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Becoming a God in Greek Thought

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to conceptualise the literary universe in ancient Greek literature as a 'cosmic society' and thereby to examine the defining features of gods and humans and how excellent human individuals might achieve divine or godlike status. Traditionally, scholarship has distinguished humans from gods solely by the strict antithesis between immortality and mortality. I believe that this dominant view can be challenged, or at least modified, by further reflection on a set of notions and categories that separate and correlate gods and humans. The thesis aims to apply several social concepts such as honour, status, and community to analyse scenarios and occasions in which extraordinary humans succeed in becoming, or are approximated to, a deity. The thesis is divided into two parts and consists of six chapters. Part I provides a general conceptual framework, which is then applied to the three case studies of extraordinary figures in the works of Homer, Pindar, and Sophocles that constitute Part II. The Introduction reviews the mainstream scholarship relating to the Greek gods and their relationship with mankind and proposes the idea of a cosmic society. Chapter 1 examines some key texts on the distribution of honour among gods and humans and provides an interpretation of it as a coherent nexus of ideas and themes about the supreme rule of Zeus, the establishment and maintenance of the cosmic society, divine–human separation, the relationship between gods and humans, and divine–human interactions. Chapter 2 formulates the principal argument of the thesis: divinity, either of a god or a divinised human, is above all defined by a special honour that is ordained or distributed as a portion by the divine community under the rule of Zeus. I examine the ways in which a new deity is initiated into the divine community and compare them with several cases of *apotheosis*. The textual investigations lead to the main subject of the thesis, i.e. approximate and transgressive forms of divinisation. Building on the findings in Part I, the case studies of Part II explore how the extraordinary statuses of Iliadic warriors, Pindaric laudandi, and Sophoclean protagonists are defined in relation to their human fellows and especially to the gods in the cosmic society. These texts are chosen to reflect the diversity of contexts and genres in which extraordinary persons reach the limit of humanity and become approximate to gods. Chapter 3 focuses on

the *aristeia* of three distinct Homeric warriors, all of whom are temporarily elevated to divine status in ways that have different thematic significance. Chapter 4 discusses Pindar's *Olympian* 1–3, composed for two Sicilian tyrants whose extraordinary statuses are defined in comparison to those of the figures of the central mythic narrative and who enjoy temporary bliss with eschatological prospects for post-mortem elevation to a divine realm, prospects that fundamentally depend on the laudandus' relationship with divine powers. Chapter 5 offers a detailed reading of the *Ajax* of Sophocles, in which the eponymous protagonist questions the traditional values relating to honour and the divine–human relationship in the cosmic society by rejecting the kind of honour based on his relationships with others and by attempting to confer on himself a special kind of honour that is independent of external recognition and divine distribution. These case studies will not only support the main argument of the thesis but also contribute to an understanding of the ethical and theological content of the poetic works, as well as their literary fabric.

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Lay Summary

This thesis proposes to understand the universe in ancient Greek literature as a large society including both gods and men. Traditionally, scholars distinguish humans from gods by the strict antithesis between immortality and mortality. With the idea of 'cosmic society', I attempt to show how gods and humans interact with each other and how excellent human individuals succeed in becoming like a deity. There are two parts and six chapters in the thesis. Part I provides a general conceptual framework. Part II tests this in three large case studies of several extraordinary figures in the works of Homer, Pindar, and Sophocles. The Introduction reviews the mainstream scholarship of the Greek gods and their relationship with mankind and proposes the idea of cosmic society. Chapter 1 shows how the cosmic society is formed and maintained through distribution of honours and defines the statuses of both gods and men in the cosmic society. Chapter 2 explores the texts regarding how newborn deities are initiated into the divine community and exceptional humans are deified. This helps to formulate the main argument of the thesis: divinity, either of a god or a divinised human, is above all defined by a special honour as a portion ordained or distributed by the divine community under the rule of Zeus. In addition, this will also lead to the main subject of the thesis: the limited (approximate, momentary, and transgressive) forms of divinisation in comparison with the full deification. With the findings in Part I, the case studies of Part II explore how Iliadic warriors, Pindaric victors, and Sophoclean protagonists are perceived as 'godlike'. Chapter 3 focuses on three extraordinary warriors, who cross the divine–human dividing line to find the limitation on human power and human's dependence on gods. Diomedes is temporarily elevated to a divine status to fight against some deities. Hector is both empowered and deceived by gods. Achilles suffers from the conflicts between his divinely bestowed honour and his honour among his human fellows. Achilles also provides a fundamental reflection on human condition and divine–human relationship. Chapter 4 discusses two Sicilian tyrants in three odes of Pindar. It considers how Pindar defines their extraordinary status in comparison with some mythological figures and how their current bliss and prospects for afterlife happiness are fundamentally dependent on their

relationship with divine favour and powers. Chapter 5 offers a detailed reading of the *Ajax* of Sophocles. The protagonist of this play, Ajax, questions the values and norms of the cosmic society by rejecting the honours based on his relations with gods and the other humans and by attempting to achieve honours independent of the others. Ajax's excessive insistence on independence and autonomy makes him great in both positive and negative senses. These case studies will not only support the main argument of the thesis but also contribute to understanding the ethical and theological content of the poetic works as well as their literary fabric.

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Table of Contents

Texts, Translation, Abbreviations

Texts and line numbers are cited from the most recent Oxford Classical Texts, unless otherwise stated. Translations of ancient passages are my own, unless otherwise indicated. The abbreviations of ancient authors and works follow those in the lists of *A Greek- English Lexicon* (ed. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, rev. H. S. Jones, Oxford[9] 1940). In addition, editors, editions, and collections are referred to with the following abbreviations:

Drachmann	*Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina*, ed. A. B. Drachmann, 3 vols (Leipzig 1903-1927).
LSJ	*A Greek English Lexicon*, eds. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, rev. H. S. Jones (Oxford[9] 1940), Revised Supplement (Oxford 1996).
OCD	*Oxford Classical Dictionary*, eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (Oxford[4] 2012)
OEAGR	*Oxford Encyclopaedia of Ancient Greece and Rome*, ed. M. Gagarin (Oxford 2010).
OED	*The Oxford English Dictionary*, eds. J. Simpson and E. Weiner (Oxford[2] 1989)
PEG	*Poetae Epici Graeci i,* ed. A. Bernabe (Leipzig, 1987).
PMG	*Poetae Melici Graeci*. ed. D. L. Page (Oxford, 1962).
West	*Homeric Hymns, Homeric Apocrypha, Lives of Homer*, ed. M. L. West (Cambridge, 2003).

0 Introduction: Divinity, Honour, and Cosmic Society

The particular theme of 'becoming a god' pursued in this thesis could seem at odds with the prevalent view among students of ancient Greece that there is an unbridgeable gulf between gods and humans. This very gulf, as reflected in scholarly concepts, is largely based on the strict antithesis between immortality and mortality. In addition, the Greek gods are often understood as transcendent beings, whose behavioural modes and existential forms are different from, or alien to, those of human beings. I believe this dominant view can be challenged, or at least modified, by further reflection on a set of notions and categories that separate and correlate gods and humans. Taking an 'emic' perspective,[1] the living world of the ancient Greeks is understood as a cosmic social unity of gods and men rather than a universe with two separate worlds. The application of several social concepts, like honour, status, and community, will show that there are other ways of bridging the gap between gods and men besides immortalisation. As we shall see, the scenarios and occasions where extraordinary humans succeed in becoming, or are approximated to, a deity, will make much more sense if we place them into a cosmic society, analysing them in terms of status and honour.

Assisted by recent scholarship, we are encouraged to reconsider the old stories about gods and humans, and their relationships and interactions in Greek literature.[2] In his article titled 'What is a Greek God?', A. Henrichs attempts to define divinity by identifying three divine properties that set gods apart from humans: immortality, anthropomorphism, and power.[3] Immortality is said to be 'the ultimate benchmark' of the divinity of the Greek gods and is conceptually 'inseparable from it'.[4] As some scholars have recently argued, however, the everyday or scholarly use of the modern notion of immortality (which is usually understood exclusively as a state of everlastingness) should be applied to the Greek world

[1] For etic/emic, see esp. Naiden (2012) 318–331; also Henrichs (2010) 28–29; Harrison (2015) 170.
[2] See e.g. Currie (2005); the essays collected in Bremmer & Erskine (2010); Versnel (2011); Long (2019) 1–28.; Meister (2020). For earlier scholarship on Greek gods, see the useful discussion in Konaris (2016). For a useful overview of recent studies of Greek religion, see Harrison (2015), also Polinskaya (2013) 59–69.
[3] Henrichs (2010).
[4] Henrichs (2010) 30–31, 38.

with caution and qualification.[5] For instance, the meaning of the Homeric words for 'immortal' (e.g. ἀθάνατος) is poised uncertainly between (1) 'existing forever' and (2) 'divine' or 'appropriate for a god'. As A. Long rightly noticed, the meaning of divine ownership or appropriateness for a god, other than endless duration, predominates in passages where a mortal figure or an earthly thing is called 'immortal'.[6] Therefore, the state of endless existence does not fully express the denotation and connotation of the passages in which terms or phrases referring to immortality are applied. In fact, immortality describes only one aspect of the multi-dimensional divine life[7] and stands as an attribute, a mark, or a privilege of a divine being.[8] Confining divinity to immortality will not do full justice to the Greek gods as perceived by their worshippers and might prevent us from exploring potential alternatives for appreciating and interpretating the literary texts.

Free from this strict antithesis, divinity and humanity are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Even if immortality remains the ultimate dividing line that humans cannot cross on their own terms, this does not prevent them from achieving a certain limited form of divinity without being immortalised. In other words, the idea that divinity is attainable by a human is not inconceivable or inconsistent with the religious and theological settings perceived by the Greeks themselves, particularly in literary works. In fact, the prospects for achieving divine status or being assimilated to a deity on many levels could be found in literary works of various genres: for instance, the Eleusinian mysteries in the Homeric hymns; the myths of those who are transported to the Blessed Island or Hyperborea for a happy life in Pindar; and certain protagonists of Sophocles' plays who come to an enigmatic end with prospects for an elevation to the divine. In Hesiod's *Works and Days*, which expounds the human condition and the separation between gods and men, we may detect a way of being approximated to the divine in the code of living (724–764) 'with suggestive parallels to the Pythagorean one'.[9]

[5] Long (2019) 7 ff.
[6] Long (2019) 18.
[7] Meister (2020) 2 ff., and *passim.*
[8] Cf. Henrichs (2010) 30, 38; Jaeger (1959) 136–137.
[9] Currie (2005) 173. For the connection between Hesiodic works and pre-Socratic thought, see Detienne (1963) 35–36 (Pythagoras); Koning (2010) 165 ff. (Empedocles).

Even in the Homeric epics, which place great emphasis on the divine–human opposition,[10] mythic stories of apotheosis or deification, such as those of Ino and Ganymede, are not excluded as anomalies or contradictions to the settings of the Homeric world.

Furthermore, when we consider another feature emphasised by Henrichs, i.e. power, the boundaries between gods and men become blurrier than is generally assumed. The gods are perceived as powerful and superior forms of 'human', leading a happy and carefree life.[11] Considering power and its exertion, it is often found that gods differ from humans in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. We may find that a mortal figure possesses the same kind of power (e.g. martial prowess), and sometimes exercises it to the extent that their action resembles that of the divine. For instance, Diomedes is empowered by Athena to fight against Aphrodite and Ares in *Iliad* 5. As R. Parker argued, a Homeric warrior, although biologically a human, could 'functionally' be recognised as a god, if he successfully, say, protects a city from the attack of enemies.[12] Gods are at work, and so are men.[13] It is thus not surprising that several recent studies propose some 'strange' concepts such as 'momentary immortality' in F. Meister's dissertation[14] and 'mortal epiphany' in K. Schulz's work, which demonstrate how a human could be perceived as a divine figure or assume the role of a deity in special cases of epiphanic occasion, but only temporarily.[15]

Moreover, anthropomorphism deserves serious consideration, as A. Henrichs proposes.[16] The terminology takes an anthropocentric form because it describes the gods from an 'etic' viewpoint.[17] From the 'emic' perspective of Homer, however, the phenomena of the similarities between gods and men are described from the opposite side of the same

[10] E.g. Dodds (1951) 10: 'Gods may appear at times in human form, men may share at times in the divine attribute of power, but in Homer there is nevertheless no real blurring of the sharp line which separates humanity from deity.'
[11] Schein (1984) 52; also Edwards (1987) 125–127.
[12] Parker (2011) 110, cf. 123.
[13] Parker (2007) 387–451; cf. Haubold (2021).
[14] Meister 'ton[es] down the apparent paradox in the original title' in the monologue published as 'Greek Praise and the Rhetoric of Divinity', see Meister (2015) and Meister (2020) vii. Divinity rather than immortality is the focus of Meister's work and my thesis. On a similar path but in a different direction, as we shall see, the present thesis embraces the paradox by exploring a kind of 'momentary divinity'.
[15] Schulz (2018).
[16] Henrichs (2010) 32–35.
[17] Henrichs (2010) 28. Cf. Burkert (1991a) 81: 'the gods of Homer in their unforgettable individuality who had become so important for the whole of the Greek world view were found to be too human or even below human standards'. The anthropocentric stance stems from Xenophanes' notorious criticism of the Homeric gods (21 B 11–12, 14, 16 DK). The stance continues with a different form in modern scholarship, for instance, the *polis*-religion model associated with Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood's works; see e.g. Sourvinou-Inwood (1988); Sourvinou-Inwood (1990). This has been criticised by scholars, e.g. Kindt (2015) and Harrison (2015).

spectrum:[18] the Homeric warriors appear to be 'theomorphic' figures, as reflected in various epithets and formulae such as 'like immortals' (ἐπιείκελος ἀθανάτοισιν) and 'equal to god' (ἰσόθεος, ἀντίθεος, δαίμονι ἶσος).[19]

More importantly, anthropomorphism and theomorphism denote the similarities between gods and men not only in terms of physical shapes but also in respect of the modes of behaviour and values shared among them. For instance, the Homeric δαίμονι ἶσος, as we shall see in Chapter 3, describes the thoughts and behaviours of a warrior such as Diomedes or Achilles that are on a par with those of a deity. In this sense, anthropomorphism refers to the phenomena that equate to more than serving the purpose of epiphany or cultic activities.[20]

This prompts a further reflection on the living world of anthropomorphic gods and theomorphic humans and the *Weltanschauung* that sustains the affinity (or unity) between gods and men and simultaneously underlines their distinction. It is more important to explore the basic facts that both underline the divine–human differentiation and make deification possible.[21] By the same token, theomorphism will not be fully comprehended until we understand the very world in which a man could be perceived as, or even elevated to, a deity. As M. Theunissen suggested, we should turn to a 'theo-anthropology' and 'the unity of unity and difference'.[22]

The view of the world determines the way of perceiving the inhabitants and their relationships and interactions in that world. For students of Greek religion and the Greek world, however, it might not be feasible or possible to retrieve fully the 'emic' viewpoint. As far as the world presented in the poetic literature of ancient Greece is concerned, the approach of W. Burkert, regarding the gods as *persons* in a ritual context, rather than the attempt of J.-

[18] The author of *On the Sublime* suggests that Homer's anthropomorphism 'turned the men involved in Iliadic affairs as far as possible into gods, but the gods into men' (9.7). Jaspers (1955) 177: 'The anthropomorphism of God corresponds to the theomorphism of Man'. The view of Goethe, quoted in Otto (1954) 236, though radically put, might serve as a good reminder of being open-minded to the Greek world: 'the Greeks' goal is to deify man, not to humanise gods—it is theomorphism, not anthropomorphism'. What should be taken more seriously is not only the anthropomorphism of the gods, as Henrichs suggests, but also the theomorphism of humans. See also Bishop (2008) 167.
[19] E.g. Griffin (1980) 82; Vernant (1991) 1–27; Currie (2005) 178–183.
[20] Cf. Henrichs (2010) 33.
[21] Bremmer (1994) 12 argued that it is precisely because of anthropomorphism that 'it was necessary to stress the immortal-mortal boundary'. But it will be more fruitful if we first understand the world that makes anthropomorphism so remarkable.
[22] Theunissen (2005) 234: 'Es entwirft eine Theoanthropologie, welche die überkommene Vorstellung von einer unüberwindbaren Kluft zwischen Göttern und Menschen durch die Idee einer Einheit von Einheit und Unterschied berichtigt.'

P. Vernant, defining the gods as powers in relation to a systematic framework of a pantheon, appears to do more justice to an anthropomorphic god in a polytheistic world.[23] Be that as it may, as J. Bremmer noted, neither approach makes the gods its real subject.[24] In fact, either the 'person' of the ritualist approach or the 'power' of the structuralist view reveals some truth about the conception of a deity and a human in the Greek world.

It seems better to follow the Greek writers.[25] According to Herodotus' 'etic' description of divine anthropomorphism (2.53; cf. *Th*. 112), the defining features of a Greek god are essentially determined (διελόντες) in terms of τιμή and τέχνη, along with other personal details given (δόντες) in ἐπωνυμία and indicated (σημήναντες) in εἶδος.[26] That τιμή and τέχνη occupy the central focus of the idea of an anthropomorphic deity is in line with what we could find in Homer and Hesiod.[27] In this regard, the Greeks experience their gods not directly in their essence but primarily[28] in their activities of various kinds (τέχναι, denoting special power, skill, or function) and, more importantly, in their reciprocal relationships to other divinities and humans (τιμαί, referring to both honours as well as the competences and privileges that demand such honours). In this light, an anthropomorphic god is not merely a powerful person with a special sphere of influence but also a member of distinct status in a certain society. It is this society that this thesis attempts to conceptualise as 'cosmic society' and, thereby, to examine the defining features of gods and humans within it. It is with this conception that the scenarios in which an excellent individual human attempts to, or has the prospects for, achieving a divine or godlike status make sense.

[23] On Vernant's side, see e.g. Vernant (1980); Detienne (1986). On Burkert's camp, see e.g. Burkert (1985), Burkert (1991a), Versnel (2011). For this debate, see Konaris (2015) 281 ff. with further details. For criticism on both sides, see also the excellent study of Naiden (2012).
[24] Bremmer (2019) 3, a revised version of his introduction for Bremmer & Erskine (2010).
[25] Versnel (2011) 318, following the Greeks rather than Vernant or Burkert to see Hermes as the most 'humanised and indeed more de-deified'. Several lines above, Versnel concluded with an impression that 'in everyday religious practice individual Greek gods were practically never conceived of as powers, let alone as cultural products, but were in the first place envisaged as *persons* with individual characters and personalities' (317).
[26] See also Clay (2009) 12.
[27] E.g. *Il*. 9.498; 15.189–93; *Th*. 73–74, 392–396, 423–425, 885.
[28] Cf. Heidegger (1992) 110, argued that the Greeks 'experienced the gods and men in their distinct essence, and in their reciprocal relation', and that is why 'they have a clear knowledge of the essence of the 'demigods', who dwell in the between, between the gods and men'.

In literary works and perhaps cultic practices, Greek deities are not perceived as absolutely transcendent beings existing in another world apart from the oikumene.[29] Rather, gods and goddesses immanently live in a polytheistic[30] cosmos in which the divine, human, and natural beings are interconnected, interacting in various degrees.[31] By 'cosmos',[32] I refer to the poetic totality of the universe according to the cosmological accounts and cosmographic descriptions shared and preserved in the poetic literature of archaic Greece, comprising celestial, terrestrial, and chthonic sections.[33]

The divine existents dominate and administer the cosmos as a society or a kingdom. Like mankind, they have their overarching *basileus*, Zeus, who bears similar attributes to earthly rulers;[34] in addition, senior gods demand more respect from junior ones, and those gods holding inferior status are expected to yield to those in a superior position.[35] Like a member of human society, the honour (τιμή) of a god is envisaged as the index of their place or rank in cosmic society and, accordingly, their 'individual sphere of influence' in which their power is 'unchallenged and absolute'.[36] Greek deities are deeply concerned about their own honours: as we shall see, each deity needs and demands deference not only from other divinities but also from humans; on the other side, a god is endowed with honours also as a set of competences, qualities, and prerogatives that attract and demand such deference. From

[29] Cf. Kearns (1995) 513 ('a sacred/secular polarity cannot play the same central role in the apprehension of the world as it has often done elsewhere').
[30] For Greek polytheism, see recently Parker (2007); Bremmer & Erskine (2010); Parker (2011) 64–102; Versnel (2011) *passim*; Polinskaya (2013); Pirenne-Delforge & Pironti (2015).
[31] Sarischoulis (2016) 98. Cf. Vernant (1980) 109–113, according to which the Greek gods are not persons but powers, created by primordial powers – which is based on the distinction of reality and representation (in the accounts of the Greeks); for an articulation of this point see also Vernant (1983) 353 ff., esp. 360: the gods are not 'separate individuals, autonomous focuses of existence and action, ontological units – persons, in our sense of the word. A divine power does not really have any existence of its own' – because the idea of 'person' is incompatible with the multiple forms of an individual Greek god with various function-oriented epithets, as reflected in cultic practice (his distinction between individualised heroes in myths and somewhat anonymous or blurred heroes in cults is also unconvincing). This sounds largely out of tone as one reads the Homeric epics. In fact, I do not see why it is difficult to accept the idea of a person with various forms of power. Versnel (2011) 60–87 convincingly argued that the question of multiple designations for one single god is not for the Greeks; cf. Tor (2017) 33–35 providing two counter-examples. On the problem of the divine omnipotence of the Greek gods, see Versnel (2011) 379–438.
[32] The Greek term κόσμος means 'order' or 'ornament', and has various bearings in different contexts. The formula ἐπέων κόσμον (Democritus 68 B21 DK; Solon, fr.1.2 West; Parmenides, 28 B8.52 DK) is of particular interest here: the *kosmos* of words is a kind of poetic representation of the cosmos in reality. In this sense, Democritus' famous comment on Homer may be translated as follows: 'he established (or assembled) a *kosmos* out of manifolded epic verses', as Gagné (2021) 25 suggested.
[33] A vivid glimpse, or a microcosmic image, of this cosmos may be found on the Shield of Achilles, crafted by Hephaestus, in *Iliad* 18 (478–608); see also Taplin (1980); Hardie (1985).
[34] Lloyd-Jones (1971) 27. Burkert (1985) 189, 'the gods are and remain the Stronger ones'.
[35] Yamagata (1994) 121 ff.
[36] Henrichs (2010) 36; also Long (2019) 8. The diversity and variety of local manifestations makes it impossible to give a consistent picture about the sphere of power of a god, even one of the major Olympian gods; cf. Bremmer (1994) 13.

an ‘emic’ point of view, these observations discourage the anthropocentric idea that divine society is perceived as ‘an extension of the hierarchical organization of human society’.[37] Instead of this ‘etic’ viewpoint,[38] all human communities as a whole are believed (emically) to be a part of the existential order of cosmic society under the administration and influence of gods, as explicitly presented in Hesiod.[39] As we shall see, the cosmos is developed and established as a society through the conflicts and consensus among all deities, who observe various social norms, especially the code of honour that sustains the overarching system of order and value.

Poetic anthropomorphism in fact encourages ‘a concept of a divine society’, which, taking its interactions with the human realms into account, also denotes a larger ‘cosmic society’.[40] This, however, should not be taken as a truism. In Hesiod, the formation of cosmic society is understood to be a result of the genealogical evolution and the foundation of the cosmic order. It is also worth noting that the establishment of divine society is not merely about theogony, but it is also relevant to the generation of the human race, as well as to the divine–human separation. In this regard, the poetic world is perceived (emically) as a ‘cosmic society’ (rather than a divine society separated from the human realms) populated with anthropomorphic gods and theomorphic humans.

Furthermore, the fundamental shaping of this society is initiated and completed, at least in part, by Zeus’ dispensation of τιμαί on heaven and earth.[41] As I attempt to describe in Part I, this cosmic society appears to be ordered[42] by an honour-graded hierarchy, and largely regulated by an ‘honour code’ commonly observed and practised by both the divine and human agents.[43] As B. Currie suggests, there seems to be no clear break between gods,

[37] Vernant (1980) 114.
[38] Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1971) 160.
[39] See also Yunis (1988) ; Kearns (1995); Clay (2003).
[40] Cf. Hornblower & Spafford (1996) 653.
[41] *Th.* 73–74, 885; cf. 392–396 and 423–425.
[42] But this is not to say that its hierarchy is static, because the pantheon is not fixed and is open to new divinities. See Bremmer (1994) 22.
[43] Sarischoulis (2016) 88: ‘men and gods are treated alike in Homer: every single god and every single human is deliberately and consciously assigned the status of an agent’. Consider also Plutarch’s comment on Hesiod (*Mor*. 415b): ‘Hesiod was the first to set forth clearly and distinctly four classes of rational beings, gods, demons, heroes and, last of all, men’, while Homer does not distinguish *daimon* and *theoi* in a clear way. For Hesiod’s demonology, see Koning (2010) 165–172.

daimones, heroes, men, and beasts, but rather a 'sliding scale'.[44] Instead of focusing on the ontological gulf that rigidly separates the mortal from the immortal, we look at the continuum of honour in a cosmic society populated by anthropomorphic gods and theomorphic humans. This will also serve as a feasible scale against which divinity and humanity could be 'measured' in terms of honour or status and by which the limited form of divinity or deification is made possible.

In Part I, therefore, the thesis will describe the development and formation of cosmic society, especially with regard to the importance of honour and distribution. Chapter 1 will also look at the divine–human separation and its place in the history of cosmic society. This dynamic view of cosmic society serves as the basis for Chapter 2's investigation of the scenarios in which a new-born deity is initiated into divine society, the cases of apotheosis or deification of humans, and, finally, the limited form of deification. Having established this, Part II will proceed to conduct three case studies that explore and discuss the occasions on which excellent human figures achieve a limited form of divinity or attempt to 'deify' themselves without being immortalised, and how the extraordinary status of Iliadic heroes, Pindaric laudandi, and Sophoclean protagonists are defined in relation to their human fellows and especially to the gods in cosmic society. These texts are chosen to reflect the diversity of contexts and genres in which extraordinary persons reach the limit of their humanity and approximate the gods. These case studies will not only support the main argument of the thesis but also contribute to the understanding of the ethical and theological content of the poetic works, as well as their literary fabric.

It should be noted that heroisation will not be discussed in this thesis because heroes are understood here as a generation of humans in the cosmic history, following the epic (thus emic) views—in this sense, heroisation will be an anachronism if applied to the Homeric warriors. In addition, since the primary focus of the thesis is the poetic representation of (limited) deification in literary contexts, heroisation based on the hero cult in actual practice

[44] Currie (2005) 176–177. Dover (1974) 80: 'Although the difference between mortality and immortality is as great a difference as there can be, the Greeks tended in some way to treat them as opposite ends of a scale rather than totally opposed natures'; Similarly, Bremmer (1994) 12–13; Ekroth (2019) 249–250: 'We may here speak of a "chain of honor" encompassing mortals as well as immortals, and where status is defined by the meat received …With the introduction of *trapezomata* and *theoxenia*, the gods, too, came to be included in this "chain of honor" but at the top level, where the Homeric concept of honor as conferred by meat was extended to include the gods as well.'

is beyond the scope of the thesis (although it is inevitably associated with some figures, e.g. the Sicilian tyrants in Pindar and Ajax in Sophocles).

Part I

Honour, Divinity, Cosmic Society

1 Honour, Distribution, and Cosmic Society

Cosmic society is developed and established through the conflicts and consensus among all deities, who observe various social norms, in particular the code of honour that sustains the overarching system of order and value. In order to illustrate this point, it is desirable to have first a preliminary discussion on a famous passage in *Iliad* 15, in which Poseidon addresses his complaint about the overweening demand of Zeus by claiming his honour along with its distribution in the past, which refers to the tripartite structure of the cosmic society. Based on a reading of this passage, we shall proceed to retrospect the formation and establishment of the order of the cosmic society, focusing on the significance of honour and its distribution. Within this overarching framework, we shall then consider the position of mankind in this cosmic society, including a discussion of the divine–human separation, which will serve as a context for the subsequent readings of the *apotheosis* cases in Chapter 2 and the case studies in the second part of the thesis.

1.1 The Honour and Distributed Portion of a Deity in the Cosmic Society

The Greek gods 'demand that men render them the honour due to them, their *timē,* and on any who fail to do so they take a terrible revenge'.[1] In addition, they defend their honour 'by keeping a constant watch for signs of disrespect form their peers'.[2] When Zeus demands Poseidon's obedience to his order of withdrawing from the battlefield, threatening by means of his superiority in power and seniority,[3] the sea-god vehemently protests against his brother by claiming his own honour, and appealing to the established equality among himself, Zeus, and Hades (*Il.* 15.185–199):

> ὢ πόποι, ἦ ῥ᾽ ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν ὑπέροπλον ἔειπεν,
> εἴ μ᾽ ὁμότιμον ἐόντα βίῃ ἀέκοντα καθέξει.

[1] Lloyd-Jones (1971) 4: 'the early Greek concept of order required each god and man should receive his proper *time*; and besides meaning justice, *dike* meant the preservation of the established order'.
[2] van Wees (1992) 115.
[3] *Il.* 15.160–167 ≈ 176–182; cf. 2.707 and 13.355; see Janko (1994) on 165–167.

τρεῖς γάρ τ᾽ ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοί, οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα,
Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ᾽ Ἀΐδης, ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσων.
τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ᾽ ἔμμορε τιμῆς·
ἦ τοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ
παλλομένων, Ἀΐδης δ᾽ ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα,
Ζεὺς δ᾽ ἔλαχ᾽ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι·
γαῖα δ᾽ ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς Ὄλυμπος.
τῶ ῥα καὶ οὔ τι Διὸς βέομαι φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ ἕκηλος
καὶ κρατερός περ ἐὼν μενέτω τριτάτῃ ἐνὶ μοίρῃ.
χερσὶ δὲ μή τί με πάγχυ κακὸν ὣς δειδισσέσθω·
θυγατέρεσσιν γάρ τε καὶ υἱάσι βέλτερον εἴη
ἐκπάγλοις ἐπέεσσιν ἐνισσέμεν, οὓς τέκεν αὐτός,
οἵ ἑθεν ὀτρύνοντος ἀκούσονται καὶ ἀνάγκῃ.

Look now, great though he is, he's speaking arrogantly if he means to restrain me, his equal in honor, by force, against my will! Three brothers were born to Rhea by Kronos: Zeus and I, the third being Hades, lord of the dead. All was divided three ways: each of us got his domain—I was allotted the grey sea to dwell in forever when the lots were shaken, while Hades obtained the murky darkness, and Zeus won the wide airy firmament and the clouds; but the earth and lofty Olympus remain common to us all. So I will in no way walk as Zeus is minded—let him, powerful though he is, stay at ease in his own third portion, nor try to scare me with toughness, as though I were some mere weakling: better for him to threaten with violent words his own sons and daughters, those he sired himself, who'll be obliged to obey him, whatever his commands.[4]

Because of the equality in honour (ὁμότιμος) predicated upon birth and the allotted portion (189, 195), it is contrary to propriety for each of the gods to trespass into another's domain or

[4] Trans. Green (2015) modified.

to restrain another from travelling to the earth or to Olympus, which remain commonly shared among the gods.[5] According to Poseidon, the tripartite division of the cosmos[6] is understood as a distribution both of the 'social share' and the 'existential share': each of the three brothers will be entitled to be the holder of, and take his abode forever in, the allotted area. The τιμή claimed by Poseidon here 'consists in the prerogatives and the freedom of action that each exercises in his specific domain'.[7] For Poseidon, the restraining order of Zeus is, thus, a disrespectful insult, and Zeus does not treat him with the proper deference to which he is due. Forced to obey, the Shaker of the Earth feels degraded to become an inferior, like an offspring of Zeus.

Iris, however, wisely reminds Poseidon of the sovereign power and seniority of Zeus (206–207; cf. *Il.* 1.533–535) and suggests that his intransigence might lead to a potential quarrel or even fight in the divine family (201–204; cf. *Il.* 15.226–228). Although angered, Poseidon acknowledges the appropriateness (κατὰ μοῖραν [...] αἴσιμα, 206–207) of Iris' wording and agrees to retreat for the moment.[8] Nevertheless, he reasserts his equality in status with Zeus in his subsequent response (208–212):[9]

> ἀλλὰ τόδ᾽ αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἱκάνει,
> ὁππότ᾽ ἂν ἰσόμορον καὶ ὁμῇ πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ
> εἰκείειν ἐθέλῃσι χολωτοῖσιν ἐπέεσσιν.
> ἀλλ᾽ ἦ τοι νῦν μέν κε νεμεσσηθεὶς ὑποείξω·
> ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, καὶ ἀπειλήσω τό γε θυμῷ·
>
> But this bitter grief comes to my mind and spirit, when he intends to rebuke with angry words one who is equal to him in *moros* and is allotted with the same *aisa*. Still, this time I will give way, for all my *nemesis*. But I will say this also, and make it a threat in my anger.

[5] Cf. Pucci (2018) 196–198.
[6] For the division of the cosmos in a wider context, see West (1997) 109–111.
[7] Cairns (2020) 18.
[8] For the diplomatic diction of Iris, see Janko (1994) 248; Minchin (2011) 24–26. For κατὰ μοῖραν (αἴσιμα, αἴσαν), see Yamagata (1994) 105–120; du Sablon (2009) 77–133 gives a most detailed discussion of these phrases.
[9] Cf. *Il.* 8.146–150.

Poseidon expresses his grievance and complaint against Zeus' disregard for his allotted honour and station.[10] On the other hand, he feels *nemesis* for having a further quarrel with the superior god in the present situation.[11] Conceding to a superior god such as Zeus does not suggest any readiness to be subjected to any of his unfair or unjust decrees.[12] Although Zeus is the greatest of the gods in power and age,[13] his honour and station, which demand obedience and respect, is not without limit.[14] Zeus' legitimate claim to τιμή is expected to be recognised and reciprocally requires one to 'limit one's own claims out of respect for those of others'.[15] Poseidon's *nemesis* does not merely express his personal deprecation of Zeus' belittling his legitimate title to τιμή along with his cosmic share, but also seriously accuses Zeus of taking actions against the divine order, which he is supposed to uphold. Poseidon yields with a threat that there will be 'incurable wrath' if Zeus continues to protect Troy against the concurrence of other gods (212–217). Poseidon restates implicitly that his capacity for upsetting the cosmic order is as great as Zeus' power of preserving it.[16]

What merits further discussion is that Poseidon defines τιμή also in terms of 'portion', 'share', 'allotment' (especially the phrase πεπρωμένον αἶσῃ[17] and the recurrent μοῖρα, μόρος, and αἶσα).[18] The basic idea behind this association is that what is due to someone (τιμή) is what is distributed as a share (μοῖρα) by some authority on the basis of one's worth and status.[19] In the Homeric world, τιμή is 'awarded by the group as a whole', that is, based on the approval and consensus of the community.[20] Although it is not explicitly expressed in

[10] On the similarity between 15.206–117 and 16.49–63 (Achilles), see Janko (1994) 321–322; cf. Griffin (1980) 167, 189.
[11] The *nemesis*-word is often associated with ideas of 'disorderliness', 'unjustness', or 'inappropriateness': for instance, in *Iliad* 5, Hera asks Zeus whether he feels *nemesis* against Ares who knows nothing of θέμιστα and is conducting murderous deeds οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (757–761; cf. *Il.* 2.231–234; *Th.* 395–396). For *nemesis* in Homer, see Cairns (1993) 51–54; Cairns (2011).
[12] Cf. Minchin (2011) 25: 'Poseidon will not accept that he is lower in status; but he is in these circumstances at a disadvantage –he has been caught doing what he had been told not to do'.
[13] Cf. *Il.* 9.157–161; 4.401–402; van Wees (1992) 122.
[14] The gods are powerful entities not without limitations. As Oudemans & Lardinois (1987) 86 remarked: 'Each entity has its limits, but also possesses the power to transcend them, thereby coming into conflict both with other entities and with its own boundaries'.
[15] Cairns (2019) 77.
[16] Muellner (1996) 29.
[17] Cf. *Il.* 3.309; 16.441; 18.329; 22.179; see also *Th.* 464, 475; *h. Hom.* 4.428
[18] For μοῖρα and αἶσα in Homer, see Yamagata (1994) 97 ff., 106 ff. with bibliographies at 116; see also the thesis of du Sablon (2009), who attempted to show the conceptual complementarity of τιμή and μοῖρα. Sarischoulis (2016) 84 noted that 'the verb forms ἔμμορε and εἵμαρτο, etymologically related to μοῖρα and μόρος, express the concept of receiving something as an allotted share of a specific event'.
[19] Dietrich (1965) 225.
[20] Cairns (2001) 213; cf. Thomson (1968) 38.

Poseidon's narrative, the lot-drawing itself indicates an idea of impartial or impersonal authority that justifies the distribution of τιμή and the right of the μοῖρα-holder.[21] The legitimately distributed μοῖρα of Poseidon refers to his specific honour, powers, and existential domain, which constitutes an important part of the order of the stratified cosmic society.[22] Poseidon's defence against the potential disrespect of Zeus is, thus, not only viewed as protecting his own status among the gods but also associated with the maintenance of the established order of the cosmic society.

In Homer, cosmic society stands as the overarching context for divine and human actions, but its formation and establishment have not received a great deal of characterisation. The scheme of the cosmic distribution takes a somewhat complicated form in Hesiod's cosmological accounts. As we shall see in the following discussion of some key passages from the poems of Hesiod, honour and its distribution prove to be significant for any understanding of cosmic society.

1.2 Distribution of Honours: The Formation and Establishment of the Cosmic Society

In the *Theogony*, the establishment of the cosmic order is understood as the product of genealogical evolution and the result of a teleological process from *chaos* to order through political conflicts and agreements.[23] It is formed and stabilised fundamentally through Zeus' powerful actions, political devices, and distribution of τιμαί, which defines each deity's status and sphere of influence in terms of birth, power, and merit.[24]

The process that finally leads to the new regime of Zeus, especially the succession story, seems *prima facie* decisively driven by the ambiguous procreations of Gaia and her mysterious oracular power.[25] The teleological process of cosmic development and the

[21] Thomson (1968) 41; Yamagata (1994) 107; Fyotek (2017) 138 n. 83: 'That Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades draw lots to receive their allotment of the cosmos is potentially a trickier issue if we are expecting a true theology, but once they have become rulers over their domains, their own power and knowledge reign, and chance is no longer much operative'.
[22] Cf. the description of the τιμή of Hades in *h. Hom.* 2.86: ἔλλαχεν ὡς τὰ πρῶτα διάτριχα δασμὸς ἐτύχθη.
[23] Almqvist (2017) 27–56 argued that *chaos* is not removed but restrained under the kingship of Zeus.
[24] *Th.* 71–74, 111–113, 390–396, 881–885; note also the δασμός of Cronus indicated in *Th.* 425–427, among the Hecate episode (411–452); Muellner (1996) 106; Haubold (2017). See also *h. Hom.* 4.428–433: Hermes sings 'how the gods were born originally and how each received his portion' (λάχε μοῖραν) […] 'honoured them according to seniority and affiliation, relating everything in due order (κατὰ κόσμον)'. For the assignment of honour and a deity's 'divinisation', see further in Chapter 2.
[25] Gaia is the one who generates anti-order creatures such as Giants and Typhus but also the one who 'tests' Zeus' abilities; see Yasumura (2011) 84; Pucci (2009) 46–48; Clay (2003) 15, cf. 17–18, 27. For Gaia's prophetic power: *Th.* 461–465,

establishment of divine order, however, are felt less as a fatalistic or mysterious history than as a poetic vision of how gods understand and define praiseworthy actions, and what should be endorsed with regard to the establishment and maintenance of the cosmic order.[26]

The language used to describe the original conflict between Gaia and Ouranos is all about (dis)honour and revenge: Ouranos' delight in his evil (κακῷ, 158) and unseemly (ἀεικέα, 166) deeds of restraining Gaia's procreations is said to be ἀτασθάλος, 'reckless' (164, usually related to ἄτη and ὕβρις and indicating a lack of αἰδῶς),[27] and committing a λώβη, 'disgrace', which Gaia encourages his children to avenge (τεισσαίμεθα, 164–165). The similarity in phraseology that one can find, for instance, in the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles in *Iliad* 1 is striking.[28] Moral concepts and sentiments seem not to be alien to, but rather inherent in, the mindset of the gods. It is felt as a moral and socio-political necessity that Gaia must act against the dishonour of Ouranos so as to restore both her procreative power and her status as a mother. When Ouranos is subsequently castrated and dethroned, he predicts that his children will be avenged for this serious deed done with ἀτασθαλίη (209–210; cf. 164). The father's dishonour against the mother is avenged through the son's dishonour against the father. The *lex talionis* (τίσις) along with the τιμή-code is laid out as a universal law underlying the whole cosmic society in the very first phase of the cosmic history. By the same token, the theme of (dis)honour and revenge echoes in the succession between Cronus and Zeus: as Cronus seeks to keep his kingly τιμή by devouring Rhea's offspring against the prophecy of Gaia and Ouranos (461–466),[29] the agonised mother (467) appeals to her parents to avenge (τείσαιτο) her husband's 'furies' (472).

Unlike his male ancestors, Zeus secures his status as king, establishes the cosmic order, and rules by the principle of reciprocation. Hesiod puts great emphasis, using Ouranos and Cronus as the negative foils, on how Zeus wisely and fairly gives χάρις and distributes τιμαί:

Cronus learnt from Gaia and Uranus about his doom of being overthrown by his own son; *Th*. 624–628 (the *Titanomachy*), assuring Zeus will hold the kingship; 881–886, making Zeus the king of gods; 887–893, Athena's birth episode, which secures Zeus' kingship see also Yasumura (2011) 77, 80–81, 464–465.

[26] Cf. Yamagata (1994) 115–116. On the teleological process of Hesiod's cosmology, see Clay (1993) 105–107; Clay (2003) 13, 86.

[27] See e.g. Fisher (1992); Cairns (1993) 131–133; Sommerstein (2013); Cairns (2012).

[28] Cf. *Il*. 11.142; 13.622; 19.208; Cairns (1993) 55; Muellner (1996) 1–31.

[29] As in Ouranos' aforementioned prediction, his and Gaia's prophecy here seems less a fatalist one than an ethic-political insight and foresight about the necessity of Cronus' failure.

while two dethroned kings deprive honours from other gods, particularly the female ones, Zeus gives special deference to Styx (390–403) and Hecate (411–442). The final victory of his war against the Titans is not possible without his recruitment of significant allies (617–663). Zeus is characterised as an ideal king in his demeanour and, thus, the rest of the gods are 'urging' (881–885) him to take the kingly τιμή:

> αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥα πόνον μάκαρες θεοὶ ἐξετέλεσσαν,
> Τιτήνεσσι δὲ τιμάων κρίναντο βίηφι,
> δή ῥα τότ' ὦτρυνον βασιλευέμεν ἠδὲ ἀνάσσειν
> Γαίης φραδμοσύνῃσιν Ὀλύμπιον εὐρύοπα Ζῆν
> ἀθανάτων· ὁ δὲ[30] τοῖσιν ἐὺ διεδάσσατο τιμάς.
>
> When the blessed gods brought their toil into *telos* and settled the matter of honours among the Titans by force, then on Gaia's counsels they urged that Olympian Zeus the wide-seeing should be king and lord of the immortals. And he allotted honours to them well.

The gods are called 'blessed' after the completion of their toils[31] and the dispensation of Zeus. Under the reign of Zeus, harmony, gratitude, and friendship (503; 651; 655–657; cf. 139–141) take the place of the discord, hatred, and anger that had been seen before. The characterisation of Zeus as the ideal king is embodied in his role as a fair dispenser and withholder of honours, and in his integration and differentiation of all the divine beings, by which the cosmic order reaches its organised stable form.[32] Instead of a ruthless tyrant abusing his power and authority, Zeus acknowledges the limitation of his authority and gives

[30] The particle δὲ could be read as 'because': it is because the gods have good reasons (Gaia's counsels) to suppose that Zeus will conduct the distribution fairly that they urged him to take the rule; see Scully (2019) 8–9.
[31] J. Haubold rightly noted that it implies 'a definition of what it means to be a god in Early Greek epic' that the gods are blessed, in contrast with the miserable humans (cf. *Il.* 24.525 ff., § 3.3.3); and that they are blessed they have completed their 'toils' (a ten-year *Titanomachia*, recalling the ten-year Trojan wars); see Haubold (2017) 30-32; Haubold (2021) 222–223. The 'bliss after toils' of some exceptional humans is a noteworthy *topos* in Pindar, see Chapter 4, esp. § 4.2.2 and § 4.3.2.
[32] Vernant (1991) 48; Fyotek (2017) 117.

proper respect to other gods.[33] For instance, when he pays his old debt to Thetis, he does not behave arbitrarily but with circumspect caution so as not to seriously offend Hera (*Il.* 1.393–412, 518–527). In fact, discord and fighting among the gods are often presented in a comical way.[34] For instance, Zeus delights (*Il.* 20.22–23; also 21.389) as the gods and goddesses come to fight among themselves on behalf of their mortal favourites in *Iliad* 20.

After the fair distribution of honours, privileges, and powers among all gods, the divine order is finally stabilised by Zeus' swallowing of Metis and birthing of Athena: he thus appropriates the female function of procreation and more importantly the 'political wisdom' or 'counsels' (cf. 545, 550, 561), represented in particular by Gaia, who ambiguously determines and shapes the political history of the cosmos. As a result, the royal power of Zeus will no longer be exposed to the threat of generational succession, and divine society will restrict itself to having new members only in special cases. With the power of Metis, Zeus fathers several goddesses of political significance to the cosmic order: Good Governance, Justice, Social Peace, Delights, Blooming, and the Muses (887–995).[35]

As the socio-political order of divine society settled down through the unsurpassed power and fundamental distribution of Zeus, the τιμή of a deity is conferred and largely fixed in accordance with his or her contribution to, or 'participation in', the cosmic order. In other words, a deity's μοῖρα is more likely to be understood as a physical, existential 'share' (as the domain in which the divine power is exercised) of the divine society and a social 'participation' (as social value and merit) in stabilising or maintaining its order.[36] The 'Hymn to Hecate' in the *Theogony* (411–452) is another illustrative example. The goddess enjoys great τιμή among the gods and holds an αἶσα of all those 'who were born from earth and sky

[33] Almqvist (2017) 51–52.
[34] Furthermore, when Aphrodite commits adultery and thus dishonours her husband Hephaestus (*Od*. 8.309), no punishments are sanctioned; instead, the shameful scene is mixed with a burst of divine laughter as Aphrodite and Ares are caught in the lame god's tricky web. In another comic scene, after Ares is battered by Diomedes and rebuked by Zeus, his honour does not diminish but is quickly restored simply because of his special relationship with Zeus and Hera: 'he sat down beside the son of Cronus, rejoicing his glory' (*Il.* 5. 895–896, 906). See Yamagata (1994) 100–101. For gods as audience in Homer, see Griffin (1980) 179 ff.
[35] Scully (2019).
[36] Cf. Yamagata (1994) 99–101: 'divine anger is μοῖρα-oriented, not morally-motivated […] Μοῖρα, which often appears as the ruthless reality of life to human beings, is merely the basis of mutual respect and eternal happiness for the gods […] They must defend and maintain the present distribution of μοῖρα which is the basis of their privilege and welfare'. A certain sense of inconsistence, however, is felt in Yamagata's idea of μοῖρα, e.g. in p. 97, μοῖρα is said to be the 'universal law of the world'.

and received τιμήν' (421–423, also 413–414). Hesiod does not explicitly inform us of the grounds on which Hecate receives such honour and privileges, except for mentioning twice that she is the only child (μουνογνής) of Asteria and Perses (426, 448; also 409–411; cf. *Op.* 367) and emphasising that what was allotted to her in the old δασμός of Cronus (423–428) will remain and be augmented in the reign of Zeus. This creates an impression that Hecate's special status is ordained or determined on the basis of her birth. On the other hand, according to S. Clay,[37] it is significant for Zeus to have Hecate in her proper place (as is Styx several lines above, 383–403) because she will play the intermediary role between gods and men. Indeed, this 'hymn', the main part of which elaborates on Hecate's unusual power of bestowing glories to humans (416–420, 429–447) is deliberately placed before the pivotal event of the birth of Zeus (453–506) and serves as the necessary complement to the Prometheus episode (521–616). This placement thus seems to be determined by theo-political considerations rather than strict genealogical chronology.[38] Hecate's particular status is measured, and her special social share (μοῖρα) is bestowed, according to her significance in relation to the teleological process of development of the cosmic order. Just as Poseidon's μοῖρα denotes his dominion over the marine portion of the cosmos and his social status as an equal of Zeus, Hecate's μοῖρα refers to the allotted domain in which her power is exercised and her entitlement to claim her deference and esteem among the gods. In both cases, each deity's μοῖρα defines and coordinates the divine figure into the cosmic hierarchy.

The present order of the gods is not 'given' but rather is a product of struggles and consensuses – the cosmos is originally 'a battlefield of conflicting forces'[39] (as it begins with χάος) but also a society whose order is based on negotiation, consensus, and the interplay of deference and demeanour. A god understands their social and physical limits, defined by their honorific portion, and the power to defend them when threatened to be diminished, neglected, or even lost. For instance, the angered Helios threatens to 'go down to Hades and shine among the dead', if Odysseus' comrades do not 'pay a fitting requital for' their insolent

[37] Clay (2003) 22–23, 131–149.
[38] For Hecate especially in Hesiod, see West (1966) on *Th.* 404–452; Boedeker (1983); Burkert (1985) 171; Griffith (1983) 51–55; Tsagalis (2009) 135–137.
[39] Oudemans & Lardinois (1987) 86.

slaying of his cattle.[40] Helios (who seems to justify his claim to τιμή strongly; see also 385–386) emphasises his role and domain ('going to starry heaven […] and turning back from heaven to earth'), which is contrasted with his threat to break down the cosmic order by crossing his boundaries into the domain of Hades. Zeus confirms the role-status of Helios (385–386) and immediately sets out to destroy the ship of Odysseus' comrades.

Although a god's power is absolute in their allotted and honorific domain, their exercise of power might become common interest and, thus, open to collective decision, as it is possible that it might have an effect on cosmic society. When Zeus thinks of saving Sarpedon, he turns to Hera for counsel (*Il.* 16.432–438, see further below). His wife warns him that 'all other gods will not approve (ἐπαινέομεν) you' (443; similarly, 4.29; 22.181)[41] and that by doing this he will risk violating the divine–human separation, thereby inciting disorder because the gods will also defend their sons in fatal fights (444–447). In another case, Poseidon complains to Zeus that he will no longer be honoured (τιμήεις) among the gods because his own progeny,[42] the Phaeacians, 'value him as nothing' (οὔ τι τίουσι), by escorting Odysseus to Ithaca through the sea, which is his honorific domain (*Od.* 13.128–138). In response to Poseidon's appeal, Zeus confirms his brother's honourable status among the gods and justifies his right to seek revenge for this insult (139–145). Following Zeus' suggestion of punishment (163, cf. 156), Poseidon turns the ship into a stone. As a highly symbolic gesture intended to demonstrate Poseidon's power within his own domain (μοῖρα; cf. *Il.* 15.196–9; *H. Hom.* 22.4–5), the petrification of the ship is simultaneously so horrible and admirable that it attracts deference from the Phaeacians (θαυμάωσιν, 157; emphasised in the *tis*-speech, 167–170) and, thus, Poseidon's τιμή will be restored to its fullest sense.[43]

The negotiation between Zeus and Poseidon in *Odyssey* 13 is comparable to the squabble between them in *Iliad* 15. As the μοῖρα is equally distributed to Zeus and Poseidon, each of them is entitled with a claim to his τιμή within his allotted domain. Measured by μοῖρα, Poseidon is right to claim to be an equal of Zeus in τιμή. Nevertheless, in the divine

[40] ἀτασθαλίῃσι κακῇσι, *Od.* 12.300 (see also 1.6 ff., linking to Aegisthus' ἀτασθαλίη and Orestes' τίσις); τίσουσι βοῶν ἐπιεκέ' ἀμοιβήν, *Od.* 12.375–384, cf. 139–141. Loney (2010) 55–57.
[41] On ἐπαίνειν as a formulaic expression indicating a decisive ratification, see Elmer (2013) esp. 107–145.
[42] de Jong (2001) 319.
[43] It is also noteworthy that the τίσις is executed by Poseidon himself within his own domain, while that of Helios is conducted through Zeus' thunder in the midst of the sea, which is beyond the limits of the sun-god (12.387–388).

community, especially when it is a matter of common interest, Zeus is recognised with a *relatively* superior status as the king and senior god and, at the same time, the collective authority and decision-making might be appealed with regard to the divine and cosmic order.

The actions of gods are both μοῖρα-oriented and τιμή-motivated.[44] While different μοῖραι locate the gods with their domains and shape the cosmic landscape, τιμαί coordinate and hierarchise them by giving each existential part a relative value.[45] They take actions in conformity with moral codes that preserve their own honorific domain and take account of those of others. It is exactly by doing so that they are recognised as a member, dominating part of the cosmic society, and sustaining its order. In other words, a god's τιμή is endowed both as a recognition of his special cosmic status and as a set of competence and prerogatives that demand such τιμή.

1.3 The Portion of Mankind (1): Separation between Gods and Men

In the course of the establishment of order in the cosmic society, the decisive scenario is the distribution of honours after the *Titanomachia* (*Th.* 881–882), which leads to a permanent separation between the Olympians and the Titans (cf. *Th.* 729–733) and a social stratification and differentiation among the gods. By the same token, there is a permanent separation between gods and mankind, which is reflected in the present condition of the divine–human relationship, resulting from the apportionment of meat during the feast attended by both gods and men at Mekone (*Th.* 535–537):

> καὶ γὰρ ὅτ' ἐκρίνοντο θεοὶ θνητοί τ' ἄνθρωποι
> Μηκώνῃ, τότ ἔπειτα μέγαν βοῦν πρόφρονι θυμῷ
> δασσάμενος προύθηκε, Διὸς νόον ἐξαπαφίσκων.
>
> Men had distinguished themselves from the gods at Mekone, just when Prometheus with eager spirit dissected a great ox and, seeking to deceive Zeus' mind, set it before him.

[44] Cf. Yamagata (1994) 99: 'the divine anger is μοῖρα-oriented, not morally-motivated'.
[45] du Sablon (2009) 75.

Prometheus's guile poses a threat to the rule of Zeus as the supreme distributor, by cheating or embarrassing Zeus himself to allot the better portion (the edible part with an inferior appearance) to humans and the worse share (the inedible part covered by fat) to gods (*Th.* 538–539, 553). This quarrel between the Titan Prometheus and the Olympian Zeus recalls the *Titanomachia* (cf. *Th.* 507–534, Zeus' punishment on Iapetus' family) and its subsequent settlement.[46] The scenario of communal feast (*dais*, cf. δασσάμενος here), as in the human realm, is also conceived as a political occasion: the institution of the *dais eise* incorporates a hierarchical ordering in the distribution of foods and drinks, mirroring the established apportionment of honours.[47] The term ἐκρίνοντο is thus applied here in the sense of κρίναντο (*Th.* 882; cf. διακρινέεσθαι, *h. Hom.* 4.438) in the context of the distribution of honours among the gods.[48] The Mekone episode marks the definitive division between gods and men:[49] the here-and-now institution of sacrificial cult (556–557) takes place in the communal feasts of the primordial generation.[50] The focal point of the divine–human feast in Mekone is on the hierarchical difference (and its interconnection)[51] in terms of honour, status, and prerogative rather than ontological difference in terms of immortality and mortality.[52] Since feasting with the gods is a privilege belonging to the Golden Race who 'lived in the way equal to gods' (*Op.* 112; *fr.* 1.6–7), the sacrificial *dais* denotes the post-Mekone mankind's inferior status within cosmic society, despite them ironically having a better share of meats.

The Mekone episode has further disastrous consequences as the quarrel develops (*Th.* 570–616; also *Op.* 53–105): the gods 'hid and keep hidden livelihood (βίον) from men' (*Op.* 42) and dispensed Pandora as an ironic gift (δώσω, *Op.* 57; δῶρον ἐδώρησαν, 82) for

[46] Nagy (1979) 215; Clay (2003) 106–108.
[47] For *dais eise*, see Hitch (2009) 108, 201–203; Bakker (2013) 36–52; Stocking (2017) 8-9; also Seaford (2004) 39–47.
[48] West (1966) 317; Almqvist (2017) 60–61; Stocking (2017) 8–9.
[49] West (1966) 318; Nagy (1979) 216–217.
[50] This is in accordance with, for instance, what we hear in the declaration of Zeus in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 4.48–49 = 24.69–70): 'My altar was never left wanting in the fair distribution, of libation and the smell of burnt sacrifice; for that is what we receive as share of honour' (οὐ γάρ μοί ποτε βωμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς ἐίσης / λοιβῆς τε κνίσης τε· τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς). The portion of Zeus that Hector offers on the sacred altar is the embodiment of his divine status, which is qualitatively different from that of the humans, and the fairness of the *dais* at the same time re-enacts the principle of distribution endorsed by gods and men in the cosmic society.
[51] Stocking (2017) 11.
[52] The ontological difference or boundary appears in the juxtaposition of θεοὶ θνητοί in 535, which is not explained as a result from the Mekone episode; cf. 512–513. See also Almqvist (2017) 86.

mankind in the place of fire (*Th.* 570; *Op.* 57), which was stolen by Prometheus in his second philanthropic offence against Zeus.[53] What Pandora brings to humans is lifelong toils and numberless evils, all covered by her beautiful appearance – a wonderful counter-trick designed by Zeus, indeed outwitting Prometheus' Mekone-trick. In the post-Pandora world, the earth is full of suffering and disease that are 'spontaneous' (αὐτομάτοι, *Op.* 103), whereas the earth bore generous and 'spontaneous' (αὐτομάτη) fruit at the time of the Golden Race (118).[54]

Like the Mekone episode, the Pandora myth functions as an explanation of the constituents of mankind's portion distributed by Zeus and, thus, the status of mankind in the cosmic society.[55] Being separated from the divine community and suffering the toils and sickness brought by Pandora, Prometheus' apportionment trick at Mekone turns out to relegate humans to an inferior status compared with that of the previous generation. Mankind's miserable condition of life, especially in the *Theogony*, is a result of the quarrel between Prometheus and Zeus over the allotment of mankind in the larger context of the course of establishing and maintaining cosmic order *via* the Olympian's apportionment of reward and punishment. The Mekone division between gods and men is conceived as part of the proceedings of the development of cosmic society.

In Hesiod's poetic and mythic fabrication, the Mekone–Pandora episode is also associated with the myth of races, introduced as 'another tale' (ἕτερον λόγον) with a striking declaration: 'the gods and mortal humans sprang from the same place' (ὁμόθεν γεγάασι, *Op.* 106–108; *fr.* 234 West).[56] Although verse 108 may indicate that gods and men share the same genealogy from Earth and Uranos (cf. *Op.* 563), it seems rather irrelevant to the following myth in which humans are 'created' by gods (110, cf. 145). As M. L. West has argued, Hesiod means that 'they started on the same terms'.[57] Indeed, what we hear in the first

[53] It should be noted that the Mekone episode is not mentioned in the *Works and Days*; in addition, the version of the fire-theft and Pandora myth in the *Theogony* bears different thematic values from that in the *Works and Days*; see Clay (2003) 118 ff. For the continuity of thought between the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, see Most (1993) 89; Clay (2003) 6; Mueller (2016) 7.
[54] Clay (2009) 124.
[55] For further discussion of the Mekone scene and Prometheus in comparison with the Pindaric Tantalus, see § 4.2.
[56] On this verse, West (1978) 178 seems to me the most reliable interpretation; cf. Verdenius (1985) *ad loc*; Clay (2003) 86 n. 21, 99 n. 56; also van Noorden (2015) 69; Almqvist (2017) 66 ff.; Bundy (1962) 37 n. 7 with *Nem.* 6.1–4. On *fr.* 234 West, see Irwin (2005).
[57] West (1978) 178.

generation is the existential proximity (ὥστε θεοί, 112) and intimacy (φίλοι, 120) between gods and men. More importantly, the characterisation of the golden race is concluded with a posthumous γέρας βασλήιον, 'a kingly honour' (126): according to the plans of Zeus (cf. 111), they become noble deities (ἐσθλοὶ δαίμονες, 122–123), who walk on earth to guard mortal mankind by dispensing judgements and wealth (123–126).[58] The special honour and offices of the golden race correspond to their blessed status and closeness to gods during their lifetime. The reference to the plans of Zeus, the supreme distributor – which is thematically correspondent, with both conferring on the entire race the *geras* and the duties of dispensation the *geras* constitutes – indicates a transition from the rule of Cronus to the kingship of Zeus after the *Titanomachia* and the definitive settlements. Hesiod here seems to indicate that Zeus' decree on the golden race takes place in a post-Mekone–Pandora epoch. This is also indicated in the emphatic reference to the mother–child relationship overarching the narrative (130–131) and their unwillingness to observe the sacrificial cults to the blessed, which have been established as a *themis* for mankind (135–137) to give honour to gods (τιμὰς οὐκ ἔδιδον, 138–139). Although the mortals of the silver race still received special honour and were called 'blessed' (141–142), they were inferior to those of the golden race and remained underneath the earth. In a similar but ultimately worse manner, the third race, who concerned themselves only with violent deeds (145–146), went down into Hades without honorific names (153–154). In the fourth generation of heroes, the demigods revive to a certain extent an intimate relationship with gods; indeed, some of them are 'bestowed livelihood (βίοτον; cf. 42) and habitations far from human beings', translated to places 'at the end of the earth' like the Island of the Blessed, where they can lead a life free from cares and toils (166–173), just like the golden race. In the fifth race, that is, the here-and-now generation, the social order collapses and moral values are so completely inverted that even Aidos and Nemesis depart from humans (177–201). It is indicated that this generation, like the bronze one, will be blotted out from earth without the bestowal of any honorific names.

[58] We follow the text printed in West (1978). West (1978) 182 rightly noted the etymology of δαίμων (δαίομαι, 'divine, distribute'; δαίς, 'portion, feast'), which is interestingly activated in their honorific offices where they dispense justice, punishment, and wealth.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full interpretation of the myth of races, which is itself a difficult task, especially when we consider the didactic purpose of the *Works and Days*. It will suffice for our purposes here to note that each race of mankind is allotted a portion of lifetime and will (or will not) receive a special posthumous honour based on how they conduct their lives and situate themselves in relation to gods. In each generation, humans are not independent existents but are treated as part of the cosmic society. More importantly, mortality or a limited lifespan does not separate humans from gods; instead, it is mankind's behaviour and relationship with the gods that measure their distance, either during their lives or their posthumous existence, from the gods in the cosmic society.

Considering the Hesiodic myths together, mankind's distancing from gods as a continuation of the divine–human separation at Mekone seems to be an ongoing process. Following the foundation of the divine order, the cosmic society proceeds to develop with further genealogical evolution between gods and men: traditionally, the *Theogony* is thought to be continued with the history of the heroic generation in the *Catalogue of Women* and in the Homeric epics. When it comes to the heroic generation, the separating process seems to reach its final stage. During this phase of cosmic history, on the one hand, several preeminent humans sometimes participate in the formation and stabilisation of cosmic society. For instance, Heracles, in Hesiod and Pindar, is the paradigmatic hero who lends support to his father Zeus in order to establish and maintain the cosmic order by fighting against the Giants, killing monsters, 'taming the route for voyaging' (*Isth.* 4.61–63), and 'mapping out the land' (*Nem.* 3.26).[59] On the other hand, the relatively intimate relations between gods and humans can sometimes have a negative impact on the Olympian order.[60] In the *Iliad*, for instance, the gods dispute and even fight against one another for the sake of the heroes born from them and favoured by them. For the harmony and serenity of Olympian society, sexual interaction between the divine and human races will not be allowed and heroes indeed gradually disappear after the Trojan wars.[61] Thus, in the *Odyssey*, Calypso is not allowed to have Odysseus as her husband, despite other deities having had affairs with mortals in the past

[59] *Th.* 289, 315, 332, 526, 530, 944, 950–955, 982; for Pindaric Heracles, see the discussion of *Olympian* 3 in § 4.3.2.
[60] Pratt (2018) 41–42.
[61] Cf. *fr.*1 (*Cyprian*); on this and *Il.* 1.5, see Kirk (1985) 53.

(5.118–129, see § 2.3).[62] This separation seems to mark the final ordering and permanent stability of the divine society: gods will ultimately be free from the threat of generational succession (which is associated with the power of female deities, especially Gaia),[63] whereas humans will forever suffer from the gifts of Pandora. Despite being 'transcendent' in relation to humans and their misery, gods remain immanent existents of the cosmic society, as they constantly exercise powers in specific spheres of influence to maintain the world order.[64]

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Mekone–Pandora episode in the *Theogony* is introduced also as a part of the aetiology of the punishments for the transgressions of the sons of Iapetus (Menoetius, 514–516; Atlas, 517–520;[65] Prometheus, 521–534). The post-Pandora condition of mankind (prefigured in the mention of Epimetheus, 512–513) is reflected in the chronic 'disease' of Prometheus (527), which is released by Heracles on Zeus's behest (527–529). The *kleos* Heracles achieved from this feat (killing the eagle that devours Prometheus' self-renewing liver on a daily basis, 522–525)[66] is planned by Zeus who intends to give greater honour to his extraordinary son (530–532). Punishing the Iapetids and rewarding Heracles, Zeus reasserts his power of ordering the cosmic society and ultimate authority of dispensation of honours. What is more, Heracles' *kleos*, along with his *apotheosis* (950–955),[67] serves as a reminder of humans' dependence on Zeus[68] and special rewards or prospects for a relief from human miseries that await those exceptional humans who 'earn the favour under the patronage of Zeus'.[69]

[62] Let it be noted that Odysseus is also apportioned with a special portion of life that he must suffer and return to Ithaca according to the will of Zeus and particularly the prophecy of Teiresias in Hades, see *Od.* 5.41–42, 113–115; 9.532–545; 11.110–139 (cf. 23.267–284); 13.132–133; also 9.507–512; 10.330–332; 5.288–289.
[63] For the ambivalent nature of Gaia and its relation to the human condition, see Kirk (2012).
[64] Redfield (1994) 36 notes that the gods 'are not outside the world; they are, like us, creatures within the world'.
[65] The punishment imposed on Atlas, a symbol of separation (heaven and earth), is also the 'portion' (μοῖραν) Zeus dispensed (ἐδάσσατο, cf. δασσάμενος, 537) to him. The daughter of Atlas, Calypso, and her affair with Odysseus, as we shall see, bear some thematic connection with this Hesiodic passage; see § 2.3.
[66] The disease of Prometheus represents, as Clay (2003) 115 put it, 'the ceaseless renewal of hunger and the insatiable demands of the belly that constitute the human lot within his own immortal body: the eagle who is never sated and the liver that never remains whole'.
[67] On Heracles' *apotheosis*, see § 2.2 and § 4.3.2.
[68] It is a recurring theme, see esp. § 3.3.3 and § 5.2.
[69] Mueller (2016) 13. It is also noteworthy that the *kleos* of Heracles by delivering Prometheus from the 'disease' marks the end of the anger of Zeus (533), which is comparable to Zeus' declaration of the end of his (or Achilles') anger which also serves to honour Achilles (*Il.* 15.72-77); see Stocking (2017) 30–31. This may also prompt a further thematic relevance between the Hesiodic Heracles and the Iliadic Achilles: whereas Heracles' *kleos* is embedded into the narrative of human condition as a result of divine–human separation, Achilles' additional *kydos* (by returning the corpse of Hector to Priam, *Il.* 110-111) includes a reflection on human's dependence on Zeus' dispensation of fortune and misfortune; see § 3.3.3.

As the distancing process ultimately shapes the cosmic society, the immortals and the mortals are located at a relatively remote distance in different domains of the cosmic society.[70] The divine–human separation, therefore, bears not only ontological but also cosmological significance: mankind is set in the middle of the cosmological triad of Heaven–Earth–Hades, which corresponds to the immortal–mortal–dead triad.[71] Theomorphic humans are thus ontologically differentiated, and 'religiously' or 'socially' separated, from the anthropomorphic gods.

1.4 The Portion of Mankind (2): Individual Level

The constituents of humankinds' portion in the cosmic society will not be fully understood until there has been a discussion of what an individual human receives as his or her portion in the cosmic society. Indeed, since human life is limited and relies on generational succession, a human's cosmic status differs from that of a deity in various aspects.

1.4.1 Family Honour: Always to Excel and Not to Shame Thy Father

Unlike the Olympian gods, who have an everlasting abode and largely secured status, the status of a mortal man in the Homeric world is conditioned to, and more importantly relies on, generational succession and family continuity. This is vividly illustrated in a famous passage of Glaucus, relating his lineage to Diomedes (*Il.* 6.145–149):

> Τυδείδη μεγάθυμε, τίη γενεὴν ἐρεείνεις;
> οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
> φύλλα τὰ μέν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ' ὕλη
> τηλεθόωσα φύει, ἔαρος δ' ἐπιγίνεται ὥρη·
> ὣς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ ἡ μὲν φύει ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει.

[70] Nagy (1979) 220; Clay (2003) 150–174, esp. 170–171. See also Kearns (2004) 66–67; Barker & Christensen (2014) 267.
[71] For such a hierarchal scheme, see Vermeule (1979) 126–127; Vernant (1980); Lloyd (2011). Every living mortal is undergoing a downward transportation from earth to Hades. On certain special occasions, however, a mortal could experience an upward transportation: for instance, Ganymede is elevated to Olympus while he is still alive and Heracles becomes the husband of Hebe after his body is burnt in a pyre; see further in the next chapter.

> Great-hearted son of Tydeus, why do you inquire of my lineage? Just as are the generations of leaves, such are those also of men. As for the leaves, the wind scatters some on the earth, but the luxuriant forest sprouts others when the season of spring has come; so of men one generation springs up and another passes away.[72]

The leaf metaphor[73] offers a poetic insight that humans are conditioned to the natural cycle and the generative power of Gaia (in line with the cosmological location of the mortals and echoing the Pandora myth), and subject to unpredictable alternation (symbolised by wind) in both an individual's life (a single leaf) and a family's history (the timber and root). The metaphor is explicated further in the genealogical narrative, which primarily elaborates on the individual life of Bellerophon (155–205). The embedded episode starts with the beauty and manhood that the gods bestowed upon Bellerophon (156–157), which turn out to be the cause of his hardship and heroic exploits (157–190); it is precisely because of such accomplishments (with divine help, 171, 183), however, that he becomes a king with a fine τέμενος in Lycia (191–195). The achievements of Bellerophon that exalt him to be recognised as 'a powerful stock of the god' (191) are followed by his failure: all gods hate him because of his attempt to join the gods on Olympus and bring death to all of his offspring except Hippolochus, who begot Glaucus' grandfather (200–206).[74] Glaucus highlights Bellerophon's achievements and the familial vicissitudes.[75] Then, he proudly claims his status as a member of this lineage (206, 211) and concludes the speech with a quotation from his father's injunction (206–210):

> Ἰππόλοχος δ' ἔμ' ἔτικτε, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φημι γενέσθαι·
> πέμπε δέ μ' ἐς Τροίην, καί μοι μάλα πόλλ' ἐπέτελλεν,

[72] Trans. Murray (1999).
[73] Cf. *Il*. 21.464–466; 13.321–323; human status, especially its mortality, is tied to the agricultural cycle of life and death, see Kitts (1994). On the leaf-metaphor and the human condition, see also Griffith (1975).
[74] Glaucus does not explain the divine hatred that might have been well known to the audience: Bellerophon attempts to ride Pegasus (whom he captured with the help of Athena) to Mount Olympus. See also *Il*. 14.328; *Ol*. 8.87–89; *Isth*. 7.44. This omission, however, creates a strong impression of the uncertainty of human life.
[75] For ancestors and familial vicissitudes, see the discussion of Pindar's *Olympian* 2 in Chapter 4, esp. § 4.2.2.

αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,
μηδὲ γένος πατέρων αἰσχυνέμεν, οἳ μέγ᾽ ἄριστοι
ἔν τ᾽ Ἐφύρῃ ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐν Λυκίῃ εὐρείῃ.
ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὔχομαι εἶναι.

But Hippolochus begot me and from him I say I am sprung; and he sent me to Troy and earnestly charged me always to be the best and preeminent above all, and not to bring shame on the race of my fathers, who were far the best in Ephyre and in wide Lycia. This is the lineage and the blood of which I declare I am sprung.

The aristocratic imperative (208–209)[76] is often found when a great father speaks to a young hero at his departure on a quest to pursue glories, which is correlated with the identity-formation or self-development of the juvenile addressee.[77] In the genealogical context, Glaucus brings up the notion of *eugeneia*, namely that it is obligatory for an aristocratic youngster to pursue honour to renew the family's fame reciprocally.[78] The vibrant conclusion of Glaucus thus echoes the opening metaphor that he views himself to be the burgeoning leaf that will bring glorious brightness to the family tree. In other words, generational reciprocity necessitates that a mortal man takes actions to prove himself to be like his ancestors and, thus, worthy of his role-status as a family member. In the same book, Hector responds to Andromache's piteous appeal to stay within the city (444–446, cf. *Od.* 1.240): 'Since I have learned to be noble and always to fight among the foremost ranks of the Trojans, winning great κλέος for my father and myself' (§ 3.2.1.1). In the same vein, one's reputation is connected to one's descendants. Hector expresses a wish in his prayer that Astyanax will be the same as he is, 'pre-eminent among the Trojans', and someday even be recognised as better than himself (6.476–681; see more in § 3.2.1.1). Similarly, when degrading Thersites

[76] See also *Il.* 11.783–784 (Peleus to Achilles); cf. 16.220–227 (Thetis to Achilles); Desmond (2018) 40 with n. 4. In Sophocles' *Ajax*, as we shall see in the final chapter, the protagonist will question this ethic in a striking way.
[77] For the father–son relationship and the concomitant heroic ethic, see e.g. Felson (2002); Pratt (2007); Pratt (2009); Gregory (2019) 70, 76–77.
[78] A great theme in Pindar. See Kurke (1991) 18–61 and § 4.2.2.

in the assembly and being scolded by Agamemnon in the battlefield, Odysseus refers to himself as the father of Telemachos (*Il.* 2.260; 4.354), who in return is expected to be, as other young warriors, 'a doer of deeds and speaker of words' like his father. The nexus of familial obligation is summarised in Nestor's exhortation when the Greeks have been driven back to their ships by Hector (*Il.* 15.661–666):

> ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε, καὶ αἰδὼ θέσθ᾽ ἐνὶ θυμῷ
> ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, ἐπὶ δὲ μνήσασθε ἕκαστος
> παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων καὶ κτήσιος ἠδὲ τοκήων,
> ἠμὲν ὅτεῳ ζώουσι καὶ ᾧ κατατεθνήκασι·
> τῶν ὕπερ ἐνθάδ᾽ ἐγὼ γουνάζομαι οὐ παρεόντων
> ἑστάμεναι κρατερῶς, μηδὲ τρωπᾶσθε φόβονδε.
>
> Friends, be men! Put in your hearts *aidos* for other men, and each one of you remember his children and his wife, his possessions and parents, whether they are living or dead. For the sake of those who are distant I here supplicate your knees to stand firm, and not be turned to the terror of panic.

As the imperative of Hippolochus, the import of Nestor's speech involves seeking honour as a way of living up to the standards of manhood (ἀνέρες ἔστε) and having regard (αἰδῶ) for other people, especially his ancestors and dependants (cf. 16.31–32).[79]

As noted by L. Pratt, a human's parental wish to have a son better than oneself distinguishes mortal parents from their divine counterparts, 'whose intergenerational conflicts are created precisely by the father's refusal to permit his son to surpass and ultimately succeed him'.[80] Pratt's observation, however, does not do full justice to the gods. As we have seen, such refusals are also suppressions of the mother's status and her procreative role (cf. Astyanax brings blooded spoils home to delight Andromache). Ouranos and Cronus' attempts

[79] Cairns (1993) 69–70; Wilson (2002) 13–39, esp. 22.
[80] Pratt (2007) 29; thus, Hector's prayer shows himself 'a more generous father than Zeus'.

to ‘freeze time and thereby preserve the established hierarchy’ are not justified and are doomed to failure because they do not recognise the relative value of others.[81] It is because of, as Pratt rightly argued, human mortality that ‘human parents must recognize that their own success demands that their children succeed’. In addition, unlike the immortal gods whose generations will directly affect the cosmic order, Hector’s prayer is not directly related to the maintenance of the social hierarchy in Troy but to the integrity and reputation of his family.

Human finitude, therefore, necessitates one’s existence to be characterised by an intense interdependence on family. While an Olympian deity possesses an honorific domain in perpetuity, a mortal must prove themselves through actions to be a worthy part of the familial honorific domain and, by so doing, to contribute to the continuity and integrity of their family.

1.4.2 Political Honour and Philoi

The aristocratic ethic, ‘always to excel and not shame thy fathers’, points beyond the interplays of deference and demeanour within one’s lineage.[82] A man is politically related to his community:[83] his honour is generally sanctioned or recognised by the political authority either as the collective whole or represented by the king.[84] In Homeric society, which is often presented as a chiefly military community, a warrior or elite is concerned about the opinions of the general public as much as those of his fellows, as his *philoi*, in both the familial and political realms. As van Wees noted, ‘in the epics, private and public statuses both form part of his “honour”’, and ‘the nature of a man’s relationships with others determines his status’.[85] As in the family, one’s political status reciprocally entails duties to one’s community, especially as regards its integrity, safety, and property.

One’s social self and existence is fundamentally interdependent with others to the extent that one will be reduced to nothing if one’s power is not put to use, if recognition of its effects remains hidden, or if one’s honour is disregarded and deprived. Thus, when

[81] Cf. Pratt (2007) 29.
[82] Cf. Wilson (2002) 34–35.
[83] Consider Hammer (2002) 32: ‘a realm in which people think about themselves, and constitute themselves, as communities’. On the historicity of Homeric society, see Wilson (2002) 11 with the works cited at 185 n. 46. As to whether we could use *polis* to describe the institutions of Homeric society, see Elmer (2013) 1–18; also Rose (1997).
[84] See van Wees (1992) 299–310; Allan & Cairns (2011) 114–115.
[85] van Wees (1992) 75. On *philos* and honour, see also e.g. Blundell (1989) 1–59; Cairns (1993) 89–100, 273–76;

Agamemnon openly dishonours Achilles by threatening to seize his *geras* (*Il.* 1.355–356) and overweeningly utters his disregard (180–181), Achilles feels degraded to a coward and even rendered as an οὐτιδανός, 'a nobody' or 'non-entity', if he keeps silent and yields to Agamemnon's abusive authority (293–294; cf. 231).[86] In his attempt to persuade Patroclus to encourage Achilles to fight, Nestor reminds Patroclus of Peleus' departing injunction, a parallel of Hippolochus', 'always to be excellent and pre-eminent among others' (11.784). Nestor's reminder is apt to the present situation insofar as Achilles is keeping his ἀρετή hidden (οἷος, 763) and does not use it for the public good, as Nestor has achieved in the past 'among men' (μετ' ἀνδράσι, 762).[87] Achilles is also suffering, however, from his withdrawal and isolation, as Nestor suggests. This becomes clear when Achilles laments the death of Patroclus before his mother (18.102–106):

> οὐδέ τι Πατρόκλῳ γενόμην φάος οὐδ' ἑτάροισι
> τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἳ δὴ πολέες δάμεν Ἕκτορι δίῳ,
> ἀλλ' ἧμαι παρὰ νηυσὶν ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης,
> τοῖος ἐὼν οἷος οὔ τις Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων
> ἐν πολέμῳ
>
> I was no light of deliverance to Patroclus or to my other comrades, those many who have been killed by divine Hector, but sit here beside my ships, a fruitless burden on the fertile land, though I am such as no other of the bronze-armoured Achaeans in war.

The failure to help friends and harm enemies exposes oneself to shame and criticism. In terms of Achilles, accordingly, his failure to project himself as a 'light' to *philoi*[88] renders him a

[86] There is an interesting parallel in the juxtaposition of οὐτιδανός with its cognate Οὖτις (*Od.* 9.460), the pseudonym of Odysseus who has not yet returned to Ithaca and restored his τιμή.
[87] In his reply to Ajax, who has just claimed to be the second ἄριστος of Achaeans (*Il.* 7.226–232), Hector lists all ἀρεταί that he 'theoretically and practically knows' (οἶδα, repeated five times) and proudly states that he would not strike his opponent 'by stealth' (λάθρῃ) but 'in wide open' space (ἀμφαδόν, 233–243).
[88] In Homer, the idea that a man's excellence is expected to be pre-eminently seen and used for the public can be found in the poetical metaphor of light. This is best illustrated in Ajax's prayer for the deliverance from darkness, when he fought

valueless self. The loss of self-esteem relates to the loss of the *philoi* as the source of the esteem (deference), and his failure to meet the obligations as the prerequisites for mutual esteem (demeanour).[89] The self-portrait in the metaphor of ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης lies in stark contrast to the social expectations of an *aristos* (cf. 12.320): Achilles views his present self as a miscast spear,[90] a fruitless barley (cf. 1.234–237; 20.495–503),[91] and a nameless wanderer who knows not how to put his valour to good use (cf. 24.531–533).[92] As Menelaus likens the Achaeans who sit there and do not fight against Hector to 'water and earth' (12.99–100), Achilles sees himself as a 'mere earth', a 'non-entity' that he once denied being.[93]

What has been long praised as the epitome of the 'Heroic Code', or the 'fullest and most explicit statement of *noblesse oblige*,[94] is the famous speech of Sarpedon (12.310–328).[95] Let us look at the first half (310–321):

> Γλαῦκε, τί ἦ δὴ νῶι τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα
> ἕδρῃ τε κρέασίν τε ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν

painstakingly to protect the corpse of Patroclus under cover of a mist sent from Zeus (17.645–648). Ajax's prayer for light is made, in the first place, for a practical purpose: in such darkness, he cannot fetch and send a fellow to let Achilles know about the death of Patroclus (640–644; also 243–245, 252–253). At the thought that he might fight till death in darkness (242–245), Ajax weeps (648, cf. 700–701) unheroically: while the tears indicate his debility and feminisation (note that the darkness forms a semi-private place like an inner room), his prayer refers to a hope of recovering the heroic self. Ajax asks for nothing but a chance to fight 'under clear air' and 'piercing brightness of the sun' (370–377). Light is prayed for as a display of the valour of a man deeply concerned about how he might be able to 'project a viable, sacred self' in the best possible light to others (see Goffman (1967) 91 and 89). As Zeus scatters the mist and Helios blazes out to lighten the whole battlefield (648–650; cf. 15.668–673 with Edwards (1991) 125; cf. 8.245 ff. with Kirk (1990) 319–320), Ajax immediately retrieves himself and uses his power to plan (651 ff.) and fight (715 ff.). To a man such as Ajax, being in the light (ἐν φάει, 17.645) is less about living as a light-given being (cf. ἐπί-ἡμέρος, 'ephemeral', see § 5.1) than about living as a light that is conspicuous, admirable, and beneficial to others (646).

[89] Cf. Schein (1984) 115; Hammer (2002) 177–178; Cairns (2018) 400.

[90] Achilles is aware of the disastrous result of his anger, on which he reflects in the next several lines. And so, he might use this metaphor to refer not only to his inactivity but also to his misuse of power in his anger.

[91] Schein (1984) 146.

[92] ἐτώσιος: useless spears when cast in vain and fallen to the ground, see 3.368; 5.854; 14.407; 17.633; 22.292; barley fell without fruit on earth, *h. Hom.* 2.310; see also *Op.* 440. Likewise, an ἀλήτης who knows neither ἔργα nor βίη is an ἄχθος ἄρουρης, *Od.* 20.377–379.

[93] Stocking (2004) 136 suggests reading ἀρούρης as a genitive of material or contents, as in ὄβριμον ἄχθος ὕλης (*Od.* 9.233). This also offers a better understanding of Agamemnon's 'annihilating' insult and Achilles' initial reaction of killing for revenge. Agamemnon clearly violates the reciprocal norms of a τιμή-based society to which Achilles and other warriors subscribe; see Cairns (2018) 391. He also annuls (or belittles) Achilles' accomplishments and merits in the past, which justifies the latter's right to claim his τιμή. Such dishonour is a denial both of Achilles' social part and his social worth, as recognised by others in his effective use of power. Agamemnon makes Achilles' projection of himself worthless and no more viable to others – all that on which his life depends. It is in this sense that Agamemnon's threat is felt as 'annihilating' and that Achilles, thus, reacts to defend his τιμή as if his life or *self* is at stake.

[94] Griffin (1980) 73.

[95] Much has been said on this passage, see e.g. Yamagata (1994) 128; Pucci (1998) 179–230; Michael Clarke (2004); Clay (2009). For further discussions of the heroic code, see e.g. Adkins (1960); Long (1970); Redfield (1975) 99–127; van Wees (1992); Zanker (1994) 1–71; Yamagata (1994); Seaford (1994) 1–29; Scodel (2008) 1–32.

ἐν Λυκίῃ, πάντες δὲ θεοὺς ὣς εἰσορόωσι;
καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθοιο παρ᾽ ὄχθας,
καλὸν φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης πυροφόροιο.
τῶ νῦν χρὴ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισιν ἐόντας
ἑστάμεν ἠδὲ μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολῆσαι,
ὄφρα τις ὧδ᾽ εἴπῃ Λυκίων πύκα θωρηκτάων·
῾οὐ μὰν ἀκλεέες Λυκίην κάτα κοιρανέουσιν
ἡμέτεροι βασιλῆες, ἔδουσί τε πίονα μῆλα
οἶνόν τ᾽ ἔξαιτον μελιηδέα· ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα καὶ ἴς
ἐσθλή, ἐπεὶ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισι μάχονται.᾽

Glaucus, why is it that we two are held in highest honour in Lycia with seating, meat, and full cups, and all look upon us as on gods? We possess a great domain by the banks of Xanthus, a fair tract of orchard and of wheat-bearing plough-land. So now we must take our stand with the foremost Lycians, and confront the blazing battle, so that one of the armoured Lycians may say: 'surely our kings ruling in Lycia are not inglorious men, they that eat fat sheep and drink choice wine, honey-sweet. Their violence is effectively and admirably good,[96] when they fight amid the foremost Lycians.'

This speech is thematically associated with the speech of his cousin Glaucus discussed above.[97] As in the Bellerophon episode (6.191–195), the Lycians confer on Glaucus and Sarpedon kingly honour and privileges at a communal feast, a fine *temenos*, and a special deference by looking at them like gods[98] as recognition for their valour and admirable deeds. While Glaucus views himself as an offspring of a great lineage and underlines the familial interdependence, Sarpedon reflects social reciprocal norms according to which a warrior-king

[96] ἴς is etymologically related to the Latin *vīs* and thus *violēns*. On ἐσθλός, see Nagy (1979) 121; Stocking (2004) 89–90. Etymologically, it might be derived from **h₁es*- and thus cognate with εἰμί, or from **h₁su*- and cognate with ἐΰς and εὖ.
[97] On this link, see Redfield (1975) 102.
[98] This might also refer to an approval of their divine pedigree to a certain extent, cf. γίνωσκε θεοῦ γόνον ἠΰν ἐόντα at 6.191; for the 'honour someone as a god' theme, see below.

is expected to perform specific duties, thereby proving himself worthy of the honorific privileges and godlike status assigned by his subjects. On the other hand, regardless of practical purposes,[99] the willingness to risk one's life is itself admirable and 'merits reward' (cf. 11.408–410).[100] The heroic imperative (αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων) is fulfilled by being held at the top of the social hierarchy (τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα) and demonstrating oneself to be an ἄριστος, a fighter of ἴς ἐσθλή in the front ranks.

In the second half of the speech, Sarpedon shifts the focus from his social status in Lycia to his present fighting position at Troy (12.322–328):

> ὦ πέπον, εἰ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε
> αἰεὶ δὴ μέλλοιμεν ἀγήρω τ' ἀθανάτω τε
> ἔσσεσθ', οὔτέ κεν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοισι μαχοίμην
> οὔτέ κε σὲ στέλλοιμι μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν·
> νῦν δ' ἔμπης γὰρ κῆρες ἐφεστᾶσιν θανάτοιο
> μυρίαι, ἃς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν βροτὸν οὐδ' ὑπαλύξαι,
> ἴομεν, ἠέ τῳ εὖχος ὀρέξομεν, ἦέ τις ἡμῖν.
>
> Ah, if once escaped from this battle we were forever to be ageless and immortal, I myself would not fight amid the foremost, nor would I send you to the battle that brings men glory. As it is, however, the spirit of death stands over us, too many to count, which no mortal may escape or avoid. So, let us advance, whether we will give glory to another, or another to us.

Sarpedon reflects on the reality of fighting by contrasting it with the unreality of 'being ageless and immortal'. Some understand that this comparison indicates the notion of immortality in renown achieved by 'dying in a heroic fashion', which transcends 'the

[99] In fact, Sarpedon fights as an ally of the Trojans far beyond the territory of his homeland. Redfield (1975) 100; Griffin (1980) 106–112; Clay (2003) 32–33.
[100] Redfield (1975) 102–103; Griffin (1980) *passim*; Cairns (2018) 396–97.

boundaries of his own community by being celebrated in epic'.[101] This reading, however, does not do full justice to the text. The immediate context of the speech does not refer to Sarpedon's posterity or posthumous fame.[102] Furthermore, 'ageless and immortal', the two fundamental features of the gods, could be understood as a synecdoche (*pars pro toto*) for the *status* of being a deity (see further Hector's *adynaton* in § 3.2.3; also *Il.* 5.339–342 in § 3.1.3).[103] Instead of thinking how to overcome mortality, Sarpedon delimits his godlike status among the Lycians (312; cf. 6.191–195) by comparing it with divine status. In this light, the actual point of comparison in the *adynaton* lies in the difference between the divine mode of existence and Sarpedon's way of life. The modified reading of 'ageless and immortal' (323) as a reference to divine status in general terms, however, must be understood with the *ad hoc* emphasis of death (κῆρες […] θανάτοιο, 326–327), which encourages us to read the expression in 323 as being in large part really about mortality that differs humans from gods. The sequence of thought is, thus, as follows: if Sarpedon could achieve divine status and live as a god free from death, there would be no need to fight on earth facing death, but since this is not the case, he must remain to fight as a godlike warrior-king (312; cf. 6.191–195) and as a mortal son of Zeus (5.635–636; 6.198–199; 15.67), confronting the deaths of himself and others.[104] Just as Glaucus speaks of human generational interdependence rather than the transgressive ambition for divine status (Bellerophon's failure to venture to Olympus is intentionally passed over, 6.200–202), Sarpedon speaks of deification in an *adynaton* and urges Glaucus to take actions in the realms of human glories and deaths.

1.4.3 Human's Cosmic Status: Life, Death, and Divine Will

[101] Michael Clarke (2004) 77–78. Clay (2009) 32–34 argued that the first half of the speech discusses the 'τιμή code', which defines one's status in terms of social norms, while the latter refers to the 'κλέος code', viewing man as a mortal creature. This distinction between the two codes is based on an observation that the Homeric warriors do not always fight for the original purpose that is derived from the need on the part of the community for its defence and self-preservation. According to Redfield (1975) 100, when warriors 'become a class or caste', they will demonstrate their martial virtues and pursue political advantages by seeking out combat far away from home, 'if his own community is not at war'. The difference between τιμή and κλέος, however, is not the point made by Sarpedon. In fact, a warrior of noble birth is expected to take action to prove himself worthy of his patrimony and, thereby, the pursuit of κλέος is not explicitly distinguished from the pursuit of τιμή. Even if one fights far away from home and not for the community's sake, he attempts to 'always be the best' and not to 'shame his forefathers' (cf. *Od.* 24.30–33). For the difference and overlaps between τιμή and κλέος, see further Martin (1989) 97; Zanker (1994) 11 ff.; Pucci (1998) 180 ff.
[102] Long (2019) 16 rightly noted that Sarpedon's thoughts are about 'his contemporary subjects, not posterity'.
[103] Cf. Long (2019) 8: 'In Homer becoming immortal is not just a matter of prolonging one's existence. It is to become an immortal, a god, and that means acquiring the ability to act as a god.'
[104] Cf. Griffin (1980) 92–93.

Just as ‘ageless and immortal’ are two key features of a deity but do not define divinity in its fullest sense, so does death serve as a mark of human status but does not embrace all of its constituents. Therefore, Sarpedon views himself primarily as a man in the cosmic society and, second, as a mortal creature in a natural world. In other words, the status difference between a man and a deity is *prior to* the ontological distinction between mortality and immortality.

Nevertheless, death reveals a fundamental truth about the human condition: humans are subject to uncertainty and alternation during their life, in which death remains the most unpredictable element. Yet, the uncertainty of human life does not indicate an agnostic point of view. Rather, as we shall see below, just as death is often understood as an allotment assigned by gods, a human’s portion in the cosmic society, including what they attain in the familial and political realms, is ultimately subject to divine apportionment.

A human’s familial-political status is fundamentally influenced and determined by their relationship and interactions with the gods.[105] For instance, in the *Theogony*, the poet tells us in express terms that kings are descended from Zeus, and that they are expected to establish justice and order in earthly communities (81–97). Likewise, in the *Iliad*, Agamemnon’s claim to kingship is justified by his sceptre inherited from Zeus (2.102–108) and by the notion of Zeus as the patron of earthly kings (1.176; 2.196–197; *h. Hom.* 25.4). Achilles claims his honour not only through his martial prowess (cf. 178, 290) and his inherited kingship but also through his status as the son of Thetis (see more in Chapter 3). More generally, the notion that human achievements (or the lack thereof) are largely dependent on gods is widely observed throughout the Greek literature. The famous speech of Achilles about the Two Urns of Zeus (24.525–533) is one such *locus classicus*.[106] We shall return to this passage in § 3.3.3. For our purposes here, let us make some preliminary remarks. The mythic section is capped with a declaration of what gods allot (ἐπικλώθειν)[107] to humans, a miserable existence, in

[105] Cf. van Wees (1992) 76.
[106] Similarly, *Pyth.* 3.80–81; *Op.* 94; Pl. *Rep.* 379d. Divine gifts are inescapable, e.g. *Il.* 3.64–66; *h. Hom.* 2.147–148, 216–217; Solon 13.64 West; Theog. 133–134, 1189–1190; see also Edwards (1991) 129; Cairns (2006) 109 and n. 37.
[107] See also *Od.* 1.17 (Homer on Odysseus’ *nostos*); 3.208 (Telemachos’ surmise of divine allotment); 4.208 (Menelaus’ general comment on divine allotment); 8.579 (Alcinous on Trojan wars); 11.139 (Odysseus on Tereisias’ prophecy of his final days); 16.64 (Eumaios on Odysseus’ ‘fake’ life-story); 20.196 (Philoitios’ generic comments on divine allotment). Richardson (1993) 330 noted that the verb occurs ‘always of a god or gods allotting destiny’.

contrast with the divine life free from sorrows (525–526).[108] The myth of Zeus' jars describes human prosperity and adversity as the allotment of Zeus,[109] especially in terms of honour; they are then explained and exemplified by the lives of Peleus (534–542) and Priam (543–548). A human's status is defined not only in the realms of human institutions (family and community) but also in the divinely ruled cosmic society, in which there is a continuum of honour from the supreme Zeus on Olympus to the beast-like man wandering on earth.

Moreover, a revealing insight may be gained from this passage that a man's course of life is a sequence of interconnected 'portions', which are conceived in sum as a divine allotment.[110] This point could be illustrated by the case of Sarpedon's death. In *Iliad* 16, Zeus mourns for the imminent death of Sarpedon and hesitates over whether or not to save his life (433–438).[111] It is noteworthy that Zeus uses μοῖρα as an umbrella term to describe how Sarpedon will meet his death at the hand of Patroclus (433).[112] This recalls the part of his larger plan that he has announced to all the gods in the previous book (15.49–77). According to his will, when the Achaeans appeal to Achilles after being defeated by Hector (64–67):

> …ὁ δ᾽ ἀνστήσει ὃν ἑταῖρον
> Πάτροκλον· τὸν δὲ κτενεῖ ἔγχεϊ φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ
> Ἰλίου προπάροιθε, πολέας ὀλέσαντ᾽ αἰζηοὺς
> τοὺς ἄλλους, μετὰ δ᾽ υἱὸν ἐμὸν Σαρπηδόνα δῖον.
>
> He [Achilles] will send out his comrade Patroclus, who will be slain by glorious Hector with the spear before the walls of Ilios after he himself has slain many other youths, and among them my son, divine Sarpedon.

[108] The divine life in archaic Greek literature is characterised by privative adjectives, such as ἀκηδής, ἄνουσος, ἀπήμων, ἀπήμαντος, ἄπονος, ἄπειρος; see e.g. Meister (2020) 2–3.
[109] Cf. *Th.* 904–906: Zeus assigns the τιμή to the Three Moirai to give 'good and evil' to mankind.
[110] Sarischoulis (2016) 84–86; cf. Clay (1983) 154–155.
[111] For other similar cases of a deity saving humans in the *Iliad*, see 3.380–382 (Aphrodite helps Alexandros), 5.22–24 (Hephaistos saves Idaios), 20.321–325 (Poseidon protects Aineias), 20.443–446, 21.596–598 (Apollo helps Hector and Agenor).
[112] Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1971) 5: '*Moira*, one's 'portion,' is in the last resort identical with the will of Zeus; when Hera reminds him that he cannot save his son Sarpedon she is only warning him that he cannot sacrifice to a sudden whim his own settled policy'.

Sarpedon's death is one part of Zeus' arrangement, which is declared with the political consensus among the Olympians (433–434; cf. 5.662 and 12.402–403).[113] Hera's response to Zeus is, thus, arguably relevant to this plan (16.441–442):[114]

> ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα, πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ,
> ἂψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι;
>
> Do you intend to release this man, being a mortal, from dolorous death, which has been allotted before?

The phrase πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ could be read simply as emphasising the inevitability of Sarpedon's death, as expressed in θνητὸν ἐόντα. It seems also to serve, however, as a reminder of what Zeus has allotted to his son (μοῖρα in 434 echoes αἴσῃ here), that is, being killed by Patroclus. Hera also reminds Zeus of his role as the supreme distributor and order-guardian in the cosmic society: it is, thus, inappropriate for a king like him to alter what has been decided in the divine assembly for the sake of a mortal human.[115] If he insists on this, Hera continues, there will be a protest from other gods, which may lead to a tumult of the cosmic order (16.443, 449). On the other hand, Hera understands the painful suffering of Zeus, who has devised the death of his beloved son,[116] and comforts him with what is appropriate: let Death and Sleep deliver the corpse of Sarpedon to his fatherland so that 'his brothers and clansmen will solemnly bury him with a tomb and a stele' – a burial, instead of being saved by Zeus, is the honourable portion (γέρας) due to the dead (455–457).[117]

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[113] Although the overall plan is accepted not with an agreeable compliance among the Olympians (15.78–79, 168 f., 236 f.), it is acknowledged as a common agreement among the gods.
[114] *Il.* 16.441–443 = 22.179–181; also 4.29; 15. 209–211; 22.181. For similar scenes in Homer, see *Il.* 3.379, 5.445, 20.321 ff., 20.443, 21.597.
[115] Pucci (2018) 32 ff. argued that there is to Zeus a contradictory position of being a pitiful father and the indifferent god of destinies. As van Wees (1992) 146 (also 158) rightly noted, however, the tension lies in the fact that the gods take actions according to norms of justice and fairness but simultaneously 'wish to support their kin and friends'. In other words, the gods are also suffering or encountering the same problems of the human world: 'absolute' or impartial justice is often posed against the ethic of 'helping-friend-harming-enemies' in practice. For previous debate over the morality of the gods, see van Wees (1992) 374 nns. 165–168.
[116] The second option of Zeus, ἦ ἤδη ὑπὸ χερσὶ Μενοιτιάδαο δαμάσσω (16.438), is heartrending: he is about to kill Sarpedon through the hand of Patroclus; cf. 16.521–522. On Zeus' contradictory position, see Pucci (2018) 32–41.
[117] Clay (2009) 36 noted that Sarpedon is the only hero in the *Iliad* to die far from home and receive γέρας θανόντων in his fatherland.

Following this advice, Zeus casts down bloody rain as if celebrating impressive rites so as to give special honour (τιμῶν) to his dear son (παῖδα φίλον, 458–461).

Sarpedon's burial at Lycia and Zeus' rain of blood attest to his cosmic status, which comprises a familial-political portion and divine allotment. As a point of comparison, γέρας θανόντων[118] interestingly contrasts with τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἠμεῖς, 'that is our [gods'] portion of honour', referring to Hector's 'fair distribution' (δαιτὸς ἐίσης) to the altars of Zeus, by which Zeus justifies Hector's piety and allows his corpse to be retrieved by Priam and transported to Troy (*Il.* 24.65–76, see further in Chapter 3). As a resonance of the Mekone–Prometheus' myth and the divine–human separation process in Hesiod, whereas 'the smoke and the savour' of sacrifice marks divine status among the gods and their separation from humans, mankind's burial as their due portion confirms their inferior status and ephemeral condition in the cosmic society.

In the case of Sarpedon, moreover, a man's death is understood in a twofold sense: it is doomed because it is the most universal aspect of a human's lot, rarely altered by gods;[119] it is also unpredictable because it is a part of one's allotment that is predicated on one's relationship and interactions with the gods. As J.-P. Vernant has noted, the power of Zeus is 'exercised subject to the same conditions as that of a king whose status is higher than that of his peers but whose rule is inseparable from a whole complex of prerogatives and honours'.[120] The divine allotment or 'spinning' (*Il.* 24.209; cf. 20.128) for a man is often found to be determined or designed with 'a certain amount of political manoeuvring' among the Olympians, whose relationship to mankind is analogous to that between kings and their subordinates.[121] In this light, the overall uncertainty of human life, the inscrutableness of human vicissitudes, and the unpredictability of death become understandable,[122] because

[118] For γέρας θανόντων, see Garland (1984); Garcia (2013) Ch. 4.
[119] Janko (1994) 4, 7. For instance, *Od.* 3.236–238; cf. *Il.* 18.115–121; 16.435–438; 22.174–176. There are a few examples (*Od.* 4.561–565; 11.300–304; 23.333–336) that are divergent from the main idea of the inescapability of death.
[120] Vernant (1980) 115; see also Almqvist (2017) 52.
[121] van Wees (1992) 143; cf. Yamagata (1994) 33: '[Zeus] may be responsible for distributing 'μόρος' or 'μοῖρα,' namely a lot, to men, i.e. their birth, status, and all that is given to and expected from men of such a stature, but not for what they do beyond their lot.' See also Aphrodite's words in Eur. *Hipp.* 5–8 (τἀμά […] κράτη […] τιμώμενοι χαίρουσιν ἀνθρώπων ὕπο).
[122] Cf. Versnel (2011) 184 and *passim* on the 'multiple causes' of human events. This brings us into a long and problematic debate on the relation between μοῖρα in the sense of 'fate' (sometimes taking the form of personified Μοῖρα, e.g. *Od.* 11.292; *Il.* 18.119, 13.602) and the gods (especially Zeus). A summary of conflicting opinions on this issue can be found in Sarischoulis (2016); cf. Yamagata (1994) 105; Dietrich (1965) 179–193. Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 11–12: 'Greek religion was not crystalized dogma, but an open system, transversed by the fundamental Greek notion of the ultimate

what determines the 'allotments' of one's life is not typically revealed to ordinary humans. Only with poetic or prophetic visions may humans learn about the conflicts, debates, and agreements among the gods.[123] The fact that Odysseus learns his μοῖρα in Hades suggests nothing more than that such kinds of knowledge are beyond the reach of humans.[124] Only a few protagonists in epics have limited knowledge about their allotments in detail before their death. For instance, although Achilles has the privilege of knowing his μοῖρα as the choice between *nostos* and *kleos*, he is ignorant about the correlation between the death of Patroclus and his second choice. As Penelope reflects, 'the immortals have placed on each his μοῖρα, on all mortals on the grain-bearing earth' (ἐπὶ γάρ τοι ἑκάστῳ μοῖραν ἔθηκαν / ἀθάνατοι θνητοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν, *Od*. 19.592–593); it is Zeus, however, not humans, who 'knows all things, both μοῖρα and non-μοῖρα of mortal human beings' (*Od.* 20.75–76).[125]

We have examined some of the main texts on the distribution of honour among gods and humans and have provided an interpretation of it as a coherent nexus of ideas and themes about the supreme rule of Zeus, the establishment and maintenance of the cosmic society, and the divine–human separation, relationship, and interactions. A general conceptual and historical framework of the cosmic society based on the ideas of honour, portion, and status is thus provided to shed light on the defining features of divinity and humanity. In the cosmic society, a deity is viewed as a social being who is assigned a permanent portion comprising a specific domain of power and a special honour. It is against this backdrop that a human is viewed primarily as a social figure in the cosmic society, and their cosmic status is not only subject to their familial and political station, which is characterised by deep interdependence, but also ultimately dependent on their relationship with the gods, which has been shaped by the divine–human separation as part of the historical development of cosmic society.

unknowability of the divine world, so there was great scope for poets to present new representations of the world beyond human experience. Thus, poetry articulated theology and mythology, but of course the versions it offered were not authoritative'. I follow most of the ideas of Sarischoulis (2016) and Clay (1983) 154–157.

[123] Vermeule (1979) 24: '*Ephemeroi*, animals and men, are probably called so, not in the sense of living one day's span in contrast to the infinite forward time of the gods, but rather as short-witted creatures whose intelligence responds to or is shaped by each day's events and accidents, ἐφημέρια φρονέοντες (xviii.136, xxi.85). As the sun may be born fresh each day, so is the mind, infant and *nepios*, unable to use the past as a guide to the future or find meaning in passing events'. For *ephemeros*, see also Fränkel (1946); Dickie (1976). A further discussion on this conception will be offered in § 5.1.

[124] Cf. Clay (1983) 156.

[125] Consider Heraclitus DK 22 B102: 'To the God everything is beautiful and good and just, but mortals assume that some things are unjust, others are just'; see also Tor (2017) 61–103.

2 Divinisation and its Limited Forms

Chapter 1 described the gods and men in terms of honour, portion, and status in the cosmic society. It briefly sketched the historical development of the cosmic society by highlighting the key moments of dispensation and differentiation among gods and humans. It is against this backdrop that a human's cosmic status is defined in terms of their relationships to their family, community, and gods. In addition, it is argued that a deity differs from a human not merely ontologically, but also (and indeed more fundamentally) in terms of status in the cosmic hierarchy. This being established, this chapter proceeds to formulate the principal argument of the thesis: divinity, either of a god or a divinised human, is foremost defined by a special honour as a portion ordained or distributed by the divine community under the rule of Zeus. This chapter will first examine the ways in which a new deity is initiated into the divine community and will then compare them with several cases of *apotheosis*. Based on this, the chapter will also address several approximate, momentary forms of divinisation (the extraordinary figures honoured like a god, the divinely empowered humans, 'self-deifiers') as the main subject of the three case studies in the second part. A brief summary of Chapters 3–5 will be provided at the end.

2.1 The Newborn Deities

The dispensation of honours among gods is fundamental to the order of the cosmic society. This social differentiation of gods, as we have seen, is also tellingly associated with their ontological and existential features. It is thus noteworthy that the birth-narrative of a newborn deity is often followed by a description of the assignment of honours and specific domains of power. For instance, The Muses, immediately after their birth on the peak of Olympus, come to meet their father with dancing songs (*Th.* 62–71, cf. 917).[1] The Muses are initiated into the Olympian community by performing their honorific role of singing that 'glorifies the ordinances and the cherished usages' of gods (66–67) and celebrates Zeus' kingship, victory,

[1] West (1966) 179.

and dispensation of honours (71–75). Hesiod then reckons with the naming of the Muses and their realms of power associated with festivity, kingship, and poetics (76–103). Likewise, in the theogonic narrative of Aphrodite (*Th.* 189–206), after the description of her genesis from the severed phallus (189–195) and an appendix-like explanation of her various epithets (196–200),[2] Hesiod returns to the time immediately following the birth (201–204):

> τῇ δ' Ἔρος ὡμάρτησε καὶ Ἵμερος ἕσπετο καλὸς
> γεινομένῃ τὰ πρῶτα θεῶν τ' ἐς φῦλον ἰούσῃ·
> ταύτην δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς τιμὴν ἔχει ἠδὲ λέλογχε
> μοῖραν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.
>
> Eros accompanied her and beautiful Desire stayed with her as soon as she was born and when she went to the tribe of the gods; and since the beginning she possesses this honour and has received as her lot this portion among human beings and immortal gods.

The narration is completed with a list of Aphrodite's assigned powers and features delimiting her influence in the cosmic society (205–206, cf. *h. Hom.* 5.2–35). Corresponding to the assignment of her honour and portion, Aphrodite's movement, accompanied by Eros and Himeros, from Cyprus to Olympus, could be viewed as an initiation into the divine community.[3]

Two Homeric Hymns serve to illustrate more clearly how a newborn deity is introduced into the divine realm and installed in the cosmic society. In the climactic moment (120–132) of the *genos* section in the *Hymn to Apollo* (19–206), the goddesses attend to the infant Apollo by bathing and swaddling him. The hymnist interestingly highlights the sustenance that the neonate is fed: instead of his mother's milk (cf. *h. Hom.* 2.236 and below), Themis serves him nectar and ambrosia (120–125). Apollo is instantly transformed from infancy to

[2] The epithets are honorific signifiers, cf. *Il.* 5.331 ff. and relevant discussion in § 1.4.3 and § 3.1.3.
[3] In the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, it is Horai who 'led her to the immortals' after putting *cosmos* on Aphrodite's body. Aphrodite is then welcomed by the gods who 'took her hand in greeting' (14–16, cf. *h. Hom.* 19.42–47, Hermes introduces the newborn Pan to the gods and the infant receives his name there).

maturity after taking in the divine food (126–129), which is intended not to immortalise Apollo but to promote his maturity and mark his divinity (cf. *h. Hom.* 6.130–132; but *h. Hom.* 2.236–237; see below). The divine diet distinguishes Apollo from a human newborn not only by its miraculous effect but also by its honorific symbolism (cf. *Il.* 5.341 ff., see Chapter 3). As A. M. Miller noticed, Apollo experiences a 'double birth', whereby he first leaps out of Leto's womb with Eileithyia's help (115–119), and then comes into being *qua* Apollo out of the swaddling clothes (cf. *h. Hom.* 7.12–15) by consuming the divine sustenance.[4] It is noteworthy that the verb ὀλόλυξαν (119) applied to the attendant goddesses serves to acknowledge Apollo's divine status, which is affirmed in the subsequent paeanic invocation[5] of his name in the form of ἴιε Φοῖβε (120, cf. 440–447 where the Krisaean women ὀλόλυξαν in the astral epiphany of Apollo, before his self-revelation and the foundation of the Delphic oracle in 480 ff.). Correspondingly, the service of Themis is conceived as a kind of initiation or acknowledgement implied by the ritual-related verb ἐπήρξατο, which appears to signal Apollo's assumption of his divine status (cf. 353–354): his first divine meal signals his initial participation in the gods' festivities, which has been prefigured in the opening scene (10–13, echoing also 125) and will be re-confirmed at his formal arrival at Olympus later in the hymn.[6] Additionally, the presence of Themis is not without significance, as her role as a negotiator of divine gatherings and dispenser of divine feasts should be recalled particularly in Zeus' absence (cf. *Il.* 15.87–88).[7] The theme of divinity recognition develops to its climax in Apollo's self-proclamation of his threefold honours (131–132):

> εἴη μοι κίθαρίς τε φίλη καὶ καμπύλα τόξα,
> χρήσω τ' ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν.
>
> Let the lyre be mine and the curved bow, and I will prophesy the unerring will of Zeus.

[4] Miller (1986) 48.
[5] Bonnell (2019) 196–197.
[6] The verb also corresponds with the purificatory rite of Apollo's first bath in 120–122 (cf. *Ol.* 1.26–27 and § 4.1.3). For the religious connotation of ἐπάρχεσθαι, see Miller (1986) 53; Bonnell (2019) 202; generally, see Jim (2011).
[7] Bonnell (2019) 200.

Apollo's unusual way of selecting his own prerogatives intimates his high status among the gods (cf. 2–4). The authoritativeness in his announcement, however, is well balanced by his recognition of Zeus and his filial subordination to his father,[8] given that the dispensation of honours is ultimately under the control of Zeus (cf. *h. Hom.* 4.472). In fact, the proclamation itself is expressed as a prophesy that instantiates the honour he claims.[9] The proclamation of Apollo's triple τιμαί recalls the opening scene of the Olympian feast (in which Apollo the archer is disarmed to participate, 2–13) and prefigures the subsequent hymnic agenda (where his foundation of the oracle receives greatest emphasis, 316–387). The proclamation of Apollo's τιμαί, therefore, serves as a thematic nexus of the entire hymn that celebrates divinity.[10] The hymn proceeds to provide a geographical sketch of Apollo's domain of power (140–146), especially the Delian festival (147–176), before coming to the second Olympian scene when Apollo comes from Pytho to the 'congregation of the other gods' (186–187, which also serves as the proem for the Pythian section).[11] The instantaneous musical festivity prompted by Apollo's arrival here forms the counterpart to the sudden panic provoked by his entrance as Apollo-the-Archer (2–4). The central position of Apollo, playing his lyre amid the other responsive deities, in the second Olympian scene attests to his divine status among gods. With the approval of Zeus in two Olympian tableaux (10–12, 205), Apollo is fully initiated into the divine assembly and begins to assume his divine offices with his lyre and bow. The ensuing part of the hymn completes the characterisation of Apollo's cosmic status by celebrating his third τιμή, the foundation of his oracle on earth, which serves as an alleviating delight (25) to the ignorant and miserable humans (190–193) by disseminating 'the unerring will of Zeus'.

As an interesting counterpart to the hymn devoted to the triple τιμαί of Apollo, the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* looks at how the newborn Hermes wins recognition amid the Olympian gods and accedes to his prerogatives on Olympus.[12] Unlike Apollo, Hermes is born

[8] Clay (1989/2006) 78.
[9] Bonnell (2019) 206, 209.
[10] For the unity of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, see Janko (1981); Clay (1989/2006) 18–19; Miller (1986) 111–117; Bonnell (2019) 1–10; cf. Chappell (1995) .
[11] For the structure of this hymn, see Janko (1981); Miller (1986) 8–9; differently, Bonnell (2019) 13–18.
[12] Clay (1989/2006) 96.

without ‘gifts and foods/prayers’ (ἀδώρητοι καὶ ἄπαστοι/ἄλιστοι)[13] in the divine society (167–168, cf. 468–471) in a dark grotto unknown to gods and men (9).[14] The hymn’s main plot revolves around Hermes’ desire for a superior status (170–175):

> βέλτερον ἤματα πάντα μετ’ ἀθανάτοις ὀαρίζειν
> πλούσιον ἀφνειὸν πολυλήιον ἢ κατὰ δῶμα
> ἄντρωι ἐν ἠερόεντι θαασσέμεν· ἀμφὶ δὲ τιμῆς,
> κἀγὼ τῆς ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι, ἧς περ Ἀπόλλων.
> εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώησι πατὴρ ἐμός, ἤτοι ἐγώ γε
> πειρήσω—δύναμαι—φιλητέων ὅρχαμος εἶναι
>
> Better to chat with the immortals for all one’s days, rich, wealthy and with lots of spoils, than to sit at home in a murky cave. In the struggle for status, I too will embark on just the same rightful share as Apollo, but if my father should withhold it, then I tell you I shall try – I am able! – to be the chief of brigands.[15]

Hermes wants himself to be recognised as an honourable member of the Olympian assembly and receive corresponding prerogatives and the ‘rightful share’ (ὁσίης, cf. 130), equal or similar to that of Apollo (cf. 469–471).[16] The desire for honour is notoriously represented in his ‘hunger’ for the ‘rightful share of meat’ (ὁσίης κρεάων, 130), his honorific piece of the twelve portions he was assigned by ballot (128–129; *h. Hom.* 3.237–238; *h. Hom.* 2.210–211). Hermes’ claim is not made on a whim: on the one hand, the infant god knows that his honour is ultimately predicated on the patriarchal authority of Zeus (174); on the other hand, Hermes has good grounds on which to justify his claim by indicating Maia’s amorous intimacy with Zeus (ὀαρίζειν, 170; cf. ὠρίζεσκον, 58) and his fraternal equality with Apollo based on the same pedigree (59). Indeed, the second song of Hermes (his *Theogony*, 425–433)

[13] For the reading of ἄπαστοι or ἄλιστοι, see Vergados (2013) 368–369; Thomas (2020) 241.
[14] Clay (1989/2006) 127; Versnel (2011) 325.
[15] Text and translation are adapted from Thomas (2020) 106–107.
[16] The meaning of ὁσίη is a puzzle in here and other passages in this hymn, see Clay (1989/2006) 128–131; Versnel (2011) 322–324; Vergados (2013) 341–342, 371–372; Peels (2016) 242–245; Thomas (2020) 243–244.

demonstrates how well the infant deity understands the hierarchy of the divine society and expresses his 'acquaintance with the broader Olympian family and his μοῖρα within it'.[17] Therefore, his threat of being 'the chief of brigands', which would be carried out by plundering the Pythian 'great house' of Apollo (176–181), is rather a revenge-like protest against being treated without proper gifts and honours. The echo between Hermes' language in verses 174–175 and the phrasing of Agamemnon in *Il.* 1.324 (εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώῃσιν ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι) bears further significance: like Agamemnon, Hermes alone (especially among the offspring of Zeus) does not receive gifts and honours (cf. *Il.* 1.118–119) and indeed he is asking for a τιμή when most of the τιμαί have been distributed among the main Olympians (cf. *Il.* 1.125).[18] Hermes will have to embark on his pursuit of honour by invention (20–62, 107–115, 511–512), theft (68–86, 94–141), and exchange (414–502, 511–566). Like Apollo's initiation on Olympus, which causes both panic and festivity, Hermes' specific 'initiation' into the divine society takes place in his two arrivals on Olympus: the first as a trial before Zeus, which gives rise to slight disturbance and soon ceases with the laughter of Zeus (313–328, 389–396), the second as his reconciliation with Apollo by exchange of honours and the assignment of offices proclaimed by Zeus (567–573). It is noteworthy that Hermes' pursuit of honours is characterised in all-too-human terms (in particular, his hunger for meat, the invention of fire, the inauguration of a human institution of *dais*, and his craving for human offerings).[19] Correspondingly, the τιμαί of Hermes, especially those dispensed by Zeus, reveal his defining features of 'in-between-ness', as he is the only messenger entitled to move between Olympus and Hades (572). Hermes' initial claim of τιμαί in the murky cave is now fulfilled with the final announcement that he will 'associate with all mortals and immortals' (576).

The preceding discussions attest to the guiding comment of Herodotus that divinity is primarily envisioned in terms of τιμαί and τέχναι as well as in terms of names and outward forms (Hdt. 2.53.2). The τιμαί of gods fundamentally mark off their prerogatives, fundamental mode of actions, and sphere of influence, which are dispensed and achieved

[17] Thomas (2020) 381.
[18] Cf. Clay (1989/2006) 96.
[19] Clay (1987).

before they can be fully integrated into the Olympian community. The initiation of a newborn deity entails a change of status (from infancy to maturity, from undistinguished to honourable) and a creation of relationships with other deities. As in the case of Hermes, his acquisition of honours not only is achieved by his precocious powers, but is also, and more importantly, predicated on the re-establishment of his fraternal friendship with Apollo and the bestowment of *charis* from his father (*h. Hom.* 4.574–575).

Moreover, the honours of a god both demarcate his relationship with other deities and specify how he interacts and correlates with humans. Each established deity is a 'holder of honour' (τιμάοχος, *h. Hom.* 2.268), a term by which Demeter refers to herself in her revelation to the Eleusinians, and which is then glossed by the goddess' influence on both 'immortals and mortals' (269, cf. *h. Hom.* 5.31–32). The competences and prerogatives that she holds coordinate her into the cosmic society; in addition, these divine qualities attract the honour that other gods and humans bestow her. In this sense, the cosmic status of Demeter is related to both divine and human realms. This point is best illustrated by the critical moment in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*: had not Zeus intervened, the wrathful Demeter would have deprived the Olympians of their 'honorific privileges and their sacrifices' (ἐρικυδέα τιμήν καὶ θυσιῶν) by destroying mankind with famine (*h. Hom.* 2.310–313, 349–354). The τιμαί of the gods are not entirely autonomous but partly dependent on the offerings of mankind, in which Hermes, like other divinities, shows a great interest.

2.2 Apotheosis

Based on the preceding discussion, divinity refers primarily to membership of and honorific status in the divine community and the special sphere of influence in the cosmic society. A deity is vastly superior to a human in terms of honour, power, and existential mode. This leads us to the subsequent discussion of some cases of deification or apotheosis. The main argument here is that deification does not merely entail a procedure of immortalisation (which is not emphasised in some cases) but also, and more fundamentally, an elevation of

status or an 'initiation' into the divine community,[20] which will involve a special dispensation of honour to the divinised figure as in the cases of a newborn deity.

The case of Ino-Leucothea is illustrative of this pattern (*Od.* 5.333–335):

τὸν δὲ ἴδεν Κάδμου θυγάτηρ, καλλίσφυρος Ἰνώ,
Λευκοθέη, ἥ πρὶν μὲν ἔην βροτὸς αὐδήεσσα,
νῦν δ' ἁλὸς ἐν πελάγεσσι θεῶν ἒξ ἔμμορε τιμῆς.

Cadmus' daughter, fair-ankled Ino, saw him, Leucothea, who was a mortal of human speech before, but now in the depths of sea has her share of honour from the gods.

The divinisation of Ino is marked by the assignment of honour from the gods, the new divine name or epithet (cf. Semele-Thyone, Nonnus, *Dion.* 8.407–418), and a translation from the human realm to the marine part of the world. Similarly, in Pindar, Ino is said to be 'ordained' (τετάχθαι) with a portion of 'undying life' (βίοτον ἄφθιτον)[21] among (μετά) the Nereids (*Ol.* 2.28–30, see also § 4.2.2). The key term τετάχθαι, which corresponds to ἔμμορε of the Odyssean passage, works together with μετά[22] to denote Ino's divinely ordained identity as a member of the marine divinities. Moreover, as A. Long has rightly noted, the sphere of influence of Ino-Leucothea is also indicated in the Homeric passage by her recsuing of the drowning Odysseus and her granting to him the life-saving veil (*Od.* 5.336–351).[23] Therefore, it is valid to say that the prerogative assigned to Ino is 'an essential part' of her divinisation.[24]

A comparable case is the 'half' divinisation of the Dioscuri (*Od.* 11.301–304):

τοὺς ἄμφω ζωοὺς κατέχει φυσίζοος αἶα·
οἳ καὶ νέρθεν γῆς τιμὴν πρὸς Ζηνὸς ἔχοντες
ἄλλοτε μὲν ζώουσ᾽ ἑτερήμεροι, ἄλλοτε δ᾽ αὖτε

[20] *Contra* Yamagata (1994) 122.
[21] Cf. *Ol.* 1.63–64 (ἄφθιτον / θῆκαν: Tantalus steals the divine food to feed his comrades, see § 4.1.2.
[22] See Vergados (2013) on *h. Hom.* 4.167–168; cf. μεταρίθμιος ἀθναάτοισιν in *h. Hom.* 26.6 (Dionysus is 'numbered among the immortals').
[23] Long (2019) 8.
[24] Long (2019) 14.

τεθνᾶσιν· τιμὴν δὲ λελόγχασιν ἶσα θεοῖσι.

The life-giving earth covers them both, alive, and even beneath the earth they have honour from Zeus, every other day they live, on the other day they die, and they have been assigned honour like that of gods.

The Tyndarids continue to have a 'posthumous' existence in a wondrous form of alternation between living and dying. This is less puzzling when we understand the recurring 'death' here as 'entering and remaining beneath the earth', just as their initial death is said to be 'covered' by earth.[25] Indeed, this is how Pindar understands the case: half the time they 'draw breath beneath the earth' in Therapne's slopes, and half the time they live 'beside their father Zeus' in his 'halls of gold' (*Nem.* 10.87–88, 55–56). In both passages, the 'posthumous', godlike existence of the Dioscuri is assigned as a portion of divine honour and as a position in the cosmic society (cf. *Ol.* 3.34–36). In the Pindaric version, where apotheosis means receiving honours as a member of the divine community, thus 'escaping death and old age' (83), it is the 'portion' (λάχος, 85) of Polydeuces to 'dwell in the heaven' (οἰκεῖν τ' οὐρανῷ, 58) together with Zeus, Athena, and Ares (84). Therefore, the 'full divinity' (πάμπαν θεὸς ἔμμεναι, 58) of Polydeuces is divisible into two equal portions (πότμον […] ὁμοῖον, 57; cf. ἴσον, 86), one of which is shared with his brother. It is also noteworthy that in both cases the divine honours are assigned in terms of relationship: like Hermes, Polydeuces is recognised as the son of Zeus; Ino–Leucothea is divinised (probably) for her nursing of Dionysus (the son of her sister Semele, who is also divinised because of the love of Zeus, see *Ol.* 2.25–27 in § 4.2.2; cf. *Th.* 942). Likewise, another Tyndarid sibling, Helen, is also reported to be divinised in Euripides (*Or.* 1635–1637, 1684–1689): Apollo proclaims that Helen, because of her status as the daughter of Zeus, must lead an immortal life (ζῆν […] ἄφθιτον) and that he himself will translate her to Olympus, where she will also be assigned with the honorific

[25] In *Il.* 3.243–244, Homer speaks of the death of the Tyndarids without mentioning their special posthumous existence. This inconsistence does not matter to the argument here.

office of guardian of the sea and receive the honour of libation (ἔντιμος) together with the Dioscuri.

The divinised figures are initiated into the divine assembly like the newborn deities. For instance, when Ganymede is snatched by Zeus up to Olympus because of his beauty (*Il.* 20.233–235), he is recognised (τετιμένος, *h. Hom.* 5.205) as a member of the divine assembly (note μετά in ἀθανάτοισι μετείη in 235 = *h. Hom.* 5.203; also *Od.* 15.251, Cleitus by Dawn; cf. Tithonus in *h. Hom.* 5.218–238) and assigned with the honorific office of nectar-server in Zeus' house (the immortality and agelessness of Ganymede are mentioned later to his father Tros, *h. Hom.* 215). The Pindaric version of Pelops is a similar but more revealing example. Like Ganymede, Pelops is carried off by Poseidon from the divine–human feast in Sipylus to the 'highest house of Zeus' on Olympus, being a cupbearer for the gods (*Ol.* 1.37–45). The transportation of Pelops takes place after a marvellous moment in which Clotho lifts Pelops out from the pure cauldron during the feast (26). The scenario in which Pelops is purified, maturated, and de-mortalised[26] is reminiscent of the birth, purificatory rite, and maturation of the infant Apollo (*h. Hom.* 3.119–129). With the presence of gods who attend the feast offered by Tantalus, the Pelops-in-cauldron scene[27] is here envisioned as a kind of initiation (the sense of divinisation is intimated) by which Pelops is introduced to the divine assembly and indeed made to be an erotic comrade of Poseidon. The (failed) divinisation of Demophon is comparable to the case of Pelops and the initial appearance of Apollo:[28] just as Thetis treats the newborn Apollo (*h. Hom.* 3.124–125), Demeter rears the infant with ambrosia instead of his mother's milk, 'as if he were born to a god' (*h. Hom.* 2.237);[29] with this divine nursing and diet, Demophon grows precociously like a divinity (δαίμονι ἶσος, 235; θεοῖσι […] ἐώκει, 241; cf. *h. Hom.* 3.127–129) and becomes a 'wonder' to behold like Apollo (240, *h. Hom.* 3.119, 135). The divinisation of Demophon entails not only the process of immortalisation

[26] Acerbo (2020). We shall return to this passage in greater detail in § 4.1.3.
[27] Cf. Apollod. 3.4.3, Melicertes is boiled in the cauldron. For further examples, see Richardson (1974) 247.
[28] While Pelops is driven out from the divine assembly because of the crime of his father Tantalus (*Ol.* 1.55–65), Demophon does not receive full divinity because of the folly of his mother Metaneira (*h. Hom.* 2.243 ff.).
[29] See also *Il.* 6.132–135, *h. Hom.* 26.3–6 (Nysa's nymphs nurse Dionysus); *h. Hom.* 19.19 ff. (Pan is attended by nymphs); *h. Hom.* 5.265–275 (Aeneas will be brought up by the nymphs of Ida); *Pyth.* 9.59–65 (Aristaeus will be raised by Horai and Gaia). For divine nursing, see also Richardson (2010) 251 on *h. Hom.* 5.256–280.

(especially burning in fire)[30] but also the establishment of a special relationship with the goddess. In Demeter's angry speech to Metaneira, the nature of Demophon's divinisation is revealed as a kind of ordainment or appointed share (αἶσαν, 257), which is fundamentally based on Demeter's intimacy with the boy (263–264).[31] By being placed on the ground instead of in the fire and attended by Metaneira's sisters in lieu of Demeter, Demophon is not initiated into the divine assembly but reincorporated into the human community (cf. *Ol.* 1.65–66, 90–93).[32] Although full divinity is unfortunately denied to Demophon, the newly formed affiliation between the boy and the goddess remains in Demophon's 'unfading honour' (ἄφθιτον τιμήν, 261, 263). The prevalent interpretation that imperishable fame serves to compensate for the loss of immortality needs to be modified:[33] ἄφθιτος is rather a permanent mark of divine authority and favour (cf. σκῆπτρον ἄφθιτον in *Il.* 2.46, 196, 101–108 with *Il.* 1.233–239)[34] on which Demophon's honour (along with his posthumous hero-cult, if any) and thus his cosmic status is predicated.

The apotheosis of Heracles is another paradigmatic case insofar as his divinisation is granted not only on the basis of his divine pedigree but also because of his marvellous achievements. In Pindar, the exploits of Heracles (see more in Chapter 4) are envisioned as participating in the establishment and maintenance of the moral and political order of the world under the lawful rule of Zeus (*Nem.* 1.62–72; *Isth.* 4.61–63).[35] As recompense for these great toils (καμάτων), Heracles is 'allotted' (λάχοντ') with 'an extraordinary *hesychia* amid the houses of the blessed' (*Nem.* 1.70–71). Similarly, in Hesiod, Heracles achieved blessed status and a divine marriage as a reward bestowed on him for his toils accomplished for the gods (*Th.* 950–955).[36] Like a newborn deity, Heracles is 'honoured (τετίμαται) by the immortals as a *philos*' and established as 'an *anax* of the golden *oikoi*' (*Isth.* 4.65–66). Just as

[30] For further examples of 'baptism in fire', see Currie (2005) 383–385.
[31] Furthermore, the oath made by Demeter to Styx along with the reference to 'all gods' (259–260) also indirectly attests to the notion that divinisation is associated with public consent of the divine assembly.
[32] Let it be noted that Demeter's gesture of removing the child from fire and laying him on the ground is followed by the nursing of Metaneira's sisters, whose inferiority is underlined by the hymnist (285–291); Foley (1994) 50–51.
[33] E.g. Nagy (1979) 179–181; Clay (1989/2006) 241; Foley (1994) 51.
[34] Nagy (1979) 180 does not make the point by saying 'the Oath of Achilles is eternally valid'. In fact, the 'imperishableness' of the sceptre is the mark of divine authority to which Achilles appeals.
[35] *Nem.* 1.67–69; *Nem.* 7.90.
[36] See also *h. Hom.* 15.4–8; *Catalogue of Women* fr. 25.26–33; fr. 229. The idea is also found in the case of Semele and Ino in Pindar's *Olympian* 2 (ἔπαθον αἶ μεγάλα, 23) and in the apotheosis of Tlepolemus in *Ol.* 7.77.

the initiation of Apollo gives rise to merry festivity (*h. Hom.* 2.185 ff.) and as Hermes' arrival on Olympus with his *Theogony* celebrates the divine order (*h. Hom.* 4.428 ff., 506–507), the apotheosis of Heracles climaxes in his marriage to Hebe,[37] for the sake of which a matrimonial feast is held (δαίσαντα) at Zeus' side, where the newly divinised groom celebrates the sacred rule of Zeus (σεμνὸν αἰνήσειν νόμον, *Nem.* 1.71–72).

It is clear that divinisation is primarily understood as the assignment of special honour, recognition of elevated status, and initiation into the divine assembly. One's special relationship with the gods and divine favour or authority is also substantial and prerequisite in some cases of quasi-divinisation whereby exceptional humans can be transported to special domains beyond the reach of ordinary mankind. For instance, because of Helen's divine pedigree, her husband, Menelaus, is divinely ordained (θέσφατόν) to be translated to the Elysian plain (*Od.* 4.561–569). Likewise, according to Hesiod, Zeus bestows on some of the heroes a carefree life and prosperous habitation on the Isles of the Blessed (*Op.* 167–173). In Pindar's *Olympian* 2, Thetis succeeds in persuading Zeus to transfer Achilles to the Isle of Blessed (78–81), where his father Peleus and Cadmus live under the rule of Rhadamanthys (see further in Chapter 4).[38] In a famous passage of Bacchylides' ode, Apollo saves Croesus from the pyre and transports him to Hyperborea as a reward for his *eusebeia* demonstrated by his superlative offerings (Bacchyl. 3.61–62, cf. 15–22).

2.3 A Special Case: Odysseus and Calypso

In the preceding cases of apotheosis, divine honour or special elevation of status is offered by the gods and ultimately approved by Zeus. In addition, apotheosis, in most cases, is predicated on special relationships and interactions between divinised figures and gods (e.g. lover–beloved, son–father). Moreover, divinisation is essentially and primarily constituted of honorific status (membership) in the divine assembly or a divinely ordained place of honour in the cosmic society.

[37] Likewise, Heracles is reported to have enjoyed the divine feast 'among (μετά) the immortal gods', having Hebe as his wife, though his phantom remains in Hades (*Od.* 11.601–604).
[38] In the *Aethiopis,* Achilles is translated to the White Island by Thetis. Similarly, the son of Dawn and Tithonus, Memnon, is granted immortality by Zeus (*Aeth.* arg. 2, 4 West).

The priority of honour (especially the divinely ordained one) is interestingly illustrated in the case of Odysseus' refusal of the promise of immortality offered by Calypso. The goddess reveals her proposal in response to Hermes as follows (*Od.* 5.135–136):[39]

τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ φιλεόν τε καὶ ἔτρεφον, ἠδὲ ἔφασκον
θήσκειν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήραον ἤματα πάντα.

I loved and nurtured him and claimed to make him immortal and ageless all his days.

Odysseus, however, declines her offer. In lieu of being the paramour of Calypso and guardian of the hollow cave on Ogygia (5.155, 218–219), Odysseus prefers to be the husband of Penelope and the king of Ithaca. Why does Odysseus refuse to be ageless and immortal, which is what Sarpedon longs for? The choice of Odysseus (82–85, 148–153) puzzles Calypso as well (206–213): whereas his *nostos* necessitates suffering and hardship, life on Ogygia is forever free from suffering; in addition, a goddess is far superior to Penelope in all appearance (*demas*, *phue*, and *eidos*). Calypso's argument sounds charming and roundly reasonable. Homer's explanation of Odysseus' choice is surprisingly simple: the nymph no longer pleases him, and the nocturnal amorous affairs in the hollow cavern become a suffering necessity (ἀνάγκη, 153–155).[40] Yet, this requires further discussion.

The promise of Calypso corroborates the notion that divinisation is dependent on divine favour and a special divine–human relationship. The themes of love and nursing recall what we have seen in the cases of Apollo, Hermes, and Demophon. There is, however, an important difference: what Calypso offers Odysseus is a permanent union with a goddess who has no place on Olympus and is located remotely from the Olympians (cf. 5.100–101). Her name is not even mentioned by Athena in the divine assembly; instead, she is referred to only by the name of her father, Atlas (*Od.* 1.48–54).[41] She does not receive any sacrificial

[39] 5.136 = 7.257 = 23.336; also 5.218; cf. 7.94.
[40] *Od.* 5.153–154; cf. 1.433; 4.271–289.
[41] The name of her island is also replaced by 'the navel of the sea' (1.50, cf. 1.85). Odysseus' departure from Calypso, as suggested in Chapter 1, may reflect the divine–human separation process after the Mekone feast held by Prometheus. Athena's characterisation of Calypso as a daughter of Atlas who 'holds apart heaven and earth' may serve as a reminder of

honours from humans. When Hermes arrives at Ogygia to deliver Zeus' bidding, he observes that 'no city or men nearby, nor people offer choice hecatombs to the gods, and perform sacrifice' (5.101–102). Odysseus' choice to leave the murky cave on Ogygia for *kleos* in the human realm forms a parallel with Hermes' revelation of his ambition for τιμή in his exchange with her mother in the dark grotto.[42] When Calypso and her island entertain Hermes, there are wonderful flora and an ambrosial diet devoid of the taste of sacrificial smoke and other amenities to which the god is accustomed.[43] Likewise, her offer to Odysseus is *merely* ageless immortality without honorific share and this itself far from 'the sight of smoke rising from' human land which Odysseus is eager for (1.58–59). What is more pleasing both to Hermes and Odysseus (two wanderers) is never mentioned by Calypso, and in fact is out of sight on Ogygia, a wooded island held by a goddess named 'the Concealer'. As we have seen in the case of Hermes, a god without τιμή is 'scarcely a god at all'.[44] Calypso's offer of divinisation comes not only without the approval of Zeus but is also insufficient insofar as it entails an ageless immortality without an honorific name.[45] Whereas Demeter is capable and authorised to grant Demophon an 'imperishable honour', Calypso can offer only what Demeter denies giving because of a human's inadvertent intervention.

The promise of immortality is paradoxically and ironically equivalent to 'death', that is, 'being concealed or covered forever'. In fact, the name of Calypso also indicates her association with the realm of death, and she is sometimes identified with 'the daimon of death'.[46] This is revealed by Hermes: 'it is not this one's αἶσα to perish (ὀλέσθαι, cf. ὀλοόφρονος, 1.52) far away from his loved ones' (5.113; this line is not from Zeus' original

this (but the Hesiodic Calypso is one of the daughters of Okeanos and Tethys, *Th.* 359). Atlas, Prometheus, Epimetheus, and Menoetius are the rebellious sons of the Titanic Iapetus. Whereas the hybristic Menoetius is hurled down into Erebus because of his 'wickedness and defiant manhood' (ἀτασθαλίης τε καὶ ἠνορέης ὑπερόπλου, *Th.* 514–516), Zeus assigns Atlas a punitive μοῖρα of upholding the sky upon his head (517–520), which symbolically represents the separation between Olympus and earth, echoing the divine–human separation caused by his brother Prometheus' division of meat at Mekone. Additionally, Homer lets Calypso rattle on about two other disapproved amours between a goddess and a man (5.118–136). At the end of the *Theogony*, the offspring of Calypso and Odysseus seem to mark the end of the divine–human matrimonial union. Although Homer does not mention any children by this couple (which may suggest a different mythical tradition), the seven-year sterility reinforces the theme of divine–human separation. See Sammos (2010) 42; Bakker & Christensen (2014) 258–259; also Graziosi & Haubold (2005).

[42] Though Maia lives in a grotto like the cave of Calypso, her special intimacy with Zeus makes her superior to Atlas' daughter.

[43] Heubeck et al. (1988) on *Od.* 5.63–85.

[44] Clay (1989/2006) 253.

[45] Vernant (2020) 187–188. The text does not support the suggestive reading of Sammos (2010) 48 that 'Calypso makes a gesture to his heroic *kleos*' by 'enrolling Odysseus in her catalogue'.

[46] For Calypso's chthonic nature and association with the realm of death, see recently Pontani (2013).

bidding in 5.29–42 but is added by Hermes himself).[47] Correspondingly, as Athena suggests, the promise of Calypso is full of 'soft and wheedling words', like the drug of Circe and the songs of the Sirens, to enchant (θέλγει) Odysseus to 'forget Ithaca'.[48] Additionally, the death-Calypso relevance also perfectly explains the choice of Hermes as the messenger (instead of Iris) because he is the only one entitled to commute between Olympus and Hades.[49]

Calypso surrenders to Zeus' decree and swears that she will no longer retain Odysseus (5.137–143, 182–191). Afterwards, the goddess and the hero have a divided meal in the hallow cave (195–199):

καί ῥ' ὁ μὲν ἔνθα καθέζετ' ἐπὶ θρόνου ἔνθεν ἀνέστη
Ἑρμείας, νύμφη δ' ἐτίθει πάρα πᾶσαν ἐδωδήν,
ἔσθειν καὶ πίνειν, οἷα βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ἔδουσιν·
αὐτὴ δ' ἀντίον ἷζεν Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο,
τῇ δὲ παρ' ἀμβροσίην δμῳαὶ καὶ νέκταρ ἔθηκαν.

and he then sat upon the chair from which Hermes had arisen,
and the nymph laid all kind of food beside him
to eat and drink, such kinds as mortal men eat.
She sat opposite Odysseus the divine
and her attendant set ambrosia and nectar beside her.

The scene is full of symbolical and thematic significance. The mention of the seat of Odysseus that was previously occupied by Hermes attests to the association between the hero and the god. Conversely, that Odysseus ceases from partaking of the divine diet corresponds with his refusal of immortality and his acceptance of the divinely ordained 'portion' (μοῖρα,

[47] Considering Calypso's subsequent reproach to the gods, Hermes may allude to a relevant possible consequence as follows: were Odysseus to accept her offer, Zeus might punish her by killing her consort like Eos' lover Orion, who is shot by Artemis, and Demeter's paramour Iasion, who is smitten by Zeus (118–136). See Clay (1983) 185.
[48] *Od.* 1.55–57; Aigisthos often tried to enchant (θέλγεσκ') the wife of Agamemnon with his words (3.263–264); the verb θέλγειν is also used in the stories of Circe (10.291, 318–326) and the Sirens (12.40–44); interestingly, compare Odysseus' enchantment in *Od*. 17.514–521.
[49] Note τά τ' ἄλλα περ in 5.29: Zeus might allude to the realm of death, which is disliked by the gods.

5.114), by which he will retrieve his cosmic status as the mortal king of Ithaca, husband of Penelope, and father of Telemachus. We should also note that Odysseus has learned from Teiresias' prophecy about his life that a special death will bring prosperity to Ithaca (11.100–137).[50] The 'godlikeness' (θείοιο) of Odysseus serves to mark his divinely approved cosmic status but also stands in stark contrast to the untenable divinisation offered by Calypso. No sooner has Odysseus left the place concealing him than he is honoured as a godlike figure by the Phaeacians according to the plan of Zeus (*Od.* 5.35–38). Just as Hermes leaves the murky cave for his honour on Olympus (in both contexts), Odysseus departs from Calypso's hollow cavern for his cosmic status, which has been divinely ordained by Zeus.

2.4 Limited Forms of Deification

The essential point that emerges in the previous discussion is the primary role of dispensation and the recognition of honour in initiating a newborn deity into the divine assembly, making an exceptional human a deity, or transporting a divinely favoured one to a happy place. In order to become a god or a divinised figure, one must crucially receive a divinely ordained position, which elevates the status of the divinised figure in the cosmic society in which honours are understood as an unbroken continuum.[51] In other words, divinisation as status-elevation is an upward moment in this sliding scale of honours. This does not mean casting aside immortality as the dividing line between gods and humans. Immortality, however, needs to be subordinated to honour and understood as one of the essential attributes of gods.[52] The honour of a god or a divinised man, as a mark of his cosmic status, refers to his membership in the divine assembly and his worships in the human realm. His honour (homage and worship in the cosmic society)[53] is sustained by the manifestation and exercise

[50] Cf. Segal (1994) 15.
[51] Vernant (1980) 107–108; Currie (2005) 176; Parker (2011) 280.
[52] Cf. Vermeule (1979) 126–127. Furthermore, 'death' is not simply opposite to life but is also referred to as 'existence in Hades' (e.g. the 'death' of the Dioscuri) and sometimes as 'being covered' or 'unrecognisable' (Odysseus at Ogygia) in the cosmic society. Cf. Dover (1974) 80.
[53] Nock (1972) 241 offers a valuable insight that the modern distinction between homage and worship is not found in ancient Greece. See also Parker (2011) 279–282.

of his specific powers in relation to it[54] and, thus, is constituted by his sphere of influence, which is incorporated into the social and natural order of the cosmic society.

Given that the apotheosis of humans is based on their elevation of status as a divinised figure, they will also receive corresponding cultic worship from other humans. There is an approximate form of divinisation, whereby an extraordinary human is recognised as having an exalted position equal to that of a deity or is praised as a godlike figure by other humans (sometimes approved by the gods) *only* in the human realm without any initiation into the divine assembly. This kind of exaltation is an approximation, or reduced form (e.g. Demophon), of the divinely ordained apotheosis. As we have seen, for instance, the Lycians pay special homage with honorific offerings to Sarpedon and Glaucus as if they were gods (πάντες δὲ θεοὺς ὣς εἰσορόωσιν, *Il.* 12.310–312). The godlike honour granted to Sarpedon is on the top of the scale of honour *within* a human community.[55] Given that a man's honour is a mark of his cosmic status, as discussed in the previous chapter, godlike honour is granted not only based on one's worthiness (e.g. extraordinary qualities and achievements) in relation to other humans[56] but also (though not necessarily) because of one's special relationship with the divine realm. For instance, the Phaeacians, according to the plan of Zeus, will honour Odysseus like a god (θεὸν ὥς τιμήσουσι, *Od.* 5.36); for the sake of this, Athena pours 'abundant *charis*' upon Odysseus so that he will be 'beloved, awe-inspiring, and worthy of respect to all Phaeacians' (8.18–22).[57] Therefore, godlike honours are often paid to kings,[58] priests,[59] those with alleged divine pedigree,[60] and even prosperous persons.[61] Because honour marks a special relationship between honorand and honourer(s), godlike honour could

[54] Parker (2011) 387–451; Henrichs (2010) 36: 'it is almost paradoxical that so many of these gods had to work so hard to sustain their divine status […] Gods who perform miracles to corroborate their own divinity serve as a reminder that the gods themselves are cultural constructs whose identities are continually in formation'. I agree with Henrichs except for the fact that the gods themselves are social beings rather than 'cultural constructs'.
[55] Cf. Soph. *OT* 31–34 (θεοῖσι […] ἰσούμενόν vs ἀνδρῶν δὲ πρῶτον); see also Meister (2020) 161 (on Eur. *Tr*. 1167–1170).
[56] Some extraordinary humans 'function' like gods; see Parker (2005) 387–451.
[57] See further Cairns (1993) 89–90.
[58] E.g. *Il.* 10.33 (Agamemnon); 13.216–218 (Thoas the ruler of the Aetolians; *Od*. 7.11 (Alcinous the king of the Phaeacians), 69–74 (Arete is honoured by the Phaeacians as a goddess because of her queenly demeanour and powers of solving quarrels); 8.172–173 with van Wees (1992) 70.
[59] E.g. *Il.* 5.78 (Dolopion the Scamander's priest); 16.605 (Onetor the priest of Zeus); cf. 13.671.
[60] E.g. *Il.* 11.58 (Aeneas as Aphrodite's son, cf. 13.461); 9.153–156, 300–304 (Achilles).
[61] E.g. *Od.* 14.205–206, Castor is honoured like a god for his prosperity and wealth; see van Wees (1992) 72–73. It is, thus, not surprising to find that the epics abound with epithets and formulaic expressions that approximate a human to a deity in various ways (e.g. δαίμονι ἶσος, θεῷ ἐναλιγκιος, θεῖος, θεοειδής, ἀντίθεος, ἰσόθεος φώς, etc.); see Griffin (1980) 82; Currie (2005) 178–181, 186–187, 190, 194, 291; Meister (2020) 5 and *passim*.

also be offered by a single human worshipper. For instance, Odysseus claims to pray to Nausicaa as to a goddess (θεῷ ὥς εὐχετοώμην) because she saved his life (*Od*. 8.467–468; similarly, Soph. *OC* 237–254; cf. *OT* 31–34).[62]

A limited form of divinisation may also occur when a mortal figure is divinely empowered to take extraordinary actions on a footing equal to that of a god or to play the role of a deity in certain special circumstances. For instance, with the guidance and support of Athena, Odysseus performs the role of 'divine agent' to fulfil divine justice, and is sometimes made to be like a deity in certain theoxenic or epiphanic scenarios.[63] In a similar vein, Diomedes in *Iliad* 5 is temporarily empowered and elevated to a certain divine status by Athena to fight against Aphrodite and Ares. As we shall see in Chapter 3, Diomedes' momentary elevation of status is fundamentally predicated on the intimate relationship between the goddess and his father (5.124–312).

Diomedes' divinely sanctioned confrontation with the gods is contrasted with other negative cases, which form a transgressive form of divinisation, that is, self-deification, when a man on his own terms competes against the gods, defies divine authority, or even denies the existence of the gods. For instance, Otus and Ephialtes fettered Ares almost to death (*Il.* 5.385–391, reported by Dione as a comfort for Aphrodite wounded by Diomedes) and even attempted to reach heaven by piling up Pelion and Ossa on Olympus (*Od.* 11.313–320; cf. *Il.* 6.200–202).[64] We may call these figures 'self-deifiers'. The Pindaric Tantalus (in *Olympian* 1, to whom we shall return in Chapter 4) and Ixion (in *Pythian* 2) are paradigmatic self-deifiers. Although elevated to an approximate divine status by receiving great *olbos* dispensed from the gods (*Pyth.* 2.25–26; *Ol.* 1.54–56), they seek to become Zeus (cf. *Pyth.* 2.88; *Ol.* 5.23–24) by committing two crimes: Ixion attempts to rape Hera (*Ptyh.* 2.33 ff.), and Tantalus dispenses nectar and ambrosia to his human fellows (*Ol.* 1.56–64). Both wrongdoers usurp the authority and power of Zeus and break the divine–human reciprocity that sustains their previous elevated statuses (*Pyth.* 2.24; cf. *Ol.* 1.75). Whereas the divinely favoured Diomedes

[62] For further discussion of praying to, or supplicating, living persons, see Currie (2005) 180–190; Meister (2020) 138–155.
[63] Kearns (1982) 7–8; Rutherford (1986) 159–161; Schulz (2018) 56–138.
[64] Capaneus, the father of Sthenelus who stands as comrade of Diomedes, will be another typical 'self-deifier'; see § 3.1.5 and § 3.2.2.

subjects himself to the divine will with an expectation of reciprocal favour from the gods, the self-deifiers assert their independence and self-sufficiency, seeking to translate their power into a superior status with no regard to the gods.

These approximate, momentary forms of divinisation,[65] in fact, will be the main subject of the following three cases studies of several outstanding characters in Homer, Pindar, and Sophocles. On the one hand, the following chapters will test the ideas and concepts (such as τιμή, μοῖρα, cosmic society, and cosmic status) developed in the first two chapters, while on the other hand, with the help of these concepts, each case study will hopefully shed new light on the understanding of these extraordinary figures in different forms of literature (epic, lyric, and tragedy). These figures are often found to be ambitious in their desire to achieve superiority and are (temporarily) elevated to a (quasi-/demi-) divine status on various occasions. Chapter 3 focuses on the *aristeia* of three distinct Homeric heroes: Diomedes, Hector, and Achilles. All are temporarily elevated to divine status in ways that have different thematic significance. As we shall see, Diomedes is presented as an ideal but simple paradigm of a warrior of *aidos* and *eusebeia*, whereas the cases of Hector and Achilles are more problematic and in effect enable us to see better the general human condition in cosmic society and how one's extraordinary status is measured and understood in terms of one's relationship with other humans and gods. Chapter 4 discusses Pindar's *Olympians* 1–3, composed for two Sicilian tyrants whose extraordinary status is defined and located in comparison with the figures of the central mythic narrative and who enjoy temporary bliss with eschatological prospects for post-mortem elevation to a divine realm, prospects that fundamentally depend on the laudandus' relationship with divine powers. Chapter 5 offers a detailed reading of Sophocles' *Ajax*, in which the protagonist questions the traditional values relating to honour and the divine–human relationship in the cosmic society by performing two inverted scenes of *aristeia*: his insane killing of animals and his remarkable suicide. Like self-deifiers, Ajax rejects the kind of honour that is rooted in reciprocal relations with gods

[65] Meister (2020) discusses several forms of human's temporary approximation to divine figure and having access to some superlative qualities and attributes of gods such as happiness, beauty, and martial power. My thesis is interested in the role of honour in these approximations, which is noted also by Meister's discussion in some passage: see Meister (2020) 30, 34, 58, 83–84, 143.

and his human fellows and attempts to confer upon himself a special kind of honour, paradoxically independent of external recognition and divine distribution. Yet, what Ajax seeks stands in stark contrast to the subsequent debate over his burial, which is solved by the divine authority as represented by Odysseus.

Part II

Case Studies

3 Homeric Warriors: Between Men and Gods

In Part I, I showed that the divinely ordained elevation of status can be envisaged as a limited form of deification and that notions such as cosmic status and dispensation can serve to make sense of a man's thoughts and actions in relation to other humans and gods. In order to test and substantiate these arguments, this chapter focuses on three extraordinary figures in the *Iliad*: Diomedes, Hector, and Achilles. These figures are chosen for the sake of comparison and in order to include as many occasions and types of characters as possible. Each warrior's extraordinary status is recognised both in the human and in the divine realms. They all experience divine empowerment or divinely ordained elevation of status, which corresponds with, and facilitates, their actions in pursuing, defending, or restoring honour or cosmic status. As we shall see, divine empowerment makes them temporarily approximate to gods on the one hand, while giving rise to several problems and conflicts on the other.

First, Diomedes is recognised as an ideal young warrior who endorses and practises filial piety and religious reverence. During his *aristeia*, when his status is elevated by Athena, Diomedes becomes a horrible power who threatens both his enemies and his friends, and comes to a transgressive position of *theomachos*, 'god-fighter', which is condemned by other divinities. Second, like Diomedes, Hector is empowered by Apollo and Zeus during his attack on the Achaeans; however, this elevation of status not only delusively fulfils his implicit ambition for divine status but also leads him into a disastrous conflict between self-assertion of the code of honour and its other-regarding aspects. The divine elevation of status temporarily makes Hector a godlike figure, leads him astray from his duties to his family and citizens, and brings him to his death devised by Zeus. Third, the case of Achilles demonstrates the 'duality' of a human's cosmic status and the potential conflicts between honour in the human realm (which is removed by Agamemnon) and the honour recognised by the gods (which is restored through Zeus' plan). Like Hector, Achilles' honour-driven wrath isolates himself from the Achaeans and leads to the 'tragic' loss of Patroclus according to the will of Zeus; like Diomedes, the divinely empowered Achilles becomes a *theomachos* during his *aristeia*, which nevertheless confirms his extraordinary status and makes him approximate to a deity, however temporarily.

3.1 The *Aristeia* of Diomedes (*Iliad* 5)

3.1.1 The Setting: Diomedes as the Son of Tydeus

In the episode of the *Epipolesis* known as 'the Tour of Inspection' (4.220–544),[1] Diomedes unexpectedly remains silent (399–400) in response to Agamemnon's harsh exhortation, which draws a comparison between the young warrior and his father Tydeus by means of a long narrative of the latter's *aristeia* in the past (370–398).[2] Diomedes 'feels *aidos* for the utterance of the *aidoios* king' (402) rather than resentment (νεμεσῶ, 413).[3] In stark contrast with the silent Diomedes, Sthenelus (cf. 14.112 ff.) takes the king's words as an affront and immediately counters with a claim of superiority over their fathers in terms of honour (τιμῇ, 410; cf. 413; 9.319).[4]

According to Agamemnon, Tydeus is 'a singular isolated hero', winning contests and defeating an ambush with divine assistance (381, 390, 398; also 5.802–808). Diomedes might notice the explicit comparison: while his excellent (375) father fights 'alone among many Cadmeans' (388), Diomedes is standing with Sthenelus among 'compacted chariots and horses' (366–367). The generational comparison of Agamemnon, therefore, strategically questions the status of Diomedes as the son of Tydeus. This makes Diomedes feel the sense of *aidos* and sets him on his path to prove that he has lived up to his father's honour (373). With a 'dark look' (411; cf. 5.251; 9.34 ff.),[5] Diomedes ends the dispute by acknowledging the status of Agamemnon as the army leader and reminding Sthenelus of his duty as a warrior of relatively inferior status (412–418). In an aspirational but respectful reply to the king's rallying speech, Diomedes dismounts from the chariot with a terrible sound from his gear (419–421), which indicates his anxiety and resolve to defend his status as the son of Tydeus in actions rather than merely in words.

[1] For the *Epipolesis*, see Andersen (1978); Kirk (1985) 353–354; Martin (1989) 69–72; Beck (2005) 154–164.
[2] For the silence of Diomedes, see Scott (1980) 17; Martin (1989) 71–72; Cairns (1993) 74; Higbie (1995) 97; Slatkin (2011) 101; Barker & Christensen (2011) 23 and n. 2; Stamatopoulou (2017) 923 and n. 9.
[3] For *aidos* in *Il.* 4.402, see Kirk (1985) *ad loc*, *contra* Willcock (1976) *ad loc*; for *aidos* in general, see Cairns (1993). For Diomedes and Tydeus (esp. in *Iliad* 4), see Turkeltaub (2010).
[4] Compare 408 and 6.183; see Barker and Christensen (2011) 26 with n. 1; Chaudhuri (2014) 33–34.
[5] For ὑπόδρα ἰδών, see Holoka (1983); Cairns (2003); Xian (2017); cf. Martin (1980) 71–72 who observed that the silence of Diomedes is a cunning one, and an ambiguous gesture that, in effect, reveals his 'agonistic intention'.

In fact, the taciturn Diomedes feels no less prick of dishonour than Sthenelus does. Indeed, the audience will hear later that the young Diomedes, like Sthenelus, after his *aristeia* in Book 5, reminds Agamemnon of this previous insult in serious terms (9.34 ff.). By referring to his lineage, he claims his right to make a speech in the assembly to argue against the king's plan of retreat (14.109–128).[6] The later verbal defence of Diomedes enables us to see his inner struggles at the moment of his silence and *aidos* (4.401–402): on the one hand, he is prudent to pay respect (αἰδῶς) to the king whose intention is to set up an imitable model for him despite the harsh wording; on the other hand, he hesitates to claim himself as having no less honour than his father. In the *Epipolesis*, Diomedes encounters a crisis of status against which he feels the *aidos*-driven necessity to take action to defend himself by means of becoming at least an equal of his father. This serves as one of the thematic backdrops of the subsequent actions of Diomedes.

There is something more to be said on this. First, the exchange between Agamemnon and Sthenelus in effect renders an extraordinary but ambiguous image of Tydeus. While Agamemnon highlights the personal feat of Tydeus, Sthenelus draws a comparison between the brazen recklessness (ἀτασθαλίῃσιν, 409) of the Seven[7] and the obedience of the Epigoni to 'the signs (τεράεσσι) of the gods and the support (ἀρωγῇ) of Zeus' (408–409; cf. 398).[8] For Diomedes, his father appears both as a positive template for imitation (a divinely empowered warrior in Agamemnon's version) and as a negative comparandum (one of the audacious transgressors against gods according to Sthenelus).[9] In proving himself as the son of Tydeus, as we shall see, Diomedes becomes as ambiguously extraordinary as his father: he is both a divinely empowered warrior and a 'successful' *theomachos* (cf. other failed *theomachoi* in 5.382–415 and 6.130–140). Second, the Agamemnon–Sthenelus dispute associates the success/failure and honour/disgrace of Tydeus with the divine–human

[6] For Diomedes as a persuasive speaker, see O'Maley (2018).
[7] Cf. Aesch. *Sep.* 425 ff.; Eur. *Ph.* 1172 ff.; Eur. *Supp.* 496 ff.; Diod. 4.65.8; Apolld. 3.6.6.
[8] The key term ἀτασθαλίαι is often found in negative critique of excessive or transgressive behaviour and disposition against the superior (in particular the gods) that leads to ruin and destruction. For *atasthaliai* and its relation to *hybris* and *ate*, see Cairns (2012). The views of Agamemnon are not at variance with those of Sthenelus in respect of the divine–human relationship: in fact, like Sthenelus, he does not fail to mention the divine assistance of Athena (390) or the divine signs (τεράεσσι; cf. σήματα of Zeus, 381) in his recapitulation of Tydeus' feat; furthermore, when he exhorts other fellow-warriors, he refers to Zeus as 'the ultimate assessor of men's relative merits' (4.223–249, esp. 235, 249). See also Boyd (2017) 43.
[9] Note 4.374–375. Diomedes has a vague memory of his father; cf. 6.223–224. This vagueness opens the gates for Agamemnon to cast the past in a manner different from Sthenelus.

interactions and relationship, which serves as another thematic background of the *aristeia* of Diomedes. As we shall see, Diomedes' way of defending his (personal and family) honour corresponds to renewing his father's relationship with Athena.

3.1.2 Athena's Empowerment of Diomedes

The subsequent passages following the dispute between Agamemnon and Sthenelus provide the martial settings for Diomedes (4.429–544). The mention of divine assistance at the end of Book 4 (507–516, 541–542) is immediately taken up at the very start of Book 5, where Athena empowers Diomedes and elevates him to an extraordinary status (1–8):[10]

> ἔνθ' αὖ Τυδεΐδηι Διομήδεϊ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
> δῶκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ἵν' ἔκδηλος μετὰ πᾶσιν
> Ἀργείοισι γένοιτο ἰδὲ κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἄροιτο·
> δαΐέ οἱ ἐκ κόρυθός τε καὶ ἀσπίδος ἀκάματον πῦρ,
> ἀστέρ' ὀπωρινῷ ἐναλίγκιον, ὅς τε μάλιστα
> λαμπρὸν παμφαίνῃσι λελουμένος Ὠκεανοῖο·
> τοῖόν οἱ πῦρ δαῖεν ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων,
> ὦρσε δέ μιν κατὰ μέσσον, ὅθι πλεῖστοι κλονέοντο.
>
> And now Pallas Athena granted strength and courage to Tydeus' son Diomedes, so that he might prove himself conspicuous among all the Argives and win the glory of valour. She kindled weariless fire blaze from his shield and helmet, like that star of the waning summer that shines brightest of all others when he has bathed in the stream of Oceanus. Such was the fire she made blaze from his head and shoulders; and she sent him into the midst where most were struggling.[11]

[10] Cf. 11.45–46 (Hera and Athena cause a crash of thunder to honour Agamemnon).
[11] Trans. Murray (1999) modified.

The explicit intention of the goddess is to give (δῶκε) Diomedes special strength and courage by which he will be superior to others and, thus, achieve *kleos* (2–3).[12] The Iliadic narrator draws attention in particular to the way in which Athena makes Diomedes 'conspicuous' (ἔκδηλος): by making fire burn from his armed head and shoulders, Diomedes is blazing in the likeness of the rising Sirius, which bears sinister or even ominous connotations (cf. *Op.* 414–422).[13] Similarly, Hector, with his glittering armour, is likened to Sirius in the passage (11.61–66) where the warrior is about to bring death to his opponents. In a more elaborate passage (22.25–31), Achilles is also compared to Sirius, 'a sign of evil', conspicuous to the eyes of Priam (25), who with pitiful language (esp. 66–76) implores Hector's return (38ff.), for fear that the bastion of Troy would be taken down by the one who has already rendered him desolate of offspring (44 ff., 61 ff.). Likewise, the simile of Sirius foreshadows the destructive power of Diomedes: he would have desolated the house of Dares, a priest of Hephaestus, had the fire-god not snatched Idaios up and rescued him (9–24, prefiguring Aphrodite's rescue of Aeneas later). Moreover, Diomedes is compared to a surging winter-torrent of the time when (91–92)

> …ἐπιβρίσῃ Διὸς ὄμβρος·
> πολλὰ δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἔργα κατήριπε κάλ' αἰζηῶν·
>
> …the storm of Zeus drives it on, and many fine works of vigorous men crumble beneath it.

Just as the river swollen by Zeus' storm becomes ruinous to all human construction or artificial works (88–90), Diomedes empowered by Athena becomes as ferocious as a flood. He rampages and attacks both the Achaeans and the Trojans indiscriminately (85–86). The raging warrior is assimilated to a sheer force, both divine and natural, like Zeus' thunder. Divine empowerment elevates him to such an extraordinary status that he seems to be

[12] On 'giving' and *kleos* here, see more below; cf. 874; also 11.45–46; *Od*. 13.422; Hes. *Aspis* 103–107.
[13] Holberg (2007) 15–20.

transformed into a destructive and uncanny figure beyond human nature.[14] Indeed, all the natural metaphors of fire, star (Sirius), beast (lion), and water (flood) denote the sub- and super-human qualities of Diomedes.[15]

Diomedes, however, is suddenly stalled and wounded by the archer Pandaros, with blood spattered on his corselet (97–100). The continuous spurting of blood (113) brings the divinely elevated warrior down to the bitter reality of human finitude, which entails mortal weakness and dependence.[16] At this critical moment, Diomedes' primary concern is neither about the wound (the embodiment of his vulnerability)[17] nor about the boast of the enemy (a threat to his honour and family fame). Instead, Diomedes appeals to Athena's friendship (φίλα) with which she had stood as a helper beside his father in the past (116–117; cf. 4.390) and asks her to resume it (φῖλαι) so that he could take revenge on Pandaros (118–120). Diomedes thinks of his relationship with Athena as being modelled on that between his father and the goddess in the past (similarly, 10.284–291; cf. 278–282).[18]

This recalls the opening verb δῶκε and the expected reciprocity. The *aristeia* of Diomedes is framed under his reciprocal relation with Athena and, more generally, the theme of divine–human relationship. Additionally, the very scene of divine intervention showcases the nature of the *kleos* of Diomedes: it is a mark of divine favour on a reciprocal basis rather than the personal achievement of the warrior. With a positive response, Athena lightens his limbs (122) and, after manifesting herself, instils in him 'paternal strength' (μένος πατρώϊον, 125–126).[19] Immediately after this, Diomedes is recognised as Τυδεΐδης (cf. 114) and sent back to the front line as a warrior like Tydeus (134).

Under the shadow of Tydeus and the grace of Athena,[20] Diomedes rages again and wreaks terrifying havoc on the Trojans (166–167, 174–176). Ambiguously, Diomedes is not

[14] E.g. 87–94, 161–165, 183; cf. 21.522–525, on which see below.
[15] Dodds (1951) 9–10.
[16] Diomedes immediately retreats to Sthenelus for help, 107–111; cf. 4.365–367.
[17] Kirk (1990) on 124–126. The pains of the wound persist at least until 5.793–795, where Diomedes is found cooling his wound. It is not healed when Athena charges him to fight Ares; see Allen-Hornblower (2014) 37.
[18] Vergados (2014) 442–443.
[19] According to Pindar (*Nem.* 10.7–8), Diomedes 'was made an immortal god' by Athena. In other sources (Thebaid *fr.* 9 *PEG* 1; Pherec. *FGrH* 3 F 97; Statius, *Theb*, 8.171 ff.), Athena refused to immortalise Tydeus when she saw him consuming the brain of Melanippus but agreed to bestow immortality on Diomedes at his request; see West (2003) 51–53; also, Griffin (1977) 46–47; Stoneman (1981) 56–67; Vergados (2014) 440–441.
[20] A similar pattern could be found in *Od.* 1.319–322: after Athena spoke to Telemachus and left (319 = *Il.* 5.133), putting *menos* in his heart (320–321). The young warrior thinks of his father much more than before (321–322).

said to be exerting divinely infused power but to be 'taken hold of' (ἕλεν) by that imposingly gigantic *menos*, 'three times as great' (135–136).[21] Corresponding to the simile of Sirius, Diomedes' ominous brutality is underlined by another elaborated simile of a lion (136–143, 161–165). The young hero, desiring superior status and honour like his father, becomes a brutal and ruthless figure who brings lamentable desolation to fathers by killing pairs of sons (Eudamus, 5.148–149; Phainops, 152–158; Priam, 159–160; cf. 11.328–333, 394).

3.1.3 Son of Tydeus and Offspring of Zeus

As one of the best Achaeans (5.103, 414; cf. 839), Diomedes is empowered and elevated to a status that enables him to fight against Aphrodite (330–351) and Ares (850–867). Not merely infusing Diomedes with the patrimonial *menos*, Athena also removes the mist so that he can easily recognise (εὖ γινώσκοις) the divine figures (127–128).[22] Athena knows that if Diomedes retaliates against Pandaros, he will also encounter Aeneas, who is under the protection of his mother Aphrodite.[23] Therefore, she only allows him to fight against Aphrodite (129–132). With divine guidance, Diomedes defeats two strong warriors and a goddess. First, he fatally hits Pandaros' nose with a spear guided by Athena (290–296), and then crushes Aeneas' hipbone with a huge stone (302–310). Regardless of Aphrodite coming to rescue her comatose son (309–310), Diomedes penetrates her ambrosial robe, tears the skin of her soft hand, and draws the ambrosial blood (ἰχώρ, 340) with his 'pitiless spear' (330–339, 354, cf. 361, 425).[24]

At the first climax of his *aristeia*, Diomedes blurs the divine–human boundaries by physically penetrating the divine body. Now the focus shifts slightly to a characterisation of Aphrodite. Unlike Athena and Enyo, Aphrodite has no martial craft to conduct wars nor any prowess to fight (331–333, 348–351, 428). More strikingly, unlike Diomedes, she cannot bear the physical pains of a graze (343, 352–354, 361, 416). Rather, she is featured with the

[21] Cf. 9.236–239; 17.210, see below.
[22] For the motif of removing mist for human vision, see Janko (1994) 301, 386. For the human ability to recognise deities, see Turkeltaub (2003); Turkeltaub (2007); Schulz (2018) 39.
[23] See 331, 432, 815, 824; cf. εἰδώς at 245. Athena's motivation here is also associated with her hostility against Aphrodite, see Mueller (2009) 126; cf. Petridou (2016) 110.
[24] The detailed description of the bodily parts injured by Diomedes emphasises the physical vulnerability of men and even the goddess (see Dione's report below) and serves as a foil for the wound of Diomedes and his temporal invulnerability. For the visual effect of Aphrodite's bleeding, see Holmes (2007) 61–62.

softness of her hands, the beauty of a Graces-woven robe (336–338), and her power of sexual beguilement (349; cf. 428–330; 14.216). The comparison between Aphrodite and the martial figures (Athena, Enyo, and Diomedes) not only emphasises her weakness in a specific domain but also parallels Diomedes with the other two goddesses. His extraordinary success in wounding Aphrodite gives rise to an impression that he has become superior to Aphrodite in war and thus reaches a godlike status. The assimilation of Diomedes into a divine figure, however, is profoundly balanced by an embedded narrative on divine blood (339–342):

> … ῥέε δ’ ἄμβροτον αἷμα θεοῖο,
> ἰχώρ, οἷός πέρ τε ῥέει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι·
> οὐ γὰρ σῖτον ἔδουσ’, οὐ πίνουσ’ αἴθοπα οἶνον,
> τοὔνεκ’ ἀναίμονές εἰσι καὶ ἀθάνατοι καλέονται.
>
> … the ambrosial blood flowed from the goddess, the *ichor*, that which flows in the blessed gods. For they do not eat bread, they do not drink ruddy wine, and so they are bloodless and are called immortal.

This short digression on the difference between ἰχώρ and αἷμα is compressed with a series of (explicit and implicit) antitheses between blessed and wretched, ambrosia and nectar, bread and wine, and immortality and mortality. Homer draws our attention to the divine–human boundaries obscured by the actions of Diomedes.

The ἰχώρ of Aphrodite shows no signs of mortality but in effect serves as a reminder of her immortality and the warrior’s mortality (note his bleeding wound). There is more to be learned from this aetiology of ἰχώρ. Strikingly, it is discussed in dietary terms in a martial context: because the gods do not partake of human meals, they have no αἷμα flowing in their veins and are called immortal. At first glance, Homer seems to suggest that αἷμα brings death to humans, while ἰχώρ sustains the immortality of the gods. This causal relationship between ἰχώρ/αἷμα and im/mortality, however, is not clearly indicated. As A. Baratz observes, there is lack of evidence in Greek literature to support the idea that the eternal life of the gods or their

ichor depends on external sources.[25] J. Clay argues that the function of the divine diet is to prevent gods from ageing and exempt them from natural cycles, but not to render immortality.[26] If the gods are immortal by nature, the second part of verse 342, 'they are called immortal', is linked to their non-human meal (341) in a sense different from the causal relationship between taking-no-human-meal and having-no-αἷμα. In a comparable episode of the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, when Aphrodite encounters Anchises (75 ff.), the mortal wonders about the identity of the goddess and says: 'Or are you one of the Graces come here, the Graces who act as a companion to all of the gods and are reckoned immortal (θεοῖσι πᾶσιν ἑταιρίζουσι καὶ ἀθάνατοι καλέονται, 95–96; cf. *Th.* 390–396)?' The phrase ἀθάνατοι καλέονται is applied here not to explain the immortality of the Graces but to reassert their honoured position and divine status as the companions of all gods. The plural adjective ἀθανάτοι is used as a kind of synecdoche to refer to divine status or divinity in general. Likewise, the same formula in the Iliadic passage above may be included to emphasise the divine status of Aphrodite as one of the ἀναίμονες gods in an honorific sense.[27] This reveals the dual intention of the embedded narrative in 339–342: first, the haematological lore explains the wound and bleeding of Aphrodite; second, it highlights her superiority to the mortal warrior. The second point is also indicated in the dietary comparison: the gods do not take part in the feasts of the mortals but have their own feast to share; ambrosia and nectar are their privileges. In this light, Aphrodite's ἰχώρ is a mark of her divine status as a member of the divine feast on Olympus on which she has her portion of the divine meal as afforded by her honour and divine status. In other words, the ambrosial blood of the goddess denotes her divinity as a whole, with specific reference to dietary privilege and immortality.

This confirms Part I's argument that immortality does not solely account for the divine–human division. All attributes of Aphrodite (ambrosial blood, privileged diet, immortality, specific functions and powers, etc.) are rooted in her identity as the daughter of Zeus and Dione along with her honoured position among the gods. In Athena's injunction that

[25] Baratz (2015).
[26] Clay (1981). Conversely, Rose (1950) 59 and West (2007) 157 thought that the divine meal plays an essential role to immortality; cf. Levy (1979) and Kirk (1990) on 339–342. In the *Iliad*, ambrosia and nectar prevent corpses from rotting, 19.37–39; 23.184–187; 16.666–683. Divine diet is related to immortalisation, see e.g. *h. Hom.* 2.231–245; *Ol.* 1.51–64; *Pyth.* 9.59–65. See also West (1966) 342–343; Sissa and Detienne (2000).
[27] Note also the hymnic relative expansion there; see Faulkner (2008) 176–177.

Diomedes should fight no other immortals except her sister (129–132), the divine pedigree of Aphrodite is contrasted with the human birth of Diomedes. When the son of Tydeus with his paternal power (125, 133) rushes against the goddess, Aphrodite is named Κύπρις for the first time (331). This nickname appears five times in *Iliad* 5 and never again in Homer.[28] Κύπρις serves to bring up the genealogy and the birthplace and honorific status of Aphrodite (*Th.* 191–206, see § 2.1). By the same token, in the Iliadic scene, as soon as Aphrodite returns to Olympus, the goddess is described with the honorific epithets (δῖα, 370; φιλομμειδής, 375) in her answer to Dione's calling her by name (372). Indeed, the antithesis between Diomedes and Aphrodite becomes increasingly sharp as the narrative shifts from the bloody scene in war to the gentle and comic scenario of the divine family on Olympus. Unlike Diomedes seeking honour far away from his fatherland (cf. 410–415), Aphrodite easily reaches her home and can be comforted and healed in the fold of her divine mother's arms (370–430).[29] While Aphrodite is forever entitled to claim her divine status as a daughter of Zeus on Olympus, Diomedes will have to prove himself to be a son of Tydeus by being Athena's protégé and 'restoring' the patrimonial *menos*.

What fundamentally separates Aphrodite from Diomedes is not merely her immortality but more importantly her status, pedigree, and specific powers. We find a similar pattern and corresponding themes in the defeat and restoration of Ares in the coda of *Iliad* 5. When Ares was severely injured by Diomedes and Athena (853–858), he swiftly reaches the abode of the gods (868). Like Aphrodite, the wound of Ares where his ἰχώρ bleeds (870) is quickly healed by Paieon with medicines, and he himself is refreshed by Hebe with a bath and delicate clothing (899–905). The restoration of Ares lies in Zeus' recognition of him as his offspring (895–896). His status as a son of Zeus and Hera prevents Ares from experiencing further suffering and the impossible death in his striking fancy.[30] The harshness of the words of Zeus, nevertheless, reminds us of the fundamental significance of pedigree-based status (897–898):

[28] Kirk (1990) on 327–30. The other four mentions appear in the teasing speech of Athena (422) and several gods' complaints about Diomedes' wounding of Aphrodite (Apollo, 458; Hera, 760; Ares, 883).
[29] Another detail sharpens the divine–human antithesis: while Dione 'wipes away the ἰχώρ' from Aphrodite's arm (416), Diomedes alone wipes 'the dark clots of αἷμα' away from his shield-strap (798).
[30] Ares suggests that his injury is theoretically fatal: were his feet not swift enough, he would 'long suffer woes among the dark dead or go living *menos*-less through the blows of the bronze spear' (885–887); see Kirk (1990) *ad loc*. That the god of war could die or exist without *menos* is not entirely a fancy: as Dione tells Aphrodite, Ares would have perished, being

εἰ δέ τευ ἐξ ἄλλου γε θεῶν γένευ ὧδ᾽ ἀίδηλος,
καί κεν δὴ πάλαι ἦσθα ἐνέρτερος Οὐρανιώνων.

But were you born of some other god and proved so ruinous, long since you would have been lower than the children of Ouranos.

The possibility of degrading Ares to a place lower than the Olympians (earth or even Tartarus of the confined Titans),[31] like the fantasy of 'lying down among the dead' imagined by Ares himself (886), remains to be an *adynaton* and an impossible wish. The fact that Ares 'was not made to be a mortal' (901; cf. 402) depends on his relationship to Zeus.[32] 'Grieving his spirit' (869) a while ago, Ares now 'sat down beside the son of Kronos, exulting in his glory (κῦδει, 906)'. As G. S. Kirk noted, this suggests Ares' 'posturing self-satisfaction – but also, after all, his ultimate divinity'.[33] The divine status of Ares, like that of Aphrodite, will be acknowledged forever (cf. 872) as long as Olympus and the cosmic order are under the rule of Zeus.

3.1.4 The Ambition of Diomedes

Despite defeating two gods, Diomedes' birth to a human father ensures that he remains inferior to the goddess. Diomedes is not a god not only because of his mortality but also because he is not entitled to a divine status and he is not a member of the divine feast. This is emphasised in his encounter with Apollo (5.433–442):

γιγνώσκων ὅ οἱ αὐτὸς ὑπείρεχε χεῖρας Ἀπόλλων·
ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ἄρ᾽ οὐδὲ θεὸν μέγαν ἄζετο, ἵετο δ᾽ αἰεὶ
Αἰνείαν κτεῖναι καὶ ἀπὸ κλυτὰ τεύχεα δῦσαι.

fettered in a brazen cauldron by Otis and Ephialtes, had not Eriboea set him free (388–391; cf. 15.117–118); cf. Anderson (1978) 326.
[31] For the possible meaning of Οὐρανιώνων as the Titans in Tartarus, cf. 8.10–16, 478–481; Kirk (1990) on 5.898.
[32] 900–901 = 401–402; cf. 15.208–210; *h. Hom.* 3.465–466.
[33] Kirk (1990) on 906.

Τρὶς μὲν ἔπειτ᾽ ἐπόρουσε κατακτάμεναι μενεαίνων,
τρὶς δέ οἱ ἐστυφέλιξε φαεινὴν ἀσπίδ᾽ Ἀπόλλων.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος,
δεινὰ δ᾽ ὁμοκλήσας προσέφη ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων·
‘φράζεο· Τυδεΐδη, καὶ χάζεο, μηδὲ θεοῖσιν
ἶσ᾽ ἔθελε φρονέειν, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποτε φῦλον ὁμοῖον
ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων.’

Though well he knew that Apollo himself held his arms over him; yet he had no reverence even for the great god but was still eager to slay Aeneas and strip from him his glorious armour. Thrice then he leapt at him, eager to slay him, and thrice did Apollo beat back his shining shield. But when for the fourth time he rushed on him like a god, then with a terrible cry spoke to him Apollo who works from afar: ‘Consider, son of Tydeus, and withdraw, do not be minded thinking on a par with the gods; since in no way of like sort is the race of immortal gods and that of men who walk upon the earth.’[34]

Despite Athena’s injunction, Diomedes’ deliberate (γινώσκων) attempt to frustrate Apollo’s rescue of Aeneas constitutes a kind of disrespect (οὐδὲ […] ἄζετο) for the god. The phrase ἵετο δ᾽ αἰεί[35] is strikingly juxtaposed with θεὸν μέγαν who lives forever. The actions of Diomedes reach a climax in the ‘3+1’ formulaic pattern[36] and he becomes ‘equal to a deity’ (δαίμονι ἶσος, 438) in his final charge.[37] The adjective ἶσος denotes that there is a measurable likeness or correspondence between Diomedes and a δαίμων. This does not imply equality of nature or essence but equality of status or honour in the hierarchical order of the cosmic society. Moreover, it denotes a particular manner of actions and the disposition of Diomedes.

[34] Trans. Murray (1999) modified.
[35] The phrase appears only at one other place (13.424), where Idomeneus in his *aristeia* (295–515) resolves to slay someone in response to Deiphobos’ boastful killing of Hypsenor (410 ff.) at the risk of death (426). Nagy (1979) 143 notes that this is the climatic point of the antagonism between Diomedes and Apollo.
[36] See Parry (1972) 14; Nagy (1979) 94–117, 143–144; Chaudhuri (2014) 21ff.; Stamatopoulou (2017) 926; Beck (2018).
[37] The phrase is particularly applied in scenarios of (or related to) *theomachia*: 16.705, 786; 20.447, 493; 21.18, 227; see more below.

For Apollo, the *daimon-isos* Diomedes in effect attempts to 'think (to act) in the ways similar or equal to those of the gods' (θεοῖσιν ἶσ' ἔθελε φρονέειν).[38] As discussed in Chapter 2.2, the adverbial phrase ἶσα θεοῖσιν[39] is applied to the divinised Ganymede (*h. Hom.* 5.214; cf. *h. Hom.* 2.235). Despite lacking a divine pedigree like Aphrodite, Ganymede is 'honoured by all immortals' (205) and is thus recognised as a member of the φῦλον of the immortal gods (cf. *Th.* 202). Unlike Ganymede, Diomedes is not entitled to claim full divine status, although Athena has elevated him to a status superior to that of most humans. Diomedes considers himself to be an equal to Apollo and, with this temporarily self-elevated status, he does not pay deference (ἄζετο) to the god according to his human status, thus, constituting an open challenge to the cosmic hierarchy sustained and administered by Zeus (456–457; cf. 380).

Against Diomede's transgression, Apollo re-establishes the boundaries by the deterrent imperative χάζεο that sharply detaches Τυδεΐδη from θεοῖσιν and a statement of the divine–human separation explicitly asserted in terms of difference or inequality (οὔ […] ὁμοῖον) between the φῦλον of the gods and that of men. Apollo briefly explains the difference in the comparison between the epithets ἀθανάτων and χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων.[40] The latter refers to the earth-bound condition of mankind, which could be understood not only as another expression of mortality but also as a reference to humans' inferior status: whereas gods hold honorific seats on Olympus, humans live in inferior settlements on earth. In line with this, when Apollo discourages Poseidon from fighting with him for the sake of insignificant mortals,[41] he describes the existential mode of mankind as follows: humans are 'as leaves are, and now flourish and grow warm with life, and feed on what the ground gives (ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδοντες), but then again fade away and are dead' (21.462–467). The two natural metaphors of leaf and fire underline mankind as something that is earth-bound, ephemeral, and subject to a natural cycle or alternation (cf. 6.142–149).[42] It is undoubtedly a description of the

[38] The Apollonian warning is commonly found in Greek literature after Homer prescribing that a mortal figure should not think (to act) to exalt their status beyond its bounds; e.g. Aech. *Per*. 819–820; Soph. *Trach*. 472–473; *Ant*. 455, 768; *Aj*. 128–130, 761, 777; Eur. *Alc*. 799; also Arist. *Rhet*. ii. 21.6. For a linguistic analysis, contextual considerations, and a thorough investigation of references to divine equality, see Fletcher-Louis (2021).

[39] Cf. 21.315 and below. Several figures are said to be honoured ἶσα θεῷ/θεοῖσι: *Od.* 11.301–304 (Dioscuri); 11.484 (Achilles); 15.519–520 (Eurymachus); also *Il.* 5.467–468 (Hector).

[40] 5.442 = *Th*. 272 = *h. Hom.* 29.2.

[41] Cf. 13.341–342; 17.446–447; *Od.* 6.329–330; Richardson (1993) on 468–469; cf. Schein (1984) 45–66.

[42] ζαφλεγέες […] φθινύθουσιν metaphorically describes the flaming and waning of the light of life; cf. Richardson (1993) on 464–466.

observable experience of mortality. In addition, Apollo mentions the human diet (ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδοντες), as in the passage about divine ἰχώρ, which can serve to characterise not only mortality but also the inferior status of mankind.

As Apollo discourages Diomedes from fighting against him, he also restricts himself from intervening in the human war. The withdrawal of Apollo thus delimits his power and status. Similarly, the restoration of Aphrodite and Ares is not merely a reiteration of their divine superiority but also a restriction of their powers: Aphrodite as a goddess of love should not exert too much influence on warfare (428–430; cf. 421–425), while Ares as a god of war is worthy of blame in undertaking excessive killing (909; cf. 133). Hera condemns the inappropriate conduct of Ares as 'out of due order' (ὀυ κατὰ κόσμον, 757; οὔ […] θέμιστα, 761). Indeed, Ares is acting too 'human' (cf. 5.604) on the battlefield, where he is found stripping a mortal's armour (841–844) and has been so murderous that he is lingering among corpses (5.703–712, 909; 6.842–845).[43] For the sake of restraining Ares and keeping the promise to Menelaus (714–178; cf. 832–834), Hera intervenes (with the permission of Zeus, 764–766) and Athena raises Diomedes to fight against Ares.

The *theomachia* of Diomedes, in effect, tests the limits of divine–mortal interactions, both in Diomedes' relationship with Athena and in the intervention and withdrawal of the gods.[44] Although Apollo's warning effectively reinstates the divine–human boundaries, Diomedes is once again elevated to an even greater status in Athena's second arrival and their cooperation to fight against Ares. As we shall see, this is initiated not simply by divine intervention but also by a re-confirmation of divine–human reciprocity.

3.1.5 The Extraordinary Status of Diomedes

Like Agamemnon in Book 4, Athena again exhorts Diomedes by recalling his father's extraordinary victory over the Kadmeians and her special support as a divine helper (802–809). Opening with the rhetorical assertion of Diomedes' inferiority to his father (800), the exhortative speech ends with a provocative statement that the weariness or fear of Diomedes

[43] See Allen-Hornblower (2014) 51.
[44] Cf. Sammons (2017) 158.

proves him not to be an offspring of the family of Oineus (813).[45] Diomedes does not remain silent like he did in Book 4, but defends himself with good reasons (815–824): his retreat, like his fight against Aphrodite, is faithful to the divine ordinance (818). By showing his deference to the goddess and an acceptance of his inferior status,[46] Diomedes also proves himself to be a son who lives up to his father's standards. This apt response of the warrior delights (κεχαρισμένε) the heart of Athena (826; cf. 17.567–569) and her benevolent reply reaffirms their intimate and reciprocal relationship.[47] By contrast, Athena disapproves of Ares' disrespect for herself and Hera by forgetting his promise to fight against the Trojans (832–834).

Unlike the first *theomachia,* Diomedes now is empowered to fight against divinities with no specific qualification. In addition, Athena herself takes the place of Sthenelus and becomes the charioteer of Diomedes to fight against Ares. Instantly after Athena mounts the chariot, Diomedes is described as δῖος (837).[48] Reaching the second climax of the *aristeia* of Diomedes, the Iliadic narrator draws attention to this brilliant moment of the divine–human union: 'the oaken axle groaned aloud under the weight, carrying a dread goddess and a best human' (δεινὴν […] θεὸν ἄνδρά τ' ἄριστον, 838–839). Diomedes becomes extraordinarily brilliant or even 'divine' (δῖος) not only in his union with Athena but also in his confrontation with Ares (Ἄρης Διομήδεα δῖον, 846; cf. 839).

The narrator does not introduce an Apollonian figure to reinstate the divine–human boundary but directly draws the distinction by juxtaposing δεινὴν θεὸν and ἄνδρα ἄριστον (cf. ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν and Διὸς θυγάτηρ, 311–312; see below). With this honorific position as a martial companion of Athena and the victory over a god of war, Diomedes achieves a status approximated to the gods and superior to all men in terms of ἀρετή, τιμή and βίη – the three aspects in which gods are so vastly superior to mankind, according to Phoenix (9.498). Apart from his victory over two gods, the narrator parallels the martial ἀρετή of Diomedes with that

[45] Athena deliberately mentions Tydeus using the epithet δαΐφρονος Οἰνεΐδαο, 'the wise son of Oineus', as the final words of her speech (813).
[46] Diomedes' exchange with Athena recalls the Sthenelus–Agamemnon dispute (cf. 4.398, 408–409).
[47] The phrase κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ denotes a sense of intimacy and close relationship, see also 243 (Sthenelus and Diomedes); 10.234 (Agamemnon and Diomedes); 11.608, 19.287 (Achilles and Patroclos). Cf. Kirk (1990) 145.
[48] Cf. 601, Hector is δῖος with Ares' companion; 370, Aphrodite is δῖα when she falls at the knees of Dione. It is of interest that δῖος originally means 'belonging to Zeus', see Stoevesandt (2016) 116.

of Athena and Enyo. Furthermore, as noted above, his divinely granted and patrimonial μένος is so mighty that he is transfigured into natural phenomena such as Sirius, storms, and floods. By virtue of his furious appearance, all-conquering power, and (temporary) invulnerability, Diomedes shows notable signs of extra-human qualities, which blur the demarcation line among beast, human, and god.[49] Indeed, Aeneas and Pandaros suspect him to be a god in epiphany and have difficulty determining what is under that anthropomorphic mask (cf. 596–606, 702).[50] Aeneas wonders whether this destructive figure is a god in *menis* (μηνίσας, 177–178).[51] Pandaros also cautiously surmises that the berserker could be either a god in the likeness of Diomedes (182–183) or a man with a deity,[52] because his arrow failed to beat him down, even though it unerringly hit and drew visible blood (181–191, 208) – a counterpart of Aphrodite's bleeding scene.

So far, the divine–human line has been blurred, transgressed, and redefined in the *aristeia* and *theomachia* of Diomedes. What ultimately distinguishes a deity from a human is status and honour based on the membership of the divine society or race (φῦλον). Although the ontological difference (immortality vs mortality) remains strict, the hierarchical difference is ultimately important for understanding the occasions where the divine–human division is blurred temporarily (Diomedes) or not (Ganymede), because it provides a sliding scale against which a human's status could be measured and compared with that of a divinity.

It is also noteworthy that Aeneas serves as an interesting comparandum for Diomedes. Aeneas' semi-divine lineage is aptly mentioned when Aphrodite comes to her son's rescue (311–313):

> καί νύ κεν ἔνθ᾽ ἀπόλοιτο ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας,
> εἰ μὴ ἄρ᾽ ὀξὺ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη,
> μήτηρ, ἥ μιν ὑπ᾽ Ἀγχίσῃ τέκε βουκολέοντι·

[49] Cf. Chaudhuri (2014) 29 n. 19, who reads Pandaros' cautious remarks as suggesting that Diomedes 'the theomachic hero […] shows signs of divinity'. This, however, should be considered alongside other characteristics of Diomedes in this context.
[50] Their encounter with Diomedes in some sense is equal to experiencing an epiphany; Schulz (2018) 39ff.; Schulz (2018) 43 rightly noted that it is rare for the Iliadic warriors to fail to recognise the prominent heroes after a ten-year war.
[51] For *menis* in the *Iliad*, see e.g. Muellner (1996); Cairns (2003); Most (2003).
[52] Note that Athena might not be with Diomedes at the moment (she left at 133, but then, it seems, returned at 290). Cf. Thoas (15.290) and Teucer (15.467–470) who observe that Hector is protected by the god; cf. also 20.98; 21.569.

> Now in this place Aeneas lord of men might have perished, had not Aphrodite, Zeus' daughter, been quick to perceive him, his mother, who had borne him to Anchises the oxherd.

With a noticeable structural similarity, the couplet (311–312) seems a deliberate choice of the narrator to highlight the superior status of Aeneas as a human king and that of Aphrodite as a divine offspring (the difference in status is also subtly noted).[53] Corresponding with his lineage, Aeneas receives both the protection of Aphrodite and Apollo and privileged treatment similar to that of Aphrodite and Ares after being wounded: he is transported to Apollo's temple in Pergamos and taken care of by Artemis and Leto (446–448). Such privilege accords with the statement Aphrodite made on Olympus that she holds Aeneas as the most beloved among all (πάντων πολὺ φίλατατος, 379).

Although Diomedes is not born to a divine mother, Athena plays a motherly role between Diomedes and Tydeus: she has empowered the father but also transmits the father's power to the son. As Aphrodite's divine pedigree ultimately determines her status, honour, and specific powers, the extraordinary status of Diomedes is fundamentally dependent on his reciprocal relationship with Athena. As long as this relationship is appropriately maintained, that is, as long as Diomedes pays deference to his divine patron and Athena responds with her favour, he could expect to be divinely empowered and elevated to a status superior to that of other humans and close to that of gods.

The success of wounding two gods places Diomedes in the category of *theomachos*. Indeed, the *aristeia* of Diomedes is presented with a constellation of *theomachoi*. As implied by Sthenelus, the audience may recall Capaneus' ascending the walls of Thebes with a self-deifying boast (4.409).[54] In Dione's report, Otus and Ephialtes fettered Ares almost to death

[53] Kirk (1990) *ad loc* noted the special (unique) verse-end position of the name Aeneas. For the verse-end position of Aphrodite and the alternative epithets (Διὸς θυγάτηρ or φιλομμειδής), see Kirk (1985) on *Il.* 3.424.

[54] Capaneus is a typical 'self-deifier' (§ 2.4). In Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebe*, Capaneus boasts that he will destroy the city 'with or without the divine will' and that 'the *Eris* of Zeus, though having fallen upon the plain, will not stand in his way' (427–429). The hero's boast constitutes a form of dishonour against Zeus also by reducing the divine thunderbolts to midday heat (441–443). Moreover, on his shield, there is a sign (σῆμα; cf. *Il.* 5.409) of an armourless man holding a torch with blazing fire as his weapon, and in golden letters, saying, 'I will burn the city' (430–434). According to Statius, Capaneus

(5.385–391) and Heracles heavily injured Hera (392–394) and Hades (395–402) with his arrows (cf. *Ol*. 9.29–35). In *Iliad* 6, Diomedes mentions the story of Lycurgus who chased Dionysus and his nurses (6.130–140). His interlocutor Glaucus alludes to the transgressive conduct of Bellerophon in attempting to storm Olympus on Pegasus (6.200–202; see §§ 1.4.1–2). Most of these *theomachoi* do not end well. As a comfort to her daughter, Dione suggests that Diomedes will not return home and his families will experience bitter sorrow (403–415). Nevertheless, the failure of the past *theomachoi* serves as a foil for the current success of Diomedes. What distinguishes Diomedes from these negative comparanda is his caution with regard to the divine ordinance and his acceptance of his inferior status as a human (cf. § 5.2). At Apollo's warning, Diomedes immediately retreats from transgression and maintains his position according to Athena's injunction. When Diomedes shudders at the sight of Ares (596), he behaves like a man incapable of crossing a fast-running river (597–600), although he himself has been likened to a flood a moment ago. He also reminds his comrades to withdraw from fighting against the gods (601–606) and expounds this principle with the story of Lycurgus the *theomachos* (6.130–140).

With a subtle complexity, Homer balances Diomedes' isolated incidence of disrespect for Apollo with his overall *eusebeia* towards the gods,[55] especially Athena in Book 5. Diomedes is featured as an ideal warrior not only in his glorious feat but also in his disposition to observe the code of honour in cosmic society properly: he pays proper deference to his superiors (gods, kings, ancestors) along with an acknowledgement of his inferior status (human, warrior, and son). Diomedes pursues honour with regard to divine ordinance, the duty to his community and family. The *aristeia* of Diomedes in Book 5 comes to an end with his friendly gift-exchange with Glaucus in Book 6 (119–236).[56] At the end of this lengthy exchange, Hippolochus' injunction (206–210), reported by Glaucus (see §§

also prays to his right hand as the only present divinity (*Theb*. 9.546–550). The overweening claim of Capaneus entails both an overestimation of one's status (ὁ κόμπος δ' οὐ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονεῖ, Aesch. *Sep.* 425) and an explicit diminution of divine honour. See also Eur. *Ph.* 1172ff.; Eur. *Supp.* 496ff.; Diod. 4.65.8; Apolld. 3.6.6.

[55] Instead of using English term 'piety', I preserve the Romanised forms of εὐσέβεια and its cognates (εὐσεβέω, εὐσεβής, σέβεσθαι, σέβας) to emphasise its original meaning of 'giving reverence to' or 'paying honour to' the superior in general terms and in particular the gods (it is not necessary to distinguish the 'ethical' or 'non-religious' from the 'religious' usages); cf. Mikalson (2010) 23. The root term σέβας/σέβειν/σέβεσθαι covers a range of feelings: awe, respect, fear, admiration, love. It could denote something that deserves respect and the feeling that expresses respect; cf. *Od.* 4.142; 8.384; Peels (2016) 68–69.

[56] Chaudhuri (2014) 23 n.12.

1.4.1–2), recalls Diomedes as being ἄριστος ἀνδρῶν (5.839) and the rallying speeches (of Agamemnon and Athena) about Tydeus. After temporarily being elevated to extraordinary status as a divine comrade of Athena, Diomedes returns to his status as the son of Tydeus by remembering his father and re-enacting the guest-friendship between the two families (6.212–236).

3.2 Hector at Home and Beyond

In the second *theomachia* of Diomedes, Hector's role as a martial companion of Ares (595, 603–604, 699, 704) resembles that of Diomedes as Athena's comrade. This also brings Hector into a comparison with his cousin Aeneas (note that the Trojans honour Aeneas as they honour Hector)[57] and prefigures the thematic contrast between Hector and Achilles. The following discussion on Hector will bear these comparisons in mind.

Like Diomedes, Hector is featured as an aristocratic warrior in terms of marvellous prowess, ambition for *kleos*, and the sense of *aidos*. In the *Iliad,* Hector is an exceptional figure in being directly empowered by Zeus (see below). Like Diomedes, Hector's elevation of status authorised by Zeus fulfils the god's plan of glorifying Achilles. Because of this divine empowerment, however, Hector's choice of actions taken for *kleos* becomes problematic regarding his relationship with his family and citizens. At the pinnacle of his *aristeia*, the delusion of being exceptionally superior seems to make Hector more than once compare himself to the offspring of Zeus. Although he expresses this as a fancy in an *adynaton* (8.538–841, 13.825–830; cf. 7.296–298), its underlying intention does not escape the notice of Poseidon (13.53–54). More strikingly, after his death, Priam claims that Hector seems like a son of the god (24.258–259). The cases of Diomedes and Hector confirm that one's success and failure lie in one's interaction with gods as well as other humans. If Diomedes is seen as an ideal but simplified paradigm of a warrior of *aidos* and *eusebeia*, the case of Hector is more problematic in terms of his relationship with gods and his fellow humans.

[57] 5.467–468: note that Aeneas is mentioned as the son of Anchises instead of Aphrodite; cf. 6.76-79, both are said to be *aristoi* in speech and action.

3.2.1 The Settings and Problems of Hector's **Aristeia**

3.2.1.1 Hector and the Trojans

In *Iliad* 5, Sarpedon is stirred by Ares to exhort Hector by reminding him of his previous boast that he could defend the city alone (473–474), and of his failure to fulfil the reciprocal duties that he owes his *xenoi,* who come to his help far away from Lycia (477–486). Like Diomedes, Hector gives no verbal reply to Sarpedon's biting exhortation; rather, he instantly dismounts from the chariot in all his armour, rallying all his fellow warriors (493–496).[58] Hector is concerned about his duties to others. In his replies to Andromache's appeal to his sense of pity, it becomes clear that Hector understands his position and manner of actions in terms of *aidos* and *kleos* (6.441–446):

> ἦ καὶ ἐμοὶ τάδε πάντα μέλει, γύναι· ἀλλὰ μάλ᾽ αἰνῶς
> αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους,
> αἴ κε κακὸς ὣς νόσφιν ἀλυσκάζω πολέμοιο·
> οὐδέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν, ἐπεὶ μάθον ἔμμεναι ἐσθλὸς
> αἰεὶ καὶ πρώτοισι μετὰ Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι,
> ἀρνύμενος πατρός τε μέγα κλέος ἠδ᾽ ἐμὸν αὐτοῦ.

> All these things are in my mind also, lady; yet I would feel deep shame before the Trojans, and the Trojan women with trailing garments, if like a coward I were to shrink aside from the fighting; and the spirit will not let me, since I have learned to be valiant and to fight always among the foremost ranks of the Trojans, winning for great glory for my father and myself.

[58] When Sarpedon appeals to his protection (684–688) after being fatally wounded by Tlepolemus (660–662), he remains silent but rushes forward to push back the foes (689–691). Similarly, hearing the plan and counsel of Helenos (6.75–101), Hector at once dismounts the chariot and carries out what his brother suggests (102–105; note also the clashing sound of his shield, 116–117); cf. 6.342.

Hector speaks of the aristocratic code: 'being always noble (ἐσθλός)' by fighting among the foremost ranks so as to win *kleos* for oneself and one's family and not to shame one's lineage.[59] Correspondingly, Hector prays to the gods that his son will be 'preeminent among the Trojans' (ἀριπρεπέα Τρώεσσιν, 477) and recognised by others to be far better than himself in the future (479). Later, Hector explicitly announces *kleos* as his aim[60] and showcases its nature when he challenges an Achaean champion to a duel and brings up a detailed proposal about the treatment of the loser's corpse after combat (7.84–91). The duel between two great warriors is a typical scenario of *aristeia* (note the emphatic position of ἀριστεύοντα in line 90),[61] which is naturally associated with death. Hector's concerns about the loser's corpse is more than a practical issue. For Hector, it is all about *kleos*: a memorial tomb after the performance of funeral rites is established for future generations to enquire about (cf. 22.304–305; *Od.* 11.76). What others will say (as reflected in the imagined *tis*-speech, 89–90) fundamentally constitutes one's *kleos* (a cognate term of κλύω).[62]

More importantly, Hector's reasoning for personal pursuit of *kleos* is framed by an emphasis on his sense of *aidos* referring to his fear of failure to live up to the social expectations of the Trojans and his own standards.[63] Like the pursuit of *kleos*, the sense of *aidos* is associated with public opinion and evaluation. However, the feeling of *aidos* that propels Hector to fight for *kleos* comes into conflict with the sense of *aidos* that he feels for his wife and dependants (450–465). Hector's return to the city in Book 6 is not merely a test of his resolve to fight but also an exposure of the clash between different social expectations that Hector is forced to face.[64] The tension is reflected in the different positions between 'fighting among the foremost ranks' (445) and 'staying on the rampart' (431). At his pathetic imagination of Andromache's future misery, he is seriously troubled by the reproaches imagined in a *tis*-speech (459–461) for failing to save his wife from captivity (454–463). Hector expresses a deep sorrow and shame in his wish to die before hearing of Andromache's

[59] In a similar vein, Diomedes argues against Sthenelus that it is not noble (γενναῖον) to shrink from fighting (5.252–254); see also 8.283–285 and §§ 1.4.1–1.4.2.
[60] Goldhill (1991) 71, 93.
[61] The context is highly competitive: for instance, before his duel with Ajax, Hector proclaims his expertise of martial skills (7.235–241).
[62] Cf. 17.128–131: Hector commands his comrades to bring the armour of Achilles back to the city to be his *kleos*.
[63] Cairns (1993) 68–87; also Cairns (2018) 402–403.
[64] Cf. Graziosi (2016) 84.

misery (464–465; cf. 410–412; 8.149–150).[65] Later, when Hector realises that his pursuit of *kleos* brings heavy losses on the army, he again feels *aidos*, not for the reproaches of his cowardice, but for the imputation of his failure to perform his duties and save the people (99–110; cf. 18.249–313).[66] Again, he is deeply troubled with what an inferior man would say, 'Hector believed in his own power and ruined his people' (106–107).

Although Hector recognises his duty to protect his family and citizens, in Book 6 and Book 22, he gives priority to his self-assertion over the other-regarding aspects of the code of honour. In response to his parents' appeal to pity (22.37–89; cf. 6.407–432), Hector wishes that he could have died with *kleos* in front of the city (ἐϋκλειῶς πρὸ πόληος) earlier (107–110; cf. 6.441–442; 8.285). He maintains the attacking position with the hope that the gods may grant him glory in the duel with Achilles (129–130). The sense of *aidos*, along with the concern for public opinion, drives Hector to fight for *kleos*. His personal conviction of what people will say, however, is not always the actual expectation of others. His individualist pursuit of *kleos* surpasses the requirement of duties and care that he owes others.[67] The prophecy-like statement of Andromache, 'your own *menos* will kill you' (407; cf. 12.46), is 'fulfilled' in Hector's final misunderstanding of the social expectation and his personal commitment to this aristocratic aim by fighting in front of the city.

3.2.1.2 Hector and the Gods

Although Hector appears to be too self-assertive in keeping his own standards, the reasoning behind his choice of actions is not merely a matter of preference or personal interest. The plea and advice of Andromache are based on her sense of doom that Hector will lose his life if he rushes too far from the city (6.407–421, 431–439).[68] Hector shares a similar and more pathetic vision of the future and states in a prophetic fashion that both Troy and his father

[65] Cairns (1993) 72; Cairns (2018) 403–404.
[66] Cairns (2018) 405; cf. Redfield (1975) 157–158; Richardson (1993) 117–118.
[67] Cf. 11.409–410: after Diomedes is wounded by Paris, Odysseus ponders to himself: 'if one is to *aristeuein*, he must by all means stand his ground strongly whether he be struck or strike down another'.
[68] Cf. 22.38–40. It seems that Hector rarely goes beyond the Skaian gates and the oak tree, if Achilles is present (9.354; 8.229–235).

will perish one day (447–449; cf. 4.163–135).[69] This pessimistic vision seems to correspond with his view of the human condition in general terms. He addresses this as a comfort to Andromache (487–489): 'No man is going to hurl me to Hades against *aisa*, but as for *moira*, I think that no man yet has escaped it once it has taken its first form, neither brave man nor coward'. Each man is born with a general 'portion', i.e. mortality (μοῖρα; cf. ἄμμορον, 408), but the way of meeting one's death as a specific 'portion' is assigned or ordained according to the gods (αἶσαν).[70] Slightly different from his previous statement about the doom of Ilium, Hector holds out some hope that he might not fail as Andromache suggests, because success or failure is the concern of gods rather than of humans. Indeed, Hector has just prayed for a bright future for his son Astyanax (475–481) and now turns to the practical concern of him as the warrior-king and that of Andromache as his wife (490–493).[71]

Hector's readiness to accept whatever 'portion' the gods devise for him seems to be the mark of his *eusebeia*.[72] Although the fall of Troy seems inevitable (and it is so as the plot of the poem is fixed), the events taking place before the imagined day of doom remain open as long as Hector is alive to take actions for his *kleos*. In other words, Hector could at least cherish a hope for a better outcome regarding his own 'portion' devised by the gods. Similarly, before returning to the battlefield, Hector exhorts Paris with the hope that they may celebrate deliverance from war, 'if Zeus somehow grants it' (6.526–529; cf. 331 and the exchange between Ajax and Tecmessa in § 5.2). Likewise, Hector's proposal of the duel in *Iliad* 7 is put forward with a special concern for the previous oath and the divine will (7.69–70, 81; cf. 52–54). When the duel is suspended by divine intervention and nightfall (273–282), Hector proposes to continue the duel tomorrow 'until the divinity decides between us and gives victory to one or the other' (291–292; cf. Priam's wording in 377–378 = 395–397).

[69] This may reveal a deeper reason for his resolve to fight among the foremost Trojans: if the fall of Troy is inevitable, a defensive strategy is less meaningful for Hector as a means by which to seek *kleos* than an offensive position (which may provide him with more chances to kill his foes and, thus, have more 'mounds' to establish for others to enquire about, just as he addressed in 7.84–91 quoted above); cf. 22.99–110, 296–305; also 15.496–499, 660–666; 22.71–72. In addition, an earlier but noble death seems implicitly a pathetic 'solution' to save him from knowing the misfortune of Andromache.
[70] Kirk (1990) 224; see also § 1.4.3.
[71] Stoevesandt (2016) 172.
[72] Hector's view on the doom of Ilium might be consonant with his moral and religious beliefs reflected in his suggestion that the gods bring affliction to Troy instead of directly punishing Paris (281–285; cf. 7.69–70).

However, Hector's *eusebeia* is balanced by his ambitious self-assertion. For instance, he seems too overweening in his victory over Patroclus in Book 16. Although the Trojans retreat when Patroclus killed Sarpedon, Apollo exhorts Hector and grants him the glory of killing Patroclus (16.720–730) according to Zeus' plan (647 ff.). When Hector succeeds in killing Patroclus, he boasts by proudly praising the gallantry of his horses with an element of self-aggrandisement (833–836; cf. 8.184–197). Hector emphasises his preeminent position among the Trojan warriors and makes a taunting comparison between himself who saved his people and Patroclus who has failed to fulfil the expectation of Achilles (837–842). Hector underscores his life-saving power without mentioning Zeus or other divinities. Patroclus senses the overweening tone of Hector's words and points out that his triumph should be attributed to Zeus and Apollo (844–846). In reply to Patroclus' prophecy of his imminent death from Achilles (849–854), Hector boasts again (in the delusive empowerment of Zeus, see below) that it is not impossible for him to subdue Achilles with his spear (ἐμῷ ὑπὸ δουρί, 860 *versus* 848; cf. 22.270–271). Hector's emphasis on his independence embodied in his spear[73] is juxtaposed by his mention of Achilles' divine parentage (Θέτιδος πάις ἠυκόμοιο, 860). It implies a further vaunt that Hector considers his power to be on an equal footing with that of Achilles (cf. 20.203–208).

As far as his choice of actions in concerned, Hector seems consistent in insisting on his independence and preferring his personal *kleos*. As we shall see, Hector's ambitious self-assertion becomes problematic not merely in his struggle to fulfil social expectations and his own standards as an ideal warrior but also in his relationship with the gods. Additionally, Hector's *eusebeia* for the gods (especially Zeus) turns out to be the delusive path leading to his 'tragic' death devised by Zeus to glorify Achilles. Hector's reasoning behind his actions seems blameless and shows a kind of *eusebeia*, but it is less so when he commits himself to this conviction and refuses to consider the alternation of the divine will. His understanding of what the gods assign for him is as problematic as his imagination of what others will say.

[73] Cf. ἔγχει δ' αὐτός, 834; also underlined by the narrator, 862, 864. For spear or 'arm-hand' as a symbol of autonomy or independence and an indication of 'self-deifying' attitude, see § 5.2.

*3.2.2 Zeus' Empowerment of Hector (***Iliad** *8)*

After the duel between Hector and Ajax, Zeus comes to the forefront and initiates his plan with a threatening assertion of his power and authority in the divine assembly (8.5–27). Zeus tips his sacred balance and causes a huge crash as a sign of giving favour to the Trojans (66–77). When Diomedes attempts to assault Hector, Zeus appallingly frustrates his attack by dashing a shimmering lightning bolt in front of his chariot (8.132–136).

With a prudent insight and encouraging tone, Nestor suggests to Diomedes that Zeus is giving glory to Hector (138–141), with a temporal qualification that the victory is valid for today (σήμερον) but not necessarily forever (142–143).[74] The old man in effect reminds Diomedes of showing *eusebeia* to Zeus, who distributes glories and holds the supreme power (142–144). Again, Diomedes shows his sense of *aidos* with a struggle: although he acknowledges Nestor's prudence (146), he is also deeply troubled about what Hector will say about his retreat (147–150). Nestor comforts his young comrade by reminding him of his previous victories, which have already demonstrated his nobility and excellence (152–155). As Diomedes concedes and retreats, Hector taunts his foe that his womanly flight will disgrace him among the Achaeans, who have held him in great honour and privileges (161–163). Hector's insult confirms Diomedes' fear and makes him ponder his return to fight. When he hesitates to attack three times, however, Zeus thunders each time to show that the tide of the battle has turned (169–171).

The exchange between Nestor and Diomedes recalls the dispute between Agamemnon and Sthenelus in Book 4. In addition, the scenario of Zeus' thundering in front of Diomedes' chariot may be reminiscent of Capaneus being smitten by Zeus' bolts (§ 3.1.5). The discretion of Nestor and the struggle of Diomedes are juxtaposed with the self-assertive speeches of Hector. Unlike prudent Nestor, Hector exhorts the Trojans with a statement that he knows (γινώσκω, cf. 140) Zeus' consent to his victory in the whole war, boasting that he will break down the wall, set fire on the ships, and cut down the Achaeans (175–183). Although Hector's interpretation of the signs turns out to be an overestimation of the support of Zeus, his confidence shows a certain sense of *eusebeia* rather than arrogance.

[74] Nestor's language is evocative of the remarkable theme of *ephemeros* in Sophocles' *Ajax*, see § 5.1.

The powerful intervention of Zeus both in the divine assembly and the human battlefield intends to single out Hector as a divinely favoured warrior. As Diomedes is blazing like fire under the favour of Athena (5.1–8), Hector is made preeminent in the battlefield with Zeus hurling down vividly 'horrible blazes of flaming sulphur' (8.135; cf. 16.730). With the support of Zeus, Hector immediately and successfully drives the Achaeans to be penned in between the ditch and the ships (213–215). The narrator confirms the glorious moment of Hector (8.215–216): 'He penned them like the rapid Ares (θοῷ ἀτάλαντος Ἄρῃ), Hector, son of Priam, since Zeus gave him *kydos*'. The epithet that likens Hector to Ares is aptly applied here to mark the murderous and disastrous situation.[75] Moreover, the epithet indicates his extraordinary status: the human status of Hector marked by the patronymic epithet Πριαμίδης is now elevated to a godlike one with the favour of Zeus. Indeed, Hector would, on this day, have wrought horrible havoc on many Achaeans and burnt their ships (217, 246), had not Hera stirred up Agamemnon to exhort his men and make a piteous prayer to Zeus (218–245). Zeus responds with a bird sign and the Argives retrieve their courage to fight back. However, the counterattack does not last long. After the withdrawal of the wounded Teucer (319–334), Zeus again empowers the Trojans to drive the Achaeans back behind the ditch. In front of Hector's divinely empowered assault, the Greeks are desperately calling to each other and extending prayers to the gods (342–327). Like Diomedes in *Iliad* 5, Hector is empowered to such an extent that he becomes a figure that is beyond ordinary humanity: fighting 'in the foremost ranks in the pride of his great strength' (335–337),[76] Hector is first likened to a hunting hound (338–342) and then compared to a Gorgon and Ares (348–349).

The extraordinary power of Hector is emphasised again in Hera's speech to Athena (8.354–356): 'They must then accomplish this evil fate and be destroyed, at the blow of one man, who rages unendurably, Hector the son of Priam, and he has done so much evil (κακὰ πολλὰ ἔοργε)'. The goddess is deeply troubled with the destruction of the Achaeans (cf. 34

[75] The epithet (θοῷ) ἀτάλαντος Ἄρῃ is not uncommonly applied to Homeric warriors (e.g. 2.627; 5.576; 15.302; 17.536), especially when they take murderous actions (13.500; a stock one for Meriones, 13.295, 328, 528). For instance, Patroclus assaults 'like the rapid Ares' three times and kills nine Trojans (16.783–785) before Apollo strikes him down at his fourth *daimoni-isos* charge (786–805). Later, Hector is again marked with the same epithet (17.72) when Apollo comes to exhort him to fight over the body of Patroclus (17.73 ff.). For Hector's likeness to Ares, see also 11.295; 13.802 (cf. 20.46) and below.

[76] Similarly, 9.236–239; 12.40–42; cf. 17.135; 20.36.

and 465). Her mention of Hector's role as Priam's son implicitly conveys her surprise that a man of mortal parentage could cause such awful carnage (cf. 342). That Hector 'has done so much evil' recalls Aeneas' wonder at the identity of his opponent 'who has such strength and has done so much evil (κακὰ πολλὰ ἔοργε)' (5.175; cf. 16.423–425). By the same token, in the recap of the daytime defeat, Agamemnon is astonished to see Hector alone wreaking 'so much baneful' havoc on the Achaeans in a day, because Hector is not 'a dear son of a goddess nor a god' (10.47–50). As we have seen, divine parentage sometimes accounts for a warrior's extraordinary power and status.[77] Like Diomedes, Hector is empowered and elevated to such a status that he is envisaged as equal to those who have special or intimate relationships with the gods. In response to Hera, Athena underscores the mortality and human ancestry of Hector in an indignant tone (8.358–359) and attributes his current success to Zeus, who supports him out of his obligation to Thetis (360 ff.). At the end of her speech, Athena reasserts Hector's human status with her threat to strike him down (377–379), which will be fulfilled in Book 22.

Like Diomedes' *theomachia*, Hector's unstoppable onslaught causes disturbance among the gods. Athena and Hera would have come into an unseemly (400) conflict with Zeus for the sake of the Achaeans (381–396), had not Zeus restrained them again with a threatening assertion of his power and supremacy (397–424, 438–456). The two goddesses concede with grief and anger (425–437, 456–468). In response to them, Zeus prophesies his plan (469–476; again, with a threat, 477–483), which nevertheless confirms the limit of Hector's godlike success. For the moment, the Zeus-empowered Hector will remain extraordinarily powerful, like a deity or at least the mortal offspring of a deity.

3.2.3 The Ambition of Hector

Interrupted by nightfall, the Zeus-favoured (Διὶ φίλος) Hector arranges an assembly by the Skamandros river (8.489–495) and gives a long and exhortative speech to his troops (496–541). For the most part, Hector addresses the majority of the practical issues, and repeats his confidence and hope for tomorrow's victory (498–525) concluding with a prayer to Zeus

[77] Hainsworth (1993) 162.

(526–528). In the coda, Hector singles out Diomedes as his major opponent and the key to victory or defeat (532–534; cf. 169–172, 254–257). This mention of Diomedes not only shows his practical concern but also serves as a clue to the thematic comparison between the two warriors. Apart from asserting his victory over Diomedes, Hector makes a striking boast in the final lines of his speech (538–541):

> … εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὡς
> εἴην ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήραος ἤματα πάντα,
> τιοίμην δ᾽ ὡς τίετ᾽ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἀπόλλων,
> ὡς νῦν ἡμέρη ἥδε κακὸν φέρει Ἀργείοισιν
>
> … For my part I would wish that I might be immortal and ageless all my days, and that I were honoured just as are Athene and Apollo, as surely as now this day brings evil on the Argives.[78]

The overweening notes echo the opening fantasy of his speech (498–499). Later, disregarding the two bird-omens favouring the Achaeans (12.200–209; 13.821–823) and Polydamas' warnings (12.210–229; 13.725–747), Hector makes a similar but stronger boast in reply to Ajax's challenge (13.825–828): 'If only I could be a son of Zeus of the aegis all my days and the lady Hera gave birth to me, and were honoured as Athena and Apollo, as surely as now this day brings evils to the Argives'. Regardless of the context, Hector's *adynaton* interestingly confirms the argument developed in Part I: ageless immortality – as a synecdoche of divinity – is glossed by divine honour in the first wish and replaced by divine parentage in the second (see also Sarpedon's *adynaton* in §1.4.2). Divinity is not fully defined by the two ontological features (immortality and agelessness) but fundamentally by honour and status recognised in divine society in the cosmos.

Hector's *adynaton* serves to underline his confidence in victory by contrasting it with the impossibility of achieving the status of an offspring of Zeus and being honoured

[78] Trans. Murray (1999).

accordingly. However, Hector's success in 'bringing much evil' to the Achaeans has already been perceived as a mark of his godlike power and extraordinary status elevated by Zeus. Even after Polydamas' first warning, Hector's dominant aggression reaches a climax when he breaks the wall of the Achaeans 'with a dark face like sudden night' and shining armour (12.462–464). The narrator marks this significant moment of Hector's triumph with a hyperbole that 'no one could have stood up against and stopped him, except the gods, when he burst in the gates and his eyes flashed fire' (465–466). Hector's martial success is measured by and compared to those achieved by the gods. Even though Hector makes use of *adynaton* to veil his ambition for divinity, his achievements and divine support allow him to expect the probability at least of achieving an extraordinary honour that is approximate to a god's. Despite being rhetorically reduced to an unlikelihood in an *adynaton*,[79] Hector's implicit intention of likening himself to a divine figure is recognised and faulted by Poseidon (13.52–54):

> τῇ δὲ δὴ αἰνότατον περιδείδια μή τι πάθωμεν,
> ᾗ ῥ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ὸ λυσσώδης φλογὶ εἴκελος ἡγεμονεύει,
> Ἕκτωρ, ὃς Διὸς εὔχετ᾽ ἐρισθενέος πάις εἶναι.
>
> But it is here that I fear most terribly that some disaster befall us, here where that berserk flamelike leads them against us, Hector, who claims that he must be son of Zeus of the high strength.

The claim made by εὔχεται, a shared habit of the Homeric figures (cf. 15.296; 21.410–411),[80] is associated with the evaluation of others and one's sense of honour, particularly in terms of genealogy (cf. 20.206–209). When one makes such a claim, he is ready to provide proof either in words or deeds to justify it and meet the challenge or doubt of others (23.667 ff., in the context of competition). For instance, when Achilles urges Calchas to speak without fear

[79] The unlikelihood is reinforced by the recurring patronymic epithet Πριαμίδης by which the narrator marks his mortal status.
[80] For εὔχομαι in Homeric epics, see Adkins (1969); Muellner (1976); Nagy (2021).

of Agamemnon, he adds that Agamemnon 'now claims to be far the best of all the Achaeans' in a suspicious and challenging tone (1.90; cf. 9.160–161). Glaucus gives a detailed narrative of his genealogy as proof of his final claim to 'such generation and blood' (6.211; similarly in Diomedes' speech, 14.112–127). Killing Lykaon, Achilles makes a triumphant genealogical comparison between his foe's parentage of a river and his own claim to 'the generation of the great Zeus' (21.184–199, see more below). Although Poseidon's hyperbole is meant to spur the Aiantes (cf. 9.237–239; 5.173),[81] and even though Hector does not explicitly make such a claim in this way, it asks the audience to see both the extraordinary status of Hector in his successful onslaught at the moment and his ambition hidden in his two apparently impossible wishes. In addition, dog-like madness (λυσσώδης, cf. 8.299; see below on 9.236–239) not only describes Hector's horrible actions, which are alien to normal humans, but also indicates his overestimation of the support of Zeus and his excessive expectation of his relationship with him.

*3.2.4 Zeus' Empowerment of Hector (***Iliad** *15, 17)*

With the intervention of Poseidon and the seductive trick of Hera, Hector is temporarily checked and stunned by Ajax (*Iliad* 13–14). In Book 15, Hector is again empowered by Zeus, who at first sends Apollo to help (231–233). It is exceptional that Hector learns of divine assurance regarding his victory, despite being ignorant about the true motive of the plan. Like Diomedes in his second *theomachia*, Hector is exhorted and empowered by Apollo as his martial comrade. Immediately, Thoas recognises that some god has come to Hector's help and rescued him (290–293). Indeed, Apollo stands in front of Hector in full armour (306–312) and wreaks havoc on the Achaeans like a little boy who crushes the sand towers he just built, while the human victims cry out his prayers in a great voice (362–368). Moreover, Zeus also protects Hector from the arrows of Teucer (461–462), who also recognises the workings of a divinity (466–470; cf. 5.182–183 above). Seeing how Zeus is helping him, Hector again exhorts his troops with a claim that Zeus gives glory to him and diminishes the strength of the Argives (489–493). This is confirmed again by Zeus, with an added reminder of his true plan

[81] Janko (1994) 49.

to fulfil the prayer of Thetis (596–599), when he 'drove Hector on against the hollow ship' and helped him from the bright sky (603–610). The comradeship of Apollo seems to be replaced by Zeus' direct assistance. With this exceptional divine empowerment, Hector is likened to destructive fire and spear-shaking Ares (15.605–606), with glittering eyes and a thunderous helm (607–609). Yet again, the narrator balances Hector's glorious moment with a pathetic note of the motive of Zeus 'who among numerous men honoured and glorified (τίμα καὶ κύδαινε) him only, since he was to have a short life' (611–613).

With Zeus' empowerment, the well-armed Hector 'shines with flame' (623) and descends on the Achaeans like a furious wave, battering a ship on all sides and causing ghastly terror among the crew (624–629; cf. 381–384).[82] Like Diomedes, Hector approximates natural forces such as fire (also 13.688; cf. 5.4), water (15.625-627; cf. 5.87–91), wind, and heavenly bodies (11.61–66; 12.462–464; cf. 5.4–6). With these similes, the two warriors are perceived as inhuman and quasi-cosmic forces such as those that reflect, and are regulated by, divine power. After elaborately likening Hector to a murderous lion (630–636),[83] the narrator again notes the 'unearthly terror' (θεσπεσίως ἐφόβηθεν) of the Achaeans fleeing before 'Hector and Zeus the father' (ὑφ' Ἕκτορι καὶ Διὶ πατρί, 637–638). This recalls Athena's mounting on the chariot of Diomedes in his second *theomachia* and the application of δῖον to the warrior therein (5.835–837, also 846). By the same token, Ἕκτορα δῖον appears at the very end of the last sentence in the narrative of Hector's killing of Periphetes (638–652).[84] At the climax of Book 15, immediately before Hector gets his hands on the ship of Protesilaos (704–705), Hector experiences an exceptional empowerment of Zeus (694–695):

> ...τὸν δὲ Ζεὺς ὦσεν ὄπισθε
> χειρὶ μάλα μεγάλῃ, ὤτρυνε δὲ λαὸν ἅμ' αὐτῷ.

[82] The metaphor of wind or cloud is often applied to the sweeping power of Hector, see 11.297–298, 304–309; 12.40.
[83] Hector is frequently likened to a lion or wild boar (7.256–257; again 12.41–49; cf. 16.756–760, 824–829, fighting against Patroclus), as well as a hound (8.338–341) and horse (15.263–270, cf. 6.506–514).
[84] Cf. 13.676 with 688. While Athena–Diomedes wounds one god, Zeus–Hector kills one man only (15.638). Furthermore, the death of Periphetes elaborated with biography, an excursus on his father (639–643), and the pathetic response of his comrades (650–652) might also remind us of the narrator's emphasis on Diomedes' bringing desolation to the families of his foes.

> …and from behind Zeus was pushing him onward hard with his long arm and stirred on his people beside him.

It is uncommon to find the supreme god assisting a human-bred warrior in such a direct way (cf. 4.439; 9.419). Gripping the ship's stern, Hector boasts of the god-given success (718–719) and proclaims the presence and reinforcement of Zeus (725). As indicated above, it is highly ironic and pathetic that such divine empowerment turns out to be Zeus' way of accelerating Hector's death and fulfilling the plan of glorifying Achilles (13.347–350).[85]

More strikingly, when Hector puts on the armour of Achilles, which was stripped off the dead Patroclus (17.192–194), Zeus condemns his inappropriate behaviour (200–206) but still invests him with 'great power or victory' (κράτος) so that Hector will not return home to hand the armour of *kleos* to Andromache (206–208; cf. 17.131). Putting on the ambrosial armour (210, 194–197), Hector is fully empowered when 'Ares the horrible war god entered him (δῦ δέ μιν Ἄρης / δεινὸς ἐνυάλιος), so that the inward body was packed full of force and fighting strength' (210–212). Like Diomedes empowered to be 'conspicuous (ἔκδηλος) to all the Argives' (5.2–3), the ambrosial armour makes Hector 'appear shining' (λαμπόμενος) among all his comrades (17.213–214). Unlike the cheering initiation of the *aristeia* of Diomedes, the arming scene of Hector is charged with a sense of irony and tragedy. The deadly and grim power of the armour recalls the prophetic claim of Andromache ('your *menos* will kill you', 6.407) and the final plan of Zeus. As Hector 'donned' (δύνε, 194) the divinely made armour, a murderous divinity 'entered' (δῦ, 210) into his inner parts.[86] The arming process transforms Hector into a quasi-divine figure: more than a figure equal to Ares, he is now becoming Ares in a figurative sense.

The divinely sanctioned 'transformation' also appears as a form of self-empowerment or even self-deification: it is Hector himself who chooses to put on the armour (emphasised in his change of mind, 189–194). The dual process of Hector's donning the armour and Ares'

[85] For the plan of Zeus, see also 8.469–477; 11.54–55, 163–164, 181–194; 12.174, 255, 437; 15.59–77, 592–604; 17.206–209 and 546; cf. the mind of Zeus in 16.688–691 with 103 and 17.176–178.
[86] Cf. 19.366–368; 9.553–554 with Hainsworth (1993) *ad loc*.

(figurative) entering Hector reminds us of the hyperbolic lines in Odysseus' speech designed to stir up Achilles in re-joining the battle (9.236–239):

> Ζεὺς δέ σφι Κρονίδης ἐνδέξια σήματα φαίνων
> ἀστράπτει· Ἕκτωρ δὲ μέγα σθένεϊ βλεμεαίνων
> μαίνεται ἐκπάγλως πίσυνος Διί, οὐδέ τι τίει
> ἀνέρας οὐδὲ θεούς· κρατερὴ δέ ἑ λύσσα δέδυκεν.
>
> And Zeus, son of Cronus, shows them signs on the right with his lightnings, while Hector in the huge pride of his strength rages irresistibly, reliant on Zeus, and respects neither men nor gods, for mighty madness has descended upon him.

Odysseus exaggerates Hector's manic behaviour by asserting that he pays no respect to gods and men (cf. 17.575–576).[87] It is noteworthy that the exaggeration and contradiction of Odysseus' wording happens to convey the complexities behind Hector's actions and disposition. On the one hand, Hector's conviction of the signs of Zeus seems to be an expression of his *eusebeia*, as indicated above. Indeed, Hector retreats when he notices the alternation of the sacred balance of Zeus (16.658; cf. 8.69–72) or the warnings of Apollo (20.379–380; cf. 17.586–395). Furthermore, when he realises the inevitability of his imminent death, Hector shows his readiness to receive whatever the gods devise for him. For Hector, his death is a calling of the gods (22.297; cf. 16.693) and has been pleasing to Zeus and Apollo (301–302). At this 'tragic' moment, Hector shows his pious subjection to the gods and maintains his great integrity in taking noble gestures to face the inevitable. On the other hand, Hector's claim to divine support is a problematic way of justifying his excessive and self-assertive actions for personal *kleos*. His strict and unshakable belief that Zeus has granted and will give him great glory makes him disregard the advice of Polydamas (12.234–242;

[87] This accusation might refer to Hector's fighting on behalf of the wrongdoer and, thus, his disregard of the established rules of conduct in general terms. Cf. 13.620–639 (Menelaus gives a denunciation of the moral blames of the Trojans and complains of Zeus' favouring the *hybristai*); cf. *Th.* 1140 ff.; *Aj.* 766–770, 454–456 in § 5.2.

18.293–296).[88] Although he knows his weakness compared to Achilles (20.434, 436; also 22.41–22), Hector exhorts his men and stands up against Achilles with a hope of victory, based on his expectation for a better 'portion' assigned by the gods (435).[89] When Hector stops running from Achilles, he makes a proposal of duel to the latter, just as he suggested in *Iliad* 8 that they swear in front of the gods to return the loser's body (22.250–259; cf. 338–343). When Achilles fails to hit Hector with his spear, Hector taunts his opponent (279–280): 'it was not, Achilles like the immortals, from Zeus that you knew my allotment (μόρον), as you said'. Not perceiving the presence of Athena (214 ff., 275–727) or the golden scales balanced by Zeus (208–213), Hector ironically still has hope and trust in Zeus' previous sign. When Hector fails to summon 'Deiphobos', he finally realises the trick of Athena and his imminent death (294–299).

Odysseus' hyperbole of Hector's beast-like conduct and disrespect for gods and men may also recall the narrator's comment on Diomedes' *daimon*-like (5.437) assault on the Apollo-protected Aeneas that 'he did not respect (ἄζεται) the great god' (434). Diomedes' trust in the goddess and the *menos* received from her temporarily drives him into a non-human state of mind (440–441). Unlike Diomedes, Hector has never taken his actions to fight or compete against any other gods (cf. 20.367–368). Yet, Hector's actions seem to become increasingly self-assertive especially after killing Patroclus. In the arming and 'transformation' scene in Book 17, the power in which Hector exults along with his conviction of Zeus' help reveals his excessive ambition and eventually drives him into a manic state of mind that seems alien to himself as a human being (λύσσα and Ἄρης).

3.2.5 The Extraordinary Status of Hector

Hector's figurative approximation to Ares recalls both his impossible wishes for divine status and his earlier elevation to being the martial companion of the war god in Book 5. In this light, Athena-Diomedes' victory over Ares(-Hector)[90] thematically prefigures the later

[88] Furthermore, he argues against his brother with the hope that he has a chance to win Achilles because the war god is impartial (18.305–309); see also 13.153–154; 16.859-861; 17.338-339.
[89] Hector's encounter with Achilles is interrupted by Apollo twice (375 ff. and 444 ff.), which may also support Hector's hope.
[90] Note that when Ares is defeated, Hector is not mentioned.

scenario of Athena-Achilles' defeating (Ares-)Hector (cf. 20.76–78).[91] While Diomedes is raised by Athena to frustrate the inappropriate onslaught of Ares, the Ares-like Hector is empowered to be a pathetic pawn in Zeus' plan of fulfilling his promise to Thetis to glorify her son Achilles.

Despite his 'tragic' failure, temporary elevation to a quasi-divine status through Zeus' exceptional empowerment makes Hector an extraordinary figure. After his death, Hector's status is evaluated and recognised on several occasions. First, immediately after killing Hector, Achilles tells his men that they have won a divinely granted victory (379, 393) by killing Hector, the one 'to whom the Trojans pray as a god (θεῷ ὡς εὐχετόωντο) in the whole city' (22.394).[92] Again, for Hecabe, Hector was not only a pride to her but also the strength and glory of the Trojans, who 'used to welcome [him] as a god' (θεὸν ὥς δειδέχατ') during his lifetime (433–436). The recognition of Hector's godlike status during his lifetime is a way of praising his life-saving power and victorious achievements among his fellows (which becomes his own *kleos*, cf. 22.510–514). Such recognition is made by his foes as a way of vaunting their success in taking down such a murderously powerful opponent. More strikingly, Priam claims that while the rest of his sons are disgraces (24.260–262), Hector 'was a god among men, who never did seem a mortal man's son, but the offspring of a god' (258–259). Priam measures Hector's status in two ways: he elevates Hector to a status far superior to that of other humans and draws a comparison between him and the son of a god.

The evaluation of Hector's cosmic status is quite different in heaven. When Achilles tries to disfigure the corpse of Hector, Apollo makes a complaint that the gods allow Achilles such inappropriate behaviour and forget Hector's abundant sacrifices offered to them in the past (24.33–54). However, Hera disagrees with Apollo's proposal of giving a burial to Hector because Hector is far inferior to Achilles in terms of honour, lineage, and connection with the

[91] See also Nagy (2013) 162: when Achilles kills Hector, he appears to kill 'the embodiment of Ares the war god'. Against Polydamas' warning, Hector's hope to defeat Achilles is expressed with reference to Ares: 'The war god is impartially common to all. Before now he has killed the killer' (18.309). Interestingly, the narrator notes that the Trojans' approval of Hector's argument is said to be attributed to Athena's intervention ('taking away their wits', 18.310–313).
[92] Similarly, Aeneas, 11.59; Achilles. 9.302; cf. 7.29–99.

gods (56–63).[93] Although Zeus approves of Hera's argument that 'there shall not be the same honour (τιμή) given to both' (66), he acknowledges Hector's special relationship (φίλτατος, cf. 423) with the gods, his superiority among the Trojans, and his satisfactory sacrifices performed to the gods (66–70; cf. 4.45–49).

The positive attitude of Zeus recalls his previous special concern over the death of Hector. During Achilles' chase of Hector, Zeus takes pity on Hector and ponders whether he should save him for the moment (22.172–176). The deliberation of Zeus is based on a positive reciprocal relationship between himself and Hector: he speaks of his favourable love for Hector and the latter's *eusebeia* in his honorific sacrifices (167–172). Such a recognition of Hector resembles that of Sarpedon (16.431–461).[94] Conceding to Hera's protest and plan, Zeus arranges for the transportation of the corpse and a decent burial for Sarpedon. Likewise, Zeus yields to Athena's argument like that of Hera and allows her to fulfil the doom of Hector (22.177–185). With a grand gesture, Zeus 'balanced his gold scales' (208–213), as he did in Book 8 to initiate his plan. Unlike his previous deceptive empowerment, Zeus finally gives appropriate honour to Hector with a special plan of his burial that brings an end to the *Iliad* (22.71 ff.). In terms of burial, although Sarpedon receives special care from Zeus based on his divine pedigree, Hector – of human birth – is no less honoured by Zeus because of his *eusebeia*. In the ultimate sense, human τιμή confirms mortality: a man's portion is constituted partly by his burial as the γέρας θανόντων (16.456–457, 674–675).

The assessment of Hector's status and honour takes place both in human societies and the divine assembly. Likewise, as in the case of Diomedes, one's status does not merely refer to his position within the human community, but also fundamentally lies in his relationship with the gods. The *aristeia* of Diomedes is one of the ideal expressions of the belief that every human achievement or failure is dependent upon the gods. As we have seen, Diomedes finds the best path of proving his entitlement to honour by re-establishing his father's relationship with Athena and receiving the prowess (*menos*) with which the goddess once

[93] The difference between Hector's mortal pedigree and the divine parentage of Achilles recalls a comparison between Diomedes and Aeneas. Furthermore, while Athena gives paternal *menos* to Diomedes, Zeus returns the corpse of Hector to his father Priam.

[94] Both the deaths of Sarpedon and Hector are brought about for someone else's glory (Patroclus and Achilles) according to the plan of Zeus. In both cases, there is a 'tragic' sense felt in different ways: Zeus 'kills' his own son through the hand of Patroclus, and he 'uses' Hector's *eusebeia* to deceive his trust in his divine support.

empowered Tydeus. The case of Hector, however, is more problematic in terms of the ideal that divine empowerment temporarily elevates one's cosmic status but that it is not always as desirable as it seems. Albeit in a negative way, the 'tragic' fall of Hector, nevertheless, confirms human dependence on the gods, as well as the importance of other-regarding aspects of the code of honour on the one hand, while maintaining Hector's greatness in terms of his *eusebeia* and power on the other.

In light of this, cosmic society is a useful idea that illustrates better how gods and men differ from, and correlate with, each other in terms of honour, status, and varying forms of relationships. More importantly, a temporary elevation to an extraordinary status that approximates divinity is conceivable and recognisable in cosmic society. Furthermore, although death is a common portion for mankind, each human will receive a specific portion of lifetime shaped by his personal effort and determined by Zeus the distributor (cf. 19.223–224; 20.242–243) along with the consent of other gods.

3.3 Achilles at the Seashore and on the Battlefield

The case of Achilles reveals another potential conflict between a man's honour in human realms and his honour assigned by the gods, which has been implied in Hector's struggle between the Trojans' expectations and Zeus' (delusive) empowerment. Like Hector, Achilles' honour-driven wrath, which is supported and authorised by the gods, isolates him from the Achaeans and leads to his 'tragic' loss of Patroclus according to the will of Zeus. Like Diomedes, the divinely empowered Achilles becomes a *theomachos* during his *aristeia*, which confirms his extraordinary status and makes him approximate to a deity, however temporarily. Achilles suffers greatly from his special cosmic status as a son of Thetis and the best of the Achaeans, which ultimately leads to his famous reflection (the Two Urns of Zeus) on the human's cosmic status and the divine–human relationship in the coda of the *Iliad*.

3.3.1 Achilles at Seashore (1): Iliad *1 and 9*

3.3.1.1 The Setting: Achilles between the Best of the Achaeans and the Son of Thetis

When the status of a Homeric warrior such as Diomedes is called into question, he must defend or prove it in words and/or deeds. Like Diomedes, the status of Achilles is severely questioned and insulted in the quarrel with Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1. The dispute arises over *gera,* the marks of one's honour and status, and rapidly develops into a fatal crisis among the Achaeans. One of the key problems in this quarrel is the incommensurability between different standards or scales of value by which each disputant's legitimate claim to honour is judged and measured. Agamemnon and Achilles, as they claim, are *agathoi* and 'the best of Achaeans' (91, 244, 412, etc.), but they are so for different reasons. This is first implied in the implicit comparison between Agamemnon's epithet, 'the king of men' (ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν), and that of Achilles, 'divinely brilliant' (δῖος, 7) in the opening of the *Iliad*. It becomes more explicit in Nestor's mediation (247 ff., esp. 275–284): on the one hand, although Agamemnon, the sceptred king endorsed by Zeus (279; cf. 175), proves to be legitimate in having a larger portion of honour (οὔ ποθ' ὁμοῖης ἔμμορε τιμῆς, 278; cf. 163–168) than Achilles because of his higher rank among the Achaeans and his wider kingship, he should not deprive Achilles of his prize as a legitimate acknowledgement of his honour as 'a mighty bulwark against evil war for all the Achaeans' (283–284); on the other hand, although Achilles is born to a goddess and is superior in martial performance (cf. 163–168; 2.769), he is not entitled to claim an honour equal to that of Agamemnon as the commander-in-chief (cf. 163) and should consider showing *aidos* for his superior (cf. 277–278), like Diomedes does in Book 4.[95]

That the mediation of Nestor is not successful is partly because the standards on which the two disputants' claims to honour are based are not comparable: political rank and rulership (Agamemnon) *versus* physical power (thus merit) and divine parentage (Achilles). Furthermore, it is because Agamemnon shamelessly (149, 158; also 9.372) abuses his authority and violates the reciprocity on which the entire expedition and, more generally, the social norms of the community are based (150–157).[96] The theme of reciprocity is brought up again and developed in Achilles' response to Odysseus later in Book 9 (316–320):

[95] Cairns (1993) 98–99, 211–212; Cairns (2018).
[96] Agamemnon also overreacts to the dissent of Achilles because he assumes Achilles attempts to oust him from power; see 287–289; cf. 131–134.

... ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄρα τις χάρις ἦεν
μάρνασθαι δηίοισι μετ' ἀνδράσι νωλεμὲς αἰεί.
ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι, καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι·
ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἠμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός·
κάτθαν' ὁμῶς ὅ τ' ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ ὅ τε πολλὰ ἐοργώς.

… since there was no gratitude given for fighting incessantly forever against the enemies. Portion is the same for the man who holds back, the same if he fights hard. We are all held in a single honour, the brave and the coward. An idle man dies like a man who works much.

Achilles complains (with an element of exaggeration) that reciprocity as the fundamental ethic and social norm marked by *charis* is no longer observed in the community under the crooked kingship of Agamemnon. Given that this is the case, as Achilles asserts, he is unlikely to retrieve his honour from the Achaeans as long as Agamemnon rules shamelessly, that is, in his own interests and at the expense of others.[97] It is exactly because of Agamemnon's arrogant outrage (368, 375, 387) and violation of reciprocal protocol that Achilles counts his offer as worth as a portion of hair (τίω δέ μιν ἐν καρὸς αἴσῃ, 378; cf. 365–367, esp. ἅσσ' ἔλαχόν γε). The criticism of the fact that the portion (μοῖρα) of honour of the noble is undistinguished from that of the wicked may be reminiscent of Achilles' previous denunciation that Agamemnon rules 'nonentities' (οὐτιδανοῖσιν, 1.231, cf. 293–294) and treats him like a 'dishonoured refugee' (ἀτίμητον μετανάτην, 9.648; 16.59). For Achilles, Agamemnon does not pay the 'full price' that he wants 'for all the heart-rending insolence' (ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην, 387) and his offer means nothing but an authoritative claim of his own superiority. If Achilles accepts the gifts, which are void of honour but full of disrespect, he will be 'deceived' (344, 371, 375) again into sacrificing his invaluable life (401, 408–409) for nothing glorious (see further below).

[97] Cf. Wilson (2002) 103.

The quarrel, however, entails more than moral and social issues within the community of the Achaeans. It is also fundamentally associated with the divine realm. First, the divine–human relationship is related to the claims made by each disputant: the legitimacy in the title of Agamemnon as a king, like many other *basileis*, is endorsed by Zeus (279, cf. 174–175; 2.196–197, 204–206), while the superiority of Achilles largely lies in his divine parentage and his extraordinary strength recognised as a mark of his special relationship with the gods (cf. 178, 290). Furthermore, there is significant intervention and involvement of the gods during the quarrel. When Achilles in his anger (ἄχος, 188; μῆνις, 207; also 217, 224), which arises from perceiving the *hybris* of Agamemnon (203–205, also 214; 9.368, 387),[98] intends to kill Agamemnon after his deliberation (which suggests that the conflict is irresolvable by men), Athena comes to stay his murderous wrath (194 ff.) because of Hera's equal (ὁμῶς, cf. ὁμοῖης in 278) care and love for both heroes (196, also 209).[99] What is more, it is Hera who pities the Achaeans and inspires Achilles to arrange the assembly (54–56). This also recalls Apollo's revenge on the Achaeans redressing the wrongs done to his priest, Chryses (43–52).[100] Like Apollo, Athena now promises to grant Achilles far more gifts in the future on account of Agamemnon's *hybris* (211–214). Instead of immediately settling the quarrel, Athena allows Achilles to 'cast in his teeth what it will be' (ὀνείδισον ὡς ἔσεταί περ, 211). As a substitute for physical retaliation, Achilles lambasts Agamemnon with abusive words (225–232)[101] and poses a severe threat by means of holding the sceptre impressively in his hand (which serves both as 'a token of his right to address to the assembly'[102] and as a symbol for the divine authority of Hera and Athena, despite this not being recognised by other warriors) that one day the Achaeans will desperately need him to ward off the attack of

[98] Cf. Arist. *EN*. 1149b 21–24. For *hybris*, see Fisher (1992) with Cairns (1996) and Cairns (2020).
[99] Let it be noted that Athena does not indicate that Achilles' intention of killing Agamemnon as a *philos* is unjustified. Hera's concern seems to lie in her relationship with Agamemnon more than the appropriate way of treating a wrongdoer in human politics.
[100] Agamemnon's unfitting refusal of Chryses' generous ransom and his open threat addressed as an implicit insult against Apollo (24–32) constitutes a typical dishonour (ἠτίμασεν, 11; cf. 94) against the priest and his divine patron. Immediately after Chryses appeals to Apollo, the god in his *menis* (75; cf. 46, 64) comes to take revenge on the Achaeans (35–42), wreaking horrible havoc on the animals and men throughout the entire camp (43–52).
[101] For ὀνείδισον as a mark of abusive language, see Lentini (2013), esp. § 11. The (divine) authority and power of Achille's verbal threat draw a pathetic contrast with his disempowered status: he can do nothing but let Briseis be taken away in front of him (345–348), a vivid affront to his honour (cf. 429–430); see Muellner (1996) 145.
[102] Kirk (1990) 77.

Hector (240–243, cf. 341–342) and regret 'not giving honour to the best of the Achaeans' (ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτισας, 243–234; cf. 412, with 91 and 2.82).

The threat of Achilles, despite being uttered with the expectation of Hera's fulfilment (1.218),[103] is in fact carried out by Zeus through the mediation of his mother Thetis. Like the weeping Chryses when supplicating for the help of Apollo on the seashore (42), the tearful Achilles, sitting alone on the seashore and gazing over the sea (348–350), calls on his divine mother (352–356):[104]

> μῆτερ ἐπεί μ' ἔτεκές γε μινυνθάδιόν περ ἐόντα,
> τιμήν πέρ μοι ὄφελλεν Ὀλύμπιος ἐγγυαλίξαι
> Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης· νῦν δ' οὐδέ με τυτθὸν ἔτισεν·
> ἦ γάρ μ' Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
> ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας, αὐτὸς ἀπούρας.
>
> My mother, since you bore me, especially since my life is short,[105] therefore Zeus of the loud thunder on Olympus should grant me honour at least. But now he has given me not even a little. Now the son of Atreus, powerful Agamemnon, has dishonoured me, since he himself has taken away my prize and keeps it

Achilles appears to refer to his entitlement to a favour or reciprocal obligation that Zeus owes (ὄφελλεν) him with regard to his honour. The indicated debt is relevant to the one that Zeus owes Thetis, which will be given in fuller form later (396–412). What may be inferred from the present passage is that Achilles' divine parentage and the ordainment of a short life seem to account for this prospect of reciprocity. First, it might refer to Achilles' choice between two possible trajectories of death (κῆρας […] θανάτοιο),[106] i.e. either to die fighting in Troy with undying *kleos* or to meet his death after a longer life without noble *kleos* (9.410–416; cf.

[103] Achilles' threatening plan is beyond Hera's expectation that many of the Achaeans, for whom she cares much (cf. 558–560), will be killed (408–412).
[104] The *Iliadic* scene bears similarities to that of Pelops calling to Poseidon in Pindar's *Olympian* 1, see § 3.2.
[105] For the translation of this line, see Kirk (1985) 89.
[106] Cf. Slatkin (1991) 34–35; Duckworth (1933) 89.

1.416–418, 505–406; 18.95, 457–458; see further below).[107] His presence in Troy shows his choice of glorious but early death over longevity, which is made in line with his commitment to aristocratic ideals (§§ 1.4.1–1.4.2). Second, as the son of Thetis, Achilles is supposed to be superior to other humans born to mortal parents.[108] Additionally, Thetis is not an insignificant deity: her mysterious and efficacious power with which she alone came to the rescue of Zeus (396–406) grants her special status among the gods (cf. 515–516; although she remains inferior to the major deities on Olympus; see 20.104–106).[109]

More importantly, as L.M. Slatkin has established, under the oracle of Themis (who represents the reason to uphold the cosmic order),[110] Thetis was forced to sacrifice the *divine status* (not merely 'immortality' but also privilege, power, and achievement of a deity) of her male offspring for the sake of the sovereignty of Zeus and the stability of the cosmic hierarchy. If this is the case, Zeus is obliged to compensate her son in turn with an alternative of divine status, which appears to be a limited form of divinity, that is, a mortal life with an undying *kleos*, like that of Demophon (§2.2).[111]

For Achilles, then, the present deprivation of honour does not merely result from Agamemnon's hybristic offence and violation of the reciprocal norms that exist among the Achaeans, but is also viewed as the failing of Zeus in his obligation of reciprocity that derives from the relationship between Zeus as the supreme distributor and Achilles as the son of Thetis.

Unlike the case of Chryses (whose prayer for Apollo's justice refers to his ritual service, 1.37–42, esp. χαρίεντ' […] νηόν in 39),[112] Achilles' appeal to Thetis rests on her earlier championing of Zeus (396–406) instead of his own past service to him.[113] As Achilles appealed, Thetis comes to supplicate Zeus with reference to her earlier favour to him (ὄρσα,

[107] For the death of Achilles foreshadowed in the *Iliad*, see Horn (2021) 9–10; cf. 16.707–709; 17.406–408; 18.95–96; 18.115–116 = 22.365–366; 19.416–417; 21.277–278; 22.358–360; 23.80–83, 91–92, 125–126; for his early death, see also 17.194–197; ὠκύμορος in 1.417 and 18.95; ὠκυμορώτατος ἄλλων in 1.505.
[108] Achilles may be implicitly complaining that he cannot become a deity like his mother; see Turkeltaub (2003) 223.
[109] On the inferior position of the Iliadic Thetis and her cosmic power, see Slatkin (1991) 65–84.
[110] The mythical background is alluded in the reference to the marriage of Thetis and Peleus in Book 18 (85–87): Zeus and Poseidon give up their rivalry for the hand of Thetis when they hear the prophecy of Themis that the offspring of Thetis will be better than his father; see *Isth.* 8.29–38; cf. [Aesch.] *PV* 167ff., 908 ff.; Slatkin (1991) 70 ff.; also Muellner (1996) 95.
[111] See also Griffin (1995) 125; cf. Nagy (1990) 122 ff.
[112] For the resemblance between the two scenes, see Kirk (1985) 88. The prayer of Achilles, however, is also a variation of the conventional form of a man praying to a deity, see Slatkin (1991) 61–64 with Muellner (1976).
[113] Cf. 16.233–248, Achilles directly makes a prayer to Zeus with the cup related to the wedding of his parents.

503-504) and entitlement to honour among gods (515–516).[114] Aware of Hera's opposition (518–520),[115] Zeus gives his assent to Thetis as a way of repaying the debt he owes her. The decision of Zeus appears to incorporate his concern about her relation to him: later in Book 24 (110–111), Zeus takes care to secure Thetis' *aidos* and *philotes* to him by granting Achilles a further *kydos* (see § 3.3.3 below).

While Agamemnon's shamelessness and *hybris* separate Achilles from the community by severely violating the social norms based on *charis*, the effective mediation of Thetis brings Achilles into association with Zeus through the workings of *charis*. With the 'renewal' of his relationship with Zeus, Achilles is entitled to restore his cosmic status as a 'demigod' through a 'disempowering empowerment': he will simply wait for Zeus' fulfilment of his plan, according to which Hector will be empowered by Zeus to wreak horrible havoc on the Achaeans and, thus, force Agamemnon to admit his disastrous error (ἄτην, 1.411–412).[116]

3.3.1.2 The Problems in the Rejection of Achilles (Iliad 9)

In *Iliad* 9, Agamemnon is made to admit his own fault, which in turn proves the cosmic status of Achilles defined in terms of his special relationship with the gods: as Nestor remarks, Agamemnon dishonoured 'a man most mighty, whom the very immortals honoured' (110–111; see also 115–120; 2.375–378). The intimate association between Achilles and Zeus, however, turns out to be problematic both to the Achaeans and Achilles himself.

At Nestor's advice (96–113, 163–171), Agamemnon sends Phoenix, Odysseus, and Ajax to persuade Achilles to return to the fray with 'countless compensation' (ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα, 120; cf. 1.12; 24.579).[117] All three emissaries come to supplicate Achilles with appeals to

[114] If Zeus refuses to do honour to Achilles, Thetis will be 'the least honoured among the gods' (μετὰ πᾶσιν ἀτιμοτάτη θεός, 515–516).

[115] The quarrel in the human realm, again, gives rise to a disturbance on Olympus. Although cautious not to excessively offend Hera (518–527), Zeus' assent given to Thetis leads to an unpleasant squabble between himself and Hera (540–570). Yet, the divine quarrel is soon put to rest and changed into a comic scene through the intervention of Hephaestus (571 ff.). The success of Hephaestus lies in the fact that Zeus, unlike his earthly counterpart Agamemnon, does not abuse his unparalleled strength and, as an ideal king, shows respect to other immortals (578–583; compare μαλακοῖσιν and ἴλαος in 582–583 with ἤπια εἰδείη in 16.72).

[116] The ruinous wrath of Achilles against the entire community is not an irrational whim: if other Achaeans were not 'nobodies' but had stood up against the 'people-devouring' king (231–233), as they could have done in favour of Chryses, Agamemnon would not be able to commit *hybris* and violate communal norms twice with impunity.

[117] On the Embassy episode, see e.g. Schein (1984) 104–116; Zanker (1994) 79–92; Redfield (1975) 3–17; Griffin (1995) esp. 51–53; Muellner (1996) 133–143; Kim (2000) 78–103; Wilson (2002) 71–108; Clarke (2019) 217 ff.

sense of honour, pity, and duty, which are fundamental features of aristocratic ideals and reciprocal protocols. In this sense, they attempt to bring Achilles back into the community by re-establishing the *charis* between him and his comrades. The first attempt of Odysseus, however, fails partly because what occupies the centre of his discourse is a report of Agamemnon's abundant compensation (122–157 ≈ 264–299). Achilles detects the intention of Agamemnon behind his gifts and marital offer, despite being well covered by the masterly rhetoric of Odysseus (308–314; cf. 158–161): the king's generosity is but a display of his wealth, authority, and superiority. Indeed, although Agamemnon realises his fault, he does not give up thinking to defend his own superiority and demands Achilles' obedience (158–161). In effect, the extravagance provokes the prideful Achilles and aggravates the conflict even further.

In response to Odysseus' appeals to his sense of pity and duty, Achilles rhetorically attempts to dissuade the Achaeans from fighting at Troy[118] by professing to renounce the heroic ideals: from the two possible 'sorts of destiny' heard from Thetis he will now choose *nostos* instead of *aphithon kleos* (410–427). The reported prophecy of Thetis (which seems not to have been relayed to his comrades)[119] reminds his audience of his special status as the son of Thetis. With this divine-maternal authority, Achilles seems to refuse the kind of honour defined by aristocratic and paternal ideology. More harshly, his last counsel also implicitly (later explicitly in 649–655) harks back to the curse-like oath made at the end of the quarrel that he wills to send many Achaeans to their death (1.240–243, 340–342, 408–412).

The emissaries are silenced and amazed at Achilles' relentless obduracy and powerful threat (9.430–431). Phoenix takes up the role of paternal figure to persuade Achilles, implicitly against the maternal authority of Thetis. The aged mentor first impassions Achilles to follow his advice by recalling the memories shared among himself, Peleus, and Achilles (434–495). He then proceeds to give injunction on accepting justified supplication by telling the allegory of *Litae* and *Ate* (496–523) and the exemplar tale of Meleager (524–599).

[118] Cf. 9.337–341, echoing Thersites' wording, 2.225–243.
[119] It may be an intervention of Achilles, see Hainsworth (1993) 116; cf. 13.665–670; 2.830–834; 11.328–332.

Phoenix winds up (601–605) his long discourse with a warning of the possible divine retribution brought by Achilles' obduracy and drawing his attention again to the aristocratic ideology along with a reasonable calculation of the undesired outcome of taking actions too late to receive Agamemnon's gifts (see also 519) and the godlike honour offered by the Achaeans (603). The paternal authority in the beginning nicely echoes the aristocratic ideology implied in the end.[120]

Achilles' response to Phoenix, however, is again frustrating (607–610):

> Φοῖνιξ, ἄττα γεραιέ, διοτρεφές, οὔ τι με ταύτης
> χρεὼ τιμῆς· φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴσῃ,
> ἥ μ' ἔξει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, εἰς ὅ κ' ἀυτμὴ
> ἐν στήθεσσι μένῃ καί μοι φίλα γούνατ' ὀρώρῃ.
>
> Phoenix my father, aged, illustrious, such honour is a thing I need not. I think I am honoured already in Zeus' ordinance, which will hold me here beside my curved ships as long as life's breath stays in my breast, as long as my knees have their spring beneath me.

The current success of Hector gives Achilles a hint (φρονέω, cf. 16.50–51) that Thetis has persuaded Zeus to grant him the portion or allotment of life (αἴσῃ) that he has already chosen. Relying on his special link with Zeus via Thetis' intimate mediation,[121] Achilles is concerned about his cosmic status secured by Zeus and rejects the honour conferred by the Achaeans. The rejection shows that his previous alleged preference of longevity over glorious death only serves his rhetorical purpose in his emotional response to Odysseus. More importantly, the honour that Achilles expects comes into conflict with the honour defined in terms of the

[120] In rejecting Agamemnon's marital proposal as part of the compensation, which appears to be an attempt to impose a paternal authority, Achilles mentions the fatherhood of Peleus, who will arrange the marriage for him and shares the rich possessions with him, if he would return to Phthia (384–400). Phoenix implicitly questions the maternal authority in the narrative of his own dishonoured and vindictive mother (450–453) and Meleager's vengeful mother, Althaea, who puts a deadly curse on her son for killing her brothers (565–571). These destructive female figures seem to allude to Thetis, who informs Achilles about his alternative deaths (cf. 16.33–35).

[121] The paternal authority in the pair of Phoenix-Peleus is replaced by the divine-paternal authority of Zeus, as mediated by Thetis.

aristocratic code (see §§ 1.4.1–1.4.2; note 12.310–327 echoing 9.401–409):[122] both Odysseus and Phoenix explicitly mention that the Achaeans will honour him like a god (οἵ σε θεὸν ὣς τίσουσ', 302–303; ἶσον γάρ σε θεῷ τίσσουσιν Ἀχαιοί, 603; cf. 297) if Achilles could in turn take the responsibility of warding them off the attack of Hector. The godlike status recognised by the Achaeans, which is the highest status or privilege acknowledged in reciprocal terms, is replaced by the limited form of Achilles' divine status, and part of his *aisa* ordained by Zeus, which is secured by the reciprocity among Achilles, Thetis, and Zeus. In other words, Achilles seeks to defend his *cosmic status* primarily as 'the son of Thetis' rather than 'the best of the Achaeans', which is secondary or derivative. Achilles will not re-enter the community by accepting the social authority of king Agamemnon nor through the mediation of the earthly paternal authority of Phoenix-Peleus, but instead through the maternal mediation of Thetis and the divine-paternal authority of Zeus.

The differentiation of the two kinds of honour in the rejection of Achilles does not mean that the aristocratic ideology is a set of values and ideas within the human realm. Rather, as argued above, the belief that human achievement is predicated on divine will is not separated from one's deliberations and actions related to one's pursuit of honour. And this belief, which speaks of the divine–human relationship in reciprocal terms, comes hand in hand with the aristocratic code of honour that underlies one's personal initiative, prowess, and responsibility to others. The case of Achilles is atypical: his claim to honour is made exclusively or primarily (especially in his response to Phoenix) in terms of the divine authority, his exceptional pedigree, and his special relationship with Zeus via Thetis, although other heroes are also called demigods (*Il.* 12.23) who are descended from a union between an immortal and a mortal.

Achilles' response is problematic to his comrades who have no divine authority like Zeus to confer the kind of honour Achilles now demands. In this light, the failure of Odysseus lies in the limitation of his persuasion, which speaks only of human honour without acknowledging its relation to gods. Better than Odysseus, Phoenix widens the scope of the

[122] Cairns (2018) 397–398; cf. Schein (1980). I am suspicious of the validity of Schein's reading that Achilles here expresses 'his alienation from the values of his society' (128).

mediation to include the relationship and interactions between gods and men. It is noteworthy that, prior to the allegory of *Litae*, Phoenix suggests a comparison between Achilles and the gods in broad terms: 'Then, Achilles, beat down your great spirit. It is not yours to have a pitiless heart. Even the very gods can be moved, though their excellence, honour, and strength (ἀρετὴ τιμή τε βίη τε) are greater than ours' (9.497–498). Like Nestor in *Iliad* 1, Phoenix suggests with an element of warning that Achilles, despite being the son of Thetis, should not transgress the moral codes (here related to the protocols regarding suppliants) that both inferior humans and vastly superior gods observe. Although this reminder of Phoenix is powerful, it does not persuade Achilles because it is now Zeus who authorises Achilles' withdrawal from the battlefield and guarantees the restoration of his cosmic status according to his divine will, which stands beyond the human realm and might not, theoretically, transgress the norms embodied in *Litae* and *Ate*.

Nevertheless, the rejection of Achilles remains problematic to himself in another fundamental aspect of his life. In fact, his personal hatred against Agamemnon and his ruinous plan of revenge on his people come into severe conflict with his friendship with other prominent comrades. The theme of friendship has been addressed by Odysseus and Phoenix and develops further in Ajax's concise but powerful speech (9.624–642). Crucially, Ajax reminds Achilles of the *philotes* (630) and *aidos* (640) that he owes his comrades, who (except Agamemnon) have been honouring and loving him above all others (631, 641–642). In Ajax's description, the excessive obduracy of Achilles seems to go beyond the human normality (629, 636–637):

> ἄγριον ἐν στήθεσσι θέτο μεγαλήτορα θυμόν ...
> ... σοὶ δ' ἄλληκτόν τε κακόν τε
> θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι θεοὶ θέσαν εἵνεκα κούρης
>
> Achilles has made savage the proud-hearted spirit within his body […] but the gods put in your breast a spirit, not to be placated, bad, for the sake of a girl.

The term ἄγριος, 'wild, savage', in 629 denotes that Achilles' mind is alienated from the values of human civilisation which are also endorsed by gods, working well with reference to divine influence upon his mind in line 637, which likewise suggests Achilles' hyper-human state of mind (cf. 16.33–35).[123]

In response to Ajax, Achilles acknowledges the friendship to his comrades (644–645), which echoes his greetings to the ambassadors (197–198). However, his anger against Agamemnon's insult remains stronger than his affection for his comrades (646–648). Achilles leaves the emissaries with his restatement of the cruel oath (649–655). The wrath of Achilles drives him to an ambiguously dangerous point: his obdurate rejection of the collective supplication in Book 9 bears resemblance to Agamemnon's rejection of the supplication of Chryses in Book 1. Indeed, Ajax' appeal to *aidos* in the coda (640) along with the lines quoted here reminds us of the language of Achilles' condemnation against Agamemnon that he is shameless, dog-faced, and deer-hearted in Book 1 (149, 225). The warning against the excessive obduracy implied here is not merely applicable to human affairs: as we shall see below, Achilles' excessive anger against Hector that drives him to humiliate the corpse is condemned by Apollo as *agrios* and shameless (24.41–44). As the ethic of reciprocity is endorsed and practised by gods and humans, so are the moral requirements related to *aidos* and *philotes*.

Conversely, if the extraordinary godlike status of Achilles is taken into consideration in a more serious sense, the moral warnings in the discourse of both Ajax and Phoenix might be weakened: Achilles appears to be entitled to redress the insult to his honour and appease his *menis* by means of a disastrous devastation (λοίγος), like Apollo whose *menis* is expressed by a plague that destroys a large amount of living things within the realm of Agamemnon's rulership. Nevertheless, the problem remains in the conflict between his *menis*, a mark of his cosmic status as the son of Thetis, and *philotes*, the relationship that he owes others and needs for himself as a mortal. Achilles will suffer as a victim of his own *menis*, which makes him

[123] It is noteworthy that in Sophocles, the savage Ajax paradoxically takes a hyper-human way to fulfil his commitment to this human normality; see Chapter 5.

withdraw from the fray and thus wastes his φιλὸν κῆρ (1.488–492), allows Hector to bring harm to many of his *philoi* and kill his double, Patroclus, his φιλὸς ἑταῖρος (e.g. 18.80, 114).

3.3.2 The Return of Achilles: Between Aristeia *and* Theomachia

Like his withdrawal from the Achaeans, the return of Achilles reveals that the extraordinary nature of his status is close to the divine one but also ambiguously 'located' in a hyper-human, perilous position. Nevertheless, his honour and status are ultimately predicated on his relationship with the gods. The following section will describe the defining features of his temporarily divine status in terms of his actions, state of mind, and relationship with the gods and will attempt to 'index' him in the cosmic society—as we shall see, the *aristeia* of Achilles, during which he is empowered by the gods, is best understood via its association with the cosmic-scaled *theomachia*.

*3.3.2.1 The Arming of Achilles (*Iliad *18 and 19)*

On learning of the death of Patroclus, Achilles in his great sorrow decides to return to the battlefield to avenge his dearest comrade and retrieve his aristocratic self and honour (*esthlon kleos*, 18.121; cf. 9.415 and 16.31 f.), despite knowing that this will accelerate the coming of his death (18.79–93, 98–126).[124] What makes his return essential is a close fight over the corpse of Patroclus (18.165–201). Before Thetis delivers the new armour to Achilles, Hera sends Iris to arouse Achilles to show himself on the trench (202–214). The subsequent episode (215–238) becomes a rehearsal of the arming scene later in *Iliad* 19 (364–397) and creates a brief epitome of the coming *aristeia*. Instead of Thetis, it is Athena who arrives to empower and equip Achilles with a divine weapon and supernatural blaze (202–206):

> αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ὦρτο Διὶ φίλος, ἀμφὶ δ' Ἀθήνη
> ὤμοις ἰφθίμοισι βάλ' αἰγίδα θυσσανόεσσαν,
> ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ κεφαλῇ νέφος ἔστεφε δῖα θεάων

[124] Achilles has certain knowledge of his imminent death by the hand of Apollo and Paris (see below 21.278; cf. 22.358–360), and he embraces his death in particular after the death of Patroclus (18.95–96, 115–121; 19.417–423; 21.109–113; 22.365–366; cf. 20.125–128); for his death in the *Iliad*, see Burgess (2009) 98–110.

χρύσεον, ἐκ δ’ αὐτοῦ δαῖε φλόγα παμφανόωσαν.

> But Achilles, the beloved of Zeus, rose up, and Athena swept about his powerful shoulders the tasselled aegis; and she, the divine among goddesses, about his head circled a golden cloud, and kindled from it[125] a flame far-shining.

The scenario resembles the brief arming scene[126] before the *aristeia* of Diomedes when the goddess instils *menos* and *tharsos* into the young hero and makes his head ablaze (5.1–7). By comparison, Achilles seems to be elevated to a much superior status in a strikingly unparalleled scenario: the goddess equips Achilles, a living mortal, with the divine *aegis*, a wondrous and fearful weapon wrought by Hephaestus, which is particularly associated with Zeus but also appears in the manifestation of Athena (e.g. 2.446–454) and Apollo (15.308–311, on Zeus’ command) on the battlefield.[127] Like *geras*, armour or accoutrement is a mark of one’s identity and honour. The old armour of Achilles is a mark both of Peleus’ honour and of a special relationship with the gods (17.194–197, 18.84–85, etc.). Likewise, Achilles allows Patroclus whom he ‘loved beyond all’ as his own life (18.81–82) to put on his armour to fight as his substitute (16.40–41, 64, 83–90) and prays that he will return safe with the armour and comrades (16.247–248). Hector’s stripping off the armour from Patroclus and donning it (17.192–212) constitutes severe disrespect against Patroclus and Achilles (18.82–93). Likewise, when Achilles considers borrowing armour from his fellows for temporary use, the armour of Telamonian Ajax appears as the first choice (18.192–193), probably because Ajax’s honour approximates that of Achilles in terms of martial prowess (2.768–769). In this sense, by lending the *aegis* to Achilles, Athena seems to have the warrior as her peer and confirm that Achilles’ status is superior and qualified to use the weapon of Zeus, but only for a brief moment. This special relationship between the two has already been indicated during

[125] For the ambiguous reference of the pronoun αὐτοῦ (either Achilles’ head or the cloud), see Coray (2018) 89–90.
[126] For an arming scene as the one of the Homeric ‘type-scenes’, see Arend (1933) 92–97; Armstrong (1958); Hainsworth (1993) 215–223; Matthew Clarke (2004) 134–135.
[127] OCD *s.v.* ‘aegis’; Kirk (1985) *ad* 2.446–451; Janko (1994) *ad* 15.308–311; Coray (2018) *ad* 18.203–204. Heath (2005) 125–126 suggests reading the aegis as a symbol of the combination of divinity and bestiality in Achilles.

the epiphany of Athena to Achilles in *Iliad* 1.[128] The encounter highlights the specialness of Achilles by making Athena reveal herself only to him without others' recognition.[129] Moreover, the opening phrase of Athena's response (αἴ κε πίθηαι, 207) takes a respectful tone to the exasperated hero, leaving the decision to him rather than assuming his blind obedience.[130] As D. Turkeltaub suggested, it is rare to find a warrior 'bargain' with a recognised deity as 'a peer striking a deal to exchange favours'.[131]

With this in mind, let us also take a look at another arming scene of the goddess in *Iliad* 5, which indeed has further correspondence to the present passage (5.733–747): the goddess 'threw around her shoulders the tasselled *aegis*' (738 ≈ 18.203), then 'upon her head she set the golden helm' (743, cf. 18.205–206, 225–227), and 'set her feet in the blazing (φλόγεα) chariot' (745, cf. φλόγα in 18.206). As a poetic technique and motif, the arming scene functions as a preparation for the upcoming battle (often an *aristeia*), where the protagonist (either a god or a man) is about to claim the honour in action and serves as poetic praise or glorification in which the status of the honorand is recognised.[132] Here, the elaborate details of the *aegis* (739–742), introduced by a hymnic relative (ἥν), honorifically serves to emphasise Athena's power and her status as the daughter of Zeus, to which the Iliadic narrator keeps drawing the audience's attention in the whole scene by deploying relevant epithets (κούρη Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο, 733; Διὸς τέρας αἰγιόχοιο, 742; ὀβριμοπάτρη, 747). In addition, the status of Athena is further emphasised in an implicit divine–human opposition (note ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων […] ὀβριμοπάτρη in 746–747).

Likewise, the arming scene of Achilles in *Iliad* 18, along with the following short *aristeia*, serves to recognise his superior status and thus accords him poetic glory. The recognition, however, is blurry because the status of the honorand appears to exist between humans and gods. The epithet, 'dear to Zeus' (διΐφιλος or Διὶ φίλος, 203) – standing next to the verb (ὦρτο), which marks the dramatic moment of Achilles' return (the *peripeteia* of the

[128] Guthrie (1950) 120.
[129] The dominant role of Achilles in their exchange by speaking first (1.202–205) challenges the epiphanic protocol, according to which a deity is expected to initiate the conversation with a mortal in the epiphany scene; see Schulz (2018) 26.
[130] See also *Il.* 21.293 with Griffin (1980) 160; Turkeltaub (2003) 238; Schulz (2018) 26 and 42.
[131] Turkeltaub (2003) 144.
[132] See Sammons (2017) 158 n.1, 163; cf. Armstrong (1958); Hainsworth (1993) 215–223; Matthew Clarke (2004) 134–135.

Iliad, in Whitman's terms)[133] – denotes the specialness of Achilles' association with Zeus. Along with his donning of the *aegis* and the nimbus-like golden cloud,[134] the passage appears to suggest that audiences perceive Achilles as an equal of Athena or Apollo, an offspring of Zeus. As usual, this indication of the temporary divine status of a mortal human is balanced by repeating Achilles' patronymic epithets, Αἰακίδαο (repeated twice in 221–222) and Πηλείωνος (226), which denote the mortal side of his lineage. Since Aeacus is the son of Zeus and Aegina,[135] however, the honorific epithet Αἰακίδαο, like διΐφιλος, could refer to the intimacy between Achilles and Zeus and thus his superior status,[136] rather than simply underlining his mortality.

Moreover, with the empowerment of Athena, the appearance and voice of Achilles greatly disturb the battlefield like a deity's would: his fiery head and trumpet-like shout (elaborated in two similes) cause fatal rout among the Trojans (twelve *aristoi* perish, 217–229) and bring deliverance to the Achaeans (230–233).[137] The dazzling presence of Achilles and its horrible consequence make the whole scene appear like a kind of epiphany, in which Achilles undertakes the role of a god in an 'epiphanic moment' that terrifies the mortals who see him.[138]

The arming scene in *Iliad* 18 prefigures Thetis' delivery of armour (19.3–12) and the second arming scene of Achilles (364–392). The arrival of Thetis brings the clang of the armour among the lamentation in the encampment of the Myrmidons. The sudden onset of the noise from the armour of Hephaestus distinguishes Achilles from his comrades: while all the Myrmidons are 'gripped with tremor' (τρόμος) and 'shy away' (ἔτρασαν) from 'looking straight at it', Achilles is 'glad' (τέρπετο, 18; τετάρπετο, 19) to look upon and hold the divine gifts, whose radiance reflects in his eyes glittering terribly (δεινόν) like flame (17–18). The

[133] Whitman (1958) 137.
[134] The golden cloud may be read as a special attribute of Olympus, see 13.521–525.
[135] Aeacus is reported to become a judge in the Underworld, see Pl. *Ap.* 41a, *Grg.* 524a.
[136] Note the juxtaposition of ἴαχε and δῖος in 228: while ἴαχε acoustically resembles Αἰακίδης/Αἰακός in 221–222, δῖος takes up Διὶ φίλος in 203.
[137] In stark contrast with Achilles' self-condemnation as 'a profitless burden', who has failed to be the light of salvation to his comrades (18.102–106), he now becomes the light of deliverance in both a literal and metaphorical sense. Cf. 15.307–327 and 5.738–747; also 2.446–454: the protective and destructive powers of Achilles, as in the case of the divinely empowered Diomedes, are also reflected in the similes related to fire and heavenly bodies (19.373–379, 381; esp. 22.26–32, see § 3.1.2 and below).
[138] Turkeltaub (2003) 227. See also Edwards (1991) 169; Constantinidou (2010) 98.

tremor of the Myrmidons picks up the fear of the Trojans hearing the divinely reinforced shout of the *aegis*-armoured Achilles (18.217–229). The scenario, in which Achilles is separated metaphorically and physically from his ordinary comrades, stands as a kind of epiphany that reveals his extraordinary status and his proximity to the divine.

In addition, the light imagery in verse 17 is noteworthy with its elaborate development in the final arming scene (19.365–366, 374–379, 381–383, 398). The constellation of imagery not only denotes the conspicuous specialness of Achilles' power and appearance but also associates him with the divine and natural realm beyond human control. Like the arming scene, the light imagery marks his distance from his comrades and approximate him as superior, superhuman or a divine figure. Likewise, this distance from the human status is denoted in his refusal to eat and drink, which is related to social values and communal life.[139] Instead of attending the earthly feast, Achilles is nourished by *nectar* and *ambrosia* from Athena on the behest of Zeus (19.342–348, 352–354).[140] Like the donning of the *aegis* in the previous arming scene, his consumption of divine food is another mark of his intimacy with the gods, especially Zeus and Athena. Achilles behaves almost like an equal to a deity in the eyes of the other mortals.

3.3.2.2 Aristeia *and* Theomachia *(*Iliad *20–21)*

The return of Achilles becomes an event that is significant both to the human war and to the gods. In *Iliad* 20, when Achilles arms himself and arouses the Achaeans to fight, Zeus summons almost *all* deities to an assembly on Olympus (6–14, echoing the divine meeting in Book 1). Zeus now allows other gods to give assistance to whichever side they choose (22–25). With the removal of the previous restriction (cf. 8.5–27), a large-scale *theomachia,* 'Battle of the Gods' is expected (31–40, 47–75). The arrangement of Zeus is thus made lest some unexpected outcome follows from the potentially excessive revenge of Achilles (26–30):

[139] Clarke (2019) 276–277.
[140] For the significance of consuming *ambrosia* and *nectar* in relation to one's status, see §§ 2.1–2.2; *Od.* 5.92–93 with 194–199 in § 2.3; *Ol.* 1.62 in § 4.1.2.

εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς οἷος ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μαχεῖται,
οὐδὲ μινυνθ’ ἕξουσι ποδώκεα Πηλεΐωνα.
καὶ δέ τί μιν καὶ πρόσθεν ὑποτρομέεσκον ὁρῶντες·
νῦν δ’ ὅτε δὴ καὶ θυμὸν ἑταίρου χώεται αἰνῶς,
δείδω μὴ καὶ τεῖχος ὑπὲρ μόρον ἐξαλαπάξῃ.

For if we leave Achilles alone to fight with the Trojans, they will not even for a little hold off the swift-footed son of Peleus. For even before now they would tremble whenever they saw him, and now when his heart is grieved and angered for his companion’s death, I fear against what is ordained he may storm their fortress.

Achilles is so vastly superior to his enemies in terms of power that he *alone* will crush the defence of the Trojans (cf. Hector’s assertion in 5.473–474; also 10.47–50). The frightening effect of his presence echoes his epiphany-like sudden appearance in *Iliad* 18 (see also 21.566; 22.40). To this extent, Achilles approximates a deity in respect of his martial prowess (cf. 20.356–359). Along with his extraordinary strength, the exceeding anger of Achilles (cf. 1.44, 46, 380, 429) for the death of Patroclus becomes a matter of concern that may lead to an outcome beyond what Zeus has ordained (ὑπὲρ μόρον, 30; cf. *Od.* 1.34–35), that is in contradiction with his plan (βουλή, 20), which he has declared before (8.473–477; 15.59–77). Instead of sending some deity to check any excessive actions of Achilles,[141] Zeus directs a *theomachia* as a counterbalance to the *aristeia* of Achilles.

Interestingly, the arrangement of Zeus invests the *aristeia* of Achilles with an element of cosmic significance. First, while the withdrawal of Achilles inflicts heavy casualties on the Achaeans and gives rise to a brief discord in the house of Zeus, his return wreaks frightful havoc on the Trojans and brings violent disturbance among the gods. Furthermore, it is noted that the opening scene of the *theomachia* (20.56–74; 21.385–390) resembles that of the conflict between Zeus and Typhoeus in Hesiod (*Th.* 847–852).[142] Unlike the Hesiodic

[141] In fact, after the *theomachia*, only Apollo remains on earth to counterbalance the power of Achilles, see 21.515–520.
[142] Graziosi (2016) 48–49.

scenario, however, the divine order has been established and secured under the powerful control of Zeus in the *Iliad*. Instead of engaging in battle, Zeus detaches himself from it and takes it as an entertaining spectacle (cf. τέρψομαι, 23; ἐγέλασσε, 21.389): indeed, the *theomachia* in *Iliad* 21, after the conflict between Hephaestus and Scamander as two elemental forces (on which see below), gradually becomes a domestic farce and turns out to be a jocular, sport-like, festive celebration for the Olympian order.[143] The *theomachia*, therefore, appears as a ritual-like re-establishment or confirmation of the cosmic hierarchy upheld by Zeus.

In this light, the expansive episode of the Shield of Achilles (18.478–608) is thematically relevant in the sense that it provides a timely, elaborate description of the cosmic society, celebrating both the establishment of the Olympian order and serving as a meaningful context for the return of Achilles. It is in such a grand, cheerful, and cosmic setting that the final episode of the *aristeia* of Achilles is staged according to Zeus' plan. In other words, the process of Achilles' restoration of status is associated with the *theomachia*. Indeed, the *aristeia* of Achilles, reaching its height, comes to be so closely juxtaposed with the *theomachia* that it appears to be a part of it.[144] If this is the case, it is striking to find that the scene of his encounter with Asteropaeus is cast in the pattern of a *theomachia* with Achilles playing the role of the god (cf. δαίμονι ἶσος, 20.447): the '3+1' pattern is used to describe the actions of Asteropaeus, while Achilles checks his fourth attempt and slaughters him (21.176–182).[145] It is worth noting here that during his first encounter with Hector, Achilles has already challenged the '3+1' pattern: it is Achilles who plays the role of uttering (restrictive) threat (20.448) at his fourth charge, 'like a deity', to strike the mist by which Apollo protects Hector (441–454).[146] This manner of action is indicative of Achilles' superhuman state of mind and stature in comparison to a mortal opponent.[147] In addition,

[143] The male gods are restrained from a real fight, while the goddesses are 'out of control'; see Graziosi (2016) 55. The only serious conflict is perhaps the one between Hephaestus and Scamander, which serves as a symbolic reminder of the *theomachia* between the Titans and the Olympians, Zeus, and Typhoeus.
[144] Note especially αὐτάρ in 47 and 75.
[145] Chaudhuri (2014) 26–27; Bolt (2019) 301; for the '3+1' pattern related to the *theomachia* (human against deity), see also Chaudhuri (2014) 16–55. See in general Beck (2018).
[146] Cf. 5.436–439 (Diomedes vs Apollo); 16.702–706 (Patroclus vs Apollo), 784–787 (Patroclus vs Apollo); cf. *Od.* 21.125–129; see Edwards (1991) 338.
[147] See also Nagy (1979) 142–150; Muellner (1996) 10–18.

Achilles conceives his victory over Asteropaeus as a natural consequence of the superiority of Zeus' descendants over the offspring of the river-deities (139–199, esp. 184 ff.; cf. 2 and 18). Raging like fire, Achilles also seems to draw an implicit comparison between himself and Zeus, who holds the horrible thunder. Similarly, Achilles' earlier boast over the corpse of Lycaon explicitly belittles the power of Xanthus and, thus, provokes the river god (124–138). Furthermore, Achilles shows very limited respect for Xanthus in his perfunctory response (223–226) to the river-god's courteous request (214–221).[148] The Homeric narrator does not fail to signpost the unusual demeanour of Achilles (227):

> Ὣς εἰπὼν Τρώεσσιν ἐπέσσυτο δαίμονι ἶσος.
>
> So saying he swept down on the Trojans, equal to a god.

The thematic formula *daimoni isos* appears also in the opening of *Iliad* 21 when Achilles, the Zeus-begotten (ὁ διογενής), 'leapt in like a god' (δαίμονι ἶσος, 17; also 20.493). Only here do we find the epithet *diogenes*, frequently applied to various figures, used with a definite article. This thematic designation interestingly echoes the description of Xanthus, 'whom the immortal Zeus begot' (2) several lines above.[149] Furthermore, with the help of Hera, Achilles rages like 'unwearied fire' (ἀκάματον πῦρ) and drives the locust-like Trojans down into the water of Xanthus (12–16) – the description undoubtedly picks up on another fire simile, a few lines earlier, during the massacre of the Trojans by Achilles at the end of *Iliad* 20: Achilles, like the 'god-kindled fire' (θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ, 490), which is driven by winds to sweep through the deep glens, rages everywhere 'like a god' (δαίμονι ἶσος, 493). All these – the fire similes, the thematic *daimoni isos*, the special epithet of 'Zeus-begotten', the grand settings etc. – bring Achilles, like the divinely empowered Diomedes and Hector, into the realm of natural forces that are mainly under the control of gods. The divine–human opposition seems relaxed

[148] There is a hint of transgression (e.g. *hybris*) in Achilles' demeanour that he behaves towards a god in a way unbecoming to a god.
[149] Let it be noted that lines 1–2 are formulaic (see 14.433–444 and 24.692–693).

as Achilles approximates the divine-natural force of fire and appears to take actions in the fashion of a deity in his verbal rivalry with the god of watery force.

Although Achilles appears to straddle the line between divine and human, his weakness and inferiority are immediately recalled (21.264) when he proves unable to resist the strong waves of the 'Zeus-fed' (διιπετέος) Scamander (234–271). Achilles is frustrated to see himself as vulnerable as a swineherd boy who is about to be drowned ignobly and insignificantly in a wild place of running torrent (281–283). This brief but striking comparison shows how far Achilles is led away from the aristocratic ideology, and that he comes to the lowest position opposite his previous godlike status (281–283).[150] He laments (ᾤμωξεν, like the powerless, old Priam, 529) with great disappointment that the gods, especially his mother and Zeus, fail to keep their promise to grant him a glorious death under the missiles of Apollo (273–278; cf. 18.79–93 above). The sudden danger, nevertheless, showcases the nature of his godlike status which is predicated on his relation to the gods rather than the degree of his physical power. Indeed, Achilles plunges into the nadir of his *aristeia* only to find his intimacy with gods and thus his exceptional status: instantly (μάλ' ὦκα) after his pathetic appeal to Zeus, Poseidon and Athena unusually arrive together at his side, 'taking his hand in theirs', to give verbal assurance of divine assistance (283–292) and courteously ask him (αἴ κε πίθηαι, cf. 1.207 quoted above) to return after killing Hector (293–297).

With Athena's empowerment, Achilles ultimately 'rushed straight on against the flood' (299–304) and, by doing so, fights with the river-god as his equal. In order to 'check this savage man' (ἄγριον ἄνδρα),[151] Xanthus must rally his forces and appeal to his brother Simois (307 ff.). At this very moment, Achilles again rages in a manner equal to that of the gods' (ἶσα θεοῖσι, 314–315). Against the fully charged counterattack of Xanthus, Hephaestus arrives to compete against Xanthus with his 'unwearied' and 'god-kindled fire' (341–342), strengthened with the winds brought by Hera (334–337),[152] which burn all flora and fauna on

[150] For a detailed discussion of the swineherd boy simile, see Ready (2011) 194–197.
[151] The adjective ἄγριος aligns Achilles with the river-god in the sense that he is transformed into a kind of natural force as strong as that of the river. Savage bestiality, as suggested above, marks Achilles' position and disposition which are beyond a human's reach but also appear to be opposite to the demeanour of a deity.
[152] The fire imagery resembles that related to Achilles in 20.490 ff., 21.12 ff.

the banks and bring the river to boil like a hot cauldron (21.362 ff.).[153] The Achilles–Xanthus battle leads to the Hephaestus–Xanthus conflict and gives a starting point for the actual encounters of gods. From the sequence of events in Books 20 and 21 and the textual observations above, we may infer that the *aristeia* of Achilles is conceived as a significant part of (or affixed to) the *theomachia* and, if so, that Achilles appears to approximate a divine figure, however temporarily, playing a role in the Battle of the Gods.

This reading, if tenable, may also shed some new light to the understanding of the expansive encounter between Achilles and Aeneas (20.75–352), 'two men the far best' (ἔξοχ' ἄριστοι, 158; cf. 334, 338–339), after the brief catalogue of the duelling pairs among the gods (31–74). The duel resembles the Achilles–Asteropaeus encounter in the sense that it is understood (as Apollo puts it) as the conflict between the offspring of a daughter (Aphrodite) of Zeus and the progeny of a daughter (Thetis) of Nereus (105–107). With the heavily explored themes of genealogy (105–107, 178–258, 302–308) and the divine–human relationship (esp. 97–98, 104, 119–124, 242–243, 298–299, 334, 347),[154] the lengthy episode, in effect, serves to 'index' Achilles in the cosmic hierarchy as an extraordinary figure with Aeneas standing as his inferior foil.

At the end of the *theomachia*, the gods 'went to Olympus' and 'sat down beside the father' (21.519–520) – a reminder of the firmly established order under the rule of Zeus. Only Apollo remains on earth and concerns himself with the divine ordainment (515–518; cf. 20.30), because the massacre-like onslaught of Achilles continues in a dreadful manner (520–525):[155]

... αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς,
Τρῶας ὁμῶς αὐτούς τ' ὄλεκεν καὶ μώνυχας ἵππους.

[153] Mackie (1998) 330 observed the thematic connection between the Iliadic passage here and Aegimius, referring to Achilles' immersion in fire or water; cf. Burgess (2009) 9–11, 102. 138n.11. Cf. *Il.* 21.520–525, on which see below.
[154] For instance, the detailed lineage of Aeneas, on the hand one, helps to explain the reasons for which Poseidon intervenes to save Aeneas from the hands of Achilles: it is not ordained (μόριμον) to annihilate the house of Dardanus, whom Zeus 'loves' (φίλατο) above all mortals (304–305); in addition, Aeneas has found favour with the gods with his pleasing (κεχαρισμένα) gifts (298–299, also 347). On the other hand, it also embeds the present encounter and the *aristeia* of Achilles in a larger mythical background in which the famous Ganymede was once elevated to live as a drinking companion of Zeus (233–235).
[155] The αὐτάρ in 520 circles back to the one in 20.75.

ὡς δ’ ὅτε καπνὸς ἰὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἵκηται
ἄστεος αἰθομένοιο, θεῶν δέ ἑ μῆνις ἀνῆκε,
πᾶσι δ’ ἔθηκε πόνον, πολλοῖσι δὲ κήδε’ ἐφῆκεν,
ὥς Ἀχιλεὺς Τρώεσσι πόνον καὶ κήδε’ ἔθηκεν.

Meanwhile Achilles was destroying alike the Trojans themselves and their single-foot horses; and as when smoke ascending goes up into the wide sky from a burning city, with the anger of the gods let loose upon it which inflicted labour upon them all, and sorrow on many, so Achilles inflicted labour and sorrow upon the Trojans.

This simile artistically signposts the transition from the *theomachia* to the earthly battle, from Hector’s threat of burning the ships of the Achaeans (8.180–183, with 553–565) to Achilles’ burning desire for vengeance that leads to the death of Hector and the lamentation of the Trojans (which ‘burns’ Ilion, 22.408–411; cf. 20.313–317).[156] The thematic *menis* in verse 523 alludes to the *menis* of Achilles in the prologue of the *Iliad* (1.1–5) and recalls his previous *menis* against Agamemnon, which has been foresworn in *Iliad* 19 (56–68). If *menis* is also the subject of the verbs in verse 524,[157] the point of comparison is not between divinely empowered Achilles and divinely ignited smoke (cf. 18.207–214) but between the fire-like onslaught driven by his new *menis* against Hector[158] and the calamitous, fiery smoke raised by the divine *menis* (8.549–552; cf. 1.43–52). If that is the case, the parenthesis in verse 523, along with the unusual repetition in the following verses, makes Achilles approximate a wrathful, divine figure, whom Apollo must check (see more below) lest the sack of Troy takes place on this very day (cf. 538–539, 544–545).[159]

The *theomachia* seems to continue in Apollo’s delaying the onslaught of Achilles. The god’s substitution of himself for Agenor (who is divinely empowered to fight with Achilles

[156] Cf. Moulton (1977) 50.
[157] See e.g. Muellner (1996) 48; for a different view (*kapnos* as the subject), see Nannini (2003) 98–99. For further discussion on this simile, see Richardson (1993) 97; Ready (2011) 47–48, 259; Constantinidou (2019) 111–113;
[158] Cf. 18.109–111, on which see Ready (2011) 42–48.
[159] If we take smoke as the subject of verse 524, Achilles becomes the agent (smoke) of the divine *menis*, rather than a divine figure with *menis*. Also relevant here might be the mythical background of Achilles’ immersion in fire or boiling water (for the texts see Burgess (2009) 138 n. 11), which is said to be a way of immortalising him or testing his immortality.

only to find his opponent's superiority in power, 21.566) turns out to be a trick (599–604) that leads Achilles astray into an empty field. In Book 22, Apollo reveals himself to mock the futility of Achilles' attempt to overtake a god and emphatically speaks of his divine superiority (θεὸν ἄμβροτον, 9; θεός εἰμι, 10) to Achilles as a mortal (αὐτὸς θνητὸς ἐών, 8–9; μόρσιμος, 13). Apollo's trick and taunt constitute forms of contempt. Strikingly, Achilles in an *adynaton* frames the scenario in terms of revenge: had he the power, he would take vengeance on (τισαίμην, 20) Apollo for depriving him glory (ἀφείλεο, 18).[160] While Apollo contrasts a god and a man in terms of status, Achilles speaks of power differentials: what he lacks, as he seems to claim, is nothing but physical strength (δύναμις),[161] which enables him to hold Apollo accountable for the disrespectful trick. The fact that Achilles acknowledges his inferiority to Apollo in terms of *strength* rather than *status* (cf. 7.456–457) suggests that Achilles positions himself almost as an equal of a deity, grudgingly complaining about the inappropriate conduct of another god (cf. 15.184 ff.; 22.14).[162] Unlike Diomedes and Patroclus (cf. 5.443–444; 16.710–711), Achilles' readiness to defy Apollo also indicates his hyper-human ambition and state of mind, which the Homeric narrator marks in the notable phrase, 'thinking big' (μέγα φρονέων, 22.21).[163]

During his *aristeia,* Achilles has been gradually invested with the features of a wrathful deity with a burning concern for honour and revenge. In the final encounter with Hector, the awe-inspiring manner and terrifying appearance of Achilles is noted with the unusual phrase 'an equal of Enyalius' (ἶσος Ἐνυαλίῳ, 22.132; cf. 20.45–46) in an emphatic position,[164] and the light imagery, which emphasises the terrible brightness of the weaponry (134–135; cf. 25–32, the ominous light of Orion's dog). That Hector flees in terror and fear instantly at the

[160] ἀφείλεο echoes Agamemnon's γέρας ἀφαιρήσεσθαι in 1.161 and γέρας ἀφελέσθαι in 16.54

[161] In Homer, δύναμις is often mentioned in martial contexts and in relation to ἀλκή (e.g. *Il.* 13.786–787= *Od.* 23.128); therefore, it denotes inner, physical force that enables one to stand and fight firmly especially for the sake of protecting oneself or others from attack (e.g. *Il.* 1.393, εἰ δύνασαί γε, περίσχεο παιδὸς ἑῆος; *Od.* 2.61–62, οὐ δεδαηκότες ἀλκήν. / ἦ τ ἂν ἀμυναίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμίς γε παρείη; see also *Il.* 1.241, 588; 6.101).

[162] For (μέγ') ὀχθήσας and the language of Achilles, see Scully (1984).

[163] Cf. Pl. *Rep.* 391a; Richardson (1993) 15–20. For 'thinking big', see also Cairns (1996). The phrase thematically echoes μέγα φρονέοντες of the Trojans (8.553) after they offer sacrifice to the gods, who nevertheless refuse to accept it (see also 11.296, note ἶσος Ἄρῃ in 295, applied to Hector). In other places, the phrase is usually used to describe warriors ready to fight: 11.325 (Odysseus and Diomedes in the likeness of boars), esp. 16.258 (the Myrmidons with Patroclus), 758 and 823 (Patroclus and Hector, in the likeness of a lion and boar); see also 13.156 (Deiphobos).

[164] It appears here only in the Homeric epics, although similar formular verses such as ἀτάλαντος Ἄρῃ are commonly found; see Richardson (1993) 121.

sight of this fearsome figure (136–137), again, makes the scene like an epiphany of a wrathful divine figure (cf. 18.225–227).[165] After the golden scales of Zeus are balanced (209–213), the duel comes to its last phase. Instantly after Apollo leaves Hector, Athena comes close to Achilles to assure him of his glory (217) and direct assistance.[166] Her arrival and companionship again mark Achilles' intimacy with the gods (note also διίφιλε in verse 216). Prior to Achilles' fatal stroke at Hector, the brief description of his shield, helmet, the golden tassels (311–316), and spear shining like Hesperos[167] (317–319) serves as a reminder of the previous arming scenes and, thus, underlines his superior status. Eventually, when Achilles has struck Hector, he speaks with a taunt (331–332):

> Ἕκτορ, ἀτάρ που ἔφης Πατροκλῆ' ἐξεναρίζων
> σῶς ἔσσεσθ', ἐμὲ δ' οὐδὲν ὀπίζεο νόσφιν ἐόντα,
> νήπιε …

> Hector, surely you thought as you killed Patroclus you would be safe, and you did not fear my wrath in my absence,[168] fool!

The usage of the verb ὀπίζεο here is unusual in that the object is Achilles rather than a deity (cf. μητρὸς γὰρ πυκινὴν ὠπίζετ' ἐφετμήν, 18.216). In other words, Achilles regards his wrath as equivalent to that of a deity.[169] Unlike the complaint of his inability to take revenge on Apollo, Achilles now exults in the fulfilment of his vengeance on Hector in the manner of a vengeful god. Moreover, in response to Hector's pathetic request for a burial (338–343, see also 254–259), Achilles angrily refuses with a cannibalistic wish and threatens to feed his corpse to wild animals (344–354, see also 261–265).

[165] Cf. Schein (1984) 151–152.
[166] Athena plays a trick on Hector (247), like Apollo misleading Achilles (21.599 and 604), and directly gives the spear back to Achilles (276–277).
[167] The star is full of metaphorical meanings that mark the end of daylight and the coming of darkness; see Constantinidou (2019) 103.
[168] Cairns (1993) 136–137.
[169] Cairns (1993) 137.

The *agrion menos* (312–313, 345) of Achilles as a lion (262)[170] reminds us of the wrath of Hera against the Trojans, which might be 'appeased' only after her 'devouring Priam and Priam's children raw' (4.34–35; cf. 24.212–213). Omophagia is a bestial habit, and cannibalism is a violation of the alimentary code observed by gods and men (cf. Cyclops Polyphemus in *Od.* 9.287–298, 373 f.; *Op.* 274–279).[171] With this sinister language and motifs, Hera expresses her excessive 'hunger' for revenge, which is not appropriate for a deity (cf. Ares' excessive slaughter in 5.133, 909). Likewise, the savagery of Achilles' *menis* against Hector and the Trojans is not appeased by mere slaughtering; rather, he goes further to effect horrible humiliation on the corpse (22.395–404; 23.1–11, 22–23) like a lion 'going against the flocks of men to win himself a feast' (24.41–43),[172] which is utterly unseemly and unbearable to see (22.395, 24; 24.54).[173] Corresponding to his staying from the communal feast among the Achaeans, the omophagic (22.345–354, 24.207) Achilles' excessive thirst for revenge, like Hera, makes him an ambiguous figure characterised by an approximation both to a deity and to a beast. Achilles' special relationship with the gods elevates him to a hyper-human position where he is allowed to seek honour by divorcing from his human community. Conversely, he is also lowered to a quasi-bestial status, which radically distances him from the civilised norms that are observed both by gods and men. As we have seen, this also transforms him into natural and divine forces that are beyond humans' control and, thus, becomes an uncanny, horrible power that could be either a vastly superior supporter or a dangerous threat to his human fellows and their social norms.

Hector has indicated that Achilles' refusal to return his corpse to Troy might provoke divine wrath (μήνιμα, 358) in the future. Indeed, Zeus approves (24.113–116) Apollo's strong condemnation (33–54) of Achilles' shameless, pitiless, and inhuman behaviour (44), which brings him no benefits but divine *nemesis* (53).[174] The side of Achilles, however, is

[170] For the hero's bestiality, see also λύσσα in 21.542 with 9.238–239 and 13.53–54 (quoted above) on which see also Heath (2005) 135–143.
[171] Redfield (1975) 197–199; Coray et. al. (2020) on 4.35–36. We may also recall two cases of 'divine cannibalism', which strikingly appear in the beginning and the end of the formation of the rulership of Zeus: Cronus' gulping down his children (*Th.* 459 ff.) and Zeus' swallowing Metis (890). Unlike beasts, however, neither Cronus nor Zeus 'feeds' himself on other divinities: while Cronus attempts to restrain the power of his offspring in his belly, Zeus incorporates the power of Metis and assumes the role of reproduction.
[172] Aristarchus prefer πᾶσι to δαῖτα, as in 1.5; on this issue, see Kirk (1985) on 1.4–5.
[173] For ἀεικέα ἔργα, see e.g. Richardson (1993) 147; de Jong (2012) 162–163; Goldhill (1991) 80; Clarke (2019) 288 ff.
[174] See also Schein (1984) 79; Cairns (1993) 132–133; Clarke (2019) 288 ff.

supported by Hera (consider the parallel of Achilles and Hephaestus in the *theomachia*) in her opposition to Apollo's appeal for returning Hector's corpse to Priam (56 ff.). In contrast with Apollo's impartial accusation against Achilles' inhuman behaviour, Hera attempts to demonstrate Achilles' superiority to Hector by referring to the hero's genealogy, his mother's intimacy with Hera herself, and her remarkable marriage with Peleus, a mortal intimate with gods (59–61). The excessive anger of Hera also makes a strikingly partial argument. Moreover, she hurls invective at Apollo's faithlessness (62–63), as he has betrayed his marital hosts and supports the Trojans to give a burial to Hector (cf. 39).[175]

The *aristeia* of Achilles interestingly comes to an end with a 'verbal *theomachia*' (24.107). The genealogical comparison takes us back to Achilles' encounters with Aeneas and Asteropaeus and, as a dispute over honour, echoes the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon. The divine strife, in this sense, serves as an introduction to the conclusion of the restoration of Achilles' cosmic status in *Iliad* 24.

3.3.3 Achilles at the Seashore (2): Final Reflections on his Cosmic Status

The support of Hera explicitly elevates the status of Achilles and partially favours his inappropriate conduct.[176] The response of Zeus is remarkably interesting: on the one hand, he confirms the superiority of Achilles in terms of honour and thus appeases the anger of Hera; on the other hand, he implicitly disagrees with Hera about Hector's special relationship with gods (φίλτατο […] θεοῖσι, 67) by reaffirming his *eusebeia* through sacrifices (note δαιτὸς ἐίσης in 69; cf. 4.48 f.). [177] Furthermore, Zeus supports the option urged by Apollo and explicitly endorses Apollo's arguments.[178] The supreme king also reasserts the principle of *do ut des*, as a fundamental code of distribution and regulation of the divine–human relationship in cosmic society (τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς, 70, which undoubtedly recalls the honourable portion due to the mortals – τὸ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ θανόντων, that is the burial rite with tomb and

[175] Macleod (1982) on 24.62–63.
[176] Although Zeus ultimately favours the appeal of Apollo, let it be noted that the strife over the corpse of Hector lasts for nine days among the gods. It would be at least a possibility that a goddess such as Hera might have the authority to treat any corpse in a more horrible manner, if the dead person, for instance, is the object of her wrath.
[177] While the lion-like Achilles feasts (δαῖα λάβῃσιν) on the flocks of men (41–43), Apollo 'dined at the feast' (δαίν') with lyre in his hand (63).
[178] E.g. in his instructions to Thetis, 73–76; cf. 22.358 and 24.53: Zeus is fulfilling Hector's prediction.

gravestone, see 16.456–457, 674–675).[179] Moreover, with the dietary terms (ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς ἐίσης, 69), Zeus forms a distant and balanced response to both Apollo (43) and Hera (63), which serves as a reminder of the establishment of the cosmic order. Moreover, reference to human sacrifice is appropriate for the divine–human communication, which seems implicitly to play down the Thetis–Peleus marriage as the climax of Hera's argument. The settlement of Zeus seems to be (remotely) relevant to the historical background of the cosmogonic development in the final phase of the divine–human separation.

Conversely, it is noteworthy that Zeus' settlement of the dispute over Hector's corpse involves a special concern for Thetis and Achilles. The invitation of Thetis, in effect, shows respect for the goddess, as well as Hera who just mentioned her role as foster-mother to Thetis. Indeed, Hera and Athena kindly receive Thetis in an amicable scene depicting a welcoming drink (100–102) – which thematically echoes the drink of Hera in *Iliad* 1 at the temporary end of her dispute with Zeus about the issue of Thetis and Achilles.[180] On the one hand, Zeus wishes to award Achilles a further honour (κῦδος) – which in effect is a face-saving solution to his condemnable abuse of the corpse (22.395–405, 24.14–21)[181] – by his voluntarily returning the body and accepting the ransom of Priam (110, 118–119); on the other hand, the supreme god intends to win over Thetis (111)[182] out of respect for her special status (cf. 1.505–516).

The remarkably wise solution of Zeus thematically brings the *Iliad* to its coda. The line between divine and human, which has been blurred by the *aristeia* of Achilles and his becoming a wrath deity with support from Hera and Athena, is now re-established by means of giving greater honour to Achilles (according to his cosmic status and intimacy with the gods) and burial to Hector (according to the norms of the cosmic social code, which dictate the bestowal of the honourable portion due to mortals).

[179] For γέρας θανόντων, see Garland (1984); Garcia (2013).
[180] Brügger (2017) on 24.100–102 with further bibliography.
[181] Brügger (2017) on 24.110.
[182] Cairns (1993) 89 ff.

As a consolatory speech to Priam (and himself and implicitly Perseus), Achilles reflects on the cosmic status of humans in the famous passage on 'the Two Urns of Zeus' (24.525–533):

ὣς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν,
ζώειν ἀχνυμένους· αὐτοὶ δέ τ' ἀκηδέες εἰσί.
δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
δώρων οἷα δίδωσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἐάων·
ᾧ μέν κ' ἀμμείξας δώῃ Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος,
ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλῷ.
ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκε,
καί ἑ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει,
φοιτᾷ δ' οὔτε θεοῖσι τετιμένος οὔτε βροτοῖσιν.

For so have the gods spun the thread for miserable mortals, that they should live with grief; and they themselves are carefree. For two urns of gifts that Zeus gives stand on his floor, the one of ills, the other of blessings. To whomever Zeus, who delights in thunder, gives a mixed lot, that man meets now with evil, now with good; but to whomever he bestows only of the baneful, him he makes to be degraded by man, and the evil hunger drives him over the shining earth, and he wanders honoured neither by gods nor by mortals.

Achilles' speech is one of the formulations of 'a characteristic archaic Greek attitude towards the nature and possibility of happiness'.[183] The dominant feature of mortal life is its miserable sorrowfulness (note that mortality seems rather relevant but not primary, as indicated in βροτοῖσιν, 525–526). This miserable condition is fundamentally rooted in the dispensation of goods and/or evils according to the will of Zeus. The divine dispensation sets limits upon human happiness by mixing tribulation with fortune, achievement, and failure. Therefore,

[183] Cairns (2014) 105–106, which offers an alternative view (see pp.111–116).

continuing prosperity will be counterbalanced by unexpected mischief, while long suffering may change into felicity. One must accept a life full of potential alterations between joy and sorrow, wealth and destitution, glory and disgrace. Achilles illustrates this with the vicissitudes in the lives of Peleus and himself (534–542) and those of Priam and his sons (543–548).

On the one hand, Achilles' parable serves a consolatory purpose: since this is what human life is, endless lamentation is meaningless (549–551, see also the exemplum of Niobe in 599–620). In terms of its location in the entire narrative of the *Iliad*, on the other hand, the speech serves as a reflection not only of Achilles' own vicissitudes during his revenge for Agamemnon's dishonour and his second revenge for Hector's killing of Patroclus but also of the ups and downs of Agamemnon, Hector, Patroclus, and Diomedes. Achilles plays the role of narrator by employing a special kind of authoritative, exemplary speech in which he 'delivers' the central ethics and ethos that the Homeric poet has been developing[184] throughout the epic: humans' cosmic status and dependence on the gods, the inevitability of suffering and alternation, limitation of human achievement etc. With this arrangement of the Homeric narrator, Achilles' role of addressing the fundamental insight of human condition and the divine–human relationship, in fact, appears to become the culmination of his *aristeia* in the *Iliad* as a whole and indicates a kind of greatness in terms of resignation, prudence, and *eusebeia*.

It is noteworthy that only one specific 'good' is mentioned (but implicitly). This is honour, in the description of the lowest or most sorrowful person, who 'receives no honour (τετιμένος) from gods and mortals' (533). Honour, which denotes one's (reciprocal) relationship with others, is fundamental to one's existence because one's life is primarily predicated on his relationship with Zeus who distributes goods and evils, but also because one exists in a set of social relationships with both gods and mortals. This ultimate honour (*kydos*) of Achilles by returning the corpse of Hector, which serves as a reminder of human's suffering and achievements that are predicated on the will of Zeus, bears thematic relevance

[184] The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are commonly considered exemplary poems, especially for rulers and leaders; see Cairns (2018) 381–382. Likewise, the works of Hesiod and Pindar are sometimes referred to in the context of a broader genre of 'instruction to princes' or 'advice poetry'; see Martin (1984); Kurke (1990).

to the extra honour of Heracles by delivering Prometheus from the Zeus-sent ‘disease’ that symbolises the post-Mekone human condition (see § 1.3). Just as the *kleos* of Heracles marks the end of Zeus’ anger against Prometheus, the *kydos* of Achilles marks the end of his anger against Hector and the Trojans as well as the anger of Zeus (*Il.* 15.72-77). In this light, if the Hesiodic episode denotes the final stage of divine-human separation initiated by Prometheus’ transgression and provides a positive hope for those who are divinely favoured, the Iliadic scene likewise marks this process of separation and presents Achilles as a paradigm of humanity shed with certain problematic lights. Furthermore, Achilles’ speech can also be envisaged as a thematical ‘response’ to the settlement of Zeus: it serves to ‘re-establish’ the order of the cosmic society on the human level. By surrendering his wrath to Zeus (139–140), receiving Priam with pity and respect (507ff., cf. 100–102), persuading him to dine with him (599–620; cf. 23.44–47 and 24.43), Achilles returns to the human side and ultimately restores his cosmic status with a few gleams of his godlike status (cf. 630) and hyper-human state of mind (also a sinisterly quasi-bestial one, cf. 572 and 570). While the *aristeia* of Achilles ends with his meeting of Priam, who is a metaphorical substitution of his father Peleus, the *Iliad* comes to its end with two burials, the one of Patroclus as the *alter ego* of Achilles, and the other of Hector, who dies as his metaphorical double by donning his old armour, thus foreshadowing the death and burial of Achilles, as well as the fall of Troy.

4. Pindar's Poetics of Extraordinariness

Unlike the Homeric and Hesiodic epics, which mainly elaborate on the mythical past, each Pindaric ode orientates itself towards the glorious present of its laudandus[1] through a poetic journey exploring the past and the future related to an ad hoc occasion. It is precisely owing to such occasionality and its historical backdrop, against which a specific ode was composed, that none of the Pindaric passages (not even a single line) could be properly read while disregarding the rhetorical and topographical features of the genre, as well as the 'extra-' and 'intra-poetic' context.[2]

Pursuing what is at one's foot is far more propitious than seeking what lies beyond one's view. As such, this chapter is delimited to understanding the poetic (re)presentation of the extraordinariness, or extraordinary status, of the figures in the first three Olympian Odes. These were composed for two related Sicilian tyrants: Hieron of Syracuse (*Ol.* 1) and Theron of Acragas (*Ol.* 2 and *Ol.* 3). Although there is no Pindaric equivalent for the word 'extraordinariness', the idea in question is expressed through a cluster of terms relating to achievement and superiority (e.g. ἀρετά, ἄριστος, ἔξοχος) and significant metaphors (e.g. gold, shining light, Pillars of Heracles). 'Extraordinariness' is deliberately chosen as an umbrella term for the consistent interest of this thesis, which is exploring the (limited) forms of divinity in humans, as well as for Pindar's rhetorical and thematic ambiguity. On the one hand, the Pindaric odes regularly remind us of the limitations of the human endeavour and that one should not seek to become a god (the so-called *ne plus ultra* theme). On the other hand, the prospects for a divine life are not strictly excluded from the poetic or contemporary world of Pindar. The term 'extra-ordinary' is apt for the laudandus because it makes room to talk about the elevated person's 'ex-humanity' without directly defying the immortal–mortal

[1] For the term 'laudandus', see Bundy (1962) and further discussion in Currie (2005) 1 n. 1.

[2] For Pindaric scholarship before and after Bundy, see Goldhill (1991) 128–166; Sigelman (2016) 7–8; cf. Budelmann (2009) 15. After Bundy (1962), many scholars such as Crotty (1982), Kurke (1991), Mackie (2003), Currie (2005) have expanded the scope and especially shifted the focus from the praise for the laudandus themselves to the social and historical settings, and more generally the performance occasion.

divide, thereby considering the extent to which the excellent person stands above other humans and their ambiguously defined position in cosmic society. The term describes the honourable and superior position of the victor and simultaneously indicates the 'unusual' and somewhat 'uncanny' aspects of his elevated status in cosmic society; in other words, it suggests some qualities or status that are beyond the human realm but (perhaps) not equal to divinity, 'ex-human' but not fully divine, lying somewhere between men and gods, remaining undefined and 'dislocated'. As we shall see, the poetic presentation of such an ambiguous, extraordinary, and dislocated status of a great victor is also related to the central themes about human vicissitudes, dependence upon divine powers, and epistemological weakness.

The discussion of the three odes furthermore serves to test the arguments of the thesis by exploring the poetic presentation of the extraordinary figures. Although the three odes will be approached as exhibiting interrelated unity,[3] each section will have disparate foci and themes. The chapter will begin with *Olympian* 1, in which deification, divine–human separation, and aristocratic ideology are the central themes. Section 4.2 will discuss *Olympian* 2 in which the theme of human vicissitudes is ambiguously juxtaposed with several extraordinary figures experiencing quasi- or full deification and with eschatological ideas. The final section will focus on *Olympian* 3, which seems to provide a synthetic view of the complexities of human extraordinary status in the cosmos through Pindar's adroit portrayal of the boundary-crossing figures, Heracles and the Dioskouri.

4.1 Hieron at Syracuse (*Olympian* 1)

4.1.1 The Cosmic Settings in the Priamel

Olympian 1 attempts to locate the extolled laudandus by juxtaposing and paralleling him with extraordinary figures marking, trespassing, or blurring the cosmic boundaries or limits where

[3] The connection between *Ol.* 1 and in *Ol.* 3 is well attested, see e.g. Segal (1964); Clay (2011) took a bold but reasonable step which this chapter follows according to its own interests: *Olympians* 1–3 will be taken as a unified sequence with variance of thematic focus. The reasons could be summarised as follows: first, the opening Priamel of *Ol.* 1 (1–7) echoes and complements the ending of *Ol.* 3 (42–45), which also leaves its trace in *Ol.* 10 composed in the same year (see also *Ol.* 11); second, the probably cooperative policies of Hieron and Theron to participate in the Olympic games might reflect the reconciliation between the two tyrants who have clashed over several political affairs; third, the opening question of *Ol.* 2 finds answers in the foundation myths of the Olympic games, which correspond to the (re)foundation of Himera and Aetna; finally, one may find that the central themes of these three odes, especially divine favour and disfavour, apotheosis and divine punishment, mortality and immortality, are gracefully woven together.

divine powers are often found to be at work. It opens with a grand picture of the cosmos in the Priamel (1–7),[4] where a series of prominent objects is, in Bundy's terms, set as the foil for the introduction of the Olympic games and the laudandus Hieron (8–13):

> ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ
> ἅτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ μεγάνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου·
> εἰ δ᾽ ἄεθλα γαρύεν
> ἔλδεαι, φίλον ἦτορ,
> μηκέθ᾽ ἁλίου σκόπει
> ἄλλο θαλπνότερον ἐν ἀμέρᾳ φαεννὸν ἄστρον ἐρήμας δι᾽ αἰθέρος,
> μηδ᾽ Ὀλυμπίας ἀγῶνα φέρτερον αὐδάσομεν
> ὅθεν ὁ πολύφατος ὕμνος ἀμφιβάλλεται
> σοφῶν μητίεσσι, κελαδεῖν
> Κρόνου παῖδ᾽ ἐς ἀφνεὰν ἱκομένους
> μάκαιραν Ἱέρωνος ἑστίαν,
> θεμιστεῖον ὃς ἀμφέπει σκᾶπτον ἐν πολυμάλῳ
> Σικελίᾳ, δρέπων μὲν κορυφὰς ἀρετᾶν ἄπο πασᾶν,

> Excellent is water, while gold, like blazing fire, shines prominently at night beyond all the lordly wealth. But if it's contests that you wish to sing, my dear heart, then look no further than the sun for warmth and brilliance in a star within the empty air of day, nor let us herald any games as higher than Olympia's, from which comes the glorious hymn to cast itself about the intellects of the wise men, that they may celebrate the son of Cronus as they arrive at the rich and blessed hearth of Hieron, who wields his sceptre lawfully in the fruitful Sicily, culling the foremost from all *aretai*.

[4] For the Priamel as a formal device in Pindar, see Bundy (1962) 4 ff.; Gerber (1982) on 1–7 for further bibliographies; cf. Eckerman (2017).

Scholars have been wrestling to determine the meanings of the natural elements (water, fire, gold, sun) and how these thematically relate to the cultural institutions or epinician occasions (the Olympian games of Zeus and the hearth of the Sicilian Hieron).[5] Lines 1–2 are most puzzling.

The ambiguity of ὕδωρ in effect allows various, overlapping levels of reading: (1) ὕδωρ may simply and generally refer to all kinds of water, including the springs, rivers, and seas (see also the discussion of Alpheus and Arethusa in § 4.1.3) known to the audiences (it is thus relevant to the idea that water is the prerequisite element for human life;[6] (2) it may evoke the metaphor of 'song as water', as revealed in other Pindaric odes;[7] (3) as we shall see below, it is also possible to read ὕδωρ as a kind of cosmic power that delimits boundaries and connects places with places. The gnomic and enigmatic outlook[8] of the first phrase encourages literal and/or metaphorical reading(s) of ὕδωρ,[9] whichever will shed different light on the meaning of ἄριστος and the rest of the Priamel.[10] In which sense is 'water' extraordinary and celebrated as the primary item? Let us first turn to a concise and derivative form of the Priamel here, which appears in the coda of *Olympian* 3 (42–45):

εἰ δ᾽ ἀριστεύει μὲν ὕδωρ, κτεάνων δὲ χρυσὸς αἰδοιέστατος,

[5] See e.g. Finley (1955) 51; Maslov (2015) 162; Eckerman (2017) 8. For a summary of earlier views on this Priamel, see Gerber (1982) on 1.

[6] For a literal reading of 'water' (based on two scholia, 1 a and 1 f Drachmann: as water is best for human life in the sense that it is the *sine qua non* of life, so *areta* in Olympic games and its celebration in songs serve best (i.e. necessary) for the purpose of attaining a life of *aretai*),), see Race (1981), Gerber (1982) 4, and Verdenius (1988) on *Ol.* 1.1.

[7] For a metaphorical reading of water as song (see e.g. *Nem.* 1.24), see Finley (1955) 52, Carey (1981) 112, Mullen (1982) 35–36, Hubbard (1985) 154 f., Steiner (1986) 72 f., Sigelman (2016) 76 f., Eckerman (2017) 9–14.

[8] The gnomic form could be seen as an enigmatic speech deployed to stage a dialogue, a form of riddles in the *ti maliston* exchange; see Sander (2018) 167ff.; also Burkert (1972/1983) 169; Slater (1989) 499 n. 71. It is noted that Pindar's Priamel receives a response from Bacchyl. 3.85–92, which was composed also for Hieron's chariot victory at 468 BCE. The meaning of the text of Bacchylides, however, is as dark as that of Pindar; see e.g. Wind (1971); Cairns (2010) 211–212; Eckerman (2017); cf. Sander (2018) 104 ff. and 167 ff.

[9] It might be more appropriate to take 'water' in both senses: for instance, Krummen (1990/2014) 245–246, which argued that 'water' is introduced as a proper encomiastic *topos*, and it vivifies the victor in physical (bath after competition) and psychological (as a praise for the laudandus and his family) senses. Based on this, 'water', 'gold', and 'fire' are evocative of the setting of Olympian victory and celebration. A less influential view relates 'water' to the pre-Socratic thought of (e.g.) Thales and Heraclitus (based on schol. 1d Drachmann), which is endorsed by Onians (1951) 229, Fränkel (1951/1975) 472, and recently Morgan (2015) 220–221, but rejected by Gildersleeve (1885) 129, Race (1981) 119–120, Gerber (1982) 8–9, and Verdenius (1988) 36.

[10] Is water the best of all others? Or is it excellent in a specific field? Following the Homeric usage (e.g. *Il.* 1.69, 91 and 2.577), ἄριστος is understood as an absolute rather than a comparative superlative; see Sandin (2014) esp. 103–104. For other reasons to consider that water is best on its own, see Gerber (1982) on 1 and the adapted list of other suggestions in Sander (2018) 170–171.

νῦν δὲ πρὸς ἐσχατιὰν Θήρων ἀρεταῖσιν ἱκάνων ἅπτεται
οἴκοθεν Ἡρακλέος σταλᾶν. τὸ πόρσω δ᾽ ἔστι σοφοῖς ἄβατον
κἀσόφοις. οὔ νιν διώξω: κεινὸς εἴην.

If water excels, and of possessions gold is the most venerable, then Theron now arriving the utmost limit through his *aretai* grasps from home the pillar of Heracles. What lies further is untrodden by the wise and unwise. I shall not seek it; I would be empty-headed to do so.

Theron's *aretai* are praised as extraordinary, reaching the point marked by Heracles' pillars. The moral message is unambiguously conveyed in the subsequent metapoetic warnings that neither the laudandus nor the poet himself should pursue anything beyond what has been established by Heracles (44–45, cf. *Pyth.* 10.27; see §§ 4.3.2–4.3.3). In *Olympian* 3 and other Pindaric odes, Heracles' exploits are both boundary-crossing and border-marking, which serve to sustain the geographical and hierarchical order of cosmic society and its permeability (see § 4.3.2). We may detect certain thematic correlation between Heracles' pillars and 'water' in *Ol.* 3.42–45. As M.-C. Beaulieu suggested, 'the Ocean is an impassable boundary for mortals because it encircles divine realities that must not be seen by mortals, namely, the residences of the Olympian gods'.[11] Heracles' boundary-crossing feats are remarkably noted as 'exploring all the lands and seas', 'taming the route for voyaging' (*Isth.* 4.61–63), and 'mapping out the land' (*Nem.* 3.26). Seeking to go beyond the pillar of Heracles would mean trespassing on an 'uncharted' sea or land which is out of human reach and thus unconceivable (*Ol.* 3.44–45). The 'water' evoked in line 42, like the pillars of Heracles, stands as both a literal reference to the sea and a metaphor of the power that marks the cosmic boundaries.

In this light, ἄριστον δ' ὕδωρ in *Ol.* 1.1 appears to stand as a reference to both the delimiting and connecting powers of unspecified 'water' in the cosmos. This reading may be in line with the conception of 'water' in the archaic Greek cosmology. According to Hesiod, the powers of water are best reflected in the Oceanus, which is the place of all sources (πηγαί)

[11] Beaulieu (2006) 42–46. Her useful survey on the *topos* of the sea enlightens my discussion here.

and boundaries (πείρατ') and the converging point of 'the black earth, the misty Tartarus, the barren sea, and the starry sky' (*Th.* 736–739). In Homer, the alternation of day and night takes place there: Helios rises from Oceanus (*Il.* 7.421–422 ≈ *Od.* 19.433–434) and sinks back into it (*Il.* 8.485; 18.239–240; cf. *Il.* 5.5–6 stars bathed in Oceanus). In terms of powers, Oceanus encircles the cosmos and thus connects its different parts; in addition, it marks its extreme reaches and stands as the cosmic threshold between visible and invisible, known and unknown, life and death, gods and men.[12]

With such conceptual background of the cosmic Oceanus and the thematic connection with the coda of *Olympian* 3 in mind, the sense of ἄριστον denoting both 'superlative' and 'limit' (cf. the verbal cognate ἀριστεύει in *Ol.* 3.42) is thus revealed in the delimiting and connecting powers of the cosmic 'water' evoked in the Priamel of *Olympian* 1. As the initial term, ἄριστον is applied to convey the ode's theme of extraordinariness in this twofold sense that the victory and achievements of the laudandus (as well as the song-journey of the poet)[13] are both superlative and limited (reaching the furthest point).[14] This leitmotif is heavily explored and developed in the central myth of Pelops and Tantalus and it runs through the entire ode (cf. ὕπατον in 100) pivoting on Hieron's extraordinary achievement as an athlete and his extraordinary position as a king (12–13, 113–114).[15]

Moreover, the reading of 'water' as delimiting and connecting powers also shed light on other images in the Priamel. In *Ol.* 3.42–45, the gold literally indicates Theron's wealth, while metaphorically referring to his achievements (as indicated by αἰδοιέστατος) and, thus, is correlated with the pillar-image (see more in §§ 4.3.3–4.3.4). As we shall also see in § 4.2.1, gold-wealth is the embodiment of divine grace and a positive divine–human relationship.[16] In this light, the distinction between the 'blazing gold' and 'lordly wealth' in *Ol.* 1.1–2 clarifies that gold marks divine grace on which earthly wealth and kingship are predicated. In fact, the image of 'nocturnal fire' added to the gold[17] supports this reading. As

[12] Moreover, as we shall see, Oceanus marks the places or dwellings of the blessed (§§ 4.2.2, 4.3.2).
[13] This also endorses the metaphorical reading of water as song.
[14] Cf. Segal (1964) 212. Note also the limiting effect of μέν on ἄριστον; see Race (1981) 121 and n.9.
[15] For instance, this reading of water sheds light on the meaning of the river Alpheus in the ode; see Griffith (2008) and below.
[16] See also Currie (2006) 183–184 on the association between wealth and blessedness in other contexts.
[17] For a different reading and the syntactic problem of νυκτί in relation to χρυσός and πῦρ, see Sandin (2014) 100 ff.

noted by scholars, the 'fire' sets several extrapoetic reference points for the ritual fire of the Olympian games (*Ol.* 10.73–83) prefiguring in turn the contests in the daytime (cf. *Isth.* 4.65–68), and for the fame of the laudandus (and probably the fire in Hieron's hearth) indicated by μεγάνορος.[18] The nocturnal blazing gold, therefore, stands as an apt image for the settings of Hieron's victory and the divine grace that it confers upon him. Furthermore, the inserted νυκτί serves as a foil image for darkness and obscurity in contrast with the blazing gold and the celestial bodies in the succeeding lines (cf. Bacchyl. 13.175–181). Correspondingly, αἰθόμενον πῦρ ἅτε, singling out the extraordinary radiance of gold, is a thematic adaptation from a Homeric formula describing martial prowess.[19] Moreover, as P. Sandin rightly noted,[20] *Il.* 22.134–135 is a possible source of inspiration: Achilles' bronze spear shone like blazing fire or rising sun when he is about to kill Hector. As we have seen in Chapter 3, pre-eminently shining objects (gold, fire, star, sun etc.) serve as the marks of divine power infused into a Homeric warrior like Diomedes and Achilles.[21] Similarly in Pindar, glinting gold is often brought into connection with wreaths won at Olympia (χρυσοστεφάνων ἀέθλων, *Ol.* 8.1; ἐπὶ στεφάνῳ χρυσέας ἐλαίας, *Ol.* 11.13) as an attestation of divine favour.[22] Light as a metaphor for source of power and divine grace, underlined in the Priamel of *Olympian* 1, is developed with subtle nuances in *Pyth.* 8.95–97 (see § 5.1):[23] basic human life relies on sunlight (cf. ὁ γενέθλιος ἀκτίνων πατήρ, *Ol.* 7.70) and its extraordinary form is predicated on Zeus-given light. By the same token, in the central myth of *Olympian* 1, Pelops prays to Poseidon at night by the sea, referring to *charis*, and the latter granted him a golden chariot (71–87), which also brought him to a quasi-divine status through an immediate victory and a posthumous hero-cult (88–94). The night prayer of Pelops, the golden chariot of Poseidon, and the blood-sacrifice of Pelops (which are an

[18] For the fire referring to the sacrifice at nightfall in Olympic games, see Krummen (1990/2014) 247–248, which also suggested an indication of the cult for Pelops in verses 90–93.
[19] It is an adaptation from the Homeric formula: see e.g. ὣς οἳ μὲν μάρναντο δέμας πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο, *Il.* 11.596 = 13.673 = 18.1, warriors fight like blazing fire.
[20] Sandin (2014) 103.
[21] In another interesting occasion, the columns of Odysseus' warehouse shone like blazing fire to the eyes of his son who assumed the presence of some god (*Od.* 19.36–40).
[22] Finley (1955) 7–8, 52–56; Sigelman (2016) 82 discussing the remarkable metaphor of golden pillars in the opening of *Olympian* 6; see also Krummen (1990/2014) 246–247.
[23] For light in Pindar, see Spelman (2018) and 45 n. 3 for further bibliographies.

embodiment of divine *charis*), thematically echo the metaphorical meaning and extrapoetic reference of the nocturnal fire-like gold in the Priamel. Moreover, the parallel of Zeus and Hieron in lines 10–11[24] is formed exactly by the mark of wealth (ἀφνεάν) as another attestation of divine favour indicated by ἄεθλα won by Hieron and Ὀλυμπιας ἀγῶνα, whose patron is Zeus.

The nuance of the image of gold is, thus, broadened with the divine–human relationship. As water functions as the convergent point of all ends, the light of gold marks the extraordinary moments when the divine and the mortal come into contact with each other through *charis*. The flaming gold is thus evoked as a superlative element in the sense that it is most capable of diffusing/reflecting the extraordinary (ἔξοχα) radiance of divine grace and it marks the extraordinary victory and wealth of the laudandus.[25] Whereas the grace-derived and status-elevating gold[26] and the ritual-oriented fire mark the divine–human encounter, the golden light, which connects all superior beings,[27] thus distinguishing them from others, is brought into the intrapoetic world on a similar footing with water, delimiting and thus connecting the cosmos from bright heaven to dark Tartarus.

The preceding reading, if tenable, shows the poetic power of Pindar in 'projecting' a poetic vision of the cosmos and introducing the fundamental themes for his epinician programme. Considering the ode's audiences and (re)performance,[28] it seems that Pindar intends to allow lines 1–2 to receive as flexible and as multiple interpretations as possible and, thus, broadens the ode's scopes and themes, beyond their basic encomiastic purpose to bolster the glory of the victor.[29] With the metapoetic themes of extraordinariness, limitation, and connection implied in the two superlative elements, the ode proceeds to places where

[24] On Zeus and Hieron, see Sicking (1983) 66; Meister (2019).
[25] *Contra* Gerber (1980) 10; cf. the criticism in Verdenius (1988) 5. Krummen (1990/2014) 247 noted in gold and *ploutos* a possible allusion to the mysteries in Sicily.
[26] The overtone of 'making a man μέγας' could be felt in μεγάνορος, see Verdenius (1988) *ad loc*; but cf. Gerber (1980) 14. Kurke (1991) 182–183 noticed a wordplay in line 2 (διαπρέπει […] μεγάνορος) on the aristocratic value of *megaloprepeia*.
[27] Verdenius (1988) 5. The light connects especially those on and above the earth; cf. the blessed island in *Ol*. 2.53–74, see below.
[28] It is agreed that Pindar in each ode may address a variety of audiences ranging from the laudandus' homeland (in its initial performance) to the Greek world (in its reperformance), to a divine audience (related to the occasions of victory and celebration). For the epinician performance, see Heath (1988); Currie (2004); Morrison (2007); Athanassaki (2004); Athanassaki (2009); more recently, the articles of A. D. Morrison, L. Athanassaki, F. Ferrari, F. Budelmann, P. Agócs, and R. Thomas in Agócs et al. (2012); Spelman (2018); Neer & Kurke (2019).
[29] For the encomiastic purpose, see Bundy (1962) esp. 3. For multiple patterns of meaning, see Kurke (1991) 262.

excellent figures distinguish themselves from others and the occasions where gods and men encounter each other. It thus shifts from a relatively static aspect of the cosmos to the passion-driven *actions* therein taken to (re)shape or violate, explore or trespass, these cosmic limits and bounds. Reading in the broadest terms, then, the images of superlative qualities in lines 1–2 seems to be evoked both as immortal and primordial powers, with which the ode forms a poetic vision of the cosmos in a gnomic fashion,[30] and as thematic constituents that are related to the extra-poetic occasion(s).[31] It is in this poetic unity of the cosmos and the epinician occasion that these superlative elements are evoked in juxtaposition with the extraordinary events (Olympian games and celebration of the victory) and persons (the laudandus, the mythical figures, and the poet himself) on which the ode focuses. In this light, the idea of extraordinariness evoked in the opening adjective, ἄριστον, and embodied in the subsequent images and figures, appears to be the central concern of the ode.

Along with the movement of the imperative σκόπει, the diurnal sun rises to outshine all stars in the aether and succeeds nocturnal fire (cf. *Th.* 124). Solar radiance (also as the source of life, see above) idiomatically defines the realm of the specific actions for excellence according to the aristocratic ideology that a real man should fight in wide open space under the daylight (see e.g. *Il.* 7.233–243; 17.645–648 with 370–372; 8.66–69; see also § 1.4.2). Pindar's language here might remind us of the famous settings of an Iliadic battle-scene (*Il.* 8.66–69): 'So long as it was dawn and the sacred daylight (ἱερὸν ἦμαρ) increasing […] But when Helios stood bestriding the middle heaven (μέσον οὐρανόν), then the father balanced his golden scales.' While the middle-positioned sun marks the critical moment of the long and fierce combat, the image of Zeus balancing his golden scales denotes the divine decision for the alternation between success and failure. In Pindar's bold adaptation, the sun becomes the figurative mark of the highest achievement, which will be won in the Zeus-patronised contests in Olympia. Taken as a whole, the run of ἄεθλα–ἁλίου–Ὀλυμπίας is a reverse of the sequence of χρυσὸς–πῦρ–πλούτου and, thus, the whole Priamel perfectly forms a ring composition: the ἄριστον ὕδωρ (the extremes and sources of the cosmos) and Ὀλυμπίας

[30] For *gnome* as expression of cosmology in Pindar, see Boeke (2007) 29–72.
[31] For intrapoetic and extrapoetic, see Sigelman (2016) 1–13, 45, 53–55, 109.

ἀγῶνα (extreme achievement of the mortals) is positioned in the opening (1) and end (7) respectively to impose a delimiting force over the middle, which is occupied exactly by the ambition for pre-eminence in contests (4). Driven by such aspiration for elevation, the Priamel proceeds to describe the superlatives and limits of the world. Starting with a panorama of the cosmos delimited and connected by water and light, it gradually narrows down to a specific location where men seek to claim the greatest achievement granted, but also defined by Zeus the supreme god. The Priamel is then extended by a relative clause (ὅθεν), which moves the scene to another convergent place of gods and men: the blessed and prosperous hearth of Hieron where the wise arrive to celebrate Zeus and the lawful Sicilian king (8–11), who is introduced by another relative clause (ὅς, 12) launching the antistrophe. Finally, it advances to another meeting point of the poet and the laudandus (14–15), the friendly table of Hieron (16–17), where the desire for singing and vaunting, the ambition for excellence (3–4, 7) is now about to be fulfilled (line 17 is followed by the imperative λάμβαν', which signals the initiation of the performance in the future).

So far, Pindar artfully brings the victory-oriented occasion into an intrapoetic vision of the cosmos in which the convergent and delimiting places are mapped out, and the superlatives and the extraordinary beings are put on stage. Nevertheless, the close parallel between Zeus and Hieron (10–12),[32] along with the image of the sun applied to describe (the fame of) the laudandus (6), conveys a sense of boldness and ambiguity over the extolled status of Hieron that needs to be expounded. The following will turn to how Pindar locates the extraordinary laudandus in this cosmos.

4.1.2 Tantalus at Sipylus and Prometheus at Mekone

The relative clause (12) marks the shifting point for the actual initiation of the encomiastic project for the laudandus. The direct antecedent of ὅς[33] is 'the blessed hearth' (μάκαιραν ἑστίαν, 11) but it refers in the clause to Hieron himself. Correspondingly, the long clause first characterises Hieron's kingship and achievement, and then describes the sympotic and xenic

[32] See Meister (2019).
[33] On this relative clause and the ambiguous reference of ὅς, see § 4.1.4 below.

setting, marked by φίλαν τράπεζαν (16–17; cf. 103; *Pyth*. 3.71). The relationship between τράπεζαν and ἑστίαν is noticeably intended in a similar context of hospitality, friendship, and praise (9–11, 14–17).[34] This also draws attention to the correlation between μακαίρα and φίλα: the former adjective denotes the Olympian Zeus' abiding divine favour which is about to be celebrated (7–8),[35] while the latter refers to the social network of reciprocity of host and guests, laudandus and laudator, king and city-fellows.

More than this, φιλά τράπεζα, though frequently held in a secular context (ἄνδρες, 17; cf. 54, 64), may also be envisioned *ad hoc* (the occasion of performance of Pindar's song) as a feast arranged in a religious or theoxenic atmosphere.[36] This is what the audience will see as a thematic parallel in 'the most well-ordered feast' (εὐνομώτατον ἔρανον), a superlative one offered by Tantalus at 'Sipylus of friendship' (φίλαν Σίπυλον, 37–38),[37] as a reciprocal banquet for the gods (ἀμοιβαῖα θεοῖσι δεῖπνα, 39). The gods have bestowed on him an exceptional honour (ἐτίμασαν, 55; cf. 75 and 85), elevating him to a blessed state vastly superior to any other mortal men:[38] he is allowed (probably to attend the divine banquet on Olympus)[39] to taste nectar and ambrosia, the divine nutriment making him immortal (ἄφθιτον, 63–64).

The case of Tantalus (before his fall) serves to illustrate the main argument of the thesis in terms of honour, (im)mortality, and the cosmic society. Honour is based on mutual relationships (φίλαν, 38), which are substantiated here in the practice of the exchange of dietary service (ἀμοιβαῖα δεῖπνα, 39).[40] Tantalus achieves a state of immortality, though a sadly temporary one as we will see, as a consequence of his honour, that is, of his being

[34] Gerber (1982) 40–41.
[35] Cf. 106–107; see also *Isth*. 4.17; *Pyth*. 5.1–11.
[36] Gerber (1982) 40: 'Zeus φίλιος was thought to participate in the symposia of mortals'; *contra* Verdenius (1988) 2 and 23.
[37] For the non-possessive meaning of φίλαν, see Gerber (1982) 75 and Verdenius (1988) 23.
[38] Gerber (1982) on 16 properly brought τιμή into association with φίλαν (16), yet he did not immediately take note of ἐτίμασαν (55) and connect it with the common notion of the dining table as an institution – like the place of distribution both of food and honour; cf. Gerber (1982) on verse 55 seemed to recognise the notion. Instead, Gerber quoted *Nem.* 10.78 and more generally Aristotle's *EN* 8.1155a1, the latter of which was criticised by Verdenius (1988) 13 as irrelevant information. Nevertheless, Verdenius missed the thematic link between φίλαν and ἐτιμάσαν and rejected the correlation of 16 and 38 via φίλαν because he overemphasised the difference between Tantalus' banquet and Hieron's symposium (p. 2).
[39] Pindar does not inform the audience for the sake of which Tantalus is honoured as such. Tantalus' attendance to the previous Olympian banquet(s) is implied in ἀμοιβαῖα, 'given in return', 'giving like for like'.
[40] Cf. *Pyth*. 2.18, ἄγει δὲ χάρις φίλων ποί τινος ἀντὶ ἔργων ὀπιζομένα, in the context (15–17) of the friendship between the Cyprians, Cinyras, and the gods (Apollo and Aphrodite), and Ixion's mortal message of 'repay your benefactor' (24).

recognised as an intimate friend to the gods (note also that he is a son of Zeus) and especially as a welcome companion of the divine party. Unlike Pelops who is transported to Olympus (because of a powerful divine *eros*) and, thus, in a sense accepted as a member of the divine community (like Ganymede for Zeus), Tantalus is elevated to a status between gods and men, as an extra-ordinary human. Being close yet inferior to the gods, Tantalus is superior to all his ordinary fellows on earth, a superlative,[41] that his mode of existence is far beyond their reach because he will continue living as an 'immortal human' in Lydia as long as he maintains the elevated status by virtue of his reciprocal relationship with the gods, which is embodied in his portion of the immortalising divine diet and the frequent arrival of the gods on Mount Sipylus.

The reciprocal banquet presented for the gods on Sipylus after Tantalus returned from Olympus where he was honoured by the gods is comparable to the theoxenic table held to celebrate Zeus in Ortygia after Hieron won the honourable prize of the chariot race at Olympia. In this light, Hieron's 'blessed hearth' under the guard of Zeus (106–108) corresponds to Tantalus' 'great prosperity' (μέγαν ὄλβον, 55) as an honour granted by the 'watchers of Olympus' (54–65), and his royal status analogous to the occupation of the mountaintop (113–114) echoes the pinnacle of Sipylus held by Tantalus the king of Lydia (cf. θεμιστεοῖον 12 and εὐνομώτατον 37).[42]

This parallel, however, is balanced (ἀλλὰ γάρ, 55) by the transgression of Tantalus rooted in his disposition, κόρος (56), an excessive desire to acquire more, because of which he steals nectar and ambrosia from the gods and gives them to his drinking fellows (60–63). Thus, he 'took an overweening disaster' (ἔλεν ἄταν ὑπέροπλον, 56–57).[43] The crime of theft is committed for the sake of sharing the sympotic merriment and immortality – again, the privileges exclusive to the gods and Tantalus whom they honour – with other ordinary mortals without the divine favour. The thievery of Tantalus constitutes an obvious case of

[41] Morgan (2015) 251.

[42] While Tantalus enjoys *nectar* and *ambrosia* on Olympus, Hieron gains an olive crown and brings it home along with a much-praised song. This comparison bears a striking connotation of the immortalising (or status-elevating) power of Hieron's victory and Pindar's poem (see further below).

[43] Gerber (1982) 95 understood ἄταν here as 'ruin' and ἀυάταν in *Pyth*. 2.28 as 'delusion'; see also Fisher (1992) 237 ff.; cf. Segal (1964) 222. The stone (Zeus hung over Tantalus' head) itself could be an illusion (like the deceptive cloud devised by Zeus for Ixion), which Tantalus is forever anxious to cast away but in vain, and a metaphor for the limit which he should not and can never transgress.

dishonour against the gods and a violation of *xenia* and reciprocity. Moreover, his unauthorised distribution of the immortalising food to his human fellows not only upsets the divine–human demarcation based on honour and (im)mortality but also puts himself on an equal footing with Zeus by seizing for himself the divine power of dispensation. As suggested in § 2.4, Tantalus falls into the category of 'self-deifier' in this transgression. For his violation of *charis*-based reciprocity[44] and festive propriety, he will never experience any sympotic or dietary merriment out of the anxiety and fear of an immovable stone suspended above his head by Zeus' device (57–59; cf. *Pyth.* 2.39–40). By this eternal punishment, Tantalus is not only separated from the divine community but also deprived of the honour once received from the gods, reduced to a status lower than an ordinary man.[45] Moreover, as a requital for the attempt to immortalise his human fellows, his son Pelops, once transported to live at ease on Olympus, will be forced to return to the race of mortals on earth (65 ff.).

In his appropriation of divine food in favour of his fellows, and arrogation of the distributive power of Zeus, Tantalus bears great resemblance to Prometheus in Hesiod's *Theogony* (535 ff.).[46] The first transgression that Prometheus committed against Zeus in favour of mankind takes place at Mekone where a *krisis* (ἐκρίνοντο) appears on the dining table attended by gods and mortals (535–546). Prometheus arranges an unfair division of an ox: the first portion is inedible bones covered with shiny fat, the other is the palatable part placed under a stomach. The trick lies in the fact that no one can make an inequitable proportion equitable by simply choosing without altering the division itself. With such division, Prometheus attempts to outwit Zeus of 'imperishable counsels' by his trick which ensnares the supreme distributor of *timai* (885–886) into a dilemma of an issue about distribution in the setting of a communal feast. By violating the principle of fair distribution related to the social practice of *dais eise*,[47] the philanthropic Titan assigns mankind a greater

[44] The κόρος-oriented 'taking' of Tantalus is put in contrast with his previous 'most orderly feast' as a reciprocal offering and Pelops' friendly 'giving' (δῶρα) to Poseidon in verse 75; cf. 85 and 30; see Segal (1964) 220–222.
[45] ἀπάλαμον βίον […] ἐμπεδόμοχθον, 59; Gerber (1982) *ad loc*; Verdenius (1988) *ad loc;* ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες, *Ol.* 2.57 (also *Il.* 5.597); cf. Ζηνὸς παλάμαι, *Pyth*. 2.40. For the meaning of ἀπάλαμον, see Page (1955) 315 on Alc. 360.2; Verdenius (1985) on *Op.* 20;
[46] Hubbard (1985) 10–11; Morgan (2015) 243–245.
[47] Clay (2003) 107. For *dais eise*, see Hitch (2009) 108, 201–203; Bakker (2013) 36–52; Stocking (2017) 8-9; also Seaford (2004) 39–47.

honour by giving them the better portion of meat which legitimately belongs to the gods. More subversive than Tantalus, Prometheus upsets the honour-based hierarchy of gods and men and usurps the power and status of Zeus by arrogating to himself the function of distribution.[48] Detecting the Titan's sinister intention, the angry Olympian hides fire from men – thus reducing them into the condition of beasts without cooked food[49] – in revenge for Prometheus' dishonouring the gods and elevating the status of mankind (562–564). The son of Iapetus, however, commits a second offence by stealing the inexhaustible fire back from Zeus for the benefit of human beings (565–569; *Op.* 47–52).[50] The theft restores human superiority to beasts but also gives rise to the creation of Pandora (from whom come the pestilent and drone-like races of women, 591ff.), a 'beautiful bane' (καλὸν κακόν, 585) for mankind in place of fire (570). Devised by Zeus with various contributions from a host of gods, the most seductively charming (573–584, 588) Pandora of a thievish and shamelessly bestial nature (572, 581; cf. *Op.* 67, 78, 420–436) is an ironic and bitter 'gift' dispensed to men who will ever suffer labouring on earth and on the dilemma of marriage (600–617).[51] With this sheer trick (δόλον αἰπύν, 589) and the final punishment of sending an eagle to consume the liver of the bound Prometheus (521–525),[52] Zeus brings full requital against the Titan's deceptive ruse and theft.

The punishment of Tantalus along with the dismissal of Pelops draws the audience back to the 'post–Mekone and post–Pandora world'.[53] In fact, Tantalus re-enacts the crime of Prometheus in the world shaped by that very crime: as gods and men 'distinguished

[48] Clay (2003) 107–108.
[49] Cf. *h. Hom.* 20.2–4.
[50] The episode of Pandora is adapted in Pindar's narrative of the punishment for Ixion's sexual transgression (καλὸν πῆμα, *Pyth.* 2.40). Ixion as a negative foil in *Pythian* 2 (another ode composed for Hieron) bears much similarity with Tantalus: he fails to sustain the sweet life and 'great prosperity' (μακρὸν ὄλβον) the friendly (εὐμενέσσι) gods bestowed on him (25–26), because he does not properly 'repay' (τίνεσθαι) his divine benefactors (24) but in his excessive love for Hera commits hybris, which drove him into an 'presumptuous delusion' (ἀυάταν ὑπεράφανον, 26–29). For further discussion, see e.g. Gerber (1982) 93–94; Fisher (1992) 235–242; Morgan (2015) 186 ff.; see also § 2.4.
[51] For a detailed discussion, see Clay (2003) 102–103, 119–115.
[52] The torment is a grim retaliation for the dietary transgression of Prometheus: since the gods are deprived of the edible part (meats and entrails) of an ox because of his subversive ambition, his liver (as the seat of passion and anger) becomes the meat for an animal. This punishment might be alluded to in Pindar's cannibalistic version of Tantalus' feast, where the human host offers his son's flesh to the gods (46–52). Though it is rejected as an impious one, it remains a further negative foil for the 'most orderly banquet' and a comparable parallel for symposia with stolen divine food: the cannibalistic feast draws gods down into a beast-like human status, while the latter lifts humans up to a divine status.
[53] Hubbard (1987) 9–10; Morgan (2015) 245. I think Hubbard might go too far in saying that the crime of Tantalus 'reflects the broader human condition as one of culpable gluttony'.

themselves' after Mekone, the divine–human communal feast (37–38) and divine erotic affair (42–45), after Tantalus' offence, will be replaced by ritual sacrifice (cf. 93–94) and the earthly pursuit of marriage (67 ff.).[54] In both cases, the alteration of human condition is fundamentally related to the changes of human's relationship with gods which take place interesting in similar dietary settings, that is, in the vivid occasion of distribution of honour and (re–)confirmation of the social order.

Hesiod concludes the Prometheus episode with the following remark: 'Thus it is impossible to escape nor bypass the mind of Zeus (613; cf. *Op.* 105, 267). A similar phrase appears in Pindar's gnomic remark on Tantalus' offence: 'But if a man hopes to elude a god in any action, he errs' (εἰ δὲ θεὸν ἀνήρ τις ἔλπεται τι λαθέμεν ἔρδων, ἁμαρτάνει, 64). The θεὸν ἀνήρ juxtaposition echoes the ἄνδρα θνατὸν Ὀλύπου σκοποί (54) in the start of the narrative, and the idea of gods as σκοποί stands in stark contrast with κλέψαις (60; cf. *Th.* 613)—which poignantly refers to the foolishness (ἄταν, 57) of Tantalus—and fits perfectly with the concluding ethic. The moral of the fall of Tantalus is picked up in the thematic imperative of 'look no further' (114), noticeably pointing back to Tantalus' κόρος (56).[55] The injunction is developed from the proper relationship between Zeus and Hieron and juxtaposed with the description of kingly status as the pinnacle of human achievement (113–114)—probably prompted by poet's coming to the conspicuous hill of Kronus at Olympia (111)[56]—which recalls the divine–human communal feast on Mount Sipylus hosted by the pre-fallen Tantalus with his superlative honour (37–39).

Tantalus should not be simply considered a negative foil because of his transgression and its outcome of the 're-mortalisation' of Pelops. In fact, the pre-fallen Tantalus, as suggested above, could be drawn as a positive comparandum for Hieron. The resemblance between Prometheus and Tantalus should be balanced by the fact that the latter's crime remains a personal issue and does not exclude from human's reach the possibility to gain his exceptional honour as well as Pelops' *apotheosis*–like transportation to Olympus, even

[54] The divine–human communal feast now usually takes place far from the ordinary world like in Hyperborea (*Pyth.* 10.30–42; *Isth.* 6.23).
[55] For similar imperatives, see *Ol.* 5.23–27; *Pyth.* 8.78; *Nem.* 7.90–2; *Isth.* 5.14–16; 6.12 f.; Hubbard (1987) 20 n. 55; Boeke (2007) 61–62.
[56] Eckerman (2013) 16–19.

though the immortal and mortal realms have been distinguished and distanced after Prometheus' crime. Therefore, Tantalus is introduced as a positive and negative foil for Hieron. In this sense, Hieron's extraordinary position is to be compared and placed in a range created between the pre-fallen status of Tantalus with his superlative honour and his lower–than–ordinary condition after his transgression, between the apotheosised and the re-mortalised states of Pelops.

Even though the ambrosia and nectar do not appear in Hieron's blessed hearth, in the parallel of Hieron's blessed hearth and Tantalus' most orderly banquet it remains possible that Pindar invites his audience to envision Hieron as a counterpart of, and even a superior (if he could avoid κόρος and maintain the χάρις of Zeus) to the pre-fallen Tantalus at Sipylus.[57] If so, then Pindar seems to place Hieron in an ambiguous and extraordinary position like that of Tantalus when he is walking the fine line (115) between gods and men. Nevertheless, as we shall see below, the earthly Pelops remains a more direct and appropriate comparandum for Hieron in a world where divinely granted honour is usually less a freely given good (like that of Tantalus) or a readily available one (like men before Prometheus) than a risky pursuit between life and death. In a more realistic light, the extraordinary status of Hieron will be finally located and fully measured with the narrative of Pelops in the post-Prometheus world as a reference point.

4.1.3 Pelops on Olympus and Pelops at Olympia

The transitional verses between the antistrophe and the epode (22–24) mark another shift from the Olympic victory of Hieron to the myth of Pelops (25 ff.):

> κράτει δὲ προσέμιξε δεσπόταν
> Συρακόσιον ἱπποχάρμαν βασιλῆα. λάμπει δέ οἱ κλέος
> ἐν εὐάνορι Λυδοῦ Πέλοπος ἀποικίᾳ

[57] Gerber (1982) xiii concluded with 'Tantalus as a negative *exemplum* to enhance the praise of Hieron by way of contrast'; Fisher (1992) 243.

> And so [Pherenichus] fused *kratos* to his lord, the Syracusan horse-loving king. His *kleos* shines in the brave-manned colony of Pelops of Lydia.

The repeating idea of ruler (δεσπόταν, βασιλῆα)[58] picks up the description of Hieron's political authority (12), whereas the shining *kleos* along with the *kratos* refers to his *areta* (13; cf. *Isth.* 1.22, λάμπει δὲ σαφῆς ἀρετά) and back to the opening images of blazing fire like gold (διαπρέπει taken by λάμπει). The thematic term *kleos* 'brackets' the long central myth as it recurs in its coda (93) where the poet relates the hero cult of Pelops at Olympia (90–96), and simultaneously weaves the entire ode together as a ring composition.[59] The correspondence of 22–24 and 93–96 obviously puts Hieron on a similar footing with Pelops.[60] Indeed, Pindar restates and develops the themes of the first triad in the fourth triad (99–115b): for instance, Hieron's xenic φίλα τράπεζα (16–17) in his μάκαιρα ἑστία (11) allusively prefigures the *theoxenia* and hero-cult-based ritual feasting[61] around Pelops' tomb and altar (90–94);[62] in a symmetrical position to the Zeus–Hieron parallel (10–11), Zeus is mentioned as the guardian god to Hieron (106–107); the conspicuous landmark of Olympia (the hill of Kronus) is evoked (111) along with the theme of superlative and limit (113–114; or traditionally put, *ne plus ultra*), echoing the two superlatives, the Olympic games and the conspicuous sun, in the Priamel (5–7).[63]

It is noteworthy that the initial lines of the strophe, antistrophe, and epode in the first triad interconnect with each other. The thought of pre-eminence runs through διαπρέπει (2), ἀμφέπει (12) and λάμπει (23) evoking a similar sound. As θεμιστεῖον corresponds with ἄριστον,[64] the wealth-renowned Λυδοῦ alludes to πλούτου, while εὐάνορι seems to be a

[58] Pitotto (2014) 12 noted that the 'horse-loving king' is emphasised 'because of the total synergy between *ordo verborum* and triadic structure'; for the horse theme, see 18–22, 41, 87, 101.
[59] On the symmetrical structure here, see Young (1968) 121–123; for a different view, see Sicking (1983) 67.
[60] Köhnken (1974) 200; Young (1968) 123 noted that the idea of superlativity is present in Pelops' feat, the Olympic games, and Hieron's position.
[61] Hieron's ἀγλαΐζεται (14) is contrasted with Tantalus' εὐφροσύνας ἀλᾶται (58) and then taken up by Pelops' ἀγλααῖσι (91).
[62] Ἑστία like ἐσχάρα could mean 'altar', LSJ sv. A. 4. Cf. Slater (1989) 490. For the ritual context here, see Burkert (1983) 93–103; Krummen (1990/2014) 184–213, esp. 192–193 for the connection between Hieron's sympotic table and Pelops' hero cult; see also Ekroth (2012).
[63] For other connecting points between the first and fourth antistrophes, see § 4.1.4.
[64] Gerber (1982) 32–33; see more in § 4.1.4.

'deliberate reminiscence' of μεγάνορος.[65] The word order of εὐάνορι Λυδοῦ Πέλοπος ἀποικίᾳ | τοῦ carries a thematic echo of that of μάκαιραν Ἱέρωνος ἑστίαν […] ὅς. As the relative pronoun ὅς brings in the glorious present of Hieron, so the τοῦ introduces the mythic past of Pelops: the antecedent of each relative pronoun is a place-name – Hieron's ἑστία (Ortygia in Syracuse of Sicily) and Pelops' ἀποικία (Olympia in Pisa of Peloponnese) – but it refers in its own clause to the person concerned.[66] The idea of Pelops' ἀποικία is a striking oxymoron because Pelops himself is the eponym of Peloponnese.[67] Likewise, the reference to Hieron's colony as an ἑστία bears a similar sense of oxymoron and 'dislocation', as hearth is generally an image for family and homeland. The correlation creates a poetic vision of continuity of the colonial expansion from Pelops to Hieron (see more in § 4.1.4).[68]

Furthermore, the reference to the horse Pherenicus rushing along the river Alpheus (20) proves to be remarkable not only because it denotes the victorious moment of Hieron but also because it serves as a prompt of the mythic and geographic connection between the river Alpheus and the fountain of Arethusa, into which Hieron's colonial progression is fused. In *Nemean* 1, Ortygia is evoked in juxtaposition with the 'up-breath' of Alpheus, vividly presenting the personified river god's gasping for breath after travelling under the earth from Olympia (1–2).[69] The fused identity of the river and the fountain might also serve as a cue to the interchangeability between source and end, *hestia* and *apoikia*, native and colonist, departure and *nostos.*[70] An aetiological myth might be familiar to Pindar and his audience:

[65] Gerber (1982) 52.
[66] Drew Griffith (2008) 6.
[67] Eckerman (2013) 17.
[68] Note also that the θεμιστεῖον […] σκᾶπτον recalls the sceptre of Agamemnon derived from Pelops, see below. For the oppressed tensions between the colonists and the natives, see Athanassaki (2003). The colonial programme of Hieron is far less gentle, according to Diod. Sic. 11.49.
[69] For the image of Arethusa and Alpheus featured in Syracusan coinage, see Morgan (2015) 61 ff.
[70] Pitotto (2014) 13 noted that 'there are no eulogistic moments designed to include the laudandus' town or his family', except Syracuse mentioned once in the context of Hieron's kingly domination. Additionally, although ἀποικία brings Pelops and Hieron together, the Deinomenid military victory or colonial practice leaves no trace in *Olympian* 1 (cf. *Pythian* 1; Bacchylides 5). Moreover, the river Alpheus with the spring Arethusa as its 'double' brings to mind the delimiting and connecting powers of water implied in the opening Priamel: Alpheus–Arethusa appears to be a mythic linkage of Greek Olympia and Sicilian Ortygia, and the convergent point of the theoxenia and Pelops' tomb (93). Alpheus is also the marking line of the south side of the Olympic hippodrome. For the recent archaeological discovery of the hippodrome at Olympia, see Muller et al. (2008).

with the help of Artemis, Arethusa fled from the river god under the sea to Ortygia.[71] The Olympian river's transoceanic and erotic travel prefigures, as C. Dougherty remarked, 'the colonists' own westward movement from Corinth' and their political foundation through violent conquest.[72] Hieron's athletic route between Ortygia and Olympia is both a (metaphorical) reversal of the subterfuge of Arethusa and a *mimesis* of the colonial–erotic pursuit of Alpheus.[73]

Moreover, the amorous double of Alpheus–Arethusa serves as a fitting backdrop for Pherenicus' reciprocal χάρις for the horse-loving Hieron (18–23)[74] and Poseidon's erotic desire for Pelops of exceptional beauty (25–26). Indeed, as Pindar takes up the Dorian *phormix* (17; cf. ἱππίῳ νόμῳ, 101),[75] the first triad culminates in the praise of Hieron in the celebration of the victory of Pherenicus[76] and the introduction of Pelops as the comparandum (23–27):

> ...λάμπει δέ οἱ κλέος
> ἐν εὐάνορι Λυδοῦ Πέλοπος ἀποικίᾳ,
> τοῦ μεγασθενὴς ἐράσσατο γαιάοχος
> Ποσειδᾶν, ἐπεί νιν καθαροῦ λέβητος ἔξελε Κλωθὼ
> ἐλέφαντι φαίδιμον ὦμον κεκαδμένον
>
> His *kleos* shines in the brave-manned colony of the Lydian Pelops, with whom the powerful Earth-holder Poseidon fell in love, when Clotho lifted him out from the pure cauldron, while his shoulder is marked with gleaming ivory.

[71] Paus. 5.7.1–5; Ovid *Met.* 5.573–641; cf. Ibycus, *PMG* 321, 323; Strabo 6.2.4; see Drew Griffith (2008); Eckerman (2013) 8–11; Morgan (2015) 89–90, 233.
[72] Dougherty (1993) 68–69.
[73] The term 'subterfuge' was from Méautis (1962) 264 quoted by Drew Griffith (2008) 6. For the association between marriage or sexual union and colonial narrative in Pindar, see also Athanassaki (2003).
[74] The epithet ἱπποχάρμαν might be connected with χάρμη, meaning 'fighting with horses'. It could be a useful ambiguity (again) for Pindar to draw attention to Hieron's joy from agonistic success and his martial and colonial exploits; for a discussion see Gerber (1982) 49; Verdenius (1988) 15.
[75] Köhnken (1974) 204 suggested reading 101 as a reference to the victorious event rather than an unknown lyric melody. Pindar's obligation to crown Hieron a *hippios nomos* in Aeolic sound (100–103); *contra* Wilamowitz (1922) 234. I would suggest that the Dorian *phormix* refers to the Olympic victory and implicitly to the Dorian colonial programme.
[76] Cf. Pindar's praise of Acresilas' horse Carrhotus, *Pyth.* 5.30–39.

The thematic and symmetrical correspondence of 20–24 and 25–27, revolving around κλέος (23), has not been emphasised by commentators. Drawing attention to the reciprocity between the loved (Pherenicus, Pelops) and the lover (Hieron, Poseidon), Pindar juxtaposes two remarkable occasions: the victorious moment when (ὅτε, 20) Pherenicus swiftly rushed along, bringing victory to his ἱπποχάρμαν master;[77] the enigmatic moment when (ἐπεί, 26) Pelops was lifted out from the cauldron, distinguished by a striking part of his body, the ivory scapula, which gives rise to Poseidon's erotic desire. In other words, Pherenicus' voluntary offering of his body is a reciprocal pay-back for Hieron's love, while the exceptional ivory scapula of Pelops is a passive object of a god's love.

Although both Hieron and Poseidon are lovers, Pindar does not put Hieron on the same footing with the sea-god. Rather, the actual counterpart of (the ἔρως of) Poseidon is (the χάρις of) Pisa (18), i.e. Olympia, which could be seen as a metonym of Zeus (cf. 7–8; *Ol.* 2.3, 3.9, 8.9–10; Bacchyl. 5.176–182). As we shall see, the phrase Πίσας τε καὶ Φερενίκου χάρις, 'the *charis* of (Zeus') Pisa and Pherenicus', is not a mere hendiadys[78] but thematically correspondent with Poseidon and his golden horses on Sipylus (41) and later the reciprocal gift of a chariot and horses (87–78) on the seashore, which leads to the *kleos* of Pelops. Viewed in this way, Pindar creates an intricate pair of comparable trios:

Olympia–Zeus ↑↓ *kados–charis*[79]	Sea–Poseidon ↑↓ *eros–philos–charis*[80]
Hieron (with lawful sceptre) ↑↓ *charma–charis*	1) Pelops on Sipylus (with ivory scapula) 2) Pelops at Olympia
Pherenicus (with unpricked body) (along Alpheus: from Ortygia to Pisa)	1) Golden horses (from Sipylus to Olympus) 2) Golden chariot and untiring winged horses; (Hippodameia?) (from Lydia to Olympia)

[77] See also Köhnken (1974) 203. For Poseidon Hippios, see *Pyth.* 2.12; 4.45; *Isth.* 1.54; *Ol.* 4.21.
[78] Cf. Verdenius (1988) 14.
[79] See 106–107, θεὸς [Zeus] ἐπίτροπος […] μήδεται, ἔχων τοῦτο κᾶδος Ἱέρων.
[80] See also 41 ἱμέρῳ; 75–6 φίλια δῶρα […] ἐσ χάριν | τέλλεται, with 85 πρᾶξιν φίλαν δίδοι; cf. 80 ἐρῶντας.

The diagram shows the encomiastic scheme to form a parallel between Hieron and Pelops, each of which is placed against a *charis*-based mutual relationship. Furthermore, several points of comparison between Hieron and Pelops deserve noting. The scene of Pelops-in-the-cauldron[81] takes place in the most lawful feast of Tantalus on Sipylus (35–39) where Poseidon, subjected to his desire, immediately snatches Pelops with golden horses to the palace of Zeus on Olympus, as a cupbearer like Ganymede (40–42).[82] The presence of Klotho denotes the appointed portion of honour of Pelops at the very start of the myth: his shining shoulder gives rise to Poseidon's love which is about to shape his life.[83] The scene resembles the initiation scenario of a newborn deity or a divinised figure (as reflected in the case of Ganymede, see §§ 2.1–2.2). Pelops is initiated into the divine assembly not only by Klotho's rejuvenating cleanse but also by the *eros* of Poseidon (along with Zeus' grace shedding over Sypilus). The radiance (φαίδιμον) of the shoulder intensified by the gleaming quality of the ivory[84] serves as a reflection of Pelops' divine favour on which his extraordinary status and *kleos* is fundamentally based.[85] The mention of the royal power and influence of Pelops at

[81] The difficulty of 25–27 has given rise to a long debate about the function of the pure cauldron. Because of the scarce evidence of the mythological data, the scholars have been wrestling to figure out the poet's innovation or derivation from the traditional and best-known version preserved in the scholia (schol. *Ol.* 1.40a-d Drachmann); see e.g. Gerber (1982) 55–56; Howie (1983); Köhnken (1983); Hubbard (1987); Verdenius (1988) 17; Slater (1989) 500; Johnston (2012) 224; Morgan (2015) 235. Acerbo (2020) seems to me the best solution: challenging the long-held assumption that the cannibalistic myth is the only version before Pindar, it argued to read Klotho's operation as an ageing process through which Pelops immediately reaches his fullness of youth and becomes 'most seasonable' (ὡραιότερος) to Poseidon. The mortal, polluting and cannibalistic cauldron is thus a false and malicious explanation (46–53) of the true cauldron of purification, maturation, rejuvenation, and 'de-mortalisation'. Furthermore, Acerbo (2020) noted that Ekroth (2012) rightly discredited the reliability of the report in Pausanias (5.13.2) and reconstructed with the new archaeological findings a brighter context of the Pelopeion in verses 90–92. For the myth's implication as a *rite de passage*, see Hubbard (1987) 6–8.

[82] Krummen (1990/2014) 222 suggests that ὕπατον εὐρυτίμου δῶμα Διός has a sympotic and celebrative connotation. Cf. *h. Hom.* 5.210–212, 216 f.; *Il.* 5.265–270; Ganymede is carried off by a gust of wind, *h. Hom.* 5.208; also, *Ol.* 10.104 f.

[83] Krummen (1990/2014) 204 f., 233 f.

[84] For the ivory scapula of Pelops, see the discussion in Johnston (2012); Acerbo (2020) 6–15. For ivory as a metaphor for divinity or divine essence, see *OEAGR*, s.v. 'ivory'.

[85] If ivory can be 'classified alongside gold and fire in the Pindaric scale of outstanding substances', it proves to be 'a sign of the highest glory' that Pelops receives from the gods, as Tantalus' honour is substantiated in the ambrosia and nectar; see Johnston (2012) 224–225. Moreover, ivory also bears a symbolic sense of royal luxury and affluence; see e.g. *Od.* 4.71–75; 19.55–58; 21.5–7; 23.199–201; cf. *Il.* 13.22; Eur. *IA* 582-583. This encourages us to take the ivory shoulder of Pelops as a parallel point to the θεμιστεῖον σκᾶπτον of Hieron (12). Indeed, Pindar's description of Hieron's sceptre resonates with that of Agamemnon's sceptre in Homer which is strikingly derived from the horse-driver (πληξίππῳ) Pelops (*Il.* 2.101–208; also 9.97–99; cf. ἱπποχάρμαν, 23); see further in Morgan (2015) 225–258; also Lefkowitz (1976) 80; Sicking (1983) 66; Harrell (2002) 442; Luraghi (2010) 32; Meister (2019) 372–373 also noted the image of Zeus with sceptre on the two coins from Aetna–Catana.

Lydia and Peloponnese (cf. 88) is consonant with the twice emphasised kingship of Hieron (23-24). By the same token, the present status of Hieron as a sceptred king and an Olympian victor (12–13) reflects the divine favour shedding over his blessed hearth (11). In this light, the Pelops-in-the-cauldron scene is comparable to the Pherenicus-along-the-Alpheus tableau: the former marks the initiation of Pelops' *kleos* under the divine *eros* of Poseidon, while the latter denotes the (ongoing)[86] fulfilment of Hieron's *kleos* under the *charis* of Olympian Zeus. As noted above, *kleos* is the merging point of Hieron and Pelops. In effect, the fulfilment (24) of Pelops' *kleos* is juxtaposed with its initiation (25). It is, thus, noteworthy that the glorious future of Pelops along with his marriage-oriented colonisation (67–93), that is, his wide-ruling kingship, is projected by a solemn and auspicious present[87] vividly marked with the ivory scapula reflecting divine favour and prefiguring his divinely ordained life course of great honour (for divine favour and *moira*, see further in § 4.2.1).[88]

After the transgression of Tantalus, however, Pelops is dismissed from Olympus and re-mortalised to live among 'the short-lived race of men' (65–66). In contrast with the rejuvenation experienced in the divine cauldron, the re-mortalised Pelops is characterised by the ageing process according to human nature (φυάν, 67–68; note also that ἐπεί is picked up by ὅτε). Instead of the divine homosexualism (cf. ἐρῶντας, 80), Pelops thinks of the marriage with the fair-famed Hippodameia, daughter of 'the Pisan' (69–70; cf. Πίσας τε καὶ Φερενίκου, 18). Unlike Poseidon, Pelops' erotic pursuit is not simply driven by the sheer beauty of Hippodameia but is undertaken with a reflection of his mortal condition (81–86):

> ...ὁ μέγας δὲ κίνδυνος ἄναλκιν οὐ φῶτα λαμβάνει.
> θανεῖν δ' οἷσιν ἀνάγκα, τά κέ τις ἀνώνυμον
> γῆρας ἐν σκότῳ καθήμενος ἕψοι μάταν,
> ἀπάντων καλῶν ἄμμορος; ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὗτος ἄεθλος
> ὑποκείσεται...

[86] Cf. 109–110, Pindar wishes to sing (κλείξειν) for Hieron's chariot-race victory in the future. Sicking (1983) 69 suggests that this future victory 'would make him a second Pelops in the house of Zeus in Olympia'.
[87] Cf. Vivante (2021) 4–5.
[88] Drew Griffith (2000) 23f. suggests the probable relation between the ivory scapula of Pelops and scapulimancy, a form of oracular practice.

> Great risk does not take hold of a strengthless man. Since it is a necessity for us to die, why would anyone sit in the darkness and vainly boil away a nameless old age, lacking a share of all noble things? No, for me, this contest must be undertaken.

This monologue-like speech of Pelops is delivered at night, alone at the seashore of Lydia, to Poseidon who suddenly reveals himself in closeness to his favourite (71–74). The scenery bears striking resemblance to that in *Olympian* 6 where Iamus seeks τιμή by appealing alone at night to Poseidon and Apollo along the river Alpheus (61–67).[89] Unlike Pelops, Iamus has limited experience about divine life. For Pelops, the inevitable life course from birth, maturation, old age and death is not merely a human condition. The phrase ἁπάντων καλῶν ἄμμορος picks up all the happy moments in the past: his father's honour among the gods, his transformation in the pure cauldron during the blessed feast on Sipylus, his erotic affair with Poseidon, his share on the table in the palace of Zeus – in short, his divine status. His experience of returning from Olympus, i.e. his re-mortalisation, means the loss of the share of τὰ καλά, that is, the loss of honour among the gods.

Pelops is demoted to an undefined status without a share of τὰ καλά among the short-lived. Due to mortality, he now faces the threat of becoming obscure and forgotten into nothingness if he could not distinguish himself with excellence and honour. In this sense, the seeking of τὰ καλά is not taken merely as an *earthly* pursuit of marriage and success in contest: it is envisaged as a way of restoring his divine status, however limited, and a means to reclaim his lost share of divinity as far as possible.

A comparable passage that deserves mention is the speech of Sarpedon addressed to his comrade Glaucus amidst the battlefield (*Il.* 12.310–328, esp. 322–328). Like Pelops,

[89] Iamus asks his divine ancestor to fulfil his desire for honour, λαοτρόφος τιμή, standing alone at night along the Alpheus, immediately after 'he plucked the fruit of lovely gold-crowned Hebe' (57–61). Instead of a heroic speech, we learn here the solemn, auspicious response of Apollo (61–63), an imperative that leads his son to the summit of Cronus' hill (64; cf. *Ol.* 1.111) on which the hero of double origin is granted with a double treasure of prophecy (65–66). *Olmypian* 6 is composed for Hegesias the general of Hieron, a co-founder of Syracuse, holding the prophetic τιμή of Iamus at Pisa; cf. *Pyth.* 4.193–201 (Jason calls on Zeus). For the correspondence between *Ol.* 1 and *Ol.* 6, see esp. Foster (2013) and Morgan (2015) 390–410; also Segal (1964) 250 f.; Köhnken (1983) 71–72; Vivante (2021) 5–7; Morrison (2007) 76; Drew Griffith (2008) 3; Meister (2019) 375.

Sarpedon, as argued in § 1.4.2, delimits his godlike status among the Lycians (312; cf. 6.191–195) by comparing it with divine status. For the Iliadic Sarpedon, full divinity is a fantasy only expressed in an *adynaton*. For the Pindaric Pelops, however, it was once achieved in reality thanks to his special relationship with the gods. Unlike Sarpedon's exhortation to Glaucus, the path for extraordinary status does not directly lie in the risky contest against an intimidating foe; rather, he withdraws from the human world (like his disappearance in the past) and makes an appeal to Poseidon for assistance as a claim to his privilege based on his intimate bond with the god. Indeed, Pelops opens his prayer with reference to their homoerotic past (75–76):

> φίλια δῶρα Κυπρίας ἄγ' εἴ τι, Ποσείδαον, ἐς χάριν
> τέλλεται…
>
> If the loving gifts of Cypria have a result that leads to gratitude, come, Poseidon…

And he concludes with a request of favour for his marital future (85):

> ...τὺ δὲ πρᾶξιν φίλαν δίδοι.
>
> And may you grant a pleasing accomplishment.

The phraseological echoes[90] do not only rhetorically create a ring composition but also form a reciprocal circle of *charis*. Scholars have enriched our understanding of the Pelops–Poseidon episode by drawing attention to the cultural institutions in the Greek world, such as the social conventions of homoeroticism, the practices of symposia, and the rites of passage.[91] What deserves further emphasis, however, is that the homoerotic interlude with Poseidon is introduced primarily and fundamentally for the status elevation of Pelops, either from Sipylus

[90] τὺ – Ποσείδαον; φίλια – φίλαν; δῶρα – δίδοι; τέλλεται – πρᾶξιν; see Gerber (1982) 130; Krummen (1990/2014) 227–228.
[91] Cairns (1977); see also Krummen (1990/2014) 226ff.; cf. Gerber (1982) on 68 and 75.

to Olympus or from Lydia to Olympia. Moreover, this special form of divine–human relationship provides a religious (rather than a homoeroticism- or initiation-related),[92] cultural framework for gauging Hieron's extraordinary status. More importantly, as suggested above, Pelops' appeal to Poseidon, as a reminder of the *charis*-based reciprocal relationship, serves to *define* his status as a divine favourite and the portion of τὰ καλά in the cosmic society.[93]

Although, unlike Sarpedon and Achilles, Pelops does not address his social relationship on earth, his motivation is rooted in a desire for a marriage and a family in the future (69).[94] It seems a deliberate choice of Pindar to characterise the mortal Pelops in such an extreme isolation from all kinds of social bonds (note that his mother is mentioned only in the rejected version of the myth) so as to illustrate that the entire existence of Pelops is ultimately dependent upon divine *charis*. The evocation of Pelops does not only remind Poseidon of *charis* but also confirms his acceptance of his inferior and dependent status.

The prayer of Pelops is immediately fulfilled (86–87):

ὣς ἔννεπεν, οὐδ' ἀκράντοις ἐφάψατ' ὧν ἔπεσι.
τὸν μὲν ἀγάλλων θεὸς
ἔδωκεν δίφρον τε χρύσεον πτεροῖσίν τ' ἀκάμαντας ἵππους.

Thus he spoke, and he did not lay hold of ineffective speech. Glorifying him, the god gave a golden chariot and horses with untiring wings.

[92] Nevertheless, it is of particular interest to see that the shift from divine homoeroticism to human heterosexual union parallels with the transition of Pelops from his status as a divine figure to his status as an extraordinary human.

[93] This reminds us of the weeping Achilles' appeal to his mother Thetis, when he 'sat in sorrow apart from his companions beside the beach of the grey sea looking out on the infinite water' (*Il.* 1.349–350). See also 18.78–93, 97–126, esp. 102. For a discussion of these Iliadic passages, see § 3.3.1. For Pelops and Achilles, see Segal (1964) 226; Gerber (1982) 128; Verdenius (1988) 37–38; Drew Griffith (1989) 171; Howie (1991) 75–76.

[94] In fact, as paternal education is replaced by divine homoeroticism, the returned Pelops has also lost his relationship with his father Tantalus, who fades into the background with his dual transgression (violating his reciprocal relation with the gods and upsetting the divine–human boundary in a symposium) as a negative foil. Additionally, the comparison between Tantalus and Oenomaus is worth mentioning, which is well observed by Hubbard (1987): Tantalus places *xenia* (to the gods and his sympotic fellows) over the family–relationship (to his son), while Oenomaus overvalues the latter (to his daughter) and undervalues the former (to the suitors). Like his father, Niobe overvalues her offspring to the extent that she undervalues her relationship to the gods.

As Gerber noted, οὐδ' ἀκράντοις is added to confirm the reciprocal circle (τέλλεται, 76; πρᾶξιν, 85) and the desire of Pelops (μάταν in 82–84) and 'serves to tie it more closely to what follows'.[95] The active verb ἀγάλλων, 'honouring or glorifying', echoes the divine passion in passive form (δαμέντα φρένας ἱμέρῳ, 41; cf. ἐράσσατο, 25); additionally, it brings us back to the glorious moment of the feast of Tantalus whom the gods held in honour (ἐτίμασσαν, 55). Just as Poseidon himself carries Pelops with a golden horse (41) from Sipylus to Olympus, the divine chariot and steeds will transport him from Lydia[96] to Olympia (94),[97] where he established his ἀποικία with his shining κλέος (93–94; cf. 23–24).

The divine gifts, the substantiated form of *charis* (picking up δῶρα and δίδοι), fulfil the main practical request of Pelops (81–82): Pelops is empowered (πέλασον) to achieve his victory (κράτει; cf. κράτει προσέμιξε, 22) by taking the power-life (βίαν) of Oenomaus and the virgin as his bride in Elis (88).

Divine power also leads Pelops to a new family with six sons and a kingdom (the Peloponnese) recalling the line that introduces Pelops: Λυδοῦ Πέλοπος ἀποικίᾳ (23). The prayer of Pelops expresses a very Homeric idea, which also has a prominent place in the epinician context: one must depart from (*apo*) home (*oikos*) to seek glorious honour with which one takes on the journey of *nostos* returning home. Yet, Pelops is a strikingly unusual case with his experiences of two *nostoi*. First, passively, he is captured away to Olympus from Lydia and dismissed to home along with his re-mortalisation. A second time, he departs from Lydia for honour but stays at his *apoikia* in Olympia instead of his original *oikos*. More strikingly, as his second departure bears resemblance with the first abduction, the journey to Olympia appears as a quasi-*nostos* to Olympus (for the journey to Olympus and its thematic significance, see §§ 4.3.2–4.3.3).

Pindar describes the athletic–military success and establishment of the family (and kingdom) of Pelops in Elis in only two lines (88–89). In contrast to such economy, almost the

[95] Gerber (1982) 133. Further, the metaphorical use of ἐφάψατ' implies the pleading position of Pelops (cf. *Il*. 1.500–502) and the closeness between the hero and the god (cf. πὰρ ποδὶ σχεδόν, 74), though the mediatory element becomes love in speech instead of eros in physical contact.

[96] Pindar does not tell us the location of the gifting scene but it is a reasonable assumption; see Gerber (1982) 135.

[97] For the equivalence between Pisa, Elis, and Olympia, see Bundy (1962) 47; Drew Griffith (2008) 2.

entire fourth strophe (90–97) is devoted to his posthumous cult at Olympia along the river Alpheus:

> νῦν δ᾽ ἐν αἱμακουρίαις
> ἀγλααῖσι μέμικται
> Ἀλφεοῦ πόρῳ κλιθείς,
> τύμβον ἀμφίπολον ἔχων πολυξενωτάτῳ παρὰ βωμῷ·
> τὸ δὲ κλέος
> τηλόθεν δέδορκε τᾶν Ὀλυμπιάδων ἐν δρόμοις
> Πέλοπος, ἵνα ταχυτὰς ποδῶν ἐρίζεται
> ἀκμαί τ᾽ ἰσχύος θρασύπονοι.
>
> But now he has a share of the splendid blood-sacrifices, as he reclines by the course of the Alpheus, having his much-attended tomb beside the altar thronged by visiting strangers. *Kleos* gleams far from the Olympic games in the racecourses of Pelops, where swiftness of foot is contested, and supreme deeds of bold strength.

Pindar refers to three kinds of sacrificial practices: the major ritual *thysia* (performed around the τύμβον and βωμῷ, 93) is modified by the *haimakouria* (90) and the *theoxenia* (suggested by κλίθεις, 92).[98] Pindar in effect visualises a religious landscape vividly starting from the Pelopion, the ash altar of Zeus, to the stadium and hippodrome (94), along with the westward watercourse of the Alpheus located south of the stadium and the conspicuous mountain of Kronus (111) on the northern side of the Altis.[99] Within the programme of the Olympic festival, a nocturnal sacrifice in honour of Pelops on the evening of the third day is followed by a procession leading to the great sacrifice to Zeus the next morning (*Ol.* 10.73–83; cf. *Ol.* 1.1–7).[100] The deliberate juxtaposition of *bomos*[101] and *kleos* in the middle of verse 93,

[98] Ekroth (2002) 191–192.

[99] For the topography of the site of Olympia, see Young (2004) 53–54; Barringer (2005); Ekroth (2012) esp. 98–99; Eckerman (2013).

[100] Krummen (1990/2014) 189; Ekroth (2012) 95.

connecting the tomb (93) and the hippodrome in honour of Pelops (94–95), might have some further implications: though it is Poseidon who provides the winged horses and golden chariot transporting Pelops to Elis, it is the Olympian Zeus with whom Pelops has the cultic feast and co-patronises the chariot race. The proximity of Pelops' tomb and Zeus' altar, with all its sacrificial and topographical connection, brings us back to the occasion when (40–41) Poseidon abducts Pelops with golden horses and (42–45)

> ὕπατον εὐρυτίμου ποτὶ δῶμα Διὸς μεταβᾶσαι,
> ἔνθα δευτέρῳ χρόνῳ
> ἦλθε καὶ Γανυμήδης
> Ζηνὶ τωὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ χρέος.
>
> transports him to the highest house of widely honoured Zeus, where at a later time Ganymede came as well to render Zeus the same service.

Like Ganymede, Pelops was once initiated as a cupbearer of *nectar* for the gods in the house of Zeus. As many scholars noted, Pelops is presented as a banqueter in an 'eternal symposium' at Olympia:[102] indeed, the sacrificial scenery in Pindar's description is noticeably characterised with festivity and hospitality (ἀμφίπολον […] πολυξενωτάτῳ), suggesting a communal dinner during which the sacrificial meat is distributed to a large number of worshippers.[103] The reference to Ganymede does not only explain Poseidon's abduction with a model familiar to the audience but also serves to prefigure the association between Pelops and Zeus. Furthermore, the earthly but eternal sympotic cult of Pelops with the gods is comparable to the erstwhile 'most orderly feast' on Sipylus (37–39) and put in

[101] The βωμῷ in 93 is ambiguous: the epithet πολυξενωτάτῳ probably suggests the ash altar of Zeus; cf. *Ol.* 3.17; 10.101; see also Krummen (1990/2014) 186. Ekroth (2012), however, has demonstrated that an altar is in the Pelopion for the performance of the blood sacrifice. Nevertheless, Ekroth (2012) 124 n. 81 acknowledged that it remains a possibility to identify the βώμος in 93 as that of Zeus.

[102] Slater (1989) 490–499.

[103] Ekroth (2012) 105. Further, the influential interpretation (e.g. Burkert (1983) 95–103 and Nagy (1986)) based on the report of Pausanias (5.13.1–7) has been challenged by new archaeological evidence. In this light, the Pelops myth in *Ol.* 1 (either the popular or the Pindaric version) is not necessarily related to the Olympian sacrifice of a black ram (Paus. 5.13.2); see also Acerbo (2020) 18–19.

stark contrast with the transgressive symposium between Tantalus and his symposiasts (61–64), as well as his post-punishment state (εὐφροσύνας ἀλᾶται, 58; cf. ἀγααῖσι in 91 and ἀγλαίζεται in 14).[104]

Now a second time, Poseidon brings the re-mortalised Pelops to Olympia as a victor and a symposiast with his *kleos* in Olympia, through his divinely empowered victory in the contest against Oenomaus, as Pindar puts it in a *gnome*: 'the victor attains a honeyed serenity (μελιτόεσσαν εὐδίαν) through the rest of life as far as contests (ἀέθλων) are concerned' (97–99). The term εὐδία thematically summarises the whole Pelops–Tantalus myth. In Pindar, εὐδία is used as a weather metaphor to signal both the alternation of human life between darkness and light and the present renewal of fortune by divine favour. For instance, in *Isthmian* 7, Poseidon granted Strepsiades with εὐδίαν after the hero's unspeakable sorrow (37–39). Similarly, in *Pythian* 5, Arkesilaos is said to be restored to prosperity by Castor, 'who sheds εὐδίαν after wintry storm over your μάκαιραν ἑστίαν' (10–11).[105] By the same token, after his dismissal from Olympus due to his father's dietary transgression, upon overcoming the darkness of toil and risk in the contest at Elis with the winged horses of Poseidon, Pelops is restored to an extraordinary status as a symposiast in Olympia of Zeus, who is now shedding honeyed serenity as a *charis* (cf. 30) upon him (note also the correspondence between δῶμα Διὸς and εὐδίαν).

Finally, the mention of the far shining *kleos* of Pelops (93–94) brings the audience all the way back to Hieron's *kleos* gleaming in the Λυδοῦ Πέλοπος ἀποικίᾳ (23–25) and the subsequent scenarios of the pure cauldron and divine love.[106] The thematic connection between the feast on Sipylus and the sympotic cult at Olympia is to a certain extent substantiated in the ritual correspondence between the rejuvenation process of the cauldron and the collective sacrifice performed by the ἀμφίπολος τύμβος with πολυξενός βώμος. This thematic parallelism creates a poetic vision of the *re*-immortalisation of Pelops through the hero-cult and the reinstallation to the divine community through the sympotic scene.

[104] Steiner (2002) 309.
[105] Cf. *Isth*. 4.11–18, esp. νιφὰς πολέμοιο […] ἐρήμωσεν μάκαιραν ἑστίαν. Kurke (1991) 60, 67; Boeke (2007) 48–50; Eisenfeld (2014) 130–131;
[106] Note the similar position of *kleos* at the end of the verse (23 and 93).

The gleaming ivory scapula of Pelops, visible in his statue in Pindar's time, must also serve as a reminder of the Sipylus feast. The ivory reflects his *kleos* and the permeation of divine *charis*. Indeed, the elevation, dismissal, and restoration of Pelops reflects the presence and absence, gain and loss, of divine favour. This is best illustrated by the famous lines in *Pythian* 8 (95–97). The *charis* of the gods fashions the gentlest things for mortals (30), as Pindar says, and when honour is added, it makes even 'the unbelievable be frequently believed' (31–32). Tantalus' Sipylus feast is a Zeus-given gleam in the dream-like past, while Pelops' present victory as a renewed shining light from Zeus awakens the unbelievable dream in a trustworthy reality. More importantly, Pelops' restoration to extraordinary honour fundamentally lies in his evocation to Poseidon as an acceptance of his subjection to divine power and ordinance. The 'heroism' in the case of the Pindaric Pelops is coloured with a deep religious sense. Yet, 'religion' is more about the divine–human relationship comprehensive to the Greeks. The existence of human beings is envisaged in the cosmic society as a union of the two separate communities in which the short-lived race of mortal humans is defined, fashioned, and (dis)honoured by the superior race of the gods, who hold the power of *charis* and the authority of distribution of the share of τὰ καλά.

4.1.4 Hieron at Syracuse and Pindar from Thebes

The image of the victor-cum-symposiast Pelops at Olympia corresponds with that of Hieron in the first triad, where the laudandus is characterised as an ambitious person desiring agonistic achievement (3–4), an Olympic winner with an empowering horse (7–8, 18–24), a host in a *(theo-)xenic* feast (14–17) with hymnic joys from the victory (8–10), in a blessed hearth under the *charis* of Olympia–Pisa (10–11, 18). A full discussion of the parallelism between Pelops and Hieron, which Pindar attempts to fashion through various themes and rich metaphors, will enlighten our understanding of the extraordinary status of Hieron.

Let us start again with the introduction of Pelops in verses 23–24, where the kingdom of the Syracusan Hieron is associated, through the light of *kleos*, with the ἀποικία of the Lydian Pelops. As suggested above, the term ἀποικία bears a sense of 'dislocation': Pelops' *apoikia* at Olympia becomes his new *oikos* (inhabited by his wife and six sons) and a quasi-*nostos* to

Olympus (having a cultic feast with the gods on earth). In a striking parallel, Hieron's *oikos* (with a blessed hearth) is located within Syracuse as an *apoikia* founded by his family; Hieron's glorious *nostos* to Syracuse as his *apoikia*, thus, corresponds with Pelops' departure for his future *apoikia* or a quasi-*nostos* to 'Olympus'. Furthermore, as discussed above, the athletic and colonial route of Hieron resembles the erotic and quasi-colonial route of Alpheus–Arethusa. All these are orchestrated together for a multidimensional representation of Hieron's *nostos*:

	Departure/ Oikos	*Journey/ Xenia*[107]	*Arrival/ Nostos*
Pelops (1)	Sipylus	Olympus	pre-dismissal: Olympus as *'apoikia'* post-dismissal: Lydia
Pelops (2)	Lydia	Elis–Olympia	Olympia as *apoikia* (Olympia as Olympus)
Alpheus –Arethusa	Olympia	Ortygia	Olympia or Ortygia as '*apoikia*'
Hieron	Syracuse	Olympia	Syracuse as '*apoikia*'

At first impression, Hieron, unlike Pelops, in fact returns to Syracuse as his *oikos*. Syracuse as his *apoikia*, however, makes Hieron's *nostos* an analogue of Pelops' arrival at Olympia. By merging the *apoikia* of Pelops and that of Hieron, Pindar creates a poetic vision of Hieron's kingship in Syracuse as derived from and empowered by Zeus through his victory achieved as a *charis* of Zeus. Moreover, as Alpheus' arrival at Ortygia and its transformation to or union with Arethusa, Syracuse seems to be re-founded or 're-colonised' as an 'Olympian' *apoikia* by the Olympic victor Hieron, just like his mythic counterpart Pelops, who establishes his rule over Elis as a 'colonist' by being a victor in the contest against Oenomaus. This is consonant with the image of Hieron as a 'Zeus-nurtured' king like Agamemnon in the *Iliad*, which as noted above is fashioned strikingly through his lawful sceptre (12) that has a mythic connection with that of Pelops. Furthermore, in light of

[107] For *xenia*, journey, and *nostos*, see Sigelman (2016) 50–85; also Kurke (1991) *passim.*

Hesiodic ideal kingship, where a just king brings prosperity and fortune to the land and people under his rulership, Pelops' εὐάνορι ἀποικίᾳ, 'well-manned settlement' (24), corresponds with the πολυμάλῳ Σικελίᾳ, 'fruitful Sicily',[108] as an *apoikia* of the lawful sceptred Hieron.[109]

It is also noteworthy that Pindar's image of the 'pre-eminently shining gold' (διαπρέπει […] ἔξοχα, 2) as a metaphor for Hieron and his shining *kleos* (λάμπει […] κλέος, 23) echoes the Hesiodic king, who 'stands out prominently (μετὰ δὲ πρέπει) in the assembly' (*Th.* 92). Although Pindar does not describe Hieron like the Hesiodic king being approached by people 'like a god' (θεὸν ὥς, 91), the verb ἀμφέπει in verse 12 that marks the honorific sphere of Hieron is 'frequently found where gods are invoked or described'.[110] Indeed, verse 12 is itself a relative clause that could convey hymnic connotations[111] and with a perceived ambiguity marks the shift from the announced praise for Zeus in verse 9 to the praise for Hieron. The boldness of verses 11–12 could be felt to a greater extent if we compare it with Hesiod's description of the subject of an ἀοιδός, who serves the Muses at the end of the poet–king episode: 'he hymns (ὑμνήσει) the superior men's *kleia* and the *makares theoi* dwelling on Olympos' (*Th.* 99–101). With such hymnic overtones, Hieron is assimilated to a divine figure along with the Olympia-oriented song's arrival at his blessed hearth (7–11).

Hieron is, thus, elevated to such a superior status that 'dislocates' him, through having a *kleos* shining both in Olympia and Syracuse, by being merged with a 'colonist' Pelops, and by 're-colonising' Syracuse as his *apoikia* upon his return from Olympia.

The sense of 'dislocation' could also be felt in the term μάκαρ modifying Hieron's hearth. The μάκαρ-related terms are mainly used for 'the gods' if unqualified,[112] and are applied rarely to living mortals[113] but, instead, to those living like gods in special locations in a post-mortem state (see further in §§ 4.2.1 and 4.3.2). Furthermore, in Pindar's extant work, the epithet μάκαιρα is applied only to Thessalia (the dwelling place of the Hyperboreans,

[108] For the fertility of Sicily, see Diod. 5.2.3–4.
[109] Morgan (2015) 230. Cf. *Op*. 225–237; similarly, σὲ δ' ἐρχόμενον ἐν δίκᾳ πολὺς ὄλβος ἀμφινέμεται, *Pyth.* 5.14.
[110] Meister (2019) 372.
[111] Gerber (1982) *ad loc*; see Meister (2019) 372 and n. 25 for further bibliographies.
[112] See e.g. *Il*. 1.339; 6.141; *Od*. 1.82; *Th*. 33, 128, 881; *Op*. 33, 101, 706; West (1966) 193 on *Th.* 171 (the Isle of the Blessed).
[113] See e.g. *Il*. 3.182; *Od*. 1.217; Op. 549; cf. εὔμοιρε in Bacchyl. 5.1.

Pyth. 10.2) and Thebes (as the city and the nymph, *Isth.* 7.1), apart from Hieron's hearth.[114] Moreover, as blessedness (μάκαρ and its cognate terms) often marks a place beyond ordinary humans' reach, where the gods and the quasi-divine humans meet (e.g. Apollo frequents the place of the Hyperboreans), so is Hieron's blessed hearth suggested to be envisioned as a convergent place of the blessed: the Olympian king, the Zeus-nurtured king, and the Muses-graced poet (cf. 106–112).[115] The blessed hearth as such brings us back to the reading of gold as a mark of divine–human convergence: indeed, hearth as a fireplace is associated with the image of fire-like gold, and the ἀφνεάν in the preceding line reinforces this connection. This might give reasons to make a further speculation of the connection between the initial lines of the first strophe (1) and the antistrophe (12): as Gerber observed, θεμιστεῖον (an hapax in the extant Greek literature) is probably rendered to balance ἄριστον and, thus, both are placed in an identical position (note the deliberately postponed relative ὅς).[116] The purpose here, however, is not to provide a 'purely structural balance' but to create a conceptual and thematic relation:[117] whereas Hieron's burning hearth (and his shining *kleos*) like the connecting light of the blazing gold gathers the blessed and the wise (cf. 9–10), the sceptred king like the boundary-marking 'water' establishes order (*themis*)[118] upon Sicily, *connecting* it with Olympia through his athletic route from Olympia's river Alpheus to Ortygia's fountain Arethusa.

Hieron's blessed hearth of Syracuse is thus also 'dislocated' by merging with the extraordinary places beyond human reach. Moreover, as the hearth is usually a place for the altar, the blessed hearth of Hieron along with his *phila trapeza* and Arethusa recalls the tomb

[114] Gerber (1982) 31.

[115] Morgan (2015) 230 rightly observed: 'the arrival of poets at the blessed hearth of Hieron in order to sing of the son of Kronos recalls the journey of the Muses toward Zeus on Olympus' (*Th.* 71–73).

[116] Gerber (1982) 32–33; for the effect of hyperbaton in 12, see Gerber (1982) *ad loc*; Pitotto (2014) 12.

[117] Cf. Gerber (1982) *ad loc*. Furthermore, there is a series of correspondences between 3–7 and 14–18: γαρύεν ἔλδεαι (3–4) is picked up by ἀγλαΐζεται […] ἀώτῳ (14–15), φίλον ἦτορ (4) by φίλαν τράπεζαν (16–17), and ἄλλο (6) by ἀλλὰ (17). This might lend support to Eckerman's (2017) reading of ἁλίου as a metaphor of Pindar's poetry: as the sun is superior to all other stars, so is Pindar's poem superior to other musical art.

[118] Gerber (1982) *ad loc* suggests that θεμιστεῖον refers to Hieron's dispensation of θέμιτες ('the ordinances or precedents which Zeus entrusts to kings'). For a different view, see Verdenius (1988) *ad loc*. θέμις and its cognate terms frequently denote the affairs related to the arrangement, establishment, and administration in respect of order. Further, the sceptre denotes the authority and responsibility to maintain the ordinances and the dispensation of justice (see e.g. *Il.* 1.237–239). In particular, it is the symbol of the power to gather (see e.g. *Il.* 1.15; 2.100 f.; *Od.* 2.37) and organise (*Il.* 2.265, Odysseus punishes Thersites with the sceptre) a political event such as an assembly or a funeral game (*Il.* 23.568).

and altar of Pelops' sympotic cult by Alpheus. This evokes the sympotic theme.[119] As argued above, the reciprocal feast hosted by Tantalus on Sipylus is comparable with the feast held by Hieron, while Tantalus' attendance of the divine feast on Olympus is then a parallel of Hieron's athletic journey to Olympia. Yet, Tantalus remains a negative foil in his transgressive symposium. Now, we have the cultic symposium of Pelops hosted after his victory over Oenomaus at Olympia, which is a more appropriate comparandum for that of Hieron hosted on behalf of his Olympian victory. This enables us to recognise the comparable points in the following three passages:

Hieron	θεμιστεῖον ὃς ἀμφέπει σκᾶπτον ἐν πολυμάλῳ
(vv. 12–17)	Σικελίᾳ, δρέπων μὲν κορυφὰς ἀρετᾶν ἄπο πασᾶν,
	ἀγλαΐζεται δὲ καὶ
	μουσικᾶς ἐν ἀώτῳ,
	οἷα παίζομεν φίλαν
	ἄνδρες ἀμφὶ θαμὰ τράπεζαν .
Tantalus	ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπάλαμον βίον τοῦτον ἐμπεδόμοχθον,
(vv. 59–65)	μετὰ τριῶν τέταρτον πόνον, ἀθανάτων ὅτι κλέψαις
	ἁλίκεσσι συμπόταις
	νέκταρ ἀμβροσίαν τε
	δῶκεν, οἷσιν ἄφθιτον
	θῆκαν.
Pelops	ἕλεν δ᾽ Οἰνομάου βίαν παρθένον τε σύνευνον:
(vv. 88–93)	ἔτέκε τε λαγέτας ἔξ ἀρεταῖσι μεμα ότας υἱούς.

[119] Seven scenes related to a feast or symposium could be found explicitly and implicitly in *Olympian* 1 in the following sequence:

1) the (theo-)xenic feast hosted by Hieron with his wise guests in honour of Zeus in the blessed hearth in Ortygia of Syracuse (8–11, 14–16);
2) the most orderly feast hosted by Tantalus with the gods on Sipylus (37–39);
3) the divine feast attended by Pelops as a cupbearer like Ganymede in the house of Zeus on Olympus (implied in 40–45);
4) the cannibalistic feast hosted by Tantalus with the gods somewhere in Lydia (48–51);
5) the divine feast joined by Tantalus at his honour on Olympus (implied in 55, 63–64);
6) the transgressive symposium hosted by Tantalus with his fellow drinkers somewhere in Lydia (60–64);
7) the cultic symposium of Pelops and Zeus with the worshippers by Alpheus in Olympia (90–93).

νῦν δ᾽ ἐν αἱμακουρίαις
ἀγλααῖσι μέμικται
Ἀλφεοῦ πόρῳ κλιθείς,
τύμβον ἀμφίπολον ἔχων πολυξενωτάτῳ παρὰ βωμῷ·

The textual correspondence is noticeable: while Tantalus has (ἔχει) a miserable life (βίον) because of stealing (κλέψαις) the immortalising foods from the gods, Pelops found a kingdom by begetting six sons of *aretai* and having (ἔχων) a much-attended (ἀμφίπολον) tomb because he took (ἕλεν) the power-life (βίαν) of Oenomaus and Hippodameia as his wife. By the same token, Hieron is delighted with praises beside the much-attended (ἀμφὶ θαμά) table because he holds (ἀμφέπει) the sceptre and plucks (δρέπων) the summit of *aretai*. Moreover, whereas Tantalus loses his kingdom and all kinds of festive joys (that is, his divine τιμή) because he violated his reciprocity with the gods and abused divine *charis* by giving the immortal foods to mortal fellows without authorisation, Pelops is entitled to a kingdom and a tomb of a hero-cult side by side with the ash altar of Zeus because of receiving the power of the winged horses as a divine *charis*. Likewise, Hieron has a blessed hearth and a kingly feast in honour of (as a reciprocal favour for) Zeus because of his Olympic victory achieved by the *charis* and power of Pherenicus[120] and Pisa.

Pindar does not only parallel Hieron's *phila trapeza* in his *makar hestia* under the *charis* of Zeus with the most orderly feast hosted by Tantalus honoured by Zeus, but also merges it with the much-attended tomb of Pelops side by side with the ash altar of Zeus. This poetic fusion creates a multidimensional vision for the audience to showcase the extraordinary status of the laudandus and unexceptional nature of the feast hosted in Syracuse, where the ode is about to be performed. Through the sympotic imagery, Hieron is elevated to a similar footing with the pre-fallen Tantalus and the re-elevated Pelops. Indeed, as a summary, Pindar praises Hieron as an extra-ordinary figure, superior to all ordinary men (103–105):

...πέποιθα δὲ ξένον

[120] Note also the correspondence between κράτει δὲ προσέμιξε (22) and κράτει δὲ πέλασον (78).

μή τιν᾽, ἀμφότερα καλῶν τε ἴδριν ἁμᾷ καὶ δύναμιν κυριώτερον
τῶν γε νῦν κλυταῖσι δαιδαλωσέμεν ὕμνων πτυχαῖς

I shall adorn no other guest-friend more knowledgeable of good things or more authoritative in his power among his contemporaries in the renowned folds of my hymns.

Like Pelops, Hieron has a great share of τὰ καλά and becomes a ruler with greatest power on earth. While the sense of superlativity recalls the opening term ἄριστος in the first strophe, δύναμιν κυριώτερον brings the audience back to θεμιστεῖον σκᾶπτον along with κορυφὰς ἀρετᾶν ἄπο πασᾶν in the opening of the first antistrophe (12). With a similar ring and a corresponding position to ἄριστος and θεμιστεῖον, the initial term χάρις (along with τιμάν) of the second strophe (30–31) is indeed the implicit theme of the lines subsequent to 105 (106–108):

θεὸς ἐπίτροπος ἐὼν τεαῖσι μήδεται
ἔχων τοῦτο κᾶδος Ἱέρων,
μερίμναισιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι,

A god acting as guardian takes thought for your ambitions, having this as his concern, Hieron, unless he should leave suddenly...

Hieron achieves supreme status as far as being recognised by Zeus as his favourite, which Pindar asserts with great emphasis. The extraordinary status of Hieron is attributed to the divine care which is underlined with three words in a row: ἐπίτροπος, μήδεται, κᾶδος. While ἐπίτροπος refers to Ὀλύμπου σκοποί (54), who honoured but also punished Tantalus (55, 64), κᾶδος recalls the *eros* of Poseidon for Pelops (25, 41; cf. *Ol.* 7.5). Furthermore, Hieron's μερίμναισιν reminds us of Pindar's depiction of the six sons of Pelops, λαγέτας ἀρεταῖσι μεμαότας, 'leaders ambitious for *aretai*' (89). Hieron 'inherits' not only the sceptre of Pelops

but also the ambitions of his offspring (cf. 3, 13), as well as the loving care of Zeus by which he becomes a 'leader' in Sicily. In *Pythian* 1, another song for Hieron, Pindar writes with a similar metaphor of 'plucking' of the theme of divine-granted honour in a military context (48–50):

> εὑρίσκοντο θεῶν παλάμαις τιμάν
> οἵαν οὔτις Ἑλλάνων δρέπει
> πλούτου στεφάνωμ' ἀγέρωχον
>
> They [sc. Hieron and his fellows] found, with gods' palms, honour such as no Hellene has ever plucked, a lordly crown of wealth.

The superlative honour, like in verses 103–105 in *Olympian* 1, comes with a laudable reminder of θεῶν παλάμαις, the touching and empowering of the gods. Without a proper relationship with the gods, without divine empowerment, one will never succeed in the pursuit of honour and wealth.

Another striking point worthy of mention is the parallelism between the divine foods of Tantalus, the blood-sacrifice of Pelops, and the excellent song (μουσικᾶς ἀώτος) of Hieron. The comparison also reminds us of the boldness of Pindar: it is by his song that Hieron will experience immortality or elevation to a status similar to the blood-sacrificial 'drink' of Pelops and the immortalising drink of Tantalus. As it is a *themis* of Zeus for poets to praise the Olympic games (*Ol.* 10.24–25), Pindar is obliged (χρή) to crown and embellish his extraordinary guest-friend (ξένος) with his 'famous folds of hymns' (100–104), and correspondingly he is driven by a much-praised song to come to Syracuse to praise both Zeus and Hieron (8–10). In this light, like water and light (of gold),[121] song plays a mediatory role between Hieron and the divine. Moreover, the arrow-equipped Pindar presents himself as an athlete[122] and a martial ally with Hieron. Like an Iliadic warrior, Pindar as an expert

[121] For Pindar's song as gold, see esp. *Ol.* 6.1–4 with Sigelman (2016) 78 f., 82–83.
[122] For Pindar as athlete, see Lefkowitz (1984).

marksman brings poetic and divine 'light' to his dear guest–friend (3–4, 105).[123] The poet Pindar acts as a divine agent to shoot arrows ('winged words') which bring a song of divine power to Hieron. The arrow metaphor thus creates a thematic link with the winged horses of Pelops received from Poseidon as a divine gift of reciprocity. The song of Pindar is mediatory not only by conveying an element of divinity to its laudandus but also leading Hieron on the path to the divine. In contrast to the false talk (φάτις) embellished (19; cf. 105) with deceptive stories (ψεύδεσι μῦθοι) by malicious and blameworthy mortals (35, 47), the poetic prayer for divine power and favour is the true path of words (ὁδόν λόγων, 110; cf. τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον, 18; *Ol.* 2.92), like Pelops' evocation to Poseidon (NB esp. ἐφάψατ' in 86), for Pindar to 'lend assistance' for Hieron's elevated, superior, blessed status at the present moment (114–115) and his future glory in chariot race (109) and himself to be excellent in poetics (115b).

The fusion or union between Hieron the king and Pindar the poet might recall the remarkable description of the ideal poet–king in Hesiod's *Theogony* (81-100, see also § 2.4).[124] As suggested above, the double of Hieron and Pindar in the opening Priamel and the apparent union of the king and the poet at the end might well be argued to be a resonant of Hesiod's (merging) picture of the Zeus-nurtured king and Muses-graced poet.[125]

The immortalising or status-elevating power of song, however, is not directly related in Pindar's own composition but preserved in the arrow of the Muse. As Hieron is patronised and empowered by Zeus, Pindar is patronised and empowered by Muse's power (ἀλκᾷ) with the 'strongest arrow' (καρτερώτατον βλέος, 112).[126] The term ἀλκά picks up ἄναλκιν in Pelops' definition of φῶς (81): as suggested above, this is the exertion of divine power that serves a divine favourite mortal to be 'illuminated' to ward off (ἀλέξειν) the darkness of a nameless, honourless obscurity and to achieve divine status. As rightly observed by W. J. Verdenius,[127] the martial valence of ἀλκά is prompted by the 'envy of his surroundings' and introduced for the encomiastic purpose of protecting the victor from oblivion.

[123] Pindar's song itself is a mark of his reciprocity with Hieron as his *xenos*.
[124] Cf. Morgan (2015) 229–231; Ready (2010).
[125] Compare Hesiod's autobiographical portrait of a sceptred poet in *Th.* 30–31 (δρέψασθαι) with *Ol.* 1.12–13 (δρέπων [...] ἄπο); note also that γηρύσασθαι in 28 echoes γαρύεν in *Ol.* 1.5.
[126] For the arrow as a metaphor for poetry, see *Ol.* 2.83–85 (below); *Ol.* 9.5; *Nem.* 6.28; *Nem.* 7.71f.; Hoey (1965) 261 n. 58; Lefkowitz (1984) 21; Sigelman (2016) 46.
[127] Verdenius (1988) 50–51, noting also the overtone of 'military ally' in ἐπίτροπος.

The immortalising power of song leads us back to the mysterious scene where Klotho lifts Pelops out from the pure cauldron (26–27). If the immortalising and rejuvenating power of Klotho parallels the defending-against-oblivion valour (ἀλκά) of the Muse, the pure cauldron plays a role analogous to the arrow, that is, the winged ode of Pindar.[128] As Klotho's pure cauldron changes the mortal mode of existence of Pelops and, thus, prefigures his initiation into the divine, Pindar's winged arrows of the Muse bring Hieron into a divine status, extra-ordinary and 'transcendent'. The 'transcendence' does not mean a departure from the physical and 'secular' world; rather, it means a permeated presence of the divine power and *charis*. As Pindar asserts in a *gnome* (99–100) following the lines of the victor's good-weather (98–99):

> ...τὸ δ᾽ αἰεὶ παράμερον ἐσλὸν
> ὕπατον ἔρχεται παντὶ βροτῶν.
>
> but the always present good comes as supreme for every mortal.

Unlike the ephemeral state alternating between darkness and bright, αἰεὶ παράμερον denotes a blessed state of existence with the eternal recurrence of divine favour. In the coda, Pindar addresses this as a reminder to Hieron that he should maintain his relationship with the gods and 'gaze no further' (114). The poet draws attention to the present status of Hieron by bringing together the past merged with his mythic paradigm and the future promised by the loving care of Zeus. In other words, the present status of Hieron, permeated with the presence of divine *charis*, not only provides a reason for past success but also guarantees future glory. With this poetic vision, as long as Hieron is recognised by the gods with a divine status, he has entered the 'immortal' realm and has been elevated from the mortal realm of time. He has achieved the extremity of human achievement, an extra-ordinary and blessed state both transcendent and immanent on earth, permeated with the gleaming light of *kleos* as a mark of

[128] In another mysteriously coloured passage of *Olympian* 2, Pindar describes his song as 'swift arrows inside my quiver that speak to those who understand' (83–85); see § 4.2.1.

the divine favour of Zeus, through the winged words of Pindar, the patronised poet of the Muse.

A fundamental point of this thesis should be recalled here. As argued above, the immortal and ageless state of Tantalus (sustained by the power of ambrosia and nectar) is the *effect* or *result* rather than the *cause* of his divine status (recognised as a co-symposiast of the gods). Likewise, the immortalising song itself does not give honour to its laudandus (the idea of 'immortal fame' as a compensation for mortality seems less important); rather, it is the *charis* of Zeus that brings Hieron an honorific status (cf. χάρις […] ἐπιφέροισα τιμάν, 30–31), a status that recognises a mortal Hieron as a member of the divine community, a status that transforms the existential mode of Hieron from a mortal into a divine one, a status which allows Hieron to host a feast similar to that of Tantalus on Sipylus as well as that of Pelops in Olympia, which obliges a Muse-patronised poet like Pindar to compose a song praising both the extraordinary blessedness of the laudandus and the divine favour of the gods.

To sum up, the merging points between Hieron and his mythic paradigms (*kleos, apoikia,* sceptre, *makar hestia – phila trapeza* vs tomb–*bomos, aotos mousikas* vs *haimakouria*) creates a poetic vision that serves to elevate the laudandus to a status as extraordinary as that of his counterparts. Through Pindar's mediatory path of true *logos,* the audience is enabled to perceive that Hieron has achieved a divine status like Tantalus and Pelops under the light of divine *charis*. As E. Krummen writes: '*Hic et nunc* in Syracuse the victor can snatch a bit of that heroic bliss, together with that special promise of his future, the promise of εὐδία'.[129]

4.2 Theron at Acragas (*Olympian* 2)

In *Olympian* 1, Pelops and Tantalus are introduced as mythological paradigms to explore and define the extraordinary status of the Syracusan Hieron. Likewise, in *Olympian* 2,[130] the epinician praise for Theron is aligned with the mythic and historic past and circles back to the glorious present with a poetic vision of the coming future. Unlike in *Olympian* 1, however, in *Olympian* 2 the foil figures that occupy the middle ground of a similar tripartite pattern are

[129] Krummen (1990/2014) 193–194.
[130] On dating problems of *Olympian* 1 (476 or 472 BCE), see Krummen (1990/2014)188 n. 14.

mainly the forefathers of the laudandus. Therefore, the extraordinary status of Theron is celebrated in relation to his heredity. As we shall see, the alternation of ups and downs, joys and pains, light and darkness, reflects both the continuity and disruption of divine favour and the existential condition of human life characterised by contingence in the course of Theron's lineage.[131] More importantly, Pindar exploits the themes of heredity and vicissitude to develop a series of poetic arguments for Theron's entitlement to a prospect of a portion of a blessed afterlife, probably his admission to the Isle of the Blessed. While Hieron attains divine status as a co-symposiast of the gods, Theron proves to have an extraordinary status, which approximates the gods by being the paragon of his glorious forebears, who are under the divine grace of Zeus.

4.2.1 The Structure of Olympian *2: Four Narrative Circles*

Before diving into the details of the poetic narrative, it is helpful to look at the structure of the ode, which is crucial to the understanding of its key subject and message. The ode is framed with what I call four 'narrative circles', each of which starts with the present, moving to its related past, and transitions back to the poetic present which incorporates the past and the future. The praise for Theron is embedded in this tripartite structure of circles woven by several thematic *gnomai*. As we shall see, if 'three' represents the circle of time, the additional 'four' would be an indication of extraordinariness and liberation from time-bound mortal status.

The ode starts with the famous opening that introduces the three categories of gods, heroes and men in a set of rhetorical questions (1–2). The first narrative circle appears in the subsequent answers: 1) a glimpse of Zeus' Pisa as the epinician occasion (3), a brief depiction of Heracles' foundation of the Olympic games (3–4), occupying the middle ground as the mythic past, and a celebrative characterisation of Theron as the Olympian victor and the paragon of Acragas (5–7).

The reference to Theron's forebears (7) prompts the start of the second narrative circle, which outlines the features of his ancestors with an anticipation of the latter, extensive mythic

[131] Cf. Grethlein (2010) 25 ff.

narratives (8–11). The circle goes back to the epinician present through the poet's prayer to the supreme god for the future generations of Theron (12–15).

The next two triads constitute the third narrative circle (15–56), starting with the Cadmeid ancestors (22–30), then the Labdacids (35–45), concluding by returning to the agonistic victories of the Emmenid Theron and Xenocrates (46–56). The mythic narrative is capped by a gnomic *logos* as a signpost of the key themes of vicissitudes and divine favour, which provides a transition from the poet's prayer for the future and the mythic past, and is thematically and programmatically crucial to the entire ode. The gnomic lines in 51–56, as a thematic and complimentary continuum of the previous *gnomai*, complete the third narrative circle.

The fourth narrative circle strikingly digresses from the lineage motif and dives into a lengthy description of four eschatological scenarios along with a soteriological system (56–83): the sinful in the realm of Zeus (ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ) will be immediately punished underneath (58–60); the nobly good (ἐσλοί) enjoy a pleasant life without toils or tears (61–67; cf. *Th.* 881–885, § 1.2); those who have led six just lives will travel 'the road of Zeus to the tower of Cronus' and live on the Isle of the Blessed (68–70); the special blessed, like Achilles, will be granted with privileged access to the Isle with the consent of Zeus (78–83).

The coda of *Olympian* 2 completes the circle with Pindar's meta-poetic claims concerning his poetic superiority and authority associated with Zeus (83–89, 95–98), which leads to the final praise of Theron's extraordinary achievements and status (89–95, 98–100). It is noteworthy that the final narrative circle is a digressive 'fourth', which departs from the *chronos*-oriented main narrative, along with the Achilles-myth as a special category,[132] beside the three groups of the dead.

The case of Achilles recalls other divinised figures, namely Heracles and the Cadmeid sisters, in the previous narrative circles. It is noteworthy that Heracles' genealogical connection with Zeus and his later *apotheosis* (*Ol.* 3.36) indicates that the tripartite categories of gods, heroes, and men in the first narrative circle are permeable, and that the hierarchy is

[132] Hurst (1981) 161–162, quoted by Grethlein (2010) 24.

not subject to strict inflexibility.[133] Although Heracles disappears after the first narrative circle,[134] the present ode's intertextuality with *Olympian* 3, where Heracles resumes as the dominant figure in mythic narrative, and its reference to other divinised figures such as Semele and Ino later on, undermine the common idea of human distance and separation from deities. In *Olympians* 2 and 3, Heracles occupies the paradigmatic mediatory position (NB the Pindaric image of the 'pillar of Heracles', see esp. *Ol.* 3.43–44 and below) that signposts the agonistic and martial context (as an epic hero) and the eschatological prospect (as a cultic hero) for the laudandus, who received a post-mortem hero cult.[135] In this light, we may take the latter ode as the final narrative circle in *Olympians* 2–3.

As indicated above, the epinician aim is to celebrate Theron by providing prospects for a transportation to the Isle of the Blessed. The following analysis will focus on Theron's extraordinary status and his relationship with the gods.

4.2.2 The Extraordinary Status of Theron

While the Priamel of *Olympian* 1 invites its audiences to gaze upon some significant elements of the (song-)world, the opening of *Olympian* 2 draws attention to cosmological categories and the hierarchical aspect of the cosmic society (1–7):

> Ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι,
> τίνα θεόν, τίν' ἥρωα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα κελαδήσομεν;
> ἦτοι Πίσα μὲν Διός· Ὀλυμπιάδα δ' ἔστασεν Ἡρακλέης
> ἀκρόθινα πολέμου·
> Θήρωνα δὲ τετραορίας ἕνεκα νικαφόρου
> γεγωνητέον, ὅπᾳ δίκαιον, ξένων ἔρεισμ', Ἀκράγαντος,
> εὐωνύμων τε πατέρων ἄωτον, ὀρθόπολιν·

[133] It is also striking to note that Theron's name is 'phonetically encoding' in the second verse (τίνα Θεόν, τίν' ΗΡΩα, τίΝΑ δ' ἄνδρα); see Sicka (2015) 115, 118; also Watkins (1950) 189–190, 280.
[134] Clay (2011) argues that the first three *Olympians* form a sequence in which the dedicatees of the two founding myths of the Olympic games recounted in *Olympian* 1 and *Olympian* 3, Hieron and Theron, consider themselves as oikists of Aetna and Himera respectively in 476 BCE. See also Morrison (2007) 46–57, 84–89.
[135] Diod. 11.53.2.

> Lyre-ruling hymns, which god, which hero, and which man should we celebrate? Indeed, Pisa is of Zeus, while Heracles established the Olympic festival as the first fruits of war; but Theron, because of his victorious four-horse chariot, is to be acclaimed, justly, as mainstay of guests, as paragon of Acragas and his famous ancestors, as upholder of the city.[136]

The rhapsodic questions and answers embed the epinician scheme of praising the laudandus as an Olympian victor in a grand frame in which Theron is celebrated *vis-à-vis* Zeus and Heracles in terms of location and authority (3–7): the dominance of Zeus in Pisa and the role of Heracles as founder of the Olympic games both provide the epinician settings and serve as 'reference points' for locating the special position of Theron as the 'tower of guests' at Acragas. While Zeus is the supreme god and Heracles the supreme hero, Theron is suggested to be the supreme man.

Concerning the epichoric context, the reference to Heracles' foundation of the Olympic games as 'a thank-offering for victory at war'[137] is implicitly parallel to the description of Theron as 'tower of guests', which does not merely reinforce the characterisation of his role as upholder of Acragas (ὀρθόπολιν, 7) but also alludes to the tyrant's building programme, including particularly the magnificent construction of the Olympieum for Zeus in Acragas (cf. *Ol.* 3.44) as commemoration of his victory in the Battle of Himera (in 480 BCE).[138] With the 'sacred dwelling' in verse 9, Theron's observation of *xenia* here could be read as an implicit reference to the practice of *theoxenia* as an ultimate form of *xenia*, which is a key theme in *Olympian* 3 (esp.1–4, 38–41, also *Isth.* 2.39–40; cf. *Ol.* 1.10–11 above).[139] Furthermore, Theron may consider himself as a re-founder of Acragas and Himera, in response to Hieron's new foundation of Aitna in the same decade.[140] Be that as it may, Theron is praised as 'the

[136] I follow the corrected text of verses 5–7 and the division of phrases in Silk (2020).
[137] Translation from Sicka (2015) 101.
[138] Lewis (2019) 182–183, 198, and 125 n. 171.
[139] Sicka (2015) 126; for *theoxenia* in *Olympian* 3, see Segal (1964) 231, 236, 239; Krummen (1990/2014) 253 ff.; van den Berge (2012) and further below.
[140] Sicka (2015) 131; cf. Lewis (2019) 225. For Hieron's foundation of Aitna in Pindar's odes, see Athanassaki (2003) 121; Morgan (2015) 232–233; Lewis (2019) 142 ff.

paragon of his fair-famed ancestors', who are treated as founders of a 'sacred habitation' (9, see further below) and, thus, cast as a hereditary (co-)founder and mainstay of the city. More importantly, this also permits the poet to align the victor with the supreme god as his ultimate ancestor (see more in § 4.3), since Theron's illustrious pedigree could be traced back to Zeus via the line of the Labdacids (43–46).[141] The parallel between Heracles as the son of Zeus and Theron as a distant offspring of Zeus is developed further through an extensive narrative of the victor's lineage in the mythic past as *Olympian* 2 progresses (to *Olympian* 3).

The first strophe establishes a programmatic and thematic scheme or pattern that will be developed later in the ode. The ode takes on its second narrative circle with the relative pronoun οἵ (8) and ends with the poet's prayer to Zeus (as the Olympian king and the supreme judge of the Olympian games) for Theron in the following antistrophe (8–15):

καμόντες οἵ πολλὰ θυμῷ̃
ἱερὸν ἔσχον οἴκημα ποταμοῦ, Σικελίας τ' ἔσαν
ὀφθαλμός, αἰὼν δ' ἔφεπε μόρσιμος, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ χάριν ἄγων
γνησίαις ἐπ' ἀρεταῖς.
ἀλλὰ ὦ̃ Κρόνιε παῖ ῥέας, ἕδος Ὀλύμπου νέμων
ἀέθλων τε κορυφὰν πόρον τ' Ἀλφεοῦ, ἰανθεὶς ἀοιδαῖς,
εὔφρων ἄρουραν ἔτι πατρίαν σφίσιν κόμισον
λοιπῷ̃ γένει.

who having toiled much in their hearts took possession of a sacred habitation on the river, and were the eye of Sicily, while their allotted life attended them, adding wealth and grace to their inborn virtues. So, son of Kronos and Rhea, ruling over your seat on Olympus, and the pinnacle of contests, and over the course of Alpheus, cheered by my songs with kindly mind transfer their ancestral land to the coming generation.

[141] Sicka (2015) 120.

The omission of the names of Theron's colonial forebears, as noticed by V. Lewis, seems to be an intentional design by Pindar, by which the poet is able to bring Theron into association with figures of the mythical past from his related lineage, who will later be celebrated as his positive foils or models later on.[142] Furthermore, both the unspecified features of the ancestors and the vagueness of the landscape of the their settlement bear eschatological connotations.[143] First, the emphatic καμόντες (anastrophic order with οἵ; cf. θεμιστεῖον ὃς in *Ol.* 1.12 above) in Homeric epics refers to 'the dead in eschatological contexts'.[144] In addition, the imagery of 'riverside sacred dwellings' is a thematic evocation of the landscape of the Isle of the Blessed (μακάρων νᾶσον ὠκεανίδες, 70–71) and its inhabitants (cf. μάκαιραν ἑστίαν in *Ol.* 1.11 above). The 'toils' (καμόντες – ἔπαθον) and 'bliss' (indicated in ἱερόν οἴκημα and the deification) also recall the Hesiodic passage that gods are called blessed after the *Titanomachia* and dispensation of honours (*Th.* 881–885, § 1.2; cf. *Ol.* 1.78; *Nem.* 3.70 below). One of Theron's progenitors, Cadmus, lives on the Isle (78), while his daughters experience divinisation after great sufferings (ἔπαθον οἷ μεγάλα, 23; the word order echoes 8). Furthermore, the wealth and grace of the forebears resembles the characterisation of life on the Isle (68–77).[145] Taken together, the colonial overtone of ἔσχον is merged with both the agonistic and eschatological ideas of winning reward/relief after toils.[146] Moreover, the studied resemblance between these landscapes implies that Acragas as the 'sacred dwelling' is a kind of terrestrial equivalent of the divine realm of the blessed.[147]

The gnomic lines 10–11, as a summary of the past, explain the glorious presence and prompt the transition to the poet's prayer to Zeus for future generations. The evocation of Zeus as the son of Kronos and Rhea (12) anticipates again the depiction of the Isle of the Blessed (Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου τύρσιν,70; πόσις ὁ πάντων Ῥέας, 77).[148] Furthermore, it

[142] Lewis (2019) 202–203.
[143] Cf. Lewis (2019) 198–199.
[144] Sicka (2015) 129–130.
[145] Cf. Currie (2006) 183–184.
[146] Sicka (2015) 129 indicated the Emmenids' win of 'an otherworldly, as well as an earthly, dwelling'; but he did not relate this to the mythic forebears.
[147] Lewis (2019) 217; cf. Currie (2005) 237–246 on βασιλέες ἱεροί in *Pyth.* 5.97, which alludes to the posthumous cult.
[148] Pindar incorporates these landscapes in the imagery of a riverside lofty place:

	Theron at Acragas	Forebears at Acragas	Forebears on the Isle of the Blessed	Zeus on Olympus	Zeus at Olympia

draws a parallel between Zeus, the king of the gods, as the greatest descendant of an older lineage, and Theron the 'city-straightener' as the 'paragon' (ἄωτον) of the Emmendis and distant forebears.[149] Moreover, with the comparison between 'riverside sacred habitation' (9) under the patronage of Theron as 'the tower of guests' (6) at Acragas and the seat on Olympus and the 'pinnacle of contests' by Alpheus at Olympia ruled by Zeus (12–13),[150] Pindar seems to suggest that Theron is seen as an earthly, inferior counterpart of Zeus, the king of gods, and Zeus Xenios.

The geographical fusion of special landscapes (see further in § 4.3.2) is fashioned not merely as an epinician praise for the laudandus and his family but also in conjunction with Pindar's poetic vision of the multi-layered past under the influence of αἰὼν μόρσιμος, which designates lives as allotted to Theron's forebears and Theron himself.[151] Indeed, the poet's prayer significantly appeals to Zeus as the ultimate ruler and distributor (νέμων, 12; cf. νέμονται in 66) of wealth and grace in the cosmic society. This leads to the fundamental point conveyed in the second narrative circle: Theron has received divine favour from Zeus, which not only proves its presence by his Olympic victory but is also seen as a renewal or reincarnation of the bliss that his forebears attained as an allotment from Zeus.

With αἰὼν μόρσιμος as the thematic signpost, the ode progresses to develop the theme of the vicissitudes of human life and the powers behind it in the third narrative circle, while moving further to the eschatological digression in the fourth narrative circle.[152] It is noteworthy that these leitmotifs and content are introduced as demonstrative data to support the argument adumbrated in the poet's prayer as a vaunt to confirm Theron's qualified prospect for a special translation like the experiences of Semele, Ino and especially Achilles (who deserves particular notice since his transportation to the Isle of the Blessed is achieved

Riverside	river Acragas	river Akragas	Oceanus	(Oceanus)	river Alpheus
Lofty images	Olympeion 'tower of guests' 'paragon of Acragas and his famous forebears'	'eye of Sicily' (10)	'tower of Kronos' ('road of Zeus', 70) ('highest throne', 77)	Mount Olympus	Kronus' hill (13; *Ol.* 1.111; 3.23)

[149] Lewis (2019) 204.
[150] Lewis (2019) 204.
[151] Note ἔξ οὗπερ […] μόριμος in verse 38 makes the transition from the mythic to the historical past.
[152] E.g. *Pyth.* 8.97; *Isth.* 3.18; 8.14; cf. Heraclitus fr. B 52 DK; see Keizer (1999)(1999) 25–26.

by his mother's appeal to Zeus and his own achievements, 79–80) and a continuity of this blessed allotment in the coming generations.[153]

1) The Cadmeids

The Cadmeid myth (cf. *Pyth.* 11.1–2) is clearly introduced as a paradigmatic example that serves to illustrate the preceding *logos* (15–22): the dark side of human vicissitudes, although it cannot be undone even by Chronus (15–17), could be overcome (δαμασθέν, 20) by divine allotment of 'high bliss aloft' (18, 21–22) as a special divine favour.[154] The narrative of Semele is also framed by a micro-tripartite circle: her present living (ζώει) on Olympus, i.e. her *apotheosis* (25), oxymoronically juxtaposed with her death (ἀποθανοῖσα) in the past by the simultaneously destructive and blissful encounter with the lightning of Zeus (25–26; cf. *Ol.* 10.79–81), which becomes, as the narrative circles back, the source of her present divine status characterised by her intimate relationship with Athena, Zeus and her son Dionysus (26–27). The brevity of the story may make it difficult to decide to which version of Semele's *apotheosis* Pindar refers.[155] Nevertheless, the emphasis is clearly on divine love (cf. *Pyth.* 3.98–100) that motivates the translation of Semele and continues to sustain her status as a beloved member among the gods (marked by the repeated φιλεῖ; cf. *Th.* 942–943). Likewise, Semele's sister, Ino, is said to be 'ordained' (τετάχθαι) with a portion of 'undying life' (βίοτον ἄφθιτον)[156]

[153] The prayer might be associated with the reality that the rule of Theron's son in Himera is insecure; see Sicka (2015) 139. The *theoxenia* practice implied in 'the tower of guests' (6), which occupies the forefront of the justification (note ὅπῃ δίκαιον) for the present praise except for his Olympic glory, becomes more explicit with the prayer of the *xenos*–poet (cf. *Ol.* 1.15–17 above; *Ol.* 3.40) as a reciprocal response to the grace of Zeus shining through the lineage of the laudandus in the past, present and future. For Pindar's prayer, Bundy (1962) 76–83; Mackie (2003) 77–106; Wells (2009) 89–128; Baxter (2012). For cultic prayer, see Versnel (1981); Bremmer (1981).

[154] Maravela (2011). The πότμος εὐδαίμων mirrors θεοῦ Μοῖρα, which sends ὄλβος ὑψηλός. Like αἰὼν μόρσιμος and πότμος, Μοῖρα here is more likely to be seen as a reference to 'allotment'. The πέμπῃ (cf. ἄγων, 10) emphasises the active aspect of divine agency, as clearly shown in the lightning of Zeus. The motif of human vicissitudes does not indicate an *entirely* neutral, indifferent fluctuation of the natural cycle in human life and death.

[155] The usual version takes the thunderbolt of Zeus as the conduit of Semele's translation to Olympus. The reference to Dionysus may imply the variant according to which the grown Dionysus rescues Semele and brings her from Hades to Olympus. For the variants of this myth and its related beliefs, see West (1966) 416 on *Th.* 942; Dodds (1986) on Eur. *Ba.* 6–12; Currie (2005) 360–362 on *Ol.* 3.98–100. For the possible Orphic connotation in this passage, see Sicka (2015) 151, 153; Graf and Johnston (2007) 74.

[156] Cf. *Ol.* 1.63–64 (ἄφθιτον/θῆκαν: Tantalus steals the divine food to feed his comrades, see above); *h.Hom.* 2.260–261 (ἄφθιτον ὥπασα τιμήν, when Demeter making Demophon divine).

among the Nereids (mirrors ἐν Ὀλυμπίοις, 28–30).[157] The key term τετάχθαι recalls the ideas of allotment related to Μοῖρα (21) and πότμος (18) and serves to confirm the special status of Ino (cf. 5.334–335).[158] The defining features of the *apotheosis* shared by the siblings are their hyper-human existential form and changed identities (they are renamed or granted a new divine title, as Thyone and Leucothea respectively; cf. *Pyth.* 11.2): each of them is transported to places beyond the human realm subject to time-bound alternation and accepted as distinctive members of the divine group.

2) The Labdacids

A tripartite *gnome* on the human condition (30–34), which bridges the Cadmeid-myth and the Labdacid-myth (38–45), takes up the poetic reflections in the previous *logos* (15–22). The chain of thought runs like this: the end of death has not been fixed (κέκριται, cf. τετάχθαι) for mortals (30–31),[159] but we cannot secure our fortune and peace each single day (32–33), because of the vicissitudes of life (33–34). The unpredictability of human life and human ignorance of it balances the optimistic scenarios in the previous myths and serves to introduce the subsequent myth of the Labdacids, which rather looks at the dark side of Theron's forebears. The natural metaphors in 32–34 (days and currents) seem to indicate that human vicissitudes are under the control of time-bound natural and unpredictable chance. This, however, does not take gods into account: as in the Cadmeid-myth, divine power occupies the foreground, and the alternation of human life is largely subject to the divine–human relationship. The following *gnome* (35–37) attests this by reprising the *logos* (19–22) that caps the Cadmeid narrative: the gracious allotment

[157] While Semele's deification is an 'anabasis' by the conduit of heavenly fire, her sibling's divinisation symmetrically takes place, as a 'katabasis', in the marine part of the world. The upward and downward movements (echoing ἀνεκὰς, ὑψηλόν, πίτνει in 22 and 23) may reflect the fluctuation of human vicissitudes, but the mythic siblings have now transcended it by being elevated to, and diving into, the edge of the world. Ino's mythic and cultic association with Dionysus may be evoked in this sequel of myths: see Sicka (2015) 157–158. Further, whereas Semele's elevation is conducted *via* the thunderbolt of Zeus, Ino's translation is through the sea. For sea (and water generally) as an intermediary space between divine and human, see § 4.1.1; for Ino's case, see also Beaulieu (2006) 116 ff.

[158] While Ino leapt into the sea and became a deity, her help for Odysseus is to rescue him from drowning and transport him from Ogygia, where Calypso offered him divine status as her husband, to Scheria, a place of mortals who have a close relationship to the gods; see also §§ 2.2–2.3. In *Olympian* 2, another Nereid appears in 79–80: Thetis appeals to Zeus for the translation of Achilles; see Sicka (2015) 159.

[159] For alternative interpretations of 30–31, see Currie (2005) 32; Sicka (2015) 161–162. As the ideas of rebirth indeed recur in the eschatological section (56 ff.), we may take 30–31 as expressing the similar thought that 'death is not the end'. This, however, does not fit very well to 32–37.

(εὔφρονα πότμον) of the Labdacids, which consists of 'god-sprung bliss' (θεόρτῳ […] ὄλβῳ) and suffering, is dependent on the agency and powers of the gods, represented by the personified Moira or 'Allotment' (Μοῖρ' […] ἔχει […] ἄγει; echoing θεοῦ Μοῖρα πέμπῃ, 21).[160] In the myth of the Labdacids, Pindar highlights the divine agency behind the contingence-like events: the fatal encounter (συναντόμενος) between Laius and his 'fated' son (μόριμος υἱός), is seen as the fulfilment of the oracle of Apollo (39–40), while the subsequent mutual fratricide is directly conducted by the Erinyes (ἔπεφνε, 41–42). The misfortune starts to be reversed (37) when Thersandros is granted with martial and agonistic honours (43–45), which evokes his kingly status and the post-mortem hero-cult.[161]

The two mythic narratives form a poetic retrospection of the vicissitudes of Theron's ancestry, in which the Cadmeid sisters stand as the positive paradigm for the Emmenids, while the Labdacid brothers serve as the negative foil and the springboard for a renewal of the bliss that the Cadmeids have received from the gods. Although no deities are mentioned regarding Thersandros' success, the *gnome* (35–37) capping this myth seems to suffice for this corollary (note the passive participle τιμώμενος). Divine power is omitted perhaps to serve for its recurrence in the climatic depiction of Theron and his brother's athletic victories (46–51): in place of the ominous Delphic oracle and the terrifying Erinyes, the Graces brought (ἄγαγον, picks up ἄγει in 37) garlands to the Emmenid brothers in two previous contests,[162] while Theron himself receives the present prize at Olympia, as a superior mark of the divine grace from Zeus. Furthermore, the plant imagery implied in ἄνθεα does not merely correspond to the genealogical image of 'shoot' (θάλος) from which Aenesidamus' sons claim their descent (σπέρματος […] ῥίζαν), but also seems to resonate with ἄωτον in line 7: the victorious moments of the Emmenid brothers, especially the Olympian triumph of Theron,

[160] Cf. Sicka (2015) 165, 'illustrating the cyclic nature of fortune controlled by Fate'.
[161] Paus. 9.5.14.
[162] The fraternal union marked by κοναί and ὁμόκλαρον stands in stark contrast with the fratricide (ἀλλαλοφονίᾳ) of the Labdacid brothers and Laius' μόριμος son. Furthermore, the Pythian victory won by the Emmenid brothers is the previous site of the oracle that led to the Labdacid patricide and fratricide (Πυθῶνι in 39 and 49).

mark a fuller restoration of the 'gracious allotment' and 'god-sprung bliss' impaired by the divine disfavour in the previous generations.

The subsequent *gnomai* (51–56) complete the third narrative circle:

> τὸ δὲ τυχεῖν
> πειρώμενον ἀγωνίας δυσφρονᾶν παραλύει,
> ὁ μὰν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος φέρει τῶν τε καὶ τῶν
> καιρὸν βαθεῖαν ὑπέχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν,
> ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον
> ἀνδρὶ φέγγος.
>
> Victory relieves the man who strives in competition from his anxieties. What is more, wealth embellished with virtues provides the opportunity for various accomplishments, by supporting a profound, raging ambition – it is the conspicuous star, the truest light for a man.

The '*aretai*-embellished wealth' echoes Theron's heredity (αἰὼν […] μόρσιμος) that brings 'wealth and grace to the inborn virtues' (10–11) in the first antistrophe.[163] *Aretai*-embellished wealth here should not be taken *merely* as secular possessions that lead to moral and agonistic achievements but also as a mark of divine favour and support (cf. *Pyth.* 5.1–11). Likewise, the attainment of agonistic victory (τὸ τυχεῖν, cf. γέρας ἔδεκτο, 49) proves the presence of divine grace that relieves hardship and the negative effects of divine disfavour (δυσφρονᾶν, cf. εὔφρονα πότμον 36; εὔφρων, 14; cf. *Ol.* 1.97–99: ὁ νικῶν […] ἔχει μελιτοέσσαν εὐδίαν)[164] in the past generations. In this light, *aretai*-embellished wealth may be taken as a synecdoche of a deity or some divine power: indeed, if human beings are subject to the currents of vicissitudes (ῥοαὶ δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλαι […] ἐς ἄνδρας ἔβαν, 34), only gods can overcome these alternations by granting a man due chance (καιρὸν) to deal with various

[163] Its structural importance also lies in prefiguring the commendation of Theron's benevolence at the coda (90–95, 97–99)
[164] Taking the passage in a non-secular light, the translation of δυσφρονᾶν, 'anxieties, troubles', seems better understood as 'anxieties about divine favour'.

occasions (τῶν τε καὶ τῶν),[165] bringing him the truest light as a conspicuous star (cf. *Ol.* 1.1–2: ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς αἰθόμενον πῦρ / ἅτε διαπρέπει νυκτὶ μεγάνορος ἔξοχα πλούτου), supporting his great ambition (cf. *Ol.* 1.106–108: θεὸς ἐπίτροπος ἐὼν τεαῖσι μήδεται / ἔχων τοῦτο κᾶδος, Ἰέρων, / μερίμναισιν).[166]

If this non-secular reading of wealth is tenable, ambition here is likely to be a reference to Theron's desire for a better afterlife (cf. *Ol.* 5.23–24; *Pyth.* 3.59–62). This corresponds with the eschatological section in the subsequent stanzas (56–83), which form the fourth narrative circle, with the 'middle ground' occupied by a description of three groups of the eschatological dead (the lawless, 57–60; the good, 61–67; the blessed, 68–77) and the myth of Achilles with his special translation (78–83).[167] In this eschatology, transgressors will be punished with a frightful toil (67), while the morally good (ἐσλοί, an epic term often associated with martial prowess, prefiguring 81–83) will be rewarded with a less toilsome life under a permanent equinox (metaphorically, this implies a transcendence of vicissitude; cf. *Th.* 881-885). Rather than rituals related to various local mystery cults and beliefs,[168] moral actions (especially those related to oath-keeping *vis-à-vis* perjury, 66)[169] pave the way for an elevated, *post-mortem* life mode, which is distant from the mundane life of the mortals (63–65, evocative of the Hesiodic description of the life after Mekone) and approximating the divine fashion. Furthermore, unlike living mortals and sinners characterised by hardship (63–65, 67), the morally good

> ἀλλὰ παρὰ μὲν τιμίοις
> θεῶν οἵτινες[170] ἔχαιρον εὐορκίαις ἄδακρυν νέμονται
> αἰῶνα

[165] Cf. Ruck (1972) 165; Sicka (2015) 184.
[166] For the mystic connotation of the wealth–virtue complex, see Sicka (2015) 183.
[167] Considering the performance context (more panhellenistic than Acragantine or Sicilian), Pindar's eschatology here seems to be better understood as a version of the traditional description of the afterlife preserved in Homer (*Od.* 4.561–569) and Hesiod (*Op.* 168–173), which is modified with the data of local beliefs available to wider audiences; see Lewis (2019) 212–213.
[168] Sicka (2015).
[169] It is noteworthy that perjury is the greatest sin among the gods; *Th.* 793–805.
[170] The ambiguity of the antecedent of οἵτινες is perhaps better understood as a reflection of the notion that both gods and men observe the same moral code; cf. Sicka (2015).

have their portion of a tearless lifespan by the side of those honoured amongst gods, who rejoiced in oath-keeping (65–67).

These lines describe the defining features of the morally good in terms of status and their relationship with the gods. The τιμίοις θεῶν seems a considered phraseology, serving to mark the elevated status of the morally good and evoke the honour-related hierarchy in the proem. This corresponds with νέμονται, evocative of the dispensation of honour conducted by the supreme god in cosmic society (see e.g. *Isth.* 5.52–53, Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, / Ζεὺς ὁ πάντων κύριος; *Pyth.* 5.122–123, Διός τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ / δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φιλῶν). The morally good, therefore, receive a portion of life with an honourable domain close to the divine plane. Furthermore, the key term αἰῶνα, as suggested above, echoes the description of Theron's forebears whose possession of (ἔσχον; cf. δέκονται, 63) a 'sacred dwelling' is associated with their 'much suffering in heart' (8) and their 'allotted portion' (αἰὼν […] μόρσιμος, 9; cf. *Th.* 881-885). The unspecified location of the morally good allows us to align the eschatological dead and the forebears. Likewise, as the eschatological myth progresses, the metaphorical correspondences between the 'sacred dwelling' and the Isle of the Blessed become much more apparent.

The third group of the eschatological dead, the blessed, mainly (but not exclusively, see below) come from the morally good, after a further process of 'moral winnowing' (68–71): those who keep their souls completely free from injustice across six reincarnations[171] will complete their journey through 'the road of Zeus to the tower of Kronus', leading to the Isle of the Blessed as the final destination.[172] Despite its convoluted ethical, philosophical, and even mysterious connotations, the entire peregrination of the blessed is not merely seen as a long test of morality but also as a process of elevation to divine status and translation to a

[171] For the number of reincarnations, see Sicka (2015) 210–211. Number 3 is perhaps thematically connected to the ode's structure (three narrative circles) and its message: if 'Three' represents the chronological frame (past, present and future) and thus the time-bound vicissitudeσ, 'Four' implies the transcendence of time (cf. the '3+1' pattern in § 3.3.2), which is the existential mode of the blessed, after 3 × 2 times of reincarnations, in the fourth antistrophe and epode.

[172] Lines 68–70 have various connotations of the contemporary and latter themes preserved in philosophical and mystery-related texts; see the excellent discussion and further bibliographies in Sicka (2015) 208–216.

holy place. The term μακάρων, which always refers to the gods if unqualified in poetic language, and implies that these morally proven dead have attained extraordinary status equal to that of deities.[173] Indeed, the life of the blessed is characterised by its coexistence with divine figures such as Cronus, Rhea, and Rhadamanthys (75–77). It is noteworthy that the only verb directly applied to the blessed dead, ἀλέγονται, activates ideas about honour, status, and relationship: like Semele recognised as a deity marked by divine love (26–27), they are 'counted' or 'honoured' as members of the divine group.[174]

The topographical features of the Isle, as noted above, bear thematic resemblances to the description of Acragas and its founders in the first antistrophe:[175] the 'riverside holy dwelling', possessed by Theron's forebears after their great sufferings (8–9), strikingly echoes 'the Isle with breezes of Oceanus'; additionally, while the golden blazing flora (72–73) evokes the Acragantine wealth and grace as a blessed allotment (9–10), the shining crowns the blessed made with these plants (73–74) on the Isle recall the agonistic victories of Thersandros and Theron (43–45, 48–51, 5).[176] Along with these metaphorical and topographical resemblances, the reference to Cadmos as one of the inhabitants on the Isle, who caps the third narrative circle (23), fully activates the leitmotif of heredity running through in this ode (3, 7, 12, 14, 27, 35, 37, 45–46, 78–80).[177]

In retrospect, the myth sheds eschatological light on the superlative vaunt, ἄωτον, in line 7: if Theron's forebears are granted the admission to the Isle, Theron, as their paragon, is thus entitled to this *post-mortem* privilege (see also 92–95 below). With this poetic vision, Pindar indicates that Theron's prospect for a special status in the afterlife is readily rooted in his inheritance as allotted from the gods rather than beyond his reach. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the 'righteous counsels' (βουλαῖς ὀρθαῖσι, 75) of Rhadamanthys find their mortal

[173] West (1978) 193 on *Th.* 171.
[174] Cf. *Il.* 16.388: ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες (the wicked against whom Zeus sends most violent water in his rage, 385–388).
[175] For the topographical and metaphorical correspondences between lines 6–11 and 70–74 via the traditional portrayal of the heroic afterlife in Homer and Hesiod, see Lewis (2019) 213–217. For further comparison between the Isle, the Hyperborea, Acragas, and Olympia, see § 4.3.2.
[176] The poetic images of water, gold, and fire (71–73) is evocative of the Priamel of *Olympian* 1, which serve to mark the converging point of gods and men and, thus, fit well in this context; see the discussion above.
[177] The connection between 'the road of Zeus' (as the conduit) and 'the tower of Cronus' (as the final access) may reinforce this thematic link.

counterpart in Theron as the 'city-straightener' (ὀρθόπολιν, 7). Theron's practice of justice is also underlined by the poet's fashioning of him as 'the pillar of guests' (6), since supporting *xenoi* is a matter of justice (*Ol.* 13.2–7; *Nem.* 4.12; a traditional idea, see e.g. *Od.* 6.120–121; *Op.* 225–226), while Zeus, 'the ruler of this realm' (58), is concerned about *xenia* (*Od.* 6.207–208). The parenthetic phrase, ὅπῃ δίκαιον (6), in this light, reinforces the idea of Theron being worthy or justified for an eschatological reward for his justice to his guests and mother city[178] through a proper poetic praise.[179]

The ode, however, does not reach its crescendo until the final section of the eschatological myth, the special translation (ἔνεικ', 78) of Achilles (see *Ol.* 3.14–16 below), a narrative which breaks 'with the timeless presents describing the Isle'.[180] The case of Achilles forms a fourth category of the eschatological dead. This special admission to the Isle is attained through Thetis' persuasive prayers (λιταῖς) to Zeus (79–80), which recalls Pindar's prayer to Zeus on Theron's behalf (12–15). The moral criteria established in the eschatological narrative seem to be broken by the intervention of Thetis in stark contrast with the duo of triple reincarnation of just life (68–69). Divine favour (the approval of Zeus in response to Thetis' persuasion), the genealogical link (his mother is a deity and his father lives on the Isle), and martial achievements (cf. the mutual fratricide of the sons of Oedipus during the Theban war) justify Achilles' admission to the Isle.[181] Moral action seems to be secondary to one's relationship with the gods. The reference to Achilles' three martial achievements (in three epics: Hector in the *Iliad*, Cycnus in the *Cypria*, and Memnon in *Aethiopis*; cf. *Isth.* 5.39–42, including Telephus; 8.49–55), like that of Heracles' thanksgiving for war, may also serve to justify Theron's massacre at Himera in 476 BCE.[182] Furthermore, it also echoes Theron's three agonistic victories in the Olympia, Pythia, and Isthmia (48–50).

[178] Cf. Bacchyl. 14.23: φιλξείνου τε καὶ ὀρθοδίκου.
[179] The accepted reading of ὅπι δίκαιον ξένων may serve better the purpose of highlighting Theron's virtue of justice and practice of *xenia*. Nevertheless, the connotation of justice remains active in Silk's reading, and it fits squarely with Pindar's acknowledgement of the limit of praise (αἶνον ἐπέβα κόρος οὐ δίκᾳ συναντόμενος, 95–96).
[180] Sicka (2015) 225.
[181] Cf. *Pyth.* 3.102, where Achilles' consumption by fire as an indication of his immortalisation serves to indicate Hieron's prospect for immortality; see Currie (2005) 344–405.
[182] Sicka (2015) 222, 226–227.

More importantly, the special translation of Achilles serves as a direct model for the eschatological future of Theron. In order to support this 'argument', the poet evokes the authority and power of Apollo and Zeus in his enigmatic proclamation of his poetic superiority (83–88, cf. *Ol.* 1.112, see above), through which the ode circles back to the epinician present and leads to his final celebration of his laudandus (92–95, 98–100), which underlines Theron's specialness among his recent forebears (the Emmenids), repeating the point made in the first strophe (ἄωτον, 7). Prompted by the military context of the Achilles-myth, the metaphor of poet-as-archer and song-as-arrow (83, 89, 91) evokes the power of Apollo,[183] who prophesies the encounter between Laius and Oedipus (39–40) and plays a crucial role in the foretold death of Achilles (*Il.* 21.278). Pindar, like a prophet of Apollo, shoots his poetic shafts on the eschatological issues relevant to Theron, with positive suggestions in contrast with the intertextual ominous connotations. Pindar also likens himself to the divine eagle of Zeus, his messenger of omen, in contrast with the ravens 'uttering words that find no fulfilment' (86–88).[184] Uttering prophetic words like Zeus' bird, Pindar, again, indicates that he has spoken an oracle-–like vaunt regarding the extraordinary status of Theron, whose specialness is under the divine grace of Zeus. The studied restraint in spelling out the actual content of this superlative praise, which is appropriate in the epinician context (95–96), corresponds with the conditional clause without a responding apodosis, which caps the eschatological narrative: 'If one who has *it* (i.e. the *aretai*-embellished wealth) knows the future…' (εἰ δὲ νιν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον, 56; cf. ἔσχον, 9). If, as suggested above, Theron's wealth refers to his attainment of divine grace from Zeus, the omitted apodosis, after the prolonged eschatology along with the special case of Achilles, could be completed as follows: 'then Theron will be certain that he is qualified to have a prospect of a blessed afterlife or even a special *post-mortem* translation'.

In retrospect, Pindar's prayer (12–15) bears a further eschatological connotation in that the poet, like Thetis, attempts to secure Zeus' gracious kindliness (εὔφρων, 14; cf. Ζηνὸς

[183] Sicka (2015) 231.

[184] The identification between eagle and the laudandus is less preferable (cf. *Ol.* 2.86–88, *Nem.* 3.80–82). The contrast may indicate Pindar's poetic rivalries, see Sicka (2015) 240–242. For eagle comparisons, see Pfeijffer (1994) and further references cited in Cairns (2010) on Bakchyl. 5.16–30; also Morgan (2015) 123–132.

ἦτορ, 79; τὸν εὔφρονα πότμον, 36), by his song authorised by the Muses (who are evoked in Ἀναξιφόρμιγγες ὕμνοι, line 1)[185] to transmit Theron and his later generation to his ancestor's land, which seems to be both the 'sacred dwelling' by the river Acragas and, implicitly, the Isle of the Blessed by Oceanus.

In sum, Pindar in *Olympian* 2 provides several paths or criteria for humans to attain extraordinary status approximating that of gods: 1) divine love (reflected in the thunderbolt of Zeus); 2) morality, especially the practice of justice, which is also endorsed amongst gods; 3) persuasion or prayer (Thetis' appeal, 79–80; Eos' supplication of Zeus to immortalise Memnon in the *Aethiopis* is alluded in 83; cf. Pindar's song-prayer to Zeus, 12–15); 4) a genealogical link or heredity: implicit in the cases of Heracles, Cadmus, Semele–Ino, Peleus, and Achilles; 5) martial and agonistic achievements: Heracles and Achilles (implicitly in the case of Thersandros). The fundamental point Pindar made in *Olympian* 2 is that one's relationship with Zeus is the necessary and sometimes sufficient condition of one's admission to the Isle, status elevation, or even *apotheosis*. The cases of Semele and Achilles (note the Cadmus–Peleus juxtaposition in line 78) are paradigmatic in this ode: while the *apotheosis* of Semele is made possible because of the active love of Zeus, the admission to the Isle of Achilles relies on his divine mother's persuasion and the consent of Zeus. Not only has Theron lived up to the moral criteria and been the paragon of his glorious forebears, but also he has also, as an extraordinary individual, received special divine grace from Zeus and the poetic–prophetic support of Pindar. In this light, if the Semele-myth provides a genealogy or heredity argument for Theron's prospect of *post-mortem* bliss, the case of Achilles implies that Theron's special admission to the Isle could be achieved by Pindar's poetic intervention. Although Pindar does not call his living mortal laudandus equal to the gods, it is implied in his special status that is favoured by Zeus and his prospect for a special *post-mortem* translation: mortality remains the only barrier for Theron to become a divine figure, which will be removed in the course of time. The defining condition for a mortal's *apotheosis* lies in elevating the *human* status rather than eliminating the *mortal* physique. [186]

[185] Sicka (2015) 116–117: 'ὕμνοι are marked as divinized substitutes for the Muses'.
[186] Cf. Shelmerdine (1987) 80.

4.3 Gods and Men in *Olympian* 3

Olympian 3 is the second ode composed for Theron's chariot victory at Olympia.[187] Three main divine figures, the Tyndarids and Heracles, are introduced to form praise for Theron. The theme of Heracles, which has been touched in the opening of the previous ode, is taken up here and developed in the principal mythic narrative about the hero's Hyperborean adventures – the transportation of the olive tree and the pursuit of Taygeta's hind. It is evident that the Tyndarids are included because the Emmenids' ritual practice of the Tyndarid *theoxenia* in Acragas explains Theron's victory at Olympia. In contrast, the myth of Heracles' adventures, despite its centrality and length (occupying two thirds of the ode), appears less relevant in explaining Theron's greatness and only serves to explain the origin of the olive crown and the position of the Tyndarids in the Olympic Games. More than aetiological accounts, however, the central myth, like that of Pelops–Tantalus in *Olympian* 1, indicates a thematic parallel between Theron and Heracles, when the audiences hear the poet's superlative vaunt in the gnomic coda that the laudandus 'has come to the furthest extremity with his achievements and has grasped the pillars of Heracles from home' (43–44). Yet, what points does the poet intend to make in the pillar-image and the alleged parallel between the Acragantine tyrant and the hero-god? How does the boundary-crossing exploit of Heracles shed light on Theron's extraordinary status? In order to answer these questions, we must discover the points of comparison between Heracles' adventures and Theron's achievements. Furthermore, we should also consider the thematic relevance of the poet's self-report about his composition, which in fact dominates the first strophe and antistrophe (1–9).

As Pindar's structural arrangements often have special bearings and convey thematic messages,[188] a formal analysis according to the textual sequence of *Olympian* 3 may help us to comprehend its themes.[189] On that basis, I will discuss the thematic values of the key elements in the central myth and speculate how Pindar relates Theron to the hero–god with

[187] For the date of the performance, see Sicka (2015) 264.
[188] Krummen (1990/2014) 278 ff. demonstrates that the ritual-related myths influence Pindar's composition.
[189] Cf. the chronological sequence of the mythical narrative provided in Sicka (2015) 287–288 based on Krummen (1990/2014) 278 ff.

respect to his encounter with the Hyperboreans, the foundation of the Olympics, and the pursuit of the Hind. As we shall see, Pindar provides a poetic vision of Theron's victory and extraordinary status by making the myth a mirroring counterpart of reality.

4.3.1 The Structure of Olympian *3*

The ode starts with the poet's prayer to 'please' three divine figures, the Tyndarids and their half-sister Helen (1), while giving honour to Acragas and song to Theron (2–3). The following lines describe the laudator's divine-assisted composition and divine-ordained duty to praise the laudandus (4–10). The central myth is then introduced by the extraordinary moment of the Hellanodika's crowning of a victor with the 'uncanny-hued *kosmos* of olive' (γλαυκόχροα κόσμον ἐλαίας, 13).[190] The first section (14–24) highlights some significant moments related to the foundation of the Olympic Games: (1) Heracles transported (ἔνεικεν) the olive from Ister's 'shady springs' to Olympia by persuading (πείσαις; cf. *Ol.* 1.103) the Hyperborean people to grant his request with 'words and trustworthy attitude' (14–18); (2) he realised the lack of 'beautiful trees' in Kronus' glen and Zeus' 'naked' precinct's subjection to Helios' piercing light (23–24); (3) after his consecration of the altars to Zeus and the establishment of the judgement of the Games and their quadrennial cycle, in the evening shining with the light of the whole, 'golden-charioted' moon (19–22). The second section of the mythic narrative (25–34) re-starts the olive-quest myth with Heracles' desire to revisit Hyperborea, and traces his knowledge about the olive by diving into his previous adventure of hunting the golden-horned reindeer of Artemis (26–29), which leads to the Taygeta-myth in the more remote past (29–30) and a return to his encounter with the olive-tree and the subsequent transplantation (31–34). Echoing the *incipit*, the mythic narrative transitions back to the final phase of the foundation process where Heracles, before his *apotheosis*, entrusts a supervisory role, especially concerning the equestrian games, to the Dioscuri (34–38). The laudator intervenes again to claim that Theron's *kydos* is predicated on the reciprocity between the Emmenids and the Tyndarids (38–41). By revising the first two lines of the Priamel of *Olympian* 1 (42), the ode concludes with a superlative vaunt for the achievements

[190] For the compound adjective of γλαυκόχροα, see Sicka (2015) 295–296.

and extraordinary status of Theron (43–44), along with a general prohibitive warning of *ne plus ultra* (44–45).

(A) The Dioscuri and Theoxenic Present (1–10) [poet's voice]		
(B) The Arrangements of Games (11–13)		
(C) Transportation (14)		[re-start (25)] Artemis' reception (26–27)
Heracles' persuasion (16) (Amphitryon's son–Zeus: πιστὰ φρονέων, 17)	–	(Heracles–Zeus *via* Eurystheus: ἀνάγκα πατρόθεν, 28) Hunting the Hind for Zeus (28–29)
Consecration of altars to Zeus (19) Foundation of Games (21–22) (golden-charioted moon, 19)	×	Taygeta's dedication of the Hind to Artemis (29–30) (golden-horned hind, 29)
Recognition of treelessness in Olympia (23–24)	–	Recognition of the olive tree in Hyperborea (31–32) (C') Transplantation (33–34)
		(B') The Arrangements of Games (34–38) [poet's voice, 38]
		(A') The Dioscuri and the Theoxenic Present (38–41)
Coda (42–45): completing the cycle of *Ol.*1–3.		

The key point of comparison between Theron and Heracles pivots on the bearing and transportation of the olive. While Heracles brings by his sincere and rational speech (16) the olive tree from the Hyperboreans by the side of the Istrian springs to Olympia, the laudandus wins by his excellence in chariot-driving (37–38)[191] the Hyperborean olive crown in Olympia along the river Alpheus and carries it thence to the 'sacred dwelling' on the river Acragas (*Ol.* 2.9). If Theron's victorious *nostos* parallels Heracles' return to Olympia, we should first compare the laudandus' journey to Olympia and the hero's two adventures to Hyperborea.

4.3.2 Heracles' Adventures to Hyperborea

The Hyperborean adventures of Heracles contain two correlated and comparable episodes: the olive transport and the hind hunt.[192] The first journey is undertaken of the hero's volition for the sake of the foundation of the Olympic Games as a way to honour Zeus (17, 25, 33),

[191] The ultimate source of Theron's victory is the favour of the Tyndarids, see below.

[192] Krummen (1990/2014) 283–289, 293–396 has remarkably located the two episodes into ritual contexts, which exercise varying degrees of influence on Pindar's structuring of the mythic narrative: whereas the olive-fetching is evocative of the Dendrophoria (a rite of initiation for boys), the hind-chase might be relevant to rituals of initiation for girls.

whereas the latter, as one of his Twelve Labours (cf. ἀέθλων 15 and δωδεκάγναμπτον 33), is driven at Zeus' behest *via* the mission of Eurystheus (28). We will return to the thematic coherence of these two parts later on. Let us first look at the section about the transportation of the olive tree (14–24).

4.3.2.1 The Eschatological Colour of the Olive-transport: Hyperborea, Isle of the Blessed, and Olympia

In this episode, Pindar describes Heracles' persuasion in his second journey to Hyperborea (14–18) and explains its motivation (19–24). It is noteworthy that this section opens with the pseudo-patronymic Ἀμφιτρυωνιάδας as a mark of his earthly status as a human, which will be transcended by his departure for Olympus, i.e. his *apotheosis* (36), at the end of his foundation of the Olympics. It is tempting to suggest a causal link between Heracles' olive-quest as a favour for Zeus and his *apotheosis* granted in return.

This activates the 'otherworldliness' and eschatological aspect of Hyperborea. As in *Pythian* 10 (dated to 498 BCE, probably the earliest ode among Pindar's extant works), it is a place located in the area beyond ordinary human reach (27–30) and is presented as a utopian place (36–42), which bears various resemblances with the Isle of the Blessed in *Olympian* 2.[193]

Furthermore, the description of Hyperborea in *Pythian* 10 is embedded into the myth of Perseus' exploit of killing the Gorgon accompanied by Athena. As a reward, it seems, Perseus comes to feast with the Hyperboreans as a foretaste of his future bliss.[194] In many ways, Perseus' journey to Hyperborea in *Pythian* 10 is comparable to Heracles' voyage to

[193] Landscape: *Ol.* 2.69–73; *Ol.* 3.31–32, 14, 18. People: *Ol.* 2.62–67, 75–77; cf. *Ol.* 3.3, 16, 30; *Pyth.* 10.34 (with Gagné (2021) 217–218), 41–42, 46; cf. *Ol.* 2.41, 59–60, 69. Festivity and Wreaths: *Ol.* 2.73–74; *Pyth.* 10.40.
For *Pythian* 10.42 and its eschatological relevance with *Olympian* 2, see Krummen (1990/2014) 305–306 with further references. For the meaning of ὑπέρδικον Νέμεσιν (*Pyth.* 10.42), see Brown (1992); Ellis (2015) 93.

[194] See van den Berge (2007). Perseus' journey also serves as a symbol of the transitory bliss enjoyed by the victor in *Pythian* 10, see excellent discussion in Meister (2020) 118–127, esp. 127: 'The aspects of immortal life and divine bliss found in the depiction of the Hyperboreans further convey that Hippocleas and Phricias enjoy a similar state of extraordinary happiness'.

Hyperborea in *Olympian* 3.[195] This leads us to take a further look at the exploits and reward of Heracles, which are spelled out in Teiresias' prophecy at the end of *Nemean* 1 (62–72):[196] Heracles will chase down lawless beasts,[197] slay the perverse,[198] and give assistance to the gods in the battle against the giants.[199] Afterwards, as a recompense for these great toils (καμάτων, 70; cf. *Ol.* 2.8, 23; *Th.* 881, § 1.2), Heracles will be 'allotted' (λάχοντ') 'an extraordinary *hesychia* amid the houses of the blessed', celebrating his marriage with Hebe at the side of Zeus, and 'praise his sacred *nomos*' (70–72).[200] The hero-god Heracles (*Nem.* 3.22) is characterised as a divine 'Giant-slayer' (θεὸς […] Γίγαντας ὅς ἐδάμασας, *Nem.* 7.89–90). The exploits of Heracles are seen as a series of divine–human collaborations in establishing and maintaining the order and harmony of cosmic society under the lawful rule of Zeus. With this in mind, it is interesting to note that Apollo delights in their feasts and splendid hecatombs of asses and 'laughs to see the beasts' high-pitched arrogance (ὕβριν ὀρθίαν)' (*Pyth.* 10.33–35). The comical *hybris* of the unmusical donkeys as sacrificial victims serves as a foil for the people's festivity led by the Muses and Apollo and their freedom from the power of Nemesis.[201] As a point of comparison, the *hesychia* of Heracles rewarded in his *apotheosis* corresponds with his support to the *nomos* of Zeus by conquering the lawless *hybristai* while he is alive on earth, just like Perseus' killing of Gorgon with Athena's help (*Pyth.* 10.45–48).

In this light, Heracles' second journey to Hyperborea for the olive tree could be seen as a foretaste of his teleological departure for Olympus. The beneficial and pious nature of Heracles' exploits corresponds with his olive-transport, which does not only serve to garnish (cf. κόσμον in 13) the *alsos* of Zeus but also bring great benefit to mankind as the olive tree

[195] The ode opens with the common ancestor, Heracles, shared between the Lacedaemonians and the Thessalians (1–2). Correspondingly, Perseus is the grandfather of Heracles. Furthermore, the themes of routes, hospitality and *ne plus ultra* are significant in *Pythian* 10 (see 13, 27–29, 64–66). For a further comparison between *Pythian* 10 and *Olympian* 3, see below.
[196] For the Sicilian context of *Nemean* 1 (composed for Chromius, the general of Hieron), see Lewis (2019) esp. 132 ff.
[197] The Nemean lion, *Isth.* 6.47–49; Geryon's cattle, *Isth* 1.12–13; the hind in *Ol.* 3.29 (cf. *Eur.* HF 377, the hind is described as 'ravager of peasants').
[198] Probably, the expedition against Troy with Telamon, *Nem.* 4.25–26; *Isth.* 5.35–36; 6.26–29; the fight with Antaeus, *Isth.* 4. 52–54; the Stables of Augias, *Ol* 10.28 ff.
[199] *Nem.* 1.67–69; *Nem.* 7.90.
[200] Similarly, upon 'exploring all the lands and seas', 'taming the route for voyaging' (*Isth.* 4.61–63), and 'mapping out the land' (*Nem.* 3.26), Heracles 'went up to Olympus', being 'honoured (τετίμαται) by the immortals as a *philos*' and 'an *anax* of the golden *oikoi*, with Hebe his wife, and the son-in-law of Hera' (*Isth.* 4.61, 65–66).
[201] For a discussion, see Fisher (1992) 232–233; cf. Gagné (2021) 219–220 for further references.

provides lovely shade for the festival attendants and wonderful crowns for the athletic victors (15–18). The olive tree, transplanted as the 'most beautiful monument of contests in Olympia' (ἀέθλων, 15), may also serve as an evergreen, permanent mark of all the labours of Heracles (cf. 28 and Εὐρυσθῆος ἀέθλων in *Il.* 8.363 and 19.163). It is, thus, not striking to find Heracles maintain a civilised and peaceful demeanour instead of exercising brutal force[202] during his quest for the olive tree: the hero resorts to speech and reason (λόγῳ, 16) along with his sincerity and filial obedience (πιστὰ φρονέων, 17), all of which are in contrast with the 'noisy braying' and 'disobedience disruption' of the *orthia hybris* of the asses.[203] Indeed, Heracles' filial and generic piety is highlighted in *Olympian* 3. The coercive sense conveyed by ἀνάγκα (28; cf. 7) is counterbalanced by Heracles 'will' (θυμὸς, 25; cf. 38) and 'sweet desire' (γλυκὺς ἵμερος, 33) aroused by the charm of the olive tree (32). As the son of Zeus, Heracles consecrates for his father (πατρί, 19; also *Ol.* 10.44–45) a marvellous altar, and measures out a sacred *alsos,* for the sake of which he undertakes this adventure (16–17). Likewise, in *Olympian* 2, Heracles' highlighted feature is his foundation of the Olympic Games as an expression of gratitude for the divine support of Zeus in war (3–4).

With such eschatological relevance, Heracles' olive-transport from Hyperborea to Olympia, in effect, makes Olympia an earthly counterpart of Hyperborea. Prior to the arrival of the olive-bearer Heracles, the *alsos* dedicated to Zeus is exposed directly to the piercing rays of Helios (24).[204] The olive tree's provision of shade brings a perpetually gentle climate to the precinct. There are further symbolical values borne by the name of Hyperborea: that this land is located 'beyond the blasts of Borea's chill' (31–32) indicates its defining feature as a place unaffected by the vicissitudes of the winds (a *topos* in Pindar, e.g. *Pyth.* 3.104–105; *Ol.* 7.94–95; *Isth.* 4.6). By the same token, as Robbins noted, Hyperborea is characterised by

[202] Like the Pelops-myth in *Olympian* 1, Pindar's mythological correction often appears to be his innovation.

[203] See Fisher (1992) 233, citing Hdt. 4.129. The Herodotean passage, interestingly, explains the Scythian horses' being thwarted by the hybristic braying of the Persian asses, which are hardly to be raised in the cold weather of Scythia. This also attests to the warm climate in Hyperborea, located 'beyond the north wind's chill' (*Ol.* 3.31–32); see How and Wells (1912) on Hdt. 4.129. Gagné (2021) 219–221 understood that *orthia hybris* mainly refers to erection, as donkeys are known for 'lechery and lasciviousness'; cf. Burkert (1983) 68–70 (ritual context). This, however, does not exclude the brayings, which are compressed by divine laughter and merry songs.

[204] For the implied rivalry between Heracles and Helios, see Sicka (2015) 308–309. Note also the nocturnal scenario balanced by the sacrificial fire from the altars and the light of the golden-charioted moon, 19–20.

its freedom from 'the vicissitudes of the sun'.[205] In this light, the transplantation of the Hyperborean olive tree also symbolically sanctifies it as a divine place by shielding off what characterises human life.[206] Therefore, the wonderful tree not only reshapes the landscape of Olympia by its aesthetical values, botanical fertility, and climatic amelioration, but also ultimately transforms the *alsos* into an ideal place like Hyperborea and the Isle of the Blessed by importing it with an element of permanent beatitude privileged to the divine. The olive-covered Olympia is then fully comparable to the Isle of Blessed and Hyperborea.[207] The parallel between Hyperborea and Olympia sheds eschatological light on Heracles' olive-–transportation and transplantation. In a famous passage of Bacchylides' ode composed for Hieron eight years after *Olympians* 2 and 3 (see further below), Croesus is said to be saved from the burning pyre by Apollo and translated to Hyperborea as a reward for his *eusebeia* based on his superlative offerings (Bacchyl. 3.61–62, cf. 15–22). This resonates with a striking intertextual echo between Heracles' transposing of the olive tree (ἔνεικεν, 14) by persuading (πείσαις) the 'servants of Apollo' (16), and Thetis' persuasion (ἔπεισε) of Zeus to translate (ἔνεικε') Achilles to the Isle of the Blessed in *Olympian* 2 (79–80).[208] As discussed above, the case of Achilles is introduced as a special model for Theron's post-mortem prospect. This verbal and thematic correspondence lends further support for taking the myth of Heracles' olive-transport as a mythological response to Theron's quest for eschatological ambition.

4.3.2.1 The Olive-transport and Hind-hunt

The second episode of the pursuit of the hind will be discussed here before we draw further comparison between Theron and Heracles. The myth of the Cerynean hind does not simply

[205] Robbins (1984) 224–225.

[206] As we shall see later on, along with the Olympia–Hades alternation in the Dioscuri-myth, this reading also activates the eschatological narrative in *Olympian* 2; see Robbins (1984) 226–227.

[207] Landscape: *Ol.* 3.22; *Ol.* 1.111, 20 (note also that Alpheus is a sibling of Ister fathered by Oceanus: *Th.* 338–339). People: *Ol.* 2.75; *Pyth.* 10.42; *Ol.* 3.11–12, 18, 21, 36–37, 40. Festivity and Wreaths: *Pyth.* 10.30 (ἀγῶνα); *Ol.* 3.34 (θαητὸν ἀγῶνα); 3.1, 13, 17–18.

[208] Sicka (2015) 296. While the goddess' appeal is a private request, Heracles' public persuasion (δᾶμου, 16) seeks a common benefit to mankind (ξυνόν ἀνθρώποις, 18; πανδόκῳ, 17) and a filial, honorific gift to Zeus. We may also recall Pelops' supplication to Poseidon, 'convey (πόρευσον) me on these swiftest chariots to (ἐς) Elis' (*Ol.* 1.77–78; cf. *Ol.* 3.25, ἐς γαῖαν πορεύεν), which is addressed based on reciprocity (φίλια δῶρα […] χάριν, 75–76).

function as an aetiology of Heracles' encounter with the olive tree. It is thematically correlated with the olive-transport and the epinician occasion. Just as Perseus' feast with the Hyperboreans is mentioned before his slaying of the Gorgon, Heracles' negotiation with the servants of Apollo is followed by his pursuit of the golden-horned hind. The chase starts at Zeus' behest (28) from the centre of mainland Greece (Arcadia, 27) and ends with Artemis' reception at the edge of the world (26–27).[209] The narrative breaks off with a brief report of the provenance of the hind as Taygeta's sacred offering to Artemis (29–30). The pious virgin stands as rather a parallel than a contrast to the hero, characterised as a devout worshipper and a filial son of Zeus. Like in the persuasion scene, the violent elements of the hind-pursuit (cf. Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.5.3) are obscured by Artemis' hospitality (27), the gratitude expression of Taygeta (30), and Heracles' wonder at the trees during his chase (31–33). Zeus' (failed) erotic pursuit of Taygeta is now re-enacted in Heracles' chase of the female (θήλειαν, 29) hind, while the father's *eros* is transformed into the son's sweet desire (33) for the olive tree.

The cult epithet of Orthosia (30) brings into play the divine domain of Artemis at Sparta. This creates a dazzling complex of spatial movements: from Arcadia to Hyperborea (27), thence to Sparta (30), thence to Hyperborea (31), thence to Olympia (33). Whereas the olive tree thriving in Hyperborea and transplanted in Olympia marks the boundary and the centre of the world, the hero's pursuit of the hind maps out the wonderous road (*Pyth.* 10.30) from the central domain to the land beyond the north wind.[210]

Furthermore, the defining features of the olive tree and the hind are thematically comparable: the uncanny-hued foliage (13) of the olive appears as a wreath on the victor's head for his success in the chariot race, whereas the golden-horned (29) hind is both a trial and a prize for Heracles' *dromos* (cf. ποικίλον κάρα δρακόντων φόβαισιν, *Pyth.* 10.46–47).

The convergence of Heracles' chase of the hind and his discovery of the olive tree is perfectly embodied in his planting of the *thambos* tree as the twelve-time-rounded *terma* of the *dromos* of horses (33–34) in the final phase of the foundation of the gracious festival at

[209] Whether δέξατ' implies a compressed sense of hostility is debated, see van den Berge (2012) 59; Sicka (2015) 311; Gagné (2021) 11 n. 54.

[210] For this point, see Gagné (2021) 4 ff., esp. 12: 'The layout of the actions of the ode translates the integrated structure of a complete order, which now contains everything, from the boreal *eschatia* to Mount Kronos'.

Olympia.[211] In other words, the Olympic chariot racer re-enacts in the *dromos* Heracles' 'cosmic race'[212] of the golden-horned hind, with the olive tree as the boundary mark, and expects to win the olive crown as a mark of the furthest limit of excellence. By bringing it to his homeland, he re-enacts the olive-transport of Heracles.[213]

What remains unclear is the thematic value of the mention of Taygeta's inscription (ἔγραψεν, 30). As noted by scholars, this very inscription recalls the Spartan Trinity (Taygeta is Lacedaemon's mother, Paus. 4.2.1) in the opening verse (1) and may evoke Spartan influences on the 'refoundation' of the Olympics.[214] I suggest that the inscription of Taygeta, however, may be more directly linked to the composition of Pindar, (ὕμνον) ὀρθώσαις (3, an anagram of Ὀρθωσίᾳ 30),[215] which also serves as a kind of dedication to the Spartan Trinity (ἀδεῖν […] εὔχομαι, 1–2). This makes perfect sense combined with Pindar's claim that the hymn he composed is 'the finest product (ἄωτον) of the unwearying-footed (ἀκαμαντοπόδων) horses' (3–4; cf. *Ol.* 1.23). The untiring feet of the horses of Theron's chariot is parallel to the golden horn of Taygeta's hind, which also shows marvellous excellence in running in its cosmic race with Heracles.[216] In this light, the inscriber–dedicator Tyageta becomes a mythic counterpart of the poet Pindar. The dedication of the deepest past is wonderfully connected with the composition of the epinician present.

4.3.3 Heracles and Theron

With such parallelism between the mythic past and the epinician present, it is time to proceed in our discussion of the central parallel between Heracles and Theron.

(1) **Heracles' Olympic Foundation and Theron's Acragantine Construction**. What in fact occupies the centre of this ode is the scenario of Heracles' consecration of altars and the

[211] Cf. Krummen (1990/2014) 276; Gagné (2021) 20.
[212] Gagné (2021) 12.
[213] Note that the etymology of Theron's name, θηράω 'hunt', may be relevant here; see Sicka (2015) 332.
[214] See Krummen (1990/2014) 299–302 (note that a temple to Orthosia is also found in Elis); Gagné (2021)10 n. 44 for further references.
[215] Sicka (2015) 274.
[216] This may also evoke the golden chariot and the untiring winged horses of Pelops (δίφρον τε χρύσεον πτεροῖσίν τ' ἀκάμαντας ἵππους, *Ol.* 1.87), which Poseidon bestows to him as a gift (ἔδωκεν).

foundation of the Olympic Games by the sacred river Alpheus (19–22). In *Olympian* 2, the hero's Olympic foundation is conducted as a thanks-giving gift for Zeus' military support (3–4). As suggested above, Theron may regard himself as the co-founder of Acragas. Furthermore, the sacred foundation of Heracles in this ode may evoke the tyrant's building programme at Acragas,[217] and especially the construction of the magnificent temple of Zeus Olympius. The 'all–welcoming' *alsos* of Zeus in Olympia is evocative of this gigantic temple at Acragas, which has the capacity to accommodate the whole city in participation to epinician performances or political assemblies.[218] The Olympieum, moreover, might be a monument to victory,[219] a votive to Zeus' divine support for Theron's military success in Himera[220] or it may stand as an embodiment of the cosmic order under the rule of Zeus with its Pythagorean elements associated with Theron's religious and eschatological beliefs.[221] We will return to this later in the discussion of the Pillars of Heracles.

(2) **Olympia, Hyperborea, and Acragas**. The parallel between Heracles' Olympic foundation and Theron's Acragantine construction prompts a further comparison between the Olympian landscape and the Acragantine cityscape, which in fact has been suggested in the imagery of 'riverside lofty place', aligning Acragas with Olympia, as well as the Isle of the Blessed. As discussed above, by Heracles' olive-transport, Olympia is linked and likened to Hyperborea and the Isle of the Blessed through eschatological relevance and topographical resemblances. It is noteworthy that olive trees grew in abundance in Acragas during the fifth century and vitally supported the economic life of the people there (Diod. Sic. 13.81.4).[222] For the audiences, the 'shady springs of Ister' (14) might be easily evocative of olive profusion and the eponymous river of Acragas. If this prompts resemblances between Acragas and Hyperborea, Theron's *nostos* with the Hyperborean–Olympic olive crown of wonderous foliage and hue, like Heracles' return to the

[217] Cf. Eisenfeld (2014) 148.
[218] Krummen (1990/2014) 262.
[219] Diod. Sic. 13.82.1–4; Polyb. 9.27.7–9.
[220] There is a debate about the date of the construction of the temple, see Lewis (2019) 182–183; Pavlou (2010) 322; Sicka (2015) 299.
[221] Bell (1980)b 372.
[222] See also Pavlou (2010) 323–324.

consecrated precinct, improves a landscape already sacred ('the sacred dwelling' of his ancestors and his building programme) with a tangible experience of divine permanence. Along with the olive crown, Theron, with the help of the poet, also brings to Acragas a *geras* (γεραίρων, 2), an Olympic-victor's hymn (3), and creates an occasion full of festivity (3–9) with the Tyndarid Trinity as guests of the superlative *theoxenia* (41). In the presence of the Muse (4), the Acragatine celebratory scene in the opening of *Olympian* 3 both parallels the gracious festival founded by Heracles (34) and evokes the Hyperborean gathering in *Pythian* 10 (31–40).[223]

(3) **Heracles' Persuasion and the Gift of the Dioscuri**. While Theron's chariot race is seen as a re-enaction of Heracles' hind-hunt, the laudandus' journey to Olympia is comparable to the hero-god's trip to Hyperborea. As a natural corollary, Theron's obtaining of the olive crown is parallel to Heracles' receipt of the olive tree from the Hyperboreans. If this is the case, we may find another parallel between the Hyperboreans and the Tyndarids. The mention of the victor's 'grey-hued ornament' of the olive wreath (13) is juxtaposed with the shape of the original one that is transported by Heracles (14). This reading seems in accordance with the poet's claim that '*kydos* has come as a gift (διδόντων) from the horsemen Tyndarids to the Emmendis and Theron' (38–39). The *kydos* achieved by Theron is embodied in the olive crown that the Hellannodika lays on his head (12–13) under the administration of the Tyndarids, whom Heracles has entrusted (36) with the Games (especially the chariot race, 37–38). This invites us to envisage Theron's Olympic racing as a participant (*xenos*) of the 'gracious festival' (34). The initial invocation of the Tyndarids as 'guest-loving' (φιλοξενίοις, 1) is picked up here in their granting of *kydos* to Theron (39, see further below). In this light, the 'horses of untiring feet' (ἀκαμαντοπόδων ἵππων, 3–4) might also be an indication of divine favour or support (cf. *Ol.* 1.87) from the 'horsemen (εὐίππων) Tyndarids' (39). This implied scenario between Theron and the Dioscuri in Olympia, therefore, is reflected in Heracles' visit as a guest to the people of Hyperborea, where sacred gatherings are held to delight Apollo (16 with *Pyh.* 10.29ff.).

[223] Note the verbal correspondence: Μοῖσα […] τρόποις (*Pyth.* 10.37–38) ~ Μοῖσα […] τρόπον (*Ol.* 3.4), βοαὶ […] αὐλῶν (10.39) ~ βοὰν αὐλῶν (3.8), δάφνᾳ τε χρυσέᾳ κόμας ἀναδήσαντες (10.40) ~ χαίταισι μὲν ζευχθέντες ἔπι στέφανοι (3.6)

(4) ***Eusebeia* and *Euergesia***. Heracles' Hyperborean exploits are acts expressing his (filial) piety to Zeus and bringing benefits to mankind. The fundamental feature of his exploits highlighted here is that they are boundary-crossing and at the same time border-marking. This feature is correlated with his *eusebeia* and *euergesia* because the main effects of his adventures in *Olympian* 3 facilitate the reciprocal connections between gods and men (whereas in other places the heroic feats support and maintain the cosmic order under the rule of Zeus or establish the ethical–geographical limits by mapping out the world).[224] In a like manner, Theron has shown constant piety to divinities by 'guarding the *teletai* of the blessed' (41), especially in his (clan's) offering of the superlative theoxenic tables to the Tyndarids (39–40).[225] Furthermore, Theron stands as a victorious benefactor of his ancestors and citizens (cf. εὐεργέταν in *Ol.* 2.90–95) in the sense that his achievements (his Olympic victory and religious construction in Acragas, *theoxenia*, *teletai* etc.) create significant connections between Acragas and Olympia. Just as Heracles' Hyperborean olive tree stands as the mediator between divinity and humanity, Theron's Olympic olive crown serves as a symbol of his role as the intermediary between the Acragantines and the gods.

4.3.4 Theron's Extraordinary Status and Eschatological Prospect

If the Heracles–Theron parallel explored above is valid, what remains to be discussed is how the hero-god's 'departure for Olympus' (Οὐλυμπόνδ' ἰών, 36), that is, his *apotheosis*, relate to Theron, who, like Hieron, received a *post-mortem* hero-cult a few years after the composition of this ode (Diod. 11.53.2, 66.4).

Heracles' *apotheosis* appears in the context of his 'coming to the gracious festival' in the companion of the Tyndarids (35), whom he has entrusted with the Games (36–38). The arrival of Heracles to attend the festival alongside the Tyndarids evokes the mythic background of the divine twins, who in fact occupy the primary position in this ode. Athough

[224] *Nem.* 1.60–72; *Nem.* 3.20–26.

[225] As L. Kurke wrote, the heroic–athletic achievement benefits both the individual victor and his *oikos*: the final actualisation of one's birth is the moment of *nostos*, the moment of the renewal of the vitality of the *oikos*, 'for all his ancestors, living and dead'; see Kurke (1991) 61, 81–82, 113–114.

the myths are not mentioned in this ode, the Tyndarid trinity (the Dioscuri and Helen) deserves further discussion here.

In spite of their shared mortal paternity,[226] all three have attained divine status because of their special relationship with Zeus. Pindar describes and explains the special existential mode of the Tyndarids in *Nemean* 10 (55–59, 80–88): because Polydeuces appeals to Zeus to share his allotment (λάχος, 85) with his half-brother who died in battle, they alternate between Olympia and Therapne. In the *Odyssey* (11.298–304, see § 2.2), the Tyndarids receive 'honour from Zeus' (τιμὴν Ζηνὸς ἔχοντες) even beneath the earth, an honour allotted to them equally as it is to gods (τιμὴν δὲ λελόγχασιν ἶσα θεοῖσι), that their life will alternate between life and death. We may find similar features and elements regarding the achieved divine status of Helen. According to Homer, Helen is a daughter of Zeus (e.g. *Il.* 3.199, 418, 426;[227] cf. *Od.* 4.561–569, Menelaus is translated to the Elysian plains; note also the cult of Helen at Sparta[228] and on Rhodes[229]). In Euripides (*Or.* 1635–1637, 1684–1689), Apollo asserts that Helen must (χρεών) lead an immortal life (ζῆν […] ἄφθιτον) and become a *theos* as a divine guardian of the sea in conjunction with the Tyndarids, because of her descent from Zeus (Ζῆνος, 1635). Although Helen's *apotheosis* is not reported in Pindar, her special status as an offspring of Zeus may not be alien to the audiences. Helen's divinity is indicated in the honorific epithet καλλιπλοκάμῳ, which is conventionally reserved for a goddess like Demeter and Thetis (e.g. *Il.* 14.326; 18.407).[230] This characterisation of Helen is exceptional in Pindar's epinician odes, given that all relevant passages focus on her role in the Trojan wars (*Ol.* 13.59; *Pyth.* 5.83, 11.33; *Isth.* 8.15). Furthermore, Helen's juxtaposition with the

[226] The paternity of Castor and Polydeuces varies depending on the author: according to Homer, Tyndareus alone is their father (*Od.* 11.298–304, to which we will return later on); in Hesiod, Zeus (Schol. *Nem*. 10.150a Drachmann, Hesiod also takes Helen to be the daughter of Oceanus and Zeus); in Pindar, only Polydeuces is fathered by Zeus (*Nem.* 10.81–82; cf. *Pyth.* 11.62, υἱοὶ θεῶν).

[227] For the kinship epithets of Helen in Homer, see Edmunds (2019) 114 ff.: although she seems to be entirely human in the *Iliad*, like the Tyndarids in her description, the narrator does not fail to mention her special status due to her divine paternity.

[228] The shrine of Menelaus and Helen, the 'Menelaion', was located at Therapne (Hdt. 6.61), which is mentioned in *Nem.* 10.57.

[229] Helen was worshipped at Rhodes as a goddess in relation to trees; see *OCD* s.v. 'Helen'. Shelmerdine (1987) 68 takes the reference to Helen as an evocation of the Rhodian Helen Dendritis in the interest of Emmenids who came from Rhodes. This makes perfect sense especially when the main myth pivots on δένδρεα in Hyperborea (32). Krummen (1990/2014) 301 notes the genealogical link between Taygeta and Helen (Paus. 4.2.1).

[230] Note that the context of 14.326 is about the erotic love of Zeus to Semele, Alcmene, Demeter, Leto, and Hera. In this light, the epithet may evoke Zeus' pursuit of Taygeta implied in *Olympian* 3 (29–30).

Tyndarids in the cultic address here implies her attendance at the Tyndarid *theoxenia* at Acragas (cf. 39).[231]

These cases of *apotheosis*, like that of Heracles (see § 3.3.2), attest to the main argument of this thesis that the divinity achieved by a mortal is fundamentally defined by his or her exceptional honour, which is predicated on his or her relationship with the gods (esp. Zeus). Heracles' departure for Olympus (36) not only refers to his blessed existence with the gods on Olympus but also denotes his divine honour and extraordinary status. Furthermore, the *apotheosis* of Heracles is seen as a reward for his exploits (cf. *Isth.* 4.52–66; see 3.3.2), characterised by boundary-crossing and border-linking. Interestingly, the hero's *apotheosis* is referred to as a spatial movement (ἰών), going from mundane Olympia to the sacred Olympus (Οὐλυμπόνδ') and now (νυν, 34) from the divine realm to the Olympic festival with the twins of Leda (34–35). This vertical reciprocation mirrors the Tyndarid mode of existence characterised by their permanently moving between Olympia and Hades and corresponds with his horizontal movements between the periphery and centre that marks and correlates the borders in supporting the rule of Zeus before his elevation to Olympus. Moreover, in *Olympian* 3, the divinity of the Tyndarids is paradoxically reflected in the pseudo-patronymic for Τυνδαρίδαις (also 39; cf. παισὶ Λήδας, 35), like Ἀμφιτρυωνιάδας for Heracles (14), which simultaneously marks earthly provenance while denoting their extraordinary honour, which has transcended the inferior status defined by the patronymics.

As a point of comparison, the reference to Theron's ancestry (Αἰνησιδάμου παιδί, 9; Ἐμμενίδαις Θέρωνί τ', 38–39),[232] in this context, does not exclude the prospect of receiving divine status because the Emmenids could trace their descent from Zeus, as indicated in *Olympian* 2. Unlike *Olympian* 2, which explores the eschatological probabilities derived from Theron's genealogy and the vicissitudes of his ancestors, *Olympian* 3 looks at Theron's interactions with the gods, especially the Tyndarids. Indeed, the *kydos* of Theron, occasioned by his Olympic victory, is fundamentally predicated on his (clan's) mutual association with the Tyndarids and *eusebeia* towards the gods via ritual practice (39–41). More importantly,

[231] Sicka (2015) 272.
[232] Cf. Sicka (2015) 286, 298.

like Heracles' boundary-crossing and border-marking exploits, the extraordinary status of Theron is explicitly praised in the climatic apodosis of the gnomic coda (42–44)[233] characterised by boundary and limit: 'reaching the *eschatia* with his *aretai*, he has grasped the pillars of Heracles *from home*'.[234] The moral message is unambiguously conveyed by the subsequent metapoetic warnings that the laudator will not pursue beyond this point established by Heracles (44–45).[235] Nevertheless, the superlative vaunt remains to be a source of praise, but it is understood in a different light, which has been laid out in this ode. In an ode full of spatial movements and boundary-crossings, *eschatia* and pillars imagery emphasise the geographical limits underlying the cosmic order. Furthermore, as we have seen, the ode also underlines spatial and existential permeability. The *aretai* of Theron, along with the ode of Pindar,[236] fuse Acragas with a utopian place comparable to Hyperborea and link it as the western periphery to Olympia, which is the centre. In this sense, Theron stands as an inferior counterpart of Heracles that has followed the path of the son of Amphrityon to facilitate the divine–human connections and maintain the cosmic order under the rule of Zeus. Theron's achievements receive their significance in the realm upon which Heracles maps out and establishes the border-pillars (cf. ὅσαις δὲ βροτὸν ἔθνος ἀγλαίαις ἁπτόμεσθα, περαίνει πρὸς ἔσχατον πλόον, *Pyth.* 10.28–29).

The *kydos* of Theron, as a mark of his extraordinary status, occasioned by his Olympic victory, is measured against Heracles' divine honour, inferred from his *apotheosis*, as a reward for his great toils and specifically his Olympic foundation, occasioned by this ode. Whereas Heracles departs for Olympus after his Olympic foundation, Theron returns to Acragas after his Olympic competition. This leads to the final point of comparison: the Tyndarid *theoxenia* held by Theron at Acragas mirrors the feasts on Olympus, in which Heracles has come to participate together with the Tyndarids.

[233] It reprises the Priamel of *Olympian* 1 (1–3) and marks the completion of the cycle from *Olympian* 1 to *Olympian* 3. The rhetorical purpose is obvious when claiming that Theron, like the superlative water and gold (evoking the elements of the Isle of the Blessed), is a supreme individual.

[234] Pavlou (2010) takes the pillars as reference to the Atlantes of the Olympieum. Sicka (2015) 333 suggests the Acragantine Temple of Heracles.

[235] For ἄβατον, cf. ὁ χάλκεος οὐρανὸς οὔ ποτ' ἀμβατὸς αὐτῷ in *Pyth.* 10.27.

[236] The verb διώξω evokes Heracles' hind-hunt and indicates the parallel between Pindar and Heracles. Indeed, just as Heracles makes his journeys under the compulsion of Zeus (28) and in his own free will (17, 25, 33), the laudator composes his song under divine necessity (7, 9, 10) and performs on his own desire (38).

5 Honour, Humanity, and Divinity in Sophocles' Ajax

This chapter will offer a detailed reading of Sophocles' *Ajax*. The eponymous protagonist questions the traditional values relating to honour and the divine–human relationship in the cosmic society. In this, he rejects the kind of honour bestowed by his relationships with others and attempts to confer on himself a special kind of honour, paradoxically independent of external recognition and divine distribution. The self-assertive Ajax demands the subjection of others with strict reciprocity, without paying sufficient attention to the other-regarding values endorsed by the code of honour. He also refuses to accept human dependence on gods, as well as mutability and alternation in the cosmic society. In addition, his excessive insistence on independence makes him a kind of 'self-deifier' and he assimilates himself to the power of the Erinyes through his suicide. As we shall see, the corpse of Ajax becomes a sacred spot that marks his extraordinary cosmic status and demarcates a special domain of power, which gives rise to horror while demanding the reverence of others. Ajax's rehabilitation, however, is carried out by Odysseus who endorses the other-regarding aspects of the honour code, acknowledges human dependence on the gods, and accepts the principle of alternation, all of which Ajax understands but disregards.

The play begins with two dramatic 'huntings': Odysseus is assisted by Athena to track down the trail of Ajax like a hound (2, 7–8, 33), whereas Ajax's attempt to capture his enemies as 'spoils' (64, 93) is frustrated by the goddess' delusion that leads him to plunder animals and drives him as an object of a new hunt into the 'net of disaster' (60).[1] The prologue dramatically presents the reversals of hunter and prey, victor and loser, culprit and victim, honour and dishonour, reason and madness that befall Ajax.[2] The peripeteia gives rise to a series of reflections and lessons that thematically dominate the rest of the play. At the end of the prologue, Athena concludes her intervention with a distinction between the sound-minded (σώφρονας) and the wicked (κακούς, 132–133), which has been developed throughout the prologue in terms of the divine–human relationship and the human condition. With this dramatic antithesis between Ajax and Odysseus, Sophocles explores the limits of human power, autonomy, and achievements with special regard to the divine–human relationship.

[1] Finglass (2011) 54.

[2] The prologue seems to form a miniature tragedy and a recapitulation of the entire play; Pucci (1994) 17–18. The central 'drama' is 'directed' by Athena and 'watched' by an inner (Odysseus; cf. 301, Tecmessa) and an external audience.

The discussion that follows will first look at what Odysseus learns from the victim Ajax and how he behaves as a sound-minded (*sophron*) person *par excellence* in the prologue and the final scene. The rest of this chapter will then proceed to discuss the thoughts and actions of Ajax in comparison with those of Odysseus. As we shall see, the notions and arguments developed in Part I also help us understand better Ajax's thoughts and behaviour, and shed fresh light on the interpretation of some key passages in the play.

5.1 Odysseus: *Sophron* and *Ephemeros*

In suspecting Ajax of plundering flocks and murdering a shepherd, Odysseus is baffled at what he has found so far (32–33). Only with the divine vision of Athena can Odysseus see the truth and find out more about what has happened to Ajax. When Athena reveals herself (in voice) to Odysseus (1–13), Odysseus pays proper respect to the goddess and recognises his own inferiority. His response to Athena's calling starts with their familiarity (14) and ends with a prudent definition of this intimate relationship (34–35):

> καιρὸν δ' ἐφήκεις· πάντα γὰρ τά τ' οὖν πάρος
> τά τ' εἰσέπειτα σῇ κυβερνῶμαι χερί.[3]
>
> And you arrived at the right time; for either in the past or in the future, I am steered by your hand.[4]

With a poetic metaphor of voyage implied by the verb κυβερνῶμαι, Odysseus acknowledges that his life's course has been subjected to the 'navigation' of Athena.[5] Odysseus aptly

[3] Cf. *h. Hom.* 2.216–217 (ἀλλὰ θεῶν μὲν δῶρα καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ / τέτλαμεν ἄνθρωποι· ἐπὶ γὰρ ζυγὸς αὐχένι κεῖται); Aesch. *Ag.* 218 (ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον).

[4] The translation and texts of the *Ajax* are from Lloyd–Jones (1994) and Finglass (2011) with slight modifications.

[5] Stanford (1963) 60. The verb finds a thematic echo in the coda of *Pythian* 5 (118–123):
καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὁμοῖα, Κρονίδαι μάκαρες,
διδοῖτ' ἐπ' ἔργοισιν ἀμφί τε βουλαῖς
ἔχειν, μὴ φθινοπωρὶς ἀνέμων
χειμερία κατὰ πνοὰ δαμαλίζοι χρόνον.
Διός τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ
δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φίλων.
And for the future, you blessed children of Cronus, allow Acresilas to possess an equal eminence in deeds and minds, may no olive-ruining stormy wind disrupt his life to come. In truth the great mind of Zeus steers the fate of men he loves.
The storm metaphor denotes the political unrest of Cyrene and more generally that human alternation is integrated in the idea of human dependence on divine will. The last two lines pick up θεόμορ' Ἀρκεσίλα (5); cf. εὐδίαν ὃς μετὰ χειμέριον ὄμβρον τεὰν | καταιθύσσει μάκαιραν ἑστίαν, '(Castor) after a stormy rain spreads a bright calm over your blessed hearth' (10–11).

responds to Athena's constant supervision (ἀεὶ […] δέδορκά σε, 1) and implicitly requests her additional support based on her assistance in the past and their special relationship.[6] In turn, Athena shows her awareness of Odysseus' undertaking (ἔγνων) and confirms her protective guidance (φύλαξ), which has been carried out in advance (36–37). Again, Odysseus demonstrates his respect with a sense of excitement by calling Athena 'dear mistress' in the subsequent question about his present task (38).[7] The exchange gives a picture of proper divine–human interactions based on reciprocity and recognition of the status of each. In front of the goddess, Odysseus conducts himself with moderation and deference: he prudently keeps his curiosity in check (38–50), refrains from the temptation to gloat at the loser (79–80),[8] and recognises the greatness of divine power (86; cf. 118–120) with appropriate acquiescence to divine demand (87–88).

The purpose of Athena's epiphany to Odysseus is twofold. First, she intends to make her power and grace known to the Achaeans (66–67). Odysseus, as messenger, will proclaim in public (cf. 785) not only the transgression of Ajax but also what the goddess has done to protect the community, especially the kings, from Ajax's night attack (45; cf. 1057, 1128–1129).[9] Second, and more importantly, she urges Odysseus to learn something significant by seeing (ὁρᾷς) the powerful manipulation of gods (τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅση) and how the 'farsighted' (προνούστερος) Ajax is now ridiculed as a plaything (118–120).

In light of this, it seems beneficial to discuss briefly the dramatic scenario between Ajax and Athena. When Athena calls Ajax, the warrior replies with a prideful and sarcastic greeting (91–93):

> Ὦ χαῖρ', Ἀθάνα, χαῖρε, Διογενὲς τέκνον
> ὡς εὖ παρέστης· καί σε παγχρύσοις ἐγὼ
> στέψω λαφύροις τῆσδε τῆς ἄγρας χάριν.

[6] Finglass (2011) 147.

[7] With a more positive tone indicated in Athena's answer (36–37), Odysseus changes his address to the goddess from φιλτάτης ἐμοὶ θεῶν to a simpler φίλη δέσποινα, whose position seems intentionally to loosen the tempo of his 'keen close-reasoning question'; see Stanford (1963) 60; Finglass (2011) 149.

[8] Garvie (1998) 131.

[9] Greene (1945) 149 suggested that this might be the first motive of Athena. Athena's usage of the first personal pronoun (51, 59, 66, 69, 85; cf. 92, 112 the usage of Ajax) emphasises her protective hand over the community. It may also indicate that Odysseus' victory in the Judge of Arms is also approved and supported by her favour. See also Jebb (1896) 18 on 51 ('an expression of divine majesty and power'); Finglass (2011) 153. Garvie's (1998) note on 1057 that Menelaus 'is in no position to know that the god was Athena' might be wrong.

> Hail, Athena, hail, child born from Zeus, how well you've stood by my side. And with all golden spoils I shall crown you in gratitude for this hunt.

Ajax's salutation to Athena as his ally resembles the language of Odysseus (14–15), without indicating any intimacy between them (cf. 38 with 105, no φίλη is added).[10] Ajax's greetings, however, bear a sense of arrogant sarcasm and pride, if the readers note that Ajax later will express a kind of hostility to the gods.[11] For Ajax, Athena's unexpected appearance is so timely that he can now have her witness her beloved protégé be maltreated by his whip (note the sarcastic tone of 105–106). Now, Ajax expresses hyperbolic gratitude to Athena (91–93, 96) in return for her support of this hunt. All of this contributes to a great tragic irony that Ajax is deluded in 'envisag[ing] a metaphorical hunt of human beings' but ignorant of the fact that he becomes the victim of Athena's hunt, and that Athena's presence is intended to allow Odysseus to see how Ajax hilariously boasts over his victory against the helpless animals.[12] Athena responds to his boast and offerings playfully with καλῶς ἔλεξας, 'Thank you' (95).[13] The exchange moves on to show Ajax's motivation for retrieving his own honour (95–99; cf. 41)[14] and his further plan of violent murders, ruthless torture, and humiliation (107–112). Ajax is puffed up with self-importance in front of a goddess: he underlines his boast (κόμπος πάρεστι, 96) and his agency by using Αἴανθ' instead of a simple μέ (98) in response to Athena's question of responsibility (χέρα, 97; cf. ἔγχος, 95).[15] Moreover, he claims his right of possessing the Arms of Achilles (100). All of this betrays a mark of excessive self-assertiveness on the part of Ajax, which is in stark contrast with Odysseus' demeanour. Ajax's torture and slaughter show his ruthlessness rather than his compassion. Even when Athena asks a favour for Odysseus, Ajax insists on his manners and plans and strikingly demands Athena's consent and even obedience (111–116):

[10] Garvie (1998) 132; Finglass (2011) 165, 168.
[11] Finglass (2011) 164. Finglass, however, seems to me to be wrong in suggesting that Ajax's speech here is 'at variance with his character' because of the divine influence. In fact, given that Athena's purpose is to reveal Ajax's disposition to Odysseus, her power changes only his eyesight.
[12] Garvie (1998) 132–133; Finglass (2011) 165.
[13] As we shall see, καλῶς ἔλεξας is also used by Calchas to describe Telamon's sensible advice ('always pursue honourable victory with gods') that is put in contrast with Ajax's 'senselessness' (ἄνους καλῶς λέγοντος ηὐρέθη πατρός, 763) when he rejects divine assistance.
[14] Ajax makes every effort to dishonour the Atreidae vehemently, especially Odysseus, in return for their unjust judgement over the Arms of Achilles (100, 113), which was a dishonour to him (98).
[15] For the thematic 'hand' as a signifier of one's agency, see also 40, 43, 50, 57, 71, 115 in contrast with the steering hand of Athena in 35 and the helping hand of Odysseus in 1384; see further below.

{ΑΘ.} Μὴ δῆτα τὸν δύστηνον ὧδέ γ' αἰκίσῃ.
{ΑΙ.} Χαίρειν, Ἀθάνα, τἄλλ' ἐγώ σ' ἐφίεμαι,
κεῖνος δὲ τείσει τήνδε κοὐκ ἄλλην δίκην.
{ΑΘ.}Σὺ δ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τέρψις ἥδε σοι τὸ δρᾶν,
χρῶ χειρί, φείδου μηδὲν ὧνπερ ἐννοεῖς.
{ΑΙ.} Χωρῶ πρὸς ἔργον, τοῦτό σοι δ' ἐφίεμαι,
τοιάνδ' ἀεί μοι σύμμαχον παρεστάναι.

Athena: Don't maltreat the miserable in this way!
Ajax: Athena, I command you to enjoy other things, but this man will pay nothing but this penalty.
Athena: Very well, then, since this is a pleasure for you to do, use your hand, refrain from nothing of what you have in mind.
Ajax: I shall move forward to work, and I command you this: always stand by me as an ally as such.

Ajax uses the verb 'command' (ἐφίεμαι) twice, 'a remarkably strong verb for a mortal to use to a deity',[16] which reveals his conception of his relationship to the goddess. The first injunction is about justice, which implicitly refers to Ajax's accusation of the divine fickleness of morality (455–456, 767–768; see below), because it seems to him that Athena might want Odysseus to go unpunished. In the second command, Ajax is sarcastic in his bidding of Athena to let her beloved Odysseus down.[17] This sarcastic reading might be supported by Athena's answering particles, δ' οὖν, 'very well then', which usually implies a defiant or contemptuous tone.[18] Indeed, Athena's reply is too agreeable to be accepted as sincere. There is nothing but irony in the eyes of the internal (Odysseus) and external audience. The ironic effect, as well as the divine playfulness, is intensified by the subsequent announcement of divine power, which is juxtaposed with Ajax's apparent earlier sound-mindedness (118–120). The unheard but imaginable laughter of the goddess signals her superiority to the deluded sarcasm of her opponent.

[16] Finglass (2011) 170.
[17] A possible reading of this command is that Ajax is ironically confident to believe that Athena is and will always be on his side.
[18] Denniston (1954) 466.

The commanding tone of Ajax shows that he does not give appropriate respect to a goddess, and he seems to put himself on a par with Athena. Although he might acknowledge the divine superiority in conventional terms (as indicated in his sacrificial offering), he is more concerned about his own honour than that of Athena. Unlike Odysseus, Ajax considers himself as at least an ally of Athena and sarcastically brags about his power to capture human fellows. In stark contrast with Odysseus' demeanour, Ajax conducts himself with excessive confidence and self-importance instead of self-restraint and respectfulness. Although the address to a divine power as an alliance is commonly found in epic tradition, Ajax's demanding request (σοὶ δ' ἐφίεμαι) in front of a deity, in sharp contrast with Odysseus' prudent reflection over his relation to Athena (35), indicates that he puts himself on an equal footing with the goddess: while Odysseus is guided by a divine hand (σῇ κυβερνῶμαι χερί), Ajax wields his own hand alone.[19] In fact, Athena knows this feature of Ajax all too well, as later we hear Calchas' speech providing an explanation of Ajax's disposition and mindset. In Athena's terms, Ajax's self-exaltation (ὄγχον ἄρῃ, 129) is rooted in his feeling of being 'weightier' than others in the strength of hand (χειρί) or in depth of wealth (πλούτου, 130).[20] One feels and perceives his power by actively using his (armed) hand.[21] The successful exercise of power brings 'weight' to one's self-image or self-conception, especially in a competitive context. In this regard, Athena's detailed description of Ajax's violent and controlling hands (αὐτόχειρ ἔχων, 57; cf. 64) over the attributes of his 'enemies' shows how Ajax's sense of power reaches such an extent that he stands in front of a goddess with excessive pomp and arrogant command, as if he was on an equal standing with Athena, which is a dishonour to the goddess. Ajax is ignorant of, but will soon realise, the fact that his hand is weighed down by a divine hand. Ajax's bidding to Athena to become his ally becomes an obvious irony, as his hand is directed to achieve another's goal. This shows the very fact that he is under the sway of Athena (cf. παραπλήκτῳ χερί, 230).

We now return to Odysseus' response to the goddess' question. Seeing the plight of Ajax, Odysseus expresses deep compassion for his fellow and an insight into the human condition (121–126):

[19] 116–117 parallel 34–35: πάντα γὰρ τά τ' οὖν πάρος τά τ' εἰσέπειτα at 35 is picked up by ἀεί, while τοῦτο σοὶ δ' ἐφίεμαι recalls σῇ κυβερνῶμαι χερί. Note the forms of the verbs: Ajax places himself in an active position, a position equal to Athena, while Odysseus puts himself in a passive status as he is subject to divine power and favour.

[20] Finglass (2011) 174 rightly suggests that the wealth here (so as *El.* 1090–1092) might be referred to as a source of τιμή.

[21] To a hero or warrior, 'hand' could mean the martial arm as the extension of the bodily arm (ἔγχος of 95 is picked by χέρα of 97) and, thus, is a vivid term for one's active force and power.

ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδέν᾽ οἶδ᾽· ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν
δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ,
ὀθούνεκ᾽ ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ,
οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν.
ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν
εἴδωλ᾽ ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν.

I know of no one. But I pity the wretched man none the less, even though he is an enemy, because he is yoked to terrible ruin, as I consider not so much his condition but my own: for I see that all we who live are nothing but images or a light shadow.

The insubstantial nature of humans is characterised by the metaphor of shadow and the oxymoron of οὐδὲν ὄντας ('non-being being').[22] In contrast with Ajax's self-glorifying bidding of Athena to be his ally (σύμμαχον, 117),[23] Odysseus debases himself into lacklustre nothingness in front of the dazzling and ruinous power of Athena. Moreover, Athena urges Odysseus to see further (εἰσορῶν, 127–133):[24]

τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰσορῶν ὑπέρκοπον
μηδέν ποτ᾽ εἴπῃς αὐτὸς ἐς θεοὺς ἔπος,
μηδ᾽ ὄγκον ἄρῃ μηδέν᾽, εἴ τινος πλέον
ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει.
ὡς ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια· τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας
θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς.

Therefore, as you behold such things, do not yourself speak any arrogant word towards the gods, nor take on yourself any pomp, if you are mightier than another either in power or the depth of great wealth. Know that a single day brings down or raises up again all mortal things, and the gods love the sensible and detest offenders!

[22] Cf. Pucci (1994) 21–22. Note also that Tecmessa ironically misrecognises Athena as some shadow to which Ajax speaks (301).
[23] For the significance of the σύμμαχος, see Chaudhuri (2014) 48 n. 69.
[24] As we shall see, Athena's concluding remarks along with the entire prologue seem not intent on introducing a severe moral judgement about Ajax's action; see Garvie (1998) 136. Cf. Knox (1979) 131; Winnington-Ingram (1980) 21; Heath (1987) 173; Cairns (1993) 229 n. 44.

Referring to her exchange with Ajax and the victim's plight (τοιαῦτα), Athena draws Odysseus's attention to prideful language and self-importance, which characterise the key features of the offenders (κακούς) and prefigure Calchas' account of Ajax's offences committed against Athena (to which we shall return). The concluding *gnome* in 131–133 broadens Athena's moral lesson with a reference to human subjection to alternation in life. As scholars have noted, the theme of alternation, which has been touched on in previous discussions of some key passages (e.g. § 3.3.3), is also crucial for our understanding of the play.[25] The awareness of human alternations is a recognition of human limits of achievements, inferior status, and insubstantial existence in comparison with the gods.

More importantly, human subjection to alternation is not only about 'the instability of fortune and the mutability of human affairs'[26] but it is also fundamentally relevant to divine–human relations and interactions, which are the main points of Athena's final remarks. In other words, human vicissitudes and unexpected reversals reflect not only the human condition but also the powerful influence of the gods, which has been dramatically presented in the divinely conducted reversal of Ajax on this 'single day' (ἡμέρα).[27] The implied metaphor of weighing scales prompted by κλίνει τε κἀνάγει resonates with the images and themes in the passage of the Golden Scales of Zeus (*Il.* 8.68 ff.).[28] Interestingly, the term ἡμέρα parallels the sacred daylight of Helios mentioned before the balancing of Zeus (66–68):[29]

> ὄφρα μὲν ἠὼς ἦν καὶ ἀέξετο ἱερὸν ἦμαρ
> τόφρα μάλ' ἀμφοτέρων βέλε' ἵπτετο, πῖπτε δὲ λαός.
> ἦμος δ' Ἠέλιος μέσον οὐρανὸν ἀμφιβεβήκει,
> καὶ τότε δὴ χρύσεια πατὴρ ἐτίταινε τάλαντα...
>
> So long as it was dawn and the sacred daylight increasing, so long the thrown weapons of both took hold and men dropped under them. But when Helios stood bestriding the middle heaven, then the father balanced his golden scales…

[25] Garvie (1998) 15; Cairns (2006) 101 ff.
[26] Cairns (2006) 102.
[27] Cf. Finglass (2011) 175.
[28] Cf. *Il.* 15.458 ff., 487 ff., and 734 ff.
[29] Cf. *Aj.* 1418–1420.

The divine heaven followed the orderly pace of Helios, which stands in contrast with the cruel turmoil among men. In this scenery of grandeur, Zeus grants the victorious lustre of golden scales to the Trojans, while he causes a terrifying flash over the Achaeans (71–77).[30] 'Seeing it' (ἰδόντες), the brave men on earth 'were stunned' and were taken hold of a 'pale terror (χλωρὸν δέος)'.[31] The colourless faces of the defeated Achaeans, under the imposingly deafening flash of Zeus and the silent beams of Helios, reflect the shadow-like nature of human being.[32] More importantly, Zeus' balancing of the Golden Scales is a way of speaking to the divine dispensation of victory and fortune. The sudden reversal of the war tides is predicated on divine judgement and distribution. Likewise, the sudden fall of Ajax under divine influence is an exemplary case of demonstrating human alternation and is also understood as the punishment imposed by Athena.

It is also arguably suggested that 131–132 might be evocative of the well–known passage of Pindar (*Pyth*. 8.95–97):[33]

> ἐπάμεροι· τί δέ τις; τί δ᾽ οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ
> ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν αἴγλα διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ,
> λαμπρὸν φέγγος ἔπεστιν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μείλιχος αἰών.
>
> Ephemerals! What is a man? What is he not? Dream of shadow is man. But whenever Zeus-sent light comes, bright lustre is on men and life is sweet.

This passage appears to be an exegesis of the conception of *ephemeros*.[34] The two questions are in effect rhetorically revealing.[35] Metaphorically and literally, human life rests on (ἐπὶ)

[30] See also Constantinidou (2010) 93–95; Constantinidou (2019) 140–141.
[31] Cf. *Il*. 7.476–479; 17.66–72.
[32] For σκιά, see also *Phil*. 946–947; *OC* 109–110.
[33] See Cairns (2006) 102–103. For further discussion of *Pyth.* 8.95–97 and the idea of *ephemeros*, see Fränkel (1946); Dickie (1976); Segal (1976); Lefkowiz (1977); Toohey (1987); Lloyd–Jones (1996); Pfeijffer (1999) 596–600; Theunissen (2000) 217–224; Fogelmark (2008).
[34] I hesitate to translate ἐπάμερος into 'creatures of a day' or any other English phrase. The denotation and connotation of the ephemeral are much more complex when we consider 1) the relation of ἐπί and ἡμέρος, 2) its relevance to the concept of time in the Greek context, and 3) its relation to themes such as the principle of alternation, the so-called pessimistic outlook, and human independence upon gods. See also *Od*. 10.455; 11.83, 213, 476, 602; 20.355; 24.14; Soph. *Phil*. 946–947; *El*. 1159; Eur. Med. 1224.
[35] For the problem of the second question at 95, see recently Fogelmark (2008).

the light of day (ἡμέρα),[36] either divine or natural: when daylight shines upon humans, they *are*, but when it does not, they are *not*. The existence of humans is thus as ephemeral as a dream of shadow (NB εἴδωλ' with κούφην at *Aj.* 126 parallels ὄναρ here): a shadow-like man wakes up in light and falls asleep in darkness.[37] The idea is explained further in the following lines: humans' transient life will bear a note of durability (αἰών) only when it is illuminated under the gracious light of Zeus.[38] The explanatory force lies in the ambivalence of the adjective '*Dios*-given':[39] the light of Zeus can either be a destructive thunder upon an excessively tall tree (cf. Hdt. 7.10ε) or a beneficial lightning as a source of fire.[40] Indeed, the alternating light of ἡμέρα is governed by, or equal to, *dios*, the Skygod Zeus (compare εὔδιος and ἔνδιος; *Aj*. 708–711).[41] The duality of Zeus' power is, thus, implicitly reflected in τί δέ τις and τί δ' οὔ τις: Zeus, the source of all forms of light, gives either a brightly waking life or a darkly sleeping death to man. Moreover, taken together with the Iliadic passages (Zeus' Golden Scales in *Iliad* 8 and the Two Urns in *Iliad* 24), the Zeus-given light in the Pindaric text is also a metaphor for the divine dispensation of honour and disgrace, defeat and victory, fortune and mischance.

Likewise, the duality of divine power is embodied in Athena's favouring of Odysseus and punishing of Ajax,[42] enlightening Odysseus and deluding Ajax,[43] honouring Odysseus and condemning Ajax. With all these intertextual resonations, the prologue of the *Ajax* illustrates in a vivid scenario the conception of *ephemeros*, which expounds the ontological condition, epistemological limits, and cosmic status of human beings. First, human life is metaphorically understood as being 'enlivened' or 'animated' by divine light, as the source of life without which a man is nothing but a shadow. Second, mankind is 'short-sighted' and one (like Diomedes in *Iliad* 5) will need divine empowerment to recognise or distinguish a deity and divine enlightenment (like Odysseus here) in order to learn the will of the gods and

[36] For the equivalence between seeing the sunlight and living, see e.g. Griffin (1980) 90–94 and Constantinidou (1994).
[37] Nagy (1994) 195–196 and Nagy (2000) 110–111 suggest an interesting interpretation: the σκιᾶς ὄναρ should be read with λῆμα at lines 44–47 and σκιά means the shade of the dead Amphiaraus; cf. Gilderslive (1885) on 95.
[38] NB the ἐπί of ἐπάμεροι might be related to the choice of ἔπ–εστιν, which indicates a sense of dependence of human existence.
[39] Cf. Bowra (1944) 98;
[40] Cf. *Il*. 22.178, πάτερ ἀργικέραθνυ, κελαινεφές, 'father of bright lightning and of dark cloud'.
[41] Burkert (1997) 15.
[42] Knox (1964) 34–35 noted that Athena is a symbol of the principle of helping friends and harming enemies. Cf. Jebb (1896) xxxix; Burian (1972) 156; Hester (1977) 33; Winnington-Ingram (1980) 58 n. 2; Goldhill (1991) 85–88; Garvie (1998) 11 and n. 43. For a systematic treatment of this ethic in Sophocles, see Blundell (1989).
[43] It is an emphatic point that Athena's power is exerted to affect human vision: Ajax is darkened to recognise beasts as men and deluded to see himself as glorious in front of a goddess; Odysseus is illuminated to have a full view of the vision-distorted Ajax, which in effect brings him a deeper insight of human dependence on divine light.

the deeper truth of human affairs. Third, and more importantly, a man's achievements and glorious status in the cosmic society are contingent upon the divine dispensation of shining grace and gleaming prominence.

Through Athena's instructive exchange with Odysseus, the prologue underlines the significance of sophrosyne in divine–human interactions (as well as social actions in human realms) and dramatically illustrates the notion of human dependence on divine power and grace. Athena's didactic interference conveys a kind of universal moral lesson that bears an impartial outlook. In fact, Athena's animus against Ajax is balanced by a relatively positive recognition of his 'far-sightedness' (although a sense of irony could be found *ad hoc*). In addition, as Calchas indicates, divine hatred and retaliation are not without limits but will pursue Ajax 'for this day only' (756–757).

It is with this divinely given insight and instruction that Odysseus returns to the stage and breaks the deadlock in the quarrel over the burial of Ajax. Interestingly, Odysseus appears in the coda of the play with such an abruptness that his reappearance can be considered akin to that of a *deux ex machina*. The timely arrival (καιρόν) of a kingly ruler (ἄναξ, 1316), who reconciles a quarrel (1317), appeases mutual hatred (1328 ff.), and restores (however partly and momentarily) communal amity, bears a striking resemblance to the abrupt but timely arrival (καιρόν, 34) of a navigator-like (35) goddess, who solves a riddle (21) and provides insight about human life and the divine–human relationship (127 ff.).[44] The divine willingness to guide the *sophron* mortal in the prologue is transformed into human readiness to labour for a great fellow and the community in the exodus. Odysseus is praised as the best (ἄριστε) of Ajax's intimates (1374–1375, 1381) for rehabilitating his honour. Odysseus is also worthy of such recognition because he champions justice and the laws of the gods by impartially giving Ajax what is due to him in terms of greatness and *arete* (1334–1345, 1355–1357) and carries out what he has learned from Athena (especially the mutability of human affairs) through his mediatory exchange with Agamemnon (1346–1373). By accepting the mutability of hatred and friendship, endorsing 'the other-regarding aspects of

[44] For the view that Odysseus represents Athena with what he has learnt from her in the prologue, see Garvie (1998) 15 and n. 57. Leinieks (1974) 200: 'Athena, although invisible, is present in the opinions expressed by Odysseus. Odysseus' appearance as a stand-in for Athena marks the end of the day of Athena's wrath. Athena is once more willing to help Ajax, and his attempts to do what the occasion demands could now be successful'. Cf. Kirkwood (1978) 48–49; Seale (1982) 172–173. The vindication of Ajax by Odysseus recalls Tecmessa's claim that the suffering of Ajax deserves the lamentation of his enemies (923–924).

the code of honour',[45] and cautiously observing what has been laid down by the gods, Odysseus in this play is admired as a man of sophrosyne *par excellence*.

The intervention of Odysseus in the exodos, however, gives rise to a question regarding the evaluation of Ajax, which seems to take a negative form in the prologue.[46] While Ajax's disgrace is caused by Athena's retaliation, his honour (along with the implication of a heroic cult) is rehabilitated by Odysseus who stands as a substitute of the goddess. The vicissitudes of Ajax's status, on the one hand, as shown in the prologue, confirm the principle of alternation in human life. On the other hand, if alternation is predicated on divine power and Ajax's fall is attributable to his transgression against Athena, does Odysseus' positive interference at the end of the play indicate a shift in Ajax's relationship with the gods, which takes place after the prologue and during his suicide? The following sections will discuss how Ajax's thoughts differ from the traditional ideas of the divine–human relationship and how his actions are a response to his present situation of disgrace. As we shall see, Ajax's decision to commit suicide shows his insistence on independence and his refusal to yield to the mutability and alternation of the cosmic society.

5.2 Ajax the Self–deifier

The audience will not learn of Athena's reason for retaliation until Ajax has 'proclaimed' his decision to commit suicide at the end of his deceptive speech (690–692). With this composition, the audience is invited to juxtapose Ajax's two long speeches – the *Trugrede* and the monologue before his suicide that show how he understands his present situation – with the speech of Calchas, which reveals how Ajax's transgression against Athena gives rise to divine wrath and, thus, relates to the prologue. We shall first look at the Messenger's report.

Ajax's hands have accomplished deeds of greatest *aretai* (616–617), which evoke *philia* within the community (619–621). Now, however, the armed hand of Ajax is first used to 'kill' the Atreidae-like animals (αὐτόχειρ, 57; χέρας, 366; cf. 372) and, then, as we shall see, to commit suicide. While the *sophron* Odysseus is steered by a god's hand (κυβερνῶμαι χερί, 35),[47] the *kakos* Ajax acts with great reliance on his own hand (χρῶ χειρί, 115; with 129–30).

[45] Cairns (2006) 115.

[46] Some of the arguments of Menelaus and Agamemnon (1071–1086, 1242–1249) remain reasonable and deserve consideration; see Cairns (2006) 116–117.

[47] Cf. 542 where Ajax's son is guided by straight hands; also 1069, when Menelaus thought that they should have disciplined Ajax with hands.

As a symbol of his autonomy and independence,[48] the 'hand' and 'body' of Ajax are the focal points of Calchas' speech, which provides Ajax's conceptions of the divine–human relationship and his 'hyper-human' disposition. Calchas first gives a characterisation of Ajax that corresponds with Athena's gnomic instruction addressed to Odysseus in the prologue (758–761):

> Τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνό[ν]ητα[49] σώματα
> πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις
> ἔφασχ' ὁ μάντις, ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσιν
> βλαστὼν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονῇ.
>
> For one's bodies grown excessive and foolish [unprofitable], fall through weighty misfortunes at the hands of the gods, the prophet said, whoever is born with human nature, but then think not in accordance with his human status.

'Excessive and foolish bodies' glosses 'take upon yourself with bulk' (129) and 'weightier in hand' (130); 'born with a human nature' reminds us of the human shadowiness and ephemerality (125–126); 'think not according to human status' refers to 'speak[ing] arrogant word to gods' (127–128).[50] Like Athena, Calchas draws our attention to the relevance between Ajax's physical power and self-conception in the context of the divine–human relationship. The prophet develops the theme by pointing out a fundamental feature of Ajax, and his transgressive thoughts or disposition,[51] which is specified in two occasions of

[48] LSJ. s.v. IV: 'τῇ χειρὶ χρᾶσθαι, to use one's hands**,** i.e. be active, stirring, opp. ἀργὸς ἐπεστάναι'.
[49] The reading of ἀνόητα is acceptable because it is in line with ἄνους (763) and ἀφρόνως (766), and the Homeric idea that it is foolish to challenge or dishonour a god; see Garvie (1998) 199. The word ἀνόνητα, however, is also inviting, as Jebb (1896) 119 and Finglass (2011) 360–361 suggest, because it provides an idea that when Ajax's power swells beyond the human limit, he 'has ceased to fulfil the proper function of mankind'. In this light, the idea of the περισσὰ κἀνόνητα might be relevant (prompted here by βλαστών) to some vegetable metaphor for *hybris* such as the *hybristic* vine with extravagant leafage that yields unprofitable or even no grapes (cf. Hdt. 7.10ε); see Michelini (1978) 38. Indeed, Ajax's excessive power brings him boastful bounty (94, 96), which is but vainly bestial ruin (ἄτη, 307; cf. 408, μώραις ἄγραις), endangering the safety of his intimates and leading to his own death. If this holds true, it might be fruitful to bring some relevant passages of Homer into the discussion: e.g. *Il.* 22.104–107 (νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ὤλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἐμῇσιν | αἰδέομαι […] Ἕκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν; *Od.* 18.139 (πολλὰ δ' ἀτάσθαλ' ἔρεξα βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων); *Od.* 13.143–144 (ἀνδρῶν δ' εἴ πέρ τίς σε βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων | οὔ τι τίει, σοὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐξοπίσω τίσις αἰεί).
[50] Furthermore, 'weighty misfortunes' might be related to the metaphor of the weighing scales of day's 'tilting down' and 'lifting up' human fortunes (131–132).
[51] Reading φρονεῖν as 'to be such and such disposed', 'to have such and such disposition'.

rejecting divine assistance (762–777). The first rejection takes place in a classic scenario of a father's farewell speech to an armed son departing for war (762–765):[52]

> Κεῖνος δ' ἀπ' οἴκων εὐθὺς ἐξορμώμενος
> ἄνους καλῶς λέγοντος ηὑρέθη πατρός.
> Ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐννέπει· Τέκνον, δορὶ
> βούλου κρατεῖν μέν, σὺν θεῷ δ' ἀεὶ κρατεῖν·
>
> When he was bid to depart from his house, he was found to be senseless though his father speaks nobly. For he addressed to him: 'Child, with your spear consider winning glory, but always win glory with a god'.

Telamon instructs Ajax to win glory not only with his armed hand (δορί) but always with the divine hand. Telamon's instruction is a specific rendering of the Homeric ideology of warrior ethics as we have seen, for instance, in Nestor's long speech, which persuades Patroclus to appeal to Achilles.[53] As a point of comparison, Telamon's addition of σὺν θεῷ serves as a particular reminder of the weakness of his son. This, in fact, could also be found in the previous part of Nestor's speech, which recapitulates his heroic exploit and victory over Itymoneus with divine guidance (*Il.* 11.670–762). The following points deserve notice: the Pylians always remembered to make sacrifices to the gods, either after or during a battle (706–707, 725–726, 735–736), while Zeus in return (as it seems so) 'granted great victory [μέγα κράτος] to the Pylians', and Athena sent a message to Pylos about the marching of the Epeians (714–715), raised the force of the Pylians (716), led the conflict (721), and 'turned back' the troops (758). The concluding remark reveals the key principle underpinning the whole narrative of the 'Pylian Epic' (761–762):

> πάντες δ' εὐχετόωντο θεῶν Διὶ Νέστορί τ' ἀνδρῶν.
> ὣς ἔον, εἴ ποτ' ἔον γε, μετ' ἀνδράσιν.

[52] Zanker (1994) 65.
[53] See discussion in Chapter 2 on *Il.* 9.254–258; 6.206–211 (with 6.123–143, 144–205); 12.309 ff.; *Od.* 24.508. See also Finglass (2011) 362.

All glorified Zeus among gods and Nestor among men. That was I, if truly I ever was, among men.

This well-structured verse, on the one hand, prudently reasserts the divine–human boundary;[54] on the other hand, the juxtaposition of Διὶ Νέστορί also denotes the special position of an excellent warrior among the gods and his human fellows. The self-restraint of Nestor is, thus, based on his awareness of his human status and his prosperity, which rely upon the gods. In light of this, Telamon's words bear a similar balance in their syntactic structure: the emphatical position of δορί, which hits the high notes of the importance and confidence of Ajax's armed hand, is balanced with a pause by μέν and the key point of his morality (note also that ἀεί is with θεῷ rather than δορί).[55] More importantly, the honour of Nestor, together with that of Zeus, is recognised in the cosmic society, where reciprocal interactions bring humans into association with the gods. In this sense, Telamon's ethics replicate the fundamental features of traditional aristocratic values and the divine–human relationship. Additionally, σὺν θεῷ is thematically associated with Odysseus's κυβερνῶμαι χερί (35) in the prologue and, thus, are opposite to μὴ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονεῖν. Taken together, accepting human dependence on divine power (σὺν θεῷ ἀεὶ κρατεῖν) is the key element of 'thinking in accordance with human status'. In R.C. Jebb's terms, the duty of a man, that is, what a man is required to do according to his cosmic status, is to be guided by and to share honour reciprocally to the gods.[56]

In stark contrast, Ajax boastfully replies with a complaint against the gods (766–770):

ὁ δ' ὑψικόμπως κἀφρόνως ἠμείψατο·
Πάτερ, θεοῖς μὲν κἂν ὁ μηδὲν ὢν ὁμοῦ
κράτος κατακτήσαιτ'· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ δίχα
κείνων πέποιθα τοῦτ' ἐπισπάσειν κλέος.
Τοσόνδ' ἐκόμπει μῦθον.

[54] Kirk (1990) on *Il.* 7.298–99. The balance of tone between 761 and 762 is noteworthy: a proud statement is piously put with θεῶν Διί accompanied with the brightness of self-actualisation (ὥς ἔον μετ' ἀνδράσιν) and the dimness of human ephemerality (εἴ ποτ' ἔον γε). His superior status among men is fundamentally grounded in divine grace.
[55] Cf. Garvie (1998)197–198.
[56] Jebb (1896) 119.

> But he replied arrogantly and senselessly: 'Father, with the gods, the worthless one also could win glory for himself, but I myself, even without them, I am confident to take the glory'. Such was the boast he uttered.

A similar complaint has been expressed in his first long speech (454–456):

> κεῖνοι δ' ἐπεγγελῶσιν ἐκπεφευγότες,
> ἐμοῦ μὲν οὐχ ἑκόντος· εἰ δέ τις θεῶν
> βλάπτοι, φύγοι γ' ἂν χὠ κακὸς τὸν κρείσσονα.
>
> But they who have escaped are laughing, against my will. But if one of the gods strikes, even the weakly coward can escape the stronger.

Such grumbles are found in the *Iliad* as frequently as the gods confer support on their intimate humans.[57] The boast of the Sophoclean Ajax in 767–769 (cf. 96), however, uttered in such a bold tone,[58] is dissonant with the attitude held by an Iliadic Nestor.[59] In Calchas' terms, it is senseless and foolish to reject divine grace and the reciprocity that sustains the divine–human relationship. Ajax's claim, however, is made not with utter irrationality: it seems to him that divine support appears to be arbitrarily or impartially granted (otherwise the non-entity would *always* be a worthless nothing), the true measure of one's worth is in achieving glory without the gods.[60] To Ajax, the gods do not play their cards in accordance with the honour code because divine favour is sometimes granted to the worthless (ὁ μήδεν ὤν; cf. *Il.* 11.762) and the weak cowards (κακός, cf. 132–133).[61] Ajax implies that the gods should be blamed for the fickleness of human life (cf. *Od.* 1.31–35). Therefore, Ajax downplays divine influence on human achievement[62] and blames the gods for his failure of taking revenge.

[57] E.g. Aeneas in *Il.* 20.97–102, cf. 5.432–442; Patroclus in *Il.* 16.843–850.
[58] Note that the antithesis is emphasised by μὲν […] δὲ and δίχα's position with κείνων; cf. Garvie (1998) *ad hoc*; Chaudhuri (2014) 50.
[59] The Locrian Ajax, in the *Odyssey*, however, is reported to assert a similar boast (a *hapax* in Homeric works) that he can save himself against a misfortune without divine help (*Od.* 4.499–511; ἀέκητι θεῶν, see also *Od.* 1.79 [Poseidon's wrath against Odysseus], 6.240 [Odysseus' presence in the palace of the Phaeacians], 24.444 [Odysseus' revelation in Ithaca, recognised by Medon]).
[60] Chaudhuri (2014) 49.
[61] This is perhaps related to Ajax's condemnation of Odysseus as a *tool* of all evils (379–380; cf. 445 παντουργῷ).
[62] Like Nestor, Telamon has demonstrated his excellence and achieved the greatest glories (434–436, 464–465, 1300); his successful life is proof of the ethic. Ajax, however, does not mention any divine factors in his father's achievement. There might be a sense of competition with his father: he can be better than his father if he can win glory δίχα θεῶν.

Ajax is so devoted to the pursuit of honour that he attempts to achieve it as far as possible: an independent victor is superior to a victor with divine assistance.[63] It is, thus, right to say that Ajax 'carries the implications of the heroic code to the extreme possible point, as no-one in Homer […] ever did'. [64] From the traditional perspective, Ajax puts himself on the same level as the gods, as he is about to bring *kleos* to himself by his own hand, just like a god bestows *kleos* to a man by means of the divine hand.

Ajax's confidence or 'trust' (πέποιθα) in armed-hand power is further clarified in the second rejection of divine support (770–777):

> …Εἶτα δεύτερον
> δίας Ἀθάνας, ἡνίκ' ὀτρύνουσά νιν
> ηὐδᾶτ' ἐπ' ἐχθροῖς χεῖρα φοινίαν τρέπειν,
> τότ' ἀντιφωνεῖ δεινὸν ἄρρητόν τ' ἔπος·
> Ἄνασσα, τοῖς ἄλλοισιν Ἀργείων πέλας
> ἵστω, καθ' ἡμᾶς δ' οὔποτ' ἐκρήξει μάχη.
> Τοιοῖσδέ τοι λόγοισιν ἀστεργῆ θεᾶς
> ἐκτήσατ' ὀργήν, οὐ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονῶν.
>
> Then on a second occasion in the presence of divine Athena, when she encouraged him and told him to direct his murderous hand against the foe, he then replied with a terrible and unspoken word: 'Queen, stand near the rest of the Argives, but in my sector, the battle will never break out'. With such words he acquired the intolerant hatred of the goddess because he did not think in accordance with human status.

That Ajax fights in isolation from all others, again, shows his great devotion to the honour code. As a scholion on Athena's final warning suggests, however, Ajax appears to be a *theomachos,* even though he does not fight a god physically. This is because the defining feature of the disposition of those 'god-fighters' is their boasting of some capacity or achievement in front of a god such as Thamyris and Niobe.[65] It is indicated in this passage that Ajax sets himself in competition against the gods in the pursuit of glory (κλέος) and

[63] Furthermore, if a man like Ajax is to κρατεῖν, σὺν θεῷ κρατεῖν seems to have much less demonstrative power than τὸ δίχα θεῶν κρατεῖν.
[64] Winnington-Ingram (1980) 18–19. Compare the Homeric Ajax's speech addressed to Achilles; see *Il.* 9.629–637 in § 3.3.1.
[65] Schol. ad *Aj*. 118; see Kamerbeek (1963) on 118; Chaudhuri (2014) 48.

maintenance of superiority (κράτος). Instead of being a dependant, he gives an order (ἵστω, 775) to Athena. It is noteworthy that the term χεῖρα (cf. 35, 130) rings a thematic bell again: Ajax rejects, literally, not Athena's help, but her directing his hand. The terms related to 'hand', 'sword' (or spear), and 'alone' are thematically repeated throughout the whole play as a mark of Ajax's independence and autonomy. Additionally, Ajax's rejection of a divine hand when this is given, in effect forsakes the divine–human reciprocity or a cooperative relationship that Nestor champions and takes pride in (*Il*. 11.761). In this case, Athena is angered at Ajax's breaking of this reciprocity. It is a pleasure to the Olympian gods for humans to honour them by attributing earthly achievement to their power, while they view it as a disgrace when someone is merely negligent of offering a votive gift for divine aid (175–179). In contrast with the words of Nestor (*Il*. 11.761), Ajax wishes for, say, a 'pure' honour shared with no one else, one that results from his own hand alone. Ajax's rejection of divine help deviates from traditional ideas, which as this thesis has demonstrated, mandate that all achievements of mankind are not merely inferior to, but also dependent on, the gods (cf. 383).[66] It is bad enough that Ajax rejects divine guidance when it is offered but even worse that he gives a command to the goddess, as if he were instructing an ally in the battlefield.

Moreover, Ajax asserts that he can hold his line in battle indefinitely (οὔποτε, 775) without divine support.[67] No one else can do this, however, except the gods. It is almost equivalent to a claim that he can play the game of honour with his actions on the same level as the gods. What Ajax thinks to acquire (κατακτήσαιτ', 768), that is, independently achieved glory, earns him (ἐκτήσατ', 777) the destructive anger of the goddess and disgraceful dishonour. What he supposes to be the only true measure of his merit, i.e. his own exercise of power, turns out to be the measure of divine force and superiority. These arrogant and senseless (ὑψικόμπως κἀφρόνως, 766), awful and unspeakable (δεινὸν ἄρρητον, 772) vaunts reveal Ajax's great but transgressive mind. Although Ajax is not wrong in his pursuit of honour, he commits an act of transgression in playing the game of honour on the same level as the gods. With his overgrown body and self-assured power, Ajax has over-valued himself and, thus, refuses to accept divine assistance or share his honour with the gods. In other words, Ajax disregards divine–human reciprocity and, thereby, deviates from human cosmic status. Inevitably, Ajax's excessive pursuit of honour deprives the gods of their portion of

[66] Cairns (2006) 109 and n. 37.

[67] In *Il*. 16.102, Ajax cannot hold his position because of the will of Zeus (103); he was too tired to hold his 'glittering shield (107); yet the Trojans cannot beat him out of his place (108); cf. Finglass (2011) 364.

privileges. When Tecmessa cries out in the name of the gods to entreat Ajax to show pity on her and Eurysaces (587–588), Ajax strikingly replies (589–590):

> Ἄγαν γε λυπεῖς. Οὐ κάτοισθ' ἐγὼ θεοῖς
> ὡς οὐδὲν ἀρκεῖν εἰμ' ὀφειλέτης[68] ἔτι;
>
> You vex me too much. Don't you know that I am no longer any debtor to perform service to the gods?

The emphatic ἐγὼ θεοῖς juxtaposition intensifies the fierceness of Ajax's breaking with the gods. By arrogating all the credit to himself and by taking actions like a deity, Ajax exalts himself to divine status with absolute independence and self-sufficiency. It is in this sense that Ajax becomes a kind of self-deifier, although he himself has never made such a claim.

Ajax's rejection of divine assistance is also associated with his blame for divine fickleness, which, in his view, prevents him from '*always* being the best'.[69] More radically put, Ajax wishes for, if possible, a world without divine interventions, a world in which the stronger (κρείσσων) should always be superior to the 'worthless' (ὁ μήδεν ὤν) and the 'weakly coward' (κάκος, 456; cf. 319–320).[70] In Ajax's ideal world, everything is in exact harmony with *his* aristocratic code of honour, where a man like him can *always* live up to his ideal self independently and self-sufficiently.

Ajax, however, lives in a world that endorses reciprocity and accepts mutability. Nevertheless, Ajax insists on his independence, which is revealed in his rational analysis of his situation. He considers three possibilities of retrieving his honour and finds them all unacceptable: he cannot fight against the Atreidae because of divine hatred; he cannot go home without prizes because of shame; he cannot rush into the battlefield alone because it would be a pleasure to his enemies among the Achaeans (450–470). This leads to the final reasoning that forms the climax of his speech (470–480):

> Οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα· πεῖρά τις ζητητέα

[68] Cf. Arist. *EN*. 9. 1167b17–1168a27; 8.1161a10–20, 30–34, 1161b.5–10; cf. Pl. *Euth.* 12e–13c.
[69] Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1390b34–1391a14, *Pol.* 1295b6–11.
[70] The thoughts of Ajax might be a kind of 'natural justice'; see Pl. *Gor.* 483a ff., esp. 491a–b; cf. *Rep.* 338c. It is interesting to note that Callicles' conception of virtues and superiority bear a Homeric mark, and he explicitly excludes *sophrosyne* from his set of virtues.

τοιάδ’ ἀφ’ ἧς γέροντι δηλώσω πατρὶ
μή τοι φύσιν γ’ ἄσπλαγχνος ἐκ κείνου γεγώς.
Αἰσχρὸν[71] γὰρ ἄνδρα τοῦ μακροῦ χρήζειν βίου,
κακοῖσιν ὅστις μηδὲν ἐξαλλάσσεται.
Τί γὰρ παρ’ ἦμαρ ἡμέρα τέρπειν ἔχει
προσθεῖσα κἀναθεῖσα τοῦ γε κατθανεῖν;
Οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην οὐδενὸς λόγου βροτὸν
ὅστις κεναῖσιν ἐλπίσιν θερμαίνεται·
ἀλλ’ ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι
τὸν εὐγενῆ χρή. Πάντ’ ἀκήκοας λόγον.

Such is not possible; I must seek some attempt as such by which I shall show my sire, my father, that by nature, at any rate, I am not gutless, being born from him. For it is shameful for a man to desire longer life, if he experiences no variation in his misfortunes. For what pleasure does a day following another day contain bringing one closer to and further from death? I would not buy a mortal for any price who feels fever with empty hopes. But either to live nobly or to be dead nobly is necessary for a noble-born. You’ve heard the whole calculation.

Ajax reasserts that his pursuit of honour is to prove himself a man of nobility. Again, this is not divergent from aristocratic ideology. The problem is that Ajax does not believe that his *status quo* will be changed in the future (475–476).[72] Moreover, he strongly despises any person who favours the hope of reversal from misery to happiness (477–478).[73] For him, passively waiting for an alternation means yielding to others’ power or will. Ajax insists that his nobility must be demonstrated on his own terms. His denial of alternation in himself (473–478)[74] is in stark contrast with what he himself has just experienced in the prologue but in accordance with his rejection of divine favour.[75]

[71] For a similar idea, see Garvie (1998) *ad hoc* citing *Ant.* 461–466; *OT* 518–519; *OC* 1211–1214; *Il.* 15.511; Aesch. *Sept.* 683–685; Eur. *Hec.* 373–378; Pl. *Phaedo* 117a.
[72] Cf. 125–126, 458–490, 520–524, 646 ff., 1087–1088; Ant. 1158–1160; *Tr.* 129 ff.; *OC* 610–615; *Ol.* 2.15 ff.
[73] Cf. *Ant.* 463; *Tr.* 1108–1111, 1145–1146.
[74] It seems to resonate with what he implies at the outset of the speech where he plays on his name *Aias* as an indicator of a grievous (*aiai*) fate (430–431). Pindar has a more optimistic move on this name-play, see *Isth.* 6.52–54; also Hesiod, fr. 250.
[75] Ajax’s farewell to his son again reveals his understanding of his situation (550–551): ‘Child, may you be more fortunate than your father, but in other respects like him; you could not then be *kakos*’. He is *kakos* not because of his being so, but only because of his being unfortunately hated by the gods. Ajax confidently claims that after the savage training, his son will

Ajax's self-assertive refusal to accept alternation is also in contrast with Tecmessa's prudent speech (485–519). Tecmessa reminds Ajax of her sufferings and evokes ideas of divine control over human affairs (485–491, 514–519). She introduces her misfortune as a springboard to make the point that Ajax's present misfortune is probably decided by divine necessity and that he should move on and be 'well disposed' to his intimates (εὖ φρονῶ τὰ σά, 491). Moreover, Tecmessa downplays the self-regarding right to claim one's honour and underlines the other-regarding duties by evoking Ajax's sense of shame and pity, reminding him of the principle of reciprocity (522–524): 'For it is *charis* which breeds *charis*, always; but when one's memory flows away, after being treated well, he could no longer be reckoned as a man of nobility'. For Tecmessa, it is out of the love, care, and compassion for others that one performs their duty and accomplishes noble deeds that bring them honour. In this way, Tecmessa modifies Ajax's ideas of nobility, which have been defined less by what is given to him than by what he is giving to others.[76]

Ajax cannot accept being dependent on others. He cannot even be persuaded to be so, for that would be a mark of softness that is against his *ethos* (593–595). His sense of pride and self-assertion, which stem from his education and reveal his sincere commitment to part of the aristocratic code, will not be mitigated to any extent, even by other imperatives (to be reciprocally dependent upon the gods, to help and look after one's friends and subjects, etc.) from the same code. The conclusive phrase οὐ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονῶν repeats the prophet's perception of Ajax's mind and disposition: so senselessly and ominously extraordinary is the warrior. As the chorus perceives, Ajax is a 'lonely pasturer of his thoughts' (614–615).[77] Indeed, Ajax's response to her appeal for pity is a command that she should 'complete properly what she is ordered' (528) as a subject with *sophrosyne* (586), just like Athena would like him to be (133).

So far, the play portrays an excessive, self-regarding Ajax who not only rejects divine–human reciprocity that requires humans to be subject to the gods but also denies his interdependence on his human fellows, thus disregarding the other-regarding aspects of the aristocratic code. Ajax demands the subjection of others and insists on his own independence

prove his innate nobility inherited from him (545–547), just as his own qualities will prove he is the son of Telamon. This resonates with his belief that the stronger should always be superior to the weaker.

[76] See Zanker (1992) 23–24; cf. MacLachlan (1993) 14: 'The courageous acts of the Homeric hero were not performed with the sole aim of reaping individual gain but were part of a reciprocal transaction. Heroes brought *charis* to their commanders […] this pleasure established a bond between him and his subordinates who helped bring about the victory'.

[77] In the parodos, the chorus thinks of an advantageous interdependence of the great and the small, and they say that 'the foolish (ἀνοήτους) cannot understand this' (160–164). As Calchas indicates, Ajax is indeed 'foolish'.

and his exclusive domain of honour, which in effect exalts himself to a divine status.[78] Ajax indeed thinks and acts not 'in accordance with human status' but stands in a hyper-human loneliness with his self-assertiveness against the cosmic society, in which mutability and reciprocity play a significant role among gods and men.[79]

5.3 Ajax's Cosmic Status

Before Ajax's *Trugrede*, the chorus have difficulty distinguishing Ajax's suicidal mood from the previous affliction sent from the gods (θείᾳ μανίᾳ ξύναυλος, 611). They compare the glorious Ajax, who like the impetuous Ares was sent to 'exercise his power' in 'the impetuous Ares-war' in the past, with the disgraced Ajax who 'feeds his lonely thoughts' and 'lives with a *theia mania*' in the present (613–614). The chorus wrongly explain Ajax's present state of mind because they now are being afflicted by Ajax's cruel response to Tecmessa and his forsaking of his *philoi.* The chorus' explanation, however, is revealing despite being misleading: Ajax's decision to commit suicide and, thus, forsake his *philoi* is not merely driven by a *theia mania,* but by his innate excessive self-assertion as revealed in Calchas' report. Only with the divine vision of Calchas can the chorus recognise that true 'madness' begins to form at the very start of Ajax's career as a warrior and breaks out after the Judgement of Arms (925–936). In this light, the *theia mania* that falls upon Ajax's huts is not only a punishment for his transgression against Athena but also a dramatic revelation of his innate 'madness', related to his pursuit of honour, which he relentlessly defends by attacking the camp at night and later by covering his sword with his own body. The wrath of Ajax is invested with an ambiguity of divinity and bestiality because of his 'inhuman thoughts' (761, 777). The chorus will realise that Ajax has never given way, as his previous speech indicated. Ajax is indeed 'incurable' (δυσθεράπευτος, 609). Ajax refuses to be 'amenable to a guiding hand',[80] as his *ethos* is 'unteachable' (595). Ajax's stiffness (594), stubbornness (913), and savageness (885) – nurtured in his mind – become manifest through

[78] The similarities between Athena and Ajax deserve mention: both have a strong desire for revenge and revel in their triumph over their enemies (cf. 79); they also both torture their victims (403; cf. 65, 111, 300). As we shall see, Ajax becomes much more like the Erinyes, to whom he appeals before his suicide (843–844); cf. Hesk (2003) 22.

[79] Buller (1981) 70: 'The Ajax whom the Athenians worshipped alongside the gods acts very much like a god in Sophocles' play'. Segal (1981) 129: 'The madness is both proximity to the divine and a disease. The hero is godlike and childlike at the same time. He aspires towards godlike autonomy in magnificent rejection of the conditioned being of mortal life but smoulders with a bitterness that makes him 'hard', 'raw', unfeeling'; Knox (1964) 9: 'Ajax's assumption of godlike confidence is only an extreme expression of his fierce dedication to the traditional morality […] In pursuing the heroic code to the bloodthirsty and megalomaniac extremes the prologue puts before us, he is acting not like a man but like a god'; Burian (2012) 72.

[80] Jebb (1896) on 913.

the intervention of the *theia mania*. His sanity might be recovered, but his overwhelming anger (41) coupled with his vengeful determination cannot be changed. Such an awful intransigence is the 'madness' grounded in his 'inhuman' mentality.

Tecmessa's speech, however, seems to have some effect on Ajax's mind.[81] Before departing for his suicide, Ajax gives a consolatory speech, the famous *Trugrede* (646–692),[82] to his *philoi*. Surprisingly, in response to Tecmessa, he shows an impressive understanding of the mutability and alternation of the world. Ajax accepts all reciprocal relationships in a set of statements that he 'who at that time was so powerful in doing awesome deeds (τὰ δείν') like iron hardened by dipping' (650–651; cf. 205) 'has been softened like a woman' and will show pity to his family (650–653) and learn to 'yield to the gods' and 'revere the Atreidae' (666–667) because he sees from the natural rhythm of yielding and overcoming (670–676) a cosmic principle (669–670):

καὶ γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ καρτερώτατα
τιμαῖς ὑπείκει…

For even the horrible and the most powerful yield to *timai*…

Ajax puts honour (with an implicit reference to his characteristics) in the very middle of the speech (669–670 of 646–692) and demands honour from his intimates at the end (688). These two lines serve as a striking transition to the natural world.[83] What follows (669–670) is a grandiose scene of alternation among various natural forces: winter gives way to summer (670–671); night withdraws for a day (672–673); terrible wind puts a groaning sea to sleep (674–675); the omnipotent sleep releases and holds not forever (675–676). Ajax's comparing himself to these natural forces indicates again his inhuman mentality, whereby he locates

[81] Heath (1987) 186: 'Ajax has been moved to pity and he acknowledges that his feelings are not exempt from the mutability in the world, but he refers to his earlier inflexibility and his will is unmoved'; similarly, Lawrence (2005) 24–28: 'Ajax is moved by Tecmessa's appeal but when he considers the implications of that idea, his resolve is only confirmed; this is the only way he can face the facts and remain true to himself; the only way of restoring and preserving his virtuous nobility; no accommodation as a general acceptance of change and the authority of the gods and the Atreidae would be possible'; see also Hesk (2003) 84.

[82] Much has been written about the *Trugrede*. For earlier views, see Jebb (1896) xxxiv–xxxviii; Reinhardt (1947) 24; Bowra (1944) 40 ff.; Whitman (1951) 75–77; Kamerbeek (1963) 133; Stanford (1963) 281–288; for recent opinions, see Garvie (1998) 184–186; Lardinois (2005); Finglass (2011) 328 ff.; Davidson (2018). See also Kirkwood (1978) 103; Simpson (1969) 94, 98; Leinieks (1974); Easterling (1977); Sicherl (1977) 73–77; Taplin (1979); Crane (1990). My reading mostly follows the interpretations of Winnington-Ingram (1980) 50–56; Segal (1981) 119, 150; Hesk (2003) 83 f.; Cairns (2006).

[83] Garvie (1998) 190: 'Ajax 'relates the universe at large to his own situation'.

himself in the cosmic society in the realms that are under divine control and beyond a human's reach. In conclusion, Ajax rhetorically instructs, like Athena, that everyone should learn to be *sophron* (σωφρονεῖν, 677), that is, to treat all other things or persons with consideration about their potential changes, and to be wise to adapt oneself to that alternation, even if it involves a solemn oath (649). Acknowledging all of this, Ajax proposes the plan of his reconciliation with the gods (654–665): he will cleanse himself from the divine *menis* in a wildly pure spot and bury there his sword, the ominous gift from Hector. Last, Ajax asks the chorus to 'honour' him (688) and to know that 'he has been saved' (692) from this misfortune.[84]

Soon after his departure from his huts, however, we hear from the report of Calchas' speech that Ajax rejected divine help by boasting 'with *deinon* and unutterable word' (772; cf. 312). A moment later, Ajax, sword in hand, is heard to curse his foes and seen to strike himself dead (815–865). Ajax maintains his *deinos* (205) and savage character (548), which cannot be schooled (595) and proves to be more *deinos* even than those natural and divine elements (671–676). *Deinos* Ajax yields to *timai,* but merely to those of his own instead of the *timai* held by others.[85] He clearly understands the mutable world but will have none of it himself.[86] The cosmic status of Ajax becomes extremely problematic because he, like a deity, seems to pursue a special domain of honour that is exclusive to himself. The very last horrible gesture of fixating his honour, as we shall see, shows that he refuses to belong to, or at least bear to be situated in, a world in which his honour must yield to alternation and mutability, and that he attempts to confer upon himself an exclusive honour on his own terms.

5.4 The Suicide of Ajax and the Sacred Spot

Ajax moves to the untrodden shore with the same resolve that the blind Oedipus showed when he limped alone to the sacred spot of his invisible grave (*OC* 1541–1546, 1588–1589, see more below). Ajax's suicide is committed in a wild spot, far from civilisation, where no

[84] The chorus replies to him with a mystical answer in the opening of the second stasimon (693); see Seaford (1994) 129–130, 136–137, 392–405, who sees the association between Ajax's command and Chorus' mystique as a prefiguration of the hero cult.

[85] Compare Teucer' τὰ δεινὰ ῥήματ' against Menelaus and Agamemnon (1226–1227).

[86] Knox (1961) 28, 34; Winnington-Ingram (1980) 54–56; Cairns (2006) 112–114. Some of the natural elements in his grandiose narration are irreconcilable opposites: there is no summer daylight in a wintry night. He will yield to the daylight when he perishes into darkness (cf. 394–395, 856–858); his storm-like disease will abate when he decides to cleanse himself and die (205–207, 258, 351 with 361; 655–656); he will be released by a quick sleep (832) without being awoken again; see Garvie (1998) 190. For a debate on Ajax's mind, see the brief but useful discussion of Hesk (2003) 85–91.

communal agreement or authoritative sanction is made for Ajax's rehabilitation.[87] The suicide is a highly symbolic gesture. Ajax decides to fix his sword – his armed hand – on the ground and fall from above upon it (cf. 899). As J. Hesk has noted, in this way, Ajax's body becomes the grave of the sword and his suicide 'becomes a completion of Ajax's single combat with Hector'.[88] In addition, Ajax will use his sword, σφαγεύς, as a sacrificial knife (815; cf. 581–582) to sacrifice himself, in the same way that he has used it to slaughter the 'men-like' animals to offer them to Athena.[89] Moreover, we should note that the sword is the very gift from Hector, by fixing which on the ground Ajax appears to manipulate the dead Hector to kill himself (817–819). This becomes a doubly 'perverted' and paradoxical scene: a dead and absent warrior (Hector) with his sword kills a living one (Ajax); a celebrant will sacrifice himself as a victim. Ajax ultimately makes use of his armed hand to accomplish a self-directing action of pursuing honour. By this acting or performance, Ajax will 'win' a glory that only he can enjoy. There is no one else, even Hector himself, who exerts his power to kill Ajax in this 'battle-scene'. More importantly, there is no honour to be shared with the gods. What remains is only the pure, brutal, and silent power of Ajax.

Moreover, Ajax makes use of his sacrificial suicide to demand (or even manipulate) revenge carried out by the Erinyes, just as he bids Athena to allow him to punish Odysseus in the prologue (835–844):

> Καλῶ δ' ἀρωγοὺς τὰς ἀεί τε παρθένους
> ἀεί θ' ὁρώσας πάντα τἀν βροτοῖς πάθη,
> σεμνὰς Ἐρινῦς τανύποδας μαθεῖν ἐμὲ
> πρὸς τῶν Ἀτρειδῶν ὡς διόλλυμαι τάλας.
> καί σφας κακοὺς κάκιστα καὶ πανωλέθρους
> ξυναρπάσειαν, ὥσπερ εἰσορῶσ' ἐμὲ
> αὐτοσφαγῆ πίπτοντα, τὼς αὐτοσφαγεῖς
> πρὸς τῶν φιλίστων ἐκγόνων ὀλοίατο.

[87] Cf. Segal (1981) 139; Hesk (2003) 98.
[88] Hesk (2003) 79–80.
[89] The terms Sophocles applied to describe Ajax's disorderly slaughtering bear religious undertones. Cf. 56 ῥαχίζω and 92–93 στέψω παγχρύσοις λαφύροις; 218–220 σφάγι' ... χρηστήρια; also 235 σφαζ'; again 298–299 ἄνω τρέπων ἔσφαζε, compare *Il*. 1.459. In 815, the sword as σφαγεύς, a sacrificial knife, cf. 657–659; Jebb (1896) *ad loc* quoting Eur. *Andr*. 1134, followed by Finglass (2011) *ad hoc* adding Eu. *IT* 621–623, *Her*. 451. During his suicide, Ajax like a priest prepares and performs a semi-sacrificial rite with sobriety and orderliness (815–823), although the victim is himself (854). Just as the newly slaughtered animals (545), Tecmessa calls him νεοσφαγής (897).

ἴτ’, ὦ ταχεῖαι ποίνιμοί τ’ Ἐρινύες,
γεύεσθε, μὴ φείδεσθε πανδήμου στρατοῦ.

And I call the helpers, the everlasting virgins and forever observers of all sufferings of mortals, the holy long-winged Erinyes, to witness me how I the miserable am destroyed by the Atreidae. And may the evil and utterly destroyed men you would seize in the worst way, just like they see me fall down through self-slaughter, just so by self-slaughters may they perish by the dearest offspring! Come, swiftest and revenging Erinyes, taste, do not spare, the entire army!

Ajax intransigently maintains his unalterable hatred against the Atreidae and even the whole army (838, 844).[90] Although Ajax rejects the help offered by Athena and his fellows, he now turns to the ‘awesome, far-striding’ Erinyes, who are notably described as his ‘helpers, the *everlasting* virgins, the *everlasting* observers of all human suffering, the avenging Erinyes’. The twice-used adjective ἀεί, a term in sharp contrast to the world of alternation and reciprocity (cf. ἀειμνήστον, the tomb of Ajax, 1166; σὺν θεῷ δ’ ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, 765; also 522), emphasises their unalterable rigidity on punishing the wrongdoers, on eye-for-an-eye ethics, and on absolute justice. Ajax calls the Erinyes as his true helpers arguably because he supposes that they, unlike other divinities, exercise absolute justice impartially. The stubborn-hearted (cf. 926) Ajax cannot bear the unjustified humiliation, a dishonour from his *philoi*, which inflames him with an unmerciful curse (838; cf. 930–932) and a godlike wrath on the whole army (cf. 408 f., 458). As R. Winnington-Ingram has argued, a Sophoclean hero is often both the victim and the agent of the Erinyes and, thus, he or she is the person both to be cursed and to curse.[91] Ajax’s suicide transforms him into ‘forces more than human’.[92] The Erinyes-like Ajax yields to nothing else except to what he insists on and pursues. Everything is changing except for Ajax’s honour-driven hand and avenging spirit. Throughout the play, Ajax is making a claim that he is somebody, that he has some worth, and that he deserves some honour; he *is* always who *he* is. He must prove this in his own way, fighting for an ideal self in *his* imperfect world.

[90] Cf. *Phil.* 1200 (Philoctetes) and *Il.* 16.97 ff. (Achilles).
[91] Winnington-Ingram (1980) 172 on Antigone, 185, 268 on Oedipus, 215 on Heracles, 228–233, 315 on Electra; also 322–324.
[92] Burnett (1998) 93.

The curse-filled wrath of Ajax recalls the case of the Iliadic Achilles. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Achilles' demand for honour that gives rise to a grievous threat to Agamemnon and the Achaeans is based on his cosmic status and the honour defined by his divine parentage, Athena's promise, and what Zeus has offered to him. Unlike Achilles, Ajax is now hated by Athena and his curses are made without an explicitly acknowledged sanction from any divinities. In fact, Ajax's prayers seem not to be fulfilled. It is also worth comparing Ajax's cursing with other figures who make similar curses in Sophoclean plays, especially[93] Oedipus' curse on his own sons (*OC.* 1370–1382). Like Ajax's prayer to let the Atreidae be murdered by their *philoi*, the old man resorts to the authority of *Dike* to imprecate his closest *philoi*, the two sons, to die by a mutual murder. Such ruthless curses are cast for the sake of justice and respect:[94] the sons will learn to respect the father, just as the Atreidae will restore Ajax's honour, only after their cursed suffering.[95] One important difference must be noted, however, namely that Oedipus' relationship with the gods differs from that of Ajax. First, Oedipus cast his curses in the presence of both his audience and the Eumenides (865–870; cf. esp. 458–460); Ajax, however, addresses his speech by the wild coast, in absolute isolation. In addition, Oedipus exercises his cursing power with divine authority from Apollo (413 ff.), of which has been clearly informed, whereas Ajax casts curses with an expectation rather than divine assurance; they are unlike the curses of Oedipus, which will be brought to a grievous completion.[96] Moreover, Oedipus is led by the gods to be re-placed in a new *polis* and translated into the divine sphere; in contrast, the independent Ajax leads himself to the suicide spot, while his rehabilitation remains undecided at that moment.

The suicide of Ajax is also comparable to the self-blinding (a ritual or metaphorical suicide) of Oedipus, who is then a '*deinos* grief for human beings to see' (ἰδεῖν, *OT* 1297–1298). The physical appearance both strikes terror into the heart of the chorus and elicits a physical response from them, a shivering (*OT* 1306).[97] Moreover, the horrible scene prompts the chorus instantly to inquire more about Oedipus' madness and its being caused by some supernatural forces (*OT* 1299–1302): they wonder at the mystic suffering of Oedipus both cognitively and emotionally (1303–1306). The self-blinding scene, as the climax of the

[93] See also *El.* 110–119; *Tr.* 807–820.
[94] *OC* 1265–1270, 1273–1279.
[95] It is noteworthy that the vexed contrast between Oedipus' formulation of *Dike–Zeus* and Polynices' *Aidos–Zeus* (1267–1268, Ἀλλ' ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ζηνὶ σύνθακος θρόνων Αἰδὼς ἐπ' ἔργοις πᾶσι) is also found in the contrast between Ajax's intransigent demand for *dike* and the *aidos*-oriented speech of Tecmessa (485–524, esp. 505–507).
[96] Winnington-Ingram (1980) 210.
[97] Cf. *Aj*. 693; see Cairns (2015) 75–76.

deinos conjunct of Oedipus' sufferings (δεινῆς συμφορᾶς, 1527), serves as a visually remarkable[98] springboard for reflecting the truth about the ephemeral condition (ἡμέραν) of mortal life (1258). The two horrible scenes of the suffering protagonists, unbearable to be seen, are not merely 'physical horror', which Sophocles applied to 'secure tragic effect',[99] but also triggers for tragic emotions and curiosity about the deeper truth of the divine and the human. In the lame foot and blinded eyes of Oedipus, the traces of divine action are perceived in the exchange between Oedipus and the chorus (1300–1302, 1311–1312):

Χο.: τίς ὁ πηδήσας
μείζονα δαίμων τῶν μηκίστων
πρὸς σῇ δυσδαίμονι μοίρᾳ; (...)
Οι.: ἰὼ δαῖμον, ἵν' ἐξήλου.
Χο.: ἐς δεινόν, οὐδ' ἀκουστόν, οὐδ' ἐπόψιμον.

Cho.: Who is the daimon who leapt further than the longest leap onto your unfortunate fate?
[…]
Oe.: Ah, *daimon*, how far you have leapt!
Cho.: To something *deinos*, not to be heard or looked upon.

The action of the *daimon* is vividly present in Oedipus himself who, being 'leapt upon' by some supernatural power, becomes a *deinos* spot like a sacred precinct that is not to be seen or talked about. To the chorus, Oedipus is paradoxically both 'the performer of *deina* deeds' and 'the sufferer' of quenching his eyes (ἔτλης τοιαῦτα, 1326). The author of these miseries is Apollo, whose name is repeated twice as the answer to the question 'Which *daimon* moved you to it' (1327–1330),[100] while the executioner is Oedipus himself (αὐτόχειρ). His affirmation of his responsibility with an emotionally charged rationale (1331–1335) seems to be a reply to the performer–sufferer paradox (1326): the *deinos* blinding, as storm-like (1314–1315) madness influenced by the *daimon's* activity, despite not being not prophesied,

[98] λεύσσετ', 1524; cf. ἐπισκοποῦντα, 1529.
[99] Bowra (1944) 374–375; cf. Kitto (1956/1960) 72–82.
[100] Cf. *Aj*. 504f., Tecmessa's misfortune is determined by a *daimon* and the hand of Ajax. For a discussion of these passages, see Winnington-Ingram (1980) 174ff.; Burkert (1991b) 16–17; Segal (2000) 111–112, 134–135; Cairns (2013).

is *willed* by the characteristically *deinos* Oedipus. The *daimon* within Oedipus, together with his personal choices and disposition, shape his life's course (μοίρᾳ).[101]

In the opening of *Oedipus at Colonus*, the old men of Colonus are struck with the *deinos* appearance and utterance of the blind Oedipus who has long wandered (*OC* 140–141): 'Ah, ah! He is *deinos* to see and *deinos* to hear!'. The fright of the spectators is caused both by Oedipus' sudden manifestation from the sacred grove of the Erinyes (36–37, 125 ff., 154 ff.), a place that forbids human voices and steps, and by his disconcerting appearance of wretchedness and blindness.[102] The term *deinos* recalls the horrible scene of Oedipus' self-blinding; simultaneously, it echoes the sacredness of the divine spot of the 'dread-faced' (δεινῶπες, 84; cf. 90) goddesses. It is striking to notice that Oedipus who sees with his voices (135), having been cursed before but now yielding a power of cursing and blessing (93), bears an uncanny resemblance to the deities called either Eumenides or Erinyes of ancient Darkness (40 ff., 106). The pious spectators react, with a combination of fright and reverence, to Oedipus as if they were encountering the goddess whom they never dare to see.[103]

Likewise, the horrible appearance of Ajax and his corpse resonates with his *deinos* features and gives rise to a sense of reverence, horror, and pity. After the prologue, Tecmessa applies *deinos* as the first term to qualify her bedfellow and lord: the '*deinos* and great man of savage strength' (ὁ δεινὸς μέγας ὠμοκρατής, 205). Etymologically related to fear (δέος), *deinos* denotes some fearsome quality: Tecmessa is gripped by fear (δείσασα, 315) as Ajax utters against her '*deina* threats' (τὰ δείν' ἐπηπείλησ' ἔπη, 312). The term *deinos* at 205 is an apt description of a man who has been suffering from a storm-like disease (206–207) sent from 'the *deine* goddess' (952; cf. 185, 243, 611). It creates an ambiguous similarity between the victim and the afflicter. After hearing the details of Ajax's madness, the chorus surmises that some '*deinoi* misfortunes' (331) have driven their lord 'to 'behave like someone who is possessed by Phoebus Apollo' (διαπεφοιβάσθαι, 331–332; cf. 243–244). Here, *deinos* bears a sense of uncanniness and strangeness: Ajax becomes something unlike himself as he speaks in an abnormal way. The madness deprives him of human language (301–302) so that he can only 'painfully drag out his words' or speak horribly like a *daimon* (243–244). His recovery to sanity is, thus, a struggle between trance-like silence (311, 323 ff.) and unusually horrible cries (312, 317 ff.). Like Cassandra (Aesch. *Ag*. 1072ff.), Ajax exits the huts with

[101] Cf. ἦθος δεινὸν Οἰδίποδι δαίμων, Heraclitus DK B119; also B78; see Winnington-Ingram (1980) 177; Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) 36 f., 45 f., 78–79.
[102] For the blindness of Oedipus, see Bernidaki-Aldous (1990).
[103] Jebb (1896) on 141, with Winnington-Ingram (1980) 268.

exclamations (333 ff.)[104] before he can finally communicate with others. The resemblance between the *deinos* Ajax and the *deinos* affliction from a *deine* goddess remains disquietingly ambiguous to the chorus (cf. 355, 481–482 with 639–640) and the audience. Later, Ajax's corpse (891 ff.) is discovered to be an unbearable sight that incurs both horror and pity (915 ff.). The corpse, cut through by a glittering sword, is shining horribly with physical distinctiveness and suggestive spiritual recalcitrance. When Teucer finally sees the corpse, he bursts out crying (992–993, 1003–1004):

> ὦ τῶν ἁπάντων δὴ θεαμάτων ἐμοὶ
> ἄλγιστον ὦν προσεῖδον ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐγώ...
> ἴθ', ἐκκάλυψον, ὡς ἴδω τὸ πᾶν κακόν.
> ὦ δυσθέατον ὄμμα καὶ τόλμης πικρᾶς
>
> Oh, most painful of all the sights that I have seen with my eyes […] Come uncover him, so that I may see the whole calamity. Oh, face that I can hardly bear to look upon, the face which reveals your cruel rashness!

This strongly emotional response springs from the horrible spectacle of his brother.[105] The face of Ajax, literally his eyes (ὄμμα), shines no more with the terrifying force that would have frightened the enemies (167–171), but becomes 'a light of bitter truth' (cf. 614–615).[106] Teucer sees in that face Ajax's characteristic feature, τόλμη πικρά (cf. 966; Aesch. *Ag*. 1535), which denotes his recalcitrance against authorities (cf. *OT* 533). He also sees a connection between his cruel rashness and the cruel, glittering sword (πικροῦ τοῦδ' αἰόλου κνώδοντος, 1024–1025). The weapon that brings glory to Ajax also carries out his death, thus denoting the paradoxical nature of human power. This prompts Teucer to hold a gloomy vision about the mystic divine power behind the death of Ajax (1026): the sword, which is a gift from Hector, becomes a killer (1029–1033) and reveals itself as a misfortune devised by the Erinyes and Hades (1034–1037). As Tecmessa conjectures after his suicide, 'These things would not have turned out like this if not without the gods' (950).

[104] Stanford (1963) on 331–332; also Garvie (1998) on 331–332.
[105] The corpse also drives Teucer to ask the typical tragic questions ('Where shall I go?', 1006; 'What am I to do?', 1024; cf. 809, 920). For this question and the ambiguity of human action, see Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) 44.
[106] Garvie (1998) on 1004–1005.

Unlike Oedipus' self-blinding, which is explicitly said to be influenced by divine power, the self-willed suicide of Ajax is indicated as a fulfilment of Calchas' prophecy of Athena's intention of Ajax's death (756–757; cf. 950–951) or conjectured as a divinely schemed disaster (1034–1037). Whereas divine power and human action are hinged together on Oedipus's golden pin of self-blinding (*OT* 1269),[107] Ajax willingly translates his power into the avenging Erinyes on the tip of his dark sword. While Oedipus is 'leapt upon' by a *daimon*, Ajax at his own initiative invites death and Erinyes into himself.[108] The *deinos* corpse of Ajax demarcates a kind of sacred spot in which a new wrath of a dead warrior continues to exert its uncanny power, although the old wrath of Athena has been appeased (cf. 656). Ajax is no longer active as a warrior but his power is translated through his prayer and self-sacrifice into the avenging hands of the Erinyes. The uncanny power continues to exert its effects through his 'eyes' and the glittering sword that remain on stage to the end. Ajax establishes for himself a specific domain of power that marks his wrath, independence, and recalcitrance. Additionally, he achieves a kind of honour that is exclusive to himself and demands others' honour and worship. 'Ajax, like the Erinyes, is a seeing god'.[109]

Although Ajax's suicidal action seems to be free from divine influence, the corpse itself becomes the receptacle of the power of the Erinyes. Ultimately, the convergence of human and divine power confirms to some extent his dependence on a special kind of divine power. The uniqueness of Ajax, however, remains remarkable in his self-willed assimilation (rather than simple subjection) to the power of the Erinyes.

Although the divine power that is felt at work over Ajax's corpse remains human conjecture (756–780, 950–954 of Athena; 1034–1037 of Erinyes and Hades; cf. 970, 331–332), a certain form of divine influence seems to take place when Odysseus unexpectedly returns with divine insight and authority in the exodus. It is the worldly mutability, which Ajax rejects, that facilitates his rehabilitation and confirms his special status in relation to the

[107] Cf. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988) 37, 47.

[108] This seems to correspond with the lyric exclamation of Ajax in his entrance (393–397): 'Oh darkness, my light, oh Erebos, most bright for me, take, take me as your inhabitant, take me!' His existence becomes an uncanny paradox, a living darkness (cf. 1124). Ajax feels himself to be hatefully discordant with the entire world (457–459), that he cannot appeal to 'the race of the ephemeral' (γένος ἀμερίων, 398–399). Indeed, he goes far beyond humanity, which is fundamentally defined by dependence upon divine power. His life 'shines' with darkness; cf. νύκτερος Αἴας in 215. Ajax's calling for darkness and the Erinyes stand in stark contrast with his prayer for 'brightness' to demonstrate his excellence in *Il*. 17.645–647. This is also evident when Zeus compassionately scatters the mist and Helios suddenly blazes out and the whole battle is lit up (648–650; cf. 15.668–673). As soon as (καὶ τότ' ἄρ', 651; cf. 237) Ajax regains the state of being under (ἐπί) the daylight (ἡμέρα), he ceases from weeping (648, 700–701) and restores his power to devise (651 ff.) and fight (715 ff.).

[109] Winnington-Ingram (1980) 45.

Achaeans.[110] Moreover, it is on the basis of reciprocity which by his fellows and enemy (Odysseus) that Ajax finally receives . The suggested interference of Athena, however, seems to be balanced by Ajax's Erinyes-like implacability, which is indicated and treated with caution by Teucer, who prevents Odysseus from taking part in the burial (1393–1395, 1376–1380).

This reversal at the end of the play serves as a reminder, not merely of the alternation of human life, but also of the limitation of human judgement (1418–1420). The closing *gnome* echoes the insight that Odysseus gained in the prologue. Likewise, this self-reflection over human weakness bears a sense of self-debasement felt before the unrecognised power of the divine at work over the corpse of Ajax. The gigantic, sword-pierced corpse of Ajax becomes a sacred spot: on the one hand, it is a horrible mark of the fearsome presence of the divine (Athena, Erinyes, or even Ajax the hero); on the other hand, with the honorific burial that prefigures (as the audience are likely to notice) the heroisation of Ajax in the future,[111] it denotes and acknowledges the hyper-human greatness of the *deinos* Ajax. In the eventual peripety of his life, the dead Ajax receives a special cosmic status[112] and shows some form of uncanny power that gives rise to horror and demands the reverence of onlookers and the audience.

[110] Cairns (2006) 115.

[111] For Ajax's hero cult among the Athenians and whether the play refers to this, see March (1991–1993); Cairns (2006) 99–100 and recently Finglass (2011) 46–51; Currie (2012) 332–336.

[112] Cf. Winnington-Ingram (1980) 55, 268; Buller (1981) 72–73.

Epilogue

In light of the issues raised and arguments made in each chapter of this thesis, I hope that 'becoming a god' can now be seen not as a simple fancy nor an utterly undesirable ambition for humans in Greek literature and thought and that the ideas such as cosmic society and cosmic status have shed light on the interpretation of the texts discussed here. In lieu of an exhaustive summary and conclusion, I provide an overview of the thesis, along with some valedictory remarks.

The study began with an exploration of the defining features of gods and humans and the world in which they live and interact with each other in Greek literature. Not only are Greek ideas of anthropomorphism and theomorphism mediated through power and appearance, but also, and more fundamentally, through the concept of cosmic society in which a sliding scale of honour underlies the hierarchical difference and interconnection between gods and humans. The formation and ordering of the cosmic society largely rest on the distribution of honours and prerogatives among gods under the rule of Zeus. Given that human communities are perceived (emically) as a part of the cosmic society, a human's cosmic status is ultimately predicated on both recognition within their community and the divine dispensation of gods.

Cosmic society allows for the elevation of status and thus a human's upward movement from an inferior to a superior status, possibly even a divine status, and *vice versa*. In cases of apotheosis, exceptional humans are accepted as members of the divine community and such recognition is modelled on the initiation of the newborn deities. There are also certain limited and aberrant forms of deification in which some exceptional figures are approximated to divinity with or without divine sanctions. Based on this, the thesis has explored the scenarios in and occasions on which such special forms of divinisation take place and in which the divinely empowered or self-elevated figures cross, blur, confirm, or question the boundaries that separate and correlate gods and humans.

The case studies have revealed how the prevalent assumption of the priority of the immortality–mortality antithesis does not paint a full picture of the texts. Some points deserve to be restated. Formulae such as 'immortal and ageless' are understood in certain cases as a

synecdoche for divinity. In the same vein, the undying *kleos* of an exceptional man marks his special relationship with a deity (Demophon–Demeter) and may come into conflict with the honour bestowed by his community (Achilles–Achaeans). Recipients of divine diet are not only prevented from ageing and dying but also recognised as special members of the divine community (Tantalus). In addition, momentary divine empowerment allows humans to play the role of gods (Diomedes, Hector, Achilles). Moreover, divine favour marked by present victory and wealth may encourage the prospects for posthumous happiness (Theron).

More importantly, 'religion' in the cosmic society does not necessarily presuppose a clear-cut division between the sacred (worship) and the secular (homage) in terms of honour. Furthermore, the poetic characterisation of extraordinary humans is cautious of the limits imposed by mortality, but this awareness is derived from or based on the hierarchical difference and connection between gods and humans. Although the cases under discussion often re-assert the conviction that there is a gulf between gods and humans, which serves as a barrier to human achievements, they justify one main argument of the thesis, namely that a human is allowed to move along the sliding scale of the cosmic hierarchy. This is mediated through his honour, a mark of his cosmic status, which rests on his relationships and interactions with other humans and ultimately with gods.

These relationships are characterised, first and foremost, by reciprocity and the codes stipulated by it. This is reflected in the aristocratic ethic (in Telamon's terms), 'ever to excel with gods', along with the relevant code of honour, which requires that one performs extraordinary deeds and undertakes the duties owed to one's fellows as well as to gods. The fulfilment of this ethic is often embodied in the godlike honours bestowed by one's community on the basis of one's qualities and achievements, which are dependent on divine power and favour; thus, such honours are also shared with gods and perceived as a mark of one's special relationship with gods. This is explicated in *Isth*. 6.10–13:

> εἰ γάρ τις ἀνθρώπων δαπάνᾳ τε χαρείς
> καὶ πόνῳ πράσσει θεοδμάτους ἀρετάς
> σύν τέ οἱ δαίμων φυτεύει δόξαν ἐπήρατον, ἐσχατιαῖς ἤδη πρὸς ὄλβου

βάλλετ' ἄγκυραν θεότιμος ἐών.

> For if a man takes delight in toil and expenditure, and so succeeds in god-framed achievements, and if a *daimon* plants in him the pleasure of fame, he drops his anchor at the furthest limits of bliss, being god-honoured.

The divine *charis* (cf. 62–66) accompanies a man in every step towards the limits of his blessedness, which, it transpires, is a confirmation of his special relationship with gods in terms of honour.[1] The approximation to divinity implied in the bestowal of godlike honours denotes how far the honorand is superior to the laudators without defying the ontological difference, and how far he approximates gods. In this regard, 'becoming a god' is not by nature in contradiction to the religious sentiment or the norms of the cosmic hierarchy; rather, it can be the summit goal of human perfection, although a qualification must be added. If the aristocratic ethic seems to convey an idea of using gods as a template to envisage the development and perfection of humans by enabling their move upwards on the sliding scale of cosmic hierarchy, it is a path that must be taken under divine guidance and favour.[2] This might be compared with, for instance, the Platonic idea of *homoiosis theoi*[3] and Aristotle's idea of contemplative life in which one must not follow the 'proverb-writers' to 'think human, since you are human'.[4]

Another set of conclusions from this thesis, however, concerns the extent of human power and the ambiguities of the divine–human relationship. It is a form of transgression for a human to elevate himself as a deity without divine approval. The poets oppose this excessive ambition (e.g. 'seek not to become Zeus', *Isth.* 5.11–16; *Ol.* 5.12–16) not only because of its potential contradiction of mortality but also because of its deviation from human status, which determines human's dependence on gods and divine dispensation of

[1] Cf. Kurke (1991) 126: 'Pindar represents the process of competition and victory as a chain of *charis*, originating with a benevolent deity and a binding king'.
[2] Cf. Currie (2005) 158–200; Currie (2006) 166.
[3] E.g. Pl. *Tht.* 176a–b; *Sym.* 207c–209e. This was proposed in Roloff (1970). For *homoiosis theoi*, see e.g. Annas (1999) 6; Sedley (2000); Jedan (2013).
[4] Arist. *EN*. X.7.1177b26–34; cf. *Aj.* 758–761. On Aristotle's passage, see San (1995); Miller (2011) 3; Colaner (2012).

honours (e.g. Tantalus in *Olympian* 1). However, a human's (excessive) commitment to the aristocratic code or obedience to gods does not always end well and in some cases leads to one's failure (e.g. the Homeric Hector and the Sophoclean Ajax). These prompt a certain pessimistic view that characterises the archaic attitudes towards the human condition and the nature of happiness: suffering remains the universal portion of mankind, and happiness remains in the hands of the gods (e.g. Achilles' parable in *Iliad* 24 and Odysseus' exchange with Athena in the *Ajax*).

A consciousness of human ephemerality – its transitory nature and its dependence on gods – occupies the serious, prudent mind of the Greek poets; suffice it to mention that Pindar prays for divine grace on behalf of the honorand, as well as for divine guidance over his poetic composition. This might in turn explain why the Greek poets do not deny the prospects for divine status nor neglect the extraordinariness of human achievements but rather dwell on their limitations and dangerous ambiguities. What they often tend to do is to present poetic insights about the human condition and the workings of the gods in the cosmic society. This also leads us to consider the social role of a poet who delivers insights and teachings through public performance to the original and potential audience who live in the same cosmic society. In fact, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are commonly considered exemplary poems, especially for rulers and leaders.[5] The works of Hesiod and Pindar are sometimes referred to as a broader genre of 'instruction to princes' or 'advice poetry'.[6] The Greek poets sometimes play the role of political rhetor and advisor, engaging in the political issues with a higher (divine) perspective and authority. For instance, as K. Morgan has suggested, Pindar came to the Hieron's feasting palace as a supporter to 'redescribe contemporary tyranny as an instantiation of golden-age kingship and consonant with best Greek tradition'.[7] In this regard, the poetic teachings and performance bear further significance in a political situation: the (re-)establishment or (re-)settlement of a political order requires not only powerful action but also poetic wisdom, both of which are derived from the heavenly gods and delivered by the earthly poets. In addition, poets might make use of the occasion of performance as a

[5] Howie (1995); Cairns (2014); Cairns (2018) 381–382.
[6] Martin (1984); Kurke (1990); Martin (2013) 53.
[7] Morgan (2015) 8.

springboard from which to deliver wisdoms that are universal and thus beyond the scope of the present situation; in other words, the particular and the universal are artfully intertwined in the mythical narrative and gnomic teaching.[8]

This leads to a final thought about the ideal of the king as the embodiment of the highest form of human perfection, which can be illustrated by the case of Odysseus. In the *Odyssey*, the protagonist warrior possesses knowledge about his divine allotment and his role in the divine plan against the suitors. With such divine knowledge and Athena's guidance, Odysseus not only performs his role with a temporary elevation to a divine status but also acts like a poet with divine insights (and he indeed plays the role of poet in his storytelling through the whole epic). At the sublime moment of divine justice, when Odysseus was about to punish the suitors and restore his status and the political order of Ithaca, he, being a divinely ordained king, plucks the bow–lyre of Apollo, the sound of which proves to be the sorrow of the unjust, echoing the thunder of heaven god Zeus (*Od*. 21.404–413).

The image of Odysseus aligns with the Hesiodic ideal of a king whose authority is derived from Zeus and who is a recipient of special wisdom from Apollo and the Muses (*Th.* 81-100, § 2.4). In this regard, the ideal of the king is the 'poet–king', an extraordinary individual with divinely given power, wisdom, or insights. The ideal can be found in the unity of a poet and a king in reality (e.g. Pindar–Hieron, § 4.1.4). And this, I suggest, might be compared with the Platonic idea of the 'philosopher–king' in which the authority of wisdom and knowledge of humans and gods appears to be transferred from poetry to philosophy.

[8] See, for instance, Morgan (2015) 1–2 on the 'atypicality' of Pindar's poetry for Hieron, quoting Willcock (1978) 37–38, suggesting that these poems are typical odes but also 'trying to be something else'.

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