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The Political Union Debate in Canada’s Maritime Provinces, 1960-1980:
Why did a Union Not Happen?

Luke Flanagan

PhD
University of Edinburgh
2012
I declare that this thesis is my own work and effort. Where other sources have been used, they are acknowledged.

Luke Flanagan
PhD Candidate
November 2012
Abstract

Utilising a historical perspective and drawing upon path dependence theory, the thesis focuses on the question of a political union of Canada’s three Maritime provinces - Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island - between 1960 and 1980. Drawing on archival sources and interviews the thesis examines the factors which increased the potential for a union and resulted in a political union not occurring in this period. The thesis reveals how the intensification of Quebec separatism throughout the 1960s and 1970s threatened to separate the region geographically from the rest of the country. It also shows that the regional expansionist agenda of the federal government undermined provincial jurisdiction as it sought to eliminate economic underdevelopment in the Maritime region. These factors coupled with the dynamics of province-building and the political ambition of key political leaders in the Maritimes created the impetus for a political union in the 1960s.

The thesis pays particular attention to the Maritime Union Study (MUS), established in 1968 by the Maritime premiers to investigate the union question. The thesis argues that the MUS was a critical juncture because it presented the premiers with a number of alternative choices for political change, including its main recommendation: the establishment of a political union. However, the thesis reveals that upon the publication of the final report of the MUS in November 1970, the ramifications of the 1970 October Crisis in Quebec and the recent election of new premiers in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick reconfigured the national and regional contexts in which a political union was considered. This reconfiguration led to a new form of institutionalised intergovernmental relations called the Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP). The CMP was a confederal structure which respected the provincially-focused decision-making capacity of the Maritime premiers.

The key conclusion of the thesis is that engagement with the question of a political union reflected a balance between political environment and political agency. The national political environment encouraged the consideration of a political union because it revealed a vulnerability to external occurrences which were beyond the control of the three provinces and connected with an internal logic for change. A political union was seen as a way for the region to develop the capacity to become economically self-sufficient and in turn neutralise the implications of unexpected externalities. However, alternative opportunities for political action were pursued when the national political environment became reconfigured and new political leaders were elected. This dynamic explains why, despite a critical juncture, a union did not happen. As such, the thesis shows that the current understanding of change to path dependent
settings is confirmed. Established trajectories will be more inclined towards persistence than change. The key contribution of the thesis to path dependence theory is that change is not the default outcome of a critical juncture. If change is viable, considered but not ultimately selected it is no less a critical juncture than those which produce enduring change. On a broader level, the thesis gives an indication as to the difficulty of political amalgamations between constitutionally protected entities within established federal states.
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List of Abbreviations

ACW – American Civil War
APC - Atlantic Premiers Conference
APEC - Atlantic Provinces Economic Council
AnPC - Annual Premiers Conference
B&B - Bilingualism and Biculturalism
BC - British Columbia
BNA – British North America
BNA Act – British North America Act
CBC - Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CMP - Council of Maritime Premiers
CPOs - Causal Process Observations
DR – Durham Report
DREE - Department of Regional Economic Expansion
EOP - Equal Opportunity Programme
FLQ - Front de Libération du Québec
HI – Historical Institutionalism
ICR – Inter-Colonial Railway
IGAs – Intergovernmental Arrangements
IGR - Intergovernmental Relations
INUS – A neither sufficient nor necessary factor that is part of an overall combination that is sufficient for the outcome
JLA - Joint Legislative Assembly
JLC - Joint Legislative Committee
MP – Member of Parliament
MPC - Maritime Provinces Commission
MRM - Maritime Rights Movement
MUS - Maritime Union Study
NDP – New Democratic Party
NI - New Institutionalism
PEI - Prince Edward Island
PQ - Parti Québécois
SUIN - a sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome
UK – United Kingdom
UN - Union Nationale
US - United States
VEP - Voluntary Economic Planning
### Key Events Timeline

**1758-1956**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1758</td>
<td>Establishment of Representative Government in Nova Scotia.</td>
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<td>1769</td>
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<td>1784</td>
<td>Colonisation of New Brunswick and Cape Breton.</td>
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<td>1820</td>
<td>Re-annexation of Cape Breton to Nova Scotia.</td>
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<td>1851</td>
<td>Establishment of Responsible Government in PEI.</td>
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<td>1864</td>
<td>Charlottetown Conference – discussion of a political union of the three Maritime colonies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Canadian Confederation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Entry of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into Confederation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>Entry of PEI into Confederation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1939</td>
<td>The Great Depression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-1945</td>
<td>The Second World War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Publication of the Rowell-Sirois Commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956 (July)</td>
<td>Establishment of the Atlantic Premiers Conference.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1960-1980

1960 (22 June)  Election of the Liberal Party of Quebec under Jean Lesage.


1963 (April)  Wilfred O'Neill, a night watchman at the Canadian Army Recruitment Centre in Montreal is killed in an explosion at the Centre. The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) claim responsibility.

1963 (October)  Louis Robichaud’s speech to the Empire Club of Canada. Highlights extreme separatism carried out by the FLQ as a threat to the Maritimes and the country.

1964 (September)  Louis Robichaud’s speech to the Centennial Conference proposing the establishment of a union study.

1965 (February)  Passing of Legislative Resolutions in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia committing to the establishment of a union study.

1966 (May)  Election of the Liberal Party of PEI under Alex Campbell.

1967 (November)  Formation of the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association in Quebec

1968 (February)  Speech from the Throne in PEI stated support for a union study.

1968 (March)  Commissioning of the Maritime Union Study.
1968 (April)     Election of Pierre Elliott Trudeau as Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and Prime Minister.

1968 (October)    Establishment of the Parti Québécois.

1969               Establishment of the Department for Regional Economic Expansion (DREE).

1970 (5 October)   Kidnapping of British Diplomat James Cross by the FLQ beginning the October Crisis.

1970 (10 October)  Kidnapping of Quebec Deputy Premier and Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte by the FLQ.

1970 (16 October)  Invocation of the War Measures Act by the Trudeau government.

1970 (17 October)  Pierre Laporte found murdered in Montreal.


1970 (November)    Publication of the Maritime Union Study.

1970 (3 December)  James Cross Released


1976 (November)    Election of the Parti Québécois. René Lévesque becomes Premier of Quebec.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1978 (September)</td>
<td>Resignation of Alex Campbell as Leader of the Liberal Party of PEI. Replaced by Bennett Campbell.</td>
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<td>1979 (September)</td>
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#### Premiers of the Maritime Provinces

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<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nova Scotia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Howe</td>
<td>Premier (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Reformer</td>
<td>1860-1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Tupper</td>
<td>Premier (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Nova Scotia</td>
<td>1864-1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angus L MacDonald</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Nova Scotia</td>
<td>1933-1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1945-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Brunswick</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Samuel Leonard Tilley</td>
<td>Premier (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Liberal Party of New Brunswick</td>
<td>1861-1865</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Douglas-Hazen</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of New Brunswick</td>
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<td>Hugh John Flemming</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of New Brunswick</td>
<td>1952-1960</td>
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<td>Louis Robichaud</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>Liberal Party of New Brunswick</td>
<td>1960-1970</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prince Edward Island</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>George Coles</td>
<td>Premier (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1851-1854</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexander B Campbell</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1966-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angus MacLean</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1979-1981</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Key Advisors and Public Servants

| Fred Arsenault | Secretary to the Maritime Union Study | Affiliated to the Progressive Conservative Party of New Brunswick | 1968-1970 |
| John Deutsch | Special Advisor to the Maritime Union Study | - | 1968-1970 |
| Fred Drummie | Executive Director of the Maritime Union Study | Affiliated to the Liberal Party (New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) | 1968-1970 |
| Tom Kent | Deputy Minister of DREE | Affiliated to the Liberal Party | 1969-1971 |
| Mike Kirby | Principal Assistant to the Premier of Nova Scotia | Affiliated to the Liberal Party of Nova Scotia | 1970-1973 |
| Innis MacLeod | Assistant to the Premier of Nova Scotia | - | 1956-1970 |
| Charles McElman | Executive Assistant to Premier of New Brunswick | Affiliated to Liberal Party of Nova Scotia | 1960-1966 |
| Andrew Wells | Secretary to the Council of Maritime Premiers | Affiliated to the Liberal Party of Prince Edward Island | 1966-1971 |
| | Secretary to the Executive Council of Prince Edward Island | - | 1971-1972 |

### Key Political Leaders of Other Jurisdictions

### Fathers of Confederation

<p>| John A. MacDonald | Deputy Premier of the Province of Canada (Colonial Era) | Liberal-Conservative Party | 1856-1857 |
| John A. MacDonald | Premier of the Province of Canada (Colonial Era) | Liberal-Conservative Party | 1857-1858 |
| | Deputy Premier of the Province | | 1858-1862 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George-Étienne Cartier</td>
<td>Premier of the Province of Canada (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Parti Bleu</td>
<td>1858-1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Militia and Defence (Post-Confederation)</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>1867-1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Brown</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Clear Grit Party</td>
<td>1851-1867</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Premier of the Province of Canada (Colonial Era)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1858</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samuel Leonard Tilley</td>
<td>Premier of New Brunswick (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Liberal Party of New Brunswick</td>
<td>1861-1865</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>Liberal-Conservative Party</td>
<td>1867-1873</td>
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<td>1878-1885</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Coles</td>
<td>Premier of Prince Edward Island (Colonial Era)</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1851-1854</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edward Barron Chandler</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Council of New Brunswick</td>
<td>Conservative Party of New Brunswick</td>
<td>1836-1878</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>1896</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Annand</td>
<td>Financial Secretary of Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Reformer</td>
<td>1860-1863</td>
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**Prime Ministers of Canada**

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<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Years</th>
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<tr>
<td>John A. MacDonald</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Liberal-Conservative Party</td>
<td>1867-1873</td>
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<td>1878-1891</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Tupper</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>1896</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Bedford Bennett</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>1930-1935</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Lyon Mackenzie King</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>1926-1930</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1935-1948</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louis St. Laurent</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>1948-1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Diefenbaker</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>1957-1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lester B. Pearson</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>1963-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pierre Elliott Trudeau</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>1968-1979</td>
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<td>1980-1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oliver Mowat</td>
<td>Premier of Ontario</td>
<td>Ontario Liberal Party</td>
<td>1872-1896</td>
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<td>Honoré Mercier</td>
<td>Premier of Quebec</td>
<td>Parti National (Liberal Party)</td>
<td>1887-1891</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maurice Duplessis</td>
<td>Premier of Quebec</td>
<td>Union Nationale</td>
<td>1936-1939</td>
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<td>Jean Lesage</td>
<td>Premier of Quebec</td>
<td>Quebec Liberal Party</td>
<td>1960-1966</td>
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<td>Jean Jacques Bertrand</td>
<td>Premier of Quebec</td>
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<td>René Lévesque</td>
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<td>Premier of Quebec</td>
<td>1976-1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bob Rae</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>1978-1982</td>
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<td>Leader</td>
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<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>2011-Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joey Smallwood</td>
<td>Premier of Newfoundland</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Newfoundland</td>
<td>1949-1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danny Williams</td>
<td>Premier of Newfoundland</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative of Newfoundland</td>
<td>2003-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett</td>
<td>Premier of British Columbia</td>
<td>British Columbia Social Credit Party</td>
<td>1952-1972</td>
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Chapter 1

Sub-National Political Union in a Federal State

1.1. Overview

This thesis focuses on why sub-states within a federal state may formally consider a political union. It argues that sub-national structural change will become salient during critical junctures when vested political leaders reach a choice point in which a particular option or course of action is chosen from one or more alternatives. Once this option is selected it will become progressively more difficult to return to the pre-juncture status quo. The key contribution to scholarship is to explain why sub-national political leaders may consider a union during a critical juncture but may opt not to unite.

The empirical focus is Canada’s Maritime provinces – Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island (PEI) – in the period 1960-1980. These provinces and time period have been selected because they offer a clearly defined context in which to address questions of sub-national political union. They also provide an opportunity to develop insight into how the dynamics of a federal state can shape the preferences of vested political leaders towards questions of structural change at the sub-national level. When the three provinces joined Confederation at or near the outset of the Dominion their territorial boundaries, colonial names and existing political institutions remained intact. The political context of the Maritime colonies at the time of Confederation was one characterised by long established political entities with nearly a century of local political institutions and two decades of colonial self government. Federalism was a salient form of consolidation in the nineteenth century because it offered to reconcile economic and external pressures and at the same time preserve the political, historical and territorial integrity of the three political entities. In joining Confederation, the three Maritime colonies, were “absorbed but remained intact as constitutionally sovereign parts in the larger national political framework” (Ziblatt, 2006: 2). This argument forms the basis of the framework - path dependence - which underpins this thesis.

The key contention of path dependence is that “once a country or region has started down a track, the cost of reversal is very high” (Levi, 1997: 28 cited in Pierson, 2000: 252).
As provinces of Canada, the Maritimes became constitutionally protected subunits (provinces) with a high degree of infrastructural capacity, that is the ability to tax, maintain order, regulate society and generally govern their societies, and the ability to legislate in a range of key social policy areas, notably healthcare, welfare and education. The constitutionally protected nature of the provinces within the Canadian federation meant that the impetus for sub-national structural change would have to emanate from within the provinces in question. It cannot be mandated by the federal government. Confederation was therefore a key point of institutional reinforcement. The institutional capacity of the Maritimes which had been developed within the colonial era was preserved within the new Canadian state. Confederation entrenched the Maritime region as comprised of three distinct territorial and political entities. Once the three Maritime colonies joined Confederation, the possibility for structural change was significantly reduced. This thesis seeks to determine why, in spite of this context, the three Maritime provinces considered a political union in the late 1960s.

Sub-national political leaders will be a central focus. The emergence of the political union debate in the 1960s was a process triggered by the decisions and perspectives of political leaders. From a conceptual standpoint, the role of political leaders in the process of structural change is viewed as one constrained by the political setting in which they operate. Kathleen Thelen has argued that political leaders will ensure the stability and continuation of a political setting because once a certain setting is in place “they will adapt their strategies in ways that reflect but also reinforce the logic of the system” (Thelen, 1999: 392). Similarly, John Zysman has argued that the political settings in which political leaders operate “induces particular kinds of behaviour by constraining and laying out a logic to the policy-making process which in turn creates predictable patterns in the way governments go about their business” (Zysman, 1994: 243). Sub-national political leaders are constrained by the political constituency in which they represent and are accountable to electorates living in a defined space.

In 1968, the three Maritime premiers commissioned a government sponsored study, the Maritime Union Study (MUS), into the viability and desirability of a political union of the three provinces within the Canadian federation. Using the tools of path dependence, it is contended that the MUS represented a critical juncture, which allowed for the consideration
of structural change. It is not clear at this stage, however, what caused the critical juncture and why a political union of the three provinces did not happen. Using the process tracing approach, the specific causes for the critical juncture and the consideration of structural change in the Maritimes will be determined.

In analysing the question of a political union in the Maritimes, a gap will be bridged within the path dependence framework. Much of the current literature is focused on how change happens, discontinuous or incremental, and where the impetus for change emanates, internally or external, yet there is rarely a focus on the outcome of a critical juncture. The expected outcome of a critical juncture is change to a new path dependent process which will then endure over time. There is, at present, a lack of focus on critical junctures that do not produce change or new path dependent processes. This thesis will address this gap by explaining why a political union did not happen following the publication of the MUS in November 1970. More specifically, the thesis will address the establishment of the Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP) in 1972. The CMP was a form of institutionalised intergovernmental relations established by the premiers following the publication of the MUS. The CMP introduced a form of structured regionalism but preserved the political and territorial integrity of the three provinces. A further focus is the notion of re-equilibration as forwarded by Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen. It will be determined whether the CMP can be considered a form of structural change following a critical juncture or if it was a restoration of the pre-juncture status quo.

**Definition of a Federal State**

Scholars have sought to define federal state from a number of different standpoints; for example, Preston King has argued that a federal state is an ideological construction “based on a coherent set of ideas with a view to mobilising and directing political action in order to serve some relatively specific purpose” (King, 1982: 20). Others, such as William Riker, have defined federalism in institutional terms, grounded on the initial formulation of the state and the internal division of power between the centre and the sub-units. For Riker, federalism involves three key characteristics: two levels of government that rule the same land and people, each level of government has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous and some constitutional guarantee of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere (Riker,
1964: 11). Michael Burgess has defined a federal state as a “distinctive organisational form or institutional fact the main purpose of which is to accommodate the constituent units of a union in the decision-making procedure of the central government by means of constitutional entrenchment” (Burgess, 2006: 2).

Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshool and Olga Shvetsova have argued that a federal state may be formed for two key reasons: economic and political. From an economic standpoint, the consolidation of political entities into a federal state may be necessary to ameliorate “market failures associated with informational asymmetries, externalities and wholly decentralised decision-making over public goods” (Filippov, Ordeshool and Shvetsova, 2004: 1). For John Kincaid, a federal state is the pursuit of economic development and prosperity through the creation of a single economic market: “a federal state can create a common market that permits a free flow of commerce among diverse political communities. By lowering trade barriers between political communities, by mitigating independent and self-aggrandising economic policy-making within those communities, and by utilising the natural and human resources of the whole country, a common market can foster economic prosperity as well as national integration” (Kincaid, 2001: 85).

From a political standpoint, a federal state allows existing political entities to consolidate or come together to address economic deficiencies or common threats but through the development of a new political structure. Such a structure can take account of the fact that some entities may “not be willing to abrogate their political authority wholly, and a degree of regional autonomy is often the only compromise that allows the establishment of a viable state” (Filippov, Ordeshool and Shvetsova, 2004: 2). For Riker, a federal state is shaped by ‘external compulsion.’ This perspective contends that “in every successfully formed federation it must be the case that a significant external or internal threat or significant opportunity for aggression is present, where the threat can be forestalled and the aggression carried out only with a bigger government. This is what brings us union at all and is the main feature, the prospective gain, in both giving and accepting the bargain” (Riker, 1964: 116).
This thesis will utilise the definition of Daniel Ziblatt when seeking a definition and characterisation of a federal state. For Ziblatt, a state can be considered federal when two key facets are present: *constitutionally embedded sub-national governments* and *sub-national infrastructural capacity*. A federal state is one with sub-national sovereign governments that possess three constitutionally embedded institutional characteristics that cluster together: “formal and informal access of sub-national governments in the decision-making process of national governments, sub-national public finance (taxing and spending) discretion, and administrative autonomy of regional governments within a nation-state” (Ziblatt, 2006: 5). Furthermore, a state can only be federal when the sub-national governments possess a high level of infrastructural capacity which denotes the ability to tax, maintain order, regulate society, and generally govern their societies (Ibid: 3). If sub-units are not constitutionally protected or do not possess a high level infrastructural capacity the state cannot be considered federal but a unitary state.

This definition provides a platform from which to consider the role of political leaders in the process of structural change between sub-units in a federal state. The fact that sub-units within federal states are constitutionally protected means that structural change cannot be mandated by the centre. However, perhaps the most important implications are *institutional capacity* and *infrastructural capacity*. The power and autonomy afforded to sub-national political leaders is high, more so in the case of Canada, whereby the provinces assumed responsibility over large areas of social policy following the Second World War and acquired a larger role in national decision-making as executive led federal-provincial intergovernmental relations became a central component of national policy making. The structural and political arrangements of federalism gave the provincial premiers a high degree of infrastructural capacity and institutional capacity in which to exert national influence. Gerald Alexander has argued that the longer a political setting has been in operation the more difficult it is to change because political leaders are vested by the benefits of the political setting. As a result they are reluctant to pursue change, even if “change may produce higher aggregate returns in the long run” (Alexander, 2001: 251). In addition, political leaders may be reluctant to enact change because the purported benefits of change may be incalculable. Therefore, it can be surmised that political leaders will not be inclined to engage with questions of change and will favour the retention of the status quo. The prospect for change is further undermined by the fact that sub-units are constitutionally protected. This not only
means that sub-national political leaders are vested as the core beneficiaries of a political setting but are vested as the core agents of change.

1.2. Research Question

This thesis is driven by one key research question. However, it is also pertinent to ask three further sub-questions which seek to understand the shapers of a critical juncture:

Research Question and Subsidiary Questions

1. Why, in spite of a critical juncture, did a political union not happen in the Maritime provinces in 1970?

   a) What factors gave rise to the critical juncture, that is the Maritime Union Study, and the consideration of a sub-national political union, in the Maritime provinces?

   b) What was the role of political agency, that is the vested political leaders, in the establishment of the critical juncture?

   c) Can the outcome of the critical juncture, institutionalised intergovernmental relations (the Council of Maritime Premiers), established in 1972, be considered a form of structural change?

1.3. Theoretical Framework

Path Dependence Theory

The basic contention of this path dependence is that “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events at a later point in time (Pierson, 2000: 252). In institutional terms, once an institution or political setting is established the prospect for change is very difficult because the longer the institution continues on its established trajectory the more embedded it becomes. When a political setting is considered path dependent, it can be expected that subsequent decisions will strengthen the established
trajectory by encouraging “further movement in the same direction. This is because the relative benefits of the current trajectory compared with other options increase over time” (Ibid). The notion of vested political leaders, as discussed earlier, is a key component of this process. Incumbent political leaders will be empowered as the core beneficiaries of the political setting and will structure their behaviour and decision-making in a way that ensures the continuation of the established trajectory. This characterisation of path dependence has led critics, for example Thelen, to argue that path dependence is a framework for the explanation of continuity and does not explain well the salience of change.

In order to account for the salience of structural change, this thesis will utilise the notion of critical junctures. James Mahoney has argued that a definition of critical junctures involves two key strands: the first denotes a critical juncture as a choice point in which a particular option or course of action is chosen from one or more alternatives. The second strand denotes that once a particular option or course of action has been selected during a critical juncture, it becomes more difficult to return to the pre-juncture status quo or another course of action that may have been viable at an earlier point in time (Mahoney, 2001a: 113). The nature of a critical juncture is that it will be temporary and may only last a short period of time, sometimes a number of years (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 343). When thinking about the question of sub-national political union in the Maritimes, this thesis will contend that the MUS was a critical juncture. Its final report presented the premiers with a number of choices for political action. It was this public study and the proposals it made which shaped the nature of the union debate for the rest of the decade and beyond.

A core source of debate within the path dependence literature is whether the cause of change is first, discontinuous or incremental, and second, internal or external. The discontinuous argument contends that change will be a rapid process in which the equilibrium of the status quo becomes punctuated by a period of crisis which will be followed by consolidation and stasis (Krasner, 1984: 240). This process has been termed punctuated equilibrium. The core trigger of punctuated equilibrium is exogenous shocks. This surmises that change will become salient as a result of threats or pressures which emanate from outside the political setting and have such a profound impact that they destabilise the existing trajectory and permit the consideration of change (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 343). The incremental argument states that structural change will not occur rapidly but over an extended
period of time through an “accumulation of related events” (Ibid: 350). The cumulative argument invokes the notion of threshold events in which change will become salient when related events pass a threshold and destabilise the existing trajectory leading to the consideration of change. The cause of a threshold event can emanate either internally or externally of the political setting.

The MUS, as a critical juncture, shaped the choices available to the provincial premiers. This thesis will seek to determine what caused the critical juncture, where it emanated (internal and external) and how it influenced the preferences and decision-making of the vested political leaders (the premiers). Furthermore, a key contribution of this thesis will be to analyse the outcome of the critical juncture. That is why the vested political leaders chose institutionalised intergovernmental relations over a political union. By doing this, it will bridge a gap in the existing explanatory framework. Thelen for example has argued that the injection of agency into the analysis of change can help garner a clearer insight into the overall outcome: “the challenge is to inject agency into institutional accounts in a way that rises above the particular episode in question, to generate portable propositions that allow us to identify broader patterns of politics and political dynamics” (Thelen, 2010: 55). John Campbell on the other hand has criticised path dependent explanations because they rarely account for the process following a critical juncture in which political leaders determine what type of change to implement, if any (Campbell, 2010: 93). These perspectives tie in with a criticism of Cappocia and Kelemen, who have asserted that analyses of critical junctures “are often characterised on the basis of their outcome, namely change” (Cappocia and Kelemen, 2007: 352). The critical juncture framework rarely takes account of ‘near misses.’ The outcome of a critical juncture does not have to be change; it can also involve the “restoration of the pre-juncture status quo” (Ibid). Cappocia and Kelemen have termed this process re-equilibration. The notion of re-equilibration denotes that a critical juncture may emerge, in which structural change was possible, plausible and actively considered in a period of high uncertainty but was ultimately rejected. Following the end of the critical juncture, the political trajectory therefore re-equilibrated and pre-critical juncture status quo was maintained (Ibid).

Through an analysis of the outcome, institutionalised intergovernmental relations, a fuller explanation will be developed to clarify the salience of a political union which also incorporates a consideration of agency and outcome. The three Maritime provinces entered a
critical juncture with the establishment of the MUS in 1968 but the core form of structural change, a political union, did not happen. By analysing the establishment of institutionalised intergovernmental relations, this thesis will seek to determine whether this could be considered a form of structural change and if not, why not. More importantly, it seeks to understand why the political leaders established institutionalised intergovernmental relations instead of a political union. It will be contended that the basis for understanding why a political union did not happen will depend on how and why the critical juncture emerged in the first place. By determining the cause of a critical juncture, it can help improve understanding of the response of the vested political leaders. Furthermore, by addressing the outcome of a critical juncture, the actions and decisions of the vested political leaders can be contrasted with those at the start of the juncture. Through this approach a clearer picture can be garnered of how and why the vested political leaders engaged with questions of union, why they decided not to enact a union and why they enacted another form of change, institutionalised intergovernmental relations, instead. It is this objective which guided the core methodological approach of process tracing.

1.4. Methodological Approach

Process tracing can be defined as “the examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence with the goal of achieving and refining causal inference. Process tracing can have distinctive probative value in supporting or overturning explanatory hypotheses” (Collier, 2010: 2). In order to determine why a political union did not happen, a focus was placed on the political decisions of the vested political leaders. Process tracing is well placed to analyse political decision-making because it can “reconstruct, in a systematic and rigorous fashion, each step of the decision-making process, identify which decisions were most influential and what options were available and viable to the actors who took them and clarify both their impact and their connection to important decisions” (Cappocia and Kelemen, 2007: 354-355). Alexander George and Timothy McKeown argued that “process tracing attempts to uncover what stimuli actors attend to, the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions, the actual behaviour that then occurs, the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, process and behaviour and the effect of other variables of interest in attention, processing and behaviour” (George and McKeown, 1985: 35 cited Falleti, 2007: 1). For Tulia Falleti, the
value of process tracing is the way in which it can “uncover the micro-foundations of individual behaviour that connect hypothesised causes and outcomes” (Falleti, 2007: 1).

Drawing on archival sources, interview transcripts and informant and elite interviews, this thesis will utilise process tracing in which to determine the cause (or causes) of the critical juncture and ascertain how it shaped the preferences and decisions of the vested political leaders towards questions of a political union. Furthermore, by focusing on the 1960-1980 timeframe, it analyses the periods before and after the critical juncture in order to capture a fuller understanding of why the vested political leaders engaged with the union concept, why a union did not happen in 1970 and the nature of the final outcome, institutionalised intergovernmental relations.

1.3. Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis explores the question of sub-national political union within an established federal state. Chapter 2 builds on the theoretical propositions detailed within this chapter. It shows that structural change amongst established political entities is unlikely because once an institutional setting is formed it is reinforced over time. Change is further undermined because certain political leaders are vested as the core beneficiaries of the institutional status quo. Furthermore, such actors are able to preserve the status quo because they have the necessary institutional capacity to resist change. It leads on to show that if change is to occur within path dependent settings, it will do so through external shocks or threshold events which precipitate critical junctures. During critical junctures the possibility of change is heightened because the vested political leaders have the opportunity to consider change to an alternative path dependent setting.

Chapter 3 outlines the methodology and methods utilised by this study. It outlines how the process tracing approach was used to garner a detailed understanding of the causes and motives of the vested political leaders in engaging with questions of structural change in the 1960s. It outlines how process tracing was intersected with the cause framework developed by James Mahoney, Erin Kimball and Kendra Koivu to ‘determine causation’ and explain the emergence of the union concept. It also considers territoriality and sub-national leadership in order to get a better sense of some of the constraints and enablers of political decision-making. These factors can help garner a clearer sense of the necessary methodological
approach. The chapter reinforces the necessity of a historical and longitudinal approach to the analysis of structural change in order to understand the basis of specific political decisions. Finally, the core research methods, interview transcripts, informant and elite interviews and archival research, are introduced and explained.

Chapter’s 4 and 5 are contextual chapters. Chapter 4 provides a historical background to frame the core focus on the period between 1960 and 1980. It analyses the historical development of the three provinces from a single territorial entity to three quasi-independent colonies of Britain. It argues that once the provinces, as colonies of Britain, were established territorially they were reinforced over time as they each acquired political institutions. Responsible government was important because it empowered local political leaders with the political capacity to resist change and defend their political, economic and territorial interests. The chapter continues by outlining that Confederation was a manifestation of this capacity as each colony sought to furnish their interests within a new political structure. The actors were able to reject a regional political union in favour of federal union because they had the political capacity to ensure that the colonies were preserved as sub-units of the new federal state. Confederation further reinforced the institutional setting established by colonisation and responsible government.

Chapter 5 analyses the post-Confederation context up to the late 1950s as a basis to understand some of the formative events which shaped the emergence of the political union concept in the 1960s. The chapter begins with a brief analysis of some early proposals for regionalism and details how the political union concept re-emerged within Confederation as a response to grievances over the operation of federalism in practice. It focuses on key events such as the Provincial Rights Movement in the 1880s, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Second World War and the early beginnings of Quebec nationalism in order to show that changes to the trajectory of the federation often occurred during periods of crisis or flux. This image of change during a period of flux is a key component of path dependence theory. Using the notion of a swinging pendulum, as developed by Edwin Black and Alan Cairns, it shows that the ‘swing’ from a decentralised to a centralised trajectory was shaped by a period of crisis, such as war, and the need for a common effort to overcome it. However, once the crisis was the centralisation agenda of the federal government precipitated tensions between the federal and provincial governments. The chapter also considers questions such as province-
building. In terms of the Maritimes, the chapter shows that the provinces were beginning to occupy an increasingly dependent position within the federation. Their economic underdevelopment shaped a reliance on federal dollars and made them susceptible to federal encroachments into their jurisdiction. That said the region was becoming more coordinated and strategic in enunciating their grievances, as demonstrated with the establishment of the Atlantic Premiers Conference in 1956.

Chapter’s 6-8 are the empirical core of the thesis. Chapter 6 charts the emergence of the political union concept in 1964 at the suggestion of New Brunswick premier Louis Robichaud, and seeks to flesh out the central causes of Robichaud’s engagement with the union concept. It shows that significant externalities within the broader political environment in Canada, notably the Quiet Revolution and extreme separatism in Quebec, and the role of provincial political officials were key to facilitating the question of a union. Chapter 7 continues along similar lines. It seeks to understand the causes of political engagement with the union concept. However, it is within this chapter that political agency is brought out as a central shaper of political engagement with the union concept. It shows how the question of a government sponsored study dominated the regionalism discourse in the mid-1960s and outlines how it took a change of government in PEI to precipitate its participation in the MUS. Furthermore, it shows that continued concerns amongst the political leaders at the implications of separatism and the initiation of a distinct federal regional development policy influenced the establishment of a union study. Finally, the chapter considers the establishment and findings of the MUS as the key choice point.

Chapter 8 considers the political response to the MUS and its recommendation for a political union within a ten year period. It focuses on the key rationale of this thesis – why a union did not happen. It shows that the reconfiguration of the internal and national contexts in late 1970, notably the election of new governments in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the peak of extreme separatism and the reshaping of federal economic development policy following the October Crisis in Quebec, established a political context that was not favourable to a political union. The reconfigured political context provided new opportunities for political action and influenced the premiers to respond to the MUS in a way that protected their political, territorial and economic interests. The establishment of the Council of Maritime Premiers as a confederal entity represented the re-equilibration of the pre-juncture
status quo. The analysis continues up until 1980 to show that the election of the separatist Parti Québécois (PQ) in Quebec and its proposal for sovereignty-association caused concern at the political level in the Maritimes because of the implications for the region. However, in spite of the concern at the implications of sovereignty-association, the premiers did not engage with questions of union because the election of the PQ precipitated a broader national debate about the constitution and national unity. This broader debate superseded a regional response from the Maritimes.

Chapter 9, the conclusion, brings together the empirical findings and analyses their implications for path dependence theory and the question of sub-national union more broadly. The key conclusion of the thesis is that engagement with questions of political union is a balance between political environment and agency. While externalities may make change necessary, it is the vested political leaders who steer the process towards questions of union. The implication is that regional structural change within the Maritimes was not an external or internal occurrence but a coalescence of the two. It was a balance between the political environment in which vested political leaders operate and the ability and willingness of those actors to engage with questions of change. Furthermore, the case shows how elections can undermine the salience of change before it can even occur. Externalities and political agency may therefore be sufficient to trigger engagement with the question of a union but, even together, they are not, at for the Maritimes, sufficient for change to take place. On a broader level, the thesis gives an indication as to the difficulty of political amalgamations between constitutionally protected territorial entities within established federal states.
Chapter 2

Conceptualising Sub-National Political Union

This chapter will seek to tease out some key conceptual propositions which can be used to understand why vested political leaders may seek to engage with questions of sub-national structural change. The central proposition which will be used to inform this thesis will be that of path dependence. Path dependence offers a useful set of analytical tools to use in explaining why political entities persist over a prolonged period of time. However, whilst path dependence is associated with persistence it can also provide a strong foundation for the explanation of political change within discussions of political temporality.

A key objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that arguments of path dependence and institutional change need not only consider the process by which change is brought about or how change occurs within the context of a critical juncture. It can also be useful in taking account of the type of change or the fact that change may not occur at all following a critical juncture. This chapter will begin with a broader analysis of institutional theory as a means to justify the choice of path dependence for the Maritime case. It will then lay out the core theoretical propositions of path dependence theory that will be utilised in this thesis. Antecedent conditions and institutional reproduction will be used to explain how the Maritimes became three distinct political entities and were embedded over time. The key tenets of exogenous shocks, threshold events and critical junctures will be outlined to provide a discontinuous context for how change is surmised to occur within path dependent settings.

Following on from this, an analysis of incremental and endogenous explanations of change will be undertaken. These propositions will be used throughout the thesis to formulate an explanation of how and why the vested political leaders engaged with questions of political union and why a union did not happen. There will also be a discussion of institutionalised intergovernmental relations (IGR) in order to explain the decision of the Maritime premiers to establish the Council of Maritime Premiers. In particular, the operational criteria to measure the institutionalisation of IGR developed by Nicole Bolleyer will be utilised to analyse whether the type of institutionalised IGR established by the Maritime premiers in 1972 can be considered a form of change or the continuation of the structural status quo.
2.1. New Institutionalism

The notion of ‘bringing the institution back in’ has been a key focus of political scientists since the Second World War. ‘New institutionalism’ (NI) has been the key term applied to the focus on institutional explanations. For Stephen Bell, “NI amounts to a revival and expansion of this approach that has been underway since the 1980s” (Bell, 2002: 367). NI places a particular focus on institutionally ‘situated’ actors. The nature of change within NI is therefore placed on the actors and the extent to which they are enabled or constrained by the institutional setting in which they operate: “institutions provide actors with opportunities as well as constraints. The preferences of public officials are constrained by the administrative apparatus, legal order and [their] enduring beliefs” (Ibid). However, as Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor note, NI is not “unified body of thought” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936). Indeed they outline three key strands to NI: rational choice, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The historical variant is utilised by this thesis. It is however necessary to outline some key tenets of the other strands in order to justify this choice. a “unified body of thought” (Ibid).

Rational Choice Institutionalism

The rational choice approach is grounded primarily in the role and preferences of the actors who operate within and are vested by the institutional setting. It assumes that actors are rational agents “with preferences over possible social states, beliefs about the world…and a capacity to employ these data intelligently” (Shepsle, 1989: 132). For Bell, rational choice assumes actors “to be selfish, utility maximising individuals whose motives and preferences are shaped or determined by the institutional context” (Bell, 2002: 369). For Mahoney rational actors make decisions by weighing ‘costs and benefits’ (Mahoney, 2001b: 521). In terms of change, it is assumed that actors will be empowered to maintain the institutional status quo because “change imposes significant net costs at least in the short term. The longer actors operate within such a status quo the more a shift to an alternative is unattractive – initial choices are thus locked in” (Alexander, 2001: 254). Bell has surmised that institutions place rational actors in a “behavioural box” which structures their behaviour according to the formal or informal rules of the institutional setting (Bell, 2002: 369).
The assumption that rational actors are selfish means that actors will “change and shape institutional environments to suit their goals” (Ibid). Actors who are vested with the power in which to maintain the institutional status quo continue to uphold its existence, even when most individuals or groups prefer to change it, because they, as the main beneficiaries of the institution, have sufficient strength and resources to promote its reproduction (Mahoney, 2001b: 521). In short, political institutions are durable because vested actors want them to be (North, 1990: 8). James March and Johan Olsen have criticised the rational choice approach because of its assumption that institutions are “equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating individual actors or arenas for contending social forces. They are collections of structures, rules and standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in life” (March and Olsen, 2006: 4). B. Guy Peters has termed March and Olsen’s perspective the ‘normative approach’ because it places an emphasis on a ‘logic of appropriateness’ which individuals acquire through their membership of institutions. Under the normative approach, actors “behave as they do because of normative standards rather than because of their desire to maximise individual utilities” (Peters, 2000: 2).

**Sociological Institutionalism**

The sociological strand of institutionalism defines institutions in terms of “symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 947). It argues that decisions and actions are not a product of deduction or calculation on the part of vested actors but a product of “culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organisations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency. Thus, sociological institutionalists argue that even the most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms” (Ibid: 946-947). Moreover, actors react “not just to the hard wiring of their institutional environment but shape their interactions with institutions and with others through frames of reference, moral templates and normative orientations” (Bell, 2002: 371). Peters has argued that the work of March and Olsen reflects the sociological strand (Peters, 2000: 2). This is again evident from their assertion of ‘rules of appropriateness.’ That is to say, action and decisions are based on the way in which the institutional framework defines action, duties, rights, and roles as appropriate (normal,
natural, right, good) or inappropriate (uncharacteristic, unnatural, wrong, bad)” (March and Olsen, 1984: 741).

The core criticism of the sociological strand is that it is too deterministic in the way it views political action. The lack of rationality in the decision-making process means actors are “satisficers, rather than utility maximisers,” whereby change is an unintended consequence of factors and events exogenous to the institutional setting (Cheiladaki-Liarokapi, 2007: 7). It is this factor which links the sociological perspective to the final strand of institutional theory and the one which will guide this thesis, historical institutionalism.

**Historical Institutionalism**

Broadly speaking, historical institutionalism (HI) contends that institutions and therefore the institutional actors that operate within them become ‘embedded’ over time: “individuals are viewed as ‘embedded’ in so many social, economic and political relationships beyond their control and even cognition that it is almost absurd to speak of utility-maximising and rational behaviour in a strictly economic sense. The very concept of rationality is dependent upon its environment” (Bell, 2002: 369). In this context, the choices over the institutional structure and trajectory are surmised to occur “at the inception of the institution and will have a persistent influence over its behaviour for the remainder of its existence” (Peters, 2000: 3). Furthermore, under this strand the role of the actors is secondary to the institution: “historical institutionalists highlight what they see as the historical and evolutionary nature of institutional design and change and tend, more so than rational choice writers, to emphasise institutions as shapers of rather than the rational product of individual behaviour” (Ibid). It is from this perspective that the notion of path dependence is drawn. As outlined, path dependence is a term used to denote the persistence of institutions over time. For this reason critics of path dependence “have suggested that the concept is unable to explain change [because of the way it downplays] the role of agency” (Cheiladaki-Liarokapi, 2007: 6).

The value of HI is the opportunity it provides to analyse choices and decisions of specified actors within a longitudinal empirical paradigm. For Bell, HI’s strength is its “inductive methodology and its willingness to derive working models of rationality and actor preferences not through abstracted assumptions but through careful empirical observation. Taking actor preferences and rationality seriously is an important step in building a proper
‘micro foundational’ account of politics and institutional life” (Bell, 2002: 371). Thelen has argued that HI is helpful in the way it can develop hypothesis based on an empirical puzzle: “[in terms of theory building] historical institutionalists begin with empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events or comparisons. Rational choice theorists often proceed somewhat differently, deriving their puzzles from situations in which observed behaviour appears to deviate from what the general theory predicts” (Thelen, 1999: 374). As such, by utilising HI there is scope for a more nuanced analysis of the choices and decisions that lead to both institutional formation and institutional change.

In terms of the Maritime provinces, the key question under investigation – why did a union not happen – is empirical in nature. This question provides the start point for the analysis and HI the basis in which to develop a theoretically grounded explanation. The historical and structural setting, that is three long-established territorial entities, offers a longitudinal context in which to explore the key junctures which established, shaped and embedded the region as three distinct political units. It is this process that has been termed path dependence. Furthermore, by accounting for the establishment and strengthening of the setting there is a stronger basis in which to determine the central triggers and rationale for questions of change. Within this context the analysis of agency is crucial. This is in spite of critiques to the contrary. The rational choice strand places the preferences of the vested actors at the forefront of institutional explanations of change. Yet to focus only on this aspect is to miss a key aspect of the explanatory process. This is also true of the incremental explanation of Mahoney and Thelen outlined later in the chapter. HI can explain change that is not planned or preferred by the vested actors but a necessary response to the internal and external environment of their institutional setting.

A further benefit of HI, and in particular path dependence, is that it focuses on the sequential process of institutionalisation and the intersection of agency and timing. Paul Pierson has argued that by systematically situating particular moments in a temporal sequence of events and processes a greater understanding of important occurrences can be garnered (Pierson, 2000: 72). For Maria Cheiladaki-Liarokapi, the observation of political behaviour through an analysis of the order in which the political leaders make the key choices and decisions offers the opportunity to incorporate timing into the analysis (Cheiladaki-Liarokapi, 2007: 12). Timing can show how the interaction of unrelated events, at some point in time,
can produce substantial consequences for an institutional setting (Ibid). It is here that the notion of critical junctures is invoked. For Thelen, the strength of HI is the way “issues of sequencing and timing can bring out the different patterns of interaction between ongoing political processes and at the effect of these interactions on questions of change and other outcomes” (Thelen, 1999: 388). Yet, within the HI framework there is also an opportunity for a theoretical contribution in explaining how and why change occurs.

A key criticism of HI has been the lack of clarity as to what causes critical junctures and the hypothesised outcome of a critical juncture. For example, Hall and Taylor have argued that the “principal problem [of HI] is to explain what precipitates critical junctures and, although historical institutionalists, generally stress the impact of economic crisis and military conflict, many do not have a well developed response to this question” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942). Similarly Thelen has argued that HI does not emphasise or even sufficiently problematise how the outcomes of critical junctures are translated into lasting legacies (Thelen, 1999: 390). The rational choice literature is perhaps clearer in this regard because it is assumed that the vested actors will pursue change when presented with a suitable opportunity. Yet with HI and critical junctures the outcome is less clear. This thesis will address this gap by analysing why a political union of the Maritimes did not happen. By utilising methodological tools which take the analysis beyond the critical juncture, the focus of the analysis can be shifted not just to the cause of change but how such causes affect the eventual outcome. Moreover, this strategy also offers an opportunity to incorporate agency into HI analysis. It is known that a political union did not happen but it has not yet been questioned why. By taking a longitudinal perspective whereby the analysis begins before and continues beyond the critical juncture the key decisions of the vested actors can be examined in a fuller way. This strategy will move the theoretical analysis beyond the criticism that HI “merely tells stories” and account for and understand the cause and content of political behaviour through systematic historically based empirical analysis (Ibid: 372). It is this theoretical strategy which can best determine why certain outcomes prevail over others.
2.2. Analytic Components of Path-Dependent Explanation

*Antecedent Conditions*

Mahoney has provided a number of ‘analytic components’ in which to construct a path dependent explanation – antecedent conditions, institutional reproduction and critical junctures. *Antecedent conditions* are the historical conditions that provide the start point for the development of a particular political trajectory which in turn “define a range of options available to actors at a key choice point” (Mahoney, 2001a: 112). For Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, antecedent conditions provide the base line in which critical junctures that permit the consideration of change to the established trajectory may be assessed (Collier and Collier, 1991: 30). Thus in order to determine how a political trajectory may be subject to change or revision, it is necessary to understand how the trajectory came into being in the first place and how it became entrenched over time. By understanding how the trajectory was established it can provide a basis for pinpointing the sources of a critical juncture and the possibility of change.

*Institutional Reproduction*

Pierson has defined *institutional reproduction* as a process of entrenchment, each step in a particular direction along an established trajectory makes it more difficult to reverse course (Pierson, 2004: 21). Once a political trajectory has been established within the context of antecedent historical conditions, certain events or factors will strengthen the trajectory and make change to an alternative political trajectory less achievable. Furthermore, causes of institutional reproduction may result in the persistence of a particular political trajectory despite the absence of the initial conditions responsible for the development of the trajectory (Mahoney, 2001a: 114). Therefore, the political trajectory may be strengthened and the possibility of political change lessened despite the detachment of the trajectory from the antecedent conditions responsible for the establishment of the trajectory in the first place. The concern of this thesis is to understand the role of political agency in periods of change. It is therefore pertinent to consider briefly how notions of institutional reproduction are assumed to affect the preferences of political leaders.
The individual preferences of political leaders are an important factor in the consideration of change within path dependent settings. Riker has argued that institutions are central to understanding the decisions of political leaders. The key facet of Riker’s analysis is that the personal opinions of political leaders are condensed into institutions and constrained by them. To clarify, institutions can be defined as “the rules of behaviour, especially about making decisions” (Riker, 1980: 432). Douglass North has argued that “institutions structure incentives in human exchange, whether social, political, or economic; institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change” (North, 1990: 3). The assumed role of political leaders is that there is a preference towards the maintenance of the institutional status quo because once empowered within a certain institutional trajectory actors will become consumed by “powerful vested self perpetuating interests” (Collier and Collier, 1991: 37).

**Critical Junctures**

Antecedent conditions and institutional reproduction are key components of path dependent explanation because they get to the very core of how and why particular institutional trajectories endure over time. An equally valuable component of path dependence is its explanation of change. At the centre of path dependent explanations of change are the notion of critical junctures. This thesis will utilise a definition forwarded by Mahoney. Critical junctures are “choice points when a particular option is adopted from among two or more alternatives. If there is no choice between alternatives, there is no critical juncture. Once a particular option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney, 2001a: 114). Capoccia and Kelemen have defined a critical juncture as “a situation in which the structural (such as, political, economic, cultural, ideological, and organisational) influences that maintain the institutional trajectory are significantly destabilised for a relatively short period” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 343). Under this scenario, the range of plausible choices open to political leaders expands substantially thereby heightening the possibility of change (Ibid). Collier and Collier got to the core of the different definitions of critical junctures:

“The character of critical junctures and the perspectives from which they are analysed vary greatly. Some critical junctures may entail considerable discretion, whereas with others the presumed choice appears deeply embedded in antecedent conditions. The
critical juncture may involve a relatively brief period of reorientation. Some analyses stress underlying societal cleavages or crises that lead up to the critical juncture, whereas other focus primarily on the critical juncture itself” (Collier and Collier, 1991: 27).

The Capoccia and Kelemen definition focuses much more on the context in which a critical juncture emerges than the juncture itself. The problem with this definition is that it does not describe a process of decision-making but an environment in which a decision can or may be made. As such, although the environment may favour change, it does not suggest that change may occur or even be considered. It is therefore questionable whether this definition actually describes a juncture or the build up to a juncture. Mahoney’s definition suggests a clear point at which vested actors may recognise the need for change and provides the parameters for analysing the type of change under consideration. It is for such reasons that Mahoney’s approach is preferred for this thesis. However, as will be outlined, context is a key component of a critical juncture but as a cause and shaper of the juncture. Context in itself does not represent a critical juncture. That said, at the same time a critical juncture does not in of itself have to result in change. Any definition of critical junctures must allow for a scenario in which change may be considered but the pre-juncture status quo endures as the preferred outcome. It is here that Capoccia and Kelemen have much to offer.

The word ‘considered’ is an important word in the critical juncture explanation because, although critical junctures are typically associated with change, the actual achievement of change following a critical juncture cannot be presupposed. Capoccia and Kelemen have argued that change may not necessarily be the outcome of a critical juncture. Actors may consider change during a critical juncture but the institutional trajectory may continue in its current form. This process is termed re-equilibration (Ibid: 352). Re-equilibration determines that although an institution may enter a critical juncture, in which change to an alternative institutional trajectory is considered, the eventual outcome may be the restoration of the pre-critical juncture status-quo (Ibid). Therefore, although change may be an important outcome of a critical juncture it is not a prerequisite; “if change was possible and plausible, considered and ultimately rejected in a situation of institutional instability, then there is no reason to discard such cases as ‘non-critical junctures’ (Ibid). That said however, critical junctures in themselves do not explain the causes of institutional change. In order for a
critical juncture to be established, and change considered, it must intersect with an overarching cause or trigger. Within path dependence change is assumed to occur in a rapid and discontinuous way. The two key triggers are exogenous shocks and threshold events.

2.3. Discontinuous Change

Exogenous Shocks

Exogenous shocks are assumed to disrupt or destabilise the institutional status quo. In terms of political institutions, war and conquest are perhaps the clearest examples of exogenous shocks that can trigger change. Campbell has intersected the concept of exogenous shocks with that of punctuated equilibrium; when institutions are path dependent they are in a state of stability or equilibrium, the prospect for change is therefore unlikely in such conditions. However, when the equilibrium becomes ‘punctuated’ by a sudden shock, it can trigger major institutional change (Campbell, 2010: 92). Exogenous shocks will invoke a discontinuous form of change because they often result in a period of crisis. Adherents of this perspective argue that only a critical juncture, underpinned by an element of crisis, will be sufficient to change the preferences of vested political leaders. This is because the implications of the exogenous shock may be such that change becomes a matter of practical necessity. In this context, as Marc Schneiberg noted, the initial impetus for change must be treated as “ad hoc” and “outside the paradigm” (Schneiberg, 2005: 94).

Threshold Events

A further cause of discontinuous change is the cumulative cause. The cumulative explanation argues that change will occur in a discontinuous way but the momentum for change, rather than emerging quickly and/or unexpectedly builds up over an extended period of time before reaching a threshold. A threshold event is a point at which the cumulative cause finally passes a threshold and leads to a rapid change in the outcome (Cappocia and Kelemen, 2007: 351). Pierson has argued that cumulative or incremental causes may not generate changes immediately but instead have “a modest or negligible impact until they reach some critical level, which then triggers major changes” (Pierson, 2004: 82). This explanation therefore surmises that the probability of a particular outcome will increase steadily over time and would therefore not present compressed moments in which key actors decisions are likely to affect outcomes (Ibid).
Pierson has likened this explanation to that of an earthquake. The core focus of an earthquake is the quake itself. However, whilst the quake may occur over a very short period, often a matter of seconds, the reality is that an earthquake is the “build up of pressure on a fault line over an extended period of time” (Ibid: 80). The implication is thus that an earthquake is “a quick outcome but the product of a very slow moving, long term casual process” (Ibid). In terms of institutional change, the cause or impetus for change may manifest over a long period but change itself will happen quickly in an environment of uncertainty when the cause reaches a threshold. For Pierson, change may be incremental but there is often a “last, minuscule increment of pressure that triggers the event” (Ibid). Furthermore, when the threshold is reached, actors will reassess their options or expectations about others likely actions, leading to relatively rapid change” (Ibid: 85). In this context, the threshold event explanation intersects with that of critical junctures in that it is assumed that when the threshold is reached actors will make a choice from a number of alternatives. In fact, it could be said that when a cumulative cause reaches a threshold it precipitates a critical juncture in which change can be achieved. Cappocia and Kelemen have argued that the threshold itself is not a critical juncture but the point at which a critical juncture may be established (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 351). A threshold event is a catalyst for change whereas a critical juncture is the point at which change is considered.

For Campbell, there are three key problems with a framework that advocates change by way of exogenous shocks or threshold events and critical junctures. First, it cannot account for incremental or evolutionary change. Second, it assumes change is inherently external and thus does not consider internal causes of crises which may result in sudden or discontinuous change. Campbell’s third criticism underpins why this thesis has selected the critical juncture of Mahoney and the focus on an outcome of a critical juncture. For Campbell, a critical juncture framework which focuses on key events and crises that create pressure for change does not take account of “the complex search process that follows whereby actors actually determine what institutional changes to make, if any” (Campbell, 2010: 91). By utilising Mahoney’s definition of a critical juncture as a choice point and by analysing the period after the critical juncture, the process by which change is considered and the eventual outcome of the critical juncture can be adequately analysed. However, the criticisms of Campbell do reflect an ever increasing desire within the historical institutionalism literature to account for change as an incremental and endogenous process.
2.4. Incremental and Endogenous Change

The 2010 publication, *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power* edited by Mahoney and Thelen reflects the desire of scholars to account for change as an incremental and endogenous process. Perhaps the most important contribution of their approach is its demonstration that “slow and piecemeal change can be equally consequential in patterning human behaviour and shaping political outcomes” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 1). Mahoney and Thelen utilise a *power distributional approach* which perceives institutions as distributional instruments laden with power implications. This approach emphasises the consideration of power over cooperation, whereby certain actors are vested or empowered by the institution at the expense of others (Ibid: 8, 9). This argument feeds into the consideration of resource allocation: “formal institutions are specifically intended to distribute resources to particular kinds of actor and not others, which provides a strong incentive for institutional continuation as opposed to change; vested actors use their resources and beneficial institutional position to maintain the institutional status quo” (Ibid: 9). It is a perspective which builds on the rational choice argument of North that institutions are durable because the vested actors want them to be.

A key source of conflict within the approach of Mahoney and Thelen rests on the way in which institutions become embedded and difficult to change. Path dependence advocates the notion of institutional reproduction, in which key events or decisions strengthen institutions over time. However, scholars such as North, Mahoney and Thelen have argued that institutions become embedded because of enforcement mechanisms within the institutional setting which mandate compliance with the institutional rules and a punishment mechanism by which non-compliance is punished. Popular elections can be considered an enforcement mechanism which encourages political leaders to comply with the rules of the institutional setting in which they operate. Under this model, compliance and enforcement are key factors for explaining institutional persistence.

In terms of change, this is determined to be a process that is grounded within compliance and the enforcement mechanism within institutions. It is argued that incremental change is expected through ‘gaps’ and ‘soft spots’ between institutional rules, the interpretation of the rules and/or the rule and its enforcement: “institutional change often occurs when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up spaces for actors to
implement existing rules in new ways” (Ibid: 4, 14). Furthermore, actors will comply with the institutional rules because of the enforcement mechanisms that are in place. However, when the rules are contested, compliance with the institutional rules begins to break down and enforcement becomes less effective. It is during such periods of compliance breakdown that incremental changes to the institutional trajectory can occur. The cause of gaps and soft spots in institutions include “cognitive limits that prevent policymakers from fully controlling the uses to which the rules they write can be put and changing circumstances which open up possibilities for new interpretations of old rules that can transform their meaning and political functions” (Thelen, 2010: 57).

A further facet of Mahoney and Thelen’s approach is to define the kind of actors, or change agents, who may seek to initiate change in institutional settings. They offer four characterisations of change agents; Insurrectionaries consciously seek to eliminate institutions or rules, and they do so by actively and visibly mobilising against them. They reject the institutional status quo and do not always abide by its regulations. (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 23-24). Symbionts come in two forms – parasitic and mutualistic – and in both forms rely (and thrive) on institutions not of their own making. Parasitic actors exploit the institution for their own private gain. Parasites rely on the preservation of the institution but carry out actions that undermine the spirit or purpose of the institution, thereby undermining it in the longer run (Ibid: 24). Mutualistic actors do not seek to exploit the institution for private gain but contribute to the “robustness of institutions, expanding the support coalition of which the institution rests” (Ibid-24-25). Subversives are actors who seek institutional change, but do not do so by breaking the rules of the institution. They instead seek to “effectively disguise the extent of their preference for institutional change by following institutional expectations and working within the system (Ibid: 25). They may appear to be supporters of the institution but “bide their time, waiting for the moment when they can actively move toward a stance of opposition” (Ibid: 25-26). Opportunists are actors who have “ambiguous preferences about institutional continuity; they do not actively seek to preserve institutions but because opposing the institutional status quo is costly they do not try to change the rules” (Ibid). Opportunists emerge as change agents when “ambiguities in the interpretation or implementation of existing rules provide a space for them to redeploy these rules in ways unanticipated by their designers” (Ibid: 27). It is the opportunist characterisation that will have most credence within this study.
2.5. Towards an Explanation of Sub-National Political Union

The theoretical propositions outlined in this chapter are by definition competing propositions which cannot be used simultaneously to explain change. The challenge for this thesis is to test the propositions against an empirical case study in order to construct a framework that can explain the salience of change. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to outline the type of change under consideration in this thesis, sub-national political union, and why the theoretical propositions outlined provide the necessary tools to explain this type of change.

Sub-National Political Union

The central rationale for this thesis is the consideration of a political union between sub-national political entities within close geographic proximity of one another or a defined region in an established federal state. At the outset of such an aim there emerges a key conceptual problem which has been articulated by Ziblatt. He noted that federal states are formed when “a political core is strong enough to forge a union but not powerful enough to overawe the constituent states” (Ziblatt, 2004: 70). The establishment of a federal state is a compromise in which to achieve the necessary objectives and, at the same time, constitutionally protect the political autonomy of the sub-units within the larger political entity. According to Richard Simeon, in a federal system “neither the central nor unit governments have hierarchical controls over another, except where authority is allocated unambiguously. One cannot dictate to another” (Simeon, 2006: 4). Therefore, interaction or cooperation between the individual components of a federal state must take place on the principle of political will; a government cannot be compelled to enter into cross-border exchange against its will. The framework of federalism utilised by this thesis presents three key blockers to the notion of a political union amongst sub-units in a federal state: institutional capacity, infrastructural capacity and constitutional protection. The sub-units are imbued with the necessary power in which to control their own economic and political destinies; power which is constitutionally protected as part of the federal bargain. Moreover, this characterisation implies that the amalgamation of sub-units under a single government was impossible in the first place, hence the necessity of federalism over a unitary system. What must therefore be determined are the factors that will precipitate sub-units to consider a political union within a federal state. Using path dependence, this thesis will argue that it is about political leaders, notably why vested
political leaders may seek to deviate from the established political trajectory when it is assumed that their interests are “nested in prevailing institutional arrangements” (Erk, 2008: 6).

For Karl Deutsch, a political union is a matter of integration theory which is grounded in the notion of capacity building. According to Deutsch, states will seek to integrate or amalgamate on the basis that it will “create a wide range of general purpose capabilities, often exceeding by an order of magnitude or more the capabilities of the component states. If there are needs that require very large capabilities and a very large range of purposes of needs not easily predicted, then there is a very strong premium on political amalgamation, that is, on the creation of common governmental institutions” (Deutsch, 1974: 113-114). Furthermore, although Deutsch has advocated a capacity building model of amalgamation he is categorical that government efficiency is not enough to invoke an amalgamation of states; “there is no case on record in which two countries have merged simply on the grounds that this merger would save money by eliminating needless duplication of governmental services; economy of services has never been an effective motive in uniting two (or more) countries” (Deutsch, 1964: 173).

According to Philip Jacob, political amalgamation is “a set of political decisions made by those who have the authority to commit their communities to collective behaviour” (Jacob, 1964: 210). Political action and political decisions are considered to be key aspects of amalgamation; “political action is basically a function of human decisions” (Ibid). Thus, understanding the decision-making process of those in a position of political power is necessary to explain the processes of political amalgamation (Ibid: 211). Other factors that are deemed to be important to the amalgamation process are the individual personality of political leaders and their political goals. Moreover, the role of institutions may be particularly important in thinking about these considerations and how they affect the decisions taken by political leaders, of which political union may be one. A political actor may have a preference for a political union but is constrained by the institutional environment in which he operates; “there is an imperative to make choices, not only in terms of what a person may directly want, but in terms of the standards of what he has come to regard as legitimate or proper” (Ibid).
There are a number of competing perspectives towards the conditions that must be satisfied before a federal state can be established. K. C Wheare outlined six conditions; a sense of military insecurity and of the consequent need for common defence; a desire to be independent of foreign powers, for which union is a necessity; a hope of economic advantage from union; some previous political association; geographical neighbourhood; and similarity of political institutions (Wheare, 1953: 37). Deutsch has put forward nine conditions; mutual compatibility of main values; a distinctive way of life; expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; unbroken links of social communications, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; a broadening of the political elite; mobility of persons at least among the politically relevant strata; and a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions (Deutsch, 1957: 58). Riker has outlined two conditions; a desire on the part of the politicians who offer the bargain to expand their area of influence by peaceful means, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression and aggrandizement; and a willingness in the part of the politicians who accept the bargain to give up some independence for the sake of union, either because they desire protection from a military or diplomatic threat or because they desire to participate in the potential aggression of the federation (Riker, 1964: 15-16).

Although these conditions relate to the establishment of a federal state, there is some credence in their value as factors in the consideration of a political union of sub-units within a federal state. More specifically, the preferences of political leaders, political and economic objectives and the internal and external conditions offer a strong context in which to understand why a political union may occur. Furthermore, in combining these conditions with the theoretical propositions outlined previously, there can be a strong basis to explain the motivation and conditions necessary for institutional change and also go some way in addressing some of the gaps in the path dependence framework.
Factors believed to affect the consideration of change during a critical juncture

Preferences of the key political leaders

Internal Economic and Political Conditions

External Economic and Political Conditions

Potential Outcomes

Structural Change

OR

Political Union

OR

Intergovernmental Relations

Re-equilibration of the pre-juncture status quo

Critical Juncture

Heightened possibility for change

Figure 2.1 brings together the key factors affecting institutional change as forwarded by the core theoretical literature. However, there are gaps within this framework which need to be addressed. First what causes the critical juncture? The three factors affecting the consideration of change are clearly articulated within the existing literature but it is not clear what triggers the initial momentum for the consideration of institutional change. Second, where does the momentum for change come from? Put another way; is the momentum for change endogenous or exogenous of the institutional setting? Third, is the momentum for change discontinuous or incremental? Fourth, how do the political dynamics of the institutional setting affect the consideration of institutional change? These are questions to which answers are not clear in the current literature. They need to be considered further within the context of a detailed case study. Thelen has argued that “although theoretical propositions may provide a promising starting point for the analysis, they cannot themselves replace the analysis; concepts need to be applied, not just invoked” (Thelen, 1999: 391).
2.6. Canada’s Maritime Provinces

The three Maritime provinces offer a rich historical and structural context in which to investigate the salience of sub-national political union. The three provinces have long histories of institutional and infrastructural capacity as quasi-autonomous entities within a larger political community, the British Empire and Canada, and the political leaders have actively considered a political union on at least two separate occasions, 1864 and 1970. In 1864, as colonies of Britain, they considered a political union but instead chose to federate to become provinces of Canada. A federal union was a response to specific internal and external factors, such as the necessity of colonial defence and the need for new economic markets and infrastructure, which could not readily be achieved by a political union of the three Maritime colonies. The most important implication of federal union was that the institutional and infrastructural capacity of the colonies was carried over into the new state and constitutionally protected. For Robert Vipond, the federal bargain operated on the basis that the central government “did not create the provincial governments and therefore could not destroy them; it could not unilaterally change the terms of the Confederation agreement and was not the final authority to which an aggrieved party could turn for redress” (Vipond, 1989: 19). Confederation was thus the point at which the status of the three Maritimes as separate political entities became permanently embedded. Confederation reinforced the path of self-government that had first been established in the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. Within Confederation their territorial existence and autonomy was constitutionally entrenched and protected and could not be altered by any central authority without their explicit approval. It is on this basis that the consideration of a political union within Confederation is all the more intriguing.

The notion of critical junctures will be key to explaining this puzzle. It is hypothesised that change will be considered through a temporary choice point. Within path dependence framework there is scope to ‘inject agency’ by considering how the preferences for change of the provincial premiers evolved or changed, if at all, before the commissioning of the Maritime Union Study and after its publication. Within this context, it is pertinent to consider the internal and external political and economic conditions and how these influenced the consideration of change. As constituent units of a federal state, the provinces were operating within a complex political and economic environment influenced by territorial interest. In
order to understand why change was considered, the role of the federal environment, that is the central government and other provinces, as an external shaper of change within the Maritimes must be taken into account. In focusing on these aspects, it will help to pinpoint the cause and dynamics of structural change in the Maritimes, that is whether it is triggered by endogenous or exogenous causes or can be defined as an incremental or discontinuous process, and allow for the construction of a conceptual framework as a tool of explanation.

The timeframe on which this thesis focuses, 1960-1980, will also allow an analysis of the eventual outcome of the union debate. It is known that, despite the publication of the Maritime Union Study, a political union did not occur at this time. Instead, the provinces engaged in an institutionalised form of intergovernmental relations channelled directly through the three provincial premiers. What is not clear is why the provincial premiers chose IGR over a political union. Why did a political union not happen and why was IGR pursued instead? Moreover, how can institutionalised IGR be accounted for within the parameters of path dependence theory? Can it be considered a form of change or was it a form of re-equilibration? In analysing this aspect of the debate, this thesis can go some way to answering the criticism of John Campbell that path dependence explanations often do not take account of “the complex search process that follows a critical juncture whereby actors actually determine what institutional changes to make, if any” (Campbell, 2010: 92). In order to be able to measure whether the type of institutionalised IGR established after the Maritime Union Study is a form of change or re-equilibration it is necessary to consider some of the previous scholarship on IGR.

2.7. Intergovernmental Relations

Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) are defined by David Walker as “a web, simple or complex, of constitutional, electoral, representational, programmatic, fiscal, administrative and judicial relationships – some formal, some informal between and among officials at all levels of government…..In a federative system the relationships generally have less of a central command character and are more reciprocal and mutually interactional” (Walker, 2000: 20). For Bolleyer, IGR is “a negotiated, non-hierarchical exchange not only between institutions on different governmental levels but also between different sub-national entities” (Bolleyer, 2006: 472). This thesis will contend that IGR is the process by which sub-national entities enter into exchanges or dialogue with counterpart entities in order to address matters
of common concern. IGR can either be ad-hoc, in order to address specific issues or policy concerns, or institutionalised, that is to say a regular form of IGR channelled through a specific inter-governmental body, established to facilitate and coordinate IGR exchanges and dialogue. Institutionalised IGR may have a defined remit or function and include aspects such as majority rule.

Bolleyer has argued that IGR is ultimately shaped by the institutional structure of the sub-states and the wider federation; “internal sub-state dynamics can systematically account for the organisation of IGR in dual federal systems; whereas majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalisation of IGR, power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to facilitate it” (Ibid: 471). Within the consideration of IGR are what Bolleyer terms intergovernmental arrangements (IGAs). IGAs can be defined as the product or outcome of IGR; IGAs can be formal agreements, accords, memorandums of understanding, compacts or concordats among themselves (Simeon, 2001: 148). IGAs may be one-off, ad hoc agreements or the product of an ongoing form of IGR channelled through specific external bodies. IGAs “may or may not contain explicit enforcement mechanisms” and, in some instances, may even be legally binding (Ibid). It is these factors which will help to determine whether the IGR established in the Maritimes in the early 1970s can be considered change or re-equilibration.

Bolleyer has offered what she terms as “operational criteria used to measure the institutionalisation” of IGR (Bolleyer, 2006: 473) (see Figure 2.2). This criteria can be used to measure the level of IGR in order to determine whether it can be described as weak, medium or strong; as Bolleyer noted, “the more features that are empirically present, the more institutionalised the IGR under examination” (Ibid). The level of institutionalisation can also give an indication as to whether IGR can be considered as a change to the institutional status quo. The more institutionalised the IGR and the more decisions that are taken outwith the present institutional setting, that is the individual provinces, the more likely it is that a form of institutional change has taken place. Bolleyer has presented three levels of institutionalisation – weak, medium and strong. Weak institutionalisation denotes IGR that is channelled “directly by the governmental departments or heads of government without any separate intergovernmental body” (Ibid). Medium institutionalisation “demands the boundedness of an arrangement that is visible through the assignment of specific competencies, resources, and
personnel to an external body” (Ibid). Strong institutionalisation is when “formal decision-making is not dependent on unanimity or veto powers and the administrative basis of IGR is delegated to separate IGR bodies or offices with “their own formally assigned tasks and the power to produce proposals of high specificity. The higher the specificity of these proposals the greater the likelihood of their transfer into sub-national legislation” (Ibid: 474).

**Figure 2.2: Bolleyer’s indicators for the degrees of institutionalization of IGR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak institutionalisation</th>
<th>Medium institutionalisation</th>
<th>Strong institutionalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Density of contacts</td>
<td>Regularity of meetings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own secretariat</td>
<td>Clearly defined functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal basis (e.g., formal statutes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority rule</td>
<td>Internal functional differentiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification of offices</td>
<td>Specification of subunits/bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of agreements</td>
<td>Legal status of agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Bolleyer, 2006: 474*

It is surmised that the type of IGR generated in Canada will militate towards weak characterisation because the prevalence of “one party majority cabinets, complete government alternations strongly and alters actors’ interest constellations over time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stable cross-boundary IGR” (Ibid: 471). The consequence of this is that political leaders are more susceptible to the potential of heavy electoral losses which induces a competitive tendency to the process. The prevalence of veto powers, unanimous decision-making and blame shifting to other governments is therefore high. This undermines the achievability of cross-border IGR in the Canadian system (Ibid).
The work of Simeon feeds well into the arguments of Bolleyer. Simeon has suggested that the specific institutional composition of federal states shape the way in which IGR are conducted within that state. The value of Simeon’s analysis is that it seeks to account for some of the incentives that may induce IGR within federal states. Simeon describes federal systems as a “coexistence of governments, which are at the same time interdependent and autonomous” (Simeon, 2006: 5). This characterisation of federalism offers an insight into the tension of federalism, whereby policy interdependence between the different units and levels of government induces a more cooperative and coordinated approach to the act of government, but at the same time is restricted by concerns over jurisdictional and territorial autonomy. For Simeon, federalism can be characterised as a “mutually dependent political relationship whereby, in very many fields, what one government does will have implications for others” (Ibid). Interdependence, in Simeon’s terms, encompasses both adjustment and coordination. The central assertion of the adjustment assumption argues that “each government’s decisions will have spill-over effects to which the others must adjust” (Ibid).

Another strand of adjustment relates to a more interactive approach, whereby governments may seek to coordinate their policies, resolve disagreements and reach mutually desired goals through direct relations with each other. Coordination on the other hand argues that policy areas, such as welfare, economic policy and transportation, “cut across formal divisions of responsibility necessitating governments to share functions” (Ibid). A counter weight to the adjustment and coordination perspectives is that of autonomy. For James Brander the behaviour of governments (and political leaders) can be attributed to the ‘public interest assumption,’ that is to say governments are “assumed to act in the interest of those they represent.” Within a federal system, sub-national governments pursue the objectives of state residents, whilst federal governments pursue the interests of the population as a whole (Brander, 1985: 33).

The perspectives of Simeon and Brander introduce two competing factors to the IGR debate: necessity and political will. The significance of these factors can be outlined as such; governments or political leaders may be induced into IGR as a matter of necessity. It may be necessary for governments to engage in cooperative relationships or policy adjustment in reaction to internal and external demands. The role of national political institutions in this process may be particularly important because although certain policies may be concentrated
in a sub-national context the policy design and funding may emanate from the federal level (Cameron and Simeon, 2002: 49). Why, therefore, do political leaders engage in IGR? Bolleyer and Simeon suggest the answer is related the individual institutional nature and composition of specific federal states. By using the operational criteria of Bolleyer it can be determined to what extent the type of IGR established can be considered a form of change and also how this measures against the core assumptions of the types of IGR expected in the Canadian context.

Michael Keating has suggested within his work on new regionalism that regions “must not be seen as government institutions but systems of action. Rather than talking of regional autonomy as a bilateral or trilateral relationship it is better to talk of government capacity at the territorial level” (Keating, 1997: 395). It may be helpful to use this context in which to consider the nature of institutionalised IGR in the Maritimes. The extent to which the IGR structures within the Maritimes have the capacity in which to enable decision-making or collective action will be an important factor in determining whether it can be considered change or simply re-equilibration.

2.8. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the key conceptual propositions which will be operationalised throughout this thesis. Path dependence offers a broad range of tools to explain why an institutional setting exists and why it endures over time. However, it is the explanation of change which is most important for this thesis. Mahoney’s approach to critical junctures will form the basis of explaining why a political union did not happen in the Maritime provinces. A critical juncture as a ‘choice point’ is a key factor because it allows for political agency to be at the forefront of the explanation. Moreover, as the next chapter will outline, the longitudinal nature of the path dependence framework when combined with the process tracing method of analysis can help determine how political agency affects political change. By placing the Maritime case within a process tracing framework specific causes and decisions can be identified and measured as shapers of the union question and the subsequent critical juncture. Only by identifying the causes of a critical juncture can the nature of the outcome be analysed. In order to understand the outcome of the Maritime case, institutionalised intergovernmental relations, the operational criterion of Bolleyer was
introduced. This can help determine whether the Council of Maritime Premiers can be characterised as a form of structural change or a continuation of separate territorial governance. Taken together, these conceptual components offer the best opportunity to understand why a union became salient in the Maritime provinces and why a union did not come to pass. The following chapter outlines how process tracing was utilised to analyse the political union question and the key data collection methods employed.
Chapter 3  

**Researching Sub-National Political Union**

This chapter explains how the question of a political union in the Maritimes was analysed within the confines of the process tracing method. The first section outlines the benefit of process tracing for the analysis of temporality and its value in pinpointing the basis and causes of political decision-making. Within this analysis questions of territoriality and sub-national leadership are discussed as potential shapers or impediments of structural change at the sub-national level. The territoriality aspect for example shows that territorial demarcation at an earlier point in time undermines structural change because territorial boundaries facilitate distinct identities which endure over time. The sub-national leadership focus shows that federalism can both empower and constrain political leaders at the sub-national level. Sub-national leaders are constrained because citizens expect their leaders to further the interests of the territory first and foremost. In a federal system however sub-national leaders have more scope to ‘innovate’ to achieve specific objectives. Sub-national actors can for example utilise inter-state channels, that is enacting their own legislation, and/or intra-state channels, such as influencing national policy, in order to achieve their territorial or personal political objectives. A focus on political ambition shows that sub-national actors may seek to facilitate their own personal objectives by adopting positions consonant with broader opinion, even if it conflicts with their own territory.

The territoriality, leadership and ambition aspects reinforce the process tracing methodology because its analytical approach can allow for a more nuanced analysis of the key events and decisions which triggered the critical juncture in the Maritime provinces. In order to understand why a union a political union did not happen between 1960 and 1980 an analysis of the key triggers of the critical juncture is essential. This interlinks with the decision to extend the analysis beyond the critical juncture. By analysing a broader chronological timeframe a better understanding of how the initial triggers shaped the eventual outcome can be garnered. The second part of the chapter outlines the core research methods. It shows that the political union question was investigated through an analysis of archival research, informant and elite interviews and interview transcripts. These methods support a process tracing approach because they offer the ‘diverse’ and ‘deep’ evidence necessary to explain why a union did not happen in the Maritimes between 1960 and 1980. As Andrew
Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel outline, “social scientists using process tracing must be even more relentless than historians in tracking down primary sources or seeking interviews with participants. A single meeting or memo may prove to be the crucial piece of evidence that instantiates one explanation or undermines another. The more probative we expect evidence to be, the more time and effort we should be willing to expend to obtain it” (Bennett and Checkel, 2012: 33).

3.1. Methodological Approach

Process Tracing

The path dependence framework that guides this thesis provides a clear hypothesis as to how political leaders may be expected to act and make decisions within a path dependent setting and what conditions provide the scope for change:

**Hypothesis:** Political leaders will make decisions within and according to the political setting that was established at an earlier point in time. Political change cannot be readily achieved because the political leaders who operate within the setting are vested as the core beneficiaries. Vested leaders who do favour change are constrained in their actions and decisions because the surmised cost of change is considered to be high. Change if it is to occur will do so through a critical juncture in which the vested leaders are faced with a choice of two or more alternatives. Once a course of action has been chosen it will become progressively difficult to reverse, even to a course of action which was previously salient.

This hypothesis does not however explain what causes a critical juncture nor does it give an indication of the factors that were most significant in shaping the salience of change. Process tracing rests on the notion of causality, which can be understood as a process whereby the effect is a consequence of the cause. For Faletti, casual mechanisms serve to “identify relationships between conditions and outcomes” and should be interlinked to a broader theoretical domain which can then be applied to alternative empirical settings beyond those for which they were originally conceived (Falleti, 2007: 5). A central concern of process tracing is the identification of sequences and/or mechanisms in the unfolding of hypothesised casual process (Bennett, 2010: 208). James Caporaso has argued that process tracing can be
understood as a means to fill the temporal and spatial gaps between the hypothesised cause and effect (Caporaso, 2009: 71). This thesis has determined that the Maritimes are ‘path dependent,’ in the sense that they are on a path of distinct territorial governance. This ‘path’ shapes and constrains political decision-making and cannot be readily changed because the political leaders are vested as the core beneficiaries of the path. It is assumed that the path will continue to be reinforced over time because the decision-making structures are weighted towards its maintenance. However, within path dependence theory there are clear causal mechanisms which seek to explain the salience of change – exogenous shocks and tipping points are two mechanisms by which change is hypothesised to occur within path dependent settings. The cause and effect of change within a path dependent setting can be surmised as such; an exogenous shock or a tipping point will trigger a critical juncture – in which an option for change will be selected from two or more alternatives.

This thesis will utilise the process tracing method as a means to understand the role of vested political leaders in instances of change within path dependent settings. In many respects, this thesis attempts to establish causation – what factors or occurrences caused the political union debate between 1960 and 1980 and how did these factors shape the preferences of the vested political leaders? However, this thesis also seeks to determine outcome. George and Andrew Bennett have argued that process tracing can be used to construct an analytical casual explanation of a historical phenomenon that is couched in an explicit theoretical form (George and Bennett, 2005: 211). Process tracing is used to identify the key points between 1960 and 1980 at which the vested actors within the Maritimes engaged with questions of structural change and to ascertain the causes or triggers of this engagement. This provides the key basis to determine why change did not happen or become salient at later points throughout the 1970s.

Process tracing can help understand a particular outcome because it uses a historical approach and examines how factors such as timing and the sequence of events influence and shape eventual outcomes. By tracing a phenomenon over time, the key decision points can be traced and the origin and cause of an outcome identified. For George and Bennett, process tracing can assess to what extent and in what ways possible outcomes of a case were restricted by the choices made at decision points along the way. John Gerring has likened process tracing to detective work: multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a
single inference (Gerring, 2007: 173). Mahoney has argued that process tracing is an appropriate method in which to identify ‘causal process observations’ (CPOs), that is to say process tracing can help develop, elaborate, or specify more precisely a given theory or hypothesis” (Mahoney, 2010: 125). It is argued that researchers can apply CPOs to specific empirical cases in order to garner detailed knowledge about the shape of a case and, as a result, develop an existing theoretical proposition (Ibid).

A key objective of this study is to help further shape key propositions of path dependence by answering a key criticism that critical junctures do not take account of outcome. Figure 3.1 conceptualises the hypothesised pattern of change within path dependent settings. Capoccia and Kelemen have asserted that “many scholars define critical junctures on the basis of their outcome, namely change” (Cappocia and Kelemen, 2007: 352). However, the explicit connection of critical junctures and change undermines the simple fact that although an exogenous shock or threshold event may increase the salience of change, it cannot be ruled out that the outcome may be “the restoration of the pre-juncture status quo: change is not a necessary element of a critical juncture. If change was possible and plausible, considered and ultimately rejected in a situation of high uncertainty, then there is no reason to discard these cases as non-critical junctures” (Ibid). The implication is that critical junctures do not have to mean change to alternative path dependent settings: change can be considered within the parameters of a critical juncture but the vested political leaders may ultimately decide to continue the pre-juncture status quo which will then be preserved over time.

**Figure 3.1: Hypothesised Process of Change within Path Dependent Settings**

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| EXOGENOUS SHOCK OR THRESHOLD EVENT | CRITICAL JUNCTURE | INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE |
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The question of whether a critical juncture should be defined based on the outcome of change creates an opening for the consideration of political agency and a longitudinal form of analysis, such as process tracing. This approach will be utilised in order to determine the role of vested political leaders within the consideration of change to path dependent settings. In
order to achieve this within the case of the Maritimes, a broad temporal period has been selected around the core critical juncture – the MUS - in order to capture what triggered the vested political leaders – the provincial premiers – to engage with questions of structural change and how they behaved following the ‘episode’ – the conclusion of the juncture.

Faletti has argued that one of the difficulties with process tracing is to decide when the narrative should start and when it should end (Falletti, 2007: 5). This thesis adopts the approach advocated by Mahoney in framing the period of analysis. Path dependent settings are formulated by ‘contingent events’ which “set cases on an historical trajectory of change that diverges from theoretical expectations” (Mahoney, 2001b: 508). Sub-national structural change goes against the expected assumptions of why a federal state may be necessary. Ziblatt for example has argued that federalism is salient when the institutional landscape of the sub-unit level precedes national unification. In such a scenario, the political leaders will favour a federal bargain because they have the institutional capacity to “defend and protect their political positions” during the negotiation process (Ziblatt, 2006: 111). Furthermore, once the federal state is formed, sub-national political leaders retain the institutional capacity to forward their territorial interests within a national context. For example, in a Canadian context, Stephen Tomblin has contended that provincialism in Canada has always survived because “the premiers have had the incentive, resources and capacity to resist outside pressures for change” (Tomblin, 2000: 158). Within a critical juncture however the prospect for change is heightened.

Collier and Collier have argued that “it is essential to the concept of a critical juncture that it occurs in different ways in different cases” (Collier and Collier, 1991: 31). In order to determine what caused the critical juncture in the Maritimes a broad analysis of the triggers and how they affected the perspectives of the vested actors towards change will be undertaken. For Mahoney, in order to understand change it is necessary to “trace a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events” (Mahoney, 2001b: 507). The analysis will begin in 1960 because it encompasses the broad period of province-building leading up to the beginning of the Maritime Union Study in 1968. In analysing the years preceding the juncture, the contingent events can be identified and measured against how they affected the perspectives of the vested political leaders. In doing this, a key difficulty is deciphering which events or occurrences were important in precipitating a critical juncture and which events or
occurrences shaped the engagement of the vested political leaders with questions of structural change. In order to determine which factors were important in shaping the critical juncture, it is necessary to invoke the cause framework of Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu.

This framework denotes that whilst it is possible to chart a particular process or sequence of events that led to a certain outcome “it is not always clear what is meant when it is asserted that some factor was a cause of the specific outcome” (Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu, 2009: 115). It is argued that there are five types of causes in which to measure an outcome. An individual cause may be 1) necessary but not sufficient; 2) sufficient but not necessary; 3) necessary and sufficient; 4) INUS (neither sufficient nor necessary but part of an overall combination that is sufficient for the outcome.); or 5) SUIN (a sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome). It is argued that by using these cause types it is possible to “make inferences about the causes of specific outcomes in particular cases and guide the researcher in explaining outcomes that have already happened, either in the distant past or in the recent past. The goal of the analysis is precisely to explain the specific past occurrences in question and how the resulting explanation might then be generalised is a secondary concern” (Ibid). It is necessary to offer a brief explanation of each type of cause in order to explain their relevance for this thesis and how they influence the broader research and analytical process.

A necessary cause stipulates that a specific outcome would entail the claim that an outcome would not have occurred if the cause had been absent; though the existence of the necessary cause did not guarantee the outcome (Ibid: 118). A sufficient cause is a cause which, although sufficient for an outcome, may not actually be necessary for that outcome. A sufficient cause is one whose presence inevitably leads to the outcome, though the outcome can occur through other means as well (Ibid: 121). A necessary and sufficient cause is necessary and sufficient for a given outcome but is rarely witnessed. This type of cause is considered the ‘gold standard of causation’ but the reality is that there are often other causes which influence an outcome also. The more a cause becomes necessary and sufficient the more important it becomes to an outcome (Ibid: 123). An INUS cause (neither sufficient nor necessary but part of an overall combination that is sufficient for the outcome) implies that multiple factors combine together to produce particular outcomes. The individual factors are neither necessary nor sufficient; rather, they are part of an overall combination that is
sufficient for the outcome (Ibid: 124). A **SUIN cause** (a sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome) is used when analysts regard the constitutive attributes of a necessary cause as causes themselves. A SUIN cause is a sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome (Ibid: 126).

The cause framework can help understand what causes triggered the critical juncture in 1968 and in turn how it affected the decisions and perspectives of the vested political leaders. This approach aims to invoke that recommended by Thelen: “to ask how prevailing structures influence the kind of change-agents and change-strategies that are more likely to emerge and succeed in specific institutional contexts” (Thelen, 2010: 55). By determining why a critical juncture emerged and what caused it, a better understanding of why the hypothesised outcome – change - did not happen. Moreover, it can help understand why questions of change did not happen at a later date. It is for this reason why the period of analysis has been taken ten years beyond the end of the critical juncture in 1970.

Faletti has argued “it is often easier to establish the end point because it is largely determined by the outcome of interest” (Falletti, 2007: 6). This study takes the analysis beyond the outcome of interest. The political context of the time period in question (1960-1980) contains key junctures which may be considered ‘exogenous shocks,’ for example the election of a separatist government in Quebec in 1976 and the holding of a referendum in Quebec in 1980 on a form of separatism (sovereignty-association). It has been decided to take the period of analysis up to the Quebec referendum in order to consider if a critical juncture occurred following the election of the PQ and if not, why not. In encompassing this period it takes the analysis beyond the single ‘episode,’ the critical juncture 1968-1970, and considers how the vested political leaders interpreted and responded to this potential shock. By analysing this period, a more rounded explanation can be garnered about the causes of structural change within the Maritime region and the agency role of the vested political leaders in shaping the salience of change. In order to undertake this task, however, two further variables must be considered; territoriality and sub-national leadership. These factors are important because they give a sense of some of the constraints and enablers of structural change at the sub-national level. Moreover, they can help garner a clearer sense of the necessary methodological approach. Process tracing offers a methodological framework capable of understanding how and why political leaders may seek change to an alternative
structural setting. Through a careful empirical analysis set within a longitudinal paradigm the shapers of structural change can be more carefully identified.

**Territoriality**

The notion of ‘sense of place’ is key to questions of territoriality and is surmised to be a central shaper of the federal bargain. As David Elkins has noted, a “primary reason for creating a federal rather than a unitary state concerns the prior existence of several independent or quasi-independent states, colonies or territories” (Elkins, 1979: 1). The Maritime provinces are the oldest political entities in the Canadian federation. Although they once constituted a single territorial entity prior to partition in 1769, their territorial and political makeup has remained consistent since the late eighteenth century. Moreover, the three provinces have always been ‘quasi-autonomous,’ that is to say they have always existed within a broader paradigm, first the British Empire and later the Canadian federation. Yet, in spite of their long histories of demarcation, the historical and political science literature frequently refers to the three provinces as ‘the Maritimes.’ It is however perhaps misconceived to refer to the three provinces in this way. Their long existence of territorial separation led to the development of distinct political units with separate identities and political processes. As such, the recalibration of the three provinces into a single sub-national territory is problematic.

For Burgess, explaining questions of territoriality within a federal context is complex because “cleavages within federations are entirely expected. This is because federations are ipso facto composed of clearly demarcated constituent units that are territorial units, that is, they are to do with space, place and political processes” (Burgess, 2006: 141). Sub-national territorial entities, such as the Canadian provinces, “represent the political organisation of space in the occupation of the territorial state [whereby the notion of] territoriality – the sense of place – plays a significant role in their self-definition” (Ibid). Nevertheless, to grasp how territoriality may affect questions of structural change it is necessary to consider a definition of territoriality and how it is surmised to affect the development of politics. For Burgess, territoriality incorporates “socio-economic and cultural elements which are encapsulated in a spatial organisation. Territorial identity cannot be construed in isolation from other social cleavages that interact with it to forge distinct identities, that is, a strong sense of self. In practice, territoriality interacts with a variety of intervening social variables to produce
complex forms of political identity” (Ibid). For John Agnew, territory can be defined from one of two perspectives; the first involves the exercise of power through a set of central political institutions. The second is the clear spatial demarcation of the territory within which the state exercises its power (Agnew, 1994: 53).

In terms of the Maritimes, Ian Stewart has suggested that the latter definition applies. That is to say the territorial boundaries which separate the three provinces have shaped and contained distinct political cultures (Stewart, 1990: 99). As Ailsa Henderson has argued, “sub-state polities generate and sustain separate political cultures, serving as ‘small words’ to citizens” (Henderson, 2010: 439). Stewart has argued that “the boundaries that presently separate Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island have been in existence for over two centuries; hence, they are particularly likely to be endowed with some socio-cultural meaning” (Stewart, 1990: 106). For Bickerton, institutions, culture, and leadership are crucial to the development of distinct communities: “institutionally-based and endowed with administrative and political structures, their further construction usually involves bringing them into existence as ‘imagined communities’ able to sustain a vision around the theme of development” (Bickerton, 2010: 5). Both Stewart and Bickerton present a logic that naturally undermines the notion of a political union. Following his analysis of the border-zone between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Stewart concluded that in the event that Canada fragmented, the inhabitants of these two provinces would likely “collapse outwards into separate countries than inwards into a unitary state [and] merge their identities into a common provincial unit” (Stewart, 1990: 111). For Bickerton, the demarcation of territory creates a space in which actors can construct and sustain a distinctive political unit: “in essence, regions are built and rebuilt by political and social actors. Culture and identity are both a condition under which leadership operates and a product of that leadership as they invoke cultural images and identities – make use of culture – in their pursuit of the regional development project” (Bickerton, 2010: 5-6).

In the case of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Stewart contended that it was unlikely that two distinct political cultures existed at the point of partition in 1784 because there were as many ‘Loyalist’ refugees in Nova Scotia as there were in New Brunswick: “the struggle for a separate ‘Loyalist’ haven in the latter province owed at least as much to the backward state of communications and an unprincipled lust for place as it did to a clash of competing
world views” (Stewart, 1990: 106). The surmised lack of distinct identities and political cultures at the time of partition suggests that if such distinct political cultures are present they have developed, and therefore become embedded, since partition. Stewart defined political culture in the following way: “the political orientations, beliefs, and values (but not the behaviour) of those individuals living within a specified area” (Stewart, 1990: 106). Elkins has noted a varying degree of attachment and loyalty to both the provinces and Canada in the Maritime region. The ‘original’ provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, were more favourable to Canada than PEI, which was third only to Newfoundland and Alberta as the province less likely to be ‘most orientated nationally’ (see Table 3.1) (Elkins, 1979: 17). New Brunswick however was more orientated nationally than both Nova Scotia and PEI. The reason for this could be attributed to its detrimental economic position and its reliance on federal fiscal mechanisms. In addition, with a high francophone population it has also looked to the federal government for protection of minority language rights (Bickerton, 1994: 440).

Although Henderson has recently re-evaluated the work of David Elkins and Richard Simeon political culture, data from the original study pertains more to the period under consideration in this thesis.

| Table 3.1: Relative Attractiveness of Canada and the Provinces by Province (1974) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|-----|
|                                 | % Most Orientated to Provinces (%) | % Most Orientated Nationally (%) | Mean Scores | Standard Deviations | N |
| National                        | 4.9%                          | 18.4%                         | 3.64        | 1.70              | 2383 |
| Newfoundland                    | 5.9%                          | 3.9%                          | 2.74        | 1.47              | 90   |
| Prince Edward Island           | 4.2%                          | 2.1%                          | 2.89        | 1.45              | 84   |
| Nova Scotia                     | 1.7%                          | 10.9%                         | 3.45        | 1.48              | 147  |
| New Brunswick                   | 4.3%                          | 21.5%                         | 4.01        | 1.65              | 85   |
| Ontario                         | 0.9%                          | 25.9%                         | 4.29        | 1.44              | 651  |
| Manitoba                        | 5.3%                          | 18.6%                         | 3.79        | 1.69              | 108  |
| Saskatchewan                    | 6.9%                          | 12.9%                         | 3.53        | 1.72              | 94   |
| Alberta                         | 12.0%                         | 6.3%                          | 2.72        | 1.68              | 166  |
| British Columbia                | 6.0%                          | 13.5%                         | 3.42        | 1.67              | 242  |
| Quebec English                  | 1.5%                          | 37.9%                         | 4.78        | 1.37              | 126  |
| Quebec French                   | 9.3%                          | 11.6%                         | 3.21        | 1.78              | 531  |
| Non-Quebec French               | 1.7%                          | 20.0%                         | 3.61        | 1.65              | 59   |


1 Note: The index compares ‘Canada in general’ to ‘your province in general,’ ‘Canada as a place to live’ to ‘your province as a place to live,’ and ‘Canadian government’ to ‘government in your province.’ The range is 0-6, with zero being most favourable to your province, and six being most nationally orientated. Percentages do not add to 100 per cent because of the omission of scores 1-5 (Elkins, 1979: 17).
The question of territoriality became more pronounced in the 1960s as the provinces began to extend their sphere of responsibility and assume a more active role in the lives of their citizens. Moreover, the premiers became more important within the national arena as executive-led vertical intergovernmental relations, known as executive federalism, became a key fixture of federal-provincial relations. As will be made clear in Chapter 5, the growth of the provinces was shaped by the agenda of the federal government which following the Second World War pursued a Keynesian economic policy underpinned by the construction of a comprehensive welfare state. However, because the constitutional responsibility for welfare policy rested with the provinces, the federal government had to work closely with the provinces and, in the case of the poorer provinces, empower them through its superior spending power to achieve its objectives. This would have broader consequences for the Maritimes, notably a sense that the federal government was indirectly shaping provincial policy.

The notion of province-building was surmised to reinforce the existing territorial boundaries. For example, Christopher Dunn noted that “the provincial governments have not only met the prerequisites for self-preservation but have gone further. Provincial political elites sit astride an organisational pyramid, possessed of both protectionist and expansionist tendencies. The minimum prerequisites for provincial survival are protection of jurisdictional competence and of territorial integrity” (Dunn, 2001: 450). Dunn surmised that these so called ‘protectionist tendencies’ derived from history: “each political office, especially those of prime ministers and premiers, has a history which constrains the succession of incumbents in it. Premiers have also engaged in strategies that further their long-term institutional self-interest” (Ibid). This is a key point because it alludes to the importance of a longitudinal paradigm in which to analyse the endurance of specific institutional settings. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of a focus on political agency. On the surface, it suggests a rational choice perspective. That is institutions endure because actors desire them to and, in turn, this constrains their successors. Yet, the historical aspect also alludes to a more structural argument. The Canadian provinces have long histories as quasi-independent political entities which have afforded them the organs of statehood. The role of the provincial political elites is to defend and expand the competencies of their province. It is therefore the historical context of the province, its status as a distinct territorial entity, and the role expectations placed upon the provincial political leaders which have embedded the setting
over time. This has been demonstrated most succinctly in the case of Newfoundland and Labrador.

The notion of the ‘Maritimes’ is frequently interspersed with the term ‘Atlantic Canada’ which is used to refer to the three Maritime provinces and Newfoundland and Labrador. Bickerton, however has questioned the value of characterising these four provinces as a designated ‘region.’ He argued that “while ‘Atlantic Canada’ can be classed a region, this does not extend beyond certain limited purposes. It has proven a convenient construct for federal administrative purposes, as a composite spatial term that handily designates a physically-adjacent grouping of provinces that for decades have occupied the lowest rungs on provincial growth and development indices, and as a sometimes useful self-designation for regional advocates taken on for lobbying or defensive purposes when the interests of the four provinces happen to coincide” (Bickerton, 2010: 7). J Murray Beck argued that the Maritime colonies “do not constitute a region in any meaningful way” (Beck, 1977: 313). The lack of a region is both historical and territorial in nature: “over two centuries the people of each province have developed such an attachment to their own political entity, its capital, and its institutions that they look with suspicion, even hostility, upon any attempt to tamper with them” (Ibid: 306).

For Newfoundland, its long history as a colony of Britain coupled with its island geography reinforced a posture of separateness from both the Maritimes and Canada. According to Bickerton, Newfoundland has always “stood somewhat apart from the Maritimes; a late entrant to the federation and perennially the poorest province in the country, has witnessed the emergence of a prominent strain of neo-nationalism and autonomist politics. This persistent political orientation draws on the province’s distinctive history, culture and identity, and is fuelled by resentment toward external political and economic forces that have been blamed for the province’s historic disappointments and difficulties” (Bickerton, 2010: 7). Although it gained provincial status in 1949, its economic collapse in the 1930s and the protracted debate over its constitutional future reinforced a reluctance to embrace federalism and a broader national vision.

As such, Newfoundland’s strong sense of internal identity (see Table 3.1) superseded that of a national identity and its continuing grievances within Canada brought it into territorial conflict with the federal government. Bickerton argued that “where provincial and
island boundaries coincide identities are reinforced. Newfoundland and PEI have been consistently more willing to express province-first identities and loyalties on surveys compared to the remainder of the region” (Bickerton, 1994: 428). Peter Crabb has argued that “because of its history, Newfoundland is perhaps more aware of the virtues of independence” (Crabb, 1981: 449). It is for such reasons why Newfoundland has frequently distanced itself from any semblance of a regional agenda and why the notion of ‘Atlantic Canada’ as a tangible political region is perhaps misguided. For Newfoundland, the words of Daniel J. Elazar apply more than anywhere else in Canada: “it is very likely, if not inevitable, that a state will possess its own particular characteristics simply by virtue of its settled existence over generations” (Elazar, 1972: 11).

A clear puzzle emerges from this discussion of territoriality. The territorial demarcation and political institutionalisation of the Maritime region at an earlier point in time established three distinct political entities. Within the territorial boundaries exists a tangible sense of identity which co-exists alongside broader identities and loyalties, for example to Canada and previously to Britain and the Empire. The political institutionalisation of these territories endowed political elites with the capacity to defend and further the interests of their territory. The emergence of province-building in the 1960s, shaped by the federal government’s social welfare agenda, was surmised to be the beginning of the provinces as activist states which strengthened the capacity of the premiers and gave them a national role. This reinforced the existing territorial boundaries as the premiers became more inclined to take a ‘province-first’ perspective, particularly in negotiations with the federal government over questions of finance. Yet, this raises the question, why, did the Maritime premiers consider a political union at a time when their relative power and visibility was extending beyond their defined territories?

This empirical puzzle demands an analysis which focuses on both the key time period of province-building and the actions of the vested political leaders. As outlined, this will be undertaken by utilising process tracing. However, this analysis has also emphasised the value of explaining political phenomena within the parameters of a historically defined case study. The historical basis of the Maritime provinces, as both territorial and political entities, is important in understanding the perceived constraints to the achievement of a political union. As the quote from Stewart and the survey data underscored, distinct identities and loyalties
have developed and vested political leaders act to maintain the territorial status quo. Structural change is however not a question which can be answered by a focus on publics. It is a question of agency and institutional context. This means not just an internal focus on the immediate territory but the broader environment in which they operate, that is the Canadian federation and how the vested leaders behave and interact as part of that environment and react to the stresses and tensions within it. The way to explain this behaviour can be garnered from empirical observation. Moreover, this analysis is not just limited to a narrow observation of the specific time period but a broader focus of the historical context of the region. To understand the basis of territorial identities and territorial argument and the persistence of particular institutional settings a historically grounded longitudinal analysis must be undertaken. This can help determine the basis of political decisions and gain some clarity on some of the enablers and constraints placed upon sub-national actors towards questions of structural change.

*Sub-National Leadership*

Institutional theory has suggested a number of ways in which political behaviour is exercised and constrained. The normative strand of scholars such as March and Olsen denotes that actors operate according to the norms and values of their institutional setting (March and Olsen, 1984: 741). As outlined in the previous chapter, these norms and values are grounded in the ‘logic of appropriateness’ which is shaped by the institution. Rational actors are assumed to be more calculating in their behaviour. That is institutions are the products of choice by political leaders. Furthermore, political leaders will make choices in order to further their own political objectives and maximise their own utility as they perceive it. Political behaviour within the historical institutional paradigm is close to the perspective of March and Olsen in that it sees behaviour as constrained by the embedded institutional trajectory. As B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre have outlined, “individuals and their values are altered by the institutions within which they are embedded and with which they come into contact. Occupying the position of prime minister or president may force individuals who conceived of themselves as political outsiders to begin to play the roles of insiders and to accept many of the prevailing role definitions of the positions they occupy” (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 566). It is not however clear whether these assumptions are applicable at the sub-national level.
Moreover, are sub-national leaders more or less constrained in their behaviour than their national counterparts?

In the Canadian context, the advent of executive federalism in the 1960s gave the premiers a high level of input into the national policy making process. This was particularly beneficial for the smaller provinces, such as the Maritimes. As David Samuels and Fernando Luiz Abrucio have argued, “federalism typically over-represents certain sub-national units, giving them influence in national politics. Over-representation can shape politicians’ strategies for national coalition-building, and tends to affect the distribution of resources. Federal constitutions typically impose specific constraints on the national government and grant certain powers to sub-national units, allowing local political entrepreneurs to counterbalance national government initiatives” (Samuels and Abrucio, 2000: 43-44). This analysis suggests that sub-national actors have more freedom to ‘innovate’ to achieve their objectives because they may be able to ‘bypass’ the national level and national policy objectives (Ibid: 44). Samuels and Abrucio use the example of social welfare to buttress this point: “sub-national governments may decide to increase social welfare spending when the national government plans an austerity budget” (Ibid). Annie Chaloux and Stephane Paquin have utilised the notion of intra and inter-state federalism in relation to the question of sub-national actors. Using the example of climate change, specifically the Kyoto agreement, in the United States and Canada they argued that “sub-national governments can use two routes to be involved in international decision-making. On the one hand, they can use an intra-state route and try to influence the national position. On the other hand, provinces and states can [take an inter-state approach] by bypassing their federal government [through their own legislation or regional IGR]” (Chaloux and Paquin, 2012: 217).

For the leaders of smaller entities, PEI for example, this is where federalism can be highly advantageous. PEI has often been singled out as a jurisdictional anomaly in Canada. As early as 1923, there were suggestions that the province should be amalgamated with other provinces (Globe and Mail, 1923: 4). A similar argument was made in 1995 (Yager, 1995: A5). Yet, as a constituent unit of the federation, PEI has a ‘seat at the table’ during federal-provincial negotiations on the same terms of larger and more densely populated provinces, such as Ontario and Quebec. For Savoie, the increased prevalence and formalisation of First Ministers Conferences, with the establishment of the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference
Secretariat, in the 1960s and 1970s allows each premier to “enjoy a special status and high visibility in the national media” (Savoie, 2006: 211). Moreover, it afforded the premiers direct access to the Prime Minister in which to exert considerable pressure for “a better economic deal for their province” (Ibid). There is a debate to be had about the effectiveness of the smaller provinces in the federal arena; a ‘stronger voice’ has long been an argument for a political union. However provincial status means provinces such as PEI are afforded all the benefits of provincial status, such as federal access, a capital, an elaborate administrative structure and a university” (Ibid).

That said the notion of a premier seeking a ‘better economic deal’ for their province is often a prerequisite of federal-provincial negotiation and can be seen as a key constraint on the ability of a premier to make particular decisions. Premiers are expected to act in a way that places the interests of their province first and foremost. Tomblin for example argued that the “premiers may be concerned what goes on in another region [or province] but they are still responsible for separate political entities” (Tomblin, 1979: 55). Moreover, each premier speaks to individual electorates and competes in separate elections. This gets to the core of a key shaper of sub-national political behaviour in Canada, political parties. The bifurcated nature of the party system acts both to enable and constrain political behaviour at the sub-national level.

**Political Parties**

The role of political parties, as a source of cohesion and conflict, is important when thinking about enablers and constraints within federal states. William Riker and Ronald Schaps have noted that political parties are “an agency that might be expected to harmonise the policies” amongst the constituent units of a federal state (Riker and Schaps, 1957: 277). It is surmised that if officials from both the federal and sub-national governments are “adherents of the same ideology or followers of the same leader or leaders, then they might be expected to pursue harmonious policies” (Ibid). This is based on an assumption that a federal state possesses an integrated party system, whereby the same parties operate at all levels of the polity. However, in federal states with a “relatively free party system with competing political parties” it is assumed that “just the reverse occurs” (Ibid). Within a bifurcated party system, where political parties may operate under the same labels but are separated between levels of government and along territorial lines, it is likely that “competing parties [will] use the central
government against the constituent governments and the constituent governments against the central” (Ibid).

For Brander, a separated political and party system encourages ‘beggar thy neighbour’ mindsets (Brander, 1985: 35). Bolleyer has termed this ‘blame shifting’ (Bolleyer, 2006: 480). The separation of political and party systems results in governments and parties formulating a “particular set of objectives” specifically tailored to that jurisdictional area (Brander, 1985: 40). Such objectives may “reflect the general interests of state residents the private interests of elected officials and civil servants who make policy or some combination” (Ibid). The core implication of this situation is that separated political parties will have conflicting objectives that are grounded in the system, environment and society in which they operate. Their core priority will thus be to “act in the interest of those they represent” (Ibid). For Riker and Schaps, the only way in which conflict may be neutralised is if “one highly disciplined party controls all governments both central and constituent” (Riker and Schaps, 1957: 277).

A bifurcated party system could therefore be seen as a constraint on political behaviour because it prevents actors taking a broader national or regional perspective in favour of narrow territorial objectives. A recent example of how the bifurcated party system can encourage sub-national political leaders to adopt narrow territorial positions, even against a party of the same ideological stripes, was the 2008 federal election. In response to perceived cuts to Newfoundland and Labrador's equalization payments, Progressive Conservative premier Danny Williams began the ‘Anything But Conservative’ campaign against the Conservative Party of Canada and actively encouraged electors to vote for other federal parties (Globe and Mail, 2008). Crucially, Williams maintained the highest approval ratings of all the premiers in Canada at that time (see Table 3.2). This supports the position that a premier who is perceived to ‘stand up for their province’ will be more popular amongst their electorate. In terms of a political union, Tomblin has argued that “anyone foolish enough to advocate a political union would not stay in office long” (Tomblin, 1979: 108). Sub-national political leaders may therefore be more able to forward territorial interests from a party standpoint but less able to take a broader national or regional perspective because it conflicts with the perceived interests of their province. A further area where this may be the case is that of political ambition.
Table 3.2: Approval Rating for Provincial Premiers, February 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
<td>Danny Williams</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Newfoundland</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>Brad Wall</td>
<td>Saskatchewan Party</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>Greg Selinger</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Manitoba</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Darrell Dexter</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Nova Scotia</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Gordon Campbell</td>
<td>Liberal Party of British Columbia</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Jean Charest</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Dalton McGuinty</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Ontario</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>Ed Stelmach</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Alberta</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>Shawn Graham</td>
<td>Liberal Party of New Brunswick</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Angus Reid, 2010: 3

Political Ambition

The consideration of political ambition may help in providing an improved understanding of why sub-national actors may behave in certain ways or articulate particular preferences. It has been argued that ambitious political leaders may structure their behaviour and preferences towards change as a means of achieving their personal political objectives. Robert Lieberman for example has argued that “political institutions create strategic opportunities for purposive political leaders to further their interests” (Lieberman, 2002: 709). However, there is perhaps more scope for sub-national politicians to achieve their political ambition during a period of structural change because they can adopt a position consistent with broader opinion, even when that opinion may be opposed or controversial in their own territory. As such, a political actor may favour change because it achieves their personal political ambition.

Joseph Schlesinger’s analysis of American politics in the 1960s provided they key theoretical foundation of political ambition. Schlesinger’s key contention is that “a politician’s behaviour is a response to his office goals” (Schlesinger 1966: 6). A central assertion of this theory is that an “incumbent actors expectations and aspirations for the future

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2 The poll cited represents: “Do you approve or disapprove of the performance of each of the following people?” No data is available for Prince Edward Island.
are relevant at a given stage of his career for his behaviour at that stage” (Prewitt and Nowlin, 1992: 299). Thus, the way in which a political actor anticipates to structure his future constrains and influences his current behaviour. An actor that aspires to a particular office or position will begin to prepare for that position long before assuming the position and will seek to facilitate the attainment of the position by “informing himself of its demands and adopting policy views consistent with the incumbency in it,” regardless of whether it is consistent with his current position/territory (Ibid). A sub-national actor who aspires to a federal career will have “policy perspectives commonly associated with the federal levels of government [and will] view policy issues differently from unambitious officeholders. If the incumbent actor hopes to move up the career ladder he will take on the characteristics he perceives to be those of incumbents in more elevated posts and will take stands on policy issues which reflect their views” (Ibid: 301).

The notion of opportunity is a key factor in the fulfilment of political ambition. For Jens Borchert, the career choices of political leaders are “shaped by the given structural opportunities and the individual ambition one might harbour” (Borchert, 2011: 119). Moreover, the territorial structure of the state in which leaders operate is an important variable in determining the type of career opportunities available. A federal state for example typically offers three levels of opportunity: municipal, sub-state and federal. However these levels may not be seen in a hierarchical fashion. That is political leaders may not automatically seek to move ‘up’ the levels, for example, municipal to sub-state to federal. An ambitious actor may also move ‘down’ depending on the nature of their aspirations. This is particularly true in a parliamentary context.

In terms of Canada, it is surmised that the parliamentary system constrains ambition and makes movement to the federal level less attractive. Roger Gibbins has argued that there is very little movement between the different levels of the political system in Canada because the weakness of national political institutions makes national office less attractive to ambitious politicians: “aspiring politicians appear to make an early choice between a provincial or national career and once launched very few cross over” (Gibbins, 1982: 141). For Barrie and Gibbins, the parliamentary system is a key impediment to movement within the political system in Canada: “the allure of becoming a federal Member of Parliament (MP) or even a federal Cabinet minister is less great than becoming a Senator in the United States”
The desire for executive authority may entice political leaders in a legislative role to move ‘up’ or ‘down’ the career structure in order to gain a greater role in the national decision-making process and expand their sphere of influence. In Canada, the rise of executive federalism was seen as an impediment to movement from the provincial to federal arena: “[executive federalism gave provincial premiers] an important and ongoing national role. The provincial level is therefore too important to be seen as a stepping stone to the federal level” (Docherty, 2001: 195). Moreover, the provincial arena may appeal more to politicians from the smaller and/or poorer provinces because of their over-representation within intergovernmental structures.

That said, although the parliamentary system is seen as an impediment to career movement in Canada the bifurcated party system can be seen as a facilitator. Within an integrated party system ambitious actors may remain in their current provincial party because the chance of achieving high office, such as prime minister or cabinet minister, may be less in the federal party. The bifurcated system however offers politicians the opportunity of satisfying their political ambitions within an alternative party. For example, a New Democratic Party (NDP) politician at the provincial level may find it more beneficial to switch allegiances to another party to be successful at the federal level. David Docherty has noted that only two parties - Liberal and Conservatives (formally Progressive Conservative) - have ever formed a federal government. Members of the NDP may therefore see their ambition best satisfied within another party (Docherty, 2011: 192). Former NDP Ontario premier Bob Rae is a key contemporary example of how politicians can switch allegiances to achieve personal political objectives. Rae unsuccessfully ran for the leadership of the federal Liberal Party in 2006 before becoming a Liberal Member of Parliament in 2008 and interim leader in 2011. Rae had already served as an MP for the NDP between 1979 and 1982.

Sub-national actors are perhaps more constrained in their decision-making than national actors because they are accountable to more geographically compact territories. They are also expected to negotiate with the national level on a basis that secures a beneficial fiscal and economic outcome for their territory. Yet, at the same time the sub-national actors are perhaps more enabled by their territorial status because they have more freedom to pursue policy which is not achievable at the national level or conflicts with the objectives of the federal government. As demonstrated, there is a double-edged context to this point because
sub-states can either try to influence the federal government (intra-state) or pass their own legislation (inter-state). In recent times this has been demonstrated on questions of climate change as sub-states have pursued emission targets despite reluctance from national governments, for example the Canadian government withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in December 2011 (BBC News, 2011). The political and party system has also been shown to be an important factor. The Canadian case has demonstrated that the parliamentary system and bifurcated party structure act as both constraints and enablers of decision-making for both sub-national and national actors, particularly in terms of ambition and career movement.

The focus on territoriality and sub-national leadership outlined the constraints and enablers that actors at the sub-national level are subject to. However, the key aspect of political decision-making is opportunity. Although political leaders may be constrained by their ongoing political and/or territorial context they may be temporarily presented with the opportunity to act or make decisions outside the established structural context. It is for this reason why process tracing has been selected as the core methodological approach. Through a careful empirical analysis of the key events and political decisions made within the specified timeframe a better understanding can be garnered of how and why a political union became salient at this time and, most importantly, why a union did not happen. This approach will also help to further develop path dependence theory and notions of critical junctures because it can help to explain how political agency affects questions of structural change. By pinpointing the key decisions which led to the consideration of change during a critical juncture inferences can be made about how they differ from a ‘non-juncture’ context and whether the political leaders were more or less constrained in their behaviour. It is such aspects which this thesis will explain in relation to the political union question.

3.2. Data Collection

This thesis utilised three core forms of data collection: archival research, interview transcripts and in-depth interviews. The archival data was used to garner a historical context to the question of a political union in order to shape the research questions and conceptual framework and narrow the empirical timeframe. Interview transcripts with key political and bureaucratic actors from the 1960-1980 period formed the central basis of the empirical analysis. In depth interviews were conducted with key (surviving) political leaders from the 1960-1980 period in order to further develop the empirical data. Interviews were also
conducted with key academic informants. These interviews served to provide a historical context, shape the methodological approach, and to locate and situate the core empirical data.

This section will address each of these methods individually in order to outline how they were used in relation to the broad research objectives and questions. Furthermore, a focus on each method will highlight the relevance of process tracing methodology for a longitudinal study such as this. The literature has highlighted that a combination of interviews, archival research and historical research as the most appropriate methods to achieve the core objectives of process tracing. For example George and Bennett had argued that “in process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (George and Bennett, 2005: 6). Rosemary Reilly supported this standpoint. She argued that in order to “encapsulate the intricacies and nuances leading to the outcome of a dependent variable more successfully than other theoretical frameworks. It is particularly suited to contexts where decision-making lies at the heart of the investigation. The data used for this method are qualitative in nature, and can include historical memoirs, interviews, press accounts and archival documents. Multiple data streams are necessary since rich and varied sources are required for process tracing” (Reilly, 2010: 2). The next sections will detail how the data collection process was carried out in order to understand and account for political decision-making within a specific chronological timeframe.

**Archival Research**

Since its conception, this study has been driven by one broad question – why did a political union not occur in the Maritimes between 1960 and 1980? Archival research was conducted in the first instance in order to gain a sense of the historical context of the question of the union context. This initial research was undertaken at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia, the Nova Scotia Legislative Library and Provincial Archives of New Brunswick between February and March 2009. The archival portion was approached with the central objective of understanding when and why a union had been discussed.

The start point of this task was to consult the material specifically categorised under the term ‘Maritime Union’ at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia. This proved important
because it revealed a collation of documents, primarily newspaper extracts, ranging from the 1960s to the early 1980s. At the start of the research process, it was assumed that the primary material on a Maritime Union would cluster around the Confederation period as the concept has been predominantly characterised as a historical concept that emerged in the consolidation debate of the 1860s. However, the collection of material from the middle of the twentieth century raised important questions about why a political union was discussed in this period and who and/or what initiated the emergence of the concept. Moreover, the question of a union in the 1960s and 1970s indicated the existence of a different kind of concept to that of the 1860s.

In the 1860s, a union was envisaged as an amalgamation of the three colonies into a unitary union to formulate a single quasi-independent colony within the British Empire. The decision to federate however preserved the Maritime colonies as quasi-independent provinces of a federal entity. This changed the nature of the research puzzle. It was now about sub-national political union within a federal state. From a conceptual standpoint, the validity of the theoretical framework was maintained. It would remain a study grounded predominantly in questions about the shapers of change to alternative path dependent settings but it would now encompass the broader consideration of change at the sub-national level within a federal state. Why would sub-national entities that had chosen to federate in the 1860s consider a political union?

The decision was taken on this basis to analyse the available documents from the mid-twentieth century in order to shed light on the question of union in this period. The documents obtained at this time included, newspaper articles, speeches, parliamentary records and interview transcripts. The use of these documents at the outset of the data collection process was to situate the core empirical focus. It was at this point that the research process as a form of detective work became prevalent. It was an effort to develop an initial explanatory account grounded in questions of ‘how’ or ‘why:’ why was the question of a union so widely discussed at this time? What precipitated the discussion of a political union on such a wide scale?

The answer to these questions related to the establishment of the MUS. The newspaper documents represented a snapshot of the extra-political engagement with both the MUS and the question of a union more broadly. The existence of the MUS provided an empirical and
conceptual context in which to approach the overarching research question and investigate the hypothesised origin of change to path dependent settings. It should be noted that from the outset the Maritimes were categorised as being ‘path dependent.’ George and Bennett have argued that in order to construct a valid explanation, “the investigator must recognise the possibility of path dependence whilst avoiding the assumption that certain outcomes were excluded” (George and Bennett, 2005: 21). The Maritimes were assumed to be path dependent in the sense that they were distinct territorial entities that had been established and reinforced over time. The likelihood of structural change was therefore considered to be low. As such, a number of questions came to the fore which guided the data collection process. Why did the Maritime premiers consider structural change? What had triggered the establishment of the MUS?

These questions had a twofold effect on the data collection process: first, it was decided to focus the study on the motivations, opinions and decisions of the premiers for establishing the MUS in order to determine why and what triggered them to consider structural change. Second, it reinforced the decision to adopt a process tracing approach. As Kevin Ford et al have noted, “process models allow a more direct focus on the intervening steps that occur between the introduction of informational inputs and the decision outcomes. A fundamental principle of this approach is data should be collected during the decision process as often as possible” (Ford et al, 1989: 75-76). Using this approach, the data collection was focused on identifying the causes and motivations of the premiers for establishing the MUS in 1968. It is for this reason that the cause framework of Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu was adopted in order to help determine what causes or occurrences shaped the decisions of the premiers.

Informant Interviews

To refine the data collection process and help shape the conceptual and empirical focus, interviews were conducted in the first instance with academic informants. In total six academic informant interviews were conducted: three with historians and three with political scientists. The insights of historians John G Reid and Margaret Conrad were particularly valuable for thinking about the historical formation of the three provinces as political entities and how they were reinforced over time as each entity developed individual political
institutions. An interview was also conducted with Brian Cuthbertson, the biographer and descendent of Richard John Uniacke, the first documented proponent of a political union in 1806. The purpose of this interview was to provide a deep historical context to the motivations of Uniacke for proposing a political union in 1806, only twenty years after the colonisation of New Brunswick and Cape Breton in 1784. This interview was illuminating for the way it revealed the importance of political agency as a shaper of questions of change.

Three political scientists, James Bickerton, Richard Simeon and Roger Gibbins, were interviewed in order to strengthen the conceptual and empirical framing of this thesis. Bickerton advised to think about how there is a notional ceiling to the types of regionalism that can be achieved in the three provinces. This perspective helped develop a broader engagement with the notion of critical junctures as facilitators of change. This interview also added an additional empirical facet to the study, the question of intergovernmental relations. Why was a form of intergovernmental relations established following the MUS? Could the establishment of intergovernmental relations be considered a form of structural change? The interview with Simeon in April 2009 was particularly helpful in crystallising the use of path dependence as the core conceptual framework. Finally, the insights of Gibbins in October 2009 helped to shape the empirical focus on questions of political agency. Gibbins highlighted how regionalism across Canada had been furthered when there was discernible political leadership in which to drive the process forward.³

Elite Interviews

In formulating the study around the preferences and decisions of political leaders and the process tracing approach, elite interviews with the key political leaders from the MUS period was chosen as the primary research method. For Oisín Tansey, “the goal of process tracing is to obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes, and the most appropriate sampling procedures are thus those that identify the key political leaders who have had the most involvement with the processes of interest. The aim is not to draw a representative sample of a larger population of political leaders that can be used as the basis to make generalisations about the full population, but to draw a sample that includes the most important political players who have participated in the political events being studied”

³ An attempt was made to secure an interview with Donald Savoie however this proved unsuccessful. Savoie has written widely on questions of economic development in the Maritimes. He has frequently advocated regional solutions, such as cooperation and a union, as a remedy to the economic problems of the three provinces.
Robert Yin has contended that, when focusing on a single empirical case study, “there should always be an attempt to procure data from the actors that were actually involved in the events under investigation unless the researcher is addressing a topic which is in the ‘dead past’ (Yin, 1994: 8).

The empirical focus of this study cannot be considered the dead past but it does address a period in which considerable time has elapsed - some of the key political leaders were therefore not alive to be interviewed or unavailable. The challenge of formulating a picture of what triggered the engagement of the premiers towards questions of structural change and how these triggers shaped their opinions and decision-making capacity was rectified in two ways: interview transcripts from interviews given when they were alive and, to a lesser extent, their public speeches. The importance of the interview transcripts to the empirical analysis warrants special consideration.

*Interview Transcripts*

The interview transcripts utilised in this study were conducted by Janet Toole, an oral history archivist at the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick, in the late 1980s. The transcripts were procured during archival research at the Public Archives of New Brunswick in March 2009. The transcripts were transcribed from the original tape recordings of interviews with thirteen key political leaders and officials who were “closely involved with the establishment of the Council of Maritime Premiers in 1972” and were commissioned by the Council of Maritime Premiers in December 1986 to “commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of its establishment” (Archives Council of Prince Edward Island, 2011). These transcripts were fundamental in shaping the empirical focus of this study because they allowed the perspectives of former politicians, who have since died, to be analysed and provided a basis for further elite interviews to be conducted. Furthermore, they helped to determine the core empirical time frame for the thesis and provide the basis for conducting a process tracing approach.

The Toole interviews were conducted with political leaders and officials who were active within the Maritimes between 1960 and 1987. They encompass premiers, political officials, such as advisors and speechwriters, and public servants. The core difference between political officials and public servants is that the former were politically affiliated. They were extra-political actors that were closely associated to the political leader and party
in power. Public servants on the other hand were part of the public administration machinery of the provinces. It is important to make this distinction because many of the key figures that were involved in the debate were political officials, which at times tempered the debate and political dynamics within and between the provinces. Political officials and public servants are an important focus of the study because they influenced the rationale and operation of the MUS.

The transcripts shaped the decision to begin the core analysis in 1960 because, in addition to the aforementioned Quebec factors, the political leaders at the centre of the establishment of the MUS were elected in that year, in the case of Louis Robichaud, or a few years prior, in the case of Robert Stanfield. The transcripts were reanalysed through content analysis in order to ‘establish causation’ for the establishment of the MUS and later the Council of Maritime Premiers, pinpoint key themes and topics and, most important, gather in rich detail a clearer picture of the thoughts and attitudes of the key elites towards questions of structural change in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Burns, 2000: 432-433). A simple coding system was implemented which noted the recurring themes. This enabled comparison to be made across the transcripts to “evaluate the plausibility” of the guiding theoretical hypothesis – path dependence (Ibid: 434).

A number of problems with interview transcripts must be acknowledged. Louise Corti has argued that secondary analysis of interview transcripts mean the researcher “lacks full knowledge to the research process and therefore may not have access to the tacit knowledge gained by the primary researcher which in some circumstances may be important in helping interpret data” (Corti, 2004: 22). This is a perspective shared by Matt Henn, Mark Weinstein and Nick Foard who have contended that the researcher may not be able to grasp the “idiosyncrasies of the spoken word which are not apparent in conventionally written language” (Henn, Weinstein and Foard, 2006: 190). The fact that the interviews were conducted by someone else means they were probably conducted with other research questions and objectives in mind. The nature of the position held by the initial researcher indicates that the interviews were conducted for an oral history record and not social scientific analysis. It should be noted however that some of the transcripts have been used by other scholars. Tomblin for example used them for his 1995 publication – Ottawa and the Outer Provinces.
The use of interview transcripts as a primary research method also raised some important ethical questions around the utilisation of primary material collected by someone else. In terms of the re-use of data, whether it was collected by the same or another researcher, there are key questions of consent. Anne Grinyer has asked whether the re-use of data, either quantitative or qualitative, can be considered a “legitimate extension of the original consent” (Grinyer, 2009: 1). Ongoing consent is key for a study such as this which has relied heavily on interview transcripts. Secondary analysis has been defined by Janet Heaton as “the use of existing data collected for the purposes of a prior study, in order to pursue a research interest which is distinct from that of the original work” (Heaton, 1998: 1). Grinyer concludes that if the data is being re-used by the original researcher then a form of one-off consent is sufficient (Grinyer, 2009: 3).

The transcripts utilised in this thesis were procured from public archives which suggests that they are within the public domain and therefore freely accessible for research purposes. That said, however, the use of qualitative archival data can be problematic because it raises further questions of consent, manipulation and decontextualisation (Ibid). Odette Parry and Natasha Mauthner have argued that there are “very practical, legal and ethical implications for the archiving and re-use of qualitative data. The key issues [about re-using qualitative archival data] involve respecting copyright and ownership, ensuring confidentiality and anonymity of respondents and researchers, and securing informed consent” (Parry and Mauthner, 2004: 141). The key problems of note for this thesis were decontextualisation and consent. As noted, the interviews were conducted in order to construct a historical account of the establishment of a regional institution. This thesis, however, sought to use the transcripts in order to gain an insight into political perspectives and political decision-making for the purpose of social scientific research.

The key question that therefore emerged was: do interviews conducted for an oral history project require further consent for their use in another context? Parry and Mauthner have argued that the “reflexive nature of qualitative research, its use of unexpected ideas that arise through data collection and its focus upon respondents’ meanings and interpretations renders the commitment to informing respondents of the exact path of the research unrealistic. [Furthermore], there has been no provision made for guidance in issues of archiving. Once the data are accessible as a secondary resource, and if there is neither legal nor ethical obligation,
nor provision for secondary researchers to consult with the respondent group, the notion of ongoing consent becomes redundant” (Ibid: 146). Many of the transcripts used in this thesis were subject to access restrictions, all of which had expired by the time of data collection. In addition, a number of the respondents were no longer alive. Nevertheless, in order to mitigate questions of context and consent and to garner further data, follow up interviews were sought with some of the surviving premiers and public servants who participated in the initial oral history project. The purpose of these elite interviews was to corroborate the themes contained within the transcripts and ask additional questions which were not covered. This proved very useful because it brought new insights and perspectives and also provided a gateway to other possible respondents. It was however kept in mind that the time lapsed between the event posed a risk of “inaccuracies due to poor recall” (Yin, 1994: 80).

The decision to make contact with Fred Drummie, a key advisor within the Robichaud government and Executive Director of the MUS, in late 2009 was particularly important because it generated a snowball effect for the interview process. Alan Bryman defines snowball sampling as a situation whereby “the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others” (Bryman, 2008: 184). Drummie arranged a telephone interview with former Nova Scotia premier Gerald Regan in July 2010 and also supplied the contact details for Fred Arsenault, the Secretary of the MUS. Drummie and Regan were both central informants to the study: Drummie because he was in government in New Brunswick when a political union was first raised in the early 1960s and actually conducted the MUS; Regan because he was the most hostile and obstructive premier to questions of regionalism and union in the early 1970s. An attempt was made to interview Fred Arsenault but it did not procure a response.

Further Methods

Further methods were used to supplement and corroborate the interview data. Speeches, newspapers, autobiographies and digital archives, such as television and radio clips, were used to support the empirical data acquired. Two types of speech were analysed - commemorative addresses by premiers’ Louis Robichaud and Joey Smallwood from the Charlottetown Centennial Conference in September 1964 and territorially focused speeches by three premiers – Robichaud, Robert Stanfield and Jean Lesage – to the Empire Club of
Canada throughout the 1960s. The commemorative address by Robichaud was a key facet of data because it was the speech in which a political union was advocated. This was used as a basis to locate themes or events which could explain his engagement with the question of union. The speech of Smallwood was used to gain an insight into the immediate reaction of a premier to the union proposal. Although Newfoundland is not a core focus of this study, Robichaud initially included Newfoundland. Smallwood was the only other premier from the region yet to make his commemorative address and was therefore able to provide an immediate reaction to the suggestion.

The Empire Club speeches were intended to corroborate the interview data. They were accessible electronically via the internet and provided a ready source of primary data. Despite their initial corroborative function, the speeches of Robichaud and Stanfield became a more significant component of the empirical data than expected. This was because, as speeches delivered in Toronto, they spoke to an audience beyond their own territories. As such, they articulated perspectives that would perhaps not be expected of provincial premiers. This led to new questions being asked of the interview data and elite informants. More specifically, they added the consideration of political ambition and personal interest to the question of structural change within path dependent settings. The speech of Lesage to the Empire Club was used to gain a clearer picture of a key theme, notably Quebec nationalism.

Newspapers, autobiographies and digital archives were used to ‘fill the gaps’ left by other sources of empirical data. These sources were largely accessed electronically at a later stage of the research process. Newspapers such as the Globe and Mail and 4th Estate (Nova Scotia), the Google News Archive and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) Digital Archive of television and radio clips were used to supplement the interviews and to provide supporting quotes and further information on specific events. This data was not used to gain opinions or perspectives but to reinforce and support the existence of a specific cause or threat and provide a snapshot of extra-political analysis. It is acknowledged that these data sources “are far from neutral” (Mitchell, 2011: 118). The perspectives of newspapers for example often reflect those of the editor or proprietor. Furthermore, media more generally is often produced with “an audience context in mind” and may therefore be subject to bias, distortion and/or errors in fact (MacDonald, 2001: 199). Irina Gendelman, Tom Dobrowolsky and Giorgia Aiello have argued that digital archives are “not unlike traditional archives - sites of
remembering and forgetting, and engage equally in acts of documentation archiving and display or exhibiting by way of the web. They both preserve and display – play a major role in shaping collective memory as well as setting the agenda for what should be seen worthy of documentation and remembrance” (Gendelman, Dobrowolsky and Aiello, 2010: 189). This aspect can also be seen as a downside to this form of data collection because it risks reflecting the bias of the archivist or editor in deciding what is ‘worthy’ or the standpoint from which a particular event or aspect is presented.

The use of Quebec English language newspapers was perhaps most at risk from the latter form of bias. English newspapers were used to provide a context to the analysis of Quebec nationalism because of an inability to read French. This approach is however problematic. A key facet of the Quiet Revolution was one of language and the sense of subordination caused by Anglophone business elites in Montreal amongst the majority francophone population. This inevitably caused tension amongst Anglophones both inside and outside Quebec: “some English-language journalists blamed provincial politicians for undermining Quebecers loyalty to the federation through an aggressive stance on relations with the federal government” (Francis, Jones, and Smith, 2010: 521). The position of English language newspapers generally reflected this hostile tone to questions of nationalism in Quebec. In order to gain a broader perspective and a sense of balance to the nationalism debate, other accessible francophone data that was available in English, such as the Empire Club speech of Jean Lesage, or had been translated, such as the autobiography and television and radio clips of René Lévesque, was analysed.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the core methodological approach of this study: a qualitative examination, harnessing the process tracing approach, which seeks to determine why and what caused the engagement of the vested political leaders with the question of a political union throughout the period 1960-1980. The process tracing methodology was intersected with cause criterion of Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu to help ‘establish causation’ and understand the basis of political decision-making during the stated timeframe, 1960-1980. The use of archival research, interview transcripts and elite interviews with the key political leaders and officials of the period helped to build a clearer temporal picture of how certain causes affected the opinions, actions and decisions the vested political leaders. Furthermore,
the archival data supplemented the interviews by corroborating perspectives and filling gaps. Moreover these methods provided basis for the ‘diverse’ and ‘deep’ data required of the process tracing methodology. By taking this approach, the causes and motivations of the vested political leaders for engaging with a union could be more carefully accounted for. Process tracing also fulfils the agency objective of the thesis by facilitating analysis beyond just the ‘episode’ in which change was considered within a critical juncture. As a result, a fuller explanation can be developed of how and why change becomes salient within path dependent settings and, most importantly, why a union did not happen in this period.
Chapter 4

The Maritime Provinces: The Origin of Distinct Territorial Governance

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the three Maritime provinces were politically developed prior to becoming a part of Canada. The political development of the Maritimes as self-governing colonies of Britain established the antecedent conditions for political decision-making. Therefore, when pressure emerged for colonial consolidation in the 1860s they embraced a federal model of consolidation over other forms of union. The 1860s represented the build up to the critical juncture of the 1864 Charlottetown Conference at which the question of structural change was discussed. At this critical juncture, the Maritime political leaders faced a choice of forming a regional political union of the three colonies (Maritime Union) or joining a continent-wide union (Confederation) of all British North America (BNA). The Maritime political leaders chose the latter at Charlottetown because a federal state would preserve the existing infrastructural and political capacity of the three colonies and satisfy their economic objectives.

The pre-Confederation period was crucial to establishing and embedding the path of distinct territorial governance in the Maritime region. The early compartmentalisation into separate colonial entities and the awarding of political institutions, through representative government in the late eighteenth century and responsible government in the mid-nineteenth century, were key to establishing the antecedent conditions that shaped and constrained the decisions of the colonial leaders. Confederation further embedded the path of distinct territorial governance because it preserved the institutional and political capacity of the colonies and constitutionally protected them as provinces within the federal state.

The cause of consolidation at this time followed Rikerian logic in that it was driven by ‘external compulsion’ (Riker, 1964: 116). The external pressures, notably an economic threat following the end of the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty with the United States (US) in 1865, a military threat due to the tension of the American Civil War (1861-1866) and Britain’s desire to reduce its defence expenditure, created an internal logic for consolidation as the Maritimes sought to mitigate the implications of the externalities. However, the territorial and political composition of the Maritimes undermined the achievability of a regional union in favour of a federal solution. The importance of Confederation was that it preserved the institutional
capacity of the Maritime colonies and reinforced the existence of three separate political entities. That said there was fervent opposition to Confederation which in turn shaped alternative structures of consolidation.

The chapter will look at how the initial colonisation of the region in the eighteenth century placed the colonies on a path of distinct territorial governance which was reinforced over time through key junctures such as the awarding of political institutions in the late eighteenth century (representative government) and in nineteenth century (responsible government) and Confederation. It will convey the complexities of the consolidation debate of the 1860s. The value of this period and analytical structure is that it can help to understand and emphasise why structural change became necessary at this time and why, despite once being a single territorial entity, a regional political union of the Maritime colonies proved so hard to achieve.

4.1. Antecedent Conditions

Colonisation and Representative Government

The logical start point is a consideration of the fact that until the late eighteenth century the three provinces comprised a single territorial entity, the Province of Nova Scotia, under the colonial governance of France and Great Britain (see Figure 4.1). The political administration of the region at this time was conducted within a complex web of ethnic and linguistic tension and conflict between Britain and France over possession of the colony. Britain was ultimately successful in gaining possession of the colony, which it called Nova Scotia, in the early eighteenth century and later Isle St Jean (St John’s Island), present day PEI, in 1763.
Following its possession of the colony in 1713, the approach of Britain towards colonial governance reflected its desire to maintain possession and prevent further conflict. Up to the 1750s, its preoccupation with respect to the francophone Acadian population, which numbered approximately 6000-7000 on the mainland and 3000 on St John’s Island, was allegiance to the Crown and a promise not to take up arms against Britain in the event of conflict with France (Lockerby, 1998). When the Acadians refused to accede to this demand they were forcibly deported in 1755 to France and French colonies, such as Louisiana. In terms of the Mi’kmaq and other aboriginal communities, notably the Maliseet and the Passamaquoddy, Britain sought to “establish a durable alliance between Britain and the
region’s aboriginal communities” (Wicken, 2008). The basis of such an alliance was Britain’s desire to dilute the alliance between the Mi’kmaq and France in periods of conflict.

The first historical juncture which served to establish distinct territorial governance in the region came in 1758 with the establishment of representative government in Nova Scotia. From a governance perspective, representative government interlinked with Britain’s desire for political control of the territory and underscored its wish to avoid further conflict. Furthermore, Britain was keen to instill a permanent settlement of British subjects in Nova Scotia and surmised that it would not be possible to establish permanent settlement without the promise of an elected assembly. The correspondence from the Lords Committee for Trade and Plantations to Governor Charles Lawrence of Nova Scotia in July 1756 underscored this fact: “we are fully convinced of the expediency of this measure and are satisfied that until it be done, this infant colony cannot said to be upon a permanent and lasting establishment” (Lords Committee for Trade and Plantations, 1756). The first Nova Scotia House of Assembly met on Monday 2 October 1758.

The imperial rationale for political institutions in Nova Scotia was central in formulating the antecedent conditions for the further settlement and colonisation of the Maritime region. In representative government, Britain had determined a political model and trajectory in which further colonisation could occur and, in articulating its concern to avoid further conflict, had established a political basis for colonisation. Representative government was a form of governance that afforded a local assembly but the executive power and decision-making capacity rested solely with the imperial governor. The governor would appoint an executive council which would be responsible to him and not the public or the assembly. Representative government was grounded in imperial interest and was mandated by imperial decision-making. In 1763, present day PEI was annexed from Nova Scotia to become a separate colony within the Empire.

Isle St Jean was colonised in 1763 against a context of the need for the subordination of the North American colonies and a necessity for permanent aristocratic presence and landed interest in the region (Bumsted, 1987: 46). The settlement of the island again reflected Britain’s twin desires to prevent further conflict and shape a permanent British settlement. However, a further facet of imperial interest also emerged, namely the desire to populate the territory but limit imperial financial liability (Ibid: 45). This formed the basis for the
establishment of a land allocation system, whereby the island was divided into sixty seven land holdings and distributed by lottery to “persons who had claims to land on the ground of military or other public services” (Campbell, 1875: 24). Such persons would be responsible for “financing settlers during the critical first years, providing them with capital and much-needed supplies” (Bumsted, 1987: 50). The advent of this land system was a key shaper of the future political and territorial identity of the island. The failure of the proprietors to honour their obligations and the awarding of land to speculators whose intentions were to make money instead of fund settlement formed the basis of what became known as ‘absentee landlordism.’ The landlord question was the basis of politics on the island and was grounded in the resistance of settlers to the ownership of land by absent proprietors.

The creation of an assembly in 1773 was perhaps the most important factor in solidifying the island as a distinct polity. An assembly was an important symbol of colonial governance which reflected the entering of the island into the British Empire in its own right. Colonial governance, coupled with the land question and the isolated island territory, provided the context for the development of a distinct identity and brand of politics. The colonisation of the island was a result of imperial self interest, in terms of Britain’s desire for settlement but at no overall cost, personal self interest on the part of the absent proprietors, and the inaccessibility of the island, which made effective governance from the mainland difficult. The continued colonisation of the region however underscored that political change could be directly linked to the vulnerability of that part of North America to external occurrences that were outside their sphere of influence. The initial momentum for further colonisation did not emanate internally, within either the Empire or the existing colonies, but as a direct result of the American Revolution.

The American Revolution (the revolution) was a catalyst for political change at this time for four key reasons. First, it changed the demographics of the region following the migration of 30,000 Loyalist refugees to Nova Scotia. The Loyalist elite agitated for separate colonial governance as a reward for their loyalty during the conflict. Second, the revolution tilted British colonial policy in North America towards a divide and rule strategy in order to prevent further rebellion. Third, the loss of the thirteen colonies, which followed after the revolution, increased the economic and strategic importance of the British North American colonies and shaped economic competition based on colonial boundaries. Fourth, the
revolution established a strong and hostile independent nation on the doorstep of Nova Scotia. The antipathy between Britain and the US in the years following the revolution was important in shaping preferences towards further change in colonial governance within the Maritime region. The US would become both a direct and indirect source of tension and hostility that would precipitate questions of political change up until the point of Confederation in 1867.

The revolution precipitated the further colonisation of the Maritime region. In 1784, two colonies were established from the existing territory of Nova Scotia; New Brunswick and Cape Breton Island. The establishment of New Brunswick and Cape Breton reflected the post-Revolution political context. The Loyalists who had migrated to Nova Scotia agitated as a way to revitalise their own sense of self and reinforce the need for a distinct political space within their new land (Fellows, 1971: 94). However, despite the internal agitation, further colonisation was based more on Britain’s opinion that the revolution reflected the failure of colonial self-government in the thirteen colonies.

For J.M Bumsted, the revolution was surmised to be a product of a “cumulative lack of calculation on the colonial front” because of the way the colonies were able to grow and populate organically within different systems of self-government (Bumsted, 1987: 48). The colonisation of Nova Scotia and St John’s Island was altogether more regulated. Despite the establishment of local assemblies, effective power remained with the governor and appointed executive council (Dupont, 2000: 72). Political control was at the centre of this form of governance. It was surmised that to keep the region within the Empire it should be fragmented into separate colonial entities. This would in turn discourage unity and undermine a revolt against imperial rule. Beck has described this policy as one of ‘Divide et Impera’ (Divide and Rule) (Beck, 1969: 2). By 1784 there were four colonies within the Maritime region; St John’s Island, New Brunswick, Cape Breton Island and a truncated Nova Scotia (see Figure 4.2).
The initial colonisation of Nova Scotia provided the model for which subsequent colonial development in BNA would be shaped. The necessity of political institutions was central to the colonisation process and represented the point at which colonisation could not be reversed. This was demonstrated in the case of Cape Breton Island. Unlike the other three colonies, Cape Breton was granted, but never received, an elected assembly upon its colonisation because the “island’s administrators considered it could not draw upon sufficient financial resources or educated electors” (Morgan, 2000). The colony was therefore governed directly by a lieutenant-governor and appointed council. In 1820 Britain decreed that Cape Breton be re-annexed as a county of Nova Scotia. This underscored the importance of political institutions in maintaining separate colonial governance.

Without an assembly Britain retained absolute sovereignty over the territory which it could duly exercise because it had conferred no power upon the population. Britain was thus able to re-amalgamate Cape Breton back into Nova Scotia. Without political institutions, the
Cape Breton did not develop the institutional capacity to defend its territorial interests (Brown, 1869: 448). The absence of an elected assembly meant that the antecedent conditions facilitated the elimination of colonial governance, something which was not considered to be as achievable in the case of St John’s Island. William Whitelaw argued that St John’s Island was “never quite free from the possibility that it would be re-annexed back into the mainland territory. Whilst the colonial status’ of Cape Breton and St John’s Island were considered to be the least satisfactory, and most likely to be altered, the existence of an assembly in the latter gave less reason for that island’s re-absorption into Nova Scotia than was the case with the former” (Whitelaw, 1934: 67, 65).

This quote underscores the importance of political institutions in the maintenance of colonial status. With political institutions in place it undermined the available options for the future political restructuring of the region. Nevertheless, the three colonies remained subordinate to the will of Britain and its decisions regarding the future composition of its colonies in North America. Ann Gorman Condon, for example, has argued that although representative government awarded some local autonomy, it ensured that Britain would ultimately determine the extent of change in North America (Condon, 1994: 187). The revolution, however, had underscored the danger in ignoring local political will, particularly when manifested in democratic political institutions. Cape Breton, without an assembly, was never fully separated from the governance structures of Nova Scotia. Structurally, this aided the practicality of re-annexation. From a political perspective, it undermined the coherent articulation and mobilisation of popular opinion, and weakened structured opposition to re-annexation. Moreover, opposition to re-annexation after the event had to be conducted from within the political institutions of Nova Scotia. The case of Cape Breton gives credence to the identification of representative government as the point at which the antecedent conditions for the future political trajectory of the Maritime region were embedded.

*The First Political Union Proposal*

Some years prior to the re-annexation of Cape Breton, a proposal emerged for the complete amalgamation of the four Maritime colonies into a single political entity within the British Empire. In 1806, just twenty-two years after the annexation of New Brunswick and Cape Breton from Nova Scotia, the Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, Richard John Uniacke, in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, William Windham,
advocated the establishment of two new British colonies in North America comprised of the six existing colonies (Uniacke, 1806: 49-50). Under the proposal, the four Maritime colonies would comprise a single colony, as would the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada. The significance of Uniacke’s political union proposal was the way it underscored the importance of political institutions in the colonies and provided an insight into the types of causes that may initiate the consideration of a political union. The context in which Uniacke proposed a political union was one of personal opinion with regard to the operation of legislative democracy in the colonies and fear at the growing dominance of the US. Taken together he surmised that these factors posed a clear threat to the four colonies remaining as colonies of Britain.

Uniacke argued that “to make an efficient government, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton should be reunited to Nova Scotia and the whole placed under one government and one legislature. We should soon find a people under the dominion of Great Britain who would rival the Americans and secure to England all the advantages resulting from their trade without the danger of having it deranged when either the interests or the hostility of the American government may dispose it to change or impede the freedom of intercourse by Britain” (Ibid: 52). His motivation for proposing a political union can be determined from two key perspectives: first, it was a way for the colonies to become more economically self-sufficient and attenuate their reliance on the US. Brian Cuthbertson argued that Uniacke’s proposals were influenced primarily by Anti-Americanism and the French Revolution (Cuthbertson, 2009). In uniting the colonies together and creating British colonies of comparable economic importance it could provide a bulwark against the influence of the US and the danger of republicanism. Second, the proposal reflected Uniacke’s desire for the restoration of Nova Scotia’s ancient boundaries. He was opposed to the further colonisation of Nova Scotia in 1784 and he held a strong belief that Nova Scotia was “key to British interests in North America” (Ibid).

A political union was proposed based on clear threats to the political and economic status quo by factors and conditions beyond the control of the four colonies. From a broader perspective, the proposal was a case of capacity building. It envisaged that by uniting into a single political and territorial entity, the colonies could counteract such threats, engineer a greater level of economic prosperity and ensure the continuation of the constitutional status
quo; that is the colonies remaining constituent units of the British Empire. Uniacke was clearly ahead of his time in what he proposed and the proposal would have been well received in the other colonies. In New Brunswick for example, the Loyalist figures of the 1780s were still alive and maintained the capacity to defend their territorial interests. Edward Winslow, a key Loyalist leader, had already accused Uniacke of disloyalty for opposing a separate Loyalist colony in 1784 (Winslow, 1784). He also demonstrated the complex nature of the political system in which the colonies existed; that is they were subordinate units of a wider Empire. Whitelaw attributed this to the reluctance of Britain to accede to calls for political restructuring to the instability of the Napoleonic era (Whitelaw, 1934: 65). From an internal perspective however, the proposal demonstrated that questions of political change can be linked to discernible political and economic threats that have the potential to undermine and destabilise the existing trajectory. A union was a means to protect the colonies against the ensuing threats and the influence of republicanism. It would also provide greater scope for the region’s economic and political maturation as a key component of the Empire.

4.2 Institutional Reproduction

Responsible Government

Responsible government was perhaps the most important source of institutional reproduction. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were awarded responsible government in 1848. PEI followed in 1851. This was the point at which the principle of self-governance was entrenched and the three Maritime colonies became quasi-autonomous entities. Responsible government was significant for three reasons; first, it reduced the role of imperial governance by requiring the governors to accede to the will of an elected colonial executive. This gave each colony its own distinct political arena in which to initiate local policies. Second, it introduced local political elites whose role it was to govern in the interest of the colonial population. Third, it was accompanied by a British policy which mandated that no changes could be made to the political composition of the region without the consent of the local political elites. This removed the threat of unilateral re-annexation or amalgamation by Britain and empowered the local political elites as the core defenders of the separate political institutions. Responsible government was significant because it gave local colonial elites the infrastructural capacity to govern their societies and the institutional capacity to defend their interests.
The operation of responsible government in comparison to representative government is demonstrated in Figure 4.3. For Alfred Cobban, responsible government was the point at which the Maritime colonies became political nations in the model of Great Britain (Cobban: 1969: 158). In Careless’ words, “nothing more than the extension of the British cabinet system to the realm of colonial government: the ministry or cabinet governed the country as a body responsible to parliament and could only rule as long as it had the support of a majority in parliament” (Careless, 1964: 188).

**Figure 4.3: The Meaning of Responsible Government**

![Diagram of Responsible Government]

Under responsible government, local political leaders were imbued with the “legislative and executive independence to regulate their affairs almost wholly by the local public opinion of the day” (Jenks, 1918: 70). The colonial governments enjoyed “unfettered control over the affairs of their communities” (Ibid: 64). Responsible government symbolised that the colonies were “not dependencies to be exploited for the benefit of the central authority but voluntary partners in a great Imperial commonwealth” (Ibid: 59-60). Furthermore, this form of
government shaped the three colonies into distinctive political communities in which political institutions provided the foundation for collective state identities. Under responsible government the local political leaders acquired the institutional capacity to pursue their own economic and political interests and, most importantly, protect and enhance the political status quo. This was demonstrated in the early 1860s when questions of consolidation became prevalent within BNA. The Maritimes, as a result of responsible government, had the institutional capacity to defend their territorial and political interests.

4.3. Confederation

The consolidation question of the 1860s opened up a complex web of constitutional options. At this time, there was broad consensus as to the necessity of consolidation but there was little consensus as to which form consolidation should take. The forces at play during this time encompassed three distinct strands of consolidation; continent-wide union, regional union and imperial union. Within the continent-wide strand there was a broader question of federal union vs. unitary union. This latter component of the debate was arguably the most important because it concerned the future of the existing colonies as distinct territorial entities. The consolidation debate ended with Confederation in 1867; however the key question of the balance of power within a new political entity would endure and shape the nature of the federation for the next century. This period can offer key insights into path dependence theory and the core empirical timeframe of this thesis because it brings to the fore the sense that for structural change to be considered, external and internal factors must come into play.

By the 1860s, questions of consolidation and structural change clearly on the political agenda in BNA. The Durham Report (DR) of 1839, commissioned to remedy the 1837-8 rebellions in the Canadas led, through the 1840 Act of Union, to the reconfiguration of Upper and Lower Canada into a single constitutional entity, the Province of Canada. The significance of the DR was the way in which it brought to the fore the notion that structural change could act as a remedy to internal tensions. Ged Martin has argued that the DR and the Act of Union directly influenced consolidation in the 1860s because they generated a mythology that consolidation could remedy internal problems within BNA: “after the Canadian problems [the report] dealt with had been resolved it began to be looked back on as a landmark, and one which might contain the key to other imperial riddles” (Martin, 1972: 74). For P.B. Waite, consolidation appeared in fits and starts following the DR: “the cause of
its appearance was almost always some pressing difficulty for which Confederation could be a remedy. In 1839 it was the political crisis, in 1849 the commercial crisis, and in 1856 it was the political difficulties already discernible in the Canadian union” (Waite, 1964: 35-36). This model can be termed the ‘crisis explanation,’ whereby consolidation in BNA became salient when the region was faced with internal and/or external crises.

The Crisis Explanation

For C.P Stacey, questions of consolidation were the product of an ‘atmosphere of crisis’ shaped by events outside of BNA and beyond the control of the colonies: “[consolidation was a response to] the violence of external forces and pressures that bore upon the Canadian situation. It is evident that the atmosphere of the 1860s – an atmosphere dominated by foreign dangers and domestic preparations to meet them – goes far to explain the success of Confederation” (Stacey, 1967: 73). The context shaped by the American Civil War (ACW) was surmised to be a key shaper of this perspective: “it was an atmosphere of anxiety, danger, dominated by the fear of war with a tremendous neighbour, by constant threats of lawless border aggression, and by the stir of military preparation” (Ibid: 78).

The feared consequence of the ACW was the annexation of British North America to the US. Annexation was a stated objective of some American politicians during the 1860s. For example, William Seward, American Secretary of State 1861-1869, argued that the annexation of BNA had a sense of inevitability due to the commercial dependence of the colonies on the US and the ability of the American government to more effectively fund their economic objectives, such as railway construction and western expansion (Glen, 1903: 2). For Donald Creighton however, whilst the ACW produced “a vague, brooding apprehension of trouble with the US, [consolidation was] planned and considered largely apart from the dangerous turmoil to the south” (Creighton, 1964: 91). Similarly, Martin argued that the crisis explanation is flawed because it portrays the Maritimes as subordinates who were compelled into a union at the behest of the Province of Canada and Britain: “the textbook explanation does itself to some extent qualify the adulation due to the ‘Fathers’ [of Confederation] by asserting that Confederation was in fact the logical answer to the question of the political destiny of the northern half of the North American continent, since it was the only solution to deadlock [in the Province of Canada] and would simultaneously provide for westward expansion, the inter-colonial railway and defence against the US” (Martin, 1991). That said
however, there does appear to be some credence in the ‘crisis’ assertion because it interlinked with an internal economic context.

J.M.S Careless termed this economic context the ‘Canadian commercial revolution,’ which served to “lay the basis for uniting the provinces. And the dangers that also developed, in truth, demanded a union, forcing it sooner than it might otherwise have come” (Careless, 1963: 207). This economic context affected the nature and scope of internal and external relationships within BNA and would have key implications for the consolidation debate. It should be noted that the term ‘debate’ is used instead of ‘debates’ because the question of consolidation was essentially a single debate, primarily about Confederation. The other forms of union militated out from Confederation and were advocated primarily to block its passage. The implication is that consolidation was recognised as necessary but the competing interests of the individual colonies and political leaders complicated the debate and gave rise to alternative political structures.

**Evolving Economic Context**

Whilst there is disagreement within the literature over whether the threat of invasion and/or annexation during the ACW shaped questions of consolidation, it did highlight the importance of railway construction, particularly for the Maritime colonies. The notion of an inter-colonial railway (ICR) from the Maritime colonies to Canada had its origins in the 1840s. The necessity of an ICR was highlighted by the DR, which stressed the military need of such a scheme and tellingly viewed it as a prerequisite for the political union of BNA (Longley, 1910: 118). Durham noted that the alienation which existed between the British North American colonies was caused largely by the lack of overland communication and fragmented political system: “they stand to one another in the position of foreign states, and of foreign states without diplomatic relations. The colonies have no common centre, except in the Colonial Office. The completion of satisfactory communication between Halifax and Quebec would produce relations between these provinces and would render a general union absolutely necessary” (Durham, 1839: 317-318).

According to Savoie the lack of transportation within BNA meant that the Maritimes developed apart from the Province of Canada to the west (Savoie, 2006: 20). Only New Brunswick was joined by land to Canada but the boundary ran through “wild and difficult
terrain,” which served to “almost completely shut off” the colony, and the Maritime region, by land to its western neighbours (Whitelaw, 1934: 14). The main water route, the Saint Lawrence River, was equally problematic because it would freeze solid during the winter making transportation impossible. This exacerbated questions of an ICR, both in terms of economic development and defence. However, the antipathy between the Maritimes and Canada undermined the achievement of an ICR because it necessitated negotiation over the allocation of cost which in turn brought out alternative forms of union.

The territorial composition of BNA was key to shaping the nature of the consolidation debate by ensuring that it was ‘interest based.’ For the Maritime colonies, their highly developed nature meant that they had the necessary institutional capacity to ensure that the debate was a negotiated process which addressed their individual economic and political interests. For Nova Scotia and New Brunswick an ICR was the prerequisite for any form of consolidation. For PEI, consolidation offered an opportunity to free itself from the absentee landlordism. That said, despite the political and economic context of this period, consolidation of any form was by no means a certainty; for consolidation to occur it required the agreement of the individual colonies and Britain.

The perceived benefit of consolidation was that an ICR could be undertaken at little direct cost because the associated construction and debt servicing costs would be assumed by the new central government (Waite, 1964: 66). An ICR became a matter of “extreme urgency” in the 1860s as a result of the changing economic context in BNA and the wider Empire and the volatile military situation in the US (Creighton, 1964: 10). The incremental removal of the preference for colonial goods in the British market, for example the repeal of the British Corn Laws in 1846, “destroyed the privileged market in Britain for Canadian flour and grain. The dependent British American colonies found themselves flung suddenly out of the old sheltered system of empire trade into the cold, hard realm of world trade, where they were ill-equipped to compete” (Careless, 1963: 208). The end of the colonial preference provided the impetus for later questions of annexation because it loosened the economic link to Britain and turned the colonies towards the US.

The Reciprocity Treaty (the treaty), signed in 1854, provided for an increase in commerce between the British colonies and the US. As Table 4.1 demonstrates, the level of commerce between the Maritimes and the US steadily increased with the advent of the treaty,
reaching its highest levels in 1865 and 1866. The literature however presents different interpretations of the economic value of the treaty. Laurence Officer and Laurence Smith for example challenge what they see as the ‘classic and generally accepted view,’ articulated by scholars such as S.A. Saunders, that the treaty provided extensive economic benefits for BNA (Saunders, 1936: 41). For Officer and Smith however, the treaty did not provide an economic boon because the increase in imports that occurred during the tenure of the treaty was offset by decreases in exports to other markets such as Britain (Officer and Smith, 1968: 599). Furthermore, they argued that the treaty did not bring distress. Waite argued that when the treaty was abrogated in 1866, it caused concern in the Maritimes because it threatened to “undermine their commercial future” (Waite, 1964: 158). Robert Ankli on the other hand argued that the treaty did not alter the ‘real’ underlying forces in the BNA economy because, although exports increased while imports remained consistent, many individual commodities were omitted from the reciprocity model (Ankli, 1971: 15).

Table 4.1. Imports from and Exports to the United States, 1853-66, as a percentage of those of 1853 (Maritime Colonies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Imports from United States (Percent)</th>
<th>Exports to United States (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>101.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>152.2</td>
<td>149.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>140.6</td>
<td>144.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1857</td>
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<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>115.8</td>
<td>149.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>127.8</td>
<td>183.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>135.9</td>
<td>182.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>124.8</td>
<td>124.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>123.5</td>
<td>138.4</td>
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<td>1863</td>
<td>153.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>159.1</td>
<td>195.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>154.9</td>
<td>284.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>161.8</td>
<td>248.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: S.A Saunders, 1936: 41.*

In spite of questions over the economic impact of the treaty, its political value was perhaps more important. This underpinned the desire to ensure the treaty continued. When the treaty was negotiated by Governor-General Lord Elgin, there was concern that the economic and political context of BNA threatened its viability as a constituent unit of the British Empire: “a very serious economic disturbance was crippling the whole trade of the country, and made
some persons believe for a short time that independence, or annexation to the neighbouring republic [US], was, preferable to continued connection with a country [Britain] which so grudgingly conceded political rights to the colony, and so ruthlessly overturned the commercial system on which the province had been so long dependent [Mercantilism]” (Bourinot, 1903: 128). Ankli argued that the British agreed to reciprocity to keep the colonies in the Empire (Ankli, 1971: 2).

When the treaty was abrogated concerns over annexation re-emerged: “efforts made to forestall the abrogation of the treaty were a good indication of the concern of all British North Americans for their commercial future; and concern for their political future was an inescapable concomitant” (Waite, 1964: 158). Furthermore, this concern was heightened because the end of the treaty intersected with the ACW. For Waite, the economic and military context at this time underscored the much reduced value of the colonies to Britain: “what use a colony, when neither a source nor a market? Colonies were not intrinsically valuable. They were certainly inconvenient to administer, and what was worse, they were often expensive. In any case their value could be calculated in economic terms” (Ibid: 18). The ACW meant that at a time when the colonies’ value was decreasing their reliance on the Empire was increasing, especially in terms of defence: “no doubt some [colonies] were valuable for imperial defence; but some were of no value at all, and others were a positive danger. After the outbreak of the ACW the British North American colonies were in this last unhappy position” (Ibid).

The interconnectivity of the consolidation question with that of an ICR was first demonstrated in 1862 when Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Canada came together to negotiate the construction of the scheme. Beck argued that such negotiations were always likely to be fraught because there existed, particularly in Nova Scotia, “a strong feeling of alienation from Canada” (Beck, 1969: 12). Driving this alienation was its outward orientation and loyalty to Britain. As will be outlined, this alienation and loyalty was key in facilitating not just opposition to consolidation with Canada but increasing the salience of regional and imperial unions. Beck argued that the failure of the ICR meant that “for the first time a Maritime Union had the emotional fervour to sustain it” (Ibid: 12). This fervour however was not based on the perceived value of a regional union but indignation towards Canada. As
such, colonial politicians suffered from a “weakness in the emotional dynamic” for the regional scheme (Ibid).

Moreover, there was a sense of inevitability about a continent-wide union, in spite of whether a regional union of the Maritimes was carried. Creighton argued that “a regional union of the Maritime colonies came to be seen as an important first step, highly desirable in itself, towards the larger scheme” (Creighton, 1964: 9). Essentially, a regional union was a fallback concept. It was interconnected with that of a continent-wide union, either as a precursor or an alternative in the event that agreement could not be reached with Canada. Whitelaw argued that a political union of the Maritime colonies “throughout its whole history had grown in the most intimate and complex relationships with the larger movement. Sometimes regarded as an important or essential preliminary to the larger union, frequently a necessary antidote to it, a political union of the Maritime provinces was seldom urged, or even thought of, except in some relation to Canadian expansion eastward. So much of the strength and character of the smaller movement was determined by these wider considerations that it seemed impossible to make an adequate examination of centripetal tendencies within the Maritime provinces except against the background of these larger forces” (Whitelaw, 1934: 6).

The important point, however, is that it was recognised in the Maritimes that a form of consolidation was necessary. There was just tension amongst the key colonial actors over which form consolidation should take. The key factor affecting this question was colonial interest. For the Maritimes, consolidation was “not the practical issue it was in Canada” but it provided appealing benefits (Waite, 1964: 52). It was analysed and measured based on the benefits that could be accrued for each colony. For example, New Brunswick provincial secretary, Samuel Leonard Tilley argued in 1864: “we won’t have this union unless you give us the railway – it is utterly impossible we could have either a political or commercial union without it. If arrangements can be satisfactorily completed, so that the interests of each province will be maintained, I can see no objection to a Confederation of the whole” (Whelan, 1865: 72-73). Similarly, William Alexander Henry, Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, argued: “it is impossible to over-estimate the commercial and social advantages of an ICR. Offering facilities on the one hand for the interchange of the natural products of each province, and
highly calculated to break down the barriers which perpetuate political and social distinctions. It is agreed to be one of the first objects of attention in the United Parliament” (Ibid: 136).

For PEI, although the political leaders were generally opposed to questions of consolidation owing to concerns of political autonomy, the opposition was relatively fluid when it was connected with absentee landlordism. Francis Bolger argued that “the aloofness of PEI [towards Confederation] resulted from a deep-seated provincialism and insularity. Its geographic isolation made the outlook of the people extremely insular and parochial and partially accounted for their lack of interest in broader movements such as Confederation” (Bolger, 1964: 16). George Coles, the first premier of PEI (1851-1854), argued that Confederation would “allow the land question to be settled on better terms. The federal government would buy the lands with federal money and give them to the local government to disburse” (Smith, 1967: 106). The case of PEI demonstrated the importance of self-government to questions of consolidation.

Responsible government was well established by the 1860s and the colonies were aware of the dangers of being overcome or subsumed within a broader political structure. The product of this was twofold; first, it undermined questions of a regional union. For example, Edward Barron Chandler, a New Brunswick politician, underscored the difficulty of achieving a union which would eliminate the existing political apparatus of the colony: “New Brunswick is as strongly in favour of a political union as Nova Scotia. It could probably be carried easier in Nova Scotia but [we] would have done our best in New Brunswick. Seat of government is a very difficult question in New Brunswick. If we were to agree to a political union it would do more harm instead of good. A political union may help us enter Confederation on better terms but that would not help us carry it” (Ibid). The desire to preserve existing political structures shaped the nature of the continent-wide union proposal in favour of a federal union (Confederation). This is an important aspect because it explains the territorial tensions between the provinces and federal government over the balance and source of power in the Canadian federation. In addition, it also provides a further scholarly perspective on the consolidation debate at this time.
**Alternative Explanation**

Martin has rejected the ‘crisis’ explanation of consolidation in favour of a more balanced focus between ideas and events. He argued that the debate around consolidation rested on the question of whether the idea [of consolidation] shaped the events or vice-versa (Martin, 2008: 333). The crisis explanation clearly insinuated the latter. The alternative explanation however stressed that “Confederation was by no means the only possible destiny for the British North American provinces in the 1860s” nor were the Maritimes coerced or even forced into Confederation by Canada and/or Britain, as implied by Creighton (Martin, 1991). Instead, consolidation was an idea long mooted whose time had come in the 1860s. Unlike the crisis explanation, Martin contended that continent-wide consolidation was a long established concept but had been given a greater urgency in the 1860s, owing to events such as the ACW. The debate was not caused by such events. In fact, Martin doubts whether the term ‘debate’ can even be applied to the question of consolidation in the 1860s: “insofar as there had been a ‘debate’ throughout the preceding decade, it was sparse on details and lacking consensus about structures. Above all, we should stress that even the small band of enthusiasts saw Confederation as a long-term development. This helped to elide the clashing ambitions of those who saw it as a step towards independence and those who dreamed of closer integration of the British Empire” (Martin, 2008: 332). This quote gets to the core of Martin’s argument. Confederation was not the default form of consolidation but one of a number of competing structures. Martin has argued that “attempts to portray smaller unions, the federation of the two Canada’s or the union of the Maritime provinces, as steps towards the wider Confederation proved illusory, and both became rival projects” (Ibid).

A continent-wide union was the favoured form of consolidation at this time both by the Maritime colonies and Britain. The salience of a regional union was measured only in relation to that of a continent-wide union. If such a union could not be achieved, then a regional union would be pursued instead. This shows however that the status quo was untenable and some form of consolidation was necessary. Even Martin recognised that the external context accelerated questions of consolidation: “time was speeding up by 1864, and it was almost certainly in the sense of impending crisis that we can identify the key role played the ACW” (Ibid). This perhaps underscores the role of the ACW as a key external shock in the consolidation narrative. Even opponents of a continent-wide union recognised the
necessity of some form of consolidation, yet in a different form to that of a continent-wide union.

*Imperial Union*

Nova Scotian politician Joseph Howe was an ardent opponent of a continent-wide union but proposed another form of union, an imperial union. For Howe, his overarching rationale was his loyalty to Britain and the Empire: “[I am] the son of loyalist – a North American – a true subject of the Queen, but one whose allegiance, to be perfect, must include every attribute of manhood, every privilege of the Empire” (Howe, 1855: 7). Furthermore, he harboured deep antipathy towards Canada and the US. An imperial union would bind the region further to Britain and not ‘entangle’ it with a distant, problematic colony to the west, open it up to annexation with the US or lead to independence. Howe argued that “from all these complications and difficulties [in the Province of Canada] the Maritime Provinces are now free and surely they may be pardoned if they have no desire to be mixed up with them. Their system is very simple. They govern themselves as completely as any other British Provinces, or any states of the American Union in perfect subordination to the Government and Parliament of the Empire” (Ibid). An imperial union was an opportunity for them to strengthen their status within Empire through legislative representation in the British parliament. Moreover, it offered clear economic benefits because it would give the Maritimes access to the Empire and European markets on the same level as Britain. Howe argued “will any North American with his heart in the right place, lightly entertain the idea of withdrawing from the enjoyment of free commercial intercourse with 260,000,000 human beings, from participation in the securities, the sources of pride, which such an Empire affords, to form, without cause, an isolated community of two millions and a half, or even ten millions, or to seek a dishonourable share of the advantages enjoyed by 30,000,000” (Ibid: 43, 44)?

It is clear that an imperial union was a bulwark against a continent-wide union which, in Howe’s mind, meant inevitable independence from Britain: “there is a position which North America may aspire to, and to my mind presents a solution to all the difficulties which attach to this question in other directions, I think the time is rapidly approaching when there must be infused into the British Empire an element of strength which has scarcely yet been regarded. North America must here long claim consolidation into the realm of England, as an
An imperial union was not a new structure but the strengthening of an existing one. It gave the colonies equity with Britain, provided new avenues for economic development and, most importantly, undermined questions of independence: “let us not cast about for new modes of political organisation, until we have tested the expansive powers and intellectual capabilities of what we have. Let us then demand with all respect, the full rights of citizenship in this great empire” (Ibid: 45). Philip Buckner captured the position of Howe towards consolidation: “[he was] wedded to British constitutional models because [he] feared it might lead to the disruption of the Empire” (Buckner, 1990: 107).

Opposition to a continent-wide union would manifest more widely than in the arguments put forward by Howe. In fact, Maritime politics became dominated by questions of union in the 1860s as the traditional party labels of Liberal and Conservative gave way to ‘Confederation’ and ‘Anti-Confederation.’ However, following the Charlottetown and Quebec conferences in the fall of 1864, the trajectory of the region was militating towards a continent-wide union. A regional union had been rejected at Charlottetown by the Maritime actors and the Quebec conference had produced seventy two resolutions – the Quebec resolutions - which laid out the framework and terms for a union of BNA. Perhaps most importantly at this time, Britain also indicated its wish to see a union carried. In a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor’s of each colony on 24 June 1865, the Secretary of State of the Colonies, Edward Cardwell, said “you will express the strong and deliberate opinion of Her Majesty’s Government that it is an object much to be desired that all the British North American Colonies should agree to unite in one Government” (Cardwell, 1865) J.K Chapman argued that, from Britain’s perspective, the resolutions adequately addressed questions of defence and self-sufficiency: “the Quebec resolutions would provide the colonies with the means to undertake their own defence and relieve the mother country of an onerous financial burden” (Chapman, 1964: 29).

Critical Juncture: Charlottetown Conference 1864

Despite the fervent opposition of figures such as Howe, the trajectory and end point of the debate had already been set at the Charlottetown Conference of 1-9 September 1864. In terms of path dependence, this was the critical juncture in which change to an alternate trajectory was most viable. The Charlottetown Conference was called, at the request of Nova Scotia
premier Charles Tupper, to discuss a regional union of three colonies. However, the critical juncture was confirmed when the Province of Canada sought to attend the conference in order to present its own plan for a union, a continent-wide union. There is some debate within the literature as to whether the Charlottetown Conference would have gone ahead without the input of Canada. Waite for example argued “[it was] by sheer accident, by fortuitous circumstances, on a question that had nothing to do with the Maritimes, a Maritime union conference suddenly became imperatively necessary. The Canadians had asked to come to it. If the Canadians were going to come to a Maritime Union conference, then there had to be a conference for them to come to” (Waite, 1964: 60). For Careless, “Maritime Union was destined never to be achieved. It was swallowed up in the plan for a greater union. Representatives of the Canadian Coalition, seizing the moment when Maritime delegates were meeting to consider new ties, swept down on their conference at Charlottetown, and captured it for the Canadian project of general federation” (Careless, 1963: 243).

This narrative presented by Careless has been contested by scholars such as Martin but his assertion that a union was “never to be achieved” was accurate. Canadian attendance at the conference presented the Maritimes with a clear choice, a regional political union of the three colonies or a continent-wide union, potentially involving all colonies of BNA. At this conference, the colonial leaders were vested with the power in which to determine the shape of change as a response to the external challenges and internal objectives of each colony. The importance of the Charlottetown Conference was that it was a juncture in which change was considered and a path chosen, a continent-wide union. The subsequent conference in October 1864, the Quebec conference, was key because it determined the nature of that union. However, Charlottetown was the most important because it embedded a continent-wide union as the preferred structure. It was here that a regional union was a viable concept but ultimately rejected for the alternative scheme.

In the Maritimes, however, despite the decision taken at Charlottetown in September 1864, and in spite of a commitment to construct an ICR, opposition to a continent-wide union remained prominent. For example, Anti-Confederate William Annand of Nova Scotia sought to cooperate with Anti-Confederates in New Brunswick. As Waite outlined, “the aim was that Anti-Confederates in the two [colonies] should act together, adopt a common policy, and support each other” (Waite, 1964: 226). The nature and scope of the opposition however is a
matter of contention. The ideological perspective for example, reflected by scholars such as Peter Smith, contends that Confederation was “not the product of a purely pragmatic exercise [but] ideological origins [which] may be traced to eighteenth and nineteenth-century British, American and French political culture” (Smith, 1987: 3). The opposition to continent-wide union in the Maritimes was surmised to reflect the ‘inherent conservatism’ of a region “content with the status quo that was dragged kicking and screaming into Confederation” (Buckner, 1990: 86). It has been demonstrated in the case of Howe, however, that the practical aspect did have a bearing on the outcome because even opponents of a continent-wide union advocated some form of consolidation.

Buckner argued that the ideological argument “trivialised the very real and substantive objections which many Maritimers had to the kind of union that they were eventually forced to accept” (Ibid). Buckner’s perspective on consolidation however was that opposition was directed not at the structure but at the terms of a continent-wide union: “only a minority of the Maritime anti-Confederates appear to have denied the need for some kind of union, but since the Maritimers were not, like the Canadians, trying simultaneously to get out one union while creating another, they were less convinced of the merits of the Quebec Resolutions” (Ibid: 108). Chester Martin argued that the opposition to Confederation in the Maritimes was “far too general to be the result of personalities or sheer parochialism” (Martin, 1955: 349). For Waite, the opposition to Confederation was grounded in a “natural concern with Maritime interests in Confederation. Whether the federal system was good or bad; whether the Maritimes would be bled white by tariffs and taxation determined elsewhere; or whether, for example, Nova Scotia, a careful man doing a snug business, should be tempted into partnership with a ‘wild speculator’ like Canada” (Waite, 1963: iii).

In many ways the broad opposition reflected the antipathy of the Maritime actors towards Canada and the perceived “ideological goals of those who drafted the resolutions” (Buckner, 1990: 108). At the core of this antipathy was the nature of the union; that is whether it would be a centralised (unitary) or decentralised (federal) union. To clarify, Confederation was the widely applied term for a continent-wide union but it did not get to the basis of the intense debate about what Confederation actually meant. Was it a federal union as in the US, where sovereignty was divided between a central and numerous sub-state governments? Was it a legislative or unitary union, where power was concentrated solely at
the centre? Or did it mean something else, for example the retention of the colonial political structures which were subordinate to a central authority?

**Federal vs. Unitary Union**

The federal vs. unitary question was one very much shaped by the internal and external context of the era. The American experience with federalism would influence arguments in favour of a centralised structure and intersected with the views of those who wanted a British model. John A. MacDonald for example argued in favour of a unitary union because it would prevent the kind of conflict seen in the US during the ACW. For MacDonald the ‘fatal error’ was state sovereignty. Although, there was considerable ambiguity in the language used by the Fathers of Confederation as to what federalism actually meant: George Brown for example said, “the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative, but in truth the scheme now before us has all the advantages of a legislative and federal one as well” (Brown, 1865). MacDonald on the other hand argued, “the true principle of Confederation lies in giving to the general government all the principles and powers of sovereignty, and in the provision that the subordinate or individual states should have no powers but those expressly bestowed upon them. We should thus have a powerful central government, a powerful central legislature, and a powerful decentralised system of minor legislatures for local purposes” (Martin, 2008: 326).

Marc Chevrier argued that federalism for MacDonald and Brown meant ‘quasi-federalism.’ The colonial legislatures would be retained but occupy a subordinate status to the central government (Chevrier, 2005: 64). This was supported by Martin who argued that “at least two other notional forms of union can be identified: one, an evolving quasi-federation; the other, a legislative union with federal features (Martin, 1986: 62). Under the quasi-federal scheme the existing colonies would remain intact but over time “real authority would gradually and unobtrusively transfer to [an] inter-colonial body which would develop into a full federal authority.” Martin argued that this was a way of introducing federalism by stealth (Ibid: 63). The second scheme proposed a colonial federal system in which the existing colonial legislatures would act as a ‘mezzanine tier’ under an overarching supervising imperial government. This proposal was close to that of Howe, in that it favoured an imperial as opposed to a colonial centred solution (Ibid). For the Maritimes and Canada East however federalism meant something different. It meant “the retention and preservation of the existing
local governments and legislatures with the cumbrous addition of a central parliament” (Chapman, 1964: 28). For some opponents, “Confederation would create a monster, an extraordinarily powerful and distant national government, highly centralised federal union in which Maritimers would have limited influence” (Buckner, 1990: 107). This question of federal vs. unitary union is important because it was carried over into Confederation. MacDonald surmised that once the union was established the provinces could be subordinated to the will of the federal government. This would have greater credence post-Confederation because it would come to shape MacDonald’s perceptions towards the operation of federalism at a practical level. His quasi-federalist stance meant that “the provinces were not to be legislated out of existence but the power given to the federal government through the British North America Act (BNA Act) would be utilised to secure recognition by the provinces that their proper status was one of subordination” (Rogers, 1933: 10). As will be shown in Chapter 5, the tension between MacDonald’s perspective and that of the provinces provided the genesis for so-called ‘provincial rights.’

**Confederation: Rupture or Continuation and Implications for Path Dependence**

This chapter has argued that 1864 was the key point in terms of the consolidation question because it was the point at which a federal union became the preferred structure for the Maritime colonies. Yet, it has also been shown that further dates were important in carving out this trajectory for the Maritimes. 1758 demonstrated the willingness of Britain to afford some degree of local autonomy, whilst the conclusion of the American Revolution in 1783 accelerated the colonisation of the region. 1848 and 1851 were important because the advent of responsible government in the Maritimes embedded the colonies as self-governing entities. Responsible government itself was the product of important occurrences, the rebellions in 1837-8 and the Durham Report in 1839, which reinforced to Britain the need for a fresh approach to governance in BNA. In his 1999 lecture *A Play in Two Acts?* Martin sought to move the focus of Canadian history away from what he saw as “the symbolic role of 1867” to consider earlier points in time as key shapers of the Canadian narrative (Martin, 1999: 17). For this thesis, however, 1867 was a key date because it was the point at which the territorial and political trajectory of the Maritime region became constitutionally entrenched within Canada. From this point on, it could not be altered unless it had the agreement of the provinces themselves. That said, two questions remain unanswered; what are the implications
of the Confederation narrative for the analysis of path dependence and structural change? Was Confederation a form of rupture from the established constitutional order or the continuation of the order in a reconfigured political structure?

Confederation generated the potential for conflict “between those who saw union as a step towards independence and those who sought reinforcement of the imperial link” (Martin, 2008: 311). This latter aspect typified the stance of Howe but the common thread of the various consolidation schemes was ambition. By the 1860s, “colonial politicians were tiring of their ‘provincial cages.’ They wanted something more; they wanted greater respect from other nations and to be elevated in the eyes of the mother country” (Smith, 1987: 26). Smith argued that ambition was a key driver of support for consolidation. That said, there was a clear tension between the type of ambition figures such as MacDonald and Howe wanted to achieve.

For Howe, consolidation was about strengthening the structural, political and economic connection to the Empire. For MacDonald, it was about state-building. It would provide a “larger stage for the colonists, an empire and nation of their own” (Smith, 1987: 26). Therefore, whilst Howe was arguing for the strengthening of an existing identity within an existing constitutional paradigm, the Empire, MacDonald was seeking to formulate a new identity within BNA through a new political and economic structure. The advent of Confederation was not necessarily a question of independence from Britain, although it was clearly on a trajectory towards that end, but the opportunity to construct an economic rival to the US, which adhered to British principles of parliamentary governance. MacDonald said his objective was to construct “a nation, a subordinate, but still a powerful people to stand by Britain in peace or in war…..when this union takes place we shall be at the outset no inconsiderable people. And, when by means of [a] a rapid increase in population – we become a nation of eight or nine millions of inhabitants, our alliance will one worth of being sought by the great nations of earth” (Parkin, 1908: 100).

The highly developed nature of the individual colonies framed the consolidation debate around competing economic and political interests. The genesis for consolidation was neither internal nor external but a balance of the two. There was evidently an element of external crisis and change within established exogenous relationships which triggered and
exacerbated questions of consolidation. However, this external context militated with internal political and economic interest. For the Maritimes, the desire for consolidation was driven by economic considerations, such as railway construction. The question of personal political ambition is also interesting. It should be noted that only one of the Charlottetown Conference delegates from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Edward Barron Chandler, did not seek a career in federal institutions after Confederation (Swift, 2000). Crucially, the existing structural composition meant that the colonial actors were imbued with the necessary capacity to protect and further their interests within the consolidation process. A regional union was not a likely form of consolidation during the 1860s because of the highly developed nature of the colonies as individual political units. The internal and external contexts shaped the critical juncture for change to occur but a federal union allowed the three colonies to consolidate but remain intact as distinct political units. Therefore, although it became reconfigured because it was subsumed within a larger political entity, the path of distinct territorial governance in the Maritime region was maintained.

Confederation reinforced the path chartered by responsible government because the colonies’ political autonomy and territorial boundaries were constitutionally protected within the new nation state. For example, Section 3 of the 1871 amendment to BNA Act stated: “the parliament of Canada may from time to time, with the consent of the legislature of any province of the said dominion, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of such province, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed to by the said legislature, and may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the effect and operation of any such increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation to any province affected thereby” (British North America Act, 1871). This amendment was important because it removed the prospect of unilateral territorial alteration by the centre. Furthermore, it empowered the provincial political leaders as the core agents of structural change. The amendment gave the provincial political leaders a constitutional role in shaping the territorial makeup of the country and, most important, the capacity to protect their territorial interests. That said however, and to quote the argument of Margaret Conrad, the core challenge for the Maritime colonies in Confederation was to adjust their existing institutional capacity to the working of the federal state (Conrad, 2009). This was a challenge because of the tension between the different visions of federalism. As the next chapter will outline, this context facilitated questions of a regional political union within Confederation.
4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an account of how the three Maritime provinces, as distinct territorial and political entities, came into being and were reinforced over time. The core reason for their establishment as individual colonies of the British Empire was the result of British imperial decision-making. The compartmentalisation and subsequent politicisation of the region occurred because it was consistent with imperial interests. The establishment of political institutions can be recognised as the formative occurrence which placed the Maritime colonies on a path of individual territorial governance. Responsible government, in particular, was a defining moment because it imbued the colonies with the infrastructural capacity to manage their own affairs and carve out separate societies. Most important was the way responsible government encouraged local political leaders who were vested by the political setting to advance and defend the interests of their colony.

The Cape Breton example demonstrates the importance of institutional reproduction as a mechanism of entrenchment in path dependent settings. The key source of reproduction in this early period was the awarding of political institutions. Without political institutions, the structural setting of Cape Breton could be returned to a previous trajectory – the island as a component of Nova Scotia. However, it was much more difficult to reverse the structural setting of the colonies that did receive political institutions. PEI for example, which was awarded political institutions upon compartmentalisation, was not re-annexed in the same way as Cape Breton. Confederation was another form of institutional reproduction; it was selected over a regional union at a time when external threats, such as the ACW, connected with an internal logic for structural change. However, as highly developed political entities the colonial actors had the capacity to negotiate a federal bargain for the new nation state. As Ziblatt has argued, actors with infrastructural capacity before the ‘national moment’ will have both “the motives and the means to defend their political positions by insisting upon being formally included as political actors in the new nation states” (Ziblatt, 2006: 111). Furthermore, Confederation empowered the political leaders as the core change agents of internal structural change because their territorial integrity and institutional capacity were constitutionally protected within the federal state.
The importance of this historical period is the way in which it provides a context as to the origin of the Maritimes as separate territorial and political entities. It also gives an idea as to how structural change becomes salient. In the 1860s, consolidation was advocated in response to conditions within the wider environment in which the Maritimes operated. The salience of structural change was shaped by external and internal factors. When the region was threatened by the implications of the American Civil War it highlighted the necessity of internal development. At this time it was railway construction for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and the abolition of absentee landlordism for PEI. Looking ahead to the post-Confederation period, the Maritimes faced new challenges and threats which served to embed a regional union as a post-Confederation concept. The 1860s is important as an indication of how and why structural change became necessary in the 1960s. It was a way to respond to external threats, particularly in terms of the pressure emanating from Quebec, and achieve internal objectives, notably economic self-sufficiency from the federal government.

The context of the Canadian federation was particularly important in embedding a political union in the Maritimes as a post-Confederation concept. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the constitutional trajectory of the Canadian federation was particularly susceptible to change as a result of a period crisis. Key events, such as the Provincial Rights Movement, the Great Depression and the Second World War brought to the fore tensions over the practical operation of federalism and whether it followed a centralised and decentralised trajectory. The perceived fluidity of federalism during such periods raises questions over whether the advent of the BNA Act in 1867 can be seen as the settled point of Confederation or whether key dates post-Confederation were more important in embedding the constitutional trajectory of Canada. The tensions over constitutional jurisdiction, particularly after the Second World War, brought to the fore a more assertive posture from the Maritimes as they sought to rebut the centralising tendencies of the federal government. A political union in the 1960s was a part of this context.
Chapter 5

The Swinging of a Pendulum: Canadian Federalism to the 1950s

This chapter provides a broad historical overview of the post-Confederation political context in Canada. It shows that the trajectory of the federation ‘swung’ back and forth between a centralised and decentralised trajectory (Black and Cairns, 1965: 29). The chapter focuses on key events such as the Provincial Rights Movement of the 1880s, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Second World War and the early beginnings of Quebec nationalism in the 1950s, in order to show how changes to the trajectory of the federation often occurred as a result of a period of crisis. This image of change as a result of a crisis is a key component of explanations of change within path dependence theory. The objective is to give a foundation to the political context in Canada up to the late 1950s as a basis for understanding the political union debate in the Maritimes in the 1960s.

Through an analysis of these key events, the chapter will show that jurisdictional tensions emerged between the provinces and the federal government as the latter sought to acquire the necessary levers to provide a coherent national response. Moreover, this tension precipitated a broader debate about whether the division of powers laid down in the 1867 British North America Act (BNA Act) was fit for purpose in the modern era. The chapter will also consider the question of province-building to show that change is not just driven exogenously or by crisis but also by internal logic. Through the establishment of the Atlantic Premiers Conference in 1956, the Maritimes were becoming more coordinated and strategic in addressing their economic underdevelopment and enunciating their grievances to the federal government. This phenomenon led W.S. MacNutt to surmise the advent of an ‘Atlantic Revolution’ (MacNutt, 1957: 11). The focus on Quebec nationalism is important because it outlines how the 1950s served as a precursor to the Quiet Revolution. The emergence of nationalism and later separatism in the 1960s was a key external shock which shaped engagement with a political union in the Maritimes. The chapter begins with an outline of regionalism in the Maritimes up to the 1930s to show how antipathy towards Confederation shaped the idea of a political union in the Maritimes as a post-Confederation concept.
Regionalism in the Maritimes 1867-1930

The political union question emerged in the Maritimes after Confederation in response to the economic and political operation of federalism. However, unlike the 1860s, structural change was not a practical necessity triggered by an external ‘crisis.’ Instead it was a concept of convenience driven by antipathy, grievance and interest. As such, support for a political union rested with individuals; there was no coalescence of opinion amongst the premiers or an active discussion. In short, there was no critical juncture.

The idea of a union emerged on at least three occasions within the mainstream political arena between 1867 and 1920. First, it was a mechanism for the prevention and then repeal of Confederation. For example, in 1866 and 1867, Joseph Howe attempted to lobby the British government to resist the passage of the *BNA Act*. When this failed he proposed two further options, an independent political union of the three provinces and a “readjustment of the terms upon which Nova Scotia was forced into Confederation” (Howe, 1868). The union concept also emerged in the 1880s whereby the Liberal government of Nova Scotia, led by premier William Stevens Fielding, like Howe, sought to establish a political union as a means of secession (Howell, 1979: 28). The third occasion was in 1908 when the Conservative premier of New Brunswick, John Douglas Hazen, advocated a political union in order to counteract the reduction of the Maritimes political representation in the House of Commons (Beck, 1969: 35).

There were also coordinated expressions of regionalism at this time which did not include proposals for a union. The Maritime Rights Movement (MRM) in the early 1920s, for example, was a regional protest movement which represented the accumulation of grievances against federal policy and the operation of federalism. For Ernest Forbes, the MRM was a reaction to “the relative decline in status and influence of the Maritimes” (Forbes, 1979: vii). The MRM was not however a movement of incumbent governments and had “no specific founder or leader” nor was it a vehicle for secession or internal structural change: it was a “spontaneous expression of the economic and social frustrations of the Maritime provinces” (Savoie, 2006: 36). For Colin Howell, in the early period of Confederation there existed a ‘regional ideology’ that reflected an amalgam of grievances towards Confederation: “a belief in a pre-Confederation Golden Age; a conviction that Confederation itself was responsible for
the region's decline; a feeling that the financial terms of Confederation needed revision; a belief that prevailing national policies were detrimental to the region; a feeling that closer commercial ties with the US were desirable; and a conviction that the Maritimes could prosper as independent states if left to their own” (Howell, 1979: 29). This ‘ideology’ was central in facilitating the development of a regional component to Maritime politics. The sense that the terms of Confederation and federal government economic policy were causing the economic decline of the Maritime region were particularly prevalent themes that shaped regionalism and the re-emergence of the political union concept until the 1960s.

This regional ideology was the overarching thread which connected early discussions of political union in the Maritimes. A union was not a “good in itself” but a means to achieve specific objectives and remedy grievances about the economic and political operation of federalism (Beck, 1969: 31). The MRM, and regionalism more broadly, was about “the region becoming an equal participant in the country’s economic development” (Savoie, 2006: 36). *The Royal Commission on Maritime Claims (The Duncan Commission)* was established by the federal government in 1926 to “find practicable remedies to Maritime problems and focus the discussion into a practicable programme” (Ibid: 158). This was considered a success for the MRM because at this time proposals for union and expressions of regionalism were not about internal economic or political change but lobbying the federal government for “the restoration of national policies that would allow the region to compete economically” (Bickerton, 1990: 332). Following the dissipation of the MRM, but for some erratic discussion in the print media, “regionalism went in to a dormancy that would last a quarter-century” (Ibid: 333). In 1924, the *St John Telegraph-Journal* aptly characterised the place of the union concept up to the 1960s: “the proposition [of a union] has never proceeded so far to warrant an estimate of its advantages and disadvantages” (*Globe and Mail*, 1924: 5). The analysis in this chapter and in Chapter 6 will explain why a union became salient in the 1960s. It will also analyse why the premiers, through the Maritime Union Study, sought to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of such a structure.
5.1. 1930s and 1940s: Emergent Crises

The Great Depression and the Second World War

The Great Depression (the Depression) of 1929-1939 was important because it created the economic and fiscal conditions which favoured the concentration of power to the centre. For the Maritimes, the Depression was a “watershed event” because it revealed the “uneven distribution of wealth in Canada” (Tomblin, 1995: 33). For Claude Bélanger, the Depression magnified existing structural problems within Canada and demonstrated economic and fiscal disparities between the provinces. As Canada became more industrialised it showed that the ability of the provinces to raise revenue was “inadequate to meet their obligations in a modern, industrialised world. What came to matter most to Canadians was their quality of life and their standard of living whose maintenance depended on provincial governments through their control of education, health, welfare, social assistance [and] labour. These services had to be provided by provincial governments that did not have the financial capacity to fully meet these increased responsibilities” (Bélanger, 2001). The question of provincial revenue also highlighted “considerable regional disparities” in the standard of public services between the richer and poorer provinces: “the poorer provinces could only provide services equal to those of the rest of the country by imposing a heavier than average fiscal burden on their taxpayers. The advent of the Great Depression magnified these two structural problems” (Ibid). Table 5.1 demonstrates how spending on relief, pensions and public welfare spiked sharply during the height of the Depression.
Table 5.1: Total Relief and Other Public Welfare Expenditures, Canada 1928-1937
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relief</th>
<th>Old Age Pensions</th>
<th>Other Public Welfare</th>
<th>Total Relief and Other Public Welfare</th>
<th>% of National Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>158.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>160.3</td>
<td>160.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>165.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1940: 162

The importance of this increased spending was that it brought a greater focus on the regional disparities within the country and called into question the ability of some provinces to meet their constitutional responsibilities. As Bélanger outlined, “the conditions which arose after 1930 soon demonstrated that provincial and municipal responsibility could not be rigorously insisted on in practice” (Ibid).

In the Maritimes, the national disparity question served to sideline the regional grievance of the agenda of the 1920s, as characterised by the MRM. The context of the Depression strengthened the resolve of the federal government not to respond to the claims of the Maritime governments and weakened their ability to make such claims in the future: “[following the Depression] the Prime Minister was in no mood to make concessions to the Maritimes. Some follow-up measures from the Duncan Commission were introduced, including further modest adjustments to federal subsidies to the three Maritime provinces, but slowly and surely the findings of the commission disappeared from the public policy agenda” (Ibid: 40). Following the Depression, there was no space within the political process for arguments of special treatment for specific regions. There was a broader debate to be had. Namely the federal government’s belief that the “1867 BNA Act was ill suited to respond to
current realities. In light of the Depression and the development of the modern state, Canada required access to public policy levers that the Act had given to the provinces” (Savoie, 2006: 41). The key point is that the economic problems caused by the Depression brought out broader tensions within the federation over the balance of power. The provinces did not however share the federal government’s analysis of the solution to the economic implications of the Depression and were not minded to forego their constitutional jurisdiction. The resulting tension was viewed by some as the re-emergence of so-called ‘provincial rights.’

_Provincial Rights: Centralisation vs. Decentralisation_

Edwin Black and Alan Cairns have argued that “the course of Canadian federalism has displayed cyclical swings from centralisation to decentralisation and back again” (Black and Cairns, 1966: 29). They attribute this to the elitist way that Confederation was formed and a perceived lack of legitimacy towards the federal government on the part of the provinces: “Confederation was the accomplishment of a small group of elites who neither sought nor obtained popular support for the new undertaking; this aspect of its origins effectively denied the new central government that widespread feeling of patriotic sentiment which it required to struggle successfully with recalcitrant provinces” (Ibid). However, the basis of the tension was more likely contained in the differing perspectives towards federalism at the time of Confederation. The tension between these two perspectives provide a strong foundation for thinking about the so-called ‘provincial rights movement’ in the 1880s and its perceived re-emergence in the 1930s.

Provincial rights was about constitutional interpretation. Different interpretations of the 1867 _BNA Act_ revealed competing visions about the practical operation of the federal union which followed closely those articulated during the shaping of Confederation in the 1860s. For Cairns, the establishment of a federal union in 1867 “created competitive political and bureaucratic elites at two levels of government endowed with an impressive array of jurisdictional, financial, administrative, and political resources to deploy in the pursuit of their objectives” (Cairns, 1977: 700). However, as noted in the Chapter 4, MacDonald’s ‘quasi-federalist’ perspective, whereby he conceded the retention of the colonial legislatures but insisted on the primacy of the central government, contradicted the perspectives of Maritimes and Quebec, which followed a more decentralised interpretation. Provincial rights was the collision of these two perspectives and resulted in the provincialists seeking a judicial
interpretation of the federal principle in the 1880s. Vipond noted that “the provincial rights movement typically argued that provincial autonomy was supported either by the black letter text of the constitution or by the more abstract federal principle” (Vipond, 1985: 292).

In the 1880s, the provinces were becoming more vociferous in their grievances towards the federal government. For example, in addition to the repeal movement in the Maritimes, there was an emergent nationalism in Quebec shaped by the hanging of Louis Riel in the Northwest Territories in 1885 and the failure of the newly opened west to develop along bicultural and bilingual lines, discontent over federal railway policies in Manitoba and tension in British Columbia over Oriental immigration used to construct the Canadian Pacific Railway (Ibid: 322-323). The provincial rights movement was successful utilising judicial channels to “attain their objectives of a more decentralised federal system” (Ibid: 323). Provincialists argued their case before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council - the final court of appeal for the British Dominions. Wallace Stewart outlined that the provinces “won the day in repeated cases carried before the Privy Council” (Stewart, 1932: 510). Vipond concluded that by the turn of the twentieth century “the courts had placed MacDonald’s reading of the BNA Act in grave doubt” (Vipond, 1991: 5-6).

The implication is that the judicial opinion of Canadian federalism in the 1880s favoured a decentralised interpretation. This suggests that the jurisdictional trajectory of the federation was not settled in 1867 at the creation of Canada. In fact, the trajectory of the federation throughout the early twentieth century was relatively fluid. However, it is important to acknowledge that the trajectory did not ‘swing’ based on legal or judicial opinions but with events or, more accurately, crises. As Black and Cairns have noted, “centralisation [was] primarily a product of emergencies such as the year of birth, of war, and the depression, when the very survival of the country was thought to be at stake” (Black and Cairns, 1966: 29). The crises of the 1930s and 1940s were important because they reopened old questions of provincial rights and provincial autonomy. However, whilst the tensions were ‘new’ in the sense that they represented a fresh discussion, it was not a new debate but the re-emergence of old jurisdictional tensions.

The Depression and the Second World War were at the forefront of the new tensions. The Depression was a key catalyst because “[it] altered established perceptions of the
economy and the role of the state” (Struthers, 2012). It awakened the federal government to the uneven economic development within the country and encouraged a more interventionist approach. The federal government of R.B. Bennett sought to implement economic and employment policies modelled on Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the United States (Ibid).

C.A Curtis argued that the so called ‘reform’ programme was designed to be ‘anti-depression’ (Curtis, 1935: 599). The reform programme indicated that the federal government required additional powers in which to adequately address the implications of the Depression. Bennett argued that “Reform means Government intervention. It means the end of laissez faire...I summon the power of the State to its support. Government will have a new function to perform in the economic system” (Resnick, 1990: 46). The importance of the reform programme was not its intention but the constitutional space that key aspects of the programme occupied. It was comprised of “sixty-six public Acts” but it was eight of the Acts, or parts thereof, which were most important in shaping the re-emergence of provincial rights in the 1930s6 (Curtis, 1935: 599). For Paul-André Linteau, the measures “were not well planned and did not take into account jurisdictional questions” (Linteau, 1986: 56).

The jurisdiction question was addressed at a Dominion-Provincial Conference in August 1934 when Prime Minister Bennett asked: “are the provinces prepared to surrender their exclusive jurisdiction over legislation dealing with such social problems as old-age pensions, unemployment and social insurance, hours and conditions for work, minimum wages, etc., to the Dominion Parliament? If so, on what terms and conditions?” (Fowke, 1952: 283) The conference was “indefinitely postponed after none of the premiers expressed enthusiasm for the idea and several were lukewarm, if not hostile” (Bryce, 1986: 179).

Nevertheless, Bennett believed that Section 91 of the BNA Act gave the federal government the general capacity to legislate in areas such as unemployment relief under the auspices of ‘peace, order and government.’7 Robert Bryce argued that two decisions of the Judicial

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6 The eight Acts were: the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Limitation of Hours of Work Act, the Natural Products Marketing Act, the Employment and Social Insurance Act, the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act and Section 498A of the Criminal Code dealing with unfair trade practices (Scott, 1937: 234).

7 Section 91: It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
Committee of the Privy Council on the question of jurisdiction over aeronautics and radio broadcasting, which ruled in favour of the federal parliament on the basis of Section 91, acted as test cases for the Bennett government on the constitutionality of the reform legislation: “these rulings encouraged Bennett and other Canadian lawyers and politicians to believe that the Judicial Committee might well approve other legislation that was not clearly within the specified powers of [the federal] Parliament or the provinces. Unemployment insurance might possibly be such a case” (Ibid: 180).

In terms of the Maritimes, the Nova Scotian government of Angus L Macdonald in the 1930s offered some input into the autonomy debate at this time. As Jennifer Smith outlined, in 1934 Macdonald presented a theoretical understanding of federalism which was anchored by the provinces’ status as established political entities at the time of Confederation: “the lynchpin [of MacDonald’s perspective] was the idea of the federating units as distinctive entities that persist in their distinctiveness because of the tenacity of local sentiment especially in the older provinces. The implication of the endurance of distinct identities was that the federation did not produce one, new identity out of them. It did not submerge them in a national identity” (Smith, 1998: 12). This perspective was significant because it showed that the centralisation agenda of the federal government was inconsistent with established provincial perspectives.

the Public Debt and Property, the Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Unemployment insurance, the raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation, the borrowing of Money on the Public Credit, Postal Service, the Census and Statistics, Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence, the fixing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of Civil and other Officers of the Government of Canada, Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island, Navigation and Shipping, Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine Hospitals, Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries, Ferries between a Province and any British or Foreign Country or between Two Provinces, Currency and Coinage, Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money, Savings Banks, Weights and Measures, Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Interest, Legal Tender, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Patents of Invention and Discovery, Copyrights, Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians, Naturalization and Aliens, Marriage and Divorce, the Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters, the Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Penitentiaries, Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
The federal government of Mackenzie King, elected in 1935, recognised the jurisdictional questions raised by the reform legislation and duly referred eight of the measures to the Supreme Court of Canada for judicial review in 1935. These decision to refer these Acts was important because “taken together [they] constituted the principal attempt made by the Dominion Parliament to cope with the economic problems disclosed by the world depression” (Scott, 1937: 234). Whilst in opposition, King’s Liberal Party argued that the reform measures were constitutionally invalid, a position which Ian Bushnell argued “did not necessitate King to deal with the merits of the scheme to relieve against the effects of the Depression” (Bushnell, 1992: 253). The basis of the Supreme Court referral was provincial autonomy and whether the federal government had the “constitutional authority to deal with what normally would have been a matter of provincial jurisdiction” (Ibid: 255).

In January 1937, following a split within the Supreme Court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, ruled that the measures were ultra vires [beyond the powers of the federal government] and therefore invalid (Scott, 1937: 235). For F. R. Scott, this was a victory for the notion of provincial rights and “an example of the way in which the Privy Council had compelled the adoption in Canada of an interpretation of the constitution unfavourable to a strong central government” (Ibid). The King government however persevered with a centralised interpretation of Canadian federalism and sought bureaucratic leverage in which to support its argument.

In the same year, the King government established the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, known as the Rowell-Sirois Commission. The commission’s terms of reference underscored the jurisdictional and constitutional tension that existed in Canada at this time and reinforced the federal government’s perspective that the political and economic context had shifted since Confederation and warranted a re-assessment of the constitutional division of power: “a re-examination of the economic and financial basis of Confederation and the re-distribution of legislative powers in light of the economic and social

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8 The statutes submitted were: the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Limitation of Hours of Work Act, the Natural Products Marketing Act, the Employment and Social Insurance Act, the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, the Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act, and the new section 498A of the Criminal Code dealing with unfair trade practices (Scott, 1937: 234).
developments of the last seventy years” (Canada, Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1940: 13). The commission’s final report, published in 1940, argued for greater centralisation at the federal level. It railed against decentralisation and attributed the harshness of the Depression to the way in which power was constitutionally distributed in Canada:

“The severity of the Depression on Canada was closely related to the nature of the economy, the constitutional division of powers and responsibilities and the economic policies of the Dominion. When a country is divided up into a number of parts with distinct economic characteristics, each with separate and independent political authorities responsible for costly government services within their respective areas, the incidence of decline in the total income is immensely important. If the distribution of the decline is fairly uniform each separate unit could perhaps carry the increasing burdens without great difficulty. If the losses fall very disproportionately upon certain regions, the public finances of some areas may be carried on with relative ease, while others are likely to break down with serious repercussions upon the financial economic and constitutional structure of the entire country” (Ibid: 160).

For Savoie, the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission were not surprising considering the context in which it was established: “it came as no surprise that the report [of the commission] stressed the need for integrating federal-provincial fiscal policies more effectively and, at the same time, sought to give the federal government a much stronger hand in managing them” (Savoie, 2006: 41). Donald Smiley however viewed the commission’s final report as a “somewhat cautious document” when held up against the constitutional impasse of the 1930s (Smiley, 1962: 54). Smiley argued that the report was cautious because it viewed the existing division of powers, in which the provinces performed a wide range of public functions, as “fundamental to the commission’s analysis” (Ibid: 54-55). As such, it was unlikely to significantly alter the division of power in Canada.

The broader significance of the Rowell-Sirois report, when thinking about how such factors shaped questions of regionalism or union in the Maritimes, was the way in which it placed an emphasis on the fiscal capacity of the provinces to meet their constitutional obligations:
“At the heart of the problem lie the needs of Canadian citizens. These needs, whether material or cultural, can be satisfied only if all the provincial governments in Canada are in a position to supply those services which the citizens of today demand of them. The ability of the provincial governments to meet the demands of their citizens depends in part on the constitutional powers which they enjoy, in part on their financial capacity to perform their recognised functions. The striking fact in the Commission’s study of Canadian conditions is that many provinces whose financial position is not the result of emergency conditions are unable to find the money to enable them to meet the needs of their citizens. The basic problem before the Commission lies, therefore, in finding a way in which the financial position of the provinces could be improved and assured, without disastrous financial consequences to the federal government on whose efficient functioning all provinces are dependent” (Canada. Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1940: 269).

For Smiley, the way the report’s authors viewed provincial autonomy was key to understanding its recommendations for the federal system in Canada: “a province has genuine independence only if it has the revenues at its disposal to carry out those functions for which it is responsible, free from federal control in respect to those functions; the master-solution of the report was aimed at ensuring that each province was put in a financial position to provide, if it chose, a level of provincial services at average national standards without subjecting its citizens to provincial taxation above the national average” (Smiley, 1962: 56). This perspective was important because it would shape a core area of federal government fiscal policy in the 1950s, namely equalization. Moreover, for the Maritimes it tapped into regional grievances over the cause of the region’s detrimental economic position within the federation.

In terms of provincial autonomy, Smiley argued that it was “vital to the commission’s concept of a viable Canadian federal system” (Ibid). However, the report argued that the federal government required exclusive access to fiscal levers reserved for the provinces. This, it said, was the key to establishing some semblance of national standard to provincial competences: “the desirability of giving the federal authorities exclusive access to the major field of direct taxation with the corresponding responsibility of effecting some redistribution of financial resources among the provinces rather than the alleged need for federal involvement in the range or standards of provincial functions” (Ibid). The report of the
Rowell-Sirois Commission was symbolically important because it strengthened both the right of the provinces to exist and the right for the federal government access to policy levers within provincial jurisdiction for achieving a national standard of public service provision in Canada.

Second World War

It would take the advent of the Second World War for the federal government to gain some access to provincial jurisdiction. Dennis Guest has argued that the need to harness skills for the war effort “hastened the beginning of unemployment insurance and a nationwide system of employment bureaus for the effective operation of an unemployment insurance scheme” (Guest, 2003: 105). The implementation of such a system however necessitated a constitutional amendment. In July 1940, the British parliament amended Section 91 of the BNA Act to give the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over legislation in the field of unemployment insurance (Ibid). This amendment did not pass without provincial resistance; three provinces, Quebec, New Brunswick and Alberta were opposed to the amendment. Guest noted that a Liberal election victory in Quebec in 1939 and a change of leadership within the governing Liberal Party in New Brunswick in 1940 facilitated agreement and placed pressure on Alberta to accede, which it did in the early months of 1940 (Black and Cairns, 1966: 35).

The constitutional question of the 1940s raised an important factor which would be central in shaping questions of regionalism and union in the Maritimes in later years. It exposed the extent to which they needed federal financial support to fulfil their constitutional functions. As Table 5.2 demonstrates, the level of federal support to the provinces rose sharply throughout the Depression. Savoie however contended that the Maritimes had reason for some optimism in supporting the Rowell-Sirois Commission’s findings because it recommended a form of wealth re-distribution on a national basis through national adjustment grants: “the commission did not want to change where wealth was being produced in the country; it argued that the benefits should be shared nationally. The national economy should be promoted, but dividends flowing from it should be shared with all regions” (Ibid: 43).
Table 5.2: Federal Subventions and Grants-in-Aid to the Provinces, 1913-1937
(millions of Canadian dollars)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>1913</td>
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<td>1930</td>
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<td>1931</td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td>72.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
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The question of adjustment grants and economic development would be key in shaping the trajectory of territorial relationships in Canada. Following the publication of the final report, the federal government was keen “to push the provinces along the road the [Rowell-Sirois] Commission had marked out” (Maxwell, 1948a: 11). However, the richer provinces were not prepared to support measures which would undermine their competitive advantage or establish a system of national adjustment grants which transferred wealth at their expense or to their detriment. At the Dominion-Provincial Conference in Ottawa in January 1941, the Premiers of Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia opposed the introduction of national adjustment grants. James Maxwell surmised that “it was not merely a coincidence that if the report had been followed, these three provinces would not have received any national adjustment grants” (Ibid). For Bryce, the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission were not fair to the stronger provinces whose support would have been essential for their adoption, since constitutional amendments would have been required (Bryce, 1986: 218-219). A key tension therefore emerged within the federation in the following decades shaped by the commitment of the federal government to eliminate regional disparities and the antipathy of the richer provinces towards a form of wealth distribution “with a bias to poorer provinces” (Savoie, 2006: 44).
The war effort however diverted attention away from the economic, fiscal and constitutional questions that had dominated the Depression years. The war was “the overwhelming factor” which allowed the federal government to take on responsibilities within provincial jurisdiction (Maxwell, 1948b: 12). As Maxwell has outlined, “the provincial premiers had declared their willingness to help in every conceivable manner so far as prosecuting the war was concerned and any protest was silenced by the patriotic desire to implement the total war effort of the Dominion” (Ibid). For Cairns however, the ‘nationalising sentiment’ which occurred during the Depression and war years had the potential to alter the balance of the federation permanently: “the centralisation predicted in the thirties seemed firmly and securely in place in the forties and for much of the fifties when centralisation was a matter of practical and technological necessity following the growth of large corporations, national trade associations, and national trade unions” (Cairns, 1977: 697).

This centralisation however occurred within a period of global crisis, which superseded questions of provincial autonomy in favour of a common purpose. As such, two key questions remained: what would happen when the war was over? And perhaps most importantly: would the jurisdiction acquired by the federal government during the war be permanent? (Maxwell, 1948b: 12) The Depression, the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission and the Second World War had set the trajectory of the constitutional debate in Canada. The federal government was committed to eliminating regional disparities by enhancing its role in the social welfare field. The provinces however were not, in a peacetime context, prepared to relinquish their constitutional jurisdiction to the centre. The post-war constitutional debate reflected these tensions and precipitated a ‘swing’ back from centralisation to decentralisation. The desire of the federal government to develop a comprehensive welfare state in the post-war period was at the forefront of new territorial tensions in Canada as the federal government sought to legislate in fields of provincial jurisdiction.

5.2. 1950s: The Post-War Context

Canadian Welfare State

Following the war, the federal government, influenced by Keynesian economic management, pursued the construction of a Canadian welfare state (Russell, 1990: 96). For Keith Banting,
“the emergence of the welfare state posed a major constitutional dilemma for Canada because the *BNA Act* was a nineteenth century document where welfare was considered to be a private matter for the individual, his family, his church, and the state’s role was largely confined to rudimentary poor relief administered at the municipal level” (Banting, 1987: 47). The federal government had already demonstrated during the Depression that it was prepared to transfer wealth to the peripheral provinces in order to mitigate disparities in employment and income across the country. In the post-war period it sought to place state intervention in social welfare policy on a permanent footing. During the Depression intervention was ad-hoc and reactionary as a result of a global financial crisis. Savoie noted that, “[Canadians] had emerged from the war determined never to permit another depression of the kind witnessed in the 1930s. The public’s confidence in the ability of governments to intervene and to manage the economy was high. Canadians had learned during the war that governments were able in moments of crisis, and when moved by an all consuming goal, to lead the country to high levels of economic activity and employment” (Savoie, 2006: 34). However, in spite of the federal government’s willingness to act, the key sticking point was that it was “unclear which level of government had the legislative authority” in the field of social welfare (Banting, 1987: 47).

For Richard Simeon and Martin Papillion, the question of ‘who does what’ has been a key question applied to the social and economic policy fields in Canada (Simeon and Papillion, 2003: 1). Moreover, the perceived ambiguity was exacerbated by the events of the previous two decades and the temporary agreements between the federal and provincial governments. The provinces were successful in utilising judicial channels to support a decentralised interpretation of Canadian federalism. However, the post-war context put this interpretation under threat once more and reopened tensions between the federal and provincial governments. In fact, from the late 1950s a new phenomenon was observed at the provincial level which undermined the federal government’s social welfare objectives. This phenomenon, termed ‘province-building,’ was a way to explain the growth of the provinces in the post-war period. Province-building was not just a question of resistance to federal encroachment, as was arguably the case with provincial-rights in the 1880s, but the development of new capacities to act at the provincial level.
In 1977, Cairns wrote “the great mystery for students of Canadian federalism has been the survival and growth of provincial governments, particularly those of English Canada” (Cairns, 1977: 699). The understanding of province-building is both provincial and federal. From a federal standpoint, it represented the response of the provinces to the agenda of the federal government following the Second World War. In the post-war period, the federal government embarked on the construction of a Keynesian welfare state, marrying a stronger government role in economic management with increased provision of income security and social services (Simeon and Papillion, 2003: 8). However, the federal government was hampered in its objective because “a good deal of power remained with the provincial governments” (Resnick, 1990: 211). Whilst the federal government had the resources and vision for a Keynesian programme it did not have the jurisdictional capacity to implement this vision across the country (Simeon and Papillion, 2003: 8). The federal government therefore had two options, it could seek a constitutional change to gain responsibility over policy fields, such as unemployment and pensions, which was opposed by richer provinces such as Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec, or it could pursue its welfare objectives within the existing constitutional framework through its superior spending power (Ibid). It was this latter option which proved most beneficial to the federal governments objectives in the post-war period.

As the provincial rights movement of the 1880s demonstrated, there were different interpretations of how the 1867 BNA Act divided powers between the federal and provincial levels. Neil Boyd has argued that the language of Sections 91 and 92 of the 1867 BNA Act, which detail the competencies of the two orders of government, is “not always sufficiently precise to permit a clear sense of whether provincial or federal jurisdictions is to prevail” (Boyd, 2011: 96). The federal government was able to use the residual power of the “peace, order and good government” contained within Section 91 to “legislate in areas of jurisdiction not expressly noted in either Section 91 or Section 92” (Ibid). Most importantly however was the way that the federal government tried to use its residual power in “perceived political, social, or economic emergencies [to] act unilaterally in the interest of the country as a whole” (Ibid). As noted earlier in the chapter, the federal government was prevented in the 1930s by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from acting unilaterally in areas not explicitly within its jurisdiction. However, during the Second World War the federal government took a
more collaborative approach as it sought to negotiate with the provinces the necessary jurisdiction to effectively manage the war effort.

The federal government signed ‘tax suspension agreements’ with all the provinces in 1941, whereby they agreed to relinquish their right to levy income taxes, both personal and corporate, for the duration of the war and for one year after it ended (Maxwell, 1948c: 11). To mitigate the loss of revenue, the federal government provided the total revenue or the net cost of debt service in 1940 and a subsidy based on fiscal need to the provinces that were deemed to need it (Ibid). The Maritimes accepted the debt option. Tellingly, the three provinces were also paid fiscal need subsidies. At the conclusion of the war, however, the federal government proposed to make the wartime tax arrangements permanent in return for “unconditional subsidies which would vary with gross national product and which were considerably more generous than the payments under the [wartime] tax agreements. It offered also a programme of old age pensions and unemployment assistance and a series of conditional grants in aid of public health, a plan for health insurance and the coordination of public investment” (Ibid: 13-14). These proposals were important because they reflected the intentions of the federal government in the social welfare field following the war.

After the war, the Maritimes favoured a form of tax agreement with the federal government. Maxwell argued that “[the Maritimes] stood to gain financially from the allocation of income tax jurisdiction to the federal government because they could not utilise the income tax effectively and because the subsidies offered seemed a generous substitute” (Ibid: 14). The richer provinces on the other hand opposed the proposals because it would “bring about a net transfer of current income from their residents” (Ibid). Daniel Béland and André Lecours have argued that the federal government’s superior spending power allowed it to challenge provincial jurisdiction in key social policy areas following the war (Béland and Lecours, 2005: 684). The Maritimes were more susceptible to federal spending power because of their economic underdevelopment and smaller tax base. The federal government was therefore able to secure their agreement more easily than in the case of the richer provinces.

At the centre of the federal government’s social welfare efforts were conditional grants in areas such as health. The federal government sought to overcome jurisdictional impediments by sponsoring new social programmes with conditional grants to the provinces
Through conditional grants, the federal government utilised its superior spending power to exert influence over provincial policy and enact a consistent standard of social policy across the country (Greer, 2004: 216). For Guest, the advent of conditional grants in the post-war period led to an era of ‘cooperative federalism’ characterised by the “sharing of decision-making powers and financial responsibility of particular programmes or projects between the two levels of government” (Guest, 1997: 127). However conditional grants were contentious because of their lack of flexibility, failure to consider the fiscal needs of the individual provinces, and the impact of the programmes on provincial autonomy (Ibid). For the Maritimes the final two points were particularly pertinent.

The availability of conditional grants offered both opportunity and danger for the Maritimes. Their economic prosperity remained stilted at a time when provinces in central and western Canada were developing new avenues of economic growth: “province-building in the economic arena – infrastructural development, hydro and resource extraction – was of great importance, giving a regional basis to governmental activities from British Columbia, Alberta and Quebec” (Resnick, 1990: 212). It was therefore unsurprising that these richer provinces “flatly rejected” the moves of the federal government into the social welfare field (Robinson and Simeon, 1994: 377). Federal spending power, however, offered the Maritimes the opportunity to maintain some form of parity with the richer provinces. Programmes such as Hospital Insurance in 1955 were offered under these arrangements (Ibid: 378). However, although the federal government acquired a greater say over how provincial policies were designed and implemented, conditional grants did not initially cause “major federal-provincial conflict” (Ibid).

The advent of province-building changed this situation as the federal government “overestimated its own influence and underestimated the entrepreneurial capacities of the premiers” (Tomblin, 1995: 48). Robinson and Simeon have argued that the one exception to the “generally harmonious pattern [of conditional grants] was Quebec” (Robinson and Simeon, 1994: 378). As will be noted in the final section of the chapter, the Quebec government was “strongly opposed to the expansion of federal influence through the spending power” (Ibid). Successive governments of all parties in Quebec fundamentally opposed the centralist trajectory favoured by the federal government in the post-war period. The 1950s was a key period because it served as a precursor to some of the key tensions within Canada
in later decades. The opposition of the Quebec government to the centralist trajectory coincided both with the emergence of province-building across the country and an emergent tension within Quebec over its place within the federation. As will be articulated, the ‘50s was the precursor to the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s.

For Black and Cairns, the post-war tension in Canada was the product of four key factors: 1) a return to peace-time normality; 2) an important diminution in the legitimacy of the governing party at Ottawa, especially with respect to any proposed federal initiatives outside its constitutional sphere of jurisdiction; 3) a mid-century decline in the importance of the powers assigned to the federal government and a corresponding magnification in social importance of the provincial powers; and 4) a relatively great increase in the competence and confidence of provincial administrations and a consequent growth in elites who identified their prospects with the fortunes and favours of the provincial governments (Ibid). The significance of this context was that it precipitated a ‘swing’ back to a decentralised interpretation of federalism. Province-building was at the forefront of this ‘swing.’

Province-building represented the provincial counter to federal centralisation. It denotes a broader process of political, administrative and bureaucratic development in the provinces after the Second World War. For Black and Cairns, “the growth of influential provincial elites in politics, administration and resource-based industries” provided a bulwark against the federal government in the post-war period (Black and Cairns, 1966: 40). The reform of the public service, the elimination of patronage, entrance by competition, and security of tenure engineered the growth of provincial bureaucracies which transformed the provinces in to ‘activist states’ (Black and Cairns, 1966: 40; Young, Faucher and Blais, 1984: 784). The growth of provincial bureaucracies helped the provincial governments to “steadily extend their tentacles of control, regulation, and manipulation into society” (Cairns, 1977: 706). For the premiers, their aim was “not only to further the long-range interests of their society and economy but [further develop their] vested interest in provincial status and power” (Ibid: 705). Moreover, this process was strengthened by the growth in influence of political officials who served ‘at pleasure’ of the premiers of the day and were not bound by the rules of the public service (Tuohy, 1992: 33). The role of political officials, who were aligned to parties and/or governments, became increasingly important in providing the will to formulate and maintain a regional agenda in the Maritimes.
Province-building indicated that the provinces were not willing to accede to jurisdictional or constitutional changes outside of a crisis environment. For notions of path dependence this is crucial because it underscores that the salience of change to an established trajectory is more achievable as a result of a period of crisis. The crises caused by the Depression and the Second World War however were seen by the provinces as temporary. When normality was restored the decentralised interpretation of federalism prevailed. For the Maritimes, the post-war context of province-building, in response to increased federal spending power, offered an opportunity for a more vigorous articulation of their historical economic grievances to the federal government. In fact, in the post-war period the Maritimes were prepared to utilise regionalism, through the establishment of the Atlantic Premiers Conference in 1956, to exploit the availability of federal spending power.

The Atlantic Premiers Conference: An Atlantic Revolution?

The Atlantic Premiers Conference (APC) was formed in July 1956 to provide an executive intergovernmental forum for the three Maritime premiers and the premier of Newfoundland to consider matters of regional importance. The significance of the APC was that its objectives linked with the key financial questions of the period, notably the issue of federal adjustment grants. The APC shifted the regionalism agenda from that of temporary, ad-hoc forms of regionalism, as characterised by the MRM in the 1920s, to a permanent regional forum which sought to embed regionalism as an ongoing strand of politics. For Bickerton, the regionalism of the 1950s was distinct because it was no longer industry based and did not agitate for the restoration of indigenous industry or favourable federal policies (Bickerton, 1990: 334). Savoie argued that the role of the APC was to “press the federal government for subsidies based on fiscal need, assistance for resource development, a new regional transportation policy, different monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate economic development and a new tariff policy geared to the regions economic interests” (Savoie, 2006: 45). The APC, like the MRM, was underpinned by a belief that “the fiscal and economic policies of the federal government were causing many of the economic problems in the Maritime provinces” (Evans, 1985: 1).

The establishment of the APC reflected the subordinate position of the region in the broader federation. It provided ‘strength in numbers’ to give the region greater influence in
national policies and apply pressure to the federal government to accede to the demands of the four provinces. The genesis of the APC was in the Maritimes premiers’ response to federal proposals for the region. In the mid-1950s, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent had challenged the Atlantic premiers to produce “the initiatives and ideas” to accomplish their economic demands. This challenge was taken up by New Brunswick premier Hugh John Flemming who invited his counterparts to meet in Fredericton in July 1956 to coordinate a response to the federal challenge (Conrad, 1987: 74). Moreover, APC was outward facing because it was formed in response to a federal government challenge. Indeed, the APC was shrouded in the early post-Confederation language of better terms. W.S MacNutt depicted the APC as an ‘Atlantic Revolution’ in which the region was fighting back against the federal government in order to rediscover the economic ‘golden age’ of the pre-Confederation period: “we can recollect that we once possessed an economy of our own, independent of the rest of Canada, prosperous and trading with all the world. The recollection will make us better Canadians” (MacNutt, 1957: 13).

This argument is important when held up against the context of the federation in the 1950s. MacNutt suggested that the Atlantic Revolution echoed the same spirit of the provincial rights and better terms movements of the nineteenth century: “since [the better terms movement of the 1880s] we have offered no such strong medicine to Ottawa. Compared with other regions we have been tranquil and complacent. We have sent able men to Ottawa, but their energies were absorbed in the building of the nation rather than in safeguarding the interests of their own region. The kind of shock that was familiar to Ottawa in the days of [W.S.] Fielding, [Oliver] Mowat and [Honoré] Mercier has come from other quarters. Messers [Leslie] Frost and [Maurice] Duplessis carry all the big sticks. There have been regional revolutions elsewhere but none here” (Ibid: 12). Whether the formation of the APC was a ‘revolution’ is questionable because it sought to embed the region more to the spending power of the federal government. However, the APC did not transcend a coordinated lobby group. Using the analytical tools of Bolleyer, the APC could be considered weakly institutionalised. There was no permanent institutional machinery that was detached from the four governments to maintain the momentum for cooperation and interaction was directly through the heads of government. Conrad argued that the key problem for the APC was that it failed to garner a new momentum for regionalism beyond “the business and bureaucratic circles in which the battles were fought” (Conrad, 1993: 419).
That said the APC was important because it provided a sense of the trajectory of the regionalism debate within the Maritimes at this time. Its establishment highlighted two factors that would be key to the political union concept in the 1960s: the role of New Brunswick in providing the impetus for regional action and the role of political officials in facilitating and sustaining regional effort. New Brunswick was instrumental in formulating a regional response to demands within the national arena. According to Corey Slumkoski, the election of Hugh John Flemming as premier of New Brunswick in 1952 “brought to the premier’s office a leader more committed to regional action” (Slumkoski, 2011: 128). The role of political officials in the regionalism process was becoming more important. Conrad for example has noted that the initial regional agenda proposed by Hugh John Flemming “[followed] the counsel of his economic advisor William Y. Smith” (Conrad, 1987: 75). Furthermore, following the first meeting of the APC the premiers established a ‘continuing committee’ comprised of three representatives from each of the four governments to provide an agenda for the next APC meeting in May 1957 (Ibid).

The implications of the APC were threefold: first, although this period is often held up as the beginning of a more assertive posture on questions of economic development from the Atlantic provinces, the genesis for the APC was external. Conrad has argued that the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects (the Gordon Commission) in 1955 “focused thinking on the region’s economic problems and inspired enthusiasm for remedial action that carried over into the federal-provincial conference in the fall of 1955 (Conrad, 1993: 407). However, the external context of the APC was not a mechanism for the achievement of internal regional objectives but a coordinated lobbying vehicle in which to achieve favourable concessions from the federal government. The APC allowed the Maritimes to act in concert in lobbying the Gordon Commission and in making the regional case at the 1955 Dominion-Provincial Conference (Ibid). The regional objectives of the 1950s sought to make the region more dependent on the federal government. The advent of equalization payments in 1957 reflected the desire of the federal government to utilise its spending power to narrow regional disparities in the country. However, the challenge of Prime Minister St Laurent indicated that “he was committed to resolving the regional disparity problem, the Atlantic premiers [had to] take on the responsibility of developing a common game plan” (Ibid). Moreover, as Savoie has argued, in equalization the federal government had not acquiesced to the region’s
demands for specific programmes but instead implemented a national programme available to all provinces in Canada (Savoie, 2006: 45).

Second, the creation of the APC reinforced the regional ideology of the nineteenth century. The provinces continued to maintain that it was Confederation that had caused their detrimental economic condition and sought compensation from the federal government for this. For Tomblin, the objectives of the APC demonstrated the historic character of regionalism at this time. He argued that “the premiers, indignant at being singled out [by the federal government] and no doubt concerned about the direction of the debate, began raising old concerns and shifting attention to the influence of past national policies and external factors on the problem of underdevelopment” (Tomblin, 1995: 82). The main issues of contention for the Maritimes were transportation policies, notably the negative impact of the 1927 Maritime Freight Rates Act, regional fisheries policy, tariff structure and energy policy (Ibid). As Evans noted, it was such policies which the premiers felt had caused the economic development of the region in the first place (Evans, 1985: 1).

Third, despite the external influences on the establishment of the APC, its structural makeup as an executive forum allowed the premiers to retain control over decision-making. For Slumkoski, the APC allowed the “premiers to meet on matters of common concern without being compelled to commit to any plan that might prove harmful to their own provinces” (Slumkoski, 2011: 129). Tomblin has argued that the structural makeup of the APC coupled with the parliamentary context of the Canadian federation hindered the capacity of the premiers to make decisions on a regional basis (Ibid: 83). He argued that “in an institutional system organised on a territorial basis, these inherited arenas of federalism and parliamentary government did not make it easy for premiers to deal with problems from a regional or national perspective. Indeed there was little incentive to focus on internal problems or to blame local people for the problem of regional disparity. Instead, politicians relied on a defensive expansionist policy and framed the issue in a way that reinforced provincial autonomy. The real challenge was to find the means to overcome institutional obstacles within the region” (Ibid). The perspective of Tomblin is important when thinking about how the premiers responded to the Maritime Union Study in the early 1970s. External pressure precipitated a regional response to internal economic problems but the premiers were unable to overcome their provincially focused decision-making capacity. A key external
shock which shaped engagement with questions of union in the Maritimes during the 1960s was the Quiet Revolution in Quebec.

_Early Beginnings of Quebec Nationalism_

The implications of the Quiet Revolution, beginning in 1960, and the subsequent rise of separatism was a key shaper of questions of political union in the Maritimes in the 1960s. An understanding of the political context in Quebec following the Second World War can help to explain the emergence of the ‘Quiet Revolution’ in the 1960s. In particular, two key trends came to the fore in the post-war period which can explain why questions of nationalism became so prevalent after 1960. The first trend was the tension between the conservative ideology of the provincial government of Maurice Duplessis and a new professional middle class who demanded an interventionist modern state in Quebec. The second trend was the autonomist posture of the Duplessis government and its rejection of the centralisation agenda of the federal government. For Donald Cuccioletta and Martin Lubin, the Quiet Revolution was not a revolution but a “noisy evolution” which had its origins in the Duplessis era (Cuccioletta and Lubin, 2011: 182). The basis for this argument rested with the notion that Quebec did not suddenly modernise, industrialise or become more assertive about its place in Canada as a consequence of the Quiet Revolution. Throughout the 1950s, there were clear signs within Quebec that a new kind of society was emerging. However, this caused schisms within the province as those who sought to anchor this society within a new interventionist state clashed with the conservative approach of the Duplessis government.

Kenneth McRoberts has argued that by the “mid-twentieth century, if not before, Quebec had indeed become an urban, industrial society. [However], the political response to these changes that one might expect – greater intervention by the Quebec state and modernisation of its structures – lagged far behind” (McRoberts, 1993: 61). This perspective has often been attributed to the inherent conservatism of Duplessis, his resistance to an active role of the state in society and his defence of traditional society, notably the role of the Catholic Church (the Church). Against the backdrop of the increased intervention of the state at the federal level through the establishment of the post-war welfare state, the existing hierarchies sought to protect the status quo in Quebec. For Michael Behiels, the Quebec was “dominated by an ‘intelligentsia’ of clerical and lay professoriat and some liberal
professionals [who] defined French-Canadian society as fundamentally spiritualist, personalist, decentralist and pluralistic” (Beheils, 1985: 98). The leaders of the Church in the province were particularly important in seeking to maintain the existing orthodoxy. The Church’s influence in Quebec society was wide-ranging, it controlled large swathes of public services, such as “social welfare, health and educational services in the province” (Ibid).

An interventionist state was seen as in direct conflict with Duplessis’s “paternalistic” system of politics dubbed ‘Duplessisme’ (Clift, 1982: 15). Duplessisme was a system “[where a] deep conservatism and traditionalism in values was associated with liberal economic policies, such as reliance on private enterprise, little intervention of the government in the economy, low taxes and debts, and, generally, few constraints on business” (Bélanger, 2006). Jacques Roulliard argued that the objective of Duplessis was to retain the status quo through a refusal to “embark on new social assistance programmes returning to a reasoning close to the traditional clerical ideology” (Roulliard, 2011: 24). The commitment of the Duplessis government to the continued role of the Church and clerical ideology in public life was seen through its assertion that Quebec did not need a government health insurance or hospital programme similar to those established in other provinces (Behiels, 1985: 98).

Critics of Duplessis described his tenure as la grande noirceur (the great darkness) to convey the perceived backwardness of the province (Cuccioletta and Lubin, 2011: 186). As Linda Cardinal and Gilles Paquet have outlined, “the twentieth-century ‘dark age’ was reputedly a period when right-wing nationalists ruled the province and opposed the introduction of political or social modernity. Quebec was almost exclusively portrayed, until recently, as a backward society governed by corrupt politicians, oppressed by the Catholic church and characterised by ethnic nationalism” (Cardinal and Paquet, 2005: 214). This was in contrast to “the rise of a progressive francophone intelligentsia whose ideas and social engagements intersected with the uprisings of Quebec workers” (Palmer, 2009: 315). The 1949 asbestos miners’ strike was an important marker of this emerging context. Pierre Trudeau argued that the strike was a “violent announcement that a new era had begun. [It was] a turning point in the entire religious, political, social, and economic history of the Province of Quebec” (Trudeau, 1974: 329). For James Marsh, the strike was significant because it continued to play an important role in the minds of Quebec intellectuals in the years leading up to the Quiet Revolution (Marsh, 2012).
Duplessis’s conservative approach also shaped his government’s interaction with the federal government and led to its rejection of the perceived centralisation agenda of the post-war period (Jones, 1983: 13). Emile Bouvier argued that “Quebec [under Duplessis was] always unwilling to play the centralisation game” (Bouvier, 1954: 41). For Richard Desrosiers, Duplessis accomplished a certain number of things for the Quiet Revolution and the subsequent governments of the sixties and seventies, such as the establishment of a provincial income tax in 1954 (Desrosiers, 1993: 80). Desrosiers argued that “budgetary self-determination and the right to levy their own taxes would be extremely important for the [Jean] Lesage government and all the governments that followed” (Ibid). Duplessis’s rejection of the federal welfare state was underpinned by a fundamental disagreement over the nature of Canadian federalism as founded in 1867. For Duplessis, Confederation in 1867 was “a sacred pact” between two races (Duschastel, 2011: 35). He argued that “it is the reasoned and definitive opinion of my government that the BNA Act is a pact of honour between the two great Canadian races and that it cannot be amended without the unanimous consent of the contracting parties” (Ibid). For Duplessis, however, the centralist agenda of the federal government following the war “changed the rules of the game” with respect to Canadian federalism (Desrosiers, 1993: 73). Duplessis believed that Canadian Confederation was threatened by Ottawa’s centralist designs because “Ottawa was aggressive, and the provinces more or less went along” (Ibid: 74).

This philosophy was at the forefront of Duplessis’s rejection of cost-sharing and conditional grants. For example, from 1951, the Duplessis government refused federal grants to universities arguing that it was “a dangerous usurpation of power by the federal government, in a sector of activity exclusively reserved to the provinces” (Jones, 1983: 13). Most important, however, was the way that Duplessis’s autonomist philosophy alluded to nationalist arguments seen during the 1960s, notably biculturalism. Alain-G Gagnon noted that “Quebec is a province not like the others. We employ the notion of the Quebec state as a political nation inscribed within a multinational whole and as a historic region in order to highlight [its] specificity rather than simply treating [it] as a province, a subordinate government or a political grouping” (Gagnon, 2004: 127). This argument could be seen in Duplessis’s language vis-à-vis political autonomy in the 1950s: “in the Province of Quebec we consider that the BNA Act does not create our rights, but only confirms and reasserts the rights of our province. When Confederation was discussed and decided upon, it was based on
the principle of complete provincial autonomy. And this for excellent reasons, the most important of which is that of Confederation is not only from its very beginning an agreement between four pioneer provinces but it is a sacred covenant between two great races whose friendly cooperation is essential to the weal and prosperity of all concerned” (Duplessis, 1950: 36). As will be outlined in Chapter 6, biculturalism was a key theme of the constitutional discourse throughout the early 1960s as the federal government sought to respond to the Quiet Revolution in Quebec.

When thinking about the posture of the Duplessis government towards federal-provincial relations it is clear that elements of province-building were prevalent. His autonomist philosophy was typified by his rejection of cost-sharing. However, this philosophy alluded to a more relevant theme when thinking about the Quiet Revolution, namely biculturalism. The glimpse of this concept in the 1950s gives credence to the assertions of scholars, such as Cuccioletta and Lubin, that elements of the Quiet Revolution were prevalent prior to 1960. Similarly, James Kennedy has argued that “the period frequently referred to as the great darkness underplays the degree to which there was also an undercurrent of change. These years were, in federal Liberal politician Gerard Pelletier’s words, ‘years of importance,’ which ultimately led to [the Quiet Revolution]” (Kennedy, 2008: 1290).

*Inter-State/Intra-State Federalism and Self-Rule/Shared Rule*

An important implication of this period was the way in which it signalled the emergent inter-state dynamic of Canadian federalism prevalent throughout the 1960s. Karl Lowenstein forwarded the notion of inter-state and intra-state federalism as a way to explain the “problems centred on the division of powers” (Breton, 1998: 260). Smiley defined inter-state and intra-state federalism as such: “inter-state federalism involves the constitutional distribution of powers between the central and regional governments. Intra-state federalism channels territorial particularisms within the central government itself” (Smiley, 1974: 16). It is argued that intra-state influences in the operations of the government of Canada are weak. The inability of the second chamber - the Senate – has been cited as the central cause of the weak intra-state dynamic in Canada because it does not provide an “adequate channel for territorial demands” in the federal parliament (Bolleyer, 2006: 494). This empowered the provincial premiers as the core channel for territorial demands at the national level As
Bolleyer has argued, second chambers are the most crucial institution of intra-state federalism’ because they permit the territories to bargain within national institutions (Ibid).

The weakness of the Canadian Senate means that “the federal government is unrepresentative of Canada’s regional diversities [which] permits the provincial governments to assume the almost exclusive franchise of speaking for regional interests” (Smiley, 1985: 68). This situation was strengthened in the post-war period as a result of the “change in financial relations between the federal and provincial governments” (MacKay, 1963: 113). As Robert MacKay has outlined, when agreements or disagreements arose between the federal government and the provinces over federal spending in provincial jurisdiction the Senate was empowered in the process through money bills. Although the Senate had the competence in which to “reject or reduce taxes or appropriates, constitutional usage was strongly against such intervention” (Ibid: 112). For Carolyn Tuohy, the Senate has not fulfilled its envisaged role as “a forum for the expression of regional interests [and has instead become a] mechanism of patronage for the governing party” (Tuohy, 1992: 28).

The autonomist posture of the Quebec government, demonstrated by its rejection of cost-sharing, showed an attempt to reinforce the inter-state dynamic of Canadian federalism. This was supported by his assertion that the provinces enjoy “complete autonomy” from the federal government (Duplessis, 1950: 36). In the Maritimes, the formation of the APC in 1956 showed that the three premiers, with Newfoundland, were prepared to come together through regionalism to strengthen the inter-state channel to the federal government. However, as Tomblin has outlined, the advent of province-building “served to highlight the fundamental characteristics of the Canadian political system; notably the blending of federalism and British parliamentary government” (Tomblin, 1995: 183). The growing importance of the provinces as a result of the post-war welfare state, coupled with the growth in importance of political officials and provincial public servants, meant that the APC was not a successful method of inter-state coordination because the provinces were more acutely empowered within the federal system as the core outlets for territorial interests. Moreover, the structural design of the APC, an executive forum of the premiers, undermined regionalism because the premiers were not inclined to overlook their own territorial interests in favour of a regional perspective. This an important point when thinking of the political response the Maritime Union Study in 1970.

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The APC was, however, a sign of the emergence of executive federalism as a key component of horizontal and vertical relations in Canada. As Smiley outlined, from 1960, “the elected and appointed officials of the two orders of government in Canada [came] to define their interests and their demands on each other in terms of increasingly comprehensive and rationalised objectives. Several alternative institutional procedures have been shown to have few capabilities for managing federal-provincial conflict in Canada- judicial review of the constitution, intraparty relations, general elections, intrastate federalism. Thus government-to-government relations, what might be called ‘executive federalism,’ play a central role both in shaping the claims which the provinces make on each other and on the national government and the resolution, if at all, of these conflicting claims” (Smiley, 1974: 17).

The more recent literature has evolved the inter-state and intra-state debate to the self-rule and shared-rule of Daniel Elazar (Elazar, 1991). According to Gagnon, “Elazar [was] speaking of the combined need for autonomy and the quest for solidarity as a way to properly manage diversity” (Gagnon, 2010: 111). For Ronald Watts, federations are composed of “two (or more) orders of government operating within a constitutional framework, with one order providing shared-rule through common institutions for certain specified purposes and with the other order (or orders) providing for local self-rule through the governments of the constituent units for certain specified purposes” (Watts, 2006: 322). Elazar has argued that federalism includes both self-rule and shared rule: “an arrangement where two or more peoples or polities find it necessary and desirable to live together within some kind of constitutional framework that will allow all the parties to preserve their respective integrities while securing peace and stability through power-sharing in those spheres where it is necessary” (Elazar, 1991).

Cameron has argued that Canada “expresses a divided rather than a shared model of federalism, including watertight compartments for the division of powers; independent taxing authority for both orders of governments; and weak provincial representation at the centre. Canada’s system of parliamentary federalism has produced strong executive-led government in Ottawa and in the provincial capitals, which, combined with a weak Senate, has led to executive domination of relations between and among the federal partners” (Cameron, 2002: 10). As the focus on Quebec within this chapter has demonstrated, the autonomist posture of
the Duplessis government began an attempt to strengthen the inter-state or self-rule dynamic within the province. As will be shown in the next chapter, the Quiet Revolution exacerbated this process as the Liberal government sought recognition for the province as a ‘distinct society’ within Canada. The federal government sought to neutralise these demands through the notion of biculturalism and to an extent asymmetric federalism. However, as Watts noted, “efforts to recognise the reality of Quebec’s distinctiveness by increasing constitutional asymmetry have been highly controversial (Ibid: 22). Similarly, as will be shown, the decision of the premiers to engage with questions of union in the 1960s also sought to strengthen the inter-state/self-rule dynamic by challenging the increasing fiscal and financial dependence of the region on federal government transfers and limiting the role of the federal government in the design of provincial policy.

5.3. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a background context to the key empirical timeframe of this thesis. The analysis of the post-Confederation period to the 1950s has raised important implications for understanding how and why change can occur within path dependent settings. The fluidity of the Canadian federation, characterised by its movement between a centralised and decentralised trajectory, occurred following a period of crisis. The judicial rulings of the 1880s and the 1930s represented a form of institutional reproduction because they reinforced the provincial interpretation of federalism and showed that the constitution protected the provinces from the unilateral encroachment of the federal government into their jurisdiction. However, external shocks such as the Great Depression and the Second World War triggered a reassessment of the distribution of powers as the federal government sought to respond to the implications of these shocks, notably regional disparities. What this chapter has shown is that change becomes more salient when there is an internal logic for change. The Maritimes in particular were willing to accede to the will of the federal government in the post-war period because it offered financial benefit.

The 1950s however offered a different narrative which highlights the importance of internal factors in questions of change to path dependent settings. As the shoots of province-building began to show in the ‘50s it became clear that the provinces were becoming resistant to the federal governments centralisation agenda. Province-building strengthened the inter-
state dynamic of the federation and further empowered the provinces as the core outlet of territorial interests. This reduced the salience of change as the provinces sought to protect their jurisdictional autonomy from federal encroachment. For the Maritimes, this period was important because it revealed the willingness of the three provinces, with Newfoundland, to utilise a regional intergovernmental forum to strengthen the inter-state channels to the federal government. However, this regionalism fell back on historical grievances as the Maritimes sought to exploit the availability of federal spending power.

Equally important was the emergence of the key external shock in the political union question, notably Quebec nationalism. Quebec was at the forefront of taking a more assertive stand against the federal government’s objectives in the ‘50s. As argued this was an indication of the broader dynamics of the federation in the 1960s. Important constitutional questions centred on Quebec’s place in the federation were to dominate the national agenda and contribute to the emergence of the union question in the Maritimes.
Chapter 6

**The 1960s: The Emergence of the Political Union Concept**

The consideration of a political union during the 1960s was significant because it was the first time within Confederation that the premiers had collectively engaged with the union concept. This chapter seeks to pinpoint how and why the political union concept emerged during this period. It argues that the key to understanding the re-emergence of the union concept in the 1960s rests with the broader political environment in Canada which, as the previous chapter outlined, had its roots in the emergent tensions of the post-war period. It presents a new analysis of the impact of the Quiet Revolution, the emergence of government led and extreme separatism and the role of federal government transfers on the Maritimes. These factors together shaped the consideration of a political union within the region at this time. Another key focus is political agency; the broader national context created an opportunity for vested political leaders to express their own distinct ideas for the region and further their own political aspirations. The role of New Brunswick at this time was important in shaping the union debate. Influenced by powerful political officials and a focus on central economic planning, a mindset emerged in the province which stressed the elimination of structural boundaries and the achievement of economic self-sufficiency. The new political environment provided the opportunity for Robichaud to advocate the achievement of such objectives at the regional level. At the same time, the new political environment provided the opportunity for ambitious political leaders to further their own personal political objectives.

The emergence of the political union concept during the 1960s was both internal and external. The national political context provided the opportunity for vested political leaders to explore questions of regional structural change to achieve internal economic and personal objectives. In order to articulate this argument, the chapter first addresses how the emergence of nationalism and separatism in Quebec created an opportunity for the consideration of structural change in the Maritimes. There was within the Maritimes concern that the Quebec government favoured a separatist solution to its grievances with Canadian federalism. The threat of separatism created an internal logic for a union. It was seen both as bulwark against the implication of separatism, such as geographic truncation, and a mechanism to achieve internal economic self-sufficiency. The section on federal government transfers argues that
the dependency of the three provinces on federal government transfer payments shaped engagement with the union concept for two reasons; the three provinces were vulnerable to federal government interference in their jurisdiction and the provinces came under pressure from richer provinces, notably British Columbia, to explore questions of structural change to lessen their dependence on federal spending power. The chapter moves on to address how Robichaud, influenced by his political officials, latched on to the fact that a union was more popular in the rest of country in order to garner a greater national visibility and enhance his prospects for a federal political career. The chapter concludes by addressing the political reaction to Robichaud’s proposal for a government sponsored study in to the viability of a union. It shows that the union study proposal did not resonate within the broader region at this time.

6.1. The Rise of Quebec Nationalism and Separatism

The Quiet Revolution

The Quiet Revolution in Quebec began with the election of the Quebec Liberal Party in 1960. It was underpinned by a sense that francophone Québécois had been subordinated “within most sectors of economic activity in the province by English Canadian and American corporations” (Gagnon, 1994; 455). The central objective of the Quebec government during the Quiet Revolution was for the province to acquire the necessary political and economic levers in which to shape its own political and economic destiny. In a speech to the Empire Club of Canada in November 1964, Quebec premier, Jean Lesage, argued that “we believe that it is essential to the development and well being of our people that Quebec should have the means of assuring not only the cultural but also the economic progress of its citizens. There is also the fact that Quebec is behind some other provinces, that it must make up the lost time and that in consequence it needs to have a greater control of the pace of its own development” (Lesage, 1964).

Writing in the Montreal Gazette, Frank Howard interpreted Lesage’s speech as a call for a kind of ‘special status’ for Quebec within the Canadian federation (Howard, 1964: 20). Lesage had argued that “because of the particular position in which a different language and culture place it, Quebec might wish to assume responsibilities in which the other provinces have no interest. In such circumstances, Quebec in the long run might end up with a particular
status without endangering the essentials of our federal system” (Lesage, 1964). The language which Lesage used can be interpreted as an interstate argument in which the province may acquire greater power in which to advance and protect the particularisms of the province. Lesage argued that “in every federal system, in every constitution, a sufficient degree of flexibility should be retained so that each of the constituent parts of the country ought not to be forced into a common mould, particularly when they differ one from the others” (Lesage, 1964). Pursuing this argument in a different context, J Anthony Long and Katharine Chiste have noted that the very nature of federalism is that it “can allow ethnic and cultural groups to exercise significant authority within their own territorial jurisdictions while at the same time providing hegemony for national political institutions” (Long and Chiste, 1994: 226).

The Quiet Revolution set the context for the development of province-building in Canada. The Quebec government directly challenged the constitutional division of power within Canada by arguing that provincial jurisdiction should be “exercised between other provinces or nation-states, so long as the provincial government in question was willing to take on the task” (Gagnon, 1994: 456). Lesage’s language in the 1964 speech imbued this strategy; “I think a Canada where all the provinces - ten or less according to the future political configuration of our country - would have more autonomy than at present, each discharging fully its constitutional responsibilities. And assuming that all of the provinces did want this broadening of their administrative functions, some of them would nevertheless wish to have some increased responsibilities that they consider themselves capable of assuming” (Lesage, 1964). This facet of Lesage’s speech is critical because it indicates that he envisaged that the broader process initiated by the Quiet Revolution provided the potential for the reconfiguration of the structural composition of the country.

The broader process triggered by the Quiet Revolution sought to determine what Quebec actually wanted from Canadian federalism and how its demands could be accommodated within the parameters of the Canadian state. The federal government approached the Quiet Revolution from a national unity standpoint and interpreted the agitation as a problem of language and culture. The key thought that informed this approach was that of biculturalism. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson argued that the “prime element of national unity is the recognition of the French language; nothing could be more important in my mind than an effort to make our French people feel that their language is an equal
language in Canada” (Pearson, 1975: 236). It was within this context that the Pearson government established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&B Commission) in July 1963. The B&B Commission, led by André Laurendeau and Davidson Dunton of Carleton University, investigated three core areas; the extent of bilingualism in the federal administration; the role of public and private organisations in promoting better cultural relations; and the opportunities for Canadians to become bilingual in English and French (Laing, 2011). In Pearson’s own words, the aim in establishing the B&B Commission was “to implement our pledge by establishing a commission with the broadest possible terms of reference to enquire into the position in Confederation of French and English speaking Canadians” (Pearson, 1975: 240). The B&B Commission signalled that the federal government was investigating institutional change within the Canadian federation as a means of neutralising the tensions emanating within Quebec.

Pearson’s desire to find a constitutional solution to Quebec’s grievances resulted in the development of a constitutional amending formula in 1964. The so-called Fulton-Favreau formula, proposed that the unanimous consent of all the provinces must be attained before changes could be made to the federal division of power and changes affecting the use of the English or French language (Russell, 1990: 72). However, as Peter Russell noted, the Quebec government’s refusal to support the Fulton-Favreau formula “indicated that Quebec’s price for supporting patriation of the constitution would be nothing less than a structuring of the Canadian federation to give sufficient scope for Quebec nationalism” (Ibid: 74). The federal government’s desire for a constitutional solution underscored its commitment to formal institutional change. Pearson noted in his memoirs, “the cautious urged us to leave it (the constitution) alone but the alternatives at the time were to work along with the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, so that ultimately we could fashion a better federal system for Canada; or to hold the line, merely keeping our thumb in the dyke, and eventually face a genuine crisis” (Pearson, 1975: 236). The insinuation of Pearson was that the status quo was not an option and that institutional change within Canadian federalism was necessary to strengthen federalism and prevent the crisis from escalating. The escalation of the crisis related to the question of separatism.

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9 The Fulton-Favreau formula was developed by federal justice minister E. Davie Fulton and Quebec Liberal cabinet member Guy Favreau.
The Question of Separatism

In the early 1960s, there were two distinct strands of separatist ideology in Quebec. At the formal political level there was a sense that the Quebec government might eventually adopt a separatist position as an extension of the Quiet Revolution. There was an emerging feeling at this time, and one which would become prevalent within the Maritimes, that there was a form of 'masked separatism' within the Quebec government. This sentiment rested on a sense that although the Quebec government argued for a form of co-existence, it would only wait so long for the rest of Canada to respond to its demands before seeking a separatist solution. The second strand was extreme separatism, characterised by the actions of terrorist organisations who sought to remove Quebec from the federation by violent means.

The concern that the Quebec government may eventually seek to take the province out of Confederation was based on the perceived ambiguity of its objectives. For Lesage the escalation of the Quiet Revolution towards separatism was dependent on the willingness of English Canada to accept and respond to its claims. He argued: “the Quebec of today is seeking, for the present and for the future, the economic, social and political conditions of an interdependence which will be conducive to its full development and which will be more worth-while than an independence which would risk being no more than an illusion. In an interdependent society, each must accept the others. Upon our part, and I speak for all save a very small minority, we are ready to accept the problems and the difficulties of coexistence-of living and working together-because we can see the ultimate advantages that will accrue from doing so. We are ready to accept our partner-English Canada as it is, and we have no intention of asking it to change its way of life or its culture. Is it prepared to do the same for us?” (Lesage, 1964). Lesage’s speech demonstrated that the Quiet Revolution was more than just a question of enhancing political autonomy. It was about re-shaping and re-balancing the Canadian federation, in political and constitutional terms, around the notion that Canada was an entity founded by and comprised of two linguistic and cultural peoples. As Eugene Forsey has noted, the broader objective of the Quiet Revolution rested on the theory of “two nations in a bi-national state” (Forsey, 1962: 487).

For Lesage, separatism was not on the agenda unless English Canada failed to accommodate Quebec’s demands: “I reject separatism as completely unrealistic and
inadmissible; and as to the other, I would say that it would set Quebec upon a course that is opposite to the course I have just noticed in Europe and according to which different countries, at the price of how many trials and errors, attempt to unite what history has made separate. What avenues remain open to us? The rest of Canada must help Quebec to attain its objectives. Otherwise, if we are forced to act alone, we shall be inclined to assume attitudes—and it would be quite human to do so—which will be less and less understood and which would only succeed in pushing us into an isolation that truly we do not want” (Lesage, 1964). This facet of the speech indicated that although Lesage considered separatism as undesirable he did not view it as out of the question.

Lesage’s speech heightened the threat of separatism because of the way it placed the onus for preventing it squarely at the door of English Canada. There existed however at the highest level of Canadian politics concern that the rest of Canada lacked the will to respond to Quebec’s grievances. For example, Pearson noted that the [Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker] “never had a strong position in Quebec. Even in the 1958-1962 period its fifty Quebec members were not able to establish positions of authority in Ottawa or control the situation in Quebec” (Pearson, 1975: 76). Pearson’s concern at the threat of separatism to the country was reflected in his 1964 Canada Day address in which he warned that: “it would be irresponsible for Canadians to close their eyes to the existence of separatist designs, even if held by a few” (Montreal Gazette, 1964: 1). He continued to argue: “I believe we have barely tapped the qualities we need to ignite a national purpose which will carry us towards our centenary stronger, more united, than we ever have been” (Ibid). Pearson was arguing that in order to prevent separatism and formulate a coherent defence against it, the existence and threat of separatism needed to be acknowledged.

In 1964, the ‘few’ supporters of separatism to which Pearson referred were on the extreme fringe of political activity in the province. The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), an extreme paramilitary organisation formed in 1963, sought to achieve an independent Quebec state through violent means. In the early 1960s extreme separatism did not pose a threat to the future of the country but it would become a key source of instability. The FLQ undertook a coordinated campaign of terrorism at targets that symbolised the Canadian federation or the English language in Montreal, for example, mailboxes, federal government or English language buildings and organisations, such as radio stations and the CBC. The
message of Pearson was that although such activity was perpetrated by a minority on the political fringes, their overall objective had the potential to pose a discernable threat to the federation and should not be underestimated.

In 1963 and 1964 separatism, government-led and the extreme variant, had not yet undermined the stability of the federation. Yet, there were clearly concerns within the federal government. The sense of masked separatism in the rhetoric of the Lesage government shaped the desire of the Pearson government to find a constitutional solution to the Quiet Revolution. However, the concern at the emergence of separatism in Quebec did not just exist at the centre but also within neighbouring jurisdictions. Within the Maritimes, in particular, there was a degree of concern about how separatism would affect both the region and the federation. The Maritimes were particularly susceptible to the implications of separatism because of their geographic location to the east of Quebec and their detrimental economic position. As will be outlined, separatism would geographically truncate the Maritimes from the rest of Canada in the event that Quebec seceded from the federation. Furthermore, their increasing reliance on federal government transfer payments throughout the 1960s made them vulnerable to changes in the operation of Canadian federalism. The concern at the implications of separatism led the vested leaders to explore questions of structural change as a way to respond to the threats emanating in the national arena and achieve regional economic and personal objectives.

6.2. The Emergence of the Political Union Concept

The Quiet Revolution had precipitated a debate in Canada over constitutional change in which to reconcile Quebec grievances within the formal parameters of Canadian federalism. Moreover, questions of separatism had created concern that not responding to these grievances would precipitate the end of the country altogether. A key point that this thesis seeks to address, and which is missing from the current literature, is that the Quiet Revolution and to a lesser extent extreme separatism led to the discussion of structural change elsewhere in the country. The political union concept emerged within the context of national unity but it was not directly linked to it. The proposal for a single Maritime province was made in the first instance based on internal economic arguments that were then connected to the implications of events in the broader national environment. Certain political leaders within the Maritimes, notably Louis Robichaud and Robert Stanfield, sought to exploit the environment created by
the Quiet Revolution, separatism, and national unity to achieve personal political objectives and forward their own distinct ideas for regional economic development.

*Louis Robichaud’s Speech to the Empire Club of Canada – 31 October 1963*¹⁰

The election of Robichaud as premier of New Brunswick in June 1960 is often held up as an important juncture in Maritime politics. He was the first francophone Acadian elected premier in the province and at age thirty-four he was the youngest premier in the history of New Brunswick and the youngest premier in Canada at that time. One of Robichaud’s key contributions as premier stemmed from the way that he challenged conventional expectations of provincial premiers. For example, as Savoie has argued, provincial premiers are “elected to promote the interests of their provinces. These interests are defined by provincial boundaries, by geography and by voters living in a defined physical space. Province-building is rooted in this provincial reality for all the provinces but more so in the case of the Maritimes (Savoie, 2006: 211). Beck concurred with this view: “although the Maritime provinces may have some sort of empathy for one another because they share the same economic misfortunes, they fall short of having the capacity to respond jointly to common problems which cut across established institutions or interests” (Beck, 1977: 313).

Beck’s argument follows closely the territorial argument outlined in Chapter 3, that is the premiers will be interested solely in the interests of their own territorial compartment and the constituencies they serve and to which they are accountable. However, Robichaud brought a mindset that went beyond provincialism and sought to introduce a broader regional mindset. The reason for this was threefold. First, he realised that the context of the federal environment may require structural change in order to improve the economic and political standing of the Maritimes in the federation. Second, he recognised the perceived threat to the Maritimes posed by the growing separatist sentiment in Quebec. Third, he was imbued with a desire to be more than just a provincial politician.

Robichaud demonstrated a regional mindset in July 1960 only a month after becoming premier. In his submission to the Dominion-Provincial Conference, held in Ottawa 25-27 July 1960 to discuss national fiscal and monetary policy, Robichaud spoke about the necessity for

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¹⁰ A full text of Louis Robichaud’s speech to the Empire Club is available from: [http://speeches.empireclub.org/60550/data?n=8](http://speeches.empireclub.org/60550/data?n=8)
fiscal measures that benefitted the region as a whole. For example, he argued that the federal government needed to “reconsider the problem of monetary policy in its effects on the Atlantic region as a matter of urgent national importance” (Globe and Mail, 1960: 8-9). This conference was important because it signalled the beginning of the Quebec government’s attempt to formulate common positions with other provinces in order to “pre-empt unilateral moves by the federal government in areas of concern to the provinces” (Gagnon, 1994: 456). At the invitation of Lesage, the provincial premiers formed the Annual Premiers Conference (AnPC). The first Annual Premiers Conference was held in Quebec City 1-2 December 1960 (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 2011b: 3).

The AnPC was the start point of the provinces, led by Quebec, making a concerted collective effort to play a more active and assertive role in national policy making (Young, Faucher and Blais, 1984: 784). This has been recognised as a key start point of province-building and a key component of the Quiet Revolution (Ibid). For the Maritimes, the July conference had underscored their dependence on federal resources as each premier argued for the necessity of federal resources for their province. Robichaud however was different in that he spoke in regional as opposed to provincial terms. Robert Stanfield (NS) and Walter Shaw (PEI) demonstrated no such regional mindset and, in their submissions, spoke purely in provincial terms. Stanfield discussed the necessity of increased federal revenue in order to provide a national standard of public service: “a national standard of essential services can only be achieved by the government of each province having a national average of essential revenue to provide those services” (Globe and Mail, 1960: 8-9). Shaw argued: “PEI requires sufficient revenues to meet the mounting cost of provincial and municipal services without imposing an inordinately high level of taxation. The province requires the implementation of a programme that will stimulate economic growth in the province and decrease the level of economic disparity in economic development between our province and the rest of Canada” (Ibid).

The individual positions of the premiers toward the financial and fiscal role of the federal government were not surprising given that they were the poorest provinces in the federation. However, in approaching the topic from a regional standpoint, Robichaud laid the foundation for a change of approach to the federal role in the economic and political affairs of the provinces. The decision to establish the AnPC represented a shift towards a more
collective approach by the premiers to vertical relations with the federal government. The Maritimes, with Newfoundland, were already engaged in collective action on questions of national policy following the establishment of the APC in 1956. However, the election of Robichaud brought a greater internal focus to questions of regionalism. Influenced by events in Quebec and his own personal objectives, he sought to imbue a greater level of economic self-sufficiency both as a way to equip the region with the necessary capacity to contribute to the broader national unity debate and shield it from the possible implications of separatism. In articulating a greater regional effort, however, Robichaud would reveal a disconnect between the notion of region in eastern Canada and whether it included Newfoundland. The establishment of the APC instilled an ‘Atlantic’ outlook to regionalism, that is to say it included Newfoundland. However, as questions of union became more prevalent Newfoundland would step back from the regionalism process in favour of a more individual approach.

On 31 October 1963 Robichaud gave a speech to the Empire Club of Canada in Toronto which highlighted two core themes that were driving the necessity for change in the Maritimes: the threat of Quebec separatism to the continuation of federalism and the internal operation of federalism, in particular fiscal questions such as equalization and shared cost programmes. In terms of separatism, Robichaud sought to characterise extreme separatism as a clear threat to both the nation and the Maritime region; “recent months have given an unwarranted amount of publicity and attention to a small group of dissidents in the Province of Quebec who called themselves the FLQ........what should be done about it? It is the responsibility of Canadians today to become militant and thoughtful supporters of the Canadian Confederation. The voice of reason reminds us that a brilliant future awaits us all within the union. We must not, therefore, become embroiled in wasteful bickering and resentment over things that provide meat for emotional debate, but serve only to divide us against ourselves. We must be strong enough to honour and preserve those concepts that were so carefully embodied in our Constitution. We must be vigilant enough to recognise and correct the causes of friction that may endanger the Confederation. We must be wise enough to use our very diversity as one of the principal foundation pieces upon which our nation will grow in strength and stature......You may accept as fact that I am proud to be a Canadian and that I am seized with a determination to remain one” (Ibid).
In speaking out against the threat of separatism and making a passionate defence of Confederation, Robichaud was positioning himself as a defender of Canada. The *Globe and Mail* the following day interpreted the speech as one in which Robichaud indirectly challenged the role of Lesage and the Quebec view of Confederation; “Jean Lesage took it upon himself to be the spokesman for all French-speaking Canadians in expressing dissatisfaction with Confederation, Louis Robichaud challenged indirectly both Mr. Lesage’s role and his thesis” (*Globe and Mail*, 1963: 6). In making such a speech, Robichaud was aware that he occupied a unique context in Canadian politics. He was a francophone politician from outside of Quebec, who was leading the government of one of the most economically depressed provinces in Canada but was, nonetheless, a passionate advocate of Confederation. As a Francophone and the premier of the Canadian province that has the second highest Francophone population in Canada, it was perhaps expected that the premier of New Brunswick would play an active role in the national unity debate. For Robichaud, however, national unity was an opening through which to carve out a national profile and exert influence on the direction and future of the country. Fred Drummie, Robichaud’s economic advisor, noted that Robichaud did harbour federal ambitions and desired “a public role governing the country” but in 1963 had just been re-elected in New Brunswick and was committed to introducing wide-ranging structural change within the province (*Drummie*, 2010b). Thus, at this stage, Robichaud was able, in his capacity as the francophone premier, to use national unity as a vehicle through which to influence and contribute to the wider national debate.

The second aspect of Robichaud’s speech concentrated on how the dynamics of the federation at that time impacted on the region. He argued that the present state of the federation underscored the necessity for a change of internal perspective, as a means to contribute to the broader national debate. In this context, the national unity debate gave him the opportunity to forward his own preference for structural reform at the regional level. He did not at this stage discuss a political union but he made a clear argument that the federal environment necessitated a greater collective response from the Maritimes. He argued that the federal government’s fiscal mechanisms and programmes to foster economic development, although well intentioned, were “related to expediency and tended to ignore the real issues. Despite the national participation in equalization payments, adjustment grants, shared-cost programmes and subventions, in the past five years our region has received one quarter of a
billion dollars in unemployment insurance benefits. In short, we have been falling farther and farther behind the economic evolution of Canada” (Robichaud, 1963). Furthermore, he sought to attenuate the external outlook of the region: “we have maintained that the relationship between the Atlantic provinces and the other provinces of Canada demands examination within the context of national unity - one of our professed aspirations. It has been our ‘original sin’ to have looked up the St. Lawrence River for omnipotent help and guidance. Generations of wishful gazing have left us weak and frustrated” (Ibid).

This was an important perspective because it refuted the foundation of Maritime regionalism throughout the twentieth century, namely that Confederation had caused the region’s detrimental economic position. This perspective formed the rationale for the formation of the APC in 1956. However, Robichaud argued that the context of national unity necessitated a new perspective based on the notion of economic self-sufficiency: “it has been an historical pastime to blame the ‘slow growth economy’ of the Atlantic Provinces on Confederation. Now, however, we recognize that a fundamental weakness in our own outlook has contributed in large measure to our distressed condition. We have been gazing wishfully when we should have been working toward our own economic emancipation” (Ibid).

It is from this standpoint that Robichaud argued for a unified regional approach to economic development within the region in order to contribute to the broader national debate: “it is no secret that the Atlantic Provinces are ill equipped, at the moment, to make a financial contribution to the national scene. However, this does not disqualify us from participation in the activity. As a unified social force we represent the human content of a market, and as such we are exchanging our historical role of passivity for one of militant participation. History supports the fact that we of the Maritime Provinces have been prone to consider the federal sector as some type of patronising superior. We categorically reject this definition. The federal sector must be composed of each of us and work for the mutual benefit of all of us. Anything short of equality, both economic and otherwise, for all members of the nation is a mockery of the ideals expressed by Confederation. There is today a new spirit and a new determination in the Atlantic Provinces. We ask that you try to keep perspective with us as we turn the eastern flanks of the nation into a reliable and aggressive industrial entity-even more worthy of respect and dignity in a proud nation” (Ibid). From this portion of the speech it is
clear that economic self-sufficiency had been placed in the context of the broader national environment.

The theme that Robichaud was developing was that an economically self-sufficient Maritime region would strengthen the country and strengthen the role of the region and its standing in the country. By articulating this perspective, Robichaud was arguing for a type of region-building at the political level. He was advocating a regional response as a way for the region to develop the economic and political capacity in which to contribute to the national unity process. The importance of this speech was that it demonstrated that the national environment had necessitated a reassessment of the Maritimes’ role and status in the country. Robichaud was prepared to engage with this environment and put forward his own ideas for both the region and the country. The reason for this was both his genuine belief in the need for a new economic perspective in response to the national environment and his desire to assume a greater national profile. The fact that he was a francophone politician from outside Quebec gave him the legitimacy to speak on questions of national unity and challenge the perspectives emerging within Quebec.

Although Robichaud had articulated a regional approach, he had not proposed a political union. This came in September 1964. His reasoning for a political union reinforced the context he developed in 1963: the broader national environment, the necessity of economic self-sufficiency and his desire for a national profile. However, it must be asked why he proposed a political union in 1964 and not 1963. The answer to this enquiry is grounded in the internal implications of Quebec separatism and the role of political officials in encouraging the premiers to plan for a worst case scenario in terms of separatism. His proposal for a political union reflected how an external threat necessitated the consideration of structural change in the Maritime region. The increased role of political officials, a desire for greater economic self-sufficiency and less dependence on the federal government conflated with the implications of Quebec separatism, notably the breakdown of the federation or geographic truncation from the rest of the country.
On 1-2 September 1964, a two day First Ministers Conference was held at the invitation of PEI premier, Walter Shaw, to “commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the 1864 Charlottetown Conference of the Fathers of Confederation” (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 2011a: 35). At the suggestion of Pearson, the conference was held over two sessions; a public session, on 1 September, to commemorate the 1864 Conference, with each First Minister delivering a speech in honour of the Fathers of Confederation and a closed business session, held the following day, to discuss a constitutional amendment formula. It was the speech delivered by Robichaud during the public session that made the most headlines the following day. In his speech, Robichaud mused that: “the New Brunswick delegation came to Charlottetown in 1864 for the ostensible purpose of fabricating a Maritime Union. Unfortunately (and I use the word advisedly), they were not resolute in their purpose; I am persuaded to believe that, had such a political or legislative union been consummated, at that time, our contribution to strength in and benefits from nationhood would have multiplied manifold. But that is the past and whimsical recrimination would now serve no useful purpose. Perhaps, however, Premiers Stanfield, Smallwood and Shaw and I may get together today and, on this centennial of that first meeting in Charlottetown, decide to reduce the number of Canadian provinces from ten to seven. Should that occur, the focal point of progress and activity in the nation would unquestionably and rapidly take a marked shift to the east” (Robichaud, 1964a: 2).

By analysing the rationale of Robichaud for proposing a political union at this time it is possible to note the emergence of three key themes: the role of a central planning culture in New Brunswick, the desire for Robichaud to gain a national profile, and concern with Quebec separatism. The Centennial Conference was an important event because of its symbolic purpose as a commemoration of the first meeting of the leaders that negotiated Confederation. However, the conference represented a paradox because, although it was an occasion to celebrate the establishment of the nation, it took place against an undercurrent of uncertainty as to the country’s continued existence.

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11 See Appendix 1 for a full text of Robichaud’s Centennial Conference speech.
The first point of consideration is the way in which Robichaud’s speech was conceived and the arena in which it was delivered. The commemorative nature of the conference warranted a brief speech from each head of government in honour of the Fathers of Confederation (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 2011a: 35). For Robichaud and the political officials within his government, the speech represented an opportunity to exploit the national political environment for their own purposes. In particular, political officials in New Brunswick desired to maintain the momentum for structural reform by applying the ongoing process within New Brunswick at the regional level. Following the New Brunswick provincial election in April 1963, in which his government was re-elected with an increased majority, Robichaud embarked on a policy that would earn him a reputation as “the most radical reformer in the country” (Canadian Public Affairs Channel. 2009).

The Equal Opportunity (EOP) programme was a process of structural reform within the province of New Brunswick, whereby the responsibility for key public services such as health and education were assumed by the province. The EOP however was a reflection of the broader political dynamics of Canadian federalism during the 1960s. It was an exercise in province-building because it centralised power away from the local country governments to the province and necessitated the engagement of citizens with the provincial government. Robert Young argued that the EOP was a combined process of economic, administrative and political change: “it enhanced economic efficiency by eliminating local county governments and providing a stable and homogenous environment within the province; it produced administrative uniformity and swept away local barriers to effective government planning and action; and finally, it brought all citizens into a direct and equal relationship with the state” (Young, 1987: 88).

The necessity for the EOP in New Brunswick reflected the growing responsibility of provincial governments following the Second World War. The enhanced responsibility of the provinces as a result of the construction of the welfare state meant that the provinces needed the administrative capacity in which to “provide a coherent provincial response to federal initiatives, notably shared cost programmes; municipal reform; administrative reform; and the stimulation of economic growth” (Ibid: 90-92). For Hugh Mellon, the EOP, as a process of structural reform, stressed provincial government service delivery and individual entitlement and allowed the province to utilise more effectively the increased federal transfers available.
during the 1960s (Mellon, 2001: 88). This is not to suggest that the impetus for the EOP was driven solely by the province’s relationship with the federal government. It “provided a glimpse of the planning culture that was sweeping industrial areas of the country, and changed the dynamic in New Brunswick in a significant way” (Tomblin, 1995: 75).

The central planning culture put structural reform at the forefront of policy in New Brunswick. The emphasis was on the removal of structural barriers to the “improvement and coordination of policy and delivery of services” (McElman, 1988: 1). The emergence of the political union concept was underpinned by this mentality. The key point to note is how Robichaud and key political officials in New Brunswick latched on to the national political environment and used it to progress their preferences for structural change and policy coordination at the regional level. The speech that Robichaud was due to give at the Centennial Conference provided the opportunity for notions of structural change to be articulated. According to Robichaud’s speechwriter, Charles McElman, the speech at the conference was “an opportunity to float the political union idea” and impart some of the basic principles that underpinned the EOP at the regional level (Ibid). The Centennial Conference was an opportunity for Robichaud to progress the ideas he had put forward in his 1963 speech to the Empire Club. In particular, he explained the advantages of adopting a regional mindset to questions of economic development and demonstrated his desire to assume a more vocal role in questions of national unity.

The economic context of Robichaud’s political union proposal was contained within a document entitled “A Proposal Regarding the Political Union of the Atlantic Provinces” presented to the APC in late September 1964.\(^\text{12}\) The purpose of the document was to provide greater detail to the union proposal and enthuse his counterparts into supporting the establishment of a “serious examination of the question (of a political union), leading to either the acceptance or rejection of the proposal on intelligent grounds” (Robichaud, 1964b: 3). The key themes of the document were threefold: increased economic capacity, increased efficiency in terms of resource development and less competition in the field of economic policy. He argued that “the fabrication of one set of policies for resource development and the provision of services could materially accelerate the growth of the region and raise the general standard of living. In my view, these provinces must plan and work together to achieve the

\(^{12}\) See Appendix 2 for a full text of Robichaud’s submission to the APC.
most efficient use of our resources, rather than to dissipate our efforts through four unrelated policies in most fields. Working as one province, the people of the region would considerably improve their prospects of prosperity in the decades ahead” (Ibid: 2).

The APC document presented a union as a tool to ensure the administrative and economic efficiency of the region: “at a time when many of the responsibilities of government are shifting to the provinces, the new unit could negotiate as the third largest province in population. Its size would more reasonably be able to provide and administer efficiently the provincial programmes” (Ibid: 1-2). In this sense, a union was a way for the region to gain greater leverage in the national policy-making process and to ensure better administration of resources and services. In addition, Robichaud sought to situate the concept within the broader national unity agenda. He argued that a union would not just be of internal economic benefit but would send a message to the rest of Canada that, as a united political entity, the region could contribute to the economic future of the country: “the union of the Atlantic provinces would give all Canadians reason to approach the second 100 years with faith, that our country can continue to adjust and face whatever pressures may beset us. Such a dramatic step at this time should display to all Canada that the people of this region have a dynamic interest in the future and contribution to make to it” (Ibid). It is important to reiterate that at this point Robichaud included the province of Newfoundland in his arguments for a union.

Robichaud’s proposal clearly indicated the double-edged nature of the political union concept. From an internal perspective, it represented the basis for facilitating economic development and administrative efficiency. However, the overarching impetus for the emergence of the union concept was grounded within the broader trends of Canadian federalism during the 1960s. The increased importance of the provinces in the context of service delivery and the role of the federal government in providing the necessary funding called for the region to develop a stronger presence within the federation in order to influence the policy process. Furthermore, in the early 1960s, the richer provinces, in particular British Columbia (BC), began to enunciate grievances at the economic and fiscal operation of the federation. The key tension was the dependency of the poorer provinces on federal government transfers. BC advocated structural change within the federation as a means of reducing the dependency of the poorer provinces and to bring about a greater level of
economic self-sufficiency. This pressure over the dependency of the Maritimes was a key shaper of the political union debate at this time.

*The Role of Federal Government Transfers*

The policy priorities of the federal government following the Second World War were key influences on the political union debate. There were two reasons for this: the ability of the federal government through its superior spending power to influence provincial policy and the emergent tension within the rest of country about the dependency of the Maritimes on federal government transfer payments.

As noted in Chapter 5, after the Second World War the priority of the federal government was to bring about a greater level of economic and social development in the country. George E. Carter argued that “memories of unemployment in the 1930s were vivid and the idea that it was possible to avert a post-war depression through proper government policies was widely held” (Carter, 1971: 2). As Cameron and Simeon have outlined, the federal government was able to gain access to such policy areas through its superior spending power, in particular the “proliferation of shared cost programmes and conditional grants” (Cameron and Simeon, 2000: 68). The nature and scope of conditional grants were wide ranging, such as old age assistance, disabled persons allowance and unemployment assistance, and health provision, for example hospital insurance (Carter, 1971: 21).

Tensions over conditional grants were constitutional in nature. Tomblin argued that conditional grants eroded the political autonomy of the provinces as the federal government sought to formulate a national standard of social welfare policy. However, because, constitutional jurisdiction rested with the provinces, they were able to reject federal dollars in such areas, something which Quebec often did throughout the 1960s. Nonetheless, as the poorest provinces in the federation, the Maritimes were less able to reject federal dollars and as such were more susceptible to the encroachment of the federal government into their jurisdiction (Boadway and Watts, 2000: 20). PEI premier Alex Campbell noted in the late 1970s that “the name of the game with conditional grants was that the federal government would design the programme and if the province could afford its fifty per cent share it would be implemented” (Campbell, 1978). For some, conditional grants were unfair to poorer
provinces because of the way they had to “reduce their spending in other areas of activity in order to match federal grants” (Stevenson, 2004: 154).

Conditional grants shaped the political union debate in two ways. First, the detrimental economic position of the Maritimes within the federation resulted in increasing dependency on federal dollars. From the beginning of the 1960s, the Maritimes became highly dependent on the federal government for their respective provincial budgets, with unconditional federal transfers frequently representing over forty per cent of total provincial revenues (see Table 6.1). The depressed economic state of the three provinces meant they were increasingly dependent on conditional grants and had less scope to reject federal dollars. This meant that the three provinces were more susceptible to the involvement of the federal government in their jurisdiction. A political union would play into concerns of the erosion of provincial autonomy as the premiers, influenced by political officials, sought to formulate ways for the three provinces to develop a greater level of economic self-sufficiency and in turn protect their autonomy from the encroachment of the federal government.

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The second influence of federal spending power was through unconditional fiscal transfers. Beginning in 1957, equalization payments were made to the poorer provinces as a way of “guaranteeing that all provinces’ revenues from the shares of three standard taxes, personal income taxes, corporate income taxes and succession duties, would be brought up to the per capita level of the average of the richest two provinces” (Courchene, 2007: 23). The concern of the federal government was that without equalization the poor provinces would have “faced the unpalatable choice of either below average welfare services or above average taxes, whereas the richer provinces would have enjoyed the luxury of below average taxes or above average welfare” (Banting, 1987: 63).

The Maritimes became increasingly dependent on equalization payments throughout the 1960s (see Table 6.2). As with conditional transfers, this influenced the political union debate and caused tension within the federation as the richer provinces pressured the poorer provinces to develop a greater level of economic self-sufficiency. Savoie has argued that the richer provinces were increasingly advocating a ‘bootstraps approach’ to economic development within the Maritimes. The core implication of the bootstraps approach was “that the richer provinces had gained their superior economic status by picking themselves up by their own bootstraps – so why can’t the Maritime provinces do the same” (Savoie, 2006: 197)? At the forefront of this pressure was BC premier W.A.C Bennett, who made clear his support for structural change as a means of achieving economic self-sufficiency and lessening the dependence of the provinces on unconditional transfers.

Bennett sought to place the question of economic dependency within the context of national unity. He argued that, although cultural and linguistic tensions were important strains on national unity, the threat posed by disparities in economic opportunity was just as great: “I want to emphasise that the stresses within the nation at the present time are primarily economic and financial in nature. Unless the problems of glaring discrepancies in standards of living and economic opportunities for low-income citizens are met, then the consideration of many matters which are now being discussed may prove to be little more than academic. I am saying that if we are to have and develop the kind of Canada we all unquestionably desire then the scope of our vision must embrace the economic facts of life in Canada. British Columbia believes the solution lies in direct assistance to persons of low income rather than
through large unconditional payments to certain provincial governments” (Bennett, 1970: 453). A key component of Bennett’s vision was his call for “viable and effective political units consonant and in conformity with the five economic regions of Canada” (Ibid).

The arguments of Bennett were a direct challenge to the concept of equalization. The notion of larger political compartments as a means of achieving economic prosperity was not new but the connection with national unity served to highlight the emerging discontent within the prosperous provinces regarding the escalation of unconditional federal grants. The words of Bennett indicate that he considered that if such a trend continued it would threaten the federation in the same way as the tensions that were ongoing in Quebec. Robichaud’s 1963 speech to the Empire Club demonstrated that he was aware of the lack of economic progress on the part of the three Maritimes in spite of the efforts of the federal government. The 1964 Centennial speech, however, was Robichaud’s opportunity to respond to Bennett and, at the same time, aid his own personal objectives.

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Source: Martin, 2001: 32
In 1963, it was considered that Robichaud “commanded little national profile with his fellow premiers” (Canadian Public Affairs Channel, 2009). As McElman acknowledged, the concern of Robichaud at the time of the speech was to “find an issue that would command regional and national coverage in order to revive public support for himself and his government” (McElman, 1988: 2). McElman and Drummie had shaped the speech with Robichaud. It appears that the speech was grounded in the spirit of the occasion but it also served as an opportunity for Robichaud to make a speech that garnered the publicity he desired. According to Drummie, “we thought that everyone else would be giving a pretty surface kind of speech. We thought that if Louis was going to get any kind of recognition or publicity or press reporting from it, then giving a slightly different speech is always a worthwhile route to follow” (Drummie, 1987a: 1).

The Centennial Conference provided a broader national and historical backdrop for the emergence of the political union concept. The Charlottetown Conference of 1864 was originally called to discuss the question of a political union, which provided Robichaud with the opportunity to situate this same idea within a broader context. Significantly, McElman noted that Robichaud was “at very best, lukewarm to the idea of raising the union question but it was not a matter of supporting the idea of a political union, but merely raising it for public discussion. Of course, I told him that the inclusion of this in his speech at the Conference, would certainly guarantee him the regional and national publicity and attention that he sought” (McElman, 1988: 2).

The reason why the union concept would generate national publicity for Robichaud related to the economic and fiscal context of national unity. By advocating a political union as a means to achieve a national profile, Robichaud was assuming a position consonant with popular viewpoints in the rest of Canada. A political union of the three provinces was a popular concept outside the Maritimes because of their small geographic size, and their population and economic dependence on the federation. The logic of having three provincial governmental machineries which administer such a small geographic area and small population were key arguments for a political union in the rest of Canada. According to Drummie, the Maritimes are an “anachronism in the modern world, there are small countries
but three small provinces with high electoral representation and with a population of less than 1.5 million combined were considered ripe for integration by the rest of the country” (Drummie, 2010a). Furthermore, the logic of supporting such provinces with generous federal transfers whilst there was little movement to self-sufficiency was also contested within certain parts of Canada. Therefore, for an incumbent provincial premier to express in such a public way that he was prepared to look at the union idea, was bound to strike a chord in the rest of Canada (Drummie, 1987a: 24).

The emergence of the political union concept in September 1964 was inherently linked to the operation of federalism. The political context in terms of province-building and increased government responsibility necessitated a more efficient administrative apparatus within and between the provinces. Moreover, the scrutiny and criticism of federal fiscal transfers, upon which the Maritimes were so dependent, demanded an internal approach to service delivery and economic development. The national political environment had provided the opportunity for such questions could be addressed. However, the case of the Maritimes also demonstrated the importance of political agency. Robichaud was a political leader with an enthusiasm for structural change because of his own personal experiences of the poor schooling system and access to basic public services in rural, francophone New Brunswick. The intersection of his personal experiences with his desire for a national political profile and the central planning culture brought by influential public officials help to explain the genesis for the re-emergence of the political union at this time. Nevertheless, although the internal dynamics of New Brunswick and the national unity debate provide some context as to the origin of the concept, it does not explain why what was essentially a speech idea resulted in an official government sponsored study into the viability of a union. The immediate reaction of Robichaud’s counterpart premiers to the suggestion of a union study gave a sense that the national context had not precipitated an interest in regional structural change in the same way as it had in New Brunswick.

Reaction to the Political Union Proposal

The reactions of Stanfield and Shaw to the suggestion of a study into the viability of a political union indicated that they did not share the perspective of Robichaud towards structural change. In fact the immediate reaction of the two premiers was to reinforce
historical perceptions of their respective provinces. Stanfield reiterated that Nova Scotia was the most prosperous in the region. He argued that the union concept would be difficult to ‘sell’ in Nova Scotia because it was more advanced than its provincial neighbours.

Bickerton has argued that “Nova Scotia has always been the economic leader of the region. The basis of Nova Scotia’s wealth has been the diversity of its economic base; whereas the other provinces in the region were heavily reliant on one economic sector – agriculture in PEI and wood based industries in New Brunswick – the Nova Scotian economy has been a blend of these, along with a significant coal and steel industry and manufacturing concerns” (Bickerton, 1994: 441). Stanfield surmised that a political union with two economically inferior political units could invoke a fear of higher taxes and a lower standard of public service: “when it came right down to it, a sales pitch to convince Nova Scotians to go into this thing, to persuade them that their taxes weren’t going to be used to help people in PEI and New Brunswick, and Nova Scotians would wind up with poorer services or higher taxes to cover better services. I could never figure out how one would sell that, so I had difficulties with it” (Stanfield, 1987a: 16-17).

The argument of Stanfield buttresses the perceived insularity of the province. Tomblin argued that this insularity prevailed during the 1960s because its politicians had resisted the bureaucratisation that had occurred elsewhere. He argued that regionalism had “strong appeal for planners and central agency types” but it did not resonate in Nova Scotia because of the “continued domination of traditional state elites in the policy process” (Tomblin, 1995: 75). In resisting the trend of central planning Nova Scotia approached the political union question from a political territorial standpoint rather than the structural economic perspective seen in New Brunswick. As such, a union was framed as a threat to the territorial integrity of the province.

Stanfield was, however, open to closer forms of economic intergovernmental cooperation which did not tamper with existing territorial boundaries or establish new
institutions: “I’m not sure that a union would be worth all the difficulties that would develop; we can cure most of our problems through close cooperation” (Fillmore, 1964: 2). A key differentiation that Stanfield sought to emphasise was the difference between economic and political forms of regionalism: “the majority of interested observers do not appear to recognise the important differences between political union and economic integration” (Ibid).

In shifting the focus towards cooperation instead of a union and seeking to separate the economic and political aspects, he was trying to embrace the economic vision of Robichaud but at the same time neutralise the political implications within his province. In arguing that internal economic objectives, such as economic development and self-sufficiency, could be achieved without the amalgamation of the existing provinces Stanfield was trying to steer the process away from a political union and towards lesser forms of regionalism that would preserve the territorial status quo.

The initial press reaction to Shaw was contradictory. The Charlottetown Guardian reported Shaw as saying that it “could be a matter for discussion” (1964: 4). The Globe and Mail reported a different response: “my view is exactly the same as that of our forefathers in 1864” (1964a: 3). In the 1860s, PEI rejected all notions of union and remained outside of the Canadian federation until 1873. As was the case with Stanfield, Shaw’s opposition to the political union concept tapped into perspectives that were based on historical experience, notably an acute sensitivity to notions of external control and domination. In a speech to the provincial legislature, Shaw questioned the argument that a union would improve the economic and political capacity of the region: “I am not sure what a political union might do for the Province of Prince Edward Island. It is said that we would have a larger and stronger province ... I am not so sure that we would be strong enough even then because if the four provinces joined together we would still be a small and weak province in the Canadian federation. But there are other angles to this. We have set up our own buildings, our own system of Civil Service, and our own appointments. Where would a political union, if it were consummated, centre the government? I don’t know possibly Halifax. I am wondering just what would happen as far as the interests of this small province if we were involved in a union of this kind” (Shaw, 1965).

This speech indicated how Shaw considered that the purported economic benefits of a political union would not be worth the loss of provincial autonomy that such a union would
involve. The fact that each province did not undergo the level of bureaucratisation that had occurred in New Brunswick meant that Nova Scotia and PEI lacked the forward-looking planning ethos that underpinned Robichaud’s rationale for a union. In addition, Stanfield and Shaw were not, at this stage, opportunist politicians seeking to use the national political environment to further their own ideas and objectives. They therefore evaluated the arguments from an economic standpoint. This was never likely to produce a favourable opinion of the union concept because the supposed economic benefits could not be guaranteed or quantified.

Sidney Pobihushchy argued that there is often very little or no comparative data as a basis upon which to assess the contentions in favour of a political union. Opinions towards a political union must therefore be based on “the logic of the rationale” (Pobihushchy, 1974: 374). With little quantifiable evidence to support the contention that a political union would enhance economic capacity, political leaders will be reluctant “to simply abandon old traditions and provincial powers” (Tomblin, 1995: 93).

The response of Stanfield and Shaw to Robichaud’s document to the APC in late September 1964 was to reject a union but at the same time to endorse the broader vision of economic development through increased intergovernmental effort. Robichaud argued in favour of a union and proposed the establishment of an official study into “the factors affecting a union” (Robichaud, 1964b: 3). A joint statement by Shaw and Newfoundland premier Joey Smallwood stated that the two provinces “would have nothing to do with the idea” (of a union) and “significant public interest would have to be shown before any joint study could be made” (Globe and Mail, 1964b: 6). The inclusion of Newfoundland in the union discussion reflected the composition of regionalism at this time. Newfoundland was a member of the APC and as such was a partner in the regional process. The APC was founded on the basis of common economic grievances towards the federal government and represented a coordinated regional approach to the enunciation of regional claims and grievances to the federal government. Newfoundland however did not share the internal regional perspective or the continuation of intergovernmental cooperation as a mechanism for negotiating with the federal government and withdrew from the APC in 1965. Savoie noted that the withdrawal of Newfoundland represented a broader pattern in which the province “was less willing to develop a regional voice in federal-provincial relations or to promote an Atlantic perspective on sectoral issues” (Savoie, 2006: 202).
Robichaud corroborated this fact: “back in 1960, Jean Lesage suggested that the Premiers of Canada should meet together once a year, first week in August, to study problems of mutual concern, all the Provincial Premiers, without the federal authority. Smallwood came in 1960 for the first meeting. I think he came in 1962 for the second meeting, and then boycotted all the other Provincial Premiers Meetings, year after year. So that was his way of looking at things” (Robichaud, 1987: 2). Robichaud surmised that Newfoundland “is conceptually different from the rest of the Atlantic Provinces. It is an island, Prince Edward Island is an island of course, but Newfoundland is quite a distance from the rest of the country, and they have their own ways of life that are completely different from those of people from Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick” (Ibid). Furthermore, the power of Smallwood was also singled out as a stumbling block to its engagement with regionalism. Smallwood was the key driving force that brought Newfoundland into Confederation in 1949 and remained in power until 1971. Robichaud likened Smallwood to an ‘emperor’ and the province of Newfoundland as “something like a sacred cow. Nobody could touch it and nobody would touch it” (Ibid). Tomblin argued that the enduring theme of Smallwood’s leadership was “the need to keep priority setting within the hands of the premier” (Tomblin, 1995: 90).

That said, however, the immediate response of Smallwood was to propose an ‘island union’ between the provinces of Newfoundland and PEI: “I suggest that a good practical beginning of this might be made by the very early union of the two great Island provinces of PEI and Newfoundland. Then perhaps, if that happened or were about to happen then the tens of thousands of Newfoundlanders who have made their home in Cape Breton Island would put up an irresistible demand to be included in this new union, of course if Cape Breton came in, Nova Scotia wouldn’t be too far behind and that would make the entry of New Brunswick quite inevitable” (Smallwood, 1964: 31). Shaw argued that an island union would encourage development, provide an outlet for PEI products, and electric power (Shaw, 1965). The seriousness and practicality of this suggestion is questionable but it does touch on a key theme that existed within the two island provinces: their desire to resist outside forces and maintain control of their natural resources. This response was a good indication of how the island provinces would approach the regional question.
Robichaud’s document to the APC redefined the union question away from whether a union should occur but whether the provinces should commission a study into its viability and desirability. The initial response of Stanfield and Shaw to the question of a union study was not favourable and Newfoundland withdrew from the process altogether but it did set in train a drive for greater levels of economic cooperation amongst the provinces. Following the APC meeting in September 1964, the premiers agreed to “explore areas for cooperation in a common approach to economic development” (Globe and Mail, 1964a: 3). The suggestion of a study was rejected, but was kept open as a possibility for the future (Watkins, 1964: 1). Robichaud himself said that the suggestion of an immediate study on the feasibility of a political union “did not penetrate as well as I had hoped” (Globe and Mail, 1964a: 3). Stanfield noted that the lack of public support meant a union was not necessary, commenting that “nobody is marching in the streets for a political union” (Drummie, 1987a: 25). For the time being at least, the premiers were focused on pursing regional objectives within the parameters of the existing provincial structures and the established regional vehicle, the APC.

6.3. Conclusion

This chapter has sought to determine why the political union concept emerged during the early 1960s. It revealed an external and internal context. The political union concept reflected the nature of the national context, shaped by questions of nationalism and separatism in Quebec and the role of federal transfer payments. It also reflected the role of political agency. The national context created an opportunity for vested political leaders to explore new avenues for regionalism. New Brunswick premier Louis Robichaud exploited the national context in which to advocate a greater regional effort. At this time, a political union was a question of capacity. It was advocated as a means to give the region the necessary economic and political capacity in which to achieve internal aspirations and respond and contribute to the broader national context. That said however, the union question and Robichaud’s suggestion for a union study did not resonate with his counterpart premiers at this time. Why then was a political union study established in March 1968? As evidence in Chapter 7 will demonstrate, how this outcome was shaped not only by occurrences in the national political environment and political agency within the Maritimes but also by the intensification of separatism in Quebec and the election of a new political leader in PEI.
Chapter 7

Towards a Critical Juncture: The Establishment of the Maritime Union

Study

This chapter outlines why it became salient for the political leaders to commission an official government sponsored study, the Maritime Union Study (MUS), to investigate the political union concept in March 1968. It will be argued that internal political dynamics, characterised by progressive premiers and the planning mindset first seen in New Brunswick, triggered the MUS as a response to the threats in the broader national environment, notably questions of Quebec separatism and the increased role of the federal government in provincial jurisdiction. The MUS was a critical juncture by which alternative political structures could be considered. That said, the MUS was also a way for the premiers to delay making a decision on the union question and remove it from the political sphere for a period of time. The MUS was structured as a commission of inquiry, which implied an investigatory role with no decision-making power. By structuring the study in this way the premiers were not obliged to accept the study’s final conclusions and therefore did not forsake their role as the core change agents. Despite the external threats, by establishing the MUS, the premiers retained the capacity to reject change at a later date.

This chapter will consider the role of conditions in the broader national environment, notably the concern caused by extreme separatism, the rise of mainstream separatism and the role of the federal government, as shapers of the decision to establish a political union study. The internal dynamics within the region were equally important. The question of personal political ambition was again prevalent, this time for Stanfield. In addition, the mindset towards the operation of government initiated within New Brunswick permeated elsewhere in the region, particularly PEI following the election of Alex Campbell in 1966. The chapter concludes with a focus on the MUS, its establishment, operation and findings. The purpose of this organisation is to bring to the fore the importance of political environment and agency in shaping questions of political union.
7.1. The Political Environment

National Political Environment

Less than two weeks after rejecting a union study, Stanfield approached Robichaud to propose that a union study should go ahead. In a letter to Robichaud, Stanfield acknowledged that although there could not be a four province union, as originally envisaged, the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick should consider a union “if it could be shown that such a step would be advantageous and acceptable to the people of both provinces” (Westell, 1964: 2). Stanfield suggested the “establishment of a joint commission to study the whole question” (Ibid). In trying to determine why or what caused Stanfield to shift his position on a union study within such a short period of time, it is pertinent to consider two key factors: the broader national environment and his personal political ambition.

Between the APC conference in late September 1964 and Stanfield’s approach to Robichaud in mid-October Queen Elizabeth II made an official visit to Canada\(^{13}\) to attend the commemoration of the 1864 Charlottetown Conference (Canadian Heritage, 2010). As part of the tour, the Queen visited Charlottetown, Ottawa and Quebec City. It was the visit of the Queen to Quebec City which caused the most controversy and served to highlight the threat of extreme separatism to the stability of the Canadian federation. For D.J Dooley, the “Queen’s visit to Quebec City dramatically emphasised the seriousness of the French-Canadian situation” (Dooley, 1965: 31). During the visit there were threats of assassination and kidnap on the Queen by separatists who saw the monarchy as a symbol of British oppression and a focus for anti-federal and anti-English sentiment. Prior to the visit, separatist leader Marcel Chaput said “some of my people are ready to let her know – and brutally - that she is not welcome in French Canada” (Ashby, 1964: 15).

The sense of tension during the visit permeated to the very top of the political establishment. Pearson noted that the growing agitation of extreme separatists was designed to “intimidate the government into cancelling the visit and served to create an image of Canada as a state on the verge of civil war and a police state or an armed camp. All of this gave priceless publicity to the separatists and played right into their hands in a completely irresponsible way” (Pearson, 1975: 291). In the event, the visit of the Queen passed off

\(^{13}\) The official visit of the Queen was made between 5 and 13 October 1964.
without major incident but it left a lasting impression because it raised questions over the threat posed by extreme separatism and developed a sense that English-Canada needed to formulate a response to the demands of the Quebec government. For example, Smiley warned that “if Confederation was to collapse, it would be through miscalculation rather than the deliberate planning of separatists; separatism through miscalculation could come either through English-Canadian delusions about the significance of minor gestures toward French-Canada or through French-Canadian insistence on a new Confederation strictly on their terms” (Sloan, 1964: 5). The simple message was that separatism was a real threat to the future of the federation and needed to be properly addressed.

In terms of the Maritimes, the threat posed by Quebec separatism was significant because of its possible implications. The two scenarios raised by the question of separatism were geographic truncation from the rest of Canada by an independent nation state and the collapse of Confederation altogether. Although strictly hypothetical, these scenarios had immediate economic consequences for the three provinces. If Confederation were to collapse, the three Maritime provinces, as the provinces most dependent on federal resources, would be in a particularly difficult position. Drummie noted that if Quebec separated from the federation the Maritimes would be cut off from the rest of Canada by both the United States and a sovereign Quebec: “the three provinces would have been in very difficult straits to have pulled themselves together and coped with that. That is a very sobering thought when you think about that one it is a good question as to what would have happened” (Drummie, 1987b: 25). The question of what would happen to the Maritimes in the event of secession by Quebec underpinned engagement with questions of regionalism in the Maritime province and influenced movement towards the establishment of a political union study. According to Drummie, a question that manifested prominently at that time was “how would it all end?” (Ibid: 10)

The fact that such a question could not be answered was key to the establishment of a critical juncture for the consideration of structural change within the Maritime region. Within this critical juncture questions of structural change could be considered in order to formulate a contingency plan against the threat of separatism. The permeation of a planning culture within New Brunswick was particularly important in situating the political union concept as a bulwark against the implications of separatism. The notion of a political union study was
central to this strategy. Drummie testified that although it was not a case of “lying awake at night worrying about it, we were certainly conscious of the fact that there was something happening in Quebec which might have a devastating impact on the Maritimes if that eventuality were to take place. If it didn’t, fine, but you couldn’t, if you were responsible, assume it away” (Ibid).

According to Robichaud, “the problem of separatism was always first and foremost in our minds [when writing the 1964 speech]” (Robichaud, 1987: 2). It was considered that the “uniting of the economies of the three Maritime Provinces was a possible way to answer the problems that would be created if Quebec eventually separated from the federation” (Ibid). Drummie recalled that at the time the speech was written there was, within the New Brunswick government, a “growing fear of separatism in Quebec” (Drummie, 1987b: 10). The proposal for a union study was influenced by this concern at the implications of separatism for the Maritimes and the belief that they needed a contingency plan in place should separatism become a reality. This was a demonstration of the culture of planning within New Brunswick during this period.

In a speech to the Empire Club of Canada on 24 November 1966, Stanfield indicated that Quebec separatism may have influenced his engagement with the planning mentality and a union study. Within the speech, Stanfield gave a sense of the necessary conditions for structural change amongst established political entities. Using the example of the formation of Canada, Stanfield argued: “the Fathers of Confederation were seeking a practical way to achieve a number of aims: governmental stability in Upper and Lower Canada; continued independence from the United States, and the development of the North and the West. Confederation involved both a solution to pressing problems and a vision of the future. Its purpose was not predominantly economic. Confederation envisaged not only a satisfactory economic future but enabled the British Colonies in North America to develop British North America themselves in their own way and independently of the United States” (Stanfield, 1966). Stanfield was arguing that Canada, as a union of existing political entities, was established in response to specific pressures and tensions which threatened to undermine the ability of the colonies to determine their own economic and political course. A political union of the British colonies was a practical necessity in order to achieve internal objectives and protect their jurisdictions from the external threat of annexation to the United States.
The purpose of Stanfield’s speech in 1966 was to contribute to the broader national unity agenda. In addressing these factors, he made a number of points that indicated that such threats could influence engagement with questions of structural change in the Maritimes. Most significantly, Stanfield surmised that “it is difficult to see Canada and the Canadian way of life surviving and flourishing if Quebec pursues some separate course” (Ibid). The sense that the fragmentation of the federation would precipitate structural change within the Maritime region was demonstrated by his assertion that Nova Scotia, which was the most industrially developed of the three provinces, would not be viable as an independent entity: “I do not personally believe Nova Scotia would be economically viable on her own in the world of today” (Ibid). This perspective gives some credence to the notion that a union study was framed in response to the uncertainty regarding the future of the federation.

Furthermore, the sense that structural change must be underpinned by an external threat was demonstrated by his assertion that economic argument alone is not enough to precipitate the amalgamation of existing political entities: “the point I wish to make here is that purely economic considerations are no more capable of binding Canada together today than they were of creating Canada in 1867. If economics alone had been considered Canada would not have been created in 1867. If economics only are considered, it is difficult to justify today the continued existence of Canada. Our country was not created and it does not continue to exist for economic reasons” (Stanfield, 1966). This assertion indicated that his reason for engaging with a union study went beyond the economic logic outlined by Robichaud in his submission to the APC.

The pressure for economic self-sufficiency by the rest of the country did however influence Stanfield’s approach to Robichaud. Stanfield cited a desire not to give “an impression that Nova Scotia was negative in its attitude” towards questions of economic self-sufficiency and national unity as a core reason for revising his opinion on a union study (Westell, 1964: 2). Some years later Stanfield further elaborated on this line of thinking: “I thought that since the people in the rest of Canada were putting a lot of money into the Maritimes we should explore every possibility that they thought was a good idea, and there was a lot of feeling in other parts of the country that a political union would make sense” (Stanfield, 1987a: 16). The desire of Stanfield to be responsive to the opinion of the rest of Canada is puzzling because of the territorial nature of provincial politics. As Savoie noted, the
role of a provincial premier is “defined by geography, by an electorate with community and territorial interests to advance” (Savoie, 2006: 5). The answer to this puzzle is that, like Robichaud, Stanfield was adapting his behaviour and perspectives to those of the broader federation in order to aid his chances of a federal political career.

Stanfield was conscious that the rest of Canada, as articulated by Bennett, wanted structural change as a means of lessening economic dependence on the federal government. Stanfield’s biographer Geoffrey Stevens has suggested that Stanfield as early as April 1964 was carving out a national persona. Stevens outlined that in a speech to the Canadian Club of Montreal in April 1964 Stanfield “stepped out of the role of premier to talk forcefully and with concern about national problems. He talked about pride in Canada, trade, foreign ownership, and the problems of relations between English and French-speaking Canadians—all areas that federal politicians like to regard as their private preserve” (Stevens, 1973: 159). Stanfield himself said that “I wasn’t aware, at least, of being at all ambitious for higher office but I felt dissatisfied with the position of the national party on Quebec, on the linguistic question in Canada. I felt I had something to contribute. I thought I understood regional disparity and the solutions better than any politician, at least in the country, so I wasn’t being unduly modest about it. I don’t know whether in my subconscious or something, there was a feeling that I wanted to be Prime Minister of Canada. But I wasn’t aware of that” (Stanfield, 1987b: 8).

By favouring the establishment of a union study it can be surmised that Stanfield was seeking to facilitate a federal career by structuring his policy perspectives with those he perceived were held in the rest of Canada. Despite his assertions that he was not ambitious, Stanfield felt he could make a contribution to the national arena and was prepared, whilst premier of Nova Scotia, to articulate his vision. The territorial nature of Canadian politics and the bifurcated party system has been outlined as an impediment to movement between the respective levels in Canada. However, as a provincial premier, Stanfield had the visibility and opportunity to articulate his national vision. As Savoie has noted, provincial premiers enjoy a high visibility in the national media and can often “plead, before a national audience for a better deal for their province” (Savoie, 2006: 211). Stanfield and Robichaud, however, were able to use their national visibility to facilitate their own political careers. The place of the political union study for Stanfield and Robichaud was as a component of the strategy to
present their opinions and perspectives as consistent with broader national opinion. Unlike Robichaud, Stanfield did make the transition to federal politics in 1967 when he became the leader of the federal Progressive Conservative Party.14

Furthermore, the engagement with a union study underscored a sense that the future of the three provinces was interlinked with the question of Quebec separatism. More so in the case of Robichaud than Stanfield, the concern that separatism, if realised, would alter the dynamic of the federation by geographically truncating the Maritimes or precipitating the fragmentation of the federation altogether, facilitated engagement with structural change as a tool to mitigate the implications of separatism for the region. The reduction of the region’s economic dependency on the federal government was forwarded as a central component of this strategy. As Robichaud argued in his Empire Club speech the Maritime region had to “direct our own economic emancipation. This we are prepared to do. This we will do” (Robichaud, 1963). Stanfield on the other hand argued that greater levels of inter-provincial cooperation were necessary to prevent the further encroachment of the federal government into areas of provincial jurisdiction: “in my view federal officials and politicians have used shared cost programmes to impose their views upon the provinces in fields of provincial jurisdiction. I realise that in the United States the trend has been for the federal government to devise and proceed with educational and welfare programmes without regard to state governments or their programmes. One gets the impression of an increasing role for the government at Washington and a decreasing role for state governments. We cannot resort to a federal steamroller as the Americans have. We must use other methods, including inter-provincial co-operation” (Stanfield, 1966).

Drummie specifically highlighted federal government centralisation as an external threat to the region. He argued that there was an increasing desire within the region that the provinces disconnect themselves more from the federal government in order to “determine their own future” (Drummie, 1987b: 27). Tomblin argued that there was growing concern that the increased role of the federal government in the economic and fiscal affairs of the provinces was precipitating “the loss of control over policy decision-making to outsiders” (Tomblin, 1995: 82). The benefit of reducing economic dependency was that it would mitigate the affect of separatism on the region, allow the region to be more self-sufficient and

14 The remainder of the Progressive Conservative party mandate in Nova Scotia was led by George Isaac Smith.
contribute to the broader national unity agenda. The question of a political union study thus sought to achieve four core objectives: a contingency against the implications of separatism, regional self-determination, a stronger contribution to the national unity debate, and the capacity to influence it.

The trigger of interest in structural change emerged outside the Maritime region. The national political environment, precipitated by questions of nationalism and separatism in Quebec and the federal government’s desire to accommodate Quebec’s grievances within the parameters of federalism, established the context in which questions of structural change at the provincial level could be proposed. Bennett presented the most comprehensive vision of structural change with his five regions concept. A union study was proposed as a means of providing a regional response to the external threats emanating within the national environment. These external threats influenced questions of regional structural change as a means of precipitating economic objectives and lessening the region’s dependency on the federal government. The notion of personal political ambition intersected with the national political environment because of the way in which it allowed opportunist political leaders to structure their policy perspectives in a way that would aid their career objectives. The investigation of structural change in the Maritime region was thus a response to the broader national environment and the threats that emerged within it.

The Political Context in the Maritimes.

Although the question of a political union study was interconnected with the broader national environment it was aided by the regional political environment. The political environment in New Brunswick was a particularly important shaper of the Maritime response to the national political environment because of the way the ideas and practices within that province became prevalent elsewhere in the region, notably PEI following the election of Campbell in 1966.

According to Drummie, the environment for structural change both within New Brunswick and the wider region was influenced by what he termed an ‘ésprit de corps mentality:’ “the nature of the people, the way we approached our work. By that I mean the openness, the creativity, which I honestly think was there in great abundance. That wonderful feeling that there was absolutely nothing we could not tackle or solve, a willingness to go back to basics and examine everything, a willingness to change even the most hallowed and
sacrosanct institutions in some cases, which was being demonstrated. It had not quite burst forth in 1964, but all of the groundwork was being laid for what was subsequently the EOP and things like a political union which the Robichaud Government was more than prepared to address” (Drummie, 1987a: 3). The esprit de corps dynamic within New Brunswick was crucial to the notion of a political union study. It not only provided the impetus for the concept to emerge but it brought a willingness to exploit the national political environment in order to place it on the public agenda.

The sense that no institution or political structure was sacrosanct over the achievement of a broader objective was a pragmatic mindset that spilled over into PEI with the election of Alex Campbell. Upon his election, he admitted to being influenced by the mindset and style of leadership being pursued in New Brunswick: “it (Equal Opportunity) demonstrated the leadership of a bold and courageous premier and government, tackling sacrosanct territory. I believe Equal Opportunity demonstrated a dynamic government in action, bold enough and courageous enough to tackle some pretty heavy structural problems within the socio/economic climate in New Brunswick” (Campbell, 1987a: 7). It was therefore not surprising that one of his first acts as premier was to engage with a union study. It is not possible to pinpoint any ulterior motive or threat as influencing Campbell’s reasoning for wanting PEI to be a part of a union study other than a genuine belief that it may be of benefit for the province to influence the process. He had articulated such a position as leader of the opposition. In a legislative exchange with Shaw in 1965, Campbell argued that “while we are not in favour of a political union, we feel that PEI should be participating in the talks which are presently being held to consider the merits of a political union” (Campbell, 1965). Campbell recalled in the 1980s: “I urged Premier Shaw to join the group, better for Prince Edward Island to be present, and to hear and see policies being formulated, and to make your own impression if you could, in the design of those policies, rather than simply being on the outside looking in, and forced from time to time, to react to the actions of the two other Maritime Provinces” (Campbell, 1987a: 3).

The pragmatic mindset of Campbell stood in sharp contrast to that of his predecessor who equated a political union study as a challenge to PEI’s political autonomy and an attempt at control by outsiders. Shaw had argued that a political union was a way for New Brunswick to exert external control over PEI and undermine its independence: “no doubt the Premier of
New Brunswick would be very happy to have PEI joined up as a county of New Brunswick. I am wondering, whether the premier of this province has given very much thought to our position if we sacrificed our individual independence and joined up with any other Maritime province” (Shaw, 1966). For Drummie, Shaw was a “traditional Prince Edward Island politician” who, as a farmer, articulated the expected political mindset (Drummie, 1987b: 3). David Milne argued that “the story of a people fending off rent collectors and wrestling control of their lands from absentee landlords to establish an independent, rural and prosperous PEI has been a constant preoccupation of Island politicians. Island politicians have returned again and again to this vision. No premier ever expressed this noble pastoral image as poetically as Walter Shaw” (Milne, 2001: 113). John Reid attributed this mentality to fears that the Island may become ‘Monctonised;’ that is, the closer the Island became to the mainland provinces, of which the City of Moncton, New Brunswick, is the closest mainland city, the more likely its unique identity would be diluted and it would be immersed into the “North American consumer economy” (Reid, 2009). The key concern of island politicians was to ensure that it maintained a “viable Island economy underpinned by agriculture and the integrity of land ownership” (Ibid).

Campbell however brought a different mindset and a different operation of government which was much more in line with the other Maritime governments at the time. Campbell’s Secretary to the Executive Council, Andrew Wells, said that Campbell “felt that the province had been far too parochial in the way in which we looked at other provinces, and the world, indeed. We needed to break ourselves out of the stand pat image, or attitude that we were in, and to become involved in looking at the concept of Maritime co-operation or political union, was quite consistent I think, with that. We genuinely felt that we should not miss this opportunity to have some influence on the decisions made, as a result of this study” (Wells, 1987: 2-3). Campbell himself argued that the establishment of the study did not necessarily mean an inevitable political union but could provide a facilitating vehicle to give the province, in terms of government direction and government policy, the steerage that it needed (Campbell, 1987a: 6, 4). The election of Campbell demonstrated that questions of structural change were interlinked with the opinion of the political leaders of the day and how they interpreted the concept. Unlike Shaw, who approached the notion of a political union from a political autonomy perspective, Campbell was more pragmatic believing that a union study was an opportunity for the province to influence the direction of the region. This was
important because support for a political union study and support for a political union were not mutually exclusive.

At the time, both Stanfield and Robichaud made statements which questioned the achievability of a union. After Robichaud’s Centennial Conference speech in 1964, Stanfield declared: “I’m not sure it [a union] would be worth all the difficulties that would develop. We can solve most of our problems through close cooperation” (Fillmore, 1964: 7). Stanfield clarified this statement some years later: “I was concerned that if the three provinces were put together, the government of that new province would be so busy for years just holding the thing together, and trying to knit the thing together somewhat, they wouldn’t really have any time or energy for much else” (Stanfield, 1987a: 16). That said, Stanfield argued that a political union study should be established because of opinions elsewhere in the country: “I thought we should undertake [a political union study] because the rest of Canada thought we should. It was to show the other provinces we were trying to help ourselves” (Stanfield, 1969: 3). Robichaud said that a political union “is not practical in my lifetime or even the lifetime of our children” (Fillmore, 1964: 7). These assertions underscore a sense that, although the political leaders did not necessarily believe that a union could or would happen, they were prepared to investigate its viability in an official government sponsored study.

Campbell brought to PEI a semblance of this mindset. At the forefront of this was the increased role of political bureaucrats in the Campbell government and the increased dialogue between bureaucrats and premiers in the Maritime region. For Drummie, Campbell “made it possible to begin to address the union issue far more realistically because, in the growing interrelationships between premiers and their senior advisors and officials, there was an increasing discussion, not in any organised fashion, not on any particular occasion, but increasing discussion as to what we were all doing and where it was all going, and a growing recognition of the mutuality of our problems” (Drummie, 1987b: 3). Between the premiers also there was a growing consensus as to the value of regional effort. With the election of Campbell there came not just a coalescence of mindset between the Maritime premiers but the development of closer personal and political relationships between the premiers and their political officials. This is not to suggest formal or official forms of cooperation between the premiers, as was the case with regional forums such as the APC, but an emerging informal
cooperation in which the premiers would discuss and/or coordinate policies on an ad-hoc basis.

The role of personal and political friendships between the incumbent premiers was important in aiding the establishment of the MUS and regionalism more broadly. Despite being of different parties, Stanfield and Robichaud both noted that inter-provincial cooperation was made easier because of their personal affinity for one another. Robichaud said of Stanfield: “we were not only two premiers, two contemporary premiers, we were friends. I can say that despite our different political affiliations. We opened a school for the deaf together in Amherst, Nova Scotia” (Robichaud, 1987: 4). Stanfield said “we always had easy relations with New Brunswickers, regardless of whether it was Hugh John Flemming or whether it was Louis Robichaud and his people. We co-operated on the school for the Deaf to be built in Nova Scotia. We built it as near New Brunswick as we could” (Stanfield, 1987a: 15). The comments of Stanfield indicated that party labels were often not important in questions of cooperation. That said however, the relationship between Robichaud and Campbell indicated that party labels did aid a deeper form of cross-border cooperation that was more akin to policy coordination. Campbell noted that he and Robichaud “would meet often and became very good friends, and we did discuss our policies, and very often, on a confidential basis” (Campbell, 1987a: 7-8).

As has been outlined, Campbell was influenced by the mindset and policies of the Robichaud government in New Brunswick at this time and the assertion of a close relationship between the two the premiers reinforced this point. Robichaud himself felt that his government “without question influenced the Campbell government in PEI” (Robichaud, 1988: 14). A clear demonstration of how the planning mindset was prevalent within PEI was the 1969 Development Plan. This was a form of province-building which dramatically increased the size and competency of the provincial state. The plan “precipitated a major reorganisation in the machinery of government: for example, the size of the civil service between 1969 and 1975 grew by seventy per cent” (Crossley, 2000: 209). The key factor of the PEI Development Plan was the involvement of bureaucratic planners and political officials from outside the province. The key architect, Del Gallagher, had been involved in the EOP in New Brunswick. Gallagher brought to PEI a glimpse of the planning mindset that was prevalent in New Brunswick at this time. Campbell noted that Gallagher brought with him to
the province “a tremendous facility for grasping concepts and fleshing them out, he was a prodigious worker; he was able to put his hands or fingers on people. He had the courage or foresight that collectively as a Cabinet we did not possess because of our limited experience here in Prince Edward Island. Del had been active in larger spheres, and he was able to bring people with specific experience and knowledge to the task which we undertook” (Campbell, 1987a: 5-6).

The Development Plan in PEI demonstrated that the province was shifting away from historical concerns about political autonomy and towards the attainment of internal structural reform and economic development. The role of Campbell was central to this change. He typified the emergence of a unique political context, in terms of political leadership, within the Maritimes and the country as a whole at this time. He noted that the 1960s was “a very exciting period in Canadian history; there was young, aggressive political leadership in the nation’s capital, as well as the provincial capitals. We began meeting together in regular conferences, getting to know each other, getting to work together more effectively in an ever increasing and more complex economy and society” (Campbell, 1987c: 1). Stanfield provided a contrast between the approach of the three Maritime premiers and that of Newfoundland premier, Joey Smallwood who, despite the province facing many of the same economic difficulties, had rejected being a part of a union study. Stanfield noted that that Newfoundland and PEI under Shaw were wary of regionalism because of the danger that the islands would be consumed or homogenised by the larger provinces: “the idea of Maritime co-operation, I think was quite distinct from Newfoundland being there. Newfoundland always claimed its interest and its future were somewhat different. Joey (Smallwood) always said that Newfoundland did not have the same interest in co-operation that the rest of us had. The Islanders I think were always nervous about Nova Scotia and New Brunswick taking them to the cleaners. The big guys you see” (Stanfield, 1987a: 15). For Campbell, Shaw’s response to questions of regionalism was to “make a strong political statement towards the preservation of the autonomy and identity of the Island as a distinctive Confederation partner, as contrasted with perhaps the prospect of becoming a county of a new Atlantic Province” (Campbell, 1987a: 3).

There are two important aspects about the comments made by Stanfield. The first relates to the multifaceted nature of both the union concept and the notion of region. The
initial suggestion of Robichaud was for an ‘Atlantic Union’ which included the three Maritime provinces and Newfoundland. However, the refusal of Newfoundland and at first PEI to be a part of the study process brought forward a formula of union that would see the region revert back to its post-1769 form. If this were to occur, PEI and Newfoundland would remain separate entities with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick amalgamated in to a single political entity. This is how the region was comprised following the annexation of PEI into a separate colony in 1769. Robichaud and Stanfield were prepared to investigate a union on this basis and passed identical legislative resolutions in February 1965 committing to the establishment of a “study to enquire into the advantages and disadvantages of a union of the Province of Nova Scotia and the Province of New Brunswick to become one province within the nation” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 1). When PEI became part of the study process it demonstrated the third permutation of the union concept and the one which dominated the union debate throughout the 1960s and 1970s. A so-called ‘Maritime Union’ of the three Maritime provinces would see the region revert back to its pre-1769 form. This was the form of union that was discussed briefly in 1864 and to which Robichaud referred in his Centennial Conference speech in September 1964.

The second aspect relates to political perspectives within Nova Scotia. In his comments, Stanfield argued that the two island provinces were reluctant to engage with the question of a union study because their political leaders were concerned at the loss of their political and territorial autonomy. The situation was not too dissimilar in Nova Scotia. As in New Brunswick and later PEI, Nova Scotia engaged with questions of central economic planning, termed Voluntary Economic Planning (VEP), in early 1962. The Nova Scotia experience however revealed a reluctance of the political leaders to delegate their decision-making capacity to political officials or extra-political actors.

The formulation of VEP was not a product of political officials or bureaucratic planners as in New Brunswick or PEI but of political leaders, notably Minister of Finance and Economics, and future premier, G.I. Smith. The rationale of VEP was to bring together “the prospects of the main industries with the government's plans for the public sector and to see how in aggregate they contribute to and fit in with the prospects for the economy as a whole” (Clancy, 1997: 9). VEP was charged with achieving such objectives through the preparation

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15 See Appendix 3 for a text of the legislative resolutions.
of an economic plan for the province, based on the advice of Nova Scotians active in economic life (Ibid). A core problem with VEP was the existence of a tension between the desire of the Stanfield government to plan centrally in ways that involved extra-political actors and advocacy groups and the reluctance of state actors to forsake their decision-making capacity. Peter Clancy noted that at the time VEP was established, “there was neither a tradition nor evident potential for consultative policy-making in Nova Scotia. As such, there was a disquieting measure of cynicism toward the whole programme. Department heads were reluctant to sacrifice their own projects in favour of those emanating from VEP” (Ibid: 27).

The consequence of this tension was that by 1970, VEP was simply “a set of channels for routinised consultation, which left state authorities firmly in charge of policy determination (Ibid: 30). VEP showed that the provincial actors in Nova Scotia were much more reticent about external influence in political policy making. This characterisation is particularly important for thinking about how the province responded to the MUS report when it was published in late 1970.

Although each political leader demonstrated a degree of pragmatism by engaging with the notion of a union study, the political sensitivity of the union concept was clearly evident. The three premiers were keen to keep the study, and the union concept, at “arms length” from government and party politics (Drummie, 1987b: 8). Robichaud and Stanfield were conscious that the study must be politically neutral and could not be linked to either government or a particular political party. For example, in order to neutralise partisan considerations “the House leaders on the Opposition side of each house were asked to second the legislative resolutions” (Globe and Mail, 1964c: 10) eventually introduced in February 1965. In addition, Campbell did not pass a legislative resolution like his counterparts when he became premier in 1966. In Drummie’s opinion, this was because it would have been “too divisive” and may have made the union concept a political or party issue in PEI (Drummie, 1987b: 8). Instead, Campbell made known his willingness to engage with a union study in the Speech from the Throne in the PEI Legislature in February 1968. The wording of the speech gives some indication as to the sensitivity of the issue within the province. Whilst the legislative resolutions in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick explicitly stated that the remit of the study was to “enquire into the advantages and disadvantages of a union” there was no mention of a political union or a single province in the Throne Speech in PEI. Instead, the remit of the study was: “to further encourage and facilitate the co-operative efforts of the Atlantic
To recap, the context in which the study was conceived was one interlinked with the external and internal political environments during the 1960s. Quebec nationalism and extreme separatism had created a desire to accommodate Quebec’s demands within the parameters of Canadian federalism and raised questions about the ongoing viability of the federation. Furthermore, economic tensions emerged about the dependency of the poorer provinces on federal transfers. The internal political environment within the Maritimes at this time underscored the importance of political agency in questions of structural change. The ‘esprit de corps’ mindset was clearly evident in shaping engagement with the union concept. The culture of central planning and structural change that had been fostered by powerful political officials in New Brunswick emerged in PEI as a result of a pragmatic premier, the mobility of political officials across territorial boundaries and the personal political relationship of two premiers, Robichaud and Campbell, of the same party label. Stanfield demonstrated an external rationale for a study. Although not convinced by the merits of a union and operating within an environment that was wary of external influence in the policy process, he was prepared for a study to be established because of pressure from the rest of the country about the region’s detrimental economic condition. Stanfield’s own personal political aspirations may have been central to this aspect. These factors together provided the context for the establishment of a political union study.

### 7.2. Critical Juncture: The Maritime Union Study

Following the passing of the legislative resolutions in February 1965, there was a three year gap before the study began work on 26 March 1968. It is not immediately clear why this gap occurred. Drummie stated however that the gap “reflected the difficulty in finding a suitable leader to conduct the study” (Drummie, 2010a). However, in this three year period, further developments within the federation underscored the necessity of the study as a response to pressures that had the potential to shock the economic and political operation of the Maritime region, notably, the evolution of Quebec separatism into a mainstream political movement following the formation of the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association in November 1967 and

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16 See Appendix 4 for a full text of the legislative statement made by each Maritime premier.
the Parti Québécois (PQ) in October 1968. In addition, the election of Pierre Trudeau as Liberal leader and Prime Minister in April 1968 increased the prevalence of the economic strand of the national unity debate within federal government policy. These developments did not directly influence the establishment of the study but they heightened the external pressures on the Maritime region and intensified the need for a regional response.

The establishment of the study precipitated a wider debate about questions of structural change in the Maritime region and gave a greater focus of how developments in the federation, such as separatism, would influence the question of a political union. Whereas the political debate prior to March 1968 had focused on the notion of a political union study, once the study itself was established, the debate shifted to addressing the union concept itself. Most important, questions of nationalism and separatism and the role of the federal government became drivers of the debate. The study and the commentary and debate within the broader process brought to the fore an idea of how and why a political union would actually occur. The MUS formally investigated structural change from an internal economic and public service perspective. Its operation was in the vein of the planning mentality that was prevalent within individual provinces throughout the 1960s. However, at the time the MUS was established, there was very little idea of how a union could actually occur.

What needs to be determined in terms of the MUS is how the final conclusions of the study impacted on the consideration and implementation of structural change in the Maritime region. The choices and decisions of the political leaders are key components of this process. A critical juncture is a choice point in which a particular option is selected from among two or more alternatives (Mahoney, 2001a: 113). The political leaders had already indicated the existence of a critical juncture because, in commissioning the MUS, it demonstrated that they were prepared to make a choice between the status quo and a political union. In considering a political union, the three political leaders had demonstrated that wholesale change to the structural setting may be a necessary response to the broader national environment. In commissioning the MUS however the political leaders sought to delay the decision-making process and in effect gain a ‘pre-decision’ on the union question from extra-political actors (Doern, 1967: 417). What is missing from this scenario is a sense of how and why political leaders may make the decision to form a political union. An analysis of the MUS, its establishment and final conclusions will give a better understanding of the factors that
influence political leaders to make decisions on wholesale structural change, which in turn marks the beginning of new path dependent processes.

*The Establishment of the Maritime Union Study*

The establishment of the MUS indicated that the political leaders recognised the necessity of some form of structural change but were not prepared to make a decision in the immediate instance. The MUS was similar to a royal commission, although not as comprehensive in scope. It followed a typical royal commission model, in that it was a method of developing policy in a “public, ad hoc and investigatory way” (Ibid). G. Bruce Doern highlighted that these three qualities as the central tenets of the royal commission method. Royal commissions are public in the sense that they seek to “sweep into the policy process outside or non-governmental or non-civil service participants” and “introduce a degree of independent and alternative sources of information and opinion about policy problems” (Ibid). Royal commissions are ad hoc because they are a form of monetary or discontinuous policy machinery which is dismantled once it has carried out its investigatory function. Crucially, royal commissions have no responsibility to implement their own recommendations. The lack of an execution function characterises royal commissions as fulfilling a pre-decision or investigatory role (Ibid: 418). The MUS was established in this ad hoc investigatory vein. Its purpose was “a special study on Maritime Union including the possibilities for economic and other forms of regional coordination and cooperation” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 2).

The terms of reference of the MUS were to “determine what improvements in public policies and public services could be achieved through closer co-operation among the three Maritime provinces and to provide information to the three governments and the people of these provinces which would assist them in determining if political union is desirable or practical and in considering what other forms of cooperation would be to their mutual advantage” (Ibid: 3). Although the terms of reference refer to the ‘people of the provinces,’ the MUS was very much a process to inform the political sphere. The impetus for an investigation into the question of a political union emanated with the premiers and the decision-making and execution of any conclusions rested with the premiers. However, in commissioning the MUS, it indicated that the premiers wished detach the question from the political arena and allow the authors of the study to make a ‘pre-decision.’ According to
Drummie, the union concept was “eased out to the side by the premiers whilst it was considered by the study” (Drummie, 1970: 225).

The figures who conducted the MUS indicated that although the study process would be detached from the three governments it would be conducted by people who were closely aligned to the political process and would approach the study from a perspective consistent with the nature of Maritime politics in the 1960s. The hiring of John Deutsch, an academic and economist who at the time was the Chancellor of Queens University, as the special advisor to the study gave an indication that the premiers wished the study to take an economic trajectory. Furthermore, Deutsch was an ‘outsider,’ in that he was from Saskatchewan and resident in Ontario, and had no sentimental ties to any Maritime province. As Drummie noted, it was surmised that, if the study’s conclusions were to be credible to all three provinces, nobody who was “visibly from the Maritime provinces” could lead the study. It had to be someone from “outside but with a knowledge of the region” (Drummie, 1987b: 8-9). Deutsch was familiar with the challenges facing the region because he had served as Chairman of the Royal Commission on Higher Education for the Robichaud Government from 1961-1962.

The hiring of Drummie, economic advisor to Robichaud, as Executive Director of the MUS, buttressed the sense that the study would be concerned with questions of economic capacity. Drummie argued that he and Deutsch were “economists concerned with economic issues and the cost of governance” (Drummie, 2010a). With Deutsch and Drummie steering the study, it was clear that the study would be heavily influenced by the mindset of the Robichaud government in New Brunswick at this time. Furthermore, the addition of Frederic Arsenault as Secretary completed the study team and strengthened the link to New Brunswick. Arsenault was a francophone from PEI who had attended university in New Brunswick and joined the study following a period as Executive Assistant to Richard Hatfield, leader of the Progressive Conservative party in New Brunswick (Arsenault, 1988: 5). Tomblin noted that the hiring of Deutsch, Drummie and Arsenault made the study “very much a New Brunswick project” (Tomblin, 1995: 91).

The study was designed to be politically and provincially neutral but the links of the three men to the Robichaud government’s structural reforms and New Brunswick politics more broadly raised suspicions as to the motives of the study. Shaw captured some of this
suspicion in 1966 when he accused the Robichaud government of wanting to subsume PEI as a county of New Brunswick. Drummie suggested that such concerns provided the reasoning for the incorporation of the cooperation aspect into the study’s terms of reference: “the cooperation aspect was incorporated partly because it was a logical consideration for such a study but also because it was understood by people who are upset with sudden or dramatic change” (Drummie, 2010a). Drummie reinforced this aspect in a letter to the premiers’ executive assistants in July 1968: “what we, the Maritime Union Study group, are primarily concerned with is coordination and cooperation not political union” (Evans, 1985: 127). This gave a sense that, although it was politically detached, the study was a preserve of the political sphere. It was a mechanism established to influence and shape political decision-making.

**The Broader Shapers of the Maritime Union Study**

The existence of the MUS stimulated extensive public debate about a political union. This provided a gauge as to how the study and the concept more broadly was perceived and the key issues driving the debate. The Chronicle Herald argued in October 1968 that “the three sponsoring governments are not interested in political union exclusively, but also in new and more effective means of cooperation, the last we suggest, will be the product of the investigation, not political union; the political, administrative, and economic arguments against union will be duly confirmed, in our view, as formidable” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 105). The Charlottetown Guardian noted that “the commission will not recommend for or against a physical union of the three provinces, it will make recommendations on areas of public service and development policies, it is the emphasis on this point which we found most reassuring. The hoary proposal for a political union in which we would stand to lose more than we gained (does not appeal to Prince Edward Islanders)” (Charlottetown Guardian, 1968: 3-4). The Fredericton Gleaner in November 1968 took a similar perspective: “a political union would mean disturbing old and deep loyalties. But common sense dictates much more intimate cooperation in economic matters” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 106). This snapshot of editorial debate indicates that cooperation as opposed to a union was perceived to be the most realistic outcome of the study. An editorial in the Chronicle Herald in late 1969 reinforced this sense: “proponents of a political union base their case (which may or may not be wholly valid) that such a union would result in industrial expansion and
rationalisation and in overall administrative economies. Yet a political union, if it materialises, will be the result of a political decision. It is only when a political union becomes practical politics, and when the peoples of these three proudly independent and, in many respects, diverse provinces are willing to sink their provincial identities into a wider and more complex loyalty, that a political union will become a reality; until this stage has been reached, such political union will remain a pipe dream for its protagonists, a nightmare to its opponents” (Chronicle Herald, 1969: 4).

This editorial is important because it gets to the core of the nature of the political union debate. In spite of the MUS, and the public and academic input that flowed to it and from it, the decision to enact a political union was a question of political agency. It was a decision to be made by political leaders. Yet the assertion that a political union would only occur when it became ‘practical politics’ was an important point because it raised the question - what, if anything, could cause a political union to become practical politics? The broader debate gave an indication of how a political union could become practical politics: it was related to the broader national environment. In March 1969, Chronicle Herald staff writer Rob Smith argued “there are two things that conceivably could bring about political union – money problems and the threat of Quebec separatism” (Smith, 1969: 5).

On the separatism question, Smith argued that a political union could become “a means of self-preservation in a Canadian Pakistan” (Ibid). This was a direct reference to concern within the region that if Quebec was to leave Canada, the Maritimes would be truncated from the rest of the country like East Pakistan had been in South Asia. Smith presented Quebec as being on a type of precipice because of the declining health of the incumbent UN premier, Jean Jacques Bertrand, and the rise of a mainstream separatist party – the Parti Québécois (PQ) - led by the former Quebec Liberal cabinet minister, René Lévesque. Smith argued: “what happens if the Quebec premier has another heart attack? Where would Canada – and the Maritime provinces - stand, if (nationalist UN politician) Jean-Guy Cardinal were premier of Quebec or indeed if René Lévesque came to hold the balance of power?” (Ibid) The formation of the PQ was important because it “mobilised the

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17 The situation following the withdrawal of Britain from the Indian subcontinent in the late 1940s, established the state of Pakistan that included, until 1971, a provincial state, East Pakistan, which was geographically separated from the country by the state of India.
mainstream separatism movement into a combined and effective political force at a time when it was fragmented and unfocused” (Saywell, 1968).

Furthermore, Smith’s analysis clearly articulated a belief that there was a sense of a ‘masked separatism’ within the UN government. The ambiguity of the UN’s position on separatism contributed to the concern within the Maritime region that some within the UN government favoured separatism should the demands of the province not be met. An example of this ambiguity was demonstrated in September 1967 by Quebec Minister of Finance, Paul Dozois. In a similar statement to that made by Lesage in Toronto in 1964, Dozois argued that the UN position was the political recognition of a two-nation principle within Confederation but that separatism may become salient if this principle is not respected: “Quebec must be given equality with the rest of Canada if this is not done, the Government will then, and only then, begin studying the possibility of independence” (Henault, 1967: 2). The sense that the UN was working towards independence was buttressed by the party’s plans at this time for a law giving the government the ability to consult the people via a referendum (Ibid). J. Ralph Winter argued that the three provinces would “rush into a union by the sudden horror of Quebec separatism. Quebec would not only have an autocratic government in charge of a dynamic but violent society, but it would geographically isolate the Maritimes from the rest of Canada” (Winter, 1969: 3).

The second concern expressed by Smith rested on a sense that the federal government could demand or influence moves towards a political union through its spending power. Smith specifically questioned whether the federal government may cut equalization in order to shape structural change in the region: “the people in the rest of the country, who to a large degree pay the shot for the Maritimes, could decide to attempt to call the game. It would be hard to resist them” (Smith, 1969: 5). However, the context of federal government economic development policy was also evolving into a more potent threat to the Maritimes. The establishment of the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) was a particularly important shaper of the regionalism question at this time. DREE formed a key component of the Trudeau government’s ‘just society’ platform. Unlike the bilingualism and biculturalism focus of the Pearson government, the Trudeau government centred on the aspiration of “a strong and united Canada founded on a policy of equal opportunity for all. The two main facets of the policy lay in equality of opportunity for all Canadians regardless of economic
region in which they lived and regardless of the language they spoke – French and English” (Trudeau, 1990: 360). Established in April 1969, DREE initiated two regional programmes: “the first programme was designed to attract private sector investment to slow growth regions through cash grants” (Desjardins, Hobson and Savoie, 1996: 34). The second programme, termed the Special Areas Programme, was designed to promote faster industrial growth (Ibid).

DREE was the vehicle through which federal spending power would be exercised in the field of economic development. Federal regional development policy was designed as a process of collaboration between the two orders of government. The deputy minister of DREE, Tom Kent, argued “regional policy is not federal and it is not provincial, it is the business of both orders of government. It depends more than most public policies on making federalism an exercise in political cooperation” (Kent, 2004: 1). One thing however was clear about regional policy: federal spending power was supreme. For example, some Special Areas Programmes were fifty percent funded by the federal government, plus a loan for all or part of the remainder (Savoie, 2006: 9). The political implications of regional policy and the establishment of DREE was that it raised questions about the motives of the federal government. Tomblin argued that the agenda of the Trudeau government was to “move the federation towards increased integration, in order to confront the forces of provincialism and Quebec nationalism within the federation” (Tomblin, 1995: 48). He further argued that regional development policy “indicated that the federal government was more than willing to exploit spending power and DREE to strengthen its dominance over weaker provinces. It made sense to bank on federal spending powers to quell the rising tide of provincial protectionism, which was seen as inhabiting economic development in peripheral regions” (Ibid).

The sense that the federal government was using its superior spending power to influence provincial policy or as an underhanded effort at centralisation was a perspective that resonated with the Maritime premiers during the 1960s. Stanfield argued: “in my view federal officials and politicians have used shared cost programmes to impose their views upon the provinces in fields of provincial jurisdiction. These programmes have been used to extend the authority of the federal government” (Stanfield, 1966). For Drummie, the prevalence of the federal government in funding provincial programmes fostered an ingrained mindset in the Maritime region that the federal government was the key source of revenue: “we were
increasingly nervous about the federal government’s domination of our governments, of our provinces, of our way of life. Through shared-cost programme, yes, but even through equalization. It became quite evident to many of us, that the federal government was rapidly becoming the dominant power, the dominant authority, and that the governments we worked for, stood the chance of becoming glorified municipalities. They were rapidly losing any real ability to make any really substantive decisions” (Drummie, 1987b: 7). Drummie described this situation as a ‘federal versus provincial government issue.’ The role of the federal government, through its spending power “threatened the ability of the people of the region to determine their own future. Economic dependency had affected the ability of the provinces to chart their own destiny” (Ibid: 27).

It was this sense of economic dependence that underpinned the work of the MUS. The MUS presented its raison d’être as a process in the restoration and protection of self-determination in the Maritime region. Furthermore, although the threat posed by Quebec separatism was acknowledged by the study it was rejected as a shaper of a political union and characterised as a national problem: “at the present time the uncertainties which confront the region – the Maritimes – from two dangers; the possible disintegration of the nation and continued substantial disparities in relation to the remainder of the country. The former possibility is not a consideration of this study other than as one factor in the changes and disturbances which concern the people of the Maritimes at this time. The severe difficulties for the nation which could result from such developments as Quebec separatism would have ramifications far beyond those affecting the union of the Maritimes, It is the threat of slow economic growth and a continued inferior level of participation in the economic and political life of the nation that poses the most likely and the most serious challenges to the people of these three provinces” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 9-10).

This excerpt from the MUS demonstrated that it was the present internal and external political environment that had necessitated the consideration of a political union at this time. Although it was stated that separatism was not a concern of the study, in acknowledging that it posed a threat to the region it demonstrated that issue was within the psyche of those conducting the study. The economic perspective which the study pursued reflected the expertise of the study’s leadership and avoided the difficulty of addressing the Quebec question, a fact which Drummie later acknowledged: “we had a terrible time, John and I,
addressing the separatism issue. If we really had come out and said separatism was a threat, we would have been accused of encouraging the separatists” (Drummie, 1987b: 25). However, what the MUS demonstrated in its rationale was that the consideration of structural change in the Maritime region was a defensive move against clear threats within the internal and external political environment. The establishment of the MUS was designed as a bulwark against the encroachment of the federal government into provincial jurisdiction and to address, through questions of economic growth and self-sufficiency, the implications of separatism.

The MUS, and the political union question more generally, reflected the effort of the premiers to defend the territorial integrity of the region and ensure its continuation as a distinct political and economic region. The royal commission model was beneficial because it allowed the premiers to receive information as the basis for a specific decision but allowed them to delay making the decision and remove it from the political sphere whilst it was investigated. Most important, the royal commission model meant the premiers had the flexibility to reject the recommendations or cherry pick the most acceptable. Thus, the key implication of the establishment of the MUS is that although the political union concept was, in the words of Drummie, “eased out to the side by the premiers,” the royal commission model ensured that they retained full control of the process with little political sacrifice.

The Process of the Maritime Union Study

The MUS began work on 26 March 1968 and was comprised of a three man study team: John James Deutsch (Special Advisor), Frederic Drummie (Executive Director) and Frederic Arsenault (Secretary). Deutsch’s role as Special Advisor was to assist in organising the study, to supervise the study, and to participate in the formulation of any recommendations and reports (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 2). Drummie’s role as Executive Director was to “coordinate efforts by the various governments as well as special studies and investigations as required” (Ibid). Drummie described his role as Executive Director as the person who “did the work,” whilst Deutsch would act in a supervisory capacity due to the nature of his role with Queen’s University (Drummie, 2010a).

The core of the MUS research was conducted between 1968 and early 1970. The way in which the MUS operated focused very much on the notion of accessibility. The question of
accessibility referred to the effort to generate public awareness of its work and the union concept more broadly and the ability of persons or organisations to make representation and/or contribute to its overall objectives and conclusions. To this end, the MUS sought to engage with the general public within each province. The role of Arsenault as Secretary was to be the face ‘on the ground’ for the study in terms of public engagement: “what I was trying to do was to stir up some interest. We had a fairly extensive research programme that had been set up, but there was concern that we might not get any public input. We wanted to bring the study down to earth, and not only be an academic exercise. We tried to get it to relate, to a certain extent, to the ordinary lives of the people” (Arsenault, 1988: 18). Furthermore, as an Acadian from PEI, Arsenault was able to engage the study with the francophone communities within the region and give the study a broader regional character. Arsenault noted that, in Nova Scotia, there was “a fairly definite feeling that the study was a New Brunswick thing; I was from PEI, so that sort of covered that aspect and we operated from a Halifax office also” (Ibid: 17-18). Drummie noted that the role of Arsenault was to conduct public meetings in order to “give the study team a source of information and a view that it otherwise did not have” (Drummie, 1987b: 17).

The second aspect related to the accessibility of the study to vested organisations, such as businesses, and the country more broadly. This role was performed by Drummie who carried out public speaking engagements, published pamphlets and documents, and arranged “special conferences and conversations with leaders, officials and individuals” within the region and across the country, for example the One Prairie Province Conference in Alberta in May 1970 (Report on Maritime Union, 1970; 3-4). The objective of this was to promote the work of the study and solicit engagement from organisations and/or experts in specific areas of social and economic life that would be affected by a political union or an enhanced form of regional cooperation. The final report of the study was influenced and shaped by a comprehensive research programme of seventeen “special studies on important aspects of the subject” (Ibid: 3).18 The studies were contracted and financed by the MUS to provide a “basis upon which to measure whether a union was possible or relevant” (Drummie, 2010a).

The research process was significant in the way it brought out a number of trends that would be relevant when thinking about the political response to the final conclusions of the

18 See Appendix 5 for a list of the special studies conducted by the MUS.
MUS. First, the research process reflected a paradox between the mechanics and practicalities of the study and the raison d'être for its establishment. The MUS was in part established to consider how the three provinces could reduce their dependence on the federal government but half of its costs were met by a grant of $125,000 from the federal government (Receiver General for Canada. 1969: 22). The grant was authorised by Kent and demonstrated that structural change and/or cooperation within the Maritime region was consistent with the broader opinions and objectives of the federal government at that time. The federal government was favourable to questions of union and/or cooperation as a means of fostering internal economic development and reducing dependency and regional disparity with Canada. Nova Scotia premier Gerald Regan argued that the federal government would often use its spending power in which to encourage and influence cooperation between the provinces (Regan, 2010). In providing $125,000 to the MUS, the federal government was seeking to facilitate an internal endeavour that fitted with its overall regional policy objectives.

The study process also demonstrated key differences of opinion between the provinces towards the question of a union. For example, business interests in New Brunswick were generally in favour of a political union because of the scope for more efficient government (Globe and Mail, 1969a: B4). Business opinion in Nova Scotia however was deemed to be less favourable. Whilst the benefits of less regulation and more efficient government were seen as potential benefits, this was outweighed by the potential for higher taxation because of the lower standard of living in New Brunswick and PEI (Globe and Mail, 1969b: B4). This perspective was similar to that articulated by Stanfield in September 1964. Opinions in PEI were also hostile. The basis of opposition rested on whether the purported economic and administrative benefits of a union were actually achievable and therefore worth the political and territorial sacrifice. Instead it was questioned whether the administrative and economic benefits could be achieved through cooperation (Globe and Mail, 1969c: B4). These positions were important because they provided an indication of how each province would respond to the final conclusions of the MUS when it was published in late 1970.

Whilst the existence of the MUS did provoke a wider visibility for the union concept, this visibility was aided by existing regional organisations, most notably the Atlantic
Provinces Economic Council (APEC). In its submission to the MUS in April 1969, APEC proclaimed that it “fully endorses not only the concept of Maritime Union but also wishes to express deep concern that a single Maritime province be created as a result of a political union of the provinces” (APEC, 1969: 1).

The key significance of the APEC contribution to the MUS was the way in which it linked external threats to an internal logic for a political union. It specifically highlighted the threat posed by dependency on the federal government. It argued that if the three provinces did not become more administratively efficient and economically self-sufficient they risked becoming colonies of the federal government: “if the three provinces do not strive to act together, through union, to increase the level of efficiency (producing the optimum output at minimum cost) and the quality of services offered, demands for federal funds to cover increased costs in these provincial responsibilities could lead to the provincial governments finding themselves in the unenviable position of becoming mere colonies of Ottawa” (Ibid: 5). APEC argued that the dependency of the region on the federal government would be exacerbated as the demand for services rose and placed increased strain on provincial expenditure. A union, it was argued, could mitigate this by providing a stronger basis for internal “economic and social development potentialities” and the scope to enhance financial capacity (Ibid: 25). In achieving internal economic and administrative objectives, it would enable the provinces to “contribute to the growth of the nation” and “deal with the current situation and that of the years ahead” (Ibid).

The Findings of the MUS

The final report of the MUS was published on 26 November 1970. Its conclusions reinforced the sense that the study was designed to be a bulwark against the broader national political environment. The undercurrent of its conclusions centred on the notion of capacity, notably how the region could acquire the internal economic and political capacity to respond and contribute to the national political environment and reduce dependency on the federal government: “it is both trite and very important to emphasise that the course of action to be taken to achieve the common interests of the region in future, must be decided by the people of the Maritimes themselves” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 65). The study offered three
regional models in which this objective could be achieved: informal cooperation, formal cooperation and some form of union. The first two options were considered to be disadvantageous because they would derive no executive power and would not overcome the inherent problems that inhibit regional effort. It was surmised that informal or formal cooperation composed of the existing governmental structures would be underpinned primarily by political will and the power of persuasion which would be problematic because the premiers would be concerned by their own provincial interest: “the political representatives who must make these decisions will continue to be responsible to provincial legislatures and their political lives will continue to be dependent on local political support. Whilst many useful things could be accomplished in this way in regard to professional, technical and specialised matters, not much of substantial significance could be expected in the realm of basic policy decision” (Ibid: 58-59).

The option of ‘some formal union’ spawned three separate types of union; administrative union, economic union and full political union. Administrative union, such as the joint collection of retail sales tax and motor tax, motor vehicle licensing and regulations, health service administration, natural resources and record maintenance, would be intergovernmental in nature and would include uniform legislation. The benefit was surmised to be a reduction in the overall cost of government through greater efficiency and doing business in the region through the elimination of differing legal and regulatory requirements. Economic union would involve the amalgamation of existing economic development machinery or the establishment of regional economic development machinery through formal agreement by the three governments. Economic union would include; a joint planning body to recommend on economic policy and to prepare regional strategy for development and growth; a single regional policy in industrial development, tourism and agriculture; uniform economic legislation in company and labour law and joint negotiation with the federal government in the field of economic development. Full political union would involve the establishment of a new provincial government and the abolition of the existing governmental machinery in the individual provinces (Ibid: 60-63).

In weighing up the practicality and effectiveness of these regional models and separate forms of union, the study argued that only full political union “would provide the most effective machinery from the fullest possible attainment of common objectives of the region”
It surmised that administrative and economic union would undermine the achievability of common regional positions because they would be dependent on the political decisions of independent governments. The vested interest of independent governments would be difficult to overcome when the basis of regionalism was steered through intergovernmentalism. In making this analysis, the MUS highlighted a core tension with the operation of regionalism, notably how to overcome vested provincial interests in favour of a common regional vision: “quite clearly the maintenance of the existing attachments, qualities and structures, can be accomplished most conveniently by the retention of the present political attachments, i.e. the separate provincial governments. The historical and traditional loyalties to the individual provincial entities are strong; the attachments to local diversities and interests are more intense than elsewhere in the country. There is a reluctance in many quarters to accommodate change. The resistance to change in existing political structures is reinforced by the established relationships and interests that are associated with governments, these tend to be particularly intimate and strong” (Ibid: 66-67).

This aspect of the study’s analysis represented a key tension in the consideration of a political union and one which caused disagreement amongst Deutsch and Drummie, notably the question of whether a political union is something primarily of public or political concern. The question of how to pitch the political union question affected how the study’s final report was framed. Drummie, for example argued that that the final report should be developed so as to explain to the general population why a political union was desirable and how it might be achieved in an acceptable way. Deutsch on the other hand argued that the study be pitched to a political audience with a short report that would be accessible to politicians: “I did the first draft of the report and included a section on how it could be done in a manner acceptable to the general population of the Maritime provinces. Dr. Deutsch edited and wrote the final report and dropped all of that to focus on a short report which politicians might read. I still think we were on the right track” (Drummie, 2010a). The fact that the report was presented as a short 123 page report accessible to politicians underscored the sense that that the political union debate was an executive dominated process. The way in which the MUS proposed to achieve a political union reflected the sense that the authors were conscious to make the conclusions and recommendations attractive to a political audience.
The rationale for a political union was based on an argument for self-determination: “if the people of the Maritimes decide that they wish to reverse the trends of the past, and develop conditions which would bring more adequate opportunities in the region on the basis of self-determined objectives, it will be necessary to establish immediately a method of cooperation which would envisage the attainment of full political union as a definite goal” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 73-74). The impetus to achieve a political union was placed squarely at the door of the political leaders. The study argued that three ‘critical requirements’ would need to be fulfilled in order to achieve a political union: strong leadership, active federal support and a regional machinery to establish common policies and agreements “necessary for the progressive attainment of a political union” (Ibid: 74). The suggested regional machinery was perhaps the most telling indication that the study was aimed at a political audience. A political union was designed to be incremental in nature through three structural junctures: The Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP), The Maritime Provinces Commission (MPC) and The Joint Legislative Assembly (JLA).

The CMP was envisaged as a regular forum for executive cooperation with meetings at least four times a year. The MPC would consist of five full time members appointed by CMP – two members from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and one from PEI – and a chairman. Its role would be to initiate joint policies, programmes and recommendations for submission to the CMP and proposals for joint legislation to the JLA. It would also be responsible for the “proposals, timetables and procedures for the progressive implementation of a political union” (Ibid: 76-77). The JLA would consist of all members of the three provincial legislatures and would meet once a year “for a few weeks to receive and discuss reports from the CMP and MPC” (Ibid: 77). It was envisaged that the process of implementing a political union would be subject to review after five years, with the process complete within a further five years. Tomblin has argued that it is clear the authors “were greatly influenced by the rise of the European Common Market initiative and the economic experiment in New Brunswick (Tomblin, 1995: 92).

It is also clear that the authors were acutely aware of the political sensitivities associated with their proposal. The MUS study team refused to be drawn on what it called the ‘nitty gritty matters,’ such as the location of a capital, seat of government and government services and flag. Furthermore, the incremental nature of the union process indicated an
attempt to make the proposal more politically palatable. The incremental nature of the union process was recognition that it was a creature of the political arena. The combination of cooperation with union as a broader goal was designed to make the process more politically palatable but also more achievable. The MUS delivered in its final report a number of warnings to the political leaders about the failure to act in a coordinated way to the challenges facing the region.

The MUS envisaged that the failure of the region to respond to the current economic and fiscal pressures, notably the inability to develop the necessary skills and knowledge to respond to the changing conditions in the Canadian economy, a change of federal policy away from transfers, and the growth of provincial responsibilities, would result in a deeper dependence on the federal government and greater level of subordination within the wider federation. The final report of the MUS was designed to aid the political and economic future of the Maritime region within the Canadian federation. However, it must be questioned whether the study was designed to be a contingency plan to counteract the threats and pressures within the federation at the time. The question of Quebec separatism was a particular factor in the consideration of a political union. For example, Drummie argued that “the environment in which we were working - late sixties - the external threat was clear, but we didn't dare mention it. Other than that just glancing mention of where we said, there is political disintegration, but we didn’t want to go any farther than that. Frankly, if we had known then that the Quebec separatist movement would have become as strong as it did, we might well have couched some of that in a different way” (Drummie, 1987b: 24-25).

The key facet that arises out of this perspective from Drummie is that the way in which political leaders respond to questions of political union is contingent on the nature of the political environment at the time in which it is considered. The way in which external threats shape the debate is particularly important. The MUS was commissioned in response to the national political environment, its final conclusions sought to provide a response to that environment in a way that was acceptable to the political leaders. It is for this reason why it took an economic and incremental perspective. The capacity of the premiers to resist the study’s final conclusions was clear and the necessity of achieving unanimity for the achievement of a political union further inhibited the achievability of a collective response:
“from the beginning, the nature of the entire policy process guaranteed that nothing could be done unless all three provincial governments were in agreement” (Tomblin, 1995: 93).

The way in which the political leaders responded to the MUS’s recommendations was grounded in the tension between the political environment and the agency of the political leaders. This tension provided the context for the emergence of the union concept and a critical juncture, that is to say the MUS. Without a critical juncture, the vested political leaders will not consider structural change as a viable or desirable approach to address their underlying economic and/or political problems. The way in which the premiers responded to the MUS reinforced this perspective and underscored the value of the royal commission model as a tool to convey action but which could be moulded to suit the political agenda of the premiers.

7.3. Conclusion

The analysis of this chapter has raised a number of important factors when considering why it became salient for the three Maritimes to investigate a political union in the late 1960s. The national and regional political environments were key in creating the conditions in which a union could be considered. The national political environment raised questions about the continued place of the three provinces within the federation and the ongoing viability of the federation in the face of nationalist and separatist agitation. This allowed for questions of institutional and structural change to permeate at the national level as a response to such pressures. It was however the internal political environment within the Maritimes at this time which allowed questions of political union to emerge. The combination of progressive premiers and the increased role of political officials brought a new mindset to the region which placed issues of economic prosperity and self-sufficiency as key objectives within the region. The national political environment necessitated a greater focus on economic self-sufficiency as the federal government and certain provinces became more forceful in articulating dissatisfaction with the economic condition of the region. The establishment of the MUS was a critical juncture in which structural change could be considered as a regional response to national political pressures.

Despite the engagement of the premiers with the question of a political union, the establishment of the MUS indicated that they were reluctant to forsake their power over the
process of change in the region. The political sensitivity of the union concept fitted well with the royal commission model because it absolved the premiers of the need to provide an immediate response whilst allowing them to retain their decision-making power. The tension between the pressures in the national political environment and the agency of the political leaders was at the centre of the debate at this time. The premiers were conscious of the need to address the threats to the region but were reluctant to commit to such wide-ranging structural change. The final conclusion of the MUS presented a dilemma for the premiers because of the fact that the initial impetus for its establishment emerged from a premier and it was an official government sponsored study. The next chapter will make clear that questions of a political union are contingent on the national and regional political environment. Without a prevalent threat or pressure, the decision-making capacity of the premiers will decrease, particularly as engagement with questions of a union draws directly on perspectives of incumbent premiers.
Chapter 8

The 1970s: Political Union vs. Intergovernmental Cooperation

The publication of the MUS in November 1970 was the central juncture in the political union debate of this period. This chapter considers how key political leaders responded to the final conclusions of the MUS and its recommendation for a full political union of the Maritime provinces. It will be shown that questions of a political union are contingent on the nature of the national and regional political environment. When the MUS was commissioned, pressures in the national environment, notably Quebec separatism and concerns over the role of the federal government, trigged questions of structural change. The role of internal dynamics within the three provinces and the perspectives of the individual premiers facilitated consideration of change during the late 1960s. However, before the publication of the MUS in November 1970, the decline of extreme separatism following the October Crisis in October 1970, the reconfiguration of federal economic development policy following the crisis and internal political change within New Brunswick and Nova Scotia militated to present a different national and internal political environment to that in which the MUS was commissioned in 1968. The reconfigured national political environment and the election of new governments in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia altered the dynamic of Maritime politics away from the pragmatism of the 1960s and towards a more traditional form of competitive provincialism.

The combination of a reconfigured national environment and different positions and perspectives in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia precipitated a disengagement with questions of union by the vested political leaders and encouraged a refocused effort on new mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation. The refocus towards cooperation however underscored a key facet of the political union debate: although the premiers were prepared to act collectively to address questions of common concern they were not prepared to forsake their decision-making power to a regional or supra-provincial government or organisation. The establishment of the Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP) in 1972 was a key component of the MUS roadmap towards a political union but, as a confederal model underpinned by unanimity, the premiers used it to strengthen their control over the process, maintain their decision-making capability and protect the status quo of separate provincial governance. The reason why the premiers reacted in this way was because the triggers in the national political
environment that precipitated engagement with a political union dissipated and evolved to shut off the critical juncture and in turn allowed the vested political leaders the opportunity for a different approach to questions of structural change.

The contention of the chapter is that questions of structural change and regionalism were maintained by occurrences in the broader national political environment: when occurrences in the national environment threatened the three provinces, the salience of regionalism increased. This was demonstrated in the 1960s with the rise of nationalism and separatism in Quebec. Pressure from other provinces and the formulation of federal regional development policy precipitated engagement with a political union through the commissioning of the MUS. The broader aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that when changes in the national and regional political environment shifted so did engagement with structural change. Moreover, this period also demonstrated that the vested political leaders will not engage with questions of union if the national political context provides an opportunity for alternative forms of political action. This was the case following the election of the PQ in Quebec in 1976. The election of the PQ caused concern within the Maritimes, notably with PEI premier Alex Campbell, because it heightened the possibility of sovereignty-association. However, although the possibility of a form of separatism increased, the response of the Maritime premiers was not as it was in the 1960s. This is because the way in which sovereignty-association was framed, as a constitutional process, and would be achieved through political negotiation, provided new opportunities for the Maritimes to shape their political and economic interests.

This chapter is organised in a way that will maximise understanding of how the national and regional political environment influenced the salience of structural change in the Maritimes during the 1970s. The first task is to examine the political environment in the months leading up to the publication of the MUS in November 1970. This will outline how internal political change and the reconfiguration of the threats in the national political environment that triggered the MUS in the late 1960s provided a different political context at the time the study was published in late 1970. The second aspect will analyse the political response to the MUS in order to demonstrate how internal political change and a reconfigured political environment will stilt engagement with structural change and increase territorial competition in the region. The final aspect of this chapter will consider how and why the re-
emergence of separatism as a mainstream concept in 1976 did not precipitate engagement with structural change.

8.1. Political Context of 1970

The year 1970 was important for the political union debate within the Maritime region. Throughout the course of 1970 there were several key junctures within the national and internal political environments, notably the growing influence of René Lévesque and the PQ, the consequences of the October Crisis and changes of government in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, that came to shape the political response to the MUS when it was published in November 1970. These key junctures in the national political environment influenced the premiers’ engagement with the internal logic for a political union, for example an enhanced focus on economic development. However, this chapter will show that when the political environment became reconfigured the achievability of regionalism diminished as the premiers pursued provincialist agendas.

Mainstream Separatism

The impact of mainstream separatism on perspectives towards the political union debate was demonstrated within the print media at the time of the Quebec general election in April 1970. The Chronicle Herald had been a consistent opponent of a political union throughout the work of the MUS. However, the prospect of a PQ victory in Quebec in 1970 underscored the level of concern that separatism caused within the region and how it influenced questions of a political union. Opinion polls before the provincial election of 29 April 1970 indicated that the incumbent UN government would be placed third behind the Quebec Liberal Party and the PQ. For the Chronicle Herald, the prospect that the PQ might form the official opposition in Quebec would increase the visibility of the party and give it a “substantial parliamentary launch pad for their next shot at power and a launch pad for independence at the election after this one” (J970a: 6). Furthermore, the editorial opinion expressed concern that separatist sentiment may produce a minority UN government, with the PQ holding the balance of power. It surmised that if the PQ was to occupy such a position it would facilitate the emergence of separatist sentiment in the UN, of which there had already been glimpses throughout its four year tenure. The editorial argued that in a minority scenario the UN “would feel obliged to vie with the PQ for the support of separatist minded Quebeckers”
(Ibid). Although the editorial did not specifically mention the impact of such a scenario on Nova Scotia or the Maritime region, it was accompanied by a political cartoon which provided a graphic characterisation as to how the political union concept was viewed within such circles at this time.

The cartoon by resident editorial cartoonist Bob Chambers depicted the question of separatism as akin to the biblical tale of Noah’s Ark (See Figure 8.1). The cartoon portrayed separatism as a tidal wave about to engulf the Maritime provinces with Noah holding a blueprint of an ark labelled Maritime Union with a caption that read “woe is me – the dyke is weakening, build yourself an ark while there is still time” (Ibid). This is an important characterisation of a political union. It showed separatism as an external shock that would precipitate engagement with the union concept as a means of self-preservation and protection against the detrimental affects separatism. Furthermore, it suggested that a political union would be a discontinuous occurrence that would take place quickly if separatism became a reality. Drummie argued that the cartoon symbolised that separatism was being taken seriously as a threat to the Maritime region and that a political union represented a possible response (Drummie, 1987b: 26).
The October Crisis

The October Crisis was triggered by three key events; the kidnapping of British diplomat James Cross by the FLQ on 5 October 1970, the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte by the FLQ on 10 October and the implementation of the War Measures Act by the federal government on 16 October. The kidnappings were a considerable escalation on the prior activities of the FLQ, which had only cost one life since it first began its campaign in 1963. The October Crisis was important because it represented the threshold of the extreme separatist movement which had first caught the attention of Robichaud in 1963. The October Crisis was a complex amalgam of FLQ demands which if not met would result in the murder of the hostages. The importance of the October Crisis from the perspective of a political union of the Maritimes was twofold, the violence precipitated by the crisis threatened to spill over in to other provinces and it offered an opportunity for the

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20 Courtesy of the Estate of Bob Chambers.
progression of mainstream separatism. First, the escalation of extreme separatism raised fears that the FLQ could mobilise a broader movement or network of violence across the country: for example, Robichaud, as a francophone premier, was considered to be at particular risk of kidnap or assassination (Stanley, 1984: 209).

Second, although the crisis centred on extreme separatism, it threatened to establish a political vacuum for the mainstream separatist movement to occupy. PQ leader René Lévesque surmised that the October Crisis had done “incalculable harm” to the mainstream separatist movement. However, there was a school of thought developed after the murder of Laporte which suggested that the inability of the Quebec government and police to capture the perpetrators necessitated a new political outlook. For Lévesque, the crisis necessitated ‘an organised middle way’ to combat the two extremisms that manifested in Quebec, notably the actions of FLQ and the decision of the federal government to implement the War Measures Act on 16 October 1970 (Lévesque, 1970).

Lévesque argued that the purpose of the War Measures Act was to prevent Quebec from achieving its destiny of independence: “the first mention of federal intervention, including military, if Quebec went towards a change was made by federal people. Distortion, lies.......everything has been used to try and paint even the most democratic forms of Quebec nationalism as something like subversion and terrorism” (Ibid). The strategy that Lévesque sought to employ going forward was that separatism was essentially a political decision within the democratic political process. The organised middle way to which Lévesque referred was his concept of sovereignty-association which envisaged Quebec as a “fully sovereign state linked with Canada by association” (Stevenson, 2004: 112). For the PQ, sovereignty-association, “whilst freeing Quebec from Ottawa’s domination, would not break an economic community that extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific; it would ensure for Quebec a maximum of autonomy while maintaining the natural interdependence and the historical links that exist between Quebec and the rest of Canada” (Government of Quebec, 1979: 47). For Garth Stevenson, sovereignty-association was a concept to “reassure those who were sympathetic to independence in principle but apprehensive about its economic consequences” (Stevenson, 2004: 112). The structure of sovereignty-association would
include four community agencies,\textsuperscript{21} a common currency and a common external tariff (Government of Quebec, 1979: 47).

Lévesque argued that sovereignty-association was a project that “was logical and easy to articulate because it was far from revolutionary. It was almost banal. Throughout the world it had served to draw together people who, while determined to be masters in their own house, had found it worthwhile to enter into associations of various kinds with others” (Lévesque, 1986: 214). Furthermore, Lévesque considered that the term independence had been tainted by extremism and violence: “the notion of independence had been dragged through the streets, acquiring an absolute, rigid character from demonstration to demonstration as if independence were an end in itself, that name was not much more than an invitation to the riot squad” (Ibid). Sovereignty-association, for Lévesque, was the most democratic way for separatism to be achieved because it was comprised of “people with real democratic conviction” that, as a result of the October Crisis, had become sandwiched between “two colliding extremisms” (Ibid). His aim was to use the characterisation of two extremisms as a means to undermine Canadian federalism and extreme separatism. This caused concern in the Maritimes. Robichaud articulated this concern: “I was concerned (about separatism) in October of 1970. I was particularly concerned during the October Crisis, so called…..what would happen to the Maritime Provinces? Would we have to join the United States, or would we have to fly over foreign countries to go back to ours? That is what would have to happen and I thought it was just a nightmare” (Robichaud, 1988: 10).

\textit{Federal Government Regional Policy after the October Crisis}

The action of the federal government in ending the October Crisis was important when thinking about the political union debate in the Maritimes because of the way it affected the broader national environment. The implementation of the \textit{War Measures Act} stabilised the country by giving the police additional powers of search and arrest. It had the immediate effect of “silencing of the vocal support for the FLQ which had been so much in evidence in the previous weeks” (Bothwell, Drummond and English, 1981: 392). The core implication of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{21} The four community agencies were. I. Community Council comprised of ministers from Quebec and Canada; II. Commission of Experts composed of Quebec and Canadian specialists chosen for their competence and appointed for a limited period of time; III. Court of Justice comprised of an equal number of judges appointed for a limited period of time from Quebec and Canada; IV. Central Monetary Authority as a supervisory authority for the central banks in each state which would have decision-making power and jurisdiction in reserve and foreign-exchange matters.}
the end of the October Crisis was that it eased the tension within the country. Trudeau noted that the end of the October Crisis brought “a more relaxed atmosphere which allowed government to continue in relative peace” (Trudeau, 1993: 148).

One important consequence of the October Crisis was the way it caused a realignment of federal government economic policy. In the aftermath of the crisis, the federal government refocused its core economic development interests towards Montreal as a means of neutralising the separatism that had caused the October Crisis. Tom Kent noted that “the depressed economy of Montreal was considered to be a breeding ground for separatist sentiment” (Kent, 1988: 424). The federal solution was the establishment of a short term industrial incentive programme for the Montreal area and eastern Ontario. The underlying rationale for this programme was a belief that greater federal effort was needed to create more employment in Montreal and provide a bulwark against separatism. For Kent, the focus on Montreal undermined federal efforts in that part of the country. He argued that the industrial incentive programme “took much of the force out of the regional development programme because if companies could get sizable subsidies for projects close to the country’s industrial heartland, they were not going to be induced to go to more remote locations for the sake of marginally bigger subsides” (Ibid). The result of this situation was that by early 1971, the industrial incentive programme was “close to the maximum incentive for the area, whilst offers in the Maritime region were far below the theoretical maximum” (Ibid).

The realignment of regional development policy removed federal pressure on the Maritimes to engage with questions of regionalism as a tool of economic development and coincided with increased equalization payments. This was a key argument of Winter, who submitted a brief to the MUS in 1969 entitled Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations and Maritime Union. It concluded that a political union could be facilitated by a “special grant of two billion dollars in equal instalments over ten years to the new province” (Winter, 1993: 217). However, he argued that the federal government’s response to the October Crisis undermined the achievability of a political union in the Maritimes because it did not seek to influence structural change through its superior spending power. He further argued that the federal government could have shaped structural change by linking change fiscal transfers: “Trudeau could have bought our allegiance to a political union. This may sound crass and
materialistic, but the fact is that precipitate changes in political institutions impose substantial economic costs” (Winter, 1996).

Instead, the federal government’s focus on Quebec after the October Crisis disincentivised a political union because the three provinces received increased unconditional federal transfers (see Table 6.2) and relaxed federal pressure to develop internal economic development: “Trudeau’s reaction after the October Crisis was to pour federal funds into Quebec in the easiest way he knew how, directing discretionary payments to persons, both private and corporate, which by-passed the formula financing for intergovernmental transfers. The Maritime provinces were merely a minor distraction who benefited by being in the right place at the right time to receive this manna from heaven. More importantly, these not insignificant sums arrived without any commitment to substantive political change being required. Is it any wonder that political leaders already jealous of their own ‘perks’ were quite content to avoid the hassle of trying to implement Maritime Union?” (Winter, 1993: 218) This therefore removed a key concern that had shaped engagement with questions of union in the 1960s, notably the fear that the federal government would seek to scale back equalization and/or further encroach in provincial jurisdiction through regional development policy. However, its focus on attenuating separatist sentiment in Quebec removed this threat and altered the dynamic of the national political environment in which the MUS was published. Following the October Crisis, the federal government was preoccupied with questions of separatism and was less concerned with regional development in the Maritimes: “Maritime Union did not have an important place on the agenda of a federal government preoccupied with events in Quebec after the FLQ crisis” (Ibid: 227).

The Internal Political Context

In addition to the changes in the national political environment, October 1970 heralded a shift in the internal political context within the Maritime region. The MUS was ready to be published in September 1970 but it was delayed until November because of provincial elections to be held in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in October.22 As Drummie recalled, “we could have reported earlier if the governments had wanted us to. But we could see we

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22 The New Brunswick General Election was held on 26 October 1970 in which Richard Hatfield was elected; the Nova Scotia election was held on 13 October 1970 in which Gerald Regan was elected; PEI had held a general election on 11 May 1970 in which Alex Campbell was re-elected with an increased majority.
were walking into election time so we consciously delayed to ensure that we did not become entangled in an election” (Drummie, 1987b: 16). Furthermore, Drummie noted that an understanding had been reached with the political leaders that a political union would not be discussed throughout the election campaigns; “I had spoken to the premiers and I had spoken to (Progressive Conservative opposition leader) Richard Hatfield (New Brunswick) but I had not really spoken to the opposition people in Nova Scotia; so I met with (Liberal opposition leader) Gerald Regan (Nova Scotia) and reinforced that part of the agreement was that a political union would not become an issue” (Drummie, 1987d: 3). The desire of the political leaders to postpone the publication of the MUS and the agreement to keep the issue out of the campaigns demonstrated the desire to keep the process detached from the political arena and ensure that it did not get caught up in partisan politics throughout the election campaigns. There was already a sense that the study had been hindered by the fact that it was seen as a process dominated by New Brunswick. Drummie said that Nova Scotia was acutely aware of the role of New Brunswick in the regional process and came to view him as part of a ‘New Brunswick Mafia’ and a proponent of ‘New Brunswick Expansionary Imperialism’ (Drummie, 1987c: 8). The fact that the study was conducted by figures from or linked to New Brunswick would come to shape perspectives towards the political union concept, particularly in Nova Scotia.

The result of the two elections further altered the internal dynamics within the region. The incumbent governments in both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were defeated. Therefore, only PEI premier Alex Campbell was still in office to receive the MUS’ recommendations. This change in political composition would be key to the political response to the MUS because new premiers Richard Hatfield (New Brunswick – Progressive Conservative) and Gerald Regan (Nova Scotia - Liberal) brought to office different perspectives of union and different styles of government to those seen during the 1960s. The election of two new leaders demonstrated that the response to the MUS was based on personality and the approach to politics of individual premiers. The three premiers who had commissioned the MUS – Robichaud, Stanfield and Campbell – had demonstrated, at various points, perspectives which went against the province-first mentality expected of provincial premiers. As outlined, Robichaud and Stanfield took a broader national perspective to some of the key questions of the period, whilst the pragmatic approach of Campbell allowed him to look beyond the traditional rural narrative of PEI politics (Milne, 2001: 113). Hatfield and
Regan however brought narrower approaches which hindered the achievability of a union because it reinforced a province-first approach. Change in political leadership in the Maritimes was therefore an important factor in how the provinces responded to potential threats. As will be shown at the end of this chapter, changes in leadership in the late 1970s altered how the provinces responded to the constitutional context precipitated by the election of the Parti Québécois in Quebec in 1976. Angus MacLean elected in PEI in 1979, for example, returned the province to a rural focus with his so-called ‘rural renaissance’ and criticism of over-development (CBC Television News, 1978).

An important factor affecting the political response to the MUS in 1970 was the unwillingness of Hatfield to provide leadership on the question of union and the mistrust of Regan towards regionalism as a vehicle for economic development. The changed dynamic of the national political environment and the internal political composition of the Maritime region after the October Crisis were key to shaping the political response to the MUS. With the threat of federal government excursion into provincial jurisdiction no longer as prevalent, the premiers’ responses to the MUS were framed in terms of the potential for regional economic development. This however would prove to be problematic because the national political context narrowed the choice of structural change available to the premiers because it allowed provincial sensitivities to manifest more prominently. This made it more difficult for figures such as Hatfield, who actually supported a political union, to further a unionist agenda and allowed Regan, a strong opponent of a union, to marginalise regionalism in favour of provincial interest.

The election of new political leaders in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was important for another key reason. Although Hatfield and Regan brought different political parties into government, there was a continuation of the personal friendship theme demonstrated by the previous administrations. All three premiers were of similar ages - in October 1970, Hatfield was thirty-nine years of age, Campbell was thirty-six years of age and Regan was forty-two years of age - and had attended Dalhousie Law School in Halifax. The existence of personal connections between the premiers was important when thinking about inter-provincial cooperation. Hatfield argued “there’s no doubt in my mind that the fact that we all went to Dalhousie [Law School], and that we were very good friends, was a stroke of luck. If Louis Robichaud had come along with G.I. Smith, who had come along with Angus
MacLean, for example, I don't think it [cooperation] would have happened, because none of those people knew each other really” (Hatfield, 1988d: 5). Regan argued that cooperation was “not a process related to party banners but based on the relationship between individuals” (Regan, 2010).

8.2. The Political Response to the Maritime Union Study

The core recommendation of the MUS was framed in a way that enabled the premiers to reject the idea of a political union. The final report argued that a political union should be an incremental process beginning with structured intergovernmental cooperation that would progressively move towards full political union over a period of ten years. However, the structural apparatus proposed by the MUS, which included the Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP), Maritime Provinces Commission (MPC) and Joint Legislative Assembly (JLA), led to a fragmented political response by the premiers because it allowed them to claim acceptance of the study’s conclusions and, at the same time, to cherry pick its most acceptable recommendations. The three strand structural apparatus meant that the political response was not a single homogenous decision or course of action but a series of decisions as to whether to implement each institution recommended by the MUS. The way in which the MUS categorised union as the end point of structured cooperation allowed the premiers to embark on the process advocated by the MUS but shape it in a way that did not impinge on their political autonomy. The key reason why the premiers were able to respond in this way was because the threats in the national political environment, that is the threat of separatism and the pressure from federal regional development policy, had dissipated.

The MUS was a critical juncture in which the political leaders faced a choice between two or more alternatives. The MUS was triggered by factors in the broader national environment and the internal political and personal objectives of the incumbent political leaders. However, the political environment in which the MUS was commissioned was very different from that in which it was published. The response of the premiers to the MUS indicated this to be the case. Although supportive of a union, Hatfield was unwilling to provide leadership on the issue like his predecessor. The political environment allowed premiers Campbell and Regan to frame the political union concept as a threat to the political autonomy of their respective provinces. These themes underscored the political response to the MUS recommendations.
In terms of the immediate reactions of the specific premiers, Hatfield was the most enthusiastic towards suggestion of a union: Hatfield called the MUS report “a vehicle which could be used to discuss a full political union. This machinery gives us some control over our own destiny; one of the first things to tackle is to find out how Ottawa stands on the matter” (Conrad, 1970: 13). The response of Regan and Campbell to the union recommendation was one of reserved judgement, citing that the “report needed to be fully evaluated” (Ibid). There was however a sense from Regan and Campbell that cooperation as opposed to a political union would be their preference. In early December 1970, Regan was equivocal in his rejection of a union. Regan’s position was “integration yes, unification no or not necessarily unification…I think we can save a great deal by integrating services, facilities and institutions in the Maritime provinces and we can probably achieve the savings and economies of size in that way while maintaining our individual sovereignty or independence” (Regan, 1970). Campbell said upon the publication of the study: “I am not prepared to commit the people of PEI to a union until we know what the full effects will be” (Windsor Star, 1970: 6).

In January 1971, the three premiers met in Halifax to determine a collective response to the MUS report. The outcome of the meeting gave an impression that the premiers had agreed to establish the structural apparatus of the MUS. The establishment of the CMP and a fifteen member committee of legislators, known as the Joint Legislative Committee (JLC) from the three provinces were key outcomes of the meeting. The question of the MPC was left unresolved and the timeline for the implementation of the apparatus was left indefinite (Watkins, 1971a: 3). The question of a union was also left unresolved with Regan declaring that the premiers had “not got far” in discussing the issue. The establishment of a regional apparatus, although modified and truncated from that proposed by the MUS, underscored a semblance of political will to engage in regionalism. However, it could not be considered an acceptance of the core recommendations of the MUS in the way that was claimed. For example Drummie argued “it was staggering to submit a report in November and have it accepted within two months” (Savoie, 2006: 204). Hatfield argued that the premiers needed to provide a regional response to the MUS because there was a political danger that the region would be “charged with refusing to help ourselves” (Hatfield, 1988a: 11). That said, the regional apparatus established by the premiers indicated their reluctance to cede control of the process to a broader regional body in the way the MUS had envisaged. Tomblin argued that the premiers responded in this way so “they could retain control over integrative activities and
at the same time present a united front to the federal government” (Tomblin, 1979: 109). The key implication was that it heralded a new period of executive control over the regionalism and economic development agendas in the Maritime region. The CMP was to be at the forefront of this process.

*The Council of Maritime Premiers*

The MUS envisaged the CMP as an intergovernmental forum that would meet at least four times a year and would “consider recommendations by the Maritime Provinces Commission, coordinate policies of the three provincial governments, secure joint agreements between the three provincial governments, approve joint submissions and negotiate with the federal government” (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 76). However, the premiers’ reluctance to establish the MPC meant that the impetus for common action and joint policy rested squarely with them. There was no regional body to initiate policy. Tomblin argued that the CMP was a ‘confederal’ form of cooperation, which can be defined as “a partnership between independent states which requires unanimous agreement before programmes are implemented” (Tomblin, 1979: 54). Nevertheless, despite rejecting the MPC, the premiers did establish a secretariat to support the work of the CMP. The secretariat was not, however, a policy body: “the decision-making and initiating powers of the CMP rested with the premiers” (Ibid).

The establishment of the CMP secretariat generated concern that it might evolve into organisation that could challenge provincial autonomy. Drummie argued that within the political sphere at this time there was an anti-bureaucratic bias: “there was fear of a conspiracy of some kind, fear that the secretariat will suddenly rise up and overwhelm them” (Drummie, 1987b: 26). For Andrew Wells, there was concern that the secretariat could begin to assume the role envisaged for the MPC without the necessary legitimacy: “I saw the secretariat growing and trying to fulfill some of the responsibilities of the MPC, without the mandate, without the people, without the time, without the resources, and not doing a particularly good job at it” (Wells, 1987: 14). Regan argued that the post-MUS debate was not one concerned with regionalism as a concept, the will to engage in regionalism was present, but the “question of whether there should be a permanent structure. We knew the disadvantage of having a secretariat that is not responsible to any one government but to three
governments, because public servants, who are not directly responsible to someone, often do not function as well as in a situation where the reporting command is clearly outlined” (Regan, 1987a: 3). The concern at the role and function of the secretariat at this time underscored a broader political concern at the role of unelected of political officials and public servants in policy formulation and implementation. For Tomblin, the concern of the premiers was to “gain control of the experiment and ensure that any new developments did not threaten the political ambitions of the government” (Tomblin, 1991: 116).

Table 8.1 compares the CMP against Bolleyer’s criteria. It shows that, in organisational terms, the Council is institutionalised on a medium level. As Bollyer has outlined, medium institutionalisation implies the establishment of an IGR arrangement that is “visible through the assignment of specific competencies, resources, and personnel to an external body. The investment in the latter indicates that intergovernmental transactions do not express only a momentary interest convergence of a group of individual actors. If IGR transactions are regular medium integration is assumed” (Bolleyer, 2006: 474). The CMP was established in May 1972 and was mandated in legislation by the 1971 Council of Maritime Premiers Act (CMP Act). The Act gave the premiers a mandate to “promote unity of purpose among their respective Governments” (Council of Maritime Premiers Act 1971). The CMP was an organisation established explicitly to channel internal regional cooperation between the three provinces. It was more than just a lobby club formed to present demands to the federal government, as was the APC in the 1950s. The CMP would meet at least four times per year and, as outlined, had its own secretariat based in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
Table 8.1: Application of Bolleyer institutionalisation model to the Council of Maritime Premiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for the Degrees of Institutionalisation</th>
<th>Council of Maritime Premiers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Density of contacts</td>
<td>Cooperation was intergovernmental and channelled directly through the premiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularity of meetings</td>
<td>Four per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly defined functions</td>
<td>Cooperation could be achieved in three ways: a) creating regional organisations b) harmonisation of provincial policies and programmes; c) common positions on matters involving other parties, such as the federal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The nature of cooperation was however dependent on the political will of the incumbent premiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal basis</td>
<td>The <em>Council of Maritime Premiers Act 1971</em> provided a legal framework for cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority rule</td>
<td>Decisions made unanimously by the premiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal functional differentiation</td>
<td>All interaction and decisions were channelled through the premiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification of offices</td>
<td>Secretariat based in Halifax with an objective to organise the work of the CMP and act as a catalyst for cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification of subunits/bodies</td>
<td>The Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission, a regional agency of the CMP, was established in 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity of agreements</td>
<td>Proposals were made in key areas, such as energy, but specific outcomes were difficult. The creation of a Maritime Electric Company was abandoned because there was not unanimous agreement amongst the premiers (Regan, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status of agreements</td>
<td>Agreements were not legally binding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The establishment of a regional agency, the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission, in 1974 strengthened the institutionalisation of the CMP and underscored the achievability of cooperation in certain areas. However, the control of the premiers in the cooperative process and the lack of a designated function within the *CMP Act* undermined the institutionalisation and permanence of the CMP. The *CMP Act* provided for no specific policy areas or framework for cooperation. Furthermore, the desire of the premiers to delimit the secretariat from becoming a challenge to their political authority meant the core impetus for regional initiatives would be at the behest of the premiers. This placed an inherent
vulnerability on the CMP because its existence was dependent on the will of incumbent premiers. There was a sense that if the CMP became too expensive or came to challenge the decision-making capacity of the premiers in any one province it would fail. Campbell for example argued that “if the CMP itself, becomes a large permanent entity, it may be a political liability for some premiers down the road, who see an opportunity to save some dollars and cash in their chips. I know that sentiment has been expressed in the past, that it might not survive another change in government” (Campbell, 1987b: 13).

The insistence on unanimity also poses a problem when trying to measure the institutionalisation of the CMP because it ensures that no agreement could progress against the will of a single government (Bolleyer, 2006: 483). The confederal model of the CMP and the unanimity of decision-making undermined the achievability of regionalism and precipitated a provincial outlook to the formation and location of regional initiatives and institutions. It is for this reason why the establishment of the veterinary college in the late 1970s was so fraught with territorial tension. For Beck, the confederal model of the CMP meant that it was “unable to develop a backbone” because the premiers could not overlook the powerful interests within their respective provinces in favour of a broader regional agenda: “the Maritime provinces fall short of being a political actor having the capacity to respond jointly to common problems which cut across established institutions or interests” (Beck, 1977: 311). Regan noted in 1972 that the premiers were able to progress a regional agenda because the “integrative efforts to date have not seriously challenged the political process in each province” (Regan, 1972: 600). Savoie argued that “province-building overshadowed region building” because each premier would pursue a provincial agenda (Savoie, 2006: 205).

The reluctance of the premiers to establish the MPC was at the core of why provincial interest prevailed. The lack of a central authority to formulate and propose regional policy in the way the MUS had envisaged meant that the CMP lacked a discernible function beyond a commitment to “promote unity of purpose” (Council of Maritime Premiers Act 1971). In organisational terms the CMP was institutionalised to the medium level but in functional terms, the role of the premiers stilted a coherent regional approach and exacerbated inter-provincial tension. The reluctance of the premiers to engage with a coherent regional agenda was in contrast to the will of the political officials within the three governments. The question
of regionalism at this time revealed an inherent tension between the bureaucratic and political spheres over influence and power within the region.

It should be noted that following the conclusion of the MUS, two of the study team became key figures in Maritime governments. Drummie became Secretary to the Cabinet in the government of Gerald Regan in Nova Scotia whilst Arsenault returned to New Brunswick to serve as a Deputy Minister in the Hatfield government. Furthermore, Andrew Wells had been in position throughout the MUS and was “informed and knowledgeable about the work of the MUS” (Drummie, 1987c: 14-15). The significance of such figures was that they were on the inside pressing for a response from the premiers to the MUS. The significance of having Drummie within the Nova Scotia government at this time was particularly important. As a New Brunswicker, who had helped write Robichaud’s speech in 1964 and, as the former Executive Director of the MUS, which had proposed a political union of the Maritime region, Drummie was viewed with acute suspicion in Nova Scotia. There was concern about his motives and influence on the question of union. Mike Kirby, Principal Assistant to the Premier of Nova Scotia, noted that the political implications of employing Drummie were considered before his appointment because of his links to New Brunswick and the MUS: “we knew there was a political downside to hiring Fred, in that some people might say that we were implicitly endorsing the recommendations of the MUS, but his talent was such that we just decided it was worth the political flak that we would get” (Kirby, 1987: 2).

Political officials were particularly important in shaping a political response to the MUS. The establishment of the CMP indicated a semblance of political will to engage in regionalism. Drummie noted, however, that even the establishment of the CMP was not enthusiastically supported by the premiers and the political officials had to use their influence to secure a political response (Drummie, 1987b: 25). The Regan government in Nova Scotia was particularly ambivalent about the regionalism process. The role of public servants such as Drummie was key to gaining a political response from the premiers following the publication of the MUS. Kirby noted that the political officials “fought and leaned on the premiers individually and collectively, hard enough to persuade them to do certain things just to keep the thing going. It was one of those situations where the premiers probably would have quietly let it die, except that they had this bureaucracy out there churning up stuff for them to do” (Kirby, 1987: 14). Wells concurred with this assessment and argued that the political
The role of political officials in the regionalism process was formalised with the establishment of a steering committee in February 1971 comprised of five senior political officials, two from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and one from PEI. The role of the steering committee was to recommend a course of action on the MUS to the premiers (Kirby, 1987: 3). The significance of the steering committee was twofold. First, it gave Drummie and Arsenault, as figures who had conducted the MUS, influence over the political response. Second, it created a formal bureaucratic network which enabled officials to coalesce and provide a coordinated bureaucratic perspective on the process and share experiences with their respective governments. Kirby outlined that the political officials “often met monthly over a meal to talk about problems in our own government” (Ibid: 6). There was, therefore, behind the scenes the emergence of a formal and informal bureaucratic union that sought to shape the debate at the political level and give it a sense of momentum that could not be garnered from the premiers.

This bureaucratic union however could not alter the fact that the real power over the process rested with the premiers. The political officials had the capacity to influence or, in Kirby’s words, “hassle the premiers,” but did not have decision-making power (Ibid). The premiers had designed the regional institutions upon which there was no direct executive input, notably the steering committee and JLC, so that they did not challenge the power of the premiers. Despite the establishment of the steering committee, there was a broader sense that the power and influence of political officials, who were instrumental in Maritime politics throughout the 1960s, was diminishing. In PEI for example, the establishment of the Development Plan relied heavily on economic planners and political officials to design and shape the plan. In the 1970s, however, a tension emerged between the politicians and bureaucrats over who was in primary charge of such areas of policy. For Campbell, the tension between the politicians and bureaucrats “boiled down to who, in fact, was going to preside over the governing of this province” (Campbell, 1987a: 9). It was decided that politicians would direct the implementation of the Development Plan and sideline the bureaucrats (Ibid). In Nova Scotia, the role of political officials had always been tenuous and the hiring of Fred Drummie in 1970 “failed to mobilise support for a new dynamic approach
to strategic regional development planning” (Tomblin, 1995: 96). Drummie himself noted that the attraction of Nova Scotia was the challenge of implementing modern government in the province but “I could never really get the Regan government, to read it or pay much attention to any kind of policy planning (Drummie, 1987b: 5). In New Brunswick, the Hatfield government was a “one man government,” in the sense that the perspective of the premier was the most important in the government (Hatfield, 1988c: 2).

The sidelining of the political officials underscored the sense that the premiers were reluctant to delegate their decision-making power. This was further demonstrated in the case of the Joint Legislative Committee (JLC). The core issue with the JLC was that it had no discernable function. The JLC was intended to provide extra steerage and broaden the regionalism process beyond that of government or one party by including backbench and opposition legislators. The key problem was that the regionalism process established post-MUS was an executive form of cooperation. It was an intergovernmental process conducted between heads of government. Agreements and initiatives were the subject of executive decision and not joint legislation. Furthermore, without the Maritime Premiers Commission to formulate and propose joint legislation there was nothing to be considered or scrutinized by the JLC. The committee was therefore dependent on the premiers actually giving the committee something to do. The ambivalence of the premiers towards the committee meant there was a reluctance to give it a purpose. As Wells noted, “the executive authority had taken from the legislative authority because decisions (to cooperate) were made at the CMP level and there was great ambivalence on the part of the premiers, as to whether or not they should ever ask or permit this joint group of people, representing the three provinces, to get into these discussions” (Wells, 1987: 7). Regan said “it was really hard to see what role it had, except one for them to be educated about the advantages of cooperation. It had no mandate and it could not be agreed what its mandate would be. It was really an effort to have people beyond the premier’s offices talk about Maritime cooperation and see the advantages of doing things on a sizeable scale but they were tied to the interests of their particular provinces and of their particular constituencies and they were not an administration, there was no legislation for them to pass” (Regan, 1987b: 10).

Hatfield outlined the complicated nature of the process, whereby the committee was expected to be responsive but looked to the premiers for steerage: “a normal legislature
responds to the initiatives of the government and they also put forth their own initiatives but these guys were sitting around there, they did not really know what to do and knew that if I suggested something, it would become controversial” (Hatfield, 1988b: 12). Wells noted that “there was great ambivalence on the part of some or all of the premiers toward the Joint Legislative Committee, and they really ended up doing nothing with it” (Wells, 1987: 6). The JLC therefore disbanded after only three meetings because of the lack of a concrete mandate and the lack of political will on the premiers to give it a mandate or some form of oversight over executive decisions. This underscored the fact that the premiers were fully in control of the regionalism process and were not willing to cede their power to extra-provincial actors and institutions. Hatfield surmised that the reason for this was because questions of economic development were linked to political capital: “governments guard the question of economic development very, very, very jealously, and that is the whole question of economic development. It is the priority of every government, economic development, more jobs. The fact of the matter is that any effort that has ever been made for intergovernmental cooperation on economic development has not succeeded. Part of the reason is that I do not want, as a political leader to give up the power I have and the credit I will get for the successes that result” (Hatfield, 1988b: 13). The cases of the Steering Committee and JLC demonstrated that the premiers were able to stifle challenges to their decision-making capacity because they were imbued as the core actors in the regionalism process. They were therefore able to keep regionalism confined to an executive process. Tomblin argued that the executive design of regionalism post-MUS was a “defensive gambit designed to avoid political union” (Tomblin, 1991: 100).

With the premiers at the forefront of the regionalism process they were able to push provincial agendas and undermine a coherent regional approach to economic development. The Regan government in Nova Scotia was the most sceptical of regionalism and approached regionalism from a provincial interest perspective. As Regan noted, his approach to cooperation was that it would only be pursued “when it was beneficial to the taxpayer of Nova Scotia” (Regan, 2010). “We did not see the advantage of going into the organisation if its purpose was to take away projects that otherwise would be in Nova Scotia, merely for the point of being able to say, ‘here’s one for you, one for you and one for you.’ We were not prepared to just automatically give away for the sake of cooperation (Regan, 1987b: 2-3). This provincial interest approach could clearly be seen in the way that Nova Scotia
approached specific regional programmes. For example, even before the first meeting of the CMP in late May 1971, tensions emerged between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick over the size, nature and scope of tidal power development in the Bay of Fundy. Regan had “a duty to Nova Scotians to pursue the project in a way that will serve their best interests” (Watkins, 1971b: B3).

The actions of Regan demonstrated that provincial interest superseded questions of party and personal friendship. For example, Campbell argued: “there is no doubt that a personal friendship existed between Regan, Hatfield and myself but personal friendships did not enter into it (cooperation) to any appreciable extent. I was elected to do a job for Prince Edward Island. The only influence that friendships may have on it is that getting the job done can be a little more pleasant, the atmosphere more friendly and cordial” (Campbell, 1987b: 11). Regan shared this perspective. He argued that the premiers “acted for the province,” which, in his opinion, was a product of the bifurcated nature of the party system in Canada. Regan argued that it was “was very unusual for a political leader to campaign or show up in another province for party reasons” (Regan, 2010). Kirby noted that the premiers got on so well, that clearly partisanship was not an issue (Kirby, 1987: 8). Regan noted that, in his opinion, he got on better with Conservative Richard Hatfield than Liberal Alex Campbell (Regan, 2010).

The location of a regional vet college in September 1977 was a key demonstration of provincial interest over personal friendships. An independent report had recommended the college be located in PEI but this was not accepted by the Regan government. Campbell noted that the tension over the location of the college was “an illustration of times when friendships do not count. You are in politics to do a job, and you have to do what you believe must be done in the interests of your constituency” (Campbell, 1987b: 11). The question of where regional institutions should be located revealed different outlooks towards cooperation amongst the three premiers. Regan argued that the logic of the vet college decision was not based on the best location for the college but on a political desire to maintain regional unity by spreading regional programmes evenly throughout the three provinces: “it seemed to me that we doomed to failure the CMP’s work, if we tried to decide locations for those institutions that were going to be joint ones, on the basis of merely, well Prince Edward Island has not had one for a while, and so it is their turn” (Regan, 1987a: 7). Campbell said of the
failure to agree a location for the vet college: “it was politics and the difficulty of kissing a very nice project goodbye, in terms of the Nova Scotia government” (Campbell, 1987b: 9). Hatfield said that regional agreement was made easier because it was a series of tradeoffs amongst the provinces: “it (regionalism) was a bunch of trade-offs. It was a bunch of wheeling-dealing, saying, well, you have got this, we want that” (Hatfield, 1988a: 4).

In terms of the MUS, Hatfield was open about his support for the report’s recommendations and the political union concept: “I made a commitment that I would work towards the concept of political union. Secondly, I felt very strongly about setting up the Commission concept that the MUS recommended. My colleagues, Alex Campbell and Gerald Regan, were not prepared to move at all” (Hatfield, 1988a: 2). In spite of his support for a political union, Hatfield did not press the matter further with his political counterparts. Upon the publication of the MUS, Hatfield explicitly stated that he would not provide the necessary leadership: “there must be no one leader; this must be a team effort” (Conrad, 1970: 13). Special advisor to the MUS, John Deutsch, argued that leadership was a “critical requirement” to ensure the progression of the union concept. Deutsch affirmed that without political leadership a political union would come to nothing (Ibid: 1). Lyndon Watkins surmised that Hatfield’s enthusiasm for a political union “seemed to wane as his term as premier progressed” (Watkins, 1974: 11). By 1974, Hatfield was judged to “have joined Regan in being virtually against integration” (Ibid).

The fact that the MUS recommended a political union despite the expectation that it would focus on questions of enhanced cooperation underscored how royal commissions can articulate more expansive policy options than political leaders. Richard Hatfield captured this aspect when he argued that the authors of the MUS had recommended a course of action that was “beyond what was practical to implement” (Hatfield, 1988a: 17). This also underscored the divide between the political leaders and the political officials and bureaucratic planners. The MUS study team approached the question of a union from an economic capacity standpoint. It was surmised that the optimum level of economic development could only be achieved through a political union rather than just an economic or administrative union. Hatfield surmised however that the study team was in a difficult position because to propose cooperation or a ‘half-way’ form of union would not have garnered the required political action (Ibid). By proposing a full political union, it ensured that the premiers would provide
some form of political response. Hatfield recalled a situation in which he met John Deutsch after the establishment of the Council of Maritime Premiers: “I remember seeing him after we set up the CMP and he said to me that he never expected the CMP to come about” (Ibid).

The position of Campbell appeared to sit somewhere in between the positions of Regan and Hatfield. Whilst not supporting a union or the MPC, Campbell demonstrated a greater willingness to engage in regional cooperation. In terms of the CMP, Campbell argued that it must be akin to the European Economic Community, in that it was a representative body for economic policy making but where the control levers “still reside with the participating nations” (Campbell, 1987b: 13). Campbell argued that the CMP had to remain “tight and small and not become an agency administratively charged with a variety of programmes. The danger is that if the CMP itself, becomes a large permanent entity, it may be a political liability for some premiers down the road, who see an opportunity to save some dollars and cash in their chips” (Ibid). The sense that the CMP, as a confederal entity underpinned by unanimity, was vulnerable to changes in government underscored the fact that it was dependent on the political will of the premiers of the day. Campbell’s concern that if the CMP got more powerful and began to cost too much or challenge provincial political autonomy it would fail as an agency for regional cooperation intersected with historical concerns about political autonomy in PEI. Regan surmised that Campbell seemed to be constrained in regional cooperation by the strong emphasis on political autonomy in PEI (Regan, 2010). It was on this basis that Campbell rejected a union and the MPC: “the MPC was a real threat to the provincial autonomy now enjoyed by the each of the three provinces, and when you pass over your policy-making authority to another body, then you have something other than provinces” (Campbell, 1987b: 11).

Journalists who analysed Campbell’s position characterised him as ‘insistently non-committal’ and ‘firmly on the fence’ (Burgoyne, 1971: 8; Watkins, 1974; 11). The attempt of Campbell to balance his preference for a greater regional effort with concerns of political autonomy manifested as indecision. However, towards the end of the 1970s key events occurred which revealed that when the structural constraints on Campbell were relaxed his perspectives towards regionalism shifted. In the late-1970s, Campbell would come to the forefront in advocating a greater regional effort. For example, in an oft quoted speech to the Atlantic Liberal caucus in September 1977, Campbell argued that the three provinces “had not
yet made the decision to develop as a region. We are separate, competitive, jealous and parochial provinces. We fight each other for industrial development, we fight each other for subsidies and we bicker about energy and transportation. Too often, the lines of battle are drawn on purely political grounds on selfish local considerations. I believe that we must come together collectively to develop the region on a sound economic basis. We must set aside jurisdictional jealousies for the bigger goal of regional unity and strength” (Campbell, 1977: 7).

At the time the MUS was published, the national political environment that had shaped engagement with the questions of union had become reconfigured. The MUS was a critical juncture in which the prospect of change to a new path dependent setting became heightened. The threats of the 1960s, notably Quebec nationalism and separatism and federal regional development policy, led the premiers to seek collective action in order to protect the region and provide a response to the implications of these threats. However, when the MUS report was published, the political environment was different. The threats of the 1960s were no longer as prevalent which allowed the premiers to respond to the MUS report in a way that protected their existing decision-making capacity. Internal political change further complicated the process by bringing to power political leaders who had not commissioned the MUS and were only just beginning their provincial mandates when the MUS report was published. The coalescence of a stable political environment and internal political change undermined the achievement of political consensus and allowed the premiers to implement a form of regionalism, institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation, which protected their territorial and political interests and ensured that they retained control over the levers and impetus for structural change.

There was also at this time less element of political ambition amongst the premiers. Regan for example entered provincial politics in 1965 after two years in the House of Commons. Regan noted that he was always more interested in provincial politics (Regan, 2010). Regan did re-enter federal politics in 1980 but only after he lost office in Nova Scotia in 1978. Regan later stated that he preferred provincial to federal politics and preferred the executive aspect of being premier than being a member of a cabinet (Regan, 1987a: 1-2). There was also no indication of ambition from either Hatfield or Campbell. Hatfield for example served as premier for seventeen years until 1987. When Campbell resigned as
premier of PEI in September 1978, eight months before the end of the Liberal Party mandate, he did not go to the federal level but was appointed to the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island. Unlike Stanfield and Robichaud in the 1960s, the three premiers were not as concerned with the broader national context but that of provincial interest. This stilted engagement with questions of union and resulted in the establishment of confederal form of cooperation – the CMP.

The establishment of the CMP was not a form of structural change but a re-equilibration of the pre-juncture status quo. The premiers considered a form of structural change through the MUS but when the political environment shifted and the threats subsided their response was to reaffirm the exiting path of separate provincial governance within the region. The confederal model of cooperation allowed the premiers to provide a response to such pressure but protect their role as the core decision makers. Moreover, because the premiers controlled the process, there was little semblance of a regional mindset. The political environment influenced a provincial interest perspective on questions of regionalism. Tomblin argued that the nature of the regional structure established post-MUS meant that “the only time we can expect the premiers to reach agreements is when either the provinces individual interests are served in the process or the issue involved is unimportant politically” (Tomblin, 1979: 55). The reason why Campbell was able to articulate a position in favour of greater regional effort in 1977 was because the broader national environment had again become dominated by questions of Quebec separatism. The importance of the re-emergence of separatism was that it re-opened the debate over structural change in the Maritime region.

8.3. The Re-emergence of Quebec Separatism

On 15 November 1976, the PQ won a majority in the Quebec general election and brought to power the first separatist provincial government. When the PQ came to power it revived concern within the Maritime region over questions of geographic truncation. In December 1974, Regan proclaimed that a political union was “as dead as a door nail. I remain totally opposed to the destruction of the sovereign identity of the province. Integration, yes…unification no” (Watkins, 1974: 11). Watkins noted that this statement from Regan was “not very different from what he has previously said on the subject but the choice phrase dead as a door nail seems somehow to put a special degree of finality on it” (Ibid). However,
journalist Ralph Surette argued in 1979 that the PQ election victory caused a “special kind of trauma in the Maritime provinces. The spectre of being cut off physically and psychologically from the rest of Canada raised its head and stimulated some high-intensity thinking about the region’s economic future: the shadow behind these calculations was always Quebec’s future course” (Surette, 1979: 8).

In the years following 1976, there was a degree of debate within the region about how the Maritimes would respond to the new threat emerging from Quebec. A political union featured heavily in this debate. The response of the Maritimes to the election of the PQ was important because it provides a new way of thinking about how external threats may influence questions of structural change. The election of the PQ perhaps posed the most potent threat to the three provinces because, unlike extreme separatism in the 1960s, it had a mainstream political platform in which to pursue a separatist agenda. However, the way in which mainstream separatism was framed, sovereignty-association, and would be achieved, a referendum in Quebec, provided different opportunities for the Maritimes that did not necessarily involve questions of structural change. Indeed, the federal government characterised sovereignty-association as a constitutional process and began its own constitutional renewal agenda through the Taskforce on Canadian Unity. The national political environment following the election of the PQ provided a context for questions of structural change to emerge, as had been the case in the 1960s. However, questions of change did not manifest at the political level because sovereignty-association, achieved through political negotiation, offered an opportunity for the reformulation of existing constitutional relationships. Therefore, whilst the election of the PQ posed more of a threat to the Maritimes, structural change was not pursued because the three provinces instead engaged in the broader constitutional debate initiated by the federal government.

The Nova Scotia based publication the 4th Estate was particularly outspoken about the need for a response to the question of separatism. For example, in early 1977 it noted that the election of the PQ affirmed a “sober realisation that René Lévesque is deadly intent on taking Quebec out of Confederation. The time has come out for Nova Scotians to begin the wrenching task of planning a future that is only partly within our ability to influence” (4th Estate, 1977a: 6). The editorial suggested that “doing nothing in the present crisis is belief in the self-fulfilling prophecy. The head in the sand theory holds that any discussion or study of
Quebec separation would hasten or promote the event” (Ibid). The editorial also suggested that some form of political consolidation in the Maritimes may be necessary as a response to the re-emergence of separatism. The first sense that the situation in Quebec had resonated within the political sphere in the Maritimes was demonstrated by Campbell in early 1977. George Rawlyk and Jerome McDonald argued that the election of the PQ “compelled Campbell to articulate his and his provinces’ concern about the future of Canada” (Rawlyk and McDonald, 1979: 190).

The sense that the Maritimes needed to provide a response to the election of the PQ was underscored by Campbell’s suggestion that the CMP establish a commission to study the long term impact of Quebec separation on the region. The 4th Estate surmised that, with Campbell making such a proposal, it could be expected that the three provinces would take “some collective action on the [separatism] question” (4th Estate, 1977b: 6). Campbell committed to raise the commission idea at a meeting of the CMP on 7 February 1977 (Ibid). The suggestion of a commission not only demonstrated concern at the implications of the PQ victory for the region but indicated the need for a contingency plan should separatism become a reality. The scenario of a premier suggesting a commission to investigate how external events would impact on the region was not too dissimilar to the establishment of the MUS nearly a decade earlier. The nature of the debate was grounded in the need for the region to address its economic underdevelopment as a means of responding to the possible implications of separatism. Campbell’s speech in September 1977 alluded to this fact. The establishment of the CMP in 1971 had done little to bring about the regional self-sufficiency which the MUS envisaged. In the 4th Estate in April 1977, Harry Bruce went as far to ask the question – “if Quebec pulls out [of Confederation] where does that leave us welfare bums of Confederation” (Bruce, 1977: 10)? Campbell predicted that if Quebec left the federation and it precipitated the exit of the richer western provinces, the consequences for the three Maritime provinces would be “certain disaster….we would have only our relative poverty to share with any province that was still around to be a partner with us. We would be alone on the Atlantic Coast and we are not self-sufficient” (Ibid).

The election of the PQ in 1976 therefore precipitated a similar debate to that which had taken place a decade earlier. It was a debate that was underpinned by the question - how could the Maritimes respond to the implications of separatism? The sense that the region
needed a contingency plan to counteract the threat was a key theme. Campbell stated that he was “reluctant to dwell upon the suggestion that the Maritime’s have a contingency plan ready to implement in the event of Quebec’s separation. If Quebec were to leave, life would still go on; we do not absolutely need Quebec to survive. But we do not want Quebec to go and we must find a way to convey these feelings to Quebeckers” (Rawlyk and McDonald, 1979: 190). The broader debate however rested on the type of structural change that may be necessary to mitigate the effects of separatism on the region. In this context, three scenarios came to the fore: annexation to the United States, a political union of the three provinces as a sovereign state and the prospect of becoming ‘the North American Bangladesh’ (Bruce, 1977: 10).

The sense that some form of structural change may be necessary as a result of the PQ election victory was reinforced by the opinions of the incumbent premiers. For example, Hatfield said “I was afraid of the triumph of, in a democratic society, an idealistic concept that was full of passion and devotion. The fear of Quebec was a factor which caused people not to dismiss it out of hand. No one knew what Quebec was up to and what Quebec was going to do. It would take some force, some outside force, not necessarily a foreign power, but some outside force like the independence of Quebec to precipitate a union” (Hatfield, 1988a: 18). This was a perspective that was shared by Gerald Regan. He argued that a political union was only achievable in “some horror situation like the breakup of Canada. Obviously then the type of affiliations that various land masses might have could change, but short of anything like that, as long as Canada continues as a federal state, I see no possibility of a political union ever happening” (Regan, 1987a: 3-4). The sentiment of Regan is important because of his ardent hostility to the notion of a union throughout the 1970s.

Significantly, despite the threat of separatism in Quebec, the question of structural change was not a question that translated into regional action in the same way that it had done a decade previously. Unlike the late 1960s, the incumbent premiers did not collectively engage with questions of regional structural change as a response to the threat of separatism. The core questions of regionalism and alternative structural scenarios manifested outside of the political arena in political commentary such as that found in the 4th Estate. The lack of political engagement with questions of regionalism at this time was because the nature of the separatist threat precipitated a national as opposed to a regional response. The actions of the
federal government and the nature of the separatist concept were key in shaping this response in the Maritime region. The fact that the PQ wanted to achieve sovereignty-association was particularly important. Sovereignty-association was a form of separatism in the sense that it envisaged Quebec as a sovereign entity with “full legal freedom in all fields, the exercise of authority to the exclusion of its territory and a presence in the community of nations” (Government of Quebec, 1979: 47). However, it was the proposal for an association that shaped the nature of the debate. By forming an association between a sovereign Quebec and the remainder of Canada, the PQ argued that it “would free Quebec from the domination of the federal government but would not break up an economic community that extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific; it would ensure for Quebec maximum autonomy while maintaining the natural interdependence and the historical and human links that exist between Quebec and the rest of Canada” (Ibid).

The framing of sovereignty-association as an alternative constitutional formula to federalism that would maintain an economic link between Quebec and Canada and the means by which this new formula would be achieved, negotiation following a mandate secured in a referendum, were the most important factors in shaping the political response in the Maritimes. The constitutional dynamic of sovereignty-association reopened the constitutional debate within the wider country. Furthermore, because the PQ sought to achieve a mandate for the negotiation of sovereignty-association through a referendum in Quebec, it established a broader battle of ideas over the constitutional future of Canada. Opponents of sovereignty-association sought to offer alternative constitutional formulae as a means of keeping Canada united. Rather than seeking a regional response as a form of contingency plan, the Maritimes sought to contribute to the broader constitutional debate that was occurring in the country. The political effort in the Maritimes following the election of the PQ was channelled towards contributing to the constitutional debate in order to preserve Canada and Canadian unity rather than the investigation of a stand-alone regional solution, such as a political union or an independent Maritime state (Rawlyk and McDonald, 1979: 193).

The establishment of the Task Force on Canadian Unity by the Trudeau government in July 1977 focused national debate towards constitutional reform. The notion of a “renewed federalism” was at the forefront of federalist arguments. The key focus of both the Quebec and the federal government was to influence public opinion in Quebec in order to secure the
desired outcome in a referendum. The role of the Maritimes was to contribute the effort to keep the country united but at the same time articulate their own constitutional grievances and preferences. The sense that the three provinces wished to maintain the constitutional status quo and ensure that the federal government continued to play a strong fiscal role were particularly prevalent themes (Ibid). The economic dependency of the three provinces continued to play a key role in shaping constitutional preferences. Robert Finbow argued that the region’s fiscal dependence often encouraged support for central power, guarantees on questions of equalization and the enhancement of the regions voice at the centre, through Senate reform for example (Finbow, 1994: 487). There was however little regional sentiment within the Maritime region itself at this time. The analysis of Surette that the election of the PQ caused “a special kind of trauma” only appeared to manifest with Alex Campbell (Surette, 1979: 8).

Campbell’s speech to the Atlantic Liberal Caucus in September 1977 was perhaps the most lucid articulation of regional sentiment. The speech was very much grounded in the kind of argument articulated by the MUS in 1970. It was an argument for increased regional effort as a means of solving underlying economic problems and contributing to questions of national unity: “the challenge today is to start working together now to build a region that will prosper, a region that will strengthen the reality of the Canadian experiment. It is to our mutual advantage to work together as a regional entity to solve our economic problems” (Campbell, 1977: 7). Campbell’s approach quote gives an indication that the establishment of the CMP had not resulted in an embedded regional mindset. Furthermore, when taken with his proposal for a CMP-led commission to study the implications for the region of the PQ election, it underscored a sense that the threat posed by the re-emergence of separatism in Quebec had shaped Campbell’s attitude towards a greater regional effort. The words of Campbell following the election of the PQ clearly indicate that he was the most concerned of the Maritime premiers by the implications of sovereignty-association. His September 1977 speech underscored the sense that he desired a regional solution to address questions of economic development. There was also a sense that the broader constitutional question was influencing his perspectives at this time: for example, in October 1977, at a public hearing of the Taskforce on Canadian Unity in Charlottetown, Campbell argued that the whole constitutional question within Canada at that time was interlinked with questions of sovereignty association. Campbell argued “we are here because of the possibility that
6,000,000 Canadians may leave Canada. The issue involves Quebec. Clearly the issue is Quebec” (Dorrell, 1977: 8). However, neither Campbell’s regional argument nor his overt concern at the question of sovereignty-association appeared to resonate with his counterpart premiers to such an extent to warrant collective action. For example, his proposal to establish a CMP-led commission to study the implications of Quebec separatism on the region was rejected on the basis that the public response of the CMP to the question of separatism “should be positive in nature” (4th Estate, 1977c: 6).

The re-emergence of separatism at this time established new opportunities for political action through the process of constitutional negotiation. As outlined, all three premiers had stated that the realisation of separatism would precipitate engagement with the union concept. However, the constitutional nature of the debate allowed the Maritimes an opportunity to shape and contribute to the broader debate. Separatism at this time was not a rapid rupture but a new constitutional arrangement (sovereignty-association) between Canada and Quebec. Furthermore, the fact that the PQ government proposed the maintenance of economic links between Canada and Quebec neutralised sentiments of geographic truncation and isolation. Under sovereignty-association, the three provinces would not be cut adrift and separated by a hostile neighbour in a Bangladesh-like scenario but form part of an economic partnership. In fact, a survey conducted as part of the Task Force on Canadian Unity revealed that “a majority of people in the [Maritime] region would favour an economic union with an independent Quebec” (Simpson, 1979: 9).

The fact that the PQ sought to gain a political mandate for the negotiation of sovereignty-association in a referendum allowed the Maritimes a role in the process. A referendum on sovereignty-association gave the provinces, in Campbell’s words, “an opportunity to communicate to the people of Quebec that we very much want you to remain with us in the Canadian family” (Rawlyk and McDonald, 1979: 190). As Laurence LeDuc has argued, a key facet of referendums is that public opinion can be shifted by the nature and terms of the debate (LeDuc, 2002: 155). The way in which the federal government was able to shift the debate to questions of constitutional reform and ‘renewed federalism’ not only undermined sovereignty-association but undermined a renewed regionalism agenda in the Maritimes. Constitutional expert Eugene Forsey gave a sense of the nature of the debate and why it perhaps did not cause a clamour towards structural change in the Maritimes. Speaking
to the Empire Club in April 1977, Forsey argued that the nature of the debate was not one of revolution but of negotiated constitutional change: “if you can bring off a successful revolution, like the one in [the] Thirteen Colonies, then the constitution of the time obviously does not matter. But my impression has always been that Monsieur Lévesque and the PQ intended to do this thing peacefully, and if possible at all events, constitutionally” (Forsey, 1977).

Most significant however was Forsey’s assertion that a unilateral form of secession by Quebec was illegal under the 1867 British North America Act but that a negotiated constitutional form of secession could occur, with the consent of all the provinces: “the answer to the question ‘could Quebec legally and constitutionally secede?’ is yes, provided all the other provinces consented, or nearly all the other provinces. That leads me, then, to the somewhat less strictly constitutional aspect of the question. In what circumstances would the provinces agree to give their unanimous, or nearly unanimous, consent? I think the answer to that is that there would have to be a great deal of very tough, hard-nosed bargaining; and this, even if there was the greatest good will on both sides, and I am afraid that much as we may desire that good will it might not be entirely ubiquitous” (Ibid). The point that Forsey makes is that any constitutional negotiation following a referendum would have to gain the consent of all the provinces or, at the very least, a substantial majority of the provinces. Forsey argued that “I can think it possible myself that the Parliament of Canada might go ahead if, let us say, Prince Edward Island alone, or my native province of Newfoundland alone, objected. But I feel quite confident that there would have to be virtually unanimous consent of the provinces” (Ibid). The assertion that a negotiated secession may be able to proceed without the consent of the smaller or poorer provinces is questionable not least because the four eastern provinces would be most directly affected by a sovereign Quebec. To proceed without the consent of the eastern provinces would be problematic for the federal government.

This constitutional context provides a new way of thinking about why the Maritimes did not engage with questions of structural change despite the enhanced threat posed by the election of the PQ and the sovereignty-association referendum. The election of a Progressive Conservative government led by John Buchanan in Nova Scotia in 1978 did not seem to change this context. Barbara Yaffe, writing in the *Globe and Mail* five days before the Quebec referendum in 1980, noted that in a speech to a national unity gathering Buchanan
used his podium perch to provide a travelogue on this great-province of ours rather than to make a coherent statement on Quebec or renewed federalism” (Yaffe, 1980: 8). In 1990, when questions of separatism again became prevalent, Buchanan argued that if separatism was achieved Nova Scotia would likely join the United States. According to Alan Freeman and Patrick Grady, Buchahan argued “what are we going to do [if Quebec secedes]? Form our own country?” That’s absurd. Stay as a fractured part of Canada? A good possibility, but that’s all. Or be part of the United States? There’s no choice” (Freeman and Grady, 1995).

The election of a Progressive Conservative government led by Angus MacLean in PEI in 1979 returned the province to a traditional rural focus. As Milne has argued, except for Alex Campbell’s tenure, “the noble pastoral image has been a mandatory metaphor for thinking about the Island and charting its future” (Milne, 2001: 113). MacLean promised a ‘rural renaissance’ with more money to farming communities and small agricultural businesses and accused the Liberal government of “overstepping its boundaries with over-development” (CBC Television News, 1978). The return to a more traditional politics in PEI under MacLean also brought a firmer stance on the constitutional question at the time of the Quebec referendum. Martin Dorrell noted that the referendum had triggered a provincial unity crisis in PEI after the provinces’ Acadian population “protested [MacLean’s] decision to refuse to take part in negotiations if Quebec casts a yes vote. Mr. MacLean said he would be prepared to discuss modifications to the Constitution if the federalists won the referendum” (Dorrell, 1980: 8).

In New Brunswick, still under the leadership of Hatfield, the legislature had passed a motion “urging Quebeceers to vote ‘non’ [in the referendum]” (Yaffe, 1980: 8). The political context in the Maritimes following the election of the PQ in 1976 and around the time of the referendum in 1980 showed an atmosphere of anxiety about the eventual outcome. The proposal of Campbell to establish a CMP-led commission underscored this concern and demonstrated that some in the region were contemplating the necessity of a contingency plan. However, it is possible to surmise that the constitutional context in which the debate was undertaken did not precipitate broader engagement with questions of structural change at the political level because it provided the three provinces within an opportunity to contribute to the broader constitutional debate. Moreover, as Forsey surmised, individual provinces could
block progress on questions of sovereignty-association unless their provincial interests were protected (Forsey, 1977).

8.4. Conclusion

The 1970s provided a key insight into the difficulty of regionalism within the Maritimes. The 1960s demonstrated that when the political environment became destabilised regionalism increased in salience. The establishment of the MUS was a critical juncture through which the political leaders formally considered structural change. The MUS was a product of political environment, in that it was shaped by key threats to the three Maritime provinces within the federation. When the federation became threatened by questions of nationalism and separatism, the political leaders of the three provinces engaged with the notion of a political union to counteract the implications for the region. However, when these threats dissipated or became reconfigured, the salience of structural change decreased and the premiers responded in a way that protected their decision-making capacity. The CMP was not structural change but a form of institutionalised intergovernmental relations which was designed to preserve the decision-making capacity of the premiers and delimit challenges to their political autonomy. The 1970s also demonstrated that internal political change could have a profound impact on engagement with structural change. The election of new political leaders who had not commissioned the MUS and who either did not support a regional agenda or were unwilling to provide political leadership undermined the achievement of some form of regional structural change in the Maritimes.

The election of the PQ in 1976 underscored the importance of political environment in shaping questions of structural change. At this point separatism became more achievable because the PQ had the capacity to negotiate the formal dissolution of the existing relationship between Quebec and the federation. However, what this chapter has sought to emphasise is that despite the increased possibility of Quebec achieving sovereignty-association, the Maritimes did not engage with questions of change in the same way as occurred in the 1960s. This was because the negotiated constitutional route to sovereignty advocated by the PQ offered the three provinces the opportunity to shape the outcome and protect their interests. This underscores the sense that although questions of structural change may be influenced by externalities, it requires internal engagement also. This chapter, and
indeed this thesis, seeks to rethink the received wisdom of the impact of separatism on questions of structural change in the Maritimes. Although externalities may cause an environment of anxiety or destabilisation, without the engagement of the vested political leaders change will not be considered. The constitutional context of the separatism debate in the late 1970s did cause an element of anxiety amongst the Maritime premiers but the opportunity in which to contribute and shape the broader constitutional debate allowed for a different approach to addressing the perceived threat of separatism to the region.
Chapter 9

Conclusion: Why did a Political Union Not Happen?

The main objective of this thesis was to answer the question – why did a political union not happen in the Maritime provinces in the period 1960-1980? Within this question there is a broader puzzle – why would constitutionally protected sub-national entities consider a political union within an established federal state? The core argument of this thesis is that the salience of sub-national structural change is grounded in the political environment in which the entities operate and the preferences of the incumbent sub-national political leaders. However, at the outset it was not clear what factor was most prevalent in shaping the salience of a political union: political environment and/or political agency.

The central conclusion of this thesis is that the question of structural change is a balance between political environment and agency. Neither factor is sufficient to precipitate the consideration of a political union amongst sub-national political entities in a federal state. Nonetheless, when these factors are taken together the salience of a political union increases. The reason why a political union did not happen in the Maritimes in the period between 1960 and 1980 was because the broader national political environment, which had shaped questions of structural change, precipitated new opportunities for political action which did not involve a political union. In addition, the pragmatic political leaders of the 1960s who were willing to engage with questions of structural change left office before the end of the critical juncture. Their successors were less willing to engage with questions of structural change and acted in a way to protect their interests and the political autonomy of their jurisdictions. The salience of a sub-national political union in the Maritimes was therefore a coalescence of external and internal factors. The critical juncture was triggered by the national political context, notably the implications of separatism and nationalism and the role of the federal government in economic development policy. The incumbent political leaders engaged questions of structural change as a bulwark against external threats and to further protect their own political interests. Without such threats in the political environment there could be no critical juncture and no scope for the political leaders to consider structural change.
From a conceptual standpoint, this chapter will contend that the empirical case of the Maritimes can help refine the value of path dependence theory as a tool for explaining structural change. As a single case study, this thesis does not seek to make generalisations but the specific case addressed within this thesis demonstrates that the injection of agency into path dependence explanation can help us gain a clearer understanding of the motivations for structural change at the sub-national level. Furthermore, by taking the analysis beyond just the point in which structural change was considered, the thesis demonstrates that the actual achievement of change is not the default outcome of a critical juncture. The consideration of change by way of a critical juncture does not have to precipitate a new path dependent process but can, as Capoccia and Kelemen surmise, result in the restoration of the pre-juncture status quo (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 343). Re-equilibration can be expected when the external threats that caused the critical juncture subside or dissipate before change can actually occur.

When there is no longer a discernable threat, the political leaders will act in a way that protects their existing political autonomy and decision-making capacity. This chapter will begin with an overview of the empirical puzzle that has driven this thesis, before detailing the core empirical findings. Finally, this chapter will articulate the broader theoretical implications and directions for further research.

The Puzzle and Research Question

Considering the nature and initial rationale for the formation of a federal state - why would constitutionally protected sub-national entities contemplate a political union within an established federal state? This thesis has drawn on Daniel Ziblatt’s definition of a federal state. He argued that to be ‘federal’ a state must demonstrate “three constitutionally embedded institutional characteristics – formal and informal access in the decision-making process of national governments; sub-national public finance (taxing and spending) discretion and administrative autonomy of sub-national governments in the nation state (Ziblatt, 2006: 5). Furthermore, for a state to be considered federal the sub-national units must be constitutionally protected, meaning their political autonomy or territorial integrity cannot be altered unilaterally by the centre. With this definition of federalism it is pertinent to recall the hypothesised reasoning for the establishment of federal state. A federal state allows existing political entities to consolidate or come together to address economic deficiencies or common threats but provides a political structure that takes account of the fact that some entities may
“not be willing to abrogate their political authority wholly, and a degree of regional autonomy is often the only compromise that allows the establishment of a viable state” (Filippov, Ordeshool and Shvetsova, 2004: 2).

From an empirical standpoint, the puzzle of the Maritimes is twofold. First, the Maritimes came to favour Confederation over a political union in the 1860s because it allowed each colony to preserve its territorial boundaries and existing institutional capacity. Second, the period under consideration – 1960-1980 – was a time of competitive federalism and province-building in which the provinces became empowered with new constitutional responsibilities in social welfare, particularly as the welfare state sought to become more active in the lives of Canadian citizens. Moreover, the provinces at this time became more resistant to the incursion of the federal government, through its spending power, into their constitutional jurisdiction: Why, after favouring federalism because it would preserve their existing institutional capacity, would the three provinces consider a political union within the federal state? Why, at a time when the institutional capacity of the provinces was increasing and the provinces were becoming more important actors in the lives of their citizens, would the Maritime provinces consider a political union?

The question of a political union of Canada’s Maritime provinces has been shown to be elitist. It was considered and decided upon in the first instance by sub-national political leaders. According to the Canadian constitution, the territorial alteration of existing provinces can only occur with the consent of the legislature of the province(s) in question. The establishment of a federal state in the 1860s reinforced the territorial and institutional capacity of the Maritimes and vested the sub-national political leaders as the core agents of sub-national structural change. For a political union of existing provinces to occur within the Canadian state it must be initiated from within the mainstream political arena and have the support of the political leaders of the day. It is for this reason the puzzle was approached with a core focus on sub-national political leaders. The key conceptual characterisation of political leaders is that once established within a particular political setting they will be consumed by “powerful vested self perpetuating interests” (Collier and Collier, 1991: 37). It is assumed that political leaders who are vested as the core beneficiaries of a political setting will seek to maintain it over time. The decision of the colonial actors in the 1860s to favour a federal union over a regional political union underscored this assumption because a federal state
would preserve the institutional and territorial integrity of the existing political entities. What therefore can explain the engagement of the Maritime political leaders with the political union concept in 1968?

To address the above conceptual and empirical puzzle, one key research question and three sub-questions were operationalised:

*Research Question and Subsidiary Questions*

1. Why, in spite of a critical juncture, did a political union not happen in the Maritime provinces in 1970?
   
   a) What factors gave rise to the critical juncture, that is the Maritime Union Study, and the consideration of a sub-national political union, in the Maritime provinces?
   
   b) What was the role of political agency, that is the vested political leaders, in the establishment of the critical juncture?
   
   c) Can the outcome of the critical juncture, institutionalised intergovernmental relations (the Council of Maritime Premiers) established in 1972, be considered a form of structural change?

9.1. Core Findings: Sub-National Structural Change as a Balance between Political Environment and Political Agency

The assumption of path dependence theory is that once a political setting has been established it will persist and be reinforced over time. As noted above, the political leaders who operate within that setting will be vested as the core defenders of institutional and territorial interest. This research has underscored that current understanding of change to path dependent settings is confirmed. The institutional trajectory will be more inclined towards persistence than change. What therefore can explain the salience of change? The current theoretical propositions denote that change to path dependent settings will occur during critical junctures which are shaped by external shocks or the accumulation of causes to a threshold. In such instances, change is considered to be rapid and discontinuous. Incremental change on the
other hand is surmised to occur when vested political leaders exploit ‘gaps’ and ‘soft spots’ in
the existing political setting for the implementation of new rules and/or the re-interpretation
of existing rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 14). This study sought to use these theoretical
assumptions to guide the analysis and seek to explain the consideration of structural change in
the Maritime provinces within the Canadian state in the period 1960-1980.

This study has found that the salience of a political union increased according to
occurrences within the broader environment in which the provinces operate, that is to say the
federal nation state. When pressures arose within the federal environment they threatened the
economic and political purpose of the provinces. Two specific external threats were
significant in shaping the emergence of the political union concept, notably the implications
of Quebec nationalism and separatism and the economic development efforts of the federal
government. The threats were significant because they intersected with internal political and
economic circumstances within the Maritime provinces and interconnected with the
objectives of their incumbent political leaders. Throughout the 1960s, the Maritimes had
become highly dependent on federal government equalization payments and federal cost-
sharing programmes for the delivery of key public services. This made the three provinces
more vulnerable to shifts and shocks within the national political environment. The
emergence of extreme separatism in Quebec in the early 1960s not only brought to the fore
the possibility that the provinces might be geographically truncated from the rest of Canada
but raised the possibility that the country may cease to exist entirely.

The Quiet Revolution under the Lesage government was instrumental in triggering a
critical juncture within the Maritime region because it challenged the operational norms of the
federation. The critical juncture was shaped by external occurrences within the federal
political environment but it intersected with internal concerns about the influence of the
federal government in provincial policy and the personal objectives on the incumbent political
leaders. Although the Quiet Revolution has been held up as a shaper of province-building, the
moves towards greater decentralisation posed a threat to the Maritimes because of their
detrimental economic position and dependence on federal government spending power.
Quebec nationalism was important because it created a greater drive for decentralisation and
shaped an antipathy towards federal spending power within the more prosperous provinces.
As a result, the prevalence of federal spending power became more scrutinised, as seen with
the case of British Columbia premier WAC Bennett. The antipathy towards federal spending power within provinces such as BC intersected with concern in the Maritimes at the use of federal spending power to influence provincial policy. The result of this environment was a greater external and internal appetite for economic self-sufficiency within the Maritimes.

Members of the incumbent political leaders at this time were particularly important because they recognised the external threats and the internal necessity for economic self-sufficiency. Initiated by Louis Robichaud, the political leaders recognised that structural change within the region may be necessary in order to develop greater level of greater economic capacity in order to lessen the impact of external threats and resist the encroachment of the federal government into provincial jurisdiction. A political union was designed to be both a bulwark against externalities and a shaper of internal economic capacity. The new regionalism argument of Michael Keating is particularly relevant in the case of the latter rationale. A political union of the three provinces emerged as a result of the changing federal context which threatened the political status quo. This led to the reshaping of the functional needs of the provinces and precipitated the consideration a new collective identity and new political institutions for collective action (Keating, 1997: 395). The internal political context of the day and the personal perspectives of the incumbent political leaders were important in bringing about recognition of this reality. The role and influence of political officials, particularly within New Brunswick, was instrumental in shaping a greater focus on central economic planning and the hindrance of political boundaries.

In addition, the shift in the federal political environment allowed for ambitious political leaders, Robichaud and Stanfield in particular, to further their own political aspirations by structuring their policy perspectives in line with their office goals. The desire of Robichaud and Stanfield to pursue federal political careers intersected with the broader political environment which gave them a platform to speak to a wider audience and articulate policy perspectives that were compatible with wider opinion. Robichaud and Stanfield latched on to a sense that structural change and economic self-sufficiency in the Maritime region was a popular course of action within the rest of the country and used this as a way to develop a broader national profile. For Stanfield in particular by engaging with questions of structural change and exploiting the wider national political environment he was able to win the leadership of the federal Progressive Conservative Party in 1967. By invoking the change
agents framework of Mahoney and Thelen, it is possible to characterise Robichaud and Stanfield as *opportunists*. The precise preferences of Robichaud and Stanfield towards structural change were ambiguous, for example the Maritime Union Study argued that Robichaud had not proposed a union in 1964 but had merely called for the completion of an unfinished debate (Report on Maritime Union, 1970: 22). Robichaud and Stanfield did not actively seek to bring about structural change at an earlier point in time but instead advocated structural change when the opportunity arose within the prevailing system. When externalities within the broader national environment challenged the political status quo Robichaud and Stanfield sought to exploit the situation to “achieve their own ends” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 27).

The triggers of the political union debate indicate that structural change was not a good in itself but a product of externalities and the agency decisions of the vested political leaders. The external threats triggered a critical juncture as a response to the broader national environment. The MUS as a bureaucratic-led public investigation indicated that the political leaders were prepared to contemplate structural change in response to the externalities but were aware of the political implications and not, therefore, prepared to make an immediate decision or relinquish their political control over the process. It demonstrated an inherent tension between national and regional agendas for structural change, and the reluctance of provincial premiers to reduce their provincially-focused decision-making capacity.

*Why did a union not happen?*

The MUS was a product of externalities in the broader national environment which intersected with regional economic and political agendas for change. The MUS was the critical juncture in which structural change could be considered but because the task of investigating the concept was delegated to a public investigation it was detached from the political process. Therefore, when the MUS was published and the concept of a political union re-entered the political process it was evaluated against the external and internal political context of the time. It is this point which explains why a political union did not happen. When the MUS was published, the context of the national and regional political environments had become reconfigured. The political leaders were therefore able to seek new opportunities for political action and reject a union.
The end of the October Crisis and the preoccupation of the federal government to concentrate economic development efforts in Montreal removed key pressures for change in the Maritimes. Equally significant was with the election of political leaders in the Maritime region, notably Gerald Regan, who were not prepared to engage with questions of structural change. The MUS was therefore framed within the existing path dependent setting, distinct territorial governance. Institutionalised intergovernmental relations were not a form of structural change but a re-equilibration of the pre-juncture status quo. When the national environment became reconfigured, the premiers were able to choose a course of action which preserved their decision-making capacity as leaders of each provincial government. Although the CMP can be characterised as institutionalised to the medium level, because of the existence of a secretariat and regularity of meetings, the confederal structure underpinned by unanimity enabled the premiers to protect their provincial interests at the expense of a broader regional agenda.

The period following the publication of the MUS also revealed the importance of externalities in shaping the salience of structural change. When the question of separatism re-emerged in 1976 it did not precipitate the same political response amongst the Maritime political leaders. The reason for this was because the national political context and the nature of the separatist context proposed by the PQ provided new opportunities for political action. The achievement of a sovereign Quebec by way of negotiation coupled with a commitment to maintain a political and economic relationship with Canada precipitated a broader constitutional debate which superseded questions of regionalism. The threat posed by sovereignty-association clearly caused concern within the Maritime region, as evidenced by the response of PEI premier Alex Campbell, however the constitutional and negotiated nature of the process gave scope for the Maritimes to use their institutional capacity as constituent units of the Canadian federation to contribute to the process. Therefore, when the sovereignty-association concept re-emerged in Quebec in 1976, the salience of regional structural change did not increase and there was no critical juncture.
Implications for Theory

The contribution that this thesis has sought to make to path dependence theory is that in order to understand how change occurs within path dependent processes there must be a focus on both the role of vested political leaders and the outcome of a critical juncture. Regional structural change within the Maritime region was not an external or internal occurrence but a coalescence of the two. The cause of the critical juncture was primarily external. Externalities within the broader national environment precipitated an engagement with structural change but it was only when such externalities intersected with internal economic and personal political objectives of the vested political leaders that regional structural change became a salient consideration. Yet, even the coalescence of these external and internal occurrences was not strong enough to establish a union between the three provinces. Together they were only strong enough to precipitate the consideration and investigation of structural change through a government sponsored study.

The federal political environment as a shaper of political engagement with questions of change is problematic because of its volatility. The case of the Maritime provinces showed that the federal environment can quickly become reconfigured and alter the nature of the regional debate in the Maritimes. Moreover, the agency aspect is equally volatile because of the reality of electoral politics. The political leaders of the 1960s displayed a willingness to engage in questions of structural change but their successors were not prepared to do so in quite the same way. There is a sense from this study that if structural change were to occur amongst sub-national political entities it would do so in a discontinuous way as a result of punctuated equilibrium. Structural change would be a product of a rapid political response to a threat or occurrence that would fundamentally alter the nature of the political environment in which the states operate. Using the framework of Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu, the combination of these factors were sufficient and necessary to trigger the consideration of change but they were not, even together, sufficient to actually bring about change.

The 1970s underscored that critical junctures are key shapers of the salience of change. Without a critical juncture, vested political leaders will act in a way that seeks to both further and to defend their own territorial interests. As Bickerton acknowledged there is a “ceiling to what can be achieved at the regional level” (Bickerton, 2009). The case of Richard
Hatfield showed that even if a political actor overtly favours change, they may be reluctant to pursue it or provide political leadership. This perhaps underscores the importance of personal and political considerations in shaping questions of change. Robichaud began the union process because of his desire to command national visibility; Hatfield however desired no such visibility and had only been in government a month when the report of the MUS was published. Robichaud had been in office four years and already secured re-election when he made his Centennial Conference speech, whereas Stanfield had been in office nine years by 1964. The role of public officials was also diminishing by the 1970s which precipitated a more narrow focus to questions of regionalism and economic development.

The examples of Hatfield and Regan show that the realities of the political process, in this case popular elections, can undermine the achievement of change even when it intersects with a critical juncture. When the report of the MUS was published in November 1970 there was still scope for change to occur but the entry of new political leaders brought new perspectives towards change and new attitudes towards the value of regionalism as a mechanism through which to achieve political and economic outcomes. Furthermore, this study also underscored the difficulty of achieving structural change when it is based on externalities that quickly evolve or change. When the final report of the MUS was published the key threats which had shaped the establishment of the study had become reconfigured. This reconfiguration allowed the premiers to take more provincially-centred perspectives to political and economic decision-making and action. The case of the Maritime provinces has shown that, even if change is actively considered, it can be expected that if the initial political context which shaped the salience of change becomes reconfigured and provides new opportunities for political action the pre-juncture status quo will be maintained.

The formation of the CMP in 1972 was a way for the premiers to demonstrate their willingness to engage in regional cooperation but protect their decision-making capacity and status as the core agents of structural change. The CMP was designed in a way so that it did not alter the logic or operation of the existing governance structures or, most important, pose a threat to the existing capacity of the premiers. The confederal design and the insistence on unanimity meant it never had the potential to set into motion changes that over time could alter the dynamic of decision-making and/or policy formation and delivery within the region (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 17). However, the premiers were able to stifle the regionalism
process and pursue provincial agendas. It is for this reason that the outcome of the critical juncture was not a form of structural change but the re-equilibration of the pre-juncture status quo.

To specifically answer the stated research question: a political union did not happen because the external and regional contexts that shaped the question of union became reconfigured and allowed the vested political leaders to pursue new opportunities for political action. In terms of the sub-questions: a) What factors gave rise to the critical juncture, that is the Maritime Union Study, and the consideration of a sub-national political union, in the Maritime provinces? The factors which gave rise to the critical juncture that led to the consideration of sub-national political union in the Maritimes were caused by a coalescence of internal and external political, economic and personal pressures. In the case of the Maritimes, the question of a political union was shaped by a combination of occurrences, notably, the personal political ambition of the incumbent political leaders, the erosion of provincial autonomy by fiscal dependency and federal economic development policy, the rise of Quebec nationalism, the threat of geographic truncation as a result of Quebec separatism, and pressure from the richer provinces over a solution to fiscal dependency. b) What was the role of political agency, that is the vested political leaders, in the establishment of the critical juncture? The premiers are the core change agents of structural change. The premiers possess the institutional, infrastructural and constitutional capacity to engage with questions of change and, perhaps most important, resist change. The premiers were able to resist change through the establishment of institutionalised intergovernmental relations. c) Can the outcome of the critical juncture, institutionalised intergovernmental relations (the Council of Maritime Premiers), established in 1972, be considered a form of structural change? Institutional intergovernmental relations were not a form of structural change. The confederal nature of the CMP and the insistence upon unanimity preserved the decision-making capacity of the premiers and ensured they did not forsake their role as the core change agents.

In terms of path dependence theory, the case of the Maritimes underscores that change is not the default outcome of a critical juncture. If the initial external and internal political context becomes reconfigured, the change agents will disengage with change and pursue individual political and economic agendas. Furthermore, if there is no threat or it is not strong enough to challenge existing norms, the political leaders will not engage with questions of
structural change as a collective regional response. To conclude, the salience of sub-national structural change was a balance between political environment and agency. Neither factor was strong enough to precipitate a political union amongst constitutionally protected sub-units within a federal state. When these factors coalesce the salience of change will increase but change may still not occur. The broader implication of this conclusion demonstrates the difficulty of achieving structural change at the sub-national level when political leaders with entrenched interests are imbued by the institutional setting as the primary change agents.

9.2. Future Research

This thesis has sought to provide a theoretically grounded explanation of why Canada’s Maritime provinces have never formed a political union. In theoretical terms, the objective was to gain a better understanding of how political agency affected the salience and outcome of structural change within path dependent settings. The core findings have suggested that externalities are important in shaping the salience of change but that political agency is necessary in order to bring about the active consideration of change to alternative path dependent settings. This thesis focused on the period between 1960 and 1980 because this was a time in which the political leaders actively engaged with the question of structural change. By focusing on this period, a detailed theoretically-backed explanation as to why change became salient for vested political leaders and why a union did not actually happen in spite of a critical juncture could be formulated. The external threat of Quebec nationalism and separatism has been emphasised as a key factor in shaping the salience of change. The role of Quebec separatism in shaping change offers an opportunity to test the explanation developed by this thesis against another time period in which questions of separatism became heightened in Canada. Faletti has argued that studies which seek to “identify relationships between conditions and outcomes” can be applied to alternative empirical settings beyond those for which they were originally conceived (Falleti, 2007: 5). Although the path dependent setting was retained following the Maritime Union Study, it cannot be ruled out that the setting will not again be subject to another crucial juncture and the consideration of change.

The Quebec referendum of 1995 in particular provides a context in which to test the explanation. Did the re-emergence of separatism in 1995 trigger questions of structural change amongst vested political leaders in the Maritime provinces? Was there a critical juncture? Did the vested political leaders interpret the re-emergence of separatism as a threat
in the same way as their predecessors? How did the re-emergence of separatism affect the broader national political environment? How did the federal government respond to the re-emergence of separatism? Did the federal response affect the salience of structural change in the Maritime region? Why did structural change not happen? These are important questions which can provide further elaboration to the empirical explanation developed in this thesis.

Furthermore, there was a distinct federal context to the question of a union in the mid-1990s. Writing in *Atlantic Progress* in February 1996 Richard Starr described the existence of ‘twin shocks’ that necessitated a political union, notably Quebec separatism and the 1995 budget of federal finance minister, Paul Martin, which involved “deep cuts to transfers and [in Starr’s opinion] threatened the viability of existing political structures” (Starr, 1996: 18). Starr argued for a political union from the standpoint of economic and administrative efficiency. These were not new arguments and were articulated during the 1960-1980 period. A key aspect of Starr’s analysis, however, was that he included Newfoundland in his union argument. This raises questions about the notion of region in this part of Canada and what factors precipitate Newfoundland’s inclusion in proposals for a union and/or an enhanced form of regionalism.

An analysis of this period may also answer new questions of how globalisation might affect questions of union. In particular, the emergence of low cost communication networks throughout the 1990s and the advent of free trade in North America in the late 1980s and early 1990s have been singled out as factors that may affect the nature of the union debate. Gerald Regan, for example, argued that although in the 1970s he maintained a position that a union may become necessary in the event of a ‘horror situation,’ such as Quebec separatism, his perspective would not be the same in the modern era. Regan argued that free trade and globalisation meant a union would not be necessary in the same way as the 1960s and 1970s (Regan, 2010). This new avenue for research may help develop a fuller understanding of how the broader political and economic context can shape questions of structural change in Canada’s Maritime region.
Appendix 1

Louis Robichaud’s Speech to the Charlottetown Centennial Conference

Commemorative Address by the Honourable Louis J. Robichaud
Premier of New Brunswick
at the
Dominion-Provincial Premiers Conference
Confederation Chamber – Charlottetown
1 September 1964

Charlottetown was, in September 1864, a place of beginning... and the end is not yet.

In 1864, Canada was merely the name of a colony, composed of Canada East (Quebec) and Canada West (Ontario). It was soon to become the name of a great dream... a dream of nationhood for the colonies and the territories that were then British North America.

Today, in 1964, Canada is the name of the nation of which our forefathers dreamed... a name that has gained world-wide respect, as we have earned our place of prominence within the Commonwealth.

Has the dream been entirely fulfilled?

I believe it has not!

Perhaps it came to fruition years ago... on the scale that was envisioned by our forefathers. Yet we are merely a puny shadow of what Canada, one day, shall become.

In 1964 our horizons are almost limitless. My thoughts are not of the might and power of domination and conquest. Those are the dreams of another age, to which few will subscribe today.

I see a Canada that will contribute in leadership of the hearts and minds of men.

One hundred years ago today, our forefathers met in this very room, not only with a dream of the future, but also with a fear of the future. There were forces, both within and without, that threatened to engulf them. They sought strength in unity.

In retrospect, the fears of that day seem small in comparison to those that were to follow.
Today, at times, we become too engrossed with the strains and stresses that must accompany a federal union such as ours. We permit our minds to become so inclined to fears of the present and the future that we fail as a nation to grasp the opportunities and the new concepts of greatness that are ever present in our fast-changing world.

I would hope that, one hundred years from today, there will be another meeting such as this in this same room.

I would hope, also, that those who participate will be able to look back upon a Canada whose people became outward-looking and reached the objectives and efficacies to which we must aspire as a nation.

The New Brunswick delegation came to Charlottetown in 1864 for the ostensible purpose of fabricating a Maritime Union, in concert with the then colonies of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.

Unfortunately (and I use the word advisedly), they were not resolute in their purpose. I am persuaded to believe that, had such a political or legislative union been consummated, at that time, our contribution to strength in and benefits from nationhood would have multiplied manyfold.

But that is past and whimsical recrimination would now serve no useful purpose.

Perhaps, however, Premiers Stanfield, Smallwood and Shaw and I may get together today and, on this centennial of that first meeting in Charlottetown, decided to reduce the number of Canadian Provinces from ten to seven. Should that occur, the focal point of progress and activity in the nation world unquestionably and rapidly take a marked shift to the east.

As I said a moment ago, the New Brunswick delegates came to Charlottetown in 1864, ostensibly to join in a Maritime Union. Historians state, however, that they and their counterparts from Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia were reluctant to sacrifice any of the political or legislative powers that they then held in the existing colonial structure.

So the die was cast.

The delegation from Canada arrived a Charlottetown with its work made easy and its purpose already well on the way to accomplishment. Those who held in their minds the idea of a vast nation from Atlantic to Pacific were led by the redoubtable young John A. Macdonald, whose star was already well in its ascendency, and soon exercised their powers of persuasion. Thoughts of the lesser union gave way to the greater concept and the destiny of a nation began to take shape.

It was “On to Quebec” for the meeting that would produce the 72 Resolutions and that would result, three years hence, in Confederation.
The historian writes that:

“After two general elections in New Brunswick, and a passing change of Government, the Resolutions were approved (in the New Brunswick Legislature) in July 1866 by good majorities.”

Those few words inadequately describe man months of hectic (and hilarious) times in the public life of New Brunswick. Those politicians who were pro-Confederation were, shortly after the Charlottetown and Quebec Conferences, pilloried and maligned. In short order, the electors pushed them from office. A like fate, however, awaited their successors.

Factors in this two year turmoil included the pressures created by a back-lash of animosity from our American neighbours, following their Civil War, (We had traded with and showed some sympathy toward the South), the imminence of Fenian raids on our borders, abrogation of The Reciprocity Act by the United States, the promise by Canada to build the Intercolonial Railway, the machinations of the then Lieutenant-Governor Arthur H. Gordon, and plentiful supplies of money from Upper Canada to buy pro-Confederation votes in the elections of New Brunswick.

In consequence of these and other factors, the pro-Confederationists were brought back from the political outer darkness and became again the heroes of the day. And Canada put on the federal garb.

So, today we honour the memory of those who “built better than they knew”. They fabricated, here at Charlottetown, and later at Quebec a constitution that, with all its faults, has given us a nation of strength and in which we take great pride.

The New Brunswick delegation that is here today is totally pro-Confederation. The cloth of our federal garb is not perfect, but many of the imperfections have been removed with years.

Those that remain will be removed with patience and quiet determination.

To the Fathers of Confederation, we are truly and duly thankful that we may call ourselves Canadian.

*Source: Robichaud, 1964a: 1-4*
Appendix 2

Louis Robichaud’s Document to the Atlantic Premiers Conference

ATLANTIC PREMIERS’ CONFERENCE
SEPTEMBER, 1964

A PROPOSAL REGARDING THE POLITICAL UNION
OF
THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

In 1864, representatives of the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island met to discuss political union. The result of this and the further meeting at Quebec was the establishment of Canada three years later. The forming of the nation satisfied the pressures and needs for mutual security and closer ties between the provinces at that time.

However, during the past 100 years the ghost of Maritime or Atlantic union has arisen with increasing regularity. The new pressures of the mid 20th century the problems of national unity, and the growth in governmental responsibilities, combine in calling for re-examination of proposals for the union of these four Atlantic provinces.

There has been a continuing development of regional liaison and co-operation, as is best indicated by the annual meeting of the Atlantic Premiers; each year there is a greater number of private and governmental bodies being formed on a four-province base. The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council is an outstanding example in the private sector, while the creation of the Atlantic Development board is a distinct governmental recognition of the need for a united approach to our future.

The four province pavilion at the 1967 World’s Fair indicates how our size so often forces us to work together.

A brief examination does not show that any significant administrative savings would be achieved through union. Nor would the economic future of this region improve automatically. The strength and value of union is in what it would make possible in the future.

At a time when many of the responsibilities of government are shifting to the provinces, the new unit could negotiate as the third largest province in population. Its size would more reasonably be able to provide and administer efficiently the provincial programmes.

The fabrication of one set of policies for resource development and the provision of services could materially accelerate the growth of the region and raise the general standard of living.

In my view, these provinces must plan and work together to achieve the most efficient use of our resources, rather than to dissipate our efforts through four unrelated policies in most fields.
Significant industrial development is essential to the future well-being of these four provinces. They are competing with every other area of this continent for new industry, which is itself becoming increasingly international in scope. It is a serious question whether these four provinces can continue to compete with each other as well and distort our inter-related regional trade by pursuing four separate approaches to a common problem.

Provincial co-operation has been sufficient in the past, but will it be enough in a future of rapidly changing Federal-Provincial relations, tax structure committees, growing social services, expanding international trade patterns, and automation?

Working as one province, the people of this region would considerably improve their prospects of prosperity in the decades ahead.

At a time when national unity is of vital importance to this country, and while approaching the Centennial of Confederation, such a step as the union of the Atlantic Provinces would give all Canadians reason to approach the second 100 years with faith, that our country can continue to adjust and face whatever pressures may beset us. Such a dramatic step at this time should display to all Canada that the people of this region have a dynamic interest in the future and a contribution to make to it.

A decision to proceed with such a union should not be considered lightly nor should it be taken or rejected hastily. It is proposed that a serious examination of the question of union be undertaken, leading to either the acceptance or rejection of the proposal on intelligent grounds. I believe the time has come when we must abandon the parochial attitudes towards our combined future; it is also time that we consider this proposition on basis of fact, rather than emotion. The subject is too serious to permit the discussion of it to become clouded or subverted by prejudice or pettiness of any nature.

It is therefore proposed that the four Atlantic Premiers approach the Government of Canada to ascertain views regarding the union of provinces and what technical and financial assistance might be forthcoming from that source for a serious examination of the subject.

Further, it is proposed that the four Atlantic Premiers establish a commission to carry out a thorough examination of all the factors affecting or affected by a union of provinces. Such a commission should report to the Premiers on the efficacy of such action and with recommendations.

It is suggested that such a commission might be composed of two representatives appointed by each province, plus a chairman appointed perhaps, by the Government of Canada, with costs to be shared by the participating governments.

Source: Robichaud, 1964b: 1-2
Appendix 3

Legislative Resolutions Committing to Establish a Political Union Study

The following resolutions were passed unanimously by the House of Assembly of the Province of Nova Scotia and by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick in February 1965

RESOLUTION (Nova Scotia – 16 February 1965)
RESOLVED that in the opinion of this House it is desirable that the government of the Province of Nova Scotia and the government of the Province of New Brunswick commission a study to enquire into the advantages and disadvantages of a union of the Province of Nova Scotia and the Province of New Brunswick to become one province within the nation.

RESOLUTION (New Brunswick – 25 February 1965)
RESOLVED that in the opinion of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick it is desirable that the government of the Province of Nova Scotia and the government of the Province of New Brunswick commission a study to enquire into the advantages and disadvantages of a union of the Province of Nova Scotia and the Province of New Brunswick to become one province within the nation.

Extract from PEI Throne Speech (22 February 1968)
My government proposes the establishment of a Secretariat to further encourage and facilitate efforts of the Atlantic Provinces in dealing with regional problems of mutual concern. A resolution will be submitted seeking the encouragement of further measures for joint governmental action.

However, before the proposed resolution could be presented, the Maritime Union Study had been agreed upon and launched by the governments of the three provinces.

Appendix 4

**Legislative Statement Made by Each Maritime Premier Announcing the Establishment of the Maritime Union Study**

The premiers of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick have agreed to sponsor a special study on Maritime union including the possibilities for economic and other forms of regional co-ordination and co-operation.

Dr. J.J. Deutsch, Principal of Queen’s University and formerly Chairman of the Economic Council of Canada, has agreed to assist in organizing the study, to supervise it, and to act as special advisor. In addition, he will participate in the formulation of any recommendations and reports.

Mr. F.R. Drummie, Economic Advisor to the New Brunswick Government, has been appointed as Executive Director of the study and will be responsible for the co-ordination of efforts by the various governments as well as special studies and investigations as required. Mr. Drummie has been granted, for the duration of the study, a leave of absence from his various responsibilities with the New Brunswick Government.

Each of the governments is committed to direct participation in the project and it is expected that the involvement of interested organisations and bodies will be sought.

I wish to join with the premiers of the other two provinces, who are making this announcement in their legislatures at this time, in thanking both these men for accepting this difficult challenge.

Appendix 5

**Special Studies of the Maritime Union Study**

- The History of Maritime Union: A Study in Frustration (J. Murray Beck)
- Public Finances in the Maritime Provinces (James H. Lynn)
- Atlantic Canada Today (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council)
- Higher Education in the Atlantic Provinces for the 1970s (The Association of Atlantic Universities)
- Region-Wide Politics for Higher Education (Arthur Murphy, J.F. O’Sullivan and E.F. Sheffield)
- Industrial Development Policies in the Maritime Provinces (Atlantic Provinces Economic Council)
- Medicare, Public Health Services and Maritime Union (M.D.T. Associates)
- Welfare Services and Maritime Union (M.D.T. Associates)
- Inter-provincial Relations in the Maritime Provinces (The Dalhousie Institute of Public Affairs and Richard H. Leach)
- Experience of National and International Co-operative Institutions (R.M. Burns)
- Provincial-Municipal Relations in the Maritime Provinces (John R. Cameron in consultation with John F. Graham)

- Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations and Maritime Union (J. R. Winter)

- Maritime Union: Implications for the French Language and Culture (Peter C. Findlay)

- The Maritimes and Maritime Union: An Opinion Study (Market Facts of Canada Limited)

- Maritime Union and Economic Planning (W.Y. Smith and Thomas Wilson)


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