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**William Temple's Doctrine of the Will:  
The Bridge Between His Theology and Social Thought**

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*To Tricia*

*whose love, sacrifice, and encouragement made this possible.*

## Abstract

William Temple (1881–1944) is undoubtedly one of the most influential Anglican figures of the twentieth century. Research on Temple, however, tends to be lopsided. Studies tend to have an imbalanced focus on his social teaching because of the popularity and impact of *Christianity and Social Order* (CASO) to the neglect of his broader theology and doctrine. Consequently, the theological underpinnings of Temple's social thought are obscured or downplayed. The principal claim of this dissertation is that Temple's social teaching is fundamentally built upon and derived from his theology. We posit the category of the will as the hermeneutic of understanding Temple's theology and specifically how it finds expression in his social thought. The will is helpful as a hermeneutic because it was central to many facets of Temple's theology. In a Thomist or Aristotelian way, Temple understood God through an argument of first cause. Creation must be an act of volition. God is therefore construed as the Divine or Creative Will. Temple's Christology naturally follows on in terms of the will. Christ had two wills, a human will and a divine Will, but the human will was subsumed within the divine Will and finds resolution within the person of the Logos. This was essentially the dyothelite position that was affirmed at the Council of Constantinople. Temple's Christology rests on his theological anthropology and his concept of personality. Every human pursues the ideal of a complete personality, that is, the harmonisation of their impulses, desires, and reason under their will. Personality is also nourished by fellowship. Humans are intrinsically social and develop most fully in a community. A complete personality in the widest possible fellowship is thus the ideal state of humans. This coheres with the goal of the Church to sum up all humanity as one "person" in Christ. Temple relied on a strongly realist interpretation of the Pauline image of the Church as the Body of Christ. Specifically, the Church is the organ or instrument of Christ's Will in the world. This led to a confluence between the Church and the State, which could be understood as a clash of two wills. The Church is the organ of Christ's Will whereas the State acts upon the community's will. Temple's social principles and middle axioms in CASO were intended to lessen this conflict through the intermediacy of Christian citizens. Yet his key social principles advocated were personality and fellowship, which were some of his key theological concepts that were developed based on the category of the will.

## Lay Summary

William Temple (1881–1944) is one of the most important Christian figures in England of the twentieth century. He is often remembered for paving the way for the establishment of the welfare state after the Second World War. Much of this was accomplished through his small but popular book, *Christianity and Social Order*. Because of this, research done on Temple tends to focus on his social thought, that is, the application of the Christian faith to society and societal issues. Studies that investigate his theology are few and far between. This dissertation attempts to contribute to that gap in knowledge by studying Temple's theology and how it gives rise to his social thought. To be specific, we argued that the category of the will can help us in our efforts. The will was an important category of thought for Temple that he constantly drew upon in his understanding of God, humans, Christ, the Church, the State, and how the Church could interact with the State. Temple understood God as Divine or Creative Will because the idea of a Will denotes choice and activity. God chose to create the world and remains active in it. Likewise, humans should be understood primarily in terms of their will. It is their will that integrates their impulses, thoughts, and feelings such that a person is ideally a unity based on their will. This is what Temple would have termed a complete personality. This personality is complemented by fellowship because humans require interaction with others humans to fully develop. Temple also thought of Christ in terms of the will. Christ had two wills, a human will and a divine Will, but the human will was incorporated into the divine Will. This was possible because there was only one person, that is the Logos, and therefore, only one will (i.e., the divine Will) in Him. The Church, being the Body of Christ, continues to be the instrument of Christ's Will in the world. It seeks to aid humans in achieving their ideal of a complete personality in fellowship by gathering them into the Church and introducing them to Christ's Will, or the divine Will. The activeness of the Church, however, brings it into conflict with the State. The conflict between them can be explained as a clash of two wills. The Church acts upon Christ's Will whereas the State follows the community's will. This conflict is experienced the most by the Christian citizen who is a member of both. Therefore, Temple proposes that the Church should offer them principles to inform and educate them on the Christian faith and how it bears on society. The two key principals that Temple espoused were personality and fellowship, which were essentially his key theological principles that were based on the will.

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## Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used to refer to the works of William Temple.

<i>CASO</i>	<i>Christianity and Social Order</i>
<i>CC</i>	<i>Citizen and Churchman</i>
<i>CHC</i>	<i>Christ in His Church</i>
<i>CLF</i>	<i>Church Looks Forward</i>
<i>CN</i>	<i>Church and Nation</i>
<i>CTT</i>	<i>The Church and its Teaching Today</i>
<i>CS</i>	<i>Christianity and the State</i>
<i>CTP</i>	<i>Christianity in Thought and Practice</i>
<i>CV</i>	<i>Christus Veritas</i>
<i>ECP</i>	<i>Essays in Christian Politics and Kindred Subjects</i>
<i>FMT</i>	<i>The Faith and Modern Thought</i>
<i>MC</i>	<i>Mens Creatrix</i>
<i>NMG</i>	<i>Nature, Man and God</i>
<i>NP</i>	<i>The Nature of Personality</i>
<i>PRLF</i>	<i>Personal Religion and the Life of Fellowship</i>
<i>RSJG</i>	<i>Readings in St. John's Gospel</i>

# Introduction

## William Temple and his Legacy

William Temple (1881–1944) is unquestionably one of the most important and influential Anglican figures of the twentieth century.<sup>1</sup> Michael Ramsey and Charles Lowry assert that no other Archbishop of Canterbury since Anselm could compare to Temple as theologian and thinker.<sup>2</sup> Others like Kenneth Hylson-Smith go further in suggesting that Temple is one of the “most outstanding churchmen not only of the twentieth but any century”.<sup>3</sup> Even those who are less enthused about the Christian faith, such as Winston Churchill and Bernard Shaw, acknowledge his importance and influence. Churchill was not particularly fond of Temple because of his socialist leanings. But when asked why he appointed Temple as the Archbishop of Canterbury, Churchill replied, “[b]ecause he was the only half-crown article in a sixpenny-halfpenny bazaar”.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, Shaw commented that to the “men of my generation an Archbishop of Temple's enlightenment was a realized impossibility”.<sup>5</sup> Even those from beyond British shores were appreciative of Temple's significance. Reinhold Niebuhr paid a touching tribute to Temple upon his death: he considered that Temple was one of the most influential theologians of his time, and lamented that his death robbed Britain “not only of its ablest and most courageous churchman but of one of the most brilliant of its statesmen”.<sup>6</sup> Niebuhr continued by noting that “the primary significance of his life lay in his ability to carry the

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<sup>1</sup> See his biography by F. A. Iremonger, *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Letters* (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1948). For good summaries see Adrian Hastings, “Temple, William (1881–1944),” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Alan M. Suggate, “William Temple,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology*, ed. Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003); John Macquarrie, “William Temple: Philosopher, Theologian, Churchman,” in *The Experiment of Life: Science and Religion*, ed. F. Kenneth Hare (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Owen C. Thomas, “William Temple,” in *The Spirit of Anglicanism: Hooker, Maurice, Temple*, ed. William J. Wolf (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> Michael Ramsey, *From Gore to Temple: The Development of Anglican Theology between Lux Mundi and the Second World War 1889–1939* (London: Longmans, 1960), 160; Charles Lowry, “William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury,” *Christendom*, vol.8 (Winter 1943): 36.

<sup>3</sup> Kenneth Hylson-Smith, *The Churches in England from Elizabeth I to Elizabeth II: 1833–1998* (London: SCM Press, 1996), 179.

<sup>4</sup> Clement Attlee, “The Churchill I Knew,” in *Churchill, By His Contemporaries: An Observer Appreciation*, ed. Observer (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), 21.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity 1920–2000*, Fourth ed. (London: SCM Press, 2001), 255.

<sup>6</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, “Dr. William Temple and His Britain,” *The Nation*, vol.159 (November 1944): 584.

radical social implication of the Christian faith into higher ecclesiastical office than any other churchman".<sup>7</sup> It is in addition to this that Alister McGrath offers that it is "not too much to say that the Church of England has never fully recovered from the loss".<sup>8</sup>

Niebuhr's tribute is telling about Temple's legacy. Temple is most often remembered for his social thought: that is, his understanding of how the Christian faith applies to society. The book most often associated with this area of his thought is *CASO*. This is inarguably his most popular and influential book, despite being a mere 90 pages. Temple had used it to advocate Christian social principles and practical suggestions that could guide the reconstruction of British society after the Second World War. It seemed to strike a chord with the British populace by addressing issues close to their hearts. In fact, it was first published as a Penguin Special early in 1942, but great demand for it necessitated a reprint in May and again in August of that same year. Sales would quickly hit well over 150,000 copies.<sup>9</sup> *CASO* dovetailed with the Beveridge Report that was published that same year of 1942. The report called for action to be taken against the five giants of want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness. The two publications contributed significantly to the growing conviction that social reconstruction after the war should include a system of social welfare. This led to the Labour Party winning the General Election of 1945 and to the eventual establishment of the welfare state.<sup>10</sup> Denys Munby, who comments on this period, contends that *CASO* was undoubtedly "one of the foundation piers of the Welfare State".<sup>11</sup> It is in this light that Joseph Fletcher averred that "[n]ever had an Archbishop spoken so unmistakably for the conscience of Britain, or so fully and unsparingly".<sup>12</sup>

The popularity and impact of *CASO* seems to have eclipsed Temple's other works or areas of thought. There is hardly any discussion of Temple as a theologian or philosopher, or of his major works, *MC*, *CV*, and *NMG*. Part of the reason for this can be attributed to some of his intellectual successors. Ronald Preston is a prime example. The passing of the baton

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Alister E. McGrath, "Temple, William," in *The SPCK Handbook of Anglican Theologians*, ed. Alister E. McGrath (London: SPCK, 1998), 216.

<sup>9</sup> Ronald H. Preston, "Introduction: Thirty-Five Years Later; 1941–1976," in *Christianity and Social Order* (London: Shephard-Walwyn, 1976), 5.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>11</sup> Denys Munby, *God and the Rich Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 157. See also Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 398; Hastings, "Temple, William (1881–1944)," 93; Suggate, "William Temple," 176.

<sup>12</sup> Joseph F. Fletcher, *William Temple: Twentieth-Century Christian* (New York: Seabury Press, 1963), 282.

from Temple to Preston has been described as “almost ... an apostolic succession”.<sup>13</sup> However, Preston has stated on more than one occasion that Temple’s main works were of little importance. *MC* and *CV* were unreadable, while *NMG* only held some limited insights.<sup>14</sup> This corroborates what he expressed to Wendy Dackson on her research trip to Britain. Preston told Dackson that Temple’s earlier books were barely worth reading, and that only *CASO* had any continuing value.<sup>15</sup> Quite clearly, all the other areas of Temple’s thought are disregarded.<sup>16</sup> Another example is Alan Suggate. He met with Dackson as well and stated that Temple’s three main works (*MC*, *CV*, and *NMG*) and social ethics were useful but each was bound to its time and place.<sup>17</sup> It is implied then that Temple’s theology and thought is outmoded, requiring significant effort to expound and extrapolate for modern readers. This is in line with Suggate’s own research that tends to focus on Temple’s social thought.<sup>18</sup> Temple’s legacy is eclipsed by the popular success of *CASO* and his social thought, as further reinforced by his interpreters.

There are other reasons for this eclipse too. Writing in 2004, in the preface to Dackson’s book on Temple’s ecclesiology, Suggate laments that Temple is only being studied fitfully even though he was eminent as a theologian, philosopher, and social reformer in his day, and suggests three reasons for this.<sup>19</sup> Firstly, Temple had admitted that his earlier work needed reappraisal in light of the challenges of the 1930s.<sup>20</sup> Because of this, it is easy to assume that his previous works, including his three main books *MC*, *CV*, and *NMG*, can be ignored, and that only his later ones are useful. Secondly, there was great respect and

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<sup>13</sup> John Atherton, *Public Theology For Changing Times* (London: SPCK, 2000), 79.

<sup>14</sup> Ronald H. Preston, *The Future of Christian Ethics* (London: SCM Press, 1987), 100; Ronald H. Preston, “William Temple: The Man and His Impact on Church and Society,” in *Archbishop William Temple: Issues in Church and Society 50 Years On*, ed. Ronald Preston, et al. (Manchester: William Temple Foundation and Gresham College, 1994), 5.

<sup>15</sup> He expressed this to Dackson on her research trip in England in the fall of 1998. Wendy Dackson, *The Ecclesiology of Archbishop William Temple (1881–1944)* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), 3.

<sup>16</sup> Dackson wrote an article questioning whether Preston adequately represents a continuation from Temple. See Wendy Dackson, “But Was It Meant to Be a Joke Legacy? Ronald Preston as Heir to William Temple,” *Studies in Christian Ethics*, vol.17, no.2 (2004).

<sup>17</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Alan M. Suggate, *William Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987); Alan M. Suggate, “In Search of a Eucharistic Social Ethic,” in *Worship and Ethics: Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue*, ed. Oswald Bayer and Alan Suggate (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996); Alan M. Suggate, “The Temple Tradition,” in *Anglican Social Theology: Renewing the Vision Today*, ed. Malcolm Brown (London: Church House Publishing, 2014); Suggate, “William Temple.”

<sup>19</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, i.

<sup>20</sup> William Temple, “Theology To-Day,” *Theology*, vol.39, no.233 (November 1939); Church of England, *Doctrine in the Church of England (1938)*, Reprint ed. (London: SPCK, 1982), 16–17.

admiration for Temple, which could discourage a detailed critical study of his work. Matthew Grimley makes the same observation. He notes that Temple, among others, has been neglected because of "tombstone hagiographies produced after their deaths ... [which] have tended to be the last word, their laborious thoroughness acting as a disincentive to later interpretations".<sup>21</sup> The unwillingness to venture beyond this is a shame as it seriously neglects Temple's intellectual contributions. The last of Suggate's reasons is that the world has rapidly changed since Temple's time. The context we live in is vastly different from that of Temple. Widespread secularism has pushed the Church into the margins, where more effort is spent offering a counter-cultural witness than studying people from the past.<sup>22</sup> We could add the major shifts in theology in the past decades to this vastly different context as well. Temple wrote in the heady days of philosophical (particularly British) idealism as he traversed philosophy and theology in his pursuit of a Christocentric metaphysics based on sacramental and incarnational theology. Mark Chapman is not wrong to say that Temple had developed "a theological system which was often dense, impenetrable and complex".<sup>23</sup> It is simply written in a different context, with different considerations, within a different philosophical and theological landscape, and to a different audience. Temple's theological enterprise sounds alien, archaic, and inapt to readers today. It is therefore easy to dismiss his theology altogether.<sup>24</sup>

Temple was undoubtedly of great influence and impact during his lifetime. Yet, his legacy seems to be lopsided and shallow. His importance tends to be confined to the bounds of *CASO*, his social thought, or his role in the establishment of the welfare state. There is little discussion of Temple as a theologian or philosopher, or studies of his major works *MC*, *CV*, and *NMG*. This is surprising, as one would assume that social thought is predicated on theology. The success of Temple's social thought should have prompted investigations of his theological and doctrinal works. Producing such an investigation is the primary aim of this dissertation. I hope to show that Temple's theology and social thought are intimately

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<sup>21</sup> Grimley singles out Iremonger's biography for Temple. Matthew Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England: Liberal Anglican Theories of the State Between the Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 23.

<sup>22</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, i.

<sup>23</sup> Mark D. Chapman, "The Evolution of Anglican Theology, 1910–2000," in *The Oxford History of Anglicanism, Volume IV: Global Western Anglicanism, c.1910–Present*, ed. Jeremy Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 37.

<sup>24</sup> John Marsden, "William Temple: Christianity and the Life of Fellowship," *Political Theology*, vol.8, no.2 (July 2007): 231.

connected. His social thought is grounded in his theology. I will substantiate this claim through a study of the category of the will in Temple's works.

## Research Context

The imbalance of Temple's legacy is based on research done on him. Studies of Temple can be loosely categorised into four main areas of focus: biographical, philosophical, social thought, and theological. We turn first to biographical studies of Temple. F. A. Iremonger's work remains Temple's main biography. It offers a comprehensive account of Temple's life, despite being somewhat hagiographical.<sup>25</sup> Charles Lowry has since offered a complementary biographical sketch that is more personal in nature.<sup>26</sup> The second area of studies focuses on Temple's philosophical contributions. Owen Thomas examines Temple's philosophy of religion. It is a descriptive rather than an analytical work, as Thomas attempts to recapitulate Temple's thought for use by others.<sup>27</sup> Jack Francis Padgett gives a good account of Temple's philosophical theology. He takes a thematic approach and does well in delineating and crystalising the main emphases in Temple's Christian philosophy. In particular, he highlights the importance of personality in Temple's theology.<sup>28</sup> Two other unpublished dissertations also study Temple's philosophy. John Lacorte analyses the dialectical philosophical in *NMG*, specially, Temple's four dialectic transitions.<sup>29</sup> Michael Wilkinson looks at Temple's ideas of personalism and value.<sup>30</sup>

The third area of focus, which is by far the largest, is Temple's social thought. It should be noted that we are taking a broad definition of social thought as the application of the Christian faith to society and societal issues. This covers areas such as social concerns and engagement, socio-political thought, and social ethics. Authors such as Harmon Smith and James Vanderlaan investigate Temple's ethics: both were attempts to study whether there was a central idea or structure that held it together. While both recognise Temple's starting

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<sup>25</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*.

<sup>26</sup> Charles Lowry, *William Temple, An Archbishop for All Seasons* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982).

<sup>27</sup> Owen C. Thomas, *William Temple's Philosophy of Religion* (London: SPCK, 1961).

<sup>28</sup> Jack Francis Padgett, *The Christian Philosophy of William Temple* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

<sup>29</sup> John Joseph Lacorte, *A Critical Analysis of the Dialectical Philosophy of William Temple* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: University of Southern California (USA), 1970).

<sup>30</sup> Michael Bernard Wilkinson, *Value and Natural Order in the Philosophy of William Temple* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: University of Surrey (UK), 1990).

point in the natural law, they diverge on whether the effect (Vanderlaan) or event (Smith) of the Incarnation was of greater significance.<sup>31</sup> We should note that Smith seemed to be aware of the importance of the will but does not investigate it further.<sup>32</sup> Other authors within this category focus on Temple's socio-political thought. Edward MacConomy's dissertation centres on Temple's political thought looking specifically at his views on British foreign and domestic policies. It is a careful study, but its analysis seems somewhat dated today.<sup>33</sup> John Bald compares the social ethics and political thought of Reinhold Niebuhr and Temple. His work is detailed, stimulating, and innovative. However, Bald concentrates on *CASO* while neglecting most of Temple's other works.<sup>34</sup> All these dissertations are as yet unpublished. There are two published studies within this area by John Carmichael and Harold Goodwin, and John Kent. Both studies focus on Temple's political legacy. However, they tend to disagree with Temple based on their own right-wing leanings. Their disagreement is largely grounded in critiques of *CASO* such as its form of social engagement and support for the welfare state.<sup>35</sup>

Research on Temple's social thought includes yet another group who examine his social concerns. Robert Craig details Temple's social concern and tries to situate it within his theology. His is probably the first study to do so; most studies thereafter often refer to him. However, Craig's study tends to be quite broad-brush. This is somewhat inevitable given the lack of secondary literature to interact with. Nonetheless, Craig's work lays important groundwork for analysis of Temple's theology and social concerns, and the interaction between them.<sup>36</sup> Alan Suggate's research is also valuable. It is a detailed and analytical attempt to study Temple's stance on various social, economic, and political issues such as war and unemployment. However, it tends to be issue-specific and does not go far in analysing

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<sup>31</sup> Harmon L. Smith, *The Structure of Christian Ethics in the Thought of William Temple* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Duke University (USA), 1967); James L. Vanderlaan, *The Structure of William Temple's Ethics: Sacramental Love* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Princeton University (USA), 1971).

<sup>32</sup> Smith, *Christian Ethics in Temple*, 102, 193–200.

<sup>33</sup> Edward Nelson MacConomy, *The Political Thought of William Temple* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: University of Michigan (USA), 1962).

<sup>34</sup> John M. Bald, *William Temple and Reinhold Niebuhr, A Comparative Study of their Social Ethics as Grounded in their Theology and as Applied in their Political Thought* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Victoria University (Toronto), 1966).

<sup>35</sup> John David Carmichael and Harold Sidney Goodwin, *William Temple's Political Legacy: A Critical Assessment* (London: A.R. Mowbray, 1963); John Kent, *William Temple: Church, State and Society in Britain, 1880–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Carmichael and Goodwin prefer liberalism as defined in the narrow sense of free market competition.

<sup>36</sup> Robert Craig, *Social Concern in the Thought of William Temple* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1963). See also Robert Craig, "William Temple and the Prospects of a Reasonable Christology," *Anglican Theological Review*, vol.41, no.1 (Jan 1959).

Temple's theological underpinnings.<sup>37</sup> Stephen Spencer takes a chronological approach to his study of Temple's social concerns. His emphasis is more historical, as effort seems to be spent chronicling instead of analysing.<sup>38</sup> More recently, authors such as Malcolm Brown, John Hughes, and Suggate have called for a reappraisal of the "Temple tradition" for Anglican social thought and public engagement. In their book *Anglican Social Theology*, they suggest that Temple's significance lies in social action that makes a real difference in people's lives.<sup>39</sup> The same call is echoed in Spencer's, *Theology Reforming Society*.<sup>40</sup> Both of these books, however, are contributory volumes, with chapters written by different authors: each chapter is by nature brief with little analysis of what Temple offered.

The last area of focus within research on Temple relates to his theology. Apart from smaller essays and journal articles, Joseph Fletcher was the first to explore Temple's theology properly. He looks at three specific areas of Temple's thought: the constructive elements of his theology, his ecumenical theology, and his social theology.<sup>41</sup> Next come more unpublished dissertations: Ellis Hollon explores the Logos concept within Temple's thought, while Richard Heaton studies Temple as part of a stream of Anglican thinkers whose social thought was shaped by sacramental theology, specifically the Eucharist.<sup>42</sup> Heaton does well to signal that Temple's social thought was shaped by his theology, but his work does not offer an in-depth analysis of Temple. Surprisingly, it was another thirty years before a second look was given to Temple's theology. Jonathan Smoot engages Temple with John Mozley on the topic of divine impassibility.<sup>43</sup> Richard Hoskins then juxtaposes Temple's and J. R. Illingworth's doctrines of

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<sup>37</sup> Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*. In any case, Suggate's own preference of Reinhold Niebuhr is overly apparent.

<sup>38</sup> Stephen Spencer, *William Temple: A Calling to Prophecy* (London: SPCK, 2001).

<sup>39</sup> Malcolm Brown, ed. *Anglican Social Theology: Renewing the Vision Today* (London: Church House Publishing, 2014).

<sup>40</sup> Stephen Spencer, ed. *Theology Reforming Society: Revisiting Anglican Social Theology* (London: SCM Press, 2017).

<sup>41</sup> Fletcher, *William Temple*.

<sup>42</sup> Ellis Wing Hollon, Jr., *The Role of the Logos-Concept in the Thought of William Temple* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Emory University (USA), 1966); Richard L. Heaton, *The Inter-Relation of Sacramental and Ethical Concepts in the Thought of Frederick D. Maurice, Henry S. Holland, Charles Gore and William Temple* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: Hobart and William Smith College (USA), 1968).

<sup>43</sup> Jonathan Smoot, *Does God Suffer? Divine Passibility in Anglican Theology from Lux Mundi to the Second World War, with Particular Reference to the Thought of William Temple and John Kenneth Mozely* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: University of Aberdeen (UK), 1996).

the Trinity. Like Smith, Hoskins detects the importance of the will within Temple's theology, but again, a full analysis of it was beyond the scope of his study.<sup>44</sup>

Wendy Dackson's ground-breaking work argues against the conventional understanding of Temple and makes a forceful case that Temple held a distinctive ecclesiology. She contends that Temple understands the Church as a living, dynamic, and interactive organism in society and the world. It is an ecclesiology that should be rightly termed a "political ecclesiology".<sup>45</sup> Edward Loane builds on Dackson's work by investigating Temple's ecumenical theology.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, Gareth Powell points out how Temple's sacramental and incarnational theology gave his ecclesiology a distinct missional flavour. Nevertheless, Temple was only one chapter in his dissertation.<sup>47</sup> John Christopher Stuart has produced a comparative study of Michael Ramsey and Temple. In particular, he studies their views on the Incarnation, their common rejection of substitutionary atonement, and the importance of fellowship to both Archbishops.<sup>48</sup> It is perhaps pertinent to note that, from this group of authors, only Fletcher, Hoskins, Dackson, and Loane have published their work.

In sum, the research context on Temple shows a clear bias towards his social thought and a neglect of his theology. It is surprising to note that only Fletcher, Dackson, and Loane have published studies that focus solely on Temple's theology. What is even more curious and surprising is the fact that none of them are British!<sup>49</sup> Perhaps some distance, both in terms of time and geography, helps to offer a fresh perspective.

### **Purpose, Method, and Structure of this Study**

This study locates itself as part of that effort to examine Temple's theology and appraises it in its historical context. The principal claim of this thesis is that Temple's social teaching is fundamentally built upon and derived from his theology. We posit the category of the will as

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<sup>44</sup> Richard Hoskins, *The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Works of John Richardson Illingworth and William Temple, and the Implications for Contemporary Trinitarian Theology*, Toronto Studies in Theology Vol. 81 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 203–205, 222–225, 270–272.

<sup>45</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*.

<sup>46</sup> Edward Loane, *William Temple and Church Unity: The Politics and Practice of Ecumenical Theology* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

<sup>47</sup> Gareth Powell, *A Critique of the Ecclesiology, Missiology and Sociology of the Mission-Shaped Church Report* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: University of Cambridge (UK), 2013).

<sup>48</sup> John Christopher Stuart, *The Rationale for the Incarnation and the Place of Substitutionary Atonement in the Thought of William Temple and Michael Ramsey: A Comparative Study* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation: University of Durham (UK), 2013).

<sup>49</sup> As far as I can tell, Fletcher and Dackson are Americans while Loane is Australian.

the hermeneutic and heuristic of understanding Temple's theology and specifically how it informs his social thought. The will is useful as a hermeneutic because it was central to many facets of Temple's theology. It plays a crucial role in his doctrine of God, Christology, theological anthropology, ecclesiology, Church–State relations, and Christian social principles. To be careful, we are not claiming that Temple intentionally organised his philosophy and theology around the category of the will. Other categories of thought, such as personality or value, might fit that claim better. However, beyond the claim of the will as a hermeneutic and heuristic, we do contend that the will is an important concept within Temple's philosophy and theology. Its importance has been picked up by authors such as Smith and Hoskins, but an extended study of it has not yet been attempted. Therefore, we could say that Temple has not been adequately understood in so far as the role and importance of the will within his thought has not yet been given adequate attention. The upshot of this study is the way in which Temple's voluntarist theology brings agency into focus. There is a clear sense of volition, dynamism, and activity in each of these facets of Temple's thought. God is active and purposeful, and humans can share in this agency. In fact, it is their development as moral agents that society and the State should aid and support. This is the basis of Temple's Christian social principles and social thought.

Our methodology initially is to focus on Temple's three principal works – *MC*, *CV*, and *NMG*. Other primary literature will be engaged appropriately, especially material from the Lambeth Palace Archives. The rationale for this approach is that Temple authored more than thirty books. However, most of these were compilations of lectures, addresses, sermons, or journal articles. These were hardly the place for Temple to exposit his ideas fully. They tend to be brief and occasional in nature, and meant for a wider popular audience. It is only in his full-length and more academic works that we can get a better grasp of his theology. We will depart from this methodology, however, in the later chapters on ecclesiology and the Church–State relationship. This is because the nature and purpose of *MC*, *CV*, and *NMG* do not lend to the discussion of these topics. *MC* was intended as a philosophical work while its sequel, *CV*, is theological but aims to develop a Christocentric metaphysics.<sup>50</sup> *NMG* contained Temple's Gifford Lectures at the University of Glasgow from 1932–1934, where the nature of

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<sup>50</sup> William Temple, *Mens Creatrix* (London: Macmillan, 1917), vii; William Temple, *Christus Veritas* (London: Macmillan, 1925), vii–ix.

the lectureship was to explore natural theology.<sup>51</sup> In different ways, each book does not lend itself to the discussion of the doctrine of Church and its relation to the State. Temple does however have significant discussions on these topics in his other books, which we will draw upon.

This study consists of six chapters. The first five chapters will explore different loci of Temple's theology: the last chapter will then survey the heart of Temple's social thought – his Christian social principles – and trace how his theology gives rise to his two key principles, personality and fellowship. The first chapter will look at Temple's doctrine of God. Temple argues in an Aristotelian or Thomist way that God should be understood through first cause or agency, which for Temple leads us to understand God in terms of the will. The will denotes choice or volition and is therefore an ultimate term of explanation in causal regression. God is therefore understood as Creative Will, or the Will that created and sustains the universe, and remains active and purposive within it. Because of this, God as Creative Will can be known through the study of the world, which is the endeavour of philosophy through its major branches of art, science, and moral goodness. Temple is careful to show that God as Creative Will is not arbitrary or capricious, but purposes towards value or good. All that exists has either inherent or latent value. Humans complement God's creation of value by being able to apprehend and pursue value. Such a construal of God and the world puts Temple on a collision course with the problem of evil and miracles. The first is a particularly problematic part of Temple's thought and pertains to the debate about whether and to what extent Temple changed his mind and capitulated to Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism.

Chapter two explores Temple's Christology. Temple preferred the category of the will over the traditional language of substance and nature. He understands Christ to have two wills, a human will and a divine Will, where the human will was subsumed within the divine Will and finds resolution within the person of the Logos. This was in essence the dyothelite position and the resolution of the Council of Constantinople in 680/1. Temple's position rests on his concept of personality. Human personality seeks the integration and harmonisation of all a person's impulses, thoughts, and desires under their will. Given that a person can only have one will, this meant that Christ's human will would ultimately be integrated or subsumed

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<sup>51</sup> William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (London: Macmillan, 1935), vii.

under his divine Will. It is Christ's divine Will that takes precedence because there one person, that is, the Logos.

This relates to chapter three, which investigates Temple's theological anthropology. For Temple, the formation of the human will is through a dynamic interplay between different factors. It is a function of its initial endowment, the fashioning of education, the imagination, and one's social environment. The ideal state that humans strive for is the inner unity of a completed personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. A completed personality is the state where all of a person's thoughts and impulses are perfectly integrated under their will. A completed personality is nourished by a perfected fellowship, that is, participating in a society that includes all humanity. This was based on Temple's belief that humans develop fully in a community. This ideal state is, however, elusive because of sin, which Temple defines as self-centredness that causes self-will. The solution cannot be found within humanity itself as the human will cannot simply will itself to be good. This situation requires the redeeming work of Christ. In an Abelardian way, Temple held that the Christ's love and sacrifice evoke a sympathetic response that induces a change of will in humans. The repentant sinner begins to align their will with Christ's Will such that their wills correspond to His. Humans are thus lifted from their self-will to take on Christ's Will. However, Temple is clear that God's salvific work is both individual and communal. The work of Christ restores the fellowship between God and humans, as well as the fellowship amongst humans. It is in this way that the human ideal of a completed personality and perfected fellowship is only possible through Christ.

Chapter four explores Temple's ecclesiology. He builds his understanding primarily on the Pauline image of the Church as the Body of Christ. Temple seemed to understand this image in a realist sense such that the Church was construed as the continuation or extension of the Incarnation. Given that his Christology was based on the will, it follows that the Church, which continues the Incarnation, will be based on the will. Temple construes the Church as being the organ or instrument of Christ's Will. Its goal is to gather all humanity as one perfect person in Christ (Galatians 3:28). This is achieved when all people align their will with Christ's Will such that there is essentially one common Will among all humans, i.e., Christ's Will. It could then be said that they are being summed up as one person, i.e., Christ. It is important to note that the Church's goal is fundamentally the same as the ideal state of humanity, which is a completed personality and a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. In other words,

the Church has a crucial role in the world as the organ of Christ's Will to bring about this ideal state for humans. But surprisingly, the Church's key activity is not to *do* anything but to *be* itself. The Church must be the worshipping community of God because it is through worship that the work of Christ is effected, where the Christian surrenders their will and takes on Christ's Will as their own. Worship, however, does not end in Church. Rather, it impels Christians back to their daily lives where they live out Christ's Will in the world. It is in this way that the Church accomplishes its mission in the world. The Church is active, visible, and dynamic in society and the world.

Chapter five then examines Temple's understanding of the relationship between Church and State. The activity and dynamism of the Church in society brings it into contact and conflict with the State. This makes sense in light of the General Strike of 1926 and the Prayer Book Controversy of 1927–1928 which contributed to a growing sense of conflict between Church and State. In many ways, this conflict between Church and State is inevitable because the State plays a key role in society and the nation. Temple argued that the State is the organ of the national community that promotes social order, that is, the welfare of its citizens and a good life for them. Its main ethical agency is the law, and it is empowered to use force to make the law effective. This appraisal is likely due to the influence of the British Idealists T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. Defined this way, the Church and the State are bound to conflict because they act on two different wills. The State is the organ of the national community and follows the community's will, whereas the Church is the organ of Christ's Will and acts upon it. Temple argues that this conflict is most acutely felt by the Christian citizens who experiences the simultaneous claims of both State and Church.

The last chapter surveys Temple's Christian social principles. Temple offers a novel and creative solution to the tension experienced by the Christian citizen. The Church should develop principles and pass them on to the Christian citizen to act upon in their daily lives and in their civic capacity. This allows them to leaven the community's will, the State, and state policy. This eases the Church–State conflict yet allowing the Church to influence the community and the State through the intermediacy of the Christian citizen. Temple offers his Christian social principles to this end. While they are found in a number of his writings, they are most efficaciously articulated in *CASO*. Temple was successful in appealing to the community's will with his Christian social principles. His key social principles of liberty (or sacredness of personality) and fellowship were important themes in his theology, where the

will was central. In other words, Temple's social principles were essentially theological principles that were premised on the will.

The concluding chapter summarises our key findings and suggests possible ways in which Temple can be reappraised and reappropriated for today. Temple's voluntarist theology brings agency into focus. God is active and purposive in the world, and humans can mirror and participate in that activeness through the exercise of their will. Human agency is therefore important and the central concern of Temple's social thought. His advocacy of the welfare state, or any social measure for that matter, was not intended to breed chronic dependency on handouts. This strips people of their agency. Rather, social measures were meant to revitalise and reengage a person's will, and connect that them to others in society. To use an analogy, social measures should not be a safety net but a trampoline that helps people to bounce back in life and into society. That is the heart of Temple's social thought that is derives from his theology.

## Chapter One

### Doctrine of God: The Divine Will in the World

#### Introduction

Our first chapter presents Temple's doctrine of God and the place of the will within it. Temple argued that philosophy and theology could do with a more "thoroughgoing conception of God in terms of Will".<sup>1</sup> It should be said from the outset that Temple's doctrine was not drawn up along classical theological lines. For example, we do not find systematic discussions regarding the attributes of God or a clearly defined doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, Temple's doctrine of God was more philosophical and in the tradition of natural theology.<sup>2</sup> In a Thomistic way, God is understood through a cosmological argument that moves from the world to the idea of God as its first cause. Temple traced this as the work of the Divine Will. It is the Divine or Creative Will that created the universe and continues to sustain, mould, and guide it. This manifests itself in the unity and rational coherence found in the world. We will survey three key areas in our analysis of Temple's doctrine of God in relation to the category of the will. First is the fact that the universe was created as an outworking of God's Will, and that Will continues to sustain it. The second area has to do with the philosophical discussion of axiology, or what theology might term as "good". God's Will is not capricious but purposes for value or good. The last area pertains to two issues that arise from the previous discussions. The problem of evil immediately presents itself. If the Divine Will is active in the world and aiming for good, then the occurrence of evil is an acute anomaly which must be accounted for. Finally, we turn to understand miracles within Temple's thoughts.

Temple's theology, especially his doctrine of God, tends to be philosophically inflected. This is to be expected given that he was primarily trained in philosophy and at one

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<sup>1</sup> Temple, *CV*, 10. The context of this quote was a critique of Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison. Temple wrote that Pringle-Pattison had proceeded on the right lines, but his mistake was to make God adjectival to the Universe. He seemed to suggest that the Universe could continue to exist even if God were to cease existing. Temple felt that what was needed to tip the balance in right way was a conception of God in terms of will.

<sup>2</sup> We should note that some of Temple's other books and addresses did understand and expound God in a more traditional or devotional way. For example, chapter 1 of *PRLF* is titled "The Christian Doctrine of God" and discussed God as Creator, Living, Ruler of History, etc. William Temple, *Personal Religion and the Life of Fellowship* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926).

time believed that he was destined to be a philosopher.<sup>3</sup> Temple read classics at Oxford and was a fellow and lecturer in philosophy at Queen's College, Oxford. He readily admitted that he was a philosopher before he was a theologian or churchman.<sup>4</sup> His confessed influences are telling of this too – Josiah Royce, Bernard Bosanquet, Robert Browning, Plato, and St. John:<sup>5</sup> philosophers and the most philosophically pregnant Gospel. No patristic Fathers, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, or even Thomas Cranmer or Richard Hooker.<sup>6</sup> His main works reflect this as well: two out of three of them were of this nature. *MC* was a philosophical work, while *NMG* was on the study of natural theology. Even his main theological treatise, *CV*, was inclined towards philosophy and natural theology. It was meant as a sequel to *MC* and was committed to the development of a Christocentric metaphysics.<sup>7</sup> Even as late as 1930, Temple would advocate for the study of philosophy as a means of advancing the Gospel. In his speech at the 1930 Lambeth Conference, Temple stated that the Christian faith held the principles of unity that philosophers were searching for, and that “the philosophy of the street corner is always a generation behind the philosophy of the lecture room”.<sup>8</sup> Fruitful engagement between theology and philosophy would eventually filter down to the populace. It is no surprise then that Temple's doctrine of God was more philosophically inflected and leaning towards natural theology.

It is perhaps in this light that E. L. Allen concludes that Temple was “a philosopher of no small distinction, and perhaps to the end he was a philosopher rather than a theologian”.<sup>9</sup> We are inclined to agree with the first half of that conclusion but disagree with the latter half. It is more likely the case that Temple was a philosophically inflected theologian. He approached theology through philosophy. His speech at the Lambeth Conference reveals his concern was not philosophy per se, but the fertile germination it could have with theology. We agree with Suggate that all of Temple's influences – Plato, G. W. F. Hegel, and British

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<sup>3</sup> Temple, *MC*, vii.

<sup>4</sup> Temple, “Theology To-Day,” 328. “We tried, so to speak, to make a map of the world as seen from the standpoint of Christian faith. In my own case, the preparation for this enterprise was more philosophical than theological”.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.; Temple, *MC*, vii. In fact, Temple believed that Christ was the fulfilment or finishing touch to Plato. He wrote that “Plato approaches or prepares for the Christian interpretation of life”. William Temple, *Plato and Christianity* (London: Macmillan, 1916), 75.

<sup>6</sup> Preston, “William Temple,” 5.

<sup>7</sup> Temple, *CV*, vii–ix.

<sup>8</sup> William Temple, *Speech at 1930 Lambeth Conference*, Lambeth Conference Papers 1930, vol.146, fol.21–24

<sup>9</sup> E. L. Allen, “British Theology and Wider Horizons,” in *Religion in Britain Since 1900*, ed. Stephen G. Spinks, E. L. Allen, and James Parkes (London: Andrew Daker Limited, 1952), 178.

idealism – were a means of exploring the meaning and purpose of the Christian faith, i.e., theology.<sup>10</sup> Michael Ramsey’s observations are probably more on point than Allen’s: Ramsey argues that because Temple came to theology through philosophy, that “in a sense his theology is that of an amateur”.<sup>11</sup> Be that as it may, being an amateur can have its advantages. It allowed Temple to view and engage with theology through his rich philosophical background. This brought a unique and distinctive flavour to his works. Moreover, while he was a philosopher by training, he was by many accounts a theologian by intuition and temperament. It was these factors that led Ramsey to conclude that if Temple was “the amateur, he was yet, par excellence, the theologian”.<sup>12</sup> Temple should be thought of as one who came to theology through philosophy.

### **Kantian Intellectual Context**

One way of framing our analysis of Temple’s doctrine of God is to set it within the context of Immanuel Kant.<sup>13</sup> Kant was one of the most important thinkers on the will during this period. In surveying the ethics of modern idealists, W. J. Mander argues that the “tradition of idealist value-analyses in terms of *will* begins with Kant”.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, Paul Avis asserts that the sacramental principle of Anglican theology from this period was heavily influenced by philosophical idealism but moderated by, amongst other factors, Kant’s moral emphasis, categorical imperative, and his stress on the will as the “seat of good and evil”.<sup>15</sup> It comes as no surprise that Temple would engage with Kant given that Temple was attempting to base his doctrine of God on the will. Specifically, Temple critiques Kant in two ways. One is a critique of Kant’s position on natural theology, and the other is a critique of Kant on the will.

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<sup>10</sup> Suggate, "William Temple," 176.

<sup>11</sup> Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 146.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 147. It should also be remembered that it was not uncharacteristic of Anglicanism then to be more shaped by music, literature, and philosophy than by theology. Charles Gore, for example, did not have any formal theological training either: he too was trained in philosophy. Adrian Hastings, "William Temple," in *The English Religious Tradition and the Genius of Anglicanism*, ed. Geoffrey Rowell (Wantage: Ikon, 1992), 213.

<sup>13</sup> Temple was fascinated by Kant in his undergraduate years. Temple felt that Kant pointed towards an idealistic yet theistic metaphysics. It was his father, Frederick Temple, who cautioned Temple against a one-sided and overly optimistic reading of Kant. See Dorothy Emmet, "The Philosopher: by Dorothy Emmet," in *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Letters* ed. F. A. Iremonger (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1948), 522.

<sup>14</sup> W. J. Mander, *Idealist Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 145.

<sup>15</sup> Paul D. L. Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church: Theological Resources in Historical Perspective*, Second ed. (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 310.

Firstly, Kant was critical of arguments for the existence of God.<sup>16</sup> To be sure, he was not questioning whether God existed but whether God's existence could be inferred from ontological or cosmological arguments.<sup>17</sup> This was impossible within Kantian thought because God was noumenal. There is no empirical and verifiable sensual datum. God along with freedom and immortality, or what Kant called postulates of practical reason, should not constitute knowledge but merely regulate it by providing heuristic. They are of residual value.<sup>18</sup> Temple rightly termed Kant's view as realism in an essay for private circulation in Oxford. However, Temple argued that realism, and Kant by implication, makes the error of viewing the world as existing independently of Mind.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, observing phenomenal occurrences can give answers to *how* an object exists but not *why* it does.<sup>20</sup> The phenomenal (i.e., how) and the noumenal (i.e., why) are making different truth claims. But with the Kantian dichotomy between the noumenon and phenomenon, the different claims cannot benefit from mutual insight. The resultant problem that Temple points out in *NMG* was the fissiparous approach to knowledge. Each department of knowledge makes its own claims independently.<sup>21</sup> In Temple's mind, this breakdown started precisely because natural theology was dichotomised from revealed religion. While its genesis preceded Kant, it was him who gave it its most compelling case.<sup>22</sup> The recovery needed was the removal of this arbitrary division. Natural theology (and scientific observation of the world) should include insight from religion or divine revelation, and vice versa. In fact, Temple observed that Kant's three great notions of God, freedom, and immortality are precisely the traditional concern of natural theology.<sup>23</sup> This sheds light on Temple's own approach to the doctrine of God. He is not a natural theologian in the sense of being a naturalist or omitting special revelation. His

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<sup>16</sup> Nicholas Adams, "Kant," in *The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology* ed. David Fergusson (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 17–19.

<sup>18</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 8–10.

<sup>19</sup> William Temple, *The Province of Science, An Essay* (Oxford, 1904), A private paper held in the Bodleian Library Archives, 92. e.198/1, 4–5.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 11. Or again that "...if you begin by attending to objects only in so far as they are measurable you are likely to end by having only their measurements before your attention". Temple, *NMG*, 13.

<sup>21</sup> For example, Temple wrote: "A belief in God based on experience and reflection is not one particular apprehension among others but an apprehension of universal import. It corresponds not with the scientist's apprehension of some one Law of Nature but with his conviction of the supreme claim of Truth". Temple, *NMG*, 24.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, chapter 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

approach is holistic and synthetic in considering insights from both natural theology (and scientific observations from the world) and revealed religion (i.e., Scripture and tradition).

A second critique that Temple makes of Kant regards the will. Kant held that humans are autonomous beings who legislate themselves according to consciousness of the universal moral law, which he terms a fact of reason.<sup>24</sup> Key to this is Kant's idea of the will. The only thing that is good without qualification is the good will. Temple agreed with Kant on this. But he noted that a paradox arises at this point. What does "good" mean in relation to the will, and what exactly is the nature of this will?<sup>25</sup> Kant would reply to the first question that the good will is one that always wills or conforms to what is right according to the criterion of universality, i.e., universal maxims or categorical imperatives.<sup>26</sup> Temple argued that this could be problematic. For example, it made too much allowance for the particularity of circumstances and the agent acting.<sup>27</sup> Temple brings a potent critique from a slightly different angle in an article now held at the Lambeth Palace Archives titled "The Freedom For Which We Fight". He observes that the Kantian idea of autonomy is "combined with a strong sense of duty and discipline, with the result that the pure freedom of the will was found only in obedience to the Categorical Imperative, which is itself the expression of man's Practical Reason. This was a purely abstract formula incapable of generating its own content".<sup>28</sup> The problem of particularity arises precisely because Kant's ethical framework lacks content. Categorical imperatives are too broad and unhelpful in specific situations. In fact, Temple goes on to make the candid point that the lack of content is how Kant's ideas then get adopted by Fichte to deify the State such that "what started as an intellectual doctrine of Freedom became a philosophical buttress of Prussian absolutism".<sup>29</sup>

On the second question, Kant would say that the key characteristic of this will is its autonomy. Again, Temple pointed out the difficulties with this position. It is hard to argue for a purely autonomous will because we are fundamentally social creatures who are bound up with one another in a web of intimate relationships. Some moral decisions are made not because of any universal moral law or intrinsic good. They are made for the sake of another

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<sup>24</sup> Adams, "Kant," 4, 8.

<sup>25</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 168.

<sup>26</sup> Adams, "Kant," 21; Temple, *NMG*, 168, 184.

<sup>27</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 184.

<sup>28</sup> William Temple, *The Freedom For Which We Fight*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.67, fol.126.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

person.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, if the will is truly autonomous then no particular action can be directly attributable to the will because it is noumenal and therefore unverifiable and unknowable. As a result, the principle of goodness becomes an empty form of universality, and ethics becomes situational and confined to particular circumstances.<sup>31</sup> In contrast to this, Temple suggests that moral goodness should focus on the person and his/her character.<sup>32</sup> He acknowledges that Kant came frustratingly close to realising this with his first categorical imperative to “treat humanity always as an end withal and never only as a means”.<sup>33</sup> Yet Kant ultimately fell short because he made it an outcome instead of the starting point of moral goodness.<sup>34</sup> Temple thus concludes that “in seeking the locus of freedom, he [Kant] knows that it cannot be the momentary acts of choice which constitute the activity of the moral life, but looks for it in an abstract will or practical reason instead of in the concrete Person”.<sup>35</sup> A further disagreement concerns the actual experience of the will in real life. There is a paradox to free will in reality. Are we truly free to will and do what we ought to? We all experience the reality that at times we cannot do what we ought to because we simply cannot will it. This is where the idea of free will breaks down – if the will is evil, or in so far as it is evil, then we are not always free to choose or reform ourselves.<sup>36</sup> Kant called this radical evil. It is the refusal to do what is right, what is one’s duty, and what is virtuous.<sup>37</sup> But because the will is autonomous, nothing more can be done about it. Radical evil or the evil will becomes the ironic culmination of the free will paradox. Temple disagreed. There must be an adequate solution if evil is right at the centre in the seat of our will. There must be something or some cause that can reform that. This becomes important to Temple’s idea of the atonement, which we will consider in chapter three. Temple’s second critique of Kant shows us their

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<sup>30</sup> “The child who is sorry to see his mother in pain does not wish that pain away in order to end his own sorrow; what he resents is not his sorrow but her pain”. Temple, *NMG*, 185.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 168. We note that Kant did not advocate for situational ethics. He was a proponent of duty or deontological ethics. See Adams, “Kant,” 20.

<sup>32</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 184.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 226.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* This was the exact problem with determinism, which is a “destruction of morality” because it sees morality as primarily concerned with actions and therefore treats persons as things. Kant was liable to Determinism because of his subjection of all experience to causation. To Temple, “[s]tark determinism is stark nonsense” because the process of mutual determination has no way of starting if everything is constituted and determined by its external relations. There is no first cause. *Ibid.*, 224–227. Quotes from 225 & 227.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 240.

<sup>37</sup> Adams, “Kant,” 23.

shared common ground on the will. Both men emphasised that the will is important. Yet, Temple saw problems with the Kantian idea of the autonomous human will.

### **God as Creative Will**

Temple's critiques of Kant give us some key contours to his doctrine of God. Natural theology should be included as part of a holistic approach to knowledge. Also, the will should be an important category but not in the Kantian sense of an autonomous human will. Rather, Temple averred that the will which mattered most was God's Will. It is God as Creative Will that created, sustains, and gives rational coherence to the World. A consistent starting point of Temple's expositions is the fact that the will is the most satisfactory and appropriate explanation of the universe. He states in *CV*:

Now, if we ask for an explanation of the Universe as a whole we are bound to formulate the answer in terms of Will. This is a dogmatic statement of a controversial position ... there is in our experience one, and only one, self-explanatory principle – namely Purpose or Will.<sup>38</sup>

This is the case because will denotes the choice or purpose behind a given phenomenon. It is the source of causation. In a line of argument similar to Aristotle's or Aquinas' idea of first cause, no further explanation is sought when we find an intelligent Will behind a given occurrence. It denotes choice or an act of volition. The will is therefore an ultimate term of explanation in causal regression.<sup>39</sup> If we were to seek an account for the universe then the Will naturally is the most suitable explanation. Or to put this differently, the Will is the origin of the universe and sustains the universe.<sup>40</sup> While this might seem strange from a theological perspective, the idea of a Will being the foundation or essence of the universe is commonplace in philosophy. Arthur Schopenhauer's "will-to-live" is an example of this. But a

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<sup>38</sup> Temple, *CV*, 7, also 92; See also Temple, *MC*, 88–89; Temple, *NMG*, 281, 302, 406, etc.

<sup>39</sup> "When in the causal regress we arrive at a will, the regression is at an end...We have reached an ultimate term". Temple, *CV*, 7. Also, that "Will, we have seen, is the only principle known to man which supplies a finally satisfactory explanation of anything whatever. The effective action of will is, almost certainly, the prototype of all concepts of causation, and it is noticeable that all attempts to account for efficient causation otherwise than by reference to Will have broken down". Temple, *NMG*, 281. See also Temple, *MC*, 88–89.

<sup>40</sup> Temple, *CV*, 7–14, 92–24

clear difference between Schopenhauer and Temple is Temple's view that a world that finds its origins in a Will is essentially a belief in the doctrine of creation, or in God as Creator.<sup>41</sup> This is the point of Genesis 1. It is the assertion that all existence depends on the Will of God.<sup>42</sup> In fact, Temple asserts that this is in line with a true doctrine of divine transcendence. God's transcendence should be understood "not [as] a reservoir of normally unutilised energy, but a volitional as contrasted with a mechanical direction of the energy utilised".<sup>43</sup> In other words, that God would exercise His Will. Interestingly, Temple does not always use the term God or God's Will to reference this Will in creation. He sometimes uses the term Creative Will. For example, that "Universe is to be conceived as deriving its origin and unity from a Creative Will".<sup>44</sup> Or again, "God as Creative Will, originating and sustaining all that is".<sup>45</sup> This Will in creation is therefore no mere issue from or of God. The Creative Will that explains, created, and sustains the universe *is* God.

In addition to explaining, creating, and sustaining the world, God as Will also gives unity and rational coherence to it. Humans can apprehend it and thereby understand God to a certain degree. This is the exact claim Temple makes in *MC* in the chapter "Will and Purpose". He postulates that there must be a principle of unity in history. And this principle must be one that humans can assent to and take part in through right apprehensions. The only principle that will suffice is that of the will.<sup>46</sup> Humans can contemplate and reflect on the world to observe its unity and coherence and thereby apprehend God's Will and thereby God. Temple also describes this another way. He writes in *NMG* that "we can only find out what is in accordance with the Will of God in other than ethical and aesthetic spheres by observing the facts and remember that they are as they are because God so willed".<sup>47</sup> Or again, in *MC*, God as Will can be found through the classic philosophical categories of art (or beauty),

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<sup>41</sup> That "a Will which is thus the origin of the Universe is plainly the Creator, i.e., God". *Ibid.*, 92. Or, that "to seek the explanation of the Universe in a Purpose grounded in a Will is Theism; it is the acceptance, provisionally at least, of the doctrine of God as Creator". *Ibid.*, 9. The same idea appears in *NMG*, where Temple writes that "if the Theistic position be accepted, it is apparent that the Divine Will is the source of world order, and also the determinant for every finite mind of its special place within that order and of the appropriate contribution of each such mind to the life of the whole". Temple, *NMG*, xxviii.

<sup>42</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 48–49. Quote from 49.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 284.

<sup>44</sup> Temple, *CV*, 13–14.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 274.

<sup>46</sup> The principle or explanation will give us recourse to "the thought of a Mind which in a perfect intuition grasps that very process which as Will it is engaged in working out". Temple, *MC*, 175–177. Quote from 177.

<sup>47</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 290.

science (or truth), and goodness (of character, or morality). In a lengthy passage worth reproducing as a whole, Temple writes:

Ethics [or Goodness/Morality] suggests a Will which is perfectly self-determined, and yet is active altogether in love; such a Will, if it be made manifest, will satisfy the aspiration of Art, for its manifestation will claim and deserve eternal contemplation; such a Will, if it control the Universe, is the very principle of unity which Science seeks, for Will, while remaining constant in its Purpose, chooses now this, now that, as means to its end, and is the only principle which, self-explanatory in itself, explains what it orders or informs. Is there such a Will? Only if there is, can the Universe be deemed rational; Man's creative mind can find satisfaction only if there be a Divine creative Mind with which it may have communion.<sup>48</sup>

Many natural theological ideas are packed in this passage. The Will that art, science, and morality suggests is self-determining, active in love, deserving eternal contemplation, the principle of unity, a principle that orders and explain, and the condition for the universe to be deemed rational. In short, it suggests the Creative Will, or God. God is therefore traceable from nature and philosophy. Temple writes that “Christ taught men to trace the activity of God especially in the normal and calculable process of nature, not chiefly in the astonishing and unpredictable”.<sup>49</sup> We can observe the world and trace God’s Will through it because God as Creative Will remains active in it.<sup>50</sup> In fact, Temple claimed that this could be an inter-faith concept. This is because the belief that such a Will exists is the base conviction of every religion.<sup>51</sup> It might even seem as though Temple held to an idea similar to prevenient grace. He writes in *NMG* that all acts of love within a person can be said to be the movement of God.

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<sup>48</sup> Temple, *MC*, 258.

<sup>49</sup> Temple, *NMG*, xvi.

<sup>50</sup> In fact, Temple averred that a study of the phenomenon of the will itself could lead us to an idea of God. This is how God could be deduced from below or apart from special revelation. Temple saw that the “Will, properly speaking, is the whole nature organised into effective unity; the character of this will, or organised personality, depends on its initial elements, on its social environment, and on its habitual direction of attention”. God as Creative Will is the perfect fulfilment of these factors. He is perfect in terms of initial elements because He is eternal. He has no social environment or no external compulsions because He wholly determines Himself. He alone supplies the grounds of his own action. His attention is perfect because his purposes cannot be thwarted. Temple, *CV*, 93–95. Quote on the Will from Temple, *NMG*, xxii.

<sup>51</sup> Temple, *MC*, 258–259.

This is what John's Gospel meant when it writes that Christ gives light to every person (John 1:9). Temple thus believes that there could be "many a heathen or Moslem whose words were 'done as God hath will and commanded'".<sup>52</sup> This was probably the influence of Plato who believed that truth is a unity and every fragment of truth provides insights to that whole. But of course, the emphasis he places on the Incarnation prevents him from falling in universalism.

Related to this topic of natural theology is the relation between theology and philosophy. Temple writes in the preface to the second impression of *CV* that "true theology in its completeness is identical with the true philosophy in its completeness".<sup>53</sup> It is important to note Temple's caveat of completeness. Theology and philosophy are identical only when they are complete. But this is never the case. Theology and philosophy are not identical because we have limited or partial knowledge.<sup>54</sup> In fact, there can be a divergence between philosophy and theology because both claim supremacy in a similar universal sphere. Both are attempts to posit reasons and frameworks for existence, life, and meaning. Theology starts from God and explains the world in reference to Him. Philosophy starts with the experience of humans and builds from there.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, theology must take into account divine revelation whereas philosophy does not.<sup>56</sup> This, however, need not be contradictory because philosophy's end goals are propositional ideas whereas theology's end goal is a relationship with God.<sup>57</sup> Their divergence is, however, related to their starting point and not their claims. Temple believed that both philosophy and theology could reach the same idea of God. As the previous paragraph showed, the study of philosophy – art, science, and morality – can lead us to the notion of a Creative Will in the universe. This sheds light on Temple's point "the primary assurances of Religion are the ultimate question of Philosophy".<sup>58</sup> Theology and philosophy can both point to God as Creative Will in the world.

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<sup>52</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 416–417. Temple disagrees with the thirteenth article of the thirty-nine articles of faith on works done before justification. He makes the point that "Christians believe that in Jesus Christ that Eternal Word was Incarnate, by agency of which all things were made, so that to every soul of man at all times and in all places that Word, which Christians know as Jesus Christ, has spoken and is speaking; and the answer that arises in their hearts is fashioned by the inspiration of His Spirit". God through Christ speaks and is at work in all people. *Ibid.*, 417.

<sup>53</sup> Temple, *MC*, xi.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 28–56.

<sup>56</sup> Temple, *MC*, xi–xiii.

<sup>57</sup> Temple, *NMG*, xvi.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

A word should be said at this juncture about Temple's terminology. Firstly, Temple often qualifies the Will when using it as a noun for God. The Will as causal explanation for the universe is never an unqualified term for him. He uses adjectival qualifications such as the Divine Will,<sup>59</sup> or Infinite Will,<sup>60</sup> or Creative Will.<sup>61</sup> Temple was perhaps mindful to differentiate his notion of the Will against a more generic idea of the Will as the essence of the world. Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche certainly come to mind. By qualifying the Will, Temple is implicitly disagreeing with their idea of the Will as a single (more so Schopenhauer), irrational, unconscious, or capricious force behind reality and ideas. Of course, the main way Temple differentiates himself from them is through the purposive nature of the Creative Will. The Creative Will always purposes towards value. We will see this in our next section. That being the case, Temple seems nonetheless careful even in his terminology. Will as a noun for God is usually qualified. It is always described as the Divine Will or Creative Will. A second interesting point about Temple's terminology regards his chosen terms in particular books. It seems as though Temple tends to stick with the Divine or Infinite Will in his more philosophical works such as *MC* and *NMG*.<sup>62</sup> As far as I can tell, God as Creative Will is only mentioned once in both these books put together.<sup>63</sup> But we see the proliferation of the term as we come over to *CV*.<sup>64</sup> It is probably the case that the difference came down to the nature of the books, i.e., philosophy or theological. The idea of God as Creative Will is more suited to theological discussions.

Another way in which Temple presents God as Creative Will is through his philosophical concept of dialectical realism. This concept is more prominent in his more philosophical works, *MC* and *NMG*. Broadly speaking, it is related to the mind–matter problem in epistemology and ontology. Temple contended that the modern way of understanding the world and God was fundamentally flawed. The central flaw was the

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<sup>59</sup> "But our enquiry did not lead us to the bare assertion that the world owes its origin and continuous existence to the Divine Will, but also to the consequent conviction that all things are in their measure an expression of that Will which sustains but also moulds and guides all things, so that the unity of the world, its principle of rational coherence, is the Divine Personality in self-expression". Ibid., 301–302.

<sup>60</sup> "If, then, we find any ground for saying that the world is the product of an Infinite Will, created for the sake of its Value, the intellect, which could not from any consideration of its own procedure reach any such result, will none the less accept this doctrine as altogether agreeable to itself". Temple, *MC*, 89.

<sup>61</sup> Temple, *CV*, 13, 14, 93.

<sup>62</sup> Other than the more general terms God or Mind.

<sup>63</sup> Temple, *MC*, 88.

<sup>64</sup> Temple, *CV*, 13, 14, 16, 35, 50, 93, 95, 274, etc.

exclusive and exaggerated focus on the problem of cognition which divided subject from object. This was related to the purported mind–matter divide. Temple traced the modern origins of this flaw to René Descartes and his theological counterpart, Martin Luther.<sup>65</sup> Through their teachings, epistemology now turned to the individual subject as the centre of knowledge. This established an object–subject divide. Philosophers thereafter tend to perpetuate this flaw as well. Some subjugated reality to the subject or the laws of human thinking (e.g., Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz). Others gave up the reality of the object altogether (e.g., John Locke and George Berkeley), or the reality of the subject (e.g. David Hume).<sup>66</sup> Kant’s ideas can be understood as an attempt to break the object–subject divide. But his attempt was to no avail. Temple mischievously surmised that “what Hume gave to Kant as a problem, Kant handed back to Hume unchanged as the solution”.<sup>67</sup>

The way forward was to clear the field of the Cartesian *faux pas* debris.<sup>68</sup> The new starting point should be the picture of the world as science offers it. This picture confirmed the commonsense view that the universe was in existence before there were minds apprehending it. Matter precedes mind.<sup>69</sup> This was a realist position. Temple acknowledges this and affirms that his starting position is closer to materialism than to idealism. Specifically, and perhaps surprisingly, it was close to the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. However, their major error was to limit the activity of the mind to its reactions to the material world. Consequently, mind became relegated, dependent, and secondary. In contrast and in a Berkeleian way, Temple argued that the distinguishing feature of the mind is its ability to form free ideas, and its capacity to direct its attention to these ideas over and against any material reason for doing so.<sup>70</sup> So, while matter is prior to mind, matter is unable to account for mind completely. Put slightly differently, an explanation based on matter alone

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<sup>65</sup> Descartes’ famous words “I think therefore I am” can be understood as a repudiation of traditional authority and a turn to the individual’s insight and consciousness. Luther’s “Here I stand; I can do nothing else” is similar. Temple, *NMG*, chapter III, especially 57–62; See also William Temple, *Christianity in Thought and Practice* (London: SCM Press, 1936), 41.

<sup>66</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 68–71.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 198, 497. Temple states that the mind–extension dichotomy should be repudiated. By implication, both idealism and materialism are also to be rejected. The former begins with the mind and makes the extended world adjectival to it, while the latter does the reverse.

<sup>69</sup> “The dominating fact in the new situation may be stated thus: the world as apprehended is now something which antedates apprehension. The world which we apprehend is apprehended as having been extant historically before anyone apprehended it. So far as our experience is concerned, apprehension takes place within the world, not the world within apprehension”. *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 498.

fails to coherently account for living organisms, especially humans. Man's ability to think, apprehend time and value, and unite his/her attention in a single focussing point showed the presence of a higher form of existence, or mind.<sup>71</sup> In fact, argues Temple, the wider world process, or evolutionary process, supports such a hypothesis. The late emergence of mind within this process does not necessarily mean that it is subsidiary and secondary. Although it emerges later, it was there in the process throughout as its dominant and directive fact.<sup>72</sup> Temple's realist starting point ultimately led to idealism. To be accurate, Temple starts from an epistemological realist position but ends up with a metaphysical idealist one. Temple termed this philosophical scheme dialectical realism.<sup>73</sup> Confusion over whether Temple was an idealist or realist is an oversimplification of this position or a failure to grasp it.<sup>74</sup>

It is pertinent to point out that Temple's dialectical realism bears many similarities with Henri Bergson's creative evolution and Alfred North Whitehead's organism.<sup>75</sup> They are all built on the evolutionary theory yet disagree with a mechanistic interpretation of it. However, there are key differences between them. While Bergson emphasizes the *élan vital* in the evolutionary process and hence the title of his book *L'Évolution créatrice (Creative Evolution)*, Temple saw the emergence of mind as the determinative event and thus the title of his first book, *MC (Mens Creatrix, or Creative Mind)*. In fact, Temple wrote that the title was deliberately "intended to indicate at once my debt to Bergson and my difference from him".<sup>76</sup> Temple engages Whitehead widely in *NMG* in the exposition of his dialectical realism. However, Temple disagrees with Whitehead's idea of "God" based on Temple's own idea of personality.<sup>77</sup> The capital error of Whitehead's organism was to collapse God and the world.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 201. "Where mind is found, it is found as potentially, and always in some degree actually, the principles of unity of that through which it is active".

<sup>72</sup> "Mind, then, though it appears within the Process at a late stage, discovers throughout that Process the activity of Mind" *ibid.*, 198–213. Quote from 219.

<sup>73</sup> "For starting with a realist view of the physical universe we were led to consideration of the fact that the world-process gives rise to minds, which themselves are capable of free ideas; and this in turn led us forward to a position which in its positive content is almost identical with such an Idealism as that of Edward Caird or of Bosanquet, apart from the method of arriving at it. For after repudiating the priority of mind qua knowing subject as a precondition of the actuality of the objective world, we were led to reaffirm the priority of mind qua purposive as the only condition of the intelligibility of that same objective world. Thus Realism becomes a basis for a spiritual interpretation of the universe, and the Materialism of our empirical starting-point is balanced by the uncompromising Theism of our conclusion". *Ibid.*, 498.

<sup>74</sup> There are some such as Thomas or Macquarrie who have understood this point. See Thomas, *William Temple's Philosophy of Religion*, 77–80; Macquarrie, "William Temple: Philosopher, Theologian, Churchman," 6–7.

<sup>75</sup> Temple discussed Whitehead's and Bergson's view in *NMG*, chapter V.

<sup>76</sup> Temple, *MC*, viii.

<sup>77</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 260, 263–264.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 395–396.

Dorothy Emmet is perhaps right to think that Temple's fundamental concern is theism. That is the key departure between Temple and thinkers such as Bergson, Whitehead, or even Bosanquet. Temple was careful not to collapse theology into metaphysical absolutism and thereby an impersonal order.<sup>79</sup> The danger was to leave little or no room for God, or to be precise, to leave no room for God to act in the particular.

Germane to our discussion of Temple's doctrine of God is the correspondence between Mind and Creative Will.<sup>80</sup> Temple wrote that Mind emerges as part of the world-process but reveals that it is its cause and governing principle. Mind is the explanation of the world.<sup>81</sup> But as we have seen, this is the same function ascribed to the Creative Will. Conversely, Temple wrote that the Creative Will must enjoy all time and all existence because it is part of the process of history.<sup>82</sup> The Creative Will is thus explained like Mind. Or again we saw above that Science, Art, and Morality each suppose the activity of an underlying Will that provides their rationale. Yet these are the main areas of activity of the Mind.<sup>83</sup> In fact, Temple seems to write of them in a certain synonymy, albeit infrequently. For example, in *CV* Temple wrote that there is an "Eternal Mind or Will but that this Mind or Will is such as is revealed in Christ".<sup>84</sup> Or in *MC* he states that "the Mind which appreciate the Whole is also Creative Mind or Will".<sup>85</sup> The most explicit statement equating the two is perhaps found again in *MC*. Temple was making the point that there is a self-explanatory principle which gives the world coherence and unity. He argued that such a principle would give us recourse to "thought of a Mind which in a perfect intuition grasps the very process which as Will it is engaged in working out".<sup>86</sup> Mind and Will, or Creative Will, are clearly coterminous. They are both final and fundamental realities that explain the universe. In fact, we might say that Mind *is* Creative Will; they are both terms and ideas that refer to God. They denote the same thing but in different contexts. Temple tended to use Mind when writing philosophically (e.g., *MC* and *NMG*), while preferring Will in more theological discussion (e.g., *CV*). Of course, Mind as a

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<sup>79</sup> Emmet, "The Philosopher," 526.

<sup>80</sup> We begin to capitalise Mind from here on to highlight Mind as a proper noun for God.

<sup>81</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 220.

<sup>82</sup> Temple, *CV*, 93.

<sup>83</sup> The Mind perceives three absolute values which correspond to the three main areas of activity of the Mind – truth is perceived through science, beauty through art, and goodness through morality. Temple, *NMG*, 219. See also chapter VI & VII; Temple, *MC*, chapter IV.

<sup>84</sup> Temple, *CV*, 188.

<sup>85</sup> Temple, *MC*, 88.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 177.

term has a rich philosophical background to it and naturally fits discussions in philosophy. Will also has a rich theological history and was a term that Temple was trying to recover for theology, as we shall see in the next chapter on Christology.

In summary, this section has shown the fundamental way in which Temple understands God. His doctrine of God is premised on the idea of the will. The will is an ultimate term in causal regression and therefore the “first cause” of creation. But a belief in a Will behind creation is essentially theism. That is the Will of God, or God as Creative Will who is the explanation of the Universe. The Creative Will created, sustains, and remains active in the world. We surmised that Temple qualifies this Will as Creative Will because he might be mindful of the danger of Will coming unmoored and drifting off towards a purely voluntarist position. Such an understating of a Creative Will can be reached through philosophy too. For one, art, science, and goodness each posit such a Will. Contemplation of the world can therefore lead to the apprehension of God’s Will. To put it simply, natural theology is possible. But Temple’s deeper philosophical train of thought lies in his dialectical realism. Although matter arose first, Mind’s eventual emergence showed that it was the directive and dominant fact of the world-process. Matter is affirmed but Mind is primary. These are philosophical discussions. Yet there is significant correspondence between Mind and Creative Will. It is probably the case that both were God in Temple’s understanding. God is both Mind and Creative Will. The difference lies in context. Mind is more philosophical whereas Creative Will is more theological. Within his doctrine of God, both philosophy and theology affirm that same thing. God as Mind or Creative Will is the origin of the universe and its active and sustaining impulse.

### **Divine Will, Purpose, Value/Good**

This section aims to clarify the relationship between will, purpose, and value. These are importance concepts in Temple’s works and pertinent to his doctrine of God. Temple held that God as Will actively purposes towards value or goodness. A quotation from *MC* encapsulates this idea succinctly, that “this Infinite Mind as Eternal Will, purposing the Universe for the value which it will realise therein”.<sup>87</sup> We proceed by understanding the relationship between will and purpose. It seems that will and purpose share an object–subject

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

relationship. Temple defines this in an essay titled “The Divinity of Christ” that he contributed to the collection called *Foundations*.<sup>88</sup> Will is the more fundamental reality that results in purpose. This explains certain phrases that Temple used such as “Purpose, as the expression of a Will”<sup>89</sup> or “Purpose grounded in a Will”<sup>90</sup> or “Will, conceived as the seat of Purpose”<sup>91</sup> or that by “Will we mean the capacity to form a Purpose”.<sup>92</sup> Or, bearing in mind the similarity between Mind and Will observed above, Temple wrote in *NMG* that “when Mind expresses itself through process, its activity is called Purpose”.<sup>93</sup> However, we must be careful not to draw the distinction too sharply because will and purpose are ultimately indistinguishable. There is no purpose without will, but we also cannot discern will without purpose. Temple likened this to the relationship between the activity of thinking and thoughts. The activity of thinking is distinguishable from thoughts, yet we cannot ascertain thinking without thoughts.<sup>94</sup> This is why he wrote in *CV* that “Purpose and Will are terms that mutually imply each other, we may speak of either indifferently”.<sup>95</sup> Will is the object that results in purpose as its subject, yet they share an ontic and organic relationship that cannot be separated. Purpose is intrinsic to will such that they imply each other. Applied to God as Creative Will, Temple is making the claim that God is purposive.

This brings us to Temple’s concept of value.<sup>96</sup> It might be useful to clarify some terms before we proceed further. Temple uses value and good similarly or even synonymously.<sup>97</sup> They both refer to the same thing, i.e., a general and fundamental category of significance. Their difference seems to be that value is derived from philosophy whereas good is a more theological term. We will follow Temple’s use of the words as our analysis continues, but it is important to be aware that they were used synonymously. Likewise, goodness or moral good tended to refer to morality and character in humans. To prevent confusion with the previous

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<sup>88</sup> William Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” in *Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought: By Seven Oxford Men*, ed. B. H. Streeter (London: Macmillan, 1912), 249–250. This chapter and the collection will be discussed in greater detail later.

<sup>89</sup> Temple, *CV*, 9.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>92</sup> Temple, *MC*, 168.

<sup>93</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 219.

<sup>94</sup> Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 249.

<sup>95</sup> Temple, *CV*, 7.

<sup>96</sup> J. W. Rogerson, “William Temple as Philosopher and Theologian,” *Theology*, vol.84, no.701 (September 1981): 328.

<sup>97</sup> Temple would also write it as “Value or Good”. See for example Temple, *CV*, 32, 33, etc; Temple, *NMG*, 149, 167, 168, 208, etc.

term, we will use the term moral good when talking about morality. With these in mind we can now discuss Temple's idea of value or good. Temple consistently wrote that will purposes towards value or good.<sup>98</sup> It acts for, or results in, value. Purpose, as the expression of will, is therefore always directed at value/good. This axiological focus was undoubtedly influenced by Temple's philosophical background. The study of value is a long-established category of thought for classical philosophy. Temple noted that it had great significance in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. But far from being antiquated, value continued to feature in contemporary philosophical discussions. The problem, however, was the indefiniteness of the relationship between value and reality or substance.<sup>99</sup> This lay in the fact that philosophers have generally made existence prior to value. On this view, existence is substantive whereas value is adjectival. Value is therefore an attribute of things.<sup>100</sup> Temple begged to differ. This key paragraph expressed Temple's basic idea:

Will acts always for the sake of value, or good, to be created or enjoyed as a result of the action. It is precisely as so acting that it is self-explanatory and intrinsically intelligible. This would lead us to expect that whatever Will creates is either itself good or is a means to good ... whatever exists must either be a means to something which is substantially good or else be itself substantially good.<sup>101</sup>

This is true of God as Creative Will as well:

The Universe is to be conceived as deriving its origin and unity from a Creative Will. But the correlative of Will is Good or Value; therefore the most fundamental element in things is their Value. This is not a property which they have incidentally; it is the constitutive principle, the true self, of every existent.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Temple, *MC*, 88–90; Temple, *CV*, 13–17, 93–95; Temple, *NMG*, 220.

<sup>99</sup> Temple, *CV*, 3.

<sup>100</sup> Temple gave Plato and Aquinas as two examples. *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 14–15. The same idea appears in *NMG* where Temple wrote that “when we begin to follow up the theory that Mind Purposive, or Intelligent Purpose, supplies the explanation of the world, we are at once confronted with the fact that Purpose is directed primarily to Value or the Good, so that the theory involves the logical priority of Value to Existence. Objects come into existence, if this theory is sound, because they are good or because some good can be brought into existence by means of them”. Temple, *NMG*, 220.

<sup>102</sup> Temple, *CV*, 13–14. Or, that “the world as a whole exists for the sake of its Value, and that the Mind which appreciates the Whole is also Creative Mind or Will”. Temple, *MC*, 88.

Creation was not fashioned with value then added on. Rather, God as Creative Will purposes towards, or acts for, the sake of value. Value is thus prior to existence.<sup>103</sup> Everything that exists is of value or good. All things are either good or a means to good. Value is thus the fundamental element or the true reality in things.<sup>104</sup> Or as Temple puts it, value is the “element in real things which both causes them to be, and makes them what they are, and is thus fitly called Substance”.<sup>105</sup> This is exactly why God said that everything was “very good” in the creation narrative found in Genesis 1.<sup>106</sup> Temple makes the same assertion in *MC* when enumerating the functions of Mind. He describes “this Infinite Mind as Eternal Will, purposing the Universe for the value which it will realise therein”.<sup>107</sup> Temple explicated further that value is chiefly known to us in the three classical philosophical categories of beauty (or art), science or (truth), and, goodness (of character, or morals).<sup>108</sup>

God as Creative Will purposes towards value or good. God is therefore not capricious. This sets Temple apart from other thinkers who also engaged the category of the will in their writings: important thinkers in this category include Schopenhauer (will-to-live) and Nietzsche (will-to-power). The will in their construal tends to be more irrational, unconscious, or capricious. Temple disagrees with them by contending that God as Creative Will always purposes towards value. It is a purposive Will that cannot be understood as prior to value. The will is thus ontically linked to value or good. One might go as far as to say that value or good is intrinsic to God’s activity as Creative Will. This has significant implications for creation. Creation was not fashioned on an impulse or whim such that existence is arbitrary or meaningless. Because God as Creative Will purposes value or good, creation and all that exists is either inherently or latently good. Everything is of value or good. Everything is either good in itself as it is or a means to good. Value or good is not adjectival but fundamental to the essence of created things. Temple’s claim that value preceded existence is radical. It might help make some sense of his equally radical statement that “Christianity is the most

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<sup>103</sup> Temple, *CV*, 14.

<sup>104</sup> Value is the “true reality which realises its various forms through embodying itself in things”. *Ibid.*, 11. Or again, that “Value is an wholly irreducible aspect or function of Reality”. Temple, *MC*, 178.

<sup>105</sup> Temple, *CV*, 15.

<sup>106</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 220. Also, that “Will aims at good in all its forms; and as God makes the world, He beholds it as very good”. Temple, *CV*, 16.

<sup>107</sup> Temple, *MC*, 90.

<sup>108</sup> Temple, *CV*, 26–32.

materialistic of all great religions”.<sup>109</sup> Granted that he was talking about the Incarnation, and about how the indwelling of Spirit in Matter gave significance to the material, but we can see how his idea of value being prior to existence could equally well support his claim about Christian materialism. The material and all that exists is important because it is imbued with value or good. This is a high claim for creation. While Temple derives it philosophically in an interesting and perhaps novel way, his suggestions amount to no more than the theological claim that God and creation are good.

A question could potentially be raised from the foregoing discussion – what is the role of reason in relation to God’s will? Is God’s will and purpose that is orientated to value and good grounded in the rationality of the divine nature? It seems to be the case, however, that divine rationality was not a significant category of thought for Temple. This might be because Temple’s theology leans more towards voluntarism than intellectualism. Voluntarism and intellectualism places emphasis on very different things. The former emphasises the will, whereas the latter emphasises the mind, intellect, or reason. These two differing positions was especially debated during the medieval period.<sup>110</sup> Aquinas was a major part of that debate and argued that will was dependent on reason.<sup>111</sup> This might go some way in explaining why Temple does not seem to draw on Aquinas that much,<sup>112</sup> especially when we consider his familiarity with Aquinas and *Summa Theologica*.<sup>113</sup> In contrast to Aquinas, Temple’s theology clearly emphasises the will and action rather than intellect, the mind, or reason. This is probably why Temple understood God as Divine Will or Creative Will. While not unimportant, reason was therefore not as crucial to Temple’s theology as the will because of his voluntarist leanings.

A final area regarding Temple’s doctrine of God and value commands our attention. God as Creative Will who purposes towards value and created the world for value also desires that value to be appreciated and apprehended. This corresponds to the theological claim that God desires fellowship. Temple writes plainly that “Value exists in order to be appreciated”.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> William Temple, *Readings in St. John's Gospel (First and Second Series)* (London: Macmillan, 1947), xx.

<sup>110</sup> See for example Tobias Hoffmann, “Intellectualism and Voluntarism,” in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dyke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 415-417.

<sup>112</sup> Only Temple, *MC*, 365; *CV*, 13, 14, 34, 239, 242; *NMG*, 5, 310, 317, 405.

<sup>113</sup> Temple described *Summa* as “the most complete map ever drawn”, and once commented that he is probably the only English clergyman then who has read the whole *Summa*. Iremonger, *William Temple*, 476.

<sup>114</sup> Temple, *CV*, 18.

The creation of value or good is not simply for its own sake or for God's pleasure. There is a counterparty required to perceive and appreciate it. This is the claim that Temple makes in this passage:

Everything except the Creative Will exists to be the expression of that Will, the actualisation of its values, and the communication of those Values to spirits created for the special value actualised through fellowship in creation and appreciation of values.<sup>115</sup>

Or again, just a few pages later:

Thus the whole universe is created to reflect the manifold goodness of the Creator, and to produce within itself beings who may share with the Creator His joy in the goodness of the created thing... The universe exists to reveal the goodness of God so far as it evolves intelligences capable of receiving the revelation.<sup>116</sup>

God as Creative Will acts for value or good so that it may be appreciated and shared by others who can apprehend it. This role is unique to humans. It is humans who begin to appreciate value through their apprehension of time, questioning of existence, and distinct awareness of good and evil. Their conduct is also directed towards the attaining of value.<sup>117</sup> Humans are hence the necessary counterpart of God's purposing of value. Or to put it differently, God has created humans for the purpose of fellowship through the apprehension of value. This is important because the human capacity "for fellowship with God is God's gift in creation".<sup>118</sup> This ability to perceive value culminates in the "Commonwealth of Value", or what is perhaps a philosophical description of heaven.<sup>119</sup> This Commonwealth is the fellowship and unity of all spirits across all time in which every individual fully perceives value and therefore fully apprehends God.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 16–17.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 19, 23, 215–216.

<sup>118</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 401.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., chapter XVI.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 422.

However, Temple pushes the point further. He argues that “every apprehension of Value is in principle a religious experience”.<sup>121</sup> He explicates this further:

To be conscious of absolute value ... is plainly a direct awareness of something ultimate in the universe; and if the position already taken up with regard to Value is correct, then it is a direct awareness of what in all creation is most fundamental. It is a consciousness of the very object of the Creative Will; it is thus of itself a knowledge of God.<sup>122</sup>

This is connected to the point above, that value is expressed in beauty (or art), science (or truth), and goodness (of character, or morals).<sup>123</sup> Any apprehension of these is a religious experience and therefore an experience of God.<sup>124</sup> Ironically, this is a Kantian idea despite Temple’s general distancing from Kant. Any moral intuition has implicit religious aspects to it. Of course, Temple expanded this beyond moral goodness. Beauty and science are other avenues too. The apprehension of God is therefore not limited to or monopolised by the Church. God as Creative Will who created the world can be grasped and experienced through creation. We now understand that this is possible through the medium of value.

It is clear by this point that Temple’s doctrine of God was influenced by philosophy. A possible criticism could be raised that such a doctrine distorts Scripture and the experience of the Church. The “God” of philosophers may not be the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Some traditional positions related to the doctrine of God such as divine immutability and divine impassibility have been questioned recently because they seem to be influenced more by classical philosophy than Scripture. Rather, Scripture speaks of a God who suffers and responds to His creation. Dialectical theologians such as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner would certainly disapprove of Temple’s approach. It is an attempt to work our way to God from the world. In their minds this is a futile endeavour. Knowledge of God comes only from God through Scripture, and it is dialectically opposed to human reason and capacities. Some of

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<sup>121</sup> Temple, *CV*, 34.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 35. Same point made later that “if there is a Creative Will, the end of its action must be absolute Value. Therefore, to be conscious of absolute Value is already to be in some form of intercourse with God; and this form of intercourse with God comes to every human being”. *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>123</sup> Temple sometimes termed these as “absolute Values”. See *ibid.*, 26, 27, 95, etc.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 26–34, 94–95.

these points may be cogent. But a good case could be made that philosophy can act as a way of introducing God. This is in the tradition of Aquinas, or more recently, Paul Tillich and his method of correlation. His five ways for the existence of God was a prolegomenon to a fuller doctrine of God. It served to give touchpoints with the world and some initial sense of God. A philosophical beginning could be complemented with ideas or passages from Scripture. Temple certainly does this: two chapters in *CV* are on God because of his methodology. One is the picture of God before or without the Incarnation in view, while the other views God in light of the Incarnation. The latter chapter is filled with Scriptural references especially from the Gospels of Matthew and John. Temple contends there that the advent of Christ modified our understanding of God by revealing God as Father in His indiscriminating and unlimited love. Temple's philosophical views, while constituting a big part of his doctrine of God, are still supplemented by Scripture. He attempts to harmonise both, showing that theology can have some points of contact with philosophy and vice versa.

This section has shown that will and purpose share an object–subject relationship. But their distinction should go no further: they are ontically linked and therefore mutually imply one another. Will is the more fundamental category, but we cannot discern it without the purpose that expresses it. A critical point in Temple's doctrine is the fact that will purposes towards value. God as Creative Will is therefore not arbitrary or capricious but purposive in its creation of value. The world is created for the sake of value. Value is hence prior to existence. All that exists is imbued with either inherent or latent value. This is the point of Genesis 1, where God declares that everything is good. However, value requires appreciation. This role is unique to humans who are distinct from creation because of their ability to apprehend value. They can do so through the contemplation and appreciation of beauty, science, and moral goodness. These draw us back full circle to the apprehension of God, because every apprehension of value is a religious experience.

### **Two Issues: Evil and Miracles**

Two issues stand out within Temple's doctrine of God. One relates to the problem of evil while the other regards miracles. We will turn our attention first to the problem of evil.<sup>125</sup> Temple's doctrine of God as described above places it on a collision course with the problem of evil.

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<sup>125</sup> Temple, *MC*, chapter XX; Temple, *CV*, chapter XIV; Temple, *NMG*, chapter XIV.

The reality of evil is an acute and jarring anomaly in a world created and sustained by God as Creative Will who is purposive for value/good such that all things are either inherently or latently good. To be fair, Temple did seem to be aware of this. For example, in *MC*, while making the point that the world is product of Infinite Will purposing towards value, he states that the “[p]roblem of Evil is here crying out for attention”.<sup>126</sup> Some of his key treatments of the problem can be observed in this passage. Temple writes:

[A]ll the evil of the world may find its justification. We do not see this yet; but we see its possibility. God did not will the evil by any specific choice; but He willed a world where evil would have its place; He willed finite centres of consciousness, capable of apprehending value, but not capable (being finite) of grasping the one true Value which is God’s whole work as God sees it; such creatures were bound to exaggerate the importance of the finite values they could apprehend, and thus arose self-will which is the Fall of Man and sin.<sup>127</sup>

Temple holds that evil can ultimately be justified. Evil has its place in a rational universe because evil can be transmuted into good when it is overcome. In that way, evil gives an opportunity for good to prevail. This is true in the case of heroism or the triumph of moral good over evil. Temple is clear that he is not claiming that the net result of good outweighs the evil. Rather, it is the belief that “the facts or episodes which are evil in themselves can become constituent elements of the absolute good”.<sup>128</sup> Temple was influenced by Bosanquet on this matter.<sup>129</sup> He footnotes Bosanquet’s *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* as he makes this statement in *CV*.<sup>130</sup> Temple was not making the naïve claim that the overall value of good outweighs the value of evil. Rather, he

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<sup>126</sup> Temple, *MC*, 89. Similar instances in Temple, *CV*, 7; William Temple, *The Faith and Modern Thought* (London: Macmillan, 1910), 17.

<sup>127</sup> Temple, *CV*, 270–271.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 254. Same idea in Temple, *MC*, 267–270.

<sup>129</sup> Temple acknowledges Bosanquet as being influential in the formation of his general outlook. But Temple writes: “I never accepted Bosanquet’s ultimate position, and at one time my main concern was to discover what was my point of divergence from one who carried me so far with him”. Temple, “Theology To-Day,” 328.

<sup>130</sup> Temple, *CV*, 254. Temple cites Bernard Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (London: Macmillan, 1912), lecture VI; Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (London: Macmillan, 1913), lecture VI & VII. Temple also cites Bosanquet on the same issue of evil constituting good in Temple, *NMG*, 509.

was arguing that occurrences of evil are occasions for good to be won and to ultimately make evil subservient to good, thereby transmuting it.<sup>131</sup> This is why Temple states that “a world redeemed is better than a world that had never known evil”.<sup>132</sup> A world with evil that has been overcome is better than a world without evil. The former is nobler than the simple innocence of the latter. If anything, the overcoming of evil in history shows that evil is not an obstacle to God and eternal perfection. Instead, God “makes evil a contributory cause of that perfection”.<sup>133</sup>

Temple’s explanation sounds reasonable, yet something feels amiss about it. It could well be Temple’s own admitted shortcoming. He states that parts of his defence are more philosophical and rational than theological. His work in *MC*, for example, is strictly philosophical without recourse to the Christian faith.<sup>134</sup> For Temple, the difference between philosophical and religious approaches to the problem of evil is significant. Philosophy’s intent is theoretical: to show that evil is justified when overcome. Religion’s intent is practical: to show that evil can be overcome.<sup>135</sup> Temple was therefore attempting a more philosophical and rational answer to the problem of evil. This might very well be right and true. But Ramsey’s critique of Temple on this issue is persuasive. Ramsey pointed out that the central problem with Temple’s view is that evil is not viewed as the obverse of value/good. Evil is not latent good that is waiting to be transmuted. Evil is the antithesis, obstruction, or destruction of good. It is something to be dealt with and got rid of, not explained or transmuted.<sup>136</sup>

Temple seemed to come around to this view of evil later in his life. He wrote in 1938, in the Preface to the *Doctrine in the Church of England*, that a change in intellectual and theological climate was about to take place and was needed. Temple and his contemporaries grew up with the stable and optimistic Victorian sense of automatic progression. The theological need, as they saw it, was for a Christocentric metaphysic based on a theology of the Incarnation.<sup>137</sup> Temple’s *MC* and *CV* were written with this objective in mind. As part of this earlier intellectual climate, evil was thought of as vestigial superstition from a previous

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<sup>131</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 220–221, 511. For example, error can serve truth when explained and clarified. *Ibid.*, 358.

<sup>132</sup> Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 220.

<sup>133</sup> Temple, *CV*, 272.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 254.

<sup>136</sup> Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 149. Spencer also critiques Temple’s idea of evil. See Stephen Spencer, *Christ in All Things: William Temple and His Writings* (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2015), 20–21.

<sup>137</sup> Church of England, *Doctrine (1938)*, 16–17. Same point in Temple, “Theology To-Day,” 329.

era. Few would believe that “any great evil could threaten society as we knew it”.<sup>138</sup> But by 1938 things had changed drastically. The Second World War had not yet broken out but the ominous circumstances that led up to it were playing out. Related to this was the accompanying shift in theological climate. Adrian Hastings and Allen point out that the 1930s, especially 1933–1936, witnessed a shift towards conservative orthodoxy. Reinhold Niebuhr, Barth, and Brunner were all gaining traction with younger theologians.<sup>139</sup>

It was likely with these factors in mind that Temple wrote that a more prophetic note is needed, and especially of the deeper and pervasive corruption of original sin and the salvation that comes from divine grace alone. The prevalent theology of the Incarnation that begins with Brooke Foss Westcott and the *Lux Mundi* school must give way to a theology of redemption. This is needed because “it is more ready to admit that much in this evil world is irrational and strictly unintelligible”.<sup>140</sup> In other words, his earlier view was no longer defensible. Evil is illogical and incomprehensible. Evil is truly evil. The only answer is redemption in God and its full eradication. Temple reaffirmed this position in a journal article titled “Theology To-Day” in November 1939. He acknowledges that he had argued in *MC* and *CV* that “evil, when overcome, is justified, and that no justification for any one instance of evil is possible until that evil is overcome”.<sup>141</sup> But he admitted that this position seems altogether wrong to a new and younger generation of theologians and people. Britain had joined the Second World War by this time, and the horrors and doom of war overshadows such a view. The Church should no longer proclaim automatic progression, but salvation in the power and name of Jesus Christ crucified as recorded in the Gospels.<sup>142</sup> In other words, evil is to be eliminated by the power of the Gospel.<sup>143</sup> This marks a clear change from his earlier view on evil. This change of view is clearly discernible in some of his other later writings as well. For example, Temple asserts in his chairperson’s introduction to the Malvern Conference of 1941 that the consummation of the Kingdom of God is so remote because we are all “concluded

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<sup>138</sup> Temple, “Theology To-Day,” 327.

<sup>139</sup> Hastings suggests that this shift can be reasonably dated to 1933 when Barth’s *Commentary to Romans* was translated to English by Edwyn Hoskyns. Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 293–294; Allen, “British Theology and the Great Blight,” 182.

<sup>140</sup> Church of England, *Doctrine (1938)*, 16–17. Quote from 17. Same point in Temple, “Theology To-Day,” 329. Temple wrote that if he and his colleagues were to begin their work again, they would explore more the themes of redemption, justification, and conversion.

<sup>141</sup> Temple, “Theology To-Day,” 330–331. Italics in original.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 332.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 331.

under sin”.<sup>144</sup> This is a far cry from his optimism in *The Kingdom of God* (1912). He writes there of the hope of being able to “complete the work of making England into a province of the kingdom of God”.<sup>145</sup>

This change has given rise to debate over the extent to which Temple came to espouse Niebuhr’s Christian realism. Niebuhr was surprisingly influential on British theology during this period. Hastings strikingly contends that Niebuhr was the “greatest single theological influence upon the decade [i.e., 1930s] – far greater than that of Barth”.<sup>146</sup> Commentators on Temple such as Robert Craig, Alan Suggate, William Sachs, and Mark Chapman are of the opinion that Temple was influenced by Niebuhr and came close to the position of Christian realism.<sup>147</sup> To be fair, there seemed to be mutual respect and admiration between the two men.<sup>148</sup> Niebuhr recalls first meeting Temple in 1923,<sup>149</sup> and their acquaintance grew as they prepared for the Oxford Conference in 1937 on Church, Community, and State, where they wrote companion pieces.<sup>150</sup> They would last meet in 1943 when Niebuhr was Temple’s guest at Canterbury. Niebuhr recalls that Temple had insisted on having long discussions with him on theology, politics, and international issues despite his heavy schedule as Archbishop of Canterbury.<sup>151</sup> In fact, the Lambeth Archives holds a private letter that Niebuhr sent to Temple expressing gratitude and admiration for a radio address Temple had given. Niebuhr had listened to it with John Baillie in Baillie’s study and felt compelled to write the note even though he was an American because he had felt “profoundly stirred by the spirit in which

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<sup>144</sup> Malvern Conference, *Malvern, 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society* (London: Longmans, Green, 1941), 15.

<sup>145</sup> William Temple, *The Kingdom of God* (London: Macmillan, 1912), 100.

<sup>146</sup> Barth was perceived to be too Protestant and overly emphasised the division of grace from nature. Niebuhr, on the other hand, offered a more subtle approach that rejected liberal protestant theology without falling into a new fundamentalism. Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 293.

<sup>147</sup> Craig, *Social Concern*, 128–129; Alan M. Suggate, "The Concept of Sacrifice in Anglican Social Ethics," in *Sacrifice and Redemption: Durham Essays in Theology*, ed. Stephen Sykes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 241–244; William L. Sachs, *The Transformation of Anglicanism: From State Church to Global Communion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 285; Chapman, "Evolution of Anglican Theology," 38.

<sup>148</sup> Niebuhr had written a touching eulogy for Temple. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Archbishop Temple," *Christianity and Crisis*, vol.4, no.19 (November 1944).

<sup>149</sup> Temple was Bishop of Manchester then and was chairing a Workers’ Education Association meeting in Oxford. Niebuhr, "Dr. William Temple and His Britain," 584.

<sup>150</sup> Alan M. Suggate, "William Temple and the Challenge of Reinhold Niebuhr," *Theology*, vol.84, no.702 (November 1981): 414.

<sup>151</sup> Niebuhr also accompanied Temple to visit two rural parishes in Canterbury. Niebuhr, "Dr. William Temple and His Britain," 584.

Britain has taken up her tragic task [of the war]”.<sup>152</sup> Likewise, Temple had written of Niebuhr as someone in the area of Christian ethics who had “broken new grounds with disturbing but, as I am convinced, most salutary effect”.<sup>153</sup> More pertinently, Temple quoted Niebuhr with approval at his opening address at the Malvern Conference of 1941. The conference was called by Temple to discuss how the Church could help in the reconstruction of society after the war. Temple contended that Niebuhr’s handling of the problem of sin was far better than Jacques Maritain or even Aquinas. Niebuhr was “a deeply Christian mind grappling with the realities of today”.<sup>154</sup>

This being the case, it is hard to ascertain how far Niebuhr’s influence went. For one, Temple does not quote or engage Niebuhr’s works much. Furthermore, some who have compared their work also alert us to noticeable differences. John Bald, for example, noted that Niebuhr rejected natural law and that his social ethics is more critical in nature. On the other hand, Temple used the concept of natural law while his social ethics is more constructive than Niebuhr’s.<sup>155</sup> More importantly, we do not see Temple taking up the full framework of Niebuhr’s Christian realism. For example, Niebuhr’s understanding of love and justice is more dialectical.<sup>156</sup> Temple, however, sees it as more a coordinated function between the Church and the State where the State maintains justice through the law, and the Church preaches love to inspire closer approximations to real justice.<sup>157</sup>

Suggate is careful in positing three factors for the change in Temple’s emphasis. Firstly, the rise of a theology of crisis, most associated with Barth, that Temple encountered on the ecumenical circuit. Secondly, the growing acquaintance with Niebuhr – in fact, Temple had acknowledged in 1938 that within the theological world the work of “Karl Barth in Europe and Reinhold Niebuhr in America has set many problems in new perspective”.<sup>158</sup> And lastly, the

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<sup>152</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, *The William Temple Papers*, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.51, fol.63. No specific context was given, but one would surmise that Niebuhr was in Edinburgh for his Gifford Lectures (1939–1940). The Second World War had started on 1 September 1939 and the United Kingdom joined on 3 September 1939. Temple probably gave a radio broadcast as the Archbishop of York about the war.

<sup>153</sup> Temple, *CTP*, 74.

<sup>154</sup> Malvern Conference, *Malvern, 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society*, 14–15.

<sup>155</sup> Bald, *William Temple and Reinhold Niebuhr*, 552–556.

<sup>156</sup> Niebuhr writes that the “Christian conception of the relation of historical justice to the love of the kingdom of God is a dialectical one. Love is both the fulfilment and the negation of all achievements of justice in history”. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation. Vol.2, Human destiny* (London: Nisbet, 1943), 255.

<sup>157</sup> William Temple, *Citizen and Churchman* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1941), 74–80.

<sup>158</sup> Church of England, *Doctrine (1938)*, 6.

deteriorating situation in the 1930s both in the United Kingdom and abroad.<sup>159</sup> These sound more plausible than just a simple capitulation to Niebuhr. We might, however, add two nuances. Firstly, that it is doubtful whether Barth played a key role in Temple's shift. Temple does not seem to take to Barth even though Barth was becoming prominent on the theological scene from the 1930s onwards. In *NMG*, Temple disagrees with the Barthian scepticism of moral progress, especially after salvation.<sup>160</sup> He also disagreed with Barth on revelation and reason.<sup>161</sup> In fact, Barth and Temple had contributed essays to a symposium on revelation which revealed their divergence.<sup>162</sup> F. A. Iremonger emphatically stated that Temple "was no Barthian".<sup>163</sup> Temple was familiar with Barth but Barth may not have played a direct or major role in the change of his emphasis. Secondly, that a divergent view between Temple and younger theologians might also have contributed to his change in view. Temple's article "Theology To-Day" specifically talks about this divergence between the older and younger theologians.<sup>164</sup> Iremonger chronicled that Temple had recognised this divergence ever since his time as Archbishop of York.<sup>165</sup> He had set himself to understand the views of this younger generation of theologians and the points of differences he might have with them. He met with a small group of them across three conferences. The first was held for three days in January 1940 hosted by the Bishop of Derby, Alfred Rawlinson, and included Michael Bruce, V. A. Demant, Dom Gregory Dix, and E. L. Mascall. It seemed that they desired a return to dogmatic theology and for the Bible to be read as the inspired word of God.<sup>166</sup> The interaction with them and openness to listen would also have given Temple much food for thought.

It is probably the confluence of all these factors that caused Temple to take more seriously the issues of evil and sin, and to recognise a shift from the Incarnation to redemption. But in our final analysis, we agree with Suggate that it is ultimately difficult to estimate Temple's change of mind. He did not have enough time to develop his thoughts

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<sup>159</sup> Suggate, "William Temple and the Challenge of Reinhold Niebuhr," 414.

<sup>160</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 396.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 396–397. See also Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 65.

<sup>162</sup> *Revelation*, ed. John Baillie and Hugh Martin (New York: Macmillan, 1937).

<sup>163</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 608.

<sup>164</sup> Temple, "Theology To-Day," 326. In fact, Mascall would reply to Temple in the subsequent issues of *Theology* on behalf of the younger theologians. He concludes by noting that "whereas it is usually the old who are theologically conservative and the young who are inclined to kick over the traces of orthodoxy, to-day ... the older men are to a greater or lesser degree liberals, while the younger are demanding a return to dogma". E. L. Mascall, "The Future of Anglican Theology," *ibid.*, no.234 (December 1939): 412.

<sup>165</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 608.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 607–610.

properly after 1939, so what we have is ambiguous and fragmentary. It is thus facile to say that Temple changed from idealism to realism. Suggate, quoting Jack Francis Padgett with approval, suggests that the change was more of a shift in emphasis within Temple's own framework, rather than a radical change of view, even if that framework was itself at breaking point.<sup>167</sup>

While his broader view of evil might prove problematic, there is another part of his assessment that might deserve reappraisal. It is also pertinent to our discussion because Temple here used the category of the will. For Temple, the larger part of evil can be overcome and thereby transmuted for good. The most challenging part of evil, however, was moral evil or sin. This was the true problem of evil because sin is categorical evil.<sup>168</sup> And it is only with the coming of humans that this problem of evil or sin "assumes proportions so overwhelming".<sup>169</sup> We will discuss sin in greater length in chapter three. What is pertinent now is to point out the way in which sin is linked to value/good and the human will. God as Creative Will made the world for value which is appreciated and therefore actualised through humans. Humans can apprehend value. But it is this apprehension of value that draws them away from God and from true value/good. Temple explained this by borrowing the Aristotelian idea of the "apparent good".<sup>170</sup> Humans are affected by original sin which is self-centredness and self-will. Humans can apprehend value, but they apprehend it wrongly because of self-centredness. They make their own value judgements according to their own system of values.<sup>171</sup> The resultant value or good that humans apprehend is what *seems* good to them, that is, the apparent good. This apparent good could well be the true good or value, but it could also be something inferior or bad. The human will is then invoked in the pursuit of this apparent good.<sup>172</sup> This is what termed as "self-will", or the wrong direction of our will.<sup>173</sup> The human will, being the agent of moral action, then affects the choices and actions we make. Importantly, these choices and acts are nonetheless ours. We still retain volition because they arise out of our human will. In other words, God desires the best for us but

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<sup>167</sup> Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 64–65.

<sup>168</sup> Temple, *NMG*, xxv; Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 220.

<sup>169</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 360.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 361–362. Quote from 362. Temple notes that the "apparent good" is an idea from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 1113a20. Temple, *MC*, 157.

<sup>171</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 365; Temple, *CV*, 75, 215, 270–271.

<sup>172</sup> Temple, *CV*, 101.

<sup>173</sup> Temple, *MC*, 285; Temple, *CV*, 101, 258, 271.

cannot force it on us because “it is only apprehensible but an act of choice”.<sup>174</sup> The choice to do otherwise is the result of our self-will.

Temple argued the same thing from a slightly different angle in *MC*, focusing on the category of the will. There is a single Will, of God as Creative Will, from which all things are derived. But this Creative Will cannot be the sole or immediate cause of all occurrences in the world because of humans who have been given free will. They make their own decisions and themselves become causes. For their wills to be truly free, their finite wills cannot be simply absorbed or controlled by the Creative Will.<sup>175</sup> The purpose of that one Will (or Creative Will) is not mechanistically accomplished through the finite wills. Rather, it is effected through them more by a means of influence.<sup>176</sup> In this way, Temple pulls away from the more Calvinistic idea of the world being governed solely by one Will. Although that one Will or Creative Will is the fundamental governing source, it is enacted and effected through the many wills of humans. The true freedom of human wills coupled with the influence-based outworking of the Creative Will gives rise to errors and thereby sin. The finite human will can choose in accordance with their own determinations and thereby frustrate the influence and effect of the Creative Will. This is self-will which is sin. God cannot always intervene, because the finite wills to be truly free and must therefore be able to choose.<sup>177</sup> Ramsey astutely noted that this was Temple’s concept of moral evil. Sin was the corollary of freedom. God gives humans a free will, but these wills become rebellious because of the taint of original sin.<sup>178</sup> This is also known as free will theodicy. Evil, or specifically moral evil, is attributed to humans, who act upon their own free will. God cannot be said to be the author of (moral) evil any more than He can be said to be the author of free will.

A second issue related to Temple’s doctrine of God concerns miracles. The turn of the twentieth century witnessed important developments in New Testament criticism, Christological controversy, and the status of miracles.<sup>179</sup> The English publication of Adolf von

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<sup>174</sup> Temple, *CV*, 195–200. Quote from 200.

<sup>175</sup> Temple, *MC*, 276.

<sup>176</sup> “[B]ut in another sense there is a perfect unity, for all is the operation of a single Purpose, originating in a single Will, however many may be the wills through which it is effected”. *Ibid.*, 277.

<sup>177</sup> Temple, *CV*, 195–200.

<sup>178</sup> Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 178.

<sup>179</sup> John R. H. Moorman, *A History of the Church in England* (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Publishing, 1980), 399; John Kenneth Mozley, *Some Tendencies in British Theology from the Publication of Lux Mundi to the Present Day* (London: SPCK, 1951), 29; K. W. Clements, *Lovers of Discord: Twentieth Century Theological Controversies in England* (London: SPCK, 1988), 15–17.

Harnack's *What is Christianity?* in 1901 sparked a debate over the essential kernels of the Christian faith. They are to be separated from the husks of Greek metaphysical speculations and superstition.<sup>180</sup> The debate would engulf New Testament scholarship, especially regarding the key miracles of the virgin birth and bodily resurrection. Some authors, like J. M. Thompson, B. H. Streeter, and the Anglican modernists, would deny that these miracles happened at all.<sup>181</sup> Those who defended the veracity of the miracles, such as Charles Gore and Frank Weston, felt that undermining these central miracles were as good as undermining the divinity of Christ, and therefore the whole Christian faith.<sup>182</sup> Temple was himself caught up in this. He was first declined for ordination by Bishop Francis Paget of Oxford because he could only tentatively accept the Virgin birth and bodily resurrection.<sup>183</sup> He was only ordained two years later by the then Archbishop of Canterbury Randall Davidson. Temple's father, Frederick Temple, was Davidson's predecessor as the Archbishop of Canterbury and knew Davidson well. It was probably on that account that Davidson decided to reassess William Temple. Davidson surmised that Temple was by then on firmer ground and decided to ordain him. Temple was ordained as deacon in 1908 and priested in 1909 at Canterbury Cathedral by Archbishop Davidson with the goodwill and blessings of Bishop Paget.<sup>184</sup>

It was within this climate that Temple wrote his main works. He put forward an interesting and novel defence of miracles based on the category of the will. Temple was opposed to the idea of divine immutability in the sense that any change in God would mean that He was less than perfect.<sup>185</sup> He was also opposed to the idea that the laws of nature were a mode of God's immanence. God was bound by them to be constant in a mechanical sense.<sup>186</sup> Instead, Temple asserted that the idea of a will or purpose necessitates variability. While will and purpose are constant, they must adapt to the diversity of circumstances in

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<sup>180</sup> Adolf von Harnack, *What is Christianity?*, trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (London: Williams and Norgate, 1901).

<sup>181</sup> See J. M. Thompson, *Miracles in the New Testament* (London: Edward Arnold, 1911); B. H. Streeter, "The Historic Christ," in *Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought: By Seven Oxford Men*, ed. B. H. Streeter (London: Macmillan, 1912); Aidan Nichols, *The Panther and the Hind: A Theological History of Anglicanism* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), chapter 9 "Anglican Modernism".

<sup>182</sup> A fierce pamphlet war would ensue between Gore, Frank Weston, and N. P. Williams on the side of orthodoxy and Streeter, William Sanday, and Herbert Hensley Henson on the other side. Chapman, "Evolution of Anglican Theology," 29–33.

<sup>183</sup> "I am inclined very tentatively to accept the doctrine of the Virgin Birth and, with rather more confidence, that of the Bodily Resurrection of our Lord". Iremonger, *William Temple*, 109.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, 117–119, 120–121.

<sup>185</sup> Temple, *CV*, 99.

<sup>186</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 287.

order to maintain their constancy.<sup>187</sup> This is what Temple means when he avers that the “Will is unswerving, the Purpose unchanged; but the very constancy of the fulfilment of the one purpose requires variations in the method of activity, if the other conditions of the activity are variable”.<sup>188</sup> In fact, it is precisely because God is living and active that we should expect Him to have the “infinitely delicate variations of adjustment to varying circumstance ... expressing His constancy through appropriate variations”.<sup>189</sup> A major contribution to this varied circumstance is human free will.<sup>190</sup> God cannot control this but can react when he deems the circumstances fit. God is therefore active in the world through the law of nature. But there may be times where He must act in a special way because the variableness of circumstances requires so. These acts are called miracles.<sup>191</sup> A passage in *PRLF* aptly captures this idea:

And this means that the unity and constancy of His Will may reveal itself in the variety of actions by which he meets the variety of circumstances. He is not a mechanical force reacting with rigid uniformity to the pressure of other forces; He is personal, adjusting His actions from time to time to the requirements of His one purpose in changing conditions. Hence the possibility of what we call miracles; it is grounded, not in any divine caprice, but in the divine constancy of personal action.<sup>192</sup>

The variableness of circumstances because of free human wills means that God might have to act. It is precisely because He is personal, living, and constant that He must act to maintain the course of that constant purpose. However, Temple cautioned that this must not lead to superstition or false providentialism. These are the downsides to a disproportionate belief in miracles. There could be the tendency to ascribe to divine volition any event that is not easily explained by human action or scientific knowledge. There is also the tendency to wait passively for God to act. Temple brings our attention back to the reality of our free human wills. He states that “it remains true that the human will is a more adequate instrument of

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<sup>187</sup> Temple, *CV*, 99; Temple, *NMG*, 295, 299.

<sup>188</sup> Temple, *CV*, 99.

<sup>189</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 299.

<sup>190</sup> Temple, *CV*, 99.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>192</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 6.

the Divine Will than any natural force can be".<sup>193</sup> God can and does act supernaturally through miracles. God can and does act through nature. But it is also true that God acts through human wills. This is to reiterate the point made above that God effects His Will through the many finite human wills. There is a point of correspondence between our human wills and God's Will. We can be active in the world and in other people's lives in the way that He is active.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has examined Temple's doctrine of God. It has revealed the central place of the category of the will. In contrast to Kant, Temple maintained the possibility of natural theology and the importance of God's Will. A principal feature of Temple's doctrine of God is his belief in God as Creative Will. Given that the will is an ultimate and final explanation in causal regression, the explanation of the universe is bound to be found in the will. In other words, it is a Creative Will who created, sustains, and remains active in the universe. This conclusion can also be reached through philosophy. Temple demonstrated this through his dialectal realism and by arguing for the prominence of the Mind. He was careful to nuance that the Will that created the universe is neither irrational nor capricious. Rather, the Creative Will purposes towards value or good. The pursuit of value is thus intrinsic to God. That also means that value is prior to existence. All that exists is either inherently good or latently good because it is a means to good. This also means that any apprehension of value or good is fundamentally a religious experience. All these put Temple's doctrine of God on a collision course with the problem of evil. Temple held that evil could be purposed for good because it can be transmuted when overcome. Such a position might make sense within his scheme of thought but can prove problematic. For one, evil is usually taken to be the obverse of good and not a step towards it. But there is something to be said about Temple's free will theodicy. Likewise, his defence of miracles is, to my mind, cogent and worth reappraising. Temple's doctrine of God that is based upon the category of the will gives rise to an active and dynamic sense of God. God creates the universe, remains active in it, and continues to purpose towards value. Notions of agency, volition, and purposiveness are prominent.

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<sup>193</sup> Temple, CV, 193.

## Chapter Two

### Christology: Two Wills in One Person

#### Introduction

The previous chapter explored Temple's doctrine of God. God was understood primarily in terms of the will, that is, the Creative Will that created and sustains the universe, and remains active and purposive within it. This chapter builds on that foundation by exploring Temple's Christology. Given that God was understood in terms of the will, it is logical that his Christology will be construed in those terms as well. Temple affirmed that Christ had two wills – a human will and a divine Will – in the person of the Logos. The human will is vital as a predicate of Jesus' moral progress and growth. The divine Will *is* the Will of God and what made Jesus divine. The novelty of Temple's Christology was his belief that the human will was subsumed within the divine Will and found resolution within the person of the Logos. This was in essence the dyothelite position and in resonance with the decree of the Council of Constantinople. Crucial to his Christology was his concept of personality which sought the integration and harmonisation of a person under one will.

Two sets of materials will form the basis of our enquiry. Temple's first foray into Christology was an essay "The Divinity of Christ" in the collection titled *Foundations*. His most developed thoughts on the matter are to be found in two chapters of his main theological work *CV*. Chapter VII is titled "The Godhead of Jesus Christ" and deals with how Jesus was perceived to be divine. Chapter VIII on "The Person of Christ" is Temple's mature and most considered work on the person and work of Christ. The material from *Foundations* and *CV* will be the primary sources we work with in this chapter.<sup>1</sup>

*Foundations* was a collection of essays written in 1912 by seven authors.<sup>2</sup> They were B. H. Streeter, who edited the collection, R. Brook, W. H. Moberly, R. G. Parsons, A. E. J.

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<sup>1</sup> Authors who have commented on Temple's Christology such as Baker and Thomas typically address a chapter from *MC* (Chapter XXIII "The Word Incarnate") and a long sermon titled "The Philosophy of the Incarnation". Insights from these will be brought in appropriately. However, we omit them from our scope because they pertain more to the rationale behind and of the Incarnation than to Christology proper. See Albert E. Baker, "Introduction," in *Religious Experience: And other Essays and Addresses By William Temple*, ed. Albert E. Baker (London: J. Clarke, 1958), 21; Thomas, "William Temple," 112.

<sup>2</sup> For an overview see Clements, *Lovers of Discord*, chapter 3; Iremonger, *William Temple*, chapter IX; Chapman, "Evolution of Anglican Theology," 29–33.

Rawlinson, N. S. Talbot, and William Temple. They were all younger men of some academic reputation who were or had been Oxford fellows. The collection's subtitle fittingly described its intent – "A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought". The authors felt that Christianity should be re-examined in light of modern thought such as historical criticism, psychology, evolution, and natural law. And "if need be [to give a] re-statement, of the *foundation* of their belief in the light of the knowledge and thought of the day".<sup>3</sup> The authors were already friends and met up over four retreats to discuss and critique each other's essays.<sup>4</sup> *Foundations* therefore could be said to express the common mind of the authors. The only exception to this was Streeter's essay.<sup>5</sup> In fact, Temple confided in a personal letter to Ronald Arbuthnott Knox that the only part of *Foundations* that disquieted him was the extent to which Streeter was dominated by Albert Schweitzer.<sup>6</sup> This seemed to anticipate the controversy that ensued. Knox, who a close friend of some of the authors, penned a satirical poem, *Absolute and Abitofhell*. He followed this up in 1913 with a more careful rebuttal in *Some Loose Stones*.<sup>7</sup> Frank Weston likewise inveighed against *Foundations* and wrote *Ecclesia Anglicana* to address his concerns.<sup>8</sup> Most of the controversy was centred on Streeter's essay which denied the physical resurrection of Jesus Christ. This was in turn part of the larger storm then surrounding miracles in the New Testament. Apart from Streeter's, the other essays were largely deemed to have done well in exploring modern question within the bounds of traditional orthodoxy.<sup>9</sup> Testament to this is the fact that five out of the seven authors were eventually consecrated as bishops.<sup>10</sup>

Temple contributed two essays to the collection titled "The Divinity of Christ" and "The Church". We are concerned in this chapter with his first essay. F. A. Iremonger chronicled that Temple's first draft that was submitted for discussion seemed like a hurried piece of work. It was both short and inadequate. The other authors expressed their disappointment

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<sup>3</sup> B. H. Streeter, ed. *Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought: By Seven Oxford Men* (London: Macmillan, 1912), vii. Emphasis mine.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, viii.

<sup>5</sup> Streeter, "The Historic Christ," 135; See also Iremonger, *William Temple*, 156.

<sup>6</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 163.

<sup>7</sup> Clements, *Lovers of Discord*, 58.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 59–64; Chapman, "Evolution of Anglican Theology," 29–33.

<sup>9</sup> Mozley, *Some Tendencies*, 43; J. W. C. Wand, *Anglicanism in History and Today* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), 123; Moorman, *History*, 399–400.

<sup>10</sup> Temple was the Bishop of Manchester, York, and Canterbury; Parsons was Bishop of Southwark and Hereford; Talbot was Bishop of Pretoria; Rawlinson was Bishop of Derby; Brook was Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich.

and gave valuable feedback. Temple took in the feedback and improved on it. The revised draft was so much improved that it impressed the other authors as deeply as the first had disappointed. It was far more substantial and had three sections. The second part which detailed the history of the doctrine of the person of Christ was wholly new, and the third concluding section was enriched and expanded.<sup>11</sup> Temple's Christology sought to bring together the merits of Peter Abelard, Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Clairvaux, Augustine of Hippo, and Eastern Greek Christologies using St. John's Logos as a starting point.<sup>12</sup> Significant for our discussion was the centrality of the will in his considerations of both the person and work of Christ. The person of Christ was construed as two wills in one Person.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the work of Christ was thought of as the perfect exemplary submission of Christ to God's Will which drew our human wills to Christ such that we take on His purpose and will as our own. In doing so, we are drawn out of our original state of sin that is self-will.<sup>14</sup> This was of course reminiscent of R. C. Moberly. There was a clear move away from the prevalent penal-substitutionary atonement that had come under much criticism then. We will explore the work of Christ more in chapter three. What is noteworthy at this point is the importance given to the will. This was part of Temple's and the collection's endeavour to modernise the Christian faith. It was hoped that using a more modern category such as the will would help to make the Christian faith more understandable to the modern mind. This emphasis on theology "in our own language" is a marked one throughout Temple's thoughts, especially in his Christology.<sup>15</sup>

If *Foundations* represents Temple's younger views, *CV* puts forth his more mature understandings. *CV* was written while he was the Bishop of Manchester and meant as a sequel to his first book, *MC*.<sup>16</sup> We will explore the nature of these books more in the sections below. What is important to point out for now is that Temple continued to emphasise the will as with *Foundations*. However, Temple seemed to be more precise and nuanced in *CV*. Specifically,

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<sup>11</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 158.

<sup>12</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 242-243.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 247-253.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 253-256.

<sup>15</sup> For example, "Let us then try to express in our own language the meaning and value of Christ's Life and Death". *Ibid.*, 246. See also 233. Same point in *CV*, 121, 134, 138.

<sup>16</sup> Temple stated that *CV* was the general theological position behind the Charge that he gave to the clergy of the Manchester Diocese during his Primary Visit. In fact, parts of his addresses were taken from *CV*. These addresses were published as *CHC*. See William Temple, *Christ in His Church* (London: Macmillan, 1925), v; Iremonger, *William Temple*, 325-327.

Temple introduces the idea of “subsumed”. Christ had a human will, but this was subsumed within the divine will. This ultimately finds resolution in the person of the Logos, or Christ. This certainly represents a development over *Foundations*.

### **Three Critical Engagements**

Before we detail Temple’s understanding of the person of Christ in terms of the will, it may be helpful to orientate ourselves by highlighting three critical engagements that Temple had in *CV*. These were engagements with Weston, Paul of Samosata, and the Council of Constantinople in 680/1. Weston is a cautionary tale that explicating an orthodox Christology is walking a fine line that one easily crosses. Despite vigorously defending orthodoxy, Weston seemed to have strayed into monothelitism. Yet, traditional orthodoxy holds that the person of Christ has two wills, i.e., a human will and a divine Will. Paul was innovative and novel in his attempt to define the person of Christ in terms of the will. But his fundamental flaw was to dichotomise will from nature, or one’s being. In doing so, the will became a separate faculty amongst others, and one that was capricious. The Council of Constantinople in 680/1 rightly concluded with the dyothelites. But it nonetheless came close to Nestorianism because of the prevalent philosophy of its day. Temple termed this philosophy logical realism. This was the root problem of Eastern Greek theology, resulting in a focus on substance metaphysics, and consequently an emphasis on materialism. This sidelined the more spiritual and dynamic category of the will.

We look first to Frank Weston. Temple gave him as an example of someone who came very close to monothelitism despite defending orthodoxy and its traditional terms. Weston was a High Churchman with deep Anglo-Catholic leanings. Having studied at Oxford, he left as a missionary to Zanzibar and eventually was consecrated as Bishop of Zanzibar. The vast geographical distance did not impede him from keeping abreast with developments back in Britain. He generally took a conservative stance and inveighed against authors such as Streeter, William Sanday, and Hensley Henson. Weston felt that such authors gave up too much to liberalism and fatally undermined Christian orthodoxy.<sup>17</sup> Weston is a critical engagement point for Temple because Temple footnoted him at an important juncture in *CV*. Temple had just defined God and Christ with regard to the will. God is three Persons with one

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<sup>17</sup> Clements, *Lovers of Discord*, chapter 3; Chapman, "Evolution of Anglican Theology," 29–33.

Will. Christ was one person with two wills, human and divine.<sup>18</sup> Temple then immediately footnoted Weston to show how traditional terminology could be difficult to explicate. Despite being a vigorous defender of orthodoxy during this period, Temple considered that Weston nonetheless came “as near to an explicit adherence to the monothelite heresy as a man could well come without an avowed acceptance of it”.<sup>19</sup>

Weston had sought to follow Chalcedonian orthodoxy of Christ having two natures after the union in the Logos, albeit with just some finetuning to modern thought. He also wanted to emphasize the divinity of Christ being *vere deus* against the Christological trends then that tended to emphasise the humanity of Christ. Unlike kenoticism, Weston proposed that the Logos retains His full divinity yet subjected Himself to a continuous self-limit or self-restraint.<sup>20</sup> He does so by building on the concept of personality. Reminiscent of R. C. Moberly, Weston sees personality as being fundamentally self-consciousness and the sum of the Logos’ relationships.<sup>21</sup> The Incarnate Logos was thus one person in two sets of relationships. The divine set of relationships (i.e. with the Trinity, and in His creative role in the cosmos) were mediated through the Logos whereas the incarnate set of relationships were mediated through the human nature.<sup>22</sup> By this means, Weston was able to affirm that the Logos continues His eternal functions and yet assumes humanity fully with all its limitations. This answered Temple’s enduring criticism of kenoticism in *CV*, “What was happening to the rest of the universe during the period of our Lord’s earthly life?”<sup>23</sup> Perhaps this was why Temple quoted Weston approvingly that the Incarnate Logos had no consciousness that His assumed humanity could not mediate.<sup>24</sup>

The difficulty of Weston’s position occurs when pressed on how those two sets of relationships relate to one another. It seemed to be the case that the Incarnate Christ remains in a continual and complete obedience to the Logos.<sup>25</sup> But if this holds true then where is the place for the human will? Here we begin to possibly see Temple’s point. Authors like Brenda Cross have attempted to defend Weston from Temple’s charges. She argued that Temple had

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<sup>18</sup> Temple, *CV*, 62.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Frank Weston, *The One Christ* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), 155.

<sup>21</sup> Lewis B. Smedes, *The Incarnation: Trends in Modern Anglican Thought* (Kampen: J.H. Kok N.V, 1953), 10–15.

<sup>22</sup> Weston, *The One Christ*, 155–156, 179–180.

<sup>23</sup> Temple, *CV*, 142.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 146. Temple quotes *The One Christ*, 184.

<sup>25</sup> Weston, *The One Christ*, 180.

assessed Weston based on his own bias against the category of substance. Thus, Cross contended that because Temple took the view that “the self is experience and will is the self in action, Temple sees monothelitism in Weston's insistence on the one divine self (incarnate)”.<sup>26</sup> However, Cross does not address Temple's concern fully. For one, Weston seems unclear on how the two sets of relationships or two wills relate to one another. His recourse is often either to the idea of one consciousness or a rehashing of the orthodox “two wills in one person” position.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, Temple's critique was raised from Weston's book, *The Christ and His Critics*, whereas Cross defends Weston exclusively from *The One Christ*.<sup>28</sup> Some portions of the former book, especially those pointed out by Temple, might seem to suggest monothelitism.<sup>29</sup> A detailed comparison between the two books or between Weston and Temple lies outside the scope of our study. Yet, we might take Temple's basic point here that explicating orthodoxy is walking a fine line that one easily crosses. Weston is a case in point that begets caution. This is perhaps why Temple cautioned that we never fully know Christ or explain Him without reservation.<sup>30</sup> There must be some element of divine mystery. This being the case, Temple was also cognisant of the danger of monothelitism. A proper Christology must give adequate reflection to both the human will and divine Will.

Another key engagement Temple had was with Paul of Samosata.<sup>31</sup> Temple was concerned that Paul misunderstood the will as one of many faculties that constitute a person. Such a misunderstanding resulted in the idea of the will as being capricious or unstable. Temple wrote about Paul in both *Foundations* and *CV* as one of the earliest failures in understanding the person of Christ, but also one of the most interesting. Temple noted that Paul might have been concerned to defend the monarchy of God but did not elaborate on

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<sup>26</sup> Brenda C. Cross, "The Christology of Frank Weston: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol.21, no.1 (April 1970): 79.

<sup>27</sup> Weston, *The One Christ*, 189.

<sup>28</sup> Frank Weston, *The Christ and His Critics* (London: Mowbray, 1919); Weston, *The One Christ*.

<sup>29</sup> For example, Temple referred to p.115 of *The Christ and His Critics* where Weston wrote, “God can, therefore, become incarnate in a man by the simple process of completely dominating all those of his functioning which can in any way manifest the divine character ... [a] man so dominated may be regarded for all practical purposes... as truly Son of God”.

<sup>30</sup> For example, “Let us make the attempt [to understand Christ], reminding ourselves that just in the degree in which we accept the Church's account of Him we shall expect to find ourselves unable to reach any clear understanding of His Person; man, who is not yet God-possessed, cannot comprehend the perfect union of God and Man”. Temple, *CV*, 121. See also 139, 145.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 127–129; Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 223–229. It is also found in William Temple, *The Universality of Christ* (London: SCM Press, 1921), 5–6.

it.<sup>32</sup> Be that as it may, Paul's overriding anxiety was the union of natures between God and humanity. His anxiety arose out of the intellectual context of his day, or what Temple termed a logical realism. This meant that divinity and humanity were thought of as substantial entities existing independent of individual occurrences. Moreover, they were on opposite ends of a great divide in Greek philosophy. Humanity was its own substance that was temporal, imperfect, and perishable. Divinity was another substance that was eternal, perfect, and immortal.<sup>33</sup> Paul was naturally alarmed when the person of Christ was thought of as being a union of the divine and human natures.<sup>34</sup> As U. M. Lang points out, Paul feared that the divinity of the Logos would be jeopardised because of the mingling with a corrupt human body.<sup>35</sup> With a union of natures or substances out of the question, Paul conceived the God–man union in Christ to be one of wills.<sup>36</sup> Yet in doing so, Paul drew a sharp distinction between nature or substance and will, though this was a common distinction then.<sup>37</sup>

The result of this distinction was twofold. Firstly, the will was conceived to be something distinct from nature. It was a separate faculty that was expressed in specific acts or choices. Nature was thus understood to be fixed and stable, while will is indeterminate and unstable. Secondly, the will was now made to be capricious: this was a corollary of the first result. The will as a separate, unstable faculty was now taken to be variable and unpredictable. The consequences of all this was most acutely felt when applied to the person of Christ. Paul's Incarnate Christ was a union of wills, or a union of acts or choices. But if so,

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<sup>32</sup> Temple, *CV*, 27. This point was new in *CV*. It was not in *Foundations*. Perhaps Temple followed Harnack who noted that for Paul God was simply one Person. The Son (Logos) and Spirit (Sophia) could be distinguished from God but merely as qualities and not persons. In a more recent article, Lang casts doubt on this Monarchian impetus. Few traces of this aspect of Paul's teaching survived and Monarchianism was not a pressing issue then in the first place. Adolf von Harnack, *History of Dogma. Translated from the Third German Edition*, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. III (London: Williams & Norgate, 1894), 40; U. M. Lang, "The Christological Controversy at the Synod of Antioch in 268/9," *Journal of Theological Studies*, vol.51, no.1 (April 2000): 59.

<sup>33</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 226–233.

<sup>34</sup> Temple saw this as the crux of the problem for Arius as well. The dichotomy that Paul had placed at the Incarnation was placed by Arius at creation. A perfect and imperishable God could not be the Creator or immediate cause of an imperfect and perishable world. An intermediary was needed – the Logos. Thus, Arius' Christ was the highest creature of creation but not consubstantial with God. However, the price paid for Christ as the mediator of creation was that he could not be the mediator of redemption. Unless Christ is consubstantial with God, he cannot be the agent of salvation and redemption. This was essentially Athanasius' point. *Ibid.*, 227–229.

<sup>35</sup> Lang, "Christological Controversy," 79.

<sup>36</sup> Temple cited Paul's words from Harnack's book in both *Foundations* and *CV* – "τὰ κρούμενα τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἔχει ἔπαινον· τὰ δὲ σχέσει φιλίας κρατούμενα ὑπεραινέται". Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 226; Temple, *CV*, 127; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, vol. III, 42.

<sup>37</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 227; Temple, *CV*, 127.

then the anomaly arises that Christ's choices or acts could change even though His nature does not. His choices could be capricious whereas His nature was stable. Temple concluded that if this is the case, then "His *self* becomes something other than Deity and is only externally related to Deity".<sup>38</sup> This was an insufficient Christology and Paul was rightly condemned at the Council of Antioch in AD 268. This variable or capricious Christ was a problem that would continue to plague Arius too.<sup>39</sup> The point taken from Paul is that will cannot be dichotomised from nature or one's being. It should not be understood as a separate faculty amongst others. Similarly, the will should not be considered as capricious. This is especially true of Christ. A capricious will in Christ would mean that He is unstable, indeterminate, and fickle. Much of these point to the fact that an adequate concept was not yet available. Christology was bound to be in terms of substance until and unless a proper understanding of the will was available.

The last critical engagement was regarding the Council of Constantinople in 680/1. Temple hoped to show the weakness of Eastern Greek Christology because of logical realism and its inevitable slide into materialism. This distracted discussion from the will. Temple argued that because of the intellectual context of the day, the dyothelite resolution was effectively very close to Nestorianism.<sup>40</sup> The controversy arose out of an Apollinarian-like belief that the Incarnate Word only had one Will, i.e., the divine Will.<sup>41</sup> But the lack of a human will would imply that the human nature in Christ was incomplete or imperfect. Christ would be fully God but not fully human. Hence, this monothelite view was condemned at Constantinople and dyothelite was proclaimed as orthodox. In Jesus Christ there are two wills – a divine Will and a human will. Yet in Temple's view, this resolution comes close to Nestorianism. There was little difference between the Nestorian duality of a human and divine person existing side by side, and the dyothelite duality of a divine Will and human will

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<sup>38</sup> Temple, *CV*, 128.

<sup>39</sup> When discussing the variability of will or choices in Christ, Temple footnoted that Arius likewise presented a variable Christ. *Ibid.* The discussion of Arius was a follow-on from Paul of Samosata in both *Foundations* and *CV*. See Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 227; Temple, *CV*, 129. There does seem to be some commonalities between Arius and Paul's Christology. Lang pointed out that Paul did not see Christ as both God and Son of God prior to the Incarnation. Neither did Paul recognise the existence of the Son (Logos) as a distinct person prior to the Incarnation. This is similar to Arius' position that there was a time when Christ was not. See Lang, "Christological Controversy", 59.

<sup>40</sup> Temple, *CV*, 135.

<sup>41</sup> For background see Cyril Hovorun, *Will, Action and Freedom: Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2008). Hovorun agreed that Apollinarius was one of four forms of monothelitism/monenergism. Hovorun, *Will, Action and Freedom*, 5.

side by side.<sup>42</sup> Temple noted that Nestorianism was rejected because of the suggestion of a human *person* in the Incarnate Christ. The orthodoxy definition was two natures, human and divine, in one person of the divine Logos. But Temple contended that if this held, then Jesus' human nature was an impersonal nature or impersonal humanity. This was precisely what Cyril of Alexandria insisted on. Christ was not a mere man but Man, i.e., human nature. His intent was to preserve the universal efficacy of the Incarnation for humanity's salvation and redemption. This goes back to logical realism. Substance/nature was thought of as existing independently and yet something that could be shared. Hypostasis was a "point of reference whereby attributes are determined as belonging to the being and not another".<sup>43</sup> Temple gave the example of two green objects. While they share the nature/substance of greenness, there are two distinct green objects because that one greenness is a quality of the two hypostases. Thus, Christ's salvific work is not universally efficacious if he is a human person or human hypostasis. He saves only himself and is at best a good example for us. Instead, Christ must redeem the whole of substance/nature of humanity so that everyone as distinct hypostases can share in it. Cyril was particularly insistent on this point in his defence of orthodoxy. Jesus must not be *a* man, but Man.

But to this Temple averred that "[t]here is no element in traditional orthodoxy which causes to the mind of the twentieth century so great difficulty as this".<sup>44</sup> The modern mind has simply ceased to believe in categories of thought such as substance/nature or hypostasis.<sup>45</sup> If anything, an impersonal humanity or impersonal human nature would suggest to a modern mind that Christ did not have a human personality.<sup>46</sup> While we might agree with Temple on the modern difficulties of logical realism, it should be said that Temple side-tracked what could have been a very pertinent discussion on dyothelitism. As we shall see, Temple's position is essentially the same as the dyothelite position and the resolutions from Constantinople. However, what we may derive from this discussion on the Council of Constantinople was Temple's thorough repudiation of logical realism and the way it ensnared discussions regarding substance/nature and person/hypostases. Because of it, Christology unintendedly declined into materialism. The focus was on matter (i.e., substance, nature,

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<sup>42</sup> Temple, *CV*, 135–136.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 138.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 135–136; Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 247.

hypostasis, etc.) and not the spirit. But matter was an object that is dead. In contrast, spirit was living, thinking, feeling, and more importantly, willing. Thus, the materialistic focus results in a static and wooden Christology. More importantly, it neglected the spiritual nature of Christology and its more dynamic corollaries or sin, human agency, and moral progress.<sup>47</sup>

This was the context behind a passage from *Foundations* which is often quoted by those who disagree with Chalcedon.<sup>48</sup> Temple averred that “[t]he formula of Chalcedon is, in fact, a confession of the bankruptcy of Greek Patristic Theology”.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, the Chalcedonian formula merely states the facts which constituted the problem without attempting to solve it.<sup>50</sup> Temple’s view did not entirely soften in *CV* as some might think.<sup>51</sup> Granted, Temple does blunt his point that Chalcedon should have attempted a solution. An authoritative formula should only be expected to state the facts.<sup>52</sup> Apart from this, he held to his main argument that Chalcedon represented the bankruptcy of Greek patristic theology in the sense that it “marks the definite failure of all attempts to explain the Incarnation in terms of Essence, Substance, Nature, and the like”.<sup>53</sup> In the accompanying footnote, Temple nuanced that it is “really not the formula, but the history of the whole controversy, that leaves the impression of bankruptcy”.<sup>54</sup> Put simply, Temple does not reject Chalcedonian orthodoxy but rather the “intellectual apparatus at their disposal”: that is, logical realism.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps Temple was influenced by Adolf von Harnack who was a leading historian then and an important source for Temple’s historical survey of Christology.<sup>56</sup> While Temple does not accept Harnack’s Christology, he does seem to be influence by Harnack’s scepticism over substance-based Christology and Greek metaphysics. The problem was logical realism. It was

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<sup>47</sup> Temple, *CV*, 128–129; Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 231–233.

<sup>48</sup> Mozley, *Some Tendencies*, 42.

<sup>49</sup> Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 230.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 230–231.

<sup>51</sup> For example, Craig, *Social Concern*, 18; Brian Hebblethwaite, “The Propriety of the Doctrine of the Incarnation as a Way of Interpreting Christ,” *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol.33, no.3 (1980): 205.

<sup>52</sup> Temple, *CV*, 134. Craig in particular takes issue with this. He saw this as a shift in Temple’s view and methodology from *Foundations* and that now in *CV* Temple was no longer attempting an explanation but just a restatement of the traditional language of Chalcedon. Craig clearly misses the point that the statement was in reference to the Chalcedonian formula and Greek theology. See Craig, *Social Concern*, 70–73.

<sup>53</sup> Temple, *CV*, 134. The only real softening is that Temple no longer held that Chalcedon should have attempted a resolution; to state the facts is exactly what an authoritative formula should do.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 230.

<sup>56</sup> Temple wrote in a footnote in *Foundations* that “[t]hroughout this historical section I am indebted to Harnack’s great work [i.e. *History of Dogma*]”. *Ibid.*, 226.

fundamentally opposed to Temple's own philosophical view of the world.<sup>57</sup> This is a main point in both *Foundations* and *CV* – that Eastern theology's Christology was doomed to fall short because logical realism was too deeply embedded in its presuppositions. Eastern theology showed "the impossibility of a theology in terms of substance"<sup>58</sup> because it is "not an unintelligible mystery but a demonstrable impossibility".<sup>59</sup> In sum, we might say that Temple agreed with the Council of Constantinople 680/1 in general. Its dyothelite resolution rightly focuses on the will and affirmed the two wills in Christ. But the dominant philosophy of its day, namely logical realism, severely limited its reflection. Discussions on the person of Christ continued its inevitable decline into substance metaphysics and became consequently materialistic. The focus on material or matter distracted discussions from the spiritual nature of things. Concomitantly, more dynamic categories such as moral progress, agency, or ethics were sidelined. This would not be the case if discussions on the person of Christ were to focus on the will.

In summary, these three critical engagements orientate us to the way in which Temple built his understanding of the person of Christ in terms of the will. He had to be mindful of several issues. Due care was needed when walking the fine line of orthodoxy without falling into the various heresies of Nestorianism, monothelitism, and the like. The will cannot be dichotomised from the nature of a person, nor can it merely be conceived as a capricious constituent faculty. Logical realism should not be presumed either. With all these in mind, Temple felt that the Western Latin side of the Church had a better starting point in its understanding of the person of Christ. Its more juristic emphasis recognised people over substances. They thus grasped the personhood of Christ better than the Eastern Greek side of the Church. This was partly because the major controversy in the West was over the will. The Pelagian controversy was useful in bringing the will into focus despite pushing

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<sup>57</sup> For example, the chasm between matter and spirit was not insurmountable. Temple's idea of the grades of reality (i.e. Matter → Life → Mind → Spirit) shows that the supervening of spirit upon matter is in fact to be anticipated. This was what Whitehead termed organism but what Temple would recognise as a sacramental universe. The Incarnation where spirit indwells matter is to be expected. In fact, the Incarnation is such an anticipated part of the process of reality that "[e]ven had there been no evil in the world to overcome, no sin to be abolished and forgiven, still the Incarnation would be the natural inauguration of the final stage of evolution". Thus, the Incarnation is "perfectly intelligible...[and] its occurrence is all of a piece with the scheme of reality". Temple, *CV*, 139.

<sup>58</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 233.

<sup>59</sup> Temple, *CV*, 125–126.

individualism to an extreme and prioritising morality over religion.<sup>60</sup> However, an adequate Christology based on the will would prove elusive. For one thing, Western theology seemed preoccupied with the deliverance from sin.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, their understanding of the will was not developed. The will was construed as merely one of many faculties that made up a person.<sup>62</sup> The final nail in the coffin was, as mentioned above, the Council of Constantinople which concluded rightly with the dyothelites yet tended towards Nestorianism. A proper Christology based on the will awaited full treatment.

### **Will-Based Christology**

It is to this end – a will-based Christology – that Temple builds his understanding of the person of Christ. Christology was the most important facet of Temple’s theology because of the prominence that he gave to the Incarnation. Owen Thomas echoes what many commentators have observed, that at the “centre of Temple’s faith, theology and philosophy is the Incarnation of God in Christ”.<sup>63</sup> It is perhaps relevant to sketch Temple’s broader view of the Incarnation before exploring his will-based Christology in depth. The centrality of the Incarnation is evident as we read Temple’s three major works. *MC* was a philosophical work that intended to show that “the Incarnation in fact supplied the one great need of philosophy”.<sup>64</sup> Humanity’s search for truth in the form of knowledge, art, morality, and religion find their convergence and unity in the Incarnation.<sup>65</sup> For what we see in Christ is “what we should see in the history of the universe if we could apprehend that history in its completeness”.<sup>66</sup> *CV* was meant as a sequel or companion to *MC* by providing a theological argument.<sup>67</sup> *CV*, or *Christus Veritas*, Christ the Truth, was written in the belief that Christ and

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<sup>60</sup> Temple wrote that Pelagianism was the only heresy that was “intrinsically damnable”. We will explore why in the next chapter. William Temple, *The Nature of Personality* (London: Macmillan, 1911), 38.

<sup>61</sup> This difference in emphasis between the Eastern Greek Church and Western Latin Church is why with “the Greeks the vital point was the Incarnation of God; with the Latins it was the Death of God Incarnate”. Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 231–234. Quote from 231.

<sup>62</sup> Temple, *CV*, 60–61. Same point in Temple, *MC*, 167; Temple, *NP*, 25.

<sup>63</sup> Thomas, “William Temple,” 112. See also Fletcher, *William Temple*, 19–34; Baker, “Religious Experience,” 20.

<sup>64</sup> Temple, *CV*, vii.

<sup>65</sup> Temple, *MC*, 1–4, 298.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 318.

<sup>67</sup> Temple, *CV*, vii. Temple was encouraged to write *CV* by Charles Gore. Gore had suggested that Temple should expand on a footnote from *MC* that engaged Henri Bergson on the idea of time and divine omniscience. In Temple’s estimation, this footnote was connected with another one where Temple suggested that the Incarnation was history’s central revealing principle. *CV* proved to be popular. It was first printed in June 1924

the Christian faith was truth for all of humanity.<sup>68</sup> Temple gives his reason for writing *CV* in his Preface:

[T]he intellectual atmosphere is dominated by a philosophy which leaves *no room for a specific incarnation*. This philosophy is not materialist or atheist; it is both spiritual and theistic; but the idea of God which it reaches is such as to preclude His ever doing anything in particular in any other sense than that in which he does everything in general. I believe a very slight touch to the intellectual balance may make the scales incline the other way... What is needed is the exposition of the Christian idea of God, life and the world, or, in other words, a Christo-centric metaphysics.<sup>69</sup>

Temple might have had in mind those who advance a Newtonian mechanical universe. Or, it is more likely that he was addressing the absolute idealism of T. H. Green, Edward Caird, or Bernard Bosanquet. Temple elsewhere gives the example of Pringle-Pattison. Temple notes that in his Gifford lecture, *The Idea of God*, Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison offers a spiritual understanding of the universe. However, his “God” is ultimately “not a Person ... not a being with whom personal fellowship and communion is so much as possible”.<sup>70</sup> *CV* was therefore intended to tip the balance based on a theology of the Incarnation to show the sacramentality of matter as a vehicle for the spirit on which a Christocentric metaphysics could be developed. This is also what Temple tried to show in his Gifford lectures, in *NMG*. Through four dialectical transitions, Temple concludes by arguing that natural theology “ends in a hunger for that Divine Revelation which it began by excluding from its purview”.<sup>71</sup> This is a hunger for “a specific Revelation”, or in other words, the Incarnation of God in Christ.<sup>72</sup> The Incarnation is not an unexpected alien work, but natural and anticipated by philosophy, theology, and natural religion. The Incarnation was clearly front and centre for Temple.

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yet plans for a reprint were already in place by December 1924. The reprint was then realised in 1925. *Ibid.*, viii–x, xiv.

<sup>68</sup> Spencer, *Christ in All Things*, 53.

<sup>69</sup> Emphasis mine. Temple, *CV*, ix.

<sup>70</sup> William Temple, *Essays in Christian Politics and Kindred Subjects* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), 172. Similar example of Pringle-Pattison in Temple, *CV*, 10–11.

<sup>71</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 520.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, xxxii. Brunner offered some critiques of *NMG* in a letter that was found in Temple’s copy of *NMG*. Brunner suggested that *NMG* read more like Christian philosophy than natural religion. Given the bounds set by the lectureship, Temple should have kept strictly to natural religion instead of a synthesis with the Christian faith. Emmet, “The Philosopher,” 531.

Temple held that the Incarnation and its validation of the sacramentality of matter finds its biblical warrant from John 1:14 that “the Word became flesh and we beheld his glory”.<sup>73</sup> He argued that implicit in that verse is “a whole theory of the relation between spirit and matter... Christianity, based as it is on the Incarnation, regards matter as destined to be the vehicle and instrument of spirit, and spirit as fully actual so far as it controls and directs matter”.<sup>74</sup> This is the fundamental building block of Temple’s sacramental theology. It is based on the idea that the structure of reality can be understood in grades which can be broadly categorised – matter, life, mind, and spirit.<sup>75</sup> Within these grades, Temple wrote, “the lower is necessary to the actuality of the higher but only finds its own fullness of being when thus used by the higher as its means of self-actualisation”.<sup>76</sup> Thus, matter is necessary for life. But when life emerges, it proves to be the controlling principle and actualisation of matter. The same logic extends upwards in the scale. The culmination point is when spirit indwells mind, and therefore indwells life and matter too. To Temple, this was “the great Christian hypothesis”.<sup>77</sup> Matter, life, and mind reach their fullest potential and actualisation when indwelled by spirit. Put this in theological terms, the universe is a sacrament that is indwelled by God such that the “whole universe is the expression of His Will”.<sup>78</sup> This is the rationale behind Temple’s famous dictum that “Christianity ... is the most avowedly materialist of all the great religions”.<sup>79</sup>

The sacramental theology of the Christian faith, as understood by Temple, gives value and meaning to matter. This sacramental universe thus prepares the way and points towards the highest act of sacramentality, that is, of the transcendent God indwelling in a human.<sup>80</sup> This is the Incarnation of God in Christ. Temple puts it this way:

[T]he universe is the fundamental sacrament, and taken in its entirety (when of course it includes the Incarnation and Atonement) is the perfect sacrament extensively; but it only becomes this, so far as our world and human history are concerned, because

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<sup>73</sup> Craig gives a good overview of Temple’s idea of a sacramental universe. Craig, *Social Concern*, 59–64.

<sup>74</sup> Temple, *RSJG*, xx–xxi.

<sup>75</sup> Temple, *CV*, 4. Same point in Temple, *CTP*, 48–50.

<sup>76</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 474.

<sup>77</sup> Temple, *CTP*, 50.

<sup>78</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 479. Chapter XIX is on “The Sacramental Universe”.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 478. Similar quote in Temple, *RSJG*, xx; Temple, *CC*, 41.

<sup>80</sup> Craig, *Social Concern*, 63.

within it and determining its course is the Incarnation, which is the perfect sacrament intensively – the perfect expression in a moment of what is also perfectly expressed in everlasting Time, the Will of God.<sup>81</sup>

This is the essence of Temple's sacramental and incarnational theology.<sup>82</sup> What is pertinent to our study is the importance of the will. The quotation immediately above tells us that it is the Will of God that the universe and Incarnation sacramentally expresses. This is in line with what we saw in the previous chapter, that Temple understood God as Creative Will, or the Will that created and sustains the universe. The universe is a sacramental expression of God's Will, just as the "Incarnation ... [is] one expression of the Divine Will".<sup>83</sup> Hence, it comes as no surprise that the category of the will is central to Temple's Christology.

Temple was clear that we must understand the divinity of Christ "not in terms of substance but of Spirit – that is Will".<sup>84</sup> This is because both God and humans are understood in terms of the will. For example, Temple wrote that "God is spirit; and in spiritual beings there is nothing more substantial than Will ... His very substance is Will".<sup>85</sup> Likewise, he wrote about humans that "Will is the only Substance there is in a man".<sup>86</sup> Therefore, the coming together of God and Man in the person of Christ must be understood in terms of the will. Temple articulated this succinctly:

According to the traditional terminology there is in God one Nature and three Persons; as Will belongs to Nature and not to Person, there is in God only one Will. On the other

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<sup>81</sup> Temple, *CV*, 234.

<sup>82</sup> Paul Avis rightly argues that the sacramental principle of this period was built upon philosophical idealism that was infused with Plato and Hegel. Spirit was the ultimate reality of things, and the universe was a manifestation of it. Humans can perceive or have communion with this spiritual reality through reason because this reality is rational. Matter is therefore not inherently evil but can be a vehicle for spirit. Avis also alerts us to the fact that Anglican sacramental theology of this period was moderated by Kant's moral emphasis, T. H. Green's community focus, and Darwin's theory of evolution which led to a more realist nuance instead of an unbridled idealism. See Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church*, 310–312.

<sup>83</sup> The "Incarnation as one expression of the Divine Will". Temple, *MC*, 318.

<sup>84</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 247.

<sup>85</sup> William Temple, "The Philosophy of the Incarnation," in *Fellowship with God*, ed. William Temple (London: Macmillan, 1920), 220–221. Or again, that "Such a Being [i.e. God] must be conceived ... in terms of Will". Temple, *Universality of Christ*, 53. Though Temple also writes that the Incarnation reveals God as Father too. Temple, *CV*, 75–78.

<sup>86</sup> He continues that the Will "is not a part of him, it is just himself as a moral (or indeed "active") being". Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 247. Same idea in Temple, *CV*, 60–61. Smedes alerted us to a possible shift in Temple: in *MC*, He perceived persons as essentially consciousness. But from *Foundations* onwards, including *CV* and *NMG*, man is essentially based on the will. Smedes, *Incarnation*, 16.

hand there is in Jesus Christ one Person and two Natures; and as Will belongs to Nature and not to Person, there are in Jesus Christ two Wills, one divine and one human.<sup>87</sup>

The Incarnate Christ has a human will and a divine Will in one person/subject of the Christ. Or as Temple clearly stated, “the unity of God and Man in Christ is a unity of Will”.<sup>88</sup> The implicit question is how the two wills relate to one another. Temple defined the will as “the whole being of a person organised for action”.<sup>89</sup> Having two wills meant that Christ could possibly have acted upon either his human will or divine Will. But the fact that the person/subject was the Logos meant that He constantly acted on the divine Will. Temple wrote that in Christ “the whole being was always set to do God’s will. Though there was real struggle and real cost, there was no enemy of self-will within, and therefore no danger of defeat” because Christ was free from “the doubt and the impotence [that] comes from the presence of sin within the Will itself”.<sup>90</sup> Robert Craig took issue with Temple on this point. If there was no enemy within and no danger of defeat, then it is questionable whether Christ had any volition. If there was none, then it is dubious whether Temple’s Christ was truly and fully human. Craig pointed to biblical texts such as Hebrews which assert that Christ was in all points tempted like us yet without sin.<sup>91</sup> However, Craig does not seem to take the point that Temple did write of the real struggle and cost involved in Christ. There are also biblical texts such as Philippians or John that speak of Jesus’ complete obedience to the Father. Perhaps Craig was eager to uphold that Jesus was *posse non peccare* instead of the Augustinian *non posse peccare* which Temple both quoted and seemed to lean towards.<sup>92</sup> In truth, both are important to Christology. Viewed from His humanity then Christ must be able to not sin. But viewed from His divinity then Christ must not be able to sin.

Again, Craig missed an important and insightful analogy that Temple uses. Jesus was able to overcome temptation precisely the way every human does it – through the “constancy

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<sup>87</sup> Temple, *CV*, 62.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.

<sup>91</sup> Craig, *Social Concern*, 71–73.

<sup>92</sup> In fact, Temple writes in *NMG* that “*Posse non peccare* is in fact an attribute *peccaturus*; mere ability not to sin can only be predicated of one who does and will sin”. Temple, *NMG*, 242.

of the Will, which is the whole being of man organised for conduct”.<sup>93</sup> The strength of that constancy is shown in “splendid incapacities”, just like when it is said of a good man accused of a heinous crime that he could not have done it.<sup>94</sup> Christ was such a man. This analogy shows very well that Christ was *posse non peccare*. He could have sinned but overcame through His Will. The temptation was real just as the effort to overcome it was real.<sup>95</sup> The question Craig raised does put its finger on the question of original sin in Christ. The Western Church has generally held that Christ was not tainted by original sin. However, Eastern thinkers such as Gregory of Nazianzus averred that the unassumed is unhealed. Christ must have had original sin. More recently, T. F. Torrance and Karl Barth have taken up that line of argument with the slight modification that Christ’s human nature was fallen but not sinful. Such nuanced positions were not taken by either Craig or Temple. Temple was content to affirm the paradox by asserting that the Bible gives us two certainties. One, that Jesus had real struggles with temptation. But two, there was no anxiety that He would yield to them, thereby falling into sin and betraying His mission.<sup>96</sup> Put simply, Temple tried to hold the tension and reality of both the human will and divine Will in the person of Christ.

In fact, Temple was certainly committed to the reality of the human will in Christ. Because it is precisely the presence of the human will that enables Christ to have moral progress and growth. Without the human will, and thereby moral progress and growth, we would end up with Docetism. The reality of these also gave an alternative to kenoticism. Writes such as Charles Gore, Donald Mackinnon, and P. T. Forsyth developed the kenotic theory in response to the biblical datum of Jesus’ limited knowledge which seemed to contradict divine omniscience. Jesus must have self-emptied part of his divinity at the Incarnation, namely his omniscience.<sup>97</sup> Temple was ill at ease with this as we saw above. kenoticism need not be the only recourse for the biblical datum within his scheme of thought. Jesus’ limited knowledge could be understood as part of the reality of human growth and development in Christ because of his human will. Christ would experience growth like any other human being if the human will in Him was real.<sup>98</sup> The same can be said of the moral

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<sup>93</sup> Temple, *CV*, 147.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* Same idea in Temple, *NP*, 43–45.

<sup>95</sup> Temple, *CV*, 217.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.

<sup>97</sup> Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 30–43. See also Thomas A. Langford, *In Search of Foundations: English Theology 1900–1920* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1969), 202–216.

<sup>98</sup> Temple, *CV*, 141–147.

progress. As we have seen above, Jesus experienced the real struggle and cost of facing temptations precisely because the human will in Him was real. His moral progress through overcoming temptations was real.<sup>99</sup> This is why Temple contended that his theory had “no difficulty about the reality of growth or the reality of temptation in the Incarnate life”.<sup>100</sup>

Temple did make an important qualification. Moral progress, and perhaps moral growth by implication, cannot be predicated of the divine Will or of God the Son. It must be in Jesus Christ and in particular the human will. In fact, this qualification is how Temple differentiated between the Will of God (in a general sense) and the divine Will in Christ. In *CV*, Temple states that the “Will in Him, while always one with, because expressive of, the Will of God, is not merely identical with it”.<sup>101</sup> This is similar to what he wrote in *Foundations*:

Christ's Will, as a subjective function, is of course not the Father's Will; but the content of the Wills – the Purpose – is the same. Christ is not the Father; but Christ and the Father are One. What we see Christ doing and desiring, that we thereby know the Father does and desires. He is the Man whose will is united with God's ... But because He is this, He is the perfect expression of the Divine in terms of human life. There are not two Gods, but in Christ we see God. Christ is identically God; the whole content of His being – this thought, feeling, and purpose, is also that of God. This is the only “substance” of a spiritual being, for it is all there is of Him at all. Thus, in the language of logicians, formally (as pure subjects) God and Christ are distinct; materially (that is in the content of the two consciousnesses) God and Christ are One and the Same.<sup>102</sup>

Temple saw the similar of this with the expression “of one mind” or “of one will” when two different people have the same thought.<sup>103</sup> Knox was quick to critique Temple’s position in *Foundations*. He contends that Temple does not really imply two wills but only one will “viewed successively from two different standpoints”.<sup>104</sup> The distinction is merely between

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<sup>99</sup> Yet, this growth does not mean that Jesus was less than perfect at the previous stage of growth. In an Irenaean sense, Jesus was at each stage “the perfection of that stage of human life”. *Ibid.*, 147.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>102</sup> Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 248–249.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 248–250.

<sup>104</sup> Because a will without a concrete content can only exist in the realm of thought, Temple’s “distinction between the human will and divine Will in our Saviour is a distinction between the content and the form of a

that which is willed and that which wills; a distinction between content and form. Furthermore, it is two different propositions to be of the same mind as another and to be the same person as the other.<sup>105</sup> Richard Hoskins agreed with Knox on this point. He found Temple's more psychological approach less convincing than J. R. Illingworth's more personal approach. In his opinion, the latter took seriously the more personal nature of the human and divine nature.<sup>106</sup> Hoskins' evaluation of Temple's Christology is curious because, as we shall see, Temple's position is fundamentally built on the idea of the person, i.e., the person of Christ. John Christopher Stuart has since given a straightforward and cogent defence, albeit in a footnote. Both Knox and Hoskins seem to have overlooked the fact that both the 'subjective function' of the divine Will and the human will are "actualised in the divine purposive Will".<sup>107</sup> Temple does clearly imply two wills that are united and actualised in a shared purpose.<sup>108</sup>

To be fair, Knox was basing his critique of Temple on *Foundations* alone. He was referring to the opening lines of the extract above on the subjective function of Christ's Will. The semantics and the logic of the quotation could leave the door open as to whether and to what extent Christ's Will differs from the Father's Will. The analogy of being of one mind does not help Temple's case either. Perhaps this is why the wording in *CV* was more careful. Temple dropped the ideas of the subjective function of Christ's Will, content of the will, and formal or material distinction. More significant is the fact that he does not speak of the Father's Will. We reiterate that Temple wrote in *CV* that the "Will in Him, while always one with, because expressive of, the Will of God, is not merely identical with it".<sup>109</sup> The Father is dropped for the more general sense of the Will of God that all three members of the Trinity share in: one Will in Three Persons. The commonality drawn is no longer between Father and Son, but between the Will that is shared amongst the Trinity and Christ's Will. The context of this quotation is important. Temple was writing about the moral progress of Christ. As we have seen earlier, Temple had made it clear that moral progress was to be predicated of the human will of Christ. In other words, Christ's Will cannot be merely identical with the Will of God because

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single will, and is therefore a distinction only in thought". Ronald Arbuthnott Knox, *Some Loose Stones* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), 152.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>106</sup> Hoskins, *Doctrine of the Trinity*, 226–228.

<sup>107</sup> Stuart, *Rationale for the Incarnation*, 190.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> Temple, *CV*, 150.

of the presence of the human will. Christ's Will is one with and expresses the Will of God because of the presence of the divine Will, but it cannot be exactly the same because of the presence of the human will.

Evidently then, Hoskins had followed Knox's critique of *Foundations* without giving sufficient attention to *CV*. Stuart is thus right to conclude that Temple's Christology does indeed imply two wills. Temple does take seriously both the human will and divine Will. But we part ways with Stuart on his point that the two wills are actualised in the divine purpose Will. The term Divine Will or Purposive Will is one that Temple tended to use in reference to God, and especially in a natural theology sense:<sup>110</sup> a creative, rational, and purposive Will that created and sustains the universe, and is apprehensible by observing it. We contend that Temple's Christology actualises the human will and divine Will in the one Person of Jesus Christ through his use of personality.

Lewis B. Smedes offered an alternative and insightful reading of Temple. He proposed that a face-value reading of the quotation from *Foundations* might seem to suggest that the person of Christ as a pure subject is not divine. It is only the active willing of Christ that is divine because its content is the same as God's willing. This contradicts Temple's clear insistence that Jesus is truly divine and his assertion that activity and subject cannot be divorced. However, Smedes suggested a possible reason for this discrepancy that we find cogent: Temple may be attempting to defend against absolute idealism and its tendency to dissolve individuality. Smedes also noted what we have already highlighted. This distinction is only found in *Foundations* and is not repeated anywhere else in Temple's oeuvre. What is important to draw from this quotation is that the identity of God with the person of Christ is found in the identity of their Wills.<sup>111</sup> The divine Will in Christ is the Will of God. He shares in that Will because he is God the Son. But it must be nuanced that Christ's Will is not identical to the Will of God because of the presence of the human will.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> For example, "But our enquiry did not lead us to the bare assertion that the world owes its origin and continuous existence to the Divine Will, but also to the consequent conviction that all things are in their measure an expression of that Will which sustains but also moulds and guides all things, so that the unity of the world, its principle of rational coherence, is the Divine Personality in self-expression". Temple, *NMG*, 301–302. See also Temple, *MC*, 277; Temple, *CV*, 30, 154, 193, 195; Temple, *NMG*, 291, 307, 378.

<sup>111</sup> Smedes, *Incarnation*, 17.

<sup>112</sup> Temple, *CV*, 150.

## Personality: The One Person of the Logos

As we have seen so far, Temple was committed to a Christology based on the will. There was a human will and a divine Will in the person of Christ. The human will was real and important because moral progress and growth were predicated on it. Jesus must be truly and fully human. The divine Will in Christ is also real. It is not a semblance or imitation, but the very Will of God. This is how we can affirm that Christ is truly and fully divine. Our concern in this section is to understand how these two wills are actualised in the person of Christ. As we will see, Temple takes the position that the human will was subsumed within the divine Will. Significantly, this is actualised in the person of the Logos. The emphasis then is on the one person of Christ. Key to Temple's logic was his concept of personality. He wrote that until "Christianity itself had led to the formation of a tolerably adequate conception of Personality, it was inevitable that the problem should be set in terms of Substance of Nature".<sup>113</sup>

In order to understand Temple's concept of personality, we need to first understand the broader category of personal idealism on which it is premised. Personal idealism was an adaptation of Hegelian idealism that emphasised the value and status of the person.<sup>114</sup> Commenting on the personal idealism within Anglican theology of this period, Paul Avis explains that this is the view "that the universe is ultimately spiritual in nature, that history is the unfolding of a spiritual development, and that it is the category of the personal that is the key to this truth, for in human persons and their mutual relationships we see the most explicit manifestation of the infinite spirit".<sup>115</sup> Avis enumerates the works of Brooke Foss Westcott (*Christus Consummator*), Gore (*Lux Mundi, Belief in Christ, The Philosophy of the Good Life*), and Charles Raven (*Natural Religion and Christian Theology*) amongst Anglican theologians who espoused personal idealism.<sup>116</sup> One way in which personal idealism achieved this

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>114</sup> Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison is often referred to as the starting point for personal idealism during this period. British idealism bifurcates after him into the two camps of absolute idealism (such as F. H. Bradley and B. Bosanquet, whose works react to Pringle-Pattison) and personal idealism. Hastings Rashdall was prominent in applying personal idealism to theology. His essay "Personality: Human and Divine" in the volume *Personal Idealism* in 1902 was particularly influential. Others such as C. C. J. Webb, A. E. Taylor would follow suit. A more recent defence and espousal of personal idealism is found in Keith Ward. See Eugene Thomas Long, *Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion, 1900–2000* (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), chapter 4; John Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, Fourth ed. (London: SCM Press, 1988), chapter III; Keith Ward, *The Christian Idea of God: A Philosophical Foundation For Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

<sup>115</sup> Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church*, 317.

<sup>116</sup> Paul D. L. Avis, *The Identity of Anglicanism: Essentials of Anglican Ecclesiology* (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 174.

emphasis on the human person was through the concept of personality.<sup>117</sup> This was a concept that was made current by the British idealist Green, who ironically held to absolute idealism.<sup>118</sup> The general logic of personality as taken up by those who espoused personal idealism ran as such: human personality was the most unique and significant occurrence in the universe and therefore the hermeneutic to understanding it; but this in turn revealed the Divine as a divine personality, of which our human personality was an image.<sup>119</sup> This line of logic seemed appealing to British theologians then. They then adapted personal idealism and personality theologically to emphasise the human's place and significance in the world and God's relation to them.<sup>120</sup> It is likely that they did so to counter to the absolute idealism of thinkers such as Hegel and Green which absorbed the individual in the Absolute, or against a mechanistic evolutionary worldview that downplayed the significance of humans.<sup>121</sup> Personality thus quickly gained prominence in Anglican thought from the 1890s on.<sup>122</sup> With regard to Christology, different authors used personality in different ways and focused on different aspects.<sup>123</sup> For example, Illingworth on self-consciousness,<sup>124</sup> Moberly focused on relationships and participation,<sup>125</sup> Weston on self-consciousness and relationships,<sup>126</sup> and Sanday and H. M. Relton on psychology.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century*, 56.

<sup>118</sup> Against the mechanistic universe of Newton and an evolutionary worldview, Green argued that there must be an intellectual principle or eternal intelligence behind the universe. And if so, then it must find its end in personality. Green was influential during this period especially on the *Lux Mundi* group. Yet, they do not entirely take on Green's overly immanent approach. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883), 38–52. See also Smedes, *Incarnation*, xiii; Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 9–10; Nichols, *Panther*, 134–135.

<sup>119</sup> For example, Temple wrote that “while we know that Personality, as Man possesses it, must be inadequate to express the nature of the Supreme Principle [i.e. God], yet it is the most adequate term we have”. Temple, *NP*, xxix.

<sup>120</sup> Within theology, Pringle-Pattison brought prominence to personality by postulating that it was a fundamental aspect of divine nature. Influential figures such as Illingworth, Moberly, Sanday, and Webb would follow suit. See A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1887), 221–228. See also Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 9–10.

<sup>121</sup> David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, *British Idealism: A Guide For The Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2012), 43.

<sup>122</sup> Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 181–183.

<sup>123</sup> For a good overview see Smedes, *Incarnation*, chapter III. See also Langford, *In Search*, 187–193.

<sup>124</sup> J. R. Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine* (London: Macmillan, 1913), 22–26. Illingworth suggests that the human personality and divine personality came together in Christ.

<sup>125</sup> R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality* (London: John Murray, 1901), chapter III. Moberly attempted to re-think the atonement not as retributive punishment but Christ the perfect suffering penitent whose personality influences ours.

<sup>126</sup> Weston, *The One Christ*, 179–180.

<sup>127</sup> William Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 159; H. M. Relton, *A Study in Christology: The Problem of the Relation of the Two Natures in the Person of Christ* (London: SPCK, 1917).

Temple was influenced by many of these thinkers and came to espouse personal idealism and personality too.<sup>128</sup> Authors such as Edward Loane and Alister E. McGrath have identified Temple as a personal idealist, while others such as W. R. Matthews, Jack Francis Padgett, Joseph Fletcher, and Mark Chapman alert us to the importance of personality in Temple's thoughts.<sup>129</sup> Padgett goes the furthest in asserting that personality was the central concept to Temple's Christian philosophy.<sup>130</sup> We agreed with current scholarship that Temple was a personal idealist who espoused personality to give value and status to the human person. However, we suggest that many, if not all, of these authors missed Temple's distinctive contribution in this area. His use of personality was focused on the will. This was due in part to his view of the world. In a view akin to the organism of Whitehead, Temple understood the world as existing in various grades or scales. One such scale is inorganic matter → organic matter → vegetable life → animal life → person (or personality). Personality is the defined characteristic of persons and what marks them off from animals and vegetables. Inorganic matter, organic matter, and vegetables have no reactions at all. Animals do have reactions, but they seem to be dominated by their impulses for food, objects, etc. It is only humans who can combine these impulses with intellect and imagination to form a will. Yet, a will is indicative of personality. Thus, personality can only be observed with persons.<sup>131</sup> It is their defining characteristic.<sup>132</sup> Or to put it in theological language, Temple understands the doctrine of Imago Dei in terms of personality. Human personality is the image of God as Divine Personality. While Temple did understand God as Divine or Creative Will, he also writes:

But our enquiry did not lead us to the bare assertion that the world owes its origin and continuous existence to the Divine Will, but also to the consequent conviction that all things are in their measure an expression of that Will which sustains but also moulds

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<sup>128</sup> See for example Temple, *NP*; Temple, *CTP*, chapter II "Personality in Theology and Ethics".

<sup>129</sup> Loane, *Temple & Church Unity*, 29; McGrath, "Temple, William," 216; W. R. Matthews, *William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation* (London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1946), 15; Padgett, *Christian Philosophy of Temple*, 2; Fletcher, *William Temple*, 49; Chapman, "Evolution of Anglican Theology," 38.

<sup>130</sup> Padgett, *Christian Philosophy of Temple*, 2. Part II offers a good analysis of the concept of personality in Temple's thoughts.

<sup>131</sup> Temple, *NP*, 23.

<sup>132</sup> Temple reached the same conclusion but from a different scale of Thing → Brute → Person. Temple, *CV*, 50–61, 173–174.

and guides all things, so that the unity of the world, its principle of rational coherence, is the Divine Personality in self-expression.<sup>133</sup>

God is Divine Personality and human personality is analogous to or an image of that. For example, Temple writes in *CASO* that human “personality [is] the quality of one made in the image of God”.<sup>134</sup> Or again elsewhere that “personality in men is *derivative*, not original, and only deserves the recognition claimed for it so far as it recognises itself as dependent on the Personality of God”.<sup>135</sup>

While persons might have some image or semblance of personality, it is the goal or telos of humans to achieve the “inner unity of complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity”.<sup>136</sup> This will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter. What we are concerned with for now is that first half of an inner unity of complete personality. Temple explicated this in numerous places such as this:

Will, then, as the agent in truly moral action is the whole organised nature of the person concerned; it is his personality as a whole; and so far is it from being an initial endowment of our nature, that the main function of education is to fashion it – a process which is only complete when the entire personality is fully integrated in a harmony of all its constituent elements.<sup>137</sup>

The will is thus a subset of personality, albeit the fundamental part of personality. Personality is based on the will. An inner unity of completed personality is when we have successfully integrated and harmonised all our impulses, desires, and reason under our will. We are not compelled by any external or internal compulsions other than our own will. Social factors do not compel us, and our education has done its job of consolidating and fostering a will. In this

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<sup>133</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 301–302.

<sup>134</sup> William Temple, *Christianity and Social Order* (London: Penguin, 1942), 44.

<sup>135</sup> Emphasise mine. Temple, *ECP*, 80.

<sup>136</sup> Temple, *CV*, 158. Also in 174–175, 186, and 211. This was also the goal of a good Christian society, the “fullest possible development of individual personality in the widest and deepest possible fellowship”. Temple, *CASO*, 74; Or again as late as 1944, “We may take as our slogan, if you like: “Fulness of Personality in the widest possible Fellowship”. William Temple, *The Church Looks Forward* (London: Macmillan, 1944), 108.

<sup>137</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 234. See also Temple, *CV*, 61.

ideal state the will and personality are synonymous.<sup>138</sup> As Temple puts it, the will “is the name for our personality so far as that is integrated”.<sup>139</sup>

In a broader sense, Temple’s focus on the will in his theology suggests the influence of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, to whom the importance of the will in modern British theology can be traced. He takes a place in British theology similar to that of Immanuel Kant in Germany. In fact, it was Coleridge who introduced many of Kant’s idea in Britain.<sup>140</sup> Kant, as we saw in the previous chapter, was one of the most important thinkers on the will during this period. Coleridge, who was influenced by Kant, also promoted the will as central to human nature. He writes in *Aids to Reflection* that “[i]f there be aught Spiritual in Man, the Will must be such. If there be a Will, there must be a Spirituality in Man”.<sup>141</sup> Coleridge therefore understood the work of Christ as regenerating and renewing our will.<sup>142</sup> Admittedly, Temple does not reference Coleridge when discussing the human will.<sup>143</sup> However, we could posit the influence of Coleridge given the similarity of language and ideas. That being the case, it is Josiah Royce who is the more immediate and verifiable influence on Temple on the will. Temple writes in a letter to Knox defending his Christology in *Foundations* that “my interpretation of Subject as primarily Will is, historically, due to Royce”.<sup>144</sup> Royce had argued in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* that if a person is to lead a moral life, their actions must express their will. However, we are often confronted with moral conflict, or the difficulty of choosing between two seemingly good or bad options. This is really a clash in the will of two rival inclinations. Yet, this reveals a commitment within humans to harmony. In a section discussing the human will, Royce writes that “[a]bsolute ethical skepticism . . . presupposes an end, namely, the effort to harmonise in one moment all the conflicting aims in the world”.<sup>145</sup> Thus, the human will seeks to work out dissonances and integrate them into a

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<sup>138</sup> Temple, *CV*, 150.

<sup>139</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 235.

<sup>140</sup> Robert S. Franks, *The Work of Christ* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1962), 649.

<sup>141</sup> Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Volume 9: Aids to Reflection*, ed. John B. Beer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 135.

<sup>142</sup> Franks, *The Work of Christ*, 654.

<sup>143</sup> He does reference Coleridge on other topics such as beauty or God’s omnipresence. See Temple, *MC*, 69, 115, 127, 161; *CV*, 276,278; *NMG*, 115, 156, 228, 244.

<sup>144</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 164. Temple would later acknowledge Royce as important in the formation of his general outlook in life. Temple, “Theology To-Day,” 328.

<sup>145</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1885), 138. Royce would go on in *The Philosophy of Loyalty* to argued for the voluntary devotion to one’s social community. In doing so, he replaces Kant’s rational will with the loyal will. See Mander, *Idealist Ethics*, 147–151.

harmony. This bears much similarity to Temple's idea of personality that seeks the integration of all our desires and impulses under our will.

Given such an understanding, the human will and divine Will cannot merely exist side by side in Christ. There cannot be a Nestorian dualism of two opposing wills seeking to act in two different ways. It would be an anomaly going by Temple's concept of personality because of the impulse to be integrated all under one will. This is the implicit logic in *CV*. The telos of a completed personality meant that Christ's Personality or Person would be integrated under one will, that is the divine Will.<sup>146</sup> Hence, Temple wrote that the human will in Christ approximates towards the Will of God (or the divine Will) with every struggle and temptation. It submits to the divine Will, thus forging an ever-deepening union with it through every victory over temptation. The culmination of this is at the Passion where there is perfection submission to the Will of God, or the "perfect sacrifice of perfect love".<sup>147</sup> This is what Jesus meant when he prayed to be glorified with the eternal glory of God in John 17:5.<sup>148</sup> The human will was thus made one with the divine Will. He was able to account for this with an idea that is somewhat novel and unique during this period. The human will was *subsumed* within the divine Will. In a key passage in *CV*, Temple explicitly stated that the human personality "does not exist side by side with the divine personality; it is subsumed in it".<sup>149</sup> We recall here that will and personality in the ideal state are synonymous. In fact, Temple averred within that same key passage that "Will and personality are ideally interchangeable terms".<sup>150</sup> There are two wills in Christ, but the human will was subsumed within the divine Will. This is why Temple wrote that "the unity of God and Man in Christ is a unity of Will".<sup>151</sup>

But Temple was immediately cautious at this point. His cautiousness was due to the fact that the ordinary human's experience of the will is vastly different from Christ's experience of it. We do not experience that unity or oneness of the will. Our desires, impulses,

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<sup>146</sup> In a similar way, God was the "perfection of Personality, which would be completely self-determining, completely 'good' as wholly realising the absolute values, and completely unified inwardly and outwardly". Temple, *CV*, 173.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.* Or again, "the human personality of Jesus Christ is subsumed in the Divine Person of the Creative Word". *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

and reasoning are not organised or harmonised under our will.<sup>152</sup> The idea of a God–man unity of the will in Christ is therefore misleading and easily misunderstood. Temple thus nuanced that it is better to say that “in Christ God and Man are *personally* one; the Person of the Man Christ Jesus is God the Son ... [and] By Person we do not understand an ultimate point of reference, but the entirety of the spiritual being. As Person Jesus is both Man and God”.<sup>153</sup> The human will in Christ was subsumed within the divine Will, but this is finally resolved and actualised in the person of the Logos. Temple reaffirms this position again later in CV. He writes of the Divine Word “so completely subsuming the human personality that God and Man in Jesus Christ are one Person”.<sup>154</sup> Temple ultimately resolved his Christology with the reality of the person: two wills in one person. This should come as no surprise to us. In the first place, Temple defined the will as “the whole being of a *person* organised for action”.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, personal idealism and the category of personality placed importance on the person. Hence for Temple, there is “only one Person, one living and energising Being” because the “the human personality of Jesus Christ is subsumed in the Divine Person of the Creative Word”.<sup>156</sup>

Temple’s will-based Christology thus takes shape. There are two wills in Christ – a human will and a divine Will. However, the human will was subsumed within the divine Will, and this is actualised in the person of the Logos.<sup>157</sup> These ideas were hazy in *Foundations* but clearly articulated in CV; the ideas of subsuming and the resolving within the person of Christ were wholly new. Interestingly, Temple’s position is essentially the dyothelite position that is in keeping with the resolutions from the Council of Constantinople in 680/1. Cyril Hovorun noted that dyothelites generally believed that even though Christ had two wills, His human will was not in conflict with his divine Will because it was wholly submitted to and in full accordance with the divine Will.<sup>158</sup> Likewise, the encyclical by Pope Leo II that followed the Council at Constantinople wrote that there are “equally two natural volitions or wills in him and two natural principles of action which undergo no division, no change, no partition, no

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<sup>152</sup> Same point in *ibid.*, 61. “Will is so much of a Personality as is consciously co-ordinated for action – the co-ordination being effected by selective attention and the pressure of environment; it can be, though it seldom is, the whole of conscious Personality ... [thus] Personality is always more than Will”.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, 218

<sup>155</sup> Emphasis mine. Temple, CV, 149.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 150–151.

<sup>157</sup> Smedes arrived at a similar interpretation of Temple’s Christology. Smedes, *Incarnation*, 19–20.

<sup>158</sup> Hovorun, *Will, Action and Freedom*, 126–127.

confusion ... And the two natural wills are not in opposition ... but his human will following, and not resisting or struggling, rather in fact subject to his divine and all-powerful will".<sup>159</sup> Temple's position finds historical precedence in the orthodox declaration of Constantinople.

Thus, Temple identified his position with that of Leontius of Byzantium and his doctrine of enhypostasis, but with terms slightly adjusted to modern use.<sup>160</sup> The use of Leontius was new, though brief, in *CV*. It is likely that Temple drew on Relton's work. In a brief discussion on Leontius in *CV*, Temple footnoted Relton as an "extremely valuable contribution to the subject" of Leontius and his doctrine of enhypostasis.<sup>161</sup> Furthermore, Cross alerted us to the fact that Relton was the one who brought prominence to Leontius of Byzantium and his doctrine of enhypostasis during Temple's period.<sup>162</sup> Relton argued that it is through the doctrine of enhypostasis that Leontius secures for the person of Christ a hypostasis and prevents that personhood from getting truncated in an Apollinarian sense. Christ becomes hypostatic in the person of the Logos and receives its subsistence from Him.<sup>163</sup> For Leontius, the personhood of Christ was important. This dovetails with more recent work on Leontius by David Beecher Evans and John J. Lynch. Evans believed that Leontius tried to harmonise the conflicting Christologies of the dyophysites and the monophysites through the Origenist Chalcedonianism of Evagrius of Pontus.<sup>164</sup> Jesus is not the Word that became flesh. Rather, in Christ the Word and flesh are each united to a single unfallen pre-existent nous.<sup>165</sup> Both natures are enhypostasised.<sup>166</sup> The important point here is that the one hypostasis of Christ is a real being. It is not a nous but the Logos himself.<sup>167</sup> Lynch agreed and converged with Evans on this important point. While Lynch casts doubt on Evan's Origenist hypothesis, he agrees with Evans that for Leontius the hypostasis of Christ is a real being.<sup>168</sup> Thus, Relton,

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<sup>159</sup> Norman P. Tanner, ed. *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, vol. 1: Nicaea I to Lateran V (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 128.

<sup>160</sup> Temple, *CV*, 137, 149.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>162</sup> Cross, "Christology of Weston," 87.

<sup>163</sup> Relton, *A Study in Christology*, 90.

<sup>164</sup> David Beecher Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology* (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1970), 184–185.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>166</sup> "In Jesus Christ, God and flesh are united not *to one another*, but each to the *nous* Jesus Christ, and only *in him* to one another. Jesus is just as much God as man, but no more; just as much man as God, but no more. God and man are *components* of Jesus Christ, and *as such*, equals. Leontius cannot say that Jesus Christ *is* God, for he believes that both natures of Christ are enhypostasized". *Ibid.*, 138.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 185.

<sup>168</sup> John J. Lynch, "Leontius of Byzantium: A Cyrillian Christology," *Theological studies (Baltimore)*, vol.36, no.3 (1975): 471. Lynch argued that being familiar with Origen's work does not mean that Leontius took Origen's

Evans and Lynch agree on the importance of the unique hypostasis of Christ in Leontius' thought. Lynch articulates this the best when he stressed that in "modern terminology, Christ, for Leontius, is one person".<sup>169</sup>

It is here that we find correspondence between Leontius and Temple. It is likely that Temple took the simplest interpretation from the doctrine of enhypostasis. The human nature of Christ was enhypostasised into the divine nature without losing its identity. The resultant hypostasis is singularly the person of Christ. This bears much resemblance to Temple's own position of a subsumed human will within the divine Will that is actualised in the Person of Christ. The shared emphasis is the fact that Christ is one person. This is an unmistakable point for Temple especially in *CV*. Temple averred that "in Christ God and Man are *personally* one; the Person of the Man Christ Jesus is God the Son ... As Person Jesus is both Man and God".<sup>170</sup> Or again, that there is only "one Person, one living and energising Being" that is the "Divine Person of the Creative Word".<sup>171</sup> Leontius' enhypostasis gave the historical precedence for Temple's final emphasis on the person of Christ that made sense to him because of personal idealism, personality, and the will. This is not unexpected within Temple's larger scheme of thought. For him, "God is personal"<sup>172</sup> and that which is "personal can only be expressed in a person".<sup>173</sup>

This is not a moot point. It is important for Temple's idea of revelation. He argued that the purpose of the Incarnation is twofold – atonement and revelation.<sup>174</sup> The Incarnation is a revelation of God to humans precisely because it is given in a person and therefore intelligible. It is understandable in human terms. The fuller context of the quotation above reads that the Incarnation "is the only way in which divine truth can be expressed, not because of our infirmity, but because of its own nature. What is personal can only be expressed in a person".<sup>175</sup> Or again in *NMG* Temple stated that "for fullness of Revelation the occurrence

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ultimate position. Moreover, there is much evidence from Leontius' extant writings to show that he does not follow Evagrius' particular reading of Origen. Lynch concluded that Leontius cannot be an Origenist. If anything, he seemed to be on the side of Cyril and Ephesus that the Word took on humanity, and with Chalcedon orthodoxy that Christ had two natures. *Ibid.*, 464, 470, 471.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, 471.

<sup>170</sup> Temple, *CV*, 149. Italics in original.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, 150–151.

<sup>172</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 354. Or again, "in all positive content of the term 'personal' it must be personal; it must be the living God". *Ibid.*, 480.

<sup>173</sup> Temple, *RSJG*, 231.

<sup>174</sup> Temple, *CV*, 140.

<sup>175</sup> Temple, *RSJG*, 231.

should take the form of personal life of such sort as to be intelligible to ... those persons to whom the revelation is given; it must be no mere theophany, but an Incarnation".<sup>176</sup> In other words, God must come as a person for the fullest revelation possible. It is the communication of God to humans in comprehensible terms to us. This is not only natural but to be expected. To be more specific, it is because of the human will in Christ that this is possible. Temple contended that it is "only because there is this real human will or personality that there is here any revelation to humanity of the divine Will".<sup>177</sup> The revelation of God in Christ is made possible and intelligible to humans because of the human will in Christ. Michael Ramsey observed that this is a characteristic teaching of Temple that "God is personal, and he can make himself fully known to humanity only through a person in relationship to other persons".<sup>178</sup> This is what Ramsey called personal or relational revelation as opposed to propositional revelation.<sup>179</sup> Temple insisted that revelation cannot take place purely through propositions. Instead, there must be an event, but also a mind or person to interpret what happened.<sup>180</sup> If this is the case, then the revelation must be intelligible to humans. In Temple's mind, the greatest revelation must therefore be God in a person. A personal God can only reveal Himself to human persons through what is personal. Fletcher is right to say that for Temple "Christian revelation is a disclosure of a Person [i.e., God] through a Person [i.e., Christ] to a person".<sup>181</sup>

Given this detailed discussion of Temple's Christology, Cross' earlier critique of Temple is no longer cogent. There is no Nestorian duality. Temple's Christology is not the dynamic uniting of human nature to the Logos in the purpose and content of willing.<sup>182</sup> The human nature was subsumed within the divine nature, but importantly, both are realised within the person of Christ. Temple ultimately resolves the Christological dilemma within the person of Christ. This is of course predicated on his understanding of persons or personality. In fact, Cross had quoted John Martin Creed in support of her point. But Creed does not actually accuse Temple of a Nestorian duality. Creed acknowledges that Temple affirmed that the

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<sup>176</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 322.

<sup>177</sup> Temple, *CV*, 150.

<sup>178</sup> Michael Ramsey, *The Anglican Spirit*, ed. Dale D. Coleman (New York: Seabury Classics, 2004), 84.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 84–85.

<sup>180</sup> William Temple, "By the Most Rev. William Temple," in *Revelation*, ed. John Baillie and Hugh Martin (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 106–108.

<sup>181</sup> Fletcher, *William Temple*, 51.

<sup>182</sup> Cross, "Christology of Weston," 77.

subject of the human experience in Christ was the Logos (or the Eternal Son) who is also given eternal comprehension of the universe. But Creed points out that this is a paradox. How can the Logos simultaneously have human limitations and yet continuously sustain the universe as the Logos? Certainly then, some measure of kenoticism is indispensable.<sup>183</sup> If anything, Creed offered a simple but good critique. There is scant evidence that Jesus thought of himself as the sustainer of the universe.<sup>184</sup> Most of it is built on Logos theology. More recently, Katherine Sonderegger has strongly criticised Temple: while Creed questioned whether Temple could escape at least an implicit use of kenoticism, Sonderegger outrightly called Temple a “hyperkenoticist”.<sup>185</sup> She argued that Temple’s hypostatic union did not require the emptying of divine omnipotence. Instead, Temple took the kenoticists’ moral aim of Christ being brought low to die directly into the Godhead.<sup>186</sup> I must confess that I do not entirely understand her point. But based on what she wrote, one wonders whether “hypokenoticist” might be a better term precisely because Temple does not cede divine omnipotence nor the creative sustaining power of the Logos. As we have seen, nowhere does Temple use or imply kenoticism. In fact, he explicitly stated in his reply to Pringle-Pattison in *NMG* that “[i]n fact my view, set out at length *in CV*, is that there is no Kenosis at all”.<sup>187</sup> In any case, both views misunderstand Temple’s Christology. The conundrum presented is based on a more Antiochene thought where one must work out how the two natures/wills coordinate. But Temple came from a more Alexandrian mode where the Logos is the only subject.

While Cross’ and Sonderegger’s points do not hold water, two critiques of Temple might be made. The first has to do with personality. John Macquarrie questions whether personal idealism makes too big an assumption about personality in relation to God. It need not follow that God must be or have personality just because personality is the highest category known to us. God as wholly other need not correspond to it. God could very well transcend personality in the way that humans transcend animals.<sup>188</sup> Suggate also makes this

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<sup>183</sup> John Martin Creed, "Recent Tendencies in English Christology," in *Mysterium Christi: Christological Studies by British and German Theologians*, ed. G. K. A. Bell and Adolf Deissmann (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), 134–136.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>185</sup> Katherine Sonderegger, *Systematic Theology: The Doctrine of God, Volume 1* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015), 157, 159.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

<sup>187</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 326. Temple goes on to say that “The Second Person of the Trinity laid aside nothing, but added to His divine attributes the experience of a strictly human life”. *Ibid.*

<sup>188</sup> Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century*, 57.

critique although perhaps unwittingly. He notes that Temple's metaphysical arguments and dialectical realism is largely based on "personal experience".<sup>189</sup> It is probably in this light that Smedes categorised Temple's Christology as being anthropocentric.<sup>190</sup> It takes human experience and extrapolates it to God. The chink in Temple's will-based Christology in this regard is the point that the will (or personality) seeks the harmonisation and organisation of a person under one will. This was the implicit point that allowed for the subsuming of the human will in the divine Will. One might query whether that reads our human experience into Christ. In Temple's defence, any explication of how the two wills or natures in Christ interact in the first place is hypothesis at best. Temple did not see his as the final nor definitive Christology, but just a way of understanding Christ that made sense to him.<sup>191</sup>

A second critique could be made precisely on the interaction of the two wills in Christ. Temple wrote that the convergence of two wills in Christ on the Cross showed Jesus' perfect submission. It was the "perfect sacrifice of perfect love".<sup>192</sup> But at this point, Temple recurses to the Johannine theme of glory. Citing John 17:5, Temple thought that through the Passion of Christ and at that moment of perfect sacrifice "He prays to be glorified with the eternal glory".<sup>193</sup> This is similar to an earlier passage when he wrote that as we watch Jesus' "Life and, above all, that Death, we say, 'We behold His Glory'".<sup>194</sup> While that is well and biblical, perhaps more space could have been given to reflect on the interaction between Christ's human will and divine Will on the Cross. Temple could have pushed a little more to postulate insights to interesting questions. For example, he could have reflected on how the divine Will reacted to the agony of the Cross. Or perhaps Temple could have foreshadowed Jürgen Moltmann in suggesting that God suffered through Christ's suffering in His Will. Important theories could have also been postulated with regard to our human experience. He could have given a tentative view on how the human will reacted or overcame the Cross. That could yield insights as to whether we, in our limited wills, could follow Christ's example.

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<sup>189</sup> Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 48.

<sup>190</sup> Smedes, *Incarnation*, 15–22.

<sup>191</sup> Temple, *CV*, 121.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

## Conclusion

Our discussion has shown that the will was central in Temple's Christology. It was his preferred category of thought over and against the language of *ousia* and substance metaphysics. Temple affirmed that Christ had two wills, a human will and a divine Will, and was committed to the reality of both wills in Christ. It is because of the presence of the human will that we can uphold Jesus' humanity, such as his growth and moral progress. At the same time, it is because of the divine Will, or the Will of God, that we can affirm Jesus' divinity. However, these two wills do not exist side-by-side in Christ; this would fall into Nestorianism. Rather, the human will was subsumed within the divine Will and finds resolution in the person of the Logos. This was a novel contribution by Temple based on his concept of personality. Human personality seeks the integration and harmonisation of all a person's thoughts, and impulse under one will. In other words, a person can only have one will. Relating this back to Christology, Christ could only have one will (i.e., the divine Will) because there is only one Person, that is, the Logos. It is interesting to note that this was in essence the dyothelite position and the resolution of the Council of Constantinople even though Temple did not seem to be aware of it. As a whole, Temple's will-based Christology offers a more dynamic picture of the divine union than one understood in terms of substance or *ousia*.

## Chapter Three

### Theological Anthropology: The Willing Person

#### Introduction

We shall now explore Temple's theological anthropology, where the category of the will features prominently again. Temple disagreed with certain strands of thought that conceived the human person as being composed of different faculties. One such strand traces its roots back to Greco-Roman philosophy. Seminal thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine of Hippo all thought of the human person as constituting three distinct components of feelings, intellect, and will.<sup>1</sup> Another strand would be modern philosophy. There was a tendency to think of some element of personality as not being part of nature, and thus standing outside the evolutionary process. Immanuel Kant, in particular, had been influential in his distinction between the noumenal self and empirical self, thus giving a double aspect of personality.<sup>2</sup> The result of such strands of thought was a fissiparous approach to the ontology. Humans were construed as being an amalgamation of distinct faculties. Temple disagreed with this. He averred that a human person is in principle unified by their will.

This chapter will explore what exactly that means. We will study five different facets of Temple's theological anthropology. Firstly, we will see how Temple disagreed with mechanistic determination: thinking, rather, that humans are determined by their pursuit of value or good. Secondly, we will explore Temple's understanding of the human person. For him, a human being is self-conscious, self-determining, and in the process of complete unification or integration based on their will. Thirdly, we survey how the human will is formed by their initial endowment, education, the imagination, and social environment. Fourthly, we will seek to understand the ideal state of the human person. Temple avers this state to be the inner unity of a completed personality along with the outer unity of a perfected fellowship. However, this ideal is ultimately unattainable because of sin. This brings us to our final area of discussion that pertains to the work of Christ. Through His love and sacrifice, Christ

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 63-64.

<sup>2</sup> W. R. Matthews, "William Temple as Thinker," in *William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation* (London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1946), 19.

introduces a new influence amongst humanity that appeals to their sympathy. Humans respond to Christ in an answering love that draws them out of their self-will to align their will with Christ's Will such that their human will now corresponds to Christ's Will. Furthermore, the work of Christ restores both the fellowship between God and humans, and the fellowship amongst humans.

### **The Deterministic Fallacy**

Temple did not agree with determinism, specifically, mechanical determinism. He was unequivocal about this. He writes in *CV* that "Determinism is sheer nonsense",<sup>3</sup> and in *NMG* that "[s]tark Determinism is stark nonsense".<sup>4</sup> Temple understood determinism to be the principle that "everything is constituted by its relation to other things".<sup>5</sup> A fallacy was straightaway apparent for him. If every event is determined by other events, then the entire process of mutual determination cannot begin.<sup>6</sup> There is no first cause. Applying this to the human person, Temple affirmed that humans are relational, yet humans cannot be constituted only by their external relations. That would render nugatory the volitional element in humans. A consequence of this would be the loss of moral and legal responsibility. A person would not morally accountable if a given act of his was not his choice.<sup>7</sup> Instead of this, Temple argued that every entity or object has something unique in it that it brings as its "underived contribution to the sum of things".<sup>8</sup> It is this unique distinctiveness that is the core of every object. For humans, this unique and distinct core is called individuality. It is the reality that a person is uniquely who they are and not another. It affirms that their volition is genuine, and that they are not merely reacting involuntarily to external forces.<sup>9</sup> This is why Temple writes in *MC* that "the individual cannot be dissolved into relations".<sup>10</sup> While a person's relations, both internal and external, go some way in forming them, those relations do not determine them completely. They remain an individual who can react to these relations and

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<sup>3</sup> Temple, *CV*, 56. Same point in William Temple, *The Church and Its Teaching Today* (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 8–9.

<sup>4</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 227.

<sup>5</sup> Temple, *MC*, 69. See also Temple, *CV*, 56; Temple, *NMG*, 266.

<sup>6</sup> Temple, *MC*, 68–69; Temple, *CV*, 56; Temple, *NMG*, 227.

<sup>7</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 238.

<sup>8</sup> Temple, *CV*, 56.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>10</sup> Temple, *MC*, 76. Chapter is on "Relativity and Individuality".

influences to decide accordingly. Or to put it differently, it is from decisions or functions that we can observe individuality. Thus, Temple states that “[i]ndividuality ... is determined by function”.<sup>11</sup> A person’s function, decisions, and reactions are not mechanistic or determined. They are the expression of their true volition. We might say that Temple’s key point in these discussions was to preserve individuality and volition. Every human person is a unique individual who has the power to truly decide and act for themselves. This sets the foundation for his emphasis on the will in the human person.

Temple is clearly against determinism. But ironically, he does not seem to escape at least an implicit use of determinism. Humans seem to be determined by God’s Will and by good or value. Temple writes in *NMG* that “the Divine Will is the source of world order, and also the determinant for every finite mind of its special place within that order and of the appropriate contribution of each such mind to the life of the whole”.<sup>12</sup> This comes back to a point made in chapter one on Temple’s doctrine of God. We saw that God is the Creative or Divine Will that is the fundamental governing source of the world. A way in which the Creative Will is expressed is through human beings. Humans are the only creatures in the universe that are capable of expressing the Creative Will.<sup>13</sup> God’s Will is thus effected through the many individual wills of humans. Hence, there is a sense in which humans are determined by God’s Will. But as we have seen in that chapter, this determinism is qualified by the affirmation of genuine human volition. Humans can truly will and choose according to their own determinations. They might choose to follow God’s Will, or to go against it and follow their own wills. The Creative Will can be frustrated or thwarted in this way.<sup>14</sup> Humans are determined by God but only to a certain extent. This brings us to a second and more important form of determinism. Humans are determined by good or value. Temple states that “[f]reedom is not absence of determination; it is spiritual determination, as distinct from mechanical or even organic, determination. It is determination by what seems good as contrasted with determination by irresistible compulsion”.<sup>15</sup> Humans are clearly determined

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

<sup>12</sup> Temple, *NMG*, xxviii.

<sup>13</sup> Temple, *CV*, 50.

<sup>14</sup> As we have seen in chapter one, this is because God’s Will works by means of influence. This is similar to an important idea that is part of Temple’s understanding of the atonement – sympathy. We will explore this later in this chapter.

<sup>15</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 229.

by value or good. They are driven and purposive towards it. Their will, and therefore their actions, are directed to its attainment.

In fact, their ability to resist God's Will is linked to their pursuit of good. This brings us back to Temple's idea of the apparent good discussed in chapter one. Humans can apprehend value or good but they misapprehend it self-centredly because of sin and end up pursuing what seems good to them, or the apparent good. This apparent good could be what is truly good, but it could also be that which is inferior or bad. But because it seems good to them, humans nevertheless end up pursuing the apparent good. There is thus a sense in which the determination in humans is "determination not by any impulsion of force but by the attraction of, and responsiveness to, apparent good".<sup>16</sup> So, while humans should pursue and obey God's Will because it is truly good, they can choose to pursue their own lesser apparent good. What is important to note is the fact that humans are determined by good. Their intrinsic desire is to pursue it even if it takes the form of the apparent good. Therefore, Temple does not escape determinism even though he was clearly against it.

This section has shown that Temple was against stark mechanical determinism. Common sense refutes it: if everything is determined by its external relations, then the whole process of determination cannot begin. Rather, every human has a unique core that is their individuality. It is through this individuality that each person can react volitionally. That being the case, Temple seems to imply a certain degree of determinism within his thought. Humans seemed to be determined by God to a certain extent, and by the pursuit of Good to a larger degree. It might be the case that Temple was against a purely arbitrary free will in humans. The human will is free, but it is drawn by Good and by God's Will in the world. The similarity to Kant is not lost on us. The Kantian autonomous human being and their autonomous will are free, yet that freedom is determined and drawn by goodness or morality.<sup>17</sup> Like Kant, Temple holds that tension between determinism and free will through the qualified pursuit of good.

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 478.

<sup>17</sup> Temple's thoughts on the Kantian moral agent is found in *NMG*, 173–178.

## The Human Person

This section explores Temple's understanding of the human person where the human will is central. Temple's definition of the human person is by no means uniform across his oeuvre. However, his central point is largely the same while the emphasis and inflections shift based on context. The definition that enables the best exploration is found in *CV*. Temple defines a person as "a self-conscious and self-determining system of experience", and that human person is "in process of achieving the complete unification of the experience which constitutes them".<sup>18</sup> Many of his key ideas about the human person are found in this definition – self-conscious, self-determining, and a process of complete unification.

The first assertion Temple makes is that a person is self-conscious. Humans are sentient beings who are future-orientated and purposive towards value. In being purposive, the human will is invoked because the will is the ability to fix one's attention on an object. Temple arrives at this understanding through his scale of being, which is similar to the organism of Alfred North Whitehead. The scale falls broadly into Thing → Brute → Person. But as we have seen in the chapter on Christology, Temple's explanation tends to greater detail: inorganic matter → organic matter → vegetable life → animal life → person.<sup>19</sup> It is only with animals that we observe sentience or consciousness. Animals are capable of self-motion and reaction, and more importantly, a sense of individuality. Two dogs of the same breed can have different temperaments and reactions: they are clearly two different beings. Consciousness is thus the awareness of one's surroundings and the awareness of individuality. A being (animal or person) is uniquely who they are and not another. What separates humans from animals is their ability to apprehend time, especially the future.<sup>20</sup> Animals only live in the present. Their impulses are directed by immediate desire and needs, such as food or water. However, it is a uniquely human characteristic to be able to consider the past, present, and future. The human mind is able to consider time as one undivided stretch.<sup>21</sup> This allows them to compare their current state with other possibilities, chiefly in

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<sup>18</sup> Temple, *CV*, 68. He also defines a person as "a self-organising system of impulses, instincts, sentiments, emotions, ideas, and all the rest which psychological analysis may set out. The initial unity of all this phantasmagoria is the physiological organism". Temple, *NMG*, 231. He goes on to say that "a human personality is a self-determining self-integrating system, and that ideas are the chief instrument of its self-determination. Moreover it is not wholly governed by the past, but by an imagined if not an actual future". *Ibid.*, 238.

<sup>19</sup> Temple, *CV*, 50–52.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 52. See also Temple, *MC*, 166, 172, 174; Temple, *NMG*, 230; Temple, *CTP*, 51–52.

<sup>21</sup> Temple, *CV*, 53.

the future.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, Temple suggests that a person is “not wholly governed by the past, but by an imagined if not an actual future”.<sup>23</sup> Or again, “a distinguishing mark of full Personality [is] that for persons the future is more interesting and more important than the past, or even the present”.<sup>24</sup> Humans tend to give prominence to the future and the possibilities of what can be. Temple expounds further that this process of comparing one’s actual state with the future is the apprehension of value or good. Humans are making value judgements when they compare and decide that an imagined future state is better or good. Humans then focus on that state and make plans to attain it. In other words, a will is formed because the will is what enables a person to fix attention on an object.<sup>25</sup>

Temple’s idea of the will is differentiated from other important thinkers on the will. Again, Arthur Schopenhauer’s “will-to-live” and Friedrich Nietzsche’s “will-to-power” comes to mind. Schopenhauer’s idea of the will was a non-rational impulse as the foundation of human instinctual drives. Nietzsche’s idea of the will is more difficult to specify because he did not discuss it systematically. But Nietzsche’s basic idea of the will is the desire to expand one’s power to dominate oneself, others, and the environment. While Temple agrees with both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the importance of the will, he parts ways on the aim of the will. We could say that Temple’s position was “will-to-value/good”. The human will is not irrational nor does it tend towards power. It purposes towards value or good, even if that good is only apparent. It is important to point out that the human will is thus analogous to God’s Will, or the Divine Creative Will. Both the human will and Divine Will are purposive towards value or good. Human self-consciousness thus begins with the awareness of their surroundings, individuality, and time, but culminates with the will purposing towards

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>23</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 238.

<sup>24</sup> Temple, *CV*, 53.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 72. Temple claimed that four results emerge out of this. Firstly, humans begin to actualise Value/Good that is latent in the Universe as they apprehend and pursue Value. Secondly, humans realise their correspondence with God. Both God and humans apprehend Value and purpose towards it. As we have mentioned in Chapter 1, human ability to apprehend Value is the necessary counterpart to God’s creation of Value. It is this that gives rise to human capability for fellowship with God. They share the “motive of Creation ‘ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil’”. Thirdly, humans’ apprehension of value allows them to become creative. It makes them form deliberate purposes and take actions towards it, thereby changing the world around them. Lastly, their apprehension of Value gives rise to sin. Humans’ apparent good is coloured by their self-centredness. They misperceive Value/Good and pursue what they decide is good instead of what is truly good. Ibid., 72–73. Quote on knowing good and evil from 73. Same point on humans knowing good and evil in Temple, *NMG*, 365

value/good, or more precisely put, towards an apparent good. In this way the human will mirrors God's Will in the pursuit, actualisation, and realisation of value or good.

The next assertion that Temple makes about humans is that they are self-determining and in the process of complete unification. This is probably the key idea in Temple's theological anthropology. It pertains again to the human will. Temple writes that a person is self-determining because of their own unique will. This is true because "self-determining is the activity of the Will".<sup>26</sup> Two children who are brought up in the same environment and circumstances can turn out differently because they each determine themselves. There is true volition in them. One's social environment and external influences play a great part, as well shall see in the next section, but they are not the decisive elements in determining a person's character and personality.<sup>27</sup> A person is self-determining because of their own unique will. Additionally, humans are in the process of complete self-unification where the will is central to process. This is the goal of an inner unity of complete personality which we will discuss later in this chapter.<sup>28</sup> Temple writes that there is a "central core of personality or self-hood, ordering all the elements of human nature by the power of something called a will".<sup>29</sup> It is the will that seeks ordering or the unification of the person. As with his definition of the human person, Temple's definition of the will is not uniform across his writings. The meaning and central point is largely the same, but the emphasis varies according to context. A good definition is found in *NMG*:

Will, then, as the agent in truly moral action is the whole organised nature of the person concerned; it is his personality as a whole; and so far is it from being an initial endowment of our nature, that the main function of education is to fashion it – a process which is only complete when the entire personality is fully integrated in a harmony of all its constituent elements ... The ideal is complete integration of personality, with all its elements included within its harmony.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Temple, *CV*, 69.

<sup>27</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 236.

<sup>28</sup> Temple, *CV*, 158. Also in 75 and 85.

<sup>29</sup> William Temple, "The Archbishop of York," in *More Points of View* (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930), 23–24.

<sup>30</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 234.

The will is the fundamental or core faculty in a person. Its role is to integrate or unify all the elements and faculties in person, thereby achieving a completed personality. Temple often began his exposition by contending against two common errors about the human will.<sup>31</sup> The first error is to take the will to be one of many faculties that exist side by side in a person.<sup>32</sup> Temple gave the example of Charles Gore. He held that Gore had espoused an outmoded faculty-based psychology and consequently viewed the human person in abstraction.<sup>33</sup> Temple also noted the slightly more modern example of passion and reason existing side by side in a person. Passion derives from our animal ancestry and reason is said to be developed to subdue it. They exist side by side in competition.<sup>34</sup> Faculty-based psychology, of course, has a long history. It can be traced back to thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine who all thought of humans as composed of three distinct components of feelings, intellect, and will. Such an understanding remains common in theology. Or perhaps, as W. R. Matthews contends, it was the more recent ideas of Kant that were lurking in the background. One strand of Continental European thought tended to think of some element of personality as not being part of nature and thus as standing outside the evolutionary process. Specifically, Kant has been influential in his distinction between the noumenal self and the empirical self, thus giving a double aspect of personality.<sup>35</sup> There was in effect two “selves” in one person. Temple was against such a faculty-based understanding of humans. To be precise, he did acknowledge that there were different faculties in a person such as impulse, intellect, and will. What he did not find cogent was the idea that they could exist alongside each other within a person. Importantly, Temple claims that faculty-based psychology has been superseded in most other academic departments and survives only in theology.<sup>36</sup>

The second common error regarding human will is to construe the will as merely the faculty of choice.<sup>37</sup> Owing to the defective faculty-based psychology, some of the older generation of thinkers saw that purpose was distinct from the other impulses and ideas within

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<sup>31</sup> Temple, *CV*, 60.

<sup>32</sup> Temple, *MC*, 167; Temple, *CV*, 60; Temple, *NMG*, 367–368; See also Temple, *NP*, 25.

<sup>33</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 230–231. Temple footnotes Charles Gore, *Can We Then Believe?* (London: Murray, 1926), 151–156; Charles Gore, *Belief in God* (London: J. Murray, 1921), 139–144; Charles Gore, *The Philosophy of the Good Life* (London: J. Murray, 1930), 262–266.

<sup>34</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 367–368.

<sup>35</sup> Matthews, "William Temple as Thinker," 19.

<sup>36</sup> Temple, *CV*, 60.

<sup>37</sup> Temple, *MC*, 167; Temple, *CV*, 60; See also Temple, *NP*, 26.

a person. A will was thus “invented to be the organ of Purpose”.<sup>38</sup> Questions were then asked such as how this will is determined, and whether it has genuine freedom. For Temple, the former question was valid and important to explore. But the latter question was a complete absurdity. Temple argued that the absurdness of the question was exposed by John Locke in his chapter on “Power” in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke posits that it is fair to ask whether humans are free to will, or whether humans even have a will. But to ask “[i]s the will free?” is absurd. It is essentially asking “[h]as the power to choose got the power to choose?” In doing so, Locke puts his finger on the crux of the issue – choice. The discussion on will and purpose has to do with concrete choices that a human makes.<sup>39</sup>

The issue of choice brings us back to a key idea in Temple’s theological anthropology. The human is in the process of complete unification where the will is the core faculty by which that unity or integration happens. Temple averred that Aristotle and Plato give us the clearest insights into choice. Aristotle explains choice as the union of intellect and appetite (or thinking and desiring). This sheds light on the epigraph Temple chose at the start of the chapter “Will and Purpose” in *MC*: “Hence choice is either appetitive intellect or intellectual appetite; and man is a principle of this kind”.<sup>40</sup> Choice is when intellect and appetite work together as one. We will revisit this again when we look at the human imagination. While Aristotle offers us the best explanation, Temple contended that it is Plato who gives us the ideal form of this union – out of the many to become one.<sup>41</sup> Temple meant this in the sense that choice is union of intellect and appetite. Yet, he also meant it in a broader sense. The ideal person is the unity and integration of all the congeries of impulses, thoughts, and desires under the human will.<sup>42</sup> They become one out of many. The will is the organ or power to choose, and the ideal situation is when all the various faculties of a person are integrated under the will in a given choice. The will is therefore not a separate entity or distinct faculty amongst others.<sup>43</sup> It is the core faculty of a person that all is to be integrated under. To be sure, Temple held that a person is already a unity by virtue of there being only one physical organism that is him/her.<sup>44</sup> But there is also a process of further unification by bringing all the

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<sup>38</sup> Temple, *MC*, 167.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*; Temple, *CV*, 59–61; Temple, *NMG*, 233; See also *NP*, 25–26.

<sup>40</sup> Temple, *MC*, 165. From Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2, 1139b6.

<sup>41</sup> Temple, *CV*, 59, 63–64; Temple, *MC*, 167; Temple, *NMG*, 233; See also Temple, *NP*, 25–26.

<sup>42</sup> Temple, *CV*, 59, 63–64.

<sup>43</sup> Temple, *MC*, 167.

<sup>44</sup> Temple, *CV*, 213.

competing impulses, thoughts, and desire under the will. This is why Temple writes in *CV* that there is “a formal unity of personality from the outset and also that substantial unity is an achievement”.<sup>45</sup> Again, Temple quotes Plato as the ideal of this substantial unity – “to become one from being many”.<sup>46</sup> We should note the confessed influence of Josiah Royce on the harmonising effect of the will as well. This was explored in chapter two on Christology.

This section has explored the main facets of Temple’s theological anthropology. A human is a self-conscious and self-determining being in the process of complete unification or integration. The human self-consciousness begins with general sentience and gives rise to the pursuit of value/good because of the apprehension of time. Human pursuit of value mirrors God’s own purpose of value. Humans are also self-determining in the process of integration towards unity. The human will is central to this. It is not one of many faculties that exist concurrently within a person, but the core faculty that all the impulses, desires, and thoughts of a person are to come under. The process of complete unification is the integration of the will.

### **Forming a Will**

The core of a human person is their will, or as Temple contends, “Will is the only Substance there is in a man”.<sup>47</sup> It is central to their self-consciousness, self-determination, and unification. But what is the human will and how is it formed? This section seeks to answer these questions. We will cover four areas that Temple often discusses. The human will is a function of its initial endowment, education, imagination, and social environment. Firstly, Temple stated that the human will is an initial endowment in our nature.<sup>48</sup> All humans have a will. The first appearance of a will is mainly in the inhibition of certain impulses and desires. As our mind develops, we become aware that certain decisions bring about undesirable consequences. For example, we get burnt if we touch fire. Our will thus prevents us from touching a flame by inhibiting the choice of doing so.<sup>49</sup> To expand on this slightly, the human will forms the purpose of not wanting to be burnt which guides the choice not to touch a

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Temple, “The Divinity of Christ,” 247. Same idea in Temple, *CV*, 60–61.

<sup>48</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 234.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

flame.<sup>50</sup> This is why Temple says that by will we mean “the faculty to form and pursue a purpose, and not merely a determination to have our own way whatever that may happen to be”.<sup>51</sup> Will is thus “the capacity to form a Purpose”.<sup>52</sup> This is in line with the discussion on will and purpose in chapter one on Temple’s doctrine of God. We saw there that purpose was an expression of will, or that purpose was grounded in a will. These ideas make sense in light of the fact that will is the capacity to form a purpose. However, there is a slight difference when it comes to the human will. Temple notes in *CV* that the “Will, conceived as the seat of Purpose, is not a separate faculty, except in the sense that man has the capacity to form a Purpose; rather it is the co-ordination of his whole psychic nature for action”.<sup>53</sup> The human will expresses itself in a purpose that results in action. It guides the choices and the conduct of humans. In other words, there is a clear focus on actions in the human will.

The second area in relation to the forming of will pertains to education. Temple often uses the example of early education to illustrate the Platonic ideal of becoming one out of many. Or, the unity of a person based on their will.<sup>54</sup> Temple notes that children are at first a mass of chaotic impulses and interests.<sup>55</sup> They do not yet have a will, but just vigorous appetite. The most needful thing is to fashion the power of concentration by attending to just one thing. Children are thus taught not to be distracted, but to focus their attention for a fixed period of time each day. This is the point of school lessons. The goal is to foster attention or concentration.<sup>56</sup> This is because the “capacity to fix the attention on one object to the neglect of others is the foundation of what is called Will”.<sup>57</sup> The period of concentration is gradually extended, and discipline begins to form. Lessons, along with this discipline, then begin to foster habits. Once this happens, the external forms and pressure can be relaxed, and the child can now live with the guidance of habits which discipline has formed. The educator is thus able to say, “I have created a will in you; at first you were a mere mass of

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 233–234.

<sup>51</sup> Temple, *MC*, 227–228.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>53</sup> Temple, *CV*, 60–61.

<sup>54</sup> Temple, *MC*, 167–168. Same illustration in Temple, *NMG*, 233; Temple, *CV*, 60; Temple, *NP*, 28–29. In fact, *MC* has a whole chapter (chapter XVII) on Education.

<sup>55</sup> Temple noted that impulses are ambivalent; they are neither good nor bad. Both virtue or vice can be fashioned out of them. But original sin dictates that the tendency of these impulses is to vice. Temple, *MC*, 168–169.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>57</sup> Temple, *CV*, 60.

impulses; I have co-ordinated and systematised those impulses, and I have developed your power of thought alike in calculating means to ends and in comparing together the various ends open to you, so that now you have a real will and purpose of your own".<sup>58</sup> The goal of education vis-à-vis the human will is to foster the ability to fix one's attention undistractedly, thereby forming the foundation of a will. The congeries of impulses, desires, and thoughts are now integrated under that one focused will.

The third aspect of the human will is that it is a function of the imagination. We have seen that the point of education is to forge concentration. It is through the focusing of attention that a will begins to form. This section on the imagination could be understood as Temple's attempt to explain what is going on within the human person when that happens. Temple posits in *MC* that the "intellect becomes imaginative when it is itself sufficiently concentrated and intense ... [and] that it may gain its hold upon Impulse and so constitute Will".<sup>59</sup> Or again, a few pages later, that "it is through passing out of its normal self into imagination that intellect is able to gain control of impulse and so constitute will".<sup>60</sup> Intellect and imagination may seem antithetical in theory. Intellect is abstract, restless, and prioritises meaning over image. Imagination, on the other hand, is concrete, contemplative, and privileges the image over meaning.<sup>61</sup> However, their difference is only theoretical. In reality, they are intricately connected as part of a single mind at work.<sup>62</sup> Temple uses the illustration that intellect gives us the skeleton while imagination provides that skeleton with flesh and contemplates the work as a whole.<sup>63</sup> The intellect's concern for facts, answers and science is complemented by the imagination's artistic function and ability to consider things in totality. But how exactly does intellect pass into imagination to gain control of impulse and thus constitute will? Temple explicates this from the real-life example of practical moral living. Humans often know what they ought to do but struggle to do it. Instead, they tend to act on

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<sup>58</sup> Temple, *MC*, 168. Same idea in Temple, *NP*, 29. Or again in *MC* Temple writes about the point of early education: "At first indeed the discipline must be externally imposed. The chaos of impulses which constitutes our original nature cannot possibly organise itself; but gradually that faculty of purpose which we call the will is built up, and in proportion as this takes place, self-discipline becomes possible. Through this, advance is made to true self-control and to that perfect harmony of the soul where all capacities are used and all instincts satisfied in the pursuit of a life's purpose. That ideal may never be actually reached, but where it is ... described as the culmination of the development of Will". Temple, *MC*, 217.

<sup>59</sup> Temple, *MC*, 153. See also *ibid.*, 71–72.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 155–156.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 153 & 160.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

impulse. They choose and act upon whichever impulse has an innate appeal to them. Or to use Temple's phrase, they act upon the apparent good.

Temple notes that the apparent good is not guided by intellect alone, but often more powerfully by imagination. He gives the example of a man prone to excessive drinking standing outside a bar. We could appeal to his intellect by telling him that drinking is bad for health. Yet, if that advice was sufficient, he might not have fallen into a drinking problem in the first place. A better way forward might be to tell him to think about his wife and children. By doing so, his mind is moving beyond the intellectual information of the ills of drinking to imaginatively consider the image of his wife and children suffering because of his drinking.<sup>64</sup> That may prove a better solution. This is probably why Temple quotes Aristotle's "intellect alone moves nothing" as the epigraph for the chapter in *MC*, "Intellect, Imagination, and Will".<sup>65</sup> A purely cognitive idea or a scientific formula cannot stir our desires and stimulate action. The intellect may work out the principles, means, and ends, but cannot move us to do it. Or, as Temple writes, "Intellect cannot control appetite".<sup>66</sup> We recall here the earlier quotation from Aristotle. Choice is neither appetitive intellect nor intellectual appetition alone. Temple would say that it is the union of both, or what occurs when intellect passes over to imagination and thus constitutes will. The intellect needs imagination to inspire action. Temple thus claims that "imagination must come to the aid of intellect and give body to the right principle, so that it may have attractive power. Imagination is normally the link between intellect and will".<sup>67</sup> In the process of concentrating and directing one's attention, the intellect becomes focused and passes over into the imagination and thereby constitutes will. When this happens, humans are then stimulated to act.

Lastly, the human will is also partly a function of the social environment. In a key passage on the human will in *CV*, Temple explains that "Will is so much of a Personality as is consciously co-ordinated for action – the co-ordination being effected by selective attention and the pressure of environment; it can be, though it seldom is, the whole of conscious Personality".<sup>68</sup> The human will is a function of selective attention and one's environment. Selective attention, as we have seen, is the goal of education. But the other major factor that

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 156–158.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 153. From Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2, 1139a35.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Temple, *CV*, 61.

affects the will is a person's environment. This point is affirmed in another key passage in *NMG*. Temple writes that the will is "not an aboriginal endowment of our nature, but is something in process of formation throughout life under the influence of our environment, natural and social – and of any other sort that environment may be".<sup>69</sup> To be sure, Temple was not contradicting his own point that the human will is partly an initial endowment. The context of this quotation was a discussion on the ideal of an integrated or unified person. That ideal state of the will is not an aboriginal state but one that requires a process of formation whereby a person's environment is vital.

Temple believed humans are inherently social and thus viewed their environment as important. This point is often made through his use of the idea of a scale of being, which we have explored above. We recall here that the scale begins with inorganic matter and ends with a person. The main point was the fact that humans are future-orientated. They are therefore capable of forming a purpose and a plan to attain their future apparent good. However, this ability to value the future, compare, and plan, also gives humans the awareness that their plans can affect others. The pursuit of my (apparent) good could adversely affect your good and your pursuit of it. This is the foundation of moral obligation. Temple writes that moral obligation "carries a man beyond the calculation of means devised for the realisation of ends which are fixed by instinct or desire. It leads him to think of himself as a person in a society of persons".<sup>70</sup> Awareness of a duty to others is the foundation of moral obligation. Moral obligation is therefore predicated upon the recognition of human sociability.<sup>71</sup> In fact, Temple pushes this point quite radically. He argues that isolated individuals do not have moral obligations or duties. The isolated individual "may be wise or foolish; [but] he cannot be moral or immoral. An atheistic debauchee upon a desert island is not liable to moral censure".<sup>72</sup> Moral obligation is therefore not an abstract idea or theory. It is only observed and realised with other human beings. Moral obligation not only recognises human sociability but presumes it. Temple noted that this point was not lost on Kant. When Kant tried to come up with a categorical imperative out of the autonomous will of the

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<sup>69</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 235.

<sup>70</sup> Temple, *CV*, 53. See also Temple, *NP*, 11–12, 52–54.

<sup>71</sup> Temple explicates further in *CV* that obligation has three roots: (1) that humans share a common purpose of coming to self-consciousness; enmity is unnatural, (2) the realisation that there are claims upon a person that are binding yet not out of his own convenience, (3) that purpose has a social dimension. Temple, *CV*, 69–70.

<sup>72</sup> Temple, *NP*, 51.

individual, it eventually took the form of “Act at all times from a maxim fit for universal law”. But the word universal assumes and implies society. As Temple asserts, “Kant's fundamental argument to prove that only the Good Will is absolutely good rests on a surreptitious reference to the admitted interests of Society; and so it must always be”.<sup>73</sup> Duty and moral obligation implies sociability and society. Humans are inherently social with a duty or moral obligation to one another.

Interestingly, Temple pushed the point on human sociability further. Humans do not only have a duty or moral obligation to one another. They are not mere subjects of claims and counter claims. Humans also have a very real part and stake in each other. Temple observed that a person is shaped by their “own initial nature and the influence of its environment and the reactions set up between these two”.<sup>74</sup> There is a unique base individuality to each person that is the core of their selfhood. Yet, a person’s social environment influences them profoundly and in a very real way. We see this interplay between a person’s self-determination and social influence in a passage from *NMG*. Temple suggests there that people “constitute each others’ characters ... by their mutual influence, but that each system of experience is also self-determining from a core of original being which is that individual’s own contribution to the total scheme of things”.<sup>75</sup> The human person is a real self-determining individual, yet a good part of them is influenced by others. Temple makes the same point in *CV* when he comments that every individual person is “largely constituted by the influence of other individuals upon him; and each takes his share in constituting others”.<sup>76</sup>

In fact, Temple pushed the logic of this train of thought to assert that every person is “a condensation of society. He *is* his fellow-men’s experience focused in a new centre”.<sup>77</sup> This is clearly a claim beyond human sociability, friendship, or moral obligation. Temple seems to be suggesting a kind of social organism. The relationships between people are more than just mechanical or biological links. It is through complex, ontic, and symbiotic relationships that people have a very real influence on one another. Human flourishing thus depends on mutual flourishing, or the whole societal environment flourishing. We surmise that this might be the

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 239; Temple, *MC*, 182.

<sup>75</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 213. Or again that “Each individual is largely constituted by the influence of other individuals upon him; and each takes his share in constituting others”. Ibid., 214.

<sup>76</sup> Temple, *CV*, 214.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 71.

influence of British Idealism. It was the prevalent philosophy then made popular through the thoughts of T. H. Green, Edward Caird, Bernard Bosanquet, and others. It was inspired by Greek and German thought, specifically, Plato and Aristotle read through the lens of Kant and G. W. F. Hegel.<sup>78</sup> A key idea of British Idealism was a societal concept of individuals.<sup>79</sup> This was a reaction against the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill which viewed society as an aggregation of separate and atomised individuals.<sup>80</sup> To be sure, the British Idealist did hold that each person was a distinct individual and a free moral agent who can direct their choices, form their character, and live a moral life. However, every person is also a social being who lives as part of a society to develop fully as a moral individual.<sup>81</sup>

People are therefore connected in a far more complex way in and through society. Individuals must be understood within the context of their community which gives them their character, thought, and even their role in life. Individuals were an abstraction or condensation of society. Even morality was construed to be social. Or as David Boucher and Andrew Vincent put it, the "individual is nothing without society, and morality is through and through social".<sup>82</sup> There is no unencumbered self that stands outside of a community or society. Bringing this back to our discussion on the human will, every human will is thus organically linked to other human wills in their environment. The formation of a person's will is dependent on the state of other human wills. One's social environment plays an important role in the formation of their will. This explains the importance Temple places on fellowship which we will see in the next section. This also goes a long way in explaining why Temple had a clear focus on societal concerns. It was not only care for the marginalised or disenfranchised, but because common societal flourishing depends on everyone flourishing.

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<sup>78</sup> It stood against utilitarianism, evolutionary theory, and positivism to argue that human reason could grasp the transcendent and spiritual realities of life. Among other things, British Idealism tended to emphasise social organism and cohesiveness, metaphysics, and an increased role for the State. For background see Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*; W. J. Mander, *British Idealism: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Peter P. Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British idealists: Selected Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Alan P. F. Sell, *Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995); Timothy Gouldstone, *The Rise and Decline of Anglican Idealism in the Nineteenth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

<sup>79</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 5–6. See also Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 35; Sell, *Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief*; Mander, *Idealist Ethics*, chapter 16 on "Idealism, Society, and Community".

<sup>80</sup> Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 32–34.

<sup>81</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 2.

<sup>82</sup> Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 9.

We should note a slight peculiarity about Temple regarding psychology. Temple's theological anthropology seems to tap on psychology. We might even say that his idea of the human person is built on a psychological understanding to a certain extent. However, it is curious that Temple does not seem to engage much with psychology as a proper field of study. This is despite the fact that psychology had become a discernible discipline by the time Temple was writing his main books. Major figures of psychology such as Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, and Ivan Pavlov had all published. To be sure, Temple does mention psychology as a field of study.<sup>83</sup> He also writes in *Thoughts on Some Problems of the Day* that psychology is a "new and consequently popular science" but that it is just the "study of mental processes. Its concern in relation to any belief is not to inquire whether the belief is true, but to inquire what was the process of its formation".<sup>84</sup> Joseph F. Fletcher noted this curious point too. But Fletcher contended that while Temple could be accused of being ignorant of these trends in psychology, it would be unfair to say that he was naïve about the subject. Temple's ideas were not erroneous or distorted because of his ignorance.<sup>85</sup> We would concur with Fletcher on this. Temple's lack of references to psychology in his writings does not diminish the points that he made. In any case, he seems to build his case from a slightly more philosophical point of view, albeit less philosophically than his doctrine of God. His engagement with Locke, Aristotle, and Plato evidence this.

This section explored how the formation of the human will is a function of four factors. There is a part of the will that is an *initial endowment* of our nature. It is unique to every individual. It helps them to restrict their impulses in its incipient stage by forming a purpose that guides action. The second factor is *education*. The purpose of education is to foster concentration and attention, thereby giving foundations to a will. All the chaotic impulses and desire innate within a person fade away in subservient to that will. Thirdly, the will is a function of *human imagination*. It is through imagination that intellect takes hold of our impulses and hence constitutes will. The last factor is our *social environment*. Built on the idea of human sociability, Temple argued for a kind of social organism of human relationships. Humans constitute one another in a very real way. Therefore, a person's will is profoundly influenced by the wills of other humans in his social environment. What is key to note from

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<sup>83</sup> Temple, *MC*, 12, 51, 81, 109, 167; Temple, *CV*, 20, 36, 60–61, 87; Temple, *NMG*, 15, 32, 50, 66.

<sup>84</sup> William Temple, *Thoughts on Some Problems of the Day* (London: Macmillian and Co., 1931), 20.

<sup>85</sup> Fletcher, *William Temple*, 306.

an overall perspective is the sense of dynamism in the process of forming the will. It is not a static state. Rather, it is an active process in which the different factors interact with each other. We should also remember that at the centre of this process is the human person. The dynamic interplay of factors is actualised in the person who, as we have seen above, is the main determinative element.

### **Complete Personality and Perfected Fellowship**

We have seen that Temple understood the human person to be self-conscious and self-determining. The human will is central to this understanding. It is what gives humans their unique individuality and agency of their moral life and action. We have also learnt that the human will is a function of its initial endowment, education, imagination, and social environment. Its formation is a dynamic interplay between these factors. The ideal state of the person and their will is set forth by Plato's idea of becoming one out of many. In other words, the congeries of impulses, desires, and ideas that are incipient in a person are integrated under the will. In this state, a person's choices and actions are solely determined by their will.

Temple often phrases this idea slightly differently. He avers that the ideal state of human beings is to achieve "the inner unity of complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity".<sup>86</sup> This was an important point in his theology. It is to this end that the Incarnation, the work of the Holy Spirit in the world, and the Church all contribute.<sup>87</sup> This ideal state of a person is also the goal of a good Christian society. In other words, Temple's theology is the buttress of his social teaching. Temple states in *CASO* that society's goal is the "fullest possible development of individual personality in the widest and deepest possible fellowship".<sup>88</sup> Society endeavours to the same ideal end that humans are striving for. It is not unexpected then that society's goal should also be the slogan that the Church and Christians alike undertake.<sup>89</sup> A complete personality and a perfected fellowship is thus the goal of humans, society, the Church vis-à-vis society, and Christians. In fact, the two key ideas there, personality and fellowship, along with service, form the main social principles

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<sup>86</sup> Temple, *CV*, 158. Also in 75 and 85.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 74.

<sup>89</sup> "We may take as our slogan, if you like: 'Fulness of Personality in the widest possible Fellowship'". Temple, *CLF*, 118.

that Temple espoused. We will explore these in our final chapter. This section now seeks to understand what this ideal state entails. We will then consider the way in which Temple was realistic about this ideal. Full personality cannot be attained because the seat of sin is right in the centre of the human person – in their will.

The ideal state of a human person is to achieve the inner unity of a complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship. We turn first to understand what a completed personality is. A key definition of the human will from *NMG* explains Temple's idea clearly. We have quoted it above, but it is worth quoting again:

Will, then, as the agent in truly moral action is the whole organised nature of the person concerned; it is his personality as a whole; and so far is it from being an initial endowment of our nature, that the main function of education is to fashion it – a process which is only complete when the entire personality is fully integrated in a harmony of all its constituent elements ... The ideal is complete integration of personality, with all its elements included within its harmony.<sup>90</sup>

A complete personality is the complete integration and coordination of all our impulses, desires, and reasoning under our will. All the initial elements within a person are harmonised. Our entire psychic being is unified and ready to choose and act based on our will.<sup>91</sup> This ideal was based on the ideas of Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine.<sup>92</sup> We have explored Aristotle's and Plato's idea earlier. A complete personality is the union of intellect and appetition, and all other faculties under the will. Additionally, Temple references Augustine too. He suggests that Augustine had placed his finger on the crux of the issue in a well-known passage from *Confessions*. Augustine observes that his hand moves when he wills it to move. But he laments that he does not seem able to do good when he wills himself to do it. His will remains unmoved. Augustine posits that the problem lies in the fact that he does not completely will to do good. For if he already willed to do good, he would not need to will it.<sup>93</sup> Simply put, the

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<sup>90</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 234.

<sup>91</sup> Temple writes that the human person has a formal unity of personality from the outset, but also endeavours to full unity of personality. The initial unity is found in his physical body. There is only one physical person. But further unity is to be sourced in the psychic life. Only one impulse or desire can be acted upon. But the ideal and full unity is the completely harmonised and organised self. Temple, *CV*, 63–68.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>93</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 234. From *Confessions*, Book VIII, chapter IX.

problem of moral weakness is an incomplete volition. As Temple puts it, “[i]f I entirely will to be good, I am good”.<sup>94</sup> If we put together the ideas of Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine, we might say that a complete personality is when all the elements of a person are integrated under their will. This is displayed when there is no sense of struggle in an act of the will because they fully will it.

Temple often illustrates this with the example of a strong-willed person. Such a person has integrated all their impulses, desires, and reasoning under their will, which is expressed in a strong purpose. This does not mean that the person simply does whatever they want. Rather, they are constant and steadfast in their choices and actions.<sup>95</sup> They are not compelled by any external or internal factors other than their own will aimed at its purpose. They would willingly make the same choices and action if presented with the same situations. Interestingly, Temple argues that this is display by “splendid incapacities”.<sup>96</sup> This is like when it is said of a good man who is accused of a heinous crime that he could not have done it. A complete personality is displayed in both volition and nolition. The person is able to do good without struggle because they fully will it. They are also unable to do evil because their will fully prevents this. This is what Temple calls true freedom. It is the state of a person when they know what the ideal or good is, are conformed to it, and do it.<sup>97</sup> The resultant act is truly their own and expresses their whole nature and will.<sup>98</sup> This is why Temple claimed that, in the ideal state, will and personality are synonymous.<sup>99</sup> The person with a complete personality lives fully in accordance with their will. Of course, Christ is the supreme example of this. We recall from the previous chapter on Christology that in Christ “the whole being was always set to do God’s will. Though there was real struggle and real cost, there was no enemy of self-will within, and therefore no danger of defeat”.<sup>100</sup> Christ was strong-willed or guided by the divine Will in Him. All his incipient impulses, desires, and reasoning were set to obey that divine Will.

As a slight excursus, we should note that there are times when the will can be temporarily suspended. This is true of aesthetic contemplation. Temple quotes Arthur Balfour

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<sup>94</sup> Temple, *CV*, 63.

<sup>95</sup> Temple, *MC*, 172.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 171–172; Temple, *NMG*, 236. See also Temple, *CV*, 64; Temple, *NP*, 30–32, 43–45.

<sup>97</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 242. See also Temple, *MC*, 170.

<sup>98</sup> Temple, *CV*, 54.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 150. Because the will “is the name for our personality so far as that is integrated”. If it is fully integrated, then will and personality are synonymous. Temple, *NMG*, 235.

<sup>100</sup> Temple, *CV*, 148.

at length in *MC* about the nature of aesthetic experience. It is the highest member of a class whose common characteristic is that they do not lead to action.<sup>101</sup> There are times when humans contemplate beauty – a painting, or music, or nature – and are so captivated by it that they are not desiring or thinking about anything. The human will, which is constantly geared for action, is suspended in that captivation. Hence, Temple writes that the “aesthetic emotion is quite non-practical ... the will and every kind of desire is quiescent”.<sup>102</sup> This is an important nuance to make regarding Temple’s doctrine of the will. Both the Divine Will and human will are understood as being active or as the agents of action. The impulse seems to be to act or to do something. A possible critique of Temple is whether his doctrine of God and theological anthropology focuses too much on action. Brenda C. Cross, for example, makes this implicit criticism of Temple when comparing him to Frank Weston.<sup>103</sup> It is therefore apt to note Temple’s nuanced qualification that there are times where the will is suspended. It can be so caught up in contemplation that it does not seek to do anything. This will be an important connection to the point on worship in the next section.

We return now to our main line of argument. A complete personality is complemented by the dialectic of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. This is not unexpected, given our discussion on the influence of social environment on the formation of the human will. If the core of personality is the will and social environment affects it, then the ideal state of a person must take account of the ideal of perfected fellowship: that, as Temple puts it, the human is “a person in a society of persons”.<sup>104</sup> Temple draws on Jacques Maritain’s *Scholasticism and Politics* to make his point. Personality and infidelity are two different concepts. Individuality is simply what differentiates a person from another. It is a principle of division. But, on the other hand, “personality is social, and only in social relationship can a man be a person... The richer his personal relationships, the more fully personal he will be”.<sup>105</sup> The claim being made is that a person is only fully personal in social relationship. Personality, which marks a person as unique from other humans and animals, also marks them as social. Hence Temple states that “the same qualities which make him [i.e., a person] supremely

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<sup>101</sup> Temple, *MC*, 94–95. From Arthur James Balfour, *Questionings on Criticism and Beauty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 21–23.

<sup>102</sup> Temple, *MC*, 98.

<sup>103</sup> Cross, “Christology of Weston,” 79.

<sup>104</sup> Temple, *CV*, 53.

<sup>105</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 48.

individual stamp his individuality as fundamentally and inherently social”.<sup>106</sup> This is why Temple declares that if “by the term Fellowship we may denote the deliberate association of free persons, then it is true to say that ‘Personality is the capacity for Fellowship’”.<sup>107</sup> To be a person is to be social, and to be social is to need fellowship.

We seem to hear echoes of Martin Buber in this claim. In fact, Temple wrote in almost identical language to Buber in *CTP*. He wrote that personality is only fully actualised “through its development in the reciprocal relationships of society”.<sup>108</sup> He goes on to explain that “I am only I in my relationships with You, and You are only You, or capable of being called an I, in your relationships with Me”.<sup>109</sup> It is interesting that this was written a year before Buber’s *I and Thou* was translated from German into English, in 1937. Temple does not reference Buber in his works, so we cannot ascertain to what degree he was familiar with Buber. In any case, Fletcher alerts us to a key difference between the two. He argues that Temple is more social or solidaristic than Buber. Buber tends to hold that the personal nature of human beings is a given quality but only fulfilled in relationships to others. Temple, however, holds that is a social product.<sup>110</sup> We tend to agree with Fletcher on this. The point is forcefully made by Temple in *CTP*:

It is positively in the interaction of embryonic personalities with one another that the resultant personality is developed. Personality is always a social product ... it is something which can only reach its own full development in its intercourse with others similarly developing in that intercourse.<sup>111</sup>

A change in emphasis is seen here. Personality is not only the capacity or need for fellowship. Personality is also a social product. The former point is the claim that humans are social. The latter is the assertion that humans *require* social interaction for their full development as a person. The same argument is seen in *CV*. Temple contends that “the [human] mind grows in intercourse with other minds more mature than itself ... it grows, not in isolation, but by

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<sup>106</sup> Temple, *CV*, 53.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> Temple, *CTP*, 59.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 59–60.

<sup>110</sup> Fletcher, *William Temple*, 307.

<sup>111</sup> Temple, *CTP*, 60.

receiving and assimilating perpetually greater wealth of experience".<sup>112</sup> Humans require social interaction or fellowship to grow and develop fully. Perhaps Temple's idea of social organism is at play here as well, that humans have a real influence over each other. Human development is the function of the intricate network of mutual influence. A person develops symbiotically in relationship with others. This is probably the reason why the ideal requires a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. Social organism necessitates that the whole network of relationships falls short as long as one person is a negative influence. That one person has a ripple effect that is endemic to society.<sup>113</sup> Likewise, fellowship is less than ideal if any one person is left out. The network of relationships is less rich and less fully developed without that person's unique contribution to the whole.

Putting it together, the ideal and goal of humanity is to achieve the inner unity of a complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship. That means that the incipient congeries of impulses, desires, and reasons within a person are fully integrated and harmonised under their will. All choices and acts done by this person are without struggle as they fully express the will. Additionally, this person is fully immersed in their social environment. That environment is one in which all persons have likewise achieved the ideal state and is a fellowship that includes all of humanity so that no one human experience is left out. It is quickly apparent that the ideal state is unachievable. Temple was realistic and acknowledges this. For one, a complete personality is unattainable. Temple writes in *CV*:

Will is so much of a Personality as is consciously co-ordinated for action – the co-ordination being effected by selective attention and the pressure of environment; it can be, though it seldom is, the whole of conscious Personality. Yet because there is more in every human being than has come within the sphere of consciousness, Personality is always more than Will.<sup>114</sup>

The will seeks to integrate and unify a person. In the ideal state, will and personality are synonymous. But because that is unattainable, personality will always remain more than will. Temple enumerates various reasons why this is the case in *MC* and *CV*. For example, our

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<sup>112</sup> Temple, *CV*, 54.

<sup>113</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 366–367.

<sup>114</sup> Temple, *CV*, 61.

impulses and desires are often too strong to overcome and integrate. There are also parts of our subconscious that cannot be brought into harmony. Moreover, we have no control over our social environment.<sup>115</sup>

However, these are not the most important reasons why a complete personality is impossible. The most critical reason is sin. Again, the category of the will is central to Temple's point. Temple explicates this clearly in *NMG*:

But the centre of trouble is the personality as a whole, which is self-centred and can only be wholesome and healthy if it is God-centred. This whole personality in action is the will; and it is the will which is perverted. Our primary need is not to control our passions by our purpose, but to direct our purpose itself to the right end. It is the form taken by our knowledge of good and evil that perverts our nature. We know good and evil, but know them amiss. We take them into our lives, but we mistake them. The corruption is at the centre of rational and purposive life.<sup>116</sup>

Temple is dealing here with the topic of sin. Temple seems to define original sin and the essence/nature of sin interchangeably between self-centredness<sup>117</sup> and self-will.<sup>118</sup> The clearest articulation of self-centredness as sin is found in Temple's *RSJG*. Temple writes that the nature of sin is "self-centredness – the putting of the self in the centre where God alone should be. We are all born doing this; that is Original Sin".<sup>119</sup> We might say that the genesis, and therefore nature, of sin is self-centredness.<sup>120</sup> Humans were meant to be God-centred, but they have displaced God and made themselves at the centre. As we explored in chapter one, this causes them to misperceive value or good. They value it self-centredly according to their own value judgments without reference to God. Consequently, their will pursues that misperceived value, or the apparent good. The human will is thus wrongly directed, a condition that Temple terms as "self-will".<sup>121</sup> The human will, as soon as it appears, is

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<sup>115</sup> Temple, *MC*, 171; Temple, *CV*, 60–61.

<sup>116</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 367.

<sup>117</sup> Temple, *CV*, 234–235; Temple, *NMG*, 369, 510, 520.

<sup>118</sup> Temple, *MC*, 285, 387, 339; Temple, *CV*, 101, 258, 271; Temple, *NMG*, 501–502.

<sup>119</sup> Temple, *RSJG*, 260. Interestingly, he writes that partial deliverance from this condition can be wrought through devotion to truth, beauty, or goodness because Christ is made partially known through them.

<sup>120</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 369, 504; Temple, *CV*, 220.

<sup>121</sup> Temple, *MC*, 285; Temple, *CV*, 101, 258, 271.

distorted by self-centredness.<sup>122</sup> Self-centredness therefore leads to and is expressed in self-will. Self-centredness is that sinful disposition which distorts the will (i.e., self-will) which leads to sinful choices and acts. This is why the extract above states that human personality is self-centred, and the human will is perverted. We should note that Temple's definition of sin as pertaining to the will was not novel in Anglican theology. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, for one, agreed with Kant that the original and fundamental corruption is of the will.<sup>123</sup> He writes in *Aids to Reflection* that "the phrase, Original Sin, is a Pleonasm . . . For if it be Sin, it must be original: and a State or Act, that has not its origin in the will, may be calamity, deformity, disease, or mischief; but a Sin it cannot be".<sup>124</sup> Original sin and sin is fundamentally about the will. Likewise, F. D. Maurice would also define sin as "disease of the will" and a "conscious separation from a pure and holy will".<sup>125</sup>

Coming back to Temple, he laments that this is the paradox of humans' spiritual and moral life. The perversion of the will, or self-will, means that the corruption of humans "has its seat in the highest part of his nature, the part that controls the whole, the 'principle of unity' in the complex organism of his personality".<sup>126</sup> In other words, the very core of a person is corrupted and perverted. The entire process of integration and unification is likewise corrupted. Even if all impulses, desires, and reasoning could be brought under the will, they would still manifest that sinful self-centredness through self-will. In other words, the doctrine of free will breaks down. This is why Temple wrote that Pelagianism is the "only heresy which is intrinsically damnable".<sup>127</sup> It falsely asserts that it is possible for humans to will to be good, and that God rewards us for being good or punishes us for being bad. But there is no ounce of truth in this. Humans are unable to will to do good all the time because the will itself is tainted and not free to reform or help itself.<sup>128</sup> Sin radically affects the will causing self-will such that a completed personality is impossible.

Likewise, the outer unity of a perfected fellowship is made impossible by sin. As mentioned above, the idea of social organism means that the whole of human fellowship is

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<sup>122</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 504–505.

<sup>123</sup> Franks, *The Work of Christ*, 650.

<sup>124</sup> Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 270–271.

<sup>125</sup> Frederick Denison Maurice, *The Doctrine of Sacrifice* (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1854), 175.

<sup>126</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 505.

<sup>127</sup> Temple, *NP*, 38.

<sup>128</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 240–241.

corrupted as long as one person has self-will.<sup>129</sup> But the ubiquity of original sin means that in reality all humans are affected by self-will. It is not just one negative influence, but an entire web of negative influences. The process of mutually influencing and constituting one another's characters and will means that the self-will of humans is perpetuated on and on. In other words, the social influence of self-will is pervasive.<sup>130</sup> Self-will is therefore present in both every individual and the whole of societal influence, with each reinforcing the other.<sup>131</sup> In fact, self-will in humans also provokes rivalry and enmity by motivating selfish action. Out of self-will springs "hostility and bitterness and oppression and war".<sup>132</sup> The adverse effects of self-will are not limited to the negative mutual influence but extend to actual hostility among humans. Self-will is thus not only non-social but anti-social.<sup>133</sup>

This section has explored the ideal state of an inner completed personality and an outer perfected fellowship. This is the idea of a fully integrated and unified person. All the impulse, desires, and reasoning of that person are harmonised under their will. They are now primed to choose or act entirely based on their own volition, i.e., based on their will. Such a person is unmoved from their purpose and displays splendid incapacities. However, a complete personality requires the complement of a perfected fellowship. This is because humans are social and develop fully through social interaction and influence. Temple's idea of social organism certainly plays a key part in this understanding. We have also seen how this ideal completed personality and perfected fellowship is impossible to attain. The key reason is the self-centredness of humans which leads to self-will. The will – the very core of the human person – is the seat of corruption. Seeking to attain a completed personality is futile. A perfected fellowship is likewise impossible to achieve because of the influence of human self-will on others. Neither personality nor fellowship can reach their ideal state because of this self-centredness and self-will.

### **The Work of Christ: Individual and Communal**

The solution to the conundrum described above cannot be found within humanity itself. For one, the root problem lies at the centre of the human person – their will. Humans cannot

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 366–367.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 366–367, 370–371.

<sup>131</sup> Temple, *CV*, 215.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 271.

<sup>133</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 518.

simply will their will to be good. More importantly, it is only God who has that perfected Personality and is the “true norm and type of Personality”.<sup>134</sup> The solution to sin and the key to humans’ aspiration of a complete personality must involve God in some way. This brings us to the work of God in Christ. Temple writes in *NMG*:

The one hope of bringing human selves into right relationship to God is that God should declare His love in an act, or acts, of sheer self-sacrifice, thereby winning their freely offered love. Then all is of God; the only thing of my very own to which I can contribute to my own redemption is the sin from which I need to be redeemed.<sup>135</sup>

The solution must be an act of redemption coming from without. It is God revealing Himself in Christ and winning our love through sacrifice. In doing so, the human will can be influenced. Temple’s theological anthropology, which incorporates philosophy, sociology, and psychology, is ultimately theological. The greatest human need is salvation. This section therefore considers Temple’s understanding of the work of Christ. It leans in a more Abelardian mould, focusing on the subjective response of the human person. Christ’s sacrifice and death wins the sympathy and answering love from humans which elicits the volitional submission of their will to Christ’s Will.

Temple had surveyed various theories of the atonement in *Foundations*. He found that each theory had its own strengths and weaknesses. His own understandings of the atonement attempted to bring together the merits of the various theories. This included Peter Abelard’s insistence that God’s love calls out our answering love; Anselm of Canterbury’s beliefs in a Holy God, the importance of moral law, and the death of Christ as a mediating force; Bernard of Clairvaux’s claim that a transaction must have taken place; Augustine’s insistence on the helplessness of the human will; and the Greek insistence on the common humanity with Christ.<sup>136</sup> The one atonement theory that Temple rejected was the penal-substitutionary or substitutionary theory.<sup>137</sup> This was typical of the period that Temple wrote in. The age of the atonement which characterised the late eighteen and early nineteenth centuries had given

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<sup>134</sup> God is the only one who perceives all time at one instance and is determined by Himself alone that is guided by His purpose and Will alone. Temple, *NP*, 78–79. See also Padgett, *Christian Philosophy of Temple*, 98–99.

<sup>135</sup> Temple, *NMG*, xxvii.

<sup>136</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 223–242.

<sup>137</sup> Temple, *CV*, 261.

way to an age of the Incarnation. The publication of *Lux Mundi* in 1890, which was subtitled “A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation”, is often pointed to as a mainstreaming of this age of the Incarnation.<sup>138</sup> Among other things, it signalled a shift in theological emphasis from Christ’s atonement as satisfaction for a wrathful God to the Incarnation of Christ and his example of morality and love. This was the result of grave doubts that had risen during the Victorian period over some traditional doctrines such as hell and eternal punishment, original sin, and substitutionary atonement. These were perceived to be archaic and portrayed God as a vengeful and capricious being.<sup>139</sup> R. C. Moberly’s *Atonement and Personality* in 1901 was significant and influential in arguing against penal-substitution and making a compelling case for personality.<sup>140</sup> Temple agreed with this and inveighs against the penal-substitutionary atonement in *CV*. Any atonement theory that suggests the wrath of God being appeased or hides God’s love is untrue. In the same vein, forgiveness is not primarily the cancellation of the penalty or punishment of sin.<sup>141</sup> Temple argues that fear, whether of a wrathful God or the punishment of sin, can only deter humans from sinful acts but is incapable of transforming sinful desires.<sup>142</sup> The human will is unperturbed by fear. In fact, Temple had come to this view early on in his life. He wrote about it in his 1906 essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize while a fellow and lecturer in philosophy at Queen’s College, Oxford, now held at the Lambeth Archives. This prize was the bequest of Edward Ellerton for the best essay on any theological subject and was open to any member of the University of Oxford who had passed their first degree. Temple argues in his essay against the “juristic theory of the atonement, which I ... characterise as irrational and unchristian”.<sup>143</sup> It was a whole theological structure based on one word “ransom” in Mark 10:32–25, and thereby the unnecessary assumption of a price paid.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Charles Gore, ed. *Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation*, Eighth ed. (London: John Murray, 1890). However, Nicholas notes a peculiar oddity. None of the essays in *Lux Mundi* had much to say about the content of the doctrine of the Incarnation in and of itself. Nichols, *Panther*, 134.

<sup>139</sup> Mozley, *Some Tendencies*, 18.

<sup>140</sup> Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*.

<sup>141</sup> Temple, *CV*, 257–259.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 263.

<sup>143</sup> William Temple, *Essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize at Oxford University*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.65, fol.71. Iremonger writes a little about the prize in Temple’s biography. Iremonger, *William Temple*, 69.

<sup>144</sup> Temple, *Essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize at Oxford University*.

Temple contends that the idea of a judicial court might have had too big an influence on atonement theory. The main error is that the prisoner has no relationship with the judge. Yet, relationship is central to the atonement. Forgiveness is precisely the restoration of relationships. Temple writes that Christ's forgiveness is "not chiefly a remission of penalty; it is the restoration to the affectionate intimacy of sons with their Father. And it is for this that the Father longs".<sup>145</sup> Stephen Spencer, for one, argues that these – the critique of the judicial court imagery and the restoration of relationships – are perhaps worth a reappraisal.<sup>146</sup> There is, perhaps, more that Temple could offer. Temple argues that the real concern of the penal-substitutionary theory is that moral law and morality are cheapened if forgiveness is given so freely.<sup>147</sup> But that which is free is not necessarily cheap. God's forgiveness came at great cost. Calvary and Gethsemane showed the cost of deep pain and agony inflicted on Christ. In fact, Temple believed that God shares in the suffering of Christ. In other words, Temple disagreed with divine impassibility. This was clearly articulated in *CV*. Temple notes that divine impassibility derives from Aristotle's apathetic God. It became entrenched as an "idol ... so hard to destroy" in the early Greek Fathers and eventually the first of the Anglican Thirty-Nine Articles where God is described as being "without passion".<sup>148</sup> This is true to a certain extent. God is not given to whims, not capricious, and never surprised. But the term more commonly came to mean that God is incapable of suffering, which Temple believes to be incorrect. God can suffer, or as Temple nuances, it is more accurate to say that there is suffering in God. Temple writes like a Moltmannian before Jürgen Moltmann:

The revelation of God's dealing with human sin shows God enduring every depth of anguish for the sake of His children. What is portrayed under the figure of physical suffering and literal blood-shedding is only a part of the pain which sin inflicts on God. We see Him suffering the absolute frustration of His Will. We see Him in the abyss of despair, as perfect adherence to right seems to end in utter failure. We hear from the Cross the Cry which expresses nothing less than the agonised dread that God has failed himself, has failed to be God... All that we can suffer of physical or mental anguish is

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<sup>145</sup> Temple, *CV*, 258.

<sup>146</sup> Spencer, *Christ in All Things*, 55.

<sup>147</sup> Temple, *CV*, 259–261.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 269.

within the divine experience; He has known it all Himself. He does not leave this world to suffer while He remains at ease apart; all the suffering of the world is His.<sup>149</sup>

The suffering of God exonerates Him from the accusation that forgiveness freely given cheapens the moral law and morality. There is no need for recourse to the penal-substitutionary theory.<sup>150</sup> What is important is the fact that God has to come in a person in order to win our hearts and change our wills. This comes back to Temple's idea of personal or relational revelation we surveyed in chapter two. God must incarnate as a Person so that all people might see and understand.<sup>151</sup>

Specifically, we witness Christ's love and suffering, and we are moved by it to respond. This is the heart of Temple's understanding of the work of Christ. Sympathy is the key to this understanding. He wrote in his essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize that "the fundamental characteristic of the Lord is His sympathy or love, universal in comprehension and infinite in depth".<sup>152</sup> This is explicated further in *CV* that "[f]rom Him [i.e., Christ] a new influence goes forth, the attractive power and compelling appeal of perfectly holy love, expressed in the human fashion that calls forth sympathy".<sup>153</sup> Temple explains in a footnote that the possibility of sympathy in theology and especially in the work of Christ has seldom received sufficient attention. Sympathy is not "merely [the] sentimental reaction on the part of a completely separate 'self' ... [but] a real union of personality through an experience in which both share, it is always a true atonement".<sup>154</sup> Temple's idea is that humans are social. We are affected by other humans and by what happens to them. We are unable to be completely indifferent to the love or the suffering of others. Thus, the only power that can evoke humans to willingly submit to be removed from self-centredness to God-centredness is "love expressed in sacrifice".<sup>155</sup> Force cannot achieve this result "because it does not convert heart or Will"

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 269–270.

<sup>150</sup> Ramsey noted Temple's stance against divine impassibility in *CV*. He also noted the careful way in which Temple seems to nuance it. Ramsey writes that for Temple "God suffers, not as one who is thwarted: but as one who wills to suffer in His Purpose as supreme Creator and victorious Redeemer; and if we say that He suffers we may never pity Him". Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 58–59.

<sup>151</sup> Temple, *CV*, 260; Temple, *NMG*, 520.

<sup>152</sup> Temple, *Essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize at Oxford University*.

<sup>153</sup> Temple, *CV*, 218.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 400.

whereas sacrifice does.<sup>156</sup> This is what Temple means when he writes that Christ “can only be my apparent good and so dominate my Self if He both is, and, in a form quickening my sympathy, manifestly displays itself as, utterly selfless love”.<sup>157</sup> Through sympathy, Christ’s suffering and sacrifice draws us in such that we “cannot fail to respond”.<sup>158</sup> Thus Temple’s idea that “[l]ove, by its own sacrifice of itself, wins back answering love”.<sup>159</sup> The love of God, expressed in the life and death of Christ, evokes a response that calls us out from our self-centredness and self-will to a fellowship with God and our neighbours.

As this happens, we are induced into a change of will. This is the key exchange that takes place in Temple’s understanding of the atonement. We are drawn to Christ through sympathy such that our will begins to align and correspond to Christ’s Will.<sup>160</sup> Temple gives the example of pleasing a beloved friend. Our conduct is determined by our friend’s pleasure as we direct our actions to please them. We take on their preferences and desires as ours. In doing so, our will, including our choices and actions, is now determined by that friend.<sup>161</sup> Our volition is not annulled. Instead, we are willingly choosing to align our will with that friend’s will to please them. This is what happens as we sympathise with Christ. His perfect love and perfect sacrifice draw us in as a beloved friend such that our will aligns and corresponds with His Will. Temple describes such a person in *NMG* as:

[T]he man who is conscious of the appeal of divine grace winning the response of his heart and will, especially if with this he is conscious of an infinite cost to the divine love willingly accepted, which saves that appeal itself from the charge of moral indifference and at the same time makes it effective.<sup>162</sup>

Temple contends that this is the way it had to be done so that God could draw humans to himself without annulling their will or overriding their freedom.<sup>163</sup> As Temple claims, “[i]f I am to be changed, something must lay hold of me and change me – not by force or by deception,

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<sup>156</sup> Temple, *CV*, 206.

<sup>157</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 520.

<sup>158</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 253–254. Quote from 254.

<sup>159</sup> William Temple, *The Baslow Retreat on Christianity and the War*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.67, fol.68.

<sup>160</sup> Temple, "The Divinity of Christ," 254-255.

<sup>161</sup> Temple, *CV*, 218–219.

<sup>162</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 414.

<sup>163</sup> Temple, *CV*, 218.

for then my will is unchanged after all, but by winning my free devotion".<sup>164</sup> Temple's idea of the work of Christ is thus more Abelardian. The atonement is accomplished in a more subjective way through influence and sympathy.<sup>165</sup> Christ's objective sacrifice on the Cross elicits an answering love from humans. The sinner is won out of sin as God draws them unto Himself in Christ and induces a change in will. The sinner begins to align their will with Christ's Will as a beloved friend.<sup>166</sup> And as chapter two on Christology has shown, Christ's Will *is* God's Will because His human will was subsumed within His divine Will. In other words, the sinner effectively takes on God's Will as his own. The ideal of a complete personality is now possible because the seat of sin, i.e. the will, has been redeemed and transformed.

Temple makes the case for sympathy using a different line of logic. He argues for it through the idea of value or good which we explored in chapter one. God created the world for value. Value is thus prior to existence such that all created things are either inherently or latently good. Humans are unique in their ability to apprehend value. This is because God desires fellowship such that humans are the necessary counterpart to God's creation of value by being able to apprehend it and thereby realise value. However, humans misapprehend value because of their self-centredness. They do not pursue what is truly good, but their own apparent good. This is sin, and it breaks humans fellowship with God. However, Christ comes as the manifestation of perfect love, or, the fulfilment of all the finite value or good. Moreover, He manifests perfect love in the Incarnate form of a person such that all humans can understand and relate to Him. Christ is therefore the real or supreme good. Humans are drawn to Him and desire Him as their apparent good. In this case, however, the apparent good *is* the true good. Given that humans are determined by "the attraction of, and responsiveness to, apparent good",<sup>167</sup> Christ is therefore able to elicit humans out of their self-centredness and self-will into an answering love.<sup>168</sup> This is the same point made in the concluding words of *NMG*:

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<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, 256.

<sup>165</sup> Temple writes on the tension between the objective and subjective aspects of the atonement. He argues that both should be held in tension. The atonement is objectively something accomplished, and it is accomplished *for* us. Humans cannot accomplish their own atonement. Yet, it is something that is also accomplished *in* us. See Temple, *FMT*, 137–138.

<sup>166</sup> Temple, *CV*, 259, 261.

<sup>167</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 478.

<sup>168</sup> Temple, *CV*, 270–271.

The Supreme Good can only be my apparent good and so dominate my Self if it both is, and, in a form quickening my sympathy, manifestly displays itself as, utterly selfless love. In order to evoke the full sympathy of human personalities, the form of its self-manifestation must be a human personality, subject to all human limitations, yet never yielding to the temptation arising from its finitude to prefer its own interests to that universal good which is the will of God – in other words, a finite self whose apparent good is the real good.<sup>169</sup>

In my mind, this is a remarkable take on the philosophical themes of value and apparent good that blends in Temple's own novel ideas of sympathy, personality, and fellowship. Christ incarnates as a human person so that it is in a form that humans can understand and sympathise with. He is the real and supreme good that supplants all our self-willed apparent goods. Humans are under no compulsion to surrender their will to Christ, but under the persuasive influence to pursue Him as their apparent good. The mechanism that brought about sin is now transmuted for good. Importantly, the volitional element in humans remains freely and truly theirs. Because the method is that of sympathetic persuasion, the choice to will Christ as the apparent and truly good remains firmly with humans.

A big question remains unanswered. How does sympathy draw us to Christ such that we take on His Will as our will? Temple's answer is unexpected and interesting. It is accomplished through worship. He writes in *NMG*: "How is the Supreme Good to be my apparent good in such wise as to win from me the submission of my conscience, the subjection of my will, the adoration of my heart – in one word, my worship?"<sup>170</sup> Or again in *RSJG*:

For worship is the submission of all our nature to God. It is the quickening of conscience by His holiness; the nourishment of mind with His truth; the purifying of imagination by His beauty; the opening of the heart to His love; the surrender of will to His purpose – and all of this gathered up in adoration, the most selfless emotion of which our nature is capable and therefore the chief remedy for that self-centredness

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<sup>169</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 520.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 519–520.

which is our original sin and the source of all actual sin. Yes – worship in spirit and truth is the way to the solution of perplexity and to the liberation from sin.<sup>171</sup>

The same point was made in a sermon that Temple preached at Exeter Cathedral in 1922 titled “The Spirit of Worship”, now kept at Lambeth Palace Archives. Preaching on John 4:24, Temple says that worship in its perfection “is [the] surrender of the will to the purpose of God, the acceptance of His will in place of our own”.<sup>172</sup> It is through worship that self-centredness is destroyed, through the total self-submission and self-giving to the object of worship.<sup>173</sup> Temple does not clarify the mechanics of this. We do not know exactly how worship removes our self-centredness and self-will to take on God’s Will as ours. But a clue might be given from a point made in the earlier section that aesthetic contemplation can lead to the suspension of the human will. Temple links this contemplation to worship. He writes in *MC* that “the aesthetic experience at its highest is on the point of passing into worship”.<sup>174</sup> We could infer that through the act of worship humans are so caught up in the contemplation of the object of worship that their self-will is suspended. It is so captivated that the human will relinquishes its need for action or assertion such that the surrender, submission, and exchange can take place. It is perhaps in this way that worship, or the aesthetic contemplation of God, is the solution to sin. In our estimation, this corresponds with Temple’s more subjective atonement where Christ wins and draws the sinner through influence and sympathy. It is a softer approach in which the sinner is beckoned, yet fully retains their volition to reply in answering love or choosing to engage in worship.

The last point to made regarding Temple’s understanding of the work of Christ is the clear social dimension to it. The coming of Christ brings a new and powerful influence into humanity’s social environment. It sparks the possibility of a perfected fellowship which was previously unattainable. Temple writes towards the conclusion of his chapter on the person of Christ in *CV*:

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<sup>171</sup> Temple, *RSJG*, 68.

<sup>172</sup> William Temple, *The Spirit of Worship*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.68, fol.1–8.

<sup>173</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 518–519.

<sup>174</sup> Temple, *MC*, 161.

Into this system of mutually influencing units Christ has come; but here is a unit perfectly capable, as others are only imperfectly capable, both of personal union with all other persons and of refusing to be influenced by the evil of His environment. It is this more than anything else which proves Him to be more and other than His fellow-men. But thus He inaugurates a new system of influence; and as this corresponds to God's Will for mankind, its appeal is to the true nature of men. So He is a Second Adam; what occurred at the Incarnation was not merely the addition of another unit to the system of mutually influencing units, it was the inauguration of a new system of mutual influence, destined to become, here or elsewhere, universally dominant. "By His Incarnation", therefore, the Lord did indeed "raise our humanity to an entirely higher level, to a level with His own"; but this was not accomplished by the unspiritual process of an infusion of an alien "nature" but by the spiritual process of mutual influence and love that calls forth love.<sup>175</sup>

This passage ties together many of the points discussed in this chapter. The coming of Christ introduces a new, perfect, and influential element into humanity's social environment. A person's social environment, as we saw above, plays an important part in the forming of their will. Christ thus opens new possibilities. Humans can be delivered from their sin, and through the process of mutual influence, the whole social environment can be redeemed and delivered too. Christ's effect is that of a second Adam. While the first Adam introduces sin, the second Adam introduces the solution to sin: that is, a Person who completely obeys and corresponds with God's Will. Humans are attracted to this, and so begins a new influence spreading through the intricate network of social organism. What is important to note is the emphasis Temple places on the change in social environment. In other words, a perfected fellowship is now possible. The work of Christ is therefore significant not only for individual redemption, but for the redemption of the whole of society and humanity.

The outworking of this relates to fellowship. We saw earlier that forgiveness is primarily about the restoration of relationships. However, Temple stressed that the relationships being restored were not only between God and the individual, but between individuals as well. This was simply the truth of the Lord's Prayer. God forgives our debts as

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<sup>175</sup> Temple, CV, 152. The in-text citation was from Temple's father, Fedrick Temple.

we forgive our debtors. God's forgiveness of humans and humans' forgiveness of one another are "bound up in each other".<sup>176</sup> Temple nuances that these two acts of forgiveness are related not as cause and effect, but as the obverse and reverse faces of the same spiritual coin. To be forgiven by God is to be restored to fellowship with Him. But being in fellowship with God means that we are in the constant experience of God's self-forgetting and self-giving love. We are influenced by it to forgive others. Temple goes as far as to say that "He [i.e., God] *can* only forgive us, as we forgive our brothers".<sup>177</sup> This is what Temple means when he writes that forgiveness is meant to "reconstitute the unity of the divine and humans".<sup>178</sup> It is not just the unity *between* the Divine and humans, but a unity *amongst* the Divine *and* all humans. Consider what Temple writes in *CV*:

To forgive is to restore to the old intimacy; there can be no intimacy between God and me in so far as I set my will against His. Moreover, I am only one of His family. He cannot restore me to the freedom of the family if there is ill-will in me against the other members of it.<sup>179</sup>

Forgiveness is the restoration of relationships, but that involves the restoration of intimacy. Through forgiveness, the broken picture of God and humanity caused by the Fall begins to piece back together as one renewed whole. Or to put it simply, there is now a renewed and restored fellowship between God and all humans. Restored fellowship with God through forgiveness necessitates the same restoration and forgiveness of others. This is why Temple writes in *NMG* that salvation "is in its own nature a fellowship primarily with God, and secondarily (and derivatively) of all souls with one another".<sup>180</sup> Salvation is fellowship with both God and fellow humans. John Christopher Stuart was right in his analysis that effecting fellowship was the central concern of the Incarnation for Temple.<sup>181</sup> His comparative study of Temple and Michael Ramsey found that God's purposive desire for fellowship was at the heart of both men's rationale of the Incarnation, and not any payment of debt for sin.<sup>182</sup> Both

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<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 265.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, 264–265. Quote from 265.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, 265.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 258–259.

<sup>180</sup> Temple, *NMG*, 415.

<sup>181</sup> Stuart, *Rationale for the Incarnation*, 13.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 207.

Temple and Ramsey understood God as desiring a restored and deeper fellowship with all humans. Clearly, Temple's understanding of the work of Christ has a social dimension to it. Robert Craig articulates this powerfully in an article:

There is thus in Temple's thought a clear connection between soteriology and sociology, for it is through the work of Christ that man is placed in this proper relationship to God and to his fellow-men. Temple's Christian social teaching thus rests on his account of the person and work of Christ ... <sup>183</sup>

He reiterates this point in his book on Temple:

This is the saving work of Christ which is thus the ground of a Christian society. We find therefore in Temple's teaching that at the basis of a Christian sociology, or teaching concerning social order, there lies Christian soteriology, the account of the saving work of Christ.<sup>184</sup>

God's salvific work in Christ inaugurates new possibilities not only for the individual to be saved from their sin, but for society to be renewed. For Temple, sociology rests on soteriology. A good Christian social teaching and society order rests on the work of Christ.

This section has explored Temple's understanding of the work of Christ. The atonement is construed in a more Abelardian direction emphasising the subjective response of human beings. Christ's love and sacrifice appeals to the sympathy of humans where a real union of personality occurs. Humans' response is elicited through influence rather than compulsion. They are induced into a change of will where they align their will with Christ's Will. This can be accomplished through worship. Worship is the highest aesthetic experience where the human will is suspended. Yet, the most interesting facet of Temple's understanding of the work of Christ is the clear focus on a social or societal dimension. Salvation is not only the restoration of fellowship with God, but the restoration of fellowship between fellow humans.

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<sup>183</sup> Craig, "Reasonable Christology."

<sup>184</sup> Craig, *Social Concern*, 76.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the different facets of Temple's theological anthropology. It is clear that the category of the will plays a central role yet again. The human will functions almost like the nexus of the human being. It is what gives rise to their self-consciousness, self-determination, and the faculty under which all else within a person seeks to be integrated. The formation of the human will is due to a complex and dynamic interplay of factors. It is a function of initial endowment, the fashioning of education, the imagination, and one's social environment. The ideal state that humans strive for is the inner unity of a completed personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. This, however, is elusive because of the sin of self-centredness that causes self-will. The solution cannot be found within humanity itself but must come from without. It requires the redeeming work of Christ. Christ's love and sacrifice elicits sympathy from humans as they are drawn to Him. In doing so, they are induced into a change of will as they begin to align and correspond their will with Christ's Will. Humans are thus lifted from their self-will to take on Christ's Will. Their volition, however, is not annulled because it is their choice to respond to Christ's love with an answering love.

## Chapter Four

### **Ecclesiology: The Body of Christ as the Organ of His Will**

#### **Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Temple's ecclesiology. His doctrine of the Church is centred upon his dominant use of the Pauline image of the Church as the Body of Christ. But what is unique about Temple's ecclesiology is the way he employed the category of the will. Temple held that the Church as the Body of Christ is the organ or instrument of Christ's Will.<sup>1</sup> The Church is therefore a dynamic and living Body that interacts with other bodies in society in seeking to accomplish the Will of Christ. This supports our hypothesis that the category of the will is central to Temple's theology, and the bridge between his theology and his social theology.

Our methodology so far has been to focus on Temple's three main books, *MC*, *CV*, and *NMG*. However, as we have indicated in the introduction, we will depart from this methodology for the next two chapters. This is because there was little discussion on ecclesiology in these books due to their nature. *MC* was intended as a philosophical work.<sup>2</sup> Its sequel, *CV*, is theological but aims to develop a Christocentric metaphysics.<sup>3</sup> *NMG* was Temple's Gifford Lectures, which were meant to explore natural theology.<sup>4</sup> The nature and purpose of each of these books did not lend itself to the discussion of the doctrine of the Church. That being the case, there are some useful chapters in each. Temple discusses ecclesiology in two chapters in *MC*, namely, chapter XXIV "The Church and Christendom" and chapter XXV "The Kingdom of God and the Holy Spirit". *CV* also has a chapter (IX) titled "The Holy Spirit and the Church". Likewise, *NMG* has a chapter (XVI) that is essentially about the Church, which is titled "The Commonwealth of Value". This Commonwealth is the fellowship

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<sup>1</sup> Temple uses the terms "organ" and "instrument" interchangeably. We will, however, use the term "organ" because it gives a better sense of the active and organic nature of the Church as the Body of Christ. It also helps to contrast against the State which Temple understands as the organ of the national community. This will be explored in the next chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Temple, *MC*, vii.

<sup>3</sup> Temple, *CV*, vii–ix.

<sup>4</sup> Temple, *NMG*, vii.

and unity of all spirits across all time in which every individual fully perceives Value and therefore fully apprehends God.<sup>5</sup>

The lack of discussion of the doctrine of the Church in Temple's main works does not imply that ecclesiology was unimportant for him. Rather, his thoughts on the topic were diffused throughout his many smaller books, sermons, speeches, and journal articles.<sup>6</sup> Putting his writings together and analysing them synchronically, there is strong evidence that Temple has a defined and distinctive ecclesiology. It is one that is built on the Pauline image of the Church as the Body of Christ.<sup>7</sup> Pertinent to our argument is the way in which Temple understood the Church as the Body of Christ to be the organ of His Will. This chapter will look at four different areas of Temple's ecclesiology. Firstly, we will survey the academic debate about whether Temple had a defined ecclesiology. Next, we will explore Temple's understanding of the Church as the Body of Christ. It seems that he took the Pauline image in a strongly realist sense and construed the Church as the extension or continuation of the Incarnation. Thirdly, we will study what the Church as the Body of Christ seeks to accomplish. Temple argued that the Church as the Body of Christ is the organ of His Will that seeks to gather all humanity as one person in Christ. Lastly, we will trace Temple's uncompromising view that the Church must be the Body of Christ in the society in an active, visible, and interactive way.

### **Whither a Defined Ecclesiology?**

Debate and confusion exist as to whether Temple had a clear doctrine of the Church. Some older commentators seem to think that he did not. They tend to give one of two reasons. Firstly, some contend that Temple's theology was lacking in general. Stephen Sykes, for example, criticised Temple for lacking doctrinal clarity in his attempt to be comprehensive.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 422.

<sup>6</sup> For example: Temple, *Kingdom of God*; William Temple, *Church and Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1915); Temple, *CHC*; William Temple, *Christianity and the State* (London: Macmillan, 1928); Temple, *CTT*; Temple, *CC*; William Temple, *What Christians Stand For in the Secular World* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965); Temple, *CLF*.

<sup>7</sup> Dackson arrived at the same conclusion. Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 6.

<sup>8</sup> Stephen Sykes, *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (London: Mowbrays, 1978), 28–33, 55–59. However, this criticism is a straw-man argument. Sykes mainly refers to Temple's Introduction to the 1938 *Doctrine in the Church of England* report. While this may be a fair reference point for Sykes to make his case that Anglicanism lacked doctrinal clarity, it is unfair for Sykes to say that Temple lacked it too. Temple was writing in his capacity as the chairperson of the commission and giving a summary of the findings. This does not express Temple's own view as a theologian as set forth in his numerous other works.

Likewise, Ronald Preston and Alan Suggate both expressed to Wendy Dackson during her research that they doubted that Temple had a defined ecclesiology. Preston told Dackson that Temple's earlier books were barely worth reading, and that only *CASO* had any continuing value.<sup>9</sup> This corroborates what Preston wrote elsewhere. He stated on more than one occasion that *MC* and *CV* were unreadable; only *NMG* gave some limited insights.<sup>10</sup> Suggate also informed Dackson that Temple's three main theological works were useful, but along with *CASO*, their social ethics was bound to their time and place. It might be inferred that Temple's ecclesiology may be outdated too.<sup>11</sup> This is in line with Suggate's own research, which gave Temple's ecclesiology only a cursory glance.<sup>12</sup> These authors thus make the implicit claim that Temple lacked a distinctive theology let alone a distinctive ecclesiology.

A second reason why some commentators contend that Temple lacked a clear ecclesiology pertains to a famous quotation from *CASO*. Temple stated that nine-tenths of the Church's work is accomplished indirectly by the laity in their daily lives and work.<sup>13</sup> It was then concluded that the main point of Temple's ecclesiology was the leavening effect of Christians in the world. The Church, in and of itself, was relatively unimportant, other than in maintaining its worship. Dackson noted that such a view was true of Preston and Suggate.<sup>14</sup> Other authors who have done research on Temple, such as Robert Craig and Joseph Fletcher, also focus on the leavening effect of Christians when surveying his ecclesiology.<sup>15</sup>

In contrast to these views, Owen Thomas was one of the first to declare that, in Temple's thought, ecclesiology was second only to the Incarnation.<sup>16</sup> While Thomas could only offer a quick sketch, Dackson has since stepped in to fill in the gaps. Dackson's research focuses solely on Temple's ecclesiology. She argued that he had a clear and rich doctrine of the Church, one that should rightly be termed a political ecclesiology.<sup>17</sup> The Church is a living, dynamic, and interactive organism that relates to others in British society and the wider global

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<sup>9</sup> They expressed this to Dackson on her research trip in England in the fall of 1998. Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 3.

<sup>10</sup> Preston, *Future of Christian Ethics*, 100; Preston, "William Temple," 5.

<sup>11</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 3.

<sup>12</sup> Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 58–59.

<sup>13</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 17.

<sup>14</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 4, 67–68.

<sup>15</sup> Craig, *Social Concern*, chapter V & VI ; Fletcher, *William Temple*, chapter III, X & XI.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas, "William Temple," 116.

<sup>17</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 7, 245–246. Dackson builds on Temple's ecclesiology to construct a political ecclesiology that seeks to baptise the nations. She argues that such an ecclesiology is more full-bodied and robust than recent Anglican authors such as Milbank and O'Donovan.

context.<sup>18</sup> Suggate has since been persuaded by Dackson's work. He writes in the Preface to her book that she has made a compelling case that Temple's ecclesiology is "far richer than most have acknowledged".<sup>19</sup> In addition to this, Edward Loane has examined Temple's reflections on Church unity and affirmed that Temple did have a distinct ecclesiology. Refuting Sykes' criticism above, Loane argued that Temple should rightly be termed as an "ecclesiological complementarian". The different parties within the Church can contribute important facets of the truth to the whole. This was not being comprehensive but complementary.<sup>20</sup> We could also add William Sachs and Mark Chapman to this list, although their work does not focus entirely on Temple, unlike Dackson and Loane. Sachs offered that Temple's vision of the Church has left an indelible mark on Anglicanism and its ministry.<sup>21</sup> Chapman cites Temple (and Michael Ramsey) as modern examples of the continued Cyprianic tradition of provincial authority as opposed to a centralised authority. He points out, for example, that Temple's case for Church unity was centred on a shared faith in Christ, and not the Petrine commission nor any visible or outward union.<sup>22</sup>

In our view, the evidence adduced by the more careful studies of Dackson and Loane is more convincing than the *prima facie* dismissal of Temple by authors such as Sykes and Preston. It is interesting that Dackson's and Loane's work comes in the new millennium, over fifty years after Temple's death. Perhaps, a bit of distance in hindsight yields clearer vision. Our own study of Temple's works seems to point to the fact that he does indeed have a clear doctrine of the Church. In fact, his thoughts on ecclesiology remain relatively consistent over his lifetime; his main points and emphasises are largely the same. To a certain extent, this indicates a settled, defined, and distinctive ecclesiology.

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 74-75.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, ii.

<sup>20</sup> Loane, *Temple & Church Unity*, 10.

<sup>21</sup> Sachs, *Transformation*, 269.

<sup>22</sup> Mark D. Chapman, *Bishops, Saints and Politics: Anglican Studies* (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 46-48.

## The Church as the Body of Christ

Temple draws on two Pauline ideas in his understanding of the Church.<sup>23</sup> To a lesser extent, he held that the Church is the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit (2 Cor 13:13, Php 2:1).<sup>24</sup> We will examine this further in the next section. However, the predominant image that Temple drew on was the Church as the Body of Christ. (1 Cor 12:12–27, Rom 12:4, Eph 4:4–13, Col 1:18, etc.). He used this extensively as the main way he understood and explained the Church.<sup>25</sup> He wrote in 1906 in his essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize, which we mentioned in chapter three, that the Church is the Body of Christ.<sup>26</sup> Or, in another article for the Student Movement in 1915, titled “The Baslow Retreat on Christianity and the War”, also kept at the Lambeth Archives, that the “Church now is His Body on earth, and we are the members of that body”.<sup>27</sup> Even in one of his last books, *CASO* (1942), he continued to see the Church as the Body of Christ.<sup>28</sup>

The image of the Body of Christ had received renewed attention at the turn of the twentieth century. It was felt that it fittingly expressed the more communal element of the faith. The Church was the community of the redeemed people of God. The atonement not only redeems the individual, but also reconciles the whole of humanity to Christ and to one another.<sup>29</sup> As we saw in chapter three, Temple espoused a similar understanding of the work of Christ as restoring the fellowship between God and humans, as well as amongst fellow humans. The Church is therefore not only the gathering of those who have been redeemed by God, but the gathering of those who have been restored in relationship to one another. It is a community of fellowship with God and one another. Temple explains this clearly in one of his earlier books, *The Kingdom of God*. He writes that “St. Paul's doctrine [is] that Christian people are linked together in a society which is to be the organ of the Will of Christ, and which,

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<sup>23</sup> Dackson would add to this the images of the Church as a city and army which are subordinated to the image of the Church as the Body of Christ. Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 88–91.

<sup>24</sup> For example, Temple, *MC*, 329, 348–350; Temple, *CV*, 154–155, 168; Temple, *CHC*, 13; Temple, *What Christians Stand For*, 8; William Temple, *Fellowship with God* (London: Macmillan, 1920), 150.

<sup>25</sup> For example, Temple, “The Church,” 340; Temple, *MC*, 333; Temple, *CV*, 162, 167; Temple, *Fellowship with God*, 151; Temple, *CHC*, 3, 9; Temple, *CTT*, 5; Temple, *CC*, 44.

<sup>26</sup> Temple, *Essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize at Oxford University*.

<sup>27</sup> Temple, *The Baslow Retreat on Christianity and the War*.

<sup>28</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 15.

<sup>29</sup> Horton Davies, *Worship and Theology in England: From Newman to Martineau, 1850–1900*, 5 vols., vol. 4 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 197–198. Davis noted that among those who espoused a more cosmic atonement were thinkers like Moberly and Forsyth.

on that account, may be called His Body".<sup>30</sup> The Church as the Body of Christ expresses that communal or social aspect of the Christian faith. Christians are not atomised believers but members of a community that jointly constitutes the Church, each bringing a distinctive contribution.<sup>31</sup>

What is interesting about Temple's understanding of the image is the fact that he seemed to interpret it with a strongly realist understanding. The Church is understood to be the Body of Christ in the same way as the physiological body of Jesus Christ was. He writes in *CV* that "through the physical organism which was His Body Christ spoke the words of eternal life, so through the Church which is His Body He speaks them still".<sup>32</sup> Or again, in his *Repton School Sermons*, that the Church is "His Body – the instrument of His Will and Spirit as His Fleshly Body was in the days of His earthly ministry".<sup>33</sup> Or yet again, in *CASO*, that the Church is the Body of Christ and it is to be "the instrument or organ of His will, as His fleshly Body was in the days of His earthly ministry".<sup>34</sup> Clearly, Temple understood the image in a realist way and interpreted the Church as the Body of Christ to be directly equivalent to Jesus' physiological body.

It is likely that, because of this, Temple went on to construe the Church as the continuation or extension of the Incarnation. He states in *CV* that the Church is the "direct outcome of the divine act of the Incarnation and the continuance of its principle".<sup>35</sup> Or again, a few pages later, that the Church that receives the Holy Spirit "involves an extension of the conception of God similar to that involved by the Incarnation".<sup>36</sup> The Incarnate Christ gives rise to and continues as the Church. So just as Christ was the fact of the Incarnation, the Church as the Body of Christ is the continuation of the Incarnation. This idea was not unique to Temple. Ramsey and Thomas Langford remind us that it was commonplace in Anglican thought.<sup>37</sup> Ramsey traces the phrase back to Jeremy Taylor, who in his book *The Worthy*

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<sup>30</sup> Temple, *Kingdom of God*, 69.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Temple, *CV*, 251.

<sup>33</sup> William Temple, *Repton School Sermons: Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation: Being the Sermons Preached in Repton School Chapel between September 1910 and July 1912* (London: Macmillan, 1914), 2–3.

<sup>34</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 15.

<sup>35</sup> Temple, *CV*, 166. Temple also described the Eucharist as the extension of the Incarnation. *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>37</sup> Michael Ramsey, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), 5; Langford, *In Search*, 159.

*Communicant* used the extension of the Incarnation to reference the Eucharist.<sup>38</sup> It was Charles Gore who gave currency to the idea of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation during this period.<sup>39</sup> Gore writes in different places that the Church is “an extension of the principle and fact of the Incarnation”.<sup>40</sup> Gore was, of course, influential on Temple. Temple had written of his affection and gratitude to Gore “from whom I learnt more than from any other now living of the Spirit of Christianity”.<sup>41</sup> G. L. Prestige also credits Temple with this tribute to Gore: “[t]hough I have had many tutors in Christ, he was perhaps above all others my father; and so far as I can picture Jesus Christ, I picture him as not unlike the father I have lost”.<sup>42</sup> It would not be surprising if Temple had followed Gore in this aspect of his ecclesiology.

One possible reason for such an understanding was to push back against the notion of the Church as simply a gathering of Christians. This view goes back to John Locke’s idea of voluntary religion. The Christian faith should not be compulsory, but a free choice made by individuals. The Church is thus a voluntary organisation where members are free to join or leave. Temple carefully argues against this. He contends that the State may view the Church as a voluntary gathering because there is no legal compulsion to be part of it. But in its own view, the Church is not a voluntary society. It is a supernatural creation of God as the extension of the Incarnation. Temple declares in *CV* that the Church is “the direct outcome of the divine act of the Incarnation and the continuance of its principle. It is not constituted by separate individuals deciding to come together. It consists of their actual union in response to the divine act”.<sup>43</sup> The divine origins and nature of the Church repudiate the idea that it is a merely a free gathering of people. Temple would often employ this line of argument in his writings against the idea of the Church as a voluntary gathering.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 115. See Jeremy Taylor, *The Worthy Communicant* (London: Printed for Richard Wellington at the Dolphin and Crown in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1701), Chapter 1, §2.

<sup>39</sup> Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 115–116; Langford, *In Search*, 148–150; Ulrike Link-Wieczorek, “Mediating Anglicanism: Maurice, Gore, and Temple,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-century Theology*, ed. David Fergusson (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 291.

<sup>40</sup> Charles Gore, *The Holy Spirit and the Church* (London: John Murray, 1924), 146–147; See also *The Church and the Ministry* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919), 48.

<sup>41</sup> In his dedication of the book, *Studies in the Spirit and Truth of Christianity*, to Gore. William Temple, *Studies in the Spirit and Truth of Christianity: Being University and School Sermons* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914).

<sup>42</sup> G. L. Prestige, *The Life of Charles Gore* (London: William Heinemann, 1935), 538.

<sup>43</sup> Temple, *CV*, 166. Same idea in Temple, *CN*, 26. Or from a different line of logic, that the Church continues as a supernatural gathering where people become members under the impulse of the Holy Spirit and through the sacrament of Baptism. Temple, *CC*, 40.

<sup>44</sup> For example, Temple, *Repton*, 288; Temple, *CC*, 46.

We should note that Temple seemed alert to the fact that the empirical reality of imperfection in the Church formed a powerful critique against such an understanding of the Church as the Body of Christ and extension of the Incarnation. He writes in various places about the reality of imperfection and sin in the Church. In *CV*, for example, Temple explains that the Church can only be perfect and ideal when all its members are wholly surrendered and united to Christ. But he laments that the “ideal Church does not exist and never has existed; some day, here or elsewhere, it will exist; meanwhile its ‘members’ are members also of ‘the world’”.<sup>45</sup> However, this is not a failure of the Church but a failure of Christians. It is the failure of Christians to be thoroughly Christian.<sup>46</sup> The same idea is conveyed in his essay “The Church”, in *Foundations*. The empirical Church is far from ideal because “the body contains imperfect and even vicious members”.<sup>47</sup> The members of the Body are the ones who are the cause of imperfection. Langford thus noted that Temple, while presenting the Church as the extension of the Incarnation, was careful to distinguish that perfection belonged to Christ alone while imperfection will continue to be found in the Church.<sup>48</sup> The empirical reality of an imperfect Church is not an indictment or refutation of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation, but the reality that Christians who constitute the Church remain only partially surrendered to Christ.

This section has examined Temple’s main image of the Church as the Body of Christ. He seemed to understand it in a realist sense such that the Church continues to minister as the physiological Body of Christ did during His earthly ministry. It is likely that this led to the striking affirmation that the Church as the Body of Christ is the continuation or extension of the Incarnation. This was commonplace in Anglican thought then. The reality of shortcomings and sin in the Church reflects the imperfection of Christians rather than the imperfection of Christ or the Church itself. It does not negate the Church’s nature as the continuation of the Incarnation.

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<sup>45</sup> Temple, *CV*, 167.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>47</sup> Or again that “The Church is the body of Christ, the organism which moves spontaneously in obedience to His Will; so far as that is not true of us, we are failing to be the Church. If that failure became complete, there would be no Church – no body of Christ – at all, but only a mass of paralysed limbs, only a heap of branches severed from the vine and ready for burning. But in the worst days it has never become complete; nor can we believe that God would ever let it be so”. Temple, *PRLF*, 70–71.

<sup>48</sup> Langford, *In Search*, 159.

## The Body of Christ as the Organ of His Will

If the Church is the Body of Christ and the continuation of the Incarnation, then it follows that the ministry of Christ would concomitantly be taken on by the Church as its own ministry of the Church. Temple expressed this by describing the Church as the organ or instrument of Christ. Once again, such an idea was not out of place within Anglican thought then. Prominent Anglican theologians such as Gore and Leonard Hodgson had used the same idea.<sup>49</sup> However, Temple seems unique in relating it to Christ's Will. He frequently wrote that the Church as the Body of Christ is the organ or instrument of Christ's Will.<sup>50</sup> As Temple puts it, the Church is the "instrument of His Will and Spirit as His Fleshly Body was in the days of His earthly ministry".<sup>51</sup> Or again, that the Church "serves as the organ of His will in that accomplishment through the world of the Divine Purpose".<sup>52</sup> The Church is not generically the organ of Christ as Gore and Hodgson saw it, but specifically the organ of Christ's Will. This reinforces the central thesis of this dissertation that the category of the will was central to Temple's theology.

Temple did not seem to explain *how* the Church was the organ of Christ's Will. He often wrote of it as if it were a given fact. It is likely that this was a natural outworking of his Christology. As we have seen in chapter two on Christology, Temple preferred the category of the will over the traditional metaphysical category of substance. Christ had two Wills – a human will and a divine Will. But his human will was subsumed within his divine Will and was actualised in the Person of the Logos. This was possible because of Temple's understanding of the integrative effect of the will. Given that Temple's Christology was built upon the category of the will, it comes naturally that his ecclesiology should also feature the will. As Temple contended, the Church as the Body of Christ naturally takes on the characteristics of its Head.<sup>53</sup> The Church as the continuation of the Incarnation is therefore a continuation of Christ's Will in the world.

While Temple is not clear about *how* the Church is the organ of Christ's Will, he is consistent and emphatic about *what* the Church as the organ of Christ's Will seeks to

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<sup>49</sup> Gore, *Spirit and Church*, ix; Leonard Hodgson, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (London: Nisbet, 1951), 99.

<sup>50</sup> Temple, "The Church," 340, 359; Temple, *MC*, 333; Temple, *PRLF*, 31; Temple, *CTT*, 5; Temple, *Kingdom of God*, 69; Temple, *CASO*, 15.

<sup>51</sup> Temple, *Repton*, 2–3.

<sup>52</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 20.

<sup>53</sup> Temple, *Repton*, 2.

accomplish. The Church endeavours to sum up all things in Christ such that there exists one perfect man or person in Christ, which is the whole measure of completeness in Christ. This is clearly articulated in this extended extract from CV:

In place of all of them [i.e., divisions] there is “one man in Christ Jesus”. [Gal 3:28] All are so dominated by His Will that for practical purposes there is only one personality, and that is Christ’s. So St. Paul sees the meaning of human history to be the fulfilment of God’s purpose to “sum up all things in Christ”, [Eph 1:10] in whom alone already “all things cohere”. [Col 1:17] And he sees the corporate personality of Christ, which is the Church, gathering into itself all persons and all nations, welding them into unity by relating them to the true principle of their being; thus the “one man in Christ Jesus” comes to his full growth, “the measure of the stature of the completeness of the Christ”. [Eph 4:13] We have already seen that the task of man is to achieve inner and outer unity – the inner unity of complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. For this human nature is plainly destined by the qualities inherent in it, that is to say, by the qualities originally bestowed on it by the Creator. Towards this human nature is impelled by the Creator’s act at the Incarnation, and the consequent activity of His Spirit at work upon humanity from within. Thus the Church’s task is defined for it. It is the herald and foretaste of the Kingdom of God. For that it exists, and for service to that end it must be organised and equipped.<sup>54</sup>

Put simply, the goal of the Church is for all humanity to exist as one person in Christ. Temple draws on several Pauline passages to make his case. He refers to Ephesians 1:10 where Paul writes about all things being summed up (ἀνακεφαλαιώω) in Christ.<sup>55</sup> This summing up is expressed in the new reality of all Christians being one man or person in Christ without division, as described in Galatians 3:28 or Ephesians 2:14–15.<sup>56</sup> The ideal or goal of this is given by Ephesians 4:13, where the Church as the Body of Christ is built “till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the

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<sup>54</sup> Temple, *CV*, 157–158.

<sup>55</sup> See also Temple, *PRLF*, 20. The ultimate aim of the church is to “sum up all things in Christ”.

<sup>56</sup> See also Temple, “The Church,” 347. That all humanity should be gathered into Christ and fashioned as “one new man”.

measure of the stature of the fullness [πλήρωμα] of Christ". (KJV) This was a very consistent point in Temple's ecclesiology.<sup>57</sup> We can trace it as far back as his 1906 essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize up until his last fuller length work, *CC*, in 1941.<sup>58</sup> Temple writes in *CC* that the Church is "the 'one man in Christ Jesus' who, as new members are incorporated into the Body, grows towards 'the measure of the stature of the completeness of the Messiah'".<sup>59</sup>

Two implications emerge out of this goal of becoming one person in Christ. Firstly, the Church as the organ of Christ's Will seeks for all nations and all people to be gathered into itself and into Christ.<sup>60</sup> The extract from *CV* above is clear about this global scope. Or again in *FMT*, Temple explains the meaning and outworking of Ephesians 4:13:

St. Paul perpetually speaks about the building up of the Body of Christ ... He [Paul] means that the whole human race is to become so knit together through the purpose of God that it will be a single whole, with one life expressed through all its members; so closely knit together that it can be called "one perfect Man": and that will be the "measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ".<sup>61</sup>

In Temple's view, the scope of the Church's ministry is the whole human race. The completion or fullness of the Church depends on the conversion of all nations and all people. Temple states strikingly that the Church is completed "only in the degree in which it is missionary".<sup>62</sup> Or again, that as long as "any race remains outside ... [the Church] is defective and the Body of Christ lacks one of its limbs of members".<sup>63</sup> The Church's goal is clearly to include all humanity within itself. Secondly, the Church's goal of humanity becoming one person in Christ is tied in with the work of Christ. Temple's ecclesiology is linked with his soteriology. He explains in *The Kingdom of God* that the idea in Ephesians 4:13 of becoming one perfect person in Christ is the reality that all of humanity is "living one life, governed by one will, and that, the will of Christ".<sup>64</sup> However, this can only happen through the atoning work of Christ.

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<sup>57</sup> Temple, *MC*, 333; Temple, *Kingdom of God*, 69–70; Temple, *FMT*, 163; Temple, "The Church," 348.

<sup>58</sup> Christians build the Church as the Body of Christ until "we all come to one perfect man, the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ". Temple, *Essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize at Oxford University*.

<sup>59</sup> Temple, *CC*, 47.

<sup>60</sup> Temple, "The Church," 347, 358–359; Temple, *MC*, 333.

<sup>61</sup> Temple, *FMT*, 163.

<sup>62</sup> Temple, *MC*, 334.

<sup>63</sup> Temple, *CC*, 98.

<sup>64</sup> Temple, *Kingdom of God*, 70. Same idea in Temple, *MC*, 333.

As we have seen in chapter three, on theological anthropology, Temple understands the work of Christ as invoking sympathy in the sinner and eliciting a response in an Abelardian way. The Christian surrenders their self-will and takes on Christ's Will as their own. The Church, which is the gathering of Christians, is therefore the community of all who have taken on Christ's Will. But Temple pushes this logic one step further. Consider these words that he wrote in *The Universality of Christ*:

[a]ll the old divisions had become negligible. There was one man; and that man was Christ Jesus. If the Will of Christ prevails throughout a society, for all practical purposes Christ is the only person there. So, Christ is the Person of the Church as God is the Person of Jesus Christ.<sup>65</sup>

Temple believed that if all people in a given assembly were of one will, the assembly could be said to be of one mind, one personality, and thus one person.<sup>66</sup> The Church, which is the gathering of Christians who have taken on Christ's Will as their own, is therefore of one will (i.e., Christ's Will) and one person (i.e., Christ).<sup>67</sup> We begin to see the remarkably wide scope of the Church's goal as the Body of Christ and organ of His Will. It is to pursue the response from all humanity to the work of Christ and the subsequent incorporation of all humanity into the Church. It is for all nations and all people to become one person in Christ by aligning their will with Christ's Will. This goes a long way in explaining the importance that Temple placed on topics such as missions and Church unity.<sup>68</sup> Chapman, for one, notes that Temple's idea of unity was not based on visible Church structures.<sup>69</sup> This is because, in Temple's words, the Church is founded on the life, teaching, death, and resurrection of Christ who "is the whole life of the Church".<sup>70</sup> The Church should only have one will and thereby one person, Jesus Christ.

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<sup>65</sup> William Temple, "The Universality of Christ" in *About Christ*, ed. J. Eric Fenn (London: SCM Press, 1962), 83.

<sup>66</sup> Temple, *CHC*, 14.

<sup>67</sup> Temple, "The Church," 349; Temple, *CV*, 157.

<sup>68</sup> Loane, for example, studies Temple's theology in relation to ecumenism and Church unity. See Loane, *Temple & Church Unity*.

<sup>69</sup> Mark D. Chapman, "The Church," in *The Vocation of Anglican Theology*, ed. Ralph McMichael (London: SCM Press, 2014), 170–171.

<sup>70</sup> Temple, "The Church," 341–342. Quote from 342.

To be sure, Temple was against the export of the Christian faith in a colonialist fashion. That wrongly universalises a particular expression of the Christian faith. Rather, he states his view in *Foundations*:

But what will be the result when the mystical and spiritual nations of the East, and the affectionate and childlike peoples of Africa, are quickened by contact with the perfection of their own virtues in the Person of Jesus of Nazareth? Inevitably the whole Church will be filled with a new spirit of devotion and selflessness.<sup>71</sup>

Each culture and nation with its unique traits bring a new experience of the Christian faith to the Church. This goes back again to Temple's idea of social organism, but extrapolated to a global scale. The Church can only be its fullest and richest when all nations and people are part of it and enriching its life. This is what he meant when he wrote in *Foundations* that the Church's unity is more of a "socialist" unity where "the single life of the whole absolutely depends on the diversity of the parts alike in form and function".<sup>72</sup> It is surprising that the missiological theme of inculturation would figure this early in Anglican thought, and especially in Temple's work. This point is not lost on Paul Avis and Chapman. Avis astutely observes that Anglican theology of this period provides surprisingly good fodder for inculturation. He notes the contributions of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, F. D. Maurice, Hensley Henson, Gore, and Temple.<sup>73</sup> Likewise, Chapman picks up Temple's train of thought that the "conversion of the colonies had nothing to do with the conversion of indigenous peoples to the English civic virtues".<sup>74</sup> Instead, the Church will necessarily evolve and change as it encounters new cultures.<sup>75</sup>

It is important to point out there is much correspondence between the goal of the Church and the ideal state of human beings. The extended quote from CV above tells us that the ideal state or the task for humans is to achieve "the inner unity of complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity".<sup>76</sup> The Incarnation, the

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 358.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 349.

<sup>73</sup> Avis, *The Identity of Anglicanism*, 52–53.

<sup>74</sup> Mark D. Chapman, *Anglicanism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 12.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>76</sup> Temple, *CV*, 158. Also in 75 and 85.

subsequent work of the Holy Spirit, and the Church all impel humanity towards this ideal. We have discussed this at length in chapter three. What is important to point out is the correspondence between the ideal state of humanity and the goal of the Church. The inner unity of a complete personality is the state where all of a person's incipient impulses, desires, and reasoning are perfectly integrated and harmonised under their will. But it is only through the work of Christ that this is possible as we align our will with Christ's Will. However, as we have seen in the paragraph above, this is the same endeavour of the Church for all people to become of one will (i.e., Christ's Will) by aligning their will with Christ's Will. Likewise, the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity is due to the social nature of humans. The ideal state is when human fellowship is fully inclusive and thereby enriched by every nation, culture, and person. This is again only possible through the work of Christ, which reconciles not only fellowship between God and humans, but amongst humans as well. Again, this is paralleled to the Church's goal of including all humanity within its fold. In other words, the work of Christ, which enables a completed personality and a perfected fellowship, is continued through the Church. It is perhaps in this way that the Church is truly the Body of Christ, the continuation of the Incarnation, and the organ of His Will. It sustains the work of Christ that enables and impels humanity towards its ideal state. Christ is the cause that opens the possibility of it, and the Church is the continued unfolding of His work.

This brings us to the other description that Temple uses – the Church is the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit.<sup>77</sup> This idea is found in Pauline texts such as Philippians 2:1 or 2 Corinthians 13:14.<sup>78</sup> It describes two important aspects of the Spirit's work in the Church. Firstly, it describes the indwelling of the Spirit in all believers. Pentecost was a significant event for the early church as the Spirit came upon the disciples to give them a deep sense of unity, and the courage and power to share the Gospel.<sup>79</sup> However, this was not an exclusive experience.

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<sup>77</sup> A caveat should be added that Temple did not see them as being independent of one another. For example, he writes that the "essence of the Church...is the Life of Christ at work in His disciple, welding them into that Fellowship of the Holy Ghost which is His Body". Temple, *PRLF*, 69–70.

<sup>78</sup> Temple, *CV*, 154. While it may be relatively infrequent in Scripture, it may be the case that its significance is derived from the fact that it is part of the Trinitarian blessings in the Anglican liturgy. Temple seems to suggest this when he wrote that "[w]e know some little fragments of the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and of the Love of God; of the Fellowship of the Holy Ghost we know virtually nothing". Temple, "The Church," 358.

<sup>79</sup> Temple, *CV*, 154–156. Same line of logic in Temple, *MC*, 324; Temple, *PRLF*, 27; Temple, *CTT*, 2–4. Temple does nuance that Pentecost was not the founding of a "new" church. Rather, it was the "first attainment by the Church which already existed [in the Old Testament] of the full sense of its own mission". To Temple, this was more Scripturally faithful and gave a better sense of continuity from the Old Testament, Old Covenant and the life of Israel. *Ibid.*, 5–7; quote from 5. See also Temple, *CC*, 44–47.

New believers who responded to the Apostles' preaching were also filled with the Spirit. Temple observes that for the early church, to confess Jesus as Lord, to have the Spirit, and to be a member of the Church were all part of the single reality of being a Christian.<sup>80</sup> The Church was therefore a Fellowship of the Holy Spirit because of the common sharing of the Spirit and the way the Spirit drew believers into the Church.<sup>81</sup> Secondly, this description also explains the work of the Spirit that welds believers into a community of love. The Spirit gives Christians the capacity for fellowship by enabling them to love one another. Pointing to Galatians 3:28, Temple perceives that this fellowship and love is potent enough to break down even the most deeply held religious, cultural, social, economic, and gender divides.<sup>82</sup> This fellowship of love is, however, a gift of the Spirit that cannot simply be manufactured.<sup>83</sup>

The Church has historically been lacking as a fellowship of love because it knows and experiences very little of the Holy Spirit.<sup>84</sup> Temple had intended to help correct this. In a private conversation with Albert Baker, Temple said that he would have resigned as the Archbishop of Canterbury at seventy to write a book on the Holy Spirit.<sup>85</sup> This historical and empirical lack of spiritual love has led some, like Dackson, to postulate that this description was an eschatological category for Temple.<sup>86</sup> Yet, her conclusion is questionable. Just because it is difficult to achieve, it is not necessarily an eschatological reality. Moreover, it was the Kingdom of God which Temple seemed to hold more clearly in eschatological terms.<sup>87</sup> What is pertinent for our discussion is the fact that the goal of the Church to include all of humanity in its fold, along with the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit which binds all in the Church in love, is essentially humanity's ideal of a comprehensive perfected fellowship. To put it differently, a perfected fellowship can only be achieved when all humanity is part of the Church and being fashioned into a community of love by the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit.

In sum, Temple understands the Church to be the Body of Christ in a realist way. It is the continuation of the Incarnation and the organ of His Will. While Temple does not explain

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<sup>80</sup> Temple, *CV*, 155; Temple, *PRLF*, 27.

<sup>81</sup> Temple, *CTT*, 5.

<sup>82</sup> Temple, *MC*, 157.

<sup>83</sup> Temple, "The Church," 357.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 357–358.

<sup>85</sup> Baker, "Religious Experience," 29.

<sup>86</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 72, 88.

<sup>87</sup> For example, Temple wrote that the Kingdom of God "in its completeness, is a Christendom extended to include all mankind, utterly leavened by a Church consisting of perfectly converted members". This is exactly what is meant by the first three petitions of the Lord's Prayer. Temple, *PRLF*, 72.

how this is the case, he is clear on what the Church seeks to accomplish. The Church seeks to realise Christ's Will of gathering all humanity as one person in Christ. This involves the vast scope of all nations and all people responding to the work of Christ in answering love and taking on Christ's Will as their own. Temple's ecclesiology is firmly connected with his soteriology. This goal of being one person in Christ has much similarity with the ideal state that humans pursue, which is the inner unity of a complete personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship. This brought us to Temple's other doctrine of the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit. This describes the reality of the Church as a community of love. Coupled with the goal of including all humanity in its fold, the Church as the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit is the direct fulfilment of that outer perfected fellowship which humanity strives for.

### **The Body of Christ in the World**

The Church clearly has an important role in the world as the Body of Christ that is the organ of His Will. It seeks to bring all humanity as one person in Christ to achieve the ideal human state of a completed personality and perfected fellowship. But what is its method of achieving this? Temple gives a somewhat unusual answer. It is not an aggressive evangelisation drive, deep engagement in social concerns, or the widespread organising of activities and programmes. It is simply worship. He explains this in *CTT* today:

What is the task of this Church? Primarily to *be* itself and not to *do* anything at all. All that it does is secondary and expressive of what it is. And, first of all, its duty is to *be* in living actuality that thing, namely, the fellowship of those who have received the power of the Holy Spirit through the revelation of the love of God in Christ. It exists to be the redeemed community which worships as redeemed ... The Church exists, first and foremost, to be the fellowship of those who worship God in Christ ... And it is only when we understand the Church as a worshipping community that we begin to understand the Church's nature and task.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Temple, *CTT*, 13–16. Same idea in *Thoughts in War-Time* where Temple writes that the “supreme service which the Church can render to the world is to be in very deed the Church. This, more than anything which it can *do*, offers to the world the satisfaction of a vital need”. He goes on to explain that worship is the characteristic activity of the Church. In fact, it is worship that was the commonality between German and French Roman Catholics on both side of “No Man’s Land”. Both receive the same sacrament by the means of the same

Temple continues by explaining what worship is:

[Worship] is the submission of the whole being to the object of worship. It is the opening of the heart to receive the love of God; it is the subjection of the conscience to be directed by Him; it is the declaration of need to be fulfilled by Him; it is the subjection of desire to be controlled by Him; and, as the result of all these together, it is the surrender of will to be used by Him. It is the total giving of self.<sup>89</sup>

The vital importance is for the Church to be itself, that is, to be a worshipping community. The key activity of the Church in its important role in the world is to maintain its worship of God. Worship is central because it enables and facilitates the surrender of the Christian's will to Christ. As we have seen in the chapter on theological anthropology, that is how the work of God is accomplished. Worship is the surrendering of our will to Christ and accepting His Will in its place. Worship is therefore the means of transmitting the Will of Christ as the Head of the Church, to Christians who are members of the Church which is His Body. As Dackson writes, "worship is what sensitizes the members of the Body to the Will of Christ".<sup>90</sup> Christians who truly worship take on Christ's Will as their own, and in so doing, become vessels that are willing to be used for His purposes. Worship, therefore, takes a central role as the vital link between the work of Christ and ecclesiology. The Church as the Body of Christ truly becomes the organ of Christ's Will in and through worship.

However, worship does not stop there. It must lead the Christian to service in the world. Temple stressed that "[w]orship is indeed the very breath of its [i.e., the Church's] life, but service of the world is the business of its life. It is the Body of Christ, that is to say, the instrument of His will, and His will is to save the world".<sup>91</sup> Christians who worship in Church continue in their worship as they are impelled back into their daily lives as conduits of God's work and love. This is clearly articulated again in *CTT*:

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rite. William Temple, *Thoughts in War-Time* (London: Macmillan, 1940), 46–50. Quote from 46. See also Temple, *CC*, 57.

<sup>89</sup> Temple, *CTT*, 15.

<sup>90</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 81.

<sup>91</sup> Temple, *CN*, 30.

But worship cannot be the whole of our activity here, because it is, in its own nature, a concentration upon the God who appoints us our duty in life, and part of our very duty to Him is that from time to time, and indeed for the greater part of our time, we should not be explicitly directing attention towards Him but devoting it with all our energies to the duty which he has given us to perform ... [And] because the divine power that comes upon us and into us in worship, if our hearts are truly given there, is the power of love, this must express itself towards the others, our fellow members in that family. And so the Church, when it is true to itself, becomes the agency through which the love of God is active in works of mercy and service in the world... That love, taking possession of the community, makes this its organ for working in the world, to draw the whole of mankind into the fellowship of love which the Church itself exists to be.<sup>92</sup>

Christians who take on Christ's Will in worship then bring His Will into the world through their daily lives. This is the way that a Christian "exerts an influence among his companions at work or play, in mine or shop or factory or directors' meeting or Parliament, that nothing effaces".<sup>93</sup> The Christian who truly worships will bring their faith to bear in all areas of their life whether work, politics, socialising, etc. Through their acts of service and love, they show forth Christ's Will in an alluring manner that attracts others to faith. They also bring the Christian principles which the Church affirms to their daily lives and act on them in their civil capacity.<sup>94</sup> This is perhaps why Temple wrote without any further explanation that although it might sound absurd, the cure for unemployment might just be found through worship!<sup>95</sup> Ramsey noted that this was a distinctive contribution of Temple to the thought of his day.<sup>96</sup> His emphasis on the priority of worship was peculiar in a time when social action was the important thing for Christianity. It was thought that Christians should find God by loving and serving their neighbours, and if worshipping aided that, then all the better. But for Temple, that was

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<sup>92</sup> Temple, *CTT*, 17–19. Same idea in Temple, *CC*, 101; Temple, *CTP*, 73–74.

<sup>93</sup> Temple, *RSJG*, 270.

<sup>94</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 35. Same idea in Temple, *PRLF*, 75–76.

<sup>95</sup> Temple, *CC*, 101.

<sup>96</sup> Ramsey, *The Anglican Spirit*, 80.

putting the cart before the horse. Humans exist to glorify and worship God. And it is through worship that we find our impetus to social action, and not vice versa.<sup>97</sup>

The idea that the Church's work is accomplished by Christians living out Christ's Will in their daily lives was the ground of one of Temple's famous (or infamous) quotes. Temple contends that "[n]ine-tenths of the work of the Church in the world is done by Christian people fulfilling responsibilities and performing tasks which in themselves are not part of the official system of the Church at all".<sup>98</sup> In so doing, Christians have a leavening effect on the societies and nations they inhabit.<sup>99</sup> This effect can be profound. The early Church slowly leavened the Roman Empire until even the Roman Emperor converted to the Christian faith.<sup>100</sup> Given that the Church only does one-tenth of the work, one might enquire whether this minimalizes the Church's role in social concerns. As we have seen above, Preston and Suggate agree. However, Dackson helpfully points out that even though it is only one-tenth, the Church's work is the *defining* one-tenth of the equation. The Church's one-tenth defines the work that Christians do.<sup>101</sup> One way is through the Christian social principles that the Church pronounces. We will explore this more in the final chapter. But the more important way that the Church is the defining one-tenth is because of worship. As Dackson puts it, it is "the Body gathered, doing the one-tenth of the Church's work within its official structures – primarily the work of prayer and worship – which makes it possible to do the nine-tenths of the Church's work that occurs in the world".<sup>102</sup> It is through worship in the Church that Christians are rejuvenated and empowered with the zeal for leavening society.

Temple does indeed seem to have a defined and distinctive ecclesiology, one that perhaps deserves reappraisal. That being the case, there are inherent weaknesses in Temple's ecclesiology. For one, he seems to rely solely on Pauline images, and predominantly on the Church as the Body of Christ. This ignores the plethora of other biblical images and images. It

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<sup>97</sup> "People are always thinking that conduct is supremely important, and that because prayer [and worship] helps it, therefore prayer is good. That is true as far as it goes; still truer is it to say that worship is of supreme importance and conduct tests it. Conduct tests how much of yourself was in the worship you gave to God". William Temple, *Christian Faith and Life* (London: SCM Press, 1963), 28–29.

<sup>98</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 17.

<sup>99</sup> "Its own distinctive activity is worship, the imparting and receiving of the Word and Sacrament, and the self-dedication of its members to His service in the world. As they thus serve Him, they leaven society". Temple, *PRLF*, 72.

<sup>100</sup> Temple, *MC*, 325.

<sup>101</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 69, and whole of chapter II.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

is this plurality of images that give us different themes, emphases, and truths. Avery Dulles, for example, crystallises five models of the Church from these various images. Each model has strengths and weaknesses, but all are required for a full and robust ecclesiology because they balance one another.<sup>103</sup> Temple's narrow focus on one image, or exclusively Pauline images, undermines these different emphasises and results in a lopsided ecclesiology.

However, the more contentious issue with Temple's ecclesiology lies with his idea of the Church as the continuation of the Incarnation. This relates to the larger problem of the Augustinian concept of *totus Christus*, where Christ and the Church are conflated as one.<sup>104</sup> Catholic (Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Joseph Ratzinger) and Protestant (Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf Bultmann, and Emil Brunner) theologians alike have been anxious about this idea. Ulrike Link-Wieczorek articulates this anxiety well in her chapter on Maurice, Gore, and Temple. While commenting on Gore's idea of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation, she contends that the tension between identity and non-identity which is central to this idea is hardly addressed.<sup>105</sup> Careful explanation is needed to nuance the sense in which Christ is continued through the Church, and the sense in which there is discontinuity. Christ as the physiological person in history cannot be directly equivalent to the Church as His body without reservation. The same critique can also be applied to Temple's idea that all people of one will can be said to be one person. A group of people thinking and willing like Temple does not make them William Temple. One of the strongest critics of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation during this period was probably Karl Barth. He argues in *Church Dogmatics* that the Church cannot be understood as an extension of the person and work of Christ. Christ and His redeeming work should stand alone in focus. Rather, Barth prefers the Church as a community, society, or fellowship.<sup>106</sup> While Barth is helpful in highlighting the conflation, his own ecclesiology tends to lose that supernatural element of the Church. His raising up of Christology is inevitably at the expense of a "low" ecclesiology.

In our estimation, Hans Küng could offer a more balanced critique. He points out that the Body of Christ is a biblical image and should therefore be affirmed as a description of the

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<sup>103</sup> The Church as institution, community, sacrament, herald, and servant. Avery Dulles, *Models of the Church*, Expanded ed. (New York: Image Books, 2002).

<sup>104</sup> Michael Scott Horton, *People and Place: A Covenant Ecclesiology* (Louisville; London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 155–189.

<sup>105</sup> Link-Wieczorek, "Mediating Anglicanism," 291.

<sup>106</sup> Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936), IV/3:7; IV/2:132.

Church. But there is no Scriptural warrant for the Church as the continuation of the Incarnation. It is one thing to say that Christ continues His work through the Church, but quite another to say that Christ is continued in the Church. Similar to Dulles, Küng asserts that a variety of biblical images for the Church must be employed together so that, for one, they caution us that Christ is not fully contained within the Church. The more organic images in the Bible (head–body, vine–branches) must be paired with the more personal ones (man–wife, bride–groom), which differentiate between Christ and the Church. Küng also notes that there was anxiety over the *totus Christus* idea since the Middle Ages. Clarification has also been given to the different meanings of the phrase “the Body of Christ”. The Church as the Body of Christ is “*corpus Christi mysticum*”, while the actual physiological body of Christ is “*corpus Christi naturale*”, and “*corpus Christi sacramentale*” refers to the body of Christ in the sacraments.<sup>107</sup> Some of these were already defined by Pope Pius XII in his encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi* of 1943.<sup>108</sup>

To be fair, Temple did observe these three meanings of the Body of Christ. He wrote in *CHC* that the term could refer to the actual physiological body of Jesus Christ, to the bread in the Eucharist, or to the Church. However, Temple enmeshed their significance when he surmised that they commonly point to the fact that the Body of Christ is essentially a vehicle of Jesus’ spiritual power.<sup>109</sup> Hence, the spiritual power that is first revealed at the Incarnation is offered to us constantly through the sacrament of Holy Communion, and exercised through all ages by the Church.<sup>110</sup> So even though he was cognisant of the distinction between Christ and the Church, Temple reduced it to a common spiritual power. The conflation remains unresolved. Nonetheless, it appears that Temple became more careful about the idea of the Church as the continuation of the Incarnation. While advancing it in some places, Temple does not use the exact wording of the Church as the continuation or extension of the Incarnation

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<sup>107</sup> Hans Küng, *The Church* (London: Burns & Oates, 1968), 225–241.

<sup>108</sup> Pope Pius XII, “*Mystici Corporis Christi*,” Vatican City: Vatican Press, [http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_p-xii\\_enc\\_29061943\\_mystici-corporis-christi.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_29061943_mystici-corporis-christi.html). Accessed 22 February, 2019.

<sup>109</sup> In fact, Temple suggests that it is Christ’s personality that links the three. He writes in *CV* that “The Eucharistic Bread is His Body for the purpose for which it is consecrated, which is Communion, in exactly the same sense as that in which a physicochemical organism was once His Body; it is the vehicle – the effective symbol – of His Personality. The identity which makes it appropriate to speak of our Lord’s fleshly organism, the Church, and the Eucharistic Bread by one name – the Body of the Lord – is an identity of relation to His Personality on the one hand and to His disciples on the other”. Temple, *CV*, 252.

<sup>110</sup> Temple, *CHC*, 9–10.

after *CV*.<sup>111</sup> In fact, Temple neither uses the term nor supports its logic in his last full-length work in 1941, *CC*. Only the image of the Church as the Body of Christ is affirmed.<sup>112</sup>

This might be because of the increased focus on ecclesiology in the period 1920–1945. Temple noted in 1941 in *CC* that there “has of late been a great deal of speaking and writing about the nature of the Church”.<sup>113</sup> This blossoming of literature on ecclesiology has also been picked up by commentators on the period such as Ramsey, Adrian Hastings, John Moorman, J. W. C. Wand, Stephen Spinks, and Horton Davies.<sup>114</sup> It had several contributing factors. One was the rise of biblical and historical criticism since the Victorian period, which had undermined Scriptural inerrancy and infallibility. This drove Christians back to the Church, whose authority was thought to be secure.<sup>115</sup> But biblical criticism also led to the linking of the Church back to the Gospels. The Church was not merely an institution, voluntarily gathering, or community, but the divinely inspired Church of Christ and the early Church, as described in the Gospels. The Church and Gospels cannot be separated. There was a renewed emphasis on the Church as a divine gift of Christ in the Gospels.<sup>116</sup> This is tied in with the turn to conservative biblical orthodoxy and a theology of crisis.<sup>117</sup> Part of this new orthodoxy included an emphasis on the Church. Thinkers such as Duncan Forrester have noted that Barth, for example, chose to locate his work not as *Christian* dogmatics, but *Church* dogmatics and *Church* ethics.<sup>118</sup>

Another major factor was the introspective reflection on the theological status of the Church. This is particularly true of the Church of England. The ecumenical movement precipitated reflection on the essential characteristics of the Church, and on whether mutual

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<sup>111</sup> For example, that the Church as the Body of Christ is “as His fleshly body was in the day of His earthly ministry”. Temple, *CASO*, 15. Or, that the Church is “the actual and necessary product of the fact of the Incarnation”. Temple, *CHC*, 8.

<sup>112</sup> Temple, *CC*, 44, 50, 57.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>114</sup> Ramsey adduces the work of Henri de Lubac (*Catholicisme*), C. H. Dodd (*History and the Gospel*), Michael Ramsey (*The Gospel and the Catholic Church*), and L. S. Thornton (*The Common Life in the Body of Christ*). See Ramsey, *Gore to Temple*, 127; Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 294–298; John R. H. Moorman, *The Anglican Spiritual Tradition* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1983), 192; Wand, *Anglicanism*, 142, 154–156; Allen, “British Theology and Wider Horizons,” 169; Horton Davies, *Worship and Theology in England: The Ecumenical Century, 1900–1965*, 5 vols., vol. 5 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 188–190.

<sup>115</sup> Wand, *Anglicanism*, 142, 154–156; Moorman, *Anglican Spiritual Tradition*, 192; Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 222.

<sup>116</sup> Davies, *Worship and Theology*, vol. 5, 189–190.

<sup>117</sup> Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 294.

<sup>118</sup> Duncan B. Forrester, *Theological Fragments: Explorations in Unsystematic Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 13.

recognition was possible.<sup>119</sup> Likewise, the Prayer Book Controversy of 1927–1928 also triggered deep deliberation of the nature of the Church and especially its relation to the State.<sup>120</sup> Ramsey's 1936 book, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*, captures many of these factors.<sup>121</sup> While noting that the Church has often been explained as the extension of the Incarnation, Ramsey points out that the Gospel also indicates the death and resurrection of Christ as grounds for the Church too.<sup>122</sup> The Church as the Body of Christ is therefore a result of both the Incarnation, the Passion, and the Resurrection. There could thus be potential reconciliatory points of ecclesiological concerns between the Catholic emphasis on the sacrament, the creeds, and the episcopacy, and the Protestant stress on the Gospel as a gift and justification by faith.

Temple's later reluctance to speak of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation might be due to this rise of ecclesiology. He was undoubtedly aware of this shift in theological climate. His November 1939 journal article, "Theology To-Day", mentions many of these issues in an almost prophetic manner.<sup>123</sup> Issues that Temple touches on include the recovery of the Gospel, an emphasis on the Cross and Christ crucified, the rise of New Testament scholarship, the threats of communism and fascism, and the central place of the *ecclesia* in apostolic experience and teaching.<sup>124</sup> Temple had already noticed what many scholars identified through hindsight. He thus suggests most perceptively that:

Partly for this reason [threat of war and fascism], and still more because of the convergence of all lines of New Testament scholarship upon the central place of the Ecclesia in the Apostolic experience and teaching, theologians of to-day are more concerned than we were about the theological status of the Church ... Hence there is a new appreciation of the importance of the Church for faith itself ... We did not fail a quarter of a century ago to insist on the necessity and claim of the Church. But this was secondary and derivative; now it is primary and basic.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Davies, *Worship and Theology*, vol. 5, 188–189.

<sup>120</sup> Wand, *Anglicanism*, 142.

<sup>121</sup> Hastings and Davies both refer to Ramsey's book. Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 298; Davies, *Worship and Theology*, vol. 5, 190–191.

<sup>122</sup> Ramsey, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*, 5.

<sup>123</sup> In fact, Temple writes as far back as 1935 that there was an increasing preoccupation with the doctrine of the Church both in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Temple, *CTT*, 9–10.

<sup>124</sup> Temple, "Theology To-Day."

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 331.

By now, Temple was probably caught up in the work of being a bishop and would not have had the time or opportunity to develop his views on ecclesiology in response to this shift. However, his final works give us some inklings as to the emphases he would have offered in any systematic work. One shorter work, *What Christians Stand for in the Secular World*, commends itself. Donald MacKinnon pointed out to Suggate that this was the work that Temple wished he would be most judged by.<sup>126</sup> Its clarion call was for the Church to offer a distinctive Christian witness to influence and transform society. There can be no retreat, recusing, or withdrawal. The Church cannot withdraw because of the special illumination – special revelation – it has, which it is called to bring to bear on society and human relationships. To withdraw would be to fail its duty to both God and men.<sup>127</sup> Temple made the same point in his enthronement sermon as Archbishop of Canterbury. The Church must expel the idea of a return to the catacombs, in the hope of preserving its purity to make its return once again.<sup>128</sup> This is reiterated in *CASO*. Temple writes that the Church is the Body of Christ which is the “instrument or organ of His will”.<sup>129</sup> The Church is therefore “bound to ‘interfere’ [in society and the world] because it is by vocation the agent of God’s purpose, outside the scope of which no human interest or activity can fall”.<sup>130</sup> Dackson is right to say that “[i]solationist or separatist ideas of the Church would be anathema to William Temple’s way of thinking, as they would be incapable of effecting the Church’s mission of social transformation”.<sup>131</sup> The Church must remain part of, and active in, society and the world. In other words, Temple did not seek to defend the theological point that the Church is the continuation of the Incarnation. Rather, he stressed the point that the Church must continue to play an active, visible, dynamic, and interactive role in society. This the rationale behind a famous quote that is often attributed to Temple, that “Church exists primarily for the sake of those who are still outside it”.<sup>132</sup> The Church as the Body of Christ must remain in the world as the organ of his Will.

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<sup>126</sup> Suggate credits D. M. MacKinnon for pointing out the significance and importance that Temple had placed on this work. Suggate, “The Temple Tradition,” 54, note 42 (on page 198).

<sup>127</sup> Temple, *What Christians Stand For*, 7. Same idea in Temple, *CLF*, 105.

<sup>128</sup> Temple, *CLF*, 1–2.

<sup>129</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 15.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>131</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 111.

<sup>132</sup> Recalled as a personal dictum by Alan Guiana, “Letter from the Archbishop of the West Indies,” *Theology*, vol.59, no.432 (June 1956).

This strong emphasis on the prominent role of the Church in society has been picked up by many commentators on Temple. Craig concludes that one of the distinctive points of Temple's ecclesiology is his "uncompromising view of the function of the Church in the world".<sup>133</sup> This is affirmed by Suggate, who notes Temple's insistence that the Church must play its role in the world as "neither wholly world-denying, nor wholly world-accepting, but world-changing".<sup>134</sup> Likewise, Sachs pointed out that Temple still held that it was the Church that was "the progenitor of a new world order" despite being increasingly influenced by Niebuhr.<sup>135</sup> Temple's focus on the Body of Christ makes the Church a dynamic, visible, and relational organism in the world. Just as Christ ate, ministered, touched, and interacted with people, so too does the Church interact with society and the world. It does so in its mission of redemptive transformation, of bringing people into Christ and into the Church.<sup>136</sup> This is, of course, in keeping with the Anglican tradition that goes back to Hooker where the Church is world-centred. The world is the Church's workplace.<sup>137</sup> Or, as Temple writes in one of his earlier books, "[w]orship is indeed the very breath of its [i.e., the Church's] life, but service of the world is the business of its life".<sup>138</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Temple has a clear and distinctive ecclesiology. It is built on the Pauline image of the Church as the Body of Christ. Temple understands this image in a strongly realist sense and construes the Church as the continuation or extension of the Incarnation, which was not an uncommon Anglican perspective in the earlier twentieth century. The Church thus takes on the ministry of Christ as the organ or instrument of His Will. It seeks to gather all humanity into its fold as one perfect person in Christ. This is similar to the ideal state of humanity, which is a completed personality and a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. It is likely the case that for Temple, the ideal state of humanity is only possible in Christ and through the Church. The Church thus has a crucial role in the world as the organ of

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<sup>133</sup> Craig, *Social Concern*, 88.

<sup>134</sup> Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 59.

<sup>135</sup> Sachs, *Transformation*, 285.

<sup>136</sup> Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 75.

<sup>137</sup> Fredrica Harris Thompsett, "The Laity," in *The Study of Anglicanism*, ed. Stephen Sykes and John E. Booty (London: SPCK, 1998), 283.

<sup>138</sup> Temple, *CN*, 30.

Christ's Will. But surprisingly, its key mandate is not to *do* anything but to *be* itself. The Church is to be the worshipping community of God. Worship is the central activity of the Church. On deeper reflection, that Temple thought this is unsurprising. Worship is the means by which the work of Christ is effected. It is through complete self-giving and captivation in worship that the Christian surrenders their will and takes on Christ's Will as their own. Worship transmits Christ's Will to the Christian. However, worship does not cease with that transmission. Christians are impelled back into their daily lives where they live out Christ's Will and bring it to bear in society and the world. It is in this way that the Church plays its role in the world. What is important to note is that the compulsion to live Christ's Will is not optional for the Christian. It is the corollary of worship.

Temple would pull back from using the notion of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation. We postulated that this might be because of the rise in concern over triumphalist ecclesiology. Such a view of the Church was not Scriptural and was criticised by theologians such as Barth. Temple was aware of and almost prophetic about this shift in concern over the theological status of the Church. This shift has allowed us to observe which portions of his ecclesiology were important and non-negotiable, and which portions could be ceded. While we do not have much later material to work with, because he was caught up with his role as Archbishop of first York and then Canterbury, we saw that Temple was willing to give up the notion of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation. What was non-negotiable was the point that the Church is the Body of Christ and the organ of His Will so it can never retreat or recuse itself. The Church clearly has an important role in the world: to bring all humanity as one person in Christ to achieve the ideal human state of a completed personality and perfected fellowship. The uncompromising part of his ecclesiology then was the insistence that the Church must remain active, visible, and dynamic in society and the world.

## Chapter Five

### Church and State: A Conflict of Two Wills

#### Introduction

The previous chapter revealed that the Church had an important role in the world, as the Body of Christ that is the organ of His Will. The Church is meant to be active and dynamic in society and in the world. However, this brings it into direct contact, or perhaps contention, with the State.<sup>1</sup> Temple understands the State to be the organ of the national community that provides the conditions for social order through the law. Temple's earlier view tends to construe the Church and the State in more harmonious terms. But this gives way to an increasing sense of conflict, with the General Strike of 1926 and the Prayer Book Controversy of 1927–1928 playing no small part in this. This chapter seeks to explore this area of Temple's thought, that is, his understanding of the Church–State relationship.

As with the previous chapter, we will depart from the methodology of focusing on Temple's three main books, *MC*, *CV*, and *NMG*. The nature of these books does not lend itself to the discussion of the relationship between the Church and the State. This by no means indicates that the Church–State relationship was an unimportant topic for Temple. In fact, Temple gave considerable attention to the topic over a wide span of years in some of his smaller books. Of particular interest here are *CN* (1915), based on Temple's Bishop Paddock Lectures of 1914–1915 at the General Theological Seminary in New York; *Essays on Christian Politics and Kindred Subjects* (1927), which were essays that Temple had written for *The Pilgrim*, a quarterly journal that reviewed Christian politics and religion; *CS* (1928), comprised of Temple's Henry Scott Holland Lectures; and *CC* (1941), which was written from "an avowed Christian standpoint".<sup>2</sup>

For Temple, the relationship between Church and State should preferably be coordinated, synergistic, and harmonious. Both entities are instruments of God that are used

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<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that there is a difference between the State as the enduring structure(s) of a nation, and the State as a legislative body. The conflict described in this chapter pertains more to the State in that latter meaning. For example, issues discussed such as the Prayer Book Controversy highlight the friction and tension between the Church and British parliament

<sup>2</sup> Temple, *CC*, 22.

to glorify Him by seeking the welfare of His people. But in reality, a fundamental tension exists between the Church and the State because of their separate claims to a universal and final sovereignty. Furthermore, there is a confluence as they share the same sphere of operation: that is, the human person's life and the national community's welfare. To state this in the terms of our overall thesis, the relationship between the Church and the State represents a confluence and conflict of two wills. The Church is the organ of Christ's Will while the State is the organ of the national community that represents its will. These two wills coincide, and this causes conflict. To be sure, Temple does not himself express the conflict in quite this way. The category of the will is not as explicit in this area of his thought as in others. However, there is good reason for us to approach it this way because the will is an important theme in politics and political theory. A prime example is the Rousseauian idea of a General Will. Also, State coercion can be thought of as the exercise of the State's will over its citizens. Or additionally, that liberal politics attempts to maximise the exercise of free will yet guard against clashes of will between individuals.

### **Historical Context: The General Strike and the Prayer Book Controversy**

There is a clear and increasing sense of conflict between the Church and the State as we progress through Temple's writings on the subject. His first book was *CN* (1915), which presents an account of Church–State relationships in largely harmonious terms. This gives way to a discernible sense of friction in *CS* (1928), especially in his discussion of the Prayer Book Controversy. The conflict between Church and State is then openly acknowledged in *CC* (1941). Suggate has identified this as well and comments that Temple seemed to dwell more on the tension that arises between the Church and State in his later writings.<sup>3</sup> It is also conspicuous that Temple pulls back from ascribing a divine origin to the State although he continues to maintain that it is an instrument of God used to serve Him. Much of this may be related to the fact that there is a confluence between the Church and the State, and a conflict between the respective wills that they represent. This sense of conflict between the Church and the State is conspicuous and curious when we consider that Temple was a senior cleric within the Church of England. He was successively the Bishop of Manchester (1921–1929), Archbishop of York (1929–1942), and Archbishop of Canterbury (1942–1944). But it is our

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<sup>3</sup> Suggate, "William Temple," 167.

contention that his view is not out of place given the seismic shifts in British life and society then. In his book, *Cantuar: Archbishops in their Office*, Edward Carpenter offers us a pithy summary of the first quarter of the twentieth century:

They were years of great scientific and industrial advance; of the shattering conflict of the First World War with the disappearance of thrones and the painful readjustment to peace; of wide-spread unemployment and the General Strike; of the birth of the League of Nations; of the advent of broadcasting; of the coming of age of the Labour Party and its first Government ... Within the Church of England they were years of the Life and Liberty Movement, the mainspring of which was William, son of Archbishop Temple; of the Enabling Acts with its setting up of Parochial Church Councils reaching up to the Church Assembly. They were years of the abortive attempt to secure the revision of the Prayer Book in 1927 and 1928; of the emergence and steady growth of the ecumenical movement; of decline in faith, increasing secularism and the weakening position of the Church of England ... They were years when the official optimism of Late Victorian England began to wear thin.<sup>4</sup>

This gives us a realistic snapshot of the upheaval in British society and the Church of England during the period Temple was writing. Germane to our discussion is the way in which various factors contributed significantly to the growing tension between Church and State. Specifically, we shall highlight two areas which impacted the Church of England and Temple greatly. The first is the General Strike of 1926 combined with the issue of secularisation. If brought to its logical end, secularisation would effectively silence the Church's Will, or relegate it to the margins of public discourse. The second is the Prayer Book Controversy of 1927–1928 and the question of Establishment. This was an imposition of the State's Will over and against the Church's Will, or to be precise, Christ's Will of which the Church is the organ.

We turn first to the General Strike of 1926.<sup>5</sup> This highlights the issue of secularisation which can be seen as a silencing of the Church, and consequently, of Christ's Will in society.

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<sup>4</sup> Edward Carpenter, *Cantuar: the Archbishops In Their Office*, Second ed. (Oxford: Mowbray, 1988), 409–410.

<sup>5</sup> For some background see Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, chapter 10; Grimley, *Citizenship*, chapter 3; Iremonger, *William Temple*, 336–344; Kent, *William Temple*, 135–147; Sachs, *Transformation*, 257. For a non-religious perspective see Margaret Morris, *The British General Strike, 1926* (London: Historical Association, 1973); *The General Strike, 1926*, ed. Jeffrey Skelley (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976); Charles Ferrall and

Temple calls attention to the General Strike's prominence in *CS* where he writes that the strike and the First World War had tremendous impact and continued to raise questions about "the nature of the social structure itself".<sup>6</sup> The General Strike was called by coal miners in response to worsening conditions and pay reduction. This was the climax of seven years of ferment where protests fell on deaf years, promises were broken, and conditions continued to deteriorate.<sup>7</sup> Hastings offers the poignant observation that the strike was "the nearest that modern British society has ever come to class war".<sup>8</sup> It was revealing of the gulf between the rich and poor. Millions were living in deplorable conditions and far removed, both socially and geographically, from the mechanisms of advancement.<sup>9</sup> A group of bishops, including Temple and Charles Gore, attempted to bring the government, mine owners, and miners together to seek a solution. This was inspired by Brooke Foss Westcott, who successfully mediated the Durham coal strike of 1892.<sup>10</sup> But this time round, the bishops' intervention proved unsuccessful. The divide and discontent were too sharp and deep for any agreement to be found.

Temple was felt to be responsible for this failed negotiation.<sup>11</sup> By his own admission, Temple acknowledged that the Church's intervention could have been more skilfully conducted.<sup>12</sup> The failed intervention drew a strong rebuke from the then Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. He openly registered his vehement opposition to Church intervention in any social, political, or economic issues. He declared that the Church had no more right to interfere in the coal dispute than the Federation of British Industry had a right to revise the Athanasian Creed.<sup>13</sup> Commentators such as Philip Williamson and John Kent argue that this was an attempt by Baldwin to replace the bishops as the moral leaders of the nation.<sup>14</sup> Baldwin was trying to establish, as Kent sees it, that "politics, not religion, was to be the

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Dougal McNeill, *Writing the 1926 General Strike: Literature, Culture, Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

<sup>6</sup> Temple, *CS*, 2–3.

<sup>7</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 336.

<sup>8</sup> Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 162.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 337.

<sup>11</sup> Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 190–192.

<sup>12</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 342.

<sup>13</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 7; See also Kent, *William Temple*, 143.

<sup>14</sup> Philip Williamson, "The Doctrinal Politics of Stanley Baldwin," in *Public and Private Doctrine: Essays in British History Presented to Maurice Cowling*, ed. Michael Bentley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 198–199; Kent, *William Temple*, 145–146.

source of the common faith and the binding set of values”.<sup>15</sup> Temple disagreed with this. The nature of the Church as the organ of Christ’s Will in the world makes it impossible for it to be a disinterested bystander. It is bound to get involved, as Christ did during his earthly life. In a letter to *The Times* dated 19 August 1926, Temple asserts that “our religion and our office require[d] of us that we should do anything which lay in our power to bring them, in the literal sense, to reason”.<sup>16</sup> He offers his *raison d’être* for this involvement in *CASO*. He states unequivocally that the Church is “bound to ‘interfere’ because it is by vocation the agent of God’s purpose, outside the scope of which no human interest or activity can fall”.<sup>17</sup> In other words, the Church is the organ of Christ’s Will that seeks to accomplish His purpose. It must remain active, visible, and engaged with society.

An issue that the General Strike underscores is the issue of secularisation in Britain then. Baldwin’s point was that the Church has its own separate sphere of activity and should not stray outside it. Politics and economic issues should be considered and governed by politicians and economists, just as Church issues should be governed by clergy. Temple was keenly aware of this secularising pressure and describes it in *CASO*. He writes that the Church’s voice in economic and political matters is “very widely resented”.<sup>18</sup> In fact, almost a third of the book was devoted to defending the Church’s right to engage in society and with the State.<sup>19</sup> Secularisation, however, would effectively silence the Church. It negates the Church as the organ of Christ’s Will that is meant to be active and expressive in society. Temple makes an astute observation, noting that the main contention was that the Church lacked the requisite expertise. The main reason why the Church’s voice is resented is because “each main department of life is independent and autonomous as regards its own technique”.<sup>20</sup> In other words, economics, or politics, or science should be left to the expert economist, politician, and scientist respectively. A clergyman has no say in these fields because he has no relevant expertise. Temple voiced the same observation at the Malvern Conference of 1941. In his review as the chairperson, he stated that one of the main criticisms

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<sup>15</sup> Kent, *William Temple*, 146. Matthew Grimley questions the extent of this claim that Baldwin had an undermining agenda. Baldwin still saw great value in the Christian faith and the Church, without which democracy would be imperilled. Nonetheless, Grimley agrees with Kent and Williamson that Baldwin was strategic and successful in his nondenominational appeal to the nation. Grimley, *Citizenship*, 117–118.

<sup>16</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 343.

<sup>17</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 16.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>19</sup> Specifically, 28 out of 90 pages.

<sup>20</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 7.

of the conference was the fact that its participants lacked the relevant proficiency in areas discussed such as housing, economics, education, etc.<sup>21</sup> This would make their findings weak and irrelevant.

It is important to note that there are different types of secularisation. José Casanova, for example, suggests three different meanings.<sup>22</sup> It could take on the meaning of religious decline, privatisation of religious faith, or secularisation as differentiation. It is likely the case that Temple was facing that third form of secularisation where different fields of study sought emancipation from religion. Science, art, law, and so on should each be their own independent fields of enquiry and not under the overarching purview of theology. As we saw in chapter one, this fissiparous approach to knowledge might be attributed to Kant's dichotomy between the phenomenon and noumenon. Temple's observations corroborate with other recent enquires into secularisation in the United Kingdom. The traditional view holds that secularisation began in the Victorian era because of the Enlightenment and increased steadily until today.<sup>23</sup> But Callum Brown's landmark study has gone far in bringing this traditional view into question. Brown showed that Christianity remained strong in England until the 1960s before declining rapidly.<sup>24</sup>

The secularisation that Temple faced was not the edging out of religion(s) from the public sphere that we are more accustomed to today. The secularisation that he faced was exactly as he had described it. It was secularisation as differentiation that sought to give each field of study its own independent voice. But even then, if the Church acquiesces in this, it effectively loses its voice in society and is confined within its own walls. Christ's Will, of which the Church is the organ, loses its rightful place in the world and fails to be fully accomplished. Secularisation effectively silences the Church and Christ's Will by relegating it to the margins of academic and public dialogue. Temple therefore gave a careful and cogent defence of the

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<sup>21</sup> Malvern Conference, *Malvern, 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society*, 215. The conference was convened to "consider from the Anglican point of view what are the fundamental facts which are relevant to the ordering of the new society, and how Christian thought can be shaped to play a leading part in the reconstruction". *Ibid.*, ix.

<sup>22</sup> José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

<sup>23</sup> Hylson-Smith, for example, argued that secularism in Britain began in the 1880s and increased rapidly after the First World War. Hylson-Smith, *Churches in England*, 8.

<sup>24</sup> Callum G. Brown, *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000* (London: Routledge, 2001), 169. See also Hugh McLeod, *The Religious Crisis of the 1960s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jeffrey Cox, *The English Churches in a Secular Society: Lambeth 1870-1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Church's role. He argued that governing by technical expertise alone is fascism.<sup>25</sup> Democracy is the governing of a State by the community's will, which is precisely not the exclusive will of the experts. Nonetheless, Temple affirmed that each field of study should have its own independent expertise.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, subject experts have an important role to play in society by detailing their knowledge, facts, and findings so that the community can consider them and be persuaded.<sup>27</sup> In fact, Temple had consulted experts such as Richard Henry Tawney (political theorist) and John Maynard Keynes (economist) when he wrote *CASO*, especially for the practical suggestions that he gave.<sup>28</sup> However, expert views and empirical facts need to be complemented by moral and ethical principles. A scientist might be able to build a bomb using science, but neither they nor science is able to offer an ethical framework to guide its use. This is where the Church can make a vital contribution to society and the State by offering principles that guide ethics and morality.<sup>29</sup> The Church's authority thus complements technical expertise. This is an important reason why the Church must develop social principles which could contribute to the development of State policy. We will explore this in the next chapter.

The second issue was the Prayer Book Controversy of 1927–1928. This incident can be understood as the Church being dominated by the State. This means that Christ's Will is being suppressed because the Church is the organ of Christ's Will. The controversy erupted when the House of Commons rejected the Prayer Book Measure in December 1927 and again in June 1928.<sup>30</sup> The Church Assembly first met in 1920 after the Enabling Act of 1919 to discuss various ecclesiastical matters to be put forward to Parliament and enacted into legislation. Many of these measures were passed, but it was not uncommon for Parliament to reject Church measures either. Two such measures had previously been rejected.<sup>31</sup> But these were

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<sup>25</sup> Malvern Malvern Conference, *Malvern, 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society*, 216.

<sup>26</sup> Temple explained that part of the reason the Church's voice was resented in society was because it did not respect this boundary. He pointed to the case of Galileo where the church had injudiciously intervened and failed to respect natural science on its own grounds. Temple, *CASO*, 8.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 21. See also Malvern Conference, *Malvern, 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society*, 215–218.

<sup>28</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 6.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 9–10, 35–36.

<sup>30</sup> For background, see John Maiden, *National Religion and the Prayer Book Controversy, 1927–1928* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2009); Grimley, *Citizenship*, chapter 4; Iremonger, *William Temple*, chapter XXII; Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 207–208, 259–261; Moorman, *History*, 427–428; Wand, *Anglicanism*, 135–137.

<sup>31</sup> The Shrewsbury Bishopric Measure, and a Measure concerning the churches and parishes in London. Temple, *CS*, 193.

far less significant than the Prayer Book Measure of 1927. This measure had gained overwhelming support from the bishops, the Convocations, the Church Assembly, and Diocesan Conferences across England. In Temple's words, the support and unity for the Prayer Book reforms has "seldom been seen in our generation".<sup>32</sup> The Measure was approved in the House of Lords by a large majority but rejected by the House of Commons by a narrow margin. This provoked a huge reaction from the Church of England which felt that Parliament had no business rejecting the Measure and unduly controlling the Church's worship. In fact, Winston Churchill had warned Parliament not to overrule the Church on this matter for it might bring about a "a period of chaos, which could only be corrected by Disestablishment".<sup>33</sup> Temple would reference this speech in 1944 when he wrote to Churchill, then the Prime Minister, in his capacity as the Archbishop of Canterbury. Temple lamented that the Church of England still "finds itself hampered in guiding and governing its own life. The rejection of the Prayer Book Measure in 1927 and 1928 created precisely the situation ... which you foretold as the consequence to be expected from rejection".<sup>34</sup> This letter is now held at the Lambeth Palace Archives.

The spotlight now shone on the issue of Parliamentary authority and control over the Church of England. Temple argued that this was not by design but a historical accident. It is traced back to the English Reformation which was "Lutheran in principle and Governmental in origin; both facts tended towards an Erastian constitution".<sup>35</sup> The Crown and Parliament were set above the Church, though the Church has displayed a spirit of independence at important moments.<sup>36</sup> The Church accepted this because of the medieval assumption that only one religion could be tolerated in a given country. All citizens were churchmen, and any assembly that represented citizens also represented churchmen and therefore the concerns of the Church.<sup>37</sup> But this was no longer the case. With the advent of religious toleration, Parliament was now an assembly of different people of all manner of religious leanings and

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<sup>32</sup> Temple, *Thoughts on Some Problems*, 83.

<sup>33</sup> Winston Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963*, 8 vols., vol. 5 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), 4445. Speech made on the Prayer Book Measure, 14 June, 1928.

<sup>34</sup> William Temple, *Letter to Winston Churchill*, *The William Temple Papers*, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.11, fol.339–345.

<sup>35</sup> Temple, *CS*, 191. He also acknowledges that Calvinist or Reformed ideas were evident in the 39 Articles of Religion. The unique facet of the English Reformation was the fact that the extreme doctrines of Luther, Calvin, and the Catholic tradition were excluded. Temple, *CC*, 11.

<sup>36</sup> Temple, *CC*, 11.

<sup>37</sup> Temple, *CHC*, 67–68.

opinions. Moreover, Parliament consisted of members not only from England, but also Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It was altogether strange to allow such a Parliament to decide on the Prayer Book of the Church of England. This situation was “an anomalous result of an historical process”.<sup>38</sup> This would lead to a Church of England commission that would result in the 1935 report on Church and State relations.<sup>39</sup> But the Church of England would have to wait until 1974 before the it would finally be able to reform its own liturgy.<sup>40</sup>

Temple argued that the Prayer Book Controversy raised two fundamental questions. The first pertains to the rights of the Church to live its own life. In his letter to Churchill mentioned above, Temple and the other Bishops proposed that authority of the Church of England should reside in the Convocations of the Provinces of Canterbury and York acting with the consent of the Church Assembly.<sup>41</sup> The broader principle here is that the State must afford rights and freedom to associations that are part of its community to live their own life. It should not be overly intrusive in dictating terms to these associations so long as their activities do not disrupt social order. One area that is strictly off-limits to State control is the Church’s activity of worship. As we have seen in the previous chapter on ecclesiology, worship is of paramount important to the Church as its core activity. The State has no grounds or rights to encroach on the worship life of the Church by deciding on its form of worship.<sup>42</sup> In other words, the Church needs the freedom to live its own life according to its Will, or Christ Will’s, without State domination. This is related to the second point. The State oversteps its boundaries when it attempts to determine the Church’s theology, doctrine, or worship. Even if the Church is Established, Parliament has a legal but not a moral right to decide on the form of worship. This is true of the 1662 Prayer Book, where Parliament had asserted its constitutional right to override the Convocation but then formally decided not to do so. The 1662 Prayer Book received legitimacy not because Parliament passed it, but because it had been drawn up and accepted by the Convocation.<sup>43</sup> Temple felt strongly that the impasse on the Prayer Book Measure and the fundamental questions that it raised were intolerable. The

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<sup>38</sup> Temple, CS, 191.

<sup>39</sup> *Church & State: Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the Relations Between Church and State, 1935*, (Westminster: Press & Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1935).

<sup>40</sup> Chapman, *Anglicanism*, 124.

<sup>41</sup> Temple, *Letter to Winston Churchill*.

<sup>42</sup> Temple, CS, 197.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 194–195.

Church must have the freedom to will its own worship forms.<sup>44</sup> The State cannot dominate over and against the Church's Will in the matter. Temple's proposed solution to the problem was radical. He suggested that the proper course of action for Parliament to take if it disapproved of the Prayer Book Measure was "not to reject the Measure, but to pass the Measure – and then disestablish the Church".<sup>45</sup>

This brings us to the question of the Established status of the Church of England, which was a live issue during Temple's lifetime. There were strong calls from some quarters for disestablishment. For one, the Liberal party had embraced disestablishment as a policy in the 1890s and was in power from 1906–1916. Moreover, the Church in Wales was disestablished in 1914.<sup>46</sup> Prominent Church of England clergymen such as Gore and Hensley Henson had also lobbied for disestablishment.<sup>47</sup> Of course, the Prayer Book Controversy played no small part in exacerbating the issue.<sup>48</sup> Temple's position on the question of Establishment was clear and consistent. It is a question that should be answered by Westminster and not Lambeth.<sup>49</sup> It is the Will of the State that matters and not the Will of the Church. This decision lies outside the Church's prerogative because it has little to do with its core duty of worshipping God and sharing the Gospel. It is a political decision that affects the whole of the national community, and thus, only the State as the organ of the community can make that decision. However, Temple was careful to expound that a sound form of Establishment is "not a control of religion by the State, but an agreement on the part of the State to recognise the divine authority of the Church and to lend its aid in the upholding of the order of the Church so far as this may be required by the Church itself".<sup>50</sup> Two important points are made in this assertion. Firstly, Establishment is a decision on the part of the State to be affiliated with the Church. In doing so, the State recognises the sovereignty and Will of God, and that it answers to a higher power. It also recognises the Church's status as the organ of Christ's Will. This is to be welcomed by the Church, but not as domination by the State. Temple made this point strikingly when he stated that it is "the duty of Lambeth to remind Westminster of its

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<sup>44</sup> Temple, *CC*, 67.

<sup>45</sup> Temple, *CS*, 195.

<sup>46</sup> Sachs, *Transformation*, 257–258.

<sup>47</sup> Kent, *William Temple*, 75.

<sup>48</sup> Some background context in Iremonger, *William Temple*, 229–231, 356–359; Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 50–55, 207–208.

<sup>49</sup> Temple, *CS*, 195; Temple, *CC*, 54; Temple, *CHC*, 72; Temple, *CLF*, 124.

<sup>50</sup> Temple, *CC*, 38.

responsibility to God; but this does not mean that Westminster is responsible to Lambeth”.<sup>51</sup> Secondly, Establishment does not mean that the State has control over the Church. The State can only aid the Church if the Church requests such aid. One area that is strictly off limits to the State is worship. The State is not entitled to influence or control the Church’s freedom or form of worship.<sup>52</sup> The State cannot impose its Will over and against the Church and its own Will, especially in matters of worship.

To be sure, Temple did not agitate for disestablishment either. In his mind, disestablishment was a lengthy and intricate process which would divert much work and attention away from what the Church should be doing. Moreover, there are certain values for the life of the nation and State that are related to Establishment. Establishment allows Christ’s Will to be a legitimate part of the State system through the instrumentation of the Church. For example, the bishops who sit in the House of Lords can express Christ’s Will on various matters through the exhortation of Christian principles. These would otherwise be lost and difficult to replace.<sup>53</sup> In his final analysis, Temple expressed that Establishment was a difficult tension that should be maintained. The Church needs freedom of decision in spiritual matters, yet relations with the State are "among the greatest secondary matter" to the spiritual mission of the church.<sup>54</sup> Disestablishment was not Temple’s agenda. Rather, his central concern was the curtailing of Parliament’s authority over the Church, in order to limit the imposition of the State’s Will upon the Church. The Church needed to be able to govern itself and live out Christ’s Will. Disestablishment was not the goal, but the extent to which Temple was willing to go to avoid unnecessary State interference. Matthew Grimley notes that this was the real issue behind the Prayer Book Controversy. It was a conflict between two different national church models. It was a choice between the “Parliament-governed Church of Hooker, and those whose national Church was to be free of direct parliamentary control”.<sup>55</sup> Temple’s choice on the matter was clear. He had been part of the Life and Liberty movement, which sought to secure some measure of self-government for the Church of England. In fact, Temple had resigned as rector of St. James, Piccadilly, to join the movement, and eventually became its leader. The movement resulted in the Enabling Act of 1919, which allowed the Church of

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>52</sup> Temple, *CS*, 196–197; Temple, *CC*, 54.

<sup>53</sup> Temple, *CLF*, 124.

<sup>54</sup> Temple, *Thoughts on Some Problems*, 84–85.

<sup>55</sup> Grimley, *Citizenship*, 170.

England to have its own decision-making Assembly.<sup>56</sup> This allowed the Church a greater measure of freedom in expressing Christ's Will without being hamstrung by the State's Will. Nevertheless, this did not solve the underlying and simmering issues. The eventual eruption of the Prayer Book Controversy and the continued rumblings of Disestablishment contributed significantly to the conflict between Church and State.

This section has attempted to portray the sense of conflict between the Church and State during the period in which Temple was writing. The two issues described contributed to the belief that the Church had transgressed its limits by wading into other areas that were beyond its expertise. Such a belief could silence the Church's Will by preventing it from engaging in society and relegating it to the margins of public dialogue. Temple's response was that the Church could furnish Christian principles to guide ethical and moral considerations in the development of State policy. The Prayer Book Controversy illustrates the imposition of the State's Will over the Church's Will on the matter of worship, thus overreaching beyond its limits and into the life of the Church. Temple's primary concern was to curtail the State's authority over the Church, or to restrict it from imposing its Will upon the Church. In sum, we might say that Temple's position reflects an evolving Anglican view on Establishment in which there is a clear differentiation between the Church and the State. This is a shift away from the Erastian position of Richard Hooker towards one that allows a degree of tension between the Church and State, and for the Church to take a more critical stance towards the State.

### **Intellectual Background: British Idealism, the General Will, and the State**

One major reason for the conflict between the Church and the State was the greater role afforded to the State in the nation and society. As we will see in the next section, Temple gave the State far greater scope and depth beyond the restriction of wrongdoing and violence. This is encapsulated in his description of the State as the "organ of the national community".<sup>57</sup> The State actively promotes the common good, its citizens' welfare, and a good life. The emphasis on the common good and people's welfare was certainly influenced by the Christian Socialism of F. D. Maurice, J. M. F. Ludlow, and Charles Kingsley that was mediated to Temple through

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<sup>56</sup> On Temple's involvement in Life and Liberty see Iremonger, *William Temple*, chapter XIV; Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 53–55, 84–85; Moorman, *History*, 419–422; Wand, *Anglicanism*, 136. See also Temple, *CS*, 135, 191–193.

<sup>57</sup> Temple, *CS*, 123–124.

Gore, Westcott, and Henry Scott Holland.<sup>58</sup> Temple had written in 1908 for *The Economic Review* that the Gospels “taught nothing less than evolutionary socialism ... the alternative stands before us – Socialism or Heresy”.<sup>59</sup> For one, Temple shared Maurice’s emphasis on the Incarnation, social concerns, and social unity.<sup>60</sup> However, they diverged on how these social concerns should be expressed and achieved. Maurice was content for social change to emerge or be discovered organically. Temple, on the other hand, was willing to give broad scope to the State to bring about these social changes structurally.<sup>61</sup> While not completely novel, such a view is in contrast with the classic European liberal model, which sought to limit the scope of the State and its actions.<sup>62</sup> It is likely that Temple’s ideas were influenced from within Britain but by others than the Christian Socialists.

We posit that this was likely the influence of British Idealism.<sup>63</sup> This was a dominant school of philosophical thought in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century until the early twentieth century. Its most lasting legacy is arguably its political and social philosophy, which endured even after the movement fizzled out.<sup>64</sup> British Idealists were critical of contemporary political theories such as popular sovereignty and utilitarianism. The French Revolution had shown that popular sovereignty could easily also go awry and descend into mob rule. The subsequent utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill did not fare any better. While it does well in benefiting the majority and not just a minority, it ultimately does not benefit all in society. Moreover, utilitarianism was advantageous when applied to social policies in relation to scarce resources, but weak when made into an absolute moral principle. The British Idealists’ main contention with political theories then was that the State and State

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<sup>58</sup> Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 19–23; Maurice B. Reckitt, *Maurice to Temple: A Century of the Christian Social Movement in the Church of England* (London: Faber & Faber, 1947), 85–88. See also Martin Davie, *A Guide to the Church of England* (London: Mowbray, 2008), 219.

<sup>59</sup> Peck in W. G. Peck, “William Temple as Social Thinker,” in *William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation*, ed. W. R. Matthews (London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1946), 65. However, the rise of socialist totalitarian regimes in Europe meant that the term became taboo or to be used with a lot of caution. In any case, Temple was approving of Socialism because it contributed to social concerns and order, and the community’s welfare. He was not necessarily supportive of it as a political structure of the State. This is why he would eventually state in *CASO* that “I do not simply advocate Socialism or Communal Ownership. Socialism is a vague term, and in one sense we are committed to Socialism already”. The issue was finding that delicate balance between the individual and the community. Temple, *CASO*, 75.

<sup>60</sup> Maurice emphasised how the Incarnation brought about the brotherhood of all man. I.e., community with God and with other humans. See Link-Wieczorek, “Mediating Anglicanism.”; Ronald H. Preston, *Explorations in Theology 9* (London: SCM Press, 1981), 79.

<sup>61</sup> Link-Wieczorek, “Mediating Anglicanism.”

<sup>62</sup> Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 77.

<sup>63</sup> Grimley, *Citizenship*, chapter 1 especially 42–64. Grimley also singles out Green and Bosanquet.

<sup>64</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 228.

action were cast in an overly negative light. Rather, the British Idealists argued that the State was the most appropriate agent to promote the common good in society, to provide the framework so that its members could lead a good life, and, if needed, to intervene so that all might progress and live well.<sup>65</sup> They affirmed the State through the idea of the General Will, a theory most associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau but adapted by taking G. W. F Hegel's critiques of it into account.<sup>66</sup> The State is therefore not an alien or abstract body, but "an organic outgrowth of the wills, dispositions, and aspirations of the citizens comprising it".<sup>67</sup>

Two British Idealists were particularly prominent for their political philosophy. The first was T. H. Green who was one of the most important British Idealists.<sup>68</sup> Many of his political ideas are found in his *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (1879–1880), which were first published posthumously in the *Works of Thomas Hill Green* in 1885–1888.<sup>69</sup> The other prominent figure was Bernard Bosanquet, who followed and expanded on many of Green's ideas.<sup>70</sup> His main work in this area is *Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899),<sup>71</sup> which was quickly acknowledged as the classic British Idealist theory of politics.<sup>72</sup> Bosanquet's best known contribution was his analysis of the General Will.<sup>73</sup> While this was a common concept among the British Idealists, it became most frequently and prominently associated with Bosanquet. We will look at both in turn.

Green was critical of the social contract theory espoused by Baruch Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Rousseau.<sup>74</sup> He was also dissatisfied with the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.<sup>75</sup> Green begins to construct his own political philosophy by returning to Rousseau. While he rejects Rousseau's social contract, Green finds the idea of the General Will as the foundation of the State to be cogent. In fact, Green writes that it was the idea of

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<sup>65</sup> Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 77–81.

<sup>66</sup> Not all British Idealists accepted Rousseau's idea of the General Will. Edward Caird, for example, did not find it appealing. Mander, *British Idealism*, 493.

<sup>67</sup> Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 79.

<sup>68</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 1.

<sup>69</sup> T. H. Green, *Works of Thomas Hill Green*, ed. R. L. Nettleship, vol. 1 (London: Longmans & Green, 1885).

<sup>70</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 489; Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 1.

<sup>71</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, Fourth ed. (London: Macmillan, 1923).

<sup>72</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 489; Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 198.

<sup>73</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 4.

<sup>74</sup> For one, it emphasises power and coercion which cannot inspire true obligation. See T. H. Green, "Popular Philosophy In Its Relation to Life," in *Works of Thomas Hill Green*, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London: Longmans & Green, 1888), 113–117, 122–124; T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," in *Works of Thomas Hill Green*, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London: Longmans & Green, 1886), §36, 46, 54, 55, 77.

<sup>75</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 232.

the General Will that was the enduring value of Rousseau's thought.<sup>76</sup> The State finds its legitimacy and authority to the extent that it expresses and embodies the thoughts and desires of its members, that is, the General Will.<sup>77</sup> Green did, however, critique a part of Rousseau's idea of the General Will. Rousseau suggested that the General Will is made known through voting. Green disagreed. He argued that a vote does not reveal the General Will (*volonté générale*) but the Will of All (*volonté de tous*), that is, the aggregate desire or summed will of individual members.<sup>78</sup> The Will of All tends to be much narrower than the General Will and more selfishly inclined, since the individual voting tends to be primarily concerned for his own benefits.

As an aside, it is worth noting that the General Will was an absolute metaphysical idea for Rousseau. It is the will of the community or populace, and as such, there is no other will that stands above it. It has a final and universal sovereignty.<sup>79</sup> In fact, Patrick Riley puts forward an interesting argument that Rousseau's idea of the General Will finds its origins as a theological term.<sup>80</sup> Owing to passages from Paul and the works of Augustine, *volonté générale* was well established in the seventeenth century as a theological, not political, term. It referred to the Will of God in deciding those who are saved.<sup>81</sup> It is through the works of other French thinkers such as Blaise Pascal, Nicolas Malebranche, and Montesquieu that its meaning began to shift. Rousseau then completes the evolution of the term *volonté générale*. He secularises it by turning it away from God and theology as the Will of God and locates it in human beings as the General Will of citizens for the common good of the city.<sup>82</sup> Temple would not have accepted or agreed to this. For Temple, God as the Divine Will is the ultimate sovereignty to which all wills should ideally submit and conform.

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<sup>76</sup> Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," §77.

<sup>77</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 232–233.

<sup>78</sup> Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," §73, 75, 98.

<sup>79</sup> See for example Patrick Riley, *The General Will Before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), chapter 5; Andrew Levine, *The General Will: Rousseau, Marx, Communism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 1; Roger D. Masters, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 323–334; John C. Hall, *Rousseau: An Introduction to His Political Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1973), chapter 5.

<sup>80</sup> Riley, *The General Will Before Rousseau*, xiii.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 4–5. *Volonté générale* as the more general Will of God that all should be saved, and *volonté particulière* as the more particular Will of God where some are saved, and some are not.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 254, ix. Rousseau's concerns were philosophical and political, but found a ready-made term in theology that could convey what he intended to say. *Ibid.*, 181.

Against Rousseau, Green defines the General Will as “an impartial and disinterested will for the common good”.<sup>83</sup> He states that this understanding affords the minority more rights and enables a better view of society’s true interests.<sup>84</sup> The primary function of the State is to provide the framework for and to build the common good. This allows its citizens to live a good life.<sup>85</sup> Green understands the good life to be more than happiness, wealth, safety, or good health. He takes the broader Greek understanding of *aretae* (ἀρετή), which refers to the cultivation or fulfilment of human excellence and potential.<sup>86</sup> The State sets the right material conditions by pursuing the common good so that its citizens can lead a good life, that is, develop their fullest potential for excellence.<sup>87</sup> Green does not deny that there are other social units such as the family, church, clubs, etc., which could help to perform this function. However, he suggests that these social units are included as organic parts of the State. The State is the “society of societies, the society in which all their claims upon each other are mutually adjusted”.<sup>88</sup> The State is therefore the most appropriate entity within a nation to take up this role of building the common good for the good life. This is one of the main reasons why citizens should obey the State. Obedience, or political obligation, is due to the State because it is acting upon the General Will for the common good. In fact, Green asserts that will, and not force, is the basis of political obligation and the authority of the State.<sup>89</sup> Force or coercion cannot achieve true obligation because humans cannot be pressured into feeling obligated.<sup>90</sup> True obligation is a moral affair with people willing or unwilling to obey.

Like Green, Bosanquet comes to Rousseau through a critique of what he called “prima facie theories”.<sup>91</sup> These theories trace back to Hobbes and Locke, and more recently, Bentham, Mill, and Herbert Spencer. Bosanquet argued that these authors built their political philosophy on a deficient understanding of humans as distinct atomised units.<sup>92</sup> It was Rousseau who “[breaks] through to the root of the whole matter”.<sup>93</sup> Rousseau rightly grasped

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<sup>83</sup> Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," §69.

<sup>84</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 232.

<sup>85</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 2.

<sup>86</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 229–231.

<sup>87</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 4 and chapter 5.

<sup>88</sup> Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," §154–155.

<sup>89</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 229.

<sup>90</sup> Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 82.

<sup>91</sup> Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 75.

<sup>92</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 492.

<sup>93</sup> Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 79.

that there is a common life to society that sustains the human individual, and particularly, sustains their will. In other words, humans are fundamentally social beings. A person must be organically part of a community or society to develop fully.<sup>94</sup> The inspiration and starting point for Rousseau's idea of the General Will was valid and correct. However, Bosanquet finds several problems with Rousseau's construal of it. Rousseau rightly gives form to the idea of a General Will, but he does not adequately explain how the General Will is expressed. Bosanquet shares Green's concern that Rousseau's idea of discovering the General Will by way of a vote revealed the Will of All and not the General Will. Furthermore, a vote bypasses all the social and political institutions where the General Will could possibly be found.<sup>95</sup>

This brings us to Hegel's critique of Rousseau, which Bosanquet found persuasive.<sup>96</sup> Hegel noted that Rousseau was trying to make a link between the individual citizen and the General Will. But in trying to make this link *directly* through a vote, Rousseau essentially enthroned the Will of All.<sup>97</sup> This bypasses all the various social institutions which mediate between the individual citizen and the General Will. In fact, the General Will is precisely to be found in these social institutions, or what Hegel called *Sittlichkeit*, a term which Hegel used to "indicate the expression of a society's values and beliefs through the whole range of its institutions and practices from political, to legal, to economic, to social".<sup>98</sup> Hegel believed that all individuals are members of various institutions and that their membership shapes their thought and behaviour. There are three layers to these social institutions or *Sittlichkeit* – the family, economic organisations, and the State. The first two have limited membership because not all individuals come from the same family or work for the same organisation. It is only the State which everyone is part of, and consequently, only at the level of the State that the General Will can emerge and be discerned.<sup>99</sup> The State clearly had an increased and privileged role in Hegel's mind. What Hegel effectively does is to link the General Will with

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<sup>94</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 200. Bosanquet noted that this is close to Plato's and Aristotle's idea of the Greek city state which also captured the fundamental social nature of humans. See Mander, *British Idealism*, 491–492.

<sup>95</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 494–495; Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 200.

<sup>96</sup> Hegel also critiques Rousseau's General Will as lacking an objective basis. He then postulated Kant's categorical imperative as a possibility. Yet, this falls back to the same inherent problem. The categorical imperative can only show where an action is consistent with a given principle or rule, but it cannot show that principle or rule is right. Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 203–204.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 200–201.

<sup>98</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 495. See also Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 204.

<sup>99</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 204.

*Sittlichkeit*, and specifically the State. This can be understood as the institutionalising of the General Will. It makes concrete the abstract idea of the General Will by giving it a clear agent that acts upon it. This allows the General Will to be worked out properly through stable social institutions.

Bosanquet finds Hegel's point valid and accepts it.<sup>100</sup> Individuals do not derive their ideas and views in a vacuum but tend to be influenced by their *Sittlichkeit*.<sup>101</sup> As Peter Nicholson points out, Bosanquet's idea of the General Will is "present in the whole complex of the institutions, practices, and culture of society. It only exists ... in the wills of individuals; that is, in the wills of all the individual members of society taken together".<sup>102</sup> This does not mean that the General Will is consciously and uniformly willed by every individual in a State. Rather, every individual has their own unique view and will, but shares ideas that are common or overlap with others because of a shared culture.<sup>103</sup> Adopting Hegel's view, Bosanquet also argues that the most important component of *Sittlichkeit* is the State. He defines the State as the "full sense of what it means as a living whole, not the mere legal and political fabric, but the complex of lives and activities, considered as the body of which that is the framework".<sup>104</sup> Similarly to Green, Bosanquet held that the State's duty was to build up the common good so that individuals can live a good life. Bosanquet was clear that the General Will "by definition aims at the public welfare".<sup>105</sup> State action should not be seen in a negative light as an infringement of life and liberty but as providing the framework and conditions for the full development of the common good and people's good life. It is in this light that Bosanquet famously declared that the State is the "hindrance to hindrances of good life".<sup>106</sup> This is the basis of citizens obeying the State.<sup>107</sup>

Green and Bosanquet were influential on Temple. In fact, Temple acknowledges their influence: he recognised that Bosanquet was key to the formation of his general outlook. Temple's main concern at one time was "to discover what was my point of divergence from

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<sup>100</sup> Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 246.

<sup>101</sup> Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 84–85.

<sup>102</sup> Nicholson, *Political Philosophy*, 211.

<sup>103</sup> Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 158–166.

<sup>104</sup> Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 311, footnote 311.

<sup>105</sup> Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 101, footnote 102.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, xxxii, 177–186.

<sup>107</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 496–497.

one [i.e., Bosanquet] who carried me so far with him".<sup>108</sup> Likewise, Temple acknowledged that Green's *Principles of Political Obligations* was one of the key resources for his book, *CS*.<sup>109</sup> The influence of British Idealism on Temple is also picked up by commentators on Temple.<sup>110</sup> What is relevant to our discussion is the way in which Green and Bosanquet shaped Temple's understanding of the State. We suggest two clear influences. Firstly, as our exposition above shows, Green and Bosanquet had given the State a far greater role in society. It will become clear in the following section that Temple does likewise.<sup>111</sup> In fact, Stephen Spencer asserts that it was specifically Green who influenced Temple in this.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, Temple follows Bosanquet in advocating for the institutionalisation of the people's will in the form of the welfare state. Secondly, Temple agreed with their point that the increased scope of the State is for the common good and a good life for its citizens. The term "good life" is telling as Temple uses that same phrase. Temple, too, believed that the State's greater role is not arbitrary but to promote and maintain social order, the welfare of its citizens, and a good life for them.

There is, however, a major point of divergence: Temple departs from Green and Bosanquet in his understanding of the General Will. He follows R. M. MacIver in understanding the General Will as "not so much the will *of* the State as the will *for* the State, the will to maintain it".<sup>113</sup> The General Will expressed the fundamental desire of people for social order. This is a novel, but somewhat perplexing use of the term General Will. The point that people desire social order is well taken: however, Temple's use of the term General Will to denote it can confuse readers, given its long use in political thought to denote the will that emerges from the people, i.e., the community's will. To further confuse the matter, Temple adopts two more terms from MacIver – the Ultimate Sovereign and the Legislative Sovereign.<sup>114</sup> The Ultimate Sovereign is the "Will of the People", or essentially what Rousseau and Hegel termed the General Will.<sup>115</sup> This is expressed through voting in a democracy and

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<sup>108</sup> Bosanquet's *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*. Temple, "Theology To-Day," 328.

<sup>109</sup> Temple, *CS*, ix.

<sup>110</sup> Grimley, for example, contends that Temple had turned to Green's ideas on civic obligation or obedience in the aftermath of the General Strike in an attempt to heal the divisions in his Diocese of Manchester. Grimley, *Citizenship*, 104.

<sup>111</sup> Mander, *British Idealism*, 6; Boucher and Vincent, *British Idealism*, 3.

<sup>112</sup> Spencer, *Christ in All Things*, 71, 83.

<sup>113</sup> Temple, *CS*, 69, 119, 132. This quote is taken from p.119 where Temple quoted directly from R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), 11.

<sup>114</sup> Temple, *CS*, 119–121.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 119.

guides the general policies that the State undertakes. Temple argued that democracy was the State structure most congruent with the Christian faith. It was an important acknowledgement of the individual by allowing them to exercise their will.<sup>116</sup> The Ultimate Sovereign is differentiated from the Legislative Sovereign, which is the government that is established by the Ultimate Sovereign through, for example, a general election. A government is the “spokesman of the state ... which wields its power for the time being”.<sup>117</sup> The task of the Legislative Sovereign is to translate general policies into specific enactments. Temple concludes that “[a]s long as the Ultimate Sovereign can thus control the Legislative Sovereign, there is little danger that the General Will of the individual persons concerned, to live as a community and submit to any restrictions necessary to that end, will be impaired. And this is the vital matter”.<sup>118</sup>

It is both fascinating and puzzling to note that Temple does recognise the notion of the General Will as espoused by Rousseau but terms it as the Ultimate Sovereign. It is this Ultimate Sovereign, or the community’s will, that gives legitimacy to the State and government, and is the real source of sovereignty. Why then does Temple not simply use the term General Will? We surmise three possible reasons. Firstly, Temple accepted MacIver’s ideas and decided to follow his train of thought even though it was unconventional and perplexing. Secondly, the General Will is closely associated with social contract theory, of which he disapproved: as we shall see in the next section. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, because of his understanding of the human will. We can observe Temple’s train of thought in *NP*, where he discusses the idea of a Social Will which closely resembles the General Will.<sup>119</sup> Temple describes the Social Will as the idea that society might be a self-conscious unit or have an aggregate will. Temple is clear that such a view is “a most precarious hypothesis” because of the danger that “the Social Will might have no reference at all to our

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<sup>116</sup> The drawback of democracy, however, is that majority is not always right and that the majority may not always reach a consensus. See William Temple, *Christian Democracy* (London: SCM Press, 1937); William Temple, “Democracy,” in *Essays in Christian Politics and Kindred Subjects*, ed. William Temple (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927).

<sup>117</sup> In this way, the government and the State share a close relation but are not identical. The State is the perpetual organ of the national community, whereas the government is temporal and decided by a general election. So, a Conservative or Labour government that is elected by the people takes up or relinquishes the responsibility conferred by the British State which exists as long as there is a British national community. Temple, *CS*, 131. See also 120–121.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 119–121. Quote from p.121.

<sup>119</sup> Temple, *NP*, 57–59.

individual wills”.<sup>120</sup> He goes on to explain that there is “no evidence whatever for the view that there is a social consciousness anywhere in society other than the consciousness of the individuals that they are members of the social body”.<sup>121</sup>

In other words, the consciousness and the will are inseparably tied to the human person. Our discussion in chapter three corroborates this. It showed that the will is inextricably tied to the human person: thus, to speak of a Social Will or General Will risks abstracting the will from the human person. Furthermore, it may give the false impression that the community and/or the State is its own distinct corporate entity with its own distinct will, i.e., the General Will. The problem then arises that the community and/or the State could potentially be understood independently from the individuals who constitute it. Andrew Levine alerts us to the fact that this is a common misconception of Rousseau’s idea of the General Will. Some people misunderstand the General Will as issuing from some “supraindividual entity” of the whole community instead of the individual citizens who are part of that community.<sup>122</sup> Clearly, Temple falls into this misunderstanding. But how then can we speak of the community or society having a common mind or goal? Temple suggests the idea of “One Purpose, Many Wills”.<sup>123</sup> He explains that “[i]f by will we mean a direction for action, then there is one social will [i.e., Purpose]; if we mean the seat of actual volition, then there are as many social wills as there are citizens”.<sup>124</sup> This rests on his idea that the human will is the “the capacity to form a Purpose”.<sup>125</sup> Temple’s own scheme of thought provides the term purpose to describe what is meant by the Social Will or General Will. We can say that the community is of one purpose. We surmise that it is for these reasons that Temple did not use the term General Will or Social Will in their usual meaning despite recognising the will of the people or the community’s will as the Ultimate Sovereign.

In summary, this section has given the intellectual background to Temple’s theory of the State. We posit that Temple was influenced by British Idealism, namely by Green and Bosanquet. Temple follows them in affording a greater role and scope to the State to build up the common good and develop a good life for its citizens. However, he diverges from them

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Levine, *The General Will*, 18.

<sup>123</sup> Temple, *NP*, 59.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>125</sup> Temple, *MC*, 168.

in his puzzling interpretation of the General Will. This might be due to his understanding of the human will. The notion of a General Will might risk abstracting the will from humans or give the false idea that it arises from the entity of the whole community as distinct from the individuals who constitute it. However, it is important to point out that he did have an idea of the community's will, which he terms the Ultimate Sovereign.

### **The Nature of the State: Organ of the National Community**

The previous sections showed real points of conflict between the Church and the State, including the Prayer Book Controversy and the General Strike. We proposed that another major source of this conflict was also due to the increased role afforded to the State by the British Idealists, by whom Temple was influenced. This section will explore Temple's understanding of the State. It refutes Preston's claim that Temple was "without a significant doctrine of the State".<sup>126</sup> On the contrary, Temple gives a precise definition and proper explanation of the State in *CS*: he follows MacIver's definition with slight modifications. MacIver was one of the most influential political theorists in Britain then, although he resided in Canada.<sup>127</sup> Temple defines the State as: "a necessary organ of the national community, maintaining through Law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power the universal external conditions of social order".<sup>128</sup>

Three significant points are pertinent to our discussion. Firstly, Temple describes the State as the organ of the national community. The State is geographically bound by the confines of the nation it is located in.<sup>129</sup> What is important is the qualification that the national community and the State are linked but not identical. This is understood from Temple's description of the State as the *organ* of the community, which he consistently used.<sup>130</sup> This was a major point in Temple's political thought, and the key point of departure from

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<sup>126</sup> Preston, *Future of Christian Ethics*, 102.

<sup>127</sup> Grimley, *Citizenship*, 94.

<sup>128</sup> Temple, *CS*, 123–124. MacIver's definition is that the "state is an association which, acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated the universal external conditions of social order". MacIver, *The Modern State*, 22.

<sup>129</sup> For Temple, the nature of the State fell into two main aspects: its internal relations to its own citizens and its external relations to other States/nations. The two aspects are distinct but related in that they operate on the same principles of personality and fellowship. A State cannot act against another State in a way that would deny or destroy the other State's citizens' personality or fellowship. We will not explore Temple's view on the State's external relations because our focus is on the nature of the State vis-à-vis its own citizens, and with the Church. Temple, *CC*, 20–21; Temple, *CS*, 141–185.

<sup>130</sup> For example, Temple, *CC*, 26; Temple, *MC*, 212; Temple, *CASO*, 47.

Maclver.<sup>131</sup> In Temple's view, the State functions as the *organ* of the community, and as such, is not directly equivalent to the community. The idea of an organ conveys that the State is not prior nor superior to the community even though it is vital to it. Temple makes his case forcefully that the State is "an organ of the community, indispensable to the continued existence of the community but entirely subordinate to it".<sup>132</sup> It is the community that is of primary importance.

Temple derived his understanding from a survey of the various political theories of the State. He proposed that they can be categorised into two groups.<sup>133</sup> The first group takes the starting position that humans are not naturally or innately social, so the State is a construct of humans who come to an agreement to live together.<sup>134</sup> The most characteristic expression of this is the social contract. The State arises out of some implicit or actual agreement by which individuals form a community by giving up a little of their natural liberty and rights to have security through law and order. Or, that individuals freely exercise their will to enter a political society from which a State is derived. In doing so, some entitlements of their will are suspended for the greater good. Glauco, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau can be enumerated under this group of political theorists.<sup>135</sup> Temple acknowledged that Locke and Rousseau were more careful in trying to limit the authority of the state. Conditions were clear under which the State forfeits its authority and citizens are morally permitted to rebel.<sup>136</sup> The State cannot disregard, suppress, or subjugate the will of its citizens. In his evaluation, Temple noted that the social contract theory does well in differentiating between the community and State, thereby curtailing the authority of the State.<sup>137</sup> However, the whole idea of a social

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<sup>131</sup> Temple argued that Maclver was right in distinguishing between the State and the community from which it emerges. But he was wrong to construe the State as an association. Maclver had arrived at this conclusion by process of elimination, having only considered the options of a community, an institution, or an association. This ignored a variety of possibilities. Grimley also notes that Temple did not agree with Maclver on the point that the national life of the community should not be guided by religious principles. Maclver was an agnostic who resented his oppressive pietistic Free Church of Scotland upbringing and disliked Erastianism. Temple, *CS*, 110–111. See also Grimley, *Citizenship*, 95. For Maclver's biography see R. M. Maclver, *As A Tale That Is Told: The Autobiography of R.M. Maclver* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

<sup>132</sup> Temple, *CC*, 26.

<sup>133</sup> Temple, *CS*, 45–90; Temple, *CC*, 23–26.

<sup>134</sup> Temple, *CS*, 44; Temple, *CC*, 23.

<sup>135</sup> For Glauco see Temple, *MC*, 207; Temple, *CS*, 45. For Hobbes see Temple, *MC*, 208; Temple, *CV*, 82; Temple, *CS*, 61–65; Temple, *CC*, 23. For Locke see Temple, *MC*, 209; Temple, *CS*, 65–67; Temple, *CC*, 23–24. For Rousseau see Temple, *MC*, 209; Temple, *CS*, 67–70, 88; Temple, *CC*, 23–24.

<sup>136</sup> Temple, *CS*, 65–70, 88; Temple, *CC*, 23–24; Temple, *MC*, 209.

<sup>137</sup> Temple, *CS*, 86; Temple, *CC*, 23.

contract “cannot in any case be more than mythological”.<sup>138</sup> No such contract was ever made, and the original parties to the contract were never named by its major proponents, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.<sup>139</sup> The biggest issue, however, with this whole group is that it fundamentally rests on the defective presumption that humans are intrinsically unsocial.<sup>140</sup>

This leads us to the other group of theories of the State that are built upon the innate sociability of humans.<sup>141</sup> Humans are social by nature and naturally group together to form communities. But over time, these communities develop their own customs and traditions which may stifle the individual. Freedom of thought and action, or the free exercise of the will, could be repressed by these customs. The requirement was for the individual to have room for liberty to express their will without imperilling the social unity of the whole. This gave rise to the State, which “represents the specific interest of the whole over against those of its parts”.<sup>142</sup> As Joseph Fletcher points out, the State in Temple’s understanding is a natural growth based on the needs of the community as a means of regulation and administration.<sup>143</sup> Temple counts the theories of Aristotle, Plato, Montesquieu, Hegel, Green, Edmund Burke, and Karl Marx within this group.<sup>144</sup> An extreme form of this view is the organic theory of the State.<sup>145</sup> It views society, community, and the State as a whole organism or part of an organic whole. The problem with such a view is that the community and the State are fused, and the State can easily become an end in itself.<sup>146</sup> Moreover, the individual loses their distinctive and independent view, and is dissolved into society as a mere part of it. The individual’s will and the community’s will are completely subsumed and enmeshed with the State.

Temple’s study of the various theories of the State made him aware of some common errors and pitfalls.<sup>147</sup> The State and the community should be distinguished from each other: the organic theory of the State alerts us to the pitfalls of merging them together. The will of

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<sup>138</sup> Temple, *CC*, 24.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.* Although, Temple does note that Rousseau attempted to answer with the test of residency, i.e., those who live on a given territory must submit to the sovereign. But this does not answer the question of the original parties to the contract. Temple, *CS*, 68.

<sup>140</sup> Temple, *CS*, 84–85; Temple, *CC*, 92.

<sup>141</sup> Temple, *CS*, 42, 72–87; Temple, *CC*, 24–25.

<sup>142</sup> Temple, *CC*, 25.

<sup>143</sup> Fletcher, *William Temple*, 168.

<sup>144</sup> Temple, *CS*, 73–84.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>146</sup> Suggate, “William Temple,” 170.

<sup>147</sup> Temple also surveyed Machiavelli, Spinoza, and Bentham. In fact, Temple wrote approvingly of Spinoza and argued that his doctrine of the State might be worthy of a reappraisal. For Machiavelli see Temple, *CS*, 14; Temple, *CC*, 2–3. For Spinoza see Temple, *MC*, 67; Temple, *CS*, 16–25. For Bentham see Temple, *CS*, 70–71.

the individuals and the will of the community gets fused with the State and is likely to be repressed. Yet the State cannot be distinguished from the community to the point that it is contrived as some construct of the community, as with social contract theory.<sup>148</sup> Temple's own view falls into the second group of political theories of the State. He averred that the correct starting point should be the intrinsic sociability of humans and that communities form naturally because of this.<sup>149</sup> The State emerges naturally out of human sociability as a means of regulating the interests of the parts and the whole, of the individual's will and the community's will. As Temple puts it, that "Society is an inherent fact of human nature, and that Sovereignty is a necessary organ of a politically developed Society".<sup>150</sup> Temple thus chose the term "organ" as the most appropriate description of the State. It distinguishes the State from the community, yet it conveys the sense of a natural or animate relationship. It expresses the point that the State is an indispensable part of the community, yet its existence is derived and conditional on the community that it serves.<sup>151</sup> It also points to the idea that the State has a clear functional role in the community as a regulator of its life, or to maintain the community's social life and the common good.<sup>152</sup>

This brings us to the second pertinent point of Temple's definition of the State. The main duty of the State is the maintenance of social order. This was a clear facet of Temple's political thought. The State is not an end, but a means of serving the national community by pursuing and preserving social order. Temple writes in *CC* that the State's primary duty is to "maintain that order which makes possible the free and unimpeded activity of its citizens".<sup>153</sup> Temple comes to this understanding by following MacIver in a unique interpretation of the General Will.<sup>154</sup> As we have seen in the previous section, Temple departs from Rousseau and Hegel by understanding the General Will as "not so much the will of the State as the will for the State, the will to maintain it".<sup>155</sup> The fundamental Will or desire of people is for social order. This gives rise to the State, which is supposed to promote and maintain that social order. Temple looks to MacIver again when he suggests that "the State serves best when it

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<sup>148</sup> Temple, *CS*, 98–99.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>153</sup> Temple, *CC*, 12.

<sup>154</sup> Temple, *CS*, 119–120.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 69, 119, 132. This quote is taken from p.119 where Temple quoted directly from MacIver, *The Modern State*, 11.

provides the liberty and order on which other associations can build, and by which they seek more intimate and particular ends".<sup>156</sup> Or in Temple's own words, the General Will gives rise to the expression of a State which is "the organ of the community itself over against its own members or associations"<sup>157</sup> as a determination "to live as a community and submit to any restrictions necessary to that end".<sup>158</sup> The State emerges from the community as "the guardian of the Community itself".<sup>159</sup> In other words, the General Will for a State is a necessary development in the community for its own preservation against the self-interest of individual members or groups. The community's will feeds into in the State which promotes and preserves social order.

As part of maintaining social order, the State also has a duty to actively promote the welfare of its citizens. Temple stressed in *CC* that the State is "an organ of the community, indispensable to the continued existence of the community but entirely subordinate to it. *Its end is the welfare of the community*".<sup>160</sup> Or again, in *CHC*, that "the State which came into existence to maintain life continues in existence to maintain the good life".<sup>161</sup> This meant that the State is concerned with all aspects of life in the community such as education, housing, and medical care. This extends to economic, commercial, and industrial enterprises, which can treat citizens unjustly.<sup>162</sup> Clearly, the State is afforded a much larger role and scope. In fact, this is the context behind the coining of the term "Welfare-State" by Temple. He was the first to use the term in writing in *CS* (1929) to refer to the kind of State that is governed by law and aims to serve its community by seeking their welfare.<sup>163</sup> This is further explicated in

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<sup>156</sup> Temple, *CS*, 114. Temple quoted directly from Maclver, *The Modern State*, 20.

<sup>157</sup> Temple, *CS*, 115.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

<sup>160</sup> Emphasis mine. Temple, *CC*, 26.

<sup>161</sup> Temple, *CHC*, 69.

<sup>162</sup> Temple, *CC*, 30–33. Temple points to the General Strike of 1926 as a prime example. This was a case of Capital against Labour where it should have fallen on the State to mediate and regulate. *Ibid.*, 129–134.

<sup>163</sup> Temple, *CS*, 170. Some confusion exists whether Temple was the first to use the term. Scholars such as Bruce, Edgerton, Petersen and Petersen, and Spencer attribute it to Alfred Zimmern in his 1934 book *Quo Vadimus*. They are, however, mistaken. Most of them follow Bruce's error of dating Temple's use of the term to *CC* in 1941. However, Temple had already used the term in 1928 in *CS*. It is also significant that Zimmern uses the term in the exact way that Temple did in *CS* to differentiate between the welfare state and power state. Garland is a scholar who gets this right. Spencer would also correct his mistake in his later book, *Christ in All Things*. See Maurice Bruce, *The Coming of the Welfare State* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1961), 31; David Edgerton, *Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 59–60; Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, "Confusion and Divergence: Origins and Meanings of the Term 'Welfare State' in Germany and Britain, 1840–1940," *Journal of European Social Policy*, vol.23, no.1 (2013): 43–44; Alfred Zimmern, *Quo Vadimus?* (London: Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1934), 35–36; David Garland, "The Emergence of the Idea of 'The

an article now at the Lambeth Palace Archive, titled “The Real Meaning of the War”. Temple argued that what was really at stake at the Second World War was two different concepts of the nature of humans: that if every human person is a child of God destined for fellowship with Him, their worth and dignity transcends the State. The State “must recognise in every citizen something superior to itself; in other words we get the conception of the ‘Welfare State’, according to which the State exists for the sake for its citizens both collectively and individually”.<sup>164</sup> The other concept was to view humans as merely episodic in history and life. This will result in the Power State where the human person exists for the State. It commands his allegiance and its prosperity overedges his welfare.<sup>165</sup> The same point is made in CS where Temple singles out the pre-First World War Austrian and Prussian states, which forced their citizens to serve the State’s own ends.<sup>166</sup>

This explanation, then, makes light of David Nicholls’ critique that Temple held to a “left of centre statism” that raised the welfare state to the point of paternalism.<sup>167</sup> Stephen Spencer is right in stating that although Temple did contend for significant state intervention, this was “always within the context of a prior commitment to the principle that ‘the State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State’”.<sup>168</sup> Quite clearly, the point was not authoritative supervision or to diminish the individual citizen’s efforts and will. Rather, it was to recognise that the human person is central and important, and to aid their development. This will become more apparent in the last chapter in our exposition of the social principles of personality.

The meaning of the term “Welfare State” would evolve after the Second World War to denote “the general package of reforms and initiatives put in place by the Labour Government of 1945–1951” which looked after citizens from cradle to grave.<sup>169</sup> But even then, this evolved meaning was already nascent in Temple’s thoughts. He was firm in his conviction that there is a “need that the State should take further steps towards establishing

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Welfare State’ in British Political Discourse,” *History of the Human Sciences*, vol.35, no.1 (August 30, 2021): 6; Spencer, *William Temple*, 70, 123; Spencer, *Christ in All Things*, 83.

<sup>164</sup> William Temple, *The Real Meaning of War*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.67, fol.125.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Temple, *CS*, 169–171; Temple, *CC*, 26, 35.

<sup>167</sup> David Nicholls, *Deity and Domination* (London: Routledge, 1989), 44–50. Quote from 44.

<sup>168</sup> Stephen Spencer, “William Temple and the ‘Temple Tradition’,” in *Theology Reforming Society: Revisiting Anglican Social Theology*, ed. Stephen Spencer (London: SCM Press, 2017), 105.

<sup>169</sup> Spencer, *Christ in All Things*, 83–84.

a basic economic and social security for all its citizens”.<sup>170</sup> Or again, that the State “must undertake the planning of our economic life, taking care, as far as may be, that all essential needs are met”.<sup>171</sup> We should nuance that for Temple the provision of basic economic needs was not an end in itself. It was meant to be a foundation for liberty. This is clear in a private correspondence between Temple and Guy Kindersley, a former Conservative member of parliament. Kindersley had written to Temple after the Beveridge Report to express concerns that its suggestion of a welfare state would impinge upon citizens’ freedom and expose them to the “dangers inherent in the claims of an omni-competent State”.<sup>172</sup> Temple disagreed. He wrote back arguing that, on the contrary, actual freedom would increase because “the primary necessity for effective liberty is security as regards the basic consumer goods”.<sup>173</sup> This corresponds with our exploration of Temple’s thoughts so far. As the organ of the community, the State’s primary function is to preserve and promote social order, which includes looking after the welfare of its citizens and enabling them to lead a good life.

The last facet of Temple’s definition of the State is his belief that the State maintains social order through the law backed by coercion. As we have seen, the State is the organ of the national community that is entrusted with the maintenance of social order. It regulates its citizens so that everyone may enjoy freedom and fellowship. Temple specifies that the State’s primary means of regulation is to “make and enforce Law governing those aspects of departments of life in society” of which the most fundamental is the “freedom of choice and action of individual or functional groups”.<sup>174</sup> That is why the State is “essentially the source and upholder of Law, and its sphere is all that is appropriately regulated by Law”.<sup>175</sup> By defining the boundary of the rule of law, Temple was effectively limiting the State and preventing it from acting arbitrarily or wantonly. The State must act in accordance with the law as the entity that enacts and enforces the law. John Bald is right in commenting that the ethical agency of the State is the use of Law in providing “liberty and an order for society

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<sup>170</sup> Temple, *CLF*, 41.

<sup>171</sup> William Temple, *The Hope of A New World* (London: SCM Press, 1940), 52.

<sup>172</sup> Guy M. Kindersley, *Letter from Major Guy M. Kindersley to William Temple*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.5, fol.29.

<sup>173</sup> William Temple, *Letter from William Temple to Major Guy M. Kindersley*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.5, fol.30.

<sup>174</sup> Temple, *CC*, 25.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

expressive of the will of the total natural community, whether that may be Christian or not”.<sup>176</sup>

In fact, Temple contends that the State can use force and coercion to enforce the law. The State is the only entity that can do so because it is the organ of the national community. It is the only entity within a nation that functions on behalf of all who reside in that nation. In other words, it represents the widest community possible in that nation as compared to their groups or associations. As Temple saw it, this wide representation gave the State a certain universality which is precisely why it is allowed to use coercion to uphold the law.<sup>177</sup> Conversely, individual citizens or groups of citizens cannot be allowed to use coercion because they are likely to use it for their own narrow interests.<sup>178</sup> That being the case, Temple is careful to nuance that the fundamental basis for order in the nation is the law and not coercion. The objective of coercion is to make the law actual and effective.<sup>179</sup> This is why Temple writes that “force [is the] the instrument of law”.<sup>180</sup> Coercive power is a legitimate tool, but it is only to be used in strict adherence to the law in its bid to enforce it. Temple expresses clearly that the “distinguishing mark of the State, then, is not its possession of force, but its self-expression through Law, which employs force as the guarantee of that universality which is its essential nature... The Majesty of Law is the foundation of a secure and progressive civilisation”.<sup>181</sup> Temple also posits that the State’s coercive powers, or perhaps the State more broadly construed, has limits. The State cannot force or demand the betrayal of one’s conscience, or the prohibition of worship.<sup>182</sup> Prohibiting worship is disallowing humans from being able to fully develop their will and personality. This is why Temple felt that the State is most out of place when it prohibits, or even determines, how people should worship God.<sup>183</sup>

It should be clear from Temple’s definition of the State that it is clearly given a much larger role and scope in society. John Atherton astutely observes that this increased State role was part of a change of tide in British political theology. It was a change from what he calls the Age of Voluntarism and Atonement, which ran from the late eighteenth century through

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<sup>176</sup> Bald, *William Temple and Reinhold Niebuhr*, 160.

<sup>177</sup> Temple, *CS*, 110–113.

<sup>178</sup> Temple, *CC*, 25.

<sup>179</sup> Temple, *CS*, 113.

<sup>180</sup> Temple, *CC*, 26.

<sup>181</sup> Temple, *CS*, 114.

<sup>182</sup> Temple, *CC*, 28–30.

<sup>183</sup> Temple, *CS*, 125.

the Victorian era, to the Age of the State and Incarnation, which began in the late nineteenth century and lasted until the 1960s. As the name suggests, the theological focus shifted from the atonement to the Incarnation, with an accompanying shift of focus in society from voluntary organisations to the State.<sup>184</sup> The State became the focal point of a new-found collectivism that would intervene in social policies on behalf of the community. Christian social reformers in the first half of the twentieth century would also tend to embrace the State as the primary means of realising progress and change.<sup>185</sup> In fact, Atherton singles out Temple as the culmination point of this Age of State and Incarnation: Temple's theology was certainly centred on the Incarnation, and he coined the term "Welfare State".<sup>186</sup> As with Bosanquet's idea of *Sittlichkeit*, this was a formal institutionalising of the community's Will. This is in contrast with voluntary organisations and associations, which are based on freely willed benevolent activity. Individuals freely will or choose to exercise their Will to cooperate to a certain end. The decline of voluntary associations probably has to do with the fact that urbanisation and both the World Wars had caused widespread poverty and loss, far beyond what the Church or any voluntary association could cope with. For example, William Sachs notes that by the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the British government was doing more to provide for social relief; the Church had lost that function.<sup>187</sup> Clearly then, the State developed a much greater role and scope in society that took over the place of voluntary associations.

This section has summarised the key aspects of how Temple understood the nature of the State. He was clear and consistent that the State is the organ of the national community. The two are linked but not identical. The State emerges naturally from the community as a means of regulating between the individual and the community, or between the freedom of the individual's will and the community's will. As such, the primary function and duty of the State is to preserve the social order. This includes the welfare of its citizens and enabling them to live a good life. The State does so through the medium of the law and is allowed to use coercion to this end. It is perhaps in this light that Atherton singles Temple out as the culmination point of the Age of Incarnation and the State.

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<sup>184</sup> Atherton, *Public Theology For Changing Times*, 66–82.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 75–79.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>187</sup> Sachs, *Transformation*, 257.

## Church and State: Confluence, Coordination, and Conflict

We now turn to the relationship between the Church and State in Temple's mind. The foregoing discussion might give the impression that Temple was a statist: giving unqualified support to the State. Atherton's description of him might certainly lead the uncaredful reader to this impression. Some of Temple's earlier writings might also lead to this misunderstanding. For example, he wrote in 1904, in a pamphlet titled "The Education of Citizens", that "man has no right to have his talents developed apart from his intention to devote them to the state ... man is essentially and before all else a member of the state".<sup>188</sup> However, as we noted in the first section of this chapter, Temple's view of the State and its relation to the Church evolved over the course of his lifetime. His experience of two World Wars, totalitarian states, the General Strike, and the Prayer Book Controversy would undoubtedly have cautioned him from giving blind support to the State. Bald is perhaps more on point in his overall evaluation that, for Temple, "the state is neither absolute nor omnipotent, an end in itself, but exists to promote the welfare of the community through its determination and application of a truly universal law".<sup>189</sup>

Temple's mature view reflects more caution over absolutising the State. This view can chiefly be found in *CC* which he writes from "an avowed Christian standpoint".<sup>190</sup> This standpoint is different from much of our foregoing discussion which leans towards political philosophy and theory. With the Christian position in mind, Temple is emphatic that the State is not omnipotent, nor free to do whatever it wants. This is because God alone is absolutely sovereign, and each person has been given value by Him. Temple makes this point forcefully:

No Christian ... can admit that the State is entitled to an absolute allegiance. Such an allegiance is due to God alone; and He is the Father of all men. All States, like all other parts of the created world, exist to do Him service and to give him glory. Similarly, no Christian can admit that the individual citizen exists solely for the service of the State. He is first and foremost a child of God ... The State exists to serve the common man.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> William Temple, *The Education of Citizens*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.47, fol.93.

<sup>189</sup> Bald, *William Temple and Reinhold Niebuhr*, 148.

<sup>190</sup> Temple, *CC*, 22.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*; Temple, *CTP*, 47.

In other words, God is the sole absolute Sovereign and the ultimate object of humans' obedience, allegiance, and loyalty. A similar point is made in *Christian Democracy*. He writes that the "national loyalty of a Christian cannot be absolute, just because it is an expression of, and subordinate to, his loyalty to God".<sup>192</sup> The State, therefore, cannot claim absolute sovereignty, allegiance, and obedience. Its power and sovereignty are graded and qualified. The State that expresses its citizens' will is subordinated to the Divine Will. In a similar vein, the State cannot subjugate or oppress its citizens because every person is endowed with an inherent and indelible worth from God. The State can make some demands of its citizens such as taxation or conscription into the army. But its right over a citizen is "limited by his conscience and his obligation to live in the spirit of fellowship with God".<sup>193</sup> It is a wrongful imposition of the State's Will on its citizens to violate either of those conditions. We recall from chapter three that the latter condition, of living in fellowship with God, was the goal or end state of salvation. Christ's work restores humans into fellowship with God, as well as restoring fellowship amongst fellow humans. And it is this restoration that enables humans to reach their ideal condition of a completed personality and perfected fellowship. That is, the complete integration of all the impulses, desires, and reasoning of a person under their will that is nourished by fellowship with God and all humanity. In other words, State violation or prohibition of its citizens' fellowship with God is no small matter. It is an imposition of the State's Will that prevents its citizens from fully developing their will, personality, and fellowship.

In fact, these principles of personality and fellowship were central to Temple's political thought. He writes in *CS* that the fundamental basis and aim of all political theories is to do justice to the sanctity of personality and the fact of fellowship. He states:

By common consent the two first principles in the Gospel as applied to social order are the Sanctity of Personality and the Fact of Fellowship. Society is, we find, essentially a Fellowship of Persons, and all the ramifications of social or political theory are articulations of that simple but far-reaching truth. By God's appointment we are free spirits; by his appointment also we are "members one of another". The whole

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<sup>192</sup> Temple, *Christian Democracy* 23.

<sup>193</sup> Temple, *CC*, 29.

problem of politics, the whole art of statesmanship, is to do full justice to both those principles without the sacrifice of either in the varying circumstances of successive ages.<sup>194</sup>

We immediately see great consistency in Temple's theology. Personality and fellowship are central to Temple's theological anthropology, Christology, and ecclesiology. A completed personality and a perfected fellowship is the ideal that all humans pursue. The work of Christ opens this possibility, and the Church continues to impel the world towards it as the organ of Christ's Will. These two principles are again important to Temple's political thought. He contends that the entire enterprise of politics is to give due consideration and weight to the fact that the individual person is important because of their personality, and that they are fundamentally social and live as part of a community such that fellowship is also important. Politics should therefore aim to protect and give full scope for the development of both personality and fellowship. It follows that these two principles, along with service, form Temple's Christian social principles that society and the State should strive towards. We will explore this more in the next chapter. What is important to note is that the principles of personality and fellowship are therefore not only the basis for political theory, but the goal of society and the State as well. If this is true, then the goal of the State is similar to the goal of the Church. We saw in chapter four that the Church is the organ of Christ's Will that seeks to gather all humanity as one person in Christ. This is the ultimate fulfilment of a completed personality and perfected fellowship because all of humanity take on Christ's Will as their own, and thus become one personality or one person in Christ. The Church and the State thus share the same goal of developing human personality and fellowship. To be sure, the Church's goal includes and considers the salvific work of Christ in this endeavour whereas the State may or may not do so.

This coincidence or confluence of the Church and the State is a clear facet of Temple's political thought. Part of this is because Temple takes the view that both the Church and the State are instruments of God. He writes in *CC* that the "distinctive functions of the two [i.e., Church and State] are governed by different principles, or rather by different relationships to

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<sup>194</sup> Temple, *CS*, 89.

the one ultimate end – the glory of God in the welfare of His people”.<sup>195</sup> Both the Church’s and the State’s goal is to glorify God and to seek the welfare of his people. This is perhaps why they both pursue the same goal of developing human personality and fellowship. Temple’s view is arguably closer to the biblical view of Church–State relationships where both the Church and the State are part of God’s sovereign rule on earth.<sup>196</sup> In fact, Temple goes so far as to suggest that the State and the Church share a similar divine origin. He writes in *MC* that the same life and power that sustain the Church also created and sustains the nations and States. The State is the “operation of God immanent in history, while the life of the Church is the energy of God transcendent”.<sup>197</sup> Or again, that the “State and the Church are the channels through which these two forms of the one spiritual influence play upon men”.<sup>198</sup> The State is thus divinely ordained by God just as the Church is. This is exactly how Temple understands Romans 13:1. He explains that Paul’s idea that “the powers that be are ordained by God” commits the Church to attribute a form of divine right to the State.<sup>199</sup> The State is therefore not an organism or a construct, or merely the organ of the national community. It is divinely ordained as an instrument of God. It should be recognised that Temple consciously pulls back from ascribing to the State a divine origin in *CC*. Yet he continues to claim that the State “is a servant and instrument of God for the preservation of Justice and for the promotion of human welfare”.<sup>200</sup> The State is an instrument of God ordained to seek the welfare of His people as the organ of the national community that maintains social order through the law. As Temple saw it, this allows human flourishing, or the development of people’s personality and fellowship. Temple presses the point by proposing that this would be true of the State even if all its citizens were atheists!<sup>201</sup>

Temple goes further by describing this confluence of Church and State as an “interlocking” situation in *CC*.<sup>202</sup> He pushes back against the claim that the Church should be

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<sup>195</sup> Temple, *CC*, 69. Same idea in *CN* where Temple writes that “both State and Church are instruments of God for establishing His Kingdom; both have the same goal; but they have different functions in relation to that goal”. Temple, *CN*, 53. Same point in 45.

<sup>196</sup> See for example Paul D. L. Avis, *Church, State and Establishment* (London: SPCK, 2001), 60–62; David Fergusson, *Church, State and Civil Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 21–22.

<sup>197</sup> Temple, *MC*, 324. Same idea in 345.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, 332.

<sup>199</sup> Temple, *CS*, 49.

<sup>200</sup> Temple, *CC*, 36.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, chapter IV.

completely independent of the State because a clean Church–State dichotomy is unrealistic.<sup>203</sup> The American “wall of separation” is impractical and untenable. Through a historical survey of Church–State relations, Temple showed that both Church and the State are bound to interact and clash with each other.<sup>204</sup> This comes down to the fact that the Church is not a purely spiritual entity with strictly spiritual pursuits. It has clear secular concerns which bring it within the State’s authority. For example, the Church owns and maintains properties which are subject to the law, of which the State is the lawmaker.<sup>205</sup> The Church also cannot stay quiet in the face of injustice enacted by the State and has to interact with it.<sup>206</sup> Similarly, the State is not a purely secular entity because it has a moral and spiritual function as well.<sup>207</sup> The legal function of the State affects and governs the ethical outlook of its members and has a moralising effect on them.<sup>208</sup> The State also has the spiritual function of regulating religion by giving free scope to it.<sup>209</sup> Clearly then, the Church has secular concerns while the State has spiritual and moral aspects to it. This is why Temple wrote earlier that the State is a “natural growth with a spiritual significance”, and that the Church is a “spiritual creation working through a natural medium”.<sup>210</sup>

Given this interlocking confluence, Temple proposes that “[c]o-operation is therefore inevitable, and co-operation may involve some measure of compromise”.<sup>211</sup> Hence, the relationship between Church and State is not dichotomous but cooperative and synergistic. Temple’s more general stance on this cooperation is best expressed in *MC*:

The State and the Church are the channels through which these two forms of the one spiritual influence play upon men. The State gives men security against certain evils in themselves or in other men, so that they may be set free for the higher life of the

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<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, chapter I.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, 46. In fact, part of the problem of Church–State relations during the medieval era was precisely that the Church ignored the spiritual function of the State. The Church claimed all spiritual activity for itself, and thus made the State unspiritual. In attempting to influence all aspects of life with spiritually, the Church then took on roles (such as the law) which were strictly meant for the State. Temple, *CN*, 43.

<sup>208</sup> Temple, *CC*, 38–39.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>210</sup> Temple, *CN*, 52.

<sup>211</sup> Temple, *CC*, 59.

spirit. The Church exists precisely to elicit that higher life of the spirit. If either Church or State tries to perform the function of the other, disaster must ensue.<sup>212</sup>

The Church and the State are meant to cooperate by having differentiated but coordinated roles. Moreover, they must keep strictly to their respective roles and to the methods appropriate for that role. The State's main role is the maintenance of social order through the law, with the potential use of coercive powers. It can regulate the community in this way because it acts upon and expresses the will of the community. The Church does not, and thus cannot, usurp the methods of the State.<sup>213</sup> Rather, the Church relies on the State to provide the necessary material and physical conditions to then draw people to a higher state of life. That is, to bring all people into fellowship with God. It does so "not by conversion of the Church into an earthly State but by incorporation of mankind into Christ".<sup>214</sup> In that way, the Church has no authority over the State or the national community, and neither should it get involved in political action directly.<sup>215</sup> The Church's Will should not encroach upon the State's Will.

A prima facie reading of this might seem to suggest that Temple had espoused the Lutheran "two kingdoms" doctrine. Some commentators like Sherman are of this opinion.<sup>216</sup> But this neglects Temple's clear repudiation of the Lutheran doctrine as a warped position. It resulted in the confinement of the Church to pietism and devotional exercise. This is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of God as Creator and Redeemer.<sup>217</sup> Temple goes so far as to suggest that because of this it is "easy to see how Luther prepared the way for Hitler"!<sup>218</sup> Temple's repudiation of the Lutheran position is further evidenced by his clear emphasis on the interlocking relationship between the Church and the State as expressed in *CC*. They are differentiated but share coordinated and synergistic roles. Beyond the broader

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<sup>212</sup> Temple, *MC*, 332.

<sup>213</sup> The Church has made the mistake of overstepping its boundary in the past by using means which are inappropriate to it. This was the main fault of the papacy in the Middle Ages. Hildebrand (or Pope Gregory VII) was right in his approach that all people should recognise God and obey His law. But Hildebrand's mistake was to adopt the methods of the State for doing so, i.e., legislation and force. Temple, *ECP*, 29; Temple, *CC*, 4–9, 17; Temple, *MC*, 217–331.

<sup>214</sup> Temple, *CC*, 56.

<sup>215</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 19.

<sup>216</sup> Franklin Sherman, "Introduction," in *What Christians Stand For in the Secular World*, ed. William Temple (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965), viii.

<sup>217</sup> Temple, *CC*, 73.

<sup>218</sup> Malvern Conference, *Malvern, 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society*, 13.

cooperation discussed, Temple also enumerates four more specific areas of cooperation between the Church and the State.<sup>219</sup>

However, conflict and tension still exist in this confluence of Church and State despite these cooperative and coordinated functions. The crux of this conflict lies in the fact that both the Church and the State claim a universal and final authority. The Church has a Revelation that is final, unique, and universal. That makes it a constant source of difficulty to any State which does not subscribe to that revelation as its guide.<sup>220</sup> On the other hand, the State also claims to act on behalf of the community with a sovereign authority that is backed by coercion or force.<sup>221</sup> To put this in the terms of our discussion, the Church and the State clash because they are organs of two different wills. The Church is the organ of Christ's Will whereas the State is the organ of the national community such that it represents the community's will. They are set out somewhat antithetically and bound to cause conflict. It is significant that Temple write about this conflict openly in *CC*, written in 1941. Both the Prayer Book Controversy and General Strike must have played no small role in contributing to this conflict.

Temple then moves on to make an interesting and novel claim. He argues that this conflict between Church and State is most acutely experienced by the Christian citizen.<sup>222</sup> The conflict and tension between Church and State is ultimately played out in the life of a human person. In other words, both Church and State share the same sphere of operation. Temple puts it this way:

No; Church and State, religion and citizenship, have the same sphere – the life of man – but they have different functions in relation to that one sphere; and the Christian citizen has to fulfil his Churchmanship and his citizenship in the whole of his life by responding at all points to the appropriate claims of Church and State.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> (1) The Church stands for love while the State stands for justice; (2) the Church focuses on the spiritual basis of life while the State provides the material basis of life; (3) the Church is universal whereas the State is particular and parochial; (4) the Church's wider universal nature forms a check against the State's narrower nationalistic tendencies. Temple, *CC*, 73–103.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, 5–6.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, 6–7.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, 73. See also Temple, *What Christians Stand For*, 5–6. "Churchman and citizen are words with a different connotation even when they denote the same person; and that person, the individual Christian, has to exercise both of these functions".

The Christian citizen is simultaneously a member of the Church and a citizen of the State. This dual identity is why they experience the tension of the Church's and the State's simultaneous claims to be universal and sovereign. Temple writes:

So we come to the heart of the problem, which is not primarily organisation but a tension in the soul of the Christian citizen. He is a member of two societies; even if the membership of these two is identical, yet as societies they are two and not one. The distinctive functions of the two are governed by different principles, or rather by different relationships to one ultimate end – the glory of God in the welfare of His people.<sup>224</sup>

Church–State conflict is most acutely felt not as a clash between two institutions, but an acute tension in the life of the Christian citizen. The Christian citizen is a member of both the Church and the State. Their dual membership in both entities causes them to experience the simultaneous demands, or the competing claims, of the two wills. This tension is pervasive for all Christian citizens in all parts of their life.<sup>225</sup>

One of the main critiques of Temple's Church–State relationship is that his construal of the State seems idealistic and static. Robert Craig makes a pointed argument by juxtaposing Temple against Emil Brunner.<sup>226</sup> Brunner's understanding of the State shares many similarities with Temple. Brunner believed that the State arises naturally out of human sociability, and its agency is through the law backed by coercion.<sup>227</sup> However, he saw the State as being capable of good and evil.<sup>228</sup> Hence, the State has "two faces" which results in a duality that is the "riddle of the state".<sup>229</sup> This riddle is derived from the humans who constitute it, and traceable back to the "original antithesis of Creation and Sin".<sup>230</sup> Craig argues that unlike Brunner, Temple does not retain this tension and antithesis of the State. Perhaps, there is some truth that Temple could have allowed for a more realistic understanding of the State as having the

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<sup>224</sup> Temple, *CC*, 69.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

<sup>226</sup> Craig, *Social Concern*, 99–103.

<sup>227</sup> Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian Ethics* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1937), 448–457.

<sup>228</sup> Brunner goes on to argue that the State is not a divine creation as it does not express God's Will, but it is nonetheless divinely appointed by God to uphold order. It is a response to human sin, to put a check to the selfish and violent tendencies of humans. *Ibid.*, 444–446.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 443. The whole of Section 4 pertains to the State.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, 443–444. Quote from 444.

potential for being evil. However, as with much theological development, context plays a crucial role. Brunner was writing within the context of Continental Europe and the rise of totalitarian regimes in Germany, Russia, and Italy. His construal of the good–evil duality of the State probably takes shape within that context. Temple, on the other hand, is writing from the context of Britain, and specifically England. The Church of England is the Established Church and part of the State. To say that the State can be or is evil might be tricky. Moreover, the government in England was not totalitarian, dictatorial, nor despotic. Rather, the problem that the Church faced with regards to the State was the confluence and conflict between them. In other words, Temple was simply theologising and making sense of the context that confronted him. This is why he chose to locate the tension in the Christian citizen who experiences the burden of the simultaneous claims of the Church and the State. That being said, locating the Church–State conflict that way does leave something to be desired. It seems to neglect the real sense of conflict that exists between the two as institutions. It would be a stretch to describe the Prayer Book Controversy, for example, as a tension in the Christian citizen. Temple could have perhaps said more about the direct conflict between the Church and the State.

Likewise, Mark Chapman makes a similar objection as Craig. He writes that in affording the State a divine origin as an order of creation, Temple “unwittingly absolutized the transient entity of the nation state”.<sup>231</sup> As a result of this, there are “few limits on the legitimacy of the state’s sovereignty ... [which] thereby becomes a necessary law of nature: all the Christian can do is to ensure that the state act morally”.<sup>232</sup> There might be some truth to this objection. Our next chapter will show that Temple would rely heavily on the use of principles. The Church should develop and teach principles which Christian citizens then use to engage the State. This tends to be a more subdued form of engagement and does not account for times when the State itself becomes oppressive or tyrannical, where stronger forms of protest or dissent might be required. However, both of Chapman’s objections are debatable. Temple’s idea of a divine origin of the State might well fall within the bounds of traditional Anglican beliefs on Church and State. Paul Avis, for example, argues that the Anglican tradition tends to hold to some common and central beliefs regarding Church and State. One is the belief

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<sup>231</sup> Mark D. Chapman, "Ronald Preston, William Temple, and the Future of Christian Politics," *Studies in Christian Ethics*, vol.17, no.2 (2004): 169.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

that the “institution of the state is ordained by God as a creation ordinance for the well-being of humanity”.<sup>233</sup> Another belief is that the Church and State are “twin divinely ordained institutions – two channels through which God works for the well-being of God’s human creation” and should therefore relate to and work with each other.<sup>234</sup> In any case, Temple did consciously pull back from this divine origin of the State in *CC* and was only willing to assert that it was an instrument of God.

At the same time, and contrary to Chapman’s second point, Temple did have limits and checks to the State’s sovereignty. We have seen from the exposition above that Temple’s fundamental belief was that the State is not an end unto itself. It is the human person that is primary. Consider this passage for example:

The social life of man is part of the Divine purpose in Creation, and what is requisite for its maintenance is part of the Divine activity in preserving what Creation called into being. This is the theological justification of the State and all its apparatus; and for anyone who approaches the whole matter from the theological side it is of supreme importance that the State has a theological justification, which also prescribes the limits of the proper activity of the State outside of which this justification would not hold.<sup>235</sup>

This passage reiterates many points discussed in this chapter. The State emerges naturally because of the intrinsic sociality of humans, to regulate their communal life. It is perhaps in this way that Temple sees the State as part of God’s purpose, activity, or instrumentation of maintaining humans’ social life. Again, the emphasis is on humans and their flourishing. The State trespasses its sovereignty when it denies or destroys human nature and their social life. But Temple has more to say. He argues that the human person is not only a social being but also “a seeker for knowledge, a creator and lover of beauty, a worshipper of God”.<sup>236</sup> Thus, the State cannot forbid the pursuit of knowledge, truth, beauty, or the worship of God

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<sup>233</sup> Avis, *Church, State and Establishment*, 60.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>235</sup> Temple, *Christian Democracy* 38–39.

<sup>236</sup> Temple, *CS*, 124.

because it goes against the fundamental nature of humans.<sup>237</sup> Such a transgression is destructive to the community, and the community is not only permitted but obliged to disobey, to protect its way of life.<sup>238</sup> It is clear that the human person is primary. Or in Temple's words, the "State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State".<sup>239</sup> State legitimacy and sovereignty is only in so far as it respects the fundamental nature of the human person.

This section has shown the sense of conflict between Church and State in Temple's thoughts. The Church and the State are in confluence because they are both instruments of God that are used for the welfare of His people. Thus, they share the same end (i.e., the welfare of the people) and the same sphere of operation (i.e., the human person's life). In fact, Temple asserts that they are caught in an interlocking situation because a clean dichotomy between Church and State is unrealistic. Within this interlocking confluence, Temple thus proposes that coordination is inevitable. The Church and the State are meant to operate in a coordinated and synergistic way with differentiated roles. This, however, does not lessen the tension and conflict that arises between them. This is because both the Church and the State claim a universal and final authority. They are fundamentally organs of two different wills. The Church is the organ of Christ's Will whereas the State is the organ of the national community and follows the community's will.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has explored Temple's understanding of the State and its relationship to the Church. He clearly saw a confluence between them that leads to conflict. The Prayer Book Controversy and the General Strike undoubtedly contributed to this growing sense of conflict. However, the deeper source of this confluence and conflict can be attributed to his understanding of the nature of the State. For Temple, the State was the organ of the national community that promotes social order, that is, the welfare of its citizens and a good life for them. Its main ethical agency is the law, and it is allowed the use of coercion to make the law effective. In other words, the State had developed a much broader and important role in the

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid. Or again, that a State's right over a citizen is "limited by his conscience and his obligation to live in the spirit of fellowship with God". Temple, *CC*, 29.

<sup>238</sup> Temple, *CS*, 124–125.

<sup>239</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 44. Exact same point and wording in Temple, *CC*, 28.

nation. This is likely influenced by Green and Bosanquet. Thus the State and the Church are bound to conflict because they represent and act on two different wills. The State is the organ of the national community and follows the community's will, whereas the Church is the organ of Christ's Will and acts upon it. The confluence of Church and State can be understood as a confluence and conflict of wills. This conflict, argues Temple, is most acutely experienced by the Christian citizen, who feels the simultaneous claims of both Church and State.

## Chapter Six

# Christian Social Principles: Appealing to and Leavening the Community's Will

### Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted the conflict between the Church and the State. We proposed that this came down to the fact that they are organs of different wills. The State is the organ of the community that follows the community's will, while the Church is the organ of Christ's Will. The Church–State conflict was therefore a clash between two wills. This conflict was, however, most acutely experienced by the Christian citizen who experiences the simultaneous demands of the Church and the State. We should make clear from the outset that Temple held to the idea of a communal will even though he did not use the Rousseauian term “General Will” to denote it. The previous chapter showed that he espoused a different understanding of the specific term “General Will”, but nonetheless held to the idea of it through the term “Ultimate Sovereignty”. We will therefore use the term “community's will” to denote the will of the people both in contrast with the “General Will” and to fit our overall thesis.

This chapter builds on the previous one by exploring Temple's proposed solution to the tension felt by the Christian citizen. He asserts that the Church should develop principles and pass them on to Christian citizens who then follow them in their civic capacity. In doing so, the Church leavens the community's will, the State, and state policy through the intermediacy of the Christian citizen. It allows the Church to engage the State indirectly because the State takes note of the community's will. Temple puts his own solution into practice by articulating three principles – freedom (or the sacredness of personality), fellowship, and service. This can be observed most prominently in *CASO*. What is striking is the importance of the will to Temple's social principles. This is because the will is central to Temple's first two and main principles of personality and fellowship. These two social principles derive from Temple's theology. The preceding chapters have shown that personality and fellowship were important categories for his doctrine of God, Christology, theological anthropology, ecclesiology, and political theory. We are making an important

claim here – that Temple’s social teaching is fundamentally built upon and buttressed by his theology. It is the hermeneutic of the will that allows us to see this bridge between social teaching and theology.

### **Development of Principles: Leavening the Community’s Will and the State**

In the previous chapter we saw Temple’s assertion that the conflict between Church and State was most acutely experienced by the Christian citizen. As we have noted there, one might be tempted to query whether and to what extent this claim is valid. The Prayer Book Controversy, for example, is probably more acutely felt between the two institutions of the Church and the State than by the Christian citizen. Nevertheless, this was an important claim that Temple made. It is the Christian citizen who feels the simultaneous and conflicting claims of both the Church and the State. Temple lamented that there is little written on this topic. Much of the literature on political theory and Church–State relationships tends to focus on an institutional point of view. There is a lacuna of literature on how it plays out in the Christian citizens’ lives and how they should deal with it.<sup>1</sup> Temple hoped to fill this gap with his unique and novel solution. The Church should formulate and announce Christian principles which equip Christian citizens to engage society, the State, and social issues in their civic capacity. In so doing, they effectively leaven the community’s will, the State, and state policy. The clergy’s role is to inspire the lay people to Christian living in the world. It is through the laity that the Church fulfils its role in the world.<sup>2</sup> In saying this, Temple seems to anticipate *Gaudium et spes*, which defines the Catholic’s view of the Church in the world and the importance of lay Christian people in accomplishing the Church’s mission. Temple writes in *CC*:

The Church is both entitled and obliged to condemn the society characterised by these evils; but it is not entitled in its corporate capacity to advocate specific remedies ... [But] the very object of condemning the evil is to stimulate those who respect its authority to seek and apply the remedy. Far the larger proportion of the Church’s contribution to social progress is made in this way. It inspires its members with a faith

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<sup>1</sup> Temple, *CC*, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

in the power of which they, acting as politicians, civil servants, business men, trade unionists, or whatever they may be, modify the customs and traditions of the department of state or section of society with which they are concerned. In other words the Church lays down principles; the Christian citizen applies them; and to do this he utilises the machinery of the State.<sup>3</sup>

Temple explains further in *CASO*:

The method of the Church's impact upon society at large should be twofold. The Church must announce Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with them. It must then pass on to Christian citizens, acting in their civic capacity, the task of re-shaping the existing order in closer conformity to the principles. For at this point technical knowledge may be required and judgements of practical expediency are always required ... In just the same way the Church may tell the politician what ends the social order should promote; but it must leave to the politician the devising of the precise means to those ends.<sup>4</sup>

The tension felt by the Christian citizen can be lessened through the use of principles by the Church. These principles provide guidance by furnishing the Christian citizen with a Christian perspective on various issues so that they are equipped to engage with them. The Christian citizen is then able to modify the customs, traditions, or institutions in the community's life that are contrary to these principles. Temple explains in *CASO* that the Christian citizen has two avenues of influence.<sup>5</sup> One is through their normal daily lives in "ordinary human relationships and in ordinary avocations".<sup>6</sup> This can be thought of as a leavening of the community's will. Temple writes plainly that the "actual leavening of the world's lump ... must be done by laymen".<sup>7</sup> Equipped with Christian principles, Christian citizens influence the life and thought of the community by bringing these principles to their daily life and work. They interact with other people in the community and engage with these principles. They also try

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 82–83.

<sup>4</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 35.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 18–19.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>7</sup> Temple, *CC*, 61.

to apply this practically at work. The Christian engineer, politician, or economist attempts to work out these principles in their respective fields. It is hoped that these Christian principles then circulate in the community and slowly influence the community's will.

Crucial to this whole enterprise is the activity of worship. The point was made in chapter four on ecclesiology that worship precedes social concerns and activism. The Christian can only be effective as an instrument of Christ's Will in the world if they are truly worshipping God, both in Church and in their daily life. The same point is made in *CC*. As the concluding point to the entire book, Temple asserts that the Christian citizen can only be effective in the world if he truly is a "Churchman – consciously belonging to the worshipping fellowship and sharing its worship – before he is a citizen; he must bring the concerns of his citizenship and his business before God, and go forth to them carrying God's inspiration with him".<sup>8</sup> We recall from chapter three that it is through worship that the Christian submits and aligns their will with Christ's Will. They now live in accordance with Christ's Will. Chapter four reminds us that worship also compels the Christian back into society to continue their worship as an organ or instrument of Christ's Will. They are channels of Christ's work and love, or conduits of Christ's Will in the world. The Christian citizen is therefore impelled by Christ's Will in their life to influence the community and its will with His Will. The Church aids this process by providing them with Christian principles as the content of that engagement and influence. Temple's Christology, soteriology, theological anthropology, ecclesiology, and social engagement are clearly intricately linked.

The other avenue of influence for Christian citizens is their "capacity as citizens shaping political decisions which affect the national life and destiny".<sup>9</sup> This can be thought of as leavening the State and state policy. The Christian citizen can use the principles that the Church advocates as a yardstick to evaluate state policies and engage in political decisions. It is their right to do so as they are exercising their civic capacity. Thus, it is the Christian citizen who influences the State and state policy directly. This was a creative way to bypass the Church–State conflict. By doing so, the Church avoids a direct confrontation with the State. It does not overstep its boundary by getting involved directly in political action and advocacy. Yet, the Church is still able to engage the State albeit through the intermediacy of the

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>9</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 18.

Christian citizen. The Church is therefore able to fulfil its role as the organ of Christ's Will. The viability of this strategy is, of course, due to the conflict between the Church and the State. Temple writes that it might be "easier for the Church, as a consciously distinct body, to impinge upon the State and influence it from without".<sup>10</sup> Temple also argued for the viability of engaging politically in terms of principles from other perspectives. For one, it prevents the Church from committing itself to a particular policy. Policies often require specific technical expertise which the Church does not have. It is in no position to develop or evaluate specific policies. The use of principles, however, avoids the need for technical expertise yet allows for conversation.<sup>11</sup> This is linked to the point made in chapter five that Temple was facing the pressure of secularisation as differentiation, that is, the emancipation of the various fields of study from religion. However, this would effectively silence the Church and Christ's Will by relegating it to the margins of academic and public discourse. Temple suggested that the Church could still play a role in complementing the various fields by providing them with moral or ethical considerations. This takes the form of principles. The various fields of study can supply the technical expertise while the Church provides principles that give ethical considerations. Another point for the viability of such principles is that they allow for a diversity of applications and opinions. The Church's role is to put forward Christian principles which should garner broad agreement amongst Christian citizens. However, there need not be agreement or conformity about how these principles are then applied to particular policies or programmes because a range of applications could be compatible with the principles. The Christian citizen has free choice to back any one of them. Conversely, there might be divisions amongst Christians if the Church chooses to advocate for a particular policy. Some would agree but others may prefer another policy which may well be compatible with Christian principles too.<sup>12</sup> It is for all these reasons that Temple suggested that the Church is "not entitled in its corporate capacity to advocate specific remedies" but to offer principles for its Christian citizens to then influence the State.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Temple, *CC*, 6.

<sup>11</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 18. See also Temple, *CTT*, 20.

<sup>12</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 18–19; Temple, *CC*, 85; Temple, *PRLF*, 75–76; Temple, *The Hope of A New World*, 91.

<sup>13</sup> Temple, *CC*, 82.

The preceding discussions shed light on a succinct summary that Temple offers us in *Christian and Social Order* of the Church's engagement with society and the State. He specifies that the Church must do three things:

(1) its members must fulfil their moral responsibilities and functions in a Christian spirit; (2) its members must exercise their purely civic rights in a Christian spirit; (3) it must itself supply them with a systematic statement of principles to aid them in doing these two things, and this will carry with it a denunciation of customs or institutions in contemporary life and practice which offend against those principles.<sup>14</sup>

This is a pithy description of Temple's idea of social engagement. The Christian citizen influences the community's will, the State, and state policy through their daily life and civic engagement by means of the principles that the Church teaches. It is in this light that he argues that the "main task of the Church must be to inculcate Christian principles and the power of the Christian spirit".<sup>15</sup> The Church's main role in its engagement with society and the State is to develop and teach Christian principles. If the Church fails to do so, the Christian citizen will be unable to engage. This cannot be: the Church must proffer Christian principles. It is also in this light that Temple suggests that "[n]ine-tenths of the work of the Church in the world is done by Christian people fulfilling responsibilities and performing tasks which in themselves are not part of the official system of the Church at all".<sup>16</sup> This is certainly true based on what we have surveyed of Temple so far. The Church's engagement with society and the State is primarily achieved through the intermediacy of the Christian citizen. However, this train of thought – and especially this quote – might suggest that the Church's role is largely diminished or made redundant: we touched on this briefly in chapter four. This would be a gross misrepresentation of Temple. Wendy Dackson is correct when she argues cogently that "the one-tenth of the work done by the Church as corporate society *defines* the nine-tenths of the work done by individuals as citizens".<sup>17</sup> The Church is the defining tenth

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<sup>14</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 21.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>17</sup> Emphasis mine. Dackson, *Ecclesiology*, 69.

because of its specialised activity of worship and the principles that it announces. The centrality of the Church is by no means reduced.

One last point must be made to give us a fuller picture of Temple's view of the relationship between the Church and the State. The preceding discussions might give the impression that the Church as a corporate entity does not intervene directly in society, the State, and the world. Or to put it differently, the Church's interaction with the State is solely achieved through the intermediacy of Christian citizens. This is true to a large extent and does represent Temple's position in the main. However, Temple did nuance that there is a difference between the Church as an institution or corporate agent of Christ in the world, and the daily leavening work of Christians. He writes in *The York Quarterly* in 1939 that:

We have always to distinguish these two functions of the Christian society in the world. First, the witness of the Church as a corporate society in its own name; that witness is to the Gospel as the one means of delivering men from the sin through which they suffer these evils. Secondly, it is the function of the Christian citizen (and the Church must always urge this on its members) to exercise his own judgment how the principles of the Gospel may in fact be most effectively applied to the circumstances of our time. Those who adopt one view will band themselves together in order to promote a particular kind of policy which they think will best achieve what all Christians most desire. The others will band themselves together to follow some other policy. But they will all seek together the application of the Gospel principles in which alone is there any hope that the world may find respite from its evil.<sup>18</sup>

The Church as a corporate entity is distinguished from the Church as constituted by its members. The Church as a corporate entity does have its own witness and voice as the organ of Christ's Will. This point is made again in *CASO* too, albeit as a point of nuance. Temple writes that "the Church can go further than this [i.e., to stop at principles] and point to features in the social structure itself which are bound to be sources of social evil because they contradict the principles of the Gospel".<sup>19</sup> The Church is not restricted to engaging only via

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<sup>18</sup> William Temple, "The Church and the Crisis," *The York Quarterly*, vol.VI, no.1 (January 1939): 477.

<sup>19</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 36.

the intermediacy of Christian citizens. The Church's Will, or Christ's Will, need not be mediated to society and the State *solely* through Christian citizens who influence the community's will. The Church can speak directly to society and the State using its own corporate voice as the organ of Christ's Will, especially on issues of great social evil.

In fact, Temple had used this to great effect when he spoke up for the Jews in his capacity as the Archbishop of Canterbury during the Second World War in the House of Lords.<sup>20</sup> His speech in 1943, *Nazi Persecution of the Jews and Others*, urged "immediate measures on the largest and most generous scale" to give temporary asylum to all Jews able to escape the Nazis. Temple made his point forcefully, that his "chief protest is against procrastination of any kind ... [w]e stand at the bar of history, of humanity and of God".<sup>21</sup> An outline of the speech with Temple's handwritten notes is now kept at the Lambeth Palace Archives. Temple not only pleaded for aid but gave specific suggestions such as the revision of visa regulations to allow the entry of refugees whose families were already in Britain, or to even make a direct offer to Hitler to receive Jews in British territories.<sup>22</sup> Temple's long and powerful speech was, in Adrian Hastings' estimation, "very probably, the most memorable and important speech Temple ever made in the House of Lords".<sup>23</sup> This corroborates newspaper clippings in the Lambeth Palace Archives, which praised Temple's speech.<sup>24</sup> Temple continued to advocate for Jews. They paid him high praise on his death when the World Jewish Congress issues a statement that Temple "will be particularly mourned by the Jewish people whose champion he was".<sup>25</sup>

This section has explored the crux of Temple's view of the Church-State relationship. He offered a novel response to the tension felt by the Christian citizen because of the conflict between the Church and the State. The Church should develop, teach, and advocate Christian principles which are then passed on the Christian citizen. They are then to espouse and act

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<sup>20</sup> William Temple, *Nazi Persecution of the Jews and Others: Some Practical Proposals for Immediate Rescue* (London: Victor Gollanez, 1943). Made by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Rochester in Speeches made on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1943 in the House of Lords. See also Wendy Dackson, "William Temple: Champion of the Jews," *Anglican and Episcopal History*, vol.66, no.1 (1997).

<sup>21</sup> Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 377. Quoted from Hansard, HL vol.CXXVI, p.811–821.

<sup>22</sup> William Temple, *Outline of Speech to be Delivered on March 23 — Archbishop of Canterbury*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.43, fol.345–349.

<sup>23</sup> Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 377.

<sup>24</sup> William Temple, *Newspaper Reactions to Temple's Speech*, The William Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library, vol.43, fol.350–352.

<sup>25</sup> Iremonger, *William Temple*, 567.

on these principles to influence society, the State, and state policy. This is achieved through their daily lives, relationships, and vocations, as well in their civic capacity through their political decisions and involvement. These Christian principles are thus diffused through the community's thought and life, as well as the State. We could say that the Christian citizen leavens the community's will, the State, and state policy with the principles that the Church develops. Christ's Will is still able to influence society and the State in this way. This, however, does not diminish the Church's role. It still plays a central role because of its responsibility to formulate principles and conduct worship. We also nuanced that the Church as a corporate entity has its own voice in society and the State.

### **CASO: Articulating Principles**

Temple's proposed solution in the previous section was not intended as abstract theory. He observed that the world was looking to the Church for concrete social principles.<sup>26</sup> Temple may not be far off the mark when we consider that this was the period of books such as Walter Rauschenbusch's *A Theology for the Social Gospel* (1917) and *The Social Principles of Jesus* (1918), Ernst Troeltsch's *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1912), and Henri de Lubac's *Catholicisme: les aspects sociaux du dogme* (1938). Writing as early as 1926, Temple argued that the reforging of Christendom should not be the central question for the Church. Rather, the Church's duty should be to "work out again the social principles of the Gospel; we must hope to be able to offer to the distracted world a Christian sociology which all Christians agree to propagate".<sup>27</sup> He notes that good progress has already been made by pointing to works such as *Rerum Novarum*, *Christianity and Industrial Problems*, *Christianity and Industrial Reconstruction*, and the various *Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizens* (COPEC) reports.<sup>28</sup> In fact, he claimed that there is relative unanimity amongst these reports. There are some differences but "the agreement is startling".<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 75; Temple, *CTT*, 9.

<sup>27</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 75.

<sup>28</sup> *Rerum Novarum* was an encyclical of Pope Leo XIII; *Christianity and Industrial Problems* was a report by the Commission of Inquiry by the Archbishop of York; *Christianity and Industrial Reconstruction* was the report of the Inter-denominational Committee on "After-War Problems in the United States of America"; COPEC was a large-scale conference to discuss issues such as unemployment, housing, and education.

<sup>29</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 76.

It comes as no surprise that Temple had developed and taught Christian social principles on numerous occasions. We find them in his books such as *CV*, *PRLF*, *ECP*, *CS*, *CLF*, and *More Points of View*.<sup>30</sup> Yet, his most efficacious articulation of Christian social principles may be found in *CASO*.<sup>31</sup> This was one of Temple's most important and popular books. Edward Carpenter, for example, ranked Temple's *CASO* as one of the two most influential books by an Archbishop of Canterbury in the twentieth century.<sup>32</sup> As we have mentioned in the introduction, *CASO* was first published as a Penguin Special early in 1942, but great demand for it necessitated a reprint in May and again in August of that same year. Sales would quickly hit well over 150,000 copies.<sup>33</sup> We could say that Temple was efficacious in appealing to the community's will with this book. While not the longest or most profound book, *CASO* seemed to address the pertinent issues in society in a most relevant way. It was published at time when the mood in Britain was one of deep frustration, insecurity, uncertainty, and despair.<sup>34</sup> The Second World War was raging on and the turning points of El Alamein and Stalingrad had not yet occurred. But there was a deep conviction that the war was a symptom of deeper problems in society. Causton, who was a journalist then, recorded this common conviction that "war had not come upon the world as a bolt from the blue, but was an outcome of a disorder present in a very sick society in the preceding years of uneasy peace".<sup>35</sup> Causton probably had in mind the lingering effects of the First World War, the General Strike of 1926, and the Great Depression of 1929. All in all, the British community needed a vision of the kind of society they were fighting for, to look forward to in the midst of the Second World War.<sup>36</sup>

*CASO* offered that vision and proved to be a beacon of hope. It seemed to speak to many of the concerns that the British people had. Its aim was in accord with the general ethos of Anglican social teaching of the period which, as Paul Avis rightly points out, was looking "not for revolution but for reform ... to ameliorate the living conditions of the poor, to reduce,

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<sup>30</sup> Temple, *CV*, 203–208; Temple, *PRLF*, 66–68; Temple, *ECP*, 9–18; Temple, *CS*, 5; Temple, *CLF*, 120–124; Temple, "The Archbishop of York," 32–33.

<sup>31</sup> For some background see John Oliver, *The Church and Social Order: Social Thought in the Church of England, 1918-1939* (London: Mowbray, 1968); Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*; Craig, *Social Concern*.

<sup>32</sup> The other was Michael Ramsey's *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*. Carpenter, *Cantuar*, 526. See also Hastings, "Temple, William (1881–1944)," 93.

<sup>33</sup> Preston, "Introduction," 5.

<sup>34</sup> Malcolm Brown, *Tensions in Christian Ethics: An Introduction* (London: SPCK, 2010), 93.

<sup>35</sup> Malvern Conference, *Malvern, 1941: The Life of the Church and the Order of Society*, 1–2.

<sup>36</sup> Owen C. Thomas, "Temple, William," in *The Encyclopedia of Christianity*, ed. Erwin Fahlbusch and Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Mich.; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 334.

not to eliminate inequality”.<sup>37</sup> As explained in the introductory chapter, *CASO* dovetailed with the Beveridge Report which was published that same year of 1942 and contributed significantly to the sentiment that social reconstruction after the war should include a system of social welfare. This helped to pave the way for the Labour Party to win the General Election of 1945 and the eventual establishment of the welfare state.<sup>38</sup> Denys Munby considers that *CASO* was undoubtedly “one of the foundation piers of the Welfare State”.<sup>39</sup> It is because of this that Joseph Fletcher declared that “[n]ever had an Archbishop spoken so unmistakably for the conscience of Britain, or so fully and unsparingly”.<sup>40</sup> Even decades later, authors such as John Atherton and Malcolm Brown are still trying to emulate Temple and *CASO*.<sup>41</sup>

However, Ronald Preston highlights for us that the book is not immune to criticism.<sup>42</sup> For one, it is clear that the book was written in haste. This led to some sweeping generalisation, such as the singling out of Calvinism as the “mainspring of unrestricted enterprise and competition”.<sup>43</sup> Robert Craig, Alan Suggate, and Fletcher also critique Temple’s construal of love and justice as brief, facile, and idealistic, especially when compared to Reinhold Niebuhr’s more nuanced dialectical understanding of it.<sup>44</sup> We could also add the point that Temple’s whole chapter on the natural order rests on an odd interpretation of the natural law. He defines natural law as “the proper function of a human activity as apprehended by a consideration of its own nature”.<sup>45</sup> This seems to be an idiosyncratic understanding that not many would agree with. In a more broadly based criticism, Mark Chapman argues that Temple’s whole scheme of engagement through principles and middle axioms ended up surrendering socio-economic decisions, political morality, and policy details to those with practical technical expertise. As a result, the whole “[e]xecution of political decision become the preserve of the expert”.<sup>46</sup> This is an ironic and unintended outcome.

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<sup>37</sup> Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church*, 312.

<sup>38</sup> Preston, "Introduction," 6.

<sup>39</sup> Munby, *God and the Rich Society*, 157. See also Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 398; Hastings, "Temple, William (1881–1944)," 93; Suggate, "William Temple," 176.

<sup>40</sup> Fletcher, *William Temple*, 282.

<sup>41</sup> John Atherton, *Christianity and New Social Order* (London: SPCK, 2011); Brown, *Anglican Social Theology*.

<sup>42</sup> Preston, "Introduction," 7.

<sup>43</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 33.

<sup>44</sup> Temple held that the “way of love lies through justice”. Justice or the law is therefore not set against love, but before it in a smooth linear synthesis. The state maintains justice through the law and the church preaches love to inspire closer approximations to real justice. Temple, *CC*, 74–80. Quote from 78. For critiques of this see Craig, *Social Concern*, 100–103; Fletcher, *William Temple*, 170–171; Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 201.

<sup>45</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 57.

<sup>46</sup> Chapman, "Ronald Preston, William Temple, and the Future of Christian Politics," 169.

Temple's intention behind developing principles was precisely to facilitate dialogue with other areas of expertise and studies, especially in terms of ethical or moral considerations. But it is easily misunderstood or misapplied as deference to the expert. Nonetheless, these criticisms do not diminish the fact that *CASO* was an efficacious articulation of Christian principles.

Two other points are worth mentioning before we explore Temple's Christian social principles in *CASO*. Firstly, it is noteworthy that the first third of the book was given to defending the Church voice in public discourse; its ability in Temple's words, to "interfere" in society.<sup>47</sup> For Temple, it is ontologically impossible for the Church to step aside and watch as a bystander. The Church is Body of Christ, that is, the organ of Christ's Will. It has a commission to carry out God's purposes in the world. It has to be active and engaged in society.<sup>48</sup> Preventing the Church from speaking up on political, economic, and social issues is effectively silencing the Church as the organ of Christ's Will, or relegating it to the margins of public discourse. Temple gives a rapid survey of history to show the Church's constant involvement in society.<sup>49</sup> Temple's main point was that the Church's social engagement is "no new usurpation, but a re-assertion of a right once universally admitted and widely regarded".<sup>50</sup>

Secondly, it is also significant that Temple gives a short exposition of the doctrine of original sin just before his Christian social principles. This was probably the recognition that the intellectual and theological climate was changing as we have described in chapter one. Temple had discerned a shift from a theology of the Incarnation to a theology of Redemption, with greater emphasis that there is much in this evil world that is irrational.<sup>51</sup> Temple noted that as part of this shift Christian thinkers were learning again "how impotent man is to save himself, how deep and pervasive is the corruption which theologian call original Sin".<sup>52</sup> The greatest human need was to be saved by the work of divine grace.<sup>53</sup> It makes sense then that he included the discussion of original sin in *CASO*. Consistent with what we explore in chapter

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<sup>47</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 16–17.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 15–16.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 7–10, 24–34. There was, however, a gap during the Industrial Revolution because the Reformers and Puritans emphasised individual faith and piety.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>51</sup> Church of England, *Doctrine (1938)*, 16–17. Same point in Temple, "Theology To-Day," 329.

<sup>52</sup> Church of England, *Doctrine (1938)*, 17.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

one and chapter three, Temple writes that sin is self-centredness: that we put ourselves at the centre of the world where God should rightfully be. This pervades all human life and societies. This is not to say that humans are utterly bad, but that they are not utterly good because even their goodness is infected with self-centredness.<sup>54</sup> The infection is in our will – self-will – such that even the intent to do good is tainted in some measure by that self-centredness. Complete deliverance can only be accomplished “by the winning of my whole heart’s devotion, the total allegiance of my will – and this only the Divine Love disclosed by Christ in His Life and Death can do”.<sup>55</sup> Or again, that the only way to be completely freed from self-centredness or sin is “a complete personal response to the love of God. Only the love of God working upon his conscience, heart, and will can set him free from the self-centredness which otherwise will vitiate both his own life and his contribution to the life of society”.<sup>56</sup> This is exactly why Temple would write later that “[i]f we have to choose between making men Christian and making the social order more Christian, we must choose the former”.<sup>57</sup> That is the only true and lasting means of redemption. However, we can only experience the fullness of that redemption on the other side of eternity; we only experience it partially in the interim.<sup>58</sup>

This tension of the already-but-not-yet along with the doctrine of original sin is why the “political problem is concerned with men as they are, not with men as they ought to be”.<sup>59</sup> What is needed is not unattainable ideals but practical principles. Therefore, Temple concludes:

Its [i.e., the Church’s] assertion of Original Sin should make the Church intensely realistic and conspicuously free from Utopianism. There is no such thing as a Christian social ideal, to which we should conform our actual society as closely as possible ... But though Christianity supplies no ideal in this sense, it supplies something of far

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<sup>54</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 37.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 39–40.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

more value – namely, principles on which we can begin to act in every possible situation.<sup>60</sup>

Because of original sin, the Church does not have a blueprint of an ideal social order or a perfect society. It is more realistic for the Church to engage through dialogue by articulating principles rather than ideals. The Church should formulate principles based on the Christian understanding of life, then look at the present circumstances around to identify areas that are contrary to it. This gives added reason for the Church to develop and teach social principles.

This brings us to the heart of *CASO* – Temple’s Christian social principles. Temple delineates his social principles into what he called primary principles and derivative principles. Temple’s primary Christian social principles are (1) God and His Purpose, and (2) Man: His Dignity, Tragedy and Destiny.<sup>61</sup> He essentially gives a pithy exposition of the Christian faith. He explains the doctrines of creation, *Imago Dei*, original sin, the Incarnation, and the work of Christ. We see points that are familiar to our discussion: the Divine–human fellowship of love, the freedom of the human will, sin as self-centredness, Christ winning humans out of their sin through sacrificial love, and the summing up of all things in Christ. Emphasis is laid on the inherent dignity and value of humans because they are children of God, and the fact that they are born into fellowship with both God and other humans through their family and nation. Three derivative Christian social principles are then inferred from the primary principles.<sup>62</sup> As Temple puts it, “Freedom, Fellowship, Service – these are the three principles of a Christian social order derived from the still more fundamental Christian postulate that Man is a child of God and is destined for a life of eternal fellowship with Him”.<sup>63</sup> The first derivative Christian social principle is freedom, or the freedom to fully realise one’s personality. This was based on the fact that every person is a child of God.<sup>64</sup> Second is social fellowship through communities, which follows on from the theological point that all humans

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 38. Same point in *CS* that “I [i.e. Temple] may stress with all possible emphasis that there is no such thing as a Christian social ideal”. Temple, *CS*, 3. Or again in *CV* that it is bad theology to suggest that the Mind of Christ desires what is utopian. Temple, *CV*, 204.

<sup>61</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 35–43.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 44–54.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 44–46.

are a part of God's family.<sup>65</sup> The last principle is that of service by the individual to his/her community and by groups to humankind.<sup>66</sup>

These derivative Christian social principles were used as a yardstick to critique society.<sup>67</sup> This gave rise to what is probably the most iconic part of *CASO*. Temple articulated six objectives which he urged all Christians to call upon the British government to achieve:

1. Every child should find itself a member of a family housed with decency and dignity, so that it may grow up as a member of that basic community in a happy fellowship unspoilt by underfeeding or overcrowding, by dirty and drab surroundings or by mechanical monotony of environment.
2. Every child should have the opportunity of an education till years of maturity, so planned as to allow for his peculiar aptitudes and make possible their full development. This education should throughout be inspired by faith in God and find its focus in worship.
3. Every citizen should be secure in possession of such income as will enable him to maintain a home and bring up children in such conditions as are described in paragraph 1 above.
4. Every citizen should have a voice in the conduct of the business or industry which is carried on by means of his labour, and the satisfaction of knowing that his labour is directed to the well-being of the community.
5. Every citizen should have sufficient daily leisure, with two days of rest in seven, and, if an employee, an annual holiday with pay, to enable him to enjoy a full personal life with such interests and activities as his task and talents may direct.
6. Every citizen should have assured liberty in the forms of freedom of worship, of speech, of assembly, and of association for special purposes.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 46–50.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 50–54.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 62–73.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 73–74.

These were middle axioms, even though Temple does not state so explicitly. It is a method of social engagement that is commonly attributed to J. H. Oldham or Henry Sidgwick,<sup>69</sup> although it probably originated with John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and Francis Bacon.<sup>70</sup> Middle axioms are statements that are meant to be more specific than broad ethical statements or principles, yet less precise than specific policies.<sup>71</sup> They effectively show a direction in which policies and decisions should head.<sup>72</sup> They are formulated in consultation with experts from other fields of studies. In Temple's case, he had consulted John Maynard Keynes, an eminent economist, and Richard Henry Tawney, a political theorist.<sup>73</sup> This was a way of dialoguing with other fields of studies, an issue that we explored in the previous chapter. As a whole, we could think of middle axioms as an attempt to speak comprehensibly to the community in an attempt to appeal to their will, not unlike the Rawlsian idea of public reason. Much could be said about the reappraisal of middle axioms as a form of social engagement for the Church today.<sup>74</sup> What is important to note is that these middle axioms were inferred and based on Christian social principles. Chris Baker gives a useful analogy to describe this process. Adapting it slightly to our purposes, he likens it to a waterfall where the primary Christian social principles cascade into the derivative principles. They then flows through the filter of middle

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<sup>69</sup> J. H. Oldham, "The Function of the Church in Society," in *The Church and its Function in Society*, ed. W. A. Visser't Hooft and J. H. Oldham (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937), 209–210; Henry Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics* (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1898), 8.

<sup>70</sup> Sidgwick terms it the "region of middle axioms" by adopting the idea from Mill. Mill was attempting to differentiate intermediate principles (or "axiomata media") from empirical laws and over-generalisations. He had written in an essay titled "Bentham" that "mankind are much more nearly of one nature, than of one opinion about their own nature, they are more easily brought to agree in their intermediate principles – vera ilia et media axiomata, as Bacon says – than in their first principles". Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics*, 8; John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*, vol. 2 (London: John W. Parker, 1843), 524–525. See also Sissela Bok, "Introduction," in *Practical Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), x. See also Mill, *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*, vol. 2, 524–525; Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics*, 8.

<sup>71</sup> Oldham, "The Function of the Church in Society," 209–210.

<sup>72</sup> Middle axioms are not without their critics. Duncan Forrester, for one, is critical of the idea and engages Preston who sought to defend it. See Duncan B. Forrester, "What is Distinctive in Social Theology," in *Christians and the Future of Social Democracy*, ed. M. H. Taylor (Ormskirk and Northridge: Hesketh, 1982); Preston, *Explorations in Theology* 9.

<sup>73</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 6.

<sup>74</sup> See for example William F. Storrar, "Scottish Civil Society and Devolution: The New Case for Ronald Preston's Defence of Middle Axioms," *Studies in Christian Ethics*, vol.17, no.2 (2004): 100–102; Elaine L. Graham, *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Public Theology in a Post-Secular Age* (London: SCM Press, 2013); Lisa Sowle Cahill, *Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, and Change* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 46–47; Robert J. Schreiter, *The New Catholicity: Theology Between the Global and the Local* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), 108–115; Martyn Eden, "Agreed in Principle? The Pursuit of the Christian Mind in Politics," in *The Gospel in the Modern World*, ed. Martyn Eden and David F. Wells (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1991).

axioms and irrigate the life of Christian citizens who then influence the community's will, the State, and state policy with them through their everyday lives.<sup>75</sup>

Spurred on by Keynes and Tawney, Temple fleshed out these middle axioms into a proposed programme in the Appendix.<sup>76</sup> This gave practical suggestions for how these middle axioms could be worked out and gave the book a realistic edge. It is likely that this helped to appeal to the community's will. Suggestions range from unemployment benefits, annual leave, proper housing, family allowance, and so on. Apart from the input of Keynes and Tawney, these suggestions undoubtedly benefited from Temple's practical experience of being engaged in social issues. For example, he had chaired the large-scale COPEC which produced impressive reports on unemployment, housing, education, etc.<sup>77</sup> He also oversaw the well-received report on unemployment, *Men Without Work*.<sup>78</sup> We should note that Temple offered the Appendix in his capacity as a Christian citizen. whereas the rest of the book is written as the Archbishop of Canterbury.<sup>79</sup> This is in line with his belief that the Church should stop at the development of principles. It is, however, debatable whether his roles can be so neatly dichotomised and whether readers will appreciate that dichotomy when reading. Nevertheless, the practical suggestions of the Appendix complemented the middle axioms well.

This section has given an overview of *CASO*. It was Temple's most popular and influential book and played no small part in preparing the British community to welcome the welfare state. At the heart of the book was Temple's Christian social principles. He formulated primary principles from which derivative principles were inferred. These then issued in the six middle axioms which seemed to strike a chord with the British public. This was probably aided by the practical remedies he offered in the Appendix, which was ambiguously offered in his capacity as a citizen. It is important to point out that Temple's social engagement was thoroughly based upon the Christian faith. His theology was the buttress of his social thought. The middle axioms and practical remedies for which he is often remembered were derived

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<sup>75</sup> Chris Baker, "Faith in the public sphere – in search of a fair and compassionate society for the twenty-first century," *Journal of Beliefs & Values*, vol.37, no.3 (2016): 261.

<sup>76</sup> Keynes and Tawney persuaded Temple to include the Appendix because they felt that its practical suggestions would enhance the book by making it more realistic. In hindsight, they were right. Iremonger, *William Temple*, 439.

<sup>77</sup> For background on COPEC see Hastings, "Temple, William (1881–1944)," 93.

<sup>78</sup> William Temple and Pilgrim Trust, *Men Without Work* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938).

<sup>79</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 19.

from his Christian social principles. Significantly, the first two of his derivative Christian social principles are constant categories that we have been exploring throughout this dissertation. Freedom (or sacredness of personality) and fellowship are key theological concepts for Temple. We now turn to explore them in greater detail.

### **Christian Social Principles: An Appeal Based on the Will**

This section will explore Temple's social principles and the way that the category of the will is central to these principles. But before we turn to Temple's social principles, it is worth beginning this section with the concluding words to the main text of *CASO*. Temple averred that his social principles and middle axioms can be summed up in a phrase – “the aim of a Christian social order is the fullest possible development of individual personality in the widest and deepest possible fellowship”.<sup>80</sup> This assertion was an important facet of Temple's social thought. He was consistent in contending for it and argues for it on at least two other occasions in his later writings.<sup>81</sup> Personality and fellowship are the aims of a good social order. But more than that, this is also the goal of the State and the Church. We saw in the previous chapter that the State must do justice to the sanctity of personality and the fact of fellowship without sacrificing either.<sup>82</sup> Chapter four on ecclesiology also showed that the Church endeavours to sum up all things in Christ such that there exists one perfect man or person in Christ. This means that all nations and all people should share in fellowship by being one “Person”, or one personality that is under one will, Christ's Will. Personality and fellowship are therefore also the goal of the Church as the organ of Christ's Will. It is thus apparent that there is much internal coherence to Temple's thought. A fully developed personality in the widest possible fellowship is the goal of a good Christian social order, of the State, and of the Church. It is perhaps pertinent to point out that this seems to anticipate *Gaudium et spes's* position of the dignity of humans and the community of humankind.

It is evident that the central focus of Temple's social order, thought, and principles is the human person. Every human must develop fully their personality that is nourished by a deep fellowship. Preston is right to argue that the central concern of *CASO* is the human

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>81</sup> That we “may promote the only real progress [of society], which is the development of personality in fellowship”. Temple, *The Hope of A New World*, 57. Or again, that we “may take as our slogan, if you like: ‘Fulness of Personality in the widest possible Fellowship’”. Temple, *CLF*, 118.

<sup>82</sup> Temple, *CS*, 89. See also Temple, *CC*, 26.

person.<sup>83</sup> Its primary exhortation is respect for every person, or persons-in-community. Preston notes the explicit influence of Jacques Maritain here, a point noted in chapter three. Maritain distinguishes Individuality and personality. The former is merely what marks a person off from another, whereas the latter is fundamentally social. Personality requires the nourishment of social relationships. As Temple puts it, the “richer his [i.e., a person’s] personal relationships, the more fully personal he will be”.<sup>84</sup> Perhaps there is something that could be reappraised from this idea of persons-in-community in contrast to the binary of individualism or collectivism, a point that Temple makes in *CASO*.<sup>85</sup> That being the case, we must also be careful not to overstate the importance of the notion of persons-in-community to Temple. While it does express his conviction to a certain extent, we contend that his deeper conviction lay in his social principles of personality, fellowship, and service. Each of them contributes a greater nuance to the idea of persons-in-community. In fact, it is important to highlight that these three social principles are not merely terms used to describe social goals. Our study thus far has shown that they are fundamental theological terms in Temple’s scheme of thought. To put it more strikingly, Temple’s social principles *are* his theological principles. Temple’s social thought is profoundly buttressed by his theology. In fact, he states in *CV* that these social principles with which we seek to order life and society “express the Mind of Christ”.<sup>86</sup>

Temple’s first derivative Christian social principle is that of liberty or freedom.<sup>87</sup> In an article held at the Lambeth Palace Archives titled “The Freedom For Which We Fight”, Temple suggests that there are two sources for the modern belief of freedom. The first is based on humanity itself. This is the belief that every person should have a right to order and live their own life. He notes that this is substantively the thought of Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. However, Kant’s ethical framework, based on the autonomous will and a duty to follow the categorical imperative, lacked content. This was misdirected by Fichte to deify the State and promote Prussian absolutism. On the other hand, Rousseau’s notion of freedom took the shape of freedom from coercion or external control. He believed that through this freedom people would recognise that all humans are equal and embrace fraternity with each

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<sup>83</sup> Preston, "Introduction," 14.

<sup>84</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 48.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>86</sup> Temple, *CV*, 203.

<sup>87</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 44–46.

other. Rousseau thus celebrated the trio of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Yet, Temple observes that through the French Revolution “we watch Liberty and Equality struggle with each other till the equality of all except the despot is served by the surrender of Liberty to despotism, Fraternity being expressed in the common enthusiasm with which the citizen-soldiers of the Republic fought their neighbours in other countries”.<sup>88</sup> Kant’s freedom ends with the totalitarian Prussian state while Rousseau’s freedom leads to despotic terror. In both cases, the individual human person is sacrificed and helpless; they were not truly free.

The other source of freedom is diametrically opposite from the preceding anthropocentric source. Humans have no claim to freedom in and of themselves. Rather, freedom is founded on the fact that “man is a child of God for whom Christ died ... [and] in his relationship to God, he has a status which is independent of any earthly society and has a higher dignity that any State can confer”.<sup>89</sup> This is the belief, Temple contends, of the English Puritans, the Scottish Covenanters, the Dutch Calvinist, and the Pilgrim Fathers. It is on this basis that they assert their claims of freedom against the State.<sup>90</sup> In Temple’s estimation, such a belief gave a much deeper foundation for freedom. Human liberty and freedom is based on the fact that every person is a child of God whom God loves, and Christ died for. Every person thus has an inherent value and dignity that is independent of anything else, such as the State or usefulness to society.<sup>91</sup> This is why Temple declares that “person is primary, not the society; the State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State”.<sup>92</sup> Every person should be respected as a person.<sup>93</sup>

Temple makes the same point from a slightly different approach. He writes in *CV*, for example, that the “personality of the child of God whose love God Himself desires is certainly a sacred thing”.<sup>94</sup> Each human person is a distinct individual with their own will and personality, and therefore their own thoughts and opinions. This is why Temple often wrote that the principle of freedom can be better expressed as the sacredness of personality.<sup>95</sup> This meant that the political idea and social principle of freedom to linked to his theological

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<sup>88</sup> Temple, *The Freedom For Which We Fight*.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Temple, *ECP*, 9.

<sup>92</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 44. Exact same point and wording in Temple, *CC*, 28.

<sup>93</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 44.

<sup>94</sup> Temple, *CV*, 203.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*; Temple, *PRLF*, 66; Temple, "The Archbishop of York," 33.

category of personality. This explains why Temple averred that freedom is not merely the absence of force, restraint, or compulsion.<sup>96</sup> He probably had in mind the belief of Rousseau, Bentham and Mill. Rather, freedom should be understood as the freedom for every human to fully develop, or specifically, to fully develop their personality. It is through freedom that “a man makes fully real his personality – the quality of one made in the image of God”.<sup>97</sup> Temple goes on to explain that this entails the “fullest possible scope for the exercise of all powers and qualities which are distinctly personal; and of these the most fundamental is deliberate choice”.<sup>98</sup> This was a point that Temple consistently made, that freedom is about the full development of personality where choice was central.<sup>99</sup> Temple suggests that it is worth noticing “how absolute was Christ’s respect for the freedom of personal choice”.<sup>100</sup> Or put slightly differently, Jesus’ “respect for the personal will of every human being”.<sup>101</sup> Jesus’ followers were never forced, bribed, or threatened to follow Him. Even Judas’ betrayal was allowed if he so determined to do it. In fact, Christ would not override a person’s freedom of choice or personal will to save them.<sup>102</sup> Deliberate and personal choice based on one’s own will is of great importance and an expression of liberty or one’s personality.

The idea of deliberate choice ties back in with Temple’s theology. We recall here our discussion on choice and the will in chapter three on theological anthropology. The ideal state of human choice was given by the Aristotelian idea of intellect and appetite working together and the Platonic notion of becoming one out of many.<sup>103</sup> For Temple, this meant the complete integration of all a person’s impulses, thoughts, and desires under their will. That person would make the same choice repeatedly in a given circumstance because their choice is consistent and steadfast because based on their will. Such a state or such a person would have achieved a completed or fully developed personality. This is why Temple’s social principle of liberty, or sacredness of personality, is associated with deliberate choice. But more could be said about this. Chapter three also showed that this fully developed personality is only possible through Christ. This is because the seat of sin is found in the will. Sin is self-

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<sup>96</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 66; Temple, *CASO*, 44–45.

<sup>97</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 44.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> See Temple, *ECP*, 9; Temple, “The Archbishop of York,” 33.

<sup>100</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 46.

<sup>101</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 66.

<sup>102</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 46.

<sup>103</sup> Temple, *CV*, 59, 63–64; Temple, *MC*, 167; Temple, *NMG*, 233.

centredness or self-will. In an Abelardian way, Christ's love, sacrifice, and suffering shown on the Cross appeals to our sympathy and evokes an answering love that induces a change of our will. Our will begins to correspond to Christ's Will as we align our will with His. This opens the possibility of a fully developed personality because our will is redeemed. This rests on Temple's understanding of the person of Christ, which we explored in chapter two. Christ has two wills, a human will and a divine Will, but the human will was subsumed in the divine Will because there is ultimately only one person, i.e., the Divine Logos. Such an explanation was made possible by the idea of personality, which sought the complete integration of a person based on their will. There could only be one dominant will because there is only one Person. Christ, therefore, is the example par excellence of a complete personality based on His one divine Will. Humans can therefore have a completed personality through Christ's Will in their life. There is clearly a reservoir of theological thought behind Temple's social principles of liberty or personality.

This first Christian social principle of freedom, or the sacredness of personality, revealed several gaps in society during Temple's time. Firstly, all persons must have access to proper housing which can be made into a home. It must be a place where families can live in happiness and healthily, as fitting for their value and dignity as children of God, or the sacredness of their God-given personality.<sup>104</sup> The second gap pertain to youths and children. Temple writes in *PRLF* that this social principle necessitates that "every boy or girl receives all in the expansion and development of personality through education that he or she could profit by".<sup>105</sup> We recall again from chapter three the centrality of education in forming a person's will. It is through education that we learn to fix our attention on one given matter. This is the foundation and beginning of our will. Over time, we get better at controlling our impulses and thoughts to will something or to have a purpose. This is perhaps why Temple suggests that freedom is about having a real purpose in life through "self-control, self-determination, self-direction".<sup>106</sup> Proper education must therefore be offered for all children and youths for their fullest development of personality. Lastly, there is also a gap in society in relation to work. Temple argued that most companies tend to forget that their labourer or worker is a person. Workers are often treated as a commodity to be "bought" at the cheapest

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<sup>104</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 63; Temple, *CLF*, 123.

<sup>105</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 66; Temple, *CASO*, 65–66; Temple, *CLF*, 123; Temple, *CV*, 203.

<sup>106</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 45.

possible price or salary.<sup>107</sup> But in treating them as a commodity, they are being essentially being treated as a “living instrument” which is Aristotle’s definition of a slave!<sup>108</sup> Or, he inveighs elsewhere that it is “wage-slavery”.<sup>109</sup> It is admittedly an improvement from the older form of slavery but still the same neglect of the sacredness of personality.

Fellowship is Temple’s second derivative Christian social principle.<sup>110</sup> This is derived from the Christian belief that “all are children of one Father, all are members of one family”.<sup>111</sup> There is therefore a real bond that connects all humans. This is the reason why humans are innately social; no person is meant to live isolated from all other humans. The fact that we are all born into families, communities, and nations demonstrates this.<sup>112</sup> Humans are therefore “naturally and incurably social” with an innate need for fellowship.<sup>113</sup> The point is pressed further when Temple asserts that a human being needs neighbours not merely because they can supply what they lack. Rather, other human beings contribute “their actual selves as the complement of his [or their] own”.<sup>114</sup> As we saw in chapter three, this is the idea of a kind of social organism that was influenced by British idealism. Temple goes on to suggest that the first principle of liberty or personality is linked with the second principle of fellowship. He writes in *ECP* that fellowship “is impossible without the first, for fellowship is essentially free co-operation, so that without liberty there can be no fellowship. On the other hand, liberty without fellowship results in chaos, disruption, social collapse”.<sup>115</sup> Personality and liberty provide the foundation for freely-willed fellowship. Yet, fellowship prevents liberty from descending into a free-for-all where every person is just pursuing their own self-interest. Rather, one’s liberty should be used in the spirit of fellowship. Because we are all fellow members of God’s family – members of one another – we should use our liberty to pursue the general or common good.<sup>116</sup> As Temple articulates, freedom is “justified only when it expresses itself through fellowship”.<sup>117</sup> Liberty must be used with fellowship in mind. Temple

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<sup>107</sup> Temple, *ECP*, 10–11; Temple, *CV*, 203; Temple, *PRLF*, 66.

<sup>108</sup> Temple, *PRLF*, 67.

<sup>109</sup> Temple, *ECP*, 12.

<sup>110</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 46–50.

<sup>111</sup> Temple, *CV*, 204.

<sup>112</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 41.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Temple, *ECP*, 12. See also Temple, *PRLF*, 67.

<sup>116</sup> Temple, *CV*, 204; Temple, *ECP*, 12; Temple, *PRLF*, 67.

<sup>117</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 48.

would commonly apply the social principle of fellowship to society. One of his constant refrains concerns the need for cooperation in industry for public service.<sup>118</sup> Industry and companies should not be driven by a purely competitive motive for private gain. This is why sole ownership of a company or industry is bad. The owners might act with their own interest in mind, and not for their workers.

Temple believed that there was convergence on this point with Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum*, which was affirmed by Pope Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*. He also refers to Maritain, mentioned above, and his belief that personality is fundamentally social. A person is most fully personal through the richness of his relationships. This is probably why Temple writes years earlier in *CV* that "Personality is the capacity for Fellowship".<sup>119</sup> It is interesting that Temple seems to emphasise the status of intermediate groups more strongly in *CASO*. While he usually highlights just the family and nation, Temple contends that human sociability and mutual influence are found in other places such as "school, college, Trade Union, professional association, city, county, nation, Church".<sup>120</sup> It is through these intermediate groups that a person can feel that they can count for something and that others depend on them. This reminds us of Hegel's idea of *Sittlichkeit* which, as shown in chapter five, was appropriated by Bosanquet in his definition of the General Will.

It is pertinent to remember that fellowship was a major theological idea for Temple as well. We saw in chapter three on theological anthropology that the ideal state of humans was a fully developed personality in the widest possible fellowship. In fact, Temple believed that a person's personality was enriched by their fellowship, and the wider the fellowship the better. This is likely because the formation of a person's will is influenced by their social environment. Influenced by British Idealism, Temple's claim went beyond human sociability to a kind of social organism where people genuinely constitute one another.

Humans are ontically linked such that our wills do influence one another. However, this whole network of mutual influence is deeply affected by the presence of sin. The whole network is tainted as long as there is one will that is tainted. Temple believed that the work of Christ was meant to correct this as well. For one, our wills are redeemed as we take on Christ's Will as our own. But more than that, Temple held that the work of Christ restores

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<sup>118</sup> Temple, *CV*, 204–205; Temple, *ECP*, 13–15.

<sup>119</sup> Temple, *CV*, 53.

<sup>120</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 47.

fellowship between God and humans, and amongst humans as well. The ideal of the widest possible fellowship is thus only possible through Christ. Chapter four showed us that this is now actualised in and through the Church. The Church's goal is to sum up all people and all nations as all things as one "person" in Christ. This means that all humanity will be of one will, that is, Christ's Will. This is the full realisation of that restored fellowship that Christ began. The ultimate fulfilment of fellowship is therefore only possible through Christ and His Church which is the organ of His Will.

The third derivative Christian social principle is service which may be more briefly explained.<sup>121</sup> This follows on from the previous two principles. If a person uses their liberty in the spirit of fellowship, then it is likely that they will serve their community.<sup>122</sup> Temple tended to apply this principle to work. People should not work primarily for selfish reasons such as for profit or power. Because work engages such a large portion of our time and energy, we need to use it for something that glorifies God. Thus, we should make it a principle to think of work as a form of service to the community. Our inclinations can guide us in deciding what work to choose. We do tend to serve best when it is in line with our aptitude and gifts.<sup>123</sup> But of course, we may not always have a choice what job we get. Nevertheless, we can still make our work our vocation by performing it for the service of others.

It is pertinent to point out that Temple usually had a fourth principle of sacrifice.<sup>124</sup> This was the idea that progress tends to be won through sacrifice, suffering, and love. He advocated for it along with the other three principles on almost all the occasions he wrote about Christian social teaching. In fact, he had espoused it as late as 1940 in his contribution to the book *More Points of View*.<sup>125</sup> However, it was conspicuously dropped in *CASO*. While there was no explanation offered, we may deduce some reasons for this, based on what he wrote about sacrifice in the book. Sacrifice, he suggests, should be a matter of personal choice and not obligatory.<sup>126</sup> Making sacrifice a social principle would run that exact risk of requiring it. To sacrifice is an act of one's will and making it compulsory denies that altruistic act of the will. There is no doubt that real sacrifice is valuable in the Christian faith. But again, it is an

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 50–54.

<sup>122</sup> Temple, *CV*, 205–206; Temple, *ECP*, 16–17; Temple, *PRLF*, 67–68.

<sup>123</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 50–51.

<sup>124</sup> Temple, *CV*, 206–208; Temple, *ECP*, 17–18; Temple, *PRLF*, 68.

<sup>125</sup> Temple, "The Archbishop of York," 33.

<sup>126</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 25. This was on the issue of common property ownership.

“exacting code, and it is of the utmost importance that we recognize this inability and the reasons for it”.<sup>127</sup> In other words, sacrifice is a noble Christian virtue but could be too demanding if enshrined as a social principle. In any case, measuring sacrifice is challenging to begin with. A sum of money which one person could afford to lose could be crippling to another person.<sup>128</sup>

Suggate makes the same observations in a chapter in which he explores Temple’s omission of sacrifice at length.<sup>129</sup> Additionally, he suggests that Temple was initially influenced by T. H. Green, who understood self-sacrifice as an essential facet of an organic communal life.<sup>130</sup> However, circumstance caused Temple to rethink his position. To advocate for sacrifice in the dire socio-economic circumstances of the General Strike and the Great Depression made little sense.<sup>131</sup> Temple would find Niebuhr’s paradigm of love and justice a persuasive alternative.<sup>132</sup> It could achieve the same result as the call to sacrifice. This is perhaps why Temple writes in *CASO* that love and justice should regulate the application of the other derivative Christian social principles.<sup>133</sup> Suggate is probably correct in his assessment. Yet, as we have shown in our first chapter, Niebuhr’s influence must not be overstated. There were significant differences between Temple and Niebuhr on the idea of love and justice. It is nonetheless noteworthy to point out the omission of sacrifice as a Christian social principle in *CASO*.

In sum, it is clear that Temple’s social principles were fundamental theological principles. This is especially true of the first two – liberty (or sacredness of personality) and fellowship. Liberty or the sacredness of personality is derived from the fact that every person is a child of God. Their value and dignity are innate to them because of this and should be respected. Freedom is best expressed through deliberate choice. This points back to the human will, its formation, and its ideal state of a fully developed personality. It also reminds us that this ideal state is only possible through humans taking on Christ’s Will as their own. It is thus apparent that Temple’s category of the will is important to his social principle of

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>129</sup> Suggate, "Concept of Sacrifice," 236–237. Suggate also makes the same point in his book. See Suggate, *Temple and Christian Social Ethics*, 69.

<sup>130</sup> Suggate, "Concept of Sacrifice," 240–241.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 241.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 241–244.

<sup>133</sup> Temple, *CASO*, 55–57. Temple also emphasises love and justice more in his later works, especially *CC*. See Temple, *CC*, 74–80.

personality. This is true of fellowship as well. It is meant as a corrective to the potential distortions of liberty. Human liberty should be exercised in the spirit of fellowship, that is, the fact that we are all members of God's family. But again, fellowship was a key theological theme for Temple. It was a crucial element in the formation of a person's will. The work of Christ restores that fellowship between God and humans, and amongst humans as well.

## **Conclusion**

Temple's social principles lie at the heart of his social thought. It was his creative and novel solution to the confluence of Church and State which, he argued, was felt most acutely by the Christian citizen. The Church must develop principles which are passed on to the Christian citizen to act on in their daily lives and in their civic capacity in relation to the State. In doing so, the Church leavens the community's will, the State, and state policy through the intermediacy of the Christian citizen. This made sense to Temple for many reasons. It helped to lessen the conflict between Church and State, it equipped the Christian citizen to engage with society and the State, and it allowed the Church to interact and dialogue with other fields of expertise. Temple himself put forward social principles in some of his works. But his most successful articulation of them is *CASO*. The slender Penguin special edition of Temple's book played no small part in ensuring that the British populace would welcome the welfare state after the Second World War. We could say that Temple was efficacious in appealing to and influencing the community's will with his book and specifically his Christian social principles. What is pertinent is that his key social principles of liberty (or sacredness of personality) and fellowship were crucial themes in his theological thought. Temple's social principles were among his key theological principles. Temple's social principles which are meant to leaven the community's will, were essentially theological principles that were premised on the will.

## Conclusion

### **William Temple and the Doctrine of the Will**

In this study, I have sought to argue that Temple's social thought is firmly rooted in his theology. This goes against the general trend of research on Temple, which tends to study his social thought in isolation from his theology. This, however, disconnects and deprives Temple's social thought of its fundamental theological underpinnings. In particular, the category of the will has been a critical and instructive hermeneutic for understanding Temple's theology and how it finds expression in his social thought. The will was central to the major loci of Temple's theology, such as his doctrine of God, Christology, theological anthropology, ecclesiology, Church–State relations, and Christian social principles. Temple has not been adequately understood, especially the connection between his theology and social thought, in so far as the role and importance of the will has not yet been adequately examined. This leads to the central contention of this study, that Temple's voluntarist theology brings the issue of agency into focus. There is a clear sense of volition, activeness, and dynamism in each facet of his theology surveyed. God is purposeful and active, and humans can share in that purposiveness and activity. The work of Christ should induce a change in the will, and this change is continued and nurtured in the community of the Church. Likewise, society and the State should support the development of humans as moral agents. This is expressed in his principal Christian social principles of personality and fellowship. These form the theological basis of Temple's social thought.

Chapter one examined Temple's doctrine of God. Temple believed, not unlike Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, that God could be understood through an argument of first cause. He argued that causation entails agency or a will. This is because a will implies volition or choice and is an ultimate term of explanation in causal regression. Therefore, Temple construes God as Creative Will, that is, as the Will that created and sustains the universe, and remains purposive and active within it. God's agency in creation is why He can be known through observation and study of the world. This is the goal of philosophy through its major branches of art, science, and moral goodness. However, Temple is cautious not to veer towards Schopenhauerian voluntarism where the Will is arbitrary and capricious, nor to fuse the Creative Will with the world and its processes like Alfred North Whitehead or Henri Bergson.

Temple avoids this by contending that God as Creative Will purposes towards value or good. God's activity in the world is for the sake of value, and consequently, all that exists in the world has either inherent or latent value. Humans complement God's creation and purpose of value by being able to apprehend and pursue value. Such a doctrine of God magnifies the problem of evil. In his younger days, Temple held that evil can be justified when it is transmuted for good. Evil is therefore an opportunity for good. But Temple would subsequently distance himself from his earlier view, although it is not entirely clear which view he then adopted. This has led to debate whether and to what extent Temple capitulated to Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism. The chapter also surveyed Temple's defence of miracles. For Temple, the idea of a will implied variability. While a strong will remains constant in its purpose, it must adapt to the variability of circumstances to maintain its constancy. God as Creative Will therefore adapts or acts in a special way when circumstances necessitate it, especially because of actions resulting from humans' exercise of free will.

The discussion in chapter two focused on Christology. Temple believed that the language of the will is to be preferred over the traditional language of substance and nature. He goes on to unfold his will-based Christology. Christ is understood to have two wills, a human will and a divine Will, and was committed to the reality of each will. It is because of the human will that we can assert that Christ is human and affirm his growth and moral progress. On the other hand, it is because of the divine Will, or the Will of God, that we can uphold Jesus' divinity. However, these two wills do not exist side-by-side in Christ. This would be Nestorianism. Temple argues that the human will was subsumed within the divine Will and finds resolution within the person of the Logos. Temple's position unwittingly finds theological precedent with the dyothelite position and the resolution of the Council of Constantinople in 680/1. Temple's Christology rests on his personal idealism and its focus on personality. Human personality seeks the integration and harmonisation of all a person's thoughts, desires, and impulses under their will. A person can only have one will and is ideally unified by that will. Hence, Christ could only have one will (i.e., the divine Will) because here is only one Person, the Logos. Temple's will-based Christology offers a more dynamic picture of the divine union in Christ than one understood in terms of substance or nature which tends to be more passive or static.

The third chapter explores Temple's theological anthropology. There is a dynamic interplay of factors in the formation of the human will. It is a function of a person's initial

endowment, the imagination, the fashioning of education, and one's social environment. Humans strive for the ideal state that entails the inner unity of a completed personality and the outer unity of a perfected fellowship as wide as humanity. A completed personality is when all of a person's thoughts, impulses, and desires are perfectly unified under their will. This completed personality is nourished by a perfected fellowship, that is, by participating in a society that includes all humanity. Humans develop most fully in a community. This ideal state is, however, made impossible because of sin, which Temple defines as self-centredness that causes self-will. However, the capacity to turn away from sin does originate from humanity itself; humans cannot simply will their will to be good. The answer requires the work of Christ. In an Abelardian way, Temple asserted that Christ's sacrifice and love evoke a sympathetic response that induces a change of will in humans. The repentant sinner is drawn out of their self-will to align their will with Christ's Will. Their will begins to correspond to Christ's Will. One way this is accomplished is through worship. It is in worship that humans surrender their will and accept Christ's Will in its place. But the work of Christ does not stop there because it is both individual and communal. The work of Christ restores the fellowship between God and humans, as well as the fellowship amongst humans. This is the way in which the ideal state of a completed personality and perfected fellowship is possible.

Chapter four then investigated Temple's ecclesiology. His understanding of the Church is mainly premised on the Pauline image of the Church as the Body of Christ. Temple interpreted this in a realist way and held that the Church is the extension or continuation of the Incarnation. Given that his Christology was based on the will, it follows that Temple's ecclesiology may also be understood in terms of the will. The Church as the Body of Christ continues the Incarnation by being the instrument or organ of Christ's Will. The goal of the Church is to gather all humanity as one perfect person in Christ (Galatians 3:28). This entails all of humanity aligning their wills with Christ's Will such that there is one common Will among all humans, which is Christ's Will. It could then be said that all humanity is one person, i.e., Christ. It is important to note that the Church's goal is essentially the same as the ideal state of humanity, that is, a completed personality and a perfected fellowship. Therefore the Church, as the organ of Christ's Will, has a critical role in the world to bring about this ideal state for humans. It is surprising, however, that Temple averred that the Church's key activity is not to *do* anything but to *be* itself. The Church's main activity is to be the worshipping community of God. It is through worship that the work of Christ is effected as Christians

surrender their will and accept Christ's Will as their own. But worship is not restricted to the confines of the Church. True worship impels Christians back to their daily lives where they bring Christ's Will to bear in their spheres of influence. This is the way in which the Church accomplishes its mission in the world. The Church as the Body of Christ and organ of His Will is active, visible, and dynamic in society and the world.

This, however, brings the Church into contact and conflict with the State. This is the focus of chapter five, which examines the relationship between Church and State. For Temple, the relationship between Church and State should ideally be coordinated, synergistic, and harmonious. Both entities are instruments of God that are used to glorify Him by seeking the welfare of His people. But in reality, a fundamental conflict exists between the Church and the State because of their separate claims to a universal and final sovereignty. In fact, there is a clear sense of conflict between the Church and the State in Temple's writings, especially in his later works. The General Strike of 1926 and the Prayer Book Controversy of 1927–1928 undoubtedly contributed to this growing sense of conflict. In a way, this conflict is inevitable because the State performs a critical role in society and the nation as the organ of the national community. It promotes social order, that is, the welfare of its citizens and a good life for them. This is mainly achieved through the law, and the State is authorised to use force to make the law effective. Such an understanding was likely the influence of the British Idealism, especially T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. The conflict between Church and State can be understood as a conflict between two wills. The Church is the organ of Christ's Will and acts upon it, whereas the State is the organ of the national community and follows the community's will. Temple stressed that this conflict is felt most acutely by Christian citizens, who experience the simultaneous claims of both State and Church.

The final chapter then examined Temple's Christian social principles and showed how they were essentially derived from his theology. Temple offers a creative and novel solution to the tension felt by the Christian citizen described above. The Church should develop principles and pass them on to the Christian citizen to act upon in their daily life and in their civic capacity. The Christian citizen thus leavens the community's will, the State, and state policy. This eases the Church–State conflict, yet allows the Church to influence the community and the State through the intermediacy of the Christian citizen. This was not meant as a theoretical solution. Temple developed Christian social principles on numerous occasions, but they were most effectively articulated in *CASO*. This small paperback was indisputably

Temple's most popular book and helped to pave the way for the welfare state. In this book, Temple advocated for three Christian social principles – liberty (or sacredness of personality), fellowship, and service. It is immediately apparent through our study that personality and fellowship were important themes in his theology, where the will was central. In other words, Temple's social principles were essentially theological principles that were premised on the will.

### **Anglican Social Thought Today: British and Singaporean Perspectives**

This study reveals that there is much more that Temple could offer Anglican theology and Anglican social thought today. We must disagree with Hensley Henson who, as the former Bishop of Durham, wrote just two weeks after Temple's death that it was a "felix opportunitate mortis".<sup>1</sup> Henson believed that Temple was fortunate to pass away before his ideas had run its course and left him exposed and obsolete. He was wrong. For one, Temple and his tradition of social thought would continue well into the 1970s and 1980s before becoming stagnant, unreflective, and limited in effectiveness in the hands of his intellectual successors.<sup>2</sup> This was a period when Temple would come under much criticism.<sup>3</sup> Even so, I would argue that Temple's diminishing relevance was not due to his theology becoming outmoded. Rather, it was because his intellectual successors such as Ronald Preston and Alan Suggate failed to give adequate attention to his theology. They ironically undercut his legacy and continued relevance by trying to prise his social thought apart from its deeper theological underpinning. This seems to have persisted till today. Discussion of Temple tends to focus narrowly on his social thought, and even then, his underlying social principles are touched on only superficially.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Evelyn Foley Braley, ed. *Letters of Herbert Hensley Henson* (London: SPCK, 1950), 159.

<sup>2</sup> Malcolm Brown, "Anglican Social Theology Tomorrow," in *Anglican Social Theology: Renewing the Vision Today*, ed. Malcolm Brown (London: Church House Publishing, 2014), 177.

<sup>3</sup> Roger Lloyd and Edward Norman, for example, would write that Temple's way of thinking was already outdated in his time and was obsolete by the 1970s. Norman argued that Temple's ideas were too idealistic, unoriginal, and poorly expressed in the first place. A. R. Vidler would also critique that Temple's focus on the Incarnation was to the neglect of the Atonement. Edward R. Norman, *Church and Society in England, 1770–1970* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 281–283, 370; Roger Bradshaigh Lloyd, *The Church of England, 1900–1965* (London: SCM, 1966), 461; Alec R. Vidler, "The Limitations of William Temple," *Theology*, vol.79, no.667 (1 Jan 1976).

<sup>4</sup> For example, Suggate, "The Temple Tradition."; Atherton, *Christianity and New Social Order*; John Hughes, "After Temple? The Recent Renewal of Anglican Social Thought," in *Anglican Social Theology: Renewing the Vision Today*, ed. Malcolm Brown (London: Church House Publishing, 2014).

There is much that could be reappropriated from Temple's voluntarist theology, which brings agency to the fore. God's active involvement in the world is the impulse behind Christian social thought and engagement. Likewise, the Church as the Body of Christ that seeks to fulfil His Will in the world cannot retreat, recuse itself, or stand aloof from society and the world. Or perhaps most importantly, human agency is important because it mirrors and participates in God's divine agency. Strikingly, Rowan Williams identifies the importance of human agency in Temple's thought in a speech at the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the William Temple Foundation. He bases his comment on a quotation from Temple in the Lambeth Palace Archives, which we have seen in chapter five. Temple wrote that "the State must recognise in every citizen something superior to itself; in other words we get the conception of the 'Welfare State', according to which the State exists for the sake for its citizens both collectively and individually".<sup>5</sup> Williams' astute comment is worth quoting at length:

Now that is a very searching and a very fruitful definition of what a welfare state might mean. The state exists for the sake of its citizens, but there is a deeper dimension to that than simply saying that the state has the duty to *provide* for its citizens; it's more that the state recognizes in the citizen 'something superior to itself'. That's not an immediately transparent formula, but I take it to mean something like this: the state deals with human beings in their fullness, in their capacity for creativity, self-motivation and self-management. That is, the state deals with human beings in their *freedom*, not just in their *need*. And if the state recognizes in human beings that dimension of creativity, of capacity for self-management and self-motivation, the state as Temple believes it ought to be will recognize in each person a unique contribution to a corporate enterprise. And by the time you've granted that, you've already somewhat dismantled the notion of the state itself as a monolith. You've already begun to see the state as the broker of different kinds of creativity: the state as negotiating with its citizens, not as a single block ...<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Temple, *The Real Meaning of War*.

<sup>6</sup> Rowan Williams, "From Welfare State to Welfare Society: The Contribution of Faiths to Happiness and Wellbeing in a Plural Civil Society," Archbishop of Canterbury Archive Website, <http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1160/archbishops-lecture-celebrating-60th-anniversary-of-the-william-temple-foundation.html>. Accessed 4 March, 2022.

William goes on to critique the welfare state, remarking that the current problem with the welfare state is not welfare but welfarism. This is the approach to social issues and challenges which “strips human beings of their agency, their initiative, and their creative capacity for dealing with themselves and one another in collaboration”.<sup>7</sup> Williams is not alone in his diagnosis of welfarism. Stephen Spencer cites a criticism of the welfare state by Philip North, and correctly states the Temple does not hold this view. North, a theologically conservative bishop in the Diocese of Blackburn, charges Temple with bequeathing a dependency on the state that plagues many working class families in northern England.<sup>8</sup> However, this is diametrically opposed to what Temple envisioned the welfare state to be! It was not meant to breed chronic dependency and strip humans of their agency. This is a point not lost on Williams in his same speech:

And to talk about human welfare only in terms of how needs are to be satisfied in emergencies, is precisely to be tied to the kind of passive account of humanity that Temple wished to avoid ... We need to get beyond such a potential division of humanity between the agents and the patients; the ones who do and the ones who are done to. We need to have an account of justice and well-being which take entirely seriously human freedom and human interdependence, the human capacity for internal change and movement, the human as subject.<sup>9</sup>

Williams seems to masterfully grasp the essence of Temple’s theology and social thought. Temple’s social thought is derived from his theology, which emphasises agency, including volition, creativity, activeness, communal interdependence, dynamism, self-management, self-motivation, internal change and movement. This is exactly what Temple hoped to express through his Christian social principles of personality and fellowship: it was to focus on nurturing the person’s will and developing their agency. The welfare state, or any social measures for that matter, should aid that process of nurture and development. To use an

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Spencer, "Temple Tradition," 90–91. Spencer quotes Philip North from North’s book review in the *Church Times* on 29 April 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Williams, "From Welfare State to Welfare Society: The Contribution of Faiths to Happiness and Wellbeing in a Plural Civil Society".

analogy, a social measure should not be a safety net but a trampoline, that helps people to re-engage or re-active their own will and connect their wills to others in society.

Temple's social thought, reconnected with its underpinning voluntarist theology, could reinvigorate Anglican social thought as it searches for deeper foundations. Malcolm Brown, who comments on Anglican social thought in England, laments that there is a great need today for "robust theological foundations for understanding why such [social] action constitutes authentic discipleship".<sup>10</sup> Or, again elsewhere, that Anglican social thought needs to "rebuild its self-confidence in Christian anthropologies and social understandings and its sense of the church as the carrier of the tradition [i.e., of a distinctive and robust Anglican social theology]".<sup>11</sup> Temple could contribute much to this rebuilding.

The same could be said of the Anglican Diocese of Singapore, which I am from. The Diocese engages extensively in social and community work. It has more than 20 schools and kindergartens, and more than 30 community services spanning senior care, psychiatric services, nursing homes, an autism centre, and a community hospital.<sup>12</sup> Yet, there is a curious lack of theological foundations and principles for this extended social engagement. Publicly available information from official Diocesan communications fails to give social thought a theological underpinning.<sup>13</sup> The Diocese's social engagement is apparently driven by five motivations: good works as part of a living faith; witness to the community; seeking the welfare of the state (Jeremiah 29:7); legitimacy with the government; and evangelism.<sup>14</sup> This is theologically thin in comparison with the scale of diocesan social services. Perhaps the Diocese could borrow from Temple at the simplest level and articulate that its social work endeavours to nurture the person's will and develop their agency.

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<sup>10</sup> Brown, "Anglican Social Theology Tomorrow," 177.

<sup>11</sup> Malcolm Brown, "Anglican Social Theology: Today and Tomorrow," in *Theology Reforming Society: Revisiting Anglican Social Theology*, ed. Stephen Spencer (London: SCM Press, 2017), 125.

<sup>12</sup> The Diocese of Singapore, "Community Services," <https://www.anglican.org.sg/community-services>. Accessed 7 March, 2022.

<sup>13</sup> Such as the biannual Diocesan Digest, the St. Andrew's Mission Hospital website, the Singapore Anglican Community Services website, and the social services newsletter, Angage. The Diocese of Singapore, "Diocesan Digest," <https://www.anglican.org.sg/diocesan-digest>. Accessed 7 March, 2022; St. Andrew's Mission Hospital, <https://www.samh.org.sg/>. Accessed 7 March, 2022; St. Andrew's Community Hospital, <https://www.sach.org.sg/>. Accessed 7 March, 2022; St. Andrew's Mission Hospital, "Angage," <https://www.samh.org.sg/newsletters/>. Accessed 7 March, 2022.

<sup>14</sup> Interestingly, Mathews picks up on these as well. Mathew Mathews, "Saving the City through Good Works: Christian Involvement in Social Services," in *Religious Diversity in Singapore*, ed. Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 535–543.

Another point of Temple's thought that could be reappraised today is his view that the Church should articulate social principles. Such a method of social engagement could still be useful as part of a range of methods that the Church utilises. To be sure, the Church must not be lulled into articulating mere principles on grave issues such as rape, child abuse, or genocide. However, these situations tend to be the exception and not the rule. A fair bit of the Church's social engagement tends to be on issues in the public sphere where most societies today are secular. Of course, the issue of religious reasoning in the public sphere has been the subject of much debate.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, Temple's idea of principles might still be useful, especially if the theological rationale for the principles is given as well. We recall Temple's principles of personality and fellowship in *CASO*, but also their clear grounding in the conviction that all humans are children of God. Will Storrar points to an effective use of this idea during the debate over Scottish self-government in the 1980s and 1990s. The Church of Scotland espoused the Knoxian principle of limited sovereignty, and supported Scottish self-government. Yet it did not specify what form this self-government should take, and articulated that a devolved assembly, a federal settlement, or outright independence were all congruent with the principle.<sup>16</sup> This nuanced contribution seemed to be well-received.<sup>17</sup>

This could be a viable social engagement method in Singapore. Singapore is a secular state because of its multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious society. Religious views are not barred from the public sphere, but they are certainly not privileged nor beyond criticism. The situation bears some resemblance to the *modus vivendi* pluralism that Jeffery Stout proposes where societal morality could be a bricolage.<sup>18</sup> Or perhaps more pertinently,

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<sup>15</sup> John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas, for example, argue that public discourse should be done in a common language, whether secular logic or public reasoning. Others like Nigel Biggar and Luke Bretherton disagree. Public reasoning is reductionistic (Biggar) and results in the loss of one another's self-understanding and primary concerns (Bretherton). There are others like Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre, and George Lindbeck who contend that there is not enough common ground in society in the first place for productive dialogue to take place. They argue that rationality seems to be more context-dependent, and thus consensus is altogether too difficult. See, for example, Nigel Biggar and Linda Hogan, *Religious Voices in Public Places* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); Luke Bretherton, *Christianity and Contemporary Politics* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (London: Duckworth, 1988); George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine* (London: SPCK, 1984).

<sup>16</sup> Storrar, "Scottish Civil Society & Devolution."

<sup>17</sup> Lindsay Paterson, "Scottish Social Democracy and Blairism: Difference, Diversity and Community," in *Tomorrow's Scotland*, ed. Gerry Hassan and Christopher Warhurst (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2002), 119.

<sup>18</sup> Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 296–297. See also Jeffrey Stout, *Ethics After Babel* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001); Nigel Biggar, "Conclusion," in *Religious Voices in Public Places*, ed. Nigel Biggar and Linda Hogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 314.

religious views in Singapore are not the main consideration for government decision and policy making.<sup>19</sup> It is a lot like the procedural secularism that Williams describes, in which the State ensures that “all voices are being heard in a process of ‘brokering’ harmony”.<sup>20</sup> Within this context, the way the Church puts forward its views in the public sphere and in its engagement with government must be careful and nuanced. To simply quote biblical passages might prove futile and does not facilitate dialogue. However, to engage through principles might still prove efficacious, because different parties who may not share a Christian or even religious background can engage in conversation. It could even be helpful to include the theological rationale underpinning those principles as part of the document that advocates for them. Those interested in reading or engaging could do so as well.

It is hoped this study sheds new light on William Temple. His social thought, much lauded as it is, has a lot more to offer when understood in the context of its theological roots. Temple was not merely a social reformer, but a theologian and philosopher. His theology was bold and creative, unrestrained by convention. This enabled him to recast theology using his doctrine of the will, which allowed a striking focus on human agency and thereby on notions of the dynamism of the will and social activity. Social measures today should try to aid the development of these. Contemporary Anglican theology and social thought that are seeking deeper foundations could do no better than turn to Temple.

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<sup>19</sup> Roland Chia, "Religion and Politics in Singapore: A Christian Reflection," *Church & Society in Asia Today*, vol.16, no.1 (April 2013): 10–12. See also Lai Ah Eng, ed. *Religious Diversity in Singapore* (Singapore ISEAS, 2008); Mathew Mathews and Mohammad Khamsya Bin Khidzer, "Preserving Racial and Religious Harmony in Singapore," in *50 Years of Social Issues in Singapore*, ed. David Chan (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2015).

<sup>20</sup> Rowan Williams, *Faith in the Public Square* (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2012), 27.

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