


THE RELATION OF ST. PAUL'S ETHICS TO HIS
DOCTRINE OF SALVATION

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CHAPTER ONE

I N T R O D U C T I O N

In the epistles of St. Paul we find a remarkably well-developed theology. Ethical teaching is, however, by no means lacking. A brief survey is sufficient to show that a large proportion of his extant writings is devoted to practical advice and exhortation. Frequently the main body of ethical teaching follows the section in which his theology is developed and explained. Sometimes, as in the epistle to the Romans, the transition seems to be abrupt and the connection obscure. Possibly it is for this reason that there has been, at times, a tendency either to emphasize the doctrine or the ethic to the exclusion of the other, or to give more or less equal weight to both, and thus to emphasize the disconnection between the two.

Some ages have taken St. Paul's doctrine without his ethic. Our own seems to be more concerned with ethics than with theology, and the attempt is made to establish morality without a doctrinal basis. In some circles, all theology, and especially St. Paul's, is looked upon as an out-dated and arbitrary picture-image. Even in more orthodox circles, where the value of the

apostle's doctrine of salvation is more fully appreciated, there is an inclination to treat his ethics as traditional in character and largely unaffected by his doctrinal beliefs.

St. Paul himself was faced with this divisive tendency on the part of his Gentile converts. To many of them it was a new idea that religion was actually and vitally concerned with ethics. It has been remarked that in St. Paul's day the problem was to make religion moral, while in our day it is to make morality religious.¹ One aspect of this modern problem is the need to make ethics authoritative without making it legalistic. This was a question with which, because of the attitude of many Jewish Christians, the apostle was forced to deal, and the principles he thus set forth have proven frequently in the history of Christian thought to be both potent and timely. If we find that the apostle's ethic is directly related to his doctrine and if we can discover how the connection is established in his epistles the influence of the greatest mind in the early church can be brought to bear upon the problems confronting twentieth century Christendom. It is not simply a matter of reinforcing ethics with a theological foundation to make it more authoritative in the modern world. Rather it is a question of seeking the eternal principles which bind together morality and religion in every age, for it has become abundantly clear that "only ethical religion is truly religious, and only

1. Cf. M. S. Enslin, "The Ethics of Paul," p. 302 n.

religious ethics is really ethical."¹

St. Paul's ethical teaching is a development from his doctrine of salvation. It is the practical application of his religious beliefs. Undoubtedly, practical questions in the missionary field compelled him to elaborate his theological position.² It is possible to argue that we have knowledge of his doctrine mainly because of his interest in matters of conduct affecting the Christian community. So P. Gardner claims that in Romans and Corinthians he is principally concerned with ethics. "He drifts into a doctrinal discussion."³ But this is not to say that his doctrine is the result of his ethical thinking. What is primary, for St. Paul, is the self-manifestation of God to him in the experience of seeing Christ at Damascus. His theology is not the outgrowth of his ethics but of his experience of life in Christ. It is from the standpoint of this new life that he views the multitudinous problems of day-to-day existence.

The question of St. Paul's ethic as a separate entity is of great importance. Did the apostle first frame his answer to a particular problem of ethics and then seek to hang it on some doctrinal tenet? Or the question may be asked in another way: Did he think independently of theology and ethics, merely discovering connecting links in the process of composition? We shall suggest that no such separation can be found. Any division

1. E. Brunner, "The Theology of Crisis," p. 71.
2. Cf. Sydney Cave, "The Gospel of St. Paul."
3. "The Religious Experience of St. Paul," p. 139.

between ethics and theology in his epistles is due entirely to arrangement and not to chronological mental processes. Even in the hortatory sections where traditional material is embodied the influence of the Pauline doctrine is everywhere apparent. St. Paul does not suddenly turn from theology to ethics. Even in the epistle to the Romans, where this transition has been remarked, he has already been dealing with ethics, weaving a close pattern of the clearest ethical theology.¹

The central theme of the great missionary apostle is salvation. This he presents in a variety of modes or metaphors. How far these have been or can be worked into a single system is a question not easily settled. It would almost appear, as C. Anderson Scott suggests, that we have no thoroughly-elaborated system.² But it must not be assumed that St. Paul was non-systematic. He deals systematically with each aspect of his doctrine, but nowhere do we find a comprehensive theology embracing every consequential detail. Rightly does Professor Stewart warn against "isolating the various elements of Christian experience" and seeking in St. Paul a "chronological chart" of salvation.³ These elements cannot be arranged like pearls on a string. They are the sparkling facets of a single diamond. But are the various soteriological terms therefore only synonyms? Adolf Deissmann thinks so. He selects five synonyms:

1. Cf. C. H. Dodd, "The Epistle to the Romans," p. 188.
 2. Cf. "Christianity According to St. Paul," p. 16.
 3. "A Man in Christ," p. 11.

justification, reconciliation, forgiveness, redemption and adoption.¹ To classify these ideas as such seems hardly to do justice to St. Paul's rich thought. Each presents some aspect of the truth not quite covered by any other, and yet they are not mutually exclusive.

Where shall we look for the roots of St. Paul's ethical teaching? Schweitzer would have us seek them solely in the apostle's doctrine of "in Christ." "Of his two doctrines of righteousness, it is only with the mystical being-in-Christ that Paul brings his ethic into connection; he never makes any attempt to derive it from the righteousness by faith.... To give ethics, from this point of view, any real foundation is impossible for him. It only remained open to him to set up an ethic independent of faith-righteousness."² Dr. Schweitzer rightly emphasizes the centrality of St. Paul's mystical concept both in his theology and in his ethics. But the denial of ethical validity to faith-righteousness is the consequence of too narrow an interpretation of this great concept. The doctrine of salvation, in all its major elucidations in the Pauline epistles, has important significance for ethics.

This thesis will attempt to show that St. Paul's ethic is based on his theology, that the apostle does not draw out the ethical implications of one soteriological term, but of all, and

1. Cf. "Paul," p. 167.

2. "The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle," p. 294.

that any doctrine which might logically result in antinomianism is deliberately controlled and directed into ethical channels.

One of the main questions will be concerned with the precise nature of man's action in relation to salvation. Is St. Paul's doctrine God-centered to the point of losing sight of man? What is the significance of a man's daily life in relation to justification? It will be seen that the interpretation of doctrine here will vitally affect the main root of any ethical system. An interpretation of salvation in eschatological and mystical terms may lead to a doctrine of election and the delineation of the part played by the human will. An interpretation in terms of a "celestial legal transaction" may make superfluous any action of man previous to salvation. On the other hand, the traditional understanding of the doctrine of justification by faith tends to exalt "faith" into the position of a "work," thus emphasizing unduly the prior action of man. Whatever answer may finally be given, the importance of St. Paul's doctrine of salvation for the ethical philosopher is apparent.

Our consideration of this great doctrine will involve a certain amount of systematization. This has its dangers. The vitality of any concept can easily be lost when it is held too firmly in the static grasp of concepts arranged on either side, and when its relationship to other thoughts is fixed and definite and unchanging. So Deissmann warns us. "To ask, 'What is the relation of justification to reconciliation in Paul? or

of forgiveness to redemption?' is to break the strings of the harp and to twist them into a tangle that it is hopeless to unravel."¹ Brunner is no more happy about what he calls an "arithmetical treatment of atonement." Yet it is clear that the epistles present more than a mere jumble of doctrines or a mixture of metaphors. There is a logical relationship between the various concepts although it is not always definable in chronological terms. A good example is the way in which the apostle's thought proceeds from justification to sonship. Moreover, some doctrines are more comprehensive than others. It seems possible, therefore, to proceed from the more general to the more particular statements concerning salvation in Christ. Some manner of analytical treatment is necessary if the roots of St. Paul's ethics are to be discovered, but analysis must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the truths which it discloses are living truths, and that the details of the apostle's doctrine are only comprehensible as the doctrine as a whole is comprehended.

What is the central doctrine of St. Paul's theology? The prevailing opinion seems to be that it is his doctrine of "in Christ." Deissmann may be quoted. "Paul's religion is Christo-centric.... It is not first of all the product of a number of convictions... it is 'fellowship' with Christ, Christ-

1. op. cit., p. 177.

intimacy."¹ Or again, "Justification is only one witness among others." Weizsacker considers justification as only a special argument used when dealing with the Jews and not the main tenet in the apostle's "independent doctrinal system." "It is simply one-sided to start from the Epistle to the Romans, and take the nature and means of righteousness as the foundation of the whole doctrine of salvation."² Similarly, Peake, Garvie, Stewart and Kennedy consider union with Christ as the center and core of St. Paul's whole doctrine.³ There can be little doubt that this view is essentially correct.

Whatever may be our view about the main emphases we shall certainly be unable to understand St. Paul's doctrine without first understanding his experience. It was the self-manifestation of God in Christ which produced the apostle's doctrine, and, it may be added, his ethic. St. Paul himself attributes everything to the experience of the living Christ which began on that fateful journey to Damascus. The nature of that experience may never yield to analysis, but the astonishing effect cannot be gainsaid. Here is where theology and ethic are

1. op. cit., p. 135.

2. "The Apostolic Age," vol. I, p. 141.

3. Cf. "The Quintessence of Paulinism," p. 23, where Peake says that the doctrine of justification is secondary, a "part of his larger doctrine of mystical union." Garvie, quoted by Stewart, op. cit., p. 150, "This personal union with Christ is the constant dominating factor in the religious experience and moral character of Paul." In "The Theology of the Epistles," p. 124, Kennedy writes, "This supremely intimate relation of union with Christ constitutes for Paul the pre-supposition of everything that counts in salvation."

one, here, in the very genesis and center of religion as proclaimed and lived by St. Paul. "No one has ever believed with such intensity that his yearning had been satisfied, and in no one has this belief been transformed into as great a capacity for ethical volition and courageous action.¹ It is thus with the conversion experience that we take our start, and it will be surprising if this experience does not colour and clarify much in St. Paul which would otherwise be unexplainable. It is here that we shall find the source-springs of the Pauline ethic. It was the genius of the Hebrew faith that its ethic was based upon its theology. It is the genius of the Christian faith that its ethic is based not only on theology but on a Person, the Living, Life-giving Person of the Son of God.

1. H. Weinel, "St. Paul," p. 10.

CHAPTER TWO

CONVERSION AND BACKGROUND

The details of the event on the Damascus road are uncertain. The three accounts in Acts vary in important particulars. St. Paul himself tells us little and that only after the passing of some years. The most we can do is to form the picture of Saul the Jew and Pharisee and then determine the significance he himself attached to this amazing experience.

St. Paul frequently recalls his strict training in the Jewish faith. "Circumcised the eighth day, of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, an Hebrew of the Hebrews; as touching the law, a Pharisee; concerning zeal, persecuting the church; touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless."¹ Even without such explicit statements it is very evident that the religion of the Old Testament is his by birth and rearing.² Texts from that source heap themselves up when the

1. Phil. 3:5,6. Cf. Rom. 11:1, 2 Cor. 11:22, Phil. 3:3.

2. Cf. A. Deissmann, op. cit., p. 99; H. Weinel, op. cit., p. 194. The latter discovers in his epistles "the vigorous imagery and poetry of prophet and psalmist" and attributes to such influence his "frequent antithesis and parallelism."

apostle's mind grapples with any subject. We find an interesting example in the third chapter of his epistle to the Romans. In eleven verses the thought and phraseology have been coloured by references to seven Old Testament passages. Thus: verses 10-12 (Ps. 14:1-3), v. 13 (Ps. 5:9), v. 13b (Ps. 140:3) v. 14 (Ps. 10:7), v. 15 (Isa. 59:7,8), v. 18 (Ps. 36:1), v. 20 (Ps. 143:2).

It is always possible that in any particular instance the collection of quotations may have been taken from some outside source, but with such a plethora of references throughout the epistles we are forced to the conviction that the apostle spontaneously turns to the scriptures which have long since been committed to memory. While he may have had no formal training in the Greek classics his intimate knowledge of the Septuagint and acquaintance with apocryphal literature has influenced his style and vocabulary. His language is more erudite than that of the ordinary citizen as exemplified in contemporary papyri.¹

There can be no doubt of St. Paul's Pharisaic background. The Rabbinic tradition colours his illustrations and arguments to the end of his days. Thoroughly Rabbinic is his argument in Gal. 3:16, based on the singular "seed." From this source come the ideas that the law was given through the mediation of angels,² that the Rock followed the Israelites,³

1. Cf. A. Deissmann, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

2. Gal. 3:19; Cf. Josephus, *Antiq.* 15:5,3.

3. 1 Cor. 10:4; Cf. J. Weiss, *ad loc.*; Str-B'beck, III, p. 406 f.

that angels are attracted by a woman's hair,¹ and the belief in angels in general and in their power to pervert human beings.² As a young Jewish scholar he would early learn to look upon God as the Creator of all things and transcendent over all. Behind creation was a divine purpose, and in accordance with His purpose God had chosen Israel as His own people, even calling them his "children." Associated with this choice is the Covenant which He made with them. On His part God made certain promises to His people.³ From them He expected obedience. The relationship is expressed in Exod. 19:5, "Now, therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine."⁴

The Jew could never be in doubt about the obedience expected as his part in the covenant. For this purpose God had given the Torah. The gift consisted of both the written word and the unwritten tradition.⁵ For both, the pious Jew gave thanks to God. The Torah was regarded as a delight and a help since it showed the will of God. The following quotations are representative:

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1. 1 Cor. 11:10. Cf. Test. Reub. 5:5,6, where head adornment is specifically mentioned, a detail lacking in 1 Enoch 6:2 and Test. Napht. 3:5. "Command your wives and your daughters, that they adorn not their heads.... For thus they allured the Watchers."
 2. Col. 2:18. Cf. Test. Levi 3:5,7; Jub. 4:15; 1 Enoch, 91-104.
 3. Cf. W. L. Knox, "St. Paul and the Church of Jerusalem," p. 9.
 4. Cf. also 1 Sam. 15:22, "To obey is better than sacrifice."
 5. Cf. R. T. Herford, "Pharisaism," p. 94.

"I delight in thy law." (Ps. 119:70)
 "O how love I thy law! it is my meditation all the day."
 (Ps. 119: 97. Cf. verses 29,77)
 "For the commandment is a lamp; and the law is light."
 (Prov. 6:23)
 "Of all the peoples that have multiplied you got
 yourself one people, and you gave to this people that
 you desired a law that was approved by all."
 (2 Esdr. 5:27, Am. trans. Cf. 9:31)
 "All this is the book of the agreement of the Most High God,
 The Law which Moses ordained for us
 As an inheritance for the congregations of Jacob;
 Which fills men with wisdom like the Pishon,
 And like the Tigris in the days of the new wheat;
 Which overflows with understanding like the Euphrates,
 And like the Jordan in harvest time."
 (Wisd. Sir. 24: 23-26. Cf. 33:3)
 "Now my children, you must be zealous for the Law, and
 give your lives for the agreement of our forefathers."
 (1 Macc. 2:50. Cf. 2:22)

This attitude to the law was a part of St. Paul's heritage as a Jew and a Pharisee. "The Law was to the Pharisee the revelation of the nature of God Himself; for the Holy One Himself observed the Law, which He had given to Israel, and indeed to all mankind, as the greatest of all His blessings."¹ As the revelation of God's nature the Torah had supreme importance for ethics. The Hebrews derived morality from the will and character of God. Their ethic was theocentric. Their conception of righteousness was based on their conception of God. "The norm depends on what is the nature of God."² Moreover, it is a righteousness which He Himself looks after. Typical of the Old Testament attitude are:

1. W. L. Knox, op. cit., p. 8.

2. Norman Snaitch, "The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament," p. 77.

"I the Lord speak righteousness; I declare things that are right." (Isa. 45:19)

"For the righteous Lord loveth righteousness; his countenance doth behold the upright." (Ps. 11:7)

"The Lord hath brought forth our righteousness." (Jer. 51:10)

The classic example is Lev. 19:2, "Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy." Of extraordinary interest here is the composite nature of the commands which follow from this premise. Sacrificial and ceremonial are mixed with moral and humanitarian rules of conduct. Reverence for parents, keeping the sabbath, abhorrence of idols are commanded. The reaper must not wholly reap the corners of the field. It is wrong to steal. It is wrong to curse the deaf. All because God is holy! The Babylonian Talmud differentiates the ceremonial and the moral commandments, and justifies the former on the basis of Lev. 18:4, declaring in effect that they are not based on logic but on the will of God.

"Our Rabbis taught: 'mine ordinances shall ye do,' i.e., such commandments which, if they were not written, they should by right have been written and these are they: idolatry, immorality and bloodshed, robbery and blasphemy. 'And my statutes shall ye keep,' i.e., such commandments to which Satan objects, they are the putting on of sha'atnez, the halizah by a sister-in-law, the purification of the leper, and the he-goat-to-be-sent-away. And perhaps you might think these are vain things, therefore Scripture says: 'I am the Lord,' i.e., I, the Lord, have made it a statute and you have no right to criticize it." (Yoma 67b)

Thus God is the Creator not only of the world, but also the Creator of 'right' and 'wrong.' Consequently, the people who do not acknowledge God have no basis for their

morality.¹ On the other hand, the people who do acknowledge God and yet live immoral lives are in rebellion against Him. Sin is rebellion against God. Therefore, "the first essential was a return to God if moral progress was to be made."² This is the burden of the prophetic message and of the Rabbinic religion alike.

The Covenant stressed the unity of the children of Israel, for what it envisaged was a national obedience and a blessing upon a united People. The Hebrews thought of religion in terms of the community. The hope of the individual rested on the acceptableness to God not only of himself but of his people. W. D. Davies emphasizes this. "Without his brethren, his kinsmen after the flesh, no Jew could ultimately enjoy immortality however justly deserved, and however delectable."³ In the Old Testament the solidarity of the whole people, past and present, is taken for granted. In Josh. 24:7 the people are addressed as if they had been eye-witnesses of events at which few, if any, could have been present. But it is in Rabbinic literature that the moral as well as the physical solidarity of Israel is most stressed. In their discussions on the Zechut Aboth the Rabbis elaborated the idea of bane and blessing as the result of the merit, or lack of merit, of others. Thus the sins of Lot are

1. Cf. L. H. Marshall, "The Challenge of New Testament Ethics," p. 235; K. Lake, "Paul, His Heritage and Legacy," p. 74; G. F. Moore, "Judaism and St. Paul," vol. II, p. 79.
 2. C. J. Barker, "The Way of Life," p. 25.
 3. "Paul and Rabbinic Judaism," p. 83. Cf. also p. 84. Also A. Marmorstein, "The Doctrine of Merits in Old Rabbinic Literature," p. 4.

held to affect Abraham in such a way that God will not reveal Himself while Lot is staying with him.¹ A forgetful man may bring exile upon his children.² A righteous man may suffer for the sins of his generation.³ Abraham, in fact, is said to have had his days shortened on account of Esau's perfidy.⁴ On the other hand, the merits of the fathers are responsible for the passage of the sea before the Egyptians, and for many other blessings. The whole nation rejoices in the merit of one good man. But all suffer for the sins of individuals. The Pharisees held that it was the non-observance of the Torah on the part of a few that prevented the rest from enjoying the blessings of the long awaited kingdom. Thus, in contrast to Greek and particularly Stoic ethics, the ethics of Judaism emphasized the value and welfare of the community and the family.

Behind the Jewish ethic we may discern three main motives. (1) The Jew sought to do God's will. He belonged to a People which was dedicated to God and devoted to His service. "For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself."⁵ As we have pointed out, their conception of righteousness was based upon their knowledge of God and not upon an ethical code.⁶ So sin is enmity with God and affects the relationship

1. Tanh. I, p. 157.

2. b. Joma 38B (Hos. 4:6)

3. b. Ber. 62b.

4. Pes. r. 47b, 49b.

5. Deut. 7:6. Cf. also 14:2, 21; 26:19.

6. supra, pp. 13-15. Cf. Snaith, op. cit., p. 60.

between the community and God. He Himself had demanded it, saying, "Ye shall be holy; for I am holy." St. Paul does not deny his heritage when he advocates, nay insists on, a holy life based on the holy nature of God and the desire to please Him.

(2) The second motive is the desire to benefit the community.¹ This is the explanation equally of the Old Testament passages which advocate the more favoured treatment of the Israelite over the foreigner, and of the Rabbinic passages which count it a graver sin to defraud a non-Jew than a Jew. The Old Testament is concerned with the inner economy and the need to strengthen the feelings of kinship among all members of the tribe. The Rabbis, on the other hand, are concerned with the impression which Jews make upon outsiders. Bad conduct before Gentiles is a "defamation" of God's name. Here too St. Paul stands in the Hebrew tradition even when, as a Christian, he links ethics with the good of the koinonia and with its good name.

(3) The third ethical motive is the belief that righteous living will hasten the coming of the Kingdom of God. W. L. Knox remarks that by observing the Law "the nation could hope to shorten the days of oppression and bring about the establishment of the Messianic Kingdom."² The idea may be discerned in Test. Jud. 24:3, 5, "And ye shall walk in His commandments first and last. Then shall the

1. Cf. P. Wernle, "The Beginnings of Christianity," vol. I, p.13; Oesterley and Box, "The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue," p. 233; Robertson Smith, "The Prophets of Israel," pp. 246,7; R. T. Herford, op. cit., p. 253.
 2. op. cit., p. 95.

sceptre of my kingdom shine forth." Here, however, the implication is not as clear as on first sight it appears, for the obedience to the commandments is as much the result as the cause of the Messianic Kingdom. It is more unequivocal in Test. Sim. 5:2-5. After the initial condition, "Now, if ye remove from you your envy and all stiff-neckedness," there follows a series of blessings culminating in verse 5, "Then the Mighty One of Israel shall glorify Shem, for the Lord God shall appear on earth, and save the sons of men." The hope of the Pharisees was to see the perfect observance of the Torah, even if for only one Sabbath, in order that the Kingdom might be established. Their aim, according to St. Paul, was to bring the Messiah down from heaven by setting up the proper righteousness.¹ Thus ethics was the concern of every Jew, and the conduct of one member had an effect on the whole community. Here we see one root of the eschatological motive behind ethics, an important motive for the apostle to the Gentiles.

Beneath this ethic of community we can discern a high standard of personal piety. Later Rabbinic literature discloses a type of religion inspired by a deep devotion and an abiding conviction of the nearness of God and His interest in His children.² This type of religion may not have been characteristic of St. Paul's age, but its origins may be found in the Old

1. Rom. 10:3,6. Cf. J. Weiss, "The History of Primitive Christianity," vol. I, p. 192.

2. R. T. Herford, op. cit., p. 126

Testament itself and undoubtedly it played a considerable part even in the Judaism of the first century. In Wisd. Sol. 2:13,16, the ungodly caricature the upright man. "He professes to possess knowledge of God, and calls himself a child of the Lord.... He calls the end of the upright happy, and boasts that God is his father." The ethic which arises from such piety is no mere formalism but a conscious attempt to treat other members of the community as members of the family of God. Thus, as P. Wernle points out, when Jesus challenged his hearers "to do God's will," no one would doubt that he was referring primarily to moral commandments.¹

Religion, for the Jew, could be a joyful service, and the Torah was considered as a help and not a burden.² Moreover, one feature of Pharisaic piety was its inwardness. Some Rabbis looked beyond the mere act to the motive behind it. They taught that a man must have the right feeling towards God and his fellow man.³

Rabbinic Judaism recognised the fact that it was impossible to avoid breaking the law. No one could fulfil it

1. op. cit., p. 22.

2. Cf. Montefiore, "Judaism and St. Paul," pp. 28, 32, 100; Oesterley and Box, op. cit., p. 135; Herford, op. cit., pp. 73, 106.

3. Cf. Davies, op. cit., p. 256. Sacrifice required sincerity and repentance. The Rabbis emulated the prophets here. "He that sacrificeth a thing wrongfully gotten, his offering is made in mockery, and the mockeries of wicked men are not well-pleasing." (Ecclus. 34:18) Bousset quotes rabbinic sayings: "Love thy neighbour as thyself," "Thy mind must be directed to goodness." "Religion des Judenthums," p. 159.

perfectly. But help was available from God, and God was merciful. After all, was not the Torah given for life and not for death?¹ In spite of the fact that the whole law needed to be fulfilled, the idea developed that God would judge the individual on his merits, on the weight of his good deeds as over against his sins. By acts of charity on earth it was possible to store up a treasury of good deeds in heaven. This idea is of frequent occurrence. In 2 Esdr. 7:(77), the angel explains "you have a treasure of works laid up with the Most High." Likewise the angel Raphael advises Tobit and his son Tobias, "Do good, and evil will not overtake you.... It is better to give to charity than to lay up gold. For charity will save a man from death; it will expiate any sin."² The same thought is expressed in Wisd. Sir. 3:14, "Charity given to a father will not be forgotten, and will build you up a further atonement for your sins." So the Jew learned to do works of love with a happy trust that, if the balance were nearly equal, God in His mercy would tip the scale in favour of the suppliant, for His righteousness was more than strict justice. It was a benevolence with a bias towards the helpless. Thus there was an optimistic spirit in Judaism, a confidence that sufficient righteousness could be achieved.³

1. Lev. 18:5; Prov. 13:14.

2. Tobit 12:7-9. Other examples: 2 Esdr. 8:33,36; Tobit 4:8f.; Test. Levi 13:5; Test. Napht. 8:5; Ps. Sol. 9:9, "Whoso doeth righteousness layeth up for himself life at the Lord's hand."

3. Cf. Snaith, op. cit., pp. 68,71; R. H. Strachan, "The Individuality of St. Paul," p. 152; Montefiore, op. cit., p. 40; G. F. Moore, "Judaism," vol. II, p. 30.

Moreover, if the individual discovered himself to be in the wrong before God, restoration was still possible. There were three ways of dealing with sin. (1) The sacrificial system provided for offerings that would "cover" the sin or wash the sins away.¹ (2) Also it was believed that acts of goodness would

1. The names of the various sacrifices detailed in the O.T. do not give much indication of their purpose. They are distinguished from one another chiefly according to the method of disposing of the sacrificial victims. The burnt-offerings were completely destroyed. The peace offerings were divided between the priests and the offerer. The guilt-offerings and sin-offerings were for the use of the priests with the exception of certain portions which were burnt on the altar. (Cf. Buchanan Gray, "Sacrifice in the Old Testament," p. 65) The peace-offerings served a propitiatory purpose, but the fact that the one offering the sacrifice shared in its consumption probably indicates that it was thought of as producing some effect within his own life. This idea of communion between the god and the worshipper is, according to Robertson Smith, fundamental to Semitic sacrificial beliefs. (Cf. "The Religion of the Semites," p. 345) Other ideas also entered in. The offering of the first-fruits was designed not only to placate God and render safe the eating of the remainder of the harvest, but also to acknowledge God as the giver of these products. But the thought of expiation also is explicit in certain sacrifices, and in this connection the distinction between burnt-offerings and sin-offerings was attenuated in post-exilic Judaism. The nucleus of the idea is contained in Lev. 5: 14-16, dealing with the case of a man who has committed a trespass against the Lord. Probably the trespasses covered by this law are those relating to taxation or some other duty where the monetary value of the offence can be assessed. The transgressor must pay up the full amount plus one fifth. He must also sacrifice a ram. If the trespass consists of an invasion of the rights of another person, such as the withholding of property which has been found, the full value plus one fifth is payable to him, and a ram is to be sacrificed to God. (Lev. 6:1-7) That this sacrifice is expiatory is clear from: (1) the fact that the ram must be of a certain value, i.e., must bear some relation to the nature of the trespass; (2) the direct statement that it is for an atonement; (3) the fact that it results in forgiveness. This is the trespass-offering. The expiatory purpose of many other types of sacrifice and of ritual is undoubted. (Cf. Gray, op. cit., p. 75) This is shown by the declaration that these sacrifices were decreed "to

cancel past sin. But equally important and effective was Repentance. One moment of repentance was held by some to outweigh the sins of a whole life-time. The key-note is the frequently quoted saying, "Repent and I will receive you." Other examples are:

"Thou hast ordained repentance for a sinner like me, For my sins are more numerous than the sands of the sea." (Prayer of Manasseh)

"As soiled garments can be cleansed, so the Israelites, albeit they sin, can return by repentance unto the Lord." (Exod.R., Beshallah, 23:10)

"If your sins are as high as heaven, even unto the seventh heaven, and even to the throne of glory, and you repent, I will receive you." (Pes. R. 185a)

"Repent while I stand upon the attribute of mercy, and then I can receive you." (Pes. R. 182b)

(Cf. Wisd. Sir. 22:21,22; 1 Enoch 40:9; Yoma 86a,b; Sanh. 105a; Jer. Makkoth 31d; Aboth 4:13)

The best known expression of the tender relationship between God and the penitent is that of R. Cahana, "Go and say to Israel, 'Repent'... 'If ye come to me, is it not to your Father in Heaven that ye come?'"¹ But repentance is more than a simple change of attitude. In Hebrew it always means a change of conduct. The return to God involves moral duties.²

As a rule the Hebrew conceived of salvation in a political sense. It was salvation from Israel's enemies and from

make atonement," (כִּפֶּה). Whether the root כִּפֶּה means "to cover," "to wipe away," "to brighten" or "to remove," it is clear that the fundamental notion is expiatory, since it seldom takes a personal object but is frequently construed with the accusative of the sin. (Cf. 1 Sam. 3:14) Expiatory value is attached to all types of sacrifice in Ezek. 45:15-17, but in Lev. 17:11 the supreme value for expiation is attributed to the blood which is sprinkled upon the altar.

1. Pesikta 165a.

2. "These are man's intercessors: repentance and good deeds." (Sab. 32a).

oppression and slavery. Although the prophets were mainly concerned with the contemporary scene their highest hopes for the future were centered upon an era of blessedness which would be on earth.¹ Their Messianic hopes were centered on a "son of David" who would be a kind of terrestrial ruler, a prince and counsellor. There had grown up, however, a second group of ideas which spoke of salvation in apocalyptic terminology. It is probable that in the eschatology of the book of Daniel the "Son of Man" is a supernatural being, and the establisher of a supernatural kingdom.² This may be denied in favour of a reference to the eschatological Israel.³ Similarly, R. H. Charles considers that the reference in Test. Jud. 24:1-3 is to John Hyrcanus.⁴ But there can be no dispute when we come to 1 Enoch. It is true that in Chapters 6 to 36 the kingdom is on earth, with its center in Jerusalem, when God should come down and dwell with men. But the supernatural character of the kingdom is clearly drawn in Chapters 91 to 104. On this section Charles writes:

"The hope of an eternal Messianic kingdom on the

1. Cf. Gardner, op. cit., p. 89.

2. So W. D. Davies, op. cit., p. 287, following Schweitzer. But W. Manson reminds us of the significant stress laid on the human likeness of the Son of Man. Cf. "Jesus the Messiah," p. 118.

3. T. W. Manson shows that we cannot exclude the possibility of an allusion to a plural entity such as the faithful Remnant. Cf. "The Teaching of Jesus," p. 228. But cf. V. Taylor, "Jesus and His Sacrifice," pp. 24ff. Taylor considers the functions of judgement to be indicative of a personal being.

4. "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," p. 95.

present earth is now absolutely and finally abandoned. The hopes of the faithful were lifted bodily out of their old materialistic environment that hampered every advance, and were established in a spiritual region of illimitable horizons, and thus the possibility was achieved of endless development in every direction. The way was thus made possible for the rise of Christianity."¹

This type of speculation had an influence on Pharisaic thought.² While certain evidence has been interpreted as pointing to the rejection of these apocalyptic ideas by the Pharisees,³ yet Davies has pointed out that the Pharisees, more than the Sadducees, were interested in life after death and concerned with the Age to Come and with the figure of the Messiah, and that, therefore, apocalyptic writings must have circulated within the party.⁴ St. Paul as a young Pharisee was probably acquainted with such apocalyptic ideas as found expression in the book of Enoch and the Testament of Judah.⁵ He must have debated in his own soul the problem of whether the Messianic kingdom was to include the Gentiles or be confined to the People of the Covenant.

Another feature of his thought-world might here be

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1. "The Book of Enoch," intro. cviii.
 2. Cf. W. L. Knox, op. cit., p. 12; Also Jub. 23:26.
 3. So Oesterley and Box, op. cit., pp. 41, 212.
 4. W. D. Davies, op. cit., p. 10.
 5. It can scarcely be proved that St. Paul was actually acquainted with these texts, but he may have been, and similar ideas and expressions are to be found in them and in the Pauline epistles. Cf. Test. Jud. 19:1, (Col. 3:5, Eph. 5:5), 20:5, (Rom. 2:15); 1 Enoch 47:3, (Phil 4:3) "book of life;" 48:7, (1 Cor. 6:11) "saved in his name;" 61:10, (Rom. 8:38, Eph. 1:21, Col. 1:16) "principalities, etc.;" 95:5, (Rom. 12:17) "requite evil." However, the assumption that St. Paul's eschatology is derived from these sources is quite unwarranted.

mentioned. The earth was generally believed to be the sphere of demons and evil spirits. Angel powers held sway in the world, controlling the vagaries of nature and the passions of man alike.¹ Messianic speculation dealt with this problem. "Part of the work of the Messiah would be the destruction of the evil spirits and the inspiration of the members of the Kingdom by the Holy Spirit."² Yet realism shaded their optimism, and we find a realization of the bitterness and intensity of the coming struggle. The Messiah might have to endure extreme suffering. The thought of such an event as the crucifixion, however, was never part of Jewish eschatology.³

While the possibility of the Messiah having to undergo suffering would be a matter for popular speculation, there was a definite aversion to the idea. W. Manson has shown that the concepts of the Davidic Messiah, the Suffering Servant, and the apocalyptic Son of Man, even if of different origin, are related to one another as successive phases of the same idea.⁴ No matter how vague the relation might be, the connection of the Messiah with the Servant would involve the problem of suffering. The reaction of the scribes was to accept the identification of the

1. Some of the angels, of course, were considered to be beneficial to men, and obedient servants of God, as the five splendid figures leading the Jews with Maccabeus. (2 Macc. 10:29) Cf. Test. Levi 3:5,7; Tobit 12:12; 3 Bar. 11:4ff.

2. K. Lake, "The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul," p. 401. Cf. Test. Sim. 7:6, "Then shall all the spirits of deceit be trodden underfoot, and men shall rule over wicked spirits."

3. Weizsacker, "The Apostolic Age" p. 130.

4. "Jesus the Messiah," pp. 171-4.

Messiah with the Servant but to delete the concept of suffering from the Servant passages. The way in which the Jewish propaganda dealt with this problem is revealed in the Targum on Isaiah, Chapters 52 and 53. The relevant passages are quoted by W. Manson and compared with the English Revised Version.¹ A typical selection is Isa. 53:7,8a, "He was oppressed, yet he humbled himself, and opened not his mouth: as a lamb that is led to the slaughter.... By oppression and judgement he was taken away." In the Targum this becomes: "He prayed, and he was answered, and ere even he had opened his mouth, he was accepted: the mighty of the peoples he will deliver up like a sheep to the slaughter.... Out of chastisements and punishments he will bring our captives near."

Thus, while accepting the identification of the Messiah with the Servant (42:1, 43:10, 52:13, 53:10), the afflictions of the Servant are transferred either to Israel or to other more deserving nations. Here is clear evidence of that type of aversion which made it so difficult for the Pharisees to accept a Messiah who had suffered crucifixion. However natural or supernatural might be His advent, the Messiah would surely display abundant evidence of the favour of God.

Another belief which gained prominence in Pharisaic circles was that of a resurrection to everlasting life. This was already explicit in pre-Christian Judaism, although only favourably received in certain quarters. Such a belief is found,

1. op. cit., pp. 168-170.

for example, in the Second book of Maccabees. Thus in 2 Macc. 7:2, the second brother avows: "The king of the world will raise us up, because we have died for his laws, to an everlasting renewal of life." And in verse 36, the youngest says: "For our brothers after enduring a brief suffering have drunk everlasting life, under the agreement of God."

Christians are prone to see in these developing ideas of Judaism a positive preparation for the Christian gospel. Some of the elements which were certainly influential in the first century, however, can only be interpreted as a negative preparation. Exclusive nationalism is one of these elements to be noted in the days when the insults of Pontius Pilate fanned fanaticism for the Torah. Despite Israel's readiness to accept Gentiles through baptism, circumcision or public profession, there always was some uncertainty as to how much share a Gentile could possibly have in the future glory.¹

P. Wernle has drawn a picture of the adverse side of Jewish ethics. He mentions the external summary of duties, the preference for the negative avoidance of sin, the equally important position assigned to morally indifferent and unimportant commandments, the casuistry and the seeking of reward. "The seeds sown by the Priestly Code attain their full growth in Pharisaism."² R. Simlai claimed that Moses had

1. Cf. Harnack, "The Expansion of Christianity," vol. I, p. 15.
2. op. cit., p. 23.

received six hundred and thirteen precepts.¹ R. Johanan and R. Simeon went further and discovered fifteen hundred and twenty one commandments in regard to Sabbath observance alone.²

The contractual relationship between God and man gave rise to a mechanical conception of salvation. So much obedience brought so much reward. H. Weinel takes the measure of the typical Pharisee. "All his cavils of the jot and tittle in his interpretation of the law bring him by so much nearer to the future glory."³ The Pharisee looked through glasses tinted with optimism both at the Torah and at his own powers. He believed that the law could be fulfilled and he felt himself capable of attaining the required standard of righteousness.⁴

Even the doctrine of Reconciliation was inadequate. The Priestly Code dealt only with sins of error. "The earliest reference wherein Lev. 16:30 is taken to include deliberate sins is in the second century."⁵ What could avail to save a man who had rebelled against God? Some might answer, Repentance. But the Jewish mind inevitably looked for some external proof of

1. B. Makkoth 24a.

2. Jer. Shabbat 9b,c.

3. op. cit., p. 42.

4. The Pharisees themselves, apparently, were untroubled by such a question as whether the law could be fulfilled. The whole development of the halachah is the result, not of the desire to increase the obligations of the law, but of the desire to make it possible to keep the law under all circumstances. In the halachah there is much to commend; for example, its transmutation of the lex talionis. Cf. Herford's chapter in "Judaism and Christianity," vol. III, ed. Rosenthal. Behind its development, however, we discern the Pharisaic optimism, the belief that a man can actually measure up to the complete will of God.

5. N. Snaith, op. cit., p. 68.

repentance. Apart from the sacrifices, the most natural proof was some act of charity or other good work. As soon as a certain work came to be looked upon as meritorious there attached to it the idea of setting up a claim before God. Religion became a service for wages, and this, without doubt, is a characteristic of Pharisaic Judaism.¹ In any case the initiative in God's forgiveness rested with man and the emphasis was on what man does to earn forgiveness.

Further points need only to be mentioned briefly. The tendency was to look to the past. God's revelation lay in the past.² The present time was a sort of vacuum between the days of the law-giving and the Age to Come. There was scarcely any experience of the Spirit in the present, and little sense of personal awareness of, and communion with, God. The idea of the Torah as being absolutely perfect crowded out prophetic inspiration. The application of its principles became a matter for pedantry and scribal tradition. The ceremonial and ritualistic regulations obscured the moral. The light of prophetic religion was taken from the candle stick and placed under a bushel. Sensitive souls relapsed into weariness and disillusionment.³

So we find, finally, a growing distrust of the law in

1. Cf. G. F. Moore, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 90. R. T. Herford seeks to refute the idea of a claim upon God, just as A. Marmorstein illustrates repentance as a grace, a prior act of God. Both use late sources, however.

2. Cf. Deissmann, "The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul" p. 72.

3. Cf. W. Wrede, "Paul," p. 27; W. Morgan, "The Religion and Theology of Paul," p. 181; W. L. Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

some quarters. The writer of 2 Esdras looks upon the law as a divine revelation, but one which condemns without being able to help those who fall short of it. "And you led him (Adam) into Paradise which your right hand planted before the earth appeared; and you enjoined upon him your one concern, and he transgressed it, and you immediately ordained death for him and his peoples... Yet you did not take from them their wicked heart so that your Law might bear fruit among them. For the first Adam, burdened with a wicked heart, transgressed and was overcome, as were also all who were descended from him. So weakness became permanent, and the Law was in the heart of the people with the evil root; and what was good departed, and what was evil remained."¹

There are close affinities between this idea and St. Paul's description in Rom. 7 of life under Law,² and the bond of

1. 2 Esdr. 3:6,7,20-22.

2. This chapter almost certainly contains autobiographical features, but the main interest is dialectic. The apostle can scarcely be describing his state of mind as a young rabbi, for he does not indicate that his was an exceptional case, which would have been so if he had felt the law as a source of temptation and an incitement to transgression. Rather, he was blameless as to the law, and when he sinned he would have blamed himself rather than the law. He is not giving a chronological description of the transition of a young Jew from a state of childish innocence to a state of adult awareness of sin, but is seeking to explain how the law entangles a man in the web of sin. He is still answering the question, "Shall we sin, because we are not under the law but under grace?" (Rom. 6:15) From the standpoint of his life in Christ he describes life under the law so as to show that the law so enslaves a man that he is no longer free to do what he wills but is the helpless slave of sin. The reference to the tenth commandment may be a personal reminiscence of some sudden realization of what sin means, but he turns it into a theological argument, stating that sin, by means of this commandment, deceived him and slew him. His use of

connection is the doctrine of the Yezer Hara. According to Rabbinic belief there were two Yezers, but it is the evil one which is most conspicuous. Probably the Yezer Hara is the original one, the good Yezer being developed later as an antithesis.¹ The Yezer was the principle or power of evil in the heart which was responsible for sin. Two quotations from R. Simon b. Lakish are pertinent: "Satan and Yetzer and the Angel of Death are one;" "The Yezer of man assaults him every day, endeavouring to kill him, and if God would not support him, man could not resist him."² As soon as he reached the years of understanding, the battle with the evil Yezer began for the Jewish youth and the more strenuously he fought the more unequal the struggle seemed. He was in thralldom to the power of evil, a thralldom for which he was responsible because of his Adamic inheritance and of which he must suffer the consequences. Saul, zealous as he was for the law of his fathers, felt most acutely the bitterness of the unequal battle. The tragedy of Judaism was that it had the highest ethical standard of the ancient world in its divinely revealed Law, without the further revelation which transforms ethic into life, the revelation of God Himself

the verb ἐξηπάτησεν in verse 10 may be influenced by the occurrence of its un-compounded form in Gen. 3:13 LXX describing the serpent's deception of Eve. His conclusion is that life under the law produces sin, but that life under grace is a walking not after the flesh, but after the Spirit (8:1ff.). W. Manson credits St. Paul with a unique idea in Rom 7, when he equates the Yezer Hara with σάρξ. Here St. Paul goes beyond rabbinic teaching.

1. Schechter makes this suggestion. Cf. "Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology," p. 243.

2. Baba Bathra 16a; Sukkah 52b.

in the Person of One who lived "under the Law."

St. Paul's claim that he was a loyal and strict Jew and a Pharisee has not been accepted by every scholar. That he was a Hellenist, which he does not claim, has been denied by more authorities. Some question even his right to be considered a representative of Diaspora Judaism. W. L. Knox suggests that he may have gone to Jerusalem in his extreme youth to live with his sister. W. D. Davies is inclined to agree with Knox that in his early education the future apostle was little influenced by the atmosphere of Tarsus.¹ Over against this view it might be remarked that it is supported by no real evidence and, indeed, some accounting must be made for the innumerable indications of familiarity with Stoic terms and Hellenic metaphors which abound in the apostle's letters.

It would be untrue to suggest that he had a more than cursory knowledge of Stoic ethics, and Wrede is probably right in his remark that the apostle "never betrays acquaintance with real philosophic thought."² Nevertheless, in his epistles we find just that unconscious familiarity with Greek ideas which can best be explained by a period of some formative years spent in the Jewish community of some such Hellenized Asiatic town as Tarsus. Leaving aside for the moment resemblances of language

1. Cf. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 179; Knox, *op. cit.*, p. 124, n.66. Montefiore, on the other hand, magnifies the influences of Diaspora Judaism, *op. cit.*, p. 92ff.

2. *op. cit.*, p. 3.

and ideas we catch, in his style, the favourite Stoic devices of "rhetorical questions," "short disconnected sentences" and "the imaginary objector."¹ In his book, "Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt," R. Bultmann has thoroughly investigated this aspect, and argues that the main characteristics of the style of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe are to be found in the epistles of St. Paul. The written word has the sound of the oral. The writer appears actually to be speaking. This impression is created by a number of artifices. Sentences are cut short and often begin abruptly. They are uttered as if with some definite person in mind, and appear to be answers to his questions. Frequently this other person is introduced into the dialogue, perhaps by means of a question: "What say you?"² or in the form of a statement: "You say, Not so."³ Occasionally the objector's remark is thrown in without any introduction or reference to the source: "Shall I not use the power for the purpose for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens? Yes, but my nose runs. For what purpose then, slave, have you hands?"⁴ Or he may be addressed in some uncomplimentary term: "Wretch"⁵ or "Fool."⁶ The dialectic is further enhanced by expressive interjections: "Never!"⁷ or "What then?"⁸

1. J. S. Stewart, op. cit., p. 57.

2. Epictetus, Disc. I, 28.

3. Ibid, II, 16.

4. Ibid, I, 28.

5. Ibid, I, 4; II, 8.

6. Ibid, III, 22. Cf. Bultmann, op. cit., p. 14.

7. Gal. 2:17.

8. Rom. 3:1.

Numerous instances of parallelism are given by Bultmann, also parallelism in conjunction with antithesis.¹ To be noted also is the impassioned pleading, the inspired flights of oratorical power, the heaping up of arguments, and the use of metaphors from natural and civil life. The conclusion must be drawn that there is a noticeable affinity between St. Paul's epistles and the Stoic preaching, so far as style is concerned.²

This style might be explained on the basis of the Old Testament parallel question and answer, but a more natural explanation is found if we accept Tarsus as the scene of St. Paul's boyhood. He would not study Stoicism formally, but quite likely he frequently heard itinerant Stoic preachers expounding their philosophy on the street corners. In such a city the young boy would catch glimpses of the games and athletics which were part of the Hellenizing process at work in all the cities of Asia Minor. The athlete, the soldier and the pedagogue jostled one another in the Tarsian streets. Even as a resident in Jerusalem St. Paul was interested in the Diaspora and ready enough to travel the road to Damascus. We take with reserve Montefiore's attempt to prove that St. Paul's Judaism was not really Rabbinic, but his arguments at least indicate the apostle's fundamental connection with the Diaspora, a connection too natural and inchoate to be explained entirely on the basis

1. op. cit., pp. 21-27.
 2. Ibid, p. 107.

of his subsequent missionary activities in the Gentile world.¹

The Diaspora Jew had a different attitude to the Torah from that of his Palestinian brother. In one way, to him it was even more important, since it shielded him from the all too apparent disgusting preoccupations of heathen society. Moreover, it was an effective bond of association with his own people. His reverence for the Torah was sincere, and yet his situation in the Diaspora induced him to examine with some questioning the individual requirements connected with it. Montefiore admits that the Hellenistic Jew might feel that the food laws were unreasonable and a burden.² Many local customs would appear quite harmless and even valuable, customs which no Jew could accept because of the Law.³ Was this the beginning of such ideas as St. Paul later developed in his arguments on the law, circumcision, the admission of Gentiles, and the question of meat offered to idols?

In any event we know that the Torah, and scripture in general, was interpreted differently in the Diaspora. Its details were fulfilled as well as possible, but special significance was attached to the spiritual meaning behind such regulations.⁴ "The outstanding peculiarities of the Law as it

1. Cf. Montefiore, *op. cit.*, p. 90 and elsewhere.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

3. Cf. W. M. Ramsay, "The Cities of St. Paul," p. 184; Deissmann, "The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul," p. 186.

4. Philo, *de Migrat. Ab.* c. 16.

affected the daily life of the Jew had been shown to be the symbolical means for inculcating on the people an exalted conception of personal morality." This process, of course, went on in Jerusalem itself, but allegorical methods of interpretation were most favoured in Alexandria and influenced greatly the thought of the whole Diaspora. Such an influence may be assumed in the case of St. Paul although the peculiarities of Philonic philosophy are alien to his mind. Above all, a sensitive Diaspora Jew must have become greatly concerned over the fate of the Gentiles, many of whom would be acquaintances. He would wonder about their relation to the coming Kingdom. There is no doubt that such mental speculations preceded the events on the Damascus road.

W. D. Davies is probably right in stressing the Old Testament and Rabbinic thought, as over against Greek conceptions, as the source of most Pauline ideas. It seems clear, however, that Hellenistic views were not unfamiliar. But these ideas have affected the form more than the essential content of Pauline statements. His reference to God as the Being, of whom, through whom and in whom are all things is more Greek than Jewish in style, but the apostle certainly does not abandon the Jewish concept of God as a Personal Being. Similarly, a certain dualism between flesh and spirit may be detected, but in reality whatever dualism there may be is ethical, not metaphysical. Also, there is a hint of the Greek idea of the body as a burden. He cries to be delivered from the body of death. But such an

exclamation is natural to any man irrespective of his philosophy. He states that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom. The natural body needs to be glorified into something different and yet an outgrowth of itself. The apostle has too strong a belief in God as the Creator of all things to be unduly influenced by Greek dualistic ideas, but he shows an awareness of them. It is quite possible to show that all these conceptions had already made their way into Judaism, and we have made reference to them in apocryphal literature.¹ No doubt such a book as the Wisdom of Solomon is St. Paul's source for much of this material. We are only concerned here to show St. Paul as a Hellenist, and of this there can be no doubt.

Of course, his use of these terms and ideas differs greatly from that of Greek philosophy. Even when he employs them, the core of his thought is Jewish rather than Greek. There is no real metaphysical dualism in his epistles. The concept is used only with reference to ethics. This and other concepts will be given more detailed treatment in later chapters. It is evident, however, that the apostle is no stranger to the Hellenistic thought world.

In the Greek world, religion was not intimately associated with ethics. The gods of the cults were non-moral.

1. For "body," cf. Wisd. Sol. 8:9, "I was a well-formed child, and a good soul fell to me, or rather, I was good and entered an undefiled body," In contrast cf. 9:15, "For a perishable body weighs down the soul and its earthly tent burdens the thoughtful mind." For "conscience," cf. Test. Reub. 4:3, and Charles' note on page 9 of his edition.

Ethical demands were not founded on the character of the god. Repentance was a change of nature rather than of conduct.¹ But there was throughout the empire a general longing for salvation. The ancient Greek religions had been discredited by their own philosophers, and the common people had found no substitute that could satisfy. A religion that was to meet their needs must provide for the dual blessing of release from the body and matter, and from evil. Thus we find the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies and the oriental mystery cults sweeping through the empire, the former philosophies with a high ethic, the cults with a doctrine of salvation and immortality. Burial unions, insurance societies and secret religious associations were common. The knowledge of this universal search for redemption may have heightened the conversion experience of the Cilician Pharisee.

Stoicism had already established itself in Tarsus before the time of St. Paul. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was a Phoenician of Cyprus. Chrysippus and Aratus were fellow Cilicians and several other Stoic authorities came from nearby Soli in Cilicia.² The university of Tarsus, if it may be called such, was an outstanding center of Stoic teaching.³ St. Paul's

1. Cf. E. F. Scott, "The Ethical Teachings of Jesus," intro. x; C. A. A. Scott, "New Testament Ethics," p. 199; K. Lake, "The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul," p. 431.

2. Cf. J. B. Lightfoot, "Dissertations on the Apostolic Age," p. 288.

3. Cf. W. M. Ramsay, op. cit., p. 89; P. Gardner, op. cit., p. 141; A. S. Peake, "The Quintessence of Paulinism," p. 10.

acquaintance with Greek ideas has been mentioned. An example comes from Aristides I, 5: "Now through him are all things." (Cf. 1 Cor. 8:6) Also a quotation from Menander in 1 Cor. 15:33. Cleanthes or Aratus is known to him, if the Athenian speech in Acts is Pauline. (Acts 17:28; cf. Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, "For we are thy offspring.") Other Stoic expressions are found in 1 Cor. 15:28, "that God may be all in all," and in Col. 1:15, "the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature." J. Weiss in his "Paul and Jesus" gives numerous examples from the epistles of vocabulary, ideas and methods of proof, which are of Stoic origination.¹ Similarly, Bishop Lightfoot lists a great many passages from Seneca showing affinity with the Pauline letters.² Most of these passages are not very striking. The same ideas might be found in many sources, such ideas as imitation of the gods, the hard life of one who is loved by the gods, the universality of evil, etc. Two maxims are of interest. The one in de Benef. VII, 7, "The whole world is the temple of the immortal gods," which is very like but not quite the same as the Pauline dictum in Acts 17:24. The other in de Benef. VII, 31, "Incessant goodness conquereth evil men," which is very similar in thought to Rom. 12:21, and also in language, especially when the translation "overcometh" is used, as it is by Lightfoot in the passage from Seneca. There

1. pp. 68, 73, 127-129.
 2. op. cit., pp. 249ff.

will be no disagreement with Lightfoot's thesis that there is no direct connection between St. Paul and Seneca. We might suggest that the nearest they ever came to each other was when the apostle appeared before Gallio, the brother of Seneca, and on that occasion the difference in status was significant. Lake is able to deny to St. Paul any real knowledge of Stoic ethics.¹ The conclusion seems inescapable, however, that Stoic conceptions and expressions come naturally to the apostle although he may have been unconscious of their origin, and certainly without any special training in Stoic literature or philosophy.

Stoic morality is primarily based on the problem of fear.² Fear is the result of desire. If a man has no particular desire he has no fear of what may happen. Here the Stoic denies the major premise of naturalistic philosophy as represented by Plato and Aristotle. The wise man's motive for action, as conceived by the Stoics, is not the satisfaction of desire but its elimination. Instead of aiming at the rationalization of desire, the Stoic opposes desire to reason, and reason acts through the will. Reason becomes the sole criterion of conduct. So we have the maxims: "Will what happens," "Act according to nature," "Act according to reason." Man can always govern his actions by what is right. Thus desire does not enter in as a

1. "Paul - His Heritage and Legacy," p. 60.

2. This approach to Stoic morality was suggested by Professor J. Macmurray in class room lectures.

motive, and the passionless man has nothing to fear and never suffers disappointment. The ideal mental state is one of ataraxia. Virtue consists in being prepared for the worst and living in conformity to nature. It is evident that there is a distinct gain here. Morality becomes an individual responsibility, something a man can discover for himself independent of family or tribe. There is a sense of the dignity of human nature.

There is a close connection between Stoic ethics and Stoic theology. At first glance this connection may seem to be rather tenuous, for the Stoic ethic is concerned with perception of the inflexible laws of matter and the governing of conduct by these laws. But the Stoics also believed in the existence of a Soul of the World, a Divine Spirit which animates matter, being immanent in every particle of it. From this belief, as Reginald A. P. Rogers points out, they drew the profound inference that "these laws are not blind, but directed by a universal World-Reason, and that consequently the search for Well-being is not a vain one."¹ Thus the Stoics presented their system as an ethico-religious philosophy.

But there are inadequacies in Stoicism. It was deficient on the social side. The passions and affections were to be crushed. Pity or forgiveness were excluded from one's dealings with a neighbour. The Stoic practice was better than its creed in this matter, but nevertheless, it lacked a social

1. "A Short History of Ethics," p. 95.

message and never appealed for self-sacrifice in the interests of another or of all. It also lacked any doctrine of a future reward. Without an attractive goal or picture of a blessed future, men lacked the inspiration necessary for abundant living. Goodness or duty were objectified in such a fashion as to make them the ultimate goals, and yet they were hopeless goals providing no source of power or of inspiration. God was the universe. There was no real revelation of his will. The Stoic might seek the principles of the universe, but there was no Spirit seeking him.

Moreover, the wise man might make a rational approach to the privileged state of apathy, but Stoicism had no hope that many men could be wise. So happiness and virtue were the possessions solely of the few. There is thus an "aristocratic condescension" about Stoic ethics. There is no joy in service to God. There is no real sense of sin. Instead, there is melancholy in its ranks, uninspired by hope for the future, unencouraged by divine help in the present. A sense of futility pervades the works of Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.¹ As R. Niebuhr remarks, "Stoicism was unable to arrest the decay of Roman life ... its idealism was, on the whole, little more than an affectation of a small intelligent aristocracy."²

In St. Paul's day the common people of the Hellenic world were greatly attracted by the mystery religions which

1. Cf. J. S. Stewart, op. cit., p. 64.

2. "An Interpretation of Christian Ethics," p. 207.

swept in from the east where people "for hundreds of years had been seeking after the knowledge of God, not through the intellect, but through the emotions."¹ The mysteries dealt with the problems of life in a manner more popular than the Stoics. In place of ethics they offered rites. These rites brought purification from defilement and brought the initiate into communion with the god. In fact, initiation partook of the character of deification whereby the worshipper became part of the god and was assured of immortality. The mystae enacted in the ceremonies the past history of the god and thus became one with the deity. This experience was looked upon as a re-birth and the rites were considered to be effective without regard to the character or feelings of the devotee.

The initiation lifted him up above the conditionedness of his ordinary life, and ethical conduct had no vital connection with the benefits enjoyed. The mysteries do not enter into the question of whether unethical conduct can annul the effect of the rite.² In fact, as the gods themselves were considered immoral the mysteries gave no encouragement towards moral living until they subsequently began to purge their stories of the degrading events in the supposed history of their gods. The best of the private associations exhibit some fine features. "There was the bond of a human fellowship in communion

1. J. T. Dean, "St. Paul and Corinth," p. 20. Cf. H. A. A. Kennedy, "St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions," p. 79.

2. Cf. Schweitzer, "The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle," p. 21.

with the special deity. There was the call to a brotherhood which ignored distinctions of race or status. There was the demand for self-denial. There was the constraint of a lifelong obligation."¹ While recognising certain points of contact with the mysteries we can safely follow Kennedy, Knox and Peake in disclaiming any borrowing on the part of St. Paul.² But, subconsciously, as a Christian missionary he fashioned his message in such a way that all the blessings which the mysteries could bestow were included in the offer of Christ, and more. He may not have taken anything over from the mystery cults, but it is entirely probable that questions raised by them were already being debated in his mind long before the momentous decision to carry the High Priest's letters to Damascus.

It is legitimate and necessary to consider all these factors in seeking to understand the meaning for St. Paul of his conversion experience. His previous thoughts and feelings are immensely significant. They do not and cannot explain the conversion, but by them we get a sense of proportion in the intermingling of factors new and old. The fact that we must assume a subjective state of mind for the apostle does not invalidate the reality or the primary importance of the objective character of the appearance. The background of that

1. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 82.

2. Kennedy, "The Theology of the Epistles," p. 25; Knox, op. cit., p. 147; Peake, op. cit., p. 10.

subjective state has now been sketched in. As a Jew under the Torah St. Paul was conscious of a sense of tension arising out of the destitution of the nation and the sinfulness of its individual members and the necessity of strict obedience as the only means of achieving divine intervention, the Messianic deliverance and the setting up of the Kingdom. Combined with this sense of tension was an awareness of the universal longing for salvation, and the individual worth of many of the Gentiles of his acquaintance. Was it possible, he may have wondered, that salvation might be won for all, and at the same time the rights of the Jew preserved and the Torah fulfilled?

With all his soul he clung to the Torah as the perfect expression of God's will. Nevertheless, doubts and questions arose. Sanday and Headlam hold that, previous to his conversion, he had already begun to criticise the Law as a principle of religion.¹ Perhaps the beginning of this process can, with A. B. Bruce, be focussed on St. Paul's discovery that the tenth commandment forbade coveting. "A mere feeling, a state of the heart not falling under the observation of others, was condemned as sin."² He may not have reasoned that a state of feeling cannot be commanded but he did see that the Law gave him no help in putting down the covetous spirit. The commandment only helped him to recognise the evil tendency within his own soul, a tendency which was strengthened rather than weakened by the

1. "The Epistle to the Romans," (ICC), p. 187.

2. Bruce, "St. Paul's Conception of Christianity," p. 28.

commandment, for the only response to a commandment is a state of will. But the Law did not convey the power to respond to its directives. St. Paul detected, therefore, a serious lack in the system of the Law.

It is outside our present purpose to give an historical account of the conversion. It is not necessary here to decide the precise time at which St. Paul first came into contact with Christianity nor the exact sequence of his thoughts on the subject. We are content to state the simple probability that he heard of Jesus first as a man who had disparaged the Law and claimed to be himself the promised Messiah. Now for St. Paul, the Jew, a man who despised the Law could not be the Messiah, and a Messiah who had been crucified could not be the one promised in the scriptures. A shameful death would not seem too harsh a punishment for such an impostor and blasphemer. Rather, it would appear as God's own judgment, and to seize and deliver to punishment all who persisted in such blasphemy would be considered the kind of meritorious act so dear to the Pharisee.¹

The question arises, Was the Roman crucifixion equated with the Jewish hanging, and was the curse of Deut. 21:23 thereby attached to it? We have not been able to find the answer to this question but we believe that, in the controversy with the apostles concerning the Messianic claims, the Pharisees

1. Cf. J. Moffat, "Paul and Paulinism," p. 11.

used the Deuteronomic text as an argument, and that St. Paul, before his conversion, was acquainted with this argument. The text has not been ignored by the Rabbis. In the Mishnah Sanh. 6,4 we find this interpretation:

"if it remained there overnight a negative command is thereby transgressed, for it is written, 'His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt surely bury him the same day; for he that is hanged is a curse against God;' as if to say: Why was this one hanged? Because he blessed (euphemism for cursed) the Name, and the Name of Heaven was found profaned."

J. Schachter in his notes on this passage writes:

"This bears no resemblance at all to crucifixion ... What a difference between this hanging after death, where the executed man had both his hands tied and did not remain one minute upon the gallows, and the Supplicium, which the Romans inflicted upon Jesus."¹ This may be granted. It also may be granted that the reason for the removal of the body of Jesus was the approaching Sabbath and not the application of the Deuteronomic injunction. This is explicitly stated in Mark 15:42,43. But the fact that the earliest gospel is at pains to emphasize this point may indicate that it was a subject of controversy. The Jewish authorities may have argued that the crucifixion was prime evidence of Jesus' blasphemy, a proof that he was accursed of God. This argument is recalled by the apostle in one of his first letters.² It is a likely inference that it was as a

1. "The Babylonian Talmud," vol. on Sanhedrin, p. 304.

2. Gal. 3:13.

Pharisee that the text which he quotes here was impressed on his memory and applied to the crucifixion of Jesus.

The persecutor of Christians justified his deeds on the basis of his reasoning that Jesus could not have been the Messiah. But if, by any chance, He was in fact the Christ, St. Paul's whole system would collapse and he would be found to be fighting against God. The key stone of his Pharisaic edifice was his certainty that the Messiah had not yet appeared. It is probable that the spectacle of the dying Stephen raised this question with renewed acuteness, for here was a man with the same fanatical spirit as that which activated St. Paul, and yet with the opposite convictions. The spectator would not fail to notice the sudden wave of assurance that smoothed the martyr's features at the moment of death as if a light from heaven had flashed upon his head. Moreover, Stephen's speech had sharpened the cleavage between the Law and Jesus. It brought the realization that acceptance of Jesus as the Christ meant the rejection of the absolute supremacy of the Law. Thus when the key stone collapsed the next stone to fall would be that of the Torah system.

It might be possible on the basis of these assumptions to construct a chain of events which would lead in an inevitable fashion to a complete change of heart. But this is not to say that the conversion was simply the result of previous events and thoughts. St. Paul himself never thought that it was a natural process. It was Christ who appeared to him, and on His own

initiative. That is what St. Paul means by grace. We may agree with Wrede when he says, "One thing is certain. Paul had not been previously won over by teaching, to which the vision was a mere appendage."¹ Weizsacker has the same point of view. "It was a manifestation of Christ which first and of itself brought him to believe in Christ."² But he goes too far when he declares that this was not preceded by any preliminary stage. "He was not conscious of any exertion of his own judgement, of any independent examination of the faith, or decision upon it. He knew no transition stage in which he hesitated and questioned."³ No doubt at the moment of crisis his questions faded into the background as he was confronted with the figure of the Crucified, but this background of thought was used by God to throw into sharper relief the truths consequent upon the Christophany.

The writer of Acts clearly understood some such previous experience of the "pricks" of conscience. Even if the final clause of 9:5 is not part of the true text, the account in 26:14 has the same statement. Here may be a reminiscence of Ps. Sol. 16:4, the text of which is uncertain.⁴ But the same word for "prick" is used, this time in the singular, and it refers to

1. op. cit., p. 9.

2. op. cit., vol. I, p. 86.

3. Ibid, p. 82.

4. i.e., the introduction of the word "horse," while the prick or goad is usually associated only with the ox or ass. Cf. Ryle and James, "The Psalms of Solomon," ad loc., where the suggestion is made that the original Hebrew meant "as with a goad."

an inward feeling like conscience. In any case we may understand the conversion experience as a divine revelation which clarified issues that had already been raised in the mind of the convert, and revealed truths of most fundamental importance.

What these truths were will now concern us. We need not distinguish between the immediate reaction and the subsequent deliberation on the experience. It may be, as A. B. Bruce says, that "a whole group of religious intuitions ... flashed simultaneously into the convert's mind ... For thought is quick at such creative epochs, and feeling is quicker still."¹ But it will suffice to say that his conversion contained the seeds of his most important doctrines and that the full realization of the essentials of Christianity came to him as a direct result of the action of Christ on the Damascus road.

The first result of Damascus was the immediate identification of Jesus with the Messiah and the realization of His active participation in the present sphere of history. St. Paul may actually have seen a figure before him and recognised the liniments of Jesus, although it is to be noted that the disciples themselves did not always recognise Him at once in His post-resurrection appearances, and it is not possible to prove that the apostle had ever seen the earthly Jesus. But in some way, it is clear, he was led to connect the Heavenly Figure with the man whose followers he was in the act of persecuting. If he

1. op. cit., p. 37.

recognised Jesus, then it would follow that He had in fact risen as was claimed. This would not necessarily lead St. Paul to belief in Him as Messiah unless His Messiahship had already been a point of controversy and the resurrection had been considered by the disciples as proof of His Messiahship.¹ This was no doubt the case. "He believed that Jesus was the Messiah from the moment he became convinced that Jesus had risen."²


If, on the other hand, the heavenly figure was recognised by the apostle as the expected Messiah, it is necessary to postulate some words such as we find in the accounts in Acts or some other means whereby the name Jesus was attached to, or accepted by, the central figure in the appearance. "It is just the identity of the heavenly Messiah, on whom he as a Jew had fixed his faith, with the crucified Jesus who walked on earth in human form, obedient to God, humble, selfless, suffering, that stands as the adorable wonder at the center from which all rays emerge."³

It may be noted that St. Paul would be familiar with the conception of the Messiah as a supernatural being. It would not be difficult for him to believe that it was the Messiah who spoke to him from the dazzling light. What was difficult was the realization that the Messiah was actually the Jesus who had lived on earth. When the identification of the Messiah with

1. Cf. J. Weiss, "The History of Primitive Christianity," vol. I, p. 31.

2. Weizsacker, op. cit. p. 87.

3. J. Weiss, op. cit., p. 161.



Jesus became no longer a matter of doubt, logical inference led to a startling truth. If Jesus were the Messiah it must follow that the Messiah had come. If the Messiah had actually walked on earth it must mean that the Messianic Age, long foretold, had already arrived. It was no longer in the future. The convert became aware that he was now in the Age to Come! The Messianic blessings were his already. Instead of waiting for man to achieve the conditions necessary for the Kingdom, God had stepped in and given the Messiah, in an act of sheer graciousness. And this truth was doubly significant for St. Paul because it was evident that God had treated him individually after the same manner. When he was still without merit, in fact in the very act of persecuting His followers, Christ had appeared to him and had given him what he had been seeking under his own power.

Here is the root of St. Paul's doctrine of salvation. It is the realization that the prerequisites of salvation are not in the power of man to secure but are offered freely through Jesus Christ. And faith, for him, is the simple acceptance of this free gift. God's gift is prior. Man's is secondary. Salvation is the action of God. Faith is man's reaction.

It may be asked if St. Paul at Damascus felt the assurance of a personal salvation, and how this would come about. It can too easily be assumed that since Christ had appeared to him he would know that he was "saved." This would not necessarily follow. There must have been some intermediate

verity which served as a connecting link. That verity may have been a feeling of inner peace, a relaxing of the tension which sin had wrought within his personality, a sense of forgiveness, some proof or demonstration of the fact of salvation. Or it may have been some word of assurance whereby the convert saw his Master as his personal Redeemer. The essential element, however, was contained in the vision itself. For if God had Himself taken the initiative and had already given the Messiah, the Messianic Age must be the unprompted gift of God, and personal salvation must depend on nothing more than man's acceptance of God's gracious offer. The blessings of the New Age were now available without man doing anything to deserve them.

One of the most important of these blessings was the ending of the reign of evil spirits. This is anticipated in Test. Sim. 7:5,6,

"For the Lord God shall appear on earth,
And save the sons of men.
Then shall all the spirits of deceit be given to be
trodden under foot,
And men shall rule over wicked spirits."

On the positive side is the gift of the Spirit. "And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh." (Joel 2:28. Cf. the following verses) The result of the gift of the Spirit is, on the religious side, a new relationship to God, and on the ethical side, a new power to obey him. Thus the prophecy in Test. Jud. 24:3,

"And He shall pour out the spirit of grace upon you;
And ye shall be unto Him sons in truth,
And ye shall walk in His commandments first and last."

There can be no doubt that the doctrine of the Spirit is of prime importance for St. Paul. The Spirit is the source, or at least the means, of a new life. Through the Spirit the body is quickened.¹ The Spirit gives life.² The Spirit also ensures everlasting life.³ The Spirit is a vital part of Christian experience for "if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his."⁴ But the supreme evidence of the Spirit, for St. Paul, is ethical conduct. The Christian is sanctified by the Spirit,⁵ and enabled to live an acceptable life free from the enslavement of sin and death.⁶ The apostle's exhortation to walk in the Spirit and thereby conquer the fleshly desires⁷ reminds us of the above-quoted passage from the Testament of Judah.

A more detailed study will be undertaken in a later chapter when we discuss the relation between St. Paul's ethical teaching and the doctrine of the Spirit. For the present we have only been concerned to show the connection between the conversion and one main root of his ethics. That connection has been traced through his sudden appreciation of the fact that the Messianic Age had dawned, his conviction that the Messianic Age signified the gift of the Spirit, and his understanding of the Spirit as the means whereby the forces of evil were to be defeated and the members of the kingdom empowered to live

1. Rom. 8:11.
 3. Gal. 6:8.
 5. 1 Cor. 6:11.
 7. Gal. 5:16.

2. 2 Cor. 3:6.
 4. Rom. 8:9.
 6. Rom. 8:1,2.

according to the laws of God.

As soon as St. Paul began to reflect on the meaning of the Christophany, the death of Jesus on the Cross appeared in a new light. Two implications were apparent. If Jesus were the Messiah, the crucifixion could not have been an act of divine judgement upon Him. Again, if Jesus had survived the crucifixion and now appeared to His followers as their exalted Leader, His death must have been according to the purpose of God.

This twofold assumption is the very core of the whole Pauline theology. It gives rise immediately to questions of the most vital importance. If the judgement visited upon Jesus were not for His own sin, for whose was it? The answer could only be that it was for the sin of mankind, or at least for the sins of others. He was crucified for the sake of others, for sinners. If His death were part of God's purpose, what could that purpose be? Again the answer must be that it was a redemptive purpose. God had undertaken to do what needed to be done in order that men might be saved. At the Cross He revealed His purpose and at the same time accomplished it. The death and resurrection of Jesus Christ were the first mighty acts in the final overthrow of the powers opposed to God.

These ideas would come naturally to the Jewish mind once the initial recognition of the Crucified One as the Messiah was made. The thought of one man suffering for all¹ was quite

1. The story of Abishai b. Zeruaiah in B. Berakot 62b is

familiar. Familiar too is the belief that an unblemished sacrifice can atone for the sins of those for whom the sacrifice is made.¹ It is difficult to see how St. Paul could have explained to Jewish hearers the implications of the Cross without the use of representational and sacrificial language. That he employs such language even before Gentile audiences is only proof of the difficulty of finding any category of thought adequate for the purpose. The essential truth which the apostle discovered at Damascus was that God in Jesus Christ had initiated the process of salvation and had done everything that was needful for the redemption of mankind.

Everything? Was there no place for man's action? The new disciple found the answer to that question also in his conversion experience. Just as the life of Christ took on new meaning for him, so also did his own life. He felt called upon to share in the humiliation and suffering of Christ's act, to die with Him, and thereby to share in the glory and power of His resurrection life. Thus his own life became eventful and ethically significant. It is here, as we shall see, that the apostle finds the direct link between his theology and his ethical teaching. The dying and rising with Christ is the major

representative of a type of tradition that must antedate the N.T. writings. Cf. Isaiah 53, where the "man of sorrows" is one who, according to W. Manson, "identifies himself with his sinful nation to the extent of making its guilt and tragedy his own." op. cit., p. 117. Also 2 Macc. 7:33,37,38; 4 Macc. 6:28,29. 1. Cf. Lev. 1:3, 5:15,18; Ezek. 46:4, especially 1 Pet. 1:19. Also Lev. 17:11; B. Yoma 5a, B. Zeb. 6a; and supra pp. 21,22.

theme underlying his exhortation and instruction. This is what the apostle means by faith. It is the committal of one's own life to Christ and the acceptance of everything that is involved in His life, i.e., His death and resurrection.

The call to share in Christ's suffering may have been made clear to him intuitively. When St. Paul became aware of the Messiah's identity with the Crucified, he may suddenly have grasped the distinctive nature of the Christian life as a way of suffering and self-emptying. Or, it may have come about in another way. With the conviction of the Messiahship of Jesus came the realization that if he were truly to serve God as he had always intended to do, he must desert the ranks of the persecutors and take his lot with the persecuted. Sharing in their tribulations he knew that he had the presence of Christ as a partner in his own sufferings, and he came to see that the afflictions which the Church endured were a part of the sufferings which Christ endured.

At the same time he became aware of himself as a member of a new society, a fellowship of all who shared in the dying and rising of their Lord. Before long he was to recognise this community of the faithful as the new Israel. Here again the ethical is deeply involved in the theological. It may be that in St. Paul's thought the idea of a new Israel implied the conception of a new Torah. Whether or not this is so, it is certainly true that the welfare and conduct of the members of the community are the concern of much of the ethical teaching

of the epistles. It is this sense of a new fellowship which inseparably binds the ethics of St. Paul to his doctrine.

Finally, the conversion meant for St. Paul a new sense of mission. Possibly he recognised that mission as one to the Gentiles.¹ At all events he discovered a meaningful life of service. His daily work had a new significance. Everything that he did and everything that happened to him was related to the work of Christ in redeeming the world. Conduct, for the apostle, was an essential part of religious experience, for it affected the success of his mission. It was an integral part of the life "in Christ."

A word must now be added to maintain the proper balance. The adjective "new" has been used so frequently in dealing with the conversion that we must take note of what was not entirely new. It is important to remember that the moral standards of his previous religious life remained to inspire and strengthen the convert's new life. He was never a man of immoral habits. What his conversion brought him was a new reason for morality, a new motive for right conduct, a sense of liberation and power, a personal relationship to God in Jesus Christ. But he retained the finest features of the Jewish ethic as a basis for the instruction of his own converts. When he repudiated the Law he did not repudiate the virtues taught in the Law. "The

1. Cf. A. B. Bruce, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Pfleiderer, "Paulinism," vol. I, p. 3; W. D. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 58; C. H. Dodd, "Ryl. Bull." vol xviii, no. 1, p. 36. However, Wrede and Schweitzer disagree.

claims of the moral law now presented themselves to him as the claims of his own inmost being."¹ A. S. Peake and W. D. Davies hold similar views. Thus:

"The Gospel was not a wholly new thing. It was the God of the old Covenant who was also the God of the new."
 (Peake, op. cit., p. 18. Cf. Weizsacker, op. cit. p. 91)
 "For him the acceptance of the Gospel was not so much the rejection of the old Judaism and the discovery of a new religion wholly antithetical to it ... but the recognition of the advent of the true and final form of Judaism, in other words, the advent of the Messianic Age of Jewish expectation. It is in this light that we are to understand the conversion of Paul."
 (Davies, op. cit. p. 324)

It cannot be denied, however, that the most significant feature is that which is new. It is a new relationship to God, a relationship considered as a being-in-Christ. From this stems the Pauline theology. It also affects to a considerable extent the religious basis of the Pauline ethic. We must now examine St. Paul's conception of living "in Christ."

1. H. Weinel, op. cit., p. 89.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DOCTRINE OF "IN CHRIST"

As a result of the Damascus experience St. Paul found a new relationship to Christ, a relationship so close as to defy analogy and so intimate that the sphere of his own life could scarcely be differentiated from that of the life of Christ. He was living in Christ. He also discovered a new freedom, a deliverance from the power of sin and an emancipation from the condemnation which his guilt merited. This, however, was not a second discovery but one and the same. It is only a different way of describing his experience of salvation. The concept of union with Christ is his comprehensive doctrine.

With regard to his doctrine of justification by faith two extreme positions have been taken. On the one hand, it has been held that justification is St. Paul's main doctrine, the center of all his thoughts concerning salvation. The "forensic" nature of redemption is thereby stressed and all religious experience perforce pressed into the same mould.

On the other hand, it has been held that justification is only a polemic doctrine and of purely incidental importance. Thus it is argued that if there had been no controversy over the

admission of the Gentiles there would have been no need for the doctrine of justification by faith. The apostle, in other words, simply stumbles upon it in trying to show that the possession of the Law does not necessarily mark out the chosen people of God. He remembers that God had accepted them in the person of Abraham before there was the Law, and on another condition than obedience to the Law. That condition he has to discover, and he finds the word "faith" in the Genesis account. So we have the doctrine of justification by faith.

The first position must be considered extreme. It does not account for the fact that St. Paul can write a long letter, using other terms and metaphors, and yet give a satisfactory account of his one main theme, the preaching of Christ crucified. His doctrine of righteousness by faith is not by any means peripheral, but it is only a special way of presenting the central truth, a way suited to special circumstances. He employs it when he is dealing with the Jews and law-righteousness. It is prominent only in Romans and Galatians. But in the Corinthian epistles this doctrine scarcely appears. He does mention justification in 1 Cor. 6:11, but only as one term among others in support of an ethical demand. In the extant Corinthian epistles there is no elaboration of this theological proposition. But his concept of union with Christ dominates these epistles and is found in all his letters. In fact, over one hundred references may be discovered.

The second position is also an overstatement. To prove

that a doctrine is polemic in character is not to prove that it is superfluous apart from the polemic. Such a chapter as Romans 5 goes far beyond polemic usage. The apostle here depicts the Christian life in terms which suggest his own experience. He seeks to include his hearers by use of the first person plural, but it is apparent that he is describing what he himself has discovered. Perhaps it was at Damascus that he first felt the love of God shed abroad in his heart by the Holy Ghost. He knew then that when he was still in weakness Christ had died for him. Who more than St. Paul himself made tribulation a cause for glorying? And yet these personal blessings of salvation are bound up in this chapter with righteousness by faith. The chapter opens: "Therefore being justified by faith." This theme is woven throughout until the final verse, "That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord." And yet Dr. Schweitzer says, "Another point, which tells strongly in favour of the doctrine of righteousness by faith being merely a fragment of a doctrine of redemption, is that Paul does not bring into connection with it the other blessings of redemption, the possession of the spirit, and the resurrection."¹ In Rom. 4 there is a direct connection between the doctrine of justification and that of the resurrection, for Abraham's justifying faith is belief in the God of the resurrection.²

1. op. cit., pp. 220, 221.

2. Cf. below, pp. 143, 144.

We must insist that the doctrine of justification is a vital part of St. Paul's theology. Even if justification is only one category of thought among many, it is nevertheless one to which the apostle turns again and again with evident satisfaction. Moreover, faith, for him, is far more than a word turned over in a spate of scriptural ploughing. It covers the whole field of man's relations with God. This alone would be enough to prove that righteousness by faith is no side-issue but a statement of a primary experience.

The dilemma is solved for us if we conceive union with Christ as the comprehensive doctrine, and justification as a particular statement of the same truth. His ideas of mystical fellowship permeate all his writings. His concept of life "in Christ" is his all-inclusive doctrine. It is not necessary, therefore, to separate the subjective and objective elements in conversion. What we have in the epistles is not a description of a double effect of salvation but the one transformation, namely, the entering into life "in Christ." This may be described as righteousness with God, acquittal, adoption, or by a variety of other terms, but the one term which includes all is life "in Christ."

But the doctrine is ancillary to the experience. As J. Weiss¹ points out, the central message of St. Paul and of the New Testament as a whole is not any theory or doctrine of

1. op. cit., vol. I, intro. ix.

atonement, but "a great and overwhelming experience of God, now found in Christ." The apostle's religion is not motivated primarily by dogmatic concepts but by a personal experience of Christ. In the words of A. Deissmann, "It is not first of all the product of a number of convictions, it is fellowship with Christ, Christ-intimacy."¹ Deissmann views the Christophany at Damascus as the origin of St. Paul's mystical union with Christ.² Schweitzer, on the other hand, holds that mystical union is not just the result of his conversion, but that it came to him "as a logical inference from Christianity." He accuses Deissmann of failure to distinguish between the conviction of the Messiahship of Jesus and the mysticism of being-in-Christ.³ Surely, however, it is more natural to understand St. Paul's sense of fellowship with Christ as first of all an inward feeling resulting from the direct action of Christ in his own life. It was, of course, more than a mere feeling, but it is from this point of view that we are to conceive faith-union. For faith is much more than the acceptance of a set of convictions. It is active and responsive fellowship with Christ. And faith in this sense was born at Damascus for St. Paul. His conception of being-in-Christ was the natural result of his conversion.

This mystical doctrine is essentially positive in character. It embraces all the blessings which God showers upon

1. "Paul," p. 135.

2. Ibid, p. 145.

3. Schweitzer, op. cit. p. 35.

the believer. It is far more unencumbered by restrictive analogies than are the other terms which have the strength and weakness of close association with the law court, the auction of slaves, the imprisonment of captives or whatever analogy may be implied. To quote J. S. Stewart:

"While justification and reconciliation undoubtedly look forward and contain in germ all the harvest of the Spirit that is to come, yet - by the very nature of the terms themselves - they carry with them, and can never quite shake off, a memory of the old life left behind; their positive implies a negative; they speak of a transition, a break, an end and a beginning; and their brightness has a dark background to set it off. Union with Christ, on the other hand, means the steady, unbroken glory of a quality of life which shines by its own light, because it is essentially supernatural; allows no hint of any negative, because 'the fullness of God' is in it; and knows no before and after, because it is already eternal." (op. cit., p. 154)

The signal importance of the concept of "in Christ" is very clearly evident when we consider the Pauline ethic. The apostle connects his ethical teaching directly with the gift of the Spirit and with the Christian's dying and rising again with Christ, both of which concepts are integral to his mystical doctrine. Schweitzer's discussion of this relationship is well-considered. We can accept unreservedly his main thesis that, "In the mystical being-in-Christ he (St. Paul) possesses a concept of redemption from which ethics directly results as a natural function of the redeemed state."¹ More will be said on this point in the following pages. But if we call the mystical his ethical doctrine there is the danger of implying that other

1. op. cit., 295.

concepts are purely of theological interest and unrelated to ethics. Here Dr. Schweitzer turns upon a path we cannot take. He reaches the position of regarding justification by faith as a theological structure with no doorway leading to ethics. If St. Paul has managed to connect the two it can only have been by breaching the logical boundary-walls of justification, for this was a "conception of redemption, from which no ethic could logically be derived."¹ We cannot, however, be content with this assertion. It will be our task in a later chapter to show how St. Paul does connect ethical teaching with his ideas regarding justification. But, more than this, we shall be able to find in his concept of faith a connection which is not in the least artificial or illogical. Faith righteousness, for the apostle, is a natural and redoubtable foundation for ethical instruction and exhortation. But, just as union with Christ forms the core of his doctrine of salvation, so does it supply the main basis for the ethics of St. Paul.

The formula "in Christ" and related phrases express the nature and reality of union with Christ. It is one of intimacy and fellowship. But it is a mystical fellowship, so much so that the Christian may be said to live in Christ in a fashion analogous to the ordinary man's life in the world. The very atmosphere of the spiritual life is Christ. Indeed the apostle is so surrounded and permeated by Christ that every act

1. op. cit., p. 225.

of living is done "in the Lord." The processes of thought and of feeling are carried on actually in Christ. When he thinks, it is Christ who thinks in him. When emotion sweeps over his soul, it is "in the bowels of Jesus Christ" that the apostle has the feeling. (Phil. 1:8) The communion is so intense that sometimes it is described as Christ in the believer, sometimes as the believer in Christ. But the note of restraint is never far distant. The apostle's eschatology helps to keep his mysticism within bounds. While he speaks of being "in Christ," he can also look forward to being "with Christ." The present fellowship is wonderfully real and satisfying, but the full consummation is yet to come.

Living in Christ, moreover, involves a wider fellowship. All who live in Christ are a part of Christ, and when one enters into union with Him he thus enters into union with all who are in Christ. Together they form the body of Christ. (Rom. 12:5, etc.) Thus the relationship between Christians is one of intimate fellowship, indeed of mystical union. And their dealings with one another take place "in Christ," as related members of the one body. So even instruction is given "in Christ." (Rom. 9:1) Testimony is given "in the Lord." (Eph. 4:17) This gives a special potency to the apostle's ethical exhortation, and whenever the analogy of the body is maintained the fellowship-motive is brightly illuminated.

Before pursuing the ethical implications further we must consider the nature of the apostle's mysticism. When the

adjective "mystical" is applied to St. Paul's concept of "in Christ" it is to be understood in the wider rather than the narrower sense of the term. In the wider sense it can be given "to every religious tendency that discovers the way to God direct through inner experience without the mediation of reasoning."¹ There are two distinct types of mysticism with different concepts regarding the origin and the ultimate goal of the mystical experience, and there are various combinations of these concepts. Deissmann distinguishes the two, first with regard to the matter of initiative. "There is acting mysticism and re-acting mysticism, anabatic and catabatic mysticism, ... mysticism of performance and mysticism of grace ... striving mysticism and mysticism of the divine gift." Secondly, with regard to the aim of mysticism, it is "either unio or communio; either oneness with God, or fellowship with God." There is "mysticism of aesthetic intoxication or mysticism of ethical enthusiasm."²

The forms which mysticism takes are usually so intricate that it is difficult to assign definite categories, but it is evident that there is a tendency in all mysticism towards the sinking of the individual personality in the divine entity. Here it is all a matter of degree. When carried to the highest point, mysticism comes to regard everything as existing

1. Deissmann, "Paul," p. 149.

2. Ibid, pp. 149-151.

in the divine. There is thus a depersonalization of the concept of God.¹ Likewise the individual suffers a loss of personality. The individual will is lost in the divine will and ethic becomes a farce. All is God, and the responsibility for action is shifted from the human will to the cosmic determination. Or, where pantheism gives way to dualism and ethics comes into play, the emphasis is still on the negation of action, for all action is tainted with sin.² Asceticism is the logical result of such mysticism. The purpose of the ascetic is to draw away from the evil side of life, which he identifies with the material, and to submerge his own ego in the divine. His ethic, therefore, consists in the avoidance of any attachment to the material.

Not all mysticism, however, is ascetic. The mystery religions as a rule emphasized rites rather than conduct. The aim here was not just submersion in the divine. By attachment to the god the devotee became in a sense himself the god. The significant feature of such mysticism is the belief that the mystic himself initiates the process of deification. He believes that his own acts are effective in securing his salvation.

Mysticism has a strong attraction for St. Paul. As we have noted, his thoughts, feelings and utterances take place "in the Lord." Even his own prayer can seem to him to be a conversation between the Holy Spirit and God. (Rom. 8:26)

1. Cf. J. Weiss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 465.

2. Cf. R. Niebuhr, "The Nature and Destiny of Man," vol. II, p. 195.

Ascetic tendencies are also evident, although there is a reason for these apart from mysticism, i.e., eschatology. But his mysticism is of a different order than that described above. For one thing, there is no depersonalization of his concept of God. God remains, for the apostle, the Creator of the world who is transcendent over all His works. St. Paul never speaks of union with God, or of losing himself in God. Flights of oratory carry him to the brink of losing all in Christ, but he stops short and returns immediately to the I-Thou relationship. The struggle produces a profound paradox, which reveals the difficulty of expressing the completeness of the mystical experience within the limits set by the necessity of maintaining the objective reality both of the personal God and of the human personality. Four times the pendulum swings in one verse. (Gal. 2:20) "I am crucified with Christ," the mystical identification of oneself with the experience of the Other. "Nevertheless I live," the retention of individuality. "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me," the swing back almost to the heights of mystic absorption. Then, returning to the other side, we expect some such statement as, "But that life is still my responsibility," or perhaps, "But my life is still in the physical world." The apostle is not satisfied, however, with such a statement and seeks to bring the pendulum to rest between the alternatives, and his final avowal seeks to retain the full paradox. The nexus is faith. A man may accept faith on his own responsibility. It is an act of personality. But faith originates in God. It is His gracious

gift. And it leads to God through faith-union with Christ. So the apostle continues, "And the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me."

St. Paul is a reacting mystic in the sense that salvation, for him, is the result of God's grace. Nothing that he does can merit it. Nor can man initiate the process because God has already acted. The Cross is the work of God on man's behalf. Even faith is only response. The act of loving is a mystical response, for Christ first loved. Therefore the Christian has love for Christ. And because Christ loves all men, and because He lives in the believer through mystical faith-union, His act of loving is carried on in the believer's life, i.e., the believer loves with the love of Christ. But the mysticism of the apostle is not of the reacting type in the sense of excluding the individual volition. For him, there is always a conscious choice of modes. He may testify in the Lord. But he assumes responsibility for his testimony and chooses his own style. His advice to the Corinthians on the matter of speaking with tongues assumes that the individual can exercise a certain control over such activities, being able to choose the most appropriate time and the degree of articulation or of ecstasy. (1 Cor. 14)

Thus his mysticism is kept within bounds. It maintains contact with the world of reality. It serves a practical end. Moreover, the union with Christ is dependent on the believer's

response. He must see to it that the union is effective. So, it is possible for the apostle to inject the imperative into the heart of his mysticism. The reality of the mystical union for any Christian may be impaired by his unChristlike conduct. He himself must make certain that he thinks with the mind of Christ. "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus." (Phil. 2:5) "I beseech Euodias, and beseech Syntyche, that they be of the same mind in the Lord." (Phil. 4:2) How frequently the simplest statement involves an exhortation! The apostle explains the reality of the sinless life, and in the next breath he is calling on his hearers to make the sinless life a reality. So in Rom. 6:12, "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal bodies." Even when not stated explicitly the imperative is implicit in every indicative. The individual is free to act in accordance with his own will. This freedom of choice is exercised by the Christian within a realm which is now under the government of Christ, and therefore the power of the Spirit is active in directing him to his decision. But nevertheless the freedom of choice is real. And the resulting conduct affects the nature and reality of the union with Christ. Ethical instruction must therefore go hand in hand with doctrinal explanation.

From the very nature of the union with Christ ethics received a distinctive impetus. The believer was brought into such close contact with his Saviour that they thought and acted in consort. Thus everything depended on the character of the

the divine Partner. On occasion, St. Paul appeals to the example of Jesus. It is true that he does not refer specifically to any number of His acts while on earth, but it is nevertheless important that the appeal is made to model one's life on the pattern of One whose acts were well known. It is also of importance that mystical union, as conceived by St. Paul, gives no shelter to that particular sin which lies at the root of so many others, namely pride. The mystic, whose endeavour it is to become divine, is beset by this tendency constantly. But the apostle's re-acting mysticism leads him to give God the glory as the initiator of all good works. And his intimate association with Christ, the historic Personality who literally died for him, humbles him day by day with reverence and thanksgiving. Gratitude is the virtue of the humble, and St. Paul daily thanks his God not only for Christ but for all the brethren "in Christ."

We have already seen that the apostle connects his mystical doctrine with his conversion experience. There is no better proof of this than in his thought of a new creation. The Christian, for him, is a new man in a new sphere. He is a new man because he is in a new environment. "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature; the old things have passed away; behold they have become new." (2 Cor. 5:17. Cf. Gal. 6:15, Eph. 2:15) God has made a new creation. Just as at the creation of the world He said, "Let there be light," and life was thereby made possible, so in the new creation it is His light in the face of Jesus Christ which is the condition of the new life.

(2 Cor. 4:6) That light shone on the Damascus road and a new life began for the convert. The darkness of pre-Christian living is analogous in intensity and range to the primordial darkness. But the light which comes with Jesus Christ is no mere analogy or philosophical concept. It is the illumination of the way of life, of virtue and of conduct. That is the reason which leads the apostle to introduce the thought of light in this text in 2 Cor. 4. He is urging his converts to renounce the benighted habits connected with their past life (verse 2), and to follow the moral principles of the Christ-enlightened life. The new creature manifests in his own conduct the life of Jesus. (verse 10)

It has often been remarked that the figure of re-birth does not appear in the Pauline letters. Many explanations have been offered. Surely the only one possible, or at least the only one necessary, is the fact that the concept of "in Christ" has far greater significance for the teaching of ethics. The new creation has all the religious implications of the re-birth concept while retaining the emphasis on individual responsibility. The purpose of God's creative action is that the new man may consciously choose the new way of life. It is interesting to note how the apostle brings out the strong and natural link between new conduct and the new creation. "For we are his workmanship, created in Jesus Christ unto good works." (Eph. 2:10) Here "in Christ" is directly associated with the new creation and through it with moral living. And in the

subordinate clause which follows, the apostle gives a strong ethical hint: "which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." There is no division here between ethics and theology. One has to look at the context to determine in which direction he is aiming at the moment. And, as so frequently is the case, we find him discharging both barrels of the gun at once. In this chapter he is dealing with the contrast between the immorality of the old pagan life and the richness of the new life in Christ, and also with the contrast between the hopelessness of life outside the mercy of God and the privilege of living inside the temple of God. In the concept of the new creation, theology and ethics are inseparably interlocked.

The new man is in a new sphere. By identifying himself with Christ's dying and rising, and entering into union with Him, he finds a new environment for his life, an environment filled with infinite possibilities. It is a "new sphere of Life, which is a sphere of that overflowing grace, which ... has power to create good vastly exceeding the self-propagating power of evil."¹ The environment is conceived mystically as Christ Himself. It is the result of being "in Christ." This is explicitly stated in Gal. 3:27, "For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ." But the putting-on of Christ is an ethical act dependent on free choice. For in Rom. 13:14 we find it stated in the imperative mood, "But put

1. C. H. Dodd, "The Epistle of Paul to the Romans," p. 95.

ye on the Lord Jesus Christ." And it has ethical fruits, for in the latter passage it is presented as a parallel to the previous verse, "Let us walk honestly ... not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying." "In Christ" the believer finds the full force of an ethical dynamic. More than a mere example or a mere figure in a forensic drama Christ is the very sphere in which the believer lives. Thus the force of righteousness in a believer's life is stronger than the power of evil and more immediately evident.

Moreover, the act of putting-on Christ involves the acceptance of a norm which has its center and source outside the believer's life. It means the destruction of egotistic pride and selfishness.¹ Here there is no place for antinomianism. All things belong to the Christian, but the Christian belongs to Christ. Therefore the principles of Christ Himself are normative for His follower. Because Christ took upon Himself the form of a servant, the Christian is to be ready to spend his life in loving self-sacrifice. (Phil. 2:6,7) That is what it means to have the mind of Christ. (Phil. 2:5) How can the body which belongs to Christ be given to a harlot? Fornication is an act of rebellion, a disruption of the fellowship, for if the union with Christ could be maintained in

1. Cf. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., vol. II, p. 223.

spite of adultery, then Christ would be involved in the deed. (1 Cor. 6:15,16) St. Paul does not shrink from connecting the ethics of sexual behaviour with his doctrine of salvation "in Christ."

The new sphere is Christ. But all Christians are in Christ. Therefore the individual believer finds himself within a mystical fellowship which includes not only Christ but all Christians. Further ethical motives are thereby brought into play. It is necessary, however, at this point to consider a number of other features of the apostle's Christ mysticism which are of importance in themselves and also a necessary preparation for a study of the ethics of the fellowship.

The heart of St. Paul's mystical doctrine is the concept of the dying and rising again with Christ. This is, par excellence, the chief ground of ethical appeal for the apostle. The important fact for St. Paul is that Christ voluntarily accepted death, and through death demonstrated the powers of the resurrection, and at the same time conquered sin - not His own sin but the sin-power of the world which, since the days of Adam, had operated in and ruled over the life of every human being. The destruction of evil, accomplished on a cosmic scale in the death and resurrection of Jesus, has also to be consummated in the miniature arena of the individual's own life. The believer himself voluntarily accepts death, death to sin, or the death of the flesh, and thereby brings into play the powers of the resurrection which end the reign of sin and

death. The death to sin is identified in a mystical fashion with the death on the Cross. Thus a double significance is attached to it. By dying with Christ the believer participates in the resurrection, receiving in this life the blessings and powers connected with the resurrection-life. But at the same time it is an actual experience and not merely metaphorical, for it takes place in a very real sense within the individual's own life. It is an act of the will. The believer voluntarily associates himself through faith with the dying and rising of Christ and in his own life crucifies the flesh.

In Gal. 2:20 St. Paul states the fact that, when Christ died on the Cross, he, too, was crucified with Him. From this primary act of union with Christ there follow spiritual death to sin and resurrection to a new life. The man in Christ has died to sin. "They that are Christ's have crucified the flesh." (Gal. 5:24) Having died to sin the Christian discovers for himself "the power of his (Christ's) resurrection." (Phil. 3:10) The same thought is pursued in Rom. 6:3-5. In the following verses of this latter chapter he shows that being buried is essentially an ethical experience, and the consequent resurrection an ethical transformation. For "our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin." (verses 6,7) Since the experience is ethical and not magical it involves the will. The apostle is, therefore, not inconsistent when he follows such a statement of fact with

an exhortation to see that the actuality of sin's destruction is maintained in the believer's conduct. Christ has died to sin. "Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin." (verse 11) Since the will is involved, the act of dying is continuous. "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body." (verse 12) Surely we must interpret this as a daily and hourly act of the will. Of course it is not the will alone, for the Christian has received the Spirit, whose power in the believer's life supplements and undergirds the action of the will. But if the apostle's injunction is not an anachronism it must imply the daily necessity of accepting the way of life which is dead to sin and the flesh, in other words, the daily necessity of dying with Christ. From this point of view, therefore, we interpret Rom. 6:3, "Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death?" Baptism implies the acceptance of all the implications of Christ's death in the believer's life. He is crucified with Christ. Baptism is supernatural in the sense that it implies a supernatural event. But it is not magical. It does not render the convert sinless. Potentially he is freed from the power of sin, for baptism necessarily involves the believer's confession that he has thrown himself upon the mercy of God who gives him the Spirit as the sign of His power over evil. The connection between baptism and conduct is the faith which leads the convert to throw himself upon the mercy of God, and the same faith which leads him to dedicate his life in loving

service to the God of his salvation.

St. Paul's concept of faith has a peculiar significance for ethics since it places conduct in direct relation to the mystical union with Christ. Other aspects of faith fall to be considered under the doctrine of righteousness by faith, but here we notice that faith includes or involves a certain relationship between man and God. It may be described as a moral relationship. It is an act of confidence in God. But, being moral, it is none the less actual. It is communion of a type only possible in the relationship of mystical union. Dr. Stewart says: "Christ is not only the object of faith, but the sphere in which faith lives and moves and grows and operates." ¹ This is a fine expression of Deissmann's well-known thesis. Faith, for the apostle, is much more than belief in an objective fact, such as the existence of God or the Messiahship of Jesus. It is a trustful relationship which is possible only because the believer is living "in Christ." This is the thought which underlies the passages in which the preposition "in" is joined with words such as "believe," "believer," and "faith." It also underlies the passages using the genitive in a similar fashion. Deissmann has pointed out that with a phrase like "faith of Jesus Christ" it is difficult to make either categories of subjective or objective genitive do justice to the full Pauline meaning. Whether or not a new category, a

1. op. cit., p. 183.

"mystical genitive," is needed, we can accept Deissmann's conclusion that "'the faith of Christ Jesus' is 'faith in Christ,' the faith which the Christian has in fellowship with Christ."¹

Thus, through faith, the Christian lives in a new atmosphere, but at the same time his own life becomes the sphere of the divine activity. Speaking of the way in which the Thessalonians had accepted the truth of the Gospel as more than the mere word of man, the apostle adds that it is "the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you who believe." (1 Thes. 2:13) Here faith is the opening of the door of the heart to the performing power of God. It is this sense of the word which Dr. Brunner develops in his "The Divine Imperative." He writes, "The Good is that which God does; the goodness of man can be no other than letting himself be placed within the activity of God. This is what 'believing' means in the New Testament. And this faith is the principle of 'ethics'".²

It is questionable, however, if such a passive interpretation does full justice to the greatness of the apostle's concept. Faith is obedience. Certainly. But it is also response, active and purposeful response. St. Paul does not shun a military analogy, nor need we. In a campaign the Officer Commanding plans the strategy and issues orders accordingly. The function of the soldier is to obey. But in the

1. "Paul," p. 163. Cf. pp. 161ff.

2. p. 55.

heat of the battle he must interpret his orders in accordance with the actual situation of the moment. Much depends on his individual skill and initiative. Or, the apostle might have extended his analogy of the athlete. He has received a great deal from God - his health, certain powers of mind and muscle, and the power of development. But his ultimate success depends on how he uses these God-given abilities. By exercise, training and self-control the athlete makes his own contribution towards winning the athletic event. So, faith is both the reception of divine grace and response to it. It was against hope that Abraham believed. (Rom. 4:18) Surely this implies something beyond a passive state of mind, whatever may be assumed to have been the physical act corresponding to the state of faith. The apostle can speak of the "obedience of faith." (Rom. 16:26) But, in fact, obedience is not the main motive. Rather, the Christian who is in Christ feels the incompatibility of the life in sin with the life in Christ. Faith is sensitivity to this incompatibility, and the active patterning of life so as to remove it. That is why Gardner can say, "The principle of the ethics of Paul lies in a mystic enthusiasm."¹

There can be no doubt that St. Paul's enthusiasm is heightened by his eschatology. The latter thus finds its place as a prime motive for ethics. We must now consider the relation between his eschatology and his mysticism, although the full

1. op. cit., p. 151.

implications of his eschatology will be brought out in later chapters.

At first sight eschatology may seem to be far removed from mysticism; and certainly, when the apostle is absorbed with thoughts concerning the future he seems almost to forget how definite and absolute have been his utterances concerning the life "in Christ." In spite of the fact that Christ is in him he can look for the coming of the Saviour from heaven.¹ He is even now in Christ but he can still look forward to being with Christ.² His mysticism is thus limited to a certain extent by his eschatology. Nevertheless, the two sets of ideas are not mutually exclusive. The germ of an eschatology is buried in his thought concerning this present life. He perceives that although a man may be in Christ he is also still in the flesh, or at least still in the world.³ Although he lives in the Spirit he is subject to the temptations of the flesh, and must resolutely wage war on it until the final transformation when he is given a new body, a spiritual in place of a fleshly one.⁴ The Christian must crucify the flesh, but he can never be finally rid of it while he lives in the world. The flesh, while not inherently evil, is the seat of evil powers and is always associated with their corrupting influence. It is, therefore, a barrier which prevents the

1. Phil. 3:20. Cf. 1 Thess. 1:10, 1 Cor. 1:7.

2. Phil. 1:23.

3. Cf. 1 Cor. 5:10.

4. Cf. 1 Cor. 15:50-54; Phil. 3:21.

perfect realization of the mystical union. The thought of a resurrection for the dead and a spiritual transformation for the living supplements and completes the concept of union with Christ.

Beneath the idea that the flesh is the seat of evil there is the thought that it is also imperfect. So long as a man has to live in a fleshly body he is handicapped in his response to God. The mystical union with Christ cannot be fully achieved because the Christian is incapable of full perception and appreciation of the presence of Christ. The consummation of complete union must await a transformation of the nature of man in order that he may participate not only intelligibly, as now, but intelligently. Hence the concept of union is connected with the postulation of a day of resurrection or other eschatological event when the imperfection of the flesh will be transmuted into the perfection of the Spirit. "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known." (1 Cor. 13:12)

The best expression of mystical, eschatological and ethical concepts combined in one passage is in the epistle to the Colossians. We cannot here enter into the question of the Pauline authorship. The verses of that epistle to be considered, however, contain nothing which has not a parallel or analogy in other Pauline epistles. It is only the inter-weaving of the elements which attracts our attention, an inter-weaving which is found illustrated abundantly although less conspicuously in

less doubtful epistles. Further examples of eschatologically-reinforced ethics will be given later. At present we are interested mainly in the mystical element. In Col. 3:1 St. Paul begins with the postulate that Christians now enjoy the resurrection-life with Christ. This thought he has developed in Rom. 6, where it is the correlative of the crucifixion of the flesh, the dying with Christ. The dying and rising with Christ are part of the concept of union with Christ. In the Colossian chapter, the resurrection-life of the Christians forms the ground of an ethical appeal. Since they are risen with Christ they are to seek the things which are above, where Christ is. They are to govern their lives according to the principles of heaven, not of earth. Then follows a re-statement of the ground of appeal, the mystical doctrine, tinged this time perhaps with an eschatological element. "For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God." (verse 3) Now comes directly a plain eschatological reference: "When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." (verse 4) And immediately the ethical element reappears. "Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is idolatry." (verse 5) Again as in the first series the doctrinal reinforcement is repeated, showing this time its obverse side. "For which things' sake the wrath of God cometh on the children of disobedience." (verse 6)

Looking at this passage as a whole we notice that

there is really only one ethical appeal, i.e., to destroy the passions and desires which have their root in fleshly things, greed, lust, etc., and to fasten all longings and hopes upon the things which have their origin above. This ethical appeal is supported first by the mystical doctrine that in Christ believers have already died and risen, and secondly by the eschatological doctrine that Christ will appear and believers will receive the gift of life and transgressors the judgement of God's wrath. Hence conduct can never be a matter of indifference for the Christian. It must conform to the exalted state to which he has attained as a sharer in Christ's resurrection, having reference at the same time to the fact that there is a day of judgement.

It may be noted in passing that the apostle reverts again to the mystical concept immediately after the mention of God's wrath. Now he speaks of union with Christ as a putting-on of the new man. Reference has already been made to the idea that the believer puts on Christ and thus lives in Him.¹ In Col. 3:10 the putting-on of the new man is described in language reminiscent of the Philo-Platonic circle of ideas. The new man "is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." But with St. Paul the idea is no mere philosophical concept but a veritable sword in support of the cause of moral living. The apostle explicitly describes the new

1. supra, pp. 75f. Cf. Rom. 13:14, Gal. 3:27, Eph. 4:24.

man in ethical terms. "Put on therefore ... bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, longsuffering: Forbearing one another, and forgiving one another." (verses 12 and 13) "And above all these things put on charity." (verse 14) But the putting-on of the new man is conditioned by a preliminary act of putting-off the old man. (verse 9. Cf. Eph. 4:22) This preliminary act is likewise conceived in ethical terms. "Put off all these: anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy communication out of your mouth." (verse 8) Since the old man has been replaced by the new, Christians must not lie to one another. (verses 9 and 10) Here the thought seems to be that the Christian's manner of life must not be incompatible with the kind of life associated with the new man. When the new man is identified with Christ, the character of Christ becomes the norm, and lying is conceived as an act not in keeping with His character. This type of argument is employed in verse 13 where the command to forgive is based on the fact that Christ has forgiven them. The old man is carnal and obeys the promptings of the flesh, but the new man is spiritual and is inspired and empowered by the Spirit of Christ.

We turn now to a consideration of the doctrine of the Spirit in its relation to the concept of "in Christ." The earlier prophets were acutely conscious of the workings of the Spirit in their own lives and in the world about them. But in the later period the tendency, as we have noted, was to think in terms of the past or of the future. There was the idea of

the Spirit as an agent in creation, an idea finding subtle expression in Gen. 1:2. There was also the idea of the Spirit as a power which, in the latter days, would be poured out upon the sons of men, putting them in close and intimate touch with the divine will and the divine command. (Joel 2:28ff.) From his standpoint St. Paul is able to combine these two ideas. He is living in the Age of the Spirit. The Spirit has come into his life as the very power of God. But it is still the creative Spirit, and the result of the Spirit's activity is a new creation. The function of the Spirit is to create life, and all who are of the Spirit are "quickened" even while living under the shadow of mortality. (Rom. 8:10,11) By the Spirit is mediated the gift of immortality. The fact that the last Adam was a quickening Spirit is a proof, for St. Paul, that Christians are to share in this gift, for they have the same Spirit as Christ. (1 Cor. 15:42ff.) The spiritual body, apparently, is to be received at a future resurrection. "As we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall bear the image of the heavenly." (1 Cor. 15:49) "In the twinkling of an eye ... we shall be changed." (1 Cor. 15:52) But the Spirit is already at work, and the process of resurrection has begun, for even now the Christian is liberated from the power of death. (Rom. 8:2) By the Spirit is also mediated the gift of holiness, of sanctification and of forgiveness. (1 Cor. 6:11) However much these blessings may be conceived as having their consummation in the future, it is clear that they also form part of the

believer's present experience, the present tense frequently being used without apology, and in the last mentioned verse the use of the aorist is significant, as also in Rom. 8:2. We might have expected the future; we should not have been surprised by the present tense; the perfect, even, might have been used to express a continuing process. But the apostle is so convinced of the certainty of the Spirit's victory that he writes in the tense of the historian. And what he writes is not the gospel of hope but the gospel of fact. He has already experienced the quickening of the life-giving Spirit. "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." (Rom. 8:2)

In two of these chapters, namely Rom. 8 and 1 Cor. 6, St. Paul is concerned primarily with ethics. His argument is that the possession of the Spirit makes right conduct possible and necessary. The power of sin has been destroyed. The Spirit is manifested as a new power in the believer's life, a power evidenced to a certain extent in ecstasy, but to a far greater degree in conduct and in the qualities of personality which lie at the root of conduct, i. e., love, joy, peace, longsuffering, etc. (Gal. 5:22) The whole of life is thus the creation of the Spirit. From this is derived the necessity of making one's life conform to the life of the Spirit. An act of the will is involved. If the Christian has become in fact a new creature, he must show it by walking in newness of life. "If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit." (Gal. 5:25. Cf.

Gal. 5:16, Rom. 8:1,4) The apostle immediately points up the exhortation with an appeal to eschew the kind of selfishness which results in pride, aggressiveness and envy. (Gal. 5:26) St. Paul thus finds in the doctrine of the Spirit both motive and dynamic for his ethical teaching.

When we speak of the doctrine of the Spirit, however, we must avoid the implication that its full development is to be found in the Pauline epistles. The exact relationship between Christ and the Spirit is not defined. Being in the Spirit is practically synonymous with being in Christ.¹ This happy inconsistency, if it can indeed be termed an inconsistency, has a very vital significance for St. Paul's ethics. It serves as a check on antinomianism. Conduct must not be subject to every whim which may present itself as inspiration. The believer must exercise a critical judgement. The value of inspiration is to be assessed by its relation to Jesus Christ. (1 Cor. 12:3) And the basis of judgement is that the Christian must have the Spirit of Christ. (Rom. 8:9) When the apostle thinks of the Spirit in terms of the historic personality of Jesus he has found a control with which to curb and regulate any antinomian tendencies which may develop among his "spiritual" converts. The spiritual man can judge all things; but the reason why he can do so is that he has the mind of Christ.² In the Ephesian epistle the apostle warns against the immoral habits of Gentile

1. Cf. Deissmann, "The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul,"
 2. 1 Cor. 2:15,16. Cf. H. L. Goudge, ad loc. (pp. 174,5.

society and sharply severs his Christian audience from all such conduct. "But ye have not so learned Christ." (4:20) The standard for them is the truth that is in Jesus. (4:21) St. Paul rarely appeals to the character of Jesus as an example. The immediate presence of his Lord is sufficient for him. But, on the other hand, the heavenly Christ and the Jesus of history are the same, and the apostle's Christology is based on historic events. When he appeals to his converts to have the mind of Christ there can be no doubt that all that is known about Jesus is thereby involved. When he challenges them to walk in the Spirit he is not thinking of an impersonal force but of the historic influence of the personality of Jesus, an influence all the more significant because now they live in Him.¹

More, however, is involved in the concept of the Spirit. The Spirit implies a fellowship. K. Lake points out that in the first century a man was accounted to be spiritual because he was obsessed by a spirit not his own but coming to him from without.² "The unity of the Spirit did not mean to the first Christians an intellectual unanimity in matters of controversy, or ecclesiastical organization, but a common inspiration by the same Divine Spirit."³ St. Paul, as we shall see, draws an ethical conclusion from this fact. But it is

1. Cf. Wernle, op. cit., pp. 264-266.

2. "The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul," p. 203.

3. Ibid, p. 385.

probable that the mere mention of the Spirit, for him, implied the concept of community. W. D. Davies gives some interesting examples to support his statement that for Rabbinic Judaism no individual Jew could receive the Holy Spirit. It was necessary for him to belong to a particular people and live in a particular milieu.¹ Now, for St. Paul, the particular society already had been created and the Age of the Spirit had dawned. The fact that the Spirit had been given was proof of the advent of the new society. He sees the workings of the Spirit as directed towards the welfare of the Christian community. He explains to the Corinthians that different manifestations are due not to a multiplicity of spirits but to the one Spirit ensuring the full activity and development of the community. (1 Cor. 12) It follows therefore that any spiritual gifts which the individual might receive are for the benefit of all. If they do not make for edification they are to be subordinated to other more useful gifts. (1 Cor. 14) It is significant that, whenever the thought of the Spirit is uppermost in St. Paul's mind, he usually employs the plural pronouns.² It is also significant that the membership of all Christians as fellow-citizens of the household of God is proved by the fact that they all have access to Him by the one Spirit. (Eph. 2:18,19) The Spirit is the unifying force whereby the holy temple, i.e., the Christian community, is joined and held together. (Eph. 2:20f.)

1. Cf. Davies, op. cit., p. 207.

2. Ibid, p. 202.

In 1 Cor 12, the unity of the Spirit leads on to the concept of the union of all believers in the body of Christ. Thus for St. Paul it is never more than a step, and that always logical, from the thought of the Spirit to the thought of being in Christ.

The definition of Christians as members of one body is but another way of expressing the unity in Christ. It is more than a metaphor. It is a mystical truth. Believers are, through faith, incorporated into Christ and find themselves, in thought, will, purpose and work, co-ordinated with one another through subordination to Christ. Just as the concept of being in Christ has its correlate in the idea of Christ in the believer, so the thought of the body of Christ has its correlate in the idea of Christ as the head of the body. Therefore, ethical considerations derived from this concept are of two kinds, according as they are conceived in terms of obedience or of co-operation. Although the latter is given more explication in the Pauline epistles it is, in reality, based on the former. Service to man is primarily service to God. So the great ethical section in Romans begins with an act of commitment to God. "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service." (Rom. 12:1) The apostle then proceeds to attack the very citadel of sin, i.e., human pride. He establishes his position by stating the fact that they are all members of the one body, having different

functions but each one making a useful contribution to the well-being of the whole. His point is not that all are equal but that all are valuable. In 1 Corinthians he emphasizes their inter-dependence. "If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing?" (1 Cor. 12:17) Their respective positions and abilities are due to the decision of God in accordance with His plan for the welfare of the whole body. (1 Cor. 12:18; Rom. 12:6ff.) In the Roman epistle, having torn away the basis of sin in man's pride, St. Paul is able to raise the structure of ethics on the foundation of the intrinsic value of each individual member of the new community. Love is to be the principle of action. (12:9) "Be kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love; in honour preferring one another." (12:10) It is but logical, therefore, that a Christian will share his wealth and hospitality. He will seek to share in the mood of his brother Christian, not placing himself above the little joys and sorrows which fill his brother's cup of life. He will seek to deal honourably and to live peaceably with others, giving no special favours to the great nor withholding any from the small. What is behind the desire for vengeance? It is inordinate self-love, the recoil of a wounded pride. But the Christian is a member of the body of Christ. An insult to one member is an insult to the whole body. Why should one member feel so important that, because it is the member attacked, it should be the one to make the return assault? In reality, it is God who has been attacked, and the prerogative

of vengeance is his. If this interpretation of Rom. 12:19 be allowed, we have one more example of ethical teaching developing naturally out of doctrine, in this case the ecumenical doctrine of the body of Christ.

The life of the community is of vital importance for St. Paul. Naturally, as a missionary, he is anxious that the Christian society should make a good impression on the world. But his ethical teaching goes far deeper than any missionary expediency. He is concerned with communal living because it is the realization and expression of the believer's union with God. It is the proof of the reality of his experience. Awareness of community is the accompaniment of awareness of God in Jesus Christ. When the Corinthians partake of the Lord's Supper unworthily, i.e., by gathering into small exclusive cliques and by greedily devouring their food without waiting for, or sharing with, others whose menial status compels them to come later and perhaps foodless, they are showing that they are not truly aware of the Lord's body. (1 Cor. 11:18-22) They do not, apparently, realize that these fellow Christians are members of the body of Christ, and that the act of communion with Him is also an act of communion with one another, an act of community. The koinonia, the community, is the test of the reality of the being-in-Christ, and fellowship with Him involves fellowship with all who are in Him. It is in this light that we are to view St. Paul's attack on anti-social vices. Stealing is an assertion of the self over against the community; it results

from inordinate concern over one's own needs rather than the needs of the community. Instead of stealing, the Christian is to engage in constructive work which will benefit society and enable him to make provision for others in need. (Eph. 4:28) Instead of lying, he is to speak words which will be an encouragement to his neighbours. (Eph. 4:29)

The apostle's choice of terms intensifies the idea of community. The obligation to give to the needy has been stressed by him, and, accordingly, a collection is being raised for the benefit of the poor in Jerusalem. When he speaks about the gift he calls it the *κοινωνία*. (Rom. 15:26, 2 Cor. 9:13) Again the same term is used to describe the distributing of the gifts. (2 Cor. 8:4) It may be noteworthy that in the account in Acts the apostle (or the editor) can use such a term as *ἐλεημοσύνας* to describe the gift, a term suggesting the giving of alms. (Acts 24:17) That may do before the chief captain, but within the Christian church the apostle employs the term *κοινωνία* which suggests communal sharing. Thus, in Rom. 12:13 we find the verb *κοινωνοῦντες* instead of *διδόντες* which lacks the warmth of the act of sharing. Even when the latter verb is used, we are likely to find it in compound form. Thus in Eph. 4:28 the idea of sharing is conveyed by the compound verb *μεταδιδόναι*. As members of the body of Christ, all must recognise the worth of every other member. The needs of any member are the responsibility of the whole community. "And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it;

or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it."
(1 Cor. 12:26)

By the same token, each member is led to recognise his own worth. He sees himself as an instrument in the hands of God. In fact, he is the temple of God.¹ Therefore he must recognise that immoral living constitutes a defilement of God's temple and will be punished by God Himself. (1 Cor. 3:17) As God's temple he belongs to God; as a member of Christ's body he belongs to Christ. He is bought with a price. (1 Cor. 6:19) Therefore he cannot give himself to another. He does not belong to himself. He must glorify God, for he is God's.

The ground of appeal is thus the holy nature of God. That is why God's temple must not be defiled. It is holy because it is God's. (1 Cor. 3:17) Likewise the apostle assumes that fornication is an act not in keeping with the character of Christ. He makes no attempt in 1 Cor. 6:15ff., to base his argument on the harmful effects of such an act. It is an act which is wrong in itself. This he illustrates in a twofold way. The Christian's body is a member of Christ. It belongs to his Lord. Therefore he cannot give it to another. Moreover, as a member of Christ his body is part of the body of Christ. In the act of fornication the two bodies become one flesh. The Christian must surely realize that Christ cannot be joined with a harlot. It is evident that this argument does not prove that

1. 1 Cor. 3:16. Cf. 1 Cor. 6:19, 2 Cor. 6:16.

fornication is wrong, but merely sharpens the sense of wrongness which already pertains to it. The same argument might have been used against the sex act in marriage. But this the apostle does not do. In spite of his alleged ascetic tendencies he is able to say that in the marriage relationship an unbelieving partner is actually sanctified. (1 Cor. 7:14) Therefore the rightness or wrongness of the sex act is not derived from the doctrine of union with Christ, but only accentuated. The knowledge that fornication is sinful is assumed. We shall have opportunity later of discussing how far this knowledge is based on natural law, or the Jewish Torah, or a "new Torah" which St. Paul may have used in the instruction of his converts in Christian morality. Our present interest lies in the use of his doctrine of "in Christ" to clinch his ethical argument on sex license. As we have seen, the most sublime religious concept serves duty as a tool for him to use in the erection of a high standard of Christian conduct.

We have now to consider St. Paul's thought concerning baptism as it is related to union with Christ. It is by baptism that the believer experiences the dying and rising with Christ. He is thereby buried with Him into death. (Rom, 6:4, Col. 2:12) The result is that he is raised to a new mode of life. It seems evident that this is not merely metaphorical language. The apostle is describing actual experience. Baptism is effective in introducing the believer into the new sphere. He is baptized into the body of Christ. (1 Cor. 12:13) The new life is the

result of baptism. At the same time it is evident that baptism is not in any sense mechanical or magical. It is not mechanical because the blessings involved are immediately available but not automatically realized in the believer's life. It is not magical because it does not constitute a claim upon God but rather a claim upon the baptized. The exposition of baptism as a dying and rising with Christ leads on to the logical inference: "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body." (Rom. 6:12) Baptism is but the beginning of the new life, but what a beginning! It is immersion into Christ, signalized by the gift of the Spirit of God.

P. Gardner says that for St. Paul baptism was of "enormous importance, not only as the gate of the church, but as the means, or at all events the accompaniment, of attaining that indwelling of the divine spirit of Christ which constituted salvation."¹ Our interest in this statement centers in the admission of inability to define precisely what, in St. Paul's view, baptism is. There is a great difference of meaning between the "accompaniment" and the "means." Either term seems to be extreme, and yet there is no middle ground. If, on the one hand, we say that baptism is the accompaniment of salvation, we tend to think of it as a symbol, whereas, for the apostle, it is an actual experience. At baptism the Christian is united with Christ in His death and resurrection. If, on the other hand,

1. op. cit., pp. 108,109.

we say that it is the means, we tend to think of it as working ex opere operato, whereas the apostle makes it clear that the baptized Christian must still battle with the flesh. The paradox, if such it is, goes back to St. Paul; indeed it goes back to the primitive church. The theory is that the Spirit is given at baptism. But St. Peter justifies his baptizing of Gentiles on the ground that they had already received the Spirit.¹ Baptism in such a case, admittedly an exceptional case, could only be the public confirmation or recognition of the genuineness of the previous experience.

St. Paul's references to baptism are not as numerous as we might expect, yet they are supremely definite and significant, and show a close connection with ethical questions. Actual references are few. The noun "baptism" occurs only thrice. The verb is found in nine verses; four of these are in the single passage, 1 Cor. 1:13-17. He seems to be indifferent about his own baptizing, feeling rather that his special calling is the preaching of the gospel. It would almost seem that baptism, for St. Paul, could not be the means whereby a believer is made a member "in Christ." Rather, it is the faith which leads to baptism which is the essential sine qua non.

Yet when the apostle speaks of baptism his language is unequivocal. All who are baptized have put on Christ. (Gal. 3:27) They have been baptized into one body. (1 Cor. 12:13) The

1. Acts 10:47. Cf. 11:17.

fact of baptism is for him the sufficient proof that this has taken place. It might have been easier for him, in view of the retrogression of some of his converts, if he had been able to make a distinction between genuine and fictitious baptism. But for him there is only one baptism and that is always effective. Perhaps instinctively he kept to the higher ground which provided greater advantage in moral warfare, and this no doubt contributed to his greatness as a missionary. He affirms that if they are baptized, his converts are actually in Christ. They do not need to question the genuineness of the rite. They have the Spirit because they have been baptized. They are freed from sin. They do not need to sin, for they now live in Christ, and the power of the Spirit is greater than the power of evil. Thus the apostle's view of baptism in relation to union with Christ furnishes a dynamic for ethical teaching.

It is not sufficiently realized that St. Paul mentions baptism only when there is a practical question involved. As we have seen, the thought of baptism into one body, a fellowship with Christ and with other Christians, has the direct ethical consequence that conduct must conform to the will of Christ and the good of the community. Likewise, the thought of baptism as a dying and rising with Christ bears the implication that the new life is a walking after the Spirit and not after the flesh. These two concepts account for all but two of the passages. In 1 Cor. 1, the division of the Corinthian church is criticised on the ground that they have all been baptized into Christ. In

Eph. 4:1-6, the virtue of tolerance and mutual understanding is based on the unity of the church, and that on the fact that there is one body, one Spirit, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father. The same thought is found in 1 Cor. 12:13. The reference to baptism in Gal. 3:27 is also associated with the thought of the oneness of all Christians, although the ethical implication is not drawn out until later in the epistle. Baptism as dying and rising with Christ is an integral part of the ethical exposition in Rom. 6. Again, in Col. 2:12, it is introduced to support the injunction to walk in Christ, putting aside fleshly sins.

The only other references to baptism by name are in 1 Cor. 10:2 and 15:29. The latter passage is not dealing directly with ethics but with the proof of the resurrection. The fact that some have been baptized for dead friends is presented as an evidence for the resurrection. There is, of course, a connection between this argument and ethics. The reality of the new mode of living is based on the truth of the resurrection. The whole chapter, therefore, is of fundamental importance to the apostle's ethical position, but, we must admit, he does not here make the connection immediately apparent. The passage in 1 Cor. 10, on the other hand, is directly concerned with ethics. The idea that the Israelites were baptized and yet subsequently sinned finds an immediate application in this chapter. It is an example for all the baptized, "to the intent that we should not lust after evil things, as they also lusted."

(verse 6) This exhausts the Pauline references to baptism by name. In every case there are practical reasons for the mention of the subject. Even less specific references are no less concerned with ethics.¹

The question of post-baptismal sins will be dealt with in our penultimate chapter. But before leaving this chapter we must make further reference to the Eucharist. In St. Paul's view it is essentially an act of fellowship. The eschatological element will occupy our attention later, but here we are concerned with the features associated with life "in Christ," and their bearing on ethics. The Supper provides the occasion for vividly realizing the presence of the Lord. It is symbolic of the mystical union, and at the same time it is a particularly vivid experience of that union. By participating in the rite the believer actively identifies himself with the dying of Christ, and also gives expression to his sense of unity with the brethren. The fact that the elements can be termed "the body of Christ" and "the blood of Christ" is of enormous significance for St. Paul. He can remind the Corinthians that all Christians are one bread and one body. (1 Cor. 10:17) Thus the Eucharist is prima facie evidence and support for the community ethics which we have already emphasized. In the apostle's thought the blood means the death rather than the risen life of Christ. Hence the Sacrament

1. Cf. 1 Cor. 6:11, Eph. 5:26.

of the Lord's Supper involves that ordering of conduct which is a consequence of dying with Christ.

The thought of the blood also includes the concept of *koinonia*. It is a fellowship of the blood.¹ All are united with Christ and with one another in this act of sharing in His death. The thought of the elements as spiritual food does not receive the same emphasis in the Pauline as in the Johannine literature. The Sacrament is not so much the reception of "life" as the realization and demonstration of the life in Christ. Indeed, if *καταγγέλλετε* has its full missionary force in 1 Cor. 11:26, the Supper has the function of propagating the gospel. The ethical point d'appui is not that the communicant goes his way with new power in his life but that he has a deepened sense of the incongruity of a man in Christ living in sin. Because of his table fellowship with Christ he must abandon all thought of similar associations with Christ's enemies, the devils. (1 Cor. 10:21) Because it is a fellowship meal he must conduct himself with deference to the convenience and needs of the others. (1 Cor. 11:19ff.) Ethical conduct is the logical inference to be derived from the Sacrament, but the power for it is mediated by the Spirit. The Spirit is not conveyed to the believer by the Eucharist. The believer has the Spirit because he is "in Christ."

In conclusion, all the benefits of the new life are

1. 1 Cor. 10:16, *κοινωνία ἐστὶν τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

received by the Christian in Christ. Because of his union with Christ he has freedom to live his life without fear of the power of evil. In him the very power of God is at work, ensuring his salvation. Life is simply a daily conformity to the life of a member of Christ's body, having regard to the welfare of the whole body. Life is therefore a joyful companionship with the Head and with all the members of the one body.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NATURE OF REDEMPTION

St. Paul's interest was in Christian living rather than in theory. As the last chapter has shown, he gives theoretical bases for his teaching but always with a didactic purpose. He cannot think of theology apart from conduct. Before examining further his doctrinal statements it is well to emphasize this practical outlook. Religion for St. Paul consists in "doing." This theme runs right through the epistles. Even in the opening chapters of Romans this note is not lacking. The day of wrath is "according to deeds." (2:6) The individual is judged and rewarded on the basis of his "patient continuance in well doing." (2:7) And so, "tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil ... but glory, honour, and peace, to ever man that worketh (*ἐργαζομένῳ*) good." (2:9,10)¹ St. Paul approves of works. He is only opposed to works as merit, the idea that a man can weigh-up his standing with God. Here is the basis of his argument against the law. It produces a false

1. Cf. 2 Cor. 5:10.

righteousness. But the amazing feature of salvation in Christ is not only that the sinner is accepted as righteous but that his very acceptance contains the seeds of a new capability to do rightly and to live rightly. The apostle thus looks to conduct for proof of the reality of the religious experience and he looks to the reality of the new relationship with God as the prime reason for new conduct.

We have already considered many examples of this inter-locking of theology and ethics. St. Paul brings eschatology into the realm of morals. He draws an ethical appeal out of a statement on the Lord's Supper. His exposition of the resurrection closes with, "therefore ... be ye stedfast." (1 Cor. 15:58) On the other hand, he turns an ethical maxim into a theological statement. In Rom. 6:23, as a parallel to "the wages of sin is death," we expect to find "the wages of righteousness is life." This, however, is unsatisfactory to the apostle. He knows that sin does pay a wage. It actually produces what it aims at. And from an ethical point of view, the same might be said of righteousness. But St. Paul does not wish to say this. He believes that eternal life is to be found, not through merit, but through grace, and that even conduct is due to the prior action of God. Therefore, in place of a moral proverb, he substitutes a tenet of belief. "The gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." There is thus no line of demarcation between theology and ethics in St. Paul's thought. The one fades into the other and vice versa, with

equal ease. We cannot therefore be satisfied with any interpretation of his doctrine which is unrelated, or only indirectly related, to conduct. If the ethical appeal has paramount significance in the doctrine of "in Christ," we shall expect the same to be true in each particular statement of that doctrine, i. e., in Redemption, Justification, Reconciliation, Sonship, etc.

One phase of salvation in Christ is the Christian's liberation from the power of the evil spirits which hold the world in thralldom. No attempt is made in the epistles to classify or define these evil spirits. In popular literature there were the demons who were the ghosts of the giants who were destroyed in the flood.¹ There were the astronomic deities. There were the fallen angels who plagued humanity, and the angelic intermediaries who functioned on God's behalf, though not always intelligently. It was these angel-powers who crucified Christ. (1 Cor. 2:8) There were also the gods and idols of heathendom. Sometimes the apostle treats them as empty figments of the imagination, as in 1 Cor. 8:4, 10:19. At other times he is content to accept the existence of these supernatural beings although denying the wisdom of giving heed to them. (1 Cor. 8:5, 2 Cor. 6:16)²

1. Cf. K. Lake, "The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul," p. 194.

2. τὰ στοιχεῖα in Gal. 4:3,9 and Col. 2:8,20, is probably a reference to such celestial spirits. The primary meaning of the term is that of objects arranged in a row. Hence, "letters of the alphabet." But also, "the physical elements." Thus, two

Some of these spirits are unmoral, influencing men for good or evil without deliberate intent. But for the most part they are diabolically immoral and seek to enslave men in

interpretations are possible. (1) "the rudiments," i.e., the rudimentary principles of knowledge. (2) "the elements of the physical world," i.e., the demonized powers of nature. There are certain features favourable to the first interpretation. Lightfoot thinks that the references to teaching and tradition in Col. accord better with this rendering. Also, the apostle's criticism of the tendency to give weight to the opinions of others about eating and drinking. This interpretation, it is held, makes possible in Gal. a good comparison between servitude under the law and under childish rules of conduct. Lightfoot claims that the use of *ἡμεῖς* here, showing that Jews and Gentiles were both in the same bondage, proves that elemental spirits cannot be meant. But St. Paul may be deliberately connecting Judaism with the worship of astral powers just as he connects the law-giving with the ministration of angels. Jewish festivals were regulated by the positions of the heavenly bodies. He refers in both passages to the observance of special days. The thought of these celestial bodies as spiritual beings or as possessing their own angels is not unknown in Jewish literature. Cf. Enoch 18:15, a reminiscence of which is found in 2 Pet. 3:10. Cf. also Job 38:7. Wisd. Sol. 13, refers to this belief among the heathen. The term is found in Wisd. Sol. 7:17 and in Philo, *de Vita contem.* 3, the latter passage implying a worship of these elements. Duncan says that in modern Greek the term is nearly equivalent to ghosts. St. Paul seems to have some such beings in mind when he speaks of angels, principalities and powers, in Rom. 8:38. Cf. Eph. 6:12. Possibly the mention of height and depth in Rom. 8:39 is a similar reference, for these may be astral terms signifying zenith and nadir. It is significant that powers and principalities are mentioned in Col. 1:16, 2:10, and the worshipping of angels in 2:18; and in Gal. 4:8 the apostle speaks of his converts' former service to beings which are in reality not gods. It is in the next verse that he calls the *στοιχεῖα* weak and beggarly, that is too impotent to do anything, too impoverished to give anything. Clearly he attributes personality to them. And in Gal. 4:2,3, as Abbott notes, the comparison between those who are *δεδουλωμένοι ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα* and those who are under *ἐπίτροποι καὶ οἰκονόμοι* points in the same direction. Also, the reference to enslavement is more trenchant if the *στοιχεῖα* are personal beings, although this point is not as decisive as Duncan's comment would suggest. But the interpretation of *στοιχεῖα* as demonic powers gives a more natural meaning to the *τοῦ κόσμου* in Col. On the whole it seems preferable.

sin. Like the great prophets the apostle attributes heathen immorality to idolatry. (Rom. 1:23ff.) Moreover, sin itself is conceived as a demonic power which has entered the world and established its dominion over the whole of humanity. A study of all the references scarcely supports Kennedy's statement that St. Paul usually speaks of sin as a quasi-personal power.¹ But there can be no doubt that this concept influences to a marked degree the apostle's thinking on the subject.² Sin entered the world and reigns over human life. (Rom. 5:12,21) The inhabitants of the world are in servitude and captivity to it.³ Sin has, in fact, entered into the very citadel of personality and thereby controls the actions of the individual. (Rom. 7:17, 20) Likewise, death is sometimes pictured in personal terms. It has entered the world along with sin, and exercises dominion over humanity,⁴ and carries out its work within the individual. (2 Cor. 4:12) In his argument against the law the apostle goes so far as to say that it brings a man into bondage to the demonic world elements. Unbelief is attributed to "the god of this world." (2 Cor. 4:4) While these evil spirits are in control there can be no hope for the mass of humanity. One aspect of St. Paul's doctrine of salvation is the certainty that the reign of evil has come to an end. The world rulers

1. "The Theology of the Epistles," p. 33.

2. Cf. Wernle, op. cit., p. 229; J. Weiss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 515; J. S. Stewart, op. cit., p. 106.

3. Rom. 6:14,16,17,20, 7:23.

4. Rom. 5:14, 6:9, 1 Cor. 15:26.

still occupy the stage but the curtain has fallen. Christ has broken the spell. Servitude to Him automatically releases a man from servitude to demons.

The apostle, however, is not content to deal with sin in any superficial manner. Sin is not merely some external power that can be eradicated by a cosmic defeat. It has in fact become a part of human nature, and its elimination can only be accomplished by a radical change within the individual, an ethical transformation so acute and complete as to resemble the physical transformation that takes place at death. It is not essentially a part of human nature in the sense that man was created sinful, but practically, in the sense that man is always sinful. The universality of sin is a matter of observation. The depravity and immorality of the Gentile world is matched by the dishonesty and deceit of the people of Israel. Moreover, it is a fact attested by conscience. The evil principle is at work in every life. All have sinned. But the supreme proof lies in the universality of death. St. Paul attributes mortality to sin. He seems to suggest that by reason of his sin Adam lost the gift or possibility of immortality, and died. Likewise his descendents all die, thus demonstrating the reality of their bondage to sin.

The connection between Adam's sin and the sin of his descendents is not exactly defined. The apostle contents himself with the simple statement that all have sinned because Adam sinned. (Rom. 5:12) Perhaps he is thinking of the transmission

of a tendency to sin. But we infer something more than this from his thought. For the tendency must have been present in Adam before his sinful act. The fact that he did sin is proof of the tendency. But if those who came after him sinned by reason of his sin, there is involved something more than the transmission of a tendency for the tendency was not due to Adam. What is involved is the fact that sin is inevitable. In consequence of Adam's sin, all have sinned.

It might be argued that it is only guilt which is inevitable. This would mean that when Adam, the representative of the race, sinned, his transgression was a corporate act involving the whole race of mankind. Everyone, therefore, comes under the wrath of God, which is the divine reaction to sin. All share in the guilt. It is probable that the apostle has this thought in mind. He says, "by one man's offence death reigned by one." (Rom. 5:17) And more explicitly, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." (1 Cor. 15:22) Here it is certain that the mystical concept is to the fore. All share in the resurrection of Christ, the representative of the new humanity, a thought which is further advanced in 1 Cor. 15:45ff. And all have been associated with Adam's fall and the consequent penalty of death. They suffer condemnation because of his offence. (Rom. 5:18) The representative nature of Adam's transgression is clearly evident. Guilt is therefore inevitable. But is this all that is implied? In Rom. 3, not only does he say that all are under sin, (verse 9) but, quoting

Ps. 14:3, he states that "there is none that doeth good, no, not one." (verse 12) Both here and in Ps. 14 the thought is clearly concerned with the action of the individual as such. Similarly, in verses 22 and 23, "there is no difference: for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." It seems more natural to understand this in the sense of personal and individual transgression.

One indication of the correctness of this interpretation lies in the parallel idea of being made alive in Christ. (1 Cor. 15:22) Because Christ rose from the dead His followers share with Him the blessings of the resurrection life. But we have shown in the last chapter that there is an act of association involved. The believer identifies himself with Christ's dying and rising. He repeats in his own life the sacrifices of self, and the crucifixion of the flesh, and in so doing he experiences the reality of the resurrection. It is probable that in St. Paul's thought there is some similar connection between Adam's sin and the sin of each individual. By his own action the individual identifies himself with Adam, repeating his transgression, and thus incurring responsibility for his own sin. But the nature of Adam's transgression was such that it involved humanity in a situation which leads every man, without exception, into sin. Every doctrine of sin must eventually reach the stage of paradox, and here the paradox is contained in the idea that the universality of sin implies its inevitability, while the universality of the condemnation

implies its avoidability.

The attribution of sin and its consequences to the fall has significance for St. Paul's ethic. Since human nature was originally uncorrupted, no part of it is inherently evil. The dualistic tendency to ascribe sin to the flesh is thereby checked, although not entirely eliminated. Consequently asceticism is shorn of its dogmatic embellishment. But, on the other hand, since human nature has become corrupt, it is always suspect. Human reason can never be the final basis for morality. The wisdom of man is foolishness with God. The apostle can issue lists of virtues after the Stoic fashion. He can appeal to what is generally accepted by both the Gentile and the Jew. But for him there is no natural law which is not at the same time a revealed law. "That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them." (Rom. 1:19) The only basis for morality is the revealed will of God. It would be interesting, by way of illustration, to compare St. Paul's ethical teaching with some of our modern sermons on practical subjects. We might find the same advice given in either case, but we should probably discover quite a different emphasis.

In the Pauline epistles, for example, the ethical appeal is not likely to be supported by the reasoned argument that sane living will make for greater happiness in the life of the individual. Happiness, for the apostle, is not so much the result of right action as its accompaniment, the characteristically

Christian method of enduring hardship. (Cf. Col. 1:11, 2 Cor. 7:4) Conduct is made right, not by its beneficial effects, but by its relationship to the will of God. Nor is the social ethic buttressed by an argument concerning the good government and general well-being that will result. Children must obey their parents because "this is right." (Eph. 6:1) Servants must be obedient to their masters "as unto Christ." (Eph. 6:5) Masters must deal justly with their servants because they themselves have a Master in heaven. (Eph. 6:9) The apostle uses reason to illustrate his teaching but not as the basis of his ethics. He might have cajoled his readers into liberality with a picture of the destitution in Jerusalem and the kind of rejoicing that would greet their generous gift, but no, his ground of appeal is the fact that Christ became poor for their sakes. (2 Cor. 8:9) The authority behind his ethic is always the example of Christ, the remembered sayings of Jesus, or the will of God as expressed in the Jewish scriptures. His distrust of a rational morality is part of the consequence of the doctrine of the fall.

His distrust of the human will is another part of the same consequence. The will has become depraved. It is not capable of controlling the body. (Rom. 7:15ff.) It cannot of itself prevent the domination of the body by sin. Therefore in ethical teaching it is useless merely to present beautiful ideals, and depend upon their attractiveness to carry the day against sin and produce right conduct. St. Paul's whole ethic is set over against the background of the doctrine of salvation

in Christ and presented in the light of the new life of the Spirit.

On the other hand, there is no doctrine of total depravity. The fact that sin is attributed to the fall is a safeguard against metaphysical dualism. The apostle's anthropology contains no concept of the material side as inherently evil. The Old Testament had too strong an influence upon him for that. When God Himself can look upon his finished creation and find it "very good,"¹ what Jew could say that anything was, as created, very bad? St. Paul's use of the term *σάρξ* demands investigation.

In many passages its use has a thoroughly Old Testament ring. It stands for humanity,² more particularly for its physical aspects, descent, status or animal nature,³ and especially for its weak, temporal and finite character.⁴ But St. Paul goes beyond Old Testament usage when he views the flesh as the willing agent of sin. He thinks of it as so evil and so active that it must be fought and mastered and, indeed, crucified.⁵ But modern scholarship generally supports the view that for St. Paul the flesh is not inherently evil.⁶ W. D.

1. Gen. 1:31.

2. Rom. 3:20, 1 Cor. 1:29.

3. Rom. 4:1, 9:3, 13:14, 2 Cor. 4:11, Eph. 6:5, Col. 3:22.

4. 1 Cor. 15:50, Gal. 4:13,14, Rom. 6:19, Col. 2:18.

5. Gal. 5:17,24.

6. L. H. Marshall, op. cit., p. 268, W. L. Knox, op. cit., p. 146, P. Wernle, op. cit., p. 232, G. B. Stevens, "Theology of the New Testament," p. 339ff., Stewart, op. cit., p. 104, Kennedy, op. cit., p. 129, J. Moffatt, "Paul and Paulinism," p. 51, Davies, op. cit., pp. 17ff.

Davies has pointed out that the very use of the word *σάρξ* instead of the Platonic *ύλη* or *οὐσία* shows the Old Testament, rather than the Greek influence in his thought.¹ His doctrine of the flesh is simply a development of the Old Testament usage. G. B. Stevens deals very conclusively with the problem.² Among other points, he mentions the fact that sin is distinguished from the flesh, being only a resident in the flesh; that in St. Paul's view, Christ possessed a human body and yet without sin; and that the flesh is capable of being cleansed and sanctified. With regard to this last point Professor Dickson discusses 2 Cor. 7:1, "let us cleanse ourselves of all defilement (*μολυσμοῦ*) of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God." Dickson writes: "As the genitives *σαρκός* and *πνεύματος* can only be genitives of the object, we see that *σάρξ* is viewed not as the seat and objective ground, but as the object, of sinful defilement, and the resulting tenor of the exhortation is that this pollution is in the Christian to be discontinued and the *σάρξ* is to become, just as is elsewhere required of the *σῶμα*, an object of sanctification. The passage would be incomprehensible, if *σάρξ* in reality denoted with Paul merely bodily matter in itself sinful."³ In contrast is A. S. Peake's description of the apostle's concept. "It (the flesh) stands for one side only of human nature, that is the lower. It is evil through and through.

1. op. cit., p. 18.

2. op. cit., pp. 339, 340.

3. "St. Paul's use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit," pp. 259, 260.

It is so irretrievably the slave and instrument of sin, it is entrenched in such deep and abiding hostility to God and His will, that no redemption or even improvement of it is possible, it must be put to death on the cross of Christ."¹

This view of A. S. Peake may be reconciled with that of the others who have been mentioned, at least to the extent that he does not explicitly state that the flesh is inherently evil. A further reconciliation is possible when we allow his argument that flesh is to be distinguished from the body. "While the flesh is crucified, the body of the Christian is the temple of the Holy Ghost and destined to share in the spirit's immortality."² But it is questionable if such an absolute distinction can be maintained. 2 Cor. 7:1 tells against it, and there is no adequate reason for doubting the genuineness of this passage. It is probable that the apostle, if pressed, might agree with Job, "yet in my flesh shall I see God." (Job 19:26) But, left to himself, he would choose other terms, for in his experience the flesh is always associated with evil. Thus he believes that Jesus came in the flesh, but he hesitates to say so, using instead the indefinite expression, "in the likeness of sinful flesh."³ The flesh, in his opinion, is found tainted

1. op. cit., p. 8.

2. Ibid, p. 11.

3. Rom. 8:3, ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας. Not a docetic concept, as Grotius suggests, (Meyer) nor a statement of the inherent sinfulness of the flesh. St. Paul believes that Jesus came in the flesh. Cf. Rom. 1:3, 9:5, Col. 1:22. But he has been using σὰρξ, by association, to represent man's sinful nature,

with sin, universally, although not necessarily. We can agree with Peake in his statement that "In his experience the flesh had been the seat and instrument of sin. Apart from the flesh there could be no sin in man."¹ When, however, he proceeds to say, "Flesh without sin was also unknown," we make the exception of the life of Jesus. And when he adds that the flesh is "not a morally indifferent thing," we pause for consideration. Empirically considered, the flesh is an active cause of human sinfulness, but not in any metaphysical sense. Sin simply inhabits and works through the flesh. The conclusion reached by Davies seems to be well established. He writes: "One conclusion only emerges; the term *σάρξ* denoted for Paul the material element in man which is morally indifferent; it has, however, become the basis from which sin attacks man; has, in short, passed under the dominion of sin; it was a corrupted not a

and this creates a difficulty when he comes to speak of the earthly life of Jesus. The flesh of Christ was real. But it was not the same as ours, for our flesh is always occupied by sin, whereas His was not. His flesh resembled our flesh which is sinful. It is our flesh which is the willing agent of sin and the cause of the law's weakness and failure. But His flesh, being without sin, was no hindrance to His life of obedience. He was a sacrifice without blemish, and in accordance with the law. *περι ἁμαρτίας* suggests the idea of sacrifice. By this method, God destroyed (*κατέκρινεν*) sin, and secured the fulfilment of the law's requirements in our lives, which are now subject not to the flesh but to the Spirit. When Christ came in the flesh he lived a human life, but a life so different from ours as to show that his flesh was not the same as ours. It resembled our sinful flesh, but actually it was flesh untainted by sin.

1. op. cit., p. 19

corrupting element; the involuntary accomplice to the act of sin but not the criminal."¹

We are forced to the conclusion that the crucifixion of the flesh is an ethical term denoting not its destruction but its sublimation. The lower nature with its passions and appetites is to be offered up. To any Christian the term crucifixion would imply a resurrection. If the apostle had meant that the flesh was to be absolutely eliminated he could have used the word "destroyed." But when he says that they have "crucified" the flesh we understand that there is to be a sort of transformation. (Gal. 5:24) It is only sin that is destroyed in the process. When the old man, i.e., the life according to the flesh, is crucified it is sin that is "destroyed." (Rom. 6:6) Indeed St. Paul uses the curious term τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας. The flesh is purged and purified. The Galatian passage furnishes support for this thesis, for there the flesh includes more than only physical passions and lust, but feelings such as hatred, wrath and envy. (Gal. 5:19-21) Now the Christian who has crucified the flesh must still live in the flesh. "The life which I now live in the flesh." (Gal. 2:20) "For though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh."² The crucifixion of the flesh involves the purging of sin and the entrance of the Spirit. The flesh is now animated and directed by the

1. op. cit. p. 19.

2. 2 Cor. 10:3. Cf. 1 Cor. 5:10, Gal. 4:13,14.

Spirit. Before he has crucified the flesh a man walks after the flesh and obeys its dictates. (Rom. 8:5, etc.) But after he has crucified it he still lives in the flesh. But he walks after the Spirit, for the flesh is no longer his master but his servant and the Spirit is the new power in his life. (Rom. 8:1,2) Before its crucifixion the flesh wars against the Spirit, but afterwards the Spirit is dominant and directs the course of action. (Gal. 5:17, Eph. 3:16) When the flesh is active it leads to all manner of excesses, sins of passion, of gluttony and of greed. But when the flesh has been crucified it becomes the passive ground of operation for the Spirit.

This statement of the ideal requires qualification, as St. Paul well knew. The passivity of the flesh is entirely due to the dominance of the Spirit. But even when it is purged it is still the potential seat of sin, and in so far as the full power of the Spirit may not be discovered in one's life, to that extent the flesh is active and the resourceful ally of sin. But, nevertheless, the new life can be lived in the Spirit, and there is no need to live after the flesh.

This contrast between the flesh and the Spirit is so important for St. Paul that he frequently forgets that the new life of the Spirit is also in the flesh. This is particularly so when the ethical interest is uppermost. The apostle is greatly concerned over the fact that the new converts do not always show in their conduct the evidence that they have the Spirit. It was often difficult for Gentiles, unused to the high

moral standard of Judaism, especially with regard to sexual relations, to reform their accustomed manner of life immediately. It was easier for them to enter into spiritual ecstasies than the virtuous life characteristic of the guidance of the Spirit. So St. Paul is at pains to stress the completeness of the transformation in Christ. The new life is after the Spirit, not after the flesh. This accounts for the language of Rom. 8:8,9, "So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you." Taken at face value, this text would be sufficient to disprove our thesis that the flesh is not annihilated but only transformed and serves the Spirit in the new resurrection mode of life. But it is in direct opposition to passages already mentioned which prove that life in the Spirit is also in the flesh. We conclude that it is an understandable case of rhetorical exaggeration. And the reason is not far to seek.

Throughout seven chapters of his letter to the Romans the apostle has been concerned with the universal sinfulness, first of the Gentiles and secondly of the Jews. The wrath of God has justly fallen upon all humanity. This burden of sin has caused him to paint a most depressing picture of the immorality and dishonesty of the human race, and finally he has faced the hopeless task confronting the natural man in his effort to conquer sin by an exertion of his own will. But, running through this mighty passage, there has been a persistent strain of hope,

indeed of absolute trust, and in chapter 8 it bursts forth in the confident note of a great conviction. "There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus." And then the ground for this assertion: "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." Then he proceeds to lay the dogmatic basis for his subsequent ethical exhortation. The man in Christ lives in the power of the Spirit. He is freed from sin and death which dominate the life of the man who lives after the flesh. "For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit." (8:5) Now he emphasizes the difference between the two ways of living. The Spirit means life and peace, but the flesh death. (8:6) The A. V. renderings, "carnally minded" and "spiritually minded" hardly do justice to the text. *τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς* means the disposition of the flesh, with a hint of intention or purpose. Similarly, *τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος*, with respect to the Spirit. When the apostle is concerned with conduct he feels the necessity of magnifying the deliberate malevolence of the flesh. What he is saying is that there is no comparison between the two ways of living. Thus it is natural for him to go on and say, "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit." This statement is not so much an inconsistency as a question of emphasis. When the ethical note is uppermost he must guard against the tendency of his converts to compromise with their lower instincts. The flesh is the chief source of temptation.

It must be crucified. But when the fundamentals of morality are not at stake, when it is a question of Christ or the Jewish law, there is a shift of emphasis in the concept of the flesh. "The life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God." (Gal. 2:20) Even after its crucifixion the flesh continues to exist, but now it is no longer a powerful, evil-intentioned flesh, but subservient and subdued. It has to be kept in such a state, and the method by which this is achieved is to live after the Spirit.

Πνεῦμα, for St. Paul, is not a constituent part of man's nature, but a divine endowment. The gift of the Spirit comes first, as the source of right conduct. But it rests with the individual whether he is to live in the Spirit or not. Hence the relevance of the ethical directives. "Having begun in the Spirit," the apostle asks, "are you now going to end in the flesh?" (Gal. 3:3) The way of legalism did not invoke the Spirit. (verse 2) The fact that they have the Spirit shows that they began their Christian life in faith. How foolish now to turn back to subservience to the law, which could never free them from their sinful habits. "This I say then, Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh." (Gal. 5:16)

Our interpretation of the flesh is related to our interpretation of sin. Where St. Paul speaks of sin, not as a force but as an act, a transgression, he is able to describe it by some definite term, i. e., lasciviousness, fornication, etc.

Now, we have already noted that sins of temper, etc., are included in the sins of the flesh. Is it not possible that, in St. Paul's thought, all sins, whether sensuous or otherwise, have their origin not in the flesh but in the very center of personality, in a man's attitude to God? In other words, is man's primary sin an act of a carnal or of a spiritual nature? Can sensuous transgression be traced ultimately to a spiritual disorder? If so, the flesh is not the cause but simply the instrument of sin. By its nature it accentuates and prompts the sin but only when there is a prior perversion of the soul. When there is harmony between the soul and God, the flesh is the servant of righteousness.

Without doubt St. Paul is greatly influenced by the thought of the Old Testament. It may be true that in later Judaism sin was conceived as mainly the transgression of a moral, or a ceremonial, code, although even here it is an act against God. But the prophets thought of sin primarily as an act of rebellion against God. As Norman Snaith has pointed out, with the eighth century prophets sin is essentially a religious term.¹ For example, in Amos the "transgressions" of Damascus, Gaza, Tyrus, etc., are called "rebellions," for that is the meaning of the Hebrew noun.² Their crimes are rebellions against God. But their crimes consist of such things as lack of pity and the savage butchery of captives. Snaith calls attention

1. op. cit., pp. 60,61.

2. Cf. Amos 1:3,6,9,11,13, 2:1.

particularly to Amos 2:6, where Israel is the transgressor. Her rebellion is the act of selling "the righteous for silver, and the poor for a pair of shoes." Also included is an immoral deed of a sexual character, which is a rebellion against God and a profanation of His holy name. (2:7)

St. Paul likewise views moral sin as an act of enmity with God. (Rom. 8:7) In fact the immorality of the Gentiles is the result of their religious perversion. (Rom. 1:23ff.) And just as Adam is the type of the race, so his sin is typical of the sin of mankind. What was Adam's sin? It was rebellion, a disruption of the harmony between himself and God. The Genesis account does not state that it was a sin of a sexual nature. It was rather one of personal disloyalty to God. But its immediate consequence was the loss of sexual innocence. (Gen. 3:7) Thus sin is primarily a wrong relationship to God which results in licentiousness and immorality. If this is true of Adam it is, in the apostle's view, true of the whole race.

Rebellion is, however, more than disobedience. It is the exaltation of self, the attempt to dethrone God and make the self god. The force of the serpent's tempting, lies in the words: "Ye shall be as gods." (Gen. 3:5) St. Paul has this same thought when he begins his dissertation on the gross depravity of the Gentiles with a reference to their scheming pride. "They are without excuse: Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was

darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image." (Rom. 1:20-23) Even idolatry may be a form of self-worship for the god is one who is subject to the worshipper. And the various forms of wrong-doing which result from the original act of self-aggrandizement also partake of the nature of egotistic arrogance. Sensuality is a form of self-assertion. R. Niebuhr is in agreement with this view, but suggests that there is an alternate form of sensuality, in which a man sins, "not by seeking to hide his finiteness and comprehending the world into himself, but by seeking to hide his freedom and by losing himself in some aspect of the world's vitalities."¹ Niebuhr is right in stating that this form of sensuality is not primarily pride. But the empirical fact is that this alternate form is really in the nature of a reaction to the first form which has its base in human presumption. The man who seeks to lose himself in opiate activities is the man who has already tried to become the center of existence, and failed. Sensuality in all its forms is the result of selfishness. Niebuhr himself makes this clear in a particularly acute appraisal of inordinate sexual desire.² "Sex reveals sensuality to be first another and final form of self-love, secondly an effort to escape self-love by the deification of another, and finally an escape from the futilities of both forms of idolatry by a plunge into

1. op. cit., vol. I, p. 191.

2. Ibid, p. 254.

unconsciousness." There is thus adequate support for St. Paul in his thesis that pride has caused the Gentiles to turn away from God and has led them into their revolting practices.

Adam's self-seeking is the primary sin. It is this type of sin which produces immorality and bad conduct in each life. Now, over against the case of Adam we are to set the case of Abraham. Adam's rebellion is matched by Abraham's faith; Adam's sin by Abraham's righteousness. Adam's relationship with God is one of opposition and distrust. Abraham's is one of acceptance and trust. When Adam disbelieved God he set himself on the road which led to unethical conduct. When Abraham believed God he walked in the path of obedience. Far from being a doctrine devoid of ethics, the concept of righteousness by faith is full of ethical implications. For faith is an attitude towards God. It is trust in Him. It is an awareness of fellowship. It was the distrustful attitude which produced sin. Faith signifies that that attitude is no more. The life of faith is therefore one that is centered in God rather than in self. It is this new relationship to God which makes possible the crucifixion of the flesh. The strength of St. Paul's position lies in the fact that the conquest of the lower impulses is not left to the power of the individual will alone. Ethical conduct is the consequence, not the cause of salvation in Christ. Faith begins with God in the work of reconciliation. It is carried over into the life of the believer in the work of re-aligning all his desires and aspirations in accordance

with the new relationship to God. The crucifixion of the flesh is simply the response of faith. This is the relationship between St. Paul's ethical teaching concerning fleshly sins and his doctrine of salvation. A fuller discussion of the doctrine of justification by faith is reserved for the next chapter.

If the central sin is human presumption, a twofold consequence may result. We have seen that it leads to self-apotheosis and thence to antinomianism. The deified ego is a law unto itself. But on the other hand, man's presumption may lead him to a new respect for law. He is tempted to look upon himself as a righteous man, and finds the proof of this in the fact that he observes perfectly the divine law. His very righteousness thus becomes a new temptation to pride and hence to unrighteousness. In such a case the law only serves to increase sin. Moreover, the motive for keeping the law will be faulty. It is a service for wages. The command is not obeyed through love for God or love for others but through love of self. Other people are viewed simply as extensions of the self to be used simply as means to the individual's own ends. The other person is treated as a means of **furthering** one's attempt at self-righteousness, not as a man who has needs of his own and who is worthy of sympathy and love. Instead of making for righteousness, the law has destroyed it by destroying its basis in the sense of community between the individual and God, and between the individual and society. Instead of cementing the fellowship, the law intervenes between the members. Instead of

the life-giving Spirit as the maintainer of the union, there is substituted the letter of the law which is fatal to that union. This has nothing to do with the relative merit of the law per se. The commandment may be good, but for the man who is at enmity with God it is an instrument of self-deception and so the agent of sin.

This may not have been St. Paul's method of approaching the question of the Jewish law. It is probable that dissatisfaction with the law began in a more personal way and was intensified by the practical nature of the question. On the personal side were his thoughts while he was yet under the law. On the practical side was the fact that as a Christian evangelist he saw that the law was a hindrance to the Gentile mission and a cause of disunity within the Church. When, in his letters, he deals with the question he makes no such philosophical reconstruction of his thoughts but merely brings out the particular aspect most directly related to his present argument, often supporting his position by a typically rabbinic exegesis. But all the elements of such a philosophy are present, in one place and another. While he did not arrange them in systematic fashion we can be certain that he had indeed thought out the full implications of the religion of law-righteousness.

There is the thought that the effect of the law is to produce sin. "The strength of sin is the law." (1 Cor. 15:56) "For without the law sin was dead." (Rom. 7:8) In typical fashion the apostle goes so far as to say that what happened

was actually intended. "The law entered, that the offence might abound." (Rom. 5:20) Here he is dealing with Adam's sin and its concomitant, the universal sin. His thought is that the law has increased sin extensively and intensively. But does this mean that the law is evil? No! The law is good. It is holy. (Rom. 7:12. Cf. 3:31) But it is spiritual. (Rom. 7:14) The self-centered man does not understand its significance. He interprets it as a method of attaining righteousness and obeys its commands through self-interest. But the true interpretation of the law is that of love. When a man acts through love he is fulfilling the whole law, for "all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." (Gal. 5:14. Cf. Rom. 10:13)

In this passage in Galatians St. Paul is concerned with the kind of freedom which believers have in Christ. It is not freedom to act selfishly. Rather, it is freedom from the stereotyped conduct which the law imposes, a freedom which gives them a greater opportunity of serving one another in love. Being freed from the law they are now able to fulfil it, for love is the fulfilment of the law. The idea behind *πεπλήρωται* in Gal. 5:14 and *πλήρωμα* in Rom. 13:10 is that of fulfilment in terms of completeness or total content, rather than in terms of completion or finality. In his note on *πλήρωμα* in his commentary on Colossians, pp. 255ff., Lightfoot gives examples of various meanings, among them that of "the entire sum," (Arist. Vesp. 660) and "the perfect attainment," (Philo, de

Abr. 46) and he suggests that the word generally refers not to "the filling material," but to "that which is complete in itself." So here the meaning is not that love is the final element in the law's completion, but that it is the totality which embraces everything in the law. There is a contrast between *πᾶς νόμος* and *ἐνὶ λόγῳ*. Love is paramount, but it is not just a general quality of mind that is called for. Duncan points to the article in the phrase *διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης* in Gal. 5:13. It is love in its fullest Christian sense. This phrase recalls the similar one in verse 6, which is connected with the verb *ἐνεργουμένη*. It is probable that this verb has a passive sense and the thought is of "a faith which is set in motion by love." But however the verb is taken, Duncan is no doubt right in suggesting that verse 6 should be read in the light of Gal. 2:20, and that love here is primarily the love of God to man. This is the source of power in Christian living, that God first loved us.

While love is the law's fulfilment in the sense of completeness rather than of end, yet the comprehensive significance accorded to love does actually mean the end, the finish, of law as a way of righteousness. Love is *ἀνυπόκριτος*. (Rom. 12:9) It is not meant for the satisfaction of any ulterior motive of the subject but for the benefit of the object. It cannot be used for self-promotion. Moreover, the centrality of love means the end of the law as a necessity. Love cannot be commanded. It is not subject to the will. If love is present the command is not needed. If it is not present the command

cannot call it into life. Thus the ultimate command can only be, not "thou shalt love," but "be ye reconciled to God." For love is a product of a right relationship to God.

Of course the very nature of physical existence imposes the necessity of some form of human law. Some other criterion than love is necessary if two motorists are to use the same road. St. Paul does not deny the value of constituted authority. On the contrary, he considers it a Christian's duty to obey the laws of the land. It might be arguable, therefore, that the specific demands of a ruler upon his subject constitute God's will for that subject. In other words, the law of society is the law of God. Moreover, divine sanction is also given for the standards of order which are to be maintained in the conduct of meetings for prayer, for the celebration of the Eucharist, etc. It would seem that the law has come to an end and yet there is still the law to be enforced. This dilemma has drawn forth two important answers. W. D. Davies has suggested that in St. Paul's thought Christianity is the new Israel. There has been a new creation and consequently a new Torah. St. Paul gives his ethical instruction as a new law which has replaced the old one.¹ C. Anderson Scott, on the other hand, believes that St. Paul distinguished between the contents of the law and law as a system.² As a system of righteousness it

1. op. cit., pp. 223ff.

2. Cf. "Christianity According to St. Paul," p. 42, and "New Testament Ethics," p. 79.

was finished. It could not lead men to God. But it was nevertheless a revelation of God's will. Its moral and social demands were important even for the Christian. Davies' objection to this position is on the ground that "even if such a distinction as Anderson Scott suggests could be proved beyond question, the problem would still remain, why, if he regarded the Law as a system as no longer valid, should Paul himself observe it?"¹ The answer is that he did not observe it as a system. There is no evidence that he continued to fulfil the edicts of the law as a means of finding favour with God. His whole argument is directed against such an interpretation of the law. The fact that he obeys any specific enactment of the law can only be taken as evidence that he does distinguish between its content and the law as system. But did he observe the law? There seems to be an all too prevalent tendency to assume that he did and to use this assumption to prove some particular theory. But the incident at Antioch, as described in Gal. 2:11-21, tells against it. Here the question at issue was not whether the Gentiles should keep the Jewish law but whether the Jews should do so. St. Paul's position is that the Christian Jew must be prepared to live as the Gentiles do, at least in certain respects, and this involves repudiation of the law. As far as he himself is concerned he is dead to the law.²

1. op. cit., p. 71.

2. Gal. 2:19.

One cannot read the account in Acts of his missionary activities without wondering how the apostle could live as he did among the Gentiles and yet strictly adhere to the full details of the law. The writer's aim is to minimize the differences between St. Paul and the authorities in Jerusalem. He ignores the difficulty of how the apostle could have kept the whole law, and instead he goes out of his way to mention any act implying conformity to the law. He instances the circumcision of Timothy (16:3), the Nazaritic vow (18:18) and St. Paul's sponsorship of the four Jews who had undertaken a similar vow. (21:23ff.) But the fact remains that the apostle's motive is not regard for the law but the desire not to offend unnecessarily his fellow Jewish Christians. Acts states definitely that he circumcised Timothy "because of the Jews." Similarly, the sponsorship of the Nazarites is undertaken to disarm the Jewish Christians who were alarmed at the report that St. Paul was persuading Jews not to circumcise their children. When, in Cenchrea, he had shorn his head he had in mind the effect on the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem, for only in that city could such a vow be completed. There is no reason therefore for doubting his statement in the Galatian epistle that he is dead to the law. As a Jew he will always respect the traditions and customs of his race, but as a Christian he has passed out of the dominion of the law.

If we accept Anderson Scott's thesis that St. Paul makes a distinction between the content and the law as a

system we must also accept its corollary, that he makes a distinction between the moral and ceremonial contents of the Law. This, no doubt, is the case. Frequently does he appeal to the law as authoritative in moral questions. Like Jesus, the apostle does not present his ethic as a wholly new code but as a new interpretation of God's will as already made known in the scriptures. We find difficulty, therefore, in accepting the full implication of Davies' theory. His study of the order of the catechetical material in the hortatory sections of the epistles, and of the use of the participle for the imperative, is particularly interesting.¹ However, there is no need to assume that St. Paul consciously presented his ethical teaching as a new Torah replacing the old. Rather, he assumes that God has already revealed His will, but because of their idolatrous pride, or because of their preoccupation with the law as an instrument of self-righteousness, men have never understood His will. The new relationship with God in Christ, however, makes possible man's knowledge of God's will unhampered by pride or legalism, and because of his being "in Christ," the truths of the Christian ethic are self-evident. The apostle gives his instruction as the logical inference from salvation in Christ.

The elimination of human pride is a consequence of the doctrine of "in Christ," as has been pointed out. The believer's whole interest is centered in Christ. But the way

1. Cf. op. cit., pp. 123ff.

of legalism is also eliminated through Christ. He has freed the Christian from the law. We cannot here enter into all the subtleties of St. Paul's rabbinic method of proving his case, but his thought is clear. In two ways Christ has replaced the law. First, He is the fulfilment of God's real purpose. God intended to bless His people, and the promise of blessing was given to Abraham. The promise was superior to the law, for it antedated it and was given directly by God without mediation. Now the law could not be the fulfilment of the promise. The promise was one of blessing, but the law contains no blessing. It can do nothing but bring a curse upon those who break it. Moreover, there is nothing in the law to help a man fulfil it. It has no power. And it must be perfectly observed, for failure in one small part is complete failure. It had nothing to do with the promise but was only a temporary measure, a parenthesis inserted into the period between the promise and the blessing. It was a custodian, exercising authority and imposing punishment during the pupil's state of immaturity. But with Christ came the gift of sonship and the end of the custodian's authority. The son passed out of his control and entered into the life of the household as a free member. Thus the life of fellowship with God is a sign of the Christian's freedom from the law. The new life of blessing is the fulfilment of the promise. The new man is not under the law but under grace.

The second way by which the law is abolished is through the death of Christ on the cross. The law states that

the transgressor is accursed. It also says that one who is hanged is accursed. But Christ suffered this penalty without being accursed and without having transgressed. Therefore the law has been annulled by its own inconsistency. Moreover, the death of one partner dissolves the marriage, from the legal point of view. Christ died for men and in their place, thereby setting them free from the law. By His death He brought the law to completion. Therefore it ceased to exercise its authority. It was fulfilled in Christ.

While some of the apostle's arguments are, to a certain extent, trivial, his thought is great. The Cross means complete freedom, freedom from the law, from sin and from death. The sting of death is sin. "It is sin which makes death terrible."¹ But the reign of sin has ended. The seemingly inexorable chain of physical attachment to sin which began with Adam has been broken, for a descendent of Adam has appeared who was sinless and thereby began a new order, an order of freedom whose power is the Spirit. Sin has overstepped its bounds in condemning a sinless man and therefore has lost its dominion. The sting of death is removed.

But there is more to his thought than this. Death itself has been removed as an injurious factor in human life. By His resurrection Christ conquered death. His resurrection is the assurance that all who are in Him will rise from the dead.²

1. Cf. G. B. Stevens, op. cit., p. 352.
2. 1 Cor. 15:12ff.

The precise nature of the transformation involved in resurrection is not made clear. The apostle insists that the new life will be a bodily form of existence. He has the typically Jewish horror of a disembodied immortality or of appearing unclothed. But how is the spiritual body to be received? St. Paul seems to give two answers. In 1 Cor. 15, he suggests that the new body is an outgrowth of the old, and yet a completely different body. In 2 Cor. 5, the new body is described as an external one already awaiting us in heaven. Possibly the two conceptions are not mutually exclusive. There is still another way of describing the transformation. In St. Paul's view, Christians have already experienced the dying and rising with their Lord. It is but one more step to say that they already have the resurrection body. Davies calls attention to the fact that in the later passages of the epistles the apostle "speaks, not of the resurrection of Christians but of their revelation."¹ He refers specially to two passages. The one is in Rom. 8:19, "The earnest longing of the creation waiteth for the revelation of the sons of God." The other is in Col. 3:4, "When Christ who is our life shall be revealed then shall ye also be revealed with him in glory." Davies goes on to say: "There is no need to resurrect those who have already died and risen with Christ and received their heavenly body, but they may be revealed." Now it is only left to us to point out that

1. op. cit., p. 318.

these two passages are directly concerned with ethics. The Colossian verse has already been discussed. Precisely the same idea is found in the chapter in Romans. The apostle is seeking to reinforce his teaching that Christians must not live after the flesh. They must not do so because they have already died to sin and now live in the Spirit. They live in the power of the resurrection. In both passages the thought of the future revelation is introduced to show that endurance in the trials and temptations of this life will be rewarded in the next. We see then that this particular feature of his resurrection-belief is stressed when the apostle is addressing himself to the need for a higher standard of conduct. It may be that this thought is not at too great variance with his other thoughts concerning the resurrection. While the resurrection life is already possessed by the Christian, still his life is hid with God. One day it will be revealed. We may view this argument as a special way of presenting the truth of the resurrection, a way fraught with the greatest ethical significance. It has a twofold applicability. First, the Christian is here and now in full fellowship with God, living his life under the power of the resurrection. Secondly, he can look forward to a future consummation when the glory that is to be revealed will more than compensate for present sufferings and when his conduct while on earth will receive a heavenly reward.

When we view the apostle's thought as a whole we cannot fail to be impressed by the sense of wonder and

excitement which is the characteristic feature of the new life in Christ. It is, for him, a thrilling experience, for the grace of God is everywhere in evidence. Life under grace has shown him what real life is. Perhaps at times his apologetic is heavy with obscure philosophical and exegetical proofs. He has often been contrasted with Jesus in this respect. The fresh air of the countryside, the smell of flowers and the singing of birds are better calculated to suggest the immediacy of the divine providence than is the stifling atmosphere of the law-court with its tension and gloom. But, apart from the choice of illustrations, the thought is the same. The apostle, too, lives in God's world. Not only has His power wrested man from the control of the elements of the world, but His love has been shed abroad. The Christian lives and moves and has his being within the all-pervasive atmosphere of God's presence. The kingdom of God is a present reality. The term *βασιλεία* is usually avoided by St. Paul, perhaps because the Gentiles held it in ill repute. But when he does make use of it he frequently thinks of it as being present.¹ But whether present or future, the kingdom is associated with ethical teaching. It involves living peaceably and cheerfully with others and dealing with them charitably.² If God has called the Thessalonians into His kingdom they must walk worthy of Him.³

1. Cf. P. Gardner, op. cit., p. 131. Also, Rom. 14:17, Col. 1:13.
 2. Rom. 14:15-17.
 3. 1 Thess. 2:12.

The kingdom is not for the unrighteous nor for extortioners,¹ but for those who, on account of their charity and patience in suffering, are accounted worthy.² Thus every blessing which the Christian receives involves a deep sense of personal responsibility. The height of his ethical standard is the measure of the greatness of St. Paul's doctrine of salvation.

1. 1 Cor. 6:9,10.

2. 2 Thess. 1:3-5.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION

The doctrine of justification by faith is a prominent feature of the epistles to the Galatians and the Romans. It is evident that this doctrine contains a double apologetic. On the one hand, St. Paul is arguing against the law as a condition of salvation. In establishing a claim for the admission of the Gentiles he suggests that the distinguishing mark of the Chosen People is not the law nor circumcision, but faith in God. It was Abraham's faith that enabled him to be justified. The true children of Abraham and the true heirs of the promise given to him are those who have his supreme characteristic, namely faith. On the other hand, the apostle is arguing against the idea of merit which attaches itself to the law. The observance of the law is no substitute for faith. The Jew, therefore, must seek acceptance with God not on the basis of works but on the basis of faith. Now in the apostle's view, the faith which God recognises is faith in Jesus Christ and in His resurrection. Abraham's faith was of this order because he believed in the God of the resurrection, the God "who quickeneth

the dead." (Rom. 4:17) Although Sara's womb was dead, likewise his own power of procreation, Abraham believed that God could give life to the dead. Hence his faith was a prototype of the Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ.¹ It is by this faith, says St. Paul, and not by any merit of the law, that the Christian is justified before God.

The doctrine of justification by faith thus serves a very practical purpose in the apostle's missionary effort. On the basis of this doctrine he can establish his right to admit the Gentiles into the church without circumcision, he can preach to the Jews the necessity of believing in Jesus Christ, and he can appeal to the Jewish Christians for a higher form of Christianity than self-righteous legalism. By finding the genesis of salvation in the grace of God the apostle is able to set the new religion free from all historical and racial encumbrances even while seeing in the history of his own race the prime evidence of God's grace. The doctrine is, therefore, of practical interest to St. Paul and has rightly been called his polemic doctrine. This, and the fact that faith is so utterly opposed to works, has led many authorities to the assumption that it is devoid of ethics.

On our view, however, the doctrine of justification by faith is an important step in the development of St. Paul's ethico-religious teaching. It is true that it suffers from the

1. This interpretation was suggested by Professor W. Manson in class room lectures.

handicaps of its metaphoric expression, but the stress the apostle lays upon it is not misplaced. It is the specific elaboration of a concept which is fundamental alike to his theology and to his ethics. St. Paul has traced unethical conduct to its source in man's wrong relationship to God. He sees man's sin as primarily an act of self-confidence, his egotistic rebellion against God. Since man has cut himself off from God he finds himself under God's wrath. Having passed over into the camp of God's enemies he serves the cause of sin. He has no contact with that divine power which alone can produce right conduct. He lives within the confines of his sin-infested flesh and has no awareness of the Spirit and no appeal to any source of power beyond himself. God has given him up to uncleanness and a reprobate mind. The apostle's answer to this human predicament is the preaching of Christ crucified. At the Cross God at once demonstrates the terrible consequences of the world's sin, and at the same time reveals His love and mercy. Being reconciled to God through Jesus Christ man finds acceptance with Him. The believer enters into Christ and as a member of His body lives his life in the closest communion with Him and with his fellow members. The result is a new type of conduct, one inspired and empowered by love, for the love of Christ articulates itself in the believer's dealings with others. It is a new type of life, one lived after the Spirit and not after the flesh, for the Spirit is the creator and sustainer of the new life.

The doctrine of justification by faith is the elaboration of the truth that God's wrath is satisfied and His righteousness vindicated when the believer approaches through faith in Jesus Christ. It is not another and alternate form of salvation but an illustration of one aspect of the apostle's one main theme. It has real significance for St. Paul's ethics. In the Roman epistle we see how he uses this doctrine to lay the theological foundation for his ethical exhortation. Its exposition is thoroughly intertwined with the various descriptions of the universal sinfulness. There can be no doubt that the apostle thought of it as the explicit answer to the problem of sin. Since the prime sin is presumption, it is fatal for man to approach God on the basis of works. On the other hand, the approach of faith is the sign that self-confidence has been cast aside. Faith means the readiness to seek the center of life's meaning in God and not in self, the trusting of one's life to Him. The righteousness which characterizes this new relationship to God is one that has its sole source in God. It is God's gift. It is not primarily an ethical quality but rather a new relationship, a rightness with God. God has graciously accepted the sinner on the basis of his faith. Thus his justification is never simply the means of securing a righteousness which will merit a reward, for he knows that his rightness with God is due solely to God's mercy. It is only because He is willing to accept faith as righteousness that a man can be justified. This strikes at the roots of

man's pride. St. Paul points this out in Rom. 3:27, "Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay: but by the law of faith."

Through the doctrine of justification by faith the apostle has established a foundation upon which he can build his ethics. First, because the basis of sin, human pride, has been eradicated. Secondly, because the new life is centered in God who alone can provide the power and the guidance for right conduct. Thirdly, because the believer is constantly aware that he is under grace, from which follow motives of thankfulness, duty and love. Finally, because his faith is in Jesus whose historic life is known and whose sacrificial death is recognized as a vicarious offering on the sinner's behalf. Hence the incentive of gratitude and the desire to imitate the life of Jesus become logical points of appeal in the apostle's ethical teaching.

These ethical implications, however, are dependent upon the proper interpretation of the meaning of justification as conveyed by the various forms of the term, especially the noun *δικαιοσύνη* and the verb *δικαίω*. It is possible, by a certain interpretation, to diminish the value of this doctrine for ethics almost to the vanishing point. If *δικαιοσύνη* is conceived as primarily an ethical term, the ethical significance of the doctrine is thereby reduced. If the verb *δικαίω* means "to make righteous," or "to impute righteousness," or even simply "to declare righteous," the doctrine of justification

may be judged to have relative unimportance for ethical teaching. Its ethical significance is in inverse proportion to the ethical content of the term "righteous." If, when the sinner is justified, he is made righteous, his righteousness is a fait accompli and moral exhortation loses its sense of urgency and its vitality. If he is not made righteous but declared to be so, when, in fact, he is not, the importance of ethics is problematical. It may be said that the declaration renders him potentially righteous, the verdict being in anticipation of the ultimate result. In this way value is given to ethics, for the believer must see to it that he becomes in actuality what he is now only in potentiality. But it is questionable if this can be described as a logical relation between doctrine and ethics. Rather, the logic seems to turn in the other direction. If God has declared the sinner to be righteous, righteous he must be, regardless of what any one else has to say about the matter. Consequently, admonition and exhortation are logically irrelevant. Moreover, if God calls a sinner a righteous man, sin cannot matter greatly to Him, for He can simply call it righteousness. Hence ethics is not conceived to be of vital importance. Such deductions were made in St. Paul's lifetime by people who misunderstood his doctrine of justification, and they have been a recurrent feature in the history of Christian thought. Whenever justification is considered to be primarily a conveyance or imputation of ethical righteousness the teaching of ethics is bound to have the appearance of unreality

or of paradox.

The point at issue is the meaning of *δικαίω*. It is now generally agreed that it cannot mean "to make righteous."¹ The rendering "to pronounce righteous" is usually preferred. But this also gives a wrong connotation, for it stresses the ethical aspect. C. H. Dodd has pointed out that the occurrence of this word and its cognates in the Pauline epistles is undoubtedly due to the Septuagint where, true to the underlying Hebrew, its primary meaning is "to be in the right," more than "to be right."² A man is justified and is thereby declared not to be righteous but to be in the right. J. Skinner³ says that it is the forensic element which predominates in the Old Testament; questions of right and wrong are regarded as capable of being decided at a tribunal, imaginary or real. In one sense righteousness means being in the right in a case. One participant is judged to be in the right, the other to be in the wrong. The one who is in the right is justified. As illustrations Skinner refers to Deut. 25:1, 10:19, Exod. 23:7,8, Isa. 5:23, 29:21 and other texts. Another sense is the establishment of a legal status. (Isa. 5:23) Righteousness is also "the quality expected of the judge in the exercise of his office." But righteousness, as applied to God, is more than that

1. So, Marshall, op. cit., p. 251, Dodd, op. cit., p. 10, Stewart, op. cit., p. 257, C. A. A. Scott, "Christianity According to St. Paul," p. 55, Sanday and Headlam, op. cit., p. 30.
 2. "The Epistle of Paul to the Romans," p. 10.
 3. "Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible," vol. iv, p. 272.

quality which is capable of dealing justly with mankind. It is His capacity for self-revelation and the carrying out of His purpose in history. In the latter part of Isaiah, when God "speaks righteousness," the meaning is clearly that He intends to see that His will is obeyed on earth. (Isa. 45:19-21) Because of His righteousness He is the Saviour. "I that speak righteousness, mighty to save." (Isa. 63:1) In the words of J. Skinner, God's righteousness "embraces a redemptive purpose." It is at this point that the notable contribution of Norman H. Snaith becomes relevant to our argument.

In his book, "The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament,"¹ Snaith traces the development of the Old Testament concept of holiness. He shows that the word $\psi\tau\rho$ came to designate that divine attribute which shows the difference between God and man. It is essentially a manifested quality. He writes: "Transcendence does not mean remoteness. It means otherness. It can involve remoteness only when religion is treated as being primarily speculative or ethical instead of being primarily a matter of relationship, with these other elements none the less important, but definitely secondary. Still less among the Hebrews does transcendence imply static remoteness, or any type of passivity."² Now, in Snaith's view the distinctive contribution of the eighth-century prophets was

1. This work supplies the basis of the discussion in this and the following two paragraphs.

2. op. cit., p. 47.

their association of the idea of holiness with the idea of righteousness. As a result, "they gave a new content to the idea of Holiness."¹ The very holiness of God required that all who are holy, i.e., belonging to God, must exhibit and reproduce His holiness in their lives, i.e., by sound ethical conduct. The connection of the two ideas is seen in Isa. 5:16, "the holy God is sanctified in righteousness." In Isa. 6:1-5, the display of God's holiness leads Isaiah to the consciousness of his own unrighteousness. "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips." The denunciations brought by these prophets against Israel and her neighbours are concerned with moral conduct, although other matters are also mentioned. The basis of the demand for righteousness is the holiness of God. We have already called attention to a specific example in Amos 2:6-8. Unethical conduct is viewed as a profanation of God's holy name. As Snaith avers, the eighth-century prophets were primarily religious prophets.² While they were essentially ethical prophets, their ethic is religious in origin. They associated the idea of holiness with the idea of righteousness in such a way as to give a new content to the former idea.

But this association also brought a new development in the idea of righteousness, and this is of major importance to our present argument. We have noted that holiness is by no

1. op. cit., p. 52.

2. Ibid, p. 59.

means thought of as a static quality of the Godhead. It is always a manifested holiness, a holiness that passes over into, and produces an effect upon, the earthly community. This self-propagating quality becomes more and more attached to the concept of righteousness from the time of the eighth-century prophets. $\rho\tau\zeta$ is not only that standard which God expects in human relations, but it is that standard which he actively maintains. It is His act of establishing justice, and since, in the prophetic view, God is especially interested in the poor and needy, righteousness is more than justice. It is the vindication of "those who cannot themselves secure their own rights."¹ Hence it is associated with the idea of redemption, and this comes to be its principal meaning. So Snaith remarks, "It is incidental that tsedeg stands for justice. It is incidental because tsedeg actually stands for the establishment of God's will in the land, and secondarily for justice, because that is part of God's will."² So in Second-Isaiah the stage is reached when righteousness is practically a synonym for salvation. Frequently the same idea is conveyed in Hebraic parallelism, using righteousness in one part and salvation in the other. Thus:

"I bring near my righteousness; it shall not be far off, and my salvation shall not tarry: and I will place salvation in Zion for Israel my glory."
(Isa. 46:13)

1. Cf. Snaith, op. cit., p. 70.

2. Ibid, p. 70.

"Drop down, ye heavens, from above, and let the skies pour down righteousness: let the earth open, and let them bring forth salvation, and let righteousness spring up together; I the Lord have created it."

(Isa. 45:8)

"My righteousness is near; my salvation is gone forth." (Isa. 51:5)

"My salvation shall be forever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished." (Isa. 51:6)

It is evident that here righteousness corresponds in meaning to salvation. The trend in this direction is clearly noticeable in Jeremiah and the eighth-century prophets, and to a greater extent in the Psalms. But in Second-Isaiah it reaches its height, and righteousness stands for the mighty work of God in freeing the captive, restoring the broken-hearted and redeeming the destitute. Righteousness is the main-stay of the Servant. Here the idea is not primarily that the Servant will deal justly, although this is involved, but that he will not fail. "I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles: To open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoner from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house." (Isa. 42:6,7) What more natural place than the Servant passages could be imagined for St. Paul and the early Christians to look for soteriological terminology and ideas? We know from our main sources that the Christians of the first century were particularly fascinated by these passages, and there is no doubt that their interest in them was first aroused by Jesus Himself. We should be surprised if St. Paul's use of the term

"righteousness" were not on the same lofty plane as that of Second-Isaiah.

Returning now to the meaning of *δικαίω*, we see that we have a choice between two interpretations. If the term is used in the sense that is usual in classical Greek, its ethical significance is paramount. The noun *δικαιοσύνη* will mean "right conduct," or, in the abstract, "Justice." The verb will signify the rendering of a judgement on a man's conduct, the acknowledgement of his righteousness. But if the Old Testament sense prevails, the ethical quality may be of secondary importance. In the Septuagint *רָצַח* is usually rendered by *δικαιοσύνη*. The use of this term by St. Paul may well reflect the prophetic development of the concept of righteousness. It is most probable that in this case, as in so many others, the Septuagint would be regulative for the apostle and would affect his understanding of the meaning of the term. If so, *δικαίω* in the Pauline epistles will have a meaning akin to "save" or "redeem." This will explain many difficult features of the apostle's doctrine of justification by faith, and will also explain the ease with which it was misunderstood by his critics in the Greek speaking cities of the empire. But before rendering a verdict we must investigate the Pauline usage of the term and see how such an interpretation fits into the thought structure of the passages concerned.

It is immediately evident that the ethical element predominates in some passages where St. Paul uses *δικαιοσύνη*

as a human attribute, although not in every such case, i.e., Gal. 2:21. An example of the ethical use is Rom. 2:26 where the apostle speaks of the uncircumcision keeping the righteousness of the law. This is in line with the Old Testament usage. But when he refers to the righteousness of God his primary thought, again reflecting the Old Testament, is of something more comprehensive. We turn first to Rom. 1:17, "For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith; as it is written, The just shall live by faith." To begin with, ἐν αὐτῷ must refer back to the τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in the previous verse. It is hardly natural to take it with σωτηρίαν and, in any case, the difference in gender is decisive. If we take the two verses together we have a striking parallelism very similar to that in the verses already quoted from Second-Isaiah. The first part of verse 16 is introductory and connective. The γάρ connects what follows with the thought of verse 15, and introduces the reason for his readiness to preach the gospel. "For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ." This he further explains by means of two supplementary and parallel clauses, each introduced by γάρ. The first clause explains that the gospel is "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." The second clause states that in the gospel "the righteousness of God (is) revealed from faith to faith." Thus we have the familiar parallelism between righteousness and salvation. Perhaps the ἐν αὐτῷ would indicate that the terms are not quite

identical, but it might be no more than a grammatical change of expression. In any case there is a close affinity between the two terms, righteousness and salvation. They refer to the same divine operation. In each case faith is the basis, and God is the source, of the action. Our understanding of *δικαιοσύνη* will therefore be influenced by our understanding of *σωτηρίαν*.

Let us examine the phrase *δύναμις Θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν*. *Eis* may be understood in the common sense of suggesting purpose or end. The power of God is intended to produce and ultimately does produce salvation. *Eis* might be taken in the same sense as in Rom. 4:3, where it is stated that Abraham's faith was counted for, or as, righteousness, although there it is admittedly translation Greek. The former sense is to be preferred. But in any event, whether the power of God is displayed as salvation, or as a means of producing salvation, it is a power which is already active and effective. The gospel is more than the preaching of the word. It is the word at work. It is more than the announcement of salvation. It is salvation actually being carried over into the believer's life. That is why it is the power of God. The significance of the word *σωτηρίαν* is made plain by Sanday and Headlam in their commentary, ad loc. In the Old Testament we find it applied first to deliverance from physical danger, then to deliverance on a national scale, such as the Exodus and the Return from exile, and finally, to the expected Messianic deliverance. The

commentary shows that New Testament writers have used the word in this last sense, as in Luke 1:69,71,77, Acts 13:26, 1 Thess. 5:9,10. St. Paul was convinced that Jesus was the Messiah, that the Messianic Age had dawned, that God had acted to redeem His people from bondage to sin and evil spirits, and that all the blessings of salvation were available to those who believed in Jesus Christ. Salvation was thus the content of the Christian gospel. But more than this, the very preaching of the word, with all its accompanying wonders, was a demonstration of salvation. The gospel was proof that salvation had been achieved. God Himself was present and active in the Christian evangel. The new age, the activity of the Holy Spirit, the success of the gospel, were signs that salvation had occurred. We shall not be far wrong if we think of σωτηρία as an event rather than merely as a status or condition.

While not equating the two terms, righteousness and salvation, we hold that they are of the same nature, as far as the Pauline epistles are concerned, and that here the apostle stands in the true prophetic tradition. The righteousness of God is His capacity for effecting His will. It is His mighty act in the redemption of the world. Thus it partakes of the nature of an event, an event in history, the work of the Messiah, but also an event in the individual life, when the results of the Messiah's work are appropriated through faith. The gospel is at once the witness to, and the instrument of, God's righteousness. "For therein is the righteousness of God

revealed."

The word "revealed" has an important bearing on our understanding of "righteousness." C. Anderson Scott states that ἀποκαλύπτεται is patient of two meanings.¹ In the first place it can mean "demonstrated." In the second place it can mean "conferred or communicated." He is of the opinion that St. Paul here uses the word in the latter sense, and he gives three reasons for this opinion. (1) Ἀποκαλύπτεται has this meaning in the following verse. The wrath of God has actually encompassed men. In Scott's words, "It is not a fact which is being revealed but an experience which is being gone through." (2) It is difficult to explain the prepositions in the phrase ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν if ἀποκαλύπτεται means "demonstrated." (3) It is also difficult to understand the applicability of the quotation from Hab. 2:4 if the former sense is accepted. The conclusion is that God's righteousness is being carried over into the life of the believer. It is His victorious redemptive activity which has conquered the powers of evil and is now being released in, and made available to, the individual on the ground of faith. It is not the moral character of God which has been called into question. God had already revealed that. The man of faith would need no assurance of that. His primary question would be, When is God going to act? The new note which the Christian gospel sounded was that God had acted. The

1. Cf. "Christianity According to St. Paul," p. 63.

revelation of His righteousness was the conferring of the effects of His action upon the individual believer.

From this point of view it is possible to give an interpretation of the phrase *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν . Εἰς πίστιν* can mean "to faith," since *ἀποκαλύπτεται* here practically amounts to a verb of motion. The sense is that the righteousness of God is conferred on faith. It is the man who has faith, not the man who has doubt, who receives it. *Ἐκ πίστεως* refers to the ability of a man to receive and recognise it. It is only faith that can perceive that redemption is real and that the forces of sin have actually been destroyed. So faith, the one and the same faith in each case, is both the ground on which the gift is conferred and the faculty which receives and appreciates it.

This interpretation has the advantage of allowing us to translate the *ἐκ πίστεως* in the quotation from Habakkuk in the same way. It is by faith that a man is able to live, for his faith makes it possible for him to see the redemptive activity of God. In regard to faith, perhaps the germ of St. Paul's thought may be discovered in Habakkuk. The latter, however, is looking to a future event, while it is for the apostle already present. Habakkuk is concerned with the apparent reign of evil and the sense of depression thus engendered in the godly man. But he declares that his faith enables him to see the coming judgement upon society. The prophet pronounces, in anticipation, the details of that

judgement, and comforts himself with the thought that God is ready to act. "But the Lord is in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before him." (Hab. 2:20) For the prophets, such a vision usually carries the implication that God's judgement is assured and imminent. It is as if the prophet sees God engaged in the business of making ready for the initiating of His promised intervention in the affairs of men. It is this faith which enables the righteous man to live. Confidence, or steadfastness, is the key note in Habakkuk. There is no antithesis between faith and works. Indeed, "fidelity" is a suitable rendering. St. Paul, of course, interprets it differently. The R. V. "He who through faith is righteous shall live" seems possible as a translation, but it is better to take *ἐκ πίστεως* with the verb. For St. Paul faith is a very comprehensive term. The belief that God will and does vindicate the faithful is but one aspect of it. But it may be that this is the aspect which he is emphasizing in this quotation. The man whom God has redeemed is able really to live because by faith he possesses the full assurance of the reality of his redemption. The result of salvation is a new and genuine life. So it may be that the apostle has been attracted to the maxim from Habakkuk by the occurrence therein of the key words *ζήσεται* and *ἐκ πίστεως*, and the term *δίκαιος* is a word which happened to be in his text. He gave little thought to the relation between *δίκαιος* and *δικαιοσύνη*. *Δίκαιος* is simply a term for a religious man, one who is close to God.

In Habakkuk it stands for the man who is close to God and shows it in his conduct. St. Paul accepts the term but lays no stress on it. This interpretation may be considered a radical departure from the accepted exegesis. But there is no more reason for supposing that the use of *δικαιοσύνη* has reminded the apostle of the *δίκαιος* in Habakkuk than for supposing that the phrase *ἐκ πίστεως*, which he has just used, has brought to mind the identical phrase in that prophecy.¹ What the apostle is here stressing is not that the righteousness of God results in man being righteous, but that when God's righteousness, i.e., His redemption, is made effective in a man's life on the basis of his faith, when, in other words, he has been freed from the power of sin and brought into the new life of fellowship with God, it is faith that enables him to live according to the pattern of the new life and to enjoy with assurance the full implications of his new freedom.

The righteousness of God is His gracious act of redemption which is granted to the believer because of his faith, and continued in his life through faith. The bestowal of this righteousness is what St. Paul calls justification. So we look upon justification as a particular statement of his doctrine of redemption, which in turn is a particular statement of his concept of life in Christ. In justification there is no

1. Cf. Lightfoot, "Notes on Epistles of St. Paul," p. 251. Lightfoot supports the view that "faith" is "the really emphatic word" here.

bestowal or imputation of ethical righteousness, but the way to sound ethical conduct is made possible by the removal of the power of sin, and the granting of new powers through the Holy Spirit.

The supreme act of redemption was what God did at Calvary. At the Cross Jesus redeemed man from sin. Justification is the conferring of the benefits of that victory upon the individual believer. It is the process of redemption carried over into the life of the Christian on the basis of his faith.

Turning now to the section beginning in Rom. 3:20, we test our interpretation in the variety of expressions found there. First of all, verse 20, "Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin." The apostle's thesis is that the law cannot redeem man from sin for it only gives him a knowledge of sin. The word *ἐνώπιον*, which owes its presence here to the reminiscence of Psalm 143, does, it is true, have forensic implications, particularly when it is translated "in his sight." It thus gives weight to the idea of justification as the conferring of a status. But it may be interpreted as suggesting no more than the presence of God as the real source of justification, even though the law could justify a man. The word does not appear in the parallel passage in Gal. 2:16, and here it is not to be stressed. In any case, we are not arguing against the idea of a status being conferred. That is always a concomitant of justification. What

we are suggesting is that justification is more than this, and that primarily it has a redemptive significance. We have sought to show that this idea is dominant in this verse.

In the following verses the same thought is uppermost. Thus verses 21 and 22, "But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; Even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all ..." The righteousness of God is manifested in Christ's death on the cross, as is made clear in verse 25. St. Paul is thinking of Christ's death not as a demonstration of the moral character of God, but as the actualizing of His redemptive purpose. It is an event which took place within human history and is thereby made manifest to men. Moreover, this is the event which is anticipated and prophesied in the law and the prophets. The law and the prophets did serve to reveal the moral requirements of God, but in St. Paul's view their greatest significance was in pointing forward to the redemption in Christ.¹ It is through this redemption that a man is justified. "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness ..." (verses 25, 26) The meaning of *ἱλαστήριον* will be discussed in the next

1. On *μαρτυρουμένη* κ.τ.λ. Lightfoot comments "especially by the foreshadowings of the mode and scheme of man's redemption both in the law and in the prophets," cf. "Notes on Epistles of St. Paul," p. 270.

chapter. We must here, however, state that, whatever its meaning, the object of *ἰλαστήριον* is man and not God. God is the subject of *προέθετο* and also in a sense the author of *ἰλαστήριον*. This word therefore stands for something which is closely connected with redemption. So we can say that St. Paul's whole thought here is concerned with the process of redemption and its effects. Redemption involves a freeing from sin, a forgiveness of sin and a cleansing from sin. Now, for St. Paul, redemption has been won by Christ. In His death He conquered sin and released man from its power. But men are still enslaved until the Victor at Calvary has carried the battle into the life of the individual and completed His victory there. Bishop Lightfoot remarks on this aspect. He says, "There is the external act, what has been done for us, our purchase, the atoning sacrifice: Christ died for us. But there must be also the internal change, what is to be done in us: We must have died with Christ."¹ The individualistic phase of redemption St. Paul calls justification. His argument is that the law cannot produce it, but that it is granted freely by the grace of God. Not all receive it, for it is only through faith that it can be received. The justification of the individual is made possible by the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, and is freely given on the ground of faith.

The same characteristics of justification are found

1. op. cit., p. 270.

in the Galatian passages on the subject. We cannot here give a detailed analysis of every text, but mention will be made of some of the features of the apostle's thought in this epistle.

We are now in a position to reach a conclusion regarding the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη* in the Pauline epistles. We have observed that when the apostle is speaking of the righteousness of man he may be thinking of it simply as ethical conduct. But his primary thought is of a right standing with God, a status conferred by Him, with the suggestion that it is the result of a verdict of acquittal. And when St. Paul speaks of the righteousness of God, it is the soteriological aspect which is uppermost. Justification means primarily the redemption of the individual believer. It also means the believer's acceptance with God, the granting of membership in His kingdom or household. And it means that the believer, who has been redeemed from the power of sin and admitted to the fellowship of Christ, is set in a new situation where ethical conduct is both possible and natural.

It is no part of this thesis to deny the ethical element in justification. On the contrary, St. Paul's thought is never far removed from ethics. The terms used always carry the implication of righteous conduct. But we have been concerned to show that the total concept has a much wider horizon. In some contexts, nothing less than salvation is meant, and in most the redemptive connotation is to be understood. We have endeavoured to demonstrate that the terms

can usually be interpreted in this way. Doubtless in some cases the exegesis ought not to be strained, and it is better to admit that St. Paul is simply referring to righteous conduct or a righteous status. The apostle uses the terms in a variety of ways with different emphases. But there can be no doubt that the redemptive significance of justification is vital to his thought. It provides the best interpretation of the much-discussed statement in Rom. 4:5, that God justifies the ungodly. The context indicates that the ungodly man here is one who has no visible connection with God. He is one without merit. But God justifies him. This surely cannot mean that God states that he is a righteous man, or even that He states that he is in the right. But it can mean that God redeems him, and this is the wonderful thing about the grace of God. Salvation is freely given.

While the righteousness of God is to be interpreted in the sense of salvation, there is no evidence that its ethical significance is excluded. It is because the character of God is righteous that His redemptive act in history is called righteousness. God's very nature requires righteousness. His real purpose is to bring men into fellowship with Himself. But men can only experience and appreciate full fellowship with Him when they are themselves righteous. The Jews, therefore, sought to become righteous in order to find acceptance with God. (Rom. 2:13) But St. Paul knows that such a method is hopeless. There is none righteous. But God has ordained another

way, a way which makes righteousness, not the requisite but the result of salvation. And this is the way, for it antedates even the law. God has decided to accept the man who has faith and to bring him into the fellowship, where, freed from the power of sin, and under the influence of the Holy Spirit, he will be able to live a life of righteousness. He offers man a way not of ethical righteousness but of faith. Faith is not righteousness. Nor is it made into righteousness to satisfy the requirement of justification. Faith itself satisfies the requirement because God has made it the basis of justification. The fact that God has done so is what the apostle means by grace. It was on this basis that God justified Abraham.

We must now ask, What is the nature of this faith which God accepts instead of righteousness? Three elements may be noted in Abraham's faith. First, it was belief in God, that He had revealed Himself, and that He had promised to bless him. Secondly, it was confidence in God, that He could and would fulfil His promise. Thirdly, it was trust in God, the active re-arranging of his life in accordance with his belief. St. Paul does not use Abraham's faith to illustrate what faith involves but only to describe how it operates. We can say, however, that for him the most prominent feature of Abraham's faith was the quality of the relationship between the patriarch and God. On the one hand, it is the God of the resurrection reaching out to quicken his servant in body and soul, and on the other hand, it is the simple trust of one who is ready to

accept God at His word and risk his comfort and security for the sake of obedience to Him.

The apostle wisely makes no attempt to elucidate his concept on the analogy of Abraham's faith. His thought is too extensive and too rich to risk the limiting effect of any one human illustration. Faith involves insight into the reality of the unseen world. (2 Cor. 5:7) It is belief in the existence of God,¹ and in His capacity as Lord of the resurrection,² and in the fact of the resurrection.³ It is belief in Christ.

(Phil. 1:29) Moreover, it is confidence that God will fulfil His promises, a confidence which is shown in the patterning of one's life in accordance with the divine will.⁴ Faith can therefore be expressed through love. (Gal. 5:6) Thus, as L. H. Marshall points out, it comprises belief, trust and loyalty. "A man really believes in God only when he is aware of a spiritual Power whose right to rule over him he recognises. A man really trusts God only when he concedes the validity of the moral claims God makes upon him and looks to God for power to fulfil them. A man is genuinely loyal to God only as he surrenders his will to the will of God."⁵ This is a very careful statement and avoids many of the discrepancies which frequently appear in attempts to describe the nature of faith.

1. Rom. 10:14.

2. Rom. 4:24.

3. Rom. 10:9.

4. Rom. 4:3, 14:23, 16:26.

5. op. cit., p. 272.

It leaves the initiative with God, thus avoiding the implication of a "work." It does not define faith as obedience, for that would make it a kind of ethical righteousness. Faith is essentially a readiness to trust oneself to the power of God. Faith in Christ is "simply the willing to be justified through Christ."¹ So C. H. Dodd writes, "It is an act which is the negation of all activity, a moment of passivity out of which the strength for action comes, because in it God acts."² And yet G. B. Stevens is not wrong when he says that it is "not a mere passive receptivity; it does not simply receive; it uses what God bestows."³

Part of the difficulty with the concept of faith arises from the fact that the apostle does not distinguish between the faith which leads to justification and that which leads to sanctification. He would no doubt say that it was one and the same faith, and that would be true. But faith is not a static quality. It begins with an initial act of God. It continues in the act of man's response. Thereafter it is an act of communion. Faith in Christ is faith "in Christ." His will permeates the believer's will and the believer conducts his life in Christ. But to begin with, the believer's faith can only be a shadow of things to come. If faith is a "reciprocal indwelling of Christ in the believer and of the

1. Weizsacker, op. cit., p. 191.

2. op. cit., p. 16.

3. op. cit., p. 422.

believer in Christ,"¹ then justification is only the confirmation of a fact, the rendering of a verdict on what has already happened. It is not a grace gift. But God justifies the sinner freely. He redeems the believer and until He does so the believer is incapable of such faith. He cannot be loyal to God until God has freed him from the power of sin. He cannot live in Christ until he has been redeemed through Christ. God gives him his faith, such faith as he is capable of receiving, and when he has responded to this act of love God saves him and brings him into the fellowship where faith is nurtured, the faith that issues in love and obedience and in perfect communion with God in Christ. The faith which is "a reciprocal indwelling of Christ" is the result of justification and leads to sanctification. But the aspect of faith which is central in justification is the readiness of the believer to respond to God's gift and to trust himself to God's action. It contains the seeds of the fuller faith of active participation in the fellowship. But the apostle's argument makes it clear that the faith which leads to justification is that attitude of utter humility which can find no grounds for hope save in the grace of God.

In his doctrine of faith St. Paul is in harmony with the teaching of Jesus. Faith is childlike trust, that eagerness to accept what is offered, without question or reservation. It

1. G. B. Stevens, op. cit., p. 423.

is the act of throwing oneself on the mercy of God, the humility of the publican who instinctively knows that he has nothing to offer in return. It is the return of the prodigal who knows that, however lowly his status is to be, home will still be better than the far country. And on the basis of such faith the Father God forgives His children and welcomes them into His household as His rightful heirs. St. Paul stands in the true Synoptic tradition when he expounds his doctrine of justification by faith.

The seeds of the Johannine concept have also germinated in the Pauline epistles. Probably before the apostle ever knew that Jesus had said, "I am the vine, ye are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing,"¹ he had learned from experience that the man in Christ had a source of strength outside himself, manifesting itself in his own life. Faith is the soul's response to God through Christ. It is carried out "in Christ." Deissmann remarks that "faith is something which is accomplished in union of life with the spiritual Christ."² As J. S. Stewart suggests, "Christ is not only the object of faith, but the sphere in which faith lives and moves and grows and operates."³ Therefore faith is dynamic because it involves the direct action of Christ in the believer's

1. Jn. 15:5.

2. "Paul," p. 162. Cf. "The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul," pp. 205ff.

3. op. cit., p. 183.

life. It leads to ethical conduct although it does not start with it. In the words of P. Wernle, "Paul can never grant that any awakening of new moral power would be possible through man's unaided efforts."¹

It is almost impossible to define the exact nature of man's first exertion of faith. In St. Paul's view it is not action but reaction. It is therefore response. But even the response is part of God's action. The initiative remains with Him and everything that the believer has comes from Him. As R. Niebuhr intimates, there is always a conviction in the believer's heart that he has been helped to his belief.² "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." (1 Cor. 12:3) Even the response of love is itself a gift. When the apostle says that "all things work together for good to them that love God," he hastily adds, "to them who are the called according to his purpose."² Faith begins with the acceptance of God's gift. It is awakened by the gospel, which is the visible evidence of God's historic gift. It is continued

1. op. cit., p. 185.

2. Rom. 8:28. Sanday and Headlam take *συνεργεῖ* transitively, "causes all things to work," and they accept the variant reading *ὁ Θεός*. Most commentators supply *ὁ Θεός* as subject of *συνεργεῖ*. "God co-operates for good in all things." Cf. Dodd, *ad loc.* But if a subject is to be supplied, a better sentence structure is obtained by supplying *τὸ Πνεῦμα* from verse 26. However, the A. V. seems satisfactory here, and *πάντα* seems the logical subject for *συνεργεῖ*. In Col. 1:20 St. Paul suggests that part of the work of Christ was to reconcile *τὰ πάντα*. In a mystical sense the Christian already has the first-fruits of that reconciliation. It may not be true literally, but it may nevertheless be near the truth to declare in faith, "All things co-operate for good with them that love God."

by accepting and using the further gifts of God's grace, that is by living in Christ. J. Weiss stresses the continuity of the initial act of faith. "Certainly this beginning of faith in the life of the Christian which requires that one 'resolve upon faith' at the time of his conversion, is not restricted to that moment but henceforth becomes the fundamental basis of the religious life."¹ The faith which brings justification is the attitude of receptivity. But this same attitude produces ethical conduct, for by it the believer receives the grace which enables him to live according to God's will. He receives freedom from the power of sin. He receives the gift of the Spirit. He receives the adoption into the household of God, and the blessings of fellowship in Christ. Thus he has the mind of Christ, not only an ideal of conduct but the very presence of Christ as a sharer in his acts. As Brunner remarks, "Previously, life, even at its best, is always a life directed towards God; now, henceforth life is lived from God as its centre."² The same faith which brings justification also results in ethical righteousness by utilizing the blessings received in justification.

When the greatness of the possibilities in justification sweeps over the apostle's mind, and when he recalls that God Himself is its guarantor, it is no wonder that he can speak of ethical righteousness as the gift of God,

1. op. cit., vol. I, p. 428.

2. "The Divine Imperative," p. 76.

and that he can think of it as conferred at the very beginning in justification. But when he contemplates the actual situation among his converts he is distressed by the fact that they have in their possession everything that makes for right conduct and yet fail to implement their blessings. His ethical exhortation is coloured by his doctrine of justification. He does not urge them to attain to righteousness as a means of appeasing God. He tells them that they have been redeemed from sin and brought into the fellowship of Christ. The major difficulties have been removed. All that they need to do is to accept God's gifts and live the life that is made possible for them. As with baptism, when the believer became a member of Christ and died to sin, yet needs to crucify the flesh by his own act, so in justification the believer receives the gift of redemption which includes righteousness, yet he must work out his own salvation. But the significant fact is that through faith he finds that it is God who is working in him.

St. Paul's thoughts on justification are so rich and varied that no systematic presentation can do justice to every side of this great concept. We must realize that his written word comes out of controversy, and is directed towards a particular situation. In one section a certain aspect of his doctrine may be exaggerated out of proportion to the other aspects. In his argument against the law he must emphasize faith, and if this were all we had on the subject we should derive a doctrine which would raise faith to the status of a

work. When he is dealing with works he must emphasize the grace of God, and this might lead us to suppose that nothing in man has value in God's sight and that His choice of whom to justify is not only arbitrary but sheer caprice. But for all that, there is no real inconsistency. The underlying unity of the concept is not destroyed by the difference in emphasis which his polemic necessitates. When the apostle's enthusiasm is kindled by the mightiness of God's act of grace the need for ethics apparently almost vanishes. But when he is concerned with the disparity between the actual and the ideal, his ethic touches the depth of pathos and then, taking the wings of hope, lifts his hearers to the full assurance of the wonderful reality of the life in Christ.

Justification means redemption in Christ, rightness with God, and righteousness because God is righteous. If the emphasis is on the last, it might well be said that there is no connection between the doctrine of justification and ethical teaching. But the primary emphasis is on the first. As Snaithe points out, the order is faith - salvation - righteousness.¹ Righteousness means salvation before it means conduct. Thus in Rom. 6:16, righteousness is a synonym for life. "Whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness." Sin is here contrasted with obedience, likewise death with righteousness, giving righteousness the connotation

1. op. cit., p. 171.

of life.¹ So Weizsacker holds that "That which takes place in justification by faith in Jesus is no mere judicial sentence."² It is more than acquittal. It is the act of grace whereby a believer finds himself within the fellowship. Thus it results in sonship, and in the various ethical implications derived from this great concept. We may safely connect the ethics of sonship with the doctrine of justification, for it is this doctrine which illuminates the graciousness of God in His act of adoption. One aspect of God's righteousness is His wrath, that principle of retribution in the universe which descends upon men in their sins, causing them to suffer for their transgressions, to realize the displeasure of God and to feel the tragic misery of their alienation from Him. The doctrine of justification does justice to both sides of the righteousness of God. The sinner is made conscious of his utter helplessness before the inexorable retribution of God's wrath. In the death of Christ he sees how inexorable it is, for the consequence of the world's sin is there made manifest. But in Christ's death he also sees the other side of God's righteousness, His readiness to take the penalty upon Himself in the sinner's stead. And as a result, the believer experiences the liberation of redemption and the joy of adoption into the family of God. In justification he stands before God, the Wholly Other, with a conviction of his own sinfulness and of the qualitative

1. Cf. N. H. Snaith, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

2. *op. cit.*, p. 167.

difference between his own nature and God's, and on the basis of his faith he finds forgiveness and acceptance with God, and enters into the life of the Christian fellowship. It is only as he sees God as the Wholly Other, the One who is completely removed in His nature and character, that he can appreciate the sheer grace of adoption into that sonship whereby he calls God "Father."

When the concept of sonship is seen to be a definition or illustration of one aspect of justification a potent motive for ethics is brought to bear upon the thought of sonship. St. Paul does not show the specific relationship between the two ideas, but there can be no doubt that in his thought justification involves the granting of the privilege of sonship.¹ In justification the believer actually becomes a son of God. It is this thought which lends such poignancy to the ethical appeals based on the fact of sonship. A son naturally tries to emulate his father. But when a man knows that he is only a creature, subject to death, and having no merit or any possibility of real life, and then finds himself, by the grace of God, accepted into His family and endowed with eternal life and all the blessings of an heir of God, he is constrained by an overwhelming sense of gratitude to seek to show in his life those qualities which are characteristic of his Father, and he enters upon his new status with a sense of thrill and adventure.

1. Cf. Weizsacker, op. cit., pp. 168-170.

Moreover, having experienced the power of God in raising him to his new position, he goes forward in the knowledge that this power is at work within him. Ethics thus has a threefold force. First, it appeals to the Christian to live worthily of his new position and to reflect the loving-kindness of his Father as revealed in Christ. Secondly, being under grace, the motives of gratitude, loyalty and the desire to please God are powerfully compelling. Thirdly, the assurance of a divine power and favour already experienced gives to the believer that confidence which is necessary to achievement.

It will be noted that in his epistles St. Paul does not draw out these ethical implications in this fashion. They are all present but not connected directly with the thought of sonship or the doctrine of justification. Frequently they are not connected with any doctrine. The explanation of this is the fact that in his epistles he deals directly with specific situations and gives his judgement on various matters of conduct. It is sufficient for his purpose to state the motives and principles which apply. He has already in his evangelistic preaching supplied the doctrinal basis for these motives, and in his letters he has also built up the foundation of ethics before proceeding to specific instruction. We can see that certain ethical principles may logically be derived from certain statements of doctrine, and we can see that the apostle makes use of these same principles elsewhere. It is not presuming too much on the apostle's intelligence to assert that

he drew out the ethical implications of his doctrine with a view to establishing the motives and principles which were to be applied in his exhortation. In our final chapter, when we deal with the motivation of his ethics, we shall see that the motives used are the same as those which we have found to be inchoate in his doctrine. Thus the motives of gratitude, loyalty, emulation, and the desire to please God, motives which are inherent in his doctrine of justification and vividly illustrated in the concept of sonship, may give rise to a wide variety of ethical directives.

In many cases, however, St. Paul does connect the ethical derivative with its doctrinal source. In Rom. 8:15ff. the Christian's readiness to endure suffering is based on the fact that he is not alone in his sufferings, for he suffers with Christ. This is based on the fact that he is a joint-heir with Christ, and this, in turn, on the fact that he has received the Spirit of adoption. Similarly, in Gal. 4:7ff., the necessity of turning away from the old habits of pre-Christian conduct is emphasized by the fact that the converts now belong to God and are His heirs. It is interesting to trace the development of his ethical position from a specific doctrine. In Gal. 4:5 the connection between sonship and redemption is established, both resulting from the Incarnation. In Eph. 5, the concept of sonship forms the basis for a whole section of ethical teaching. "Be ye therefore followers of God, as dear children; and walk in love, as Christ also hath loved

us, and hath given himself for us ..." (verses 1 and 2) Here, first, is the motive of emulation, to be like God in character and conduct, and then the motive of gratitude, the thankfulness for Christ's offering of self and the desire to reflect His love by loving conduct. The desire to live worthily becomes the motive of verse 3, for sonship involves a certain standard of behaviour. "But fornication, and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not be once named among you, as becometh saints." This thought is continued in the next verse with the added suggestion that instead of engaging in disgraceful and idle practices the Christian ought to be giving thanks to God. Continuing, the apostle states that immoral persons cannot claim inheritance in the kingdom. They are not the true children of God but the children of disobedience, and experience His wrath. But the children of the Lord are children of light and have no fellowship with the works of darkness. They must walk in the light, and they must remember that they have the Spirit, and "the fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness and righteousness and truth." (verse 9) Then follow instructions based on the theme of living worthily, always giving thanks, and submitting themselves unto the Lord. Under the latter head come the exhortations relating to family life, and in the wider sphere of society. As children of God they are all members of one family and must love one another even as they love themselves. "Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might." (6:10)

So far from being a concept from which no ethic can be derived, the doctrine of justification heightens the motives which are implied in other doctrines, and gives the assurance of divine help in the conduct of life. The charge of antinomianism only arises when one aspect is over-emphasized. When all the elements are seen in their proper perspective, justification is recognized to have a very vital significance for ethics. What the apostle has done through this doctrine is to protest that God does not withhold redemption until a man comes to Him with the proper degree of righteousness, but that He gives redemption freely on the ground of faith, and that it is only when a man has been redeemed from the power of sin and brought into the divine fellowship that he finds a source of strength sufficient for his needs. Henceforth he does not labour in vain, for he labours in the Lord, and his new life is not his alone but Christ living in him.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NATURE OF RECONCILIATION

There are some aspects of Redemption which, while present in the thought of justification, are not sufficiently emphasized thereby and these St. Paul articulates in his doctrine of reconciliation. By this concept the apostle is able to emphasize the fact that sin does matter to God. It might be thought that, since God saves men freely regardless of their sinfulness, He can simply ignore sin and carry out His plan of redemption as if sin did not exist. If this were so, ethics would be a matter of indifference to mankind and there would be no need to concern oneself with questions of conduct. The apostle, however, insists that it is not so. God must reckon with sin, for it has alienated men from Him and caused them to be hostile to Him. There is something objective about the nature of sin. As C. J. Barker indicates, "It is not enough to ignore sin: to treat the sinner as if he had never sinned."¹ The fact is that he has sinned, and his sin has

1. "The Way of Life," p. 45.

created a barrier which must be removed.¹ His sin is not just a perversion of the mind which might be corrected by right knowledge. It is not just an imperfection due to man's immaturity, and therefore amenable to growth and development. His sin is radical. It affects him in the very center of his being and cuts the nerve of any act of self-improvement. St. Paul's view is that God deals not only with the sinner but with sin itself. He takes upon Himself its consequences and eradicates its hold on man. Because it is radical evil He must take account of it and deal with it objectively. And this, according to the apostle, He has done at the Cross.

St. Paul believes that man's redemption costs God something. It is not a case of God calling sin righteousness and admitting the sinner to His presence on the same terms as a righteous man. God cancels sin by Himself bearing its consequences. He makes atonement for man's sin. In the doctrine of reconciliation St. Paul emphasizes the work of Christ and the necessity of that work for man's salvation. In justification this thought is indispensable, but it is nevertheless more in the background. It might be assumed from that doctrine that the significance of Christ was simply that He revealed God as ready to justify men, and that His death was solely to excite faith and to form a dogmatic ground on which faith could operate. But St. Paul's thought is greater than this, and in

1. Cf. Brunner, "The Mediator," p. 135, and elsewhere.

the concepts gathering about the idea of reconciliation the apostle gives expression to its greatness. Christ not only revealed God's method of reconciliation; He was that reconciliation.

It may be that the idea of the *koinonia* is also expressed more decisively under this doctrine. In Gal. 4:5, St. Paul connects the fact of sonship with redemption through Christ. Sonship with God implies the brotherhood of men, at least of redeemed men. We may take this as the logical implication of redemption, whether thought of as justification or reconciliation. But the latter concept has a further implication. There is more than a hint that it is actually a restoration. It is a restoration of a harmony that once existed, when, at Creation, God placed man in a world created for him and gave him human companionship, and in the cool of the evening came down Himself to walk in man's garden. Man was meant to live at harmony with his Creator and with his fellows, in a harmonious world. The man in Christ finds that all things have been made new, and as a new creation he lives at peace with God. Stronger than any ethical motive or reasoned argument, the sense of joy that overwhelms the Christian proves to be a major dynamic behind the day to day life of the man whom Christ has reconciled to God.

Everything in the Pauline theology points to the historic act of Christ on Calvary. All the present blessings of salvation are connected closely with the Cross. God's

forgiveness is rendered possible, is actually won for man by Christ's sacrifice. Forgiveness, joy, peace, reconciliation with God are the results of the death of Christ. So, the apostle's every word is coloured by the thought of "Christ crucified."

When we ask the nature of Christ's sacrifice we find a twofold answer. The Cross is the revelation of God's love. This does not mean that sin is simply due to ignorance, nor that the only sin actually affected by the Cross is that sin which a man has committed because he was unaware of God's love, a sin which he will not now repeat. But the man who has sinned deliberately now discovers that in spite of his sin God is reaching out to him with arms of love. It is not merely a new understanding of God's nature, but a positive awareness of God's love as active on his behalf and as affecting his own life; this is part of the meaning of the Cross.

But the Cross is more than God's self-revelation. It is an objective act of redemption, a necessary part of the work of salvation. This does not mean that sin is merely a puppet, put up to be cast down, or that salvation is simply a transaction between God and Himself. St. Paul accepts the idea of transaction but he calls for an act of identification. Man cannot pay the cost, but he can realize the cost, at least to a certain extent. And this realization costs him something. It is terrible! It goes beyond mere intellectual apprehension and touches him at the heart, radically affecting his emotions and

his volition. He cannot make atonement, but he can identify himself with it, with the dying of Christ. Under the Jewish sacrificial system there was provision for such an act of identification, whereby the offerer associated himself with his sacrificial offering. "And he shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him." (Lev. 1:4) For the Christian, God provides the sacrifice, i.e., Christ. By His incarnation Christ identified Himself with the sinner. But the sinner must show that he accepts the sacrifice as made on his behalf. This he does through faith. The sinner's self-identification with the Sacrifice is, for the apostle, far more than merely ethical, but it has the profoundest significance for ethics. The old leaven of wickedness must be cast out because Christ is our Πάσχα.

The sacrificial terminology is scarcely able to carry the full weight of St. Paul's doctrine of the atonement without resort to paradox. For the Victim and the Priest are one, and this is the greatness of the apostle's rich concept. The One who suffers is the second person of the Trinity, the Priest and Victim are God incarnate. The Cross is God's mighty act, and the resulting redemption is what He has won for man. Behind the doctrine of the atonement is the doctrine of the Incarnation. "God was in Christ."

It must be evident that St. Paul thinks of the death of Christ as an efficacious act whereby God actually achieves

something. It is a victory. That is why the preaching of the Cross is the focal point of the apostle's whole activity. Christ crucified is his real message. If the death of Christ were merely the revelation of the love of God it would be of great importance but only in a relative fashion. That the Son of God actually submitted to death would be held to be a greater revelation than that He taught that God was love, but it would still be on the same plane. It would be looked upon as the best illustration of what was also illustrated in the teachings of Jesus. If this were St. Paul's view we should expect to find many references to both methods of revelation, with Christ's death being proportionately favoured. But in the Pauline letters it is hardly a question of proportion. The death of Christ has an importance quite out of proportion, if it is merely divine self-revelation. It can scarcely be said that St. Paul places the teachings of Jesus on the same plane as the death of Christ. There is more than a difference of degree. Christ's death towers in significance above everything else.

Moreover, the references themselves imply more than this. For example, when St. Paul says that Christ died for all, it is not necessary to go the length of an elaborate ransom theology, but it is necessary to understand it as a deed that has a significance surpassing mere revelation. Similarly, in Rom. 8:3, the apostle states that "God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin,

condemned sin in the flesh." We must understand by this more than the rendering of a verdict of judgement. The law had already done that. But the argument is that God did what the law could not do. The law could reveal sin for what it was and could pronounce God's sentence upon it. But it could not carry out that sentence. *Κατέκρινεν* is here used to suggest that not only has God determined sin's sentence but that He has actually carried it out. Through Jesus Christ, God has acted and dealt with sin objectively. And the result is that there is now no *κατάκριμα* to those who are in Christ Jesus. (Rom. 8:1) This is but one of several ways in which he illustrates and further defines his main thesis which is stated in 1 Cor. 15:4, that "Christ died for our sins." *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν* implies an efficacious act, and *κατὰ τὰς γραφάς* would otherwise be meaningless.¹ The apostle's proneness to the use of sacrificial language points in the same direction.

On the other hand, the sacrificial language must not be pressed too far. St. Paul does not allow himself to become involved in the incidental questions which might arise. His thought is too great to be confined within the limits of any one category. He does not allow the sacrificial language to commit him to any position which would suggest that God is

1. This teaching was, of course, part of the primitive kerygma, and was accepted and repeated by St. Paul. J. Weiss, however, thinks that the apostle has amplified his source with the addition of the single word *ἡμῶν*, "for our sins." Cf. op. cit., vol. I, p. 118.

placated by the sacrifice of Christ. As Wrede has pointed out, he never declares that God needed to wait until his justice was satisfied before forgiving men, or that it is God who is reconciled to man.¹ G. B. Stevens writes: "When it is said that, according to Paul, Christ rendered satisfaction to God's violated law and so enabled Him to suspend its verdict against sinful man, several un-Pauline inferences are likely to be involved. The essence of Paul's thought does not lie in such notions as those of a deified law, quantitative equivalents, and literal substitutions and transfers ..."² It is clear that St. Paul does not think of Christ's work in this fashion. He does think of it in a representative capacity. Christ suffers for our sins and includes us in His obedience to God. But nevertheless the emphasis is always on the fact that God is the One who gives rather than the One who receives. Reconciliation is an act of grace.

Our understanding of St. Paul's thought turns upon the interpretation of the two important words *καταλλαγή* and *ἰλαστήριον*. The former word might suggest a reconciliation based on a mutual exchange, but it cannot be shown that the apostle uses it in this sense. J. Weiss says that *καταλλάκτης* means "the money-changer," and *καταλλαγή* is "the trading, the exchanging in which both parties give and receive something."³

1. Cf. "Paul," p. 134.

2. op. cit., p. 412.

3. op. cit., vol. II, 497 n.

Thus the use of the verb *καταλλαγήτω* in 1 Cor. 7:11 implies a change of attitude in the husband as well as in the wife, according to Weiss, although the primary consideration is a restoration of the matrimonial relationship.¹ Similarly, Sanday and Headlam survey some of the Pauline statements regarding the hostility between man and God, propitiation and reconciliation, and conclude: "We infer that the natural explanation of the passages which speak of enmity and reconciliation between God and man is that they are not on one side only, but are mutual."² But on the other hand, many great scholars are convinced that St. Paul does not contemplate a change in the attitude of God towards man. A. Deissmann warns us that we "must not suppose that God is conciliated."³ Weizsacker asserts that "Paul has nowhere spoken of the wrath of God dispelled by the death of Christ."⁴ V. Taylor agrees, "Never do we read of God being reconciled . . ."⁵ Also in agreement are Stewart, Brunner, Wrede, Lightfoot and Westcott.⁶ The weight of the evidence is with this view.

The argument that God is reconciled to man cannot be based on 1 Cor. 7:11. It is doubtful if *καταλλαγήτω* contains

1. Cf. L. H. Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
2. *op. cit.*, p. 230. Cf. James Denney, "The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation," p. 238.
3. "The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of Paul," p. 212.
4. *op. cit.*, p. 161.
5. "Forgiveness and Reconciliation," p. 86.
6. Stewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 211ff.; Brunner, "The Mediator," p. 519; Wrede, *op. cit.*, p. 134; Lightfoot on Col. 1:21 (p. 159); Westcott on 1 Jn. 2:2 (p. 85 and especially p. 87).

any reference whatsoever to the attitude of the husband. If he had been the one to terminate the alliance it would be necessary to conciliate him. But St. Paul is dealing with the case of a woman who has left her husband on her own initiative. She is the one who must change her mind in order that there might be a reconciliation. Whether the husband needs to be placated will depend upon his character, but it cannot be taken for granted. Consequently the only clear implication of *καταλλαγῆτω* is that the wife must change her attitude, and no presumption is made about the husband. But even if a mutual change of mind be granted for this verse, it need not follow that the apostle expects the same to be true of reconciliation between God and man. The meaning of the word "reconciliation" depends on the nature of the disaffection. Professor Stewart points this out: "If the resentment has been mutual, then fellowship can be re-established only when both parties agree to put their angry feelings away. If the enmity has been on one side, harmony may be restored either by a deliberate change of feeling in the hostile mind, or by a friendly approach from the other side which disarms antagonism."¹ The word *καταλλαγῆ* can be used to denote the restoration of harmony in either case. It is significant that St. Paul speaks of man being reconciled to God but never of God being reconciled to man.

An important passage is Rom. 5:10,11. "For if, when

1. op. cit., p. 209.

we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement.

(Καταλλαγήν)."

Here it is clearly stated that God is the author and man the recipient of reconciliation. There is no suggestion that man does anything but receive it. Moreover, the reconciliation is connected directly with the death of Christ. It is the gift of God made available through the work of Christ. A question, however, arises about the interpretation of *ἐχθροί*. Is it to be understood in an active or a passive sense? In this passage it need not mean anything more than that we have become enemies by our own action. We are hostile to God. No assumption is made about God's attitude. But in two other passages some commentators claim that the passive sense is clearly indicated. Thus in Rom. 11:28, there is a contrast between *ἐχθροί* and *ἀγαπητοί*. Since *ἀγαπητοί* must be passive, Sanday and Headlam believe that *ἐχθροί* is also passive. This produces a strong element of contrast. Even though they were hated by Him, God has chosen to make them His beloved. But Stewart suggests that an even greater contrast is intended.¹ Even though they hate Him they are beloved by God. The strongest antithesis is conveyed by the active sense of the

1. op. cit., pp. 212, 213.

word. Similarly in Col. 1:21, *ἐχθρούς* can best be taken, as Lightfoot takes it, in the active sense.¹ Men are alienated from God and are at enmity with Him solely because they have cut themselves off from Him and turned their rebellious faces against Him. But He has not turned against them in anger.

It is necessary to remember that, as has already been pointed out, the wrath of God is not to be understood primarily as an attitude or emotion on the part of God. It is mainly used by St. Paul in an eschatological sense.² But even where this is not the case, the reference is to the activity of God in punishing sin. The wrath of God is never purely wrath. It is one side of His righteousness and has a redemptive purpose. Punishment comes upon the ungodly but it is more than punishment, for when God acts He acts in accordance with His whole nature. The wonder of Calvary is that "when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly." (Rom. 5:6) For St. Paul, the grace of God means that He acted first. He did not wait until He had received anything from man but sent His Son and thereby gave man the reconciliation. It might be true to say that our enmity with God affects His attitude to us. Thus V. Taylor writes, "We must conclude that in Rom. 5:10 *ἐχθροί* describes, not only the hostile attitude of men, but also their character in the eyes of God. He sees

1. Cf. Anderson Scott, op. cit., pp. 77f.

2. Cf. J. S. Stewart, op. cit., p. 218.

them as enemies; and yet He reconciles them to Himself."¹ But the point is that reconciliation does not involve a change of attitude on the part of God. The idea of an exchange is no part of the Pauline doctrine. The essence of his teaching is not, "Return unto me, and I will return unto you, saith the Lord of hosts,"² but, "God commendeth his love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." (Rom. 5:8) In Christ, God came to man before there was any exertion on man's part. His prevenient grace is seen in the gift of reconciliation which needs only to be accepted. Therefore, the sinner can give nothing in exchange. He can only show, by accepting the reconciliation, that his attitude of enmity to God no longer exists. It is man's attitude that needs to be changed. Therefore the apostle appeals, "Be ye reconciled to God." (2 Cor. 5:20)

The interpretation of the word *ἰλαστήριον* is involved in any discussion of the nature of reconciliation. Even if man's part is not to cause a change in God's attitude, it might be supposed from Rom. 3:25 that God effects the reconciliation by giving to Christ the means of appeasing Him on behalf of man. It is very difficult to decide the particular image which the apostle has in his mind when he uses the term *ἰλαστήριον*, and the difficulty is aggravated by the syntactical problem. However, one thing is clear. *Ἰλαστήριον*

1. op. cit., p. 89.
2. Mel. 3:7.

is to be understood as "expiation" rather than "propitiation." C. H. Dodd has shown that *ἱλάσκεσθαι* and its cognates can mean either to placate a god or man, or to expiate a sin.¹ The former is the usual meaning in classical Greek and in the Koine, but not in the Septuagint. Here the sense is "to perform an act whereby guilt or defilement is removed." When the subject of the verb is a man the verb is best translated by "to make expiation." But, Dr. Dodd says that when God is the subject the meaning is "to forgive." And so, "the sending of Christ ... is the divine method of forgiveness." Whether or not the sacrificial language best conveys the meaning, the fact is that St. Paul uses it, and we must recognise that there is some element in his thought which conceives the death of Christ in terms of a ritualistic act. It may be that something of this nature determines the choice of *προέθετο* in this verse. But St. Paul is not using it in its technical sense of setting forth a sacrificial offering. Rather, the force of the verb is behind the emphasis on the visible manifestation of the *ἱλαστήριον*.² The description of Christ as *τὸ Πάσχα ἡμῶν* in 1 Cor. 5:7 is, of course, due to Jewish ritual, but it seems to be a term flung up in passing and not the result of a fully-considered soteriology. As Gardner remarks, "The Passover was not a sacrifice of propitiation, and the whole context shows

1. Cf. Dodd, *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 55; "The Bible and the Greeks," pp. 94, 95.

2. So Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

that Paul introduces the phrase without much intention."¹ On this whole question W. D. Davies may be considered to be an authoritative voice. He says, "We are also constrained to point out that although in labouring to do justice to the significance of the Death of Jesus he uses sacrificial terms, Paul does not develop these but leaves them inchoate."²

The grammatical problem connected with *ἰλαστήριον* in Rom. 3:25 is interesting but not of primary importance to our thesis. The word can be neuter or masculine, and if the latter it can be a noun or an adjective agreeing with *δύ*. If it is neuter the absence of the article excites comment. It seems best to take it as a masculine accusative adjective, but it must be admitted that there is a very strong case for the neuter. The latter is made especially attractive by T. W. Manson's interpretation of *ἰλαστήριον* as "the place where God's mercy was supremely manifested."³ This explains the absence of the article and retains the idea of "mercy-seat" of the Septuagint use of this word.⁴ But it seems better to retain as much as possible the personal element in the work of Christ, and on this ground we are not satisfied with Manson's interpretation, nor with the common translation, "as a means of expiation." In "The Mediator," Brunner makes this comment:

1. op. cit., p. 192. Cf. Davies, op. cit., pp. 242ff.

2. op. cit., p. 242.

3. Cf. T. W. Manson's article in J T S, 1945, vol. xlvi.

4. As also in Heb. 9:5.

"The Son is not only the One who is sent, but also the One who willingly permits Himself to be sent He is here not simply as One who suffers and endures, but also as One who is active in the midst of His passive acceptance. He would not be a real person but merely a material instrument if His life were not also His own act."¹ For this reason the interpretation of Anderson Scott proves to be more in keeping with the totality of New Testament doctrine. He suggests the translation "as one exercising reconciling power."² Vincent Taylor labels this an improbable rendering,³ but it is grammatically in line with Denney's "with propitiatory power,"⁴ and a not unnatural development of the position of many commentators.⁵ Christ is the One who actually reconciles men to God. He does this through His death on the Cross. This is the meaning of *ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι* which is to be taken with *ἰλαστήριον* and not with *πίστεως*.⁶ The sacrificial element is present here, and Sanday and Headlam suggest that by virtue of the sacrifice of blood, which is the seat of life, there is an "application of life."⁷ But it is probable that, while the use of the term is originally due to the sacrificial system, the blood is almost

1. p. 411.

2. op. cit., p. 72.

3. "Forgiveness and Reconciliation," p. 46.

4. Exp. Gk. Test., vol. ii, p. 611.

5. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, op. cit., p. 88; J. S. Stewart, op. cit., p. 215; H. A. A. Kennedy, "The Theology of the Epistles," p. 130.

6. So Sanday and Headlam, op. cit., p. 89.

7. op. cit., p. 89.

a technical term for the death of Christ. It means His act of voluntarily laying down His life in obedience to God.¹ He gave Himself, not as a means of appeasing God, but as God's way of reconciling men. It is at the Cross where He is supremely the One "exercising reconciling power."

We must now ask, How does the death of Christ effect the reconciliation of men to God? Dealing with reconciliation, J. S. Stewart writes, "Any idea of an offering made to God for the purpose of securing the divine favour was thoroughly alien to Paul's whole outlook ... The fact that Paul regarded the cross as a sacrifice is not in dispute: the sense in which he so regarded it is the vital question ... By sacrifice Paul means the utter self-abandonment and self-consecration of love."² But how are men brought within the orbit of His reconciling power? What is the connection between the obedience of Christ and the sin of men? Several answers may be given. His death was their ransom from sin. His death was, in a sense, a substitution whereby He took their place and accepted their penalty and made atonement for their sin. Or His death was a representative death in which all who are in union with Him share. The last is the most significant expression of St. Paul's thought. The idea of ransom and that of atonement have a more particular and limited significance, but nevertheless

1. Cf. C. H. Dodd, "The Epistle of Paul to the Romans," p. 55; J. S. Stewart, op. cit., p. 237.
 2. op. cit., pp. 237, 238.

convey truths which cannot be neglected.

St. Paul does not use the simple word *λύτρον*, and this fact alone is sufficient warrant for the denial to the apostle of any well-developed ransom theology. But it is equally certain that the ransom idea is present in his mind and supplies an emotional content to both theology and ethics. He uses the word *ἀπολύτρωσις* not infrequently.¹ The A. V. translation "redemption" is very suitable, since the ransom idea is not to be pressed. As Anderson Scott points out, the history of the word "shows a clearly marked tendency to broaden the conception by lifting off the idea of 'ransom' or price paid, and leaving the more generalized idea of deliverance or emancipation."² Nevertheless, any compound of *λύτρον* cannot help but carry the hint that redemption has been won at a great cost, and there is no doubt that the apostle would not seek to eliminate such a hint. He uses *ἡγοράσθητε* in 1 Cor. 6:20 and 7:23, and *ἐξηγόρασεν* in Gal. 3:13. This word is clearly designed to suggest a price that is paid. And it may be that *ἐλευθεροῦν* carries, at least in the apostle's mind, the same connotation.

Quite probably St. Paul has some particular mental picture before him when he uses these terms. He sees Christ in His death paying the price that means freedom for all who

1. Cf. Rom. 3:24, 8:23, 1 Cor. 1:30, Eph. 1:7,14, 4:30, Col. 1:14.

2. Cf. Dodd, op. cit., p. 53; Abbott on Eph. 1:7.

believe. Deissmann thinks that he may have in mind some saying of Jesus, probably that recorded in Mark 10:45, Mt. 20:28, a saying recalled in Phil. 2:7, "took upon him the form of a servant (*δούλου*)." Deissmann interprets the Markan verse: "The Son of Man came not to be served, but to serve (as a slave) and to give His life a ransom for many (slaves)."¹ It is significant that *ἐλευθερία* is thought of as liberation from bondage (*δουλείας*) in Gal. 2:4, and similarly in 5:1. If, in his use of these terms *ἐλευθερία* and *ἀπολύτρωσις*, St. Paul is thinking of the freeing of slaves, it is probable that he has in mind the method of manumission whereby money is paid into the temple treasury and the slave is purchased by the god.² The slave becomes the property of the god, but in the eyes of men he is free. This thought is echoed in Romans where it forms the basis of an ethical exhortation. "Being then made free (*ἐλευθερωθέντες*) from sin, ye became the servants (*ἐδουλώθητε*) of righteousness." (6:18) The concept of Christ paying the price has a double significance for ethics. It brings into play the motive of gratitude and reinforces the call to moral living with the reminder that those who have been redeemed are now in the service of God. Yet the apostle does not develop it into a full-scale theology. He is content to use it for homiletic purposes, as an illustration of the grace of God and of the greatness of Christ's work, but he does not

1. "Paul," p. 173.

2. Ibid, p. 173.

answer the questions as to how the death of Christ is a payment or who receives the price that is paid. Nor is there any need for him to do so. The language of sacrifice is native to religion although it is never able adequately to express the central mystery which can only be expressed in the language of an act of love.¹

What is true of the idea of a ransom is true also of the idea of Christ as man's substitute. It is not articulated as a theological tenet, but nevertheless it exercises a profound influence upon the apostle's thought. He does not actually state that Christ suffered in our stead, but he implies it. He says that He died for all,² and that He was made sin for us. The preposition in each case is *ὑπέρ* which is not as definitive as *ἀντί*. The meaning is not that Christ died instead of us, but that He died in order that we might not have to die. No doubt St. Paul believes that Christ did suffer and die on our behalf, and took upon Himself the consequences of our sins, but he does not formally promulgate this belief. It is possible to eliminate these substitutionary ideas only by undiscerning exegesis, but for the most part they are implicit rather than explicit. G. B. Stevens is of the opinion that St. Paul does not think of Christ as being substituted for us, but of a substitution of His death and sufferings for

1. Cf. R. Otto, "The Kingdom of God and the Son of Man," chapter xii, especially p. 257, where he says that *λύτρον* was a religious, before it was a commercial, term.
2. 2 Cor. 5:14.

our punishment.¹ Nor is His suffering the same as our penalty, for it lacks the element of punishment since He was not guilty. Also, according to Stevens, when the apostle says that He was made a curse for us he does not mean that it was the curse which applies to sin. (Gal. 3:13) Nevertheless the apostle does state that Christ was delivered for our offences,² and the words *παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα* are more than a reminiscence of Isaiah 53. The natural inference from this is that "He bare the sin of many." So Stewart writes: "It is a sure instinct of the soul that sees the crucified Christ standing in the sinner's place, taking all the guilt and shame and horror upon His own great loving heart, and allowing sin's direct consequences to have their way with Him in grief and agony until, in that death of Christ on Calvary, the curse of sin has worked itself out to an end and is finished once for all. This is Paul's Gospel."³

The main emphasis of these concepts, however, lies in the representative nature of the life and death of Jesus. Christ represents man before God. He stands as the Head of the race, and accepts the penalty for His people's sins and wins redemption for all whom He represents. He is the Second Adam, and the consequences of His act of obedience are passed on to His spiritual descendents, just as the consequences of the

1. op. cit., pp. 410, 411.

2. Rom. 4:25.

3. op. cit., pp. 241, 242.

first Adam's sin were passed on to all his descendents after the flesh. The latter shared in Adam's act of transgression. Those who are in Christ share in His death, but in a more vital fashion, for they voluntarily associate themselves with Him. Thus He is their representative even more truly than was Adam the representative of mankind. St. Paul's thought is that the believer himself dies with Christ, and it is this thought which overshadows the sacrificial element in his epistles. So Schweitzer says, "His death is thought of not so much as an atoning death as a death shared by the believer."¹ This is clear from Rom. 6:8 and indeed from every epistle.

In 2 Cor. 5:14, "one died for all," there is a hint of the substitutionary idea. But the main thought is that of believers sharing in His death. This is clear because the apostle immediately goes on to speak of living unto Christ. "And that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them and rose again." (2 Cor. 5:15) There is a reciprocal character about life, for they share in Christ's resurrection and live their lives unto Him. So strong is the reciprocal element that one virtually passes into the Other, and the new life is "in Christ." It is here that the language of the atonement proves inadequate. For the death of Christ is also a death of the believer who, on the basis of his faith,

1. "The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle," p. 222.

associates himself with Christ in His death and thereby dies with Him.

On the part of man there is both an active and a passive side to his reconciliation to God. He receives the reconciliation. This is the passive side. But he must also be reconciled to God. This means his active participation in the reconciliation. This corresponds to St. Paul's thoughts on the death of Christ. The believer accepts His work as done on his behalf. But he also associates himself with Christ in His death. He dies with Christ. In His death the believer also dies. And it follows that in His life the believer also lives. He lives in Christ. Reconciliation involves the entrance of the believer into the fellowship of Christ and into the family of God. Thus the apostle's doctrine of reconciliation leads directly into the ethics of the *koinonia* and the moral requirements of sonship. These have already been discussed in previous chapters and will receive our attention again. But we must note that the doctrine of reconciliation supplies an element of pathos and a sense of overwhelming debt which drive the ethical appeal deep into the very center of the believer's heart, whence spring the emotional and volitional stimuli that spur the body into action. And even more significant is the fact that, as a result of reconciliation to God, Christ now lives in the believer, and the moral fruits produced in his life are the yield of His indwelling Spirit.

The desire to please God is the logical result of

such a doctrine of grace. But more than this, the moral dynamic is powerfully reinforced by a fresh understanding of what it means to please God. The perfect example is Jesus Christ.

(Phil. 2:5-12) He represents and includes all believers in His obedience to God. They must look to Him and model their lives after His if they are truly to share in His life. As the Second Adam He is the perfect type of humanity. R. Niebuhr has written of the significance of the Second Adam: "The same Christ who is accepted by faith as the revelation of the true character of God is also regarded as the revelation of the true character of man."¹ The imitation of Christ is a vital part of the Pauline ethic, but, in actuality, the apostle only points as a definite example to Christ's obedience to God. He emptied Himself and became poor for our sakes. He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death. The incarnation and the crucifixion are the focal points. But it must not be assumed that St. Paul regarded the intervening period of His earthly life with indifference, or that it had no significance for the apostle's ethic. Instead of referring to specific acts, the apostle is concerned to emphasize the obedience of Christ. He does not want a slavish imitation. The circumstances of life are constantly changing and religious customs must be adaptable to new situations. The missionary to the Gentiles was well aware of the folly of copying in one country the minute details of life in another. There must be freedom for

1. op. cit., vol. I, p. 157.

the Spirit to operate. Moreover, Jesus lived under the Jewish law, but the believer is freed from the law. In this instance he does not imitate the earthly life of Christ. Nevertheless, when St. Paul points to Christ as an example of perfect obedience to God, he knows that the details of His life are known to all Christians and that His life does serve as a guide and example for them. As the prototype of all Christians, Christ shows that kind of obedience which can rightfully be expected of them.

Reconciliation implies freedom, forgiveness, peace and joy. It implies freedom because it is a restoration of the filial relationship to God, and the sons of the house are free. But this freedom is not license, for the law is replaced by the Spirit, and the Spirit searches all things, and its fruits are goodness and righteousness, and above all, love, which is the fulfilment of the whole law. "So, then, the freedom of the Christian from the law is no freedom to commit sin, for from the Spirit there proceeds only the victory over sin, and obedience to the will of God."¹

For St. Paul, forgiveness is more than a remission of sins. It is a restoration to a personal relationship to God. The depth of his conception of sin is seen in the fact that he thinks of it as requiring not only the acquittal but the reconciliation of the sinner.² Anderson Scott points out the

1. P. Wernle, "The Beginnings of Christianity," p. 310.

2. Cf. Anderson Scott, "New Testament Ethics," p. 85.

significance of the apostle's use of the word *χαρίζομαι* which appears only once in the Synoptics. "It is a term which ignores the forensic aspect, and emphasizes the personal relation, once destroyed, now restored."¹ The sinner who is reconciled to God is not only released from the guilt of sin but he is placed within a vital fellowship and thus given every aid in his attempt to live without sin. He finds new interests, new loyalties and, above all, a new dynamic, for the Spirit of God is at work within his heart.

Peace may be viewed as the result of reconciliation, but it is practically a synonym for it. The enmity with God is at an end. (Rom. 5:10) The believer has peace with God. There is no longer any barrier to fellowship with Him. More than a change of attitude is involved. There is a change in man's relations with God.² Peace, for the apostle, is primarily peace with God. But as a result of peace with God the believer finds an inner harmony within his own soul, for the conflict of desires and passions is resolved in the direct relation of the believer to God. He has peace with God and with himself, and also with his fellow men and with the world which God has likewise reconciled to Himself. All this is closely connected with ethics. When the tensions, fears, perversions and personality-schisms are removed morality shows its natural vitality. When a man feels right with God, right with himself,

1. "New Testament Ethics," p. 84. Cf. Eph. 4:32.
 2. Cf. Dodd, op. cit., p. 73.

right with his brethren and right with the whole world, he will be anxious to conduct his life so as to retain and increase this sense of well-being, and he will seek to avoid anything which might disturb this happy harmony. Moreover, in St. Paul's thought, this peace is something which God gives, and something which acts as a force to safeguard and direct the life of the recipient. Taylor's comment is lucid. "As he puts it, the 'peace of God', which surpasses every thought, mounts guard (*φρουρέω*) over the hearts and thoughts of believers (Phil. 4:7), while 'the peace of Christ', into which men are called, rules or 'arbitrates' (*βραβεύω*) in the heart (Col. 3:15)."¹

It is therefore not without cause that the Christian is able to rejoice. His every thought is filled with the greatness of God's gift and the wonder of the new life of freedom and peace. Joyfulness is the characteristic of the Christian's life, but it is not his goal in life. Such terms as *εὐδαιμονία* and *ἡδονή* are not found in the Pauline literature. The apostle does not think of happiness in the abstract. He always thinks of it in relation to its source, and with a sense of thankfulness. The Christian can rejoice in God or in his fellow members of Christ or in the opportunity to suffer for Him. When the cause for rejoicing is thus defined a claim is established, for a man will naturally want to bring

1. op. cit., p. 103.

pleasure to those who have given him joy. The antidote to a self-centered existence is to find outside the self the real object of enjoyment. The rejoicing is, in part, anticipatory. It has an eschatological element, for the day of Christ will bring rejoicing. Because of this, the Christian is able to rejoice now, and is able to see the events of this life in the light of eternity. There are times when good conduct involves hardship and calls for qualities of endurance and resoluteness, but when a man is overwhelmed by a sense of joyfulness, when he is possessed by the thought of his good fortune, and when he sees meaning in every circumstance of this life by relating it to the life to come, he goes forth to his task with eagerness and confidence, knowing that his "labour is not in vain in the Lord." (1 Cor. 15:58) Thus in many ways the great apostle encourages his converts and provides them with the qualities of spirit which make for vigorous and successful ethical action.

The doctrine of reconciliation serves to supplement St. Paul's concept of "in Christ," not by adding new truths but by emphasizing particular aspects of it. When a man is in Christ he is a new creature in a new creation. He is also a reconciled man in a reconciled world. In 2 Cor. 5:19 the apostle is thinking of the world of men when he states that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself," for he adds "not imputing their trespasses unto them." But in Col. 1:20 the context shows that the inanimate world is also reconciled. Peace, in this verse, is not a state of feeling but

the harmony which pertains throughout the universe when all the elements work in unison, obedient to the will of God. It is the kind of peace which existed before the fall, and in fact, reconciliation means a restoration of the primal harmony.

The fact that Christ is both the Son of God and the Second Adam has significance for the thought of a new creation. On the one hand, men become aware of the presence of God within His world, standing indeed before them as He did in the garden.¹ Brunner writes : "The incarnation of the Logos does not mean merely the removal of a physical taint, but the restoration of the original image of God, and with this the original relation to God ..."² And on the other hand, in Christ, the perfect man, the lost perfection of the race is restored. The Second Adam renews all that was lost in the fall, and more than this, for His perfection surpasses that of the first Adam. Irenaeus remarks that Christ exceeds the goodness of Adam before the fall as perfection transcends innocency.³ Reconciliation is more than restoration, for there is a new quality about life in

1. Duncan's interpretation of Phil. 2:6ff. is interesting. He holds that there is here an implied contrast between Jesus and Adam. Adam hoped to become like God Himself. Jesus, on the other hand, did not snatch at equality with God but sought to identify Himself with man, and became a Servant. "Where the first Adam failed the second Adam triumphed, and triumphed because He pursued a wholly different path." Whatever may have been St. Paul's thought, Duncan believes that this is the meaning of this early Christian hymn used here by the apostle. Cf. "Jesus, Son of Man," pp. 193, 194.

2. "The Mediator," p. 491 n.

3. Referred to by R. Niebuhr, "The Nature and Destiny of Man," vol. II, p. 80.

Christ. The Second Adam is a living Spirit and all who live in Him live after the Spirit. The new creation is also a new age. It is the age of the Spirit.

The new man lives in a new world. He also lives in a new society, for reconciliation with God involves reconciliation with the brethren. The peace which is established between man and God, and between man and his environment, is also between man and man. In Eph. 2:14 St. Paul says that Christ is our peace, and then shows in what way this is true. He heals the divisions which cause disharmony. Even the widest division, that between Jew and Gentile, is eliminated for they are completely united. In Christ both are made "one new man." If Jew and Gentile find their unity in Christ it follows that all believers are so united. At the Cross only one body is reconciled to God. (verse 16) In that body are united all who are in Christ. Where there is no unity there is no reconciliation. This must be the meaning of this verse and of the following one. "And that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby: And came and preached peace to you which were afar off, and to them that are nigh." (verses 16,17) In fact this whole section shows a marked preference for terms signifying the unity of the Christian community. "The commonwealth of Israel" (12); "the covenant" (12); "made both one" (14); "one new man" (15); "one body" (16); "one Spirit" (18); "fellowcitizens" (19); "the household of God" (19); "builded together" (22) Reconciliation to God means

reconciliation to all who are likewise reconciled to Him.¹ And when the apostle uses the imperative, "Be ye reconciled to God," it is implied that one must establish a peaceful relationship to the family of God.

To recapitulate, the doctrine of reconciliation is a powerful theological engine pulling a number of ethical carriages. First come the ethics founded on the motives of gratitude and love. Reconciliation is not won, but simply received by men. Christ gave His life to reconcile the sinner to God.² So Stevens writes: "The aim of Christ's death is not solely to atone for past sin; it is also to the end that men should renounce the selfish life and strive to realize the life of love (2 Cor. 5:15). Here the love of God, which is evinced in the death of Christ, is exhibited as a motive prompting to love in return."³ The desire to please God and to imitate Christ are also derived from this doctrine. Ethics is reinforced by the knowledge of freedom from the old way of life and the experience of new powers and responsibilities as mature sons of God. With freedom and sonship come the blessings of joyfulness and peace. Peace with God means a new nearness to Him and so, guidance, strength and confidence. Peace with the world means the renewal of interest in life, and the

1. Cf. V. Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.

2. Cf. James Mackinnon, "The Gospel in the Early Church," p. 103, "The purpose of this redeeming sacrifice is that men might be ethically benefited as well as juridically acquitted."

3. "The Christian Doctrine of Salvation," p. 68.

removal of those fears and tensions which handicap endeavour.¹
It does not mean that the reconciled universe does away with suffering and injury, but that man is reconciled to life; he knows that all things operate for the good of those who love God and he trusts God's world because it is obedient to His will. And peace with the brethren involves a responsibility for the welfare and good of the Christian community.

1. Denney writes, "Not only is God a new God, the world is a new world to the reconciled sinner; he is not at war with the conditions of life - at least he is not at a spiritless, angry, discontented war with them. He knows that if God is for him, no one can be against him, and that his very badge as a Christian is that he can overcome the world, combining, as Paul so characteristically combined, much affliction with joy in the Holy Ghost. His faith in providence is an inference from his experience of reconciliation. 'He who spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things?'" "The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation," pp. 178,179.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE LIFE OF HOLINESS

Properly speaking, the life of holiness is not the process of sanctification but the result of sanctification. In the thought of St. Paul sanctification is one of the blessings which redemption brings to the believer. It is a special quality of the life in Christ. The doctrine of sanctification, like that of reconciliation, serves to emphasize certain features which are inherent in the over-all concept but not therein made sufficiently distinct. The man who is justified is also sanctified; that is, he is consecrated to God, and through the gift of the Spirit he is enabled to show in his life the qualities which are characteristic of God's holiness.¹

1. The order of the verbs ἀπελούσασθε, ἡγιασθήτε, ἐδικαιώθητε, in 1 Cor. 6:11 is not significant. An explanation of the order may be made by taking ἐδικαιώθητε in an eschatological sense. But the apostle is not outlining a theological scheme. Rather, he is so disturbed by the thought that some of his converts may have lapsed into old habits of wickedness that he bursts out, "But ye have washed yourselves." The use of the middle mood is significant. It is an act which they have done consciously. How, then, can they continue in sin. Ἠγιασθήτε is passive, but, as Weiss shows, it suggests an active idea. Behind it there is an act of will. Cf. Rom. 6:19, 1 Thess. 4:3. From this the apostle

Thus it involves ethical conduct since God is conceived as the source of ethics. But the main thought lies in the new religious relationship between man and God, a relationship based on the recognition of God as the Wholly-Other and on the complete dedication of self to Him.

Rudolf Otto maintains the primacy of the religious connotation of the word "holiness," a connotation for which he evolves the term numinous which describes the "overplus of meaning" beyond its moral significance. "Nor is this merely a later or acquired meaning; rather, 'holy', or at least the equivalent words in Latin and Greek, in Semitic and other ancient languages, denoted first and foremost only this overplus: if the ethical element was present at all, at any rate it was not original and never constituted the whole meaning of the word."¹ With Otto's main thesis Norman Snaith is in agreement. He holds that the root behind the Hebrew $\psi\tau\rho$ and its cognates meant originally "separation."² It pertains to that which belongs distinctively to God (or the gods) in contrast to that which is human. But Snaith maintains that even in its early history there is a suggestion of some kind of ethical implication. He says, "The word godesh originally

proceeds to $\epsilon\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\acute{\omega}\theta\eta\tau\epsilon$ which is wholly God's act and the climax of the argument, but actually the initial event in the whole process of being freed from sin. Cf. J. Weiss on 1 Cor. 6:11 (pp. 157, 158).

1. "The Idea of the Holy," pp. 5, 6.

2. "The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament," p. 23.

had no moral content in our developed sense of the word 'moral', but it did involve pre-ethical restrictions, as undeveloped in content as itself."¹

In any case, there is general agreement that the primary significance of the word is religious and that it gradually acquired ethical associations as the moral nature of God became more and more apparent. The Septuagint recognised this development by using the Greek word *ἅγιος* instead of *ἱερός*. The latter would have retained the exclusively religious or numinous connotation of the word, but the former allows for its development towards ethics. Holtzmann finds that the religious idea is most prominent in the adjective *ἅγιος*, but is supplanted by the ethical in the verb *ἁγιάζειν* and the nouns *ἁγιωσύνη* and *ἁγιασμός*.² However, in the usage of St. Paul the Septuagint would be the determining factor and that in turn was conditioned by the Hebrew original. "The holy" refers exclusively to God and to what belongs to God. Holiness is so closely associated with His nature that He can be called "The Holy One." It is that element which evokes that creature-feeling which is the essential of true religion. God alone is holy. The "making holy" or "sanctification" of human beings refers to their being set apart as dedicated to God. The idea of being dedicated to God inevitably leads to and involves the

1. *op. cit.*, p. 32.

2. Cf. H. J. Holtzmann, "Neutestamentliche Theologie," vol. II, p. 146.

thought of reflecting the nature of God. That which is devoted to God and accepted by Him will be governed entirely by His will, and God will shape the life of the devotee in accordance with His own nature. So ethical conduct is the consequence of sanctification.

In primitive thought, holiness is almost a physical quality pertaining to God and attaching itself to everything sacred. It can be transmitted from one to the other and can be washed away by ceremonial lustration. Its contagious quality is shown in the story of Uzzah touching the ark. (2 Sam. 6:6ff.) It is probable that such a primitive note was only retained in the Old Testament by the interests of the priestly class who desired to inculcate reverence for all things sacred. There is, however, a trace of the same idea in the epistles. In 1 Cor. 7:14 there is the thought that the unbelieving husband is "sanctified" by the believing wife.¹ It is no more than a trace, for St. Paul's real thought is that the wife's faith and conduct will have a good influence on the husband. But it is evident that the apostle does think of some sort of impartation of the divine nature in sanctification. This is involved in the gift of the Spirit, for the Spirit is the means of sanctification, and when the Spirit dwells in a man the fact is shown in his manner of life. But sanctification is not a gradual process. St. Paul views it as a work of God coincident

1. Cf. J. Weiss, "The History of Primitive Christianity," vol. I, p. 430.

with justification and reconciliation.

There is no reason for supposing that sanctification, for St. Paul, is a gradual process. It is true that he speaks of it as something in the future, but so he does of justification. It is already accomplished and yet the perfect consummation awaits the final act of God. But he can speak of it as an experienced fact, and this is his usual reference to it. Thus he addresses a letter "to them that are sanctified in Christ Jesus." (1 Cor. 1:2) They are further defined as ones "called to be saints." Now he does not mention any other class in the superscription, and the letter is certainly for the perusal of the whole church. The inference is inescapable that he considers the members of the Corinthian church to be sanctified already and even now "saints." That is because they have been redeemed by Christ, with all that that involves, justification, reconciliation and sanctification. As Stewart suggests we must keep justification and sanctification "welded together."¹ The man who is in Christ is sanctified. There are not two classes of Christians, and justification is not just a prelude to sanctification, or a partial and inferior gift. The one gift includes all.

Sanctification has significance for ethics, partly

1. op. cit., p. 257. Cf. R. H. Strachan, "The Individuality of St. Paul," p. 170. Strachan says that it is "impossible to separate the ideas of justification and sanctification." Cf. also R. Niebuhr, "The Nature and Destiny of Man," vol. II, pp. 138, 139.

because it means devotion to God whose holiness demands right conduct, and because He actively co-operates and inspires the new life, and also because it involves an obligation to live according to the revealed will of God. His holiness demands right conduct because right conduct derives its incipience from the character of God. Thus Moore writes: "Historically, the epithet (Holy) was not applied to God because He was conceived to be morally perfect, but the meaning of moral perfection attached to the word because such perfection belonged to the character of the Holy One (i. e. of God)."¹ God co-operates in the new life through the influence of the Spirit whose fruits are ethical qualities and righteous deeds. So his righteousness is not merely a righteousness which "God demands or confers, but a righteousness God looks after."² The sense of obligation arises from the fact that God has sanctified the Christians but they still have their part to play. So we find a number of exhortations based on the theme, "Become what you are."³ The life of holiness calls for an exertion on the part of the believer, an endeavour to live in keeping with the nature of his dedication to the Holy God. But it is never merely self-exertion, nor is it dedication solely in the sense of self-dedication. It is the Spirit who sanctifies, who dedicates him to God, and it is the Spirit who continues to

1. G. F. Moore, "Judaism," vol. II, p. 102 n.

2. J. Oman, "Grace and Personality," p. 230, quoted by Stewart, op. cit., p. 258. Cf. Strachan, op. cit., p. 165.

3. Cf. 1 Cor. 5:7, Rom. 6:11f., 8:9,12.

work in him, and the Spirit is the source of virtue and the author of good conduct.

We have said that in St. Paul's view Christians are already sanctified. Some qualification is, however, necessary. The fulness is yet to come. The apostle anticipates a time when his body will be completely redeemed. (Rom. 8:23) There is still in the future a day of redemption. (Eph. 4:30) He has not fully attained unto the resurrection, nor is he yet perfect. (Phil. 3:12) It is his goal, his ambition, rather than his actual achievement. (Phil. 3:14) But nevertheless, the life of holiness was real. The Christian had the earnest of the Spirit. By his baptism he had passed over into the new life and received the gift of the Spirit. He was freed from sin. Eternal life is his by the gift of God.

In theory the apostle held that the man who was baptized had received the Spirit and was thereby sanctified and therefore sinless. But in practice, he was forced to admit that Christians were not always without sin. The efficacy of baptism depended upon the subsequent conduct of the baptized person. Thus he warns against immoral living and gives the example of the Israelites who were baptized in the wilderness but nevertheless fell from grace. (1 Cor. 10:1-6) The same is true of the fornicator whom the church is to disown. (1 Cor. 5:1-5)

St. Paul was never able to explain how it was that a Christian might still desire to sin. The easiest way was to

say that the man who sinned was living after the flesh and not after the Spirit. Therefore he did not possess the Spirit and was not a Christian. (Rom. 8:5-9) But the apostle remembered that his converts were really only babes in Christ and he was not disposed to excommunicate them for such offences as they might outgrow. He calls the Corinthians "saints" and "sanctified in Christ Jesus." (1 Cor. 1:2) When we remember the behaviour of these saints as shown in various references throughout the Corinthian epistles we cannot but wonder what sanctification really meant. The fact is that St. Paul does not allow this situation to affect his doctrine. He still insists that the Christian will not sin. In 1 Cor. 6 he chides his converts for bringing law suits against one another in the civil courts. This is a fault and they ought to know that wrong conduct will exclude them from the kingdom. This leads him to describe the manner of life of the unrighteous, Some of the Corinthians themselves had been thieves and drunkards and fornicators. "But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of God." Therefore, so runs the implication, they cannot do such things any longer. The apostle does not envisage the possibility that they might have reverted in some measure to such practices. He has no doctrine to deal with the problem of post-baptismal sins and a second repentance. He can only reiterate that the man in Christ has been redeemed from his sinful past. It may be that, psychologically, this is the best

method of attacking the problem. He leads his hearers to sense for themselves the incongruity between unethical conduct and the life of sonship with God, and to desire to make their lives conform to the high standard of their calling in Jesus Christ. And he assures them that the Spirit provides adequate power for all their needs.

L. H. Marshall voices the opinion that "Paul nowhere suggests that God does everything and leaves the Christian with nothing to do for himself."¹ It is true that the apostle's ethics is as much concerned with active as with passive virtues. Yet even the activity of a Christian stems from his passive acceptance of the Spirit's work in his life. St. Paul's position is that everything good in a man's life is God's doing, and not man's at all, while everything evil is due solely to man himself. This is a paradox which is basic not only to St. Paul but to Christianity itself.² So, when the apostle is stressing the unmerited grace of God and the independence of the divine choice he does not stress the significance of the part man has to play. For example, when he seeks to explain the fact that the majority of his fellow countrymen have remained outside the Christian faith and that the true Israel is composed of Gentiles as well as Jews, he emphasizes the complete autonomy of the divine favour. (Rom. 9)

1. op. cit., p. 261.

2. Cf. D. M. Baillie, "God was in Christ," pp. 114ff.

Before Sara had conceived, God had decided that His promise of blessing should apply to Abraham's descendents through Isaac her son and not through Ishmael. And of Isaac's children God had chosen Jacob rather than Esau, and that before their birth and before they had had opportunity to do either good or evil. So then, God has exercised the same freedom in choosing the descendents of Jacob. The true Israelites are those whom God decides to call the children of Jacob, i. e., Israel. The whole point of the argument is that man's salvation depends solely on God's decision to save him, and that decision need not be based on human action or merit. Of Rebecca's two children one was called in preference to the other, although neither had done anything good or evil for they had not been born. (Rom. 9:10-12) The argument is reinforced by a reference to God's word to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." (verse 15) Also by a reference to the clay in the hand of the potter. (verse 21) It is God's work which determines the issue in each individual life. And yet, when the case has been so clearly set out and proved, the apostle cannot leave it without turning again to the other side and giving the human factor its full weight. Evil is due to man's own act of wilfulness and of independence. The reason why the Jews failed to achieve salvation and the Gentiles did was because the former sought it by works and the latter by faith. (verses 30-32) He is always careful to point out that faith

must not be equated with works. How can anyone do good, even though he has faith, until he has received the power from God? But faith plus the Spirit means good conduct. And if he continues to live an immoral life he shows that he has not true faith. The man who is a fornicator or an extortioner etc. is not a true member of the koinonia. (1 Cor. 5:10) If he has no fruits of the Spirit he shows that he has not the Spirit.

When St. Paul considers his own experience he cannot but be amazed at the grace of God, and he feels that God in Christ has done everything for him. He is filled with humility for he cannot think what he himself contributed to that great work. Was he not a persecutor of the church of God? But when the apostle considers the case of those who have received the same grace and have failed to reflect it in their daily lives he traces the cause to their lack of co-operation with God. Man is responsible for the evil which he does, but God alone is the author of the good. This paradox explains the contrasting positions assumed in Rom. 9 and Rom. 10 regarding divine determinism and human responsibility. Commenting on this, Sanday and Headlam say, "The antinomy, if we may call it so, of chaps. ix and x is one which is and must be the characteristic of all religious thought and experience."¹

1. "The Epistle to the Romans," p. 348. S. & H. here mention St. Paul's "habit of isolating one point of view, and looking at the question from that point of view alone." Cf. p. 275 for Fritzsche's view that St. Paul is unconscious of any inconsistency, being unskilled in logic and philosophy.(?).

Redemption begins with God. But man can accept or refuse. If he accepts he can be a co-worker with God. It is with reference to man's side of the work of redemption that the apostle begins his great ethical section in Rom. 12. It might be supposed that God has done everything. It is God who justifies, Christ who reconciles, and the Holy Spirit who sanctifies. We have shown that St. Paul gives a higher place to man than mere passivity in justification and reconciliation. The same is true of sanctification. The believer is sanctified by the Holy Spirit. But he must present his body as a living sacrifice. (Rom. 12:1) Apparently it depends upon himself whether it is holy and acceptable to God. We note the sacrificial language: *παραστῆσαι* (although not used in a technical sense in the Old Testament), *θυσίαν*, *ἀγίαν* (free from blemish), and *λατρείαν*. While Christ is our sacrifice, and sufficient in God's eyes, yet all who share in His sacrifice must show that they do so voluntarily. This is a "spiritual rite" which is the believer's own. We note also the ethical language. Their bodies are to be presented. There is here no license for the view that religion is only a matter that concerns the intellect and that it does not interest itself in what we do with our bodies. Every member of the body is to be dedicated to God. Moreover, it is a living sacrifice. In the sacrificial system the victims were slaughtered. The term *θυσίαν ζῶσαν* is thus unusual and significant. The way in which believers present their bodies to God is through their

manner of life. It is a sacrifice, holy and well-pleasing to God, because it is free from the taint of sinful living. And with the dedication of the believer's body is associated the transformation of his mind, or rather, the transformation of his whole personality through the re-orientation of his mind. He finds a new center for his thought and this affects his sense of values and his understanding of the issues which underlie good conduct.

It is noteworthy that this change of body and mind is thought of as within the purview of the individual's own action. It is a question of will. Sanctification does not mean deification. Men are devoted to God but not made gods. Ethics devolves from the fact that the creature who is sanctified does not lose his free-will and power of choice; he can withhold his service or he can give himself to God in daily acts of love and obedience. But the sanctified man has the Spirit of God, and so the power to make his life holy and acceptable unto Him. Ethical exhortation therefore hovers between a statement of fact and a challenge to realize the full implications of that fact in the believer's own life.

St. Paul's analogies offer further proof of his regard for the value of human effort. He speaks of the athlete in a race. The Christian life calls for self discipline and strenuous effort. He looks on his own life as a race and he strives to the utmost that he may not run in vain. So he calls on his converts to run as if seeking to win a prize and to

remember that the prize in this race is far more valuable than the fragile garlands of the stadium which soon lose their glory. (1 Cor. 9:24-27) Victory calls for self-discipline and temperance in all things. The athlete must have absolute control over his body, and the Christian must likewise master his desires and train himself for victory. The boxer must come to grips with his opponent, and the Christian must deal vigorously with himself for the major temptations of life come from within. These virile metaphors strongly refute any suggestion that the life of holiness is sheer passivity.¹

The apostle also illustrates his thought by the analogy of the masterbuilder. (1 Cor. 3:9ff.) A man's life is likened to a building and the man himself throughout his life is at work upon it. It is true that St. Paul comes to this thought through the problem of the divisions in the Corinthian church and he speaks of the church as the building and of himself and Apollos as its builders together with God. But he is also thinking of the individual life as a building. In this passage are two features of importance to our study. The one is the thought that we are all labourers together with God. God does not do everything Himself. Man has his task. This reminds us of Phil. 2:12,13, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you ..."

The other feature is the idea that man has a choice. He has a

1. Cf. also Gal. 2:2, 5:7, Phil. 2:16.

choice of building materials and can use that which will endure testing by fire or that which is destructible. And the building stands or falls according to the competence of the human builder. If the analogy be pressed further it might be said that the structure of gold or of wood is raised upon the foundation which is Christ, and that the meaning is that a man can found his life on Christ and yet build foolishly; he can be baptized and yet ruin the effectiveness of his baptism. In any case, it is clear that the apostle does give a large place to the decisive importance of human effort. This explains his use of "edification" (οἰκοδομή) as a standard by which to judge practical questions. Christians are everywhere engaged in the important task of building true character. Whatever is a help in this task is valuable. Here is an ethical norm of the first magnitude.¹

Another metaphor is that of the soldier arming himself for the fight.² The Christian life is a warfare and a man must be prepared to meet the onslaughts of temptation and the attacks of the powers of evil. Here again we see the correlative of the divine victory over sin. The battle has been joined by God and the issue decided. The battle, however, is not completed until it is won in the believer's life. The Christian must fight his own battle with evil. But he does not fight unaided, for God is his armourer, and the arms which He

1. Cf. Rom. 14:19, 15:12, 1 Cor. 8:1, 10:23, 14:1ff., 2 Cor. 12:19,
2. Eph. 6:10, Rom. 13:12, 2 Cor. 10:4. / Eph. 4:29, 1 Thess. 5:11.

provides are reliable and efficient. All that the soldier need do is to use what is provided, but he cannot expect the victory without himself engaging in the conflict.

The implication is unavoidable, that what a man does counts for something along with what God does. As C. J. Barker points out, "Paul safeguards the vital truth that all depends on the divine initiative in his doctrine of grace; but he never suggests that man's response is inevitable."¹ When St. Paul insists on the voluntary acceptance of the dying with Christ he refutes the suggestion of any magical rebirth and maintains the ethical reality of the new life in Christ. Fellowship with Christ in His sufferings is, for the apostle, conformity to Christ's way of life. The Christian way of life issues in Christlikeness, and the proof is found in the appearance in the life of the individual of the virtues of Christ.² No one has emphasized the greatness of God's work more than St. Paul, but the apostle does not despise the element of human co-operation necessary to a life of holiness. In Deissmann's metaphor, for him the oar was as valuable as the sail.³

We now see the relation which exists between the ascetic tendencies in St. Paul's ethics and his doctrine of salvation. The man in Christ is sanctified by the Holy Spirit. He is holy, devoted to God. His part consists in making his

1. "The Way of Life," p. 30.

2. Cf. L. H. Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

3. Cf. "Paul," p. 216.

life conform to God's holiness and in winning the struggle against the competing forces of evil, and in this he has the co-operation of God and of God's world. Like the athlete, the boxer, the soldier, he must discipline himself and avoid the distractions and enervating pastimes of life. Like the builder he must select wisely the things that make for endurance and strength. There is no real asceticism in St. Paul's teaching. He does not shun the world or seek to escape from it but rather he seeks to overcome the world and defeat the forces that cause ruin and despair. This point will receive attention in the next chapter but we must here note that his ethics serves practical ends. In many questions his advice is not based on absolute right or wrong, but on what will best serve the interests of peace in the community, and what will edify the brethren. In the great struggle against evil there is need for the utmost strength and endeavour. His ethical judgements on questions of sex are not based on a repugnance for the physical attachments of life but on the belief that in the short time before the parousia the interests of the church will best be served by those who are unattached and undistracted. But if celibacy is causing, rather than eliminating, distractions, the apostle is quite agreeable to the convert's decision to marry. His sole aim is that there should be a maximum human effort and that no one shall have run in vain. Of course, there is no purely "human" effort. When a man has done his best he is most acutely conscious of the divine power, beside which his own

strength is puny.

When all sides of the Pauline thought are kept in mind there is little danger that religion will be conceived as complete passivity or inactivity. R. Niebuhr speaks of "the mystic fear of action, because all action is tainted with sin."¹ St. Paul's mysticism is not of this sort. It is not flight from the world into a kind of spiritual existence but rather a living in society of the life of the Spirit. The spiritual life is judged by its ethical results. Niebuhr goes on to say that the mystic fear of action "has its counterpart in the Lutheran fear of action, because it may tempt to a new pride." Proof texts may be found in the Pauline epistles to support both the mystic and the dogmatic aversion to human activity, but the apostle's doctrine, taken as a whole, is definitely opposed to such a one-sided interpretation. His doctrine of justification by faith refutes the false idea that man's act is prior to God's, but as Niebuhr suggests, ideally it means "a release of the soul into action." It guarantees the elimination of pride by ascribing the power for all action to God, but it does not do away with human initiative. Rather, with the destruction of the power of the forces of evil the individual finds himself, for the first time in his life, able to choose his course and capable of doing what he wills to do. St. Paul, like Jesus, discovered the root of man's trouble in

1. op. cit., vol. II, p. 195.

the will. But Jesus was concerned more with man's lack of will, whereas St. Paul was concerned with the perversion of his will. Many of the parables of Jesus are directed towards encouraging men to desire the kingdom of God. St. Paul generally takes the desire for granted but is convinced that man's failure is largely due to the fact that his will lacks the power necessary for the good life. In salvation God sets him free from his bondage, admits him to the life of sonship, and provides the power to live a holy life. The will is not destroyed but reinforced. Man's freedom is freedom to act, and his action is a demonstration of his mystical union with Christ.

St. Paul's ethics concerning the state has often been interpreted as implying a negative attitude to participation in political and national affairs, and a confirmation of the ideas of the recluse. His teaching on these matters is, however, based on practical rather than dogmatic considerations. He has a great respect for the empire as an institution and is not insensible to the value of the Pax Romana for his missionary work. The authority of the emperor tended to curb the viciousness of Jewish persecution. So the apostle advocated obedience to the civil authority. In his eyes it was a divine provision and served the interests of the Christian evangel. Moreover, so long as the state looked upon Christianity as a form of Judaism, Christians could enjoy the freedom of worship guaranteed to the Jews. It was of vital importance that they should not call attention to themselves

by seeking to interfere in the affairs of the state. The civil structure of society, the economic system, or the abuses in administration were not of major importance to St. Paul. With his eschatological outlook the temporal affairs appear to be on the verge of collapse and their immediate rectification is only a matter of secondary importance. What is of primary importance is the salvation of mankind, and in the interest of evangelization all unnecessary entanglements are to be avoided. The good repute of the Christian community is a more immediate need than the reorganization of society. This is why he urges believers to settle their disputes internally without recourse to the civil courts. If they are to be judges of the world in future they can surely judge their own affairs now. At this point St. Paul draws on the ethics of Judaism when he says that the church should settle matters of dispute between its members. He cannot be charged with initiating an ethic of isolationism; he is only applying an existing principle in the interests of the Christian mission.

The fact that St. Paul has eschatological beliefs is of immense significance for his ethics; the detailed systematization of these beliefs is of minor interest for ethics. When we say that he expected in the immediate future the return of his Lord we acknowledge that his ethic has something of the character of an interim-ethic. When we say that he anticipated a final consummation at the end of the world, when the material would give place to the immaterial, the judgement

would take place, and Christians would enter fully into the resurrection life, we suggest further characteristics of his ethics, i.e., the emphasis on values of the soul rather than on one's station in life or physical resources, the self-examination induced by the knowledge of the coming judgement, the sense of tension between what now is and what is to be, and the joyful anticipation of the future exaltation. But when we attempt to make up a time table of events between the return of Jesus and the final consummation we find ourselves far removed from the theological basis of ethics. It is questionable, for example, if the apostle's eschatology is as complex as Schweitzer would have us believe. One reads the relevant pages of "The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle" with the feeling that the writer is expounding one phase of the contemporary Messianic speculation under the impression that he is expounding St. Paul. Of course, Schweitzer admits that the apostle gives no description of the Messianic kingdom and does not portray a general resurrection, yet these are integrated into Schweitzer's scheme. W. D. Davies disagrees with those who hold that St. Paul's eschatology included belief in a temporary Messianic kingdom. He writes: "The assumption which they all make is that Paul would naturally borrow the contemporary Messianic categories and proceed to construct his specifically Christian eschatology on their basis."¹ He does borrow the terms but he has too great a

1. op. cit., p. 290.

consciousness of the decisive character of what Christ has already done; all that remains to take place is the last judgement when those who have fallen asleep in Jesus shall be raised, the faithful living shall be transformed, and God shall be all in all.

The fact is that the main thought of the Pauline epistles involves a realized eschatology. The believer is already in the New Age and its blessings are even now present. The eschatological discourse in 1 Cor. 15 leads up to the statement that the last Adam was made a life-giving spirit. (verse 45) There can be no doubt that the apostle can speak so confidently of the future because he has already experienced the new life of the Spirit. Pfleiderer examines some of these eschatological expressions, including 1 Cor. 15:22, "even so in Christ shall all be made alive," and Rom. 6:5-8, "we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection ... we believe that we shall also live with him." He says that the word "live" in these passages is primarily eschatological.¹ But through the mystical communion with Christ the believer has entered into the spirit-life and has already tasted the fruits of the final consummation. The life of the Spirit is "essentially identical with the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* and *ἐπουράνιος* of the risen Jesus and of our own resurrection." So Pfleiderer remarks that "the transcendent eschatological idea became of necessity an

1. Cf. "Paulinism," vol. I, p. 19.

immanent ethical one." He continues:

"We have here a turn of Christian thought which has bearings of immeasurable importance. Whilst the direction of the primitive Christian consciousness was predominantly, one may almost say exclusively, eschatological, and the life of a Christian on earth appeared for this reason to be still an expectation, not yet a completion, the old that perishes, not the new that endures (αἰὼν οὗτος, not αἰὼν μέλλων), Paul makes the 'newness of life' to begin not with that completion on the other side of the grave, but with the life of faith on earth of the Messiah's community. And this change in the time of its commencement immediately leads to a transformation of the idea itself; the Messianic ζωή, by commencing at once in the life of faith on earth, is stripped of its one-sided, supernatural, apocalyptic character, and becomes the new life of Christians in the truly spiritual, in the ethical sense of the word, the renewal of the νοῦς, the self that thinks, feels and wills. ... It is just the development by Paul of the immanent ethical out of the transcendent eschatological idea that was so original and so fruitful for Christian dogma." (op. cit., pp. 19, 20.)

It is by this means that St. Paul is able to fortify his doctrine on both fronts. On the one hand, he is able to maintain the cause of free-will and human responsibility against the thought of salvation as something arbitrary on God's part and magical in its operation. The individual has yet to be judged on the basis of his life. His conduct affects his chances of enjoying the consummation of the life of the Spirit. On the other hand, the grace of God is still basic, for the life of holiness would not be possible without the gift of sanctification. The materials have been given to the Christian and all the necessities provided. He does not create something out of nothing. He has the new life. All that he need do is to use it. This thought is well and truly phrased by

Strachan: "Moral progress is not a growth into holiness, but a growth in holiness."¹

The apostle's doctrine is so fruitful for ethics because on the one hand it gives ground for confidence, and on the other hand it maintains the tension between what is and what is to be, between the actual and the ideal. It breeds confidence because the convert has the assurance that God has already acted on his behalf and provided for his every need. He has been accepted by God and granted a new life, a life of fellowship and of power. And he knows this because he now has the Spirit. The mention of the Spirit is always cause for rejoicing and St. Paul never refers to the Spirit without assurance. A typical example is 2 Cor. 5:5,6, "Now he that hath wrought us for the selfsame thing is God, who also hath given unto us the earnest of the Spirit. Therefore we are always confident ..." ² This kind of confidence is not to be equated with a high morale; it is founded on the fact that the Spirit brings real power into the life of the individual and creates an inner strength sufficient for the tasks of life. The apostle tells the Ephesians that his prayer for them is "that ye may be strengthened with power through his spirit in the inward man." (3:16, R. V.) This renewal of a man's life from the center is the secret of successful Christian living, the more so because the new man has a confident approach to the

1. op. cit., p. 171.

2. Cf. also Rom. 8:26-28.

problems of life. His confidence is based on God's active participation in his affairs as evidenced through His Spirit.

At the same time, however, the sense of tension between the actual and the ideal is heightened by the tremendous possibilities of the new life. The Spirit is the source of power, but living in the Spirit requires the constant affirmation of the human will. It is an act of choice and a matter of ceaseless endeavour. Wernle remarks that "St. Paul knew very well that the work of the Spirit cannot be compared to natural causation, so that the moral life could be deduced from it by purely logical methods."¹ As Christians we know that "our old man is crucified with him" but we must still yield our "members as instruments of righteousness unto God." The Christian is freed from sin but he is not freed from a sense of sin. Its power over him has been broken but he has a lively awareness of how far short his life comes from the life of true holiness. His life is lived in power but it is also lived in the knowledge of the disparity between the power that is available and the power that is utilized. There is always a tension between what he has already received and what he has yet to achieve.² Where sin abounded grace did much more abound,

1. op. cit., p. 311.

2. St. Paul is always conscious of the fact that, much as he has already received, what he has is but the first fruits of what is yet to come. Cf. Phil. 3:12ff. The context shows that ὅσοι τέλειοι in verse 15 does not refer to those who are ethically "perfect," for they must still "press toward the mark," Τέλειοι is a technical expression applied to those who

and yet the man who is under grace has still to make the decision that he will not continue in sin. Thus Brunner speaks of grace: "It is a having and a not having, a standing beyond the contradiction while still standing in it. It is the justification of the sinner, who, though justified, does not cease being a sinner to the last day of his earthly life, but continues as much in need of forgiveness as on the day of his conversion."¹ The fact that the Christian life is lived within history means that the same issues are constantly presenting themselves in a variety of forms and each new situation requires a new decision. There are many decisive battles but no complete victory in this life. The onslaughts of temptation never abate. The truth which history perpetually reaffirms is, as Niebuhr has averred, that the possibilities of evil grow with the possibilities of good.² Therefore we may not think in terms of a progressive victory over evil but rather of a progressive conflict in which the opposing forces become increasingly aggressive and the struggle increasingly intense. The Christian is always possessed with a sense of incompleteness,

are mature in faith, possibly borrowed from the mystical vocabulary. (Cf. Robertson and Plummer on 1 Cor. 2:6) It is akin to *πνευματικοί* and contrasted with *νήπιοι* which in turn is akin to *σάρκινοι*. Lightfoot says that the early Christians applied *τέλειοι* to the baptized, as opposed to the catechumens. (Cf. Lightfoot on Col. 1:28) St. Paul uses it more sparingly, always as a high compliment, yet never without a hint of the heights yet to be reached. The best among them are mature, but none is perfect. (Cf. Abbott on Eph. 4:13)

1. "The Theology of Crisis," pp. 63, 64.

2. Cf. "An Interpretation of Christian Ethics," p. 97.

and yet he has peace. His peace, however, is not merely contentment but a knowledge that his sins have been forgiven.¹ His soul is filled with wonder at the power and love of God as evidenced in his own life, but at the same time he becomes increasingly aware of the incompleteness of his life. The greater his ascendancy over sin the more conscious he is of his sinful condition. The greater his consciousness of sin the more he is driven back to God and in His strength he meets the temptations and trials of life.

C. J. Barker has spoken of a twofold ethical development which characterized the period after the exile, a development reflected in the Pauline epistles.² First, ethics became linked with eschatology. The contemporary scene was viewed in the light of the kingdom which already existed in heaven and which would shortly be consummated upon earth. Ethics was conceived in terms of loyalty to the heavenly kingdom. St. Paul refers to the heavenly citizenship of Christians. (Phil. 3:20) It is worthy of note that he does so in an ethical connection. He has been calling on the Philippians to copy his manner of life. Then he makes the parenthetical remark: "For many walk ... whose end is destruction, whose God is their belly, and whose glory is their shame, who mind earthly things." The reason for their

1. Cf. R. Niebuhr, "The Nature and Destiny of Man," vol. II, p. 104.

2. op. cit., p. 28.

unethical conduct lies in their horizontal outlook. They have no sense of values apart from the purely human and earthly standards of expediency. But the Christian is a member of a community with a heavenly charter. His conduct is determined by the standards of the divine society. He enjoys the freedom and accepts the responsibilities consistent with heavenly citizenship.

The second line of ethical development after the exile was an emphasis on the gentler qualities. The fight against evil was seen to be immeasurably beyond the powers of man. It was in reality a battle on the spiritual plane. Tyranny and oppression in human society were the results of the reign of Satan in the spiritual order. The elimination of the evils of life consequently rested entirely with the success of God's plan for the destruction of Satan. All that man could do was to wait humbly upon God and show in his own life the qualities of forgiveness, mercy and kindness which he hoped for in God. St. Paul felt that the brunt of the battle with evil was in the spiritual order. "For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, etc." (Eph. 6:12) It is significant that this chapter in the Ephesian letter is concerned with social ethics, the relations which ought to exist within the family and within the household. Forbearance and consideration are the key-notes here. A man's relations with others are affected by the knowledge of his utter dependence upon God. The fact that God is his Master will

influence his treatment of those who call him master. (Eph. 6:9) Moreover, the apostle emphasizes man's dependence upon God in the fight against evil by showing that every item of his equipment for battle is something which he can receive only from God. And when, fully armed, he goes forth to the battle, the activities which claim his attention are, after all, Godward enterprises, prayer, supplication and perseverance. (verse 18)

The final issue is in the hands of God. The victory is His and not the individual's. The fruits of victory are at the disposal of God who will judge and reward every man in the day of judgement on the basis of his deeds. "For we must all appear before the judgement seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." (2 Cor. 5:10) The thought of the coming judgement has a twofold significance for ethics. In the first place, it stresses the importance of each individual act. There may be matters of greater or lesser importance, but when all deeds are to be taken into the reckoning a man is never certain how much weight will be given to the apparently minor acts in his life. The life of holiness involves taking into consideration the details of conduct and endeavouring to make oneself acceptable to God. In the verse previous to the one quoted St. Paul says, "Wherefore we labour, that ... we may be accepted of him." The verb *φιλοτιμούμεθα* with the infinitive means "to endeavour earnestly." The judgement is

explicitly stated to be the reason for the life of endeavour. The Christian must, in the good sense of the word, take pride in his conduct. The idea of the coming judgement is also applied ethically in Rom. 14. St. Paul is concerned with the tendency among the Christians to disparage the views of fellow members regarding vegetarianism and similar matters. Disputes have arisen within the church because one man presumes to judge his brother on a question of minor importance. The apostle's advice is to stop worrying about the other man's habits and to look to his own life to make certain that he was not defeating the will of God by putting obstacles in the path of his brother. (verse 13) His exhortation is supported by reference to the judgement. "But why dost thou judge thy brother? or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? for we shall all stand before the judgement seat of Christ." (verse 10) "So then everyone of us shall give account of himself to God." (verse 12)

In the second place, the thought of the coming judgement provides a sense of urgency to the daily life of the Christian. Not only must he look to the details of his conduct but he must regard the events of each and every day as of crucial importance. He does not know which day will witness the appearing of his Lord and the beginning of the judgement. "The day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night." (1 Thess. 5:2) Therefore sobriety and watchfulness must characterize the Christian. (verse 6) Watchfulness

means more than expectation. It is an ethical virtue. "Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men, be strong. Let all your things be done with charity."¹

Akin to watchfulness is the thought of preparedness. Here again the ethical note predominates. When Christ appears we also shall appear with him in glory. (Col. 3:4) Therefore we must now begin to live the kind of life which will be ours fully in that future day. In order that immoral habits may have no part in our lives we must mortify our members which are upon earth. (verse 5) But here again the positive nature of the apostle's ethic is brought out, for in his thought the mortification of one's body is by the power of God. (Rom. 8:13) Johannes Weiss sees in this verse a rich blending of the passive and active aspects of the moral life. "The impelling force and the discipline of self cannot be more closely conjoined than in Paul's idea that the divine power of the Spirit may be used (*πνεύματι*) to mortify the flesh (*θανάτοῦν*)."²

The life of holiness is thus a life of endeavour and of conscientiousness. But it is not a hopeless task for God has already sanctified the believer. His life is in the hands of God. He has received the Spirit as the earnest of future perfection and as the power for moral living in the

1. 1 Cor. 16:13,14.

2. J. Weiss, "Paul and Jesus," p. 113.

present. Therefore life is nothing less than a joyful service and an opportunity for showing gratitude and trust. The life of holiness is the commitment of the self through the power of the Spirit to the God of his salvation.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ETHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

"An ethic which is free from presuppositions has never existed." So writes Brunner in "The Divine Imperative."¹ No exception need be made in the case of St. Paul. His ethic is thoroughly religious in character and presented as a logical inference from the truths expounded in his theology. We have sought to show that his doctrine of salvation, in all its major elucidations, has profound significance for his ethical teaching. This position is not without its critics, but we believe that St. Paul, if not at all times with perfect logic, at least never without complete conviction, brings his moral precepts into relation with his doctrine and in so doing finds an ethical implication in every one of his soteriological concepts.² This we have attempted to demonstrate under the various heads prescribed by the conventional treatment of the

1. p. 87.

2. Cf. H. Weinel, "St. Paul, The Man and His Work," p. 245, for illustrations of his statement that "Each doctrinal theory has its practical consequences most skilfully indicated."

Pauline theology.

The relationship, however, must not be conceived as in any way mathematical, so many moral, so many doctrinal precepts, and each theological idea giving rise to a specific ethical counsel. Rather, the counsels are based upon certain presuppositions, each presupposition being associated with more than one phase of his doctrine and, in turn, giving rise to a number of ethical injunctions. In the course of our study we have considered these presuppositions as they arose, often repeatedly, in successive examinations of the apostle's doctrine, and we have indicated motives and grounds of appeal devolving from them. In some cases we have shown the actual use made of such motives in St. Paul's ethical teaching. There now remains to summarize our findings and further illustrate the apostle's use of these presuppositions in his ethics.

The term "presupposition" suggests chronological primacy and may therefore lead to an incorrect assumption. There can be no doubt that much of the Pauline ethic, in origin at least, antedates St. Paul's Christian theology. Even before his conversion the apostle had reached conclusions about right and wrong concerning most of the moral problems which later confronted him as a Christian missionary. His decisions on these matters are the result of his Jewish training. But it is nevertheless true to say that the content of his ethic is due to his Christian beliefs. Such words as "peace," "gentleness," "longsuffering" were not new. But a new

content was put into the old forms, and that content was specifically Christian. And as a Christian he found new and weightier reasons with which to reinforce his decisions, and an entirely new attitude to the whole question of the moral law. His doctrine vitally affects his ethical teaching, and not only in the more occasional and specific counsels of the Corinthian epistles, but also in the more formal, and it may be more traditional, hortatory sections in the other epistles. A. M. Hunter may find grounds for his contention that in these latter sections St. Paul is following traditional material in the form of a Christian Halakka, but he overstates his case when he says that "these hortatory sections in Paul's epistles have little connection with the theoretic foundations of Paul's ethic."¹ 1 Thess. 4, one of the sections in his list, is a very definite example of the permeation of ethics by specifically Pauline thought-forms.

The content of the ethic in these sections may not differ radically from Jewish or pre-Pauline Christian ethics. The decision as to what ought to be done in a particular circumstance may be essentially the same. But in its presentation, in the motives to which appeal is made, and in

1. "Paul and His Predecessors," p. 64. Hunter's general position seems to be well documented and strongly maintained. He does not dispute the apostle's originality in handling this traditional material. Nevertheless, St. Paul does more than add a phrase here and there, "in the Lord," "as unto the Lord," etc. His central doctrines all put in an appearance in these hortatory sections.

the logic behind it, the apostle's doctrinal position is everywhere in evidence. E. Caird holds that "It would be truer to say that the ethical principle of St. Paul begot the theological than that the theological begot the ethical."¹ It is true that St. Paul was greatly concerned with the conduct of his converts and much of his correspondence deals with practical problems. But we cannot infer from this that his doctrine is expounded mainly for this purpose or that it was arrived at as a result of didactic needs. Of what ethic is the doctrine of justification by faith the child? It might be argued that his whole concept of redemption is designed to meet specific needs, such as the defence of the admission of the Gentiles. But it is more amenable to proof to say that his doctrine is primarily the result of his own experience and of his meditation on the meaning of Christ for his own life, and this has been our approach to the question. The implications of St. Paul's doctrine have been drawn out and the details elaborated in such a way as to make it universally applicable and inclusive of the experience of all Christians. It is at this point that his doctrine affects his ethics as he relates the implications of his doctrine to the common life of Christians, sometimes actually producing a new judgement, sometimes providing new grounds of appeal for older moral criteria, and generally setting every problem in a new light.

1. "The Evolution of Religion," vol. II, p. 202.

The apostle's eschatology has influenced his judgement on certain questions, notably marriage, slavery and the maintenance of the status quo. His concept of the koinonia also affects his counsels on the relations between members of the church. Not only does he ask for peace and harmony, which would have been sufficient if his sole concern were with practical matters, but he makes love the supreme virtue. And here the ultimate ground is theological, namely that love, more than any other gift, is characteristic of the eternal realm. Love never fails but endures because it is of the order that is to be and that is already present though not fully known. (1 Cor. 13:8-13) It is because of his concept of Christians as members of the body of Christ that St. Paul desires his converts to be "kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love; in honour preferring one another." (Rom. 12:10) The term *τῆ φιλadelphία*, which Sanday and Headlam translate "love of the brethren," serves to emphasize the peculiar relationship which exists between Christians. Here the Pauline ethic transcends the Jewish, for it finds its basis not in any code of conduct but in a quality of friendship. Any man whom God has accepted into the sonship must be accorded full recognition as a brother and a fellow member of Christ, not simply to be treated fairly but to be loved and honoured. This is the distinguishing feature of the ethic of Jesus, which is essentially living the life of sonship with God, and St. Paul is in this respect a worthy disciple of

his Lord. Moreover, he has the same attitude as his Master to the principle behind right conduct. Conduct involves not simply doing the right act but doing it with the right spirit. So love (and here *ἀγάπη* is used in a wider sense than within the Christian fellowship) must be *ἀνυπόκριτος*. A gift must be made *ἐν ἀπλότητι*. Not only must a Christian be merciful but he must show mercy *ἐν ἰλαρότητι*. (Rom. 12:8,9) But even more decisively has his ethic been affected by his doctrine, for the apostle holds that the promises have already been realized in Christ. Christians have the Spirit who is the creator of new life and the source of power in that life. Therefore ethical instruction is never purely a laying down of rules but a description of the mighty working of the Spirit as manifested in the quality of life of Christians, and an exhortation to measure up to the full status of men under the Spirit. And it is given "in the Lord." It is never considered as a divine decree but as a life-giving principle transmitted by inward processes throughout the membership.

We have remarked on certain evidence of the apostle's knowledge of Stoic ethics. It is quite clear that he draws on Greek and Jewish popular literature for much of his terminology and frequently uses as a framework for his ideas the popular lists of vices and, to a lesser extent, of virtues.¹ Weinel has

1. Cf. H. Weinel, *op. cit.*, pp. 236, 237; C. H. Dodd, "The Epistle of Paul to the Romans," p. 27.

reminded us that "The morality of early Christianity as a whole was not simply an indigenous growth."¹ It grew out of the Jewish morality.² But Hellenistic Jews were already familiar with the attempts of writers like Philo and the author of the Fourth Book of Maccabees to connect the scriptural morality with the ideas of the Greek philosophers.³ So Prede says that St. Paul's ethic "is in the main the Jewish ethic ... augmented by a few Christian features which are not peculiar to Paul."⁴ This writer characteristically makes too much of this point and ignores the distinctively Pauline features, but many other scholars have also noted the traditional nature of the hortatory portions of his epistles. Weizsacker remarked that 1 Thess. 4 "reads like a sort of catechism," and since his time this aspect of the problem has been thoroughly investigated by men like Carrington, Hunter and Davies.

Carrington deals with the material from the point of view of the Jewish catechetical instruction relative to proselyte baptism, and finds evidence that the early church made use of similar formulae. Many scholars believe that First Peter contains such instruction, and Carrington compares 1 Pet. 1:6 with Rom. 5:3 to show the similarity of ideas, a similarity

1. op. cit., p. 337.

2. Cf. W. D. Davies, op. cit., p. 131, for the use of the participle in place of the imperative, showing a Jewish source.

3. Cf. G. F. Moore, op. cit., vol. II, p. 81; J. Weiss, "The History of Primitive Christianity," vol. I, p. 240.

4. "Paul," p. 117.

also found in Jas. 1:2.¹ There is a difference in the language of the three passages, and this is Carrington's strongest point for he shows that although James echoes Peter in two identical phrases he also has one phrase found in Romans and not in the Petrine verse. Moreover, both St. Paul and St. James have the phrase "knowing this," which seems to suggest a well-known aphorism. The conclusion reached is that these writers are using the same formulae which are older than their documents. Bishop Carrington further examines the hortatory sections in Colossians, Ephesians, James, Hebrews, and two in 1 Peter.² From this examination he discovers a common pattern and concludes that there was a common source, probably oral, and after investigating the terminology he affirms the opinion that the material was "connected with baptismal and catechetical procedure."³

C. H. Dodd has shown that the early church maintained a distinction between the *κῆρυγμα* and the *διδασχῆ*.⁴ The latter was mainly ethical. A. M. Hunter, who surveys a much greater range of St. Paul's ethics than does Carrington, has noted that the hortatory sections have little specific relevance to actual situations in the churches addressed, and that they seem to correspond to the kind of instruction which the apostle

1. Cf. "The Primitive Christian Catechism," pp. 23ff.

2. Ibid, pp. 31ff.

3. Ibid, p. 88.

4. "The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments," pp. 3ff.

has already given his converts and which he calls "the tradition."¹ W. D. Davies follows Carrington and reaffirms the opinion that these sections contain baptismal catechetical material.² If this is so, we may assume that St. Paul used such material in his instructions to his converts before baptism, and that when he discovered that the baptized Christian did not always correct his manner of life to a sufficient degree the apostle wrote, reiterating his teaching and strengthening it with exhortation based on his κήρυγμα. In this way we can account for the similarity of order and ideas in the various epistles, and also the variety of expressions and of subordinate material. It is not the teaching, then, which is of prime importance in these sections of the epistles, for that teaching had already been given, and much of it no doubt had been memorized by the convert. What is of special importance is the theological support provided for that teaching, and the logical nature of the exhortation.

We have said that St. Paul's doctrine gives rise to certain major implications which become presuppositions for his ethical teaching. Although no tabulation of these presuppositions has yet been attempted we have already discerned their origins in the various doctrinal concepts. Our point here is that they are used by the apostle to support not

1. Cf. Hunter, "Paul and His Predecessors," pp. 63, 64. Cf. also

2. Thess. 2:6.

2. Cf. Davies, op. cit., p. 128.

only his decisions on practical matters of immediate concern to the specific church addressed but also his so called catechetical material. One of these sections dealt with by all three of the authorities referred to, i.e., Carrington, Hunter and Davies, is Eph. 4:25ff. On examination we see immediately that the presupposition of the koinonia provides a ground of appeal. Lying is wrong because they are members one of another. (4:25) Stealing is wrong because work and sharing is the basis of communal life. (4:28) Slander is wrong because the church needs encouragement and edification. (4:29) The presupposition of the holy nature of God also affects his thought. Fornication, etc., are out of keeping with their calling as saints dedicated to God. (5:3,4) But forgiveness must be practised because God forgives. (4:32) The imitation of Christ is the basis for the appeal to walk in love. (5:2) Sonship with God implies that they will follow Him, (5:1) and not live immoral lives which would deprive them of their "inheritance" in the kingdom. (5:5) The gift of the Spirit implies that those who have received the Spirit will show the fruit, i.e., goodness, righteousness and truth. (5:9) Practically the whole of this section has already been examined in our consideration of the apostle's theology, and we have seen further examples, especially in chapter 6, of the influence of his doctrine on his ethical teaching. The fact that a study of this section has arisen naturally in the course of our investigation of doctrine is an illustration of the close relationship which exists between his

theology and even that part of his ethics which is most traditional.¹

All the evidence points to the fact that St. Paul does not slavishly copy any authoritative manual of ethics. Those who are so anxious to cut off the ethical sections and minimize the apostle's originality must explain the absence in these sections of any collections of the logia of Jesus such as are incorporated into the Synoptic Gospels. There can be no doubt that St. Paul was familiar with a number of the sayings of Jesus. Many reminiscences have been detected. In Acts 20:35 the apostle reminds the Ephesian elders that Jesus had said, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." This passage in Acts contains many affinities with the Pauline epistles, and in the same verse there is a parallel to 1 Thess. 5:14, namely the precept "support the weak." We may well have here an indication that St. Paul has knowledge of certain dicta of Jesus, some of which are not recorded elsewhere. Further proof is found in 1 Cor. 7:12, 25, where he disclaims any specific authority from Christ for his practical suggestions. He says that he has no "commandment of the Lord." The word ἐπιταγή shows that he is not referring to a spiritual revelation.² "Paul means" says Enslin, "he has no traditional command whereas he has on other points."³ Further references to a

1. 1 Thess. 4 exhibits the same relationship between ethics and some, although not all, of these presuppositions.
 2. Cf. Davies, op. cit., pp. 195, 196.
 3. "The Ethics of Paul," p. 110.

tradition which he has received and passed on to his converts are found in 1 Cor. 11:23, 15:3, 2 Thess. 3:5.

If St. Paul in his epistles had merely expounded his theology and then turned to traditional sources for his ethics we should expect to find a series of quotations of the words of Jesus and a number of specific references to his authority for certain pronouncements. But this is not the case. It is when he has no definite authority that he mentions the fact. But when he is on sure ground, when he feels that he is building upon the ethic of Jesus and is in keeping with known tradition, he has no need for scribal annotation of precedent and authority but interprets the divine will with freedom and under the warrant of his own doctrine. His ethic is thoroughly in the spirit of his Master's ethic; he attacks the same evils, lauds the same virtues and adopts the same attitude to life, but everywhere he shows his own individuality and the influence of his own concepts.

When we compare St. Paul's ethic with that of Jesus we see the evidence of the apostle's independence in the difference of emphasis, and yet, fundamentally, the two are at one.¹ There is a difference in emphasis in regard to the place of the human will in determining conduct. Jesus assumed the ability of a man to find eternal life if he had the will to do so. The Rich Ruler is given a practical task to perform,

1. Cf. A. B. D. Alexander, "The Ethics of St. Paul," p. 12.

something he could have done had he had the will. St. Paul would have felt constrained to go further and explain that the will was corrupt and that its condition could only be changed through faith. Yet this is implicit in the ethic of Jesus. The Sermon on the Mount is a series of illustrations of the way a Christian will act under certain conditions. But it is not a code of conduct, for it turns upon the attitude of a man to life under God. It has been described as an impossible ethic given for the purpose of demonstrating the impossibility of living up to a set of rules. But it might better be described as a demonstration of the ultimate sources of right conduct which are impossible to define but capable of being illustrated. The focus is not on a series of acts but on a quality of life. As L. H. Marshall remarks, "For Jesus, the main question confronting every man is not, What acts ought I to do? but, What manner of man ought I to be?"¹ Definite acts of goodness flow from the intangibles in a man's life, his attitude to God, to his fellow men, and to the whole purpose of creation. So the first two ethical principles of Jesus, in Marshall's view, are: (1) "Conduct is determined by character and not character by conduct;" (2) "A good disposition."² St. Paul in like fashion bases conduct upon rightness with God and the renewal of the mind.

1. op. cit., p. 67. Cf. Brunner, "The Divine Imperative," p. 137; E. F. Scott, "The Ethical Teaching of Jesus," p. 39.
 2. Marshall, op. cit., pp. 63ff.

Moreover, Jesus views the whole field of conduct as a natural outcome of the Fatherhood of God. Ethics is not regarded in isolation but is considered in relation to the Kingdom of God. Much of His teaching is directed towards the awakening of his hearers to the recognition of God's fatherly care over them. They are taught to look to Him for their needs and to depend on Him in every situation. Right conduct begins with the recognition, and is shaped by the realization, of one's membership in the family of God. So the ethic of Jesus begins with the proclamation of the reality of the Kingdom of God and the call for repentance. In similar fashion the ethic of St. Paul revolves about the central concept of sonship with God realized through union with Christ and demanding faith as a condition of entrance. Character is based on the nature of God, a reproduction of the qualities of the Father. Immorality disqualifies one from the inheritance.

In his book, "The Individuality of St. Paul," R. H. Strachan makes the observation that "The New Testament preachers went forth, not as preachers of morality, but to proclaim a gospel which involved duties."¹ St. Paul is no exception. His ethic is an inference from his theology, not the theology from the ethic, and his doctrine provides the basis which is essential to any acceptance by man of a course of action as his duty. The apostle thus solves many questions which are involved

1. p. 174.

in the problem of morality. One question is that raised by what Niebuhr calls "the sceptical reflection that 'a living dog is better than a dead lion.'"¹ Unless a man believes in a higher reality than the world of sense "all moral imperatives are limited by the survival impulse." The apostle's ethic is truly religious; it is based on the reality of the unseen world. And it requires faith to make it truly effective. When St. Paul makes faith central in his theology he, at the same time, overcomes a major hazard to ethics.

Another question concerns the nature of duty. What lies behind conduct? What is it that makes a certain act right? Is it the objective factor or the subjective? Either answer has its difficulties. If right conduct is determined by the objective condition, e.g., another man's need in a certain situation, then that is right which answers to the objective condition, e.g., meets the other man's particular need. But the objection is raised that one man may accidentally and quite unintentionally perform the act which solves the needy man's problem, while another man may make a real sacrifice to be of service and yet fail in his endeavour. To make the objective factor the criterion of goodness is thus to evaluate success more highly than motive. On the other hand, when the subjective factor is paramount there is the danger of assessing well-intentioned blundering at least equally with a more intelligent

1. op. cit., vol. II, p. 79.

and direct participation in the affairs of society.

Nevertheless, when all factors are taken into consideration, it must appear that the subjectively good act is in fact the right act. This is the conclusion reached by Sir David Ross in a fine survey of the problem in his book, "Foundations of Ethics."¹ But when the moral philosopher arrives at this point he has difficulty in connecting the sense of duty with the subjective good, for he cannot think of anything that is obligatory except a self-exertion, and this seems to be the turning taken by Ross. The result is that morality becomes a series of acts rather than a life, a quantitative rather than a qualitative existence. The difficulty may be stated simply. Motive is one aspect of the subjective situation. But motive cannot be commanded or brought into the realm of duty. Therefore duty is only concerned with the specific act and not with the motive behind it. So Ross writes: "To say that we ought to act from love is to say that we ought to think that a certain act would promote some one's welfare, and that we ought to desire his welfare, and that we ought to do the act on that account. But surely neither opinion or desire is under our immediate control."²

Now in St. Paul's view the Christian never has to look at any situation in isolation. He sees it in relation to

1. pp. 147ff.

2. Ibid, p. 115.

the whole, for he himself has been caught up into the eternal purposes of God and made a partner in His activity. The motives for action are already provided, for not only is he a son of God and a member of the *koinonia* but he has the mind of Christ. But still there is the objection that even though a man may have the right motive his duty is to do the right act, and the sense of obligation does not extend to the motive behind the act. So Ross writes: "Our duty is to do acts and not to do them from certain motives."¹ It is evident that St. Paul is not hampered by such speculation, for he looks on love not only as a virtue but as a commandment. "If there be any other commandment, it is ... "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." (Rom. 13:9) But even when the philosophical difficulty is admitted, the apostle has the answer to the relation between duty and motive. Granted that it is not a man's duty to act from certain motives, St. Paul would say that the Christian will act from certain motives and that if he does not his problem is not ethical but religious in origin. The answer to his problem is not the acceptance of these motives as a duty, but the acceptance of salvation in Christ whence come not only the desire but the power to act from these motives.

Another question arises out of the conception of duty in relation to the development of a man's own personality. The Orphic saying, "Become what thou art," is fundamental to ethics,

1. op. cit., p. 116.

but it cannot convey any feeling of obligation, for ethics alone cannot help a man to see himself in all his possibilities. "It is impossible to define," says Brunner, "what man ought to be from that which he actually is."¹ But the Christian sees himself in relation to God and thus discovers what he really is and what he ought to be. St. Paul does not start with a rational philosophy but with a theocentric religion. The man who has been baptized is a saint, that is, he is set apart and dedicated to God and takes his character from Him. The norm is the character of God, and this is exemplified in the life of Jesus. Admitted into sonship, the Christian becomes aware of his true nature and receives the gift of the Spirit to help him become in fact what he is now only in potentiality. The gift of the Spirit means that the life with God is not so much the reward and goal of his striving as the center and source of all living. Brunner sums it up thus: "Previously, life, even at its best, is always a life directed towards God; now, henceforth life is lived from God as its centre."² Or, in A. B. D. Alexander's words: "Christ transforms morality from a routine into a life; and with Paul goodness ceases to be a thing of outward rule, and becomes a spontaneous energy of the soul."³

We turn now to a brief resume of the apostle's ethics

1. "The Divine Imperative," p. 40.

2. Ibid, p. 76.

3. op. cit., p. 12.

for the purpose of illustrating what we have discovered to be the relation between his ethical teaching and his doctrine. His ethics concerning sex is based on his concept of the Christian as one who has been admitted into sonship with God and destined to enjoy the full privileges of sonship in the future, and as one who has been sanctified by the Holy Spirit and even now lives the life of holiness. For example, in 1 Cor. 6:12-20, St. Paul apparently gives three reasons why the Christian should consider fornication a sin. His first argument is that other activities such as eating affect only a part of the body, i.e., the belly, but fornication affects the whole body, and the body belongs to the Lord. Secondly, he asserts that our bodies are members of Christ and when a man consorts with a harlot his body becomes one body with that of the harlot, making Christ, in effect, a partner to an unholy union. Thirdly, the body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, therefore holy and consecrated to God, and must be used for His glorification and not for unseemly practices.¹

It is immediately evident that these are not actually reasons in themselves. They do not prove that fornication is wrong. But assuming that it is, they demonstrate how grievously wrong it is. The same arguments could be used against any form of sexual love. Logically, a man ought not to give himself to

1. St. Paul has none of the Hellenistic dualism which was based on the idea of matter as evil. Cf. supra, pp. 36, 37, 116ff.

his wife, because his body is the Lord's. But this is no part of the apostle's meaning, for he recognizes the right to marry, and even sees the marriage relationship as a means whereby the unbelieving partner is sanctified by the believer. Sex is therefore not wrong in itself, and the apostle does not here explain why fornication is wrong. But, in fact, he has already done so, for the real basis of his teaching is that fornication is not sanctioned by God and is not consistent with the life of sonship. This is made clear in an earlier part of the same chapter. "Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God? Be not deceived: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind ... shall inherit the kingdom of God." (1 Cor. 6:9,10) Thus the real basis of his ethic is seen to be the categorical designation of fornication as unrighteous, and what is assumed is that God has expressly so decreed. This is no utilitarian ethic but an ethic founded on the known will of God. Further, the word "inherit" (*κληρονομήσουσιν*) implies the life of sonship, and fornication is deemed to be inconsistent with such a life. Once this premise has been established its further explication in the passage just discussed is both logical and forceful.

Elsewhere St. Paul attacks sexual immorality on the same two grounds, i.e., that it is out of keeping with the holy nature of God and that it is contrary to the manner of life of a son of God destined to dwell in His kingdom. We see this in

Eph. 5. In verse 3, the appeal is to the fact that a Christian is holy. Fornication is not becoming to the "saint." In verse 5, the "whoremonger" is included in the list of those who have no inheritance in the kingdom. Again in 1 Thess. 4, the basis is the will of God and the fact that the Christian is sanctified. (verse 3) The apostle has said in the previous verse that he has given the Thessalonians certain commandments of the Lord, one of which obviously was "to abstain from fornication." His ethical admonition here is based on the will of God, the express commandment of Jesus, and the fact that God has called them unto holiness. (verse 7) The positive side of the apostle's sexual ethics is introduced in verse 4, where we may detect the influence of his doctrine of the koinonia. "That every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour." Here we have a greater thought than the principle of equality. The use of the word "honour" suggests the divine source of the partner's worthiness. We have to turn to 1 Cor. 12:12ff. for an explanation of St. Paul's thought. In that passage he speaks of the value of each individual member of the body of Christ, and the honour which God has given to all, and more especially to the more lowly. "But God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honour to that part which lacked: that there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one for another." (1 Cor. 12:24,25) The wife is to be honoured because she is also a member of the body of Christ and because God has given

her honour. The use of the phrase ἐν ἁγιασμῷ shows the lofty plane on which St. Paul's thought is moving. In the marriage relationship a man does not take away from the Lord the body which belongs to Him in order to give it to another, but rather, he has therein an opportunity of expressing the sacredness of his life and of his wife's. The one partner sanctifies the other, and in the marriage relationship it is possible so to live that a sense of dedication to God pervades the whole life of the family.

It is apparent that St. Paul has a lofty estimate of the married state. He uses the figure of marriage to illustrate the union of Christ and the church.¹ Within the marriage bond he calls for mutual love.² Moreover, he proclaims the indissolubility of the marriage vow, and makes no mention of the exception allowed for in the account in Matthew.³ A wife separated from her husband must not marry another. The husband must not put away his wife. Even if one is married to an unbeliever it is better not to separate. (1 Cor. 7:12ff.) It is difficult to reconcile this advice with his thought in 2 Cor. 6:14ff., where St. Paul suggests the advisability of separation from unbelievers. That he is there referring to

1. The prophets had used the figure of marriage to describe the relation between God and Israel. Hosea is an outstanding example. (2:19,20) cf. Jer. 3:14, "Turn, O backsliding children, saith the Lord; for I am married unto you." Also Isa. 54:5. In keeping with this idea they term apostasy "whoredom."
 2. Col. 3:18ff. Cf. Eph. 5:22,23; 2 Cor. 11:2.
 3. 1 Cor. 7:10,11. Cf. Mt. 5:32.

sexual union is clear from the word *ἑτεροζυγοῦντες* which is a reminiscence of Lev. 19:19, which is concerned with the breeding of animals. The best explanation of the discrepancy in views is that in the passage in 2 Corinthians he has in mind certain known cases where the believing partner has been hampered and possibly enticed away from the faith by the pagan member of the marriage. His main object is thus to guard against such situations in the future by insisting that no believer should become unequally yoked with an unbeliever, and in so doing he overstates his case and calls for separation from all unbelievers. Judging this to be a part of an earlier letter, we find in 1 Cor. 7:12ff. a correction of his former advice and a statement of his general position on the question, similar to that given in 1 Cor. 5:9,10.¹

St. Paul's thought concerning marriage has another side which calls for explanation. Highly as he values the married state he gives his opinion that it is better not to marry. He calls attention to his own example in this respect. (1 Cor. 7:8) And he is only prepared to admit the advisability of marriage on account of the weakness of human nature. It is better to marry than to be distraught with temptation. (1 Cor.

1. Cf. Denney on 2 Cor. 6:14ff. He notes the interruption of ideas at 6:13 and the resumption of the argument at 7:2, but he finds that there is, nevertheless, a connexion between this passage and what precedes it. His defence of the Pauline authorship is convincing, but the outlook of the passage is so similar to that of the former letter described in 1 Cor. 5:9,10 that it may well be part of that letter.

7:2,9) It is difficult to find a suitable explanation for such an attitude. It cannot be attributed to rabbinic Judaism. Moore asserts that celibacy was disapproved by the rabbis and he quotes a Midrashic saying concerning the unmarried man. "He is not a whole man, for it is said, And He blessed them, and He called their name, 'man' (Gen. 5:1)."¹ Possibly the apostle's attitude may have a psychological origin connected with some past experience, but in any event the two reasons he himself gives have undoubtedly influenced his thought. These reasons are connected with his eschatology and with his concept of the koinonia. Since the time is short, it is foolish to concentrate one's attention on worldly concerns. The things of God require one's full time, and marriage is a distraction. Probably St. Paul is also thinking of a period of tribulation to precede the final consummation of all things, and he may have knowledge of the tradition behind Mark 13:17. But he is also thinking of the need for full time service in the work of evangelizing, and especially of the value of example in the Gentile communities. In such a city as Corinth sexual vice was rife, and it seemed of importance to the apostle that Christians should be able to demonstrate that the sexual urge could be controlled and that there were other things in life of more importance. The example and the good name of the koinonia were weighty reasons for St. Paul's commendation of

1. op. cit., vol. II, p. 119.

the celibate life.¹ There is no suggestion of ascetic principles as causative here. When we remember that the Jews tended to consider all sexual relations as a defilement of holiness requiring ritual purification to restore the state of holiness, and when we recall the apostle's opinion that the marriage relationship can be exercised in holiness, we see the record in the Pauline epistles of a true advance in the ethics of marriage.

St. Paul is far more conservative in regard to the position of women than in any other aspect of his teaching. We may suggest a number of reasons for this. First, he has respect for the social customs of his own age. He is no revolutionary on matters which he does not consider of vital importance to his evangel. Secondly, he is concerned that the Christian community shall not attract unfavourable attention to itself, partly out of anxiety for the welfare of his converts who would suffer if the Roman authorities should take notice of the little group and of its distinctive entity, and partly out of fear that would-be converts might be dissuaded by such social extravagances. Thirdly, he was probably faced with a situation in Corinth which was partly the result of his own teaching.² Some women may have taken too seriously their new role as members of Christ, and, transforming equality of status

1. Cf. Morton S. Enslin, "The Ethics of Paul," pp. 190ff.

2. Cf. Gal. 3:28.

into equality of function, assumed the right to interrupt the recognised leaders of the church, creating confusion in the service of worship. This third reason may have influenced the apostle's teaching even though the authenticity of 1 Cor. 14:34,35 be challenged.

Social customs undoubtedly lie behind St. Paul's teaching in 1 Cor. 6 regarding the headdress in church, and the relation of the wife to her husband. But there is also the wish to avoid notoriety. It is not the Jewish custom which he advises but the local custom of women appearing at worship with head covering, and men uncovered. The later Jewish practice was for men to wear head covering, and it is probable that this was the contemporary custom. It is when the apostle attempts to base his teaching on something other than custom that he overstates his case. His argument for headdress is in rabbinic fashion. Woman belongs to man in the same way that man belongs to God. She was made for him, not he for her. Interpreting Gen. 2 literally he sees in the order of creation the sign of woman's inferiority.

It must be noted, however, that he does not argue for any form of inferiority apart from that decreed by custom, and we must infer that his main thought is for harmony within the church. His doctrinal position is that of equality, and it is only when this comes into conflict with the practical needs of his missionary work that he feels called upon to maintain the traditional place of women. In Gal. 3:28 he gives the

woman the same rights as a man, just as he insists on the equality of the Jew and the Greek. He frequently expresses his appreciation of the work of individual women and seems to value their personal support of him as well as their help in spiritual exercises. The opinions expressed in 1 Cor. 14:34, 35 ought not to be allowed to detract from this high estimate, for they are of doubtful authenticity and in any case flatly contradict 1 Cor. 11:5, 13.¹ In three passages St. Paul does assign to women a position subordinate to men, but even here the principle of equality is not entirely submerged. In 1 Cor. 11, the man is described as "the head" of the woman. What are we to understand by *ἡ κεφαλή*? Anderson Scott gives this opinion: "He is obviously using the word 'head' not in the derived sense of governor, but in the natural sense, in which the head is the organ by which the body is guided."² Scott then points out that the apostle's statement that God is the head of Christ has not been deemed inconsistent with the equality within the Godhead, and that a similar equality between man and woman may therefore be maintained.

Further, in his command to wives to submit themselves

1. Verses 34 and 35 in 1 Cor. 14 are placed after verse 40 in most of the Western Mss., (D, F, G) and may be an interpolation from 1 Tim. 1:11. Verse 36 follows naturally after verse 33. The appeal to the Law seems un-Pauline. For these reasons many commentators deny their authenticity. So Bousset, Weiss, C. A. A. Scott, "Christianity According to St. Paul," p. 227, Marshall, op. cit., p. 330. Kennedy mentions the possibility but gives no opinion, op. cit., p. 146. Goudge is silent, ad loc.

2. "New Testament Ethics," p. 126.

to their husbands he asks no more of them than of all Christians. Indeed either translation, i.e., "submit" or "be in subjection", contains implications which are not inherent in the apostle's thought. Here his thought is more akin to Rom. 12:3, where he counsels the Christian "not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think," and in Eph. 4:2, where his advice is to walk worthily, "with all lowliness and meekness, with long suffering, forbearing one another in love." It is this idea which lies behind the *ὑποτασσόμενοι* in Eph. 5:21. Christians are to be ready to give place to one another, "in honour preferring one another." (Rom. 12:10) In Eph. 5, the best text connects verse 21 with verse 22, the latter depending on the former for the verb.¹ In verse 21 he suggests that this attitude should be basic in all relations between Christians, and in verse 22, as a specific example he calls upon wives to show similar deference to their husbands. The section in Col. 3:18ff. repeats the counsel given to the Ephesians, including the admonition, "Husbands, love your wives."

Our consideration of St. Paul's ethics concerning the status of women leads to the conclusion that the apostle is influenced by two forces which exert a pull in opposite directions, and both of which derive from his doctrine. The first is the concept of the equality of all members of Christ,

1. So Westcott and Hort.

which is the logical result of his doctrine of union with Christ. The second is his desire for harmony within the koinonia and for the respect of the whole community, which is the result of his concept of the church as the New Israel.

Turning next to St. Paul's ethics with respect to the church and the services of worship we see the influence again of his presuppositions. On the one hand, there is the thought of the freedom of the individual as an equal member of Christ, and on the other hand, there is the need for restraint for the good of the koinonia. On the one hand, his high evaluation of the work of the Spirit as the source of power and guidance in the new life. On the other hand, his depreciation of such uncontrolled spiritual exercises as may disturb the worship of others and make no contribution to their understanding of the gospel.

For St. Paul, the Spirit is of vital importance in the life of the church. The Spirit brings to the believer the recognition of God as his Father. (Rom. 8:15) The Spirit helps him in his attempts at prayer. (Rom. 8:26) The manifestation of the Spirit is a proof of the truth of the apostle's message. (Gal. 3:5) Therefore he must appeal to the Thessalonians not to quench the Spirit. (1 Thess. 5:19) In this passage he places spiritual gifts before prophesying, doubtless because he feels that there is a lack of such wholesome exuberance at Thessalonica. But the situation at Corinth is different and in 1 Cor. 12:10 speaking with tongues and its interpretation

follow prophecy in the list of gifts. St. Paul himself was able to speak with tongues, but he is more concerned to edify the church. (1 Cor. 14:18,19) Therefore he emphasizes prophecy which appeals to unbelievers and may convert them, and he seeks to regulate glossolalia so that it may cease to be a meaningless indulgence in ecstasy and become a source of edification through the ministrations of an interpreter.¹ But of even greater importance is the "more excellent way" of love.² Thus his concern is for the general well-being of the fellowship. that there may be mutual love and that everything may be done "decently and in order." (1 Cor. 14:40) And at the same time he is hopeful that the spiritual life of the congregation may be maintained at a high level with a demonstration of the wonder and power of the Spirit. We see this in his objection to the way in which the Lord's Supper was being celebrated at Corinth. St. Paul deplores the disorder of the meetings and the lack of brotherly love, but also the evidence that the participants have no awareness of the real significance of the solemn occasion. (1 Cor. 11:17ff.)

Again, in dealing with the rise of factions in the church St. Paul gives evidence of the influence of his doctrinal position. The division of the Corinthian church into parties amounts to a division of the body of Christ. Since

1. Cf. 1 Cor. 14:4,13,23,24.
2. Cf. 1 Cor. 12:31, 13:13.

Christ cannot be divided, it must mean that there is a destruction of the unity between the disputants and Christ. (1 Cor. 3:3ff.) Moreover, in their clamant arguments for recognition they lose sight of the fact that every good work comes from and depends upon God. And those who make the claim to be spiritual and to have superior knowledge are forgetting that much more important than knowledge is the capacity for love. It may be that some such faction is responsible for St. Paul's recommendation to avoid participation in pagan banquets. (1 Cor. 8) We know the apostle's attitude regarding meat that may have been offered to idols and the eating of such meat at social functions. He sees no harm at all, and suggests that the believer attend if he wishes to do so, and eat without questioning the history of the food offered. (1 Cor. 10:25-27) His reason is that God Himself is the provider of all things. But in 1 Cor. 8, the apostle has in mind the fact that some, who cannot grasp the significance of this fact and who still see in such eating a recognition of the jurisdiction of idols, may be discouraged by the apparent dereliction of their fellow Christians and be led to do what was against their consciences. Therefore, out of love and out of concern for the well-being of the church, it is better to avoid such practices. But the main thing is that the unity of the fellowship should not be destroyed or even impaired. Therefore, whatever views a man may hold, it is essential that he should not display a sense of superiority over those who think differently. (Rom. 14:3) He

is to remember that judgement is the prerogative of God.

When we consider St. Paul's ethics regarding the relations of Christians to the state we see that here again the practical desire for peace is influential, as is his desire that Christianity may win its way on the quality of character produced rather than through contentiousness and rebellion. The apostle begins his discourse in 1 Rom. 13 with the demand that all believers should adopt the same attitude to the civil authorities that he expects of them in their relations with one another. He does not state it in these terms but he uses the imperative *ὑποτασσέσθω* which is the same verb as that used in Eph. 5:21 to describe a mutual relationship. It seems evident that the apostle's primary concern is to encourage respect for others, and in this passage in Romans he extends its application to include state officers. The chronological relationship between Romans and Ephesians is immaterial. What is demanded by *ὑποτασσέσθω* is an attitude of respectful compliance. The objects of this attitude are *ἐξουσίαις ὑπερέχουσιν*, the former term being described by Sanday and Headlam as an instance of the abstract for the concrete and translated "those in authority," the latter term being a more precise definition, "who are in an eminent position." The reason for this attitude is the fact that there can be no authority except by God. (MS evidence is decisive for *ὑπό*.) This statement might have been interpreted as attributing the existence of human authority to the divine permission in much

the same way as the existence of evil is explained, but St. Paul goes on to say that this delegated authority is for good and serves the purposes of justice; and grave consequences for Christianity have thereby resulted. Such historical considerations, however, lie outside our field. Jesus was not as indiscriminating in his evaluation of the rulers of this world, but he too saw the necessity for recognising and fulfilling one's obligations to those in authority. St. Paul echoes this part of the teaching of Jesus. (Rom. 13:7) Apparently there was a danger that Christians might refuse to pay the tribute and thus bring retribution on themselves and their brethren. The apostle appeals for them to pay everything which may lawfully be required of them.

An indication that the apostle is more concerned with the character of the Christian than with the character of the state is contained in verse 8. It is true that this is the beginning of a new section and the commentators treat it as such. But the fact that his thought moves from "submission" to "love" shows that he is more interested in the quality of life of the Christian than in the quality of justice in the state. His laudation of the virtues of the established government is merely to encourage the proper attitude which the Christian ought to take to the state. While verse 8 begins a new section it is closely connected with the previous argument as is shown by the use of the word *ὀφείλετε* in verse 8 when he has just mentioned *τὰς ὀφειλάς* in verse 7. *ὀφείλετε* is imperative as

the negatives show. The force of this injunction is that, after stating that the Christian is to pay everything that is due, he now says that he must pay up entirely, leaving nothing due except love for one another. Love can never be paid up because from the standpoint of the receiver it can never be claimed as something due to him, and from the standpoint of the giver it is a debt which he owes to God and he can never fully make up that debt. For this reason when one loves another he transcends the law and at the same time fulfils it. *Νόμον* in this verse is transitional between the idea of tribute as a lawful debt and the idea of the commandment as a divine law. Love is the final criterion in both aspects of the law.

It cannot be denied that St. Paul's ethic regarding civil duties tends to maintain the status quo, and that this was the apostle's object. This was due partly to his eschatology and the thought that the existing world situation was not destined to last for long, and partly due to his concern for the peaceful establishment of the church as a lawful institution and his recognition of the advantages secured by the pax Romana, but mostly due to his desire to see the development of a distinctively Christian character, motivated by love for others and the will to co-operate and to fulfil one's obligations to society. His attitude to slavery is entirely in keeping with this. His advice to the slave is to be contented with his lot,¹

1. The exegesis of 1 Cor. 7:21 is difficult. *Δούλος ἐκλήθης;*

to serve his master faithfully and to remember that he has the true freedom, for Christ has set him free (from sin), and that in Christ there is true equality, for there is no distinction between bond and free; even the master, if Christian, is the slave of Christ.¹ St. Paul does not attack the institution of

probably means: "Were you called when a slave?" rather than "called to be a slave." μή σοι μελέτω "do not care about that." ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ δύνασαι ἐλεύθερος γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον χρῆσαι may mean either (1) "Even if you can become free, rather use your servitude;" or (2) "But if you have opportunity to become free, rather use it than not." Schweitzer deems the second alternative "both grammatically and logically impossible." (op. cit., p. 194) Many commentators favour the first. But nevertheless the second is possible. "καὶ affects δύνασαι, not εἰ" say Robertson and Plummer. If this be allowed, the whole emphasis is thrown on δύνασαι. Moreover, the ἀλλά indicates a different train of thought. If the first interpretation were the apostle's meaning, would it not have been more natural for him to say, "If you are a slave, be content, and if you have the opportunity to be free remain as you are."? The vital question, however, is whether χρῆσαι refers to the clause immediately preceding, in which case the slave is to seize the opportunity to be free, or whether it refers to the δούλος ἐκλήθης, in which case he is to remain as he is. The former seems preferable on grounds of proximity, but this is not conclusive, for the μᾶλλον must refer to the clause not connected with the χρῆσαι, and therefore only one can be connected with the clause immediately preceding. If it is the opportunity that is to be used, it is to be used rather than the servitude. Thus μᾶλλον is not in the best position. However, this rendering seems most suitable, and further support may be found in a similar use of χρῆσαι in 1 Cor. 9:12,15, referring to the use of a privilege, as Goudge points out. The Aorist imperative χρῆσαι is important, indicating a specific act, rather than a continuous service. It seems probable that St. Paul here recommends the advisability of taking advantage of an offer of manumission. (So, Lightfoot, Goudge, Robertson and Plummer, and L. H. Marshall, op. cit., p. 328) Schweitzer says that the slave is to remain as he is, just as the married man or the single man is to remain as he is. But, one notes that the apostle makes an exception and permits marriage. So, here, he permits freedom when the opportunity is presented.

1. Cf. 1 Cor. 7:20ff.; Eph. 6:5ff.; Col. 3:22-4:1.

slavery. He probably feared the political consequences of a general manumission. But in calling upon the master to treat his slave as a brother in Christ he set the stage for the eventual elimination of slavery as an institution.¹

When we consider the social implications of St. Paul's ethics we are forced to the realization that, while he legislates principally for the church and seeks to encourage right relations within the fellowship, yet he does not forget the community at large, and the principles of conduct which he advocates are such as will, when followed, produce a new type of society. Love is to be practised not only towards the brethren but towards all.² Lying and stealing are condemned as anti-social. The life of the Christian is a new life. He has put off the old, and with it he has put off those things which mar his relationship with others. This is the apostle's argument in Col. 3:8.³ It is interesting to note the implied characteristics of the new life by examining the vices which are described as characteristic of the old life. In this passage he mentions: *ὀργή* "anger," *θυμός* "wrath," the distinction between them being that the former denotes a "settled and sullen hostility," while the latter denotes the more sudden and passionate outbursts, *κακία* "the evil habit of mind, the malitia"⁴, "the vicious or evil intent of the man

1. Cf. Philemon 16.

2. Cf. 1 Thess. 3:12, 5:15, Col. 4:5.

3. Cf. also Eph. 4:22.

4. R. C. Trench, "New Testament Synonyms," p. 36.

bent on injuring others"¹, *βλασφημία* "injurious speaking," probably from *βλάπτω* and *φημί*,² referring to an act directed not against God but against one's fellow men, thus amounting to slander³, *αἰσχρολογία* "foul language"⁴ but not confined to filthy, lewd or wanton speech, but also abusive language directed against others.⁵

A complete study of St. Paul's ethical terminology would show the vital importance attached by him to the need for good relations between men. He has a great variety of terms for sins of speech, from the cunning remarks of twisted wit (*εὐτραπελία*) to the inane chattering of senseless folly (*μωρολογία*), from whispered hints by *ψιθυρισταί* to outspoken libel by *κατάλαλοι*. He inveighs against the swindler (*ἄρπαξ*) who preys on his fellow men. He condemns the overbearing person (*ὑβριστής*) whose life is characterized by highhandedness (*ὑβρις*). Selfishness is particularly marked out by the apostle. In this connection, *ἐριθία* is to be translated by "self-seeking" rather than by "faction." It is derived from *ἐριθος* "a wage earner", and signifies the business of working solely for one's own benefit.⁶ In contrast, the apostle advocates love (*ἀγάπη*), kindness (*χρηστότης*,

1. So Enslin, op. cit., p. 274.

2. So Moulton and Milligan.

3. Cf. Mt. 12:31, 15:19, Mk. 7:22, Eph. 4:31.

4. So Marshall, op. cit., p. 284.

5. So Trench, op. cit., pp. 114, 115.

6. Cf. Kittel, TWNT, vol. II, p. 658.

primarily "usefulness"), goodness (ἀγαθωσύνη), fidelity (πίστις, in the passive sense of trustworthiness), peace (εἰρήνη), good temper (μακροθυμία i.e., endurance of the faults of others) and joy (χαρά) which means an active appreciation of the value of all such virtues.

After a survey of the meanings of such terms one cannot escape the impression that St. Paul is concerned with something more than harmony within the koinonia, and peace with the outside world. He is in fact interested in the development of a new type of character. His lists of vices and virtues go beyond the requirements of a social ethic. His teaching is conditioned by his thought of the Christian as a member of Christ and as a saint reflecting the holy character of God. And it can truthfully be said that as a result he has, like Jesus, made the discovery of the dignity of the individual personality. It is therefore natural that he should include in his denunciation such evils as carousings (κῶμοι) and drunken excesses (μέθαι). These are wrong because they are out of character with the true child of God, and rob him of his inheritance.¹ Indicative of the apostle's attitude is his comparatively novel thought that fornication is a sin against a man's own body. (1 Cor. 6:18) Σῶμα may be used here in the sense of personality, a concept for which many ancient languages possess no word. But the Christian life is far more than mere

1. Cf. Gal. 5:21, Eph. 5:5, Col. 3:6, 1 Cor. 6:9, Rom. 13:13.

negation. It is not enough to adopt a passive attitude to vilification, or to endure wrong with Stoic serenity. How truly St. Paul's ethic reflects the spirit of magnanimity characteristic of Jesus! As Christians we are called upon to suffer and to endure, but - and this is the radical nature of Christian ethics - "being reviled, we bless." (1 Cor. 4:12)

The ethics of St. Paul must have constituted a revolution in the moral outlook of the centers to which he addressed his epistles. That drunkenness was wrong in itself must have appeared as a novel idea to most of his readers. That sexual indulgence was something both higher and lower than a physical need, such as eating, would have seemed a revolutionary thought. Both drunkenness and sexual immorality were regular features of Graeco-Roman society, and particularly virulent in such a city as Corinth. The only real alternative ever hitherto presented to them had been the way of asceticism. But St. Paul comes on the scene with the non-ascetic proclamation: "All things are yours," but with the significant addition, "And ye are Christ's and Christ is God's." And in the light of that truth he offers a new type of morality, goodness instead of indulgence, and love instead of apathy. Into the life of holiness the Christian is propelled by the constraining power of the love of Christ, and in the living of that life he has the aid of the Spirit whose fruit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, fidelity, meekness, and temperance. St. Paul's ethic is so rich and vital because

behind it is a theology based upon the experience of the power and love of God in Jesus Christ.

The relation of St. Paul's ethics to his doctrine of salvation may be seen in the way in which the implications of his theology become the presuppositions of his ethic. Our study has shown that certain themes which come to light frequently and logically in his doctrinal statements have great importance for ethics, both as influences upon his ethical judgements and as bases of appeal in his ethical exhortations. Having no wish to impose systematization where there is none, nor to produce statistics where there is only a large and comprehensive understanding of the complexities of life, we have refrained from categorizing these presuppositions and thereby unduly limiting them to specific aspects of conduct. No one presupposition owes its origin to one side only of the apostle's doctrine, nor is it applied to one division only of his ethics. As Anderson Scott remarks, "Paul never shrinks from using a steam-hammer to crack a nut."¹ Dealing with the problems of life, however small, he brings the whole weight of his full doctrinal beliefs to bear upon the situation, and presents his ethic in the light of the tremendous fact of salvation "in the Lord."

In conclusion, we suggest, not as a complete tabulation of categories, but as a number of illustrations of

1. "New Testament Ethics," p. 120.

ethical presuppositions, the following themes.

THE HOLINESS OF GOD.

The whole of St. Paul's teaching is centered in his religion. Morality has no independent existence. The character of God is the norm of conduct and the source of the good life. The life that results from the reception of the Spirit cannot be anything other than moral because the Holy God is the giver of the Spirit. An ethic based on the individual's apprehension of the will of God might issue in many queer forms of conduct under the sanction of religion, but in St. Paul adequate safeguards are provided. First, because God has revealed Himself as love and made love a criterion of conduct. Secondly, because He has expressed His will in definite form, not only in the natural law, nor in the guidance of conscience, but actually in the scriptural commandments and in the teaching of Jesus. And thirdly, because in St. Paul's view, the Spirit of holiness is to be identified with the Spirit of Christ, and the example of Christ becomes operative. Sanctification involves the work of the Spirit whereby the believer is consecrated to God and shares in His holy nature. Therefore the believer cannot be a fornicator or a thief, etc. He has been sanctified. (1 Cor. 6:11) He must abstain from fornication because it is the will of God, whose will also is that he should be sanctified. (1 Thess. 4:3) He must forgive because God forgives. (Eph. 4:32) The ethic of St. Paul has a transcendent source. It is not founded on the value of human

happiness, nor does it make utilitarianism its ground of appeal. But the transcendent source is God Himself, and not any law above Him from which He takes His holiness. God is the creator, not only of the universe, but of the moral law and of the ordinances which He has revealed to man.

FELLOWSHIP WITH GOD.

Fellowship with God is experienced through the Spirit. When He enters a man's life there is a present awareness of the activity of the Divine. The believer feels that he is not working alone, but that he is in fact a co-worker with God. This sense of the divine immanence brings joy into the performance of duty. Moreover, the Spirit maintains the believer's communion with God so that his deepest need does not escape the notice of the Almighty. The finest expression of this fellowship is in the thought of sonship. The believer has been accepted by the sheer grace of God into sonship with Him. Thus there is adequate motivation for the good life, the motivation of gratitude, of love, of obedience, of imitation, and the desire to please God.¹ The life of sonship implies that there is a standard of conduct to be maintained so that the Christian must walk worthy of his calling. But more than this, it means that God has imparted something of Himself to His son so that the new life is a natural reflection of the qualities of character associated with the Father God.

1. Cf. 1 Thess. 2:4,12, 4:1, Eph. 4:32, 5:1.

Christian morality does not begin with the ambition to win approval, but with the thankful recognition of all that God has done for His children, and all that He is doing in them.

CHRISTLIKENESS.

When the Christian seeks to live in conformity with his status as a child of God he need be in no doubt about God's nature, for He has revealed Himself to him. He has brought light into his life and in that light the believer is able to discern the likeness of God in the face of Jesus Christ.¹ St. Paul does not hesitate to point to Christ as an example for the believer. And when he does so he knows that his appeal will be interpreted with reference not only to the cardinal acts associated with the Incarnation and the Passion of our Lord, but also with reference to the simple acts of goodness associated with His earthly life, for the apostle, in similar terms, urges his converts to copy his own life. The word *μιμητής* means one who follows a teacher with respect to doctrine and with a view to becoming like him.² The idea of Christ as the object of imitation for the Christian finds frequent expression in the Pauline epistles. The new man lives *ἐν Χριστῷ* but he must also live *κατὰ Χριστόν*. Christ is the norm of conduct for him. Therefore we find appeals to the example, to the words, and to the living presence of the

1. Cf. Denney on 2 Cor. 4:6.

2. Cf. J. Weiss, "Paul and Jesus," p. 117. Cf. also 1 Cor. 11:1, and similar passages listed on page 291, note 1, below.

Lord Jesus Christ.¹

UNION WITH CHRIST.

Even more important than the thought of the believer following the example of Christ is the fact that he is actually in Christ. This leads to a new appreciation of the dignity of one's own personality and a new respect for the value of others who are equally worthy, being also in Christ. But still more important for St. Paul's ethic is the inference that the life in Christ is to be the controlling factor in the whole of conduct. Of this, many examples have been given. Very striking is the exhortation in Phil. 2:5, *ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΑΡ ΦΡΟΝΕΙΣΘΩ Ἐν ὑμῖν ὁ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.*² J. S. Stewart's interpretation of this verse is most illuminating. He suggests that the phrase, *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* is to be taken, in its strict Pauline sense, and that the verb to be supplied in the subordinate clause will most naturally be taken from the main verb. *Φρονεῖτε* is most suitable.³ Thus the meaning is that the thoughts which are characteristic of the life in Christ, that is the thoughts which come in the closest communion of the believer with Christ so that he scarcely knows whether he or Christ is their author, these thoughts are also to be characteristic of the life of inter-communion between believers. This is no mere theoretical

1. On this section cf. Rom. 6:4, 15:3, 5, 7, 1 Cor. 4:16, 11:1, 2 Cor. 4:6, 8:9, 10:5, 11:17, Eph. 4:20, 21, 32, 5:1, 2, 25, 29, Phil. 2:7, 3:17, 4:9, Col. 2:6, 3:2, 13, 1 Thess. 1:6, 4:2.
 2. Westcott and Hort prefer the reading *ΤΟΥΤΟ ΦΡΟΝΕΙΤΕ*.
 3. Cf. Stewart, op. cit., p. 159.

argument. It is introduced in support of the exhortation to show respect for the worth of others and to consider their needs a claim upon oneself. Union with Christ is the main source of the apostle's greatest arguments for a thorough reevaluation of the whole field of conduct in the Christian life.

THE KOINONIA.

The thought of the fellowship of Christians is not to be isolated from the concept of union with Christ. It is the idea of the individual as a member of the body of Christ that gives rise to the thought of all Christians as sharing in a corporate life. As a result, St. Paul lays great stress on the value of love, co-operation and sharing. A large proportion of the sins he condemns consists of those evils which mar the sense of fellowship. He is also greatly concerned with those things which may degrade or enhance the reputation of the Christian community. So, in a sense, he gives a new law. It may be that behind his teaching there is the thought of a New Creation, and so a New Israel, and therefore a New Torah. But it is more probable that the necessity for law comes in through his concept of the body of Christ. All members must obey the Head in order that the total function of the Body may be efficiently and harmoniously carried out.

CHRISTIAN LOVE.

The real motivation of the Christian life is not simply the desire to observe a set of rules. The fulfilment of

the law is love. And love is primarily response. St. Paul sees in the reconciliation achieved through the death of Jesus the evidence of the divine love for man. "That some sacrifice was required," writes Moffatt, "he took for granted. But what amazed and thrilled him was to discover in this sacrifice the love of God."¹ The man who is thereby reconciled comes under the influence of this love, and his whole life is affected and indeed controlled by love. (2 Cor. 5:14) Man's response begins with love to God, and this element is not neglected by St. Paul. But love to God is shown in one's love of his fellow human beings. This fact conditions every relationship of the Christian to others. That the emotional content is of secondary importance is shown by the fact that it is the less colourful word, *ἀγάπη*, which Christianity adopted, developed and made its own.² It is not a sentimental colouring of the character of the other person, an obscuring of whatever defects there may be, but rather a recognition that he is also a child of God and loved by the Father, a man for whom Christ died. It is an enduring quality, a habit of action, a continuous sense of the value and the needs of others.

ESCHATOLOGY.

We have noticed that St. Paul's eschatology has provided an argument for his teaching on matters connected with

1. "Love in the New Testament," p. 135.

2. Yet St. Paul can use *φιλέω* even of love for God. Cf. 1 Cor. 16:22.

the civil status of Christians. It is most probable, however, that in these ethical questions his main interest is with the well-being of the koinonia, the need for peace, and the moral dangers of attaching too much importance to one's social position. The real bearing which eschatology has on the apostle's ethics is through the thought of the coming judgement. Some belief regarding the final triumph of the good is necessary to any ethic. The Pauline ethic is based upon what God has already done in Christ, and also upon His intention utterly to destroy the evil and to vindicate the good. Conduct cannot be a matter of indifference because the Day of Judgement is to reveal the quality of a man's life on the basis of his deeds. Like Jesus, the apostle does not neglect the motive of reward, but reminds his hearers that God's blessing will more than compensate for all their sufferings. Moreover, since God is to be the judge, the Christian must not seek to judge his brother, but must consider his own life in relation to the divine judgement.

THE HOLY SPIRIT.

The propulsive power of the Pauline ethic is derived from the concept of the Spirit. It is of tremendous significance that the Spirit has already been given as an earnest of the future glory and as a guide and source of power. The Christian life is a life in the Spirit. It is not the tedious groping-for-footholds of the lonely climber's laborious ascent, but the joyful, winging upsweep of the dove whose flight is powered by

the winds of God. The Spirit brings to the believer the very presence of the Almighty. Therefore there is no discouragement, and where there is trust there can be no failure. The gift of the Spirit results in ethical conduct, for the fruit of the Spirit is ethical qualities and, being the Spirit of Christ, He directs the believer's life after the pattern of the life of Christ.

St. Paul's doctrine of salvation is vitally concerned with ethics as an indivisible part of the life in Christ. Every part of his doctrine has importance for ethics. There is no concept which may fairly be described as non-ethical. We have seen that all his major statements of doctrine give rise to ideas which are basic to his ethics. Moreover, his doctrinal position influences the practical conclusions and exhortations throughout the whole of his extant epistles. Whatever his debt to other sources, his ethical teaching is his own, presented in the light of his doctrinal beliefs, and invigorated and enriched by his own experience of the Eternal God whose light had suddenly illuminated a bewildered soul's darkness to give knowledge of His glory in the face of Jesus Christ.

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