraft argues that attention must be paid to the public/private divide as a focal point for organizing around the death of Black women. By amplifying the private domain, the deaths caused within it can benefit from the same technologically enhanced witnessing that has spurred activism in response to the police murder of Black males in the public and challenge the intraracial stratifications within the Black community. The witnessing of state violence in public has allowed the #BLM movement to inject meaning into the bodies of the male dead. But, to ensure that Black women are given the same concern, intraracial hierarchies will have to be addressed. Despite the intersectional politics of the #BLM, Threadcraft maintains that that their reliance on narratives that challenge state power reinforce intraracial hierarchies and the notion that Black male death matters more than those of nonprototypical Black people. As she writes, Blacks face issues of equality “not only of relative white indifference to black death, of whites caring less about murdered blacks, but also of black men and women caring less about murdered black women, of cis blacks caring less about slain trans blacks, and so on.” Accordingly, cis-heterosexual “blacks also tolerate high levels of harassment and violence against trans blacks, just as they tolerate the disproportionate murder of trans women of color.” Another factor that sheds doubt on the efficacy of the “what happens to the men happens to us” approach taken by activists who have attempted to spearhead a conversation about female victims of police violence for Threadcraft is that state power is rarely applied with lethal force to Black women. But given her commitment to identity politics, this recognition doesn’t motivate a methodological shift towards population-centric or structural paradigms of analysis. Rather, Threadcraft argues that to properly center Black women requires de-centering how state violence facilitates “death and the production of dead bodies” through the imposition of deadly force on marginalized populations. If such a focus is maintained, the state must be de-emphasized as a purveyor of cruelty because it is often “not the biggest threat of violence in a woman’s life.” So, indictments of the state must be tailored towards criticisms of its “inaction in the face of violence against” women as opposed to a “death-distributing mechanism” instead. This view of the state as a passive actor in the perpetration of violence against women includes attention to sexual assault by agents of the state and a disentangling of the
androcidal logic homicide by distinguishing femicide from it analytically. The former, Threadcraft avers, is largely a male phenomenon with “men more likely to be killing in what are quite literally more “spectacular” circumstances, in ways that are public and in view.” While the latter occurs in private and though it happens at lesser rates than male-victimization of homicide, femicides are thought to occur “in the home, that space long considered a man’s castle.” Within the context of murder more generally, Threadcraft notes that it is a phenomenon segmented within the Black race. Blacks are “six times more likely to be murdered than whites” while “black women are killed at higher rates than white men and have been for decades.” Going further, Threadcraft argues that “a black woman is killed by her intimate partner every nineteen hours”—this dire situation means that Black women must challenge the state to act on their behalf more effectively. The deaths that occur, in Threadcraft’s estimation, “are the result of police (and prosecutorial and judicial) inaction in response to violence against Black women.” Despite her reliance on racial-sexual stratification theory and the supposition that Black men are patriarchs who delimit the humanity of nonprototypical Black people in life and death, she clarifies that Black femicide is not a problem of “black male deviance” and tacitly acknowledges the causal role of socioeconomic measures like unemployment in the perpetration of IPV in the Black community. Nevertheless, she maintains that at the core of the black femicide problem is state inaction that once remedied would lead to not only the amplification of the private domain into the public but also to the more effective administration of police agencies that will protect black women’s lives.

In a more recent work, Threadcraft reiterates this argument. In *Making Black Femicide Visible* (2021), she claims that four reasons undergird the invisibility of the violence levied against Black women. These are: the fact that the violence occurs in private, the violence is associated with sex, sexuality and intimacy; the violence is not amplified within the public or counterpublic spheres; and lastly, that activists have not been successful in constructing narratives regarding this violence. Contrasting the public killing of Black men and the private killing of Black women, Threadcraft writes that the disproportionality of men’s experience of lethal violence next to women does not harm this group. Rather, it provides them with privilege even in death because the spectacle that accompanies the killing of men in the public spurs outrage which play “an important role in building communities, spontaneous counterpublics” and also sustain “blacks as a political people.” The killing of women does not achieve such ends. Next to this, women are thought to be killed “because of intimacy” or “killed because they are women.” This connection to issues of sex, sexuality and intimacy makes amplification of these murders in the public realm important because they “do not fit the standard frames of antiblack violence, where, for example, cop A murders black man B” and thus falls on deaf ears. Again, the problem with the state from a female perspective is the fact that the state does not protect black women adequately. Rather, established laws function to “only protect white women and do that at the expense of increased” violence towards black women. Black women’s intimacy with Black men also cause them to be hurt “because police are looking for black men with whom the women are in close proximity, black women are hurt and black women are killed because they ask for help in their relationships with black men.” Ostensibly, a more just world would include a police force that targets Black men more effectively without harming black women or those who need police to intervene these men. But as long as this is the case, Black women’s deaths won’t be “dramatized in a way that mobilizes the kind of reforms that have to happen in order to protect more life and make police more accountable.” As it relates to the problem of amplification,
Threadcraft laments the lack of media coverage of deadly police violence experienced by Black women as opposed to Black men. These biased narratives have implications for social media discourse and as a result explain the fact that though “hashtag}$ are often used to name black victims of police brutality, not one specifically mentioned a Black woman or a girl” between August 2014 and 2015.\textsuperscript{cxxxiv}

The lack of media coverage ties into the final reason posited by Threadcraft to explain the lack of visibility of violence against Black women: dramatization. The dominant racist violence is indifferent to story-telling and narrativization that are imposed on Black women “at the hands of intimate partners, but also to the violence they experience from members of their households with whom they are not intimately involved, community members and state agents” which includes “physical assaults and sexual exploitation by police officers and the assaults they are subject to in state custody.”\textsuperscript{cxxxv} Additionally, because their victimization is not recognized as a gender-based phenomena and does not “go on to become a spectacle” in the public, it is not as central to the Black community as other forms of harm like lynching.\textsuperscript{cxxxvi} The centrality of lynching to the people-hood and collective political mobilization of the Black community has given these dead black male bodies and the suffering they experienced “meaning and worth, purpose and pride” while “black women downplayed the private violence they experienced” and made their victimization tertiary to the broader collective memory and the “people-building” stories of the race.\textsuperscript{cxxxvii} Taken together, Threadcraft urges the reader to understand the four problems of (in)visibility of Black femicide to be instances of epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression is defined as “persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s to knowledge production.”\textsuperscript{cxxxviii} Those who this impact have their “epistemic agency infringed upon” where agency is “understood as “the ability to utilize persuasively shared epistemic resources within a given community of knowers in order to participate in knowledge production and, if required, the revision of those same resources.”\textsuperscript{cxxxix} There is also a distinction between reducible and irreducible epistemic oppression. The former follows from “social and political oppression” while the latter “follows from features of epistemological systems” and can “only begin to be address through recognition of the limits of one’s overall epistemological framework.”\textsuperscript{ccxl} On Threadcraft’s account, Black women “suffer from both reducible and irreducible forms” which “the hegemonic lynching story has increased” by ensuring the exclusion of Black women from “becoming equal authors of the values by which we live.”\textsuperscript{ccxli} This narrative – which privileges the death of black men by white racists – leads to the actualization of Black women as democratic citizens being occluded due to their inability to “be equal authors of the narratives that drive social movements” which “help bring about genuine recognition” through the “expansive exercise of their capacities for speech and storytelling.”\textsuperscript{ccxlii} By telling their stories of intraracial victimization, Black women would be able to tell stories that not only lead movements but also engage in people building that “will help to change the balance of the symbolic order” which will “address the problem of amplification and end our tendency to discredit what black women, those who survive and those who do not, say.”\textsuperscript{ccxliii}

The femicide argument has several drawbacks. To begin, the erection of a static binary of the public/private divide not only “ignores the multiple ways in which the public and private are linked in contemporary society” to urge for a more effective criminal justice apparatus to protect Black women from abuse but in doing so reifies a basic tenet of colonial and modern counterinsurgency doctrine: legitimizing a discourse of Black women’s subjugation which
rationalizes the application of military-police force of “the white male “superior” to the “inferior” dark male” for the protection of these women from physical and sexual assault as an ultimately democratic-humanitarian (assimilationist) endeavor. Women and their gender-based victimization by racialized males remains important as a means for de-legitimizing the racialized male enemy in counterinsurgencies along with furnishing counterinsurgents with cultural information from these women. Such information allows counterinsurgents to weaponize dark/nonwhite women as proxies of social engineering who, rather than being marked for death, are conceptualized as “captives in their own homes” that are potential allies and conduits through which counterinsurgents can more effectively map the social networks upon which potential insurgents depend and mobilize the population towards their interests. Again, this weaponization of culture has been a dimension of counterinsurgent doctrine since the 19th century. Since then it has been informed by the “tropes of savage, brutal men” and their victimized women, centering “gender and women in the tactical discussion so that counterinsurgents can more properly ascertain the broader social-political landscape which is key to victory – using native women as a ‘force multiplier’ who oppose the cultural malformations thought to fuel insurgency and thus ensure western popular support which is ultimately the objective given that counterinsurgent conflicts boil down to “a lethal struggle to control the population.” Moreover, because Black femicide argues that Black “women are killed because they are women” it solidifies a biologism: a causal logic that demands an understanding of Black women’s victimization that derives from her biological designation as female.

However, this causal relationship is not verified by the empirical data. Despite the supposition that IPV or sexual violence victimization is a phenomenon primarily perpetrated by men against women, reciprocal or bidirectional violence has become a fairly commonly recognized pattern among scholars who study this issue. In the US, “sexual assault and rape/made to penetrate violence among men and women have been found to be practically equal.” Though, over a “twelve-month period, Black men report the highest rates of contact sexual violence, which includes rape, being made to penetrate, sexual coercion, and unwanted sexual contact.” Contrary to the gendered assumptions inherent in the femicide argument, women were identified as “most of the perpetrators of sexual violence against men.” Similar patterns of perpetration and victimization are also found in data sets collated on intimate partner violence. While “Black women report disproportionate rates of intimate partner violence victimization over a twelve-month period (9.6%), Black men report higher levels of domestic violence victimization (11.6%) among groups of men and most groups of women in the same period.” Systematic reviews of IPV perpetration from a gender neutral view demonstrates that “female perpetrated abuse in intimate relationships is at least as common as male abuse, often extends to the same degree of severity, can result in serious negative outcomes for male and female victims, and seems to reflect a common set of background causes.” Findings contradict the primary characterizations of IPV so starkly that clinicians have questioned “the utility of focusing on partner abuse preventions and interventions solely on male aggression.”

For instance, studies have found that about half of all cases of IPV was bidirectional and that “a woman’s perpetration of violence was the strongest predictor of her being a victim of partner violence.” Among violent relationships, social psychologist Daniel J. Whitaker avers that nearly half (49.7%) were characterized as bidirectional. Among those characterized as nonreciprocal or unidirectional, “women were reported to be perpetrator in a majority of cases
(70.7%), as reported by both women (67.7%) and men (74.9%).”

In their analysis of frequency, men’s perpetration did not vary by reciprocity (bidirectionality) while for women there was a higher frequency in the context of bidirectional and unidirectional violence. Said differently, reciprocal violence was about as common as nonreciprocal violence in their national sample; and violence was perpetrated “more frequently (by women only) and was more likely to result in injury when it was reciprocal as opposed to nonreciprocal.” Even more surprising for the authors given the trope of the male batterer in the American imagination was that “among relationships with nonreciprocal violence, women were the perpetrators in a majority of cases” while “women who were victims of nonreciprocal violence experienced less violence and a lower likelihood of injury than did women who were victims of violence in reciprocally violent relationships.”

Comprehensive reviews of bidirectional violence in intimate relationships reflect this pattern as well. A comprehensive review of 48 studies on the topic conducted since 1990 led by clinical psychologist Jennifer Langhinrichsen-Rohling revealed that bidirectional violence was common “across all types of samples” (from population-based to criminal justice), which suggests the role of women in violent relationships is important to consider even if all aspects of women’s perpetration of IPV are not symmetrical to men’s perpetration of IPV. Langhinrichsen-Rohling’s findings also show that the ratio of unidirectional female-to-male compared to male-to-female differed significantly among samples by race, with higher rates of female-perpetrated unidirectional violence found in four of the five sample types considered; competing explanations have been advanced to explain these results but have not been tested. Importantly, the different rates of bidirectionality were also found among different racial groups: with Black couples having the highest. As they explain, “only 50.9% of IPV of IPV was bidirectional according to white reporters and 49.0% of IPV was bidirectional among Hispanic reporters. However, among Black reporters, 61.8% of the reported IPV was bidirectional.”

Language is also advanced to explain these results but have not been tested. Importantly, the different rates of bidirectionality were also found among different racial groups: with Black couples having the highest. As they explain, “only 50.9% of IPV of IPV was bidirectional according to white reporters and 49.0% of IPV was bidirectional among Hispanic reporters. However, among Black reporters, 61.8% of the reported IPV was bidirectional.”

Looking at unidirectional perpetration, the ratios of female-to-male as compared to male-to-female violence fly in the face of the dominant suppositions defended by gender theorists/Black feminists which suggest Black men oppress Black women via an intraracial patriarchal perpetration of IPV. As they report, the ratio “was 2.75 for Black reporters, 2.26 for White reporters, and 1.34 for Hispanic reporters.” They qualify their findings by pointing out that though women’s and men’s rates of engagement in IPV are similar and that women’s rates often exceeds men’s, the impact (resulting in injury) of IPV perpetration are different depending on the gender of the perpetrator. Nevertheless, researchers surmise that the matriarchal cultures of Black Americans may be an explanatory factor undergirding the high rates of bidirectionality and female-to-male violence. Thus, contrary to the tendency towards explaining intimate partner violence occurring in Black communities using the idea of patriarchy/male-domination stemming from racial-sexual stratification theory, intimate partner violence in Black communities is “found to be exceptionally defined by bidirectionality.”

The previously outlined comprehensive review is not an anomaly. Social science and public health research findings have consistently demonstrated that in the case of domestic violence and intimate partner homicide in the Black community, “there is no fixed perpetrator or victim: Black men and women can be both simultaneously and often are” – thus “Black IPV is rooted in mutual victimization and violence” in patterns that “socialize men, women, and children into cycles of mutual conflict in which perpetrators cannot be clearly marked.” Black families and couples consistently report more intimate partner violence than other racial groups. As psychologists Shareefah Al’Uqdah, Casilda Maxwell and Nicholle Hill explain, findings indicate that Black men and women are “victimized by intimate partners at a rate 35% higher than persons...
of any other race.”

Between 1993 and 1998, Black men “reported alarmingly high rates of IPV victimization” and “were 62% more likely than white men, and about 2.5 times more likely than women of other races” to become victims of IPV. In their analysis of risk factors, male gender is not reported as a causal mechanism. They remark that “African American couples are not inherently more violent than White American couples, but rather social factors” like poverty and neighborhood variables are primary factors. In one study they review for readers to emphasize this point, “there was no significant difference between the rate of IPV for African Americans and Whites who resided in disadvantaged neighborhoods.” After a review of the available literature, they argue that the issue of IPV in the African American community is simply not “attributable to one singular cause, but is a product of multiple factors” that include: low socioeconomic status, disadvantaged neighborhoods, unemployment and experiences of racism.

Reiterating this conclusion even more forcefully, findings from a study inquiring into household poverty and nonfatal violent victimization between 2008-2012 authored by the Department of Justice demonstrate a deep relationship between these structural factors. The authors of the report highlight the fact that overall patterns of poverty and higher rates of violent victimization was consistent for Blacks and whites. In their own words, the “rate of intimate partner violence for persons in poor households (8.1 per 1,000) was almost double the rate for low-income persons (4.3 per 1,000) and almost four times for high-income persons (2.1 per 1,000).” Regardless of the economic measure used (both income strata and federal poverty measures were employed), “the rate of violence decreased as households moved above the federal poverty line or income level increased.”

Research into the fatal instances of intimate partner violence and homicide in the US also casts doubt on the racist stereotypes of Black men and gendered logics on which the femicide argument depends.

While Threadcraft rightly points out the fact that Black women have higher rates of homicide victimization than white males to motivate her claim that Black women’s victimization is tied to sex, sexuality and intimacy, a deeper look at demographic patterns in homicide victimization (which fatal intimate partner violence is a subset of) reveals that Black males have a unique relationship to this phenomenon that is obscured by the gendered logic of femicide. According to the CDC’s most recent national violent death reporting system (NVDRS), “[H]omicide was the leading cause of death for non-Hispanic Black males aged 15-34 and the second leading cause of death for Black boys aged 1-14 years.” During the period observed (2019), Black persons “accounted for 60.3% of male homicide victims and more than half (55.5%) of all homicide victims.” Accordingly, Black males “had the highest rate of homicide” compared to all other racial and sex groups (44.5 per 100,000); this rate was highest among all males and seven times higher than American Indian women (who had the highest rates of homicide victimization among females at 6.9 per 100,000) and almost seven times the rate of Black women (6.4 per 100,000). Indeed, Black men and boys as a population are in the midst of a “birth to homicide death pipeline” that has “dramatically increased after the civil rights movement (1950-1960), Black Liberation (1970) eras, and during the enactment of federal criminal justice policies” under the Nixon, Reagan, Bush and Clinton presidencies. However, homicide (in the public or through IPH within the home) is not a leading cause of death for Black women. As Tommy Curry explains,

From 1998 to 2013, homicide ranked second to unintentional injuries for young Black women age fifteen to twenty-four, while Black women within the average
age of marriage (twenty-four to forty-four) were less likely to die from homicide generally. Among Black women age twenty-four to forty-four, homicide ranged from the fourth to seventh most likely cause of death; thus, contrary to the idea that Black men are dangerous as spouses and intimate partners, the threat of homicide as a leading cause of death diminished among Black women in this age group.\textsuperscript{cclxxiv}

Black men’s vulnerability to homicide is not unique to public instances of violence. The causal logic which grounds the notion of Black femicide is further contradicted by the evidence available on IPH in Black communities. As opposed to Black women being unilaterally targeted with violence in the home historically, research shows that Black males have often been victims of fatal IPV. CDC data indicates that between the years of 1981 and 1998, the rates of IPH victimization among males of all races were lower than female: except for Blacks. Not only did Blacks report the “highest overall and sex-specific rates”, but among them alone did rates of victimization of males exceed rates of females.\textsuperscript{cclxxv} To be exact, the rate of victimization for Black males was recorded at “1.16 times the rate among black females.”\textsuperscript{cclxxvi} Though they observed sharp declines in IPH victimization among all race-sex groups during this period, the authors of the report were not clear on why the rates of victimization were higher for Black males than females or why “white males were at approximately the same risk as white females for IPH in the early 1980s.”\textsuperscript{cclxxvii} But they do proffer socioeconomic differences as a possible explananda to reconcile these differences. A more recent analysis of NVDRS data find that Black men and women remain overrepresented as victims of IPH. In fact, Black men were almost half of IPH victims among males (45.4%) and in gross numbers were victimized more than women who were racially identified as Hispanic and other.\textsuperscript{cclxxviii} Thus, the notion that Black women are subjected to a ‘femicide’ within the Black community fueled by a targeting of them based on their gender is simply not verified by the available evidence. Rather, homicide caused by IPV is a public health crisis “for both men and women, with women and Black men at particular risk.”\textsuperscript{cclxxix} Another pitfall of the Black femicide argument is its reliance on the intersectional invisibility framework. Under this schema, Black feminist and intersectional theorists hold a paradoxical view of dehumanization and violence wherein the “violence against women in patriarchal societies is evidence of their lower status and domination under patriarchy” while “the greater violence against racialized men in the same society are not evidence of dehumanization, but their privilege (visibility) as men.”\textsuperscript{recclx} Threadcraft’s reliance on this theoretical methodology is evident in her insistence that Black men’s hegemony over accounts of racist violence impedes the amplification of Black women’s suffering in the home and contributed to the epistemological oppression of Black women as human subjects.

So, while Black men’s victimization imparts them visibility and privilege as prototypical subjects of state violence, Black women’s suffering is positive proof of their subjugation (even if it is not experienced by them at the same propensity or extent as Black men). Black Male Studies scholars have pointed out not only this contradictory view of violence as privilege for racialized males posited by intersectional invisibility theorists, but also how its emphasis on a rhetoric of liberal recognition has confined Black men “to being thought of as perpetrators” and a “female as victim perspective” organized and sustained the logics and legitimacy of the #BLM movement despite its reactionary (capitalist) organizational model compared to older forms of Black nationalist centered armed self-defense politics of the 1960s and 1970s, but also the logical consequence of the intersectional invisibility methodology given the literature’s concession to the
Subordinate Male Target Hypothesis posited by Social Dominance Theory: that the kinds of violence stemming from racism, genocide or colonialism can “somehow be assuaged by the dominant groups/genocidaires giving positive recognition of the less threatening (nonprototypical/gender nonconforming) members” of the targeted outgroup. As I have argued previously, there exists no evidence that conflicts which feature the degree of violence experienced by Black communities or other groups subject to counterinsurgency warfare tactics are “assuaged by cultural representation of any variation of non-prototypical subordinate group members (or any other group members for that matter).” Rather, the “extensive literature analysing the central role of visual representations in creating mythologies of racialized masculinity” argues that hypervisibility of these men is in fact “an indication of social degradation.” Moreover, despite Threadcraft’s understanding of public visibility as the basis of an efficacious social movement like #BLM, the organization’s successes has not introduced any structural mitigation of Black men’s exposure to state violence. As a demographic, Black males are still subject to deadly police violence at the highest rates among all race-sex groups and the broader patterns of police shootings have not been reduced in the aftermath of the #BLM movement but have instead steadily increased. In fact, between 2005 and the conviction of Derek Chauvin for the murder of George Floyd Jr. “only five non-federal law enforcement officers were convicted of murder in an on-duty shooting and not had the conviction later overturned” at a later time. While the intersectional feminist #BLM organization (along with other assimilationist Black political groups) have amassed hundreds of millions of dollars from corporations and foundations to confront systemic racism and the murder of Black men by agents of the state, working-class and poor Black communities have been commodified and left to defend themselves in the wake of the organization’s retreat from the forefront of social protest.

Even more damning is that the supposition by intersectional invisibility theorists that prototypicality (via androcentrism) reifies a privileged social positionality for males of racially subordinated groups who are then targeted with lethal violence on this basis is contradicted by psychological research. Colin Holbrook, a psychologist who researches racial stereotyping found that in whites, “Black or Hispanic men are envisioned to be physically larger, higher in aggression, and lower in status.” Said differently, whites have a negative psychological association between threatening or potentially violent Black males and social status. Thus, “outgroup men stereotyped as dangerous are judged as dangerous and having tendencies toward aggressiveness contrary to status.” For her part, Threadcraft takes this supposition even further than those who introduced intersectional invisibility as a theoretical methodology by arguing that ‘hegemonic’ representation of Black men as victims of state violence and authors of narratives to combat this violence has given Black men such a high status that such narratives form the cultural-autopoietic seedbed of Black Americans as a people. On her account, the stories which Black men have advanced as victims of racial (especially lynching) and state violence have been those that have spearheaded a broader endeavor towards “people-building”; a process she argues that Black women “have not fared well in” contributing to towards their own ends due to their low status in the community. But the assertion that Black Americans are a people forged out of victimhood is simply ahistorical. Victimhood has not driven the project of people-building for Black Americans as an ethno-cultural or political group. Rather, resistance against the power relations of the chattel slave system “in its multitude of forms has helped create African American people” as such.
laid the basis for African descended peoples to conceptualize a new basis for their own humanity which acquired substance through music, oral and folk culture and military rebellion – it was this newly forged “consciousness and identity which would be in turn the ultimate negation of that structure of values” installed by the plantation system which transformed and continued to dehumanize them as raw labor or ‘niggers’ in the years after its eradication.

Threadcraft’s lack of emphasis on “black male deviance” notwithstanding, the ostensibly “insurgent” long-range development of Black feminist theory has been premised on a concretization of the figure of the intraracial rapist/killer in the black imagination: a criminological and compensatory conception of Black masculinity which functions to stabilize an intraracial hierarchy which subjects Black women to domestic, sexual and femicidal violence on the basis of Black patriarchy. On the whole, the biologies sustaining Black feminist theorists envisaging of patriarchy in the Black community are simply unmoved by the empirical evidence on IPV or the social science findings and attitudinal studies on Black males since the mid-1980s which demonstrate not only that Black men are “are by far the most liberal sex-race grouping in America” but also that they “do not share the same definitions or hold the same cultural expectations as white men” concerning sex, love, marriage and manhood.

The signification of Black males as physical and sexual threats to (Black and white) women do not emerge out of a vacuum, they reify a counter-insurgent logic that took a new trajectory following the doctrinal reformulation of counterinsurgency doctrine by the US in response to the global anti-colonial revolutions of the late 20th century using a cultural (as opposed to eugenic-scientific) grammar to rationalize imperialism and provide a vocabulary to a white supremacist worldview that is essentially the same as those that ethnological and eugenic human sciences justified in the years before it. With its reductionistic demonization of Black militancy/nationalism as a priori masculine (thus exclusionary) and an appetency towards a more benevolent patriarchal state that will protect Black women from gendered violence, Black feminist theory has solidified an assimilationist agenda in Black thought and positioned gender and sex as the tenets around which Blackness more generally is understood in the academy and in the broader public. In doing so, it has foreshadowed the emergence of gender/feminist ideologies in 21st century US counterinsurgencies in the ‘Global War on Terror’ as subterfuges through which populations can be pacified and governed in accordance with Western conceptions of freedom, individual liberty, and human security.

Conclusion – The Enduring Utility of ‘Women’s Liberation’ for Pacification in 21st Century Counter-Insurgency Warfare

US Counter-insurgency doctrine was reformulated in the late 20th century and again in the 21st century. In both cases, the US security state demonstrated an impressive capacity for institutional learning – explicitly drawing on colonial era tactics of empire-building and population-centric pacification to subvert and anticipate the emergence of insurgents. Accordingly, the targeting of women with education, social and economic incentives to function as the ‘counterinsurgent girl’ who will counteract the influence of anti-western radicality in her population remains central to US counterinsurgency doctrine and praxis. As international relations scholar Laleh Khalili explains, counterinsurgency not only has a long history as the central strategy for western colonial expansion but “is now considered the most significant and frequent form of warfare to be fought across the world and into the future.” While killing as a force of social regulation is still a prominent aspect of these operations, “developmental language and agendas
such as ‘a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope’, psychological and 
information operations, the use of local proxies, and ‘the integration of civilian and military 
efforts’ including aid and governance in order to ultimately win over a largely uncommitted 
civilian population’ have all been foregrounded in new ways.\textsuperscript{xcvi} Like previous eras, the new set 
of practices which aims “at winning the hearts and minds of civilian populations and persuading 
them to support the counterinsurgents has a particularly gendered character.”\textsuperscript{xcvii} This gendering 
takes place through a tripartite framework. As Khalili writes,

“At one level, counterinsurgency itself is presented as the opposite of a more 
mechanised, technologically advanced, higher-fire-power form of warfare. Given 
that the latter is often coded as hyper-masculine, the former is considered feminine. 
Second, the very object of population-centric counterinsurgency would be 
perceived as feminine, since the focus of counterinsurgency is the transformation 
of civilian allegiances and remaking of their social world. On the one hand, in the 
binary categorisation which forms the basis of mainstream discourses about war, 
civilian (feminine) is the opposite of combatant (masculine). On the other hand 
those spaces and subjectivities which regular warfare destroys as a matter of side 
effect rather than intent, or which are considered ‘collateral’ to the main job of war-
fighting in conventional warfare, are demarginalised, brought into focus, and, in 
some senses, made central to the work of military and civilian counterinsurgents. 
These spaces and subjectivities are perceived by both the military and the civilians 
as gendered in particular and specific sorts of ways. Finally, the practice of 
counterinsurgency itself is predicated on ‘telling’ (combatants from civilians, 
hostiles from friendlies etc.), invading, organising, fighting, detaining, 
transforming, and destroying on the basis of gender (cross-hatched with class and 
race).”\textsuperscript{xcviii}

In other words, civilians are gendered as feminine and interpellated into the battlefield 
through the construction of physical and human terrain about which detailed cultural knowledge 
is collated so that a population can be “controlled, surveilled, monitored, and made to acquiesce” 
according to counterinsurgent interests.\textsuperscript{xcix} A second site of gendering occurs in the “hierarchies 
and discourses produced in the context of US forces training indigenous police and military 
divisions” wherein the ‘imperial grunts’ of the counterinsurgent force comes into direct contact 
with “the conquered, whether the latter are those detained and subjected to interrogation or the 
local proxy security forces being trained by the US military.”\textsuperscript{cc} In this context, gendering most 
prominently in the form of sexuality which is used as a technology of coercion, “the infliction of 
abjection via effeminizing practices” and maintaining subordination through the implementation 
of “gendered, raced, and classed hierarchies.”\textsuperscript{ccl} A final locale of gendering is in the domain of 
policy and doctrine wherein “a new form of masculinity emerges, authorized by a consumerism 
and neo-liberal feminism, in which ‘manliness’ is softened, and the sensitive masculinity of the 
humanitarian soldier-scholar (white, literate, articulate, and doctorate-festooned) overshadows the 
hypermasculinity of warrior kings (or indeed of the racialized imperial grunts.”\textsuperscript{cclii} Moreover, these 
new masculinities and femininities allows for “white middle class women civilians to move into 
prestigious political positions as counterinsurgents, all the while casting their own advance as a 
broader victory for the universal woman.”\textsuperscript{ccliii} Thus, the contemporary gendering of 
counterinsurgency creates a new social field that “works to create particular imperial hierarchies
in which one’s gender” isn’t determinative of social positioning and “where different kind of masculinities and femininities co-exist once inflected through lenses of race and class.” On the battlefield, gender is transformed into the basis of counterinsurgency action. Via demographics, women are targeted “as counterbalancing forces to male radicalization, through the cooptation of gendered spaces to counterinsurgency practice, and the use of gendered ‘telling’ to distinguish those who are to be protected from those who are to be feared or destroyed.” Said differently, physical human terrain or gender demographics are “invoked as both justification for targeting young men, and more instrumentally, for planning military action”, especially against “men between the ages of 15 and 30”, who are seen “as an automatically useful resource for radical recruitment”— while “women’s education and job-creation programs” are then implemented “as ‘necessary antidotes’” to the potential emergence of new insurgents.

Like the colonial era, women of the targeted group continue to be stereotyped as victims of their own men to discredit insurgent groups and socially engineer the population in accordance with tenets of modernization theory. The “use of stories of socially marginal women being exploited by men” sets the stage for liberal-economic development to be prefigured as the only legitimate pathway for the socio-economic advancement of women. Thus, “women are essentialized” by counterinsurgents as “less corrupt, more efficient, better for economic development and less warlike.” US policymakers deploy a gendered economic development agenda to suit women with the intent of demobilizing the entire population. Citing counterinsurgency tactician David Kilcullen’s argument for “‘co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programmes’”, Khalili explains that “advancing women’s rights through modernisation is automatically seen as meeting the national security interests of the US.” The practice of ‘telling’ and categorization of threat in a population is also highly gendered. As Khalili explains, the easiest way to quickly identify and categorise populations as high-risk combatants or low-risk civilians is by gender”, so “the combatant/non-combatant distinction becomes fully gendered, where the all-encompassing suspicion against all men is operationalised into specific actions” from conscription to the application of deadly force, “while women are afforded the status of being ‘naïve’ objects of ‘protection’, pacification, and humanitarian salvage.” Reflecting its colonial heritage, modern counterinsurgency understands ‘women and children’ within a bifurcated framework: “complicit with the combatants, a terrain upon whom the counterinsurgency’s social engineering experiments can be performed” or “as hostages and literal or symbolic message-bearers” who legitimize the work of counterinsurgency. At the same time, men “between the ages of 15 or 16 and 50 are considered the primary” targets of “intensive, aggressive, and invasive surveillance” which not only demonizes/criminalizes them but also functions to “effeminize the men of the population through both symbolic and practical emasculation.” By dishonoring the males, counterinsurgents re-engineer gender relations symbolically and economically. Under the modernization paradigm “women are subjected to a slightly less severe regime of controls, [so] they can more easily find jobs and keep their jobs” which means that the males are sidelined as social and economic actors who then “suffer from depression and a loss of identity” after finding themselves displaced and unemployable outside of being conscripts for local security forces administrated by the US military.

Demonstrating how gender further informs the counterinsurgent endeavor in the new millennium, Khalili turns to two groups involved on the ground – the men and women of the
invading military and conquered male conscripts. Just as gendered logics demonize Black and other racialized males within the US, empire inverts hierarchy abroad by prefiguring conquered men as “rapists and oppressors of their wives and families” while positioning white females of western forces as against and above these males. As their superiors, females of the invading force signify humanitarian egalitarianism and function to “reproduce a geopolitical [civilizational] dominance” wherein gender equality in the empire “reinforces racial hierarchy in military contexts in the colony/neo-colony.” After being coerced to join these proxy security forces to begin with, local men are also effeminized during their training, routinely being called “‘women’ or ‘pussies’, and seen as inadequate and passive enforcers of good order by their trainers.” Underlying this dehumanization is a shading of gender by race, class and other factors that place the manhood of the colonized male under scrutiny for not effectively fighting in a war in which he does not necessarily have allegiance to in the first place. Thus, the proxy forces undergo two kinds of gendering processes with common characteristics and roots in colonial counterinsurgencies. On the one hand, they are envisioned as barbaric and “naturally’ fiercer fighters, more disciplined and fearless warriors, and thus far more masculine” while on the other hand they are effeminized because the white race is thought of “as the male of the [human] species and the black race as the female”, which meant “that the conquered were naturalized as feminine, conquered, penetrated, and possessed.” Though these may seem contradictory, these discourses are connected together by a set of tropes and a psycho-libidinal register which subjects racialized males to the fantasies or fetishes of the dominant colonial or racial group. Loyalty to white empire affords one a degree of masculinity and redeems the native form moral degeneracy, while racialized men’s masculinity is also conflated with a particular notion of sexuality which constitutes this moral degeneracy – he is thus ‘oversexed’, and understood as “‘the polygamist, the masturbator, the whorer, and the sexually fluid.” Within the domain of counterinsurgency then, racialized males suffer “from impositions of social force that denature” their “flesh into phantasm” – rendering them as entities who are “positioned as an imagination of” white society who are hyper-sexualized “as objects of desire, possession, and want” while also constituting “the substantive (social) meaning of rape, while simultaneously being subjugated to rape” and death by “both the male and female members of the dominant group.”

Turning towards policymaking within the metropole, the final edifice within the broader gendering of modern counterinsurgency, Khalili outlines how policy planners use gender through a combination of a new ‘soldier-scholar’ masculinity and colonial feminism to legitimize operations. The new masculinity is portrayed as soft compared with a conventional warrior ethos focused on the application of deadly force on the battlefield as a pathway to victory in and of itself whereas the former is focused on socially engineering the population and the acquisition of hearts and minds through the deployment of “an openly liberal discourse of salvation and humanitarianism.” Thus, the new soldier-scholar is “the ultimate in civic virtue” but also “the embodiment of international wisdom, war-fighting prowess, and a kind of knowingness about the world.” The complementarity of this softer and more intelligent white masculinity is “a much more familiar colonial feminism” that “today deploys the language of humanitarian rescue” of women from savage dark males. Through its impact on security rhetoric, military and foreign policy around the world is justified through the connection of aims towards the promoting of democracy and pursuit of women’s rights. Going further than previous iterations, it even criticizes the insurgent racialized males for not centering women as combatants, admonishing “‘the terrorists’ for not picking women.” In doing so, these feminists use a language of visibility
strikingly similar to gender theorists who have criticized Black nationalists over the last four decades for their ostensibly misogynistic exclusion of women from leadership in the Black Power movement. As Khalili explains:

“A former Pentagon official complains that ‘In the years since [Leila] Khaled’s hijackings, women’s involvement in Palestinian terrorism has been either inconsistent or invisible. Even after proving their success as hijackers, bombers, and cover for men, women have to remind terrorist leaders of their tactical usefulness.’ This colonial feminism is appealing to a new category of women policymakers who pride themselves in a kind of collaborative warrior femininity. These counterinsurgent women not only deploy a gendered analysis in their discussion of counterinsurgency – ‘these type of operations require very perceptive and deep emotional IQs’, and ‘women have a more collaborative style’ – but also use feminist justifications for their involvement: ‘we aren’t going to win by telling half the population they can’t play’.”

Together, the softer masculinity of the soldier-scholar and the tough warrior femininity of modern counterinsurgency represent a deep continuity in western methods of warfare against racialized and (formerly) colonized groups. They form a broader complex that serves “empire in the guise of liberal or even progressive” gender politic. Thus, counterinsurgency establishes a dynamic tripartite stratification: on the top exists imperial masculinity and femininities, below are the “imperial grunts” and “working class white women” who “find themselves elevated above the colonized men they are charged to monitor, control or subdue.” And at the “very bottom layer of this pyramid of power are the conquered men and women” whose bodies accumulate violence and surveillance and whose lives and societies are re-shaped and engineered to suit the vision of pacification conceptualized by the counterinsurgent US state. The counterinsurgent processes of social engineering imposed on foreign populations by US empire are the same ones that have provided the conditions of homeostasis for its internal racial order since the chattel enslavement period. However, these tactics were implemented anew in response to the anticolonial revolutions of the late 20th century. Drawing on its colonial roots, a doctrinal reconceptualization of counterinsurgency by the Kennedy Administration (in anticipation and response to anticolonial Black revolution) was installed as the fountainhead from which internal and foreign (potentially) insurgent/racialized populations were to be managed. Thus, the hierarchies reflected on indigenous populations in the War on Terror counterinsurgency campaigns of the 21st century have long been at the core of the ontological program constructed to pre-emptively subvert Black militancy and Third World anticolonialism around the world. Contrary to claims that it is essentially a radical or insurgent development that was a necessary corrective to the regressive hetero-normativity and patriarchal impulse of Black nationalism, Black feminism functions as an (assimilationist) ideology which reifies the gendercidal agenda which has followed the implementation of counterinsurgency as the primary managerial technique of the US state: the organization of an underclass of Black men at the bottom of the social, political and economic hierarchy, the overdetermining of their existence through the production of theory that reflects the denigrating caricatures which posit Black men, Black militants and Black nationalism writ large as mimetic and toxic objects who function as intraracial rapists, abusers and femicidal killers of women (and children) in their communities, and thus entities whose targeting by whites’ social predation in a “distinctly aggressive and debilitative character” is a privilege based on maleness.
which theory should simply ignore because to inquire into this condition erects an obstacle to the accomplishment of the emancipation of Black women and nonprototypical/nongenderconforming Black people from the patriarchal subjugation, exclusion and abuse they face from these men. The next chapter will theorize the emergence of counterinsurgency as the primary managerial technique of US empire and argue that it followed a rewriting of knowledge from which a new onto-epistemological proleptic genre of the human emerged that I posit as now constituting the primary contradiction of the new millennium: MAN3 or homo homini lupus (man as wolf to other man AKA MAN as Praetorian).


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XV Ibid, 141

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Chapter 4: Killology, Homo Homini Lupus (MAN as Wolf to Other Man) AKA MAN as Praetorian or MAN3 as a Problem for Being-Knowledge and an Obstacle for Thought or the Accomplishment of a New Truly Human Theory of Victory

“This is the way it is with the white man in America. He's a wolf-and you're sheep. Any time a shepherd, a pastor, teaches you and me not to run from the white man and, at the same time, teaches us not to fight the white man, he’s a traitor to you and me.” – Malcolm X/El-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz

“Twenty years after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the so-called war on terror shows no sign of winding down. It waxes and wanes, largely in the shadows and out of the headlines…” – Mark Landler

Introduction

Since the eradication of Black Studies (in its initial radical conception) and its corollary Black Arts and Black Power movements, Black thought has been mired under the disciplinary and conceptual agendas of (white) American disciplinary liberalism and identity politics, alienated from and thus unable to contribute any knowledge towards the liberation of the Black community. Africana philosopher Sylvia Wynter argues that the failure of Black thought to complete a cognitive leap in how the human being is conceptualized stems from three factors: (1) the class fracturing of the mass based social movements of the 60s which has allowed the incorporation of a small black middle class and the socially mobile lower middle classes into the US mainstream and away from the black underclass—what Wynter identifies as part of a broader “rightward swing” in US/Western society; (2) the defection of Amiri Baraka, the foremost practitioner of the Black Arts Movement from “Black Power nationalism to the Maoist wing of Marxism-Leninism as a universalist counter to the universalism of Liberalism”; (3) and the emergence of Black feminist thought “which took as one of their major targets the male and macho hegemonic aspect of the Black nationalist” movement and aesthetic, “even where black women had played as creative role as the men.” Thus, the current schemata of Black thought works to sustain the overrepresentation or reification of the western descriptive statement of the human: MAN(2), a biodicy premised on a normative conception of white liberal society as a bio-evolutionary (or eugenically) selected superior genre of human existence whose dialectical negation of Black African/African-descended (and other nonwhite) societies, values, physiognomy, cognitive capacity and being as its opposite, amounts to a fundamental ontological contradiction. The struggle for our new millennium, Wynter argues, is between this hegemonic Liberal descriptive statement to understand consciousness and existence in its terms and the human as it actually exists outside of western philosophical anthropology/disciplinary schemas.

This cognitive order emerged in the 19th century as the result of a convergence between the Darwinian evolutionary archetype of humanity with the militarized institutional and knowledge edifices formulated to accomplish a Western Hemispheric colonial-chattel racial order. In her own words, Wynter writes that “a new principle of nonhomogeneity, that of DuBois’s Color Line in its
white/nonwhite, Men/Natives form (i.e., as drawn between the lighter and darker races), will now be discursively and institutionally deployed as a “space of Otherness” on which to project an imagined and extrahumanly (because ostensibly bio-evolutionarily) determined nonhomogeneity of genetic substance between the category of those selected- by- Evolution and the category of those dysselected- by- Evolution.” Thus, the Color/Colonial line would come to replace the 16th century role of the “by Heaven/Earth, supralunar/sublunar, and by the rational humans/ irrational animals premises of nonhomogeneity in order to enable the selected/dysselected, and thus deserving/undeserving status organizing principle that it encoded to function for the nation- state as well as the imperial orders of the Western bourgeoisie…”. In her article No Humans Involved (1992), Wynter traces the emergence of the dehumanizing NHI category used by the LAPD against young jobless Black males to reify schemas of being radiating from western academic disciplines, and the secularizing of knowledge premised on a shift in self-conception which occurred in Western Europe and America during the 16th (MAN1) and 19th centuries (MAN2). Together, these shifts underlie the contemporary mode of knowledge and the means by “which the human would come to perceive and know itself as if it were a purely natural organism in complete continuity with organic life,” expressed by two characteristic fallacies: (a) the technocultural fallacy and (b) the fallacy of supraculturalism. The first fallacy “underlies the premise of the discipline of economics”, and generates from an anthropological failure which holds “that our human behaviors are motivated primarily by the imperative common to all organic species of securing the material [economic] basis of their existence; rather than by the imperative of securing the overall conditions of existence (cultural, religious, representational and through their mediation, material)…” This initial anthropological failure to “distinguish the purposive aspects of human behavior” from the “unconscious structure in human culture (as reflected in language and the cognitive bases of life)” generates the second fallacy which revolves around an emblematic problem: supraculturalism. As Wynter explains, supraculturalism “mistakes our present “local culture’s representation-of-the-human-as-a-natural organism as if it were the human-in-itself.” In other words, it entails a reification fallacy wherein the local western culture’s biocentric conception of the human – MAN – (an abstraction) is wrongly taken to be the human from a truly transcultural or universal perspective (the thing in itself).

The European feudal religious order of knowledge or “truth” of the “divinely ordered hegemony of the aristocracy based on its Noble line of descent; one which legitimated their caste dominance” was shattered by the “intellectual revolution of humanism of fourteenth and fifteenth century Europe” which challenged the theological concepts of the then dominant modality of knowledge of scholasticism and introduced MAN1. But by the end of the 18th century, breakthroughs in physical and biological scientific knowledge demanded a new conception of the human based on the Narrative of Evolution, which is understood as MAN2. As Wynter explains, these ontological and epistemological structures provided the imaginative substance upon which American society would come to organize its institutions, values, ideas and reify its civilizational aspirations. As she explains, Western societies are now integrated on the basis of MAN2 as a core idea. This belief is “that of the genetic-racial inferiority of Black people to all others, functions to enable our social hierarchies, including those of rich and poor determined directly by the economic system, to be perceived as having been as pre-determined by “that great crap game called life,” as have also ostensibly been the invariant hierarchy between White and Black.” Because the negation of Blackness at an ontological level is reflected in our normative paradigm of knowledge, it is inseparable from the scholarly endeavor – and the institutions through which police officers
(and other professionals and lay people within civil society) are psychologized into their subjective understanding of the Black males – “who have been made to pay the “sacrificial costs” for the relatively improved conditions since the 1960s that have impelled many Blacks out of the ghettos” – as nonhumans. Accordingly, Wynter notes that the American curriculum of education negates the being of “black Americans as a function of the United States continuing to conceive of itself as a White and Euroamerican “Nation of Immigrants.” Building on Carter G. Woodson’s “epistemological break” of the early 20th century, Wynter connects this systemic exclusion of Blacks within educational materials to the dialectical verification of the “truth” of white genetic supremacy at the base of the dominant order of knowledge. Carter G. Woodson’s arguments on history is crucial here because the “cognitive distortions” engendered by American education that are actualized in the lynching and mutilation of Black bodies are premised on the contributions of a given race’s contributions to it (or lack thereof). As she explains, these distortions:

…served an extra-cognitive function. This function was that of inducing the White students to believe that their ancestors had done everything worth doing in both the past, and at the same time, to induce the Black students to believe that their ancestors had done nothing worth doing, whether in the human or in the American past. One of the clues to this extra-cognitive function was that all non-whites were not equally stigmatizes. Whilst the past of all other groups was stigmatized, they were nevertheless left with certain shreds of human dignity. This was not so with respect to the 1933 curriculum’s misrepresentation of the Afro-American past as well as its present.

The “escape hatch” out of the normative paradigm and regimes of “truth” reified by the NHI category, Wynter argues, is to make an object of knowledge of the subjectivity of the liminal categories subjected to the external and internal pacification programs (young Black males, the Global poor, the natural environment) whose material reality contradict the normative absolutism of the dominant bio-economic liberal categories and disciplinary paradigms. This is so because within all human societies, the liminal category’s dehumanization is “a condition of each order’s truth” or horizon of understanding. Thus, it is on the marrying of knowledge to their condemnation that the former must be rewritten so that we can “understand the rules governing our human modes of perception and the behaviors to which they lead” and “secure, as a species, the full dimensions of our human autonomy.”

The classarchy of the bourgeois white male/female subject has been a central focus of scholars seeking to integrate the work of Sylvia Wynter within Black Studies. However, the focal point of this research has been little more than an attempt to use Wynter’s theory of MAN as the basis for reasserting the projection of Western gender categories, Black/decolonial feminist theories of subjectivity and intersectional theories of oppression as a reanimation of Black (female) humanity. Contrary to this tendency, I build on Wynter’s identification of the Black male subject (dehumanized as the pieza or chattel slave) as the archetype of liminality and the basis for the ontological negation of Blackness and argue that the problematic of MAN2 foreshadows the emergence of a new proleptic being—MAN3—a kind of MAN that exceeds the political, ideational and economic iterations of the 19th and 20th century by the extent to which counterinsurgent forms of democratic liberal development, imprisonment and targeted killings are
all simultaneously deployed as the primary forces of social regulation. The reification of the 20th century dominant western genre of humanity — Man2 — underwent an epochal transformation in the 1950s and 60s as a consequence of both the emergence of the US as our species first extra-territorial or planetary empire and one which mastered conditioning the nervous systems of its military/police agents to “kill the enemy” (MAN as Praetorian) along with its spearheading of the western liberal response to anticolonialism insurgencies (and then all such threats into our current millennium) through a mastery of population-centric warfare with assistance of cutting edge technology and a basis in police-military professionalization whose destructive capacity is conditioned on the racialized construction of threats: counterinsurgency warfare (killology). Thus, the new struggle for the human of this millennium (its primary ontological/epistemological contradiction) is between the imperative of securing the well-being of our present normative Western bourgeois civilizational construct of the human, MAN3 (MAN as defender of the status quo/Praetorian) informed by a mastery of counterinsurgency and killology as the basis for liberal civil society and social development) which overrepresents itself as if it were the human as it actually exists, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves (in its innumerable plurality). This new order of knowledge has preserved the ontological negation of racialized populations (African/African descended with a particular intensity) as its opposite through a framework of cultural inferiority (as opposed to its previous criterion of eugenic selection/dysselection). On this basis, MAN3 sociogenically construes racialized populations as monstrous threats to the social order (i.e. the “terrorist”, “immigrant”, “[black] criminal or super-predator”, “lesser races”, etc.). The planetary proleptic elimination of this threat — what I term killology - has been electrified to an unprecedented degree by the implementation of new kinds of psychological, surveillance and military technology (prison, surveillance, drones and other kinds of semi-autonomous lethal weapons and the strategic deployment of classical and operant conditioning to desensitize the nervous system of agents of the state towards the killing act, along with a new and deadlier white power movement). A new population-centric approach to black militancy and thought (along with a strident resistance to the criminalization of self-defense, and a new Black consciousness or set of ‘inner eyes’ based on revolutionary suicide) with the masses as its center of gravity will be the basis for a cultural-logical contribution toward accomplishment of a new truly human theory of victory—the accomplishment of a new Human. Any rebuttal to this position is simply out of touch with the current order of knowledge-being and its basis in the civilizational mastery of counterinsurgency in the late 20th century response to anticolonialism and any (physical or ideational) threats to the social order thereafter.

Wynter’s account of Western humanism has a huge conceptual gap and is unable to grasp the full consequences of the US’s and the broader Western world’s response to anticolonialism beyond the diminution of Black Studies and a “rightward swing” in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and into the current millennium. In response to Hitler’s emphasis on eugenics, the breakthroughs in theory and praxis of guerrilla warfare techniques (first by Mao Zedong and then across Africa, Asia India, South America and within the US), liberal empires reformulated counterinsurgency tactics and forged a new discourse of ‘culture’ as opposed to civilizational (ethnological/eugenic) discourses and merged new definitions of (liberal) human rights within a paradigm of population centric warfare, mass detention/incarceration, and a turn towards lethal semiautonomous weapons with cybernetics and artificial intelligence technologies on the premise that such an approach to war is “more humane” than previous forms of counterinsurgent
colonial/savage warfare. In the first section, I will demonstrate how tropes of Black male militants as criminal and internal terrorists animated US administrators’ rationalization of a counterinsurgent pacification program that was applied to Black America through mass incarceration/detention, surveillance and police professionalization. This domestic war agenda was coterminous with the doctrinal institution of counterinsurgency as the basis for US empire in the late 20th century as a response to anticolonialism and foreshadowed the emergence of the 21st century ‘Global War on Terror’ in that it was (and remains) a highly technological, spatial and temporal indeterminant program of pacification. Alongside this new planetary paradigm of (physical and ideational) warfare, the hegemonic genre of MAN introduced a new self-conception: MAN3/homo homini lupus (man as wolf to another man AKA MAN as Praetorian) which weaponized disciplinary knowledge towards the mastery of “order maintenance” policing or counterinsurgency to delimit expression of all forms of human life that are not amenable with its hegemonic Liberal genre and made a breakthrough in the application of military science through cybernetics, mass surveillance and the mastering the operant and conditional conditioning techniques of its agents’ nervous systems toward the killing act. These developments foreshadow the 21st century Global War on Terror and constitute the emergence of MAN3—homo homini lupus—a highly technological, spatially and temporally indeterminate proleptic order which seeks to delimit the expressions of human life through the application of planetary population-level techniques of warfare, detention, and killing as the primary forces of social regulation.

In the second section, I will observe the broader militarization of US empire globally, its new forms of cutting-edge technology and the erection of its new surveillance apparatus, technologies to kill, and the white power movement which has spawned from this nexus. Together, these factors constitute a new proleptic order wherein counterinsurgency: the marriage of economic development, social engineering, selective killing (and mass detention) of target populations (with an emphasis on males of the group), as the primary force of social regulation functions to sustain the dominant onto-epistemological order. The continuing destruction of the planet, deleterious situation of the Black community and intense calcification of wealth are also understood within this framework of global pacification—MAN3—and its normative expressions of human species-life forms and deadly forces of social regulation. With a comprehensive grasp of the obstacles to the accomplishment of the Human Project this millennium, Black thought will be able to complete a cognitive leap and contribute to a truly human theory of victory. Rather than simply positing new hermeneutics or endeavoring to humanize Blackness with feminist/gender theory, Black thought must formulate a new population-centric theory of humanity with a basis in Black militancy. Only from this foundation can a new theory of victory to the ‘endless’ global war on terrorism be accomplished and ensure the introduction of a new cognitive order in which we, as a species, breach the full dimensions of our human autonomy and knowledge can be rewritten accordingly.

Section One: Hunting for Humans, MAN3 (AKA MAN as Praetorian) in the New Millennium and the Pacification of the Planet (Killology)

“The "police" are everywhere and they all wear the same uniform and use the same tools, and have the same purpose: the protection of the ruling circle here in North America. It is true that the world is one community, but we are not satisfied with
the concentration of its power. We want the power for the people.” – Huey P. Newton

In its current utilization by the US security apparatus, counterinsurgency is “widely touted not only as an instrument for defeating Iraqi or Afghan insurgents but also as a panacea for fighting global terrorism.” Rather than simply a mode of military engagement with foreign enemies, counterinsurgency doctrine ought to be understood as “a programme of both rule and warfare that seeks to assemble humans, technologies, tactics and modes of knowledge (production) into an ambiguous machine geared towards pacifying ungoverned spaces and populations that more often than not tend to be” racialized and formerly colonized groups in the “post” colonial south. The effort to pacify these unruly populations of the planet rely on the provision of “security to the local population while (re)building the politico-economic infrastructure that would ultimately enable” the target group to govern itself. Furthermore, the dual infusion of security of development “is supposed to occur against the backdrop of an overall battle over perceptions to waved through effective information operations” which socially engineer subjects to view pacification efforts (and the government installed at its conclusion) as legitimate. Said differently, 21st century counterinsurgency campaigns imply a war of bodies and ideas between a centralized state and combatants engaged in guerrilla warfare “conducted on all fronts—political, social, military, informational, religious and cultural—by all levels and departments in the military, government, and nongovernmental agencies.” With this combination of providence (economic development) and destructive power (the application incarceration and deadly force) deployed with the goal of “engineering consent,” modern US counterinsurgency “seeks to internally pacify foreign societies in order to check the global flow of threats and thereby also secure already pacified societies.”

Framing the broader discourse of Human Security within the framework of counterinsurgency, Markus Keinscherf demonstrates that security officials understand the two as essentially “the same because both cluster around the ‘two key principles’ of providing security and vital services to the population and separating ‘the reconcilable from the irreconcilables.’” However, Keinscherf argues that human security discourse is better understood as the logical antecedent to pacification efforts. The former being driven “by the unlimited aim of securing humanity from its own inherent threats” yields the latter as a “spatially and temporally indeterminate” remedy for the “pathologies of insecurity and danger.” Within this paradigm of planetary war, the referent objects are unruly populations who inhabit failed or weak states or areas of instability. This grounds the pacification aim – facilitated by a combination of liberal development and liberal war – to rid target regions of forms of species-life and autonomy that threaten western forms of social organization while promoting forms of “adaptive self-reliance that are deemed safe.” The weaponization of sociocultural knowledge through the US ‘Human Terrain System’ (HTS) makes the application of these techniques limitless. These “combine social-network analysis with the geospatial analysis of human and physical geography in an effort to render the sociocultural environment intelligible, so that the military can differentiate between active supporters of the insurgency, a passive majority, and active supporters” who are then to be targeted with incarceration or deadly force. In other words, the HTS differentiates between those “elements of the population to be attacked (or assassinated) and those it would be better not to – in brief sophisticated targeting” though a cultural calculus that has replaced the one formerly occupied by racial categories.
Deployed as the primary mode of social regulation applicable to the entire human species, liberal imperialism “cannot openly profess to privilege some aspect of the species over others purely on the basis of race” any longer. In the aftermath of World War 2, liberal states recapitulated their colonial policies “in nonracial terms” that saw “past intimations of racial inferiority” give way “to a language of developmental [cultural] backwardness” that then “was used to provide the basis for counterinsurgency action.” Thus, cultural “fitness has now replaced biological heritage” to “enable the targeting of threatening species-life and thereby ends up producing and reinforcing both the conceptual and physical borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’” yielded from the previous eras of European imperialism. Generally speaking, counterinsurgency doctrines are “designed to straddle the divide between policing and war-fighting, in order counter the complex threat of insurgents hiding among civilian populations.” In doing so, modern US iterations “rehabilitate older imperial, and highly oppressive, practices of population security, and harness them to the imperatives” of US security interests that are “not limited by geostrategic objectives of individual nation-states, but rather driven by the potentially unlimited aims of promoting” certain kinds of life while simultaneously “security it from its own inherent threats.”

Despite its reiteration of colonial style warfare, it’s synthesis with human security discourse has yielded a veneer through which counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners frame the endeavor as one of “‘securing” and “protecting” the [target] population.” Such language rationalizes population-centric methods of mass incarceration that have combined with other methods to function as a kind of social restructuring or species managerial method; “a conjugation of military tactics, systems of knowledge, and social engineering.” In other words, counterinsurgency is population control that “is at once “armed social science” and “armed social work.”” Illuminating how this new generation of counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners have sought to obscure the role of deadly force by blending their doctrine with human security agendas, Jonathan Gilmore explains that deadly force is assumed to be necessary to liberate populations the “oppressive” groups of insurgents. For Gilmore, this implies a dualism reminiscent the colonial French expeditionary force: the combination of destructive force and an approach aimed at development are thus complementary. In other words, human security discourse simply represents “the ‘velvet glove’ surrounding the ‘iron fist’ of traditional [colonial] warfighting.” Scholars documenting the emergence of modernization theory and US’ mastery of counterinsurgency wars since the late 20th century have been clear that the Kennedy administration was the turning point which “led to a flurry of activities at all levels of the US national security apparatus” that laid the basis for “the frenetic formulation of new policies and doctrine.” However, there has been scant attention to how Kennedy/Johnson’s administrations installed counterinsurgency (as policing) as the primary method of social regulation with a singular lens of vision that made no distinction sensitive to region when reformulating tactics in (anticipation of and) response to the spread of anti-colonialism. Thus, counterinsurgency was readily applied within the continental United States while US administrators were perfecting techniques of counterinsurgency to maintain foreign security interests abroad.

Since the implementation of US counterinsurgency (in anticipation of and) as a response to the Human Rights/Black Nationalist/Third World revolutions of the late 20th century, Black America has been subject to a new decidedly punitive law and order regime that is expressed at its core in the phenomenon of mass racialized incarceration—though in line with methods of
counterinsurgency warfare since the (settler) colonial era going forward, this took a qualitative leap in development after the eradication of the Jim Crow regime and was coterminous with the implementation of controls in response to the prison activism of George Jackson and the leadership role he assumed in the broader Black Liberation Movement. Sociologists Lawrence Bobo and Victor Thompson demonstrate in *Racialized Mass Incarceration: Poverty, Prejudice and Punishment* that the rise of mass incarceration is coterminous with a socioeconomic restructuring that produced “intensified ghetto poverty and dislocations through the 1980s on the one hand, and a series of social policies that made jail or prison among the primary response to urban social distress.” Anti-black racism translated into a deep turn in the punitive culture and public opinion of the US. Nevertheless, the authors find the legitimacy of the criminal justice system shaky: especially in its consumption of Black (male) bodies. They demonstrate a gendered specificity and misandric logic at the heart of the “incarceration binge” of the US in the post-civil rights era. As they write, the term ‘mass incarceration’ “obscures the role of race in this social concentration of imprisonment.” They continue, observing that “[…] 1 in 15 African Americans [is] behind Bars,” or even more distressing, “1 in 9 Black Men, age 20 to 34 [is] behind Bars.” That is, while the overall U.S. rate of incarceration is up very substantially, this shift has fallen with radically disproportionate severity on African Americans, particularly low-income and poorly educated” black males. Continuing, they write that “the end result has been a sharp overrepresentation of blacks in jails and prisons” which is stark when the demographic figures of Black males are considered. As they explain, in 2007, “black males constituted roughly 39 percent of incarcerated males in state, federal, and local prisons or jails, though representing only 12 percent of the total adult male population” while white males “on the other hand, constituted just 36.1 percent of the male inmate population in 2007, well under their 65.6 percent of the total male population.” The Hispanic population “is also overrepresented but is much closer to its relative share of the total population of about 16 percent.” These trends have such a deleterious impact on the black male population that a “black male born in the 1990s faced almost one in three lifetime odds of ending up in jail as compared to well under one in ten lifetime chances for non-Hispanic white males.” Indeed, the carceral regime of the US is so focused on the Black male population that even those born into families top 1% of the parental income distribution are incarcerated at the same rate as “white boys who grew up in families at the 34th percentile of the parental income distribution” while “incarceration rates are very low for black and white females across the parental income distribution.”

Bobo and Thompson contribute to a sharpened understanding of this alongside work by scholars like Elizabeth Hinton who in her 2016 text *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime* locates the roots of modern mass incarceration with the inherited Kennedy counterinsurgency paradigm erected by the Johnson Administration’s merging of a national policing paradigm to social welfare policy. Ideologically, policy makers were motivated by new social science methodologies based on a what Hinton terms a “statistical discourse” connected to a broader nexus of ideas premised on the inherent criminality of young black males which stemmed from the ethnological discourses of the late 1890s but took shape to yield a strategy to crush Black Power and maintain white racial rule after the eradication of Jim Crow. In other words, eugenic thinking was discarded, and new cultural and statistical or cultural discourses were deployed simultaneously to understand and rationalize policies to solve the “problem” of black male criminality. As Hinton writes, this “problem” was considered “an objective truth and a statistically irrefutable fact” which meant that “notions of black criminality justified both structural and everyday racism.”
Continuing, Hinton writes that “[t]aken to its extreme, these ideas sanctioned the lynching of black people in the southern states and the bombing of African American homes and institutions in the urban north before World War II, both of which were defended as necessary to preserve public safety.” lv After WW2, “social scientists increasingly rejected biological racism but created a new statistical discourse about black criminality that went on to have a far more direct impact on subsequent national policies and, eventually, served as the intellectual foundation of mass incarceration.” lvii Hinton also explains how this push towards data collection created a self-justifying and circular logic that made crime control and the warehousing of young Black men a proleptic normative endeavor. Black men needed to be incarcerated to prevent crimes that had not yet occurred. In her own words, starting around the late 1960s and 1970s “the deliberate arrest and incarceration of young African American men became a strategy to prevent future crime, rationalized by the new theoretical and scientific approaches to understanding black criminal behavior.” lviii Reflecting the focus on youth demography which regard children as potential insurgents in prevailing models of counterinsurgency, US officials “attributed the increase of violent crime in the 1960s to the nation’s growing youth population and urged policymakers to develop crime control programs based on [the] demographic realities” of the Black community. lxiii

Thus, influential white social scientists like James Q. Wilson concluded that the “only sure way we know of fighting crime is birth control.” lx For Wilson and others involved in crafting policy to contain the Black community, “short of locking up every one under 30 years of age,” urban police needed to make “the scene of the prospective crime” more secure. lix Since black neighborhoods, understood through the new statistical discourse, were the most likely scene of potential crime, “the federal government anchored the national law enforcement program in those neighborhoods with the purpose of rounding up potentially serious criminals.” lx Thus, the calculation “to remove low-income youth of color from their neighborhoods was justified and reinforced by new data on African American crime that appeared in the early 1970s—data that were the product of the modernization of police departments and the new state criminal justice bureaucracies established during the prior decade.” lxii The riots in the ghetto and the emergence of the Black Power movement spurred federal policymakers and local police departments to implement an unprecedented proleptic strategy of counterinsurgency/crime control rooted in the legal and ideological foundation of the Kennedy Administration’s War on Poverty. Hinton avers that the Watts riots of 1965 and its potential to catalyze the Black Power movement leading into 1967 laid the basis for the construction of a legal foundation that transformed the attack on delinquency into a War on Crime and Black dissent in toto. Cultural pathologies grounded the thinking of US policymakers who “explained the high rates of reported crime in African American neighborhoods, and as a result of these racist assumptions, positioned crime control as the primary social service provided to segregated communities suffering from high rates of poverty and employment.” lix This blending of social welfare and criminal justice was concretized by the passing of the safe streets act and the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA). Importantly, administrators within Johnson’s cabinet saw civil peace as a top priority and viewed the Black rioter as an incipient threat to the American social order. As Hinton avers, the “president was anxious that urban rebellion and the burgeoning Black Power movement would compromise the great potential of the War on Poverty” and “federal officials and policymakers feared that unless something changed in the administration of urban social programs, militants would organize residents into full-scale rebellion.” lxiv Consequently, a battle plan was put in place that gave “law enforcement a new role in social welfare programs”, instantiating a full-scale pacification program
Based on the findings of the Kerner Commission, the US police were modernized and reformulated to fill a fundamentally new role as a mechanism of controlling Black youth and the community writ large on a counterinsurgent paradigm geared towards the apprehension of the black [male] criminal. This model of domestic community policing is consonant with the modern doctrinal counterinsurgency framework which describes the counterinsurgent as conducting “armed social work.” Hinton explains the relationship between this new pathological understanding of Black male criminality and this shift in policing thusly,

“In the late nineteenth century, it has been the purpose of American police to enforce the law, to make arrests, and to build criminal cases. Suddenly, national policies had called upon police officers to deliver turkeys to needy families on Thanksgiving, play pool with troublesome children in after-school programs, and counsel low-income couples during marital disputes. In principle, these programs had the potential to promote public safety in innovative ways. But in practice, as the Kerner Commission recognized, officers had little incentive to dedicate themselves to social welfare goals. Noting that law enforcement authorities measured the performance of rank-and-file cops by their ability to catch criminals and based their criteria for special awards, promotions, bonuses, and selection for elite assignments on the demonstrated heroism or arrest activity of an individual officer, the commission recommended that these reward systems “take equal cognizance of the work of officers who improve relations with alienated members of the community and by so doing minimize the potential for disorder.” Yet federal policymakers did not heed this crucial recommendation, proceeding to increase the patrol and surveillance of “ghetto residents” on the streets, in schools and housing projects, and within social welfare services without working to refashion the very definition of and rewards for effective police work in vulnerable neighborhoods. Officers who were expected to build long-term relationships with residents rarely received the kind of recognition as did their counter parts who successfully apprehended suspects during high-speed chases or shoot-outs. Beneath its liberal rhetoric, in the final analysis, the Kerner Commission supported a massive War on Crime. Its members took for granted the guiding principle of domestic urban policy in the 1960s— that community pathology caused poverty and crime—and following the Crime Commission’s recommendations, it identified black urban neighborhoods as the primary targets for the federal government’s punitive intervention.”

She continues, writing

In defending the turn to police patrol and surveillance in domestic urban policy, the Kerner Commission also affirmed the focus and attention of crime war strategies on African American youth. The commission’s outlook was based on data projections indicating that the black youth population— perceived by policymakers and the public at large as responsible for urban disorder— was the fastest-growing group in the United States. Using FBI data and census population trends, the Kerner Commission predicted that black urban populations would increase 72 percent by 1985, reaching roughly 21 million people. The Johnson administration grew
especially concerned about the commission’s conclusion that the population of young black Americans especially would “grow much faster than either the Negro population as a whole, or the white population in the same age group.” (Black men between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four were identified by both the Crime Commission and the Kerner Commission as the group responsible for the majority of the nation’s crime.) Although members of the Kerner Commission maintained “in a phrase . . . the problem is white racism compounded by poverty,” its alarming population forecasts and policy suggestions reinforced the urgency of the Johnson administration’s historic War on Crime.\textsuperscript{lxviii} – p. 131

Subculture of violence theory was also a major factor in the reasoning of administrators who reformulated the US police to subvert the radical threat of insurgency in the Black community. With this framework, concretized by the arguments of Marvin Wolfgang and sociologist Robert Martinson as their basis, policymakers constructed an apparatus of proleptic counterinsurgent containment of and elimination of young Black males as part of a broader paradigm of policing-militaristic and social control.\textsuperscript{lxix} While Black Male Studies scholars have pointed out the connections between subculture of violence, criminological and modern Black feminist theoretical constructions of Black masculinity as compensatory, deviant, mimetic, and hypersexual, subculture of violence theory was also crucial to it grounding how policymakers went about interpreting of recently compiled crime statistics which ostensibly reflected a concentration of criminality among young black males to construct a counterinsurgent proleptic domestic order.\textsuperscript{lxx}

Thus, “authorities frequently cited the work of University of Pennsylvania law professor Marvin Wolfgang to argue for the expansion of punitive program targeting black youth in urban areas”, who surmised “that the crime problem was essentially one of black and Latino [male] youth” and that “a small but racially concentrated population of offenders was responsible for one third of the arrests and half of the convictions in Philadelphia.”\textsuperscript{lxxi} These findings were published in Wolfgang’s study, \textit{Delinquency in a Birth Cohort} (1972) and led him to suggest to officials who were already convinced of the cultural inferiority of Black people that crime was “a forgone conclusions in low-income African American communities, where, it was thought, cultural pathologies and inadequate parental supervision fostered delinquency and violence.”\textsuperscript{lxxii} Despite the methodological flaws of the study or the shaky grounds for generalizing his conclusion nationwide, “federal policymakers reconstituted the American juvenile justice system in order to “deal with those”, as Indiana senator Birch Bayh explains, “who are preying on us within the country.”\textsuperscript{lxxiii} This focus on Black [male] youth facilitated a concept of crime prevention that indicted “entire communities as criminal” a priori.\textsuperscript{lxxiv} Thus, “the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 shifted the federal government’s approach to delinquency towards punishment and managing the symptoms of urban poverty, empowering law enforcement authorities to intervene in public institutions serving” black youth.\textsuperscript{lxxv}

Viewed through the lens of national security, the Department of justice was the bureaucratic basis which guided the preemption that the act of 1974 institutionalized - a view of Black youth as dangerous and latent threats to the social order to the extent that prisons were framed as a permanent artifact needed to warehouse a fundamentally defective and culturally pathological racial group. As Hinton writes, “as prisons’ criminogenic power became better understood, a growing chorus of scholars and law enforcement experts argued that nothing could be done short of more incarceration to control rising populations of low-income black youth.”\textsuperscript{lxxvi}
Like administrations before him, Carter’s linked urban crime to unemployment/poverty but formulated greater punitive control measures as the sole remedy. Importantly, this occurred despite the functional dismantling of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which was a core aspect of Lyndon B. Johnson’s “war on crime” program. In response to backlash from “public and private law enforcement and criminal justice institutions” spurred by the war on crime, Carter “devised a plan that maintained the agency’s functions but divided it into three separate organizations that would be phased into existence over a period of several years.” Taking public housing projects as his “testing site for punitive urban policy”, Carter made security the as the primary aim of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) via the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act.

Headed by criminologist and contracultural theorist Lynn A. Curtis, who viewed blacks as a “nonwhite enemy” with a subversive psychological tendency which needed to be attacked with “more men, more equipment, more incursions and swift and sure punishment” to be stopped. With a new emphasis on security and surveillance technologies in Black living spaces, lawmakers synthesized urban/crime policy and effectively reconciled previous ideological tensions. For his part, Curtis institutionalized a new interagency approach based on the ‘defensible space’ concept theorized by Oscar Newman. Through the agency of HUD, this was a primary objective and generated a new dimension to the implementation of counterinsurgent surveillance technologies. As Hinton explains, these measures had their roots in “architectural plans that had been commissioned under Nixon and Ford” and “was articulated by New York City architect Oscar Newman, first in his 1972 book Defensible Space and then in public housing guidelines he designed throughout the 1970s.” This notion provided the chassis for “a new approach to crime control” which “proposed a solution that involved replacing high-rise projects with smaller enclaves of defensible space in which physical hardware, rather than police patrol, would provide a type of omniscient surveillance that increased the risk of apprehension and therefore acted as a powerful deterrent against criminal behavior.” In other words, because it understood “the physical arrangement and social organization of housing projects as the root cause of their problems, Newman’s research created a vital new battleground for the War on Crime.” Hinton’s work is indispensable to apprehend the relationship between the emergence of the US crime control and prison empire based on a proleptic program of counterinsurgency, and how the construction of the racialized enemy as ‘criminal’ or conditioned the implementation of domestic counterinsurgency. However, the relationship between the Great Society programs, US imperialism and the pacification is even more comprehensive than her work suggests.

Demystifying this relationship in his work To Secure the Global Great Society (2016) Stuart Schrader shows participation is an underappreciated aspect of pacification. Showing that its roots don’t in fact lie outside the US, he shows that participation was a modality of social control before during and after the Great Society. Title IX of the revised Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 and its domestic cognate of the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 made it common sense among policy experts and officials that participation combined development and preemptive security programming because of grassroots mobilizations that also gave a given public greater say on how and why to eliminate poverty in their communities. In other words, community development was conterminous within foreign and domestic spheres and in turn “security was also the register and index of development’s success.” Within the pacification paradigm, popular “participation was the practical yoke that joined security and development.” Like its former
applications by the French colonial regiments in Algeria or Morocco, pacification was implemented as a two-pronged paradigm, providential (community participation) and catastrophic power (the killing and elimination of insurgents). Historians have not understood this relationship and how the state sought to coerce populations to cede violence to the state solely. As Schrader writes, prior “scholarship has been frustrated in explaining elite assent to grassroots mobilization, calling it, for example, “ironic.””lxxxiv

However, by the mid-1960s “[T]itle IX made participatory poverty alleviation an instrument of U.S. foreign policy” and “bureaucrats began subtly rewriting history to claim that participation was the true heir to nineteenth-century populism and earlier American federal traditions.”lxxxv According to this interpretation, “Progressive Era relief programs implicitly had represented a deviation from “sentiments and practices which lie deeply imbedded in the American character,” and participation represented a sensible return to course, not a policy compelled by social activism.”lxxxvi But this suggests that “the adoption of participation was an ironic policy decision”, especially from the view of the grassroots.lxxxvii But considered from the “perspective of security professionals, however, elite decisions to rely on participation become less baffling” and that “‘community development aid’ increased in South Vietnam after 1963 while declining in other aid-recipient countries becomes intelligible.”lxxxviii What also becomes clear “to see the internalization of participation in pacification as a process of state-formation, of devolved capacity building, for a state buffeted by multiple forms of insurgency, rather than only as a process of localized grassroots-led socioeconomic uplift and development, as social historians generally have interpreted Great Society programming.”lxxxix Schrader warns readers that it “would be a mistake to see participation as a cynical ploy by security experts to attain the support of the populace.”xc Nevertheless, he points out that participation “emerged in a moment when state legitimacy at home and abroad was imperiled” and that “situations of concentrated insurgency, as occurred in the 1960s in Detroit and in provincial South Vietnam, the state’s possession of a monopoly on the means of violence was tenuous.”xci This led state administrators to look “to participatory development to offload responsibility for constructing state legitimacy onto state subjects”, thus investing “them with an interest in forfeiting their means of violence to the state’s monopoly.”xcii

US policymakers administered a program of counterinsurgent pacification with no regard to domains of application. Schrader explains that this was not “simply imported or exported as a strategy”, because security experts “held that the problem of security had no frontiers and that insecurity threatened or precluded development anywhere it arose.”xciii Substantiating Hinton’s findings, Schrader avers that the US government “combined expanded aid to poor people with increasingly vigorous policing and imprisonment of them.”xciv But he maintains that this process was implemented around the formerly colonized world, making domestic wars against Black Power “inseparable from the context of the global war on communism, in both its hotspots in South Vietnam and its cooler locales, where the United States offered development and policing assistance that provided a testing ground for ideas and practices of the domestic wars.”xcv Highlighting the isomorphism of tactics in the wars on Harlem and Saigon alike, Schrader demonstrates the continuity these practices of participation were expressed in policymakers and counterinsurgency thinkers. Pointing to the problems in historiography, he points out the error in the assumption that “Johnson’s efforts at social justice ran aground on the US war in Vietnam, as funding that might have been used to alleviate poverty went to the war effort” by showing how “efforts at social justice at home” and “development efforts abroad” shared “similar nation-
building, antiviolence goals and drew on similar participatory, community-based methods.”

Explaining the simultaneity of counterinsurgent practices domestically and globally, Schrader writes, “counterinsurgency practitioners like Colby and Charles T. R. Bohannan had prized participation all along” and demonstrated a dedication to participation that “suggests that it is necessary to rethink the apparent benevolence and radical sociopolitical ambitions of community development that scholars of the War on Poverty increasingly celebrate.” Though demands for reform and “redress of injustice could be issued through the community action program the EOA enabled”, in its doctrinal application participation was not a foreign element to counterinsurgency “but rather attempted to internalize it and direct it.” Counterinsurgents conduct “war among the people” and endorsed the idea that “pacification could not be achieved without the participation of the people who were to be its objects.” Thus, the referent objects of warfare “had to become the active subjects, through its most important criterion”: democratic participation. Thereafter, these “active subjects then found themselves with a drastically attenuated horizon of political possibility to which their newly institutionalized avenues of democratic demand could be addressed.”

Like crime policy against Blacks within the imperial core, the new principle of non-homogeneity (culture) laid the basis for pacification to be conceptualized as an enterprise premised on the anticipatory neutralization of threats while also being “community based, as across the rest of the globe where insurgency threatened.” Though the idea implied the complete elimination of threats across the entire earth, counterinsurgency was not “intended to stamp out the threat of insurgency entirely” per se. Rather, it was envisioned a spatially and temporally indeterminate endeavor with a mission to “restore [and maintain] order, not destroy the enemy.” As Schrader explains, pacification is “based on cognizance that loyalties and allegiances” are constantly shifting and malleable. As opposed to the installation of a “strict central government”, a “relationship of economic oriented toward self-help as well as consensus-based mutual investment was the goal” for counterinsurgent strategists and policymakers. Title IX institutionalized such a relationship and laid the basis for pacification as a “future oriented, community-based civilian methods of the prevention of civil violence and held that ongoing prevention as its goal.” Accordingly, the most flexible dimensions of pacification were thus not the most “abjectly coercive but rather those that worked to further participation and police-enforced rule of law.” Both Schrader and Hinton’s insights do much to illuminate the relationship between the eradication of the Black Power/militant nationalist and anti-colonial movements, the erection of the US’s unparalleled militarized and spatially indeterminate police-prison empire and it’s doctrinal paradigm of modern counterinsurgency. But they don’t establish the relationship between the policymakers’ construction of Black militants as racialized threats and the application of killing as a force of social regulation within the broader paradigm of counterinsurgency going back to colonial era iterations. After the murder of Martin Luther King Jr., the Black Panther Party became an object of fascination by the security apparatus. As American historian Kenneth O’Reilly explains, they were characterized by FBI director J. Edgar Hoover as “armed and extremely dangerous” and as essentially aspiring to accomplish the “eventual destruction of the white race” and thus the “greatest threat to the internal security of the nation.” Thus while the broader Black community was officially subject to a full panoply of counterinsurgent techniques to anticipate Black militancy as early as 1963, by 1968 the psychological tendency of the President to “imagine dissent as a gigantic conspiracy led by his enemies”, counterinsurgency acquired a prolepsis and was lubricated by the stereotyping of Black male militants as fanatical – “rantin’ and ravin’
radicals” – who terrorized women and children in the Black community and whose appeals to police brutality and internal colonization were not to be legitimated but rather be understood as excuses “for any unlawful or violent act” by actors who were essentially criminals and sought to justify “terrorist-type” activities.

The deployment of misandric caricatures and stereotypes to rationalize the application of deadly military force on the Black Panther Party is consistent with those deployed in the colonial, slavery and Jim-crow eras which “designated the white male “superior” to the “inferior” dark male” which rationalized protection of women “against allegedly over-sexed, barbarous male enemies.” In their work, Sabrina Serac explains that the unique combination of Black nationalism and Socialist oriented Third World internationalism that typified the Black Panther Party spurred a moral panic in the American cultural imaginary. Rather than highlighting their community work and egalitarian arguments, the media (in line with the US security establishment) engaged in an “orgy of sensationalism” that “was an obvious continuation of a much older cultural stereotypes of black Americans especially, black males.” Going back to chattel slavery, the black male image was bifurcated between depictions of Black (males) “as happy slaves”, the other of blacks as “a dangerous social menace.” With their strident militancy and “armed defiance to white oppression”, the Panthers registered as “an all-too-manifest reality” of the latter image. Despite the fact that the Panthers represented no actual threat to US sovereignty, the author argues that the challenge they posed to the legitimacy of the US police constituted a threat to “the legitimacy and ownership of authority” that had to be eliminated. 

Outlining the various cultural and academic narratives that emerged in the late 1990s in response to the popular culture and spate of biographies published by former Panthers from 1987-1993, they author explains negative stereotypes of Black male panthers – particularly surrounding Huey P. Newton — were deployed to confirm “the dirty side of the Panthers which seemed to satisfy the expectations of many people.” Journalist Hugh Pearson exploited this atmosphere with his publication Shadow of the Panther (1994), “an outrageous, macabre, and sensationalist account” of Newton which used “unreliable sources, biased interviews and suspect revelations.” In addition to this, the decade saw the Panthers be grossly oversimplified through an emphasis on the ostensible “frightful violence and hyper-masculine image of the Panthers with the aim of teaching a new generation [of black youth] the heavy price that must be paid for a culture of arms and drugs.” Stripped of all “substance and contribution as a political group”, this emphasis on male “Panther violence and danger” reached its apotheosis with the publication “of a comparison with today’s American public enemy #1: Osama Bin Laden” with Huey P. Newton. In the “Summer 2007 issue on “Facets of Black Masculinity,”” the article “A Comparison of the Political Thought of Huey P. Newton and Osama Bin Laden” by Robert Stanley Oden “draws a far-fetched comparison with the situation of the Panthers in the context of the 1960s” with Islamist activists of the War on Terrorism.

Noting the inaptness and pseudo-scholasticism of the entire endeavor, Serac explains that that this “amalgam between the BPP & Al Qaeda” is demonstrative of the fact that the image of the Black (male) Panthers has come “to reflect the projections of different fears and anxieties, sometimes reaching the status of “folk devils” in the American psyche, depending on the era in which they were being considered.” Serac concludes by emphasizing the role of scholarship in “this ongoing phenomenon”, “the treatment of the Panthers in the media, popular culture, and sometimes even academia is ultimately the result of a long tradition of lack of critical” engagement with them. This misandric application of stereotypes to the Panthers is consistent with the
application of counterinsurgent techniques to subvert them and in counterinsurgencies more generally. Indeed, in Black America, Vietnam, Iraq like “all counterinsurgencies anywhere, “any male was fair game.” The use of police repression, federal maximum-security prisons, and assassinations to repress the Panthers were concentrated among male Panthers even though the organization promoted egalitarian conceptions of manhood and did not assign designated sex roles for women who filled its ranks.

Black Panther leaders were aware of the relationship between the stereotyping of the males of the group as criminals/internal terrorists and how this laid the basis for counterinsurgency action to subvert them and subsequently the entire Black freedom movement. Former Panther Ericka Huggins described the period of BPP repression in ways that verify the targeting of male Panthers by police. In her own words, “when police arrested and killed they tended to seek out men, thinking that men were the leaders. They didn’t know that behind the scenes women ran almost every program, were involved in every level of the party…” During his tenure as leading theoretician of the Black Panther Party, Huey P. Newton was aware of how the initial militaristic transformation of the US foreign and domestic policy around the concept of counterinsurgency was animated by the human rights revolution and the racialized constructed threat of male Panthers. In his work response of the government to the Black Panther Party (1980) he explains that officials in the Nixon administration drew up a “White House Enemies List” that in its original form included his name among a few others who belonged to “minority political parties or organizations.” This was then incorporated into a broader framework called the Hurston Plan and that “advocated the blanket presidential authorization for such practices as wiretapping, mail covers, and black-bag jobs or break-ins.” Seeking to improve inter-agency cooperation in a new way after the Cold War, “distinctions between foreign and domestic dissident groups became blurred” and the FBI’s assumed role as the “ideological security police” which led it to dedicate its “full panoply of resources to investigating the organization” once it became visible in 1967. The Panthers represented an ideological threat, but the officials codified fighting crime as a stratagem to maintain secret police operations. As Newton writes, the “FBI was also aware of and disturbed by the Panther’s efforts to build community institutions.” Continuing, he explains that the executive branch was so threatened by this that “the one survival program that seemed most laudatory--that of providing free breakfasts to children was pinpointed by J. Edgar Hoover as the real long-range threat to America.” The rationale behind this was

“…that children participating in the program were being propagandized, which simply meant they were taught ideas, or an ideology, that the FBI and Hoover disliked. Yet Hoover was not so naive as to believe an overt ideological war was any longer sufficient to garner the support or non-interference necessary for the bureau to destroy the Panthers. A better rationale or cover for the public would have to be employed. This new cover for secret police operations was, as the Huston Plan suggested, a crusade against criminals and terrorists. Now, the administration would fight "crime," not ideologies.”

The tactics employed against them sought to systematically criminalize Panther leaders to cast a negative doubt on their public reputation. But they also included extortion and snitch-jackets. The ideological force of the criminal trope made the narcotics cover particularly effective. Using the strategic advantage of public fear about the “deadly [Black militant] threat to the children of
American citizens and their property”, officials erected the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) which was to be “a new superagency to direct the counterintelligence activities against the BPP and other dissident groups.”

From the information available through declassified documents, this attack was with supplemented with coordinated work from the IRS, CIA and a special counterintelligence operation conducted by the FBI dubbed COINTELPRO (one of many programs deployed to subvert the insurgency of Black militancy). Using tactics that were tried and tested over the years of application in the foreign domain like never before, COINTELPRO targeted Black dissidents with most of its subversive efforts according to a racial calculus which meant that it was “Blacks, and the Panthers in particular, who bore the brunt of the damage.”

However, Newton observes that “the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations found, [T]he White Hate COINTELPRO also used comparatively few techniques which carried a risk of serious physical, emotional, or economic damage to the targets, while the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO used such techniques extensively.”

For his part, Black Panther Party lieutenant and former political prisoner Dhoruba Bin-Wahad argues that the military isolation of the Black America – itself “a very important aspect of U.S. foreign policy” – their capacity for armed self-defense was easily eradicated, leaving the weaknesses of the community could be fed upon. Establishing the psychic basis of the FBI’s assault on the BPP in the same logics that has spurred the development of counter-terrorism as the basis of contemporary counterinsurgency warfare doctrine, Dhoruba explains the reasoning behind the US government’s assault as “psycho-sexual” in origin. The American mind has an intense fear when considering “the thought of asserting Black manhood” and “cannot deal with the threat that it represents.”

This, Bin-Wahad avers, was the “idea that had to be destroyed” as it was embodied by the Panthers and their principled claim to the right to self-defense. This psycho-sexual aspect goes back to the chattel slavery system and Bin-Wahad notes how these dynamics were also present in lynchings which “invariably involved the dismemberment of sexual organs” and is reflective of the anthropological distinctions made between whites as “true” representations of humanity and Blacks as “animals or chattel, subhumans” at the basis of the US social order. This basic distinction between the white and Black register of humanity is to be always upheld and abided by. As it relates to the repression of Blacks and the development of counterinsurgency wars administrated around the globe, Bin-Wahad points toward the same organizational goals identified by Newton: improved interagency cooperation and the development of the Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force (JATTF). Bin-Wahad’s legal case (which saw him framed with murder of two police officers) was the pilot case for JATTF. On this basis, the JATTF institutionalized methods of “disrupt the overt organizations” of the Black Liberation Movement based on “purely military tactics.”

This has also led to the “development of SWAT teams” in the US and other quick response emergency teams on the local and national levels. SWAT teams, Bin-Wahad explains, generated directly from the clashes between the Panthers and police throughout the country. In response to the fact that Black Panther offices “tended to be fortified and heavily armed,” police began to use “APCs—armored personnel carriers—and helicopters” and SWAT teams based on BUT (Basic Unit Tactics) “utilizing advanced weaponry training that you find in the military, adapted to the urban situation.”

Another conduit to the extension of counterinsurgency on nonwhites and the Third World was the war on drugs. As Bin-Wahad explains, the entire “idea of a war on drugs is a domestic
war policy” that was derived from the mechanism used to exert “economic and political control” of the formerly colonized portions of the world.\footnote{cxlii} With a surplus and potentially rebellious segment of the population the answer is the creation of a new place in society for these people: Prison. US administrators reasoned that they needed to “[b]uild more prisons. You can’t employ them, you can’t educate them, because the economy can’t provide jobs for them” so with a declaration of a war on drugs “you can go on to build armies, based on waging this war on drugs.”\footnote{cxliii} Within this new global paradigm/dichotomy of power after the subversion of the Soviet Union, Bin-Wahad argues that anti-terrorism be understood as substituting anti-communism in the wake of glasnost and the nationalist threat of fundamentalist Islam. In addition to communism, terrorism and its antithesis (counter-terrorism) have substituted itself “for blatant racism” so that as opposed to hanging “Black folks by a tree and lynch them”, white America declares “them terrorists” and eliminate them as a threat to civilization.\footnote{cxliv} With the transformation of the East-West dichotomy of power resolved, fundamentalist Islam and the world’s racialized populations represents the new global threat to Euro-American (Liberal) forms of governance. In his own words on the role of terrorism and its function in laying the basis for modern military action, Bin-Wahad explains that

> “Terrorism is being used because the conflict is no longer intended to be East vs. West. That no longer satisfies the industry of the Russians or of the United States, but they have a common basis: they are racists in Moscow and they are racists in Washington, and they both have the same European historical root. They have to continue to control the European empires, be it the empire in Asia—which is called the Soviet Socialist Republic or be it the empire in the Third World Latin America or Africa. In order to fight that war, they have to fight terrorism.”\footnote{cxlv}

In his article, \textit{A Citizens’ Peace Force (1974)} Newton explicitly identifies an epistemological link between the sophistication in militarized policing towards counterinsurgency and counter-insurgent style repression. Knowledge itself, Newton argues, was being harnessed for the benefit of the military-police apparatus. In his own words, “[s]ince Watts, domestic counter-insurgency has become a “growth industry”’ due to both a spate of new police agencies who have felt “the pinch of the reduced Pentagon budgets of the losing wars in Asia” and the “rising fear of” even more ghetto rebellions.\footnote{cxlii} Newton coined ‘the police-military-academic industrial complex’ to refer to an epistemological link between the CIA’s penetration into “local law enforcement at the personnel level, the government funded think-tanks [that] ideologize the ‘world-view’ or ‘mind-set’ of our domestic government and law enforcement” and the militarized political economy of knowledge production acts as the guiding force of assigning value and the utilization of knowledge towards counterinsurgency with the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) as a funding source provided by the federal government.\footnote{cxlvi} As Newton explains, the “basic structure of a police-military-academic industrial complex is already built and this complex is growing rapidly.”\footnote{cxlvii} With the federal government giving “central direction and finances it with tax dollars; business provides products for a growing and profitable market; and the universities contribute brainpower and knowledge.”\footnote{cxlviii} At the same time, Newton continues, the “LEAA is preparing the way to an efficient national police network by streamlining and standardizing all aspects of police operations from recruitment and selection procedures and training curricula to intelligence, communications and crime reporting systems, to equipment and weapons acquisition.”\footnote{cxlix} This entails the transformation of “40,000 poorly funded, untrained and
undisciplined police departments into a force that is well-trained, well-disciplined and well-equipped with the latest technological breakthroughs, many of which were developed and tested by the Army for counter-insurgency warfare in Vietnam.’’

Tracing this epistemological link between the counterinsurgent aspirations of the department of defense and late 20th century counterinsurgency practices, anthropologist David H. Price buttresses Newton’s observations, documenting that the CIA and the Pentagon have historically used funding fronts throughout the 1950s and 1960s for the purposes of using “cultural anthropological knowledge to design effective means of counterinsurgency.’’ This weaponization of knowledge was by no means unique to anthropology being that the Cold War laid the basis for all disciplines or human sciences to be weaponized toward the aspirations of US imperial interests. Importantly though, Price explains the this weaponization of knowledge has roots in pacification programs going back to the settler colonial Indian War that birthed the US state apparatus wherein “the U.S. military and Department of the Interior used ethnographic knowledge to assist in what we would now recognize as “counterinsurgency operations” by using knowledge of Indian groups to assist in the deployment” of these tactics as “native groups were cordoned off, moved and isolated in camps and reservations.’’ This yoking of disciplinary knowledge to the national security apparatus was grounded on the “false promise of using cultural anthropological knowledge to design effective means of counterinsurgency that has been the most enduringly attractive feature of anthropology for the CIA and the Pentagon’’ – especially during the 1950s and 1960s. As Price explains, “[T]he Church Committee found that, in the 1960s, the CIA channeled funds to unwitting scholars working in geographic regions of interest to the CIA” and that “the funding of one project over another shaped the form and direction of research that transformed the discipline in profound unexamined ways.’’ Again, these massive shifts were not limited to the discipline of anthropology. In the aftermath of World War II, Marxism and its Hegelian (Stalinist) dialectical vision of history culminating in a worker’s paradise was “seen as the inevitable wave of the future” and “was winning adherents across the world.’’ This necessitated the positing of a philosophical alternative on behalf of the Liberal-Capitalist West. For its part, Stalinist dialectics had two advantages in the early Cold War: first, it had “a strong pseudoscientific façade in the form of its so-called laws of history” which “rendered the triumph of Communism necessary and predictable” and it also had a “narrative of history that its capitalist counterpart simply could not match” which envisioned “capitalist contradictions building to a revolutionary cataclysm” that “promised a much faster transition to a society of general abundance.’’ By contrast, the capitalist narrative of history “began only around the sixteenth century, with the rise of the free market” and “needed a counter-discourse” to dismiss the grand historical plot advanced by Stalinist dialectics. The basis of this counter-discourse was a new (pseudoscientific) theory of human rationality grounded naturalized voting and market behavior: rational choice theory (RCT).

In substance, RCT contained a “series of point-for-point contrasts” with Marxism and pointed towards market and voting behavior wherein “the only thing that ever happened was that individuals made free choices in order to maximize their utility.’’ As opposed to demanding the “subordination of individual aspirations to the common good, RCT held that there is no such thing” and simply “presupposed that the very thing at issue in the intellectual struggle between Marxism and capitalism: the existence of free markets and elections in the first place.’’ On its basis, “the United States credibly assume[d] the global mission of defending free markets and voters’
democracy wherever they existed, and of bringing them to places where they did not.” 

Thereafter, it was to be institutionalized in economics departments, “through the academy in general; then through American society itself; and finally across the world” through counterinsurgent pacification. Within the paradigm of population-centric counterinsurgency, the strategy of “controlled escalation” posited unruly and insurgent populations as “rational choosers: when the war became too painful for them, they would stop fighting it.” In other words, rebellious populations are understood to be confronting “a choice, that of whether or not to join (or help) the Americans, and it is assumed that they will make that choice on the basis of their expectations of utility.” By the late 1960s, this rational-choice theoretic was the chassis of US counterinsurgency and order-maintenance policing as policymakers repudiated the “hearts and minds” approach to pacification. As Stuart Schrader explains, despite its empirical ambiguities, Harvard economist Charles Wolf deployed RCT to introduce an iteration of counterinsurgency, one the RAND corporation favored. In line with the broader paradigm of modernization, this new approach to counterinsurgency was premised on a simple goal: to “draw support away from communists by offering a better, more targeted carrot [i.e. economic support] and then continue to support those who took that carrot, to keep it from falling into the wrong hands” while at the same time allowing the “areas under the control of the enemy to languish, so as to highlight the difference in quality of life for those” in US controlled areas. Thus, Wolf “dispensed with the premise that counterinsurgency required winning hearts and minds through the provision of social welfare” and made “reassessments to three pillars common to thinking behind pacification: the beliefs that insurgents and counterinsurgents vied for popular support because they both required it to succeed; that neutralizing popular support for insurgents could be achieved by providing economic and social benefits; and that socioeconomic aid was essential for counterinsurgency.”

Guided by RCT, he argued that the best way to conduct insurgency was to input aid on the condition that its provision was subsequent to “the kind of behavior the government wants to promote among the people.” Within this system of social engineering, insurgency was understood as “depending on the conversion of “inputs” into “outputs” – focusing on the latter was “labor- and capital-intensive” and so emphasizing the former “which did not necessarily require military intervention, was a better approach.” Thus, Wolf argued, [c]oercion to control behaviors” was the goal of counterinsurgency. Because the war in Vietnam “discredited the hearts and minds strategy,” it cleared the way for the emergence of RCT behavior control frameworks to be applied in both military foreign counterinsurgency and domestic policing endeavors.

Moreover, the push to master counterinsurgency by the security apparatus hinged on a “laser beam focus on the use of technology to bolster effectiveness.” Huey Newton has identified the factor of technology and information as crucial factors in maintaining US imperial authority in his essays. As he explains in the technology question: 1972, the surplus “gained through expropriation from the people, including slavery proper but also chattel slavery followed by wage slavery” has yielded “a reservoir of information” which allowed America to “produce the kinds of experimental agencies and universities that created the information explosion.” Through this superior technology and information the US ruling class discredits “wars of liberation, especially the establishment of what we call provisional revolutionary governments, by pouring in the very bounty they stole into the puppet administrations” set up to execute their will. Indeed, a breakthrough in technological capacity to master counterinsurgency and “modernize America’s military posture to meet” the threat of anti-colonial revolution occurring in
foreign and domestic domains occurred on two levels: computing and anthropomorphic. Through an agency housed in the Pentagon (named the Advanced Research Projects Agency known today as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or DARPA), America’s pacification efforts to subvert anti-colonial revolutions around the globe to stop “the perceived global spread of communism” laid the basis for the development of “computer-aided information technology.”

As Yasha Levine explains in Surveillance Valley (2018), the internet was generated from this proleptic effort: “an attempt to build computer systems that could collect and share intelligence, watch the world in real time, and study and analyze people and political movements with the ultimate goal of predicting and preventing social upheaval.” Thus, the late 20th century endeavor to master counterinsurgency entailed a weaponization and rewriting of knowledge itself. Aspiring towards the application of pacification techniques around the world, the Pentagon “started “throwing money at social and behavioral scientists, hiring them to make sure America’s “counterinsurgency weapon” always hit its target, regardless of the culture in which it was being fired” and thus “ARPA became one of the main pipelines for these programs, helping to weaponize anthropology, psychology, and sociology and putting them in the service of American counterinsurgency.”

This effort led to a reconceptualization of human life itself under the paradigm of cybernetics, which “posited that human beings, like all living things, were information processing machines.” It is this new technology and paradigm of knowledge from which the US military and defense industry has sought to “create computers with what we now call artificial intelligence” and proclaim a “messianic understanding of computing, in which computation was the underlying matter of everything in the social world and could therefore be brought under state-capitalist military control—centralized, hierarchical control.” During this same period, the technological leap in computing was also conducted in the anthropomorphic domain wherein the hijacking of the nervous systems of US military and police officers to kill the enemy has been amplified in a way it hasn’t been by any other empire in human history.

In his controversial book, On Killing retired army officer David Grossman outlines the anthropomorphic developments that led the US to revolutionize the killing potential of its soldiers and police officers. He frames his study by demonstrating the connection between the institutionalization of research findings from Brigadier General SLA Marshall’s study of firing rates of men in war and US dominance in fire and close combat since Vietnam. Marshall’s conclusion was “that the vast majority of combatants throughout history, at the moment of truth when they could and should kill the enemy, have found themselves to be “conscientious objectors”” who were unable to complete the killing act. Crucial to Grossman’s argument is the observation that only 2 percent of humanity is “predisposed toward what has been termed "aggressive psychopathic" tendencies” that allow them to kill in combat with no negative psychological repercussions. Despite debates over the methodology of Marshall’s study, modern military (and then police) training was organized to override the powerful human instinct against killing another member of its own species. Whether or not one agrees with his ideological reasoning and conclusions, the sophistication of military and its hijacking of the human nervous system towards the act of killing in warfare after WW2 is simply a fact. As Grossman details, this institutional model includes:

- Using man-shaped targets instead of bullseye targets for marksmanship.
- Practicing and drilling how soldiers would actually fight
• Multiple Modes of distancing the individual from the act to ease the kill: this mean
  dispersing responsibility for killing throughout the group, or
• Displacing responsibility for the killing onto an authority figure (social learning via
  Drill sergeants)

Grossman’s work dedicates most of its space to demonstrating the effectiveness of this
model by the time of the US’s counterinsurgent intervention in Vietnam. He writes that with this
modernization, US military boot camps deployed desensitization techniques and were transformed
into spaces that conducted the “deification of killing as having been unheard of in World War I,
rare in World War II, and increasingly present in Korea, and thoroughly institutionalized in
Vietnam.” This new approach to desensitization stemmed from a combination of (1) Pavlovian
classical conditioning and (2) Skinnerian operant conditioning in modern military and police
training. (1) was present in the man-shaped targets placed into marksmanship training. But (2) is
built into the conditioned stimulus of positive reinforcement in mimicry of the act of killing on the
battlefield. As he writes,

“Most modern infantry leaders understand that realistic training with immediate
feedback to the soldier works, and they know that it is essential for success and
survival on the modern battlefield. But the military is not, as a rule, a particularly
introspective organization, and it has been my experience that those ordering,
conducting, and participating in this training do not understand or even wonder (1)
what makes it work or (2) what its psychological and sociological side effects might
be. It works, and for them that is good enough. What makes this training process
work is the same thing that made Pavlov’s dogs salivate and B. F. Skinner’s rats
press their ban. What makes it work is the single most powerful and reliable
behavior modification process yet discovered by the field of psychology, and now
applied to the field of warfare: operant conditioning.”

These two factors work in tandem with ideological “denial defense mechanisms” which
are “unconscious methods of dealing with traumatic experiences” which Grossman regards as a
“remarkable contribution from modern U.S. Army training.” With these mechanisms, “the
soldier has rehearsed the process so many times that when he does kill in combat he is able to, at
one level, deny to himself that he is actually killing another human being” this “rehearsal and
realistic mimicry of the act of killing permit the soldier to convince himself that he has only
“engaged” another target.” These are such powerful psychological factors that together they
can cause counterintuitive side-effects. As Grossman explains, the programs of desensitization,
conditioning, and denial defense mechanisms combined with “participation in a war, may make it
possible to share the guilt of killing without ever having killed.” An important subset of the
classical conditioning component to ensuring combatants kill is cultural distance from the enemy
or racial dehumanization. Through the psychologizing of soldiers that “their opponents are not
really human but inferior forms of life, then their natural resistance to killing their own species
will be reduced.” Though Hitler and Nazi leadership is identified by Grossman as penultimate
examples of the explosiveness of racial dehumanization on the battlefield, he explains that
“European imperial defeat and domination of the “darker races”” in the 20th century “was
facilitated by [similar] cultural distance factors.” Seeking to defend the position his work is
most invested in, that killing can be conducted with no negative psychological results if conducted
with certain institutional controls to usher individuals through the process of rationalization and performance, Grossman argues that the erosion of positive social rituals and demonization of Vietnam era veterans and those thereafter have interrupted the development of healthy rationalizations of killing explains the explosion of PTSD in veteran populations. Not only were Vietnam veterans the first generation to have their bonding process interrupted through short tours in the field which ruptured the strong bonds needed to rationalize killing, they were the first generation to have “‘tranquillizing drugs and phenothiazines’ administered to them “on the combat front.”

These factors were combined with broader social neglect and demonization of veterans due to anti-war protests which did not allow a “cooldown” or “cleansing” period where soldiers “received respect of their communities as stories of their experiences were told to children and relatives by proud parents and wives” – an important ritual that when denied leaves combatants unable “to purge their guilt or be assured that what they did was right” and facilitates a turning of their negative emotions inward. Thus, in the population that saw the emergence of PTSD, “the rationalization and acceptance process appears to have failed” and have been replaced with shame. For Grossman then, the proliferation of PTSD diagnoses are less from the trauma of killing and more connected to the “agony of guilt and torment created by the society’s condemnation.” Nevertheless, Grossman argues that the “newfound science of killology permits us to identify such key processes” that ensure the completion of the killing act with no negative psychological implications. And he maintains that with proper rationalization and acceptance rituals, PTSD can be avoided altogether. Given what he sees as the virus of violence within and surrounding modern American society, he concludes with an emphasis on the continuing need to master the science of killing (killology) that makes the protector of western civilization (the military soldier/police officer) inoculated to the killing act. As he writes, “[w]e have learned how to enable the Thanatos [the death force]. We know how to take the psychological safety catch off of human beings almost as easily as you would switch a weapon from "safe" to "fire." We must understand where and what that psychological safety catch is, how it works, and how to put it back on. That is the purpose of killology[…”

Grossman’s writings are not those of an eclectic or lonesome veteran who is unconnected form the broader pillar of ideas institutionalized within the US security apparatus. In fact, Grossman’s ideas have been deeply integrated in domestic police and military training during the War on Terror. As Journalist Max Hauptman reports, Grossman’s ideas have circulated throughout the police/military sector. Hauptman explains that Grossman’s text “is on the Marine Corps Commandant’s Professional Reading List and has been part of the curriculum at the FBI and the nation’s service academies” and part of a broader infusing of domestic policing with a ‘warrior mindset’ Among other factors driven by the institutionalizing of policing as counterinsurgency, the spread of Grossman’s ideas is central to the argument that the symbiosis
between the military and policing has matured to the extent that they are no longer functionally separate domains. As journalist Rodney Balko argues in *The Rise of the Warrior Cop (2021)* the rise of the US police state and the identification of a ‘battlefield mentality’ that constitutes the institutional blueprint for modern policing spawned a crime control apparatus that is functionally antagonistic to a free society. Balko explains that as police have added paramilitary functions through SWAT teams (which were piloted by the chief of the LAPD in a raid on Black Panthers), these institutional changes have spurred a “new wave of dehumanization” that targets racialized populations and even some portions of the citizenry as enemy combatants.

While Balko’s study neglects attention to the function of racialization in the dehumanization and the role of US militarized police forces in managing racialized populations through death, recent findings indicate that police violence is the sixth leading cause of death for young Black men whose lifetime risks of being killed by police is the highest among all race-sex groups in the country. In accordance with the misandric application of deadly force characteristic of liberal counterinsurgencies going back to the colonial period, contemporary psychological evidence suggests “that outgroup men are perceived as more threatening than either ingroup men or outgroup women” and thus Black males’ demonization continues to provide the basis for the completion of the killing act by agents of the state. Said differently, whites tend to “perceive Black men as more threatening than White men and both Black and White women.” Accordingly, the social processes that drive the targeting of Black males for removal from society by US (counterinsurgent) police forces are also guided by the negative stereotypes held by whites about this group which “are more similar to their perception of the men from racial-ethnic groups than of the women” and leads to the dehumanization of the entire race with tropes of “violence, promiscuity, and lack of intelligence” based on “their beliefs about black males.”

Though these patterns reached a stage of maturation in the 21st century Global War on Terror, their roots lie in the emergence of the US as the species’ first truly planetary empire in the late 20th century. As the conditions of rule shifted in the late 20th century there were – for the first time in human history – no longer nations or communities whose existence was “external and independent of” the US empire which “is a nation-state that has transformed itself into a power controlling all the world’s lands and people.” The primary managerial method institutionalized since this period to maintain US imperial rule is a spatially and temporally indeterminate counterinsurgent endeavor. This counterrevolutionary crusade is grounded in modernization theory which envisages the US as a power who “must shield Third World regimes as they evolve[d] through stages” of “economic development toward viable capitalist economic structures” and ensure that they are protected from “being subverted by anti-capitalist insurgents.” As an artifact of white humanist liberal thought, developmental theory combined “American wisdom and generosity” with “the marvels of [US led] social engineering” as the basis for the remaking of all the world’s people and societies into its own image. Accordingly, it “carried forward long-established American views on race” albeit in a new language of culture—essentially “recasting the old racial [eugenic] hierarchy into cultural terms” that allows US leaders to justify the superiority of their own kind through a new lexicon.

These developments in knowledge and military power cannot be reduced to a “rightward swing” of the biohumanist conception of MAN2 or *homo economicus* as Wynter has argued. Wynter’s account of MAN2 or *homo oeconomicus* implies a reification and homogenized desire
of the liberal democratic civilizational kind of existence that is animated by a bifurcated sociogeny of those prefigured as “naturally selected-eugenic humans” (optimally the white, western, consumer/breadwinner) and the “naturally dysselected/dysgenic” portions of humanity (the racialized “others”, Global Poor, unemployed and the planetary environment). She periodizes the emergence of this genre as replacing MAN1 or homo politicus/virtuous citizen, the civic humanist conceptualization of humanity which legitimated the rule of the rational, land (and slave) owning European aristocracy in the terms of the sovereign state (as opposed to the feudal nobility) in the 16th century. Wynter’s framework of homo oeconomicus remains relevant. Indeed, the discipline of economics still sustains our current epistemological order. However, the terms by which the technocultural and reification (or supraculturalism) fallacies that articulate the modern liberal descriptive statement of the human self as one “whose economic decision making and self-interested pursuit of accumulation of capital as the means of production” now employs rational choice theory as its model of cognition and is no longer represented as isomorphic with humanity in its innumerable particularities in sociogenic ‘eugenic/dysgenic’ terms.

As I have labored to demonstrate here, with the struggle of the Cold War and anti-colonial revolutions spearheaded by those negated by MAN2’s eugenic/dysgenic sociogenic code, US empire introduced new cultural terms to sustain the stratification of human kinds and refined (counterinsurgent) imperial managerial methods on the basis of rational choice theory. These changes have laid the basis for the emergence of a new kind of MAN or order of being in the mid-20th century. This rewriting of knowledge/human sciences and the concomitant planetary application of pacification techniques to anticipate and subvert any anticolonial insurgency from the Third World/Black ghettoes has shifted “the territory” and ushered in a new kind of ontological-epistemological (sociogenic) order on which the struggle for The Human will take place this new millennium: MAN3 or homo homini lupus (man as wolf to another man AKA MAN as Praetorian). That is to say, the emergence of homo politicus/virtuous citizen (MAN1) and its nineteenth century biohumanist reinvention as homo oeconomicus/virtuous breadwinner (MAN2) premised on the symbolic life/death codes of eugenic selection and dysselection foreshadows a third reinvention premised on a proleptic logic: the genre homo homini lupus/Man as Wolf to another Man which materialized to legitimate political, economic and social dominance of (US imperial) Liberal capitalist society, which idealizes the human being as the white counterinsurgent guardian of the Liberal status quo (valorizing the counterinsurgent/Praetorian or armed defender of US empire alongside the breadwinner/consumer bourgeois citizen of the Western “democratic” liberal state) whose symbolic (sociogenic) code uses cultural valuations to overrepresent itself as if it were the human as it/we actually exist in our innumerable local particular instantiations and through counterinsurgency acts as the normative arbiter of expressions of our species-life thorough the application of deadly force (killology) to those forms which threaten its dominance via the deployment of highly technologized, population centric practices of coercion, detention and the selective killing of insurgents (‘irreconcilables’) as the primary forces of social regulation.

Section 2: The “Fangs Out, Kill, Kill, Kill” Mentality: Homo Homini Lupus (Wolf-MAN) AKA the Mechanized Praetorian (MAN3) in the 21st Century Global Wars on Bodies and Ideas

“In fact, my research indicates that drone warfare is a logical progression from COIN (and let us not forget that drones often provided aerial support for counterinsurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq—not to mention that COIN in
Afghanistan was accompanied by air strikes.) Innovation in drone technology is driven by democratic norms that center civilian protection and troop protection, key components of US identity. Perhaps this connection sounds counterintuitive, given that the United States treats military-age males differently than “women and children,” both in life and death. These contradictory tensions characterize US warfare since September 11, 2001. Counterinsurgents seek to win populations that the US stigmatizes, and US foreign policy officials characterize drone strikes as necessary to protect civilian life, even though civilian status is treated with legal ambivalence.” – Sarah Shoker

“The death of a suspect in the Dallas police shootings marks the first time U.S. police officers have used a robot to kill someone, according to Texas and national experts.

Hours long negotiations with the man broke down into an exchange of gunfire, Dallas Police Chief David Brown said at a news conference Friday morning. At that point, the officers deployed a robot armed with an explosive.

“We saw no other option but to use our bomb robot and place a device on its extension for it to detonate where the suspect was,” Brown said.

The announcement left law enforcement experts nationwide searching in vain for a precedent. New America Foundation robotics expert Peter W. Singer told the Associated Press that the suspect's death was the first time to his knowledge that police have used a robot to kill. Willard Oliver, a professor of criminal justice at Sam Houston State University, a former police officer and retired military member, said soldiers in Iraq had used bomb robots against combatants, but American police officers never had.” – The Texas Tribune

In his book Unmanned (2015) William Arkin reframes the nature of the introduction of drone technology and observes some of the long-range consequences of it on the nature of 21st century US counterinsurgent war operations. Rather than 9/11, he shows that the roots of the drone platform that has transformed the nature of sovereignty lie in the Gulf War of the early 1990s. Unmanned technologies “just then emerging—computing power, digital optics, satellite navigation, ubiquitous (and cheap) long-range control, a worldwide and robust network of communications—would form the back end of every military and civilian development to follow.” For Arkin, it is important to express the extent to which these new kinds of technologically enhanced killing machines (he calls drones ‘black boxes’) gather intelligence and data in ways that allowed the intense de-emphasis of physical troops on the physical battlefield. In his own words, after the development of drone platforms from Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and Predator Drone platforms in the Gulf and Kosovo Wars, “everything was now about the data” – “it wouldn’t be much of an exaggeration to say that machines outnumbered men.” He explains further that, “the inaugural use of an armed Predator ended up being an introduction to the fundamental divide that exists between the world of the manned and the unmanned, as war begins to slip dangerously into the realm of video games and button-pushing murder.” Continuing, Arkin explains that there “are wars and secret wars, special and unspecial operations,
civilians acting as military men and the actual field commanders being constantly diverted to tend to some promised silver bullet.”

Within this new millennium, unmanned warfare is presented as “safer, more flexible, newer, and certainly more alluring—[though it] might demand greater human attention but also starts us down the road of devaluing human input.”

As a consequence of Arkin’s analysis, there is no longer a question about the primary role of counterinsurgency as a managerial technique to maintain US security interests – with this new global and technological capacity, all former reigning doctrines of warfare (be they counterinsurgency or maneuver warfare approaches) are now symbiotic with the broader supremacy of the Data Machine: a permanent machine which now exists and is premised on targeting and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance). Thus, the essence of the global war (on terror) now waged by the US – independent of politicians or presidents – is initiated and focused on “individual targets – fixed, mobile and even individual humans – [who are] identified and validated and located and tracked form the ground or sky; they are identified through imagery, electronic emissions, communications, or other intelligence.”

In his own words, Arkin writes “…no matter how many red lines the generals draw in the sand, no matter how many routes north and south are labeled with military precision to suggest battles of the past, no matter how many gaps in the defenses are studied for breaching, no matter how many counterinsurgency doctrines are written or how many cultural intelligence programs are created, the Data Machine has become the supreme authority and influential silent partner in all that has unfolded. After 9/11, the United States moved the Machine to Kuwait and the Gulf states, positioning it in obliging foreign lands to extend the unblinking eye and its accompanying broadband to dead spots on the globe, which then meant Afghanistan. It only made practical sense after the fall of Kabul not to close up the hot spot and send the network home. That same Machine, growing in global capacity, then expanded into a targeted killing campaign in Pakistan and Yemen and Somalia and elsewhere, this time with no boots on the ground, at least not the boots of old. Drones were only a minor part of what emerged: the black boxes themselves accumulated and got better; then came every new platform from Constant Hawk to Harvest Hawk to space-based systems and even the cybervirtual that is body-worn. A permanent high-capacity global hot spot followed through the pumping up of satellite communications and the tetherless network, the be-anywhere air communications node. Combat troops left, but the Machine spiraled and perfected. And then, even as forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan, the pace of development didn’t stop. Cemented into permanent and invisible space, the Machine could support global operations anywhere. But it was a particular kind of operation—targeting—and that in itself seemed to define both American involvement and its limits.”

Arkin’s analysis is valuable and exposes enormous gaps in how scholars understand how computing/information technology and data collection has changed the idea of war and the approaches to counterinsurgency by US empire in its spatially and temporally indeterminate fight against terrorism. With a similar framing deployed by Arkin, Paul Scharre explains in Army of None (2018) that an ongoing technological revolution has brought us to a crucial threshold in humanity’s relationship to war. In six portions, his text explores the rapidly evolving world of
next-generation robotics. Scharre outlines the strides in autonomy and identifies the logical consequences of this techno-arms race: autonomous weapons that complete military engagements with no human intervention. Disambiguating the notion of autonomy, he explains that it does not imply free will, but rather that such systems integrate goal-oriented behavior and take into account a range of variables to consider the best option. Rather than an entirely new emergent capacity, he explains that (semi) autonomous weapons are grounded in breakthroughs of the mid-19th century introduction of the Gatling and Machine guns. More importantly, Scharre centers the Department of Defense (DOD) as the major actor in the contemporary robotics revolution, laying the foundation for the military of the future with a host of capabilities premised on an aspiration of perfecting warfare operations and the strategic prevention of surprise attacks. As he explains, “few actors loom larger in the robotics revolution than the US Department of Defense.”

Nevertheless, “defense leaders are concerned about the United States falling behind” and have gone on to pioneer programs to actualize new weapons using deep learning neural networks and algorithms. Citing the work of Bob Work – the #2 bureaucrat in the DOD – Scharre explains that robotics, AI and its aspiration towards artificial general intelligence represent a complete paradigm shift in how humanity will fight wars. As he writes, “from 2014–17, Work was the driving force behind the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy and its focus on human-machine teaming.”

In Work’s “vision of future conflicts, AI will work in concert with humans in human-machine teams” and this “blended human-plus-machine approach could take many forms.” Consequently, “[h]umans could be enhanced through exoskeleton suits and augmented reality, enabled by machine intelligence” which means “AI systems could help humans make decisions, much like in “centaur chess,” where humans are assisted by chess programs that analyze possible moves.” Continuing, Scharre explains that “[I]n some cases, AI systems may perform tasks on their own with human oversight, particularly when speed is an advantage, similar to automated stock trading.” These weapons of the future “will be more intelligent and cooperative, swarming adversaries.” Collectively, “these advances may lead to a “revolution” in warfare” which Work characterizes as “‘periods of sharp, discontinuous change [in which] . . . existing military regimes are often upended by new more dominant ones, leaving old ways of warfare behind.” Thus, Scharre’s overarching argument is that the victors of tomorrow’s war “will be those who best exploit AI.” While Arkin’s and Scharre’s works are necessary to grasp the enormous influence of artificial intelligence, data, drones and information on modern practices of warfare, they don’t disambiguate the relationship between (past practices of colonial warfare and) modern counterinsurgencies, the explosion of advance computing technology within that context, nor how drones and gender ideologies function to fuel racial stereotypes that rationalize the killing act – via counterinsurgent ground forces or drone strikes – by making the boys and men high contrast targets in populations subjected to counterinsurgent forces. The push to converge the doctrinal mastery of counterinsurgency with predictive computing technology has its roots in WW2. Though, a qualitative leap in the technologization of counterinsurgency did occur during the Vietnam war with the goal of preempting and stopping revolution before “its initiators even know they were headed down the path to political violence.” This was typified by projects Camelot and Cambridge – both being spearheaded by the synthesis between military and academic efforts. The former (whose full name was “Methods for Prediction and Influencing Social Change and internal War Potential”) had an ultimate goal: “to build a radar system for left-wing revolutions—a computerized early warning system that could predict and prevent political
movements before they ever got off the ground.” While the latter picked up where the former left off and sought to construct “data banks” that compiled and made available to military analysts and behavioral scientists a barrage of information that concretized a truly planetary system of counterinsurgency. This included the following:

- Public opinion polls from all countries
- Cultural patterns of all the tribes and peoples of the world
- Archives on comparative communism… files on the contemporary world communist movements
- Political participation of various countries…. This includes such variables as voting, membership in associations, activity of political parties, etc.
- Youth movements
- Mass unrest and political movements under conditions of rapid social change
- Data on national integration, particularly in “plural” societies; the integration of ethnic, racial and religious minorities; the merging or splitting of present political units
- International propaganda output
- Peasant attitudes and behavior
- International armament expenditures and trends

Documenting the political, ideational, and bureaucratic ecosystem that legitimized violent military action against threats in the post-9/11 period, Sarah Shoker explores the “military-age male” as a category and demonstrates how it was deployed to identify insurgent combatants who persist by blending into civilian environments in her work, *Military-Age Males in Counterinsurgency and Drone Warfare* (2020). Though US officials argue that military-age males are not automatically assumed to be combatants, security professionals nevertheless used the trope of the racialized male to interpret the battlespace and distinguish between which parts of the population required development and the application of deadly force, respectively. This had the implication of contradicting the stated aims of the war on terrorism to begin with: civilian protection. As Shoker shows, an analysis of the Obama administration’s move to exclude adolescent boys and men from drone warfare’s collateral damage count and these same tendencies with combatant identification under Bush deteriorated, rather than enhanced civilian protection: an idea at the chassis of the US’ (and Western states more generally) foreign policy agenda and rationalization for invasions of formerly colonized territories. Shoker also discusses the link between counterinsurgency, drone warfare, and emerging trends in artificial intelligence and autonomy in weapons systems. The virtues of Shoker’s monograph is in her clarity around the genealogy of the ‘military-age male’ (MAM) in US counterinsurgency wars; how the construction of men and boys of racialized and formerly colonized groups as threats/risks is driven by western gender categories and the modern articulation of liberal subjecthood (understood as ‘women and children’ and premised on RCT) in counterinsurgent campaigns; and how the explosion of data and knowledge production characterized by drone warfare (especially ‘signature strikes’) is a logical extension of counter-insurgent/asymmetric military endeavors of liberal-democratic states in previous centuries. The genealogy of the MAM category is the subject of Shokers’s first chapter. Recall, the nature of counterinsurgencies is that combatants are disguised as civilians. This has led the US to develop “an alternative visual vocabulary to highlight” these “low-contrast” targets and sort them within the security theater as high-contrast ones. Rather than an objective
description, Shoker urges readers to understand the MAM as a “mode of thought” that “tells counterinsurgents, drone crews, and military planners where to look” when applying deadly force and pacifying populations. Said differently, this label functions as a cognitive short-cut that institutionalizes a link between violence and racialized maleness as a relationship worth monitoring – using physiology to “reorder social life” during counterinsurgencies and thus allowing boys and men to be “targeted with differentiated treatment, not because of what they have done, but because of who they are.”

The origin of this ideational device is in the push in western theoretical and legal thinking to protect civilians. In line with the colonial narrative of the ‘civilizing mission’, American (and liberal states more generally) foreign policy experts “link civilizational progress with gender (women) and children” who are coded as “civilians” who ought to be protected from the maladies of warfare. Though it was deployed in the US counterinsurgency in Vietnam, the MAM category has endured and reemerged as a “way of making sense of war” and as a “cognitive shorthand that is used to make sense of security theaters” within the prevailing “civilian/combatant” legal distinctions. Again, this does not imply that MAMs are combatants. Rather, the MAM is better understood as the “not-civilian”—male bodies who “become a shorthand for violence even when violence is not committed” which works contradictorily by allowing certain citizens to be killed with impunity. Western gender ideas are at the core of this cognitive nexus, and has functioned in western theoretical/legal thinking to make sex differences the basis for the notion of the civilian and justification for measuring male bodies (sometimes also children) in terms of violent potential. As Shoker explains,

These ideas stretch back to Hugo Grotius, who was foundational in providing the theoretical justifications for what is now known as the principle of distinction in international law, codified in the 1949 IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Grotius argued that nation-building was a task left for men as women could not “devise wars…the difference in sex that authority is not held in common but the husband is the head of the wife…[t]he woman under the eye of the man and under his guardianship”. Consequently, women did not possess sufficient authority to wage war because they were under the guardianship of their husbands.

Thus, western thought prefigures women as “innocent” by nature which works to stabilize distinctions “between those who may and may not be killed” by appealing to discourses of gender which “establish sex as an ontological basis for distinguishing between the two” to rationalize the targeting of outgroup males with deadly military force. As a result of these patterns of thinking, male bodies have been imbued with violent capacities and consequently guide counterinsurgent forms of “gendered population management and technologies of surveillance” which legitimized US security professionals’ omission of boys and men from the collateral (civilian) damage counts of drone/counterinsurgent campaigns. On the role of liberal subjecthood (through rational choice anthropological accounts of subjectivity), Shoker explains that this allows the valorization of the Hobbesian state apparatus as the basis of civil society and that this stratagem works to make the home/domestic life to become sites of militarized counterinsurgent intervention. With deadly force reserved for male bodies, development aspects of counterinsurgencies were gendered and “translated to modifying life processes, environments,
social reproduction and bodily security” wherein ‘civilian power’ (aka women’s rights) was framed as a core pillar of the US foreign policy agenda.\textsuperscript{ccxxxvii} In line with this, women’s rights were understood as consonant with the overall development schema of the counterinsurgency campaign in the Middle East. As Shoker notes, within policy directives and bulletins published by the US Chiefs of Staff analyzed by her “women and girls were mentioned 133 times in 242 pages, usually in relation to “protection and empowerment” and increasing their capacity to make (often political) decisions.”\textsuperscript{ccxxxviii} To reiterate, this is in line with colonial counterinsurgencies. In these conflicts, gender (especially economic well-being to women’s rights) become central to the justification of population-centric security logic, to the navigation of “security provisions and managing the counterinsurgency terrain.”\textsuperscript{ccxxxix} Within this framework, next to risky and (potentially violent male bodies; female bodies are construed as sites of investment to animate the logic of “white men saving brown women from brown men.”\textsuperscript{ccxl} This is “a trend that did not change with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{ccxli} Thus, the deployment of knowledge and social science fosters a gendered social engineering endeavor wherein counterinsurgency wars place racialized boys and men “under increased surveillance”, subject them to systematic observation and weaponize “the information collected about them” to be “used to govern their activities.”\textsuperscript{ccxlii} In this way, the emergence of data driven technologies follow a similar misandric pattern of those that animated colonial counterinsurgent warfare techniques: tropes/information constructed about racialized males were/are deployed to rationalize their imprisonment, torture, sexual assault and violent deaths.\textsuperscript{ccxliii}

In her explanation of the relationship between drone warfare and counterinsurgency as logically related as forms of military endeavors of liberal states, Shoker makes it clear gender “was central from the early days of the drone program.”\textsuperscript{ccxliv} As she explains, the deployment of drones functions as an “anticipatory self-defense [measure] virtually anywhere in the world.”\textsuperscript{ccxlv} The gendered (misandric) logic of drone strikes are explicit in the use of ‘signature strikes’. As opposed to personality strikes which are directed at those who are known to be involved in hostilities, signature strikes are proleptic endeavors which seek to kill men before the targets’ ostensible malevolent plans come to fruition. Through racialized misandric tropes about who is a threat, these are legitimated through “risk profiles” based on observed patterns of behavior. In this way, drones build on the logic of, rather than shift from, broader counterinsurgent campaigns and are better suited for asymmetric opponents than industrial ones. Their logical relationship to counterinsurgency makes drones “particularly attractive to democratic states who see social sorting as the key to fighting modern battles.”\textsuperscript{ccxlvi} However, Shoker explains that drones are only “effective against poorly resourced non-state actors who do not have the technical capacity to contest the aerial dominance of a state” and thus should “not be thought of as an inevitable march toward technological progress, but as a relationship between greater powers and (usually) former colonies.”\textsuperscript{ccxlvii} Like counterinsurgency campaigns more broadly, drones are touted by liberal powers as more humane and precise. But Shoker shows that in fact they are “not more precise; they are simply smaller weapons and therefore less destructive.”\textsuperscript{ccxlviii} Additionally, their deployment maps on to the collection of data (patterns of life) that are gendered in the security theater. This makes physiological difference to be a cue that enabled surveillance. So, “[d]espite the diversity of cultures, gender became a standardized feature of counterinsurgencies and drone warfare.”\textsuperscript{ccxlviii} The rising prominence in data only represent the reification of these biases and the coming breakthroughs in autonomy “will not eradicate a problem borne from problematic data collection.”\textsuperscript{ccl} Thus, in practice “drone warfare acts as an extension of a counterinsurgency
paradigm centered on population control, where social spaces are reassessed according to military logic” – marking men for death while their families, the civilians who might survive “are props that policy officials cite to justify the pursuit of precision.” With this, it is clear that MAMs “have become a category that influenced the practice of war.”

The explosion of technological capacity by US security forces was not spearheaded in the new millennium and have not been limited in their application to foreign territories. The deployment of algorithmic technologies by US police in Black communities have led to reifications of racial biases in software predictions. As law professor Andrew Gunthrie Ferguson shows in *The Rise of Big Data Policing (2017)*, domestic policing has been enhanced since the introduction of predictive crime control technologies, cybernetics and big data to in line with other shifts towards population level predictive modeling in counterinsurgencies of the Global War on Terrorism. Gunthrie Ferguson explains that race has influenced these technologies thus poor Black men have been uniquely targeted by these technologies since police acquired them. The combination of social science and algorithmic data analysis has led to situation a wherein “poverty correlates with communities of color, predictive policing and intelligence-driven prosecution results in a focus on” males of minority groups. Moreover, the use of robotics – specifically Bomb robots – have also been repurposed from foreign applications in counterinsurgency operations to domestic ones administrated by police forces against the internal Black male threat. For the first time, a bomb robot which was “widely used by U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq to deal with improvised explosive devices”, was deployed within the US by Dallas Police to kill a Black male gunman who claimed to be upset over “recent killings of black people [by police] and said he wanted to kill white people – particularly white police officers.” After the shooter, US army veteran Micah Xavier Johnson sustained “a prolonged exchange of gunfire and a five-hour-long standoff” in the summer of 2016, a bomb robot was deployed to neutralize him. Again, counterinsurgency’s roots are in the late 20th century and the US’s late 20th century doctrinal mastery of counterinsurgency draws on (settler) colonial campaigns of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. Despite deep historical continuities, what changed in the 21st century iteration of counterinsurgency at the dawn of the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ is the increased capacity by the US empire for killing insurgents and those deemed irreconcilable to its security interests. As philosopher William C. Gay argues, underneath the ideological definitions that abounded from the national security strategy documents that emerged in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the US is that “a quantitative increase in killing” was marshaled for the US War on Terrorism as opposed to “a qualitative change in capability.” Citing David Luban to emphasize his point, Gay writes:

“The aim of war is not to kill the enemy—killing the enemy is the means used to achieve the real end, which is to force capitulation. In the War on Terrorism, no capitulation is possible. That means that the real aim of the war is, quite simply, to kill or capture all of the terrorists—to keep on killing and killing, capturing and capturing, until they are all gone.”

The only genuine difference between past and present practices, Gay argues, was a readiness to kill which generated from a push from the Bush Administration to conceptualize a theory of victory not hampered by the notion of self-deterrence. This aspiration was outlined in section 5 of the Administration’s national security strategy which “explicitly rejects deterrence as
an adequate means of protecting the interests of the United States.” In the post-9/11 period, values of militarization have become normative and aspirational, serving as a powerful force that shapes everyday lives, memories and daily experiences and is the fountainhead of our current genre of life and order of knowledge. Anthropologist Joshua O. Reno and philosopher Henry Giroux give shape to the deep continuities between military applications abroad and American domestic life. In his monograph, *Military Waste: The Unexpected Consequences of Permanent War Readiness* (2020) Reno analytically connects America’s military preparedness within the framework of the never-ending war on terror and the cultural imagination of its citizens. As he writes,

“It is no accident that two of the most prominent American exports involve violent simulacra—Hollywood blockbusters, which invariably contain simulations of cataclysmic destruction, and military weapons ready for any kind of conflict imaginable. When it comes to national war readiness, history may well regard the contemporary United States as the most prepared of all time; Is it any wonder that in best-selling end-of-the-world fantasies, whether alien invasion or zombie outbreak, all of this excess weaponry suddenly becomes useful? It is as if Americans were waiting for something, anything, to justify the enormous arsenal that they have amassed, ready to mete out violence anywhere, anytime, instantly. Whatever one’s personal beliefs about the US military, even when it is not being used to wage war, it is still changing the world.”

For his part, philosopher Henry Giroux demonstrates the contemporaneous synergy between foreign policy interests, cultural values of militarism and the structural organization of America’s centers of knowledge production. Giroux argues that this relationship is typified by programs such as the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program and the Intelligence Community Scholarship Programs which disregard the principles of academic freedom, weaponize knowledge and recruit students “to serve in a number of intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, which have a long history of using torture, assassinations, and illegal prisons, and on occasion committing domestic atrocities—such as spying on Juan Cole, a prominent academic and critic of the Iraq War.” Continuing, Giroux argues that the “increasingly intensified and expansive symbiosis between the military-industrial complex and academia is also on full display the creation of the “Minerva Consortium,” ironically named after the goddess of wisdom, whose purpose is to fund various universities to “carry out social sciences research relevant to national security.” Giroux also notes the growing reactionary attack on higher education in the US. He writes that this assault is characterized in that “[C]lose to 43 states have pledged major cuts to higher education in order to compensate for insufficient state funding.” This has the implication of “an unprecedented hike in tuition rates […] enrollments are being slashed; salaries are being reduced; and need-based scholarships in some states are being eliminated” – circumscribing the access to educations for millions of poor students.

Rather than simply being defunded, in *Militarism and Education in America* (2020), Dr. William Astore shows that the infrastructure undergirding the economies of knowledge production have been constructed mold US universities and re-shape them to “serve as feeders to the military industrial complex and the wider intelligence community.” Even more troublesome, Astore explains, is how education has been reconfigured as a tool of social control and commercial
industry rather than human freedom or dissent. As he writes, “education rarely takes the form of encouraging dissent” and far too often is “reduced to a commodity – a means to an end, the end being a decent salary and a comfortable life, often in the service of business, industry and the” military industrial complex.\textsuperscript{cix} But the tendencies towards social control and the weaponization of western disciplines outlined by these authors have been fused to a counterinsurgent surveillance paradigm that is immensely more advanced than its 20\textsuperscript{th} century predecessors and has no contemporary rival.

In his publication \textit{Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State} (2020), journalist Baron Gellman reveals details about the infamous PRISM program and the communications monopoly consolidated in the NSA and the US state apparatus more generally in the post 9/11 period. Going far beyond simply listening to phone calls (as is often presented in mainstream media, television shows and movies), NSA analysts used PRISM and other software to “review stored account information, but also dial in and record live audio, video, chat and file transfers.”\textsuperscript{cclxx} In addition, they could monitor keystrokes as they happened during a live chat or search before a user ever clicked “send”. As a program, he explains that PRISM became integrated into Presidential briefings and measured on an “annual intake in the trillions of communications.”\textsuperscript{cclxxi} Though they could only technically target foreigners located abroad, most of the world’s communications flowed through the US by the year 2000, giving the NSA a new domain to master – the entire planet. Giving readers an idea of the precedents and expanded scope of the NSA in the response to the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, Gellman explains that President Bush and Vice-President Cheney oversaw the reimagining of legal strictures and organized the FBI an NSA under four programs to begin widespread surveillance of internet and telephone communications, while concealing this from most of the national security official staff, congress and the FISA Court (which previously worked to circumscribe surveillance and data collection but whose amendments in 2007, 2008 and 2012 laid the basis for the emergence of PRISM to begin with and entrenched its secrecy thereafter). Emphasizing the how this new paradigm sought application to everyone in anticipation of terrorism from foreigners and citizens alike, Gellman writes that “[W]hen the New York Times revealed one of the secret programs in 2005, a speechwriter for Bush came up with the name “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” a marketing slogan that deliberately misdirected public scrutiny.”\textsuperscript{cclxxi} This “domestic surveillance did not spy on known terrorists”, rather it “aspired to cover substantially all Americans, collecting hundreds of billions of telephone and internet records, in the hope of discovering unknown conspirators.”\textsuperscript{cclxxii} Gellman also explains that internal classification guides indicated that “the NSA followed Bush’s political lead and began using “TSP,” a made-up compartment name, “in briefings and declarations intended for external audiences, such as Congress and the courts.”\textsuperscript{cclxxiii}

To be clear, PRISM never conducted outright mass operations. It simply used secretive and narrow interpretations of laws to construct a low threshold to capture Americans’ information as part of “incidental” collection. As Gellman explains, this “specialized legal term” does not mean “accidentally, unexpectedly, unforeseeably, or even undesirably.”\textsuperscript{cclxxiv} Rather, it “meant that the NSA caught U.S. persons in nets that it cast with some other lawful purpose in mind.”\textsuperscript{cclxxv} Explaining further, Gellman writes that

“Collection remained incidental even when the NSA knew for certain that Americans would be swept in and was happy to have them. The NSA could hold
on to the incidental data, and it did so. Once in hand, the American communications could be searched and analyzed along with the foreign stuff. With U.S. identities masked (sometimes), the information could be shared with other agencies. The law did not say “finders keepers”—it was more nuanced than that—but the NSA did not have to discard what it gathered about Americans in the course of business abroad.\(^{\text{cclxxvi}}\)

As a logical consequence of the “aggressive use of the NSA’s foreign intelligence-gathering powers” Gellman warns that it could “have as much impact on American privacy as domestic surveillance. It might have more.”\(^{\text{cclxxvii}}\) Demonstrative of this point, the newly constructed surveillance state and its now planetary domain of application shifted by 2012 and the NSA, CIA and intelligence officials had come to a point where the acquisition of all human generated information had become an aspiration being that their new technology allowed them to keep “everything...forever.”\(^{\text{cclxxviii}}\) Thus, the post WW2 era revolution in signals intelligence and a new legal paradigm that emerged after 9/11 (USA Patriot Act, Protect America Act of 2007, and the FISA Court amendments of 2007, 2008 and 2012 specifically) laid the basis for a truly global surveillance apparatus – which functionally applies to US citizens, foreigners and terrorists alike whether they are potential threats to the US social order or not. For Gellman, the relationship between foreign espionage (which he sees as a necessity) and domestic violations of privacy have high stakes due to the potential for abuse by government officials. But it is important to note that those nationalist concerns aside, the entire human population is now facing an inherent threat and an unprecedented obstacle to revolutionary praxis against the status quo. As Gellman avers,

“Many advances we take for granted now in civil rights and social justice—women’s suffrage, desegregation, the right to form unions, gay marriage—relied on organized resistance against the law of their times. The Underground Railroad could not have run in a time of pervasive surveillance. The same could be said of the American Revolution. “They wouldn’t have been able to coordinate,” Snowden said of the founders. “They would have been individually popped off the street and thrown in King George’s jail.” Comprehensive transparency in service of comprehensive law enforcement, he said, would mean “freezing in place the status quo of that society forever.”\(^{\text{cclxxix}}\)

Despite this behemoth of a surveillance state and its new paradigm of planetary counterinsurgency under the paradigm of counter-terrorism, white supremacist terrorism remains embedded within the social fabric and broader security apparatus of the US empire. In fact, the current white power movement has been consolidated and expanded with the help of the US government. In a report titled ‘Revelation that ex-Nazi now holds key DOJ counterterror post highlights police infiltration threat’ published in late 2021, journalist David Neiwert revealed that a key official overseeing counterterrorism for the US Department of Justice (DOJ) – Brian P. Haughton – was an active skinhead in the late 1980s and 90s.\(^{\text{cclxxx}}\) Now in his 50s, Haughton worked for the Philadelphia Police Department (after his associations with neo-nazis) and thereafter was hired into the DOJ. Haughton nor the DOJ responded to inquiries. Nevertheless, Neiwart reports the following statement after meeting with reformed skinhead Frank Meeink who knew Haughton in the 1980s,““[A] person like him should never have been able to become a cop. That’s just a fact.””\(^{\text{cclxxxi}}\) Continuing, Neiwart writes that in addition to higher probabilities that
“extremists who have infiltrated a police agency can enable white supremacists’ criminal acts, the presence of ideologically sympathetic extremists within law enforcement also poses a security threat to any agency dealing with their criminal activities, particularly officers who keep any fascist affiliations secret and work to implement a far-right agenda from within the force.”

Citing former FBI agent Michael German, Neiwert writes that since 2000, officers in over 15 states connected to hundreds of other federal, state and local law officials have been revealed to have ties to racist, nativist and sexist social media activities and have had allegations of extremism. Citing German further, he explains that not only is bias “far too common”, but also that “officers’ activities are often known within their departments, but only result in disciplinary action or termination if they trigger public scandals.” Most damning, German’s research indicates that DOJ policies de-prioritize far-right terrorism as a national security threat. As Neiwart explains,

“Justice Department policies de-prioritize far-right terrorism as a national security threat, ranking it behind cases it labels “international” terrorism and those directed at domestic protest groups. These policies label a significant portion of the violence committed by far-right militants as “hate crimes” rather than terrorism before any federal evaluation of the incident takes place, and defer the investigation, prosecution, and tracking of these crimes to state and local law enforcement. While state prosecutions may ultimately be determined to be appropriate in many cases, by abandoning the responsibility to examine and account for these crimes the Justice Department blinds itself to the true scope of the threat. This practice also deprives the federal government of an intelligence base necessary to develop an effective strategy to target far-right violence.”

So rather than being an obsessive focus on the character of Haughton, whose effects within the DOJ counterterrorism section is “impossible to assess,” the report indicates just “how deep and broad the problem of white extremist infiltration of law enforcement has become.” In her recent book, *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America* (2018), historian Kathleen Belew details the expansion of the white power movement against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and the long-range implications wars have on US society. In doing so, she demonstrates just how crucial the federal government has been in securing the development and evolution of the white power movement while simultaneously mastering counterinsurgency and executing pacification programs against Black nationalist, communist and left-wing radical movements through counterinsurgent operations around the world. To begin, she explains that the white power movement is used to “refer to the social movement that brought together members of the Klan, militias, radical tax resisters, white separatists, neo-Nazis, and proponents of white theologies such as Christian identity, Odinism, and Dualism between 1975 and 1995.”

Splitting her subject matter into three parts: Formation; The War Comes Home; and Apocalypse, Belew introduces Vietnam veterans like Louis Beam as crucial to conceptualizing the cosmogony of the movement which imported an unending combat narrative drawing on a white racist conception of the war in Vietnam.

The “Vietnam War was such a powerful symbol and reference point that some activists claimed to have served when they had not” and regardless of whether they enlisted, they took from
it “a tangle of testimony and potent narratives, as well as a set of uniforms, weapons, and political rhetoric.” On the importance of Beam to this ideological cohesion Belew writes that, “[N]owhere in the movement was this narrative more clearly distilled than in the writings and speeches of Louis Beam, one of the movement’s most well-recorded and persuasive voices.” Continuing, Belew argues that “Beam’s narrative, which turned on the violence of warfare, was based on his own service, but it reflected common elements of the Vietnam War experience popularized in memoirs and in movies such as The Deer Hunter, Platoon, Apocalypse Now, and Full Metal Jacket.” With a narrative which “turned on stymied grief, constant danger, fixation on weapons, and betrayal, all elements that he believed were shared by fellow white Americans”, Beam spun together new ideological basis and sophisticated the tactics of the new movement using paramilitarism and cell-style warfare. As she writes, he “would create an elite Special-Forces-style within the Klan and proceed to build a network of paramilitary training camps” with a new vigor. These camps grew “directly from the combat experiences of key activists in Vietnam” but government infiltration spurred him to “set out to form his own group.” Despite numerous arrests for things like “dynamiting a Houston radio station” or “blowing up the local Communist Party headquarters”, charges in these cases “were dropped or never filed.” Thus, Beam was able to spearhead the transmission of military tactics to a new zone of application for the purpose of white supremacy in the US. But he didn’t limit his potential opponents to nonwhite races. As Belew explains, he “felt he had the right to recruit and train an army to defend his race from the threat of immigration, and to carry out border enforcement on behalf of the state” and “as with a military boot camp, violence was meant to do the work of shaping foot soldiers who would be loyal to one another and to his cause.”

In addition, “the camps also prepared participants for future antigovernment combat” driven by the belief of Beam “that the United States and the Soviet Union would soon engage in a nuclear struggle but would lack the military strength to follow missile attacks with a land invasion.” Beam “planned to wage race war at that moment of vulnerability, after the missile strikes”, and through commandeering a white separatist army he envisioned taking “control of the United States—or at least Texas—expelling all nonwhite people to create a white homeland.” These initial activities laid the basis for Beam to go on to “pursue his war against nonwhites and develop the cell-style strategy of leaderless resistance” – his “ideals would teach white power activists how to carry out the revolution and succeed in his vision of war to kill nonwhites and communists in the United States as he had killed them in Vietnam.” The war never had such an effect on the leftwing comparable to the right and “the right’s cultural embrace of weapons”, personnel and material continued unabated. With a functioning underground that showed durable resistance to the FBI and government infiltration, emboldened by public and legal support after the shooting of communists in 1979, the united white power movement went on to integrate itself into the military mercenary circuit. With the help of the federal government, they took their paramilitarism into a new domain of praxis.

Documenting the role of Tom Posey, another young man eager to contribute to paramilitarism against nonwhites and communists, Belew writes that as opposed to fitting into already existing organizations, he formed a new group called the “…Civilian Military Assistance (CMA). Drawn largely from Vietnam veterans and active-duty National Guardsmen in the South, CMA described itself as a civil organization dedicated to supporting anticommunist combat in Central America with supplies, weapons, and manpower.” The CMA collaborated with the
federal security apparatus and recapitulated past practices of earlier Klan organizations. As Belew writes, they “conducted vigilante patrols of the U.S.-Mexico border, adopting the tactics of the earlier Klan Border Watch, and contributed mercenary soldiers to the Contras, a loose alliance of paramilitary groups that sought to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua after the 1979 revolution.” In Nicaragua, the “CMA acted covertly on behalf of the U.S. government—it was funded by the CIA and supplied by the U.S. military.” Moreover, “under President Ronald Reagan, the state’s semi-official interventions would swell into a bustling, multilayered network of mercenary soldiers, CIA operatives disguised as rogue mercenaries, and civilian veterans doing the work of state military advisors, all participating in a frenzied effort to circumvent public opinion and congressional checks, to contain or roll back communism, and to redeem the loss in Vietnam” – “Posey’s engagements are one example of the complex interconnections between U.S.-sanctioned covert intervention in Central America, white power activism, and the actions of independent mercenary soldiers.” Building on the late 20th century paradigm shift based on counterinsurgency, US “mercenaries fought to preserve white minority-rule governments in Rhodesia and South Africa, and in Latin America and the Caribbean they propped up U.S. supported regimes, opposed leftist movements and attempted to overthrow leftist governments.” Belew writes that this paramilitary “turn, in both popular culture and foreign policy, built upon decades of counterinsurgency strategy and crystallized around the loss of the Vietnam War.” With a public whose attitudes were reeling from the defeat of Vietnam, the “United States increasingly fought communism through covert interventions and the support and the use of U.S.-trained local counterinsurgent units.”

Thus, the counterinsurgent turn in US foreign and domestic policy was apposite to an explosion of white power activists who gained experience in counterrevolutionary praxis, as wars waged “for self-determination were often deemed communist and thus threats to be contained.” While administrators ensured that leftist governments were attacked and subverted root and branch, the US state did not contain the synergy between “American mercenaries and the white power movement.” This allowed “white power mercenaries” to position “themselves within a state ideology of covert action that itself constituted a form of paramilitarism (counterinsurgency).” These conditions also allowed Central America to be a training ground for white power guerrilla warfare with the direct help of the State Department. But by 1983 – as part 2 of Belew’s work shows – the interests of the white power movement and the state had diverged. Now fighting for a white homeland, white supremacists aspired towards the destabilization of the federal government to wage its “revolutionary” race war. Though drawing on past iterations of the Klan, this new movement was premised on a qualitatively new development: leaderless resistance. In her own words, “violent white supremacists had sought to subvert or overthrow state power” and in such “cases, their violence does not properly qualify as vigilantism because it no longer worked to support the state: it is better understood as revolutionary violence.” Tracking the continuities between modern white power activists and the Klan of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Belew explains that the “first era of the Ku Klux Klan sought to undermine the federal government through violence against freed slaves and supporters of Reconstruction” and “dissipated only after the end of the system it had sought to overthrow.” However, as “lynching became more visible and public, Klan terror gave way to violence that worked to uphold the new Jim Crow social order—vigilante violence.” The Klan of the mid-20th century, “too, worked against some aspects of the federal state during the civil rights movement, using acts of violence to confront demonstrators, but also to prevent the
enforcement of laws prohibiting segregation and disenfranchisement.” Significantly, none of these earlier iterations of the Klan “sought to overthrow the federal government itself”: These “groups had limited and local objectives, seeking to regain local power or prevent federal influence in local contexts.” Thus, “the post-1983 white power movement represented a major break with prior Klan activity.” Three military “veterans shaped a new wave of coordinated—though “leaderless”—revolutionary action nationwide” – “Louis Beam had served in Vietnam, and Richard Butler and Robert Miles claimed to have fought in World War II, Miles with the French Foreign Legion.”

Again, this new strategy of leaderless resistance was premised on “cell-based organization” which was constructed to “conceal the movement’s organization and protect its leaders, make it difficult for agents provocateurs to infiltrate the movement, limit the government’s ability to prosecute the movement for incidents of white power violence, and forestall public opposition.” Such an approach depended tactically upon not direct administration but “upon commonly held cultural narratives and values, and shared texts and symbols, to motivate and coordinate activity.” Alongside cultural narratives of the Vietnam War the utopian novel, The Turner Diaries were crucial to this ideological cohesion. As Belew explains, this text “worked as a foundational how-to manual for the movement, outlining a detailed plan for race war.” Narrated “as a diary found and published after a white racist revolution has overthrown the U.S. government, it describes an all-white utopia” and “recounts a series of terrorist attacks leading up to the partitioning of a white homeland in California and the use of nuclear weapons to clear first the United States and then the world of nonwhite populations.” In the future world it presents to readers, “the diary serves as a historical artifact of the revolution, the white supremacist army, called the Organization” who “has abolished the dollar, started a new calendar at year zero, and made women subservient.”

The mobilization of leaderless cells also necessitated communications networks and spurred the mobilization of computers by white power thinkers and activists decades “before the popularization of social media as a method of organization”, white power groups used this technology to connect “with one another personally, and to coordinate violence and radical activism.” Spearheaded in its use by Beam and Butler, these strategies were somewhat effective in that it obscured the movement from the knowledge of the public, even if “federal agents and a few journalists were aware of them” the public was largely unaware; spurring the phrase “lone wolf”, which became more and more popular in the “1980s and 1990s to describe white power activists.” This turn to the use of technology “relied on the work of [white] female activists” within the movement. Referring to one white power group – the Order – Belew explains that the “wives, daughters, and girlfriends of Order members brokered social relationships and performed supportive work for white power cells. Said differently, reflecting patterns from the suffrage and early feminist movements earlier in the century, white women were crucial actors in the maintenance and consolidation of white racial dominance in the US white power movement. Symbolically, white women were a powerful signifier whose vulnerability to sexual threats of Black and other racialized men were coded as a danger to the ability of the white race to procreate. As Belew explains, “ideas of the pure and chaste white female body remained powerful in the 1980s” and were accompanied by the “mythic villain, the black rapist” who “still appeared regularly in post–Vietnam War white power publications, even as movement rhetoric and violence increasingly used anticommunism as an alibi for racial
violence.” Moreover, this feature often “ran next to a “Sick Photo of the Month,” which usually pictured interracial couples or biracial children, implying the interchangeability and equal repulsiveness of rape, miscegenation, and interracial reproduction.”

Thus, “[P]rotection of white women and their reproductive capacity represented one ideology motivating white power activists to wage war” because the “future of the white race, activists believed, rested with the mothers of white children.”

Belew also shows that in the early 1980s “a key development in movement strategy would intensify the emphasis on the reproductive capacity of white women”, a sentiment shared by many whites “across the political spectrum” who were concerned “about demographic shifts and the waning white majority.” These collective factors fueled a vision for a white homeland in which white women would “be delighted with their task of bearing and raising white warriors.”

Despite often reduced to symbols, Belew makes it clear to readers that white women nonetheless actively contributed to the movement and validated “men’s activism both rhetorically and practically.” As she explains, the “wives of white power activists played critical roles in establishing the credibility of their husbands.”

For instance, “Kathleen Metzger ran the suburban Aryan Women’s League in the late 1980s, which published a considerable amount of material in its own name while her husband Tom Metzger’s WAR (White Aryan Resistance) dominated white power activities in California.” Thus, in the white power “war on the state, women were expected to bear future white warriors, train as nurses to heal the wounded, prepare stores of food and other supplies to sustain white people through apocalyptic race war, and carry out support work.”

Belew also details what she terms a “renewed apocalyptic imaginary, a worldview characterized by intensifying urgency that would eventually lead to the 1995 bombing of Oklahoma City.” With this new ideological basis – anchored by The Turner Diaries – and an implicit orientation towards a confrontation with the very police-surveillance state apparatus that aided in its paramilitary evolution and used to destroy Black organizations root and branch just a few decades before, Belew explains the impact and underlying implications of the bombing at Oklahoma in 1995. Counterinsurgency police repression had a marginal impact on the white power movement up until the 90s. Unlike Black Nationalist/Black Power movements, the media trivialized their continuity and threat to the social order and portrayed it “as a novel development.”

But after a confrontation at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, after “federal agents used excessive military force—and broke government rules of engagement—to apprehend a white separatist who sold two illegally modified weapons” the movement became electrified and imbibed itself with “a large segment of the mainstream evangelical right.” By 1992, Beam has reconceptualized his leader resistance approach in ways that made them “widely available to the purportedly nonracist militia movement.” With the same basic framework, Beam’s new strategy was “modified to reflect the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of communism as a viable enemy.” Consequently, as opposed to communism, the defeat of federal tyranny became the next objective. For Beam, it was this new enemy – the specter of US government tyranny that “represents a [new] threat to everyone.” With this new aim, the cell-style method of warfare requiring “no orders issues from central leadership” went on to ripple “through the newer skinhead and militant factions” it had not penetrated before. As Belew explains, this shift laid the basis
for Timothy McVeigh’s deployment of the cell-style strategy “by claiming that he acted alone in bombing the Oklahoma City federal building.” Between the Ruby Ridge incident and an explosive confrontation in Waco, Texas at the Mount Carmel compound which ended “in a massive fire after a months-long siege; seventy-six compound members” dead, including twenty-one children along with several federal agents – white power movement actors in general and “McVeigh in particular” began to understand themselves as victims of a “massacre carried out by a rampant superstate and its corrupt agents.” These shifts led to an upsurge in members and paramilitarism. As Belew writes,

“The powerful rhetoric of protecting white women blended, once again, with narratives of government corruption and the symbols of the tank and the Huey helicopter passed down from the Vietnam War to frame the standoff. As Michael McNulty, a Vietnam veteran who produced the documentary Waco: Rules of Engagement, said, “Every promise that’s ever been made to me has been broken. . . . [Waco] starts to look like Vietnam.” McNulty drew on the narrative of betrayal of authority from the Vietnam War to frame this new confrontation on the Texas prairie. “Sons of bitches lied to us again,” added an anonymous Vietnam veteran at the scene. The press invoked the Vietnam War, too: the Guardian called it “the Vietnam-style assault on Waco.” Waco and Ruby Ridge did more than inflame the movement; for its members, they became the standard of atrocity associated with the New World Order, by now synonymous with the federal government. In their aftermath, the militia movement surged to more than 50,000 members in forty-seven states, and focused increasingly on taking violent action to stop the rampant federal government. One SPLC analyst estimated that some five million people considered themselves part of the “patriot movement”—militias and militia sympathizers—in the mid-1990s. If correct, that number outstrips previous post-Vietnam War white power mobilization and signifies an even larger movement than the second-era Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s; the white power movement had substantial numbers in addition to its extensive underground of cells dedicated to resistance. Continued paramilitarism and proven white power movement tactics structured this new groundswell. Near Waco, the Texas Constitutional Militia claimed several thousand members, and veteran Green Berets and Navy SEALS conducted its paramilitary training. The militia Big Star One, which spanned Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, included active-duty U.S. Army officers and carried out mortar and grenade-launcher exercises in west Texas.”

Belew provides readers with an analysis the impact and underlying implications of McVeigh’s bombing of the federal building in 1995. For her, it is an artifact of the refinement, deadliness and success of the white power movement, its ideas and infrastructure. Demystifying the caricature of the “lone wolf” behind an incident that “wounded more than 500 people and killed 168, including 19 young children in the building’s day care center”, Belew argues that “in no sense was the bombing of Oklahoma City carried out by one man.” This popular understanding came to be promulgated “through several processes that eroded contextual understanding.” One of these was the impact of the Gulf War which concretized “a right-wing narrative that the Vietnam War had been lost only through government betrayal.” Another factor was the lack of convictions for previous extremist activity, mainly the Fort Smith sedition trial in which “thirteen
white power activists were acquitted of charges including seditious conspiracy despite overwhelming evidence of their war on the state. Indeed, this failure was tied to an institutional strategy devised by the FBI to refrain from any attempts at tying “individual crimes to a broader movement” – which both obscured the bombing as part of a social movement but also “effectively erased the movement itself from public understanding.” In sharp contrast to the FBI’s meticulous counterinsurgency campaign on Black radicals, human rights activists and the broader black community throughout the 20th century and into the new millennium, Belew explains that when it came to McVeigh they assumed a ‘lone wolf’ lens. Clarifying the pitfalls in this approach in her own words, she explains that “the FBI’s own assessment of McVeigh in a criminological study of personality types fit poorly with his portrayal as a lone terrorist acting on his own motivations” and thus painted a truncated picture of McVeigh which understood him as a one man-wrecking crew.

Emphasizing the shortcoming of this “lone-wolf” lens, Belew notes that McVeigh lived “with a militia movement member who had long fixated on blowing up the Murrah Building” and also had a “lifelong obsession with guns” which provided “him entry into a national network of weapons dealers.” In her estimation, McVeigh in fact “was carrying out a planned and logical act, one that drew directly on the resources and strategies of the white power movement and targeted a building that had been at the forefront of the movement’s collective conscience for more than a decade.” He even carried “the messages of the white power movement on his body during the attack” and drew explicitly on the Turner Diaries. In the end, the success of the strategy of leaderless resistance “meant that movement leaders could never be linked to the bombing” – allowing the “white power movement itself” to become invisible: “its coordinated violence misunderstood as disconnected acts carried out by lone terrorists.”

In the aftermath of McVeigh’s attack, the white power movement underwent yet another “inevitable shift” — relocating “into the online spaces it had begun to build more than a decade earlier.” As a result, further activity was guarded from public view and the movement came to be “generally regarded as a fringe and untenable ideology.” With this, the Vietnam War story that grounded the cultural narratives of the movement lost some of its potency but has endured within a global network of information which has motivated a host of actors to take action to further movement goals – from Dylann Roof to mercenaries and militias in Europe. Roof is a notable example in that his killing of “nine black worshippers at a Bible study in Charleston, South Carolina” followed the white power movement’s “teachings in an attempt to foment race war.”

In the end, Belew’s work demonstrates exactly which kinds of ideas the US’s 21st century counterinsurgent empire sees as worthy of eradication and those who were worthy of preservation. Accordingly, the white power movement underwent an evolution which extended it into the 21st century with the help of the federal government while the Black nationalist movement was destroyed root and branch through the surgical application of population-level counterinsurgent techniques, the mass incarceration and the assassination of key leaders. This new iteration of the white power movement is still undergoing processes of transformation to fulfill new functions in the context of the global war on terror.

In a recently published article in Time Magazine titled The White Power Mercenaries Fighting for the Lost Cause Around the World (2022) Belew (among others) outlined the global dimensions of white power movement paramilitarism. The author emphasizes the breadth of white power thinking and praxis, noting that the trope of the Lost Cause has been reappropriated from
the US war in Vietnam and transposed to reflect the interests of groups “in the former Apartheid South Africa, and more recently in Russia, across Scandinavia and Australia.” As they explain, the “American white power movement doesn’t just absorb” cultural “artifacts from abroad, it exports them, too” – making the influences circular. Thus, as Belew argues, that South African mercenary groups like Dyck Advisory Group draw on cultural references to the Vietnam War is to be expected – because the kind of methods employed during Vietnam (internecine conflict) imply the mass killing of nonwhite civilians. Noting the parallels between American and Russian white supremacists and its convergence on the view of Islam as a civilizational threat to the white race, Professor Candace Rondeaux notes that for them “the rise of ISIS is also indicative of a clash of civilizations which demands “the rise and return of white crusaders.” Connecting this global growth and ideological coherence in white extremism to recent instances of white supremacist terrorism like the brutal killing of ten Black people in Buffalo, New York in May of 2022, the author cites Rondeaux further. As they write,

“Wagner [a Russian white supremacist militia] shares with some American militias a particular apocalyptic philosophy: accelerationism, or a desire to foment immediate radical social upheaval. Perhaps the most well-known American accelerationists are the Boogaloo Bois, the heavily armed, Hawaiian shirt-wearing militia that seeks to bring on the “big luau,” the big race war, as quickly as possible.

“At the root of accelerationism is the tension between replacement theory and the supremacy of the white race,” said Rondeaux said. Replacement is the animating anxiety for white power groups, and the motivation for Peyton Gendron’s alleged mass shooting on May 14th in Buffalo. Gendron boasted Nazi symbols and specifically targeted Black people, but think also of the chant from the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville: “Jews will not replace us.” Accelerationism wants to bring on the war soon, while whites are perceived as still being in a better position to win. “The Boogaloo and the Russian Imperial Legion share a common worldview,” Rondeaux said.”

With this basic framework to justify killing nonwhite people around the world, the new white power movement is positioned to spearhead a global race war with unprecedented implications. Taken together, I argue that the phenomena outlined here be conceptualized as a new proleptic genre of MAN – MAN3: Homo homini lupus AKA MAN as Praetorian guided by killology, which is the highly technological, spatially and temporally indeterminate proleptic order which seeks to delimit the expressions of human life through the application of planetary population-level techniques of counterinsurgency action, detention, and targeted killings as the primary forces of social regulation. MAN3 thus constitutes the reification fallacy at the heart of the struggle for the Human of this new millennium: one between the dominant normative epistemological-ontological schema of western MAN represented as isomorphic with humanity as-it-actually-exists in its innumerable local particularities centered on the epochal rewriting of knowledge premised on four new factors heretofore not considered by Wynter or any other Black scholars who have sought to integrate her classarchy framework of the bourgeois male and female subject into the conceptual and disciplinary agenda of Black Studies. These are: 1) an evolution in the construction of threats – particularly the transformation of the ‘nigger/savage’ which justified the colonial civilizing mission to the criminal/terrorist trope which justifies a now spatially and
temporally indeterminate counterinsurgent program of global pacification; 2) the civilizational mastery of counterinsurgency by the US empire (alongside this a positing of a new “universal” liberal subjectivity and economic laws which foster the modernization of all human societies from traditional to liberal free market “mass consumption” economies based on rational choice theory) via police professionalization and the construction of a prison/surveillance empire to suppress and anticipate the threat of communism, then all varieties of Black nationalism and anti-colonialism; 3) the breakthrough in technological capacity at both the level of signals intelligence or telecommunications, semi-autonomous weapons and human psychology which ground an unprecedented global surveillance apparatus, the application of drone/AI/cyber warfare operations and the desensitization of state agents towards the act of killing the designated “enemy” – making western military/police forces the deadliest in human history; and lastly, 4) the state sponsored facilitation of an evolution of the white power movement which is poised to execute a paramilitary race war in defense of Western civilization from the threat of both fundamentalist Islam as a tool of insurgent social organization and the populational threat of nonwhite people more generally.

**Conclusion: From Sun Tzu’s “Desperate Ground” to Genuine Self-Determination? Towards the Conception of a Truly Universal Human Theory of Victory**

“We are living in a world where the price of death is not just the lives of others but the life of our own grandchildren. This is the price we are ready to pay.”

“Brothers, the price is death, really. The price to make other respect your human rights is death. You have to be ready to die or you have to be ready to take the lives of others…This is what you have to say. Respect me or put me to death. But when you start to put me to death, we’re both going to die together…this is not violence. This is intelligence. As soon as you start even thinking like that, they say you’re advocating violence. No, you’re advocating intelligence.”

“As a slave, the social phenomenon that engages my whole consciousness is, of course, revolution. The slave – and revolution.”

The 21st century and the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ has ushered in a new epoch and fundamentally changed the landscape and nature of the threats to the Human Project. Despite the Biden administration’s curtailing the War in Afghanistan and pledge to end 'forever wars’, counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa constitute an extension of foreign strategies in a new direction and are thus a sign of things to come. As W. J. Hennigan reports in *Time Magazine*, Biden is continuing the policies of his predecessors which entails “drawing down high-profile military missions abroad while keeping heavily armed, highly engaged counterterrorism task forces in place in trouble spots” – using special operations, drones, intelligence-based warfare and the training of partner foreign forces to extend and fortify US influence. This planetary foreign defense policy – the *global* war on terror – has encompassed parts of Africa, the “Middle East” and has generated an investment in counterterror operations against domestic agents of extremism. As Hennigan writes, this inchoate approach “represents a turning point for America and the world” in part because US president Joe Biden is “banking that a low-profile globe-spanning battle, and whatever collateral damage comes with it, will be politically palatable enough for Congress to keep funding, and effective enough to keep existing and emerging militant groups from threatening America.” Rather than being a provisional approach, at “Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. military’s only permanent base on the African continent, the approach is already being put to the test every
The imperative of a global counterinsurgent/counterterrorism war is compounded by the fact that the liberal civilizational status quo—premised on the normative modernization of all economies toward the accomplishment of a mass consumption economy (and thus the creation of more mass pollution/ecological destruction) has facilitated an unprecedented calcification of wealth and the acceleration in the rate of species extinctions, eroding the biodiversity of the planet and compounding climate change which threatens the total collapse of human society. Global distribution estimates of wealth indicate that 53% of all adults in the world has a net worth below ten thousand US dollars while high net worth individuals—the top tier of high-net-worth individuals, the global 1%—“are increasingly dominant in terms of total wealth ownership and their share of global wealth.”

This high-net-worth class has saw their aggregate holdings increase four-fold from 2000 to 2020 (from 41.5 trillion to 191.6 trillion) and their global share of wealth rise “from 35% to 46% over the same period.” A recent UN report on the loss of biodiversity published in 2019 paints a damning picture. The report states that though biodiversity is “humanity’s most important life-supporting ‘safety net’,” it is “stretched almost to [a] breaking point.” This situation is reflective of the fact that the “diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems, as well as many fundamental contributions we derive from nature, are declining fast” and that the “average abundance of native species in most major land-based habitats has fallen by at least 20%, mostly since 1900.” Continuing, the report explains that more than “40% of amphibian species, almost 33% of reef-forming corals and more than a third of all marine mammals are threatened.” While the data is less clear for insects, “available evidence supports a tentative estimate of 10% being threatened.” They also report that “at least 680 vertebrate species had been driven to extinction since the 16th century and more than 9% of all domesticated breeds of mammals used for food and agriculture had become extinct by 2016, with at least 1,000 more breeds still threatened.” The authors of the report identify the very markers of “modernization” and development of modern social development as key contributors to the destruction of the life forms. As they write, “drivers include increased population and per capita consumption; technological innovation, which in some cases has lowered and in other cases increased the damage to nature; and, critically, issues of governance and accountability.” Another recent report published by the same international body argues that the climate shocks, wildfires, floods and droughts constitute a dangerous “new normal” that threatens “political, economic and social stability.” British naturalist and broadcaster Sir David Attenborough issued the following warning to leaders at the 15-member Council in 2021:

“If we continue on our current path, we will face the collapse of everything that gives us our security: food production, access to fresh water, habitable ambient temperature, and ocean food chains,” he said, adding “and if the natural world can no longer support the most basic of our needs, then much of the rest of civilization will quickly break down.”

Next to these and the aforementioned factors stemming from the US empire’s planetary application of counterinsurgency, the implementation of an unprecedented surveillance-prison-police apparatus, its modernizing economic planning agenda and it’s spearheading of an evolution within a broader paradigm of white power paramilitarism, the Black community within the US finds itself trapped within a matrix of gendercidal police terror, gun violence, and premature death
which is worsened by a posture of indifference from the international community as to its rights to self-determination/self-defense. As journalist Shirley M. Carswell shows in Have We Surrendered to Gun Violence in Urban America? (2019), the last three generations have spelled doom for young Black men while the federal government has simply rationalized this population as crimogenic. Recent data shows that 85% of the Black people killed in the last decade were “young men in the prime of life.” Demonstrating the differential impact of gun violence between the White and Black communities, she notes that firearm “homicide rates are 8-10 times higher for Black men than White men for more than 30 years” and that for “every death, there are four to five Black men who are wounded by gunfire.” She is also critical of the indifference of federal agencies to solve this problem. In her own words, despite the magnitude of this problem “an exhaustive review shows that there has been little research or federal resources trained on studying” this problem. Not only are there no “comprehensive studies on gun ownership in America” but there “has been little scientific research into the effectiveness of federal gun policies or the illegal gun markets that find ways to skirt the laws and distribute firearms in cities with strict bans.”

Observing a 40-year decline of homicide overall, Carswell casts doubt on the explanations of high rates of gun violence that emphasize the criminal justice/police and “tough on crime” approaches popular among state and federal policymakers. As she argues, there “is no conclusive proof that major federal gun laws in 1968 and 1993 or any of the myriad state and local laws enacted over the years had any direct correlation with plunging murder rates.”

Noting the obstacles stemming from the lack of information and governmental study into this public health crisis, Carswell cites Dr. Garen Wintemute, director of the Violence Prevention Research Center at the University of California, Davis, who argues that there is “a deliberate effort to keep us ignorant about it.”

Nevertheless, Carswell does provide readers with the segmented nature of gun violence in the US. It has been suffered largely by young Black men (as the perpetrators and victims) – a fact that has contributed to the neglect of the problem by the federal government on her account. As she explains, “most of the firearm homicides occurred in poor, decaying neighborhoods where both the shooters and the victims were Black males between the ages of 15 and 44 years.”

Furthermore, survey’s find “sharp differences between Blacks and Whites when assessing the impact of gun violence today” and show that while “[N]early half (49%) of African Americans . . . say gun violence is a very big problem in their local community; just 11% of Whites rate this as a very big problem.”

Carswell argues that the “federal government appears to see it that way too and, therefore, has allocated few resources to understanding the root causes of the killings”, citing the fact that lawmakers have dedicated more resources to studying research into psoriasis, a skin condition that typically is not fatal” than gun research.

Despite federal and international indifference, the Black community is experiencing a public health crisis in the form of a “birth to premature death pipeline” of young Black males by homicide and suicide that “intensifies at ages 15 to 24” and signify a broader gendercidal campaign which threatens the existence of the entire Black community.

If Black thought is to follow up on its 20th century cognitive (anti-colonial) breach and contribute to the rewriting of knowledge and secure the accomplishment of a new Human or theory of victory, it will have to proceed on three bases. The first is a grasp of killology. All thought must be in touch with the managerial military/police tactics employed by the liberal world system to anticipate, crush and quell dissent though the doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare. Without an appropriate understanding of it and its overarching goal of pacification, all liberatory thought and praxis is compromised a priori. The nature of repression has only intensified in the last five
decades. The population centric nature of this repression must be properly understood if it is to be overcome. The second basis is the notion of revolutionary suicide. Revolutionary suicide provides a metaphysical schema that is in line with the pillar of cultural folk values that have sustained African descendants through the horrors of slavery in the New World going forward in that, it stresses a relationship between the living, dead and unborn while also emphasizing resistance to Black oppression as “an act of self-definition and self-respect.”

As historians Sterling Stuckey and V.P. Franklin reveal in their work, a continuing “interplay between the living and the dead” is verified in the culture, folk tales and burial practices of Africans/African-descended people enslaved as chattel in the Americas—reflecting “customs vital to West Africa” that “were recognized and strengthened in America despite differences in language and despite certain differences in burial ceremonies” among the various ethnic groups. The “unity of being” or sense of ‘peoplehood’ that emerged from the synthesis of African cosmogonies enslaved in North America yielded a unique ‘African-American’ cultural consciousness and a schedule of values which emphasized “survival with dignity” and “resistance to oppression” and continued to be popular among the masses well into the 20th century.

Putting the “dead and living in perpetual communication” and combining this link to the aspiration of a more just world, revolutionary suicide as posited by Huey P. Newton begins from an existential imperative which holds that “it is better to oppose the forces that would drive me to self-murder than to endure them.” This axiological commitment provides the basis for self-respect, “hope and dignity” even if death (however premature) is the result. Thus, the revolutionary suicide demands a holistic view of existence, forcing the revolutionary to view “his life and his death as one piece” in the broader struggle for a better world. This existential focus also provides inquiry with a new frame of reference or center of gravity that Black thought does not have presently: the masses of Black people and humanity more generally. Revolutionary suicide helps guide the center of gravity of knowledge production to reestablish the relationship between knowledge itself and the liberation of a people. With these two, the final basis for the resolution of the reification of MAN3 will be resistance to the criminalization of armed self-defense against racist attacks. Though it provided a guiding light for Black nationalists and revolutionaries of the 19th and 20th centuries, the assimilationist orientation of bourgeois theory, combined with the intense intellectual erasure, political repression and criminalization of Black nationalism and radicalism has erased this concept from the consciousness of Black theorists.

However, with growing threats of white supremacist violence, the worsening epidemic of gun violence and premature death of young men in the Black community and the indifference of the state and international community to such phenomena, the Black community must find the internal basis for its own preservation – which will not be done by appealing to the morality of any other group. Together, these will lay the basis for a new cultural turn in Black consciousness—a cultural renaissance in which populations of humanity negated and rendered MAN3’s dialectical opposites can be projected and protected. Above all, I argue that they will be the basis of how Black people can contribute to a revolution in the Human Project itself and accomplish a new theory of victory and resolve the spatially and temporally indeterminate war on terror—on truly human terms. Such a victory is an imperative given the ontological insecurity at the heart of US society and self-identity this millennium. The establishment of a global counterinsurgency has paradoxically thrown America’s ontological security – which is premised on decisive victory and
winning against its (racially inferior) military opponents – into a crisis. Through convincing victories on the battlefield, “the nation’s sense of order and continuity that enables its agency and” control of the people of the world is legitimated. The prolonged and indeterminate nature of its ‘Global War on Terrorism’ has led to the inability to secure ontological security and ruptured the narratives that positively reinforce the nation’s self-identity and reify the American Self. Thus, the understanding of the US as exceptional: both in its ability to “resist the historical laws of great power decline” and in achieving overwhelming victories against military opponents historically have been rendered illusory and triggered an ontological dissonance. This dissonance stems from the disconnect between the idea of “total victory” so central to the American Self and the endless, prolonged nature of the Global War on Terror. Through a successful cognitive breach and rewriting of knowledge towards a new normative conception of Human (modeled on the human as it/we actually exists in all of its/our plurality), this dissonance can be mature into a total negation – and the full cognitive and behavior autonomy of the human species can be actualized towards truly human endeavors.


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vii Wynter, “No Humans Involved,” 48-49.

viii Ibid, 49

ix Ibid, 49

x Ibid, 52

xi Ibid, 52

xii Ibid, 56

xiii Ibid, 58

xiv Ibid, 67

xv Ibid, 69-70


xxi Kienscherf, “A Programme,” 520.

xxii Ibid, 520

xxiii Ibid, 520


xxvi Ibid, 522

xxvii Ibid, 522

xxviii Ibid, 522
xxix Ibid, 523  
xxx Ibid, 526  
xxi Ibid, 527  
xxii Ibid, 527  
xxv Ibid, 528  
xxvi Ibid, 530  
xxviii Ibid, 177  
xxix Ibid, 177  

xv Bobo and Thompson, “Racialized Mass Incarceration,” 341.  
xvi Ibid, 327  
xvii Ibid, 327  
xviii Ibid, 327  
xix Ibid, 328  
xix Ibid, 328  
xx Ibid, 328  
xxi Ibid, 329  

xiv Hinton, *From the War*, 19.  
xv Ibid, 19  
xvi Ibid, 22  
xviii Ibid, 22  
xix Ibid, 22  
xx Ibid, 22  
xxi Ibid, 22  
xii Ibid, 99  
xxiv Ibid, 112  
xxv Ibid, 113

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Conclusion – The Human Beyond MAN3, Killology or Homo Homini Lupus

“COIN offers a doctrine of escapism for many relevant personalities and institutions – a flight from democratic civilian control, even from modernity, into an anachronistic, romanticized, Orientalist vision that projects quintessentially Western values, and Western prejudices, onto non-Western societies.” – Douglas Porch

“Americans are in a position of dependency on the people outside the U.S., those who are getting ripped off….The world is in a predicament, and we do not have a world policy. We, the people, do not have a worldview.” – Huey P. Newton

“If there is one pillar of belief that sustains the permanent war economy, it might be that the United States must ever be ready for war because the world is a violent place full of people who mean each other harm. Americans routinely worry, then and now, about falling behind real and imagined enemies in war preparation.” – Joshua O. Rosen

“Most people think of Blackness and how we study Blackness as a negative endeavor. It’s always associated with oppression, pathology, suffering. There’s another way that we could look at Blackness as an alternate version of the human being.” – Tommy Curry

I have provided an intellectual history of Huey Newton’s ideas centered on his theory of intercommunalism and posited a framework to understand the primary onto-epistemological contradiction of the new millennium between the western normative conception of the human and the human as it actually exists: killology. Rather letting caricatures or value judgements demarcate the boundaries of the study, I offer an analysis of Huey P. Newton’s ideas within the US Black nationalist tradition going back to the chattel enslavement period. Drawing on the conceptual arguments offered by Black intellectuals in the 19th century, Newton and his peers in the Civil Rights cum Black Power Movement initially converged on the notion that African-America constituted ‘a nation within a nation’ whose oppression could be alleviated through national liberation. Synthesizing insights from anti-colonial thinkers from around the world, Newton posited the theory intercommunalism – a theory which exploded the basic unit of analysis (the nation) deployed by any of his peers and held that US imperialism was the primary obstacle to freedom for all of the peoples of the world. Building on Newton’s identification of the “unprecedented concept of counterinsurgency” as the basis of US imperialism, I then provided an comprehensive account of the roots and modern development of counterinsurgency from the late 17th century into the new millennium’s endless war: the ‘Global War on Terrorism’. Filling a gap in knowledge left by the pull of gender theory on Black studies, I then posit counterinsurgency warfare as an overarching framework that has and continues to function as the organizing principle of western, defense, military and policing apparati to manage racialized/non-western populations. In accordance with the principles of this modality of population-centric warfare, divide-and-rule gender strategies have been consistently applied to colonized populations to ensure that insurgent
movements cannot attain legitimacy among the masses of the people. Chapter three provides an analysis of this dimension of counterinsurgency during the colonial empire-building era into the modern era which concretized the full-scale repression/criminalization of the Black Liberation Movement starting in the late 20th century. Rather than being framed as an essentially revolutionary paradigm, contemporary arguments and narratives sustaining Black feminist theory demonstrate its enduring utility as a counterinsurgent ideology and a continuing reliance on (ethnological and criminological) tropes – the Black Buck (the militant nationalist patriarch), the intra-racial rapist, and that of the ‘counterinsurgent girl’ who’s education is institutionalized as a ‘force multiplier’ that will lead them to oppose the pathological culture of the males of their group and resist participation in insurgent (terrorist) activity – that rationalize the further penetration of ‘domestic spheres’ in the Black community by the counterinsurgent (police) state to secure the (public) visibility, liberty and bodily integrity of Black women and other non-prototypical bodies against the violent intra-racial hierarchies that facilitate their deaths. Documenting the sophistication of counterinsurgency over the last several decades, I posit that Wynter’s framework of MAN (1 and 2) – the normative conception of the human reified by western disciplines and overrepresented as if it is the human as it actually exists foreshadows a third reinvention premised on a proleptic logic: the genre of homo homini lupus/Man as Wolf to another Man which materialized to legitimate political, economic and social dominance of (US imperial) Liberal capitalist society, and idealizes human being as guardian of the status quo (valorizing the counterinsurgent/Praetorian or armed defender of the status quo alongside the breadwinner/consumer bourgeois citizen of the Western “democratic” liberal state) and overrepresents itself over and against the innumerable local particular instantiations of humanity as the unadulterated arbiter of expressions of species-life via the application of counterinsurgency (killology) to those which threaten its dominance through the deployment of highly technologized, population centric practices of coercion, detention and the selective killing of insurgents (or ‘irreconcilables’) as the primary forces of social regulation.

Future research is needed to explore how (philosophical) anthropology guides the specific application of these and other techniques on African America, and other non-western/formerly colonized populations during the periods covered and contemporaneously. The relationship between western taxonomy and doctrinal techniques of counterinsurgency has been highlighted throughout this study. Building on the symbiotic relationship between these factors historically includes specific case studies of colonial wars from the Napoleonic wars/chattel enslavement period in the US and methods of empire-building used by European/Western liberal societies since the late renaissance/Enlightenment period in the Americas, Africa, Asia and India. Contemporaneously (since the 1950s and new doctrinal approaches to population-centric counterinsurgency epitomized by the infamous COINTELPRO program) this includes the importation of dangerous drugs, weapons, and physical segregation of racialized populations that underlie the explosion of peer-to-peer homicide or “birth to premature death pipelines” among these groups along with the erection of a legal architecture that pre-emptively criminalizes and rationalizes the removal of these populations from society as necessary to ensure safety, civility and the protection of women, children and the citizenry. Findings indicate that in recent years, American forces “have conducted counterterrorism training exercises in 41 countries” and have “trained the military, police or border forces of close to 80 countries.” To better understand the implications of killology and the emergence of the US as the dominant military power in the world based on its doctrinal applications of counterinsurgency theory and the proliferation of nonstate actors who challenge its authority, future studies also ought to also inquire into its role in training
and distributing weapons for proxy forces (including the modern white power movement) around the world. Given the historical and contemporary tendency of empires to use the bodies of the conquered to extend itself through conscription and compulsory military service (in national armies or proxy forces), future researchers should consider investigating the existential impacts that the state-sanctioned murder and demonization of the males of these cultural and ethnic groups have on those who have been compelled to serve in security forces who facilitate the destruction of their own people.

By providing an account of the development of the Black nationalist tradition and the theoretic sophistication of internal colonialism into intercommunalism by Huey P. Newton sensitive to the psychical and historical consciousness of African-descended people in the US, this work has filled a gap in knowledge regarding the driving ideas behind the Black Power era left in the wake of Black philosophy’s dereliction and reification of white humanism. The epistemological and normative mandates of academic philosophy pressures have heretofore delimited the study of anti-colonialism on this basis. Through an empirically sensitive study of counterinsurgency as a form of warfare that spawned to conceptually confirm the philosophical anthropological schemas westerners have used to dehumanized non-western populations, this study exposes the propagandistic character of academic philosophy and (inter)disciplinary approaches to study Blackness in the aftermath of the downfall of Black Studies in its original conception. However, unlike others within the necropolitical moment it typifies, this work posits Blackness as a register of existence to be understood not in the destructive terms of an ontological holocaust, existence essentially characterized as “being for the captor” or social death, or as so overdetermined by violence and death that it is beyond the grasp of paradigmatic explanation but as an alternate register of the human being with the capacity to overcome MAN3: one “made within history, that really stands within the courage and enduring of slavery, suffering and poverty” as “an evolved kind of humanity that’s of the world and not something that stands outside of it.”

This is not to deny that Blackness remains “the central image of the non-western (white) other by which the West distinguishes itself.” ix However, as a genre or kind of being that has the potentiality to “create the world through a co-authoring of the world,” killology posits the Black human as capable of contributing to the actualization of a truly human theory of victory – a victory for the world’s people caught in the midst of the indeterminate and ruthless ‘Global War on Terror’. x The accomplishment of a truly human victory, or the leap beyond MAN and the new cognitive order it implies will only emerge by seizing on the ontological crisis of the American sense of order and continuity that enables its agency and control of the people of the world induced by the indeterminacy and longevity of its spatially unbounded ‘Global War on Terrorism’. xi


