



THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use:

This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author.

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author.

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.

Bringing Virtue Epistemology Down to Earth

Rie Iizuka



PhD Philosophy

The University of Edinburgh

2019

Declaration of authorship

I, Rie Iizuka, hereby declare the following. The present thesis, submitted for examination in pursuit of a PhD by Research in Philosophy, has been entirely composed by myself, and it has not been submitted in pursuit of any other academic degree, or professional qualification.

Signature:

Date: 23, December, 2019

Acknowledgement

I sincerely appreciate my primary supervisor Duncan Pritchard, and secondly supervisor David Ward for their academic support.

I thank Emma Gordon and Adam Carter for helping my thesis as my third supervisors when they were at the University of Edinburgh.

I am grateful to the Canon Foundation and JASSO (Japan Student Services Organization) for awarding me scholarships.

The fellow PhD candidates at the University of Edinburgh have contributed to the development of my work through their feedback. In particular, I thank Hadeel Naeem.

A special thank you goes to Ian James Kidd at University of Nottingham whose feedback on my work encouraged me enormously, Shane Ryan at Nazarbayev University for encouraging me to study at Edinburgh, Yuanyuan Liu who helped me submit my thesis, April Wilson, Caitlin Carr, Emma Tilley, Michaela van Esveld who helped me improve my English on my drafts, Mayu Koike, Maki Kubota for supporting my life in the UK tremendously.

Finally, thank you to my grandmother Eiko Matsuki, my parents: Masami & Tatsuhiro Iizuka, and my partner, Akito Inoue.

Abstract

Virtue responsibilist epistemology (hereafter, virtue epistemology) is a philosophical thesis: it claims epistemic virtues and epistemic vices play essential roles in understanding the normative dimension of inquirers and inquiries, and help solve epistemological problems. The theory has developed over the past few decades, yet the approach suffers from some difficulties. My thesis addresses problems virtue epistemology faces and responds to each issue. In the first chapter, I would discuss the situationist critique. Epistemic situationists are skeptical about the explanatory and predictive power of our epistemic character traits. I address self-determination theory and argue that our motivation is causally efficacious: self-determined motivation predicts desirable behaviors contributing to our good life in a way that favors the position of the virtue epistemology. In the second chapter, I criticize the newly developed personalist virtue epistemology. Personalism relies on attributability responsibility, and dismisses the acquisition condition of virtue: i.e., the moral responsibility is defined by what we care and value synchronically. I defend the traditional responsibilist view of virtue on the ground of the narrative self-constitution view. The third chapter considers the impact of the epistemic partiality of friendship. I argue that friendship is dynamic: it is true that epistemic partiality is important for our care-relationship. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which our friendship is compatible with evidences, i.e., via epistemic partisan affiliation with our friends. I show that the value of friendship competes with other values such as epistemic justice in the exact same way as friendship competes with evidences. Thus, the argument given by the

proponents of epistemic partiality of friendship is shown to be not as convincing as it first appears. In the fourth chapter, I introduce the value of receptivity (the value against control and perfection) into virtue epistemology. The value of intellectual autonomy is often highly regarded among virtue epistemologists, but I argue that the value of intellectual receptivity will help explain what is wrong with the agent with excessive desire for knowledge first hand, and will help explain some key intellectual virtues like humility and open-mindedness. The fifth chapter is devoted to the problem of subjectivity in virtue epistemology. Oppressive social structures shape our standpoints: the oppressed are privileged in knowing about their oppressed life. I argue that virtue epistemologists should take this insight from standpoint epistemology into thinking about how some of our intellectual vices are socially formed, and institutionally remedied. In the sixth chapter, I propose some revisions to exemplar-based virtue education. Our imitative and learning behaviors are influenced by our perceived social distances between the self and the model, according to construal level theory. It is argued that the promotion of diverse intellectual exemplars in society would help us emulate exemplars and cultivate intellectual virtues more effectively. In this way, virtue epistemologists have often failed to take human psychology and the social nature of our inquiry into account. They also have not addressed how other aspects of human flourishing are intertwined with epistemic goods. My thesis aims at providing a down-to-earth account of how we should pursue epistemic virtues and avoid epistemic vices.

Lay Summary

Virtue epistemology is a philosophical position: it claims that good character traits in relation to knowledge acquisition, such as being humble and open-minded plays essential roles in solving epistemological problems. This theory has developed over the past few decades, yet the approach suffers from some difficulties. My thesis addresses problems virtue epistemology faces and responds to each issue. In the first chapter, I address the situationist critique. Situationists are skeptical about the empirical adequacy of character traits. I argue that our motivation is causally efficacious based on self-determination theory. In the second chapter, I criticize the view called personalism. Personalist believes we can be responsible for our characters that we have not cultivated in the past (in other words, we are responsible for our characters reflecting on our present values). I defend the traditional view: a view of responsibility that cares both our past and the present. I also defend such a view on the grounds of a theory of self, called the narrative self. The third chapter considers the impact of the epistemic partiality of friendship. We are prone to believe in our friends more so than the strangers. This appears to contradict with the following epistemological thesis: we ought to believe in accordance with evidence. I argue that friendship is dynamic, and hence, friendship can be interpreted both in line with the former view and the latter view. I show that the argument given by the proponents of epistemic partiality of friendship is not as strong as it first appears by appealing to the concept of epistemic justice. In the fourth chapter, I introduce the value of receptivity into virtue epistemology. The value of intellectual autonomy, in other words, aiming at

becoming epistemically self-reliant has been an essential value among epistemologists. I argue that the value of intellectual receptivity: having a positive attitude towards epistemic goods that cannot be controlled and appreciating such things as they are, and integrating them into our epistemic self is as important as the value of epistemic autonomy. The fifth chapter is devoted to the standpoint epistemology. Oppressive social structures in society shape our standpoints. The oppressed are privileged in knowing about their oppressed life. I argue that the insight offered from standpoint epistemology should help virtue epistemologists think about how our intellectual vices are institutionally formed and treated. In the sixth chapter, I consider how we emulate intellectual exemplars in society. Relying on construal level theory, it is argued that promoting diverse exemplars in society might help us cultivate intellectual virtues more efficiently. In this way, I address some of the problems virtue epistemology faces. Virtuous agent (vicious agent) are traditionally understood and portrayed as individualistic. Virtue epistemology often failed to take human psychology and the social nature of our inquiry into account. My thesis provides a down-to-earth account of how we should frame and pursue epistemic virtues and avoid vices.

Table of Contents

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	3
ABSTRACT.....	4
LAY SUMMARY.....	6
TABLE OF CONTENTS	8
INTRODUCTION	10
CHAPTER 1 SITUATIONISM, VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, AND SELF- DETERMINATION THEORY	17
CHAPTER 2 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND NARRATIVE SELF	56
CHAPTER 3 EPISTEMIC PARTIALITY OF FRIENDSHIP, AND EPISTEMIC JUSTICE.....	101
CHAPTER 4 TOWARD ESTABLISHING INTELLECTUAL RECEPTIVITY AS AN EPISTEMIC VALUE	135
CHAPTER 5 TOWARD THE STANDPOINT VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY ...	161

CHAPTER 6 DIVERSIFICATION OF EXEMPLARS: EDUCATING THROUGH EMULATION AND IMITATION	189
CONCLUSIONS	219
REFERENCES	225

Introduction

Virtue responsibilist epistemology (henceforth, virtue epistemology, for short) is a philosophical thesis: it claims the concept of intellectual virtues and vices are useful where epistemological problems are concerned (Baehr 2011). Virtues are understood as excellent character traits: in Zagzebski's famous term, virtue is "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end" (Zagzebski 1996, 137). Intellectual virtues are excellences of our mind as an inquirer, and on the other hand, intellectual vices are bad character traits that get in the way of our inquiry.

The theory of intellectual virtues and vices I address throughout my thesis is broadly in line with the influential work by Linda Zagzebski (1996) and Jason Baehr (2011). I am on board with their idea that there is the distinctly an epistemic dimension in our life of flourishing. Acquiring intellectual virtues and avoiding intellectual vices is necessary for such an epistemic part of flourishing. In other words, virtue epistemology is committed to the belief that becoming a good inquirer is a necessary part of a good life. Virtue epistemology has developed in the past thirty years. The study of individual epistemic virtues and vices are representative as such. Yet, the approach suffers from some difficulties. Broadly speaking, virtue epistemology suffers from a number of problems I could term as problems of individualism. In the standard way of understanding intellectual virtues, a virtuous agent is portrayed as

individualistic. The virtuous person is motivated by the love of epistemic goods (such as truth, knowledge, understanding, wisdom), and she develops distinctive epistemic dispositions grounded in her love of knowledge. This is called the two-tier psychological model of intellectual virtues (Baehr 2013). Take an example of open-mindedness: “to be open-minded is to be aware of one's fallibility as a believer, and to be willing to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, it is possible that one is wrong” (Riggs 2010, 180). It is not very clear how our social environment, our social identity impacts on the pursuit of such an intellectual virtue.

The questions lurking in this debate are: can we really acquire such an admirable intellectual disposition flow from our love of knowledge at all (Chapter 1)? Even if it is a feasible option to pursue intellectual virtues, can we cultivate such virtues solely by our efforts? If not, to what extent, are environmental helps compatible with our intellectual virtue acquisition and treatment of vices (Chapter 2)? What if intellectual virtue cultivations are systematically in conflict with the pursuit of other values and, what can virtue epistemologists say about such conflicts (Chapter 3)? Becoming more epistemically self-reliant, i.e., intellectual autonomy is demonstrably an epistemic value, but in the majority of cases, our epistemic enterprises are socially embedded and reliant upon other's testimony. What kind of epistemic value are we to promote, say, when we cultivate intellectual humility (Chapter 4)? Are our epistemic vices always constructed individually? If there are vices primarily constructed by social oppressions then, do we need any different treatments to the vices of the socially oppressed from the non-oppressed and do we need any institutional interventions to

socially constructed vices (Chapter 5)? Exposure to exemplars is promoted as a representative way in which we could teach intellectual virtues to novices. But do people feel motivated to emulate the exemplar in the same way (Chapter 6)? In each chapter of my thesis, I will address these issues accordingly.

In the first chapter, I address the situationist critique with reference to empirical work in psychology. Situationists criticized the predictive and explanatory power of character traits and on this basis have criticized the empirical adequacy of moral virtue. Alfano (2013) has extended the situationist critique from virtue ethics to virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemology is criticized as empirically inadequate in light of the extent to which individuals are shown to be susceptible to seemingly trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational influences. I argue that Alfano's attempted redeployment of the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology is on closer inspection not as straightforward as he claims. Various psychological studies (known as self-determination theory) which situationists have overlooked, suggest that virtuous motivation is causally efficacious in a way that favors the position of the virtue epistemology over the situationist. I will defend the empirical adequacy of virtue theory based on self-determination theory. When we afford closer attention to studies on the orientation of our motivation, it becomes clear how the dynamics of our motivation have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioral outcomes: how much they influence upon whether we live a good life.

In the second chapter, I will address the problem of how we should consider our environmental influences on our virtue cultivation in relation to the concept of self and

responsibility. As shown in the chapter 1, the view that virtues are traits cultivated merely by one's control has been criticized; instead, more theorists are inclined to hold that being in a well-designed environment is necessary for obtaining virtues. In her recent paper, Heather Battaly goes further, arguing that such a friendly environment is not only necessary but sufficient for virtue possession; her view is called personalist account of virtues and vices (Battaly 2015, 2016). I go against such a radical move. After demonstrating why establishing a friendly environment is now widely accepted as an essential element in virtue cultivation among virtue epistemologists, and reformulating Battaly's argument for the personalist account of virtue and vice, I will first demonstrate that what Battaly has pointed out about vice could be consistent with the traditional view (responsibilist view) supplemented with other moral considerations. I argue that personalist vice overlooks the success component of virtue, and it contradicts the essential part of virtue understood as an achievement. I will show that some manipulation cases that personalists accept as responsible in line with attributability responsibility are problematic on the ground of attributability responsibility. I also argue that personalism contradicts the concept of self embedded in virtue epistemology. I believe that the concept of self now known as narrative self would help us understand the proper relation between our virtues and our environment.

In the third chapter, I will address the problem of the epistemic partiality of friendship. We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, more so than those who are not our friends. This imbalance in our doxastic attitude towards friends and non-

friends is often called the epistemic partiality of friendship. The epistemic partiality of friendship is widespread and commonly observed in our daily lives, but whether or not it is a good practice is far less clear. Philosophical dialogue on the epistemic partiality of friendship for the past fifteen years has shown us that the solution to this puzzle cannot be straightforward. First, I will lay out the standard picture of the epistemic partiality of friendship. Second, I will summarize the arguments proposed by the main opponents of epistemic partiality, Jason Kawall (2013), Sanford Goldberg (2018), and Katherine Hawley (2014). I will analyze the nature of friendship as a dynamic process and point out that the current debate ignores some important aspects of friendship. I will outline potential arguments from epistemic injustice against epistemic partiality of friendship that I believe are as strong as the argument from friendship against evidentialism. I will provide three interpretations of my arguments. I will show that the argument from epistemic partiality of friendship is not as strong as it first appears. I will argue that this point leads us to an even more complicated debate about value pluralism. Finally, I will come back to the implication of this argument for virtue epistemology.

The aim of the fourth chapter is to apply the value of receptivity into virtue epistemology. I will first portrait what it means to know something first hand. I do this by way of addressing Elizabeth Fricker's argument against the autonomous knower (E. Fricker 2006) and Duncan Pritchard's argument on seeing things for oneself (Pritchard 2016). I address the social nature of our inquiry. Then, I ask the question of where we need to pursue epistemic autonomy. I will discuss how our "interests"

calls for first hand knowledge. In the final section, a value of intellectual receptivity will be introduced. I argue that the value of intellectual receptivity helps us realize the vice that the value of epistemic autonomy could not solely explain and better articulate some essential intellectual virtues.

In the fifth chapter, I introduce feminist standpoint theory (henceforth, standpoint theory, for short) into virtue epistemology. I will first briefly explain the core thesis of standpoint epistemology and suggest the complexity that the theory implies. If standpoint theory were on the right track, what can we say about virtue epistemology? Then, I will provide a schematic view of standpoint virtue epistemology. I will portray a possible scenario where social oppression promotes vices in different ways for the oppressed as for non-oppressed. I will address some institutional interventions to our cognition called “nudge” theory (especially, nudge-enhanced exemplar stories). Nudges might help cure our vices. However, I will leave some cautionary remarks on how to set up nudges considering social oppression.

In the sixth chapter, I aim to give suggestions in relation to emulation-based virtue theories which enable greater sophistication in our understanding of them, based on the study of imitation and emulation in psychology; second, I aim to engage with a diversity and inclusion problem in academia, especially in philosophy. To initiate the discussion, I first define emulation-based virtue theory. Then, the recent study of the influence of psychological distance on copying and learning behaviors will be addressed. Why diversification of exemplars is an attractive option for emulation-based virtue theory will be presented. My view will be applied to the problem of

diversity and inclusion in philosophy. I argue that philosophers who endorse emulation-based virtue theory must also accept and promote diversification of those models that are emulated in society. Particularly in philosophy, this leads to the promotion of hiring people from underrepresented groups in the community.

In this way, in each chapter, I address different issues that virtue epistemology suffers from. Intellectually virtuous agents have been portrayed as too individualistic that the theorists have often failed to take human psychology and the social nature of our inquiry into account. They also have not addressed how other aspects of human flourishing are intertwined with epistemic goods. My thesis hopes to provide a more realistic and down-to-earth account of how we should pursue epistemic virtues and avoid epistemic vices.

Chapter 1 Situationism, Virtue Epistemology, and Self-Determination Theory¹

0. Introduction

Virtue ethicists believe that acquiring praiseworthy character traits like honesty and kindness is necessary if we are to flourish (e.g. Hursthouse 1999, 185). This position is often contrasted with other normative ethical views, in that it focuses on processes rather than consequences or rules. Recently, the notion of intellectual virtue has gained popularity in epistemology, especially with those epistemologists who regard intellectual virtues as offering new possibilities for addressing traditional epistemological problems within the theory of knowledge (e.g. Zagzebski 1996; Sosa 2007, 2010; Greco 2010, 2012).² The virtue-based approach in epistemology, known as virtue epistemology, is divided into two main camps: virtue reliabilism, and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists (e.g. Sosa 2010, 2015; Greco 1999, 2003, 2012) view intellectual virtues as reliable abilities or faculties, which qualify as intellectual virtues in so far as they predominantly issue epistemic goods such as knowledge, and allow one to achieve truth.³ Representative examples include perception, inference, and memory. Whereas virtue responsibilists (e.g. Axtell and Carter 2008; Baehr 2011;

¹ This chapter is an adapted version of my paper of the same name (Iizuka 2018), published in *Synthese*.

² To be more precise, intellectual virtues (or, epistemic virtues) were first introduced in epistemology by Sosa(1980). In this thesis, I focus on virtue responsibilism, with reference to Zagzebski's (1996) ground-breaking book on virtue responsibilism. Virtue responsibilism traces its roots earlier, to Montmarquet (1992) and Code (1987)

³ Recent work by Sosa places agential virtues in the reliabilist framework (Sosa 2015). The distinction between reliabilism and responsibilism becomes ever subtler; however, it is beyond the purview of this thesis.

Montmarquet 1992; R. C. Roberts and Wood 2007) regard intellectual virtues as intellectual character traits, typical examples of which include open-mindedness, intellectual courage and tenacity. Virtue responsibilists share the ideal that research on intellectual virtues will help us elucidate non-traditional epistemological problems; problems such as what kind of epistemic agents we ought to aim at becoming.⁴

The resurgence of virtue ethics has prompted criticism based on social psychological data. These data consist of a vast range of experimental results, which purport to show that our behavior is influenced to a significant extent by morally irrelevant factors.⁵ For instance, it was discovered that among bystanders hearing an epileptic seizure over earphones, subjects who believed that they were among other witnesses were less likely to seek help for the victim than were subjects who believed they were the only person in the experiment (Darley and Latané 1968). We believe it is morally right to help a person suffering from a seizure regardless of the fact there is a bystander close by. Such a factor is understood as “morally irrelevant”

⁴ Virtue responsibilist Linda Zagzebski goes further, using the study of intellectual virtues to answer traditional epistemological problems such as analysis of knowledge (Zagzebski 1996).

⁵ The representative examples of situationist data are as follows: mood effects, bystander intervention, good Samaritan experiments, honesty and deception experiments in schoolchildren, Milgram experiments, and the Stanford prison experiment (Alzola 2008). See also (Darley and Batson 1973; Isen and Levin 1972; Latané and Rodin 1969; Milgram 1963; Zimbardo et al. 1973). Also, in this chapter, “situationist data” includes an even wider range of experimental results from social science in general. Such data also imply our behavior is widely and easily influenced by the subtle environmental factors surrounding us.

by the experimenters; however, that is exactly what predicted people's subsequent moral behavior.

This aforementioned group of philosophers, now known as *situationists* (e.g. Harman 1999; Doris 2002), argue that the psychological data according to which our behavior is significantly influenced by morally irrelevant factors is incompatible with the virtue ethicist's description of moral virtues as cross-situationally coherent character traits (also known as global traits). They appeal to psychological data in combination with a particular interpretation of virtue theory and a particular methodological constraint on ethical theorizing to support skepticism about virtue. This constraint is called *psychological realism*: the idea that ethical reflection should be "predicated on a moral psychology bearing a recognizable resemblance to actual human psychologies" (Doris 2002, 112). If you are a psychological realist, then your normative ethical view should be constructed on well-entrenched psychological studies.⁶ Complying with this methodology, these philosophers claim that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate.⁷ If virtue responsibilism is an epistemological counterpart of virtue ethics, then it might be thought that the situationist critique of virtue ethics naturally extends to virtue responsibilism *mutatis mutandis*: if virtue ethics is empirically inadequate in light of the psychological data, then so is virtue responsibilism. As Mark Alfano (Alfano 2013) has recently argued, there are social

⁶ Gilbert Harman argues against virtue ethics in a similar fashion (Harman 1999).

⁷ In this thesis, I am not going against situationism *simpliciter*; rather, I aim to argue against the conclusion that the situationist data could invalidate virtue ethics. It is my view that situationist data and virtue theory are compatible.

psychological data implying epistemic virtues are rarely observed. In an experiment, subjects are asked to fix a candle to a corkboard in such a way that wax does not drip. They are given three items: a box of thumbtacks, matches, and a candle. Subjects who saw a comedy film or were given some candy before engaging in the task were more likely to give a proper and creative answer to the question: to empty the match box and tack it to the cork board (Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki 1987). In this experiment, creative behavior was linked to mood elevators, and so our apparent intellectually virtuous behaviors are more aptly explained by situational factors than personal quality. Alfano infers from such data that virtue responsibilism is empirically inadequate.⁸⁹

Is it really the case that virtue theory—I'll use this term hereafter to refer to both responsibilist virtue epistemology and virtue ethics—is empirically inadequate? I will argue that the problem of this situationist debate lies in the fact that both camps hold

⁸ In his book, Alfano criticizes virtue responsibilism as empirically inadequate, whilst also admitting that, with the help of appropriate environmental scaffoldings, people can act according to virtues (Alfano 2013, chapter 7). I agree with that virtuous acts are facilitated and inhibited by social environments (Alfano 2014b); what I am objecting in this chapter is his overly negative conclusion on intellectual virtues (inquiry responsibilism in his terminology) based on social psychological data. He takes this experiment as suggestive of how people behave under the influence of trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational factors such as mood; it shows how people tend to be swayed by emotional elevators. He generalized his critique so as to apply to various kinds of epistemic virtues, not just intellectual creativity. I explain why his objection to responsibilist epistemology is too strong, and not convincing in the later sections.

⁹ Alfano also attacks the empirical adequacy of virtue reliabilism (Alfano 2014a), but it is beyond the purview of this thesis to go in depth with this debate.

different assumptions concerning the hard core of virtue theories: what makes virtue theory a virtue theory. Section 2 will address what the hard-core of virtue theory really amounts to. The hard-core involves motivational requirements and an inherent relation between virtues and a good life. Further, it is often claimed by situationists that virtue theory requires a commitment to a few theoretical assumptions such as explanatorism, egalitarianism, and consistency. They argue that situationist data invalidates these assumptions. In section 3, I will discuss the existing debate over the aforementioned theoretical assumptions shared by situationists. I will show that these assumptions do not have the strong theoretical implications on the hard-core of virtue theories that situationists claim they do, as well as showing what is missing in their argument. This first part of my thesis (Sects. 2 and 3) is aiming at articulating why the current debate is indecisive, and also at motivating why a further empirical data to support virtue theory is necessary. One way of doing this is to offer an empirically plausible theory supporting virtue theorists. The second part (Sect. 4, 5, 6) of my thesis introduces some empirical data supporting the virtue theoretical camp. One of my counter-arguments draws from recent psychological research on our motivation and passion, now known as self-determination theory. The group of psychologists working on this theory, believe that the orientation of our motivation predicts and explains some dispositions of our behavior and they believe that such orientation is inherently tied to our good life. Section 4 will introduce this theory and Sects. 5 and 6 will focus on its implications for virtue theory and situationism respectively. My defense

of virtue theory leads to the conclusion that virtue theorists can be psychological realists in a different way to situationists.

1. The hard core of virtue theory?

Before scrutinizing the situationist debate, some clarification on the nature of virtue would be helpful. While it is impossible to pin down the common features shared by all virtue theorists, the virtue theories developed in the past few decades share a few core ideas about the psychology of our good character and the relation between virtue to our good life. In this section I will illustrate what the hard core of virtue theory amounts to in neo-Aristotelian virtue theories, broadly construed.

Virtues are known as excellent personal character traits; they are the traits that show our values, purposes, and motivations. As Linda Zagzebski famously put: virtues are “a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end” (1996, 137). This definition reveals virtues are not just behavioral patterns. One characterization shared by virtue theorists is *proper motivation*. As virtue responsibilist Jason Baehr remarks:

all intellectual virtues have in common something like a ‘love of truth’ or desire for knowledge, but that (b) each individual virtue has its own distinctive and more immediate focus or motivation—a focus or motivation on account of which it can be individuated from other intellectual virtues. But [...] the immediate focus

or concern characteristic of particular intellectual virtues is 'grounded in' or 'flows from' the more basic concern with truth, knowledge, or the like. (Baehr 2013, 100).

For instance, in order for a subject to cultivate open-mindedness, she must be motivated by epistemic goods, e.g. knowledge. Because of this love of knowledge, the person forms an individual disposition of a cognitive detaching from a default cognitive standpoint (Baehr 2011, 152–62).¹⁰¹¹ Therefore, according to virtue responsibilism, our psychological reason-responsiveness is the key for the acquisition of our intellectual virtues.

Along similar lines, virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) has emphasized the importance of being appropriately motivated by goods in moral virtue acquisition.¹² She maintains that the virtuous choose virtuous actions for their own sake. She elaborates on this idea:

'The virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions "for their own sake" means 'the virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions for at least one of a certain type or

¹⁰ "Love of knowledge" is here understood as a theoretical concept, rather than sheer attachment with our epistemically praiseworthy states. Our psychological states, that are being motivated by epistemic goods (knowledge, truth, wisdom, understanding, cognitive contact with reality) for their own sake, are important in a virtue epistemological light.

¹¹ See also Carter and Gordon (2014), for further discussion of open-mindedness.

¹² See also Adams (2006).

range of reasons, X', where 'the type or range X' is typical of, and differs according to, whichever virtue is in question. What are reasons 'typical of' a virtue? They will be the sorts of reasons for which someone with a particular virtue, V, will do a V act. (Hursthouse 1999, 127–28).

Let us call this condition, the *motivation requirement*. Unsurprisingly, the details of how to articulate this motivation requirement vary amongst virtue theorists. Settling this issue is beyond the purview of this thesis, however it is important to show some examples to see what is at issue among them.

First, it is helpful to describe what is *not* required by the motivation requirement. It is widely recognized that it is not necessary for the virtuous person to consciously deliberate the values of the traits in question when she acts. Virtue theorists regard such a requirement as too strong and psychologically overdemanding to be a necessary condition (Baehr 2013, 102). In addition, Hursthouse (1999, 132–36), points out there are some cases where apparent virtuous action (actions that appear to be what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances) fail to be genuinely virtuous. This will be the case when children, severely mentally handicapped people, and also, the case of people who act with an appropriate reason for virtue, yet in an *uncharacteristic way* (not from their dispositional character, they fail to be genuinely virtuous actions because their action is not their characteristic way of life). She summarizes what it is missing in these cases, namely the agent's being "really committed" to the value of her V acts (Hursthouse 1999).

In relation to this point, some virtue epistemologists detail further requirements for virtue. To be genuinely virtuous, the traits in question must be *integrated into the person's character in a relatively deep, enduring, and personal way* (Baehr 2013, 103). Precisely, she ought to take a positive view of the trait, be aware of its value, and thus identify with the trait.¹³

One way of characterizing this integration is having a positive or negative attitude toward the actions. This last point reveals genuine virtue comes with emotional reactions. A genuinely kind person would help people in need not only because she wants to, but because she is also happy to do it. A virtuous person would be angry at unjust behavior in his society, and rightly so. The motivational requirement not only tracks the proper reasons for virtuous action, it also tracks our proper emotional reactions.

Another important point of agreement amongst virtue theorists is a broader theoretical aim. It is often claimed that virtue theory is primarily aimed at answering how one should live, in reference to virtues. Merritt believes this is the principal normative claim shared by virtue theorists: “[Virtue theorists believe] the life that offers the surest chance of being, from the point of view of the person who lives it, a very good life, is the life of having the virtues” (Merritt 2000, 370). Virtues are a necessary

¹³ Furthermore, Baehr emphasized the importance of a person becoming the significant part of the explanation of her possession of the traits in question (Baehr 2013, 104). In this way, if an apparent virtuous trait T turns out to be merely infused by her community or parents, and the possession of the traits are solely explainable by these external factors, Baehr thinks that we rightly dismiss this case as not virtuous because the trait is not creditable to the person.

component for attaining the good life, and there is an inherent relation between the two. All the luck and contingency in our lives aside, from an agent's point of view, pursuing virtues is a necessary part of living a good life. This view is widespread in virtue theory broadly construed (Hursthouse 1999; Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011).

As we have seen, the hard core of virtue theory is to have both a rich motivation requirement, and a commitment to the inherent relation between virtue and a good life. The existing situationist debate seeks to invalidate these core commitments, both through appeal to the situationist data and by calling on some assumptions they believe we as virtue theorists have. In the next section, I'll address these issues and show how the situationists' argument is not convincing enough to reach their conclusion.

2. Implication of situationists arguments

According to situationists, virtue theories have the following theoretical commitments: explanatorism, egalitarianism, and consistency (Doris 2002; Alfano 2013). It is true, as the situationist presents, that these three theoretical commitments make virtue theorists extremely vulnerable to situationist attack; however, it is not clear if virtue theorists are in fact agreed upon these commitments, nor if such commitments necessarily follow from the hard core of virtue theory. In this section, I will give a closer inspection of each commitment, with some commitments shown to be overly restrictive.

Explanatorism

What sort of roles are virtues supposed to serve in virtue theories? Alfano emphasizes that the apparent advantage of virtue ethics is its “empirically adequate moral psychology” (Alfano 2012, 231). Situationists maintain that virtues are supposed to play an important part in the explanation and prediction of human behavior. As Doris puts it:

Attributing a quality of character invokes a depiction of behavior and psychology: The brave person acts distinctively, with distinctive motives, affects, and cognitions. Attributions also underwrite explanation and prediction: Knowing something about a person’s character is supposed to render their behavior intelligible and help observers determine what behaviors to expect (Doris 2002, 5).

Let us call this view *explanatorism*: virtues are supposed to serve as an explanation and prediction of our behavior. The above line of reasoning, together with the psychological data introduced earlier, can be reconstructed in the following manner.¹⁴

i. Virtue theory is correct only if virtue is to serve as the primary explanation and prediction of human behavior in general;

¹⁴ Alfano also made this explicit: “Extrapolating, I will suggest that if similar arguments apply to the other global virtues, then much of our epistemic conduct can be explained without reference to such dispositions. If this is right, inquiry responsibilism cannot claim empirical adequacy” (Alfano 2012, 241).

- ii. Social psychology gives us a genuine explanation and prediction of our behavior in general, which is not compatible with the properties involved in virtue;
- iii. Thus, it is not the case that virtue theory is correct.

It is true that the psychological data implies the general dispositions of people's behavior, and, as a result, our behavior might be more aptly explained and predicted by situational factors than by appealing to virtue theory. To put this differently, situationists believe that, according to the virtue theorist, virtues are supposed to explain and predict general human behavior.

Virtue theorists could answer such a worry in two ways: first, the simple response would be to claim that virtue theory has a different theoretical target than situationists have demonstrated. Virtues are aiming at describing and predicting the behavior of those who are admirable, but not normal human beings. However, the actions and life of the virtuous can tell us something about the non-virtuous (e.g. what non-virtuous ought to look into.) So, in this sense, predictions and explanations of non-virtuous people is what this theory is trying to achieve. Virtues explain the dispositions of the virtuous; they give us some understanding of why a virtuous agent would behave in a certain way in a certain situation, or why a non-virtuous agent ought to act in a certain way, in a certain situation. Explaining virtuous behavior through virtue is compatible with most of us not exhibiting this behavior.

Situationists might not be convinced by such simple reply. They emphasized the fact virtues and virtue-related terms are widespread in our languages, and we do have

practices of praising and blaming normal people with such terms. Hence, based on situationist findings, they claim that our virtue and vice attribution are systematically erroneous (because in many cases where we make such attribution, it is situational factor that primarily explains our behavior, not our character traits). And from such errors, situationists think we ought to disregard the virtue paradigm all together. The problem of this kind of criticism is that there is a huge gap between the ideas that our moral practice is in error and that the moral theory is in error. What situationists have so far demonstrated is support for the former, not the latter.

Secondly, the sort of explanatory and predictive power at issue is very short-sighted; research focuses on our immediate behavior influenced by the environment close to it. It is underdeveloped if virtues have explanatory and predictive power in a long run. If the hard core of virtue psychology was shown to make a difference in people's behavior, the strength of the situationist critique regarding explanatorism would be substantially weakened. I will revisit this point in the second half of this chapter.

Egalitarianism

Closely related to explanatorism, is a view called *egalitarianism*, which is the thesis that virtues are instantiated by many ordinary people (Doris 2002). According to the characterization of virtue theory offered by Alfano, egalitarianism is widespread among virtue theorists (Alfano 2011, 2012, 2013). This point, I believe, is doubtful, and so suggests an uncharitable reading of virtue theory on behalf of the situationist.

Egalitarianism is not necessary for the hard-core of Virtue Theory; and virtue as an ideal does not suffer from the problems posed by situationists.

The first problem related to the egalitarianism assumption relates to the difficulties of virtue acquisition. It is hard to deny the difficulties of virtue cultivation. Prominent virtue theorists have in various places explicitly conceded that genuine virtue is hard to come by. On this point, Aristotle first noted that becoming genuinely virtuous is extremely difficult (NE 1106b; 1109b). Heather Battaly also summarized that the egalitarian view is not at all widespread among virtue epistemologists (Battaly 2008, 660).

Being egalitarian in Alfano's sense may not be necessary for advocating virtue theory; we could maintain the hard core of virtue theory without committing to egalitarianism. A representative case by Zagzebski is *exemplarist virtue theory*. According to this paradigm, virtues are assumed to be possessed by a few exemplars in a society, and individuals refer to these exemplars when they emulate virtues. (It is even possible for a fictional character to take this role.) (Zagzebski 2010). It may be true that some virtue theorists take for granted that virtue is realized often by normal individuals [such as MacIntyre (1981)]; but it is entirely within the purview of available options for a virtue theorist to simply revise, rather than abandon, this theory in the face of situationist critique.

Given that virtue possession is a matter of degree, it is possible to hold simultaneously that genuine virtue is hard to come by and that virtue is at least *partly* instantiated by some ordinary people. This moderate view is compatible with Alfano

and Doris' supposition. It is far from clear that virtue theorists should be understood as egalitarian in Alfano's sense.¹⁵

The second problem with the egalitarian assumption can be subsumed under a more general and typical reply on behalf of the virtue theorist camp; which is that virtues are what we should aim at, or our ideals, not what we usually achieve. Doris and Alfano are skeptical about this style of reply.

Alfano questions the adequacy of virtue theory by making reference to the ought-can implication. He maintains, "if virtue is rare and exceedingly difficult to attain, it might be that they[people] really cannot" (Alfano 2014a, 108). According to Sreenivasan, there is a way we could understand the hidden assumption of situationism, which is as follows: "an ideal of virtuous character has normative purchase only if it is easy for the average human being to acquire the relevant character trait" (Sreenivasan 2013, 297). It is not clear why situationists hold this hidden assumption, and situationists need further supports to make this case.

¹⁵ King recently explicitly opposes the situationist conclusion by proposing that "even in some of the most 'situationist-friendly' studies, 13–20% of the subjects were reported to exhibit the relevant behavior. If we take the studies at face value, and their results as representative of the population at large, there may still be hundreds of millions of people who exhibit responsibilist virtues" (King 2014, 252). If virtue theories describe the properties of the disposition of those 13–20% of human beings, there is no reason to doubt that the descriptions might help the rest of us who are striving for virtues. The more precise descriptions of virtues we find, the better the possibilities of appreciating those virtues. Thus, we might be able to encourage further investigation on virtues, rather than giving up on this endeavor.

This hidden assumption turns out to be even more questionable, when we realize being virtuous and acquiring virtue are two distinct processes, which need distinct attention. The acquiring process is generally regarded to be as important as the acquired state in virtue theory; consider that virtues are often described as *habituated* character traits. It is articulated that virtue is an acquired trait as opposed to an innate ability (Baehr 2011; Zagzebski 1996). In the situationist debate, the static side of virtue has been at the heart of the argument. It remains mysterious as to how situationist data mostly showing that “we are not virtuous” could invalidate the cultivation of virtues; in other words, the empirical inadequacy of striving for virtues is yet to be achieved.

It is true that virtues are exceedingly difficult to attain, and that this appears to contradict the ought-can implication. This is however, a common predicament shared by any normative theory; it is also exceedingly difficult to comply with what consequentialist or deontic ethicists tell you to do. In so far as the criticism at issue is just an expression of this ubiquitous kind of pessimism, it is not a serious worry for the virtue theorist in particular that virtue theory falls prey to a general skepticism about moral theory.¹⁶

Related to this point, another situationist Doris (2002, Chap. 6–7) would argue that virtue as a deliberate ideal is not a welcoming revision for virtue theorists because

¹⁶ This is, in fact, similar to a famous objection to utilitarianism known as the demandingness objection: that it is too demanding by Bernard Williams (Williams 1985). See also Singer (1972).

it would undermine the advantages of virtue theory over other normative ethical theories. This problem is called “theoretical mediation”. Doris states:

“worries about theoretical mediation” (see Railton 1984) are reintroduced on the idealized conception. One attraction of character-based approaches is that they appear to escape worries about what we might call the “creepiness” of theory-driven moral reflection; the decreased authenticity and increased alienation that are supposed to afflict theoretical approaches to morality (Doris 2002, 152).

Fair enough, if virtue theory falls back to deliberate ideal, and requires people to reflect on a virtuous exemplar when they behave, then it reintroduces the problem of theoretical mediation other normative ethics have suffered from. As Stocker famously noted, visiting a friend in hospital because it is your duty does not sound quite right (Stocker 1976); as does the case in which you visit because that is what morally virtuous people would do.

This criticism is, on closer inspection, not entirely clear. It involves another hidden assumption: if virtue is an idealized concept, virtue would be only acquired through deliberation on the theory. Remember here that virtue involves both cognitive and emotional factors. In a recent paper, virtue epistemologist Battaly introduced an “emotional contagion” as the key phenomena in rehabilitating our vices (Battaly 2016). Emotional contagion is an involuntary non-cognitive process that enables us to catch emotions from other people. Her suggestion is to put vicious people in a friendly

environment so that they can catch the virtuous emotions of exemplars via contagion. Her suggestion of rehabilitating vicious people through the emotional (anti-intellectual) part of virtue is illuminating; it implies many options are available in our virtue cultivation. It is entirely within the purview of virtue theory to start cultivating virtue in a non-cognitive way, as well as to simultaneously pursue virtue as an ideal in a cognitive way. The strength of the argument of theoretical mediation is much weaker than Doris has assumed.

Consistency

It is assumed by situationists that virtuous people respond the same way whenever they have the same reason (Alfano 2012, 230).¹⁷ As we have addressed earlier, this point is widely agreed upon by virtue theorists. However, the situationist position on this issue has not been sufficiently addressed, which has caused tremendous confusion in the debate. The situationists' statement that virtue ethics is empirically invalidated was based on the data showing many people do not act morally in a cross-situationally consistent way (Doris 2002; Sreenivasan 2002, 2008; Webber 2006). Much of the discussion over the consistency of our behavior was about the interpretations of situationist data, such as whether those situationist data with one-

¹⁷ As a part of criticism on the consistency of virtues, it could be argued that virtue theorists admit of the unity of Virtue. In believing this, Doris states that the virtue theorists commit to an evaluative integration (Doris 2002, 20–22). However, the unity thesis is a highly controversial claim that not every virtue ethicist advocates. I do not go into this debate here, as I believe it is entirely within the purview of available options for a virtue theorist to simply abandon it (Sreenivasan 2009).

time performance are sufficient for the claim that there are no such thing as cross-situational character traits (Sreenivasan 2008, 2013).

Yet not enough attention has been paid to the theoretically rich notion of the motivation requirement of virtues. Though behavioral consistency is important even among virtue theorists, the stronger emphasis is rather put on the fact that virtuous people choose their acts for the right reasons and hence, they act consistently. In such a frame-work, consistent actions are only the result of the reason-responsiveness of the virtuous. Whether the situationist empirical data on our actions reveals the empirical inadequacy of virtues is, on closer inspection, not as clear as it appears, because they always suffer from a “masking problem”. Sreenivasan points this out through reference to classic situationist experiments on honesty conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928). He argues, students in these experiments were given multiple “honesty-related” tests. Two actions were fixed as cases of dishonest behavior by the experimenter: taking change left on the table in an empty classroom, and a situation presenting an opportunity to make a false report. However, in laying out the concrete situations, reasons for action can be masked: it might have been the case that some people had a policy of “finders keepers” in the former scenario, and that making a false report could serve to prevent another child from getting into trouble in the latter. In which cases, subjects are not necessarily agreed that the situations are “honesty eliciting” (Sreenivasan 2013, 301–3).

If showing the empirical inadequacy of virtue theory is what situationists are ultimately trying to achieve, the fruitful outcome should come from the empirical study

of our reason-responsiveness, rather than from single-pass behavioral differences.¹⁸ In saying this, I do not disagree with situationists in that situationist data implies that the majority of us are not acting morally in certain situations. Rather, what I would like to emphasize is that these data remain ambiguous due to the nature of the empirical setting; it is always open for virtue theorists to interpret the study charitably, thereby making the debate indecisive.

In sum, the situationist's criticism of the empirical adequacy of virtue was based on an uncharitable reading of virtue theory. Egalitarianism is not a necessary component of advocating virtue theory and it is not entirely clear explanatorism is shown to be threatening for virtue theorists. It is true that people behave morally and epistemically in a non cross-situationally consistent way, but it is yet to be shown how this fact undermines the validity of the process of acquiring virtues.

The first part of this chapter has shown that the situationist debate is perplexed due to the ambiguity of interpretation and theoretical implication of the data, as well as strong assumptions of virtue theory by situationists. It is also true that there was no positive empirical data from the virtue theorists; all we could hope for from them was the reinterpretation of situationists' data and arguments, making the whole debate

¹⁸ Candace Upton also identifies this problem when she writes: "empirical research would have to establish either that most humans are not in a virtuous frame of mind, or that while many humans are in a virtuous frame of mind, they also possess additional adverse mental features that would preclude their virtuous behavior" (Upton 2009, 182).

indecisive, at best. In the second part of this chapter, I will introduce some recent developmental psychology as support for the empirical adequacy of virtue theory.¹⁹

3. Self-determination theory

We have seen in the earlier section that the proper motivation is widely accepted as a necessary condition of virtue. What virtue theorists need is empirical support for such a commitment: namely that character traits are responsive to our motivation. If it turns out that our motivation is causally ineffective in our character cultivation, then this accordingly counts against the empirical adequacy of virtue theory.

An important question becomes: how has it been proven that we form our dispositions based on our motivations? Many virtue theorists implicitly take this as a prerequisite for their theory. However, if it is not feasible to show that this is the case on any justificatory ground, then an important assumption of the view is mistaken. In

¹⁹ There is also a situationist debate over the Big Five: five scores (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) that are given to us that tell us a great deal about the ways we behave through our lives (Nettle 2007). (See also, Judge et al. 1999; Mendiburo-Seguel, Páez, and Martínez-Sánchez 2015). Miller argues the Big Five contradicts virtue theory because those personality traits implied by the data are relatively fixed, tied to our genetic makeup, and variations in traits are produced as a result of natural selection (Nettle 2006; Cravchik and Goldman 2000), hence, such traits are not suitable for our ethical evaluation as virtue theorist assume (Miller 2014). While settling this ongoing debate is beyond the purview of this thesis, even if we are born with natural temperaments, based on such temperaments, the actual behaviors are up to us. Outlets of our actual behaviors, together with our goals and values in life is what matters when we judge ourselves to be morally, or epistemically, praiseworthy, and this crucial part of virtue theory seems unscathed in the face of their critique (See also, Nettle 2007).

this section, empirical support for this assumption of virtue theory will be introduced, and in particular, I will engage with the psychological study of our motivation.

The series of works on self-determination theory (henceforth, SDT; also known as the study of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation) initiated by Ryan and Deci (e.g. Ryan and Deci 2000), suggests that it is not the quantity or magnitude of our motivation, but the quality of motivation which matters with respect to predicting action and the outcome of our behavior. This quality of motivation is more commonly identified as the orientation of our motivation. The most basic distinction made with regards to the orientation of our motivation is between *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* motivations. Intrinsic motivation is motivation to do something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, whereas extrinsic motivation is motivation to do something because it leads to some further desirable outcome. SDT proposes that our performances are significantly enhanced when intrinsically rather than merely extrinsically motivated (Ryan and Deci 2000).

Already, in the early stages of motivation studies, the empirical results indicated that those who are extrinsically motivated to solve certain puzzles (e.g. under the threat of punishment, or having the payment of money contingent upon their performances), are less likely to perform puzzle solving activity than subjects who solved the same puzzles without threats or rewards but who were motivated by pure interest in its activity (Deci 1972, 220). According to Deci, when subjects are extrinsically motivated, their interest in the activity (the inclination of engagement of the activity) is diminished.

A more recent study on the orientation of our motivation indicates that extrinsic motivations can issue very different results depending on how far the motivation for one's behavior emanates from one's self.²⁰ For instance, when an individual has identified the importance of the activity, integrating this importance fully to herself, this type of extrinsic motivation is called *integration*. And integration together with intrinsic motivation, are grouped as "*autonomous*", "*self-determined*" motivation. Empirical studies have shown that the qualitative differences between the extrinsic motivations also explain the different outcomes of extrinsically motivated behavior.

The latest study on SDT extends to our passion. Vallerand defines passion as a strong inclination toward a self-defining activity that one likes, finds important and meaningful, and in which one invests time and energy (Vallerand et al. 2003, 757). In this paradigm, researchers found that our passion could be shaped into different forms. One of these forms is called harmonious passion; it results from an autonomous internalization of the activity into the person's identity and self (Vallerand 2012, 47–48). According to Vallerand, the difference between self-determined motivation and harmonious passion comes down to how the activity is self-defining.

²⁰ It is known that external motivation constitutes five different kinds: *amotivation*, the state of lacking intention to act; *external regulation*, behaviors performed to satisfy an external demand or to obtain an externally imposed reward; *introjection*, behaviors with a type of internal regulation yet quite controlling—performing actions upon feeling the pressure to avoid guilt or anxiety, or to attain ego-enhancement or pride; *identification*, behaviors in which a person has identified with its personal importance and has accepted its regulation as being his or her own; and *integration*: behaviors in which identified regulations have been fully assimilated to the self (Ryan and Deci 2000, 61–62).

Passion is directed particularly towards identity-defining activities such as professional sports and music (Bonneville-Roussy, Lavigne, and Vallerand 2011; Vallerand et al. 2008), while self-determined motivation is not.

Empirical results suggest that when people have a harmonious passion toward certain activities, they are more inclined to achieve high-level performances. Bonneville-Roussy conducted a study on 187 professional musicians, mostly from Canada and America (Bonneville-Roussy, Lavigne, and Vallerand 2011). The subjects answered a questionnaire to determine if their passion toward music is harmonious (e.g. “playing my instrument is in harmony with the other activities in my life”) or not (e.g. “I have difficulties controlling my urge to play my instrument”). They were also asked what their goals of engagement in playing an instrument are (e.g. “it is important for me to develop my skills as thoroughly as possible”), and how often they deliberately practice (e.g. “when I do my practice, I slowly repeat difficult excerpts”). What this suggests is that musicians with harmonious passion were more inclined to have a goal of improving their ability and master new skills (mastery goals). Such goals were associated with the type of training in which the explicit aim is to improve performance, such as repeating the difficult part of the song (deliberate practice), and, such training predicted the numbers of solo concerts given by the subjects, which implied a higher level of performance.²¹ Generally put, harmonious passion leads to

²¹ In order to avoid the performance variable being solely a reflection of the number of years of music involvement, the numbers of concerts given by participants was divided by the numbers of years of experience (Bonneville-Roussy, Lavigne, and Vallerand 2011, 130).

mastery goals: people aim to learn and eventually master new skills. Mastery goals then predict deliberate practices, which are positively associated with higher performance over time (Vallerand 2012, 49).²²

What this suggests is that SDT has theoretical implications which support the motivational requirement of virtue theory. The experiments designed and conducted on SDT are feasible only if it is possible that our behavioral outcomes change in a way that is sensitive to the orientation of our motivation. In other words, it shows our behavior is influenced in a systematic way by our evaluations of our activities. SDT shows that our motivation plays an important explanatory and predictive role in terms of our behavior. As Vallerand states: “motivational process matter greatly with respect to living a meaningful life” (Vallerand 2012, 49).

It is our behaviors, and the dispositions of our behaviors, that are significantly affected by the orientation of our motivation. The fruitful results of the SDT research paradigm are suggestive of empirical support for the motivational requirement. The relation between the two theories will be addressed in more detail in the next section.

4. SDT and virtue theory

In this section, theoretical implications of SDT for virtue theory will be addressed. Both SDT and virtue theory are theories of meaningful life. There is strong empirical support for SDT that also lends weight to virtue theory. The SDT research program has

²² Obsessive passion predicts mixed achievement processes; some are adaptive and others are maladaptive (Vallerand 2012).

produced data showing self-determined agents experience high performance in important domains of our lives. In the last part of this section, some critical evaluation of SDT will be also provided.

SDT as a formal theory of good life

First, it should be noted that the structural similarity between SDT and virtue theory is beyond appearance. Ryan and his colleagues have explicitly noticed the intimate relationship between SDT and Aristotelian ethics (eudemonism), and they accordingly depict SDT as *a formal theory of eudaimonia*. They maintain:

“[Many of the] elements in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia [living well, being actively engaged in excellent activity, reflectively making decisions, and behaving voluntarily toward ends that represent the realization of our highest human natures] are at the core of self-determination theory’s (SDT’s) conceptions of wellness”(Ryan, Huta, and Deci 2008, 145–47).

Therefore, SDT is trying to construct an empirical theory of eudaimonia. The connection between virtue theory and SDT I have proposed is not just superficial, but rather embedded in the SDT framework.²³ As addressed in the first section, the hard

²³ This point implies the possibility that SDT might be able to shed some theoretical light on virtue theory, especially on the nature of the motivational requirement; and that virtue epistemology can in turn suggest that moral goods and epistemic goods might be truly worthwhile and are of inherent or intrinsic human worth. In future research, virtue theory will go hand in hand with SDT.

core of virtue theory was the shared belief that virtue is necessary for leading a good life; this inherent relation between virtue and a good life is also found in SDT. This implies the more positive outcomes we obtain from SDT, the more likely that virtue theoretical assumptions are shown to be on the right track.

Secondly, as a formal theory of eudaimonia, SDT places a focus on subjects who engage in desirable behaviors in a variety of contexts. SDT is applied to domains such as sports, subjective-wellbeing, healthcare, and education (Ryan and Deci 2000).²⁴ The importance of achievement in these domains is commonly acknowledged. Here education is particularly salient. The SDT literature on education suggests the virtue acquisition process (cultivation of certain attitudes, abilities, dispositions and motivations) is one that runs parallel to education. Virtue acquisition is comprised of the cultivation of various abilities, and education shares this ideology.²⁵ Moreover, our understanding of successful or ideal agents in education is commonly shared, with less controversy compared to other domains, such as morality. In terms of morality, what moral success consists of is itself a central topic in theoretical ethics, and ethicists do not always agree on this matter. However, it is less problematic to talk about educational success; denying the idea that success in education contributes towards our meaningful life is especially controversial in the modern world. According

²⁴ Intrinsic motivation and harmonious passion are known to predict subjective well-being and good mental health (Niemi and Ryan 2009).

²⁵ For instance, Pritchard makes it explicit that our educational goal is not just the acquisition of knowledge, but rather the cultivation of students' understanding. Understanding in this sense demands an elevated level of ability (Pritchard 2013).

to the studies on SDT and its application to education, students who are regulated by autonomous motivations (i.e., intrinsic and integrated) are more likely to experience positive consequences at school (Guay, Ratelle, and Chanal 2008, 234).²⁶ That is, “doing school activities out of choice and/or pleasure will produce higher levels of achievement than engaging in school activities for external reasons and/or internal pressure” (Guay and Vallerand 1996, 225). Self-determined motivation predicts students’ persistence in high school and college. In one study, students answered a questionnaire on educational activities during the semester in the class, and the motivational profiles of those who dropped out of the course were assessed at the end of semester. Students whose answers indicated they were intrinsically motivated to study were less likely to have dropped out of high school (Vallerand and Blssonnette 1992; Vallerand, Fortier, and Guay 1997).²⁷

Another connected and interesting result involves creativity. According to psychologists, creativity involves the development of a novel product, idea, or solution to a problem that is of value to the individual and/or the larger social group (Hennessey and Amabile 2010). A classic study conducted by Amabile suggests subjects who have intrinsic motivations for writing poems were found to be more creative than their extrinsically motivated counterparts (Amabile 1985). In more recent

²⁶ These consequences can take different forms: behavioral, cognitive, or affective (Guay, Ratelle, and Chanal 2008).

²⁷ It has also been shown that autonomous motivation predicted greater achievement in education over a one-year period (Guay and Vallerand 1996). Note that this finding is a long-term experiment and thus implies the orientation of our motivation influences not only our single actions, but our behavioral dispositions.

studies on identified (self-determined) motivation and creativity, undergraduate students in social science courses were asked to join an experiment. They first answered a questionnaire on the importance of various values as a guiding principle in their lives; subsequently, they participated in creativity-relevant tasks (math, art, and verbal). In an artistic task, participants were given 10 min to create small drawings with the following titles (e.g. circle, rectangle, person, and motion). Some undergraduate research assistants were trained as judges. Judges were instructed to employ their own subjective understanding of creativity to rate each product relative to the others. They used a rating scale ranging from not at all creative to highly creative. For the titles such as “circle” and “triangle,” many participants drew the shapes in a straightforward manner; however, other participants created drawings that displayed alternative, nongeometric interpretations (e.g., a circle of friends, a relationship triangle). This demonstrated an unusual perspective on the shapes, and such drawings were evaluated as creative by the judges. This study showed that subjects who held an identified motivation toward the value of creativity were judged to be more creative in the subsequent task (Kasof et al. 2007). It is striking that our creative behavior is observed by agents with autonomous orientation of motivation, because, as we have addressed earlier, creativity is one of the intellectual virtues Alfano has shown to be explained and predicted by situational factors (Alfano 2012, 235). Here, the SDT data casts doubt on the situationists’ overly strong and negative conclusion, implying that our virtue could explain and predict our behavior in a different way from situationist on the same phenomena.

Another empirical result comes from a study on our passion. Young competitive water-polo and synchronized swimming athletes were asked to join an experiment (Vallerand et al. 2008). These athletes were high-level performers; at the time of this study, they had been engaged in their sport very seriously.²⁸ These swimmers answered a questionnaire at the beginning of the season (Time 1). This assessment examined their passion, measuring their agreement with statements such as “synchronized swimming is in harmony with other activities in my life”.²⁹ Swimmers were also asked about their goals of engagement in the sport (e.g. “It is important to develop my skills as thoroughly as possible this season”). Four months later (Time 2), swimmers were asked how much they engaged in individual deliberate practices such as the exercise of concentration and reflection to have a better control during the game. Finally, at the end of the season (Time 3), their coaches assessed and answered a questionnaire on the performance of individual players relative to others. They were asked to answer questions such as, “Since the beginning of the season, compared to the other athletes of his or her age, this athlete has been performing well under pressure”. The results indicated that swimmers who believed playing their sport (e.g., water-polo) was in harmony with other activities in their life, tended to believe it was important to develop their skills as thoroughly as possible during the season.

²⁸ According to the researcher, the subjects had played the sport an average of 5.21 years, 4.73 times per week, each time for an average of 110.32 min (Vallerand et al. 2008).

²⁹ At time 1, assessment was also conducted on their life satisfaction (e.g. Swimmers were asked if “I’m satisfied with my life”). And as expected, the harmonious passion predicted the higher subjective well-being among swimmers (Vallerand et al. 2008).

Further, this goal correlated with the swimmer undertaking additional practice independent of the supervision of their coaches. Swimmers who engaged in deliberate practices were more likely to be judged as having better performed by their coaches at the end of the season. The researchers maintain that by holding harmonious passion, these swimmers did not experience the need to compare themselves to others, and did not have internal or external pressure to practice, known as maladaptive for high-quality performances (Vallerand et al. 2008).

Thus, SDT has shown that the orientation of our motivation has a strong influence on the achievement of desirable educational goals. This is relevant to virtue epistemology. Responsibilist virtue epistemologists ask what is necessary for individuals to become responsible, intellectual agents. They submit that this is achievable via the cultivation of intellectual virtues. In essence, as we have already seen in the second section, this is best attained when we are *motivated* by epistemic goods for their own sake. In other words, cultivating individual character traits derived from these motivations is equivalent to internalizing the value of the activity to the self. These conditions, imposed upon us, have significant overlap with the motivational structure of agents with autonomous motivation and harmonious passion who are led to desirable outcomes in SDT research. We have already seen that students with desirable educational outcomes tend to be motivated by educational activities in themselves, or that they have internalized educational values. In so doing, they de facto meet the conditions imposed upon us by virtue epistemologists to be responsible

inquirers. Thus, it can be inferred that these empirical findings support in an important respect the adequacy of the empirical component of (intellectual) virtues.

Some critical evaluation of SDT

I should also raise some critical awareness of the problems on the current framework of SDT for facilitating future research between SDT and virtue theory.

First, one might be skeptical about the empirical validity of first-person data such as first person reports of motivational profile and deliberate practice in SDT. Due to the nature of the SDT, it is inevitable that people's motivational orientations are based on first-person introspective reports (e.g. answering questionnaires). One might also worry that such reports might not accurately represent people's internal state. Such a worry often comes from a position that introspective reports are private rather than public, and that science should be carried out with public method. However, Piccinini points out that a scientific method is public if and only if, any investigator can apply the method to the same questions, and that the method generates the same results regardless of who is applying it (Piccinini 2003b). He goes on to say that introspective reports accord with these methods, as "psychologists do not ask introspecting subjects to collect data by introspecting; rather, they record the subjects' reports, and then the psychologists themselves extract data from those reports by following public procedures that are analogous to those followed by other scientists in generating their results" (Piccinini 2003b, 609).³⁰ Moreover, even some situationist data includes

³⁰ This is an ongoing debate in philosophy of science. See also Dennett (1991), and Piccinini (2003a, 2003b, 2010).

introspective reports as part of their experiments. In the infamous Samaritan experiment, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire on their religiosity (Darley and Batson 1973). While there might be room for improvement in experimental settings in the future, in the current debate, experiments including introspective reports do not seem to undermine the legitimacy of arguments.

My second worry for the current SDT program is a possible oversimplification of our motivational orientation. It seems a perfectly feasible explanation that a person could be motivated to swim because it is inherently interesting as well as out of concern for her health. In SDT our motivational profile is pushed into one category among a few different profiles, and it remains unexplained why two motivational profiles never coexist.

Related to this point, it appears there is an important dissimilarity between SDT and virtue theory. The lack of a developmental sequence in the internalization of the value of an activity in SDT framework might worry virtue theorists. It is a necessary part of the cultivation of virtue, that the value of a worthwhile activity is integrated into the self. A non-virtuous agent learns and gradually integrates the value of an activity into their self, and finds their activity pleasurable. Whereas SDT seems open to the possibility of us being natural-born moral saints, or natural-born epistemic sages. The problem lies in the current model in that it is a theoretically feasible option on SDT for a person to be intrinsically motivated towards an activity without the value of the activity being integrated whilst pursuing a meaningful life. In the standard Aristotelian model, both motivational profiles are vitally important in acquiring virtues. Virtue

acquisition requires an agent to both be intrinsically motivated towards moral and epistemic activity, as well as integrating the value of activity into their self.

In this section, I have addressed some theoretical implications of SDT. SDT, as a formal theory of a good life, has an intrinsic connection with virtue theory. It is more than a superficial resemblance. As a theory of a good life, SDT has shown our motivational profile has a big explanatory and predictive role in worthy activities such as education. It is also worthwhile to note there are some worries in an SDT framework and a potential dissimilarity between SDT and virtue theory for the future development of this research. In the last section, further implications of SDT and situationism will be addressed.

5. SDT and situationism

In this last section, I want to touch upon the relationship between situational factors and SDT. According to researchers, SDT can accommodate some situational factors as facilitating our autonomous motivation. This leads to a problem concerning the causation of our actions. If the orientation of our motivation plays some important role in the cause of our actions, SDT warrants attention equal to situationism.

Deci and Ryan (1985) have identified three basic needs bearing on the development of internalized motivation: autonomy, competence, and relatedness.³¹

³¹ Researchers of SDT not only find superficial differences between the consequences of autonomous and non-autonomous motivation, they also investigate why it turns out like this. According to their findings, human beings have three basic psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) and intrinsic

Psychologists working on SDT investigate the factors that enhance these human needs. Many such factors are situational, in the sense that they come from outside of our body; in this respect, situational factors constitute an indispensable part of the SDT research program. For instance, college students are known to be more prone to having autonomous motivation to learn than high school students (Ratelle et al. 2007; Guay, Ratelle, and Chanal 2008). Guay maintains that the educational setting in college has lesser constraints compared to high school and this situational factor influences student motivation towards learning. This finding implies that students' motivational profiles are context sensitive. Furthermore, autonomy and a relatedness supportive environment for students (e.g. supportive parents) have been shown to predict students' intrinsic/extrinsic goal outcomes (Kasser et al. 1995).³²

Situationists might at this point reply by insisting that situational factors bring out the behavioral outcome but not our motivations. While SDT researchers investigate situational factors influencing our behavior, it is important to note that they never explain data away by appealing to sheer situational factors. Beachboard et al. write, "SDT hypothesizes that environments that support perceptions of social relatedness improve motivation, thereby positively influencing learning behavior" (Beachboard et

motivations are more likely to lead to desirable behavioral outcomes than extrinsic motivations due to the fact that they are mediated through fulfillment of these psychological needs.

³² A similar finding is reproduced in the study of our motivation (Mageau and Vallerand 2003), also in the study of passion. When coaches are autonomy supportive, athletes tend to have harmonious passion rather than obsessive passion (Mageau et al. 2009).

al. 2011, 853). Notice here that it is alleged that situational factors do not cause our behavior but rather influence human behavior via motivation.

The situationist, at this juncture, might attempt to dispute the above causal claim, which raises a more general and difficult question of causation. What is the cause of action, constitutes a devastating philosophical problem and it is beyond the purview of this thesis to settle such a question; however, one prominent line, which accounts for how one event causes the other (e.g. a short-circuit causes a fire), is Mackie's much discussed INUS conditions:³³

the so-called cause[short-circuit] is, and is known to be, an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result[fire]. [...] I suggest that when we speak of the cause of some particular event, it is often a condition of this sort that we have in mind (Mackie 1965, 245).

According to this view, a fire could be set with malicious intent by an arsonist, but this fact does not hinder a short-circuit from being the cause of the fire at issue. Thus, the INUS condition observes a short-circuit as a primary cause of fire. Along the same line, I take it that psychologists understand our proper motivation as an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which itself is unnecessary but sufficient for our desirable behavioral outcomes, such as high-quality performance in music and

³³ The nature of causation is an ongoing debate and some might not agree with the INUS condition (See for instance, contrasted view: Northcott 2008) however, it is beyond the purview of this thesis to go in depth with this debate.

swimming, and school persistence in education. It is true that such outcomes might in some cases be produced in the absence of good motivation (or even with vicious motivation); however, just like the fire might have been caused by arson, or someone forgetting to put out a cigarette, this itself has nothing to do with the fact that virtuous motivation can take a necessary and important causal role in producing the same kind of outcome in different cases.³⁴

To be clear, I am happy to accept the fact that situational factors can constitute INUS conditions in some circumstances where our desirable epistemic behaviors are observed. If, however, the situationist intends to show the empirical inadequacy of the assumptions of virtue theory based on their best data, situational factors (but not our motivations) must have played the role of the INUS condition in every case or at least in a significant part of our life. At least, they should convince us that situational factors are the causes of the event in most cases rather than our orientation of motivation. Put another way, the situationist ought to show us that motivation could not take a role of an INUS condition in many occasions. Nevertheless, the situationists' alleged conclusion has this implication, and it is far from clear how this argument would succeed.

³⁴ Some philosophers have criticized responsibilist virtue epistemology in this vein, insisting that many responsibilist intellectual virtues are auxiliary, but not constitutive of knowledge (Sosa 2015). Sosa's point is only convincing if we restrict our epistemological interest only to knowledge; however, some apparent auxiliary virtues might turn out constitutive of some other epistemic goods, such as understanding, or wisdom. Carter and Gordon (2014) also imply this possibility. This is an ongoing debate on how much responsibilist virtues are constitutive of our epistemic goals.

Here the problem lies with what constitutes the primary explanation of our behavior. According to the situationist, it is the situational factor that most aptly explains and predicts our subsequent moral and epistemic behavior. For instance, in a situationist experiment, subjects who found a dime placed in a phone booth, subsequently helped a person in need (also a staged part of the experiment) (Isen and Levin 1972). As the situationist explains it, the situational factor (i.e. finding the dime) causes one to perform the helpful act in the test, not our morally-relevant motivation. On the other hand, according to the SDT framework, our motivational orientation is the factor in the experiment aptly explaining and predicting our behavior. On closer inspection, the situationist and SDT research programs are similar in experimental design. Yet based on experiments from each side, their argument appeals to the factor they are correlating with the result. Finding a dime was the factor in the former case, and having autonomous motivation played the same role in the latter case. If situationists want to keep being skeptical about the results of the experiments proposed by SDT framework, they need further arguments as to why they think so, in the face of the structural similarity of their experiments.

We have addressed even some situationists elements that could be integrated into this SDT framework. The decades long studies of SDT indicate that our motivational orientation has genuine explanatory and predictive power. Situationists might be skeptical as to the causal power of our motivation; however, we have addressed that both situationist and SDT researchers seem to share the causal

explanation of our behavior. Thus, on closer inspection, their evidential statuses are, at best, on a par.

6. Conclusion

Although situationists have criticized virtue theory for its empirical inadequacy in combination with the commitment to psychological realism, the nature of this criticism has been problematically ambiguous. This is due to their misunderstanding of the hard core of the virtue theory and their stipulation of theoretical commitments of virtue theory. In this chapter, I have addressed the confusion of the existing debate, and the conclusion drawn is that virtue theory ultimately remains unscathed. While situationists have assumed that social psychological studies undermine the empirical adequacy of virtue theory, such studies show, at most, that not many of us are genuinely virtuous. When we afford closer attention to studies on the orientation of our motivation, it becomes clear how the dynamics of our motivation have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioral outcomes: a good life. Moreover, the empirical components of virtues are in fact supported by such empirical motivation studies, and they correspond well with the way people are motivated when they engage in important activities. Supporting virtue theory and being a psychological realist are, thus, compatible, and further research on this perspective should be undertaken for the future debate to be productive.

Chapter 2 Virtue Epistemology, Responsibility, and Narrative Self

0. Introduction

This chapter will address the problem of how we should consider our environmental influences on our virtue cultivation in relation to the concept of self and responsibility. In recent years, the view that virtues are traits cultivated merely by one's control has been criticized; instead, more theorists are inclined to hold that being in a well-designed environment is necessary for obtaining virtues. In her recent paper, Heather Battaly goes further by arguing that such friendly environment is not only necessary but sufficient for virtue possession; her view is called a personalist account of virtues and vices (Battaly 2015, 2016). My thesis goes against such radical move. In the first section, I will demonstrate why establishing a friendly environment is now widely accepted as an essential element in virtue cultivation among virtue epistemologists. In the second section, I will reformulate Battaly's argument for the personalist account of virtue and vice. In the third section, some preliminary objections to Battaly's debate will be addressed. Here, I will also demonstrate that what Battaly has pointed out about vice could be consistent with the traditional view (nonpersonalist view or, in other words, responsibilist view) supplemented with other moral considerations. In the fourth section, I will argue that personalist vice overlooks the success component of virtue, and by rejecting any efforts on the side of an agent, it contradicts the essential part of virtue understood as an achievement. In the fifth section, I will show that some manipulation cases that the personalist accepts as responsible in line with

attributability responsibility are problematic on the ground of attributability responsibility. In the sixth section, I will argue that personalism comes at a very high price. Personalism contradicts the concept of self embedded in virtue epistemology. I believe that the concept of self now known as narrative self would help us understand the proper relation of our virtues and environment. Finally, I will briefly explain why revising responsibilism so that it accommodates some environmental scaffoldings is a better option than holding a pluralism of intellectual virtues.

1. Why the environment is important in our virtue cultivations

Responsibilist virtue epistemologists have the common thought that epistemic virtues are excellent epistemic character traits—e.g., open-mindedness and intellectual courage—and that these traits show our values, purposes, and motivations. As Linda Zagzebski famously put it, virtues are “deep and enduring acquired excellence that require dispositions of motivation and dispositions of internal and external success” (Zagzebski 1996, 137). In other words, virtues have some acquisition conditions. Virtues need to be cultivated in specific ways—e.g., self-cultivation. The flip side of this acquisition condition claim is that virtues cannot be obtained by some extreme means—e.g., brainwashing. The assumption embedded in this kind of view is that we are responsible only for the trait that we choose to acquire; in other words, “S brought it about that she has V” (Cassam 2019). The acquisition condition states how a particular character trait is to be obtained among individuals.

Recent findings on human cognitive shortcomings have an impact on theorizing this acquisition condition. Human cognitive shortcomings, such as cognitive biases, and constraints, as well as a large number of social psychological data implying that our epistemic behaviors are heavily influenced by epistemically irrelevant trivial factors, threaten the traditional virtue epistemology (Alfano 2013). For instance, Alfano argues that creative behavior is attained with the help of the environment. In an experiment, subjects were asked to fix a candle to a corkboard in a way that the wax did not drip. They were given three items: a box of thumbtacks, matches, and a candle. The subjects who saw a comedy film or who were given some candy before engaging in the task were more likely to give a proper and creative answer to the question: to empty the matchbox and tack it to the corkboard (Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki 1987). In this experiment, creative behavior was linked to mood elevators, so the apparent intellectually virtuous behaviors were more aptly explained by situational factors than personal quality. Alfano infers from such data that virtue responsibilism (narrowly construed) is empirically inadequate and that our virtuous behavior is obtainable with the help of the environment.

Faced with such empirical data, virtue epistemologists are now fully aware of the difficulty of obtaining virtues purely by our own efforts, and they understand the importance of tailoring friendly environments to our virtue cultivation. They concede that without any help from our environment, it is unrealistic and elitist to pursue virtues. Thus, manipulations of our environment are understood as keys in this field, and these theorists now believe them to be necessary for the cultivation of virtues.

One way of doing this is by appealing to cognitive extensions (Pritchard 2015). Pritchard criticizes traditional virtue epistemologists who hold that cognitive processes reside only in our brains; this view is narrow-minded and ill-motivated. Pritchard proposes an anti-individualism of cognitive processes, going along with Clark and Chalmers, in which extended cognitive processes coupled with our brain, with high degrees of trust, reliance, and accessibility, are indistinguishable from inner processes (Clark and Chalmers 1998). According to such view, if some external process is properly incorporated into the cognitive character of the agent, this would be sufficient to regard this process as a genuine part of cognition, which properly belongs to the agent. A similar idea comes from a different angle of cognitive enhancement. Fröding believes that our cognitive constraints could be overcome through medical or technical enhancements. She maintains that with cognitive neuroenhancement, agents could be levelled up to a starting point from which they might find it very possible to embark on the habituation process of virtues (Fröding 2011, 2013).

While these theorists emphasize the importance of proper environmental scaffoldings, they maintain that environmental scaffoldings are not enough for virtue acquisition. They believe that agents must play a substantive role in the explanation of trait cultivation (self-cultivation). Heather Battaly, in her recent papers, claims that self-cultivation is not a necessary component of virtue possession; when agents are placed in a well-designed environment, it is sufficient for holding virtues (Battaly 2015,

2016). In other words, she distinguishes two phenomena: acquisition and possession of virtues.

Traditionally, virtues are understood to be cultivated and then obtained; hence, these two processes are interconnected: virtues need to be acquired in specific ways for them to be possessed. However, Battaly believes that we can take a pluralism toward what it means to possess virtues. According to her view, now known as a personalist account of virtues, there is no acquisition condition on virtue. I believe that this difference is very crucial. The personalist thesis is very problematic for virtue epistemologists in its own right. Ultimately, I hope to draw the following alternative conclusion: rather than taking a pluralism about virtues, it is more fruitful to hold a traditional view but revise it if necessary. In the next section, I will reformulate her argument for personalism—in other words, a non-self-reform view of virtues and vices.

Personalist virtues and vices

In this section, I will reformulate the personalist argument and demonstrate which part I will go against. The personalist concludes that it is not necessary to self-cultivate to possess virtues. To see whether such conclusion is a feasible option, I will examine her arguments in detail. In my analysis, the personalist's arguments rest on a few assumptions, some of which have been shown to be problematic upon closer inspection in later sections.

Before moving on to the difference between Zagzebski's responsibilist view and Battaly's personalist view, let me emphasize the commonality between the two: they both hold a motivationalist view of virtue. According to this view, virtues are character

traits that reflect personal values and conceptions. Motivationalists, such as Baehr and Zagzebski, hold that intellectual virtues are individuated by their proximate motivation but that all intellectual virtues have ultimate motivations of love of knowledge in common (Baehr 2011; Zagzebski 1996). The difference between responsibilism and personalism comes down to where this motivation arises from. Personalism is a theory solely about possession of virtue, rather than acquisition. At a given time t , a person is intellectually virtuous if and only if she is motivated by her love of knowledge with the right kind of conception of epistemic goods and possesses a disposition driven by such motivation. Such trait appears to be obtainable through many different ways: perhaps it can be obtained by our effort, by a mixture of effort and some external factors such as environmental help, or in theory, even purely by environmental help. Environmental support can also take a wide variety of forms, such as education, paternalistic interventions, nudges, external situational interventions, brainwashing, or in theory, an experience machine. These processes concern how to acquire virtuous character traits, and personalism blatantly dismisses the developmental process as irrelevant to virtue possession. To provide better details, Battaly proposes a pluralism of virtue: personalism is not trying to replace responsibilism. Personalism is just another way of understanding the concept of virtue. However, I even doubt that whether this is a useful expansion throughout the thesis.

By reconstructing Zagzebski's arguments about responsibilism, in other words, a self-cultivation view of virtue, Battaly identifies "self-cultivation" with a control condition over the acquisition of our traits.

First, she [Zagzebski] conceives of virtues and vices as the sorts of qualities for whose possession the agent is responsible. Second, she thinks that to be responsible for possessing a quality, the agent must have had some control over its development. Third, she locates this control in the voluntary actions, and act-omissions, of the agent. To put the last point differently, she locates this control in the agent's self-cultivation of the quality. In short, Zagzebski argues that the qualities an agent comes to possess will not count as virtues or vices unless self-cultivation plays a role in their development (Battaly 2016, 210).

The control condition is inherently related to the concept of responsibility and praise/blame; it requires an agent to act her part in the course of the acquisition of virtues. This way of understanding responsibility corresponds to a concept of responsibility known as accountability responsibility (Watson 1996). "Holding people responsible [...] involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to one another's failures to comply with these demands" (Watson 1996, 229). It is a condition of virtue in its acquisition. For responsibilism, possession of virtue is only attainable through a proper course of the acquisition of traits; hence, acquisition precedes possession, and we cannot mention the latter without mentioning the former, according to responsibilism.

Personalism, on the other hand, separates these two issues. To provide a convincing argument that this separation is feasible, the personalist includes concrete

cases of vices performed by an agent without committing to control conditions, such as some terrorists and killers who were raised under unfortunate circumstances. Consider children who were “raised” by the Hitler Jugend. Imagine people who were “raised” by the KKK, Taliban, or ISIS. She points out that we rightly blame their traits (e.g., cruelty) as vices, while the traits in question might have developed that way because of their environment. She holds that such vicious agents are rightly blamed because of their vicious conceptions and motivations.

Those traits [e.g., cruelty] were still personal, and they were clearly bad. To explicate, Harris and the Hitler youth didn’t just acquire dispositions of behavior from their environments. They acquired personal qualities—they acquired false conceptions of value with the motivational profiles to match. Harris was not an unthinking killing machine; he believed that other people were insignificant, and he was committed to making them suffer. (Battaly 2016, 212)

To address the criticism that her view lets vicious people off from being responsible and blameworthy, she introduces the notion of attributability responsibility. Along the lines of George Sher’s (2005) view, Battaly believes that a person is responsible for a trait, or action, if and only if he is generally responsive to reasons and the trait or action reflects positively or negatively on him as a person or thinker (Battaly 2016, 215). Thus, vicious persons are responsible for the possession of their vices, and they

are blameworthy, even if they did not have sufficient control over the development of their vices.

The most striking example that shows the difference between personalism and the traditional view of virtue is the transformation machine case (Nozick 1974). The following is a long quote from Battaly's argument, which is crucially important for the current debate:

Zagzebski argues that it is conceptually impossible for Robert Nozick's transformation machine to produce human virtues. In one of his lesser-known thought-experiments, Nozick asks us to imagine a transformation machine that can, at the flick of a switch, "transform us into whatever sort of person we'd like to be" (Nozick, 1974, p. 44). Zagzebski contends that the traits the transformation machine produces cannot be virtues, since virtues cannot be gotten so cheaply—virtues are not the sort of traits that can be acquired at the flick of a switch. In her words, "the problem is that the subject has contributed nothing but a single act of will to the acquisition of the desired trait. But a single act of will does not a virtue make [...] a single act of will is logically insufficient to transform oneself into a person whose resulting quality is something we would praise in the sense we praise a virtue" (1996, p. 121, her emphasis). In other words, for a trait to count as a virtue, the agent herself must be praiseworthy for coming to possess it. But it is not the agent who is praiseworthy for the traits produced by the transformation machine, since the only

praiseworthy contribution the agent makes is the single act of flicking a switch. She has not put in enough work. If anyone deserves praise for the traits the machine produces, it is the creator of the machine, rather than the agent herself. On this point, Zagzebski agrees with Robert Roberts, who contends that even if we could use a transformation machine to “produce a being who was indistinguishable, in terms of his present dispositions, from a saint,” we still would not count him as virtuous (Roberts, 1984, p. 235). Is this standard Aristotelian line correct? Is self-cultivation necessary for developing virtues and vices? Contra Zagzebski, and many other Aristotelians, we have good reason to think that it is not (Battaly 2016, 211–12).

Contra Zagzebski, the personalist would argue that a flick of a switch can, in theory, make someone fully virtuous—i.e., for personalism, environmental factors are sufficient for virtue possession (Battaly thinks that self-cultivation can contribute to virtues, especially at the later stage of acquisition, but she holds that self-cultivation is not at all necessary for virtues).

Based on Battaly’s assumptions that I have addressed so far, we can reformulate her argument as follows: Virtue is understood as excellent character traits that express what a person cares about and values. This is a shared view of virtue. Intellectual virtues reflect what a person values as an inquirer. From a standard neo-Aristotelian view of virtues, being responsible and praiseworthy requires control on the agent’s part (let us call this a control condition). Some paradigmatic vicious agents,

however, seem to have developed their vices primarily because of their environment. Yet they have acquired personal qualities—they have acquired a false conception of value with motivational profiles to match. Attributability responsibility requires people only to be responsive to reasons, and the trait or action reflects the person positively or negatively. So vicious people are regarded as responsible without committing to the control condition, and we can rightly blame them. Thus, the control condition is not a necessary condition for vice. Virtue and vice are similar in form; thus, what we could say about vices could also be applied to virtues. Thus, the control condition is not a necessary condition for virtues.

If this reformulation is correct, I think further questions would arise. First, is personalism the right way to understand the concept of virtue? Is there anything seriously missing in virtue epistemology by adopting personalism? Second, is the personalist's formulation of attributability responsibility correct? More precisely, is a transformation machine case compatible with attributability responsibility to begin with? By holding on to attributability responsibility, can we really be responsible for traits created by a flick of a switch? Third, is it really the case that what we could say about vice could also apply to virtues? Research on vices remains underdeveloped. In recent years, vice epistemologists have actively engaged in a debate about whether epistemic vices are similar in form as epistemic virtues (Crerar 2018). In the next section, I will first give a skeptical argument for the third point—the symmetry thesis of virtues and vices—and I will show why it is not always right that what we

could say about vice could also apply to virtues. In the later sections, I will challenge the first and second questions.

2. The Asymmetry of Virtues and Vices

In the last section, I reconstructed Battaly's argument, of which the last part depends on the assumption that virtues and vices are structurally similar (symmetry of vice and virtue). First, let me address this point. For the sake of argument, let us grant that the rest of her case is correct, and hence, the vice can be rehabilitated purely by environmental scaffoldings. While in her argument the structural parallelism between virtues and vices is presupposed, it is not as clear as theorists have imagined it to be the case.

First, Battaly considers a case of vicious agents, such as terrorists and killers. She points out that we rightly conceive of their traits as vice, and we rightly blame them (e.g., cruelty) while their traits in question might have developed that way because of their environment. She infers from such cases of vice and concludes that the same judgment applies to virtues. For rehabilitating vice, Battaly suggests transforming vicious people through emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is an involuntary noncognitive process that enables us to catch emotions from other people. Her suggestion is to put vicious people in a friendly environment with moral (epistemic) exemplars so that vicious people can catch the virtuous emotions of exemplars through contagion. So we see this as a case of environmental scaffolding in terms of virtue acquisition. Her suggestion of rehabilitating vicious people through

the emotional (anti-intellectual) part of character development is illuminating, and I do not disagree at all with such suggestion per se; however, what we could infer from this suggestion, at most, is that we might be able to start cultivating virtue through similar resources. Considering that virtue comes in degrees, it is not very clear whether such friendly environment is sufficient for full-blown virtues or for the full-blown rehabilitation of vice. As I mentioned in the first section, the majority of virtue responsibilists are happy to concede that it is important to create friendly epistemic environments in our virtue cultivation and rehabilitation of vice, and hence, to this extent, it is not necessary to hold a strong view like Battaly's to incorporate such cases into virtue epistemology.

Battaly points out that some vicious traits are rightly blameworthy, while the traits are formed without efforts on the side of the agent, and she infers that the same could be said about virtues. Here, I pay close attention to our practice of blame. When we look at our practices of blaming and praising people, the asymmetry between praiseworthy behavior and blameworthy behavior becomes more evident.

For the sake of argument, let us grant Battaly's point that vices and virtues are symmetrical in form; however, our subsequent blame/praise judgments might not necessarily be symmetrical. In a debate on our desert judgment, Sommers proposed a view now known as partial desert. He argued that we should not understand desert as connected only to the personal culpability of the agent; instead, we should adopt a "partial" account according to which desert judgments are properly sensitive to the feelings, desires, and behaviors of those most closely affected by a wrongdoing

(Sommers 2013). In such view, one's personal culpability and punishment are not identical. Imagine that a woman decides to leave her philandering husband. Sommers rightly points out that in such scenario, even if the husband said to his wife, "I understand you're angry, but fairness requires that you don't leave me. Bill's wife stayed with him, and he's had several more affairs than I have" (Sommers 2013, 255), this does not determine what he deserves. It is up to the relevant parties (his wife) to determine the right response within certain boundaries.³⁵

³⁵ Some empirical results on our moral intuition might be helpful in showing the dissimilarity between such cases. There is a famous experiment conducted by Knobe (2003). The subjects in this experiment were provided with a vignette with either a harm condition or a help condition as follows: "The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 'We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm [help] the environment.' The chairman of the board answered, 'I don't care at all about harming [helping] the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start the new program.' They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed [helped]" (Knobe 2003, 191–192). The subjects were then asked to determine how much blame/praise the chairman deserved and whether they thought the chairman intentionally harmed/helped the environment. In the harm condition setup, the subjects said that the chairman deserved a lot of blame and that the chairman brought about the side effect intentionally. On the other hand, in the help condition setup, they judged that the chairman did not bring about the good side effect intentionally, and they thought that the chairman deserved very little praise. How these data are interpreted remains extremely controversial (especially with intentionality), but for the current debate, it is very insightful to look at how people judge asymmetrically in praiseworthy and blameworthy cases. Theorists who blindly assume that our blame and praise are symmetrical in form, including Battaly, need an explanation on the asymmetry of our actual moral practices.

As shown above, our practices of praising and blaming people for their good and bad deeds and character traits are substantially different, unlike the virtue that ethicists and epistemologists traditionally presuppose in theory. Going back to the original argument, what Battaly has shown in her argument is that for rehabilitating vice, putting a vicious agent in a friendly environment is deemed sufficient to start rehabilitating vices; but she infers from this assumption that a friendly environment would also be sufficient for full-fledged virtue possession.

The first problem with this inference is that in the former cases, she misses the clear dissimilarity of cases between virtues and vices: the stakes of people being vicious are very high. Vicious behavior is often inflicted on other people, and some harms are done. The desert judgment—how blameworthy the agent is—might be partly decided by the affect and feeling of the victims affected by the vicious behavior. While this partial desert account may not be applicable to all instances of vicious behavior, to those examples proposed by Battaly (e.g., a killer and terrorists), it certainly is. In the original terrorist case, what they deserve might be substantially influenced by the attitudes and feelings of the people affected by the incident. In Battaly's argument, our moral and epistemological intuition that the killer is blameworthy takes an important role in supporting her further argument. The strength of her argument is substantially weakened when it is shown that it is not our judgment that "killers are vicious without the effort condition" that makes the killer highly blameworthy; rather, what makes the killer highly blameworthy are the attitudes and feelings of the victims or people affected by the incident.

Related to this point, when we pay attention to the significance of our vicious acts, it might be argued that rehabilitating vice should be the highest priority in our societies. Imagine a society where the majority of citizens are haughty. Intellectually haughty behavior, according to Tanesini's view, leads to another kind of vices, timidity and servility, on the side of the receivers of haughty behaviors. For instance, haughty individuals are irresponsible in a way that they often violate rules of taking turns during conversations, and they interrupt others by talking for too long. Such disposition is disrespectful and harmful, and hence, these individuals intimidate their conversation partners. When they harm repeatedly, haughty behaviors foster other types of vices, such as timidity, on the recipient side (Tanesini 2016, 86–87).

As described above, vicious behaviors typically harm others, and in bad cases, they even foster other people's vices. Then the crucial asymmetry between virtues and vices is this moral and epistemic significance to others. Virtues are excellences of the agent, and a virtuous character reflects who a person is. On the other hand, a vice reflects who a person is negatively; vicious behaviors are harmful to other human beings. Anyone who is committed to moral theorizing aspires to remove unjust harms and pains. As Singer famously puts it, if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it (Singer 1972). While this is originally a consequentialist account of morally obligatory acts, virtue theorists seem to have no objection to going along with such general moral assumption. As Battaly has argued, if moral contagion is shown to be an effective method in rehabilitating our vices, this is certainly good

news for virtue theorists. With the rehabilitation of vices framed as our moral obligation, consider also that some virtuous actions are regarded as supererogatory actions (Kawall 2009). Suppose that someone risks her life for a drowning child. This action is admirable but does not seem to be morally obligatory. If a full-fledged virtue requires such supererogation, it makes sense to say that it is hard to obtain such trait. I do not disagree with Battaly on the rehabilitation of vices through environmental scaffolding, but I support it because of another reason: harm needs to be removed.

Even if we grant that other parts of her argument were correct, I believe that more needs to be said to argue that environmental scaffoldings are sufficient for virtue acquisition in the same way as for vices, as virtues lack the very characteristic that vices typically suffer. The purported inference from vices to virtues is not as clear as it might have been assumed by personalism. More argument is needed to support the symmetry between the two. In the next section, I will consider the larger problem in the personalist argument: her assumption that virtue is attainable without self-cultivation on our part.

3. Success, Achievement, and Virtue

In this section, my criticism focuses on the way the personalist spells out the effort condition. Self-cultivation can be spelled out in a wide variety of forms. Battaly's original characterization of self-cultivation in her paper is based on Zagzebski's characterization of control concerning responsibility. However, I argue that we should focus more on the success component of intellectual virtue.

Zagzebski formulates epistemic responsibility by appealing to alternate possibilities. She writes that the “kind of praiseworthiness that applies to virtue reflects the fact that the agent could have gone either way” (Zagzebski 1996, 105). The principle of alternate possibility is notoriously problematic. According to Frankfurt’s infamous thought experiment, in which a hidden demon behind the agent could easily intervene in the agent’s action, the notion of alternate possibility could be easily undermined, yet we could adequately claim that such agent is responsible (Frankfurt 1969). I am not going to settle this issue here. When Battaly criticized Zagzebski’s control condition on virtue by saying, “In other words, [Zagzebski thinks] acquiring virtue and avoiding vice requires effort on the agent’s part. The agent must do something to get virtues; he must act and act repeatedly [...] on Zagzebski’s view, self-cultivation is necessary for the development of virtues and vices” (Battaly 2016, 211). We can see that Battaly identifies a control condition understood as the alternate possibility with efforts on the side of the agent, namely, self-cultivation. I argue that it is just one way of spelling out efforts on the side of the agent. But it is not the only way. We can find an alternative sense of self-cultivation in the virtue epistemological framework. If the personalist disagrees with this point, she needs a further argument to pursue it.

In the virtue epistemological framework, the natural way of interpreting efforts on the side of the agent is the exercise of our ability. To explain this alternative understanding, and to see why self-cultivation as an exercise of our ability is legitimate, let us go back to the definition of virtue. Virtue has a success component, as well as

a motivation component. A virtuous agent is not only one who holds the proper motivation but one who reliably succeeds in behaving in accordance with this motivation (Zagzebski 1996). The following is a passage explaining what success components of moral virtues are like:

For example, benevolence is the virtue according to which a person is characteristically motivated to bring about the well-being of others and is reliably successful in doing so. Courage is the virtue according to which a person is characteristically motivated to risk danger to himself when something of greater value is at stake and is reliably successful in doing it. Justice is the virtue according to which a person is characteristically motivated to respect others as persons and is reliably successful in treating them that way (Zagzebski 1996, 89).

And here is an example of a success component of an intellectual virtue:

An intellectually virtuous person is reliable in bringing about the aims of the virtue, which in this case are internal, this means that she is generally successful in acting open-mindedly or with intellectual autonomy, courage, carefulness, and so on. Take the case of open-mindedness. If she is reliable in acting open-mindedly, not only must she be appropriately motivated, but she must be reliably aware of the views of others that are worth considering (Zagzebski 1996, 244).

Here, I would like to further analyze this success component through a more appropriate notion: achievement. As Pritchard (2010a) has insightfully pointed out, success does not suffice for an achievement, as success can be attained in all kinds of ways, not all of them suitable for bona fide achievements. One can be successful through brute luck—e.g., when all of one’s competitors in a sprint race succumb to injury—and in such cases, being successful does not constitute an achievement. There is an important implication here, which is that achievements involve the exercise of relevant abilities on the part of the agent. That is, your abilities should play a role in enabling you to be successful, rather than the success in question just being due to blind fortune. And importantly, the account of achievement demands that one’s success be because of the exercise of one’s relevant abilities in the sense that this success is significantly creditable to this exercise of ability rather than to some other factor that is external to one’s agency (like dumb luck)(Pritchard 2010a). The success component of virtue specifies that the agent reliably succeed in behaving because of their proper motivation. Such success is not a lucky success, as it must arise from the agent’s motivation. Imagine a person who goes bungee jumping for a prize. With the prize money, he will be able to buy his son a Christmas gift. He was motivated to risk danger to himself. Before he jumped, he accidentally sneezed at the edge of the cliff and ended up jumping. Although he had the intention and motivation to jump, such action is not a case of courageous action, as he did not jump because of his motivation.

Hence, success understood as an achievement is precise about what the success component means to capture in the case of intellectual virtue.

The personalist commits to the view that self-cultivation is not necessary for virtue in any sense; they put themselves in the corner. I think personalism comes into an impasse. If the personalist tries to persuade us that her cases of virtue (e.g., transformation-machine-induced virtuous agent) are genuine cases of virtue, she must admit that it is a case of achievement. An achievement component requires exercises of our ability; hence, effort on the part of the agent is involved in the exercise of our ability. So her original assumption that virtuous people obtain virtue without any effort on their part no longer holds. On the other hand, let us imagine that personalists maintain their initial assumption that (apparently) virtuous people obtain (apparent) virtue without any effort on the agent's part. Then such trait does not include achievement creditable to the exercise of the ability of the person; thus, we no longer conceive such case as a genuine case of virtue along with the two-tier account. It is up to personalism which option to choose. Either way, the conclusion of her argument no longer follows what she initially formulated.

Effort, understood as exercising our ability, is shown to be a necessary component of the success (i.e., achievement) component of virtue. It remains unclear how Battaly could define intellectual virtues without committing to the success component or how she could explain success without mentioning effort on the side of the agent. The personalist might be able to give up the two-tier concept of virtue and get rid of the success component altogether off the theory. The price to pay is high: without the

success component, having a proper motivation for epistemic goods would be sufficient for being intellectually virtuous.

4. Attributability Responsibility and Transformation Machine

In this section, let us focus on attributability responsibility: the concept of responsibility personalism relies on. Remember that attributability responsibility only requires that we are generally responsive to reasons and traits reflect who we are as a person. These can be understood as both characteristics of the agent at a particular time slice. The etiology of a character does not seem to matter to the status of the responsibility of the agent. Hence, personalism blatantly dismisses the thinking about etiology. At face value, personalists accept that transformation machines can even make us virtuous. Yet this is a radical suggestion, and even attributability responsibilists find some transformation machine cases problematic. Benjamin Matheson's analysis is helpful in solving this puzzle that attributability responsibilists face (Matheson 2018). However, his solution yields another obstacle for virtue epistemologists, including personalists.

Matheson provides a helpful distinction among theories of moral responsibility that is directly relevant to the current debate: theorists who hold that people's history partly determines whether she is morally responsible for her action is called historicists. On the other hand, nonhistoricists think that nonhistorical properties can determine whether she is morally responsible or not (Matheson 2018, 1–2). Attributability responsibilists are nonhistoricists, and accountability responsibilists are

historicists. In other words, historicists pay attention to the diachronic features of the agent when determining her status of responsibility, while nonhistoricist see synchronic features. The crucial difference between these two positions is that only historicists hold an ownership condition for moral responsibility by appealing to her history. In other words, a condition telling us which mental states belong to the agent in a way that she is morally responsible should refer to the agent's past characteristics, according to historicists (Matheson 2018, 2).

Sher's attributability responsibility is a representative nonhistoricist view of moral responsibility. (While there is more than one way to be a nonhistoricist, for the sake of argument, here, nonhistoricist and attributability responsibility are used interchangeably). As I mentioned in section 2, personalism is a view on the possession of virtue but not on the acquisition of virtue. So in theory, it appears that nothing prevents a person's transformation machine created a second ago from being fully responsible. Battaly's earnest acceptance of the transformation machine case seems to be a straightforward consequence of a theory of attributability responsibility. However, it is essential to point out that this particular consequence of the transformation machine case is seen as a considerable threat to nonhistoricists even among attributability responsibilists. For moral responsibility theorists, thought insertion cases like transformation machine go against our intuition of responsibility. Watson (1996) expressed this concern as follows:

Consider the way in which hypnosis and brainwashing are thought to engender “motivation” for which the agent is not responsible. Whereas other views would explain this by appealing to the absence of control, the problem on the self-disclosure view is to explain these processes undercut attributability (Watson 1996, 234).

Similarly, Matheson’s two manipulation cases express a similar worry as Watson. The following is a local manipulation case:

Local Larry: Larry has all the capacities and competences of a fully developed human adult. One night, he goes to see the Great Garibaldi, a famous stage hypnotist. Garibaldi invites Larry on stage; Larry dutifully agrees. Larry believes that Garibaldi will cure his fear of clowns. However, knowing that Larry plans to go to the bank tomorrow, Garibaldi implants a small amount of psychological states into Larry such that the next day Larry will rob that bank. Garibaldi is no ordinary stage hypnotist. He implants the psychological states such that Larry acts on a first-order desire that aligns with a second-order volition, and such that Larry acts from a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism (Matheson 2018, 3).

As a nonhistoricist, Matheson (2018) agrees that “Larry doesn’t own the relevant psychological states or mechanisms, and so he isn’t morally responsible for robbing

the bank” (3–4). However, unlike historicists, nonhistoricists need to explain why Larry is not responsible, by appealing to the synchronic characteristics of the agent. Matheson thinks that nonhistoricists can understand such ownership condition through a general psychological coherence involving all sorts of mental states of the agent, such as beliefs, values, desires, and cares. We can judge whether a psychological state belongs to the owner based on the fact that such mental event fits well in a story about the agent as told by an idealized narrator. This view remains nonhistorical because “the story must reference Larry’s actual psychology at the time of action” (8). As for Larry’s case, an intelligible story about why Larry robbed the bank would not be given by the narrator. “This is because Larry isn’t the sort of person who likes robbing banks” (8). Consider another person, Harry, who is the kind of person who is predisposed to rob a bank. Even if the thought of robbing the bank was inserted by Garibaldi, for Harry, he would be responsible for robbing the bank, unlike Larry, as such psychological state is consistent with his general psychology. An idealized narrator can offer a narrative story of Harry robbing the bank. In such scenario, Garibaldi just made the “bank-robbing-conducive reasons more salient” (9) for Harry. Along this line of thought, Matheson adopted Mele’s global manipulation case with a twist.

Brainwashed Beth. When Beth crawled into bed last night she was an exceptionally sweet person, as she always had been. Beth’s character was such that intentionally doing anyone serious bodily harm definitely was not an option

for her: her character—or collection of values—left no place for a desire to do such a thing to take root [...] Beth awakes with a desire to stalk and kill a neighbor, George. Although she had always found George unpleasant, she is very surprised by this desire. What happened is that, while Beth slept, a team of psychologists that had discovered the system of values that make Chuck [a serial killer] tick implanted those values in Beth after erasing hers (Mele 2013, 169–170).

In the original case, Beth's memory remained intact through manipulation, yet here, Matheson goes further and assumes that her memories were also inserted.

Suppose we change the case so that the manipulators provide Beth with pseudo-memories such that the ideal narrator is then able to provide a narrative explanation of her action of killing George (Matheson 2018, 15).

In such global manipulation case, the new Beth is morally responsible, according to attributability responsibility (she is reason-responsive, and her action reflects her values and concepts at the time of her conduct), for killing George. However, this Beth is numerically distinct from the original Beth. The Beth before the transformation and the Beth after the change are different persons, because “psychological continuity requires overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness” (15). The two Beth's beliefs, desires, and values are so different, and “there is a break in

psychological continuity—and hence a break in personal identity—between pre- and post-brainwashing Beth” (15). Hence, in the global manipulation cases, it is true that the agent is responsible after the transformation, according to nonhistoricists. However, such agent is not identical to the pretransformed agent. In other words, the Beth before the transformation is not responsible for killing George.

If this analysis of manipulations by Matheson were on the right track, what could we say about the epistemic case? I would say that the epistemic transformation machine case (quoted in section 2) does not provide enough details for us to make any judgment, as it was originally formulated. If a flick of a switch can transform us into whatever sort of person we want, such transformation can be implemented in a few different ways. A flick of a switch can implant some psychological states in an agent, e.g., a desire to listen to the view of her opponent in a debate and a desire to be a person with this desire. If such implanted states were not coherent with her overall psychology at time *t* in a way that an ideal narrator can tell an intelligible story about her act, she would not be responsible for such implanted psychological states. If a flick of a switch could insert all the attitudes, values, desires, beliefs, and cares necessary for epistemic virtues, such agent after the transformation would be responsible; but she would not be identical to the person before the transformation. I believe that personalists are not happy with this result, as they implicitly assume that the same person is transformed into a virtuous one by a machine, as Battaly argues

that “it is possible for us to unwittingly acquire virtues and vices from our environment, bypassing self-cultivation” (Battaly 2016, 212).³⁶

Attributability responsibility personalism relies on a nonhistoricist view of responsibility, so personalists pay attention only to the synchronic features of the agent when determining a psychological state belong to the agent. Even so, unlike the personalist’s initial assumption, transformation machine cases are controversial even for attributability responsibility: if psychological states were locally manipulated, only if an ideal narrator could tell an intelligible story about her action could such action be taken as responsible. If psychological states were globally manipulated, such agent might be responsible, yet she is no longer the same person as the one before the transformation. In the next section, I will consider how this argument transfers to the cases of virtues.

5. Virtue and Narrative Self

In this section, in line with the discussion from the previous section, I will address the following question: will the single act of flicking a switch make one intellectually virtuous? I want to answer no to this question. One of Battaly’s papers on personalism began with the following question: “what is the role of the self in developing virtue and

³⁶ Just like in Larry’s and Harry’s cases, if implanted psychological states (e.g., a desire to listen to the view of her opponent in a debate and a desire to be a person with this desire) were consistent with one’s general psychology in such a way that a narrative story of him listening to his opponent’s view were offered, we could say that the transformation machine just made the opponent-listening reason salient for him.

in rehabilitating vice?" (Battaly 2016, 207). She did not perform any substantive analysis of what the self is and quickly changed the topic into a slightly different yet relevant second question: what role does self-cultivation play in the development of one's virtues? But what does the self amount to? Can we answer the second question without answering the first? This worry leads me to consider the essential underlying concepts of a virtue framework: the concept of self.

While the nature of self is underdeveloped in virtue epistemology, one thing is clear: virtue epistemologists, including Battaly, admit that self is an ingredient of virtue. Intellectual virtue reflects what we care about epistemically, what kind of agent we are qua epistemic agent (Baehr 2011). In such framework, people are understood as not mere natural organisms but as beings with specific values, abilities, and motivations. Contrary to the human being as a species, it is evident that a distinct way of understanding the human being, namely, self, is presupposed in the virtue theoretical framework. Without being a self, there is no hope for us to cultivate virtues or vices. If a self is different from an organism in our capacities and potentials, then we should look into the nature of the conditions, which put us in a virtue framework. Hence, I understand that the concept of self provides us with abilities with which we could start cultivating virtues. Self is the basis for holding us responsible, praiseworthy and blameworthy, and virtuous and vicious.³⁷

In the past few decades, a particular view of self has come to the fore, now known as the narrative approach to self. According to narrative self theorists (e.g., Dennett

³⁷ In this chapter, I use the terms person and self interchangeably.

1992; Schechtman 1996; Taylor 1989; Velleman 2009), the lives of our selves are inherently narrative and storylike. Marya Schechtman maintains that we constitute ourselves as selves by understanding our lives as narratives in form and living accordingly. Our lives are experienced as a part of an ongoing story rather than as isolated moments (Schechtman 2011). Her narrative self-view is called the narrative self constitution view. Individual differences aside, narrative theorists have the common assumption that our action can only be intelligible when put into our narrative, reflecting our values and choices from the past and for the future.

For the current debate, two important points from Schechtman's narrative account of self are worth mentioning: first, narratives are diachronic in nature. While Schechtman denies that we need an overarching thematic unity over our self narrative, she emphasizes that for an action or experience to belong to self, we do need to identify with it or care about or take an interest in it. This is called "appropriation" of our experience. For instance, the appropriation of our experience enables us to assess the quality of our present experience, unifying our consciousness over time through affective connections and identification (Schechtman 2007, 171). Actions and experiences that people find not interesting or alienating are not a part of the self narrative.

The second important point is, among the constraints on what counts as a self-constituting narrative, there is an "articulation constraint," which indicates that "the narrator should be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what he believes, and feels what he feels" (Schechtman 1996, 114). Schechtman later

specifies what is required to meet her articulation constraint. Confronted with a question like “Why did you choose that course of action?” people do not necessarily need to have a clearly thought-out explanation to meet this constraint. But one should not be at a loss or fail to understand the sense of the question. One must recognize a kind of explanatory burden and be able to meet it for the most part (Schechtman 2007, 163). According to the narrative account of self, living a life of self poses many theoretical and empirical conditions upon the course of our life. If the nature of our self is as such, as I will explain, we will encounter a huge difference between the virtues in the personalist’s account and the virtues as traditionally understood.

The narrative self constitution view that I endorse in this chapter is different in some critical sense from the ideal narrator supported by Matheson (2018), which I addressed in the previous section. Matheson explicitly rejects Schechtman’s view, on account of the unity of self. He maintains that

narrative explanations do not need to include every aspect of a person’s life, but need only involve smaller stories. As I will now explain, my sense of narrative explanation only appeals to these smaller stories [...] these are then constitutive of an individual’s personal identity over time. On their view, if a person is able to tell a story about a mental state or action and they are psychologically connected (that is, causally connected and psychologically similar) to the person-stage who possessed that mental state or performed that action, then they are narratively connected to that person-stage (Matheson 2018, 7).

But the narrative self constitution view asks more than having smaller stories for our narrative to constitute a self. While rejecting the strong ethical thematic unity, her concept of narrative requires “individual conceive of his life as having the form and the logic of a story—more specifically, the story of a person’s life—where “story” is understood as a conventional, linear narrative” (Schechtman 1996, 96). This form of narrative self is embedded in the idea that intellectual virtue reflects what we care about epistemically, what kind of agent we are qua epistemic agent.³⁸³⁹ The self of

³⁸ The narrative self constitution view might ultimately contradict Matheson’s understanding of self (person); however, even so, it does not threaten my arguments. The aim of my argument in the previous section was minimal. A personalist commits to attributability responsibility. We can be responsible for things based on what we care about synchronically. Given that the attributability responsibility were correct, the personalist’s conclusion in the case of the transformation machine did not follow. As a personalist presupposes, a machine can transform the same person from nonvirtuous to entirely virtuous through global manipulations. This claim has been shown to be inconsistent. In doing so, I remain neutral about the legitimacy of attributability responsibility. As I am on board with the responsibilism of virtue, I am more inclined to hold accountability responsibility. However, settling this debate is beyond the purview of this thesis. Moreover, in the next footnote, I propose how two ideas of self can be compatible.

³⁹ I can endorse the pluralism of the degree of intelligibility of narratives. As Schechtman states, “at one extreme, there is the ideal (which no one actually attains) of perfect intelligibility—a life story in which every aspect coheres with every other. At the other extreme, there is a random sequence of experiences that have little, if any, relation to one another . . . the demand that a person’s narrative be intelligible cannot, therefore, be a categorical demand, for intelligibility is not an all-or-nothing condition” (Schechtman 1996, 97–98). It might be the case that having small narratives is sufficient for selves to be responsible for their action (as Matheson proposes), but being responsible is necessary but not sufficient for being virtuous. In this sense, Schechtman might be wrong in saying that our self per se requires that an “individual

people who are intellectually virtuous, or at least those who pursue intellectual virtues, is in such a way that they can tell a story of their life.⁴⁰

Based on this understanding of the narrative self, I will start arguing against the personalist virtue. Remember that for personalism, as long as the environment de facto constitutes people's reason-responsiveness and her traits reflect positively or negatively on him as a thinker as required by the virtue epistemologist, this is sufficient to conceive of such people as genuinely epistemically virtuous.

To counter such account, imagine a college student, Lily, who has little motivation to write her dissertation on ethics. Her supervisor decides to transform her using the

conceive of his life as having the form and the logic of a story—more specifically, the story of the person's life—where 'story' is understood as a conventional, linear narrative" (Schechtman 1996, 96). However, I think it is correct that the self of a virtuous person, or the self of a person who pursues virtues, is exactly intelligible in such a way that the "person has a self-conception that coheres to produce a well-defined character" (97). All I need in this chapter is to show that the self narrative shared by the intellectually virtuous agents embedded in virtue epistemology (namely, by the idea that intellectual virtue reflects what we care about epistemically, what kind of agent we are qua epistemic agent) resembles a narrative story through the narrative self constitution view. And this is no coincidence, as when we aspire for intellectual virtue, we are disposed to act in specific ways to attain epistemic goods.

⁴⁰ Another putative difference between the narrative self constitution view and the ideal narrator held by Matheson is that in the former, the narrator is the agent herself. In the latter, it is the idealized narrator who tells a story about the agent. The reason Matheson believes that the story about the agent should be told by the ideal narrator rather than herself is that "individuals aren't reliable narrators of themselves" (Matheson 2018, 6). However, in the narrative self constitution view, there is a reality constraint on our self narrative: the story of us cannot be massively false. It is not entirely clear to what extent these two characterizations of the fallibility of our narratives are different.

machine. Not knowing what is going on, she goes into the machine and subsequently obtains the intrinsic motivation for epistemic goods, such as obtaining a deep understanding of ethical issues. After the transformation, Lily believes that it is genuinely worthwhile to understand ethical problems. She enjoys her project wholeheartedly and subsequently obtains various intellectual virtues: reading academic papers carefully, discussing ethical issues with her friends open-mindedly, and writing her dissertation thoroughly.

Lily* is an epistemic counterpart of Lily. She also has little motivation to write her dissertation on ethics but does not go into the machine. Instead, she talks to her friend Mika, who is always very keen to discuss ethical problems. Mika advises Lily* to think about concrete cases where morality matters in Lily*'s life and in the world that Lily* lives in. Lily* looks back and considers cases in which she thought she was morally harmed: sexual harassment, racial prejudices, and so on. Mika helps Lily* imagine problems of morality in the world around her: the legalized death penalty in her country, the widespread poverty in some developing countries, and so on. By doing so repeatedly, Lily* finds out how angry and resentful or puzzled she is by these issues. She tries to look for some data that support her memory, as well as about the problems with which she is concerned. After all this, Lily* finds out that she is motivated to learn more about ethical issues. Now that Lily* believes that it is genuinely worthwhile to understand ethical problems, she enjoys her project wholeheartedly and subsequently obtains various intellectual virtues: reading academic papers carefully,

discussing ethical issues with her friend open-mindedly, writing her dissertation thoroughly.

Both Lily and Lily* appear to have become genuinely intellectually virtuous in the personalist's formulation because of the fact that not only Lily* but also Lily have de facto intrinsic motivation for ethical inquiry, and she surely succeeds in writing her thesis through her epistemic motivation. Then, the personalist believes that the two motivations are functionally identical and serve in the same way in our life. I doubt this move. I do think that Lily* but not Lily is genuinely intellectually virtuous. What I need to show is that there is some important functional difference between Lily and Lily* and that such difference undermines the full-blown virtue of Lily.

Based on the narrative self view, "in order to constitute oneself as a self, one must have a narrative in which one experiences the past and future as one's own in the strong sense of experiencing the present as part of the whole narrative" (Schechtman 2007, 171). Our self narrative requires the appropriation of our experience even in the case of Lily and Lily*; in such cases, alienated experiences cannot be properly integrated into the self narrative. In Lily's case, her present self may have certain motivations, values, and attitudes toward the relevant domain of ethical research, but her self narrative cannot integrate her past experiences about the issue at hand. This is because, by definition, her current self narrative holds a set of motivations, values, and attitudes toward ethical research that have arisen by using the machine, and the affective connections and identification necessary for self narrative are attainable only for her future behavior. Her narrative is ruptured by the

transformation machine. I do not deny that the transformed Lily would hold a different self narrative, but her new story has just begun. And it begins from nowhere, because the transformation machine cuts her off from her previous self; her past experiences are alienated from her current narrative.

People might wonder—Lily* has gone through a change in her motivation for ethical research (after all, she was also not intrinsically motivated to study ethics at some point, and then she started to feel the opposite)—why should only Lily’s self narrative be understood as being cut off? I think that Lily’s self narrative is substantially different from Lily*s, which is successive even before and after the changes to her motivational profile, because there are some stories to tell for Lily*. To understand the further difference between Lily and Lily*, here, the articulation constraint of self narrative comes into the debate. Imagine people asking Lily, “Why did you come to believe that ethical inquiry is intrinsically worthwhile?” Lily will be puzzled, not knowing what to say, because that is the motivation infused by the machine; and although she is de facto motivated by ethical inquiry, it is something unrelated to her past. On the other hand, Lily* can tell a story like the following: “You know, I was a lazy student back then. I did not even think properly what morality amounts to. But my friend Mika suggested I should think about my past experiences where I believe I was unjustly harmed. I then looked back at my past experiences. I remembered I felt very offended when I was verbally harassed by my male friend in primary school. Come to think of it, I felt similar resentment when I saw children working at the age of ten, instead of going to school in developing countries. You know,

it's wrong. Something is wrong. This kind of thing really matters! I don't know to this date what exactly makes me so resentful, but I went to the library to look for some books about this stuff. I read a book by Rawls, and his work was inspiring..." Stories like this are open to alteration or reinterpretation later in her life, but a subject like Lily* has a story to tell about her intrinsic motivation for epistemic goods, while Lily does not.

My argument has addressed the functional differences between Lily and Lily* that the personalist has failed to notice. Two possible objections need to be addressed: First, people might wonder that we could imagine the machine implanting the same kind of beliefs of Lily* about her motivations on Lily. In that case, a subject such as Lily seems to meet the two relevant requirements of self narrative: appropriation and articulation. As Schechtman puts it, however, the story of us cannot be massively false; she thinks that the self constitutional narrative must cohere with reality; hence, for instance, if someone believes himself to be Napoleon even when he is not, we cannot properly believe him as a self. This is called reality constraint on the narrative self. Even if Lily obtains a corresponding belief about why she is motivated by ethical inquiry as she is now and competently tells a story about why she finds ethical theory a worthwhile thing to study, the meaning of her present action, according to the narrative constitution view, depends on her story across time. According to narrative self theory, what it means for an action to be a part of someone's narrative is for it to flow naturally from the rest of her life story (Schechtman 1996, 159). I have described how Lily's story is not continuous before and after the intervention of the machine; it

is true that our belief constitutes a part of our story; however, belief about her motivation on its own does not seem to give a sufficient ground for us to regard Lily to be as continuous as Lily*.

The second kind of objection might be to think that if Lily knows what the machine will do to her, and then goes into the machine, expecting to be virtuous, and obtains the proper motivations and behavioral dispositions accordingly because of the machine, then some might think that she would be as virtuous as her counterpart because her motivation for epistemic goods and her behavioral disposition to match are guided by her second-order desire to be epistemically virtuous. Let us call this Lily with belief about the reliability of the machine as Lily**. Is Lily**'s belief about the reliability of the machine sufficient for her to obtain virtue like Lily*?

My answer is that it depends on the details of the vignette. It is possible to imagine a case where Lily** is able to continue narrating her self narrative before and after the transformation and tell an intelligible story about her transformation. However, Lily**'s belief about the reliability of the machine might not be enough to make her virtuous, because such objection weighs too much on our synchronic belief at one point. I think this kind of objection conflates a case of intellectual virtue with a case of knowledge. In a debate on the nature of knowledge, virtue reliabilists have analyzed knowledge through our reliable cognitive abilities. Not any kind of reliable cognitive ability is sufficient for knowledge, but only those abilities integrated into one's cognitive character are understood as properly knowledge conducive (Greco 2003), because

we can come up with cases where reliable cognitive abilities allow the agent to have a true belief yet fail to obtain knowledge, like Temp,

who regularly forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room by consulting a thermometer on the wall. Unbeknownst to Temp, however, he is looking at a faulty thermometer which is randomly fluctuating within a given range. Nonetheless, his beliefs so formed are reliable because (again unbeknownst to him) there is someone hidden in the room next to the thermostat who every time she sees Temp heads towards the thermometer and adjusts the thermostat so that the temperature of the room corresponds to the reading on the thermometer. (Pritchard 2010b, 135).

Epistemologists agree that Temp does not obtain knowledge because his cognitive ability is not properly integrated into his cognitive character; however, Pritchard goes on to say that if Temp becomes aware that he has a helper in this way and, hence, obtains a rational belief about his reliable cognitive process, we can think that his true belief about the temperature of the room is sufficient for us to count it as knowledge, because now the reliable cognitive character is integrated into his cognitive character (Pritchard 2010b). So as for the case of knowledge, I agree that a subject such as Lily** can obtain knowledge by trusting a machine.

Yet the matter of whether such cognitive integration is sufficient for epistemic virtue is another issue.⁴¹ There are two reasons why I doubt that Lily** is not as virtuous as Lily*. First, it is true that intellectual virtues and knowledge go hand in hand to some extent, as virtue epistemologists define intellectual virtue as character traits common to epistemically praiseworthy people, and such agents often obtain a lot of knowledge as a matter of fact, but not vice versa. Knowledgeable people are not necessarily virtuous, as we know counting grains of sand would not make us intellectually praiseworthy qua person. Knowledge is descriptive, while virtues are inherently value-laden concepts. The extension of knowledge does not seem to correspond to the extension of virtue. Second, as we saw in the earlier section, virtue is a form of achievement (hence success) that demands that one's success be because of the exercise of one's relevant abilities, in the sense that this success is substantively creditable to this exercise of ability rather than to some other factor that is external to one's agency. Then, the cognitive integration at issue in cases of intellectual virtue is more demanding than cases of knowledge, which sometimes require a lot less than cognitive achievement, such as testimony cases (Pritchard 2015).

⁴¹ Note here that I am fully aware of the importance of cognitive integration even in cases of intellectual virtues. For instance, according to Baehr, being intellectually virtuous involves having a good reason to think that one's virtue-relevant actions are likely (in the world in which one finds oneself) to be an effective means to one's virtue-relevant goals (Baehr 2013).

Hence, the fact that Lily knows that the transformation machine reliably changes her into a being that she likes is not a sufficient ground for intellectual virtue. The moral here is that even if we could say that belief about the reliability of the machine is sufficient for cognitive integration of knowledge, as reliabilists assume, we cannot straightforwardly infer from such cases that the same applies to virtue. There is at least a difference between the story that Lily* can tell and that which Lily** can on her transformation. If the opponent of my view insists that Lily is as virtuous as Lily* on account of her knowledge about the reliability of the machine, they need to explain more why they believe that. Settling the debate about the relation of knowledge and cognitive integration or its relevance to intellectual virtue goes beyond the purview of this thesis, yet I hope that I have provided some reasons that would convince my readers that our intuition in cases of knowledge does not support cases of intellectual virtues in Lily**.

In sum, the self narratives of Lily and Lily* are, after all, very different in nature. This difference demonstrates what is missing in Lily's trait (after transformation). Lily's trait lacks emotional attachment to her past experience, which is necessary for the continuous narrative self; thus, her self narratives are torn, fragmented at best. In addition, Lily's trait lacks the rich explanatory story behind her motivation. Lily's de facto motivation is not rich enough, unlike Lily*'s. Lily's motivation does not flow naturally from her narrative. These points give enough reasons to doubt the personalist's assumption that subjects like Lily and Lily* have motivations that are functionally on a par with each other. In this section, I have given an argument on why

I doubt the personalist's argument based on the underlying concept of virtue: narrative self. As virtue epistemologists, including Battaly, hold the view that the self is an ingredient of virtue, the significant difference I have shown between the self of the transformed agent like Lily and the virtuous agent in a traditional sense like Lily* should cast doubts on the personalist's assumption that the motivations of Lily and Lily* are functionally identical; hence, Battaly's argument for a non-self reform view of virtue is more problematic than it initially appears.

6. Against Personalism

Why do I worry so much about personalism? Ultimately, personalism does not threaten responsibilism, because Battaly recommends pluralism of virtue by proposing her personalism. People might think that adding a personalist option does no harm. In this final section, I hope to briefly provide reasons why, instead of holding a pluralism of intellectual virtues, I recommend revising responsibilism so that it can accommodate environmental scaffoldings into the theory of virtue.

First, holding personalism as it is formulated blurs the importance of weighing appropriate environmental help against inappropriate ones. I believe that both responsibilists and personalists are concerned about how we could effectively avoid intellectual vices and cultivate virtues. And as shown in section 1, virtue epistemologists are pressured to accept that environmental factors are necessary components of virtue cultivation. However, environmental scaffoldings vary so much. If personalism were correct, how we obtain traits would have nothing to do with the status of virtue. Personalism dismisses the differences among environmental factors

that influence our behaviors as if they can all contribute to intellectual virtues in the same way. We have already seen that global manipulations and local manipulations are different in terms of virtue possession. Are nudges compatible with virtue cultivation (Engelen et al. 2018)? How about cognitive enhancements (Fröding 2011)? Personalism does not seem to help direct us to virtues by weighing appropriate environmental help against inappropriate ones.

This first worry leads me to the second worry: what can a personalist say about what we can do to improve our virtues? If any environmental factors contribute to intellectual virtues in the same way at one point in the past, we can expect that any environmental factors can contribute to the same extent in improving intellectual virtues now or in the future. Personalism does not help direct us to virtue, even in cases where we are future-oriented.

Personalists might dismiss these worries. They might insist that personalism has nothing to do with the etiology of traits, and thus, only responsibilists should deal with such problems. If so, we must ask ourselves instead, what kind of difficulties can personalism deal with that responsibilists cannot? Can responsibilists not blame vicious people who purportedly have no control in the acquisition of their vices (e.g., Robert Harris, Hitler Jugend) as the personalist initially portrays? As discussed earlier, the control condition is one way but not the only way to spell out how we put our efforts. We can revise responsibilism in a way that it accommodates some cases of vices where we lack control (e.g., Harris) but not others (e.g., global manipulation case) into their theory. Revisions to responsibilism might be feasible by adopting an alternative

way of spelling out our effort but with control. To me, it looks like we lose too much and gain too little by thinking of virtue as having been formulated by the personalist. Revising responsibilism in a way that it can accommodate some environmental scaffoldings, but not all of them, in line with an alternative understanding of self-cultivation seems to be a more fruitful approach for both understanding and pursuing (avoiding) intellectual virtues (vices).

7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I criticized the personalist account of intellectual virtue (a non-self-cultivating view of intellectual virtue). While I am fully aware of the importance of a friendly environment in cultivating virtues and rehabilitating vices (especially the latter), I still believe that self-cultivation—i.e., efforts on the side of the agent—is a necessary component of virtue acquisition. Success—i.e., the achievement component of virtue widely shared by virtue epistemologists, including Battaly— involves efforts on the side of the agent. The personalist relies on attributability responsibility. I argued that such responsibility is not compatible with some transformation machine cases, as the personalist initially assumed. I have argued that the self in the form of a narrative underlies the concept of intellectual virtue when they say that intellectual virtue reflects who we are as a thinker. From a narrative point of view, there are some essential differences between the agent with de facto epistemic motivation inserted by the transformation machine and the genuinely virtuous agent. In future research, instead of holding the pluralism of

intellectual virtues, fertile research should come from our inquiry about to what extent environmental scaffoldings are compatible with our virtue in a responsibilist sense.

Chapter 3 Epistemic Partiality of Friendship, and Epistemic Justice

0. Introduction

We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, more so than those who are not our friends. This imbalance in our doxastic attitude towards friends and non- friends is often called the epistemic partiality of friendship (Stroud 2006). The epistemic partiality of friendship is widespread and commonly observed in our daily lives, but whether or not it is a good practice is far less clear. Philosophical dialogue on the epistemic partiality of friendship for the past 15 years has shown us that the solution to this puzzle cannot be straightforward. In this chapter, I will first lay out the standard picture of the epistemic partiality of friendship. Second, I will summarize arguments proposed by the main opponents of epistemic partiality, Jason Kawall (2013), Sanford Goldberg (2018), and Katherine Hawley (2014). Third, I will analyze the nature of friendship as a dynamic process and point out that the current debate ignores some important aspects of friendship. Fourth, I will outline potential arguments from epistemic injustice against epistemic partiality of friendship that I believe are as strong as any argument from friendship against evidentialism. Fifth, I will provide three interpretations of my arguments and summarize that although epistemic partiality of friendship is not as strong as it first appears, it leads us to an even more complicated debate about value pluralism. Finally, I will come back to the implication of this argument for virtue epistemology.

1. Epistemic Partiality of Friendship

Sarah Stroud (2006) and Simon Keller (Keller 2004) have both made very similar yet independent arguments for allowing the epistemic partiality of friendship precedence over epistemic norms. Let me begin with two examples motivating the debate proposed by these two philosophers. The first one is “Sam’s case” from Stroud’s paper.

Suppose, for instance, that a third party reports that your friend Sam recently slept with someone and then cruelly never returned any of that person’s calls, knowingly breaking that person’s heart. Importantly, though, ... let’s stipulate that this story is not something which you know to be false (Stroud 2006, 504).

When facing a damning story about our friend, as a good friend, Stroud suggests that we ought to adopt, “differential epistemic practices” (505). This consists of interpreting such cases in less damning ways, and giving greater credence to such alternative interpretations in cases involving friends, as compared to non- friends. She is clearly aware that an outright rejection of obvious facts cannot be a characteristic of friendship; rather, epistemic partiality occurs at the level of “interpreting the reported actions and placing them in perspective” (507) by spending more time and energy on minimizing the effect of damning data regarding friends, and giving such an alternative construal greater credence: something we are not expected to do for strangers. What is distinct about Stroud’s proposal here is that she maintains that it is our beliefs, not only our behaviors, that need special handling in cases of friendship. Hence “the

differential doxastic practices of the good friend are a constitutive feature of friendship” (Stroud 2006, 505).

What is illuminating about this proposal? It is new because the way we are encouraged to believe in friends by Stroud is alleged to go against what the evidence straightforwardly suggests. Take the case of Sam; if Sam were not our friend, Stroud assumes, we would take this damning story about Sam at face value, and believe the testimony of the third party. A standard epistemological norm assumed here is *evidentialism*. To put it bluntly, the evidentialists’ principle is that P is justified if and only if S believes in accordance with the evidence.⁴² In Sam’s case, the evidence suggests Sam has done something wrong, but the fact that Sam is a friend leads us to interpret this evidence in a different way than we would in cases of non-friends.

Keller’s example suggests a similar yet slightly different positive doxastic treatment we extend to friends.

Rebecca is scheduled to give a poetry reading at a café. She is nervous about reading her poetry in public, but has decided to do it on this occasion because she knows that a certain literary agent will be present and she hopes that her work might catch his attention. She lets her good friend Eric know that she’ll be giving the reading, and asks whether he’d mind coming along to be in the audience (Keller 2004, 332).

⁴² More precisely, Stroud cites the following definition of evidentialism: “Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t” (Feldman and Conee 1985, 15–34).

Keller describes what Eric is expected to believe. That is, as a friend, he should listen to Rebecca's poetry with a "sympathetic ear" (332) and subsequently believe her poetry was pretty good—even though if it were not Rebecca reading, he would not have judged the same way.⁴³ But Keller carefully avoids an unfavorable conclusion here, and emphasizes that sympathetic interpretation does not necessarily lead to sympathetic belief formation. If Rebecca's poetry was hopeless then Eric, as a good friend of Rebecca, should actually tell her so. So, the thought behind Keller's epistemic partiality is that friendship requires us to make special effort. Similarly to Stroud, Keller sees this sympathetic ear in friendship as not only descriptive, but also as a normative concept: sympathetic treatment is not only manifested in friends but "it is one that we can *want* them to manifest ... the distinctive goods of friendship is the knowledge that someone is on your side" (338).

Thus, both Stroud and Keller believe in a genuine clash between epistemic partiality of friendship and epistemic norms. Objections to the epistemic partiality so far proposed (I will address these in the next section) have targeted this clash. But Stroud does not only acknowledge the clash, goes further and defends something more provocative: in many cases, the epistemic partiality of friendship gives us strong

⁴³ Hawley writes that both Stroud and Keller operate "a kind of counterfactual test of epistemic reasonableness" (Hawley 2014, 2039) as they both treat our non-friend cases as our default reactions to the evidence available, and then compare special cases of friends, given the same evidence. As it turns out, later in this chapter, this assumption is not very convincing, as it presupposes that "friendship per se is an epistemically irrelevant factor" (2039).

reasons to revise our ideas of epistemic rationality. The following is a reconstruction of her argument (Stroud 2006, 518–519):

- ① Friendship is an indispensable component of a good life. Hence, each of us has very strong reasons to form and to maintain friendships.
- ② If satisfying certain ideals would preclude friendship, we all have very strong reasons not to live up to those ideals.
- ③ Epistemic partiality (i.e. friendship) competes with a certain conception of epistemic rationality.
- ④ We have strong reasons not to live up to such a concept of epistemic rationality.

This implies that when the standard conception of epistemic rationality and friendship compete, friendship—due to its indispensable role in our well-being—provides a strong case against the standard view of epistemic rationality. Opponents of the epistemic partiality of friendship have not paid enough attention to this latter half of Stroud’s argument.

The proposal of epistemic partiality of friendship—that we should afford epistemic partiality to our friends—is, by itself, a very controversial claim, and hence, epistemologists have criticized the idea. I find the latter half of Stroud's argument: that, on the ground that friendship is a necessary part of a good life, epistemic partiality of friendship should override other values such as the epistemic norm, even more controversial. I will address these two points individually. In the next section, I first

address objections to the proposal of epistemic partiality of friendship by epistemologists. I will come back to the second point in section 4.

2. How to Solve the Dilemma

The epistemic partiality of friendship is recognized as a genuinely problematic proposal for epistemologists. There are a number of ways to explain away the clash between the epistemic norm and the norm of friendship: for example, we might (1) claim that friendship actually tracks evidence and hence, epistemic partiality of friendship is in line with epistemic norms; (2) epistemic partiality of friendship exists but it does not threaten the epistemic norm. In doing so, there are a few key features that epistemologists could tweak so that the putative tension between the two norms can be explained away. Remember that both Stroud's and Keller's proposals consist of two views: the epistemic partiality of friendship in combination with the epistemic norm (more precisely, evidentialism). And according to evidentialism, there is a widely shared hidden assumption that the doxastic attitude we take to a proposition is decided uniquely at a time, given evidence: *uniqueness of doxastic attitudes* (White 2005, Hawley 2014). Proponents of epistemic rationality can attack one or many of the components in the initial argument. Hence, the points I would like to draw my readers' attention to in each opposing view are: the relationship between friendship and reason; the evidentialist's claim that we should believe in accordance with the evidence; and the uniqueness of doxastic attitudes.

Let me start with the simplest objection to epistemic partiality of friendship: it is a *reductionist* answer. Reductionism ultimately reduces our epistemic reliance on our friends to the epistemic reasons why we should believe our friends more than our non-friends. Stroud anticipated the reductionist reply:

This strategy sees the friend's apparently differential epistemic practices simply as reflections of the very different evidential stances she occupies vis a vis her friends on the one hand and nonfriends on the other (Stroud 2006, 515).

It is obviously true that we know more about our friends than strangers. And as Stroud herself concedes, if your friend leaves a party without thanking the host, the host might see him as a rude man, but you have better epistemic reasons to believe he did not act rudely, but rather he (might have) just received worrying news and left in a hurry (Stroud 2006). Even so, Stroud has two reasons for doubting that such a reductionist answer is sufficient to describe the epistemic partiality of friendship. First, that in such cases our active intervention in interpreting the evidence in favor of our friends seems "out of kilter with the objective weight of the considerations" (516), and second, that the evidence we hold regarding our friends is already corrupted. I will come back to this reductionist argument again in the next section.

According to Hawley (2014), trust will steer us out of the crisis. Trust in friendship is beneficial: trust will deepen our friendship and is rewarding for us: these are self-interested reasons to trust our friends. There are also good grounds to trust our

friends: “people are more likely to behave in a trustworthy manner towards their friends, and we are more likely to form friendships with people we consider to be trustworthy” (2037). Trusting someone to do X is compatible with not having a belief that she would do X. Unless we have overwhelming reasons to believe otherwise, we are epistemically permitted to trust friends “without-belief” (2034). She concedes that if we were to choose one single epistemic rationality, between cases of friends and non-friends, she admits that what we believe of a stranger is a norm, but it does not necessarily mean that our trust in friends is epistemically irrational, as she here gives up the principle of uniqueness of our doxastic attitudes. For her, “more than one set of standards is epistemically reasonable” (2040). Hawley explains away the putative clash between two norms by analyzing our trust in friendship and provides epistemic reasons why we ought to believe in friends, and she also sacrifices the uniqueness criteria of doxastic attitudes.

Jason Kawall also tweaks the epistemic norm (i.e. evidentialism) so that it accommodates the apparently problematic pragmatic pressure, arising from friendship, to reinterpret the evidence. As he rightly points out, two goals often acknowledged among epistemologists are obtaining true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, and we must always balance these two goals. How is such balance determined? Pragmatic concerns can play a role in deciding how we balance these two concerns, according to Kawall. The following example of his illustrates a clear example in which a pragmatic reason influences our epistemic rationality.

Claire is severely allergic to peanuts; her friend is not. At a bakery, the friend is satisfied by asking an employee whether there are peanuts in the baked goods she is about to buy. It seems she can form a justified true belief that there are no peanuts based on the employee's testimony—a paradigmatic instance of knowledge-acquisition via testimony. But Claire will presumably be much more careful—are products with peanuts made on the same machinery as these goods? Have there been any past instances of contamination? It is crucial for Claire to be careful to avoid falsely believing that there are no peanuts in the items she is about to purchase (Kawall 2013, 364).

Avoiding a false belief about the absence of peanuts is vitally important for Claire. Kawall sees cases of friendship as similar to this allergy case. There is a minimum justification for belief to count as knowledge (cases of non-friends would need to satisfy this criteria), and pragmatic concerns can raise it to a certain degree, but anything that comes down in between absolute certainty and the minimum threshold of knowledge is “epistemically permissible” (367). So, according to Kawall, friendship does set a bar high for knowledge, but people who act upon it “would be acting entirely appropriately epistemically” (367–368). Hence, epistemic norms and the norm of friendship do not clash, as Stroud and Keller initially illustrate.⁴⁴ Kawall explains away

⁴⁴ Kawall's idea is in line with an epistemological view called pragmatic encroachment. He explicitly avoids a strong type of pragmatic encroachment thesis: subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI). According to SSI, “if you have knowledge-level justification that *p*, then *p* is warranted enough to justify you in Φ -ing, for any Φ ” (Fantl and McGrath 2009,

the clash between norm of friendship and epistemic rationality but by doing so, he admits that pragmatic concern can change the thresholds of knowledge.

Very similarly to Kawall, Goldberg also appeals to pragmatic concerns in explaining away the putative tension between the two norms. Practical reasons naturally arise from various values we cherish, and friendship is a representative example of such a value in life. In Goldberg's terms, the allergy case discussed above can be understood as one in which we have value-reflecting practical reasons to protect our values, as our survival or health are at stake (Goldberg 2018). Here, unlike Kawall, Goldberg does not believe that these practical reasons would change the threshold of justification. People who have practical reasons to inquire further are justified in believing in the first place, before any further inquiry. Further inquiry imposed by their value-generated practical reasons are for actions, but not for beliefs to be justified, and hence, according to Goldberg, beliefs are still governed by the standard evidentialistic epistemic norm. Goldberg explains away the tension between the two norms, but in doing so, the epistemic norm remains as the evidentialists have traditionally formulated it, and the reason why we believe in our friends is reduced to pragmatic reasons to inquire further, hence, action.

98). Unlike SSI, he admits there is a minimum threshold for all beliefs to satisfy; however, I took Kawall's view in line with pragmatic encroachment in a broad sense, because he allows that pragmatic reasons ultimately decide the thresholds of justified belief. He might not agree with my interpretation here; however, it is beyond the purview of this thesis to settle this issue.

I have summarized three approaches that aim to eliminate the tension between epistemic norms and the norm of friendship. For epistemologists, Goldberg's analysis might be judged as the most attractive, as his view keeps the standard epistemic norm in its purest form, compared to the other two views, where the uniqueness of doxastic attitudes is violated. Giving up the uniqueness of doxastic attitudes, or committing to pragmatic encroachment, might be attractive options for some, but are not welcome solutions for every epistemologist. In the next section, I will outline my potential concerns about the whole debate.

3. Friendship as a Dynamic Process

In this section, my aim is to express concerns that I have with the current debate on the epistemic partiality of friendship. My core point is that the dynamic of friendship is never discussed in the literature on the epistemic partiality of friendship in philosophy. How do we make friends and maintain our friendships in real life? When do our friendships come to an end? If we pay proper attention to the dynamic nature of friendship, I believe that the putative tension between Stroud and Keller and their opponents would be much more subtle and also more complicated than it initially appears.

There is a question lurking in the debate. Does our friendship track the truth? Stroud and Keller would agree that the epistemic partiality of friendship genuinely clashes with epistemic norms, because they think that loyalty to friends is not compatible with tracking the truth. And their opponents, especially Hawley, provide

reasons for thinking otherwise—i.e., she provides a reason why trust in friendship is an epistemically relevant factor (Hawley 2014), and hence goes along with evidentialism, broadly construed. My concern here is this: why do we need to take a side in the first place? Another option seems available when answering this question. Does friendship track the truth? My answer is both yes and no, to some extent.

Friendship is dynamic and comes in stages: friendship is constructed over time; friendship also has to be maintained; and sometimes friendship decays, or ceases to exist when things go wrong.⁴⁵ Thus, I take it that there are at least three possible stages in friendship: construction, maintenance, and termination.⁴⁶ By examining each stage of friendship (though this is surely not an exhaustive list of what friendship can be), we would be able to provide a richer understanding of this type of relationship.

⁴⁵ When Stroud explains that the reductionist answer does not hold because our beliefs about our friends are already “corrupted and slanted” (Stroud 2006, 516) due to the epistemic partiality of friendship, she misses the fact that friendship is a gradually constructed phenomenon. Hawley also points out that friendship is constructed gradually, hence Stroud’s point does not hold for the early stage of a friendship (Hawley 2014). According to Hawley, “earlier beliefs about our friend’s behavior may have been less ‘corrupted and slanted’, and thus can provide some grounds for our current opinions” (2037). But in her account, it is not clear how such early beliefs about our friends help shape our current friendship and how our beliefs about our friends in the early stage of friendship transform into trust in our friends. In section 4, I hope to explain this gap via the concept of epistemic partisanship.

⁴⁶ Oswald also points out that “relationship maintenance is conceptualized both as the phase in between initiation and termination of the relationship and also as a process”(Oswald 2016, 368). My view of friendship as a dynamic process is in line with this understanding.

This claim is in line with some psychological studies on friendship. For instance, Roberts and Dunbar write:

Social relationships are not fixed, static entities but are prone to decay such that they become less close over time [...] To prevent this decay, and keep the relationship at a particular level of emotional intensity, active maintenance is required (Roberts and Dunbar 2011, 187).

This characterization of friendship implies that friendship requires special kinds of maintenance behavior, and their experiments show that maintaining behaviors such as engaging in different activities together (multiplexity), and frequent communication, are called for in order to maintain emotional closeness in friendship over time, unlike other close relationships such as kin (Roberts and Dunbar 2011).

Once a good friendship is established, its maintenance comes to the fore. In maintaining friendship, some important aspects of being friends are more relevant, such as being mutually respectful and supportive. Friendship here constructs a special relation—namely, it is a *care relation*. We all have a small number of people who are near and dear to us, more so than strangers. We often care for our parents, our partners and our friends. It is surprising that the theorists in the debate on the epistemic partiality of friendship have not made an explicit connection between friendship and care ethics; however, the strong connection between the two is already

implicit in the debate. For instance, Keller compares friendship with coaching when he writes:

If you are working towards a goal, like increasing your fitness or performing well on an exam, you might benefit from having a coach who doesn't just teach you skills and give you specialized information, but provides motivation and encouragement (Keller 2004, 339).

Keller's description of our friends as encouraging coaches is in line with some descriptions of our care relations; for instance, Nel Noddings rightly points out that the carer becomes attentive to the needs of the cared-for, and by detecting their needs, she is motivated to act for the cared-for and his project, more so than for her own projects (Noddings 2012). Here people might associate the care relation with a one-sided relation such as the parent-child, but this is not always the case, as she writes:

In adult, on-going relationships, the usual expectation is that the parties will exchange positions regularly: I may be carer in one encounter and cared-for in the next (Noddings 2012, 53).

In a friendship understood as a care relation, it makes sense that we put effort into answering the need of the cared-for (i.e., your friend) in comparison with a stranger. In a care relationship, there is an expectation of mutuality: that your friend is taking

good care of you, and you will be taking good care of your friend. Seen from this maintenance point of view, sticking to your friend, as Keller and Stroud expect, might be a necessary part of what it is to be a good friend. I take the epistemic partiality of friendship to be best understood from this maintenance stage of friendship.

Having said that, I think the construction stage of friendship is best understood from an evidentialist point of view. We do not make friends with everyone. And unlike some other close relationships, friendship is voluntary (Oswald 2016)—we need to pay attention to its formation, and termination as well. If someone claims that he believes in a friend's testimony because she is his friend, he is putting the cart before the horse (Hawley 2014; Keller 2004). We become friends with someone because they are trustworthy, because of their attractive character traits, etc. but not vice versa. Compulsive lying prevents true friendship, and becoming friends with someone who says morally repugnant things all the time is perhaps not a feasible option. Saying that believing in a friend does not track the truth at all would make the genealogy of friendship a complete mystery. On the other hand, it is not the case that we make friends with someone for their knowledge, either. It sounds counterintuitive and also repugnant to make a friend because I want her as a reliable informant. Such a reason for friendship is counterintuitive in the same way that we feel morally disgusted when we visit a sick friend in the hospital because we think it is our moral duty, not because she is my friend (Stocker 1976).

When it comes to understanding the relation of the initiation of friendship and epistemic norms further, I think introducing the concept of *partisan affiliation* would be

helpful. Partisan affiliation reflects a person's value commitments, and, based on the common normative views of the world among partisans, "sometimes it makes sense to assign greater credibility to a testifier because you know you share a political affiliation with her...When I learn a person's partisan affiliation, I learn something about the political and moral values she endorses" (Rini 2017, E-50–51). There are significant diversities within parties but when I learn my partisan affiliation is shared by someone, "I learn that *she tends to get normative questions* right (by my normative lights)" (E51). The scope of Rini's argument is primarily on moral and political values; however, I would like to propose an idea that *friends tend to share epistemic values* as well. And I believe that this point helps us understand why construction of friendship is more in line with epistemic norms rather than the epistemic partiality of friendship.

I see no reason why we cannot extend Rini's argument to epistemic value commitments. When you inquire into something, what is the first thing you would do? What do you think allows one to reach the truth? What kind of intellectual character traits do you think are truth-conducive? Who, do you think, are reliable informants and why do you think so? People have different responses to such questions. And people's styles of inquiry are different depending on their answers to such questions. I would like to call these value commitments related to inquiry, *epistemic partisanship*. When my friend and I share epistemic partisanship i.e. epistemically normative commitments, I will think that she tends to get epistemic questions right *by my own normative lights*. Then, there is a sense in which friendship tracks truth (through my

eyes). But such evidence is dependent on our subjective epistemic values: what *I think* leads us to truth. If friends are epistemic partisans, we have reasons why we think they get things correct. But obviously this is a double-edged sword: if I were not on the right track, my friend who shares a partisan affiliation with me might also be perceiving important things incorrectly. With epistemic partisanship in mind, we are able to see why construction of friendship track evidence (but by my own normative lights).

People might say that in the cases of friends from childhood, we become friends with someone based on contingent factors rather than shared values (e.g., where you happened to have been born). I do not disagree on this point; however, is it not precisely this contingency and lack of a common set of values that explains why we often end up being estranged from our old friends later in life? Here, to understand further that construction of friendship is in line with epistemic norms (by my own normative lights), let's imagine the third stage of friendship: where friendship ceases to exist. Let me illustrate a couple of examples.

Imagine your old childhood friend A. You and he grew up together in a small town, and he was a close friend of yours. You left your hometown for college but you occasionally stayed in touch when you went back home. You were confused about his condescending remarks to his female colleagues in his workplace, but you visited A from time to time. Time went by, and you are now working as an ethics lecturer in a college in the city where you live. When you call your parents, you hear that your old friend A has committed sexual harassment in his workplace and been fired. You are

disgusted by the incident and feel very distanced from him: you consider stopping visiting him, stopping sending him messages, because such immoral conduct runs contrary to your values.

Imagine another friend B. As with A, you and he grew up together in a small town, and he was a close friend of yours. You have a newborn baby at home, and raising a child is a totally new experience for you. You remember your old friend B had a baby a few years ago, and call him to get some advice on baby care. When you call him, you quickly discover that he is now actively denying the efficacy of vaccines, and he tries to convince you not to vaccinate your newborn baby. You hold up the phone, take a deep breath, and determine that you will never ask B for any advice related to child raising in future.

We all have similar experiences in life—when your old trusted friends suddenly express a sexist opinion, when they say something awful about immigrants, when they don't pay money back to you on time, when they tell you a lie, etc. The cases of friends A and B described above are thumbnail portraits of friendship decay. There is a clash of value commitments: in the case of A, the value in question is moral, and in the case of B, epistemic. When friendship breaks down, we can often pin down the reason, namely, that our values have moved apart. If this analysis is on the right track, then these descriptions of the construction and termination of friendship teach us that friends often share normative values, and especially, epistemic values. Epistemic partisanship would provide some basis for the claim that friendship tracks evidence. Believing a friend is therefore in line with epistemic norms.

I am not aiming to describe all cases of friendship here. Admittedly, there are cases where strong friendship remains, between people who have radically different moral-political commitments and world views. However, it is enough for the current debate to show that epistemic partisanship sometimes explains the initiation and termination of friendship—in such cases, friendship does track truth from the subjective point of view of the agent. Then the problem remains, especially for epistemologists, how these subjective epistemic standards are to be improved, so that our subjective epistemic standard and epistemic partisanship actually track truth. Virtue epistemology might be helpful in this regard; I will come back to this point in the final section.

My illustrations of the first and the third stage of friendship indicate that the current debate on the epistemic partiality of friendship is too coarse-grained: Keller and Stroud would be sympathetic to the view that friendship is by nature like coaching, while an opponent like Kawall or Hawley would not. Without making reference to different stages of friendship, they look as if they are in real conflict over what friendship is supposed to be (i.e. some say friendship must be such that it is like coaching, and others do not), although it seems to me that they are just trying to capture the different stages of friendship respectively. In the worst case, they end up talking over each other, with different concepts of friendship in mind. In any case, this putative conflict looks futile.

What can we infer about friendship per se from this analysis? Regarding the three potential stages of friendship—construction, maintenance, and termination—I hope

to have shown that we are encouraged to act in different ways in different stages of friendship, and the existing literature on the epistemic partiality of friendship tries to capture one or some among the many. The construction period is dependent on evidence (albeit subjective), in contrast to what Keller and Stroud suggest. On the other hand, in maintaining friendship, the care ethics framework fits very well in explaining the partiality we owe. Note that I do not claim that only these considerations apply to each stage of friendship— rather, the point of emphasis is that friendship is a dynamic process in which different concerns can apply in different contexts, and the current debate on the epistemic partiality of friendship does not seem to pay enough attention to this fact.

4. Testimonial Injustice, and Friendship

In the last part of the second section, I explained that epistemologists perhaps prefer Goldberg's practical account because his account holds to evidentialism in its purest form. Here I will express a concern that even if his view is on the right track, it leads us to a clash of values (namely, between friendship, evidence, and justice). And there's a potential further worry about the practical account. I will first address cases where multiple values clash, including friendship and epistemic rationality, but also justice. And second, I will provide three interpretations of such clashes of multiple values including friendship.

We attribute credibility to our interlocutor's assertions. When a speaker receives an unfair deficit of credibility from a hearer because of prejudice on the hearer's part,

we are able to identify in such a case that the speaker is suffering from *testimonial injustice* (M. Fricker 2007). In testimonial exchanges, hearers make credibility attributions regarding the speakers, and in the attribution, there can be error in the direction of excess or deficit. An excess will tend to be advantageous for the speaker, and a deficit tend to be disadvantageous. The hearer must match the level of credibility she applies to the speaker to the evidence that the speaker offers. There exists a distinctively epistemic injustice when someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower. As a specific case of testimonial injustice, I draw your attention to a case of gaslighting. Gaslighting “involves expressing doubts that the harm or injustice that the speaker is testifying to really happened as the speaker claims” (Mckinnon 2017, 168). Looking at a case of gaslighting, we might be surprised by how structurally similar Mckinnon’s case is to the case proposed by Stroud. A trans-woman Victoria is testifying to Susan about her colleague James, where James is a friend of Susan.

Susan: “I’m sure you just misheard him: you’re on edge and expect to hear mispronouncing. I just don’t believe that James would do that. He won a university diversity award for his supporting queer issues, after all. Besides, he’s been a supporter of yours in the past too. He really is your ally.”

Victoria: “Well, he’s done it a bunch of times in the past few months. The last time was two weeks ago in his office.”

Susan: "You say that he's done it before, and maybe he has, but I've never heard him do it before" (McKinnon 2017, 168).

McKinnon further argues that social situatedness decides who is sufficiently well epistemically positioned to even properly perceive the world in a certain way. As a trans-woman, Victoria is "far better epistemically positioned than her cis 'ally' Susan to perceive mispronouncing" (170). Susan's epistemically partial treatment of Victoria's testimony about what her friend James has said to her might be regarded as desirable from the "friendship" point of view by Keller and Stroud. If McKinnon is on the right track, Victoria is here gaslit, suffering from an epistemic injustice and wronged as a knower. My concern is that for those who were convinced by the argument for the epistemic partiality of friendship Susan's belief can be seen as desirable, seen from a point of view of a friendship Susan holds to James, although it is a clear case of epistemic injustice. What is even more frightening here is that this concern can be generalized. Here's a recipe for many problems: imagine a case in which subject X, a victim of gaslighting from an underrepresented group in society, tries to testify about something important to you, and your good friend Y stops by and testifies to the opposite of what X says. Is it epistemically desirable to defend Y on the grounds of your friendship?

If Stroud and Keller are right, we do have an obligation to listen to a friend's testimony with more sympathetic ears (as Susan clearly does for James) than we would a stranger's. So if we take their argument at face value, it is epistemically

desirable to gaslight Victoria, from the friendship point of view. Even conceding to Goldberg that friendship gives us pragmatic reasons to inquire further in the case of a friend, Susan might be justified in believing Victoria had she inquired further, but she will not do this as her friendship to James gives her proper excuses not to.

In the first section, I showed that Stroud's initial argument was that friendship outweighs epistemic rationality because friendship is necessary for a good life, and if epistemic rationality competes with friendship, we have reasons not to live up to such a concept of epistemic rationality. However, justice is also, arguably, an indispensable component of a good life. Imagine the ethicists' favorite case of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. The reason why, in ethical debate, Huck is perceived as morally praiseworthy in helping Jim run away from his owner is partly because of his friendship to Jim, but also because not acting so was unjust (despite his knowledge, Jim's action is just, as a matter of fact). He would not have been so praiseworthy if he had rescued a friend who was a runaway murderer. Then why can we not construct a very similar argument for epistemic justice, based on the same reasoning as that given in section 1?

- ① Being treated epistemically justly—not being wronged specifically in my capacity as a knower—is an indispensable component of a good life. Hence, each of us has very strong reasons to conform to epistemic justice.
- ② If satisfying certain ideals would preclude epistemic justice, we all have very strong reasons not to live up to those ideals.

- ③ Epistemic justice competes with the epistemic partiality of friendship
- ④ We have strong reasons not to live up to such a concept of the epistemic partiality of friendship.

Epistemic partiality, as a necessary component of a good friend (Stroud's second half of the argument), is then shown to infringe something that is by itself also necessary for a good life: epistemic justice. As we have seen in the case of gaslighting, Victoria was suffering from the epistemic kind of injustice due to the epistemic partiality of friendship of Susan to James. In order to respect epistemic justice as such, we are required to respect evidentialism and believe in accordance with evidence (i.e. Victoria's testimony). I hope to have shown that not only friendship but also other values, such as epistemic justice, can take exactly the same role in the form of argument proposed by Stroud. Hence, Stroud's initial argument does not look as convincing as it first appears.⁴⁷

Let me close this section with possible interpretations of my analysis here. If we grant that the values of friendship and justice genuinely clash, what should we do in such scenarios? I have three suggestions. First, there's an issue of *subjective and*

⁴⁷ Note here I am not claiming that epistemic justice always outweighs epistemic partiality in friendship, but nor do cases of friendship: neither Keller nor Stroud believe that epistemic partiality of friendship always outweighs epistemic rationality. My argument given here is sufficient to show that where an important value like epistemic justice competes with another value X, this would give us reasons not to live up to X. As the original argument goes, this would provide us with a strong reason to revise our understanding of X. But, as shown here, value X could be friendship, and the subsequent partiality arising from friendship.

objective values. In the practical approach proposed by Goldberg, he is referring to subjective values:

The basic idea behind the notion of a value-reflecting reason is not new. Ethicists have employed the idea to capture the practical reasons we have in virtue of our values—deriving either from the values themselves, or from our valuing them. In this paper *I will employ the version which speaks of our valuing, not of the values themselves*—but nothing hinges on this choice (Goldberg 2018, italics mine).

We are all fallible in choosing what we feel is worthwhile to pursue for our well-being. Unlike Goldberg, we could perhaps say some values are objectively good (i.e., justice). Even if Susan values friendship and fails to notice the value of justice, and hence fails to listen to Victoria's testimony thus making her act look appropriate initially, from perspective of friendship, we could perhaps still condemn her and says that she misses the important objective value of justice (which is perhaps supposed to be a dominant value in this particular case). A potential issue here is that friendship could also be objectively valued, as well as the objective value of justice; hence some people will find that a genuine clash between the two values seems to remain.

This leads us to our second interpretation of the clash of friendship and justice: *impossibility of perfection*. This interpretation is in line with Michael Slote's moral imperfectionism. Slote criticizes a widespread ideal in philosophy that our values for

happiness are ultimately in harmony. He concedes that an ethically perfect being is untenable, evident from cases such as clashes between tactfulness and frankness, career and family, and so on. We cannot be ethically perfect: according to Slote, if we aspire to this we are failing to “recognize how messy and unharmonious our values really are” (Slote 2013, 149). This is not tantamount to a claim of ethical pluralism, as pluralism can accommodate many lives with “different styles of perfection” and hence permits “*different styles or forms of harmony*” (150). On the other hand, imperfectionism denies the possibility of perfect harmony per se, and takes the following predicament at face value: “certain conflicting values cannot either separately or in some kind of diluted combination make for a perfect whole” (150). By following moral imperfectionism, there is a chance we can say, in a particular case such as gaslighting, that both the original Susan, and the Susan who listens to Victoria sympathetically, act virtuously, as they both genuinely aspire to adhere to an objective value, although each conflicts with the other, and it is not feasible for us to pursue these two values at a time in this scenario. Two values cannot be pursued in harmony.

Lastly, the most pessimistic interpretation of the case at hand is to see it as similar to an *irresolvable tragic dilemma* (Hursthouse 1999). An irresolvable dilemma is one in which we have no clue how we should to choose one action over another: such as pondering what kind of birthday present to give to your daughter, where both options A or B are desirable and there’s no moral ground on which to opt for one over another (this is a pleasant irresolvable dilemma). Tragic dilemmas are cases such as “saving one’s own life by betraying or killing others” (Hursthouse 1999, 72), where both

actions are bad, hence even the virtuous agent cannot “emerge with her life unmarred... simply in virtue of the fact that her life presented her with this choice” (74–75). But my case of gaslighting—where friendship and epistemic justice compete—is neither a straightforward case of a pleasant irresolvable dilemma, nor a tragic irresolvable dilemma. Unlike those cases, interestingly, our case of gaslighting can be understood as a mixture of the two (or, we could perhaps say these are a particular case of tragic irresolvable dilemmas whose choices are all virtuous): both actions—sticking to your friend’s testimony, or believing what Victoria says because she is from an underrepresented group of today’s society—pursue their own good, yet the agent cannot avoid their own life being marred, nonetheless. An unpalatable conclusion for this strongest interpretation of the phenomena for an epistemologist is that, even if we listen to Victoria in pursuing justice, we must admit that we cannot emerge with clean hands in such a case.⁴⁸

Among these three interpretations, the question of which best describes the genuine clash of friendship and epistemic justice requires a whole paper in itself, and goes way beyond my current purview. As for the particular case of Victoria and Susan, there might be a way to handle it in line with the first interpretation. Even if we concede that we see friendship as an objective value, it does not necessary follow from that that the friendships we currently engage with are with the kind of friends we are

⁴⁸ These three interpretations are not competing with each other: it might be the case that two or three interpretations are compatible. I aim to show as many potential interpretations of the clash of values of friendship and epistemic justice as possible, some of which can overlap with each other.

supposed to have. The case of abusive relationships is suggestive here: as a matter of fact, in an abusive relationship, people still love their abusive partner, love being their objective and subjective value, but they often retrospectively regret such a relationship and think that they should not have spent time and energy on this kind of person. A similar thing can be said of some friendships. On the other hand, in cases of knowledge or justice, it is hard to imagine instances of knowledge that we should not have had, nor justices we should not have achieved. So even if it is true that friendship, justice, and knowledge are all pursued objectively in the case of Victoria and Susan, we might still be able to argue that Susan's action of gaslighting Victoria is vicious here, as Susan should not have been a friend to a person like James in the first place, or alternatively, she should not have shaped herself the way she currently is.

5. Implication for Virtue Epistemology

Based on these arguments about epistemic partiality of friendship so far addressed, there are two implications for virtue epistemology. I will argue that virtue epistemologists are required to spend more time considering cases where epistemic value clashes with non-epistemic values. Such conflicting cases were neglected in the debate because theorists did not take imperfectionism seriously. Subsequently, the problem of proper reaction toward such conflicting cases, i.e. tragic cases, would arise. Secondly, a positive implication of epistemic partiality of friendship for virtue

epistemology will be addressed. I will argue that epistemic partisanship held by friendship reinforces the importance of cultivation of intellectual virtues on individuals.

First, and foremost, virtue epistemologists have not paid enough attention to conflicting cases of non-epistemic and epistemic values. The debate of epistemic partiality of friendship was the first significant attempt as such. If my argument is on the right track, epistemic partiality of friendship often creates not only a conflict between evidence and friendship but also a three-sided struggle among evidence, friendship, and (epistemic) justice. We ought to pursue all these three values in life. As we have seen in the previous section, some situations might require us to choose a virtuous act over others, without emerging with our life unmarred.

Traditionally minded virtue epistemologists believed that such a conflict could be explained away. Because they are, consciously or unconsciously, committed to the “enlightenment assumptions and those of ancient Greek thought about the harmony or harmonizability of all our ethical values” (Slote 2013, 149). The presupposition among traditionalists is that there can be a harmony among the epistemic virtues we pursue, or epistemic and moral virtues we pursue. So even if the situation appears to call for two incompatible virtuous actions, they thought that a truly virtuous agent could find a way out. Nevertheless, I believe virtue epistemologists ought to pay proper attention to imperfectionism. Where there is a fundamental conflict among values, and among virtues, they need to figure out cases where epistemic goods are to be pursued over other values. Similarly, there are cases where an epistemically virtuous action

needs to be weighed against a morally virtuous action. Virtue epistemologists need to take these cases more seriously, and provide justifications for such choices.

It is important to note that virtue epistemologists do not pursue epistemic goods over other goods in every case. It is hard to make sense of a theory encouraging people to spend their entire life pursuing epistemic goods such as knowledge. Instead, virtue epistemologists' contribution in philosophy is that they have established a distinctively epistemic dimension in our good life. Relatedly, there are distinctively good and bad epistemic character traits according to such epistemic goods. When virtue epistemologists remained less sanguine about the clash of values and virtues; they did not need to worry about how to solve such a conflict seriously. However, throughout the chapter, I hope to have shown that such conflicts are not at all negligible, and can be observed frequently, and with surprising variety.

To show how this problem multiplies, remember that friendship is broadly in line with care-relation. It is fair to say that other care-relations we hold with people who are near and dear to us might provide us with (pragmatic) reasons to inquire further compared to cases where people whom we do not care are involved. This clash might present in a different way in different friendship cases. Representative of such relationships are a partnership, a kinship, and a children-parent(s) relationship. Virtue epistemologists need to investigate further the nature of the clash between epistemic goods and goods inherent in each care relation.

Relatedly, the problem of our response to the conflict would emerge. Hursthouse argues, "a situation from which even a virtuous agent cannot emerge with her life

unmarred" (Hursthouse 1999,75) is the definition of us calling situations *tragic*. However, imperfectionism would multiply such tragic cases significantly. By the nature of the principle, we cannot be perfect, every life would encounter a tragic conflict. Are we supposed to call each one of them tragic where we cannot emerge with our life unmarred? Is it not too harsh to describe every tragic conflict as marring life, when fulfilling it is not tenable for anyone? Shall we, instead, feel regret in situations where two virtuous actions and two fundamental values are mutually exclusive? We have to ask ourselves what response we are to take in tragic cases. A serious consideration of imperfectionism would thus lead us to a new theoretical terrain of virtue epistemology.

Secondly, a study on epistemic partiality of friendship might paradoxically promote virtue epistemology on individual level. As shown in section 3, epistemic partisanship can partly explain why we think our friends are right. When my friend and I share epistemically normative commitments, such as whom we think are reliable informants and why we think so, I can trust them in getting questions right by my own normative rights. In this way, there is a sense in which friendship tracks evidence from my perspective. But such evidence is dependent on my subjective epistemic values. We have seen that this is a double-edged sword: if I were not taking epistemic norms right in the first place, my friend who shares an epistemic partisan affiliation with me might also be incorrect. So epistemic partiality of friendship would perpetuate a vicious cycle in such a scenario. Note that here, what I believe to be truth-conducive is the reference point of judgments. Then, in order to minimize the epistemic error

springing from epistemic partiality of friendship; we have strong motivation to hold on to the right kind of epistemic standards on individuals. Epistemic virtues are known as character traits responsible inquirers would hold (Zagzebski 1996). Virtue epistemology has a distinct role in promoting this aim by encouraging cultivations of epistemic virtues. Ironically, then, the fact that we are prone to believe our friend puts extra practical pressure on us to cultivate epistemic virtues on the individual level.

However, this does not necessarily mean that we should promote cultivations of virtues by individuals. Given that we are prone to become friends with someone from a young age, cultivation of intellectual virtues needs to be implemented around the same time, from an early stage of our life to mitigate the effect of epistemic partisanship. Promotion of virtues at the early stage of life are not our choice, but often imposed upon us. As Heather Battaly describes, “self-cultivation may be the exception rather than the rule with respect to our initial possession of virtues and vices” (Battaly 2016, 214). The kind of virtue cultivation the current debate of epistemic partiality of friendship promotes for virtue epistemologists would be environmental routes at the early stage of our lives. Nevertheless, this does not contradict with individuals aspiring for virtues individually at the later stage of our life, as I have argued in chapter 2, self-cultivation does have some important roles in cultivating virtues overall. If epistemic virtue cultivation and epistemic partisanship formation were done around the same time, we might be able to expect that a side effect of epistemic partiality of friendship could be minimized in such a way that intellectually virtuous character traits of

individual inquirers can monitor where the epistemic partiality of friendship goes too far.

6. Conclusion

We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, and given that good friendship is a care relation, I do agree that epistemic partiality of friendship exists and rightly so. But if we pay attention to the initiation and termination of friendship, there is a sense that our friendships track evidence. If I do not give up evidentialism, then some values—including friendship—generate practical reasons to inquire further. Stroud and Keller make a strong argument for the claim that friendship is necessary for a good life and that if anything competes with friendship, we have reasons not to live up to such a concept of epistemic rationality. However, I hope to have shown that the exact same thing can be said of any of the important values in life, such as justice. And there is a genuinely epistemic kind of justice we pursue: epistemic justice, and this competes with epistemic partiality in friendship. This conclusion can lead to three interpretations: a clash of subjective and objective values, moral imperfectionism, and irresolvable tragic dilemmas. Either way, I conclude that the argument from the epistemic partiality of friendship is not as strong as Keller and Stroud initially propose. Finally, this debate had two implications for virtue epistemology. A serious consideration of imperfectionism encourages virtue epistemologists' careful examination of the nature of the conflict between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Such a consideration at least involves: what kind of care-relation creates tension with epistemic values beyond

friendship, how are we to respond to such a tragic conflict. Secondly, epistemic partiality of friendship also indirectly promotes cultivations of epistemic virtues on individuals. Because epistemic partisanship partially supports friendship, and we take our friend to get things right (from my normative lights). When an individual holds a set of epistemic values that are biased, epistemic partiality based on such a partisan affiliation this invites disastrous epistemic consequences; the existence of epistemic partiality puts even more pressure for the individual inquirer to cultivate epistemic virtues. Nevertheless, given that we make friends with others from the early stage of our life, virtue cultivation should also be promoted from a young age. Such a process would be predominantly from environmental routes rather than self-cultivation. If epistemic virtue cultivation and epistemic partisanship are formed hand in hand, we could expect that a side effect of epistemic partiality of friendship is minimized.

Chapter 4 Toward Establishing Intellectual Receptivity as an Epistemic Value

0. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to apply the value of receptivity to virtue epistemology. I do this in the interests of the development of virtue epistemology. In the first section, I will first portray what it means to know something first-hand. I do this by way of addressing Elizabeth Fricker's argument against the autonomous knower (E. Fricker 2006) and Duncan Pritchard's argument on the epistemic importance for seeing things for oneself (Pritchard 2016). In the second section, I address the social nature of our inquiry. In the third section, I ask the question of where we need to pursue epistemic autonomy. I will discuss how our "interests" call for first-hand knowledge. In the final section, a value of intellectual receptivity will be introduced. I argue that the value of intellectual receptivity helps us realize the vice that the value of epistemic autonomy could not solely explain and better articulate some essential intellectual virtues.

1. Seeing It for Oneself

In this section, I will examine the idea that we ought to know P first-hand. Elizabeth Flicker (2006) addressed how epistemologists have long been obsessed with the ideal of an autonomous knower and indeed criticized such a view. Nevertheless, by doing so, she retained some desirable features of the first-hand knowledge that testimonial knowledge lacks. Duncan Pritchard (2016) also suggests that there is a

sense in which seeing it for oneself is more valuable than testimonial knowledge. The two authors have proposed a few ways about how first-hand knowledge can be more desirable than testimonial knowledge.

First and foremost, what is an autonomous knower? “The wholly autonomous knower will not accept any proposition, unless she herself possesses the evidence establishing it” (E. Fricker 2006, 225). Such a perfect epistemically autonomous agent would never believe “on the basis of a second-order warrant for belief” (243).

In fact, we are not such perfectly epistemically autonomous beings, and we defer to the testimony of others in regard to knowing many things. According to Elizabeth Fricker, deferring to such testimony is appropriate in the following manner:

TDAP [Testimony Deferential Acceptance Principle] 2: One properly accepts that P on the basis of trust in another’s testimony that P – her word that P– just if she speaks sincerely, and she is epistemically well enough placed with respect to P so that were she to have, or make a judgement to form, a conscious belief regarding whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge; and she is better epistemically placed with respect to P than oneself; and one recognizes all these things to be so; and one is not aware of significant contrary testimony regarding P (E. Fricker 2006, 232).

She provides this standard for discerning when we ought to defer to the testimony of others and when we ought to obtain evidence establishing knowledge. Although she

rightly criticizes the ideal of the autonomous knower and accepts that we need to defer to the testimony of others when it is due, nonetheless there is an assumption behind the standard that knowledge obtained by testimony is second-class compared to first-hand knowledge. But in what way is testimonial knowledge second-class? She explains:

T: If H knows that P through being told that P and trusting the teller, there is or was someone who knows that P in some other way – not in virtue of having been told that P and trusting the teller. It is a consequence of T that if someone knows that P through trust in testimony, there must be some other way in which P is or once was known. Hence T has the corollary: T corollary: For any proposition P that can be known, there must be some way other than trust in testimony through which P can or once could be known (E. Fricker 2006, 240).

Being fully aware of the impossibility of the ideal of the entirely autonomous knower, Elizabeth Fricker nevertheless holds that the knowledge obtained by testimony is “at least one respect inferior to when I know at first hand” (240). She argues that there is a risk of being deceived in testimonial exchanges and that believing in testimony will lack “sensitivity to defeating evidence” (242). There are some important properties of first-hand knowledge that testimonial knowledge lacks, but the flip side of this analysis is that there are a few distinct characteristics of testimonial knowledge that first-hand knowledge lacks. To begin with, it is time-saving and pragmatic, and it expands our

epistemic horizons. Thus it does not have the general superiority of first-hand knowledge, instead, it seems more accurate to identify the two kinds of knowledge as having different characteristics: one understood in the context of discovery (and rediscovery), and another that is already discovered and hence available to people in the pool of knowledge in society.

One might argue that the discovery of knowledge provides an individual with credit in regard to their possessed knowledge, which they do not possess in regard to their testimonial knowledge, and in this sense the latter is inferior to the former. This point is in line with Duncan Pritchard's argument on the superiority of seeing it for oneself to testimonial knowledge.⁴⁹

[seeing it for oneself] essentially involve what are known as strong cognitive achievements, where strong achievements, cognitive or otherwise, are standardly thought of as being finally (i.e., non-instrumentally) valuable. An achievement is typically held to be a success that it is because of – i.e., attributable to – one's exercise of relevant agency (i.e., as opposed to being attributable to dumb luck, or someone else's agency, and so forth). A strong

⁴⁹ Pritchard's "seeing it for oneself" covers both perceptually seeing something for oneself and intellectually seeing something for oneself (i.e., understanding). These two cases are both knowing things in a particular way, contrasted with knowing by testimony. Seeing it for oneself is a technical term derived from the broadly Aristotelian tradition of believing that *human desires to know*. Pritchard thinks a particular kind of knowledge, namely, only seeing it for oneself can sate our desire to know, rather than knowledge simpliciter (Pritchard 2016).

achievement in addition demands either the manifestation of a high level of skill or else the overcoming of a significant obstacle to success (Pritchard 2016, 37).

On the contrary, testimonial knowledge can be obtained easily. It can be obtained passively. When we obtain knowledge via testimony, our cognitive success is normally attributable to the speaker's agency rather than the hearer's. Then, there is a sense in which seeing it for oneself has a special value that a corresponding testimonial knowledge lacks. People who know P via testimony cannot claim that they have achieved something in a strong sense in obtaining P. This special value is, as Pritchard notes, a general value attached to a strong achievement. Hence, discovering P is valuable because achieving something due to one's high-level skill is valuable. Hence, the special kind of credit given to first-hand knowledge is a sense in which seeing it for oneself is superior to testimonial knowledge on the grounds of non-epistemic value.

The most interesting suggestion for the current debate Pritchard makes about the epistemic value of seeing it for oneself concerns intellectual autonomy. He maintains:

Intellectual autonomy can be thought of as both an intellectual virtue and as a goal of intellectual virtue (i.e., being intellectually autonomous). In the latter sense, it is the good of being epistemically self-reliant, where this involves one taking ownership of one's epistemic position" (Pritchard 2016, 36).

By knowing something first-hand, then, we pursue a value of intellectual autonomy as a goal of intellectual virtues. If it is an epistemically significant value to become epistemically self-reliant, we have to ask when we should pursue such a value. As Pritchard himself points out, the “good of intellectual autonomy is entirely compatible with treating the acquisition of knowledge as for the most part a social enterprise” (Pritchard 2016, 40). Elizabeth Fricker also admits that “we humans are essentially social creatures, and it is not clear that we do or could possess any knowledge at all which is not in some way, perhaps obliquely, dependent on testimony” (E. Fricker 2006, 225). It might be true that the value of epistemic autonomy is the value when we pursue first-hand knowledge and cultivate intellectual virtues thereof. But we need to ask where and when we are encouraged to pursue knowledge in this fashion. I will come back to this point in the third section.

In this section, I have addressed some differences between first-hand knowledge and testimonial knowledge. We have seen that each type of knowledge has some distinct characteristics, yet, the pursuit of first-hand knowledge can promote an epistemic value of intellectual autonomy in such a way that second-hand knowledge cannot.

2. Knowledge Pool and Social Nature of Our Inquiry

In this section, I will consider what it means for knowledge as being inherently social. Elizabeth Fricker herself repeatedly points out that trusting someone is necessary for

our social life (E. Fricker 2006, 226, 228). The social nature of the inquirer would transfer to the inquiry. Influenced heavily by Edward Craig's work (Craig 1990), the epistemological view sharing the view that the function of knowledge is to flag a good informant is called the *genealogical method in epistemology* (Kusch and McKenna 2018)⁵⁰.

Along the same lines, Miranda Fricker portrays three collective epistemic needs springing from the state of nature. If we as humans live in a minimally social group, we need truth for our survival, such as to obtain food, and to avoid being poisoned; we need to engage in an epistemic practice whereby information is shared or pooled; we need to foster dispositions in people that will stabilize a community of trust (M. Fricker 2007, 110–11). The most important aspect of this argument from the point of view of the current debate is that we have an epistemic need to engage in an epistemic practice whereby information is shared or pooled. The maintenance and generation of knowledge as such are inherently social rather than individual: pooled knowledge is maintained by society as a whole. It is true that knowledge is discovered at one point and then integrated into the pool, and later transmitted through the chain of testimonial exchanges.

⁵⁰ The original discussion of Craig's work (1990) was about the concept of knowledge rather than knowledge itself, and he asked why the concept of knowledge was introduced in hypothetical primitive human society. In this chapter, I discuss knowledge in line with the genealogists' state of nature story. The difference between the concept of knowledge and knowledge itself is important yet negligible for this discussion. For objections to the genealogical view and their replies, see also (Kusch and McKenna 2018).

Such a knowledge pool can be in good shape or bad shape. For instance, if knowledge in the pool was scarce, people in society might find it difficult to survive. By the time the complexity of our life increases, the need for more knowledge would also increase. Thus, pooled knowledge needs *expansion*. If no one takes care of the knowledge in society, society may lose track of why something is the case. Moreover, the justification of knowledge might be improved by the enhancement of the epistemic tools, and by the growth of the research community, the pool of knowledge needs *proper maintenance*. The knowledge pool can be biased in many ways. For instance, knowledge in the pool may not be beneficial for the marginalized population in society; some knowledge might be compartmentalized, not equally accessible for all. Knowledge in the pool might not be homogeneous: e.g., we can imagine a society where a particular kind of knowledge is abundant while other kinds are scarce. There is a sense in which the knowledge pool is in better shape if there are no such *biases*.

If we engage with the knowledge pool, a few different kinds of responsibility will spring from the demands of the knowledge pool I have just articulated (i.e., expansion, proper maintenance, and no bias). Related to the second demand, it is then also fair to expect someone in society being responsible for maintaining intact the chain of non-testimony based evidence, even after it was first discovered (I would call this process *rediscovery*). As Elizabeth Fricker argues, for any proposition P, there is a way other than trust in testimony through which P can be known: namely, discovering P.

We could ask who should take this role of rediscovering and maintaining the chain of non-testimonial evidence for knowledge in the pool. It is not everyone: if everyone engages with rediscovery, it would be repetitive and redundant as regards the purpose of maintaining the knowledge pool. If someone suitable in society knows P by discovering or rediscovering it, and hence maintains intact the chain of evidence from testimony to non-testimony, why should others who are less suitable engage in the same task to the same extent? Once P is tethered to non-testimonial evidence by a suitable group of people, it does not need to be rediscovered repeatedly by every other citizen. This is because such repetition would become futile and pointless after a few trials (especially those carried out by people who are not suitable for the project in the situation), and, more importantly, excessive repetition would hinder society's other responsibilities in relation to the knowledge pool: i.e., to expand its knowledge pool, or to make knowledge more accessible for all, etc.

Consequently, there is a further departure from Elizabeth Fricker in terms of where we each think our inquiry should begin. For Elizabeth Fricker, knowing on the basis of non-testimonial grounds is the norm. This means that where there are good grounds for believing someone else, we should defer to the other's view. She maintains:

we have seen that rational prudence dictates that one should bestow trust only where it is due; where one has good grounds to believe one's informant competent and sincere (E. Fricker 2006, 243).

If we take the social nature of knowledge seriously, the knowledge pool does not require everyone to maintain the chain of every piece of knowledge. Instead, by default, we defer to the testimony of others in the vast majority of cases, and rightly so. We do not ask ourselves if we should defer to the testimony of others in a history class, in cases of reading newspapers, or when talking to our friends. Instead, we ought to discover P only where we have good grounds to do so. The next question is what counts as reasonable grounds for acquiring knowledge first-hand. Even the proponents of the value of epistemic autonomy are aware it not the case that we are always required to pursue seeing things for oneself. Then, when would it be encouraged?

3. Seeing It for Oneself, Revisited

In the first section, we discussed why knowing first-hand is more desirable than testimonial knowledge. Nevertheless, both Elizabeth Fricker and Pritchard admit that holding on to such an ideal does not mean that we should not defer to the testimony of others. Instead, in the previous section, we have seen in the majority of cases, by default, that we in fact defer to the testimony of others. In this section, I will ask what calls for knowledge first-hand. Pooled knowledge requires maintenance and rediscovery. When is first-hand knowledge more desirable than testimonial knowledge? Who is expected to maintain the chain of testimony back to the non-testimonial grounds? In short, my answer is that our interests determine when it is

appropriate and who should hold knowledge first-hand. I will explain more in detail below.

Here, my theory is schematic and relies heavily on folk psychological observation. I do not aim to cover an exhaustive list of situations where we are required to obtain first-hand knowledge, nonetheless this analysis may be helpful to begin to sort cases where first-hand knowledge is more desirable than testimonial cases. The pressure to know something first-hand may spring from both external and internal factors surrounding agents, but I think we can capture both cases by the concept of *interests*. Representative cases, as such, are expertise, personal concerns, and social interests, which I will address respectively.

Intuitively, the more complex knowledge becomes, the more it is the case that there should be a group of people who are expected to rediscover the non-testimonial grounds of the knowledge in question – namely, *experts* in the subject area. When people seek a piece of medical advice, they go to their GP, instead of to primary school teachers or butchers. This is because GPs are more inclined to have better knowledge about medicine than primary school teachers or butchers. Expertise requires thorough knowledge of certain domains: this involves knowing on the basis of non-testimonial grounds.

Secondly, non-testimonial knowledge might be called for based on individual concerns. The representative as such is self-knowledge. You know about yourself based on non-testimonial grounds more than anyone else, and you are interested in doing so because it is important for you, relevant to your concerns, and vital for your

survival. Similarly, if you are curious about baking, you will not only watch YouTube tutorials on baking, you will also proceed to bake by yourself and know first-hand what it means to bake. There is something off-putting in saying that Sam is interested in math, but never engages with it. When someone is personally interested in something, it is fair to say that she is the right person to pursue such knowledge first-hand.

Both of these interests, expertise and personal concern, are well articulated in Pritchard's scientist case:

Imagine, for example, a scientist conducting important experiments as part of a team, but who always opts, despite there being no practical cost to her, to being told how the experiments went rather than observing them for herself. Indeed, to make the case more vivid, imagine that the experiments are concerned with something momentous, like the discovery of the Higgs boson. Wouldn't we think there was something importantly lacking, from the perspective of intellectual virtue and character, about a scientist who was content to be told the results of such an experiment second-hand when she could easily see it for herself (Pritchard 2016, 30).

If the scientist is not concerned with observing the result for herself at all, there is something epistemically off about her. First, it is her profession that requires her to see the result for herself, more so than others. Second, she is the one who became a scientist, then, observing such a result is supposed to fit well with her personal

concern. If she were genuinely interested in science, and became a scientist, she should care about the truth in the domain and this behavior of hers shows the lack of such a concern for truth in science. In this way, having no interest in seeing the experimental result for herself goes against both external and internal interests in this scenario. As Pritchard describes, some inquiries cannot be adequately closed by mere knowledge (i.e., testimonial knowledge). For someone who is genuinely curious about the movement of the tides, her curiosity is not sated by the experts' testimony: her curiosity is sated only by her understanding of the phenomenon. In this way, some inquiries can only be legitimately closed by knowledge of a specific kind (i.e., first-hand knowledge, or knowledge as understanding) (Pritchard 2016, 33-36).

Lastly, social interests might determine when first-hand knowledge is desirable. Non-testimonial knowledge may spring from coincidental factors of the agent in an important way. Such coincidences confer on particular subjects first-hand knowledge regardless of whether they want to hold on to it or not. First is the external coincidence case. If you happen to be involved in a tragic train crash, or if you happen to be born in a country in the middle of a civil war, your first-hand knowledge of what has happened as the remaining passenger or as a war survivor are of great importance in society, both symbolically and pragmatically. There is a sense in which non-testimonial knowledge as such is more desirable than testimonial knowledge in such a context. Relatedly, the demand for non-testimonial knowledge may spring from coincidental personal factors of the agent. In a society marked by systematic oppression, the oppressed are said to have privileged knowledge about their life that

the non-oppressed will find it hard to obtain (Wylie 2013). In a patriarchal society, then, women are expected to have privileged knowledge of their oppressed life first-hand, and such first-hand knowledge might be of greater importance than testimonial knowledge. I will come back to this point in more depth in the next chapter.

One might be worried about the third case, as the agents may not be personally interested in the course of obtaining their knowledge. However, we could say that there is a sense in which society is interested in the content of their knowledge. For instance, imagine first-hand knowledge of the Second World War by a survivor in a concentration camp, or immigrant women's first-hand knowledge of their marginalized experience in the UK. Such first-hand knowledge is of higher social and historical importance. In this sense, it may first appear that the agents are passively acquiring their perceptual knowledge. However, in such socially interested knowledge, I think there is a sense in which the agents actively engaged in maintaining their knowledge. In this sense, some knowledge of which the interest is socially conferred we can take as active perceptual knowledge, i.e., seeing it for oneself. In other words, our inquiry can only be adequately closed by a particular kind of knowledge, first-hand knowledge in these cases.

Individual and social interests represented by the expertise, personal concerns, and social interests— this might not be an exhaustive list of what makes first-hand knowledge more desirable than second-hand knowledge, yet it tells us how to start differentiating between cases where we can rely on the testimony of others and those where we should start inquiring in a non-testimonial mode. In the next section, I will

address the other side of the epistemic phenomenon – obtaining knowledge primarily by testimony, and I will introduce new epistemic value in understanding what we do and should do in such cases.

4. Receptivity and virtue epistemology

The focus of my debate will shift from first-hand to second-hand knowledge in this section. I boldly claim that we should adopt the value of receptivity in the realm of virtue epistemology. I will explain why this move is necessary throughout the section.

In the first section, I summarized a few advantages of first-hand knowledge that testimonial knowledge lacks, represented by the value of epistemic autonomy that seeing it for oneself promotes. However, in the second section, I emphasized that in most cases we defer to the testimony of others and rightly so, derived from the social nature of inquiries and the knowledge pool. I think there is an apparent tension here: where our interests are concerned, we can say that we are encouraged to acquire knowledge first-hand, and pursue the value of epistemic autonomy by wishing to be epistemically self-reliant. However, the vast majority of our epistemic activity relies on the testimony of others. What kind of value are we pursuing here? Claiming that deferring to the testimony of others is the norm obviously does not mean that we should believe in such testimony indiscriminately. Instead, when deferring to the testimony of others, we realize that doing so is actually a more nuanced and varied activity than Elizabeth Fricker's TDAP2. Trusting competent and sincere testifiers is, of course, better than trusting incompetent and deceitful counterparts. It is, however,

a complicated task to find a trustworthy testifier. We must ask what the characteristics of competence and sincerity in trusting are. Such a question lies at the center of virtue epistemological inquiry. In the case of first-hand knowledge, we have the value of epistemic autonomy. One thing missing in this debate of *excelling at testimonial knowledge acquisition* is the corresponding epistemic value.

In the realm of morality, there is an important yet neglected value: *receptivity*. According to Slote (2013), receptivity is a value that has long been neglected by Western philosophers. He portrays receptivity as an antidote for harmful yet influential overly rationalistic ways of thinking in modern philosophy, which are characterized by their *excessive desire for control*. Our attitude to and desire for control and domination in areas of our life that we cannot control is the issue. Through praising practical rationality, philosophers have encouraged the idea that “one should live one’s life according to a life plan” (Slote 2013, 169). Yet, in life, there are some crucial goods that we cannot properly plan to obtain, such as love and friendship. We cannot plan to become friends with someone, and we cannot control ourselves being in love with someone. “Anyone who thinks or tries to think of those goods in that way is expressing a desire for control over his or her life and a lack of receptivity toward the eventualities of their life that make no sense for human beings” (173). By contrast, in areas we cannot control, Slote continues, “a receptive and open attitude makes sense in our

lives” (174). Being receptive to what our life may bring to us is thus one value that is often overshadowed by our excessive desire for control.⁵¹

Claiming that receptivity is a value is not to deny the value of control altogether. It is, instead, to say that there are limits to the value we place on control. Not pointing out such a limit is equal to giving “a distorted ethical picture of human life” (213). Receptivity is thus an antidote for our excessive desire for control, but what exactly does “being receptive” amount to? Slote only provides a negative definition of the concept. Receptivity is not the same as passivity, because “passivity is receptivity without any admixture of or potential for activeness” (212). Receptivity is not the same as openness, either, because “being receptive to the idea or suggestion of change implies more readiness to change than mere talk of openness does” (220). Summarizing those characteristics given so far, I take being receptive as having a positive attitude towards things that cannot be controlled (including our own life, other people, or objects) and appreciating such things as they are, and integrating them into our self. In the realm of epistemology, I believe we can say something similar in line with Slote’s argument.

⁵¹ Our excessive desire for control comes in different forms. One way in which we have an inappropriate desire for control is towards nature. Human beings have treated nature as something we can dominate. Such an attitude is now under attack. An alternative attitude we could hold towards nature is “appreciating” it, or “feeling awe” (182) towards it. Slote also calls these attitudes receptivity (Slote 2013, Chapter 10).

The ideal of becoming an autonomous knower involves “being willing and able to think and decide things for oneself” (215), and such a desire for control in our inquiry might be appropriate for some knowledge within the reach, as I have shown in the previous section. However, we are not required to obtain first-hand knowledge in every case. Holding such a desire in regard to every piece of knowledge would be excessive, and hence, might even be harmful for us because such an attitude ignores and fails to appreciate the important value of being receptive. I would like to propose a value of intellectual receptivity as a goal of intellectual virtues together with the value of intellectual autonomy:

Intellectual receptivity: having a positive attitude towards epistemic goods that cannot be controlled and appreciating such things as they are and integrating them into our epistemic self.

When virtue epistemologists take this value of intellectual receptivity as a goal, I believe there are a few advantages of such an approach.

First, the putative tension between cases of when we pursue first-hand knowledge and when we pursue testimonial knowledge would be explained away by adopting the value of intellectual receptivity. As shown in the previous section, there are some inquiries that can legitimately be closed by a particular kind of knowledge such as first-hand knowledge. However, the flip side of such an argument is that other inquiries are adequately closed by testimonial knowledge. If someone believes every

knowledge must be closed by seeing it for oneself, what can we say wrong about him? Pritchard expressed the relevant worry:

The crux of the matter is that it seems to be part of what it is to be intellectually virtuous, and hence to have a good intellectual character, that one has a standing desire to see things for oneself. As with the exercise of all virtues, one needs to bear in mind the different trade-offs that might be relevant in this regard. If one excessively desired always to see things for oneself, even when, say, the practical costs of doing so are enormous, then this would no longer be the manifestation of virtue but of vice (Pritchard 2016, 31).

When we solely hold on to the value of epistemic autonomy, it is hard to articulate what is wrong with this agent with his excessive desire to know things first-hand. In other words, he is trying to be epistemically self-reliant. What is puzzling about this agent is a putative tension between the value of epistemic autonomy and his attitudes. Seen from the value of epistemic autonomy, his attitude appears to be in line with fulfilling this value, while there is something epistemically off about him. Once we adopt the value of intellectual receptivity, the problem of this agent becomes much more intelligible. He lacks the appropriate receptivity toward his epistemic life. He should notice the eventuality of our epistemic life and ease his excessive desire to know things first-hand.

I think it is important to leave a few cautionary remarks: note that my proposal is not in tension with the value of epistemic autonomy per se. Instead, it is complimentary. The proponent of the goal of epistemic autonomy is not encouraging epistemic autonomy without limit. In this sense, this revision is supposed to be welcome news even for the proponent of epistemic autonomy. As moral receptivity is the antidote to the excessive desire to control one's life, I believe that intellectual receptivity is the antidote to our excessive desire to see things for oneself. Some might worry if intellectual receptivity gets in the way of our curiosity. I believe that intellectual receptivity does not get in the way of one's curiosity. We have seen that a genuinely curious agent's desire to know the cause of the movement of the tides is only sated by her proper understanding (i.e., seeing things for oneself). Imagine an ambitious freshman; she might be curious in many different subjects, enjoys attending lectures in chemistry, law, Spanish, and philosophy. However, at the end of the day, she needs to select one or a few subjects to study at university. Genuine curiosity requires our focus and dedication, and indiscriminate curiosity would hinder genuine curiosity from being sated. Being intellectually receptive to what we can know first-hand goes hand in hand with our genuine curiosity.

Second, some intellectual virtues become more intelligible by the goal of intellectual receptivity than intellectual autonomy. Some intellectual virtues are better understood as aiming at being excellent at relying on others. It is hard to make sense of such a virtue in terms of epistemic autonomy. Take the example of the virtue of intellectual humility. I focus on two ways of understanding intellectual humility here:

the accuracy view and non-egoist view (Pritchard 2018). According to the accuracy view, being intellectually humble means to be properly attentive to, and to own, one's own epistemic limitations (Whitcomb et al. 2017). Owning one's epistemic limitation involves proper cognitive, behavioral, motivational, and affective responses to one's own limitations (Whitcomb et al. 2017, 518): one believes, admits, cares about, and regrets that one has epistemic limitations. Intellectual humility is a virtue; hence this character trait makes a person excellent as a cognitive agent (Baehr 2011). An intellectually humble person is attentive to and owns their epistemic limitations. Hence, she knows full well that she does not know certain things on her side, and by calling this a virtue, it is particularly at this point that she has excelled. If epistemic autonomy, i.e., being epistemically self-reliant, were a sole goal of intellectual virtues, such a goal does not sit well with the virtue of intellectual humility in this accuracy sense. We can expect a humble agent to defer to the testimony of others, where she knows her knowledge is limited. According to the value of intellectual receptivity, being humble in this sense is one way we are responsible for deferring to the testimony of others.

According to the non-egoist view, humility "involves lacking those characteristic dispositions involved in excessive self-regard, such as conceit, arrogance, haughtiness, and so on" (Pritchard 2018, 6). The non-egoist view of humility is characterized by our epistemic disposition of other-directedness motivated by one's respect for others. Such epistemic dispositions involve being open to change one's opinion, willing to reflect on one's evidence and counterevidence presented by others, being respectful of other people's views (Pritchard 2018, 8). What can we say about

the non-egoistic view of humility concerning the value of intellectual receptivity? I believe that the other-directed motivation that humble dispositions are rooted in represents the fact that our epistemic endeavor is social, collective, and collaborative in nature. The non-egoist view of humility ably demonstrates that there is a way we can excel at having an epistemically collaborative attitude. This is a sense in which a value of intellectual receptivity is promoted.⁵²

⁵² Pritchard is opposed to the accuracy view and held his non-egoistic view, he proposed some independent reasons to support the non-egoistic view over the accuracy view, but one of the biggest reasons why the non-egoistic view is more attractive is that it fares better in a non-conciliatory view of peer-disagreement. The accuracy view of humility appears to recommend us to change our confidence in our belief in the face of disagreements. “The problem is that if one sticks to one’s commitment to the target proposition in the face of an epistemic peer disagreement, and hence regards one’s belief as just as justified as before, then one is not, it seems, ‘owning’ one’s fallibility at all, but rather ignoring it” (Pritchard 2018, 8). On the contrary, if one takes the non-egoistic view, sticking to one’s commitment is compatible to be epistemically humble: namely, having dispositions rooted in the motivation of respect for other epistemic agents, and holding one’s belief no less justified, and hence, no less likely to amount to knowledge after disagreement. I agree with Pritchard’s points here (e.g., the importance of holding a non-conciliatory view of peer disagreement, and also the importance of other-regarding epistemic motivation). But in this thesis, I leave the issue of epistemic humility open for the following two reasons. First, there might be another independent reason for an accuracy view to be more attractive that we have yet to consider. Second, the accuracy view might be compatible with a non-conciliatory view of peer disagreement. Riggs (2010) proposes a similar worry in his paper on open-mindedness. Should a genuinely open-minded person consider every challenge to one’s belief? In his reply, he takes open-mindedness as an attitude toward oneself as a believer. “To be open-minded is to be aware of one’s fallibility as a believer, and to be willing to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, it is possible that one is wrong” (Riggs 2010, 180). By having this attitude, an open-minded person engages with self-monitoring

In this way, a virtue of humility can be understood as promoting our goal of intellectual receptivity. The virtue of epistemic humility is pursuing something different from being epistemically self-reliant. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which it is epistemically desirable and the agent who holds the trait as being admirable as an inquirer. Virtue epistemologists had a hard time articulating this value. Epistemic autonomy is demonstratively a value some intellectual virtues are aiming at promoting (e.g., intellectual courage, intellectual perseverance, and so on). On the other hand, some intellectual virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness seem to promote something different from being epistemically self-reliant, yet something epistemically worthwhile in a distinct way. I believe intellectual receptivity will help articulate such an alternative value that some intellectual virtues are aiming at promoting. Complexity aside, this division of epistemic values would map nicely onto the debate of first-hand knowledge and testimonial knowledge. Broadly speaking, the individual and social interests call for seeing things for oneself; we are encouraged to “for signs that one is in a domain or situation in which one is likely to be biased” (183). With the self-knowledge of the situations and domains, she is prone to go astray, “when an open-minded person dismisses a challenge from a confident judgment both that she is well-justified in her belief that *p* and that she is not being led astray by the relevant bad habits of thought, and she is correct about the latter, her dismissal is open-minded” (186). It might be the case that for this strategy to work, we are obliged to no longer see one’s opponent as an epistemic peer. However, at least the supporters of accuracy view of intellectual humility can start considering how their view can be compatible with the non-conciliatory view of peer-disagreement from Riggs’ answer stated above. In this way, the debate on the compatibility of epistemic humility and peer disagreement generates considerable debate. Nevertheless, settling this debate goes way beyond the purview of this thesis.

cultivate and display intellectual virtues promoting the goal of epistemic autonomy. On the other hand, when we rely on the testimony of others, we are encouraged to cultivate and display intellectual virtues promoting the goal of intellectual receptivity. Both epistemic autonomy and intellectual receptivity are necessary for attaining various epistemic goods and navigating our epistemic life. As is always the case, the balance between two such values would be crucial for our epistemic flourishing.

I want to close this chapter with a potential case where the values of intellectual autonomy and intellectual receptivity clash. Is there any case where two values conflict? In the majority of cases, these two values go hand in hand; however, imagine where some external interventions can change our cognitive make-up so that they enable humans to expand the possibilities of what we can know by ourselves. These interventions are known as cognitive enhancements. It is tempting for us to expand our human cognitive potentials to know more. For some, cognitive enhancements are essential for cultivating intellectual virtues (Fröding 2013). However, unlimited excessive desire for knowing things for ourselves might get in the way of the virtue of respecting other epistemic agents and realizing one's epistemic limitations. The proponent of the value of intellectual receptivity would be more cautious about such cognitive enhancements. This problem is, in short, an epistemic mirror image of the debate between the proponents of moral enhancements and bio-conservatism (Sandel 2007; Persson and Savulescu 2012). If I am on the right track, we could say that intellectual autonomy and intellectual receptivity are both equally significant epistemic values that intellectual virtues are aiming at promoting. Then, virtue

epistemologists must have a right balance between the two tendencies: the transhumanistic tendency of overcoming our human nature by cognitive enhancements, and the bio-conservatistic tendency of accepting our human nature (i.e., not pursuing epistemic perfection). Finding the right balance between the two is easier said than done: in future research, virtue epistemologists need to look into this debate more seriously, e.g., how each value promotes and prohibits individual cases of cognitive enhancements. Settling this debate is way beyond the purview of this thesis, but it is nonetheless important to flag the future direction of this inquiry.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I first addressed some differences between first-hand and second-hand knowledge. There are some senses in which first-hand knowledge is more desirable than testimonial knowledge, such as only the former being finally valuable and promoting the value of intellectual autonomy. In the second section, the social nature of our inquiry was explained. In the vast majority of cases, we defer to the opinions of others and are right to do so. In the third section, I have articulated what makes seeing things for ourselves more desirable than relying on testimony both socially and individually. In the final section, I introduced the value of intellectual receptivity derived from the receptivity in the realm of morality. This value is an antidote for an excessive desire for first-hand knowledge. Being intellectually receptive means having a positive attitude towards epistemic goods that cannot be controlled and appreciating such things as they are, and integrating them into our epistemic self. This value can help

explain what is missing in an agent who excessively desires to know everything first-hand. The value would help explain some intellectual virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, where we are not pursuing an epistemically self-reliant agent. In developing virtues of humility, we are hoping to excel at relying on the opinions of others or having an epistemically collaborative attitude. The value of intellectual receptivity goes hand in hand with the value of intellectual autonomy. Intellectual receptivity might play an essential role in understanding some intellectual virtues concerning obtaining our testimonial knowledge. Finally, I have sketched a potential case where the value of intellectual receptivity and intellectual autonomy may conflict in the form of the cognitive enhancement debate. Future research will spend more time on this debate.

Chapter 5 Toward the standpoint virtue epistemology

0. Introduction

In the past 30 years, running parallel to the advancement of virtue epistemology, another strand of epistemological theory of knowledge has undergone an outstanding development: this is *feminist standpoint theory* (henceforth, standpoint theory, for short). In this chapter, I will argue that virtue epistemologists can learn tremendously from standpoint theory. In the first section, I briefly explain the core thesis of standpoint epistemology and suggest the complexity the theory implies. If standpoint theory were on the right track, what can we say about virtue epistemology? In the second section, I provide a schematic view of standpoint virtue epistemology and then in the third present a possible scenario where social oppression promotes vices in different ways on the oppressed and non-oppressed. In the fourth section, I address some institutional interventions to our cognition called “nudge” theory (especially, nudge-enhanced exemplar stories). Nudges might help cure our vices. However, I will leave some cautionary remarks on how to set up nudges considering social oppression.

1. Standpoint theory

I aim at achieving three things in this section: first, I will portrait some core theses of standpoint epistemology. Second, I will highlight the important way the oppressed are epistemically disadvantaged. Third, I will lay out the complexities of our standpoint, virtue epistemology needs to incorporate in the future.

According to Alison Wylie's influential work, the central claim of standpoint theorists is called the *inversion thesis*: "those who are subject to structures of domination that systematically marginalize and oppress them may, in fact, be epistemically privileged in some crucial respects" (Wylie 2013, 26). So, women might be inclined to know certain things or know certain things in a better way than their male counterparts who are privileged, based on their experience and interpretation of their experiences. Wylie is careful to avoid two claims that are easily conflated with the inversion thesis: essentialism and the automatic privilege claim. It is not the case that the inversion thesis implies that a woman knows some things better because she's biologically a woman, nor that she knows some things better without doing anything on her part. It is, rather, the historically coincidental, social, political features of women that lead them to know some things better than men, who occupy a more dominant, oppressing, and central role in society. Hence:

Those who are economically dispossessed, politically oppressed, socially marginalized and are therefore likely to be discredited as epistemic agents—e.g., as uneducated, uninformed, unreliable—may actually have a capacity, by virtue of their standpoint, to know things that those occupying privileged positions typically do not know, or are invested in not knowing (or, indeed, are invested in systematically ignoring and denying) (Wylie 2013, 32).⁵³

⁵³ One might worry that such a theory would inevitably lead to a relativism of knowledge; this is not the case. Our standpoint is perhaps not objective: what standpoint theorists are committed to is the idea that objectivity, understood as the

Our standpoint, such as being women, people of color, being gay, or being poor, may confer some epistemic privilege. What kind of epistemic privileges can the oppressed obtain? I here apply Uma Narayan's analysis regarding the epistemic privileges of those who are oppressed. People who are systematically oppressed in society are in a better position to have "immediate subtle, and critical knowledge about their oppressed life" (Narayan 1988, 36). Such knowledge includes:

All the details of the ways in which their oppression is experienced, seen to be inflicted, and of the ways in which the oppression affects the major and minor details of their social and psychic lives. *They know first-hand* the detailed and concrete ways in which oppression defines the spaces in which they live and how it affects their lives (Narayan 1988, 36, italics added by the author).

Those who are oppressed are under pressure to develop the ability to grasp power dynamics for their survival in a way that people from the dominant group are not (Wylie

neutrality of the subject (such as, disengagement and affective distance from the claim), is not a necessary or a sufficient condition for reaching the objectivity which is one of the desirable characteristics of knowledge. Such objectivity as a property of knowledge consists of "fidelity to a rich body of evidence (empirical depth)" and the capacity for the claim to be "extended to a range of domains or applications (empirical breath)" (Wylie 2013, 33). Such objectivity as a characteristic of knowledge can be effectively achieved by individuals with particularly interested standpoints. Hence, Wylie has successfully shown the compatibility of the non-objective standpoint of the inquirer with objectivity as a desirable characteristic of knowledge.

2003, 35). But Narayan adds a cautionary remark on the nature of the epistemic advantages of the disadvantaged: such an epistemic privilege of the oppressed often lacks “clearer or better knowledge of the causes of their oppression” (Narayan 1988, 36). Why is this the case? It is because a part of the oppression they suffer is represented in the unequal access to epistemic resources, such as education and conceptual tools: by being denied access to the same kind of education or method of inquiry, they lack “detailed knowledge of the history of their oppression, conceptual tools with which to analyze its mechanisms” (36).⁵⁴

This final point that the oppressed enjoy an epistemic privilege together with the structural epistemic disadvantage will be of great importance in my discussion in the next section.⁵⁵ It is undoubtedly true that due to their unequal access to epistemic resources, the oppressed are systematically in a bad position to articulate where their

⁵⁴ According to Narayan, there is a possibility for people who are not members of the oppressed group to come to understand the experiences of the oppressed, but this is only feasible with a great deal of effort (Narayan 1988). She emphasizes that it is also a part of their responsibility to try to understand the experience of the oppressed. Extrapolating from Narayan’s description, what makes standpoint distinct from mere subjectivity is this difficulty of transmission of the privileged knowledge by the oppressed. I, as a philosopher, do not have knowledge of what it is like to be a lawyer, or a primary school teacher, yet this knowledge can be transmitted and obtained relatively easily through the testimony of lawyers and teachers, in a way that knowledge of black American life cannot be.

⁵⁵ This point about epistemic disadvantages of the oppressed resembles the hermeneutical injustice proposed by Miranda Fricker: “Hermeneutical injustice is: the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource” (M. Fricker 2007, 155).

oppression is coming from. Moreover, if unequal access to education and epistemic resources is a part of the very oppression people who are marginalized in the society are suffering, even if they actually have the epistemic privilege of first-hand knowledge of their oppressed life experiences, as Narayan and Wylie suggest, simultaneously, there is a structural difficulty in transferring such knowledge to the dominant group. The oppressed often lack epistemic access to an orthodoxy of knowledge consumption and production in their society, so even though they enjoy the epistemic advantage of immediate knowledge of their oppressed life, they are likely to suffer as regards effectively communicating it to the non-oppressed.⁵⁶

Before moving on to the next section, let me close this part with a cautionary tale about the way oppression has been simplified in the current debate. The idea that has been missing in the current debate is *intersectionality*. Various kinds of oppressions interact with one another in complex ways. It is in no doubt that women are marginalized in many patriarchal societies, yet the way white women are troubled by such oppression is very different from the way women of color experience it. Moreover, rich women of color might be able to mitigate the result of the social oppression they

⁵⁶ Ironically, this fact that the oppressed suffer from an unequal access to the epistemic resource also explains another dimension related to why they enjoy a kind of epistemic privilege. As Wylie points out, the oppressed have a “critical dissociation from the authoritative forms of knowledge that are born of and that serve (that legitimate and rationalize) positions of privilege” (Wylie 2013, 37). The oppressed are not interested in maintaining the world view of the dominant: rather, they suspect the epistemic authority in such a way that their standpoint might contribute to improving the objectivity of the knowledge in question (as a desirable characteristic of knowledge).

suffer by means of being rich (e.g., moving from one place to another) in a way that poor women of color cannot. Ann Garry's comprehensive characterization of intersectionality might be helpful, in order to obtain a better understanding of this phenomenon:

Oppression and privilege by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, class, nationality, and so on do not act independently of each other in our individual lives or in our social structures; instead, each kind of oppression or privilege is shaped by and works through the others. These compounded, intermeshed systems of oppression and privilege in our social structures help to produce (a) our social relations, (b) our experiences of our own identity, and (c) the limitations of shared interests even among members of "the same" oppressed or privileged group (Garry 2011, 827).

Thus, when we consider the effect of social oppression in our inquiry, talking only about being women, being non-white, etc. is too coarse-grained. Oppressive social structures work in more complex ways than I have portrayed in the earlier parts of this section, and failing to realize this intersectionality and providing interventions solely based on the experiences of those who are oppressed in one way yet privileged in another way will not be helpful for certain groups of people suffering from multiple oppressions. As the theorist who introduced the concept of intersectionality, Kimberley Crenshaw, states, "women of color are differently situated in the economic, social,

and political worlds. When reform efforts undertaken on behalf of women neglect this fact, women of color are less likely to have their needs met than women who are racially privileged” (Crenshaw 1991, 1250). A striking example of such a case are the interventions related to domestic violence established primarily with white women in mind: such interventions are not always helpful for victims who are women of color. Because women of color in the US suffer not only from oppression due to their gender, but also from oppression due to their race, and often also suffer from economic hardship, depending on the cultural background, there is a barrier for women of color to report violence to the authorities, which white women do not experience. For instance, when immigrant women can only apply for permanent residency after a certain period of time of marriage, they might prefer to remain married despite the fact that their spouse batters them, since they fear being deported. A woman suffering from domestic abuse whose cultural background means she has extended family of multiple generations may find it difficult even to be alone in the house in order to make a call to report her case (Crenshaw 1991, 1247–1252).

Intersectional analysis of oppression and privilege is, hence, crucial in fashioning remedies for issues arising from multifaceted social oppression in real life. In the same vein, I believe that intersectional analysis of oppression and privilege in inquiry needs to be combined with virtue epistemology, in the same way that we need to integrate standpoint theory into virtue epistemology. Nonetheless, this goes beyond the purview of the current thesis. In the next section, I will discuss how social oppression understood in a simpler way, such as the subordination of women, can change the

way we understand intellectual virtues and vices. Intersectional analysis of the inquirer is an extension of such a project, and I would like to expand my project in this direction in the near future. For a start, we can make valuable progress in virtue epistemology if we realize the systematic influence of social oppression on inquirers.

2. Social oppression and virtue epistemology

Standpoint theory illustrates one critical aspect of our inquiry that virtue epistemology has traditionally systematically failed to articulate: it is our oppressive social structures that form the epistemic divide between insider and outsider. Such a division even creates a niche epistemic privilege of the oppressed, in regard to their first-hand knowledge of their oppressed life experiences. Nonetheless, due to the oppression they suffer in the epistemic domain (lacking the epistemic tools and proper education), it is difficult to communicate their knowledge to people who are not oppressed. Virtue epistemologists have recognized the ways that oppressive social structures affect our efforts at inquiry, but they have not sufficiently incorporated such a factor into their analyses. More precisely, virtue epistemologists have perhaps been fully aware of the oppressive social structures in society, and their potential effect on individual inquirers, but they have taken them as one of the social factors influencing individuals' inquiries in the same way as other situational factors, and they did not consider having different approaches to vices depending on how the vices are primarily shaped. If a form of oppression is so systematic that it even shapes the epistemic privilege of the oppressed, it is no longer a negligible phenomenon that is happening at an individual

level. Until recently, there has been little study of the relationship between our standpoint as shaped by oppressive social structures and epistemic virtues. My view is that research on epistemic virtues should incorporate the standpoint of the inquirer more seriously. This goes beyond just seeing it as an external factor influencing individual inquirers.

I propose the idea that when we think of the cultivation of individual virtues and the avoidance of individual vices, social structure of oppression and subordination should be integrated more systematically into the virtue epistemological theory. I thus propose “standpoint virtue epistemology”. Where an oppressive social structure causes an epistemic divide in society in such a way that the oppressed have an epistemic privilege with regard to their oppressed lives, the oppressed are required to foster different kinds of intellectual virtues based on the standpoint of the inquirer. When virtue epistemologists take oppressing social structures into account, we can expect a few theoretical consequences: Whenever we ask ourselves how our individual character vices hinder our inquiry, we have to first take the oppressive social structures shaping our standpoint into account. If we find that the vice at issue is primarily shaped by the social oppression than individuals:

(1) The oppressed might be suffering from intellectual vices in a distinct way. This means that the oppressed might be encouraged to develop a different kind of virtues to the non-oppressed, or the oppressed might be encouraged to develop the same virtue as the non-oppressed but in a very different way.

(2) If so, epistemic virtue education should pay due attention to the vices of the oppressed, as well as those of the non-oppressed.

(3) Where the oppressed are required to cure a vice that is formed by social oppression, virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation should be facilitated socially more than individually.

Let me address these three claims one by one in the next section. Regarding the first point, what I am trying to establish is in line with Alessandra Tanesini's influential work on haughtiness, and intellectual timidity and servility (Tanesini 2016). In the beginning of the section in which she discusses how haughty behaviors shape the intellectual vice of timidity and servility on the recipients, she mentions that the influence of social oppression in the society is what is ultimately shaping this individual character vice.

Their ultimate causes lie in social relations of domination and subordination which are systematic. Nevertheless, these social causes have effects on individual psychologies and contribute to shaping people's characters. [...] It is my contention—although for reasons of space I cannot substantiate it here—that relations of domination shape the psychology of members of dominant groups so that they are extremely likely to become haughty and arrogant. A particularly pernicious consequence of this state of affairs is that haughty and arrogant behavior is most likely to be exhibited in interactions with members of

subordinated groups, since they are more likely to be judged as intellectually inferior and are less likely to have the power required to put a stop to the inappropriate behavior (Tanesini 2016, 86–87).

According to Tanesini's view, the intellectual vice of haughtiness leads to another kind of vice of timidity and servility on the side of the receivers of haughty behaviors. Timidity and servility often co-developed, due to two kinds of interacting silencing behaviors. When someone is not given a proper opportunity to speak up in conversation, they are subject to locutionary silencing. Haughty individuals are irresponsible in such a way that they often violate rules of turn-taking during conversation, and hence they locutionary silence their conversation partners: they interrupt others, and talk for too long; such a disposition is disrespectful and harmful.

When people are subject to locutionary silencing repeatedly, they will be intimidated and will choose to stay silent, and they eventually become timid. They do not get the respect that they are due as inquirers. In a similar way, when someone asserts something, we make ourselves accountable to others in terms of the content of the assertion. Yet such an assertion misfires if the receiver does not even recognize it as an assertion. In this way, a speaker is subject to illocutionary silencing. Haughty individuals inappropriately dismiss others' assertions. When this is done repeatedly, individuals are humiliated, and eventually they defer to the other's view too easily; they become servile (Tanesini 2016, 87–90).

Tanesini notes that we often observe such locutionary and illocutionary silencing where there is a systematic social relation of “domination and subordination” (86) between speakers and hearers. In a society where women are subordinated to men, the vice of haughtiness often belongs to men, whereas timidity and servility are observed among women (claiming this does not exclude cases of some men being timid, and some women being haughty). It is in no doubt, as Tanesini points out, that “these social causes have effects on individual psychologies and contribute to shaping people’s characters” (86). Tanesini is right in pointing out that oppressive social structures in society shape some vices. On top of her analysis of the vice shaped by social oppression, I further believe we need a deferential approach to the vice primarily shaped by social oppression. Where there is a systematic social relation of oppression, in such a way that this oppression shapes our standpoint, we should consider this social contribution as more fundamental to the formation of intellectual vice, and hence more fundamental to considerations of how to get rid of them. Where there is systematic oppression, their standpoint makes individuals’ vicious behaviors more intelligible. To put it more crudely, the true nature of such an intellectual vice is made clear when we shed light on the systematic oppression in the society.

If an individual suffers from an intellectual vice primarily because of the oppressive social structure, she might be suffering from a particular vice, hence she would be encouraged to develop a virtue in a different way than a non-oppressed person. In my opinion, social oppression is more than just one way the environment surrounding the agent influences our behavior, but I would like to argue that such

cases are of greater importance for virtue epistemologists and need a special attention. In the next section, I hope to show why such an approach is necessary, by showing that doing otherwise yields epistemic harm to the oppressed.

3. Social Oppression and Intellectual Vices

In the previous section, I have proposed the following three claims about standpoint virtue epistemology. When a vice is primarily shaped by social oppression:

(1) The oppressed might be suffering from intellectual vices in a distinct way. This means that the oppressed might be encouraged to develop a different kind of virtues to the non-oppressed, or the oppressed might be encouraged to develop the same virtue as the non-oppressed but in a very different way.

(2) If so, epistemic virtue education should pay due attention to the vices of the oppressed, as well as those of the non-oppressed.

(3) Where the oppressed are required to cure a vice that is formed by social oppression, virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation should be facilitated socially more than individually.

In this section, I hope to show these claims are on the right track, by portraying a case where a social oppressive structure shape vices on the oppressed and non-oppressed in different ways.

The main body of research on individual virtues and vices has been conducted within a Western cultural background. The epistemic virtue of humility is a popular virtue, but I doubt if the same argument applies in other societies where social

oppression works in a different way. The virtue of humility is important when our epistemic life is impeded by the people in the society who fail to comply with it. But there are many ways to fall prey to vices.

Consider a case of Japanese female.⁵⁷ The Japanese are known to provide inaccurate responses in self-assessment tasks in psychology experiments. They underestimate how well they do in tasks unlike their Western counterparts, even in an anonymous condition.⁵⁸ According to Yamagishi and his colleagues who conducted this research, Japanese are socially pressured to be “modest” and, an underestimation of their ability among Japanese is known to be their default strategy

⁵⁷ Here, I am not arguing that there is something inherently different among eastern cultures compared to the west. The difference I hope to articulate here is contingent. We saw that Wylie's inversion thesis did not commit to essentialism and the automatic privilege claim. Similarly, my claim about the intellectual vice of Japanese women does not commit to essentialism and automatic privilege claim, either. It is, instead, the historically coincidental, social, political features of Japanese women that lead them to shape certain vices. The critical point to make is that social oppression shapes our standpoint in varied ways; then, the vices created thereof are also different from society to society.

⁵⁸ An interesting twist of Yamagishi's study is that the observed self-effacing effect among Japanese participants was found to disappear, and was even reversed (hence, became self-enhancing), when they were given a small amount of money (equivalent to 3 dollars). Yamagishi believes that this is because Japanese have a default “do-not-offend-others strategy” (Yamagishi et al. 2012 , 63), and such a strategy is mitigated by the bonus. This finding is fascinating and it might be key when searching for a cure for the intellectual servility among Japanese. Yet, considering that we normally are not explicitly given economic incentives in judging how well we perform, the self-effacing effect observed among Japanese remains insightful for the current debate.

(Yamagishi et al. 2012).⁵⁹ Researchers have found that women tend to apply a lower assessment of their own ability than their male counterparts; this self-effacing tendency has been observed across cultures (Furnham et al. 2001). Note that broadly Aristotelian virtue theorists including many virtue epistemologists believe that virtue is a mean between two vices. Then, virtue of humility is a mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility (Whitcomb et al. 2017).⁶⁰ Intellectually arrogant people act like epistemic authorities due to their inflated self. Intellectually servile people, on the other hand, defer to others' views too much because they are repeatedly silenced by their conversation partners (Tanesini 2016). Intellectual servility is an epistemic vice because it impedes our responsible inquiry (Cassam 2016). When there is a social pressure to be modest, unlike in other society, Japanese, and especially Japanese women, are more inclined to be epistemically servile.

It is true that both for those who are arrogant and servile, intellectual humility is lacking, yet how we can cure such vices and how we should aim to develop humility differ significantly in those two cases. The rehabilitation processes the intellectually arrogant need to go through would be different from those of the intellectually servile.

⁵⁹ A default strategy means a rule people adopt when what kind of decision rule should be used is not clear. In collectivistic societies where the cost of being excluded from the social relationship is very high, the best rule to adopt is avoid actions to offend others. Be modest is hence, the default strategy in such a collectivistic society (Yamagishi et al. 2012, 61).

⁶⁰ For another interpretation of intellectual humility, see also (Priest 2017; Pritchard 2018). However, settling the debate of intellectual humility is beyond the purview of this chapter.

Those who are socially oppressed, i.e. Japanese females, need to acquire the virtue of humility via battling with their intellectual servility. If virtue epistemology only focuses on how to be humble by battling with intellectual arrogance, oppressed Japanese females will be left out of the debate, and such a “cure” for the arrogant might even worsen the servility of Japanese females, if applied inappropriately. If a study of humility available in a society was centered around the problem of arrogance as against humility, it would not only be unhelpful for Japanese women, it might also perpetuate their oppression. First, they might lack epistemic resources to cure their servility, and, second, the epistemic resources in the society would be invested in the rehabilitation of the vice of the non-oppressed. Is this not yet another form of social oppression in the domain of epistemology?

It might be argued here that, if we take Tanesini’s argument at face value, it is the haughtiness of the non-oppressed that is creating the servility on the side of the oppressed. Curing the former is actually helpful for curing the latter, so why should we be bothered by the vice of servility? Due to the nature of vices, it is fair to say that mitigating vice (of any kind) is always good. In this sense, I agree that any project that seeks to avoid falling prey to intellectual haughtiness is desirable. And since the fact that haughtiness contributes to creating servility of the oppressed, it might also be true, to some extent, that getting rid of the haughtiness of the oppressor might reduce the servility of the oppressed. Nonetheless, I think there is a sense in which studying the vices that oppressors suffer, but not those of the oppressed, is not quite right: that is, in the sense of distributive justice. Epistemic resources, such as intellectual virtue

education, need to be distributed fairly. As Miranda Fricker describes, where distributive justice is at issue, “we picture social agents who have an interest in various goods, some of them epistemic, and question whether everyone is getting their fair share” (M. Fricker 2007, 1). If epistemic virtue education does not pay attention to the vices the marginalized are suffering, we cannot say that they are getting their fair share. When we think about how to cultivate virtues, and avoid vices, such epistemic education ought to be distributed fairly. Doing otherwise is unfair to certain groups of people: in the current debate, it is unfair to the oppressed who suffer from intellectual servility, such as Japanese females. Noting that they already suffer from the oppressive social structure, such an unfair distribution of epistemic resources even perpetuates their oppression. In this way, when an oppressive social structure shapes particular vices of the oppressed in a different way to the non-oppressed, they are encouraged to develop particular virtues depending on their standpoints, and epistemic virtue education should pay due attention to the vice of the oppressed as such.

Let us now move on to the final point. I believe that in cases like the above, where the oppressed are required to develop virtues in a special way due to their standpoint, virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation ought to be facilitated socially more than individually. My view here reflects Elizabeth Anderson’s position in the debate between Anderson and Miranda Fricker on counteracting epistemic injustice (Anderson 2012; M. Fricker 2007, 2010). Among two cases of vice of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice, I will focus on testimonial

injustice in the following discussion, yet the same thing can be said for the case of hermeneutical injustice. In Miranda Fricker's original formulation, the central case of testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer discounts a speaker's credibility due to prejudice against the speaker because of her social identity (M. Fricker 2007, 28). If juries did not believe the testimony of a black man because he is black, despite overwhelming evidence in line with his testimony, he is suffering from testimonial injustice on the part of the hearer. The vice of testimonial injustice should be counteracted by cultivating a virtue of epistemic justice among vicious individuals. Such a virtue could be obtained innately, in theory. Yet in many cases it is corrective in nature: the virtue of epistemic justice operates in such a way that people correct their own prejudice via reflection. By increasing the credibility level of the speaker, making their own judgement vague and more tentative, by suspending their judgement, by seeking out further evidence, "the virtuous hearer neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements" (M. Fricker 2007, 92). Though she admits its difficulty, Fricker's approach is individualistic, as it implies that the main strategy for counteracting testimonial injustice should be operated at the level of individuals.

By contrast, Anderson believes we need to stress institutional solutions to testimonial injustice. First and foremost, Anderson is skeptical about ideas of reflectively correcting prejudices, which are a kind of cognitive bias. It is in the nature of bias that it is difficult to control and that it is insulated from our consciousness. Moreover, while Fricker's original testimonial injustice relied on individuals' social

identity prejudice, Anderson argues that disadvantaged social groups can be unjustly denied credibility in structural forms, and such structural credibility deficits are more pervasive than Fricker acknowledged. For instance, individuals make use of various *markers of credibility* when making credibility judgements, such as education, and rightly so. “Yet in societies that systematically deprive disadvantaged social groups of access to a decent education, the use of such markers in assessing credibility will tend to exclude those groups from further participation in inquiry” (Anderson 2012, 169). Where there is a differential access to markers of credibility for people from marginalized groups, there is a structural cause of their testimonial injustice. And to counteract such a structurally formed testimonial injustice, institutional epistemic justice is called for. Anderson writes:

In the face of massive structural injustice, individual epistemic virtue plays a comparable role to the practice of individual charity in the context of massive structural poverty. Just as it would be better and more effective to redesign economic institutions so as to prevent mass poverty in the first place, it would be better to reconfigure epistemic institutions so as to prevent epistemic injustice from arising. Structural injustices call for structural remedies. (Anderson 2012, 171).

In a similar vein, where there is a structural cause for the formation of a vice of the oppressed, I believe it calls for structural remedies. In cases like intellectual servility

of the oppressed, institutional remedies will be more effective than individual vice rehabilitation and virtue cultivation. (It goes without saying that this approach is not hostile to an individual approach. Instead, I am skeptical about the sole use of such an approach in solving the problem of the structurally formed vice). As, Anderson suggests, transactionally innocent behaviors of individuals might help foster the intellectual vices of the oppressed. Earlier, we saw how a haughty individual locutionarily silences people who are oppressed in the society (e.g., women) in Tanesini's argument. However, those who locutionarily silence women might not always be haughty individuals. Similar to Anderson's example, imagine a marker of credibility in the domain of political debate in Japan. If being a professional politician functions as a marker of credibility in political debate, women are locutionarily silenced in Japan, where only 10.2% of lawmakers (in the house of representatives) are female, giving Japan the rank of 165 out of 193 countries as for the numbers of female lawmakers (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2019). In such a society, Japanese women will be inclined to be servile when debating political issues in public. The difficulty is that those vices are formed partly by benign behaviors of individuals (when seen from the transactional level) and yet women are treated unjustly when seen from the structural level. If those structures are fostering a vice of intellectual servility of Japanese women, then institutional change might help change the status quo.

Another reason why an institutional remedy is called for the vice of the oppressed is because there is a sense in which society would be benefitted by rehabilitating the oppressed with respect to their vice. Since the oppressed suffer from vices such as

timidity and servility, such vices get in the way of incorporating the first-hand knowledge of the oppressed in the knowledge pool of a society. Remember the inversion thesis: the debate about the epistemic privilege of the oppressed. We have seen that those who are systematically oppressed in society are pressured to develop an ability to understand power dynamics for their own survival in a way that people from dominant groups are not, and, consequently, the oppressed are in a better position to have immediate, subtle and critical knowledge about their oppressed life first-hand. Also, remember the discussion of first-hand knowledge in chapter 4. Not everyone is required to obtain knowledge first-hand, but for every piece of knowledge, there must be some groups of people who are in charge of maintaining the chain of non-testimonial evidence of knowledge. Coincidental factors, like their standpoint, confer on the oppressed first-hand knowledge that the non-oppressed cannot easily obtain. This means that although the oppressed have valuable first-hand knowledge of their oppressed life, it is compartmentalized in such a way that people from dominant group cannot easily access it. The function of the knowledge pool is to help our social life, yet such a pool is malfunctioning when some valuable knowledge is blocked and is not accessible for all. It was also pointed out that the first-hand knowledge of oppression possessed by the oppressed is difficult to communicate to the non-oppressed due to their unequal access to epistemic resources, such as education. The intellectual vice of the oppressed makes it even more difficult for the society to circulate and appreciate their first-hand knowledge about their oppressed

life. To improve the knowledge pool in the society, an institutional remedy is necessary to rehabilitate them with regard to their intellectual vice.

In this section, I have proposed three steps to improve the individualistic framework of virtue epistemology. I believe traditional virtue epistemologists have been too individualistic in thinking how vice is formed. There are cases where individual vice is primarily formed because of systematic social oppression. When intellectual vice is formed by systematic social oppression, we need special care for such cases. The oppressed often suffer from vices in different ways from dominant groups: treating such vice of the oppressed separately from the vice of the dominant is vitally important from a distributive justice point of view. And when the intellectual vice of the oppressed is structurally formed, a structural remedy is called for. This is also needed in order to improve the knowledge pool of the society.

4. Nudging in oppressed societies

In this section of the chapter, I consider a particular type of institutional intervention in character building: Nudging, concerning the current debate of social oppression and standpoints. As the advocates of nudging strategy, Thaler and Sunstein define nudging as an intervention in “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6). Some theorists are interested in integrating nudging in character building (Engelen et al. 2018). I will

argue that nudging in character education can be a form of structural remedy for vices but add a cautionary remark about how we should implement such strategies.

Before moving on to the debate, we first need to address the nature of nudging. Unlike other paternalistic interventions to contents of our choices, nudges are exploiting our psychology, appeal to our unconscious decision-making mechanisms; choices are structured in such a way people can attain the designed goal with less cognitive effort. Take a famous cafeteria case: school can promote a healthy diet among students by rearranging the order of the food shown in cafeteria by manipulating the effect of our psychology that we are prone to choose things presented earlier than the later (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). In such a scenario, there is

a manipulation of people's choices via the choice architecture, i.e. the way in which the choices are presented to them. This works in the following way. Choices are structured such that some psychological mechanism leads people toward options that are either thought to be in their own best interest or thought to be in society's best interest. In all cases of Nudge, if the choice situation had not been so structured, then people would be less prone to make the choice that is either in their own or in society's interest (Bovens 2009, 208).⁶¹

⁶¹ The advocate of nudging strategy believe that manipulations of our choice architecture are not at all as problematic as it may sound: as in every case of our decision making, our choices are presented in certain ways, our decisions are taking place in certain choice architecture anyway, it does not matter if such a choice

In theory, it is a feasible option to set up nudges to constrain our behaviors by ourselves (Bovens 2009, 215-216); however, most nudges are provided by someone else with good intentions. My main concern for this section is, among others, nudges set up to promote our character education by any authoritative institutions. Engelen and his colleagues proposed nudge-influenced character-building strategies about exemplars. Namely, they believe we can improve the use of exemplar stories through nudge strategies in three ways.⁶² We should tell a story about our exemplars in such a way that their stories are particularly emotionally laden, and that the exemplars are more relatable to the hearers, and that the narrative elicits our admiration for the exemplars. These strategies exploit the way we are emotionally triggered by the story, the way the perceived relatability between exemplars and ourselves influences our behavior, and the way we are triggered to feel more admiration so that we can imitate the exemplars (Engelen et al. 2018, 352-355). I am aware that constructing “nudge-enhanced exemplar stories” (Engelen et al. 2018, 357) is just one way we can

architecture were consciously designed or not. This argument is called an argument from ubiquity (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 83).

⁶² According to Engelen and his colleagues, exemplar stories are by nature nudges: “moral exemplars are typically embedded in narrative structures whereby certain features of the choice situation are highlighted and others rendered less salient. As such, exemplar stories are already nudges. They employ at least the following nudge strategies from Sunstein’s list: (2) making information available; (7) personalizing information; (8) framing (moral) choices; and (9) rendering options salient” (Engelen et al. 2018, 351).

institutionally intervene in vice rehabilitation and virtue cultivation. However, for the sake of argument, I will focus on this strategy in the following discussion.

We can think of two cases where standpoint matters in nudge-enhanced exemplar stories. In the first case, the vices at issue are formed primarily by social oppression in the society (let us imagine again, the case of intellectual servility among Japanese females). In such a scenario, what I have argued in the previous section directly applies: special care for the vices of the oppressed is called for. In a nutshell, by nudging, we should cure vices of the oppressed as well as the non-oppressed. When we tell stories about our exemplars that are emotionally laden, relatable to the hearers, and elicits our admiration for the exemplars, the society should consciously construct nudges so that they address the vice of the oppressed. Some of the exemplar stories of the intellectually humble (or stories of the exemplar being not servile) should be provided in such a way the oppressed, i.e., Japanese females can feel emotionally aroused, being relatable to, and elicit their admiration.

In the second case, where the vices at issue are formed primarily individually (not by the social oppression in the society), what can we say about nudges for curing the vices? Even in these cases, there is a sense in which we still need to pay attention to the social oppression and standpoints in nudging. We should be wary of nudging where we can expect the oppressed to react differently to the manipulated choice architecture, due to their standpoint. If nudge-enhanced exemplar stories about the intellectually courageous people available in the society happened to be white male figures, people of color or women might not feel the same extent of admiration or

found him relatable unlike their white or male counterparts. In such a scenario, the oppressed in the society may not take the nudged choice as salient as it is initially designed. If nudge-enhanced exemplar stories could promote intellectual vice rehabilitation (and intellectual virtue cultivation, subsequently) as Engelen expects, even for vices primarily shaped by individuals, we need to worry about social oppression when we set up the nudge-enhanced exemplar stories.

People might worry about why we must pay special attention to social oppression in nudging. At the end of the day, our personal preferences might have similar countervailing effects on nudges. If an intellectually courageous person in the exemplar story coincidentally looks very much like a person bullied you in the past, you might not be emotionally triggered to emulate the exemplar as the designer intended. If you are interested in cultivating open-mindedness for whatever reason, you are prone to emulate the exemplar regardless of nudges. Contrary to the designer's intention, not everyone would indeed react to nudges. The reason why I believe we should pay special attention to social oppressions is: social oppressions often occur along with categories of social identity (racial, political, sexual, religious) that are essential to one's identity, essential to who the person is (M. Fricker 2007, 54). This implication for our identity is an essential difference between social oppression and mere personal preference. Institutional interventions should benefit the mass but, simultaneously, they should not perpetuate the pre-existing injustices in society. We need to avoid any systematic harm done to our identity. In this sense, even in cases of the vice primarily shaped by individuals, social oppression, and the

standpoint thereof needs to be taken into serious consideration when we construct nudges to cure such vices. I will come back to this point, and the details of the pedagogical implication of exemplars concerning virtue cultivation will be discussed in more depth later in the final chapter.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, my aim was to incorporate standpoint theory into virtue epistemology. I have challenged the ideal of the objectivity of the inquirer by introducing the recent work of standpoint theory. According to standpoint theory, systematic social oppression creates privileged knowledge on the side of the oppressed. The oppressed have first-hand privileged knowledge about their oppressed life that the non-oppressed would find hard to grasp. Simultaneously, a part of the oppression they suffer is epistemic in form: they lack tools and sufficient education to communicate their privileged knowledge to the non-oppressed. As already hinted in the work by Tanesini, social oppression systematically contributes to our vice formation: it systematically fosters intellectual vices in a distinct way for the oppressed compared to the non-oppressed. Vices created this way by social oppression need special attention and care. Where social oppressions foster intellectual vices, these cases are not the same as the mere situational influences. The oppressed are suffering in an epistemically unique way: their valuable first-hand knowledge of their oppressed experience are not easily transferable. Treating the vice of the oppressed would be just from distributive justice point of view. Doing otherwise, the oppressed

would fail to have a fair share of epistemic virtue education. Moreover, not treating their vice prevents their privileged knowledge being transmitted in the society further. When our vices are formed primarily by social oppression, such vices should be addressed institutionally. Lastly, the same consideration may apply to when we consider some concrete cases of institutional interventions to cure vices and foster virtues. Rearranging the way our choices are presented with the intention of changing our behavior by exploiting the knowledge of our decision making, nudging might help make some exemplar stories look salient and attractive. In doing so, it was suggested that we should emphasize the emotional, relatable, and admirable aspects of the exemplar-stories. Nudges are one way we can approach our vices institutionally. What might be missing in this picture is again, social oppression and our standpoint. Virtue epistemology developed in the past 30 years has, without a second thought, inherited some old values prevalent in modern epistemology, yet I hope to have shown that it is high time to reconsider some of them: paying proper attention to our epistemic standpoint created by the social pressure would be of great importance. It is a myth in many cases that our intellectual vices are formed individually. Some of them were primarily fostered by the oppressive social structures in the society. Virtue epistemologists should incorporate insights from feminist philosophy on social oppression and standpoint into their theory, and such insight will help construct institutional scaffoldings to cure our vices.

Chapter 6 Diversification of Exemplars: Educating through Emulation and Imitation

0. Introduction

In this chapter, I have two aims: first, to give some suggestions in relation to emulation-based virtue epistemology, to enable greater sophistication of our understanding of them, based on the study of imitation and emulation in psychology; second, to engage with a diversity and inclusion problem in academia, especially in philosophy, and to suggest some pedagogical implications. I will explore how emulation-based virtue epistemology, represented by Zagzebski's recently proposed exemplarism, can be related to recent studies on social distances in imitating behaviors in psychology, and I will make clear the implications of such investigation for the education of character: diversification of exemplars. In the first section, I will define emulation-based virtue theory in order to initiate the discussion. In the second section, the recent study of the influence of psychological distance on copying and learning behaviors will be addressed. Third, I will argue, based on the aforementioned studies, for diversification of exemplars. In the fourth section, the problem of diversity and inclusion in philosophy will be addressed, based on the argument I have formulated. I will argue that philosophers who endorse emulation-based virtue cultivation, especially in the domain of epistemology, must also accept and promote diversification of those models that are emulated in society. Particularly in philosophy, this leads to the promotion of hiring people from underrepresented groups in the

community, such as women, people of color, and the disabled population; this also promotes diverse reading lists in philosophy classes.

1. Emulation-based virtue theory

In this section, my aim is to lay out an overview of emulation-based virtue epistemology, and present the potential concern I have identified, which such a view needs to address.

Virtue epistemologists in the Aristotelian tradition, broadly construed (e.g. Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011), in line with virtue ethics (Hursthouse 1999), endorse common assumptions on the nature of virtues: virtues are habituated character traits; and virtues are inherently related to, if not constitutive of, a good life. I use the term “virtue theory” here as an umbrella term to refer to both virtue epistemology and virtue ethics, but the focus of my thesis is on virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemologists are not entirely in agreement on how we actually cultivate such epistemic virtues and avoid or correct epistemic vices. According to Porter, there are four standard approaches to virtue inculcation: (1) direct instruction on the nature and importance of the virtues; (2) exposure to exemplars of the virtues; (3) the practice of virtuous behaviors and the resultant habituation of virtuous dispositions; and (4) crafting environments that enculturate virtue (Porter 2015, 222).⁶³ My discussion in this chapter addresses the second strand in his list: exposure to the exemplars of the

⁶³ See David Carr's work for educational theories of moral virtues (Carr 1996, 2003, 2017).

virtues. Before moving on to present my main concern with such a view, let me first clarify some central concepts I will use throughout this chapter.

Who are exemplars? Models and exemplars are those who are perceived as excellent in some respect, in other words, they are human examples that have “achieved a kind of normative force” (Warnick 2009, 5). Students or novices are attracted to a model’s display of their virtuous traits, and “thereby inspired to approach a subject matter with the disposition that has been exemplified” (Porter 2015, 222). Porter’s description indicates that exemplars are always people with admirable character traits: moral or epistemic. Zagzebski also thinks exemplars have good character traits: exemplars are those who obtain excellent, acquired psychological features (Zagzebski 2017, 64)⁶⁴. Thus, exemplars are a kind of model with certain characters traits. In line with their usage, in this chapter, I use the terms ‘exemplar’, ‘model’, and ‘role-model’ respectively. Exemplars are a subset of models and it is harder for us to achieve exemplarity than merely to become a model or role-model. Both role-models and exemplars instantiate some excellences in a certain domain, and exemplars instantiate them more fully and extensively in the area of virtues (See

⁶⁴ Epistemic virtues are directly relevant to my second aim of this chapter: engaging with a diversity and inclusion problem in academia, especially in philosophy. According to virtue epistemologists: epistemic virtuous persons are intrinsically motivated by epistemic goods (such as truth, knowledge, and wisdom) and they successfully develop certain dispositions out of this motivation (Baehr 2011, Zagzebski 1996). Academic philosophers are known to be critical thinkers, pursuing epistemic goods for their own sake, and we would expect novices see philosophers as epistemic exemplars or epistemic role models.

also Gibson and Dolan 2003; Vos 2018). In this chapter the domain I am chiefly concerned with as such is the excellences of our epistemic character traits, known as epistemic virtues, but I assume what we can say about models can also be said of exemplars, and role-models, other things being equal.

The next point of clarification is on emulation and imitation. In this chapter, I differentiate imitation from emulation in the following way: imitation here corresponds to copying the end state of an observed action by executing the same movements as performed by the modeled person, while emulation corresponds to reproducing the same end state of an observed action, but not necessarily by the same movements as the models use. This definition of imitation and emulation is endorsed by psychologists (Hansen, Alves, and Trope 2016) as well as a philosopher (Warnick 2009, 6) in the relevant debate. Throughout the chapter I use imitative behavior as an umbrella term to refer both imitation and emulation.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Some philosophers propose, similarly, yet another distinction between imitation and emulation. They take emulation as including a strong cognitive component. Novices who emulate find the character(s) of the model attractive and hence motivated to act like her, while they can imitate people's behavior without valuing their characters. Sanderse (2013) characterizes imitation as conditioning, while in emulations "first, there is the learner's understanding of why the quality that is possessed by the model is worthy of being valued. Second, the learner will need some thinking about the ways in which he can alter himself in order to acquire the quality" (36). Kristjánsson also points out that blind copying is different from emulation, as emulating the exemplar should "help you to arrive at an articulate conception of what you value and want to strive towards and to help you find realistic means ('fulfillable duties') to that end" (Kristjánsson 2007, 40). I do not commit to a strongly cognitive interpretation of emulation like Sanderse and Kristjánsson in this thesis. Even in my weaker account, novices who emulate the model know the end state they are aiming

Next, I will briefly address three philosophers' formulations of emulation-based theory, from epistemology and also from virtue ethics: those of Zagzebski, Kristjánsson, and Battaly. By doing so, I aim to provide a better grasp of what kind of theory I mean by emulation-based virtue theory. Among many theorists, in recent years, Zagzebski has proposed an extensive emulation-based theory, now known as exemplarism (Zagzebski 2010, 2017): she takes it that an exemplar is a "paradigmatically good person" (2010, 54), such as a saint, hero, or sage. Such exemplars are most admirable people; we imitate exemplars through our emotion of admiration (Zagzebski 2010, 52-55).

Another emulation theorist, Kristján Kristjánsson, analyses emulation as having four elements: affective, conative, cognitive and behavioral. When we see a role-model, we feel envy because we lack the desired quality of the model (affective) and are motivated to be like the model (conative), but by doing so, we also need to develop an understanding of why this quality is worth pursuing and how it is to be pursued in

to achieve; in this sense, there is a minimal cognitive element even in the concept of emulation. There is another reason why I do not hold the strong cognitive view: if knowing the value of the trait is necessary for emulating someone, it remains a mystery how emulation is initiated to begin with. At least in the initial stage of virtue cultivation, I see no way that emulation can occur without an understanding of why the trait of the model is worthy of being pursued. I believe such understanding can be obtained by the help of another means such as direct instruction on the nature of virtues (Porter 2015). I do believe virtue cultivation by emulation and imitation goes hand in hand with other means; however, I doubt they are necessary for the concept of emulation *per se*.

our own life (cognitive), and we must actually act to obtain such a quality (behavioral) (Kristjánsson 2007, 45).

How we obtain epistemic virtues through emulation and imitation are still an area that has not been fully developed by virtue epistemologists, yet Battaly (2016) recently provided the idea of rehabilitating our epistemic vice by emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is an involuntary non-cognitive process that enables us to catch emotions from other people (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994). Battaly suggests, in brief, putting vicious people in a friendly environment with epistemic exemplars so that vicious people can 'catch' the virtuous emotions of exemplars via contagion. This is also, I believe, a type of emulation-based theory, because virtuous people in friendly environments are perceived as models in some respect by vicious agents, and vicious agents (are expected to) behave in the same way as the virtuous.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Related to the footnote 65, some people might argue that it is not clear whether vicious agents in a friendly environment are moved to genuine emulation by emotional contagion, because emotional contagion is an involuntary non-cognitive process by definition. It is contradictory to the Aristotelian-Kristjánsson's analysis of the emotion of emulation (Kristjánsson 2007). Indeed, vicious agents might not consciously be able to access the value of the character exemplified by the exemplars in the situation. But how well novices can articulate the values of the character exemplified by exemplars seems to be a matter of degree. For instance, it is not hard to imagine a person who finds the virtue of humility exemplified by a model attractive, and yet not be able to explain why she feels so during the initial stage of her virtue cultivation. Denying the status of emulation entirely in such cases would amount to ignoring the rich developmental aspects of virtue acquisition and vice rehabilitations (Battaly, 2016). However, settling this issue goes beyond the purview of this thesis.

By addressing some basic concepts and representative views in the debate, I can offer a summary view that *emulation-based virtue theories* are virtue-epistemological and virtue-ethical theories that endorse emulation and imitation of exemplars as an important way to cultivate virtue and correct vices: exemplars would serve as a guide for our moral and epistemic virtues. The distinct characteristic of emulation has been identified as the concreteness of the case and subsequent motivating power. By being exposed to exemplars, we can see “what the virtue looks like in action, and, because of this, the value of the virtue is more vivid, which increases the attractiveness of the virtue and therefore one’s desire to acquire the virtuous disposition” (Porter 2015, 222). Emulation thus affords us vivid, direct appreciation of virtues, going beyond abstract conceptual apprehension. Emulation-based virtue theories do not hold that emulation is the exclusive way of undertaking virtue cultivation. Insofar as emulation plays an important role in our processes of education, it is sufficient to call such a view an emulation-based virtue theory and the argument I will propose in this chapter goes along with such an understanding.

Lastly, let me propose my potential concern for emulation-based virtue theories. In supporting virtue theories, those philosophers aim to make a claim that applies to all rational beings, regardless of person-related aspects and properties of our socio-cultural background, such as gender, ethnicity, cultural background, and sexual orientation. Both women and men, people of color and whites, from East to West, are understood as proper candidates for epistemic virtue acquisition. In other words:

virtues can and should be sought after by these people, regardless of the subjective and contextual particularities of their identity and standpoint, *ceteris paribus*.⁶⁷

With this in mind, if certain groups of people are shown to be marginalized in respect of this virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation, because of their person-related characteristics, there is a problem the theory needs to address. If, for instance, it turns out that in the current society, the emulation of exemplars is an effective way of cultivating virtues only in the white, male, English-speaking, heterosexual population, such a theory would need substantive modification.⁶⁸ Let me call these assumptions, taken together, the impartiality assumption. If the impartiality assumption of virtues is correct, what can we say with regard to emulation-based virtue theories, more specifically? If it were shown that person A and person B's imitative behaviors turn out to be systematically different, although both A and B are motivated to emulate,

⁶⁷ Imitative behaviors do not always occur for wide variety of reasons: we only imitate some actions, not all actions (Warnick 2009, Chapter 5), we sometimes fail to properly admire exemplars through distortion such as envy (Zagzebski 2017, Chapter 2). Some will have a better understanding of the virtue that is necessary for the acquisition of the virtue in question than others (Annas 2011, 19). Some may have personal preferences determining whom they will admire over others. I agree with their line of argument; however, I am chiefly concerned with variations in imitative behaviors that may exist, even when such factors are held fixed.

⁶⁸ For example, Zagzebski has given a detailed analysis of the nature of admiration (Zagzebski 2017, chapter 4), such as the possibility of mistakenly admiring non-exemplary persons, as well as some cases where envy distorts our admiration. However, the cases I have in mind here: where, given the same feeling of admiration, two people admire an exemplary person in their society (e.g., a sage-like figure, such as a famous scientist), and yet imitate that person in different manners, has remained unexamined in her discussion.

understand the importance of the virtue in question, and admire the same exemplar: emulation-based virtue theorists need to investigate why such differences exist, and, if such difference hinders one from pursuing virtues, how to mitigate such differences needs to be addressed. The question arises, then, whether there exists any case that supports the idea that our imitative behaviors may vary depending solely on who we are. I am going to argue that such cases exist in the next section.

2. Emulation and imitation in construal-level theory

My question is: is there any variety in our imitative behaviors and practices, and, if so, what impact does such variation have on the theories? I will address some empirical findings on our imitative behavior and distances: distance from the model with regards to the excellences, and distances among persons. The first kind of findings suggest that our emulative behaviors vary according to how close and attainable the models are to us in the relevant domain. However, and more importantly, our emulative behavior might be influenced by more subtle differences between the model and the self than attainability and relevance, namely, based on our person-related characteristics. I will address a psychological theory called construal-level theory (CLT) and its findings to demonstrate this point.

Since an early study conducted in the 1990s, perceived relevance between the model and the subject has explained differences of the imitability of the model. In Lockwood and Kunda's experiment, first-year accounting students and fourth-year accounting students were exposed to a story of an outstandingly successful fourth-

year accounting student. The first-year students were more inspired by such a model than the fourth-year students, and, moreover, the fourth-year students rated the target as less “relevant to them”. This finding was explained by the fact that the first-year students who had not yet tackled the course thought that the success of the superstar was attainable to them. For fourth-year students, superstar status was evidently not attainable; hence, they not only try to reduce their closeness to the model to reduce the model’s threat to them, they even denigrated the comparison process in the open-ended explanations of their relevance ratings in the experiment (Lockwood and Kunda 1997, 96–99).

More recently, Han and his colleagues conducted experiments on imitability in emulation. Students who read stories of attainable moral exemplars (e.g., a story about a student who helps disadvantaged kids for an hour per week) were more likely to increase voluntary service activity engagement than those who were exposed to stories of unattainable exemplars (e.g., a story about a student helps disadvantaged kids for 15 hours per week). The attainable group showed significantly increased engagement compared to the unattainable group. In another experiment, subjects in the peer exemplar group discussed and admired the exemplary behaviors of those who were close to them, such as family members, friends, or teachers; on the other hand, subjects in the historic moral figure group discussed and admired historical moral figures. The former group were shown to be more effectively motivated to service engagement compared with their counterpart (Han *et al.* 2017, 1–12).

It is perhaps intuitive and very convincing that our emulative behaviors vary according to how close the model's excellence is to the self, and also to the attainability of the model. Findings so far addressed are concerned with the difference of exemplarity between subjects: those who are emulated and those who emulate, *in the relevant domain of excellence*.⁶⁹ But it is important to note this is not the only kind of distance that can explain variation of imitative behaviors. Our imitative behavior might be influenced by more subtle differences between the model and the self than those in attainability and relevance. This is exactly what I would like to draw my readers' attention to.

Recent studies in psychology address how our imitating behaviors vary depending on our perceived 'psychological distance' from the model. Psychological distance involves temporal, spatial, and social distance, and hypotheticality between the self and objects. "Psychological distance is thus egocentric: Its reference point is to the self, here and now, and the different ways in which an object might be removed from that point" (Liberman and Trope 2008; Trope and Liberman 2010, 440). The most important among these different factors in the current debate is social distance. Social distance is here defined as an interpersonal similarity, as Trope and Liberman put it: "the less similar someone is to oneself, the more socially distant they typically seem"

⁶⁹ Warnick's philosophical analysis on imitation might help us understand these findings further. Imitation does not occur of every action, there must be a sorting mechanism, and he suggests people do not imitate when action is not congruent with their own self-narrative (Warnick 2008, Chapter 4). The model who we believe to be attainable might be easily consistent with our stories about ourselves, unlike models who threaten our self-narrative or are too far-fetched.

(Trope and Liberman 2012, 129). The authors of the following two studies were trying to uncover how perceived social distance influences our imitative behaviors.

In a study of temporal distance and spatial distance conducted by Hansen and his colleagues, students participated in a study on learning how to fold a dog made out of towels (Hansen, Alves, and Trope 2016). In the first study, students at Salzburg University (25 females, 11 males whose age ranged between 18 and 39) participated. A video was presented showing a person demonstrating how to create a dog out of towels. Participants in the distance condition were told that the video was recorded in the year 1990, while participants in the nearness condition were told that the video was recorded in the year in which the experiment was conducted, 2012. Their behavior was recorded and their movements were coded in relation to how they matched with the model's movements. The participants performed more imitations than emulations in the near condition than in the distant condition. The result shown was that behavior that is framed as temporally close is imitated more literally than behavior that is framed as temporally distant. Similarly, in the second study, the participants were 46 students (35 females, 11 males) at New York University. The second task was to create a dog out of towels by observing a video model. Students were told that the video was made either in New York (near condition) or in Los Angeles (distant condition). The result was that the participants performed more exact literal imitations in the near condition than in the distant condition.

Similarly, Kalkstein and his colleagues conducted a series of experiments on social distance, in scenarios of social learning (Kalkstein *et al.* 2016). In their first

study, 67 undergraduates at New York University participated. The study was divided into two phases. In the first, learning, phase, participants saw two types of shape: global squares that were comprised of local triangles (Group A), and global triangles that were comprised of local squares (Group B). In the second, test, phase, novel shapes shown to the subjects could be categorized either by matching the global configuration of the original shape (high-level features), or by matching the local components of the original shape (low-level features). The subjects in this study were divided into two conditions: in the direct experience condition, subjects were told to categorize the shapes in front of the screen. In the social learning condition, the subjects were told that they would be learning from another participant. They watched a video of a previous participant conducting the categorization task, with a message indicating whether they had made a correct or incorrect categorization. Experimenters calculated the percentage of participants in each condition who categorized the shape on the basis of its global configuration in the test phase (high-level features). The results showed that a larger percentage of the subjects in the social learning condition (42%) categorized novel shapes based on their high-level global features than in the direct experience condition (19%).

In the second study by Kalkstein and his colleagues, 54 undergraduates at New York University participated in similar categorization tasks. Participants introduced to the model were either psychologically close (Psychology students from the same university), or psychologically distant (Psychology students from their rival university, Columbia University). Participants in the learning phase observed the model

categorizing the same set of shapes as in Study 1. They were explicitly told to learn as much as they could from the model because they would classify shapes into the two categories in the test phase. As in Study 1, subjects categorized novel shapes in the test phase. The results showed that a greater percentage of participants in the distant condition (54%) categorized the novel shapes according to their high-level, global features than did participants in the psychologically near condition (25%) (Kalkstein *et al.* 2016).

In the last section, I hinted that emulation-based virtue theorists have not considered a case where, given the appropriate sensitivity and feeling of admiration, two people might admire the correct person, but still might imitate her in different ways. The aforementioned studies on our imitation and learning seem to offer strong support for such cases. Hansen and his colleagues predict that when a model is temporally and geographically far from the subject, individuals emulate (achieving the end state with different means) more than imitate (copying the end state of an observed action by executing the same movements): namely, they are prone to imitate, they are less likely to execute the same movements as the model, compared to when the model is temporally and geographically close. Also, it is suggested by Kalkstein and his colleagues that when subjects are learning from a psychologically distant model, they are more prone to learn the global features of the task than they are when they learn from a socially close counterpart. What these findings imply is that when we facilitate emulation and imitation among subjects, the personal profile of the model might have an important role in determining and sorting how subjects direct their behaviors.

Before moving on to my argument, let me briefly explain psychologists' understanding regarding how psychological distance makes participants imitate and learn in different ways. These experiments are designed based on a psychological theory: CLT – the view that psychological distance increases the abstractness of our mental representation (e.g. Trope and Liberman 2010). Lower-level construal of events takes the form of “concrete, relatively unstructured, and contextualized representations that include subordinate and incidental features of events [while] higher-level construal are abstract, schematic, and decontextualized representations that extract the gist from the available information. They emphasize superordinate, core features of events, omitting specific features that may vary without significantly changing the meaning of events” (Hansen, Alves, and Trope 2016, 321). Hence, experimenters infer, based on their data on our copying and learning behaviors in the CLT framework, that our different levels of construal of the model's performance lead to our different styles of copying and learning behavior. Those students who are engaged in the categorizing task following a psychologically distant model, construe the task at a higher level: a distant model's behaviors will be learned and internalized at a higher level and, hence, emulated and reproduced in line with this higher-level representation (Kalkstein *et al.* 2016, 7).

So far, we have seen that the inclination to construe events in different ways based on social and psychological distance is widespread among us; so what implications does this have in virtue cultivation? The temporal and distal positions of the model, or the social affiliations of the model, such as university affiliation, are

understood to be epistemically irrelevant factors when we consider the cultivation of virtues (See Alfano 2013). Their epistemically praiseworthy characters seem to be the sole concern when virtue theorists look for models to inculcate admirable characteristics among people. It is a surprising fact that people's imitative behavior or learning behavior changes based on how temporally and distantly close they are to the model, or on how socially close they are to the model.

First, such an inclination needs to be integrated into emulation-based virtue theories: for instance, in Zagzebski's exemplarism, on the emulation of fictional characters, she maintains: "we learn through narratives of both fictional and nonfictional persons that some people are admirable and worth imitating" (Zagzebski 2010, 51). It is perhaps true that both fictional characters and real-life figures can be exemplars, but they may induce our behavior in different ways. Caregivers are socially closer to children than fictional characters, for instance, and hence, even if both parties happen to be epistemically praiseworthy (for example, being intellectually courageous) to the very same extent, they might induce different styles of copying behavior among children because children may construe the virtue of caregivers more concretely (though this fact does not undermine the importance of fictional characters as exemplars). Children might be able to copy their caregivers' intellectually courageous actions more literally, than those of fictional characters, when they are encouraged to do so.

Here I am not arguing that emulation-based virtue theories are wrong in any sense, but it seems to me that philosophical models of our imitative behaviors require

some refinement. According to recent studies in social psychology and CLT, variation exists in our imitating and learning behaviors, depending on the distances between who we are and who models are, and such variation is observed frequently, and with surprising variety. I now consider some potential amendments to emulation-based virtue theory that flow from this data.

3. Diversification of exemplars

In this section, I will suggest a pluralistic exemplar-based approach. My aim is to convince readers that we need to diversify our exemplars in society in order to effectively cultivate virtues through emulation and imitation.

A pluralistic exemplar-based approach has already been encouraged from a theoretical point of view (Croce and Silvia Vaccarezza 2017). But I believe the scope of this view needs widening. Croce and Vaccarezza point out that emulating heroes (who have both virtues and vices) is more fruitful than emulating saints (who are genuinely virtuous), as it helps to develop the novice's moral imagination, the proper cultivation of which represents a fundamental educational task. On the imitability of heroes and saints, it is also suggested that the former is easier to handle than the latter, because when the traits an exemplar displays are not beyond our reach, it is easier for us to imitate them. On the other hand, when a novice is presented with moral sainthood, it is difficult for her to be attracted to the saint "due to her distance from the moral imperfection of ordinary people" (Croce and Vaccarezza 2017, 10). They further maintain:

As a matter of fact, it is easier to imitate someone, when we discover that her moral exemplarity is not beyond our reach [...] in contrast, when presenting novices with exemplars of moral sainthood, the educator will often have to deal with their discouragement and put great effort into helping them be attracted to the saint, due to her distance from the moral imperfection of ordinary people. Thus, it seems evident that the hero constitutes a more imitable kind of exemplar than the saint does. (Croce and Vaccarezza 2017, 10)

Here there is an interesting suggestion regarding the imitability of the exemplar. They imply that, when the exemplar (e.g., a saint) is psychologically distant from the novice, it will be more difficult for her to imitate the exemplar than it is for those who are less distant (e.g., a hero). This is in line with the empirical research addressed in the first part of section 2. When senior students were confronted with the unattainable superstar, their perceived closeness to the model was reduced and they avoided being threatened. When novices admired exemplars close to them, their voluntary service activity engagement was promoted (Han *et al.* 2017; Lockwood and Kunda 1997). Perceived relevance explained the difference between the imitability of the models.⁷⁰ Yet the scope of both such psychological findings, and Croce and

⁷⁰ Moreover, an exemplar who is very distant from the moral imperfection of ordinary people is known to facilitate a different kind of self-threat: self-threats that triggers defense mechanisms (moral inferiority), self-threats which makes us question the

Vaccarezza's argument, apply only to the excellence of the model; the issue is to what extent exemplars have admirable traits and how emulators perceived their moral distance from the exemplar (e.g., how little we can achieve such traits, unlike the exemplars). However, it is not clear why this must be so. Against its apparent plausibility, remember that the moral we derived from the former section that even personal characteristics of the model irrelevant to virtues or excellences, such as the time and place where models are located, or to which institution the model is affiliated, and if the model is presented in a video or through direct instruction, elicited different imitative behaviors systematically. Such purportedly subtle psychological distances could influence a subject's representation of the event and their subsequent copying and learning behaviors. Thus, emulation-based virtue theorists have a strong reason to broaden the scope of the psychological distance to take into consideration in virtue cultivation. According to the CLT framework, it is our mental representation of the relevant event and hence the exemplars which do this job of sorting different types of imitative and learning behaviors. These perceptions are always egocentric; hence, not only who the models are but also who the imitators are play an important role in this sorting process. Here I can summarize my view on imitative behaviors and distances as follows: when a novice is presented with an exemplar who is psychologically very distant from herself she may not copy the literal behavior of the ethical appropriateness of our own behavior (moral confusion), and self-threats which cause us to suspect that models are judging our morality (anticipated moral reproach)(Monin 2007, 57–61) With this in place, we can defend the principle of emulation on stronger grounds.

exemplar as closely as when imitating an exemplar who is psychologically closer to her.

When diverse novices exist in a society, yet exemplars remain less diverse, this fact would systematically influence novices' imitative behaviors. But this would be problematic only if emulating but not imitating, or *vice versa*, turns out to be unjust in some sense. If this is the case, diversification of exemplars is called for. Is there any reason for us to believe that such an imbalance of emulation and imitation is unjust, making diversification of exemplars necessary? I think we have good reasons to think so, especially in virtue cultivation. It is often emphasized that virtue is not rule-following, but moral decision-making: virtue cultivation is understood as learning how to become sensitive to circumstances (Fröding 2013, 45). What is required for such virtuous sensitivity? One answer is to learn how to act virtuously in a wide variety of virtue-eliciting circumstances. How is emulation and imitation helpful in this regard? Virtues are only attainable in acknowledging the moral complexity of the lives of us and of the exemplar. As Vos (2018) highlights, exemplars provide us with "holistic images that nevertheless remain concrete and are exemplary because and insofar as they appeal to our own life concerns" (Vos 2018, 26). Virtue cultivation requires an understanding of why a certain quality is worth pursuing and how it is to be pursued in one's own life (Kristjánsson 2007). Such a personalization of value through emulation requires creativity on the side of novices in cultivating virtues in their own life context.

Traditionally, philosophers might have assumed that when we admire some virtuous exemplars, it does not matter whether such agents are women or men; dead or alive; seen at first hand or learned about from others or through reading a book. However, without being consciously aware of it, we are prone to imitate models who are psychologically close to ourselves, and we tend to emulate those who are psychologically far from ourselves. Imitation provides a clearer means to the end that you are trying to achieve: all you need to do to imitate is follow the sequence of actions of the model, hence imitation is more concrete. Imitation is however, highly contextualized; it is not clear that repeating the actions of the model would be helpful in achieving the same end in different situations. On the other hand, in emulation demands creativity in finding a means to achieve an end by yourself; hence, it is more abstract. It may also come with a risk that one might not be able to find the right means. We can and ought to manipulate these inclinations in the cultivation of virtues to have a better grasp of virtues and how virtues are to be pursued in one's own life. In doing this, exposure to a wide variety of virtue-eliciting circumstances are necessary.

Hence, in order to cultivate virtues, we need a diversification of our exemplars. I hope to have shown that there is a strong case for emulation-based virtue theorists to take diversification of exemplars into serious consideration.

4. Diversifying exemplars: educational implications

In this final section, I suggest an application of diversification of exemplars in academia, especially in academic philosophy. My idea is that it is the key to tackling the current demographic and inclusion problem we face in philosophy.

When we look at universities, we see students from a variety of backgrounds, in gender, race, culture, socio-economic background, and sexual orientation. Professors, lecturers, and teachers are often taken as epistemic models, based on their admirable intellectual character traits, their excellent epistemic skills or their prominent understanding of the subject matter, which are all necessary for obtaining epistemic virtues. On one hand, while students are diverse, our epistemic models, on the other, are not so diverse. If novices imitate and emulate epistemic models based on the psychological distance between students and professors *qua* our epistemic models, then, for instance, the current demographic and professional dominance of men in almost all areas of academia might hinder students from conducting a certain type of copying and learning behavior. Generally, put, male students might be more inclined to emulate female professors than to imitate male professors, and for female students we can expect it to work in the opposite way. Let me imagine some hypothetical scenarios in line with these thoughts: if an introductory logic class was designed to encourage novice students to engage in solving a logical formula step by step, just like a lecturer does, and if such a class was given by male professors and male tutors, female students might struggle more than their male counterparts to address the problems by learning concrete, lower-level features in the situation. By contrast, abstracted thoughts are often strongly associated with the discipline of academic

philosophy. If a male lecturer in an ethics class hopes to deliver abstract philosophical ideas to his pupils in his lectures, such as fairness or justice, male students might be inclined to pay more attention to the details of the argument compared to their female counterparts. The issue here is, granted that we already have students from diverse backgrounds, without diverse models, a part of our epistemic virtue cultivation remains far from optimal in such a situation. Quite to the contrary, such a project might be slowed down, and, eventually, hindered. Note that the diversification of exemplars here does not only help people from underrepresented groups, such as women, and students of color. Diversification in the context of virtue helps everyone, because in order to cultivate virtuous sensitivity, novices must learn from the model both in concrete and abstract ways. By diversifying models, novices will be placed in an environment where they are capable both of emulating and imitating models. Such an environment is more conducive to the cultivating of virtues and avoiding vices.

The problem of diversity is especially severe in academic philosophy. It is widely known that academic philosophy is extremely demographically homogeneous (Kidd 2017, 118). Philosophy is dominated by white men; it suffers from the underrepresentation of various groups, most obviously women but also other groups (e.g., philosophers from certain ethnic backgrounds such as African or Asian, and people with disabilities). According to a 2018 report by the Higher Education Statistics Agency, among the non-SET subject areas, philosophy is the only subject that is notably gender imbalanced (70.3% men). In the same report, academic staff in philosophy in the UK were found to be 95.2% white (among the non-SET subjects, it

is the fourth biggest subject dominated by the white population, next to classics, sport, and history), and 93.9% are non-disabled (Advance HE 2018a). This problem relates to the underrepresentation and marginalization of philosophers from various groups including women, people of color, those from a non-Western background, people with disabilities and, perhaps, LGBTQ people.⁷¹ Let us continue to focus our attention on the gender imbalance in philosophy, for the sake of our argument In this chapter. According to a report by the British Philosophical Association in 2011, while 45% of

⁷¹ The data supports my view on gender, ethnic group, and disability; however, underrepresentation of LGBTQ people in philosophy is waiting to be confirmed. The Equality Act 2010 extended protected characteristics in the UK to cover new areas: gender reassignment, religion and belief (or none), and sexual orientation. No information was available for philosophers specifically on their sexual orientation and gender reassignment in the report. Moreover, this information is optional: only 77.4% of British academic staff gave their sexual orientation in the survey. Among the staff in the institutions returning data, 0.7% were bisexual, 1.2% were gay man, 0.6% were gay women, while 46.2% were heterosexual. On the other hand, 82.6% institution returned data on sexual orientation among students: 2% were bisexual, 1.1% were gay men, 0.6% were gay women, while 65.6% were heterosexual. It is true that the rate of gay staff members and students are roughly similar, but there is a striking difference between the number of staff who refused to give their sexual orientation (12.3%), and left it blank (38.5%) and that of students (7.8% refused to answer, 21.8% left blank); it is not clear how to interpret this data. Among the students in institutions returning data about gender reassignment, 3.2% had a gender identity different from that assigned at birth, while staff who had a gender identity different from that assigned at birth were 0.2% (Advance HE 2018b). It can be said that for bisexuals and transgender people in UK universities, there is some imbalance between staff and student populations (Advance HE 2018a). These data speak to my idea that there is a demographic imbalance among academic staff members (model) and students (novices) in the protected characteristics generally; however, whether this is truly the case for philosophers specifically is yet to be confirmed by further investigation.

philosophy students at undergraduate level are female, only 20% of professional philosophers in the UK are women. The largest drops occur between undergraduate and master's level (9 percentage points), and between master's and PhD level (6 percentage points). The data seem to suggest that something discouraging to female philosophers is taking place in the university (Beebee and Saul 2011).

Grounded on such data, I propose that a diversification of our exemplars is important in counteracting the demographically challenged nature of contemporary academic philosophy. If students are to become genuinely intellectually virtuous, by obtaining the proper sensitivity to situations through both emulation and imitation, hence by learning concretely and learning abstractly, demographic homogeneity in philosophy is a genuine problem for all, not only for female philosophers, but also for our male colleagues. In a situation where students are expected to act with intellectual virtue by emulating exemplars, depending on the social distance between students and professors, they will be likely to systematically exhibit different types of copying and learning behavior. If philosophy departments employ more female professors, postdocs, and tutors, compared to homogenous departments, both female and male undergraduate students can be expected to respond in slightly different ways in the class when they are encouraged to imitate the epistemically praiseworthy character of the model. If this were the case, I predict that demographic diversity in the philosophy department will be likely to foster intellectual skills, deeper understanding of the subject, and, finally, intellectual virtues among students. If this happens, the opportunities for a socially diverse student community to develop epistemic virtues

will be improved, more so than for those whose formation unfortunately proceeds within a demographically challenged socio-epistemic environment.

The same argument should apply to facilitating the diversification of philosophy reading lists.⁷² Philosophers might uncritically assume that their reading lists should be selected based purely on the academic excellence of the content, and they might also believe that current homogenous reading lists are superb in this regard. First of all, it is a highly dubious assumption that the current reading lists reflect purely the excellence of the material. However, this point goes beyond our discussion. Secondly, consideration, in selection of reading materials, of the factors we know to influence our learning behavior, such as time and place, and by whom it is written, does not necessarily contradict our excellence criteria (properly construed) in selecting materials, anyway. More importantly, if part of the aim of the education of philosophy is to make students excellent inquirers, our reading list should pay proper attention not only to excellence but also to the pragmatic factors that actually help foster students' intellectual excellence, such as time and place, author, and in what language the reading material was written. If we have a list of readings consisting of books written in the ancient period and up to the present, written by both female and male writers, from East to West, written in ancient Chinese and modern Spanish, students will be exposed to opportunities for learning and exhibiting different ways of emulating and imitating the model. Hence, we could expect them to be more sensitive to epistemic virtue-eliciting circumstances in their philosophical inquiry.

⁷² For instance, see <https://diversityreadinglist.org>.

In order to illustrate how my argument for the diversification of philosophers is on the right track, let me briefly touch upon an insightful experiment conducted at the University of Oklahoma. Though the target of this study is not directly related to tackling virtue cultivation, it indirectly tells us about how similarity in respect of exemplars matters in philosophy education. Heather Demarest and her colleagues (Demarest *et al.* 2017) conducted research on the continuation of undergraduates studying philosophy. They carried out two short surveys with students in an introductory philosophy course in 2015, at both the beginning and the end of the semester. In this survey, students were asked to agree or disagree with 16 statements, including ones asking about their continuation in philosophy (e.g. “I have seriously considered a philosophy major or minor”). The experiment suggested that for female students in introductory philosophy, what predicts their continuation in philosophy is whether or not they feel similar to the philosophers. Demarest *et al.* maintain,

It would be hard to overstate the importance of [S7], “I feel similar to the kinds of people who become philosophers”, as it has a correlation value of 0.80 ($p < 0.0001$) with Continuation for women (0.62 for men). No other statement is a better predictor of Continuation. (Demarest *et al.* 2017, 528)

The experimenters are hesitant to recommend direct interventions, such as increasing “the number of women instructors for introductory courses, directly exposing students to professional women philosophers” (529) as they consider this “putting the cart

before the horse” (529). But is this so? Important intellectual abilities, such as critical thinking and logical thinking, are often associated with philosophers. Such cognitive skills are necessary, if not sufficient, for the intellectually virtuous character traits virtue epistemologists aim to foster in society. As I implied earlier, if certain groups of people are shown to be marginalized in regard to virtue cultivation and vice rehabilitation, something is going wrong in such a practice from a virtue-epistemological perspective. The diversification of philosophers is hence vitally important for philosophy and, especially, for emulation-based virtue epistemologists. It is important to repeat that my suggestion of diversifying exemplars where they are highly demographically unbalanced is expected to benefit all in the context of virtue cultivation: not only the underrepresented population, but also the dominant party; and diversification is not

affirmative action but rather a correction to combat the injustice that is prevalent in the domain.⁷³⁷⁴

In this section, I have argued that the diversification of exemplars is a necessary move for emulation-based virtue theorists who are concerned with maximizing the

⁷³ Some people might worry that my view represents a type of nudge strategy, and would thus suffer from objections that these attract. There are two points to make in reply. First, I am happy to see my view as being in line with nudging. According to Thaler and Sunstein (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, Engelen *et al.* 2018) any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives' are nudges. A deliberate intervention in choosing exemplars is, then, compatible with such a strategy. Secondly, however, the well known objection to nudge theory is that it is too paternalistic, and against human autonomy. In line with Engelen's (Engelen *et al.* 2018) argument, I have limited my nudges as strategies for epistemic virtues among those who explicitly endorse emulation-based virtue epistemology. For theorists who believe that virtues ought to be pursued by everyone, via imitation and emulation of models, diversification of exemplars helps to fulfill their goal rather than hinder their autonomous choice, so I can avoid the most problematic type of objection to nudge theory. It is beyond the purview of this thesis to address other issues with nudge theories; however, it will be worth examining them in my future work. I thank my anonymous reviewer for this constructive comment.

⁷⁴ People might ask what existing staff members can do to become better models by getting acquainted with the results from the psychological literature. We might be able to infer from CLT that a model can be perceived differently, to some extent, depending on the way the person is framed. In teaching logic as a white male philosopher, making sure that students from underrepresented groups follow inferences step by step might be helpful. In teaching history of philosophy (those philosophers are not only temporally and spatially distant, but also, perhaps, not attainable), offering more information about their personal lives and characters in detail might help students see the exemplar as less disturbing, or more relatable. Such a strategy might or might not be helpful to mitigate the problem arising from the imbalance of emulation and imitation. All of these needs further investigation.

prospects for the edification of a socially diverse student body. Considering that the demographic problem is an urgent and pressing issue in philosophy, the diversification of exemplars is a highly attractive option, especially in academic philosophy, from a virtue-epistemological point of view. Those who believe that emulation is a viable strategy for moral and epistemic character education ought to take this diversification turn seriously and they should implement and support relevant policies and initiatives.

5. Conclusion

A body of research on our copying and learning behavior conducted in recent years under the CLT framework indicates that “who we are” and “who our exemplars are” systematically influence our imitative behaviors. Emulation-based virtue theorists have failed to notice this point. I have suggested the diversification of exemplars in education, and especially in academic philosophy, where we are facing a demographic problem. By having diverse epistemic exemplars in a department, such as female philosophy professors, it is suggested that not only female students, but all students, might develop a variety of imitative strategies toward models, and, hence, the development of epistemic virtues by gaining sensitivity to the virtue-eliciting environment might become more viable. The same argument applies to the diversification of our reading list in philosophy. I hope my thesis has provided hints toward an improvement both of emulation-based virtue epistemology and a practical response to our demographic problems in philosophy.

Conclusions

In my thesis, I have addressed the following questions lurking in virtue epistemology: can we really acquire an admirable intellectual disposition flow from our love of knowledge as virtue epistemologists portray (Chapter 1)? Can we cultivate such intellectual virtues solely by our efforts? If not, to what extent are environmental helps compatible with our intellectual virtue acquisition and treatment of intellectual vices (Chapter 2)? If intellectual virtue cultivations are systematically in conflict with the pursuit of other values, what can virtue epistemologists say about such conflicts (Chapter 3)? Intellectual autonomy is demonstratively an epistemic value, yet, the majority of our epistemic pursuits are socially embedded. In our testimonial exchanges, what kind of epistemic value are we promoting (Chapter 4)? Are some of our vices primarily constructed by social oppressions, and if so, do we need any different treatments to the vices of the socially oppressed from the non-oppressed (Chapter 5)? Theorists believe we can cultivate intellectual virtues by emulating exemplars in society but do we all feel motivated to emulate exemplars in a similar way (Chapter 6)? In each chapter of my thesis, I addressed these issues one by one.

In the first chapter, I have addressed the situationist critique of virtues. Although situationists criticized virtue theory for its empirical inadequacy in combination with the commitment to psychological realism, the nature of this criticism has been ambiguous. This is due to their misunderstanding of the hard core of the virtue theory and their stipulation of theoretical commitments of virtue theory. While situationists have assumed that social psychological studies undermine the empirical adequacy of

virtue theory, such studies show, at most, that not many of us are genuinely virtuous. The studies on the orientation of our motivation indicates how the dynamics of our motivation have a tremendous influence on desirable behavioral outcomes: a good life. The motivation components of intellectual virtues correspond well with the way people are motivated when they engage in important activities in such studies. I hope to have shown that virtue theory and being a psychological realist are compatible.

In the second chapter, I criticized the personalist account of intellectual virtue. While constructing a friendly environment is vitally important, however, contra personalism, I still believe self-cultivation i.e., efforts on the side of the agent, is a necessary component of virtue acquisition. Personalism faces a few issues: first, personalism cannot make sense of the success (i.e., achievement) component of virtue. Second, personalist relies on attributability responsibility. Nonetheless, attributability responsibility is not compatible with some transformation machine cases, as personalist initially assumed. Third, I have argued that the self in the form of narrative are underlying the concept of intellectual virtue, when they say intellectual virtue reflects who we are as a thinker. Seen from the narrative point of view, there are some essential differences between the agent transformed by the machine, and the genuinely virtuous agent.

In the third section, the problem of the epistemic partiality of friendship was addressed. We are prone to believe what our friends tell us, and given that good friendship is a care relation, epistemic partiality of friendship exists and rightly so. But the initiation and termination of friendship indicates that there is also a sense in which

our friendships track evidence (via our epistemic partisan affiliations). The proponents of the epistemic partiality of friendship relied on the idea that friendship is necessary for a good life, but the exact same thing can be said of any of the important values in life, such as justice. Conflicts of multiple values lead to a few interpretations: a clash of subjective and objective values, moral imperfectionism, or irresolvable tragic dilemmas. Virtue epistemology might be able to help mitigate the side effect of epistemic partiality of friendship by promoting intellectual virtues in the early stage of our life. Nevertheless, such virtue cultivation processes would be predominantly environmental routes rather than self-cultivation.

In the fourth chapter, the value of intellectual receptivity was introduced. There are some senses in which first-hand knowledge is more desirable than the testimonial knowledge, such as only the former is promoting the value of intellectual autonomy. Considering that knowing something is a social activity, we defer to others' opinions and are rightly doing so. I've introduced the value of intellectual receptivity derived from receptivity in the realm of morality: having a positive attitude towards epistemic goods that cannot be controlled and appreciating such things as they are, and integrating them into our epistemic self. This value helps us explain why an excessive desire for the first-hand knowledge can be harmful. It also helps explain why some intellectual virtues are worthwhile pursuing.

In the fifth chapter, my aim was to incorporate standpoint theory into virtue epistemology. According to standpoint theory, systematic social oppression creates standpoints. The oppressed have first-hand privileged knowledge about their

oppressed life that the non-oppressed would find hard to grasp, yet a part of the oppression they suffer is epistemic in form: they lack tools and sufficient education to communicate their privileged knowledge to the non-oppressed. Social oppression systematically contributes to our vice formation: it systematically fosters intellectual vices in a distinct way for the oppressed compared to the non-oppressed. Not treating their vice is unjust and prevents their privileged knowledge being transmitted in the society further. When our vices are formed primarily by a social oppression, such vices should be addressed institutionally. The same consideration may apply to institutional interventions to cure vices and foster virtues, such as nudging.

In chapter six, we have seen a body of research on our copying and learning behaviors called construal level theory. They indicate that “who we are” and “who our exemplars are” systematically influence our imitative behaviors. Emulation-based virtue theorists have failed to notice this point. I have suggested the diversification of exemplars in education, and especially in academic philosophy, where we are facing a demographic problem. It is suggested that having diverse epistemic exemplars in society help all students develop a variety of imitative strategies toward models, and, hence, the development of epistemic virtues by gaining sensitivity to the virtue-eliciting environment might become more viable.

Finally, I will propose my future research direction. The starting point of my inquiry was to admit the following predicament: intellectual virtues are hard to come by, and we are easily fallen for intellectual vices. In this vein, I have emphasized the importance of environmental scaffoldings in cultivating intellectual virtues and

avoiding intellectual vices throughout my thesis. Environmental help can take a variety of forms: I have addressed a few in my thesis: e.g., education, nudging, and technological enhancements. These may not be an exhaustive list of environmental routes to intellectual virtues. In future research, virtue epistemologists need to expand this list of environmental scaffoldings so that we are less inclined to fall prey to vicious minds, and consider to what extent such environmental helps are compatible with the acquisition condition of virtues (In my thesis, I have shown that the most extreme case: Nozick's transformation machine was not compatible with the acquisition condition of intellectual virtues). The consideration for our responsibility (both accountability and attributability senses) and for the concept of self (narrative or otherwise) might help us address such a question. If I am on the right track of promoting the value of intellectual receptivity in virtue epistemology, some interventions that can potentially fundamentally changes what we can know (i.e., changes on our epistemic human nature), therefore such as some cognitive enhancements need to be handled with care. Virtue epistemologists must have the right balance between the transhumanistic tendency of overcoming our cognitive shortcomings and becoming a more self-reliant epistemic agent by cognitive enhancements, and the bio-conservatistic tendency of accepting and appreciating what we cannot know as they are (i.e., they go against the epistemic perfection). These cases of cognitive enhancements which directly change our cognitive make-up are thus theoretically important for virtue epistemology. Yet, the issue is still, far-fetched. The more pressing issue for virtue epistemologists is perhaps, how to think

of the oppressive social structures currently influencing our intellectual dispositions. As I hinted in my thesis, societies we live in comes with a variety of forms of social oppressions along with our social identities (some of which are widely in common across cultures but others are more culturally distinct). If I am right in that the vices that are primarily socially constructed often takes different forms between the oppressed and the non-oppressed: we need differential remedial approaches to such vices. Virtue epistemologists first need to sort out such socially constructed vices from more individualistic ones. Then, we must consider how to institutionally intervene in such socially constructed vices (especially, those vices that the marginalized population in the society are suffering). Virtue epistemology may need to pay more attention to feminist philosophy, I hope my thesis help convince my readers that the down-to-earth virtue epistemology will help improve our intellect, but with care.

References

- Adams, Robert Merrihew. 2006. *A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Advance HE. 2018a. "Equality+Higher Education Staff Statistical Report 2018." London. 2018. https://www.advance-he.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-05/2018-06-ECU_HE-stats-report_staff_v5-compressed.pdf.
- . 2018b. "Equality+Higher Education Student Statistical Report 2018." London. 2018. https://www.advance-he.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-05/2018-06-ECU_HE-stats-report_students_v5-compressed.pdf.
- Alfano, Mark. 2011. "Explaining Away Intuitions about Traits: Why Virtue Ethics Seems Plausible (Even If It Isn't)." *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 2 (1): 121–36.
- . 2012. "Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 62 (247): 223–49.
- . 2013. *Character as Moral Fiction*. Cambridge: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- . 2014a. "Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism about Inference." In *Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science (Synthese Library Book 366)*, edited by Abrol Fairweather, 103–22.

- . 2014b. "Stereotype Threat and Intellectual Virtue." In *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue*, edited by A. Fairweather and Owen Flanagan, 155–74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alzola, Miguel. 2008. "Character and Environment: The Status of Virtues in Organizations." *Journal of Business Ethics* 78 (3): 343–57.
- Amabile, Teresa M. 1985. "Motivation and Creativity: Effects of Motivational Orientation on Creative Writers." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48 (2): 393–99.
- Anderson, Elizabeth. 2012. "Social Epistemology A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions" 26 (2): 163–73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211>.
- Annas, Julia. 2011. *Intelligent Virtue*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Aristotle. 2000. *Nicomachean Ethics (Terence Irwin Trans. 2nd Edition)*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Axtell, Guy, and J Adam Carter. 2008. "Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology." *Philosophical Papers* 37 (3): 413–34.
- Baehr, Jason. 2011. *The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.001.0001>.
- . 2013. "The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue." In *Knowledge, Virtue, and Action.*, edited by Tim Henning and David P Schweikard, 99–118. New York: Routledge.

- Battaly, Heather. 2008. "Virtue Epistemology." *Philosophy Compass* 3 (4): 639–63.
- . 2015. "Epistemic Virtue and Vice: Reliabilism, Responsibilism, and Personalism." In *Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy*, edited by Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa, 109–30. Routledge.
- . 2016. "Developing Virtue and Rehabilitating Vice : Worries about Self-Cultivation and Self-Reform." *Journal of Moral Education* 45 (2): 207–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2016.1195732>.
- Beachboard, Martine Robinson, John C Beachboard, Wenling Li, and Stephen R Adkison. 2011. "Cohorts and Relatedness: Self-Determination Theory as an Explanation of How Learning Communities Affect Educational Outcomes." *Research in Higher Education* 52 (8): 853–74.
- Beebee, Helen, and Jennifer Saul. 2011. "Women in Philosophy in the UK, A Report by the British Philosophical Association and the Society for Women in Philosophy UK." 2011. https://bpa.ac.uk/uploads/2011/02/BPA_Report_Women_In_Philosophy.pdf.
- Bonneville-Roussy, Arielle, Geneviève L Lavigne, and Robert J Vallerand. 2011. "When Passion Leads to Excellence: The Case of Musicians." *Psychology of Music* 39 (1): 123–38.
- Bovens, Luc. 2009. "The Ethics of Nudge." In *Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology*, edited by Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven

- Ove Hansson, 207–19. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2593-7>.
- Carr, David. 1996. “After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development.” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 15 (4): 353–70. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368492>.
- . 2003. “Character and Moral Choice in the Cultivation of Virtue.” *Philosophy* 78 (304): 219–32. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819103000251>.
- . 2017. “Literature, Rival Conceptions of Virtue, and Moral Education.” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 51 (2): 1–16.
<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/657590>.
- Carter, J Adam, and Emma C Gordon. 2014. “Openmindedness and Truth.” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 44 (2): 207–24.
- Cassam, Quassim. 2016. “Vice Epistemology.” *Monist* 99 (2): 159–80.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onv034>.
- . 2019. *Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198826903.001.0001>.
- Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. 1998. “The Extended Mind.” *Analysis* 58 (1): 7–19. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00096>.
- Code, Lorraine. 1987. *Epistemic Responsibility*. Andover: University Press of New England.
- Craig, Edward. 1990. *Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Cravchik, Anibal, and David Goldman. 2000. "Neurochemical Individuality: Genetic Diversity among Human Dopamine and Serotonin Receptors and Transporters." *Archives of General Psychiatry* 57 (12): 1105–14.
- Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1991. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review* 43 (6): 1241–99. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039>.
- Crerar, Charlie. 2018. "Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 96 (4): 753–66. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1394334>.
- Croce, Michel, and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza. 2017. "Educating through Exemplars: Alternative Paths to Virtue." *Theory and Research in Education* 15 (1): 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878517695903>.
- Darley, John M, and C Daniel Batson. 1973. "'From Jerusalem to Jericho': A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 27 (1): 100–108.
- Darley, John M, and Bibb Latané. 1968. "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 8 (4, Pt.1): 377–83.
- Deci, Edward L. 1972. "The Effects of Contingent and Noncontingent Rewards and Controls on Intrinsic Motivation." *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance* 8 (2): 217–29.

- Deci, Edward L, and Richard M Ryan. 1985. *Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior*. Berlin: Springer.
- Demarest, Heather, Seth Robertson, Megan Haggard, Madeline Martin-Seaver, and Jewelle Bickel. 2017. "Similarity and Enjoyment: Predicting Continuation for Women in Philosophy." *Analysis (United Kingdom)* 77 (3): 525–41.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx098>.
- Dennett, Daniel C. 1991. *Consciousness Explained*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
- . 1992. *The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Doris, John. 2002. *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Engelen, Bart, Alan Thomas, Alfred Archer, and Niels van de Ven. 2018. "Exemplars and Nudges: Combining Two Strategies for Moral Education." *Journal of Moral Education* 47 (3): 346–65.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2017.1396966>.
- Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. 2009. *Knowledge in an Uncertain World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001>.
- Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee. 1985. "Evidentialism." *Philosophical Studies* 48 (1): 15–34. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372404>.
- Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." *The Journal of Philosophy* 66 (23): 829–39.

- Fricker, Elizabeth. 2006. "Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy." In *The Epistemology of Testimony*, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa. New York: Oxford University Press.
- <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0011>.
- Fricker, Miranda. 2007. *Epistemic Injustice : Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. Oxford : Oxford .
- . 2010. "Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway on Epistemic Injustice." *Episteme* 7 (2): 164–78. <https://doi.org/10.3366/E1742360010000894>.
- Fröding, Barbro. 2011. "Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life." *Neuroethics* 4 (3): 223–34. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-010-9092-2>.
- . 2013. *Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement*. SpringerBriefs in Ethics. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4>.
- Furnham, Adrian, Tatsuro Hosoe, Thomas Li, and -Ping Tang. 2001. "Male Hubris and Female Humility? A Cross-Cultural Study of Ratings of Self, Parental, and Sibling Multiple Intelligence in America, Britain, and Japan." *Intelligence*. Vol. 30. <https://pdf.sciencedirectassets.com/272071/1-s2.0-S0160289600X00189/1-s2.0-S0160289601000800/main.pdf?x-amz-security-token=AgoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEE4aCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIB7s5EbipIKIkc4ebtj4nMi88nJaN8oQf%2B%2B6vdTPSdMnAiABUcFS%2BkKJD338%2BEluCGn823tK%2FXipLmGAcC>.
- Garry, Ann. 2011. "Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender." *Hypatia* 26 (4): 826–50. <https://about.jstor.org/terms>.

- Gibson, Donald E. 2004. "Role Models in Career Development: New Directions for Theory and Research." *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 65 (1): 134–56.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0001-8791\(03\)00051-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0001-8791(03)00051-4).
- Goldberg, Sanford C. 2018. "Against Epistemic Partiality in Friendship: Value-Reflecting Reasons." *Philosophical Studies*, May, 1–22.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1123-6>.
- Greco, John. 1999. "Agent Reliabilism." *Philosophical Perspectives* 13: 273–96.
- . 2003. "Knowledge as Credit for True Belief." In *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, edited by Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, 111–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2010. *Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2012. "A (Different) Virtue Epistemology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85 (1): 1–26.
- Guay, Frédéric, Catherine F. Ratelle, and Julien Chanal. 2008. "Optimal Learning in Optimal Contexts: The Role of Self-Determination in Education." *Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne* 49 (3): 233–40.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012758>.
- Guay, Frédéric, and Robert J Vallerand. 1996. "Social Context, Student's Motivation, and Academic Achievement: Toward a Process Model." *Social Psychology of Education* 1 (3): 211–33.

- Han, Hyemin, Jeongmin Kim, Changwoo Jeong, and Geoffrey L. Cohen. 2017. "Attainable and Relevant Moral Exemplars Are More Effective than Extraordinary Exemplars in Promoting Voluntary Service Engagement." *Frontiers in Psychology* 8 (March): 283. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00283>.
- Hansen, Jochim, Hans Alves, and Yaacov Trope. 2016. "Psychological Distance Reduces Literal Imitation: Evidence from an Imitation-Learning Paradigm." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 42 (3): 320–30. <https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000150>.
- Harman, Gilbert. 1999. "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99 (1): 315–332.
- Hartshorne, Hugh, and Mark May. 1928. *Studies in the Nature of Character, Studies in Deceit (Vol. I)*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hatfield, Elaine., John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson. 1994. *Emotional Contagion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hawley, Katherine. 2014. "Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting." *Synthese* 191: 2029–45. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0129-4>.
- Hennessey, Beth A, and Teresa M Amabile. 2010. "Creativity." *Annual Review of Psychology* 61 (1): 569–98. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100416>.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. *On Virtue Ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Iizuka, Rie. 2018. "Situationism, Virtue Epistemology, and Self-Determination Theory." *Synthese*, March, 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1750-7>.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2019. "Women in National Parliaments." 2019. <http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>.
- Isen, Alice M, Kimberly A Daubman, and Gary P Nowicki. 1987. "Positive Affect Facilitates Creative Problem Solving." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (6): 1122–31. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1122>.
- Isen, Alice M, and Paula F Levin. 1972. "Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 21 (3): 384.
- Judge, Timothy A, Chad A Higgins, Carl J Thoresen, and Murray R Barrick. 1999. "The Big Five Personality Traits, General Mental Ability, and Career Success across the Life Span." *Personnel Psychology* 52 (3): 621–52.
- Kalkstein, David A, Tali Kleiman, Cheryl J Wakslak, Nira Liberman, and Yaacov Trope. 2016. "Social Learning across Psychological Distance." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 110 (1): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000042>.
- Kasof, Joseph, Chuansheng Chen, Amy Himsel, and Ellen Greenberger. 2007. "Values and Creativity." *Creativity Research Journal* 19 (2–3): 105–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10400410701397164>.
- Kasser, Tim, Richard M Ryan, Melvin Zax, and Arnold J Sameroff. 1995. "The Relations of Maternal and Social Environments to Late Adolescents' Materialistic and Prosocial Values." *Developmental Psychology* 31 (6): 907.

- Kawall, Jason. 2009. "Virtue Theory, Ideal Observers, and the Supererogatory." *Philosophical Studies* 146 (2): 179–96. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9250-0>.
- . 2013. "Friendship and Epistemic Norms." *Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 165 (2): 349–70. <https://doi.org/10.1007/sl>.
- Keller, Simon. 2004. "Friendship and Belief." *Philosophical Papers* 33 (3): 329–51. <https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640409485146>.
- Kidd, Ian, James. 2017. "Resisters, Diversity in Philosophy, and the Demographic Problem." *Rivista Di Estetica*, no. 64 (April): 118–33. <https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.2071>.
- King, Nathan L. 2014. "Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology: A Reply to the Situationist Challenge." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 64 (255): 243–53.
- Knobe, Joshua. 2003. "Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language." Edited by Joshua Knobe. *Analysis* 63 (3): 190–94. <https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.3.190>.
- Kristjánsson, Kristján. 2007. "Emulation and the Use of Role Models in Moral Education." *Journal of Moral Education* 35 (1): 37–49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240500495278>.
- Kusch, Martin, and Robin McKenna. 2018. "The Genealogical Method in Epistemology." *Synthese*, 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1675-1>.

- Latané, Bibb, and Judith Rodin. 1969. "A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 5 (2): 189–202.
- Liberman, Nira, and Yaacov Trope. 2008. "The Psychology of Transcending the Here and Now." *Science*. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1161958>.
- Lockwood, Penelope, and Ziva Kunda. 1997. "Superstars and Me: Predicting the Impact of Role Models on the Self." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73 (1): 91–103. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.91>.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. London: Duckworth.
- Mackie, John L. 1965. "Causes and Conditions." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2 (4): 245–64.
- Mageau, Geneviève A, and Robert J Vallerand. 2003. "The Coach–Athlete Relationship: A Motivational Model." *Journal of Sports Sciences* 21 (11): 883–904. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0264041031000140374>.
- Mageau, Geneviève A, Robert J Vallerand, Julie Charest, Sarah-Jeanne Salvy, Nathalie Lacaille, Thérèse Bouffard, and Richard Koestner. 2009. "On the Development of Harmonious and Obsessive Passion: The Role of Autonomy Support, Activity Specialization, and Identification with the Activity." *Journal of Personality* 77 (3): 601–46.

- Matheson, Benjamin. 2018. "Towards a Structural Ownership Condition on Moral Responsibility." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, June, 1–23.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1480853>.
- Mckinnon, Rachel. 2017. "Allies Behaving Badly: Gaslighting as Epistemic Injustice." In *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*, edited by Ian James Kidd and José Medina. London: Routledge.
- Mele, Alfred R. 2013. "Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting." *Journal of Ethics* 17 (3): 167–84. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-013-9147-9>.
- Mendiburo-Seguel, Andrés, Darío Páez, and Francisco Martínez-Sánchez. 2015. "Humor Styles and Personality: A Meta-analysis of the Relation between Humor Styles and the Big Five Personality Traits." *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology* 56 (3): 335–40.
- Merritt, Maria. 2000. "Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 3 (4): 365–83.
- Milgram, Stanley. 1963. "Behavioral Study of Obedience." *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 67 (4): 371–78.
- Miller, Christian. 2014. "Moral Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, and the Big Five." In *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue*, 92–117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Montmarquet, James. 1992. "Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 29 (4): 331–41.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014428>.

- Narayan, Uma. 1988. "Working Together Across Difference: Some Considerations on Emotions and Political Practice." *Hypatia* 3 (2): 31–48.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1988.tb00067.x>.
- Nettle, Daniel. 2006. "The Evolution of Personality Variation in Humans and Other Animals." *American Psychologist* 61 (6): 622–31.
- . 2007. *Personality: What Makes You the Way You Are*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Niemiec, Christopher P, and Richard M Ryan. 2009. "Autonomy, Competence, and Relatedness in the Classroom: Applying Self-Determination Theory to Educational Practice." *Theory and Research in Education* 7 (2): 133–44.
- Noddings, Nel. 2012. "The Language of Care Ethics." *Knowledge Quest* 40 (5): 52–56.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=82564009&site=ehost-live>.
- Northcott, Robert. 2008. "Causation and Contrast Classes." *Philosophical Studies* 139 (1): 111–23.
- Nozick, Robert. 1974. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Oswald, Debra L. 2016. "Maintaining Long-Lasting Friendships." In *The Psychology of Friendship*, edited by Mahzad Hojjat and Anne Moyer, 267–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190222024.003.0016>.

- Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. 2012. *Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Piccinini, Gualtiero. 2003a. "Data from Introspective Reports: Upgrading from Common Sense to Science." *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 10 (9–10): 141–56.
- . 2003b. "Epistemic Divergence and the Publicity of Scientific Methods." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 34 (3): 597–612.
- . 2010. "How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data." *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 17 (3–4): 84–106.
- Porter, Steven. 2015. "A Therapeutic Approach to Intellectual Virtue Formation in the Classroom." In *Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology*, edited by Jason Baehr, 221–39. New York: Routledge.
- Priest, Maura. 2017. "Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory." *Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy* 4 (September): 463–80.
<https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.016>.
- Pritchard, Duncan. 2010a. "Achievements, Luck and Value." *Think* 9 (25): 19–30.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s1477175610000035>.
- . 2010b. "Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis." *Synthese* 175 (1): 133–51. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9738-y>.
- . 2013. "Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education." *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 47 (2): 236–47.

- . 2015. "Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education." In *Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology*, edited by Jason Baehr, 113–27. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315714127-7>.
- . 2016. "Seeing It for Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy." *Episteme* 13 (1): 29–42.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.59>.
- . 2018. "Intellectual Humility and the Epistemology of Disagreement." *Synthese*, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5>.
- Railton, Peter. 1984. "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality." *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 134–71.
- Ratelle, Catherine F, Frédéric Guay, Robert J Vallerand, Simon Larose, and Caroline Senécal. 2007. "Autonomous, Controlled, and Amotivated Types of Academic Motivation: A Person-Oriented Analysis." *Journal of Educational Psychology* 99 (4): 734.
- Riggs, Wayne. 2010. "Open-Mindedness." *Metaphilosophy* 41 (1/2): 172–88.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439880>.
- Rini, Regina. 2017. "Fake News and Partisan Epistemology." *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 27 (2S): E-43-E-64. <https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2017.0025>.
- Roberts, Robert C, and W Jay Wood. 2007. *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roberts, Sam G.B., and Robin I.M. Dunbar. 2011. "The Costs of Family and Friends: An 18-Month Longitudinal Study of Relationship Maintenance and

Decay." *Evolution and Human Behavior* 32 (3): 186–97.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.08.005>.

Ryan, Richard M, and Edward L Deci. 2000. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations:

Classic Definitions and New Directions." *Contemporary Educational*

Psychology 25 (1): 54–67.

<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1020>.

Ryan, Richard M, Veronika Huta, and Edward L Deci. 2008. "Living Well: A Self-

Determination Theory Perspective on Eudaimonia." *Journal of Happiness*

Studies 9 (1): 139–70. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-006-9023-4>.

Sandel, Michael J. 2007. *The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic*

Engineering. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Sanderse, Wouter. 2013. "The Meaning of Role Modelling in Moral and Character

Education." *Journal of Moral Education* 42 (1): 28–42.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2012.690727>.

Schechtman, Marya. 1996. *The Constitution of Selves*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-

sity Press.

———. 2007. "Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival: A Refinement and Defense of the

Narrative View." *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 60 (May): 155–78.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246107000082>.

———. 2011. "The Narrative Self." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Self*, edited by

Shaun Gallagher. Oxford University Press.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0018>.

- Sher, George. 2005. *In Praise of Blame*. New York: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/0195187423.001.0001>.
- Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 1 (3): 229–43.
- Slote, Michael. 2013. *From Enlightenment to Receptivity: Rethinking Our Values*. New York: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199970704.001.0001>.
- Sommers, Tamler. 2013. "Partial Desert." In *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1*, edited by David Shoemaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0011>.
- Sosa, Ernest. 1980. "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1): 3–26.
- . 2007. *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Vol. I)*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 2010. *Knowing Full Well*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2015. *Judgment and Agency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sreenivasan, Gopal. 2002. "Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution." *Mind* 111 (441): 47–68.
- . 2008. "Character and Consistency: Still More Errors." *Mind* 117 (467): 603–12.
- . 2009. "Disunity of Virtue." *The Journal of Ethics* 13 (2–3): 195–212.

- . 2013. "The Situationist Critique of Virtue Ethics." In *The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy)*, edited by Daniel C. Russell, 290–314. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stocker, Michael. 1976. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (14): 453–66.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2025782.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae510162a1cfd051396b3f612f5dd7a38>.
- Stroud, Sarah. 2006. "Epistemic Partiality in Friendship." *Ethics* 116 (3): 498–524.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/500337>.
- Tanesini, Alessandra. 2016. "'Calm down, Dear': Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance." In *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume*, 90:71–92. <https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akw011>.
- Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the Self*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2008. *Nudge : Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Trope, Yaacov, and Nira Liberman. 2010. "Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance." *Psychological Review* 117 (2): 440–63.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018963>.
- . 2012. "Construal Level Theory." In *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume 1*, edited by P. A. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, and E. T.

Higgins, 118–34. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

<https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446249215.n7>.

Upton, Candace L. 2009. "The Structure of Character." *The Journal of Ethics* 13 (2–3): 175–93.

Vallerand, Robert J. 2012. "From Motivation to Passion: In Search of the Motivational Processes Involved in a Meaningful Life." *Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne* 53 (1): 42–52.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026377>.

Vallerand, Robert J., Céline Blanchard, Geneviève A. Mageau, Richard Koestner, Catherine Ratelle, Maude Léonard, Marylène Gagné, and Josée Marsolais. 2003. "Les Passions de l'âme: On Obsessive and Harmonious Passion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85 (4): 756–67.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.756>.

Vallerand, Robert J., and Robert Blissonette. 1992. "Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Amotivational Styles as Predictors of Behavior: A Prospective Study." *Journal of Personality* 60 (3): 599–620. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00922.x>.

Vallerand, Robert J., Michelle S. Fortier, and Frédéric Guay. 1997. "Self-Determination and Persistence in a Real-Life Setting: Toward a Motivational Model of High School Dropout." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72 (5): 1161–76. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.5.1161>.

- Vallerand, Robert J, Geneviève A Mageau, Andrew J Elliot, Alexandre Dumais, Marc-André Demers, and François Rousseau. 2008. "Passion and Performance Attainment in Sport." *Psychology of Sport and Exercise* 9 (3): 373–92. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2007.05.003>.
- Velleman, J. David. 2009. "The Self as Narrator." In *Self to Self*, 203–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498862.009>.
- Vos, Pieter H. 2018. "Learning from Exemplars: Emulation, Character Formation and the Complexities of Ordinary Life." *Journal of Beliefs & Values* 39 (1): 17–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2017.1393295>.
- Warnick, Bryan R. 2009. *Imitation and Education: A Philosophical Inquiry into Learning by Example*. New York: SUNY Press.
- Watson, Gary. 1996. "Two Faces of Responsibility." *Philosophical Topics* 24 (2): 227–48. <https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199624222>.
- Webber, Jonathan. 2006. "Character, Consistency, and Classification." *Mind* 115 (459): 651–58.
- Whitcomb, Dennis, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder. 2017. "Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 94 (3): 509–39.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12228>.
- White, Roger. 2005. "Epistemic Permissiveness." *Philosophical Perspectives* 19 (1): 445–59. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x>.

- Williams, Bernard. 1985. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Wylie, Alison. 2013. "Why Standpoint Matters." In *Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology*, edited by Sandra Harding and Robert Figueroa, 26–48. New York: Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315881010>.
- Yamagishi, Toshio, Hirofumi Hashimoto, Karen S. Cook, Toko Kiyonari, Mizuho Shinada, Nobuhiro Mifune, Keigo Inukai, Haruto Takagishi, Yutaka Horita, and Yang Li. 2012. "Modesty in Self-Presentation: A Comparison between the USA and Japan." *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 15 (1): 60–68.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-839X.2011.01362.x>.
- Zagzebski, Linda. 1996. *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2010. "Exemplarist Virtue Theory." *Metaphilosophy* 41 (1-2): 41–57.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01627.x>.
- . 2017. *Exemplarist Moral Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190655846.001.0001>.
- Zimbardo, Philip G, Craig Haney, W Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe. 1973. "A Pirandellian Prison: The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer." *New York Times Magazine* 8 (1973): 38–60.