"And some other uncontroversial words":

the status of stance–commitments in the lexicosyntactic variation of identity labels

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Declaration

I have read and understood the University of Edinburgh guidelines on plagiarism and declare that this written dissertation is all my own work except where I indicate otherwise by proper use of quotes and references.

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1   Introduction

Traditionally, formal linguistic approaches have assumed that affective stance (Ochs 1992, Jaffe 2009) is not part of a linguistic expression's semantics, although recent approaches have sought to integrate stance and other aspects of social discourse into semantic approaches (McConnell-Ginet 2002, 2006, 2008; Potts 2003, 2005). In this paper I will outline some of the definitional and methodological areas of concern in current stance research.

I will also explore how stancetaking is "done" on the lexicosyntactic level and argue that empirical evidence from lexicosyntactic variation and discourse suggests that affect is part of what speakers commit themselves to when they utter a statement containing a semantically "double-barreled" (Zwicky 2003, p. 84) term.

The empirical enquiry and definitional concerns provide a motivation for integrating stance into semantic/pragmatic models; I shall consider what sorts of semantic/pragmatic description can accommodate stance–commitments and argue that we should look to Sally McConnell-Ginet's tripartite account of lexical significance as a possible model for the integration of stance into semantics (McConnell-Ginet 2002, 2006, 2008).

Along the way, I will look at what consequences this has in terms of knowledge distribution for social kind terms; and outline some directions for future stance research, including a quick look at what an analysis of reclamatory language use (Zwicky 2003) might have to offer.

2   Let's stance

Although several definitions of stance have been offered in the sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology literature (see Jaffe 2009 for an overview), I shall rely primarily on the definition given by Elinor Ochs (1992), which is based on indexicality.

Stance: linguistic and social resources that can be employed in a directly or indirectly indexical manner to perform a particular pragmatic attitude or social action (Ochs 1992, p. 342).

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On Ochs's framework, certain clusters of stances can jointly constitute a social *role*.

The sociolinguistic notion of stance is not well–defined, although it has a great deal of explanatory power. In the sociolinguistic tradition, the explanatory power of stance has been exploited in both discursive and variationist approaches. In discursive approaches, stance may be used to explain situated meaning — that is, how and why interlocutors orient to particular propositions in context, and how these contribute to the building of identity (Moore & Podesva 2009). In variationist approaches, stance may be used to explain how we get from frequencies (first–order indexicality) to social meaning (second– and third– order) — these are research questions that underpin the work such as that done by Eckert (2005), Labov (2010), Leslie and James Milroy (Milroy & Milroy 2010), and others.

It should be noted here that *indexical* in this context is the sociolinguistic notion of indexicality, not the traditional semantic notion of indexical terms such as *here, you, me*, etc. In this paper, I will rely on the sociolinguistic notion of indexicality, according to which we say that the relationship between identity and and sociolinguistic variables becomes indexical when it becomes "imbued with meaning drawn from local ideology" (Johnstone & Kiesling 2008, p. 7; see also Eckert 1996, Ochs 1992).

2.1 So what are stance and affect when they're at home?

Stance is the way sociolinguists talk about affect and "pragmatic attitude" (Ochs 1992, p. 342) in interaction; as a way of modelling the connection

between an utterance and the social action it may realise. This should not be confused with speech act theory (Austin 1975, Geis 1995), although they bear several similarities, and I will treat them as parallel research directions.

Presumably all of the sentences below[1] are about the same attribute of Ayisha's, but in each case the speaker has a different attitude towards the attribute:

(1)   a.   Ayisha is obstinate.

        b.   Ayisha is stubborn.

        c.   Ayisha is pigheaded.

None of the sentences are generally taken to be positive (at least compared to, say, calling someone *tenacious*), but example (c) seems much more negative than (a) or (b). Of course context will change the way that a hearer might interpret these, but it seems plausible to say that, all else being equal, it is kinder to Ayisha to describe her as *stubborn* than as *pigheaded*.

Since *obstinate*, *stubborn*, and *pigheaded* all pick out the same attribute, the difference between them seems to be one of *affect* — that is, the emotional content of a term. If the speaker uses clusters of linguistic features to express their attitude relative to the the attribute in context, that is *stance*, and affect–laden lexical items may be one such type of linguistic feature. I will use the term *affect* for the emotional or attitudinal content of a term; and I shall use the term *stance* to talk about the interactional effects that indexicality and affect may realise in context.

2.2   A discursive view

There are two senses of *discourse* that must be distinguished:

(linguistic) discourse: a communicative event.

(social/societal) discourse: "sets of propositions in circulation about a

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[1]This example is Jeffrey Ketland's, and I am grateful to him for his permission to include it.

particular phenomenon, which constitute what people take to be the reality of the phenomenon" (Cameron & Kulick 2003, p. 16).

These two senses of *discourse* are connected in that they are a least partly mutually constitutive. Social discourses, a notion that comes from critical theory, is made up of many instances of communicative events. Similarly, individual communicative events may draw on social discourses for their context and background assumptions — a point that Kitzinger 2005 builds on in her argument that heterosexuality is "backgrounded" by the quotidian use of family relationship labels such as "my wife" in ordinary conversational interaction. This, Kitzinger argues, is connected to broader discourses about family structure and marriage, and it's these broader discourses that are brought into play that can trigger interactional difficulty if the expression "my wife" is used by a woman.

2.3 Indexicality

On Johnstone and Kiesling's schema, a first–order indexical is a feature that correlates with some particular sociodemographic group (2008, p. 8). A first–order indexical becomes a second–order indexical when it "become[s] available for social work" (p. 8) and speakers can attribute social significance to the feature, or use it to identify speakers as having a particular identity. Second–order indexicals become third–order indexicals when it can be used as part of an explicit performance, serious or ironic, of a particular identity. While not all indexical linguistic strategies are equally available to all speakers (Podesva et al 2008), the use of certain features as third–order indexicals is available to speakers for whom it is not a first–order indexical. Johnstone and Kiesling 2008 discuss the case of /aw/–monophthongization in Pittsburgh English: use of /aw/–monophthongization is higher among working-class men in Pittsburgh, but /aw/–monophthongized words like "dahtahn" are printed on T-shirts and other souvenirs as examples of "Pittsburghese"; so speakers who are not working-class male Pittsburghers can and do use the feature, either seriously or playfully, in order to sound more "local".

Clusters of stances may jointly constitute social roles. Ochs (1992) makes this argument with regard to accommodating and nurturing stances (which, she argues, are in turn constituted by features of linguistic accommodation in speech to children by their caregivers) jointly constituting White Western middle-class motherhood. In other words, on Ochs's view, it is possible to indexically link child–directed speech with a motherhood role. Following Johnstone and Kiesling's argument, we can also point out that this indexical link is available to non-mothers in order to perform social work. For example, if I were to say "Now, now, play nicely together" to some rowdy colleagues, I risk sounding condescending (perhaps playfully so), because of the way in which such an utterance (and certain deliveries, such as the use of phonological simplification and other features of addressee–focussed speech) is indexically connected to child–directed speech; my colleagues would recognise these features, although I am not myself a mother.

How best to describe indexicality and stance is a point of ongoing debate among linguists, as some linguists argue there is a particular primacy to certain social variables (Meyerhoff, forthcoming), and others arguing that indexing is a matter of style and register (Eckert 2005). A particular point that requires closer attention in these debates is *salience* — Johnstone & Kiesling's 2008 schema is closely tied to levels of awareness among speakers. However, as Meyerhoff (forthcoming) notes, some social attributes such as gender may be salient in terms of how community life is organised, but may not be significant for many linguistic variables, as in the case of the Bequia speech community where Meyerhoff and her collaborators have consistently found more significant results for variation according to village than for gender, when investigating a range of linguistic variables.

In order to answer the question of why some variables come to be "imbued with meaning drawn from local ideology" (Johnstone & Kiesling 2008, p. 7), it seems that linguists need a clearer notion of linguistic salience. However, Meyerhoff's

findings seem to be a warning against being too quick to assume that sociopolitical salience will necessarily translate into statistically significant variation for a particular linguistic variable.

2.4   Definitional problems

The lack definitional clarity for stance is due to a number of factors:

1. Social range: the range of indexicalities performable by a feature (Agha 2005, p. 39)[2]. Since stances are constituted by clusters of socially–coded features, each of which may present a range of performable indexicalities, individuating stances may not be a straightforward matter.

2. Social domain: the domain of people to whom the stance is recognisable (Agha 2005, p. 40). The social domain may not precisely map the set of speakers who are licensed to perform a feature (Podesva et al 2008).

3. Licensing: some strategies for stancetaking might not be equally available to all speakers (Podesva et al 2008). Use of an indexical feature does not mean that the feature is straightforwardly "switched on", nor does using more of a feature that indexes, say, intelligence, necessarily mean that the speaker will be perceived as more articulate. The work of Podesva et al (2008) on /t/ realisations shows that speakers may "overshoot" in their production of indexical variants, and then be perceived as not being genuine, rather than as having more intelligence.

4. Vagueness: a feature may index vague attributes such as "masculinity", or "local identity", as in Johnstone & Kiesling's work (2008).

5. Situatedness: the notion of situated meaning which pervades stance research — especially in the linguistic anthropology tradition — is the idea that elements of social significance arise in dynamic situations as a product of interaction in a particular fleeting context, and cannot be isolated from that context.

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[2]Agha 2005 is discussing *registers*, but I take the same discussion to be applicable, mutatis mutandum, for sociolinguistic resources that constitute a stance.

Some linguists argue that stance is always situated, whereas others would want to recognise situated meaning as having certain special properties; so any account of stance must at the very least, remain compatible with situated meaning.[3] I would argue that stance can benefit from clarification without losing its explanatory power with regard to situated meaning, and the dangers of not doing so are serious. In particular, linguists should be concerned that study of situated meaning does not become permissive of research that is not fully testable, and repeatable, or of work that is "mind–reading".

The danger of poorly–defined notions is that they may lead to methodological sloppiness, and deviate significantly from the scientific method, even if they have explanatory power. I have outlined above a few examples in the literature where it seems to me that this change has led to problematic developments in stance research, and as a result, it seems that there are strong advantages to a clarification of stance and stance research methodologies.

Intention analyses

These are analyses that are premised on the idea that we can know or gain access to a speaker's intentions or mental states through linguistic analysis. Some linguists, such as Anna Wierzbicka go so far as to argue that an analysis of mental states is not only possible, but actually necessary for semantic analysis, in her work on speech act verbs from a second–language acquisition perspective (1987). She argues that

> 'first person mental phrases are not only more common than third person ones: they are also more basic, semantically. 'I want' is more basic than "he wants," and "I feel" is more basic than "she feels"' (1987, p. 15).

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[3]Thanks to Emma Moore for helpful discussion on this point

However, it is not at all clear what it means for a mental phrase to be semantically "more basic", since the criteria Wierzbicka gives are syntactic and epistemological: she asserts that people cannot be wrong about what they themselves want or feel (but see Descartes 1996) and this is reflected by first person mental phrases being less grammatically complex in some languages, such as Japanese and Hua. However, this claim is highly problematic: Firstly, syntactic complexity in some languages does not necessarily license the conflation of epistemic concerns (about what it is possible for me to know about my mental states, and the mental states of others) with syntactic criteria (about the grammatical complexity of particular constructions). Secondly, neither of these are semantic criteria, so there is some danger of a category error.

Intention analyses present a range of philosophical problems and are epistemically vulnerable since speakers' intentions are mental states to which linguists have no access.

Omnipresence analyses

These are analyses that are premised on the idea that certain attributes (eg, gender, power, etc) must always be relevant in any given dataset or discourse. Schegloff (1997) discusses this problem at length, and notes the need for more rigorous approaches in order to ground conversation analysis and critical discourse analysis firmly in what the speakers themselves orient to, and in the linguistic form of their discourse, and he warns against permitting linguistic analysis to become "merely ideological" (1997, p. 183).

Essentialist analyses

These are analyses that are premised on the assumption that a speaker's sociodemographic group membership determines their speech in all contexts, and by extension, that broad sociodemographic categories (eg, gender) are sufficient to explain linguistic features. Kira Hall (2003) discusses a discourse transcription used in two different publications for starkly different conclusions:

Mike: What kind of salad dressing should I make?

Ken: Oil and vinegar, what else?

Mike: What do you mean "what else?"

Ken: Well, I always make oil and vinegar, but if you want, we could try something else.

Ken: Does that mean you don't like it when I make other dressings?

Mike: No, I like it. Go ahead. Make something else.

Ken: I don't. Make a yoghurt dressing.

Mike makes yoghurt dressing, tastes it, and makes a face.

Ken: Isn't it good?

Mike: I don't know how to make yoghurt dressing.

Ken: Well, if you don't like it, throw it out.

Mike: Never mind.

Ken: What never mind? It's just a little yoghurt.

Mike: You're making a big deal about nothing.

Ken: *You* are!

(From Tannen 1986, p. 119)

Tannen presents the interaction between two male partners as an example of self–deprecating humour that was not understood by one of the interlocutors, leading to a disagreement. But as Hall points out, in Burrell and Fitzpatrick (1989), the interlocutors are presented as Bob and Joanne instead of Mike and

Ken; and the authors couch their analysis in terms of traditional gender roles.

Hall points out is not at all clear how the interaction between two men came to be recast as an interaction between different-sex partners, but the fact that the interaction can be "straightened" at all, and still be read as a plausible conversation shows the gendered element that Burrell and Fitzpatrick highlight is not inherent to the original text at all and is and certainly nothing that the speakers themselves orient to.

However the recasting of the original couple as a heterosexual couple came about, this case highlights that linguists must be much more careful about attributing particular linguistic usage to sociodemographic group membership without careful consideration of what a falsifying case would look like (Popper 1998)

2.4.1   The demarcation of science

The philosopher of science Karl Popper argues that falsifiability is the primary distinction between scientific theories and pseudoscientific accounts (1998); he gives the examples of Einsteinian physics, in contrast to Marx's accounts of history and class struggle. One should not, Popper argues, search for verification of a claim — any Marxist can point out countless examples that support Marx's claims, because even strikingly different situations can be explained by Marx's account: if people in deprived areas of England riot, it can be explained by saying that they are alienated (Marx 1844); if some other equally–deprived young people do not riot, this can be explained by saying they are under false consciousness. Consequently, almost any situation can be seen as confirmation of Marx's account.

By contrast, Einstein's theory of relativity made testable predictions, that were "*incompatible with certain possible results of observation*" (Popper 1998, p. 6, emphasis original).

Instead of seeking confirmation of a theory, therefore, Popper argues that one

should seek to refute a theory, which he explains as:

1. "[...] Confirmations should count only if they are the result of *risky predictions*; that is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory – an event which would have refuted the theory.

2. Every 'good' scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.

3. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non–scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.

4. Every genuine *test* of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it. Testability is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risk.

5. Confirming evidence should not count *except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory*; and this means it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory (I now speak in such cases of 'corroborating evidence')."

(From Popper 1998, p. 7. Emphasis original)

Thomas Kuhn also discussed the psychological tendency to seek out verification in his work on the shortcomings of the scientific method. He argues that although we would want science to be objective and unified, advances in science ("scientific revolutions") are frequently neither (1996). Scientific revolution are much better described as decisions between incommensurable paradigms than objective decisions between comparable theories. This is strikingly similar to the anthropology and linguistic anthropology literature on subjectivity, which concerns itself with the ways in which a researcher views data through the lens of

their subjective experience, and the extent to which it is possible for researchers to detach themselves from their subjectivity (see, for example, Kulick & Wilson 1995). Kuhn's claims are descriptive not prescriptive, so he does not advocate subjectivity, but rather notes it as a tendency of human psychology (1996).

My concern here is that some stance research may be deviating from the falsifiability principle of scientific method, and tending more towards embracing subjectivity. In light of the falsifiability criterion, it would seem that sociolinguists are right to struggle with questions of what constitutes explanatory adequacy for studies on style, stance, identity, and variation, as it is not always clear what would count as falsifiability when considering many of these questions.[4]

There are also reasons to be concerned with the clarification of these notions within semantics, given the extent to which previous work has relied on speakers' mental states, and the extent to which semantics methodologies have made use of intuition. A more detailed overview of these problems will be undertaken in Section 6.1.

Despite methodological concerns, however, there has been an ongoing program of research in semantics and pragmatics to understand the interactional effects of certain sentences and sentence forms. For example, Sadock & Zwicky 1985 are concerned with how to explain clause types and their associated force. As mentioned above, I will treat this development in semantics/pragmatics work as a parallel research program to stance research.

In other words, it seems that semanticists have been working towards a comparable understanding of utterances as effecting certain kinds of interactional work as sociolinguists have, but through different methods and working from different premises, and with little cross-fertilisation between the subdisciplines. It is my aim here to create a little common ground between the sociolinguistic and semantic accounts of the mechanisms that underly this interactional work, and in

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[4]Thanks to Lauren Hall-Lew and the participants of the Sociolinguistics Reading Group for productive conversations on this topic.

doing so, to clarify some of these concepts.

2.4.2   Possible applications

An ancillary advantage to the clarification of stance would be practical applications as well as theoretical clarification. These applications are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but I have sketched them here as motivation for definitional clarification.

The clarification of stance in semantic and pragmatic terms also opens the possibility of formalising it, and applying it for computational use in the long run. I shall not attempt this here, but potential applications might include machine summarisation, and similar computational problems.

Another practical application, in the long run, might be a clearer understanding of high-affect terms in legal domains. For example, a recent employment dispute between the train operator Arwyn Thomas, and his employer, the London Underground, hung on whether Thomas had been abusive in calling another member of staff a "scab" and a "strikebreaker". Thomas was dismissed by London Underground under gross misconduct regulations, but he maintained that he had been victimised for his trade union activities, and had been unfairly dismissed (Thomas v London Underground 2011). It is possible that a clearer understanding of wether and how high–affect terms are taken to commit speakers to particular stances might have been helpful in this case, and other cases that turn on instances of stancetaking in the field of language and the law.

2.5   Sociolinguistic and empirical approaches to stance

Traditionally, studies on stance have drawn primarily on discursive methods, although there is an increasing move to combine discursive and empirical methods. For example, MOORE AND PODESVA 2009 use a combination of statistical and discursive methods in order to comment on both the distribution of tag questions among British teenagers, and the interactional contexts in which

they occur. Similarly, Adachi uses a similar approach for her investigation on compliments among young Japanese adults (2011). Such methods allow the authors to discuss not only the frequency and significance of the features they investigate, but also their contexts, and how the occurrence of the features in context can be seen as performatively realising certain social categories.

Stuart-Smith and her colleagues use a combination of discursive methods, together with Labovian methods such as word lists, in their investigation of media influence in TH-fronting among Glasgow teenagers (2010). They argue that media influence of the teenagers' speech is due to their stance to mass media programmes such as *East Enders*, and this results in TH-fronting in liminoid situations. That is, the realisation of voiceless[5] interdental fricatives as labiodental:

(2)   Non-fronted: I'd do any[θ]ing for love, but I won't listen to Meat Loaf.
        TH-fronted: I'd do any[f]ing for love, but I won't listen to Meat Loaf.

Recent work on stance and indexicality has also focused on experimental approaches, although many of these have been focused primarily on sociophonetic variation. Johnstone & Kiesling 2008 work consisted of asking participants to evaluate sentences containing /aw/–monophthongized lexemes, and use this work as a basis to develop their indexicality schema. Podesva and his collaborators used an experimental approach to both production and perception of /t/ realisation in the speech of US politicians (Podesva et al 2008), and found that the released variant seemed to be available for use by politicians to create an "articulate" persona.

While there has been extensive work on on phonetic and phonological variation as a vehicle for stance (including , Johnstone & Kiesling 2008, Labov 2010, Podesva et al 2008, Stuart-Smith 2010), there has been surprisingly little work

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[5]Stuart-Smith is dealing only with voiceless TH-fronting, but cases of voiced TH-fronting are also attested in some UK dialects, including my own.

on other types of linguistic features for as vehicles for stance and indexicality. Somasundaran and Wiebe's work on stance identification in online ideological debates focuses on lexical choice (2010); Meyerhoff's work (forthcoming) on place in Bequian English investigates a range of morphosyntactic features; and Moore and Podesva discuss the role of tag questions as indexes. However, there has been surprisingly little research on lexicosyntactic features as vehicles for stance, with an exception of Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's (2006) work on ethnonyms (ethnicity labels such as *Turk, Chinese, Welsh*). The current research aims to redress this gap in the literature by focussing primarily on lexicosyntactic phenomena.

Type	Example	Characteristics
I	*German*	Regular singular/plural opposition. Same declensional properties as most common nouns.
II	*French, Scottish*	Formed with –ish/–sh/–ch suffix. Only plural–collective usage; no formal singular.
IIIa	*Japanese, Chinese*	Formed by the –ese suffix. Singular and plural are formally identical.
IIIb	*Swiss, Manx*	Ethnonyms ending in sibilants that have the same formal characteristics as Type IIIa. (Some dictionaries do allow regular plurals for some Type IIIb words with –es suffix.)
IV	*Zulu, Arawak*	Can be declined according to either Type I or Type III model (with or without overt plural suffix).

Table 1: Table showing a typology of ethnonym declensions, from Tuite 1995, pp. 491–492.

Hall-Lew &Norcliffe (2006) rely on Tuite's (1995) typology of ethnonyms, above, and note that mass plurals are not grammatical for individual, discrete or enumerated entities:

(3)   *I ate rices for dinner.

(4)   *There are fifty cereals in the breakfast bowl.

(5)   ?There five French in the restaurant.

Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's study investigated the use of ethnonyms in singular, plural, collective plural, and enumerated plural (with different numbers) environments. They found that, for ethnonyms where grammaticality depended on number, politeness also depended on number (2006, p. 35). They note that this supports the idea that "grammaticality and politeness judgements may be correlated for English ethnonyms" (2006, p. 33). Where grammaticality did not depend on number, politeness varied according to lexical cluster. They also found variation according to age and dialect, but not gender (p. 36).

Somasundaran and Wiebe discuss a formal approach to recognising stance in online ideological argumentation (2010). They characterise stance in terms of "sides" for and against in argumentation, such as *for–existence of God*. They note that "unigrams are reliable for stance classification in political domains" (2010, p. 121), remarking that,

> "Intuitively, evoking a particular topic can be indicative of a stance. For example, a participant who chooses to speak about "child" and "life" in an abortion debate is more likely from an against–abortion side, while someone speaking about "woman", "rape" and "choice" is more likely from a for–abortion stance" (Somasundaran & Wiebe 2010, p. 121).

Somasundaran and Wiebe's labelling of argument sides seems to be driven by statistics rather than by ethnography, in that whether someone who opposes restrictions on abortion should be described as "for" abortion, or "for" choice, is an ideologically–laden decision, and situates the speaker in relation to a set of social discourses. To my ears at least, "pro-abortion" is a label that people tend not to pick for themselves, although political opponents may use it to speak about them, which suggests that the labelling of stances can itself be associated with particular discourses and with affect, although this claim would need to be tested. In this sense, competing discourse may not be "equal and opposite",

since opposition to the stance or its accompanying discourse may come in the form of opposing the premises of an argument, rather than simply disagreeing with the conclusion. I will explore how this insight might raise some interesting questions for work on reclamatory language in Section 9.5, but it is worth noting here that this may have immediate empirical consequences in that semantically similar words may not necessarily correspond to the same argument side:

> "we do not see a clear separation of the terms (for e.g., "bible" is an indicator for against-gay rights while "christianity" is an indicator for for–gay rights)" (Somasundaran & Wiebe 2010, p. 122).

What Somasundaran and Wiebe note as a lack of clear separation of terms might in fact be indicative of salient semantic difference for the speakers, and indeed I will argue that this is the case.

2.6   Theoretical approaches to stance

The exploration of stance from the theoretical linguistics subdisciplines is somewhat underdeveloped, but some avenues of investigation appear promising. In general the relevant semantics literature does not address stance and (sociolinguistic) indexicality using the framework that sociolinguists use, but nevertheless, there is ongoing work on similar ideas. The phenomenon of affective variation according to lexical and social categorisation has been noted by several linguists, especially by Arnold Zwicky, who has noted speakers' affective attitudes as an important issue for semantic problems (1974, 1997a, 1997b, 2003). In particular, Zwicky remarks that different affective content may be associated with gay_{Adj} and gay_N, and that the affective variation by grammatical category may extent to *straight, queer* and *Jew(ish)* (1997a, pp. 22–23), but he does not offer a semantic/pragmatic characterisation of the issues that he identifies.

Christopher Potts has gives an account of expressives as conventional implicatures (2003, 2005), to which Kent Bach responds (1999, 2006); and I shall

review both Potts's account and Bach's response in Section 8. I will argue that Potts has overlooked crucial features of the referential component of high–affect terms, and adopt Bach's analysis of apparent–conventional implicatures. However, I will also argue that expressives have important consequences for a traditional view of the demarcation between semantics and pragmatics.

Perhaps working most closely to the sociolinguistic framework I have outlined above, Sally McConnell-Ginet argues that social significance should be considered to be part of the semantics of words like *marriage*, where salient sociopolitical discourses exist (2002, 2006, 2008). I will respond to McConnell-Ginet's argument in Section 11.

Geis develops an account of what he calls "conversational competence" (1995, p. xi) in which he argues that what, on an Austinian view, we might consider to be performative speech acts (Austin 1975) such as requesting or promising are *social* rather than linguistic actions (*pace* Sadock & Zwicky 1985), and that making this distinction reduces the need to "associate the performance of particular speech acts with the uttering of sentences having particular linguistic forms" (Geis 1995, p. xii). Geis aims to revise the traditional view of speech act structure; and critiques traditional speech act theory on the basis that speech acts lack the appropriate (linguistic) individuation conditions.

3   "What do you mean by that?" Some remarks on meaning

There is extensive empirical sociolinguistic research to motivate taking seriously the idea of linguistically-encoded conceptual baggage (Eckert 2005, Podesva et al 2008, Stuart-Smith 2010, and others).

However variation according to speaker, speech community or community of practice, and context suggests that at least some elements of conceptual baggage cannot be truth-conditional unless one is prepared to accommodate a very large and unwieldy amount of relativisation. Even so, some degree of relativisation is not terribly controversial — indeed, relativisation is built into systems such as

Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993), and the claim that context shapes discourse is widely accepted by computational and theoretical linguists as well as by sociolinguists.

However, some sociolinguists make a much stronger claim than an argument for relativisation for context. For example the work of Susan Ehrlich (2007) and Jan Blommaert (2005) suggests that not only does context change as speakers make certain things more or less salient by adding to what is in the common ground; but rather that the context itself is discursively constructed. This makes relativising to context in order to accommodate for this notion an intractable prospect indeed, and is surely not what Kamp and Reyle 1993 had in mind.

Linguists working in a semantic or pragmatic framework have differed on whether stance should be thought of as truth-conditional. I will return to this issue and explore its consequences for the status of stance and the semantic–pragmatic distinction in Section 11.

4   Sociopolitical identity labels

While there is an extensive and growing body of literature on language and ethnicity, sexuality, politics, and similar topics, there is comparatively less linguistic work focussed specifically on identity labels. I have chosen to focus my study on identity labels (*gay*, *black*, etc) which can be used in both affective ways and straightforwardly referential ways, as a way of exploring stance through lexicosyntactic variation and the implications for semantic/pragmatic description when dealing with terms that have both referential and affective components.

The linguistic issues that have been raised in previous linguistics work include the following:

- semantic "double-barrel[ing]" (Zwicky 2003, p. 84) of identity labels: this is when terms have both a referential component and an affective component.

- language and identity: the emergence and maintenance of group and individual identities through linguistic practice. This include local community-based identities but also debates about the extent to which broader categories like "gay", "African American", or "woman" can or should be thought of as corresponding to a set of linguistic practices (see, for example, Kulick 2000).

- renaming and reclaiming (Cameron 1985, Cameron & Kulick 2003, Zwicky 2003)

- semantic derogation of terms that are indexed with social identities that have low or problematic social status, such as the pejoration of *mistress* because of its association with the social status of women (Schultz 1975)

- construction of in-group and out-group identities (Cameron & Kulick 2003)

- folk taxonomies (Zwicky 1997a)

My enquiry will be focused primarily on the first of these. Approaches to these topics has changed considerably since the early work on language and identity in that, where labelling according to sociodemographic group membership used to be seen as an essentialist, deterministic matter by linguists, there has been a move in recent years to consider these categories to be matters of sociopolitical performance within certain normative conditions (Cameron & Kulick 2003, Kulick 2003).

It is important to note that these labels are not natural kind terms. They are social kind terms (see Haslanger 2000 for a detailed exploration of social kind terms) — terms for groups that are socially constructed. This means that the type of sociopolitical identities that are salient in a given context are culturally contingent: for example, *black* is a salient ethnicity category in the UK, in a way that *Hispanic* is not — *Hispanic* is not commonly a listed option on British racial equality monitoring forms, and is frequently confused with *Caribbean*. In the USA, the distinction between *Hispanic* and *Caribbean* is a salient one, but the distinction between, say, *Welsh* and *British* might not be. It would be

methodologically naive to assume that identity labels are deterministic.

Cameron and Kulick (2003; Kulick 2002) have argued for a move to studying performativity and desire within language and gender and sexuality research, precisely as a way of moving away from relying on naively–labelled categories. While I have not taken up that approach here, I will discuss the problematisation of identity labels in Section 10.

4.1   Neutrality

The usage of lexicosyntactic constructions containing identity labels is the focus of strong lay speaker ideologies, and these are often expressed both explicitly and implicitly in mass media and institutional discourse, as well as in lay speaker conversation. For example, the American English lexical shifts from *negro*, to *coloured*, to *black*, to *Black*, to ethnicity-focused terms such as *African American*, to *person of colour*, highlights a complex relationship between political and linguistic norms. In such a context, it is not at all clear that there exist neutral choices of lexicosyntactic construction.

5   Hypotheses

My hypotheses, each with its corresponding H_0 formulation, are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: I expect to see consistent, and statistically significant, association between intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements

H_{0_1}: There will be no statistically significant pattern in participants' identification of intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements.

Hypothesis 2: I expect intra-linguistic features that are identified as polite not to be identified as offensive and vice-versa; and for intra-linguistic features that are identified as polite to also be selected for friend use and acquaintance use.

H_{0_2}: There will be no statistically significant relationship between intra-linguistic features that are judged as polite, and how those features

are judged for offensiveness, friend use, and acquaintance use.

Hypothesis 3: I expect to see evidence of linguistic features being used to mark social distance: that is, consistent, and statistically significant, distinctions between intra-linguistic features that are judged as being suitable for friend use and those judged as being suitable for acquaintance use in the statistical analysis, and reports of differential use for friends and acquaintances in the discourse analysis.

H_{0_3}: *There will be no evidence of a significant relationship between intra-linguistic features and social distance, in either the statistical analysis or the discourse analysis.*

Hypothesis 4: I expect to see a statistically significant correlation between number and politeness or ungrammaticality judgements for labels that belong to the Type II (*Jewish, Scottish*) and Type III (*Chinese*) formal lexical classes.

H_{0_4}: *There will be no statistically significant correlation according to formal lexical class and number.*

6 Methodology

6.1 Methodological disputes

Stance research has been undertaken with a number of different approaches, including sociolinguistic and linguistic anthropological fieldwork, corpus linguistics methods, acceptability judgements. I will briefly discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the methods used in the literature I have discussed in Sections 2–4 with a view to selecting a method for my own enquiry. As in Adachi's review of methodologies for speech act research (2011, pp. 49-58), it seems that "there is no one perfect methodology out there" (2011, p. 54).

6.1.1   Fieldwork methods

In the context of stance literature, "fieldwork methods" means participant–observer data collection, which is recorded and later used for conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis, or other type of linguistic analysis. Fieldwork has the potential to yield large amounts of ethnographic information which has the three major advantages.

Firstly, the researcher will be able to gain more insight into the interactional context of conversation by knowing the participants better, and having a greater knowledge of their community ties. This can help the researcher in interpreting situated meaning. For example, Stuart-Smith opts for an explanation of stance in liminoid situations to explain the data — it would have been impossible to arrive at this explanation without knowledge of which situations could be considered liminoid for a given speaker, which in turn requires detailed knowledge of the speaker, and their social situation (Stuart-Smith 2010).

Secondly, fieldwork methods allow for the type of social network to be taken into account in the analysis, since the structure of social networks may play a large role in creating or maintaining certain types of meaning (Milroy & Milroy 2010).

Thirdly, fieldwork methods have traditionally been used in order to gain more naturalistic data. It is worth noting, however, that there is an extensive body of anthropological literature on researcher subjectivity and Otherness in the field, and the extent to which this may affect the researcher's inclusion in the field community, or may bias the researcher with respect to the data (see, for example Kulick & Wilson 1995). In other words, linguists may be overestimating the extent to which participant–observation really allows them an understanding of participants' interactional context.

A methodological reliance on subjectivity may therefore make fieldwork data vulnerable through not necessarily being repeatable or falsifiable, and this may compromise its scientific status (see Popper 1998). Additionally, fieldwork is

highly time– and energy–intensive.

6.1.2 Corpus methods

Corpus methods have the advantage of being able to draw on a much larger range of genres and contexts than fieldwork methods, and being able to work with larger data sets than could be collected using fieldwork or lab–based methods. Typically this typically does not include naturally–occurring face-to-face interactions, but does tend to include recorded or computer–mediated interaction which may be suitable for conversational or discursive analytic methods (see, for example Somasundaran and Wiebe). The disadvantage is that it may be difficult to get ethnographic information about the participants, so corpus methods tend to be most suitable for statistics–based research, rather than ethnography–based work.

6.1.3 Acceptability judgements

Theoretical linguistics has tended to draw heavily on intuition for data about the grammaticality or acceptability of particular sentences. Often this takes the form of authors relying on their own intuitions, but may also include sampling the intuitions of lay speakers with surveys, to gather data on acceptability judgements. This may be done using a variety of methods, including various forms of ordinal data such as 7-point scales, or continuous line scales.

The use of the authors' own intuitions comes from the Chomskyan tradition that one cannot be wrong about one's own linguistic intuitions. However, as a methodological principle, it is subject to what I shall refer to as the Headcocking Problem — a term taken from Barbara C. Scholz's work, who described the problem as an individual who tilts their head and squints just so, and intuits a judgement without further evidence (History of Analytic Philosophy Seminars 200/2010). Headcocked judgements may not be scientifically rigorous because of the following problems:

- they may involve unwarranted or implausible degrees of accommodation.

- they may involve making an unwarranted generalisation about a class of features based on a single example, or a small number of examples.

- it is unclear whether grammaticality judgements should be made on the basis of individual judgements or on the basis of speech community norms;[6] some individuals may be exceptionally accommodating, and so may not accurately reflect the community norms; additionally, some norms may only come into play in certain social situations (Bell 2010) so an individual working in isolation is not accurately recreating the conditions that trigger particular forms or judgements.

Schütze discusses various difficulties with obtaining grammaticality judgements from lay speakers (2010), and argues that lay speakers give *acceptability* judgements, not grammaticality judgements in the way that linguists think about "grammar", since a sentence may be unacceptable to a lay speaker because of semantic, pragmatic, or social factors. Additionally, lay speakers tolerate sentences that linguists consider ungrammatical, and do not tolerate sentences that linguists do consider to be grammatical. Schütze gives the following example as a case that lay speakers seem to tolerate although most linguists agree it is ungrammatical (from Schütze 2010, p. 213):

(6)   More people have been to Russia than I have.

Lay speakers also do not necessarily show a strict demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable sentences — they may judge some sentences as "not great" or "not what I would say", but not completely unacceptable. Finally, Schütze notes that it may not always be clear who should be considered to be speaking "the same language" in that some constructions may be acceptable only to a small speech community.

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[6]It has not gone unnoticed that speech community membership is not a straightforward matter for the purpose of grammaticality judgements. See Schütze PAGE.

The disadvantage of acceptability judgements, as Adachi points out, is that it does not help when it comes to collecting data on the frequency and distribution patterns of the *production* of the features that are being investigated (Adachi 2011, p. 50). There may also be a risk of Observer's Paradox, as the tasks designed to elicit acceptability judgements may be ones that make speakers self-conscious or trigger high attention to speech.

However, there are advantages to this method. In particular, it allows for the collection of speakers' opinions and ideologies about particular forms in a highly time–efficient manner. Because part of my focus is speaker opinions and ideologies, I have used a combination of survey and discursive methods that focus on acceptability judgements; the method is described in detail in Section 6.2.

6.1.4 The Observer's Paradox and ethical issues

The Observer's Paradox is the dilemma that arises when one considers that people may behave differently if they know they are being observed, compared to situations when they believe that they are unobserved. As linguists we usually want to obtain data about speakers' behaviour and beliefs in a context that is as close to how they behave ordinarily; but to collect this data, we must observe them, and in observing speakers, we may be changing their speech.

The Observer's Paradox is of particular importance since it is usually considered unacceptable or irresponsible to record people without their informed consent. This being the case, many researchers have opted for research methods that either minimise participants' sense of being observed; for example, Stuart-Smith and her colleagues set up various game scenarios for their study participants in order to make their participants feel more comfortable (2010). Alternatively, a researcher may opt to set up the study such that the Observer's Paradox is exploited in order to tap into the participants' meta-linguistic knowledge and ideologies, as in Bell's work on audience design (2010). This latter is the approach I have taken in the present research since it was important to collect

not only self-reports of use, but also information about the ideologies that constrain use.

In some cases, the situations that might give rise to the most naturalistic realisations of a variable would put participants at unacceptable or irresponsible levels of risk. For example, in my own research, there would have been a high risk of causing significant psychological stress to participants had I attempted to elicit naturalistic productions of utterances that could have been offensive, hurtful, or threatening; so ethical considerations barred me from using such a method; additionally, it is not clear that such a method would have succeeded in eliciting the specific data I needed in sufficient quantity.

Some linguists have queried the extent to which observation actually does change speech to a sufficient extent as to invalidate results obtained in non-naturalistic settings (see Cameron 2011). That is not to deny audience–design effects (Bell 2010), but rather to suggest that it is the type of observation, not the observation itself, that should be the focus of methodological concern. There is some risk that my method might be perceived as a "formal" situation, which might cause that participants may be more polite or formal in this context than they would, say, if they were having an informal chat in the pub with close friends. But I consider that this risk is worthwhile, as it also permits me to gather extensive meta-linguistic information about language ideologies.

6.2 Method

In the present research I have taken an empirical approach to some of the questions I raise in the earlier sections, which I will use to inform a theoretical enquiry in Sections 11–13. The goal of the experimental enquiry is to know whether speakers consistently associate certain lexicosyntactic constructions with particular sociopolitical stances. There are two portions to my method: a pilot study consisting of a focus group which yielded some fairly free–form conversation; and a survey to gather statistical data. Both components are

described in detail below.

Since constructions containing identity labels are the focus of extensive lay speaker ideologies, I will be able to test for how consistently speakers associate certain constructions with particular stances. Cameron & Kulick 2003 note that such ideologies is often be associated with community building and in-group/out-group usage (pp. 25-6; also Cameron 1985, p. 78; Zwicky 2003, p. 84). It will therefore be important to collect demographic information in order to check for social factors which might constrain variation.

I intend to examine the effect of grammatical category of the identity label (Hall-Lew & Norcliffe 2006, Zwicky 1997a), plurals and lexical class (Hall-Lew & Norcliffe 2006, Tuite 1995), determiner presence and type (Kamp & Reyle 1993 Russell 1905, Strawson 1966, Webber 1979), and grammatical pattern in which the label occurs.

6.3 Focus group

I used a focus group as a pilot study which served two purposes: firstly, it allowed me to check the questions and parameters that should be used for the survey (to ensure that all of the lexicosyntactic constructions that had compiled for use in the survey were indeed within the envelope of variation); and secondly, the focus group also allowed me to collect discourse data.

Focus group participants were recruited from the undergraduate population of Edinburgh University. The participants were shown the sentence list in Appendix I, which used the following lexical categories:

ethnicity/race: *black, white*
religion: *Catholic, Protestant, Jew(ish)*
nationality: *Scot(tish), German, Chinese*
sexuality: *gay$[_{masc}]$, gay$[_{gender-neutral}]$, lesbian*
subculture: *emo*

Henceforth, I shall term the set of sentences I tested containing the lexical item
emo as the "*emo* cluster", and so on, mutatis mutandum, for all of the others.

The participants were asked for their opinions on the sentences, what they
thought the sentences implied, whether any were offensive or polite, whether they
would use them for different audiences, and whether any were grammatically
incorrect. The conversation was loosely structured by my questions, but also by
the participants' interests and what they felt was significant about the sentences.
Although designing the task in this way gave the participants a great deal of
meta–knowledge about the task, it seemed to me that meta–linguistic knowledge
was a strength in this case, as I was able to gain information about language
ideologies, as explained above.

Demographic data was also collected from the participants using a short
demographic questionnaire.

Three students participated in the focus group, and the conversation was sound–
and video–recorded. Because of the use of video–recording, two kinds of informed
consent procedure were used. Verbal consent was obtained prior to recording,
and the participants were given written consent forms at the end of the recording.

The focus group yielded 27 minutes of conversation which I then transcribed and
used for discourse analysis. This analysis is presented in Section 8.

Some changes were made to the sentence list that was then in preparation for
the survey, as a result of observations made in the focus group. The "*The _____
people*" constructions did not appear to be within the envelope of variation, so all
instances of *person* or *people* were changed to *student(s)*, except in the *German*
cluster and the *Chinese* cluster, where I replaced *student(s)* with *scientist(s)* in
order to avoid the possibility of the sentence being understood as meaning
"student of German/Chinese" rather than "student who is German/Chinese". In
order to maximise comparability across the lexical categories, two attributive
adjective patterns were added to the set of grammatical patterns. The *vegetarian*

cluster was added so that there would be two clusters in the Subculture category; and in order to reduce the risk of survey fatigue, the $gay_{[gender-neutral]}$ cluster was removed. Finally, a question was added to the demographic questionnaire in the survey asking participants about their political engagement.

6.4 Survey

An online survey was used to gather statistically analysable data on acceptability judgements of the lexicosyntactic constructions.

The survey used the following lexical categories:

ethnicity/race: *black, white*

religion: *Catholic, Protestant*

nationality: *Scot(tish), German*

sexuality: *gay, lesbian*

subculture: *emo, vegetarian*

ambiguous: *Jew(ish), Chinese*

Each cluster consisted of 10 syntactic patterns for each lexical cluster:

A) $(\text{indefinite-Det} + \text{singular-N}_{label})_{complement-NP}$

B) $(\text{Adj}_{label})_{singular-complement-NP}$

C) $(\text{definite-Det} + \text{Adj}_{label} + \text{singular-N}_{proper-name})_{subject-NP}$

D) $(\text{Adj}_{label} + \text{singular-N}_{proper-name})_{subject-NP}$

E) $(\text{plural-N}_{label})_{subject-NP}$

F) $(\text{definite-Det} + \text{Adj}_{label} + \text{plural-N})_{subject-NP}$

G) $(\text{definite-Det} + \text{plural-N}_{label})_{subject-NP}$

H) $(\text{Adj}_{label} + \text{plural-N})_{subject-NP}$

I) $(\text{indefinite-Det} + \text{Adj}_{label} + \text{singular-N})_{complement-NP}$

J) $(\text{definite-Det} + \text{Adj}_{label} + \text{singular-N} + \text{singular-N}_{proper-name})_{subject-NP}$

And for each cluster, the following questions were asked:

1. Which sentence is the most polite?

2. Are any of these sentences offensive, and if so, which ones?

3. Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about a friend, and if so, which ones?

4. Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about someone you know only slightly, and if so, which ones?

5. Are any of the questions grammatically wrong, and if so, which ones?

The sentences, and the clusters, were presented in random order. However, the questions were always presented in the same left–to–right order, with the question about grammaticality to the furthest right, in order to avoid priming participants about grammaticality judgements which might influence their views on the acceptability of the sentences (following Johnstone & Kiesling 2008).

At the end of the survey, the participants were asked for demographic data: gender, race/ethnicity, religious beliefs (if any), sexuality/sexual orientation, age, where they are from, and whether they would describe themselves as politically engaged.[7] The participants were asked to enter this information into free text boxes rather than selecting from a list, for all the demographic questions except for age (which had to be a numeric value), and political engagement (the participants selected "yes" or "no", but could fill in free text for a "yes" response). There was also an opportunity for participants to make general comments about the sentences if they wished, towards the end of the survey.

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[7]I use the terms *ethnicity/race*, *sexuality/sexual orientation*, and *religion/religious beliefs* as being interchangeable for each case, although this is not standard sociolinguistic practice. This is because, it is not clear that all lay speakers make consistent distinctions between, for example, race and ethnicity (Saul 2006); and speakers who do consistently make such a distinction may not make it along the same lines that linguists do.

The survey was distributed to undergraduates of the university through departmental mailing lists, as well as to politically-oriented student societies in order to recruit participants who were engaged in politics, as wells as participants who were not. The survey was also distributed through social media.[8]

This yielded 54 completed survey responses, with 120 acceptability judgements per participant, for a total of 6480 judgements.

The responses were coded for the social and intra-linguistic factors mentioned above. This way of coding does introduce some duplication: coding for grammatical pattern *and* a range of grammatical features means that some factor groups will not be independent of each other. However, I considered that it was worth the risk, as coding for grammatical pattern tracks only effects connected to each distinct syntactic construction, whereas coding for plurals and determiner presence tracks for similarities between grammatical patterns.

Coding for lexical cluster and the participants' demographic data constitutes double coding of a slightly different sort. One way for social factors to affect acceptability is for the lexical clusters to be judged differently because of their subject matter (Schultz 1975 argues this might play an important role in semantic derogation); but another way is for certain social groups to behave differently in their acceptability judgements. I coded for both of these possibilities.

The data was analysed using Rbrul, and the results are presented in the next section.

7 Results: Discourse Analysis

In this section, I shall examine 11 transcribed extracts from the focus group. The focus group consisted of three undergraduates recruited from undergraduate population of Edinburgh University. The given names used for the participants in the transcripts are, of course, pseudonyms.

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[8]Special thanks to the people who retweeted and shared the survey on Facebook and Twitter.

In many ways, the three participants seem to be demographically typical examples of the students who responded to the survey. Of the three participants, two were male (James and Gareth), and one was female (Laura). James and Gareth are Scottish, and Laura is English. Laura and James are both 20 years old, and Gareth is a mature student. All three participants are white. Gareth is religious and mentions attending church, but James is atheist and Laura has no religion. Of the three, one described themselves as bisexual, one as heterosexual, and one participant preferred not to say.

Overall, the discourse shows a great deal of latching and crosstalk, which is typically thought to be a supportive interaction behaviour. The transcription conventions are shown in Appendix II.

7.1 Lexicosyntactic features as vehicles for stance

7.1.1 Extract 1: "Depersonalising"

In this extract, Gareth and Laura are discussing sentence types C and D from the focus group sentence list given in Appendix I (note that the set of gramamtical patterns used in for the focus group does not correspond exactly to those used in the survey, so C and D mentioned here are not the same C and D from the survey!), for example, sentences such as *The Catholic, Edith, celebrates Christmas.*

((T=1:51))

31 Gareth: =if I was wanting to say C or D, I would say "Edith is a
32   Catholic, and she celebrates Christmas"=

33 Int: =Mm.=

34 Gareth: And I wouldn't, I wouldn't conflate Catholic and Edith.

((A few turns skipped))

41 Laura: The use of say "THE Catholic" or "THE emo", or

42   "THE lesbian", it sounds like you're just picking out

43   that quality of them?=

44   Gareth: Right.=

45   Laura: =And that's all that's important

46   Gareth: All that's important, yes.

        ((A few turns skipped))

57   Laura: Yeah.

58   And particularly the use of a demonstrative, sounds like

59   that's just how you would talk about them, like you- it's

60   almost like you're using that instead of a name, even

61   though you're using a name as well.

62   Int: Mm.

63   Laura: It's like, I wouldn't want anyone to refer to me like

64   "THE something".

65   It It sounds a little bit like a, I don't know.

66   It sounds slightly offensive, unless it was "THE

67   something really good", but if it was just "THE some

68   quality of me", it's a bit, deper- like depersonalising.

((T = 3:17))

In this extract, Laura and Gareth discuss the problems of isolating a single quality and "conflat[ing]" them with the person (line 34). Laura isolates elements of lexicosyntactic structure as contributing to an "offensive" (line 66) stance: "particularly the use of a demonstrative" in line 58. Laura goes on to say that it is the "depersonalising" aspect (line 68) of this construction that is offensive. Here Laura particularly isolates the definite determiner, which she repeatedly stresses in lines 41–42 and 64–67.

7.1.2 Extract 2: "[T]he connotations of calling someone emo"

((T= 11:02))

259	Laura:	I think, also, like, oddly, like, it's um 4B, the LACK of
260		demonstrative makes it sound a little bit more offensive
261		again? Like, rather than the other way round.
262		To say "something is emo" is a little more offensive than
263		to say "someone is an emo".
264	Int:	Hmm.
265		Ok.
266	Laura:	I'm not sure WHY.
267		Like it's the only one I think out of the entire group that
268		I would say it was that way round.
269	Int:	Right.
270	Laura:	I think.
271		Having read through them.
272		Cause like I said that like "is a gay" sounds more
273		offensive than "is gay".
274		And I'd say the same for most of them. But for some
275		reason, to say someone is emo? is more offensive.
276		I think possibly just because of the connotations of
277		calling someone emo.
278		Like sometimes you don't mean they're of that
279		subculture.
280		Sometimes you just mean that they're just WHIning a
281		bit and they need to shut up. So to say that someone is
282		an emo can't have that connotation, [but to say]
283	James:	[You- you mean] why emo can be used as an insult.

284   Laura: Yeah, right.

285   James: I think that's different.

286   Gareth: Every single one of them can be used [as]

287   James: [Ah YEAH], but emo more so I think, because I wouldn't

288   just go "oh you're Chinese", it would just be "and?"

289   Laura: Yeah, if someone if someone called me like Chinese it

290   wouldn't offend me at all.

291   If someone called me emo I would actually be a little be

292   upset, @so.

((T = 12:05))

Here again, Laura isolates an element of lexicosyntactic structure — this time
the "LACK of demonstrative" (line 259) — that makes a construction offensive,
rather than the presence of a demonstrative, which is the element discussed in
Extract 1.

Laura remark that "if someone called me Chinese it wouldn't offend me at all"
(line 290), together with James's hypothetical negotiation of "I wouldn't just go
"oh you're Chinese, it would just be "and?"" (lines 287–288) suggests that some
lexical items are more affect–laden than others: there is something specific to the
lexical significance of *emo*. This is good grounds to think that the lexical clusters
may behave differently with regard to acceptability judgements, and also with
regard to how affect–laden they can be.

7.1.3   Extract 3: "I was just taught not to"

((T = 3:29))

69   Gareth: I don't like "Harry is a Chinese".

70   James: Yeah. I think with [all the] nationality ones, I'm thinking.

71   Gareth: [That's].

72   Well I don't I don't MIND it with "a German", "a Jew",

73   "a Catholic", "a lesbian", "a Scot".

74   I'm a Scot and I don't mind myself being referred to

75   that way.

76   I don't like "a black".

77   Int: Mm.

78   James: Or "a gay" as well.

79   Laura: YEAH.

80   Gareth: Yes, "a gay". Same thing.

81   "A white" likewise.

82   But seem- seems fine with um, with "a German" or "a

83   Catholic".=

84   Int: =Mm.

85   Gareth: I think there's something specific about "Chinese".

86   You don't - (Hx), I don't know? I was just taught not

87   to, as a child?

88   But it it seems worse with Chinese, FAR worse with

89   Chinese than with German.=

         ((T = 4:28))

Here Gareth notes that nationality words do not necessarily pattern together in terms of their acceptability for the "*x is a [label]*" construction: "I'd happily say that "so-and-so is a German", but never DREAM of saying "Harry is a Chinese"", in lines (91–92), and compares "a Chinese" with "a gay", "a white", and "a black" (lines 76, 80, 81), but isolates "a Chinese" as having "something specific about" it (line 85).

This seems noteworthy in that *Chinese* is a sibilant-ending ethnonym which

belongs to Type III in Tuite's typology (1995), and Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's results would lead us to expect that using it in a singular construction would be considered ungrammatical (2006). But here the participants seem to regard it as comparable, but "FAR worse", than Type I ethnonyms such as *Germans.* This is good grounds to think that ungrammaticality and offensiveness may be proxies for each other in terms of how ordinary speakers perceive acceptability (cf Schütze 2010, Hall-Lew & Norcliffe 2006).

7.2   Plurals and grammaticality

7.2.1   Extract 4: "[N]atural plurals"

((T = 15:53))

358   Int: Are there any others that seem like grammatically not
359   acceptable?=

360   Gareth: =Yes, 3E.

361   Int: 3E.

362   Gareth: I wouldn't use "Chinese" as a plural count noun.

363   James: Mm, no I would- I would say 3E, actually. I think
364   "Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year" that, that's fine
365   for me.

366   Gareth: That's ok for you, is it?

367   James: Yeah

368   Gareth: Aha.

369   Laura: I I w- wouldn't say that.
370   I would say "the Chinese" [or] "Chi- Chinese [PEople]",
371   but I wouldn't just say "Chinese celebrate".

372   Gareth: [Yeah] [Yes]

373   Laura: For some reason, I don't know why.

374   Like grammatically it just doesn't sit right.

375   Gareth: It's um, you can say "Scots", you can say "Germans",

376   the words "Scot" and "German" used as nouns have

377   natural plurals.

378   Laura: Yeah.

379   Gareth: You can't say "Chineses".

380   Um, and I think it's the difficulty of making the word

381   "Chinese" plural.

382   Laura: I find even "Harry is a Chinese" a BIT off, to be honest.

383   Gareth: Yes.

384   James: Mm. That does seem a bit off.

            ((T = 16:55))

Here the participants isolate acceptability problems for *Chinese* depending on plurality. The singular and plural of *Chinese* are formally identical (Tuite 1995), but as the participants note, there may be constraints on usage for bare plurals. James finds the bare plural construction, *Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year*, acceptable (line 363), but Laura does not (lines 369–371) and she offers "the Chinese" or "Chinese people" as better alternatives, noting that "grammatically it just doesn't sit right" (line 374).

Conversely, for the singular, all three speakers seem to regard "Harry is a Chinese" — that is, the Type a singular nominal construction with an indefinite determiner — as being "a BIT off" (line 382). As in the previous extract, this is a construction that, according to Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's results, one would expect to be considered ungrammatical (2006); but the interviewer question

about grammaticality has been renegotiated to "off" in line 382 by Laura, so this is good grounds to think that there is a connection between ungrammaticality and offensiveness.

Gareth attributes these effects to the lack of a "natural plural" for *Chinese* (lines 377, 379–381), which he exemplifies with the impossibility of inflecting for number in line 379. Gareth is in fact incorrect about whether the word *Chinese* can be plural, — since Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's findings would seem to indicate that it is compulsory for *Chinese* to occur in plural constructions (2006). But Gareth is right to note that plurality may be relevant for *Chinese* which is a Type III ethnonym.

7.2.2   Extract 5: "You could use it to [identify him]"

((T = 21:16))

485   Gareth: You could use it to [identify him,]

486   Laura: [Mhm. Yeah]

487   Gareth: if there were two Toms, you could say "no no, I'm
488   talking about blind Tom".=

489   James: =[Yeah.]

490   Laura: =[Yeah] and like you could do the same possibly with
491   like black and white. Like if you have two friends called
492   Tom you could say "oh yeah, black Tom".

493   Gareth: Yeah.

494   Laura: But that would be with company that you knew quite
495   well.

496   James: [Yeah it's a bit of an insult]

497   Laura: [You you wouldn't use] that as the feature with people

498   you don't know

((T = 21:34))

Here the participants discuss under what circumstances it is appropriate to use constructions such as *Black Georgina celebrates Hogmanay*, and line 485 Gareth suggests that it could be used to "identify" a person, and then he and Laura repeat that this would be "if there were two Toms" (line 487) and "if you have two friends called Tom (line 491–492). Even used in the context they suggest, James, says that it is "a bit of an insult" (line 496) and so Laura emphasises that it would be for use with "company that you knew quite well" (lines 494 – 495), not "with people you don't know" (lines 497–498).

The picture we get here is that this construction is only suitable as contrastive (to "identify", line 485), when it is implicit in the context that there are multiple possibilities for the referent of the named individual.

7.3   Social kind construction and related language norms

The participants do seem to show a general preference for more economical options, as shown in this extract:

7.3.1   Extract 6: "Tautologous"

        ((T = 5:37))

118   Laura: I think 6B is a bit odd, saying "Charlotte is a lesbian
119   WOman".

120   James: Yeah, it's

121   Laura: Because, I think that's possibly

122   James: Yeah [what's the purpose]

123   Laura: [just superfluous]=

124   Gareth: =not necessary, it's tauto- tautologous=

125   James: =Yeah, the same with "THE lesbian women celebrate

126   Pride".

127   Laura: And I think if you were adding that extra thing in, it

128   almost sounds like you w- wouldn't understand a

129   hundred percent what lesbian meant?

             ((a few turns skipped))

138   Laura: It's as if that- the person who's saying "The Jewish

139   people" feels like they need to specify that Jewish people

140   ARE people?

             ((T = 6:43))

In this extract, the participants criticise lexicosyntactic constructions that they consider to be "superfluous" or "tautologous" (lines 123–124), in that they duplicate information that seems to already be lexically encoded ("if you were adding that extra thing in", line 127). Moreover, if one does specify unnecessary information, this marks the speaker as either not understanding ("almost sounds like you w- wouldn't understand a hundred percent", lines 128–129) the meaning of the label *lesbian* or *Jewish*, or as taking a particular stance relative to Jewishness ("It's as if the person who's saying "The Jewish people" feels like they need to specify that Jewish people ARE people?", line 140).

Curiously, Laura herself uses the construction "Jewish people" that she seems to be criticising in line 140.

7.3.2 Extract 7: "[Y]ou don't use that as the distinguishing feature"

             ((T = 21:34))

494   Laura: [You you wouldn't use] that as the feature with people

495   you don't know, and I think that co- that's VERY

496   obvious, like when people, like uh when you're you're

497   watching TV like when there's an audience? and they're

498   trying to pick people out they specifically don't say like

499   "the BLACK man". "Can I have a question from THE

500   BLACK man?"

501 James: =Or they'll like point out by your T-shirt or something.

502 Laura: Yeah it's like "the person with the white shirt."

503   There could be like THREE people with white shirts in

504   that area and they're all like "which one of us?" but

505   they're still not going to say

506 James: =Yeah it'll be more your hair, stuff like that

507 Laura: Yeah. Cause anything, any other feature, you don't use

508   that as the distinguishing feature.

      ((T = 22:08))

Despite the participants' apparent preference for less "superfluous" constructions, expressed in Extract 6, this extract suggests that in some cases, circumlocution is preferable (line 498), to avoid using race as "the distinguishing feature".

7.3.3 Extract 8: "[H]as […] connotations of race

Some of the lexical clusters are ambiguous with respect to social type: for example, it is unclear whether *Jew(ish)* is considered to be a race term or a religion term. In this extract, Laura and Gareth suggest that *Jew* is a race term, but *Jewish* is a religion term:

      ((T = 24:20))

563 Gareth: If if I were, if I were to convert to Judaism, I would say

564   "I'm now Jewish", but I wouldn't regard myself as one

565   of the Jewish people.

566   Int: Because– sorry why is that?

567   Gareth: Because the phrase "the Jewish people" has for me
568   connotations of race.

569   Int: Oh right I [see, ok.]

570   James: [I see.]

571   Laura: [Yeah]

572   Gareth: I've converted, I'm not one of THEM, I've merely
573   converted to their religion, is the way that I would see it.

574   Laura: And you also wouldn't say like "I'm a Jew", no, I don't
575   think.
576   I don't think I would.

577   James: No, "I'm Jewish" #

578   Laura: It'd be "I'm Jewish now" but you wouldn't say "I'm a
579   Jew now"=

580   Gareth: =Yeah.
581   That's right.=

582   Laura: =Because it sounds like, just doesn't sound like
583   something you could suddenly become.
584   It would just be like walking in and going "I'm black
585   now" and like I can't do that, it's not going to happen,
586   so.

((T = 25:04))

Here race is presented as immutable by Laura: "I can't do that, it's not going to happen", lines 580–581; and "just doesn't sound like something you could suddenly become" lines 582–583. By contrast, religion is presented as something

one can convert to (lines 563, 572). On Laura and Gareth's account, the race/religion distinction between *Jew* and *Jewish* is such that *a Jewish person* and *Jew(s)* could potentially have different referents, in the hypothetical case of someone who converts to Judaism (lines 563–564 and 575). Gareth explains that, were he to convert, this would make him Jewish, but not "one of the Jewish people" (lines 564–565) which Laura renegotiates to "a Jew" when she says that if she would not say "I'm a Jew" if she had converted, in lines 574 and repeats in line 578.

7.4 Double-barrelling

7.4.1 Extract 9: "Could just be describing"

((T = 4:45))

98   Laura: "is a GAY" sounds particularly offensive to me.

99   I think possibly because, when people have said that

100   around me like at, high school and stuff, they've

101   MEANT it in an offensive way?

102   James: [Yeah.]

103   Int: [Right]

104   Laura: So, like, to say like someone is gay, like it CAN be

105   offensive but it- you could also just be describing.

106   But to say someone is A gay, was almost always used

107   offensively.

((T=5:08))

Here Laura highlights the tension between the derogatory baggage (""a gay" sounds particularly offensive to me", line 98) and referential sense ("you could also just be describing", line 105) of *gay*. So it seems reasonable to consider *gay* to be a semantically "double-barreled" term (Zwicky 2003, p. 84): there is an affective component and a referential component and both are lexically encoded.

In Extract 2 above, double-barrelling also seems to be an important attribute of *emo*, in Laura's remark that if you call someone an emo, " sometimes you don't mean they're of that subculture. Sometimes you just mean that they're just whining a bit and they need to shut up" (lines 279–281). Laura also notes that some of the labels have more affective content than others, in that being called an emo is more offensive than being called, say, Chinese (lines 289–292). Similarly, in the next extract Laura discusses her reservations about *lesbian*.

7.4.2   Extract 10: "there's always that sort of FEEling"

((T = 15:16))

348   Laura: I would say maybe "you're a lesbian" but I don't think I
349   would say "you're a gay".
350   It just- even saying it just now out loud it feels a bit like
351   I'm doing something I shouldn't.
352   Cause I COULD be causing offense to someone.
353   But I think there is that like - there is just that whole
354   thing where people like use "gay" to mean something
355   REAlly negative for a LONG long time, so I think there's
356   always that sort of FEEling when you use the word.

((T = 15:43))

Here Laura remarks that *lesbian* and *gay* may always have a negative dimension to them (line 355), to the point that Laura reports concern about saying *lesbian* in the focus group setting (line 350). This suggests that, while the extent to which a term is offensive may vary in context, it may be that some semantically double-barrelled terms cannot ever be only referential and not affective.

7.4.3   Extract 11: "Jokingly insulting"

((T = 14:11))

326   Laura: Yeah, if I was joke- jokingly insulting someone, a friend, I

327   would definitely go with the A categories, on these like,

328   1A "Edith is a Catholic" sort of a thing like.

329   To say someone is "a something" is- is for some reason

330   a little bit more insulting

331   So I would use those with friends, but I wouldn't use

332   those with people I didn't know well.

333   And when I was using them with friends I would

334   probably be using them with the intention of being

335   jokingly insulting.

336   Int: Mm.

337   Laura: Although I don't think I would even say "you're a gay"

338   to one of my friends, particularly one who WAS actually

339   gay.=

340   James: =Yeah. Although I I w- would say, I think me and my

341   sister say that, to each other a lot, in jest. But if anyone

342   who's actually gay, you'd NEver say that to them.

         ((T = 14:55))

Here the "you're a gay" construction seems to have a default insulting reading,
but proximity might mitigate the insult and make it "jest" (line 341). However,
Laura and James both seem to suggest that the strategy is not available if the
addressee is "actually gay" (lines 339 and 341).[9]

A reasonable query is who is "actually gay", since in the discourse analytic
method, this should not be a-priori'ed. Cameron 1997 paper on men's

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[9]Caroline Heycock notes that this could be a social/pragmatic constraint associated with the
paucity of situations in which one would non-insultingly inform another person of their sexuality
or other demographic group membership. While this is a possibility, it does not seem a flaw
to the argument, since *You're a gay* seems to be available for jokingly insulting someone in a
way that *You're a jazz enthusiast* or *You're a young professional* does not. This would seem to
indicate that the double-barrelled property of *gay* is not solely due to the context of informing
someone else of their demographic membership. A tip of the hat to Caroline for helpful discussion
on this point.

homosocial gossip explores the connection between the disparaging sense and normative masculinity. In the extract she analyses, a group of young men describe a classmate as "that really gay guy" (p. 67) which is re-negotiated to "he's the antithesis of man". In another extract, "a real artsy, fartsy fag he's like (indeciph) he's so gay" sits next to a woman classmate, who is described as having "four homos hitting on her" (p. 69). Cameron points out (p. 66) that the criteria for the categorisation of people as "gay" or "homo" in the discourse is not necessarily straightforwards, since what we know about the romantic life of the supposed "homos" is that they "hit[ ] on" women, so it seems clear that "homo" in this case does not mean something like "someone whose sociopolitical identity is typically associated with experiencing attraction to people of the same gender", but rather something like "non-normatively masculine", since the interlocutors express other disapproval of the men in question by criticising their clothing, their presumed behaviours, their bodies, and the "ugliest-ass bitch" they are "hitting on" (p. 69).

Similarly, Zwicky 2003 seems to suggest that "faggot" means something like [+gay man, +disparaging] or [+gay man, -normatively masculine], although the disparaging dimension is not independent of the non-normatively masculinity dimension. However, the use of normative masculinity is not the only way in which *gay* can be disparaging. Another sense of *gay* is something like "inadequate" or "wrongheaded", not necessarily with any reference to masculinity. For example, the following sentences would be well-understood among my peers:

(7)   *East Enders* is gay — the plots are so boring; I much prefer *Doctor Who*.

This suggests a process of semantic derogation (Schulz 1975, Wong 2002): a process in which words become associated with people of lower social status and for that reason become derogatory. Schulz argues this with words that become associated with women in order to explain, for example, why words which ought

to be masculine and feminine counterparts, such as *master* and *mistress* have differ in their affective content (1975). Similarly, Wong argues that *tongzhi* has undergone a process of semantic derogation due to its use for and by Chinese lesbian and gay people (2002). It seems reasonable to posit that the English *gay* has undergone a similar process due to its association with homosexuality. This semantic derogation licenses its use as an insult.[10]

However, Laura and James note some tension between the insulting use and the "literal" use: "I don't think I would even say "you're a gay" to one of my friends, particularly one who WAS actually gay" (lines 337-337, and 342). The disparaging sense is invoked specifically in contrast to "actually gay" (lines 338 and 342). So the implication is that the disparaging sense is not the "actual" sense of *gay*.

Semantic derogation also explains why political instability might lead to linguistic instability: if a linguistic form becomes derogatory through association with a particular demographic group, the group may then seek a new linguistic form (although one would want to avoid a strongly Whorfian view of semantic change as being driven entirely by societal structure).

8   Results: Quantitative Analysis

In this section I will present the statistical analysis for each of the dependent variables in turn. Overall, the intralinguistic factor groups show some fairly consistent patterns although the social factor groups are more of a mixed bag. These trends will also be considered in more depth in the discussion in Section 9.

Throughout, percentages are accurate to one decimal place, and probabilities and

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[10]Ronnie Cann notes that the referential component and affective component could be homonyms, especially in a case like *gay*, where the affective component may appear in contexts where is seems to be bleached of its referential sense. While this is a possibility, it does not seem fatal to my argument since the affective form *can* occur with the referential form. It therefore seems more economical to explain this apparent–homonymy by pointing to semantic processes like reclamation and semantic derogation. Thanks to Ronnie for helpful discussion on this topic.

factor weights are accurate to three significant figures unless otherwise specified. I take the significance threshold to be $p \leq 0.05$.

8.1   A note on the sample and coding

Since participants self-selected to take part, it is important to note the demographics of the participants, and explain some of the coding and statistical decision that were made. Although Rbrul will run an analysis on singleton groups — a factor which consists of only one token or participant — it is generally considered better practice to remove or recode singleton factors as they cannot show evidence of variation according to that factor.

Because of this, some tokens had to be excluded from the statistical analysis. From the place factor group, participants from Switzerland, Australia, India, Trinidad and Tobago, or participants who had moved to the UK from other countries, and one participant who gave their place information as "earth", were all excluded; as these participants all resulted in singleton groups, and some of them constituted singleton groups in more than one factor group. From the political engagement factor group, I excluded a participant who described themself as independent, as this participant resulted in a singleton group. I also excluded a participant who described themself as a Liberal activist, as I could not be certain whether the participant was referring to the Liberal party (in which case they would have formed a singleton group), or a "small-L liberal", in which case they could have been recoded. However, I still discuss all these participants' responses as important data points for the discursive construction of the demographic categories, as described in Section 9, so their survey data was still highly valuable.

After excluding these participants from the statistical analysis, there remained a total of 5160 tokens from 43 participants, for use in the statistical analysis. The tables in this section give the demographic breakdown of the participants whose tokens were used in the statistical analysis, after recoding.

Gender

Of these 43 participants, 20 described themselves as female, one described herself as a woman, 21 described themselves as male, and one was genderqueer (as we shall see, gender turned out not to be significant, even after recoding attempted recoding, so I have left the singleton groups as is).

Gender	Number of Participants
Female or F	20
Woman	1
Genderqueer	1
Male or M	21
TOTAL	43

Table 2: Survey participants by gender

Sexuality/Sexual orientation

In terms of sexuality 28 of the 43 participants (65.1%) identified as straight or heterosexual, which is disproportionately low (one participant identified as "straight/het" and was recoded as straight as that was the best fit statistically); two participants answered "in a hetero-relationship currently" or answered "I don't" and were coded as "no label". One participant answered "other" and was coded with the queer participant as this was the best fit. The full breakdown by sexuality is shown in Table 3.

Sexuality	Number of Participants
Asexual	3
Bisexual	2
Gay	4
Lesbian	2
Queer/Other	2
Heterosexual	14
Straight	14
(no label)	2
Total	43

Table 3: Survey participants by sexuality

Age

Participants ranged in age from 17 to 64, but the sample is disproportionately biased towards younger adults. The median age was 25.5; and only 8 participants (18.6%) are over 40, compared to the 69.8% who are aged under 30. It is fair to say, therefore, that this is primarily a survey of young adults' judgements.

Place

Of the 43 participants, 34 of the participants (79.1%) were from the UK. Of these 34 participants, 19 were English, 10 were Scottish, and 4 did not specify. One participant from Northern Ireland was coded with the UK group as they would otherwise have been a singleton group, although I realise this is politically controversial. The full breakdown is given in Table 4. Prospective participants were asked to take part only if they were native speakers of English.

Place	Number of Participants
Canada	3
USA	6
England	19
Scotland	10
UK (not specified)	5
TOTAL	43

Table 4: Survey participants by place

Ethnicity/race

Due to the high number of singleton groups, it would have been impossible to include the ethnicity/race factor group without significant recoding. However, while it would have been possible to recode some of the white denominations together, it is unclear how to recode, for example, singleton factors like "Chinese" and "British Sudanese". Consequently, it was not possible to include to include ethnicity in the statistical analysis. However, I rely on the ethnicity/race data the participants gave as important data points for the discursive construction of the demographic categories, and there is a fuller discussion of this in Section 9.5.7.

Religion

In answer to the question "How would you describe your religion, if any?", nearly half (48.8%) replied that they had none. Another 20.9% said they were atheist and 9.3% said they were agnostic. Jointly these three groups constitute 79.1% of the participants, so it is fair to say that they are not, on the whole, a religious bunch. Three of the participants are Catholic, but of these two described themselves as "lapsed" or "not religious". Four participants were Protestant; some described themselves simply as "Protestant", but others gave a denomination, and these included Episcopalian and Church of England. Two participants were Jewish. One participant described themself as Quaker agnostic,

but as they formed a singleton group, they were recoded as agnostic.

Religion	Number of Participants
None	21
Atheist	9
Agnostic	4
Catholic	3
Protestant	4
Jewish	2
TOTAL	43

Table 5: Participants by religion

Political affiliation

Participants who did not describe themselves as being politically engaged were a slight majority at 53.5%, compared to the 46.5% of participants who did describe themselves as engaged. Participants who were politically engaged were disproportionately likely to describe their engagement in terms of alignment with socially progressive or left–of–center political parties (eg, the Green Party) or ideologies (eg, socialist, "small-L liberal"); or with causes that are often associated with social progressivism (eg, feminism, anti-militarism). Singleton categories that patterned together statistically were coded together as "broad left"; and a few participants detailed the type of engagement without a description of their political alignment, such as saying they "watch the news and debate with friends", for example, and these participants were recoded together with participants who described themselves as engaged but did not specify the type of engagement.

Political engagement	Number of Participants
None	23
Democrat	3
Labour Party	2
Green	2
Small-L liberal	4
Socialist	2
Broad left	4
Engaged (not otherwise specified)	4
TOTAL	43

Table 6: Participants by political engagement

8.2   Dependent variable: most polite

Politeness was measured by asking the participants "Which sentence is the most polite?". The significant factor groups for politeness were: grammatical pattern, friend use, acquaintance use, offensiveness, ungrammaticality, place, religion, sexuality, and political engagement. These are shown in the Table 7. Overall, the probability for this model was $p = 0.015$.

As one would expect, offensiveness and ungrammaticality both disfavour a politeness judgement, with offensive and ungrammatical sentences being judged polite only 1.9% and 2.4% of the time, respectively, which is near–categorical. Friend use and acquaintance use favour a politeness judgement and show a virtually identical pattern: since sentences judged appropriate for friend use are judged polite 33.5% of the time, and sentences judged appropriate for acquaintance use are judged polite 32.2% of the time, which is perhaps slightly lower than one might expect, although sentences judged not appropriate for friend use or acquaintance use are near–categorically not judged polite.

Of all the grammatical patterns, B $((\text{Adj}_{label})_{singular-complement-NP})$, is the most commonly judged as polite at 50.2%, and having a strongly favouring factor weight[11] of 0.907. The most strongly disfavoured patterns are patterns G, E, C, and D:

G) $(\text{definite-Det} + \text{plural-N}_{label})_{subject-NP}$

E) $(\text{plural-N}_{label})_{subject-NP}$

C) $(\text{definite-Det} + \text{Adj}_{label} + \text{singular-N}_{proper-name})_{subject-NP}$

D) $(\text{Adj}_{label} + \text{singular-N}_{proper-name})_{subject-NP}$

All four of these constructions are considered to be polite in less than 3% of cases and can all therefore be considered to be near–categorical non–polite constructions.

English participants (14.6%, factor weight = 0.680) were more likely to judge the sentences polite than Scottish participants (9.0%, factor weight = 0.299), who produced the least politeness judgements overall (although participants from the USA had the lowest factor weight at 0.241). Canadian participants were the most likely to judge a sentence as polite, with a favouring factor weight of 0.757.

The top age bracket patterns more closely to the youngest participants than to participants who are chronologically closer to them — in fact, the 17–22 group and the 54+ group differ by only 0.6 percentage points. It is unclear how this should be interpreted, since the correlation between decreased politeness judgements and age is weak ($R^2 = 0.03736$). It could be that the speakers in the two higher age brackets, which have fewer participants, are anomalous.

Atheist participants have the highest factor weight of 0.618, closely followed by participants who have no religion with 0.616, and agnostic participants are slightly lower at 0.589. However, there are several crossovers in this group, so

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[11]A factor weight, which is an probability scale between 0 and 1, is a measure of whether a factor favours or disfavours a particular feature. A factor weight of 0 disfavours the feature, 1 favours it, and 0.5 is neutral.

Graph showing politeness judgements by age

Figure 1: Showing politeness judgements by age

looking at the percentages, atheist participants pattern most closely with Catholic participants, who produced the most politeness judgements at 15.3%. Protestant participants produced the lowest number of politeness responses with only 9.6%, but disfavour the politeness rating, rather than patterning with agnostic participants who differed by only 0.2 percentage points.

The sexuality category is also something of a mixed bag with several crossovers. Participants in the queer/other group most favour politeness responses, with a strongly favouring factor weight of 0.933, but judged only 8.8% of the sentences polite. The most politeness judgements are given by heterosexual participants, at 16.2%, which is slightly favouring. Curiously, participants who identified themselves as straight do not pattern together with participants who identified themselves as heterosexual; the former return only 11.8% politeness judgements. Gay participants return the least politeness judgments, judging sentences as polite in only 7.3% of cases, and showing a slightly disfavouring factor weight of 0.413.

Political engagement also shows some crossovers, with Labour Party members producing the greatest percentage politeness responses with 19.2%, but

Figure 2: Showing politeness judgements by age

Democrats are the most favouring according to factor weight, with the strongly favouring factor weight of 0.841 (but the second–lowest percentage, with 9.2%). The lowest percentage is produced by the broad left group with 7.7%.

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
OFFENSIVE $(p = 1.83 \times 10^{-7})$	0	4169	15.0	0.653
	yes	991	1.9	0.347
FRIEND USE $(p = 0.0222)$	yes	1279	33.5	0.546
	0	3881	5.6	0.454
ACQUAINTANCE USE $(p = 2 \times 10^{-19})$	yes	1362	32.2	0.671
	0	3798	5.5	0.329
UNGRAMMATICAL $(p = 0.000429)$	0	4748	13.4	0.639
	yes	412	2.4	0.361
GRAMMATICAL PATTERN	B	516	50.2	0.907
	A	516	21.5	0.790
	I	516	21.7	0.711
	F	516	11.0	0.588

$(p = 1.96 \times 10^{-79})$

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
	H	516	7.0	0.475
	J	516	6.4	0.468
	G	516	2.9	0.309
	E	516	2.1	0.256
	C	516	1.4	0.229
	D	516	1.0	0.175
PLACE	Canada	360	16.9	0.757
	England	2280	14.6	0.680
$(p = 5.20 \times 10^{-21})$	UK (nos)[12]	600	12.7	0.526
	Scotland	1200	9.0	0.299
	USA	720	9.6	0.241
AGE	29–40	840	17.3	0.715
	23–28	1680	14.3	0.575
$(p = 7.98 \times 10^{-11})$	17–22	1680	10.2	0.544
	54+	240	10.8	0.463
	41–53	720	8.9	0.223
RELIGION	Atheist	1080	14.6	0.618
	None	2520	12.4	0.616
	Agnostic	480	9.8	0.589
$(p = 0.0419)$	Catholic	360	15.3	0.485
	Protestant	480	9.6	0.372
	Jewish	240	11.2	0.324
SEXUALITY	Other/Queer	240	8.8	0.933
	Lesbian	240	10.4	0.682
	Heterosexual	1680	16.2	0.593
	(No label)	240	14.6	0.516
$(p = 5.4 \times 10^{-17})$	Gay	480	7.3	0.413
	Straight	1680	11.8	0.398
	Bisexual	240	10.4	0.185
	Asexual	360	9.2	0.169
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT	Democrat	360	9.2	0.841
	Green	240	13.3	0.626
	Labour	240	19.2	0.588
	Small-L liberal	480	10.2	0.559
	None	2760	14.3	0.555
$(p = 8.1 \times 10^{-14})$	Broad left	480	7.7	0.525
	Engaged (nos)	360	8.3	0.213

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[12]Here and throughout, "nos" stands for "not otherwise specified".

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
	Socialist	240	10.0	0.143
OVERALL	Deviance	Degrees of freedom	Probability	R^2
	2475.837	41	0.015	0.453

Table 7   Factors constraining variation in politeness judgements, in reply to the question "Which sentence is the most polite?"

8.3   Dependent variable: offensiveness

Participants were asked for offensiveness judgements with the question "Are any of these sentences offensive, and if so, which ones?", and the factors constraining variation are shown in Table 8. The significant factor groups constraining their answers were: grammatical pattern, politeness, friend use, acquaintance use, place, age, religion, sexuality, and political engagement. The overall probability for the model is $p = 0.036$. Surprisingly, ungrammaticality is not significant for offensiveness ($p = 0.278$), although it is significant for politeness, friend use, and acquaintance use.

As one might expect, a politeness judgement, friend use judgement, and acquaintance use judgement all disfavour an offensiveness judgement. Only 2.9% of sentences judged polite, 2.0% of sentences reported for friend use, and 2.3% of sentences reported for acquaintance use, are judged as offensive (factor weights of 0.328, 0.287, and 0.334, respectively). These are all near–categorical.

However for sentences not judged polite, a surprisingly low percentage of only 21.5% are judged as offensive (factor weight = 0.672), which suggests that participants are making a distinction between a sentence that is non-polite and one that is offensive. Similarly, only 24.9% of sentences that are not judged as friend use, and 25.3% of sentences that are not judged as acquaintance use, are judged as offensive. It may be the case that participants distinguish between what is offensive and what they simply would not use.

Figure 3: Showing friend use and acquaintance use judgments by grammatical pattern

Grammatical pattern A (((indefinite-Det + singular-N$_{label}$)$_{complement-NP}$) most strongly favours an offensive response, with a factor weight of 0.756. But if ranked by percentages, the four patterns that all return more than 30% are the same four patterns that were least favoured in the politeness analysis, but in different order:

G) (definite-Det + plural-N$_{label}$)$_{subject-NP}$

D) (Adj$_{label}$ + singular-N$_{proper-name}$)$_{subject-NP}$

E) (plural-N$_{label}$) $_{subject-NP}$

C) (definite-Det + Adj$_{label}$ + singular-N$_{proper-name}$)$_{subject-NP}$

Grammatical pattern B ((Adj$_{label}$)$_{singular-complement-NP}$), which was the most favoured in the politeness analysis, is the penultimate one here, with the near–categorical 3.3% and a factor weight of 0.228. The most strongly

Figure 4: Showing friend use and acquaintance use judgments by grammatical pattern

disfavoured, and least selected pattern, is pattern I ((indefinite-Det+ Adj$_{label}$ + singular-N)$_{complement-NP}$).

English participants and Scottish participants returned very similar responses, with 18.1% and 18.5% offensive judgements respectively; but despite the difference of only 0.4 percentage points, Scottish participants returned the most disfavouring factor weight. Participants from the USA gave the most offensiveness judgements, judging 27.1% of the sentences to be offensive (factor weight = 0.825).

The results by age show a U–shaped curve with participants in the 41–54 group giving the fewest offensiveness judgements (3.5%); and participants in the youngest group judging 23.9% of the sentences offensive, and participants in the 54+ group returning the most offensiveness judgements at 50.8%. There is an

overall trend of offensiveness judgements increasing with age, but the correlation is weak ($R^2 = 0.1143$). However, the 54+ group has only two participants, so it could be an anomalous point in a trend of decreasing offensive judgements as age increases.

The results by religion present a similar picture to the politeness results by religion; and again, there are some crossovers. Catholic participants most strongly favoured offensive judgements with a factor weight of 0.935, but judge only 17.8% of the sentences offensive. As with the politeness analysis, Catholic participants pattern closely with atheist participants, with only 0.3 percentage points difference between them; these two groups return fewest offensiveness judgements. Protestant participants and participants with no religion both judged 20.0% of sentences offensive, making them the two groups to return the most offensiveness judgements.

Sexuality presents almost the reverse picture from the politeness analysis. Participants in the lesbian and other/queer groups were the most favouring of offensiveness judgement with factor weights of 0.896 and 0.752 respectively (participants who described themselves as other or queer returned the highest percentage of offensiveness judgement responses at 37.5%), but were also the two groups most favouring of politeness judgements. Here, gay participants were the least favouring with only 13.3% offensiveness judgements, and a factor weight of 0.176. Straight and heterosexual participants patterned differently with heterosexual participants producing 23.3% of offensiveness judgements, and straight participants producing just over half as many with 12.6%.

Political engagement also has some crossover categories. Participants in the engaged–(not otherwise specified) category most favoured offensiveness judgements, with a factor weight of 0.819 and Labour members were the most disfavouring group with a factor weight of 0.272. The broad left group returned the lowest percentage at 9.6%.

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
MOST POLITE $(p = 4.35 \times 10^{-8})$	0	4514	21.5	0.672
	yes	646	2.9	0.328
FRIEND USE $(p = 6.48 \times 10^{-16})$	0	3881	24.9	0.713
	yes	1279	2.0	0.287
ACQUAINTANCE USE $(p = 1.01 \times 10^{-11})$	0	3798	25.3	0.666
	yes	1362	2.3	0.334
GRAMMATICAL PATTERN	A	516	25.0	0.756
	G	516	32.8	0.736
	D	516	33.7	0.732
	E	516	30.8	0.712
	C	516	32.8	0.691
	H	516	11.6	0.403
$(p = 2.46 \times 10^{-76})$	F	516	10.1	0.351
	J	516	8.9	0.269
	B	516	3.3	0.228
	I	516	3.1	0.161
PLACE	USA	720	27.1	0.825
	England	2280	18.1	0.599
	Canada	360	16.7	0.376
$(p = 8.22 \times 10^{-32})$	UK (nos)	600	17.0	0.364
	Scotland	1200	18.5	0.29
AGE	54+	240	50.8	0.963
	17–22	1680	23.9	0.688
	23–28	1680	19.5	0.644
$(p = 1.38 \times 10^{-113})$	29–40	840	13.7	0.308
	41–53	720	3.5	0.021
RELIGION	Catholic	360	17.8	0.935
	Protestant	480	19.6	0.515
	None	2520	20.0	0.388
$(p = 6.06 \times 10^{-19})$	Atheist	1080	17.5	0.366
	Jewish	240	20.0	0.320
	Agnostic	480	19.2	0.274
SEXUALITY	Lesbian	240	0.212	0.896
	Other/Queer	240	37.5	0.752
	(no label)	240	27.5	0.455
	Heterosexual	1680	23.3	0.450
$(p = 1.98 \times 10^{-22})$	Asexual	360	18.9	0.428
	Bisexual	240	20.0	0.374
	Straight	1680	12.6	0.370

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
	Gay	480	13. 3	0.176
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT	Engaged (nos)	360	29.4	0.819
	Green	240	22.9	0.747
	Small-L liberal	480	15.4	0.507
	Broad-left	480	9. 6	0.476
$(p = 1.38 \times 10^{-6})$	Socialist	240	15.4	0.449
	None	2760	18.2	0.384
	Democrat	360	30.0	0.297
	Labour	240	26. 2	0.272
OVERALL	Deviance	Degrees of freedom	Probability	R^2
	3286.859	40	0.036	0.463

Table 8 Factors constraining variation in offensiveness judgements, in reply to the question "Are any of these sentences offensive, and if so, which ones?"

8.4   Dependent variable: friend use

Participants were asked "Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about a friend, and if so, which ones?", and the resulting data is recorded in Table 9 as friend use. The significant factor groups for friend use were: lexical cluster, grammatical pattern, politeness, acquaintance use, offensiveness, ungrammaticality, place, age, religion, sexuality, and political engagement. Overall, the model fit for this variable was significant with $p = 0.043$ and shows a strong correlation with $R^2 = 0.747$.

Friend use is the only dependent variable for which cluster is a significant factor group ($p = 0.000282$). All of the clusters show the same behaviour, except for the *black* cluster which disfavours friend use with a factor weight of 0.391, and only 15.8% of *black* cluster sentences were judged suitable for friend use, compared to the other clusters which have a factor weight of 0.609 and are judged suitable for friend us in 25.6% of cases.

Sentences that are considered polite return a high percentage of friend use

judgements at 66.4%, but this is only marginally favouring with a factor weight of 0.559. Unsurprisingly, however, sentences judged offensive are hardly ever judged suitable for friend use, with the near–categorical percentage of 2.6%. Also unsurprising is that sentences considered to be ungrammatical were hardly ever considered to be suitable for friend use, with a near–categorical 3.2% (factor weight $= 0.269$).

Acquaintance use is the strongest predictor of friend use ($p = 4.82 \times 10^{-279}$), and 73.1% of sentences which are considered to be suitable for acquaintance use are also judged suitable for friend use, yielding the strongly favouring factor weight of 0.887.

Grammatical patterns, B ((Adj_{label})$_{singular-complement-NP}$) was judged suitable for friend use in 69.4% of cases and was the most strongly favoured grammatical pattern (factor weight $= 0.907$). The second–most selected pattern, pattern I trails nearly 20 percentage points behind (50.0%, factor weight $= 0.748$); and the second–most favoured pattern which was pattern A trails nearly 30 percentage points behind(39.7%, factor weight $= 0.811$). The most disfavoured pattern was pattern C ((definite-Det + Adj_{label} + singular-$\text{N}_{proper-name}$)$_{subject-NP}$) with the near–categorical 2.5% and a factor weight of 0.158. Pattern C was also among the most disfavoured patterns for the politeness variable and most favoured for the offensiveness variable.

Scottish participants returned the most friend use judgements at 29.8% (factor weight of 0.612); English students (23.3%, factor weight of 0.403) were less likely to consider a sentence suitable for friend use than Scottish students. Participants from the USA returned a friend use judgement on 22.5% of sentences, and patterned closely to Canadian participants for this variable, with only 0.3 percentage points' difference between the two groups.

Friend use judgments increase with age, and the correlation is strong compared to the other dependent variables ($R^2 = 0.83347$). However, the factor weights

present a different picture, with speakers aged 23–28 and 29–40 disfavouring friend use judgements (factor weights of 0.398 and 0.217 respectively), the youngest speakers almost neutral (0.513), and speakers in the 54+ and 41–53 groups favouring friend use judgments. This mixed evidence will be assessed in more detain in the discussion in Section 9.

The pattern by religion is very similar to that seen in the politeness analysis, with Catholic and atheist participants producing the most friend use judgements at 29.7% and 30.3% respectively (factor weights of 0.864, and 0.540 respectively). Agnostic participants most disfavouring friend use judgements (factor weight = 0.150) and Protestant participants return the least friend use judgements with 18.1%.

Straight and heterosexual participants pattern differently, with straight participants returning 30.6% friend use judgements, and heterosexual participants returning 25.5% friend use judgements. The other/queer group shows the lowest friend use judgements at 11.7%, as in the politeness analysis. Lesbian participants pattern very differently from gay and bisexual participants at 28.3% whereas the three groups had patterned similarly in the politeness analysis.

Labour party members return the most friend use judgements at 29.2% who had also returned the most politeness judgements). They are followed closely by unengaged participants (28.9%). Democrats are the most strongly disfavouring of friend use judgements (10.6%, factor weight of 0.062), followed by green participants (15.4%, factor weight of 0.238).

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
CLUSTER ($p = 0.000282$)	(All others)	4730	25.6	0.609
	Black	430	15.8	0.391
MOST POLITE ($p = 0.00355$)	yes	646	66.4	0.559
	0	4514	18.8	0.441
OFFENSIVE ($p = 2.8 \times 10^{-13}$)	0	4169	30.1	0.708
	yes	991	2.6	0.292
ACQUAINTANCE USE	yes	1362	76.6	0.887

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
$(p = 4.82 \times 10^{-279})$	0	3798	6.2	0.113
UNGRAMMATICAL	0	4748	26.7	0.731
$(p = 3.74 \times 10^{-11})$	yes	412	3.2	0.269
GRAMMATICAL	B	516	69.4	0.907
PATTERN	A	516	39.7	0.811
	I	516	50.0	0.748
	D	516	9.7	0.528
	F	516	22.1	0.389
$(p = 6.74 \times 10^{-80})$	E	516	11.8	0.387
	G	516	11.8	0.357
	H	516	18.8	0.347
	J	516	12.0	0.245
	C	516	2.5	0.158
PLACE	Canada	360	22.8	0.619
	Scotland	1200	29.8	0.612
$(p = 3.26 \times 10^{-10})$	USA	720	22.5	0.607
	England	2280	23.3	0.403
	UK (nos)	600	24.3	0.272
AGE	41–53	720	26.7	0.725
	54+	240	30.8	0.647
$(p = 3.31 \times 10^{-12})$	17–22	1680	21.5	0.531
	23–28	1680	24.5	0.398
	29–40	840	28.6	0.217
RELIGION	Catholic	360	29.7	0.864
	Jewish	240	25.0	0.843
	Atheist	1080	30.3	0.540
$(p = 3.77 \times 10^{-17})$	None	2520	23.9	0.379
	Protestant	480	18.1	0.187
	Agnostic	480	20.0	0.150
SEXUALITY	(no label)	240	35.0	0.961
	Lesbian	240	28.3	0.774
	Asexual	360	19.2	0.644
	Straight	1680	30.6	0.607
$(p = 8.86 \times 10^{-26})$	Heterosexual	1680	25.5	0.461
	Bisexual	240	12.5	0.243
	Gay	480	11.9	0.200
	Other/Queer	240	11.7	0.058
POLITICAL	Engaged (nos)	360	25.6	0.859
ENGAGEMENT	Labour	240	29.2	0.767

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
$(p = 3.02 \times 10^{-15})$	None	2760	28.9	0.723
	Socialist	240	25.0	0.642
	Broad left	480	18.8	0.448
	Small-L liberal	480	19.6	0.388
	Green	240	15.4	0.238
	Democrat	360	10.6	0.062
OVERALL	Deviance	Degrees of freedom	Probability	R^2
	2167.996	42	0.043	0.747

Table 9 Factors constraining variation in friend use judgements, in reply to the question "Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about a friend, and if so, which ones?""

8.5   Dependent variable: acquaintance use

The significant factor groups for acquaintance use were: grammatical pattern, politeness, offensiveness, ungrammaticality, religion, sexuality, and political engagement. The overall model is significant with $p = 0.029$. Unlike the dependent variables we have seen so far, place and age were not significant; and although friend use was a significant predictor (and its inclusion decreased the deviance and increased the R^2 value, suggesting an overall better fit model), I have removed it as the two variables appear to be strongly co-linear (81.5% of sentences that were judged suitable for friend use were also judged suitable for acquaintance use and only 8.2% of sentences that were not judged suitable for friend use were judged suitable for acquaintance use); and its inclusion would have raised the probability above the acceptable threshold.

As with the friend use analysis, a politeness judgement response favours an acquaintance use judgement with a factor weight of 0.673: 67.8% of sentences that were judged polite were judged suitable for acquaintance use. But curiously, 20.5% of sentences that are not judged polite are judged suitable for acquaintance use.

Unsurprisingly, sentences judged offensive are nearly categorically not judged usable for acquaintances, returning only 3.2% (factor weight = 0.256), but only 31.9% of sentences that are not judged offensive are judged suitable for acquaintance use (factor weight =0.744). Similarly, sentences that were considered ungrammatical also return the near–categorical 3.6% for acquaintance use (factor weight = 0.251), but bizarrely, only 28.4% of sentences that were not considered ungrammatical are considered suitable for acquaintance use (factor weight = 0.749).

Of the grammatical patterns, B $((\text{Adj}_{label})_{singular-complement-NP}$ is the most favoured with a factor weight of 0.788 and judged suitable for acquaintance use in 60.1% of cases; followed by pattern I $((\text{indefinite-Det}+ \text{Adj}_{label} + \text{singular-N})_{complement-NP})$ which is judged suitable for acquaintance use in 48.1% of cases (factor weight of 0.726); patterns B and I were also the two most favoured patterns for friend use. The least used pattern is pattern C (definite-Det + Adj_{label} + $\text{singular-N}_{proper-name})_{subject-NP}$, at only 5.4% and with a disfavouring factor weight of 0.210; which is also comparable to its ranking in the friend use analysis.

The pattern by religion is somewhat different from what we have seen so far. Catholic and atheist participants do not pattern together, and they return relatively few acquaintance use judgements at 21.1% and 29.2% respectively (but their factor weights are close, at 0.112 for Catholic participants, and 0.101 for atheist participants). Here, it is Protestant and Jewish participants who pattern most closely with 40.8% (factor weight = 0.995) and 35.4% (factor weight =0.968) acquaintance use judgements, respectively.

The pattern by sexuality is somewhat different from that for the other variables. This time straight participants and heterosexual do pattern similarly 29.5% (factor weight = 0.877) and 25.7% (factor weight = 0.849) respectively. Lesbian, gay, and bisexual participants also pattern together, unlike in the friend use.

Political engagement patterns very similarly for this variable to the patterns in the friend use analysis. In both analyses, Democrats and green participants are the most strongly disfavouring (here, the factor weight is 0.057 for Democrats, and 0.129 for green participants). The broad left participants return the lowest percentage of acquaintance use, with only 11.2%. Labour party members and unengaged participants return the highest acquaintance use judgements at 28.8% and 31.9% respectively.

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
MOST POLITE $(p = 3.44 \times 10^{-36})$	yes	646	67.8	0.673
	0	4514	20.5	0.327
OFFENSIVE $(p = 1.79 \times 10^{-42})$	0	4169	31.9	0.744
	yes	991	3.2	0.256
UNGRAMMATICAL $(p = 1.84 \times 10^{-21})$	0	4748	28.4	0.749
	yes	412	3.6	0.251
GRAMMATICAL PATTERN $(p = 8.25 \times 10^{-63})$	B	516	60.1	0.788
	I	516	48.1	0.726
	A	516	34.1	0.673
	F	516	29.1	0.527
	H	516	26.2	0.506
	J	516	21.9	0.445
	G	516	15.7	0.419
	E	516	14.5	0.416
	D	516	8.9	0.284
	C	516	5.4	0.210
RELIGION $(p = 2.52 \times 10^{-86})$	Protestant	480	40.8	0.995
	Jewish	240	35.4	0.968
	Catholic	360	21.1	0.112
	None	2520	23.3	0.110
	Atheist	1080	29.2	0.101
	Agnostic	480	21.5	0.080
SEXUALITY $(p = 1.29 \times 10^{-79})$	(no label)	240	33.8	0.993
	Straight	1680	29.5	0.877
	Heterosexual	1680	25.7	0.849
	Atheist	360	21.1	0.828
	Bisexual	240	21.7	0.791
	Lesbian	240	20.8	0.042
	Gay	480	22.3	0.018

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
	Other/Queer	240	28.8	0.012
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT	Engaged (nos)	360	23.9	0.853
	None	2760	31.9	0.816
	Small-L liberal	480	24.2	0.783
	Broad left	480	11.2	0.682
$(p = 1.95 \times 10^{-76})$	Labour	240	28.8	0.499
	Socialist	240	24.6	0.360
	Green	240	14.6	0.129
	Democrat	360	17.2	0.057
	Deviance	Degrees of freedom	Probability	R^2
OVERALL				
	3996.67	32	0.029	0.461

Table 10   Factors constraining variation in acquaintance use judgements, in reply to the question "Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about someone you know only slightly, and if so, which ones?"

8.6   Dependent variable: ungrammaticality

The significant factor groups for ungrammaticality were: grammatical pattern, lexical class, politeness, most polite, friend use, acquaintance use, place, age, religion, and political engagement. The overall probability for the model is $p = 0.010$, which is well below the significance threshold, although of all the dependent variable models it shows the weakest correlation.

As one would expect, most of the factors return low percentages compared to the other dependent variables. So while for the other dependent variables, seeing so many factors return counts less than 10% might be cause for concern, here it is not (although it perhaps does explain the low R^2 value) — one expects ungrammaticality judgements to be rare with the set of sentences that have been presented.

Unsurprisingly, sentences which are considered to be polite, suitable for friend use, or suitable for acquaintance use are all near–categorically not considered to

be ungrammatical, at 1.5%, 1.0%, and 1.1% respectively.

Three of the grammatical patterns show strikingly high propensity to be judged ungrammatical; these are patterns C((definite-Det + Adj$_{label}$ + singular-N$_{proper-name}$)$_{subject-NP}$) at 24.0%, A ((indefinite-Det + singular-N$_{label}$)$_{complement-NP}$) at 16.1%, and D ((Adj$_{label}$ + singular-N$_{proper-name}$)$_{subject-NP}$) at 12.4%. Of these, A and C both have strongly favouring factor weights of 0.831 and 0.826 respectively, with D at the slightly lower but still favouring 0.678. Four patterns seem to be near–categorical, returning counts of less than 5.0%, these were patterns G (4.8%), I (1.0%), H (1.2%), and F (1.0%).

Lexical class is significant only for this dependent variable. The Type III ethnonym (*Chinese*) clocks a high level of ungrammaticality judgements at 17.2% and a factor weight of 0.695, followed after a wide margin by Type I ethnonyms (*German, Jew, Scot*). Type II ethnonyms (eg, *Scottish, Jewish*) were the most grammatically acceptable according to the percentage count, but the factor weight of 0.473 is close to neutral. Type 0 is the category for non-ethnonym labels that have the same formal properties as Type I ethnonyms (eg *vegetarian*, *emo*), and unsurprisingly, they behave similarly.

Scottish and Canadian participants were the most likely to consider sentences ungrammatical, producing ungrammaticality judgements 13.3% (factor weight = 0.628) and 13.9% (factor weight = 0.687) of the time, respectively. Participants from the USA were the least likely to consider the sentences ungrammatical, producing ungrammaticality judgements in 4.0% of cases, which is near–categorical. English participants are only slightly more likely to consider the sentences ungrammatical, at 5.8%.

It is difficult to draw conclusions based on age as some of the percentages are near–categorical, but this again seems to be a U-shaped curve, with the participants in the 54+ group (who judged sentences ungrammatical in 12.1%of

cases) behaving most like the participants in 17–22 group (who judged sentences ungrammatical in 10.5 % of cases), rather than like the participants who are chronologically closest to them. This does not look like a change over time, since the line of best fit is nearly level, and the correlation is extremely weak ($R^2 = 0.00319$). This U–shaped curve is much more characteristic of age–grading.

Catholic and Jewish participants were most likely to consider one of the sentences to be ungrammatical, at 13.1% (factor weight = 0.815) and 10.4% (factor weight = 0.756). Participants who described themselves as having no religion, atheist, or agnostic, pattern closely together; with all three groups returning percentages at 8.1% or lower, and disfavouring factor weights.

Participants who fall into the engaged (not otherwise specified) category returned the highest levels of ungrammaticality judgements, at 13.3% (factor weight = 0.772), followed by Labour Party members at 10.0% (factor weight = 0.652), and participants who were not politically engaged at 9.7% (factor weight = 0.679). Democrats and broad left participants were near–categorical non-users of ungrammaticality judgements at only 3.3% (factor weight = 0.228) and 1.0% respectively (factor weight = 0.086).

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
MOST POLITE ($p = 7.63 \times 10^{-5}$)	0	4514	8.9	0.657
	yes	646	1.5	0.343
FRIEND USE ($p = 9.37 \times 10^{-13}$)	0	3881	10.3	0.733
	yes	1279	1.0	0.267
ACQUAINTANCE USE ($p = 0.000143$)	0	3798	10.5	0.631
	yes	1362	1.1	0.369
GRAMMATICAL PATTERN	A	516	16.1	0.831
	C	516	24.0	0.826
	B	516	5.8	0.750
	D	516	12.4	0.678
	E	516	8.5	0.572
($p = 4.03 \times 10^{-58}$)	J	516	5.0	0.437
	G	516	4.8	0.422

Factor group	Factor	Tokens	Percentage	Factor weight
	I	516	1.0	0.217
	H	516	1.2	0.161
	F	516	1.0	0.143
LEXICAL CLASS	Type III	430	17.2	0.695
	Type II	516	4.1	0.473
$(p = 4.96 \times 10^{-10})$	Type I	1634	9.2	0.431
	(Type 0)	2580	6.5	0.393
PLACE	Canada	360	13.9	0.687
	Scotland	1200	13.3	0.628
$(p = 1.25 \times 10^{-10})$	UK (nos)	600	6.8	0.427
	England	2280	5.8	0.400
	USA	720	4.0	0.352
AGE	54+	240	12.1	0.669
	17–22	1680	10.5	0.665
$(p = 2.42 \times 10^{-11})$	23–28	1680	7.1	0.522
	41–53	720	2.6	0.385
	29–40	840	8.2	0.266
RELIGION	Catholic	360	13.1	0.815
	Jewish	240	10.4	0.756
	Protestant	480	7.1	0.436
$(p = 2.16 \times 10^{-13})$	Atheist	1080	6.7	0.372
	None	2520	8.1	0.307
	Agnostic	480	6.0	0.266
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT	Socialist	240	5.4	0.790
	Engaged (nos)	360	13.3	0.772
	None	2760	9.7	0.679
	Labour	240	10.0	0.652
	Green	240	5.8	0.581
$(p = 1.42 \times 10^{-24})$	Small-L liberal	480	5.6	0.341
	Democrat	360	3.3	0.228
	Broad left	480	1.0	0.086
OVERALL	Deviance	Degrees of freedom	Probability	R^2
	2001.078	36	0.010	0.364

Table 11   Factors constraining variation in friend use judgements, in reply to the question "Can you imagine using any of these sentences to talk about a friend, and if so, which ones?""

9 Discussion

9.1 The dependent variables

Although ungrammaticality is not a significant factor group for offensiveness, ($p = 0.278$), ungrammatical sentences are judged to be offensive in 37.6% of cases, and the focus group participants give discursive evidence that grammatically anomalous sentence seem "off" to them in Extract 4. It is unclear why participants would consider ungrammatical sentences to be offensive, rather than value–neutral, but this is in keeping with Schütze's (2010) observation that lay speakers' grammaticality judgements may be influenced by pragmatic factors, and Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's finding that ungrammaticality and offensiveness may be proxies for one another to some extent (2006).

Politeness, friend use, and acquaintance use are all strong predictors for each other. Offensiveness and ungrammaticality seem to correlate negatively with these three, as one might expect. The non-independence of the variables suggests that they are multicolinear. However, it seems that participants distinguish between what is not polite and what is offensive, since only 15.0% of sentences that are not judged offensive are judged polite. It also seems that many participants do distinguish between friend use and acquaintance use, since some factors patterned differently between the two groups, and notably, lexical cluster is significant for friend use but not for acquaintance use.

9.2 Distal and proximal use

In order to claim evidence of distal use — forms that mark social distance — one would expect to see a notable difference between forms that are judged suitable for friend use, and forms that are judged suitable for acquaintance use. The evidence for this is somewhat mixed.

The predictors for friend use and the predictors for acquaintance use are extremely similar, and acquaintance use is an extremely strong predictor for

friend use ($p = 4.82 \times 10^{-279}$) suggesting that participants are treating them similarly. However, if friend use and acquaintance use are plotted against grammatical pattern, there appears to be some interaction. Notably, grammatical pattern F appears to behave differently in the friend use and acquaintance use environment; it is only rarely judged suitable for friend use (11.9% of cases are judged suitable for friend use), but it is judged as suitable for acquaintance use in 29.1% of cases. It is possible, therefore, that pattern F is specifically associated with social distance uses, and not with social proximity. This is tentative, at best.

Figure 5: Showing friend use and acquaintance use judgments by grammatical pattern

Figure 6: Showing friend use and aquaintance use judgments by grammatical pattern

In the discourse evidence from Extract 11, participants do note that forms that would ordinarily be offensive can be suitable for use with people they are close to, suggesting that some forms can mark social proximity in particular contexts. However, there is not enough statistical evidence to generalise this observation, since, according to the statistical analysis, offensive forms are almost categorically not judged suitable for friend use — only 2.6% of offensive sentences are judged suitable for friend use.

9.3   Zero response

The responses for the politeness, friend use, acquaintance use, offensiveness, and ungrammaticality factor groups were tallied by, for each sentences a participant was shown, considering whether the participant had selected the sentence for one (or more) of the five judgement types. I use the term "zero response" for when a

sentence was not selected.

There is a high rate of zero response for all the dependent variables, and a number of participants remarked that they simply would not use the options on offer. Some of the survey responses exemplify this sentiment:

> "[T]here wasn't an option of ""I wouldn't say this"" not that I find it offensive, or necessarily polite, just that I would never say it."
> [Response 24][13]

> "[M]any of the sentences, while grammatically correct, are quite forced and would never occur in real life. I can't imagine the circumstances when I would say 'The Xs go to the library' or 'X Bob goes to the library' for any X. Not because such sentences are necessarily offensive, they're just odd things to say." [Response 59]

> "What about a category ""Would never say this!""" [Response 142]

The three participants above all report that there are some sentences they simply would not say, even though they are not necessarily offensive. This is consistent with Schütze's observation that ordinary speakers do not necessarily make a bivalent distinction between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" sentences, but rather may view acceptability as a spectrum, with some sentences being best described as "not ones that I would say" but neither "ungrammatical" nor fully acceptable.

It seems possible, therefore, this is not an anomalous result, but rather suggestive of participants treating options as something approaching an ordinal scale,

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[13]Here and in all quotes from written responses, I have kept kept the participants' original spelling, capitalisation, and punctuation in quotes. This is partly because non-standard usage sometimes conveys differences in meaning and affective content and also to preserve the original "flavour" of participants' comments, as one would with a conversation analysis or discourse analysis transcription.

ranging from offensive' or ungrammatical (or both simultaneously) to polite, with friend use and acquaintance use and zero responses somewhere in the middle. However, it is not entirely clear that all the participants conceptualise the ordinal scale in the same way, and indeed it is not clear that all the participants have approached the task as an ordinal task. For example, some participants have only marked sentences as either polite or offensive, not selecting any other options, and never selecting more than one option at a time; suggesting that they regard the options as bivalent rather than as a spectrum. Additionally, even assuming some participants had approached the task as ordinal, it is not at all clear what they consider to be at the two extremes — some participants have marked nearly all the sentences they considered to be offensive as also being ungrammatical, whereas other participants have treated grammaticality and offensiveness more independently, so it is unclear whether the extreme should be taken to be offensiveness, or ungrammaticality, or offensive *and* ungrammatical. For these reasons I have treated the data as ratio data rather than ordinal data.

Some participants also reported that they would not use certain sentences except in very particular contexts, such as in the comment below:

> "There are some phrases I just wouldn't say in general, but in a specific context, I might say them. For example, I would tend not to use the term ""white"" to describe someone, but if I knew that the other person in the conversation was talking about two different Janets and was in a hurry, she might say ""is it white Janet or black Janet?"". Knowing she is not using the term in a derogatory way, but just as a quick shorthand, I would resist the term, but might just find myself saying ""black Janet"" even though it would not sit well or be my choice." [Response65]

In such a case, zero response does not appear to be indicative of an ordinal approach to the questions, but rather a reaction to "a specific context" and

whether accommodation is appropriate in that context: that is, a decision as to whether to "resist the term" or use it "even though it would not sit well or be [her] choice".

Some participants also reported discomfort with the use of demographic labels, either for certain demographic groups, or for particular contexts, as a reason for zero-response:

> "With the exception of those that were offensive, I didn't think I would use the sentences involving going to the library because I felt that in such cases, the adjectives: lesbian, gay, black, white, chinese, protestant, catholic etc were simply not relevant information."
> [Response 182]

> "Typically, I would not use racial or cultural qualifiers unless it was relevant to the discussion." [Response 196]

Here, as in Response 65, there seems to be requirement for the identity label to be "relevant" in the context, and the absence of obvious relevance seems to render a sentence unusable. Response 185 below explains how relevance might affect usage:

> "[I]t's not clear whether the context is 'a group of gay students are headed to the library now' or 'gay students often frequent the library'. This makes a difference in usage, since the first is an observation ('the jewish students have left synagogue and are going to the library') and the second is a generalisation and thus liable to stereotyping ('those nerdy chinese kids hang around in libraries all the time'). [Response 185]

While the participant does not say whether there is affective difference between her observation case and her generalisation case, or which one she considers more

acceptable, she does does note that it "makes a difference in usage". Some speakers have strong taboos against both generalisations and stereotyping, or may not make a distinction between the two, particularly for certain social characteristics (eg, race).[14] Because of this usage difference, there was a risk that, if the sentences were highly stereotyped, participants' responses might be due to whether or not they recognised the stereotype and thought it acceptable to stereotype, as well as to the factors currently in play. For that reason, I attempted to make the sentences as neutral as possible with respect to stereotyping; this introduces the risk that the sentences will be judged unacceptable because the identity labels are not "relevant", as response 182 and 196 show, but it was important to control for the stereotyping effect. However, the manipulation of stereotype versus generalisation might be an important direction for future research.

9.4 Grammatical patterns

Pattern B ($(\text{sing adj}_{label})_{complNP}$)is consistently selected as a preferred pattern, as shown by its by it being the most commonly selected pattern for the politeness variable (50.2% polite judgement responses, factor weight of 0.907), and the most strongly favoured pattern for friend use (69.4% friend use judgement responses, factor weight of 0.907) and acquaintance use (60.1% acquaintance use judgement responses, factor weight of 0.788). This shows a strong positive association with politeness and suitability for use. A negative association with unsuitability can also be seen in pattern B being very rarely selected as offensive (3.3% offensive judgement responses, factor weight of 0.228) or ungrammatical (5.8% ungrammaticality judgement responses).

Pattern I ($(\text{indef det}+ \text{adj}_{label} + \text{sing N})_{complNP}$) shows a very similar pattern. It

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[14]In my own schooling in the South of the USA, which to some extent remains de facto segregated in education, it was strongly inculcated in young children that *any* statement about a racial group was racist. This included factual claims such as "This is a majority–white school", and, *to an equal extent*, factually inaccurate and negatively biased descriptions of majority–black schools as violent. In other words, the language ideology that I was then taught did not distinguish race–based generalisations from stereotypes.

is the second most commonly selected construction for the politeness variable (21.7%), the friend use variable (50.0%), and the acquaintance use variable (48.1%); showing a positive association with politeness and suitability for use. It's negative correlation with unsuitability for use is extremely strong — indeed it seems to be almost invariant, and is selected on only 1.0% of cases as ungrammatical, and is the least selected factor for the offensiveness variable, at only 3.1%.

By contrast, pattern A ($($indef det $+$ sing $N_{label})_{complNP}$) appears to have a positive correlation with both suitability and unsuitability for use. It is selected 21.5% of the time as the most polite option (behaving much like pattern I); 39.7% of the time for friend use, and 34.1% of the time for acquaintance use, consistently ranking as the third most used pattern after patterns B and I for these variables. However, it is also the most favoured option for ungrammaticality (factor weight of 0.831) and for offensiveness (factor weight of 0.756).

Patterns C, D, E, and G all return near–categorically low percentages in the politeness and acquaintance use analyses, and the four lowest percentages in the friend use analysis. This suggests that they are either invariant, or have a strong negative correlation with suitability for use. The latter interpretation is reinforced by these four patterns returning the four highest percentages in the offensiveness analysis. Of these four patterns, all except C return relatively low percentages for ungrammaticality judgements, but C returns a 24.0%, the second highest percentage for that variable.

Patterns F, H, and J all pattern closely together. They return low percentages for politeness (11.0%, 7.0%, 6.4%, respectively), middling scores for friend use (22.1%, 18.8%, 12.0%, respectively), and middling scores again for acquaintance use (29.1%, 26.2%, 21.9%, respectively). They also return near–categorically low percentages for ungrammaticality, and relatively low percentages for offensiveness (10.1%, 11.6%, 8.9%, respectively). It may be that these patterns simply are not commonly used by the participants.

Most of the grammatical patterns are judged similarly for friend use and acquaintance use, but a few are judged differently. Notably, pattern F shows a dramatic difference between the two: it judged as suitable for friend use in 11.9% of cases, which is relatively low, but suitable for acquaintance use in 29.1% of cases — nearly three times as often. No other pattern shows such a dramatic change between the two contexts. It is possible, therefore, that pattern F is specifically associated with social distance.

9.5   Cluster

Cluster is only significant in the friend use analysis, where it has a probability of $p = 0.000282$. The *black* cluster is selected for friend use suitability in only 15.8% of cases, whereas the other clusters are selected in 25.6% of cases.

In the discourse section, participants select certain constructions containing "black" as being unacceptable, because of grammatical constraints (in line 76 of the transcript, Gareth remarks that "a black" is not acceptable for him), but also because of ideologies about using race as a distinguishing feature (see Extract 7). If cluster is plotted against grammatical pattern, it because clear that patten A shows a much greater disparity by cluster than the other grammatical patterns do.

The unacceptability of x *is a black* compared to other pattern A constructions may explain provide at least a partial explanation for the *black* cluster patterning differently from other clusters.

9.6   Lexical class

This factor group is only significant for the ungrammaticality variable. *Chinese*, which is the Type III ethnonym receives the highest levels of ungrammaticality judgements. Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's results (2006) should lead us to expect singular constructions (that is, patterns A, B, C, D, I, and J) to be more likely to be considered ungrammatical.

If lexical class and grammatical pattern are cross-tabulated, *Chinese* shows much

higher ungrammaticality judgements than the other lexical classes for grammatical patterns A, C, and E:

A) (indefinite-Det + singular-N$_{label}$)$_{complement-NP}$

C) (definite-Det + Adj$_{label}$ + singular-N$_{proper-name}$)$_{subject-NP}$

E) (plural-N$_{label}$) $_{subject-NP}$

Patterns A and C are singular constructions, and the ungrammaticality judgements for *Harry is a Chinese* and *The Chinese Harry goes to the library* fit with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's findings (2006) and with what the participants reported in the focus group. They report that *Chinese Harry* can be used as contrastive, to distinguish two Harrys, but is not permissible if one only knows one person called Harry (see Extract 5) — this probably also explains the slightly elevated ungrammaticality levels for all the lexical classes for pattern D. Hall-Lew and Norcliffe found that non-adjectival Type II and III ethnonyms "gain[ed] acceptability as the number approaches a 'mass'–like, non-individuating quantity" (2006, p. 22), and since *Harry is a Chinese* is highly individuating, this explains the the high ungrammaticality rating.

Pattern E, however, is plural and "non-individuating" (Hall-Lew & Norcliffe 2006, p. 22), but does not fit with the expected pattern from Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's findings. It seems, therefore, that the Type III ethnonym requires a determiner in its plural nominal form. Because there is only one Type III ethnonym in the sentence list, it is impossible to tell for certain whether this property is specific to the lexeme *Chinese*, or whether it is a property of the whole Type III class.

Patterns B, I, and J, which are all also singular, do not show a notable difference between the behaviour of the Type II and III ethnonyms and Type I ethnonyms (although pattern B shows a difference between ethnonyms and non-ethnonyms). However, pattern B (x *is [label]*) is consistently selected as the most polite pattern, and since grammaticality and politeness are connected, this may explain why it is not considered to be ungrammatical. Patterns I and J show

near–categorically low levels of ungrammaticality judgements for all the formal classes, and are among the patterns that do not seem to show much variation overall, and I posited that they might be less ideologically–laden; however, it still is strange that patterns that seem to be less ideologically laden would be less likely to be considered ungrammatical.

For all patterns except pattern D Type II ethnonyms otherwise pattern closely with Type I ethnonyms and non-ethnonyms (marked as Type 0); although this is not consistent with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's findings (2006), it is not unexpected since both of the Type II ethnonyms used here — *Jewish* and *Scottish* — also appeared in their Type I forms *Jew* and *Scot*, although patterning by cluster was not significant for these two lexemes overall.

Overall, these results show some correlation with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's findings, but there are some inconsistencies too. Tuite's original claim that Type III ethnonyms have a formally identical singular and plural (1995); and that Type II ethnonyms can be used as collective plurals only, seem insufficient to explain this pattern; since there does seem to be evidence that both Type II and Type III ethnonyms can be used politely and grammatically with pattern B in the singular, and grammatically if not politely with patterns I and J.

9.7   Grammatical category, plurality, determiner presence

None of grammatical category, plurality, determiner presence were significant for any dependent variable. It may be that none of these can successfully convey stance on their own, and that it is crucial to stance that it is conveyed by *clusters* of linguistic resources (Moore & Podesva 2009, p. 448, make a similar point about style).

9.8   Sociolinguistic factors

Place, and political engagement are non-independent, due to the place-specificity of political affiliation. So only North American participants describe themselves

as Hispanic (a category that does not appear to be very salient in the UK), only British participants describe their political engagement in terms of Scottish Green Party membership, or indeed as the following:

"Non–partisan but liberal, as in left not as in the Liberal
Democrats— I hate them with a deep and burning passion"
[Response 164]

9.8.1   Place

Figure 7: Showing acceptability judgements by place and context

Place is significant for all the dependent variables except for acquaintance use.

On the whole, Scottish and English participants pattern differently for most of the dependent variables, but converge on offensive judgements. North American participants also pattern differently, but converge on friend use.

Participants from the USA may have perceived the sentences as overall more offensive (but not more ungrammatical) than other speakers, since they returned least politeness and friend use judgements, but the most offensiveness judgements. Canadian participants seem to show the least affective responses towards the sentence, since their responses show relatively little variation between contexts compared to the other participants, on the figure, the line for Canda, shown in purple, is relatively flat compared to the sharp peaks for Scotland, England, and the USA. It may be that the sentences were more stance–conducing for participants from Scotland, England, and the USA, but this is highly tentative, and would need to be much more rigorously tested with a sample that is more balanced by place.

9.8.2   Religion

Participants who described themselves as atheist, agnostic or as having no religion follow a similar pattern for all the dependent variables, converging for offensiveness and ungrammaticality. Catholic participants patterned more closely to atheist participants than they did to Protestant participants; and Jewish participants patterned closely with Protestant participants. As two of the three of Catholic participants were, in their own words, "somewhat lapsed" or "not religious", this split between the behaviour of Protestant and Catholic participants might reflect a difference between religiously practicing and non-practicing participants, rather than between Catholic and Protestant speakers, but there is insufficient data to tell (this data is based on small groups of speakers), and these possibilities should be taken as highly speculative.

It would therefore be interesting to see whether active involvement in a religious community (as opposed to merely having a religious affiliation) influences the results that people might give. That is, whether, someone who considers religious or secular affiliation and involvement, including perhaps involvement in secular Humanism or radical atheism (as popularised by Richard Dawkins) to be a major component of their life, produces substantially different results from people who

Figure 8: Showing acceptability judgements by religion and context

consider religious involvement or background to be minor components of their lives, or those who consider secularity to be a major component to their lives.

9.8.3   Sexuality

Of all the sexuality groups, the other/queer group returns far more offensiveness judgements; so they may be perceiving the sentences as worse overall, since they produce very few friend use and politeness judgements; alternatively, as they show the greatest difference between their politeness judgements and offensiveness judgements (28.7 percentage points, compared to only 0.8 percentage points for straight participants), the sentences may be more stance–conducing for them than for other participants. Like bisexual and gay

Figure 9: Showing acceptability judgements by sexuality and context

participants, the other/queer group show an S-shaped curve: they give few politeness and friend use judgements, but rather higher levels of acquaintance use and offensive judgements. This is unexpected, since acquaintance use and friend use are strongly non-independent, and one would expect to see similar levels of use reported for both friend use and acquaintance use.

Lesbian participants show almost the opposite pattern to gay and bisexual participants: they give relatively high friend use judgements, but lower acquaintance use judgments; again, this is unexpected.

If straight participants and heterosexual participants are compared to each other, with the other participants taken out of the equation and compared directly to each other, we see that the pattern differently, and that the difference is significant ($\chi^2 = 73.9$, degrees of freedom $= 3$, $p = 0.000$ to 3 decimal places). It is unclear why straight participants and heterosexual participants pattern differently.

Figure 10: Showing friend use and aquaintance use judgments by grammatical pattern

9.8.4 Political engagement

Political engagement is something of a mixed bag in terms of results; the factor group is significant for all the dependent variables but it is difficult to draw conclusions about clear trends.

Nearly all the engagement groups show fewer politeness judgements than friend use, but green participants and Democrats show little difference between the two. Four of the eight groups (Labour, engaged not otherwise specified, socialist, and green) show little difference between friend use judgements and acquaintance use judgements; Democrats, small-L liberals, and participants who are not engaged all return more acquaintance use judgements than friend use judgements, and an even higher percentage of offensiveness judgements than acquaintance use judgements.

Figure 11: Showing acceptability judgements by political engagement and context

There does appear to some interaction between engagement and grammatical pattern: when the dependent variables are cross-tabulated against grammatical pattern and grouped according to political engagement, we see that Labour is an produces far higher politeness, friend use, and acquaintance use judgements for pattern I, and relatively high ungrammaticality judgements for pattern G.

It would be interesting to see the survey repeated with participants who described themselves as being actively involved in, for example, racial justice or queer/LGBTQIAetc rights campaigns, since such campaigns often have extensive language ideologies about how one ought to speak (or not) about particular social groups.

9.8.5   Age

For a change in progress, one would expect to see an S–shaped curve when a dependent variable is plotted against age; whereas age–grading patterns typically show high use of a feature in younger and older speakers. However, due to low

numbers of participants in the higher age brackets, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions about variation according to age, since the very highest bracket which contains only two participants, could be anomalous.

Politeness shows a steady increase for the first three age groups, but then lower percentages for the higher age groups — it is unclear whether this is anomalous or due to age grade. Friend use shows an upward trend as age increases, and could be said to show the S-shaped curves with respect to age that would be expected for a change in progress. Offensiveness seems to show a downward trend as age increases, apart from the highest age bracket. This last point could be anomalous, or it could be that this variable is age–graded, and not a change in progress. Ungrammaticality also shows the U-shaped curve more commonly associated with age–grading.

There does not therefore appear to be adequate evidence for a change in progress, but a larger sample that is more balanced with respect to age will be needed to test this.

9.8.6 Ethnicity/race

It was not possible to include ethnicity/race in the statistical analysis due to the number of singleton groups that could not be collapsed or recoded. However, the discursive construction of ethnicity/race may affect usage, and for that reason, I will comment on construction briefly here.

Participants were asked "How would you describe your race/ethnicity?", and many participants responded with terms that were nationality–focused such as "Scottish", "British", or "Chinese". Eight of 54 participants[15] (14.8%) gave their ethnicity/race in these purely nationality–focused terms, and a further 16 participants (29.6%) giving a combination of color + nationality terms such as "White Scottish" or "White Southern English". Nine participants (16.7%) give

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[15] For the discussion of ethnicity/race, I will consider also those responses that had been excluded from the statistical analysis, since my focus here is discursive construction, not statistics. For this reason, the number of participants is given as 54, not 43.

Figure 12: Showing acceptability judgements by age and context

their race/ethnicity in ancestry terms (eg, "Euro-American", "Caucasian", "Hispanic"), and 16 (29.6%) use only colour terms ("white"). A few other types of description are used – a full list is given in 12.

The focus group participants described a usage distinction between *Jew* and *Jewish* in terms of a difference between race and religion (Extract 8). While it is impossible to gather statistical evidence on whether this is a widespread usage distinction, it may be noteworthy that one participant gave their race/ethnicity information as "White/Jewish", suggesting that for at least some speakers, Jewishness can be an ethnicity, although another Jewish participant gave their race/ethnicity as "British", so the view of Jewishness as an ethnicity is not necessarily universal.

These subtleties in the construction of ethnicity/race mean that language ideologies about which attributes are appropriate to use as distinguishing features

in Extract 7, may be affected by ambiguous cases, such as whether *Jew(ish)* is considered to be an ethnicity/race term or a religion term (see Extract 8), or whether *Chinese* and *Scottish* are ethnicity/race terms or nationality terms. For that matter, since several of the participants use nationality–focused terms as ethnicity/race terms, so *German* could potentially be ambiguous in this respect too.

Further work would be required to draw any conclusions from this data, but there seems to be some evidence to tentatively suggest that construction affects usage, so this seems a valuable direction for future work.

Nationality–focused terms:
British Sudanese
Greek/ English
Chinese
British
Indian
Scottish
Canadian with Spanish background (parents are from Spain)[16]

Color + Nationality–focused terms:
White British
white british
white (british)
White/UK
white/british
White Irish
White Scottish
White English
White Southern English
White American

Ancestry–focused terms:
Euro-American
European
Caucasian
Caucasion

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[16]It is unclear whether this should be classed with nationality–focused terms or ancestry–focused, as it has properties of both.

caucasian
Hispanic
Mixed black, white and Indian

Color terms:
White
white

Other terms:
White/Jewish
unwanted priviledge
I wouldn't, but am usually pigeonholed in surveys to
    ""caucasion"" or ""white"" or ""other"" if the only choice
    is ""White British"" or ""Black British""

Table 12   List of ethnicity/race terms used by survey partic-
ipants in response to the question "How would you describe
your race/ethnicity?"

9.8.7   Inter-speaker variation

It was not possible to include inter-speaker variation in the statistical analysis.

9.8.8   Gender

Gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables. This is in keeping
with Hall-Lew and Norcliffe's finding that there was no apparent difference by sex
for either politeness or gramamticality judgements (2006, p. 19).

9.9   Problematisation of labels

Several participants seem to resist "naive" demographic categorisation. For
example, in reply to the question "How would you describe your sexuality/sexual
orientation?" the following replies do not fall comfortably within the dominant
narrative of everyone having a sexual orientation that is stable over time and
according to which they can be categorised:

    "I don't" [Response 38]

"Other" [Response 187]

Similarly for ethnicity; in reply to the question "How would you describe your race/ethnicity?", one participant replied,

> "I wouldn't, but am usually pigeonholed in surveys to ""caucasion"" or ""white"" or ""other"" if the only choice is ""White British"" or ""Black British"" " [Response 65]

And in reply to the question "How would you describe your religion, if any?":

> Tricky one. ""Theist"" is the most straightforward, but doesn't really fall into any ""religion"" as it tends to be defined. Not Christian. Tricky. [Response 65]

Cameron and Kulick's critique (2003) of relying on broad identity groupings such as *bisexual* and *lesbian* is therefore directly relevant, as at least a few participants do not seem to claim these labels for themselves when given a choice. Even if such participants represented a small proportion of the total group of participants, they had a disproportionate effect on the statistical analysis and methodology: coding such responses for use with Rbrul turned out to be a tricky balance between ethnographic and statistical responsibility. On the one hand, ethnographic and and ethical concerns require me to take seriously the terms that participants use for themselves; on the other, coding such responses for the statistical analysis raised a number of questions as to whether to treat such responses as singleton groups in the statistical analysis, or recode them together with other responses (and whether this would constitute the "pigeonholing" from Response 65)

It might please these participants to know, therefore, that they raise a number of methodological questions, since there is a large extent to which regression

modelling depends on speakers being categorisable into the factor groups that are then used in the statistical analysis. I would not wish to discount statistical methods entirely (quite the contrary!); but it may be that linguists must always be prepared to combine statistical analysis with discursive methods, or must consider more carefully how to gather demographic data for statistical analysis.

While some of these response were integrated into the statistical analysis, they are also worth examining in purely discursive terms. Compared to whom or what is the participant who wrote response 187 "Other"? Response 38 runs contrary to the dominant discourse in most Anglo-European culture that everyone has a sexuality/sexual orientation that is broadly categorisable in terms such as *heterosexual*, *bisexual*, *gay*, etc. While this amount of data is not sufficient to make the kind of shift in focus from identity to social construction that Kulick & Cameron advocate (2003), nor is it clear how that would work for a project such as this one which is specifically about the lexicosyntactic and pragmatic properties of identity labels, it is worth noting the effect nonetheless, as it suggests that a number of lay speakers are actively engaged in problematising identity labels.

9.10   Evidence for reclamatory use?

There is no robust evidence for reclamatory use in the statistical analysis, since offensive sentences are only judged suitable for friend use in 2.0% of cases, which is near–categorically. However, this may be due to limitations of the survey method: it is that it is difficult to know how a speaker would judge a sentence they believed to be reclamatory, and whether the correct test really is to look to offensive sentences that are suitable for friend use, or whether a better measurement would be whether someone would use a traditionally–offensive term of themselves (if referentially accurate), rather than whether they would use an offensive term for a friend. I had opted not to ask participants if they would use the terms for themselves, since this might require a counterfactual conditional ("if you were a member of this social group, would you use this sentence about yourself?" and I was concerned this might be confusing. However, it may be that

this is the only way to gather the relevant data for statistical purposes.

There is some discursive evidence for reclaiming, however. One survey participant did indicate in the free text option that:

> "As a Jewish lesbian, I feel I should point out that I have a personal
> pet hate of being referred to as 'the Jews' when out with other
> Jewish people. But, that frequently myself and my LGBTQIAP
> friends will refer to our group of friends as 'the gays'."
> [Response 164]

This suggests that the participant finds it acceptable in certain circumstances to use a construction that is otherwise offensive, about themselves.

This is not robust evidence for reclaiming however, and it seems that this methodology is not ideally suited to collected the relevant data.

9.11   Explanatory adequacy

Having raised questions about what would constitute explanatory adequacy, it would be more than little methodologically question–begging to accept the statistical analysis results as connecting straightforwardly with stances that speakers orient to in interaction. To some extent, I accept the "cheat" that if lay speakers explicitly take particular features to be orienting to particular attitudes, then it is acceptable for linguists to do so in analyses, and the discourse from the focus group does show a striking correspondence to the findings of the statistical analysis. However, there are also points of difference. And in particular, there are affect–laden points from the discourse that cannot be explained from the statistical analysis, such as Laura's remark that certain forms are "depersonalising" in Extract 1. Stance research has attempted to map frequencies and statistical results to social significance. In this case, seeking to map the statistical results in this case to their social significance of "depersonalis[ation]" would not be a departure from standard practice in stance

research, but it is unclear whether the standard practice provides adequate explanation.

9.12 Hypotheses revisited

It is now possible to revisit the hypotheses, and consider whether they should be accepted or rejected.

My hypotheses, each with its corresponding H_0 formulation, are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: I expect to see consistent, and statistically significant, association between intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements

H_{0_1}*: There will be no statistically significant pattern in participants' identification of intra-linguistic features and acceptability judgements.*

Hypothesis 2: I expect intra-linguistic features that are identified as polite not to be identified as offensive and vice-versa; and for intra-linguistic features that are identified as polite to also be selected for friend use and acquaintance use.

H_{0_2}*: There will be no statistically significant relationship between intra-linguistic features that are judged as polite, and how those features are judged for offensiveness, friend use, and acquaintance use.*

Grammatical pattern is a significant factor group for all the dependent variables, and shows consistent acceptability patterns across the five dependent variables, as discussed above. The H_{0_1} and H_{0_2} and can therefore be rejected, as the evidence seems to confirm Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3: I expect to see evidence of linguistic features being used to mark social distance: that is, consistent, and statistically significant, distinctions between intra-linguistic features that are judged as being suitable for friend use and those judged as being suitable for acquaintance use in the statistical analysis, and reports of differential use for friends and acquaintances in the discourse analysis.

H_{0_3}: *There will be no evidence of a significant relationship between intra-linguistic features and social distance, in either the statistical analysis or the discourse analysis.*

The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. As discussed above, there is some evidence for distal use, but it is unclear how robust this data is. There is discourse evidence for proximal use in the form of focus group participants saying that they would use forms that would ordinarily be considered offensive if they were speaking with someone they are close to, but there is no statistical evidence to support generalising this observation.

In other words, there appears to be discursive evidence, but not statistical evidence, for proximal use; and statistical, but not discursive, evidence for distal use.

Hypothesis 4: I expect to see a statistically significant correlation between number and politeness or ungrammaticality judgements for labels that belong to the Type II (*Jewish, Scottish*) and Type III (*Chinese*) formal lexical classes.
H_{0_4}: *There will be no statistically significant correlation according to formal lexical class and number.*

The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. Formal lexical class is significant for ungrammaticality, and some singular individuating constructions with Type II and III ethnonyms are judged ungrammatical to a greater extent than in plural constructions or with Type I ethnonyms, but there appears to be interaction with other factors.

10   What is the status of stance–commitments? The semantic-pragmatic distinction, and "what is said"

The discourse in Section 6 shows that ordinary language users have strong intuitions that speakers are expressing commitments in using certain kinds of lexicosyntactic constructions. However, it is not clear what the status of these stance commitments are, and whether they should be thought of as semantic or pragmatic content. In this section, I will explore whether we should consider stance–commitments to be semantic commitments, or pragmatic discourse strategies, and how they should be classified with regard to the Gricean dichotomy between "what is said" and "what is implicated" or inferred (Grice 1989, pp. 24-25).

The semantic–pragmatic distinction is a fixture of linguistics literature, although many accounts have sought to problematise a strict demarcation. The semantic–pragmatic distinction has been described in terms of:

- "what is said" versus "what is is implicated" or inferred (Grice 1989 pp. 24-25)
- "literal" meaning versus use (Bach, No Date; Grice 1989; and others)
- truth conditional content versus non-truth conditional content (Bach, No Date; Grice 1989; and others)
- conceptual versus procedural content (Blakemore 1992; Wilson 2010)

However, it is not at all clear that all of these distinctions are isomorphic to each other. In particular, Steedman and Petrick (2007) argue that, strictly speaking, *all* utterances require inference; and in fairness, it should be noted that nearly all neo-Griceans acknowledge "pragmatic intrusion" (Horn 2006) in the decoding of utterances, but on Steedman and Petrick's view, "pragmatic intrusion" is the same cognitive process as the inference required for conversational implicature, and so the two are reducible (2007). On this view, it is not clear how we should

interpret the "what is said" versus "what is implicated" distinction, since these seem to be reducible categories, but we might still want to retain a special category for inferences that are calculable, or that seem to be part of lexical significance. McConnell-Ginet's work (2002, 2006, 2008) also problematises the "literal" versus use distinction as we shall see in section 8, by arguing for discursive history to be considered part of a word's semantics.

Relevance-theoretic approaches such as that of Diane Blakemore (1992) and Deidre Wilson (2010) have proposed that some lexical items — especially discourse connectives — may serve to orient interlocutors to a particular argument; that is, the content expressed by such lexical items is procedural, not conceptual. I have not adopted a relevance-theoretic approach here, and for reasons of brevity will not explore all these debates fully. However, it should be noted that relevance-theoretic approaches problematise the relationship between semantics and truth-conditional content.

In the next chapters, I will argue that stance–commitments may problematise an attempt to maintain a strict demarcation between semantics and pragmatics (cf. Bach, No Date).[17] In particular, I will argue that stance–commitments do contribute to "what is said", and do contribute to lexical significance. In this section, I will explore conventional implicatures, and why these are not appropriate ways to think about stance–commitments.

10.1 Conventional implicatures

We might think that stance–commitments are conventional implicatures (henceforth, CIs), because lay speakers have a strong intuition that some forms are insulting by default, sometimes even regardless of the context.

Grice defines CIs as implicatures that arise because of the conventionalised meaning of an expression, and which are not truth-conditional (1989, p. 25), and gives the example

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[17]Hat tip to Ronnie Cann for helpful comments on this section.

(8)   He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (1989, p. 25.)

However, later approaches have generally considered cases like *therefore* to be truth-conditional, rather than CIs — that is, if bravery is not connected to Englishness, then Grice's example seems to be false, rather than simply infelicitous.

Consequently, Potts considers (2003, 2005) that many of the cases that Grice considered CIs are in fact truth-conditional, but that certain classes of expressions might still be CIs. In particular, he considers parentheticals and expressives, and it is this latter class that is relevant here. However, it is worth noting that the class of expressives[18] Potts considers are "contentless", such as *damn* and *lovely* — that is, they serve only to express affect.

Following Potts (2003, 2005), one could argue that CIs express stance. For example (from Potts 2005, p. 7), the following sentence expresses a negative stance towards lawn-mowing

(9)   I have to mow the damn lawn.

Potts argues that if someone said (2) and did like mowing the lawn, one would not respond by saying "that's not true!", and this shows that the negative stance is not part of the truth-conditions of the sentence. However, he does note that this negative stance is a commitment of sorts, as one would be unwise to respond to the speaker by telling them that they really do love lawn-mowing.

However, we might reasonably question Potts's claims with regard to the challengeability of sentences containing CIs. Potts seems to be correct in the intuition that challenging the truth or falsity of a sentence containing high affect terms seems pragmatically problematic. For example, if we take *the gays* as expressing a negative stance — following the discourse evidence in Section 6 —

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[18]Although Potts speaks of *expressive content*, and other linguists and philosophers of language speak of *affective content*, I assume that any difference between these terms is negligible.

none of speaker B's responses are highly problematic if they are attempts to contradict speaker A's negative stance.

(10)   A: The gays are having a Pride march.

       B: (i) #That's not true!

           (ii) #They're not gay!

           (iii) #No they aren't!

We should note that the objection presented here is a different one from that noted by Donnellan 1966, Strawson 1950, and others who note that the "that's not true!" diagnostic does not apply in cases of where an ordinary referring expression simply fails. So it would be perfectly acceptable to say:

(11)   A: The gays are having a Pride march.

       B: (i)   No they aren't — it's actually an impromptu folk music festival.

           (ii) That's not true — they couldn't get Council permission this year.

I should be noted that in these examples what is challenged is the whether or not the referent set of *the gays* are in fact having a Pride march, not speaker A's stance.

However, there does not appear to be anything wrong with challenging the stance that a speaker is committed to, rather than the truth-value. Potts seems to be conflating the pragmatic unacceptability of "that's not true!" with utterances that are pragmatically acceptable but possibly interactionally dispreferred because of politeness norms, expectations of formality or informality, attention to face, or similar concerns. If speaker B thinks that speaker A is not in fact anti-gay, then the following examples all seem to be pragmatically and semantically acceptable, although in certain contexts they might be

face-threatening or inappropriately formal/informal:

(12)   A: The gays are having a Pride march.
       B: (i)   But you're not anti-gay.
            (ii)   I don't think that's an appropriate way to speak.
            (iii) Dude, not cool.

This suggests that the problem with the "that's not true!" diagnostic is not one of presupposition (cf Strawson 1950 and others) or of attributive uses (cf Donnellan 1966), but a specific problem with attempting to use "that's not true!" to challenge the whole sentence containing an apparent–CI.

So, *contra* Potts, perhaps the "that's not true!" diagnostic is not conceptually adequate for CIs. This diagnostic seems to be relying on the assumption that each sentence expresses only one at-issue proposition. It may not be felicitous to challenge the truth of something that is not the main point of a given sentence, but that need not mean that the expression is not truth-conditional. Arguing this view Bach (1999), gives the CI thesis in terms of the relationship to truth conditions:

(13)   CI thesis: "A proposition is a conventional implicature of an utterance just in case (a) the speaker (speaking seriously) is committed to the truth of the proposition, (b) which proposition that is depends upon the (or a) conventional meaning of some particular linguistic device in the utterance, but (c) the falsity of that proposition is compatible with the truth of the utterance" (Bach 1999, p. 331).

Bach's formulation of the CI thesis highlights a degree of ambiguity regarding what is meant by "what is said" and how we should know if a something is part of "what is said", since the "that's not true!" diagnostic does not seem to be adequate. He proposes a different diagnostic instead, the IQ test, noting that

apparent–CIs are preserved in indirect quotation:

(14)   IQ test: An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an
         utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and
         complete indirect quotation of the utterances (in the same language)
         which includes that element, or a correspondent element, in the
         'that'-clause that specifies what is said (Bach 1999, p. 340).

Bach argues that apparent–CIs are in fact truth conditional and part of "what is
said", but it may be infelicitous to attempt to challenge the whole sentence with
"that's not true!" because sentences containing apparent–CIs express more than
one proposition, and the proposition being challenged may not be the main point
of the sentence (the at-issue content). This argument explains examples (3) and
(4) above. On Bach's view, *the gays are having a Pride march* expresses both
that the referent set of *The gays* are engaging in Pride march, and that the
speaker disapproves. Parenthetically, we should perhaps note a degree of
ambiguity: it is unclear whether the negative stance is restricted to the referent
set of *the gays* or whether it extends to the Pride march as well.[19]

Bach also notes that some of the content expressed by a sentence containing
apparent–CIs may be second–order speech acts: that is, speech acts which
modify that manner of delivery. Bach does not argue that these are part of
"what is said", but he does note that these are reducible, through Speech Act
Theory. Other apparent–CIs, he argues, are reducible to "what is said".

Potts gives a rule for CI and at-issue meaning which suggests he is committed to
a strict dichotomy between the two types of lexical content.

(15)   "No lexical item contributes both an at-issue and a CI meaning"
         (2005, p. 7)

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[19]Of course there is also a common-sense constraint on the ambiguity — people who have a
negative stance towards gay people are likely to also have a negative stance towards Pride, but
the reverse need not be true.

However, it seems that, for example, lexical items which are "semantically double-barreled" (Zwicky 2003, p. 83) are precisely the kind of terms that could be contributing both affective and at-issue meaning.[20]

It seems that a crucial question here is what sort of content Potts imagines at-issue content to be, and whether types of content are reducible, as Bach suggests.

10.2   Are stance–commitments reducible?

I will adopt Bach's analysis of the reducibility of CIs here. The question then arises of whether Bach's IQ test applies to the lexicosyntactic constructions that are taken as expressing stance:

(16)   a.   Ada: The gays are having a Pride march.

          b$_{IQ}$ Emmy: Ada said that the gays are having a Pride march.

And a "real-life" example (from Daily Mail 2009):

(17)   Carol Thatcher, speaking about Jo-Wilfried Tsonga: You also have to consider the frogs. You know, that froggy golliwog guy.

         Adrian Chiles$_{IQ}$: Carol Thatcher said that Jo-Wilfried Tsonga is a froggy golliwog.

Since it is possible to read (8)b such that Emmy is not committed to sharing Ada's negative stance[21], it seems that this example passes the IQ test. This point seems to be reinforced by the example with higher affect terms such as *froggy golliwog*, where we do not take Adrian Chiles to be sharing Carol Thatcher's stance.

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[20]It should be noted that Zwicky 2003 does not comment on the semantic or pragmatic mechanisms that might underpin "double-barrel[ling]" (2003, p. 83).

[21]Examples (8)a and (8)b do show the scope ambiguity that is noted above but, but since it is present in (8)a, rather than introduced by the indirect quotation, it does not seem fatal to my argument.

Zwicky also notes that lexical "double-barrel[ling]" (2003, p. 83) has the effect of expressing multiple propositions, as Bach suggests:

> "The guys in the pickup truck who shouted 'Faggot!' at me in front
> of the Palo Alto post office one day were saying, to rephrase it all in
> milder terms, that I was a gay man ... and that they disapproved of
> gay men" (Zwicky 2003, pp. 82-82).

Consequently, since it seems that Bach's argument applies to the lexicosyntactic constructions that express stance, such as those in Sections 5 and 6, as well as to Potts's examples, it seems reasonable to consider them to be part of "what is said" — that is, a truth-conditional semantic commitment. As we noted above, however, there is considerable ambiguity as to what this means, especially if the "what is said" versus what is inferred categories are reducible. In the next section, I will consider how discursive history impacts on this question.

11   What is the status of stance–commitments? A look at discursive history

McConnell-Ginet 2002, 2006, 2008 argues that the semantic of many words are underspecified and shaped by discursive history. In particular, she focuses on definitions of *marriage* such as:

(18)   Marriage$_1$: "[T]he word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one
        man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers
        only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife"
        (Defense of Marriage Act 1996, Section 3).

(19)   Marriage$_2$: "Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two
        persons to the exclusion of all others" (Civil Marriage Act 2005 [Loi sur
        le mariage civil], Section 2).

(20)   Marriage$_3$: "A marriage is always made up of two people who are prepared to swear that only the *other* one snores" (Pratchett 2000, p. 122).

Some of the definitions listed above would include marriages that other definitions exclude. McConnell-Ginet argues that struggles over the semantics of *marriage* are also struggles over the institution of marriage (2002, 2006, 2008), which accords certain legal rights and responsibilities to married people that unmarried people do not have. Struggles over *marriage* carry with them sociopolitical baggage which has become discursively associated with the word *marriage*, and which people may have strong investments in claiming or rejecting (2006, 2008).

A comparable case would also be the struggles over the meaning of *queer*, which for some speakers is synonymous with *gay*, and for other speakers, it can act as an umbrella term which can refer not only gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, but also includes number of non– or anti–heteronormative identities and behaviours, such as trans people, gender binary nonconformers, polyamory/polyfidelity, asexual people, intersex people, and so on (cf Anon. 1990, p. 10; Cameron & Kulick 2003, p. 28; Zwicky 1997a, p. 23). The association of *queer* with a move to "repackage" categories that were traditionally associated with "preference" to categories that are defined in terms of positions with regard to heteronormativity associated *queer* with a particular type of political discourse for many speakers (cf Anon 1990, Zwicky 1997b).

In other words, the claim is that many words' referents cannot be thought of as "moderate-sized specimens of dry goods" (Austin 1962, p. 8), but rather that "In a real sense, [...] many words are queer; that is, they resist definition and it is their definitional intractability that gives them much of their real bite." (McConnell-Ginet 2002 p. 138).

Motivated by the need to consider the baggage associated with sociopolitical and discursive history, McConnell-Ginet proposes a framework for analysing lexical

significance in terms of three underlying components (2008, p. 508):

semantic representation: "part of what language users 'know' when they have fully acquired words" (p. 508).

reference: the selction of an object in the external world by a linguistic expression.

conceptual baggage: social significance which becomes discursively associated with a linguistic expression.

This leaves the question of which component best describes stance–commitments.

11.1 Semantic representations

As McConnell-Ginet notes (2008), what semantic representations look like is controversial among linguists, but they probably include some consideration of truth-conditions (2008, p. 509), and,

> Linguists have often assumed that semantic representations
> (or semantic knowledge more generally) would include all that would
> be needed to calculate ENTAILMENTS licensed by sentences in which
> a word occurs (2008, p. 509. Emphasis original.).

An argument that stance–commitments are truth-conditional would commit one to the view that they belong at least partly to the realm of semantic representation. It should be noted that a semantic externalist view complicates this model significantly, as McConnell-Ginet notes: on the view of folks like Putnam who argue that meaning is fixed by a weighted division of linguistic labour, in which "experts" determine the meaning of terms such as *beech* and *elm*, (Putnam 1981, p. 18). However, a queer-theoretic response to such a view would be to ask what sort of person would count as an "expert" in determining the meaning of terms such as *marriage*, *queer*, *wife*, and others. Kitzinger

(2005), for example, notes that a woman speaking of "my wife" can cause major interactional difficulties.

11.2   Reference

The relationship between stance and reference is somewhat complex. In the case of *marriage* discussed above, it seems that, at least some of the time, stance might fix the referent, in that at least part of the dispute over the meaning of *marriage* is whether its refers to only to partnerships involving different-sex partners; or whether it can refer to same-sex partners also.

In other cases, however, it does not seem that stance affects reference at all. For example, the referents set to be the same in both pairs of sentences below, although each sentence seems to convey a different stance:

(21)   a.   Edith, who is a Catholic, goes to the library.

     b.   The Catholic, Edith, goes to the library.

(22)   a.   The black students write essays.

     b.   Black students write essays.

Similarly, the poll results below suggest that people have dramatically different response to *homosexuals* and *gay men and lesbians*, even though it seems implausible to suggest that respondents imagine the referent sets of these lexical items to be different. The poll was done in the United States in the run up to the repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" rule that prevented LGBT people from serving openly in the US armed forces. Respondents were asked either "Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve openly in the military?", or "Do you think gay men and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly in the military?", with rather more people answering that they favoured "gay men and lesbians" serving openly.

Allowed to serve openly

	Homosexuals	Gay Men & Lesbians
Favor	44%	58%
Oppose	42%	28%

Table 13: From CBSNews/New York Times Poll, 2010

11.3   Conceptual baggage

This may be the most appropriate description for stance–commitments.

According to McConnell-Ginet's argument (2002, 2006, 2008), conceptual baggage consists of the set of assumptions that is discursively as socially associate with a term, but is not part of what that term is taken to mean truth-conditionally. This set of assumptions are part of a salient sociopolitical discourse,

For example, when David Laws was discovered to have been claiming parliamentary expenses in order to pay rent for in a home he shared with his partner, he fell foul of parliamentary rules that prevent parliamentarians from renting accommodation from a partner or family member. His defence depended on the definition of *partner*, which is defined in the The Green Book, which governs how Members of Parliament may claim expenses, as:

> "Partner means one of a couple, whether of the same sex or of the opposite sex (the other being a Member [of Parliament]) who although not married to each other or civil partners are living together and treat each other as spouses" (The Green Book 2009, p. 17).

Laws claimed that

> "At no point did I consider myself to be in breach of the rules which in 2009 defined partner as one of a couple who although not married

to each-other or civil partners are living together and treat each-other
as spouses'.

Although we were living together we did not treat each other as
spouses. For example we do not share bank accounts and indeed
have separate social lives." (The Telegraph 2010).

That is, Laws's claim is much like McConnell-Ginet's (2008) and Kitzinger's
(2005): words like *partner* and *spouse* suggest to the hearer that a number of
things are the case, for example, that the spouses/partners are in a long-term
relationship, that they live together, that they have certain responsibilities
towards each other, that they have friends in common, that they do not profit
directly from each other's domestic expenses, and so on. However, Laws seems
to have been relying on the idea that these are *constitutive* of a partnership, and
so since he and his partner had separate social lives, they did not "count" as
partners. McConnell-Ginet, however, points out that these discursively associated
ideas are not truth-conidtional: that is, many people might consider it slightly
surprising, but not contradictory or semantically problematic[22] to say something
like:

(23)   My partner and I do not live together.

McConnell-Ginet also notes that conceptual baggage is distinct from Gricean or
neo-Gricean implicature (2008, p. 513), since the inferences that interlocutors
orient to need not be ones they are consciously aware of:

"The parsimonious–minded might well think of saying that such
conceptual baggage should be considered a matter of Gricean
IMPLICATURE — what the speaker means as distinguished from

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[22]It happens to be true in my case that the person I describe as "my partner" is not a person
I live with, and I find no particular interactional difficulty arises from this point, which contrasts
sharply with KITZINGER'S observation of the interactional difficulty that may arise if a woman
speaks of "my wife". It may be that some inferences are more salient than others.

what she says. After all, we need the notion of speakers meaning for other reasons. But this move will not do the trick in general, because conceptual baggage can trigger inferences even if the speaker does not intend those inferences to be drawn, perhaps has not even considered them explicitly" (2008, p. 513. Emphasis original).

That is, it seems to be a crucial aspect of Gricean implicature that implicatures are a matter of communicative *intention*.[23] However, in this case it seems that it would be helpful to have a rigorous account of when inferences are invited, as intention is a mental state and as such interlocutors have no direct access to it.

One advantage of Steedman and Petrick's approach is that it allows us to reduce communicative intention to rule-based inference (2007, Sections 4.6-4.7); they discuss the cases such as *You're a fine friend!*, and how the hearer can infer, without needing to be told explicitly, that what the speaker intends is that they are a lousy friend from rules such as (from 2007, Sections 4.6):

(24)   "If X say p to Y and Y suppose $\neg p$, then Y continues to suppose $\neg p$ and supposes that $\neg p$ is not common ground."

The distinction between conceptual baggage and implicature is clearer in cases such as the following Liz Feldman quote (cited in Zwicky 2011)

(25)   "It's very dear to me, the issue of gay marriage. Or, as I like to call it: 'marriage'. You know, because I had lunch this afternoon, not gay lunch. I parked my car, I didn't gay park it."

Here the comedian Liz Feldman exploits the tension between conceptual baggage and implicature. *Gay marriage* carries with it the baggage that is associated with socially conservative opposition to same-sex marriage, and that much of that opposition is focussed on opposing the use of *marriage* for same-sex couples.

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[23]Thanks to Rob Truswell for helpful comments on this point.

However the term *gay park* has no political currency of a parallel sort, so an inference is triggered that there is a "gay" way of parking, or that the manner in which a person parks their car can be attributed to their being gay.

The tension between the various ways of "packaging" (cf. McConnell-Ginet 2008, p. 516) *marriage* may be part of a process of semantic change. Political instability of this kind can trigger linguistic instability which can in turn trigger semantic shift. McConnell-Ginet (2008, p. 516) outlines the types of semantic change that can occur when conceptual baggage is contested:

REFERENCE	CONCEPTUAL BAGGAGE	TYPE OF CHANGE
same	different	repackaging/reclaiming
different	same	adaptation
different	different	invention

Table 14: Typology of (possibly contested) changes in lexical significance (from McConnell-Ginet 2008, p. 516).

If McConnell-Ginet's arguments and mine are both correct, and stance–commitments are a special subcategory of conceptual baggage, then definitional struggles are struggles over stance. This is an empirical claim, not a theoretical one, and it would need to be clarified and tested. That is, it would be important to know whether, for example reclaiming does in fact occur in situations where the conceptual baggage, but not the reference, is contested.

11.4   Conversational implicatures

Although McConnell-Ginet argues that conceptual baggage is distinct from conversational implicature (2008, p. 513), it will be important examine the notion of conversational implicatures, and similar approaches, in order to understand how they are distinct, and in order to clarify the question that was raised above regarding the reducibility of "what is said" and "what is implicated".

HP Grice proposes a descriptive framework for inference work in communication

(1989). These context-dependent inferences are conversational implicatures (henceforth, simply *implicatures*). They are calculable — is it possible to determine the intended implicature from the context; and defeasible — the implicature can be explicitly cancelled.

In the Gricean paradigm, implicatures are generated through the assumption that speakers adhere to certain maxims which are given as:

Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false, or for which you lack adequate evidence.

Relation: Be relevant.

Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief. Be orderly.

(From 1989, pp. 26-27.)

Additionally, Grice proposes an overarching descriptive principle:

> The Cooperative Principle: "Make your conversational contribution
> such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
> purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged"
> (Grice 1989 p. 26).

On Grice's view, the maxims are descriptive of the assumptions that speakers use to reason about discursive interaction. For example:

(26)   A: My member of parliament lacks principle.
        B: She is a Liberal Democrat.

In theory, there is no obvious connection between the member of parliament's lack of principle and their party membership. However, Grice argues that the

co-operative speaker will adhere to the maxims, and say only things that are relevant, informative, and appropriate for the purposes of the talk. The hearer can therefore infer a causal connection between speaker B pointing out the party allegiance in response to the complain about lack of principle; and in the context of widespread public displeasure with the Liberal Democrats' reversal of a number of core election pledges, such an implicature would be highly salient. The implicature is also cancellable — speaker A could reply:

(27)   A: It's nothing to do with her party. *All* politicians are unprincipled!

Other neo-Gricean theorists (cf, for example, Horn 2006) have sought to condense and clarify the maxims. Steedman and Petrick (2007), however, propose a non-Gricean view of inference, according to which all speech acts require rule-based inference, but no maxims — all that is necessary is a procedure for rule-substitution and a notion of affordance. They further suggest that it is not necessary for a speaker to recognise intention or illocutionary force associated with particular discourse moves in order to be able to reason about and plan the next dialogue move.

One might argue that stance–commitments seem like implicatures because they are defeasible depending on what one knows about the speaker (Ronnie Cann, personal communication). Recall Extract 4, in which Laura and James note that proximity may mitigate the insulting sense of "you're a gay" if it is addressed to a friend or sibling, and make it "in jest". If stance–commitments are calculable and defeasible based on communicative intention, this seems like good grounds for considering them to be a special class of implicatures.

However, lay speakers seem to be able to calculate stance–commitments when they have very little knowledge about the speaker, and indeed the stance itself may serve as a basis for beliefs or presumed knowledge about the speaker. For example, when a German newspaper described the then UK Foreign Minister

Malcolm Rifkind as "der Jude Rifkind" ("the Jew Rifkind"), the report was met with international criticism (New York Times 1997), and both the journalist Michaela Wiegel and the newspaper in which the report originally appeared were accused of anti-semitism and Nazism by media commentators and members of the public who presumably knew very little about her.

(28)   "As though he was not fully convinced by his own speech, the Jew
         Rifkind, ironically apologetic, concluded with the German phrase by
         Luther: 'Here I stand, I cannot do other'" (cited in New York Times
         1997).

So in this case it is not clear that the stance–commitment really is defeasible based on what one knows about the speaker, and indeed. One might also reasonably query what it would mean for the stance–commitment in such an utterance to be defeasible. Traditionally, defeasibility means that a speaker can truthfully claim that the inference is not part of the literal meaning of their utterance, for example:

(29)   Speaker A: Jocelyn Bell discovered pulsars. Her male supervisor got a
                Nobel Prize.
         Speaker B: So you think gender was a factor?
         Speaker A: I didn't say that.

Here Speaker A implicates that there is a gendered factor in the allocation of the Nobel Prize, but this is not part of the "narrow" or "literal" meaning of her utterance. She can therefore explicitly deny that she intended such an implicature to be drawn.

However, we perhaps should note that some cancellations are more plausible than others, because of our social knowledge and assumptions, but intention alone does not seem to be an adequate explanation on its own. McConnell-Ginet's

approach problematises our understanding of "narrow" or "literal" semantics by introducing conceptual baggage into the mix, which provides the explanatory power that is necessary in these situations. For example, *if* it is part of the semantics of *the Jew Rifkind* that such an expression commits the speaker to an anti-semitic stance, then cancellation by the speaker would seem discursively implausible. This complicates our understanding of semantic and pragmatic content, since defeasible utterances are generally taken to be pragmatic.

11.5   Reclamatory use

Arnold Zwicky notes that some terms, eg *faggot* that have high affective content are semantically "double-barreled" (Zwicky 2003, p. 84) in that they incorporate both a referential sense and a disparaging sense. In particular, Zwicky focuses on positive, or reclamatory, uses of *faggot*, and their connection with the disparaging and referential components. Zwicky argues that reclamatory uses of *faggot* are possible in that "lingering nastiness in the word can be a source of power, even strength" (2003, p. 84). For this use to be possible, however, the disparaging use must also, at the very least, be in circulation, because the reclamatory use depends on the disparaging use. This example highlights that reclaiming relies on the continued sting of disparaging words. It seems to be crucial to reclaiming that there is an element of using "the enemy's words":

> "...QUEER can be a rough word but it is also a sly and ironic weapon
> we can steal from the homophobe's hands and use against him"
> (Anon. 1990, p. 10. Emphasis original.)

Queer present an example of the mainstreaming of a term which was once used almost exclusively as a term of abuse. We now have *queer theory*, *queer linguistics*, and *queer studies*: these are all mainstream usages in which *queer* seems to have lost its derogatory sting, and consequently also to have lost its "transgressive" edge (Zwicky 1997b) in certain contexts (but see Queen 2001, pp. 82-4) although, *queer* can still be used to insult in other contexts.

This raises a curious double bind. If reclamatory force is derived from disparaging sting, the mainstreaming of reclaimed words may make them less confrontationally useful — they may not longer be "sly ironic weapon[s]" (Anon. 1990, p. 10). Cameron writes:

> "An important part of the meaning of an insult is [...] what the receiver takes the speaker's intention to have been. We [...] can reclaim certain words amongst ourselves without touching their status as insults" (Cameron 1985, p. 78).

On Cameron's view, it seems impossible to reclaim with complete success, since the words one might seek to reclaim are intended to hurt; but the other side of this coin is that if a word does lose its hurtful sting in certain contexts, it may lose its confrontational power.

Reclamatory language can be explained by applying McConnell-Ginet's (2002, 2006, 2008) analysis to lexical items that have traditionally been seen as insulting. If McConnell-Ginet is correct in her analysis of the influence of stance on semantic shift, then reclamatory language use might be fertile ground for empirical study to verify her argument.

12 "What have experts ever done for us?" Speech acts, knowledge, and performativity

Since Austin's analysis of speech acts (1975), it is no longer possible to maintain a strict dichotomy between speech and action. On Austin's analysis, utterances of the form *I bet, I promise* cannot be described in narrowly literal or truth-conditional terms, but also comprises what they *do* in context. Crucially, in saying them, an action is effected. Speech acts have three components:

Locutionary act: conveying information (eg, that a promise/bet has been made)

Illocutionary act: the action done by the utterance (betting, promising).

Perlocutionary effect: intended or unintended consequence of the speech act on the thoughts and feelings of the hearers (eg, surprising the hearer with your promise.)

(Austin 1975).

Later work in speech act theory and pragmatics more broadly have problematised the relationship between these three components, and between utterances and speech acts. In particular, they have argued that speech acts cannot necessarily be clearly individuated. For example, depending on the relationship between the interlocutors and the context of the interaction, the utterance below could either some friendly advice (if the interlocutors are speaking informally), or a threat (if the speaker is the employer of the hearer).

(30)   I advise you not to be late again.

Geis (1995) also argues that the individuation of speech acts depends on social factors — such as the relationship between speakers, the context of the interaction — not linguistic ones, and so speech acts are more correctly viewed as social acts. However, previous work on stance and indexicality shows that social features such as speaker relationships and attitudes as well as demographic information can influence linguistic features, especially phonetic features, lexical choice, and as my current work shows, lexicosyntactic features. This being the case, it is perhaps more correct to say that the individuation of speech acts depends on *sociolinguistic*, but not *intralinguistic* conditions.

In this chapter and the subsequent one, I will attempt to sketch out how one might think of the connection between the sociolinguistic notions that have been discussed so far, and semantic and pragmatic accounts of speech acts (Austin 1975, Geis 1995)

12.1   Speech act structure and the distribution of knowledge

Grice (1989) and neo-Gricean approaches to discourse are based on speakers exploiting social and real-world knowledge in various ways to make implicit connections between statements (Horn 2006). Hearers must then notice that there is an anomaly in what has been said, and supply the missing information. However, Steedman (Steedman & Petrick 2007) and McConnell-Ginet (2002, 2006, 2008), although working from rather different approaches, reach a similar conclusion, which is that salience is a crucial notion in discourse.

Steedman, working from a computational semantics and pragmatics perspective, argues for a rule-driven computational account of discourse in which the relevant rules are determined by what is salient in a given context.

McConnell-Ginet, working at the intersection of semantics and queer linguistics, argues that some words index particular politically salient stances. and it is reasonable to consider these as part of a word's semantics.

In both of these accounts, saliences plays a crucial role. While it is difficult to speak of queer linguistics as being a cohesive body of theory with agreed principles (see, for example, the debates Campbell-Kibler et al 2002), it is worth noting the idea that ordinary speakers can dispute the meanings of words, which pervades the work of linguists working in this tradition such as McConnell-Ginet (2006, 2008). This is in sharp contrast to the work of philosophers of language such as Putnam who argue that the division of linguistic labour within speech communities is such that experts have a special role in fixing the meanings of particular roles (Putnam 1981). Putnam argues that, if an ordinary speaker uses *elm* of a tree that a botanist would call a *beech*, then the ordinary speaker is incorrect, because the botanist has a privileged role in the fixing of words like *elm* and *beech* (1981).

However, it is unclear what sort of person would be an expert about the meaning of *marriage*, or *queer*, or the words used in this the present research: *black*,

Jewish, *gay*, etc. A point highlighted by McConnell-Ginet 2006 is that part of the political dispute with regard to the semantics of *marriage* is who is licensed to comment on the meaning of marriage, with opponents of same-sex marriage often arguing that same-sex marriage is impossible or oxymoronic by definition, and pointing to, as they see it, authorities such as dictionaries, the Bible, clergy, etc. Proponents of same-sex marriage, by contrast, may argue that such definitions are outdated or simply incorrect. In other words, the dispute is at least in part about who is licensed to provide a definition of *marriage*; and more broadly, of social kind terms in general.

It is not clear that this dispute extends to natural kind terms, and this would require further research. However, in the present empirical and discourse enquiry, we are concerned with terms such as *gay, black* and so on, which are social kind terms. So my argument here is restricted to social kind terms, and I make no claims about terms which might be regarded as natural kind terms (but see Haslanger 2000).

In other words, disputes over lexical significance can occur at multiple levels, and in order to make testable claims about these disputes, we must refine what is meant by "disputes" and at what level we are seeking to investigate the claim.

13   Directions for future work

Reclamatory use

As discussed in Section 11.5, reclamatory language may be fertile ground for future work, with a view to clarifying and testing McConnell-Ginet's argument and their consequences for the role of stance in semantic shift.

Computable models

I have attempted here to outline some of the problems with our current approaches to stand research; a logical next step would be to attempt to clarify stance further with a view to formalising the notion of stance and making it

computable, so that it can be integrated into current ongoing research programs of making discourse relations computable (see, for example, Jurafsky 2004, Webber 2009).

Generics

Kamp and Reyle discuss the semantic difference between generics and ordinary indefinite noun phrase constructions, in terms of propositions about "typical" cases. (1993, p. 294). Since lay speaker ideologies may focus on whether or not it is appropriate to consider certain social groups as cohesive or as having "typical" members, it is possible that generics may constrain affect, and this might be a fruitful avenue of further research.

Performativity and third–order indexicals

One might reasonably ask what counts as explanatory adequacy for saying that something is a third–order indexical. On Johnstone & Kiesling's schema, performativity is achieved through the use of second– and third– order indexicals (2008). The evidence they give for /aw/-monophthogization being third–order is a combination of discursive and empirical evidence,and they specifically point to stereotyping as evidence of performative use. However, this merely shifts the question sideways, so to speak, since one might still reasonably ask what counts as adequate proof that a feature has been stereotyped. Johnstone and Kiesling offer the presence of "dahntahn" on lists of "Pittsburghese" lexemes on T-shirts and other souvenirs.

It seems that there is much to be gained by clarifying the notion of indexicality with regard to salience and explanatory adequacy. There may be evidence for third–order indexical identity labels in mass media usage; for example, T-shirts with the slogan "Marriage is so gay" or the use of the Twitter hashtag "#sogay".

14 Conclusion

The empirical evidence from lexicosyntactic variation and discourse analysis suggests that stance is part of what speakers commit themselves to when they utter a statement containing a semantically double-barrelled term, and the degree of consistency with which affect seems to be associated with certain grammatical patterns is particularly striking.

I have sketched out some methodological worries for researchers working on stance, and enumerated some of definitional problems with our current notion of stance. These methodological concerns serve as motivation to integrate stance into semantic/pragmatic description.

I have also considered and what sorts of semantic/pragmatic description can accommodate stance–commitments, and in particular, argued that we should take seriously the idea that stance forms part of a word's semantics by constituting part of the "conceptual baggage" of a term, on McConnell-Ginet's tripartite analysis (2002, 2006, 2008). This in turn has consequences for knowledge distribution for social kind terms, and disputes over meaning.

15   Acknowledgements

16 References

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17   Appendix I: Focus group sentence list

1. (a) Edith is a Catholic.
   (b) Edith is Catholic.
   (c) The Catholic, Edith, celebrates Christmas.
   (d) Catholic Edith celebrates Christmas.
   (e) Catholics celebrate Christmas.
   (f) The Catholic people celebrate Christmas.
   (g) The Catholics celebrate Christmas.
   (h) Catholic people celebrate Christmas.

2. (a) Jack is a German.
   (b) Jack is German.
   (c) The German, Jack, celebrates New Year's.
   (d) German Jack celebrates New Year's.
   (e) German celebrate New Year's.
   (f) German people celebrate New Year's.
   (g) The German people celebrate New Year's.
   (h) The Germans celebrate New Year's.

3. (a) Harry is a Chinese.
   (b) Harry is Chinese.
   (c) The Chinese, Harry, celebrates Chinese New Year.
   (d) Chinese Harry celebrates Chinese New Year.
   (e) Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year.
   (f) Chinese people celebrate Chinese New Year.
   (g) The Chinese people celebrate Chinese New Year.
   (h) The Chinese celebrate Chinese New Year.

4. (a) Kim is an emo.
   (b) Kim is emo.
   (c) The emo, Kim, goes to gigs.
   (d) Emo Kim goes to gigs.
   (e) Emos go to gigs.
   (f) Emo people go to gigs.
   (g) The emo people go to gigs.
   (h) The emos go to gigs.

5. (a) Alice is a Jew.
   (b) Alice is Jewish.
   (c) The Jew, Alice, celebrates Hanukkah.
   (d) Jewish Alice celebrates Hanukkah.
   (e) Jews celebrate Hanukkah.
   (f) Jewish people celebrate Hanukkah.
   (g) The Jewish people celebrate Hanukkah.
   (h) The Jews celebrate Hanukkah.

6. (a) Charlotte is a lesbian.
   (b) Charlotte is a lesbian woman.
   (c) Charlotte is lesbian.
   (d) The lesbian, Charlotte, celebrates Pride.
   (e) Lesbian Charlotte celebrates Pride.
   (f) The lesbian woman, Charlotte, celebrates Pride.
   (g) The lesbians celebrate Pride.
   (h) Lesbians celebrate Pride.
   (i) The lesbian women celebrate Pride.
   (j) Lesbian women celebrate Pride.

7. (a) Bob is a Scot.
   (b) Bob is Scottish.
   (c) The Scot, Bob, celebrates Hogmanay.
   (d) Scottish Bob celebrates Hogmanay.
   (e) Scots celebrate Hogmanay.
   (f) Scottish people celebrate Hogmanay.
   (g) The Scottish people celebrate Hogmanay.
   (h) The Scots celebrate Hogmanay.

8. (a) Georgina is a black.
   (b) Georgina is black.
   (c) The black, Georgina, celebrates Hogmanay.
   (d) Black Georgina celebrates Hogmanay.
   (e) Blacks celebrate Hogmanay.
   (f) Black people celebrate Hogmanay.
   (g) The black people celebrate Hogmanay.
   (h) The blacks celebrate Hogmanay.

9. (a) Darren is a gay.
    (b) Darren is a gay man.
    (c) Darren is gay.
    (d) The gay, Darren, celebrates Pride.
    (e) Gay Darren celebrates Pride.
    (f) The gay man, Darren, celebrates Pride.
    (g) The gays celebrate Pride.
    (h) Gays celebrate Pride.
    (i) The gay men celebrate Pride.
    (j) Gay men celebrate Pride.

10. (a) Imogen is a white.
    (b) Imogen is white.
    (c) The white, Imogen, celebrates Hogmanay.
    (d) White Imogen celebrates Hogmanay.
    (e) White celebrate Hogmanay.
    (f) White people celebrate Hogmanay.
    (g) The white people celebrate Hogmanay.
    (h) The whites celebrate Hogmanay.

11. (a) Fred is a Protestant.
    (b) Fred is Protestant.
    (c) The Protestant, Fred, celebrates Christmas.
    (d) Protestant Fred celebrates Christmas.
    (e) Protestants celebrate Christmas.
    (f) Protestant people celebrate Christmas.
    (g) The Protestant people celebrate Christmas.
    (h) The Protestants celebrate Christmas.

12. (a) Louise is a gay.
    (b) Louise is a gay woman.
    (c) Louise is gay.
    (d) The gay, Louise, celebrates Pride.
    (e) Gay Louise celebrates Pride.
    (f) The gay woman, Louise, celebrates Pride.
    (g) The gay women celebrate Pride.
    (h) Gay women celebrate Pride.

18 Appendix II: Transcription conventions

Laura:	Colon follows speaker name
@	Laughter.
@yeah	Laughter during a word.
#	Unintelligible. One symbol per syllable.
#yeah	Uncertain. One symbol per word.
wor–	Truncated word.
—	Truncated intonational unit.
Capital letter	Start of the intonational unit or "sentence".
	(Note that I have also used capital letters for names of people and events etc, for grammatical clarity).
.	Boundary, or end of intonational unit or "sentence".
,	Pause, but intonational unit or "sentence" continues.
?	Upwards intonation or pitch rise (not necessarily a query).
((Comment))	Transcription comment.
CAPS	Emphasis.
[text]	Overlap.
=	Latching.
5	Line number for reference.
((T = 2:30))	Duration of transcribed recording, in minutes and second.
((Start/End at T = 2:30))	Start or end time for an extracted transcription.